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**NATO'S 'OUT-OF-AREA' TASKS AND THE
ROLE OF 'POLICY COMMUNITIES' (1990-1995)**

Giovanna Bono

submitted at the University of Kent in Canterbury (UK) in September 2000

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ABSTRACT

This thesis provides an overview of some of the explanations put forward by International Relations and political science theorists to account for NATO's transformation and survival. From a synthesis of some of the assumptions contained in transgovernmental relations, policy networks and epistemic community approaches, the hypothesis of the existence of a 'policy-community', which influenced NATO's decisions to assume 'out-of-area' tasks, is derived. A 'policy community' is defined as "a group of social actors located in government or (semi)-private organisations at a national or international level. Policy communities are characterised by a system of horizontal and vertical relationships. Members share similar belief systems and, although they might have separate national or institutional interests, they seek to pursue common policy aims in a specific policy area." The testing for the existence of 'policy communities' is undertaken by comparing the role of NATO international staff, British, German and US politicians and officials during key moments that characterised NATO's decision to assume an 'out-of-area' role.

The thesis demonstrates that during 1990 and 1991, a 'policy community' was in operation that involved sections of NATO international staff, US and British militaries and officials. The policy community played a key role in placing the 'out-of-area' issue on the agenda. However, its views and strategies only gained in influence because of how shifting domestic and international attitudes toward the Yugoslav conflict and the existence of institutional competitive dynamics between NATO and EC/WEU brought into existence a new coalition of forces in favour of NATO's 'out-of-area' deployment. During 1993 and 1994 the composition of the policy community changed and had a significant impact on NATO's role in the Balkans. The ambitions of sections of NATO international staff to develop 'out-of-area' activities found stronger support among the newly elected Clinton administration and German politicians and officials than among the British government. During this period, the 'policy community' agreed on three issues: the need to intensify the use of NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, the importance of forging a Bosnian Croat - Bosnian Muslim alliance and to embark on a wider transformation of NATO's force posture. The influence of the 'policy community' on the policy-making process is interlinked with two other factors. First, there were organisational dynamics that influenced the process. From mid 1992 onwards, NATO's planning for the deployment of a large peacekeeping force in the Balkans became the focus of the rejuvenation of the NATO integrated military structure. The concepts of Combined Joint Task Forces and Partnership for Peace, the two key elements of NATO's new strategy, were worked out by the US military, with the support of the NATO international staff and the German Ministry of Defence, as a result of studying military activities in the Balkans. The second factor was an element of chaotic, ad hoc reaction to events, partly influenced by media reporting, which facilitated the realisation of the views and plans developed by the 'policy community'. The findings disprove the assumptions derived from the neorealist and security community approaches, whilst supporting, with qualifications, some of the assumptions contained in the neoinstitutionalist, organisational, transgovernmental relations and epistemic community approaches.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACCHAN	Allied Command Channel
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACLANT	Allied Command Atlantic
AFT	Allied Tactical Air Force
AMF	Allied Mobile Force
AARC	ACE Rapid Reaction Corps
ARFPS	Ace Reaction Forces Planning Staff
AWACs	Airborne Warning and Control Systems
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine
BiH/HVO	Bosnian Government Forces and Bosnian Croats Forces
BDF	Bosnian Defence Force
BMV	Bundesministerium der Verteidigung [German Ministry of Defence]
BSA	Bosnian Serbian Army
CAS	Close air support
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CINCHAN	Commander-in-Chief Allied Command Channel
CINCSOUTH	Commander-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe
CDU	Christian Democratic Union [Germany]
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CGS	Chief of General Staff
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CNS	Chief of Naval Staff
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSU	Christian Socialist Union [Germany]
DPC	Defence Planning Committee
DPP	Defence Policy and Planning
DRC	Defence Review Committee
DPC	Defence Planning Committee
EC	European Community
EUROFOR	European (Rapid Deployment) Force
EUROMARFOR	European Maritime Force
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
FAWEU	Force Answerable to the Western European Union
FCC	Federal Constitutional Court
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FDP	Free Democratic Party of Germany
IFOR	Nato Implementation Force
IGC	Inter-governmental Conference
IS	International Staff
IMS	International Military Staff
IFOR	Implementation Force
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JNA	Yugoslav Army
LANDCENT	Allied Land Forces Central Europe

LANDSOUTHCENT	Allied Land Forces South-Central Europe
MC	Military Committee
MNCs	Major NATO Commanders
MoD	British Ministry of Defence
MSWG	Military Strategy Working Group
NAA	North Atlantic Assembly
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NORTHAG	Northern Army Group
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
NSC	National Security Council
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
PDS	Party of Democratic Socialists [Germany]
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PJC	Permanent Joint Council (NATO-Russia)
PMSC	Political-Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace
PPCG	Provisional Policy Co-ordination Group
PUS	Permanent Undersecretary of State
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RRF	Rapid Reaction Forces
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SPD	Social Democratic Party [Germany]
STANAVFORCHAN	Standing Allied Naval Forces Channel
VOPP	Vance-Owen Peace Plan
UN	United Nations
UNPAs	United Nations Protected Areas
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
WEU	Western European Union

Introduction

From the end of the Cold War, NATO has been at the centre of the redefinition of European security. In early 1990, the role of the alliance came under intense scrutiny. On both sides of the Atlantic, politicians, defence experts and academics raised doubts as to the relevancy of the organisation. There were plans for a large peace dividend and for the replacement of NATO by a new pan-European security framework. By the end of the decade, NATO had responded to these demands by transforming itself into a new type of organisation. Although it retained the collective defence tasks, its main focus of activities came to lie in 'out-of-area operations'. A number of developments reflect this change. These include: NATO's 72 days of air bombing campaign against the Republic of Yugoslavia during the spring of 1999 and the decisions taken at the NATO Summit in April 1999 to allow admittance to the Alliance club of three former Communist countries - Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. Another example is the emphasis given to crisis management activities in the New Strategic Concept, agreed in April 1999. According to the new military doctrine, crisis management is defined as a central task of the alliance to deal with the following threats:

“uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly... Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states”¹

The expansion of NATO's 'out-of-area' role is a remarkable development. It must be remembered that throughout the post-war period, NATO's 'out-of-area' role was a thorny issue in transatlantic relations. Although various American Administrations attempted to use the NATO framework to obtain European partners' support for their operations in Asia and the Middle East, the Europeans

¹NATO. North Atlantic Council. *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*. 24 April 1999. NAC-S(99)65. available at <http://www.nato.int/>. see paragraphs 10 and 20.

were reluctant to support US actions. European NATO member states rejected US pressure to use the framework of the Alliance to deploy forces in such conflicts.²

The aim of this thesis is to contribute to an understanding of why NATO managed to assume 'out-of-area' tasks and transform itself into a 'peace-enforcement' organisation. There is excellent literature on the process of transformation of the Atlantic Alliance but this research is by and large not driven by theoretical concerns.³ The exceptions have tended to adopt either a neorealist or an neoinstitutionalist approach, two prominent schools of thought in International Relations Theory in the USA.⁴ To simplify the arguments, neorealists maintain that NATO survived because of the continued existence of threats, as the conflicts between Iraq and Kuwait and in former Yugoslavia exemplify. Neoinstitutionalists believe that the high level of co-operation established within NATO member states fostered commonalities of views and interests in maintaining the organisations. It was also perceived that the material costs of building new organisations were too

²Stuart, D. T. and Tow, W. T. *The limits of alliance: NATO out-of-area problems since 1949*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1990.; Winrow, G. 'NATO and out-of-area: a post-cold war challenge'. *European Security*, Winter 1994, Vol 3, No. 4, page 617-638.; Blaker, R. J. *The out-of-area question and NATO burden sharing*. New York: Praeger Publishers. 1985.

³Brenner, M. E. (Ed.). *NATO and Collective Security*. London, New York: Macmillan Press and St. Martin's Press. 1998.; Cornish, P. *Partnership in crisis: The US, Europe and the fall and rise of NATO*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1997.; Drew, S. N. *NATO From Berlin to Bosnia: transatlantic security in transition*. Washington: National Defence University. 1995.; Foster, E. *NATO's military in the age of crisis management*. London.: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. 1995.; Harris, S. A., and Steinberg, J. B. *European defense and the future of transatlantic cooperation*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. 1993.; Kelleher, C. M. *The future of European security: an interim assessment*. Washington: Brookings Institution. 1995.; Kugler, R. L. *Commitment to purpose: how alliance partnership won the cold war*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. 1993.; Meiers, F.-J. *NATO's peacekeeping dilemma*. Bonn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. 1996.; Papacosma, S. V., and Heiss, M. A. (Eds.). *NATO in the post-cold war era: does it have a future?* Basingstoke: Macmillans. 1995.; Wijk, R. D. *NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium: The Battle for Consensus*. London: Brassey's. 1997.;

⁴Chernoff, F. *After bipolarity: the vanishing threat, theories of cooperation, and the future of the Atlantic Alliance*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1995.; Karádi, M. Z. *Die Reform der Atlantischen Allianz: Bündnispolitik als Beitrag zur kooperativen Sicherheit in Europe?*. Münster: Lit Verlag. 1994; Leggold, J. 'NATO's Post-Cold war Collective action problem'. *International Security*, Summer 1998, Vol. 23 No. 1 pages 78-106.; Koslowski, G. *Die NATO und der Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegowina: Deutschland, Frankreich und die USA im internationalen Krisenmanagement*. Vierow bei Greifswald: SH-Verlag. 1995. Rader, S. 'NATO peacekeeping'. In T. Findlay (Ed.), *Challenges for the new peacekeepers* Oxford New York: Oxford University Press. 1996. pages 142-157.

high, despite the fact that the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) existed already. Some writers have pointed to organisational interests, the existence of security and epistemic communities in shaping international organisations' behaviours. However, organisational theory, security and epistemic community approaches have not tested their assumptions by analysing the specificity of NATO's survival process in the 1990s. Because of the predominance of neorealist and neoinstitutionalist assumptions in the analysis of defence and alliance issues, there has been a lack of explanations that incorporate simultaneously the role of domestic factors and transnational politics.

This thesis develops the hypothesis of the role of 'policy communities' in shaping alliance's transformation by synthesising some of the assumptions contained in the transgovernmental relations, policy network and epistemic community approaches. A policy community is defined as "a group of social actors located in government or (semi)-private organisations at a national or international level. Policy communities are characterised by a system of horizontal and vertical relationships. Members share similar belief systems and, although they might have separate national or institutional interests, they seek to pursue common policy aims in a specific policy area." The hypothesis assumes that the existence of a 'policy community' contributes to shaping policy formulation and policy outcome. In this study, the role of 'policy communities' is examined by comparing the attitudes and roles of NATO international staff, British, German and US policy makers during key events that shaped the development of NATO's 'out-of-area' tasks between 1990 and 1995.

The thesis examines the existence and role of 'policy communities' during four stages. The first stage, covering the period from 1990 to mid 1991, finds evidence for the emergence of a 'policy community' among British, US officials and NATO international staff. The 'policy community' put the issue of the Alliance's 'out-of-area' role on the agenda and, thanks to the outbreak of the Gulf war, gained some influence in policy-making circles. However, its aspirations were thwarted by the opposition of some European member states, particularly France and Germany, to its views and plans.

The second phase, from mid 1991 to July 1992, explains how the NATO's 'out-of-area' issue became intertwined with two new developments: the desire of some European NATO member states to develop a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and the outbreak of the Yugoslav conflict. During this period a pattern of competition between NATO and WEU emerged. This, combined with shifting perceptions of the Yugoslav conflict, contributed to the decision to deploy both NATO and WEU forces in the Balkans. The Dutch and Canadians acted as mediators to end the transatlantic debate about which regional organisation should lead peacekeeping operations in Europe.

During the third phase, from mid 1992 to 1993, NATO's operations in the Balkans began to assume a new meaning for the Alliance's internal restructuring process. Once the Alliance obtained the mandate to plan for large-scale peacekeeping operations, NATO international staff equated their ability to assemble and launch a large peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslavia as an essential task for simultaneously testing and creating new forces and command structures to regenerate the entire organisation.

During this period, a shift occurred in the composition of the 'policy community'. A new understanding emerged among the Clinton Administration, NATO international staff and German officials on three issues. First, there was a common view about the need to renew the alliance by agreeing to the concepts of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) and Partnership for Peace (PFP). Secondly, German and US officials synchronised their policies to seek to isolate the Bosnian Serbs by forging a military alliance between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats. Finally, an agreement was reached regarding the need to widen the use of NATO's military means to resolve the Balkan conflict. On these issues, the 'policy community' had the unusual support of leading sections of the SPD and the Labour Party. It will be argued that the development of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) and Partnership for Peace (PFP) concepts would not have been possible without the activities of the 'policy community'.

During the final phase, from 1994 to mid 1995 there was a tendency among US officials and NATO international staff to consciously seek to change the nature of the UN mandates so as to give the Western Alliance supremacy over the planning and conduct of military operations in the Balkans. Their views gained the support of previously reluctant British and French politicians because of what could be defined as a 'spiral of violence' process: to an intensified use of NATO's air strikes, the Bosnian Serbs responded with increased attacks against UNPROFOR and civilians. This in-turn fuelled public outcry and created additional pressures on politicians to seek a swifter use of military means.

The final chapter discusses the research findings in the light of the hypotheses derived from neorealism, neoinstitutionalism, security communities, organisational theory, transgovernmental relations and epistemic community approaches. The neorealist assumption of the existence of a threat to the Alliance is refuted. Similarly the findings do not give support to the assumption of the existence of a 'security community'. The neoinstitutional assumption of the role of uncertainty is seen as providing a partial explanation for the events during the first nine months of 1990 but not for subsequent developments. The economic assumptions derived from the neoinstitutional and organisational theory approaches, that is the concerns about military costs and jobs, are discussed. Because of the nature of the research design, no conclusions are drawn either for or against the influence of these two factors.

More consistent evidence is found for the hypothesis of 'epistemic communities', conceptualised as a group of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain or issue area. The findings demonstrate that sections of the NATO international staff and of the NATO military authorities were constant members of the policy communities identified. As the 'epistemic community' approach predicts they influenced the debate during the emergence of the new policy and its implementation. The existence and influence of professional networks among NATO international staff and the military authorities is explained as the product of a process of 'professionalisation' of the structures of the alliance,

as the hypothesis of 'normative isomorphism' derived from organisational theory states.

In conclusion, this research demonstrates the existence and influence of 'policy communities' in shaping NATO's 'out-of-area' role. During the period 1990 to mid 1992, the 'policy community' put the issue of NATO's 'out-of-area' tasks on the agenda and successfully lobbied for the establishment of military forces with the capabilities for such tasks. NATO's 1992 July decision to intervene in the Balkans can be explained as the product of the interaction between the strategy of the 'policy community' and two additional factors: intrainstitutional competitive dynamics and domestic politics. During 1993 and 1995 the 'policy community' worked towards giving NATO control over military operations in the Balkans. However, the Western Alliance succeeded in assuming a peace-enforcement mandate in the Balkans because domestic circumstances, organisational concerns and the out-of-control nature of events in the former Yugoslavia favoured the views and strategies of the 'policy community'.

By finding evidence for the hypothesis of 'policy communities' this research brings to the surface the importance of coalitions of civilians and politicians acting as 'vanguards' in shaping defence policy making. The fact that NATO civilians and sections of the military were members of the 'policy-communities' identified points to the significance of the NATO integrated military structure as a *'quasi'* independent actor in alliance politics.

Chapter 1: Explaining NATO's transformation into a 'peace-enforcement' organisation: a review and synthesis of approaches

Introduction

NATO's transformation and survival represents one of the most significant events in international relations during the early 1990s. This has been reflected in a proliferation of writings on the organisation over the past ten years. Yet most of the current literature is not driven by a search for theoretical understanding.¹ The majority of current writers on NATO have failed to engage with hypotheses contained in International Relations theory and political theories.² The aim of this chapter is to narrow the gap in this field by synthesising some of the assumptions contained in IR and political theory and by so doing develop new research questions.

To achieve this aim, five approaches will be analysed: neorealism, neoinstitutionalism, organisational theory, epistemic communities and security communities. It will be argued that the hypotheses contained in those approaches privilege a priori specific features of policy-making process - either the working of institutions, the balance of power, or the role of ideas. In other words, each of the approaches is already biased towards a set of explanations. An alternative

¹ Walt, S. M. 'Why alliances endure or collapse' *Survival*, Spring 1997, Vol. 39 No. 1 pages 156 - 179.

²Exceptions are: McCalla, R. B. 'NATO's persistence after the cold war'. *International Organization*, Summer 1996, Vol 50, No 3. page 445-475; Carment, D. 'NATO and the international politics of ethnic conflict: perspectives on theory and policy'. *Contemporary security policy*, December 1995, Vol. 16 No. 3. page 347-379.; Koslowski, G. *op.cit* ; Siedschlag, A. *NATO meets the post-strategic condition: political vicissitudes and theoretical puzzles in the Alliance's first wave of adaptation: 1990-1997*. Münster: LIT Verlag. 1998; Duffield, J. S. 'International Regimes and Alliance behavior: explaining NATO conventional force levels.'. *International Organisations*. Autumn 1992 , Vol 4, No. 46, pages 819 - 855.; Hellman, G., and Wolf, R. 'Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO.'. *Security Studies* , Autumn 1993 , No. 3, pages 3 - 43.; Lepgold, J. 'NATO's Post-Cold war Collective action problem'. *International Security*, Summer 1998, Vol. 23 No. 1, pages 78 - 106.; Chernoff, F. *After bipolarity: the vanishing threat, theories of cooperation, and the future of the Atlantic Alliance*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1995.; Karádi, M. Z. *Die Reform der Atlantischen Allianz: Bündnispolitik als Beitrag zur kooperativen Sicherheit in Europe?*. Münster: Lit Verlag. 1994;

framework is provided by transgovernmental and policy network theories. The advantage of these hypotheses is that it allows the study of NATO's transformation by taking into account the role of domestic, institutional and external factors, what is known as a multilevel analysis. The shortcomings of these approaches are that they do not make explicit the methodological tools for testing their hypotheses. For these reasons, in order to test some of the assumptions contained in these approaches, a comparative historical approach that takes into account the insight of policy network and transgovernmental theories will be adopted.

Neorealism: the theory of threat

The realist and neorealist paradigms in International Relations have not been at the vanguard of explaining NATO's survival and transformation. One reason for this lies in the history and methodology of the approaches. In the immediate post-war period, realist writers conceptualised NATO as a military alliance and much effort was devoted to the subject. Although there were some difficulties in agreeing on a definition of the phenomenon of alliances³, it was commonly accepted that the dynamics of transformation of such formations lay in the existence of an external threat. A simple proposition was made: the survival of alliances depends upon external danger and alliances are bound to decline as threat is reduced.⁴ Despite the simplicity of the proposition, by the early 1980s it had become clear that alliance theorists had focused their research on devising typologies of alliances and their formation and had neglected the issue of institutional change. In his salient survey of the alliance literature carried out in 1982, Michael Don Ward pointed out that the gap in this field of research on alliance maintenance was still to be filled. In his view "considerable examination of the topic of alliance maintenance needs to be undertaken. Despite the lip service paid to this notion, its role in alliance dynamics

³ Ward, M. *Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics*. Denver: University of Denver. 1982 pages 4 - 13.

⁴Liska, G. *Nations in Alliances: the limits of interdependence*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1962. pages 97 - 100 . Wolfers, A. *Discord and collaboration*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1962. page 29. Liska however conceded that alliances might introduce measures to prevent their erosion. This included expanding or reducing functions and objectives. *ibid*, page 108.

is virgin territory".⁵ Nearly seventeen years onwards, those working within a realist framework have made little progress in this area.

This failure is partly to be explained by the rise of neorealism in International Relations theory. With the rise of neo-realism the study of alliances was transformed. Apart from a few exceptions,⁶ neorealists, such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, assumed that NATO's dynamics and regeneration capabilities could be understood only by looking at the workings of the balance of power. In a often quoted essay published in 1990, Mearsheimer predicted that the end of the so-called 'bipolarity system' would lead to the re-emerge of conflict among the Western Powers. In his analysis, NATO would cease to exist.⁷ This prediction was based on a number of assumptions about the nature of the international system, which are best expressed in the writing of Kenneth Waltz.

Waltz reinterpreted classical realists' propositions regarding the working of the balance of power in order to elevate it to one of the most important laws governing international relations.⁸ His argument is constructed as follows. Firstly, he proceeds by abstracting the nature of the international system from political, economic and societal factors, which shape states. He justifies this method of analysis by arguing that only by adopting this mode of abstraction can a 'scientific' explanation be developed. He then proceeds by looking at three differences between domestic and political structures: the principles by which the system is ordered the functions of the units and the distribution of capabilities among units. By so doing, although he demonstrates that an international system exists, he endows the international system with decentralised and anarchic characteristics in which states act as egoistic rational units.⁹

⁵ Ward, M, *op.cit.*, page 60.

⁶ Walt, S. M. *The origins of alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1987

⁷Mearsheimer, J. 'Back to the Future' *International Security*, Summer 1990, Vol 15 No. 1; Mearsheimer, J. J. 'The False Promise of International Institutions'. *International Security*, Winter 1994/95, Vol 19 No. 3, pages 4 - 49.

⁸ Waltz, K. N. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. 1979.

Since the work of Waltz was published in 1979, most writers working on alliance theory have taken Waltz's proposition as the starting point of their inquiry. They concentrate their research efforts on testing Waltz's proposition that states, in the pursuit of their own interests, tend to establish a balance of power. The main focus of realists' attention has in fact become the testing of the hypotheses that states are prone either to balance or bandwagon.¹⁰

Waltz's theory and research programme has been under attack for sometime. As a number of critics have pointed out, Waltz's arguments are problematic because they abstract the characteristics of nation states one-sidedly by dehistoricising their evolution of both the international system and those of nation states.¹¹ His balance of power theory is based on the assumption that states can be understood as unitary actors in pursuit of self-help.¹² By defining the state as a unitary rational actor, Waltz creates a black box around any role that domestic politics can have on the dynamics of the international system.¹³ His definition of the anarchic nature of the system is also questionable. The concept of anarchy is used interchangeably to mean the lack of government and lack of order. The failure to define precisely the concept of anarchy brings into question some of the premises of structural realism.¹⁴ More recently, John Vasquez has found fault with the entire research

⁹ *Ibid* pages 80 - 88.

¹⁰ Balancing is defined as occurring when weaker states ally against stronger states. Bandwagoning is defined as taking place when weaker states align with stronger states. The key writings on alliance theory in recent period include: S. M. Walt *op.cit.*; Schweller, R. K. 'Bandwagoning for profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in', *International Security*, Summer 1994, vol. 19, No. 1; Christensen, T. J. and Snyder, J. 'Chain gangs and passes bucks: predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity.' *International Organisation*, Spring 1990, vol. 44, No. 2.

¹¹ Maclean, J. 'Political Theory, International Theory, and Problems of Ideology', *Millennium: Journal of International Relations*, August 1981, vol. 10, No. 2, pages 102-115, especially pages 108 - 111.

¹² For criticism of Waltz's work see: Ashley, R. K. 'The Poverty of Neorealism' in R.O. Keohane, 1986. *Neorealism and its critics*. Columbia: Columbia University Press. 1986.; Wendt, A. 'Anarchy is what make it.' *International Organisation*, 1992, vol. 46, No. 2, pages 391-425.

¹³ On this point see: Rosencrance R. and Stein, A. E, eds. *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.

¹⁴ For a critique of the ahistorical nature of the concept of anarchy, see Schroeder, P. 'Historical reality versus neorealist theory.', *International Security*, Summer 1994, vol. 19, No. 1, pages 108-148.; Milner, H. 'The assumption of anarchy in International Relations Theory: a critique' in D.A. Baldwin. *Neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary*

programme of Waltz' structuralism. He argued that Waltz' research programme is degenerative and fails to satisfy both theoretical and empirical criteria.¹⁵

Despite, the severe criticisms that neorealist propositions have undergone over the past decade, the theory of threat remains, explicitly or inexplicitly, one of the dominant explanations for NATO's survival. Policy-makers and journalists have often stated that NATO intervened in the former Yugoslavia in order to prevent a 'spill-over' effect, that is the conflict spreading to other Balkan states. This is an explanation not only upheld by policy-makers and journalists but also by academics studying the subject. Thus, for example, S.L Burg, in his review of the role of international organisations in the conflict in former Yugoslavia, argues that NATO intervened in the region and undertook peacekeeping tasks because of the threat that the conflict posed to the military security of Western European countries.¹⁶

Criticism of neorealism

The theory of threat and the focus on the working of the balance of power to explain the alliance's dynamics as outlined by neorealists is problematic. It assumes that organisational dynamics and domestic factors did not play a role in NATO's transformation. The theory of threat takes as its starting point the preoccupation of members of the Western Alliance without explaining why some countries were more concerned than others about external developments. The theory assumes that external developments can be conceptualised as 'exogeneous' and distinct from the perception and interests that NATO and Western governments had in the region and in the modernisation of the Western Alliance. An analysis of the role of threat has to be able to explain the interaction between perceptions and outcome. Although events in the former Yugoslavia did have their own dynamics, separate from those of alliance politics, as soon as Western governments demonstrated an interest in regional developments, the separation between the two

debate. New York, Columbia University Press. 1993, pages 145-148.

¹⁵ Vasquez, J. A. 'The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition', *American Political Science Review*, December 1997, vol. 91, No. 4, pages 899-912.

¹⁶ Burg, S. L. 'The International Community and the Yugoslav Crisis' in M. J. Esman and S. Telhami, (Eds.). *International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict*. Ithaca and London:

processes became blurred. By assuming that threat was constant and real, the theory of threat legitimises the perception of certain policy-makers without accounting for the origin and reasons for such perceptions.

Assumptions from the regime and neoinstitutionalist approaches

The liberal neoinstitutionalism paradigm in International Relations provides a rich set of hypotheses as to why NATO survived and transformed itself into a peacekeeping and conflict management organisation. Neoliberal institutionalists base their argument on the assumptions that international regimes are an important characteristic of the world system. Two complementary definitions of regimes have been outlined. Keohane conceptualises international regimes as an 'intervening variable' between fundamental characteristics of world politics such as the international distribution of power on the one hand and the behaviour of states and non-state actors such as multinational corporations on the other.¹⁷ Krasner, in contrast, provides a different definition of international regimes. He describes them as "a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations."¹⁸

Neoinstitutionalists believe that the international regimes foster co-operation among states. However, in his writing from the mid 1980s onwards, Keohane shares with Waltz the assumption that anarchy is an essential feature of the international system and that states can be conceptualised as rational self-interested actors. But, in contrast to Waltz, Keohane believes that the existence of international regimes, while not eliminating the impact of anarchy on states' behaviour, mitigates some of the competitive characteristics of states' relations.

Cornell University Press. 1995, pages 235-271.

¹⁷ Krasner, S.D. 'After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy' in R.O. Keohane, ed. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1984. page 64.

¹⁸ Krasner, S. D. *International Regimes*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press. 1983.

Keohane argues that international regimes foster co-operation in a number of ways. First, international regimes reduce the costs of legitimate transactions by making it easier for governments to get together and negotiate agreements. Secondly, international regimes involved state transactions on a number of issues and the clustering of issues under a regime facilitates side-payments. Thirdly, international regimes reduce asymmetries in information. In other words all policy-makers have access to the same level of information. Fourthly, by establishing rules and principles international regimes render the behaviour of states more predictable. This implies that states have fewer reasons to be suspicious of others.¹⁹

Although Keohane had begun his analysis by adopting the realist assumption that states pursued their own self-interest, Keohane modifies his definition of self-interest. He argues that actors cannot maximise their self-interest in the classical sense because they are not capable of using all of the information that is potentially available. In his view policy makers have limited cognitive capabilities. Like individuals, states make decisions according to a 'satisfying' level of interest. At a certain point of calculating a particular option, they will decide what suits their interests. This notion is defined as 'bounded rationality'. The impact of 'bounded rationality' on the behaviour of states in international relations is that it makes them more inclined to participate in an international regime.²⁰

From this argument, neoinstitutionalists develop a set of hypotheses as to why states might decide to maintain an international regime even after changes in the distribution of the balance of power has occurred. Policy makers might do so because they have invested a lot of resources in the creation of the regime. States might perceive that the cost of ending a regime, outweighs the start-up costs of creating a new one.²¹ In addition, policy-makers might fear that if a regime ends, it would be very difficult to create a new one.²² Keohane also maintains that NATO,

¹⁹ Keohane, *op.cit.*, chapter entitled "A functional theory of international regime". pages 85 - 109.

²⁰ *ibid.* pages 110 - 132. see chapter entitled "Bounded Rationality and redefinition of self-interest".

²¹ *ibid.* pages 79 - 80.

²² Keohane, R. O and Nye, J. S. *Power and interdependence*. 2nd ed. Glenview, Ill: Scott.

unlike other military alliances, is a highly institutionalised organisation. It has a formal bureaucracy, a complex routine of decision-making and differentiated functions. Organisational interests might have an impact on the dynamic of renewal and survival of the alliance.²³ Finally, some institutionalists believe that an institution's success might create a momentum for the organisation that is particularly useful at a time of external change or stress.²⁴

Criticisms of neoliberal institutionalism

The neoinstitutionalist approach does provide some powerful hypotheses worth investigating. Consideration of the role of start-up costs, and perception of the difficulties in creating a new regime might have played a role in policy-makers' calculations of NATO's future. Similarly there might have been organisational interests that shaped the Western Alliance's renewal. The testing of neoinstitutionalist hypotheses remains important because neo-liberal institutionalists have shied away from undertaking extensive research in the area of security studies.²⁵ Neoinstitutionalists have assumed that the pattern of co-

1989. page 101-2; For more recent research on this point see Duffield, J. S. 'International Regimes and Alliance behavior: explaining NATO conventional force levels', *International Organisation*, Autumn 1992, vol. 4, No. 46, page 819-855.

²³ Keohane, R. O. 'Alliances, threats, and the uses of neorealism', *International Security*, 1988, vol. 13, pages 169 - 176. especially page 174

²⁴ Hellman, G. 'Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO.', *Security Studies*, Autumn 1993, vol. 3, pages 3 - 43.

²⁵ An exception has been the work of see Chernoff, F. *After bipolarity: the vanishing threat, theories of cooperation, and the future of the Atlantic Alliance*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1995. He investigates the level of co-operation that existed throughout the duration of the alliance, by testing four hypotheses on co-operation extracted from structural realism, balance-of-threat-realism, the neo-liberal theory of regimes and cybernetic theory. He tested these hypotheses using cross-tabulations, statistical measures of association, and Boolean algebra against 21 NATO case studies spanning from the Suez crisis to Operation Desert Storm. He divides his case studies into four issue-areas: weapons deployments, arms control, out-of-area activities, and doctrine. Chernoff concludes that none of the existing theories adequately explains variations in cooperativeness present during NATO's history. As an alternative, Chernoff offers a theory, called the disjunctive, aggregative model of co-operation (DAMC), which combines four variables drawn from the competing theories: 1) the quality of information exchanged between the allies; 2) the experience national leaders have had with similar decisions 3) the support of the hegemon; 4) the perception of common threat. For a critique see Mingst, K. A. 'After bipolarity: the vanishing threat, theories of cooperation, and the future of the Atlantic Alliance.' *Journal of Politics*, August 1996, Vol 58, No. 2, pages 605 - 608.

operation is more likely to occur in international regimes in the fields of economics than in the security area.

However, as previously mentioned there has been a tendency within neoinstitutionalism to adopt uncritically some of the assumptions contained in realism, particularly those related to the role of anarchy in shaping international relations. This has meant that some neoinstitutionalist writers accept a priori the predominance of the balance of power and institutions in shaping a state's behaviour, thus failing to explain the dynamics of interest formation within national, international and transnational policy making fora. As it will be explained in the section on transgovernmental and transnational literature, a distinction will therefore need to be drawn between the early hypothesis developed by neoliberal writers and their later writings.

Organisational theory's assumptions

Organisational theory studies political institutions and a number of approaches are included in it. It will be beyond the scope of this chapter to consider the differences among them. For this reason, only those approaches that seek to explain NATO's transformation will be mentioned.²⁶

The importance of organisational theory for the study of NATO has being highlighted by Robert B. McCalla. In his view organisations create bureaucracies that might have their own interests for wanting to maintain an organisation. He points out that NATO employs more than 3, 750 people. NATO staff might have an supported the survival of the organisation because jobs and future careers were at stake. Organisational interests might also reinforced by the fact that NATO member states send officials to become members of the alliance's international bureaucracy and integrated military structures. Through the experience of working

²⁶ For an overview of organisational theory and the study of political institutions see: Aldrich, H. and Marsden, P. 'Environments and Organisations' in Smelser, Neil J. *Handbook of Sociology*. London, Sage. 1988. pages 361 - 392.; Rothstein, B. 'Political institutions: an overview'. in Goodin, R.E and Klingemann, H. D. *A new handbook of political science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1996. pages 133 - 166.; Peters, G. B. *Political institutions: old and new*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1996.

in the organisation, these officials might develop a personal interest in the organisation itself.²⁷

McCalla outlines and provides evidence for three types of behaviours that NATO officials pursued during the transformation of the alliance: firstly, resistance to change in the form of a denial that significant changes had occurred; second, affirmation of organisational necessity that stressed the continued importance of the organisation and finally, adaptation to the new environment. MacCalla finds evidence of resistance to change in the events of 1988 to 1989 when he states that NATO officials denied that the military threat from the Soviet Union had changed significantly. In addition, he outlines a process of affirmation of organisational necessity by quoting many statements made by NATO's Secretary-General and member states' foreign and defence ministers. McCalla argues that the strategy of adaptation can be found in the way in which NATO officials shaped the new policies towards the former Soviet Union and Eastern European communist countries, the transformation of NATO into a conflict management organisation and the initiatives towards the 'Europeanisation' of the alliance.²⁸

Similarities to McCalla's hypotheses can be found in the work of the new-institutionalists in the field of sociology.²⁹ Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell have built a set of hypotheses about institutional change based on a refinement of the concept of isomorphism. This concept captures the process of homogenisation that characterises contemporary organisations' development. According to a number of studies, organisations are structured into a particular field area and there are forces that lead organisations to grow similar to one another. DiMaggio and Powell have expanded on this concept of isomorphism by arguing that there are two types: competitive and institutional. They identify three mechanisms through which institutional isomorphic change occurs: first, coercive isomorphism that stems from political influence and the problems of legitimacy; second mimetic

²⁷ McCalla, R. B. 'NATO's persistence after the cold war', *International Organization*, Summer 1996, vol. 50, No. 3, pages 445-475.

²⁸ *Ibid* page 459.

²⁹ For a review of new institutionalists in organisational theory see: Koeble, T. A. 'The new institutionalism in political science and sociology' *Comparative Politics*, January

isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty; and third, normative isomorphism, associated with professionalisation.³⁰ They argue that the growth and elaboration of professional networks that span organisations facilitate the diffusion of similar modes of thinking and practice. From this analysis, DiMaggio and Powell draw the following hypothesis: “The greater the extent of professionalisation in a field, the greater the amount of institutional isomorphic change”.³¹

DiMaggio and Powell’s hypothesis substantiates some of McCalla’s assumptions that the existence of a high level of professionalisation of NATO staff might have contributed to creating common views and practices towards renewing the alliance. Two types of people in fact make up NATO personnel: those seconded by national governments and those employed by the organisation. In both cases, NATO staff go through a process of ‘socialisation’ and receive similar training. There is however a difference as to whether staff work for the political or military NATO structures. The higher level of exchanges among military staff during NATO training programmes may foster stronger professional connections within the military than the political section of NATO. These professional networks can create common interests and a common outlook towards vital issues, such as the future of the organisation.

1995, Vol 27, No. 2, pages 231-243.

³⁰DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell, W. M. ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality’ in P.J. DiMaggio and W. M. Powell. *The New Institutionalists in Organisational Analysis*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press: pages 63 - 82. 1991, especially pages 66 - 67.

³¹*Ibid.* page 77.

Criticism of the 'organisational theory' approach

The role of NATO staff and the process of 'normative isomorphism' are assumptions worth considering. However, it is important not to exclude a priori an understanding of the interaction of how domestic politics and external factors could have shaped alliance transformation. As McCalla has indicated, NATO international staff might have pursued common strategies towards maintaining and transforming the alliance but they required crucial support among NATO member states. To be able to analyse the interaction between institutional and domestic policy making processes, additional methodological tools may be required. The concept of normative isomorphism cannot capture methodologically the dynamics among domestic, institutional and external developments because it assumes that only members of professional networks can shape alliance dynamics. Since there might be interest groups, think tanks, government departments who are not part of the 'professionalised' network nevertheless, under specific circumstances, they may contribute to reinforcing or undermining the process of 'normative isomorphism'. In addition giving priority to professional networks excludes an analysis of economic and ideological factors that might bring departments and individuals to share common views.

The 'Security Communities' approach

The 'security community' approach offers another explanation as to why NATO survived. According to writers belonging to this school of thought, NATO and the EU have formed an 'Atlantic Community' in which war is increasingly 'unthinkable'. The alliance has survived because of the new level of ideological solidarity established within it. Thus, C. A. Kupchan, whilst describing relations among EU and NATO member states, argues that "the Western democracies have built much more than an alliance of convenience among countries each out for individual gain. They enjoy unprecedented levels of trust and reciprocity and share a political order based on capitalist economies and liberal societies".³² Similarly, Ole Waever argues that Western Europe constitutes a 'security community' in

³² Kupchan, C. A. 'Reviving the West', *Foreign Affairs*, May-June 1996, vol. 75, No. 3.; pages 92 - 104. see page 94. Also see: Deudney, D and Ikenberry, G. J. 'The Logic of the West', *World Policy Journal*, Winter 1993/94, ges 17 - 25.

which member states have agreed on a new notion of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘security’. Waever characterises Europe as an “unlabelled unicentric, multi-layered formation”, in which NATO and the EU co-operate.³³

The literature on security communities is based on a reinterpretation of the work of Karl Deutsch. In his book on *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, published in 1957, Deutsch conceptualised the idea of ‘security communities’ as a “group of people, which have become integrated”. Integration can be found when members of a community decide to work together to maintain peaceful institutions rather than engage in conflict. As he explains:

“By INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population.
By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful change’.”³⁴

Deutsch distinguished between two types of ‘security communities’: amalgamated and pluralistic. Amalgamated security communities involve the merger of two or more independent units, like for example the creation of the United States. Pluralistic security communities in contrast retain the legal independence of separate governments.³⁵ Deutsch’s study was based on ten examples and identifies the factors that facilitate or undermine the creation and success of security communities. He concluded that there were three key factors that determined the success of security communities. First the compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making. This meant that all members of the political bodies involved in a political decision-making process would have common values and would also strive to ensure that the continued existence of incompatible values

³³ Waever, O. ‘Insecurity, security, and a security in the West European non-war community.’ in Adler, E; Barnett, M. (Eds). *Security communities*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. pages 67 - 118.

³⁴ Deutsch, K. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Princeton: University Press. 1957. page 5.

would not undermine the political process. The second factor was the capacity of participating political units or governments to respond to each other's needs, messages and actions. This involved the existence of a 'sense of community', as previously defined. Deutsch stressed that this sense of community and mutual responsiveness will have to be built not purely on shared ideas but more importantly on the existence of political institutions that facilitated the habits of political communications and consultation. The third factor was the mutual predictability of behaviour.

Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett have recently reinterpreted Karl Deutsch's work in order to develop a new research programme. Their approach is based on three propositions: firstly that there is a security community that operates at the international level;³⁶ secondly, that security politics are profoundly affected by it and thirdly that states that develop within an international community develop a pacific disposition.³⁷ To test the validity of this proposition, Adler and Barnett modify Deutsch's approach. Instead of relying on quantitative methods of analysis, they adopt a 'constructivist' approach. This emphasises that international actors are embedded in both normative and material conditions. Their focus of analysis is Deutsch's notion of 'pluralistic communities'. In their views there are two types of pluralistic communities: loosely coupled and tightly coupled. The differences are accounted for by a number of factors: the depth of trust, nature and degree of institutionalisation of their governance system and whether they reside in a formal anarchy or are on the verge of transforming it.³⁸

In addition, in order to deal with some of the criticisms advanced against Deutsch's theory, Adler and Barnett develop a framework of analysis and indicators to

³⁵ *Ibid* pages 65 – 69.

³⁶ Security communities are defined by three characteristics: 1) shared identities, value and meanings. 2) those in a community have many-sided and direct relations; interaction occurs not indirectly and in only specific and isolated domains but rather through some form of face-to-face encounter and relations in a numerous settings. 3) express reciprocity, in other words they express long-term interest.

³⁷ Adler, E and Barnett, M. 'Security Communities in theoretical perspective' in Adler, E; and Barnett, M. (Eds.). *op.cit.* pages 3 - 28, especially page 3.

³⁸ Adler, E and Barnett, M. 'A framework for the study of security communities.' In Adler, E; and Barnett, M (Eds.). *op.cit.* 1998. page 29-66. especially pages 30 - 31.

contribute to the identifications of security communities. They argue that researchers should distinguish between three tiers of processes. The first tier focuses on an analysis of the exogenous and endogenous factors that lead states to co-ordinate their policies. The second tier looks at the way in which relations among states are structured. Finally, the third tier examines the role of trust and knowledge. The role of indicators is described as a component of three phases of development of security communities: nascent, ascent and mature.³⁹

Criticism of the ‘security community’ approach

The ‘security community’ approach offers the advantage of seeking to conceptualise the European security order by taking into account the role of social learning, identities formation and belief systems. The approach goes further than neo-institutionalists in proposing that policy makers are not driven by the pursuit of national interests. However, the adoption of this approach in the study of NATO’s transformation is problematic. The work of Adler and Emanuel is in fact entirely focused on identifying the conditions under which security communities might come into existence. There is no emphasis on explaining how security communities influence policy outcomes or seek to reproduce themselves. The method of analysis could be considered as flawed. It could be argued that it is impossible to explain the existence of ‘security communities’ without explaining how they shape policy formulation and outcomes. In addition, the security communities approach assumes that the existence of co-operation among states create the conditions for peace within the group. It does not contemplate the possibility that forms of co-operation among certain states might be based on mechanisms of exclusion that might endanger world peace. On many occasions those who are not part of the sense of community are in fact perceived as either enemies or a potential danger to peace. The presence of hegemonic powers within co-operative frameworks can also lead to tensions.

³⁹ *Ibid.* page 45.

Transgovernmental relations and ‘epistemic communities’

Another set of hypotheses can be derived from the institutional and organisational literature of the 1970s and the more recent work of Thomas Risse-Kappen (also known as Thomas Risse). In the early 1970s, Keohane and Nye had argued that the dynamics shaping international organisations were partly determined by a combination of interests between actors belonging to the international organisations and actors at the national level. They stated that policy-making within international organisations was characterised most of the time by an alliance between sections of the international bureaucracy and subsections of national bureaucracies.⁴⁰ Keohane and Nye believed that two types of phenomena characterised international relations in the post-war period: the existence of transnational and transgovernmental relations. Transnational relations involved relations among non-governmental actors. Transgovernmental relations existed when sub-units of government behaved in a relatively autonomous way from higher authority in politics.⁴¹ Keohane and Nye identified two types of transgovernmental relations: transgovernmental policy co-ordination and transgovernmental coalition building. The former occurs when there is a high level of exchange of information and frequent meetings among subunits. This creates a sense of collegiality and individuals might even start to think more in relation to the transnational group than purely in national terms. The existence of a regularised pattern of co-ordination leads to the formation of *transgovernmental elite networks* linking officials in various governments to one another by ties of common interest, professional orientation, and personal friendship.⁴² In contrast, *transgovernmental coalitions* occur when subunits of government build coalitions with similar agencies from other governments against elements of their own administrative structures. Transgovernmental coalitions are

⁴⁰ Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S. ‘Transgovernmental relations and international organizations’, *World Politics*, 1974, vol. 28, No. 1, pages 38 - 62. Similar points have been reemphasised by Risse-Kappen (today known as Risse) who used the concept to analyse policy making within NATO. His work is discussed later in this chapter.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* page 43. "We define transgovernmental relations as a set of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments".

⁴² *Ibid.*, pages 43 - 46.

thus formed by a coalition of sub-units of different governments coming together to influence government policy.

A number of conditions had to be present in order for transgovernmental coalition to develop. Firstly, there had to be a certain level of transnational policy coordination. Secondly, there had to be a conflict of interest among subunits of national governments. Thirdly central executive control must be loose and finally actors within the coalition have to be able to combine their resources - defined as funds, prestige, information and consent - effectively.⁴³

Keohane and Nye maintained that the activities of international organisations helped to increase the formation of transgovernmental coalitions by creating the opportunity for different sub-units of government to come in close contact with each other and share information. Moreover, international organisation could play an active role in creating transgovernmental coalitions. As they explained:

"Most intergovernmental organizations have secretariats, and like all bureaucracies they have their own interests and goals that are defined through an interplay of staff and clientele. International secretariats can be viewed both as catalysts and as potential members of coalitions."⁴⁴

Similarly R. W. Cox and H. K. Jacobson, in classical studies of policy-making within international organisations, pointed to the existence of transgovernmental coalitions in shaping international organisations' policy. They argued that there were three types of actors involved in policy-making within international organisations: those appointed in the name of the organisation; the direct participants in the decision, including the executive board, the international bureaucracy. As they explained, there existed " a system of interaction including all of those who directly participate in decisions taken within the framework of the international organisation, and in addition all officials and individuals whom in

⁴³ *Ibid*, pages 46 - 50.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, page 52.

various ways actively determine the positions of the direct participants." ⁴⁵ Cox and Jacobson emphasised that one of the most interesting aspects of the politics of international organisations lay in the way in which alliances could be established between sections of the international bureaucracy and members belonging to national institutions.⁴⁶

Despite the claims made by Keohane and Nye and Cox and Jacobson, only a few writers have sought to examine the existence of transgovernmental coalitions in shaping current NATO policy. The work of Thomas Risse-Kappen is an exception.⁴⁷ In a study of the nature of co-operation among democracies, Risse-Kappen revalued the contribution of 'transnational coalition-building' in explaining domestic processes in alliances. In his view the approach provides an insight into the working of NATO. As he stated: "international institutions such as NATO provide a framework in which informal networks between officials can emerge. The sense of community might further allow for such networks".⁴⁸ At a methodological level, Risse believes that "highly institutionalised alliances among democracies can no longer be conceptualised as interstate relations, but as networks among like-minded actors across national boundaries".⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Cox, R. W. and Jacobson, H. K. 'The Framework of Inquiry' in R. W. Cox, *The anatomy of Influence: decision making in international organizations*, Yale University Press. 1974, page 16.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* pages 17 and 18.

⁴⁷ Risse-Kappen, T. E. 'Ideas do not float freely: transnational coalitions, domestic structures and the end of the Cold War.', *International Organisations*, Spring 1994. No. 48 pages 185 - 214; Risse-Kappen, T. E. *Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995a; Risse-Kappen, T. E. *Cooperation among Democracies. The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy*, Princeton N.J, Princeton University Press, 1995b; Risse-Kappen, T.E. 'Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, March 1996, vol. 34, No. 1, pages 53 - 80. Muller, S. and G. Schweigler, (Eds.). *From occupation to cooperation: the United States and United Germany in a changing world order*. New York, Norton. 1992.

⁴⁸ Risse-Kappen. 1995b. *ibid.* page 39.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, page 208.

Epistemic communities

It is interesting to notice that the analysis outlined by the 'transgovernmental relations' approach has some similarities with the 'epistemic communities' school of thought. Peter M Haas defines 'epistemic communities' as a "network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area".⁵⁰ 'Epistemic communities' can be distinguished from other policy makers and groups of professionals by the fact that they have three characteristics in common: they have a set of principled and causal beliefs, share notions of validity and share options of policy enterprise.⁵¹ 'Epistemic communities' can be mobilised and can exert significant influence on the policy-making process. As Haas explains: "the greater the extent to which epistemic communities are mobilised and are able to gain influence in their respective nation-states, the greater is the likelihood that these nation-states will in turn exert power on behalf of the values and practices of the epistemic communities and thus help in their institutionalisation".⁵² Haas and Adler believe that this phenomenon plays a significant role during a particular stage of the policy making process, what they describe as 'policy innovation'. This stage is distinguished from the other two, that is 'policy diffusion' and 'policy selection'. Epistemic communities are assumed to shape the policy innovation process and to diffuse it nationally, transnationally and internationally. If they manage to influence key policy-makers or if members of the community become part of the national policy-making institutions, then the group will have contributed significantly to the definition of the national interest.⁵³

⁵⁰ Haas, P. 'Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy-co-ordination.' *International Organization*, Winter 1992, Vol 46, No. 1, pages 1 - 35.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* pages 17 - 19.

⁵² Adler, E and Haas, P.M. 'Conclusion: epistemic communities, world order, and the creation of a reflective research program', *International Organisation.*, Winter 1992, vol. 46, No. 1, pages 367 to 390. especially page 370.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pages 373 - 370. Haas and Adler argue that during the policy innovation process, epistemic communities influence policy-making by framing the range of political controversy, by defining the national interest and by setting standards. The success of an epistemic community in shaping a convergence of policy preferences will be dependent on whether its members have simultaneously been able to influence several governments or not. In the case in which the epistemic community has only acquired power in one country then its international influence is seen as the function of that country's influence over

The difference between the 'epistemic communities' and the 'transgovernmental coalition/networks approach' are twofold. Firstly, the 'epistemic communities' approach emphasises the ideological and value systems as forging common attitudes, whereas the 'transgovernmental approach' does not specify a priori what brings departments, or units to share a common approach. Secondly, the 'epistemic communities' approach does not assume that individuals or institutions that can influence the policy-making process are to be located in government structures. The transgovernmental coalition literature in contrast privileges government actors.

Criticism of 'transgovernmental' and 'epistemic communities' approaches

The advantages of both the 'transgovernmental' and 'epistemic communities' approaches over the neorealist and neoinstitutionalist and organisational hypotheses are that they allow the inclusion of domestic explanations in the analysis. The 'transgovernmental' approach also offer some advantages over the 'epistemic communities' approach in that it does not assume a priori that common views merge out of shared belief systems. Rather it leaves the questions of what brings departments or units to share common views in the policy making process open to interpretation. The weakness of both approaches is that they do not provide a clear methodology of how the comparison between the different sections of the bureaucracies and national institutions and other non-governmental actors could be desegregated and analysed.

From this overview of a number of different hypotheses derived from the political science and IR literature, it could be argued that fertile ground for theoretical investigation does exist. The problem with beginning an analysis by testing for the hypotheses contained in the neorealist, neoinstitutionalist, organisational, epistemic and security communities approaches is that the researcher could be giving an a

others. Haas and Adler maintain that epistemic communities do not need to have a large number of members: 35 people could constitute a community. Two factors will determine the extent to which epistemic communities will be able to gain influence. Firstly it is more likely that their role will become crucial during periods of crisis, when policy-makers come to rely to a greater extent on the role of 'experts'. Secondly it will be dependent on whether policy-makers feel confident that they have sufficient knowledge and understanding of the subject. Adler, E. and Haas, P. M. "Conclusion" *ibid.* pages 379 - 380 and Haas, P. Winter

priori emphasis to a specific level of analysis over another. For this reason, although the approaches do allow a set of research questions to be formulated, the focus of this thesis will be on testing only a set of propositions that allow both the adoption of an inductive and a deductive method of analysis. The approach can be developed by combining the hypotheses contained in transgovernmental relations and epistemic community literature with methods adopted from policy networks and historical comparative analysis. It is to the contribution of the later two methodologies that I now turn.

The ‘policy networks’ approach: a theory or a method?

Policy networks’ analysis has been applied to a variety of disciplines within the social sciences. Anthony Judge pioneered the approach within the IR discipline back in the 1970s.⁵⁴ In political science, ‘policy network’ analysis has predominantly been used to understand the policy making process within the EU and domestic policy making in a variety of business sectors. It has also been applied to analysing the working of central and local government. The ‘policy network’ literature however remains a controversial area in political science. This is because ‘policy networks’ have been defined as a metaphor, theory and method. Within the literature two distinct schools of thought can be discerned. One school views ‘policy networks’ as a form of governance, the other as a form of typology of interest intermediation between state and society.⁵⁵ In order to explore how ‘policy network’ theory could help us overcome some of the shortcomings of the IR and political theory’s methodologies, the distinction between the two schools of thought will be sketched and a clarification of the advantages and disadvantages of adopting either of the two perspectives will be provided.

1992. *op.cit.* pages 14 - 16.

⁵⁴Judge. A. “Network: the need for a new concept” *International Associations*, No. 3, 1974. His work was reviewed by A.J. Groom. see Groom, A. J. R. “International Organisations in a world society” in A.J. R. Groom and P. Taylor. *International organisation: a conceptual approach*. London: F. Pinter New York: Nichols Pub. Co. 1978.

⁵⁵Börzel, T. A. ‘Policy networks’: *A new paradigm for European governance?* Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico (FI), Italy: European University Institute. EUI Working Paper RSC. 1997. Pappi, F. U. ‘Policy-Netze: Escheinungsform moderner Politiksteuerung oder methodischer Ansatz?’ *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 1993, Sonderheft Vol 24, No. 24.

'Policy networks' as a form of governance

Writers who conceptualise 'policy networks' as a form of governance agree that they are characterised by predominantly *informal interactions* between public and private actors with distinctive, but interdependent interests. These actors strive to solve problems of collective action at central, non-hierarchical levels. 'Policy networks' are viewed as forming a framework of *horizontal co-ordination* that can cut across hierarchical structures of governance or work closely together within such structures.⁵⁶ It is argued that 'policy networks' are the result of a number of contemporary developments: sectoralisation, the increased scope of state policy making, the fragmentation of the state, the blurring of boundaries between the public and the private and the transnationalisation of domestic politics. These phenomena have favoured the emergence of 'policy networks' as a new form of governance that is distinct from two conventional forms of governance: hierarchy and market.

At a methodological level, there are a number of advantages in using 'policy network' analysis. Firstly, the conceptualisation of 'policy networks' as a form of governance could facilitate an understanding of NATO's policy-making that does not presuppose the dominance of the systemic or institutional dynamics. Rather it looks for potential linkages across and within committees and groups located at a different level of policy making, that is international, national and subsectoral. In this sense the application of policy network tools allows for a new form of disaggregation of the components of policy-making. Secondly, it helps to examine

pages 84 - 94.

⁵⁶Kenis, P. and Schneider, V. 'Policy networks' and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox.' in B. Marin, and R. Mayntz, eds. *'Policy networks': empirical evidence and theoretical considerations*. Frankfurt am Main: Westview Press, 1991.; Mayntz, R. 'Policy-Netzwerke und die Logik von Verhandlungssystemen', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* Vol 24, 1993. pages 39 - 57. Scharp, F., W. 'Einführung. Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen' in A. Benz; F. W. Scharpf, and R. Zintl *Horizontale Politik-Verflechtung: Zur Theorie von Verhandlungssystemen*. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1992. pages 11 - 28. Scharp, F. W. 'Koordination durch Verhandlungssysteme: Analytische Konzepte und institutionelle Lösungen'. in A. Benz; F. W. Scharpf and R. Zintl *ibid*; Scharpf, F. W. *Games in hierarchies and networks: analytical and empirical approaches to the study of governance institutions*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag Boulder, 1993.

relationships not only between state actors but also public actors. In other words, it assumes that the nature of policy making in advanced Western societies is such that it has to include non-governmental actors. Thirdly, it facilitates an analysis of horizontal relations between the supranational and the national levels. Fourthly, it allows for the possibility that, during the policy-making process, a set of non-traditional coalitions between national, (governmental and private), and supranational actors might develop.

The 'typology of interest intermediation' school of thought

A leading exponent of the 'typology of interest intermediation' school of thought is R.A.W. Rhodes.⁵⁷ He developed his understanding of 'policy-networks' by analysing intergovernmental relations in a variety of policy sectors in Britain. Rhodes distinguishes five types of networks according to the degree to which their members are integrated, the type of members and the distribution of resources among them. These networks range from a continuum from highly integrated 'policy communities' and loosely integrated issue networks. *Policy communities* are characterised by stability of relationships, continuity of highly restricted membership, vertical interdependence, insulation from other networks and the general public and high levels of integration. In contrast, *issue networks* are characterised by loosely integrated relationships, in which consensus is seldom achieved and in which consultation is ad hoc. In his view, these different typologies

⁵⁷Rhodes, R. A. W. 'Power-Dependence, Policy Communities and Intergovernmental Networks.' *Public Administration Bulletin*, 1985, Vol 49, pages 4 - 29. Rhodes, R. A. W. *European Policy-Making, Implementation and Sub-central Governments*. Maastricht, European Institute of Public Administration. 1986.; Rhodes, R. A. W. *The National World of Local Government*. London, Allen & Unwin. 1986; Rhodes, R. A. W. 'Policy networks': a British perspective.' *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 1990, Vol 2, No. 3, pages 293 - 317. Rhodes, R. A. W. *Beyond Westminster and Whitehall*. London, Routledge, 1992. Rhodes, R. A. W. *The European Union, Cohesion Policy and Sub-National Authorities in the United Kingdom*. Florence, European University Institute. 1995. Rhodes, R. A. W. *State Theory and the Policy Network Model*. Glasgow, Department of Government: University of Strathclyde. 1995.; Rhodes, R. A. W., Bache, I. et al. "Policy networks' and Policy Making in the European Union' in L. Hooghe. *Cohesion Policy and European Integration, Building Multilevel Governance*". Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pages 367 - 387. Rhodes, R. A. W. and Marsh. D 'New directions in the study of 'policy networks' *European Journal of Political Research*, 1992a, Vol 21, Special Issue, 1 and 2, pages 181 - 205. Rhodes, R. A. W. and Marsh, D "Policy networks' in British politics: A critique of existing approaches' in R.A.W. Rhodes and D. Marsh. *'Policy networks' in British*

of networks are not mutually exclusive and 'policy networks' can have two tiers - a core and a periphery. As he explains: "within a *policy network*, there is a clear distinction between members with resources and influence and those without it".⁵⁸

An understanding the existence of 'policy communities' in specific issue-areas is of great importance because, although they do not necessarily determine the outcomes of policies, they influence decision-making. As Rhodes argues, policy communities "constrain and facilitate the actions of agents, thus privileging certain actors and certain strategies".⁵⁹ 'Policy communities' can also play a crucial role in building consensus during the policy implementation process. Members of the 'policy communities' can seek either to gain wider support for their views by building coalitions or mediate closely with key opponents in order to achieve a compromise.

Criticism of 'policy-network' analysis

Despite the promises of policy-network analysis, there are some difficulties in its application in the field of international relations. This is because within the approach there are a number of unresolved methodological issues. Firstly, much of the efforts of 'policy-network' writers have been directed to the development of a typology of networks rather than seeking to refine the methodology adopted.⁶⁰ Secondly, during the identification of the 'policy-network' it is also questionable whether resources and access to knowledge should provide the criteria for the definition of participation in the network. It could be argued that it is also useful to look at the interaction of actors within a specific area by taking into account the 'belief systems' held by participants in the network.⁶¹

government. Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1992b, pages 1 - 26.

⁵⁸Rhodes, R. A. W. and Marsh, D. 1992a. *ibid* pages 181-205. especially 192.

⁵⁹ Rhodes, R. A. W. and Marsh, D 1992b. *ibid*

⁶⁰ One debate has focused on how to develop a typology of policy-networks. See Jordan, G. and K. Schubert. 'A preliminary ordering of 'policy networks' labels.' *European Journal of Political Science*, 1992, Vol 21, Special Issue, 1 and 2, page 7-25. Waarden, F. V. 'Dimensions and types of 'policy networks''. *European Journal of Political Science*, 1992, Vol 21, Special Issue 1 and 2, pages 29 - 52.

⁶¹Indeed some writers such as Paul A. Sabatier has developed the concept of 'advocacy coalitions'. In Sabatier's view the policy option pursued by different actors within a particular 'political subsystem' can be conceptualised as oriented toward 'belief systems'. Sabatier, P. A. 'Advocacy-Koalitionen, Policy-Wandel und Policy-Lernen: Eine

Thirdly, many writers using the 'policy network' approach have tended to use quantitative methods of analysis.⁶² Such methods might be valid if one aim is to identify the density of sets of actors that are involved in a specific policy area. This method is however of little use if one is seeking to analyse the influence and interactions of different actors over time. A qualitative and historical approach is required when seeking to explain whether there is a 'policy community' in existence and the influence that such policy might have during the evolution of a specific policy.

An analysis of NATO's transformation into a peace-enforcement organisation in fact involves not simply outlining the involvement of actors. Rather one has to be able to identify which actors endorse which policy options at different stages of the policy-making process. For these reasons, although the 'policy network' methodology can provide a useful tool in the identification of the members of the policy community, the method will need to be supplemented by using a comparative historical method of analysis.

Alternative zur Phasenheuristik.' *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 1993, vol 24, Sonderheft, pages 116 - 148.

⁶²See for example: Josselin, D. *Domestic 'policy networks' and the Making of EC Policy: the case of financial services in France, the UK: 1987-1992*. PhD Thesis. London: London School of Economics and Political Science. 1995.

Conclusion and Research Questions

Most of the current literature on NATO's transformation is not driven by theoretical considerations. However, neorealism, neoinstitutionalism, organisational theory, security communities and epistemic community approaches offer a number of assumptions that are worth investigating. These can briefly be summarised as follows:

Neorealism

NATO went 'out-of-area' because new threats emerged in Eastern Europe. The outbreak of the conflict in former Yugoslavia and the potential of widening of the conflict forced NATO to intervene to contain the conflict.

Neoinstitutionalism

NATO member states decided to maintain the alliance because the material costs of ending a regime, outweigh the start-up costs of creating a new one. It was also believed that if a regime ends, it is very difficult to create a new one.

There were organisational interests at play, that is a desire for individuals working as part of NATO international staff to maintain the alliance. (This proposition is similar but not as developed as that of organisational theory, see below.) The institution's past success created a momentum for the organisation that was particularly useful at a time of external change or stress.

Organisational theory

The staff working for NATO had a material interest in maintaining the organisation. The existence of professional networks fostered a common strategy among NATO international staff for organisational renewal and innovation.

Epistemic community

There was an epistemic community that influenced the evolution of NATO's 'out-of-area' policy, particularly during the stages of formulation. The 'epistemic community' was composed by policy makers and groups of professionals who had

three characteristics in common: a set of principled and causal beliefs, a shared notion of validity and shared options of policy enterprise.

Security community

In the transatlantic area, there is a 'security community' in existence that facilitates a process of policy co-ordination among NATO member states. The 'security community' is characterised as having common values, the ability to respond to each other each other's needs, messages and actions. In addition members of the 'security community' have a common sense of feeling, trust and mutually successful prediction of behaviour.

Transgovernmental relations: transgovernmental policy co-ordination and transgovernmental coalition building.

Two different types of propositions are present in the approach. According to the transgovernmental policy co-ordination assumption there was a strong sense of collegiality among individuals belonging to national governments and NATO staff. This collegiality transcended national interests. In other words there was a transgovernmental elite network in operation. The second assumption argues that there was a transgovernmental coalition among subunits of government. The coalition among similar governmental agencies was formed against elements of national administrative structures.

The assumptions contained in the neo-institutionalist, transgovernmental relations, organisational, epistemic and security communities approaches have some features in common in that they start from the premises that international relations cannot be reduced to the working of the 'balance of power'. In contrast to the neorealist approach, they seek to conceptualise the international system not as a simple abstraction from its basic unit - the state. It could thus be argued that the epistemological and ontological premises of the above mentioned approaches allow social scientists potentially to synthesise some of their assumptions.

However, it should also be noticed that even within the neoinstitutionalist, transgovernmental relations, epistemic and security community approaches there is

a tendency to treat assumptions as an a priori basis for analysis, in another words they are engaging insufficiently in inductive reasoning. Hence, it is useful to test some of the assumptions by incorporating them within the 'policy network' and comparative historical methods of analysis. The policy network approach in fact does not presuppose the dominance of one level of analysis, either the system, institutional dynamics, or domestic factors. Rather it looks for potential linkages across different level of analysis. In other words, it allows a new form of disaggregation of the components of policy-making, before making deductive statements. To ensure that both inductive and deductive methods of reasoning are adopted, the comparative historical method of analysis would also be used. The historical approach permits both the tracing and comparing of the efforts of different policy makers within and across policy issue areas.

The aim of this thesis is twofold: first to develop a new hypothesis about the factors that influenced NATO's decision to assume 'out-of-area' tasks by synthesising some of the assumptions contained in the transgovernmental coalitions theory, epistemic community and policy networks approaches. The hypothesis is that there was in existence a 'policy community' which influenced the policy-making process. The second aim is to test the findings in the light of hypotheses derived from the approaches previously discussed. This study defines a 'policy community' as "a group of social actors located in government or (semi)-private organisations at a national or international level. Policy communities are characterised by a system of horizontal and vertical relationships. Members share similar belief systems and, although they might have separate national or institutional interests, they seek to pursue common policy aims in a specific policy area."

Since NATO has sixteen member states, it would be methodologically very difficult to analyse the existence of a policy-community among all of the policy-makers, think tanks, academics, the media, interest groups in each of the member states. For this reason, a group of countries have been selected. Apart from a contribution of the NATO international staff, Britain, Germany and the United States have been selected as a sample. The United States and Britain have been chosen because they have traditionally been dominant players in the Western

Alliance. Germany have been selected because the end of the Cold War had more of a dramatic strategic impact on the structure of its military forces and political culture than on those of other NATO's member states.⁶³

The research questions are as follows:

- 1) Can one identify a 'policy community' in favour of NATO assuming an 'out-of-area' role during the period from 1990 to 1995 comprising sections of the NATO permanent staff, officials within sections of the German, American and British policy making structures, along with transnational actors such as think tanks and private interests groups?
- 2) If a 'policy community' was in existence, to what extent were its members closely involved in NATO policy-making processes? Did members of the policy community seek actively to engage with the opposition, both domestically and internationally, in order to obtain support for their position?
- 3) Did those policy makers opposed to the idea that the alliance should assume conflict management and peacekeeping tasks change their positions because of the impact of external developments? Or did they modify their positions because of the influence of the actions and ideas of the policy community in favour of NATO's 'out-of-area' role? In other words, was a consensus achieved about the future of NATO's 'out-of-area' role because of the influence of 'policy communities' or was a consensus reached as a result of other factors such as ad hoc reactions to external developments or the fear of threat?

If substantial evidence is found to give a positive answer to these questions, then the existence and influence of policy communities in NATO's transformation into a conflict management organisation will be supported. A negative answer to all questions will disprove the hypothesis. There is also the possibility that policy communities were in operation but that they did not influence significantly the

⁶³ For a description of the methodological assumptions behind the selections of actors, see appendix B. For the methodological procedure followed see appendix A and C.

policy making process.

Chapter 2: The debate about the Western Alliance's future and establishment of the ARRC (January 1990 to June 1991)

In the first 15 months after the end of the Cold War, there was an intense debate on both sides of the Atlantic about NATO's future. The alliance's strategy of forward defence and flexible deterrence came under intense scrutiny. There were calls for a peace dividend, for a new co-operative relationship with the former Eastern European communist countries and for a new institutional framework for European security. During this period suggestions were put forward to give the alliance an 'out-of-area' role. At first, these proposals did not find widespread support but by June 1991 the desires of some NATO member states for such a change was implicitly mentioned in a NAC communiqué.¹ In May 1991 the NATO Military Committee (MC) had already announced a new force posture: the Active Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). This announcement signalled that the alliance was reorienting itself to fight regional wars. In some policy-making circles, it was believed that the ARRC would have the capacity to be deployed in conflict outside the alliance's immediate borders. The NATO MC, NATO International Military Staff (IMS), the Secretary-General, British and US officials worked consciously towards giving the alliance an out-of-area role. The position of other member states acted as a restraint on the development of the alliance's new strategy.

To trace the role played by national policy makers and NATO IMS during the debate about the alliance's future role, the discussions that took place among the different working groups established at NATO headquarters will be reconstructed. At the same time a comparative analysis of the positions of American, British and German officials and politicians toward NATO restructuring would be provided. The attitudes of other NATO member states will be briefly sketched. The chapter is subdivided into two rough and ready historical periods: from January 1990 to October 1990 and from the outbreak of the Gulf conflict in summer and autumn of 1990 to mid 1991.

¹The communiqué stated that NATO 'must be prepared to address other unpredictable developments that are beyond the focus of traditional Alliance concerns, but that have direct implications for our security' NATO. North Atlantic Council. *Final Communiqué*.

The debate about the future of Western Alliance and the first proposal for NATO's 'out-of-area role': January 1990 to October 1990

The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe in the winter of 1989 and the first six months of 1990 created a mixture of euphoria, confusion and uncertainty in Western capitals and at NATO. A debate emerged about the significance of the developments for the future task of the Western Alliance. The debate took place at different levels of policy-making: within the NATO structures, within the executive bodies of national governments, in the legislatures and among the media. Within the first two levels there was a new emerging policy, formulated behind closed doors, which envisaged an 'out-of-area' role for the Western Alliance. In contrast, apart from the views of leading US Senators, the opinions expressed by British, US and German MPs and the media envisaged a diminished military role for the alliance.

The official national positions

The US government

The initial reactions by the Bush administration to the dramatic events in Eastern Europe in the winter of 1989 and the first months of 1990 was to recognise and pursue a policy of full-support for German unification. There was however one precondition: that Germany remained a member of Western Alliance. Thus at the NATO Summit in December 1989, Bush stated that "German unification should occur in the context of Germany's continued commitment to NATO and an increasingly integrated European Community".² The Bush administration feared that without continued German participation in the Atlantic Alliance, European security would be endangered. In order to win over the Soviet and East German leadership to this position, on the 9th February 1990, US Secretary of State James

Copenhagen, Sect. 10. 6-7 June 1991

² Szabo, S. F. *The diplomacy of German unification*. New York: St Martin's Press. 1992.

Baker promised that NATO would become more of a political organisation rather than a military alliance.³ He also envisaged that a new co-operative structure toward Eastern Europe would emerge in which the CSCE and the EEC would play a vital role.⁴

During the intense diplomatic discussions about German unification, the Bush administration announced, in early February 1990, a reduction in its military forces in Western Europe to a maximum of 225,000, of which 195,000 were to be stationed in the 'central zone' of West Germany and the remaining 30,000 in Britain, Italy and Turkey.⁵ Apart from this reduction, US officials remained committed to a policy of forward deterrence and left untouched major nuclear-missile programmes and the level of spending on the Strategic Defence Initiative. In January 1990, in fact, the Bush administration proposed that the 1991 defence budget would be of US\$ 295.1 bn. This meant cuts of US\$ 22.4 bn, equal to a 2.6 per cent reduction. The announcement failed to meet the expectations of Congress and the Senate for a peace dividend.⁶ The defence budget also did not envision substantial changes in the force posture of NATO troops. However, Bush did announce that a new US defence strategy was being prepared "that is more flexible, more geared to contingencies outside of Europe while continuing to meet our inescapable responsibility to NATO and to maintaining the global balance".⁷

pages 1 - 45.

³ United States. State Department. 'Press Conference of the Honourable State Secretary James Baker, Following US-USSR Ministerial meeting, Novosti Press Center, Moscow, USSR, February 9, 1990.' *Dispatch*, 16 February 1990, No. 14.

⁴ Baker's speech in West Berlin is reprinted in *Washington Post*, p A.28. 13 December 1989

⁵ 'President seeks deeper troop cuts in Europe: state of the Union viewed in the "New Era" *Washington Post*. Section A, page 1, Vol 113, Issue 58. 1 February 1990. For the full transcript in 'Transcript: Bush - Events of 1989 Mark a "New Era in the World's affairs' *The Washington Post*, Vol 113, Issue 58. 1st February 1990. Section A, page 8.

