# The Transformation of Squatter Settlements into Authorised Apartment Blocks: A Case Study of Ankara, Turkey

A Thesis submitted in part fulfilment for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

at the
University of Kent at Canterbury

by
Nihan Ozdemir

1999

Keynes College

# The Transformation of Squatter Settlements into Authorised Apartment Blocks: A Case Study of Ankara

**A Thesis submitted in part fulfilment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

**at the**
**University of Kent at Canterbury**
**by**
**Nihan Ozdemir**

## Abstract

In a city where more than half the population lives in squatter housing, the transformation of squatter housing into apartment blocks has important consequences on the socio-spatial structure of the city . This thesis aims to provide an account of the recent transformation of squatter settlements in Ankara into apartment blocks, with special reference to the political, economic, cultural as well as spatial consequences of this transformation.

The theoretical part of the thesis has shown that existing theories on the formation and transformation of squatter settlements fail to provide an adequate account of their formation. While the articulation approach seems to be the most adequate for illustrating the formation of squatter settlements, it too remains silent in the face of transformation processes of squatter housing into apartment blocks on such a massive scale. In order to explain this process, rent gap theory. which was developed for the study of gentrification, is applied to the case of squatter transformation. Along with these structural dynamics, the political and ideological motives behind this policy shift on squatter settlements are also emphasised.

In order to provide a holistic view of the development of squatter housing in Turkey, and particularly in Ankara, a brief review of the trajectory of squatter development in Turkey and in Ankara is provided with reference to state policies in this area. It is revealed that state strategies towards the squatter have undergone dramatic changes, from complete denial to covert acceptance, and then to overt support partly due to the increasing negotiation power of the squatter dwellers. In this context, the recent transformation of the squatter settlements needs to be understood with reference to this negotiation process as well as to the strategic location of the land occupied by the squatter settlements for redevelopment.

Regarding the repercussions of this massive scale transformation on the city as a whole, and the different groups involved in this process, the case studies has shown that despite the considerable difference between the public and private sector-led transformation schemes, the main losers were the tenants, as they were forced to leave the areas that were subjected to redevelopment. Ironically, although the squatter owners received flats and in some cases cash for their land plot at the end of redevelopment process, this return is far from meeting their initial expectations. The main winner seems to be developers, public or private, in the redevelopment process. Yet, in the long term, the main loser seems to be the city population on the whole, as the newly emerging environments, as a result of redevelopment, reduced the environmental standards of the city and created a city that was intended to be avoided by the original development plan.

# ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am deeply grateful to my supervisor Prof. Chris G. Pickvance. Without his invaluable comments, encouragement and patience this study would not have been completed.

I would like to state my thanks to several people I met in Canterbury for the pleasure of spending great time together.

Special thanks are due to my brother Niyazi who perfectly reproduced all the figures in the thesis and sincerely helped whenever I needed. I would also like to thank to Tarik for his friendship and support throughout this study.

# CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ..... i

ACKNOWLEDGMENT ..... ii

LIST OF TABLES ..... vi

LIST OF FIGURES ..... viii

INTRODUCTION ..... 1

1. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES ..... 1

2. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ..... 4

3. THE METHOD OF ANALYSIS ..... 6

CHAPTER 1: THEORIES OF SQUATTER SETTLEMENT FORMATION AND TRANSFORMATION ..... 8

1.1 INTRODUCTION ..... 8

1.2 SQUATTER FORMATION IN THE THIRD WORLD ..... 9
1.2.1 THE LIBERAL APPROACH ..... 10
1.2.1.1 Modernisation Theory 10
1.2.2 RADICAL APPROACH ..... 26
1.2.2.1 Dependency Theory 26
1.2.2.2 Articulation of Modes of Production Theory 34
1.2.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS ..... 45

1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING SQUATTER SETTLEMENT TRANSFORMATION IN THE THIRD WORLD ..... 46
1.3.1 THE DEFINITION OF AND DISCUSSIONS ON GENTRIFICATION ..... 47
1.3.2 DEMAND-SIDE EXPLANATIONS ..... 50
1.3.3 SUPPLY-SIDE EXPLANATIONS ..... 55
1.3.3.1 The Rent gap Theory 57
1.3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE RELEVANCE OF GENTRIFICATION DEBATE IN THE CONTEXT OF UNAUTHORISED HOUSING REDEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD ..... 61

