EXPLANATION AND INTERPRETATION IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

A READING OF FREUD'S INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

A reading of the first volume of Sigmund Freud's Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916-17 [1915-17]), concentrating on the account of the technique for the interpretation of dreams. In these lectures Freud attempts to elaborate an empirical model for the investigation and explanation of the dream. Closer examination of this argument, however, quickly brings to light certain difficulties that allow us to question whether the validity of psychoanalytic procedures could ever be sustained in these terms. It is suggested that this account requires the introduction of conditions and assumptions of another order.

This argument amounts to a critique of the attempt to provide empirical foundations for certain key psychoanalytic concepts, in favour of a deduction of the validity of those concepts at the level of formal conditions of the technique of interpretation itself. It suggests that the legitimacy of that technique of interpretation depends upon a particular mode of deduction that can be considered characteristic of psychoanalytic procedure in general. The validity of the central concepts of psychoanalysis is then to be considered in terms of the procedure of argument from which their status is derived.

Two models of psychoanalytic investigation are considered - an empirical model for the explanation of the dream and a more formal account of the fundamental principles of interpretation. The thesis concludes that these two models are not in fact exclusive but are rather complementary, and that a comprehensive statement of the conditions of validity of the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation can only be achieved through their interaction and articulation. At the same time it attempts to demonstrate that these issues have a fundamental influence upon our conception of the orientation and goals of that technique of interpretation.

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CONTENTS

Abstract

Acknowledgements

Preface i

Section One:

1.1 Introduction 1

1.2 Parapraxes 9

Section Two:

2.1 Dreams - First Approaches 24

2.2 Premisses of the Technique of Interpretation 34

2.3 The Method of Free Association 45

Section Three:

3.1 On the Distinction Between Latent and Manifest 58

3.2 The Dreams of Children 76

3.3 The Censorship of Dreams 101

Section Four:

4.1 Symbolism in Dreams 119

4.2 The Dream-Work 129

Section Five:

5.1 Archaic and Infantile Features 148

5.2 Wish-Fulfilment 157

5.3 Conclusion 176

Bibliography 180

PREFACE

I.

This thesis is based on a reading of the first volume of Sigmund Freud's Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916-17 [1915-17], Volume XV in the Standard Edition), concentrating on the account of the technique for the interpretation of dreams. Even then, it makes no claim to being an exhaustive or comprehensive analysis of that account, but merely pursues one line of argument through this text. It hopes to demonstrate that closer attention to some of the details of this account might provide us with a better understanding of Freud's procedure of argument in other areas of his work.

The technique for the interpretation of dreams, the "royal road" to the discovery of the unconscious, plays a central role in the development of Freud's work and is indispensible for any understanding of the theory of psychoanalysis in general. The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a) remains the defining statement of this technique and of the foundations of the psychoanalytic method elaborated around it. The only other exposition of comparable scope is to be found in the lectures which Freud delivered at the University of Vienna in the winter term of 1915-16. It is the contrast between these two accounts that served as the point of departure for work on this thesis.

The later argument does not rely to the same extent on the psycho-physiological model of the psychic apparatus carried over into The Interpretation of Dreams from Freud's earliest work in neurology. Instead it offers an account of the principles and premisses of the technique of interpretation within a broader consideration of the scientific status of psychoanalytic theory in general. It thus provides the basis for a more formal account of the conditions of validity of that technique, freed from any immediate dependence upon the metapsychological model of the psychic apparatus.

At the same time this account forms part of a more general argument for the legitimacy of the central concepts of psychoanalysis. These lectures provide a consistent and cumulative argument which allows us to suggest that the validity of those concepts is in fact derived from, and depends upon, some of the most basic issues at stake in the account of the technique of interpretation itself. It can thus be demonstrated that a proper appreciation of the nature and status of those concepts within the body of psychoanalytic

theory depends upon an understanding of the underlying argument for the validity of that technique.

In the Introductory Lectures Freud puts forward what appears to be a straightforward "common sense" argument for the validity of psychoanalysis as a form of scientific knowledge. This account elaborates a basic empirical model for the investigation and explanation of the dream. Closer examination of this argument, however, quickly brings to light certain difficulties that allow us to question whether the validity of psychoanalytic procedures could ever be sustained in these terms. It is suggested that this account requires the introduction of conditions and assumptions of another order.

This argument amounts to a critique of the attempt to provide empirical foundations for certain key psychoanalytic concepts, in favour of a deduction of the validity of those concepts at the level of formal conditions of the technique of interpretation itself. It suggests that the legitimacy of that technique of interpretation depends upon a particular mode of deduction that can be considered characteristic of psychoanalytic procedure in general. The validity of the central concepts of psychoanalysis is then to be considered in terms of the procedure of argument from which their status is derived.

This thesis therefore considers two models of psychoanalytic investigation - an empirical model for the explanation of the dream and a more formal account of the fundamental principles of interpretation. It concludes that these two models are not in fact exclusive but are rather complementary, and that a comprehensive statement of the conditions of validity of the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation can only be achieved through their interaction and articulation. At the same time it attempts to demonstrate that these issues have a fundamental influence upon our conception of the nature and orientation of that technique.

II.

The Introduction sets out some of the basic questions concerning the status of psychoanalysis as science which will have to be considered by these lectures as a whole. These questions turn upon the problematic status of the object of psychoanalysis and the difficulties which this creates for any empirical model of psychoanalytic investigation. The broad aim of these lectures may then be understood as an attempt to elaborate an alternative foundation upon which the validity of psychoanalytic knowledge is to rest.

The lectures on the parapraxes consider these issues in more detail in relation to one of the more familiar objects of psychoanalytic investigation. This account serves as a concrete illustration of some of the difficulties confronting psychoanalysis and provides a first indication of the approach that will allow Freud to come to terms with the difficulties posed by the status of the psychoanalytic object in general. This section thus contains a preliminary outline of the argument that will serve as the framework for these lectures as a whole.

The account of the technique for the interpretation of dreams may then be understood as an attempt to elaborate a more comprehensive response to these difficulties. The first approach to the problem of dreams demonstrates how these questions are raised in their most extreme form by the nature of the dream as possible object of scientific investigation. We must therefore consider the characteristics of the dream that allow it to serve both as the privileged example of the difficulties facing psychoanalytic investigation and the site of their resolution. For it is in overcoming these obstacles that the psychoanalytic method will take on its mature form.

The lecture on the premisses and principles of the technique of interpretation establishes the foundations for a novel technique of investigation that will allow psychoanalysis to come to terms with its object. This technique is grounded in the method of free association, which is peculiar to psychoanalysis and forms the basis for its discoveries. Particular attention will be paid to the two fundamental premisses of the technique of interpretation, as it is the discussion of the respective status of these two premisses that establishes the procedure of derivation which proves central to understanding the nature of Freud's argument in general.

The distinction in registers established by the relation between these two premisses is then situated at the root of a distinction between two different models of the technique of psychoanalytic investigation itself. At one level Freud attempts to elaborate an empirical model for the explanation of the dream, structured around a direct relation between its manifest and latent poles. The difficulties encountered in the implementation of this model of investigation, however, lead to the postulation of a further register of conditions that will prove indispensable to the account of the conditions of validity of the technique of interpretation as a whole.

The principles of the empirical model of investigation are considered in the lecture on the dreams of children. Freud makes use of the more transparent examples of children's dreams to establish a model for the explanation of the dream as a direct reaction to a stimulus disturbing sleep. The absence of distortion in these dreams allows him to demonstrate the nature of the latent stimulus as a wish arising out of the events of the previous day, giving rise to the claim that the function of the dream is one of wish-fulfilment. These examples thus allow Freud to introduce the central thesis of the technique for the interpretation of dreams and to provide immediate evidence for its validity.

Closer examination of Freud's argument, however, raises doubts about the nature of the evidence upon which the thesis of wish-fulfilment depends. For the problem of distortion remains an immediate restriction upon the applicability of this thesis to the wider class of dreams as a whole. The difficulties associated with the empirical status of the principle of wish-fulfilment lead to the elaboration of an alternative argument for the validity of this principle as a necessary condition of the technique of interpretation itself. This argument becomes the basis for an alternative conception of the orientation and conditions of validity of the psychoanalytic method in general.

This account of the technique of interpretation finds its grounding in the theory of the dream-work. The empirical model for the explanation of the dream relies upon the suppression of the register of distortion in order to establish a direct and verifiable relation between the manifest and latent elements of the dream. The theory of the dream-work, on the other hand, offers a systematic account of the modalities of distortion that arise in the relation between those manifest and latent elements. The register of the dream-work thus provides the basis for a revised account not only of the goals and orientation of the technique of investigation, but also of the nature and position of the wish upon which that technique devolves.

The final section of this thesis attempts to situate these two different lines of argument in relation to one another and to reconcile the concepts and principles associated with each. This account centres on Freud's defence of the validity of the principle of wish-fulfilment as the fundamental postulate of the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation. It is the discussion of the conditions of wish-fulfilment in the dream that provides the context for the attempt to bring the two different models of investigation into alignment and to

consider the nature of the articulation between them. The defence of the principle of wish-fulfilment thus amounts to a comprehensive statement of the conditions of validity of the psychoanalytic method as a whole.

III.

All page references are to the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (Freud, 1916-17 [1915-17]). As an aid to continuity it has been thought best to retain these references in the text itself, while keeping them to a minimum. References are given to the relevant volume of both the Standard Edition of Freud's works and the Penguin Freud Library, with the Standard Edition always cited first - e.g. "(P)sychoanalysis is a procedure for the medical treatment of neurotic patients."(15/39) This indicates that this reference is to be found on page 15 of Volume XV of the Standard Edition, and page 39 of Volume 1 of the Penguin Edition.

SECTION ONE

1.1 Introduction

I.

Psychoanalysis is introduced in its most general form as "a procedure for the medical treatment of neurotic patients".(15/39) It will be defined, however, both as a method of therapy and as a form of scientific knowledge, in distinction from the medical model. "(I)n this field a number of things take place in a different way - often indeed in an opposite way - from what they do elsewhere in medical practice".(15/39) The distinction between the procedures of psychoanalytic investigation and those of medical science will be pursued via a discussion of the differences in instruction and training in the two disciplines. These differences reflect the nature of each discipline as a body of scientific knowledge, and extend by implication to the structure of demonstration and evidence which each assumes.

The primary characteristic of medical training is that "you are accustomed to see things".(16/40) Medical knowledge is organised around, and assumes, the primacy of an immediate perceptual relationship to its object, the body. The register of anatomical and physiological processes provides the field of evidence, accessible to objective verification and demonstration, upon which medicine's status as science depends. "In psychoanalysis, alas, everything is different. Nothing takes place in a psychoanalytic treatment but an interchange of words between the patient and the analyst."(17/41) The entire field of psychoanalytic experience is thus limited to, and remains suspended from, this exchange of words. It is this restriction of the scope of psychoanalytic investigation to the register of language that constitutes the defining condition of psychoanalysis in contrast to medicine, whether as a form of clinical treatment or as a body of scientific knowledge.

The restriction of the field of clinical experience to an exchange of words between patient and analyst raises the question of the nature and foundation of psychoanalysis as a technique of therapeutic intervention. In contrast to any form of direct medical intervention at the level of the body, it is the register of speech or language that effectively becomes the site of psychoanalytic intervention. This would suggest that the means and conditions of that intervention are themselves to be pursued at the level of the register of language. Freud's remarks on the role of words as a means of therapeutic intervention serve merely to situate in the most general terms the problem

of the relation between language and the body in the therapeutic process. This leads us to question the nature of the neurotic symptom, its structure and genesis, and hence the possibility of its resolution, as in some way associated with the conditions of language itself.

The restriction of the field of psychoanalytic investigation to the register of language raises more immediate difficulties for the foundations of psychoanalysis as a body of scientific knowledge. For the conditions governing access to its clinical material would appear from the start to deny to psychoanalytic investigation the sort of relation to its object which its status as science would require. The only material to which psychoanalysis does have direct access is that of the patient's speech. The natural expectation, then, is that it is the patient's speech, the register of clinical discourse, that is to provide the proper object, and thus the appropriate field of verification, for a science of psychoanalysis. Freud, however, immediately rules out the possibility of independent access to the patient, rejecting any attempt to situate the discourse of the patient within the accepted structure of empirical verification. "The talk of which psychoanalysis consists brooks no listener; it cannot be demonstrated .... you cannot be present as an audience at a psychoanalytic treatment."(17/42)

This stipulation would appear to remove the possibility of objective verification of the findings of psychoanalytic investigation, and hence any prospect of psychoanalysis being accepted as a legitimate form of scientific knowledge. Far from attempting to gloss over these difficulties, Freud is quite explicit here in his attempt to distance the conditions of psychoanalytic investigation from the standard epistemology of medical science. He thus emphasises that even though the patient can, on analogy with the model of medical demonstration, be presented at a psychiatric lecture, and can be induced to give an account of his symptoms, the patient's willingness to provide this material still depends solely on the condition of his special relation of "emotional attachment" to the doctor.

The restriction on independent access to the material of psychoanalysis, apparently ruling out the prospect of objective verification of its findings, is the decisive condition differentiating the structure of psychoanalytic investigation from that of medical science. The closure of the field of psychoanalytic experience at the same time establishes the dyadic relation between doctor and patient, the relation of transference, as the condition of access to its object. It is therefore the very condition precluding the possibility of empirical verification of the findings of psychoanalysis, the exclusive

nature of the clinical relation between patient and analyst, that is set up as the defining condition of the field of psychoanalytic investigation.

Freud's attempt to establish psychoanalysis as a valid form of scientific knowledge, to outline an alternative epistemological foundation for psychoanalytic investigation, must therefore be in some way bound up with this process where the traditional framework of medical investigation is disrupted by the conditions restricting the field of psychoanalytic experience to an exchange of words between patient and analyst. At the same time this process juxtaposes the question of language, the role of words as a means of therapeutic intervention, and the problem of transference, the relation between patient and analyst as the condition of access to the material of psychoanalysis.

This account thus involves a striking inversion of the concepts of language and transference within the distinction of registers between psychoanalysis as a form of scientific knowledge and psychoanalysis as a form of therapeutic intervention. For the problem of transference is introduced, prior to any questions of clinical technique, as the central condition defining the epistemological structure of psychoanalysis as a method of scientific investigation, just as the question of language has been introduced in a discussion of the conditions of therapeutic intervention.

Freud will develop the possibilities of this dialectic between the epistemological register of psychoanalysis as science and the clinical register of therapeutic technique throughout his argument. This strategy is only really apparent by proxy in the first half of these lectures, where we find a deliberate exclusion of any clinical material in favour of an introduction to the principles of psychoanalytic interpretation within the framework of general questions of scientific validity. The subsequent account of pathological processes, which concludes with a discussion of clinical technique, then comes to focus on the problem of the transference as the condition upon which the possibility of therapeutic intervention rests.

A certain symmetry of argument elaborated around this distinction will, however, allow Freud to explore themes in one register via themes in the other. Thus we will find that questions concerning the conditions of epistemological access to its object come to reflect across questions of the nature of psychoanalysis as a technique of therapeutic intervention, and vice versa. These initial remarks on the notion of transference as the condition defining the epistemological structure of psychoanalytic

investigation, will thus be mirrored by the concluding remarks on the role of knowledge or understanding as a condition of therapeutic resolution.

A constant and fundamental theme in this dialectic between the two wings of psychoanalysis, as science and as therapy, will be the attempt to situate some further register common to both, or at least delimited by their relation, in terms of which their intersection, and ultimately their mutual conditions of validity, can be understood. Thus it is that the question of the transference comes to emerge more and more clearly, both as the register within which the conditions of therapeutic intervention may be defined, and, more problematically, as the underlying epistemological register from which psychoanalytic knowledge derives its validity.

It is this theme that provides the key to Freud's discussion of the conditions structuring the field of psychoanalytic investigation, and accounts for his otherwise rather puzzling approach to the question of the status of psychoanalysis as science. At the same time this strategy allows us to appreciate the use Freud makes here of the analogy of the lecture situation to provide the framework for his argument.

He has begun by using the procedures of teaching or training in the two disciplines to distinguish the form of psychoanalytic investigation from that of medical science, around the question of independent perceptual access to the object in question. This account has involved a deliberate rejection of any attempt to situate psychoanalysis within the standard structure of empirical verification, in order to focus the conditions of access to its material onto the closed relation between patient and analyst.

As a result of the restrictions on access to the material of psychoanalysis, Freud's audience are placed in a position where they are forced to rely solely on what they hear from him, rather than on any independent assessment of that material. The audience's judgement as to the validity or accuracy of what they are told thus comes to rest upon quite specific conditions. "As a result of receiving your instruction at second hand, as it were, you find yourselves under quite unusual conditions for forming a judgement. That will obviously depend for the most part on how much credence you can give to your informant."(18/42)

It is clear that these "unusual conditions of judgement" can be used to characterise the particular epistemological conditions structuring the field of psychoanalytic investigation as a whole. Yet by the same token it is difficult to see how this situation is to provide the basis for a legitimate form of scientific knowledge. For the conditions

restricting access to the object of psychoanalysis place the audience in a position of exaggerated subjectivity, where their judgement comes to depend on the reliability of their informant rather than on any objective evaluation of the relevant material.

It is in order to elaborate on this issue that Freud here refers to analogous difficulties in the epistemology of historical investigation, where one's object is by definition not available to direct examination, placing one in a similar position of dependence on alternative sources of information. Once again it is the framework of the lecture situation that allows him to formulate the question, not in terms of the status of the object of investigation, but in terms of the possible grounds for confirming the claims of one's informant. "What grounds would you have for believing in the truth of what he reported?"(18/42)

The two major sources of historical evidence, the monument and the document, are considered here primarily in their status as possible sources of verification for the claims of the historian. And yet it is clear that the aim of Freud's remarks is not in fact to establish the document as an alternative foundation for the validity of historical knowledge. On the contrary, he is concerned precisely to problematise the objective status of the document itself, by questioning the possibility of any concrete verification of its relation to the event in question. "Strictly speaking, however, all these documents only prove that earlier generations already believed in ... the reality of [these] deeds, and your criticisms might start afresh at that point."(18/43)

The question of the status of the document as a form of objective evidence is in this way itself absorbed into the question of the possible grounds for the verification of one's sources. The criteria for the verification of historical knowledge are thus effectively displaced away from the traditional site of evaluation, that of the relation between the document and the event, onto the axis of our relation to the informant. Again, then, the value of the material reported comes to depend on a decision based on the credibility of our sources, rather than on any independent verification of the material itself.

It is difficult to see how this line of argument, this strategy of excluding any external source of verification, in favour of absolute dependence on the report of one's informant, is to provide a reliable basis for psychoanalytic knowledge. Freud does suggest that our evaluation of the material reported would then come to rest on two primary considerations - the conformity between the reports of witnesses, and our knowledge of possible motives for deceit and fabrication on the part of the informant.

Yet at the same time he himself goes on, with some irony, to refer to the doubts we might entertain as to the credibility of our informant in psychoanalysis.

Ignoring the contradictions involved in this approach, Freud will merely take his argument to an even more problematic conclusion. "If there is no objective verification of psychoanalysis, and no possibility of demonstrating it, how can one learn psychoanalysis at all, and convince oneself of the truth of its assertions?"(19/43) The answer to this question is provided in equally enigmatic form. "One learns psychoanalysis on oneself."(19/43) Only in that way can one acquire "the desired sense of conviction of the reality of the processes described by analysis and of the correctness of its views".(19/44)

The reduction of the epistemological structure of psychoanalysis to a point of extreme subjectivity constitutes the apex of Freud's strategy of argument here. This amounts to a systematic attempt to maximise the "unusual conditions" of psychoanalytic knowledge, rejecting any attempt to situate the claims of psychoanalysis within the accepted framework of objective verification, in order to place his audience in a position of exaggerated dependence, where their judgement of psychoanalysis comes to rest upon the highly problematic notions of credence and conviction.

Making no attempt to enter into the difficulties entailed by this argument, Freud returns to the distinction between psychoanalysis and medicine. It was this distinction that allowed him to bring to light the linguistic framework of psychoanalytic experience in contrast to the perceptual basis of medical investigation. The status attributed to the register of anatomy in medical knowledge corresponds directly to the primacy of the visual modality in the structure of its demonstrations. The register of physiological processes then provides the common foundation for both the aetiological explanations and the clinical interventions of medical science.

Freud's account of the anatomical foundations of medical and psychiatric knowledge is of particular interest here, because he will explicitly dissociate the conditions of psychoanalytic explanation from any reliance on the register of physiological processes. He thus emphasises the limitations of psychiatric nosology, as a purely descriptive classification of mental disorders that can account for neither the origin, the mechanism, nor the interrelation of symptoms, except in terms of their relation to disturbances of physiological functioning. "These mental disorders are only accessible to therapeutic influence when they can be recognised as subsidiary effects of what is otherwise an organic illness."(21/45)

The nature of psychoanalytic explanation is again characterised by contrast to the medical model, this time in the rejection of any foundation in the anatomical unity of physiological functioning. The orientation of psychoanalytic thought is now defined by the goal of providing for psychiatry the psychological foundation that would allow it to account for mental disorders that have no observable organic basis. At the same time the particular nature of psychoanalytic knowledge and the conditions of its validity will come to be associated with the attempt to define this "missing psychological foundation".(21/45)

The goal of Freud's argument in these lectures as a whole may be understood as an attempt to elaborate the conditions upon which the validity of psychoanalytic knowledge is to rest. The only indication that we are given here as to the possible nature of this foundation must be inferred from the two hypotheses that Freud now puts forward as characteristic of psychoanalytic science. He has already rejected as alien to psychoanalytic thought any hypothesis "of an anatomical, chemical or physiological kind".(21/45) Instead he introduces two hypotheses that are particular to psychoanalysis and characteristic of its mode of explanation.

The orientation of Freud's argument in this lecture leads us to suspect that the foundation for psychoanalytic knowledge, defined in the move away from any basis in the objective realm of organic processes, is to be sought in the opposite pole of subjective psychological experience. Yet the first hypothesis cited by Freud, the postulate of the existence of unconscious mental processes, itself puts an end to any suggestion that he is hoping to situate the register of subjective experience at the foundation of psychoanalytic thought. For the assertion that mental processes are not necessarily conscious can only serve to frustrate any form of investigation that aims to base itself in the register of psychological experience.

Despite Freud's use of the term "psychological" to provisionally characterise the nature of psychoanalytic knowledge in contrast to the physiological foundations of medical science, then, it is clear that he is equally concerned to distance himself from the concepts and assumptions of classical psychology, which equates the register of the psychical with the field of conscious experience. It is the use of this postulate, the hypothesis of unconscious mental processes, to drive a wedge between the definition of the psychological and the register of subjective experience, that then "paves the way to a decisive new orientation in the world and in science".(22/47)

This first psychoanalytic hypothesis thus serves to problematise the entire orientation of Freud's argument up to now, with its apparent tendency to reduce the field of psychoanalytic knowledge to the pole of subjective experience. Yet in the context of that same argument the second hypothesis can only be put forward with equally provocative implications in mind. For in the light of Freud's rejection of any foundation in the register of physiological processes, what are we to make of the proposition that the psychoanalytic explanation of neurotic symptoms centres on the role of "instinctual impulses which can only be described as sexual, both in the narrower and wider sense of the word"?(22/47)

Within the context of Freud's attempt to define an alternative foundation for the validity of psychoanalytic science, the juxtapositioning of these two hypotheses can therefore only have the paradoxical effect of problematising the nature of that foundation itself. Far from allowing us to define the conditions of psychoanalytic explanation, these two hypotheses serve merely to preclude any attempt to situate this foundation in the register of either psychology or physiology, in the subjective or the objective pole. Instead we are left with the question of the nature of the conditions determining the form of psychoanalytic explanation, characterised only as "the common ground on the basis of which the convergence of physical and mental disorder will become intelligible".(21/45)

Our only indication as to the possible status of this alternative register of psychoanalytic intelligibility, founded neither in the register of objective empirical verification nor in the subjective register of psychological experience, remains that initial process by which the field of psychoanalytic investigation has been restricted to a relation of speech between patient and analyst. For it is this process of delimitation, according to which the grounds of psychoanalytic intervention become identified with the conditions of the register of language itself, that suggests that the conditions defining the field of clinical experience, and thus of psychoanalytic intelligibility as a whole, are to be sought in terms of a possible convergence between the registers of language and the transference.

1.2 Parapraxes

I.

The account of the psychoanalytic method begins not with postulates or principles, but with "an investigation".(25/50) The question then arises as to what it is about the topic, or object, of this enquiry that will allow us to characterise the method of psychoanalytic investigation. We find a first indication in the suggestion that "the material for its observations is usually provided by the inconsiderable events which have been put aside by the other sciences as being too unimportant - the dregs, one might say, of the world of phenomena." (27/52)

The characteristics of the parapraxis, the initial topic of discussion, certainly conform to this description. These apparently random and trivial disturbances, to which everyone is liable, manifest themselves as inexplicable and fleeting disruptions of normal activities. As they possess no identifiable foundation in illness or organic pathology, and are without any real practical significance, they are easily disregarded by medicine as not worthy of scientific investigation.

The status of these occurrences in the scale of scientific interest is reflected in the fact that before Freud they were not even considered a unified class or category, but perceived merely as a confused range of random disturbances. Indeed, their only common attribute, the negative prefix by which the various species are designated, indicates that they were simply conceived as a lapse, a failure, in relation to the positive organic unity of normal functioning.

The marginal or residual status of these phenomena in the world of scientific objects is not, then, a simple question of their lack of practical importance. In lacking the recognised criteria of physiological or functional unity that would render them liable to medical explanation these phenomena in fact fall below the threshold of scientific visibility. It is then legitimate to enquire into the criteria or procedures by which this array of random and inexplicable phenomena now come to be constituted as positive objects of psychoanalytic investigation.

Freud begins by establishing the principle of determinism as a fundamental condition of the scientific "Weltanschauung". The suggestion that there might be any occurrence, no matter how trivial, that is not liable to explanation, that drops out of "the universal concatenation of events", would amount to "a break in the determinism of natural events", which is itself the most general premiss of scientific explanation.(28/53)

Hence it must in principle be possible to account for these phenomena, like any others, or at least assign to them certain determinants.

He goes on to consider the "psycho-physiological" determinants involved in disruptions of normal functioning, factors that might "result in insufficient attention being directed to the function in question".(29/54) Parapraxes could then be accounted for as "the effects of a disturbance of attention, whether from organic or psychical causes".(29/54) There are, however, certain features of parapraxes, the positive or productive aspects of these phenomena, which are not explained by a withdrawal of attention. Here Freud cites the most common and most striking examples of slips of the tongue, where one says precisely the opposite of what one intended to say.

The psycho-physiological theory of the parapraxis cannot account for the product of the parapraxis, except as the arbitrary or accidental consequence of a disruption of normal functioning. It has therefore failed to examine "what it is that emerges in the slip itself", or to ask "why it is that the slip occurred in that particular way and no other".(32/57) In the place of any functional explanation of how a parapraxis might occur, psychoanalysis will take the product of the parapraxis as the object of its investigations, and seek to explain why it took that particular form. "Is there something that compels me in the particular case to make the slip in this particular way, or does it remain a matter of chance, of arbitrary choice"?(32/58)

The constitution of the parapraxis as a positive object of psychoanalytic investigation, this shift from "how" to "why", entails a move away from the general physiological conditions of this process to the question of the individual determinants, the possible psychological significance, of any particular slip. This distinction is clearly marked by Freud's claim that until we can account for the particular nature of the product of any parapraxis, "the phenomenon remains a chance event from the psychological point of view, even though it may have been given a physiological explanation".(32/57)

The form of psychoanalytic explanation is thus characterised by the move away from the register of physiological processes to a consideration of the significance of the parapraxis "from the psychological point of view". It is this shift in registers that underlies the constitution of the parapraxis as an object of scientific investigation, and makes possible the recognition that the parapraxis "has a sense of its own".(35/61) The form of explanation that makes this recognition possible, the psychological

foundation of psychoanalytic investigation, will similarly come to be characterised in terms of the notions of "significance" or "sense".

It is here that Freud's choice of slips of the tongue as the most suitable examples of parapraxes becomes pertinent. For it is this category that most easily allows the introduction of the thesis that the parapraxis is to be considered as "a statement with a content and a significance".(35/61) The topic of parapraxes in general has similar advantages for an introduction to the method and principles of psychoanalytic interpretation. For the parapraxis, even more clearly than the dream, allows Freud to bridge the gap from a physiological model of psychic functioning to a register of "psychological" explanation based on the concepts of sense and significance.

Freud goes on to claim that if these parapraxes can be shown to have a sense then it becomes feasible "to leave all physiological or psycho-physiological factors on one side and devote ourselves to purely psychological investigations into the sense - that is, the meaning or purpose - of parapraxes".(36/62) This is the clearest indication yet as to Freud's conception of the nature of these investigations and of the alternative foundation for psychoanalytic explanation. His use of the term "psychological", as a provisional designation for this register in distinction from that of physiology, is here seen to entail a far broader conception than that traditionally associated with the sphere of empirical psychology.

Thus where the term "psychology" has been used until now to distinguish this register from that of physiology, so too the term "sense" must now be taken as an index distinguishing this register from the traditional conception of psychology itself. We must therefore examine Freud's use of this term in the context of his attempt to define an alternative foundation for psychoanalytic explanation. An awareness of the position of the concept of sense within Freud's argument will help us to negotiate more successfully some of the confusions or ambiguities that might arise not only around the definition of this term, but also in relation to the status of the parapraxis in general.

The constitution of the parapraxis as an object of psychoanalytic explanation entails a conception of the parapraxis "as a completely valid psychical act pursuing an aim of its own, as a statement with a content and significance".(35/61) Already in this definition we may distinguish two aspects. On the one hand we have a notion of the parapraxis "as a completely valid psychical act pursuing an aim of its own", and thus as "a normal act which merely took the place of the other act which was the one expected or intended". On the other hand the parapraxis is to be considered as "a statement with a

content and a significance", and thus as an utterance which has "a sense of its own".(35/61)

This distinction between the two different conceptions of the parapraxis corresponds directly to the two aspects which Freud associates with the concept of sense itself - i.e. as "purpose" and as "meaning".(36/62) Hence we find both in the conception of the parapraxis and in the concept of sense a common nexus of ambiguity or divergence that can be traced to, or aligned in terms of, the tension within Freud's argument between a register of physiological explanation and a register of psychological significance.

The use of slips of the tongue as the privileged example of parapraxes thus not only facilitates the introduction of the notion of sense, but also serves the attempt to maintain the primacy of a conception of the parapraxis as "statement", over the more obvious conception of the parapraxis as a "psychical act" or "function". For this latter notion remains in danger of returning us to a conception of the parapraxis modelled on the physiological conditions of normal functioning which, like any attempt to explain a psychic function on the structure of normal action, relies on a reference to the problematic psychological notions of "intention" and "purpose".

That Freud hopes to use the notion of sense to bypass these more problematic subjective assumptions of psychological explanation, in favour of a form of interpretation based in an objective register of signification, is suggested not only by his privileging of the conception of the parapraxis as statement, but also by his choice of examples from literature to support his argument. How else are we to account for Freud's strategy here of presenting examples taken from fiction as evidence for his basic claim that parapraxes can be shown to have a sense?

At an obvious level these examples provide a clear illustration of the role of intention in parapraxes. Hence Freud will claim that they prove that the author must regard the parapraxis as having a sense, "since he has produced it deliberately". This suggests that "he intends to bring something to our notice by means of the slip of the tongue".(36/62) Yet at the same time does not this claim fundamentally invalidate the basic conception of the parapraxis itself? For "what has happened is not that the author has made an accidental slip". Rather, "he has produced it deliberately".(36/62)

This assertion, which might appear to contradict Freud's whole account of the parapraxis, serves instead to problematise the conception of a meaning or purpose

internal to the slip itself, raising the question of the conditions under which the existence of such an intention could legitimately be demonstrated or verified. Freud will go on to argue that even if the slip cannot after all be shown to possess a meaning of its own, "the author would still retain his right to intellectualise it by furnishing it with a sense so as to employ it for his own purposes".(36/62)

In this way the gap opened up between the author and his character has the simultaneous effect of creating a displacement between the notion of sense and the notion of intention. This frees the assertion of sense from any reliance on evidence for a meaning inherent in the parapraxis, allowing us to dissociate the question of sense from the psychological axis of subjective intention. This manoeuvre in turn serves to establish objective conditions for the sense of the parapraxis that might be derived from its position within an external register of narrative development rather than its relation to the intentions of a subject.

II.

We have examined Freud's attempt to characterise the nature of psychoanalytic investigation by contrast to that of medical science. This argument turns on the distinction between a form of explanation grounded in the register of physiological functioning and an alternative psychological foundation which has come to be associated with the notions of sense and significance. We may therefore use the framework of this distinction to position the concepts that Freud introduces to define the conditions of psychoanalytic explanation.

It becomes apparent that the concept of sense, which has been used to characterise the specific register of psychoanalytic investigation, is itself possessed of a certain degree of ambiguity or divergence that can be understood in terms of this underlying distinction. Freud's initial definition of the term as "meaning or purpose" (36/62) thus allows us to separate out these two aspects of the concept of sense in terms of a distinction between a concept of "meaning" in a linguistic register of semantics or significance, and a concept of "purpose" in a physiological register of function or intention.

Freud's return to the concept of sense at the start of the third lecture merely serves to confirm the structure of this distinction. Here we find the assertion that "what is to be understood by the 'sense' of a psychical process" is nothing other than "the intention it

serves and its position in a psychical continuity".(40/66) The two aspects of this definition again correspond to the two possible approaches to the explanation of the parapraxis - either in terms of the intention or purpose that lies behind it, or in terms of the meaning or sense that can be attributed to it on the basis of "its position in a psychical continuity".

An awareness of the underlying dynamics of the argument should thus prevent us leaping to any premature conclusions when Freud announces the aim of pursuing here only one aspect of that definition, that of intention or purpose. "In most of our researches we can replace 'sense' by 'intention' or 'purpose'."(40/66) This assertion should not blind us to the possibility that Freud is here using the strategy of eliding the distinction between the concept of "sense" and that of "intention" precisely in order to bring to light the difficulties inherent in any attempt to explain the parapraxis by reference to the notion of intention.

The particular interest of this discussion is not therefore Freud's apparent efforts to defend an explanation of the parapraxis predicated upon the psychological concept of intention, but rather the attempt to bring into focus the difficulties that the subjective and internal aspects of this notion pose for the requirements of empirical verification. For if the sense of the parapraxis is to be reduced to its relation to an intention, then the validity of that explanation comes to depend on the possibility of demonstrating the existence of a second, disturbing intention, which interferes with the function initially intended.

We start with the simplest case in which both the sense of the parapraxis and the intention behind it are "plainly visible".(40/66) It is the examples where "what was intended is replaced by its contrary" that provide the clearest instance of the role of a second intention in the outcome of the parapraxis. For here not only is the sense of the parapraxis unmistakable, but the existence of the conflicting intention is clearly demonstrated in the product of the slip itself.

This schema, where the sense of the parapraxis is explained by reference to a relation of interference between two conflicting intentions, is then extended to the more obscure instances where neither the sense nor the nature of the disturbing intention are so easily discernible. Freud will claim that even the most obscure or meaningless examples can be explained in terms of a process of interference between two conflicting intentions. In these cases the absence of sense is itself to be attributed to

the effects of distortion arising from the mutual interference between those intentions.(42/68)

The entire range of parapraxes, from those where the sense is displayed most clearly to the most distorted instances where neither the sense nor the intention is apparent, can thus be accounted for in terms of the variety of possible relations between two conflicting intentions. "The differences between these cases of slips arise merely from the fact that on some occasions one intention takes the place of the other completely (becomes a substitute for it), as in slips of the tongue that express the contrary, whereas on other occasions the one intention has to be satisfied with distorting or modifying the other, so that composite structures are produced".(42/69)

The explanation of any given parapraxis thus comes to rest upon the possibility of identifying the two conflicting intentions involved in each case and determining the nature of the relation between them. One of these intentions, that associated with the conscious function, is by definition easily established as manifest in the function itself. The question then becomes that of the procedure by which the nature and role of the other "disturbing" intention is to be discovered.

In the most favourable case, where the one intention completely replaces the other, this second intention is apparent in the outcome of the slip itself. In all the other cases, however, the relation of interference between intentions gives rise to a degree of distortion that prevents us from easily determining the nature of the second intention. A fundamental problem for this method of investigation then arises. "(H)ow do we arrive at the disturbing purpose from the distortion?"(47/74)

Again Freud will make use of the simplest-case scenario to define the essence of the problem. We simply ask the speaker to explain his own parapraxis. In the most favourable case he is able to tell us both what he intended to say and what it was that disturbed him. "Here then the disturbing purpose is as securely established as the disturbed one".(47/74) This procedure, in which the speaker is himself asked to account for the parapraxis and provides the explanation "with the first thing that occurs to him", is now presented as the fundamental model "for every psychoanalytic investigation".(48/75)

This formulation of the psychoanalytic method in its most basic profile has the effect of situating the speaking subject at the centre of its investigations, thus bringing into focus the most obvious objection to the validity of this procedure - the question of the

reliability of the information supplied by the speaker. "But there is no proof that the slip did in fact take place in that way".(48/75) This issue becomes even more unavoidable when we turn to the more problematic case where the speaker not only fails to confirm the role of the second intention, but goes on to deny or repudiate any suggestion that it exists at all. Is psychoanalysis not then forced to abandon its "unproveable interpretation"?(49/76)

It is clear, then, that this formulation of the psychoanalytic method is not designed to defend the validity of psychoanalytic interpretation with simplistic examples, but on the contrary to bring into focus the problematic position of psychoanalysis in relation to objective verification. So too, the structuring of the argument between the most favourable and most problematic instance is not, despite appearances, an attempt to show that the latter can be reduced to, or at least approximated to, the model of the former. It serves rather to problematise the very possibility of verification from this source, by demonstrating the difficulties inherent in even the most favourable case.

By bringing the model of investigation to bear on the position of the speaking subject, Freud thus demonstrates the basic contradiction faced by psychoanalysis. On the one hand the speaker is himself established as the sole source of information concerning the intentions or purposes involved in the slip. At the same time it is clear that the material provided by that speaker can not serve as an objective foundation for psychoanalytic explanation. This problematic situation gives rise to the admission that in the absence of reliable information from the speaker "we cannot arrive at a direct proof of the suspected sense". Instead, "we are obliged to turn to circumstantial evidence".(50-51/78)

Here Freud invokes the analogy with the conditions of legal procedure as justification for turning to alternative sources of verification for psychoanalytic interpretation. The sense of the parapraxis is thus to be sought not in the hidden intentions of the subject, but rather in an examination of "the psychical situation in which the parapraxis occurs".(51/78) At the same time we encounter a slightly more elaborate account of that procedure of interpretation itself, which starts from general principles of interpretation, and then looks for confirmation or clarification either in the details of this psychical situation or in the course of subsequent events.

"What happens as a rule is that the interpretation is carried out according to general principles: to begin with there is only a suspicion, a suggestion for an interpretation, and we then find a confirmation by examining the psychical situation. Sometimes we

have to wait for subsequent events as well (which have, as it were, announced themselves by the parapraxis) before our suspicion is confirmed."(51/78-79)

Freud goes on to provide a range of examples intended to demonstrate not just that parapraxes have a sense, but more pertinently, "how that sense is discovered or confirmed by the attendant circumstances".(55/83) He refers to two groups of observations in particular - accumulated or combined parapraxes and cases in which our interpretations are confirmed by the course of subsequent events. It may be hoped that the relation between these two groups of examples might provide us with some clarification as to the status of the concept of sense and the orientation of psychoanalytic interpretation itself.

The examples of accumulated and combined parapraxes are described as "without doubt the finest flower of their kind".(56/83) What is it about these forms that presents us with the essence of the psychoanalytic conception of parapraxes? On the one hand it is the accumulation of these phenomena which betrays an obstinacy that makes their sense unmistakable and indicates "something intentional". On the other, it is precisely their "mutual interchangeability", the variety and diversity of the forms they take, that demonstrates most clearly "what it is in parapraxes that is important and characteristic".(56/83)

Despite Freud's use of the terms "intention" and "purpose", then, it is clear that the sense constituted by the series of parapraxes as a whole is not to be identified with the intention associated with any particular function. Instead we are pointed towards a definition of the sense of parapraxes that goes beyond any limited intention or purpose of the psychological subject, and is constituted rather by the accumulated sequence of events.

This suggestion is supported by the second group of examples in which an interpretation of the sense of the parapraxis can only be confirmed by the course of subsequent events. Here again the attribution of a sense to the parapraxis depends not on any primary reference to the intentions of the subject, which remain obscure, but rather on what the sequence of objective events allows us to infer about the nature of those intentions.

The "governing condition" of these instances is that "the present psychical situation is unknown to us or inaccessible to our enquiries".(57/85) But has not the thrust of Freud's entire argument been to demonstrate the difficulties arising from the fact that

the object of psychoanalytic investigation is by nature inaccessible to the standard procedures of observation and verification? Hence the need to elaborate alternative principles of explanation that do not depend on the possibility of any immediate access to the subjective sphere of intention, which is by definition "unknown to us" and equally "inaccessible to our enquiries".

Hence when Freud suggests that there is a similarity in the status of parapraxes and "the omens and auguries of the ancients" he is hardly implying that psychoanalytic interpretation operates at the level of divination or superstition. This reference serves rather to establish a point of articulation between "objective happenings" and "subjective acts". For it is at this point that we might be able to deploy a form of interpretation that would allow us to interpret the external course of events as "indications of intentions that were still concealed".(58/86)

III.