⁶ Barber, L. 'US Budget: Pentagon aims to head off claims for Congress about peace dividend is meagre' *Financial Times*, 30 January 1990, pp 8.

⁷ 'Bush to announce plan to restructure defence policy' *Wall Street Journal*. 25 January 1990

The West German government's official position

In the early months of 1990, German policy makers were preoccupied with the process of unification and a central concern was the extent to which a united Germany should remain a member of NATO. In order to deal with the legacy of the Second World War, and the special status of East and West Berlin, the West German government supported a US initiative. The aim of the initiative was to discuss the issue of German membership in NATO with four countries: the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France. The mediation process came to be known as the two plus four talks.⁸

At the same time, during January 1990, the West German government gave strong support to the idea of enhancing the role of the CSCE as the new pan-European structure for dealing with security issues. This position was adopted partly in order to foster better understanding with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European member states. Thus, Germany, supported by France and other NATO member states, put pressure on Baker to hold a conference on the CSCE.⁹ On the 24 and 25 February 1990, at the Camp David Summit, Kohl and Bush announced that a united Germany would remain a full member of NATO and that Germany would continue to assign its forces to the alliance's integrated military structure and to host substantial US nuclear and conventional forces.¹⁰ During the summit, however, Kohl continued to stress the role of the CSCE and mentioned NATO only sparingly.¹¹

⁸ A good overview of the process is provided by Szabo, S. F. *The diplomacy of German unification*. New York, St Martin Press. 1992. Bortfeldt, H. *Washington - Bonn - Berlin*. Bonn, Bouvier Verlag. 1993. Pond, E. *Beyond the Wall; Germany's Road to unification*. Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1993.

⁹ 'German unity plans fuel NATO debate: Western leaders weight future of alliance.' *The Washington Post*, Section A, Vol 113, issue 65, 8 February 1990, page 27.

¹⁰ 'Bush-Kohl talks seen as crucial to unification: NATO role, Soviet Troops to be discussed' *The Washington Post*, 24 February 1990, Section A, page 21, Vol 113, issue 81. 'Kohl says united Germany will respect neighbours' security'. *Reuters News Service*. USA. 25 February 1990. Teltschik, H. *329 Tage: Inneansichten der Einigung*. Berlin, Siedler. 1991.

¹¹ 'Kohl, Bush endorse NATO role: borders still at issue', *Wall Street Journal*, 26 February 1990.

The FDP, the junior partner in the government, was in agreement with Kohl over Germany's membership in the alliance. On the 31 January 1990 at the Protestant Academy of Tutzing, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the German Foreign Minister, stated that a united Germany would remain in NATO.¹² Similarly, Dr Graf Lambsdorff, emphasised that a united Germany had to work in a multilateral framework to achieve a new European security order.¹³ In the first few months of 1990, however, Genscher did call for a change in NATO force posture. In his view, the alliance would have to assume more of a political rather than a military role and in the longer term, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, would be overtaken by a new pan-European security organisation that would unite East and West.¹⁴ Genscher was very sensitive to East German and Soviet worries about the expansion of NATO forces into East Germany. Hence he put forward a plan that envisaged that the alliance would forswear military expansion into the territory of the then GDR. During a period of several years the Federal Republic would also refrain from moving its forces assigned to the NATO area. The Soviet Union would be able to keep troops in the GDR for up to three years before removing them all.¹⁵

The British government's official position

In the early months of 1990, the UK government was slow in reacting to changes in Eastern Europe and resisted suggestions from other member states and defence

¹² Gennrich, C. 'Moscow will die deutsche einheit bald'. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 May 1990, pages 1 - 2, The speech is to be found in Kaiser, K. *Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationale Aspekte, mit den wichtigen Dokumenten*. Bergish-Gladbach, Bastei Luebbe. 1991. This position was also reaffirmed in parliament in May 1990: Germany. Deutscher Bundestag. *Plenarprotokolle*, 11 Wahlperiode, 210 Sitzung, 10 May 1990, section 16483A.

¹³ Germany. Deutscher Bundestag. *Plenarprotokolle*, 11 Wahlperiode, 188 Sitzung, 20 January 1990, section 14524.

¹⁴ see extract of speech of the German Foreign Minister Genscher during a special meeting of the WEU Assembly in Luxembourg on 23 March 1990: Germany. Auswärtiges Amt. *Deutsche Assenpolitik 1990/91*. Bonn, Auswärtiges Amt, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit. April 1991, pages 97 - 101; Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. 'Erklärung der Bundesregierung zum NATO-Aussenministertreffen am 3 Mai 1990' in *Bulletin der Bundesregierung*, 11 May 1990, No. 58.

¹⁵ Genscher's proposal was to become known as the 'Genscher-Plan' and was introduced in Article 5 of the Two-plus-Four Treaty.

experts that a change in NATO posture was required. Thus British policy-makers were surprised when Bush announced that he was prepared to contemplate cuts in the level of US forces in Europe. During a Commons question time on 9 January 1990, Tom King, the British Defence Secretary, insisted that it would be a great mistake to change NATO defence policy in response to political developments in Eastern Europe. He stressed that there was too much instability and uncertainty in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, endorsed Tom King's statement.¹⁶ At the heart of the British position was a reluctance, especially on the part of the Prime Minister, to accept that fundamental changes were taking place. As Percy Cradock, the Prime Minister's Foreign Policy Adviser under the Margaret Thatcher and John Major's governments, explains:

“The hard fact was that the Prime Minister did not like reunification.... To her it was an unpalatable irony that, after the expenditure of British blood and treasure in two world wars, we should be faced with a Germany able once again to dominate Europe.”¹⁷

In February 1990, Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, did however concede that NATO had to undergo some changes. He outlined some characteristics that the alliance would maintain and others that it would have to modify. Among the characteristics to be safeguarded were: country membership, stationed forces, a mix of nuclear and conventional forces and British retention of an independent nuclear deterrence. In his view the alliance would change its tasks by becoming involved in managing change and by developing a dialogue with the East in arms control and verification. NATO would also act as a consultation forum on security problems outside as well as inside Europe.¹⁸

In the early months of 1990, there were thus different perspectives within the Western Alliance towards the extent and nature of its reform. Apart from calls for

¹⁶ ‘Parliament and Politics: King cautious over changing NATO stance. Defence Questions’. *Financial Times*, 10 January 1990

¹⁷ Cradock, P. *In pursuit of British interests: reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major*. London: John Murray. 1997. page 110.

¹⁸ Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates*, 12 to 23 February 1990, Vol. 167, section 1088.

NATO to play a more active role in fostering consultations about security problems outside the treaty area, there were no official demands for NATO to assume 'out-of-area' tasks. There appeared to have been deeper commonality of views between Bonn and Washington over the need to make NATO more of a 'political', rather than a military organisation. In contrast, the British government, whilst admitting that some changes were necessary, was more reluctant to question the deterrence aspect of the alliance. As one commentator states, "within the United Kingdom, the response of the political leaders to the immense changes in the international relations context, was ... a very cautious one."¹⁹

Despite the conservative positions taken by the German, US and British governments on the future of NATO, there were forces who were working towards a more substantial modification of national and NATO defence strategies. Within the NATO International Staff and the US and British defence establishments a number of studies were in fact underway on the subject. Within the national parliaments and political parties of the three states, there were calls for a more radical revision of NATO's military and political stance. The following questions were raised: to what extent do the policies of the Soviet Union constitute a major threat to Western nations? What should be the role of the alliance? What kind of security and defence policies is best suited for the post-cold war world? Is NATO still relevant? It is in the process of finding an answer to such questions that the idea of NATO assuming 'out-of-area tasks' was raised officially.

The debate within NATO structures

Within the NATO structures the 'out-of-area' issue emerged during attempts by the military staff to undertake a review of the alliance' strategy. NATO structures can be subdivided into two sides: those forming the political-civilian structures and those involving civilians and military staff working in military departments and headquarters. Within the political-civilian structures there was an unwillingness to

¹⁹ Keohane, D. 'Britain's security policy and NATO in the 1990s.' *Arms Control*, May 1991, Vol. 12, No. 1, page 72-81. page 72; for an example of the cautious approach see the view expressed by UK Permanent Representative to NATO: Alexander, M. 'NATO's role in a changing world'. *NATO Review*, April 1990, Vol 1, page. 1-6.

undertake a review of NATO defence strategy. In contrast, the military-civilian structures were eager. In the autumn of 1989, General Vigleik Eide, the chairman of the Military Committee, resolved to develop a policy document for long-term defence planning, to be known as MC 134. This document argued for a new strategy. Because of the changing external circumstances the study proved difficult to undertake. The International Military Staff (IMS) called for a second study, which focused on providing a conceptual analysis of the potential impact of the changes in the security environment on NATO military strategy. In the winter of 1989, General Colonel Dr Klaus Wittman (a member of IMS) completed a report, the first version of which was known as the 'Wittman paper'. The report was completed in February 1990 and was discussed with the representatives of the major NATO Commanders (MNCs) in March. The document had a high political content. Wittman argued that, in the longer term, the Soviet Union would cease to represent a real threat and that it would become more difficult to predict the future nature of threats. He recommended a review of military strategy and a modification of defence concepts. He argued that mobile and flexible combat units, capable of quick deployment in crisis areas, were needed.

Despite strong opposition from the civil bureaucracy and by political leaders to a defence strategy review, the IMS continued their internal work. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and defence staff in capitals were asked for their input. The Military Committee (MC) sanctioned the steps undertaken by the IMS. It decided that, in addition to the Wittmann Paper, the IMS should also write a short memorandum based upon it. The document was to be forwarded to the Secretary-General. The results of the review undertaken by the MC, which was completed in April 1990, underscored that the doctrine of forward defence and flexible response, requiring a mixture of conventional and nuclear weapons, remained valid. However, in the longer term, the changed security environment should lead to a modification of document MC 14/3 and the operational concepts behind it.²⁰

²⁰ Wijk, R. D. *NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium: The Battle for Consensus*. London: Brassey's. 1997.; pages 13 - 17.

By May 1990, the work undertaken by the IMS and the MC led to the establishment of a formal NATO defence review: the Defence Review Committee (DRC) chaired by Assistant Secretary-General Michael Legge. However the struggle between the political and military parts of NATO had not been resolved. A controversy emerged as to the role of the DRC in shaping the political guidelines for NATO military strategy. Legge proposed that the DRC should deal with the strategy's political dimension upon which basis a new military strategy would then be developed. The MC, however, wanted an ad hoc working group formed by both the International Staff and IMS to be in charge of the political framework. The MC maintained that the guidelines should be subsequently approved by the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and translated into concrete directives. In mid July Secretary-General Manfred Wörner sought a compromise. He proposed a two-track approach. The first track would generate general principles and the second the military strategy. The development of the new strategy was to be an interactive process. Despite the intervention of the Secretary-General the debate between the civilian and military sections continued unabated. Legge insisted that it was the task of his group, and not that of the MC, to establish a political framework and he obtained the support of a number of countries, which were opposed to the strategy review. In October 1990, a compromise was achieved. It was decided that the work on the transformation of NATO and the new strategy would be carried on three tracks, instead of two. The Secretary-General defined the tracks.²¹ The first was to involve a series of brainstorming sessions by the NATO ambassadors in the Permanent Council and was to include France. The task of this track was to philosophise about the Alliance's future tasks from a broad political perspective. The second track was composed by the International Staff's Strategy Review Group. It was to work on a narrower approach on a new political strategy to provide guidelines for the future structures of NATO armed forces and military operational concepts and doctrines. The third track was the responsibility of the Military authorities, who were charged with developing NATO's military strategy.²²

²¹ *Ibid*; pages 20 - 23.

²² *Ibid*; page 23; North Atlantic Assembly, Special Committee on Alliance Strategy and Arms Control (Rapporteurs: T. Frinking and D. Bereuter), *NATO's new Strategic Concept and the Status of the Treaty on the Conventional Forces in Europe*. Brussels. October 1991,

It was during the discussions undertaken by the three tracks that the issue of NATO assuming an 'out-of-area' role was debated. Strikingly, whilst no consensus on the matter could be achieved in the first two tracks, within the military sections a strong commonality of views for NATO assuming an 'out-of-area' role emerged. In the second half of 1990, the Military Strategy Working Group put forward a document entitled : 'A military assessment of factors of change with regard to NATO's Military Strategy'. As Wijk explains:

"In contrast to the discussions in the Strategy Review Group, more emphasis was placed on threats other than the Soviet Union and therefore on other interpretations of crisis management. The central question in this document was how to react to unforeseen threats on the periphery of NATO's territory. This allowed the Military Committee to develop a concept for NATO military operations outside the treaty area".²³

In September 1990, General John Galvin, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) stated publicly that NATO structures should be revised to permit 'out-of-area' operations in the future.²⁴ The view of the IMS and SACEUR had the support of influential members of the International Political Staff (IPS) and Manfred Wörner.²⁵ On 20 September 1990 Wörner stated that in the future NATO would no longer be able to afford to limit itself to consultations in instances of security risks outside the treaty area. The American ambassador William H. Taft IV expressed similar sentiments on 15 October.²⁶

page 1.

²³ *Ibid*; page 40.

²⁴ 'Defining a new role for NATO after the Thaw' *Jane's Defence Weekly*., 22 September 1990.

²⁵ The role of the Political Affairs sections of NATO International Staff has been confirmed during interviews with the Norwegian and Italian NATO representatives. For an example of the view of member of the Political Affairs Division: see Law, D. and Rühle, M. 'Die NATO und das 'out-of-area' Problem.' *Europa-Archiv* , 1992, Vol. 47 pages 15 - 16. I asked Mr Michael Barrett, Director of the Political Affairs Division, during 1992 - 1995, what the position of NATO international staff was. He replied that he did not know the answer. He emphasised that the Political Affairs Division only expresses the view of NATO member states. His statement contradicts some of the views that officials from NATO member states have of the role of the international staff.

²⁶ North Atlantic Assembly. Political Committee (Rapporteur: L. Bouvard), *Problems of*

The emergence of the initial consensus among the NATO military authorities can be seen partly as the result of the practicalities of dealings with changes in the central front.²⁷ Parallel to the debates about military strategy, in the early months of 1990 SACEUR had in fact undertaken a number of studies about force structures. Until late 1989, NATO forces had a 'layer cake' structure. They were composed of national corps each assigned to a portion of the front line. Each corps was arranged in two army groups. Each army group was supplemented with a multinational air grouping. The role of NATO was not so much to prepare a battle plan but rather centrally to co-ordinate liaison between national corps commanders. By mid-1990, SACEUR developed a new concept for the force structure.²⁸ SHAPE proposed three types of forces: Covering Forces, Main Defence Forces and Reaction Forces.²⁹ These forces were to be arranged along a north-south arrangement, rather than a 'layer-cake'. The covering forces would be stationed nearest to the east border and would be mainly German. Their task would be to identify and delay any aggression. The Main Defence Forces would have the capabilities to destroy the enemy. Contrary to the Cold War period, these forces would contain divisions that would be assigned to them only in the case of an emerging threat. This arrangement was partly due to the fact that an increased warning time was envisaged. The Reaction Forces were to be used for sending a multinational force quickly to a threatened sector of the NATO front, or as a combat reserve, covering weak sectors of the front until reinforcements arrived.

The development of plans for the Reaction Forces represented the first concrete steps that NATO Military Commanders took to develop an 'out-of-area' role. During a meeting among British and German military experts in June 1990, the possibility for reaction to threats from outside the central region, within the

European Security. November 1990, Brussels: NAA. pages 14 - 15.

²⁷ British-American Security Information Council and Berlin Information Centre for Transatlantic Security. *NATO, peacekeeping and the United Nations*. London and Berlin: British-American Security Information Council; Berlin Information Centre for Transatlantic Security. Report No. 94.1. 1994.

²⁸ McInnes, C. *NATO's changing strategic agenda*. London: Unwin Hyman. 1990.

²⁹ Evans, M. 'NATO's evolving concept for armoured warfare on the central front: implications for the British Army.' *British Army Review*, August 1991, No. 98.

framework of that regional command structure, was in fact considered.³⁰ It appears that the idea of dealing with 'out-of-area' operations began partly to emerge because military planners were thinking about how, in the longer term, they might need to think differently about reacting to events in Eastern Europe. In an interview with the BBC correspondent Bill Hayton, Colonel Bob Stewart, the Military Assistant to the Chairman of NATO's MC (1989-1991) explained the thinking in alliance military circles during early 1990. Asked how the organisation sought to find a new role he replied:

"Well, people like myself in NATO spend a lot of time thinking about *how we might find a role* particularly in the situation where there were small circumstances outside the NATO area. Now this was something new, because NATO was traditionally only concerned with what happened within it. *But now we were looking beyond the NATO area to almost 'out-of-area'*, but we considered there was 'out-of-area' and 'beyond-out-of-area'. *Out of area was particularly in Eastern Europe* so we began to look at that"³¹

Other factors that could help to explain the consensus emerging within the military authorities with regard to NATO's 'out-of-area' role can be identified by comparing the impact and interaction between the national defence strategy reviews being undertaken in the United States, Britain and Germany. It is to this issue that we now turn.

³⁰ Bellamy, C. 'NATO lays plans for all-out reorganisation of forces'. *The Independent*. 11 June 1990, page 10.

³¹ Original transcript of an interview Stewart, B (Colonel) *Interview with Hayton, B.* (BBC 24 hours journalist), 7th April 1999. Colonel Bob Stewart was a Military Assistant to the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee (1989-1991). My own italics.

The Impact of National Defence debates on NATO's transformation process

The US debate

In the first months of 1990, the US government announced a strategy review whilst simultaneously arguing against defence cuts. This sparked a reaction from Congress and Senate. Some of the proposals put forward in the Senate were based on assumptions close to the thinking of defence working groups which had been set up within the Pentagon. Unintentionally, Senators' criticism of national defence persuaded the Bush administration to endorse a more radical review of military strategy.

The US administration's defence review process

The review of the national security strategy was restricted to a few individuals, the most central of whom were Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, General Colin Powell and Paul D. Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense.³² The revision of the alliance's role was undertaken by an inter-departmental working group which was set up to co-ordinate all the necessary nuclear and conventional shifts in NATO's stance. The working group was an interagency committee, it included members of the State Department and the Defense Department such as Under Secretary of State, Reginald Bartholemew and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian affairs Raymond Seitz. A European Strategy Steering Group handled the issue of the role of Germany within NATO. Robert Gates was the chairman, Robert Blackwill the chief bureaucratic tactician and Philip Zelikow the executive secretary.³³ Although the proposals were worked out in these working groups, members of the CIA, ex-chiefs of staff and defence experts in the Senate influenced the process.

³² Tritten, J. J. *Our new national security strategy: America promises to come back*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. 1992. See especially chapter 1: Sources of the New Strategy. page 1-16. Other key figures included: Joint Staff Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-S), Lieutenant General George Lee Butler, US Air Force and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David E. Jeremiah, US Navy.

³³ Pond, E. *Beyond the Wall; Germany's Road to unification*. Washington: The Brooking

As early as October 1989, Colin Powell, upon assuming the duties as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, asked his Joint Staff to work on a modification of the joint planning processes. The aim was to shorten the planning cycles used during the Cold War and to focus planning away from the declining Soviet threat. He produced a study, entitled the 'view of the 1990s', in which he explained how the USA could remain a superpower in the post-cold war era and the type of military capabilities that it would require. The study was based on the following methodology. He began with an examination of each region of the world in the context of current and anticipated changes. From the regional analyses, the study identified the enduring defence needs. This resulted in the presentation of new strategic concepts for regional conflict and the principle of force packages to meet new security needs. The forces envisaged by Powell in his study represented significant reductions beyond the 1991 fiscal year programme presented by the Pentagon to Congress.³⁴

In parallel, but not in collaboration with this process, Paul D. Wolfowitz led a different working group with similar aims within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Already during 1989 Wolfowitz had initiated a national security strategy review. Among its results was an admission that the government was suffering financial difficulties; a stress on the need of US leadership; the belief that Soviet expansionism was unlikely and support for Cold War alliances until the transition period was clarified. In early 1990, Wolfowitz's working group began a study on different methodological premises from those pursued by the planning group under the supervision of Powell. The OSD group analysed global trends and developed alternative future scenarios for the global security environment. Among the security environments, it envisaged the existence of regional crises particularly in the Middle East, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. For each of the future scenarios, it believed that in order to respond to such regional crises a strategy of 'crisis response/reconstitution' as the determinant of future military needs was required. According to the OSD planning group, a significant US presence in

Institution. 1993. page 213

³⁴ Snider, D. M. *Strategy, forces and budgets: dominant influences in executive decision making, post-cold war, 1989-1991*: Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute. February 1993.

Western Europe was required. As in the case of Powell's planning group, the OSD staff maintained that the force capabilities needed were significantly less than had been requested in the 1991 budget submission.³⁵

The proposals discussed by Powell and the OSD planning staff were however not synchronised with the thinking in other parts of the Pentagon and among the service chiefs who were reluctant to endorse major defence cuts.³⁶ In addition, among members of the military establishments there was a strong belief that the Soviet Union remained a threat. In a series of Congressional hearings, General John W Vessey, Jr (USA) (Ret), Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General John Galvin, SACEUR, made their positions public. They warned the Bush administration against proposals to scale down substantially their forces in Europe.³⁷

The Impact of Congress on the defence review

In January 1990, the announcement of the budget for the 1991 fiscal year sparked a vivid debate in Congress and in the Senate about the future US defence strategy. In Congress, Senator George Mitchell, the Democratic Majority leader, described the budget as "unrealistic" and several Democrats urged for larger defence cuts.³⁸ Simultaneously, Democratic Congressional leaders Pat Schroeder and Ron Dellums began to gather support for slashing defence spending.³⁹ However, the democratic parties had difficulties in co-ordinating their opposition because of divergent views in their ranks about the level of cuts. In contrast, in the Senate, both Senator Nunn

³⁵ *Ibid*; pages 21 and 22.

³⁶ *Ibid*; pages 13 - 18.

³⁷ United States. Senate Armed Forces Committee. *Threat Assessment: military strategy and operational requirements: Hearings before the committee of the Armed Services, 101 Congress*. Washington: GPO. 12 December 1989, 23-26 and 30 January 1990, 2,6-8, 21-22 February, 7 March 1990.

³⁸ Riddell, P. 'Congress challenge to Bush budget' *Financial Times*; Barber, L and Cassell, M. 'Pentagon plans include cuts in European military operations' *Financial Times*, 30 January 1990, page 24.

³⁹ 30 January 1990. 'Pentagon aims to head off claims in Congress that 'peace dividend' is meagre'. *Financial Times*, page 9.

and Senator Aspin advanced criticisms that were to influence the strategy review process.

Senator Nunn argued that the 1991 defence budget had been developed without explaining the nature of the threat, the strategy, the force structure and the amount of money needed for major programmes. In his view the 1991 Defence Budget had been drawn up on the assumptions that nothing fundamentally had changed in the security environment. He insisted that what was required was a new budget based on an assessment of the threat. To underline this point, Senator Nunn brought to the attention of the Congress and the Senate press leaks from the Pentagon and the CIA which made public that defence experts in the Administration believed that there had been a dramatic and irreversible change in the nature of the Soviet threat. Hence, during the early months of 1990, Senator Nunn and the Senate Armed Services Force Committee undertook a number of hearings with leading figures in the US Armed forces, the CIA, the Defense Department, defence experts and former Generals to obtain a clear assessment of the threat.⁴⁰

The Senate Armed Forces Committee hearings highlighted the existence of contrasting views within the US administration as to the nature of the changes in the European security environment and the future of the Western Alliance. Some Washington officials, while agreeing to the existence of new threats and the continued need for involvement in NATO, believed that the US would have to direct fewer resources toward the alliance. The Administration had to develop a new 'burden sharing' strategy so that Europeans would increase their financial contribution toward maintaining the alliance. Wolfowitz expressed such views in his congressional testimony. He argued that the United States would remain committed to the Western Alliance but more and more resources would have to be redirected toward supporting non-NATO areas.⁴¹ In a similar tone, Dr James

⁴⁰ The summary of Senator Nunn's view is given in United States. Senate. 'The changed threat environment of the 1990s' *Congressional Record*, 29 March 1990 section S3441 to S453. The Senate Armed Forces Committee's hearing are to be found in : United States. Senate Armed Forces Committee. *Threat assessment: military strategy and operational requirements: hearings before the committee on armed services*. Washington D.C: GPO. 12 December 1989, January 23-26 and 30, February 2, 6-8, 21-22, March 7 1990.

⁴¹ *Ibid*; section 21 - 25.

Schlesinger (Former Secretary of Defense and Director of the CIA), while expressing his belief that NATO had to maintain its capability to balance Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe, called for a decrease in the number of US troops stationed in Europe. He stated that "as the threat is reduced the United States' role should also shrink because the Europeans can handle a larger part of their own defenses".⁴²

The findings and interpretations of the long series of testimonies were summarised by Senators Nunn and Warner in a number of speeches held in the Senate in March 1990. Senator Nunn argued that the following scenarios of threat existed for the USA: firstly, the threat of a large-scale Warsaw Pact attack against Western Europe had been virtually eliminated; secondly, it would be very difficult for the Soviet Union to re-establish a credible threat of a large-scale conventional attack on NATO; thirdly there remained a nuclear threat; fourthly, there existed a large number of old and new threats: these included contingencies in and around the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula, Southwest Asia, North Korea, the proliferation in the Third World of weapons of mass destruction, the danger of increased arms sales to the third world; the possibility of another Arab-Israeli war; the danger of future instability in China; potential instability in the Pacific region, Latin America and Africa, Eastern Europe and the threat from international narcotics trafficking. This was not a rosy picture for world security.

Senator Nunn's recommendations with regard to the future of NATO was that the organisation had to maintain an ability to deter at a lower level and to reconstitute its forces in time to prevent a potential Soviet attack. As he explained:

"NATO's criterion (for judging the adequacy of its defense posture) should be whether the alliance is capable of maintaining deterrence at lower levels and mobilizing and rebuilding to higher levels in time should a Soviet build-up begin. In short, it is a question of the West mobilizing faster than the enemy can get ready for war. This, to me has got to be the future measure of the adequacy of our future conventional forces and conventional posture".⁴³

⁴² *Ibid*; section 295.

⁴³ *Ibid*; section 3447.

Remarkably, Senator Nunn's position reinforced the views held by the teams led by Powell and Wolfowitz. The consensus was that a new defence strategy was required which aimed at dealing more with regional threats than with the Soviet Union. The only real debate between the Senate and the Administration concerned the level of defence cuts necessary to retain a force capable of dealing with regional threats. Senator Nunn demanded larger levels of troop reductions in Europe than those envisaged by the Pentagon and the Administration.

The announcement of the new US defence strategy

By August 1990, the Bush administration felt confident in announcing its new defence strategy. In a speech at Aspen on August 2, 1990, the same day that Iraq invaded Kuwait, Bush endorsed four concepts to guide future national defence strategy: nuclear deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution. Most significantly, Bush argued that US military forces had to be restructured no longer to meet the Soviet threat but rather regional conflicts. The US armed forces were to be converted into a regional fighting force.⁴⁴

The Bush administration sought to strike a balance between old elements of military thinking with new ones. The old thinking involved maintaining a dual-element of strategic deterrence and defence and the emphasis on the continued importance of a forward American military presence around the world. Both of these two elements had been key aspects of US military strategy throughout the Cold War period. The new elements involved an emphasis on crisis response capabilities and the element of 'reconstitution'. The two new concepts endorsed the proposals put forward by Powell and Wolfowitz's working groups. New regional contingency planning was to be developed to deal with a variety of new threats: from regional wars, terrorism, and insurgencies to low-intensity conflicts.

⁴⁴ Bush, G. 'In Defense of Defense, remarks made to the Aspen Institute Symposium'. Office of the Press Secretary: the White House.; Durr, B. 'Bush proposes 25% troop cut' in *The Financial Times*, 3 August 1990, page 6.

The armed forces were to be reconstituted to deal with such threats. The concepts of reconstitution and base force capture the way in which the changes were envisaged. Reconstitution involved the restructuring of American forces in such a way as to maintain a capability to deal with two possible threats simultaneously and unilaterally. The base force concept envisaged that although the US armed forces were to remain organised into four basic military geographical components, - that is Strategic Force, Atlantic, Pacific, and a Contingency Force - and existing service organisations, they were to provide a 'menu of capabilities' from which commanders would be able to select a suitable response package to crises.⁴⁵ The process of reconstitution involved the capability to train and field new fighting forces, initially from cadre-type units, as well as activating the industrial base on a large scale.

The significance of the new US military strategy for NATO's restructuring

The concept of 'forward presence' and 'crisis management' gave a unique role to traditional regional alliances. In order to be able to meet new threats to its own national security, the US government required that its soldiers remained stationed abroad and had use of the alliance's facilities to respond quickly to new challenges. Explicit support for NATO assuming a new role to face regional crises had been made by General Galvin as early as in February 1990. During a Congressional hearing he had stated that:

"... I am saying that if you look around all of NATO and ask where is there instability and the possibility of incipient conflict that could lead from one thing to another.... The things that is going on that shows instability, that show turmoil, that show uncertainty would indicate that right now the south flank [of NATO] compared to the center is vitally important to us".⁴⁶

Similarly in July 1990, US Secretary of Defense Cheney, speaking to the press after a visit to Norway, stated that NATO should in future tackle the problem of 'out-of-area'. He said:

⁴⁵Tritten, J. J. and Stockton, P. N. *Reconstituting America's defence: the new U.S. national security*. New York: Praeger Publishers. 1992.

⁴⁶ United States. Senate Armed Forces Committee. *op.cit.*, 12 December 1989, January 23-26 and 30, February 2, 6-8, 21-22, March 7 1990. page 429.

“it may well be that one of the things that will emerge from the dialogue over the next few months, or years, will in fact be new concepts about how NATO deals with these kinds of ‘out-of-area’ threats that nonetheless have ramifications for our mutual security”.⁴⁷

It could therefore be argued that the US national defence debate reinforced the position of sections of the NATO IMS who wanted to undertake a substantial review of the alliance’s defence strategy. In addition, there was an agreement that crisis management tasks and the ability to engage ‘out-of-area’ were key elements of the new military strategy. Although in the United States there were a number of academics and think tanks that questioned the ability of the alliance to survive and called upon the Administration not to pursue a grand strategy of renewal of alliances, their voices did not seem to have had a significant influence on the policy making process.⁴⁸

The British defence review and NATO’s out of area role

Despite its reluctance to endorse substantial changes in NATO strategies, by late January 1990 the British government began its own national defence review and this was made public in April 1990 and finalised two months later. The announced review envisaged changes that were less radical than those outlined in Washington. This can be explained partly by the fact that there were marked differences of opinion within the Cabinet and government over the future of British assigned

⁴⁷ ‘American Secretary of Defence pronounces himself on ‘out-of-area’ challenges, CFE talks.’ *Atlantic News*, 11 July 1990.

⁴⁸ Doubts about the ability of NATO to survive were raised by Dr Harold Brown (Secretary of Defense under Carter and Chairman of the School of Advanced International Studies John Hopkins University). See his testimony in Senate Armed Forces Committee. 12 December 1989, January 23-26 and 30, February 2, 6-8, 21-22, March 7 1990) *op.cit.*; page 380. Professor Stanley Hoffman called for NATO to return to the tasks envisaged in the 1949 treaty and thus put into question the significance of the NATO integrated military structure. see Hoffman, S. ‘A plan for the new Europe.’ *New York Review of Books* 19 January 1990. page 18-21. A number of academics, spanning from sections of the radical intelligentsia and to conservative thinkers, voiced criticisms against the Bush administration’s decision to maintain a high level of engagement in European security. Some of these critics favoured Europeans having more of a say in the organisation. See Carpenter, T.G. *A search for enemies: America’s alliances after the cold war.*; Washington D.C.: CATO Institute. 1992.; Holmes, K. *Making the World Safe for America.*

forces on the European continent. This reflected divergent interests between the service chiefs and a tension between the Treasury and the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

Within the government, the work on the national and NATO defence reviews involved a small circle of actors. On the 31 January 1990, an ad hoc group composed of Tom King, (Defence Secretary), Margaret Thatcher, Douglas Hurd (Foreign Secretary) and John Major (Chancellor) was established to assess the way ahead for NATO. Sources revealed that the group was considering 'force projection' in which NATO forces could be deployed rapidly to trouble spots. The option would require a bigger navy, a smaller army and the commissioning of aircraft carriers capable of launching fixed-wing aircraft.⁴⁹ The defence policy review, closely supervised by the Cabinet, was carried out in secret and involved a closed section of policy makers led by Sir Michael Quinlan, Permanent Under Secretary at the MoD and Philip Mottram, the Deputy Under Secretary (Policy).⁵⁰ Other members included Alan Clark and Archie Hamilton, General Sir Dick Vincent, the next Chief of Defence staff and Ken MacDonald, the civil servant in charge of finance at the MoD.⁵¹

The debate about NATO and the defence white paper

On the 2nd of April 1990 the government published a Defence White Paper in which the need to maintain NATO and its flexible response was reaffirmed.⁵² Few

Washington: The Heritage Foundation. April 1992.

⁴⁹ 'Ministers look at new role for NATO', *The Times*. 31 January 1990. The existence of the ad-hoc group was confirmed by government sources to *The Times* a week later. 'Thatcher confirms readiness to review military study'. *The Times*. 7 February 1990.

⁵⁰ 'Hawks delay defence review' *The Independent*, 29 July 1990.

⁵¹ Bellamy, C and Brown, C. 'Ministers poles apart on defence changes: Tom King, the Secretary of State for Defence, opposes a plan submitted by Alan Clark, the Minister for Defence Procurement, to cut the British Army of the Rhine rather than the Royal Navy as part of an internal review.' *The Independent*, 28 May 1990.

⁵² 'Need for collective security remains; Defence White Paper.' *The Times*., 3 April 1990. Also see: Britain. House of Commons Papers. *Statement on the Defence Estimates*., April 1990, Vol 1, HMSO, page 19. The paper states that "Successive governments have recognised that our defence must be based on the collective security provided by the North Atlantic Alliance, and our national defence effort is overwhelmingly directed towards contributing to the ability of NATO to deter war. British forces make a major contribution

months later, on the 7th of June 1990, during a NAC meeting at Turberry in the UK, Margaret Thatcher made public her vision of the future of the Western Alliance. She argued that although NATO no longer had a clear front line, it still had a crucial role to play in defence. She stated that “we must keep our capacity effectively to deter and to defend ourselves. You don’t cancel your home insurance policy just because there have been fewer burglaries in your street in the last twelve months”.⁵³ She insisted that NATO had to retain enough nuclear weapons to meet long-term security needs and emphasised the importance of maintaining the integrated military structure. In addition, she argued that a united Germany should be a full member of NATO and that US forces should remain in Europe.

Among the possible new directions that the alliance could take, Mrs Thatcher raised the possibility of ‘out-of-area’ functions. She argued: “Ought NATO to give more thought to possible threats to our security from other directions? There is no guarantee that threats to our security will stop at some imaginary line across the mid-Atlantic. It is not long since some of us had to go to the Arabian Gulf to keep oil supplies flowing. We shall become very heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil once again in the next century. With the spread of sophisticated weapons and military technology to areas like the Middle East, potential threats to NATO territory may originate more from outside Europe.”⁵⁴

Margaret Thatcher was not the only British policy-maker who openly called for NATO to assume ‘out-of-area’ activities. In June 1990, Sir Michael Alexander, Britain’s permanent representative to NATO also stated that he believed that the alliance had to substitute its strategy of “flexible response and forward defence” with a new ‘out-of-area’ strategy aimed at dealing with the southern flank of NATO, North Africa and the Middle East. In his view it was the southern flank that

to the military effectiveness of the Alliance and they are committed to four main roles in NATO: nuclear forces, defence of the UK home-base, defence of the European mainland and maritime forces.”

⁵³ Britain. The Prime Minister’s Office. *Text of a speech made by the Prime Minister the Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher FRS MP to the North Atlantic Council at Turnberry on Thursday 7 June 1990*. London.1990, page 5.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*; p 5. Mrs Thatcher admitted the need to build on the CSCE as the body within which political and security issues as a whole can be discussed. In her view, however, the CSCE could never be a substitute for NATO.

would provide the main sources of threat to European security.⁵⁵ Julian Brazier, a Conservative backbencher on the Defence Committee and member of the All Party Parliamentary Maritime Group shared a similar opinion. He argued that "Britain must strive for NATO's brief to be expanded to include the Middle East, from North Africa to the Gulf".⁵⁶

Criticisms

The official government policy came under attack from a number of quarters. Some former Military Commanders and defence experts believed that the government was not facing up sufficiently to the need to change the alliance. Sir David Fraser, the Vice Chief of the General Staff and former British Military Representative to NATO contended that if the Soviet threat had really dissolved itself, then NATO's purpose would tend to dissolve too. Sir David Fraser believed that there was a need to transform the alliance's tasks fundamentally. He envisaged that NATO would become the instrument of transition to a new alliance.⁵⁷ Similarly, Edward Heath challenged the British government and US position that NATO could develop a new political role. In his view, other organisations in Europe already played such a role.⁵⁸

In a radical statement, Field Marshall Lord Carver, former Chief of Defence Staff, questioned NATO's future role. He called for the scrapping of the organisation by arguing that "existing NATO forces would be 'totally inappropriate' if democracy and stability took hold in Eastern Europe". In his view "NATO should be replaced by a European security organisation with multi-national units. While smaller American forces would still be needed in Europe to counterbalance the Soviet army, the elbowing out of the US generals would enable the French to play a full

⁵⁵ 'Defence experts warn of European military danger.' *The Times*, 21 June 1990.

⁵⁶ Brazier, J. *Arms and the men: a defence policy for a time of upheaval*. London: Centre for Policy Studies. October 1990. Julian Brazier called for Britain to strengthen the role of the WEU. He proposed that Britain should give the WEU a cell of NATO's intelligence and set up a small military planning staff able to examine Middle East issue. The cell would be answerable to NATO.

⁵⁷ Fraser, D (General). *Imperatives for Defence*. London: Centre for Policy Studies. 1990

⁵⁸ Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates*. 12 to 23rd February 1990, Vol 167, page 1102

part in the new European forces." In his view the new security organisation would combine NATO's task of providing a deterrent role against the Soviet Union and the tasks that the UN peacekeeping forces would have to undertake to deal with the re-awakening of nationalism in Eastern Europe.⁵⁹

Opposition from Labour rebels and the Liberals Lords

In the early part of 1990, the leadership of the British Labour Party did not voice robust criticisms against the government policy towards NATO. Although, in January 1990 Neil Kinnock had warned that Margaret Thatcher was creating problems for the country by pretending that nothing had changed, the leadership of the main opposition party did not put forward plans for revising NATO's role.⁶⁰ Rather, in a defence policy document published in May 1990, the Labour Party stated that it fully supported US Secretary of State Baker's demand for a more political NATO.⁶¹ Severe opposition to the continued existence of the Western Alliance and its strategy of flexible deterrence remained confined to the more radical sections of the Labour Party and among Liberal and Labour party peers. Denis Healey believed NATO had become a "biological monstrosity" and called for its replacement by a new organisation based on the model of the CSCE.⁶² Tony Benn believed that the argument for NATO no longer existed and maintained that what was required was a new European security treaty to replace the organisation and the Warsaw Pact.⁶³ The Liberal Democrat, Lord Mayhew, shared Tony Benn's belief in the need to replace NATO. In the Lords, Lord Williams (Labour) asked what was the point of keeping the alliance: "We should not be caught in a time

⁵⁹ Bellamy, C and Ripley, T. 'Clark denies a rift with King over defence policy: As Alan Clark, the Defence Procurement Minister, denies a split with Tom King, the Secretary of State of Defence.' *The Independent*, 1 June 1990.

⁶⁰ Timmins, N. 'Parliament and Politics: Labour presses for defence review.' *The Independent*, 30 January 1990, page 8.

⁶¹ Brown, C. 'Parliament and Politics: Defence cuts could pay pounds 5bn dividend.' *The Independent*, 16 May 1990. page 8.

⁶² *Independent*. 4 July 1990.

⁶³ 'The day in politics: labour hits uncertainty over defence – defence debate –' *The Guardian*. 19 June 1990.

warp of strategic planning, saying if there is no enemy we must invent one to keep our weapons systems up to date."⁶⁴

Within the main opposition party and in the British media there were high expectations for a 'peace dividend'. Already at the Labour Party conference in 1989, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) had forced a vote, against the wishes of the party leadership, to recommend reducing UK defence spending to the average level of other Western European countries. This policy was to be introduced through unilateral action. Although the Conference endorsed the motion proposed by the CND, in March 1990, the Labour Party stressed that defence cuts could only be achieved within a multilateral framework and that nuclear deterrence should be maintained until it was negotiated away.⁶⁵ Then in May the Labour Party published its revised defence policy. Although, in the policy document, no figure for the cuts in defence was again quoted, an indication was given that they could amount to more than 5 bn pounds.⁶⁶

The debates within the British government

Apart from such voices in opposition, there was also a controversy among policy makers in charge of outlining the new defence strategy. There were alleged disagreements between the Defence Minister Tom King and the Junior Defence Minister Alan Clark about the extent of the restructuring of the armed forces. Tom King, supported by most of the British military commanders, believed that the Soviet Union still posed a considerable threat and thus demanded a defence review that did not put into question the basic service level and its structure. Alan Clark, in contrast, argued that there had to be a more fundamental reappraisal of the security environment and of the nature and structure of the armed forces. Clark wanted

⁶⁴ quoted in 'The Day in Politics: Both Houses urge deeper cuts in Britain's military forces' *The Guardian*, 18 July 1990, page 4.

⁶⁵ 'No rapid military cuts, warns Labour Defence spokesmen' *Tribune*, 9 March 1990; and Brown, C. 'Labour rules out big defence cuts' *Independent*, 3 March 1990, page 2. For background see Keohane, D. *The Labour Party's defence policy since 1945*. Leicester & New York: Leicester University Press and St. Martin's Press. 1993.

⁶⁶ Brown, C. 'Parliament and Politics: Defence cuts could pay pounds 5bn dividend.' *The Independent*, 16 May 1990, page 8; Brown, C. 'Planning for defence puts priority on jobs'

Britain to maintain and foster an 'out-of-area' capability. He favoured deep cuts in the army and a halving of the 140,000 strong civilian staff but an expansion of the Royal Marines and Parachute regiment.⁶⁷

The outcome: 'Option for Change'

On the 25 July 1990, the British new defence strategy, 'Option for Change' was made public. One of the most controversial decisions was to halve the number of British forces stationed in Germany by the mid-1990s. Other reductions included cuts from 15 to nine in the number of squadrons in RAF Germany. The RAF bases were to be reduced from 4 to 2. The British contribution to the air defence of Germany was to end. There were to be less drastic changes in naval and domestic forces.⁶⁸ The review envisaged an 18 per cent cut in personnel the bulk of which was concentrated within the Army and RAF.⁶⁹ The commitment to 'out-of-area' operations was expressed in two policies: first, the creation of a division bringing together amphibious, parachute, air-mobile and armoured formations; secondly, the absence of significant cuts in the naval forces, which allowed Britain to maintain a forward maritime capability.⁷⁰

The Independent, 14 May 1990. page 6.

⁶⁷ Bellamy, C and Brown, C. 'Ministers poles apart on defence changes: Tom King, the Secretary of State for Defence, opposes a plan submitted by Alan Clark, the Minister for Defence Procurement, to cut the British Army of the Rhine rather than the Royal Navy as part of an internal review.' *The Independent*., 28 May 1990; Bellamy, C and Ripley, T. 'Clark denies a rift with King over defence policy: As Alan Clark, the Defence Procurement Minister, denies a split with Tom King, the Secretary of State for Defence'. *The Independent*. 1 June 1990.; 'Ministers face defence review 'shambles' row'. *The Independent*. 18 June 1990.

⁶⁸ Naval forces, including nuclear and diesel submarines were to be reduced from 27 to around 16 and destroyers and frigates from 48 to around 40.

⁶⁹ The Regular Army would number 120,000, the Royal Navy and Royal Marines would together number about 60,000 and the Royal Air Force about 75,000. The cuts included similar reduction in UK-based civilians employed by the Ministry of Defence. The document stressed a commitment to retaining the strategic deterrence. Trident would replace Polaris and the dual-capable Tornados (in slightly smaller numbers) would be equipped with a new nuclear stand-off missile. On the home front no significant cuts were announced. British commitment overseas remained unaffected.

⁷⁰ Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates*, 25 July 1990, Vol 177, pages 468 - 486.

The measures outlined in 'Options for Change' were criticised for lacking a strategic rationale.⁷¹ Indeed, it appeared that the divergent positions present within the Treasury, the MoD and the Cabinet had prevented a radical restructuring of forces. Although there was to be a reduction in the army stationed in Europe, there was no clear strategy that explained what would happen to the remaining troops.

The German debate about the role of NATO and national defence

Since Germany was at the centre of the dramatic political changes and was undergoing a process of transformation from a divided to a united country, the debate about national defence strategy and NATO was of a qualitative different nature from those in Britain and the United States. In the first eight months of 1990, the national security debate concerned the following issues: to what extent should a united Germany remain a member of NATO and what kind of strategies should it pursue? At the same time the efforts of military planners were directed towards devising ways to merge the East German army with the Bundeswehr. Because of these national preoccupations, the German government was not at the vanguard in shaping the NATO defence review.⁷² For a number of historical reasons, later to be explained, German policy makers were also extremely reluctant to acknowledge openly any attempts present among partners' countries and NATO structures to give the Western Alliance an 'out-of-area' role.

As previously mentioned, German defence strategies and the future structure and size of the Bundeswehr were negotiated at the 2 plus 4 talks. As a result of the negotiations, in September 1990, the Kohl government put forward its defence budget, which envisaged a reduction in the level of the Bundeswehr to 370,000 troops and plans to integrate the East German army. Throughout the negotiations,

⁷¹ Freedman, L. 'Whom are we defending, and against what?' *The Independent*. 10 July 1991. Britain. Defence Committee. *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1991: Session 1990-1991*. Eleventh Report, HC 394, London. 24 July 1991. para 2.1. Other defence experts argued that the lack of coherent strategy behind the changes was to be explained by the fact the policy had been driven by arbitrary expenditure cuts imposed by the Treasury. Hutchinson, R. 'Unilateralism by stealth?' *International Defence Review*. No. 8; 1991.

⁷² This point was confirmed during interviews with Paul Breuer 24 June 1999 and with Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp on 25 June 1999.

the ruling coalition was confronted with substantial opposition from the SPD and the Green party.

SPD and the Greens: opposition to NATO

Until April 1990, the SPD remained opposed to the government policy that a united Germany was to remain a member of the NATO alliance. Oskar Lafontaine, the SPD's candidate for West German Chancellor, argued repeatedly for Germany's withdrawal from the integrated military command structure of NATO.⁷³ Speaking at the East's party congress in Leipzig in February 1990, Lafontaine stated that the alliance was "downright anachronistic".⁷⁴ Although in April 1990,⁷⁵ the SPD came around to the government position that a unified Germany would be a member of the alliance, the SPD's agreement was conditional. The SPD conceptualised membership to the organisation remaining limited to an interim, transitional period.⁷⁶ In the longer term, the SPD envisaged that NATO's main tasks would be that of overcoming the division inherent in the European security system. The SPD argued that NATO had to be dismantled and the CSCE had to become the new institutional instrument for security relations in Europe.⁷⁷ Some party members also wanted a more far-reaching transformation of the alliance, even within the 'transitional period'. Hermann Scheer and Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, who represented the pacifist wing within the SPD, contended that the alliance had to change its nuclear and offensive strategy immediately.⁷⁸

⁷³ 5 March 1990. 'GIS find welcome wears thin as German unification looms'. *Washington Post*, 5 March 1990, Section A, Vol 113, issue 90.

⁷⁴ 'Analysis: German unity drive poses problems for Kohl: His party is upstaged by Social Democrats' *The Washington Post*, 27 February 1990, Section A, page 14, Volume 113, issue 84.

⁷⁵ The SPD only agreed to German unification in April 1990 and the Greens remained opposed to some of the terms negotiated during the "2 Plus 4" talks. Presseservice der SPD. *Positionspapier zu den sicherheitspolitischen Aspekten der deutschen Einigung. Von der Konfrontation der Blöcke zu einem Europäischen Sicherheitssystem*. Bonn. 25 April 1990. For how the SPD changed its view of the Genscher plan and dropped the idea of abandoning NATO see Voigt, K. D. 'Deutsche Einheit und gesamteuropäische Ordnung, des Friedens und der Freiheit.' *Deutschland Archiv*, 4 April 1990, pages 562 - 568.

⁷⁶ Voigt, K. D. in Germany. Deutscher Bundestag, *Plenarprotokoll* 11 Wahlperiode, 210 Sitzung, 10 May 1990, seite 16498.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*; Dr Ehmke seite 16484.

⁷⁸ Payne, K. B. and Rühle, M. 'The Future of the Alliance: emerging German views'

The Greens, the second main opposition party in Parliament, had traditionally opposed German membership in NATO. Throughout 1990s, the Greens expressed doubts toward the alliance's ability to become an instrument of peace. In contrast to the SPD, the Greens were concerned that maintaining NATO during a transitional period would create the basis for giving a new life to the alliance, rather than contributing to dissolving it.⁷⁹ The Greens suggested that, in the short term, NATO should be transformed into a political alliance and, in the longer term, it should be dissolved. This meant that NATO had to abolish its strategy of flexible response and remove all conventional, atomic and chemical weapons immediately. In addition, the Greens proposed that Europe should develop new security structures and organisations. In their view, Germany and other CSCE member states had to transfer their sovereignty over their security policies to a common peace and security organisation.⁸⁰ Britain and France had also to follow a similar path. The Greens called for a new form of co-operation between the Soviet Union and North America and a new relationship between the European Community (EC) and the UN. They argued that a new system should be established to govern the relationship between the EC and the UN. From their perspective, a European Security Council with executive functions and the power to introduce sanctions had to be established. They envisaged the existence of a parliamentary assembly for the democratic control of European security policy and also a European High Court for the management of conflict.⁸¹ In addition, throughout the 2 plus 4 negotiations, the Greens rejected the government's plans to make a unified Germany a full member of NATO. According to them, the signing of the 2 plus 4 treaty would strengthen NATO and undermine the CSCE.⁸²

Strategic Review, Winter 1991, Vol 19, pages 37 - 45.

⁷⁹ Germany. Deutscher Bundestag. 10 May 1990. *op.cit.* Dr Lippelt section 16484 and Hoss Greens, sections 16493.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*; Mr Hoss section 16493 and 16494; Exact statement: "Europa sollte folgende Strukturen haben. Erstens. Das vereinigte Deutschland wie auch alle anderen KSZE-Staaten übertragen die Souveränität über ihre Sicherheitspolitik der gesamteuropäischen Friedens- und Sicherheitsorganisation."

⁸¹ *Ibid*; Mr Hoss page 16493 and 16494; Germany. Deutscher Bundestag. *Plenarprotokoll*, 11 Wahlperiode, Sitzung 214, 31 May 1990 see Frau Beer.

⁸² Germany. Deutscher Bundestag. *Plenarprotokoll*, 11 Wahlperiode, Sitzung 22. 5 September 1990. Frau Kottwitz 17543; Germany. Deutscher Bundestag. *Plenarprotokoll*,

The anti-NATO feelings present among the SPD and the Greens surfaced during the debates about the stationing of NATO troops in Germany and the size of the defence budget. In May 1990, a SPD spokesman stated that the sections of the NATO treaty that dealt with the stationing of NATO forces in Germany had to be revised. In addition, the SPD pressed for domestic and foreign military forces stationed in Germany to be cut substantially and their tasks and aims changed fundamentally.⁸³ It is with no surprise that, when in September 1990 the new defence budget was announced, both the SPD and the Greens criticised it for relying on Cold War assumptions and for failing to develop new security concepts. The two opposition parties accused the government of pursuing a new armament strategy through the introduction of anti-missiles systems and a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons.⁸⁴

The Bundeswehr's 'out-of-area' issue

Because of the nature of the domestic debate about security policy, in the first eight months of 1990, German politicians and officials were not at the forefront for calling for NATO to assume an 'out-of-area' role. The issue of the deployment of the Bundeswehr in 'out-of-area' operations was in fact taboo in German political culture. Throughout the Cold-War period there was a consensus among German politicians that the Bundeswehr should not become involved in conflicts outside the NATO treaty area. German parties agreed that the country's role in international politics was to foster co-operation among states and resolve conflicts through the

11 Wahlperiode 226 Sitzung, 20 September 1990, Frau Beer, section 17820. Frau Kelly did not vote in support of the 2 plus 4 treaty because Germany had not totally refused to possess atomic weapons and the treaty had not clarified if the reduction in the number of German troops would mean that would not be equipped with atomic weapons. Deutscher Bundestag *Plenarprotokoll*, 229 Sitzung, 11 Wahlperiode, 5 October 1990. See Frau Kelly section 18109. The Greens were also unhappy with the proposals that no NATO troops should be stationed on the territory of the former DDR during a period of 3 to 4 years.

⁸³ Germany. Deutscher Bundestag. Fraktion der SPD *Drucksache* 11/7292, 30 May 1990. For discussions see Germany. Deutscher Bundestag, *Plenarprotokoll*, 11 Wahlperiode, Sitzung 214, 31 May 1990.

⁸⁴ For the SPD, see Verheugen's speech in Germany. Deutscher Bundestag. *Plenarprotokolle*, 11 Wahlperiode, 216 Sitzung, 20 June 1990, section 17054. For the Greens see Frau Beer Germany. Deutscher Bundestag. *Plenarprotokoll*, 11 Wahlperiode,

use of non-military means, a stance often defined as the country acting as a “civilian power”.⁸⁵ The complexity of the issue of the Bundeswehr’s ‘out-of-area’ role is expressed by the fact that there were a number of constitutional provisions related to the issue.⁸⁶ In the late 1980s, partly as a response to US pressure to provide support for mine-sweeping activities in the Persian Gulf, sections of the Ministry of Defence had drafted a proposal to allow the Bundeswehr to take part in ‘out-of-area’ engagements. However, at the time there was no support within government circles and political parties for such an initiative. The sensitivity of the issue was also demonstrated by the fact that when in October 1987, Horst Teltschik, adviser to Kohl, publicly stated that the constitution allowed for the deployment of the German Bundeswehr world-wide within NATO, the UN, the EC and the WEU, his statement was greeted with consternation. In a later interview he was forced to deny that he sought to promote the role of the Bundeswehr world-wide.⁸⁷

In the late 1980s, although the SPD was opposed to any talks of allowing the Bundeswehr to act outside the NATO treaty area, there were a number of defence experts who supported the idea of the Bundeswehr becoming involved in peacekeeping operations. The same view was expressed within CDU/CSU circles. Public statements in this regard were made in May 1988 by members of the Foreign Policy Working group who included Defence Minister Scholz, Karl

216 Sitzung, 20 June 1990, section 17055.

⁸⁵ Maull, H. W. ‘Zivilmacht: die konzeption und ihre sicherheitspolitische Relevanz.’ in W. Heydrich et al. (Ed.). *Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands: Neue Konstellationen, Risiken, Instrumente*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.1995/1996.

⁸⁶They are to be found in Article 87a, 24 and 25 of the German constitution. Article 87a states that the armed forces serve “defensive purposes” and “apart from defence ... are only to be used to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic law”. Article 24 states that the Federal Republic can enter a “system of mutual collective security” and consent to any resulting limitation on national sovereignty in order to help bring about a peaceful world. Article 25 gives international law precedent over national law.

⁸⁷ In the Spring of 1987, the BMV circulated an internal paper according to which, under international law and within the parameters of the German constitution, the Bundeswehr could be deployed abroad in the following three cases: 1) during humanitarian operations and in the case of disaster relief operations; 2) for the protection of German citizens’ property and; 3) for the protection of the international order through minesweeping measures in international shipping waters. This paper is to be found in Nikutta, R. and Thomas, C. (Ed.) *Bundeswehr und Grundgesetz - Zur neuen Rolle der militärischen Intervention in der Aussenpolitik, Militärpolitik Dokumentation*, No. 78/79, Vol 13,

Lamers, Franz-Josef Strauss and Manfred Wörner.⁸⁸ Within the SPD, the position was expressed by members of the “Arbeitsgruppe Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle”. The group included Norbert Gansel, Genrot Erler, Florian Gerster, Hermann Scheer, Dietrich Stobbe, Helga Timm and Egon Bahr.⁸⁹ In August 1988, the SPD group put forward a proposal to change Art 24 GG of the constitution. Their statement argued that “The Federal forces should be allowed to participate outside the borders of a system of collective security which the army is contributing as a member. This should take place only within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations or with approval of the Security Council and of the party involved in the conflict.”⁹⁰

As commentators have pointed out, since the SPD’s proposal mentioned the “borders of a system of reciprocal collective security” one could but think of NATO. Only the Western Alliance had in fact a defence obligation limited to a particular area. To a certain extent, perhaps because of an oversight over legal terms, the proposal of the group “Arbeitsgruppe Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle” appeared to go beyond the thinking within sections of the CDU/CSU.⁹¹

It is important to stress however that these views belonged to a minority. In 1990, German officials directed their efforts to ensure that any changes in the military status of Germany did not raise suspicions among NATO allies that the country was pursuing an independent defence policy. Domestically, the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition was keen to achieve a broad consensus on security and defence

Frankfurt. 1991, pages 72 - 74.

⁸⁸ ‘Tagung der Arbeitskreises Aussenpolitik der Union: Europäische Pfeiler der NATO stärken.’ *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 17 May 1988; ‘Verteidigungsminister Scholz lässt sich eine Tür offen. Gedanken des Einsatzes von Soldaten ausserhalb der NATO aufgegriffen/Aus SPD und FDP sind ähnliche Töne zu hören.’ *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 6 August 1988. Löwe, V. *Peacekeeping-Operationen der UN - Aspekte einer Beteiligung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Muenster, Hamburg: Lit Verlag. 1994. page 231-232.

⁸⁹ Egon Bahr was not a MP but took part in the discussion.

⁹⁰ “Die Streitkräfte des Bundes dürfen ausserhalb der Grenzen eines Systems gegenseitiger kollektiver Sicherheit, dem der Bund als Mitglied beigetreten ist, nur im Rahmen des Abschnittes VII der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen oder mit Zustimmung des Sicherheitsrates und der Konfliktparteien bei friedssichernden Massnahmen der Vereinten Nationen eingesetzt werden”. quoted in ‘SPD-Vorschlag für Einsatz der Bundeswehr bei UN-Truppen.’ *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 17 August 1988.

⁹¹ Phillippi, N. *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als aussen- und sicherheitspolitisches*

issues⁹² and did not make any official statement in support of NATO going 'out-of-area'.

In summary, within the first eight months of 1990, NATO IMS, US and British politicians considered the proposal that NATO should assume 'out-of-area' operations. The German government was not officially concerned with this issue. Other NATO member states remained domestically divided on the issue.

Only the Ministry of Defence of a small number of NATO countries embraced the proposal for NATO to go 'out-of-area'. The Italian, Norwegians and Canadian Ministries of Defence supported the project for a number of different reasons. Since the mid 1980s, the Italian Ministry of Defence had been at the vanguard in calling for the establishment of rapid reaction forces (RRF) to be deployed in the Mediterranean region. In 1985 an official decision was taken to establish such force but progress in its formation had been slow. For the Italian militaries, the creation of new NATO capabilities would have stimulated the establishment of its RRF.⁹³ The Canadian and Danish Ministries of Defence gave strong support to the idea of developing 'out-of-area' capabilities because of lessons drawn from carrying out a number of UN peacekeeping operations. SACEUR's proposal for developing rapid reaction forces was perceived as allowing Canadian and Danish soldiers to be better prepared to deal with the escalating and changing tasks of peacekeeping operations.⁹⁴ Within the Danish Ministry of Defence, the ideas discussed in NATO were also perceived as helping to create a domestic consensus for the restructuring of its own domestic armed forces. As Kristian Fischer, Defence Adviser in NATO, explained in an interview, the nature of the Danish political system required that

Problem des geeingten Deutschland. Trier. 1996, pages 64 – 65.

⁹² This point was confirmed in an interview with the Deputy German Permanent Representative at NATO on 7 September 1998.

⁹³ Zannoni, F. *La logica del disordine: la politica di sicurezza italiana nell'era post-bipolare*. Series Politica studi; 24, Milano: F. Angeli. 1997. Stenhouse, M. "Italy" in G. Bruce. (Ed.). *Jane's NATO Handbook 1991*. Coulsdon, UK: Jane's. 1991.

⁹⁴ Interviews at NATO Headquarters with Mr Kristian Fischer, Defence Adviser at the Permanent Representative of Denmark to NATO Headquarters, (8 September 1998) and Major Craig Cotter, Military Adviser at the Permanent Representative of Canada to NATO Headquarters. (5 November 1998)

the government obtained the broadest possible political and public support for any proposals for restructuring the army.⁹⁵

However, in all NATO member states there were strong expectations for a peace dividend and some European governments, particularly France and Spain, had strong political objections to the development of NATO 'out-of-area' operations. In Paris and Madrid politicians perceived the 'out-of-area' proposals as an attempt by Britain and the United States to reinforce their dominant positions within NATO. The Dutch and Norwegian governments were concerned that if NATO were to assume 'out-of-area' activities it would be at the expense of the United Nations. Some Italian and Turkish officials feared that an emphasis on 'out-of-area' tasks would jeopardise the integrated military structure.⁹⁶

The impact of the Gulf war on the NATO review process: November 1990 to June 1991

The debates about the future of NATO and the restructuring of national defence forces were influenced by the response of the international community to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait that began in August 1990.⁹⁷ The Gulf war strengthened the position of those groups who had advocated an 'out-of-area' role for the alliance. It led to an increased awareness within German government circles, sections of the SPD and the FDP of the urgency to revise the role of the Bundeswehr in operations outside the domestic territory. To understand the emergence of this new consensus, the nature of NATO participation in the Gulf war would first be described. Then an analysis of the lessons learnt by NATO staff and British and US officials would be provided. In the final section, the changed perceptions of German politicians will be outlined.

⁹⁵ interview with Kristian Fischer, *ibid*.

⁹⁶ This point was made during a number of interviews at NATO headquarters.

⁹⁷ A number of books have been written on the response of the West to the Gulf war: see Donnenreuther, R. *The Gulf Conflict: a political and strategic analysis*. London: Adelphi Papers, Winter 1991/1992.; McCausland, J. L.-C. *The Gulf conflict : a military analysis*. London, IISS. November 1993; Taylor, P. and Groom, A. J. R. *The United Nations and the Gulf war, 1990-1991: Back to the Future ?* London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1992.

NATO's participation in the Gulf war

On the 2nd August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait. The next day, NATO responded by holding an emergency meeting. During the meeting, the United States pressed for a NATO 'out-of-area' operation. Then on the 10th of August the Council met at a ministerial level, although NATO member states expressed their unanimous backing of US President Bush's decision to provide military support for Saudi Arabia, it agreed that joint action under the aegis of the alliance was ruled out. It was decided that NATO would limit itself to act as a forum to discuss common strategies toward the crisis.⁹⁸ The United States embarked on establishing and leading an anti-Iraq coalition through the United Nations. The anti-Iraq coalition included Canada and nine European NATO member states.⁹⁹ Despite the formal decision not to become involved in 'out-of-area' operations, NATO started to use its military infrastructure and resources to support the preparation for Operation Desert Storm. At the same time, the organisation deployed military forces in Turkey and in the Mediterranean in order to safeguard Turkey from a potential attack from Iraq.¹⁰⁰

NATO's military engagement in support of the anti-Iraq coalition can be described as follows. During August and September 1990 the alliance limited its defensive posture towards the region by sending NATO Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) to eastern Turkey; it raised the level of intelligence reporting in the Southern region and on 14 September it activated the NATO Naval on-Call Force Mediterranean. Then, on 2nd January 1991, following Ankara's request for military support, it dispatched German, Dutch and Belgian air squadrons, part of the Allied Mobile Force (AMF) to Turkey. The day after the air war began the alliance approved a further increased naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean.

⁹⁸ NATO Foreign Minister meeting. *Communiqué of Special Ministerial meeting*. Brussels: NATO. 10 August 1990.; Dickson, T. 'Crisis in the Gulf: NATO backing for Bush unanimous.' *Financial Times*, 11 August 1990. page 2.

⁹⁹The European NATO member states were: Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom.

¹⁰⁰ At the 10 August 1990 Ministerial Meeting, NATO made it clear that it considered any attack on Turkey as an attack on all members.

It sent mine counter measures vessels of the Standing Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN) to the Central Mediterranean. STANAVFORCHAN consisted of ships from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the U.K. By early 1991, maritime surveillance in the Mediterranean was augmented by several units from the German Navy and by STANAVFORCHAN, all under NATO command, bringing the number of men deployed on ships to 2000. Maritime Patrol Aircrafts from Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United States, France, Spain and the United Kingdom were also stationed and co-ordinated their missions with NATO.¹⁰¹ This activity would not have taken place smoothly without prior planning. As General Galvin explained during a congressional testimony, past NATO exercises were used to help the anti-Iraqi coalition deploy the largest concentration of military power ever seen since the Second World War.¹⁰²

The military lessons

A number of important military lessons were drawn from participation in the Gulf war. During the operations, NATO commanders developed new command and control structures to co-ordinate the activities of member states. NATO operations in the Mediterranean exemplified this point in that it was organised on a two tier system: a defensive and warning network and Mednet, defined as “a set of measures designed to detect and deter troublemakers along the sea and air routes in the Mediterranean”.¹⁰³ Mednet involved the use of 27 maritime patrol aircrafts

¹⁰¹ NATO activities in the Mediterranean came to be known as ‘Southern Guard’. See NATO Allied Forces Southern Europe. *Fact Sheet: Southern Guard*. available at <http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/SouthernGuardFactSheet.htm>. January-March 1991.

¹⁰² United States. Senate Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services. *Changes in European Security Environment*. Washington: GPO, February 26, 27 and 7 March 1991. pages 148 - 149. Asked by a Senator, if NATO had a plan to deal with ‘out-of-area’ contingency plans and how it managed to prepare the forces and resolve the logistical problems to support the anti-Iraq coalition, Galvin replied: “..We did not have a plan to do that, but what we did have was a management arrangement which had come about over the years from doing Reforger, where we brought the American troops over each year in fairly large quantities. At one point in recent years we brought the III Corps out of Texas into the north German plain. What we did was Reforger and worked it on the reverse. Only we worked fast.... Normally, to plan Reforger takes about six to eight months. We planned it in reverse with the Germans in 3 days.”

¹⁰³ Howe, J. T. ‘NATO and the Gulf crisis’ *Survival*, May/June 1991, vol.XXX III, no3. pages 246 - 259. see pages 249 - 252.

(MPA), 20 submarines from seven nations and a structure of co-ordination to link both naval and air forces. As Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, Commander in Chief of Allied Force in NATO's southern region, explained, the significance of Mednet was that it was "destined to be a model for future co-operation among the nations of the alliance, as they shape strategies and operational concepts for smaller forces in response to new challenges."¹⁰⁴

The success of Operation Desert Storm and the subsequent retreat of Iraqi forces from Kuwait proved to the Western Allies that military forces could succeed in stopping aggression. Most importantly, it reinforced the belief that an 'out-of-area' crisis, particularly in the Middle East, posed a new threat to European security. The arguments that the NATO treaty allowed for joint 'out-of-area' operations and that such operations should be part of the organisation's new tasks grew stronger during and immediately after the end of the Gulf war.¹⁰⁵

Whilst, General Eide, the Chairman of the MC, stressed the importance of the allies' contribution to the operation in the Gulf in the areas of logistics, groups and material,¹⁰⁶ Manfred Wörner, NATO Secretary-General, and William F. Taft, US Ambassador to NATO, called for the Western Alliance to assume 'out-of-area' tasks.¹⁰⁷ In a speech to the North Atlantic Assembly on 29 November 1990, Wörner argued that although there had been more Alliance solidarity during the Gulf war than in any previous 'out-of-area' crisis, NATO had to be able to do more. The alliance had to learn from the lessons of the Gulf to "improve both its crisis management and crisis prevention machinery".¹⁰⁸ In an interview with the *Financial Times* in May 1991, Wörner also argued the NATO treaty did allow the

¹⁰⁴ *ibid* page 15.

¹⁰⁵ Lowe, K. and Young, T.-D. 'Multinational corps in NATO' *Survival*, January/February 1991, issue 33, Volume 1 page 66-77.; Stuart, D. T. "NATO after Operation Desert Storm: new roles for new forces?" in B. George. (Ed.). *Jane's NATO Handbook* Coulsdon. 1991. pages 211 - 214.

¹⁰⁶ North Atlantic Assembly, Special Committee on Alliance Strategy and Arms Control (Rapporteurs: L. Bouvard). November 1990. *op.cit.* page 15.

¹⁰⁷ The role of Manfred Wörner in promoting NATO's 'out-of-area' role has been confirmed in a number of interviews at NATO Headquarters; 5 December 1990, 'The out-of-area question: the atlantic alliance will not play the role of "global policeman".' *Atlantic News*, No. 2278.

organisation to take action 'out-of-area' but consensus among nations had to be achieved on the issue.¹⁰⁹ Similarly in 1991 William F. Taft commented on the significance of the Gulf war by stating that "perhaps a broader lesson we have learned is that the alliance not only worked for four decades to deter Soviet aggression, but it also works to defeat aggression by Third World dictators."¹¹⁰

US and British military lessons

The sentiments expressed by NATO international staff were in tune with the military lessons being drawn by the US and British militaries. The Gulf war confirmed two beliefs that were already held by the Pentagon and US military advisers: firstly that the United States needed to shift its focus to regional crises; secondly that the future threat would be unpredictable. The idea of 'forward presence', that is the ability to deploy forces rapidly, gained strength. The implication was that access to overseas infrastructure and a high level of mobility for both forces based at sea and in the air was vital.¹¹¹ Hence, US military analysts argued that the existence of the NATO infrastructure had been crucial to the success of Desert Storm. Since it was envisaged that future threats would come from the Middle East, it was argued that it was crucial that the United States maintained troops in Europe so as to be able to respond promptly to any military threats.¹¹² The Pentagon incorporated the lessons in their national defence strategy. In August 1991, a major source document for the new strategy was in fact released, the title of which was the *National Security Strategy of the United States*. In the

¹⁰⁸ North Atlantic Assembly. *Proceedings*, 36th Annual Session. 29 November 1990.

¹⁰⁹ Mauthner, R. 'The FT Interview: Pillar in a world of instability - Manfred Wörner, the Secretary-General of NATO, speaks to Robert Mauthner'. *Financial Times*, page 38, 7 May 1991.

¹¹⁰ Taft, W. H. "NATO transformed: the new US role in Europe". in B. George. (Ed.). *op.cit.* 1991, pages 233 - 236:

¹¹¹ Pocalyko, M. N. 'Riding on the Storm: the influence of war on strategy.' In J. J. Tritten and P. N. Stockton. *op.cit.*. 1992. pages 51 - 67

¹¹² Backwell, J. A. A. *The Gulf war: military lesson learned - Interim report of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies - Study group on lessons learned from the Gulf war*. Washington, D.C: The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1991.; and Christman, C. D. W. (Brigadier General US Army) 'Desert Shield: Test of a New "Contingency"'. *Armed Forces Journal International*, December 1990, Vol 128 issue 5.

document, it was argued that regional crises along with forward presence were to be the primary determinants of the size and structure of future US forces.¹¹³

Moreover, US military advisers asserted that it was evident that to deal with a new potential Iraqi scenario, strong military and political co-operation had to be maintained between US troops and European allies. NATO had a crucial role to play in that area. At the same time, the deployment of US troops in Europe was no longer to be based on the rationale of fighting a war against the Soviet Union, but rather to deal with 'out-of-area' crises. As Jan S. Breemer explained, during the Cold War period one of the strongest reasons for US presence in Europe was the US nuclear guarantee to offset Russian strategic capability. By early 1991 the lack of a credible anti-Soviet scenario forced the US European command (USECOM) to institutionalise the precedent set by Desert Shield/Storm and to reorient its day-to-day operational planning to 'out-of-area'. Thus, the projection of force for 'out-of-area' contingencies became "the most persuasive military rationale for preserving a US presence in Europe."¹¹⁴

Like their US counterparts, the British military commanders drew two vital military lessons from the Gulf war. Firstly, the need for units especially equipped and trained to move troops and supporting equipment overseas quickly. Secondly, the necessity for flexibility in command structure, that is the ability to build up command structures for deploying forces, as the crisis developed.¹¹⁵

During the war, within US and British military circles the idea was floated that closer co-operation in putting forward concrete proposals for new force structures was required. Hence, in September 1990, SACEUR asked the British government if it was willing to take over the command of the future NATO RRF, later to be known as the ARRC. The idea fulfilled divergent US and British domestic concerns. For the Americans, the idea of giving Britain the command of the ARRC,

¹¹³ United States. The White House. *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Washington, DC, US: US Government Printing Office. August 1991.