1.4 CONCLUSION ..... 63

CHAPTER 2: FORMATION OF GECEKONDUS IN ANKARA ..... 65

2.1 INTRODUCTION ..... 65

2.2 THE 1923-1950 PERIOD ..... 66

2.1.1 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE 1950s MIGRATION ....76

**2.3 THE 1950-1960 PERIOD ....78**

**2.4 THE 1960-1980 PERIOD ....83**

**2.5 THE 1980s ....93**

**2.6 CONCLUSION ....98**

**CHAPTER 3: MEANS OF TRANSFORMATION: IMPROVEMENT PLANS ....102**

**3.1 INTRODUCTION ....102**

**3.2 IMPROVEMENT PLANS ....103**
3.2.1 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE IMPROVEMENT PLANS ....104
3.2.2 THE TECHNICAL PROCEDURE FOR PREPARING IMPROVEMENT PLANS ....106
3.2.3 DIFFERENT TYPES OF PLANNING STRATEGIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF IMPROVEMENT PLANS ....108

**3.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IMPROVEMENT PLANS IN ANKARA ....111**
3.3.1 THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE OF ANKARA ....111
3.3.2 THE IMPROVEMENT PLANNING PROCESS IN ANKARA ....114

**3.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE IMPROVEMENT PLANS ....120**
3.4.1 PHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS ....121
3.4.2 ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS ....124
3.4.3 POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS ....128
3.4.4 CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS ....132

**3.5 CONCLUSION ....134**

**CHAPTER 4: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES ....137**

**4.1 KECIOREN DISTRICT ....138**

**4.2 CANKAYA DISTRICT ....142**

**4.3 ABOUT THE CASE STUDY AREAS ....144**

**CHAPTER 5: TRANSFORMATION BY MARKET FORCES: THE CASE OF 19 MAYIS MAHALLESI ....149**

**5.1 INTRODUCTION ....149**

**5.2 THE CASE OF KECIOREN DISTRICT ....150**

5.2.1 THE IMPROVEMENT PLANNING PROCESS IN THE KECIOREN MUNICIPALITY ..... 150

**5.3 19 MAYIS MAHALLESI ..... 156**
5.3.1 HISTORY OF THE MAHALLE ..... 156

**5.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE IMPROVEMENT PLANS IN THE MAHALLE ..... 158**
5.4.1 PHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS ..... 159
5.4.2 ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS ..... 168
5.4.2.1 During the redevelopment 169
5.4.2.2 After the redevelopment 173
5.4.3 POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS ..... 180
5.4.4 CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS ..... 186
5.4.4.1 Demographic Characteristics 187
5.4.4.2 Family Structure 189
5.4.4.3 Education 190
5.4.4.4 Life in the Apartment Building 193

**5.5 CONCLUSION ..... 195**

**CHAPTER 6: TRANSFORMATION BY PUBLIC SECTOR: THE CASE OF DIKMEN VALLEY ..... 198**

**6.1 INTRODUCTION ..... 198**

**6.2 THE CASE OF CANKAYA DISTRICT: ..... 199**
6.2.1 IMPROVEMENT PLANNING PROCESS IN THE CANKAYA MUNICIPALITY ..... 199

**6.3 DIKMEN VALLEY ..... 201**
6.3.1 PLANNING HISTORY OF THE VALLEY ..... 201
6.3.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF A SPECIFIC IMPROVEMENT PLAN IN THE VALLEY ..... 205
6.3.2.1 Metropolitan Development Corporation 207
6.3.2.2 Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project 208

**6.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIKMEN VALLEY PROJECT ..... 218**
6.4.1 PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS ..... 218
6.4.2 ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS ..... 223
6.4.3 POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS ..... 233
6.4.4 CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS ..... 237