The register of psychoanalytic investigation has been defined in terms of the proposition that its object, in this case the parapraxis, has a sense. This concept of sense has made possible an "extension to the world of psychical phenomena", and rendered liable to explanation "phenomena which were not reckoned earlier as belonging to it".(60/87) And yet we still have no account of the grounds for this claim, nor any clarification of the status of that concept of sense itself. This question is hardly resolved by Freud's suggestion that the notion of sense constitutes both the "product" of the psychoanalytic method and the "basis" for its further enquiries.(60/87)

Freud points out that the validity of this conception of the parapraxis does not in fact depend on the possibility of demonstrating "that every single parapraxis that occurs has a sense", even though that may be considered likely. He thus allows for the possibility of parapraxes that may either occur on a purely physiological basis or be regarded as unintended. These two provisos, which seem to contradict the very tenets of his argument, are situated as qualifications or "limitations" to the hypothesis that serves as the starting point of these investigations - "that parapraxes are psychical acts and arise from mutual interference between two intentions".(60/87)

We have seen that the explanation of the parapraxis is made possible by structuring it as a valid psychical act according to the model of normal psychical functioning. The sense of that parapraxis is then to be determined by tracing it to the underlying

structure of interference between two conflicting intentions. Freud will now elaborate on this model of the parapraxis and his conception of psychical phenomena in general, by questioning the concept of psychical act itself. "Let us pause for a moment longer over the assertion that parapraxes are 'psychical acts'. Does this imply more than what we have said already - that they have a sense? I think not."(60/87)

Here Freud provides the most unmistakable indication yet that the constitution of the novel register of psychoanalytic objects is to be associated with the concept of sense, by positing a direct relationship between the conception of "psychical act" and that of "sense", and arguing for a reduction of the former to the latter. He will now consider the respective value of these two terms in the description of psychical processes via a discussion of the notion of "mental phenomenon" itself. The relevant question is then whether this phenomenon has either "arisen immediately from somatic, organic and material influences" or is rather "derived in the first instance from other mental processes".(60-61/88)

Freud will once again reject any form of investigation oriented towards immediate physiological influences as falling outside the realm of psychology. He argues instead that the description of a phenomenon as psychical implies that it is situated primarily in relation to other mental processes. The term "sense" is introduced to distinguish this conception of psychical phenomena, the proper object of psychology, from any reduction to the form of physiological functioning. Hence even though the parapraxis may have a physiological basis, or even a purely physiological mechanism, it is quite clear that these influences do not constitute its sense, which is here established as the specific register of psychoanalytic investigation.(61/88)

The advantage of a form of interpretation pivoting upon the concept of sense, rather than on the concept of psychical function more traditional to psychology, is then illustrated by reference to a group of phenomena - chance and symptomatic actions - which are "distinguished from parapraxes by their lack of another intention with which they are in collision and which is disturbed by them".(61/88) As these phenomena have no conscious function there can be no question of accounting for them in terms of any conflict of intentions. Yet it is precisely the notion of sense that allows these phenomena to be interpreted "in the same way as parapraxes", even though they lack what would otherwise be considered the requisite structure of intentions.(61/88)

Rather than immediately pursuing the implications of these comments, however, Freud will return instead to the initial model of the parapraxis as the product of an

interference between intentions, "in connection with which problems important for psychoanalysis can be worked out with far greater clarity".(61/88) We have seen that the validity of any attempt to account for the parapraxis as the product of an interference between intentions depends on its ability to determine the nature of the intentions involved, in order to explain how they came into a relation of mutual interference. Here Freud will make use of the inverse procedure, approaching the question of the nature of those intentions in terms of a discussion of the various relations possible between them.

Again he sets up a relation between two possible cases. In the obvious case where the two intentions are incompatible or opposed, the parapraxis "represents a conflict between two incompatible intentions".(62/89) The relation of interference between them may then be accounted for in terms of the content of the two intentions themselves. This approach is not, however, adequate for the more problematic case where there is no apparent relation of content between the intentions involved, and any relation appears to be artificially imposed along external or arbitrary paths of association.

It is this second instance that suggests that the disturbance resulting in the parapraxis need not in fact arise from any intrinsic relation between the two intentions at all, but must be accounted for on other grounds. "If the disturbing intention has nothing to do with the disturbed one, where can it have come from and why is it that it makes itself noticeable as a disturbance at this particular point?"(63/90)

This is the framework which Freud establishes as the context for his approach to "the main question ... of what sort of intentions these are, which find expression in this unusual fashion as disturbers of other intentions".(64/91) He will go on to catalogue the different possible types of disturbing intentions into three groups, "among which we must look for the common factor". These examples are grouped not according to the nature of the intentions themselves, but rather in terms of the manner in which we may come to know them.

We may thus distinguish cases in which either "the disturbing purpose is known to the speaker and ... noticed by him"; or "the disturbing purpose is equally recognised as his by the speaker", but of whose role at that moment he was unaware; and finally, "the interpretation of the disturbing intention is vigorously rejected by the speaker" as being "entirely foreign to him".(64/91) The common element uniting these three groups is provided by the observation that, in the first two cases at least, "the disturbing purpose

is recognised by the speaker" but had been "forced back" or denied expression. It is this purpose which is then "put into words against the speaker's will".(65/92)

This conception of the mechanism common to all cases of slips of the tongue gives rise to the observation that "what distinguishes these three groups from one another is the differing extent to which the intention is forced back".(65/93) This formulation in its turn provides the basis for the thesis that "the suppression of the speaker's intention to say something is the indispensable condition for the occurrence of a slip of the tongue".(66/93)

It is the third group of examples, however, that remains an obstacle for this account of the mechanism of the parapraxis. For if the only information about the intentions involved comes directly from the speaker himself, then this third instance where the speaker denies all knowledge of that intention would seem to constitute a serious restriction to the general validity of this thesis. The coherence of this account then requires the introduction of a further assumption - "the hypothesis that intentions can find expression in a speaker of which he himself knows nothing" but which can be inferred "from circumstantial evidence".(64-65/92)

It becomes apparent that it is in fact the legitimacy of this hypothesis, the assumption that "intentions can find expression in a speaker of which he himself knows nothing", that constitutes the horizon of this whole argument. For it is this hypothesis that introduces the question fundamental to the validity of psychoanalytic explanation in general - that of the grounds for the postulation of unconscious mental processes whose existence is unknown to the subject and can not be immediately demonstrated or verified.

This account, which appears to tie the validity of psychoanalytic interpretation to the confirmation of the speaker, must therefore be assessed in relation to the more problematic instance where the speaker knows nothing of those processes and can not be expected to acknowledge their existence. Far from wishing to base his argument on the speaker's own evidence, Freud has been concerned to demonstrate the degree to which that material is fundamentally compromised as a source of objective verification. Hence the need for alternative principles of interpretation that not only do not rely on any direct knowledge of the intentions of the speaker, but will ultimately have to stand against the denials or protests of the speaker himself.

These issues have a direct correlate in the model of the parapraxis as the outcome of a relation of interference between intentions. For not only can there be no direct access to these intentions, nor any independent verification of their existence, but so too there will be instances where the role of those intentions can only be presumed or inferred. Hence the significance of the examples in which there is no discernible relation of content between the intentions, and the relation of interference has to be explained on other grounds. It is precisely the condition of the prior suppression of one of those intentions that then accounts for the relation of interference between them, and thus for the occurrence of the parapraxis itself.

This hypothesis therefore implies a fundamental inversion in the procedure of explanation. The parapraxis was initially to be explained as the outcome of a relation of interference between two conflicting intentions. Attention was then focused on the nature of the disturbing intention in order to explain how that process of interference came about. This question will now, however, be answered not in terms of the content of that intention, nor even in terms of its relation to the intention that it disrupts, but solely in terms of the fact of its prior suppression. "One of these intentions must have been in some way forced back from being put into effect before it can manifest itself as a disturbance of another intention".(66/93)

The suppression of an intention is thus established as the "indispensable condition" for the occurrence of a parapraxis. This hypothesis, however, poses as many questions as it resolves. For it appears to rest upon the possibility of identifying that process of suppression as the common factor in all instances of parapraxis. We have just seen, however, that this conception itself demands the apparently arbitrary introduction of the subsidiary hypothesis concerning the role of intentions unknown to the speaker. And this hypothesis in turn is not only entirely devoid of adequate grounding, but appears to contradict the very grounds for the method of psychoanalytic investigation itself.

These, then, are the questions that will have to be resolved in the course of Freud's argument. For this preliminary account has served merely to introduce the terms of the problem and to set these issues in place. Making no attempt to approach these difficulties or to elaborate on the status of the two hypotheses, Freud is content to abandon the analysis of parapraxes at this point, concerned only to emphasise "the manner in which we have treated these phenomena" as the model for the procedures and assumptions of psychoanalytic explanation in general. This approach he designates as "a dynamic view of mental phenomena".(67/95)

This dynamic view, which will come to characterises the specificity of psychoanalytic explanation in contrast to the procedures of medical science, involves two interrelated aspects. On the one hand, psychical phenomena are to be understood and explained "as signs of an interplay of forces in the mind, as a manifestation of purposeful intentions working concurrently or in mutual opposition".(67/94) At the same time Freud suggests that the principle of this dynamic view of mental life implies that "the phenomena that are perceived must yield in importance to trends which are only hypothetical".(67/95)

SECTION TWO

2.1 Dreams - Difficulties and First Approaches

I.

Freud's introduction to the psychoanalytic method has focused upon the constitution of the parapraxis as an object of scientific investigation. We have seen that this account revolves around the proposition that the parapraxis has a sense. We were led to question the grounds for this claim and the status of the notion of sense itself. For it is already clear that this notion of sense and its role in the procedure of interpretation will be fundamental to the validity of the psychoanalytic method in general.

When we turn to the account of the dream we find the notion of sense situated once more at the centre of Freud's argument. The discovery of sense is presented as the inaugural moment of the psychoanalytic method and placed at the root of a brief sketch of the development of that method that is condensed to the point of being misleading. "It was discovered one day that the pathological symptoms of certain neurotic patients have a sense. On this discovery the psychoanalytic method of treatment was founded. It happened in the course of this treatment that patients, instead of bringing forward their symptoms, brought forward dreams. A suspicion thus arose that the dreams too had a sense."(83/111)

The difficulties associated with this account of the process by which the dream becomes the object of psychoanalytic investigation have nothing to do with the question of its historical accuracy. It is rather the notion of the "discovery" of the sense of the symptom, upon which this method is supposedly founded, that appears to take as given the very question that is at issue. For this would imply that the concept of sense itself stands at the foundation of the method of investigation which makes that discovery possible. And yet it is precisely the problem of the status of this central concept that remains the most contentious and unresolved aspect of Freud's argument for the validity of the technique of interpretation elaborated around it.

Similarly, the strategy of using the demonstration of the sense of the dream as an introduction to the study of pathological symptoms rests upon a proposed equivalence between dreams and symptoms. There is, however, every reason to suspect that this equivalence is itself only made possible by that very notion of sense that the argument sets out to demonstrate. For it is surely only on the basis of such a conception that Freud can claim that "dreams are themselves a neurotic symptom", or that the entire

scope of psychoanalytic knowledge could be elaborated around an interpretation of the dreams of healthy people.(83/111)

On the basis of Freud's earlier remarks we might suggest that it is more precisely a concept of sense associated with the conditions of psychoanalytic interpretation rather than the specific object involved that allows psychoanalysis to propose a novel level of equivalence between the symptom and the dream and to explore features common to both. It would then be precisely the rejection of the physiological criteria of medical explanation in favour of a problematic of sense that allows psychoanalysis to overcome the rigid functional distinction between normal and pathological processes and to consider both dream and symptom alike in terms of their role in the therapeutic process.

It is clear that Freud's whole procedure here, his very approach to the study of dreams as an introduction to the general principles of psychoanalytic interpretation, revolves around the question of the status to be attributed to this problematic concept of sense. His discussion of the nature of the dream and the process by which the dream becomes the privileged object of psychoanalytic investigation should therefore allow us to situate this fundamental concept as that defining the parameters of this argument as a whole.

II.

"Dreams then have become a subject of psychoanalytic research."(83/112) The position of dreams and parapraxes as common objects of psychoanalytic investigation entails certain obvious similarities. The problematic status of the dream as an object of scientific research, however, is distinguished from that of the parapraxis by an additional obstacle - "the odium of being unscientific". Again this issue provides us with an index to more fundamental questions concerning the constitution of the object of science itself. For the characteristics of the dream, its very nature as object, challenge the most basic criteria of scientific and medical investigation. "In investigating dreams one is not even certain about the object of one's research."(84/112)

The characteristic attributes of the dream, its fragmentation, incoherence, and general instability, would seem from the start to preclude its definition as a coherent object. Compounding the intrinsic difficulty of its status as object is the fact that we can have

no direct access to the content of any particular dream apart from the dreamer's own description of it. We are thus faced with two interrelated aspects of the same fundamental problem. On the one hand the object itself, the dream as content or experience, is by definition beyond access to direct investigation or objective examination. At the same time our only source of information about that dream remains highly suspect as a possible basis for scientific assessment.

The status of the dreamer's report as a reliable or accurate description of the dream becomes the central question - "has he any guarantee that his account has been correct?"(84/112) Here the difficulties of objective verification appear even more insurmountable than in the case of the parapraxis. For the possibility of determining the veracity of the dreamer's account would seem to require the availability of the dream itself as the basis for comparison. The particular nature of the dream, however, definitively rules out any form of verification predicated upon the relation between the dreamer's description and its object. For not only do we lack any means of independent access to the content of that dream, but the objective profile of the dream itself remains characteristically unstable or elusive.

It is the indistinct and fragmentary position of the dream in the dreamer's recollection, the problems of forgetting and uncertainty, that would appear to finally preclude any objective verification of the dreamer's account of it. Freud's response to these difficulties, simply doing away with the object itself, is as startling for the nonchalant manner with which he proposes it as it is for the implications that it carries for the foundations of psychoanalytic knowledge. "We can help to overcome the defect of uncertainty in remembering dreams if we decide that whatever the dreamer tells us must count as his dream, without regard to what he may have forgotten or have altered in recalling it."(85/113)

Let us take a step back. These lectures constitute an attempt to characterise the method of psychoanalytic investigation in distinction from the methods of medical investigation and the criteria and procedures of empirical science upon which it relies. Freud has chosen to approach this matter not in terms of the general principles of psychoanalytic investigation, but rather by way of the particular conditions determining the means of access to its objects. The question then arises as to what it is about the nature of these objects, and the conditions under which they become available to psychoanalytic investigation, that will allow us to characterise the conditions of that form of investigation itself.

The example of the parapraxis has provided the preliminary framework for this argument. It is the topic of dreams, however, that will serve as the central platform around which Freud will formulate the basic principles of psychoanalytic investigation. We must therefore ask what it is about the status of the dream that makes it suitable to illustrate the specific conditions under which the method of psychoanalytic investigation comes to be elaborated and systematised. If the dream constitutes the privileged site for the development of that method, we can expect that the difficulties encountered in the attempt to situate the dream as an object of scientific research must be representative of the conditions of the field of psychoanalytic investigation in general.

The study of the dream is faced with the immediate difficulty of its very definition as object. Where the symptom, for example, at least offers us a positive object of investigation, the characteristics of the dream render it beyond access to empirical examination. Instead we are forced to rely on the dreamer's report as our only source of information about the content of that dream. Yet the validity of this report, and hence its suitability to serve as the basis for objective findings, is rendered doubtful by the distortions of memory that arise between the experience of the dream and its waking recollection. With no independent source of information about the content of that dream, and no means of access to the dream itself, we are left without any measure by which the veracity of that report might be assessed.

As Freud has pointed out in his introduction, these difficulties are not in fact unique to the class of psychoanalytic objects, nor therefore necessarily characteristic of psychoanalytic investigation. The discipline of history is confronted with analogous conditions in that its object is by definition irretrievable, and thus inaccessible to direct examination. Although immediate access to its object may be denied, some form of valid knowledge of historical events is still considered feasible on the basis of correlation between alternative sources of information about those events. The absolutely insular experience of the dream, however, precludes any attempt to approximate to the structure of objective verification by means of alternative forms of corroborating evidence, apparently ruling out any form of reliable knowledge about that dream.

At the same time that the tenuous objective status of the dream places us in a position of absolute dependence on the subjective report of the dreamer, we are confronted with the additional difficulty of the extreme instability of the subjective pole itself. It is this aspect, the inherent uncertainty and indistinctness of the dreamer's own

recollection of his dream, that ultimately precludes any attempt to use that report as a source of approximate information upon which access to the dream might still be founded. Apart from any difficulties with the insular or inaccessible nature of the dream as object, therefore, it is in fact the corollary instability of the subjective pole, the uncertainty of the dreamer's recollection, that turns out to be the decisive factor for the attempt to configure the dream as the object of scientific investigation.

We are thus forced to abandon any attempt to use the dreamer's report as a means of gaining access to the dream itself. Instead psychoanalysis will take as its sole point of reference the dreamer's recollection of the material of his dream, as it is preserved in his memory and configured in his recounting. The rejection of any criteria of validity external to the dreamer's account would at the same time, however, appear to exclude the possibility of an objective knowledge of that dream. By cutting the dream free from any reference to the object, in order to consider the fragments of representation preserved in the recollection of the dreamer, Freud seems to be removing the empirical foundation for its investigation. And yet it is quite clear that the precarious nature of the dreamer's own recollection is in no way suited to serve as an alternative foundation for psychoanalytic science.

III.

It is only then reasonable to expect Freud to provide some other criteria by which the veracity of the dreamer's recollections might be evaluated, and which would then serve as the guiding principles of psychoanalytic investigation. We are presented instead with an apparently anecdotal history of attitudes to dreams, which contrasts the contemporary status of the dream in medical and scientific circles with the significance attached to dreams in ancient times as objects of practical interpretation.

Freud suggests that it is the criteria associated with the rise of the exact sciences, and the quantitative and physiological foundations of medical science in particular, that have led to dreams being considered solely as the peripheral expression of somatic processes, and thus as "non-psychical acts". The presuppositions determining the orientation of medical investigation have tended to rule out any positive conception of dreaming as a psychical process in its own right. Instead the attributes of dreams have been considered in relation to the conditions of normal mental functioning in inevitably deprecatory terms, as mere "signs of diminished functioning".(87/115)

It is here that Freud raises the possibility of alternative criteria of investigation that would allow psychoanalysis to approach the dream as a form of coherent mental activity with a sense of its own, one that might have escaped the procedures of empirical investigation. Freud sets out to situate this task by means of "a general survey of the field of dreams". Avoiding the problematic issue of providing a definition of the dream as the object of this enquiry, he proposes instead to isolate "the essential feature" of dreams. It is suggested that this defining feature of the dream might be sought in something that can be shown to be "common to all dreams".(87-88/116)

The most obvious common attribute of dreams is the fact that they occur while we are asleep. Dreaming is a form of mental activity which is distinguished from waking thought by certain characteristics that can be traced to the conditions of the state of sleep itself. Here Freud approaches the state of sleep not in terms of its biological or physiological function, which would merely return us to the medical model of the dream, but rather in terms of its "psychological characteristics". The state of sleep is thus characterised by a withdrawal of psychic interest from the external world. "The biological purpose of sleep seems therefore to be rehabilitation, and its psychological characteristic suspense of interest in the world."(88/117)

In that case dreams cannot be attributed directly to the condition of sleep, for they contradict the demand for complete absence of stimuli. Dreams would appear rather to involve the residues of mental activity which persist in sleep. The primary common feature of dreams, their relationship to the state of sleep, thus allows Freud to elaborate a "psycho-physiological" model of the dream as a form of defensive reaction to the stimuli which disturb sleep. "A dream, then, is the manner in which the mind reacts to stimuli that impinge upon it in the state of sleep."(89/118) This model serves to re-establish an empirical framework within which the occurrence of the dream might be explained by reference to the stimuli out of which it arises.

Freud will devote the remainder of the lecture to an evaluation of this model and its ability to account for the most characteristic features of the dream. It is important, therefore, not to ignore the proviso that Freud situates at this stage of the discussion - that the explanation of the dream as a simple reaction to a disturbing stimulus leaves no room for the factor of sense. For it is this qualification that structures Freud's approach to the psycho-physiological model and allows him to use the shortcomings of this model to situate the dimension of sense. It is thus precisely those aspects of the dream that can not be accounted for in terms of any direct relation between stimulus and response that will point us towards the register of sense.

This question also explains Freud's somewhat enigmatic reference here to the other common attribute of dreams. For the only other feature common to all dreams, the difference between mental processes in dreams and in waking life, cannot be dismissed as the sign of a reduction or impairment of mental functioning in sleep. Rather it points to some form of qualitative transformation, a change in modality inherent to the process of dream formation, that would account for the predominance of visual images in dreams despite the various types of stimulus involved. It is this qualitative transformation that underlies the impression of strangeness in the dream, and suggests that "the scene of action of dreams is different from that of waking ideational life".(90/119)

The conception of the dream as a response to the stimuli that impinge on sleep thus has two obvious limitations. On the one hand there would be no need for the dream to have a sense, nor in fact to possess any positive function beyond simple reaction to residual stimuli in sleep. On the other hand it should then be possible to explain the dream by tracing it to the particular disturbing stimulus to which it constitutes the response. Yet the variety of dreams, the range of differences between individual dreams, can hardly be explained either in terms of a correspondence to the different states or stages of sleep, nor in terms of the various kinds of stimulus involved. "This variety is not in fact what we might expect to find in a mere defensive reaction to a stimulus".(90/119)

After making note of these reservations, which themselves serve to cast doubt on the viability of the psycho-physiological model of the dream, Freud will propose leaving to one side the question of the sense of the dream in order to press ahead with the conception of the dream as "the reaction to a stimulus which disturbs sleep".(92/120) Again we start with the simplest example, where the stimulus appears in the content of the dream, providing the most direct evidence for the role of that stimulus in the formation of the dream. We continue with a series of "arousal dreams" where the dreamer is in fact woken from the dream by the persistent disturbance of the stimulus. These instances again provide a simple demonstration of the role of some external stimulus in the instigation of the dream.

In these examples, however, the stimulus does not actually appear in the content of the dream. Instead the dream "interprets" the stimulus, and replaces it with another. It is here that a problem arises for any attempt to explain the dream by reference to the stimulus around which it forms, for "it interprets it differently each time".(93/122)

Thus in each of these examples the same disturbing stimulus is represented by a different image. An adequate explanation of the dream would have to be able to explain why this particular image and no other was chosen for the representation of the stimulus in the dream. As that aspect of the dream is clearly not determined by the nature of the stimulus, the question of the choice of image would appear to be "a matter of caprice".(93/122)

Freud goes on to suggest that the examples of arousal dreams "offer the best chance of establishing the influence of external sleep-disturbing stimuli", in that the stimulus itself remains available to consciousness on waking. In all other instances we are faced with the problem of the means by which we are to determine the nature of the stimulus which gave rise to the dream when we have no information about that stimulus. "If the stimulus can no longer be pointed to we cannot be convinced of its existence."(94/123) Yet Freud will also point out that, whatever the status of this external stimulus, it can in any case explain only those aspects of the dream which correspond directly to the influence of that stimulus, but not the most familiar and characteristic aspects of dream formation in general.

When Freud turns to the role of internal stimuli in the formation of the dream he will make us of the same framework of argument. Thus although we find ourselves returned here to the register of physiological processes, Freud is concerned above all to emphasise that the role of somatic stimuli in the formation of the dream is open to the same objections as that of external stimuli. On the one hand there is the problem that the influence of a somatic stimulus is "uncertain or unproveable", in that this stimulus "is no longer manifest after waking and can therefore not be proved to have occurred".(95/124) On the other hand, and more decisively, Freud wishes to point out that "internal somatic stimuli are as little able as external sensory stimuli to explain more of a dream than what corresponds in it to a direct reaction to the stimulus".(96/125)

In this case too there are examples where the relation of the content of the dream to the source of a somatic stimulus "is too plain to be mistaken".(95/124) Here it is precisely the pressure of a need, an over-full bladder or a state of excitation of the genital organs, that provides the clearest example of the role of an internal stimulus in the formation of a dream. In all other cases there can be at best "a justifiable suspicion" that a somatic stimulus is involved. For although the content of the dream might provide some indication of the influence of a somatic stimulus, that stimulus is inevitably subjected to a process of "interpretation" or "working over". "Dreams do

not simply reproduce the stimulus; they work it over, they make allusions to it, they include it in some context, they replace it by something else."(96/125)

It is this active or productive aspect of the process of dream formation, the "working over" of the stimulus, that can not be explained in terms of any simple relation of reaction to that stimulus. For that process does not appear to be determined by the nature of the stimulus itself. The difficulties involved in establishing the origin of the stimulus that disturbs sleep are thus rendered irrelevant by the subordinate role attributed to that stimulus as mere "instigator" of dream formation. Whatever the status of that stimulus, and whatever its role in the instigation of the dream, it can still not account for the aspects of dream formation that might be considered most characteristic of the dream itself.

This point is illustrated by reference to the simplest or most reasonable dreams, which might be expected to display most clearly the influence of the stimuli from which they arise. Even in these most transparent instances, where there appears to be a minimum of working over and the dream is made up of nothing more than a direct representation of material from everyday life, we still need to know "why and for what purpose this familiar material, only recently experienced, has been repeated in the dream".(97/127)

IV.

The attempt to characterise the dream in terms of the conditions of sleep, and thus in terms of its relation to possible sources of disturbance to sleep, appears to have met with limited success. An alternative approach to the problem seems called for. Freud suggests that the topic of day-dreams might provide an indication of some further attribute of dreams apart from those already considered.

It is immediately apparent that any claim of day-dreams to be considered a form of dreaming can have nothing to do with the state of sleep, for "there is no trace in them of the two things that are common to dreams".(98/127) Any similarity between night-dreams and day-dreams would rather have to do with their nature as "products of the imagination". Their common designation would thus be attributable to their "having the same relation to reality".(99/128)

This would suggest in turn that the two common features already identified might not in fact be the ultimate determinants of dreaming, but might merely account for the

characteristic form in which it is experienced. The conditions of the state of sleep would in that case account for the irrational or incoherent aspects of mental activity in the dream, as well as the predominance of visual imagery. So-called "day-dreams" would, in contrast, provide us with an example of the mental activity of dreaming, but without those aspects derived from the conditions of sleep that make dreams themselves so difficult to understand.

The more accessible content of the day-dream would then provide us with insight into the nature of these forms of imaginative production, expressed in the rational modality of waking thought. Here the function of this form of mental activity as the imaginary fulfilment of wishes of either an egoistic or erotic nature becomes quite apparent. "The content of these phantasies is dominated by a very transparent motive. They are scenes and events in which the subject's egoistic needs of ambition and power or his erotic wishes find satisfaction."(98/128)

The analogy between night-dreams and day-dreams, founded on apparently speculative linguistic grounds, thus allows Freud in one move to dispose of the two "common features" of dreams, which have served their purpose to establish the terms of the argument, and to bring to light the more essential question of the status of dreams as "products of the imagination". This in turn allows him to introduce the central psychoanalytic thesis that the dream is a form of wish-fulfilment in its most concrete and plausible context. The grounds for that principle, however, will have to be sought elsewhere.

2.2 The Premisses of Interpretation

I.

Freud's introduction to the method of psychoanalytic investigation has until now revolved around an examination of the characteristics of the object involved. This procedure is made quite explicit at the beginning of the second lecture, where Freud proposes starting with a particular object of investigation, the parapraxis, rather than with general principles or postulates. The aim of this procedure may be understood as an attempt to situate the field of psychoanalytic investigation in terms of the particular conditions of access to its object. The initial approach to the topic of the dream has been shaped by a similar attempt to bring into focus those aspects of the psychoanalytic object that prove resistant to standard procedures of empirical investigation. It is in response to the limitations of the physiological account of dream formation that Freud now proposes an alternative approach. "What we need, then, is a new path, a method which will enable us to make a start in the investigation of dreams."(100/129)

Freud turns to elaborating the principles of a procedure of investigation that will allow psychoanalysis to come to terms with the particular nature of its object. This new approach is marked by a shift in register away from an examination of the object to a general discussion of the principles or premisses of the technique of interpretation. This step marks a decisive shift in the orientation of the argument. The previous discussion has focused on the characteristics of the psychoanalytic object, in an attempt to demonstrate that it is the problematic status of its object that denies to psychoanalysis the sort of empirical foundation that grounds other forms of scientific investigation and ensures their validity. Instead psychoanalysis will be forced to seek an alternative foundation at the level of the principles underlying its procedure of investigation. It is these principles, the premisses of the technique of interpretation, that are to provide the basis for a novel approach to its object.

The first premiss of the psychoanalytic technique for the interpretation of dreams is the assumption that "dreams are not somatic but psychical phenomena".(100/129) A large part of the previous lecture has been devoted to a discussion of the inadequacies of the physiological model of dream formation, in order to demonstrate that the attempt to explain the dream in terms of the somatic processes that underlie it is unable to account for the most characteristic features of the dream. This discussion was aimed precisely at bringing to light those aspects of the process of dream formation that can only be accounted for in terms of the dream's nature as a form of mental activity or

"imaginative production". Yet here Freud will make no reference to this preceding argument, which itself amounts to a decisive rejection of the somatic model of dream formation. Instead he will choose to present this premiss in what seems to be an unnecessarily belligerent or dogmatic manner. "(W)hat justifies our making the assumption? Nothing: but there is nothing either to prevent our making it."(100/129)

Let us not forget that we are here dealing with what is to be the first premiss of the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation. The validity of that technique of interpretation, and thus of the psychoanalytic method as a whole, can therefore only be presumed to rest upon, or at least be closely tied to, the legitimacy of this initial premiss. It is not then unreasonable to expect closer attention to be paid to the question of the status of this premiss and the grounds of its validity. Freud's approach to this issue becomes even more puzzling when one realises that he has at his disposal perfectly plausible grounds for arguing that the dream is in fact a form of mental activity, and could even claim to have demonstrated this likelihood in the previous lecture. Yet he will ignore the available empirical support for this premiss, in favour of the far more tenuous argument that dreams "can only interest us on the assumption that they are mental phenomena".(100/129) Are we truly to believe that the nature of the dream is to be considered dependent upon the reasons for our interest in it?

We can only make sense of Freud's procedure here as an attempt to separate off the question of the validity of this premiss, and thus of the technique of interpretation itself, from any foundation in the empirical register. The manner in which the issue is formulated then serves to bring this strategy to our attention and to highlight this distinction. For the first premiss of the technique of interpretation is formulated as an assumption concerning the nature of the object under investigation. It also happens that there are quite legitimate grounds for this assumption in the demonstrated characteristics of the dream itself. The validity of this premiss could thus be far more effectively argued on those grounds, in terms of the positive attributes of the object of this assertion. Yet Freud will disregard any possible empirical support for this assumption, in order to tie the validity of the premiss to the aims of the work of investigation. "The outcome of our work will decide whether we are to hold to this assumption and whether we may then go on to treat it in turn as a proved finding."(100/129)

The legitimacy of this first premiss is not, therefore, considered in terms of any foundation that it might have in the characteristics of the object involved, nor in terms of any possibility of establishing its validity at the level of an empirical examination of

that object. The validity of this assertion as a premiss of interpretation is rather to be considered solely in terms of its status as a principle of explanation, and thus in relation to the aims or goals of the work of investigation. And what are these aims, the "outcome" of the work of investigation, to which the validity of this premiss will be tied? "(S)omething sought for in all scientific work - to understand the phenomena, to establish a correlation between them".(100/129)

Freud's procedure of argument here, his conception of the status and grounds of validity of this initial premiss, becomes even more significant in the light of the inference he immediately wishes to draw from it. "We proceed with our work, accordingly, on the supposition that dreams are psychical phenomena. In that case they are products and utterances of the dreamer's, but utterances which tell us nothing, which we do not understand."(100/129) A great deal will hinge upon this inference, for Freud will go on to characterise the method for the interpretation of the dream as the attempt to discover the meaning of this "utterance". We can only then presume that the validity of that method of interpretation will depend to a large degree on the legitimacy of this assumption and the concept of meaning that it implies. And yet, after taking a somewhat oblique approach to the relatively innocuous question of whether the dream is to be considered a psychical process or not, Freud is quite happy, without any further qualification, to now draw this crucial and contentious conclusion from that premiss. We must then take a closer look at this first premiss of the technique of interpretation, in order to determine in what sense it can be considered to imply, or provide the basis for, the assumption that the dream has a meaning.

Freud's account of the method of psychoanalytic investigation began with the distinction between the physiological register of medical investigation and the "psychological" register of psychoanalytic explanation. It is not, then, entirely unexpected to find this same distinction situated at the root of the first premiss of the technique of interpretation. For the question whether the dream is to be considered a somatic or a psychical phenomenon merely maps, in the form of a hypothesis about the nature of the object, that initial distinction between registers of explanation that Freud has already established as fundamental to the method of psychoanalytic investigation. Nor should it surprise us to find that the next step takes us once more to the heart of the problematic of sense. We have already examined the use Freud makes of that initial distinction to situate the parapraxis, the first object of psychoanalytic investigation, as a "statement" with a sense or a meaning. That whole argument now serves as the framework for the attempt to situate the dream as an "utterance", on the grounds of its position in the register of mental activity.

That initial argument thus allows Freud to treat this first premiss of psychoanalytic interpretation, formulated as a claim about the dream's status as psychic phenomenon, as amounting to the premiss that the dream has a sense. For has he not already gone to some pains to set up an equivalence between the notion of "mental phenomenon" and the notion of "sense"? It is this conception of the sense of mental phenomena in general that now forms the basis for the assertion that the dream has a sense, and may thus be considered a meaningful utterance. Once we appreciate that this premiss in effect amounts to the postulate of sense then we have for the first time some indication as to the status of that enigmatic concept itself. For we may then treat the procedure by which this first premiss has been argued as establishing the general framework for the premiss of sense as well. In that case the sense of the dream, and of the psychoanalytic object in general, is to be postulated in the form of a provisional hypothesis on the basis of which the work of interpretation proceeds. The validity of this assumption is then to be justified on the basis of the outcome of that work of interpretation, in terms of its success in rendering that dream intelligible.

The suggestion of circularity or tautology about this process, that a concept of sense is postulated as the basis for a technique of interpretation that then allows us to "discover" that sense, only arises if we ignore the procedure according to which this premiss is argued. For just as the claim that the dream can only interest us on the assumption that it is a mental phenomenon remains inexplicable if treated as a dogmatic assertion about the nature of the object, so too the postulate that the dream has a sense is not to be considered as an empirical or substantive claim, but rather as a provisional assumption justified in its status as a necessary premiss of interpretation. The premiss of sense is thus postulated in a provisional or "hypothetical" mode as the premiss of the intelligibility of the dream. This principle of intelligibility rests on no other grounds than its status as a necessary assumption required if interpretation of the dream is to be at all possible. The legitimacy of this principle will then be considered in terms of its success in rendering the interpretation of the dream possible, rather than on the basis of any empirical demonstration of characteristics intrinsic to the dream itself.

"We proceed with our work, accordingly, on the supposition that dreams are psychical phenomena".(100/129) This allows us to consider the dream as a product of the dreamer's mental activity that is in principle intelligible or meaningful, even though that meaning may not be at all apparent. The question then becomes merely one of the procedure by which that meaning is to be discovered or established. The most obvious approach would be to ask the dreamer what his dream means. This "common-sense"

model of investigation, already elaborated around the parapraxis as the basic model for every psychoanalytic investigation, however, runs into immediate difficulties in the case of the dream. With the parapraxis the basic procedure of interpretation was modelled on the simplest case where the speaker was himself able to tell us what he had intended to say. In all other cases that model of investigation turned out to be a little more problematic, and ultimately required the introduction of supplementary hypotheses of questionable legitimacy. The nature of the dream forces these difficulties to the forefront, in that from the start the dreamer has no information to give regarding the meaning of his dream. "With dreams cases of the first sort are entirely lacking; the dreamer always says he knows nothing".(101/130)

Again, then, it is the dream that raises the most serious doubts about the viability of this method of investigation. "Since he knows nothing, and we know nothing, and a third person could know even less, there seems to be no prospect of finding out".(101/130) It is in response to this characteristic situation that Freud introduces the second premiss of psychoanalytic investigation. "(I)t is quite possible, and highly probable indeed, that the dreamer does know what his dream means: only he does not know that he knows it and for that reason thinks he does not know it".(101/130)

The manner in which Freud formulates this second premiss, upon which the procedure of psychoanalytic interpretation is to rest, gives rise to such a welter of paradoxical implications as to defy any credence to that premiss itself. For not only does Freud's use of the term "know" appear to go beyond any accepted conception of knowledge, in suggesting the possibility of the dreamer knowing something that he does not know, but tied as it is to our enquiry into the meaning of the dream, this claim further implies a conception of the dreamer meaning something that he does not mean. This situation is not, in fact, any further clarified by Freud's indication that this second premiss amounts to the postulation of the existence of unconscious mental processes. Why then the formulation of this key issue, one of the more problematic psychoanalytic hypotheses, in a manner apparently designed to guarantee its dismissal? And yet he will go on to argue that this second premiss actually refers to an established empirical fact, one that "has already been proved in another field".(102/131)

At this stage it becomes difficult to keep track of Freud's intentions here. He has begun by arguing what should be a relatively straightforward first premiss, concerning the nature of the dream as psychical process, in what seems an unnecessarily obscure or tautological manner. He has now arrived at what would appear to be one of the most contentious of all psychoanalytic hypotheses, that of the possibility of

unconscious knowledge, which we might well expect to see argued in provisional form. And yet he will proceed to argue that this second premiss refers to a concrete and demonstrable empirical fact. If we are not to go astray here, it will be necessary to make some effort to sort out the precise status of these two premisses, and the nature of their relationship to one another.

We have seen how the first premiss, which situates the dream within the register of mental processes, can be considered to introduce the postulate of sense, in the form of the assumption of the intelligibility of the dream, necessary if interpretation is to be at all possible. Given that the very possibility of interpreting the dream must depend to some extent on the question of whether the dream does in fact has a sense, it should not surprise us to find this postulate tied up with the premisses upon which the technique of interpretation is to rest. The manner in which this first premiss is approached, however, suggests that Freud wishes to derive the postulate of sense from the assertion that the dream is to be considered a psychical rather than a somatic process. This first premiss thus seems to entail the postulate that the dream is to be considered intelligible, in principle, solely on the basis of its situation within the register of psychical processes. It is, therefore, the possibility of situating the dream within the context of mental activity that in itself constitutes the basis for the claim that the dream has a meaning or a "sense".

We thus have a conception of the sense of the dream, postulated in the form of the premiss of its intelligibility, that derives from the situation of that dream within the register of mental activity. This concept of sense need imply no more than the possibility of assigning to the dream a certain significance solely on the basis of its occurrence within an economy of psychological processes. It is surely only on the basis of such a conception that Freud can argue for any direct equivalence between the notion of mental phenomenon and the notion of sense. The possibility of interpretation would depend, then, neither on the configuration of the dream as a "meaningful utterance", nor on the demonstration of any meaning that might be apparent in the manifest dream itself. Instead we would have the basis for a formal conception of the intelligibility of the dream that would be derived from its position within the closed economy of psychical processes as a whole, rather than from any relation to the intentions of the dreamer.

Are we not then required to distinguish between this conception of the sense of the dream and any conception of meaning that would be derived from the conscious knowledge or intentions of the dreamer? It is only on the basis of such a distinction

that we can hope to make any sense of the ambiguities of the second premiss. This distinction would at the same time allow us to clarify the question of the relationship between the two premisses, which Freud rather enigmatically characterises as laid down "one within the other".(102/131) If we understand the first premiss as establishing the postulate of the sense of the dream, in the form of a general principle of intelligibility associated with its situation in the register of mental events as a whole, then it becomes clear how the second premiss can be considered to be established "within" the first. For the second premiss merely formulates the implications of that initial postulate of intelligibility, but within a structure of meaningful communication predicated upon the position of the conscious subject as the site of knowledge and source of meaning.

It is only on the basis of such a conception of the relationship between the two premisses, and the sense in which the second is to be considered as postulated "within" the first, that we can account for, or hope to resolve, the paradoxes of the second premiss. At the same time the distinction in registers defined by the relation between the two premisses would provide a comprehensive framework for an understanding of the use of the terms within them. The transition from a general conception of the "sense" of the dream, postulated in the first premiss as a principle of intelligibility, to a positive assumption of the "meaning" of the dream considered as an utterance of the dreamer, would then account for the paradoxical formulations of the second premiss. For it is the transition from the first premiss to the second that contains the questionable inference from the postulate of the intelligibility of the dream to its structure as meaningful utterance. "In that case they are products and utterances of the dreamer's, but utterances which tell us nothing, which we do not understand".(100/129)

It is around this second conception of the dream as utterance that Freud will then deploy the basic model of investigation already elaborated in relation to the parapraxis as statement. The major difference between the dream and the parapraxis, however, is that the parapraxis is already situated in the context of meaningful speech or functional activity. The examples of slips of the tongue, in particular, can thus quite plausibly be structured in terms of the model of meaningful communication. Hence when we question the speaker as to what he "meant to say", he will tell us what he had "intended to say".(101/130) The question of the meaning of the parapraxis may thus be answered in terms of the intention that lies behind it. The practical difficulties encountered by this model of investigation in the case of the dream, on the other hand, bring to light more fundamental difficulties with the model of meaning which it

assumes. The fact that the dreamer cannot tell us what his dream means is merely an indication that the dream is not in fact structured as a meaningful utterance, and can not therefore be explained in terms of any simple relation to the dreamer's intentions.

