

**TITLE**

**An Analysis of Some Central  
Mechanisms of Reproduction in  
Advanced Capitalism :**  
a comparative study of the U.K. and Italy  
from 1948-1983.

**A  
Thesis  
by  
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## ABSTRACT.

The central argument of the thesis is that mechanisms sustaining the reproductive conditions in advanced capitalism, are based on a differential distribution of knowledge, skills and resources, which for the majority is rational and progressive.

This thesis seeks to understand, in a comparative study, the connecting mechanisms which operate during the structural, cultural and political development of society, and why pluralistic conceptions and individual choices appear to be consistent with relatively stable civil and political institutions.

The thesis first postulates a general proposition and critically reviews the foremost theories of social and cultural reproduction and more latterly resistance theories. It also outlines in some detail the theories of Antonio Gramsci and comments on its relevance in modern society. Secondly a critique is made of the functionalist approach to understanding social phenomena and its problems and usefulness in this thesis. Thirdly the importance of education is discussed in the context of regional differential development. Fourthly Gramsci's problematic of hegemony and the cultural development of society is argued in terms of why modern institutional democracy is able to resist radical political change. Fifthly all the various arguments are brought together so that the mechanisms are clearly identified. In conclusion, based on the visible development of the two cases, I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the present cultural and political development.

This thesis therefore contributes to both our theoretical and empirical understanding of advanced society.

## DECLARATION

This thesis as submitted is all my own work. All the statistical data presented have been derived and elaborated from official statistics, both British and Italian. The thesis draws heavily from the works of Antonio Gramsci on which I have constructed the theoretical framework for this study and the basis for its critique.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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## **Chapter I.**

### **Introduction.**

This research investigates some of the mechanisms of continuity in advanced capitalist societies. It aims to show that the development of advanced societies manifests endogenous characteristics which have political, social and economic functions which can be conceived of as mechanisms in the reproductive processes of capitalism.

The idea that reproductive theory might be approached by investigating some of society's mechanisms, is really a product of all the scholarly work that has informed this subject area. It is an attempt to locate the practical bench marks and relate them to theory. Therefore the eclecticism evident in this study, is not one I feel necessary to defend. Indeed, one of its virtues is the integration of important strands that have been the subject of debate in social theory. In particular, the subject/object argument and its concerns, have been usefully directed to explain not only my conceptual framework, but also to contest the basis on which radical theories of transformation of advanced society, have been constructed.

Much of the work focusing on reproduction theory, has made education its central concern. While this is generally accepted to be the case, until recently it ignored the wider aspects that influence and control education, as well as the historical development of capitalist societies which could demonstrate that "mechanisms" other than education, are equally prominent, albeit dependent for their development on the progress of education itself.

It is, I believe, by establishing what mechanisms appear to be at work, by the construction of theory from practice, that we can eventually formulate a theory of reproduction that can be usefully applied to policy and realistically interpreted with

regard to the extent of ideological change that is possible, while still participating in the dominant system. It is the latter concern of change, the problem of transforming society, that has been at the core of reproduction theory. Much of the difficulty surrounding its theoretical development, it has been suggested and I agree,<sup>1</sup> is due to the political commitment and insistence on a radical theory of education that either perceives the idea of a "relatively autonomous institution", from which social change can be developed by a pedagogy sympathetic to radical causes. Or more recently, the development of theories of resistance in education, as expounded by such writers as Giroux (1983), Willis (1977), Apple (1980a, 1980b) and Anyon (1980). While some interesting ethnographical data emerges of the culturalist perspective in the cases of Willis and Anyon, one must turn to Giroux for a more comprehensive approach. His treatment of the subject/object debate, which underpins his theory of resistance and transformation, is an attempt to embrace the difficult task of revitalizing the impasse resulting predominantly from neo-marxist theorising. All have succeeded in their attempts to distance past deterministic approaches that prevailed in the seventies. But regarding resistance theories in general, there must be serious doubts as to the nature of the kind of cultural resistance claimed to have been detected, and how relevant it is as a counter force to the dominant order. Typologies of youth resistance, their reasons and motivations, are difficult to apply when they are endogenous to a specific culture. Resistance, which might be developed as an integral part of a new pedagogy, is however quite different. This notion, on which Giroux (1983) bases his theory, is not new. Indeed Antonio Gramsci<sup>2</sup> conceived of the transformation of capitalism precisely through this medium. But

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<sup>1</sup> A. Hargreaves. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*. Vol. 3. No. 2. 1982.

J. C. Walker. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*. Vol. 7. No. 1. 1986.

<sup>2</sup> Antonio Gramsci. 1891-1937. Italian Communist leader and thinker, whose writings of the state, hegemony and the conception of radical social change, have been used in this study as the tools for a theoretical framework.

even in his powerful argument, the development of an oppositional pedagogy does not necessarily lead to a utopian society, to which radical thought appears to be dedicated. My principle argument against a theory of resistance, as presently articulated, is that no empirical evidence can be unearthed which could realistically be interpreted as supporting such a theory. Secondly, as history does not demonstrate that the development of advanced capitalism is producing a trend towards radical political change,<sup>3</sup> then on what premise can a theory of resistance, or any other theory directed towards political change, be formulated. It is here that I will take issue with both Gramsci and Giroux, not on the possibility of social and political transformation of advanced society for that eventuality, however implausible the present evidence might be, is always subject to unintentional consequences, but rather on the theoretical basis their arguments.

### **Research Method.**

The methodological approach to this thesis can be divided into three parts. Firstly, I have selected two advanced societies, The U.K. and Italy, so that a comparative analysis can be made. Secondly, all the theoretical discussion and empirical findings, are argued with reference to the framework of Gramsci's theory of radical political change. The notion here is that what Gramsci has considered to be the necessary development and conditions for the transition of advanced society, can be related to those mechanisms found in this study, and assessed as to their strength or weakness towards potential radical political change. Thirdly, based on the formulation of my general proposition below, I have conceptualized society as a system of functions and will analyse them within a functionalist framework.

The direction of social change is the implicit theme

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<sup>3</sup> All my arguments in this study amount to a logical assessment of the ideological trend of society.

throughout this study. Indeed the logic of identifying mechanisms is constantly determining whether the extent of change, as this must always be the case, is serving trends that favour radical interests or that the direction might possibly be the result of some unintentional functions. Consequently theories of social change form the background of my theoretical arguments.

### **Structure of thesis.**

In this chapter I will first formulate my general proposition which incorporates a number of assertions on which my arguments are based and expanded throughout the following chapters. As I proceed I review the major protagonists of reproduction theory and conclude by setting out my comments and general position.

*Chapter 2* is entirely dedicated to describing the theories of Antonio Gramsci, particularly those concerning the role of intellectuals and the development of hegemony in modern societies. My own more specific comments on the relevance of Gramsci's theories in today's world are made with respect to the whole notion of political and social change.

*Chapter 3* considers in more detail the theoretical perspective of this study in order to ensure that ideological issues are separated from the fundamental assumptions or presuppositions needed, and on which my arguments are based. In readiness for comparing the empirical world with my theoretical arguments, I carry out a critique of the functionalist approach to understanding social phenomena. Briefly my position here is that the many arguments of functionalism's static, harmonious and teleological biases, are not in my view found to be intrinsic qualities, and therefore I can see no reason why its accepted need for further development by those more favourably disposed, should be among the reasons for not embracing this method of investigation. I conclude this chapter with a discussion on presuppositions. These concern, as mentioned above, those

characteristics I believe to be most generalized and not reducible and therefore can serve any sociological perspective from the metaphysical to the empirical level of analysis.

*Chapter 4* deals exclusively with geographic regional differentiation and educational expansion. The underlying theme here is that social and economic disparities cannot be entirely reduced to ideological constructions. Differences it is argued, are attributed to factors such as logistical distribution of resources, terrain, human choices as well as political and social policy.

*Chapter 5* extends the notion of progress first mentioned in the review of Gramsci in chapter 2. The theme here is that the idea of progress is associated with the advancement of knowledge by the educators of society. Knowledge cannot be transmitted in schools and educational institutions without giving rise to conflicting values culturally, religiously and politically. The aim here is not only to show how teachers are constantly pulled from one side to another between what are known to be central values and those which conflict with their own, but also to practically demonstrate by analogy how difficult it is to inculcate a new cultural ethos which might be contemplated as an alternative development.

*Chapter 6* argues the reasons for advanced society's democratic consensus and how it operates in a climate which is constantly conflictual. This development characterized by pluralism, is discussed within the context of Gramsci's problematic of hegemony.

*Chapter 7* investigates the Gramscian conceptual framework of the state and civil society with the aim of understanding how the present development of political parties opposes the notion of a single party state. Here we will see how difficult it is for the concept of the *integral state* as Gramsci terms it, to form a collective will towards a political union.

*Chapter 8* pursues again the idea of progress previously discussed in chapter 5, to political progress in terms of

institutionalizing processes of conflict by collective mediation and consensus. The notion of progress is also consistent with society's leadership of the moral and intellectual order which appears to the majority as a rational system and a totality of ideas.

*Chapter 9* brings together all the theoretical arguments so that each of the assertions made in my general proposition are linked to form a logical deductive sequence within a functional framework. Each of the assertions made have been the subject of previous discussion in this thesis and therefore their validity has already been established. Also all the general assumptions on which the deductive logic depends are argued here in detail.

Chapter 10 comments generally on the mechanisms through which functions operate in advanced society and concludes with a subjective view of the direction of society's cultural and political development.

### **General proposition-**

My general proposition has been conceived primarily from my study of the writings of Gramsci, and more latterly, Marzio Barbagli,<sup>4</sup> whose work on unemployed graduates in Italy, has given new insights into this subject area. Here I became convinced that the historical and political development of advanced societies, could not be entirely reconciled with many of the ideas currently held as causal to reproducing and sustaining the present capitalist order. For example, it is apparent that advanced societies do enjoy a level of relative political stability which appears as a continuing trend. Why should this be so in the face of a level of freedom which enables oppositional elements to exist and public pressure groups to act ? There is further, a tendency for political thoughts of diverse ideologies "to merge"

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<sup>4</sup> Marzio Barbagli, whose research on unemployed graduates in Italy had had wide acclaim, and was first published under the title of 'Disoccupazione Intellettuale e Sistema Scolastico in Italia'. Società Editrice il Mulino, Bologna.1974. Translated into English under the title of 'Educating for Unemployment' Columbia U.P, N.Y. 1982.



by unproclaimed processes of mediation, all within the dominant ideology of capitalism. This is a significant social and political phenomenon that has not yet emerged as a salient concept requiring an explanation. Certainly it should not be dismissed to the realms of the dominant hegemony as a blanket cover of coercive social and political control, for this phenomenon precedes, and is ultimately subsumed by hegemony as an integral part of the political system.<sup>5</sup> Further, when the above is related to two paradoxical social developments, the expansion of education generally giving the masses a wider conception of the world, higher cognitive development and conceptions of freedom, and secondly, the persistence of relative inequalities of social and economic conditions of life, then what explanation can be offered? We are faced therefore with a social and political development that has produced the conditions for the emergence of various levels of critical thought, and therefore recognition of oppressive elements, and yet the result is relative political stability. What are the mechanisms<sup>6</sup> that sustain such a relationship? These questions are not those usually directed at the problem of reproduction, but nevertheless require a response that must ultimately satisfy the existence of these social phenomena.

From the above observations, I have formulated the following general proposition :-

Some mechanisms of reproduction in advanced capitalist societies, are revealed by the relationship between the following elements :-

The extent to which the presence of geographical regional inequalities of social and economic conditions, will produce a demand for education thereby creating the means and direction through which the unequal distribution of human and material resources are actively maintained. Further the subsequent development of cognitive

<sup>5</sup> The concept to which I refer is one that will be developed fully in this study and is the subject of Chapter 6.

<sup>6</sup> Mechanisms, as defined by R. K. Merton are 'any element brought into existence as necessary for the change, attachment or maintenance of a system's preferred state'. R. K. Merton. *On Theoretical Sociology. Five Essays*, The Free Press, New York. 1967. p 106.

dispositions and diffusion of the educated<sup>7</sup> and through them the inculcation of the moral and intellectual direction<sup>8</sup> of society, will continually produce new conceptions of freedom which necessarily require the institutionalisation<sup>9</sup> of political pluralism with its consensus and constraints to maintain stability; all collectively contributing to the notion of capitalist progress.

The essence of my general proposition is that the inescapable presence of inequalities, which are not all due to ideological constructions, is the motivation for purposive goals by human beings which continually reproduces differences in knowledge and skills. Education is the means by which knowledge is acquired and on which society depends for its cultural development and hegemony. But there is a further element which I have mentioned but that has not been given adequate attention in the past. This concerns the reasons why normative values are predominantly embraced and consensus prevails when there are relatively free choices that can be made and pluralism exists in both civil and political institutions. This aspect of my proposition confronts society's relative stability with the paradox of inequality. In the past this is where most theoretical discourse plunges into the deterministic nature of ideological transmissions of the dominant culture, the past debates of the hidden curriculum, Apple (1979), Lawton (1979), were both protagonists of this view. These views to some extent still cherished and of course not without some truth. But it is my argument that advanced society's stability is not the result of an uncritical acceptance of ideological transmissions, nor is there any evidence to suggest that, as recently argued by Giroux, a new

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<sup>7</sup> *Diffusion of the educated* is linked to the theoretical concept of Antonio Gramsci of the 'Diffusion of intellectuals', discussed in chapter 2.

<sup>8</sup> *Moral and intellectual direction* is again a theoretical concept of Gramsci. Its meaning here is the dominant hegemony of society inculcated through cultural inculcation by those educated.

<sup>9</sup> The institutionalisation of political pluralism, is my reference to 'Modern Transformismo' which is particularly the subject of Chapter 6, and relates to the form of accommodation of ideological differences in advanced society, which produces paradoxically political stability through the active contribution of all the participants.

pedagogy could radically change this direction. The core of this thesis resides in the notion that mechanisms which operate function in advanced society are largely derived from the progressive development choice.

### **The case for understanding mechanisms of reproduction.**

Firstly, the present state of our understanding of reproduction theory, could be greatly enhanced by formulating theories that are more relevant to practice. This is not an argument for empiricism as will be evident throughout this thesis, but a reference to trends towards conflating society's social and political conflicts to ideological issues without examining alternative solutions at other levels of sociological thought. It should however be interpreted as a call for establishing more explanatory connections between the present radical theories, and the lack of experiential significance, historical or immediate.

Secondly, to show that considerations other than economic, play an equally important role, is of course not new. Earlier marxist sociology of education as expounded by Hogan (1979), King (1980) and Dale (1982), produced arguments that were economic bound. Today, as already stated, the theories of relative autonomy and resistance, are just such a development that enables marxists to distance themselves from solely economic criteria. But in this study the task is neither to distance itself nor embrace economic criteria. Indeed, the notion of inequalities, is inextricably bound with the economic realm, but also other considerations as already stated are equally important. It is primarily because of these other influences producing functions and consequences that make the need to clarify our understanding of this subject important, and not be bound by the particularistic nature of economic discourse for which we have now become so familiar.

## **The case for a comparative study.**

The development of advanced capitalism is not confined to a single society, it is the result of global activity which has involved the political, economic and social development of large areas of the world. The history of human and material exploitation benefiting the industrially advanced countries, is an integral part of modern capitalism's evolution and present activity. The assumption I draw from this is that similar characteristics are inherent in all advanced countries because of this experience, making mechanisms when exposed, broadly recognisable. The validity of this assumption I believe can be tested in a comparative study of at least two advanced societies.<sup>10</sup>

The case for selecting Italy, I think has particular significance. Firstly its political development historically, is quite different from that of the U.K., being in political terms, a young nation. Secondly Italy has not enjoyed a stable government (as opposed to a relatively stable political system) since the early post war years of the De Gasperi<sup>11</sup> administration, which is in marked contrast to the British case. Thirdly while regionalism has been and still remains more pronounced in Italy than in the U.K., I make the assumption that the interrelationships of all the elements within the system operate in the same way. However differences must be present and influenced by one or other of the elements concerned. For instance education reflects more deep seated characteristics in society which may be less evident in a relatively more homogeneous distribution such as the U.K. The research of Barbagli<sup>12</sup> is particularly useful in making such comparisons. We are aware for example from his work, that economically and socially disadvantaged regions have produced

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<sup>10</sup> Common characteristics of capitalist development are not intended to convey the idea of convergence theory. However, this point is discussed in the next Chapter 4 and Appendix 1, at the back of this thesis.

<sup>11</sup> Alcide De Gasperi, Italian leader of the Christian Democratic Party (DC).

<sup>12</sup> Barbagli. Op. cit.

proportionally higher rates of enrolment in education after the obligatory age limit, than more advantaged regions. Further, although not apparent in Barbagli's research, which extended only until 1967, is that a major policy change in Italy in 1963, giving access to further education, produced increases that demonstrated a relationship between advantaged and disadvantaged regions. In this study, by extending the period of investigation until 1983, I am able to interpret the course of this relationship which is essentially to maintain a constant socio-economic gap between advantaged and disadvantaged regions despite the equally constant increase in educational expansion.<sup>13</sup> The regional differences in the U.K. are presumed to be subject to the same phenomenon but to a lesser degree. Fourthly the educational system in Italy has been noted for its ambivalence. It has considered both, the lack of and increase in educational opportunities as desirable for control. This ambivalence has made access passage to further education<sup>14</sup> more observable in their consequences. The educational system prior to 1963, quite specifically limited educational choices making, at the lower secondary level, a type of functional fit which could be applied to the economy. A similar relationship might be argued existed also in the U.K. in the early post war years, and the application of the now less popular *Human Capital Theory* may also have had some credence when applied to the economy. However I think it would be misleading to take this analogy too far. The old style *Tri-Fortite* system, even with its in-built limitations for further advancement, did offer some potential for mobility.

All these differences, the historical political development, the level of political stability, regionalism and different educational policy, make the two cases appropriate for a comparative study.

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<sup>13</sup> Results taken from my own data at the back of this thesis.

<sup>14</sup> Further education in Italy starts at the 'Lower Secondary School' or so called 'Middle Schools', which have been greatly reformed since 1962, requiring a state examination to qualify to enter the Upper Secondary Schools at a minimum age of 14 years.

## **Review of reproduction theories**

It is, I believe, true to say that the theories of reproduction which emerged in the seventies, i.e, theories of social reproduction essentially bound by economic criteria, and those theories that have a cultural basis for their production, have not evolved in their theoretical development primarily because they are seen to be deterministic. The emphases given by more recent contributors to this subject, Willis (1977), Anyon (1981), Apple (1982) and Giroux (1983), in formulating new theories of resistance, appear to justify this point. The problem that is inherent in the new direction of theories seeking the political transformation of society, is that either it lacks an adequate body of theory to explain the ethnographical data claimed to be observed, or that the theory itself is flawed by the inability to demonstrate practice. In other words, the current trend of resistance theories have yet to prove their case , and on present evidence I believe a different approach is necessary, as this study will show.

For the three positions, social cultural and resistance theories, reviewing them serves two purposes. Firstly to locate their defects and secondly, to reveal more clearly where this study is located in this subject area.

The protagonists whom I believe are representative of these major positions, are Althusser (1969,1971)<sup>15</sup>, whose structuralist perspective together with Bowles and Gintis (1976),<sup>16</sup> and their 'economic functionalism', might both be considered as primarily viewing the material influences determining social outcomes. On the other hand, Basil Bernstein and Pierre Bourdieu, view the reproductive process as one that is culturally oriented. To these theorists should now be added Henri Giroux, as representing the new trend of resistance theories. I shall conclude this Chapter

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<sup>15</sup> L. Althusser. *For Marx*. London: Allen Lane. The Penguin Press. 1969. L. Althusser. "Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses" *Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays*. London. New Left Books. 1971.

<sup>16</sup> S. Bowles and H. Gintis. *Schooling in Capitalist America*. New York. Basic Books. 1976.

by commenting generally on these three positions.

### **Social reproduction.**

**Althusser.** I would think it justified to say that Althusser's contribution to reproduction theory has been very significant. He attempted and succeeded, in part, in showing that the Apparatus of the state need not be directly dependent on the economic realm in capitalism, but that institutions of the state might be considered as being 'relatively autonomous' and therefore the needs of the economy would be subject to mediation indirectly. His task of rescuing marxism from economic reductionism, might be seen as the forerunner to viewing the capitalist social and economic structure as being the product of a much broader spectrum of advanced society's characteristics. In this respect, Althusser views ideology as the purveyor of reproduction. But for Althusser, his conception of ideology is not that of Marx who conceives it as that which fails to correspond to the real world. Rather he argues that,

'ideology interpellates individuals as subjects'<sup>17</sup>.

Not unlike Marx, Althusser sees the state as an 'apparatus of repression' and labels it accordingly, *Repressive State Apparatus (RSA)*. Then he makes a distinction between the *RSA* and some private institutions, which he calls, *Ideological State Institutions (ISA)*, which are also part of the state although private. This distinction is somewhat confusing as the difference between private and public is unaffected by his conception of ideology. Seemingly, as the *RSA* contains only public institutions of a repressive nature ie, the military, police, prisons ect. and the private institutions of the church, education, the family , as described by Althusser, then the 'relative autonomy' he claims exists with the private institutions, would lessen the determinism which might otherwise be attached. This structure is unfortunately destroyed by Althusser's insistence that the

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<sup>17</sup> L. Althusser. Op. cit. p.134.

distinction between 'public and private' is not important as the private institutions 'can perfectly well "function" as ISA'.<sup>18</sup>

Althusser's mechanisms of reproduction, are claimed to be in the *ISA*, and in particular, the schools. The skills for jobs, the rules for behaviour for the existing social relations, are all means for the subjection of labour power to the dominant order. However, Althusser leaves little if any room for counter oppositional thought or action in describing what is learnt at schools. He states:

besides these techniques and knowledge, and in learning them, children at school also learn the 'rules' of good behaviour, i.e. the attitude that should be observed by every agent in the division of labour, according to the job he is 'destined' for: rules of morality, civic and professional conscience, which actually means rules of respect for the socio-technical division of labour and ultimately the rules of the order established by class domination.<sup>19</sup>

In order to understand why individual consciousness appears to be completely absent in Althusser's portrayal of the role of the schools, one must turn to his view of ideology which occupies the central position of his thesis.

Althusser's general theory of ideology claims to have no history and no false consciousness. It further claims to reflect, not his real existence, but is representative of the individuals 'lived relation' to their condition of existence, this lived relation being an imaginary one. The point that is important to this study is in what way can we interpret mechanisms that maintain the continuity of advanced capitalism, and more specifically, what does ideology mean to Althusser? On the latter point, ideology is for Althusser, the subject and object of all knowledge. He states:

there is no ideology except for concrete subjects, and this destination for ideology is only made possible by the subject.<sup>20</sup>

The epistemological problem of the subject being also the object of knowledge, the subject being the only source of sense

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<sup>18</sup> L. Althusser. Op. cit. p 138.

<sup>19</sup> L. Althusser. Op.cit. p.127.

<sup>20</sup> L. Althusser Op.cit. p.160.



experience, and as he claims that ideology has no history, then the origin of knowledge becomes unclear and leads us to the philosophical problem of subjective idealism<sup>21</sup>. If we put this polemic aside, the core of Althusser's conception of ideology can be taken from this quotation:

In truth, ideology has very little to do with "consciousness"....It is profoundly unconscious, even when it presents itself in a reflected form. Ideology is indeed a system of representations, but in the majority of cases these representations have nothing to do with "consciousness".<sup>22</sup>

Here it is difficult to see how representations, especially if unfavourable, are not able to produce a consciousness of their presence. Does not ideology in the 'Althusserian' sense become devoid of development, a static conception in which the individual plays a passive role? When we consider the problem of transition, the concept of 'structural causality', what Althusser calls the relation between a structure and its effects, the dismissal of the marxist 'base' metaphor, and so diminishing the importance of the predominance of the economic realm, still leaves a theory of transition incoherent.

In conclusion, it appears that the mechanism of ideology as theorised by Althusser, inhibits, not only the idea of transition, but also the development of society itself.

### **Bowles and Gintis.**

Again like Althusser, the school for Bowles and Gintis has the central role in producing labour power and reproducing the forms of consciousness and dispositions that ultimately are necessary to the interests of capitalism. On the other hand unlike Althusser, ideology is not seen as the mode of domination, the latter emanating from the 'congruence' of the school and the needs of society. This is summed up in the following statement:

the economic system will be embraced when, first the perceived needs of individuals are congruent with the types of satisfaction the economic

<sup>21</sup> Bishop George Berkeley. Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710).

<sup>22</sup> L. Althusser. 'For Marx' New York, Vintage Books. 1969.

system can objectively provide<sup>23</sup>.

These needs are purported to be those that social class groups require to perform economic functions in a capitalist society. For example, working class pupils are expected to be docile and obtain low grade skills and menial jobs and submit to authority. Pupils that fall into middle class groups are also expected to obey orders but a higher degree of skills, linguistic and otherwise, is expected of them. Upper class pupils must be intellectually competent and know how to manipulate the rules. While no one would dispute that elements of truth undoubtedly exists in this perspective, the simplicity of its construction contributing to a theory of reproduction of a whole society is surely inadequate. As with Althusser, the most glaring absence is a consciousness of the circumstances surrounding every day life.

A major theme that characterises the work of Bowles and Gintis, is to see the hierarchical division of labour required by the capitalist economy, as related to unequal education. Although Bowles and Gintis note that state socialist countries also have a 'hierarchy of production',<sup>24</sup> they unfortunately do not expand on this observation. However, even without explaining what differentiates the two political systems in this regard, they still argue the case that educational inequalities are likely to persist as long as capitalism survives. Bowles (1971)<sup>25</sup> states:

Thus unequal education has its roots in the very class structure which serves to legitimize and reproduce. Inequalities in education are thus seen as part of the web of capitalist society, and likely to persist as long as capitalism survives.

While Bowles produces some data of the inequalities of

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<sup>23</sup> S. Bowles and H. Gintis. *Op.cit.* 1976. p 127

<sup>24</sup> S. Bowles and H. Gintis. "I. Q. in the U.S. Class Structure" *Social Policy* 3. (Nov.Dec 1972). pp 65-96.

<sup>25</sup> Bowles.S. "Unequal Education and the Reproduction of the Social Division of Labour" *Review of Radical Political Economics* 3 (Fall 1971), reprinted in *Power and Ideology in Education*, Edited by Jerome Karabel and A.H.Halsey. New York. Oxford University Press. 1977. p137.

years of schooling in America, based on social class composition, he was surely obliged to reinforce his statement of a similar hierarchical production system in socialist countries, by producing what differences exist in years of schooling between those at different level in the hierarchy. To establish that years of schooling was indeed different between groups in the hierarchy of production of socialism, would of course destroy the cause as the capitalist system, and suggest the possibility that both political systems produced the same phenomenon, albeit differing in its aims. The fact is that Bowles appears to overlook that education in any political system must produce differential skills in accordance with individual capabilities and desires, quite apart from the opportunities of access and discrimination by selection, all contributing to the state of inequality. Therefore, in the reading of Bowles and Gintis's work, it is well to remember that some important aspects are not discussed.

Regarding transformation to socialism, Bowles and Gintis recognise this can only come about through changes in consciousness and the practice in economic life. They say also that the education system can only change as a function of the changes in economic activity. In this respect they argue that 'an equal and liberating educational system can only emerge from a broad based movement dedicated to the transformation of economic life (1976. p 266). Precisely what is meant by *an equal and liberating system* has a number of implications, not least the whole concept of freedom which can not be based on the presupposition of its developing nature and surrounding structures.<sup>26</sup> But the major problem for Bowles and Gintis, lies in their notion of the educational system mirroring the relations of production of the work process of life. Here the description is one that does not demonstrate a developing consciousness of the individuals plight. Consequently the idea of transition cannot have for the majority, an objective presence.

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<sup>26</sup> The concept of freedom is discussed throughout this thesis, but is given particular attention in Chapters 2 and 5.

## **Cultural reproduction.**

### **Pierre Bourdieu.**

Bourdieu's theory of cultural reproduction is to see culture (literature, art, religion, language and all symbolic systems) as structuring the system of social relations by its own functioning. Culture then has the central role in the way society becomes divided, and education, the principal means to achieve the reproduction of class and social differences, through a system of teaching and language, all communicated by the dominant group's *cultural arbitrary*, a system of values and norms perpetuated by being institutionalised in the educational system itself.

Bourdieu sees the form of this culture as 'capital' which ultimately can be quantified for the individual in the cultural market place in much the same way as economic capital. But the culture 'inculcated' in the schools, is of benefit in accordance with the *cultural capital* that different social classes bring to the schools. In other words those with the minimum cultural capital will have an equally minimal chance of acquiring and benefiting from the dominant cultural arbitrary taught. Consequently, the educational system will reproduce a class society through the culture already set, the latter being the source of values and attitudes, and not the schools.

Bourdieu and Passeron (1977),<sup>27</sup> have a structuralist perspective of social reality, which leads them to assert that the appearance of human activity is not reality; there being underlying relationships which are structuring the structure. Their belief is that there is a subtle violence that is effective in imposing meaning so structuring awareness through the culture. Peoples reality is therefore a product of the structure, and the educational system, and what is taught in the schools as part of what is structured, becomes a fundamental part of that product.

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27 P. Bourdieu and J. C. Passeron. *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. Sage Publication Ltd. London. 1977.

Reality then has its source in those who confer cultural legitimacy, the dominant culture. They state:

Legitimation of the established order by the school presupposes social recognition of the legitimacy of the school, a recognition resting in turn on misrecognition of the delegation of authority which establishes that legitimacy .....Thus the educational system objectively tends, by concealing the objective truth of it's functioning, to produce the ideological justification of the order it reproduces by it's functioning.<sup>28</sup>

Once again, as we have seen with Althusser and Bowles and Gintis, the dialectic between consciousness of the individual and the structure of society, is absent. Bourdieu's mystification of the true structure, the cultural arbitrary structuring a superimposed structure on reality, leads to objective relations being given a primacy, and the individual a subordinate role. The question as to why Bourdieu has found it necessary to depict the individual as a product of the structure, rather than the structure structuring consciousness, is not clear. By doing this, Bourdieu has ensured that consciousness of reality remains always a mystification. In so doing there is no 'becoming' for man in the sense that progress, as an ideology, evolves through a consciousness of objective reality, constantly modified by new experiences and practices.<sup>29</sup> The fact that behind the objective reality of society, lie objective truths, does not impede the individual participating in a dynamic interplay with the structure.

We also have no indication of the source of power relations. The dominant culture confers legitimacy on the culture in the schools who then reproduce the 'dominant cultural capital'. It seems that to ask from where is power derived, is also to question why it is not resisted? Carnoy (1982) also states in his critique of Bourdieu:

The implication of the analysis is that the source of power is power itself.<sup>30</sup>

Giroux (1983) points out that Bourdieu and Passeron:

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<sup>28</sup> P. Bourdieu and J. C. Passeron. *Op. Cit.* 1977. p 206.

<sup>29</sup> The concept of progress and its relationship with objectivity, is discussed in Chapter 2.

<sup>30</sup> M. Carnoy. *Education, economy and the state.* in *Cultural and Economic Reproduction in Education.* Edited by M. Apple. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. 1982. p 105.

appear to have forgotten that domination has to be grounded in something other than ideology, that it also has material conditions. This is no small matter, because it points to a major gap in Bourdieu's (1977) reasoning regarding working class failure. That is, the internalization of dominant ideology is not the only force that motivates the working class student or secures his or her failure. The behaviour, failures, and choices of these students are also grounded in material conditions.<sup>31</sup>

Bourdieu and Passeron are not alone in this respect, for the location of power does not reveal itself so readily. Culture, as important as it is, ultimately is an integral part of a whole system and its reproduction is equally a result of collective phenomena that have historically developed as a system<sup>32</sup>

### **Basil Bernstein.**

Bernstein's thesis is primarily concerned with communication and its consequences through language emphasising the effects of socialisation and education. Bernstein's studies, concerning childrens form of speech, is traced, through the effects generated between different social classes, until the child enters school where the different linguistic forms adopted by the working and middle classes, reveal particular advantages for the middle classes whose form of linguistic expression conform to that adopted by the schools. This leads Bernstein to regard education as a fundamental reproducing and producing agency.

In embracing linguistic expressions and socialisation, the differences between working and middle class children become the fundamental basis on which the division of labour is structured. Bernstein states,

The broad answer given by this thesis is that class relations, generate,

<sup>31</sup> H. Giroux. Op. Cit. p 95. It should be mentioned that in Giroux's own thesis of radical pedagogy, the source of domination in material conditions, would be hard to find.

<sup>32</sup> I am referring here to the rationality of the capitalist system which distances the idea of a specific material location of the source of power. It is evident from my general proposition that advanced capitalism is based on a differential society from which it derives its internal logic. The Weberian undertones of this form of rationality, is discussed in chapter 3.

distribute, reproduce and legitimate, distinctive forms of communication, which transmit dominating and dominated codes: and that subjects are differentially positioned by these codes in the process of their acquisition.<sup>33</sup>

Specific codes form the bed-rock on which social classes show a distinctiveness by the use of either *restricted* or *elaborated* codes. The differentiated use of vocabulary and grammatical system are said to arise from social structure and forms of early socialization where *restricted* codes are associated with the working classes and *elaborated* codes with the middle classes. As these codes have their origin in social classes, there is also a subsequent differential access to meaning in schools, where education in general favours the use of elaborated codes, and therefore the middle classes. Bernstein states,

we see education as a fundamental reproducing and producing agency, crucial to, but not in close correspondence relation with, the class regulation of the mode of production, and crucial to the class regulation of modes of social control.<sup>34</sup>

Although Bernstein sees education as socially creating, maintaining and reproducing skills and dispositions;

which have an approximate relevance to the mode of production.<sup>35</sup>

He does not see schools as producing a *correspondence* between values and those dispositions of the work place. In other words the *Relative Autonomy* of schools, implies that education is not directly related to working structures.

In terms of cultural reproduction, Bernstein's approach to language and distinctive class codes tells us very little as to what mechanisms are operating, merely that there are distinctive differences. I make two approaches to how relevant such distinctions are to sustaining advanced society. The first is Bernstein's own comment. He says,

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<sup>33</sup> B. Bernstein. Codes modalities and the process of cultural reproduction: a model, in Cultural and Economic Reproduction In Education, Edited by M.W.Apple. Routledge Education Books. p. 304-355. 1982.

<sup>34</sup> B. Bernstein. Op.cit. p. 312. 1982.

<sup>35</sup> B. Bernstein. Class, Codes and Control. Vol. 3. Towards a Theory of Educational Transmission. 2nd Edition. Routledge & Kegan Paul. London, Boston and Henley. 1977. p.185.

Class acts fundamentally on the division of labour by structuring its moral basis; that is, by creating the underlying relationships of production, distribution and consumption.<sup>36</sup>

This is clear enough, Bernstein himself believes that it fulfils the criteria for continuity. My second approach is to question whether Bernstein is correct? In this respect the answer is probably yes. The criteria I believe against which this should be judged, is whether codes and modalities and what they represent in terms of cultural background, is restricting their advancement of knowledge. If restrictive language inhibits firstly opportunities for the acquisition of knowledge and secondly, the subsequent development of cognitive processes to assimilate and differentiate new knowledge, then individual values and the basis on which to make moral choices, is also restricted.

### **Resistance theory.**

#### **Henri Giroux (1983).**

Henri Giroux believes he has located the failure of other reproduction theorists; whose formulations have led to pessimistic perceptions of how power and control function, i.e, in the interests of the dominant order. Giroux's main object is to develop a radical theory of education that can dismiss earlier determinism and replace it *by engaging those aspects of daily life in which capitalist ideology is indifferent*.<sup>37</sup> Here he sees the possibility of developing a theory of radical pedagogy that incorporates the promise of substituting 'the contradictions and tensions in class room experiences', by a counter ideology. Giroux's theory of resistance is a normative one, i.e, that which could be reality is concealed by conditions that are within man's scope to uncover. The means by which Giroux foresees the possible transition of society, is to be found in the nexus of human behaviour and ideology. Here is where Giroux has been greatly influenced by Gramsci in seeing ideology centred in

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<sup>36</sup> B. Bernstein. Op cit. p 23.

<sup>37</sup> H. Giroux. Op. cit. p 76.



aspects of human behaviour, what he calls 'structured needs', the unconscious, common sense and critical consciousness. These three categories are the theoretical concepts by which, he claims, we can recognise (a) how past traditions have been assimilated (unconscious needs), and (b) the mode of thinking in an uncritical fashion (common sense needs), and the reflective realm of consciousness that is to be interpreted as grounding knowledge and formed to shape specific interests at a moment in time (critical consciousness). By seeing ideology even in the unconscious, Giroux is able to distance himself from marxist theory in one important aspect, that is, that ideology is not confined only to consciousness and domination, but needs also. Ideology thus becomes in Giroux's interpretation, the focal point for meaning rather than the acquisition of power and control. This conception of ideology, linking the human to the material world by the construction of meaning, is to see ideology as the 'source and effect of social and institutional practices'. This conception prepares the terrain for a new oppositional ideology, one that can be articulated and lay bare what Giroux describes as *the historically and socially sedimented values at work in the construction of knowledge, social relations and material practices*. It is intended to produce rather than reproduce culture, a view expounded by Paulo Freire (1970)<sup>38</sup> in his radical theory of literacy. Here the notion of literacy is that culture contains, as Giroux explains it:

not only a moment of domination, but also the possibility for the oppressed to produce, re-invent and create the ideological and material tools they need to break through the myths and structures that prevent them from transforming an oppressive social reality.<sup>39</sup>

In this view, the ideology, born of critical literacy, goes beyond the idea that culture is neutral. In fact it becomes equally politicised as traditional forms of culture. Its aim being to

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<sup>38</sup> Freire, P. 'Cultural Action for Freedom. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Educational Review Monograph (1) 1970.

<sup>39</sup> H. Giroux. Op. cit. p 226.

analyse the relationships in society and change it by a pedagogy that gives critical reflection and would lead to social action.

The treatment of culture in dialectical terms, as a mode of imposing a wider conception of the world surrounding human agency, compared to viewing only domination, must be considered a legitimate theoretical undertaking. The flaw lies in overlooking a dialectical development of culture with other social forces that have simultaneously produced a level of critical consciousness and material development, that does not necessarily view oppression in terms that are obviously assumed. There are two comments here. The first, Freire, Giroux and others, pursue the notion, and correctly so, that the development of critical consciousness is the vertex by which the individual is able to reason with himself and his surroundings. The construction of meaning in a new radical ideology, one that produces resistance to the dominant ideology, is claimed to be the path by which this phenomenon can be achieved. Such a development is contrary to present evidence which suggests that the expansion of education generally in advanced societies, is over time, a deconstructing<sup>40</sup> process, thereby developing critical thought. How else are we to assume that such a phenomenon could take place? <sup>41</sup> Secondly, it is implicit in Giroux's thesis that despite the fact that there is no empirical evidence to support a trend for radical social change, future history can be pre-determined.<sup>42</sup> This assumption, to the extent that not only the nature of man but

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<sup>40</sup> By the word 'deconstruction' which I have employed elsewhere in this study, I refer to the breakdown of accepted ideas so revealing an alternative or modified meaning. 'Deconstruction', which is not listed in the English dictionary, is cited by P. Wexler, in Structure, text and Subject, in 'Cultural And Economic Reproduction In Education, Edited by M. W. Apple, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1982. p.279.

<sup>41</sup> Critical thinking is discussed in chapters 2 and 6.

<sup>42</sup> I consider that the premise on which the philosophy of praxis contributes to understanding the past and the extent to which we can intervene to make new history, is based on circumstances that have been demonstrated by either an historical process or that the conditions and circumstances prevailing give grounds for theorising new practises. This theme is pursued throughout this study.

also his structures are pre-emptive, is in my view a major theoretical flaw which I shall pursue in my "General Comments" later.

### **General comments.**

Nobody would argue that investigating and explicating the mechanisms of advanced capitalism from the relationships that exist among knowledge , culture , ideology, social and economic criteria on the one hand, and the human characteristics that are alerted to motivate action and develop consciousness of the individual's surroundings and conditions, is other than the most complex of subjects. In this study, in attempting to find some of the mechanisms that sustain these relationships, the guiding principle has been to seek the practice of the two cases in order to establish the theoretical structure that can explain the historical events over the past 40 years.

The lack of empirical data, to which I include historical explanations, has to some extent even enriched the theories of reproduction, of which the leading exponents have been reviewed here. This of course has both advantages and disadvantages, in that one must not make assumptions about those aspects of theory that have now become fashionable to portray as factual, but still remain unsupported by practice or reasoned argument.

My comment generally on the theories reviewed are that in the end, no one characteristic of advanced capitalism so far submitted as explaining the reproductive processes, can fit the practice and development over time, which can be observed. As must be the case in research, it is the questions that the researcher asks that are of fundamental importance, and in this case I have already pointed the way by asking why modern society is characterised by a relative level of stability when a plurality of institutions exist among which, political oppositional forces operate and education is expanding, giving ever wider conceptions of the world and of freedom ? Indeed Giroux cites

Madeleine MacDonald (1977)<sup>43</sup> as posing a similar question, but does not pursue its implications further. In my view, if there is a singular concept that would re-shape the thinking of this field of study, it will be linking the theory that explains this modern phenomenon. It might well be that the recent emergence and popularity of Gramsci's theories, in which he has already identified this area, although hitherto it has remained inexplicably undeveloped, will become theoretically more fertile, and to which this study will attempt to make a small contribution.

The concept of resistance, as the most recent theoretical development in this field, merits particular attention. Giroux articulates the location of resistance in modern capitalism by the following:

Human agency and structures come together most visibly at the point where oppositional practices and meanings contribute to the very nature of the hegemonic process. Such resistance not only reveals the active side of hegemony, it also provides the basis for a radical pedagogy that would make it the object of critical deciphering and analysis. What this suggests is that beneath even forms of resistance there are underlying commonalities forged in the logic of domination.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Madeleine MacDonald. *The Curriculum and Cultural Reproduction*. Milton Keynes, Open University Press. 1977. The quotation cited by Giroux from this writer was: ".....understanding of how stability occurs despite conflicts, how order is maintained over and above the face of change. Any system of reproduction in so far as it operates within a cultural hegemony must be struggled for, won and maintained in the context of opposition. The nature of the victory is uncertain unless we can define the source and the force of the opposition."

<sup>44</sup> H. Giroux. *Op.cit.* p 165. Note here that Giroux has, in my opinion, correctly located an historical development of advanced capitalism, but fails to develop it's full implication. The first three lines quoted above, indicate clearly that the very participation of oppositional forces contribute to sustaining the dominant hegemony. The idea however, that such a paradoxical development also provides the basis for a radical pedagogy, is, as I will show in this thesis, difficult to sustain. Such an idea can be seen in the construction of Gramsci's theory of radical political change, where the terrain of 'classical *Trasformismo*' is exploited to the advantage of those intent on transforming the political system. My arguments in Chapter 6, in developing what I have called 'Modern *Trasformismo*', incorporate precisely this 'participation' of oppositional forces, but my conclusions are that it does not lead to change of the political system.

While there is much here that I believe is coherent theoretically, the basis for a radical pedagogy is unsupported by practice. But even on the theoretical level, Giroux's teleological assertion that transition can be served by a radical pedagogy, cannot be sustained. Specifically here the question to be asked is, on what basis can it be asserted that a changed pedagogy will be causal to its intended purpose, and thereafter to serve that purpose. Resistance is already the result of society's development, to which the present pedagogical system has inevitably contributed. But even Resistance, understood as a collective force antagonistic to the capitalist order, is subsumed in its function by the Political opposition, the latter concept to be understood as embracing all political forces opposing the executive of the day, and some also the political system. As such, participants of Resistance actually contribute to the reinforcement of capitalism. This is not an inversion of the logic of resistance, but part of the rationality of capitalism which sustains itself by propagating pluralism<sup>45</sup>. There is no empirical evidence to suggest that advanced capitalism functionally depends on the docility of its work-force and therefore continuity emanates by replicating, in education, the needs of the economy and its relations. Or that the *ISAs 'interpellates'* or invokes individuals in a manner which apparently denies the possibility that counter ideological constructions could be interpreted. The relative and semi-Autonomy of institutions, as suggested by Althusser Bourdieu/Passeron and even Bernstein, while accounting for a practical tolerance of institutional movement, really serves no useful purpose towards explaining the reproductive processes.