**6.5 CONCLUSION ..... 241**

**CONCLUSION ..... 245**

**REFERENCES ..... 263**

**APENDIX-1: FIELD SURVEY ..... 271**

## *LIST OF TABLES:*

*Table 1.1 Urban Population Share by Major World Regions 1920-1975* ..... 14
*Table 2.1 Population of Ankara* ..... 67
*Table 2.2 Spatial Distribution of Buildings in Terms of Their Use (1935)* ..... 72
*Table 2.3 Number of Tractors and Area of Cultivated Lands in Turkey, 1940-1967* ..... 77
*Table 2.4 Contribution of Different Sectors to the City's Economy (value added)* ..... 79
*Table 2.5 Number of Gecekondus in Ankara* ..... 84
*Table 2.6 Number of Gecekondus in Turkey* ..... 94
*Table 3.1 Area Covered (ha) by Improvement Plans Approved Each Year in the Different District Municipalities and in Total* ..... 116
*Table 3.2 Summary of the Improvement Planning Works at the end of 1992* ..... 118
*Table 3.3 Distribution of Improvement Plans According to Different Planning Approaches* ..... 119
*Table 3.4 Existing and Proposed Populations and Densities (person/ha) in Gecekondu Areas* ..... 122
*Table 3.5 Party Support in National Elections by Gecekondus in Ankara (%)* ..... 129
*Table 5.1 Minimum Required and Actually Allocated Social Service Areas in One Mahalle (no.1)* ..... 153
*Table 5.2 Land-Use in 19 Mayis* ..... 164
*Table 5.3 Minimum Required and Actually Allocated Social Service Areas in 19 Mayis* ..... 166
*Table 5.4 Distribution of the Exchange Rates by Number of Shareholders of the Building Plot* ..... 170
*Table 5.5 Previous Location of the Current Residents* ..... 174
*Table 5.6 Income Structure (in million TL/month)* ..... 174
*Table 5.7 Employment Status by Tenure (Head of Households)* ..... 176
*Table 5.8 How People Became Flat Owners* ..... 177
*Table 5.9 Rent: Income Ratios* ..... 179
*Table 5.10 Interest in Local Politics* ..... 182
*Table 5.11 Reported Party Support in 1989 Local Elections by Residents Who Previously Lived in the 19 Mayis* ..... 183
*Table 5.12 Reported Party Support in 1989 Local Elections by Current Residents* ..... 184
*Table 5.13 Expected Voting in the March 1994 Local Elections by the Current Residents* ..... 185
*Table 5.14 Religious Sects* ..... 188
*Table 5.15 Family Structure by Tenure* ..... 189
*Table 5. 16 Education by Gender* ..... 191

*Table 5.17 Education by Gender (owners)* ..... *191*
*Table 5.18 Education by Gender (tenants)* ..... *192*
*Table 6.1 Land-Use Distribution in Valley According to the Project* ..... *214*
*Table 6.2 Total Cost of the Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project* ..... *226*
*Table 6.3 Total Revenue of the Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project* ..... *227*
*Table 6.4 Monthly Average Income of the Residents (in million TL/month)* ..... *232*
*Table 6.5 Education by Gender (Gecekondu Owners)* ..... *238*
*Table 6.6 Education by Gender (Tenants in New Flats)* ..... *239*
*Table 6.7 Family Structure* ..... *240*

## *LIST OF FIGURES:*

*Figure 2.1 Gecekondu Settlements in Ankara* ..... *89*
*Figure 3.1 The 'Improvement Plan' Overlaid upon an Existing Gecekondu Area* ..... *109*
*Figure 3.2 Districts Municipalities of Ankara Metropolitan Area* ..... *113*
*Figure 4.1 Distribution of Income Groups in Ankara, 1970* ..... *139*
*Figure 4.2 Distribution of Income Groups in Ankara, 1980* ..... *140*
*Figure 4.3 Views from a typical gecekondu area in Ankara* ..... *146*
*Figure 4.4 A view from authorised part of the Kecioren District* ..... *147*
*Figure 4.5 Views from an upper-middle income residential area in the Cankaya District* ..... *148*
*Figure 5.1 Improvement Plan for 19 Mayis* ..... *160*
*Figure 5.2 19 Mayis during the redevelopment* ..... *162*
*Figure 5.3 19 Mayis after the redevelopment* ..... *163*
*Figure 6.1 Location of the Valley* ..... *202*
*Figure 6.2 Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project* ..... *213*
*Figure 6.3 Dikmen Valley after the redevelopment* ..... *219*
*Figure 6.4 Apartment blocks allocated to the ex-gecekondu owners* ..... *219*
*Figure 6.5 The "Culture Bridge"* ..... *220*