The manner in which Freud approaches this discussion, and the contradictions into which he leads it, suggests, however, that the underlying aim of this strategy is precisely to allow him to demonstrate the difficulties inherent in such a conception of the meaning of the dream and the inadequacy of any model of investigation based upon it. This procedure thus serves to bring into focus the impasse into which such a concept of meaning leads us, demonstrating the need for some further conception of the sense of the dream and an alternative procedure for its investigation. To tie both the meaning of the dream and the possibility of its interpretation to the conscious knowledge of the dreamer, as Freud appears to do here, can only give rise to immediate difficulties. Within any model of meaningful communication structured on the intentions of the speaking subject, the dream would by definition remain meaningless, and thus beyond interpretation. In the light of such a conception of meaning the insistence that the dream does have a meaning, and that the dreamer does know what that meaning is, even though there is manifestly no trace of either that knowledge or that meaning, can only amount to a deliberate paradox.

The only possible grounds for such an assertion would be the assumption of a meaning that does not in fact rest upon the conscious knowledge or intentions of the dreamer. The first premiss, the postulate of the intelligibility of the dream in relation to the economy of psychical processes as a whole, itself sets up the conditions for such a concept of sense. For this initial postulate already entails a conception of the sense of the dream associated with, or constituted by, conditions external to it, and thus distinct from the intentions of the dreamer. The second premiss then amounts to no more than a reformulation of this first premiss of the intelligibility of the dream within the traditional structure of meaning and knowledge as devolving upon the position of the conscious subject. The appearance of paradox that arises from the insistence that the dreamer must know what his dream means, even though he does not know, only follows if we are unaware of the foundation of this claim in the initial postulate that the dream has a sense that, given the availability of the necessary material, can in principle be deciphered without the knowledge of the dreamer. This second formulation, by bringing the issue to bear on the site of the conscious subject in its position as sole arbiter of knowledge and meaning, serves, however, to manufacture a paradox that will require the dissolution of that sovereign position for its resolution.

It is thus the distinction in registers defined by the relationship between the two premisses, to the extent that the second may be considered to be laid down within the first, that provides the framework within which this procedure becomes intelligible. For it is only in terms of the distinction between the registers of the two premisses that we may appreciate the questionable nature of the inference that links them, and which gives rise to the paradoxical implications of the second premiss. And it is only if we can understand how the paradox of the second premiss is constructed that we can understand how it is to be resolved, by tracing the illegitimate use of terms in their positive formulation back to the context from which they derive their appropriate conditions of use. The paradoxical implications of the second premiss turn upon a double use of the terms "knowledge" and "meaning" - once as postulated in hypothetical form in the initial premiss of intelligibility, and then again within the positive model of the meaning of the dream, devolving on the position of the conscious subject as source and support of that meaning. The difficulties associated with the second premiss could then be shown to arise from the illicit use in substantive mode of terms which derive their coherence from within a different register.

This procedure for the resolution of the paradoxes of the second premiss provides us with the outline of an approach to symptoms in general. If we consider the paradox as a simple formal model of the symptom, then the procedure for the resolution of the symptom would entail a similar "therapeutic deduction", tracing the illegitimate conjunction of terms in the conscious register, which has given rise to the difficulties of the symptom, back to the context from which they arise. This procedure of derivation would also provide a first indication as to the appropriate status for the concept of the unconscious itself, as the register of intelligibility within which the occurrence of the symptom can be accounted for. This concept would then imply no substantive assertion concerning the positive nature of unconscious mental processes, nor depend upon any empirical evidence for their existence, but rests solely on its status as a necessary postulate required if explanation of certain paradoxical effects in the register of conscious experience is to become possible. In each case the appropriate procedure of derivation would entail the demonstration that the difficulties experienced at the level of positive formulation demand the postulation of an alternative register of intelligibility, in the context of which alone the coherence of phenomena in the empirical register can be explained.

This procedure of deduction, by which the postulate of the unconscious is to be justified, also throws some light on the analogous status of the concept of sense. For it would account to some extent for the rather puzzling manner in which the postulate of

sense has been proposed, under cover of the first premiss, as a hypothetical principle of intelligibility justified on no positive grounds apart from its success in rendering the phenomena in question intelligible. The legitimacy of that first premiss of intelligibility, whether configured as the premiss of sense or as the postulate of the unconscious, would then derive, in the first instance, solely from the procedure of deduction itself. This argument also takes us some way towards a more comprehensive account of the relative status of the two premisses themselves. For a simple inversion in the direction of derivation, from the positive formulation of the second premiss to the necessary postulation of the first, required in order to render that second premiss intelligible, immediately renders their relationship more transparent. This reversal of the procedure of argument would allow us to account not only for the puzzling hypothetical status of the first premiss, with its lack of any apparent empirical foundation, but also for the problematic inference linking the two premisses and giving rise to the paradoxes of the second. For the difficulties at each of these stages of Freud's argument could then be traced to the attempt to present in a positive or substantive mode postulates whose status is derived from an inverse procedure of deduction.

It is therefore the reversal of this legitimate procedure of derivation, in the attempt to provide a substantive statement of the foundations of the technique of interpretation, that accounts for the problematic provisional status of the premiss of sense. At the same time it is the illegitimate inference bridging the gap between the two premisses and giving rise, in the progressive direction, to the paradoxes of the second premiss, that remains the most obvious index of this inversion of the procedure of argument. It is no accident, therefore, that it is precisely the questionable inference connecting the two premisses that has provided our initial point of access in the attempt to situate the concept of sense in terms of the relationship between the two premisses. Freud's procedure of argument here remains, however, all the more important, because it is around this inference that we may see how, in effect, the paradox of the second premiss is constructed. The ensuing argument will now go on to demonstrate the conditions under which that paradox may be resolved, precisely by means of the introduction of an alternative conception of knowledge and sense already prepared by the first premiss.

In a way then, it is only at this stage that we are provided with a clear picture of the position and status of the concept of sense entailed by the premiss of intelligibility. From now on that concept of sense, and the register of intelligibility defined by the first premiss as a whole, will in effect disappear from view under the register of the second premiss. It is around the formulation of this second premiss that Freud will elaborate a

method of investigation directed towards the conscious knowledge of the dreamer. This will allow him to elaborate a simple common-sense model of psychoanalytic investigation anchored resolutely at the level of concrete empirical procedures. His strategy of argument, however, will remain consistent in the attempt to bring into focus the difficulties facing this method of investigation, precisely in order to demonstrate the need to introduce further conditions of intelligibility, in the context of which alone these difficulties might be resolved. The concept of sense, this alternative register of intelligibility, will thus be left in suspense in order to pursue a conception of meaning oriented upon the conscious knowledge of the dreamer. It is the demonstration of the limitations of the model of investigation elaborated around this notion of meaning, however, that will then serve to establish the possibility of a more comprehensive frame of reference for the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation as a whole.

If we are not, then, to fall into a simplistic or reductive reading of Freud's argument here, it will be necessary to orient that reading in terms of the distinction of registers established by the relationship between the two premisses of the technique of interpretation. For that same distinction between a register of meaning and a register of sense will give rise to a radical divergence between two fundamentally different conceptions of the nature, conditions, and orientation of the technique of psychoanalytic investigation itself. The relationship between these two premisses, the distinction in registers that it entails, and the appropriate procedure of derivation from one to the other, will therefore continue to provide the framework for the argument that follows.

2.3 The Method of Free Association

I.

This thesis concerning the relationship between the two premisses of interpretation allows us to reconsider Freud's attempt to argue the second premiss in the form of an empirical postulate. Our conception of the status of this premiss will have a determining influence on our understanding of the orientation and grounds of validity of the technique of interpretation as a whole. For the elaboration of a scientific model of psychoanalytic investigation around this second premiss depends in the first instance on the assertion that this premiss, the postulate that the dreamer does in fact know the meaning of his dream even though he does not realise it, can be maintained as an established fact. The proof for this assertion will be provided by evidence taken from the field of hypnotic phenomena. The procedures of hypnotic investigation will at the same time serve as the initial model for the investigation of the dream.

Yet in following the development of this account we should not entirely neglect the register of conditions defined by the first premiss of sense. For it is clear that the argument for the validity of the second premiss, and of the technique of interpretation in general, does not rest solely on the evidence of hypnotic phenomena. The plausibility of this argument turns equally on the legitimacy of the grounds that allow us to transfer these findings from the field of hypnotic investigation in the first place. This procedure depends in turn upon the postulation of an analogy in the conditions supporting the possibility of dreams and hypnosis - the state of sleep and the state of hypnotic somnambulism respectively. The viability of the attempt to defend the second premiss on the basis of the evidence of hypnotic phenomena thus comes to rest upon the claim that "(t)he psychical situations in the two cases are really analogous".(104/133)

The psychical situation underlying these two phenomena will now be characterised in terms of the withdrawal of interest from the external world. This description of the psychical situation underlying the two instances recalls Freud's earlier attempt to define the state of sleep underlying the dream in terms of its psychological rather than physiological characteristics. In the case of the day-dream, too, the psychical situation was characterised by a withdrawal of interest from the external world, a suspension of the relation to reality which creates the conditions for a closed field of imaginative production. In each case the attempt to characterise the dream in terms of a descriptive analogy at a positive level, whether to day-dreams or to hypnosis,

ultimately depends on our ability to define the underlying psychical situation that may be considered the necessary condition of each.

The attempt to argue the second premiss at an empirical level, on the basis of evidence brought over from the field of hypnotic investigation, thus rests upon the assumption of a closed economy of mental activity underlying both the dream and the phenomena of hypnosis. Yet the position of this underlying psychical situation, a closed field of imaginative production defined by the withdrawal of interest from the external world, bears certain striking similarities to that of the register of sense delimited by the first premiss. For not only has that register of sense been defined in terms of a closed economy of mental activity, within which the dream may be considered meaningful, but so too its status has been established in the form of a necessary condition, required if effects in the empirical sphere are to be rendered intelligible. Once again, then, it is the relationship between the two premisses of interpretation that provides our guide to an argument apparently elaborated solely at the positive level of the secondpremiss.

A comprehensive account of the grounds and orientation of the technique for the interpretation of dreams can therefore only be sketched out in the space opened out by the relation between these two premisses. The first premiss of sense establishes the initial conditions for a form of interpretation that does not depend on the dreamer's limited knowledge about the meaning of his dream. For that first premiss postulates the intelligibility of the dream in terms of its position within the economy of mental processes as a whole. The question that then arises is how that register of sense, the underlying psychical situation, is to be determined in any particular case. It is the second premiss, which orients the general premiss of intelligibility onto the knowledge of the dreamer, that provides the basis for the attempt to establish the context of signification in relation to which the meaning of any specific dream might be determined.

The defence of the second premiss by reference to the evidence of hypnotic phenomena thus serves to provide provisional support for the assertion that the dreamer may indeed have access to material of which he previously knew nothing. At the same time the procedure of hypnotic investigation provides a concrete and plausible demonstration of a technique by which that material may be brought to light. Once the second premiss has been established in positive terms, in a way that the first could not, then it is around this premiss, the assumption that the dreamer does know more about his dream than is immediately accessible to him, that the basic model of psychoanalytic investigation will be deployed. "It is very probable, then, that the

dreamer knows about his dream; the only question is how to make it possible for him to discover his knowledge and communicate it to us."(104/134)

It is clear, however, that such a conception of the goals and orientation of the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation, modelled directly on the procedures of hypnotic investigation, would merely lead us once more into all the difficulties of the positive model of knowledge and meaning. For this would imply that our knowledge of the meaning of the dream, and hence the possibility of its interpretation, rests directly upon the dreamer's own knowledge of that meaning, and the possibility of his communicating it to us. Apart from the practical obstacles already outlined, it is difficult to see how this procedure might be expected to provide the basis for a reliable form of objective knowledge about the dream.

Despite the initial claim that the goal of investigation is for the dreamer himself to discover the meaning of his dream, in order to communicate it to us, it is clear that the technique of interpretation cannot ultimately rely upon that knowledge for its validity. For the dreamer cannot be expected to have any direct knowledge of the dream's meaning, but merely to guide us towards "the circle of thoughts and interests from which it sprang".(104-05/134) It is this circle of thoughts and interests, the context of signification within which the meaning of that dream is determined, that will then form the basis for a technique of interpretation that does not ultimately depend on the conscious knowledge of the dreamer.

While the second premiss serves to orient the question of the intelligibility of the dream upon the knowledge of the individual dreamer, therefore, its formulation as paradox at the same time serves to problematise that concept of knowledge and its foundation in the conscious subject. The immediate outcome of this strategy will be a displacement of the traditional position of the conscious subject as sovereign arbiter of knowledge and meaning, in order to establish a more comprehensive context for the interpretation of the dream. "Thus we disregard the distinction between his thinking or not thinking that he knows something, and we treat both cases as one and the same."(105/134)

We can only consider this step, the dissolution of a distinction central to the definition of knowledge itself, to be the direct result of the manner in which the second premiss has been formulated. The paradoxical implications of the second premiss here give rise to a fundamental displacement of the position of the conscious subject, in order to introduce a conception of meaning that neither coincides with nor depends on the knowledge of the dreamer. It is this step, the dissolution of the distinction supporting

the position of the knowing subject, that now provides the basis for the method of free association, upon which the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation is to be founded.

At the same time it becomes apparent that, despite immediate appearances, a positive model of investigation, elaborated at the level of the second premiss and oriented upon the knowledge of the dreamer, can no longer be sustained. For although this second premiss appears to establish the knowledge of the dreamer as the foundation for an understanding of the dream, it is clear that the technique of interpretation does not in fact depend upon the dreamer's own knowledge about that meaning, but merely uses his associations to establish the context of thoughts and interests in relation to which the dream might be rendered intelligible.

It is easy, therefore, to fall into a simplistic reading of Freud's argument here if we ignore the framework provided by the relationship of the two premisses, and in particular the procedure of derivation according to which Freud makes use of the paradoxical implications of the second premiss in order to arrive at the alternative register of intelligibility postulated by the first. This would leave us with a simplistic conception of the conditions of the technique of interpretation, argued solely at the positive level of the second premiss, based on the dubious empirical foundations of the model of hypnotic investigation, and devolving upon the conscious knowledge of the dreamer.

The strategy of argument outlined in relation to the paradoxes of the second premiss may now, however, be extended to the assumptions of the model of investigation elaborated around it. Freud will make use of the dialectical possibilities of the lecture format to raise hypothetical objections to an argument formulated in empirical terms, precisely in order to develop principles of explanation that could not be directly established at a positive level. Hence it is in fact the shortcomings of this model of investigation, and the limitations of the concepts of knowledge and meaning which it assumes, that will allow Freud to situate the further register of conditions which the coherence of that procedure of investigation ultimately demands.

II.

The legitimacy of such a reading of Freud's argument in these lectures remains to be demonstrated. This approach, however, immediately allows us to reconsider the status

of the initial model for the explanation of the parapraxis, which was proposed by Freud as the basic procedure for all psychoanalytic investigation. For we may suspect that it is precisely the criticisms of the empirical validity of this model of investigation that will allow Freud to introduce further principles of explanation which might resolve the difficulties implicit in that earlier account. It is this more comprehensive account of the technique of interpretation, elaborated in the first instance around the principle of the determinism of associations, that will then provide the foundation upon which the psychoanalytic theory of the dream is to rest.

In the original model for the investigation of the parapraxis the speaker was asked to account for his slip, "and the first thing that occurred to him gave us the explanation".(105/134) His reply provides us with an explanation only to the extent that he is aware of the intentions involved, and can thus explain the meaning of his parapraxis by informing us of the intention that lay behind it. The conscious knowledge of the speaker is here quite clearly situated as the site of the relation between meaning and intention, and hence as the primary condition for the explanation of the parapraxis.

It is clear, however, that the sense in which the dreamer's response constitutes an explanation of his dream merely approximates, at best, to the case of the parapraxis. For the dreamer has no conscious knowledge of the meaning of his dream, and can thus not be expected to provide any direct explanation of it. It is here that Freud suggests that we disregard the distinction between the dreamer having or not having any knowledge of that meaning, and enquire merely as to what occurs to him "in connection with the dream".(105/134) The dreamer's remarks, the first ideas that occur to him, are then to be considered an explanation to the extent that they provide access to the circle of thoughts and interests from which the dream arose.

The validity of this technique thus comes to depend upon the nature of the relation between the ideas that arise and the dream which they are supposed to explain. These ideas provide the basis for an explanation of the dream only if it can be shown that they bear some sort of determinable relation to the meaning of which we are in search. The term "free association" itself points us towards the crux of this issue. For the question at stake is precisely whether what occurs to the dreamer in response to his dream does arise at random, or whether it can be shown to bear a necessary relation to that dream, hence providing the basis for an explanation of its meaning.

This difficulty is already implicit in the original model for the investigation and explanation of the parapraxis. In the initial account Freud points out that even if the speaker does have some knowledge of the meaning or intention underlying his parapraxis, and even if he is prepared to communicate this knowledge to us, there can still be no proof that his explanation is reliable.(48/75) Hence even in this most concrete case, where the relation between the meaning of the parapraxis and the intention underlying it is clearly established in the consciousness of the speaker, we still lack the conditions for the objective verification of that relation, and thus for any demonstration of the validity of the explanation.

At that stage Freud was content to dismiss this objection with a reference to the notion of a "psychical fact", although the relation of this term to the general principle of psychic determinism was neither elaborated nor pursued. Here he will defend the validity of the method of free association by reference to a "determinism whose rule extends over mental life", and will go on to argue that this determinism is a demonstrable fact. "It can be proved that the idea produced by the man was not arbitrary, nor indeterminable, nor unconnected with what we were looking for."(106/136) Once again we might expect that the attempt to defend the principle of determinism at an empirical level will at the same time allow us to situate a further register of conditions underlying that principle.

The basic model of association to the dream entails association around a specific topic, "while keeping an idea in mind as a starting-point".(106/136) The question then concerns the nature of the connection between this initial idea and the associations that arise in response to it. Rather than attempting to demonstrate the determinism of any particular association, however, Freud will approach this issue by situating that relation in the context of the determinism of associations as a whole. This will allow him to arrive at the conclusion that if "things that occur to one quite freely are determined in this way and form parts of a connected whole, we shall no doubt be justified in concluding that things that occur to one with a single link - namely their link with the idea which serves as their starting point - cannot be any less determined".(108/138)

We thus begin with examples where the initial condition of a fixed starting-point is dropped, and associations are merely called for within a particular context, according to a general rule or principle of association which specifies only the sort or kind of association called for.(107/136) The example of numbers chosen at random provides the most instructive example of the type of association implied here. For the class of numbers offers the classic illustration of a closed economy of elements elaborated

around specific rules of procedure. We thus have a purely formal organisation of elements, meaningless in themselves, whose value or significance is determined by their position in relation to the other elements within the system as a whole.

Precisely for that reason association within the system of numbers provides the most telling demonstration of the influence of mental processes whose existence is not otherwise apparent. For, in contrast to the system of language, there can be no question of any "meaning" inherent to the elements themselves, and thus no additional factor to mask the influence of these hidden interests. These examples therefore provide the clearest evidence for the assertion that associations are "always strictly determined by important internal attitudes of mind which are not known to us at the moment at which they operate - which are as little known to us as the disturbing purposes of parapraxes and the provoking ones of chance actions".(107/136)

The example of association within the class of proper names then provides the link to the determinism of associations within the system of ordinary language. For just as association to numbers displays the unmistakable evidence of subjective influences, so too "it is impossible to think of a name at random which does not turn out to be closely determined by the immediate circumstances, the characteristics of the subject of the experiment and his situation at the moment".(107/137)

The crucial distinction, however, one that can easily be obscured in these examples, is that between the determinism of associations at the level of the system of language itself, according to the link to the initial idea, and the further influence on the pattern of associations by unconscious emotional influences. "Investigation shows, in fact, that, apart from the link we have given them with the initial idea, they are found to be dependent as well on groups of strongly emotional thoughts and interests, 'complexes', whose participation is not known at the moment - that is to say, is unconscious."(109/138)

It thus appears that associations may be determined in two ways or from two possible directions - either according to their links with the particular idea that serves as their starting-point or by the influence of emotional interests "whose participation is not known at the moment". The question then becomes that of the possible articulation between these two registers of influence upon the determination of associations. For if the association to any particular dream element may be determined either by its links to that element itself or by the influence of unknown emotional interests, or both, then it

is difficult to see how we might use this association to arrive at a reliable explanation of the meaning of the dream.

The answer suggested by Freud points us towards the key to the method of free association as a whole. For in contrast to association experiments, where the stimulus-word is selected by the experimenter and imposed upon the subject, in the dream "the stimulus-word is replaced by something that is itself derived from the dreamer's mental life".(110/140) It is this condition, the fact that both the dream and its associations arise from the mental activity of the dreamer, that renders it probable "that the further associations linked to the dream elements will be determined by the same complex as that of the element itself and will lead to its discovery".(110/140)

III.

This returns us to the question of the grounds for the principle of determinism that is the central tenet of the method of free association. It is clear that not only the validity of this method, but the very possibility of the technique of interpretation elaborated around it, comes to rest upon the assumption of a necessary connection between associations. For if the regularity or reliability of the relation between associations can be questioned, then the validity of the technique as a whole is cast in doubt. The manner in which the principle of determinism is established and defended will thus be fundamental to our conception of the nature and conditions of the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation itself.

The basic principle of the determinism of associations implies the assumption that whatever occurs to the dreamer in relation to his dream is in some way connected to the meaning that we are in search of. Objections to the plausibility of this assumption can themselves be related to more fundamental questions concerning an attribution of a meaning to the dream in the first place. For it is this problem, that of the grounds for the postulation of a meaning to the dream to begin with, that remains fundamental to the question of the procedures or criteria by which that meaning might be determined and verified.

This question raises obvious difficulties for the standard framework of psychological investigation. Any attempt to explain the dream in terms of its relation to the intentions of the dreamer appears futile, as the dreamer himself has no knowledge of that meaning. The alternative approach proposed here by Freud, that of attempting to

establish the meaning of the dream by tracing it to the circle of thoughts and interests from which it is supposed to have arisen, remains no less problematic. For even if that meaning is to be determined in relation to some context of thoughts and interests, it is still difficult to know just how we are to settle on the precise context that is relevant in any particular instance.

Apart from the questionable methods suggested to extract this material from the dreamer, there still remains no way of assuring ourselves of the validity of any associations that do arise. For if the ideas that emerge in response to this method are to provide the basis for an explanation of the dream, or to lead us to its meaning, then we would require some sort of objective criteria in terms of which the pertinence of those associations could be assessed. Even if the dreamer were to provide a quite coherent and plausible account of the origin and meaning of his dream, there would still be no way of verifying this explanation or of excluding any other equally plausible alternatives.

The attempt to determine the meaning of the dream by means of the method of free association is thus faced with two corollary difficulties - the question of the grounds for the apparently arbitrary attribution of a meaning to the dream in the first place, and the criteria for the specification of an equally random context of associations in relation to which that meaning is to be determined. And yet it is precisely the contingency of this process, the dreamer's "freedom" to select any element of his dream for association and to pursue any path of association that occurs to him, that will provide the basis for the reliability of this method.

The initial step, in which the dreamer himself selects aspects of the dream for association, and divides it up into arbitrary elements of meaning, already provides an indication of the context within which the dream is to be situated. In contrast to the assumptions of a positive model of meaning, which would require some criteria for the specification of units of meaning in the dream, it is clear that the apparently arbitrary nature of this procedure constitutes no objection to its validity. For the meaning of those elements is not considered as fixed, nor "objective", nor even inherent in the elements themselves, but rather remains essentially contingent upon the context within which they arise and are situated.

It becomes clear to what extent Freud can claim that the random delimitation of a context of associations is itself "a matter of indifference".(105/135) For any association, even the most minimal or tangential, ultimately even the absence of

associations, will be sufficient to indicate a context of interests in relation to which that element might be defined as meaningful. This procedure is thus indifferent to any empirical or historical criteria for the verification of associations - their source, their status, or even ultimately the nature of their relation to the dream in question. For the role of these associations does not depend upon their veracity as memories but solely upon their ability to define a context of thoughts and interests in terms of which the sense of that dream might be established.

It is clear, then, that the question of the criteria for evaluating the relation between the dream and its associations must be considered in a new light. For it is this conception of the sense of the dream that allows Freud to claim that the mere fact that an idea arises in the context of associations to a dream is in itself sufficient grounds for establishing its validity, or its relevance to the meaning of that dream. It is thus no longer a question of whether the association can be shown to have any necessary relation to the meaning of the dream, but rather that the occurrence of the association itself serves to establish a context of significance in relation to which that dream might be defined as meaningful.

The principles of the method of free association do therefore indeed have a fundamental relation to the grounds for the postulation of a meaning to the dream. Not, however, in the obvious sense that the validity of this method depends upon the initial assumption of the existence of a meaning. But rather in the sense that the method of free association itself serves to produce or to delimit the context of signification within which that meaning is to be established. Hence, rather than attempting to trace the conditions of the method of free association to some hypothetical premiss of the sense of the dream, it could just as easily be argued that it is in fact the positive and concrete procedures of the method of free association that allow us to postulate and to determine that sense.

It is such a conception of a register of sense, in terms of which the meaning of any element of the dream may be determined, that provides the basis for the assertion of "a determinism whose rule extends over mental life".(106/136) For it is clear that such a register of sense, a context of significance delimited by the method of free association, provides a coherent and tenable framework for a register of signifying determinism within which no thought or remark that arises can be considered arbitrary or undetermined, or unrelated to others within that same sphere of associations. And it is the principle of the determinism of associations founded in this register of sense that

provides the foundation for the validity not only of the method of free association but of the technique of interpretation elaborated around it.

This conception of the conditions under which the sense of the dream is to be determined, in terms of its relation to an essentially mobile or contingent context of associations, allows us at the same time to account for the possible "over-determination" of the meaning of any term. For if the meaning of any element of the dream is neither fixed nor in any positive sense inherent in that element itself, but derives from its relation to a particular context of signification as delimited by the method of free association, then by the same token the meaning of that element is never finalised, but remains open to modification by further associations or by further elaboration of the system of signification within which its meaning is determined.

Hence even though it might have an accepted or established meaning, in relation to an accepted context of use, no term may claim a fixed or absolute meaning, nor escape the possibility of having its meaning altered by modifications in the context of signification within which it is situated. Again, the manifest or accepted sense of any term, as determined by a recognised circle of associations, may still be influenced by, or subject to, a further context of thoughts and interests, which are not themselves equally apparent. The meaning of any single manifest term would then be subject to a certain degree of ambiguity, according to the various registers of significance by which it is supported.

It would be instructive, perhaps, to contrast this account of the "over-determination" of mental processes, and the accompanying conception of the unconscious as a context of signification that is not immediately available to consciousness, with Freud's initial model of symptomatic over-determination in terms of an economy of libidinal investment as laid out in his "Project for a Scientific Psychology" (Freud,1950a [1895]). This comparison might at the same time allow us to contrast the different concepts of determinism entailed by the two accounts according to the distinction between a register of mechanical or physiological causality and an alternative register of signifying determinism.

The aim of the "Project" is to elaborate a psycho-physiological model of the psychic apparatus around its somatic foundations in the principles of neurological activity. We thus find an essentially mechanistic conception of the functioning of the psychic apparatus, described in terms of the investment and distribution of a hypothetical quantity of neurological excitation or cathexis. Even this account of the distribution of

cathexis within a neurological model of the psychic apparatus, however, rests upon fundamental principles of economic coherence, which regulate the flow of that hypothetical quantity within a closed system of investments.

The influence of the unconscious, the over-determination of conscious thought-processes, is then explained in fundamentally mechanistic terms according to the distribution of cathexis from somatic or physiological sources, which diverts the passage of directed thought-processes by means of the greater magnitude of unconscious investments. It is this account of the displacement and investment of neurological excitation within the psychic apparatus that provides the basis for a physiological and quantitative conception of the unconscious, as the reservoir of libido arising from somatic or instinctual sources.

In contrast to this physiological model of the determinism of unconscious processes, in terms of the mechanistic causality of somatic instincts, we now have before us the grounds for an alternative signifying model of the psychic apparatus, founded on a register of sense which itself constitutes an economy of signification. This gives rise to a conception of a procedure of interpretation which does indeed approach any given phenomenon within its domain as an "utterance", as a positive manifestation of sense that is in principle intelligible, but precisely in the attempt to diagnose, or to determine, the conditions in relation to which that utterance might be defined as meaningful.

The central problem for such an account, and for the technique of interpretation associated with it, would be the question of the rules and procedures according to which such a closed economy of sense is to be defined. For it is only on the basis of the conditions or limits constituting such a register of sense that we are able to determine the place, and thus the meaning, of any element or term within that realm. The goal of this technique of interpretation would not then rest with the meaning of any particular element, nor even ultimately with the sense of the dream itself, but rather with the attempt, by means of these procedures, to define or to delimit the register of significance in terms of which the appearance of any element within it might be rendered intelligible.

At the same time it becomes clear to what degree it is the dream, the privileged object of psychoanalytic investigation, that provides the closed space within which these themes may be explored. For it is precisely the problematic nature of the dream, a register of representations severed from any obvious relation to either the external world of objects or the conscious intentions of the dreamer, that allows the register of

sense to emerge in its primacy. And it is the method of free association, the concrete procedure by which this register of sense is to be delimited, that provides us with the practical means by which this register, which ultimately constitutes the space of psychoanalytic intelligibility itself, may be elaborated.

SECTION THREE

3.1 On the Distinction between Manifest and Latent

I.

The procedure for the investigation of the parapraxis has been established as the basic model of psychoanalytic investigation. The application of this procedure to the interpretation of the dream is, however, subjected to a qualifying clause which appears to be mentioned only in passing, and might thus easily be overlooked or ignored. Our earlier discussion would suggest that we are not lightly to dismiss Freud's attempt to situate the two premisses of the technique of interpretation as the limiting condition of the argument here as well.(113/143) This reference indicates that we must be prepared to use the framework of argument already elaborated around those premisses to guide our reading of the account that follows.

Subject to that crucial qualifying clause, then, the basic model of investigation will now be applied to the analysis of the dream, giving rise both to a more detailed account of the process of interpretation and to a more elaborate conception of the nature and structure of the dream itself. The application of this model of investigation to the case of the dream will, however, be subject to certain important qualifications, which open onto a more comprehensive account of the foundations and conditions of validity of the technique of interpretation as a whole. An examination of the grounds of Freud's argument here will show that neither that argument nor the model of investigation that it proposes can ultimately be sustained at an empirical level, but demand in both instances the introduction of conditions of intelligibility of another order.

This model of investigation is elaborated around the account found at the end of the previous lecture of the analysis of one of the most common of parapraxes, the temporary forgetting of a proper name.(110/140) This example is presented there as both a practical illustration of a procedure of investigation based on the method of free association, and a confirmation of the validity of the principles upon which that method is based. This procedure, which demonstrates the possibility of recovering a forgotten name by means of free association, is now to serve as the basic model for the interpretation of the dream.

The obvious advantage of this example is that it provides a concrete and plausible demonstration of the method, one that can easily be confirmed by immediate personal experience. I find myself temporarily unable to recall a name, which I am nevertheless

certain that I know. Despite all my efforts, I find that the name remains inaccessible to recall. In place of that forgotten name I am able to produce several substitute names, even though I recognise that these substitute names are not the one I am looking for. The method of free association is then applied to each of the substitute names, allowing us to arrive at the forgotten name by a more roundabout path. "I find when this happens that both the spontaneous substitute name and the ones I have called up are connected with the forgotten one and were determined by it."(111/141)

The successful outcome of this procedure allows us to demonstrate the manner in which both the substitute names and the associations around them are connected to the forgotten name in question, thus confirming the validity of the principle of determinism which this method assumes. The procedure for arriving at the unknown name merely retraces the path from the substitute names and their associations to the forgotten name by which they were determined. There is then every likelihood that in the case of the dream too, the dream elements and their associations will turn out to be determined by the still unknown meaning of the dream. We may thus make use of the same procedure in order to arrive at that meaning by way of the associations.

The procedure for the recovery of the forgotten name by means of free association is thus proposed as the model for the investigation of the dream. This account allows us to consider the dream elements as substitutes which stand in for, or take the place of, the real meaning of the dream, which remains unknown. "Like this substitute name, the dream element is not the right thing, but only takes the place of something else - of the genuine thing which I do not know and which I am to discover by means of the dream-analysis."(110/140)

It is this conception of the status of the "substitute" dream elements, and their relation to the hidden or "genuine" meaning of the dream, that establishes the basic framework for the interpretation of the dream. The analysis of any individual dream element entails tracing that element, via the chain of associations, back to the idea from which it arose and by which it was determined. This procedure for establishing the meaning of any individual element of the dream is then to be "carried over" to the whole dream, considered as the sum of such elements, providing the basis for a technique of interpretation that will allow us to establish the meaning of the dream as a whole.

It is here that questions about the legitimacy of this argument first arise. For the application of this procedure to the investigation of the dream assumes, in the first instance, an analogy between the status of the proper name that has been forgotten and

the meaning of the dream that is unknown. Even if the procedure for the recovery of the forgotten name is to be considered a valid demonstration of the method of free association and the principles which it assumes, it is still by no means clear that the attempt to discover the unknown meaning of the dream entails a strictly analogous situation.

It is precisely the question of whether the dream does in fact possess any meaning at all that remains a primary issue for this argument as a whole. It is here that the premisses of interpretation, the grounds for the postulation of that meaning, must therefore be introduced. Again, then, the validity of this argument comes to rest upon the legitimacy of those initial premisses. And yet our discussion of those two premisses would suggest that however the meaning of the dream is to be conceived, it is unlikely to be tractable to any easy reduction to the simple atomic status of a forgotten name.

The argument around the two premisses suggests rather that we must distinguish between the attempt to determine the "meaning" of any individual dream element, in terms of its relation to the idea that lies behind it, and a conception of the "sense" of the dream as a whole. The distinction in registers established between those premisses appears to rule out any attempt to conceive of the sense of the dream merely in terms of the simple accumulation of individual elements and their meanings. This difference of order would similarly render problematic any attempt to conceive of the technique of interpretation as a mere generalisation of this model to the investigation of the dream as a whole.

The procedure for the recovery of the forgotten name thus provides, at best, a model for the investigation of the separate elements of the dream, considered in isolation. Even at this simplest level, however, certain difficulties remain. When Freud proposes the example of the forgotten name as an "excellent model of what happens in dream analysis", he goes on to point out that "the difference is only that events that are shared between two people in dream-analysis are combined in a single person in the parapraxis".(110/140) It can, however, quite easily be shown that a number of further differences, crucial to the credibility of this example, follow from that initial condition.

It is from this difference that stems the fact that, in direct contrast to the case of the dream, the forgetting of the name is accompanied by "a certainty that I know it".(110/140) Hence when I find that a name which I know has been lost from consciousness, or has become temporarily inaccessible to recall, I am nevertheless confident that I do still know it. It is this sense of certainty, derived from the fact that

the name has already been registered in my conscious knowledge, that provides the rationale for the attempt to recover it, to restore that name to consciousness.

The initial positive status of that name as known then provides not just the immediate practical rationale for the procedure that follows, but more significantly, the measure of its success. For when the name does emerge, or is discovered, it is again that prior knowledge that serves as the basis for its recognition as the "genuine thing". And it is only once that original forgotten name has re-emerged at the end of the chain of associations that we are able to demonstrate the manner in which the associations had been connected to it, thus confirming the validity of the principle of determinism that this method assumes.

It can therefore be argued that the plausibility of this example, as well as its value as an empirical demonstration, in fact relies on the phenomenological framework that stems from the fact that the missing name has already been established in the conscious knowledge of the speaker. Similarly, it is only the security of that initial knowledge of the name in question, even though it has now become inaccessible to recall, that allows us to recognise as "substitutes" the replacement names that arise in its place. The very status of those names as substitutes, and hence their role in the process of association, is thus derived from, or depends on, the initial status of the original name as known or "genuine".

At each stage of this process, then, the empirical claims of the model for the investigation of the parapraxis rest upon the assumption of the initial positive status of the "genuine thing" which has become inaccessible. In the case of the dream, however, we still lack the grounds for postulating a meaning in the first place. Without any independent confirmation that such a meaning does exist, or any form of prior knowledge as to what that meaning might be, we lack the measure against which the success or validity of this procedure is to be assessed. Hence even if some meaning were to be discovered by this procedure, we would still have no reliable grounds for confirming the validity of that outcome, nor defending it against any alternative interpretation.

In consequence, the very framework for our attempt to approach the dream elements in their status as substitutes, in order to trace them back by association to the meaning that lies behind them, becomes somewhat problematic. For without any form of primary evidence for the existence of the "genuine thing", the basis for our conception of the dream elements as "substitutes" is itself cast in doubt. It is thus not merely a

question of a difference in nature between the forgotten name of the parapraxis and the unknown meaning of the dream, but more crucially a significant difference in their respective status, that stands in the way of any simple application of this model to the dream.

It is no accident that it is at precisely this juncture that we find Freud introducing, as a change of "nomenclature", the term "unconscious".(113/143) At the same time he takes care to emphasise that the term is introduced solely in a descriptive sense, to imply no more than "inaccessible to the dreamer's consciousness", or "unconscious at the moment".(113/143) Freud thus makes every effort here to indicate that the descriptive use of this term, to designate that which is not accessible to consciousness at the moment, is not to be taken in the full systematic sense of the psychoanalytic concept. "This nomenclature so far involves no theoretical construction."(113-114/144)

We have rather what might be called a positive use of the term unconscious, associated quite explicitly with the empirical model of investigation, to designate merely that which lies outside the immediate access of consciousness. "I mean nothing else by this than what might be suggested to you when you think of a word that has escaped you or the disturbing purpose in a parapraxis".(113/143) Again, then, it is the initial positive status of the word as known or conscious that is the primary point of reference for its subsequent description as unconscious. At the same time the distinction between "substitute" and "genuine", the two poles between which this procedure of investigation is to operate, is itself situated within the empirical realm.

It is here, in relation to the framework of this empirical model of investigation, that the grounds for the distinction between the manifest and the latent aspects of the dream are established. For it is at this level that the model of investigation will be applied to the individual elements of the dream, in an attempt to explain the meaning of any element by tracing it to the idea that lies behind it. Yet it is clear that the viability of this procedure, and the validity of the model of explanation elaborated around it, assumes that both poles of this model may be defined in positive terms. For only in this way could a relation of explanation be established between them in a manner that satisfies the conditions of empirical demonstration.

Whatever our reservations about this procedure for establishing the meaning of any individual element of the dream, it does seem clear that the possibility of extending this model to account for the sense of the dream as a whole remains questionable. For the

argument around the two premisses, which must be brought to bear at precisely this point, would, if nothing else, appear to exclude the prospect of the concept of sense conforming to the requirements of this model. We might entertain similar reservations as to whether an adequate understanding of the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious, its status and conditions of validity, may be arrived at by a simple extension of the descriptive use of this term from the distinction between manifest and latent.

This entire argument rests upon the assumption that the initial model of investigation, whose validity has been established within specific parameters, may then be applied to the dream with equal validity. This entails an attempt to extend the positive framework of this model to the more uncertain instance of the dream, where those parameters are not so easily defined. Yet the attempt to generalise this positive model, whose empirical foundations are already suspect, requires that we then assume the validity of further premisses whose status is equally doubtful. We are thus forced to question the legitimacy of the attempt to apply this model of investigation to the case of the dream and the grounds for the distinction between manifest and latent upon which it relies.

Freud's initial step of situating the two premisses of the technique of interpretation as the parameters of this argument, as the limiting conditions for the attempt to apply this procedure of investigation to the dream, gives us, however, some indication as to the strategy of argument that will be followed. We might suspect that it is precisely the inadequacy of the attempt to simply generalise this model to the analysis of the dream that will serve to expose the limitations of the positive model of investigation itself. The questions that can be raised about the empirical validity of this model of investigation, and the scope of the distinction between which it operates, will then serve to introduce an alternative account of the conditions and goals of the technique of interpretation and the concept of the unconscious which it entails.

II.

The basic model of investigation centres on the attempt to explain the meaning of any individual element of the dream by tracing it back to the latent idea that lies behind it and from which it arose. The validity of this model would then require not only that both poles can be securely established in positive form, but also that a direct and unambiguous relation of explanation can be established between them. It is at the

point at which the attempt to explain the meaning of the dream in terms of its relation to the ideas which lie behind it starts to run into difficulties that the entire framework of this model comes into question. It is thus the practical obstacles encountered in the application of this model to the investigation of the dream that serve to expose more fundamental difficulties with the principles which it assumes.

The practical obstacles encountered in the attempt to establish a direct and verifiable relationship between the manifest and latent poles of the dream merely serve to bring to light more fundamental doubts as to whether this model could ever satisfy the requirements of empirical verification, in even the most favourable conditions. Yet it is precisely the obstacles that stand in the way of the attempt to establish a valid relation of explanation between manifest and latent that will provide the starting point for a novel conception of the conditions and orientation of the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation, one that completely inverts the positive framework of the empirical model of investigation.