Finally, to close this rather lengthy introduction, I shall confine my comments to Resistance theory and transformation which, apart from being the most recent theoretical development on this subject, has some parallels with Gramsci's own thinking over 55 years ago.

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<sup>45</sup> The development of political pluralism is discussed in chapter 6.

All theories of transformation appear, as presently articulated, to have one major theoretical problem which is essentially caused by the agency/structure distinction. As history does not demonstrate that the development of advanced capitalism is producing a trend towards radical political change, then on what premise can a theory be formulated? the implicit argument in radical theory, is to assume that *men make their own history*,<sup>46</sup> to vulgarise Marx's much quoted dictum. The error perpetuated by this line of thought, is due more to political optimism one suspects, than to intentional mis-reading of Marx, although I find Willis deliberately guilty,<sup>47</sup> a point which J. C. Walker aptly criticises<sup>48</sup>.

The foresight of Gramsci in perceiving the model of base/superstructure relations as too constraining to incorporate

<sup>46</sup> K. Marx. The full quotation taken from the "Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Selected works (London, Lawrence & Wishart.1972) - "Men make their history, but they do not make it just as they please, they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.

<sup>47</sup> P. E. Willis, in 'Cultural production is different from cultural reproduction is different from social reproduction is different from reproduction', in Interchange, 12. (2-3), pp 48-68; is objecting to Louis Althusser's structuralism, the mechanistic nature of structures which are uncontested and the outcome of social processes. Here he refers to Marx's dictum to enlist the influence of agency on history: "Certainly Althusser directs us towards the important balance of the famous formulation, 'but they do not make it (history) just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past". But where is the main clause of the argument? Where is "Men make their own history"? The omission is to take ashes not fire from history (1981 p 52).

<sup>48</sup> J. C. Walker's comments are worth quoting in full.

"...human beings do make circumstances in the present, as they did in the past and will in the future; they do not make all the relevant circumstances, of course, but those beyond their control are neither coextensive with those inherited from the past nor with 'social structures'; nor are the 'structures' coextensive with circumstances transmitted from the past. Marx has confused the limits of human choice with the (indeterminate) line between past and present; so has Willis, who has also confused the distinction between agency and structure with the past/present distinction." British Journal of Sociology of Education. Vol.7. No. 1.1986. p 62.

the experiences of the human subject, is really the point where we can glimpse the theoretical path that Raymond Williams (1963)<sup>49</sup> tried to develop his culturalist perspective. Here the whole notion of classes and economic relations, are viewed in terms of human relationships. This perspective, which places consciousness and experience as the primary determinants in shaping history, is probably more meritorious in its extreme, than the structuralist accounts which dominated the seventies, retaining that the force of material practices and the social relationships produced, had primacy. This latter perspective denies human experience and consciousness any control or participation in the process of history, as demonstrated by Althusser's theory, other than as an effect of structures.

To ascertain the mechanisms that are effective in sustaining the continuity of advanced capitalism, necessitates establishing factual evidence or reasoned arguments, the latter having epistemological value. The closeness of this study to the works of reproduction theorists, obviously lies in seeing the weaknesses in the mechanisms that are held to support capitalism. By the same token, weaknesses in existing theories can equally be observed. In this respect, one of the most contentious theoretical flaws lies in the final optimistic leap to establish a theory of transition.

I will briefly return to J. C. Walker's quotation in note 48 above. The logic of theorists who pursue this perspective of making new history, as do Giroux, Freire, Willis and also Gramsci, is that causality will precede the effect, that is, in the case of Giroux, a radical pedagogy will precede a radical political change, the conditions for that change being sufficient and made possible by earlier events. To some limited extent future history no doubt may evolve in this way. But it must also follow that the events now evolving also had sufficient conditions in the past for the present events to have effect.<sup>50</sup> The question is, where are those

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<sup>49</sup> R. Williams. *Culture and Society*. London Penguin. 1963.

<sup>50</sup> A. J. Ayer. *The Problem of Knowledge*. Penguin Books. Middx. England. 1980. pp

conditions that are sufficient and produced by earlier events ? for without them we are in the world of speculation.

It appears to me that Gramsci, and Giroux in particular, accept the inseparable nature of agency and structure, and yet equally appear unable to accept that by the type of intervention they both theorise, they have superceded the constraints of a philosophy on which their theories are founded, the philosophy of praxis, not only by the experiences and consciousness of human agencies, but also by the material practices that will form the structures. By avoiding the indeterminate nature and consequences of human interaction, and the type of structures that would evolve, a theory of transition can be postulated at the cost of a realistic relationship with the practical world.

There is one final observation of Gramsci's theory of change that appears incompatible with the social trend of advanced society. I will argue in this study that advanced society has already entered a phase of revolutionary change in terms of,

(a) 'the re-structuring of the concept of hegemony, linking values rather than a class characteristic (see Chapter 7), and

(b) the distribution of knowledge. (see chapter 5).

The latter of course is a matter of degree and interpretation of the way that knowledge is measured and distributed, and also the level of receptiveness and development of man's consciousness today, compared with the period of the nineteen twenties and thirties. I am referring in particular to the *Gramscian* dialectic of intellectuals and the masses as the bases of a new fundamental class, and from which a counter-hegemony can be founded. If this aspect of Gramsci's theory is undermined, the idea of social and political transformation becomes unsustainable.



## Chapter 2.

### ANTONIO GRAMSCI (1891-1937)

#### Introduction

The works of Antonio Gramsci have found in recent years a considerable amount of popularity among sociologists and educationalists, primarily one suspects, because of the unique approach that Gramsci advocates for social change within the existing political system of advanced capitalism.

I have, where possible, indicated in the footnotes, the page references from both the *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* translated by Quintin Hoare (1971), and the version by Valentino Gerratana, *Quaderni del Carcere* (1977).

For the purpose of this study, it would be particularly relevant to give an outline of Gramsci's conceptual framework of hegemony and the role of intellectuals in his theory of transition to socialism, and importantly, his philosophical position. In fact it is the latter which might be considered the most contentious part of Gramsci's whole thesis, and where moral choices do not necessarily coincide with what he seems to regard as unchanging human needs. Much of what is described in the following, is discussed in detail throughout this study.

In presenting an overview of Gramsci's ideas, one is reminded that his wide-spread appeal, especially to non-marxist tradition, might well have emerged from the flexible, and often erroneous interpretation that his writing offers. Gramsci does not present a specific model of advanced society to which one can easily refer. Indeed much of his writings, in the form of articles and notes, present a disjointed, complex and often changing use of concepts, which are confusing to those unfamiliar with his work. To assist the reader here I have made

reference to schemas of my interpretation of Gramsci's ideas wherever they appear useful in this study, and also in the following discussion.

At the heart of Gramsci's theory of transition to socialism, is the recognition that capitalism has produced a political development which accommodates a constant process of parliamentary mediation<sup>1</sup> as well as a coercive political structure. The form of political hegemony which Gramsci associates with parliamentarians, and the moral and intellectual leadership which dominates, lead Gramsci to theorise a conceptual framework of the state and civil society that integrates both, so forming a cultural and political entity. From this Gramsci theorises that the masses will develop a collective 'will' directed to making transformation a practical possibility. The strategy he conceives for achieving this, is by intervening in the capitalist process passively rather than by the use of force. Essentially, this will be done through the cultural education of the masses by the intellectuals, who will be recruited from the working classes.

Such an idea necessarily requires an explanation of those concepts that Gramsci regards as important, and what are their intended relationship. For example, among the concepts which constitute the Gramscian notion of hegemony, those I shall discuss here are,

(a) The *integral state*, where the economic, social, cultural, intellectual and political realms become one, and the coercive elements associated with the capitalist state, will eventually be eliminated.

(b) The concept of *organic* and *traditional* intellectuals, where the former are from the working classes and are conceived as the spear-head for a 'new order'.

(c) The concept of the *war of position*<sup>2</sup>, where a correct moment

<sup>1</sup> Although in Italy, the parliamentary mediatory process, is depicted by Gramsci as containing the corrupting practices of 'classico trasformismo', it does not diminish the fact that radicals and radical initiatives, can be absorbed by such a process.

<sup>2</sup> The concept of the 'war of position', which is quoted many times by Gramsci in his works, is a

for political intervention is identified.

(d) Gramsci's conception of philosophy as absolute historicism.

Particularly Important is the recognition of the correct political *moment*<sup>3</sup> to intervene, rather than undermining existing institutions by force. By analysing the events of history, particularly the Italian Risorgimento, Gramsci is able to theorise the construction of a counter-hegemony to transform the present social and political order. He conceded that it could not follow the course that history reveals gave growth to the development of capitalism, but required instead a new culture, a new approach to change the popular mentality.

Such a thesis required on Gramsci's part, a complete re-thinking of the marxist approach to the state which was based on an economic distinction between the *base and superstructure*. The fruit of this new approach, was the concept of the *Integral state* (see chapter 7), where both the concept of *hegemony*, the cultural development of civil society, and the *state*, the political institutions, become one, leading to a

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revolutionary strategic term, developed for gaining governmental power. Gramsci has created some confusion with this concept by using it to describe the form of political struggles and also for military analogies. A specific definition from Gramsci is hard to find, but can be interpreted as follows:- The war of position aims to combine all forces, civil, political and military, in such a manner, as to gain hegemonic leadership before governmental power is achieved. The 'war of position' is often associated by Gramsci with the 'passive revolution' of the Risorgimento and indeed Fascism, the former based on the ideological assimilation of important individuals and groups from the opposition 'Action Party', and the latter where the creation of expectation and hope in the masses, served the ideological content. There is also a further concept, the 'war of movement', which Gramsci associates equally as a revolutionary concept, but inadequate in modern western societies with developed institutions of state and civil society. The 'war of movement', which is applied by Gramsci to the Russian Revolution of 1917, exemplifies this concept by the strategy adopted, a sustained attack on the city of St. Petersburg to acquire the fall of the Russian state. In other words, the undeveloped nature of civil institutions and lack of education of the masses, did not necessitate the hegemonic conquest of its people. (Of the many references relating to the 'war of position' and 'war of movement', one of the most informative can be found in Gramsci. Op. cit. pp. 1228-29 (PN.119-120).

- 3 The 'moment' to intervene in the political process entails on Gramsci's part a study of the French revolution and the Italian risorgimento, and the forces in history which were mounted as opportunities for change.

fundamental modification of the relationship of the state to the economic base. What Gramsci considered was the coercive nature of the political institutions of the state, now becomes an integral part of the development of cultural hegemony. It is on this theoretical foundation that he constructs the basis of radical intervention.

In my view, an explanation of the concept of hegemony as a point of entry into Gramsci's theory of social and political change, is probably the most useful, although its presence is evident throughout this overview.

As I stated, the disjointed nature of Gramsci's writings does leave open different interpretations and of course debate. But whatever interpretation is placed, in this case, on the concept of hegemony, it is still necessary to understand why he put so much importance on its development and what he thought could be realistically achieved towards the transformation of society.

### **Hegemony in Gramsci.**

Hegemony in Gramsci, is a concept which makes claims about a coherent outlook of the world, where consensus and conformity, form part of a complexity of concepts, all interlinking to produce a global outlook. But such an outlook, in this case directed towards a socialist society, requires in the first place a philosophical standpoint, a philosophy from which moral choices can be made and actions taken that have the broad consent of the majority. To achieve such a hegemony requires firstly to change the culture of civil society so that the masses are inculcated with the appropriate values, and secondly to devise a strategy for subjugating the existing hegemony by one that is more dominant, a counter-hegemony.

For Gramsci, the idea of a counter-hegemony derives from his analysis and understanding of the process and development of the present intellectual order, and the functions they perform in a modern society.

He reasoned that, to transform society, the key must be to change the existing *intellectual and moral*<sup>4</sup> order. In other words, to change the present 'coherent outlook' which forms the dominant view of society. But, as Gramsci argues, the problem is that the moral and intellectual leadership which currently dominates all society, is the historical product of a pedagogical system, into which the intellectuals have, by their superior conception of the world, inculcated the masses through their various levels of cultural contact. Added to this is the formal educational process, with its traditional curricular content, from which man regulates his existence to the norms of 'civil society', that is, to the legal processes which produce conformity, and to cultural institutions whose aims are consistent with the moral and intellectual order. In other words, if, in the course of pedagogical training, the consciousness of individuals reflects what has been traditionally taught by the existing social order (the moral and intellectual direction), then the process of formal education, must provide the means by which such a 'reality' is transcended.<sup>5</sup> But the problem of a new pedagogy that could inculcate the 'true' social reality, is, as Gramsci recognised, not so simple to reform. He stated,

The struggle against the old school was right, but reforming it was not so easy as it appeared, it was not a matter of a model curriculum, but of men, and not of men who immediately become teachers, but of all the social complexity of which men are an expression.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> A hegemony which is able to absorb and lead other subordinate hegemonic blocs by its superior 'intellectual and moral conceptions of the world', may be said to be dominant.

<sup>5</sup> The distinction here of what is traditionally taught by the existing social order, and education as a formal process, is firstly the teaching of the 'popular mentality' of a wider outlook of the world, based on the philosophical development of 'common sense' views. Secondly, it is a process of education that will bring a level of conformism to society. The combination of these two processes, the development of the moral and intellectual direction, the hegemonic order of society, and the means through education of its continual inculcation, leads Gramsci to the view that intellectuals from the working classes, 'organic intellectuals', must necessarily be in the vanguard of any radical change in society.

<sup>6</sup> Antonio Gramsci. *Quaderni del carcere*. Edizione critica dell'Istituto Gramsci. A cura di Valentino Gerratana. Giulio Einaudi editore. 1977. Vol. III. p 1542.

It is by seeing all in society as being participants in changing the moral and intellectual direction, and so making formal education the process for maintaining a new cultural leadership, that now becomes the problem. How is this to be done? This is really Gramsci's central argument, if the masses are to be participants, then those individuals with superior knowledge must lead, teach and subsequently change, the *popular mentality*. This is to be achieved by the development of intellectuals that have their origins in the subordinate classes. However, before passing to the problem of intellectuals, the philosophical foundation for hegemony, is even more important to uncover. Here the questions are, what is the connection between philosophy and politics, and which philosophy should be adopted? It is to this I shall now pass.

### **Philosophy and hegemony.**

As the 'Prison Notebooks' make clear, for Gramsci philosophy was not exclusively for intellectuals, but rather a concrete activity in which all men participate. If we take Gramsci's own problematic of how to gain hegemonic leadership, the issues concerning philosophy and its connection with politics rest with obtaining a world view that is followed and accepted by the masses, including the intellectuals. A dominant group must be able to lead all social classes and intellectual groups, and to do this, it must lead, politically, morally, philosophically and culturally.

It is impossible to do justice to Gramsci's perspective of philosophy and conception of marxism without some lengthy introduction. Indeed Gramsci himself devoted a considerable amount of his writings in the 'Prison Notebooks' to philosophy, including the philosophy of individual philosophers, and to the elaboration of marxist philosophy.

But it is to the Italian philosopher, Antonio Labriola, to whom we should connect, at least in part, Gramsci's development of philosophical

issues. What Gramsci saw in Labriola's writings, was the way to identify philosophy with history, although Labriola's rejection of transcendent metaphysics of the Kantian type does not accord, as we shall see, with Gramsci's later development. There is little doubt however, that Gramsci must have found Labriola's philosophy immediately attractive to his marxism, as indeed others did, because history would account for all man's labour, and the social conditions in which it was produced. Labriola did not see his philosophy as meeting any great design, but rather as a *method of research and conception*,<sup>7</sup> and as such, the given social and economic conditions presented by history were continually subject to change, and therefore to different construction of philosophy itself. That is, historical materialism must also be subject to change, as imposed by history. The constant within historical materialism, that is, the abstract link running through history itself, is the dialectic of theory and practice, i.e, praxis. This is the assurance that events are not arbitrarily produced, but have an historical connection from one epoch to another.

The writings of Benedetto Croce, the Italian idealist philosopher and a close friend of Labriola, also had a great influence on Gramsci's intellectual development. Croce was himself a marxist for a brief period between 1895 to 1900, and indebted for his views to his association with Labriola.<sup>8</sup> He was also a Fascist for an equally short period. In Gramsci's critique of Croce, what appears to be abundantly evident, is his commitment to change by revealing the inability of Croce's idealism to find a way forward for man's progressive development in his activity.

Fundamental to Croce's philosophy based on his critique of Hegel's dialectic, is his 'philosophy of distincts'. The point of Croce's departure from Hegel's dialectic of opposites, is where we can see Gramsci's insight in establishing a connection with Marx. Although Gramsci's

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<sup>7</sup> Antonio Labriola. *La concezione materialistica della storia*. Gius. Laterza e Figli, Bari, 1945, p166.

<sup>8</sup> B. Croce. *My Philosophy*. London. George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1949, p 22.

conception of the philosophy of praxis, and indeed Marx himself, owes much to Hegel, Gramsci apparently felt the necessity to dispense with Croce's idealism, especially as his attitude to marxism at that time, was less than favourable, and in the post war years which he survived, even more so. Also, one can detect that Gramsci identified in Croce's philosophy, characteristics that were in keeping with marxism, for example, Croce dismissal of dogmatism, and insistence that philosophy must change with each change of historical epoch.<sup>9</sup> But Gramsci also found polemical areas of great importance, such as Croce's conception of politics, which was not included as a *distinct*, but as *mere passion*, unlike Gramsci who would regard it as *the centre of human life*.

Firstly, Croce's undoubted esteem for Hegel, whom he regarded as the *last great speculative genius to appear in the history of philosophy, and whose dialectic had been absorbed into the blood of a whole generation*,<sup>10</sup> made it nevertheless necessary to reformulate the dialectic, which he believed to be in error. He stated,

I rebelled because I found it impossible to find any meaning for the dialectical transitions, asserted by this Hegel, from the 'Idea' to Nature and Nature to Spirit or for the return from Spirit to the restoration of the 'Idea'; in fact I found meaningless almost all the triads which at every step he constructed and overcame by sophistic solutions which gave his system a specious plausibility and coherence.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> The idea that as life changes so must also philosophy, cannot be attributed solely to Croce. Thomas Nemeth argues that such a thought was 'very much in the air at the time', as evidenced by the writings of Lukács, Korsch and of course Labriola, as already mentioned.

<sup>10</sup> B. Croce. Op. cit. p 13.

<sup>11</sup> B Croce. Op. cit. p 14. Croce, in referring to the Hegelian dialectic, is arguing for his own dialectic of distincts, which claims there are two ways of knowing, through theoretical activity and practical activity, Each of these two modes is further divided into two so that there are four 'moments' or categories, which Croce terms, truth (philosophy or logic), art (aesthetics), ethics (the good), and utility (sometimes called economic—the useful). It is in these four moments, and the manner of their relationship to one another, that Croce differs from Hegel. According to Croce, for example, the sub division of the theoretical and practical activities, are separated on the bases of whether the object is particular or universal. The practical activity would contain 'particular and individual ends' in what he calls 'utility or economic'. The universal division of practical activity, is the relation between particulars, 'ethics'. The theoretical activity is



The great problem for Gramsci starts here, for in Croce's four distincts, (described in footnote 11), politics can only be a composite entity, or as stated above, *mere passion*, and of no philosophical value. This does touch on one of the two central themes<sup>12</sup> of Gramsci, in this case the formation of the superstructure, because he would regard politics as a human activity, and therefore having a philosophical base. Gramsci's attack on the four distincts, stems essentially from the fact that they operate as absolutes and outside of time. Gramsci sees consequently that the all-important historicism, so fundamental to eliminating any traces of metaphysics and being genuinely an absolute historicism, is missing in Croce. As such Gramsci is unable to understand the historical process in the context of the development of the superstructure.<sup>13</sup>

### **Philosophy of praxis.**

Gramsci saw marxism as a philosophical system which could potentially reflect a new social order. The important difference, he noted, between other philosophical systems, is that while they all sought to educate society, this was marxism's prime activity, and importantly in terms of a new hegemonic order, to educate the masses represented by

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treated in the same way, with art, whose object is particular, and philosophy or logic, whose object is universal. Croce regards each of these moments as 'distinct' from each other, and they represent all reality, there being no other moments (or concepts) to consider. It is from the mode of translation of these moments, that one can grasp Croce's meaning of distincts. Of the four moments, art and economics are fundamental and presupposes the other two. But to have knowledge of the two universals (ethics and logic), is to have knowledge of the particulars (art and economics). Importantly here, practical activity must presuppose theoretical activity. The point here to which Gramsci objects, is that although we can see in Croce, thought precedes action for praxis to occur, as all the four distincts are absolutes, praxis is not related to changes in history.

<sup>12</sup> I would regard the formation of organic intellectuals to be Gramsci's other central theme.

<sup>13</sup> What Gramsci is conceptualizing here that is absent in Croce, is that historicism must be responsible for the development of the superstructure in terms of eliminating the contradictions in society from class differences. This requires that objectivity is formed from the praxis of each epoch, something that Croce's idealism cannot do.

the *popular mentality* in particular. But to grasp Gramsci's conception of philosophy, we should start with understanding the philosophy of praxis.<sup>14</sup>

All too often, one notes that Gramsci's interpretation of marxism, which he considered was a genuine philosophy but in need of further development, is given inadequate attention, by many writers, as to precisely how he constructed his philosophical framework. Such omissions, I believe, are responsible for failing to uncover important defects, which most certainly are present, and have become essential to modify and re-introduce by further action into the very philosophy of praxis.

Fundamental to Gramsci's philosophy of praxis is his absolute historicism, which dismisses absolute truths as a permanent function of a continually constructed reality.<sup>15</sup> In other words, the philosophy of praxis starts with the consciousness that exists, or one might say, the world view which predominates, and proceeds by demonstrating the problems existing, which have been brought from the past, and how the old and new should be analysed.<sup>16</sup> In this way, Gramsci believes he can bring awareness to the masses by making the present at once coherent and also self-reflective. His approach to explaining the philosophy of praxis, starts with demonstrating how everyday 'common sense',<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Writers on Gramsci often refer to the term 'philosophy of praxis' as used by him in substitution for the word 'marxism' to avoid the problem of censorship while he was in prison. My own view is that as the word marxism can be found quoted on a number of occasions in the *Quaderni Del Carcere*, it is more likely that Gramsci only restricted the use of the word so as not to draw too much overt attention.

<sup>15</sup> If one accepts that there are no absolute truths, but only absolute historicism, then the problem of objectivity coming from praxis and leading to further praxis, the basis of all new history, becomes impossible to uphold if it also carries absolute truths as permanent objectives and not subject to mundane time. This leads Gramsci to an external objectivity of a transcendental nature.

<sup>16</sup> Gramsci. *Op cit.* p 1383. (PN. pp 330-1).

<sup>17</sup> Gramsci's use of the term 'common sense' has a somewhat different meaning than is generally understood in the English language. Gramsci regards 'common sense' as a product of history and

which is something existing, and is constituted by opinions, notions and conceptions, which are mostly un-critical, and derived from conceptions that are more coherent<sup>16</sup>. Such forms of conceptions, are for the majority, the basis of knowledge for understanding the world.<sup>19</sup> The problem with 'common sense', Gramsci states, is that it is also part of religion, as well as having a materialist base.<sup>20</sup> 'Common sense' becomes an integral part of metaphysical conceptions of the world. This is a problem which, although Gramsci is dedicated to overcoming it in order to liberate the 'popular mentality' from such infiltration, surely cannot be resolved while adhering to the Hegelian dialectic.<sup>21</sup> Such seemingly contradictory statements do not destroy for Hegel the

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subject always to change and enriching itself. It is, in Gramsci's use, an uncritical conception and subordinate to philosophy. He states, "Philosophy is criticism and the superceding of religion and 'common sense'. Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1378. (PN. p 326).

- <sup>18</sup> It must be remembered that as Gramsci regards the philosophy of praxis as absolute historicism, activity during the temporality of praxis, becomes constituted as objective reality. If such coherence is consequently in continual transformation, so is also the objective truth. The problem here becomes obvious regarding the mundane human needs, which cannot be predicted a priori to the knowledge of future action. As we shall see, Gramsci's absolute historicism is put into jeopardy by attempting to account for a priori knowledge. This is the transcendental path which I shall discuss below. (In anticipation of my discussion overleaf, Gramsci's 'objectivity' is logically linked to his revolutionary praxis, but is in conflict with the absolute historicism of praxis although it is constituted by it).
- <sup>19</sup> One must continually bear in mind that Gramsci's aims to show that fundamental to man's objectivity, which must be based on knowledge, are his needs. What man's needs are, should not be accepted uncritically. This I have discussed in my comments later. By connecting human needs to subjectivities, Gramsci is distancing himself from the solely material concerns of the economic, which marxists pursue as determining the development of the superstructure.
- <sup>20</sup> According to Lucio Colletti, Gramsci, as well as others, have made the wide-spread mistake of "thinking that pre-critical metaphysics is materialism and therefore materialism is of religious origin". *Marxism and Hegel*. Unwin Brothers Limited. 1973, p 38. First Published as Part II of *Il Marxismo e Hegel* By Editori Laterza, Bari, 1969.
- <sup>21</sup> If Gramsci's perspective of the absolute historicism of the philosophy of praxis is maintained, then the Hegelian dialectic of seeing the infinite in the finite and vice versa, and synthesizing the two, resolves in praxis the partial truths of 'common sense' and new ideas, but does not resolve the *a priori* objectivity that has been imposed by Gramsci and remains unchanging.

metaphysical conception of the world. Recognizing this, Gramsci claims that the philosophy of praxis must supersede this; 'common sense' is not an affirmation of truth,<sup>22</sup> and therefore the work of religion must not be permitted to maintain the 'simple' in their naivety. But Gramsci, true to Hegel's dialectic, sees the task of the intellectuals as accepting the 'common sense' of the 'popular mentality', and integrating with it their own intellectual ideas. By taking the given with the new, and synthesizing the two in praxis, Gramsci remains within the framework of the philosophy of praxis to influence change.

Gramsci, like Marx, takes the nexus of human needs and activity, as the basis for man's relationship with the world, his objectivity. Marx states,

Hegel conceives labour as man's act of self creation (though in abstract terms).<sup>23</sup>

Gramsci it appears, wrestled with the problem of how man's needs, though being satisfied through activity, could produce objectivity and new knowledge. By citing something outside of man he is trying to avoid the old problem of anti-explanation in the positivistic sciences, and so introduce new knowledge that gives ontological meaning to objectivity. He states,

Also in science to search for reality outside of men, meaning that in the religious or metaphysical sense, appears nothing other than a paradox. Without man what would reality of the universe mean? All science is tied to needs, to life, to the activity of man. Without the activity of man creating all values, even the scientific ones, what would 'objectivity' be?<sup>24</sup>

Gramsci, in attempting to overcome this problem, is drawn towards a transcendental perspective. Although he recognised the limitations of the positivistic sciences regarding the completeness of man's potential progress, he accepts that subjective creative knowledge, when universalised, becomes objective knowledge and forms a basis for satisfying some human needs.<sup>25</sup> It is precisely from this subjective

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<sup>22</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 225. (PN. p 423).

<sup>23</sup> Marx. 'Marx in his own words' by Ernest Fischer. Penguin Books, 1978, p 31.

<sup>24</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1457.

creation of knowledge that Gramsci seeks the universal in a cultural unity deriving from the development of the superstructure.

How is this to be done? The objective reality of the external world is Gramsci's answer, for man can, by what is *a priori* given, create the conditions for the philosophy of praxis, so that the accumulated praxis, i.e., thought and action which constitutes objectivity, continue to reach higher and higher stages of development until it becomes universalised into *a single unitary cultural system*.<sup>26</sup>

Gramsci does not describe his perspective of objectivity as a transcendental one, but from his rather lengthy discussion of the *objective reality of the external world*, its presence is clear.<sup>27</sup> Bearing in mind again that Gramsci believes that man must actively seek objective knowledge as opposed to the naive realist who is constrained to the everyday view of what is objective: man existing here, as a passive creature, unable to act, only to be acted upon (as in positivism or vulgar marxism). On the other hand, extending the *a priori* given, so that knowledge is stretched to the limits of praxis, is to make man a thinking subject. Unless this is done, there is no dialectic, which is missing in positivism, and man's progress cannot other than be always explained in retrospect.

It is not difficult to see that Gramsci's concern to initiate social and political change must formulate the epistemology of an objectivity that is related to human needs, needs that he believes can become an inter-subjective universal, and so a hegemony of a world view. While it is not difficult to see the connection between a subjective creation in the positivistic sciences, and its ultimate acceptance as a social universal, by the burden of proof of experimentation and objective use, such is not so easy in Gramsci's version of external objectivity. Here the activity related to human needs is understood as being constituted

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<sup>25</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1449. (PN. p 446).

<sup>26</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1415. (PN. p 445).

<sup>27</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. pp 1411-1416. (PN. pp 440-448).

from praxis, the labours of collective action that give concreteness to the real world. To become a universal would depend on the development of 'common sense' as partial truths becoming coherent truths.

### **Intellectuals.**

Gramsci's discussion on the place of intellectuals in society, serves two purposes. Firstly he must show that intellectuals as commonly understood, must be re-defined so that the functions they perform reflect a collective activity that can be directed as the 'will' of a whole society. And secondly, that the growth of a new form of intellectual, must emerge from a culture that would be consistent with the aims of changing society to socialism. One can quickly grasp Gramsci's thinking by knowing that on the first count his re-definition of intellectuals incorporates the notion that all human activity requires a degree of intellectualism to perform a function of work. On the second count, the cultural development of a new form of intellectual rests on a combination of pedagogical training, *unitary* schools, and (importantly) the political party, which initially replaces civil society as the centre of growth and advancement, progress, which the present system restricts by recruiting only to its class position.

Firstly, his argument is to question the myth of the autonomous category of intellectuals as a class, or, as he states,

does every social group have its own particular specialised category of intellectuals ? <sup>28</sup>

Gramsci's response is to compare this unique problem with the capitalist entrepreneur as a leader of industry, who must have the capacity, intellectually, to lead and organise others, and have a wider knowledge than his own particular field. But also to surround himself with various specialists i.e, technicians, economists, administrators etc. in order to create the conditions most favourable to give confidence to his investors, and to the customers for his products. Gramsci's reasoning

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<sup>28</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1513. (PN. p 5).

here is that every new organisation, or social group, must equally have its own specialised functions and specialists, which in the course of its development, is expanded. It does this by creating for itself what he calls *organic intellectuals*.<sup>29</sup> That is, intellectuals whose origins are from that social group, and can lead and organise other specialists. Gramsci's analogy with entrepreneurs is that intellectuals only differ in their functions, and by expanding their specialist requirements, they also expand their social group, and with it, the different levels of intellectuals to perform all the functions necessary. He states,

(Every social group) creates together with itself, organically, one or more rank\* of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only with economic but also in the social and political fields.<sup>30</sup>

Here we note that Gramsci talks of *one or more (rank) of intellectuals*. So intellectuals for him have a particular interpretation, functioning at different levels. The entrepreneur, while he himself must have the administrative and technical capacity to direct others, must also surround himself with other competents that can be termed

29 Gramsci's distinction between 'Organic' and 'Traditional' intellectuals, is based on his account of the different social and professional positions of urban and rural intellectuals. The urban intellectual is essentially a link in the division of labour, being tied to industry and an 'articulator' between the entrepreneur and the masses, lacking the autonomous characteristics to break with the system. The 'rural intellectual is essentially of the 'traditional 'type', and has a closer relationship with the masses (peasantry), and brings them into contact with local and state administration. His position is seen as important because it carries a socio-political role. Families and individuals from the masses, aspiring to emulate the position of any of these traditional intellectuals (priests, lawyers, teachers etc), are seen by Gramsci, as having an ambivalent attitude, contempt on the one hand for their way of life and higher standard of living, and on the other the opportunity to escape from their social position, and see a member of their family elevated to the higher ranks of society, and to acquire the type of connections which are bound to follow.

30 Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1513. (PN. p 5). \* In the English version of the Prison Notebooks, the Italian word 'ceti' is translated as 'strata', also remarking that it does not carry quite the same weight as 'class' but there is a lack of alternatives. I have used the word 'rank' because my interpretation of Gramsci's meaning here is that he is referring to awareness of a social and political functions, rather than a social order which strata infers.

'intellectuals', a classification based on the functions they perform. In order to develop the idea that the intellectual's relationship with the masses is fundamental to the notion of radical social and political change, Gramsci needs to show that the functions performed by intellectuals are different from their roles in society, which is determined by the general social relations which specifically characterizes their position within their field, and not the qualifications of an intellectual kind that each possesses. By making this distinction between the intellectual function and the social relation necessary in any activity, Gramsci is able to pose the question of the difference between intellectuals and non-intellectuals, where the latter, in Gramsci's opinion, do not really exist. His reasoning is that when distinguishing between intellectuals and non-intellectuals, one is

referring in reality only to the immediate social function of the professional category of the intellectuals, that is, one has in mind the direction in which their specific professional activity is weighted, whether towards intellectual elaboration or towards muscular-nervous effort.<sup>31</sup>

Gramsci's point here is that every man in his professional work carries out some level of intellectual activity and this would include even physical work. Further, that outside ones professional participation in physical work, every man, one way or another, participates as a philosopher, an artist or even a politician, thereby contributing to sustaining a conception of the world, or to modifying it. His argument that a man's position in society is not determined by qualifications of an *intellectual nature*, but by the general social relations that characterize that position, is intended to give emphasis to the collective man in that *man the maker and man the thinker*, are not separated.<sup>32</sup> By establishing that every man is involved to some extent in intellectual

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<sup>31</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1516. (PN. p 9).

<sup>32</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1516. (PN. p 9). The underlying theme in Gramsci's thesis, as portrayed here and elsewhere, is the development of the collective man. We have already seen this in the way objectivity is constituted by collective praxis, and here we can see the same theme in that human relations, found in the functions man performs, is directed towards the development of a collective 'will'.



activity, and thereby with his practical work is collectively contributing to changing or modifying his world, there is now the foundation for a new and collective conception of the world. Whereas previously, the traditional types of intellectual with whom we are all familiar, i.e. the journalist, the philosophers, the lawyers, etc, were unthinkingly our conception of this social category, they are now to be confronted in the modern world by a new type of intellectual, the technically educated, who are associated with industrial labour at its lowest level.

Gramsci theorised that the growth of this new type of intellectualism, and its connections to *real forms of life*, as for any small group wishing to become dominant, is to,

assimilate and to conquer ideologically the traditional intellectuals<sup>33</sup>

But such a task would require the growth of its own new found *organic intellectuals*, and at the same time to absorb the traditional intellectuals hegemonically. The problem then does bear the same framework as the example of the industrial organization given above, inasmuch that the ranks or levels of intellectuals through the functions they perform, will develop the notion of collective 'will' through their social relationship.

The problem still remains as to the type of organization it should be. Gramsci's analysis considered the way schools produce intellectuals with their specialized skills, and their relationship with private and state institutions. He reasoned here that as schools were the instrument through which intellectuals were produced, at various levels and specialized subject areas, then the expansion of the intellectual strata, does not take place on what he calls the *terrain of abstract democracy*. On the contrary, the varying distribution of different types of schools, are themselves a determinate of the forms of intellectual specialisation. For example, the southern regions of Italy are noted for producing the professional and state functionaries, while the northern regions produce

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<sup>33</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1517. (FN. p 10).

the industrialists and technical strata. Further, the intellectuals relationship with civil society and the private institutions, as indeed with state institutions, was an indirect one being,

'mediated' by the whole fabric of society and by the complex of superstructures, of which intellectuals are precisely, the "functionaries".<sup>34</sup>

So the specialized form of training in various schools resulted ultimately in an indirect relationship between the state and vast numbers of intellectuals. Such a separation could only maintain civil society subordinate to political society. On the one hand we have the function of hegemony exercised by the dominant group of intellectuals from civil society, and on the other, to what Gramsci refers to as *direct domination*<sup>35</sup> exercised through the state, the law and the government. So the distinction between the organic and traditional intellectuals, in the way society is organised, means that the development of the masses, is predominantly dependent on the movement within its ranks of intellectuals. But the way society is organised is precisely what Gramsci wants to change, and it is the modern political party that he sees as the answer to producing organic intellectuals from the masses. There are two aspects about political parties which he regards as distinctive. Firstly they are, for some social classes, essentially a way of expanding directly their own organic intellectuals in the political and philosophical areas. And secondly, what is common for all social classes, is that political parties are mechanisms performing functions in civil society, just as the the state does in political society, but much less effectively. One of its major functions, is to expand the social class group to which it belongs. This it does by bringing together its own organic intellectuals with traditional intellectuals, if it wishes to

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<sup>34</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1518. (FN. p 12).

<sup>35</sup> That area of society that Gramsci regards as imposing direct domination, is at other times referred to as 'political hegemony'. The two aspects of political hegemony, 'classico trasformismo' and the 'legislature, judiciary and executive', to which civil servants as categories of intellectuals are attached to the state institutions, form a power bloc that is seen by Gramsci as in conflict with the development of cultural hegemony in civil society. The integration of the political with civil society, forms Gramsci's concept of the "integral state".

become a potentially dominant group.<sup>36</sup> As we have seen previously, the growth of organic intellectuals of the subordinate classes within the present order of society is, in Gramsci's view, severely restricted. But as members of a political party, the growth of organic intellectuals, increases, albeit at different intellectual levels, with the directive and organisational functions that are required to be performed.

### **Comments on Gramsci's theories.**

As I have stated at the beginning of this chapter, there are many erroneous as well as different interpretations of Gramsci's writings, and now my own must bear scrutiny. (Nevertheless they are my own views, elsewhere in this study given further attention).

As I have shown, the model that we can mentally construct from Gramsci's writings in the Prison Notebooks, is hegemony understood as the moral and intellectual leadership exercised predominantly from civil society, with the state or political society, as he often called it, being the coercive component and ultimate agent of force. As already evident from my general overview of Gramsci's conceptualization, hegemony, which really incorporates the strategy for political change of the state and civil society, is the foundation for understanding all his other concepts, with the economy, as important as it is, is not as determinant as it was for other marxists.

To my mind, there can be little doubt that the form of parliamentary democracy which Gramsci had associated with the 'Risorgimento', and which he considered still existed at the time of his writings, not only presented a substantial problem for him from the point of view of an adequate strategy, but also for us speculating whether the same problem is relevant today.

In fact the problem can be divided into three parts. Firstly, Gramsci describes the historical development of the dominant hegemony

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<sup>36</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1522. (PN. p 15).

as being the result of an educational relationship which entails a *cultural battle to transform the popular mentality*.<sup>37</sup> This is the cultural development of the masses through a relationship with the intellectuals of society. Secondly, his concern with *classical trasformismo* as a corrupting practice of the movement of individuals or whole groups in parliament, so weakening the intellectual leadership of aspiring political parties, the dominant position and political hegemony. Thirdly also part of political hegemony are the intellectuals who in their professional capacity work for state institutions including the judiciary and the military. The question I pose here is, to what extent should one regard the two forms of development, i.e, of cultural hegemony in civil society and the political hegemony formed from the elite in parliament and functionaries (civil servants) of the state, as resistant to Gramsci's theories of social political change ? This question relates directly to my general proposition and the spread of education in particular. The following comments therefore are intended to reveal my own position.

There is in Gramsci's writings regarding the relationship between intellectuals and the masses, the conviction that the cultural development of the working classes, aided by the pedagogical training of organic intellectuals, and the subsequent system of *unitary schools*, will ensure the ideological direction for a socialist society. My position here is that I am unable to reconcile the dogmatism that Gramsci finds acceptable in his objectivity, while his whole philosophical position is based on the autonomous choices people are potentially capable of making. Gramsci appears to assume that by the form of pedagogical training advocated, and the conformism obtained through the education of specialized schools, that the masses will emerge with the correctly ideological conceptions of socialism through a consensual process indeed, that there will be a collective 'will-formation'. Gramsci has already cogently argued the case for comparing the cultural development

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<sup>37</sup> This is discussed in Chapter 5.

of religion, and the control it maintained over the masses by a hegemony which depended on separating the intellectuals from the 'simple', with that of the cultural development and integration of both groups, through a new relationship. If, through education, we are able to elevate the masses to a superior culture and world view, thus distancing the restricted and inferior world views born of religion, then a new world view, based on a moral philosophy with claims to a higher cultural development, must contend with the moral views and choices of all the recipients of that higher culture. This implies that I do not think the case for a collective 'will' through human needs, has been established adequately by Gramsci. As human needs must change in accordance with the conditions and circumstances revealed by praxis, the basis of a common link which can relate to a collective 'will' cannot be shown to be present. Failure to respond to this development would mean that a dominant hegemony could not be achieved. At the heart of Gramsci's thesis, the only claim that he can make which purports to lead to a socialist society, is that this objective will be continuously constituted from the praxis of life, the thoughts and actions that contribute to the historicism of the philosophy of praxis. On this point I shall comment further below.

My second and third points concerning political hegemony, should be considered together. There can be little doubt that with the large majority of the masses being relatively uneducated at the time of Gramsci's writings, it would be reasonable to assume that the superior cultural and economic status of parliamentary elite, would make political hegemony, and its moral and intellectual leadership, the most dominant. Certainly Gramsci implied as much in his historical analysis of the 'Risorgimento' and the decline of the Action party,

The Moderates\* continued to lead the Action party even after 1870 and 1876, and so-called "trasformismo" was only the parliamentary expression of this action of intellectual, moral and political hegemony.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Gramsci Op. cit. p 41. (PN. p 58). \* Gramsci is referring here to the 'Moderate political party'

But those two aspects of political hegemony in Gramsci must now be considered differently. Firstly the form of parliamentary democracy which exists today, for both cases, cannot determine the moral and intellectual leadership of a whole society from within its own ranks. This is my reason for drawing attention to this aspect of Gramsci's writings, which has not hitherto gathered sufficient interest from other commentators, although Gramsci himself was aware that it had not been *adequately emphasised*.<sup>39</sup> Political hegemony, as was conceived by Gramsci in the form of *classical trasformismo*, which could determine governmental power by shifts in political allegiance by important individuals or groups, can no longer lay claim to a similar influence with respect to the moral and intellectual leadership of an advanced society. Of course, Gramsci was referring essentially to Italian politics, based on its history, but he did not consider it an isolated phenomenon, for both the French, under Napoleon and the English under Cromwell, have demonstrated organic processes from which 'Transformism' is evident, particularly in the aftermath of war when the ruling classes are in disarray.<sup>40</sup> But Gramsci's real interest is centred on the phenomenon of Fascism's rise to power, and the conditions that made this possible. In Gramsci's discussion entitled *The philosophy of the epoch*,<sup>41</sup> he questions the post war (1914-18) disintegration of the hegemonic apparatus of the ruling group in Italy, and why it should occur. He dismisses the idea that the forces opposing capitalism had developed a collective political will, but concludes that disintegration resulted from *purely mechanical causes*. In fact, Gramsci's own assessment, in which

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so called, which was able to extend its own form of moral and intellectual leadership on other subordinate groups, as well as the 'Action party', after the Risorgimento. This was to become known as the 'passive revolution'.

<sup>39</sup> Gramsci. Op.cit. p 1767. (PN. p 109). I have in Chapter 4, discussed the concept of 'classical trasformismo' as described by Gramsci, and shown how it cannot function in advanced society with the same power relations that it once held.

<sup>40</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. PN. p 128 footnote no. 6.

<sup>41</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. PN. pp 228-229.

he gives three reasons, make possible a direct comparison with today's society, and provide in part, the basis of his theoretical formulation for change. His reasons are,

1. because great masses, previously passive, entered into movement-but into a chaotic and disorganized movement, without leadership, i.e. without any precise collective political will;
2. because the middle classes, who during the war held positions of command and responsibility, when peace came were deprived of these and left unemployed-precisely after having learned how to command, etc.;
3. because the antagonistic forces proved to be incapable of organizing this situation of disorder to their own advantage. The problem was to reconstruct a hegemonic apparatus for these formerly passive and apolitical elements.