¹¹⁴ Breemer, J. S. 'US forces in Europe: the search of a mission' in. J.J. Tritten and P.N. Stockton. *op.cit.* pages, 137 - 152.

¹¹⁵ Thomson, C. J. (Air Vice Marshall), 'Air Force in Operations Granby - The lessons so

meant that the United States did not commit itself directly to maintaining additional troops on European soil. This was an important issue since leading figures in the Senate questioned the US military commitment to Europe. Les Aspin, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, for example, held the view that although the US presence in Europe was necessary, the level of US troops commitment to Europe had to be reduced.¹¹⁶

For the British militaries and members of the Cabinet, participation in developing and commanding new rapid reaction forces had an advantage. It represented an important opportunity for the British armed forces to reconstitute themselves on more flexible and mobile lines. The British government supported the establishment of the AARC because it could achieve simultaneously a number of foreign and defence goals. On the one hand, since British troops would be integrated with those of other nations, Britain could maintain its European military presence and withstand demands for further cuts in continental engagements. This was an important issue because, as previously mentioned, the future of three armoured divisions and 15 RAF squadrons stationed in West Germany, a presence known as the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), had caused much controversy during the defence review and raised concerns among military commanders.¹¹⁷ The proposal allowed the British army to withstand further demands for cuts in forces stationed in continental Europe. As McInnes explains:

far' *RUSI Journal*, Winter 1990.

¹¹⁶ For the Cheney-Aspin debate see Winnefeld, James, A. *The Post-Cold War Force-Sizing Debate: Paradigms, Metaphors, and Disconnects*. Santa Monica: Rand. 1992.

¹¹⁷ BAOR was subdivided into the following corps: one (British) Corps contributed to the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), RAF Germany contributed to the Second Allied Tactical Air Force (TWOATAF), and a substantial reinforcement contribution mainly to the "flanks". Britain also contributed with 2,300 servicemen and women to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) and SACEUR's Strategic Reserve (AIR). Britain earmarked a command brigade, an infantry brigade and three squadrons of Jaguar aircraft to reinforce Norway and Denmark. Britain also formed the United Kingdom Mobile Force (UKMF) and the Regional Air Reinforcement Squadron (RRS).

“Without the leadership of the ARRC and the implication of a substantial British contribution, the British Army might have encountered severe difficulties in justifying both its size and its retention of substantial armoured and mechanised forces to the Treasury keen on reducing defence expenditure. Therefore in early 1991 the British were pushing strongly for the ARRC in NATO counsels.”¹¹⁸

On the other hand, through taking the lead in ARRC, the British Ministry of Defence was not only able to retain two divisions of the BAOR but also succeeded in modernising a third division. In fact, when the NATO AARC were announced,¹¹⁹ the 3rd Division of the previous BAOR was given new parachute and air-mobile capabilities to allow it to function as a rapidly deployable force for crises outside the NATO area. Thanks to the new consensus among the US and British militaries, the IMS sought approval from the MC for the new rapid reaction forces. In the Spring of 1991, SHAPE tabled an official proposal for a three-tier NATO structure divided into Reaction, Main Defence and Augmentation forces. In April 1991, the NATO MC accepted this proposal, known as MC 317. A month later, the NAC approved the establishment of a single stand-by army corps - the ARRC - and awarded leadership of the new elite to the United Kingdom. By so doing, Britain confirmed its leading position in NATO.

The structure of the AARC approved in 1991 was similar to that planned and discussed within the MC and IMS in early 1990. The ARRC was to include a multinational reaction force, consisting of an Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) and a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). The first was to be made up of a 5,000 strong brigade with supporting air elements and was to be available on seventy-two hours' notice. Its purpose was quick-reaction to crisis management and its organisation was essentially an elaboration of the existing Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force. The RRF was the centrepiece of NATO's new multinational force structure. It was to consist of elements drawn from all three services, land, sea and

¹¹⁸ McInnes, C. *The British Army and NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps*. London, Brassey's for the Centre of Defence Studies. 1993. page 8.

air but the core was to be a British led 70,000 strong rapid reaction forces (RRF). The latter were to be built around two British divisions and a multinational division composed of German, Dutch, and Belgian units. The RRF was to require up to ten days to augment the IRF.¹²⁰

The IMS not only pushed for the approval of the ARRC but also, in the context of the three tracks working groups, took the lead in putting forward concrete plans for the emerging new NATO Strategic Concept. In June 1991, the chairman of the Military Strategy Working Group (MSWG) presented a draft of a military strategy document. The MSWG wanted the document to form the basic principles and guidelines for the 3 Major NATO Commanders and national military authorities and politicians. The document aimed to be used as a basis for the development of their operational concepts and plans. It was intended to guard the development of new command and force structures for the armed forces of NATO countries. The title of the document was MC 400: "MC Directives for military implementation of the Alliance Strategic Concept". An ambitious timetable was attached to it. It was supposed to be approved by the MC before the Rome Summit and approved by the DPC on 12 and 13 December 1991.¹²¹

However, even if the ARRC had been approved by the NAC, it remained unclear whether the new forces could become engaged in 'out-of-area' operations. Some NATO countries were concerned that the IMS's proposals were going too far in restructuring NATO forces and in implying a future 'out-of-area' role for the alliance. French and Spanish officials saw in the development of the ARRC an attempt by the British and the United States to use the alliance for their own 'out-of-area' operations and thus reassert their dominance with the organisation. Some French officials remarked publicly that the decision to form the ARRC had been taken by the military above the heads of politicians.¹²² Other NATO member states

¹¹⁹ They were officially announced in June 1991.

¹²⁰ For an in-depth overview of the structure of AARC see: Pengelley, R. (October 1992). 'AARC arising'. *International Defense Review*, page 981-985. The model for the RRC was to be the existing Northern Army Group (NORTHAG).

¹²¹ Wjik, R. D. *op.cit.* page 40

¹²² WEU Assembly. *Assembly debates and proceedings: Fourth Sitting* Brussels: WEU. 4 June 1991.

were concerned that 'out-of-area' activities would undermine the integrated military structure.¹²³ Turkish and Norwegian officials continued to perceive the Soviet Union as the main threat to their own security. A Turkish official expressed the view that the demand that NATO went 'out of area' was a superfluous request put forward by rich alliance members in order to project military power overseas.¹²⁴ The Dutch and the Norwegian governments also insisted that the AARC should act within Article 5 of the NATO treaty, that is for self-defence, and should not become involved in 'out-of-area' activities.¹²⁵

Impact of the Gulf war on German policy makers' position toward NATO's 'out-of-area' role

Whereas the Gulf war strengthened the influence of the British and US militaries on the NATO restructuring process, for the German government the Gulf war highlighted its continued subordinate role in the Western Alliance. For the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition, the most significant lesson learnt from the war was the need to rethink the so-called 'culture of restraint' in its foreign policy. This meant considering a new role for the Bundeswehr in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations outside the NATO treaty area. German policy makers were however deeply divided on the issue. To understand the emergence of a new awareness, the response of the German political establishment to the Gulf war will first be outlined and then the different proposals and strategies pursued by German political actors will be described.

¹²³ Interview with General Degli Innocenti, Italian member of the NATO Military Committee during 1993-1995. (4th November 1998)

¹²⁴ Interview with Mr Basat Öztürk, First Secretary Turkish Delegation to NATO (Defence/WEU-ESDI related issues. (8 September 1998)

¹²⁵ Interviews with Mr Kees Klompenhower, Defence Counsellor at the Permanent Representative of Netherlands to NATO. (7th of September 1998) and Mr John Mikal Kvistad. First Secretary of the Embassy, Member of the Permanent Norwegian delegation at NATO headquarters. (7th of September 1998)

Germany's response to the Gulf war: the domestic debate

At the beginning of the Second Gulf crisis, in August 1990, the German government agreed to allow the USA to use NATO military installations based on German territory to send US soldiers to Saudi Arabia. On 16th August Germany sent a flotilla of minesweepers and supply ships to the eastern Mediterranean to replace American vessels that had been diverted to the Persian Gulf. At the same time Chancellor Kohl stated that the Bundeswehr should consider sending minesweepers to the Gulf as part of a European naval task force. Kohl argued that the UN mandate of August 1990 allowed the deployment of German soldiers in the Gulf and that participation in the operations was necessary to demonstrate Germany's solidarity with the international community.¹²⁶

However the FDP, the SPD and the Greens were of a different opinion. They maintained that German participation in the minesweeping activities in the Persian Gulf was unconstitutional.¹²⁷ The divergent positions present within Parliament reached a climax in January 1991, when the government announced it was sending German forces to Turkey in support of NATO efforts in the region. On 2 January 1991, the German Cabinet took the decision to dispatch 18 Alpha-Jets to Turkey.¹²⁸ Strong objections were raised to this decision. SPD politicians such as Wiczorek-Zeul and Hermann Scheer argued that the action was unconstitutional since German territory was not directly under attack. In such a case a two thirds parliamentary support was required because the action had domestic consequences on the question of which legal organ had the right to decide on defence issues not

¹²⁶ *Washington Post*, A18, 15 August 1990; *Washington Post*, 17 August 1990, A9.

¹²⁷ 'Kohl schließt Einsatz im Golf nicht aus. Weiter Streit in Bonn. FDP and CDU bekräftigen ihre unterschiedlichen Positionen'. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 August 1990. (16 August 1990) 'Uneinigkeit in der Bonner Koalition über einen Einsatz der Bundeswehr im Golf. FDP: Verstoss gegen die Verfassung/Die Beratung der WEU.' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 August 1990.; 'Verständigung in Bonn noch eingehenden Beratungen. Kein Ansatz der Bundeswehr am Golf. An UNO-Friedenmission sollen deutsche Soldaten erst nach einer Änderung der Verfassung teilnehmen können' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 August 1990

¹²⁸ Petty, T. 'Germany welcomes NATO decision to send air squadrons to Turkey'. *The Associated Press.*, 2 January 1991.

covered by the constitution.¹²⁹ Other SPD, CDU and FDP members questioned Germany's obligation to assist Turkey in response to Iraqi attacks on other legal grounds. They maintained that if a NATO member state was the first to fire shots against Iraq, then any attack by Iraq against Turkey could not be considered as a justification for the Western Alliance's action against the Baghdad regime.¹³⁰ During a parliamentary debate on the issue, the SPD called for the withdrawal of the Alpha-Jets from Turkey.¹³¹

Influential members of the German cabinet were also not fully behind the determination of Washington and London to use extensive military means to force Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. When, in mid January 1991, operation Desert Storm began, the German government was restrained in its support for military action.¹³² Hence, despite the dispatch of minesweeping vessels, transport access and a substantial financial contribution that Germany made to the Gulf war effort,¹³³ Western allies and the international media still reprimanded German politicians for not standing full-heartily behind the anti-Iraqi coalition.

In Washington and London, politicians were troubled by the Germany's inability to play a more active role in 'out-of-area' operations. In a speech in November 1990, Bush stated that it was Germany's duty to share the burden of change within the Atlantic Alliance. Failure to do so, endangered what had been achieved within the international community. At the same time he called explicitly for Europe to go beyond its borders.¹³⁴

¹²⁹ Klein, E. 'Bundestagsbeschluss nicht erforderlich.' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 January 1991.

¹³⁰ This position was held by Herta Däubler-Gmelin, Hans-Jochen Vogel, Björn Engholm (SPDs), Burkhard Hirsch (FDP) and the leader of the Foreign Policy committee, Hans Stercken (CDU).

¹³¹ 'Die SPD fordert den Rückruf der AlphaJets aus der Türkei. Der Streit über Haltung zum Golfkrieg verschärft sich'. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 23 January 1991.

¹³² Kaiser, K. *Deutschland und der Irak-Konflikt: internationale Sicherheitsverantwortung Deutschlands und Europas nach der deutschen Vereinigung*. Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. 1992. pages 26 - 27.

¹³³ Germany's total contribution to the international measures taken during the gulf crisis was approximately DM 18 billion, or the equivalent of more than one-third of its annual defence budget.

¹³⁴ Riddell, P. 'Bush presses Germany to step up international role'. *Financial Times.*, 19

In Bonn, politicians became extremely concerned about the criticisms made by Western Allies. Pressure from abroad was indeed one of the crucial factors that led to a new determination on the part of sections of the CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD to give the Bundeswehr a new role in international affairs. As Reinhard Bettzüge, Deputy German Ambassador to NATO, explained in an interview, the key lesson from the Gulf war was an increased awareness of the need to develop a new consensus about the role that Germany should play in foreign policy. "Germany had to remove its 'sensitivity' [Empfindlichkeit] toward the issue."¹³⁵

There were however remarkably divergent views about what it meant to develop a new role for the Bundeswehr. As previously mentioned throughout the 1980s, the idea of allowing the Bundeswehr to take part in 'out-of-area' operations was never publicly endorsed by leading government figures and by the leadership of the main political parties. The situation started to change in early 1991. Within the CDU/CSU and sections of the FDP and SPD various proposals emerged which envisaged the Bundeswehr's ability to engage in military operations outside its own territory. The proposals sparked a debate around three issues. Firstly, in what kind of operations should the Bundeswehr be allowed to participate? Should the Bundeswehr be allowed to participate in purely peacekeeping operations or also in peace-enforcement operations? Secondly, should the Bundeswehr be allowed to participate only in UN operations or should it be allowed to take part in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations undertaken by the WEU and NATO? Thirdly, does the constitution allow the Bundeswehr to undertake 'out-of-area' operations or should the constitution be revised?

During 1991, the discussion was characterised by divergent opinions across and among the mainstream parties and the Government. Within the CDU/CSU there was a consensus that the Bundeswehr should be allowed to take part in UN operations of both a peacekeeping and peace-enforcement nature. Statements to this effect were made by Helmut Kohl in his speech to parliament on 13 March 1991

November 1990.

¹³⁵Mr Reinhard Bettzüge, Deputy Permanent Representative of Germany to NATO 1995-.

and restated during a visit to Washington in May 1991.¹³⁶ In a number of statements, Helmut Kohl argued that Germany had to bear a greater international responsibility as a result of unification and that the international community expected Germany to play a more active role in security organisations such as the UN, NATO and the WEU. He warned that failure to live up to the new demands of the international community could not only endanger the country's reputation but also lead to its isolation.¹³⁷

Within the ranks of the CDU/CSU there was a group of politicians that wanted to allow the Bundeswehr to take part in both peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations undertaken not only by the UN but also by the WEU and NATO. The leading members of this group were Karl Lamers, CDU/CSU member of the defence and security committee of the Bundestag, Wolfgang Schauble leader of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group and Wolfgang Bötsch. These three figures sought to convince Volker Rühle, at the time spokesman for Foreign Affairs within the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, of their views.¹³⁸ Karl Lamers was a strong supporter of developing a European Security Defence Identity (ESDI), - a topic which will be fully discussed in the next chapter.¹³⁹ He linked the idea of allowing the Bundeswehr to take part in 'out-of-area' operations explicitly with the notion of strengthening a European defence identity. Karl Lamers argued that in order for Germany to strengthen ESDI, the country had to be able to participate in all kinds

Interviewed on 7 September 1998.

¹³⁶ Speech of the Chancellor Helmut Kohl. 'Die Rolle Deutschlands in Europa' auf der Tagung "Forum für Deutschland" in Berlin *Bulletin. Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung*. No. 33, 13 March 1991.;

¹³⁷Germany. Deutscher Bundestag. *Plenarprotokoll*, 12/28, 6 June 1991. Bundestag: Bonn. Kohl's speech page 2100; Kohl, H. 'Unsere Verantwortung für die Freiheit.' *Bulletin*, 31 January 1991. No. 11. 61-76., see page 61-63.; Kohl, H. "Die Rolle Deutschlands in Europa" auf der Tagung 'Forum für Deutschland' in Berlin." *Bulletin*, No. 33, 22 March 1991. However, during the first six months of 1991, Kohl did not publicly express his view on the issue of changing the constitution.

¹³⁸ Dr Ulrich Schleier, Adviser to the CDU/CSU delegation at the Bundestag. Bonn, 24 June 1999.

¹³⁹Lamers believed that a European political union required the integration of foreign and defence policies within a European framework. Germany. Deutscher Bundestag. 20 June 1990. *Plenarprotokoll*, 11 Wahlperiode, 216 Sitzung. see Lamers scite 17051.

of military operations. This meant that the role of the Bundeswehr could not be restricted to undertaking UN led missions.¹⁴⁰

To pursue their ideas both Wolfgang Böttsch and Karl Lamers put forward two separate parliamentary motions in the Spring and Winter of 1991 respectively. Böttsch's motion called for changing the constitution to allow the Bundeswehr to be deployed in all multilateral frameworks. Implicitly this meant that NATO, together with the WEU, EU and the UN could undertake 'out-of-area' operations.¹⁴¹ Karl Lamers' motion called for the Bundeswehr to be deployed in the framework of the UN, NATO and the EU/WEU. He argued that only by so doing could Germany achieve an equal status with other European member states.¹⁴²

During 1991, within the FDP voices were also heard in favour of allowing the Bundeswehr to take part in UN peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. Until 1989, the FDP had been opposed to the Bundeswehr's participation in UN peacekeeping activities but on 16 August 1990 Genscher officially stated his support for the Bundeswehr's participation in such activities.¹⁴³ After Operation Desert Storm began, a number of FDP officials advocated that German forces should be permitted to join all types of military operations covered by the UN Charter, including combat missions intended to implement UN Security Council Resolutions on the model of the 'Gulf war'.¹⁴⁴ FDP officials however insisted that the constitution had to be modified and that the Bundeswehr should not participate in WEU and NATO's 'out-of-area' operations.

Within the SPD, a group of politicians also sought to persuade their party to agree to constitutional changes to allow the deployment of the Bundeswehr in

¹⁴⁰ Kohl, H. 22 March 1991. *op.cit.* page 243.; Lamers, K, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: West Europe*, 9 March 1991.

¹⁴¹ Phillippi, N. *op.cit.* page 86

¹⁴² 'Lamers: deutsche Verantwortung wächst. Voraussetzung für die Beteiligung an Friedenstruppen schaffen'. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 5 November 1991. ; Phillippi. 1996. *Ibid.* page 86.

¹⁴³ 16 August 1990, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, page 2.

¹⁴⁴ 'FDP will UN-Einsatz deutscher Soldaten bald möglich machen' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 February 1991.

peacekeeping. This group of politicians included prominent foreign policy experts and party leaders such as Gunter Verheugen, Willy Brandt (Former Chancellor), Egon Bahr, Helmut Schmidt (Former Chancellor), Karsten Voigt, Bjorn Engholm (party leader), Hans-Jochen Vogel (former party leader) Hans-Ulrich Klose (parliamentary leader).¹⁴⁵ In their view, the party's opposition to the Bundeswehr's involvement in peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations risked isolating the SPD domestically. Yet, they did not envisage a role for the Bundeswehr in 'out-of-area' operations undertaken by either NATO or the WEU.¹⁴⁶

On 25 May 1992, the FDP sanctioned a new party position on the role of the Bundeswehr by sanctioning its deployment in peacekeeping and combat operations undertaken within a UN mandate and with parliamentary approval. Operations on the model of the Gulf war were only to be agreed if there was a UN Security Council mandate.¹⁴⁷ In contrast, the SPD did not endorse the views of 'reformers' within its own ranks. At the SPD Party Congress in Bremen in the autumn of 1991, the party voted against a proposal to allow the Bundeswehr to take part in peacekeeping operations under the UN.¹⁴⁸

Because of the position taken by the FDP, a member of the ruling coalition, the government was split on the issue. The CDU/CSU could not implement a change in the role of the Bundeswehr without the support of the FDP and without fulfilling its demands for constitutional change. Any such proposal would have also required SPD's support which at the time was hard to obtain. For these reasons, the German government remained restrained in its position towards allowing NATO to assume an 'out-of-area' role. Kohl was of the opinion that a broad consensus had to be

¹⁴⁵ Other members were Norbert Gansel and Florian Gerster, former members of the 'Arbeitsgruppe Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle' who, as previously mentioned, in 1988 had put forward proposal for far-reaching changes in the Bundeswehr status.

¹⁴⁶ Phillippi, N. *op.cit.* Trier. pages 114 - 115

¹⁴⁷ Beschluss des Bundeshauptausschusses der FDP vom 25.05.91 in Hamburg in Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Referat III B 5 'Freiheit und Verantwortung gehören zusammen'. *Materialsammlung zur Diskussion über den Einsatz der Bundeswehr im Rahmen von Systemen kollektiver Sicherheit*, Bonn, June 1992, page 18. 'Die FDP befürwortet Kampfeinsätze.' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 May 1991.

¹⁴⁸ Löwe, *op.cit.*, page 263. Boege, V. 'Mut zur Selbstbeschränkung. Deutsche Machtpolitik, das Grundgesetz und die UNO' *Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik*, 1991, pages 818 - 831.

established. Thus, in the first part of 1991, the Chancellor did not commit himself to a specific policy option. It is only after Genscher retired as Foreign Minister and Volker R  he rose to the position of Minister of Defence that the German government began to pursue a new strategy toward the issue, as it will be explained in the next sections.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to outline how the idea of NATO assuming an 'out-of-area' role emerged and to identify those policy-makers who coherently advocated such policy. It has been demonstrated that the strongest consensus for this turn in the alliance's posture was present within the NATO IMS, the Military Strategy Working Group and the NATO Political Affairs Division. Within the British Cabinet and sections of the British and US militaries a similar position was advocated. In the first eight months of 1990, these groups did not have the support of other NATO member states and were faced with considerable domestic public hostility to their ideas. It was only after the outbreak of the Gulf war that the position of the pro 'out-of-area' policy-makers and officials began to gain strength.

In the first eight months of 1990, the policy community's idea of developing NATO's 'out of area' role appears to have been influenced by three factors: ideological considerations, the efforts undertaken by the NATO IMS and members of the MC to consider a restructuring of alliance's military forces, and the process of national defence reviews undertaken in Britain and the United States.

At NATO headquarters the idea of developing the alliance's 'out-of-area' capabilities emerged out of the belief that a review of the organisation's defence posture was necessary. As shown, it was the IMS and members of the MC that most consistently argued for an early defence review. When undertaking their studies, NATO military commanders started to believe that forces allocated to the West German front could be reorganised in such a manner as to allow rapid deployment to Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean region. At the same time, the plans proposed in the Pentagon, to develop a more flexible US force, strengthened the position of those who advocated more mobile and flexible forces at NATO headquarters.

Margaret Thatcher strongly supported the view of IMS and the MC. Next to her belief in the existence of new threats and instability arising from the Middle East and Eastern Europe, the British Prime Minister wanted to safeguard Britain's leading position within the alliance. Thatcher and other member of her Cabinet

were extremely concerned about the future of British military forces allocated to the defence of the central front, the BAOR. At the same time, they were sensitive to the MoD's arguments that a 'peace dividend' should not result in a weakening of Britain's military forces. For these reasons, some members of the British Cabinet supported the initiatives to modernise NATO integrated military structures.

The consensus that existed within the NATO IMS and the MC may be explained by three factors. NATO IMS shared a common reference framework when looking at the military environment of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Since the IMS and members of the MC undergo similar training and share common professional backgrounds, there was a tendency to seek solutions to the changing political and military environment that enhanced rather than reduced the ability of military forces to become engaged internationally. In addition, within the MC there were fears that the peace dividend could substantially reduce national military capabilities. Finally, in European NATO member states, especially in Denmark, Norway, Germany and Italy the development of the AARC meant the establishment of new military forces capable of 'out-of-area' projections. The defence review discussions at NATO headquarters thus gave support to the Danish, Norwegian, German and Italian Ministries of Defence' demands for force modernisation to include rapid reaction capabilities.

In the first half of 1990s, however, the views advocated by the IMS, and leading figures within the British and US Administration, did not have the support of the political sections of NATO. There remained also considerable opposition within the legislatures of Britain and the United States to a revamped role for the Alliance. France and Spain were totally opposed to the initiatives taken by pro 'out-of-area' forces. Among the political parties of NATO member states and within public opinion, there were great expectations for a peace dividend and for new co-operative relations among East and West. Within the SPD, the German Greens, the British Labour and Liberal parties and the Democrats in Congress, there were also vivid voices in opposition to NATO's continued existence and military posture.

In Germany, the proposition that the Bundeswehr should become involved in NATO's 'out-of-area' operations remained a political taboo. In contrast to developments in Britain and the United States, the efforts of the German government were directed towards the unification process. In Bonn there was a belief that no policies should be pursued that could arouse suspicions in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe that Germany was seeking to expand its military capabilities. For these reasons, apart from some parliamentarians, German government officials did not express an opinion toward the NATO's 'out-of-area' issue during 1990.

The outbreak of the Gulf war represented a turning point in the debate about NATO's future. It strengthened the position of those who advocated a new role for the alliance's 'out-of-area' role. NATO forces' participation in the Gulf war allowed the IMS to develop new military concepts of co-ordination of national military forces in the Mediterranean region. This permitted the Military Strategy Working Group (MSWG) and SHAPE to speed up their work on the NATO defence review. It was within this group that a quick consensus was achieved to establish the ARRC. By June 1991 the MSWG was also able to present the draft of a military strategy document, later to be known as MC 400, and to argue for its adoption. Thus, whilst the NATO political working groups discussed the alliance's future posture, the military advanced concrete proposals.

It is remarkable how the MSWG and the MC reversed the policy-making process by advancing force structure proposals before political guidelines had been agreed. By so doing the MSWG and the MC took the lead in transforming the alliance. Through what appeared as 'technical' proposals, such as those presented in April 1991, the MSWG and the MC promoted a new political framework. In fact, changes in force posture are never merely a technical matter. The proposals contained within themselves a set of political assumptions about the future direction of the Alliance. By so doing the MSWG and the MC turned upside down the pattern of policy-making. Rather than democratically elected politicians deciding about the future of the Western Alliance and giving orders to the military authorities, the military shaped its directions.

However, the agreement to develop ARRC did not imply a de facto political consensus for NATO 'out-of-area' operations. In Germany, by mid-1991, the issue of the Bundeswehr's participation in out-of-area operations, either under the UN, NATO or the WEU had moved to the centre of political debate. Although sections of the CDU/CSU had started to endorse the new NATO position, the German government had a long way to go to create the political and public consensus required. In addition, the French and Spanish governments remained reluctant to endorse the proposed new alliance's role. The Italian, Turkish and Norwegian governments feared that an emphasis on non-Article 5 activities would undermine NATO integrated military structure.

It was the attitudes of Western policy makers to the outbreak of the Yugoslav conflict and the interaction of this development with the transatlantic row over burden sharing that sparked the final decision to give NATO an 'out-of-area' role. It is to these dynamics that we now turn.

Chapter 3: The impetus to the development of NATO's 'out-of-area' role: ESDI and the reaction to the Yugoslav crisis:

(June 1991 to July 1992)

Introduction

In July 1992, NATO began monitoring operations in the Adriatic in support of the UN arms embargo against the republics of the former Yugoslavia.¹ NATO also sent troops to establish a new UN Headquarter in Sarajevo. These activities represented the first 'out-of-area' operations undertaken by the Western Alliance since its establishment in 1949. In this section it will be argued that NATO was able to assume a new role because of the interaction of three dynamics: firstly, Franco-German attempts to develop a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI); secondly the shifting perception by NATO and EC member states of the nature of the Yugoslav conflict and the strategies to be pursued toward it; and finally the strategy pursued by the policy-community.

The chapter is subdivided in two sections. In the first, the nature of the discussions about ESDI and US reactions to it will be outlined. The analysis will then turn to explaining how France and Germany's policy towards the Yugoslav conflict and their attempts to foster a WEU role in the Balkans influenced the Maastricht negotiations and the US position.² In the second section, it will be explained how the United States and other European members of NATO developed strategies to mediate their divergent interests over the nature of the European security

¹ NATO. "Statement on NATO Maritime operations issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session in Helsinki, 10 July 1992." *NATO communiqués 1991-1995*. Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press. 1998. pages 82 - 82.

² Throughout this chapter events in Former Yugoslavia will be mentioned but no detailed analysis of the domestic dynamics of disintegration will be provided. Some of the most convincing explanations for the origin of the conflict can be found among those writers who emphasise the relationship between the collapse of the socialist market system and the rise of nationalism within Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. Crnobrnja, M. *The Yugoslav drama*. Montreal and Kingston, London, Buffalo: McGill Queen's University Press. 1994.; Akhavan, P and Howse, R. (Ed.). *Yugoslavia: the Former and the Future: Reflections by scholars from the Region*. Washington: The Brookings Institutions and Geneva: the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. 1995.

architecture. These strategies focused on two interlinked issues: one involved giving NATO a CSCE mandate to undertake peacekeeping activities and the other concerned attempts to integrate the newly announced Eurocorps into NATO structures.

ESDI proposals: 1990 to mid 1991

Throughout the late 1980s, EC member states had sought to strengthen their co-operation in political and economic matters. France and Germany had also embarked on a series of initiatives to create closer military co-operation. This had resulted in the announcement of the Franco-German brigade in 1989.³ The collapse of the Eastern European communist regimes hastened the desire of EC member states to seek closer political and economic co-operation. In April 1990, France and Germany put forward a proposal, in the form of a joint letter by Kohl and Mitterand, for the EC to conduct a special intergovernmental conference (IGC) on political and economic union. During the negotiations the two heads of state made public their desire for the EC to develop a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and to bring the working of the Western European Union (WEU) closer to EC structures. The April 1990 proposal, in fact, included a specific reference for the IGC to consider the definition and implementation of CFSP.⁴ Then, on the 7th December 1990, few days before the IGC began, Kohl and Mitterand sent a second joint letter to the EC Presidency calling for the development of a EC competence in security policy. The communiqué stated that the conference should examine how the political union and the WEU could establish a relationship and how the WEU could eventually form part of the political union.⁵

The Franco-German proposals were supported by the EC Commission and by Dr Willem van Eekelen, the WEU Secretary-General. On 21 February 1990, the Commission published a plan that advocated a full-fledged EC defence policy. In

³ Haglund, D. G. *Alliance within the alliance?: Franco-German military cooperation and the European pillar of defence*. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press. 1991.; Pirote, O. (Ed.). *Les politiques de defense Franco-Allemandes*. Paris: Fondation pour les Études de la défense. 1997.

⁴ Marsh, G; Graham, D and Stephens, P. 'Bonn and Paris move to speed European unity' *Financial Times*, 20 April 1990, page 1.

⁵ Davidson, I. 'Joint European foreign policy urged by France and Germany' *Financial Times*, 8 December 1990, page 7.

March 1990, van Eekelen wrote of three possible scenarios for future European security arrangements. One of these scenarios included strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance by giving the WEU an operational role in the deployment of European forces.⁶ Leading European security experts such as Karl Kaiser, director of the German Society for Foreign Affairs in Bonn and Mr de Montbrial, Director of the French Institute for International Relations, also called for the EC to be given a permanent mechanism to define common security interests.⁷

By early 1991, an elaboration of the Franco-German proposal emerged. On the 4th February during the ministerial-level meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union, Roland Dumas and Hans-Dietrich Genscher presented to their community partners ideas on the way to develop a common security policy. The two leaders proposed, inter alia, that the European Council should be able to decide what areas of security policy should be the subject of a common policy. The European Union could deal with a number of policy areas which included disarmament and control of armaments in Europe, peacekeeping in the context of the UN, nuclear non-proliferation and cooperation concerning armaments. In addition, they renewed the call for the WEU to develop a common security policy on behalf of the EU.⁸ The position on EU defence was soon reaffirmed at an extraordinary Meeting of the WEU Council, where Kohl and Mitterand stated that they envisaged the WEU becoming the defence expression of the European Community until a time when the modified Brussels Treaty could be merged into the Rome Treaty. The WEU was in fact described as “an integral component of the European unification project”.⁹ Since French politicians believed that the

⁶ WEU Assembly. *European Security and the Gulf Crisis: report submitted by Decket, D. on behalf of the Political Committee*. Paris: Western European Union. Document 1224, 14 November 1990.

⁷ Kaiser, K and de Montbrial, T. ‘France and Germany: the tasks ahead’ *International Herald Tribune*, 13 December 1990.

⁸ ‘European security policy: the Franco-German proposals at the intergovernmental conference of the twelve on political union’ *Europe Documents.*, 15 February 1991, No 1690. Brussels: Europe Agence internationale d’information pour la presse.

⁹ Auswärtiges Amt. *Europäische Politische Zusammenarbeit (EPZ) auf dem Weg zu einer Gemeinsamen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) - Dokumentation*. Bonn.1992. pages 425 - 429.

modification of the Brussels Treaty was not on the cards in the immediate future, they aimed for the WEU to become subordinated to the European Council.¹⁰

The push towards a European security policy in early 1991 was determined by a number of factors. As previously stated, both in France and in Germany there was the belief that the project of European Union would not be complete without common foreign and defence policies. At the same time there were divergent national interests behind the bilateral announcement which stemmed from the experience of the Gulf war and continuing discussions on transforming the Western Alliance. German political leaders felt that they had not had a say in the unfolding Gulf crisis and wanted to strengthen the defence pillar of the EU in order to offset this shortcoming. As Mr Genscher declared in a press conference: “during the Gulf crisis, we lacked a capacity in the area of security and defence. This is a practical demonstration that security and defence are necessary for political union.”¹¹

Members of the German government also wanted to lift the constitutional restriction on sending German troops outside the NATO area, a controversial issue as explained in the previous chapter. German policy-makers believed that some of the constitutional problems could be circumscribed by allowing the WEU to go ‘out-of-area’, thus setting a precedent for future NATO negotiations on the issue. In contrast, French leaders were motivated by other concerns. From the experience of the Gulf war, French politicians concluded that their international standing had been undermined by the role that the special Anglo-American relationship played during the crisis. There was also the perception that there were some serious shortcoming in the military capabilities to engage in large-scale overseas operations. French leaders therefore supported a stronger European security policy

¹⁰ Jopp, M. *The strategic implications of European integration: an analysis of trends in integration policies and their consequences for transatlantic partnership and a new European security order*. London: International Institute for Strategic studies/Brasseys. 1994.

¹¹ quoted from. ‘La France et l’Allemagne relancent le projet de politique étrangère et de défense européennes communes’ *Le Monde*, 6 February 1991. my own translation. Original “Durant la crise du Golfe, ce qui nous a manqué, c’est une capacité d’action en matière de sécurité et de défense. C’est une démonstration du fait que la sécurité et la défense sont nécessaires pur l’union politique”.



in order to re-establish France's leadership position in both the political and military field in co-operation with Germany and other European allies.¹²

In June 1991, the Luxembourg Presidency made public its draft treaty on political and economic union. The draft envisaged the creation of three pillars: one for EC, the second for foreign policy and the third for home affairs. The pillar structure was designed to be a temporary measure but facilitated an intergovernmental approach on foreign and defence issues and limited the role of institutions such as the Commission and Parliament. Since the draft treaty disappointed the expectations of more supranationally inclined countries - such as Germany, Belgium and Spain - when the Dutch Presidency took over, it sought to win a consensus for a new proposal. With the support of the Commission, the Dutch Presidency attempted to revert to a single pillar. However, the style of the Dutch Presidency was not liked by many EC member states and the draft was rejected.¹³

The British view of ESDI

During the negotiations, the United Kingdom was opposed to strengthening the defence identity of the EC. London objected strongly to any suggestions that the WEU could be integrated with the EC structures. For a number of reasons, British politicians were wary of any moves to create ESDI. Firstly, since Britain held a leadership position in NATO, it did not want its role to be undermined by new European security structures. Secondly, throughout the negotiations on European Political Union, the British government was against the supranational character of the enterprise. London did not want the EC Commission to determine British defence policies. Between the two options discussed during the negotiations, British officials preferred a WEU, independent from EC structures, acting as a bridge between NATO and the EU. British officials favoured the WEU because of

¹²Schmidt, P. *The special Franco-German security relationship in the 1990s*. 1993. Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies. Haglund, D. G. *Who is afraid of Franco-German military co-operation?* Centre for International Relations Occasional Paper No. 44. Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Queen's University. November 1991. Haglund states that Paris wanted to foster the military co-operation with Germany in order to 'contain' Germany.

¹³ Corbett, R. 'The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union.' *Journal of Common Market Studies*, September 1992, Vol 30 No 3.

its intergovernmental character, such as the right of initiative being lodged with the Presidency rather than with supranational organs and the existence of a separate Assembly selected from parliaments rather than one directly elected.¹⁴

The British government position during the negotiations for the European Political Union was also facilitated by the support given by the Labour Party to the government stance. Like the Conservatives, the Labour Party rejected a role for the EC in European defence. The British Labour Party was aware of the US opposition to the idea of a strong European defence identity. At the same time, it did not want to raise the issue of defence during the elections for fear of sparking a controversy within its own ranks.¹⁵ Moreover, even within the most left-wing sections of the Labour Party, there was opposition to the WEU, because of its strong pro-nuclear outlook, and hostility towards the EC and particularly the project of political union.¹⁶

The US position on ESDI

The US government's view was close to that expressed in London. Although the Bush administration was not opposed to the project of European Political Union, it had reservations about the inclusion of a CFSP and a European Defence Identity. US officials feared that Western European member states would form their foreign and defence policy option in the EU/WEU and then present their position as an inflexible bloc with the NAC.¹⁷ The depth of US antagonism toward the Franco-German proposals became public because the State Department sent a letter to embassies in Europe which questioned the European capability to act without the USA and the European need for American assistance in times of crisis.¹⁸ The

¹⁴ Bailes, A. J.K. 'Western European Union and Contemporary European security: a British Perspective' in Deighton, A. E. *Western European Union, 1954-1997 : defence, security, integration*. Oxford: European Interdependence Research Unit, St Antony's College, Oxford. 1997.

¹⁵ Throughout the 1980s defence had been a controversial issues among the Labour Party and Kinnock believed it was one of the reasons why the party had lost the election.

¹⁶ Keohane, D. 1993. *op.cit.*

¹⁷ Murray, C. 'View from the United States: Common Foreign Security Policy as a centrepiece of US interest in European political union'. in Rummel, R. E. *Toward political union*. Boulder, Westview. 1992.

¹⁸ The letter was written by Reginald Bartholomew, Raymond Seitz and Timothy Dobbins from the State Department. Myers, J. A. *The WEU: pillar of NATO or defence arm of the*

immediate impact of the US *démarche* was to cause uproar in European capitals. France objected strongly to US interference. Other EC member states were thrown into confusion.¹⁹ The process of negotiations for a new ESDI came to a halt for a few months. It was only after the outbreak of the conflict in Yugoslavia that the attempt to build ESDI and CFSP achieved a new momentum.

Outbreak of the conflict in Slovenia and the EC/US responses

Whilst the negotiations for ESDI and the discussions on NATO's future were underway, in June 1991 the conflict in Yugoslavia erupted. Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. The Slovenian leadership confronted the Yugoslav Federal authorities by deciding to establish its own separate borders. The Federal Presidency was in a state of disarray and an initiative was taken by the Yugoslav Ministry of Defence to send the army into Slovenia to deal with the problem. A week of fighting followed.

The causes of the Yugoslav conflict lay in the use of nationalism by political leaders in the federal republics to respond to economic crisis and political unrest. Since the early 1980s the Yugoslav economy had been in a state of recession. A number of commissions had been set up in an attempt to resolve the problems but none were successful in preventing the slide towards bankruptcy. In late 1989 a far-reaching programme of political and economic reforms was introduced that chipped away at the 'socialist control economy'. At the same time, there was a revival of nationalist feelings among all Yugoslav republics.

It was the Serbian leadership that first stirred nationalism by asserting its interests in Kosovo. In May 1986, Slobodan Milosevic was elected Serbian party chief. During 1987, Milosevic went about consolidating his control over the Serbian party. At the same time, he began to champion the demands and rights of the Serbian population in Kosovo. After a riot in 1981 between ethnic Kosovar

EC?. 1993. page 38. Rees, W. *The Western European Union at the Crossroads: Between trans-atlantic Solidarity and European Integration*. Boulder (Colorado, USA) and Oxford: Westview Press. 1998. page 80. Drorkdrak, W. 'US shows arrogance to allies, French says' *Washington Post*, 12 June 1991.

¹⁹ 'Euro jigsaw puzzle' *The Economist*, 30 March 1991. page 24.

Albanians and the Serb police tensions between the two ethnic groups remained high. Some Kosovars, of Albanian ethnic origin, organised themselves around the demand for Kosovo becoming part of Albania. This fostered suspicion in Serbia where a number of intellectuals around the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts publicly advocated that Serbia should have full political control over the region. In the summer of 1987, Milosevic reacted to ethnic tensions in Kosovo by vowing to protect the Serb minority in Kosovo. During a public speech, he made his sentiments clear. He told the Serb minority in Kosovo that “no one will ever beat you again”. By the spring of 1990, Serbia proposed a number of measures to reduce the autonomous political status of Kosovo.²⁰

Milosevic’s strategy in Kosovo opened up a Pandora’s box. The Croatian and Slovenian leaderships saw in Milosevic’s moves a confirmation of their suspicions: Serbia was aiming to dominate the federation. From the mid-1980s, communist members of the ruling party in Croatia and Slovenia started to believe that their economic interests were best served in promoting a nationalist programme. In their view the Yugoslav federal system had to be reformed to allow greater autonomy. The aspirations of these sections of society were partly fulfilled by the results of the elections held in 1990. The election brought into power new nationalist parties, mainly composed of former communist leaders, determined to pursue a nationalist programme that gave their regions a stronger form of autonomy. The political leadership in Croatia and Slovenia were divided in two camps: the moderate who believed that a compromise with Belgrade was possible and more radical nationalist force. A number of incidents and repressive actions taken by the Belgrade leadership gave ammunition to the arguments held by the radical Slovenian and Croatian nationalists forces.²¹

In February 1991, the crisis in Former Yugoslavia intensified when Slovenia and Croatia introduced parliamentary amendments to invalidate Yugoslav federal law

²⁰ For a background to the Kosovo issues see: Vickers, M. *Between Serbia and Albania: a history of Kosovo*. London: Hurst & Company. 1998.

²¹ On the 9th March 1991, the Serbian leadership used force to silence its own domestic opposition. The Serbian authorities also called for an economic boycott against Slovenia because it had refused to allow a Serb rally to take place.

and move toward independence.²² This precipitated inter-republic talks for constitutional change. At the same time, Croatia was in turmoil. There was the rise of anti-Communist demonstrations in Belgrade and violent ethnic incidents in Croatia fuelled fear of a civil war.²³ The hopes for a peaceful resolution to the crisis came to be focused on the role of the Yugoslav Presidency. But, due to intransigence among all of the republics, the talks broke down and Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence.²⁴

Response of the West to the conflict: April to July 1991

During April and May 1991, the EC sought to maintain a neutral position towards the conflict by refusing to support Slovenia and Croatia's demands for independence. At the same time the EC began to act as a mediator in the conflict. In May 1991, the Presidency of the Community had visited Belgrade in an attempt to prevent the escalation of the crisis. The Presidency called for unity and argued that if Yugoslavia wanted to continue to receive economic aid under the PHARE programme, then the government and political structures in Yugoslavia had to work toward the improvement of minority rights, continued economic reforms and dialogue.²⁵

When Croatia and Slovenia declared independence, the EC reaffirmed its position of support for the unity of Yugoslavia, whilst increasing its efforts in the region. At the meeting of the WEU Foreign Ministers on 26 June, it was proposed to call upon the CSCE to implement emergency crisis procedures. These procedures envisaged

²² Silber, L. 'Slovenia edges toward secession'. *Financial Times*, 21 February 1991. page 4. Silber, L. 'Croatia raises the political stakes' *Financial Times*, 22 February 1991. page 4.

²³ Silber, L. 'Croatia on verge of war as 16 die in clashes' *Financial Times*, 4 May 1991, page 2.

²⁴ On the key events that led to the break down of the talks, see Silber, L. 'Peace move rejected by Croats and Serbs' *Financial Times*, 11 May 1991, page 1. Dempsey, J; Silber, L. 'Yugoslav crisis deepens on Serbian warning'. *Financial Times*, 31 May 1991, page 14. Dempsey, J. 'Yugoslav republics prepare ground for secession'. *Financial Times*, 18 June 1991. page 2.

²⁵ Buchan, D. 'EC takes cautious line on Yugoslavia' *Financial Times*, 29 May 1991. 3; Gardner, D.; Silber, L. 'Brussels warning to Yugoslavs on aid' *Financial Times*, 21 May 1991. page 2.

the despatch of an investigation committee to Yugoslavia.²⁶ A few days later, on 28th and 29th of June at the European Council meeting an agreement was reached to pursue three options toward Yugoslavia: firstly the despatch to Belgrade of a high level delegation composed of the EC Troika to warn the federal troops to stop their offensive in Slovenia; secondly, the suspension of Community aid if the Troika's missions failed to bring about the cease-fire and the decision; and finally the EC reaffirmed the earlier decision taken by the WEU Foreign Ministers to invoke the CSCE's emergency consultation procedures.²⁷

On the 28 June the Troika's mission began. It was composed of three Foreign Ministers, Gianni de Michelis (Italy), Jacques Poos (Luxembourg) and Hans van den Broek (Netherlands).²⁸ The mission consisted of a three-point plan which called for a resolution of the presidential crisis, suspension of implementation of the declarations of independence for a period of three months and the Yugoslavia National Army (JNA)'s return to its barracks. The Troika succeeded in obtaining a signature to the plan, what came to be known as the Brioni agreement.²⁹ However, the plan did not end the violence in Slovenia. For this reason, on 30 June, the three Foreign Ministers returned to Belgrade to salvage the agreement. This time they used the threat of freezing all Community aid. For a brief period, the threat of sanctions seemed to work as an agreement was reached on the presidential crisis and a cease-fire was called. Despite the efforts, peace was not restored. The fighting in fact spread to Croatia.³⁰

²⁶ It appears that this proposal was put forward by the Germans. Helm, S. '5 nation set for meeting on crisis' *Independent*, 28 June 1991, page 1.

²⁷ Savill, A. 'Yugoslavia: EC accepts 'duty to intervene'' *The Independent*. 29 June 1991. page 8.

²⁸ The Troika comprised the past, present and coming Foreign Ministers of the Presidency of the European Council of Ministers.

²⁹ The Brioni agreement was signed on 8 July 1991. It called for serious discussions about their future relations to begin no later than 1st August, after a total cease-fire had been implemented and the republic's independent declarations temporarily suspended. The Brioni meeting permitted for observers from the Community to monitor the cease-fire in Slovenia.

³⁰ Barber, T; Crawshaw, S. 'Slovenia wins truce after talks with EC troika' *The Independent*. 8 July 1991. page 8.

The 'burden sharing' debates and EC and US national and institutional responses to the outbreak of the conflict in Croatia

Conflict in Croatia: August 1991 to September 1991

During the conflict between the JNA and Slovenia, the Croatian authorities had remained neutral. The situation in Croatia was much more volatile because of the presence of a large Serbian minority. The Croatian government under Tudjman pursued a number of policies, which denied the Serbian minority their rights to citizenship. Tudjman also set up Croatia's own independent army and fights took place between civilian Croats and Serbs. The civil unrest began to take a new dimension in Vukovar. In Vukovar the Croatian authorities had disbanded the local assembly and an appointed representative had been nominated. Although Vukovar had a Croat majority, in the surrounding area Serbs were in the majority. The Serbs rejected Zagreb's decision to disband their elected bodies and the Croats responded by sending in a militia. This time the JNA took sides with the Serbs. The subsequent battle led Tudjman to declare a general mobilisation against the JNA. In August 1991 the war, which was to last four months, began. The Croats could not easily defeat the JNA militarily. Their tactics were to provoke the JNA by blockading barracks and cutting off communal supplies to them. The JNA responded by making use of its military power by indiscriminately bombing Vukova and Dubronivk. These actions were televised around the world. The bombing made the JNA a pariah in the eyes of the world community. Although brutalities were committed on all sides, the most visible ones were those of the JNA.

If, during the crisis in Slovenia, the EC emerged as an actor in crisis management, by the summer of 1991 the divergent national perspectives on the Yugoslav crisis became closely interlinked with the debate about a future ESDI.

Divergent national perspectives on the Yugoslav conflict

The German perspective

The Germans had a unique perspective on the nature of the Yugoslav conflict. Until the spring of 1991, the leadership of the CDU/CSU and SPD supported EC efforts to keep the country together. The Greens/Bündniss were the only German parties not in line with the government in that they wanted self-determination for Croatia and Slovenia and a confederation of sovereign states as a solution to the crisis.³¹ As soon as Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence, the CDU/CSU and the SPD changed their attitude. On 27th July the CDU called for the recognition of the new republics. Then on July 1st the SPD argued that Genscher should actively pursue this option within the EC. By July 9th, the FDP was in line with the position of the other parties. From then onwards, German policy-makers consistently called upon the EC to recognise Slovenian and Croatian independence, though Genscher was more reserved in voicing these views when meeting other EC counterparts.³²

There are number of explanations as to why there was an agreement among the German political parties on the need to recognise the republics.³³ One of the most convincing explanations can be found in the literature which emphasises domestic

³¹ Crawford, B. 'Explaining defection from international co-operation: Germany's unilateral recognition of Croatia.' *World Politics*, July 1996, Vol 48, No. 4 page 482-521. For the CDU/CSU see *Deutsche Press Agentur*. 19 May 1991. For the position of the Greens see: Germany. Deutscher Bundestag. *Parlamentarische Protokoll 12/12*, 21 February 1991.

³² Axt, H.J. 'Hat Genscher Jugoslawien entzweit? Mythen und Fakten zur Aussenpolitik des vereinten Deutschlands.' *Europa-Archiv*, 1993, Vol 12, page 351-360. See also Libel, M. *Limits of persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav crisis, 1991-1992*. Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger. 1997. page 15 to 21. Libel argues that Genscher was careful in calling for recognition of the break-away Yugoslav republics within the EC. Genscher favoured using the issue of recognition as a mediation tool to end the violence in Yugoslavia.

³³ There are three school of thought on the recognition issue: firstly, the realist explanation that Germany wanted to express its hegemonic role in European affairs; secondly, the existence of a weak regime on the recognition issue; thirdly societal pressures and elite-party politics. My explanations here will be taken from the last two schools. These can be found among the following writers Axt, *ibid.* Crawford, B. *op.cit*, pages 482 - 521. Crawford seeks to combine domestic explanations with international factors. page 504 to 511. Maull, H. W. 'Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis' *Survival*, 1995/1996, Vol 37, No. 4, pages 99 - 130. Lucarelli, S. 'Germany's recognition of Slovenia and Croatia: an institutionalist perspective' *International Spectator*, April-June 1997, XXXII, No. 2, pages

and international factors. As Crawford explains, throughout the post-war period the CDU/CSU political ideology had been based on the tenets of anti-communism and claims for self-determination for the East Germans. With the fall of the East German regime, CDU/CSU ideology appeared to have been proved right. CDU/CSU politicians were thus inclined to see the conflict in Yugoslavia in the simplified terms of oppressors (the Serbs) and the oppressed (the breakaway republics). Thus, CDU/CSU politicians consciously linked the issue of self-determination for the East Germans with those of Croatia and Slovenia. Within the CSU, the Bavarian wing of the party had also strong links to Croatia and the Catholic Church. The Roman Catholic Church was concerned with the fate of the Roman Catholic territories in Yugoslavia and put pressure on the government through CSU channels.³⁴ Other writers have also pointed out that the conservative press, particularly *Die Welt* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* ran a campaign in their editorials in which the Serbs were referred to as barbarians, thus contributing to the demand for independence by the breakaway republics.³⁵ The SPD changed its position because of the existence of a 'bandwagoning' process, as Crawford explains. Among SPD politicians there was the belief that the party had lost the December 1990 election partly because many of its voters had moved over to the Greens, who at the time were calling for recognition. In order to win back the votes from the Greens and to meet the challenge of the CDU/CSU, the SPD decided to align its policy toward Yugoslavia with those of the other parties. The importance assigned by the German government to the Yugoslav issue can also be explained as an attempt to establish a more assertive foreign policy. The German government linked the recognition issue to the Maastricht negotiations and by so doing demonstrated its ability to shape the EC policy agenda.³⁶

65 - 91.

³⁴ Maull, H.W. *ibid.* page 122 and Lucarelli, S. *ibid.* page 81.

³⁵ Veremis, T; Thumann, M. 1994. *The Balkans and CFSP: the views of Greece and Germany*. CEPS papers; No.59. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.

³⁶ Lucarelli, S. *op.cit.*

The British perspective

The British outlook on the Yugoslav conflict was rather different. In Whitehall and among British politicians the outbreak of war was perceived at the time largely as inter-ethnic and historic. There was no enthusiasm for the idea of national self-determination as evoked by Croatian and Slovenian leaders. This perception was reinforced by the experience of British engagement in Northern Ireland. British government officials believed that if Slovenia and Croatia's secessionist aims were supported, the approach could open a Pandora's box across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, thus creating instability on an even larger scale. They also argued that premature recognition would complicate the negotiation process.³⁷ The Labour Party supported the government position. In mid 1991, there was only a very small minority of dissidents who favoured recognition and the use of force.³⁸

The US perspective

During the spring and summer of 1991, The US government advocated maintaining a federal structure. In early June 1991, US Secretary James Baker visited Belgrade and warned Tudjman and the Slovenian leader Milan Kucan against declaring independence. At the same time, the United States supported the efforts of Mr Ante Markovic, the Yugoslav Prime Minister, to maintain a federal government.³⁹ After Croatia and Slovenia announced independence, James Baker called repeatedly for the different Yugoslav factions to resume "dialogue and negotiation" and avoid "a

³⁷ Britain. Foreign Affairs Committee, Central and Eastern Europe. *Problems of the Post-Communist Era* First Report, Vol II. London: HMSO. 1992. p 58. Douglas Hurd's testimony in front of the Foreign Affairs committee, page 181. Britain. House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee. *Developments in Eastern Europe: minutes of evidence*. London: HMSO. 14 January 1992. See statement of the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr Douglas Hogg see Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates*, 14 October 1991. pages 40 - 48.

³⁸ Mr Gerald Kaufman: Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates*., 14 October 1991, page 40-48. page 42. One dissident within the Labour ranks was Mr Macdonald. Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates*, 13 November 1991, page 1204.

³⁹ Dempsey, J. 'Markovic backed' *Financial Times*, 30 March 1991. page 2.

powderkeg”.⁴⁰ On 7 July 1991 during a visit to Belgrade, Baker reaffirmed his support for the political and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.⁴¹

The US position was shaped by a number of factors. Firstly, like Britain, US policy makers did not wish to put the principle of national self-determination above those of state sovereignty for fear that it would create a dangerous precedent for other Eastern European and Soviet minority groups.⁴² Secondly, Bush had just completed his successful military victory against Iraq and, faced with criticism that he was not paying sufficient attention to resolve the domestic economic problems, he did not want to become involved in a new foreign policy initiative. In addition, since the Republican Party had to prepare itself to win the election, Bush was concerned not to become entangled in a conflict that could cost US soldiers’ lives.⁴³ The US Administration also was not sympathetic to President Tudjman because of his views on minorities who were perceived as resembling those of the Ustasha regime during the Second World War.⁴⁴

The background of Bush’s advisers and the position taken by the Pentagon influenced US policy toward Yugoslavia. Brent Scowcroft, US National Security Adviser and Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State, had served in Yugoslavia. They had first-hand experience with the depth and complexity of the political situation in the country. Their experience reinforced their beliefs that the US should avoid getting deeply involved in the Yugoslav conflict, especially when there was lack of strong public support for such an initiative.⁴⁵ The Pentagon’s

⁴⁰ Goshko, J. M. ‘US , Allies Plan meeting on Yugoslavia’ *Washington Post.*, 28 June 1991, page - 31, Volume 114. Issue 205.

⁴¹ Paulsen, T. *Die Jugoslawienpolitik der USA 1989 - 1994: Begrenztes Engagement und Konfliktdynamik.* Baden Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 1995. page 41.

⁴² Zametica, J. *The Yugoslav conflict.* London, IISS, Brassey's. Summer 1992. page 60.
Tucker, R. W; Hendrickson, D. C. ‘America and Bosnia. *National Interest*, Fall 1993, Vol 33. pages 14 - 27

⁴³ Laraabee, F. S. ‘Implications for transatlantic relations.’ in Jopp, M. E (Ed), *The implication of the Yugoslav crisis for Western Europe's foreign relations* . Paris: Institute for Security Studies - Western European Union. October 1994.

⁴⁴ Schild, G. ‘The USA and Civil War in Bosnia’. *Aussenpolitik*, 1996, Vol 1, 22-32. page 24.

⁴⁵ Throughout mid-1991 to the Spring of 1992, public opinion remained against involvement in the region. see Kohut, A; Toth, R. C. ‘Arms and the people’. *Foreign*

assessment was that there was no sign that the fighting in Yugoslavia posed a threat to neighbouring US allies such as Italy and Greece. Hence, the US did not see the need to plan regional contingencies for the region.⁴⁶

EC member states demand for a WEU peacekeeping force in former Yugoslavia

By the summer of 1991, the EC perspective towards the conflict in Yugoslavia began to be shaped by institutional concerns about which multilateral organisation should assume peacekeeping and conflict management activities in the Balkans. This discussion was linked to the IGC negotiations, more specifically to the French and German demands for a European defence policy.

Calls for a WEU peacekeeping force

In early August 1991, after the eruption of the war in Croatia, the French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas argued that a WEU inter-position force of 30,000 troops should be sent to eastern Croatia to police a cease-fire.⁴⁷ The French proposal was taken up by the Dutch Presidency who, on 19 September 1991, called an emergency meeting of the EC Foreign Minister to consider the proposal for a peacekeeping force in Former Yugoslavia. As a result of the meeting, EC Foreign Ministers asked the WEU to assess the feasibility of sending a military force to support the role of EC monitors on the ground.

The EC member states were divided on the response to the proposal. Germany, Italy and the Netherlands supported the idea.⁴⁸ Britain, Portugal and Denmark were opposed. The British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd laid down a number of

Affairs, November/December 1994, vol 73, No. 6, pages 47 - 61.

⁴⁶ Hoffman, D; Goschko, J. M. 'West considering Yugoslav arms embargo, aid cutoff; Baker warns of "full-fledged civil war' *The Washington Post.*, 4 July 1991, 19 Volume , Issue 211, page 114.

⁴⁷ Gardner, D. and Silber, L. 'France seeks Yugoslav force: Armed European intervention urged as EC sets up crisis talks' *The Independent.*, 6 August 1991, page 17.

⁴⁸ Germany even moved away from their earlier condition that military intervention could only come after approval by all parties involved in the Yugoslav conflict. Usborn, David, Eisenhammer, J and Marshall, A. 'Europe split on military force' *The Independent.*, 18 September 1991, page 9.

conditions during the discussions: a cease-fire had to have been established in advance, the force would have to have been invited by all parties involved, including the Serbian guerrillas and mediation had to continue.⁴⁹ The British Foreign Office and other defence experts voiced reservations at the idea. A MoD spokesman underlined that the lack of a cease-fire meant that troops would be sent to undertake peace-making activities rather than peacekeeping, as he explained peace-making “is really not on the cards at all. You can peace-keep, but not peace-make. Where’s your frontier? Where’s your enemy? It’s really not a runner.” The Foreign Office in London agreed with the MoD. As a Foreign Office spokesman stated publicly “We do not contemplate that British troops would be given a combat role”.⁵⁰

A compromise was reached on 20 September 1991 when the EC Foreign Ministers pulled back from sending any immediate peacekeeping force to Yugoslavia. Instead they agreed to consider greater armed protection for an enlarged mission of EC cease-fire monitors.⁵¹ The decision to invoke the role of the WEU in Yugoslavia gave a new dimension to the crisis. The EC member states’ response to the crisis became closely entangled with the negotiation process to establish ESDI. As Eyal explains a vicious circle was established:

“any proposal for tackling the conflict was first analysed in every Western capital, not according to whether it could actually contribute to the solution of the civil war, but according to its implications for what was still termed Western Europe’s ‘architecture’.”⁵²

⁴⁹ Tanner, M; Osborne D. ‘Europe may use force in Yugoslavia: as fighting intensifies WEU ministers consider dispatch of peacekeeping troops to back Community’s diplomatic efforts’ *The Independent*, 17 September 1991, page 1.

⁵⁰ Bellamy, C. ‘Peace-keeping force an “impractical idea”’ *The Independent*, 18 September 1991, page 9; Brown, C and Helm, S ‘Major warns against intervention’ *The Independent*, 18 September 1991, page 1.

⁵¹ Osborne, D. ‘EC pulls back from sending troops to Yugoslavia’ *Independent*, 20 September 1991.

⁵² Eyal, J. *Europe and Yugoslavia: lessons from a failure*. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. 1993. page 33

In other words, although some EC member states wanted to send a WEU peacekeeping force because of a genuine belief that through such an action the EC could help to prevent additional bloodshed, for some EC member states there was also a desire to foster the EC/WEU institutional architecture because of specific national beliefs in the role of EC/WEU institutions in crisis management. Added to this were WEU institutional interests in developing a 'peacekeeping role'. It is therefore important to look at these specific national and institutional interests.

German policy makers view of the role of the WEU in peacekeeping

The German position on the role of the WEU in peacekeeping was shaped by a number of concerns. First, across the political parties and among government officials there was the view that 'something had to be done' to stop the bloodshed in Former Yugoslavia. Secondly, there were concerns about the lack of US engagement. It was feared that the US would pursue an isolationist policy.⁵³ Thirdly, as previously mentioned, CDU/CSU officials believed that it would be easier to foster the Bundeswehr's 'out-of-area' role within the WEU structure than within the NATO treaty. The WEU treaty did not have any legal limitation in respect to the 'out-of-area' involvement, whereas the NATO treaty had clauses dealing with this issue.⁵⁴ CDU/CSU politicians were also aware that a consensus was emerging across the FDP, SPD and the Greens over the measures necessary to deal with the conflict in Yugoslavia. By linking the issue of military intervention with reforming WEU functions, the CDU/CSU leadership hoped to foster an agreement on the policy of allowing the Bundeswehr to assume 'out-of-area' tasks. This thinking could explain why as early as July 1991, Volker Rühle, then the chairman of Germany's ruling Christian Democrats, expressed an interest in WEU involvement in Yugoslavia.⁵⁵ Finally, some commentators have argued that the German government decision to support the development of the WEU was partly

⁵³ This point was raised by CDU/CSU MP Paul Breuer on 24 June 1999.

⁵⁴ This point was confirmed in an interview with Dr Schleier, Bundestag, Bonn 24 June 1999.

⁵⁵ Peel, Q; Muthner, R and Graham, G. 'Peace force is urged for Yugoslavia' *Financial Times*, 1 August 1991, page 16

influenced by resentment toward the NATO decision to give the leadership of the AARC to Britain.⁵⁶

WEU institutional interests

WEU officials and members of the WEU defence committee perceived the conflict in Yugoslavia as an opportunity to demonstrate the role that the WEU could play in peacekeeping. Already during 1988 the WEU had undertaken mine-clearing operations in the Gulf and after the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 the WEU co-ordinated naval operations in enforcing the embargo against Iraq.⁵⁷ From these experiences, the WEU international staff and the WEU Defence Assembly had learned a number of lessons. Both bodies were in agreement on the need to give the WEU a role in the co-ordination of military activities and proposals were put forward in a number of stages. In November 1990, the Defence Committee recommended that the WEU Assembly should approve a document that called for the organisation to undertake a co-ordinating role during 'out-of-area' operations. The WEU Defence Committee also urged the Council to examine the idea of creating a WEU naval on-call force for external operations and recommended the pooling of appropriate air-mobile assets into a European rapid reaction force.⁵⁸ In December 1990, the WEU Defence Committee recommended that a high level of co-operation within the Chiefs of Defence - (their first meeting within the WEU had occurred in early 1990) - be maintained. It called upon the Council to instruct the Chiefs of Defence staff of the WEU member countries to prepare the armed forces for possible co-ordinated operations. Thanks to the activities of the Defence Committee, the WEU Assembly approved a proposal which called for the WEU armed forces to have a common definition of joint procedures, exchange of

⁵⁶ 'Eine historische Entscheidung?' *Der Spiegel*, 21 October 1991, Vol 43; Menon, A.; Foster, A; et al. 'A common European defence.' *Survival*, Autumn 1992, pages 106 – 112, see page 107.

⁵⁷ The operation in 1988 was conducted under the auspices of a group of high-level WEU correspondents, it represented the first example of a combined military operation coordinated by the WEU. Vierucci, L. 'The role of the Western European Union in the maintenance of international peace and security' *International Peacekeeping*, 1995, Vol 2, No. 3, page 311; Wilson, G. "WEU's operational capability: delusion or reality" in Lenzi, G. (Ed.). *WEU at fifty*. Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies. 1998

⁵⁸ WEU. Defence Committee. Report submitted by Scheffer, D. H. *Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf Region: report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee.*, London: WEU Assembly, Document No. 1248. 7 November 1990.

operational information, co-ordination in respect of transport, interoperability of equipment and common exercises.⁵⁹ In December 1990, the WEU Secretary-General, Willem van Eekelen, endorsed some of the WEU Assembly's demands and urged the establishment of a European Reaction Force.⁶⁰

The French national perspective on the WEU role in peacekeeping

As previously mentioned, the French government took the lead in calling for a role for the WEU in peacekeeping. France put forward this position not only because of concerns about the nature of the conflict in Yugoslavia but also because it wanted to prevent NATO assuming an 'out-of-area' role. As mentioned in the previous chapter, since France was outside the NATO military structures, it was particularly concerned about the discussions within NATO fora on giving the organisation an 'out-of-area' role. By strengthening the role of the WEU in peacekeeping, France hoped to prevent NATO from taking the lead in crisis management.⁶¹ As Wijk explains: "If France could claim operations outside the NATO area for the WEU, the position of the WEU would be strengthened and NATO could become increasingly superfluous".⁶² At the same time, France wanted to affirm itself as the leader in European politics and perceived the need to manage the Yugoslav crisis in order to give Europe a stronger foreign and security dimension.⁶³

Opposition to WEU assuming a peacekeeping role

There was however considerable opposition to the WEU assuming a peacekeeping role. The US government was wary of the idea. In Europe, the British government, supported by Denmark, Ireland, and Portugal, led the opposition to WEU's

⁵⁹ WEU Assembly. *Eight, Ninth and Tenth sittings*. Brussels: WEU Assembly. 5 December 1990.

⁶⁰ Eekelen, van W. 'Building a new European security order: WEU's contribution' *NATO Review*, August 1990, No. 4, pages 18 - 23.

⁶¹ Bozo, F. 'France'. In M. E. Brenner. (Ed.), *NATO and Collective Security*. London, New York: Macmillan Press and St. Martin's Press. 1998. especially pages 39 - 49.

⁶² Wijk, R. D. *NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: The Battle for Consensus*. London: Brassey's. 1997.; page 51.

⁶³ Tardy, T. *La France et la gestion des conflits yougoslaves (1991 - 1995)*. Bruxelles: Établissements Émile Bruylant. 1999.; page 115.

involvement in Yugoslavia. In contrast to the French, Italian and German governments that saw in the conflict the attempt by Serbia to dominate the republics, British politicians continued to believe that the nature of the conflict was inter-ethnic, a civil war with no quick fix. They therefore remained reluctant to endorse any type of military operations.⁶⁴

In Germany, only the CDU/CSU supported the role of WEU in peacekeeping in 1991. On 8 July 1991, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the German Foreign Minister and acting Chairman in Office of the WEU Council, did not conceal his opposition to the proposed intervention of the organisation in Yugoslavia. To rebuff the proposal, Mr Genscher called for the creation of a CSCE 'blue helmets'.⁶⁵ Similarly, SPD representatives at the WEU Assembly voiced their opposition to the idea. Speaking during a WEU Assembly meeting, SPD member Mr Antretter strongly argued against sending a peacekeeping force to Yugoslavia because there was no peace to maintain. To control some of the demands for intervention from conservative and liberal circles, the socialist group in the WEU prepared a motion requesting that WEU peacekeeping activities should be authorised by the United Nations.⁶⁶

The failure to find a compromise on the 'burden sharing' issues and the shift in the EC and US perceptions of the Yugoslav conflict: autumn 1991

In order to accommodate Kohl and Mitterand's plans for ESDI, in October 1991, during the IGC negotiations, the British and Italian governments proposed the

⁶⁴ For a good analysis of the position of different member states toward the WEU intervention in former Yugoslavia see Edwards, G. 'The potential limits of the CFSP: The Yugoslav example' in E. Regelsberger; P.T de Schoutheete; W. Wessels. *Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond*. London: Lynne Reiner. 1997. Opposition by the Danish and the Portuguese governments were confirmed during interviews at NATO Headquarters. September 1998.

⁶⁵ WEU Assembly. Political Committee (6 November 1991). *Report submitted by Roseta General report - activities of the WEU Council submitted on behalf of the Political Committee*, Paris: WEU Assembly.

⁶⁶ WEU Assembly. Defence Committee. *Report submitted by Scheffer, D. H. Operational arrangements for WEU - the Yugoslav crisis: report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee*, Paris: WEU. 27 November 1991. The SPD's motion for the UN giving a mandate to the WEU can be found in is reprinted in WEU Assembly. *WEU Sitings*, No.

creation and development of multinational troops to be put at the disposal of both the WEU and NATO. These troops were only to be deployed for 'out-of-area' operations. It was envisaged that the new European reaction force would have its own planning structures and could detach its forces from NATO responsibilities in the event that the Western Alliance did not want to be involved in an operation.⁶⁷ The Italo-British proposal stated that the WEU would remain autonomous from the EC. The role of the WEU was to be reconsidered in 1998. The Netherlands, Portugal and Denmark supported the Anglo-Italian proposal.⁶⁸

The British and Italian governments pursued a number of strategies through the proposal. Although British politicians were opposed to the development of a European defence identity, they conceded that some form of European defence identity was inevitable. Through the offer, London and Rome were thus seeking to contain and redirect the ambitions of the French and the German governments for an independent European defence policy. At the same time they sought to establish a closer link between the WEU and NATO structures in order to reassure the United States of their continued support for the alliance.

The Anglo-Italian proposal did not fulfil the demands made in Bonn and Paris in that it rejected the idea of a stronger link between the WEU and the EC. In Bonn and Paris doubts were also expressed as to the extent to which the Italo-British proposal would lead to NATO taking over control of the WEU.⁶⁹ For these reasons, rather than seeking a compromise, the German and French governments raised the stakes in the negotiations. On the 14 October 1991, Kohl and Mitterand announced

10. Paris: WEU..3 December 1991. The Recommendation is No 512.

⁶⁷ Original text in Laursen, F. and Vanhooancker, S.E *The intergovernmental conference on Political Union. Institutional Reforms, new policies and international identity of the European Community*, Maastricht. 1992. page. 413-414. On comments about the proposal see: Menon, A; Forster, A and Wallace, W. *op.cit.*, Moens, A. 'Behind complementarity and transparency: the politics of the European Security and Defence Identity'. *Journal of European Integration*, XVI. 1992. pages 29 - 48.