The initial model of investigation, as elaborated around the distinction between the manifest and latent aspects of the dream, thus serves to establish the immediate framework within which the interpretation of the dream will be pursued. It is this model that provides the initial conception of both the goal of interpretation and the structure of the dream itself. "If we carry over our conception of the separate elements to the whole dream, it follows that the dream as a whole is a distorted substitute for something else, something unconscious, and that the task of interpreting the dream is to discover this unconscious material."(114/144)

From this conception of the dream "there at once follow three important rules".(114/144) We would want to consider these three precepts of interpretation as direct corollaries of that initial distinction. The primary consequence is that we are no longer concerned with "what the dream appears to tell us ... since it cannot possibly be the unconscious material we are in search of".(114/144) In this way the distinction between manifest and latent effects a fundamental displacement in the site of coherence or intelligibility of the dream, away from the register of what is experienced in the dream itself. The explanation of the dream is no longer to be sought at the level of the manifest dream, but is to be established in relation to ideas or processes which lie outside it.

The content of the dream is no longer the primary point of reference for the work of investigation, as our interest is no longer directed towards any meaning that might be

apparent in the dream itself. Instead the preliminary work of interpretation is limited to merely calling up associations around that dream. "We must restrict our work to calling up the substitutive ideas for each element".(114/144) Yet, by the same token, the value of these associations or substitute ideas is no longer to be considered solely in terms of their relation to the manifest dream. "(W)e must not trouble ourselves with how far they diverge from the dream element".(114/144)

The chain of associations is to be allowed freedom to unfold without the restriction of any immediate or apparent relation to the manifest dream. It is within this context of associations that the unconscious material will emerge "of its own accord".(114/144) All three of the principles of interpretation that follow from the distinction between manifest and latent are thus merely interrelated aspects of the same fundamental theme - a displacement of the status of the manifest register in the explanation of the dream and the relegation of the manifest element to the role of mere point of departure for the context of associations elaborated around it.

This tendency already implies a certain divergence from the stated goal of investigation, formulated as an attempt to account for the meaning of the manifest element in terms of its relation to the latent idea behind it. For the discovery of the unconscious material of which we are in search is here defined independently of any relation to the manifest element that served as our starting point. Far from being our primary point of reference, the status of that manifest element is reduced to being no more than an arbitrary or disposable stimulus for the chain of associations that will allow us to delimit the unconscious material.

It is in relation to this process of displacement, and the distinction by which it is effected, that we may now understand "to what extent it is a matter of indifference how much or how little the dream is remembered and, above all, how accurately or how uncertainly".(114/144) For if the dream itself is no longer our primary point of reference in the search for the unconscious material, but is rather to be considered "a distorted substitute" which merely serves as our starting point in the process of association, then so too the distortions or inaccuracies in our recollection of that dream no longer constitute a fundamental obstacle to the success of this procedure.

Here, then, further light is thrown on the difficulties encountered in the initial approach to the dream. Any attempt to take the dream as an object of empirical investigation faces the immediate difficulty that we have no means of access to that object, except via the recollection or description of the dreamer himself. The validity of these

investigations becomes dependent on, and restricted by, the nature of the relation between the dreamer's recollection and the experienced dream. For the success of our enquiries would then appear to depend on the degree to which valid access to our object may be achieved by way of the dreamer's account of it.

The reliability of the dreamer's description of his dream thus becomes the crucial question for this particular line of investigation. This would in turn require some means of assessing the objectivity of the relation between the dream as experienced by the dreamer and his subsequent recollection of it. Yet any attempt to determine the accuracy of the dreamer's recollection is inevitably frustrated by our lack of access to the dream itself. In the absence of any independent knowledge of the experienced dream, we lack the standard against which the veracity of the dreamer's report might be assessed and any distortions or uncertainties rectified.

The introduction of the distinction between the manifest and latent registers of the dream alters the focus of our enquiries by displacing the site of intelligibility outside the experienced dream. This allows us to completely bypass the difficulties of the previous line of investigation by collapsing the importance of the axis along which it was deployed. As the meaning of the dream is no longer to be found in the manifest dream, the question of our access to that dream is no longer decisive to the success of our enquiries. For the manifest dream now serves merely as the starting point for a process of association that will allow us to delimit the unconscious material that would explain it.

In this way the distinction between manifest and latent, which relegates the status of the experienced dream to that of mere substitute for the genuine material from which it arose, serves at the same time to simply bypass the question of the veracity of our recollection of that dream. For now both the dream itself, as experienced by the dreamer, and his recollection or description of that dream, as well as his associations around them, are equally to be considered as distorted substitutes which take the place of the real object of our enquiries.

As a result, what had previously constituted the major obstacle to the validity of these investigations, the distortions or inaccuracies of the dreamer's recollection, may now, paradoxically, take on a positive value. "If our memory has been inaccurate, therefore, it has merely made a further distortion of this substitute - a distortion, moreover, which cannot have been without a reason."(114/144)

The distinction between manifest and latent thus opens up a new orientation for the interpretation of the dream in terms of the relation between the manifest dream and the latent material that lies behind it. The aim of the procedure of investigation deployed along this axis is now defined as an attempt to trace the manifest element back to the latent idea that would explain its meaning. This procedure, in turn, is made possible by the method of free association, and the principle of the determinism of associations that it assumes. Yet our attempt to gain access to the latent material by way of the chain of associations immediately runs up against an obstacle. We discover that "something is opposing our work".(114/145)

The attempt to implement this procedure of investigation finds itself opposed by various forms of "testing and selecting influences", which interfere with the free emergence of associations. These critical objections interrupt the chain of associations by rejecting certain of the ideas that arise, on the grounds of their lack of relevance to the task in hand. As a result certain key ideas that might lead us to the latent material in question are suppressed before they can take shape.

This illicit process of criticism and selection, which results in the suppression of some of the associations that might lead us to the latent material, constitutes an obvious difficulty for this model of investigation as a whole. For any opposition encountered by the attempt to trace the relation between the manifest and latent poles of the dream constitutes an obstacle not just to the practical implementation of this technique, but also to the theoretical aspiration of establishing an adequate relation of explanation between them.

To counter the effects of these critical objections and to facilitate the work of investigation, Freud introduces the one inviolable rule of the method of free association, the rule that the dreamer must not, for whatever reason, hold back any idea that occurs to him in association.(115/145) It is clear that this fundamental technical rule, designed to safeguard the goals of this procedure, in fact amounts to the formal condition of the method of free association itself. For it is only on the basis of the unimpeded emergence of associations that we can hope to trace the manifest element back to the latent idea from which it arose.

We can only then presume that the viability of this entire method of investigation depends on the degree of conscientiousness with which the dreamer adheres to this rule. Again, however, we encounter a practical obstacle that seems to indicate a more fundamental difficulty with the rationale underlying this procedure in general. For this

one "inviolable rule" of the technique of interpretation, laid down in an attempt to guarantee the success of the method of free association, appears to be made only in order to be broken. "The dreamer promises to obey the rule, and we may be annoyed afterwards to find how badly he keeps his promise when the occasion arises."(115/145)

It is the dreamer's failure to obey this rule, then, that appears to constitute the real obstacle for this procedure. For despite all attempts to convince the dreamer of the theoretical justification for this condition, he persists with his illicit suppression of certain of the ideas that arise. It becomes apparent that these critical objections are in fact the manifestations of a more deep-seated resistance, which is independent of the theoretical convictions of the dreamer, and thus impervious to rational argument. "We perceive that the work of interpreting dreams is carried out in the face of a resistance, which opposes it and of which the critical objections are manifestations."(116/146)

Hence we find that the difficulties encountered by the original model for the scientific investigation of dreams have not after all been disposed of, or even bypassed, by means of the distinction between the manifest and latent registers of the dream. Instead those difficulties have merely been displaced, along with the change in the axis of investigation, onto the relation between manifest and latent, where they are now encountered in even more intractable form.

Freud will go on to admit as much by establishing an explicit correlation between the problem of distortion and that of resistance, and suggesting that the one may in fact be attributed to the other. The problem of distortion, encountered in the attempt to trace the relation between the manifest and latent elements of the dream, is now linked to a dynamic conception of resistance. The greater the intensity of resistance, the more tenuous will be the link between the manifest dream and the latent material that underlies it. "(A) greater resistance means that the unconscious material will be greatly distorted and that the path will be a long one from the substitute back to the unconscious material."(117/147)

The corollary problems of distortion and resistance, encountered in the attempt to gain access to the latent material, constitute the fundamental obstacle for the empirical as well as the practical viability of this entire procedure of investigation. For the more difficult it is to establish the link between the manifest and latent poles, the less likely it becomes that this relation will be able to satisfy criteria of demonstration or verification. Yet Freud will claim not merely that these difficulties can be overcome by

the psychoanalytic method, but that they in fact take on a positive and essential function in the work of investigation.(116/146)

It is only legitimate then to enquire into the conditions under which such an assertion becomes sustainable, or even conceivable. For this would appear to entail a flagrant contradiction of the goals and conditions of the empirical model of investigation, according to which it is precisely the obstacles to its validity that are here proposed as the condition of its success. How then does it come about that what appears to constitute the primary obstacle to this procedure of investigation may now take on a positive value?

III.

Let us start by taking a closer look at the nature and source of these critical objections which arise in opposition to the attempt to gain access to the latent material. Freud mentions three types of testing and selecting influences, which lead to the suppression of associations on the grounds that the ideas that arise are either not relevant, too senseless, or too unimportant to be reported.(115/145)

All three forms of critical objection take the nature of their relation to the manifest element as their point of reference. It is the attempt to maintain a relation of relevance to the manifest dream, or criticisms based on that relation, that now figure as an obstacle to the success of this procedure. "Thus on the one hand we keep too close to the idea that was our starting point, the dream element itself; and on the other hand we interfere with the outcome of the free associations by making a selection."(115/145)

This observation itself brings to light a certain contradiction implicit in the rationale and goals of this model of investigation. The relation between the manifest element and the ideas which arise in association to it has been proposed as the basis for a novel explanation of the meaning of the dream. Yet it is that very relation which now emerges as an obstacle to the attempt to gain access to the material that would allow us to confirm that meaning. For it is precisely the question of the relevance of these ideas to the manifest dream that here provides the grounds for opposition to the attempt to uncover the latent material behind it.

This contradiction, however, can be resolved by means of a distinction prepared by Freud's earlier comments on the two possible sources of influence on the pattern of

associations.(108-09/138) There he distinguishes between the determinism of associations at the level of their relation to the manifest idea that serves as their starting point, and the further influence on associations by unconscious groups of emotionally charged thoughts and interests. This distinction allows us to situate the fourth source of "illicit selection" that Freud to some extent sets to one side as distinct from the other three - the influence of unpleasure on the course of associations, the notion that an idea that arises might be too distressing or disagreeable to be reported.

At that stage it was suggested that these two levels or sources of determinism might to some extent work across one another, allowing the determinism of associations at the positive level of their relation to the initial manifest idea to obstruct or to mask the further influence of unconscious interests. This distinction between the two possible registers of determinism provided the starting point for two alternative approaches to the principle of determinism itself. The contrasted accounts of the status and grounds of validity of the principle of determinism then defined the point of divergence for two fundamentally different conceptions of the conditions and orientation of the technique of interpretation as a whole.

The simplest account of the principle of determinism assumes that both manifest and latent poles can be specified in positive terms and brought into relation in such a way as to demonstrate a relation of determinism between them. The confirmation of this principle would then depend on the possibility of establishing a direct or verifiable relation between two positive terms situated within the empirical register. The validity of the model of investigation elaborated around this principle of determinism is then similarly defined in terms of the possibility of establishing an unambiguous relation of explanation between the manifest element and the latent idea from which it arose.

In contrast to this conception of the grounds of validity of the principle of determinism, we have sketched an alternative account of signifying determinism, founded on holistic principles of coherence within a closed register of sense. The validity of this concept of determinism does not rest upon any demonstration of a simple causal or mechanistic relation between individual elements, but upon the possibility of defining a closed system of relations within which the influence of signifying determinism would become apparent in the pattern of associations. The relation between any specific elements in that system will then be considered primarily in terms of their position within that register as a whole.

The tension between these two different registers of determinism, which not only operate across one another, but are to some extent in opposition to one another, is apparent in the term "free association" itself. The contradiction embodied in the use of the term "free" may thus serve as an index of this underlying distinction in registers, such that it is precisely the freedom to say anything, at the positive level of relevance or meaning, that allows the influence of a further register of determinism to become apparent.

It is this distinction that underlies the ambiguous status of the fundamental rule which implements the method of free association and the question of the dreamer's problematic relation to that rule. The distinction, not simply between two different registers of determinism, but between the conditions and procedures of interpretation associated with each, similarly accounts for the possibility of a successful implementation of this rule. The dreamer's failure to obey that rule, or his selective adherence to it, would otherwise constitute an immediate restriction to the validity of this procedure of investigation as a whole.

The fundamental rule of analysis is thus situated at the point of intersection between two different planes or levels of determinism. It is the tension between these two registers of determinism, and the contrasting goals and conditions of investigation associated with each, that accounts for the ambiguous status of this rule. From the point of view of the aims of the positive model of investigation this rule is designed merely to facilitate the attempt to trace the manifest element back to the latent idea from which it arose and by which it was determined. But at the same time this rule establishes the conditions for the emergence of a further register of signifying determinism, defined in terms of the closed boundaries of a register of sense.

It is the intrusion of effects from this register that is then experienced as an obstacle to the relation between the manifest and latent elements of the dream. For the influence of this register on the course of associations is manifested both in the form of resistance to the work of investigation and as distortion arising in the space between the manifest and latent poles. The dreamer's resistance, first apparent in his failure to comply with the rule of association, may nevertheless provide us with a point of entry into a register of determinism that extends beyond the knowledge of the conscious subject. For it is precisely those manifestations that provide us with an indication of the influence of a register of signifying determinism that is the register of sense itself.

It is the interaction between these two registers of determinism that underlies Freud's claim that not only are the critical objections never justified, but that the ideas which are suppressed on the basis of these objections turn out to be invariably the most important, and constitute the crucial link in the search for the unconscious material. This assertion already entails a modification of the criteria for the evaluation of associations, where it is precisely the rejection of ideas on the basis of their lack of relevance to the meaning of the manifest dream that may now be taken as the distinguishing mark of their significance. At the same time this claim implies a fundamental inversion of the framework of investigation, according to which it is those factors which seemed to stand in the way of its success that now become the pivot for an alternative account of the conditions and orientation of the technique of interpretation.

IV.

Again, then, we find ourselves at a point of divergence between two fundamentally different models of the procedure for the investigation of dreams. This distinction concerns not merely our conception of the goals and orientation of that procedure, but also more fundamental questions concerning the conditions of validity which each model assumes. This contrast can now, however, be clarified in terms of the status attributed to the principle of determinism in each.

Any positive confirmation of the principle of determinism will depend on the possibility of the manifest and latent poles of the dream being brought into a relation that satisfies the conditions of empirical demonstration. The attempt to maintain a relation between the two poles of a sort that would be liable to verification inevitably entails the attempt to reduce the distance between them to a minimum. It is then precisely the dimension of distortion that is situated as the primary restriction on the validity of the attempt to establish a transparent relation between the manifest element and the latent idea that would explain its meaning.

The goals of the model of investigation elaborated around this principle will be shaped by a similar attempt to identify the latent pole in positive terms, and to establish its relation to the manifest element in terms that would conform to the conditions for valid explanation. From this point of view it is clear that the intrusion of distortion into the relation between manifest and latent can only be experienced as an obstacle to be excluded or reduced to a minimum. And yet it is precisely this register of distortion

that provides the point of access to the register of signifying determinism that constitutes the locus of the alternative procedure of interpretation.

We have already noted the ways in which this conception of a register of signifying determinism might escape the limitations of a mechanistic account of the relation between the manifest and latent elements of the dream and of the principle of determinism in general. For this procedure of interpretation relies on those elements, the manifest and latent poles, only to the extent that they give provisional definition to the attempt to establish a coherent register of signifying determinism. The relation between those poles, or between any specific elements of association, will then be considered primarily in terms of their position within the register as a whole.

Our understanding of the goals and conditions of validity of the technique for the interpretation of dreams will obviously depend on our conception of the status to be attributed to the principle of determinism upon which it depends. Yet at the same time it is clear that the account of this technique, and Freud's argument as a whole, can only be comprehensively evaluated on the basis of the relation between the two registers of determinism and the different goals of investigation associated with each. The two approaches are not, then, mutually exclusive, but function rather as complementary endeavours that depend for their definition upon their interaction and articulation.

The question of the primacy to be attributed to either model will, however, remain fundamental in determining our conception not just of the orientation of the work of investigation, but also of the conditions upon which its status as science is to depend. It is this tension between the two accounts of the technique of interpretation, and the contrasting conditions of validity that each assumes, that underlies the difficulties to which Freud refers here in choosing how to proceed. "You cannot imagine how hard I find it to decide; nor can I yet make the nature of my difficulties plain to you."(117/147) Yet this decision centres on precisely the question of the status to be attributed to the problem of distortion in the argument that follows.

These issues are most immediately apparent in the whole range of questions associated with the role to be attributed to the corollary problems of distortion and resistance in this account. For the status attributed to the problem of distortion will provide the surest indication of the underlying approach to the procedure of investigation and the level of argument involved. The problem of distortion will carry an almost directly inverted value in the argument according to whether it is considered the primary

obstacle to the validity of the positive model of investigation or as the necessary point of access to the register of sense and the procedure of interpretation that this implies.

This explains why the question comes to the fore at precisely the point at which the model of investigation elaborated in relation to single dream elements is to be applied to the dream as a whole. Here we find the problem of distortion suddenly transformed, allowing Freud to claim that the dreams that betray the most extensive effects of distortion are in fact those whose meaning appears most transparent. "There must obviously be dreams which have on the whole been subjected to only a little distortion, and the best plan would be to begin with them. But what dreams have been least distorted? The ones that are intelligible and not confused ... ? That would be leading us quite astray. Investigation shows that such dreams have been subjected to an extraordinarily high degree of distortion."(117/147)

Given the complexity of the issues involved, it is not surprising that Freud will choose to remain at the level of the positive model of investigation, and to examine the meaning of certain manifest elements considered in isolation, rather than turning immediately to the consideration of the sense of the dream as a whole. "Instead of starting on the interpretation of whole dreams, we will restrict ourselves to a few dream-elements, and we will trace out in a number of examples how these can be explained by applying our technique to them."(118/148)

The various forms of relation between the manifest and latent poles that Freud goes on to examine in these examples will, however, all be characterised first and foremost as modalities of distortion. It is these modalities of distortion, which the framework of relations between manifest and latent allow us to identify and systematise, that then become the basis for the concept of the dream-work. And it is the various modalities of the dream-work, which most clearly demonstrate the influence of unconscious processes, that will then provide our point of access to the register of sense.

It is necessary, however, to remain aware of the implications that follow from this procedure of argument. For the primacy given to the framework of the positive model of investigation will influence our conception not only of the aims and goals of the process of interpretation, but also of the nature and status of the concepts involved. These issues will become decisive in determining the approach to the topic of children's dreams in the following lecture, where the relation between the problem of distortion and the question of wish-fulfilment first comes into focus.

It is significant, however, that it is only once Freud has announced the decision to remain at the level of the positive model of investigation in applying this technique to the analysis of the dream that he will formally introduce the terms "manifest" and "latent" for the first time. "The moment seems to me to have arrived for introducing two terms, which we could have made use of long ago. We will describe what the dream actually tells us as the manifest dream-content, and the concealed material, which we hope to reach by pursuing the ideas that occur to the dreamer, as the latent dream-thoughts."(120/150-51)

Freud's argument in this lecture has up to this point been taking full advantage of the ambiguity involved in his use of the term "unconscious" in both its descriptive sense, to designate the status of the latent material, as well as its more comprehensive psychoanalytic usage, to characterise the status of the register of sense. It is precisely this elision of the distinction between the two uses of the term that has allowed him to set up the conditions for an alternative account of the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation under cover of the aims and goals of the empirical model of investigation.

The ensuing argument will endeavour to give definition to this more comprehensive procedure of interpretation by contrast to the goals and conditions of the initial model. This argument is accompanied by the attempt to situate the full psychoanalytic sense of the concept "unconscious" by means of a similar process, in distinction from the descriptive use of the term associated with the latent pole. In each case that procedure of argument, where a concept is defined by contrast to the terms and conditions of the empirical register, will involve a crucial and characteristic process of inversion that comes to be definitive of the properly psychoanalytic status of those terms.

This strategy of argument, whereby a concept is initially situated in positive terms at the level of the latent pole, and then separated off by a process of inversion, becomes most apparent in Freud's approach to the status of the wish in the interpretation of the dream. It is, however, the initial approach to the problem of distortion that provides the first introduction to these themes, and which remains the surest indication of the procedure of argument involved. It is thus the question of distortion that must be our guide in the argument that follows.

3.2 The Dreams of Children

I.

The argument of these lectures is elaborated around a parallel development of a definition of the psychoanalytic object, on the one hand, and of the conditions for its interpretation, on the other. The account of the nature and structure of the dream, as privileged object of psychoanalytic investigation, is thus interwoven with, and inseparable from, the principles of the technique by which the interpretation of that dream becomes possible.

The previous lecture introduced a distinction between the manifest and latent registers of the dream. The method of investigation attempts to establish the meaning of any manifest element in the dream by tracing it back, via the associations of the dreamer, to the latent thoughts that lie behind it. Questions concerning the validity of this method of investigation come to focus on the nature of the relation between manifest and latent, on the possibility of establishing a link between them strong enough to satisfy the demands of empirical verification. It is here that we encounter the twin problems of resistance and distortion, the two most serious obstacles to the success of this procedure.

The argument then turns on the question of the status to be attributed to the problems of resistance and distortion in the process of interpretation. For it is in the attempt to come to terms with the difficulties raised by these two obstacles that the psychoanalytic technique in fact takes on its definitive form. It is these issues which underlie the dilemma to which Freud refers concerning the status of the problem of distortion in his argument. We have attempted to distinguish the two different levels at which this argument might be pursued, and the implications for our conception of the nature and conditions of the technique of interpretation itself.

The choice of children's dreams as the next topic of discussion is immediately referred back to this question of how to proceed around the problem of distortion, and situated in the context of the issues raised there. Here Freud refers to the suggestion that, for the purposes of exposition, it would be best to bypass the problem of distortion entirely, and to start with those dreams that show as little distortion as possible. "(W)e were saying that our best plan would be to get round the difficulty by keeping to dreams in which there was no distortion or only a very little - if such dreams exist."(126/157)

The category of children's dreams is introduced at this point as the type of dream that most closely approximates to this ideal requirement of minimal distortion. The characteristics which make these dreams "easy to understand and unambiguous" can be attributed directly to the absence of distortion. This transparency makes them particularly suited to a demonstration of the basic principles of dream interpretation. "From these children's dreams we can draw conclusions with great ease and certainty on the essential nature of dreams in general, and we can hope that those conclusions will prove decisive and universally valid."(126/157-58)

Once again, however, we must be careful not to let the advantages of this procedure blind us to the qualifications involved. For it quickly becomes apparent that this entire category of dreams, introduced here for purposes of exposition, is to some extent an artificial one. These dreams are not in fact to be attributed to any specific phase of childhood, nor even necessarily restricted to children at all, but rather constitute an ideal "infantile" type structured around the basic condition of an absence of distortion. Questions concerning the status of this category of dream can then be focused on the role it plays in Freud's argument.

"This will once more mean a divergence from the historical development of our discoveries; for actually it was only after the technique of interpretation had been consistently applied and distorted dreams had been completely analysed that the existence of dreams that are free from distortion came to our notice."(126/157) This approach raises issues that go beyond any simple questions of historical chronology. For the historical priority attributed to the technique of interpretation over the discoveries that it makes possible seems here to entail some form of corresponding epistemological priority as well. Freud appears to be suggesting that the very existence of this category of undistorted dreams, or at least the possibility of their knowledge, is dependent upon the successful implementation of the technique of interpretation itself.

The divergence from the historical development of the technique of interpretation thus masks more fundamental questions concerning the epistemological grounds which this technique assumes. For it is here suggested that the knowledge of these undistorted dreams itself depends upon the overcoming of the problem of distortion, which only the prior elaboration of the technique of interpretation makes possible. In that case the material derived from these dreams can not in fact serve as the foundation for the technique itself. The principles upon which this technique relies must be grounded

elsewhere, and can not depend on the evidence of these children's dreams for their validity.

We thus become aware of the real issues at stake in Freud's choice of this category of dreams to support his argument. For he here resorts to the artificial and somewhat problematic category of children's dreams, defined around the criterion of the absence of distortion, in order to establish certain basic postulates concerning the nature and structure of those dreams. This ideal positive model of children's dreams, freed from the ambiguities and obscurities introduced by the factor of distortion, will then allow him to demonstrate the relevance of these postulates to the explanation of dreams in general. This demonstration, however, assumes the suspension of the problem of distortion that we have suggested is the defining issue for the technique of interpretation itself.

It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the postulates and conclusions established in positive terms on the basis of this model of children's dreams can in fact be considered to be "universally valid" for the interpretation of dreams in general. Our examination of the conclusions derived from the study of children's dreams will once again be focused on the status of the postulates established under these ideal positive conditions, and the legitimacy of the attempt to generalise these conclusions to the more obscure instances of distorted dreams.

II.

The pertinence of these considerations is immediately borne out by the first point that Freud introduces to characterise the dreams of children. "No analysis, no application of any technique is necessary in order to understand these dreams."(126-27/158) The assertion that children's dreams present no distortion and therefore require no interpretation again emphasises the close relation between the technique of interpretation and the problem of distortion. "These dreams are without any dream-distortion, and therefore call for no interpretative activity."(128/159)

The correlation between these two issues is now brought into connection with a further point by Freud's subsequent remark that in these dreams there would be no effective distinction between the manifest and latent registers of the dream. "Here the manifest and the latent dream coincide."(128/159) The interdependence of these two issues, the relation between interpretation and distortion, is here situated in terms of

the common register within which they both arise - that defined by the relation between the manifest and latent poles of the dream.

It is this assertion that makes explicit the degree to which children's dreams are here being proposed in the form of an ideal transparency. For it is the elision of the distinction between manifest and latent, the superimposition of the manifest dream and the latent thought that explains it, that allows Freud to eliminate the register of distortion. By bracketing out the problem of distortion he hopes to be able to demonstrate certain basic postulates concerning the nature of these dreams. Yet it is clear that the elision of the distinction between manifest and latent at the same time collapses the entire framework within which the technique of interpretation has up to now been elaborated.

Again we encounter a certain tension in this argument, where any attempt to define the object in positive terms, to bring the dream forward as a concrete object whose nature and structure may be empirically demonstrated, is accompanied by a corollary recession of the register proper to its interpretation. We have already suggested that Freud is quite aware of this tendency, and constantly attempts, within the confines of his argument, to draw attention to the dangers it involves. Here he is quick to acknowledge that the very concept of an undistorted dream is an artificial one. "But when we examine these dreams more closely, we shall recognise a small piece of dream-distortion even in them, a certain distinction between the manifest content of the dream and the latent dream-thoughts."(128/159)

The perfect transparency of these children's dreams, and hence their status within this argument, is thus an artificial construct that cannot ultimately be maintained. On the one hand a minimal degree of distortion has to admitted, implied in the very distinction between the manifest and latent registers themselves. And on the other hand a certain element of interpretation is assumed, in that we are obliged, in order to understand that dream, "to add a piece of information to it from the events of the child's life".(127/158) This piece of information is some event or experience from the previous day. "There is invariably some experience of the previous day which explains the dream to us. The dream is the reaction of the child's mental life in his sleep to this experience of the previous day."(127/158)

We are provided with three examples which demonstrate quite clearly the relation of a dream to an event of the previous day. In each case the example concerns an experience of disappointment in the child's daily life that is subsequently remedied in

the dream itself. On the basis of these examples Freud will go on to propose that a child's dream should be understood as "a reaction to an experience of the previous day, which has left behind it a regret, a longing, a wish that has not been dealt with".(128/159) This claim in its turn paves the way, without further ado, for the assertion that the dream "produces a direct, undisguised fulfilment of that wish."(128/159)

With this assertion we find ourselves suddenly at the heart of the problematic around which the entire theory of dreams revolves. Yet our very proximity to that central thesis, that dreams are to be understood as the fulfilment of a wish, throws up a whole wall of difficulties. These difficulties centre on the question of the status of this proposition and the grounds of its validity. Freud makes no attempt to disguise the fact that this assertion is based solely on the evidence of these three carefully selected examples. We are forced then to question not only the validity of these particular examples as sufficient grounds for the proposition that follows, but also the legitimacy of the entire procedure of argument that attempts to derive propositions of universal validity from instances of restricted empirical scope.

Once again it is Freud's apparently naive procedure of reducing his argument to its simplest possible terms that brings into focus the difficulties inherent in this procedure as a whole. For even if this proposition could in fact be established in positive terms on the basis of the restricted evidence of these undistorted children's dreams, it remains doubtful whether it could be extended with equal validity to the more complex instances of distorted dreams. More immediately, however, it becomes apparent that even in the absence of the complicating factor of distortion, these examples still create difficulties for an empirical model of psychoanalytic explanation.

III.

It is here that Freud refers again to the aetiological role of somatic stimuli in the instigation of the dream. This reference returns us to the basic physiological model for the explanation of the dream as a direct reaction to a specified somatic stimulus. This model of the dream conforms to the conditions of empirical demonstration, providing a positive definition of the two terms involved, as stimulus and response, and holding out the possibility of establishing an objective correlation between them via the causal intermediary of the reflex arc.

Freud has from the start expressed reservations about the ability of the physiological model of dream formation to account for the most characteristic aspects of the dream. The limitations of this model were shown to reflect the restricted explanatory range of the empirical model of explanation in general. Yet, despite these reservations, Freud now proposes introducing into the framework of this somatic model the notion of a "mental stimulus", which is to play a similar aetiological role in the explanation of the dream.

Questions concerning the legitimacy of the attempt to introduce the notion of a mental stimulus into the terms of the somatic model of the dream must thus be added to our doubts concerning the validity of this model of explanation in general. These doubts will focus on the explanatory role played by the concept of the wish that comes to occupy the position of this mental stimulus in the empirical model. "In the case of children, therefore, the stimulus that disturbs sleep is a mental one - the wish that has not been dealt with - and it is to this that they react with a dream."(128-29/160)

A first indication can be detected right here in the attempt to set up the model of the child's dream as the reaction to an event of the previous day. It is this model that is to provide the empirical framework for the explanation of the dream as a fulfilment of the wish arising out of that event. The absence of distortion in these examples allows Freud to present them as an objective demonstration of the relation between the dream and the event, and thus as evidence for the proposition that these dreams are formed in direct response to the wish arising out of that event. "The dream produces a direct, undisguised fulfilment of that wish."(128/159)

The legitimacy of this demonstration, however, assumes that both poles of this model may be defined in objective terms, in order to bring them into a relation that might be liable to independent verification. The need to exclude the factor of distortion in that relation is thus accompanied by a corollary demand to minimise the role of interpretation in establishing the nature of the two poles themselves. Hence the attempt to present the child's dream in the form of a direct reaction to an event of the previous day. For then there would be no need to question the child, no need to rely on any subjective information from the dreamer, in order to establish a direct causal relation between the dream and the event.

The objective structure of this explanatory model is already rendered problematic by the difficulty of establishing any definition of the dream that does not rely on the dreamer's own description of it. More important here, however, are the corresponding

difficulties in establishing the status of the other pole of this model, that of the event. For just as the dream itself has no independent status as an object apart from the dreamer's subjective account of it, so too the role of the event in the instigation of that dream can only be defined in terms of its profile as an experience of the dreamer.

The attempt to set up an empirical framework for explaining the dream as a reaction to an event of the previous day thus immediately runs into difficulties with the status of its stimulus pole. The difficulty of providing a satisfactory definition of the event within the terms of this model already disrupts its objective, external structure and the conditions of verification to which it aspires. This instability in the definition of the stimulus pole, however, at the same time directly influences the explanatory role that it may play within this model, putting into question the entire causal framework which the empirical model assumes.

The somatic model allows us to account for the occurrence of the dream at the level of physiological processes, as a direct reaction to a specified somatic stimulus. It is thus possible to define both poles of this model in somatic terms and to account for their relation in terms of physiologically defined paths of transmission, on the model of the reflex arc. The register of physiological processes, which provides the common register within which both stimulus and response may be situated, is also established as the site of coherence for the explanation of their causal relation.

The relation between the dream and the event, however, is more problematic. This relation is of a different order, one that does not in any obvious sense partake in the realm of physiological processes that provides the register of causal coherence for the somatic model. For it is clear that neither the dream nor the event in response to which it supposedly arises can ultimately be defined apart from the dreamer's own experience of them. This inevitably renders problematic the attempt to establish any relation of causal explanation between the two terms that does not rely on their common situation in the experience of the dreamer.

The difficulties involved in the shift from the register of physiology to the register of subjective representation become apparent above all in the attempt to define the status of the stimulus pole and to account for its causal role in this relation. The somatic model of the dream at least allows us to define the aetiological role of the stimulus in the objective terms of physiological processes. Yet here it is not in fact the external event that is responsible for the instigation of the dream, but rather its phenomenological profile as an experience. There is thus no way of specifying the

causal role of this event without taking into account its subjective significance in the experience of the dreamer.

The relation between this subjective experience and the dream is, however, further complicated by the difficulty of demonstrating any immediate reaction to that event. For it is only subsequently, in the sleep of the dreamer, that the dream arises as a somewhat belated reaction to the experience of the previous day. Thus it is not until the dream itself has actually arisen that there is any possibility of identifying the particular stimulus to which it may be said to constitute the response. The nature and position of that stimulus, and hence its causal role in this process, can therefore only be established retrospectively on the basis of its significance in the formation of the dream.

The shift away from the somatic register thus presents immediate difficulties for this whole model of explanation and the structure of mechanical causality which it assumes. For despite the attempt to preserve an empirical model of the dream as the direct reaction to an event of the previous day, it is clear that neither that event nor its causal role in this relation can ultimately receive positive specification in terms that this model would require. The difficulty of providing a definition of the stimulus term which does not rely on its subjective significance in the experience of the dreamer renders problematic the entire causal framework upon which the somatic model relies.

In the somatic model it is the possibility of providing a positive definition of the stimulus, in the objective terms of physiological processes, that is a primary assumption in the explanation of the effects to which it gives rise. The shift into the register of subjective representation, however, would seem to imply conditions of interpretation that directly contradict the assumptions of the somatic model, as we can no longer provide an objective specification of the stimulus term, nor therefore assume the primary status of that term in the explanation of what follows. Instead we must resort to a form of explanation that can only account for the causal role of the stimulus in retrospect, on the basis of an interpretation of the dream itself.

It is clear, then, that despite the apparent similarity between the terms "mental stimulus" and "somatic stimulus", there can be no direct substitution of one for the other within the causal framework of the somatic model. For on the one hand there is no way of defining that mental stimulus in terms that would satisfy the demands of this model, without lapsing back into a characterisation in terms of its physiological substratum. And at the same time the problematic empirical status of the term "mental

stimulus" means that it cannot play the same explanatory role in this account as does the somatic stimulus within the causal mechanism of the physiological model.

The similarity of terminology serves here only to mask the fact that the causal role played by these two terms is not at all equivalent. The difference in the status of the two terms can only be understood in terms of the difference between the two registers within which they are to be situated - that of mental representations and that of physiological processes. And it would appear that the conditions of explanation within these two registers are not in fact of the same order. Rather, the difference between these two registers itself gives rise to a distinction between two contrasting modes of explanation whose terms and conditions appear to be different, if not opposed.

IV.

Freud uses the example of children's dreams to set up an empirical model for the explanation of the dream as the reaction to a wish arising out of an event of the previous day. The absence of distortion in these examples allows him to establish the two poles of this model in positive terms and to demonstrate a direct relation of cause and effect between them. Yet this demonstration is only made possible by the suppression of the entire sphere of representation underlying the dream and the elision of the conditions of interpretation appropriate to it. It is only by ignoring the role of interpretation in establishing those poles in the first place that he is able to present this relation in the objective causal terms of the empirical model.

The causal framework of this model then gives rise to a number of difficulties that can be traced directly to the suppression of the register of representation. For the objective structure of the model is itself the first product of the elision of the conditions of interpretation appropriate to that register. The attempt to reintroduce the problematic of representation, under the guise of a "mental stimulus", while maintaining the framework of this model, inevitably gives rise to certain difficulties with the causal status of that term. These difficulties come to devolve upon the concept of the wish that is to be situated in the position of the mental stimulus within this model, and the question of its role in the explanation of the dream.

"In the case of children, therefore, the stimulus that disturbs sleep is a mental one - the wish that has not been dealt with - and it is to this that they react with the dream."(128-29/160) The physiological model of the reflex arc provides the basic

framework for this account of the dream as a reaction to the stimuli that impinge on sleep. The conception of the function of the dream as the guardian of sleep then merely elaborates on this essentially somatic model, by introducing the notion that the dream must serve somehow to protect sleep against the disturbance of those stimuli. "In so far as a dream is a reaction to a psychical stimulus, it must be equivalent to dealing with the stimulus in such a way that it is got rid of and that sleep can continue."(129/160)

It is in its role as guardian of sleep that the dream arises as an attempt to fend off, or to "deal with", the stimulus that threatens to disturb sleep. This essentially physiological conception of the function of the dream as guardian of sleep provides the economic or dynamic underpinning for the relation between the dream and the wish. And yet what remains unresolved in this account is precisely the question of the means by which this process of "dealing with" the wish occurs. "We do not yet know how this dealing with the stimulus by the dream is made possible dynamically..."(129/160)

This question can hardly be dismissed as an incidental or peripheral issue. For it concerns the very process of wish-fulfilment which is to stand as the central postulate of Freud's entire theory of the dream and its interpretation. The failure to provide a plausible explanation of that process within the dynamic or mechanical terms of this account can only then be considered as a sign of a fundamental deficiency in the account as a whole. The inability to account for the nature of the relation between the wish and the dream may then be considered as a symptom of a certain causal gap in this model, one which can be traced directly to the attempt to preserve the terms in which it is framed.

This issue takes on focus when considered in the light of the earlier difficulties associated with the status of the wish, in its definition as a mental stimulus arising out of the event. For if the function of the dream is to be that of "dealing with" the stimulus, let us not forget that the mental stimulus has itself only just been configured as a wish which was not "dealt with" in the experience of the previous day. The double use of this problematic term cannot be coincidental here, nor the symmetry by which the function of the dream is now proposed as dealing with a wish that has itself not been dealt with in the event.

The introduction of the notion of a mental stimulus into the framework of relations between dream and event thus results in a strange form of causal doubling, whereby this relation is now divided into two complementary phases. The initial experience

gives rise to a residue, a mental stimulus or wish, that has not been dealt with in the event. The process by which the dream arises in reaction to that stimulus is then situated as the direct complement of the process by which the stimulus itself first arose out of the event. Any difficulties with the mechanics of the process by which the dream deals with the wish must therefore be referred to the complementary process by which that wish is itself defined as the residue of the event.

In both cases the use of this ambiguous phrase indicates a certain difficulty in accounting for the nature of this process within the terms of the empirical model. And in both instances it might be suggested that these difficulties, which appear as causal gaps in the mechanical framework of this model, are a consequence of the failure to consider the role of representation in that relation. For it is not the event itself that gives rise to the dream, but rather the experience constituted around it. This experience, however, does not cause the dream in any direct or immediate manner, but rather in its turn gives rise to a certain residue - the memory which persists in sleep. It is this memory that serves as the mental stimulus that gives rise to the dream.

The attempt to maintain the external framework of this model of dream formation, based on an objective relation between dream and event, thus results in a series of slippages or displacements around the causal status of the stimulus pole. And yet there is still no way of accounting for the causal role of that memory in the formation of the dream except by configuring it as a regret or longing left behind by the experience. It is this element of regret, the longing that has not been dealt with in the event, that constitutes the disturbing force of the mental stimulus that is responsible for the instigation of the dream.

The introduction of the notion of a mental stimulus into this relation thus serves to negotiate the causal gap produced by the suppression of the register of representation in the empirical model. The framework of this model at the same time demands that this mental stimulus be configured as a regret or a longing, in order to produce the necessary causal impetus required to account for its role in this process. This in turn means, however, that examples have to be chosen where the event gives rise to an experience of disappointment, which would provide the force of "longing" necessary to justify the causal role of the wish in the process of dream formation.

In this way it becomes apparent to what extent the restricted validity of this model of explanation, tied as it is to a limited range of examples of a specific type, is a direct result of the positive terms which it assumes. From this point of view it does indeed

appear that the role of the wish in this process is a necessary postulate, because there is no other way of accounting for the nature of the relation between event and dream. And yet at the same time it is clear that the validity of any proposition maintaining the causal role of a wish in this model of dream formation will necessarily be tied to the nature of the experience of disappointment that underlies it.

The difficulties involved in this account can thus be traced in every instance to the terms of the attempt to construct an empirical model for the explanation of the dream around a direct causal relation between two objective poles. For the status of those two poles, as well as the possibility of demonstrating a relation of cause and effect between them, assumes the suppression of the register of representation that is the true site of their relation. The problematic status of the mental stimulus in this account could then be attributed directly to the attempt to reintroduce in a positive term the very register of representation upon whose suppression this entire model is predicated.

This would suggest that the difficulties associated with the role of the mental stimulus in this model might be resolved by considering it in the context of the sphere of representation within which it properly arises. This would also provide us with a first approach to accounting for the problematic causal status of the wish that comes to occupy the position of the mental stimulus in this model of explanation. That concept of wish, or at least its explanatory status in this model, could then be considered as the positive embodiment of all the causal difficulties that follow from the suppression of representation in the empirical model of the dream.