In today's advanced society, much would depend on whether one would regard the masses as still being *passive* and *apolitical*. In my view it would be difficult to draw such a conclusion. That is not to say that there is a high level of political awareness amongst the general public. But it would be equally difficult to substantiate, relative to Gramsci's historical period, that the moral and intellectual leadership of a whole society, still resides with the parliamentary elite as political hegemony. If it does not, as I believe is the case, then the phenomenon of Fascism's rise to power becomes more understandable in the context of that period, *as a political event only*. Gramsci's own analysis above however, could only lead to the conclusion, and this is evident in item (3), that the opportunity to exploit the cultural realm in civil society was not available to what he called 'antagonistic forces'. This conclusion is reached on the basis of the relative educational development of the mass population for the epoch compared to the present. What Gramsci appeared to be contemplating here was a moment in history as a 'war of position' which really did not exist and could rightly be referred to the second of Marx's two principles.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> These two principles taken from Marx, 'Preface to A Contribution To The Critique of Political Economy' (1859), were quoted by Gramsci while in prison (Gramsci. Op.cit. P 455. FN. p 177). However Marx wrote the following, " No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production

One is reminded here of Gramsci's own quotation that,

A group can and indeed must, already exercise "leadership" before winning governmental power ( this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power).<sup>43</sup>

Leadership here means hegemony over subordinate groups, rather than the masses. It is, as Gramsci sees it, a lesson learnt from the Risorgimento of the supremacy of one political party over another. It appears that Gramsci is trying to exploit the existence of 'classical trasformismo' by dominance over other political groups through an intellectual and moral leadership, rather than the corruptive role hitherto used. But this strategy is, in my view, no longer plausible in the light of educational development in society as a whole. Everything in Gramsci's theory of change suggests that what was good for the Risorgimento must now be reversed. It is in civil society that leadership should first be acquired, subsequently followed by governmental power. This is the detailed subject of chapter 6.

Gramsci's further and understandable concern regarding political hegemony, is with certain categories of intellectuals who are in the service of the state and its bureaucracy, and are closely tied to the *old dominant classes*.<sup>44</sup> This concern can be clearly associated with Gramsci's concept of the *Integral state*,<sup>45</sup> where the present separate realms of cultural and political hegemony will become combined so ultimately eliminating the class divisions of labour, and the consequent cause of contradictions in society. But the latter change is dependent entirely on the introduction and development of scholastic reform (common schools)<sup>46</sup> that will radically change the culture of the

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never appear before the material conditions for their existence have matured in the womb of the old society. Therefore mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can resolve; since, looking at the matter more closely, it will always be found that the task itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation.

<sup>43</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 2010. (PN. p 57).

<sup>44</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1632. (PN. p 186).

<sup>45</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. pp 751-752. (PN. p 245).

<sup>46</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. pp 1533-1538. (PN. pp 29-31).



population, and the formation of a political party which can become hegemonic, so that there will be a synthesis between the cultural and political realms of society. The integration of political society, which is the legislature, judiciary and executive, becomes a problem of the most fundamental kind. My position here is that the idea of a cultural and political hegemony of the state appears as a contradiction to the concept of hegemony itself. It may well be that Gramsci is arguing a qualitative type of consent,<sup>47</sup> but the element of coercion that presently resides in political society, is not part of Gramsci's conception of hegemony, and its removal is not easy to see.

We are now dealing, at least with respect to Gramsci's theory of political change, predominantly with the existing development of a cultural hegemony where its moral and intellectual leadership is located in civil society. Gramsci's concern therefore with political hegemony, although properly considered by him in its historical context, remains in character coercive, although that is not what he intended.

What can we detect as Gramsci's mode of analysing the world, in order to reveal his premises? Gramsci really starts, as indeed all philosophers do, by conceiving the world in a certain way, and it is here that one can take immediate issue with him. For Gramsci, the validation of knowledge claims is ultimately decided on whether knowledge satisfy, or at least be directed towards human needs. The difference between human intention and the final fulfilment of human needs must be related to the contradictions in society itself. But defining human needs, again raises the problem of moral choices. In this respect, Gramsci claims the philosophy of praxis is an expression of historical contradictions, and as such, individuals, or entire social groups, are also elements of those contradictions. My critique of Gramsci's position is that if we accept the apodicticity of contradictions, it does not necessarily follow that human needs<sup>48</sup>, which the very presence of contradictions implies are

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<sup>47</sup> This is a subject on which P. Anderson has argued in the *New Left Review*, entitled, *The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci*, No 100, 1976-77, and to which I have referred in Chapter 6.

not universal, will be satisfied by subsequent practical activity, and comply with the transient conditions of the philosophy of praxis. This has many implications for Gramsci's theory, for there is no reason to assume that the masses will accord with the 'party' in a specific ideological vision merely because a common culture is the predicted route. This makes the implicit assumption that a common culture will produce a singular conception of the world. Indeed we can say that Gramsci's dialectical thinking about the relationship of intellectuals and masses, is not given the same treatment for the equally important relationship between the party and masses.<sup>48</sup> There is also the contradictory aspect of man's changing human nature<sup>50</sup> over time, and what appears to be Gramsci's assumption of unchanging human needs. If man, as the ensemble of his conditions of life, changes between one period of history and another, as Gramsci claims, then how is one to

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<sup>48</sup> As the ideological direction for Gramsci is socialism, the dogmatism, which must also be an inherent part of any ideology, gives a teleological character to Gramsci's transformation of society, and can only mean that he has already defined human needs as a constant. Unless and until those needs can be identified as universal, an inter-subjective consensus, its premisses must be suspect, and strongly solipsistic. It is nevertheless, the foundation on which Gramsci's theory is constructed, and one must assume it is a 'given', an absolute truth. Further, even if such an absolute were accepted, its validity as truth, is then subject to the historicism of the philosophy of praxis, otherwise scepticism would result. Gramsci himself stated, "an externally produced absolute has had practical origins and has represented a" provisional value"..... it is still very difficult to make people grasp "practically" that such an interpretation is valid for the philosophy of praxis itself,...(Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1489. PN p 406). Yet with regard to human needs, Gramsci is silent. Thomas Nemeth, is surprisingly uncritical on this point stating that, "Each philosophical system presents a world view which intends to solve the problem of the day, i.e., intends to meet the needs of society. Whether its intention is fulfilled is another matter. Fulfillment would mean truth. ( Gramsci's Philosophy. A critical study. The Harvester press, 1980, fn. 65. p 96).

<sup>49</sup> T. Nemeth. Op. cit. p 184.

<sup>50</sup> The term 'human nature' is used here as Gramsci describes it, as the ensemble of his conditions of life. If the mode of measurement of man between one period of time to another is, as Gramsci claims, the extent to which man dominates nature and chance, then his needs will change in accordance with domination. (Gramsci . Op cit. p 1337-1338. (PN. p 359-360).

assess his *a priori* needs.

Secondly, we have the glaring problem of how to link the constituted objective reality, which depends on an *a priori*, with the absolute historicism of the philosophy of praxis.

One of the examples Gramsci uses to introduce his 'objectivity' was the subjective discovery in science that could, by development and diffusion of knowledge, reach universal acceptance as a coherent belief.<sup>51</sup> Let us put, for example, Gramsci in the role of the 'scientific experimenter', sowing the subjective element of initial creation by equating human needs with the resolution of internal contradictions in society. Now the objectivity necessary can only be realized, or constituted, by the process of collective activity, that is, through praxis, which one must remember, for Gramsci, is absolute historicism. Thus the concrete link between the externally constituted objectivity and the philosophy of praxis must have a mundane and common time element, so making the constituted objective reality no less part of the same mundane historicism from which praxis is produced. This in my view must jeopardize the absolute character of the historicism of the philosophy of praxis,<sup>52</sup> if human needs are strictly identified with moral precepts and conceptions of freedom, that are then treated as *a priori* truths. This must be concluded from Gramsci's choice of a philosophical position, which is a moral one, based on his desire to change the capitalist system. So in order to sustain his ideas, human needs must also retain characteristics which will fulfill those initial aims. This would mean starting from a position where objectivity had incorporated what Gramsci considered was an absolute. It may very well have been the case, that the truths surrounding human needs had reached the status of 'common sense' values, and therefore entered the philosophy of praxis at that level. But the latter is quite a different argument, for its

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<sup>51</sup> Gramsci. *Op. cit.* p 1415. (PN. p 445).

<sup>52</sup> In a similar discussion, Thomas Nemeth, *op. cit.* p 197-8, also argues that Gramsci has, by introducing a transcendental perspective, endangered the 'absolute historicism' in the philosophy of praxis.

development thereafter would entirely depend on whether future praxis confirmed those needs as universal, and not just restricted to an ideological distribution.

It seems to me that one can only retain the absolute historicism of the philosophy of praxis by accepting historical truths as relative only; anything else would be a return to dogmatism and scepticism. This of course would deny Gramsci the element of revolutionary praxis by importing into his absolute historicism a prior set of beliefs.

Finally, there is the very important development of organic intellectuals from the working classes, so necessary to Gramsci's transition of society. These, together with the political 'party', are to be the means of spear-heading cultural changes in civil society through the reform of the school system and curriculum. As Gramsci has argued, organic intellectuals have for the most part been recruited into the ranks of the middle class, because it offers the only route to social mobility. The retention of organic intellectuals true to their class is in Gramsci's thesis, not ultimately dependent on loyalty, although this is partly the case,<sup>53</sup> but a on cultural assimilation and reform of a whole society. Such a cultural shift is as yet unknown to history; we can only draw from examples where societies have experienced ideological transition, achieved primarily by coercive means, through what Gramsci terms the *war of movement*.<sup>54</sup> To my view, the notion of intellectuals organic to sections of society and pursuing political ideals through interested groups, is on a general level representative of both the left and right of the political spectrum. What I believe is in question in Gramsci however, is the specific nature of its application which does not appear to take into account the liberalizing character of education. For example, Gramsci himself remarked, with reference to the hegemony over the

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<sup>53</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1386 (PN. p 334).

<sup>54</sup> I have regarded the destruction of the 'Aliende' popularly elected communist government of Chile, by General Pinochet, as denying the world the relevant experience on which to make any judgement as to a genuine hegemony.

intellectuals by the Moderate political party of the Risorgimento,

Scholastic activities of a liberal or liberalizing character have great significance for grasping the mechanism of the Moderates' hegemony over the intellectuals. Scholastic activity, at all levels, has an enormous importance (economic as well) for intellectuals of all degrees. And at that same time it had an even greater importance than it does today, given the narrowness of the social structures and the few roads open to the initiative of the petite bourgeoisie. (Today, journalism, the political parties, industry, a very extensive state apparatus, etc., have broadened the possibilities of employment to an unheard of extent).<sup>55</sup>

This liberalizing character for Gramsci is one sided, as indeed it may well have been considering the social development at the time of the Risorgimento. But there is the suspicion that Gramsci does not pursue where the liberalizing effect could lead. For instance, following on in the same text he says that hegemony over the intellectuals, from a 'directive centre', meaning a political party, asserts itself in two ways. (a) By giving them a general conception of life offering 'dignity' and a principle of differentiation from the old ideologies. And (b), by offering an 'original pedagogy' to those interested intellectuals who form an homogeneous group extending from primary teachers to university lecturers. The assertion that the liberalizing nature of education enables past ideologies to be perceived in a different way, and yet at the same time can also offer an 'original pedagogy', omits to explain the full implications of being able to differentiate between past ideologies and what is new. Where is the dialectic between the intellectuals who conceive the world differently to those introducing the new and 'original pedagogy'? What does its synthesis mean?

Gramsci was greatly struck by what he described as a 'gap' between the popular masses and the intellectual groups.<sup>56</sup> Indeed his constant reference to the organization of religion reflects this view. Again one must question to what extent has educational expansion diminished this 'gap' in social relations, given the greater coherence and

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<sup>55</sup> Gramsci Op. cit. pp 2047-2048. (PN. pp 102-103).

<sup>56</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1394. (PN. p 342).

homogeneous conception which Gramsci considered was previously lacking. The development of a coherent conception of the state and world views would of course completely undermine the strategy of organic intellectuals in their task of bringing the masses to a superior culture.

Gramsci's idea of scholastic reform based on *common schools* for the whole population must, one assumes, sustain a period of enduring development in order to become culturally dominant. Even if a whole society were to be reformed by such a system, it must necessarily compete culturally, and maintain during its development, the absolute historicism of the philosophy of praxis. This is the core of the whole problem of theorising change, but retaining ideals and values dictated by choice that time and therefore history cannot control. It is true that ultimately the theoretical and practical consciences are merged in Gramsci's theory, so bringing to an end the philosophy of praxis. But in the meantime, there is the assumption that regardless of future events and circumstances praxis can be constituted objectively. Yet we cannot exclude the cultural assimilations that are imported from all sources, within the schools, private organizations, the media both nationally and internationally, all forming part of our everyday lives, either challenging, reinforcing or modifying our conceptions.

In the end it is hard to imagine that a generalized culture (for that is what common schools are) will produce an ideology consistent with competing conceptions, a world view which is not at all that which Gramsci theorised.

**CHAPTER 3.**  
**Theoretical Perspectives,**  
**Functionalism, social change and presuppositions.**

My aim in this chapter is first to clarify the theoretical perspective of my general proposition and how it relates to other perspectives particularly functionalist theory. Secondly the theoretical position of Antonio Gramsci is also discussed and referred to constantly, both in terms of its usefulness as a competing perspective and as a continuing critique. But my principal aim here is to outline the theoretical logic on which Gramsci proceeds to formulate his strategy of social and political change, so that his theoretical arguments become explicit, and will be further discussed in chapters 6 and 7. Thirdly regarding functionalism, my intention here is to argue the criticisms it has attracted, and why its usefulness as a logical framework to describe thoughts about phenomena, still has a place in social theory in keeping with other perspectives non-empirical and empirical. The argument here is that functional analysis, once its general assumptions have been clearly articulated and not confused with social political commitments, can contribute to explanations of social processes. Fourthly I will argue social change in the context of competing social phenomena where primacy of some events appear to determine the eventual outcome. This discussion relates to both the strategic features of Gramsci's theory of change as well as my own proposition. And lastly, to examine the fundamental elements of action and order that might be considered at the most generalized level of sociological thought, and therefore beyond ideological or methodological arguments.

**Theoretical perspective.**

My general proposition addresses fundamentally significant social characteristics which, I assert; produce distinctive consequences in society. My first aim here is to explain why the propositional

statements conceptualizing the empirical world are separated from other levels of sociological thought, including Gramsci's theoretical position, by analytic distinction only. This is based on the view which I shall pursue throughout this chapter, that all perspectives of sociological thought whether at the level of presuppositions<sup>1</sup>, models, or of empirical form, that is, throughout the whole theory/data range from the non-empirical to the empirical level, contain implicit references that link each to the other. The general assumptions<sup>2</sup> on which my general proposition has been conceptualized, are made in my view without reference to a particular ideological orientation. To expand further on this, my methodological approach is that at other levels of sociological thought, including Gramsci's theoretical position, each must be analysed against what I shall term neutral criteria. That is, the general assumptions made should be by character acceptable to any theoretical level, be it non-empirical or empirical. Such an example for instance is that conflict is mostly argued in ideological terms and not substantively. Unless conflict is isolated concretely as a feature of social behaviour independent of the ideological argument; and therefore capable of being implicitly linked to other perspectives, it must eventually become conflated as part of the theoretical logic, and ultimately refuted. All propositions containing particularistic concepts must for this very reason necessarily include neutral criteria for their

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<sup>1</sup> J. C. Alexander, in his substantial four volume work on theoretical logic, continually refers to "general presuppositions" as the most basic level of sociological thought which must conform to two fundamental criteria, they must be 'truly generalized' principles so broad in scope that they cannot be subsumed by any more empirically- oriented level of the scientific continuum. Also they must be "truly decisive" having significant repercussions at every more specific level of sociological analysis. These presuppositions, which I refer to simply as 'assumptions', have distinctive consequences throughout the whole theory /data range, that is, from the metaphysical to empirical forms of theoretical debates. This latter range stretching from the non-empirical to the empirical, is termed by Alexander as the "scientific continuum" (Reference here is made from *Theoretical Logic in sociology*. Routledge & Kegan Paul. London and Henly. 1982. pp 36-39).

<sup>2</sup> My general assumptions are argued in Chapter 7.



basic assumptions in order that the social phenomena being investigated do not start from a point which merely show a perceptual or explicit difference. Common as such an error has become, it must ultimately fail to be acceptable as a social scientific explanation.

Turning to my proposition, I argue that the relationship between education and society's geographical regional disparities, are in part the result of a philosophical position taken by social groups on the choices they make. Education it is asserted, and its expansion in the post war years at the higher levels, requires a voluntaristic element for its progress. As I shall argue in more detail later in chapter 7, the voluntary character of choices at the assumptional level of sociological thought does not mean that unconstrained freedom exists at the level of empirical commitment.<sup>3</sup> My general proposition further states that the diffusion of the educated and the subsequent cultural development of the masses, have implications relating to its form of progress. This at the empirical level is a reference to an ideological commitment, but on the assumptional level it is first concerned with the form of behaviour produced, the type of order which sustains the form of progress empirically in evidence. In the first place one must attempt to establish the nature of that order and how the voluntaristic element might conflict with the collective approach to social order. Understanding how the prevailing order and ideological commitment of capitalism can be reconciled with assumptions derived from freedom of choice to act and the criteria of discrimination which must be present in all individuals, is what I shall attempt to establish later.

### **Gramsci's theoretical perspective.**

As we have already seen in chapter 2, Gramsci's theoretical perspective of change, is based on a philosophical position and ideologically oriented, which then serves as the basis for a theoretical

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<sup>3</sup> As I argue later in this chapter, individual goals and final consequences produce discrepancies which contribute to the notion of social change. The decision taken by individuals at the philosophical level of choices, are subject to constraints of conditions and circumstances which culminate in a combination of intentional and unintentional consequences.

strategy leading to political action. The argument here is that Gramsci's explicit orientation must be based on general assumptions about the world he is conceptualizing. Those assumptions must also be capable of focusing at any point in the theory/data range, that is, between the various theoretical perspectives ranging from the non-empirical to the empirical. One cannot deny the philosophical choices available and the type of human action which could potentially follow, but unless the theoretical issues of ideology and social conflict (just to name two contentious areas of social life) are excluded from the theoretical logic that can address these sociological problems, explanatory arguments as already mentioned, can always be refuted.

The assumption which can be found in Gramsci and might be considered as on the most general level of analysis, is based on the connection between the *order of ideas and that of action*.<sup>4</sup> The subsequent development of Gramsci's logic from this point which argues that a theoretical position can be used to organise practice and subsequently be shown to be rational and necessary, will almost certainly find disagreement at other theoretical levels. The type of order that Gramsci conceptualizes from this level of logic is collective and moral and derives from his belief in a 'world view', because any conception of the world which has become a philosophy becomes also a cultural movement where order can be visualized in a normative way. Firstly the nature of order in Gramsci's thoughts is based on the cultural development of hegemony from which the philosophical view of the world accedes to a normative order. Secondly the means to achieving this order is through the activity of intellectuals in society as a whole, in the political party and in the system of education. It is a dialectical relationship of action and order which Gramsci brings to many of his concepts.

Clearly Gramsci does make assumptions on which objectivity is

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<sup>4</sup> A. Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1482. (PN. pp 364-365).

based. By taking action and order<sup>5</sup> there is an ontological basis from which a theoretical logic can be formulated. The form of this action and the pattern of the order is again where disagreement will be found.

My view which sees the necessity to have general assumptions analysing social phenomena from any chosen perspective in the theory/data range, and follows closely the arguments of J. C. Alexander<sup>6</sup>. As functionalism is but another level of scientific formulation, its theoretical perspective constructed as a logical framework describing phenomena, must contain the same theoretical assumptions as a basis for its analysis as already argued, even though as social system models, certain comparisons cannot be made.

In now turning to functionalism, the principle of establishing neutral criteria as discussed above, will be seen in the following as a necessary methodological approach which must apply equally to functionalism if it is to contribute usefully to an explanation of social phenomena.

### **Functionalism.**

The desire to provide a comprehensive theory of how society functions, has attracted historians and sociologists in the past and continues to do so. But still we cannot claim to understand the various elements which constitute the theory and practice of human activity linking each epoch of history, and from which some theorists believe they have detected a degree of rational shape and order. Functionalism, or neo-evolutionism, or holistic theory as it is sometimes called, is

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<sup>5</sup> From J. C. Alexander, he states, "Action and Order represent the true presuppositions of sociological debate; they establish a general framework that cannot be subsumed under other kinds of theoretical dispute and, at the same time, they manifest properties that decisively affect sociological thought at every level of the intellectual continuum. *Theoretical Logic in Sociology*. Vol. 1. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1982. p 65. Also Alexander claims that Parsons' 'frame of reference' is a presuppositional formulation in which action and order are fundamental to it". In *Theoretical Logic in Sociology. The Modern Reconstruction of Classical Thought: Talcott Parsons*. Routledge & Kegan Paul. plc. Vol. 4. p 12.

<sup>6</sup> J. C. Alexander. *Op. cit.* p 2.

just such a social theory which has been pervasive and certainly controversial.

In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the various ideas of evolutionism and their laws of different stages of development through which civilization must pass, is where Auguste Comte provided what was then a leading explanation of society's continuity, through a framework which he called social statics and social dynamics<sup>7</sup>. The former was to comprehend the structures of a given society, and the latter to comprehend the outlines of history. Modern functionalist ideas have come mainly from social anthropologists such as Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942) and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955), are generally acknowledged as being the founders of this social theory. However subsequent development of functionalism has been largely an American phenomenon,<sup>8</sup> which sought to combine the classical theories of Durkheim's notion of normative integration of societies, and Weber's action frame of reference.

The basic notion of functionalism is that of a social system in which the constituent parts are interdependent. One suspects that the lack of a precise definition of functionalism reflects the changing pattern of its development from its use in explaining simple societies to the complexities of modern social structures. Talcott Parsons did venture his own definition of systems theory after the publication of *The Structure of Social Action* as,

"a body of logically interdependent generalized concepts of empirical reference" in which "every logical implication of any combination of propositions in the {theoretical} system is explicitly stated in some other proposition in the same system."<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> R. Aron. *Main Currents in Sociological Thoughts I*. Penguin Books. England. 1965. pp 88-92.

<sup>8</sup> This is a reference to Talcott Parsons and R. K. Merton who were the foremost articulators of systems theory.

<sup>9</sup> T. Parsons. *The Present Position and Prospects of Systematic Theory Sociology*, in Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory*. New York. 1954. p 213. Also quoted in J. C. Alexander. *Op. cit.* Vol. 4. p 44.

Such an idea logically suggests that the system must impose a degree of constraint on the whole range of components. What this means is that a change in one component will be followed by a change in another, so that many functions or consequences occur and through their interdependence, a stable form of order prevails. While it may be argued that a systems approach to society must imply a consensus, the two are not necessarily logically present. As I shall discuss below, the teleological problem is one of functionalisms' main criticism, and yet its not as easy as it appears to sustain it logically.

The fact that functionalism as a social theory has proved to be so controversial to contemporary theorists, has brought the need to find generalisations of social life. However it must be said that until recently even this seemingly obvious lack has not been one of its defects. Parsons, who strived for prerequisites relating to every type of social system rather than generalisations that would find agreement with other theoretical perspectives, has (according to Alexander) provided within his theoretical framework the basic assumptions, even though he may not have been entirely conscious of it.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand Merton (1967), did recognise this need through his arguments on 'middle range theories',<sup>11</sup> but failed to achieve them. Today unlike the trend of the seventies, there is a new approach developing towards functionalism as argued by Alexander (1982) and R. Münch (1987)<sup>12</sup>, which might be the basis for rationalising the particularistic arguments which still prevail.

Among the many concerns surrounding the functionalist perspective is the problem which many critics have voiced of a conservative formulation depicting advanced society as supportive of its structures and portraying an unrealistic absence of conflict. There is a

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<sup>10</sup> T. Parsons. *Essays In Sociological theory*. Free press. 1949. p 224. Also J. C. Alexander. *Op. cit.* Vol. 4. p 12.

<sup>11</sup> R. K. Merton. *On Theoretical Sociology. Five Essays, Old And New*. The Free Press, New York. 1967. p 52.

<sup>12</sup> R. Münch. *Parsonian Theory Today : In Search of a New Synthesis*. In *Social Theory Today*. Edited by A. Giddens & J. H. Turner. Polity Press. 1987. p 149.

further and possibly deeper concern which has been argued at length by Alexander which questions, not the usefulness of functionalism as a social theory, but a misperception which is introduced when a systems formulation of society on the level of 'model' is discussed. Such problems which are often not recognised he claims, are that models cannot be identified with,

theoretical decisions about empirical propositions, methodological positions, or ideological values. Nor, most importantly, can the commitment to a systems model be identified with those more generalized definitions of the fundamental elements of action and their interrelation which establish the presuppositions within which every model must be more concretely specified.<sup>13</sup>

This of course relates to what I have already pointed out as the necessary general assumptions which forms the basis for their theoretical logic.

There are two issues regarding functionalism with which I shall concern myself. Firstly to outline the major criticisms that are normally levelled at this theory interspersed with my own comments, and secondly to argue further its methodological position.

### **Criticisms of functionalism.**

Criticisms of functionalism are not hard to find, but for all that there have been genuine attempts to view objectively the characteristics of this social theory of society. P. S. Cohen (1975)<sup>14</sup> lists three categories of criticisms: logical, substantive and ideological. A. D. Smith (1973)<sup>15</sup> on the other hand looks at the criticisms levelled which argue the static nature of functionalism and its inability to cope with social change, the interdependence of its parts, and its neglect of conflict and coercion. Also Alexander (1982)<sup>16</sup> looks essentially at three

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<sup>13</sup> J. C. Alexander. *Op. cit.* p 56

<sup>14</sup> P. S. Cohen. *Modern Social Theory*. Heinemann. London. 1975. pp 47-64.

<sup>15</sup> A. D. Smith. *The concept of social change. A critique of the functionalist theory of social change.* Routledge & Kegan Paul. London and Boston. 1973. pp 2-7.

<sup>16</sup> J. C. Alexander. *Op. cit.* pp 55-63.

issues, social order and how functionalism militates against voluntarism, bias against social change and commitment to a conservative ideological position. Despite the different categories chosen by these writers, the criticisms are broadly the same and overlapping to some extent. I will look particularly at the teleological, ideological and conflict criticisms, because once these have been enunciated, the others are one way or another, implied.

### **Teleological criticism.**

The teleological criticism of functionalism is on the face of it a powerful argument, but extremely difficult to sustain after close scrutiny. As we are dealing with elements which have an interdependent relationship, as functionalism argues, there must necessarily follow an inescapable cyclic development? As with all teleological arguments this problem is so closely linked to social change, which is argued in detail later in this chapter, that it is relevant now to anticipate my eventual thoughts.

There is in my view some confusion between the argument of functionalism's teleological condition and its inability to explain social change which, many claim, it has proved inadequate to do. Certainly social change as Merton argues it has in my view some potential for development, but rather side steps the nub of the teleological problem. The connection here is simply that cyclic phenomena (or feedback as some prefer to call it) cannot maintain such a condition and at the same time explain social change.

Parsons in *The Structure of Social Action* rather fuels the problem by a limited explanation of the atemporal characteristic of system models. The argument is as follows. The temporal nature of any action which underpins the processes involved from a single act and its consequences, is the schema which Parsons draws to encompass a conceptual framework of thoughts about phenomena and not actual empirical data. While empirical data can be shown to be different along

a time scale, a system representing action must inherently incorporate time between a single act and consequence, so that the contemporaneous presence of means/ends becomes inevitable. In Parsonian functionalism there can be no escaping from this temporal process in the *action frame of reference*.<sup>17</sup> Parsons argues that as the features of the action schema *do not constitute "data" of any empirical problem*,<sup>18</sup> time cannot be involved as if it were a physical phenomenon. The implication here is that we are dealing with a characteristic which is intrinsic to functionalist systems. But there is in my view no need to accept this. Take for example two possible approaches to this problem. The first is that the conceptual schema of phenomena assumes that the consequences produced are objective and achieved. The second is that the objective is not achieved or only partly so. In both cases the means/ends incorporates consequences, but their level of achievement can be quite different. We therefore cannot necessarily accept that purposive action and final consequence in an action frame of reference, are direct products of that initial action, for that also assumes there are no other forces involved.<sup>19</sup> What this line of inquiry suggests is that functions between elements can be different, and this leads directly to one of functionalisms' three postulates<sup>20</sup>, *indispensability*,<sup>21</sup> which makes

<sup>17</sup> T. Parsons. Op. cit. 2nd edition. 1966. p 732.

<sup>18</sup> T. Parsons. Op. cit. (as footnote no.17). p 733.

<sup>19</sup> "Other forces" refer specifically to those consequences that are unexplained. Not only, as I do below, argue Merton's 'latent functions' as an explanation of social change, but also Gramsci's 'relations of forces' which offer a similar insight to the possible mechanisms of change.

<sup>20</sup> The other two postulates of functional analysis are, the *Functional Unity of society* as asserted by Radcliffe-Brown which states, "The function of a particular social usage is the contribution it makes to the total social life as a functioning system. Such a view implies that a social system (the total social structure of a society together with the totality of social usages, in which that structure appears and on which it depends for its continued existence) has a certain kind of unity, which we may speak of as a functional unity. We may define it as a condition in which all parts of the social system work together with a sufficient degree of harmony or internal consistency, i.e., without producing persistent conflicts which can neither be resolved nor regulated". A. R. Radcliffe-Brown. On The Concept of Function in Social Science. American Anthropologist. 1935. p



claim to elements constituting a necessary condition for a system to continue. It asserts that (a) certain functions are indispensable for society and individual groups if society is to persist.<sup>22</sup> (b) That certain cultural and social forms are indispensable for fulfilling each of these functions. It specifically claims that institutions, norms and values are indispensable for society's existence. This postulate is far from satisfactory and Merton himself raises doubts about it in his arguments of *functional alternatives*.<sup>23</sup> Clearly functional alternatives cannot live with the idea of indispensability. We have really no justifiable reason why there should be but one function as Malinowski claims (footnote 19). That is, what is necessary for society's existence, institutions, norms, values, action, etc., cannot be replaced. Functional alternatives in complex societies abound, there being no difficulty in finding examples. For instance, the functional requirement of agriculture it could be argued, is to satisfy hunger, but it also includes making employment, the organisation of land by a transportation network of roads and railways. But alternatively those same functions can be fulfilled by other items, for example, the organisation of land can be equally fulfilled by building

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397. The second postulate is *Universal Functionalism* described by Merton as, 'this postulate holds that all standardized social or cultural forms have positive functions. R. K. Merton. Op. cit. p 84. Also but more extremely asserted by Malinowski, "The functional view of culture insists therefore upon the principle that in every type of civilization, every custom, material object, idea and belief fulfills some vital function... B. Malinowski. 'Anthropology' Encyclopaedia Britannica, First Supplementary Volume, (London and New York) 1926. p 132.

21 The postulate of *indispensability* asserts according to Malinowski, "...in every type of civilization, every custom, material object, idea and belief fulfills some vital function, has some task to accomplish, represents an indispensable part within the working whole". B. Malinowski. 'Anthropology' Op. cit. p 132.

22 It should be noted here that the well known ambiguity surrounding this postulate should not be forgotten. That is, whether indispensability refers to the function of the system or to the items to which the system relates.

23 R. K. Merton. Op. cit. p 106. The concept of functional alternatives also known as functional equivalents or substitutes, suggests possible variation in the items which can subserve a functional requirement. This very possibility cast doubt on the postulate of indispensability.

complexes, factory sites and private dwellings, just as the function of employment can find alternative items such as manufacturing, service and retail industries, etc. The teleological argument which relates to the claim of a static system and tries to maintain a preferred state of equilibrium, appears to overlook the fact that the multiplicity of items that can produce one function or alternatively, the many functions that can serve one item, rather undermines the concept of indispensability.

Piotr Sztompka the Polish sociologist<sup>24</sup> concludes from his analysis that the charge of teleological bias is unfounded. His arguments are based on the analysis of four mechanisms which he suggests are the ways functionalists approach this problem. The first is the *evolutionary mechanism* which is most often encountered operating in the history of human society. Here the argument goes that *those societies have persisted in which institutions conducive to persistence developed, while others have perished*.<sup>25</sup> The second is the *rational mechanism* which states *members of a society have a full and adequate knowledge of the social goals as well as the best means to achieve them, and they take this knowledge into account as the basic motivation behind their own actions*, from which the result is a complete integration of individual and social goals. The third *normative mechanism* postulates that *the integration of individual and social goals is brought about by the full internalization by the members of a society of that society's norms and values*. And lastly *structural mechanisms* suggest that *functional requirements of the system and individual goals are considered the result of the direct influence of existing structural arrangements on the motivation of the individual acting within the framework of these arrangements*.<sup>26</sup> None of these

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<sup>24</sup> P. Sztompka in defending functionalism, sought to establish what he claimed is a fundamental affinity between Marxism and functionalism based on a common conceptual model. In *System And Function: Toward a Theory of Society*. Academic Press. New York San Francisco. 1974. pp 169-170.

<sup>25</sup> This mechanism bears resemblance to the postulate of indispensability mentioned above.

<sup>26</sup> P. Sztompka. *Op. cit.* pp 138-152.

mechanisms Sztompka argues, is sufficient to substantiate a teleological bias.

The approach of Merton perhaps offers at least a clearer if not a better response to the teleological problem although he does not claim it as such. He suggest that if an avowed purpose fails to be achieved, then we can say that the motive and the objective function have not coincided.<sup>27</sup> Merton's point here is that the failure to achieve this coincidence will nevertheless produce consequences. Human motives and functional consequences vary independently, so that the behaviour of end-in-view motives and the objective functional consequences of action,<sup>28</sup> will produce

function(s) that are not limited to conscious and explicit purpose.<sup>29</sup>

Such a discrepancy between what society might aim for and what it achieves, becomes the basis of Merton's *manifest* and *latent* functions. He defines the former as functions intended and recognised by the participants, and the latter as functions that are not intended or recognised.<sup>30</sup> Merton's purpose here was to make clear what has already been described above regarding the distinction between motive and function, i.e. that there is a difference between conscious motivation and its objective consequences. Purposeful action on a societal level, viewed as akin to Merton's *manifest* function, cannot be isolated from those unintended *latent* functions for which an explanation is not given. An example is that most social phenomena are the result of unintended consequences, that is, social actions may have themselves been purposive, but their final consequences cannot be attributed as a direct connection. The social conduct which leads to the phenomenon of war might be purposive in terms of the initial conduct, but many of its consequences have no direct connection. What now appears as unconnected from the teleological problem originally discussed, is in

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<sup>27</sup> R. K. Merton. Op. cit. p 118.

<sup>28</sup> R. K. Merton. Op. cit. p 115.

<sup>29</sup> R. K. Merton. Op. cit. p 116.

<sup>30</sup> R. K. Merton. Op. cit. p 105.

fact very much its concern, for the problem is now shown not to be intrinsic to the functions of systemic theory, but essentially a confusion of applying human motives to functional consequences as if they were one and the same element.

Stephen Mennell (1976) argues that Merton's *manifest* and *latent* functions despite their usefulness do not resolve the problem of teleological explanations. He states,

Explaining patterns whose consequences are manifest-even if manifest only to a powerful minority-is no problem. The manifest consequence is also their cause. Unfortunately this does not in the least help to explain why a latent need, recognized by no one, should give rise to any social pattern.<sup>31</sup>

In my view Mennell has missed the point. To make a causal connection is an error. The total cause is precisely what is not explained. The whole conception of manifest-plus-latent functions is precisely that it attempts to explain the mechanisms of social change by showing the difference between intention (motive) and the objective consequences (function). Because such consequences were not intended and not recognised, does not in any way diminish the fact that may give rise or contribute to a social pattern. By showing that the objective consequences (function) are 'changed' by the intervention of the subject (motive), Merton has, whether he consciously intended or not, demonstrated that functions can not be teleological.

### **Ideological Criticism.**

If one is inclined to concede to the arguments that social order is central to the concerns of functionalism, then it is only too easy to conclude that the criticisms of a conservative bias have some substance. Gouldner for instance, regards the character of functionalism as essentially conservative, not because it is pro-capitalist or even could be pro-socialist, but because its disposition is to support whatever powers are established.<sup>32</sup> Merton's defence of functionalism from such criticisms

<sup>31</sup> S. Mennell. *Sociological theory: Uses and Unities*. Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd. 1976. p 157.

<sup>32</sup> A. W. Gouldner. *Op. cit.* p 333.

is that while ideological commitments may be implicit in some works by functional analysts, they are more extraneous rather than intrinsic to functional theory.<sup>33</sup> At the heart of this criticism is again the problem of *indispensability* which has been discussed previously. The notion of *indispensability* arises because arguing the interdependence of parts in society, ensures that regardless of what ideological view is pursued its overriding feature is directed towards a stable order. The idea therefore of a stratified system where social class is a fundamental characteristic of society and its relationship is based on an interdependence of all its parts, gives credence to the criticism that functionalism is a conservative theory.

A stratified society is argued in terms of the division of labour arising from differential skills where the roles of actors and the demands in a complex society, make some functions serve others, but where the rewards are held to be different. It is of course a well worn although powerful argument that such a view leads to the prestige, wealth and privileges of elite families with all the subsequent generational advantages of social mobility. There are also powerful counter arguments to this view. For example, differential skills and roles do not necessarily translate to greater rewards and privileges, such distinctions are not intrinsic to a complex society. The worth of a manual labourer in the tasks he performs could be equally valuable to society as those of an accountant. Also the attentions of a nurse are no less essential to a patient than those of a surgeon. These counter arguments, reasonable as they are, probably err on the side of dismissing rather too glibly human motivations and incentives which are themselves present in the oppositional voice. What these examples show is that, as Merton argues, functions can have a multi-role and do not serve systems deterministically. We should not confuse social political acts with the general assumptions of theoretical logic which make action universal. The actions described above are the result of different ideological views

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<sup>33</sup> R. K. Merton. Op. cit. p 96.

which one may agree or disagree. They are not arguments on the level of theoretical logic which can lay the foundation for scientifically refuting one or the other.

The fact remains that a stratified society requires (as does a society based on attaining greater equality) both motives and functions for its continuation. But the propensity to be ideological requires human motivation, and this varies independently<sup>34</sup> of functions which are always subject to circumstances and conditions. We can therefore argue two things here. Firstly ideology cannot be intrinsic to functionalism as a social theory. Secondly, the charge of a conservative bias requires that the postulate of *indispensability* be sustained. This it cannot do because specific functions and items are not indispensable to each other, there are alternative functions which can serve each item. Once the argument is granted that functions are not slavishly operating serving one item, but indeed can serve many items, then the concept of interdependence of parts begins to fall away as the notion of change is introduced, and with it the charge of a conservative teleology.

### **Conflict criticisms.**

Criticism that conflict is minimized is really generally implied throughout the whole debate of functionalism in the sense that the latter argues a formulation leading to harmony and equilibrium. Gouldner views this aspect of functionalism as the inevitable result of seeking order. To seek order, he says, is to seek a reduction of conflict.<sup>35</sup> Coser, while he concedes that Parsons speaks of conflict, prefers to use words such as 'tensions' and 'strains'.<sup>36</sup> He takes particular issue with Parsons model of a stable society and his view of conflict having a *disruptive, dissociating and dysfunctional consequences*.<sup>37</sup> And Dahrendorf who

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<sup>34</sup> See footnote 26.

<sup>35</sup> A. Gouldner. Op. cit. p 251.

<sup>36</sup> L. A. Coser. The Functions of Social Conflict. Routledge & Kegan Paul. Ltd. London. 1956. p 22.

<sup>37</sup> L. A. Coser. Op. cit. p 21.

contends that class conflict occurs between those possessing authority and those who do not, argues that Parsons displays a particular bias in favour of analysis in terms of values and norms.<sup>38</sup> There can be no doubt that these criticisms can be upheld. However on the theoretical level itself, this can not be justified. It is clear that criticisms of conflict are directed at Parsons' treatment of issues rather than the efficacy or otherwise of functionalism. For example, the criticism of a consensual society is largely a response to the Parsonian interpretation of society which subdues the voluntaristic character of individuals, and unrealistically portrays society as being without alternative functions that would reveal conflict as part of social life. If we consider that the conflict enters contrary claims, then the relationship of means to ends implies that its achievement is not guaranteed. The means are subject always to sufficient conditions and circumstances. Conflicts become in this context, a permanent characteristic of social life. My point here is that there is no justification to portray society without conflict and therefore no necessity for functional theory to omit the alternative routes in which items can be fulfilled.

### **More general comments on functionalism.**

The criticisms of functionalism are many, and while as I have attempted to show not all are justified, they do give to the debate the positive aspect of what should be made explicit and clarified.

My discussion here on the usefulness of functionalism and its criticisms, have clearly overlapped in each section. And yet this is in itself significant in that it demonstrates the arguments are interlinked mainly because the criticisms themselves have a similar relationship. The critics of functional analysis have largely focused on its purported conservative bias, its emphasis on social order at the expense of the voluntaristic element, and the lack of conflict which realistically

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<sup>38</sup> R. Dahrendorf. *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*. Routledge & Kegan Paul. London. 1965. p 160.

represents social life. The common element in each of these debates can be seen as focusing on order. Alexander has argued that many of these criticisms are conflationary and arise from a more generalized theoretical problem, in particular the argument of social order.

In deciding just how useful functionalist theory is, one must first consider on what basis such a decision can be judged. As I have argued here, it is my view that functionalism must formulate its theoretical logic based on assumptions that can be compared with other perspectives. Only on this foundation can contingent empirical propositions be made. Regarding the former, assumptions, this of course applies to all theoretical perspectives and not just to functionalism. But its importance arises here primarily because it has not been fundamental to its critics. This is especially true of the criticisms of social order and an anti-voluntaristic view of society which it is argued, functionalism conveys. The problem stems from the emphasis given to the harmonious nature of social order and the relative absence of a voluntary element within individuals to act freely. But this need not be interpreted as a limitation of this theory, but rather an inadequate conceptualization of order and voluntarism. For example, the arguments as to whether collective order and individual freedom can be integrated, is not one that should be argued in terms of its logic within the functionalist framework, but at the level of general assumptions. One can argue about degree of order or freedom which a functionalist model might allow in terms of their social political function, but you cannot argue about the intrinsic property of the elements that when evaluated are seen to have plausibility and relevance as universal criteria which can serve any sociological level of thought.

There is also the argument which I have not discussed so far but is nevertheless worthy of being mentioned, and that is the philosophical problem of how to conceive society, either starting from the unity of the whole as functionalism does, from order searching to establish the fact,



or from fact to finding an intelligible order. The former we see as the logic of Auguste Comte and the latter as that of Montesquieu and Max Weber. The notion of the entity over the element has probably obscured the voluntary role in favour of social order, to the extent that functionalism, as a means of explaining social phenomena, has not justified its potential.

From the criticisms discussed of functionalism, much of it is aimed at the fact that order remains *a priori* to the individual, i.e., the lack of conflict, the cyclic phenomenon and the conservative bias. This view it seems has clouded what is actually the case. One sees here probably a fundamental error carried over from the past of focusing exclusively on the structure of total systems, rather than including the properties of the elements constituting the system.<sup>39</sup> This however cannot be said to be true of Merton's approach for he did, by including the concepts manifest and latent functions, show that man's intervention by purposive action leaves a discrepancy between intention and final consequence, and this implies something has changed. It also implies that man has participated in history, contributed to social change, and that importantly, final consequences are the result of indeterminate functions.

My conclusions are, that while functionalist theory is still in need of development, much of its criticisms are not intrinsic to functional systemic theory, and that a more rigorous methodological preparation which excludes specifically conflictual and ideological orientations as part of its fundamental logic, will produce a more objective basis for its evaluation.

### **A framework for understanding social change.**

The notion of explaining social change by single concepts which express society as conflictual, adaptive, economic-bound, or otherwise, portray only partial views with each unable to incorporate the totality of

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<sup>39</sup> P. Sztompka. Op. cit. p 12.

practices pursued by society, and therefore incapable of explaining social change. While we cannot as yet be sure how and in what way the interaction of all these conceptual relationships together will operate to produce change, it does seem reasonable to state that these individualistic theories cannot properly address the complexity and diversity of all social phenomena in the course of their interaction.

As already stated in chapter 1, the many assertions made of how society is reproduced, constitute nothing other than a search for social change. This has been mainly debated in ideological terms of conflict, coercion and power, rather than initially as social mechanisms. Only thereafter can one argue in the context of motivated action at the ideological or empirical level.