⁶⁸ 'Britain, Italy Propose Stronger Defence, Want Rapid Reaction Force' *The Associated Press*, 4 October 1991.

⁶⁹ Another option under discussion was that of the Dutch. In September 1991, the Dutch put forward a new proposal which sought to reaffirm their atlanticist credentials, while supporting a supranational option. The proposal was rejected by the member states for different reasons.

a new initiative. This included a clarification about the WEU member states co-operation with European institutions and NATO. A key aspect of the new initiative was a proposal that the European Council should develop defence and security policies within the European Union. In other words, France and Germany sought to subordinate the WEU to the EC, whilst emphasising the intergovernmental aspect of future EC defence policy. Additional proposals included the creation of a permanent WEU group to plan possible deployments and the establishment of military units answerable to the WEU.⁷⁰ Most significantly, a concluding paragraph, added as a note for the record, announced that a Franco-German brigade, originally formed in 1987, would be expanded. The official communiqué stated that France and Germany hoped the unit would become “the model for closer military cooperation between the WEU Member States”.⁷¹ Through this announcement, Kohl and Mitterand sought to demonstrate their determination to develop a role for the WEU. At the same time, it appeared that in Bonn and Paris there was the desire to lead in the development of European crisis intervention forces.⁷²

Reaction of NATO member states to the announcement of the Eurocorps

The announcement of the development of the Eurocorps and France and Germany's support for the strengthening of the WEU's role set in motion a number of initiatives by other NATO member states opposed to such steps. The immediate reaction of the British government to the proposal was to reaffirm that it did not see the need to duplicate NATO's military efforts and sought additional information.⁷³ The Italian Foreign Minister M. Gianni de Michelis in contrast read in the proposal a desire to achieve a compromise.⁷⁴ The new Franco-German proposal was also

⁷⁰ 'Political Union: Franco-German initiative foreign, security and defence policy. Europe Documents.' *Europe Documents*. Brussels: Europe Agence Internationale d'information pour la presse. No. 1738 Atlantic, Doc No. 74. 18 October 1991.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² The third aspect mentioned is support in an anonymous article of one of high level German officials employed at NATO. Cited in Peters, S. 'Germany's future defence policy: opening up the option for German power politics.' *German Politics and Society* Vol 26, pp54-74. 1992.

⁷³ 'Londres ne veut pas d'une 'copie' de l'OTAN' *Le Monde*, 18 October 1991.

⁷⁴ 'M. Gianni de Michelis estime qu' "il y a convergence" des points de vue au sein des

welcomed by the Spanish, Greek and Belgian governments as a positive step towards further negotiations.⁷⁵

The US government was worried by the development. To avoid another row in transatlantic relations, Washington pursued a restrained and subtle way to voice its disapproval of the new initiative. The spokesmen of the State Department, Mr Richard Boucher stated its support for a European defence identity, which was complementary to NATO missions.⁷⁶ In a similar manner, NATO Secretary-General Wörner made clear that it made no sense to have a separate European force to operate in defence of NATO territory since the Western Alliance was already fulfilling such a task. However, Wörner conceded that the WEU could play a role 'out-of-area'.⁷⁷

Privately, US officials were concerned that a new European defence system could weaken NATO's integrated military structure. NATO international staff located within the NATO Political Affairs Division, the Pentagon and the State Department became increasingly worried that if the WEU were to take over operations in Yugoslavia, it would undermine NATO.⁷⁸ If France could succeed in persuading Spain, Belgium and other WEU member states to put their troops at the disposal of the WEU, in a time of crisis not sufficient troops might be available for NATO operations, thus jeopardising the NATO integrated military structure. Because of the shrinking defence budget, it was clear that NATO member states participating in the Eurocorps were not going to develop new corps, rather they were going to

Douze' *Le Monde*, 18 October 1991.; 'Gianni De Michelis au "Figaro": "Nous approchons d'un accord sur une défense européenne" *Le Figaro*, 17 October 1991. De Michelis saw the major stumbling block to a European foreign and defence policy, the British reluctance to agree to a unanimity vote during the policy-making process.

⁷⁵ 'Accueil positif suaf à Londres et à Washington' *Le Monde.*, 18 October 1991.; 'Brauchbare Grundlage' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 October 1991, page 3.; 'La proposition Kohl-Mitterand: réaction mitigées dans la CEE' *Le Quotidien.*, 17 October 1991.

⁷⁶ 'Réaction prudente de Washington à la proposition franco-allemande' *AFT (162027)*, 15 October 1991.

⁷⁷ Bellamy, C; Gooch, A. 'NATO unease on Franco-German plan' *Independent*. 22 October 1991, page 12.

⁷⁸ This point was confirmed during an interview with CDU/CSU MP Paul Breuer, Bundestag, Bonn 24 June 1999.

earmarked existing troops for the WEU. The anxiety along the corridors of NATO and the US State Department was well expressed by an official who stated that:

“We look at the discussion on European security policy and we see a potential competitor. We see a relationship in which we would become an unequal partner, instead of an equal partner, or admittedly, more than equal partner, as at present...”⁷⁹

During the November 1991 NATO meeting, Bush expressed his concerns at the Europeans drifting away from the Western Alliance. In a candid speech, Bush warned European allies not to undermine the NATO alliance. He stated that “if your ultimate aim is to provide independently for your own defence, the time to tell us is today.”⁸⁰ NATO international staff and officials within the State Department were not alone in their uneasiness about the role of the Eurocorps and the WEU. Canada, Denmark, Turkey, Britain and the Netherlands shared the same fears.⁸¹

The failure of diplomatic efforts: autumn 1991

Whilst the negotiations on European Security were underway, the Yugoslav conflict entered a new stage. At the diplomatic level, an agreement was reached to set up a Yugoslav Conference, under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington, the former British Foreign Secretary and former Secretary-General of NATO. The aim of the conference was to achieve an agreement by mid-October.⁸² On the 7th September the EC Conference on Yugoslavia was convened at the Hague. The talks were to be based on three principles: no unilateral changes of borders, protection of

⁷⁹ quoted in Lichtfield, J. ‘Fears for NATO muddy the issue in Washington’ *Independent*, 28 November 1991, page 12.

⁸⁰ Quoted in Mauthner, R. and Barber, L. ‘Bush calls on Europe to clarify role in NATO’. *Financial Times*., 8 November 1991, page 1.

⁸¹ Myers, J. A. 1993. *op.cit.* Interview with Major Craig Cotter, Military Adviser at the Permanent Representative of Canada to NATO Headquarters. 5 November 1998; Interview with Mr Kristian Fischer, Defence Adviser at the Permanent Representative of Denmark and Mr Basat Öztürk, First Secretary Turkish Delegation to NATO. Brussels: 8 September 1998.

⁸²The expiry date for the monitoring missions provided by the Brioni agreement.

the rights of all minorities, and full respect for all legitimate interests and aspirations.⁸³

At the beginning of October the EC discussed the possibility of removing recognition from Yugoslavia and its official representatives. Under this threat on October 4th Carrington secured Milosevic's agreement to seek a political solution "on the basis of the independence of those wishing it".⁸⁴ The significant concession made by Milosevic did nothing to stop the fighting. On the contrary, Tudjman declared a full mobilisation and the JNA responded by bombarding Croatian cities. Then, on the 18th October Carrington held the sixth plenary session of the Conference and submitted a rather detailed sketch of his project for a political settlement. The overall idea was to create a free association of those republics wishing independence, with a strong mechanism for guaranteeing human rights and a special status of autonomy for certain groups and regions. If the republics requested recognition, they would receive it, provided that internal borders were respected. Those ethnic communities enjoying special status in a given territory were to be able to use their own national emblems and their own political, legal and educational institutions. It was also publicly stated that if Milosevic did not accept the proposal, the EC would continue the negotiations with the republics which wanted independence.⁸⁵ Milosevic rejected the plan because in his view it abolished with one stroke of pen the Yugoslav federation and rewarded the secession of Croatia and Slovenia.⁸⁶ Milosevic was given an ultimatum to sign the proposal put forward by the conference on 28th October but he failed to do so. As a consequence, the EC imposed sanctions on November 8.⁸⁷

⁸³ During the talks, it became clear that neither Tudjman or the Serb leader Milosevic could guarantee an end to the fighting in the short-term. Nevertheless, Carrington decided to go ahead with the conference with the hope of reaching a lasting cease-fire.

⁸⁴ Palmer, J. 'Serb climb down in EC pact' *The Guardian*., 5 October 1991, page 8.

⁸⁵ Gow, J. *Triumph of the lack of will: international diplomacy and the Yugoslav war*. London: Hurst & Company. 1997. page 59.

⁸⁶ Gardner, D; Van de Krol, R. 'Serbia rejects EC peace proposal'. *Financial Times*. 6 November 1991. page 22.

⁸⁷ Gardner, D; Silber, L. 'EC agrees tough sanctions if Serbs reject peace plan' *Financial Times*. 5 November 1991. page 20.

The failure of the EC Conference and the end of the Brioni agreement was a turning point in EC member states' attitude to the conflict.⁸⁸ A stronger consensus started to emerge about the need to recognise the Yugoslav republics and to intervene militarily in the conflict. By October 1991, France and Italy began to support Germany's demands for recognition. On 28 November 1991, Bonn and Rome announced that they would recognise Croatia and Slovenia before the end of the year. In Britain, the Foreign Office also signalled that London would be ready to go along with the proposals.⁸⁹ EC member states took steps to prepare for a potential military involvement in Yugoslavia. On the 1st October the EC agreed to increase the number of cease-fire monitors in Yugoslavia to 120 and the WEU planned forces to be sent in support of the monitors. The planned options included sending a small force, perhaps 5,000 soldiers or sending a larger force about 25,000.⁹⁰ On 18 November the WEU agreed in principle to send naval vessels to form an 'humanitarian corridor' in the Adriatic.⁹¹

In Britain, calls for intervention also grew. Sir Russell Johnson, David Alton (Liberals) and Labour MP Macdonald stated that a NATO 'sky shield' over Croatian air space was necessary and put forward a moral case for intervention.⁹² The Minister of State at the Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Office, Mr Douglas Hogg, responded to these demands by pointing out that the deployment could only be effective if it was authorised to use force. No such a consensus existed within the UN Security Council. The same applied to the use of air interdiction. He also expressed his fears that once the sea and air actions had been approved, land operations could not be excluded. In his view the lack of a cease-

⁸⁸This point was made by General Degli Innocenti, Italian member of the NATO Military Committee during 1993-1995. Interviewed on 4th November 1998 and by Mr Kees Klompenhower, Defence Counsellor at the Permanent Representative of Netherlands to NATO. Interviewed on 7th of September 1998.

⁸⁹ Bridge, A; Helm, S. 'UK ready to recognise Croatia and Slovenia.' *The Independent*, 29 November 1991, page 1.

⁹⁰ Marshall, A. 'EC moves nearer armed action on Yugoslavia' *Independent*, , 1 October 1991, page 8.

⁹¹ Christopher, B. and Helm, S. 'Naval guard force awaits word to sail' *Independent*., 20 November 1991, page 12.

⁹² Britain. House of Commons, *Parliamentary debates*, 12 December 1991, Vol 182. page 1016. and Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates*, 13 November 1991, vol 180. page 1204.

fire in Croatia meant that UN and British forces could not undertake peacekeeping tasks.⁹³ The demands of the British pro-NATO interventionists did not win wide support in the House of Commons.

The German push for recognition: December 1991

In December 1991, the German government policy of pressurising other EC member states to recognise Croatian and Slovenian independence reached a climax. Bonn recognised the two republics unilaterally. At the same time it sought to obtain other EC member states' support by delaying the implementation of the decision until January 1992. As previously mentioned most EC countries had already concluded that the recognition of Slovenia's independence had to be accepted. Doubts however remained about Croatia because of its poor record on human rights. On the 16th December the EC foreign ministers announced that they were prepared to support the national demand for independence of all the republics of Yugoslavia which fulfilled specific criteria for human rights and minority protections. The EC asked Robert Badinter, a French international lawyer, to compile a report on whether all the Yugoslav republics fulfilled the criteria. Despite the fact that Badinter reported that Croatia did not meet the criteria laid down by the EC on the safeguarding of minority rights, in January 1992 the EC agreed that Croatia and Slovenia could become independent republics. They also stated that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro could follow suit, if they so wished. In the period of seven months, EC member states had thus undergone a volte face on the issue of recognition. As Eyal explains:

“Paradoxically, a Western policy which began by trying to keep Yugoslavia together, ended up in forcing Bosnia and Macedonia to ask for their independence on the basis of a criteria which hardly apply to their circumstances”.⁹⁴

⁹³ Britain. House of Commons. *ibid.*, 13 November 1991, page 1202

⁹⁴ Eyal, J. *op.cit.* page 50.

EC recognition of the two Yugoslav republics raised strong suspicions in the United States and did nothing to repair the already shaky transatlantic relationship. US policy-makers were stunned at the EC decision. The State Department was angry at not having been consulted. Within the corridors of Capitol Hill, anti-German feelings were expressed. US politicians felt that their Yugoslav policy had been defeated.⁹⁵

The mediation for the ‘interlocking of institutions’ in regional peacekeeping: November 1991 to July 1992

In December 1991, EC member states reached a muddled compromise not only on the recognition issue but also on the relationship between the WEU and the EC. The Maastricht Treaty signed on 7th February 1992 envisaged that EC member states were to strengthen their common defence policy and the role of the WEU. The Maastricht Treaty states in its section on ‘Provisions on Common Foreign and Security Policy’ that “the Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.”⁹⁶ However, the thorny issue of the nature of the European defence architecture was not resolved. The period between December 1991 and July 1992 is in fact characterised by negotiations among US and EC policy makers to resolve the dispute about the European security structure. During this mediation, those US, British and NATO officials that for long had advocated a Western Alliance ‘out-of-area’ role found new allies in both national governmental structures and among other EU and NATO member states.

The idea of involving NATO in peacekeeping operations was first advanced by the NATO Secretary-General and members of the Political Affairs Division and the Department of Policy and Planning.⁹⁷ On the 10 October 1991, Wörner had clearly

⁹⁵ Paulsen, T. *op.cit* page 52.

⁹⁶ See Title V, Article J.4 paragraph 2 of the Maastricht Treaty. Text in Full of the “Treaty of the European Union”. in *Europe Documents* No 1759/60. Agence Europe. Brussels. 7 February 1992.

⁹⁷ The role of these sections of NATO international staff in shaping the development of

stated in an interview that he envisaged that NATO would eventually put peacekeeping forces in places of ethnic or border unrest, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural mountains.⁹⁸ Similarly, Michael Legge, the architect of the New Strategic Concept, speaking on a personal basis, argued that “I can envision a situation in the future where the integrated military forces of NATO might form the nucleus of a military force to be put at the disposal of the CSCE.... I must emphasise that this is not the policy of the alliance at present. But the outstanding characteristic of NATO is that it does have the one, effective, functioning collective military organisation in Europe”.⁹⁹

The idea that NATO should undertake peacekeeping activities started to find strong support among US policy making structures because of the changing perception of the nature of the Yugoslav conflict and growing concerns about European allies’ security strategies. In the United States, the voices of opposition to the US policy of non-intervention in the Balkans were located within conservative circles. These included the Heritage Foundation and the magazine *National Review*. Writers for these periodicals, together with members of Senate and House of Representatives’ foreign policy subcommittees and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, argued that the US administration was giving the wrong priority to geostrategic interests over those of human and democratic rights.¹⁰⁰ Pro-interventionist views began to achieve widespread support among the media also because of the lobbying activities of organised Slovenian and Croatian interest groups in the United States.¹⁰¹ The Croatian Democracy Project and the Croatian

NATO’s peacekeeping role was stressed by the Italian, German and Norwegian NATO Delegations during interviews in September and November 1998. (see appendix for details of interviews)

⁹⁸ ‘NATO Seeks New Identity In Europe; Cooperation With East Seen Ensuring Stability’ *The Washington Post*, 4 October 1991, Volume 114. Issue 303. page 19.

⁹⁹ ‘NATO may wither without wider role’ - *Reuter Textline Reuter News Service - Eastern Europe.*, 20 March 1992.

¹⁰⁰ United States. Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. *Geneva meeting on national minorities and Moscow meeting on the human dimension.* 102nd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C.. 31 July 1991.; Paulsen, T. *op.cit.* pages 42 - 43.

¹⁰¹ The Croatian community in the US used professional public relations techniques. One source reported that the Croatians spent more than US\$50 million in lobbying politicians in Washington during mid 1991 and mid 1993. see *Defence and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, 31 March 1993, page 3. In contrast, no comparable pro-Yugoslav or pro-Serb lobbies existed in the United States because the Serb émigré communities were divided.

American Association were two of the most important Croatian-American lobby groups. During the summer of 1991 they raised the accusation that the Bush administration had double moral standards toward the Balkans and argued for Croatian and Slovenian independence.¹⁰² The domestic criticisms raised at home and the EC decision to recognise Croatia and Slovenia led the Bush administration to rethink its strategy toward the Balkans.

At the same time, within the State Department and the Pentagon there were fears that the French and German strategy of developing the Eurocorps and prepare the WEU to assume peacekeeping activities could undermine the NATO integrated military structure. As a result the US government instructed its personnel at NATO headquarters to begin gathering support for a NATO mandate in the Balkans.¹⁰³

The initial diplomatic efforts to give NATO a peacekeeping mandate began in November 1991. During this period, the Dutch Minister Ruud Lubbers called for NATO to assume peacekeeping activities on behalf of the CSCE.¹⁰⁴ This call was first made at the Rome NATO summit but was not approved.¹⁰⁵ However, on the 12th and 13th December 1991 at the Defence Policy Committee ministerial meeting the MC 400 document that had been developed by the Military Strategy Working Group, was again debated. During the meeting, a temporary compromise was reached on the 'out-of-area' issue. It was decided that individual allies could act outside the treaty area. NATO infrastructure could play an important role.¹⁰⁶ This decision sanctioned preparation for intervention in Yugoslavia that was already underway at the WEU planning cell in Metz.¹⁰⁷ As Mr Juan De Louis, Assistant to the Head of the Security Policy Section at WEU headquarters

¹⁰² Paulsen, T. *op.cit.* page 44.

¹⁰³ Interview with Mr John Kindler at NATO headquarters, 11 September 1998. Mr Kindler argued that the United States supported efforts in both the United Nations and NATO to ensure that the organisation was given a mandate to undertake peacekeeping activities. Wijk, *op.cit.* page 54.

¹⁰⁴ Scheltema, G. 1992. "CSCE Peacekeeping Operations." *Helsinki Monitor*, 1992, Vol 3 issue 4; page 7-17. page 4

¹⁰⁵ Wijk, R. D. *op.cit.* page 54.

¹⁰⁶ Wijk, R. D. *op.cit.* pages 42 - 43.

¹⁰⁷ WEU Assembly. *European security policy- reply to the 37 annual report of the Council submitted on behalf of the Political Committee: Report written by Goerens.* Paris: WEU

acknowledged in an interview, the planning for military operations in the Yugoslavia had been underway throughout the autumn and winter of 1991 and different European capitals were involved. The information was shared within both the WEU and NATO military planning staff.¹⁰⁸

The efforts to give NATO a mandate to act 'out-of-area' continued in early 1992. On 30-31st January 1992 a discussion took place in Prague at the CSCE Ministerial Council. The Dutch Foreign Minister argued that NATO or the WEU should demonstrate a readiness, on a case-by-case basis, to assist the CSCE in the execution of observer missions or peacekeeping operations. In his view the CSCE should not seek to duplicate the capabilities of the WEU and NATO. Rather the two organisations could help the CSCE strengthen its crisis management mechanisms. The idea of the 'interlocking of institutions' was favoured by Canada, Norway and former communist countries such as Poland, Estonia and Russia.¹⁰⁹ A few weeks later, on 17 February 1992, the Netherlands put forward the idea at NATO and this became the subject of brainstorming sessions of the Ambassadors.¹¹⁰ During the discussion, it became clear that the United States, Britain, Canada and the Netherlands supported the NATO international staff's efforts to give the organisation a mandate to undertake peacekeeping activities. Other NATO countries such as Portugal, Norway and Greece were less enthusiastic but went along with the proposals. Germany, France, Spain and Belgium expressed the strongest level of concern.¹¹¹

The mandate issue involved three controversial areas. The first was whether the CSCE could request another organisation directly (and not just its member states) to contribute to peacekeeping activities. The German, French and Spanish

Assembly. document 1342. 16 November 1992.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Mr Juan De Louis, WEU headquarters in Brussels, 6th November 1998.

¹⁰⁹ Scheltema, G. *op.cit.* page 10. For the view of the Dutch Foreign Ministry, see also: Hans van den Broek' opening address in Seventh International Roundtable Conference. *Preventing instability in Post-Cold war Europe: the institutional responses of NATO, the WEU, the EC, the CSCE, and the UN.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. April 10 - 11, 1992. pages 30 - 38.

¹¹⁰ Wijk, R. D *op.cit.* page 54.

¹¹¹ Interviews at NATO headquarters in September and November 1998. see appendix.

governments questioned the idea that the CSCE should be able to appeal directly to NATO to act as a regional organisation. In their view, the CSCE should restrict itself to requesting national governments to undertake peacekeeping activities. It was up to national governments to decide whether to use the means and procedures of NATO or not.¹¹² The second controversial issue was the extent to which the CSCE should be established as a regional arrangement in terms of the UN Charter. The German Foreign Minister Genscher and the Dutch government advocated this position. Finally, there was the issue of the definition of the type and level of activities that could be undertaken under a peacekeeping mandate.¹¹³ The debate about the CSCE mandate was a hot issue because of the outbreak of conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina

During the months of January and May 1992, the conflict in Croatia had moved to Bosnia, where there were three ethnic groups: the Muslims, the Serbs and the Croats. The relationship between these groups had been peaceful. But the conflict in Croatia and Slovenia had begun to unsettle relations between the three groups. One of the direct consequences of the Croatia conflict was that Croatian Serb refugees moved into Northern Bosnia and reported the atrocities being committed against them. The Bosnian Serbs thus became extremely sensitive to any form of discrimination against their national status. Their fears appeared to be grounded when in September and October 1991, Alija Izetbegovic, the Bosnian Muslim leader, persuaded the Bosnian Assembly to declare its independence from Yugoslavia, although the Serb Members of Parliament abstained and walked out.¹¹⁴

On 3rd March Izetbegovic proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Bosnia. The declaration led to clashes between civilians and Serb irregulars in Sarajevo. To calm the situation the EC intervened and on the 18 March a Sarajevo Agreement

¹¹²Wjik. R. D. 1997. *op.cit.* page. 54. In the interview with Paul Breuer he argued that the CSU/CDU was opposed to the CSCE having the authority to call upon NATO to act collectively.

¹¹³ This issue will be discussed in more in detailed in the next chapters.

¹¹⁴ O'Ballance, E. *Civil war in Bosnia, 1992-94*. London: Macmillan. 1995. page 7.

was declared. The agreement envisaged dividing Bosnia into three autonomous cantons. After initially signing the agreement, Izetbegovic rejected it. He hoped by so doing to buy time to consolidate his control both in the capital and in other towns where the Muslim population was in a majority. The failure of the accord led to a fresh outbreak of conflict. In April an anti-Serb demonstration attacked the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia (SDS) and the Serbs responded with sniper fire. Izetbegovic ordered the mobilisation of the reserve army and on 7th April a state of emergency was declared.

The Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs embarked on distinct political and military strategies. The Bosnian Muslims did not have their own armed forces and began taking control over the police force by purging its members of Serb descent. Thus on the 8th April the army was reorganised and the Bosnian Defence Force (BDF) was created. At the same time, since Izetbegovic did not have much military equipment, he requested the JNA to withdraw from Bosnia and to leave all its equipment behind. This request was promptly rebuffed by the JNA. The self-declared Bosnian government, following the example of the Croatian government a year earlier, besieged all JNA controlled buildings in Sarajevo. The JNA responded by kidnapping Izetbegovic and conflict in Sarajevo exploded into warfare. At the same time, the Bosnian Serbs embarked on a military strategy to secure their control of the Northeast of the country, what came to be known as the Serb Drina Valley campaign. Since the Bosnian Serbs had traditionally formed the largest ethnic group in most of the villages and small towns in the North of the country, they wanted to consolidate this advantage while at the same time creating a corridor between Serbia and their own self-controlled Bosnian territory. Between March and April 1992, the Bosnian Serbs managed to gain control over a substantial stretch of the Bosnian terrain on the West Bank of the Drina River. They made similar successful advances in some towns in the north region bordering Croatia. By May 1992, the eyes of the international community were focused on the escalating conflict in Sarajevo, which had assumed the dimension of a full and bloody civil war.

The EC and US response to the outbreak of conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina

In contrast to the outbreak of the conflict in Slovenia and Croatia, the EC reacted by pressing immediately for a mixture of both diplomatic and military measures toward the conflict. During April, France had continued in its efforts to allow the WEU to undertake peacekeeping operations in Yugoslavia. On the 30th April 1992 the UN discussed a French idea that the WEU should organise a peacekeeping force under the UN flag. At the same time the French government called for the dispatch of a mission to evaluate the situation in Bosnia. Paris favoured sending a lightly-armed force of a 'few hundred men' The job of these forces was to protect UN buildings and senior officials involved in the peace process, such as Lord Carrington. But, as commentators pointed out, it appeared that the French Foreign Minister Dumas wanted the force to grow later into a fully-fledge peacekeeping force, separate from the UN blue helmets that were already deployed in Yugoslavia.¹¹⁵

Preparations for military efforts were also undertaken within NATO structures. On the 26 May 1992, NATO Defence Ministers agreed that the alliance could undertake a peacekeeping role.¹¹⁶ The official position was that the decision did not mean that NATO was going to assume a military role in Yugoslavia. In fact, the Dutch Defence Minister Relus Ter Beek and US Defence Secretary Dick Cheney warned that the declaration made by the Defence Minister would not automatically mean sending NATO troops to all of Europe's hot spots. Dick Cheney, like Wörner and other European officials, insisted that there was no agreement to intervene in Yugoslavia.¹¹⁷ Despite the official line taken by the members of the defence committee, it can be stipulated that the option of intervening militarily in Yugoslavia was discussed. During the winter of 1991, the naval officers of the WEU member states had in fact held a number of meetings on the Yugoslav crisis. As previously mentioned, a sharing of plans did take place among WEU and

¹¹⁵ Barber, T; Jackson, T. 'French push for EC action in Yugoslavia'. *Independent* page 14. 2 May 1992.

¹¹⁶ 'NATO could have peacekeepers ready by year's end' *The Associated Press*, 26 May 1992.

¹¹⁷ 'NATO poised to take on peacekeeping role' *The Associated Press*, 27 May 1992.

NATO structures.¹¹⁸ The announcement made by NATO Defence Ministers only contributed to strengthening the view that military means had to be seriously considered. It was a form of lobbying at NAC level. At the same time, the negotiations within the CSCE, UN, WEU, NATO and national capitals to achieve a compromise on the European security structure reached a new momentum.

The Helsinki and Oslo Declarations of June 1992

At a diplomatic level, by the spring of 1992, the efforts of NATO international staff, US, Canadian and Dutch officials to give NATO a peacekeeping mandate were rewarded. On 4th June it was agreed that the CSCE could call upon other international institutions and organisations, NATO and the WEU, to support its operations. Peacekeeping activities were defined as including a range of activities from small-scale observer missions to large deployments of forces. Peacekeeping was not to entail enforcement actions as outlined under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In addition it was agreed that the relationship between the UN and CSCE peacekeeping would take place within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (that is acting as a regional organisation).¹¹⁹ The final legitimising touch for NATO to assume a peacekeeping role was worked out at the fringes of the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Oslo where it was agreed that NATO could “support, on a case-by-case basis Peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE”.¹²⁰

The CSCE declaration was a carefully drafted compromise. It represented a victory for Genscher and the Dutch government who for sometime had worked towards the CSCE becoming a regional organisation under international law. At the same time, the declaration meant that the United States, Canada, the Netherlands and Norway, in co-operation with NATO international staff, had managed to persuade more

¹¹⁸ The sharing of information among WEU and NATO structures was hinted in an interview with Mr Juan De Louis, Assistant to the Head of the Security Policy Section at WEU Headquarters in Brussels on 6th of November 1998.

¹¹⁹ CSCE. *Helsinki Summit Declaration: the challenge of change. 1992.* at <http://www.osce.org/docs/summits/hels92e.htm>.

¹²⁰ NATO. *Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué*, Brussels, page 4. 4 June 1992.

reluctant EC countries such as Ireland, Belgium, Germany, Spain and France to allow NATO to assume 'out-of-area' activities.¹²¹

At the Oslo Conference, US officials did offer their support for NATO military engagement in the Yugoslav crisis. The US Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger stated that the alliance should "stand ready to support" the implementation of sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council against Yugoslavia. He declared that the United States was willing to offer airlift and other logistical support to assist NATO peace-keeping operations, and added, "We also do not exclude providing ground contingents on the same basis as other nations." US Secretary of State Baker also refused to rule out military intervention to end the fighting.¹²² The US government had however not made a final decision on the issue, although a significant shift in favour of military means was evident.

US U-turn on military intervention

The significance of Eagleburger's speech is that it captured the mood of the pro-interventionist lobby. This represented the culmination of a number of domestic factors and changing perceptions of the European environment. As previously stated in the United States there were influential lobby groups in the Senate and in Congress, which had been arguing for sometime for a policy of intervention. During the month of June, within the US policy-making establishment influential figures voiced their support for the use of military force. Senator Richard Lugar, acting ranking Republican on the Foreign Affairs Committee, whose views were

¹²¹ Scheltema. *op.cit.* And in a testimony to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr Peter Ludlow, Director of the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels described the relationship between the CSCE and NATO as follows: "it seems to me that in the course of the last 6 to 9 months NATO has gained the initiative in what I think one must describe as inevitable institutional rivalry. There is competition here. There is conflict, if you like, a bureaucratic conflict of interest for turf. ... there is undoubtedly a tussle for power and NATO has a lot of advantages, not least, the fact, that is a going-concern with a strong institutional base.... The CSCE is increasingly forced in effect to pick up the crumbs from NATO's table." House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee. *Developments in Central Europe: mechanics of security and co-operations*. Britain: House of Commons. 15 January 1992. page 211.

¹²² 'NATO Opens for Peacekeeper Role in Europe' *The Associated Press*, 4 June 1992.; 'NATO Widens Mandate On Forces; European Conflicts Targeted, But Balkan Turmoil

often sought by the White House and colleagues in Congress, stated in a radio interview that the causes of the Yugoslav war lay in the attempts by Serbia to dominate the region. He believed that failure to curb Serbia could ultimately lead to aggression against Albania and Greece. "At their leisure, the Serbian government of Yugoslavia will go after Kosovo and take on Albania. And in due course Macedonia and take on Greece." Lugar urged the Bush administration to build a coalition in the UN Security Council to undertake a military operation in Yugoslavia similar to 'Desert Storm'.¹²³ On the 4th of June, at a Hearing of the Subcommittee on European Affairs, Senator Lugar, after reaffirming his belief that sanctions could only work if military force was used, stated that NATO had a military role to play in bringing peace to Yugoslavia.¹²⁴ Some academics providing expert evidence to the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs, lined up to support Lugar's statements. Jennone Walker, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, urged the Bush administration to form a contingent as part of the UN efforts and to allow NATO and the WEU to intervene in the Balkans.¹²⁵ Dr Glyn, a member of the American Enterprise Institute, accused the State Department of "a total allergy to involvement" in the Balkans and advocated a military option.¹²⁶ On the 22nd June, at a forum organised by the Atlantic Council, Senator Dole, the leader of the Republicans in Senate, added his voice to the pro-interventionist lobby.¹²⁷

Apart from these domestic pressures for action, the Bush administration seemed to have taken the final decision to intervene militarily in the Balkans because of a new momentum to the negotiations over ESDI and the announcement of the Petersberg Declaration, described below. It was this decision that strengthened the already existing belief in existence on Capitol Hill that if the United States would not

Not Specified' *The Washington Post* , 5 June 1992.

¹²³'US Senator calls for UN force against Serbia' *Reuter Textline, Reuter News Service, USA*, 10 June 1992.

¹²⁴ United States. Senate. Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations.. *Yugoslavia: the question of intervention*. 11 June 1992, pp32.

¹²⁵ *Ibid* page 29.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, page 33 - 34.

¹²⁷ David Briscoe . 'Key Republican Senator Calls For NATO Moves In Yugoslavia' *The Associated Press*, 22 June 1992.

intervene in Yugoslavia, the WEU member states would otherwise go-it-alone and by so doing undermine NATO. The dynamic of competition between NATO and the WEU had in fact not been resolved despite great efforts by US and European officials to find a compromise.

The negotiations about the Eurocorps

As previously mentioned, the hostility of the US administration to the announcement of the Eurocorps, made in October 1991, had prompted the German government to undertake a series of steps to reassure Washington and other NATO allies of its aim. Throughout January to May 1992, German officials argued that the Eurocorps were to be 'double-hatted', that is they were to be made available to either the WEU or NATO and they were not to be a standing army at the sole disposal of the WEU. The Eurocorps would retain its NATO assignments and the alliance would continue to have first call on them. A commitment was also given that the Eurocorps was to be placed under NATO command.¹²⁸ At the same time, in a number of speeches by both Kohl and Kinkel, the newly appointed Foreign Minister, stressed the complementarity of NATO and the WEU. According to German officials the development of the Eurocorps, far from undermining NATO, would reinforce the alliance by strengthening the European pillar and reducing the burden shouldered by the US. In addition, through the Eurocorps, France could be brought closer to NATO structures.¹²⁹

During a number of secret negotiations, it was reported that the French had agreed to German demands that the proposed bi-national force of about 25,000 soldiers would come under the operational control of NATO in the event of war in NATO's European heartland. (The concession was mainly a conceptual one since the force

¹²⁸ Muenster, W. 'Die NATO wird sich behaupten müssen. In der Allianz wird die Logik der jüngsten deutsch-französischen Initiative respektiert'. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. 18 October 1991. This commitment was embodied in the May 1992 Franco-German declaration that formally established the corps.

¹²⁹ Kohl, H. 'Ein geeintes Deutschland als Gewinn für Stabilität und Sicherheit in Europa' *Bulletin*, 16 May 1990, No. 68, page 585-589. Kinkel, K. 'The new NATO: Steps towards reform'. *NATO Review*, May 1996. Vol 44, No. 3, page 8-12; Kinkel, K. *Foreign policy in a new era: forging a transatlantic approach: speech to the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies*. Washington, New York: GIC. 25 May 1995.

was to take some time to materialise.) The French concession, however, did not placate all the fears in Western capitals that France and Germany were undermining NATO. The agreement did not mention putting the Eurocorps under NATO command in the case of 'out-of-area' operations. In addition, no agreement appeared to exist as to the extent to which the WEU would be able to organise 'out-of-area' operations independently from NATO. The US and the German policy-makers proposed that Eurocorps would be authorised to operate in areas outside the NATO treaty but only when NATO declined to intervene. The French government rejected this proposal.¹³⁰ It was only in May 1992 that France agreed to put the Eurocorps at the disposal of NATO. But even then, the issue of whether NATO would have the final say in the deployment of 'dual-hatted' troops remained open.

The Petersberg Declaration of June 1992

The rift in transatlantic relations was intensified by the decision by the WEU Council of Ministers to issue the Petersberg Declaration on 19 June 1992. One of the key features of the declaration was the agreement that the WEU could be employed for "humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making."¹³¹ WEU member states also agreed to strengthen the operational role of the organisation. A WEU planning cell was to be established by 1 October 1992 and WEU member states committed themselves to make military units answerable to the WEU. Participation in specific operations was to remain a decision taken by member states in accordance with their national constitutions. Other important steps toward strengthening the operational role of the WEU were taken. These included a decision that the Chiefs of Defence Staff should meet twice a year prior to the regular Ministerial Councils and on an ad hoc basis whenever necessary.

The Petersberg Declaration was of great significance for the development of a new European security structure. For the first time in its own history, WEU member

¹³⁰ Hoagland, J. 'The Case For European Self-defence' *The Washington Post* 19 March 1992, page 27, Volume 15. Issue 105.

¹³¹ WEU Council of Ministers. 'Western European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration.' WEU Documents. section II On Strengthening WEU. 19 June 1992.

states had agreed to lay the groundwork for the establishment of military units answerable to the organisation, and the establishment of planning cells. In addition, the WEU had expanded its jurisdiction. It had assumed a new set of tasks outside the defence of Western European territory. The declaration demonstrated the level of resolve that existed within France, Germany, Spain and Belgium for a stronger European Defence Identity. At a political level the declaration went beyond NATO's decision taken on 4th June 1992 to make its forces available for peacekeeping under CSCE auspices. The Petersberg Declaration in fact implied that the WEU could assume peacekeeping and conflict management operations without the approval of the CSCE or the UN Security Council. What remained unclear, however, was the extent to which WEU member states would agree to such an action.

The declaration contained a number of grey areas that reflected the controversial nature of some of the issues discussed and the persistence of different national perspectives. One grey issue was the extent to which the WEU would be able to command and control troops put at its disposal. The declaration stated that WEU would have its own troops. However, since the decision to make troops available to the WEU was to reside with national governments, there were serious doubts as to the extent to which the WEU Presidency and Council could initiate and organise the operations. It was also unclear if the WEU would be commanding or co-ordinating the troops and whether the WEU political or military authorities would be responsible for such activities. Finally, the policy-making process for taking the decision to engage in peacekeeping and crisis management activities remained vague. The Petersberg Declaration did not specify if the decision to undertake peacekeeping and crisis management activities was to be taken by the WEU Council or the European Council.¹³²

Despite these unresolved issues, some WEU member states were keen to undertake military operations in Yugoslavia. On 20th June 1992, Italy and France renewed

¹³² WEU. Assembly. Political Committee *Report submitted by Mr Gorens, European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht, on European security policy - reply to the 37 annual report of the Council. WEU Assembly document 1342.* Paris: WEU Assembly November 1992, page 361.

their call for WEU intervention in Yugoslavia. They argued that WEU partners should be prepared to intervene in Yugoslavia with a naval and air blockade. At a meeting in Bonn of Foreign and Defence Ministers from the WEU, a senior Italian official said that the WEU "must be in a position to neutralise the offensive capacity of the Serbian forces should United Nations sanctions fail to work."¹³³ On the 27th June, Rome and Paris renewed their calls for considering the use of force to bring food and humanitarian aid to Sarajevo.¹³⁴

The last steps toward military intervention

US government officials in the Pentagon and in the State Department were taken aback by the Petersberg Declaration. The declaration did nothing but fuel already existing fears that the Europeans were undermining NATO.¹³⁵ Confronted with this new consensus within the WEU and domestic calls for intervention, the Bush Administration could not stand-by idly. On the 30th June US Defence Secretary Cheney announced that the United States was prepared to commit air and combat forces to escort and protect relief convoys to Sarajevo.¹³⁶

On July 7, after the United States had signalled its full readiness to undertake military activities in the Balkans, a consensus emerged at the G7 meeting among key NATO member states on the use of military means to resolve the crisis. A White House spokesman announced that the United States was ready to provide air cover "whatever forces might be necessary to secure the [Sarajevo] airport" or a corridor by which humanitarian aid could be delivered to the city. Italian Foreign Minister Vincenzo Scotti stated that he was to call a meeting of the nine-countries

¹³³ Eisenhammer, J. 'Fight over the role of WEU' *Independent*, 20 June 1992, page 10.

¹³⁴ Gellman, B; Devroy, A. 'Balkans solution sought: US officials ponder use of force at Sarajevo.' *The Washington Post*, 27 June 1992, Vol 115, issue 205, page 1.

¹³⁵ The reaction of the US to the Petersberg Declaration was confirmed during the interview with CDU/CSU MP Paul Breuer, Bundestag, Bonn 24 June 1999.

¹³⁶ Gellman, B. 'US Is Prepared To Commit Combat Forces; Cheney Acknowledges Possibility Of 'Some Military Resistance' From Serb Combatants' *The Washington Post*, 1 July 1992.

of the WEU in Helsinki to establish a naval blockade in the Adriatic Sea aimed at enforcing the UN embargo against Serbia.¹³⁷

British policy makers supported the United States initiative but continued to oppose the French and Italian's calls for forces to be deployed in a combat role. On 8th July Douglas Hurd, speaking in front of the EC Parliament in Strasbourg, stated: "We have no right, nor appetite to establish protectorates in Eastern Europe in the name of European order. We must not exaggerate our power to remove those agonies". At the same time, Prime Minister Major played down suggestions from France and Italy that the WEU might urge the sending of a ground force. "There is not a proposition that is remotely agreed by anyone to put in land forces to fight on the ground in Yugoslavia. That is not an option that has been discussed".¹³⁸ As a compromise, within NATO and the WEU a common agreement was reached to undertake sanction-monitoring activities, which excluded the use of ground troops.

On 16 July 1992 NATO began sanctions monitoring activities, in what was known as 'Operation Maritime Monitor.' In order to enforce the embargo, NATO decided that "all ships entering or leaving the territorial waters of the Former Yugoslavia will be halted to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations."¹³⁹ On 10 July, WEU ministers approved operation 'Sharp Guard', which involved sea-monitoring activities and surveillance. Six ships, four maritime patrol aircraft, ground based helicopters and one support ship were deployed.¹⁴⁰ WEU and NATO ships were under separate commands.

¹³⁷ Fischer, M; Auerback, S. 'Major Powers To Stiffen Stand On Serbia; UN Troops Seen Opening Relief Land Corridors' *The Washington Post*, 7 July 1992.

¹³⁸ Jackson, T; Savill, A. 'Yugoslavia: UK warns against use of force: Hurd tells EC that military option is not feasible - Royal Navy may help police embargo against Serbia' *The Independent.*, 9 July 1992, page 10.

¹³⁹ North Atlantic Council Meeting. 'Statement on NATO maritime Operations', 10 July 1992. Brussels: NATO.

¹⁴⁰ WEU Assembly. *Western European Union: information document, report submitted by Mrs Guirado (Spain) and Mrs Katseli (Greece) on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.* Paris: WEU, page 112. 1998.

Conclusion

The findings outlined in this chapter challenge the widespread belief that NATO assumed an 'out-of-area' role because of the conflict in Yugoslavia. It is argued that the most important stimuli to NATO's decisions to assume an 'out-of-area' role was the interaction between the debate about the future of a European security structure and the shifting perception at both an international and domestic level of the nature of the Balkan conflict. The July 1992 NATO decision to intervene in the Yugoslav conflict was not solely the result of a perception that military means had to supplement the diplomatic efforts in the Balkans. NATO intervened because the United States was concerned about Franco-German attempts, supported by other EC member states, to give the WEU a role in peacekeeping and to develop WEU military capabilities. There was a pattern of competition between WEU and NATO over which organisation should lead in crisis management in Europe. It was partly this pattern of competition that explains why both alliances assumed separate military roles in the Balkans in July 1992.

When the conflict erupted in Yugoslavia, in the spring of 1991, the policy community that existed within NATO international staff, British and US officials was hesitant to call for NATO intervention in the region. Within the British and US governments the conflict in Slovenia was perceived as an internal matter to be resolved through diplomatic means. The French and the German governments were however of a different outlook. The conflict in Yugoslavia in fact began at a time when EC member states were negotiating the future of European Political Union. There was a Franco-German agreement that the EC should develop a common foreign and security policy, which included a defence role. In both Bonn and Paris there was a growing disillusionment with the process of Alliance transformation. In Bonn, the announcement that the British would lead the newly established ARRC had in fact sent the signals that the alliance was not prepared to reward Germany for its continued commitment to it. The announcement had also ignited fears in Paris that NATO was in the process of reorganising itself to assume crisis management tasks.

At the same time, France and Germany, together with other EC member states, took the lead in attempting to resolve the Yugoslav conflict. However, the failure of the EC initiative, the Brioni agreement, to bring peace to the region and the outbreak of the conflict in Croatia, stimulated a new approach within the EC. France called for the WEU to assume a peacekeeping role in the region. At the same time, the German government began to push for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia's independence. France's call for a role for the WEU in peacekeeping had the support of the WEU international staff and the German, Dutch and Italian governments. Among these actors, there was a growing concern about the nature of the conflict in Yugoslavia and diverging goals for developing a new European security architecture. By calling for a WEU peacekeeping role, the French government hoped to strengthen WEU's military capability and foster a new division of labour between the WEU and NATO. According to the French vision, the WEU would be responsible for peacekeeping activities in Europe and NATO would maintain the role of providing collective security.

France's aims had the warm support of WEU international staff and the WEU Assembly Defence Committee. Since early 1990, both the WEU Secretary-General and the WEU Assembly Defence Committee had been arguing for the establishment of an independent WEU military capability and command and control structures. For the German government, support for the WEU was not only linked to a belief that the process of political and economic integration should include foreign and defence goals. There were also fears that the United States was assuming an isolationist stance and it was thought among CDU/CSU circles that if the WEU could intervene in Yugoslav, the action would stimulate a consensus among the domestic parties for a revision of Bundeswehr's role in 'out-of-area'. The Italian and the Dutch governments supported the proposal because of a belief that 'something had to be done' to stop the Balkan conflict.

Although the United States endorsed the diplomatic initiatives taken by the EC toward the crisis in Yugoslavia, it was openly hostile to the Franco-German initiative in early 1991. A mediating position was put forward by Britain and Italy to seek to contain Franco-German demands. The compromise emphasised the

ability of the WEU to undertake 'out-of-area' operations, in close consultation with NATO. The refusal of Bonn and Paris to accept the proposal and the announcement of the transformation of the Franco-German brigade into the Eurocorps fuelled further the transatlantic rift.

By late 1991, NATO international staff, particularly the Secretary-General and members of the Political Affairs Committee began openly to advocate that NATO should intervene militarily in the Balkans. The Dutch, Turkish and Canadian governments supported such calls. So did the Bush administration which was coming under pressure domestically to change Yugoslav policy. Within the State Department, there was a growing desire to take the lead in handling the Yugoslav conflict. The Bush administration therefore gave instructions to US staff at NATO headquarters to support initiatives to give NATO a mandated role in peacekeeping and started to move away from supporting Yugoslav unity. Thus, by November 1991, NATO international staff, with the support of the Dutch and Canadian governments led the negotiations to create a new division of labour among the UN and regional security organisations. They argued that the CSCE and the UN should give NATO a mandate in undertaking peacekeeping activities.

Despite intense negotiations in both the EC, UN, NATO and CSCE there remained marked differences of opinion about which European regional organisation should undertake 'out-of-area' operations and the nature of such operations. Although the negotiations succeeded in May 1992 to obtain France and Germany's agreement that the Eurocorps were to be placed under the SHAPE command, Bonn and Paris continued to view the Eurocorps as forming the nucleus of a future European defence capability able to engage in peacekeeping activities. At Metz and in European capitals, plans were also drawn up for sending a European force to Yugoslavia.

In June 1992, the competing efforts undertaken by NATO international staff, the US, Canadian governments and WEU/EU member states reached a climax. In June 1992 the CSCE agreed to give both NATO and the WEU a peacekeeping role and France and Germany managed to persuade reluctant WEU member states to sign

the Petersberg Declaration. The Declaration signalled an historic agreement to develop a WEU defence capability and command structures for 'out-of-area' operations. At the same time, it contributed to fuelling worries in Washington that France and Germany were determined to seek to develop an autonomous defence structure. Faced with these new developments, both British and US politicians put aside their lasting reservations about the use of military means in Yugoslavia. Thus, in July 1992 a compromise was achieved: both the WEU and NATO intervened in the Balkans under separate commands.

Chapter 4: NATO's new role in the Balkans and the internal restructuring debate: August 1992 to December 1993

Introduction

From August 1992 to the summer of 1993, NATO widened its role in the Balkans. It assumed a wide range of tasks spanning from sanction monitoring activities both in the air and at sea to planning a large-scale peacekeeping operation.¹ To undertake these activities, NATO international staff had to develop new methods of commanding and organising military forces. Most of the alliance's military plans had in fact been prepared to deal with the outbreak of conflict against the Soviet Union. There were no rules for engagement in 'out-of-area' operations already in existence. NATO's increased involvement in the Balkans started to assume a new significance for the alliance's internal restructuring debate.

The aim of this chapter is twofold: first, to examine the extent to which the shift toward relying on NATO military capabilities to resolve the conflict in the Balkans was partly the result of the political strategy pursued by a 'policy community'. It will be beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the Western Allies' diplomatic strategies towards former Yugoslavia.² For this reason, the analysis will be restricted to the key events that led to a reliance on NATO's military means. Secondly, an analysis will be provided of how the experience of military engagement in the Balkans influenced the internal debate about the future of the alliance. To deal with this issue I will identify the sections of the policy-making structures that most significantly contributed to the following developments: the

¹ The tasks included logistical and military support for UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo and for UNPROFOR in crisis situation; contingencies planning in support of humanitarian efforts, involving land and air based options; planning for supervision of heavy weapons and a contribution to the creation of safe areas.

² There already exists an excellent literature on the Western Allies's diplomatic strategies towards the Balkans during 1992 and 1995. Among these are: Woodward, S. L. *Balkan tragedy: chaos and dissolution after the Cold War*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution. 1995.; Watson, F. M. *Peace proposals for Bosnia-Herzegovina*. London: House of Commons Library. 1993.; Gow, J. *Triumph of the lack of will: international diplomacy and the Yugoslav war*. London: Hurst & Company. 1997.; O'Ballance, E. *Civil war in Bosnia, 1992-94*. London: Macmillan. 1995; Sloan, E. C. *Bosnia and the New Collective Security*. London, Westport Connecticut: Praeger. 1998.;

drafting of a NATO peacekeeping doctrine, the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) and the initiative toward NATO enlargement, which later came to be known as the Partnership for Peace (PfP).

NATO mandates for planning humanitarian aid and enforcing sanctions at sea and in the air: August 1992 to December 1992

During the period from August 1992 to December 1992, NATO endorsed a set of measures that transformed its involvement in the former Yugoslavia. The initial impetus to this event can be located in media reports about the existence of concentration camps in Bosnia, the continued fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina and rising casualties.

During the first week of August 1992, ITN journalists visited refugee camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the control of the Serbian authorities. They reported that there were 'concentration camps' in which atrocities were being committed on a mass scale. To substantiate their allegations, pictures of emaciated prisoners behind a wire fence, evoking the images of the holocaust, were beamed through the television screens across the Western world. At the same time, the US journalist Roy Gutman of *Newsday* gave a number of dispatches providing names of witnesses of mass atrocities who claimed that up to 1,350 prisoners in a camp in the city of Brcko had been executed.³ As a result of these reports, the media and political parties across Western Europe and the United States began aggressively to criticise their own governments and international institutions for failing to endorse harsher measures against the Serbs.

In the United States, the news of the atrocities was revealed in the midst of a presidential campaign. The Democratic candidate, Bill Clinton and his vice presidential running partner, Sen. Albert Gore Jr called on Bush to "do whatever it takes to stop the slaughter of civilians". Both candidates advocated the use of military means. They were supported in Capitol Hill by a bipartisan group of

³ Oberdorfer, D. 'US verifies killings in Serb camps; State Department spokesman repeats condemnation of horrible abuses'. *The Washington Post*. Vol 115. Issue 243. 4 August 1992. Final section 1, page 1.

Senators including Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D) and Minority Leader Robert J. Dole (R). On the 5th of August, Mitchell and Dole sponsored a non-binding resolution within the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. They urged Bush to ask the UN Security Council to authorise two types of policies: first, the use of military force to assure the delivery of humanitarian relief and supplies and second the use of force, if necessary, to allow international observers to enter the detention camps.⁴ A day later, during a Senate debate, Senator D'Amato used the analogy of the holocaust to describe the conflict in former Yugoslavia. In his view the Serbs were committing acts of atrocity comparable to those of the Nazis in order to establish themselves as the 'master race' in the Balkans. D'Amato put forward a resolution calling for the establishment of a War Crimes Tribunal and for a vigorous leadership that was prepared to enforce a total economic embargo against Yugoslavia and the use of military means at selected targets where the death camps were operating.⁵

US officials reacted sceptically at the reports. On the 4th of August Thomas MT Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian affairs told journalists that the reports did not represent "substantiated information" and therefore the United States could not confirm that the atrocities had taken place.⁶ The following day, the Bush administration reviewed its response to the news. George Bush and John Major vowed to take all possible measures to open up Serb-run detention camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They called for an emergency meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission to launch an investigation into the Bosnian-Serb run camps. On 6th August 1992, Bush directed the Secretary of State to press hard for quick passage of a United Nations Security Council Resolution "authorizing the use of all necessary measures to establish conditions necessary for, and to facilitate the delivery of, humanitarian assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina

⁴ Oberdorfer, D; Dewar, H. 'Clinton, Senators urge Bush to act on Balkans; forceful response to atrocity reports is sought.' *The Washington Post*, 6 August 1992, final Section A page 1. Vol 115, issue 245.

⁵ 'Milosevic's Balkan genocide' *Congressional Record*, 4 August 1992, section 11437 - 11440.

⁶ Oberdorfer, D. 'State Department. Backtracks on atrocity reports: Calls for action on Serbs camps rise.' *The Washington Post*. 5 August 1992, Vol 115. Issue 244, section A, page 1.

This resolution was to authorise the international community to use force, if necessary, to deliver humanitarian relief supplies".⁷ In addition, Bush called for a new set of measures that included the strengthening of economic sanctions against Serbia, giving Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina full recognition and the deployment of monitoring missions in areas surrounding Serbia. The call for use of military means to assist humanitarian efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina represented a departure from previous policies. It implied a readiness on the part of the Bush administration to consider the deployment of US soldiers on the ground. US officials were however at pains to emphasise that the Administration was not contemplating large-scale military intervention in Bosnia.⁸

Despite the US government's change of policy in the Balkans, some European member states and US politicians continued to put pressure on the White House to take stronger measures. On the 7th of August Mr Goerges Kiejman, French Deputy Foreign Minister, announced that his government was ready to increase the numbers and equipment at the disposal of UN forces in Bosnia and would try to alter the mandate to let them control the camps and protect aid convoys.⁹ On 10th August a cross-party motion was put forward in the US Senate by a number of leading senators - Liberman, Mitchell and Biden were the Democratic senators and Dole and Lugar the Republicans. During the debate in the Senate voices were heard in favour of a wider use of military means than those outlined by the President. As a result, Senator Levin (Democrat) tabled an amendment that asked the President to urge the UN to put together an international military force not only to provide humanitarian assistance but also to open up the camps where prisoners were being held. The amendment was accepted.¹⁰

⁷ United States. The White House . 'Remarks by the President Upon Departure, Paterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Co'. *Congressional Record*. 6 August 1992. United States, Senatae. 'Authorization of Multilateral Action in Bosnia-Herzegovina'. *Congressional Record*, 10 August 1992, page 1203.

⁸ Lichfield, J. 'US reluctant to lead the way against Serbs' *Independent*., 6 August 1992, page 8.

⁹ Dempsey, J; Dawnay, I. 'West vows to open up Serb camps: Britain and US look for alternative strategies to military intervention in Bosnia'. *Financial Times*, 8 August 1992, page 2. Doyle, L. 'Europe and US split on Bosnia: Allies at odds on the use of troops to protect aid convoys' *Independent*, 8 August 1992, page 1.

¹⁰United States. Senate. 'Authorization of Multilateral Action in Bosnia-Herzegovina

In London and Bonn, there was support for the Bush initiative but calls for military actions were rejected. Douglas Hogg, a British Foreign Office Minister, agreed that more troops to protect humanitarian aid convoys were needed. He nevertheless stated that there was a 'great dividing line' between escorting relief workers and using troops to enforce a cease-fire. Kohl also warned against any air strikes.¹¹ The Chancellor emphasised that more concerned efforts to resolve the crisis had to be undertaken within the EC.¹²

Both the Major and Kohl governments were not under the same domestic pressure to intervene in the conflict as the Bush administration. In Britain, criticism of government policy was confined to Paddy Ashdown (leader of the Liberal Party), Lord Owen (leader of the S.P.D) and the liberal press. During the crisis Ashdown and Owen called for NATO air strikes against Serb ground forces.¹³ In Germany, there were only a few supporters for a large scale military intervention. Within the ranks of the CDU/CSU they included: Carl-Dieter Spranger, CSU Minister for Development,¹⁴ Wolfgang Schäuble and Norbert Blüm.¹⁵ The following CDU/CSU Members of Parliament also expressed pro-interventionist positions: Alfred Dregger,¹⁶ Karl Lamers,¹⁷ Johannes Gerster,¹⁸ Heiner Geissler,¹⁹ Norbert Blum²⁰ and Christian Schwarz-Schilling.²¹

(Senate).' *Congressional Record*, 10 August 1992, section 12022 – 12044.

¹¹ Fischer, M. 'Bosnia camp images fuel outrage; European nations pressured to intervene militarily in conflict' *The Washington Post*, 8 August 1992, Vol 115, issue 247. Section A; page 1.

¹² Matthews, R; Dunne, N. 'UN may back force in Bosnia: Western governments strive to resolve differences over scale of military intervention' *Financial Times*, 10 August 1992, page 12.

¹³ Brown, C. 'Appeals for UK military action in Bosnia rejected' *The Independent*, 4 August 1992, page 2.

¹⁴ 'Suche nach Nischen: Was tun für Bosnien? Bonner Generäle halten wenig von einer intervention auf dem Balkan.' *Der Spiegel*, 4 August 1992, No. 2, Vol 35.

¹⁵ 'Raus aus dem Dilemma: SPIEGEL-Gespräch mit Verteidigungsminister Volker Rühle über deutsche Einsätze in der Welt.' *Der Spiegel*, 21 February 1992, Vol 52 pages 21 - 23.; Winter, M. 'Einsatz der Bundeswehr verlangt. Zwei Minister fordern Intervention in Jugoslawien'. *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 15 November 1991.

¹⁶ Gow, D. 'Calls in Bonn to stop Serbia by force'. *The Guardian*, 16 July 1992.

¹⁷ 'Vor der Sondersitzung des Bundestages entschliesst sich die SPD zur Klage beim Verfassungsgericht'. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 July 1992.

¹⁸ 'Gerster steht mit seinem Vorstoss allein. Kohl und Schaeuble lehnen Erwegungen

Most importantly, the images of the holocaust used to represent events in Bosnia, stirred a new reaction among the ranks of the SPD and the Greens. For the first time in post-war German history, some members of the SPD and the Greens endorsed the use of military means. This view was expressed by SPD MPs such as Horst Niggemeier,²² Hartmut Soell,²³ Freimut Duve²⁴ and Willy Brandt. Within the ranks of the Greens, Helmut Lippelt and the anti-Vietnam 1960s student leader, Cohn-Bendit joined the pro-interventionist lobby.²⁵

Whilst the domestic debates across the Atlantic raged, on the 11th August Britain, France and the United States reached an agreement over a draft UN Resolution calling for the use of force. Thus on 13th August 1992, United Nations Security Council Resolution 761 was approved. It called upon all states "to take nationally, or through regional agencies or arrangements, all necessary means to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance".²⁶ The resolution implied far-reaching changes in the UN approach to peacekeeping. As one commentator states: "It was the first time that, acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council gave the authorisation to use force for humanitarian purposes".²⁷ It was apparent to many observers that the execution of the resolution had the potential to jeopardise the neutral status of UN

ueber Militärschlag ab' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 July 1992.

¹⁹ 'Ruhe für deutsche Blauhelme in Somalia. Pioniere, Fernmelder und Sanitaeter sollen Hilfe leisten'. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 December 1992.

²⁰ 'CDU-Politiker stützen Kritik Schwarz-Schilling' *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 17 December 1992.

²¹ 'Christian Schwarz-Schilling, Somalia "Enddlich beteiligen auch wir uns". Nicht heuchlen, handeln.' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 December 1992.

²² Niggemeier, H. 'Militäreinsatz in Jugoslawien' *Münchner Merkur*, 13 July 1992.

²³ 'Vor der sondersitzung des Bundestages entschlisst sich die SPD zur Klage beim Verfassungsgericht'. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 July 1992.

²⁴ Heinrich, A. . 'Wunderbare Wandlung. Die Nackriegsdeutschen und der Bosnien-Einmarsch. ein Frontbericht.' *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 1993, Vol 39 No. 4, pages 406 - 515.

²⁵ Kostede, N. 'Pragmatischer Pazifismus'. *Die Zeit*. 10 July 1992.; for Lippelt see *ibid*.

²⁶ United Nations Security Council Resolution 761, 29 June 1992 reprinted in D. Bethlehem; M, Weller. *The "Yugoslav" crisis in international law: general issues Part 1*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1997. page 13.

²⁷ Leurdijk, D. A; Venema, A. P. *The United Nations and NATO in former Yugoslavia: partners in international cooperation*. Hague, Netherlands Atlantic Commission in cooperation with Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'. 1994. page 23.

peacekeeping forces in the region. British policy makers had expressed this concern on a number of occasions. Lewis Mackenzie, the Canadian general, former commander of the UN peace-keeping operations in Sarajevo, made public in a newspaper interview and in testimony to the US Senate Armed Services Committee his opposition to the use for military means. In his view the use of military force to deliver humanitarian aid would lead to a wider scale Western engagement in the conflict. General Mackenzie believed that the mere possibility of intervention, especially a US military presence, would encourage the Bosnia Muslims to continue military actions rather than engage in peace negotiations. In his view, the calls for the use of military forces expressed by the Senate and by the US Administration were playing into the hands of Iztebegovic, the Bosnia President.²⁸

The failure of the resolution to specify who and how the operation should be conducted suggested that the UN mandate had come about not as a planned strategy but as the result of media and public pressures for action. Bush decided to put the option of military intervention on the cards, not because he had the support of the Pentagon, but rather because he was concerned about the falling popularity of his electoral campaign. Noting that opinion polls suggested that 53 per cent of the public favoured some form of military intervention, Bush did not want the Democrats to take the lead on the issue.²⁹

NATO contingency plans in support of humanitarian efforts

As soon as the US resolution was put forward to the UN, NATO international staff embarked on developing contingency plans aimed at sending troops to protect humanitarian relief convoys to Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO international staff interpreted the mandate in a very broad manner. Three options for operations were presented: firstly, increased maritime sanctions, secondly providing observers and

²⁸ United States. Congress. Senate Committee on Armed Services. *Situation in Bosnia and appropriate US and western responses: hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, second session, August 11, 1992*. Washington. 11 August 1992. page 51-52, 56,59-61. Winsor, H. 'UN general scorns intervention'. *The Independent.*, 13 August 1992. page 7.

²⁹ Matthews, R; Dunne, N. 'UN may back force in Bosnia: Western governments strive to resolve differences over scale of military involvement' *Financial Times*, 10 August 1992, page 2.

humanitarian assistance and finally protected corridors in Bosnia. These types of operations were to involve different levels of commitment. At least 12,000 troops were needed to secure Sarajevo airport alone and up to 100,000 to protect 'humanitarian' corridors. It was envisaged that the corridors would stretch from the port of Split to Sarajevo. The tasks of the troops, apart from delivery of aid was to keep Serb patrols and heavy weapons out of range, with perhaps two more divisions (of up to 50,000) troops to secure the supply route and outlying Muslim areas such as Goradze and Zenica. These latter areas were to become 'safe areas' for Bosnia Muslim and Croats.³⁰

There appeared to have been a desire on the part of NATO international staff to choose military options that required the largest possible military commitment, that is the option of deploying at least 100,000 troops. Indeed, during a testimony in front of the Congressional Committee on Armed Services, General Galvin (SACEUR) had no inhibitions in calling for the widest possible range of military means to resolve the crisis in the Balkans so as to allow NATO to establish a military presence in the region. In his view the measures to deal with the crisis should span from the dispatch of forces to establish enclaves with the assistance of Eastern European countries to the selective use of air capabilities to support humanitarian assistance. He also endorsed sending 'forward air controllers' on the ground to help NATO and the UN to monitor developments.³¹ Evidence of the eagerness of some NATO militaries in becoming involved in peacekeeping operations in Yugoslavia can also be found in a statement made by Sir Jeremy Mackenzie, Commander Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, to Lieutenant-Colonel Bob Stewart in August 1992. He stated that he hoped the Rapid Reactions Corps would be deployed soon in Bosnia.³²

A majority of NATO member states were however less enthusiastic than IMS and SACEUR in becoming involved in large military operations in the former

³⁰ Bellamy, C. 'NATO ponders how to turn words into action' *The Independent*, 12 August 1992, page 8.

³¹ United States. Congress. Senate Committee on Armed Services. *op.cit* page 66-68, 74-76, 80.

³² Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, B. *Broken Lives: a personal view of the Bosnian conflict*.

Yugoslavia. On 15th August 1992, diplomatic representatives at NATO announced that they were not prepared to commit any troops to protect humanitarian aid convoys to towns and cities in Bosnia. This position reflected fears among NATO member states, especially in Britain, that once military forces were dispatched to the region they would become entangled in a civil war. In London, John Major underscored that large-scale deployment of British troops could not find support among the public.³³ In the United States, although Senators had pressed for military action, the Administration urged caution. Speaking to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Stephen Hadley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, explained that the resolution tabled by the government in the UN did allow for the use of military force not only for the delivery of food but also for opening up camps. Nevertheless the Administration hoped that such aims will be achieved through consensus and not through force. In Hadley's opinion, "we should be very reluctant to go beyond the commitment of military power already made by the President to the Bosnian crisis... those who understand the nature of this conflict understand that an enduring solution cannot be imposed by force from outside on unwilling participants".³⁴ A similar approach was adopted by the military. In his testimony to the Committee, Lt. Gen. Barry R McCaffey, Assistant to the Chairman, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pointed out some of the limits of a possible use of military force to assist humanitarian relief. In his view, it was not clear how the use of violence employed selectively against one side or another could prevent the resurgence of hatred once the international force had left the scene. There was also the issue of the reaction of the opposition to the use of military force. He asked: "What is the anticipated reaction of our opponent, whoever he is, when we employ military force against him? Does he directly confront coalition ground forces or does he move against another party, perhaps innocent civilians who are subject to his vengeance?"³⁵

HaperCollinsPublishers. 1993. page 15.

³³ Wintour, P. 'Rift grows in Britain on sending in troops' *The Guardian*, 14 August 1992, page 6. Hill, A; Dempsey, J. 'NATO rules out large-scale troop deployment to Bosnia.' *Financial Times*. 15 August 1992. p 1. Turkey promised to send a 480-strong battalion and Spain an unspecified number of soldiers.

³⁴ United States. Congress. Senate Committee on Armed Services. *op.cit* .page 18.

³⁵ *Ibid*, page 32.

Whilst the British government and the Bush administration remained reluctant to intervene militarily with combat ground troops, on 14th August 1992, France announced that it was ready to send a contingent of 1,100 men to the Balkans. Turkey and Spain also made public their plans to join the operations. Partly as a result of these new developments, by August 18th, the British government did a U-turn. It declared its willingness to place 1,800 soldiers at the disposal of the UN in order to protect humanitarian convoys.³⁶ Simultaneously, at NATO Headquarters, the options for a large-scale military intervention were revised. Instead of involving up to 100,000 troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was estimated that only 10,000 would be required.³⁷

During this period, therefore, the disunity among NATO member states towards the level of military engagement in the Balkans put some checks on the desire of SACEUR and sections of NATO international staff to become engaged in the Balkans. Nevertheless, NATO took the decision to dispatch the Alliance's Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) to the Balkans. NORTHAG included a staff of some 1000 personnel and it provided support for administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, public information, civil-military operation, linguistic support and legal affairs.³⁸ NORTHAG troops in Bosnia included US, British, French, Spanish, Danish, Portuguese and Norwegian soldiers. The United States contributed with intelligence and logistics sources and provided a link with air support from the US Sixth Fleet.³⁹ Although the headquarters was called a United Nations headquarters, NATO was leading the entire operation. As the *Financial Times* reported: "Apart

³⁶ Keesings, *World Events: News Digest* for August 1992. section 39035.

³⁷ 'NATO scales down military plans for Bosnia' *Financial Times*, 21 August 1992. page 2. Bellamy Christopher 'NATO plans limited 6,000-strong Bosnia force' *The Independent*, 25 August 1992, page 6. These estimates were more in line with the WEU plans that had been drawn up in Metz during the previous six months.

³⁸ Barrett, J. 'Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: the NATO approach' in Bauwens, W; Reychler, L. (Eds.) *The Art of Conflict Prevention*, 1994. page 113-136. NATO. "Part 1: The transformation of the Alliance: NATO's role in peacekeeping" in *NATO Handbook*. Brussels: NATO. 1996. online version at <http://www.nato.int/handbook/hb10604e.htm>.

³⁹ Fairhall, D. 'NATO role in new British force for Bosnia' *The Guardian*, 8 October 1992, page 8.

from two token officers representing Ukrainian and Egyptian troops based in Sarajevo, it is a totally NATO affair.”⁴⁰

The significance of this operation was twofold: firstly it was the first sign that the French military were willing to work within a NATO command structure. During the decision to send in troops to support UNPROFOR a controversy had been unleashed over whether France or Britain would have control over the command chain. It was decided that Maj. Gen. Morillon, formerly commander of the 1st French armoured division in Germany, one of the cornerstones of the planned Franco-German Eurocorps, would take control of UNPROFOR. The French government also signalled its willingness to join NATO in the planning of peacekeeping operations in the region. As a French official admitted, when it came to peacekeeping operations “France favoured setting up a planning cell of all 16 allies”. In other words, France was willing to re-enter the NATO integrated military structure to undertake peacekeeping operations. Secondly, the deployment of NORTHAG to Sarajevo represented the kernel of staff that NATO could use to enhance its surveillance of combat troop movements. Through the deployment of the staff at UN Headquarters, NATO was in fact able to co-ordinate military operations both at sea, in the air and on the ground. The presence of highly trained military staff was essential to the strategy of seeking a more robust response to the fighting as events were soon to demonstrate.

The debate about the use of force in the implementation of the flight ban

During October 1992, NATO was given the UN mandate to undertake a flight ban using Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft, an operation known as ‘Operation Sky Monitor’.⁴¹ A month later, NATO was also mandated to board and search ships suspected of violating a new UN embargo. The operation was

⁴⁰ White, D. ‘Post-cold war NATO works its way into its new role: not far from Sarajevo, a unit once ranged against Moscow deploys its resources as a peacekeeper’ *Financial Times*., 17 December 1992, page 2.

⁴¹ The operation was in support of UNSCR 781 which banned all non-UN authorised flights in the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina. UNPROFOR was requested to monitor compliance with the ban. At the same time, the Security Council called upon states “to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to provide assistance to UNPROFOR, based on technical monitoring.”

named 'Operation Maritime Guard'.⁴² Despite these new sets of measures, during December, some policy-makers urged the enforcement of the ban through military means. It was argued that NATO aircraft should be allowed to shoot down Serb aircraft that flouted the UN zone. Clinton was the strongest advocator of this policy option. He had the support of the Dutch and Turkish governments, of some sections of NATO International Staff and of French officials.⁴³

At first the German and British governments were hesitant to endorse a military enforcement of the ban. In Britain, John Major, Malcom Rifkind and Douglas Hurd emphasised that the enforcement of the no-fly zone would hamper humanitarian efforts and threaten British troops deployed in the region.⁴⁴ In Westminster support for the use of military force was indeed confined to sections of the Liberal Party.⁴⁵ In the UN, China and Russia also expressed opposition to the implementation of military means to enforce the ban. In Germany, the SPD and FDP were vehemently opposed to the idea that the Bundeswehr could participate in the military enforcement of the ban.