It becomes increasingly evident that the empirical framework of this model, the status of its terms, and the nature of the causal relation that it posits between them, is in fact predicated upon the suppression of the register of representation that is the true site of this relation. This leads us to suspect that the return of the register of representation would imply the subversion of the entire framework of this model and the conditions of explanation that it assumes. Far from being able to demonstrate any relation of mechanical causality between the two poles of this model, it would no longer be possible to maintain the positive status of those poles themselves.

Any form of interpretation that wished to take the question of representation into account would be forced to abandon the presuppositions of this mechanical model of dream formation and to situate the register of representation as its primary object of interest. A technique of interpretation oriented upon the problematic of representation would no longer be able to assume the positive status of the poles of this model in its

attempt to explain the nature of the relation between them. Instead we would have to consider an alternative model of interpretation grounded directly in the register of representation itself, which attempts on that basis to determine the status of the terms involved.

This would mean abandoning the procedure of the progressive model of dream formation, which takes as given the positive status of the wish and attempts to account for the nature of the dream on the basis of what it knows about that wish. Instead we would be forced to grant priority to the process of dream formation itself, as a process grounded essentially in the register of representation, and ask rather on that basis, what must a wish be such that a process of representation might result in its fulfilment?

V.

Some of the implications of such an argument can be pursued through a discussion of the two postulates which Freud now adduces as the two "chief characteristics" of dreams. "What instigates a dream is a wish, and the fulfilment of that wish is the content of the dream - this is one of the chief characteristics of dreams. The other, equally constant one, is that a dream does not simply give expression to a thought, but represents the wish fulfilled as a hallucinatory experience."(129/160)

Our first question will concern the status of these two postulates, their grounds and conditions of validity. For these two characteristics, presented here in the form of dogmatic propositions concerning the nature of dreams in general, are quite clearly derived in the first instance from the examples of children's dreams that we have been examining. We must therefore ask whether the evidence presented for these two postulates in the limited instance of children's dreams is such as to warrant their validity for dreams in general.

In the light of the argument outlined above, we might suspect that the status of these two propositions is more profitably to be considered in terms of their relation to one another, rather than on any empirical grounds. For if the first proposition, concerning the role of the wish in the instigation of the dream, is put forward in the form of a dogmatic postulate requiring independent verification, it is clear that the status of the second, concerning the process by which that wish is fulfilled, will remain equally problematic until the first has been resolved.

Yet it remains difficult to see by what means appropriate verification for this first proposition might be obtained. For if the validity of this proposition cannot be established here, in the ideal conditions of undistorted children's dreams, it is not likely to be any more easily established in the more complex instances of adult dreams. And even if this proposition were to be adequately grounded in the evidence of these examples, there is still no reason to believe that a proposition established under these restricted conditions could be applied with equal validity to the more obscure instances of distorted dreams in general.

Freud himself points out that it is only on the basis of "far-reaching investigations" that we could hope "to establish the fact that what instigates a dream must always be a wish".(130/161) The question remains, however, as to just what form of investigation would be sufficient to provide the necessary verification for this first proposition. There is every reason to suspect that this postulate is itself a fundamental principle of the technique of interpretation, and would thus be assumed by those investigations themselves. Freud has already suggested that it was only once the technique of interpretation had been fully elaborated that investigations of this nature became possible.

Once again we encounter the outline of a vicious circle whereby the validity of a proposition fundamental to the technique of interpretation can only be established on the basis of evidence obtained by the implementation of that technique itself. This suggests that the problematic status of both these postulates is to be traced to the attempt to maintain the first in the form of a dogmatic postulate requiring independent verification. Exactly the same difficulties were seen to arise around the proposition put forward as the first of the two premisses of the technique of interpretation. This raises the possibility that a similar form of argument might underlie the relation between the two propositions characterising the essential nature of the dream itself.

In the case of the two premisses of interpretation it was shown that the difficulties resulting from a dogmatic formulation of these principles and their relationship could be comprehensively resolved by an inverse procedure of argument that attempted to establish the validity of the first premiss in the form of a necessary postulate required to account for the possibility of the second. This yielded a conception of the status of that fundamental premiss in the mode of a transcendental postulate, upon which the very possibility of the technique of interpretation is to rest. It might be hoped that a

similar procedure of argument will allow us to situate the key postulate of wish-fulfilment, itself fundamental to the technique of interpretation, in its appropriate form.

We might then suspect that Freud is making strategic use of the problematic status of this first postulate to have the general validity of the second accepted more easily. This in turn suggests that the correct procedure of argument would be to derive the necessary validity of the first proposition from the universality of the second. "Of the two general characteristics of dreams which I have here brought forward, the second clearly has more prospect of being accepted without contradiction than the first. It is only by means of far-reaching investigations that we shall be able to establish the fact that what instigates a dream must always be a wish and cannot be a worry or an intention or a reproach; but this will not affect the other characteristic - that the dream does not simply reproduce this stimulus, but removes it, gets rid of it, deals with it, by means of a kind of experience."(130/161)

This conception of the relation between these two propositions would suggest that the most effective way of determining the conditions of validity of the first postulate would be to approach it via an examination of the second. This approach would follow directly from the issues at stake in the preceding discussion of the status of the wish in the empirical model of explanation. For that argument applies equally to the status of this first proposition, which merely formulates the role of the wish in the instigation of the dream. Any attempt to situate this postulate as a dogmatic proposition whose validity must be established on independent grounds remains hampered by the problematic empirical status of the wish itself. This renders the second postulate equally inaccessible until the status of the first can be determined.

An alternative conception of the relation between these two propositions, which attempted to establish the necessity of the first in terms of the universality of the second, might provide us with a more productive approach to considering the conditions of validity of this crucial first proposition. This approach would conform not only to the mode of argument already encountered in determining the status of the premisses of interpretation, but also to the procedure followed by the technique of interpretation itself. For we do not begin with any positive knowledge of the wish, and then proceed to examine the process by which that wish comes to be satisfied in the dream. Interpretation starts rather with the outcome of the process of dream formation and attempts to determine the role of the wish in it. It is to be hoped that a similar procedure of argument will allow us to arrive at an appropriate status for this first proposition in terms of the conditions of the process of wish-fulfilment itself.

VI.

What instigates the dream is a thought of the form: "I should like to go on the lake". The dream does not simply give expression to this thought, but represents it fulfilled in a hallucinatory experience: "I am going on the lake". This hallucinatory experience then makes up the content of the manifest dream. This transformation already introduces an element of distortion into the manifest dream, for that thought is now represented in the form of an actual experience. "Thus even in these simplest children's dreams a difference remains between the latent and the manifest dream, there is a distortion of the latent dream-thought: the transformation of a thought into an experience. In the process of interpreting a dream this alteration must first be undone."(129/161)

We may therefore distinguish two different but complementary models for the explanation of the dream - a progressive model of dream formation and a retrospective model for the interpretation of that dream. The dream arises through a process of hallucinatory transformation, by which the wish is represented as an actual experience. This process gives rise to a certain degree of distortion in the manifest dream, which serves as the primary obstacle to the attempt to discover the wish that underlies that dream. The technique of interpretation is obliged to take as its immediate object of investigation the outcome of this process, the element of distortion itself, and attempts on that basis to determine the nature of the wish that could account for the formation of the dream.

The technique of interpretation thus operates in precisely the opposite direction to the process of dream formation. For it takes the product of this transformation, the hallucinatory experience making up the manifest dream, and attempts to reverse that process in order to arrive at the wish that lies behind it. The technique of interpretation proceeds to interpret the content of the manifest dream by asking what kind of wish would account for that experience or explain its origin. It begins by examining the nature of the experience making up the content of the manifest dream - "I am going ..." - and seeks to reinstate the wish-clause that would render that experience intelligible - "I should like to go ...".

These two models are therefore distinguished not simply by the reversal of their direction or mode of operation, but more crucially by an inversion in the status of the terms involved. The concept of the wish, which featured as the primary assumption of

the progressive model of dream formation, is now posited in the form of a final term in the procedure of interpretation. It is the revised status attributed to the problem of distortion in the procedure of interpretation that makes this inversion of the explanatory status of the wish possible. For the element of distortion is now taken as the primary object of interpretation, while the role of the wish is considered in its status as a necessary postulate required to render that dream intelligible.

In this way the explanatory status of the wish becomes associated with the basic conditions of the technique of interpretation itself, in its role as a condition of the intelligibility of the dream. It is this inversion in the explanatory status of the wish that now provides us with an alternative approach to the conditions of validity of the postulate of wish-fulfilment, which itself serves as a fundamental principle of that technique. For just as the concept of the wish is now situated in its explanatory role as a condition of interpretation, so too we might attempt to derive the validity of this fundamental postulate from its status as a necessary condition of intelligibility, upon which the very possibility of the technique of interpretation is to rest.

This procedure of argument entails an obvious contrast to that of the empirical model of explanation, which would consider the validity of this proposition solely in terms of evidence derived from a direct examination of the dream itself. Freud has, however, already gone to some lengths to demonstrate the difficulties involved in any such attempt to derive the validity of psychoanalytic postulates from evidence obtained at the level of the object. The problem of distortion then features as the primary obstacle not only to the methods of this form of investigation, but equally to the attempt to generalise its findings with any validity. The role of the wish similarly remains the most inaccessible or refractory aspect of the dream under these conditions.

The immediate advantage of associating the explanatory role of the wish with the conditions of the technique of interpretation would be to give us access to the form of universality and necessity required if this postulate is to serve as a fundamental principle of the psychoanalytic method. At the same time it is clear that the status of this proposition, and the validity of the technique of interpretation elaborated around it, would no longer be restricted in the same way by the problem of distortion. For, as we have shown, it is in fact precisely the revised status attributed to the problem of distortion that permits this procedure of interpretation to establish the status of the wish in the form of a necessary condition of intelligibility.

In direct contrast to the empirical model, which attempts to suppress the problem of distortion, only to re-encounter it as the constant limit of its validity, the technique of interpretation establishes the question of distortion as its immediate object and starting-point. The positive status attributed to the problem of distortion then serves as the initial point of reference for the procedure of interpretation, in so far as the register of representation is now acknowledged to be fundamental to the intelligibility of the dream. For the status here attributed to the issue of distortion is itself merely an indication of a more fundamental revision in the status of the register of representation as a whole, as the site of coherence for the procedures and principles of the technique of interpretation in general.

VII.

It may appear that this line of argument creates as many difficulties as it can be said to resolve. At this stage, however, these suggestions amount to no more than a provisional formulation of a mode of argument which can only really take shape through pursuing their implications in a reading of the text itself. Similarly, the real test of these hypotheses will be their productivity in dealing with the issues at stake in Freud's argument, and their ability to come to terms with difficulties that would otherwise necessarily remain obscure. This argument can, however, be shown to have an immediate application in the analogy that Freud now proposes to establish between the models for the explanation of the dream and the parapraxis.

Freud has outlined a model for the explanation of the parapraxis as the outcome of a conflict of intentions, where a second purpose comes to disturb a conscious function. The argument then turns on the claim that the product of this disturbance can be shown to be the result of a compromise between the conflicting aims of the two purposes. He now proposes to fit the model of the dream into the same pattern of explanation. The need to sleep is thus situated as the dominant purpose underlying the dream, as implied by the very conditions of the state of sleep itself. The mental stimulus, or wish, can then be situated as the disturbing purpose which comes into conflict with this dominant tendency, by pressing to be dealt with during sleep.

This conception of the role of the mental stimulus as a disturbance to sleep follows directly from the manner in which the notion of mental stimulus was introduced above, as a form of excitation "responsible for disturbing the sleep of an adult by preventing him from establishing the mood required for falling asleep - the withdrawing of interest

from the world".(128/160) At the same time the withdrawal of interest from the external world is here already in place as the basic condition underlying the state of sleep, and thus as the preliminary form of the dominant tendency in the dream. This condition has been established from the very beginning of this account as the basic psychological characteristic of the state of sleep.

The wish to sleep, in the form of a withdrawal of interest from the external world, can thus quite legitimately be situated here as a defining characteristic of the dream itself, in so far as the possibility of dreaming assumes the state of sleep as its underlying condition. This psychological characterisation of the state of sleep then establishes the grounds for the apparently physiological conception of the function of the dream as the guardian of sleep. For that concept of the function of the dream, as an attempt to protect sleep against the disturbance of stimuli, merely elaborates on the basic psychological condition underlying the dream, the wish to preserve sleep, to go on sleeping.

The function of the dream as guardian of sleep, here configured as the dominant wish to sleep, may thus be directly derived from the psychological condition defining the state of sleep in general, the withdrawal of interest from the external world. And just as it is this wish that underlies the function of the dream as guardian of sleep, so too the wish that serves as the disturbing stimulus has been defined from the start in terms of its role as a disturbance to sleep. "The disturbed purpose can only be that of sleeping. We may replace the disturbing one by the psychical stimulus, or let us say by the wish which presses to be dealt with, since we have not learned so far of any other psychical stimulus that disturbs sleep."(130/161)

It thus appears that the functional model of the dream has from the start been structured in terms of the original dynamic model for the explanation of the parapraxis as the outcome of a disturbance between two conflicting tendencies. In the same way, the dream is now to be explained as a compromise, the result of this conflict between the wish to sleep and a further wish which presses to be dealt with during sleep, in the form of a disturbing stimulus. "Here the dream, too, is the result of a compromise. One sleeps, but one nevertheless experiences the removing of a wish; one satisfies a wish, but at the same time one continues to sleep. Both purposes are partly achieved and partly abandoned."(130/161-62)

It is at this stage, however, that the problematic status of the wish in this account brings into focus all the difficulties associated with the original model of the parapraxis.

For the explanation of the parapraxis as the outcome of a conflict between two opposing tendencies depends in the first instance on our ability to identify the purposes involved. Until we have some reliable means of determining the nature of these purposes we are faced with the problem of explaining how they came into conflict in the first place. The validity of this model for the explanation of the dream would be immediately restricted by the problematic empirical status of the wish, and our difficulty in positively identifying the disturbing stimulus involved in the instigation of the dream.

The model for the explanation of the parapraxis finds itself faced with difficulties that are in fact characteristic of any model of psychoanalytic investigation. This model proposes an explanation of the parapraxis as the product of a conflict of intentions between two opposing tendencies. Yet on the one hand we have no independent means of determining the nature of at least one of the purposes involved in this conflict. And on the other hand the immediate outcome of that conflict, the distortion produced by the compromise between them, serves to obscure the nature of the tendencies themselves. The product of this conflict of purposes, the parapraxis itself, thus merely serves as an obstacle to the validity of the model for its explanation, by preventing any demonstration of the terms involved.

The argument outlined above, however, provides us with a consistent approach to resolving the difficulties of this account. For that argument would suggest that the problematic position of the concept of distortion in this model of explanation is to be directly attributed to the positive status of the terms which it assumes. In that case the two primary difficulties faced by this account would merely constitute interlinked and complementary aspects of the same underlying difficulty with the conditions of this model. The problematic status of the tendencies at the root of this conflict thus inevitably gives rise to a conception of the outcome of that conflict as a site of distortion that stands in the way of any attempt to identify the purposes themselves.

If we were able to escape these presuppositions, it would become possible to invert the terms of this account to yield an alternative form of deductive explanation that avoids the difficulties inherent in the empirical model. This would provide us with a form of explanation that no longer relied on the positive status of the intentions for an explanation of the conflict to which they give rise, but would rather take that point of conflict as its primary point of reference in the attempt to identify the tendencies involved. The revised status attributed to this site of conflict, as our immediate object of investigation, would then serve as the point of departure for our attempt to

determine the role of the wish in that conflict. Our conception of the nature and status of that wish will therefore be crucial to the viability of this procedure as a whole.

VIII.

Freud's definition of the function of the dream as the guardian of sleep establishes the initial point of reference for this procedure of argument. It is this conception that allows him to situate the need to sleep as the dominant tendency in the dream, one that may be considered a defining characteristic of dreams in general. The need to sleep, established here as the condition of dreaming, then serves as a fixed and constant point of reference, in relation to which we may attempt to determine the nature of the other wish that comes into conflict with it. It is that site of opposition, the point of conflict with the dominant tendency, that then provides our primary point of reference in defining the role of the mental stimulus that disturbs sleep.

This returns us to the question of the mental stimulus and its role in the instigation of the dream. The mental stimulus has been defined from the start in terms of its role as a disturbance to sleep, and hence on the basis of its conflict with the attempt to preserve sleep. That mental stimulus, therefore, only figures in the construction of the dream to the extent that it has come into conflict with the dominant tendency as a threat to sleep. This would suggest that any mental stimulus which encroaches on sleep, and thus comes into conflict with this dominant tendency, has the capacity to give rise to a dream. Similarly, we might argue that the capacity of any mental stimulus to disturb sleep is in itself sufficient grounds for that mental stimulus to play the role of a wish in the formation of the dream.

This opens the possibility of a more formal definition of the role of the wish in the instigation of the dream, purely in terms of the capacity of a mental stimulus to disturb sleep. It is clear that the actual nature of this mental stimulus would not be the primary consideration in this account. For the role of that mental stimulus in the instigation of the dream would be considered solely in terms of its capacity to disturb sleep, and thus to come into opposition with the dominant need for sleep. Hence any mental stimulus could play a role in the instigation of the dream, to the extent that it has the capacity to disturb sleep. Similarly, it is only to the extent that this mental stimulus encroaches on sleep, and thus comes into conflict with the dominant tendency, that it functions as a wish in the instigation of the dream.

This definition of the role of the wish in the formation of the dream follows directly from the dynamic model of the dream as the outcome of a conflict between two opposing tendencies, the need to sleep and a disturbing stimulus. For it is only to the extent that a mental stimulus has come into conflict with the demand to sleep, only to the extent that it figures as a disturbance to sleep, that that mental stimulus is to be considered a wish. Within this dynamic model, the fact that a dream has arisen in itself implies that something has come into opposition with the dominant tendency to sleep. To the extent that we have a dream, therefore, to the extent that a dream has arisen to mark the site of this disturbance, we may posit the role of a disturbing stimulus, and hence the role of a wish in the instigation of that dream.

Within this simple framework of intelligibility we may thus derive by formal inversion the necessity of the postulate that what instigates the dream is always a wish. For the role of that wish in the formation of the dream is now defined solely in terms of the capacity of any mental stimulus to disturb sleep, and thus to come into opposition with the dominant need for sleep. Hence, rather than any positive conception of the wish as an independent empirical entity which then gives rise to the dream, the fact of dream formation is itself now established as the grounds for positing the role of a disturbing wish.

This definition of the role of the wish in the instigation of the dream would then immediately provide us with the form of necessity and universality required if this postulate is to serve as a fundamental principle of the technique of interpretation. At the same time it would provide us with the basis for a more productive approach to the question of how it is that the dream can be considered the fulfilment of that wish. For the problem has been one of explaining under what conditions this process of dream formation, this process of representing a thought as a hallucinatory experience, can be said to "deal with" that stimulus, and thus to satisfy the wish.

The dynamic model of dream formation allows us to sketch a preliminary approach to this question. For it now becomes clear that the dream's ability to deal with that stimulus, and thus to satisfy the wish that it represents, is in fact only considered in terms of the role of the stimulus as a disturbance to sleep. The role of the wish in the instigation of the dream can thus be defined precisely in terms of the capacity of any mental stimulus to disturb sleep. And the function of the dream as guardian of sleep can similarly be characterised by the attempt to protect sleep against the disturbance of that stimulus. The process of dream formation, to the extent that it serves the function

of protecting sleep, does not therefore have to remove the stimulus itself, but merely the threat that it poses to sleep.

The process of dream formation attempts to deal with the disturbance posed by any mental stimulus that arises during sleep by integrating that stimulus into a dream. The process of transforming this stimulus into a hallucinatory experience is then to be considered a process of wish-fulfilment to the extent that it removes the capacity of that mental stimulus to disturb sleep. The transformation of that mental stimulus into an experience itself removes its potential as a disturbance to sleep by representing it as an actual state of affairs. In this way the process of dream formation manages to pre-empt the disturbance posed by any wish that presses to be dealt with during sleep by representing it as fulfilled, realising it as a hallucinatory experience.

At the same time it is clear that this wish that presses to be dealt with during sleep cannot be said to have been satisfied in any real sense. For it is merely the capacity of that stimulus to disturb sleep that has been removed in this process of hallucinatory representation. The wish has merely been fobbed off, or defused, to the extent that it posed a threat to sleep. The only wish that can really be said to have been satisfied in this process is in fact the opposing wish to go on sleeping. We thus arrive at the paradoxical situation where the representation of one wish as fulfilled in fact merely serves to satisfy the opposing wish to preserve sleep.

IX.

The nature of the dream as a form of wish-fulfilment can only be adequately appreciated on the basis of this dynamic model of dream formation as the outcome of a conflict between two opposing tendencies. It is this dynamic model that then underlies the conception of the dream as a compromise formation, as the product of a compromise between the need to sleep and the demands of a disturbing wish. In this way both the dominant tendency to preserve sleep and the instigatory role of a disturbing wish become integral to our conception of the nature of the dream itself. For just as in the parapraxis we must distinguish between a disturbing purpose and a disturbed one, so too the process of dream formation will remain unintelligible unless we posit this conflict of tendencies that underlies it.

It is not the actual nature of these tendencies, however, but the conflict between them that remains of primary importance in this account. The common factor in this

dynamic model, which underlies the explanation of both the parapraxis and the dream, is not the particular tendencies involved, but rather the primary fact of an opposition between them. This would once again suggest that it is the site of conflict between the opposing tendencies, rather than those tendencies themselves, that serves as the positive element in this dynamic model of the dream. This would similarly allow us to argue that it is the fact of that distinction itself, the possibility of distinguishing the role of two opposing tendencies in this process, that is here invoked as the primary condition of intelligibility for the psychoanalytic object in general.

The attempt to situate the principle of conflict as a fundamental condition of psychoanalytic intelligibility would then merely formalise in an epistemological sphere the argument that it is the site of the opposition between them, rather than the positive nature of the tendencies themselves, that serves as the immediate object of psychoanalytic investigation. This argument would provide us with a link between the dynamic model of dream formation and the earlier structural model for the explanation of the dream in terms of the distinction between its manifest and latent registers. For there too we have suggested that this model of explanation does not ultimately rest upon any positive conception of the terms involved, but rather on the nature of the relation posited between them.

The distinction between manifest and latent could then itself be considered one of the conditions for the intelligibility of the dream. The first step of the procedure of interpretation, exploring the distinction between manifest and latent in order to establish the nature of the thoughts that lie behind the dream, would then depend in the first instance on nothing more than the status of this distinction as a necessary condition of intelligibility. Yet the implementation of that distinction will at the same time allow us, in principle, to extract the latent thoughts that will account for that dream. For this procedure, in its turn, merely entails the possibility of re-instating the wish clause that had been collapsed into the manifest dream by the process of dream formation itself.

Once again, then, it is the critique of the positive terms of the empirical model for the explanation of the dream that clears the way for a more flexible, dynamic conception of the procedure of interpretation. The validity of this procedure neither relies on, nor presumes, the positive status of the latent wish in the process of dream formation, which is in any case elusive and undemonstrable. For the role of the wish in this process is no longer tied to the nature of the mental stimulus in the latent pole, nor dependent on our ability to bring that latent thought to light. It is rather the distinction

between the manifest and latent registers in the dream that must itself provide the basis for our attempt to determine the nature of the terms involved. Just as the distinction between manifest and latent tendencies now becomes a fundamental condition of psychoanalytic investigation, so too the role of the wish in this process must be derived in the first instance from the nature of that relation itself.

3.3 The Censorship of Dreams

I.

"The study of the dreams of children has taught us the origin, the essential nature and the function of dreams. Dreams are things which get rid of (psychical) stimuli disturbing to sleep, by the method of hallucinatory satisfaction."(136/168) The basic model of children's dreams has allowed Freud to elaborate an integrated functional definition of the dream as an attempt to protect sleep against disruption by mental stimuli. This functional definition of the dream allows him to account for both its origin, in the disturbance of a mental stimulus that presses to be dealt with during sleep, and its essential nature, as a process of hallucinatory representation which serves to remove that disturbance.

"Whenever a dream has been completely intelligible to us, it has turned out to be the hallucinatory fulfilment of a wish. This coincidence cannot be a chance one nor a matter of indifference."(136/168) From one point of view, this finding will ultimately always remain a matter of coincidence. For no matter how regular or widespread this observation may be, there always remains the possibility that we shall encounter a dream that does not turn out to be the fulfilment of a wish. Freud has himself pointed out that there are in fact many dreams that appear to involve a worry or an intention or a reproach, rather than a wish. The question then arises as to his grounds for claiming that these dreams too can be shown to involve the satisfaction of a wish.

From the point of view of the argument put forward above, on the other hand, this finding would involve no coincidence at all. For the role of the wish in the formation of the dream has been proposed as a defining characteristic of the dream itself, as the condition of its intelligibility. The very possibility of a successful interpretation of that dream would thus inevitably turn upon the role of a wish in its formation. It then becomes a question of whether this approach to the principle of wish-fulfilment, and the dynamic model for the explanation of the dream elaborated around it, offers any advantages over the empirical argument when we turn to the wider class of dreams in general.

Freud now turns from the examples of children's dreams to an examination of dreams in which distortion plays a more obvious part. Distortion is immediately defined in terms of its status as an obstacle to the work of interpretation. "Dream-distortion is what makes a dream seem strange and unintelligible to us."(136/168) It is distortion that stands in the way of our attempt to determine the role of the wish in the dream,

and thus prevents us from discovering its meaning. The overcoming of distortion is therefore a primary condition for the successful interpretation of that dream. "Our immediate task, then, is an enquiry which will lead to an understanding of this distortion in dreams."(136/168)

Freud will go on to elaborate a dynamic account of distortion that traces it back to the operation of a particular psychic function, that of "dream-censorship". It is censorship that is responsible in the first instance for the distortion encountered in the attempt to trace the meaning of the manifest dream back to the latent wish that underlies it. This preliminary account of the operation of censorship in dream formation then sets up the framework for a more comprehensive account of the role of the dream-work. "We can also say that dream-distortion is carried out by the dream-work; and we want to describe the dream-work and trace it back to the forces operating in it."(136/168)

It is here, precisely in relation to the question of distortion, that the distinction structuring the argument of these lectures will again come into play. The initial model of investigation, situated in the empirical sphere and directed towards the overcoming of distortion, will thus make way for an account of the interpretation of the dream elaborated around the register of distortion itself. An alternative conception both of the meaning of the dream and of the role of the wish in it, defined by contradistinction to the use of these terms in the empirical sphere, will similarly provide the basis for a more comprehensive account of the conditions of validity of the technique of interpretation as a whole.

II.

We are presented with an example of a dream that seems to have been chosen precisely for its clarity and coherence. For it presents none of the fragmentation or confusion usually associated with dreams, apart from some gaps in its content. Freud points out that these gaps are not the result of any uncertainty in the dreamer's recollection of the dream, but constitute rather gaps or omissions in the dream itself. "(W)hat is remarkable and interesting from our point of view is that the dream shows several gaps - gaps not in the dreamer's memory of the dream but in the content of the dream itself."(138/170)

The coherent text of this dream makes it quite simple to identify the points at which those gaps have arisen. In each case it involves a passage of direct speech where a

particular word or phrase, the "performative", has been suppressed. If we make the insertions called for by the context we arrive at the content of the dream, which turns out to be "the model of a shameless libidinal phantasy".(138/171) Hence we may go on to infer that it was in all likelihood precisely on account of the objectionable nature of this phantasy that all direct references to it were deleted from the manifest dream itself. "You will, I hope, think it plausible to suppose that it was precisely the objectionable nature of these passages that was the motive for their suppression."(138-39/171)

Freud makes use of the analogy of newspaper censorship in wartime as the simplest illustration of the suppression of offending passages. "In these empty places there was something that displeased the higher censorship authorities and for that reason it was removed."(139/171) This instance of suppression by omission constitutes the most straightforward example of censorship. In other cases censorship does not operate by direct suppression once these passages are already in place, but gives rise to certain modifications and circumlocutions in the formulation of the passages themselves. The manifest dream then refers to these matters only by "approximations and allusions".(139/171)

The third form of operation involves the rather more complicated instance of a complete reorganisation of material, a displacement of emphasis, so that the central themes of the latent thoughts do not appear in the manifest dream at all. "As a result of this displacement of accent, this fresh grouping of the elements of the content, the manifest dream has become so unlike the latent dream-thoughts that no-one would suspect the presence of the latter behind the former. This displacement of accent is one of the chief instruments of dream-distortion and is what gives the dream the strangeness on account of which the dreamer himself is not inclined to recognise it as his own production."(140/172)

We are thus faced with three possible instances of censorship, ranging from the most straightforward case of direct suppression by omission to the more complex instance where a complete reorganisation of the material of the manifest dream removes any reference to the latent thoughts. It is this third instance, where no trace of the latent material can be detected in the dream itself, that will constitute the real difficulty for Freud's argument. For if the censorship has managed to sever all connection with the latent dream-thoughts, such that we can no longer point to any trace of those latent thoughts in the manifest dream, then on what grounds can we claim to explain the meaning of that dream in terms of its relation to a wish that lies behind it?

This third instance becomes the true horizon of the argument that Freud hopes to elaborate around the simplest case of direct censorship. The legitimacy of that argument must therefore be considered in terms of its possible application to the more problematic instance. A first indication of the way forward is provided by a comment that would appear almost incidental if not for the categorical manner in which it is formulated. "Wherever there are gaps in the manifest dream the dream-censorship is responsible for them. We should go further, and regard it as a manifestation of the censorship wherever a dream-element is remembered especially faintly, indefinitely and doubtfully among other elements that are more clearly constructed."(139/172)

Freud has begun by claiming that the meaning of the dream is to be traced back to the role of a wish in its formation. He has then suggested that distortion is what makes a dream seem unintelligible to us. He has gone on to claim that it is the censorship that is responsible in the first instance for this distortion. We now encounter the general claim that whatever is unclear or uncertain in the dream is to be regarded as a sign of censorship. Thus whether these gaps in the content of the dream are due to obscurities in expression in the dream itself, or simply to doubts or uncertainties in recall, they are to be considered first of all as an index of the operation of the censorship.

This in turn allows us to arrive at a more formal definition of the role of the censorship, considered from the point of view of the work of interpretation rather than the process of dream formation itself. For anything in the dream which cannot be explained, any aspect of the dream which remains unintelligible, is now to be attributed to the operation of censorship. This claim, that the censorship is what prevents the dream from being understood, would merely entail a corollary formulation of the basic notion that it is the censorship that obscures the meaning of the manifest dream by severing its relation to the latent content that lies behind it.

Freud's subsequent remarks will support this formulation of the status of censorship. For he will go on to establish a direct relation between the operation of censorship in the dream and that of resistance to the work of interpretation. "What we met with as resistance in our work of interpretation must now be introduced into the dream-work in the form of the dream-censorship. The resistance to interpretation is only a putting into effect of the dream-censorship."(141/173-74)

This parallel between the operation of resistance and of censorship then forms the basis for the notion that the operation of censorship is not confined to the construction of

the dream, but "persists as a permanent institution" whose aim is the maintenance of that distortion against any attempt at deciphering the dream.(141/173-74)

At the same time Freud has been quite explicit in cautioning against any attempt to understand the operation of this function of censorship in any substantive or localised sense. The effects of distortion and resistance are not to be conceived in terms of the operation of any particular apparatus or agency of censorship, but rather simply in terms of the relation between forces in the dream. "For the time being it is nothing more than a serviceable term for describing a dynamic relation. The word does not prevent our asking by what purpose this influence is exercised and against what purpose it is directed."(140/173)

Freud thus proposes a dynamic model of the operation of censorship, structured once more in terms of the relation between conflicting tendencies in the dream. He will go on to suggest that this dynamic approach to the censorship is fundamental not only for the understanding of the dream, but for the explanation of human life in general. We would want, therefore, to consider the framework of this dynamic model of explanation in terms that could indeed support the scope of these aspirations. For our understanding of this claim will inevitably be influenced by our conception of the purposes involved and the nature of their relationship as a whole.

III.

The "immediate task" of the present lecture has been formulated as "an enquiry which will lead to an understanding of this distortion in dreams".(136/168) The explanation of distortion turns upon the notion of censorship. For it is the operation of censorship that is responsible in the first instance for the distortion that obscures the meaning of the dream. At the same time Freud suggests that it will be possible to carry out a parallel derivation to account for the effects of resistance to interpretation. Resistance to the work of interpretation is merely a "putting into effect" of the same censorship that is responsible for the distortion encountered in the dream.

Censorship is thus the common term invoked to account for both the effects of distortion in the formation of the dream and the effects of resistance in the interpretation of that dream. It is this notion that allows Freud to establish an explicit parallel between the two major obstacles to the technique of interpretation, by suggesting that they have a common source. "(J)ust as the strength of the resistance

varies in the interpretation of each element in a dream, so too the magnitude of the distortion introduced by the censorship varies for each element in the same dream."(141/174)

Freud has begun his account of the role of censorship in the dream with a survey of some of its basic forms of operation, in order to establish "what it does".(136/168) He now turns from the survey of the mechanisms of censorship to an examination of its source, in an attempt to determine the nature of the forces by which it is implemented. It is precisely at this point that we find the introduction of the dynamic model of censorship prefaced by a warning against the dangers of a positive or substantive reading of what is in the first instance no more than a descriptive or explanatory term.(140/173)

The very notion of "the censorship", as a permanent institution in the psychic apparatus, shows how difficult it is to avoid introducing anthropomorphic and teleological assumptions into an account of this nature. For it is a small step from describing a process in terms of its perceived outcome to describing it as a function in terms of the purpose that it serves and then going on to attribute responsibility for that function to a particular agency in the psychic apparatus. Hence Freud's explicit caution against any localising conception of the censorship as a particular "office" in the psychic apparatus, "from which a censoring influence of this kind issues".(140/173)

The dynamic model of the operation of censorship is introduced in an attempt to counteract the anthropomorphic tendencies inherent in this process of derivation, which tend to become lodged in the concept of censorship itself. Freud emphasises that the notion of censorship is to be understood primarily in terms of a dynamic relation between the forces at work in the process of dream formation. The term would then serve merely to designate the effects of a particular process, the outcome of a dynamic relation between opposing tendencies operating in the dream. It is this conception that is to provide the framework for the attempt to determine the nature of the particular forces involved.

It is here that our understanding of the status and grounds of validity of the dynamic model of explanation in general will have a direct influence on our conception of the nature of these "tendencies" or "purposes". Only an appreciation of the appropriate formal status of the principles of this model can prevent us from slipping straight back into all the teleological assumptions entailed by the concept of "purpose" itself. Hence the warning against the dangers of a positive reading of an explanatory term. For any

substantive conception of the purposes at work in the dream would simply involve us once more in all the conceptual difficulties that the dynamic model of explanation might allow us to avoid.

The use of the English term "purpose" here, where the German has "Tendenz", merely serves, of course, to accentuate the dangers of a teleological reading of this account. The translator's footnote to the use of this term does, however, refer us back to the introduction of this term into the original model of the parapraxis in the third lecture.(40/66) This footnote thus refers us directly to the root of this entire argument in Freud's initial discussion of the sense of a psychical process. We may therefore consider the position of the term "purpose" here as an index to all the issues at stake in that initial argument, and thus to the concept of sense around which that argument turns.

It was in the initial discussion of the sense of a psychical process that it first became possible to distinguish two divergent readings of the concept of sense itself. We thus distinguished between a functional or psycho-physiological reading of this term, in the direction of "intention" or "purpose", and an alternative reading of this notion in terms of a broader context of significance. We attempted to indicate some of the ways in which this conception of the sense of a psychical process can help us to overcome the empirical limitations of any explanation of the parapraxis that relies on the problematic psychological notions of intention and purpose.

This distinction between the notions of purpose and intention, on the one hand, and those of sense and significance, on the other, served as the point of departure for our attempt to elaborate a more comprehensive account of the technique of interpretation, in distinction from the original model for the investigation of the parapraxis. This involved a procedure of interpretation oriented upon the signifying context that supports the parapraxis rather than any functional structure of intentions that might lie behind it. For the initial model for the investigation and explanation of the parapraxis remains hampered by the psycho-physiological conceptions that provide its empirical foundation.

We proceeded to consider an alternative account of the principles and conditions of the technique of interpretation, defined in contrast to the limitations of the psycho-physiological model of the parapraxis and the functional principles that it assumes. This argument has culminated in a critique of the empirical foundations of the initial dynamic model of the parapraxis in favour of principles of explanation defined solely at

the level of formal conditions of the technique of interpretation itself. This has allowed us to elaborate a dynamic model for the explanation of the dream that depends primarily on the possibility of distinguishing between opposing tendencies at work in the dream, rather than on any positive or empirical conception of the nature of those tendencies themselves.

The attempt to rid this argument of any residual reliance upon psycho-physiological notions has thus amounted to a critique of the empirical foundations of psychoanalytic principles in general. We have argued that the validity of these principles can only be effectively sustained at the level of epistemological conditions of interpretation, formulated in the mode of necessary principles of explanation. Only in this way can these principles attain to the form of necessity and universal validity adequate to their status as fundamental principles of the technique of interpretation. Similarly, we have demonstrated that it is only by this means that we can resolve the difficulties that arise from the attempt to found these principles at the level of empirical procedures and postulates.

It should now be possible to carry through this argument to a critique of the substantive notions entailed in the dynamic model of censorship itself. We would want to maintain the formal priority of the dynamic principles of explanation, elaborated around the possibility of distinguishing between conflicting tendencies at work in this process, over any attempt to determine the positive nature of those tendencies themselves. Only in this manner can we avoid the conceptual difficulties that inevitably accompany the attempt to ground this model in an empirical investigation of the "purposes" or "tendencies" that it postulates. For these tendencies themselves constitute no more than explanatory postulates, hypothetical processes at work in the psychic apparatus, invoked to account for given effects in the dream.

This provides some indication of the issues at stake in Freud's caution against a substantive reading of what are postulated in the first instance as descriptive or explanatory terms. The term "purpose", which quite clearly serves merely to support the causal structure postulated by this account, is the most obvious instance of a functional embodiment of an explanatory term. An appreciation of the appropriate status of this term then provides us with a guideline in our approach to a whole range of other concepts invoked to support psychoanalytic explanation, including those of "cathexis", "libido", "drive", "wish", and "intention". For we would want to reconsider the status of each of these concepts in terms of the role it plays within the broader economy of psychoanalytic explanation, as a causal postulate ultimately founded at the

level of explanation, which then receives functional embodiment at the level of the object.

It is clear that our understanding of the status of these explanatory concepts in psychoanalysis will have a direct influence on our conception of the role they play in the model of the psychic apparatus. Our conception of the status and foundation of that model of the psychic apparatus as a whole will similarly be determined by our approach to the principles of explanation upon which it depends. For the model of the psychic apparatus proposed by psychoanalysis merely constitutes a functional systematisation of those fundamental explanatory concepts and the principles from which they are derived. The central structural distinction around which this model is elaborated, the notion of a divided psychic apparatus, can thus itself be considered an embodiment of the fundamental principle of conflict that we have shown to lie at the heart of the dynamic model of explanation.

It is this dynamic principle of conflict or opposition, established as a formal principle of explanation, that then provides the framework for the postulation of unconscious processes operating in the psychic apparatus. For the postulate of the existence of processes which have no immediate empirical manifestation can clearly only be justified in the first instance as a necessary postulate required to support the dynamic model of explanation. It is those dynamic principles of explanation, and the argument elaborated around them, that must therefore provide the foundation for our attempt to establish the status of the central concepts in psychoanalysis. The attempt to determine the appropriate status of those dynamic principles of explanation will thus remain our point of reference in the argument that follows.

Similarly, we should be wary of any substantive rendering of a concept that is postulated in the form of a necessary condition of interpretation. Any simplistic physiological or functional reduction of a concept such as "the Unconscious" would merely stand in the way of the attempt to grasp the common principle that allows Freud to go beyond the distinction between Cs. and Ucs., or even Ego and Id, towards the postulation of a notion such as the Death Drive. In each case we are dealing with concepts elaborated around a dynamic principle of opposition that is situated as the condition of intelligibility of the psychoanalytic object in general. The status of the concepts invoked to structure that dynamic relation is in each case derived from those fundamental principles of explanation, themselves defined as formal conditions of interpretation.

IV.

"The purposes which exercise the censorship are those which are acknowledged by the dreamer's waking judgement, those with which he feels himself at one."(142/174) Censorship is attributed to the influence of the dreamer's faculty of judgement, all the ethical and critical judgements with which the ego identifies. This faculty, however, appears to be precisely the same as that which is responsible for the critical objections that constituted the initial obstacle to the method of free association. The issues of censorship and resistance are thus brought into relation to one another, situated as obstacles to the work of interpretation, and attributed to a common source. "You may be sure that if you reject an interpretation of one of your own dreams which has been correctly carried out, you are doing so from the same motives for which the dream-censorship has been exercised, the dream-distortion brought about and the interpretation made necessary."(142/174)

"The purposes against which the dream-censorship is directed must be described in the first instance from the point of view of that agency itself."(142/174-75) Here, then, we have a procedure of derivation already identified as characteristic of the dynamic model of explanation. The effects of censorship have been attributed to the interests of waking judgement, to the dominant influence of those judgements with which the waking ego identifies. The purposes against which that censorship is implemented are now defined solely in terms of their relation to those dominant trends, and thus in terms of their point of conflict or opposition with those "waking judgements".