# INTRODUCTION

## 1. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

In the period since the Second World War, underdeveloped countries have urbanised very rapidly, and in some countries half or more of the population is now living in the cities. The main features of this pattern of urbanisation are the explosive growth of a few cities, the increase in urban unemployment and poverty, the growth of the urban informal sector, the inadequate provision of basic goods and services and the rapid proliferation of slums and squatter areas.

The initial reaction of governments to these settlements was to eradicate them. Throughout the Third World countries, and especially in Latin America, slum and squatter clearance policies were the order of the day and were implemented during the 1950s and early 1960s. However, these policies were effective neither in the eradication of such areas nor in the prevention of new ones.

As a result, the development of squatter settlements attracted a great deal of attention from scholars. The vast majority of the literature has focused on the dynamics of the squatter-formation process. In the early writings, which mainly followed modernisation theory, squatter settlements were regarded as temporary phenomena which would come to an end by the achievement of modern, industrial society. Their residents, on the other hand, were seen as marginals who could not integrate into the urban way of life. However, later discussions placed an emphasis upon

understanding the conditions from which these settlements emerged. Dependency and the articulation of modes-of-production theories contributed to the explanation of the phenomenon in a wider context. They explained the existence of such settlements in the context of the incorporation of Third World countries into the world capitalist system.

Turkey, too, has experienced an unprecedented rural-urban influx since the 1950s. Governments have failed to produce enough urban land for the newcomers, and squatter settlements have mushroomed in the invaded peripheries of the large cities. Ankara, as the capital city, was one of the cities which suffered from very rapid urbanisation. After having settled in these lands, dwellers in squatter settlements started to press the government to provide basic services and infrastructure and legalise their buildings.

The Turkish government's response to squatter settlements has changed from overt opposition in the 1950s to covert encouragement in the 1970s and overt support in the 1980s. After 1983, most municipalities prepared 'Improvement Plans' for these settlements. These allowed squatter housing to be transformed into regularised, multi-storey apartment blocks, a phenomenon which has not occurred in any other Third World country. The effect of these plans, however, is not only to set a series of planning standards regulating the construction of buildings, the level of services to be provided, the required street width and the public space, but also to open these areas to speculation. Therefore, the outcomes as well as the implications of this distinctive process requires a detailed scrutiny that will reveal the real dynamics.

In Turkey, there is a historical tendency to regard the owners of squatter dwellings as the people who always seek the appreciation of rent for their land. The previous examples of redevelopment projects implemented in some of the squatter settlements back this rough claim. However, to what extent the squatter owners have been successful in doing so, after the recent transformation processes, has not been examined in detail yet. In this regard, the thesis aims at filling this gap in current urban studies.

The lack of a theoretical framework for understanding the transformation of squatter areas in the Third World, however, has made it necessary to use theories of gentrification, and rent gap theory in particular, to explain such transformations in Ankara. In this context, the thesis is also an attempt to apply rent gap theory, as a structural framework, to the transformation of unauthorised housing in Turkey.

The thesis makes a comparative evaluation of the transformation processes experienced in two different squatter settlements of Ankara in order to answer the following questions:

- What is the role of political actors, developers, squatter owners and other interests in the process of designation and preparation of the redevelopment plan for the area?

- What determines, whether, once designated and planned, squatter areas are actually transformed?

- Do differences in transformation mode, (i.e., whether transformation is undertaken by market actors or by the public sector) lead to differences in terms of plan preparation and implementation?

- What are the physical, economic, political and social implications of the transformation process?

- Who are the losers and winners at the end of the transformation?

## 2. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

Chapter 1 presents a review of theories relating to squatter-settlement formation and transformation. Liberal and radical approaches explaining Third World squatter development are discussed in the first section of the chapter. The positions of modernisation, dependency and articulation of modes-of-production theories are outlined in relation to their explanations of the dual-structure of Third World countries. Modernisation and neo-modernisation policy recommendations are also included in the discussion as they were influential in the formation of such settlements. In the second section of the chapter, theories of gentrification are discussed as an attempt to form a theoretical framework to understand Third World housing transformation.