However, by mid December, a shift in the British and German positions became apparent. Leading British political figures began to endorse the US calls for the

⁴² The action was mandated by UNSCR Resolution 713 and 757 (November 1992) which stated that "acting under Chapters VII and VIII" it called upon states "to use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destination and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of Resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992)". Reprinted in Bethlehem, D; Weller, M. *op.cit.* p 1 and 9. For details of the operation see NATO. NATO Basic Fact Sheet. 'NATO's role in bringing peace to the Former Yugoslavia'. March 1997. NATO web page: <http://www.nato.int/doc/facts/bpfy.htm>. page 3.

⁴³ Mauthner, R; Stephens, P. 'NATO wary of military response in Bosnia'. *Financial Times*, 18 December 1992, p 14; Savill, A; Brown, C. 'NATO backs "pause" over no-fly zone' *Independent*, 18 December 1992. p 1. NATO officials told the press that they hoped for a UN resolution providing for the use of armed forces to contain and end the fighting in ex-Yugoslavia. 'NATO Official: US ready to draw line for Serbia on Kosovo' *The Associated Press*, 7 December 1992.

⁴⁴ Atkins, R. 'Parliament and Politics: PM 'would not block UN effort'. *Financial Times*, 4 December 1992, page 10.

⁴⁵ In November 1992, Mr Menzies Campbell, on behalf of the Liberal Democrats, called for the UN to be given a mandate to take out the use of heavy weapons and aircraft for offensive purposes. Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates*, 16 November 1992, page 71.

enforcement of no-fly zone. Cyril Townsend, the Conservative vice-chairman of the backbench House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, stated openly his support for the new policy.⁴⁶ Mr John Smith, the British Labour leader, also argued for the strengthening of the no-fly zone.⁴⁷ As it will explained in more detail later, the German Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: BMV) appeared to have persuaded the sceptical Chancellor's Office to go along with US demands for the enforcement of the flight ban in order to achieve specific political aims. In the BMV, Volker Rühle was in fact preparing a 'salami tactic' policy to force the opposition parties to agree to a new role for the Bundeswehr in peace-enforcement operations. By working together with the United States and the NATO military authorities in planning the enforcement of the flight ban, the BMV hoped to create a de facto precedent for the Bundeswehr's participation in 'out-of-area' military operations.⁴⁸

Faced with this new domestic and international consensus, by the 21th December, Prime Minister John Major agreed with the US to sponsor a UN resolution calling for the military enforcement of the no-fly zone.⁴⁹ It was apparent that the decision to militarily enforce the no-fly zone was not driven by a worsening of Serb use of its aircraft in the fighting. Western military experts in fact accepted that since the implementation of the flight ban, the Serbs had not flown any combat missions. The flights appeared to have been used to transport material and personnel. The calls for the enforcement seemed to have been driven by other factors. Firstly it was clear that NATO staff were keen to demonstrate their military capability in enforcing the no-fly zone. Secondly, during this period the Muslim world had threatened to supply the Bosnian Muslims with military assistance. The Bush administration did not want to be outflanked by the Muslim world and by the

⁴⁶ Cornwell, R. 'US gets tougher over Serbia'. *The Independent*, 14 December 1992. page 1.

⁴⁷ Mauthner, R.; Atkins, R.; White, D. 'UK reluctant to enforce no-fly zone' *Financial Times*, 16 December 1992, page 3.

⁴⁸ Personal interview with Dr Karl-Heinz Kampf interviewed on 25 June 1999 at the Adenauer Stiftung Institute in Bonn

⁴⁹ Brown, C; Lambert, S. 'Britain wants three-week deadline for no-fly zone' *Independent*, 22 December 1992, page 8.

rhetoric of the new President, Bill Clinton.⁵⁰ Disagreement on the enforcement of the military ban however remained strong and it was not until the spring of 1993 that the decision was taken to use military means, as the next section will explain.

The emergence of a new modus vivendi between the Clinton administration and NATO staff: January 1993 to July 1993

Clinton's background on the Balkans and his new 'team'

During his election campaign Clinton had urged Bush to turn up the heat against the Serb forces.⁵¹ In his view the conflict was an outright act of aggression on the part of Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. Clinton appeared to have formulated a view by relying on the reading and analysis of defence experts who perceived the conflict in terms of an aggression on the part of one ethnic group against another.⁵² The newly elected President also chose to work with a team of advisers who included individuals who had a background in the politics of the civil rights of the 1960s. These individuals tended to put the issue of humanitarian and ethical concerns above an analysis of historical and political dynamics.⁵³

At the beginning of his term in office, however, Clinton tuned down some of his earlier statements. He announced that there would be no lifting of the arms embargo, despite strong pressure from Senate and Congress. He also formally endorsed the diplomatic measures adopted by European allies. The Secretary of State Warren Christopher presented the official new US policy in February 1993. It confirmed US participation in the negotiations and a commitment to the process of communication with all parties to make the latter aware that war could only end

⁵⁰ Barber, T. 'Bush "threatens force against Serbia' *Independent*, 29 December 1992, page 6.

⁵¹ Fairhall, D. 'Clinton calls for West to "turn up heat" on Serbs'. *The Guardian*, 12 December 1992, page 14;

⁵² Some commentators have argued that Clinton did not have a well-founded background in the politics of the region. His view was strongly influenced by a book written by Kaplan, R. D. *Balkan Ghost*. see Halverson, T. 'America Perspectives.' in A. Danchev and T. Halverson. (Eds.). *International perspectives on the Yugoslav conflict*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1996. page. 1-28; page 15.

through negotiations. It reaffirmed US participation in the implementation of the no-fly zone and the validity of close consultations with Russia. Christopher also announced a willingness to tighten economic sanctions against Serbia and a commitment to respond to any Serbian aggression in Kosovo and Macedonia. Finally, Christopher made clear US readiness to participate in peacekeeping operations in the implementation of a peace agreement, either under the UN or NATO.⁵⁴

The latter policy was a central aspect of the Vance-Owen peace plan (VOPP) which had been made official in January 1993.⁵⁵ The key feature of the VOPP was the creation of a de-centralised state of ten provinces.⁵⁶ The plan envisaged that once a cease-fire had been reached and agreement from the warring parties obtained, a peacekeeping force would be sent to the region with the aim of enforcing the cease-fire, disarming irregular forces, monitoring and securing heavy weapons, and ensuring deliveries of humanitarian aid. NATO was identified as the organisation responsible for planning and implementing the peacekeeping operation. The decision to give NATO this new task was partly the result of an understanding between London and Washington⁵⁷ and partly the culmination of efforts undertaken by NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner who lobbied heavily for NATO's role.⁵⁸

⁵³ The name of these individuals will be mentioned later.

⁵⁴ Christopher, W. 'New steps toward conflict resolution in the Former Yugoslavia.' *US Department of State Dispatch*, 15 February 1993, Vol, No. 7.

⁵⁵ The VOPP was drafted within the framework of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia which in September 1992 had succeeded the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia. The first version of the VOPP was presented to the plenary Steering Group meeting in Geneva on 27 October 1992 under the label "Options for BiH".

⁵⁶ See appendix D for a summary of the key feature of the plan. For an overview of how the plan came about see: Gow, J. *Triumph of the lack of will: international diplomacy and the Yugoslav war*. London: Hurst & Company. 1997.; pages 223 - 235.

⁵⁷ Lord Owen was picked as the new Chairmen of the International Conference in Yugoslavia to replace Lord Carrington who resigned in August 1992. Prior to his appointment, David Owen advocated NATO air strikes and the parachuting of UN troops into besieged towns. Wintour, P. 'Yugoslav Peace Conference: appointing Owen would signal tougher EC stance' *The Guardian*, 22 August 1992. On David Owen's belief in the use of military means in the early part of 1992 Owen, D. *Balkan Odyssey*. London: Victor Gollancz and Cassell. 1995. pages 5 - 29.

However, there was also a semi-official US policy. This involved an active promotion of the strengthening of the military enforcement of the flight ban, even if there was no consensus for such action. The US also indirectly supported the lifting of the arms embargo.⁵⁹ In addition, privately Clinton was reluctant to endorse unequivocally the Vance-Owen plan. He believed that the plan rewarded the Bosnian Serbs and punished the Muslims unjustly. He was also sceptical of the idea that the Bosnian Serbs would give up their arms and agree to it. The Clinton administration's views about the Vance-Owen plan were well expressed by Warren Christopher. He publicly stated that although the Administration supported the negotiations, he had doubts whether it could realistically be achieved. Madeleine Albright, the newly appointed Ambassador to the UN, was even more critical of the Vance Owen plan.⁶⁰

Germany policy-makers' response to the US initiative

In Germany, leading members of the Cabinet agreed at an ideological level with the new approach of the Clinton administration. German Foreign Minister Kinkel supported Clinton's view that the Bosnian Serbs were the main culprits of the war and advocated tough actions. In June 1992, in a parliamentary speech, Kinkel had made clear that he believed all economic and military means had to be used against the Serbs, including Western military intervention. He urged the international community to bring the "Serbs to their knees" since Belgrade responded only to the threat of force.⁶¹ To persuade non-interventionists, Kinkel made the point that it was only through a military campaign that Hitler had been defeated.⁶² Despite this outburst, Kinkel was however careful not to endorse the deployment of German soldiers in combat operations in the Balkans. In fact Kinkel fully supported the so-

⁵⁸ O' Ballance, *op.cit.* page 128.

⁵⁹ For a description of the US policy see Owen, D. *op cit.*, page 107.

⁶⁰ Owen, D. *op.cit.* page 101. According to David Owen most of the opposition to the Vance Owen plan came from within the State Department. He explains: "some in the US State Department were encouraging Izetbegovic to seek changes in the map which we knew were not negotiable". *Ibid.* pages 94 - 95.

⁶¹ For Kinkel's position Germany. Bundestag. *Plenarprotokoll*, 12 Wahlperiode, Sitzung 97, 17 June 1992. Bonn: Bundestag. section 7976.

⁶² Germany. Bundestag. *Plenarprotokoll*. 12 Wahlperiod, 21 April 1993, Sitzung 151 Bonn, Bundestag. section 12925 to 12930 and 12925 - 12978.

called Kohl 'doctrine'. This was based on the argument that because of the historical legacy of German intervention in the Balkans during the Nazi period, the deployment of the Bundeswehr had to be avoided. During this period, the German government also rejected any talks of lifting the arms embargo. The German Defence Minister Volker R  he publicly stated that such a policy would only widen the conflict.⁶³

British government response to the US initiative

Despite Anglo-American co-operation in negotiating the clause of the Vance-Owen plan that envisaged the deployment of NATO troops to the region, British government officials continued to see no easy military solution to the Balkan conflict. In contrast to their US and German counterparts, the vast majority of British policy-makers repeated the argument that the war was not the simple result of Serbian aggression. Rather it was a civil war in which all parties were guilty. As Rifkind put it: "this conflict is not simply an act of aggression by one faction against another. It is the consequence of the collapse of Yugoslavia and the development of a conflict within Bosnia among three sections of the community, all of which are Bosnian, which has many of the characteristics of a civil war".⁶⁴ For these reasons, British policy makers, including the Labour Party, rejected any unofficial US calls for lifting the arms embargo.⁶⁵ Douglas Hurd maintained that it would be impossible to lift the arms embargo only against one faction and not another, the action could only result in an intensification and worsening of the fighting.⁶⁶

⁶³ 'Raus aus dem Dilemma: SPIEGEL-Gespr  ch mit Verteidigungsminister Volker R  he   ber deutsche Eins  tze in der Welt' *Der Spiegel*. 21 February 1992, Vol 52, pages 21 - 23.

⁶⁴ Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates*, 14 April 1993, Vol 222, column 829.

⁶⁵ Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates*. 29 April 1993, Vol 223, column 1177.

⁶⁶ Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Papers*, 13 January 1993, column 900. For a non-interventionist policy: Britain. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. *Briefing. The case against military intervention*. London: FCO. 1992.

Operation Deny Flight

At the end of March 1993, the efforts of sections of the Clinton administration and NATO international staff undertaken to enforce the flight ban militarily were rewarded. On 31st March 1993 it was reported that the Serb authorities violated the flight ban by attacking civilian villages in Bosnia. The United Nations responded by approving Resolution 816 authorising the extension of the flight ban to all types of military flights, that is “fixed wing and rotary-wing”. The resolution authorised member states “acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the event of further violations, proportionate to the specific circumstances and the nature of the flights.”⁶⁷ The resolution was approved by 14-0 with China abstaining.⁶⁸ NATO officials welcome the resolution. On 8 April the NAC approved plans for the enforcement of the ban and in a letter from Manfred Wörner to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Wörner affirmed NATO member states’ willingness to undertake the operation. Thus on 12 April 1993 “Operation Deny Flight” began.⁶⁹

Despite the agreement to enforce the ban doubts were raised by the French, British, Canadian and Dutch governments which had troops on the ground. Two questions were raised: who should have command and control of the operations? What should be the rules of engagement, in other words under what circumstances should NATO engage in air attacks?⁷⁰ The answer to these questions required the Western powers to find a solution to diverging national perspectives towards the conflict. Control of the operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina involved issues of national pride. The US government wanted NATO to have full command and control of the

⁶⁷ United Nations Security Council. Resolution. 816 Reprinted in Bethlehem, D; Weller, M. *op.cit.* page 33.

⁶⁸ Chinese delegates objected to invoking mandatory enforcement provision of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

⁶⁹ Operation Deny flight involved some 50 fighter and reconnaissance aircraft from various Alliance nations, flying from airbases in Italy and from aircraft carriers in the Adriatic.

⁷⁰ For the intensity of the French view on the issue see: Mauthern, R. ‘Morillon tries new tack in Srebrenica’ *Financial Times*, 8 April 1993, page 2.

operation. The Clinton administration was of the opinion that the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces South in Naples (CinC South) had to have the power to order air strikes. France, Britain and Canada, in contrast, insisted that both the Chief of Allied Forces and the UNPROFOR commander had a veto on the use of air power. If either of them disagreed, then the matter should be referred to the NAC and the UN. The Russians also insisted that the rules of engagement for the NATO no-fly zone were to be confined to aerial combat in Bosnian airspace. They could not fire at targets on the ground, unless the fire was in self-defence. In their view, any changes in the rules of engagement required a new Security Council resolution.⁷¹ In national parliament some MPs also raised concerns about the nature of the operation. Thus, for example, Sir Patrick McNair-Wilson, a British Conservative backbencher, argued that the operation ran the risks of encouraging those forces which believed that if they were to protest they would obtain the support of NATO air power in their military strategy.⁷²

During April, a compromise was agreed. It was decided that NATO had operational command. The day-to-day missions were delegated through the SACEUR, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Commander Europe (CINCSOUTH) and subsequently, through Commander-in-Chief Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), to the Commander of the fifth Allied Tactical Air Force (5th ATAF), at the base in Vicenza. Before initiating the strikes, both the NAC and NATO authorities, at various levels, had to agree. Despite this formal agreement, the issues of command and control and the rules of engagement were to remain at the heart of the tension between the Western Allies for the subsequent fifteen months, as the next sections and chapter will explain.

The introduction of the no-flight zone gave NATO staff a new level of control over the military operations in the Balkans. Not only did NATO alone have

⁷¹ Pringle, P. 'UN gives NATO right to down Serbian planes: Security Council endorses military action against aircraft violating no-fly zone over Bosnia'. *Independent*, 1 April 1993, page 11.

⁷² Sir Patrick McNair-Wilson (New Forest). Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates*, 14 April 1993, column 222. Some members of the Labour Party were also worried that during the operation the warring parties would not be treated the same way. Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates*, 1 April 1993, column 497. Vol 222.

responsibility for the operational tasks but it also widened its ground and overall presence. Whereas during autumn 1992, NATO only had staff in the UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo, from April 1993 onwards it sent liaison officers to the headquarters at Zagreb and Kiseljak, (Bosnia-Herzegovina). The function of these liaison officers was to ensure a constant exchange of information between UNPROFOR and NATO. These individuals worked in close contact with UNPROFOR staff to ensure that 'close air support' (CAS) operations became a feature of NATO and UNPROFOR engagement in the region. The implementation of 'Operation Deny Flight', together with previous operation, led to a total of 4,500 NATO personnel being deployed to former Yugoslavia.⁷³

The German domestic debate about participation in Operation Deny Flight

The German government decided to take part in the flight ban whilst it was fully aware that the decision was to cause a showdown with the FDP and the opposition parties. The FDP and the SPD brought two separate injunctions against the government on this issue. The FDP, which initially had not been opposed to German military participation in Operation Sky Monitor, recoiled at German soldiers' potential engagement in combat operations aboard the AWACs. FDP politicians argued that the role of German soldiers in relaying information to fighters charged with shooting down violators was incompatible with the Federal constitution. The FDP, like the SPD, maintained that the Government's decision to take part in the AWACS operations was unconstitutional because the operations involved sending German combat troops outside the NATO area in a situation in which there was no impending possibility of an attack on the alliance. In addition, both parties underscored that the government had committed a breach of the constitution by not consulting parliament on the issue. Both parties demanded that German participation in the AWACS be ended.⁷⁴

The SPD went to court with other legal arguments. It called for an injunction not only because of German participation in the 'No Fly Ban' but also because of the

⁷³ Leurdijk, D A; Venema, A. P. *op.cit.* page 33.

⁷⁴ Articles 87 a ABS2 GG and Art 24, were mentioned in this regard.

German government's decision to take part in the sanction monitoring operation in the Adriatic. The SPD believed that by taking part in the operation the Government aimed to change the nature of NATO and WEU treaties without seeking parliamentary consent. The SPD also maintained that the implementation of the flight ban had created a situation that resembled war. The lack of parliamentary approval meant that the lives of German soldiers were being put at risk whilst they could not be assured that their actions were legal. The SPD stressed also that the AWACS system could operate without German participation and that under the UN Charter and the NATO treaties there was no obligation on the part of Germany to take part in military operations of the nature undertaken by the AWACS.⁷⁵

In the courts, the government refuted the FDP and SPD accusations by stating that it did not have a constitutional obligation to consult with parliament and that the deployment of German soldiers in the framework of NATO and their participation in the enforcement operation was constitutional.⁷⁶ The Government explained that it did not seek to create a *fait accompli* in that there was no obligation on Germany's part either to remain on board the AWACS or to take part in similar operations in the future under the UN or NATO. To support their case the Government emphasised that without German military participation, the entire operation would be put at risk. If the court were to accept the FDP and SPD injunction order, the decision could have serious repercussions in the standing of Germany within the Western Alliance. NATO partners would lose their confidence in the country's ability to be an effective member of the alliance. In addition, since NATO strategy and organisational planning was based on the concept of multinationality, if German soldiers were to be withdrawn from the integrated units, the action would seriously disrupt NATO's strategy and put into question its organisational capabilities.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ 'Anträge der SPD- und der F.D.P-Fraktionen auf einstweilige Anordnung. 8 April 1993'. Mitgliedern des Bundesverfassungsgericht. *Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts im 88. Band der amtlichen Entscheidungssammlung*. Tübingen: J.C.B Mohr Paul Siebec. 1994. Bonn, pages 173 - 185.

⁷⁶ Articles 2 GG Art. 87 and ABS 2GG were mentioned as authorising government policy.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* Rühle also warned that withdrawing German participation in the operations would cause NATO to unravel. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, 21 January 1993.

In January 1993, the intensity of the debate was such that for a short while it appeared that the coalition government might collapse. At the last moment a compromise was reached. It was decided that parliament would take a vote on the UN Security Council resolution to authorise enforcement of the flight ban. The FDP would oppose the Union parties on this issue and pending a Court's decision on the FDP's temporary injunctions, no German soldiers would participate in combat operations. The voting took place on the 2nd February 1993. At the same time the FDP filed a lawsuit.

On the 8th April, the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) decided to support the government against the court injunctions sought by the FDP and SPD to halt German participation in NATO and WEU operations in the Balkans.⁷⁸ The court's ruling was based on rather complex legal reasoning. In their verdict, the judges did not dwell on the constitutionality of German participation in the AWACS operations: it left the final decision to a later hearing. Instead, pending a final result on the constitutionality of the operation, the court focused on the likely political consequences, in terms of advantages and disadvantages, of either upholding or denying the request of injunction.⁷⁹

In its verdict the judges endorsed most of the arguments put forward by the German government and explicitly admitted that they had been persuaded by the testimony of leading figures such as Manfred Wörner, General Naumann and General Ehmann, who had given testimony in support of the government. Four arguments were given for the decision. Firstly, the judges believed that if they had upheld the injunction the entire AWACS operations would have been put in jeopardy because German soldiers contributed 30% to the military personnel on board and were the only units responsible for the security of the flight. Secondly, the participation in the AWACS would have seriously disappointed the Allies and other European states. Thirdly, the court ruled that the government decision in no way had an

⁷⁸ 'Auszüge aus dem Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. Präjudizierung tritt nicht ein' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 10 April 1993, page 3.

⁷⁹ Some commentators have pointed out that by so doing the court had already undermined some of the FDP and SPD arguments see Phillippi, N. *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als aussen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeingten*

impact on the impending legal debate about changes in the constitution that was to be decided by the court at a later stage. Fourthly, it accepted the government's argument that there was no danger to the well-being of the German soldiers.⁸⁰

A turning point in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Srebreniza and the 'Safe Areas' mandate

Whilst in Germany the debate about the role of the Bundeswehr was underway and within the alliance disagreement raged as to the nature of the no-flight ban, a series of events in March and April 1993 marked a new phase in NATO's involvement in the Balkans. The events began with the personal decision taken by General Morillon, the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina to intervene in the fighting in Srebrenica.

General Morillon in Srebrenica⁸¹

As mentioned in previous chapters, prior to the declaration of independence by the Tudjman government, the Serbs occupied 70% of the Bosnian territory but were spread throughout the rural countryside. The Muslim population resided in the major city centres in Bosnia. Srebrenica, located close to the Serbia's border, was a typical Muslim city surrounded by Bosnian Serbian inhabitants. When war broke out in April 1992, the town's Muslim leader made an agreement with the local Serbs. The agreement did not last long. The Bosnian Muslims led by Naser Oric staged an uprising and drove the Serb forces out of Srebrenica. The Bosnian Serbs suffered heavy casualties. On the 7th January, Oric's forces launched a surprise attack on Serb positions in the North, killing Serb civilians and burning their villages. The Serbs staged a counterattack between February and March. This led to Muslim refugees pouring into Srebrenica. In March 1992, Srebrenica was about to fall to the Bosnian Serbs. UN Force Commander Phillipe Morillon decided, against the advice of UN authorities, to pay a visit to Srebrenica. When his

Deutschland. Trier. 1996. page 50.

⁸⁰ 'Auszüge aus dem Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. Präjudizierung tritt nicht ein' *op.cit.* page 3. The full version of the verdict can be found in Mitgliedern des Bundesverfassungsgericht. *op.cit.*

⁸¹For General Morillon's personal account of the events see Morillon, P. (General). 1993. *Croire et oser: chronique de Sarajevo*. Paris: Bernard Grasset. 1993, pages 161 - 181.

contingent of three vehicles entered the town, the Muslim refugees, desperate to leave the city, took him hostage. At the same time the Muslim military leaders called for military protection. General Morillon, behaving like Don Quixote, gave a public speech in which he declared that "I will not abandon you". The Western media focused on his gesture and after negotiations he was left free to leave Srebrenica.⁸²

Although General Morillon appeared to have acted on his own initiative, it was clear that he was not the only Western officer in Bosnia who favoured a more active international approach to the crisis. On the 12 April, Larry Hollingworth, a British official with UNHCR, made a public statement ending the neutral position of the UN agency. He vehemently condemned the Bosnian Serbs political and military leadership for attacking Srebrenica. As a good-will gesture, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to allow a convoy of humanitarian aid to go to Srebrenica to evacuate the injured. But it was clear that the Bosnian Serbs had no intention of giving up the city. On 15th April Muslim leaders surrendered to the Bosnian Serbs and Morillon and other UNPROFOR staff offered to mediate the terms of surrender. However, some UNPROFOR staff presented their role to the outside world in a different light. Rather than making public that they were negotiating the terms of surrender of the Bosnia Muslims, they stated that they were ensuring the "demilitarisation" of the city. But in so doing they raised the hopes that UNPROFOR could somehow rebalance the result of the battle.⁸³

The highly emotional picture of the civilian sufferings in Srebrenica, led the international community to call for a variety of new measures. On April 17th, the Clinton administration admitted that it was looking at a variety of options including bombing Serb installations. Britain and France supported the tightening of sanctions but were reluctant to endorse an extensive air campaign. Reginald Bartholomew, President Clinton's special envoy on Bosnia, repeated the view that the arms embargo on the Muslim should be lifted if the Serbs did not halt their

⁸² Silber, L; Little, A. *The death of Yugoslavia*. London: BBC Books, Penguin Books. 1995. page 293-298 and Mauthner, R. 'UN general hopeful of Bosnia aid breakthrough' *Financial Times*, 16 March 1993. page 2.

⁸³ *Ibid.* pages 298 - 305.

attacks and agree to the Owen-Vance peace plan. Lord Owen, the European Community peace envoy, and NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Wörner called for a bombing campaign. France and a number of non-aligned states envisaged the creation of 'safe areas'.⁸⁴

After an intense period of consultation, on 16th April 1993, the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted Resolution 819 demanding that all parties treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a 'safe area' and requesting that the Secretary-General take immediate steps to increase UNPROFOR's presence in Srebrenica.⁸⁵ It was apparent that the decision to call for the establishment of the safe area had not been the result of a well-thought out military strategy. Rather it represented a compromise between competing perspectives within the policy-making structures of the United States, Britain, France and NATO. The resolution signalled the willingness of some NATO member states to end UNPROFOR's neutral status in the conflict.⁸⁶ Commenting on the significance of the UN steps, some Balkans experts concluded that: 'For the first time the international community had committed itself - morally, if not in any effective practical sense - to the protection of one side in the war against the other'.⁸⁷ David Owen described the decision to establish the 'safe areas' as one of the most irresponsible acts of the international community.⁸⁸

Although the resolution called for additional UNPROFOR forces, it was unclear who would be prepared to put troops on the ground. As soon as the resolution was passed, General Morillon decided to send 150 Canadian troops to Srebrenica but

⁸⁴ Martin, J; Mauthner, R; Silber, L. 'West warns Serbs as forces close in on Srebrenica: Britain, US and France pledge early strengthening of sanctions' *Financial Times*, page 1. 17 April 1993. Wynn D; Pringle, P. 'Fate of Srebrenica spurs West to act on Bosnia: with town on verge of surrender, Britain, France and US press forward with sanctions vote'. *The Independent*, 17 April 1993, page 1. For Wörner's position see: Marshall, A. 'NATO chief favours action on Bosnia: Manfred Wörner tells Andrew Marshall in Brussels the UN should consider air strikes against Serbian forces' *Independent*, 22 April 1993. page 10.

⁸⁵ United Nations Security Council. Resolution 819. reprinted in Bethlehem, Daniel; Weller, March *op.cit.* page 35.

⁸⁶ For an excellent critique of the 'safe area' policy see Tardy, T. *La France et la gestion des conflits yougoslaves (1991 - 1995)*. Bruxelles: Établissements Émile Bruylant. 1999. pages 229 - 231.

⁸⁷ Silber, L; Little, A. *op.cit.* page 304.

confusion prevailed about the role that the soldiers were to play. UNPROFOR officials interpreted the mandate in contradictory terms. Lt General Lars-Eric Wahlgren, the UNPROFOR commander of the Canadian contingent sent to Srebrenica, stated that the order was clear. The role of the UNPROFOR soldiers was to “protect this demilitarised zone as peace-keepers, that means that if somebody tries to enter it with force, they will use force in self-defence”. A UN official was however quick to rebuke Wahlgren’s statement by pointing out that “We have no mandate, no ability and no intention of defending Srebrenica by the use of force”.⁸⁹

Meanwhile in Washington, US officials were busy considering a new initiative towards Bosnia-Herzegovina. From April 17th to May 1st, intense high level consultations took place at the White House on the issue. Clinton sought to strike a balance between two contending positions taken by his advisers. On the one hand there were those who called for the full use of military force, in the form of air strikes and lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. This position was supported by National Security Advisers Anthony Lake, and his representative Samuel R. Berger, Vice President Gore, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright and Jennone Walker, leader of the Department for European Affairs.⁹⁰ Support for the policy of lift and strike could also be found among members of the lower echelons of the State Department and within members of the leadership of the Democratic and Republican parties.⁹¹ In Congress, the strongest call for a tougher line were

⁸⁸ Owen, D. *op.cit.* page 178.

⁸⁹ White, D. ‘UK may back US on bombing Serbs’. *Financial Times*, 23 April 1993, page 2.

⁹⁰ For the view of Jennone Walker see United States. Senate. Committee of the Armed Forces. *Situation in Bosnia and appropriate US and Western Responses*. Washington, D.C: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 102 Congress, 2nd session. 11 February 1992; United States. Senate. Hearing before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. *Yugoslavia: The Questions of Intervention*. 102nd congress, 2nd session Washington D.C. 11 June 1992. The position of Madeleine Albright was expressed in a memo she sent to President Clinton in April 1993 in which she urged for the use of air strikes to protect aid convoys. *International Herald Tribune*, 12 April 1993. page 1 - 5.

⁹¹ In April 1993, 12 officers of the State Department took the unusual step to write to Christopher to call for a strong military strategy against the Bosnian Serbs.; *New York Times*, 23 April 1993.; *Congressional Quarterly*, 17 April 1993, page 960; *Congressional Quarterly*, 24 April 1993, page 1031.

voiced by Senator Biden (Democrat), Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs, who requested that the military give protection to the aid convoys and urged the Administration to lift the arms embargo. Republican Senators Lugar and Dole voiced their support for the Bosnian Muslims.⁹² In April 1993, they, together with 47 members from both parties in the House of Representative, issued a statement demanding that military steps be taken.⁹³

A more cautious approach to the use of air strikes and forceful opposition to lifting the arms embargo was expressed by Joint Chief of Staff, Colin Powell, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Admiral David Jeremiah and Les Aspin. They believed that the use of air strikes could not stop the Bosnian Serbs. Because of Bosnia's mountainous territory, the Bosnian Serbs could easily hide their weapons. A bombing campaign and lifting the arms embargo was dangerous because it would lead to an escalation of US involvement in the conflict. Strongly influenced by the Vietnam experience, Colin Powell insisted that the public had to be prepared to accept heavy casualties, including US soldiers. In early 1993, Secretary of State Christopher was on the side of the doves and despite revolt in the lower echelons of his department, he preferred to give diplomatic means more of a chance.⁹⁴ The division within the US establishment was reflected within the general public. There was overwhelming support for sending aircraft to enforce the no-fly zone. However, when the public was asked if the level of involvement was correct, 44 per cent said there was too much involvement, 43 per cent that involvement was about right, and 8 per cent that there was not enough.⁹⁵

By the end of April, Clinton privately decided to call for lifting the arms embargo and using air power against the Bosnian Serbs. He insisted that such policy had to be pursued within a multilateral framework. This meant gaining the support of

⁹² *International Herald Tribune*, 27 April 1993. page 2.

⁹³ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26 April 1993.

⁹⁴ Bert, W. *The reluctant superpower: United States' policy in Bosnia, 1991-95*. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1997. page 200-202

⁹⁵ Gallup, G., Jr. *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1993*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources. 1993. During 1993 and 1994 public opinion remained however against the United States taking over more responsibility in the conflict. Kohut, A.; Toth, R. C. 'The People, the Press, and the use of Force' in The Aspen Strategy Group. (Ed.), *The United*

Russia and Western European allies. Before making his decision public, Clinton sent Christopher on a tour of European capitals to test for the level of support that his initiative could have. In the second half of April, EC member states had sent contradictory signals to Washington. On 26 April, EC Foreign Ministers left open the possibility of using force against the Bosnian Serbs but made it clear that they were to exert the option with profound reluctance. France and Britain were also ambivalent in their declarations. They openly rejected any calls for lifting the arms embargo but stated that they were prepared to contemplate selective air strikes.⁹⁶

Domestically, British policy makers were under pressure to put forward harsher measures against the Bosnian Serbs. Voices of opposition to government policy cut across political parties and included sections of the liberal media. Baroness Thatcher accused the UK and other western countries of acting like “an accomplice to massacre”. She condemned Douglas Hurd for not arming the Bosnian Muslims. In her view, in fact, the arms embargo ought to be lifted and the Bosnian Muslims had to be backed by air cover and possible ground attacks.⁹⁷ Thatcher’s view on the use of air strikes was supported by Labour Party’s back-benchers. Ms Clare Short drew parallels between the plight of Bosnian Moslems and the failure to protect Jews in the Second World War. Tony Banks and John Smith called for air strikes.⁹⁸ Leading British broadsheet newspapers supported the pro-intervention camp. *The Times*’ leaders stridently advocated a policy of intervention. So did the *Daily Telegraph*’s columnist Robert Fox. In *The Guardian*, Maggi O’Kane, Tihomir Loza and Martin Woollacott called for air enforcement. *The Independent* bitterly attacked what it called a “Western appeasement policy” and on two occasions

States, the Use of Force in the Post Cold War era. 1995. pages 148 - 154.

⁹⁶ Barber, L. ‘Europeans look for US lead on Bosnia’. *Financial Times*, 26 April 1993, page 2. Rogaly, J. ‘Clinton calls the shot’ *Financial Times*, 23 April 1993, page 16.

⁹⁷ Atkins, R. ‘Thatcher attacks Hurd on Bosnia: “Accomplice to massacre” accusation threatens Conservative party unity’ *Financial Times*, 14 April 1993. page 2.

⁹⁸ Tony Banks and Mr Frank Field in Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates*, 14 April 1993, Vol 222, column 836 and 837; Atkins, R. ‘Parliament and Politics: Thatcher rekindles her old fire over Bosnia’ *Financial Times*. 15 April 1993, page 1. Stephens, P. ‘Parliament and Politics: Little appetite for diet of military involvement’ *Financial Times*, 28 April 1993. page 11. Stephe, P; Owen, I. ‘Parliament and Politics: Hurd firm on Bosnia arms embargo’ *Financial Times*. 30 April 1993. page 11. For the views of other Labour Party members, such Michael Meacher and Calum Macdonald, who advocated enforcement policies ‘Should we use force in Bosnia’ *The Times*, 20 April 1993.

devoted its front page to a list of prominent names that endorsed a tough stance against the Serbs. It also published letters by Sir Anthony Duff, the former Deputy Secretary in the Cabinet Office, by David Alton MP, Michael Meacher and others who were in favour of the use of force.⁹⁹

In parliament, Defence Secretary Rifkind defended government policy by insisting that air strikes unsupported by substantial number of troops on the ground could not change the nature of the conflict. There were also the risks of high civilian casualties and putting in jeopardy the humanitarian relief effort. In his view, diplomacy and not military action was the key policy to end the conflict.¹⁰⁰ Rifkind also emphasised that the policy advocated by Baroness Thatcher and other Labour MPs would fundamentally change the role of the UN in that the organisation would become a combatant in the war. Lifting the arms embargo and intervening in a wider military campaign would internationalise the conflict, thus exacerbating the situation.¹⁰¹ In a number of parliamentary interventions, Hurd questioned the extent to which bombing could be effective in bringing to an end to the fighting and pointed out that the immediate effect of bombing was the killing of people, including civilians. He also stressed that the lifting of the arms embargo would aggravate the sufferings of civilians in that it would lead to an intensification of military activities.¹⁰² Hurd rebuffed the interventionist lobby with the following statement:

“Anger and horror are not enough as a basis for decisions. It is a British interest to make a reasoned contribution towards a more orderly and decent world. But it is not a British interest, and it would only be pretence, to suppose that we can intervene and sort out every tragedy, which captures people’s attention and sympathy. I have never found the phrase ‘something

⁹⁹ A good review of the position of the media is provided by Towle, P. ‘The British debate about intervention in European conflicts’. Freedman, L. (Ed.) *Military intervention in European conflicts*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers. 1994. page 100.

¹⁰⁰ Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates.*, 14 April 1993, Vol 222, columns 829, 830, 832.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* columns 836 and 837.

¹⁰² Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates.*, 19 April 1993, Vol 223, column 28 and 35 and Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates.*, 14 April 1993, Vol

must be done' to be a phrase which carries any conviction in places such as the House or the Government where people have to take decisions.

Governments and Parliaments have to weigh and judge. Bosnia is not the same as Kuwait or the Falklands, in history or terrain or calculation of risk. Decisions cannot be based either on false analogies or on a desire to achieve better headlines tomorrow than today...."¹⁰³

Despite the fact that the Cabinet had the support of most sections of the Conservative Party,¹⁰⁴ by April 28th, the British government came reluctantly to accept that limited air strikes were inevitable. This policy shift seemed to have arisen not so much because of domestic opposition but rather because of US pressure. In order to placate US demands for a harsher stance, British policy makers drafted a compromise: the United States would not pursue its policy of lifting the arms embargo, in exchange Britain would support limited air strikes.¹⁰⁵

The German perspective on the 'safe areas'

During March and April 1993, because of the impending legal court ruling over its participation in WEU and NATO operations in the Balkans, the German government did not openly advocate the use of military force in the conflict. Rather it supported French moves within the UN to reinforce UN peacekeeping forces in the designated safe areas.¹⁰⁶ However, the FCC's ruling that German soldiers could be deployed in NATO operations gave a boost to the confidence of those CDU/CSU politicians who were seeking a far-reaching revision of German defence policy. Within the ranks of the CDU/CSU, a number of politicians called for tough military actions. Among the supporters of this position were Hermann Gröhe, leader of the Young Union, MP Peter Kurz Würzbach, Hartmut Koschyk and the

222, column 1173.

¹⁰³ Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates*, 29 April 1993, Vol 223, 1176.

¹⁰⁴ Atkins, R. 'Parliament and Politics: Hurd wins backing for Bosnia blockade' *Financial Times*. 20 April 1993, page 11.

¹⁰⁵ Barber, L; Stephens, P and Silber, L. 'West split over the use of force in Bosnia' *Financial Times*, 30 April 1993, page 18.

¹⁰⁶ 'Bonn und Paris wollen Schutzzonen für Muslim'. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. 3 June 1993, page 2.

CDU/CSU party whip Karl-Heinz Hornhues.¹⁰⁷ Dr Christian Schwarz-Schilling held a more extreme position. He called for lifting of the arms embargo so that the Bosnians could carry out their own campaign.¹⁰⁸

Across sections of the SPD, the FDP and the Greens voices were also heard in support of the deployment of military means. The SPD defence expert Horst Niggemeier and the FDP MP Burkarhard Zurheide argued that the bombing in Srebrenica demonstrated that what was required was the immediate deployment of military forces. Zurheide also agreed with the need to bomb the Serbs. In his view the “barbaric instinct” of the “Serbian terror units” could only be met with limited military attacks.¹⁰⁹ Speaking in parliament on behalf of the Greens, MP Vera Wollenberger argued that since in Bosnia-Herzegovina all non-military means for conflict resolution have been exhausted, military intervention was necessary.¹¹⁰

These pro-interventionist voices were, however, in a minority and the German government was reluctant openly to support any demands for a tougher stance against the Bosnian Serbs. German policy outlook towards the use of military means remained shaped by the so-called ‘Kohl doctrine’. Foreign Minister Kinkel rebuffed demands for military engagement in the Balkans by stating that there was no constitutional right for the participation of German soldiers in air strikes. He reminded parliament that in the case of German participation in the AWACS flights, the FCC had decided that every action had to be considered in its own legal rights and must be proven. The Justice Minister, Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger also emphasised that the FCC’s decision did not allow for the deployment of combat troops.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ ‘Bundeswehr-Streit geht quer durch die Parteien: Nun auch Politiker aus SPD und FDP für Beteiligung an Militäraktion in früheren Jugo.’ *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 15 April 1993, page 2.

¹⁰⁸ Germany. Deutscher Bundestag. *Plenarprotokolle*, Wahlperiode 12, 21 April 1993, Sitzung 151 section 12925 - 12978. Bonn.

¹⁰⁹ ‘Bundeswehr-Streit geht quer durch die Parteien: Nun auch Politiker aus SPD und FDP für Beteiligung an Militäraktion in früheren Jugo.’ *op.cit.* page 2.

¹¹⁰ Germany. Deutscher Bundestag. *Plenarprotokolle*, Wahlperiode 12, 21 April 1993, Sitzung 151, section 12925 – 12978. Bonn.

¹¹¹ ‘Kinkel weiss Forderung nach Entsendung von Kampfflugzeugen zurück’ *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 14 April 1993, page 2.

UN Resolution 814 and 836 and the transatlantic rift over Bosnia-Herzegovina

In April 1993, the reluctance on the part of France, Britain and Germany to contemplate military action led Warren Christopher to return to Washington rather empty handed. He did not manage to gain support for a lift and strike policy. He had only obtained a half-backed commitment for the use of air strikes. During May, US-EC relations reached a very low web. EC member states sought to dissuade the United States from giving any open statements in favour of a lift and strike policy until the Bosnian Serbs completed their referendum on the Vance-Owen plan. EC member states developed a new diplomatic and military strategy to end the conflict in former Yugoslavia. They signalled support for the endorsement of a widening of the safe areas' status to other Bosnian cities and sought to put pressure on Serbia to stop supplying arms to the Bosnian Serbs. At the same time they called upon the United States to supply forces for UNPROFOR.

The announcement of the new EC initiative sparked a new round of transatlantic condemnations. In the United States, Senator Joseph Biden denounced the Europeans for "indifference, timidity, self-delusion and hypocrisy."¹¹² At the same time senior NATO officials blamed the Europeans for the failure of the Clinton administration to endorse decisive military action.¹¹³ In Europe, EC officials described Madeleine Albright, US Ambassador to the United Nations, as a menace for privately suggesting to Mr Clinton that the US should go ahead and table a UN Security Council resolution to lift the arms embargo on Bosnian Muslims. She was also disliked for having argued that air strikes would not require any further UN resolution at all. Across European capitals the belief spread that the United States had an over-simplistic view of the conflict. It was perceived that US officials tended to blame every single act of violence on the Serbs and were failing to see that the Croats were also slaughtering the Muslims. US officials were accused of turning a blind eye to the fact that the Muslims had a tendency to exaggerate their

¹¹² Davidson, I. 'Bosnia's moment of truth: Europe' *Financial Times*, 17 May 1993, page 28.

¹¹³ Barber, L; Stephens, P. and Silber, L. 'West split over use of force in Bosnia' *Financial Times*, 30 April 1993, page 18.

sufferings in order to gain Western sympathy. European allies also objected to the reproaches of US politicians whose government had so far failed to put any troops into Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹¹⁴

UN Resolution 814 and 836

Because of the deterioration in US-West European relations a new policy initiative was sought. On 6 May, the day after Bosnian Serbs had rejected the Vance-Owen plan in a referendum, the UNSC adopted Resolution 814, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Resolution 814 declared that, "in addition to Srebrenica, Sarajevo and other such threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and their surroundings, should be treated as safe areas by all the parties concerned".¹¹⁵ A few weeks later, the United States took the initiative by announcing that it would make a formal announcement for a new peace plan. On 22nd May, the Clinton administration invited the Foreign Ministers of Russia, France, Spain and Britain to Washington to sign a 'Joint Action Program' to provide additional military protection for the six areas designated as 'safe' by the UN Security Council. Through this action, Clinton was endorsing some of the previous assumptions contained in the Vance-Owen plan, that is that the Muslims could not hope to regain all of the territory that they had lost to the Serbs. The solution was one of cantonization. But in exchange, Clinton obtained European allies' support for a policy of limited use of air strikes.¹¹⁶ Thus, on the 4th June 1993, a compromise was struck with UN Security Council Resolution 836. This resolution authorised UN member states "acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to a) bombardment against the safe area, or b) to armed incursion into them, or c) in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys."¹¹⁷ The UN Security Council also decided

¹¹⁴ Savill, A. 'Inside File: Europe angry at White House "simplistic" view of Bosnia'. *Independent*. 13 May 1993, page 10.

¹¹⁵ United Nations Security Council. Resolution 824 reprinted in Bethlehem, D; Weller, M. *op.cit.* page 40.

¹¹⁶ Cockburn, P. 'US deal "to end Bosnia war' *Independent on Sunday*, 23 May 1993, page 1.

¹¹⁷ UNSCR 836, 4 June 1993, para 10. reprinted in Bethlehem, D; Weller, M. *op.cit.* page

that Member States, acting nationally or through regional arrangements were authorised to take “all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in Bosnia to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate”.¹¹⁸

The significance of UNSC Resolution 836 was that it gave NATO a mandate to use its military air power in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the ministerial meeting of the NAC in Athens on 10 June 1993 Western allies welcome the setting up of safe areas and stated that they were ready to “offer our protective air-power in case of attack against UNPROFOR in the performance of its overall mandate, if it so requests”.¹¹⁹ The nature of the mandate was however soon to be disputed, as events in August 1993 were to demonstrate.

The first test of NATO air power in the Balkans: Sarajevo (August 1993)

At the end of July 1993, the Bosnian Serbs were close to capturing Mount Igman. The United States reacted by organising a special meeting of the NAC on the 2nd of August. During the meeting US officials called for decisive actions, including air strikes. Warren Christopher stated that the US was determined to “move forward quickly” to break the Sarajevo siege through air strikes. In a private letter to the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Warren Christopher stated that air power had to be put “at the service of diplomacy”.¹²⁰ On the 4th August, the NAC declared that it was prepared to use air strikes to break the siege of Sarajevo.¹²¹

NATO international staff was fully supportive of the US stance. The mood among NATO international staff is well described by Mr Calum Macdonald during his parliamentary account of a visit to NATO headquarters. He explained that “A group of us visited NATO headquarters recently. We left there with the clear

43.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* page 43.

¹¹⁹ NATO. North Atlantic Council. *Final Communiqué*, 10 June 1993. M-NAC-1(93)38.

¹²⁰ Silber, L. ‘US warns Serbs to halt attacks: NATO discusses air strikes as Bosnian positions falls to “huge offensive’ *Financial Times*, 3 August 1993. page 14.

¹²¹ Toward the end of July, more than 80 American congressmen signed an open letter to President Clinton calling for a 72-hour ultimatum to lift the siege of Sarajevo and the other besieged towns, and advocated the use of force pending a lack of compliance.

impression that the most senior officials in NATO were satisfied that intervention was not only feasible and advisable but urgently required. We received a clear impression that there was intense frustration at the failure at the political level to take the steps necessary to resolve the crisis.”¹²² An earlier statement made by British Field Marshal Richard Vincent, the chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, confirmed this view. In July 1993 he had compared western inaction to save Bosnia to the appeasement of fascism in the 1930s.¹²³ The US government and NATO staff also had the support of General Morillon who, finally released from the leash of his political masters, called for military action and air strikes to lift the siege on Sarajevo.¹²⁴

Throughout August acrimonious discussions took place among the Western Allies about the nature of NATO’s use of air strikes and command and control issues for such operations. In NATO Headquarters two proposals were discussed. One proposal stated that the use of NATO’s air power was to be deployed to defend ground troops stationed in Bosnia. Britain, France and Canada supported this position. The second and more radical US-led proposal argued that NATO could attack artillery positions, Serb positions outside of Sarajevo and targets outside Bosnia. On the issue of command and control, France, Britain and Canada - supported by UN Secretary-General - insisted that the UN had final approval for such operations. In contrast, the United States wanted NATO to have full control over the air-strikes operations.¹²⁵

To justify these divergent positions member states relied on different interpretation of UN mandates. Those in support of the UN having the final say in air-strikes operations, argued that UNSCR 836 stated that the use of air power would be

¹²² Britain House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates*. 26 July 1993. column 838, vol 229.

¹²³ Marr, A. ‘Politicians “let NATO down over Bosnia’ *The Independent*, 21 July 1993.

¹²⁴ Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates*, 26 July 1993. Volume 229

¹²⁵ Tett, G; ‘Allies remain hesitant over air strikes. It is still unclear if the allies threat to act against the Serbs encircling Sarajevo’. *Financial Times*, 6 August 1993, page 2.;

Gillian, T. ‘NATO planners draw up Bosnia air-strikes targets’ *Financial Times*, 12 August 1993.; ‘NATO warns of air strikes if Serbs fail to lift siege’ *Financial Times*, 10 August 1993, page 2.

subject to close co-ordination with the UN Secretary-General and UNPROFOR.¹²⁶ The UN Secretary-General had the first decision to initiate the use of air resources.¹²⁷ US officials, however, rather than relying on UNSCR 836, chose to rely on UNSCR 770 of 13 August 1992, - a resolution that authorised member states to use all necessary means to protect aid shipments to civilians in Bosnia.¹²⁸ US officials argued that NATO should have the authority to carry out air strikes at "times and places of NATO's choosing". In contrast, Boutros-Ghali argued that the general authority granted to member states in Resolution 770 had to be interpreted in the context of the modalities established pursuant to Resolution 816 and 836. In his view the use of air strikes could only be carried out in the defence of peacekeepers. If NATO air power was used beyond those goals not only would the lives of the UN troops be put at risks, but also an important political threshold would be reached.¹²⁹

Whilst the discussions on the nature of the mandate were taking place, on August 8th the Bosnian Serbs agreed to a phased withdrawal from two strategic mountains overlooking Sarajevo. Some NATO member states believed that the announcement was genuine and that therefore time should be given for the Serbs to withdraw. On 10th August Wörner issued a warning to the Bosnian Serbs that the alliance was prepared to take military action. However, the NAC meeting stopped short of ordering the attack. On the command and control issue of the operations, the NAC agreed that air strikes could only begin if they had been specifically requested by the United Nations or NATO leaders and approved by both Admiral Jeremy Boorda, NATO's commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe, and General Jean Cot, Commander of UNPROFOR in Bosnia. The Serbs were to be given a clear warning, which effectively ruled out 'surprise' attacks. It was agreed that the US proposal to identify targets outside of Bosnia was a no-go area.¹³⁰ On the 18

¹²⁶ UNSCR 836, 4 June 1993. in Bethlehem, Daniel; Weller, Marc. *op.cit*, page 43.

¹²⁷ UNS Doc S/25939, 14 June 1993 in Bethlehem, Daniel; Weller, Marc. 1997. *op.cit*. page 625 and 633.

¹²⁸ Douglas, J. 'US turn Bosnian threat into a near ultimatum' *New York Times*., 4 August 1993.

¹²⁹ UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, letter to US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 2 August 1993.

¹³⁰ Tett, G. 'NATO planners draw up Bosnia air-strikes targets'. *Financial Times*, 12

August, the crisis was resolved when NATO carried out its first air support exercise and the Bosnia Serbs pull back their artillery from Sarajevo.

The August events demonstrated a shift among the Western Allies toward relying on military means to resolve the Balkan conflict. The events also demonstrated to the hawks in Washington, in European capitals and among sections of NATO's international staff that the threat of air strikes could succeed in restraining the Bosnian Serbs from their military strategy. From August onwards, the idea of limited air strikes was no longer rejected out-right by the international community. At the same time, the events gave an impetus to EC member states to seek to hasten the search for a diplomatic solution.¹³¹

The development of NATO peacekeeping doctrine, CJTF, PfP and the role of 'policy communities' (July 1992-December 1993)

During July 1992 and December 1993, NATO's involvement in the Balkans influenced a number of policy initiatives aimed at resolving the debate about the future structures and role of the Alliance. The new initiatives involved the formulation of a peacekeeping doctrine, the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept and Partnership for Peace (PfP). In this section, I will argue that NATO international military staff and NATO military authorities were at the vanguard in formulating the new policies. They had the support of the Clinton administration and of leading members of the German Ministry of Defence.

August 1993, page 2.

¹³¹ During the summer and winter of 1993 attempts at finding a political solution were focused on the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan. In November 1993 the EC put forward a new peace initiative. This requested the Serbs gave up 3 to 4 percent of Bosnian territory and that Croats gave the Muslims access to the sea. In exchange EC member states put pressure on the Bosnian Muslim to accept the new plan or face losing their humanitarian aid. (see appendix D for peace plans)

The development of NATO peacekeeping doctrine

In mid 1992, different sections of NATO international staff began to grapple with the issue of developing a peacekeeping doctrine. A Senior Political Committee, (SPC) was set up to look at this issue. This was constituted by sixteen Deputy Ambassadors, (it included France). Soon it became clear that in the forum no agreement could be found on a peacekeeping doctrine and hence new committees and working groups were established. This included a committee composed of fifteen nations, (which excluded France), represented by Deputy Ambassadors and either a military representative from their delegation, which was a member of the MC or a Defence Counsellor of the delegation. The task of this committee, chaired by David Lightburn, was to deal with the problems of command and control in the implementation of the Vance-Owen plan and with the command and control issues between the UN and NATO.¹³² At the same time following a brainstorming session at Ambassadorial level, the NACC ad hoc Group on Co-operation in Peacekeeping was set up on 18th December 1992. The aims of the group were twofold: first, to develop a common understanding on the political principles of the tools of peacekeeping; second, to develop common practical approaches and co-operation in support of peacekeeping under the responsibility of the UN or the CSCE. NATO peacekeeping doctrine was also discussed within the Defence Review Committee (DRC), which brought together fifteen nations. This was composed of military officers and officials from the Ministries of Defence.¹³³

UN peacekeeping doctrine under question

The efforts undertaken by NATO to develop a peacekeeping role took place during a period when the nature of UN peacekeeping doctrine was being questioned in a variety of quarters. Throughout the Cold War period, there had been an agreement

¹³² Hammack, M. Lieutenant Colonel; Bentley, L W; Lieutenant Colonel Rader; S. C. 'Peace-operations and the consequences for planning'. *The changing security agenda: the national experience of peace-keeping and the lessons for NATO: Report of a seminar for experts in the field of peace-keeping. April 5 and 6, 1993.* The Hague and Clingendael, The Clingendael Institute and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations. June 1993. pages 123 - 132.

¹³³ Barrett, J. 'Regional Peacekeeping arrangements and NATO'. *Peacekeeping*

among UN member states that peacekeeping involved three principles: consent and co-operation from parties to the conflict, impartiality and the non-use of force except in immediate self-defence.¹³⁴ Between 1947 and 1989, the United Nations undertook eighteen peacekeeping operations of varying scope, duration and degree of success, a mathematical average of 2 and half operations per year. In the period of 1991 and 1992, the United Nations was called upon to undertake eight additional operations.¹³⁵ Defence experts began to argue for a reform of the way in which peacekeeping was being undertaken. Thus, for example, Brian Urquhart¹³⁶, a Senior UN member of staff between 1945-1986, and Indarjit Rikhe¹³⁷, former military advisor to the Secretary-General, and a number of experts working in think tanks and research institutes judged that it was necessary to develop a new peacekeeping doctrine which allowed for the use of limited force.¹³⁸ By the winter of 1992, the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali also endorsed the view that peace enforcement units should be able to restore cease-fires.¹³⁹

The reformists maintained that changes in the conduct of UN peacekeeping operations were necessary because the size of the operations was increasing and the UN was being called to intervene in situations where there was lack of consent among the parties. From a more traditionalist perspective, it could be argued however that UN operations had neither changed in nature nor in size, only in

Challenges and Euro-Atlantic Security. 1994.

¹³⁴ For a review of these principles see Groom, A. J. R. 'United Nations Peacekeeping' in J. P. De Cuellar, J. P and Y-S. Cho. (Eds.). *World Encyclopedia Peace*, 2nd edition, Dobbles Ferry NY: Oceana Publications. 1999.

¹³⁵ Durch, W. J. 'Introduction' in W. J. Durch. (Ed.) *The evolution of UN peacekeeping: case studies and comparative analysis*. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1993. page 7-13

¹³⁶ Urquhart, B. 'Who can stop civil wars?' *The New York Times*, 29 December 1991, Section 4, page 9.

¹³⁷ Rikhe, I. I. *The United Nations of the 1990s and International Peacekeeping Operations*, Southampton Papers in International Policy. No. 3. 1992, page 6.

¹³⁸ Davis, L. E. *Peacekeeping and peacemaking after the Cold War*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Summer Institute. 1993.; Lee, J. M. *United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking: a summary*. Washington D.C.: International Economic Studies Institute. April 1992.; United Nations Association-National Capital Area. *The common defence: peace and security in a changing world*. Washington D.C.: UNA-USA. June 1992.

¹³⁹ Boutros-Ghali, B. *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace. Position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth Anniversary of the UN*. New York: United Nations. January 1995.; Boutros-Ghali, B. 'Empowering the United Nations'. *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1992/3, Vol 72, No. 5, p 89-102. Boutros-Ghali, B. 'UN peacekeeping in a new era:

numbers. In fact, throughout the post-war period, although the United Nations had intervened when there was consent to do so on the part of the warring parties, consent was continuously renegotiated.¹⁴⁰ Rather than because of the objective nature of the operations, the reformists' arguments gained ground because of changes in the way in which the Western powers, particularly the United States, viewed the issue. (This concept is explained in more detail below). In addition, whereas in the past the Soviet Union had been reluctant to agree in the UNSC on a number of UN peacekeeping missions, it was now prepared to co-operate with the Western powers.

During 1992 and 1993, within NATO member states only some countries, Canada, the Netherlands, Britain, Norway and France had developed peacekeeping doctrines. Among them, however, there was a lack of consensus about the extent to which such a doctrine had to be reformed.¹⁴¹ Among the French military there was some willingness to support a revisionist position toward peacekeeping. According to the French Ministry of Defence, the principle of impartiality and restrictive rules of engagement which prevented troops from using force to protect civilians and to implement their mandate had to be revised. Thus, the French introduced the concept of 'active impartiality'. This concept allowed peacekeepers to use force in defence of the mandate and in defence of civilians.¹⁴² In contrast, in Britain, there was a tendency to reaffirm traditional principles of peacekeeping, as the British peacekeeping manual *Wider Peacekeeping*, drafted in 1993 and 1994 stated.¹⁴³

More significantly, during 1990 and early 1993, US policy-makers began to show an increasing interest in participating in UN peacekeeping activities. Throughout the Cold War period, the United States had restricted its support mainly to providing logistical, communication support and finances. The situation started to

a new chance for peace.' *The World Today*, Winter 1992/93, Vol 49 No. 5.

¹⁴⁰ Groom, A. J. R. 1999. *op.cit.*

¹⁴¹ Mackinlay, J. 'Peace support operations doctrine.' *British Army Review*, August 1996, No. 113. pages 5 - 13.

¹⁴² For a general review of French peacekeeping see: Tardy, T. 'French policy towards peace support operations.' *International peacekeeping*, Spring 1994, Vol 6, No. 1, 55-78.

¹⁴³ Britain. Ministry of Defence. *Wider Peacekeeping, Manual for the British Forces for Peace Support Operations*. London, HMSO. (The drafts circulated between 1993 and 1994

change even prior to Bush's announcement of a 'New World Order' in the summer of 1991. Within the State Department there were civilians, described in the literature as 'careerists', who wanted and worked towards US active participation in UN peacekeeping, including those operations of a more 'robust' nature. They argued for this position during the crisis in Somalia in the summer and autumn of 1992.¹⁴⁴ Les Aspin, the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee and who was later to become Secretary of Defence, gave also a speech in which in favour of redefining the Pentagon's doctrine on military intervention. However, at the time these voices did not carry much support among other sections of the US government. It was only with the advent of the Clinton administration, that an official review of US peacekeeping policy was announced. As MacKinnon explains the attitudes of the Clinton appointees towards US support for UN peacekeeping was more in line with the careerists in the State Department.¹⁴⁵ Thus, for example, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and the US Ambassador to the UN, Madleine Albright maintained that the USA should support UN efforts in 'national building' in Somalia even if it implied a forceful approach.¹⁴⁶

Differences of opinion were present not only in national capitals but also within the political wing of NATO. In contrast, among the NATO military authorities a consensus quickly emerged which allowed them to influence the debate. The role

but were not published for distribution);

¹⁴⁴Mackinnon, M. G. 'Rivals or Partners? Bureaucratic politics and the evolution of US peacekeeping policy.' *International peacekeeping*, Spring 1999, Vol 6 No. 1, page 32-54. see page 35. Evidence for this argument can also be found in an article written by former Bush administration official John Bolton. He refers to the more proactive arguments put forth by the 'State Department careerists', implying a difference in perspective between the careerists and the political appointees'. Bolton, John R. 'Wrong turn in Somalia' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 73, No. 1, January/February 1994. pages 56 - 66. see page 58.

¹⁴⁵ibid, page 35.

¹⁴⁶ After 18 US Rangers lost their lives in Mogadishu, the State Department revised its attitude toward peacekeeping. In contrast the DoD came to accept the need for US involvement in peacekeeping but wanted to retain control over the operations. The Clinton administration's new peacekeeping doctrine was not announced until 3rd May 1994. The White House Presidential Decision Directive 25. *The US Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, unclassified version*. Washington: White House. 6 May 1994.; Also known as PDD-25. For additional reviews of the emergence of the new doctrine see: Sokolsky, J. L. 'Great ideals and uneasy compromise: the US approach to peacekeeping' in Ehrhart, Hans-Georg; D. Haglund. (Eds.). *The 'new peacekeeping' and European security: German and Canadian interests and issues*. Baden-Baden. 1995. Ruggie, J. G. 'Peacekeeping and US interests.' *Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1994, No. 17, vol 4,

played by the NATO military authorities is evident in the manner and timing of the draft of peacekeeping documents circulated within NATO policy making structures.

NACC on Peacekeeping

At the Ministerial meeting of the NACC in Athens on 11th June 1993, the Athens Report was agreed.¹⁴⁷ The report represented the result of many months of discussions on how to define peacekeeping. The document reaffirmed the wishes of most NATO member states that peacekeeping could only be carried out under the authority of the UN Security Council, or of the CSCE in accordance with the CSCE Document agreed in Helsinki in July 1992. At the same time, it stressed that only the UN or the CSCE could define the arrangements for the conduct of peacekeeping operations, including command relationships. NACC member states agreed to three principles: first that peace enforcement operations could be part of the overall conceptual definition of peacekeeping. Secondly that there could be an exception to the criteria of the need of obtaining the consent of the parties to conflict if the operation was conducted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thirdly that the use of force was justified either as part of a specific mandate or in order for forces deployed in the conflict to be able to defend themselves when under attack. The principles were thus a reaffirmation of traditional UN peacekeeping doctrine.

During the discussions it became however clear that some countries, particularly the United States and Canada wanted a new definition of peacekeeping which included a wider mandate for using force as part of the mandate. The Russians were however very reluctant to agree to any loosely defined idea that involved defining peacekeeping activities as peace-enforcement operations. Since the Russian delegates prevented progress on the concept it was decided to leave the relationship

pages 175 - 184.

¹⁴⁷ NATO. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. *Press Communiqué: Report to the Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Athens, Greece.* Brussels: NATO. 11 June 1993. M-NACC 1(93)40.

between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement loose. Russia's concerns were brushed aside by moving on to detailed discussions about the nature of peacekeeping in different fora.¹⁴⁸ At the NACC meeting it was decided that the Assistant Secretary-General of the Department of Policy and Planning (ASG DPP) was to co-ordinate the role between the Military Authorities and NACC. At the same time the Department of Policy Planning (DPP) came to chair an Ad Hoc Technical Sub-Group (TSG), which included both NACC members and NATO authorities. The aim of this group was to identify issues and methods of co-operation on the basis of national contributions.¹⁴⁹

As previously mentioned as these discussions were underway, in France, Britain and the United States, the peacekeeping doctrines were still in their drafting stages and no consensus could be found.¹⁵⁰ In the United States, by mid 1993, the State Department presented a proposal that included allowing US troops to come under the command of the UN. The proposal was not accepted by the Pentagon and the Department of Defense (DoD) who stated that the USA needed to maintain overall command and control over US troops. Within the DoD and the Pentagon, where there were only seven people working on peacekeeping in 1992/1993, there was a tendency to rely on the principles outlined in the Weinberger/Powell doctrine, which could be summarised as being based on the following logic: only become involved if there is an exit strategy and be prepared to use all possible means. The experience in Somalia, involving the death of a dozen of US soldiers, and Congressional opposition to a State Department's draft proposal on peacekeeping meant that the view of the Pentagon and Department of Defense slowly began to take hold.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Canadian delegations at NATO headquarters in September 1998.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.* During 1993, a number of further steps were taken to develop the work of the NACC Ad hoc Group on Cooperation and Peacekeeping. This included work on Command and Control Standards and Procedures and Rules of Engagement (ROEs) for peacekeeping operations. see NATO. NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation and Peacekeeping. *Press Communiqué. Progress Report to Ministers by NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping.* Brussels: NATO. M-NACC-2(93)73. 3 December 1993.

¹⁵⁰ The French, British and US doctrine were in fact announced only in late 1994 and 1995.

¹⁵¹ Mackinnon, M. G. *op.cit.*

At the same time, during 1993, the Military Committee started consultations and obtained consensus for a draft policy document on NATO peacekeeping doctrine. The document came to be known as MC 327 “Peace Support Operations”.¹⁵² The document identified six peace support operational missions:

- Conflict prevention
- Peacemaking
- Peacekeeping
- Humanitarian Aid
- Peace Enforcement
- Peacebuilding

MC 327 defined peace enforcement as “using military means to restore peace in an area of conflict under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This can include dealing with an inter-state conflict, or with internal conflict to meet a humanitarian need, or where state institutions have largely collapsed”.¹⁵³ The document differed from the Athens Report in that it treated peace-enforcement operations as being on a continuum between peacekeeping and peace-building operations. It also defined in detail the rules of engagement and the command and control relationships that would characterise such operations. In its definition of command and control relationships, the document tended to give the NAC overall control over peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations.¹⁵⁴

Because of the far-reaching measures included in MC 327, the NAC authorities failed to approve the document in 1993.¹⁵⁵ Although the French military authorities

¹⁵² References to MC327 are found in : Whitford, J. and Thomas-Durell, Y. ‘Multinational command authorities: the need for change in NATO’. *Defense Analysis*, 1997, No. 13 Vol 1, page 33-57. (There does not appear to be a publicly available copy of this document). Document is often quoted as follows: ‘*NATO and Peacekeeping: The Doctrine for NATO Military involvement in or Support of Peacekeeping, Conflict Prevention, and Humanitarian Assistance*’ (Final Draft), 31 May 1993; and MC327, ‘*NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations*’ Brussels: NATO, 6 August 1993, page 4-5. During 1998, different version of MC327 were discussed.

¹⁵³ quoted in Foster, E. *NATO's military in the age of crisis management*. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. 1995. page 7. Emphasis added.

¹⁵⁴ Interviews with members of the Dutch and Canadian Delegations at NATO headquarters.

¹⁵⁵ During interviews at NATO Headquarters in November 1998, it was confirmed that MC327 remained a controversial document within the NAC. (At the end of 1998, different

had taken part in the discussions that led to MC 327, French politicians remained adamantly opposed to the proposals contained in the document. Other NATO member states, such as Italy and Norway, were also not fully supportive of MC 327.¹⁵⁶ The controversial issues were the definition of peace-enforcement operations and the command and control arrangements envisaged.¹⁵⁷

Although there was a lack of political agreement at NAC level about MC 327, within NATO's integrated military structure MC 327 came to be widely used to plan operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁵⁸ This demonstrates that during 1993, within the Military Committee, there was much more of a readiness to contemplate a shift from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement than within the political wing of NATO and among NATO member states. As a former Italian Military Representative at NATO explained, the vagueness of UN mandates and the need of NATO commanders to give precise orders to soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina fostered a traditional view of operations that relied on the notion of a defensive, rather than a neutral military posture.¹⁵⁹ The input of the US military, who lacked an overall conception and experience in peacekeeping seemed also to have been a factor influencing the evolution of MC 327.

The pre-eminence of the NATO military authorities in defining NATO peacekeeping doctrine can also be explained by the fact that it was left to them to deal on a day-to-day basis with the planning of the operations in former Yugoslavia. As a number of NATO personnel have pointed out in a series of interviews, the development of NATO's peacekeeping doctrine was mainly

versions of MC327 had been circulated at NATO Headquarters but no agreement was reached. The issue raised in MC327 became central to the revision of the New Strategy Concept that took place at the Washington Summit in April 1999).

¹⁵⁶ Interviews with former Italian Military Representative at NATO headquarters during November 1998 and with a member of the Norwegian Delegation during September 1998.

¹⁵⁷ Interview with Danish delegation at NATO Headquarters July 1998.

¹⁵⁸ British-American Security Information Council and Berlin Information Centre for Transatlantic Security. *op.cit*; Interviews with Canadian NATO delegation at NATO Headquarters September 1998.

¹⁵⁹ Interview with General Degli Innocenti, Italian member of the NATO Military Committee during 1993-1995. NATO Headquarters in Brussels 4th November 1998.

derived from ad hoc and day-to-day responses to developments in the Balkans.¹⁶⁰ These responses fed back into NATO planning process and stimulated new thinking among NATO policy-making structures.

The role of the Department for Policy and Planning, SHAPE and SACLANT in shaping NATO new peacekeeping role

Among the sections that dealt with day-to-day planning of activities in the Balkans was the Department of Policy and Planning (DPP). From September 1992, the planning of peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, which envisaged the deployment of up to 100,000 troops, came to be the central focus of activity of NATO military planners.¹⁶¹ DPP used to draw general guidelines for operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It then requested the military staff at SHAPE and SACLANT to work on the details of the plan. The International Military Staff then reported back to the DPP which in turn submitted the proposals to the NAC.¹⁶² Within SACEUR and SACLANT great efforts were undertaken to analyse and integrate the day-to-day activities with long-term military planning for restructuring NATO forces and commands.¹⁶³

To deal with the new tasks, the military side of the NATO house underwent changes in its operational structures. In October 1992, a peacekeeping cell was formed at SHAPE and later expanded into an office within the formal staff structure.¹⁶⁴ In December 1992 a liaison officer was posted from the IMS to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York.¹⁶⁵ In April 1993, the ACE Reaction Forces Planning Staff (ARFPS) was established. ARFPS was responsible

¹⁶⁰ Interview with an official who was member of the DPP in 1992 (official wishes to remain anonymous)

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² Interviews with Canadian NATO delegation at NATO Headquarters September 1998 and *ibid.*

¹⁶³ *Ibid*

¹⁶⁴ Rader, S. 'NATO peacekeeping' in Findlay, T. *Challenges for the new peacekeepers*. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press. 1996, pages 142 - 157.

¹⁶⁵ Chayes, A. H., & Weitz, R. 'The Military Perspective on Conflict Prevention: NATO.' in Chaynes, A; Chayes, A. H. (Eds.). *Preventing conflict in the post-communist world: mobilizing international and regional organizations*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution. 1996. pages 411 - 412.

to SACEUR for planning activities of the Allied Command Europe Reaction Forces. Elements of forces were in operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. ARFPS encompassed some 60 staff personnel and co-ordinated the operational, exercise and force planning aspects of ACE Reaction Forces.

The need to plan operations in Bosnia accelerated the restructuring of NATO forces in other ways. Firstly it led to faster decisions about the composition of the Rapid Reaction Forces. The NATO Strategic Concept of November 1991 had in fact not provided detailed information about the composition of the forces under the concept. In October 1992, the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) was created and in April 1993 the Air Reaction Forces Planning Staff was activated. In 1993, it was announced that the ARRC were to consist of Immediate Reaction Forces and ACE Rapid Reaction Forces.¹⁶⁶ The ARRC became responsible for conducting the detailed planning, exercising and mounting of the land aspects of NATO peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, whilst the ARFPS carried out joint planning of land, sea and air operations.¹⁶⁷

During the operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO was not the only organisation engaged in the region. Apart from UNPROFOR, the WEU, Eastern European countries and humanitarian agencies were stationed in Bosnia. However, the NATO military authorities increasingly began to lead the operations. These can be seen in the role played by NATO military authorities in the Ad Hoc Planning Co-ordinating Group and in the structure formed to co-ordinate WEU and NATO activities in the Adriatic. The Ad Hoc Planning Co-ordinating Group was established to co-ordinate activities among the various agencies involved in former Yugoslavia, that is UN commanders based at various headquarters in Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNPROFOR, WEU, ICG and non-NATO member states. Members of the MC chaired the meeting of the group. Soon it became apparent that rather than sharing ideas among its participants, members of the MC tended to use the

¹⁶⁶ NATO. Office of Information and Press. *NATO's Force Structure: Basic Fact Sheet*. Brussels: NATO. September 1993.