These "purposes" that come into conflict with the dominant tendencies will then be identified as wishes. In conformity with dynamic principles of explanation, these wishes will be given, in the first instance, no positive content. Instead they are merely situated in relation to their point of conflict with those dominant tendencies. They will thus be characterised in terms of their opposition to the standards of waking judgement. Hence, "they are invariably of a reprehensible nature, repulsive from the ethical, aesthetic and social point of view".(142/175) So too, their expression in the dream is inevitably subject to censorship and distortion, because they are by definition wishes that come into conflict with the judgements of the censoring agency.

Certain consequences immediately follow. In the first place it is clear that the dreamer's information can no longer serve as the basis for our conclusions about the nature of these wishes. For the appearance of those wishes in the dream is now

defined precisely in terms of their opposition to the judgements and sentiments of the waking ego. Our investigations can therefore no longer rely on the dreamer's confirmation, but must instead be maintained against all his claims and protests to the contrary. Any attempt to determine the nature of the wishes involved in the formation of dreams will thus have to be carried out in opposition to the conscious knowledge of the dreamer.

The investigation of these censored wishes finds itself oriented in opposition to the judgements of the waking ego. The dreamer's judgements concerning those wishes can therefore no longer serve as a point of reference, except by contrast. For we will be forced to postulate the existence of wishes that are not only unknown to the dreamer, but which directly contradict those of which he is aware. The role of these wishes in the dream will be defined in the first instance precisely in terms of their opposition to the tendencies acknowledged by the dreamer. It is the occurrence of censorship and distortion, therefore, that provides the point of inversion around which the postulation of unconscious wishes first becomes possible.

Distortion and censorship themselves become our justification for the postulation of wishes not recognised by the dreamer. For the occurrence of these wishes in the dream is postulated in the first instance solely in terms of their conflict with those that he does recognise, and thus on the grounds of their opposition to the judgements of the waking ego. Censorship and distortion are thus situated as necessary conditions for the appearance of those wishes in the dream. Similarly, the manifestation of a directly contrary sentiment in the ego can no longer be any argument against the existence of an unconscious wish. For it is precisely that contradiction that is here established as the grounds for postulating the existence of its unconscious opposite.

Only a framework of argument such as that already elaborated around the dynamic principles of explanation can support this sort of move beyond the evidence of the empirical realm. For this step amounts to an overthrow of the entire structure of proof and demonstration upon which the empirical model of investigation has relied, along with a fundamental displacement in the notion of evidence itself. Hence the need to establish the principles of psychoanalytic interpretation at the level of formal principles of explanation, which no longer depend upon the availability of evidence from the empirical sphere. For those interpretations will have to be maintained not merely in the absence of any immediate empirical support, but in the face of direct counter-evidence presented by the dreamer himself.

The work of investigation into the nature of the censored wishes that appear in the dream must thus be carried out in direct opposition to the knowledge of the waking ego. Hence it is the ego of the dreamer that is now encountered as the primary obstacle and source of resistance to our interpretations. The success of these investigations will turn on the attempt to remove the obstruction provided by the dreamer's ego and to overthrow the ego's claim to stand as the ultimate judge and arbiter on the legitimacy of our findings. The first step entails an attempt to demonstrate that the dreamer's claim to be an objective and impartial judge in these matters is undermined by the conflicts and contradictions to which the ego is itself subject by its position in the dream.

"These wishes, which are censored and given a distorted expression in dreams, are first and foremost manifestations of an unbridled and ruthless egoism."(142/175) This statement not only runs directly counter to all our expectations, but also appears to contradict everything that has been said above. For the first step towards a positive characterisation of these censored wishes appears to attribute them to the ego, or at least seems to put them on the side of the ego. And yet Freud will go on to suggest that the ego, "freed from all ethical bonds, also finds itself at one with all the demands of sexual desire, even those which have long been condemned by our aesthetic upbringing and those which contradict all the requirements of moral restraint."(142/175)

It is thus apparent that any straightforward account of the positive nature of the ego, or of the relation between ego and wish, or even the basic framework of conscious and unconscious processes, will be of no immediate use to us here. For the purposes that exercise the censorship have been attributed to the waking judgements with which the dreamer's ego feels itself "at one". And yet the ego now finds itself "at one" with all the prohibited sexual wishes against which that censorship is implemented. Little wonder, then, that the dream shows signs of an unbridled egoism, or that the ego appears to play the chief part in it.

"This 'sacro egoismo' of dreams is certainly not unrelated to the attitude we adopt when we sleep, which consists in our withdrawing our interest from the whole external world."(142/175) Once again, the situation in the dream is traced to the fundamental condition of a withdrawal of interest from reality. This withdrawal of interest, the severing of links with the external world, has already been identified as the primary psychological characteristic of the state of sleep. The immediate consequence is an

inevitable heightening of narcissistic cathexis, as the ego withdraws any investment from external objects in favour of the self-enclosed narcissism of sleep.

We have previously argued that the severing of the relation to the external world entails a corollary disruption, or suspension, of the relation to the faculty of critical judgement. It is this suspension of the relation to the critical faculty that frees the ego from the bonds of moral restraint and allows free rein to the demands of sexual desire. We find the ego veering from an identification with the demands of waking judgement, the tendencies that exercise censorship, to an identification with those against which it is implemented. Hence the ego finds itself at one with the most basic sexual wishes, which may now choose their objects without inhibition.

The withdrawal of interest from the external world in sleep is thus accompanied by a corollary suspension of the axis of critical judgement. As a result, the ego is freed from the immediate demands both of external reality and of moral restraint, leading to the uninhibited expression of sexual desires. This lifting of inhibitions would then account for the conditions of hallucinatory fulfilment of wishes in sleep. Yet it is the ego itself that will provide the immediate object of those wishes. The over-riding narcissism of the dream may thus be attributed to a direct sexual investment of the ego, as the primary object of hallucinatory gratification, which becomes merged with the demands of sexual desire.

It is clear, then, that the status of the ego in the dream must itself be considered in terms of a dynamic relation between opposing tendencies. The dynamic model of explanation may thus be brought to bear on the ego, in order to demonstrate its precarious position at the intersection of the conflicting demands of critical judgement and sexual desire. It becomes apparent to what degree the ego is inevitably the site of distortion, resistance and misrecognition, produced by the effects of this conflict. We may therefore question the ego's claim to sovereign status as an objective judge on these matters, and hence its right to contest the findings and postulates of psychoanalytic interpretation.

V.

The strategy underlying the rhetoric of Freud's argument in the rest of this lecture involves a precisely analogous attempt to bring the dynamic model of explanation to bear on the positions of common opposition to the findings of psychoanalysis. This

strategy entails a procedure of dialectical argument which attempts to bring to light the conflicts and contradictions underlying these positions by making explicit the assumptions upon which they rely. This sets up the framework for implementing dynamic principles of explanation, in order to demonstrate that the resolution of these contradictions requires the dissolution of the position of common reason which they assume. This procedure clears the way for the recognition of wishes which are not only unknown to the ego, but contrary to everything it stands for, thus establishing the grounds for the postulation of the existence of the unconscious itself.

This argument will be pursued at two levels, that of moral or ethical objections to the findings of psychoanalysis, and that of intellectual or theoretical criticisms of the principles from which they are derived. The thread of this argument is not always easy to make out underneath the rhetoric, as it is pursued on two fronts, alternating between issues of moral or emotional outrage and more obvious questions of theoretical principle. In both cases, however, the objections will be traced to the position of the psychological subject which they defend. Freud will go on to suggest that these criticisms constitute merely two complementary forms of resistance that can be attributed to a common emotional source. And in both instances the difficulties will be resolved by dynamic principles of explanation aimed at overthrowing the moral and theoretical prejudices that support the position of the psychological subject.

The initial step of this strategy turns on the attempt to emphasise or exaggerate the reprehensible, repugnant or evil nature of the wishes that psychoanalysis claims to find in the dream. "Lusts which we think of as remote from human nature show themselves strong enough to provoke dreams. Hatred, too, rages without restraint."(143/175) These comments are aimed at arousing moral outrage against the postulates and findings of psychoanalytic interpretation, suggesting that they are to be rejected as contradicting basic tenets of human decency and dignity. This line of argument will culminate in the suggestion that psychoanalysis is responsible for an immoral and degenerate view of mental life that merely serves to detract from the true worth of mankind.

Freud's counter to this accusation then amounts to a justification of a dynamic view of mental life in general. "On the contrary; I am exhibiting to you not only the evil dream-wishes which are censored but also the censorship, which suppresses them and makes them unrecognisable. We lay stronger emphasis on what is evil in men only because other people disavow it and thereby make the human mind, not better, but incomprehensible. If we now give up this one-sided ethical valuation, we shall

undoubtedly find a more correct formula for the relation between good and evil in human nature."(147/180)

The real issue at stake here, however, concerns the attempt to use the nature of the findings of psychoanalytic investigation as an argument against the premisses and principles from which they are derived. This question is directly related to the peculiar status of psychoanalytic principles, and the manner in which Freud has been obliged to formulate the initial premisses of the technique of interpretation. For, given the provisional and hypothetical manner in which those premisses have been laid down, it would appear that their legitimacy is directly dependent on the plausibility of the findings that follow from them. Freud had himself, after all, suggested as much at the time. "The outcome of our work will decide whether we are to hold to this assumption and whether we may then go on to treat it in turn as a proven finding."(100/129)

It is thus the initial status of those premisses, and the manner in which they were laid down, that now renders Freud's argument susceptible to this sort of attack. This may also account for the sudden outbreak of rhetorical flourishes here, as Freud attempts to make the most of the ethical issues involved. For it is easy enough to deal with the more obvious objections based on the immoral or unpleasant aspects of these findings. Freud will merely suggest that the rejection of the findings of psychoanalysis on grounds of their conflict with the moral or aesthetic criteria of humanist sentiment amounts to a form of resistance. "When you reject something that is disagreeable to you, what you are doing is repeating the mechanism of constructing dreams rather than understanding it and surmounting it."(145-46/178)

It is more difficult, however, to defend against similar objections on a theoretical level, which contest the plausibility or the empirical validity of these findings in general. Freud is thus forced to admit to the difficulties facing his argument here. "If on the basis of these premisses we had arrived at plausible findings from dream-interpretation, we should have been justified in concluding that the premisses were valid. But how about it if these findings seem to be as I have pictured them? We should then be tempted to say: 'These are impossible, senseless or at least most improbable findings; so there was something wrong about the premisses.' "(144/176)

Freud's response to this difficulty will once more take an unexpected direction. Rather than attempting to avoid these objections, or to deal with them on this ground, he will attempt to formulate them in terms more favourable to his argument by tackling them

in a more extreme version. "(F)irst, we can further strengthen the criticism of our dream-interpretations. The fact that the findings from them are so disagreeable and repellent need not, perhaps, carry very great weight. A stronger argument is that the dreamers to whom we are led to attribute such wishful purposes by the interpretation of their dreams reject them most emphatically and for good reasons."(144/177)

With this we find ourselves back on the grounds of the initial model for the investigation of the parapraxis. There Freud made use of a similar strategy in order to focus the argument concerning the validity of the method of investigation onto the position of the speaker involved. We were presented with a series of instances, from the simplest case where the speaker is both aware of the disturbing intention and able to confirm our interpretation, to the more problematic instance where the speaker not only has no knowledge of the disturbing intention, but also strenuously rejects our interpretation. In the most favourable instance the validity of our interpretation is confirmed by the speaker. The more problematic instance, however, where the speaker was not prepared to support our interpretation, required the introduction of the hypothesis that there were processes at work in him of which he knew nothing.

The whole account elaborated around the model of the parapraxis appeared, then, to founder at this point. For this method of investigation, whose validity appears to rest in the first instance upon the evidence provided by the speaker, can now only be applied to the more problematic examples by way of the apparently arbitrary hypothesis of unconscious mental processes. The scope and validity of this model for the investigation of the parapraxis is thus immediately limited by its reliance on a hypothesis that appears to have no further grounds of justification. We similarly noted that in order to preserve the continuity between the various cases Freud was forced to introduce a further, subsidiary hypothesis - that of the suppression of intentions in the speaker. This postulate was then presented as the "indispensable condition" for the occurrence of a slip of the tongue.(65-66/92-93)

It is to this preliminary account of the method of psychoanalytic investigation, therefore, that we must look for the structure that underlies Freud's argument here. Once again he appears eager to bring the question of the validity of interpretation to rest upon evidence obtained from the dreamer. Yet here he will push this strategy through to such an extreme form that it appears to remove any support he might hope to gain from it. For it is not simply the case that the dreamer has no supporting evidence to offer, nor even that the dreamer rejects our findings as unlikely. Rather, the dreamer's rejection of our interpretation is here founded on unambiguous evidence

to the contrary, which appears to directly disprove our claims. "But when they feel in themselves the precise contrary of the wish we have interpreted to them and when they are able to prove to us by the lives they lead that they are dominated by this contrary wish, it must surely take us aback."(144-45/177)

The possibility of holding to our findings in the face of direct counter-evidence from the dreamer would once again appear to rest upon the introduction of the hypothesis of the existence of mental processes of which the dreamer knows nothing. And yet it is precisely the unresolved question of the grounds or the justification for assuming this hypothesis of unconscious mental processes in the first place that remains the most problematic issue at the heart of this account. "Granted that there are unconscious purposes in mental life, nothing is proved by showing that purposes opposed to these are dominant in conscious life. Perhaps there is room in the mind for contrary purposes to exist side by side. Possibly, indeed, the dominance of one impulse is precisely a necessary condition of its contrary being unconscious."(145/178)

Just as in the case of the parapraxis, then, the plausibility of this whole argument appears to rest upon the introduction of an arbitrary and unfounded hypothesis of the existence of unconscious mental processes. There is, however, one crucial difference that distinguishes this account from the earlier model for the investigation of the parapraxis. And that is the introduction of the dynamic factor of censorship. It is the dynamic model of censorship that provides the framework within which the dominance of one impulse in consciousness may serve rather as a sign of the existence of its unconscious opposite. It is now precisely the dreamer's disavowal, his rejection of these wishes as contrary to everything he stands for, that provides our primary point of reference in exploring those unconscious processes.

We have shown above how the introduction of the dynamic model of explanation makes possible a complete transformation in the status of the problem of distortion in the interpretation of dreams. The formal status of those dynamic principles of explanation then serves to establish the general framework within which the postulation of unconscious processes becomes possible. Here it is the introduction of the factor of censorship into this dynamic model of explanation that provides the specific point of reference for the general postulate of the possibility of unconscious processes. For it is the framework of the dynamic model of censorship that allows us to postulate the existence of unconscious wishes in direct opposition to those apparent in the conscious portion of the mind.

It is the dynamic model of censorship, then, that establishes the framework within which it becomes possible to suggest that the dominance of one impulse in the mind is in fact a "necessary condition" of its contrary being unconscious. This same notion of censorship then serves to provide retrospective justification for Freud's initial claim concerning the role of the suppression of an intention in the parapraxis, which was similarly posited as the "indispensable condition" for the occurrence of the parapraxis. Far from being an auxiliary or subsidiary hypothesis to the postulation of the unconscious, it is in fact this condition of "suppression" or "rejection" due to censorship that now provides the grounds for the concept of the unconscious itself.

Hence it is the introduction of the dynamic factor of censorship that will now allow Freud to go beyond any simple descriptive use of the term "unconscious" towards establishing this concept in its comprehensive psychoanalytic sense. "With this the unconscious acquires a new sense for us; the characteristic of 'for the time being' or 'temporary' disappears from its essential nature. It can mean permanently unconscious and not merely 'latent at the time'."(148/181)

SECTION FOUR

4.1 Symbolism in Dreams

I.

The model for the investigation of dreams is elaborated around the distinction between the manifest and latent registers of the dream. The meaning of the manifest dream comes to rest upon the nature of the latent thoughts which lie behind it. The dream appears unintelligible to us precisely because its relation to those latent thoughts has been severed or obscured. The procedure for interpreting the dream turns on the attempt to re-establish that connection, in order to explain the manifest dream in terms of its relation to the latent thoughts from which it arose.

The practical basis for this technique of interpretation is to be found in the method of free association, which uses the dreamer's associations to re-establish that relation. The theoretical model of dream formation is based on the findings of the method of free association and the discoveries which it makes possible. This theoretical model is, in effect, developed to account for the difficulties encountered in the attempt to trace the relation from the manifest dream to the latent thoughts from which it arose. It thus examines the nature of the relations between the manifest and latent elements in the dream and attempts to account for the manner in which that relation has become obscured.

The problem of distortion constitutes the most general difficulty for any attempt to trace the relation between the manifest and latent registers of the dream. The problem of resistance, which first arises as a practical obstacle in the method of free association, is situated as the complementary difficulty at the level of the technique of interpretation. The notion of censorship, one of the major theoretical innovations of the psychoanalytic theory of the dream, is introduced to account for the effects of both distortion and resistance. It is censorship, therefore, that features as the common source of the two major difficulties facing any attempt to interpret the dream.

The operation of censorship becomes one of the defining conditions of the process of dream formation. Censorship finds its point of deployment above all in the attempt to obscure the relation between the manifest dream and the latent thoughts which gave rise to it. The aims of censorship are served by all the peculiarities inherent in the process of dream formation itself, all the obscurities which arise in the process by which the latent thoughts are transformed into the manifest dream. At the same time,

it introduces further measures of its own to secure this aim and to prevent recognition of the latent thoughts involved.

We can thus separate out two sources of distortion in the process of dream formation. On the one hand we have what might be considered the non-tendentious sources of distortion, all the obscurities and oddities of expression inherent in the process itself, which arise from the transformation of the latent thoughts into visual images. We may also distinguish the further influence of forms of distortion that are to be attributed directly to the operation of the censorship, which makes use of all these obscurities of expression for its own ends. The conjunction or interaction of these two sources of distortion in the dream provides the framework for our approach to the register of the dream-work as a whole.

The field of the dream-work is constituted by all the processes involved in the transformation of the latent thoughts into the manifest dream. This register is defined by the interaction between two sources of distortion - the obscurities associated with the nature of this transformation itself, and the further sources of distortion introduced by the censorship in its struggle against the wish. The "natural" factors involved in this process - all the characteristics of dream formation attributable directly to the transformation of thoughts into visual images - thus become the battlefield, or site of appropriation, for the dynamic interplay between the conflicting demands of censorship and wish.

The use of symbols in the process of dream formation constitutes the first of these "natural" sources of distortion. This factor is explicitly distinguished from the effects of the censorship, and attributed directly to the process by which the latent thoughts are represented in the manifest dream. We would want, therefore, to use the topic of symbolism in dreams to situate the most general conditions of the process of dream formation, as it turns on the transformation of thoughts into visual images. How we conceive the problem of symbolism will determine our approach to the general question of the relations between words and images in the dream as a whole.

II.

The manner in which this topic is raised is of particular interest for what it tells us about Freud's approach to the problem of symbolism in general. The role of symbolism in the dream is introduced in the first instance as a new source of distortion,

as a further obstacle to the intelligibility of the dream. It is thus considered in relation to the technique of interpretation as a failure, a "gap" in the method of free association. "We come upon this other factor which prevents dreams from being lucid, this new contribution to dream-distortion, by noticing a gap in our technique."(149/182)

There is no general discussion of the foundations for our knowledge of symbols. The problem of symbolism is defined rather in terms of its relation to the aims and goals of the technique of interpretation, as a shortcoming of the method of free association. There are instances where associations to certain elements of the dream fail to materialise. Freud claims that it is possible to distinguish these instances from manifestations of resistance, as they regularly occur in relation to specific dream elements. "(W)e begin to recognise that a fresh general principle is at work where we had begun by thinking we were only faced by an exceptional failure of technique."(150/183)

We are thus introduced to the notion that certain manifest elements have a fixed meaning that can be defined independently of their role in any particular dream. Freud postulates a constant or generic relation between certain dream elements and the ideas behind them, which can therefore be understood apart from the associations of the dreamer concerned. This raises the possibility of a stable translation of these elements on independent grounds, without relying on any information from the dreamer. "A constant relation of this kind between a dream element and its translation is described by us as a 'symbolic' one, and the dream element itself as a 'symbol' of the unconscious dream-thought."(150/183-4)

The notion of symbolism is introduced as a "general principle" that allows us both to account for this gap in the method of free association and to make up for it on the basis of our own knowledge. Yet Freud gives no account of the grounds for this knowledge of the meaning of symbols, apart from suggesting that the reliability of this procedure stems from "an accumulation of many similar cases".(150/183) He will defer any discussion of the theory which makes such a fixed translation of certain dream elements possible, suggesting that a knowledge of symbolism is neither specific to psychoanalysis, nor an essential part of its theory of dreams. "(S)ymbolism is not particular to dreams alone and is not characteristic of them".(152/185)

The whole question of the knowledge of symbolism and the grounds for postulating a fixed meaning for certain elements of the dream is thus in a sense separated off and situated outside of psychoanalysis. Freud implies that the problem of the general

validity of the theory of symbolism is not in fact one that is fundamental to psychoanalysis or its technique for the interpretation of the dream. What is particular to psychoanalysis is the use to which this knowledge is put in the process of interpretation. The issue of symbolism and its role in the interpretation of the dream is thus defined from the start in terms of its relation to the principles and goals of the method of free association, which forms the basis for that technique of interpretation.

The occurrence of symbolism in the dream is characterised primarily in terms of the possibility of a "constant translation" for specific dream elements. The meaning of the symbol is supported by a fixed relationship between certain manifest and latent elements in the dream. This makes a direct translation of those manifest elements possible, allowing us to determine their meaning on independent grounds. An understanding of symbols would then, in certain cases, allow us to explain the meaning of the whole dream without relying on any information from the dreamer. "They allow us in certain circumstances to interpret a dream without questioning the dreamer, who indeed would in any case have nothing to tell us about the symbol."(151/184)

The whole point of this account, however, is to emphasise the difference between such a procedure and the principles of the method of free association itself. The interpretation of symbols is explicitly distinguished from the method of free association, where "constant replacements of dream elements never come to light".(150/183) A knowledge of the meaning of symbols may thus provide us with a fixed translation of particular elements in the dream. This process of direct translation, however, merely plays a subsidiary or auxiliary role in the procedure of interpretation as a whole. "Interpretation based on a knowledge of symbols is not a technique which can replace or compete with the associative one. It forms a supplement to the latter and yields results which are only of use when introduced into it."(151/184)

The interpretation of symbols and interpretation on the basis of the method of free association are here explicitly distinguished and situated in relation to one another. A knowledge of symbolism supplies us with the meaning of certain manifest elements, which can then be understood apart from any acquaintance with the dreamer. This knowledge, and the meaning of the symbol itself, rests on grounds that have nothing to do with the circumstances of the dreamer or the role played by the symbol in that particular dream. Such a procedure of translation, however, gives us no insight into what Freud calls the dreamer's "psychical situation", except when situated in the context of his associations around that dream.(151/185)

It is this notion of the "psychical situation" of the dreamer that appears to play the defining role in establishing the contrast between these two forms of interpretation. Similarly, it is this psychical situation, delimited by the associations of the dreamer, that appears to constitute the proper locus of the psychoanalytic method as a whole. The whole question of the meaning of symbols, a form of interpretation based on a fixed or constant relation between a dream element and its meaning, thus appears to be raised here only in order to distinguish it from the method of free association. This would suggest in turn that the meaning of any particular dream element is not in fact of primary concern to the psychoanalytic method, which is aimed rather at delimiting the psychical situation of the dreamer by way of his associations around that dream.

Hence the manner in which the topic of symbolism is introduced as a gap in the technique of interpretation, as the occasion for a failure of associations. Certain dream elements remain "mute" and the dreamer can produce no associations to them. The chain of associations would remain interrupted unless the analyst intervened with an interpretation of his own. What is important, however, is not the meaning of that particular element, but rather that the interpretation of the symbol clears away the obstacle that it constitutes, and allows the flow of associations to continue. The interpretation of the meaning of this element is not considered an end in itself, but merely serves as a supplementary technique in relation to the aims of the psychoanalytic process as a whole.

We thus have a contrast here between a form of interpretation oriented towards the meaning of particular dream elements and one oriented towards the configuration of the "psychical situation" of the dreamer. The manner in which these two forms of interpretation are defined in relation to one another suggests that it is not the meaning of these symbols, nor ultimately of any particular dream element, that is of primary concern to the psychoanalytic process. The interpretation of that element must rather be considered in the context of the attempt to delimit the configuration of the psychical situation underlying the dream as a whole. Our approach to the problem of symbolism must similarly allow us to establish the conditions determining the process of dream formation in general.

III.

The topic of symbolism is introduced in the first instance as a question of technique, a problem of "mute" dream elements which defy the method of free association. This

raises the possibility that certain elements in the manifest dream have a fixed meaning that does not derive from their occurrence in any particular dream. At the same time it is clear that the dreamer himself has no knowledge of that meaning or insight into the source of this element. As a result the meaning of that symbol is not brought to light by the dreamer's associations, and would remain an obstacle to the process of free association if we did not intervene with an interpretation of our own.

The meaning of such a "dream-symbol" therefore has no relation to the circumstances of the dreamer, and does not depend on the position of that element in any particular dream. It is this factor which appears to distinguish this type of relation between an element and its meaning from the other forms of relation already identified between manifest and latent elements in the dream. Thus, on the one hand, this type of "symbolic" relation appears to be more specific and more constant, in that it implies a fixed relation between that element and the idea which it represents. And yet, on the other hand, it points to conditions which go beyond the role of that element in any dream, to the extent that its meaning appears independent of the circumstances in which it arises.

This provides some indication of the curious position occupied by the topic of symbolism in Freud's account. It is included with the other three types of relationship between the manifest and latent poles of the dream, as one of the four basic modalities of relation between manifest and latent elements in general. At the same time it is separated off and introduced as a distinct topic that appears at once more specific and yet more general than the others. This suggests that we might hope to use the topic of symbolism to situate the general conditions of relations between manifest and latent elements in the dream as a whole. And yet Freud's attempts to establish the nature and conditions of this peculiar type of relation leave us no closer than before.

"The essence of this symbolic relation is that it is a comparison, though not a comparison of any sort. Special limitations seem to be attached to the comparison, but it is hard to say what these are. Not everything with which we can compare an object or a process appears in dreams as a symbol for it."(152/185) The relation underlying the use of symbols in dreams is thus defined as a "comparison" between manifest and latent elements. This type of relation is not, however, equivalent to the relation of comparison in general, or to any kind of comparison, but is to be distinguished by specific limiting conditions. And yet Freud finds himself unable to determine just what these distinguishing conditions might be.

"We must admit, too, that the concept of a symbol cannot at present be sharply delimited: it shades off into such notions as those of a replacement or representation, and even approaches that of an allusion."(152/185) These other forms, however, appear to be precisely the same as the three modalities of relations between dream elements already specified - replacement of part for whole, allusion, and plastic representation or portrayal. Once again this type of symbolic relation, initially defined as a fixed and limited relation between manifest and latent elements, now appears to be so broad as to include or to subsume the other three forms of relationship as well.

Symbolism in dreams, then, concerns a fixed or constant relation between manifest and latent elements that may yet involve aspects of all three of these other modalities. In certain examples this relation is supported by a straightforward similarity, and "the comparison which underlies them is obvious".(152/185) In other cases it is precisely this element of similarity that is lacking, and the basis for that comparison, the "common element" which that relation presupposes, remains impossible to detect. And yet, if we can no longer determine the basis for that comparison, the element of similarity that provides the foundation for that relation, then how are we to justify characterising that relation as one of comparison in the first place?

Similarly, if the meaning of the symbol is supported by a relation of comparison between specific manifest and latent elements in the dream, then it is strange that the dreamer should have no insight into the nature of that relation. It is not merely that the dreamer should make use of a symbol in the dream without knowing from where it derives its meaning. Nor even that the dreamer should feel "no inclination to acknowledge the comparison even after it has been pointed out to him".(152-3/186) The whole method of free association is, after all, designed precisely to overcome the obstacle posed by the fact that relations between manifest and latent elements in the dream are not in general available to the conscious knowledge of the dreamer.

What is striking is that, in contrast to the other modes of relation between manifest and latent elements in the dream, no information about the meaning of the symbol should come to light in the process of free association itself. If the meaning of that symbol does in fact rest upon a relation of comparison, one might legitimately expect that it would be precisely the process of free association that would bring that relation to light. Instead we have a relation of comparison between certain elements in the dream that not only falls outside the sphere of conscious knowledge, but also appears to have no contact with the sphere of unconscious associations which subtend that dream.

IV.

The attempt to determine the nature and conditions of the relation supporting the meaning of the symbol in the dream has not proved particularly informative. Freud turns from an account of that relation to an examination of the types of elements involved in it. We are provided with a catalogue of dream symbols, organised first in terms of the type of element that is subject to symbolic representation, and then in terms of the elements that serve as symbols in the manifest dream itself. If we were able to specify the defining conditions of these two groups of elements - those which receive symbolic representation and those of the symbols themselves - it might then become possible to throw further light on the question of the relation between the two groups as a whole.

It is here that Freud points to "a strange disproportion", between the set of symbols and the set of elements which receive symbolic representation.(153/187) Although the elements which can serve as symbols in the dream show great variety, the range of ideas that actually receive this type of representation is, on the contrary, extremely limited, and restricted to a small complex of topics concerning the themes of generation and sexuality. Thus on the one hand we have a surprisingly wide variety of possible symbols in the dream, to the extent that there appears to be a free displacement between them and a whole range of equivalent symbols can serve to represent the same element. And yet at the same time the set of elements which are given symbolic representation appears to be subject to strict limiting conditions.

The disproportion between these two groups of elements raises a number of questions, not all of which have an obvious relation to the question of symbolism itself. For the conditions of this disproportion between the two sets of elements involved in the relation of symbolism in dreams would appear to have as much to do with the question of sexuality as it does with that of symbolism. This would suggest that the conditions under which symbolism comes to play a role in the dream are in some way related to the limiting condition which gives the set of sexual elements its unity or identity. Similarly, it is interesting that it should be in relation to the topic of symbolism that we should find the issue of sexuality raised for the first time in these lectures.

The problem of symbolism thus brings us into immediate contact with the question of sexuality. This suggests that it may be the topic of sexuality that holds the key to the role of symbolism in the dream. This observation would also provide a possible indication of why it is that a direct investigation of the relationship between symbolism

and dreams has so far yielded no immediate solution. For it appears that it is in fact the relationship between the topics of symbolism and sexuality that offers the more promising line of approach to the problem of symbolism in general. The conditions of this relation should at the same time allow us to approach the question of why it is that the dream should provide the site of articulation where this relationship between symbolism and sexuality first becomes apparent.

Freud remarks that this conjunction itself gives rise to objections against the validity of psychoanalytic interpretations of symbolism. Why, after all, should the meaning of symbols in dreams so consistently be reduced to the topics and themes of sexuality? He goes on to suggest that a proper understanding of these issues would depend on a more comprehensive insight into "the development of sexual ideas in human beings".(157/191) Rather than pursuing this avenue, which would require a more detailed discussion of the topic of sexuality in general, Freud will instead attempt to deal with these objections by turning to the question raised earlier of "how we in fact come to know the meaning of these dream-symbols, upon which the dreamer himself gives us insufficient information or none at all".(158/192)

Once again it is emphasised that our knowledge of the meaning of these symbols is derived not from the field of psychoanalytic work, from the information or associations of any particular dreamer, but rather from material drawn from a range of objective studies in the various fields of mythology, folklore, anthropology and philology. And once again Freud will make no attempt to enter into the question of the validity of the findings of these various disciplines. Instead he will merely suggest that the convergence of the material from these sources provides sufficient support for the interpretation of symbolism in dreams. "If we go into these sources in detail, we shall find so many parallels to dream symbolism that we cannot fail to be convinced of our interpretations."(159/192)

We are provided with a wide range of examples from these different fields of research, all of which illustrate the symbolic representation of sexual themes in various spheres of language use, whether poetic, mythical, colloquial or traditional. It is the question of language that supplies the common thread running through these examples, just as it is the methods and principles of etymology and philology that constitute the common methodological framework for these other disciplines. This would suggest that the study of the origins and development of language might provide us with a scientific basis for the understanding of symbols and the conditions governing their use. The correlations between the findings of these various branches of cultural research would

similarly constitute a source of objective support for psychoanalytic interpretations of symbols in dreams.

Freud will go on to suggest that findings in the field of comparative philology allow us to trace the conditions of symbolic representation to a more primitive stage of language development where the connection between words and things was more intimate. Symbolism would then constitute an enigmatic residue of this archaic mode of language, which has since been surpassed and forgotten. The prevalence of symbolic imagery in the dream would imply a return to these more primitive conditions of representation, where the relation between words and images is treated in a more concrete fashion than in waking thought. The relation between symbolism and sexuality would similarly suggest that these themes might have a common origin, or have developed out of common roots, in the earliest phases of language development.

This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the difficulties raised by the philological hypotheses upon which Freud relies here, which would necessarily lead us far afield. Freud has himself, however, repeatedly pointed out that these questions are not specific to psychoanalysis, nor fundamental to the general validity of its technique for the interpretation of dreams. The whole approach to the topic of symbolism has, after all, been structured precisely by the distinction between the method for the interpretation of symbols and a technique of interpretation founded on the method of free association that is unique to psychoanalysis. It is this distinction, similarly, that will provide the context for the question of the conditions under which symbols become appropriated for the purpose of sexual representation in dreams.

What is of specific interest for psychoanalysis, and for this argument in particular, is the use to which these symbols are put in the process of dream formation. Here Freud remarks that where symbolism in other fields is by no means concerned solely with sexual topics, in the case of dreams it appears that "symbols are used almost exclusively for the expression of sexual objects and relations".(166/201) It is this conjunction that raises many interesting questions for psychoanalysis and for its understanding both of the nature of sexuality and of the dream. In order to approach this question, however, we must first consider some of the broader conditions of the process of dream formation as a whole. It is accordingly to the account of the dream-work that we must turn next.

4.2 The Dream-Work

I.

Freud has elaborated a novel technique of investigation which brings to light the latent thoughts that underlie the dream. This technique allows us to explain the meaning of that dream in terms of its relation to the latent thoughts from which it rose. The example of children's dreams provides a simplified model of the process by which the latent thoughts are transformed into the manifest dream. It has thus been possible to establish the nature of these latent thoughts as wishful tendencies left over from the experiences of the previous day and to account for dream formation as a process of wish-fulfilment.

The model of dream formation centres upon two basic processes - the transformation of the latent thoughts into visual images, and the realisation of the wish in an hallucinatory experience. We have suggested that an examination of the interrelation between these two aspects might provide the key to an understanding of the process of wish-fulfilment as a whole. The goal of interpretation is then defined as one of undoing the effects of this transformation - image back into thought and experience back into wish - in order to determine the nature of the thoughts that lie behind the dream.

It is here that we encounter the problem of distortion, an obstacle both to the success of this procedure of interpretation and to the validity of the model of explanation elaborated upon it. Freud has identified censorship and symbolism as the two primary sources of distortion in dreams and provided us with an account of two complementary techniques - free association and the interpretation of symbols - that allow us to deal with these obstacles. A grasp of these two techniques will thus provide us with the means of access to the register of latent thoughts underlying the dream.

The basic account of the goals and conditions of the procedure for the investigation of the dream is in effect now complete. Not all dreams, however, display the simplified picture of dream formation that is assumed by the model of children's dreams. The transformation of the latent thoughts into the manifest dream is subject to a whole range of other forms of distortion which serve to further complicate the relation between the manifest and latent registers of the dream as a whole. It is this range of additional sources of distortion, associated with the process of transformation itself, that is known as the dream-work.

The theory of the dream-work, a systematic exposition of the various modalities of distortion and transformation involved in the relation between the manifest and latent registers of the dream, constitutes Freud's major theoretical contribution to an understanding of the process of dream formation. This account provides the basis for the psychoanalytic explanation of the mechanisms involved in the process of symptom formation and in psychic processes in general. It is important, therefore, to consider the status of the theory of the dream-work and to examine its relation to the model of investigation already elaborated.

This theory attempts to account for the difference between the manifest and latent registers of the dream in terms of the transformations which the latent material undergoes in the process of dream formation. This account itself presumes the successful completion of the work of investigation, for it is only once the latent material has come to light that it becomes possible to compare the two registers and to examine the nature of the differences between them. The very possibility of a theory of the dream-work, a systematic account of the processes by which the latent material is transformed into the manifest dream, thus rests on, or assumes, a positive knowledge of the latent material involved.

There is thus a certain interdependence between the theory of the dream-work and the model of investigation already elaborated. On the one hand there can be no theory of the dream-work without access to the latent material. And yet there can be no access to that latent material without taking into account the forms of distortion introduced by the modalities of the dream-work. Again it is the problem of distortion that provides the point of intersection between them. For the effects of the dream-work are first encountered as an obstacle to the goals of that model of investigation. Similarly, it is an understanding of the dream-work that constitutes the crucial step in tracing the manifest dream back to the latent thoughts from which it arose.

Simple demands of conceptual coherence obviously require that these two aspects be considered separately. Indeed, it is only the separation of these two issues that makes a systematic exposition of each possible. This separation, which produces the empirical account of the model of investigation on the one hand and a positive theory of the dream-work on the other, has, however, certain implicit consequences. Foremost among these, as we have already noted in the account of the model of investigation, is the tendency to elide the problematic of representation that in fact constitutes the site of the articulation between them.

It is necessary, therefore, to be aware of the nature of the relation between these two accounts and to consider the possible implications for our understanding of the dream-work itself. For there is the danger that our conception of the dream-work will absorb all the positive conditions and assumptions which supported the elaboration of an empirical model of investigation to begin with. The value of the theory of the dream-work would then become limited by the very conditions that establish its status as a body of metapsychological theory.

We have seen how Freud's account of the model of investigation has been carried through under the ideal condition of a direct and undisguised relation between the manifest and latent elements of the dream. Hence the attempt to privilege the model of children's dreams where the factor of distortion is held to a minimum, allowing a model for the explanation of the dream to be elaborated around the transparent relation between those manifest and latent poles. We have noted the difficulties that arise from this approach and the simplifications that necessarily follow from the attempt to exclude the register of representation.

The account of the dream-work will now be situated as the direct complement of that model of investigation, as an attempt to systematise the register of distortion and representation that has been suppressed in the positive model. This theory, the account of the modalities of distortion that accompany the transformation of the latent material, will be based on a comparison of the manifest and latent registers of the dream as a whole. Freud makes no attempt to disguise the fact that this account constitutes a "summary description" based on the completed interpretation of a large number of dreams.(171/205)

The theory of the dream-work claims to account for the differences that arise between the latent and manifest registers of the dream on the basis of a systematic description of the modes of transformation that occur between them. This account is based upon a comparison of the manifest and latent registers of the dream, and therefore assumes the positive status of the latent pole, which itself depends upon the successful outcome of the work of investigation. This latent pole then stands at the core of a progressive model of the dream-work which examines the changes undergone by that latent material in the course of its transformation into the manifest dream.

The danger of this progressive model of the dream-work, however, is that the themes of interpretation and representation become elided in favour of a quantitative and mechanistic account of the transformations undergone by the latent material in the

course of its passage into the manifest dream. At best we arrive at a conception of the dream-work as a process of transcription or translation that allows the original material of the latent thoughts to be expressed in a different form in the manifest dream. In either case, the result is a model of dream formation as a process of transformation to which some pre-existent original material is subjected.

We may contrast this progressive model of the dream-work with our attempt to maintain the primacy of the axis of interpretation, and the resultant foregrounding of the problem of representation that this entails. This account begins with the given elements of the manifest dream and, following the regressive orientation of the procedure of interpretation, seeks to decipher those elements by bringing to light the context of latent thoughts that would render them intelligible. The regressive orientation of the procedure of interpretation accordingly allows us to consider the relation between manifest and latent elements as one of representation rather than transformation.

This account opens up the way for a more flexible conception of the status of the latent thoughts as a whole. For we could then consider the latent register as a shifting context of signification supporting the meaning of the manifest elements in the dream, rather than any pre-existent nucleus of original material. The role attributed to the latent thoughts in the formation of the dream would similarly no longer depend upon any primary evidence for their prior existence. The status of that latent material would, on the contrary, depend solely upon its position as a context of intelligibility for the interpretation of the manifest dream.

The contrasted orientation of these two accounts has a fundamental influence on our understanding of the nature of the process of interpretation itself. A progressive, transformational model of the dream-work, which examines the modes and mechanisms of the process by which the latent material is transformed into the manifest dream, gives rise to a conception of the task of interpretation as an attempt to "undo" this transformation, in order to arrive at the original latent material. The interpretative model, on the other hand, aims merely to render that dream intelligible by considering the possible modalities of representation and signification by which the meaning of a manifest element might be determined.

This approach brings into focus once more the question of the nature of the relations between thoughts and images in the dream. We may in fact consider this question as one of the defining problems of the process of dream formation as a whole. For, in

direct contrast to the customary mode of signification in the language of waking thought, where it is a word which represents an image, here we have a visual image which stands in for a word or phrase. The problem of the dream-work centres precisely on this change of modality according to which the manifest dream appears unintelligible to us because we no longer understand the nature of the relation between the manifest images and the thoughts that would explain them. The theory of the dream-work aims to define the conditions of this relation in the dream, and to account for the manner in which it differs from that of waking thought.

II.