My aim in this final section is to look closer at how Gramsci conceptualizes social and political change. There are two reasons for this. The first is to show how Gramsci's approach was first and foremost through the participation of human agency. This does not, it appears in Gramsci's view, detract from the marxist's notion of social classes being constituted by the dominant mode of production, but rather that social groups are agents of change and therefore can potentially constitute their economic and political world. Secondly, the notion that human participation contributes significantly to shaping man's world is in my view consistent with the voluntaristic element which is implicit in my proposition. But also importantly, as final consequences can never be predicted at the levels of complexity of societal change, radical theories of transformation such as Gramsci's, need to argue change in such a manner that what are unintentional consequences, will become subordinate components in the complexity of interacting elements. This means that final consequences, which are derived in Gramsci's theoretical framework from activities which have a dominance of organic development and voluntary character, can be theorised as credible. It is this latter point which lacks conviction<sup>40</sup>, and will be

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<sup>40</sup> By not considering the possibility of unintended consequences so giving the dominance of organic

evident in the following.

Although my comments on Gramsci's theory of transformation of society in Chapter 2, reveal considerable difficulties to its realisation, there is little doubt in my mind, that Gramsci's conceptual analyses of historical events, have provided insights which can be fruitfully exploited, particularly for constructing a framework for understanding change which I shall discuss below.

### **Social change.**

If we regard the cultural development of advanced society as being crucial to Gramsci to explain the presence of hegemony and how it can also produce a counter hegemony, it is in terms of understanding social phenomena only a point of entry, even if central to Gramsci's thesis. We should not see its importance, which it undoubtedly has to society and Gramsci, as necessarily determining the outcome in its relationship with other realms of practices. A particular example from Gramsci which is subsumed in the context of cultural development, is his concern with intellectuals. As we have already seen, the transformation of society in Gramsci, is dependent on the development of *organic intellectuals* of the working classes. The whole structure of society is not only needed to produce such intellectuals, but also to maintain and reproduce them.

In dealing here with the implication of Gramsci's theory, the practical problems to consider might be the allocation of resources and funds, the production of materials, books, equipment etc., the provision of schools, building materials, technical and professional services, artisans, etc., and other human resources of teachers and ancillary staff. In addition the largely unintentional occurrence of instrumental events both nationally and internationally, producing influences that might range from strikes and the restriction of necessary goods and services,

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development of elements an unimpeded direction in social change, Gramsci leaves the conditions for the 'war of position' as the only obstacle to transition.

to the evolvment of new ideas and pressure for change. All such concerns only highlight the unintended consequences of so many practices that impinge on the development of *organic intellectuals* in order that their conception should become a reality.<sup>41</sup>

Clearly, there is a multiplicity of unintentional consequences which are responsible for the development of culture and society. These necessarily and reciprocally influence all realms of practices, so that the overriding dominance of one particular realm, which history may show was logically in evidence for a period, must be explained as a relational and not as a singular conceptual cause. It is this relational aspect of social phenomena that is so intriguing in Gramsci's formulation and which must be understood in order to judge its merit for changing society, at the same time its usefulness as a framework for understanding social change generally.

### **Relations of forces.**

The notion of forces acting to produce change, is a methodological approach used by Gramsci to distinguish between periods of historical development of society's structure, political awareness and military capability. These *relations of forces*<sup>42</sup> as he terms them, are crucial

<sup>41</sup> It must always be true that the realisation of theorised events such as 'organic intellectuals' are subject to circumstances and conditions as argued by both Marx and Gramsci. This can imply either that explanations are fortuitous if those very conditions are presented, or partial if they are not, which is most likely the case. This proviso is itself the outcome of changes that are subject to similar conditions which cannot be controlled as if social phenomena had the same properties as the physical sciences. It is not therefore, in my view, appropriate to argue this proviso to substantiate a theory as being otherwise satisfactory. If the reasonable definition of 'conditions and circumstances' is that no other changes should take place than those foreseen in order that the theory is accepted, then the very phenomena we are trying to understand must always elude us and explanations are reduced to an absurdity.

<sup>42</sup> The concept of the relations of force which Gramsci uses as a methodological principle, stems from the notion of finding forces and their relationship which have occurred in a determinate period of history. The question of "what is" and "what ought to be" which intellectuals have pondered throughout time, is one that Gramsci believes, through his understanding of Machiavelli, should not be put in these terms. Machiavelli did not suggest changing reality, but that historical forces could

forces in history, the prime Gramscian example being the political events surrounding the 'Risorgimento'.<sup>43</sup> The methodological use of these events for Gramsci was to show how moments in history could produce a relationship of structural and military *relation of forces* that once recognised as politically forceful enough, could result in radical change. What Gramsci is talking about is nothing less than a framework

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operate more efficiently (Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1578). In the following we can see more clearly Gramsci's thinking on how to interpret forces for change.

The active politician is a creator, an initiator; but he neither creates from nothing nor does he move in the turbid void of his own desires and dreams. He bases himself on effective reality, but what is this effective reality? Is it something static and immobile, or is it not rather a *relation of forces* in continuous motion and shift of equilibrium? If one applies one's will to the creation of a new equilibrium among the forces which really exist and are operative— basing oneself on a particular force which one believes to be progressive and strengthening to help it to victory— one still moves on the terrain of effective reality, but does so in order to dominate and transcend it (or to contribute to this). What "ought to be" is therefore concrete; indeed it is the only realistic and historicist interpretation of reality, it alone is history in the making and philosophy in the making, it alone is politics. (My italics above). Gramsci. Op. cit. p 172.

We can see that Gramsci takes elements of empirical observation and conceptualizes them in the context of 'situations' in order to analyse and establish the various levels on which forces act. This process is also characterised by 'organic and 'conjunctional\* movements', the former described by Gramsci as events occurring which are organic in development and therefore relatively permanent, and the latter as events occurring suddenly and by chance ( the Italian word used 'occasionale' which in this sense might be considered as events occurring that are not predictable). The importance of this concept for Gramsci lies in its observation and analysis, for these events reveal opportunities for political outcomes, if they are recognised and fruitfully exploited. Gramsci. Op.cit. pp.455-459 (PNE p.175-185). \* In the Prison Notebooks, op. cit, the word conjunctional substitutes 'conjunctural' which has been used by the English translator.

<sup>43</sup> Such an example in Gramsci is the 'Risorgimento' where historical events led to the 'Moderate' political party winning hegemony over other social groups. This is the model which Gramsci constructs to show that the dominance of events have their origin in the organicity of social groups, institutions or structures. In this particular case, it is the 'Moderate party's organic development including its cultural assimilation of other groups, which enabled it to win leadership even before hegemony was won. What Gramsci is doing here is taking historical events which have different qualities of development, i.e., conjunctural (unpredictable phenomena) and permanent (organic phenomena), and conceiving their effect on outcomes as forces, and their interaction with each other as "relations of forces".

of social change at the macro level. In the following quotation, Gramsci seeks to clarify what he means by the relation of forces with respect to economic crises and their connection with fundamental events in society,

The particular question of economic hardship or well being as a cause of new historical realities is a partial aspect of the question of the relations of force at the various levels. Changes can come about either because a situation of well being is threatened by the narrow self-interest of a social class, or because hardship has become intolerable and no force is visible in the old society capable of mitigating it and of re-establishing normality by legal means. Hence it may be said that all these elements are the concrete manifestation of the conjunctural\* fluctuations of the totality of social relations of force, on whose terrain the passage takes place from the latter to political relations of force, and finally to the military relation which is decisive..... The decisive element in every situation is the permanently organised and long prepared force which can be put into the field when it is judged that a situation is favourable only in so far as such a force exists, ...<sup>44</sup>

By taking social elements as a bloc so representing at a particular moment in time a *relations of force*, Gramsci is introducing not only a methodology on which he can theorise radical change, but also implicit in this formulation is the notion that there is change at the conjunctural<sup>45</sup> level, which by its very nature cannot be specific in direction. This requires a more permanent 'force' which is a reference to an organic development or a 'long prepared force', which could be a dominant contribution towards the direction of change by the will of man.

If we take this approach of Gramsci's and relate it to detailed practices at the more mundane level of society, we can conceive of a similar framework in which conjunctural and organic phenomena, both having intentional and unintentional consequences, is social change. This notion of change does not specifically single out one particular realm of activity as having dominance in the way events evolve. But for

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<sup>44</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. pp1587-1588. (PN. pp 184-185). \* Reference is made to 'conjunctural' in footnote no. 42.

<sup>45</sup> Connecting events of no historical importance.

Gramsci, the emphasis he puts on the cultural development of society, must lead to the interpretation that culture has primacy over events in the other realms of activity. The basis on which this view is formed, has already been discussed previously in Chapter 2. One must return to Gramsci's explanation of objectivity in order to link his conception of social change to the dominance of specific social phenomena. Prediction for Gramsci is based on the will of man and a 'programme' of action, from which it acquires objectivity. Purely objective prediction has no meaning for Gramsci as we can note in the following,

Anybody who makes a prediction has in fact a "programme" for whose victory he is working, and his prediction is precisely an element contributing to that victory. This does not mean that prediction need always be arbitrary and gratuitous, or simply tendentious. Indeed one might say that only to the extent to which the objective aspect of prediction is linked to a programme does it acquire its objectivity.<sup>46</sup>

Clearly we cannot separate prediction from objectivity in Gramsci, for as long as the 'programme' is objective, then aspects of that programme must be dominant for objective consequences to be achieved. In my earlier comments on Gramsci's thoughts in Chapter 2, I discussed the way objectivity was constituted from theory and practice. This we can relate to the programme referred to above, which becomes a process in which the objective aspect of Gramsci's prediction of social change is a continual refinement to reach the desired consequences.

Such an interpretation in my view cannot be accepted. As indicated in footnote 41, Gramsci does make a distinction between events that have occurred through organic links in the formation of its development, and events occurring that have a spontaneous nature. It seems reasonable then to interpret that primacy is given to events of organic lineage but (and I emphasise this) from which no dominance of outcome can be assigned in terms of a specific consequence. This latter statement does not necessarily accord with Gramsci's view, for he would surely consider that such primacy, being the most influential, will

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<sup>46</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p (FN. p171).

ultimately culminate in the desired consequence through the process of theory and practice. After all, his theory of change is directed towards this end. The intentional and unintentional consequences which lead practices to conjunctures, and can be viewed as historical events, does not reveal an epistemological basis from which the salience of one element or another can be said to determine the eventual outcome. This view would also be rejected by Althusser who has argued that the contradictions of a complex whole *structured in dominance*, cannot be conceived without its contradictions in the constituted existence that make the whole complex. In other words, elemental contradictions are linked to the contradictions that make the complex dominant. If the economic realm is dominant in advanced society 'in the last instance' as Althusser claims, that is, it determines the 'structure in dominance',<sup>47</sup> it is because events are dictated by the dominance of economics. With Althusser, the notion of interdependence leads to determinism, for he cannot conceive, as he states,

The domination of one contradiction over others cannot, in Marxism, be the result of a contingent distribution of different contradictions in a collection that is regarded as an object.<sup>48</sup>

The theme of contradictions to explain social change make all practices supportive of each other, giving us the notion of stability in a complex and contradictory society. To return again to my viewpoint, what Althusser describes is only one strand running through society as an organic development, albeit an important strand which can influence conjunctures in history, but not necessarily to determine its consequences. Indeed the balanced argument here is that for advanced society to reproduce itself, it must also encounter junctures in history in which the situations produced by the totality of practices, both organic and conjunctural, must contend with changes in all realms of activity. Economic contradictions are not static entities immuned from

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<sup>47</sup> L. Althusser. Op. cit. p. 111.

<sup>48</sup> L. Althusser. Op. cit. p. 201.



other influences, least of all from human intervention.

That latter view is one that Gramsci would endorse. Nowhere does Gramsci claim the dominance of the economic realm, rather his whole approach is founded on the choices that are available to the individual. If we depart from the determined structured view of society, and its failure to regard human beings as causal subjects and filling a multiplicity of roles which engage the social world, then we raise the question of how the latter view can support the reproductive processes of social change, from the freedom of choices claimed ?

### **First level assumptions.**

The relevance of first level assumptions has already been discussed in chapter 3, and why they serve as generalizations on which different views of the world can be constructed. In this study, my general proposition makes a number of assertions which indicate the presence of individual motivations and means/end goals, and therefore a type of action is assumed to be implicit. Also other concepts of consensus and constraints and normative behaviour, all imply the notion of order, both at the individual and collective level of society. While I make a number of general assumptions, or what I call second level assumptions relating to all these dimensions of variability at the empirical level, the necessity to establish the existence of the more fundamental characteristics of the type of action and order, is relevant to isolating ideological reasons for the presence of empirical activity and social control. For example, one cannot impute a voluntaristic action which might also have a normative component as simply ideological if this is an irreducible aspect of human action. By looking at my general proposition, the assertion is that education, at the levels concerned, is motivated by the choices available from which follows a certain social development and order that cannot be immediately assumed as ideological.

Presuppositions or first level assumptions , are those that can be considered universal and on which genuinely different views of the world can be based. For example, we can say that Gramsci's historical interpretation of the Risorgimento was the genuine basis for his view of the world and later formulated into a theory of radical change from a foundation of theoretical and philosophical logic or assumptions. His particular historical interpretation immediately gives rise to how objective it was, and whether a revisional reading would so change general views that a different radical approach must be theorised. But whether this is the case or not, the point of reference will be that the assumptions at the fundamental level should remain unaltered and irreducible regardless of the different approaches and development. However, one must be very careful, as J. H. Turner argues ,

..not to suffocate theoretical activity and lose sight of the goal of all theory : to explain how the social universe works.

I am certainly mindful of this criticism in the following.

I shall divide the following discussion into three parts, firstly, an approach to rationality and non-rationality, secondly, an approach to social action, and thirdly, and approach to social order.

### **Rational and non-rational action.**

The central argument is really one which requires an attempt to understand the nature of action. In view of the classical work on this subject by M. Weber, T. Parsons, A. Schutz, and others, one can barely scratch the surface here in spite of its undoubted importance to any postulated theory in acknowledging the problem of action and its concern with norms and motivation. There is no denying that more latterly efforts by J. C. Alexander whose attempt to advance this thorny issue, is a most valuable contribution to sociology as a whole.

The question which might appear fundamental to ask is to what degree is action rational where goals are essentially calculated to achieve the most efficient means to reach ends ? First of all this type

of action, which is instrumentally rational, would regard goals as materially oriented and where norms play no part. Conversely this would also mean the goals which did not fulfil a rational criteria would somehow be discarded. Those theorists from the Frankfurt School Marcuse, Adorno and Horkheimer, saw 'instrumental reason' as capitalism's guiding principle and also as potentially self-undermining. The vision that was portrayed by these writers was of a conflict taking place between technical rationality and latent human needs. While of course on the ideological level one can argue the presence of conflict for many reasons, but to propound such an argument by eliminating completely the subjective reference of any action so that technical rationality singularly prevails, must be a gross distortion of reality. This view is to show society as simply adapting to material conditions and a conception of action where freedom and constraints are replaced by determinism, and simply masks the distinction between human action and social order. However what one can say is that instrumental rationality is singularly irreducible and therefore rightly is an assumption at the most fundamental level of sociological thought. But in practical terms what theory could argue that social action is pursued in such a manner where such efficiency prevails. Even the demands of economics must consider human factors.

Non-rational or non-instrumental action, has not been quite so popular in western thought, most probably because its association is closely allied to abstract and religious orientations, and the nature of social life. In contrast to rational action, non-rational action is not materially oriented or concerned with the most efficient path in achieving goals. Norms are not viewed in conjunction with instrumental and technical efficiency, but contain a distinctive ideal element in which the internal voluntary characteristic of human action is emphasised. This implies that action is realised mostly from a subjective assessment of normative commitments rather than from the external environment. There is of course an equally unreal vision of behaviour in this form of

non-rational activity which can lead to idealism, as there is with purely rational activity. But if one regards both forms of activity as serving each other so that the voluntary versus the determined or the ideal versus the material aspects, then one introduces the ethical qualities of non-rationality into instrumental forms of life. Parsons treatment of the subjective and normative components of social action in systems has been paramount in all his works. He has always presented his case for the primacy of the normative in structuring action. He says that, Institutional patterns are the 'backbone' of the social system.

This of course has been one of the problems with accepting the functionalist approach by many of its critics because of the notion that norms are internalized and conformity is taken for granted. Even with a wide reading of Parsons, it is not easy to conclude whether this form of normative action is ideologically conflated or a truly generalized form which could be regarded as a fundamental assumption.

If the conception of rational action is regarded as normative and internalized and not purely instrumental and conditionally determined, the voluntary element still needs to be explained. What is regarded as normative for one does not automatically follow that it is also for another. To choose to be educated at the higher levels, is a normatively regulated phenomena, but not purely instrumental and determined although some part of the rational action might be categorized as such. But the non-rational aspect of action might also include moral criteria on which judgements were made which had quite different normative standards. It does now seem apparent that neither of these two notions of rationality will suffice on their own to explain the substantive empirical world without seriously conflating ones' argument.

### **Social order.**

Social order can be implied or associated with a number of concepts, i.e., cultural norms, consensus, constraints, stability, harmony,

etc. One way or another every social theory has to explain the nature of the actions of social groups and how that action is interrelated with order. Some assertions I make in my general proposition, include the concepts of consensus and constraints which is describing the properties of social order under the conditions and circumstances which have developed. It also includes the 'institutionalization process' which gives rise to social patterns of interaction. However the presence of these concepts should not immediately indicate that the perspective of society is one based only on a rational normative society that has a conservative bias. It may well be all these things; but it is insufficient reason to conclude the type of order or even the ideological interpretation without recognizing non-rational norms and the voluntary element in human activity which have contributed to the reality described. The point is, can there be a generalized order assumption? Alexander has argued this case against three levels of reduction which he has noted, empirical stability versus change; cultural versus institutional causation; and conservative versus socialist ideology. The point that Alexander makes is that the reduction of order to any particular version noted here, eliminates its usefulness. Therefore to be able to decide the characteristics of social order which can be considered as potentially capable of generalized decisions, one must examine two levels of analysis, the individual and the collective level. However, as order on the individual level only is sterile in the social context, I will consider only the collective context.

Returning to my discussion of action, the rationalist approach eliminates the element of voluntarism which seems unrealistic in terms of human choices and subsequent decisions to act. To retain this element we must appeal to the non-rational and normative components of action. By doing this we are confronted with a conception of order which is both collective and internal to the individual. The question which now arises is how can this be related to external collective order? For example I have already touched on the problems of freedom and constraint as the

characteristics which have emerged as part of the cultural development of advanced society, and it is very much the subject of my later discussion in chapter 6, relating to the concept of Modern Trasformismo and the stability of liberal democracy. Collective order can be conceived, according to Alexander,

Because norms are not material, the same norm can be conceived as interconnecting two or more individuals. Such an interconnection creates collective patterns.<sup>49</sup>

This conception intertwines the characteristics of action with order so that they are inextricably linked.

To ensure that I am not unduly side tracked on this issue, I believe I must appeal to the logic of the premise in my general proposition which is that human beings are motivated to act. The above conception would successfully retain the notion of motivation by the voluntary element in action, and would also satisfy the collectivist position of order that the institutionalization of political behaviour demands, i, e., consensus and constraints. I therefore must reject the alternative instrumentally collectivist position because this cannot accommodate the idea of motivation and consequently does not satisfy all the conditions that can be generalized.

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<sup>49</sup> J. C. Alexander. *Op. cit.* p 104.

## CHAPTER 4.

### GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN ADVANCED SOCIETIES.

#### INTRODUCTION

It is perhaps not unreasonable that sociologists cite regional inequalities of social and economic resources, as a datum in class disparities and educational opportunities. While the evidence for this is substantial, explanations are varied. Certainly regional differences in economic terms have been examined in depth by many writers,<sup>1</sup> but such explanations are far too restricted. My assertion already broadly stated in my general proposition is that inequalities are the result of at least three integrated areas of development, structural, social and political. They are:

(a) The geographical terrain and spatial orientation of resources have largely determined the type of economy that has historically developed.

(b) The extent to which geographic regions differ socially and economically, is dependent on firstly (a) above which will influence all forms of communications, medical and educational facilities and consequently opportunities generally. Secondly, from my general proposition, the nature of advanced society's unequal distribution of human and material resources, is in part the result of rational individual choices. This will include the choice to advance one's own knowledge and skills, given the means

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<sup>1</sup> Stuart Holland. *Capital; versus the Regions*. McMillan Press. 1976.

Gunnar Myrdal. *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions*. Methuen. 1969.

Alfred Weber. *Über den Standort der Industrien 1909*. - Translated under the title 'Theory of the Location of Industries.' University of Chicago Press. 1928.

and opportunity to do so.

(c) The extent to which human and material resources can be exploited, and social and technical services introduced, increased or decreased, so shifting differences in the division of labour and consequent social conditions. This is political in nature and becomes the objectives on which ideological constructions are formed.

Differences between geographical regions are therefore an inherent phenomenon of nature on one side, and the combined result of individual choices and political will on the other, the latter being subject to external influences apart from its ideological requirements.

It is my aim in this first section to establish the nature and development of regional differences so as to show how, in advanced capitalist societies, human motivations and political objectives can become fused to form a rational, social and political system.

Geographical regional differences, immediately give a Weberian form of rationality<sup>2</sup> to what after all is a system based on differentiation. While I do not draw away from this general position, the development of cognitive dispositions referred to in my general proposition, implies levels of critical thinking<sup>3</sup> which do not permit a direct formulation of Weber. Further there is a form of determinism in the idea of a differentiated society that leads radical thinkers to unrealistically theorise its negation. Here a pre-conceived future society appears to suppress the ongoing processes of critical thought and social change which always make even purposeful goals unpredictable. But it is precisely because a differentiated society has produced relative levels of stability, and within that framework the development of critical consciousness for a

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<sup>2</sup> The concept of rationality is the particular subject of discussion in chapter 8, and the definition I wish to convey is stated in footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> My discussion of the relationship between critical thinking and education is argued in chapter 6.



significant proportion of the population, that the need arises to analyse the processes involved. On this point Westergaard notes:

the very persistence of inequalities proves their inevitabilities and moral necessity <sup>4</sup>

It is more the persistence of inequalities that is my concern here inasmuch as it relates to the purposeful actions of human beings in achieving goals, while the *moral necessity* might be argued and justified in the context of the normative values which are associated with rational purposeful action.<sup>5</sup> While Westergaard's perspective of inequalities might be anathema to the marxist view of revolutionary change, it is also incompatible to Marx's own view of regional imbalances<sup>6</sup> in the sense that regional inequality finds some possible causality in other than the intrinsic nature of capitalist economic growth.

But the three principal areas from which inequality emanates and extends to permeate a whole society, are fundamental characteristics of the development of advanced societies. It also raises the question of the extent that any ideology can change society's disparity in any radical way when spatial arrangements and individual choices play a significant part in reinforcing its existence. In other words what can be achieved ideologically must always be separated from factors attributed to the natural environment and assumptions about human behaviour as generalizations.<sup>7</sup>

The French and Russian revolutions are worth reflecting on to establish an historic fact of human behaviour. Both revolutions achieved their objectives by eliminating the dominant ruling class. In so doing the emergent societies were able to draw on the skills and talents of the new ruling classes and ultimately to form its own inevitable elite. The result of this social process

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<sup>4</sup> J. Westergaard and H. Resler. *Class in a Capitalist society*. Heinemann. London. 1975.

<sup>5</sup> Discussed in my presuppositions in chapter 3.

<sup>6</sup> Marx's indirect references to regional problems stem from his concern for large scale production displacing small craft industries and labour. It is the crux of the process of the division of labour and the rural-urban movement of physical resources.

<sup>7</sup> Again this has already been discussed in chapter 3.

is for lesser talents and skills to emerge as subordinate groups. Such a model would apply to any political change we could conceive. The point I wish to emphasise is that the complete transformation of society by these two revolutions changed only the extent of inequality, not the nature of it.

### **The nature of regional disparities.**

Disparities are part of the transitory condition of our natural environment, no one element of time or space can be the same as another.<sup>8</sup> In chapter 3 the notion of social change was introduced as resulting from the interrelationship of elements. Disparities might also be seen as part of the phenomena of social change in which dominant influences continually maintain degrees of differences. But dominant influences cannot be reduced to one specific element, for if this were the case one could predict precisely what social change could produce. Rather the influences contributing to disparity are varied and conflictual and not all reducible to ideological criteria. For instance, political objectives of a national kind will concern military requirements and the use of scarce resources apart from vast sums of money. Security requires different levels of policing facilities in the cities than in the urban and country areas. There is also a disproportionate requirement of social and educational services between more and less densely populated areas of society. All these requirements attract varying levels of human and material resources which simply indicate the logistical differences necessary. The extent that these differences can be decreased or even increased is certainly in part a political decision, but the social characteristic of the phenomena itself cannot be eliminated.

What we have here is a dynamic system comprising disparate needs, a change in one element can influence a change in another, the imbalance arising in this case from specific

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<sup>8</sup> William James. *Principles of Psychology*. chap. XI. 1890

functional requirements. Again my point here relates to inequalities as a generality, its functional needs contribute in part to society's differentiation. We might say therefore that although reducing or increasing inequalities is functional within the limits necessary to ensure society's continual momentum, not all functions are necessarily in the interests of advanced society, a point which has already been mentioned regarding 'dysfunctional' consequences in chapter 3, but also in chapter 8.<sup>9</sup>

### **Ideologically inspired disparities.**

So far I have discussed the nature of regional differences in general terms in covering its major characteristics. But specifically on the ideological level there is the question of the type of support which human beings bring to bear.

It is not difficult to draw a parallel relationship between rich and poor countries of the world, and the advantaged and disadvantaged regions internal to a country. A generalisation is that those countries and regions enjoying relative prosperity, tend to uphold this position. While other countries and regions less fortunate tend to remain poor embracing all the inherent inequalities, but more pronounced. While this appears to be a very obvious fact, the majority acceptance of this order as rational, becomes apparent if one concedes that for the concept of hegemony to have meaning in any social group, there must be present the tacit<sup>10</sup> or active support of that order. For example,

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<sup>9</sup> In chapter 8 footnote 16, I have with reference to one of my general assumptions 'specific functionality' no. 16, drawn attention to Jon Elster's criticism of M. Kalecki's belief that all functions come close to being beneficial to capitalism.

<sup>10</sup> The type of support which may be given to the moral and intellectual direction of a group or of a whole society can in my view be quite varied. For instance, we can categorize some individuals as being completely aware of the form of cultural and political inculcation to which they have been part and also to which they may be radically opposed, while others equally conscious support its moral and intellectual direction. But while knowledge implies having values about life (see chapter 5) as in the latter category, we cannot assume that all have been imbued with the dominant hegemony and are conscious of the moral and intellectual leadership they follow. These I categorize as

politically maintained differences can be put into focus by the rather extreme analysis given by Wallerstein (1974),

Free labour is indeed a defining feature of capitalism, but not free labour throughout the productive enterprises. Free labour is the form of labour control used for skilled work in core countries, whereas coerced labour is used for less skilled work in peripheral areas. The combination thereof is the essence of capitalism.<sup>11</sup>

Wallerstein's point here was to understand the nature of capitalism as a world system. One could not isolate the economy of Western Europe from the whole capitalist system. The developing economics of the Third World, in having capitalism thrust upon them, have evolved from slave labour to a mode of production that is somewhat less than free labour. The 'Tea Plantations' of Shri Lanka have, even in recent times, been subject to the criticisms and scrutiny of the media depicting unacceptable living conditions of its indigenous labour force. The benefit to the more prosperous countries of their relatively low priced products is all too obvious. In other words, 'the essence of capitalism' as Wallerstein describes it, is that we, or no doubt the majority, tacitly accept or unconsciously do so, a disparate level of living and working conditions within capitalism, which obscures the necessity for disparities to persist, even at the regional level within modern societies.

The practical realities of regional differences can very easily be put into focus. In the U.K. 40% of the population live in the cities with nearly 33% of the entire population concentrated in the South East regions, and 14% in the capital itself. Clearly a population distribution of these proportions related to the declining regions with respect to unemployment, migration and lack of investment, must ultimately result in proportional reductions in social, technical and communication services. The perspective that emerges shows that the disparate nature of society is partly structured by the natural phenomenon of unequal distribution of the population and service resources, and also the

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giving 'tacit' support.

11 I. Wallerstein. *The Modern World System*. (N.Y). Academic Press. 1974. p.127.

actions of generalized human behaviour<sup>12</sup> in the choices they make. In addition what is politically imposed through decisions which influence control and the conditions presented, become the ideological objectives. Consequently there is a 'trade off' between the necessity to maintain an adequate level of motivation and the extent of amelioration that can be permitted; without eroding the differences in society which promote purposeful goals. The evidence for this view can be supported by the almost constant disparity gap between advantaged and disadvantaged regions for both cases over time.<sup>13</sup>

### **Italy: regional differences and education.**

The legendary Northern and Southern divide, which characterises Italy's regional differences and commonly referred to as the 'Questione Meridionale'<sup>14</sup> is, relative to the U.K., much more intense, having a significant historical and political dimension. Certainly, the relatively short period of Italy's

<sup>12</sup> My general proposition in chapter 1. refers to motivational requirements by stating the means and direction needed for human action.

<sup>13</sup> The unit of measure for 'Disparity' in this study is the 'occupational socio-economic class difference'. This is discussed in detail in Appendix 4 at the back of this thesis.

<sup>14</sup> 'Questione Meridionale' The Southern Question, is both economic and political. Since the Risorgimento of 1861, the myth that the southern regions hung like a 'Palla di Piombo'\* has characterized the belief by the northern regions that progress would be hard to achieve, the misery of the south being an innate problem worthy of the well used expression 'lazzaronismo Napolitane'.\*\* But the human reactions aside, there are two factors that have certainly contributed to the retarded development of the south. Firstly, the north of Italy and other parts of Europe, notably Germany, France and Switzerland, have benefited from the labour resources of the south in an almost continual migrational flow until the 1970s, including it's intellectual labour. Secondly, there has been a constant stream of state financial funds to the south 'Cassa per il Mezzogiorno'\*\*\* which is always channelled through 'clientele relations' and consequently unlikely to benefit the southern population generally.+

\* 'Palla di Piombo' ball of lead.

\*\* 'Lazzaronismo Napolitane' a derogatory remark implying that the southerners are less than industrious.

\*\*\*'Cassa per il Mezzogiorno', Fund for the development of the south.

+ 'Clientele relations' system of political connections and patronage.

political unity<sup>15</sup> as a single nation, reveals more starkly the geographical social and economic differences.

The intensity of regional differences in Italy has been subject to much discussion and scholarship by many writers.<sup>16</sup> Indeed it is not my intention to appraise their work, but rather to assess the significance of regional differences inasmuch as it serves this study.

It is often said that after the unification of Italy, the southern regions were restrained from industrial growth because the northern regions were so much more strong economically and organizationally. Statements of this kind have a factual content that is undoubtedly true, but at the same time masks by its simplicity the factors that contributed to its historical development. Italian landowners in the Mezzogiorno<sup>17</sup> have historically held considerable economic and political power. The intra-regional disparity has long traditional roots from which the noble rich and 'ceti-sociali'<sup>18</sup> of southern Italy were well aware that industrialization gives the economy a 'dynamic momentum'<sup>19</sup> that would erode the distinctive stratified society from which centuries have produced. But while the post war development will show that relative differences within and between regions are still significant, the trend reveals some interesting facts. For example, it can be shown that the greatest proportional increases in educational expansion were produced by the southern regions between 1951 and 1961, a fact already established by the researches of Barbagli (1974). However equally important is the educational reform of 1963, which allowed greater access to education beyond the compulsory leaving age. This shows that

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<sup>15</sup> Proclamation of national unity made by Vittorio Emanuele II, King of Italy, 17th March 1861, and the 27th March 1861, Parliament proclaimed Rome as Italy's capital.

<sup>16</sup> Among the most notable are: G. Salvemini. E. Ciccotti. E. Natham. Also A. Gramsci.

<sup>17</sup> 'Mezzogiorno' the south of Italy.

<sup>18</sup> 'Ceti-sociali' social strata, usually referring to the ceti medi or middle classes.

<sup>19</sup> J. Myrdal. *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions*. University Paperbacks 1964. p 27.

there is a near equal distribution of proportional increases between the southern and northern-central regions from that date. I regard the significance of this result<sup>20</sup> as reflecting two criteria of regional disparity. Firstly, that disparity motivates the relevant age cohort in disadvantaged regions<sup>21</sup> to participate in education beyond the normal leaving age. Secondly, with increasing educational expansion, disparity between regions tends to maintain a constant separation while proportional increases in educational participation tend to be the same for both advantaged and disadvantaged regions. The question which now arises is, can the same phenomenon be observed in the U.K. between regional disparities and educational expansion? If this can be shown to be the case, it would imply that the phenomenon of regional disparity and its incentives for educational expansion includes functions other than Italy's political history.

The argument so far has been that a level of disparity appears to be influenced by different factors and that ideological reasons, as important as they are, should not be confused and reduced to only political issues. The demand for education at the higher levels, which must inevitably increase differences in specialized skills and therefore maintain society's disparity by its diffusion geographically, need not be the result of any fundamental difference in political strategy although control can be seen to reside here. For example, there is a very interesting report issued by the Cuban government to UNESCO<sup>22</sup> which suggests that incentives are essential for educational progress,

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<sup>20</sup> For regional educational data covering the U.K. and Italy see tables 3 and 4 at the back of this thesis.

<sup>21</sup> See note 9 in this Chapter.

<sup>22</sup> UNESCO conference on 'education and economic and social development' held in Santiago, Chile in 1962. The entire document is reprinted in Seers, Dudley, ed. Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964. pp 348-51. Also an excellent account by Martin Carnoy and Jorge Werthein 'Socialist Ideology and the Transformation of Cuban Education', in Power and Ideology in Education by Jerome Karabel and A.H.Halsey, Oxford University Press, 1977. pp 573-589.



but equally important is the basis on which these incentives are founded. In this report it suggests that it is the collective action rather than individual initiative which underpins this socialist labour educational experiment. Such a basis for educational reform was founded on moral incentives, the aim being 'to link education with productive labour as a means of developing men in every aspect'. In this socialist experiment, the rural teachers were depicted as an 'elite corps' often resulting in access to University and promotion. Even some secondary schools for intellectual elite were established, although the commitment was expressly to achieving social and economic egalitarianism. Although the tendency towards elitism is linked to Cuba's haste for economic growth, it was justified within the parameters of moral incentives.

What I think we may learn from the Cuban experiment<sup>23</sup> is that incentives to act, which are only indirectly in the collective interest, remain on the fundamental level of human behaviour and should not be confused with ideological issues or the political control which made access possible.

### **Summary so far.**

The development of any advanced society, regardless of whether it is a socialist or capitalist system, would appear to generate differential regional requirements of its human and material resources. In the first instance the spatial distribution of the population, territorial configuration and location of natural resources, are given factors of threshold differences which are structurally determined. Secondly the demand for education, always given that access is politically sanctioned, is a rational purposeful act which if taken in sufficient numbers will sustain

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<sup>23</sup> Further investigation into the incentives associated with the Cuban Revolution might be usefully researched from the statistical data of two writers on this subject. Carl J. Dahlman 'The Nationwide Learning System in Cuba' Mimeographed, Princeton, N.J. Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. July. 1973. and Lowry Nelson, 'The School Drop-out Problem in Cuba,' *School and Society*, 99, (April 1971) p.234-235.



the differential nature of society by its specialized knowledge and by the diffusion of those who become educated.

### **Post war regional development.**

In the first part of this chapter, I have effectively divided regional disparities into two categories. The first as a social and structural phenomenon arising from resource location and population distribution, and the second was the permitted regional disparities emerging from the ideological framework of its political setting. In this section I will outline the present regional development for both cases over the last 40 years, but with the specific aim of determining what factors appear to have influenced the variations in regional socio-economic differences.

### **The U.K.**

There is an abundance of historical evidence in Britain that rural societies, despite their appearance of inert and retarded life-style, have been the life blood of later industrial growth by migrating movements to urban areas and cities of domestic labour, manual labourers and young apprentices.<sup>24</sup> Therefore in the overall context of change over time, the development after the second world war of a changing spatial pattern; surrounding the capital by new towns and industry and the subsequent distribution of the population, is all part of the evolving society historically linked as a chain of effects.

In the last 40 years there appears to be visible three phases through which British society has developed socially and economically. The necessity to disperse the population out of the capital and urban war torn areas in the early post war years, to various newly constructed towns, had ostensibly a two-fold

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24 J.Patten. 'Patterns of migration and movement of labour to three pre-industrial East Anglian towns. 1976. *Journal of Historical Geography*. Vol. 2. pp 111-129.

R.A.Pelham. 'The immigrant population of Birmingham. *Birmingham Archaeological Society*. Vol. 61. pp 75-82.

effect. Firstly it acted as new service centres to outlying towns and villages supplying social needs, employment, new skills and trades to those otherwise employed in agriculture and unskilled work. Also educational resources of a level not previously considered. Secondly, as wage levels rose with demand and the expansion of industry, so did the aspirations of low paid workers to achieve better educational levels for their children.

The second phase followed some 10 to 15 years later. Although many decaying areas in the capital were demolished in the early post war years, those remaining reflected the environmental conditions and social disadvantages of the early rural dwellers.<sup>25</sup> These areas acted as filters, allowing those with working skills to migrate and leaving others in the lowest socio-economic groups to occupy slum dwellings and generally declining social conditions. The years of the fifties and sixties saw the rise of the commuter belt.<sup>26</sup> Those fortunate to live outside the city centres were mostly salaried workers, financially able to support travelling costs and had tenure of employment. The inner city dwellers plight on the other hand, has progressively worsened and to date remains so. By extending service centres from the capital or from metropolitan areas, and so reaching pockets of rural inhabitants, they have been able to utilize resources that otherwise would not have been available to them. While this does seem to be an appropriate development and desirable, it also demonstrates some important and relevant characteristics that contribute to the rise and fall of regional disparities and redistribution of resources.

As I stated previously for the Italian case, as disparity declines, the proportional increases in those pupils participating

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<sup>25</sup> Again we are looking at evolving effects not causes.

<sup>26</sup> The commuter belt has also been subject to changing criteria between the years of 1950 and 1970. Managerial and middle class groups found it profitable and desirable to buy homes some 30 to 60 km. from their work centres. This was made possible by the relatively cheap public transport and improving road network. In more recent times it is not unusual to find commuters travelling up to 150 km. radius daily.

in education beyond the compulsory leaving age, tends to be similar for all regions. That is, the disadvantaged regions relative superiority in proportional increases previously experienced, also declines. With a greater quantity of educational skills outstripping the market demand, the economic repercussions leading to unemployment are already well documented. My principal point here is that these two areas of social development in post war Britain, the decreasing difference between socio-economic groups and education through the policy of 'Equality of Educational Opportunity', were bound by the logic of the relationship to sustain differences. It is difficult to know whether it was realized even by the most informed of political policy makers, that such a result would follow.<sup>27</sup>

The third phase is characterised by both the post war economic revival and the global effects of enormous price increases in petroleum products effecting the world's entire energy requirements. The most significant regional development was the addition of new towns and their dependence on government subsidies over many years to attract industry and private investment, by the facilities supplied and the infrastructure erected. While one should perhaps avoid the temptation to describe new towns as an artificial location of social and economic collectivity, they do nevertheless in the main lack the historical motives for their emergence. As a consequence they are more vulnerable as an entity to the economic fortunes of the nation as a whole and the governments continuing desire to

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<sup>27</sup> From 1945 to the early 1970s, there has been some reticence to recognize that Equality of Educational opportunity does not lead to a more egalitarian society. A.H.Halsey perceived this when he stated: 'equality rather than equality of opportunity is the aim .....' in 'Towards Meritocracy? The case for Britain.' In *Power and Ideology in Education*, p 175. Op. Cit. Further Frank Musgrove pursues this argument in 1979 when he stated: 'The pursuit of equality, on the one hand, and of equality of opportunity, on the other, are now widely seen as representing traditions of thought which are fundamentally and perhaps irreconcilably opposed.' in 'School and the Social Order' John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 1979. p 119.

subsidise their growth. In other words, new towns are a political construction arising as a solution to a temporal need rather than an organic one. Nevertheless, new towns are instrumental to change and can be manipulated to suit the emerging technology and skills. The predominantly economic factors relating to this development, are for the most part all too apparent. Investment into expanding industrial centres creates the incentives for an equally expanding service industry, encouraging yet further enterprise and potential growth. The pull of migratory labour, both skilled and unskilled from other areas, especially where those traditional heavy industries have declined, while serving the requirements newly created, also help to deprive other areas of its young and able and in turn weakens its demand for goods and services. While growth and investment are maintained, free market forces will ensure that the pull of human and material resources will be drawn to it and as a consequence, the continuity of disparities is reinforced.

For both cases the pattern of disadvantaged regions has in relative terms remained the same, particularly so in Italy.<sup>28</sup>

### **Italy.**

By contrast, Italy's post war development had a number of fundamental differences. With the downfall of Fascism, the political situation was essentially one that left Italy with little option but to have the "protection" of the American umbrella. Despite the early political strength of the communists and socialists, they were not able to resist the De Gasperi government of 1947,<sup>29</sup> which according to the 'export thesis', a popular view of the Italian post-war economic miracle,

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<sup>28</sup> Data for regional socio-economic levels for both cases are at the back of this thesis.

<sup>29</sup> Between the years of 1945 to 1950, there were five coalition governments led by Alcide De Gasperi, leader of the Christian Democratic party (DC). The communists PCI and the Socialists PSI, participated in the first three governments as did also some minor parties of the Centre. In 1947 the Left were expelled leaving the DC and its allies to govern until the early sixties.

concentrated on the development of the international market rather than their internal problems of agriculture and the south in particular.<sup>30</sup> In essence, the major economic difference between the U.K. and Italy, was the latter's lack of natural resources, coal and iron, although oil and gas<sup>31</sup> were found after 1954. This dependence on necessary imports was of course not unconnected with the political requirement of ensuring, through the American 'Marshal Aid' programme and its conditions, the unification of Western Europe and the USA. The construction of an economic policy therefore of Italian industry producing for export, cannot really be attributed to Italy's post war regional differences in which the south could have equally participated in the export of its then mainly agricultural products.

The agrarian reforms of 1950 are also considered to be entirely politically inspired. These reforms concerned the *Latifondo*<sup>32</sup> areas which originally commenced with the distribution of 40,000 hectares of land in Calabria, and later included all the *Latifondisti*. Subsequently, the law which produced the *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno*, already mentioned, followed completing a political framework of agrarian reform that was to make landowners from the peasant population controlled by the *Cassa*; an agency of the DC,<sup>33</sup> and therefore ostensibly a political reform. In this way, there would be disunity between the working classes of the south and the peasant landowners, so retarding its industrialization and leaving labour for migration to the North at low wage levels.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> There are a number of writers that have concerned themselves with this economic period among which A.Graziani (1969). D.Sassoon (1986) comment in some detail on this problem in a critique of this theory and also list other writers. pp 31-45.

<sup>31</sup> In 1949 oil was found in Emilia and natural gas in Lodi. Later in 1954 oil was found in Ragusa Sicily.

<sup>32</sup> 'Latifondo' large landed property.

<sup>33</sup> P. Allum. *L'Italia tra crisi e emergenza*. Guida Editori-Napoli. 1979. pp 118-119. This is one of the many examples in Italy where the party apparatus is stronger than those of the state.

<sup>34</sup> P.Allum. *Op.cit.* p.53.