¹⁶⁷ Estrella, R. *CJTF and the Reform of NATO*. Brussels: North Atlantic Assembly. 25 October 1996.

forum to inform others of its decisions. In other words, the MC was inclined to impose its views on others.¹⁶⁸

During 1993, NATO also developed new forms of co-operation with the WEU. The sanctions monitoring and enforcement operations in the Adriatic by the WEU and NATO were commanded separately. As mentioned earlier because of institutional rivalry between the two institutions and because of French reluctance to subordinate its military staff to NATO command structure, the WEU undertook operations in the Adriatic under a WEU command. This led to a paradoxical situation: there were ships in the Adriatic undertaking similar operations and commanded by military staff of the same nationality that reported to different military structures. Efforts were undertaken by national commanders involved in the operations to achieve a better form of co-ordination. This led on the 8th June 1993 to the NAC and Council of the WEU's decision to combine NATO and WEU operations in the Adriatic. The operations came to be known as 'Sharp Guard'. Officially, Operation Sharp Guard had a single command and control arrangement under the authority of the Councils of both organisation.¹⁶⁹ The reality was that the operation was entirely run by NATO staff.¹⁷⁰

CJTF and PFP

Although during 1993, NATO military authorities had taken the lead in defining the peacekeeping concept, they did not have the political consensus required for making their ideas come to fruition. There were too many divergent opinions among NATO member states on the issue. However, the experience of planning operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina did have an impact on the rethinking of both military and political strategy within NATO. It was in fact within SACLANT and SACEUR that the kernel of what later was to become Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) and Partnership for Peace (PFP) were developed. The thinking of NATO

¹⁶⁸ Interview with WEU International Staff in November 1998 and with NATO International Staff in September 1998.

¹⁶⁹ *Atlantic News* No. 2533 11/6/93 and NATO Basic Fact Sheet. *op.cit.* page 3. Also see Leurdijk *op.cit.*, pages 24 - 31.

¹⁷⁰ Interviews with Mr Juan De Louis and Ms Clare Roberts at WEU Headquarters in Brussels on 6th of November 1998. (see annex C).

military authorities found strong support among sections of the German and US policy-making structures. It was the working of these three structures that shaped the CJTF and PFP proposals approved at the NATO Summit in January 1994.

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)

The CJTF concept had both political and military elements. From a military point of view, CJTF represented a new way of organising command and control structures within NATO. The key element of the concept is captured by three ideas: 'task force', 'combined' and 'joint'. A task force is a military body organised to achieve a specific mission or operational purpose. At the completion of the military mission the task force is disbanded. Combined means that that military commanders have the task to bring together the military forces of a number of nations. Joint means that operations include elements from two or more services: the army, navy, marine or air force units. A key feature of CJTF was the idea that forces could be assembled at very short notice for a variety of tasks from peacekeeping to traditional Article 5 tasks. Initially, the proposal was to set up cells within the major Subordinate Command headquarters.¹⁷¹ These cells would contain a number of assigned officers, for example, officers specialising in intelligence, communications, logistics and civil affairs. Once a crisis situation had emerged and the NAC had decided to take action, the cell would be augmented with further team of experts. The augmented cell would have the task to launch new headquarters and to put together the necessary force packages. The allocation of forces would have to be approved by individual member states.¹⁷²

¹⁷¹ According to US policy makers there would eventually be two to three CJTFs headquarters in Allied Command Europe (ACE) and two to three in Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT). see Answer given by Frank Wisner, Under Secretary for Policy, Department of Defence to a question asked by Senator Biden. United States. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. *The NATO Summit and the future of European security: hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, February 2, 1994.* Washington DC: Congress.1994. page 118.

¹⁷² There exists a variety of secondary literature that explains the concept. see: Barry, C. 'NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice.' *Survival*, Spring 1996, Vol 38, No. 1. 81-97. Estrella, R. *CJTF and the Reform of NATO*. Brussels, North Atlantic Assembly. 26 October 1996.; Cornish, P. *Partnership in crisis: The US, Europe and the*

The political significance of CJTF was that it proposed to resolve some of the problems of burden sharing whilst simultaneously facilitating new forms of co-ordination for peacekeeping operations. Throughout the Cold War period, NATO had headquarters that were static. The CJTF permitted the implementation of ad hoc coalitions, also known as the 'coalition of the willing'. In practice, it meant that CJTF allowed NATO forces to be integrated with Eastern European, Russian and WEU member states forces. Finally, CJTF allowed the flexibility to combine forces according to missions. This was particularly important because threats were considered to be unpredictable.

Partnership for peace (PfP)

The PfP concept aimed to establish a new practical programme of co-operation with CSCE member states and, as I will argue later, to give NATO the possibility to undertake military operations in the territory of its former enemies.¹⁷³ Through the programme, NATO member states extended their promise of co-operation with Eastern Europe, whilst at the same not fully endorsing open membership. The Partnership for Peace requested member states, which wanted to take part in the initiative, to undertake six steps to come closer to the alliance. The steps included the implementation of measures to facilitate transparency in national defence planning and budgetary processes and the introduction of measures to ensure democratic control of defence forces. It was envisaged that participating states would develop plans for reducing forces and maintain the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the UN and the responsibility of the CSCE. Participating states were to be required to undertake joint planning, training, and exercises with NATO member states in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peace-keeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as might subsequently be agreed. Participating

fall and rise of NATO. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1997., A. 'The Combined Jointed Task Force Concept: a key component of the Alliance's adaptation'. *NATO Review*, July 1996, Vol_44 No. 4, pages 7-10. My understanding was deepened by discussions with a number of NATO officials at NATO headquarters in September 1998. Cragg.

¹⁷³ Williams, N. 'Partnership for Peace: Permanent Fixture of Declining Asset?' *Survival*.,

states were also requested to introduce measures for developing over the longer-term forces better able to operate with those of NATO member states. New mechanisms of consultation were to be created to facilitate consultations with NATO if participating states perceived a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security. Finally, PfP offered partners offices at NATO headquarters and a Partnership Co-ordination Cell adjacent to SHAPE.¹⁷⁴

Origins of CJTF and PfP

The origins of both the CJTF and PfP lie in two phenomena: firstly in the lessons that SACLANT and SHAPE staff drew from the experience of planning military operations in Bosnia and secondly in the determination of policy-makers, particularly in the United States and Germany to resolve the internal disputes about the future of the alliance. In 1993, SHAPE and SACLANT took the lead in developing a new concept for organising NATO military forces.¹⁷⁵ An example of the influence of the US military in shaping the new military and political thinking can be found in the published work of Admiral Paul D. Miller, who formulated some of the ideas contained in CJTF before the concept was actually approved.¹⁷⁶ His views found support among individuals located within the branches of the US executive, the Republican Party and among US defence experts.¹⁷⁷ Similarly the

Spring 1996, vol 38. No. 1 , Spring 1996, pages 98 - 110.

¹⁷⁴ 'Partnership for Peace: Framework Document' in Britain. House of Commons. Defence Committee. *The Future of NATO: the 1994 summit and its consequences: 10th Report, HC 747.* . London: HMSO. 19 July 1995. Annex 3c, pages 68 – 69.

¹⁷⁵ This point was expressed by members of the Canadian, Danish, and Dutch delegations. Interview at NATO headquarters in September 1998.

¹⁷⁶ Miller, P. D. *Retaining Alliance Relevancy: NATO and the Common Joint Task Force.* Cambridge US: IFPA. 1994.; Miller, P. D. *Leadership in a Transnational World: the challenge of keeping the peace.* National Security Paper Number 12. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in association with the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. 1993.;

¹⁷⁷ In the autumn of 1993, a number of US defence experts published an article in which they proposed a very ambitious programme for renewing NATO. They argued that in order to build a new Europe, the United States had to pursue four strategies: 1) it had to work towards closer ties with the French; 2) it had to help Germany strategically to emancipate itself; 3) NATO had to gain the ability to become involved out of area; 4) NATO membership had to be opened up to Visegrad countries. See: Asmus, R. D., Kugler, R. L., & Larrabee, S. F. 'Building a new NATO' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 72, No. 4. September and October 1993. In a later book R. L. Kugler boasts that the view expressed by himself and

concept of PfP originated in March-April 1993 as 'Peace Partners' from SACEUR John Shalikashvili. Beginning in May 1993 the idea was then elaborated in the Department of Defense (DOD) by Assistant Secretary for Regional Security Affairs Charles Freeman, assisted by the principal draftsman - Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO affairs, Joseph Kruzal, together with two other officials, Daryl Johnson and Clarence H. Juhl.¹⁷⁸ Within the US legislative bodies, Senator Lugar was fully behind the proposal of enlarging NATO. At NATO headquarters in Brussels, in September 1993, Manfred Wörner and NATO spokesman Jamie Shea gave a number of speeches placing the enlargement of the alliance at the centre of the future mission of the organisation.¹⁷⁹

The idea of CJTF and PfP was well received by German officials located in the Ministry of Defence. Volker Rühle, in particular, became a champion of NATO enlargement.¹⁸⁰ Whilst US officials were hesitant in giving details of the proposals, Volker Rühle in the spring of 1993, spoke publicly on the benefits of drawing the Visegrad countries, identified specifically by name, into NATO. As he informed the Defence and Security Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly on 21 May 1993, "With their forthcoming association with the European Communities, the political foundations have been laid [for EU and WEU membership] and for the Visegrad states - Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. I therefore see no reason in principle for denying future members of the European Union membership of NATO."¹⁸¹

Although the German and US governments and NATO international staff agreed in principle on the need to make an offer to the former communist states, there were

other writers were endorsed by US Senator Richard Lugar (R. Ind), Volker Rühle and US luminaries such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, James Baker and Dick Cheney. Kugler, R. L. *Commitment to purpose: how alliance partnership won the cold war*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. 1993. page 569.

¹⁷⁸ Solomon, G. B. *The NATO enlargement debate: 1990-1997: blessings of liberty*. 1998. Westport, The Center for Strategic and International Studies. page 26 and 27.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.* pages 22 - 25.

¹⁸⁰ Interviews with Paul Breur, CDU MP and with Karl-Heinz Kamp from the Adenauer Stiftung in Bonn, June 1999.

¹⁸¹ Borawski, J. 'Partnership for Peace and beyond.' *International Affairs*, 1995, Vol 71, No. 2. pages 233 - 246.

divergent views as to the exact nature of the proposal. Should NATO signal that it was ready for enlargement by laying down the criteria for membership? Should Russia be invited to take part? Leading members of the Clinton Administration were divided on the issue. Within the State Department, Under-Secretary of State Lynn Davis reportedly urged in October 1993 in a memo to the Secretary of State Warren Christopher that criteria for membership should be elaborated. Strobe Talbot, the Special Presidential Adviser on the successor states of the Soviet Union and later Deputy Secretary of State, favoured a more cautious approach towards enlargement. Members of the Pentagon and the Secretary of Defense Les Aspin did not agree on laying the basis for a speedy road towards enlargement. In Germany, Klaus Kinkel was also cautious. Although he was fully behind widening NATO membership he emphasised the need for a strategic partnership with Russia. Britain, France and Italy were also concerned about Russia's reactions to such initiative.¹⁸²

Whilst the debate continued among Western capitals as to the exact nature of the proposal, it was left to a few selected officials to work on the details of CJTF and PfP. On September 11, 1993, a conference was held at Truman Hall. Among the present were Kruzel, Shalikashvili, Wörner, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe Admiral Jeremy Boorda, and US Mission NATO policy planning officer Captain Charles Dale. Other member states were informed about PfP at the meeting of Defence Ministers in Travemünde in October 1993.¹⁸³

The German-American co-operation in the evolution of PfP was remarkable. For Volker Rühle the expansion of the NATO alliance to the East was a national security issue. It was a way of protecting Germany from the threat of unrest and turmoil in Eastern Europe. It was also a way of consolidating German economic and political interest in the region.¹⁸⁴ For the United States, PfP and CJTF provided a way to maintain leadership in Europe. It was thought that PfP would consolidate democracy and provide an incentive for reform in Eastern Europe, whilst at the

¹⁸² Solomon. *op.cit.* pages 21, 28 – 31.

¹⁸³ *Ibid* pages 32 - 33.

¹⁸⁴ The points about US view on Enlargement were made by Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp during an interview on 25 June 1999 at the Adenauer Stiftung Institute.

same time providing for a peaceful settlement of conflict. Among some Republicans, the policy of NATO enlargement was compared to the US support for the Marshall plan at the end of the Second World War. It was an attempt to relive the past US leadership role in reforging a new Europe.¹⁸⁵

Most importantly, although in the public discussions about PfP the emphasis was placed on the political feature of the initiative, PfP had a specific military aspect. It allowed NATO member states to become involved in military operations on the territory of former potential adversaries states. This reason was at the heart of the support given by NATO Defence Ministers and NATO military authorities to the initiative. During a Congressional debate, a number of US officials made clear how the idea of PfP was designed to strengthen NATO's role in 'out-of-area' operations. Senator Wisner argued that PfP "has potentially strengthened NATO's capability to go 'out-of-area', particularly to the East, to build an effective and working relationship with the military forces of Eastern Europe as we face real practical peacekeeping problems".¹⁸⁶

The connection established between CJTF and PfP and 'out-of-area', in what were now known as 'peacekeeping' operations, transformed the nature of the alliance's involvement in former Yugoslavia. In the eyes of NATO military planners the operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina provided a test of the ability of the alliance to transform itself. In other words, there was a pressure within NATO international staff and among some NATO member states to resolve the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina so that the alliance could demonstrate its ability to remodernise its integrated military structure and establish new military relationships with former communist states.

¹⁸⁵ For an overview see Carpenter, T. G. *Beyond NATO: staying out of Europe's wars*. Washington, D.C, Cato Institute. 1994. page. 69-71. and Rudolf, P. 'The USA and NATO enlargement.' *Aussenpolitik*, May 1996, Vol 47 No. 4, 339-347. page 342.

¹⁸⁶ United States. Senate. Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee of Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Coalitions Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services. *The future of NATO jointly before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee of Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Coalitions Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate*. Washington: US Government Printing Office. 1994. page 18.

Conclusion

The decisions to give NATO a role in enforcing humanitarian operations in the Balkans and to establish a flight ban over Yugoslavia appeared not to have been the result of the efforts of a policy community. Rather, Western politicians were put under pressure by media reports and by public opinion to do something to stop the massacres, alleged to be on the proportion of the holocaust, which were taking place in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bush took the lead in calling for such measures because of domestic factors. The Bush administration was in the midst of conducting an electoral campaign. The Democratic candidate, Bill Clinton, was doing well in the polls and advocated tough measures. In order not to be outflanked by the Democrats, Bush called upon the UN to introduce a new set of measures in support of UN humanitarian operations.

During September to December 1992, the lack of specificity of the UN mandates allowed NATO to propose a wide range of options. Thus, NATO responded to the request for support to the humanitarian effort by drawing up plans, which included large-scale military intervention on the ground to involve up to 100,000 men. Similarly, in September 1992, the NATO military authorities responded to the UN request for assistance by sending a disproportionate number of civilian and military staff to set up the UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo, up to 1000 soldiers were sent. General Galvin (SACEUR) had also no reservations in calling for a wide range of military tasks for NATO in the Balkans. Overall, there seems no doubt that NATO was eager to intervene. The same level of eagerness in becoming involved militarily in former Yugoslavia was not present in NATO national capitals and a check was placed on the nature of the Western Alliance's operations in the region.

The advent of the Clinton Administration marked a departure in US policy towards the Balkans and provided the catalyst for a new modus vivendi between NATO international staff and US policy-making structures. The Clinton administration went a step further than its Republican predecessor in advocating NATO's role in the region. The new Democratic leadership more openly supported the cause of the Bosnian Muslims and refused to co-operate fully in the realisation of the Vance-

Owen plan. It advocated the implementation of a no-fly zone and unofficially the lifting of the arms embargo. The new *modus vivendi* was partly due to the fact that the Clinton Administration brought to power new groups of officials whose framework of reference, when looking at the Bosnia conflict, was not shaped by the Cold War. Many of Clinton's advisers had a background in the civil rights movement of the 1960s and tended to see the Balkan conflict in the simple dichotomy of oppressor and oppressed. This thinking was similar to those held by sections of the German policy-making establishment. Leading figures within the German Cabinet fully supported the US initiatives but because of the unresolved nature of the domestic debate about the role of the Bundeswehr they were restrained in their public statements. The British government followed US leadership but had divergent views about the cause of the conflict and how to resolve it. In Britain, the positions of the Clinton administration and NATO international staff had the strongest level of support among the opposition parties, that is the Labour Party and the Liberals.

The Clinton administration with the support of NATO international staff and sections of the German government worked towards the enforcement of the no-fly zone. The establishment of the 'safe areas' and the decision to give NATO a mandate to use force to support UNPROFOR was however not simply the result of the action of the policy community. There was an element of spontaneous, and at time chaotic, reaction to events. The perception that General Morillon and UNHRC staff had of the conflict in the Balkans and their actions during events in Srebreniza in the spring of 1993 fuelled an international public outcry. The chaotic character of the events is exemplified by the fact that despite the agreement in the UN Security Council to establish safe areas, none of the UN nor NATO member states was willing to give the UN the military capabilities to supervise the areas. Most significantly, the creation of the 'safe areas' created a paradoxical situation for the military forces involved in the region. UNPROFOR was given the task of protecting areas that acted as a military base for Bosnian Muslim forces to attack the Bosnian Serbs. UNPROFOR was thus supposed simultaneously to uphold the principle of impartiality whilst at the same time indirectly and involuntarily supporting the military actions of one group against another.

The new *modus vivendi* established between the Clinton Administration and NATO international staff became obvious during the events in August 1993. The US government decided to react to Bosnian Serbs advances in Sarajevo by calling for air strikes. During the diplomatic negotiations that ensued it was apparent that the US and NATO staff were seeking a wide ranging definition of the scope of NATO military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They envisaged the right to call for air strikes without the need to consult with UN civilian authorities and considered striking not only at Serbian artillery based in Sarajevo but also at Serb military installations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. US and NATO international staff were not able to win support for their policy because France and Britain recoiled at the idea of using air power to strike at a wide range of military targets. They were also concerned about steps taken by NATO and US staff to undermine the authority of the UN in controlling military operations.

The position of German government officials was closer to US thinking than that of their French and British counterparts. However, German officials were publicly restrained from endorsing fully the demands made by US and NATO international staff. Although the German government was not opposed in principle to the use of air strikes it insisted on the legitimacy of the operations and on the UN having overall supervision for the operations. Within the SPD and the FDP there remained also considerable opposition to NATO air strikes.

During August 1992 and 1993, the operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina assumed a new significance for the internal debate about the future role of the alliance. Because of the wide range of tasks that NATO was asked to undertake in former Yugoslavia, the IMS was forced to quickly devise new methods of working and of organising its military capabilities. The NATO military authorities were at the vanguard over the political wing of NATO and European national governments in devising a NATO peacekeeping doctrine, MC 327. Although in 1993, MC 327 did not receive support from the political wing of NATO, some of the ideas proposed in the document came to shape NATO's response to the conflict in Bosnia. In addition, the day-to-day policies developed in the DPP, SHAPE and SACLANT to

plan and conduct operations in the former Yugoslavia reinforced the new long-term strategic military thinking that was being formulated at SHAPE and SACLANT.

The evolution of NATO peacekeeping policy was also partly the result of evolving US domestic debate about its contribution to UN peacekeeping. During the domestic debate, influenced by the experience in Somalia and the lack of previous expertise in UN peacekeeping among the US policy making structures, the Pentagon and the Department of Defense came at the forefront in defining the US contribution to UN peacekeeping. They drafted proposals in which peacekeeping operations were based on a notion of combat operations rather than on traditional 'neutrality' principles.

In addition, the military commanders at SHAPE and SACLANT were at the vanguard of formulating what came later to be known as CJTF and Pfp. The US State Department, the Pentagon and the German Ministry of Defence then took up their ideas. The development of these concepts gave a new meaning to NATO's operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both CJTF and Pfp were in fact devised to allow the Western Alliance to undertake military operations outside its own borders and to create a division of labour between NATO and WEU. The new concepts promised to save the crumbling Western Alliance. From mid-1993 onwards, NATO's strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina started to be shaped by a desire on the part of the Western Alliance to make CJTF and Pfp a reality.

Chapter 5: NATO use of air power and the establishment of IFOR: 1994-1995

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to outline the final phases to the development of NATO's 'out-of-area' role. The chapter will address the following questions: during 1994 and 1995 did the Western Allies agree to engage in combat operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina because of the worsening of the military situation and the threat of spill over? Or was the decision the outcome of a planned policy to secure a role for the alliance in the region? Can we understand Operation Deliberate Hope and the establishment of IFOR just as a series of ad-hoc, unplanned responses to events? How did the discussions about CJTF and PfP relate, if at all, to NATO's strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina? As in the previous chapter, NATO's involvement in Bosnia will be analysed by focusing on the decisions to use its military power. The analysis will be situated in the context of the warring's parties military strategies and domestic debates about the policies to be pursued.¹

The chapter is subdivided into two sections. In the first section, the reaction of policy-makers to the January 1994 NATO Summit is described and an analysis of the progress made toward the realisation of PfP and CJTF is provided. In the second section, the increased involvement and transformation of NATO's operations in the Balkans into 'peace-enforcement' activities is presented. The development is rendered in three subsections. The first section, spanning roughly the period from January to April 1994, explains how NATO came to launch its first air attacks against both land and air based targets. In addition it examines the impact of the Washington Agreement, the product of the new level of co-operation among German and US officials, on the military balance in the Balkans. In the second subsection the role of NATO international staff and US officials in encouraging the extensive use of NATO air power and shifting the nature of the 'dual-key' arrangement, which shaped the UN and NATO relationship, is provided.

¹ The diplomatic strategies pursued will only be sketched. See appendix D for an overview.

In the final section an explanation is provided for the Western allies' response to military developments in the second half of 1994 and 1995 which culminated in Operation Deliberate Hope and the deployment of IFOR.

CJTF and PfP during 1994 and 1995

Reaction to the announcement of CJTF and PfP

The announcement of CJTF and PfP at the NATO Summit in January 1994 received a mixed welcome among NATO member states.

US reaction

In Washington, the NATO summit of 1994 was heralded as demonstrating Clinton's leadership in world affairs. In both Senate and Congress it won the support of the Democratic Party.² The main opposition to the PfP came from those who wanted a faster approach to opening the door for membership of NATO. Leading figures such as Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Senator Lugar formed the opposition. The Republican led Congress and the Polish lobby were behind them.³ In a written statement to a committee hearing, Senator Lugar described PfP as an inappropriate policy that failed to address the lack of stable security in Europe. In his view PfP gave Russia a veto over Western policy.⁴ The Republicans opposed PfP not only because of foreign policy reasons but also because of domestic factors. They wanted to dissociate themselves from what they defined as Clinton's policy of 'Russia first' and thus obtain the votes of the population of Central Eastern Europe - a population located in key US states.

² United States. Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee of Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Coalitions Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services. *The future of NATO jointly before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee of Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Coalitions Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate*. Washington: US Government Printing Office. 1994. see statement made by Senator Biden and Senator Wisner, page 18.

³ Rudolf, P. 'The USA and NATO enlargement.' *Aussenpolitik*, May 1996, Vol 47 No. 4, pages 339 - 347.

⁴ For Lugar's view see United States. Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee of Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Coalitions Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services .1994. *op.cit.* pages 12 – 16.

NATO policy-making structures

Since NATO international military staff developed the CJTF concept, it was with no surprise that they took the lead in implementing it. Immediately after the announcement, the NATO military authorities defined a CJTF headquarter as a “deployable, multinational, multiservice headquarters of variable size, formed to command joint forces of NATO, and possibly, non-NATO nations, for the purpose of conducting peace operations outside the territory of NATO.” The political wing of NATO was in contrast rather slow at formulating concepts and procedures for making CJTF a reality.⁵ The dominance of military structures in defining the concept can be found in the composition and authority given to the military in a number of important fora. Consultations about the nature of the CJTF took place at three levels: firstly, under the authority of the NAC; secondly, at the Military and Political Committee level/the Provisional Policy Co-ordination Group (PPCG), which was tasked with defining the role of SACEUR in such operations; and finally at the major NATO command level - in a forum called the Military Transitional Issue Working group, which examined operational aspects for CJTF and harmonisation of positions of member states and was under the command of SACEUR.⁶

British reactions to the NATO summit of February 1994

In his remarks to parliament, John Major stressed the novelty of the idea of CJTF and how the concept was supposed to allow NATO to respond to crises such as those in Bosnia. As he explained: “Although the command and control, for example, of NATO operations in Bosnia has been ingenious and effective, it has necessarily been ad hoc. It [CJTF] is intended to ensure that the alliance is capable of taking on a full range of likely future mission adjustments. The purpose of combined joint task forces will be to ensure that a proper command and control

⁵ WEU Assembly. Defence Committee. (Rapporteur: Mrs Baarveld-Schalaman) *The WEU Planning Cell I - reply to the thirty-nine annual report of the Council, 19 May 1994*. Document 1421. 19 May 1994. Paris: WEU. pages 215 - 216.

⁶ WEU Assembly. Defence Committee. (Rapporteur: Mr De Decker) *European armed forces*. Document No. 1468. 12 June 1995.

structure is swiftly available, rather than it having to be provided when a crisis arises”⁷ Major cautiously mentioned that the concept would meet some of the requirements for a new European defence identity. As he stated: “They [CJTfFs] will improve NATO’s capability to deploy tasks forces inside or outside the NATO area, but, because they will be available for purely and predominantly European operations, the combined joint task forces could also meet the requirements of the European security and defence identity. They will strengthen the European role within NATO without detracting from its transatlantic character.”⁸

On the issue of Pfp, Major emphasised that the summit had developed a clear perspective on the enlargement process. Although it was too soon to determine which countries would be the members of the alliance, he admitted that there were strong candidates. In answer to a question on whether the alliance would be prepared to give security guarantees under Article 5 to Eastern European countries, the British Prime Minister explained that he did not see a consensus on the issue and he did not want to commit himself to such a perspective.⁹

The British parliament and members of the Defence Committee fully endorsed both Pfp and CJTF.¹⁰ Speaking on behalf of the Labour Party, John Smith approved the decisions taken at the summit. He praised both Pfp and CJTF. His only criticism of Pfp was that it laid too much stress on military co-operation. In his view NATO should also encourage political developments within applicant countries.¹¹ Some doubts were however expressed by members of the Defence Committee as to the ability of the WEU to assume military tasks.¹² The strongest criticisms of Pfp were expressed outside parliament by leading defence experts who believed NATO should have made clear its willingness to admit member states, rather than sending

⁷ Britain. House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol 235, column 177. 12 January 1994.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.* page 186.

¹⁰ *Ibid* criticism was expressed by Mr Bob Cryer who argued that NATO was redundant. page 187; House of Commons Defence Committee. ‘Minutes of Evidence taken before the Defence Committee’ in *The Future of NATO: the 1994 summit and its consequences: 10th Report, HC 747*. 19 July 1995. pages 1 - 42.

¹¹ Britain. House of Commons. *op.cit.* 12 January 1994.

contradictory signals to Eastern Europe. According to Dr J. Eyal, it was in the national interest of Britain and of NATO to enlarge because the alternative scenario would be that Germany would pursue a unilateral policy toward the East, outside European co-operative frameworks.¹³

German reactions to the NATO summit of February 1994

In a statement to the German parliament, Kohl outlined PfP as the appropriate step to allow the Eastern European countries to become closer to NATO whilst taking into account Russian concerns. Kohl however put a slightly different emphasis on the significance of the summit in relation to the CJTF. In contrast to Major, Kohl described the achievement of CJTF as follows:

“NATO supports without reservations the Maastricht Treaty and with it the strengthening of European political unity. This is valid also for the efforts to build an independent European security and defence policy with the help of the Western European Union as the security arm of the political union, as corresponding to the Maastricht Treaty. The initial reservations that some US government representatives had of the project have disappeared. In the future the Western European Union’s deployments will rely, as when necessary, on NATO forces.”¹⁴

It was apparent that for the German government the CJTF represented a shift in US support for ESDI. As argued in Chapter 3, Kohl had been at the forefront of calling for ESDI to strengthen the Western Alliance. These remarks had however remained rhetorical in nature. The German government had been unable to developed

¹² Britain. House of Commons Defence Committee. *op.cit.* 19 July 1995, pages 1 - 42.

¹³ *Ibid* pages 19 - 23.

¹⁴ Germany. Deutscher Bundestag. *Plenarprotokolle*, 12 Wahlperiode, 202 Sitzung. seite 17412. 13 January 1994. Original “NATO unterstützt unmissverständlich den Vertrag von Maastricht und damit die weitere politische Einigung Europas. Dies gilt auch für die Bemühungen, eine eingeständige europäische Sicherheitspolitik und Verteidigung mit Hilfe der Westeuropäischen Union als sicherheitspolitischem Arm der Politischen Union entsprechend dem Maastricht-Vertrag aufzubauen. Früher von manchen amerikanischen Regierungsvertreten hiergegen geäußerte Vorbehalte gibt es jetzt nicht mehr. Künftig wird die Westeuropäische Union für eigene Einsätze, so dies notwendig ist, auf Streitkräfte der

practical proposals to put some flesh on the bone. The US proposal was seen as following German thinking: it allowed France to pursue its ambitions for 'out-of-area' operations in co-operation with the NATO structure.¹⁵

Speaking on behalf of the SPD, Hans-Ulrich Klose backed the efforts in establishing a relationship between the WEU and NATO. He agreed with the government's proposals that the WEU should have a military capability. He also endorsed PfP as the right policy towards enlarging the alliance.¹⁶ Klose believed that both NATO and WEU could undertake operations on behalf of the UN and the CSCE. He criticised however the government for putting forward military and organisational concepts without formulating the political strategy required to build a common foreign and defence identity. He objected to the lack of explanations provided by the government on the decision making process. He reminded Parliament that the SPD remained opposed to any attempts to give the WEU a role outside the NATO treaty area.¹⁷

In contrast, the PDS/Linke Liste and the Greens were critical of the NATO summit. Andrea Lederer (PDS/Linke Liste) and Vera Wollenberg (Greens) argued that the summit had failed to take the opportunity to create a new system of collective security. Instead the summit re-affirmed the dominance of classical military alliances and an intensification of the rearmament in East European societies. Andrea Lederer predicted that in the future NATO would be able to intervene 'out of area' at a world-wide level independently from the UN and the CSCE. The WEU would also be deployed ad hoc. He expressed concern that the summit represented a polarisation in East-West relations and a legitimisation of the role of NATO as

NATO zurückgreifen können."

¹⁵ Remarks made by Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp. Interview held at Adenauer Stiftung Institute on 25 June 1999.

¹⁶ A similar statement in favour of PfP was made by Brigitte Shulte who welcomed PfP because it allowed improvements in East and West co-operation in the area of crisis management. see Germany. Deutscher Bundestag. 13 January 1994. *op.cit.* section 17435. In a visit to the US in April 1994, Rudolf Scharping reaffirmed the SPD's full support for NATO enlargement. see Peel Q. 'The FT Interview: Earnest about important allies - Rudolf Scharping, leader of Germany's SPD' *Financial Times*, 11 April 1994, page 14. Dr Karl-Hein Kamp confirmed that the SPD, like the CDU/CSU, FDP was fully supportive of NATO enlargement.

¹⁷ Deutscher Bundestag. *op.cit.* section 17418. 13 January 1994.

world policeman with the authority to intervene world-wide, beyond Eastern Europe. Lederer feared that the PfP would result in a selective enlargement process that would antagonise Russia and by so doing create a new dividing wall between Christian and Orthodox countries.¹⁸

In order to defend the government record in establishing a new collective security system, Dr Klaus Kinkel, the German Foreign Minister, argued that steps had been taken to develop a new European security structure. There was the development of an interlocking system between on the one hand the UN and the CSCE, and on the other, NACC, the WEU and the EU. At the same time he believed that no member of the new collective system should have a right to veto decisions. Volker Rühle, the German Defence Minister, told parliament that PfP was a vital national interest and was not a substitute for the opening up of the Western Alliance toward the East. The aim of PfP was not to discriminate, though the West had a right to differentiate. In his view, Germany had a vital role to play in fostering a new solidarity in the security field with the neighbouring countries of Eastern Europe. Germany had no other option, as he put it: “either we export stability, or we will import instability”. During the parliamentary debate, both Kinkel and Rühle used the opportunity to remind the opposition that at the NATO Summit decisive steps had been taken to give NATO the authority to undertake peacekeeping activities on behalf of the UN and CSCE. It was time that parliament endorsed these changes in NATO tasks rather than opposing them.¹⁹

The remarkable feature of the German parliamentary debate was that the SPD fully endorsed PfP whilst still maintaining a critical position towards Germany participating in ‘out-of-area’ operations. It was rather difficult for outside commentators to understand the logic in the position. In addition, although CJTF represented a new direction for the alliance, it was remarkable that the German legislative bodies did not contribute to shaping the concept. In the German defence and foreign affairs committee, CJTF was hardly ever discussed in-depth.²⁰ Only a

¹⁸ *Ibid.* section 17424 - 17426.

¹⁹ *Ibid* section 17427-17433.

²⁰ Interview with MP Paul Breuer on 24 June 1999, CDU/CSU parliamentary group, at the

few defence and foreign policy experts demonstrated any interest in the subject. It was left to the NATO desks of the German Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office to make a contribution.²¹

Other NATO member states' reaction to CJTF

The French interpreted the declaration as allowing the WEU access to NATO facilities when the United States did not want to be involved in military operations. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Alain Juppé made clear his view on 21st January 1994. He stated that "In operations where it is clear that the United States for its own reasons does not wish to become heavily involved, this type of task force could not only be made available to Western European Union but also, in such cases, placed under its command rather than under the authority of SACEUR - *and this has been explicitly accepted*. The United States has therefore taken an important step forward in agreeing to a modification of the traditional chain of command..."²² On PFP, French officials expressed their official support but they saw the policy as secondary and remained sceptical of US aims.²³ Indeed some French officials held the view that the initiative was an attempt by the United States to dominate European security.²⁴

Other NATO member states reacted to the announcement differently and made a distinction between two aspects of the new policy: the restructuring of headquarters and the creation of new co-operative military arrangements with NATO and WEU. Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal were among the states that supported the announcement without reservations. In all of these countries, CJTF was perceived as allowing an upgrading of domestic forces dedicated to

German parliament in Bonn.

²¹ Interview with Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp, 25 June 1999, at the Adenauer Stiftung Institute and with Dr Ulrich Schile on 24 June 1999 at CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the German Bundestag.

²² WEU Assembly. Political Committee. (Rapporteur: Mr Baumel). *The evolution of NATO and its consequences for WEU: Document 1410, 24 March 1994*. my own italics. 23rd March 1994. page 31.

²³ Grant, R.P. 'France's new relationship with NATO' *Survival*, vol 38, No.1, Spring 1998. pages 58 - 80.

²⁴ Interview with Karl-Heinz Kamp at the Adenauer Stiftung, Bonn June 1999.

peacekeeping operations. The initiative was perceived also as a logical step toward a more flexible command and force structure.²⁵ However, among Canadian, Danish, Norwegian and Turkish officials, whose countries were neither members of the WEU nor had an associate status in the organisation, the reaction to the second aspect of the policy varied from outright hostility to scepticism. Thus, for example, Canadian officials found it extremely difficult to envisage a situation in which they would agree to NATO assets being put at the sole disposal of the WEU.²⁶ Similarly Turkish, Danish and Norwegian officials were not supportive of the idea of placing their troops under the command of the WEU when they did not have a full say in the organisation. Turkish officials were adamant that they wanted a right of veto in such decision.²⁷ In addition, Italian and Turkish officials feared that CJTF could potentially undermine the integrated military structure. They were worried that CJTF would lead to a new layer of command and force structure at a time when the defence ministries were under pressure to shed resources.²⁸

In contrast, the WEU Council warmly welcomed the initiative and established a specific CJTF political-military working group to prepare the WEU response to the NATO summit meeting. In addition the WEU Council authorised the Planning Cell to take part in the working group's meeting to support the efforts of NATO military authorities. In order to position itself in the new round of negotiations, the WEU had to resolve internal problems in developing its own military capabilities. In 1993, the establishment of a military force under the command of the WEU Planning Cell, the so-called Forces Answerable to the WEU, FAWEU, had been agreed. To develop these capabilities, the Planning Cell relied on information from the Ministries of Defence of member states. It soon transpired that the Planning Cell could not obtain an overview of the FAWEU because some Ministries were

²⁵ Interviews with Canadian, Dutch, Portuguese, Danish, Norwegian members of national delegations at NATO headquarters, September and November 1998.

²⁶ Interview with Canadian defence experts at the Canadian NATO delegation in November 1998.

²⁷ Interview with Danish and Norwegian defence experts at the respective NATO delegations in September 1998.

²⁸ Interviews with Italian and Turkish national representatives at NATO headquarters in September and November 1998. Also Britain. House of Commons Defence Committee. *Tenth Report from the defence committee*. London: HMSO. 2 March 1994. Testimony by Mr Frank Cook, page 16.

reluctant to provide information. This was due to the fact that the Defence Ministries of WEU member states were accustomed to working with NATO rather than the WEU.²⁹ This issue became pressing because without the Planning Cell having access to relevant information, it would have been difficult for the WEU to plan CJTF operations. The WEU would have been totally reliant on the NATO information-gathering role.

In summary, although the NATO Summit of January 1994 signalled a change in the direction of the alliance, the details of the process of transformation had to be defined. As I will demonstrate below, throughout 1994 and the first six months of 1995 slow steps were made in resolving the burden sharing issue of CJTF and the NATO policy of enlargement.

Negotiations on CJTF and PFP during 1994 and the first half of 1995

During 1994 and the first half of 1995 a number of obstacles prevented progress on the CJTF and PFP issues. In the case of CJTF, the stumbling block was the definition of the nature of the division of labour that had to be established between NATO and the WEU during the implementation of CJTF-type operations. A number of proposals were put forward to examine the form of consultations to be followed during such events, the composition of forces making up the CJTF and the command levels. On 29 June 1994, WEU member states had pressed a report from NATO outlining their views on the issues.³⁰ During 1994, a great number of papers were shuffled through the WEU and NATO headquarters but no agreement could be reached. The NAC was reluctant to accept that the Europeans formulated their positions within the WEU and then presented it to the NAC. France did not want to subordinate its forces to SACEUR in a CJTF operation and the United States and Canada were resolute in maintaining command of their own resources.³¹

²⁹ Interview with a member of the Political Affairs Division at WEU Headquarters. This point is also made in Assembly of the WEU. WEU. Assembly. (Rapporteur: Mrs Baarveld-Schlaman) *The WEU Planning Cell - reply to the 9 annual report of the Council*. Document 1421. Paris: WEU. 19 May 1995.

³⁰ WEU Assembly. (Rapporteur: Baumel) *The evolution of NATO and its consequences for WEU*. Document 1410, 24 March 1994: Paris: WEU.1994/5

³¹ WEU Assembly. Defence Committee. (Rapporteur: Mr De Decker) *WEU Assembly*

The lack of co-operation between the NAC and the WEU was demonstrated by the fact that when on the 15 May 1995, France, Italy and Spain announced the formation of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, the NAC was taken by surprise.³²

In the case of PfP, progress was also rather slow because of divergent opinions among NATO allies about the timing of the enlargement and the extent to which Russian considerations had to be taken into account. During 1994 members of the Republican Party sought to put pressure on the Clinton Administration to agree to the enlargement process. On the 14 April 1994, Congressman Benjamin Gilman, then ranking Republican and future chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and a member of the House delegation to the NAA, sponsored the 'NATO Expansion Act of 1994'. The act declared that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia should be the first, but not necessarily the last, to be made full NATO members by 1999. A month later, on May 5, 1994, another Republican, Congressman Henry Hyde, introduced the 'NATO Revitalization Act'. It urged NATO to establish benchmarks and a timetable for eventual membership for selected countries in transition.

By mid 1994, the WEU took the initiative in the area of enlargement. At the WEU Kircherberg meeting in May 1994, the WEU created the 'status of Association' for nine Eastern European member states. They were allowed to participate in Council discussions and by invitation in the WEU working groups, carrying on a liaison arrangement with the WEU Planning Cell. The Agreement sanctioned that the new members would be free to participate in 'Petersberg missions', should they wish to do so, and by taking part in such operations they would be eligible to join in the planning and decision-making process of assembling and controlling the necessary forces.³³ The US response to this initiative was contradictory. On the one hand, US

Document 1468: European armed forces. Document 1468. Paris: WEU. 12 June 1995.

³² WEU Assembly. *WEU in the Atlantic Alliance.* Paris: WEU. 6 November 1995. The formation of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, respectively land based and air based combined forces, can be seen as part of an effort by Italy and Spain to develop their own Rapid Reaction capabilities. It also boosted the WEU ability to undertake 'out-of-area' operations. The development could also be interpreted as an attempt to bolster the Italian, French and Spanish positions during the negotiations on CJTF. Cutileiro, J. 'WEU's operational development and its relationship to NATO.' *NATO review*, September 1995, Vol 5, pages 8 - 11.

³³ Wohlfeld, M. 'Closing the gap: WEU and Central European countries' in Lenzi, G.

officials urged the WEU and NATO to co-ordinate their outreach programmes. On the other, the Clinton administration was reluctant to endorse a fast track to NATO enlargement. Then, during a visit to Poland on 17 June 1994, Clinton disappointed the Polish parliament by avoiding elaborating on the membership question.³⁴

By the end of 1994, Volker Rühle took again the initiative. He urged the alliance to accept Polish membership while making clear that NATO could cooperate with Russia but not integrate it.³⁵ As a compromise, at the end of December 1994, NATO Foreign Ministers agreed to begin an examination into the enlargement issue. It was decided that they would not look at the question of how and when. Nine months later, on 20 September 1995, the NAC endorsed the 'Study on NATO Enlargement'. The study envisaged that there was to be no a priori requirement for stationing allied troops or nuclear forces on the territory of new members, but it would be important that allied forces could be deployed, when and if appropriate on the territory of the new members. No link was made to EU membership or to a strategic partnership with Russia.³⁶

If during 1994 and 1995, the diplomatic processes failed to make substantial inroads into fostering NATO enlargement strategy and elaborating the European contribution to CJTF, during NATO's military operations in the former Yugoslavia agreement was reached on two vital issues: the rules of engagement to be used to undertake peacekeeping activities and agreement on the composition, command and control structure of Operation Deliberate Hope and IFOR. It is to these developments that we now turn.

(Ed.) *WEU at fifty*. Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies. 1998. pages 79 - 92.

³⁴At a military level some progress was made towards realising PfP when on the 12 September 1994, NATO undertook its first exercises on ex-Warsaw Pact territory with Ukraine, Polish and Bulgarian forces.

³⁵ Solomon, G. B. *The NATO enlargement debate: 1990-1997: blessings of liberty*. 1998. Wesport, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, pages 48 - 67.

³⁶ NATO. *Study on Enlargement*. Brussels: NATO. September 1995.

NATO's first air strikes: February to April 1994

NATO and the Sarajevo crisis of February 1994

During February and April 1994, a series of events in Sarajevo and in Goradze led to NATO's first air strikes against both air and ground targets. On 5 February 1994 a mortar attack on a Sarajevo market killed 68 people and 200 civilians were injured. This prompted an immediate reaction by the Western Allies. Clinton called for an emergency meeting to discuss the US response to the outrage, at which all options including air strikes were to be considered. He argued that the USA had a number of interests in the region that justified American involvement in the crisis: firstly, the USA had to prevent a broader conflict in Europe; secondly, NATO needed to demonstrate that it remained a credible force for peace in post-Cold War Europe and finally, it had humanitarian interests in helping to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo.³⁷

One day after the massacre, the German Foreign Minister Kinkel responded by describing the attack as an act of barbaric violence. Mr Vogel, a government spokesman, argued that the use of limited military means, as offered by NATO to the UN in August 1993, should be taken into account.³⁸ A few days later, the German government took a more restrained position. On the one hand, a German government spokesman stated that the government would support any actions taken by NATO member states and, if the UN authorised air strikes, it would support them.³⁹ On the other, German officials emphasised that their role was not to give "cheap advice". For a number of historical reasons, Germany would provide "moral" support for air strikes but it would not take part in such operations. In a similarly restrained fashion, within the Bundeskanzleramt concerns were raised about the impact that the bombing would have on the safety and operations of the

³⁷ US President Clinton 'Responding to the Sarajevo Marketplace Shelling' statement to the press, *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, 9 February 1994.

³⁸ 'Menschenverachtende Haltung' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 February 1994.

³⁹ Kinkel explained that he believed UNSC Resolution 836 already gave NATO a legitimate mandate to undertake such operation.

Blue Helmets and military advisers were extremely cautious not to express any position on the issue.⁴⁰

British and French officials reacted by calling an urgent NATO ministerial meeting. Mr Alain Juppé, the French Foreign Minister, favoured the issuing of an ultimatum to the Bosnia Serbs. But Douglas Hurd was more restrained. In his view air power had only to be used if those on the spot believed that it would help achieve the UN's objectives.⁴¹ On February 6th, the UN Secretary General stated that it had become necessary, in accordance with Resolution 836, to prepare urgently for the use of air strikes to deter further attacks. At the same time Boutros Ghali requested the NATO Secretary-General to obtain approval from the NAC "to authorise the Commander-in-Chief of NATO's Southern Command to launch air strikes, at the request of the United Nations".⁴²

In European capitals the mood for military action was widespread. This was evident during a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers. At the meeting it was agreed that NATO and the UN should try to lift the siege of Sarajevo using all means necessary, including the use of air power. But British government officials remained uneasy about the consequences of military action. Lord Owen, the chief negotiator, feared that a NATO's action would antagonise the Russians. General Michael Rose was also determined to get a settlement on the ground without the use of NATO air power, which would jeopardise the safety of his UN troops. Thus, Lord Owen and General Rose embarked on a series of diplomatic meetings with the Bosnian Serb leadership. On the 8th February, British officials tried to have the NAC discussions cancelled by informing members that General Rose was in the process of working on a demilitarisation agreement.⁴³ After the Secretary-General had held consultation with NATO ambassadors, the meeting was

⁴⁰ 'Deutschland will nicht billige Ratschläge erteilen' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 February 1994.

⁴¹ Mauther, R. 'West divided on air strikes against Serbs: France calls for urgent NATO meeting to try to force lifting of Sarajevo siege.' *Financial Times*, 7 February 1994.

⁴² quoted in 'Boutros Ghali calls on NATO to step in' *Financial Times*, 9 February 1994, page 2.

⁴³ Silber, L and Little, A; *The death of Yugoslavia*. London: BBC Books, Penguin Books. 1995. pages 345 – 347.

confirmed for the next day. On February 9th, although General Rose obtained a verbal agreement from the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims,⁴⁴ the United States and France persuaded other NATO countries to agree to an ultimatum. Under considerable pressure from the United States, British officials reluctantly agreed to threaten the use of air strikes. Thus on the 9th February NATO announced that it was authorising air strikes and gave the Bosnian Serbs a ten day ultimatum to comply with its demands.⁴⁵

At home, both the British and German governments gave official backing to NATO's action but with some qualifications. During a parliamentary debate Douglas Hurd was forced to admit that the government had backed the ultimatum because of the need to maintain alliance solidarity.⁴⁶ In Germany, Kinkel stated that the government would seek to do its best in supporting NATO operations in the logistical field but not in military operations.⁴⁷ In the British and German parliaments a number of criticisms were voiced against the governments' stance. In Britain, Conservative MPs were concerned that NATO's ultimatum would lead to an escalation in the fighting and sought the government's reassurance that in such a case British troops would be withdrawn from the region. In Bonn, more marked anti-interventionist and pro-interventionist voices were heard. Among the former were members of the FDP and SPD. The FDP General Secretary Hoyer stated that there was a tendency within the government to overestimate the impact of targeted air strikes on the diplomatic process, there was also the danger of supporting air

⁴⁴ *Ibid* page 348-350.

⁴⁵ NATO. *NAC communiqué*. 19 February 1994. available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/commu/49-95/c949209a.htm>. Paragraph 6 called for "the withdrawal, or regrouping and placing under UNPROFOR control, within ten days, of heavy weapons of the Bosnian Serb forces located in an area within 20 kilometres of the centre of Sarajevo, and excluding an area within two kilometres of the centre of Pale."

⁴⁶ Stephens, P. 'Britain 'bowed to US pressure' over Bosnia ultimatum: decision to support NATO plan averted damaging rift with Washington" *Financial Times*, 11 February 1994.

⁴⁷ Gennrich, C. 'Deutschland ist nicht nur Zuschauer. Wie Aussenminister Kinkel die Zuspitzung in Bosnien-Herzegovina beurteilt /' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 11 February 1994.; 'Deutsche Soldaten werden an Luftschlägen nicht teilnehmen. Auswärtiges Amt: Awacs-Flugzeuge haben bei Angriffen keine Funktion / SPD hält an ihrer Auffassung fest' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 February 1994.; 'Bis an die äusserste Grenze' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 18 February 1994.

strikes without clearly identified political aims.⁴⁸ SPD officials called upon the government to restrain from suggesting the use of military means in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Karsten Voigt justified this position by arguing that because of the memories of the Second World War, Germany could not take part in military operations in the region. In his view, the use of air strikes would lead to many civilian casualties. In addition, once the air strikes had ended, the international community would be faced with renewed demands for the protection of Tuzla from Serbs, Vitez from Muslims and Mostar from Croats. The SPD defence spokesman Opel also warned against the use of NATO military power in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In his view NATO air strikes could be interpreted as the Alliance supporting one of the warring parties.⁴⁹

Among the German pro-interventionists were leading figures within the Kanzleramt, the CDU/CSU and other pressure groups. Speaking in a private capacity on television, the State Minister of the Bundeskanzleramt, Schmidbauer, stated that he supported the use of air strikes in Bosnia. Lamers, CDU foreign spokesman, went further than Schmidbauer in condemning Germany's restraint in calling for the use of force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In his view Germany could no longer sustain an ambivalent attitude toward the use of force: military means were the only way to end mass murder.⁵⁰ The leading newspaper the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* was also scornful of the German government's stance.⁵¹

Whilst the domestic debates continued, at the UN Headquarters the policy of calling for NATO air strikes did not have unanimous support. During a UN Council meeting on 14-15 February some member states, led by Russia and China, voiced their opposition. To prevent NATO bombing from starting, Russian policy makers

⁴⁸ 'Deutschland will "nicht billige Ratschläge erteilen' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 February 1994.

⁴⁹ 'Luftangriffe möglich und nötig?. "Meinung Schmidbauers" / Lamers: Es geht um Glaubwürdigkeit' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9 February 1994.; Strong opposition to military strikes were also expressed by left-winger within the SPD see 'Hilfloser Aktionismus' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 February 1994.

⁵⁰ 'Luftangriffe möglich und nötig?. "Meinung Schmidbauers" / Lamers: Es geht um Glaubwürdigkeit' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9 February 1994.

⁵¹ 'Leitglosse. Gerassel oder Geklapper?' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 February 1994.

intervened as a mediator. They put forward a peace plan, which did not include air strikes, in order to put pressure on Milosevic to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their heavy artillery from Sarajevo. At the same time Russia offered to send its own peacekeeping forces to ensure the Serb withdrawal, thus providing the Bosnian Serbs with a face-saving formula. On 17 February, after a meeting with Russian officials, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to withdraw all their heavy weapons from the exclusion zone set by NATO within two days. At the same time Sir Michael Rose, UNPROFOR's commander in Bosnia, reached an agreement for the demilitarisation of Sarajevo.⁵² On the 20 February, at a meeting between the Security Council and NATO the air strikes were suspended.

The Aftermath of the Sarajevo Crisis (February 1994)

After the events in Sarajevo, in some European capitals a shift in favour of the use of military air strikes became apparent. French officials viewed NATO's action as the first success for the Alliance. Within the NAC there were talks for the strategy to be widened to other towns.⁵³ In Germany, Kinkel stated that it would now be possible to use the experience in Sarajevo to safeguard other Bosnian towns such as Bihac and Tuzla.⁵⁴ The SPD was also forced to admit that the threat of the use of air strikes had worked. Speaking on behalf of the SPD, Verheugen praised the tactics of the international community in Sarajevo.⁵⁵

NATO's first air strikes

Few weeks after the events in Sarajevo, the new international mood facilitated NATO's decision to engage in its first combat operations. On 29 February after six Serb bombers attacked a hospital and an ammunition dump in two Muslim held

⁵² on the efforts of General Rose to obtain an agreement, see Silber, L and Little, A; *op.cit.* pages 350 - 353.

⁵³ 'Konzept von Sarajevo soll auf andere Städte übertragen werden. Keine Luftangriffe auf Stellungen um die bosnische Hauptstadt / Die NATO spricht von einem ersten Erfolg' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 February 1994.

⁵⁴ 'Beratungen am Dienstag in Bonn' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 February 1994.; 'Verhaltene Zuversicht in Bonn. Regierung und Opposition hoffen auf Frieden in Bosnien' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 February 1994.

⁵⁵ 'Verhaltene Zuversicht in Bonn. Regierung und Opposition hoffen auf Frieden in

areas, Bugojono and Novie Travnik, NATO responded by shooting down four of the six Serb planes. It is important to notice that the decision to launch the attacks was facilitated by the fact that NATO air operations in support of the no-fly zone were not under the UN 'dual key arrangement'. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) were that once a NATO fighter pilot had intercepted or engaged a no-fly zone violation, a three or four star NATO general could authorise the strike. The UN ground commanders had no say in the decision.

Events in Goradze: April 1994

Five weeks after NATO fired its first air shots, UN officials called upon NATO to provide Close Air Support to UNPROFOR located around Goradze. The subsequent events in Gordaze led to the first serious military confrontation between the Bosnian Serbs and Alliance forces and to a change in the Alliance's mandate. It also heightened tensions among on the one hand between NATO and UN staff and on the other among NATO allies themselves. As the descriptions of the events below will demonstrate, there was a remarkable willingness on the part of NATO military commanders and US officials to use the full range of NATO military means against the Bosnian Serbs. The same level of willingness was not present among other Western policy-makers.

The town of Goradze was in the hands of the Bosnian Muslims who were well armed. The town is of great strategic importance - being located on the main roads between two large Serb-held cities in the Drina valley between Visegrad and Foca - and was used by the Bosnian Muslims to launch counter-attacks against the Bosnian Serbs. In early April, the Bosnian Serb army began to move toward the city. General Rose, the commander of UNPROFOR, did not at first consider the advances as jeopardising the mediation efforts. UNHRC and UN observers in Goradze were of a different opinion. Leaked reports were given to the press that highlighted the worsening of the situation.⁵⁶ On the 10th April Bosnian Serb attacks against the city escalated. Yusushi Akashi, UN Secretary-General's special envoy,

Bosnien' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 February 1994.

⁵⁶ Silber, L; Little, A. *op.cit.* page 362.

gave approval for a NATO attack. On 10th April US Air Force F16s dropped three bombs on a Bosnian Serb artillery command bunker. Air attacks were repeated on the next day. US Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornets fired three more bombs against tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Both sets of air strikes were directed from the ground by eight British forward air controllers, members of the British Special Air Service, who had been sent by General Rose into Goradze under the guise of UN Military Observers. Mr Michael Williams, the UN's chief spokesman in former Yugoslavia, justified the action under Security Council resolution 836 which "allows for the use of air power, in and around the safe areas, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate".⁵⁷

The Bosnian Serbs responded by refusing to comply with the UN. Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb military leader, interpreted the action as the UN taking sides with the Muslims. He stated that "obviously the United Nations have positioned themselves on the Muslim side. This is a very crucial moment and we do not know how we can possibly cooperate further with UNPROFOR while they are one-sided in this civil war".⁵⁸ Serb forces cut all routes in and out of Sarajevo and isolated the French UN garrison at Sarajevo airport, showing that they were able to tighten the siege at a moment's notice. There were also unconfirmed reports that some UN soldiers had been taken hostage or placed under house arrest by the Bosnian Serbs.⁵⁹

The Russians were astonished by the events. The Russian Foreign Minister, Mr Kozyrev described the air attack as "a big mistake and a great risk".⁶⁰ President Clinton had to reassure Boris Yeltsin that the action was in line with agreed policy.⁶¹ In order to intervene in the escalating crisis, Russia sent a diplomat, Vitaly

⁵⁷ Mortimer, E; Silber, L. 'NATO air strike halts Serb shelling' *Financial Times*, 11 April 1994, page 1.

⁵⁸ Traynor, I; Stephen, C. 'New raid fails to halt Serbs'. *The Guardian*, 12 April 1994, page 1.

⁵⁹ Bellay, C. 'UN denied access to "safe areas"', *Independent*, 14 April 1994, page 10.

⁶⁰ Traynor and Stephen, C. 12 April 1994. *op.cit.*

⁶¹ Cornwell, R. 'Strikes raise US stakes in war' *The Independent*, 12 April 1994, page 10. Clark, B. 'NATO's air onslaught risks alienating diplomatic ally' *Financial Times*, 11 April 1994, page 3. Privately, it appeared that some US officials were concerned that the action would undermine Yeltsin's national authority. In Moscow there was in fact a cross-

Churkin, to Pale to find a compromise between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs.

On 15 April, the Bosnian Muslim defences collapsed and two British SAS, who found themselves on the front-line, were wounded. General Rose called for CAS to evacuate the injured SAS but Yashushi Akashi refused to give permission for the operation.⁶² On April 16 the Bosnian Serbs announced that they had captured the strategic heights around Goradze. General Rose called again for CAS. This time Akashi approved the operations but the Bosnian Serbs were better prepared for the attack and shot down a British Sea Harrier.⁶³ The incident and bad weather forced NATO and the UN to call off the operations. Tensions increased. There were rumours that up to 30 NATO aircrafts were prepared to strike at a wide range of positions in Goradze. At the last moment, the Russian envoy Churchin succeeded in persuading Akashi to call off further air strikes.⁶⁴

It was during these rather chaotic developments that Clinton and the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali endorsed the idea of threatening the Bosnian Serbs with further NATO air strikes to help protect civilians in all six UN declared 'safe areas' in Bosnia.⁶⁵ This position was reaffirmed at a NAC meeting when both the United States and NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Wörner, insisted that NATO should use its air power to deter further attacks.⁶⁶ Other NATO countries were taken aback by the proposal. The Western Alliance seemed at a breaking point. The British insisted that NATO military actions would jeopardise the safety of UN troops. A compromise was achieved: on 22 April the NAC issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs. The ultimatum had three key elements: firstly it requested the

party consensus that Russia had to stand up for the Serbs.

⁶² For an interesting account of the events see, Silber, L and Little, A. *op.cit.* page 365-366.

⁶³ Bellamy, C. 'Serbs shoot down British jet as all-out conflict looms' *Independent on Sunday*, 17 April 1994, page 1.

⁶⁴ Bellamy, C; 'How to outmanoeuvre the West' *Independent on Sunday*, 17 April 1994, page 10. Akashi was keen to halt further military action for fear of 'Bosnian Serbs' reappraisal against UN troops.

⁶⁵ Cockburn, P. 'Clinton supports further NATO air strikes' *Independent*, page 10, 20 April 1994.

⁶⁶ Silber, L and Little, A *op.cit.* page 369.

Bosnian Serbs to stop attacks against Goradze; secondly they had to pull back three km from the centre and UN forces, relief and medical assistance had to be allowed into the city; thirdly, the Bosnian Serbs had to agree to a 'military exclusion zone' of twenty kilometres being established around Goradze. The Serbs had to withdraw by April 27. If they refused, NATO threatened air strikes against Serb heavy weapons and other military targets in the area. The NAC also asserted its resolve to respond in a similar fashion to protect the other five safe areas.⁶⁷

On 23rd April, NATO Southern Europe Commander, Admiral Leighton Smith, contacted Akashi to ask him to authorise air strikes on the grounds that the Serbs had not met conditions of the cease-fire outlined in the NATO ultimatum. Akashi refused to authorise the air strikes. In his view, there were signs that the Serbs would comply but they needed additional time to withdraw. Admiral Leighton Smith was furious and reported the situation to Manfred Wörner who perceived Akashi's refusal as jeopardising the legitimacy of the alliance. The crisis in UN/NATO relations was quickly resolved because on April 27 the Bosnian Serbs agreed to withdraw their heavy artillery and British and Ukrainian UN troops were allowed to enter Goradze to administer the agreement.

The events highlighted a change in NATO's operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The air strikes of the 10 and 11 April had been carried out under UN Security Council Resolution 836 to deter attack and not to defend a territory or to protect citizens. However, since the action was undertaken when a battle involving two warring factions was underway and civilians were being caught in the middle, it was not surprising that the Bosnian Serbs interpreted UNPROFOR and NATO as being biased against them. There is no doubt that the Bosnian Serbs committed atrocities against civilians but it should also be stressed that their military activities were partly the result of the counter-offensive undertaken by Bosnian Muslim forces. The overwhelming reactions of the Bosnian Serbs did nothing but raise the willingness among the Western Allies to use military means. Faced with a threat to the lives of peacekeepers and intense media and public outrage particularly in the

⁶⁷NATO. NAC. 'Decision on the Protection of Safe Areas' *NATO Communiqué*. 22 April 1994. available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940422b.htm>.

United States and Germany, NATO member states agreed to a change in the NATO mandate. In contrast to the NATO ultimatum of January, the 22nd April NAC ultimatum did not call upon both warring parties to refrain from fighting. Rather it explicitly mentioned the Bosnian Serbs and by so doing tacitly it sanctioned the military offensive undertaken by Bosnian Muslims prior to the Bosnian Serbs's onslaught. In other words, NATO member states began to modify the UN stance of impartiality towards the warring parties.

The events in Goradze led to two new developments during the spring and autumn of 1994: firstly, US and NATO officials became determined to establish a new division of labour between the United Nations and NATO commanders. Secondly, among NATO, US and German officials efforts were undertaken better to co-ordinate both political and military strategies in the region.

The attempts to foster a new division of labour between the UN and NATO

During 1992 and the early part of 1993, a 'dual key' arrangement had come into existence between the UN and NATO in the former Yugoslavia. As previously mentioned, because UN mandates were the product of political compromises, they remained vague in specifying the mandate of regional organisations. NATO officials had therefore a certain scope for manoeuvre in defining the rules of engagement. By mid 1993, there were a variety of arrangements in place that controlled UN and NATO operations in former Yugoslavia. NATO could strike at targets in Bosnia in two ways: either in CAS operations or during a violation of the no-flight ban. In the first case the initiative had to come from a troop commander. The request would be channelled to the UNPROFOR commander who would liaise with a NATO Southern commander based in Naples. In the latter case, the NATO Southern commander did not have to report to the UN officials about the timing of the air strikes.

In January 1994, two UNPROFOR commanders, General Jean Cot and General Briquemont criticised the UN for not giving them the power of calling for air

strikes when the Blue Helmets were under attack. They wanted a modification of the CAS procedures. Although the two Generals resigned,⁶⁸ the UN Secretary-General did introduce some modification in the CAS procedures. He delegated his authority to order air strikes to Akashi, who was based at UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb.⁶⁹ At the time, in January 1994, it became apparent that sections of the US policy-making structures were troubled by the nature of the 'dual-key' arrangement. It was believed that the arrangement could give rise to tensions between the different commanders.⁷⁰

After the events in Goradze in April 1994, NATO and some policy-makers argued that the 'dual-key' arrangements in place was not running sufficiently smoothly. At an informal September 1994 meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in Seville, the US Secretary of Defense William Perry called for the Alliance to ensure that its air-power was used in a more timely and effective manner.⁷¹ NATO Defence Ministers were unhappy with the fact that NATO could only act upon request from UNPROFOR commanders, who had the authority to decide on the target. They were also critical of giving the warring parties a warning time. In contrast to this practice, they requested that there should be no prior warning and that they should be given at least four options from UNPROFOR commanders.⁷² To modify the current practice, NATO officials developed a proposal that involved agreeing in advance with the UN what actions counted as a violation and what sort of response

⁶⁸ Tardy, T. *La France et la gestion des conflits yougoslaves (1991 - 1995)*. Bruxelles: Établissements Émile Bruylant. 1999. page 241.

⁶⁹ Sloan, E. C. *Bosnia and the New Collective Security*. London, Westport Connecticut: Praeger. 1998.; page 32. His authority extended to both ordering a first air strike against Serb gun positions around Sarajevo and ordering close air support to protect UN troops; Chuck, S. 'Faster decisions are sought on Bosnia air strikes'. *New York Times*, 25 January 1994 page A8.

⁷⁰ United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Briefing on Bosnia and other current military operations: hearing before the committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, second session*. Washington: G.P.O. 23 February 1994. see the line of questioning pursued pages 17 - 25.

⁷¹ Schulte, G. L. 'Bringing Peace to Bosnia and change to the alliance.' *NATO Review*, March 1997, Vol 45 No. 2. page 28.

⁷² Clark, B. 'US ready for unilateral end to arms ban: White House move highlights differences in Bosnia policy' *Financial Times*, 20 October 1994.

would be proportionate, thereby reducing the say that UN commanders in the field would have over the launching of air strikes.⁷³

These modifications in procedures were presented by William Perry to Akashi and senior UNPROFOR commanders in a meeting in Split on 4th October.⁷⁴ After three hours of discussions, no agreement could be reached. A NATO team was also dispatched to New York to pursue the matter with the UN Secretariat. The discussions between the UN and NATO on these points and the nature of peacekeeping efforts produced no overall agreement.⁷⁵ French and British UNPROFOR officers at first resisted US pressure. Boutros-Ghali also made clear that a general imposition and stricter enforcement of exclusion zones around the safe areas would place UNPROFOR unambiguously on one side of a continuing conflict.⁷⁶

However, a meeting on 19 October between General Bertrand de Lapresle, the UN commander in former Yugoslavia, and senior NATO officials, a compromise emerged. It was decided that NATO air strikes were now to be conducted on a “timely basis” and “while general warning may be given to an offending party, tactical warning of impending air strikes, in principle will not.”⁷⁷ Then, on 29 October, the UN and NATO officially agreed on new procedures for air strikes. The new arrangement allowed NATO freedom in the selection of targets and removed the need for warning.⁷⁸

⁷³ Marshall, A. ‘NATO divided on use of Bosnia air strikes’ *Independent*, 7 October 1994.

⁷⁴ ‘UN and NATO split over use of air power against Bosnian Serbs’, *Financial Times*, 4 October 1994, page 2.

⁷⁵ Cohen, R. ‘Bosnian Serbs attack aid convoy: UN rejects NATO strike’ *New York Times*, 19 October 1994.

⁷⁶ United Nations. Resolution. S/1067, 17 September 1994, para 25; Cohen, R. ‘Sarajevo standoff: paralysis of big-power diplomacy’ *New York Times*, 7 September 1994, p A3.

⁷⁷ Wilson, G. ‘Arms in Arms after the Cold War? The Uneasy NATO-UN relationship.’ *International Peacekeeping*, Spring 1995, Vol 2 No. 1, 74-96. See also Schulte, Gregory L. Spring 1997 *op.cit.* page 28. Clark, B. ‘US ready for unilateral end to arms ban: White House move highlights differences in Bosnia policy’. *Financial Times*, 20 October 1994.

⁷⁸ Clark, B. ‘US asks UN to lift ban on Bosnia arms.’ *Financial Times*. 29 October 1994, page 2.

Domestic reactions to events in Goradze

During the events in Goradze, there was a differential response of national domestic actors in Britain, the United States and Germany to the use of NATO air strikes. As previously mentioned, the British Government only reluctantly agreed to use air strikes. Conservative backbenchers had to be persuaded that air strikes were appropriate. Thus, in Parliament the British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd pleaded for support of NATO air strikes by arguing that Britain had no diplomatic choice but to accept the US and French demands for such an action. Worried about the safety of British troops, some Conservative backbenchers urged once more for British withdrawal from Bosnia. In contrast, the opposition criticised the government stance as dovish. On 17 April 1994, Jack Cunningham, shadow Foreign Secretary, disapproved of the UN and NATO allies's policy during the events in Goradze and urged a renewal of air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs if they did not hold to a cease-fire.⁷⁹ The Liberal Democrats' defence spokesman, Menzies Campbell, also fiercely advocated an air strike policy.⁸⁰

In contrast to the British position, there were stronger similarities of views among US and German political parties towards events in Goradze.

The US Congress and Senate reacted by heavily criticising the Administration's policy toward the Balkans. Senator Dole described NATO's action in Goradze on the 10th and 11th of April as feeble and called not only for NATO to act on behalf of the Bosnian government but also for the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. In support of his position he quoted an article written in the *New York Times* by Jeane Kirkpatrick, former Ambassador to the United Nations during the Reagan administration, and by Morton Abramowitz, who held a number of senior positions in the State Department and was at the time President of the Carnegie Endowment. In addition he quoted a telegram from the executive committee of the Action Council for Peace in the Balkans - which included

⁷⁹ Bellamy, C. 'Serbs shoot down British jet as all-out conflict looms' *Independent on Sunday*, 17 April 1994, page 1.

⁸⁰ Wintour, P. 'Rifkind hits back at MPs who demand air strikes' *The Guardian*, 18 April 1994, page 10.

prominent figures like Zbigniew Brzezinski and called for extensive use of NATO air strikes and the end of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims.⁸¹ In a number of congressional interventions similar positions were voiced and the Bosnian Serb's strategy toward Goradze was regularly compared to the Nazi's policy of conquest of Eastern Europe. Some Congressional figures also called for a widening of NATO air strikes to include positions in Serbia.⁸²

German policy-makers' response to events in Goradze

In Germany, during April 1994, there was a remarkable rapprochement between the position of the SPD and the Government over the use of NATO air power in the former Yugoslavia. Responding to the events in Goradze, Kinkel argued that the deployment of NATO combat aircrafts on behalf of the UN had been "right, necessary and correct".⁸³ He argued that the Bosnian Serb attacks against the UN protection zones were a "provocation of the world community".⁸⁴ In a similar way, on the 13th April, during a visit to Washington, Scharping described NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs as necessary and legitimate.⁸⁵ On April 14th, during a parliamentary debate on Bosnia, the SPD supported a motion put forward by the government legitimising the use of air strikes.⁸⁶ Karsten Voigt, a SPD defence spokesman, speaking in a radio interview, stated that the threat of NATO ultimatum would not lead to more bloodshed but rather less.⁸⁷

⁸¹ Senator Dole 'Bosnia' *Congressional Record*, 20 April 1994, page S4493 to S4605.

⁸² See intervention by Bonior and Mrs Feinstein in *Congressional Record*, 20 April 1994, page H2399-H2562 and S4550 - 4551 respectively. During the Congressional Debate two articles from the *Washington Post*, 20 April 1994, were reprinted: Hoagland, J. 'Not-so-Great Powers' and Will, G.F. 'Wreckage of feeble intention'.

⁸³ "berechtigt, notwendig und richtig".

⁸⁴ 'Der Bundestag hält Luftangriffe der NATO für gerechtfertigt. Die SPD nähert sich Standpunkten der Regierung an / Debatte über Bosnien-Herzegowina' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15 April 1994.

⁸⁵ 'Scharping verspricht aussenpolitische Kontinuität'. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 13 April 1994, page 2; 'Unterstützung für Clintons Bosnien-Strategie und Rechtfertigung der Luftangriffe. Scharping: Wechsel in Bonn kein Wechsel der Aussenpolitik / Amerika als "starker Freund" / Kein Partner für "grünen Unsinn' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 April 1994.