The first thing that becomes apparent from a comparison of the manifest and latent registers of the dream is a simple quantitative difference in the amount of material - "the manifest dream has a smaller content than the latent one".(171/205) This difference suggests that a process of compression or condensation has occurred in the course of dream formation, which results in the latent thoughts being expressed in a far more concise form in the manifest dream. Hence the notion that the manifest dream can be considered an "abbreviated translation" of those latent thoughts. An understanding of the process of condensation will give us a first indication of the nature and conditions of this process of translation as a whole.

The most basic model of condensation would attribute the difference in the quantity of material in the manifest and latent registers to a simple process of selection and omission in the course of dream formation. As a result of this filtering process only a fraction of the latent material would pass over into the manifest dream. This purely passive model of condensation, however, is clearly inadequate to account for the change of modality that occurs between the manifest and latent registers of the dream. Freud will instead focus on a more active conception of condensation, as a constructive process responsible for combining elements of the latent material into a single unity in the manifest dream.

The construction of composite figures in the dream provides the simplest illustration of this process. Here features and attributes of various people are combined into a single image, which then serves to represent all those different characters in the manifest dream. This process concentrates upon some attribute that the various figures have in common. This common feature then serves as the nucleus for the formation of the composite image upon which these different associations converge. "The process is

like constructing a new and transitory concept which has this common element as its nucleus."(171-2/206)

This process would itself account for the factor of compression observed in the content of the manifest dream. This suggests that there is some fundamental economic consideration at work in the process of dream formation which leads it to seek out the most economical means of expressing the latent thoughts. "The production of composite structures like these must be of great importance to the dream-work, since we can show that where in the first instance the common elements necessary for them were missing, they are deliberately introduced - for instance, through the choice of words by which a thought is expressed."(172/206)

The dream-work goes to some trouble to seek out suitable points of convergence that will allow a single image to represent more than one latent element in the manifest dream. Here Freud refers to the manipulation of linguistic structures in the process of dream formation, the preference for word play and ambiguous verbal forms that allow more than one meaning to be attached to them. Above all, it is a question of the apparently arbitrary means employed to construct the verbal forms that make this process possible. Hence the emphasis on the construction of artificial verbal structures out of fragments of accepted linguistic forms, producing novel compound structures which articulate disparate trains of thought.

The crucial issue here is the disregard shown for the rules of syntax or the standard criteria of meaningful thought. The dream-work is prepared to ignore any considerations of intelligibility in favour of artificial and arbitrary forms of expression aimed solely at facilitating the process of multiple determination. Freud suggests that the effects of condensation indicate that there is some underlying economic principle at work in the process of dream formation. This economic or quantitative consideration would then account for both the operation of condensation and the disregard for intelligibility manifested in the dream.

The primacy of this quantitative factor, the predominance of considerations of economy over any considerations of intelligibility, poses an immediate and obvious difficulty for our understanding of the dream as a whole. For on the one hand we have a convergence of meanings on a single manifest element, so that the same element may have widely divergent or even contradictory meanings in the manifest dream. And on the other hand that process of condensation appears sometimes to disregard the

question of meaning entirely, and to privilege elements whose only role is to provide a bridge from one train of associations to another.

The result is a complex web of relations between manifest and latent registers that not only appears to rule out the possibility of any reliable interpretation, but throws doubt upon the very grounds for considering the manifest dream a translation of the latent thoughts in the first place. "Thus the dream-work carries out a very unusual kind of transcription of the dream-thoughts: it is not a word-for-word or a sign-for-sign translation; nor is it a selection made according to fixed rules - as though one were to reproduce only the consonants in a word and to leave out the vowels; nor is it what might be described as a representative selection - one element being invariably chosen to take the place of several; it is something different and far more complicated."(173/208)

The difficulties facing the technique for the interpretation of the dream could not be more clearly stated. For the effects of this process of condensation are such as to lead us to question the very basis for postulating any significant relation between the manifest and latent registers of the dream. If the dream is to be considered a process of translation, it is one that ignores all known principles of representation, any accepted criteria of intelligibility, and any respect for the meaning of the material that it transcribes. Yet the possibility of interpretation depends precisely upon our ability to establish the rules according to which this process of transcription is carried out, and thus to determine the nature of the conditions regulating relations between manifest and latent elements in the dream.

One response to this difficulty would be to simply abandon the attempt to interpret the manifest dream, and return to a simple mechanistic explanation of this process. For is it not precisely the predominance of a quantitative factor that accounts for the disregard shown for the criterion of intelligibility in the process of dream formation? And yet, even if the question of economy does constitute the primary consideration underlying the mechanism of condensation, the point remains that it is the factor of meaning that provides the privileged point of application for this process. Thus it is above all the role of verbal ambiguity in the process of condensation, the use of terms with more than one meaning, that allows the dream to articulate different trains of thought around the same material.

The example of the condensation of various images into a single composite figure in the dream has the drawback of allowing this point to be elided in favour of a simple

quantitative conception of a process of compression. The examples of verbal condensation in jokes or parapraxes, however, allow a more effective demonstration of what is at issue here, by bringing the question of meaning more clearly to the fore. Thus we may observe the operation of condensation in the technique of certain jokes, where the effect turns upon the use of an ambiguous word that allows a second train of thought to be introduced, subverting the meaning of the first. In the case of parapraxes, the product of the slip of the tongue is an artificial verbal compound which has no meaning of its own, but is constructed out of verbal elements from the competing trains of thought articulated in it.

A similar process is apparent in the example of neologisms in dreams - anomalous verbal structures that are not part of accepted language and have no meaning of their own, but which serve merely as the point of articulation for two otherwise unrelated chains of association. We may posit a further instance where an existent word is introduced into the dream with no other purpose than to provide a convenient bridge between two trains of thought. Here that word is quite clearly taken out of context, with no regard for its accepted meaning, and features merely for formal reasons of its verbal structure being suited to provide a nucleus of condensation. An analogous effect may be observed where passages of recollected speech are inserted intact into the dream, yet obviously torn from their original context and without regard for their original meaning.

It is these last instances of the treatment of language in the process of dream formation that are most instructive, because they highlight the conflict between the accepted meaning that a word might possess and the role attributed to it in the process of dream formation. Here the meaning of that word would in fact constitute an obstacle to the interpretation of the dream, as its position in the manifest dream is not at all determined by its meaning. That meaning has rather been ignored in favour of the purely formal or external attributes of the word which make it a suitable point of articulation for the process of condensation. Words, sentences, linguistic structures in general, may thus be cut up and manipulated without regard for their meaning, but rearranged instead as if they were simple building-blocks in the process of dream formation.

These considerations also provide a first indication of the role played by the mechanism of displacement in this process, suggesting an integral link between the two mechanisms of condensation and displacement in the formation of the dream. Freud has already suggested that it is in fact a process of displacement at the level of the

wording of the latent thoughts that makes the process of condensation possible. The process of displacement gives rise to a complete reformulation of the latent thoughts, introducing a form of wording that will facilitate condensation with other elements in the manifest dream. The process of displacement thus gives emphasis to different aspects of the latent material, diverting attention away from its primary content onto peripheral and subsidiary aspects of its wording.

Once again it is the examples of the displacement apparent in jokes that serve to highlight the issue in question here. Certain jokes also make use of external associations of sound or contiguity to provide the artificial verbal bridges that allow the leap from one circle of thoughts to another. The effect of these jokes, however, arises precisely from the realisation that there is in fact a deeper connection of meaning between the two trains of thought, which is only brought to our notice by that verbal bridge. The primary characteristic of displacement in the dream, on the other hand, is to disregard considerations of meaning entirely. Hence the effect of a weak pun, or a bad joke, where the precondition of any further link of content or meaning is abandoned in favour of purely contingent associations.

This effect of random allusion by the most remote or arbitrary means, without any regard for meaning or intelligibility, poses an obvious difficulty in the interpretation of the dream. It is precisely this effect, therefore, that serves the interests of censorship in the dream, which aims to sever all links between the manifest and latent registers, opposing any attempt to understand the connection. The result is a relation between the manifest dream and the latent thoughts that bears no trace of any resemblance or similarity between them. The manifest dream can thus be considered neither a transcription of the content nor an expression of the meaning of the latent thoughts. Rather, we have a process of representation organised according to quite different principles.

We do, however, have an indication of the manner in which the two mechanisms of condensation and displacement combine in transforming the latent thoughts into the manifest dream. On the one hand, the process of displacement has the effect of stripping the latent elements of any meaning that they might have in waking thought. The process of condensation then makes use of the fragmentary material of the latent thoughts to create the new unities and composite formations that make up the manifest dream. The result is the production of an entirely novel register of representation organised according to criteria quite alien to those of rational thought or waking

experience. For the role of any element in the manifest dream is no longer determined by its content or its meaning, but rather by its position in a network of associations.

The combined effect of these two processes thus takes us some way towards accounting for the comprehensive transformation in the conditions of representation that occurs between the latent and manifest registers of the dream. This aspect of the dream-work may be summed up in the notion that words are treated as things in the process of dream formation. The latent thoughts are made up of perfectly coherent thought processes articulated according to the normal laws of waking thought. The position of any element in those latent thoughts is thus determined primarily in terms of the intrinsic importance of its content within the structure of meaningful thought. In the process of dream formation, however, the conditions of rational thought are entirely disregarded in favour of quite different criteria of representation.

It is clear that these considerations definitively rule out any attempt to interpret the meaning of the manifest images in terms of any simple relation to the content of the latent thoughts. For the primary effect of the two processes of condensation and displacement is to sever precisely that axis of meaning that is the support of waking thought. The severing of the axis of meaning then creates the conditions for the emergence of quite novel conditions of representation in the manifest dream. It is the attempt to determine the principles governing this register of representation, or at least to characterise them in terms of their opposition to the accepted criteria of rational thought, that must guide our examination of the central process of the dream-work - the transformation of thoughts into visual images.

III.

The transformation of thoughts into visual images is a theme that has featured from the very beginning of this account as one of the fundamental features of the process of dream formation, one that might even be considered definitive of the dream itself. For it was in the place of any formal definition of the dream that Freud started by establishing two characteristic features that are common to all dreams - the state of sleep and the predominance of visual images.(cf. 87f./116f.) The orientation of this entire account has been structured by the relationship elaborated between these two essential characteristics.

The first characteristic, the state of sleep underlying the dream, becomes the basis for the reflex-arc model of the dream as the response to a stimulus which disturbs sleep. This conception establishes the foundation for the empirical model for the explanation of the dream in terms of its relation to that stimulus. Even when the initial psycho-physiological model of the dream is abandoned, this notion will continue to provide the framework for the explanation of the manifest dream in terms of its relation to the latent thoughts from which it rises.

In the elaboration of this reflex-arc model of the dream the other primary characteristic, the role of visual images in the process of dream formation, is to some extent neglected, and appears to be discarded along with the whole question of sense that had featured so predominantly up to that point. Yet it is precisely the predominance of visual images in the manifest dream, in spite of the differences in the nature of the stimulus involved, that stands as the immediate obstacle to the attempt to trace the dream directly to that stimulus. The question of the change of modality in the process of dream formation thus constitutes a primary difficulty for the psycho-physiological model of the dream, and ultimately for the empirical model of explanation as a whole.

The predominance of visual images in the dream provides the first indication that dream formation cannot be considered a merely passive process of reaction to a stimulus, but entails a productive activity of transformation. The transformation of mental processes into visual images becomes the basis for the notion that the scene of action in dreams is different from that of waking ideational life. Freud suggests that this change in modality, the "qualitative difference" involved in the process of dream formation, appears to be the result of an active process of working over - one that might "bring us nearer to the essence of dreams".(96/125)

In the lecture on children's dreams we are once again presented with two fundamental characteristics of the dream. The first of these is the central proposition that the dream constitutes the fulfilment of a latent wish. We have already discussed the foundation for this proposition in the definition of the function of the dream as guardian against disturbances to sleep. The other chief characteristic is that "a dream does not simply give expression to a thought, but represents the wish fulfilled as a hallucinatory experience".(129/160) We have suggested that the explanation of the process of wish-fulfilment is to be sought here, in the conditions of this transformation of a latent thought into a hallucinatory experience.

Freud has already mentioned the translation of words into visual images, the "plastic" representation of thoughts, as one of the basic forms of relation between manifest and latent elements. Here, however, we are dealing not with the transformation of individual elements into visual images, but with the articulation of the latent thoughts as a whole into a hallucinatory experience based in a predominantly visual modality. As Freud points out, not everything in the latent thoughts is necessarily changed into a visual image. Some elements may in fact retain their form and appear directly in the manifest dream as articulated thoughts or coherent speeches. The function and significance of these elements, however, is radically transformed when they make their appearance in the manifest dream.

The fundamental question here, then, concerns the conditions governing this transformation of the latent thoughts into a register of hallucinatory experience. Yet it is the translation of words into visual images, this change in the modality of representation, that provides the key to the difference in the principles of organisation governing the two registers. For it is in the transition from a register of latent thoughts, articulated according to the principles of waking thought, to a register of visual experience in the manifest dream, that all the characteristic features of dream formation are to be found. It is in the contrast between the principles governing the articulation of the latent thoughts and those governing a field of hallucinatory experience, therefore, that the conditions of the process of wish-fulfilment in the dream must be sought.

The shift from the register of the latent thoughts to that of the manifest dream is summed up in the contrast between a mode of "alphabet writing" and a register of visual experience organised according to the principles of "picture writing".(175/210) The latent register is made up of a complex network of rational thought, generally expressed in a verbal modality and articulated according to the accepted principles of logic and syntax. The formation of the manifest dream, as a transition to a mode of representation organised around visual images, introduces the task of providing a visual representation for that latent material. It is above all the difference in the means of representation available to these two registers that is expressed in the notion of a translation of words into visual images.

The limitations of the means of representation in the visual modality thus constitute the fundamental condition of the difference in the principles of organisation of the two registers. It is the restrictions of visual representation that first bring into focus a distinction that Freud draws here between the concrete and the abstract elements of the

material of the latent thoughts. By the concrete elements Freud means the substantive content, the "raw material" of the latent thoughts, all the elements involving simple representations of people, objects and events. There is an obvious tendency for the process of dream formation to favour these concrete or substantive elements of the dream thoughts, as their close relation to a particular content facilitates the process of visual representation.

To these concrete elements of the latent thoughts Freud contrasts the abstract elements of language, all the logical relations between concepts, the network of syntactical articulations making up the tissue of thought itself. It is these aspects of the latent thoughts that prove more resistant to visual representation. For unlike the concrete elements, whose meaning is closely tied to some particular sensory image or object, these elements have no substantive content of their own, but deal only with relations between other terms. Freud suggests that part of the preliminary work of dream formation involves a process of reformulating the latent thoughts in order to introduce the type of linguistic element that favours direct visual representation in the dream. This process is conceived as one of a regressive reduction of abstract concepts to their origin in a concrete image or situation.

Freud's account here is hampered by this simplistic distinction between the concrete and abstract elements of language, and the more general difficulties associated with the empiricist model of language development upon which he relies. On this account the meaning of the first words would be derived directly from a relation of designation to particular objects or events. In the course of the development of the language these simple substantive terms would be elaborated into more abstract concepts, gradually freeing themselves from any direct reliance on perceptual images. At the same time this process would allow these words to become linked up with other words and elaborated into more and more abstract relations of thought. Dream formation would then involve a regressive process of reducing thought to its most primitive concrete terms, allowing the transformation of these words back into the visual images from which they arose.

The distinction between concrete and abstract terms in language does, however, serve to bring into focus the contrasted axes that underlie these different parts of speech. The meaning of concrete or substantive terms is conceived as supported by a direct relation of designation to particular objects or sensory images. It is this relation of designation, the relation between a word and its perceptual content, that provides the basis for its transformation into a visual image in the manifest dream. The abstract

parts of speech, on the other hand, are supported by lateral relations of logical articulation between terms, having no direct relation of designation to any substantive content of their own. It is these aspects of the latent thoughts, the entire network of lateral relations making up the network of thought itself, that will be lost in an exclusively visual mode of representation.

While the majority of these relations are thus ignored or abandoned in the course of dream formation, Freud suggests that the dream does succeed in representing certain aspects of the logical relations among the latent thoughts in a more indirect manner, by way of peculiarities in the form of the manifest dream itself. The process of dream formation, for example, takes account of the more general relations of conceptual unity amongst the elements of the latent thoughts by combining the whole material into a single dream. Here the visual or experiential unity of the dramatic situation in the manifest dream provides the most general framework for the representation of the logical and conceptual relations among the various aspects of the dream thoughts.

The logical relations between the latent thoughts are thus expressed in the first instance by the visual and dramatic unity of the manifest dream. This principle is carried through to the representation of the smaller details in the dream itself. Here relations of logical implication between elements of the latent thoughts are represented in terms of spatial association or unification in a single visual experience. A visual contiguity between two elements in the manifest dream may then provide an indication of a similar logical or conceptual association between the corresponding elements of the underlying latent material. An essentially spatial and pictorial logic of appearances thus replaces the more familiar logical and syntactical articulation of the latent thoughts.

This difference in the principles of representation governing the two registers is in fact already implied in the notion of a transformation of words into visual images. The latent thoughts, articulated in the verbal modality of waking thought, are oriented along the diachronic axis of language in accordance with the rational principles of logic and syntax. The verbal and sequential mode of the latent thoughts, however, gives way to a fundamentally visual and spatial mode of representation in the manifest dream. Here the elements of the manifest dream are organised according to spatial and pictorial principles of composition, which take the place of the verbal and syntactical principles of articulation among the latent thoughts.

The contrast between verbal and visual, while the most obvious and striking aspect of the shift from latent to manifest, is thus merely an indication of a more fundamental transformation in the principles of representation underlying those two registers. The question of the transformation of words into visual images is therefore neither an essential nor an absolute criterion of this process. For verbal elements may still make their appearance in the manifest dream, just as visual and dramatic aspects of memory may play a role in the latent thoughts. It now, however, becomes possible to account for the peculiar role played by verbal elements in the manifest dream, in terms of the transformation in the principles of representation underlying that change in modality.

The role of verbal elements in the manifest dream may thus be understood in terms of the contrast between the principles of articulation governing the logic of the latent thoughts and their position in a field of hallucinatory experience organised according to essentially visual and spatial principles of representation. These verbal elements are torn from their legitimate linguistic context in the latent thoughts and inserted into the pictorial logic of the manifest dream. At the same time they are stripped of the meaning associated with their position in a context of syntactical articulation, and serve rather as raw material for a process of visual and pictorial composition. The significance and function of the same verbal element may thus be radically transformed according to its position in the latent or manifest registers.

The contrast in the principles of organisation underlying the two registers reaches its most acute expression in the notion that "nonsense and absurdity in dreams have their meaning".(178/212) The grounds for this claim must be sought in the comprehensive transformation in the principles of logic and representation that occurs between the register of latent thought and that of the manifest dream. An element that might be considered meaningless or absurd in the rational logic of waking thought may yet play a significant role in the manifest dream, where it serves as the representation of a judgement or criticism in the latent thoughts. Conversely, an expression of judgement in the manifest dream may in fact involve the direct transmission of an element of the latent thoughts into the dream itself, where its significance becomes entirely transformed by that change of context.

The problem of the transformation of words into visual images thus takes us to the heart of the question of the difference in the principles of representation governing the manifest and latent registers of the dream. The transition from a verbal to a visual modality itself entails a comprehensive transformation of the linguistic and syntactical principles of rational thought into an essentially spatial mode of representation. It is at

this level, in terms of the transition from the syntactical and diachronic principles of logical articulation to the spatial and pictorial principles governing the organisation of the visual field, that we can account for some of the other characteristic features of the logic of dreams.

One of the most characteristic aspects of dream formation is its flagrant disregard for the basic criteria of rational thought - the logical principles of contradiction, opposition and negation. The absence of these logical principles is initially expressed in the observation that the alternative "either/or" is never to be found in the manifest dream. The process of dream formation tends rather to ignore this disjunction and to attribute equal value to both terms of the alternative, giving them independent representation in the dream. Elements which would be considered as contradictory or mutually exclusive in the logic of waking thought are thus treated as equally valid, and appear side by side in the manifest dream.

This attitude to the principle of disjunction would of itself account for the characteristic fate of a range of other logical relations in the process of dream formation. All relations of contradiction, opposition and negation, which might be considered to depend upon that fundamental principle of disjunctive exclusion, then fall away, and with them the entire logical framework of rational thought. This process is carried to its conclusion when we find these contradictory and mutually exclusive opposites combined into a unity and represented by a single common term in the manifest dream. There is then no way of immediately telling from the appearance of this one element whether it is to be taken in a positive or a negative sense.

This tendency to combine contradictory opposites into a single unity, ignoring the principle of disjunction, raises obvious difficulties for the work of interpretation. We have, however, already become familiar with the basic conditions of this process at the root of the mechanism of condensation. There we noted a process of combining the elements of the latent thoughts into a single unity around the common nucleus provided by a visual image in the manifest dream. Similarly, it was made clear that this mechanism is prepared to abandon any strict considerations of similarity or resemblance in order to produce condensation at any cost. Legitimate criteria of difference and disjunction at the level of the latent thoughts are thus ignored in favour of an overriding tendency to combination in the formation of the manifest dream.

The primacy of this process of combination and condensation in dream formation would account for numerous features of the manifest dream. For all the effects of

pictorial and spatial composition around a visual nucleus in the formation of the manifest dream could be traced to a central principle of conjunction, replacing the verbal and syntactical articulations based on accepted principles of opposition and contradiction among the latent thoughts. The relative positions of a principle of disjunction and a principle of conjunction could then similarly be invoked to account for a whole range of characteristic logical effects involved in the transition between latent and manifest registers.

This relation between a principle of disjunction and a principle of conjunction could thus be situated as the fundamental contrast underlying the difference in the logic of representation in the latent and manifest registers. The relative positions of these two basic principles of logical articulation would then provide the framework for the other essential contrasts already noted - the transition from a sequential to a spatial logic and the transformation from a verbal to a visual mode of representation. The relation of these two principles would then be situated at the nucleus of a process of dream formation that entails the elision of disjunctive principles of verbal and syntactical articulation in favour of a process of spatial and pictorial composition in a visual field.

The irrational appearance of the manifest dream could then be considered as the outcome of a process by which the relations of disjunctive articulation supporting the latent thoughts are collapsed into relations of conjunction and combination. Elements of the latent thoughts now find themselves deployed within a visual field, organised around spatial principles of contiguity and composition, without regard for their original meaning. The significance of these elements is entirely transformed by their position in this novel register of hallucinatory experience, articulated in accordance with a spatial and pictorial logic of composition. It is in the principles governing the coherence of representation within this field of hallucinatory experience that we might hope to determine some of the conditions of the process of wish-fulfilment in dreams.

At the same time it becomes clear that we have already encountered an outline of this process in the relation between the first two mechanisms of the dream work, in the combined effects of condensation and displacement. The mechanism of displacement was conceived as a process of stripping the elements of the latent thoughts of any meaning that might derive from their position in a context of logical and syntactical articulations. These isolated elements then provide the raw material for a process of condensation in which words are treated as things to be combined into a spatial and pictorial field of visual experience in the manifest dream. Any attempt to interpret

these elements in terms of the meaning they might have in the context of rational thought is therefore bound to be misleading.

This account may also provide an indication of the role played by the fourth and final mechanism of the dream-work - that of secondary revision. The function of secondary revision consists in arranging the material of the manifest dream into a more or less continuous whole that approximates to the criteria of rational thought. The imposition of a framework of logical coherence upon the material of the dream has the effect of configuring that dream as a meaningful whole. Yet it is clear from what we have said above that any meaning attributed to that material within a logic of narrative development is one that inevitably contradicts its role in the formation of the dream. For the principles of representation by which the dream is organised are diametrically opposed to the narrative logic of waking thought.

The process of secondary revision thus entails a fundamental re-orientation of the principles of representation in the dream, from the spatial principles governing the production of material back into the narrative and sequential mode of waking thought. Hence the notion that the operation of secondary revision constitutes a "preliminary interpretation" of the manifest dream, in accordance with the logical criteria of rational thought. The meaning produced by this operation, however, can only constitute a direct obstacle to the analysis of that dream. For any attempt to interpret the dream in terms of a narrative logic of meaningful content at the level of the manifest dream entails a fundamental misunderstanding of the principles according to which that dream was formed.

It is this conflict of axes that provides the foundation for Freud's claim that the clearest and most coherent dreams are in fact the ones that show the effects of the most comprehensive distortion. For the imposition of a framework of narrative continuity upon the material of the manifest dream necessarily entails a contradiction of the underlying principles of spatial coherence by which that material is organised. The facade of meaning that the dream then derives from this framework of narrative intelligibility similarly constitutes the most effective obstacle to an understanding of the principles of representation by which the process of wish-fulfilment in the dream becomes possible. The process of secondary revision, as a function aligned on the side of recollection and waking thought, is thus shown to operate in the direct interests of censorship in the dream.

The first task is therefore to clear away the effects of this preliminary interpretation, to break down the framework of narrative continuity imposing a meaning on the content of the dream. Here the basic procedure of the technique of free association once again proves essential to the psychoanalytic method, taking up each element of the dream in isolation as the starting point for an independent chain of associations. This procedure has the effect of interrupting any coherent narrative structure in the manifest dream and elaborating a field of associations around each element that will cast new light upon that dream's significance. In this way the focus of interpretation is turned away from the content of the manifest dream towards delimiting a context of associations within which the external principles of coherence underlying that dream will become apparent.

Once again we arrive at a conception of a technique of interpretation that considers the content of the manifest dream only in so far as it provides the starting point for the attempt to delimit the external principles of coherence from which the significance of that dream derives. At the same time it is clear that the mechanisms of the dream-work play a fundamental role in defining the conditions and parameters of this procedure. For it is the mechanisms of the dream-work that establish the framework within which the process of wish-fulfilment takes place, whether in the formation of a dream or a neurotic symptom. These four mechanisms thus constitute the indispensable co-ordinates and guidelines for the psychoanalytic technique of interpretation in general.

SECTION FIVE

5.1 Archaic and Infantile Features

I.

The psychoanalytic account of the dream rests upon the distinction of a register of latent thoughts underlying the manifest dream. This latent material is shown to involve perfectly coherent thoughts and wishes left over from the experiences of the previous day. The peculiarities of the manifest dream are then attributed to the nature of the transformation which those latent thoughts undergo in the process of dream formation. It is the various mechanisms of the dream-work that are responsible for transposing the latent thoughts into a mode of expression that is incomprehensible to waking thought.

It becomes apparent that the distinction between manifest and latent does not in fact provide an adequate framework for understanding the distinction between conscious and unconscious in psychoanalysis. For it is the manifest dream that bears all the indications of a mode of expression completely alien to rational thought, while the latent thoughts, although unconscious in a descriptive sense, are formulated in the mode of normal waking thought. It is not the latent thoughts, but rather the form into which they are transposed under the influence of the dream-work, that provides our point of access to an exploration of the mechanisms of unconscious thought.

The uncovering of the latent thoughts which lie behind the dream constitutes the practical goal of the procedure of investigation that aims to explain how any particular dream arose. It is the register of the dream-work, however, the various mechanisms by which those latent thoughts are transformed into the manifest dream, that becomes the real focus of theoretical interest. It is the dream-work, rather than the latent thoughts, that must be considered the essential component of the process of dream formation. Similarly, it is the systematic examination of the register of the dream-work that provides our first indication of the formal and logical principles governing the operation of unconscious processes of thought.

In this lecture Freud will place the emphasis on the regressive orientation of the dream-work, as a process responsible for introducing a primitive or archaic mode of expression into the dream. Dream formation is thus considered as a process of regressive transformation by which abstract thoughts are reduced to the perceptual images from which they first arose. The transformation of the latent thoughts into visual images, which reduces these thoughts to their most concrete perceptual

elements, at the same time returns us to a mode of expression associated with conditions of language and thought that have long since been superseded in the course of intellectual development.

The process of regressive transformation in the mode of expression in dreams may thus provide us with insight into the original conditions of language and thought. This process will similarly provide the framework for an exploration of the initial stages of individual development. For the hypermnesic character of dreams, their access to material from the earliest years of childhood, is tied to the outcome of this regressive transformation in the conditions of representation. "The prehistory into which the dream-work leads us back is of two kinds - on the one hand, into the individual's prehistory, and on the other, in so far as each individual recapitulates in an abbreviated form the entire development of the human race, into phylogenetic prehistory too."(199/235)

The relation between regression in the form of expression and regression at the level of individual development is thus immediately collapsed into the problematic of ontogenesis and phylogenesis. In this way the question of the relationship between formal regression in the conditions of representation in dreams and the access of dreams to material from the earliest stages of childhood is reduced to a question of distinguishing between ontogenetic and phylogenetic contributions to the latent thoughts. The notion of phylogenetic inheritance then serves merely to obscure the point of articulation between language and the individual, closing down one of the most productive avenues for our attempt to situate and define the concept of the unconscious.

The question of the relations between phylogenesis and ontogenesis is one of the most problematic aspects of Freud's work, and one that will feature more centrally in the later part of these lectures. At this stage it may suffice merely to situate the problem by indicating the point at which the issue arises. It is apparent that this question arises directly out of Freud's emphasis on the regressive orientation of the process of dream formation rather than the formal and logical aspects of the dream-work. This would suggest that the difficulties associated with the notions of ontogenetic and phylogenetic development can, in this instance at least, be attributed to undue reliance on an undifferentiated concept of regression, on the one hand, and failure to adequately situate the problematic of representation, on the other.

It might then be hoped that the attempt to give priority to the formal and logical attributes of the dream-work, as the key to the conditions of representation underlying the dream, would allow us to avoid the difficulties inherent in the notion of phylogenetic transmission. A formal account of the principles of representation involved in the process of dream formation would constitute a more promising register within which to pursue the possible relations between formal and material regression in the dream. This account would at the same time provide a more suitable framework within which to elaborate a properly psychoanalytic definition of the concept of the unconscious.

II.

The formal regression in the mode of expression in dreams constitutes the point of departure for an examination of their hypermnesic character. The fact that dreams have access to material that is not otherwise available to waking memory will in its turn lead to the introduction of the question of infantile sexuality. It is important, then, to consider Freud's approach to the problem of infantile amnesia, as the orientation of his argument here will provide the framework for his approach to the question of infantile sexuality in general. The position of the topic of infantile sexuality in this argument will have a similar influence on our conception of the status to be attributed to the infantile sexual wishes discovered in dreams.

The problem of infantile amnesia is defined by the relation between two phenomena, neither of which is necessarily conclusive in itself. On the one hand we have the remarkable absence of memories from the first years of childhood, despite the well-developed capacity for language and thought that is already apparent. This generalised absence of memory for the infantile years is complemented by the persistence of certain isolated memory images whose retention cannot be justified in terms of any inherent importance or significance. The correlation between these two issues will provide the framework for the psychoanalytic approach to the question of infantile experience and its residues.

Freud will suggest that the position of these isolated "screen memories" is the outcome of a process of distortion and displacement similar to that observed in dreams. He thus postulates an underlying relationship of significance between these screen memories and infantile experience, but one that has been subjected to the influence of the mechanisms familiar to us from the account of the dream-work. The account of

relations between manifest and latent elements in the dream then provides the basis for the attempt to trace these screen memories back to the experiences from which they arose. The method of free association may thus be used to circumvent the obstacles of censorship and distortion, giving us access to memories of childhood experiences that had long since been forgotten.

The fact that these memories may emerge spontaneously in dreams is an indication that these experiences had not actually been forgotten, but had merely become inaccessible to conscious recall owing to the effects of censorship and distortion. The factor of censorship is thus invoked to account for the nature of the relation between the "false" or "substitute" memories and the experiences which they screen. The operation of censorship will similarly provide the primary point of reference in the attempt to determine the nature of those experiences themselves. Once again we find the concept of censorship playing a pivotal role in a dynamic model for the investigation of material that has become inaccessible to recall.

In the lecture on censorship we discussed the role played by this factor in the dynamic procedure for determining the nature of the wishes that instigate dreams. These wishes, which emerge in conflict with the demands of censorship, are initially defined solely in terms of their opposition to the accepted standards of the waking ego. Hence those wishes are by definition characterised as evil or immoral. Freud will now attempt to provide a positive determination for the content of these wishes by bringing them into relation with their source in infantile material. The validity of this procedure, however, must be considered in terms of the dynamic model of explanation that continues to provide the frame of reference for this account.

It has already been established that dreams are instigated by wishes which contradict the moral standards of the subject, and are thus experienced as alien by the waking ego. These wishes will now be attributed to a period of the individual's past when they were not in fact foreign to the ego, but constituted a recognised part of mental life. Freud thus posits an original phase of unified experience, before the opposition between censorship and wish arose, when these wishes were an accepted part of conscious experience. It was only subsequently that these wishes were experienced as contradicting the integrity of the ego, and were thus separated off and repressed, instituting a permanent opposition between censorship and wish.

This process of repudiation and suppression, however, must now be considered an integral element in the definition of those wishes. For it is only the process of

repression, along with the change in the status of the wish that this implies, that can account for the persistence of the wish in a form capable of emerging in the construction of a dream. Despite the postulation of an ideal phase of unified experience, therefore, when the wish was available in its positive profile, it is the factor of repression, the opposition between censorship and wish, that now constitutes the primary reference in the attempt to define the status of that wish and to account for its role in the instigation of the dream. This procedure of argument is fundamental to the attempt to determine the status of the complex of infantile and Oedipal wishes as a whole.

Freud begins by focusing on the hostile and aggressive wishes encountered in dreams. These impulses - "wishes for getting rid of someone" - are attributed in the first instance to the unrestricted egoism of the dreamer.(203/240) The narcissistic conditions of the dream, however, merely replicate the original conditions of unbounded egoism in the earliest phases of infancy. The enclosed narcissism of the state of sleep allows these egoistic and aggressive wishes to emerge once more in the construction of a dream. "But as soon as we were led to look for the origin of these wishes in the past, we discovered the period of the individual's past in which there was no longer anything strange in such egoism and such wishful impulses, directed even against his closest relatives."(204/240)

It is thus the absolute self-interest of the infant that issues in unrestrained impulses of hostility and aggression against any obstacles to the gratification of its egoistic wishes. This state of primary egoism then accounts for the manifestations of hostility against anyone in the infant's immediate environment that might be perceived as a rival for attention and affection. It is only subsequently that these manifestations of egoistic self-interest come under the sway of the moderating influence of love and concern for others. "Children love themselves first, and it is only later that they learn to love others and to sacrifice something of their own ego to others.... Not until later does the impulse to love make itself independent of egoism."(204/240)

Freud thus makes use of the postulate of an original state of primary egoism in order to establish a dynamic framework of relations between hostile and affectionate impulses. The relation between the hostile and affectionate attitudes will now provide the framework for an account of the infant's relations to its parents and siblings. It is interesting to note, however, the emphasis that Freud places upon the hostile impulses in developing the structure of Oedipal relations around the theme of rivalry in love. For it is only once the dynamic framework of hostile and affectionate impulses is

already in place that the sexual component of Oedipal relations will be introduced, as a somewhat subsidiary or peripheral issue.

"There is no need to feel surprised, therefore, if, in a large number of people, dreams disclose their wish to get rid of their parents and especially the parent of their own sex. We may assume that this wish is also present in waking life and is even conscious sometimes, if it can be masked by some other motive ... It is rarely that the hostility alone dominates the relationship; far oftener it is in the background of more affectionate impulses by which it is suppressed, and it must wait until a dream isolates it, as it were."(206/243)

We have seen that the postulation of aggressive and hostile wishes in the dream is justified in the first instance around the condition of censorship and repudiation. It is thus the opposition between ego and wish that provides the initial grounds for the determination of these wishes, which are encountered in a distorted form in dreams. Only then will Freud proceed to infer an original phase of ideal unity of experience, prior to the institution of the split between ego and wish, when egoism was of such an extent to embrace such wishful impulses. This phase of primary egoism then serves to provide both a source and a positive content for these distorted wishes, attributing to them an origin in infantile attitudes and experiences.

The same procedure of argument will structure Freud's approach to the other group of wishes encountered in dreams, the "forbidden" sexual wishes. Here the postulate of an infantile phase of perverse sexual activity will play exactly the same role in the argument as that played by the postulation of an original phase of primary egoism. It is necessary, therefore, to maintain the primacy of the dynamic principles of explanation that provide the framework for this argument. For it might otherwise appear that the phase of infantile sexual activity is to be situated as a positive point of origin for a simplified developmental account of the sexual impulses.

The sexual wishes encountered in dreams will thus be traced to a source in infantile experience. The excessive sexual impulses manifested in dreams will be attributed to the nature of the infantile sexual constitution, and explained as the residues of an original phase of polymorphous sexual activity. We should not, however, overlook the role Freud attributes to the disavowal of infantile sexual activity in general, and the emphasis he places on the barriers and prohibitions erected against these wishes. For it is the factor of repudiation and suppression that serves as the primary condition in establishing the existence of these infantile wishes. Only subsequently will

supplementary information about the development of the sexual impulses be introduced to permit a positive characterisation of those wishes.

III.

It is important to emphasise the procedure of argument involved here, as it is this entire framework that is at stake in the conclusion of this lecture, in the attempt to bring these findings into relation with the concept of the unconscious already elaborated. Freud will now propose using the infantile material derived from dreams to provide a positive foundation for the unconscious, extending this concept along a developmental axis.

"Let us now bring together what our researches into child psychology have contributed to our understanding of dreams. We have not only found that the material of the forgotten experiences of childhood is accessible to dreams, but we have also seen that the mental life of children with all its characteristics, its egoism, its incestuous choice of love-objects, and so on, still persists in dreams - that is, in the unconscious, and that dreams carry us back every night to this infantile level. The fact is thus confirmed that what is unconscious in mental life is also what is infantile." (210/247)

The question of the relation between formal and material regression in dreams, which appeared to be raised only in passing at the beginning of this lecture, is in fact fundamental to this whole account. For it is the formal regression in the mode of expression in dreams that provides our first access to material from the earliest phases of infantile experience. The material derived from the investigation of individual development then serves to provide a positive characterisation for the wishes that had been identified as the instigators of dreams. This material will now be brought into relation with the concept of the unconscious derived from the initial account of dream formation, in an attempt to situate that concept in its full psychoanalytic extension.

The relationship defined between these two registers of regression thus opens out a space within which the concept of the unconscious can be extended and transformed. The plane of formal regression allows us to determine the formal and logical principles defining the conditions of representation in dreams. The plane of material regression provides access to the content of infantile impulses and experiences tied up with the archaic modes of thought. This infantile material is now ascribed to the unconscious, providing a positive determination for that concept as a system with its own

mechanisms and content. "'Unconscious' is no longer the name of what is latent at the moment; the unconscious is a particular realm of the mind with its own wishful impulses, its own mode of expression and its peculiar mental mechanisms which are not in force elsewhere."(212/249)

This extended concept of the unconscious as a systematic realm founded upon infantile determinants now gives rise to a certain tension in relation to the concept of the unconscious that has already been elaborated around the status of the latent pole. "But the latent dream-thoughts which we have discovered by interpreting dreams do not belong to this realm; they are on the contrary thoughts just as we might have thought them in waking life. Nevertheless, they are unconscious. How, then, is this contradiction to be solved?"(212/249) Freud will at last be forced to bring into focus the distinction between the systematic concept of the unconscious and the descriptive use of the term that has served him so well. "(T)he time will soon have come to provide another name for the unconscious character of the latent dream-thoughts in order to distinguish it from the unconscious which comes from the realm of the infantile."(212/249)

Freud will make use of this distinction to separate off the systematic concept of the unconscious from everything that had until now been situated at the latent pole, which becomes the site of "the day's residues". The process of dream formation will now be attributed to the interaction, or combined influence, of these two distinct components. "Something which is derived from our conscious life and shares its characteristics - we call it 'the day's residues' - combines with something else coming from the realm of the unconscious in order to construct a dream."(212/249) This once more implies a process of dynamic articulation whereby the influence of an unconscious wish is distinguished from the contribution of the latent thoughts. It is this process of dynamic articulation, along with the inversion of status that it implies, that serves to establish the position of the unconscious wish in distinction from that of the latent material.

It now becomes possible to distinguish the contribution of these two components to the process of dream formation as a whole. Dream formation is thus conceived as a process of regressive transformation which the material of the latent thoughts undergoes under the influence of an unconscious wish. This also provides us with a first indication of a possible interaction between the registers of formal and material regression in dreams. For the regression of the dream thoughts is now attributed to the influence of unconscious mechanisms upon the form of representation of that material. "The dream-work is accomplished between these two components. The

influence exercised upon the day's residues by the addition of the unconscious is no doubt among the determinants of regression."(212/249)

The relationship between formal and material regression in dreams will thus be placed upon a new footing and considered in relation to the question of the conditions of wish-fulfilment in the dream. "We can, of course, raise another question besides: What is it that forces psychical activity during sleep to make this regression? Why does it not dispose of the mental stimuli that disturb sleep without doing this?"(212/249) The answer to this question, "that it is not otherwise dynamically possible to get rid of the stimulus to the dream", will allow us to situate the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious in terms of the articulation of the formal and material conditions of wish-fulfilment in dreams.

5.2 Wish-fulfilment

I.

Freud's discussion of the question of wish-fulfilment in dreams constitutes the culmination of the argument that has provided the structure for these lectures as a whole. We have shown how this argument is elaborated around the initial distinction between two different approaches to the problem of dreams, hence between two possible models of psychoanalytic investigation. In this lecture Freud will bring these two lines of argument into relation with one another and attempt to reconcile them around a defence of the thesis that every dream must be understood as the fulfilment of a wish.