In Chapter 2, squatter settlement formation in Ankara is evaluated. The discussion here covers the time span between the early 1920s and late 1980s which is divided

into four periods. The first period (1923-1950) examines the early days of the capital in relation to the emergence of the first squatter settlements in the city. The second period (1950-1960) explores the second wave of migration to the city which resulted from structural changes in agricultural production. In the third period (1960-1980) the dynamics of the consolidation of the squatter settlements in urban physical, economic, political and social spheres is discussed. And in the forth period (1980-onwards) the more recent developments which led to the transformation of squatter settlements are evaluated.

Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 are the empirical chapters in which the transformation of squatter settlements in Ankara is evaluated. In Chapter 3 the means of this transformation, Improvement Plans, are examined as a framework for the case studies. Here, the interpretations and implementations of the Improvement Plans by the district municipalities of Ankara are presented.

Chapter 4 contains a brief description of two socio-economically different districts, Kecioren and Cankaya, as an introduction to the case studies. Kecioren is a low and lower-middle income residential area whereas Cankaya is an upper-middle and upper income area. The chapter summarises the development process of both authorised and unauthorised parts of the districts, and presents the perception of the squatter settlements by their residents. The reasons for the selection of the two squatter settlements together with very brief outlines of their characteristics are also given in this introductory chapter.

Chapter 5 explores the market-led transformation process taking place at the current time in the Kecioren municipality. It discusses the implementation of Improvement Plans in the Kecioren area and evaluates this type of transformation in one of its squatter settlements, 19 Mayis. The position of different interest groups throughout the plan preparation and implementation phases and final outcome of the plans are discussed in the chapter.

Chapter 6, on the other hand, focuses on the redevelopment of another squatter settlement, Dikmen Valley, in Cankaya District, where the whole process of transformation is carried out by the public sector. It discusses the same issues as Chapter 5 in relation to the implementation and implications of the transformation.

Finally, in the concluding section, a general assessment of the different types of squatter-settlement transformation processes experienced in Ankara is presented.

## 3. THE METHOD OF ANALYSIS

The data for this thesis was gathered in three main ways:

1. Interviews were conducted with local government officials and planners, local politicians, neighbourhood heads and elderly residents. This gave a picture of the opinions of different interest groups regarding the implementation of Improvement Plans which could not be drawn from any other source.

2. Plans, plan reports, interim reports prepared by the municipalities and municipal archives are examined. As we will see, these provided the basis especially for the discussions of the plan preparation and implementation phases.
3. A survey was conducted in two squatter areas of Ankara, 19 Mayis and Dikmen Valley, from the Kecioren and Cankaya districts respectively. The survey provided data on gecekondu owners and tenants, current residents of the transformed neighbourhoods and finally on private developers[1]. As mentioned above, survey areas were chosen from two socio-economically distinct districts of Ankara, Kecioren and Cankaya, in order to show to what extent the heterogeneity of squatter areas (in terms of their locations, both within their own districts and in the city as a whole, and the socio-economic characteristics and political attitudes of the residents) and implementation of different types of redevelopment modes can affect both the means and ends of the transformation process.

[1] Details of the samples and examples of the questionnaires given to each group are shown in Appendix-1

# CHAPTER 1:

# THEORIES OF SQUATTER SETTLEMENT FORMATION AND TRANSFORMATION

## 1.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter of the thesis a review of the literature on the formation as well as the transformation process of squatter settlements in Third World countries will be presented.

In the first part, discussions on squatter-settlement formation in the Third World will be reviewed. The main objective here is to improve our understanding of the social, economic and political conditions of urbanisation experienced by such countries. In this context, different approaches to Third World development will be briefly examined as a starting point for the discussion to see how the so-called 'dual-structure' in social, economic and political spheres is explained by these approaches. This will enable us to understand the conditions of the formation of the same duality in the urban domain (i.e. the formation of squatter settlements alongside conventional housing).