The *Questione Meridionale* in its complexity, tends to hide the different reasons for regional disparity which appear above as mostly attributable to ideological reasons. Also if we look at Gramsci's own assessment of the problem we see that he regards it entirely as exploitation. Gramsci stated:

In Italy capitalism has been developed by the state in as much as the state has crushed the peasant population, especially in the south. You have today heard the urgency of those problems, by promising a (miliardo)\* for Sardinia, promising public works and hundreds of millions (lire) to all the Mezzogiorno; but to seriously undertake this work in a concrete way, you could begin by reimbursing Sardinia the 100-150 million (lire) of tax that is extorted every year from the Sardinian people. You could reimburse to the Mezzogiorno the hundreds of millions of tax that every year is extorted from the meridione population..., sums that the state extorts from the southern peasants in order to give a capitalist base to the north...., It is on this terrain of contradictions of the Italian capitalist system that *it is necessary* to form the union of the worker and the peasant against the common enemy.<sup>35</sup>

There are of course good reasons why Gramsci sought the unity of southern workers and peasants, as he states above. His theoretical strategy of the *guerra di posizione*<sup>36</sup> can be seen as the mode for combatting the 'fracture' between the North and the *Mezzogiorno*, as a phase opened by history that man can exploit for political and social transition.<sup>37</sup> While many problems remain in the *Mezzogiorno* today, it would not be correct to depict regional differences in other than relative terms. That is not to say that clientelism<sup>38</sup> no longer exists, rather that the extent to which it can operate is now more limited. It is worth noting that the OECD report<sup>39</sup> 1969 regarding enrolment trends in education,

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<sup>35</sup> From Gramsci's speech to the "Camera dei Deputati" on the 16th May 1925. A. Gramsci. *La Costruzione del partito comunista (1923-26)*, Torino, 1971 p 83. Also quoted in *Politica e Storia in Gramsci*, Vol I. by Franco Ferri, Editori Riuniti Istituto Gramsci. 1977. in an article by G. Giarrizzo 'Il Mezzogiorno di Gramsci' pp. 321-322.

\* 'Miliardo' One Billion.

<sup>36</sup> 'Guerra di posizione' This concept has already been discussed in chapter 2.

<sup>37</sup> Rosario Villari, discusses the 'guerra di posizione' with respect to the meridione in 'Gramsci e il Mezzogiorno' in *Politica e Storia in Gramsci*, op. cit.

<sup>38</sup> See footnote 13.

<sup>39</sup> OECD Italy 1969. p 81. *Review of National Policies for Education* (Paris).

is a further example of reducing all reasons for Italy's regional differences to purely social and economic factors. They state,

... enrolments depend on social and economic factors and there is no doubt at all that the improvements in living standards in the South have helped to increase enrolments.

It also goes on to say that,

the rate of expansion of the school population which is higher in the south than in other regions ultimately reflects a greater demand for education in the southern regions which used to be particularly underdeveloped in this respect.

Such broad conclusions, while containing truth, really tell us little other than one contributory although important cause, and the effect of raising living standards. Such a trend can be observed in every advanced society. What is more valuable is a particular bench mark which can point specifically to where and when social and economic changes occurred, so that other reasons might be seen as contributing to change. In this respect, Italy's most positive educational development made a great leap forward when the *avviamento*<sup>40</sup> was abolished by the 1962 educational reforms.<sup>41</sup> This political intervention I would regard as one of the most potent and significant actions that can be identified leading to an effective mechanism for producing a variety of functions from which some helped sustain a disparate order.<sup>42</sup>

What my data shows is that where previously the southern regions were clearly producing a greater proportional increase than the other regions in the years between 1951 to 1961,

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<sup>40</sup> The system of the 'avviamento schools' replaced, after the decree of abolition on the 7th January 1929, the 'scuola complementare', the latter intentionally constraining the aspirations of students to reaching higher social levels through education. The 'scuola di avviamento', although allowing the possibility of some educational advancement, was essentially present to adapt labour potential to market requirements. The subsequent abolition of the *avviamento* markedly changed the course of educational expansion in Italy, and in anticipation of my analysis and results, note should be taken of all social indicators from 1962 onwards. (*Avviamento*- from the verb *avviare*, to start or to set going. In this case to start work).

<sup>41</sup> See M. Barbagli op. cit, especially pp 148, 204 and 257 for a detailed historical discussion on the Italian education system .

<sup>42</sup> Again one is reminded that not all functions are beneficial to capitalism whether for short or long term. See footnote 9 relating to Jon Elster.

thereafter the increases are similar.<sup>43</sup> As this period is also accompanied by a decreasing difference between what I have defined in this study as 'upper and lower occupational social classes'<sup>44</sup>, the implications are two fold. Firstly there is a relationship between the increase in education at the higher levels and society's socio-economic disparities, not only statistically but also following the logic of differential skills creating differences. Secondly, as the demand for education can not be attributed to ideological reasons alone, its contribution to the differential nature of society becomes a generalized characteristic.

The United Kingdom's own regional educational trends in the post war period show similar characteristics to Italy though much less marked between those regions defined here as advantaged and disadvantaged. It is I think important to point out that although some common trends in data will be observed between the two cases, they should not lead to immediate thoughts of a convergence theory<sup>45</sup> as debated in the past. Similar trends do lend support to the view that elements of determinism become the rationale, and that the development of industrialisation must promote these common characteristics. As this argument has some overall relevance although not my immediate concern, I have briefly discussed this past debate in Appendix 1.

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<sup>43</sup> See regional socio-economic data at the back of this thesis. It should be noted that Barbagli was not able to detect in his own research, which extended at that time until 1967, that the proportional increases in the higher educated became similar for most regions rather than favouring the southern and disadvantaged regions. The significance is important because Barbagli attributed the earlier result to Italy's political suppression of the south. My result shows that at the very least educational expansion cannot be regarded as politically generated except inasmuch as it can provide the means.

<sup>44</sup> See Appendix 3 at the back of this thesis.

<sup>45</sup> 'Convergence theory' suggests that the more societies adopt an industrial infrastructure, common factors are the outcome of political and economic processes which make them more alike.



To return to my original point regarding the decreasing trend in relative socio-economic regional differences coupled with proportional educational increases which are similar, the constant gap which is maintained between advantaged and disadvantaged regions, is not directly ideologically inspired but a contingent development which can be subsequently promoted politically.

### **Summary of regional post war development.**

My aim in the second part of this chapter has been to see what factors have influenced the variations in socio-economic regional differences. There are strong reasons to uphold my earlier assertions that such variations arise from both, human choices through education and the political decisions of making the demand possible.

The U.K. has had a largely unhindered expansion of urban development that has to some extent exacerbated the continuing post war problem of restraining the general decrease in the percentage difference between the upper and lower occupational socio-economic groups. On the other hand, Italy can still demonstrate a lesser rate of decrease in both absolute and relative terms between the Southern regions, the most disadvantaged socially and economically, and the Northern and Central regions. The most significant post war development common to both cases, is the widening social and economic gap, between regions during the period producing the greatest educational expansion. In other words, despite the continued amelioration, socially and economically for both cases, disparate regional development remains a feature of the post war era.

One might ask, given all the arguments above of advanced society's continued regional differences due to structural factors, human choices and political decisions, what possible alternative could be ideologically offered to change the present development? Such a question I think is entirely relevant in the context of the aim of this thesis and what sustains the present

order. While I shall comment further in my conclusions, at this point I can say that two of the areas asserted as contributing to society's differences, structural factors which include terrain and distribution of natural resources, and human choices as purposeful rational action, are immutable. Only ideological changes can be contemplated. On this level it becomes a matter of the extent of differences that will be politically tolerated. What is tolerated is what is understood to be rational as a system.

## **Chapter 5.**

### **Progress ideology in advanced society.**

#### **Introduction.**

The Gramscian notion of society's cultural development becoming the key to the moral and intellectual leadership of all social groups and therefore the dominant hegemony, does make the assumption that the majority of educators of all cultural forms can and will subscribe to the idea of society's progress. This chapter aims to discuss what is implied in the idea of progress in an advanced society and the problems that are likely to be encountered by teachers whose value systems and attitudes are divided between the central values of educational institutions and those they believe to be correct for their students, and yet between these two stand their own personal conviction.

#### **Advancing knowledge.**

All institutional educators acquire knowledge possibly for several reasons. There is firstly the intrinsic reason of acquiring knowledge for its own sake. Secondly, the necessity to professionalize one's ability and skills, and thirdly to prepare others to contribute to resolving the problems of society. These collected reasons are no doubt influential to an educators attitude towards his pupils, the values he transmits and the motives behind them. But one must also remember that the values and motives are in part a product of the institutions and society's conditions under which all skills can be used and values formed. Certainly the second and third reasons for acquiring knowledge can be seen as both instrumental and carrying a normative element and where the socialization process of human beings can become conflictual with the personal development of moral values which are not necessarily shared

by others nor central to those of society.

### **The conflict of education in advanced society.**

R. M. Hutchins (1953) stated that,

The aim of an educational system is the same in every age and in every society where such a system can exist: it is to improve man as man.<sup>1</sup>

To improve man does suggest it is progressive but in what sense? As I mentioned above, of the three possible reasons for acquiring knowledge by an educator, two were associated with adapting to the environment for both the educator and pupil, where the environment is both social and political. If education is successful in this task, then it might be said to be good for man. Good is a relative term and requires some standard against which it can be judged. Man can be moral and through philosophy we know man can be rational and also spiritual in order to develop all these attributes to some or the fullest extent. If then the purpose of education is the improvement of man, then values must be present. Again Hutchins argues,

A system that denies the existence of values denies the possibility of education. Relativism, scientism, scepticism, and anti-intellectualism, the four horsemen of the philosophical apocalypse, have produced that chaos in education which will end in the disintegration of the West.<sup>2</sup>

The point here is very much what values are good for man. It cannot simply be to adapt to society's central values or indeed to satisfy one's immediate needs. A man may subscribe in part to collective values but he also needs to develop his own value system against which all other values are tested and this he can only know through a process of learning. But what sort of education will give man what he requires to know and who is to tell him what he ought to know? The problems that spring from such questions are many and soon become political in nature.

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1 R. M. Hutchins. *The conflict in Education in a Democratic society*. Harper and Row. 1953. Reprinted in 'School, Society, and the Professional Educator'. A book of readings, by F. H. Blackington III and R. S. Patterson. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. New York. 1968. p 65.

2 R. M. Hutchins. *Op. cit.* (School, Society, and the Professional Educator). p 67

Hutchins argues that 'liberal education', by which he means to develop the powers of understanding and judgement and acquire the habits ideas and techniques to be able to continue to educate oneself not only when one is young but throughout life, is the appropriate form for all free men.<sup>3</sup> To arrive at the point at which one has acquired adequate cognitive skills to critically think, to be able to deduce and differentiate from one set of values to another, and this is possibly what Hutchins means by 'liberal education', is probably the only way that the term 'good education' can be appropriately applied. Nisbet, in developing the idea of progress in society, cites from St. Augustine's theology,

Custom, tradition, use and wont all have played a large role in what Augustine refers to as " the education of the human race" over a long period of time. He sees the progress of mankind, the material progress we have already found to shine so brilliantly in his account, as akin to a long process of cumulative education in a single human being.<sup>4</sup>

For St. Augustine progressive learning is the way human beings acquire cognitive skills which enables them to have values and moral choices.

I have in the three previous chapters emphasised the importance that Gramsci places on the educators in the cultural development of society and with which I also agree. But while my arguments have mainly been concerned with the expansion and diffusion of the educated, by establishing above the genesis of different values and the ability to differentiate those values on an intellectual level, the conflicts which arise for the educator in the course of his professional work, have a direct bearing on the whole cultural development of society. I refer here to the human problems of different cultural values between the teacher and pupils and between the teachers own particular values, including those that are political, and the knowledge to be transmitted. It has already been argued in chapter 2 relating to Gramsci and also asserted in my general proposition, that the key to the cultural hegemony of society is dependent on the educated becoming educators. Then for advanced society, those values consistent with capitalism must ultimately

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<sup>3</sup> R. M. Hutchins. *Op. cit.* p 67.

<sup>4</sup> R. Nisbet. *History of the Idea of Progress.* Basic Books, Inc., New York. 1980. p 61.

prevail.

### **The teachers position, attitudes and values.**

The teachers as educators and transmitters of the central values and norms of society are by their inculcation, responsible to a significant degree for its final cultural development. In the past when levels of educational attainment reflected certain social values generally in society under the system of selection, one could probably have said that social groups were more homogeneous in character and shared common values. Today in the U.K., comprehensive schools have to a substantial degree ensured that there are heterogeneous social groupings where one is more likely to find different social values between pupils, although this characteristic is probably less marked in the inner city areas. However, the position of the teacher in dealing with such diverse backgrounds and cultural values, presents particular difficulties.

Let us take firstly the problem of the teachers conflict of transmitting values that are those generally considered to be central values of society. This one might view as a socializing process in which there is a moral obligation on the part of the teacher to impart these values as an employee of the state. Durkhiem seems to suggest that this is the case,

The teacher should embody the central values of society<sup>5</sup>.

But the teachers own values and beliefs may present dilemmas which manifest differences between those that are considered central values of society and also those of the pupils.

The conflicts which are relevant to the advancement of knowledge subscribing to the idea of progress, is my underlying theme in this chapter. With this in mind, the first reason I gave for the possible acquisition of knowledge was for its intrinsic qualities which, if it were

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<sup>5</sup> E. Durkheim. *Moral Education: A Study in the Theory & Application of the Sociology of Education.*The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. 1973.

possible for a teacher to hold this view only, would most likely result in transmitting knowledge in a balanced form. That is, the arguments would not be unduly weighted without presenting counter-arguments. While such an ideal is what teachers may aim to realize, and in some subject areas conflict may well be minimal in terms of values, it is more realistic to accept that there are many issues which involve central institutional values or even the cultural values of some pupils, which are in direct conflict with those held by the teacher. This obviously imposes on the teacher the necessity to exercise constraint on introducing personal opinions. I shall take three areas where such conflicts are most likely to occur.

### *Religious values.*

No country in the West can claim to be a theocracy so that its central moral values are institutionalized with the state and its laws. However even though this might not be technically the case for Italy and the U.K., each have links with religious values that have infiltrated from the past and have at some stage become accepted as central values.<sup>6</sup> It might be difficult now to establish the extent that present central values were previously those synonymous with Christian values, but it is a fact that through increasing secularization of social behaviour, the values of Christian teachings are not only challenged but are, in the case of catholicism, no longer consistent with national laws, i.e., homosexuality and abortion. Also the purely moral arguments against wars and the nuclear deterrent would be discouraged as competing knowledge in schools. However the heterogeneous character of the population of both cases and in particular the U.K., the Christian values held as a body of knowledge will today almost certainly be in conflict with other religious views quite apart from humanist interpretation to life. Teachers therefore have a role conflict to surmount, either because

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<sup>6</sup> From Gramsci's notion of the development of 'common sense' becoming acceptable as objective and true. See chapter 2.

they subscribe to Christianity or some other religious belief or even none at all. In each of these cases unless one is teaching to an homogeneous group, which is less the case in most educational institutions, then a potential conflict is always present.

#### *Professional values .*

Closely connected to conflict issues but particularly associated with the second reason for acquiring knowledge, is the integrity of teachers with regard to permitting access to knowledge by their pupils. The general point here is the question of whether or not the free pursuit of knowledge should be allowed to pass between the teacher and pupil and not restricted for either political cultural or religious reasons. In chapter 6, I have referred to political and environmental issues in schools for the Italian case, in which open discussions were conducted between teacher and pupils in a highly sensitive public debate. The controversy centered around ethnic minorities from the African continent which had formed the major immigrant groups into Italy in the last decade, and Italy's rising unemployment situation. The specific conflict problem here was that not all the teachers were happy about the political ramifications that these issues were bound to excite. The free access of information and debate was not, it was felt by some teachers, capable of being balanced by contrary arguments when pupils' families were among the unemployed. Other examples may be found where unrestricted access of information relating to trade unionism, humanism, the nuclear issue and sexual behaviour and no doubt many others, will cause controversy between teacher and pupils or teacher and parents, so that the integrity of the teacher is challenged in conveying or not conveying valued judgements.

#### *Cultural values .*

The instrumental reasons for acquiring knowledge as the third item above leading to the advancement of knowledge is, in the context of this study, an important area of conflict. The preparation of pupils for their future includes guidance of the type of work realistically possible



and suitable in terms of their capabilities. Such values the teacher has may be less instrumental and more oriented to the subject which has stimulated the pupil and might necessarily require further and more academic education. But outside pressures for manpower or general cultural attitudes to terminate any further studies and find immediate employment, conflict with the teacher's values.

Differences in cultural values may also be extended to those teachers who subscribe to more central values of differentiation in society and maintaining elite forms so that functions reflect a hierarchical order. On the other hand those teachers who believe that creating a 'common culture' is their greatest concern and moral justification as educators, might see any form of selection and differentiation as detrimental to future cultural development.

### **Comments.**

I have tried to show in the above discussion that the advancement of knowledge encounters many obstacles as to how it is transmitted. The free access of information for the pupil becomes the test of professional integrity for the teacher. The central values held by society become the moral dilemma of the teacher who does not share them. Political convictions are an integral part of the attitudes held by the teacher as with anyone else, but the self-discipline required to be objective particularly in this subject area is paramount.

However in spite of all these difficulties society retains the notion of progress. Educators are trapped, albeit unwillingly; into participating and transmitting values they do not necessarily share. Yet on the other hand they are also equally the beneficiaries of the relative stability of society which their consensus<sup>7</sup> has equally contributed. This will be seen more clearly in the following, first concerning the intellectuals as educators in institutions of higher learning, and

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<sup>7</sup> Consensus is discussed in more detail in chapter 6.

secondly how the conception of freedom with its practical constraints is also progress. The concept of Progress that is of theoretical concern here, is in the sense that Sorel has expounded, that is,

it is not a moral or linear progress of the natural order of things, but an ideology of modern institutions of domination.<sup>8</sup>

### **Intellectuals and the Ideology of Progress.**

It may well be true as Lenin stated "without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary practice", but it would be equally true to add that unless that revolutionary theory is related to changing practices, it is not even that. One of the most contentious practices for radical thinkers is that they are participants in changing social phenomena and cannot extricate themselves from this position. It is specifically in this respect that we can view the position of intellectuals in advanced society and how the changing circumstances of social and economic conditions of life, reverberate through the political aspirations of those more radically oriented. In brief, the problem arises because the construction of radical theory emerges as a product of and integrated with, the rationality<sup>9</sup> of the dominant system. Gramsci's belief that the key to changing this rationality lies with the educational process, has in practice demonstrated that the social conditions of life must move contrary to the present trend.

One argument by Erik Olin Wright (1978)<sup>10</sup>, refers to the contradictory position of 'intellectuals within class relations'. This particular problem, which has already been touched upon in Chapter 2, can now be usefully examined in more detail, although Erik O. Wright's concerns are particularly oriented towards intellectuals in Universities.

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<sup>8</sup> G.Sorel. *The Illusions of Progress*. p.xxxii.

<sup>9</sup> One should also reflect on the characteristics of presuppositions or first level assumptions discussed in chapter 3, and how much of this can be explained by the purposeful rational goals as well as specific ideological oriented actions.

<sup>10</sup> E. O. Wright. *Intellectuals and the working class*. From the *Insurgent Sociologist*. Vol.8.No.1, and also in *Capitalist Society: readings for a critical sociology*. Edited by Richard Quinney. The Dorsey Press. Homewood Illinois. 1979.

The context of his argument is the involuntary contribution made by theorists sympathetic to radical reforms to the political system, by their acquiescence to conformity which ultimately only adds to the existing rationality.

Erik. O. Wright's argument essentially rests on how intellectuals confront and reshape existing theories based on a body of practices. That is, how theorists ask questions which practice has already shaped. They then shape the concepts to answer those questions. And finally the answers, constrained by historical conditions, shape new questions. It is a problem of how theorists are linked to practices, that in accounting for their position in a capitalist institution, they must obviously be ambivalent or circumspect in their responses and behaviour if their concerns are with the working classes. It is primarily how theorists are related to their own practice that deprives them from obtaining the necessary conceptual tools to produce appropriate questions from new evolving practices.<sup>11</sup>

The conclusion of Erik. O. Wright, is that the intellectuals contradictory position within the Universities, has favoured the development of marxism, but at the same time *displaced the central political problem of making revolution*<sup>12</sup>. Making a revolution requires the evolvment of theory and practice, but the intellectuals participation in the centrally held values of society; is precisely the strategy theorised by Gramsci and discussed and commented upon in chapter 2, and to which I have expressed my doubts.

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<sup>11</sup> One might question how bourgeois radicals, Marx and Engels, were able to relate to the practise of their time and yet be apart in the radical construction of theory. Here one must take into consideration that the social and economic conditions of the working classes and their practises, have substantially changed. Also the conditions and circumstances that gave rise to the thoughts of Marx and Engels, did not impel them to participate in active participation with the masses. We cannot look at the data presented here in, relating to the decreasing difference between the upper and lower occupational social groups, without accepting that the consciousness of both social groups are implicated in change in accordance with their social and economic conditions.

<sup>12</sup> E. O. Wright. Op. cit. p 106.

One of the tenets of theory and practice, is that the philosophy of praxis only becomes historical by its continuity of contact with the relevant forces or actors. For example Gramsci noted<sup>13</sup> that the problem with the church was the absence of contact between the 'simple' and the intellectuals,<sup>14</sup> which allowed the church to maintain control, and at the same time to implicitly deprive the masses of their developmental potential. As we well know, the post war development has brought the masses, not just towards the intellectuals, but entwined their relationships and so *to a superior conception of the world*.<sup>15</sup> Hence the contact between the intellectuals and masses *has rendered politically possible an intellectual progress of the masses*<sup>16</sup>. These two quotations by Gramsci, were of course related to organic intellectuals of the working classes, yet they are still relevant in substance. Practice has increasingly diverged from his theory because the character of the new fundamental class has changed. The ideological and economic

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<sup>13</sup> Gramsci emphasised repeatedly the force of Catholicism, and how the church 'struggled to prevent the official formation of two churches, one for the intellectuals and the other for 'simple souls'. The organisational stability of the church cannot be easily diminished, nor it's ability to have shrewdly recognised that it's unifying doctrine (or ideology) combines theory to a practical life, a theme that dominates Gramsci's theory of social change. What is now presented in advanced society, is precisely the opposite, inasmuch that intellectuals are present in both strata of society, that is, the masses have what Gramsci terms 'organic intellectuals', who have the capability of making coherent the practical problems of the masses. These problems are those that are found in periods of history that have evolved from philosophy and withstood the test of time. The integration of 'organic intellectuals' with the masses, which characterises advanced societies, is progressively forming cultural blocs. Previously, as Catholicism demonstrates, social stability was attained at the cost of denying the 'simple' a wider conception of the world. Today, advanced society has created many cultural blocs comprising many intellectuals among masses, which may be considered, in point of time, to be demonstrating a contradictory terrain on which all are accommodated and in conflict simultaneously. The analogy with Catholicism is that the intellectual moral bloc formed by the church, ensured the political impotence of the 'simple' by the very separation of the intellectual strata.

<sup>14</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1383 (PN. p 331).

<sup>15</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1384 (PN. p 332).

<sup>16</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1385 (PN. p 333).

characteristics of class, only add to the difficulty of interpreting contradictory positions which now characterise lower socio-economic groups, either by their relative levels of material and property ownership, or by their political values. The point here is that intellectuals, in the broadest sense, and the masses, are no longer separate entities in today's world of practice. The diffusion of education has integrated these two entities to a closer and indistinct social proximity resulting in the development that has reinforced the progress of advanced society.

### **Freedom and the Ideology of Progress.**

Part of our conception of what constitutes political progress, must be the undefined balance between the extent of pluralism present and the power of the state. Freedom of individuals and the constraint that surrounds their liberty to attain goals, depends in any society very much on the development of their collective consciousness of their surroundings conditions, and their relative ability to make judgements of their institutions and those in control. The idea of progress then on the empirical level becomes a collective term only when the necessity for social constraints are recognised. Education, in giving wider conceptions of the world, is inevitably the driving force to pushing the frontiers of a pluralistic society. Yet despite this development, there are many restrictions imposed that constrain the conscious freedom that we have attained. My aim here is to show that the Idea of progress is, among other concepts, dependent on the extent of consensus conception of freedom present.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> This is intended to emphasise the collective conception of freedom and the normative element contained in human action (as discussed in my presuppositions chapter 3). It is essential to locate the individual's conception of freedom and constraints as valid only in his objectivity, and not as a basis for ideological formulation of freedom. I refer here specifically to theorists individual conception whereby each ideological position immediately presupposes an order that defines the nature of the freedom that it should contain, correctly so if it is based on the objective freedom, or indeed its constraints, that practice has revealed. The problem with different ideological

Is it not contradictory to conceive freedom from other than the social and material limitations that society has revealed in practice ? Does not 'objective reality' negate the very idea of a monolithic conception of freedom so that the theorists construction of future freedom is shaped by the conditions that history has presented ? If we are forced to accept the above, then can we not also negate a monolithic conception of work, free time or leisure time, and ultimately some of the constraints which impede and surround such a conception of freedom. In this respect Marx's own 'objective reality' is made, in his terms, absolute when he states,

In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases.<sup>18</sup>

Marx is referring here to his idea of human freedom, which as a pre-requisite must have shorter working days coupled with what he regards as the necessities surrounding this development. My point here is that practice must reflect that this is the collective conception of freedom, not just Marx's projection of a future society. The nature and conception of freedom, as I have already stated elsewhere and in footnote 17 above, cannot arise from a pre-determined teleological doctrine<sup>19</sup>, that is,

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views of society, is that 'voluntarism' is mistakenly interpreted on the empirical level as unbridled 'free will' to change the conditions of society that is presented, rather than freedom to act with a normative element and rational purpose which is quite different.

<sup>18</sup> K. Marx and F. Engels. Capital. Vol. 3. London. , Lawrence & Wishart. p 820.

<sup>19</sup> Gramsci attempts to make this leap by projecting thought into the future by laying it's seeds in the present. The promise of what praxis could achieve leads him to state the following :- "Accepting the affirmation that our knowledge of things is nothing other than ourselves, our needs and interests, that is, that our knowledge is superstructure (or inconclusive philosophy) and it is difficult not to think in terms of something real beyond this knowledge, not in a metaphysical sense of a 'noumenon' , of an 'unknown god ' or of an 'unknowable', but in the concrete sense of a 'relative ignorance' of the reality , of something still 'unknown' which will however be known one day when the ' physical and intellectual tools of mankind are more perfect, that is when the social and technical conditions of mankind have mutated in a progressive direction. We are therefore making an historical prediction which consists simply in an act of thought that projects into the future a process of development similar to that confirmed by the past to today". Gramsci. Op cit. p.1291 (PN. p 368). This point is discussed further in my final conclusions.

Marx's basis of freedom appears to have been guided by his ultimate goal, a legitimate enough intellectual enterprise but inadequate if it cannot be sustained logically. The problem with this approach, as will become clearer, is that freedom abstractly conceived has no existence,<sup>20</sup> and without practice one cannot conceive of progress. Of course Marx is aware of this when he states in 'The German Ideology',

In reality of course, what happened was that people won freedom for themselves each time to the extent that was dictated and permitted not by their ideal of man but by the existing productive forces.<sup>21</sup>

Although Marx has said it differently, he does separate the ideal from practical freedom.

The idea of a *relative ignorance of reality, of something still unknown* (from footnote 19), is not per se in dispute. But if that *reality* is part of the consciousness of man (in the sense that Gramsci describes it *as an act of thought*), then on what basis does one state that *an act of thought that projects into the future a process of development* of something that has had no existence, excepting thought, is freedom. When freedom in the present is the development of man's consciousness of his surroundings and the extent of constraints that impede his freedom (footnote 21), the link between the *unknown as an act of thought*, and freedom having no existence other than in thought, can only be one of optimism. Man's 'becoming' is full of the unknown, but the gap between perception, purposeful action and man's becoming, is based on (the link) a reasonable prediction of an earlier perception. Gramsci's step here into a form of Kantian teleology, from which experience is *posteriori* and that the idea of freedom is a *thing-in-itself*, delimits the scope of our possible knowledge allowing the free-will to construct the world to our way of knowing. Gramsci is drawn to this view by

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<sup>20</sup> To add further to footnote 17, one must regard the element of voluntarism in human action as becoming on the empirical level consciousness of freedom. The extent of freedom in reality is then subject to ideological views and what is practicable.

<sup>21</sup> K. Marx and F. Engels. *The German Ideology*. Ed. C. J. Arthur. Lawrence & Wishart. London. Camelot Press. 1985. 'Needs and Conditions'. P 115.

noting the following,

In the conception of 'historical mission' might not a teleological root be discovered ? (And) in fact in many cases it assumes equivocal and mystical significance. But in other cases it has a meaning, that, after the Kantian conception of teleology, it can be sustained and justified by the philosophy of praxis.<sup>22</sup>

There is to my view a conflict here with the parameters of the social conditions presented at any moment in time and the change that can be accomplished by human will. This does not make man an object in the world of experience, pre-determined and conforming, nor does it make the inverse true, that the world conforms to man's ways of knowing. The philosophy of praxis is a process from which we only know by acting, we cannot assume *a priori* position of causality but recognise it by experience and modify practice.

Intellectuals who claim to have working class allegiance, must inevitably be constrained by the requirements of that class. However, by the very level of critical consciousness and wide conceptions of the world possessed by them, they cannot possibly have a restricted conception of freedom in class terms only, or indeed its constraints. In my discussion on intellectuals here in the previous section, Erik O. Wright has implied the same by their very participation in the plurality of institutions of advanced capitalism. Thus for the intellectual, freedom is his precisely because his attachment to a specific class is contradicted by other conceptions of society's pluralism, and not because freedom conceived by one class is the objective truth. Also the phenomenon of declining class allegiance has turned the traditional working classes towards values that cannot possibly constrain them to working class values of old. A change in values thus releasing the previous heteronomy, is itself a development of freedom, all within the same system's rationality.

To briefly summarise the above we can say that where freedom is conceived in abstract form as thought, having no epistemological

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<sup>22</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. 1426.



foundation, no evolvement of man and nature, the idea of progress can have no meaning.

## Chapter 6.

### Modern Trasformismo: Development of political consciousness and the problem of political change.

#### Introduction.

My aim in this chapter is to show that within liberal democracy, and specifically within a framework of political power relationships, there exist mechanisms that while functioning in the interests of democracy, are nevertheless exposed to potential alternative cultural, and consequently political interventions.

My conceptual term 'Modern Trasformismo', which has been mentioned in the previous chapters, is taken from Gramsci's description of the historical political events of the Risorgimento, which is recounted below. Here Gramsci describes how the dominant cultural hegemony is able to subordinate its rivals to gain political advantage. While these events and Gramsci's treatment of them are not disputed, they are inadequate to substantiate and explain the continuing political stability that sustains modern democracies. The following is a logical analysis of a relevant although a small part of liberal democracy. By itself this may be insufficient as proof, but when such a framework is associated with historical facts<sup>1</sup> it could then be argued that a more concrete content is given to the existence of the concept in question.

Firstly my definition of Modern Trasformismo is to be understood as, the autonomy existing in liberal democracy, which potentially permits social, cultural and political change to evolve.

In order to adequately argue this concept in a 'new' context and identify its location within liberal democracy, it is first necessary to expand on the abstract relationship already described between the

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<sup>1</sup> G. Sartori. *Democratic Theory*. Frederick A. Praeger. New York. 1967. p 186. Translation of *democrazia e definizioni* (2nd edition). Il Mulino, Bologna, 1958.

development of critical consciousness, stated in my general proposition as 'cognitive dispositions', and also why its development impedes the idea of a counter-hegemony. Again from my general proposition, the reference to the *conceptions of freedom and constraints* which arise from educational development, are theorised as having a relationship with the political actions manifested. By this I mean firstly, the participation in the political system by all groups. Secondly the subsequent mediation which follows attempting to re-align divergent views. And thirdly, the consensus reached to satisfy collective needs and which so far has sustained and reformed the present democratic system, also contains in its procedural process, the theoretical potential to transform it. It is this integrated process that I call *Modern Trasformismo*, and it is different from the classical form which has been referred to in the previous chapters.

### **The Historical Background to the concept of 'Classical Trasformismo'.**

I have described *Trasformismo*<sup>2</sup> as possessing different characteristics. For example in chapter 1, I stated there was *the tendency of political thoughts from diverse ideologies "to merge" by unproclaimed processes of mediation, and that demonstrates a propensity to finding and sustaining a stable equilibrium*. These descriptions carry the idea of flexibility to accommodate differences, as indeed they do. But primarily Gramsci's concern with its presence is associated more with the parliamentary phenomenon of political mutability of elite individuals and political groups. While theoretically capable of transforming the system to socialism, in practise it functions only to maintain the status quo by the corruptive party dealings of self

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<sup>2</sup> "Classico Trasformismo" can be defined as a system of transformation and adaptation of political parties and individuals, according to the opportunity of the moment. It is the movement of elite, as individuals or groups, from one political party to another, so altering the balance of power. But, as history as so far shown, it has favoured only the dominant moral and intellectual leadership.

interest. This is what he referred to as *classical trasformismo*.

Although Gramsci is not the first to use this term in the political sense, his historical analysis of the Risorgimento and observance of political events which subsequently emerged, led him to theorise the importance of '*the movement of the political elite*' and the moral and intellectual direction that could potentially arise from its development. It must be said however, that Gramsci did not pursue in depth the full implications of the increasing effect of education on the masses. In retrospect of course we are able to see that the political elite have increased dramatically in their numbers and particularly in the individual power they wield, so as to change the character of this concept in keeping with the changing environment. Such an omission is hard to understand in view of the very great detail analysed by Gramsci dialectically for all his concepts. It is even more inexplicable when one is reminded that his concern with '*classico trasformismo*' could readily be interpreted as the terrain on which an alternative moral and intellectual direction could be politically progressive<sup>3</sup>, and that all its activities would cease with the subordination of its rivals and the coming of the 'New Order'.

The political events of the Risorgimento are depicted by Gramsci as the practical manifestation and power of *Trasformismo*. The dominant political party in this period, the 'Moderate Party', represented a relatively homogeneous group with its aim modestly set although organically progressive. On the other hand the so called 'Action Party' was not attached to any specific historic class and ultimately took the aims of the Moderate Party as those of its own. The inevitable if not rather simplistic conclusion, is that the Action Party was first guided in its aims, and then ostensibly submitted intellectually and morally to the Moderates. From the unfurling of these political events Gramsci stated the following;

The supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as 'dominant' and giving

<sup>3</sup> Gramsci. *Op. cit.* p 1818.

'intellectual and moral leadership'. .... A social group can, or rather must, have leadership even before gaining governmental power (this is a principal condition of gaining power).<sup>4</sup>

The intended reference to the Moderate Party continuing to direct the Action Party after the events of 1870-1876, is effectively describing Trasformismo in action:

...."Trasformismo" is not other than the parliamentary expression of this intellectual hegemonic action, morally and politically.<sup>5</sup>

From these observations, Gramsci's perception of the modern Italian state is that it is characterised by a continuing Trasformismo by an ever growing dominant class

Rather one can say that the whole life of the Italian state since 1848 onwards, has been characterised by Trasformismo, that is by a growing dominant class in the mould shaped by the Moderates after 1848....<sup>6</sup>

The clear interpretation here is that the moral and intellectual direction has been unchanged since these historic events. It has become *an aspect of the function of domination* inasmuch that the absorption of the elite from oppositional groups is to render them impotent for long periods to come. Added to this view is the evidence, quite apparent throughout advanced capitalism, that socialist political parties have a high proportion of their elite from the upper classes, a point which Gramsci was well aware.<sup>7</sup>

The historic development of Trasformismo therefore has always been regarded in its classical form as a parliamentary phenomenon of the elite moving from one political party to another, either as individuals or whole groups, accepting its moral and intellectual leadership.

Today classical Trasformismo may well be a continuing phenomenon in a diluted form, but it too has evolved to embrace the elite of the masses whose power is significant in the extent of the political movement they potentially hold. It is to this we can now pass.

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<sup>4</sup> Gramsci. Op.cit. pp 2010-2011.

<sup>5</sup> Gramsci. Op.cit. p 2011.

<sup>6</sup> Gramsci. Op.cit. p 2011.

<sup>7</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 396.

## **The potential for political change within liberal democracy.**

The idea that the present democracy can be changed, is based on the premise that society is a determining one, in which choices, given the conditions and circumstances, can be a process for social and political change. The problematic surrounding this thesis is contained in the following question. *What is it that impedes a democratic state from embarking on a process of radical political and social change from within ? Or put another way, can there be generated from within, a revolt against democracy itself ?* The whole construction of social and political change theorised by Gramsci, was in just such a manner. But from my following discussion we can begin to see how the modern development of advanced society makes his theory of transformation, difficult to ground in practise.

There is within liberal democracy a substantial latent power link between the individual and decision makers, although one's immediate thought is probably contrary to this view. The link, essentially the extent of cultural power that is transmitted, has to be viewed on the basis of its historical development and the practical outcome of the extent of freedom that is objectively available. It was Rousseau who had an aversion to the notion of representation of one's individual sovereignty by an elected representative, making in the process a sovereign Parliament. But it is nevertheless through this very process that the delegation of individual sovereignty is lost. The exercise of power is therefore awarded to others. Consequently as a collectivity, the masses have delegated power which is tested at periodic intervals to re-establish the political direction of that power. However the fact that power is delegated by popular suffrage tends to hide a major mechanism of democracy. That is, relinquishing direct power does not mean that its delegation has deprived the individual of the effect of that action, and the power that is transferred through it. For with the choice of delegate, is also transferred an element of the moral and intellectual leadership

that the individual has accepted as the philosophical viewpoint and directive in society. It therefore must follow that the masses who, one way or another, are participating and therefore subscribing to the moral and intellectual direction, transfers through their elected representatives the custodianship and maintenance of that fundamental viewpoint. Of course the question of how the moral and intellectual direction is attained by the masses, which includes the educated,<sup>8</sup> is essential as part of the logic of this thesis and to which I shall now pass.

Firstly it is necessary to discuss the concept of critical consciousness, and how it is related to the development of education and linked to the moral and intellectual direction. The question I must first pose is, how can we assess whether critical consciousness is indeed a contributor to the development of the moral and intellectual direction, and what section of the population if not all, subscribe to its development? To answer the first question, the premise taken from my general proposition, is that educational development and its subsequent diffusion throughout society giving wider conceptions of the world, has enabled significant proportions of the masses to rationalise with their present conditions of life and prevailing circumstances. Firstly the definition of critical consciousness that Gramsci associates with professional intellectuals is,

The capacity of professional intellectuals to ably combine induction and deduction, to generalize, to deduce, to take from one sphere to another, a criterion of discrimination, adapting it to new conditions ect; is a 'speciality', it is not something given from common sense.<sup>9</sup>

Gramsci makes clear that in his view, the ability to think critically is an intellectual function in the sense that it is for the 'trained mind'. But it is my view that the ability to deduce, to generalize and discriminate etc, must also be mental functions which have degrees of ascending efficiency according to the level of intellectual training afforded. In

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<sup>8</sup> As defined in this study (see Appendix 4 at the back of this thesis).

<sup>9</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 33.

other words, one does not arrive at the pinnacle of this intellectual state other than by intellectual development, a process in which the mind is applied to tasks in a methodical way. From this point of view my assertion is that at educational levels beyond the compulsory leaving age pupils are, by and large, submitted to mental training of increasing rigor that is pursuing a process of critical thinking, albeit at levels inferior to the professional intellectual. For instance media studies in secondary schools in the U.K., instill the idea of interpreting the meaning, its distortion or otherwise, of transmitted information relative to the world they can observe.

It is an exercise in discrimination, training the mind to discern between the information transmitted and what is real, either in the present or in an historical context. In Italy general studies of both a political and environmental nature, are introduced at the lower and upper secondary schools, which question Italy's many social and political controversies including nuclear, ethnic and pollution issues. These are raised in conjunction with the parents of the communities, encouraging critical debates, so that the pupils are not the recipients of a single viewpoint. But even more diffused than media studies and equally requiring relative levels of critical thinking, is the study of literature and history. Interpreting cultural meanings in different historical contexts, is no less a training ground for the organisation of thoughts and the learning skills required for later and more complex tasks in critical thinking. Consequently, the developmental process from which levels of critical thinking are acquired, is related to levels of education, in terms of the increasing specialisation and complexity of tasks to train the human mind in this form of mental function.

If the educated, significantly represented in the total resident population in advanced society,<sup>10</sup> have received scholastic training,

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<sup>10</sup> This is based on calculations of the number of people in the resident population that have qualified at diplomati , advanced ('A') and degree level in Italy and the U.K. (Italy 13.25% of the population of those 19 years of age and above, and for the U.K., 15.37% of those 18 years of age



acquiring relative levels of intellectual ability to critically think, how is the majority of this group then attributed with the inheritance and formation of the moral and intellectual direction, and their subsequent influence reflected in the masses as a whole? Indeed why should there be an homogeneous way of thinking to produce a moral and intellectual direction, engendered and historically developed from the masses? Certainly in a differential society, one would not expect to see such a cultural development produce attitudes, opinions and beliefs, that would conform to universal conceptions of the world. The process of critical thinking even in its elementary phase of development, is to produce precisely those mental characteristics which defy homogeneity, other than as a rational outcome of the choices available. This could lead to consensus, the latter not necessarily reflecting a universal opinion, but an agreement to comply.

The relationship between the masses in society, to which I include here the intellectuals, and the moral and intellectual direction, is an historical one. Its epistemology is based, as Gramsci has described it, on the way philosophy is a conception of the world. He states

that philosophical activity is not to be conceived solely as the "individual" elaboration of systematically coherent concepts, but also and above all as a cultural battle to transform the popular "mentality" and to diffuse the philosophical innovations which will demonstrate themselves to be "historically true" to the extent that they become concretely - i.e. historically and socially - universal.<sup>11</sup>

By referring to the *'cultural battle to transform the popular "mentality"'*, Gramsci is indicating that cultural activities at various levels which come into contact with one another through the use of language, and what has become 'common sense', lead to collective action. This relationship, which is constantly ensuing between different cultural strata, he describes as developing in the following manner,

An historic act can only be performed by "collective man" and this presupposes the attainment of a "cultural-social" unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills,

and above, both for 1981)

<sup>11</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. pp 1330-1331. (PN. pp 348-349)

with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of a common conception of the world, both general and particular, operating in transitory bursts (in emotional ways) or permanently where the intellectual base is so well rooted, assimilated and experienced that it becomes passion. Since this is the way things happen, great importance is assumed by the general question of language, that is, the question of collectively attaining a single cultural "climate".<sup>12</sup>

On this basis= Gramsci argues that there is an educational relationship between the new generation and the old, where contact and experiences are absorbed. This then develops to the extent that it becomes historically culturally superior<sup>13</sup>. This he claims, exists between intellectual and non-intellectual, elite and followers, rulers and ruled, so that,

Every relationship of "hegemony" is necessarily an educational relationship and occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which the nation is composed, but in the international and world wide field, between complexes of national and continental civilisations.<sup>14</sup>

If we can deduce from what has been written above, that the social relationship between different cultural strata in its activity, is an hegemonic one, that is, it provides the fundamental viewpoint for a whole society a moral and intellectual leadership, then the relationship between society's intellectuals and the non-intellectuals, is an integral and substantial part of this process. Thus we have the link between the critical thinker and the moral and intellectual direction of society, the thinkers' relationship with history and his environment, which is then translated by the same educational process to the non-intellectual, who becomes an elemental contributor to the collective viewpoint and world conception.

### **Consensus of the Masses.**

The readiness of so many individuals to act in conformity with the majority, a condition of solidarity, does require some explanation as to

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<sup>12</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1331. (PN. p 349).

<sup>13</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1331. (PN. p 350).

<sup>14</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1331. (PN. p 350).

the type of compliance that must be present. To return to Gramsci's analysis above of the historical relationship between the masses and intellectuals, that is, the transforming of the *popular mentality* so that what is *historically true* becomes *socially universal*, is for Gramsci, a complete and rational answer. However in the light of some theoretical development in this area and the researches of both Almond and Verba (1963) and M. Mann (1984) in particular, some useful comments can be added.

To act in conformity with the moral and intellectual leadership of society, requires some form of compliance if one is to reasonably assume that Gramsci's historical account, although establishing how initial commitment to authority is produced, is still found wanting. One can start from the undisputed observation that there is of course some consensus in society, for without it there can be no basis for legality.<sup>15</sup> But to argue what type of compliance exists within the notion of consensus, is also to assume that the masses have not necessarily wholly accepted what is *historically true*, but conform for different reasons. Here the researches of both, Almond and Verba and Michael Mann, are relevant for different reasons.

One may regard that to establish a majority consensus is sufficient without necessarily knowing the specific reasons for conformity. This under certain circumstances I would accept, but it will not do for those intent on developing a counter-hegemony, and Gramsci's assumption of the extent and effectiveness of revealing the *historical truth* is dependent on it.