⁸⁶ 'Der Bundestag hält Luftangriffe der NATO für gerechtfertigt. Die SPD nähert sich Standpunkten der Regierung an / Debatte über Bosnien-Herzegowina' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15 April 1994.

⁸⁷ 'Kinkel: Derzeit kein Grund für NATO-Schlag' *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 26 April 1994.

The Washington agreement and Western responses to the warring parties' military strategies in the summer and winter of 1994

The strong pro-interventionist lobbies present in the United States and Germany, allowed both governments to pursue more freely a common strategy towards the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This strategy consisted in persuading the Croats and Bosnian Muslims to form a military alliance. This policy had been formulated in Washington during the second half of March 1994. Throughout 1992 and 1993, Croat forces had been fighting the Muslims. The Croat forces were composed of both Bosnian Croats and members of the Croat army. Croatia had in fact territorial ambitions in both Serbian and Bosnian Muslims held territory. On the 3rd February 1994 the UN had given an ultimatum to Croatia to pull back its forces or face the consequences. In return for giving up his ambitions in Croatia, Tudjman was promised economic, political and military support from the United States and Germany. After some pressure, Tudjman signed up to a draft constitution binding Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats into a federation. The significance of the Washington Agreement was that it halted the fighting between the Croats and Muslims and it allowed the two armies to work together to launch attacks against the Bosnian Serbs.⁸⁸

Throughout the summer and autumn of 1994, Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces made military advances against the Bosnian Serbs. In June 1994, UN military commanders and Akashi had negotiated a cease-fire among all the three warring parties. On 26 June, the Bosnian Muslim government forces broke the cease-fire by seeking to take control over Bosnian Serb held territory in Central Bosnia, near Zenica and Tuzla. The aim was to open a road linking central Bosnia to the Adriatic coast.⁸⁹ Then, on August 21st, Bosnian Muslim troops launched an attack in the Bihac area against the troops of Fikret Abdic, a Bosnian Muslim who had won the election in Sarajevo but had fallen out from grace with Izebegovic during the war.

⁸⁸ Silber, L and Little, A. *op.cit.* page 354-353. On the significance of the agreement see also: Dodd, T. *War and peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia*. London: House of Commons Library. 1995.

During September and early October, Bosnian and Croat forces launched another offensive in the Bihac area against the Bosnian Serbs. At the same time the Bosnian Muslims attacked the Bosnian Serb held southern suburb of Ilidze in Sarajevo and made significant advances to recapture the strategic post of Mount Igman. Most significantly, on 28 October, the Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces achieved significant military victory in the Bihac area. The two armies pushed back Bosnian Serb forces capturing between 100 and 150 square kilometres. Serb forces fled leaving their equipment behind. The fighting created an exodus of civilians from the area.⁹⁰ Bosnian Serb forces also came under attack in the Kupres, west of Sarajevo.⁹¹

In early November the Bosnian Serbs counterattacked. They regained part of the territory they had previously lost to the Croats and Bosnia Muslim forces in the Bihac area. On the 18 and 19 November Krajina Serbs carried out two separate air attacks. One of these, launched from within the Serb-held area of Croatia, was aimed at civilian targets in the pocket of Bihac.

During the Croat and Bosnian Muslims military operations throughout June and October 1994, UN and NATO military officials reacted differently. The UN militaries were more willing than NATO officials to take action against the Bosnian Muslims. Thus, for example in June, UN military officials in Sarajevo mobilised tanks against the Bosnian Muslims.⁹² Similarly in September 1994, Gen. Sir Michael Rose called upon NATO to strike at Bosnian government forces. In contrast, NATO did not issue any warning to the Bosnian Muslims and NATO officials turned down Michael Rose's request for air strikes.⁹³ During this period, NATO used its air power on two occasions against the Bosnian Serbs: one on the 5 August, aimed at punishing the Bosnian Serbs for seizing five heavy weapons from

⁸⁹ *Keesing's Record of World Events*, section 40072. June 1994.

⁹⁰ 'Bosnian army drives out Serbs' *Financial Times*, 28 October 1994, page 3.

⁹¹ Clark, B. 'Balance in Bosnia shifts Moslems' way' *Financial Times*, 29 October 1994, page 2.

⁹² *Keesing's Record of World Events*, June 1994, section 40072.

⁹³ Clark, B. 'NATO diplomats impatient at UN caution in Bosnia' *Financial Times*, 22 September 1992, page 2.

a depot at Ilidza and the other on the 22 September, in response to an attack by Serb forces on a French UNPROFOR vehicle north of Sarajevo.⁹⁴

NATO air strike in Ubdina

The Bosnian Muslim and Croats' attacks in the Bihac area in late October 1994 and the Bosnian Serbs counterattack represented a serious military escalation. The Western Alliance was split on how to respond. US officials and Willy Claes, NATO Secretary-General, renewed their call for military action. On 18 November, Mr Willy Claes stated that the time had come "to act and give clear signals to the Serbs that this has to be stopped".⁹⁵ On 19 November 1994 the NAC approved the extension of Close Air Support to Croatia for the protection of UN forces in Croatia. Two days later on the 21 November, NATO launched air attacks against Serb airfields in the Serb-held area of Croatia and on the 23 November it renewed its air attacks against surface-to-air missiles on the Ubdina airstrip located in the UNPA Sector South in Croatia. The attack on the Ubdina airstrip involved the largest number of airplanes ever hitherto used in combat by the Western Alliance.

At the same time, the US Ambassador to NATO put forward plans for the creation of a protection zone around the town of Bihac. The plan involved NATO jets attacking heavy weapons in the area. The Europeans were sceptical of the strategy. French officials had a different plan in mind that reflected the European member states' view. It was a more modest plan in that it involved a four-mile extension of the existing 'safe area' in Bihac. NATO Ambassadors, who could not agree on the strategy to be pursued, decided to reject the US plans. Mr Willy Claes, the new NATO Secretary-General, was very disappointed at the outcome of the negotiations. In his view, the Western Allies "should have been able to push further".⁹⁶ US Republican Senator Dole, during a trip to Europe argued that "Nato's inability to respond to a war of aggression on south-eastern Europe raises serious

⁹⁴ Clark, B and Gray, B; 'British and US jets strike at Bosnian Serbs: NATO hits back after attacks on UN troops', *Financial Times*, 23 September 1994, page 1.

⁹⁵ Stephens, P; Graham, G. 'UK fears NATO split over Bosnia' *Financial Times*, 19 November 1994.

⁹⁶ Clark, B. 'UN and NATO in struggle over Bosnia.' *Financial Times*, 26 November 1994.

questions about Nato's future plans to expand to central and Eastern Europe,". In contrast Douglas Hurd struck a more cautious cord. He stated that peace in the Bihac area "will not be achieved by fostering illusions about what Nato air power can achieve".⁹⁷

The debate about the type of response required in face of the intensification of the fighting occurred at a delicate time in US-European relations. On 12 November 1994, the USA had taken the unilateral decision to end the maritime embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. The decision had been the result of pressure from Congress and the Senate.⁹⁸ The announcement sent shock waves through member states.⁹⁹ France argued that the lifting was sending the wrong signals to the Bosnian Muslims. It was an attempt to force the Europeans into a more active role in the conflict. As a French official put it, the Americans, who had not committed any of their own forces, "are willing to support the Bosnian government down to the last French or UK soldier". In the French official's view the US attitude was endangering the UN mission in Bosnia. Mr Francois Leotard, the French Defence Minister, threatened to withdraw French troops from Bosnia in the event of "one more step" in the wrong direction. Widespread rumours also circulated that the US military were involved in training Croats and Muslims forces, causing consternation among European allies. Both the German and UK governments played down the alleged reports and the warning of the lifting of the arms embargo. There was however a feeling that the decision was endangering the unity of the Western Alliance.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Silber, L; Tucker, E; Buchan, D; 'Pressure grows for Bihac truce: US aligns with Europe and Russia for settlement in former Yugoslavia' *Financial Times*, 29 November 1994.

⁹⁸ In June 1994, the House of Representatives had voted by a large margin (244-178) to require the Administration to lift the arms embargo unilaterally. This action was taken despite Clinton's warning that US action to lift the arms embargo would bring the peace process to an end. In order to prevent the bill becoming law, the Clinton Administration worked on a compromise. During August 1994, a new bill, personally supported by Clinton, was put forward. On the 17 August the House of Representatives voted, (280-137), in support of a bill that requested the US to withdraw all funds for US enforcement of the ban, if the negotiations failed November 15, 1994.

⁹⁹ Graham, G; Silber, L; Freeland, C. *Financial Times*, 12 November 1994.

¹⁰⁰ Clark, B and Freeland, C. 'New world order going badly wrong' *Financial Times*, 19 November 1994.

The aftermath of the Ubdina Strike and US lifting of the arms embargo at sea

The Bosnian Serbs reacted to NATO's attacks in Ubdina by taking UNPROFOR soldiers hostages. This caused Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary-General, to consider withdrawing UNPROFOR. Boutros-Ghali in fact openly admitted that UN could not continue its peacekeeping operations because its neutrality was at stake.¹⁰¹

After the reactions of the Serbs to the Ubdina events and the US unilateral lifting of the arms embargo, an intense process of negotiations led to a reassessment of the Western military strategy toward the region. Although diplomatic efforts were revamped, a significant change in military strategy occurred. At the EU Summit on the 10 December, EU member states worked on a three-point plan, which relied heavily on President Slobodan Milosevic putting pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the settlement.¹⁰² Most significantly, France and Britain reassured their allies that they would not withdraw their troops but rather they would transform their contingents into a combat force.¹⁰³ This position represented an important step towards realising, though not fulfilling in its entirety, US and NATO military officials' demands that the Western Alliance should be given the military capability to undertake a large military operation. In return for the French and British government's decision to give a new mandate to their military forces in Bosnia, the Clinton administration promised to send 10,000 to 12,000 US troops to provide cover for any future UNPROFOR pullout.

Thus, in December 1994 talks at NATO became focused on arranging for the last steps to prepare for large military operations in Bosnia. One scenario, discussed at

¹⁰¹ United Nations. *The Blue Helmets: a review of United Nations Peacekeeping*. New York: United Nations Publications. 1996, pages 533-534.

¹⁰² 'Britain and France firm on Bosnia' *Financial Times*, 10 December 1994.

¹⁰³ France and Britain's decision to collaborate in establishing a RRF to send to Bosnia was influenced by a wider bilateral rapprochement in the defence field. At the 18 November Anglo-French summit measures for co-operation in joint-air command, peace-keeping training and the development of a new frigate were agreed. see Marshall, A and Downden, R. 'Anglo-French Summit: Britain eyes new pact with Paris: Military ties and European defence will dominate today's agenda' *Financial Times*, 18 November 1994, page 12.

NATO in fact envisaged 29,600 ground troops and 4,000 airmen for combat roles alone, plus many thousands more in communications and logistics role. Mr William Perry, US Defense Secretary, also disclosed that the NATO operation would involve removing or destroying the Serbs' anti-aircraft batteries.¹⁰⁴ In order to test, the readiness of European allies to take part in such an operation, General Joulwan outlined "worst case" needs for a massive alliance force in a letter to member states. This involved at least seven to nine brigades of troops - representing 30,000 to 45,000 troops, including mechanised infantry, light armour, engineering battalions and at least three sophisticated communications battalions. Gen Joulwan's letter also called for three aircraft carriers along with up to 70 additional aircraft and both attack and reconnaissance helicopters if UN troops had to be removed in a hostile environment.¹⁰⁵ NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes made clear that NATO wanted to have full control over the operation, a request masked under the euphemism of 'unity of command'.¹⁰⁶

European Allies' response to NATO and US plans for sending ground troops into Bosnia-Herzegovina

Whilst the British government was in principle prepared to take part in NATO-led ground operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, French officials expressed some reservations. The French government wanted either UNPROFOR or the WEU to be in control of the operation. It objected to placing its troops under the command of SACEUR. The position taken by France was partly influenced by continuing negotiations about the CJTF. The French government was split on the issue. Among the French militaries there was a higher level of willingness than among politicians and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to work under a US-led command structure.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Clark, B. 'France and US raise the stakes in Bosnia' *Financial Times*, 16 December 1994.

¹⁰⁵ 'NATO sees big force for Bosnia pullout' *Financial Times*, 15 December 1994.

¹⁰⁶ Feldmeyer, K. 'Tornado-Anfrage bringt die Bundesregierung in Verlegenheit. Sorge angesichts der benötigten Mehrheit / Kohl spricht mit Claes.' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 December 1994.; 'Niemand will den Abzug, die NATO bereitet ihn vor. "Für alle Fälle" / Regierungen bekunden die Absicht, die Unprofor aus Bosnien nicht abzuziehen' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 10 December 1994.

¹⁰⁷ Points raised by Karl Heinz-Kamp during an interview at the Adenauer Stiftung in

Germany's response to the request of participation in NATO military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina

In Germany, the issue of participation in operations to support a potential UNPROFOR withdrawal was controversial. On 2nd December, SACEUR asked Germany to contribute with air forces to NATO planned operations in Bosnia.¹⁰⁸ The German government's response was shaped by domestic considerations over how to interpret the Federal Constitutional Court's decision of July 1994.

As discussed in a previous chapter, the German Federal Court was asked to decide on whether the German government had followed German constitutional law when it decided to participate in a NATO and WEU embargo in the Adriatic on March 1992 and July 1992. The court had to decide on the constitutionality of three other issues: first, German participation in the flight ban in support for UNSCR 871; second, whether to allow German soldiers to remain on board of the AWACS and finally whether the government had been right in its decision to support the NATO New Strategy Concept and the WEU Petersberg Declaration without seeking a revision of both treaties.

The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the government had acted in accordance with the constitution in deploying the Bundeswehr outside of NATO territory in UN mandated operations.¹⁰⁹ The government was permitted to deploy the Bundeswehr not only in UN military formations but also within regional institutions that were implementing UN mandates.

Bonn in June 1999 and during an interview with Paul Breuer at the CDU section of the Bundestag. June 1999.

¹⁰⁸ 'Kinkel schliesst den einsatz deutscher Flugzeuge in Bosnien nicht mehr aus: Eine Anfrage des NATO-Oberbeehlshabers Europa. Grosse Meinungsverschiedenheiten im Bündnis' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 2 December 1994; Crashaw, S. 'Bonn stalls on warplanes for Bosnia: German Defence Minister tell Steve Crashaw of his dilemma' *Independent* 8 December 1994, page 12.

¹⁰⁹ Mitgliedern des Bundesverfassungsgericht. *Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts im 88. Band der amtlichen Entscheidungssammlung*. Tübingen: J.C.B Mohr Paul Siebec. 1994, pages 344 - 345.

The German Federal Constitutional Court arrived at this conclusion by defining NATO and the WEU as institutions that belonged to a system of collective security. In their explanations the judges ruled that NATO was a collective security institution for a number of reasons: firstly, because it aimed at safeguarding freedom and preserving security; secondly, because members are obliged to resolve conflicts peacefully and thirdly, because in situations of crisis members are obliged to consult with each other.¹¹⁰ The court stated that the German Federal government was obliged to obtain approval from the Bundestag for each proposed military mission and that this agreement had to be obtained in principle prior to the deployment. A simple majority was required by the government to approve the operations. An exception was made in cases of emergencies. In such circumstances, the government would have the right to dispatch troops abroad on a temporary basis. However, it would have quickly to seek parliamentary approval and the troops would be subjected to recall if parliament did not approve the mission. The Federal Constitutional Court left it up to the legislative bodies to decide about the modalities of decision making.¹¹¹ On the issue of the revision of the NATO and WEU treaties, the four constitutional judges resolved not to support the SPD claim. In their view, the existing treaties covered the decisions taken by NATO and WEU over the future tasks of the organisations.¹¹²

One of the issues that the constitutional court did not clarify in its ruling related to government's behaviour in a situation in which there was the deployment of armed forces in an humanitarian situation for which there was no parliamentary approval. The government was confronted with the question: should parliament decide during the preparation for an eventual happening or should it decide when the deployment was ready?¹¹³

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* BVerfGe 90, page 349. In relation to the WEU no clarification was given. The decision to treat NATO and WEU as a "system of collective security" was strongly criticised by legal experts who argued that the decision must have been driven by political considerations. Since decisions by the UNSC can be vetoed by China and Russia, the qualification of NATO and WEU as systems of collective security allows a participation of the German army in their operations without a UN mandate.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* BVerfGe 90, page 388.

¹¹² *Ibid.* See BVerfGe 90, page 370.

¹¹³ The court decision left open a number of issues: firstly, it did not clarify whether Germany should be allowed to provide emergency help, without a UN mandate, to

The issue of participation in the withdrawal of UN troops was seen by certain sections of the German policy making structures as a test of the country's new willingness to participate in peace-enforcement operations outside the NATO treaty area. The Ministry of Defence, with the support of SACEUR, put the issue of participation on the agenda. The reaction of the German cabinet to the request for participation in NATO operations was at first cautious. Whilst R  he fully endorsed the proposal, Kinkel and Kohl were more reserved. Leading CDU foreign affairs and defence spokesmen were also divided on the issue.¹¹⁴ The SPD and the Greens complained that SACEUR and the German military were by-passing politicians by introducing proposals without the approval of the NAC.¹¹⁵ Kohl and Kinkel were very susceptible to such criticisms in that they wanted to obtain the broadest possible consensus on the issue. At the German cabinet meeting on 8th December, Kohl refused to reply to the request because it was not official. On the 13th December NATO legitimised SACEUR's request by sending an official proposal for participation. This time, in a television interview, Kohl hinted that he was willing to consider sending soldiers. However, since he wanted the widest possible parliamentary support for the decision, he thus embarked on high level consultations with the leader of the SPD and the Greens/B  ndniss.¹¹⁶ Kohl sought broad support because there remained substantial public opposition to military engagement abroad and he did not want to be seen as actively pushing the issue.¹¹⁷

countries which were neither members of NATO nor of the UN; secondly, it did not clarify if Germany could participate in emergency aid operations when, the operations was led by only one or a few NATO or WEU members, that is ad hoc operations.

114 'Bonn reagiert zur  ckhaltend auf die Anfrage der NATO. Die Angelegenheit "wird gepr  ft" / Keine Zeitvorgabe, keine Eile / Innenpolitische   berlegungen' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 December 1994.

115 'Die SPD zu Gespr  chen   ber einen deutschen Beitrag bereit. Bundestagsdebatte zum Bosnien-Konflikt / Kohl: Die Opposition wird nicht vor vollendete Tatsachen gestellt' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 December 1994.

116 'Die NATO fragt nach deutschen Bodentruppen f  r Bosnien. Vogel: Voranfrage f  r den Eventualfall / Bundessicherheitsrat noch nicht einberufen' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 December 1994.; 'Bundeswehr-Einsatz steht nicht auf der Tagesordnung'. R  ckzug der UN-Truppen aus Bosnien? / Regierungskoalition will Konsens herstellen' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*; 14 December 1994.

117 Interview with MP Paul Breuer on 24 June 1999, CDU/CSU parliamentary group, at the German parliament in Bonn.

Kohl's strategy was facilitated by the fact that by the end of 1994, it was apparent that the pro-interventionists within the SPD had gained the upper hand. After the decision at Karlsruhe the SPD found itself on the defensive on foreign security issues. Within the party, the foreign and defence policy experts started to call for an end to the limitations in the role of the Bundeswehr. Karsten Voigt, Hans-Ulrich Klose, Egon Bahr, Henning Voscherau and Ingrid Mattaus-Meier argued that the weakening of the UN and potential international isolation on the issue, required a change in attitude. Rudolf Scharping, the new party leader, made clear that he favoured a revision in the party's attitude toward the role of the Bundeswehr in 'out-of-area' operations. Lafontaine and Schröder, who had voiced opposition to NATO engagement in Bosnia, remained silent.¹¹⁸ Wiczorek-Zeul was the only MP to maintain a 'pacifist' stance.¹¹⁹

It is thus with no surprise that during the December's consultation, Scharping gave his support for German participation in the NATO-led operation. However, he warned the government that "it should not give the impression to be dancing at the military's tune".¹²⁰ On 21st December 1994, the German government, after having obtained SPD and Green's support for its stance, announced it was ready to participate in the withdrawal's operation.

¹¹⁸ The opposition of Lafontaine and Schröder to changes in the Bundeswehr were apparent at the 1993 Party Congress. During the meeting, Rudolf Scharping had proposed a new compromise with the government. The SPD would renounce the distinction between peace-keeping and peace-enforcement, in exchange the government would agree that parliament would decide on each type of operation. A two thirds majority on each type of operation would be required. Both Lafontaine and Schröder opposed the compromise, so did the party.

¹¹⁹ 'Bonn zur Entsendung von Tornados fuer Einsätze in Bosnien bereit. Zur Unterstützung von NATO und UN / Endgültige Entscheidung im Kabinett am Dienstag' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 December 1994.

¹²⁰ My own translation. Original in: 'Die SPD zu Gesprächen über einen deutschen Beitrag bereit. Bundestagsdebatte zum Bosnien-Konflikt / Kohl: Die Opposition wird nicht vor vollendete Tatsachen gestellt' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 December 1994.

Western Allies' responses to warring parties' military strategies in the spring and summer of 1995: 'Operation Deliberate Hope'

As the debates about the modalities of UNPROFOR withdrawal were underway, during the first few months of 1995, the Western Powers decided to give the Bosnian Serbs another chance to come to a mediated solution to the conflict. In January 1995, the former United States President Jimmy Carter negotiated a cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.¹²¹ On the 30 January a peace plan was put forward by the Zagreb Four (the UN, Russia, the European Union and the USA). Under the plan, known as the 'Draft agreement on the Krajina, Slavonia, Southern Baranja and Western Sirmium', the Serbs were required to cede half of the territory which they controlled in Croatia. In exchange they were to be granted extensive regional autonomy, including control over taxation, police, education, tourism and public services' policies. At the same time, the Contact Group proposed a partial suspension of sanctions against Serbia in exchange for the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia recognising that Krajina was part of Croatia. The diplomatic efforts failed to gain the support of Zagreb and the Bosnian Serbs living in Krajina who wanted UNPROFOR to remain in Krajina. The plan was also unsuccessful because Belgrade's politicians argued it could only consider recognition after sanctions had been lifted. Belgrade's officials also maintained that the constitutional relationship between Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia was to be regulated locally.¹²²

The renewed Croatian military offensive in Krajina

Following the failure of the diplomatic efforts there was an increase in the military operations of the warring parties. On the 1st and 2nd of May 1995 Croatia forces carried out a major military offensive against the Bosnian Serbs in the Krajina areas, fuelling the conflict throughout the region.

¹²¹ United Nations. 1996. *op.cit.*, page 537.

¹²² Watson, F, M. *Bosnia and Croatia: the conflict continues*. Research Paper 95/55. London: House of Commons Library. International Affairs and Defence Section. 1 May 1994. page 11.

The background to the Croatian offensive can be located in President Franjo Tudjman's decision in January 1995 not to permit the renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate beyond its expiry date of 31 March 1995.¹²³ It was obvious that Tudjman wanted to assimilate the United Nations Protectorate Areas (UNPAs) into Croatia. During an interview with the German weekly *Der Spiegel* in January 1995, Tudjman declared without any restraint that Croatia would retake the Serb-held territory, "if necessary by force".¹²⁴ In March, Tudjman held talks with US Vice-President Al Gore and agreed to permit the continued presence of a UN peacekeeping force but on radically revised terms. The UN peacekeeping force was to be reduced to 5,000 troops. Three tasks were assigned to the force: firstly, the control of Croatia's border with Bosnia and Yugoslavia; secondly, control the passage of aid through Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and thirdly the UN had to expedite the implementation of agreements between Croatia and the Croatian Serbs and the reintegration of Krajina.¹²⁵

On 1st May, a force of some 7,200 Croatia soldiers entered the UN cease-fire lines and drove deep into the Western Slavonia, part of the self-declared Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). Tanks, helicopters and rocket launchers backed them. The offensive began by Croatia bombing the main western Slovenian towns of Okucani and Pakrac and seeking to destroy a Serb-held bridge on the border with Bosnia. Shortly afterwards Croatia troops punched east into Serb territory along a highway from the Croatia-held town of Novska, 66 miles south-east of Zagreb. A second Croatian army column began to enter Serb territory on the opposite side of the Serb-held pocket, pushing west along the highway from Nova Gradiska. MiG-21 fighters also targeted the headquarters of Milan Babic, the Foreign Minister of the breakaway of RSK. Croatian troops also took three UN observation posts in the Medak pocket in the South.¹²⁶ The Western Slavonia Serbs were taken by surprise.

¹²³ *Ibid.* page 12.

¹²⁴ see *Der Spiegel* quoted in *Keesings World of Events, News Digest January 1995*, page 40371.

¹²⁵ *Keesing's Record of World Events: News Digest for March 1995*. March 1994. page 40465.

¹²⁶ 'Croatian jets, artillery pound rebel serbs' *Reuter Textline, Reuter News Service - Eastern Europe*, 2 May 1995; 'Croatian Army Launches Blitz Against Serbs' *The Washington Post*, 2 May 1994, 1 Volume 118, Issue 148. page 1.

By the 2nd of May, they admitted losing considerable territory. Thousands of Croatian Serb refugees and soldiers began to flee from advancing Croatian troops.¹²⁷

There were claims that Croatian forces fired on a convoy of refugees killing 500 people and 40 Serbs soldiers who were escorting the convoy.¹²⁸ On the 4th May, the Croatian Defence Minister stated that between 350 and 450 Serb soldiers and civilians had been killed, whilst the Yugoslavia media claimed that 1,000 Serbs had lost their lives. In response to the attack, on the 2nd of May the Krajina Serbs fired a missile into urban areas of Zagreb killing five people.¹²⁹ Bosnian and Croatian Serb leaders threatened to work together to retake lost territory unless the UN restored Serb control over the area and Croats returned to their original positions.¹³⁰

The UN responded to the offensive by mediating a cease-fire on 3rd May. The cease-fire guaranteed that Serb civilians and soldiers would be allowed to leave the Western Slovenia pocket under UN protection and seek safety in neighbouring Bosnia.¹³¹ Whilst negotiations were underway, Bosnian government forces launched attacks against the Bosnian Serbs in the eastern enclave of Goradze.¹³² Fighting also broke out in the Croat-held Orasje pocket in northern Bosnia

¹²⁷ 'Serb Civilians and Soldiers Flee Croat Army Offensive' *The Associated Press*; 2 May 1995.

¹²⁸ 'Serb Refugees Flee Croatian Offensive into Bosnia' *The Associated Press*, 3 May 1995. These claims were repeated on 5 May 1995 when an UN aid official Kris Janowski said 7,000 refugees from Western Slavonia had reported Croatian artillery and sniper fire against columns of fleeing people. Heinrich, M. 'Serb move civilians in fear of Croatian attack' *Reuter News Service - Eastern Europe.*, 6 May 1995. On the 8 May UN began investigations and UN officials stated that 100 refugees they interviewed gave "reliable and justified" accounts that the civilians were killed on purpose. A CBS News team also witnessed Croatian authorities, in all-white jump suits, spraying chlorine on an area that UN investigators were to examine. Pomfret, J. 'UN investigates killing of civilians in Croatia; Serb refugees were fleeing army attack.' *The Washington Post*, 8 May 1995, page 18, Vol 118, issue 154.

¹²⁹ *Keesing's Record of World Events: News Digest*. May 1995, page 40565.

¹³⁰ 'Krajina, Bosnian Serbs threaten counteroffensive' *Reuter Textline- Reuter News Service -Eastern Europe.*, 4 May 1995.

¹³¹ 'UN calls for end to fighting in Croatia, cease-fire in Bosnia' *The Associated Press.*, 3 May 1995.

¹³² McDowall, L. 'UN accuses Bosnian Government army of using UN troops as shields' *The Associated Press.*, 5 May 1995.

involving Croatian, Muslim and Serb forces.¹³³ The influx of Serb Krajina refugees and the widespread allegation of atrocities raised tension in northern Bosnia.¹³⁴ On 7 and 8 May, the Bosnian Serbs shelled Sarajevo and Tuzla killing 10 people.

Western Allies' responses

On the 3rd May NATO issued a statement calling for a halt to the renewed fighting in Bosnia and Croatia and warned it was still ready to use air power to support UN forces in former Yugoslavia. The UN agreed on a resolution calling for an immediate Bosnian Serb withdrawal from the region and requested that the government of Croatia fully respected the rights of the Serb population.¹³⁵

US, NATO and EU member states' response to the Croatian offensive was rather muted in comparison to similar large-scale offensives by the Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the previous two years of civil war. US government officials were concerned that the Croatian offensive would spark a wider war. Although officially, the United States urged both Croatia and Krajina Serbs to withdraw from Western Slovenia and restore the authority of the United Nations, a number of US analysts admitted that the Clinton administration quietly accepted the Croatian take-over.¹³⁶ Patrick Glynn of the American Enterprise Institute think tank stated that US policy was "to try to stabilise the status quo rather than achieve some kind of status quo ante". The US was not asking Croatia to surrender captured territory.¹³⁷ EU member states restricted themselves to discussing the suspension of talks on a co-operation agreement as a sign of displeasure at the Croatian army's

¹³³ 'Heavy fighting breaks out in Northern Bosnia' *Textline Reuter News Service - Eastern Europe.*, 5 May 1995.

¹³⁴ 'Ethnic tension rises in Northern Bosnia' *Reuter Textline - Reuter News Service - Eastern Europe.*, 6 May 1995.

¹³⁵ 'NATO Issues New Air Strike Warning On Bosnia, Croatia' *The Associated Press*, 3 May 1995.

¹³⁶ The Croat Foreign Affairs Minister Mate Granic declared to press that the US tacitly accepted Croatia's operations in Krajina. The statement was made to the Associated Press and was quoted in *Le Monde*, 12 August 1995.

¹³⁷ Wornsnip, P. 'US may let Croatia rest on gains' *Reuter News Service, USA.*, 3 May 1995.

attack.¹³⁸ During an investigation about alleged Croatian army atrocities against the Krajina Serbs - that were meant to have occurred after the cease-fire had been signed - Gunter Baron, a EU monitor, rejected the allegations and even praised the Croatian operations as “excellent, professional, competent and correct”.¹³⁹

Renewed transatlantic rift on how to respond to the fighting

Whilst NATO closed an eye at Croatia’s military offensive, the Bosnian Serbs attacks prompted General Rupert Smith, the newly appointed UN military commander who had replaced General Rose, to call for air strikes. Yasushi Akashi, the overall UN commander and French Gen. Bernard Janvier refused the request, although NATO jets were already in the air. As on several previous occasions, US officials castigated UN officials for their refusal. Madeleine Albright, US Ambassador to the United Nations, stated “ I have to say that I fail to understand the logic behind turning down such a request given the kinds of activities that have been taking place in and around Sarajevo”.¹⁴⁰ In Washington, a State Department official, Christine Shelly, insisted that NATO had a right to intervene and that the USA continued to believe that air strikes could be effective, despite the need to ensure the safety of UNPROFOR. She stressed that there was a UN and NATO agreement about the use of air power and that the USA wanted a tougher enforcement. “We’re not attempting to change the agreement, but consistent with statements we’ve made in the past we would like to see tougher enforcement of those agreements.” In a similar ways, Defense Secretary William Perry stated that “The shelling that took place in Sarajevo yesterday was a clear violation of that safe zone, and I believe that the NATO forces should have been called upon to provide an effective response to that”.¹⁴¹ A few days later, in a testimony to the Senate Foreign Subcommittee, Warren Christopher admitted that he had mounted a new

¹³⁸ Heinrich, M. ‘Serbs agree ceasefire after new Zagreb attack’ *Reuter News Service - Eastern Europe* , 3 May 1995.

¹³⁹ Heinrich, M. ‘Croats, EU deny mistreatment of Serbs.’ *Reuter Textline - Reuters News Service*, 5 May 1995.

¹⁴⁰ Latal, S. ‘Warring Sides Press UN in Croatia and Bosnia’ *The Associated Press*, 8 May 1995.

¹⁴¹ ‘US renews calls for air strikes on Serbs’ *Reuter Textline - Reuter News Service -USA.*, 9 May 1995.

effort to persuade the United Nations and US allies to retaliate against Bosnian Serb aggression in Bosnia.¹⁴²

British reaction to the renewed offensive

In Britain, Douglas Hurd reaffirmed his belief that NATO air strikes could only be of limited use. In contrast, Robin Cook, for the opposition, while acknowledging some of the limits of air power, criticised the UN for not calling upon NATO more often. He stated that “ I still take the view that the UN could have been more robust in the use of limited air power in response to local violations.”¹⁴³ In his view, the failure of the UN to approve General Smith’s request for air strikes undermined the UN authority in the world.¹⁴⁴

In contrast to the reservations expressed by Douglas Hurd, French and British military officials called for a change in the rules of engagement so that soldiers had the right to start shooting back if they were attacked. The desire to take a tougher stance on the part of the US government and British and French commanders in Bosnia-Herzegovina, led Boutros-Ghali to intensify his review of UNPROFOR operations. The UN Secretary-General, first held intense talks with the overall UN commander French Gen. Bernard Janvier¹⁴⁵ and General Smith on the nature of the operations. Then, on the 13 May, he announced that he was considering a total review of the peacekeeping operation.¹⁴⁶

The pressure put by US officials, French and British military commanders on the British and French governments paid off. On the 25th May, UNPROFOR officials called for NATO attacks after Serbs ignored a deadline to return four pieces of heavy weaponry to UN-monitored storage sites outside Sarajevo. A half-dozen

¹⁴² ‘Christopher pressing for NATO air strikes in Bosnia’ *Reuter Textline Reuter News Service - USA.*, 18 May 1995.

¹⁴³ House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debate*, 9 May 1995, Volume 259. Column 591.

¹⁴⁴ House of Commons. *Parliamentary Debate*, 9 May 1995, Volume 259. Column 592.

¹⁴⁵ The thought of General Janvier became known on the 24 May when he argued in front of the Security Council that the UNPROFOR should adopt a tougher approach and leave the enclave of Srebrenica, Zepa and Goradze. Tardy, T. *op.cit.* page 270.

¹⁴⁶ Drozdiak, W. ‘Total Review Of Peacekeeping Ordered By UN’ *The Washington*

NATO warplanes struck against two ammunition depots at Jahorinski Potok, near Pale. The chosen targets had a great political significance. The ammunition depots were in fact located about two kilometres from the headquarters of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.¹⁴⁷ In a change from past uses of NATO air power, the strike was directed at a fixed target as opposed to Serb armour, aircraft or mobile command posts. General Smith admitted that the target had been chosen because of its proximity to the Bosnian Serb headquarters. He stated "it was our decision that this target would send the kinds of signals that we wanted to send to the factions".¹⁴⁸

Bosnian Serbs's responses to NATO's attack in Pale

The Bosnian Serbs reacted to the NATO attack with a defiant barrage of shells against Tuzla and Sarajevo. In Tuzla a bomb struck at a cafe killing 20 to 30 people. Karadzic warned that the United Nations would be treated as "enemies" in case of further air strikes.¹⁴⁹ On the 26 May, NATO warplanes returned to the ammunition depot near Pale and fire about a dozen missiles. NATO officials said the air strikes were in retaliation for Bosnian Serb attacks. This time the Bosnian Serbs responded by taking UN peacekeepers as hostages. French, Ghanaian, Canadian, Czech, Russian and Polish UN peacekeepers were chained to a bridge in retaliation to NATO attacks. One soldier held hostage radioed his headquarters in Sarajevo with a message from the Serbs: "If the bombing starts again, we've been instructed to tell you we will die for the sake of NATO".¹⁵⁰

Post, 13 May 1995.

¹⁴⁷ Brank, J. 'NATO Strikes Threatened In Sarajevo; UN Officer Gives 2 Sides Until Today To Cease Fire' *The Washington Post*, 25 May 1995.; Dragic, Z. 'As NATO Missiles Land, Serb Shock Gives Way to Defiance' *The Associated Press*, 25 May 1995.;

¹⁴⁸ Diamond, J. 'US Officials Say Air Strike Sends Messages to Bosnian Serbs'. *The Associated Press*, 25 May 1995.;

¹⁴⁹ Stejepanovic, O. 'NATO Strikes at Serb Ammunition Dump' *The Associated Press*, 25 May 1995.

¹⁵⁰ Brand, J. and Mojsilovic, J. 'Serbs Take Hostages After Airstrike; UN Troops Held In Retaliation For 2nd NATO Bombing' *The Washington Post*, 27 May 1995.

French and British governments's responses to the seizure of UNPROFOR as hostages

The Bosnian Serbs' decision to take UN hostages led to a stiffening in French and British resolve to use military force in order to end the conflict. Thus, at an emergency NATO meeting on 27 May, France won support from its NATO allies for its call for a tougher UN force in Bosnia. France took the lead in calling for a change of policy partly because of the arrival in power at the Elysée of a Gaullist President: Jacques Chirac. In contrast to Mitterand, Chirac wanted French forces to make wider use of their military power in the conflict.¹⁵¹ At the same time, in London practical steps were taken to transform the UK contribution to UNPROFOR into a combat force. On the 28 May, after an emergency meeting between Prime Minister John Major, Senior Ministers and Defence Chiefs at Downing Street, it was announced that around 5,000 British troops were being sent immediately or being placed on standby for deployment. In addition, a composite unit - the 24 Air Mobile Brigade, which consisted of 4,000 men, artillery and helicopters - was being placed under orders for deployment in Bosnia after consultation with UNPROFOR.¹⁵² Parliament was recalled from holiday for an extraordinary session, an action that had not occurred since the Gulf war of 1991.¹⁵³ Three days later, on the 30 May, the Contact Group endorsed a French plan at an emergency meeting in The Hague. The plan envisaged that with the exception of all three safe areas in Eastern Bosnia - Goradze, Srebrenica, and Zepa - all isolated outposts would be abandoned.

At the same time, a delegation of British, French and Dutch military and civilian officials arrived in New York to outline a plan to provide military reinforcements for UNPROFOR. The plan aimed to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel and enhance its capacity to carry out its existing mandate.¹⁵⁴ According

¹⁵¹ Tardy. *op.cit.* page 268.

¹⁵² Peston, R. and Martin, H. 'UK poised to double troop levels in Bosnia: Emergency recall for parliament; Serbs capture 33 British soldiers' *Financial Times*, 29 May 1995, page 15.

¹⁵³ Ames, P. 'NATO backs French call for tougher UN force in Bosnia' *The Associated Press.*; 17 May 1995.

¹⁵⁴ see letter by the UN Secretary-General of 9 June 1995 and its annex UN Doc.

to their plan, a 12,500 troop, Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), armed with heavy weapons would be formed and placed at the disposal of UNPROFOR. The RRF's mission would include providing emergency responses to assist isolated or threatened United Nations units, helping the redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR and facilitating freedom of movement where necessary. Although officially, it was argued that the newly established force would act in support of UNPROFOR's existing mandate, and was to operate under the previously established rules of engagement, it was obvious that air-mobile units and field artillery were being sent to Bosnia to engage in combat operations, that is 'peace-enforcement operations'.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, the RRF were to come under the direct command of national governments, thus removing the UN civilians from the chain of command.¹⁵⁶

Despite the decision to transform UNPROFOR's operations, during the month of June, NATO and UNPROFOR did not engage in military operations in the region. It was only after a significant worsening of the fighting in July and August 1995 that NATO decided to launch its first ever large-scale air bombing campaign - Operation Deliberate Hope - and use the newly deployed RRFs.

Warring parties' military strategies in July-August 1995 and Operation Deliberate Hope

During July, all warring parties were engaged in military offensives in different parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Krajina. Between July 11 and July 22nd the Bosnian Serbs captured both the 'safe areas' of Srebrenica and Zepa.¹⁵⁷ At the same time, on July 19, the Krajina Serbs and forces loyal to Abdic launched an offensive against the Croatian army in the Bihac pocket. In order to launch a counteroffensive, on 22nd July Tudjman and Itzebegovic formed a new military

S/1995/470, 9 June 1995.

¹⁵⁵ 'Unprofitable Unprofor' *Economist*, 24 June 1994; United Nations Security Council *Resolution 998* (S/RES/998). New York: United Nations. 16 June 1995. available at: <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1995/>

¹⁵⁶ On the specific nature of the RRF to be deployed in support of UNPROFOR see Tardy. *op.cit.* pages 276 - 280.

¹⁵⁷ It has been alleged that during the taking of Srebrenica a vast amount of atrocities have committed by the Bosnian Serbs. The events are still under investigation at the time of writing.

pact. They signed the Split Declaration, which committed the Croatian government to assist militarily Bosnian forces in the Bihac pocket. By the end of July the combined forces of the Croatian army and Bosnian Croats had captured cities in Western Bosnia. At the same time the BiH army in central Bosnia and east of Bihac began to advance towards Banja Luka, the main Bosnian Serb stronghold in Western Bosnia. On 4th August an eight hours offensive by Croatia in Krajina resulted in the defeat of the Krajina Serbs and the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from the area. The Croatian army also attacked the North and South sectors and during the operation UN peacekeepers were fired at and used as human shields. The fighting led to an increase in tension in Sector East - Eastern Slovenia and provoked a mass exodus from the region. The operations meant that within days, Croatia had re-established control over the Krajina region and secured control over south-western Bosnia, thereby leaving the Bosnian Serbs in north-west Bosnia surrounded by hostile forces.

NATO, British, German and US responses to the July and August offensives

The escalation of the fighting led to the final steps to be taken at NATO headquarters in preparation for military intervention. During 21 and 25 July, NATO and UN commanders agreed that the UN should give the authority to NATO military commanders to call for air strikes without having to obtain in every instance UN officials' approval.¹⁵⁸ On 1st August NATO ambassadors agreed to broaden the scope for air strikes to protect Bihac and other UN safe areas in Bosnia against Bosnian Serb attacks. At the same time, British, French and American generals warned Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic that NATO and the UN would meet any further attacks on UN safe areas with "disproportionate" and "overwhelming" force.¹⁵⁹ At the same time UNPROFOR was withdrawn from Srebrenica. Through these measures, NATO was in a better position to respond to attacks by extensive use of force.

¹⁵⁸Dobb, T. 12 October 1995. *op.cit.* page 18.

¹⁵⁹ 'Turn of the Tide?' *Economist*, 5 August 1995, page 47

Operation Deliberate Hope

NATO's opportunity to strike soon arose. On 28 August a mortar shell hit a busy street in Sarajevo killing 37 people and injuring 88. The UN investigated the attack and argued that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible. Two days later NATO launched 'Operation Deliberate Hope'. The operation was characterised by three phases. In the first phase, from 28 August to 1st of September, NATO and RRF co-ordinated their action and undertook heavy bombing of 'targeted areas'. During its first day 60 aircraft flew 300 sorties and attacked Bosnian Serb anti-aircraft defences, missiles sites, radars and command centres. On the second day, approximately another 200 sorties were carried out and air strikes were this time aimed at factories, barracks, arms depots and heavy weapons sites. While NATO undertook the air strikes, on the ground the RRF mortars and artillery engaged the Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo. During the second phase, on 1st September both NATO actions were suspended to allow for a Bosnian Serbian Army (BSA) response to the NATO ultimatum for the withdrawal of Serb heavy weapons from the Sarajevo exclusion zone. Between 5 and 14 September a third phase began. NATO renewed its strikes against military targets in Sarajevo. Then, on 10 September NATO military commanders decided to allow a US warship in the Adriatic to fire 13 Tomahawk cruise missiles at Bosnian Serb targets in Banka Luka and in other parts of north-western Bosnia.¹⁶⁰ At the same time there was close co-ordination between NATO efforts and the launching of a Bosnian-Muslim and Croat military ground campaign against the Bosnian Serbs.¹⁶¹

During the third phase of NATO bombing raids, the Bosnian Serbs decided to give in to two of NATO's demands - to stop shelling the UN 'safe areas' and to open routes into Sarajevo. However, the Bosnian Serb commander still refused to give in to the third demand of withdrawing all heavy weapons from the exclusion zone.¹⁶² Hence NATO responded by launching a fresh round of air strikes, expanding its

¹⁶⁰ 'Serbs hit with cruise missiles.' *The Guardian*. 11 September 1995, page 1.

¹⁶¹ Although the US Secretary of Defence stated that it was a pure coincidence that NATO air strikes were taking place as the HVO/BiH were advancing, other commentators have argued that some co-ordination did take place. see *International Herald Tribune*, 2 October 1995.

target and discussing the prospect of bringing US F-117 stealth fighter-bombers into the equation.

NATO air strikes struck at the heart of the BSA military structure and damaged the telecommunications infrastructure upon which the BSA relied to co-ordinate its activities. This strategy facilitated the military efforts of the Croat-Muslim federation, with the assistance of Croatian army,¹⁶³ to capture Bosnian Serb held territory. In the week beginning 10th September, the Croat-Muslim federation troops in fact launched a joint offensive in north-western Bosnia. Within two weeks the combined force captured some 4,000 square kilometres of territory, connecting what had been an isolated enclave of Muslims around Bihac to the territory that had been taken the previous month by allied Croatian forces to the South. The BiH/HVO gained control of the key lines of communication in north western and central Bosnia and the BiH army seized the Teskavica Mountains to the east of Sarajevo.¹⁶⁴

On the 14 September NATO air campaign was suspended after the Bosnian Serbs military and political leaders committed themselves to withdraw their heavy weapons from the 20 km 'exclusion zone' around Sarajevo. One week later, NATO and United Nations announced in a joint statement that their demands had been met in full. During the three phases, a total 3,500 sorties were flown around Sarajevo, Goradze, Tuzla and Mostar.¹⁶⁵

Diplomatic efforts during Operation Deliberate Hope

Throughout the NATO bombing campaign, the Western Allies undertook intense diplomatic efforts. British, French and the US officials were extremely sensitive to

¹⁶² 'Ratko refuses to leave the sinking ship' *Economist*, 16 September 1995, p 57.

¹⁶³ The sweeping advances made by the HVO and the Bosnian government would not have been possible without the support of the Croatian army. As an observer commented, "In this offensive, I would say that the Croatian Army was contributing 75 per cent and the Bosnian Army the Rest". quoted *The Guardian* 16 September 1997.

¹⁶⁴ *The Independent*, 6 October 1995.

¹⁶⁵ Watson, F. M. and Dodd, T. *Bosnia and Croatia: the conflict continues*. London: House of Commons Library. 1995. page 9.

the military objectives of the air campaign. Although there had been an agreement to use NATO military power to shift the balance of power in former Yugoslavia, the three governments feared that the NATO campaign would result in an out-right victory for the Croat-Muslim federation. More specifically, there were three types of concerns: firstly that if the Muslim and Croats won too much territory, Serbia might come back into the equation. Malcom Rifkind in fact warned that Serbia might intervene on the side of its “allies and ethnic kin” if the air campaign continued much longer;¹⁶⁶ secondly, NATO officials were concerned that the Bosnian government would become overconfident and would withdraw its support for Holbrook’s peace plan;¹⁶⁷ and finally, there were fears that the conflict would spread beyond the Balkans borders. For these reasons, NATO stopped short in its military campaign. On the 8 September 1995, the Foreign Ministers of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia met in Geneva with the Contact Group Foreign Ministers. During the meeting, held under the chairmanship of Holbrook, they agreed to the Contact Group’s demands of giving the Muslim-Croat federation 51 per cent of Bosnia territory and the Bosnian Serbs 49 per cent would form the basis of negotiations. On 5th October 1995 the parties agreed to a countrywide cease-fire in Bosnia to take effect five days later and to be followed by comprehensive peace talks. On 21st November 1995 the Dayton Agreement was signed and a peace plan was agreed in Paris on 14th December 1995.¹⁶⁸

Operation Joint Endeavour: obtaining the final support

A central aspect of the Dayton agreement involved military matters. It was decided, with the approval of all parties, that a multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR) under the authority, direction and political control of NATO, would be dispatched to the region for approximately one year.¹⁶⁹ In addition, a three-stage

¹⁶⁶ Williams, D. ‘A new dawn for Sarajevo as Serbs meet UN demands’ *International Herald Tribune*, 21 September 1995, page 1.

¹⁶⁷ Atkinson, R. ‘NATO worries about the next target for Serbs’ Sarjevo guns’ *International Herald Tribune*, 19 September 1995, page 6.

¹⁶⁸ US Department of State. Fact Sheet released by Office Spokesman. IFOR: *The General Framework Agreement: Summary*, 30 November 1995. See Article 1, Annex IV: Constitution of Bosnian and Herzegovina.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.* see Article 1: General Obligations, section Annex 1 A: Military Aspects of the agreement;

plan for the withdrawal of forces was agreed.¹⁷⁰ The decision to implement IFOR, however, required approval from national governments and German and US officials had to put some efforts in persuading their domestic audiences of the viability of the operation.

The German debate about participating in IFOR

On the 28 November 1995, the German government put forward a parliamentary motion for the participation of German troops in the peace treaty for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The motion envisaged that Germany would participate in the following ways:

- strengthening of the medical contingent already present in Croatia;
- deployment of ground and air transport capacity and of engineers;
- deployment of transport force;
- deployment of TORNADO air planes;
- participation in maritime operation with ships;
- deployment of personnel for the management of troops in the headquarters;
- in total 4,000 German soldiers were envisaged for a period of two months.¹⁷¹

The SPD was in full agreement with the aims of the Dayton Agreement but objected to the deployment of combat troops, specifically Tornado planes.¹⁷² The SPD leadership sought a compromise. At the SPD Party Congress in Mannheim in November 1995, Scharping argued that the Tornado issue was not crucial because they would be deployed only after a cease-fire had been declared. In his view, what was essential, however, was that the party gave support to the humanitarian efforts of the Western allies. Lafontaine, who represented the left-wing of the party, while

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.* see Annex IV: Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina; see Article IV: Redeployment of Forces

¹⁷¹ Deutscher Bundestag. 13. Wahlperiode. *Drucksache 13/3122: Antrag der Bundesregierung. Deutsche Beteiligung an den militärischen Massnahmen zur Absicherung des Friedensvertrages für Bosnia-Herzegovina.*, 28 November 1995. Bonn: Bundestag.

¹⁷² see section d). Germany. Deutscher Bundestag. *Drucksache, Entschliessungsantrag der Fraktion der SPD: zur Abgabe einer Erklärung der Bundesregierung zur Friedensvereinbarung für Bosnien.* Wahlperiode 13/3135. Bonn: Bundestag.

reinstating his opposition to deployment of combat aircraft, agreed to support the government proposal on the condition that the Bundeswehr activities remained limited to 'peace-keeping' measures. Lafontaine also supported a paper put forward by Voigt in which it was argued that the party decision, taken in 1993, to limit its support to the German army's 'out-of-area' activities to participation in UN blue-helmets should be lifted.¹⁷³ Lafontaine's position represented a substantial shift among left-wing circles on security and defence policies.¹⁷⁴

Alliance 90/The Greens and PDS

Within the Alliance 90/Greens's ranks support for participation in the operation was also present. During the parliamentary debate in December 1995, 22 Green MPs voted in favour of the government bill, 22 voted against and 5 abstained. Those in favour of change in the party stance argued that confronted with ethnic and national conflicts the party had to support the efforts of the international community to safeguard a minimum level of human rights. They argued that German troops outside of NATO did not represent the militarisation of German politics, a position maintained by the non-interventionist wing of the party. In their views, Germany was not in the process of becoming a military power because any negative aspirations were checked by its membership in NATO and in the UN.¹⁷⁵ In contrast to the significant change in the SPD and Green's positions toward military intervention, the PDS stuck to its non-interventionist stance. Dr Gregor Gysi justified the party's position by arguing that the deployment had to be rejected for historical reasons. In his view, the supervision of the peace treaty was seen as a

¹⁷³ Bannas, G. 'Aufmacher. In Mannheim im Jubel und eine Unterschriftensammlung für Lafontaine. Schwere Parteitagezeiten für Scharping. Streit über die Bundeswehr in Bosnien von Guenter Bannas'. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 November 1995.; 'SPD will in Mannheim aussenpolitischen Streit vermeiden. Kongress für das kommende Jahr geplant. Frau Wiczorek-Zeul stimmt zu./ Beginn des Parteitags' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 November 1995.

¹⁷⁴ The shift in the SPD left-wing was confirmed during the parliamentary debate. A significant section of them supported the government 'Die SPD in der Bosnien-Frage gespalten. Minderheit spricht von einem Verrats-Beschluss/Inhaltliche und grundsätzliche Bedenken.' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 December 1995.

¹⁷⁵ Wagner, R. 'Das Prinzip von Aktion und Reaktion. Die Grünen debattieren über Militäreinsätze.' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26 September 1995.; For an outline of the position that the party should accept the use of military force in the development of a European security system. see Sager, Krista. 'Grüne Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik'

task best carried out by the UN. Overall, he believed that the deployment of the Bundeswehr in the framework of IFOR was a step towards Germany taking part in combat operations abroad and a militarisation of German foreign policy.¹⁷⁶

United States domestic debate

In the USA there was substantial opposition to the deployment of US soldiers in the Balkans. Among the most prominent opponents of sending troops to Bosnia were Pat Buchanan and the Republicans. Buchanan argued that Bosnia was not worth the lives of US soldiers and gave the examples of Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia to prove that US peacekeeping had a tendency to end in a quagmire and to cost US lives. Most Republican Congressmen opposed to the plan believed that peace on the longer term could only be achieved if the Muslims were trained and armed to defend themselves. Others argued that the use of NATO's sanctions and air power, coupled with the lifting of the arms embargo and the training of the Muslims was sufficient to maintain the peace. At a House of Representative hearing, Duke Cunningham, a California Republican, expressed the feeling of a large number of Congressmen when he described the plan as a foolhardy.¹⁷⁷ More specific criticisms of the plan were directed to the number of troops involved, the mission's goals and ways of making factions comply with the peace, the mission's duration and the lack of an exit strategy.¹⁷⁸

In order to support the US soldiers' participation in IFOR, Bill Clinton made clear in early October 1995 that he was prepared to use his presidential power. To counteract the arguments of its opponents and to win public support for sending US

Internationale Politik., August 1996, Vol.51, No.8, pages 43-48.

¹⁷⁶ Deutscher Bundestag., *Drucksache/ 3127: Antrag der Gruppe der PDS: Kein Einsatz der Bundeswehr im frühen Jugoslawien. Wahlperiode 13.* 28 November 1995. The PDS motion was discussed at a sitting of the Foreign Affairs and Defence committees. In all the committees the motion was rejected with the FDP, CDU/CSU and SPD voting against it and with the Bündniss 90/Die Grünen abstaining. see Deutscher Bundestag. *Wahlperiode 13, Drucksache 3193: Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Auswärtigen Ausschusses (3. Ausschuss).* 4 December 1995.

¹⁷⁷ Adams, J. 'US Bosnia peacekeepers plan attacked in Congress' *Reuters*, 18 October 1995. For other views see Safire, W. 10 October 1995. 'Don't send occupation forces in Bosnia' *International Herald Tribune*.

¹⁷⁸ Worsnip, P. 'US officials press Congress to back Bosnia force'. *Reuters*, 30 November 1995.

troops to the Balkans, the White House masterminded a publicity campaign involving radio and television broadcasts, newspapers interviews, congressional hearings and private meetings between Clinton and key Congressmen. At the same time, it worked towards obtaining the support from leading Conservative members in order to achieve a compromise in Congress. Senators Dole, Biden and Lugar had been key campaigners for US intervention in Bosnia. They were supportive of the US maintaining a leading role in international relations and in NATO but they were opposed to the deployment of US soldiers in the Balkans. Clinton and other members of the NSC understood that if they were to manage to get Senators Dole, Biden or Lugar to support their plans of sending US troops in Bosnia, they could win over important sections of Congress and the public. In order to obtain the backing of these "leading opinion makers"¹⁷⁹, Clinton and his advisers initially argued that to withhold US ground troops meant the end of NATO and the loss of American prestige in the world.

Thus, for example, on an NBC television programme William Perry argued that "were the United States to step back and say 'No, we will not participate, having brought it this far', this would really lead to an unravelling of NATO."¹⁸⁰ Similarly, Clinton, while speaking on the issue of US participation in NATO-led peacekeeping in Bosnia, argued that "if we fail to secure this peace our success around the world we will be weakened".¹⁸¹ Another key argument stressed by Clinton during his radio message for Thanksgiving on 25 November, and during his televised speech three days later, was that if the United States was not part of NATO, there would be no NATO force. As a consequence, the conflict in the region would restart and spread to other parts of Europe. As he put it:

"If we're not there, NATO will not be there. The peace will collapse. The war will re-ignite. The slaughter of innocents will begin again. A conflict that already has claimed so many victims could spread like poison, will eat

¹⁷⁹ For the significance of the role of Robert J. Dole see Broder, David S. 'Awaiting Dole's stand on Bosnia'. *International Herald Tribune*, 5 December 1995.

¹⁸⁰ Wolf, J. 'NATO won't hold without US in Bosnia - Perry' *Reuters*, 22 October 1995.

¹⁸¹ Mcquillan, L. 'Clinton sees danger if US not in Bosnia force', *Reuters*. 26 October 1995.

away at Europe's stability and erode our partnership with our European allies."¹⁸²

A strong moral duty to intervene was also present in Clinton's Thanksgiving speech. He argued that "violence done to civilians does violence to the principles on which America stands ... our conscience demands we act".¹⁸³ At the same time, an attempt was made to undermine some of the more specific criticisms made by opponents. Clinton reassured the public that US troops would be under an American general, that the mission was clear and that US forces would be able to defend themselves.¹⁸⁴ Anthony Lake sought to deal with the negative parallels of Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia by emphasising that lessons had been learnt from those experiences and that, in contrast to previous peacekeeping missions, in Bosnia there was a peace agreement and factions had consented to NATO troop deployment.¹⁸⁵

The orchestrated campaign did not appear to make much difference to opinion polls, which remained against involvement. More important was the public support that the Clinton Administration obtained from prominent conservative figures and the compromise orchestrated in the Senate with Dole's help. During early December, former President George Bush and former President Ford urged Congress to support Clinton's Bosnia plan. Colin Powell and Henry Kissinger also conveyed their support to the White House.¹⁸⁶ Dole decided to support the implementation of the military provision of the Dayton agreement because he believed that Congress should not undermine the authority of the President on issue of troops' engagement abroad, as Congress had done during the Gulf war. Such a step undermined the authority of the President and since he had the Presidency in mind, he did not want to set a negative precedent. Nevertheless, Dole outlined three

¹⁸² Holland, S. 'Clinton tell Americans US must lead on Bosnia' *Reuters*, 28 November 1995.; Also see Kenen, J. 'Clinton urges support for US troops in Bosnia' in *Reuters*, 25 November 1995.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ Kenen, J. *ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ Schmitt, E. 'Pentagon believes it can avoid errors of earlier debacles' *International Herald Tribune*, 28 November 1995.

¹⁸⁶ Schork, K. 'Clinton gets key backing for Bosnia mission'. *Reuters*, 6 December 1995.

conditions for his support. These conditions were expressed in a motion put forward by himself and Senator McCain. The motion called for the tasks of IFOR to be limited to the implementation of the military provision of the accord and called for an IFOR exit strategy to be linked to a military balance of power, which would leave Bosnians able to defend themselves. Thus, it requested the USA to lead the effort to give Bosnia the means to defend itself.¹⁸⁷ The latter aim was to be achieved through the arming and training of Bosnian Muslims. The Clinton Administration agreed to these conditions and on 14 December 1995 the Senate voted favourably by 69 to 30 votes.¹⁸⁸

IFOR

Having obtained the support of the German and US legislative bodies, NATO had gained the necessary level of troops for IFOR. NATO international staff also finalised, during intense diplomatic negotiations in the months of November and December, the participation of PfP member states and Russia in the operation. To respond to Russian concerns, it was decided that the Russian contingent would be directly subordinated to Col. General Leontij Shevtsov, as General Joulwan's Russian Deputy. In the theatre, the Russian brigade would be placed under the tactical control of the US-led Multinational Division (North).¹⁸⁹ The French government also agreed to a number of steps that represented a turning point in its rapprochement with the alliance. It decided to put its troops under SACEUR command and to participate fully in the NATO's Military Committee. At the same time, in December, Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette announced that France would participate fully in NATO's Military Committee.¹⁹⁰ The scenario for the deployment of NATO ground troops in Bosnia was ready. On December 16th,

¹⁸⁷ 'Excerpts from Senate debate on sending US troops to Bosnia' in *New York Times*, 14 December 1995.

¹⁸⁸ Adams, J. 'Congress backs Clinton's Bosnia troop deployment'. *Reuters*, 14 December 1995.

¹⁸⁹ NATO. Information Service. *Press Release M-DPC/NPG*. February 1995.

¹⁹⁰ Hervé de Charette, speech delivered to the North Atlantic Council, 5 December 1995. For a review of France's relationship with NATO see Grant, R. P. 'France's new relationship with NATO'. In M. E. Brenner (Ed.), *NATO and Collective Security* London, New York: Macmillan Press and St. Martin's Press. 1998. pages 53 - 76.

NATO's role in the implementation of the peace agreement began as operation 'Joint Endeavour'.¹⁹¹

¹⁹¹ The operation involved the transfer of most of UNPROFOR functions to the NATO led IFOR force. The transfer took officially place on the 20th December. IFOR assumed the following tasks: ensuring continued compliance with the cease-fire; ensuring the withdrawal of forces from the agreed cease-fire zone of separation, back to their perspective territories, and to ensure the separation of forces; ensuring the collection of heavy weapons into cantonment sites and barracks and the demobilisation of remaining forces; creating conditions for the safe, orderly and speedy withdrawal of UN forces that have not transferred to the NATO-led IFOR'. See NATO. *Fact sheet No. 11: NATO's role in the Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement*. Brussels: NATO.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that from its first air strikes during February and April 1994 to Operation Deliberate Hope in September 1995, NATO came to be used as a 'peace enforcement' tool in the hands of Western policy-makers. This change was partly the result of the existence of a policy-community involving US officials and NATO international staff who wanted, partly for different reasons, to transform the role of the organisation in the Balkans. Evidence of the influence of the 'policy community' can be found in their readiness to call for air strikes and in the role that they played during the negotiations for reshaping the 'dual-key' arrangement that defined the UN and NATO relationship. US and NATO officials in fact wanted the Western Alliance to have wider powers to define the nature of the military responses.

Throughout the period under discussion, NATO had less restraint than the UN to take sides in the conflict. The organisation was in fact used to alter the balance of military forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This new trend became apparent in the selective use of air strikes during the summer and autumn of 1994. It was also evident during the Western response to the Croats military offensive and Bosnian Serbs counterattacks and retaliations in May and August 1995. Although during these events not only the Bosnian Serbs, but also the Bosnian Muslims and Croats violated a number of cease-fires and engaged in large scale military attacks and atrocities, NATO was only called upon to strike against the Bosnian Serbs. Most significantly, it was evident that during Operation Deliberate Hope there was close co-ordination between the NATO air campaign and the military advances made by Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces. This could not have been coincidental. There were in fact widespread rumours that US military commanders were working closely with the Bosnian and the Croat militaries.

The policy community in existence had the strong support of sections of the German government. Although throughout 1994 and 1995, German policy-makers appeared not to be the leading actors shaping Western policy towards the Balkans and never consistently advocated the wide-scale use of NATO air power, they played a crucial role in fostering the Bosnian Muslim and Croat military alliance in

the Spring of 1994. It was this new alliance that facilitated Bosnian Muslim and Croat advances during the second part of 1994 and the first part of 1995. In comparison to the British political scene, German policy makers had also a number of domestic political factors that influenced their attitudes towards the use of military force in the former Yugoslavia. In April 1994 the German Federal Court had ruled in favour of the German government's policy of participation in NATO's air sanctions activities in the Balkans. At the same time, there was a shift in the SPD and Green's ranks towards favouring the use of NATO air power in the Balkans - a remarkable event in the post-war history of the two parties. Faced with this favourable situation, the German government supported NATO's plan for large-scale military intervention in the region partly in order to remove the remaining domestic taboos regarding ground troop deployment abroad.

The transformation of NATO during the period under discussion was however only partly the product of the ambitions of US and NATO officials. Although these actors put forward concrete proposals to allow NATO to engage in large-scale military operations in the Balkans and at moments of crises urged their allies to use NATO military muscle, there was also an element of chaotic response to events. British and French policy makers went along with some of the proposals put forward by US and NATO officials because of their spontaneous reaction to the deterioration of the military situation on the ground. Once NATO was unleashed, even if in a limited way its air power, it fuelled a large-scale reprisal by the Bosnian Serbs against both civilians and UNPROFOR. This in turn triggered the French and British governments to take a harsher military stance to seek to protect both the civilian population and their own soldiers. It could thus be argued that France and Britain partly agreed to change the UNPROFOR mandate because of this 'spiral of violence' in the winter of 1994 and the Spring of 1995.

The combination of elements of pressure and spontaneous reaction to events is best expressed in the changes in the British position. In the early part of 1994, Britain sought to contain some of the US and NATO officials' demands for an extensive use of air power. British government officials believed that air power alone could not make a difference on the ground, it would only jeopardise the humanitarian

operations undertaken by UNPROFOR and thus endanger its own troops. Despite this view, when the British government was faced with the issue of safety of their soldiers in November 1994, their attitude changed. In addition, when the US Congress decided to lift the arms embargo and the subsequent renewed row in transatlantic relations, Douglas Hurd and Malcom Rifkind moved their position closer to the pro-interventionists, that is NATO international military staff and British commanders stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The desire to safeguard the 'special relationship' and maintain alliance solidarity thus played a role in British policy toward the use of force in the Balkans. It should be stressed that the British change in late autumn 1994 was also partly driven by the fear that the US lifting of the arms embargo and the Croat and Bosnian Muslims' military advances were refuelling a large-scale military conflict.

The change in the British and French positions in late 1994, was also the outcome of the continuing planning for peace-enforcement operations undertaken by NATO structures. Throughout 1994 and 1995, progress towards the realisation of CJTF and the working out of NATO's enlargement policy had been slow. Most of the Alliance's efforts were in fact focused towards planning a large-scale military operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Among government circles in Paris and London, there was a belief that it was vital to shape the planning of the military operations in the region because it was by so doing that NATO was testing its capability to transform its command and control structures. The French government was painfully aware of this process and this is why in December 1994 it insisted that a WEU commander should be in charge of NATO's peacekeeping efforts in the region.

Chapter 6: Explaining the evolution of NATO's 'out-of-area' role: an assessment of competing approaches.

The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the theoretical explanations advanced by IR theorists to account for the development of NATO's 'out-of-area' role. To achieve this, the research questions were driven by a synthesis of approaches around the assumption of the existence of a 'policy community' defined as "a group of social actors located in government or (semi)-private organisations at a national or international level. Policy communities are characterised by a system of horizontal and vertical relationships. Members share similar belief systems and, although they might have separate national or institutional interests, they seek to pursue common policy aims in a specific policy area."¹ In this concluding section, I will discuss the findings of the research in light of the hypotheses derived from the approaches discussed in the first chapter, that is neorealism, security communities, neoinstitutionalism, organisational theory, transgovernmental relations and epistemic communities.

Neorealism

The hypothesis derived from the neorealist approach states that NATO went 'out-of-area' because of the threat that the conflict in Yugoslavia posed to European security. The threat could be conceived as a military attack on an alliance member state or as a 'spill over' effect. There are two types of 'spill-over' effects; one consisting of the fighting spreading into NATO member states and the other that of a large number of refugees moving into neighbouring states and causing internal instability. Evidence for this hypothesis would be based on finding a consensus among the Western Allies about the nature of the 'threat' during either the initial decision to deploy NATO in the Balkans (1991-1992) or during subsequent developments (mid 1992 to 1995).

¹ This definition was developed in the first chapter by synthesising some of the assumptions derived from the transgovernmental relations, policy networks and epistemic communities approaches.

Throughout 1991 and 1992 the fear of a direct attack on alliance member states did not exist to all intents and purposes. Politicians and officials involved in defining NATO policies never referred to it in their official statements. In contrast, the potential of a 'spill over' effect was mentioned by some policy-makers. The conflict did provoke a significant refugee crisis. By the autumn of 1992 there was 2.7 million refugees and displaced persons.² Yet, the movement of refugees was towards the constituent republics of the former Yugoslavia and did not result in large number of people crossing over into neighbouring countries. In fact, there was not an exponential increase in the number of people seeking refugee status in alliance member states during mid 1991 and 1992.³ Moreover, there was no agreement among NATO member states as to the 'danger' that the conflict posed for European security. Whilst France and Germany, countries without borders with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), called as early as September 1991 for an interposition force, other alliance member states had a different opinion. As explained in Chapter two, for the Bush administration and the British government, the dispute between the Yugoslav republics had the characteristics of a civil war and the conflict could be resolved by supporting the unity of Yugoslavia without the use of military means. For German policy makers, in contrast, the developments in Yugoslavia were perceived as the attempt by a communist regime to impose its will on democratic states and active support was given to the aims of the Slovenian and Croatian separatists.

It is interesting to note that the NATO member states that would have been most affected by a potential 'spill-over' of the conflict, Greece and Italy, were throughout 1991 and 1992 not the leading countries which supported NATO's military involvement in the Balkans. Both the Italian and Greek governments were

² UN sources quoted in Amer, R; Heldt, B; Landgren, S 'Major armed conflicts' in *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*, pages 81 – 118, see page 92.

³ Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés. *Les réfugiés dans le Monde: 1993*. UNHCR: Paris et Editions La découverte. Page 151-152. Also see UNHCR web site. Table 8: 'Origin of major refugee populations and Others of concern to UNHCR by country of asylum and assistance of status as at 31 December 1993 and December 1994'. at <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/refbib/refstat/1995/table08.htm>. However, by 1998 Germany was the NATO member states with the largest number of refugees from the FRY. see 'Table VI.8 Recognition of asylum-seekers under the 1951 Convention and those granted humanitarian status by origin, Europe, 1989-1998' in UNHCR. *Statistics* at UNHCR's web

in fact extremely reluctant to support the demands to give Croatia and Slovenia independence. The Greek government believed that its security needs could best be served by maintaining good diplomatic relations with Serbia and was against NATO involvement in the region.⁴ Similarly, the Italian government believed that the best way to contain any 'spill-over' effect was to maintain Yugoslavia as a united country and did not call a NATO role in the region. After it modified its position on the recognition issue in December 1991, most of leading Italian politicians were caught in a corruption scandal, the *Tangentoli*. Italian foreign policy was therefore inward looking.⁵

The problem with the neorealist approach in explaining the initial decision of NATO to intervene 'out-of-area' is that it neglects to take into account the interaction between the events in the former Yugoslavia and three key factors. First, there was the existence of a 'policy community' that wanted NATO to assume an 'out-of-area' role. Secondly, the bargaining process that was underway between NATO and WEU/EU was a relevant factor and finally the support that the Slovenian and Croatian independence movements found among German political parties, the German Catholic Church, the international liberal media and within the lower ranks of the State Department was of significance. These three factors, rather than the 'fear of threat', explain better the July 1992 decision to allow NATO to go 'out-of-area'.

An alternative explanation to the 'theory of threat'

As shown in Chapters two and three, the outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis occurred at a time when the nature of the new European security order was in flux. The collapse of the Berlin wall gave rise to a debate about the future tasks of the

site: http://www.unhcr.ch/statist/98oview/tab6_8.htm.

⁴ Valinakis, Y. 'Greek security policy in the perspective of the CFSP' in Heinz-Jürgen Axt (Ed.) *Greece and the European Union: Stranger among Partners?*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 1997.

⁵ The position of Italy has been discussed in Chapter 2 and 3. Also see: Missiroli, A. 'Italy' in Manners, I and Whitman, R. G. (Eds). *The Foreign policies of EU member states*. Manchester University Press, 2000. Greco, E. 'Italy, the Yugoslav crisis and the Osimo Agreements' *The International Spectator*, Volume XXIX, No. 1, January-March 1994, pages 13 – 31.