The question of distortion provides the point of distinction, and hence the site of a possible articulation, between the two different lines of argument. For it was the suspension of the problem of distortion, in the case of children's dreams, that allowed the positive model of investigation to be elaborated around a direct relation between the manifest and latent poles of the dream. It was a systematic examination of the modalities of distortion which arise to obscure this relation, on the other hand, that allowed the notion of the dream-work to be established as the register fundamental to the process of dream formation as a whole.

The problem of distortion is thus attributed a diametrically opposed position in each of these two approaches to the dream - in the one case an obstacle to be eliminated or reduced to a minimum, in the other the primary object of concern. The respective outcomes of these two forms of investigation, the claims and findings upon which the different lines of argument depend, are not therefore entirely compatible. "We are bound to admit, however, that the things we have discovered by the one path and by the other do not entirely correspond. It will be our task to piece the two sets of findings together and reconcile them with each other."(213/250)

The lack of correspondence between the two models of investigation has been most clearly illustrated by the position of the concept "unconscious" in each. The previous lecture contained a first attempt to reconcile the different definitions of this concept, and to situate a revised and extended concept of the unconscious in the space defined by their relationship. This argument will now provide the framework for the attempt to reconcile the two accounts of the procedure of investigation itself. The outcome will be a more comprehensive conception of the nature and grounds of validity of the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation as a whole.

The question of the status and justification of the concept "unconscious" is hardly, therefore, an isolated or independent issue. This question is inseparable from our conception of the grounds of validity of the psychoanalytic technique itself. We have seen how this concept is developed around the role played by the wish in the instigation of the dream. The question of the status of the wish in the explanation of the dream then served as the point of articulation for the distinction between the two different models of investigation. The discussion of the conditions of wish-fulfilment in the dream will provide the register within which this question can be pursued.

The notion of wish-fulfilment was introduced on the basis of the model of children's dreams. The absence of distortion in these dreams permits the elaboration of a reflex-arc model of the dream as the response to a stimulus that disturbs sleep. This empirical model of the dream then supplies the foundation for the psychoanalytic account of the process of dream formation and the possibility of its explanation. Yet this entire model, and the evidence for the central thesis of wish-fulfilment itself, rests upon the condition of the absence of distortion. The question now arises as to whether this model can be applied with equal validity to distorted dreams as well. "Now that we believe we have overcome dream-distortion, we must go on to inquire whether the view of dreams as the fulfilment of wishes is also valid of distorted dreams."(213/250)

Freud will consider possible objections to the thesis that every dream must be considered the fulfilment of a wish. His response to criticisms of the empirical validity of this thesis will allow him to extend the grounds of this claim in the light of the more comprehensive account of the process of dream formation since elaborated. This procedure will at the same time allow him to resituate the position of the wish itself, abandoning its status in the latent pole in favour of a source in the systematic, or "infantile", unconscious. The process of dynamic articulation by which this unconscious wish is distinguished from the latent stimulus entails an inversion in the status of that wish and the role it plays in explanation. It is this characteristic procedure of derivation that then supports the concept of the unconscious itself.

The question of the status of the proposition of wish-fulfilment thus becomes the pivot of Freud's entire argument. Our understanding of the grounds and justification for this thesis will have a determining influence on our conception of the nature and orientation of the psychoanalytic technique as a whole. It is thus the very possibility of psychoanalytic interpretation, as well as the scope of its validity, that is at stake in Freud's defence of this proposition.

II.

The most obvious objection to the thesis that every dream is the fulfilment of a wish is the occurrence of dreams with a distressing content. Common sense would suggest that if every dream was in fact the fulfilment of a wish then feelings of anxiety and unpleasure should be impossible in them. The experience of a dream accompanied by distressing affects would then constitute an immediate contradiction of the validity of this thesis. Freud's discussion of this objection will allow him to challenge this simplistic view of wish-fulfilment and to introduce a more comprehensive view of the conditions of wish-fulfilment in dreams. At the same time we will be forced to revise our conception of the nature of the wish and the role it plays in the account of dream formation as a whole.

Once again it is a dynamic procedure of argument that serves as the most reliable guide to understanding Freud's approach to this question. And again it is the factor of distortion that is introduced to provide the initial pivot for this argument. "We have no difficulty in replying that in distorted dreams the wish-fulfilment cannot be obvious but must be looked for, so that it cannot be pointed out until the dream has been interpreted. We know too that the wishes in these distorted dreams are forbidden ones - rejected by the censorship - whose existence was precisely the cause of the dream's distortion, the reason for the intervention of the dream-censorship."(214/251)

The factor of distortion, the most intractable obstacle for the initial attempt to demonstrate the role of the wish in the process of dream formation, is thus established as the pivot of a dynamic argument. This argument then provides the framework for Freud's attempt to dissociate the wish from its empirical status in the latent pole and to resituate it in the systematic unconscious. It is this procedure that will allow him to revise the causal role played by the wish in the explanation of the dream, establishing it in the guise of a final term of interpretation. The role of the wish in distorted dreams is thus established as a necessary postulate required to explain precisely that distortion which stands in the way of the attempt to demonstrate the presence of the wish itself.

This manoeuvre, inverting the relative status of the wish and the factor of distortion within a dynamic argument, serves as the foundation for the account that follows. For the problem of distressing affects in the dream will now be introduced into this dynamic framework in a position analogous to that of the factor of distortion. This will allow Freud to deal with the difficulties raised by the question of anxiety by examining the definition of the wish itself and the conditions of its fulfilment in the dream. In this way he will make use of the problem of distressing affects in dreams to

introduce novel distinctions into the concept of the wish, thus elaborating a dynamic account of the conditions of wish-fulfilment within a more comprehensive account of the process of dream formation as a whole.

This argument will be carried out in three stages, in the discussion of three "complications" that have to be taken into account when considering the problem of affects in dreams. "Firstly, it may be that the dream-work has not completely succeeded in creating a wish-fulfilment; so that a portion of the distressing affect in the dream-thoughts has been left over in the manifest dream."(214-15/252) This, the simplest argument, relies upon the suggestion that the process of dream formation might fail to completely satisfy the wish that instigated it. The degree of unpleasure experienced in the dream would then be attributed to the residue of the discomfort associated with the wishful state itself.

This line of argument, which relies upon the dream's failure to fulfil its function, obviously remains of limited effectiveness as an argument for establishing the nature of that function in general. For this approach serves just as well to put in question exactly what is meant by the dream's fulfilment of a wish. This argument then merely raises more fundamental questions concerning the definition of the wish itself and its role in the process of dream formation. Any doubts concerning the dream's ability to satisfy the wish thus immediately problematises both our conception of the nature of the wish involved and the conditions of its possible satisfaction in the dream.

It is this notion, however, that allows Freud to introduce a distinction between the dream's content and the quota of affect associated with that content. "Such instances of failure are no rare event. This is helped by the fact that it is so much harder for the dream-work to alter the sense of a dream's affects than of its content; affects are sometimes highly resistant."(215/252) The possibility that these two components of the wish might have separate vicissitudes in the dream would then account for the distressing affects experienced in the dream despite its attempts at wish-fulfilment. "What then happens is that the dream-work transforms the distressing content of the dream-thoughts into the fulfilment of a wish, while the distressing affect persists unaltered."(215/252)

The introduction of the distinction between content and affect serves to undermine the unitary conception of the wish assumed in the initial account of wish-fulfilment. The problematic occurrence of distressing affects in the dream can now be accounted for in terms of the separate, and possibly contradictory, vicissitudes of these two components

of the wish. This dynamic reversal culminates in the assertion that in this case it would be precisely the experience of distressing affects that would constitute evidence for the thesis of wish-fulfilment. For "it is precisely in dreams like this that the wish-fulfilling purpose of the dream-work appears most clearly, because in isolation".(215/252)

The import of this argument, however, is not so much its claim to constitute a comprehensive response to these objections as to introduce the terms within which a solution might be achieved. The distinction between content and affect breaks down the unitary definition of the wish and introduces the possibility of a dynamic articulation between these two components. At the same time this distinction establishes a preliminary framework that will be elaborated into a dynamic relation between two separate wishes in the process of dream formation. This approach will then culminate, in the discussion of punishment dreams, in the assertion that the experience of unpleasure in the dream may itself be considered the satisfaction of a wish.

The first stage of this argument thus questions the unitary conception of the wish by identifying two separate components of that wish and raising the possibility that these components might have independent vicissitudes in the process of wish-fulfilment. The dissolution of the unitary conception of the wish itself problematises the previous account of wish-fulfilment in a move towards a dynamic account structured around the possible relations between these two components of the wish. The next step will take the elaboration of this dynamic model of wish-fulfilment a stage further by bringing into focus the question of the dreamer's relation to his wish. "No doubt a wish-fulfilment must bring pleasure; but the question then arises 'To whom?' "(215-16/253)

The unitary account of wish-fulfilment had taken for granted that the dreamer and his wish are to be identified. It now becomes possible to establish a dynamic relation between them, within which the aims of the wish no longer necessarily coincide with those of the dreamer. Here it is the factor of censorship that serves as the wedge opening up a dynamic relation between dreamer and wish. This notion then provides the crucial point of inversion in this relation, allowing the introduction of the possibility that the fulfilment of the wish is not necessarily accompanied by the experience of pleasure. "But, as we know, a dreamer's relation to his wishes is a quite peculiar one. He repudiates them and censors them - he has no liking for them, in short. So that their fulfilment will give him no pleasure, but just the opposite."(216/253)

The identity of dreamer and wish is thus dissolved into a dynamic relation between two separate components which might have independent and even contradictory aims. "Thus a dreamer in his relation to his dream-wishes can only be compared to an amalgamation of two separate people who are linked by some strong element in common."(216/253) The emphasis here, however, is not so much on the element of common interest that regulates the relation between these two components, but rather on the possibility that their interests might no longer coincide. Freud thus treats us to a fairy tale intended precisely to illustrate "the possibility that if two people are not at one with each other the fulfilment of a wish of one of them may bring nothing but unpleasure to the other".(216/253-54)

It is within this framework that it becomes possible to elaborate a preliminary explanation of the phenomenon of anxiety in dreams. For anxiety will now be explained as the product of a dynamic opposition between conflicting tendencies at work in the formation of the dream. Observing that in anxiety-dreams the content is often entirely devoid of distortion, Freud suggests that in these dreams the fulfilment of the wish has managed to evade the demands of the censorship, at the cost of the generation of anxiety. "An anxiety-dream is often the undisguised fulfilment of a wish - not, of course, of an acceptable wish, but of a repudiated one. The generation of anxiety has taken the place of the censorship."(216-17/254)

Freud goes on to point out that anxiety-dreams usually have the effect of waking the dreamer. The anxiety serves as a signal that the repressed wish is in danger of attaining fulfilment despite the demands of censorship. The anxiety generated in response to any particularly disturbing wish would then take over the function of censorship, putting an end to that dream by rousing the dreamer from sleep. "Anxiety-dreams are as a rule also arousal dreams; we usually interrupt our sleep before the repressed wish in the dream has put its fulfilment through completely in spite of the censorship. In that case the function of the dream has failed, but its essential nature is not altered by this."(217/254-55)

The problem of anxiety in dreams is thus reduced to the question of the dynamic conditions under which it becomes possible for a repressed wish to evade the function of censorship in the construction of a dream. The answer to this question is to be sought in the alteration in the balance of forces between censorship and wish brought about by the state of sleep itself. Freud suggests that the function of censorship, which is greatly reduced in the state of sleep, tends to become merged with the dominant wish to sleep. This creates the conditions for the free expression of repressed wishes

under the presupposition that they remain harmless from a practical point of view, as the state of sleep bars access to any active implementation.

It is clear that this account is not intended as a definitive statement on the problem of anxiety which, Freud points out, must be approached from a different angle. It should rather be considered merely as an introduction to the terms of the problem within the context of the attempt to elaborate a dynamic account of the process of wish-fulfilment in dreams. This dynamic model of anxiety as the product of a relation of conflict between opposing tendencies in the dream then supports the claim that the fulfilment of a wish in the dream need not necessarily be experienced as pleasure. "For there is a possibility that the fulfilment of a wish may bring about something very far from pleasant - namely, a punishment."(219/256)

The reference to the notion of punishment dreams completes the elaboration of this dynamic account of wish-fulfilment, introducing the possibility that the unpleasure generated may itself be considered the fulfilment of a wish of the opposing tendency. Far from constituting an objection to the thesis of wish-fulfilment, the problem of unpleasure in dreams now becomes the grounds for postulating the existence of further, punishing tendencies in the dream which are satisfied by that very experience of unpleasure. "(T)he punishment is also the fulfilment of a wish - of the wish of the other, censoring person."(219/257)

This passage brings into focus once again the contrasted modes of psychoanalytic and empirical argument. If the thesis of wish-fulfilment were to be considered an empirical proposition, established by a process of abstraction and generalisation from the given evidence, then the experience of anxiety-dreams would seem to constitute a direct contradiction to the universal validity of that principle. The particular experience of unpleasure in the dream would thus provide grounds for modifying the scope of that general principle in order to accommodate the conflicting evidence.

We have shown, however, that the validity of this principle does not in fact rest upon the plane of empirical evidence, but is rather established at the level of the formal principles of interpretation. It is the primary position of this postulate as a necessary condition of the intelligibility of the dream that serves as the basis for Freud's subsequent procedure in relation to the apparently contradictory evidence of unpleasure in the dream. The experience of anxiety-dreams thus becomes the occasion for the elaboration of certain topographic distinctions designed to account for the possibility that the fulfilment of a wish might be accompanied by unpleasure. The

discussion of the conditions under which the fulfilment of a wish might give rise to unpleasure then establishes that principle on the broader grounds of a dynamic model of wish-fulfilment in the dream.

This procedure of argument at the same time allows us to clarify the nature of the relation between dynamic and topographic considerations in psychoanalytic theory. Here we have the fundamental proposition of wish-fulfilment, established on formal grounds as a necessary principle of interpretation. The formal status of this principle provides the basis for the approach to the problem of unpleasure in dreams, which is resolved by an elaboration of the dynamic conditions under which that experience might be accounted for. The account of a dynamic relation between conflicting tendencies in the dream then serves as the foundation for a topographic account of the relation of wishes within the psychic apparatus. The topographic model of a divided psychic apparatus, therefore, merely constitutes a structural elaboration of those fundamental explanatory principles.

Criticisms of the empirical validity of the proposition of wish-fulfilment rest upon a misunderstanding of the nature of this argument and the relation between principles and evidence which it assumes. Hence the importance of the formal derivation of this principle, on the one hand, and the critique of the empirical status of the wish, on the other. For it is above all the initial critique of the empirical status of the wish in the explanation of the dream that prepares the ground for the more fundamental inversion in the relation between principle and evidence which this argument makes possible. The experience of unpleasure in the dream thus no longer constitutes grounds for a modification of the universal validity of the proposition of wish-fulfilment. Rather we have a modification in our concept of the wish itself, and the elaboration of a dynamic account of the process of wish-fulfilment to allow for the possibility that the fulfilment of a wish in the dream might give rise tounpleasure.

III.

Freud will go to great lengths here to emphasise the importance of the thesis of wish-fulfilment and the central role it plays in his argument. The entire theory of the dream obviously depends to a large extent on the validity of the proposition that the dream is in essence the fulfilment of a wish. Even more important, however, is the question of the grounds for this proposition and the argument by which it is established. For the justification of this thesis as a necessary principle of interpretation ties this proposition

to the very conditions of possibility of the psychoanalytic technique itself. The question of the status of the proposition that every dream is to be considered the fulfilment of a wish thus becomes fundamental to the validity of psychoanalytic theory in general.

The discussion of these issues is once again set in place by formulating a key objection to the plausibility of this thesis. "When someone has accompanied us so far in the interpretation of dreams and has accepted everything that has been brought forward up to this point, it often happens that he comes to a halt at wish-fulfilment and says: 'Granted that dreams always have a sense, and that this sense can be discovered by the technique of psychoanalysis, why must that sense, all evidence to the contrary, be invariably pushed into the formula of wish-fulfilment?' "(221/259)

This passage, and the objection that it raises, may in fact be understood as both a summary and a culmination of Freud's argument up to this point. For here we have the first explicit suggestion that it is wish-fulfilment that constitutes the sense of the dream. The question of the validity of the thesis of wish-fulfilment is here brought into direct relation with the initial premiss that all dreams have a sense. The juxtapositioning of the notion of sense and that of the wish then has immediate and far-reaching implications for our understanding of the coherence of Freud's argument as a whole.

With this conjunction we are thrown back to the very beginning of this argument, to the role of the concept of sense in the constitution of the dream as an object of interpretation. The proposition that the dream has a sense was situated as a fundamental condition of the intelligibility of the dream in general. Yet the problematic status of this notion of sense, which appeared to feature as both the premiss and the product of interpretation, was never resolved.

This notion appeared rather to be abandoned in the course of the attempt to establish an empirical model for the explanation of the dream as a reaction to a stimulus disturbing sleep. The elaboration of this empirical model then came to centre upon the concept of the wish and its role in the instigation of the dream. We were, however, faced with analogous difficulties concerning the status of that wish and the role it was to play in the interpretation of the dream. It is these issues that are at stake in the question of the grounds for the proposition that every dream is the fulfilment of a wish.

It now becomes apparent that, far from being discarded in the course of the argument, the concept of sense has in fact continued to provide the most general framework for

the discussion of the wish. For in pursuing the question of the wish, and the validity of the proposition of wish-fulfilment in general, we have by implication served to clarify some of the difficulties associated with the premiss of sense. We have thus suggested that the problematic status of both propositions can best be resolved by abandoning the attempt to provide an empirical foundation for these concepts in favour of the argument for their derivation as conditions of the technique of interpretation itself.

This procedure would allow us not only to resolve the difficulties associated with the status of the two concepts, but also to comprehend the nature of their relation to one another. For it is only in terms of their position as conditions of interpretation, and thus in terms of their common derivation from the technique of interpretation itself, that we can make any sense of the correlation that Freud here establishes between them. This relation would allow us to resolve the question of the status of the premiss of sense in the light of the grounds for the justification of the thesis of wish-fulfilment. The relation with the concept of sense would similarly have profound implications for our understanding of the wish and its position in psychoanalytic thought.

The critique of the empirical and physiological conception of the wish thus clears the way for the attempt to situate the wish within a context of signification defined by the dream itself. This would imply abandoning any attempt to define the nature of the wish in terms of the physiological and functional processes underlying the dream, in order to approach the constitution of the wish within a register of sense. This approach would allow us to consider the conditions under which the context of signification supporting the wish might become assimilated to the register of representation defined by the dream itself. This would then provide us with a far more promising framework for determining the conditions under which that wish might be fulfilled in the process of dream formation.

The third term in this correlation between the concept of the wish and that of sense will be supplied by the notion of transference. Freud's concluding discussion of the transference will focus upon the paradoxical position of this concept as a fundamental condition of analytic interpretation and yet as the major obstacle to the success of that process. The difficulties associated with the concept of transference will then be resolved, by an argument analogous in every respect to the one here, in terms of its status as a condition of psychoanalytic interpretation. This argument will take the form of a critique of the attempt to ground this concept in the empirical sphere, on the basis of its manifestations as an affective relation between patient and analyst, in order to situate the transference as a field of signification delimiting the analytic realm itself.

The notions of sense, wish, and transference are thus established as three interlocking and overlapping concepts whose interrelation serves to define the constitution of the psychoanalytic register as a whole. The possibility of this correlation, however, can only be understood and justified in terms of the common situation of these three concepts as conditions of possibility of the technique of interpretation from which the entire theory derives. For it is the technique of interpretation that provides the point of articulation in relation to which the correlation between these three terms can be elaborated into the field of psychoanalytic knowledge in general. The broad epistemological framework defined by the relation between these terms then provides the register within which the status of the other psychoanalytic concepts can be determined.

These are themes that only really come into focus in the course of Freud's final detailed discussion of the concept of transference and its role in analytic therapy. It is clear, however, that there is no way of understanding the relation between these concepts, and hence the scope and coherence of this argument, except in terms of their common derivation from the conditions of the technique of interpretation itself. Any attempt to ground these terms in the empirical register, and to derive their validity from the nature of the object in question, will merely prevent us from making any sense of the relation between them. This approach not only gives rise to intractable difficulties in determining the status of the individual concepts, but also precludes any grasp of the nature of their relation to one another within the coherence of Freud's argument as a whole.

The definition of each of these central psychoanalytic concepts will thus be supported by the same characteristic procedure of argument. This argument requires a critique of the positive status of these terms within the empirical register, in order to demonstrate the possibility of a fundamental correlation between them at the level of their common epistemological grounds as conditions of the technique of interpretation. The discussion of these concepts will in each case involve two levels or stages of argument. The initial definition serves to bring to light the difficulties inherent in any attempt to establish the validity of the concept on empirical grounds. The critique of the positive, substantive, and nuclear status of that concept then provides the foundation for the attempt to elaborate a more comprehensive definition of the epistemological conditions under which it might legitimately be employed.

We have already demonstrated how this argument may be brought to bear on the initial distinction between meaning and sense in the dream. This distinction turns on the contrast between a concept of meaning based on an internal relation of correspondence and intention, and the constitution of a closed register of sense defined in terms of its external conditions of coherence. The same distinction re-emerges in the account of the transference, which is aimed precisely at bringing to light the contradictions inherent in the manifestations of this phenomenon as an affective relation unfolding at the positive level of meaning and wish. This will allow us to establish a more comprehensive definition of the transference as a register of signification whose external limits are identical with those of the analytic realm itself. The correlation between the concept of transference and that of sense thus allows us to define the constitution of the analytic register in terms of the epistemological conditions under which psychoanalytic interpretation may be successfully carried out.

IV.

These are somewhat broader considerations which may appear to have no immediate relevance to the issue in question here. It is these broader epistemological concerns, however, that provide the context for Freud's approach to the thesis of wish-fulfilment by bringing it into relation with the basic premiss of interpretation, that every dream has a sense. The defence of this thesis then comes to rest upon the introduction of a distinction between the latent dream thoughts and the broader register of unconscious thought processes as a whole. It is this distinction that establishes the framework for the critique of the empirical status of the wish as a latent stimulus, in order to situate that wish within the context of signification defined by the dream itself. It is the constitution of a closed register of sense in the process of dream formation that then creates the context within which latent material of the most varied nature comes to be configured as a wish.

The defence of the principle of wish-fulfilment, introduced here in the form of a questioning of the plausibility of that thesis, involves two steps. The first brings the validity of this principle into relation with the premiss of sense, the primary condition of the intelligibility of the dream in general. This step serves to bring the principle of wish-fulfilment into relation with the conditions under which interpretation of the dream becomes possible in the first place. It is in the context of this premiss of sense that we may then ask under what conditions the range of functions of waking thought become restricted to the single, necessary, and inevitable sense of wish-fulfilment in the

dream. For this is the question posed as the second part of Freud's "objection" to the validity of this thesis. "Why should not the sense of this nightly thinking be of as many kinds as that of daytime thinking?"(221/259)

It is clear that any attempt to approach this question in terms of the physiological foundations of thought can only lead us into immediate difficulties. For we are then reduced to seeking to account for this difference in terms of the physiological or neurological conditions of thought during sleep. Whatever the nature of these criteria, it remains difficult to see how the physiological conditions of thought processes in sleep could lead us to the necessary formulation of a wish in the dream. The proximity of the problematic of sense, however, allows us to consider this question in terms of the conditions under which the various functions of waking thought become restricted to the single formula of wish-fulfilment in the dream. This question may then be answered in terms of the constitution of a closed register of sense, within which those thoughts take on the value of representative elements in a process of wish-fulfilment.

The argument for the thesis of wish-fulfilment thus turns upon precisely this distinction between the various functions or meanings of the latent thoughts and the single all-embracing sense of the dream. The profile of that latent material as a wish is then to be considered in terms of its position within the register of sense constituted by the dream as a whole. It is the context of signification established by the process of dream formation itself, then, that provides the conditions under which the range of functions of waking thought become assimilated to the single sense of wish-fulfilment in the dream. For the material of those latent thoughts, left over from the waking interests of the previous day, finds a place in the process of dream formation only on the basis of its suitability to serve the representation of an unconscious wish.

This distinction between the content of the latent material and the form of the dream as a whole allows us to sketch a basic account of the conditions under which the variety of functions of waking thought may become integrated into a process of wish-fulfilment in the dream. At the same time it will be seen that this account of the constitution of a register of sense provides us with a preliminary model of the conditions under which certain fundamental analytic phenomena operate. For the analytic process itself entails a situation where a wide range of activities and functions of waking life come to be focused around, or aligned in terms of, the single theme of the transference. The operation of the transference may thus be considered in terms of the constitution of a closed register of sense, within which a range of innocuous

functions come to take on a transferential significance in relation to the analytic situation.

The question of the conditions of validity of the thesis of wish-fulfilment in dreams thus establishes a framework for an entire range of analytic phenomena, and provides us with a concrete illustration of how those phenomena come within range of psychoanalytic interpretation. For this model would then allow us to consider the nature of the symptom as wish-fulfilment in terms of the conditions under which certain physiological or somatic functions may become situated within a particular context of signification. Any attempt to approach this question in terms of the somatic underpinnings of these phenomena, on the other hand, merely reduces us to looking for physiological criteria for the distinction between normal and pathological processes along the lines of the distinction between waking and sleeping thought. The symptomatic quality of these phenomena, however, is in no way to be sought in their physiological foundation, but derives rather from their position within a register of sense that at the same time provides their conditions of intelligibility.

It becomes clear that the question of the status of the principle of wish-fulfilment does indeed bear the importance which Freud here attributes to it within the theory as a whole. For our understanding of the grounds of validity of this thesis will have a profound influence upon our conception of the scope of validity of psychoanalytic interpretation in general. Any attempt to found this principle directly upon the evidence derived from an examination of the dream, for example, would merely restrict the validity of this thesis to the nature of the particular object concerned. An empirical grounding for this thesis would imply a limited conception both of the nature of the wish and of the scope and orientation of the technique of interpretation itself. This approach would merely serve to cut us off from an appreciation of the full scope of this thesis and its validity as a basic principle of interpretation across the range of psychoanalytic objects as a whole.

The defence of the thesis of wish-fulfilment comes to rest upon the distinction between the range of meanings of the latent thoughts and the underlying sense of the dream as a whole. This distinction allows Freud to finally clarify the relation between the two different models of interpretation and to distinguish their respective orientations, goals, and conditions of validity. This account gives rise to two radically different conceptions of the nature and status of the wish, one situated in the latent pole and derived from the interests of waking thought, and the other associated with the register of the dream work and attributed to a source in the infantile unconscious. The

distinction between the function of the latent thoughts and the sense of the dream as a whole thus not only becomes the occasion for situating the definition of the psychoanalytic unconscious in its full systematic sense, but also allows us to elaborate a novel conception of the nature and conditions of the wish in psychoanalysis.

V.

Freud will claim that the criticisms of the validity of the thesis of wish-fulfilment are based upon "a misunderstanding which confuses the dream with the latent dream-thoughts, and asserts of the former something that applies solely to the latter".(222/260) He is quite prepared to acknowledge that these latent dream-thoughts may involve the full range of functions and activities of waking thought, for it is from the concerns and interests of waking thought that they are directly derived. The latent thoughts, or "day's residues", may thus possess all the characteristics of normal thought processes, apart from the fact that they were not conscious to the dreamer at the time. The immediate goal of interpretation is then defined as an attempt to bring these latent thoughts to light by undoing the process by which they had been transformed into the manifest dream.

We may thus distinguish a strictly limited practical aim of investigation, which is concerned solely with removing the effects of the dream-work in order to determine the nature of the latent thoughts out of which that dream arose. This interest in the content of the latent thoughts is, however, quite explicitly contrasted with the modes and mechanisms of the dream-work, which are responsible for giving those latent thoughts their characteristic form in the dream. It is the register of the dream-work, the array of mechanisms responsible for producing the manifest dream out of the latent material, that is here established as the real focus of interpretation and the essential component of the process of dream formation itself. "The only essential thing about dreams is the dream-work that has influenced the thought-material."(223/261)

The contrast between the content of the latent thoughts and the form into which that material is translated by the mechanisms of the dream-work is then attributed to the influence of an unconscious wish. "Analytic observation shows further that the dream-work never restricts itself to translating these thoughts into the archaic or regressive mode of expression that is familiar to you. In addition, it regularly takes possession of something else, which is not part of the latent thoughts of the previous day, but which is the true motive force for the construction of the dream. This indispensable addition

is the equally unconscious wish for the fulfilment of which the content of the dream is given its new form."(223-24/261-62)

Here, then, we finally arrive at the postulation of an unconscious wish, "the true motive force" of the dream, introduced to account for the difference between the content of the latent thoughts and the form in which they appear in the dream. The form of the dream as a whole is now attributed to the influence of this unconscious wish, for the fulfilment of which the entire process of dream formation comes about. At the same time the role of the latent thoughts is reduced to that of mere instigating stimulus. The latent thoughts provide both the occasion and the material for the process of dream formation. They could not, however, play this role without the "indispensable addition" of the influence of an unconscious wish, which is responsible for the form in which that dream then arises.

The explanation of the process of dream formation thus comes to rest upon the postulation of an unconscious wish, which provides the necessary causal force for the construction of the dream. And yet it is clear that all the difficulties already associated with the form of psychoanalytic explanation now merely become focused upon the question of the status of this unconscious wish and its possible grounds of justification. The validity of the thesis of wish-fulfilment similarly comes to rest upon the claim that the influence of an unconscious wish is to be detected in the formation of every dream. Given the difficulties of establishing the empirical validity of this proposition in its initial form, however, it is difficult to see how it can now be successfully defended with the postulation of a wish whose existence remains even more elusive.

One should not, then, overlook the difficulties involved in this line of argument. Freud has begun by attempting to elaborate an empirical model of the process of dream formation which turns upon the role of a latent wish in the instigation of the dream. He has attempted to provide evidence for the validity of his central thesis with the examples of direct wish-fulfilment in the undistorted dreams of children. The attempt to extend this model to account for the more obscure instances of distorted dreams, however, meets with certain obstacles that allow us to question the legitimacy of this argument as a whole. The difficulties in establishing the general validity of the thesis of wish-fulfilment thus cast doubt upon the validity of the entire psychoanalytic model for the explanation of dreams.

In response to criticisms of the validity of this thesis and the evidence upon which it is based, Freud now appears to be attempting to modify his argument. He is thus

prepared to admit that a latent wish is not in fact an indispensable factor in the formation of the dream, and that the latent thoughts do not therefore necessarily take the form of a wish. Instead he will claim that the role of those latent thoughts in the dream depends upon the influence of a further, more unconscious wish, which has no immediate empirical profile and whose existence cannot therefore be clearly demonstrated. It is the influence of this unconscious wish upon the residual material of waking thought, however, that is to account for all the characteristic transformations that arise in the course of dream formation.

The latent wish, which has served up to now as the pivot of the empirical model of explanation, is thus rendered secondary and reduced to the role of mere instigating stimulus in the process of dream formation. Hence even if the latent thoughts should happen to take the form of a wish, they would still not in themselves possess sufficient motive force to account for this process. The latent wish will only be able to give rise to the construction of a dream if it succeeds in gaining reinforcement from an unconscious wish, which provides the psychical energy necessary for the process of dream formation. The latent thoughts themselves then only play a role in the dream on account of their ability to serve the fulfilment of that unconscious wish.

Freud goes on to invoke the analogy of the relation between capitalist and entrepreneur to illustrate the relation between the unconscious wish and the latent material. We thus arrive at a conception of the unconscious wish as the product of an accumulation of psychical energy from infantile and instinctual sources which supplies the quantitative force necessary to motivate the process of dream formation. Due to the state of repression this reservoir of libidinal forces cannot itself achieve discharge via any of the recognised channels. The conditions of the state of sleep, however, allow it to transfer its excitation onto the latent material of thought, achieving a certain discharge by proxy in the formation of a dream.

This quantitative account of the unconscious wish, however, gives rise to certain difficulties with the economics of the process of wish-fulfilment in dreams. For we are immediately faced with the question of the conditions under which an unconscious wish of this nature can be considered to achieve any form of adequate discharge in the dream. This question then comes to focus upon the nature of the relation between the unconscious wish and the latent thoughts, and the mechanics of the process by which this wish transfers its energy onto that latent material in the dream. These questions in turn lead us back to more fundamental difficulties with the possible grounds for

establishing the status of this unconscious wish as the "indispensable addition" in the construction of every dream.

Once again it is the problematic status of the unconscious wish itself that lies at the root of the difficulties with the role attributed to it in the explanation of the dream. The difficulties of reconciling the questionable empirical status of this wish with the universal and necessary role it plays in the explanation of the dream can, however, quite easily be resolved by the argument already elaborated. For here it is the process of dynamic articulation by which this wish is distinguished from the empirical stimulus that provides the key to understanding both the status of the unconscious wish and its role in the dream. It is this relation of dynamic articulation, rather than any simple quantitative relation of "addition", that then supports the status of that unconscious wish in the explanation of the dream.

The simple expedient of negotiating the problematic relation between the unconscious wish and the latent material in the inverse direction thus allows us to clarify the difficulties associated both with the status of these terms and the nature of their relation to one another. This returns us to the derivation of the unconscious wish as a context of signification required to account for the presence of the latent material in the dream and its role in a process of wish-fulfilment. If we maintain this procedure of derivation it is clear that there is no need for any further evidence for the independent existence of this unconscious wish. For that unconscious wish becomes identified with the register of sense itself, the context of signification delimited by the field of associations which render that dream intelligible.

The status of the register of sense which supports the role of the unconscious wish in the process of dream formation is itself no longer obscure. We have noted that the influence of the unconscious wish is introduced in the first instance to account for the difference between the content of the latent material and the form of the dream as a whole. And yet the dream-work has already been established as the activity responsible for transforming that latent material into the form it assumes in the manifest dream. The register of the dream-work is therefore now in place to account for the transformations undergone by those latent thoughts in the course of dream formation. The modes and mechanisms of the dream-work provide us with a systematic account of this register of sense within which the influence of the unconscious wish may be identified and determined.

This procedure of derivation provides the key to understanding not only the explanatory status of the unconscious wish but the nature of that wish itself. The process by which this unconscious wish is distinguished from the latent thoughts shows us that it is not merely a question of a difference of magnitude or of levels of consciousness. The unconscious wish is not a latent wish that is both more powerful and less conscious. The relation of dynamic articulation indicates rather that we must conceive the effects of this unconscious wish on a different plane entirely. For this unconscious wish is to be identified with the external context of signification within which the dream as a whole becomes intelligible. It is this context of signification which is then required to account for the role of the latent thoughts in the process of dream formation.

An appreciation of the relation between these two conceptions of the wish is fundamental to an understanding of the two different procedures of investigation oriented upon them. We must thus distinguish a model of investigation devolving upon the role of the latent thoughts in the instigation of the dream and a technique of interpretation which attempts to delimit the register of sense supporting them. Any attempt to pursue the investigation of the unconscious wish in the same mode as that of the latent wish would merely commit us to the fruitless pursuit of an elusive vanishing-point that is in fact no more than the internal reflection of an external perimeter of signification. The relation and articulation between these two models of investigation, on the other hand, provides us with a coherent account of the conditions of validity of the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation as a whole.

5.3 Conclusion

I.

This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that Freud's entire argument for the validity of the technique for the interpretation of dreams comes to devolve upon the proposition that every dream is to be understood as the fulfilment of a wish. We have suggested that the principle of wish-fulfilment does not stand as merely one finding among others in the psychoanalytic theory of the dream, but rather constitutes the very foundation of the technique of interpretation from which that theory derives. Our understanding of the status of this principle and the position assigned to it within Freud's argument will therefore have a profound influence on our conception of the nature of that technique and the grounds for its validity.

It is noteworthy, then, that we encounter this principle twice in the course of Freud's argument - once in the lecture on children's dreams, the apex of the initial empirical model of explanation, and then again in the discussion of the process of wish-fulfilment itself. It has been suggested that these two approaches to the principle of wish-fulfilment are associated with two fundamentally different accounts of the orientation and grounds of validity of the psychoanalytic technique for the investigation of dreams. For it is in fact a critique of the initial empirical argument for the validity of this principle that allows us to elaborate a more comprehensive account of the conditions of psychoanalytic interpretation in general.

The initial account develops a reflex-arc model for the explanation of the dream in terms of the nature of the latent thoughts that lie behind it. The problem of distortion remains the most obvious obstacle to the success of this procedure and the validity of the model of explanation elaborated around it. The concern to establish a verifiable relation of explanation between the manifest and latent poles of the dream issues in an attempt to suppress the register of distortion arising between them. This tendency is most apparent in the account of children's dreams, where it is in fact the suspension of the problem of distortion that allows the first introduction of the thesis of wish-fulfilment. For it is only the exclusion of this register that allows Freud to demonstrate the nature of the latent stimulus as a wish left over from the experiences of the previous day.

This functional model of the dream as a reaction to the disturbance of a stimulus in sleep becomes the basis for the psychoanalytic theory of the dream and the possibility of its explanation. The problem of distortion, however, remains an immediate and

constant restriction on the validity of this model and the legitimation of the principles upon which it depends. These difficulties come to focus upon the status of the wish in this model and the possibility of demonstrating its role in distorted dreams as well. We were forced to question whether the validity of the principle of wish-fulfilment could in fact be defended in these terms. We raised similar doubts about the viability of the attempt to arrive at an adequate definition of the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious by simply extending the scope of the distinction between the manifest and latent poles of the dream.

The difficulties associated with this initial model for the explanation of the dream led us to question whether the validity of psychoanalytic procedures could ever be adequately established on these grounds. A critique of the empirical status of the wish as stimulus then allowed us to develop an alternative argument around the problem of distortion itself. Where the initial model attempted to eliminate the register of distortion in order to bring the wish to light, the introduction of the notion of censorship allowed us to invert the terms of this model and postulate the role of the wish precisely in order to account for the very distortion that hides it from view. This procedure of derivation becomes the basis for a revised account of the procedure of interpretation itself, which takes the register of distortion and representation as the foundation for its approach to the wish.

This approach allowed us to develop a more comprehensive account of the conditions of wish-fulfilment in the dream, elaborated around the register of representation which provides the basis for the process of dream formation as a whole. The theory of the dream-work was established as the true focus of a procedure of interpretation operating at a diagonal across the original axis of the relations between manifest and latent in an attempt to delimit the register of sense defined by that relation. A systematic account of the modalities of distortion arising in the relation between the manifest and latent poles of the dream allowed us to determine some of the conditions of representation at work in dream formation. The theory of the dream-work becomes the basis for a revised account not only of the goals and orientation of the technique of interpretation but also of the nature and status of the wish underlying the dream.

The procedure of argument at the heart of this account at the same time allowed us to establish the principle of wish-fulfilment with the appropriate degree of universality required to justify the position attributed to it in Freud's argument. For the critique of the initial empirical grounds for this principle clears the way for a formal derivation of its status as a condition of possibility for the technique for the interpretation of dreams.

This allowed us to elaborate this principle, in conjunction with the associated concepts of sense and transference, into the register of epistemological conditions supporting the validity of psychoanalytic knowledge in general. This manoeuvre, however, is only made possible by the procedure of argument that allows us to derive these concepts in their position as necessary conditions of validity of the technique of interpretation itself.

The most obvious drawback of this procedure is that it has tended to neglect the empirical component of psychoanalytic investigation in favour of formal principles of interpretation elaborated without any obvious relation to the context from which they are derived. This tendency is perhaps an inevitable consequence of the approach taken in this thesis, which has used a critique of the empirical argument for the validity of psychoanalytic procedures in order to bring to light the further register of conditions which that argument is forced to assume. The tendency towards an empty formalism of transcendental conditions of interpretation would then be to some extent the direct outcome of the simplifications of this approach and its restricted account of the possibilities of an empirical argument in general. This approach might, however, be considered a necessary counterweight against a simplistic reading of Freud's argument in these lectures and the conception of psychoanalytic technique that would follow.

Yet this approach has at the same time served to bring to light the dynamic procedure of argument at the heart of Freud's account and allowed us to follow Freud in suggesting that this style of argument be considered characteristic of psychoanalytic procedures in general. This dynamic procedure might similarly point the way forward to negotiating the simplifications of the distinction between the empirical and the transcendental in attempting to define a procedure of argument specific to the position of psychoanalysis in modern knowledge. The approach that has allowed us to distinguish these two strands of Freud's argument would then also allow us to maintain an appropriate articulation between them. We have attempted to emphasise at every stage of this account that it is the relation between these two procedures of argument, and the models of investigation associated with them, that allows us to arrive at a comprehensive account of the conditions of validity of psychoanalytic theory as a whole.

These issues will be pursued in the second volume of these lectures where Freud turns to considering the explanation of the symptom. Here it is the question of resistance that will serve as the focus of investigation and the point of articulation of a dynamic procedure of argument. Where the problem of distortion has allowed us to establish

the register of sense as the field of conditions supporting the validity of psychoanalytic explanation, so too the problem of resistance will now lead us to question the conditions of effective therapeutic intervention in the clinic. An examination of the paradoxical position of the phenomenon of transference, as both the primary condition of intervention and ultimate obstacle to the success of that procedure, will allow us to situate the register of transference in an analogous position as the foundation for the validity of psychoanalytic interpretation in general. The application of this technique to the clinical material will at the same time serve as the most effective test of the validity of this argument and its ability to integrate the formal and empirical components of psychoanalytic theory.

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