Michael Mann in his research of the social cohesion of liberal democracy in the U.K. and the United States, asks the following question,

(To) what extent do the various classes in society internalize norms, values and beliefs which legitimate the social order ?<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> P. S. Cohen. *Modern Social Theory*. Heineman, London. 1975. p 145.

<sup>16</sup> M. Mann. *The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy*. *American Sociological Review* 35 (1970): pp 423-439. Also in *Classes, Power, and Conflict*. Edited by Anthony Giddens and David Held. 1984. p 376. ( pp 373-395).

The question might well contain in its general meaning the following, *to what extent do the various classes in society internalize the values of the moral and intellectual direction in a liberal democracy ?* And also the statements requiring responses contain under the heading, *Harmonistic and Conflictual Images of Society* , the character that could be adapted to suit my question in a meaningful way.<sup>17</sup> From the interpretation of his results, Mann concludes that,

A significant measure of consensus and normative harmony may be necessary among ruling groups, but it is the absence of consensus among lower classes which keeps them compliant. And if we wish to explain this lack of consensus, we must rely to some extent on the Marxist theories of pragmatic\* role acceptance and manipulative socialization.<sup>18</sup>

One could interpret from these findings that either Gramsci has been at least in part correct in his assertion that the educated have transformed the *popular mentality* , to the extent that they see no other acceptable alternative. Or that the internalization of the moral expectations of the ruling class, has not been wholly achieved. Which ever interpretation one makes, it does not reject Gramsci's historical analysis in terms of consensus, only that the type of compliance which produces conformity has not been established.

The research of Almond and Verba, leaves some difficulty as to how one should assess the type of compliance present in the masses, primarily because the least educated in both Italy and the U.K., produce quite different results. There appears to be a relatively high level of political awareness of the least educated in the U.K. compared to that in Italy.<sup>19</sup> The latter case lacking, both in interest and political information. As the researchers measure of political cognition was based on *subjective estimates of exposure to political and governmental*

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<sup>17</sup> M. Mann. Op. cit. Table 2, pp 380-381.

<sup>18</sup> M. Mann. Op. cit. p 391. \* Mann distinguishes between two types of acceptance of consensus: **pragmatic** acceptance, where the individual complies because he perceives no realistic alternative, and **normative** acceptance, where the individual internalizes the moral expectations of the ruling class and views his own inferior position as legitimate.

<sup>19</sup> Almond and Verba. Op. cit. Table 11.6, p 57.

*affairs*,<sup>20</sup> i.e, essentially through respondents ability to identify politicians at the national level, they accept that they have tapped only a *limited aspect of the capacity to use knowledge*. And yet in the same research, which includes also Mexico, they too at the lower educational level lacked information, but always readily gave opinions. Consequently the lack of cognition is in the Italian case, according to Almond and Verba, related to the lack of political interest and therefore alienated. This might well be so, but it does not explain very satisfactorily why the results for Mexico should be so completely different. I am of the view that there is a deeper cultural reason for Italy's lack of political awareness among the less educated, which lies in their disenchantment with politicians since the Unification of Italy in the last century. But even this on the evidence produced, shows that it diminishes with the acquisition of education. As Almond and Verba state,

Within each nation the more educated segment is more fully involved in the political system, is more fully a participant in politics. The less educated segment is less likely to take a full participating role.<sup>21</sup>

If we take into account that Italy's resident educated has increased by nearly threefold since 1961, then the logical conclusion based on Almond and Verba's own statement above, is that there must be an increase in the trend of political participation. However one is again still left without establishing the type of compliance within the apparent consensus from the masses. It does appear that the only reasonable conclusion here is that, without a level of cognitive development, which is sufficient to enable a 'mental' participation in politics, the type of responses produced, will be inadequate to determine the nature of compliance present. Once again, as with Michael Mann's research, Almond and Verba's findings do not disprove Gramsci's historical analysis.

### **Mediation.**

The acquisition by the masses of the moral and intellectual

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<sup>20</sup> Almond and Verba. *Op. cit.* p 57.

<sup>21</sup> Almond and Verba. *Op. cit.* p 319.

direction, cannot be other than by an historical process involving conflict. The evidence for this is clearly seen in the relationship existing between the state and civil society. For example, the levying of fiscal requirements, licensing of all kinds, military obligations, policing, and a whole range of subsidies, must reflect not only the potential for the permanent existence of conflict, but also the political nature of the control that must be present. It is within this context of conflict that the principle of mediation is the focal point in collective action, which reveals the social relationship adopted to resolving competing ideas and practices. It is primarily the process of mediation as practised by parliamentarians, the decision makers, that is my specific concern here. As in exchange theory, reciprocal exchange can be based on an equality of exchange, where the participants have an understanding of what is required from each.

But parliamentary mediation commences as a process in which the balance of power is for the most part, unequal and its purpose is to shift the balance so that advantages and disadvantages are negotiated. Specific to the parliamentarians where power has been delegated, the process of mediation is one that takes its strength from the distribution of power located in the sectional interests represented by groups or individual members. Without this distribution of power the principle of mediation would become unnecessary.

But the important question which now arises, is to what extent can the moral and intellectual leadership, delegated in the manner described, defend its dominant position during the crucial stages of mediation? The question bears directly on to the strategy adopted by Gramsci in theorising a counter-hegemonic struggle, which is the subject of chapter 7. The answer to this question lies in who has the political authority, that is, legitimate political power.

Claus Offe (1978)<sup>22</sup> in his article stated below, cogently argues

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<sup>22</sup> C. Offe. Political Authority and Class Structures—An Analysis of Late Capitalist Societies  
International Journal of Sociology Vol.II, No.1. 1972, pp. 73-105. Also excerpt in Critical

the location of political authority in a democratic society, and whether *authority is vested in the constitution or privilege power groups*. Certainly from the argument I have pursued here, that legitimacy is claimed by the masses in the moral and intellectual leadership they hold, thus making political parties and institutions subordinate to that authority. This view does not accord with the explanations of the modern democratic systems as espoused by conflict and integration theories<sup>23</sup>, as neither supports the notion that political authority is indirectly derived from the masses. But it does follow from my argument, substantiating the claim of political authority by the masses, that the question above relating to how the moral and intellectual leadership is defended in liberal democracy, takes a prejudicial position. By this I mean that even in a democratic system there must be an *a priori* position on which mediation is based. The process commences on the assumption that its political authority is derived from the moral and intellectual leadership.

### **Parliamentary Consensus.**

There is a qualitative difference in content between the consensus found in the acceptance of the moral and intellectual

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Sociology edited by Paul Connerton. Penguin Books 1978. pp. 388-421.

23 These two models of society, conflict or coercion on the one side and consensus or integration on the other, have been surrounded by much controversy. Essentially, with the former model one associates characteristics of coercion, division, hostility, dissensus, conflict, malintegration and change. For the latter model, the associated characteristics are, cohesion, solidarity, consensus, reciprocity, co-operation, integration, stability and persistence. (These model attributes are taken from Modern Social Theory by Percy S. Cohen. Heineman, London. 1975. p 166). Writers that one associates with conflict models are, K.Marx, K.Mannheim and C. Wright Mills, see R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society, Stanford University Press, Cal. 1959. Those associated with integration models are T. Parsons. An Outline of the Social System. In Theories of Society (T. Parsons, E. A. Shils, K. D. Naegle, and J. R. Pitts, eds.), Free Press, New York. 1961. S. M. Lipset. Sociology of Democracy. Newwied, 1965.

direction, and the consensus ultimately produced as an everyday process from the decision makers of society. On the one hand the apparent consensus of the moral and intellectual direction, becomes accepted by the majority predominantly by the cultural inculcation already described above. But the everyday consensus of the decision makers, which is primarily my concern as the holders of delegated power, is preceded by the mediatory process. The very presence of such a process implies that dissent is negotiable, with a reasonable prospect of an agreement to accept the majority decision, a consensus.

The content of this consensus is in my view, unlike that produced by the masses, because it is primarily based on a rational agreement of circumstances and/or events at a moment in time. However apart from this difference, the concept of consensus itself means different things to different writers. For example, Almond and Verba (1963) in their research of five countries, which includes also Italy and the U.K., stress *trustworthiness and co-operation* as forming the basis of consensus. Lipset (1963), stresses generalized beliefs in equality and achievement, a commitment to 'ultimate values'. Dahl (1967); McKenzie and Silver (1968), regard social norms and adherence to the 'rules of the game' as important. The *rules of the game* and *co-operation*, may be the most powerful of these attributes, if one accepts that through the principle of mediation, the *a priori position* of the moral and intellectual direction is preserved. The concept of trustworthiness is one that might reasonably follow from this position. The statement below from Almond and Verba supporting a consensual view among the elite, is based on a logical deduction of human behaviour and pragmatism,

If there is no consensus within society, there can be little potentiality for the peaceful resolution of political differences that is associated with the democratic process. If, for instance, the incumbent elite considered the opposition elite too threatening, it is unlikely that the incumbents would allow a peaceful competition for elite position.<sup>24</sup>

While Almond and Verba's research in this respect concentrates on the citizen level regarding the management of cleavage, which essentially

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<sup>24</sup> Almond and Verba. Op. cit. p 358.



subordinates conflicts on the political level to "*some higher overarching attitudes of solidarity*", they can see no reason why cleavage is not managed by the elite in the same way. They state,

This balance (between consensus and cleavage), furthermore, must be maintained on the elite as well as the citizen level. Though our data are not relevant here, it is quite likely that similar mechanisms operate on the elite level as well. The elaborate formal and informal rules of etiquette in the legislatures of Britain and the United States, for example, foster and indeed require friendly relations (or at least friendly words) between supporters of the opposing parties. And this tempers the intensity of partisanship. It is not that partisanship is destroyed as a significant force; rather, it is kept in place by more general norms of social relationships.<sup>25</sup> (my brackets above)

The point here is that Almond and Verba see no reason to draw a distinction between the citizen and the elite level in the form of consensus that emerges. However as they do not include Italy in the above, the conclusion that might be reached here is that the level of trust and co-operation at the citizen level, which is much lower for Italy than for Britain and the United States<sup>26</sup>, can also be reflected between the elite at the political legislative level. It could be argued that their research from today's viewpoint, might be considered as bearing the effects of the aftermath of the second world war, and therefore not entirely significant when related to contemporary attitudes. But as they further claim, and indeed supported by my arguments above and in chapter 1, (The Italian Case), Italy's short political history since the Risorgimento, has imbued attitudes of mistrust in the state and politicians. Further and to some extent contradictory, it is the consistent argument of Almond and Verba that education affects an individual's political attitude.<sup>27</sup> This introduces an important factor which was not previously present in 1963, at the time of their research, and relates to the extent that education has expanded in all countries, and particularly for Italy. Also with respect to the higher educated, according to Almond and Verba's data, all countries researched, displayed

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<sup>25</sup> Almond and Verba. Op. cit. p 360.

<sup>26</sup> Almond and Verba. Op. cit. see table IX.2, p 213.

<sup>27</sup> Almond and Verba. Op. cit. p 316.

the same characteristic regarding trust and helpfulness of others<sup>28</sup>, which is greater than for the lower educated. The only conclusion one can draw from this is that the educated elite, the decision makers in this case, are more likely to be consensual regardless of their political orientation.

### **Summary and comments.**

By examining a small but important part of liberal democracy, I have tried to show the extent of autonomous movement which exists and where some mechanisms operate.

Modern Trasformismo in the conceptual framework discussed, encompasses this autonomous movement and can be seen on the one hand as having the capacity to continually assimilate and adjust to new situations, through a process of education, mediation and consensus. And yet on the other it can also be seen as vulnerable, where a counter-hegemony can potentially develop, first through the development of a new culture, and then subsequently as a political movement.

It was from the historical events of the Risorgimento, that Gramsci conceived of how the dominant moral and intellectual leadership was reinforced, not by the masses, but as a parliamentary phenomenon of elite moving from one power bloc to another as individuals or groups. In the new conception of what I have termed 'Modern Trasformismo', the elite are no longer, in advanced society, the domain of any single political party, but diffused throughout all society's institutions, and representing a significant although a minority proportion of the masses. It is this fundamental difference of how political authority now emerges from the masses, in the form of the moral and intellectual leadership, which gives liberal democracy both its potential to shift its ideological position, or to continually reform its institutions.

The emphasis for the development of Modern Trasformismo has

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<sup>28</sup> Almond and Verba. *Op. cit.* p 318.

been argued as one which is pedagogical. Commencing from Gramsci's assertion that the dominant hegemony is a collective cultural activity, between the educated and the 'popular mentality', to the ultimate forms of consensus which demonstrate that educational development is strongly connected. But can one refute the pedagogical relationship and still have adequate grounds to explain the present social and political development? If we dismiss Gramsci's epistemological explanation of the growth of cultural hegemony, by collective activity between different levels of cultural groups, how do we then explain the growing consensus between those who are educated and those who are not, and more specifically, what was causal to this consensus.

This finally brings me to the contentious argument of the functionalist approach as an explanation of social processes. It is difficult to avoid stating, that the idea of progress of western societies, which education has seemingly favoured, is not in evidence. But it would be equally difficult to deny the affect of education on the masses, or that conflict and consensus reside together.

One can view the development of Modern trasformismo as producing an everyday process constructing a social world, which is then constantly leaning towards adaptation of surrounding changes. But equally one can also argue the extent of conflict present, and the type of compliance producing consensus. This is also a process constructing the social world, and can therefore make the notion of progress seem less favourable. As both of these two statements are valid, they must both be a representation of objective reality. I think that this is a good example of how various social processes, defy rejection.

## Chapter 7.

### The 'Integral state' and the nature of opposition to political change.

#### Introduction.

If political science means science of the state, and the state is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules, then it is obvious that all the essential questions of sociology are nothing other than the questions of political science.<sup>1</sup>

As we have seen in chapter 2, the concept of the state, is not viewed by Gramsci as a repressive instrument at the behest of the dominant forces, but assimilates all the educative functions so that the entire cultural bloc comprising the whole of society, becomes indivisible from the state. To be sure, the state has the capacity to call upon coercive forces in the last instance to maintain control. But primarily, the whole conception of the extension of the state, as Gramsci theorised it, includes the apparatus of hegemony and therefore is involved in the struggle for consciousness of the reality that is present. This is the crucial objective to which Gramsci's theory of change is directed. In the context of this study, the question of how different political parties are then integrated in the hegemonic apparatus of society, does imply that either the ideological basis for their existence is not in conflict with the dominant hegemony, or that a true understanding of their class position has not been properly assessed. The issue here is, can we assume that the development of political parties and the moral and intellectual views they hold, are categorised simply as those that are of the dominant moral direction and that the rest are subordinate to the criteria set, or is the development of the dominant moral direction, one

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<sup>1</sup> Gramsci. Op.cit. p.1765 (FN. p 244).

that is emerging as a collective contribution by all participating parties due to the characteristics engendered by *Trasformismo*. While each political party attempts to stamp its superiority over others, the persistent participation as a collective mediating body, makes the struggle for consciousness of a specific class, harder to maintain.

The concepts of the 'historic bloc' and the 'relations of force', already introduced in chapter 2, together underpin the idea of how a potential counter-hegemony can evolve. The existence of a dominant cultural hegemony, has been the result of a process of historical development, from which the events that combined to produce relations of forces (footnote 8 chapter 2), have stamped their bench marks on history by the formation and development of an historic bloc. If, as we understand from Gramsci's theory of the integral state, that there are many historic blocs at various levels of development and subordinate to the dominant bloc, then the idea of political change presupposes that one group's political development and distinct ideological direction will, given the means through the objective conditions presented, overpower the dominant hegemony by its own superior moral and intellectual direction. But is it also possible that advanced society's development, and the changing configuration of its dominant historic bloc, is no longer able to completely assimilate the hegemony of other political parties, whose resistance is manifested by a collective role in shaping the form and content of the moral and intellectual direction? My point here is that if one is to accept the concept of the relation of forces and its role in making real the events that combine to form a dominant historic bloc,<sup>2</sup> then we cannot ignore other events that have subscribed

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<sup>2</sup> What must be remembered here is that Gramsci conceived the concept of the relations of forces for his own particular ends relating to achieving radical change. However, as I argued in chapter 3, this concept is equally explained as social change and as such we must consider, to put it in Merton's terminology, not only those functions that are manifest but also those which are latent. I cannot regard it as legitimate for Gramsci to choose those events of history, important as they were and no doubt significant in their

to producing the present political party development, i.e., advanced society's relative stability and political polarising<sup>3</sup> trend.

My aim here is to show how the present development of political parties for both cases, is diminishing the ideological differences by their active participation in the political system.

My reason for developing the above, is to show that Gramsci's notion of integrating conceptually the state and civil society, is flawed. His purpose was to combine the cultural and political blocs of society so that they could emerge as the dominant intellectual and moral order, as well as the state party. In the concept of the integral state, Gramsci sees the preparation of the state-party, 'modern prince',<sup>4</sup> as the embryo of the 'new order'.<sup>5</sup> The discussion here therefore is one showing why there is no reasonable conception of a 'unified collective will' that is related to a single political party.

### **The Integral State**

From the inception of Fascism in Italy in 1922 and the defeat of the proletarian revolution in the west, was for Gramsci, judging by his writings in the thirties, the birth of his conception of the state which challenged the marxist basis of viewing it in instrumental terms; i.e., the economic distinction between base and superstructure. The theoretical construction of the 'expansion of the state' when related to Gramsci's theory of revolutionary change, can apply to any form of class rule, although of course his aim was specifically socialism. The point here is that the nature of the political struggle to achieve change, entails equally understanding the nature of the state itself and that it is independent of class. Gramsci made the following

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influence on other events, as the only influences that matter.

<sup>3</sup> The term 'polarising' is used here in the sense that support for each political party has stabilized.

<sup>4</sup> Modern prince, the communist party.

<sup>5</sup> Christine Buci-Glucksmann. *Op. cit.* p 290.

statement in explicating the state which is a convenient point from which to proceed:

The concept of revolutionary and of internationalist, in the modern sense of the word, is correlative with the precise concept of the state and of class: little understanding of the state means little class consciousness (and understanding of the state exists not only when one defends it, but also when one attacks it in order to overthrow it); hence the low level of effectiveness of the parties, etc.

Gypsy bands or political nomadism are not dangerous phenomena.<sup>6</sup>

So by understanding the complexity of the state, the mechanisms that retain it (defend it) or release it (overthrow it), are better revealed. In the following I shall explain the present political party development in conjunction with Gramsci's notion of the Integral state.

The Gramscian concept of the 'relations of force', is really the foundation on which all other concepts follow.<sup>7</sup> The forces he has in mind that will lead to radical political change are the development of productive forces, the relations of political forces and those between political parties as well as political relations that are potentially military. We have already discussed in chapter 3, and footnote 41, that these *relations of forces* are characterised by *organic* and *conjunctional* moments, which require to be carefully studied in order that the correct 'moment' is observed for a subsequent and politically fruitful action to occur. To take no advantage of such a 'conjunctional moment' by the possibility it offers of effectively intervening, that is, by men's own will and capability is, in the context of transforming the political system, to have further contradictory situations. These conjunctional moments are dependent on phenomena that

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<sup>6</sup> Gramsci. Op.cit. p 326. (PN. p 275). The reference to 'Gypsy' really relates to the ease in which volunteers could be recruited due to the past social composition of Italy (a point mention in PN. p 203).

<sup>7</sup> This point is critically argued by N. Badaloni in *Direzione Consapevole e Spontaneita'* in *Ideologia e Azione politica*, Roma, 1972. p 73. Also a short account is quoted in Christine Euci-Glucksmann. Op. cit. p 71. The basis of the contention that has arisen among writers of Gramsci, is interpreting the social totality as something different from the historic bloc. Whether an historic bloc is created or not, Badaloni argues, is dependent on the objective conditions that make it possible.

are presented 'occasionally' or by accident, and carry only;

'minute weight in historical terms'.<sup>8</sup>

From the point of view of this study, these conjunctures have their significance in that they are themselves dependent on the movements that are regarded as 'organic' in the structures, and having evolved historically, are therefore 'relatively permanent'. If one considers conjunctural moments as the weak links in the permanence of structures, the terrain on which changes in society can be potentially made, then three statements can be posed;

1. That conjunctural phenomenon favourable to transformation, has not yet been presented.

2. That a conjunctural phenomenon has been presented, but is unrecognised by those disposed to radical political change.

3. That the development of the mediatory processes that characterise the development of modern Trasformismo, might be regarded as a buffer zone in which 'the opportunity of the moment', a formal explanation of political transformation, literally dampens the opportunity offered by conjunctural phenomena.

From the latter statement, the mechanism observed is an historical development that does not fit easily with Gramsci's idea of change. The terrain of Trasformismo must already be eliminated for a conjunctural moment, if recognised, to be exploited. The contradictions that have evolved in the structure and have, over an historical period, defied attempts by the dominant political forces to resolve them, have by theory and practice, mutated the conditions by which these contradictions can, within limits, be accommodated.

To return to the connection between the relations of forces and the forming of an historic bloc, it should now be apparent that the former concept must precede the formation of the latter. The conception of the historic bloc, which represents the consolidated expression of the relations of forces, and underpins Gramsci's theory of the integral state, reflects the historical

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<sup>8</sup> Gramsci. *Op. cit.* p 1579.



development of the economic base and the institutions of civil society. This is why Gramsci sees structure and superstructure as inseparable and leading dialectically to including the apparatus of hegemony as part of the state. The very basis on which an historic bloc is formed from the relations of forces, that is, from the objective conditions that made it possible, depends on the extent of a group or class, to organically produce and dominate it. Hence the very nature of the historic bloc, is that of the hegemony of the dominant class. Further, the state, by inheriting the dominant hegemony, embraces all the apparatus of hegemony as its own; i.e, private, cultural and ideological institutions.

We must now take the concept of the historic bloc a little further in order to see the practical development and location of political parties and the role of intellectuals in their political context. Gramsci defined the modern state (advanced society), in terms of its capacity to form an organic bloc. It follows from this that states other than the 'modern state', have not formed an organic bloc, or more probably, only partly so. The underlying criterion here is the extent of hegemony developed by a class to give the historic bloc its beliefs and values in such proportions as to be dominant. Other groups may also form historic blocs at varying levels of hegemonic development, the whole forming an heterogeneous configuration representing the historic development of the state. It is here we can see the theoretical division in the historic bloc, that is, whether the dominant class and its values are able to either contain and/or absorb the hegemony of other groups, or are there indications (organic) that the structural hegemony is disintegrating? The connection here is to see political parties as each having an historic bloc, among a complexity of blocs of many types of social groups, and also at varying levels of development, with their own content of material forces and ideological form. From this schema, we can now link the 'abstract reality' of the structure and superstructure, and

make concrete the *relations of forces* that have contributed to shaping the various historic blocs, with their differences and conflicts, into a practical form.

### **Political Parties.**

In essence, the integral state theorised by Gramsci, combining both the economic structure and civil society, permits elements of the historic bloc, represented by social and political groups, to make changes in the economic, political and social realms. This reciprocal capacity, both the state's strength and weakness, shows how the conflicts in the superstructure, in society's institutions, reproduced by the heterogeneous nature of all aspects of their historical development, can change the configuration of the historic bloc both favourably or unfavourably to the dominant hegemony.<sup>9</sup> The arguments in chapter 6, showed

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<sup>9</sup> Gramsci's conception of the hegemonic apparatus, is to include all the institutions of the social totality, i.e, Education, Cultural centres of information, Trade Unions, Religious and private institutions of all kinds. It is worth noting here that N. Poulantzas, claimed that Gramsci had 'wrongly' included state structures in his concept of hegemony, as well as unacceptably extending hegemony to include working class strategy', in *Political Power and Social Classes*, London 1973. (p 226 and p 140 the former and pp 225-6 the latter criticism). This discussion is covered by Christine Buci-Glucksmann, *Op.cit.* particularly pages 59 and 184. As I have not been able to find a response by others to Poulantzas criticisms of Gramsci, I believe the observations I have made of Gramsci's writing regarding these two points, in Chapter 5, may have some validity. Nicos Poulantzas polemic in dismissing the inclusion of working class strategy as part of the hegemonic apparatus, implies that the hegemony of the working classes can develop and overcome the structures that have evolved around it. I have argued that the contribution of potential counter-political forces to the dominant system, is weakened by their participation through the processes of Modern *Trasformismo* (Chapter 6). Hence Poulantzas resistance to the inclusion of working class strategy, is understandable, but he is left without the tools for an alternative theoretical construction. What Poulantzas implies is that a working class strategy can gain hegemony over other hegemonic groups without cultural participation. Without participation there can be no conquest of hegemony. The consequent result of this is that the argument of Poulantzas is technically correct in that avoiding participation through the dominant hegemony, is also to avoid the mediatory processes that subordinate all social groups. However, it is difficult to see on what basis, and one assumes Poulantzas acceptance of the concept of hegemony, that working class strategy can

that the present development of both cases, in political terms, demonstrated a trend to accommodating the conflicts of different political ideologies by the presence and institutionalization of these characteristics in 'modern Trasformismo'. The conclusion here is, in Gramscian language, that the configuration of the dominant historic bloc has changed, as indeed it must, but not unfavourably to the dominant hegemony. It is primarily this link, the articulators of the mediating process of modern Trasformismo, the intellectuals, that would appear to offer an explanation to the constant source of political opposition, which ultimately fuels the dominant hegemony. This of course is contrary to the development required for radical political change, for it cannot lead to an organic crisis of the state, that is, a crisis of hegemony, according to the tenets of Gramsci's theory of transition.<sup>10</sup> I will first discuss the above in general terms, then examine it in the context of the two cases.

The extent of diffusion of intellectuals throughout advanced society, is obviously a relative term taken from one period to another. However accepting such relative differences as comparative from the data collected in this study, we know that educational expansion at the higher levels<sup>11</sup> has increased for both cases by over 32% for Italy and 25% for the U.K. between the years 1951 to 1983. In addition, the regional distribution of the

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become dominant.

<sup>10</sup> Gramsci. *Op. cit.* p 1603. See also footnote 2, chapter 2.

<sup>11</sup> See Tables 1 and 2 at the back of this thesis. The increase in the higher educated and its significance to the mass of ordinary people, lies in their diffusion throughout society as the 'educated become the educators' so producing through cultural assimilation, the form of development from which the moral and intellectual development of society is derived. The theoretical discussion relating to the notion of the 'diffusion of the intellectuals', was first mentioned in chapter 2, particularly footnote 35. Here the argument is related to the problem, as Gramsci saw it, of combining the state functions with civil society in order to avoid what he termed as 'direct domination' through traditional intellectuals or 'functionaries' of the state. The notion of intellectual diffusion was also the concern of the last chapter (6) regarding the development of critical consciousness and parliamentary consensus.

highly educated in Italy as part of the resident population, has more than trebled between 1961 to 1981. My point here becomes significant when we consider that the diffusion of intellectuals throughout advanced society today, can no longer be seen as a 'separation from the masses' as understood by Gramsci, and to which he based the ultimate development of hegemony for the working classes. He stated;

But it should be noted that in all countries, though in differing degrees, there is a great gap between the popular masses and the intellectual groups, even the largest ones, and those nearest to the peripheries of national life, like priests and school teachers. The reason for this is that, however much the ruling class may affirm to the contrary, the state as such, does not have a unitary, coherent and homogeneous conception, with the result that intellectual groups are scattered between one stratum and the next, or even within a single stratum.<sup>12</sup>

The reality of society's present development would suggest, again in relative terms, that while cultural differences are undeniable between sections of the population, the extent of cultural overlap does not readily equate with a 'gap between the masses and intellectuals' on the one hand, nor that there is other than a heterogeneous unity of the state on the other.

The result of this present development clearly does not demonstrate a trend towards a working class expansion in terms of a distinct culture and ideology. Indeed, quite the reverse, the advance of education has blurred the edges. Much has been written on the polarising of ideological positions, the separate factions within those ideological groups and the mediation constantly in progress within and between political parties. Here I will introduce a somewhat different conception of the effects of educational diffusion in society, that produces difficulties for theorising a unitary conception (see Introduction here) in the Gramscian sense, and in doing so, reveal why oppositional forces of an heterogeneous nature emerge.

The mediation constantly in evidence within and between political parties, the effects of widespread education, have

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<sup>12</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1394 (PN. p 342).

inhibited the progress of various ideological thrusts from achieving a singular moral direction that might potentially lead to dominance. We might say that each historic bloc has not been able to develop sufficient hegemonic force to reshape the dominant. But that is not to say that they have not reshaped each other, including the dominant configuration. Widespread education has not produced social groups with cultural values that are constrained as uni-directional, but to the contrary, have produced a wider conception of the world which enables them to assess values and beliefs beyond their own particular culture. It follows from this that the construction of hegemony, political, cultural and social, should not now be seen as a unitary conception embracing all in a particular party or group, but rather hegemony embracing diverse groups in different political parties. Hegemony has therefore been subject to change in content by society's re-distribution of social groups. The dominant hegemony of a specific class is not therefore the appropriate conception, dominance being characterised by an heterogeneous grouping crossing cultural barriers. The consequence of this developmental trend, can be demonstrated by the present state of political parties.

### **The Italian Case.**

Italian society politically distinguishes itself primarily from most other societies, by a democracy which is fragmented and polarised.<sup>13</sup> The pluralistic nature of Italian political parties, having at least 6 significant parties, is unusual among countries of advanced development. Sartori<sup>14</sup> has investigated the dual problem of ideological polarisation in Italy and the fragmentary party system, which constantly produces a coalition form of government. The Christian Democrats (DC) as the majority party, have found themselves in latter years persistently sharing

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<sup>13</sup> A. Levi. *Ipotesi sull'Italia: undici diagnosi per una crisi*. Il Mulino. Contemporanea 3. 1983.

<sup>14</sup> G. Sartori. *Teoria dei Partiti e caso Italiano*. Milano. SugarCo. 1982.

power, while the Communists (PCI), the second largest party, are constantly excluded, except for periods during 1976 and 1979. The ideological distance that separates Italian political parties, is often regarded as forming a pyramid, with the largest parties at the base, substantially divided, and the smaller parties at the top, much closer and less ideologically divided.

For the Italian case, political party development has shown four major characteristics, a plurality of parties, a polarising of different ideologies, political factions within parties and a significant anti-system party presence, as shown by the percentage of popular votes.<sup>15</sup> Firstly, the plurality of political parties in Italy undoubtedly owes much to the short historical period since the Unification. As Carlo Donolo rightly states;

Certain specific features are explained by the manner in which national Unification and the industrial revolution came about: a serious uneven development has resulted in the heterogeneous quality of the dominant bloc which has had two consequences: a) the primacy of the executive function and the art of mediation; b) the necessity to delegate to moderate non-capitalist parties the responsibility of producing consensus.....<sup>16</sup>

If the plurality of the Italian political parties is due to the historical processes following the 'Unification', then what causal reason could explain the lack of movement of different ideological groups? The whole implication of consensus politics, the diffusion of education and the crossing of cultural barriers, all combining to form the nature of Modern Trasformismo as the practical expression of capitalism, has resulted in a strong tendency to lessen the movement between different ideological views, or the polarising of political views as Sartori calls it. In terms of advanced society's political stability, the polarising trend should be considered a positive feature. The re-structuring of our conception of the dominant hegemony, while weakening the ideological purity of traditional political views, leads to a more

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<sup>15</sup> See table 5 at the back of this thesis.

<sup>16</sup> Carlo Donolo. Transformation of the state in Italy, in *The State In Western Europe*, edited by Richard Scase. Croom Helm, London 1978. p 191.

active terrain on which all the characteristics of *Trasformismo* are exercised.

Political party factions, while necessarily requiring a vehicle for their minority views, are to some extent encouraged by the polarising development to break the political impasse. They are equally the results of intellectual diffusion as any other collectivity, and a reflection of the development of different levels of critical thought. But as Gramsci recognised, they are also destructive to unity and radical social change. The consequence of their activity, is to produce the grist for oppositional forces to mediate with the dominant force; which is precisely what we see in reality. The place of political factions appear as appendages to more developed ideological forces, and although non-conforming in their argumentation, their presence serves the institutionalization of Modern *Trasformismo* and the need to reach consensus. Individually their future role cannot be easily predicted.

The strength of anti-system parties in Italian politics is substantial. One cannot overlook that their very survival is a paradox on such a scale, as reflected by the popular vote. Yet, is not the significance of this paradox to be found in the theoretical model presented here? That is, the disseminated values overlapping cultural barriers, have eroded ideological distinctions in favour of value interests. Sartori<sup>17</sup> for example, regards issues as being the basis of majority alignments and suggests that no single stable majority exists among the present political parties. Majority alignments will vary according to the issues considered, be it 'distribution of wealth' as an economic issue, or a 'crisis of legitimation', a problem which has been a serious one in Italian politics, or issues that have religious ramifications. The point is that again we see that practice, as it appears objectively to Sartori, requires that radical political change as theorised by

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<sup>17</sup> G. Sartori. *European Political Parties. The case of polarised pluralism*, in J. La Palombara and Weiner, eds. *Political Parties and Political Development*, Princeton University Press, 1966. p 6.

Gramsci, be modified. The hegemony previously conceived as structured around a group or class, to which the core ideology of that group reflected other values, is now re-structured to embrace a system of values that surpass class and ideological boundaries.

Fig. 1.

**U.K. and Italy-** Comparative table of political party characteristics and their effects on the political system.

Characteristic	UK/ITALY	EFFECT
<b>Plurality(Italy)</b> <b>(U.K.)</b>	plural system with 6 major parties Bi-polar system with emerging centre and regional parties.	Leading to coalition gov'ts Wider spread of ideological positions.
<b>Polarity(Italy)</b>  <b>(U.K.)</b>	positions of first two major parties DC, and PCI, have stabilized polarity while other parties are showing a declining movement. Conservative party has stabilised polarity, while other parties are showing positive movement.	Polarising of ideologies has developed the mediatory characteristics of co-habiting with anti-system parties. A fluctuating characteristic for the 'movement of groups' (tras'mo) but its trend over time is much the same as Italy's.
<b>Factions(Italy)</b>  <b>(U.K.)</b>	Multi-factional  Factions mainly to the centre and left	Thrives on political polarisation. As an essentially short term phenomenon it is an instrument of transition in Gramsci's 'war of position', although detrimental to unity. Characteristic of parties in oppos'n and destructive to gaining power.
<b>Anti-System Parties(Italy)</b>  <b>(UK)<sup>1</sup></b>	Substantial presence substantial but declining trend.  Possibly minor clandestine presence.	Allied with a plural political party In a plural party system, political radicalism is more inclined to compromise, Has seemingly reinforced, by its participation, the political system.

Note 1. It is doubtful that the functional radicalism associated with the labour party could ever justify it being categorised as an 'anti-system party'. Like the Italian PSI, they have become more moderate in recent years.

The U.K. case, presents a different political scene, but common characteristics in its modern development with those found in the Italian case. Specifically, I refer to polarising of ideologies, only in this case although the trend for the



conservative party has been remarkably consistent in this characteristic,<sup>18</sup> the labour party and centre ground have been much less so. If we return to the four characteristics of political parties of 'plurality', 'polarity', 'factions' and 'anti-system parties', we can construct a comparative table as shown in Fig. 1. For the U.K. case, my concern here with the two party system relates only to the effectiveness or otherwise, as a mechanism sustaining the continuity of advanced capitalism. Indeed, criticisms of its undemocratic nature as well as its demise, have been voiced since 1911, when Belloc and Chesterton<sup>19</sup> declared the necessity to be rid of it. More recently, Finer (1975), declared his opposition to the two party system, which is worth quoting because of its lack of development, rather than any inaccuracies;

As a result of this adversary system, 'extremists' succeed in capturing the control of the two major parties. The reason for this is that the parties are either on the right and left of the centre, but to achieve intra-party unity the left of the conservative party and the right of the labour party must compromise with their respective right and left wings; thus the conservative party is pushed further to the right of centre and the labour party is pushed further to the left.<sup>20</sup>

What I believe Finer has observed, was not a characteristic specifically associated with a two party system, but the type of compromise and ideological shift that are present in all political systems of advanced society. The pull towards the division of power, draws factions to compromise pragmatically in time, or wither away. We can already observe the labour party's shift to the right to confront the public shift that has been evident over the last decade. The extreme right position of the conservative party has succeeded in drawing all parties directionally. Hence if Finer's observations were correct, that is, specific to a two party system, they were not sufficiently enduring to persist, as history demonstrates. Sartori predicted more than 14 years ago, that the

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<sup>18</sup> See table 6 at the back of this thesis.

<sup>19</sup> H. Belloc and C.K.Chesterton. *The Party System*. London. Stephen Swift. 1911. p 157.

<sup>20</sup> S. E. Finer. (ed). *Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform*, London. Anthony Wigram. 1975. p 13.

two party system would probably change. From the position of hindsight, we have of course seen the emergence of a fluctuating centre ground, and where fringe regional parties may find more fertile activity. While this may not be a plural party system as the entrenched Italian case, it nevertheless represents a break in the political pattern and must be attributable to some aspect of the present development.

The polarising of ideological positions is not then a phenomenon specific to multi-party systems, as in the Italian case, but probably characteristic of a phase of relative political stability in advanced society's development. The advance of capitalism, by its educational processes, produces periods of ideological immobility on the one hand, and the greater development of *Trasformismo* on the other, that is, by the latter characteristic of striving for consensus. Ideological criteria are not always paramount. In this context, the intervals of polarisation or a lack of ideological shift, are not necessarily detrimental to the course of capitalism,<sup>21</sup> although they are, in Gramscian terms, conjunctures, in which the potential for radical political change exists, always supposing that other criteria relating to a crisis of hegemony are associated with this phase.<sup>22</sup> The point of relevance here, is one of 'issue voting', where Franklin's<sup>23</sup> research in the U.K. showed that 'issue voting' increased as 'class voting' declined. Notable 'issues' that have ignored class barriers in recent times are, the so called 'Falklands factor', and the rise in home ownership (mainly through the sale of houses formerly owned by local authorities). Both issues seemingly ignored the parallel development of rising unemployment and severe Trade Union legislation. While the Falklands issue relies on unifying the nation because of its

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<sup>21</sup> This is not a reference to the notion that all functions in capitalism are positive. I have again referred to this in the context of one of my general assumptions, "specific functionality" in chapter 9, including footnote 16 on J. Elster's criticism of M. Kalecki.

<sup>22</sup> See footnote 2, chapter 2, regarding Gramsci's 'war of position'.

<sup>23</sup> M. N. Franklin. *Op.cit.* 1985. p 128.

patriotic nature, the sale of houses traditionally reserved for those on relatively low incomes, is paradoxical in terms of working class long term interests. The logical assumption here is that the loyalty to working class solidarity, has given way to a wider conception of their interests, not in any sense to altruism, but to what this conception offers.

The decline therefore of the labour party and consequent gains of the conservatives, must, on the basis of the arguments presented here, be a transitional movement of adjusting developing attitudes. This view is supported by existing trends. For example, the decline of the Trade Unions as an effective representative force of the working classes, gives credence to the notion that other institutions of civil and *quasi* political forces of opposition, can replace their changing interests. The decline of Trade Union strength cannot be seen as an accident of the legislative measures of recent years, although undoubtedly it has been the coup de gras, but more the inability of the labour party to integrate an heterogeneous political consciousness among the whole working classes. And for good reason, the process of integrating the masses and intellectuals, which the advancement of education has brought, rejects the anachronistic values that are antagonistic to new conceptions. In this respect, the Trade Unions and some sections of the labour party, have failed to realise that a 'unitary' conception of the working classes, was inconsistent with the trend and diffusion of education. The inability to recognise what might be interpreted as a step towards a 'war of position' may also be regarded as a mechanism retarding socialism's development. For if this reality is the result of 'relations of forces', it has further contributed to the dominant historical bloc and shaped the developing circumstances in its own interests.

## Summary and Comments.

The aim of this Chapter has been to show that the present political party development is moving away, rather than towards, a unitary party-state<sup>24</sup> which could potentially produce a 'unified collective will'. By using Gramsci's conception of expanding the state, I have been able to compare the political party characteristics of the two cases, as a qualitative guide to determining their ideological development in terms of the effects of participation within the present political system.

The gradual trend to a more pluralistic party system in the U.K., and the same already historically entrenched in Italy, is consistent with the dialectic development between education and the masses which potentially holds the key to change in future history;<sup>25</sup> although not towards a unitary party state. One can comment in some detail on the above, especially as it is relevant to the development of today's advanced society and the model presented by Gramsci's theory.

The whole purpose of theorising the integral state, was for Gramsci, the methodology for preparing the *vanguard party* to establish the hegemonic apparatus for the eventual transition to socialism. From the writings of Machiavelli and a critique of Azzallini<sup>26</sup>, in which the latter writer appears to accuse

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<sup>24</sup> The evidence that underlying this trend is a social development which suggests attitudes and aspirations which are contrary to a unified political conception, is one of deductive logic rather than empirical data. This can be seen as inherent in a number of issues discussed. For instance, starting from the epistemological basis of action which was discussed in chapter 3 as a presupposition or first level assumption, has a normative and voluntaristic component. This suggests that purposeful actions in a pluralistic environment have goals directed by norms to maintain; and freedom to achieve that goal. Further in chapter 5, progress ideology and freedom do not suggest that purposeful action towards goals are also systemic. They may well be, but as I have argued further in chapter 8 'general assumption no. 14', individual purposes are not determined by the system but constrained by it. This would be wholly consistent with the normative element identified in purposful action. Finally, a 'unified political conception' is the antithesis of the pluralism argued as the fruits of educational advancement and levels of critical thinking.

<sup>25</sup> A .S. Sasson. Op. cit. p 230.

Macchiavelli of not taking into account constitutional law in his conception of a ready made state, Gramsci concludes that the 'Prince' as used in Machiavelli's work, could be interpreted as the 'head of state' and therefore as a political party. This idea, which the following quotation clearly expresses, reveals Gramsci's framework of thought;

... the 'Prince' could be a Head of state, or a leader of a government, but it could also be a political leader whose aim is to conquer a state, or to found a new type of state; in this sense, 'Prince' could be translated in modern terms as 'political party'. In certain states, the 'Head of state' - in other words, the element which balances the various interests struggling against the predominant (but not exclusivistic) interest- is precisely the 'political party'. With the difference however, that in terms of traditional, constitutional law it juridically neither rules or governs. It has 'de facto' power', and exercises the hegemonic function and hence that of holding the balance between the various interests in 'civil society'; the latter, however, is in fact intertwined with political society to such an extent that all the citizens feel that the party on the contrary, both rules and governs.<sup>27</sup>

It would appear that at least three aspects about the above statement, can reveal a number of interesting comparisons with the reality of advanced society today. Implicitly, the absorption of political society into civil society, a singular entity of political participation, seems to deny, either the existence of alternative thought and hence political opposition as understood in advanced society, or that there will be a monolithic evolution where dissension is minimal. There logically follows from this that the further development of intellectual and moral reform can be achieved unopposed.<sup>28</sup>

The assumptions that Gramsci makes are really outside the control of any single society. Firstly, the international relations of forces, which impose themselves on any developing 'historic

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<sup>26</sup> M. Azzallini. La politica, scienza ed arte di stato, in 'Nuovo Antologia', 16th Dec. 1929.

<sup>27</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 662 (PN. p 252-253).

<sup>28</sup> I have already mentioned in my comments on Gramsci in chapter 2, the contradiction of the notion of hegemony and the state forces as a combined bloc within the concept of the Integral state. The idea of unifying coercive and cultural institutions and still retain the notion of hegemony, fulfils the requirements of a normative and determined society rather than one based on philosophical choices.

bloc', must follow a simultaneous moral and intellectual development in order to avoid the infiltration of deviated views, the very essence of the growth of international socialism. Secondly, the contradictions to be eradicated in the structure and superstructure, even by new relations of forces produced by a combination of events arising from its own ideological relations of production cannot, as for the present dominant system, ensure that the climate of intellectual and moral reform will be continuous within the limiting tolerance set. One must remember here that advanced society's pluralistic system is mediated by the constraints of an institutionalised *Trasformismo*, which sets an unspecified limiting tolerance according to the criteria of any epoch. The philosophy of praxis enables man to take action, 'impelled by historic necessity, to transform reality'.<sup>29</sup> The idea that it will be continually necessary to adopt such a philosophy, is of course dispensed with by Gramsci's theoretical development of a future society where theory and practice become one, that is, where the theoretical and practical consciousness are united.<sup>30</sup> My point in chapter 4, was to underpin the importance of demonstrating that the development of advanced society depended on its dynamic nature. This of course contrasts completely with what one must assume is the relative immutability of a new society which evolves after the unity of theory and practice. In other words, in my view, there is no basis to argue in practice, and therefore impossible to ground in theory, that the 'common sense' of today will not change the political act of practice that 'impels man' to transform society continuously. Thirdly, the idea of political participation of the masses as a single ideological system hegemonically developed prior to transition, as the concept of the Integral state would suggest, might possibly be Gramsci's most revealing theoretical construct which leads to incoherence as a social system in the light of the present

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<sup>29</sup> Gramsci. *Op. cit.* p 657 (PN. p 249).