Alliance. Within the legislatures of all member states, there was a desire for a peace dividend and for a reform of the NATO alliance so that it would assume more of a political rather than a military role. There was however a group of policy-makers who wanted to enhance the role of the alliance. These policy makers included sections of NATO staff and leading figures in the British and US governments, who constituted a 'policy community'.

In the period from 1990 to mid 1991, this 'policy community' played a vital role in placing the 'out-of-area' issue on the agenda in domestic fora and within NATO working groups. Its influence can be seen in the strategy pursued by the Military Committee (MC) during internal discussions to develop a new force structure. It was the MC which, by addressing the issue of creating a 'buffer zone' left by the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Central and Eastern Europe, raised concrete proposals for transforming NATO command and control structures so that NATO could deal with 'out-of-area' threats in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East.

The ideas put forward by the MC were synchronised with proposals developed by two working groups located in the US Defense and State Departments: one led by General Colin Powell and the other by Under Secretary of State Paul D. Wolfowitz. From late 1989, these working groups had been at the vanguard in analysing the new security environment and devising plans for new force structures. The working groups led by Powell and Wolfowitz predicted the need to redirect US national military strategy to meet regional threats. The strategy involved substantial reductions in military forces but Commanders in Chief at first rejected the proposals. However during the domestic debate that followed, senior Senate figures supported the radical restructuring proposals. This agreement helps to explain why, as early as the summer of 1990, US President George Bush announced a new defence strategy.⁶ In Britain, the 'policy community' had the support of Margaret Thatcher. At the Turberry NAC meeting on 7th June 1990, Thatcher in fact openly called upon NATO member states to agree to give the alliance an 'out-of-area' role.

At first the ideas of the 'policy community' found little support among other

⁶ See Chapter 2.

NATO member states. But the outbreak of the Gulf war and the decision to agree to Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm created opportunities for the 'policy community' to advance its vision within NATO and national policy making structures. The MC, SACEUR, the British and US defence ministries used the example of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to argue that the development of 'out-of-area' capabilities was essential to deal with new types of regional threats. More importantly, during the Gulf war, NATO international military staff and the US and British militaries tested their own command and control capabilities to launch large-scale land and air based operations. The success of the anti-Iraq coalition fostered a desire to build on the level of co-operation achieved. The lessons from the Gulf war were incorporated within the new defence plans, which were being drafted in the Pentagon, Whitehall and at NATO headquarters.

Hence, in June 1991, the 'policy community' took the lead in the discussions about the transformation of the alliance. It proposed and obtained NAC agreement for the establishment of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (AARC). The development of the AARC was presented as a technical issue. In reality it was a proposal with a strong political content in that implicit within it was the idea that 'out-of-area' risks should become central to NATO strategy and policy direction.⁷ Thus prior to the outbreak of the Yugoslav conflict, there were plans for giving NATO an 'out-of-area' role, which were being considered at the highest possible levels.

However the strategy of the 'policy community' alienated other NATO member states that were seeking to forge a new European security structure. Both Germany and France saw in the establishment of the AARC a reaffirmation of the traditional Anglo-American special relationship with a leadership role in NATO structures. Partly for these reasons, France and Germany sought to enhance the EC role in defence by arguing that the EC should develop a European defence identity by integrating in its treaty some of the functions undertaken by the WEU. In addition, when the Yugoslav conflict erupted, French and German policy makers read in the US low profile in mediating in the conflict, the signal to take the lead, thus

⁷ As explained in chapter 1, through the establishment of the AARC, NATO began to obtain the military capabilities to undertake peacekeeping/peace-enforcement operations.

demonstrating that the 'hour of Europe' had arrived.

The findings reveal that when the Yugoslav conflict started, the perceptions that Western policy makers developed towards it were shaped by these intra-institutional discussions. The French and German governments' announcement that they were to set up the Eurocorps and send a WEU peacekeeping force to Yugoslavia fuelled fears in Washington and among NATO international staff that EC member states were undermining the alliance. If the WEU would intervene in the region, it would create a de facto new role for itself in European crisis management. European member states would use the frameworks of the WEU and EC to discuss defence issues and this was perceived as undermining cohesiveness within the NAC.

NATO decided to intervene in the conflict in July 1992, not so much because of the 'threat' that the conflict posed but because the actions of EC policy makers and the intensification of the conflict in Yugoslavia brought into existence a new coalition. Sections of NATO international military staff and civilians situated in the NATO Political Division, who had for long argued for the alliance to develop an 'out-of-area' role, found supporters amongst the US State Department, Congressmen and the liberal media. These actors, partly influenced by the activities of pro-Croatian and pro-Bosnian lobbying groups, wanted US leadership in the Balkans. At the same time NATO staff and US policy makers obtained the support of the Canadian and Dutch governments. From December 1991 to July 1992, the Canadian and Dutch governments in fact worked towards giving the WEU and NATO a legal mandate for assuming peacekeeping tasks.

Stated differently, the July 1992 NAC decision to allow NATO to intervene in former Yugoslavia was not the result of an objective 'external threat' that could seriously challenge militarily its member states. The conflict in Yugoslavia assumed a new dimension in the eyes of European and US policy makers because the calls for the WEU to intervene in the region indirectly put into question the sphere of competence of NATO. The perception that the Yugoslav conflict represented a new 'external threat' for European security was mainly the product of

the mediation of conflicting interests within the Western Alliance itself.

Assuming that the 'fear of threat' did not play a key role in the initial decision, do the findings of this research support the idea that the 'fear of threat' did play a role once NATO had become involved in the Balkans? Some evidence has been found for the assumption that from the winter of 1992 onwards, the Allies were concerned that the conflict would spill over into Macedonia. During 1994 and early 1995, after Croatia had attacked the Krajina areas, the Allies feared that Serbia would respond by launching a counterattack against Croatia. This fear contributed to an intensification of both the Allies' diplomatic efforts and use of the threat of NATO military power to resolve the conflict. At the same time, some commentators have argued that German politicians were concerned that large number of refugees from FRY who were seeking asylum would create an internal security problem.

However, these developments cannot substantiate the argument that NATO intervened to prevent these 'spill overs' for two reasons. Firstly, it was decided that the UN and not NATO had to assume a conflict prevention role in Macedonia.⁸

Secondly, it is not clear why the Allies did not consider Croatia's attack against the Krajina Serbs to be as dangerous for the stability of the region as a potential Serbian military counter-attack on neighbouring Croatia, since the former was a potential trigger for the latter. At the time, German government officials or leading politicians did not mention the concern for the activities of the refugees to be the key factor that shaped their attitudes towards the Balkans.

If the 'fear of threat' was not to borders of the alliance, what about the potential 'threat' to the moral values of the alliance? In a number of official statements, leading Western policy makers, including Bill Clinton, have argued that the conflict in the region represented not so much a military but rather a 'moral threat' to Western societies. By allowing atrocities committed against civilians in the Balkans to go unpunished, NATO member states were condoning them. From this perspective NATO had to intervene, otherwise its legitimacy would be undermined.

⁸ UN Security Council 795, 11 December 1992 authorised the deployment of a force in the FROM as part of UNPROFOR.

It should be noted that this argument does not have strong theoretical foundations. Although it has some similarities with those approaches that emphasise the role of ideological factors, it retains a 'populist' character. What gave the argument its influence, is the fact that it relies on the notion that there was a qualitative new aspect to the Yugoslav conflict that had been missing from previous conflicts. In fact, the regional conflict has often been analysed by some leading sections of the international media using the analogy of the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime against the Jews. The argument is that there was a plan on the part of the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian government to cleanse the region of Muslims. This strategy was based not only on regional ambitions but also on an ideological belief of superiority over the Muslims.⁹

There is no doubt that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible for a great number of atrocities during the conflict but they were far from being the only ones to do so. However, the comparison of their strategies with those of the Nazi relativises the Holocaust in that it assumes that every atrocity - large or small - is an act of genocide. This implies that the crimes committed by the Nazi regime against the Jews were ordinary.¹⁰ Nevertheless the comparison created a new ideological framework through which Western opinion makers and some officials, evaluated Western involvement in the region. At its kernel, the argument equated diplomatic efforts to resolve the Yugoslav conflict with the 'appeasement' strategy of the Western Allies during the inter-war period. By so doing it elevated the use of force on the part of an international security organisation to a new realm: it endowed the use of military force with a capacity to resolve all types of injustices without an analysis of the specific circumstances under which Western forces are deployed.¹¹

⁹ see analysis in Chapter four. Because of the divergent opinion among the Allies as to the use of military means to resolve the conflict in former Yugoslavia, the international media's reporting of the conflict played a significant role in shaping Western strategy toward the Balkans. see Freedman, L. 'Reflection on the Kosovo war' *Review of International Studies*, Vol 26. Nr 3, July 2000. p 335 - 358. p 339; Carruthers, S. L. *The media at war*. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 2000.

¹⁰ 'Editorial comment: Situation in Bosnia isn't like holocaust'. *The New York Times*, 19 August 1992, page 20. Füredi, F. 'Cleansing the Holocaust' *LM*, issue 48, October 1992.

¹¹ It should be noted that the displacement of large number of civilians, the raping of women, the rounding up of people and the practice of torture have all been features of many wars throughout the post-war period. There is the danger that to endow the Yugoslav conflict with a unique feature of brutality, helps to relativise not only the Holocaust but

Leaving aside the lack of theoretical underpinning of the argument, one needs to explain why is it that the conflict in Yugoslavia was perceived as undermining the values of the alliance whilst other conflicts, internal to the alliance itself, such as the conflict between the Kurdish minority and the Turkish government, which was occurring at the same time as the conflict in FRY, did not cause the same reaction.¹² The argument of a 'moral threat' also fails to explain the reasons why during 1993 and the early part of 1994 there were divergent views among the Allies as to the significance of the conflict for NATO's legitimacy and survival.

'Security communities'

Do the 'security community' assumptions that the existence of common 'norms' and values help us understand why NATO survived and assumed 'out-of-area' tasks? As explained in the first chapter, Charles A Kupchan, Ole Waever, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, in their recent re-interpretation of Karl Deutsch's work, argue that there is a 'security community' encompassing EU and NATO member states. Members within the 'security community' have a common sense of feeling, trust and mutually successful prediction of behaviour. Kupchan states that the existence of this 'security community' helps to explain why NATO member states have agreed to maintain the organisation. Adler and Barnett also believe that the states, which are part of the 'security community', develop a pacific disposition. From this perspective, NATO assumed an 'out-of-area' role because the values and norms held by policy makers had more of an influence on the policy-making process than other factors, such as national considerations, institutionally based interests and ad hoc reactions to events.

It is true that the Allies are committed to a common view of the nature of the

also the errors committed by Western powers during the decolonisation process in Asia and Africa.

¹² During 1993 and 1994 more than 3500 villages were destroyed by the Turkish forces. Yet, with the NAC, the morality issue was not raised and the displacement of the population was never considered by the Western media as one of 'ethnic cleansing'. Chomsky, N. *Le nouvel humanisme militaire*. Cahiers libres. Editions page deux. Lausanne. 1999. pages 89 - 91.

international order based on democratic values and the maintenance of peace. However, in their day-to-day work Western policy-makers have to translate general principals into policy oriented ideas. In so doing, they are influenced not only by norms but also by other factors such as concerns about their electorate; the position of the opposition and the media, and the advice from other allies. In addition, during 1990 and 1993, there was simultaneously a new set of international political circumstances and an erosion of the ideological framework that had shaped Cold War thinking. Rather than NATO's strategy being shaped by common norms and values, there was confusion as to the best policies to be pursued. NATO member states had difficulties in agreeing on how the conflict in the former Yugoslavia should be resolved, for example whether NATO or the UN should assume control over the military operations and the nature of the diplomatic efforts. There were also marked differences of opinion between the NATO military authorities and the NATO political leadership as to the nature of the organisations' emerging 'peacekeeping' doctrine.

Although in early 1995, NATO member states settled some of their differences, the 'security community' did not exhibit a pacific tendency in that NATO came to rely on an extensive use of military means - as demonstrated by Operation Deliberate Force - to end the conflict in the Balkans. The United States also became involved in supporting, partly publicly and partly secretly, the aims of the Bosnian Muslims, thus abandoning any principle of neutrality that had previously shaped the UN approach to internal conflicts. In addition, although with the deployment of IFOR in the winter of 1995 NATO appeared to have confirmed its leading role in European security, the pattern of intra-institutional competition between itself and the EC/WEU was abated but not removed.¹³ It could thus be argued that the 'security community' approach downplays the differences of opinion that existed among the Western Allies and their impact on the conflict. By privileging norms and ideas, it also fails to take into account the role of intra-institutional competitive

¹³ This could be seen in the subsequent debate about the future of CJTF and during the Kosovo crisis. Stanley, R. S. *The United States and European Defence*. Chaillot Papers 39. Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union: Paris. April 2000. Howorth, Jolyon. "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative" *Survival*, Vol 42, No 2, Summer 2000, pages 33 - 35.

dynamics and domestic considerations.

Neoinstitutionalism

Neoinstitutionalists believe that international organisations are important characteristics of the international system. From their perspective NATO can be analysed and considered as an international organisation. Writers within this school of thought advance three propositions to explain why an international organisation might survive. First, states might perceive that the costs of ending a regime outweigh the start-up costs of creating a new one; they might also fear that if a regime ends, it is very difficult to create a new one. Secondly, an institution's past success might create a momentum for the organisation and this might be particularly useful at a time of external change. Thirdly there are organisational interests at play, that is individuals working for NATO, fearing for their jobs, want to preserve and modernise the alliance. Since this last proposition is very similar to an assumption present in organisational theory, it will be analysed later.¹⁴

From the first proposition, it could be predicted that if the Allies held the view that it was prohibitively expensive to build alternative organisations to allow their national forces to assume 'out-of-area' tasks, then the neoinstitutionalists's argument would be supported. The second proposition would be sustained if evidence were to be found that the Allies were surprised by developments in European security and preferred to hold on to what they knew rather than change radically existing institutional settings.

There are no publicly available documents that can help us examine the extent to which the Allies made their institutional choice based on an analysis of the comparative costs of building 'out-of-area' capabilities under either the WEU, NATO, the CSCE or a new pan-European organisation. Nevertheless, some arguments can be advanced. It is true that NATO had stronger military capabilities than other European security organisations such as the WEU and the CSCE. The comparative advantage of NATO over other security organisations however lies mainly in traditional article 5 operations, that is the defence of allies' territory.

Between 1990 and 1992, the alliance did not have the military and operational capacities to engage in large scale operations outside its borders. Most of the NATO troops were in fact organised to meet a threat from the Soviet Union. Apart from the USA and Britain, NATO member states did not have communication and intelligence capabilities, mobile logistics, transport assets or the training required to undertake 'out-of-area' operations. Taking into account that NATO does not have its own standing force but rather functions by having national troops earmarked for its operations, the main advantage that NATO had over the WEU was the military capacity that the USA had to project power overseas, the possession of the AWACs and the existence of the integrated military structure. Whichever institutional setting was chosen, European NATO members had to spend a substantial amount of money in developing the military capabilities to undertake 'out-of-area' operations.¹⁵

The fact that in July 1992 both the WEU and NATO decided to intervene in the FRY demonstrate that at the time the Allies had not made their final institutional choice. Some countries were keen to give the WEU the military capabilities for 'out-of-area' operations. They were not concerned about the costs for so doing. The CSCE was perceived more as legitimising the peacekeeping operations of the WEU and NATO. During subsequent developments, it became clear that the definition of the peacekeeping doctrine advanced by the NATO militaries and the CJTFs concept were to involve substantial increases in national defence budgets. In fact, although it has often been stated that the CJTFs was created to prevent a duplication of resources, the reality is that the majority of European NATO member states had to restructure their military forces and find the required equipment - such as air and sealift transport capabilities - for CJTFs type of operations. The acquisition of these capabilities was not cheap.

The findings have revealed that the main reasons why by 1995 NATO took the lead in managing 'out-of-area' operations was not because European member states

¹⁴ For additional details, see the section on neoinstitutionalism in Chapter 1.

¹⁵ Kugler, R. L. *U.S. - West European Cooperation in out-of-area military operations: problems and prospects*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. 1994. see chapters five and six, page 79 - 135.

believed that it was cheaper to develop 'out-of-area' capabilities within the Alliance, rather than within the WEU or the CSCE. To anticipate an alternative explanation presented below, during 1993 and 1995 NATO came to assume the leading role in planning and conducting 'out-of-area' operations because of the strategy of the 'policy community' in managing a series of bargaining processes. There was also the impact of organisational dynamics and ad hoc reactions to events on the attitudes of the warring parties and those countries who had been reluctant to support NATO's extensive use of its air power.

The findings give some support to the proposition advanced by neoinstitutionalists concerning the role of an alliance's past success and the impact of uncertainty. During 1990 some NATO member states were taken aback by events. This was particularly the case in Whitehall and Westminster, where politicians greeted the dramatic events of the winter of 1989 with a sense of malaise about the future. The Allies were eager to maintain the political framework provided by NATO in order to prevent a renationalisation of defence policies. Thus, for example, even those political forces with a strong pacifist tendency, such as the German Green Party, wished to maintain, even if for a short transitional period, the political functions of the alliance. Moreover, notwithstanding the French government's traditional criticism of the US role in the Alliance, French officials praised NATO's political function of maintaining stability during a process of transition.

However, the institutionalists's hypotheses of the impact of past successes and sense of uncertainty can only explain some aspects of the events for the first nine months of 1990. The assumption cannot account for subsequent developments. As previously described, from 1991 onwards more complex domestic and international dynamics came to shape the strategies of the Allies toward the transformation of NATO.

Organisation theory

Organisation theory offers a complex set of explanations as to why organisations survive and change. Robert B McCalla, a scholar belonging to this school of thought, put forward a number of assumptions as to why NATO survived. He

argues that the consensus for maintaining the alliance was due to a desire to safeguard jobs and that the staff working for NATO had a material interest in the survival of the organisation. These propositions are similar to those advanced by some neoinstitutionalists as previously mentioned. The second assumption, to be found in the work of Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell is that of normative isomorphism. They maintain that the growth and elaboration of professional networks that span organisations facilitate the diffusion of similar modes of thinking and practice. Their hypothesis is that “the greater the extent of professionalisation in a field, the greater the amount of institutional isomorphic change”.¹⁶

From the first proposition, it could be argued that evidence in its support would be found if the allies proposed to develop ‘out-of-area’ tasks to preserve jobs either domestically or within NATO. In other words, the evidence will consist of finding that there were some material benefits that the creation of new ‘out-of-area’ tasks brought to either the military-industrial complex in NATO member states or to the NATO international staff. The prediction from the concept of ‘normative isomorphism’ is that there were ‘professional networks’ spanning across member states that influenced the NATO debate. This prediction is similar to that derived from the ‘epistemic communities’ approach and it will be evaluated later.

It should be stressed that when the Allies made choices about the NATO’s military posture, they were influencing the level and nature of military spending in member states. The workings of the integrated military structure - in particular the NATO defence planning cycle- and the formulation of the Strategic Concept shape the allocation of national resources dedicated to defence. By defining the guidelines for production and modification of military equipment and forces, NATO influences a number of domestic policies: the posture of national military forces; the nature of some of contracts that national governments allocate to defence companies and the type of research and development undertaken in high tech industries. However, not

¹⁶DiMaggio, P.J.and Powell, W.M ‘The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality’ in P.J. DiMaggio and W. M. Powell. *The new institutionalists in organisational analysis*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 1991, pages 63 to 82, especially 66 and 67.

all NATO member states have similar defence budgets and the size of the military-industrial complex varies across NATO member states. The defence sector is more important for the economies of Britain and the United States than for the others. Britain and the United States in fact devote a higher percentage of their GDP to defence than other NATO member states¹⁷ and have a leading position as producers of military equipment.¹⁸

The support given by the Bush administration and the British government to the idea of developing NATO's 'out-of-area' capabilities in the early part of 1990s can partly be explained as a desire to safeguard jobs. As explained in Chapter 2, the regional strategy advanced by Bush in August 1990 was developed partly to allow the United States to maintain a leading overseas presence and to modernise its military-industrial base. Britain also supported the creation of the AARC partly in order to prevent the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) from being dissolved, thus safeguarding jobs for the military. The creation of the AARC, requiring the creation of new mobile units, also created new orders for the defence industries. However, for the Defence Ministries of other NATO member states the main concern was not so much the preservation of jobs but rather the modernisation of national military capabilities. It should however be stressed that these economic considerations were *not* the most significant factors that can explain the position that the Allies had toward the 'out-of-area' issue.

To what extent did concerns about jobs influence the decision to develop CJTF and PFP? As previously stated the development of CJTF implied an increase in defence spending. The development of NATO's enlargement strategy was also to involve considerable costs for member states.¹⁹ For these reasons, some commentators have suggested that NATO's enlargement and 'out-of-area' policies have not only given the military-industrial complex more resources but it has also created the

¹⁷The International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance 1995-1996*. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies and Brassey's. 1996, page 264.

¹⁸The International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance 1996-1997*. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies and Brassey's. 1996. pages 273 - 275

¹⁹The estimated costs of NATO enlargement vary widely from US\$ 1.5 billion to US \$125 billion over periods of 10 to 15 years. Hartley, K and Sandler, T. 'NATO Burden-Sharing:

opportunity for leading arms exporting countries such as the USA to win new contracts abroad. As an example, it has been argued that to modernise Polish military forces, the Polish government would have to buy 100 to 150 new fighter planes, meaning contracts worth some two to six billion dollars for Lockheed or Boeing.²⁰

The findings presented in this research are inconclusive on this issue. Although it has been demonstrated that NATO military authorities and US military were at the vanguard in developing the CJTF and PfP concepts, it is unclear to what extent they promoted this view in order to help the military-industrial complex or to preserve jobs. To analyse this type of assumption would have required a study of how the military-industrial complex in different member states viewed the NATO negotiations during 1990 - 1995. In addition, an analysis of the lobbying strategies of the defence industries would have been required. Insufficient resources were available to undertake this type of primary research.

Another reason why it has been difficult to find evidence for or against McCalla's assumptions lies in the fact that this research has analysed the enlargement issue only in so far as it related to the development of NATO's 'peacekeeping' and 'peace-enforcement' role in FRY. NATO's enlargement policy only developed after NATO had assumed tasks in the Balkans. The final decision about NATO's enlargement policy was not taken until April 1999. Although no conclusive statements can be made, it is clear that economic factors per se cannot account for the decision to develop CJTF and PfP.

past and future. *Peace Research*, 1999, Vol. 36, no. 6. pages 665 - 680. page 670.

²⁰ Johnstone, D. 'Deception and self-deception: the mixed motives behind NATO's war against Yugoslavia' *Review of International Affairs*, April-June 2000, Vol. LI No. 1091-93. pages 10 - 14.

Transgovernmental relations

Keohane and Nye in their writings of the early 1970s advanced the argument that policy-making within international organisations was characterised most of the time by an alliance between sections of the international bureaucracy and sub-sections of national bureaucracies.²¹ To account for this phenomenon, they developed the notion of transgovernmental relations. They defined transgovernmental relations as existing when sub-units of governments behave in relatively autonomy from any higher authority in politics.²² They identified two types of transgovernmental relations. One defined as transgovernmental policy co-ordination, the other as transgovernmental coalitions building. The former occurs when there is a high level of exchange of information and frequent meetings among sub-units. This creates a sense of collegiality and individuals might start to think more in relation to the transnational group than purely in national terms. The existence of a regularised pattern of co-ordination leads to the formation of transgovernmental elite network linking officials in various governments to one another by ties of common interest, professional orientation and personal friendship. In contrast, transgovernmental coalitions occur when sub-units of government build coalitions with similar agencies from other governments against elements of their own administrative structures.²³

The assumption of transgovernmental relations predicts that NATO's decisions to assume 'out-of-area' tasks were shaped by the existence of a transgovernmental elite network. This means that there were strong commonalities of views and ties amongst, for example, members of British, German and US defence establishments. Members of this network acted in a manner that transcended national considerations and did not have the direct support of higher political authorities. In contrast the assumption of transgovernmental coalitions predicts that there were in existence a number of coalitions amongst sub-units of governments and similar agencies from other governments. The members of the coalition acted

²¹Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S. 'Transgovernmental relations and international organizations', *World Politics*, 1974, vol. 28, No. 1, pages 38 - 62.

²²*Ibid.* page 43.

²³ See discussion of transgovernmental coalition in Chapter 1.

against elements their own national administrative structures. A number of coalitions can be predicted upon this principle. For example, sections of the British Ministry of Defence could have allied with the German Defence Ministry against the Foreign Commonwealth Office.

Before examining the findings against these predictions, it should be noted that the hypothesis of the role and existence of the 'policy communities' is partly based on the assumptions contained in the transgovernmental relations approach in that it looks for similarities of attitudes and strategies amongst actors located within the international staff and at a national level. The assumption of the 'policy community' differs from that of 'transgovernmental coalitions' in that it stresses the role of belief systems. It also emphasises that policy-making might be influenced by non-governmental actors, such as interests groups and the media. The relations amongst the social actors can be based on both horizontal and vertical relationships.

Transgovernmental policy co-ordination

The findings have revealed that there was a 'policy community' in operation. The principal protagonists of this policy community were sections of NATO international staff and the military authorities. They obtained support for their views amongst sub-sections of national governments. Between 1990 to mid 1991, the defence establishments of Britain, Germany and the United States advocated similar positions to those of NATO international staff and NATO military authorities. However, the nature of the 'policy community' identified does not correspond to the definition of 'transgovernmental elite networks' in that the activities did not take place outside the control of the executive. As previously mentioned, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US President George Bush actively supported those who argued for the development of 'out-of-area' capabilities.

As will be explained in more detail below, during 1993 and 1995, there was a 'policy community' consisting of sections of NATO international staff, NATO

military authorities and both US and German politicians. As in the former case, this 'policy community' cannot be characterised as a transgovernmental elite network because it had the active support of high level politicians within both the Clinton administration and the Kohl government.

Transgovernmental coalitions

In the early 1990s, a transgovernmental coalition appeared to have been in place involving the Defence Ministries of Britain, Germany and the United States against the Finance Departments of each of the three member states. This tension stemmed from the fact that there was pressure to slash defence spending and the ministries of defence were seeking to prevent far-reaching cuts from being introduced. During 1990 and 1991, in Germany the division amongst the different departments was accentuated by another factor. Since the German Ministry of Defence was under the control of officials from the ranks of the CDU/CSU, whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was under the leadership of officials from the FDP, there was substantial disagreement on defence issues. However, the transgovernmental coalition only managed to influence the process because it not only had the support of the British and US executive but also because it had an ally in sections of NATO international staff. The 'policy community' also strengthened its position by mid 1992 by obtaining the support of lower sections of the State Department.

For the period from 1993 to 1995, no evidence has been found for the existence of transgovernmental coalitions in that the Ministries of Defence of Britain, USA and Germany did not act against other units of governments. In all the three countries, the strategies and views held by the Defence Ministries were more or less in line with those held by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs.

Epistemic communities

'Epistemic communities' have been defined by Peter M Haas as a "network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and

an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area".²⁴ 'Epistemic communities' can be distinguished from other policy makers and groups of professionals by the fact that they have three characteristics in common: they have a set of principled and causal beliefs, share notions of validity and share options of policy enterprise.²⁵ 'Epistemic communities' can be mobilised and can exert significant influence on the policy-making process particularly during the stage of 'policy selection' and 'policy diffusion'. From this school of thought, the prediction can be made that if there were a group of professionals who held similar set of principled and causal beliefs, along with shared notions of validity towards the NATO's 'out-of-area' issue, and that they sought to shape the NATO's decision-making process, then the 'epistemic community' assumption would be sustained.

Sketching the relationship between 'epistemic communities' and 'policy-communities'

The findings of this analysis do give some support to the hypothesis of 'epistemic communities'. The 'policy community' identified during the period of 1990-1992 had some of the characteristics of an 'epistemic community' in that amongst its members were NATO international staff and NATO military authorities. Although between 1993 and 1995 the 'policy community' reconstituted itself, NATO international staff and NATO military authorities remained members of it. As predicted by Peter M. Haas and by the hypothesis of the 'policy community', the actors identified sought to influence the emergence of new policies and to diffuse them. Below I will describe the nature of the reconstitution of the 'policy community' and the type of influence that it exercised. In conclusion, the differences between the assumptions of 'epistemic communities' and 'policy communities' will be discussed.

²⁴ Haas, P. 'Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy-co-ordination.' *International Organization*, Winter 1992, Vol 46, No. 1, pages 1 - 35.

²⁵ *Ibid.* pages 17 - 19.

Reconstitution of the 'policy community' and its influence

From 1993 to 1995, the 'policy community' transformed itself. With the advent of the Clinton administration and after a shift in the German politicians' attitude to the use of military means had begun to emerge, the NATO international military staff and NATO military authorities found new influential allies for their perspectives. The Clinton administration brought into power a new group of politicians and advisers who were less influenced by the politics of the Cold War when examining regional conflicts. In fact, among Clinton's close circles of advisers there were those who viewed the Yugoslav quagmire through the prism of civil and human rights, (a position influenced by many Democratic politicians' previous participation in the civil rights movements of the 1960s). They saw the Muslims as oppressed people who had been denied their own territory and civil rights. The Clinton administration did not have time for the British officials' views that all warring parties in the Bosnia conflict had to be treated equally. This is the reason why officials at the White House had less reservations in seeking to support some of the demands of the Bosnian government and did not fully back the diplomatic process led by Vance and Owen.

In common with the position taken by members of the Clinton administration, the German government and leading sections of the SPD, FDP and the Bündniss 90/Greens viewed the conflict in former Yugoslavia as the result of Serbia's denial of democratic rights to another group of peoples. But, because of the unresolved nature of the domestic debate about defence and foreign policies, German government officials found it difficult openly to support the more pro-interventionist position taken in Washington during 1993. To overcome this problem, away from the TV cameras and conference receptions that marked international meetings, German and US officials went about fostering a new political and military alliance between the Bosnian Muslim and Croatian forces.

The strategy of the 'policy community' influenced subsequent developments. By the spring of 1994, various diplomatic moves led to the ending of the fighting between the two groups and the signing of the Washington Agreement. This

rapprochement contributed to the first military victory for Bosnian Muslim forces against the Bosnian Serbs in late 1994. The event was to have an impact on subsequent military developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia and the success of Operation Deliberate Hope. Moreover, NATO international military staff and NATO officials together with US and German government figures cooperated in shaping a new plan for the alliance's structure and future tasks. As outlined in Chapter four, NATO international military authorities played a leading role in shaping the emergence of the CJTF and PfP concepts. SACEUR and SACLANT worked out the embryonic ideas. Their ideas were subsequently taken up and developed by State Department officials and by the German Ministry of Defence. The concepts of CJTF and PfP had both a military and a political component. At a political level they sought to resolve the burden sharing issue among NATO and WEU, whilst on the other fostering a new partnership with Eastern European member states. At a military level, both concepts entailed a new role for the alliance in 'out-of-area' operations in that it was envisaged that CJTF headquarters would be established for both articles V and non-article V, that is peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. PfP was also to allow NATO countries to use the territory of Eastern European member states to undertake military operations.

NATO international military staff and US policy makers also sought to shape the development of the NATO peace-enforcement doctrine. As has been demonstrated, from mid 1992 onwards the NATO military drafted a proposal for a peacekeeping doctrine in which it was stated that 'peace-enforcement' operations were to be considered on a continuum with article VI type of operations. There were divergent opinions within the political and military sections of NATO on the issue. Despite this lack of agreement NATO military authorities and the NATO international staff sought to promote the use of force in resolving the conflict in FRY. This became evident during the negotiations between NATO and the UN on the dual key arrangement. NATO international staff and US officials sought to give the alliance more day-to-day control over the type of warnings to be given to the warring factions and the exact nature of the targets. In a subtle way, this corresponded to an attempt to take away from the authority of the UN Security Council the full control

over military operations.²⁶

During 1993 and early 1995 the existence and influence of the 'policy community' came to the surface not only during efforts to reshape the UN-NATO 'dual key arrangements' and the peacekeeping doctrine. It was also apparent in the way in which the 'policy community' began openly to advocate that the UN should abandon its impartiality in the civil war. This can be seen during the response of the Allies to a number of warring parties' activities. As soon as the Bosnian Serbs committed acts of atrocity, NATO international staff, US and some German politicians were more ready than other NATO member states to urge air strikes. The 'policy community' did not advocate the same position when the Bosnian Muslims or Croats massacred civilians during their military campaigns. The analysis of these events undertaken in Chapters four and five demonstrates that the 'policy community' wanted to use NATO as a military tool to change the balance of military forces on the ground. In their view, NATO had to become engaged in military operations to end the Bosnian Serbs' territorial advances. This could only be done by supporting militarily some of the territorial aims of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Hence during Operation Deliberate Hope, there was a certain level of synchronisation between the air strikes campaign and the military advances of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats forces, though the alliance had in the end to restrain their aims to reach a diplomatic settlement.

However, the findings of the existence and influence of the 'policy community' do not coincide in its entirety with the hypothesis advanced by the 'epistemic community'. The latter approach in fact assumes that expertise, knowledge and ideological factors brought the 'epistemic community' and leading politicians together. In contrast the findings reveal that there were divergent national and organisational interests that brought officials and politicians together.

For the Clinton administration, it was important to show leadership in European defence affairs, so that it would be able to use the alliance for potential future

²⁶In delicate crisis situations, the selection of targets and the exact nature of the warning can in fact determine the response of the adversary.

operations in the Middle East, South Eastern Europe, North Africa, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia.²⁷ Through CJTF and PfP, the USA demonstrated its leadership in developing a new bargaining strategy with the EU and Eastern European countries while maintaining its hegemonic position within NATO.²⁸

For the German government, the development of PfP and IFOR helped to 'stabilise' its own backyard, that is Eastern Europe. At the same time, the German government's support for NATO's strategy in the former Yugoslavia was shaped by a desire to remove some of the domestic barriers to international military engagements with the maximum cross-party consensus. The leadership in the Ministry of Defence and CDU/CSU politicians astutely used the position taken by NATO in the former Yugoslavia to raise the stakes in the domestic debate. The strategy and stance taken by leading members of the FDP, SPD and the Greens helped them. When in 1992, the German government decided to support the deployment of the WEU and NATO in former Yugoslavia, the FDP was split on the issue. The FDP leadership in the Bundestag wanted to have a constitutional clarification of the government's decision in order to pacify dissent in its own party ranks. Similarly to the strategy of the FDP leadership, the SPD leaders decided to take the government to court over the deployment of the WEU and NATO in former Yugoslavia because there were divisions in its own ranks over the issue. The strategies of both parties played into the hands of the revisionists in that it moved the debate away from the legislature and from party congresses. At the same time, during 1993 and 1994, the intensification of the fighting in Bosnia led influential SPD and Greens MPs openly to endorse the view that the use of military means by international organisations was the only way to resolve the conflict in the Balkans. The government was aware of this change of mood in the opposition parties and cultivated relationships with the leadership of the FDP and SPD to

²⁷Robert E. Hunter, Senior Adviser at Rand, former U.S Ambassador to NATO from 1993 to 1998 and Vice President of the Atlantic Treaty Association, mentioned North Africa, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia as subject for discussion for future 'out-of-area' tasks. Hunter, R. E. 'Maximizing NATO: a relevant Alliance knows how to reach' *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1999, Vol 78, Nr 3. pages 190 - 203.

²⁸ For an overall assessment of the Clinton administration policy towards NATO see: Kubbig, B. W; Dembinski, M; Kelle, A. *Unilateralismus als alleinige aussenpolitische Strategie? Die amerikanische Politik gegenüber UNO, NATO und der Chemiewaffen-Organisation in der Ära Clinton*. HSFK-Report 3/2000. May 2000. pages 31 - 44.

obtain the maximum consensus in preparing public opinion to accepting the Bundeswehr's engagement in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. Thus, when in December 1994, the NAC called upon the German government to contribute militarily to its operations in the Balkans in support of UNPROFOR, Chancellor Helmut Kohl managed to persuade the leadership of the FDP and SPD to agree to this request. Despite the efforts of these policy-makers, German public opinion and opposition MPs remained split on the issue.²⁹

For the IMS and the NATO military the main interest in contributing to the development of the alliance's 'out-of-area' role seem to stem from a professional allegiance to the functions of the integrated military structure. The military authorities and NATO international staff greatly contributed to the development of PfP, CJTF and to the peacekeeping doctrine. Their contribution seem to have been the product of reacting to day-to-day demands for planning operations in the Balkans and seeking to respond to requests from both EU member states and former East European communist states for a more flexible military command structure. The role of 'professionalism' here identified, resembles Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell's hypothesis of 'normative isomorphism' previously described. By fostering professional training and exercises among the military bodies that constitute the integrated military structure, a promotion of 'innovative' practices took place. This might explain why there was an unprecedented level of understanding among the Ministries of Defence of NATO member states.³⁰

There are two additional differences between the assumptions of the 'epistemic communities' and those of the 'policy communities'. First, the former approach does not analyse the role of non-governmental actors, such as the media and interests groups, in diffusing ideas and pursuing strategies similar to those held by

²⁹ See chapter 5 on how German MPs voted during the debate on allowing the Bundeswehr to be part of IFOR.

³⁰ It should be stressed that one of the unique features of the NATO integrated military structure is that its leadership is made up of the Chiefs of Staff of NATO member states that hold a dual role: they command NATO forces and domestic forces simultaneously. Because of this dual position, the Chiefs of Staff might have exercised more influence on the NATO policy-making process, than it is commonly accepted. Additional research is

members of the 'epistemic community'. In contrast, the hypothesis of the 'policy communities' sought to take into account the impact of non-governmental actors. The research findings have in fact revealed that there were interest groups such as the Croatian and Slovenian lobbying groups, sections of the media and think tanks that provided ideas to members of the 'policy community'.³¹ Second, the findings obtained through the hypothesis of the 'policy community' approach has identified a number of additional factors that influenced NATO's decisions to assume 'out-of-area' tasks. As demonstrated, the Alliance successfully assumed 'peace-keeping' tasks in 1995 because there was an 'out-of-control' and 'ad hoc' nature in Western policy-making in the Balkans, which involuntarily and paradoxically contributed to moving more reluctant countries towards the position of the 'policy community'.

The 'ad hoc' and 'out-of-control' nature of Western policy making can be seen in the events that led up to the creation of the 'safe zones'. The desire of UNCHR officials and General Morillon to protect civilians spurred intense media coverage of the fighting in Srebrenica. This in turn put pressure on the international community to act. Without thinking about the long-term consequences of their decisions, the Allies agreed to change the UNPROFOR mandate. But by calling for the establishment of the 'safe areas', they legitimised the strategies of the two warring parties. The Bosnian Muslims used the 'safe areas' to launch attacks on their enemies and the Bosnian Serbs continued in their strategy to conquer cities whose surrounding areas were inhabited by a high number of ethnic Bosnian Serbs.

These events led to the decision to approve UN Security Council Resolutions 814 and 836. Through these Resolutions, UNPROFOR lost its neutral status but was not given the means to act as a 'peace-enforcement' force. This is why it came to rely on NATO air strikes. The contradictory situation in which UNPROFOR found itself, coupled with the failure of the diplomatic process, contributed to what could be described as a 'spiral of violence' phenomenon. With every NATO air strike, the Bosnian Serbs responded by defiantly continuing to shell civilians and by taking

required on this issue.

³¹ It should be emphasised that the activities of interest groups, the media and think tanks were not always synchronised with those of the 'policy community'. Further conceptualisation of the role of (semi-)official structures in shaping the development and

UNPROFOR hostages. By so doing, they contributed to the stiffening of the stance of the French and British governments.

In conclusion, the findings have not supported the assumptions derived from the neorealist and security communities approaches. Insufficient evidence has been found to sustain the assumptions derived from neoinstitutionalism. The results demonstrate that a synthesis of the assumptions contained in the transgovernmental relations, policy networks and epistemic community approaches can provide a new set of explanations for the dynamics of NATO's transformation into a 'peace-keeping' and 'peace-enforcement' organisation.

The findings have revealed the existence and influence of 'policy communities' in shaping NATO's 'out-of-area' role. During the period 1990 to mid 1992, the 'policy community' put the issue of NATO's 'out-of-area' role on the agenda and successfully lobbied for the establishment of the AARC. NATO's 1992 July decision to intervene in the Balkans can be explained as the product of the interaction between the strategy of the 'policy community' and two additional factors: intrainstitutional competitive dynamics and domestic politics. During 1993 and 1995 the 'policy community' worked towards giving NATO control over military operations in the Balkans. However, the Western Alliance succeeded in assuming a peace-enforcement mandate in the Balkans because domestic circumstances, organisational concerns and the out-of-control nature of events in the former Yugoslavia favoured the views and strategies of the 'policy community'.

In contrast to the often heard criticism that NATO was not doing 'enough' in the Balkans, it has been demonstrated that there were coalitions of politicians and civilians who were consistently at the vanguard in seeking to foster NATO's role in the region. Although, these policy-makers and civilians were moved by a desire to end the sufferings in the Balkans, they were simultaneously seeking to resolve complex domestic and transatlantic 'burden-sharing' issues. The Alliance's role in the Balkans was therefore never purely driven by humanitarian concerns. Without

actions of 'policy communities' is therefore required.

the operation of the NATO integrated military structure in diffusing new innovative practices and concepts within the Ministries of Defence and without the emergence of a new German-American understanding on European security affairs, NATO would have perhaps never survived the challenge of finding a new role in the 1990s. The influence exercised by the NATO international staff and the NATO military indicates that the operations of the integrated military structure should represent a focus of analysis for IR scholars undertaking future research on the Western Alliance.

APPENDIXES

ANNEX A: Data Gathering procedures

In order to test the hypothesis for the existence of a ‘policy community’, data was gathered on policy-makers located within NATO structures, US, British and German national security policy-making bodies. The aim was to identify who was involved in putting forward proposals and expressing views on NATO restructuring. (see annex B for selection of actors). The following methods of gathering data were adopted:

1) secondary sources: in the form of books and articles;

2) primary sources which included:

- parliamentary papers (Parliamentary Debates, Committee Papers, Bills, White Papers NATO, UN, EU, OSCE, WEU Ministerial communiqués);
- press releases;
- speeches of Members of Parliament and officials;
- party manifestos;
- memoirs of officials and politicians.

3) Qualitative face-to-face interviews with the following:


- NATO Permanent Representatives of the 16 member states;
- NATO international staff;
- German members of parliament;
- WEU staff;
- defence experts (see list in annex c)

Interviews were planned during the autumn and winter of 1998 and the spring of 1999. The interviews were qualitative in nature and followed a semi-structured questionnaire.

ANNEX B: Sketching the policy network: methodological assumptions.

In this section, the institutional structures involved in shaping security policy-making in NATO, Britain, Germany and the United States will be sketched. At the simplest level, these structures could be described as in Figure 1.


Figure 1: Security policy making structures under analysis



NATO policy making structures¹

NATO is both a political and military organisation. The highest level of decision making takes place at North Atlantic Council level, (NAC). The NAC can be conceived at three different levels: at Head of State or Head of Government, at Foreign Ministers level or at ambassadorial or permanent representative levels. When the Council meets at the level of Permanent Representatives it is known as the Council in Permanent Session. No decisions are taken by majority voting. Unanimity is the rule in the Council as it is throughout NATO.² Figure 2 summarises NATO's civil and military structures.

Figure 2



¹ Most of the information for this section, unless otherwise stated, is taken from the following: NATO. Office of Information and Press. *NATO Handbook: 50th anniversary*. NATO: Brussels. 1998.; NATO. Office of Information and Press. *The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: 1949 - 1989*. NATO: Brussels. 1989.

² George, D. and Ault-Kinhead, K. 'NATO decision making and structures'. in B. George (Ed.). *Jane's NATO Handbook 1991-1992*. Coulsdon: Jane's Defence. 1991. pages 11 - 26.

Other principal decision making fora are the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The decisions taken by each of these bodies have the same status and represent the agreed policy of the member countries, irrespective of the level at which they are taken.

Defence Planning Committee (DPC)

DPC is normally composed of Permanent Representatives but meets at the level of Defence Ministers at least twice a year, and deals with most defence matters and subjects related to collective defence planning. During 1990-1995, with the exception of France, all member countries were represented in the forum. The DPC provided guidance to NATO's military authorities and, within the area of its responsibilities, has the same functions and attributes, authority as the Council on matters within its competence.

The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)

The Defence Ministers of member countries that take part in NATO's Defence Planning Committee meets at regular intervals in the NPG, where they discuss specific policy issues associated with nuclear forces.

Secretary-General

The Secretary-General is responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation and decision-making throughout the alliance. He may propose items for discussion and has the authority to use his offices in cases of dispute between member countries. He is responsible for directing the IS and IMS and is the principal spokesmen for the Alliance.

Under him are the following:

- Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Support
- Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Planning and Operations
- Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs

- Assistant Secretary-General for security investment, logistics and civil emergency planning- Assistant Secretary-General for Scientific and environmental affairs.

NATO International Staff


The work of the NAC and its subordinate committees is supported by an International Staff (IS). The IS consists of personnel from member countries, either recruited directly by the organisation or seconded by their governments. The NATO military structures have an equivalent: the International Military Staff (IMS), discussed below. In total more than 3,000 people are part of the IS and IMS.

The IS comprises the Office of the Secretary-General, five operational Divisions, the Office of Management and Office of the Financial Controller. The five divisions are:

- Divisions of Political Affairs
- Division of Defence planning and operations
- Division of Defence Support
- Division of security investment, logistics and civil emergency planning
- Division of scientific and environmental affairs. (see Figure 3) ³

³NATO Information Service 1991.

Figure 3: NATO International Staff and its Divisions



The first two divisions are involved in the development of NATO strategy.

Divisions of Political Affairs

It comes under the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs who chairs the Senior Political committee and is (acting) chairman of a number of other committees. The Division has a Political Directorate and an Economics Directorate. The Political Directorate has a number of functions:

- preparation of the political discussion to the Council and of the discussion of the Political Committee at regular and senior level
- preparation of notes and report on political subjects for the Secretary and the Council
- political liaison with the delegates of member councils
- liaison with international organisations, both governmental and non governmental
- develop common positions and/or proposals on conventional arms control and confidence and security building measures; development of NATO's relations with the OSCE and peacekeeping policy aspects of NATO's relations with the UN; staffing of the PMSC Ad Hoc Group on cooperation in Peacekeeping and of the NATO-Russia PJC Working Group on Peacekeeping; political aspects of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

From 1993 onwards, the Political directorate began to deal with the formulation of peacekeeping policies.

Division of Defence planning and operations⁴

The directorate is under the Assistant Secretary-General. It consists of two divisions:

- 1) Force Planning Directorate
- 2) Nuclear Planning Directorate.

The Force Planning Directorate

The Force Planning Directorate has a number of responsibilities. These include:

- preparation of all papers and business concerned with the Defence Review, including the analysis of national defence programmes by collaboration with national delegates
- political-military and military-economic matters considered by the Defence Planning Committee
- preparation of studies of NATO defence planning and policy on behalf of the Defence Planning Committee
- maintenance of a database of information on NATO and ex-Warsaw Pact forces

NATO Military Organisation and Structures

Within NATO there are four types of military structures:

- 1) the Military Committee
- 2) Chairman of the Military Committee
- 3) Major NATO Commanders
- 3) International Military Staff (IMS)

The Military Committee (MC)

The Military Committee (MC) is the highest military authority of the Alliance under the political authority of the North Atlantic Council and the Defence Planning Committee. It consists of the Chiefs of Staff of NATO member states, (excluding Iceland and France until 1966-1995). The MC is responsible for recommending to NATO's political authorities those measures considered necessary for the common defence of the NATO area. Its role is to provide direction and advice on military policy and strategy. The MC also provides guidance on military matters to the Major NATO commanders (MNCs). The MC assists in developing overall strategic concepts for the Alliance and prepares an annual long-term assessment of the strength and capabilities of countries and areas posing a risk to NATO's interests. In periods of tension or war the MC advises the Council and Defence Planning Committee of the military situation and makes

⁴Until 1992 the department was known as Defence Planning and Policy division

recommendations on the use of military force, the implementation of contingency plans and the development of appropriate rules of engagement. On a day-to-day basis, the work of the MC is undertaken by the Military Representatives, acting on behalf of Chiefs of Defence Staff.⁵

The MC acts as an interface between the political aspects of NATO and the military aspect. It provides military advice up to the DPC and NAC. The Chairman of the Military Committee is the only one of its officers to attend the NAC, DPC and summit meetings.

On a day-to-day basis, the work of the Military Committee is undertaken by the Military Representatives, acting on behalf of their Chiefs of Defence.

Major NATO Commanders (MNCs)

The MNCs are responsible to the MC for the overall direction and conduct of all Alliance military matters within their areas of command. Each MNC has representatives at NATO of General or Flag Officer rank, who assist them by maintaining close links with both the political and military staffs within the headquarters and by ensuring that the flow of information and communication in both directions works efficiently.

The MNC Representatives attend meetings of the MC and provide advice on MC business relating to their respective Command. Until 1995, there were three MNCs: 1) the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), 2) the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCHAN). In 1995 CINCHAN was disbanded.

⁵Bland, D. *The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: a study of structure and strategy*. New York: Praeger. 1991.


International Military Staff (IMS)

The IMS is headed by a General/Flag officer, selected by the MC from candidates nominated by member nations for the position of Director of the International Military Staff. The IMS is responsible for planning, assessing and recommending policy on military matters for consideration by the MC, as well as ensuring that the policies and decisions of the Committee are implemented as directed. The IMS consist of military personnel who have been sent by their nations to take up staff appointments at NATO Headquarters. Like the IS, they are supposed to work for the common interest of the Alliance rather than on behalf of their nation.

The Director of the IMS is supported by five Assistant Directors, each of which heads separate functional Divisions. The divisions are:

- the Plans and Policy Division
- the Operations Division
- the Cooperation and Regional Security Division
- the Logistics, Armaments and Resource Division
- the NATO Situation Centre
- the Financial Controller of the IMS

Figure 4: The International Military Staff.⁶



⁶ Source: NATO Information Service 1991.

The Integrated Military Command Structure

The role of the integrated military structure is to provide the organisational framework for defending the territory of member countries against threats to their security and stability, in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The NATO military structure has also been called upon undertaking peacekeeping activities.

The Military Command Structure has undergone significant restructuring during 1990 and 1995. In 1990, NATO forces were organised under three headquarters: Allied Command Europe (ACE), Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) and Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN). Each headquarters had different numbers of subordinate commands. By 1995, ACCHAN was dissolved and the number of commands under ACE and ACLANT were reduced. Figures 5 and 6 give an overview of the changes.

Figure 5 NATO's Military Structure 1989





Figure 6: NATO Military Structure (1996)



Forces available to NATO

The forces of member countries available to NATO's integrated military command are essentially of two categories. Assigned forces come under the operational command or operational control of a Major NATO Commander when required, in accordance with specified procedures or at prescribed stages of alert measures approved by NATO. Earmarked forces are those which nations have agreed to assign to the operational command or operational control of a Major NATO Commander at a future date.

During 1990-1995, the NATO forces underwent significant changes in its composition, as explained earlier. By 1995, they were composed of three types:

- Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces
- Main Defence Forces
- Augumentation Forces.

Defence Planning Cycle

Alliance defence planning is conducted in long-term and mid-term. Until November 1991, the long-term planning document for NATO was the "Conceptual Military Framework (CMF)".⁷ From November 1991, the Strategic Concept became the starting point for defence planning. More detailed guidance is given by the Defence Ministers every two years, in a document known as "Ministerial Guidance". This gives guidance on defence planning in general and force planning in particular. It addresses the political, economic, technological and military factors which could affect the development of forces and capabilities of allies; and sets out the priorities and areas of concern to be addressed by the NATO Military Authorities in drawing up their force goals in the first instance, and secondly by nations in their own planning.

Allied defence planning is reviewed annually and given direction by Ministers of Defence in an "Annual Defence Review". In response to a Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) issued every year, governments of member countries prepare and submit to the Alliance their force plans and their defence spending plans for the five-year period covered by the review. The Review culminates in the compilation of a common NATO Force Plan which provides the basis for NATO defence planning over a five-year time frame.

National replies to the Defence Planning Questionnaires are examined simultaneously by the International Staff (IS) and the NATO Military Authorities. The International Staff prepares draft "Country Chapters" for each country. These set out in detail any unresolved differences between the NATO Force Goals and the country plans. They describe whether countries have fulfilled, or expect to fulfil, existing force commitments undertaken for the current year. Explanations of any shortcomings are set out, and national efforts are assessed against the background of their capabilities and constraints. The draft Country Chapters is supplemented by Major NATO Commanders' assessments, which focus on force capabilities in relation to their operational requirements and missions.

⁷ Bland, D. *op.cit.* page 200.

The Draft Country Chapters are considered in “multilateral examinations”. These include a review of the extent to which countries have fulfilled force commitments undertaken for the current year. They are directed particularly towards reconciling possible differences between country force plans and NATO Force Goals and plans.

In the light of the Country Chapters and of an assessment by the MC, a General Report is submitted to the DPC. It recommends a NATO five-year force plan for adoption by Defence Ministers, and examines the overall balance, feasibility and acceptability of the force plan. It also contains sections on national compliance with their force commitments for the current year, and an assessment of how far the overall objectives and specific guidance, laid down in Ministerial Guidance have been met.

US executive structures involved in security policy

The President and the White House staff

The US executive security structures are marked by a presidential style. The President and his Office have a number of appointed political assistants. The role of the Advisers and Political Appointees to the White House has over the last decades achieved greater importance in foreign policy decisions. The background and attitudes of the White House staff is a significant variable in the policy-making process.

NSC

The National Security Council Staff (NSC) is composed by the following policy-makers:

- the President
- Vice-President
- Secretary of State
- Secretary for Defense
- Director of the CIA
- Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff.
- Member of White House National Economic Council⁸.

The NSC is composed of six regional and four functional policy co-ordinating committees.⁹ Under Bush they were called Policy Co-ordinating Committees and Clinton renamed them Interagency Working Groups. The committees are composed of assistant secretary-level representatives from the appropriate agencies.

⁸ Under the Clinton Administration

⁹Jordan, A. A., & Korb, W. J. *American National Security Policy and Process*. (4th Edition ed.). London: John Hopkins University Press. 1993. page 100.

US Departments

There are a great number of departments and agencies that contribute to the formulation of US security policies. The most important are the State Department and the Department of Defense. An outline of their structure is given below.

The State Department

The State Department is organised according to geographical/regional responsibility and functional responsibility. Figure 7 provides a graphical representation of the structure.¹⁰ The day-to-day level of developing policy toward NATO and Europe was concentrated under the Secretary for Political Affairs.

Defense Department

Figure 8 provides a representation of the organisation of the Defense Department. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) plays a fundamental role in the policy making process toward alliance strategy. One of the roles of the JCS is in fact to act as senior military adviser to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defence. The other role is to command individually their respective services. The Joint Chiefs of Staff include:

- army chief of staff
- air chief of staff
- chief of naval operations
- commandant of the Marine Corps
- chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff
- vice chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff.

¹⁰Source of the figure: United States State Department web site at: <http://www.state.gov>.

Figure 7: US Department of State

United States Department of State





Figure 8: US Defence Department


US Department of Defense



German security policy making

The structures present at the Executive Level that shape the evolution of German security policy are summarised in Figure 9.¹¹

Figure9: German Foreign Policy making structure.



The Chancellor and the Cabinet are the primary bodies responsible for security policy making. Although the Chancellor's Office cannot issue directives to either the Foreign Office or the BMV working levels,¹² it does contribute to the discussions about security policy.

Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt)

The Foreign Office plays a role in the formulation of both foreign and defence policy. It co-ordinates the exchanges between NATO and the BMV. The Foreign Office's Political Department has the Atlantic Alliance and Defence Policy desks. In contrast to the BMV it has a small number of defence experts. The Foreign

¹¹The chart has been adapted from a chart published in McArdle Kelleher, C. 'Germany'. in Murray, D. J. and Viotti, P.R. (Eds.). *The defence policies of nations: a comparative study*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1994.

¹² Haftendorn, H. 'West Germany and the management of security relations: security policy under the conditions of international interdependence' in E. Krippendorf and V. Rittberger. (Eds.), *The foreign policy of West Germany*: London and Beverly Hills, Calif. 1980.

Office planning staff has no formal policy planning responsibility. It is primarily concerned with advising the ministers on a broad range of issue.¹³

Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, BMV)

Figure 10 summarises the structure of the BMV.¹⁴ The planning staff in the BMV has a far greater conceptual input in the ministerial planning than its FCO counterpart. It is headed by a civilian with a military deputy. The BMV has an inspector general that is in charge of all staff divisions. The difference between the inspector general and his counterparts in the United States and Britain is that he cannot issue directives to the departments of the service chiefs or military superiors. The service chief's responsibility for operational readiness is the minister alone and they have direct access to him.¹⁵

Within the Department there are Division II and III involved in the threat assessment and strategic planning. Division III has the following desks:


- Desk on Military Political Factors (III 1)
- Military Strategy (III 2)
- Military relations with NATO and WEU (III3)
- Armament Planning (III 4)
- Arms limitations control (III5)
- Operational factor (III6)

¹³ Cowen, R. 'West Germany'. in G. M. Dillon. (Ed.), *Defence policy making: a comparative analysis* Leicester: Leicester University Press. 1988. McArdle Kelleher, C. *op.cit*, pages 119 - 146.

¹⁴Figure 5 in McArdle Kelleher, C. 1994. *op.cit*.

¹⁵ *Ibid*.

Figure 10: The German Ministry of Defence



British Executive Structures in defence and foreign policy

Prime Minister's Office

The Prime Minister, with the support of his/her private secretaries and policy advisers, determine what is discussed in the various defence and foreign policy committees and how quickly a decision will be taken. The personality and interests of the Prime Ministers shape the policy making process.¹⁶

Cabinet Office

Composed by a committee of Ministers meeting for two hours once or twice a week and a network of approximately 25 secret sub-committees, a powerful secretariat, the Prime Minister's own office and liaison committees. The most important defence policy-making structure is the Defence and Overseas Policy Subcommittee of the Cabinet. It comprises the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Chancellor, the Secretary of State for Defence and one or two other senior ministers in the government.¹⁷

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)


The FCO is composed by a ministerial team and by senior management which supervise the workings of commands. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Foreign Secretary) is responsible to Parliament for the work of the FCO. He is supported by three Minister of State and a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. Ministerial responsibilities are described in figure 11.

The Permanent Under-Secretary (PSU) of the FCO, who is also Head of the Diplomatic Service, is responsible for the flow of advice on all aspects of foreign policy to the Foreign Secretary and for the management of the FCO and the Diplomatic Service.

¹⁶ Clarke, M. 'The policy-making process' in M. Smith; S. Smith and B. White. (Eds.). *British foreign policy: tradition, change and transformation*. page. London: Unwin Hyman. 1988, pages 71 - 95.

¹⁷ Dillon, G. M. 'Britain'. in Dillon, G. M. (Ed.). 1988. *op.cit.*

Figure 11: Structure of the FCO.




With the Deputy Under-Secretaries (DUSs), he supervises and co-ordinates the work of the Directors, who are responsible for the formulation of policy and the deployment of resources within their area of command. Commands fall into three categories:

- **geographical:** eg. Europe, Northern Asia & Pacific
- **functional:** e.g. International Security, Overseas Trade
- **administrative:** e.g. Resources, Personnel and Security.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD)

The Secretary of State for Defence is responsible for the formulation and conduct of defence. He is supported by two Minister of State, one for Forces and one for Defence Procurement, and a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. The Secretary of State has two principal advisers, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the Permanent Undersecretary of State (PUS). Figure 12 provides an overview of the top management of the MoD.¹⁸

Figure 12: Top management of MoD



¹⁸ Britain. Ministry of Defence. *Department performance report: 1998-1999*. available at <http://www.mod.uk/policy/dpr9899/annexe.htm>.

The Defence Council is composed of

- Secretary of State for Defence who is the Chairman
- Secretary of State four junior ministers
- the Chiefs of Staff
- the Chief of Defence Staff
- Vice Chief of Defence Staff
- Senior civil servants for the Ministry.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee is chaired by the CDS and is the main forum in which the collective military advice of Chiefs is obtained on operational issues and Defence policy. It is the MoD principal management committee. The PSU attends the COS committee.

CDS and PUS each have a deputy: the Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) and the 2nd Under-Secretary of State (2nd PUS) respectively.

Under the CDS, each of the three Services has its own Chief of Staff: the Chief of the Naval Staff; Chief of the General Staff (CGS); and the Chief of Air Staff. CNS, CGS and Chief of Air Staff are the professional heads of the royal navy, the army and the royal air force respectively.

There are individual service chiefs and the Defence Staff. They report to the Chief of Defence Staff. The Central Military Staffs are organised in four subgroups.

ANNEX C: Interviews undertaken

Interviews at NATO Headquarters

Mr Reinhard Bettzüge, Deputy Permanent Representative of Germany to NATO 1995-. Interviewed on 7 September 1998

Dr Harald H. Bungarden, Deputy NATO Press Officer. Interviewed on 10 September 1998.

Major Craig Cotter, Military Adviser at the Permanent Representative of Canada to NATO Headquarters. Interviewed on 5 November 1998

General Degli Innocenti, Italian member of the NATO Military Committee during 1993-1995. Interviewed on 4th November 1998.

Mr Kristian Fischer, Defence Adviser at the Permanent Representative of Denmark to NATO Headquarters. Interviewed on 8 September 1998.

Mr John Kindler, Head of the Council Operation Section Crisis Management and Operations Directorate; former member of the Political Affairs Division between 1990-1992 and member of the Executive Secretariat in 1994. Interviewed on 11 September 1998

Mr Kees Klompenhower, Defence Counsellor at the Permanent Representative of Netherlands to NATO. Interviewed on 7th of September 1998.

Mr John Mikal Kvistad. First Secretary of the Embassy, Member of the Permanent Norwegian delegation at NATO headquarters. Interviewed 7th of September 1998.

Ms Isabelle Poupart, Third Secretary to the Canadian Joint Delegation to NATO Headquarters. Interviewed on 5 November 1998

Mr Basat Öztürk, First Secretary Turkish Delegation to NATO (Defense/WEU-ESDI related issues. Interviewed on 8 September 1998

Mrs Vacali, First Secretary member of the Permanent Greek delegation at NATO headquarters. Interviewed on 8th September 1998

Interview with an official who had been a member of the Bosnian Task Force and a member of Defence Policy Planning Division in early 1990s. The interviewee wishes to remain anonymous. Interview held on 10 September 1998

Mr Joaquim Francisco de Almada Paes de Villas-Boas, Military Counsellor at the Permanent Representative of Portugal to NATO headquarters. Interviewed on 8th of September 1998.

Interview with Gülhan Ulutekin, First Secretary Turkish Delegation to NATO.

Interviewed on 8th September 1998.

Interviews at WEU in Brussels and Paris

Mr Juan De Louis, Assistant to the Head of the Security Policy Section at WEU Headquarters in Brussels on 6th of November 1998.

Dr Antonio Missiroli, Senior Research Fellow at the WEU Institute for Security Studies in Paris. Interviewed on 9 August 2000.

Ms Clare Roberts, Assistant to the Head of the Defence Policy Section at WEU Headquarters in Brussels on 6th of November 1998.

Mr Steffen Elgersma, Assistant to the Head of the Security Policy Section at WEU Headquarters in Brussels on 6th of November 1998.

Interviews in Germany

Mr Paul Breuer, CDU/CSU Member of Parliament. Interview at the German Bundestag in Bonn on 24 June 1999

Dr Ulrich Schleier, Adviser to the CDU/CSU delegation at the Bundestag. Bonn, 24 June 1999.

Dr Karl-Heinz Kampf on 25 June 1999 at the Adenauer Stiftung Institute in Bonn.

Answer to written questionnaires:

Dr John Barrett, Director of the Political Affairs Division, during 1992 - 1995 (14 August 1998)

Prof Hanns Maull, University of Trier, Germany. (8 February 1999)

Interview Transcripts

Original transcript of an interview between Hayton, B. (BBC 24 hours journalist) undertaken on 7th April 1999 with Colonel Bob Stewart. Military Assistant to the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee (1989-1991).

ANNEX D: Chronology of NATO member states' diplomatic initiatives towards the Yugoslav conflict 1991-1995

Date	Name of diplomatic initiative	Summary of initiative
27 June to 4 July 1991.	The Troika Mission's three point plan	The EC peace plan called for a resolution of the presidential crisis, suspension of implementation of the declaration of independence for a period of three months; and the JNA return to barracks.
7 July 1991	Brioni Agreement	EC mediators convince Slovenia, Croatia to suspend their demand for independence. EC argues that if conflict was not over by October 7, the EC would impose sanctions. EC called for an UN-imposed oil embargo and a UN peace-keeping mission.
2 September 1991	International Conference on Yugoslavia	The EC convened the International Conference on Yugoslavia at the Hague under the presidency of Lord Carrington. Talks were to be based on three principles: no unilateral changes of borders, protection of rights of all minorities, and full respect for all legitimate interests and aspirations.
6 October 1991	EC Foreign Affairs Council	It was agreed that Carrington would propose a Draft Convention envisaging the re-configuration of relations between the Yugoslav republics. Those republics seeking independence would gain it, subject to certain conditions including provision for minorities and the maintenance of a single economic space through a custom union. If the Draft Convention was not accepted, the EC would move to a position of working with those republics co-operating with the Conference in the light of their right to independence.
23 December 1991	German recognition of Croatia and Slovenia	Germany takes the unilateral decision to recognise Slovenia and Croatia independence.
15 January 1992	EC	EC recognises the independence of Croatia and Slovenia.
March 1992	Peace Conference on Yugoslavia: Lisbon agreement	The agreement envisaged that Bosnian would become an independent confederation of three ethnic units headed by a common central government. The general agreement did not last long because of division over which area should be designated to a specific community.

Date	Title	Summary of initiative
26- 28 August 1992	The London- Peace Conference	The London Peace Conference dealt with issues such as the cessation of violence, confidence-bulding measures, humanitarian issues from preventing human rights violation, the refugee issues, dismantling detention camps. The conference paved the way for expanding UNPROFOR's mandate to include escorting humanitarian assistance convoys. In addition it united the diplomatic efforts of the EC and the UN by creating a permanent negotiating forum called the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia. It also endorsed measures to strengthen the sanctions regime. Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance appointed respectively EC and UN mediators .
3 September 1992	International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia convened	The aim of the conference was to establish a working group to end hostilities, demilitarize Sarajevo, and draft a consitution that would respond to the aspirations of the three constituent nations and provide strong guarantees and enforcement mechanisms for human and minority rights.
2 January 1993	Vance-Owen Peace Plan	<p>The plan comprised a three-part package of 10 constitutional principles, a detailed cessation of hostilities agreement, and a map. Central to the plan was the idea that the three main ethnic group would dominate in three of the ten provinces; Sarajevo would remain a mixed province and become a demilitarised city. The assumption was the Serbs would have 43% of the territory, the Croats 15%, the Bosnian Muslim 27% and the Croat Bosnians 11%. Sarajevo was to control the remaining 4%. This distribuiton was prepared according to the population distribution in each region. To achieve an equitable solution, the co-chairmen devised a canton system and tried to divide up the land according to the population ratios.</p> <p>The central government and all provinces except Sarajevo would have separate elected legislatures, elected chief executives and independent judiciaries. A nine-member presidency and a Constitutional Court, acting as the highest authority, would consist of representatives of each of the three ethnic groups The ten provinces would carry out most government functions but would have no international legal personality and could not enter into legal agreements with foreign states, nor with international organisations.</p>
16 April 1993	Establi- shment of the 'safe area'	UN Security Council Resolution 819 demanded that all parties treated Srebrenica and its surrounding as a 'safe area'

Date	Title	Summary of initiative
22 May 1993	The "Joint-action programme"	The 'joint-action programme' was signed by Foreign Ministers of the United States, Russia, Britain, France and Spain in Washington. It stated that sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had to continue and that the no fly zone were to be retained. The programme envisaged assistance to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to help it seal off its Bosnian border; the expansion of the safe areas and the establishment of a war crimes tribunals. The United States agreed to contribute a preventative deployment of troops along the Macedonian border to ensure the war did not spread to the Republic.
30 July 1993	Owen-Stoltenberg Plan	Plan proposed the division of the country into a confederation of three ethnic ministates. The Bosnian Serbs would control 52.5 percent of Bosnian territory, the Croats 17.5 percent, and the Muslims 30%. The three parts of Bosnia would be jointed in a loose union with a common Presidency, Council of Ministers, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, and Court of Human Rights.
November 1993	The European Union Action Plan and the Franco-German proposal.	The European Union Action Plan encompassed a map under which the Muslims would control 33.5% of Bosnian territory, the Serbs 49% percent and the Croats 17.5%. Parallel to this plan France and Germany put forward another proposal to lift the sanctions against Serbia in exchange for territorial concessions.
13 May 1994	Contact Group's peace proposal.¹⁹	It proposed a peace formula that would give the Muslim-Croat federation 51% of Bosnian territory and the Bosnian Serbs 49%. On the 5th July the Contact Group formally approved a detailed map indicating which parts of Bosnian would make up the allocated territorial percentages. A series of incentives and disincentives were agreed. These included tougher sanctions on Serbia, stricter enforcement of the weapons exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Goradze, the establishment of similar zones around other Bosnian towns, and the eventual lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnian if the Bosnian Serbs rejected the proposal. If the Serbs accepted the plan and the Muslims did not, trade sanctions on Serbia could be lifted progressively.
Winter 1994	New Contact Group's proposal	The Contact Group sought to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to accept its proposed peace plan. In called on the Serbia leadership to recognise Bosnia's independence in exchange for an end to sanctions. To achieve this aim the Contact Group revised the peace plan to make the proposed map more negotiable and it allowed open the possibility for a confederation.

¹⁹ Members of the Contact Group were US, France, Britain, Germany and Russia.

		Summary of initiative
21 November 1995	Dayton²⁰ Agreement	<p>The agreement envisaged the maintenance of the Bosnian-Herzegovina into a unitary Bosnian state within internationally recognised borders with Sarajevo as the capital. Political power was to be exercised through a dual system: a central government structure constituted by a three-man presidency with representative from each of the three ethnic groups, a Council of Ministers and a Central Parliament. These institutions were to be responsible for foreign policy; monetary and foreign trade policy; finance and refugees and asylum policy; international and inter-entity criminal law enforcement, establishment and operation of common and international communications facilities and air traffic control. The second political structure was to be controlled by two Federal entities: the Muslim-Croat Federation, which would control 51% of the territory and the Republika Srpska, constituted by the Bosnian Serbs, which would control the remaining 49%. This federal division of the country was to correspond to the 51%-49% split formula put forward by the international communities since 1993. The two entities were to control all policies not under the jurisdiction of central government. The agreement also provided for the establishment of Parliamentary Assembly divided into two chambers: the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives. The House of Peoples was to comprise 15 delegates ten from the Federation (five Croats and five Bosnians) and five from the Republika Srpska, elected by the assemblies of the Entities. The House of Representatives was to comprise 42 members, two-thirds elected from the territory of the Federation and one-third from the territory of the Republika Srpska. Another central aspect of the agreement involved military matters, the introduction of a multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR). Other aspects covered by the agreement included: the decision to hold elections within six months of the agreement entering into force; an agreement on arms control aspects and restriction on military deployments and exercises; a decision to honour a system of arbitration to resolve disputes; an agreement on investigating alleged human rights abuses; a commitment to help refugees and displaced persons return to their homes; a decision to set up a High Representative to mobilise and co-ordinate the activities of the organisation and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement; a decision to establish a UN International Police Task Force (IPTF); and finally a commitment to preserving national monuments and to establish public corporations.</p>

²⁰ U.S. Department of State. Fact Sheet released by Office Spokesman. (30 November 1995 IFOR: *The General Framework Agreement: Summary* (see Article 1, Annex IV: Constitution of Bosnian and Herzegovina).

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