Having examined squatter-settlement formation in the Third World, in the second part an attempt will be made to develop a theoretical framework for the *transformation* of squatter settlements. In this context, the literature on gentrification in general, and Rent Gap theory in particular, is discussed in order to construct a theoretical base for understanding the transformation of squatter settlements in the Third World.

## 1.2 SQUATTER FORMATION IN THE THIRD WORLD

The patterns and processes of urban development in Third World countries are best understood within the context of the development patterns followed by these countries. Explanations of the rapid proliferation of squatter areas, therefore, cannot be isolated from the economic, social and political conditions that generate the patterns of Third World urbanisation. In other words, any attempt to understand the essence of urbanisation in general and squatter formation in particular should refer to the above mentioned conditions.

Hence in this part of the chapter the liberal and radical approaches to the development of the Third World are reviewed in order to provide the basis for a subsequent evaluation of squatter-settlement formation.

In the liberal approach the main focus of discussion is modernisation theory. Since the policy recommendations of this theory, and later neo-modernisation policies, largely shaped the development of most of the Third World cities in the post-war

period, special emphasis is put on these two. The debate over self-help housing (an outcome of these policies) in relation to squatter-settlement formation is also reviewed.

Among radical approaches to Third World development dependency and articulation of the modes-of-production theories are examined. The alternative explanations of the existence of squatter settlements based on dependency theory are set out. A critical evaluation of self-help housing policies and their implementation based on the articulation of modes-of-production theory is then presented. In this context, how self-help housing production is articulated to other types of housing production in the Third World is discussed.

### 1.2.1 THE LIBERAL APPROACH

#### 1.2.1.1 Modernisation Theory

To a considerable extent, modernisation theory is the reinterpretation of structural-functionalism, which mainly employs environmental deterministic explanations in its analysis. Very briefly, structural-functionalism explains social phenomena by making analogies between biological and social processes by using the general concepts of organic evolution (i.e. variation, selection, adaptation, differentiation, and integration). Based upon this assumption, modernisation theory argues that societies can be analysed within general rules affecting the whole living environment. The transition from a traditional to a modern society, therefore, can be explained by the rules of organic evolution.

Parsons (1966, 1971), the most important theorist in this school, identifies five distinctive characteristics of modern and traditional societies. These are: universalism vs. particularism, performance vs. quality, affective neutrality vs. affectivity, specificity vs. diffuseness, self-orientation vs. collectivity orientation. For him, traditional society is 'ascriptive particularistic' while industrial/modern society is 'acquisitive universalistic', and the transition from a traditional to an industrial or modern society will bring about the expansion of acquisitive universalistic roles over ascriptive particularistic ones.

In the economic sphere, modernisation theory was first represented by Rostow (1960)[1]. In claiming to propose an alternative to the Marxist theory of history, he developed a theory of stages of economic growth. According to him, all societies lie in one of these five universal stages from traditional to modern. They are: 1) traditional society, 2) preconditions for take-off, 3) take-off, 4) the drive to maturity and 5) high mass-consumption. He claimed that modernisation could only be achieved by following these stages.

During the first stage, societies are mainly agricultural with a primitive technology and therefore show low productivity and growth. Landlords hold power in the society and the value system is fatalistic.

The second stage is the starting point of the transition. With the introduction of new technologies in agriculture, the preconditions of economic development came into

[1]He was the Director of Policy and Planning in US State Department during the Kennedy administration

existence. This happened in England and Western Europe in the 19th century with new technological inventions. However, in most traditional societies this stage starts with the import of new technologies from the developed countries. As a result of this external effect, a series of economic and social changes begin which first shake and then start to destroy the traditional structure (i.e. increase in investments, developments in the financial system, expansion of education and so on). However, despite these changes the society can still be considered as traditional in terms of social structures.

The stage of take-off is the total transformation of societies towards the modern one. In this stage the rate of investment rises, new industries are developed, urbanisation increases and the number of entrepreneurs increase. This stage was also achieved by Western European countries by technological changes and external discoveries, but in other undeveloped countries, the political authorities must favour modernisation since the introduction of new technology depends heavily upon the openness of the country to the external inputs.