<sup>30</sup> This is discussed in chapter 8 relating to rational action.

development.

In making such comparisons with Gramsci's theory of transition, one cannot be other than mindful of the fact that Western development has substantially changed since the 1930s, and with it the perspective of revolutionary thought. While none of this changes the composition and theory of the state, as conceived by Gramsci, it poses problems for transition in its present form.

Finally, the re-structuring of the concept of hegemony, as I have explained it here, links the growing phenomenon of cross cultural common values rather than a class characteristic to the development of political parties. If this is an enduring trend, due to a majority contributing to a 'collective intellectual and moral direction', then we must conclude that this developmental phase of advanced society is weakening specific ideological roots.

## Chapter 8.

### The ideology of progress.

#### Introduction.

In chapter 5, I discussed the idea of progress in terms of the advancement of knowledge and how the teachers as educators, found difficulty in separating their obligations and values from those central to society and their pupils. There are two reasons for analysing 'progress' here. Firstly the rationality<sup>1</sup> of a political system is expressed through the interrelationship of its concepts, and the ideology of progress produced is the result of a diffused consciousness of this development. Secondly, there is also here the methodological necessity to interlink the conceptual relationships to demonstrate their effectiveness as an enduring social and political system. As such progress is not imposed but arises out of a process that is uniquely rational, in this case to advanced capitalism. Progress as an ideology, must then become an obstacle for any radical alternative perspective inasmuch that the dominant ideology of progress produces a coherent world view and is for the majority objectively true<sup>2</sup>;

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<sup>1</sup> The concept of rationality provokes some concern because of its rather liberal use. The possible conviction by many that this term denotes thought and action is the use I have already applied to its meaning in chapter 5. Here the term is used to apply to a totality of action. From Max Weber 'The theory of Social and Economic Organization, Oxford University Press. 1947. p 80. edited by T. Parsons, we have, "No single act can stand by itself or be valued on its own merits alone, but only in terms of its bearing on a whole system of rational conduct."

Weber gives it here the meaning of a system of actions that has been conducted according to rational norms. It is this meaning of rationality I wish to convey here.

<sup>2</sup> The problem of 'objective knowledge' of which Gramsci had much to say, surrounds his idea that objective knowledge has not yet been secured. Gramsci states, "Man knows objectively in so far as knowledge is real for the whole human race"historically" intergrated in a single unitary cultural system. But this process of historical integration takes place through the disappearance of the internal contradictions which tear apart human society, while these contradictions themselves are the conditions for the formation of groups and for the births of



if it appears to help meet their needs.<sup>3</sup> In this sense Progress understood as the practices and meaning constituting human activity, is, as Gramsci describes it, a perpetual 'becoming', the point at which critical thinking creates objective reality and acts further upon it.<sup>4</sup>

My aim in this Chapter is to look at the collective idea of progress from the point of view of how individuals link the norms and values that are central to society's pluralistic political development and moral and intellectual leadership.

### **Rationality, Motivation and The Ideology of Progress.**

Even with the formulation of a conceptual framework representing the structural dynamics of advanced society, one is still faced with the problem of establishing the internal logic (dialectic) of the rationality<sup>5</sup> sustaining capitalism. The past debates which have concerned theorists of the Frankfurt School, particularly Horkheimer, Adorno, Lukacs and Marcuse, have probably highlighted the difficulties rather than found solutions for a conception of reason of the logic of modern industrial society. By adopting a negative dialectic of progress, they (Frankfurt School) were able to criticise Weber's conception of rationality<sup>6</sup> because it did not include such concepts as

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ideologies which are not concretely universal but are immediately rendered transient by the practical origin of their substance. There is therefore a struggle for objectivity (to liberate itself from partial and fallacious ideologies) and this struggle is the same struggle as for the integration of the human race". Gramsci. Op cit. p. 1416.

<sup>3</sup> Thomas Nemeth. Gramsci's Philosophy. A critical study. The Harvester Press. Sussex. p.114-115. 1980.

<sup>4</sup> Gramsci regarded the philosophy of praxis also as 'a becoming', for action can only take place by the intervention of human will. Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1042.

<sup>5</sup> The notion that *rationality* or *reason* is a distinctive characteristic of human beings.

<sup>6</sup> Max Weber is credited with the most extensive use of this term and classifies all action into 4 types, *purposively rational* (zweckrational), action chosen to obtain ends, *value rational* (wertrational) where action agrees with conscious value standards, *affektual and traditional* (regarded as associated with rational action.

*freedom, justice and happiness*. This did not imply their rejection of Weber's conception of rationality, which reflected what they saw as the reality of advanced society, rather that there was an absence of a potential for a classless society with what they regarded as the reification of social relationships which resulted from the development of modern capitalism.<sup>7</sup> Therefore it was not the dialectic that was the problem but rather what they regarded as an *irrational society* which demanded an alternative dialectic of progress. Such a conception<sup>8</sup> did not see the transition of society as a development of progress, but rather a break from which freedom would be attained. This conception by the Frankfurt school and Marx's inability to reconcile an emancipated society to the development of advanced capitalism, continually in my view, demonstrates how freedom has been regarded less in dialectical terms and more by ideological commitment<sup>9</sup>. Jürgen Habermas's intervention into this debate by his introduction of the concept of *communicative action*, a theme which theorises the development of an integrated society by depicting its consensual nature through argumentation, and thereby in the process dismissing traditional dogmas, appears to contain the notion of a progressive acquisition of consensus as a development of consciousness.

At the heart of Habermas's thesis is that *communicative rationality* demonstrates validity claims and forms a social reality which can undermine previous values and beliefs. It is worth comparing the Gramscian conception of a social system's rationality with that of Habermas, so that we might see how each may serve this study in this particular respect.

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Max Weber. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisations*, Op. cit. p 147. p 115.

<sup>7</sup> Albrecht Wellmer. *Reason, Utopia, and Enlightenment*. in Habermas and Modernity Polity Press, 1985. p 44.

<sup>8</sup> Mainly that of Horkheimer and Adorno in the late nineteen thirties.

<sup>9</sup> As I have argued in chapter 3, voluntarism as an irreducible element within human action, cannot be regarded as unbridled freedom on the empirical level. Freedom is only realized through practice and not as an ideological commitment.

According to Gramsci, the philosophy of praxis makes everything that exists 'rational', that is, it had or has a useful function.

...that which exists has existed, that is, it had its reason to be in that it 'conformed' to a way of life, of operating by the dominant class, and does not signify that it has become 'irrational' because the dominant class has been deprived of power and of its force to give an impulse to the whole of society.<sup>10</sup>

On the other hand Habermas states,

There is no reason for assuming that a continuum of rationality exists extending from the capacity of technical control over objectified processes to the practical mastery of historical processes. The root of the 'irrationality' of history is that we 'make' it, without, however, having been able until now to make it consciously.<sup>11</sup>

Gramsci makes valued judgments relevant to each epoch, while Habermas is really saying that *a priori* development of consciousness is essential to extend rationality. Habermas continues from the above quotation by stating,

A rationalization of history cannot therefore be furthered by an extended power of control on the part of manipulative human beings, but only by a higher stage of reflection, a consciousness of acting human beings moving forward in the direction of emancipation.<sup>12</sup>

My interpretation is that both theorists are stating the same, despite what appears at first glance to be the opposite. Gramsci is arguing the rationality in each epoch of history with respect to the level of reason acquired by the development of consciousness. The latter view I deduce from Gramsci's own statement regarding the development of two consciousnesses, one practical and one theoretical.<sup>13</sup> Habermas, it can be argued, is

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<sup>10</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1776.

<sup>11</sup> Jürgen Habermas. Theory and Practise in a Scientific Civilization. Taken from excerpt in 'Critical Sociology. selected readings'. edited by Paul Connerton. Penguin books. 1978. p 346. (Theory and Practise . Published by Heinemann 1974. First published in 1963. English translation © Beacon Press, 1973. German text © Herman Luchterhand Verlag, 1953.

<sup>12</sup> Jürgen Habermas. Critical Sociology. Op. cit. p 346.

<sup>13</sup> The full text of Gramsci's statement of contradictory consciousness is as follows. "His theoretical consciousness can indeed be historically in opposition to his activity. One might say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory

also stating the same by *a higher stage of reflection*. The theoretical break between one epoch and another, implies only a different basis for reason, and not a previous *irrational* period.

Now to turn to the conceptual relationships that ultimately determine the framework for a rational system. It can be seen in my general proposition that among the assertions I make regarding rational purposeful behaviour, are the concepts of consensus and constraints or what Habermas describes as *communicative rationality*, although his arguments obviously do not conceive the same conceptual structure. I am referring here to the norms and practices which have institutionalized the structures of Modern Trasformismo which embrace the conceptual characteristics mentioned above. Habermas confers on advanced society a rationality confined to a technological horizon.<sup>14</sup> He argues we are no longer able to distinguish between practical and technical power, and that there exists a paradox,

In industrially advanced society, research , technology, production, and administration have coalesced into a system which cannot be surveyed as a whole, but in which they are all functionally interdependent. This has literally become the basis of our life. We are related to it in a peculiar manner, at the same time intimate and yet estranged. On the one hand we are bound externally<sup>15</sup> by a network of organisations and a chain of consumer goods. On

consciousness): one which is implicit in his activity and which in reality unites him with his fellow-workers in the practical transformation of the real world; and one, superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed. But this verbal conception is not without consequences. It holds together a specific social group, it influences moral conduct and the direction of will, with varying efficacy but often powerful enough to produce a situation in which the contradictory state of consciousness does not permit of any action, any decision or any choice, and produces a condition of moral and political passivity. Critical understanding of self takes place therefore through a struggle of political 'hegemonies' and of opposing directions, first in the ethical field and then in that of politics proper, in order to arrive at the working out at a higher level of one's own conception of reality. Consciousness of being part of a particular hegemonic force (that is to say, political consciousness) is the first stage towards a further progressive self-consciousness in which theory and practise will finally be one". Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1385. (PN. 333).

<sup>14</sup> Jürgen Habermas. Critical Sociology. Op. cit. p 332.

the other hand; this basis is shut off from our knowledge, and even more from our reflection. The paradox of this state of affairs will, of course, only be recognised by a theory orientated towards practice, even though this paradox is so evident: <sup>16</sup>

This he claims,

....can only be overcome by a change in the state of consciousness itself, by the practical effects of a theory which does not improve the manipulation of things and of their reifications, but which instead advances the interest of reason in human adulthood, in the autonomy of action and in the liberation from dogmatism. (continued from the above quotation).

Habermas, as he himself is aware, cannot be excluded from dogmatism in this statement, as he cannot foresee the form and content which advance the *interest of reason in human adulthood* or indeed of freedom itself. The paradox to which Habermas refers, between the *system and the life world* is the clash between the system's rationality and that of the rationality of the life-world, which is *communicative rationality*. Referring to this Richard J. Bernstein states, there is really no paradox,

there is no logical, conceptual or historical necessity that systemic imperatives must destroy the life-world.<sup>17</sup>

I certainly agree that there is no paradox to consider, but Bernstein has also added confusion to the issue. My whole point here regarding the idea of progress and a system's rationality, is that we are dealing essentially with the totality of man's activity in making a rational system. We cannot separate one from the other. In this respect I have argued later that the idea of self-sustaining systems<sup>18</sup> is not acceptable, consequently I reject the notion that systems have 'imperatives' as R. J. Bernstein states. Human beings have needs and imperatives systems do not.

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<sup>15</sup> Habermas is referring here to the concept of 'life world', society's development of norms and traditions.

<sup>16</sup> Jürgen Habermas. *Critical Theory*. Op. cit. p 333.

<sup>17</sup> Richard J. Bernstein. *Habermas and Modernity*. Op.cit. p 23.

<sup>18</sup> I refer here to one of my general assumptions no. 9 in chapter 9, "The assumption of systemic process".

### **Modern Trasformismo and the Ideology of Progress.**

In this study I have already made it clear that the development of Modern Trasformismo is the essence of capitalist progress. That is, its very development undermines the intervention of a radical political ideology becoming dominant. On the other hand Gramsci believes quite the reverse, arguing that transition to socialism can be achieved on the terrain of Trasformismo<sup>19</sup> in what I would describe as a bloodless coup d'etat.

My aim here is to show that the accommodation in advanced society of a permanent state of political conflict of an adversarial nature, which reflects the equally permanent contradictions in the system, has produced solutions which essentially constrain groups to make compromises of a moral, ethical and technical nature. The resultant outcome of this process as a totality of political activity, is the development of the notion of progress of capitalism. Man's progress or 'becoming' is dependent on resolutions of conflict, whether by the nature of argument, compromise or force. If ultimately capitalist progress is for the majority, a consensus reflection that the total practices of the political system is ideologically acceptable, then Trasformismo must be the final practical manifestation of it.

The whole development of a conflictual system, mediated by compromises and the antithesis of a radical socialist order, means there are no absolutes. It is of course a response to a contradictory system, a mechanism by which disparities are held between upper and lower limits in social and economic terms. The usefulness and possibly even the logic of its presence, was clearly a problem for Gramsci's view of a 'new order' although he appears to retain the notion of exploiting its presence (see footnote 18).

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<sup>19</sup> This is a reference to my footnote 3 in chapter 6 where Gramsci appears to imply that that on the terrain of Trasformismo it is possible to change the existing relationship of those in power " ...by slow pressure which cannot be impeded...".

But Gramsci's uncharacteristic lack of theoretical development in this area might be interpreted as further confirmation of the necessity to first see its disintegration before the eventual formation of a 'new order'. The order of priority for the progressive development of socialism is first cultural, from whence its moral leadership will emerge, and then followed by Gramsci's notion of transition in the form of the 'ethos of separation' (*spirito di scissione*).<sup>20</sup> There is in this sequence no coherent understanding as to why the processes of Modern Trasformismo with all its characteristics of accommodating pluralistic institutions as a consensual forum, will be displaced. Its continual presence and function then become an important mechanism sustaining capitalism. Contrary to Gramsci's thoughts, the development of Modern Trasformismo necessarily impedes that which is not consensual. Its accommodation serves a single function, that is, every political act unavoidably becomes a subject of mediation. Its outcome as a resolution carries with it the majority view, at least in constitutional terms.

But to return to the moral and intellectual direction as a process. The facts of history do present<sup>21</sup> in the Italian case an example that should not be ignored. It is not really in retrospect so surprising that the intervention of Fascism, although progressive industrially, did not destroy the intellectual and moral order of capitalism, primarily because it was not a dominant hegemonic force embracing all political groups. In fact,

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20 The concept of the 'Spirito di scissione' is described by N. Badaloni as 'the recognition of separation of the New fundamental class, with the end of "Transformation" or "Trasformismo" and its way of operating during its dissolution and the (actual) start of separation.

21 In an effort to avoid any idea of determinism projected by past history, Gramsci states, 'Certainly the philosophy of praxis is realised in the concrete study of past history, and in the actual creation of new history. But one can make the theory of history and politics, because if the facts are always individual and changing in the flux of historical movement, the concepts can always be theorised; otherwise one would not even know what is the movement or the dialectic and fall into a new form of nominalism. Gramsci. Op. cit. p 1433.

as its rule was characterized by a level of coercion, it could be argued that it was not strictly speaking, an hegemonic order at all. While the intellectual and moral leadership of Fascism had attained political power, they failed to undermine or entirely replace the cultural processes which had previously formed the dominant historic bloc and hegemony. This view is supported by the subsequent historical fact that the defeat of Fascism by force has since not seen its resurgence, except as a minor political party. The whole process of classical, and Modern *Trasformismo* as I have defined it, becomes one of minor *war of position* avoiding seemingly catastrophic endings. Gramsci, whose analysis of Fascism depicting its acquisition of power as a *passive revolution*, was that communism had lost its opportunity in the aftermath of the war (1919) to achieve power by the same means.<sup>22</sup> What Gramsci was not able to conclude by his early death, was of course the demise of Fascism, to which he might also have considered how communism would have succeeded in the long term, for there are parallels that could be applied. It is questionable for instance as to whether an alternative intellectual and moral bloc had developed sufficient expression to promote the conditions for the *ethos of separation* to be present as a preliminary to transformation. The facts are that Fascism was progressive in relative terms socially and economically, and without a working class following, a point that obviously concerned Gramsci. They did not, in accordance with Gramsci's own arguments, acquire hegemony of the masses before power was seized.<sup>23</sup>

The fact that these conditions were not met, only further supports my view that the intellectual and moral order of Italy's capitalist development, had remained intact. Again one must bear

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<sup>22</sup> Gramsci. Op. cit. p 912.

<sup>23</sup> This refers to Gramsci's statement that " A group can and indeed must, already exercise "leadership" before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power). This has already been quoted in footnote 43, chapter 2.



in mind that the fall of Fascism does not detract from the phenomenon of its rise to power.

For Gramsci, Fascism was not a corruptive intervention, but rather it possessed the ability to impose its transformistic activity on social structures and the industries of state, in the form of a passive revolution.<sup>24</sup> However, we are able in the post Fascist era, to consider whether its rise and fall fulfilled only a *conjunctional moment* from which its eventual collapse was re-appropriating history for advanced capitalism. Or on the other hand was it as Marx stated in his two principles<sup>25</sup> from the *Preface (to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy)*, thus indicating that capitalism had not yet run its full course. A yet further but more remote thought relates to the theory of regeneration by Giambattista Vico<sup>26</sup>, remembering that initially Fascism followed the path of the 'old right' or 'traditional right'. Such an idea however would be contrary to the progress inherent in the philosophy of praxis.

What conclusions can we draw from the above arguments, especially regarding the relationship between Trasformismo and the Ideology of progress ? It would appear necessary to see the 'fracture of history', at least in Gramscian terms, by a new

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<sup>24</sup> N.Badaloni. 1975. Op.cit. p 168.

<sup>25</sup> The two principles taken from Marx " Preface ( to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy), Early Writings, Pelican Books. 1977. p 424," are, (1) " No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions for their existence have matured in the womb of the old society. (2) Therefore mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, it will always be found that the task itself arises only when the material conditions for it's solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation." "Gramsci also stated these two principles while in prison and probably from memory as the version is somewhat different to the original above. Gramsci. Op.cit. p 455. (PN p.177),

<sup>26</sup> Gramsci rejected the romantic theory of regeneration of society. As Badaloni states " the history of two social groups (one in dissolution and the other in the ascendancy) do not develop on parallel lines, but through the conflicts that conditions the whole historical epoch. N. Badaloni Op. cit. p 168.

productive force, the *ethos of separation* as the starting point for the *war of position*, from which its beginnings spell a new rationality and Ideology of progress. It is of course precisely this that conflicts with the development of modern Trasformismo. The preliminary condition for radical change is impeded by the movement of heterogeneous groups whose mobility politically appears to be dependent on issues that reflect a broad conception of social, economic and political values, rather than distinctly class<sup>27</sup> (see also Chapter 7). If one is no longer looking at a 'new fundamental class' as an homogeneous group, then the nature of radical change based on class structure begins to fall away.

As I have argued previously, the class relationship between intellectuals and the masses, by the nature of the freedom present, is difficult to support practically. I draw two conclusions from the above. Firstly, the advent of the *proletariat as the universal class* has no coherence in the reality of the present development. Secondly, The triumph of capitalism emerging from its crisis of hegemony, which the rise of Fascism produced, cannot be easily dismissed. In all my previous arguments in this study, one must accept that the level of capitalist development achieved by Italy, although relatively young in its political unification, had permitted the movement of social groups within the sphere of active Trasformismo thus assimilating change but, without foregoing its intellectual and moral structure.<sup>28</sup> Further, the very continuity of Trasformismo

<sup>27</sup> The argument of declining class in terms of the division of labour and its replacement by other and possibly wider values, has in part been deduced by the logic of expansion and diffusion of the educated which, if the advancement of knowledge had reinforced class distinctions in any substantial way, society must reflect those divisions both socially and politically which in my view is not the case. Further the decreasing socio-economic difference between social groups is empirically valid as an indicator, as the unit of measure is based on working categories and therefore the division of labour itself.

<sup>28</sup> An alternative view is the Vicoian theory of regeneration (footnote 25), that it's Intellectual and moral structure was indeed lost but refound.

serves to reinforce the Ideology of progress if we consider the paradigm of Fascism as an attempted intervention. The failure of the latter to survive, poses the question as to whether submission to the ethos of Trasformismo initially, is an irretrievable step, making a process of radical change even harder and less likely. It must however be true to say that while Trasformismo is present, radical political reform must always be compromised for its accommodation, and thereby excludes its original radical nature and effectiveness. But the subject or subjects of that compromise are very much part of it and their 'becoming' albeit unwillingly, is a substantial contribution to the progress of the system.

## Chapter 9.

### **Theoretical arguments and empirical connections.**

My aim in this chapter is to attempt to establish the links between the theoretical propositions asserted in this thesis and stated in chapter 1, and the empirical world. Many of my arguments will be an extension of the previous chapters and in particular from those discussed in chapter 3, which laid the foundation for uncovering concrete empirical knowledge.

### **The functionalist method.**

The strategy I will adopt is to organize my data in a meaningful explanatory system, that is, a functional analysis for explaining all the social phenomena considered relevant. My conceptual model, which as stated previously has been at the outset of this study only loosely framed as an overall guide through the early chapters, and used to generate the broad explanatory structures, must now be organized in a more rigorous form so that each explanation of the elements comprising the system, can be identified as to its function.

Because of the present stage of development of systemic functional theory, the controversy surrounding its application to social reality will no doubt extend to criteria selected as adequate for verification. I am nevertheless of the opinion that together intrinsic and extrinsic criteria can serve as a rigorous guide to equating the 'degree of fit' between a selected model and social reality. The criteria to which I refer are general assumptions which are relevant to social systems and specific to the phenomena being analysed. These are at the level of functions and together can be conceived of as producing social phenomena. J. Lopreato (1971) argues in support of this view in his critique of Parsons' "equilibrium analysis". He states,

It follows that, strictly speaking, we are justified in speaking of actual phenomena as "systems" in the proportion in which the ideal system is isomorphic with, or accurately encompasses, the phenomenon it was constructed to represent.<sup>1</sup>

Sztompka lists a comprehensive but not necessarily conclusive number of assumptions which can be presupposed by an ascending complexity of functional systemic models.<sup>2</sup> These I believe are a useful guide to select, combine or add further to satisfy my model's image of social reality.

### **Type of functional model.**

There are of course different functional models which can be appropriately applied depending on the type of system being analysed. From my conceptual model constructed below in detail, the major characteristic is the linking of human motivational activity with the structure. It is from this conception of advanced society that the specific assumptions of my model can be formulated. These general assumptions therefore are selected to generate particular dimensions of possible structural variability within the model, and include those general to systems which are widely accepted.

In the context of this study and indeed for Gramsci, social structures are an integral part of human activity from the conscious or unconscious choices made. Such actions produced whether intentional and rational or unintentional, the final outcome or

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<sup>1</sup> J. Lopreato. *The Concept of Equilibrium: Sociological Tantalizer*. In 'Institutions and Social Exchange'. Op. cit. 1971. p 310.

<sup>2</sup> P. Sztompka. Op. cit. pp 58-96. Functional requirement or 'needs' of a system, is a concept that I feel should be defined more narrowly so that there is no ambiguity as to whether the needs are those specifically applied to the system, which includes both human beings and structures, or only to the human participants in the system. If 'needs' in a social system can only apply to human beings, the difference becomes important when assumptions are considered. One may question for example, that systems are only self-regulating through human will and not as a mechanism intrinsic to a system, which implies that the needs are those of human beings and therefore determining the system. There are a number of ramifications from this distinction that will be apparent later in my assumptions.

consequence is the result of a complex interplay between subjectivity and objectivity. The underlying requirement which might include all these activities as a social image of society, is the presence of human motivation. A partial system in advanced society such as the present study, can only be considered in the context of people in their relationship with social structures. All the assumptions on which my model is based and described later in this chapter, will include not only those normally accepted for simple functional systems, but also the particular assumption of motivation as a purposive act.

### **Functional Requisites.**

As Merton argues, whether tacit or expressed, there is embedded in every functional analysis the functional requirements of the system. He goes on to say that,

...this remains one of the cloudiest and empirically most debatable concepts in functional theory. As utilized by sociologists, the concept of functional requirement tends to be tautological or *ex post facto*; it tends to be confined to the conditions of "survival" of a given system; it tends, as in the work of Malinowski, to include biological as well as social "needs".

This involves the difficult problem of establishing types of functional requirements (universal vs specific); procedures for validating the assumption of these requirements; etc.<sup>3</sup>

Validating assumptions of system requirements becomes crucial as to what is included and excluded. However, recognizing a potential problem does not eliminate it, even though identifying procedural weaknesses is an essential part of any study.

The question can be put as follows, what are the functional requirements of the system as framed in my general proposition? This refers essentially to what must be done if advanced society is to continue. The simple answer to this is, the functional requirement or needs of the system is to maintain the motivation for a disparate society in social and economic terms. If the functional orientations lead to the

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<sup>3</sup> R. K. Merton. *Op. cit.* p 106.

specific notion of progress which characterizes advanced societies, then the assumptions of my conceptual model must be consistent with this requirement.

The essence of the functional analysis I shall attempt is to particularly distinguish elements that have either been shown to be essential from empirical data, or that there is a logical reason for their presence. For example, education at higher levels, regional differences, socio-economic differences, ideological differences, individual freedom, normative values, consensus, ect., All these elements together constitute a system and contribute to some preferred partial state or requirement.

### **Conceptual model.**

The conceptual model I shall construct from explicating my propositional statements, really serves two purposes. By showing the interconnections between propositions, I am revealing the possible broad mechanisms<sup>4</sup> that appear to be operating through which functions are fulfilled. But the explanatory knowledge required for isolating these mechanisms must include knowing the 'situation' which relates to them. So by explaining functions we can also specify what should be done in order to bring about a mechanism of a certain phenomenon. Explaining a situation does lead to the possibility of theorising what should be done to modify or transform it. As Meehan (1968) says,

An explanation is an instinct that suggests ways in which man might in principle intervene in empirical situations to alter the course of events.<sup>5</sup>

But all this depends on theories being able to explain the functions contained in its propositions, so that every question 'why' relating to a social phenomena, can furnish an explanation of that proposition in the form of 'because'. The question is how do we explain these adequately in order to find the interconnections of functions which relate to

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<sup>4</sup> Definition of mechanisms as stated by R. Merton in footnote 6, chapter 1.

<sup>5</sup> E. J. Meehan. *Explanation in Social science: A System Paradigm*. Homewood: Dorsey Press. 1968. p 21.

elements which can be considered as mechanisms ?

### **Specification of conceptual model.**

In order to explain the interconnecting assertions of my general proposition, I require some criteria on which distinctions can be made. There appears to be little agreement as to a common methodological approach to functional analysis, which makes it necessary to be somewhat eclectic in ones view. However, I have in this respect borrowed heavily from Sztompka (1974) as a guide to formalizing a methodological structure, which in my view does permit replication.

Sztompka owes the basic structure for explaining propositions in a rigorous form to Nikitin (1970) who outlines the broad framework in the following,

By a system of explanations I understand a set 'W' of explanations which satisfies the following criteria: (a) it consists of more than one explanation, (b) for every explanation 'W1' in this set, there is at least one explanation 'W2', such that either one of the components of explanans of 'W1' is also an explanandum of 'W2', or an explanandum of 'W1' is also one of the components of explanans of 'W2', and (c) all the explanations in the set W are connected in a unified logical structure, which allows to move from one to the other by means of a finite sequence of logical operations.<sup>6</sup>

It is a pyramid of explanations, one on top of the other so that each is logically linked by the properties previously explained. In this respect, what has been previously explained has also been the subject argued theory or deductive logic. The following expands in some detail the method of this approach.

(1a) I can begin this propositional structure by first explaining the individual assertions made, that is, my general proposition which is it self a system of explanation linking one proposition to another, can be further clarified giving them the individual status of explained propositions (explanandum). All these propositions have in one way or another, been the subject of the previous chapters, and therefore in

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<sup>6</sup> E. P. Nikitin. *Objasnienije: funkcyja nauki*. (Explanation: the function of science). Moscow: Izdatielstwo Nauka. 1970. p 242. Cited in Sztompka, op. cit., p 21.



terms of the assertions made have already theoretical support. I am commencing therefore on the basis of having already logically argued its validity upon which my pyramid can be further constructed.

(1b) Those explained propositions (explanandum), can now generate explaining propositions (explanans), and necessarily require some way on which it has a scientific basis for evaluation, i.e., it is suggested by Sztompka that its *object* and *properties* are specified. For example, from my own proposition, to ask why are 'geographical regions disparate' describes not only the object, 'geographical regions', but also its property of being 'disparate'.

(1c) However we still need to know what is its scope, that is, on what assumption is this based? at this stage we have no reason to accept that it is true or false, although much of my earlier arguments would suggest that it is at least real.

### **Validity of explanation.**

The above is a specification for explained propositions (explanandum), but how should one deal with the relationship between these and explaining propositions (explanans)? The link is essentially logical, arrived at by deducing from premises that certain conclusions follow. The explanans then must connect the explained proposition as implying truth or at least be highly probable. What has first been shown to be probable by theory, is now subsumed by the explanans so further implying an order in the strength of its validity. So to return to my question *why* 'are geographical regions disparate'? the validity of my explanation is wholly dependent on the assumption of the question being the consequence. For example, if the answer is *because* 'human beings are motivated to acquire differential skills', then my explanation is seen as valid because the former is implied by the latter, the explanandum is implied by the explanans by logical deduction.

## **Testable propositions.**

While we can now say that the above propositions are valid, as I have also said previously, they are not necessarily true. I have merely confirmed that the link between the explanandum and explanans is valid, but the truth of a proposition requires something more, that is, the proposition forming the explanans must be testable. In other words we must be able to verify or falsify them. However, even if something is testable, again it is not necessarily true. For example, I can state that 'regional social groups are disparate socio-economically'. This is clearly testable but is it true? We must therefore justify the explanandum in the first place, and this can only be done if the explained properties have already been tested. For example, the explained proposition must have already proved that social groups are socio-economically disparate.

This description of a testable theory does give the impression of being just too precise, which is not my intention. It is as well I believe, to mention a pragmatic view as stated by J. H. Turner (1987) who regards explanations as in most cases not involving precise predictions and deductions, primarily he says,

because experimental controls are not possible in the tests of most theories. Explanations will consist, instead, of a more discursive use of abstract propositions and models to understand specific events. Deductions will be loose, and even metaphorical. And it will be naturally subject to argument and debate.... But again, we do not need to abandon our search for invariant properties any more than physics has after recognizing that many formulations are stated, initially at least, rather loosely and that they are subject to political negotiation within the scientific community.<sup>7</sup>

## **Completeness of explaining propositions (explanans).**

Explaining propositions must be done in such a manner that other problems are not raised. In other words they are complete which is far from a simple task and possibly never fulfilled beyond criticism. The obvious point here is that we can never be sure that what is unknown today is not new found knowledge tomorrow.<sup>8</sup> It is quite possible then

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<sup>7</sup> J. H. Turner. Op cit. 1987. 157.

<sup>8</sup> P. Sztompka. Op. cit. p 20.

to ask questions that are unable to promote productive answers, in other words one arrives at a point where a pragmatic acceptance in the light of present knowledge makes logical sense at a particular moment in time.

### **Semantic consistency of linking propositions.**

It does seem obvious enough though somehow important to mention that the properties of elements in any theory should be consistent in terms of its language. I refer particularly to the condition of semantic homogeneity, whereby linking propositions may easily and inadvertently mix the properties of variables and non-variables so confounding the relationship.

### **Usefulness of combining theories.**

It must be already apparent that in the preceding chapters, I have not hesitated to bring together the conception of social change which is implied in Gramsci's reconstruction of the Risorgimento, and Merton's 'manifest and latent functions'.<sup>9</sup> Both theories attempt to explain social change but with different emphases. The point here really is that the characteristics of theories could be usefully combined to explain a function. For example, one may argue that a normative order might be adequately explained by consensus theory, but on the other hand a theory of rational behaviour as serving individual goals might also be an acceptable but different approach.

### **Conceptual model.**

As I stated in chapter 1, my general proposition was a conceptualization of organizing experience so that relationships between variables could be identified. This, while serving me adequately in the preceding chapters for generating the various theoretical debates, now requires to be formulated in more precise terms as specified in this

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<sup>9</sup> See footnote 30 chapter 3.

chapter so far.

### Structure of explanations.

*Explanandum 1.* The geographic regions of advanced society<sup>10</sup><sub>o1</sub>, defined in terms of boundary, terrain, social and technical infrastructure, and population (for both cases), are characterized by social and economic disparity of social groups<sub>p1</sub> within and between all regions. (Theoretical discussions relating to the above concern chapter 4).

*Explanandum 2.* The demand for education at the higher levels<sub>p2</sub>, being over and above the compulsory age requirement; and therefore containing the fundamental characteristic of choice to acquire it (always given the means to make that choice, i.e., financial resources, transportation, educational facilities, etc.), produces an unequal distribution of human and material resources throughout society<sub>p2</sub>.

(Theoretical discussions relating to the above concern chapter 4).

*Explanandum 3.* The diffusion of the educated<sub>o3</sub> is responsible for the dissemination of knowledge and the development of cultural values and beliefs throughout society<sub>p3</sub>.

(Theoretical discussions relating to the above concern chapters 2 and 4).

*Explanandum 4.* Through educational development the different levels of critical thinking<sub>o4</sub>, produce different conceptions of freedom<sub>p4</sub>.

(Theoretical discussions relating to the above concern chapters 2,4 and 5).

*Explanandum 5.* The growing development of consciousness of the contradictions in advanced society<sub>o5</sub>, gives rise to levels of social and political conflict<sub>p5</sub>.

(Theoretical discussions relating to the above, concerns chapter 5 and 6).

Second level.

*Explanans 1a linking explanandum (1 & 2).* One of the important

<sup>10</sup> The subscripts designated by a prefix 'o' and 'p', indicate the object and the properties respectively of the propositions in question, followed by the number of the explanandum. This is intended to be a methodological guide as to the logical order of deduction.

functions of education at the higher levels is to produce differential skills relative to the population as a whole. Geographical regional socio-economic disparities<sub>o1a</sub> produce a demand for education at the higher levels<sub>p1a</sub> with the result that the differential skills acquired are translated into the social and economic differences found within and between every region.

(Theoretical discussions relating to the above concern chapter 4).

*Explanans 1b linking explanandum (2 & 3).* The cultural development of advanced society by the educated becoming the educators<sub>o1b</sub>, brings with it not only a dissemination of knowledge but importantly the inculcation of values and beliefs<sub>p1b</sub>.

(Theoretical discussions relating to the above concern chapters 2 and 7).

*Explanans 1c linking explanandum (3 & 4).* The development of pluralism of civil of and political institutions in advanced society<sub>o1c</sub>, leads to wider conceptions of freedom of thought and potential to act<sub>p1c</sub>.

(Theoretical discussions relating to the above concern chapters 2 and 5).

*Explanans 1d linking explanandum (4 & 5).* The conflict situations which are present because of the consciousness of disparate characteristics in advanced society<sub>o1d</sub>, arise from the contradictions created from unequal social development<sub>p1d</sub>.

(Theoretical discussions relating to the above concern chapter 5).

Third level.

*Explanans 2a linking explanandum (1a & 1b).* The development of normative values and beliefs through a process of cultural inculcation through education and law in advanced society<sub>o2a</sub>, produces levels of conformism<sub>p2a</sub>.

(Theoretical discussions relating to the above concern chapters 2 and 5).

*Explanans 2b linking explanandum (1b & 1c).* The different conceptions of freedom acquired through the cultural development of advanced society<sub>o2b</sub> produces different views of order and social reality<sub>p2b</sub>.

(Theoretical discussions relating to the above concern chapters 2 and 4).

*Explanans 2c linking explanandum (1c & 1d).* The necessity to constrain

action arising from different conceptions of social reality in advanced society<sub>o2c</sub>, produces the institutionalization of actions for resolving tensions and differences<sub>p2c</sub>.

(Theoretical discussions relating to the above concern chapter 6).

Fourth level.

*Explanans 3a linking explanandum (2a & 2b)* The presence of different ideological views represented by political groups within a normative framework of values in advanced society<sub>o3a</sub>, has produced constraints on their freedom to take autonomous action<sub>p3a</sub>.

(Theoretical discussions relating to the above, concern chapters 5 and 6).

*Explanans 3b linking explanandum (2b & 2c)* The consensual nature of resolving social and political conflict in advanced society<sub>o3a</sub>, has produced political structures where oppositional views contribute to maintaining those very structures<sub>p3b</sub>.

(Theoretical discussions related to the above concern chapter 6).

Fifth level.

*Explanans 4a linking explanandum (3a & 3b)* The ideology of the conception of progress produced in advanced society<sub>o4a</sub>, contains significant purposeful motivation to give it direction<sub>p4a</sub>.

(Theoretical discussions relating to the above concern chapter 5).

### **How substantial are my propositions ?**

*First*, the primary level of explanandum has been organized so as to identify clearly in each case the criteria specified. Disparity as a key property, has already been defined specifically in chapter 1. The basis for claiming the universal presence of disparity as defined for the two cases, is from empirical data.

*Second*, The scope of the propositions in each explanandum are matched by the same scope in each explanans.

*Third*, The hierarchical order describing each functional operation with respect to others, implies the importance each has in the system and can

be identified and tested.

*Fourth*, All the propositions have been the subject of theoretical discussion and argued logically, and in some cases with empirical data, in previous chapters to establish a confirmed status for their presence.

*Fifth*, Each explanandum and explanans has been so stated as not to require a further explanation.

*Sixth*, The properties of variables are consistent throughout.

*Seventh*, All the assertions comprising my general proposition are not isolated from other theories. These have been discussed widely here to question their relevance and presence.

### **Mechanisms operating through which functions are fulfilled.**

The social mechanisms which concerns this study and to which my analysis has sought to reveal as maintaining the continuity of advanced society, can be shown as operating to perform the following functions.

<b>1st. Level.</b>	<b>2nd. Level</b>	<b>3rd Level</b>	<b>4th. Level</b>	<b>5th. Level.</b>
1.Reg. disparity	1a. Differential skills			
2.Demand for Educ. <		2a. Norm. Development	Diff.	
	1b. Cultural inculcation <		3a. ideog. views.	
3.Diff. of Educ. <		2b. C'ceptions of fr'dom <		4a. I. of Prog.
	1c. Plural conceptions <		3b. Consensus	
4.Critical thinking. <		2c. Constraints		
	1d. Conflict			
5.Contradictions.				

### **First level assumptions.**

The importance and relevance of assumptions which I have regarded as on the most fundamental level of sociological thought, have already been discussed in chapter 3.

### **General assumptions of my functional model.**

The following assumptions are intended to be firstly a method of

appraising both the usefulness and limitation of my conceptual model. This is done by checking the 'degree of fit' which, from the logic of the deductions made, characterizes the model as a system requiring motivation in its organization.

Secondly, the first 4 assumptions are those that should apply to any system and can be regarded as fundamental. Nevertheless, despite the self-evident characteristics of these assumptions, even what is taken as accepted, should still be described and given a place of relevance.

*(1) The assumption of plurality.*

This assumption simply claims that society consists of a plurality of elements.

*Relevance to my model.* The plurality of elements comprising advanced society, is conceived of as a multiplicity of diverse social groups, institutions, patterns of behaviour and a host of interrelations between individuals, social groups and institutional structures of all kinds, civil, social, religious, military and political.

*(2) The assumption of wholeness.*

This assumption claims that certain elements are bound together by certain interrelations to constitute a whole. The particular properties of wholeness are said to be irreducible to other emergent features.

*Relevance to my model.* There are constituted in my model, a group of elements which together give the system its particular meaning. The notion of wholeness here is specific to the the elements concerned.

*(3) The assumption of integration.*

This assumption claims that the elements within the whole are interrelated in some way.

If elements are not related or influenced in some way, then it is not regarded as part of the system.

*Relevance to my model.* It is impossible to conceive social reality without the notion of integrating all the elements that comprise social phenomena to make the above assumption of 'wholeness' meaningful. The



result of the particular set of social elements observed in my model, are distinctive<sup>11</sup> yet remain related.

*(4) The assumption of boundary openness.*

This assumption claims that a system's dependence on its environment is not wholly bounded by the internal influences within it.

From Parsons definition of boundary, there is a clear reference to a system's openness to external influences,

....a theoretically and empirically significant difference between structure and processes internal to a system and those external to it exists and tends to be maintained. In so far as boundaries in this sense do not exist; it is not possible to identify a set of interdependent phenomena as a system; it is merged in some other, more extensive system.<sup>12</sup>

It is precisely because systems cannot be practically considered as existing only for themselves, that is, in isolation of other influences, that motivated goals are always questionable in the sense that consequences must always be unknown.

*Relevance to my model.* The methodological necessity to conceptualize boundaries is a useful tool to make necessary distinctions between roles and structures which characterize all systems, but both elements are interconnected by the internal and external environment. The ideology of progress in advanced society for example, is contingent on the ability of the system to adjust to changing influences whether they are internal or external in origin.

*(5) The assumption of exploitation.*

This assumption claims that all elements in the system in their relationships, do not bring symmetrical benefits.

A. W. Gouldner<sup>13</sup> argues that reciprocal functional interchanges are more likely to make systems persist. This premise I find is

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<sup>11</sup> The distinctive nature of elements comprising a 'whole' is commented on under "Further considerations of my assumptions" at the end of this chapter.

<sup>12</sup> T. Parsons. *Theories of society*. (co-editors with E. Shils, K. D. Naegle and J. R. Pitt), 2 vols., New York: The Free Press of Gencoe. 1961. p 36.

<sup>13</sup> A. W. Gouldner. *Reciprocity and Autonomy in functional theory*. In *Symposium On Sociological Theory*, edited by L. Gross. New York.: Harper & Row. 1959. p 249.

inconsistent with the notion of social change generally and more specifically as expounded in this study (see chapter 3).

*Relevance to my model.* The persistence of disparate regions or even educational expansion is one of degree only. The relationship of elements producing these conditions, are sub-systems of exploitation where exchanges are unequal until a social, economic or political point is reached by which continual or excessive exploitation by one or more elements, is exposed as requiring intervention of some kind. The argument that dysfunctional effects are an example of reciprocal exchange, is entirely dependent on the case in question, and also in terms of values. For instance, too much educational expansion will produce economic repercussions. This can be both a positive (holding wages down) and negative exchange (making unemployment). If the argument is that reciprocity of exchange is still present regardless of values, because the system, although fluctuating survives, then one returns to the response above which is that each exchange is a social change to the system, a mutation of it, and therefore it is exploited. The notion that exchanges are asymmetrical so that deficiencies in exchange are common experience, is part of the consistent modification of activity to achieve goals.

*(6) The assumption of consensus.*

This assumption claims that the relationship between elements of a system are not incompatible with each other.

This assumption, which has been discussed in detail in chapter 6, does not exclude levels of conflict as part of the social environment, but agrees or complies to constrain it for a variety of reasons. The conflictual nature of political disagreement, does not evade the pragmatism of consensus short of outright hostilities.

*Relevance to my model.* Society's geographical regional disparities are impossible to contemplate without all the social and political ramification manifested by levels of conflict. But the propositions

explained in my model (1d and 2c), describe functions which are both conflictual and consensual and where social constraint interacts with both (2c). Parsons, in defending his own particular view of order and consensus on the one hand and conflict and change on the other, states,

...I have, as noted later, long disagreed with the thesis of Dahrendorf that these two aspects of social systems should be the subject of two independent theories. My own view has rather been that order and conflict are two kinds of phenomena that should be explained as obverse possibilities in terms of the same theoretical scheme.<sup>14</sup>

This argument cannot be separated from purposeful rationality in the attainment of goals.

*(?) The assumption of partial dependence.*

This assumption claims that elements are partially dependent on each other. Partial functional dependency gives rise to functional alternatives resulting from the options surrounding choice. I have included 'partial' to move in a more realistic direction which has been informed by my earlier arguments in chapter 3 regarding the 'indispensability of elements'. As Wrong (1961) stated,

When this property is treated as absolute and constant, rather than relative and variable, the "over-integrated view of society" is the direct result.<sup>15</sup>

*Relevance to my model.* The assumption of dependence immediately produces connotations of determinism, which is fundamentally true for some processes of activity. Scientific laws necessarily rely on such proposition. Certain functions must determine certain results, for instance, Newton's law of action and reaction are equal and opposite, or Boyle's law in which a given mass of gas, the pressure, volume and temperature are dependent on one another. It must also be said that the mechanisms operating in my model so that the hierarchical order of functions of the system, both vertically and laterally at their various levels, not only show a logical order as one would expect, but also what

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<sup>14</sup> T. Parsons. Commentary, in 'Institutions and Social Exchange. The sociologies of Talcott Parsons & George C. Homans. Edited by Herman Turk & Richard L. Simpson. The Bobbs-Merill Company, Inc. Indianapolis & New York. 1971. p 385.

<sup>15</sup> D. Wrong. The oversocialized conception of man in modern sociology. American Sociological Review 26(2). 1961. pp 184.

appears to be a dependency of one to the other. On the other hand if we question the interconnections of my model and ask, must conflict be only dependent on the functions of consciousness of contradictions in society, or that constraints are only dependent on those functions produced by different conceptions of conflict ? then the answer must be no, for this presupposes functional prerequisites or preconditions for fulfilling each of these functions, which is not the case. For example, an alternative function resulting from consciousness of society's contradictions must reasonably include passive and collaborative functions that surround a stabile society as well as conflictual. And again, conflict and different conceptions of the world need not produce a consensual function but a hostile one. The cultural, political and social elements in my model are not therefore assumed to be irreplaceable for fulfilling each function, there can be functional alternatives. What has determined the order in my particular model has been the deductive logic of the presence of each element, and what its functional presence achieves in the system when it is related to a progress ideology. But the activities of one particular element, if taken out of the system, will not necessarily cease to exist. For example, a political party may not have existence outside its domestic environment, but a political group such as the 'Green party' may well survive as part of the European political scene.

*(8) The assumption of the interrelationship between system and environment or intrasystemic process.*

This assumption claims that functions internal to a system cannot be isolated from external influence. For example, a major area of structural influence on internal systems, is the external changing political structure where adjustments in strategy, procedure, sovereignty, military requirements, influence those internal to a system. *Relevance to my model* . Specific examples of external influences during the period under study are commercial and political. For both cases,

investment from external sources includes banking and tourism, manufacturing under license, especially military equipment, and the export trade generally, are essential for the wealth of both these countries, and therefore contribute to their relative socio-economic levels, and internally to the disparateness of their distribution. Politically the strengthening ties of the European Economic Community, extends its influence in every area of social life, from European laws and individual rights to the environment and to potential military implications for defence. Both of these areas of activity can and do have repercussions on regional financial aid, levels of employment and political decisions generally. Finally, a much used example is the widespread influence of religion on cultural forms of behaviour and education.

### **Specific assumptions.**

#### *(9) The assumption of systemic process.*

This assumption claims that there is a continuous sequence of changes. There has always been great difficulty in explaining the goals of a system, i.e., does it have a specific goal, can we assume that there is a directive process? Both these questions relate to the arguments of 'self-regulation' and a teleological process, and indeed we might include the core of the reproduction argument itself.

*Relevance to my model.* In order for the assumption of systemic process to have coherence with other criteria stated in this thesis, it is not necessary that a process has a particular end goal or preferred state. The view that I am postulating here is that the individual or collective will which is necessarily present for a systemic process to be directive or indeed for it to strive towards maintaining a near preferred state, is not an essential condition for a process. Structural changes from a multiplicity of directive goals produce processes which are not necessarily intended and require human intervention to re-direct existing process to an end goal. An example of a sub-systemic process

of regional disparity fluctuating in accordance with educational expansion, is that the goal end state of individuals or groups, is only what they desire it to be. But the process, the multiplicity of diverse activities which is the driving force for all the interconnections made, can only be given direction through the collective will of human intervention. A further example is that political, lawful and social relations are pursued as processes and by virtue of their operation, changes which occur externally, influence the necessity for change within the processes. Here implicitly the notion of self-regulation is dismissed. It is in my view a mythical notion that covers for unexplained phenomena. Mechanisms certainly exist for a system's regulation, but they are not self-regulating, they occur from strains caused by other changes which necessitate human intervention to retain a preferred state.

*(10) The assumption of specific functionality.*

This assumption claims that elements of a system can be positive, neutral or even detrimental functionally to a system's preferred state. The argument that all functions contribute positively to a system's preferred state, as asserted by the postulate of 'universal functionalism' (chapter 3) is not, in my view, an acceptable assumption. One is reminded here of Jon Elster's criticism of M. Kalecki, where the latter writer, as Elster puts it,

....comes very close to arguing that the business cycle can be explained by its beneficial effects for the capitalist class. Full employment for long periods of time is politically dangerous, whereas permanent unemployment is economically dangerous, whence the need for a business cycle.<sup>16</sup>

To imply that all functions in capitalism are positive is also to infer that it is also deterministic. Elster's criticism is in my view correct, for what we have here is that once it is accepted that the domain

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<sup>16</sup> J. Elster. *Ulysses and the Sirens*. Studies in rationality and irrationality. Cambridge University Press. 1979. p 35. Reference to M. Kalecki. *Political Aspects of full employment*. In M. Kalecki, *Selected essays on the dynamics of the capitalist economy*, pp. 138-45. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1971.

conditions can change and social change is being experienced, then functions are not necessarily serving to maintain the system that was previously functioning in the interest of capitalism.

*Relevance to my model.* Cultural survivals, which form the basis of Malinowski's argument of persistence of cultural elements (see footnote 20 chapter 3), must require that the asserted characteristic of universal functions relate to the domain which exists, but it cannot be considered 'universal' if the domain conditions have changed. My example here is that it requires different functions to increase and decrease levels of regional disparity. But these different functions appertain to the same system and within the same process, but their consequences are quite different. The positive nature of a function clearly cannot be assigned to either of these functions for each can be characterized as positive or detrimental, depending on the conception held of the social situation. Specific functionality is consistent in my opinion with social change and the dominance of some functions in their interrelation with other functions in producing a consequence.

*(11) The assumption of functional dominance.*

This assumption claims that an element in its interrelationship with one or more elements, emerges as the most influential in the production of new phenomena. This assumption is similar to *differential functionality* which claims that some elements functionally contribute to the attainment of a given preferred state of a system more than others. Further, I embrace within the assumption here of *functional dominance*, the less discussed assumption of *disequilibrium* which claims that the preferred state of a system is constantly changing. In my view the substantial overlap of these assumptions makes distinctions confusing and possibly even irrelevant.

*Relevance to my model.* The essence of the structure of my model is based on some functions being more influential than others, or as stated above, there is a differential functionality from which some functions

contribute to maintaining a system in a preferred state, by compensating for the process of continual social change. A glance above at the mechanisms operating at the various levels shown, informs us of certain functions that have prevailed and influenced other functions to produce phenomena. The analysis as to which functions are dominant in their contribution and which are, in the context of my model, less important, have already been decided by logical deduction in the preceding chapters. Gouldner makes the same point,

In short, different system parts make different degrees of contribution to either the stability or the change of the system, and these need to be analytically and empirically distinguished.<sup>17</sup>

*(12) The assumption of Structural alternatives.*

This assumption claims that there are diverse structural arrangements which may fulfil a function.

*Relevance to my model.* As argued in chapter 3, the concept of indispensability is rejected leaving alternative functions as a more realistic possibility. The selection of a particular item which is argued as effective in satisfying a functional requirement rather than another, has to be seen in the context of the system as a whole, that is, an alternative function does not ultimately result in 'dysfunctional effects elsewhere in the system.

Clearly in this study structural alternatives and structural constraints imply that even alternatives are subject to individual and group choices as well as prevailing circumstances and conditions. For example, the functions which produce a normative order in society (third level 2a above), could be through harsh and punitive laws, but not without changing other functions. Also moral codes of behaviour found in religion can often substitute the necessity to legislate, as noted by Hoebel (1954),<sup>18</sup> but the proportion of the whole of society that would be prepared to behave according to moral codes would limit such an

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<sup>17</sup> A. W. Gouldner. *Op. cit.* Reciprocity and Autonomy in functional theory. 1959. p 265.

<sup>18</sup> E. A. Hoebel. *The Law of Primitive Man.* Cambridge, Massachusetts.: Harvard University Press 1959. p 70.



alternative in advanced society being viable.

As Merton notes,

The range of variation in the items which can fulfill designated functions in a social structure is not unlimited.<sup>19</sup>

*(13) The assumption of purposeful rationality*

This assumption claims that human action is in the main oriented towards achieving purposes.

Purposes and functions so differ that the directive nature of the process has meaning only if we can identify the purpose involved (rationality has been discussed in chapter 3). On this assumption rests much of what we do not know, i.e., how decisions are made, the extent of information to hand, and the conditions and circumstances which determine decisions by an individual or group. In other words we have an aspect of human beings which can be considered a generalized property, and with our present state of knowledge cannot be further reduced.

*Relevance to my model.* The purpose of choosing to be educated at the higher levels must be manifold (argued in chapter 6), but for my model it is the outcome of all the combined purposes that is structurally important for image of society presented. The significance of this assumption, that there is a rational purpose underlying motivation, is that a system's process is given direction only because of this human characteristic. From this we may extend the logic inherent in my model which is that mechanisms retaining the functions within advanced society, are not mechanically reproductive and self-sustaining, nor are they teleological for any intrinsic systemic reason, but they may be all of these because of conscious rational action by human beings. As Levy stated,

Man as an animal is capable of conscious teleological action. That is to say, men consciously seek to bring about a state of affairs at least in theory, from the actors' point of view would be different in some degree if they did not orient their actions to a

<sup>19</sup> R. K. Merton. Op. cit. P 106.

particular goal.<sup>20</sup>

*(14) The assumption of integration of individual purposes as a rational system.*

This assumption claims that a significant range of individual purposes is so directed that its attainment is the condition for the preferred state of the system partial or global.

What is to be considered here is the total actions of individual contributions to a system which satisfy collectively what Levy (1952) describes as,

the goals that are such that the member of a given society must hold them sufficiently in common to 'motivate' the performance of the functional requisites of that society.<sup>21</sup>

*Relevance to my model.* Underlying this assumption is the extent to which individual purposes are determined by the system's preferred state. For example, the third, fourth and fifth level mechanisms shown above are, through various functions, indirectly satisfying the functional requirements of the collective needs<sup>22</sup> of human activity which make the system rational. Individual purposes which aim at cultural or political hegemony, are integrating with the system goals of advanced society.

### **Further considerations relating to assumptions.**

As already mentioned, the assumptions included or excluded will always be a subject of debate either to myself personally or to others. *The assumption of purposeful rationality*, is the determination of my systems preferred state or functional requirement, and my further comments here are intended to convey the importance I attach to this assumption. I refer here to the core argument of my thesis, finding mechanisms which sustain advanced society. By establishing that the

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<sup>20</sup> M. Levy (jr). *The Structure of Society*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1952. p 174.

<sup>21</sup> M. Levy. Jr. *Op. cit.* p 175.

<sup>22</sup> See footnote 2 in this chapter.

link between human action and structure is founded on purposeful rationality, that all actions have objective goals, the notion of a self-maintaining system or conception of cyclic events, brings to the fore the idea that systems maintenance is, in as much that change is constantly taking place, a collective phenomenon of human will and activity, and not an intrinsic property of the structure. There is no assumption here of an internal mechanism pushing to achieve this preferred state which is not by human intervention, intentional or unintentional. Such a notion, which I have dismissed here and in chapter 3, is a return to teleological and deterministic responses.

My final assumption above, *the integration of individual purposes as a rational system* links cultural inculcation as a form of socialization and normative values as a form of social control, can really only be explained according to the generalizations of human actions and order (chapter 3).

## Chapter 10

### Conclusions.

The aim of this thesis has been to find some mechanisms which reproduce and sustain an advanced capitalist system. My findings are that some mechanisms are among those resulting from differences of all kind, structural in terms of geographical arrangements of terrain and resources, of differences in educational and intellectual skills and their distribution. From this development other functions emerge relating to cultural processes of central values and beliefs including those which are political.

Mechanisms operating functions can be seen as attempting to find resolutions to differences on each level of my conceptual model in the last chapter. Each function is a logical step to the next and each concerns overcoming differences so that the whole makes rational sense. The truth of these mechanisms does not lie in a precise method of experimentation as J. H. Turner argued<sup>1</sup>, but depend on interconnecting methodological steps to arrive at a logical conclusion. For example, the two major variables of education and socio-economic disparity, have been at the outset of this thesis established as factual. Thereafter each chapter has contained one or more areas of discussion which has linked my conceptual model (argued in detail in chapter 9) so that the pyramid of functions one on top of the other and described as a functional system, was the product of a logical deductive argument. Further, the conceptual model also depended on fourteen general assumptions which are themselves the subject of theories already established or argued in this thesis.

The decision on my part to use the conceptual framework of Gramsci rather than someone else's; or even construct one that has no

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<sup>1</sup> See chapter 9, footnote 7.

connection with others, is based firstly on my own assumptions about how human beings act and to what extent their actions are determined by other forces. In this respect my decision to use the Gramscian framework was primarily because it satisfied the criterion for me that philosophical moral choices of the individual was a fundamental generalized element, and that from this spring other consequences to which I might find some or no agreement according to my empirical findings and logical arguments.

The emphasis upon human beings, their cultural development, the intellectual levels to critically think, their relative freedom to make moral choices and participate in social consent, have all been central to the arguments in this thesis of how change is achieved. All the discussions surrounding these social characteristics have been directed towards a greater understanding of why advanced societies are able to achieve relative stability and the notion of progress from its total activity, when differences in society, structural and political as well as social and economic, appear to contradict such characteristics.

I shall below review the thesis fundamental points by way of a summary and for my final comments.

In chapter 1, my review of the theorists in the field of reproduction in society centred with particular interest on Giroux and his argument for pedagogic change.

There are two fundamental problems which arise with this notion of a new culture from pedagogic change, the first is to inculcate values and beliefs which must be the result of its historical development and dependent upon the theory and practice of everyday life. Secondly, The very notion of freedom theorised by Giroux is not a conception which will necessarily emerge from a new culture. On the first count pedagogic change implies not just a change in the curriculum of schools, of transmitting specific knowledge which is favourable to new conceptions, but of re-educating all society. It is clear from this study that the process of cultural development of a whole society is not the result of a

specific programme, but the evolution of the mind and nature from which social change and all its consequences is the result of a totality of actions. On the second count the pluralistic development of advanced society is a practical demonstration that, as shown in the argument of the expansion of the state (chapter 7), a unitary conception of the world is an ideological conflation of values which are not supported by assumptions of general behaviour. I refer here specifically to moral choices and normative conduct which are directed towards purposeful goals and become integrated with the rationality of the system (my general assumption no. 14) but importantly, not determined by it. It must be implicit in Giroux's theory that values are determined and do not evolve as a consequence of theory and practise.

Chapter 2 was a critique of Gramsci and contained my own comments on the central themes of hegemony and the intellectuals in society. The relationship between the intellectuals and masses aided by the pedagogic training of organic intellectuals and a system of 'unitary schools', was for Gramsci the key to radical political change. My argument here was not unlike that above for Giroux, which is the dogmatism that Gramsci finds acceptable in his objectivity, while the very basis of his philosophical position is that human beings have autonomous choices. Gramsci constantly argues for the development of a 'collective will' without establishing that this must be consistent with the rationality of the social system as a society. It is again the problem of imposing the dogmatism of ones' own views as those that can become general values without accepting that for a collective will to develop the totality of individual purposes is what makes a system rational.

Gramsci's problematic of hegemony which is dependent on the cultural development of society produced from the relationship between organic intellectuals and the masses, concerns itself with overcoming the political development of *classico trasformismo*. Gramsci's interpretation of the 'Risorgimento' was the basis of his conception that the moral and

intellectual leadership of society was largely in the hands of Parliamentary elite. My view, as I later describe them in chapter 6, is that the moral and intellectual leadership of society is no longer dominated by a minority of elite but by the majority in society, although political hegemony to some extent is still the province of civil servants.

Gramsci's absolute historicism in the philosophy of praxis is in my view unsustainable. The idea of constituting objectivity from theory and practice without importing absolutes from the past, is a contradiction of Gramsci's own values on which his initial premise is based. It is true that he argued the progressive nature of 'common sense' knowledge becoming objective truths and entering the philosophy of praxis at that level. But praxis thereafter would have to confirm those truths in the light of further development, and this would apply to his own values.

Chapter 3 discussed the functionalist approach to explaining social phenomena and attempted to separate the various criticisms of its purported harmonious, teleological, stable and non-conflictual characteristics; from purely ideological criteria. In addition the problem of order and the anti-voluntaristic view of society, which its critics argue it conveys, is in my view, a just criticism but one that is based on the error of conflating 'order' ideologically, when the explanation lies in preparing an adequate understanding of the fundamental elements of human behaviour. My conclusions were that these criticisms were not intrinsic to functionalism as a system for explaining phenomena.

I discussed two further concerns in this chapter relevant to the approach of this thesis. The first, social change in the context of dominant events in history and their influence on change. This was my response to Gramsci's analysis of the 'Risorgimento' and how certain events dictated the course of history. The essence of my comments on Gramsci's interpretation of past events, was that he failed to account for the relational influences which produce social phenomena, which include also unintentional consequences. As Merton explains in the

context of latent functions, these maybe unrecognized and therefore unexplained but they do produce consequences just the same. Secondly, I argued the presuppositions of action and order as a preparation for identifying generalized human behaviour. I am well aware that this latter subject merits a much more intense treatment than that given here. However my intention has been served in dealing with conflationary arguments regarding what is attributable to human behaviour and what is ideological.

Chapter 4 extends in some detail the central proposition of society's geographical regional disparities and the relationship of expanding education at the higher levels. The core of my argument is that the structural aspect of geographical regional differences together with the behavioural characteristics of human beings to have purposeful goals and moral choices, are themselves fundamental to sustaining a disparate society. The political will thereafter to increase or decrease the level of differences, is the ideological consideration and extent of change that can be realistically contemplated within the context of an hegemonic and industrial society; as we presently understand it. The ramifications of education throughout every chapter, cannot be said to be more crucial with respect to maintaining differences; as it is to educate society as a whole. But the significance of the data presented in the context of differences is especially important for it indicates that rational purposeful action contributes to disparity given the means to exercise choice.

Chapter 5 pursues the idea of progress through the advancement of knowledge. The context of this discussion can be first linked to Gramsci's notion of educating society through the development of 'organic intellectuals' of the working classes. The problem of social and political change for Gramsci starts with the cultural inculcation of the masses and the relationship necessary between teacher and pupils. The difficulty highlighted in this chapter relates to the problems of the teacher's own values and those central to society and pupils. The



problem is further compounded by the constraints which bear upon the teacher in transmitting centrally held values they do not necessarily share.

Chapter 6 discussed the extent of autonomy existing in liberal democracy and why the political events following the 'Risorgimento' as Gramsci conceived them; are no longer relevant. The notion of hegemony in society is not only crucial to Gramsci, but also to the whole understanding of why society is relatively stable and what impedes political groups from radically intervening from within. This was indeed the strategy of Gramsci, but my analysis in this chapter explained why such a prospect is an unlikely event in terms of an hegemonic transition. Classical *trasformismo* as Gramsci understood it with the movement of political elite as a parliamentary phenomenon and their overall control of the moral and intellectual leadership, can no longer be understood in these terms today. What I call Modern *trasformismo* are the characteristics of liberal democracy of compromise, consensus and participation of all political groups; which reform its institutions and yet also sustain its political order. This differs from Gramsci's conception primarily because today, the moral and intellectual leadership of society is with the masses and not with a single individual or group.

Chapter 7 argues that the expansion of the state concept, that is, combining civil and political society so that a unified notion of a singular party state could be conceived, is really a contradiction in terms of moral choices which Gramsci so stridently advocates. The most important factor to emerge, is the dismissal of the idea of a *state party* from which a *New Order* could arise with its own *moral and intellectual direction*. The plural development of political parties and the assurance of their presence within the framework of Modern *Trasformismo*, excludes the monolithic development of a single ideology. Further, Gramsci's contention that there is a great gap between the

masses and intellectuals has really little relevance in modern Italy and society in general.

In this chapter I also mentioned the polemic of Nicos Poulantzas and his rejection of Gramsci's inclusion of *working class strategy as part of the hegemonic apparatus* (see footnote 12). Once again one is faced with the reality of the trend of practice. Participation and contribution to the political system excludes the idea that the working classes can evolve and overcome the structures surrounding them, when they themselves have, however reluctantly, assisted in its construction. It must be said that the question of whether participation and the active contribution to the existing political system via the institutional form of Modern Trasformismo, could also accommodate the active elements of its own destruction, must remain unanswered. One may argue, as I have already stated, the 'technical' correctness of Poulantzas observation. But there follows automatically the rejection of other tenets of Gramsci's theory which have not been brought to the fore. For example, without gaining the leadership of a whole society, in hegemonic terms, eventual power if obtained, cannot include the moral and intellectual control of all the masses. The exclusion of *working class strategy from the hegemonic apparatus* would suggest that this would be the case. Although I believe the Poulantzas polemic is worthy of further discussion as a basis for critical review of working class culture and a cultural force for change, especially in view of the more recent world political changes, I am unable to justify pursuing it further here

Chapter 8 returns again to the theme of progress with the aim of understanding how there is a collective idea of progress from the point of view of how individuals link the norms and values that are central to the development of society's institutions. I looked particularly at the development of Modern Trasformismo because the totality of political activity, its conflicts, mediations, its compromises and participation by those who are radically opposed to its values, its striving for consensus and implied exercising of constraints, are all an indication that there is

advancement from which knowledge is gained and progress made.

It is also notable that Gramsci did little in the way of analysing the problems which would lead to the progressive nature of political institutions, especially as he clearly indicated some concern for its continual presence.

Chapter 9 finally links all the arguments into a coherent system of explanations using the approach of functional analysis which was discussed in some detail in chapter 3. All the general assumptions I make are of course important and as I have already stated, my decision of what to exclude must now remain. But I would make a particular note of my final assumption, *the integration of individual purposes as a rational system*. Here it will be noted I do not argue in terms of a system's functional requirement, but the functional requirement which is collectively rational for the system. To argue the former is, in my view inconsistent with what makes a social system function, human activity.

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## Statistical Sources

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2. **Annuario di Statistiche Demografiche.** Istituto Centrale Di Statistica. Roma. Data relating to socio-economic groups where required other than the census years of 1951-61-71 and 81, have been calculated from the data for those 'registered' and 'cancelled' (iscritti e cancellati) for each region.
3. **Annuario Statistico dell'istruzione Italiana.** Istituto Centrale Di Statistica. Volumes for each year from 1961. for data relating to the number of students in the Scuole Superiore and Universities. Much of the relevant data for education required for this study can also be found in the source stated in item 1, above.
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## APPENDIX 1. Convergence Theory.

This past debate which considered whether totalitarian regimes would 'inevitably' become less monistic with continuing industrial advance,<sup>1</sup> cannot be dismissed without some qualification. While there is some reasonable basis for accepting that the general advance of industrialisation has produced a set of values, thoughts and aspirations, that have recognisable common characteristics, the very presence of pluralism must inevitably limit the extent of convergence by it's liberal nature. The fallacy I believe, and many others have voiced the same opinion, that has obscured this past debate, is to see the logic of industrialisation as the single development on which stratification and differentiation in society depends, and consequently the convergence of it's characteristics. The extent to which it must do this cannot be insignificant, but the acquisition of knowledge, to which industrialisation owes everything, is itself a global force in the convergence of ideas as well as those dividing them.

From this point of view the convergence of the internal processes of advanced societies, far from being determined as mono-directional, emerges as a continual competing phenomenon from many different terrains. In other words, the direction from which economic and political processes emerge, is the outcome of changing knowledge that satisfies the internal logic of a system's rationality. In this respect a monistic regime (i.e., Stalinism) is equally exposed to critical thinking of new conceptions of knowledge just as capitalism itself. Once the idea, that only industrialisation leads to the notion of convergence, is undermined, then other theoretical assumptions are questioned. Not least of these is

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<sup>1</sup> J.H.Goldthorpe. *Social Stratification in Industrial Society*, in R.Bendix and S.M.Lipset (eds), *Class, Status and Power*, Routledge & Keagan Paul. 1967. Also in *Sociological Perspectives*, edited by Kenneth Thompson and Jeremy Tunstall, Penguin Books in association with The Open University, 1971. pp 344-5.

the primacy of economic forces, which have played such a formidable part in the social and political structure emphasised by neo-marxists. For example, if the socialist countries of the Eastern bloc adopted the 'Socialist Pluralism'<sup>2</sup> currently being advocated, would this imply a convergence with some of the ideals of capitalism as a result of global industrialisation, or the outcome of wider conceptions of the world through education and the logic of following appropriate as well as expedient social and political processes as they are objectively seen? Some validity must be seen in both questions, but it is precisely because the wider educative processes<sup>3</sup> that lead towards the development of a critical consciousness of the individual's environment, that ultimately must influence the dogmatic conception of an ideology that had hitherto a fixed perspective of society's structure and form of freedom. One sees for example, how Wilensky (1975) leaves no alternative but industrialisation, restricting unnecessarily his vision of possible causes. He states,

The primacy of economic level and its demographic and bureaucratic correlates is support for the convergence hypothesis, economic growth makes countries with contrasting cultural and political traditions more alike in the strategy for constructing the floor below which no one sinks.<sup>4</sup>

Wilensky's over simplification of this social and political phenomenon, diminishes the entire cultural complexity of society, which is the result of an historical development, and to which the function of the state is inextricably tied. I refer here to the notion of hegemony as an apparatus of the state, as conceived by Gramsci, and which is the subject of Chapter

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<sup>2</sup> A term recently used by the Russian President M. Gorbachev, relating to political and social reforms. As I have discussed further in Chapter 8, 'Social Pluralism' by explicitly limiting the scope for freedom, sets itself yet a further task.

<sup>3</sup> By 'wider educative processes' I mean all forms of international communication and media information apart from formal education.

<sup>4</sup> H. Wilensky. *The Welfare State and Equality*, Berkeley, University of California Press. 1975. pp. 27-28.

## APPENDIX 2.

### Geographic regions of Italy.

<b>Central &amp; North Eastern.</b>	<b>Northern &amp; Western.</b>	<b>Southern</b>
Trentino-Alto Adige	Piemonte	Abruzzi
Veneto	Valle D'Aosta	Molise
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	Lombardia	Campania
Emilia-Romagna	Liguria	Puglia
Toscana		Basilicata
Umbria		Calabria
Marche		Sicilia
Lazio		Sardegna

The above regions were formed in the 1948 constitution (Art.131), devolving power from Central Government. This political action was taken primarily to allay the fears that surrounded the ease in which Fascism came to power in the early 1920s.

### Geographical Regions of the U.K.

<b>Regions of England</b>	<b>Other Regions the U.K.</b>
North.	Wales.
Yorkshire and Humberside.	Scotland.
East Midlands.	Northern Ireland.
East Anglia.	
South East.	
South West.	
West Midlands.	
North West	

The above list defined as New Standard Regions apply from 1966 when regional boundaries were changed.

## Appendix 3.

### Italy- Occupational Social Classes.

Italian occupational social class groupings, are divided into 9 categories and 39 sub-groups. Statistically, they have been compiled into 6 broad categories which I have dichotomised into the following:

#### Upper Occupational Social Class.

Property owners, Liberal professions, Directors, Administrators and clerical staff.

#### Lower Occupational Social Class.

Assistants, all categories of artisans.

The category of self-employed workers is by present day standards in advanced society, somewhat misleading. There is a notable percentage that enjoy the cultural and educational background of the Upper occupational category as well as its financial remuneration. I have therefore proportionally divided this category between the dichotomised groups as follows.

$$\text{Upper O.S.Class proportion of self-Employed} = \frac{\% \text{ Self-Employed}}{[\text{Ratio of Upper O.S.C/ Lower O.S.C}] + 1}$$

Source of data- Anuario Statistico Italiano (Istituto Centrale di statistica), for 1951-61-71-81. For a full category list of the active resident population by profession, see table 2.23, p 62, of the 1981 edition.

### U.K.-Occupational Social Classes.

The upper and lower social class categories, have been based on occupational groupings of head of households. The allocation of occupations, taken from the Registrar General's own list of 5 social and 7 occupational classes,<sup>23</sup> are divided in the following manner,

Upper occupational social class- Social class I. II. Occupational class. IA. IB. 2A. 2B.

Lower occupational social class- Social class III. IV. V. Occupational class. 3. 4. 5. 6. and 7.

The self-employed and non-civilian categories, are as for the Italian case, proportionally divided between the upper and lower groups as described above.

Source of data- Family Household surveys 1967-84.

For 1966, the data has been calculated from Table 21, Regional Trends 1975 (primary source Census of Population 1966). The data for Northern Ireland has been estimated.


The data for 1951, has been calculated from Table 14, Annual Abstract of Statistics 1961 (primary source Registrar General).

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<sup>23</sup> Classification of occupations, Census 1951 (HMSO 1956).

## Appendix 4.

Pupils staying on beyond the compulsory age limit, differ for both cases because of the earlier leaving age in Italy.



The assumption I make is that there is no significance in the different number of years considered, 10 years of study for Italy and 8 for the U.K., when the data are calculated.

Data source for Italy- Anuario Statistico dell'istruzione Italiana 1951 to 1983. The age range of 14 to 24 years, includes all pupils attending the upper secondary schools, 14-19 years (Scuole Secondarie Superiori) and those in higher education at university including part-time 'fuori corso'.

Data source for the U.K.- Department of Science and Education. The data for England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, compiled by the DES, presents, over the period which concerns this study, a disconnected series which makes the accuracy of the data questionable. The DES are themselves unable to verify the compilation of my data between 1951 to 1967. However, they are on my part the result of much time consuming research, and I am satisfied that they represent the best overall time series data available.

The age range, 15/16 to 24 years, includes all secondary schools, non-advanced further education (full-time and sandwich, part-time day and evening), higher education (full-time and part-time), part-time includes also Open University students within the age range of the data.

The changing of regional boundaries in England makes comparison between the two cases before 1966 somewhat difficult. Even a domestic comparison before this date with standard regions is strictly incorrect.

Table 1.

ITALY—Percentage difference between upper and lower occupational social class groups (as defined in Appendix 4 Chapter 6) for each region, and percentage 'R' ratio, for the period 1951-61-71 and 81.

Region	1951		1961		1971		1981		<i>1951=100</i>		<i>1971=100</i>	
	%diff.	R	%diff.	R	%diff.	R	%diff.	R	<i>1971</i>	<i>1981</i>		
P'monte	72.24	6.2	63.54	4.4	45.34	2.6	28.40	1.8	<i>-37.23</i>	<i>-37.36</i>		
V.D'Aosta	80.85*	9.4	66.30	4.9	41.07	2.4	25.50	1.7	<i>-49.20</i>	<i>-37.91</i>		
Liguria	66.27	4.9	57.65	3.7	37.64	2.2	20.00	1.5	<i>-28.63</i>	<i>-46.86</i>		
Lombardia	66.36	4.9	50.92	3.0	31.14	1.9	15.20	1.3	<i>-53.07</i>	<i>-51.18</i>		
-----												
T.A.Adige	77.23	7.7	61.10	4.1	41.17	2.4	26.05	1.7	<i>-46.69</i>	<i>-36.72</i>		
Veneto	79.45*	8.7	68.47*5.3		49.25*2.9		32.68*2.0		<i>-38.01</i>	<i>-33.64</i>		
F.V.Giulia	80.04*	9.0	59.14	3.9	35.98	2.1	20.96	1.5	<i>-55.04</i>	<i>-41.74</i>		
E.Rom.	75.20	7.0	67.50	5.1	46.35*2.7		26.94	1.7	<i>-38.36</i>	<i>-41.87</i>		
Marche	76.83	7.6	73.01*6.4		53.38*3.3		34.94*2.0		<i>-30.52</i>	<i>-34.54</i>		
Toscana	76.05	7.3	65.23	4.7	43.11	2.5	27.34	1.7	<i>-43.31</i>	<i>-36.38</i>		
Umbria	77.35*	7.8	71.63*6.0		48.31*2.9		33.92*2.0		<i>-37.54</i>	<i>-29.78</i>		
Lazio	69.00	5.4	42.89	2.5	19.73	1.5	4.15	1.1	<i>-71.40</i>	<i>-78.96</i>		
-----												
Campania	80.00*	9.0	70.28*5.7		50.55*3.1		30.65*2.0		<i>-36.81</i>	<i>-39.36</i>		
Abr/Mol.	78.47*	8.3	75.75*7.2		50.90*3.0		32.10*1.9		<i>-35.13</i>	<i>-36.93</i>		
Puglia	78.40*	8.2	79.44*8.7		61.55*4.2		42.61*2.5		<i>-21.49</i>	<i>-30.77</i>		
Basilicata	82.90*10.7		82.60*10.5		62.40*4.3		45.06*2.6		<i>-24.70</i>	<i>-27.78</i>		
Calabria	81.70*	9.9	77.72*8.0		48.00*2.8		38.92*2.3		<i>-41.74</i>	<i>-18.91</i>		
Sicilia	77.30*	7.8	71.53*6.0		49.62*3.0		30.86*1.9		<i>-35.80</i>	<i>-37.80</i>		
Sardegna	76.20	●	69.50*5.2		43.88*2.6		30.75*1.9		<i>-40.35</i>	<i>-29.92</i>		
-----												
Col.mean.	76.41		67.06		47.85		28.79					
Italy	70.23	5.7	64.87	4.7	59.21	3.9	26.40	1.7				
S. Labini	75.95	7.3	68.84	5.4	-		-		(see Appendix 3)			

Source. See Appendix 3.

Note. The mean percentage for all regions do not correspond to the national totals stated above. Both sets of data have been collected separately and demonstrate the extent of inaccuracy present.



**Table 2.**

**U.K.**— Percentage difference between upper and lower occupational social class groups (as defined in Appendix 3) for each region, and percentage 'R' ratio, for the period 1966-71-76 - 81 and 84

Region	1966		1971		1976		1981		1984		1966=100 1981
	%Diff.	%R	%Diff.	%R	%Diff.	%R	%Diff.	%R	%Diff.	%R	
<b>North.</b>	61.58	<del>4.2</del>	58.95	<del>3.9</del>	54.35	3.4	58.69	<del>3.8</del>	50.07	<del>3.0</del>	-4.7
<b>Y&amp;H.</b>	61.32	<del>4.1</del>	49.43	2.9	61.27	<del>4.2</del>	46.27	2.7	37.55	<del>2.7</del>	-14.5
<b>E.Mid.</b>	62.17	<del>4.3</del>	61.56	<del>4.2</del>	51.27	3.1	51.11	<del>3.1</del>	29.01	1.8	-17.8
<b>E.Ang</b>	56.49	3.4	44.01	2.6	46.83	2.8	43.05	2.5	33.77	2.0	-23.8
<b>S.East.</b>	42.25	2.4	38.61	2.3	27.73	1.8	23.65	1.6	5.75	1.1	-44.0
<b>S.West.</b>	50.65	3.0	50.01	2.6	46.57	2.7	30.37	1.9	24.67	1.6	-40.0
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<b>W.Mid.</b>	57.00	3.9	50.08	2.9	59.55	<del>3.9</del>	46.39	<del>2.7</del>	35.83	<del>2.1</del>	-18.6
<b>N.West.</b>	58.20	<del>3.8</del>	55.19	<del>3.5</del>	55.49	3.5	35.09	2.1	35.51	2.1	-39.7
<b>Scot.</b>	58.15	<del>3.8</del>	53.87	<del>3.3</del>	59.81	<del>4.0</del>	29.35	1.8	32.63	2.0	-49.5
<b>Wales</b>	59.35	<del>3.9</del>	59.19	<del>3.9</del>	62.79	<del>4.4</del>	50.5	<del>4.5</del>	39.47	<del>2.3</del>	-14.8
<b>N.Ir.</b>	42.57	-	43.41	2.5	71.37	<del>6.0</del>	63.5	<del>3.0</del>	38.71	<del>2.3</del>	+33.0
-----											
Col. mean.			51.39		54.99		44.34		32.99		
<b>U.K.</b>	55.43	-	49.38	3.1	49.55	3.6	36.17	2.7	27.99	1.9	-

Source. See Appendix 3.

**Table 3.**

**U.K.**— Educational Expansion for each region of students continuing beyond the compulsory age limit (15/16-18 years), as a percentage of their age group, for the period 1966-71-76 and 81.

Region	Students x 1000									
	1966		1971		1976		1981		1966 =100	
	Stud.	%	Stud.	%	Stud.	%	Stud.	%		
<b>North.</b>	80.66	<b>35.05*</b>	93.08	<b>49.57*</b>	94.24	<b>54.73</b>	87.10	<b>55.61*</b>		<b>+36.97</b>
<b>Y&amp;H.</b>	132.00	<b>42.56*</b>	139.28	<b>52.48</b>	144.23	<b>56.89*</b>	141.70	<b>58.53</b>		<b>+27.28</b>
<b>E.Mid.</b>	87.09	<b>43.60*</b>	69.40	<b>35.74*</b>	90.31	<b>47.23</b>	110.52	<b>58.70*</b>		<b>+25.72</b>
<b>E.Ang</b>	36.95	<b>21.00</b>	41.81	<b>31.14</b>	46.85	<b>42.41</b>	45.20	<b>52.14</b>		<b>+59.72</b>
<b>S.East</b>	463.86	<b>46.22</b>	499.20	<b>53.42</b>	495.40	<b>56.82</b>	494.40	<b>61.08</b>		<b>+24.32</b>
<b>S.West.</b>	94.31	<b>38.72</b>	105.64	<b>52.79</b>	117.42	<b>58.25</b>	118.93	<b>58.56</b>		<b>+33.87</b>
<b>W.Mid.</b>	134.95	<b>43.54</b>	136.88	<b>47.42</b>	150.17	<b>54.74</b>	111.49	<b>42.88*</b>		<b>- 1.51</b>
<b>N.West</b>	181.48	<b>39.87*</b>	186.27	<b>50.50*</b>	198.53	<b>56.77*</b>	205.17	<b>62.06</b>		<b>-35.75</b>
<b>Scot.</b>	150.00	<b>44.33*</b>	141.30	<b>44.56*</b>	135.00	<b>52.04*</b>	130.58	<b>54.13</b>		<b>-18.10</b>
<b>Wales</b>	87.34	<b>59.24*</b>	95.80	<b>65.57*</b>	93.10	<b>66.14*</b>	89.64	<b>66.21*</b>		<b>-10.52</b>
<b>N.Ir.</b>	50.00	<b>48.26</b>	56.00	<b>53.79</b>	53.00	<b>63.17*</b>	52.40	<b>61.50*</b>		<b>-21.52</b>
<b>U.K.</b>	1491.66	<b>43.64</b>	1595.28	<b>52.15</b>	1554.78	<b>61.52</b>	1522.16	<b>53.00</b>		<b>-17.66</b>
<b>Col. mean.</b>		<b>43.03</b>		<b>48.81</b>		<b>55.38</b>		<b>57.40</b>		

Source. See Appendix.

Notes. \* Regions classified in this study as 'disadvantaged'.

**Table 4.**

**ITALY**- Educational Expansion for each region of students continuing education beyond the compulsory age limit (14-19 years). Number of students and percentage of age group. 1951-61-71 and 81.

Region	1951		1961		1971		1981		1971 group = 100 mean
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	
P'monte	28740	9.96	40681	13.40	132781	43.28	161852	52.73	17.92
V.D'Aosta	348	3.96*	720	8.25	3012	34.27	3978	44.66	23.26 (20.3)
Liguria	19579	15.96	29355	22.13	64528	48.33	77766	58.00	16.67
Lombardia	51490	8.23	87235	13.16	272505	40.81	356559	53.57	23.82
T.A.Adige.	4485	6.53	8636	10.71	26402	32.53	31198	38.32	15.10
Veneto	24338	5.79*	43801	11.34*	36064	35.00*	171582	43.91*	20.29
F.V.Giulia	6418	7.38*	17811	16.24	40589	37.00	50298	54.89	19.37
E.Rom.	31348	9.32	51918	16.44	140584	44.32	159991	52.57	11.88 (11.7)
Marche.	12467	8.61	21111	17.40	52388	43.15	61179	51.10	12.54
Toscana	27184	9.78	46478	16.73	123433	44.19	147169	52.57	15.94
Umbria	6928	6.15*	13258	18.37*	32540	45.21*	36936	51.10*	11.53
Lazio.	45981	13.39	82170	21.51	210610	54.27	262713	57.38	5.42
Campania	44022	8.86*	81452	15.96*	205820	40.10*	25953	50.13*	20.00
Abr/Mol.	12654	6.37*	24215	16.68*	59347	41.09*	71602	49.18*	6.45
Puglia	25430	6.94*	55484	14.98*	132178	35.52*	170132	45.28*	21.55
Basilicata	2617	3.29*	6152	10.27*	24158	40.62*	28706	47.87*	15.14 (16.2)
Calabria.	14889	5.96*	29149	13.80*	82702	39.26*	100170	46.88	16.25
Sicilia	40617	8.31	73546	15.82*	169506	36.48*	206878	44.23*	7.52
Sardegna.	8827	6.30*	22530	14.54*	58437	37.58*	70460	44.88*	16.26
Col. mean		7.65		21.81		45.28		52.50	
Italy	416317	7.65	824150	17.28	1743000	36.34	2443790	44.04	17.48

Source. See Appendix. Note. \* Regions classified in this study as 'disadvantaged'.

Table 5.

ITALY- Popular voting support for Anti-System political Parties, as a percentage of the total votes cast at each general election between 1945 to 1983.

Anti-system Pol. Parties	1945	1948	1953	1958	1963	1968	1972	1976	1979	PE <sup>1</sup> 1979	1983
PCI <sup>2</sup>	39.6	31.0	22.6	22.7	25.3	26.9	27.2	34.4	30.4	29.6	29.9
PSI <sup>3</sup>	-	-	12.7	14.2	13.8	14.5	-	-	-	-	-
PDI/PDIUM <sup>2</sup>	2.8	2.8	6.9	4.8	1.7	1.3	-	-	-	-	-
MSI	5.3	2.0	5.8	4.8	5.1	4.4	8.6	6.1	5.3	-	6.8
TOTAL	47.7	35.8	48.0	46.5	45.9	47.1	35.8	40.5	35.7	29.6	36.7

Source. Data take from Annuario Statistico Italiano.

Notes.

1. European Parliamentary Elections
2. Results of PCI and PSI were combined for 1945 and 1948..
3. The Socialists PSI and the Monarchists PDI-PDIUM, have in recent years moved towards a moderate position and thereby are no longer classified as an Anti-system party.

Table 6. ITALY and The U.K.- Relative variability (C.Vr) for each political party for both cases between 1945-83.

Italy /party	1946-68	1946-83	UK /party	1945-66	1945-83
DC	14.852	12.120	CON	10.844	10.662
PCI	18.456	18.346	LAB	4.192	14.645
PLI	72.011	68.686	LIB/LIB/All.	47.866	65.133
PRI	56.600	45.673	•	•	•
PSDI	60.698	47.779	•	•	•
PSI	61.463	48.332	•	•	•
Others	55.286	39.775	•	•	•

Source. Data for Italy taken from Annuario Statistico Italiano. Data for the UK. taken from Craig (1981) op. cit. for the years between 1945-79, and Butler and Kavangh (1984) op. cit. for 1983.