The fourth stage, the drive to maturity, is the period in which all aspects of modernisation penetrate the whole economy and enable the development and use of new technologies of all sorts. In this long period, new sophisticated industries take the place of old ones and society becomes mature in all aspects of social life.

In the final stage, the increase in per capita income moves the economy towards producing more and more consumer goods and services for the new type of consumers (i.e. skilled workers and urban-based office workers).

In short, as summarised in these stages, the development model of modernisation theory is 'to copy an-already-proven example' (i.e. Western capitalist countries) (Peet, 1991, p.33) to achieve economic, social, cultural and political modernisation. As Burgess put it '..the transition from 'agricultural and peasant societies' to 'modern urban industrial societies' could be achieved by the 'developing' country emulating the historical pattern of capitalist development followed by the West' (Burgess, 1992, p.76). Here, what is meant by transformation in concrete terms was to decrease the agricultural share of output and employment while increasing the industrial sector.

***Modernisation Policies and Their Implementation:***

During the 1950s and 1960s, modernisation theory emerged as a solution to the development problems of the Third World and its policy recommendations were implemented by most of the Latin American countries. Among other things these policies proposed and implicitly encouraged urbanisation as an inevitable outcome of industrialisation. Migration from rural to urban areas, in this regard, was a necessary condition for modernisation and development and therefore was to be encouraged. To a considerable extent, these policies worked and rural to urban migration accelerated. As a result, the share of the urban population started to increase very rapidly in Third World countries (Table 1.1).

In the face of this massive population migration, it was argued that the increasing population in the urban centres might not be employed initially. But a pool of unemployed people could encourage the industrialisation process in such areas

leading to the absorption of the unemployed. The implicit assumption, here, was first that economic growth will be achieved and then poverty will be eradicated through income redistribution.

**Table 1.1 Urban Population Share by Major World Regions 1920-1975***

| World Region | 1920 | 1940 | 1960 | 1975 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Europe | 34.7 | 39.5 | 44.2 | 48.2 |
| US and Canada | 41.4 | 46.2 | 58.0 | 65.4 |
| Soviet Union | 10.3 | 24.1 | 36.4 | 46.4 |
| Oceania | 36.5 | 40.9 | 52.9 | 57.1 |
| East Asia | 7.2 | 11.6 | 18.5 | 23.7 |
| South Asia | 5.7 | 8.3 | 13.7 | 17.4 |
| ***Latin America*** | ***14.4*** | ***19.6*** | ***32.8*** | ***40.5*** |
| Africa | 4.8 | 7.2 | 13.4 | 18.1 |
| Developed Nations | 29.8 | 36.7 | 45.6 | 52.1 |
| ***Less Developed Nations*** | ***6.9*** | ***10.4*** | ***17.3*** | ***22.2*** |
| The World | 14.3 | 18.8 | 25.4 | 29.7 |

Source: Gilbert and Gugler, 1990, p.5
*Urban places are those with more than 20 000 inhabitants

During the "transition" period, however, the existence of a dual structure (traditional/modern) in the economic and social spheres was inevitable. In other words, this situation should be regarded as a temporary phenomenon which would vanish when development was totally achieved. This would only be possible by the replacement of traditional systems by Western value systems.

The spatial organisation of this dual structure was reflected in the emergence of slums and squatter settlements in urban centres. Obviously, these did not satisfy the

expectations of modernisation theorists and were regarded as anomalies which should be replaced by the conventional housing areas based on Western standards.

The term "marginal" was first used to refer to the physical locations of the squatter areas in Latin American cities. As Perlman put it:

> 'Analysts of Latin American urbanisation originally used the term "marginal" to describe the newly established, substandard and makeshift housing settlements built by recent migrants on the fringes of the urban areas. It was the physical characteristics of these settlements –their marginal location with respect to the central city as well as their clearly deficient infrastructure, unsound construction, lack of sanitary services, and overcrowding –that drew the attention of observers. A marginal situation was circularly defined as a condition of inhabiting marginal neighbourhoods' (Perlman, 1976, p.102).

Later on it was applied to the socio-cultural, political and economic situations of their residents. The term socio-cultural marginality assumed that such areas and their residents were socially disorganised and totally isolated from modern urban life. It was also argued that these people had their own cultural values which were opposed to the new urban way of life. The concept of political marginality, on the other hand, assumed that these people lacked the ability to participate in the modern democratic process. In other words, they were regarded as a part of society which was excluded from political participation. Finally, the term economic marginality referred to the existence of a high unemployment rate among migrants and in the urban informal sector[2]. From this point of view 'concepts such as 'parasitic cities' ...and 'cancers' ...are developed in order to

[2] This term refers to the part of an economy 'which performs productive, useful and necessary labour without formal systems of control and remuneration and which operates beyond official recognition' (Johnston et. al., 1990, p. 227).

point out the superficial nature of the economic base of Third World urbanisation' (Keles, 1988, p.17).

Despite all these negative aspects, marginality, for modernisation theorists, was a temporary condition experienced by the migrants in the social, political and economic spheres of urban life during the transition period. This condition can be summed up as a lack of adaptation of one part of the society to the rest of it.

In accordance with these views, in most Latin American countries housing policies recommended the eradication of slum and squatter settlement areas. Since such areas were considered as anomalies, they were to be replaced by 'conventional' housing units; i.e. housing units built to Western cultural and technical standards. Perlman explains these policies in the context of Latin America as follows:

> 'Latin American policy-makers equated the problem of marginality with that of substandard housing. The perceivable housing deficit, a product of the rapidly accelerating pace of internal migration, was considered the main cause of marginal neighbourhoods. Marginality was seen as something to be *physically* eradicated, a manifestation that had a simple cure: remove favela dwellings (squatters) and provide for the public construction and financing of adequate low-cost housing' (Perlman, 1976, p.103).

In these low-cost conventional housing projects houses were 'produced by the building industry in combination with private investment or state funding, using plans made by architects or engineers, yet without any involvement or participation in the planning or building procedures by the users except financial down-payments.. The finished product

is produced either for a general market or, with some subsidies, for a special population sector as *social housing*' (Harms, 1992, p.38). ). As Burgess puts it:

> 'The reverse side of the eradication coin, and the universal housing policy formula, was the construction with industrial or semi-industrial techniques of public housing projects on peripheral land. In line with the industrial priorities of modernisation strategy, public housing contracts were used to favour those firms which were most active in pursuing the goods of capital-intensive industrialisation. Essentially this meant state sponsorship of the industrial form which its standardised and prefabricated parts and structures, complex and multi-rise designs and 'packaged' housing arrangements' (Burgess, 1989, p.40).

Conventional housing policies found a wide range of implementation opportunities during the 1950s and the 1960s in many Third World countries, especially in Latin America. During the period in which Keynesian type of development policies were dominant, investment in housing was regarded as a tool to accelerate development and to create employment opportunities. Parallel to these policies, conventional housing projects 'offered considerable investment opportunities for landed property, finance and construction capital, employment opportunities for bureaucratic and professional interests' (Burgess, 1989, p.40).

By the second half of the 1960s, modernisation policies and their implementation in the urban realm started to fail. As mentioned before, the level of economic growth was too low to allow the goals of modernisation policies affecting the urban poor to be achieved. Since little development could be achieved in the agricultural sector, rural-urban migration increasingly continued with rising unemployment rates in the

urban centres. And these migrants could not be employed in the capital-intensive industrial sector.

The implementation of modernisation strategies in the housing sphere also failed. The eradication of slums and squatter settlements and the construction of 'modern' houses did not help to solve the housing problems of migrants in urban areas. Since the number of conventional dwellings built was too low to meet the increasing demand and at the same time their price was too expensive for most of the urban poor, these policies were far from being a remedy to the housing problems of the urban poor. Perlman summarises the experience of conventional housing projects implemented in a number of Latin American cities as follows:

> '...the private housing industry was slow to react to the prospects of such low-profit housing. Government subsidies needed to be granted.... Most of the countries showed a clear structural incapacity to build housing units in adequate numbers, and indulged a bias toward architecturally "pleasing" solutions based on middle-class standards and building codes. The few units that were produced proved too desirable to be allocated to previously removed squatters. Very rapidly the field of subsidised public housing became the domain of government bureaucrats and other members of the lower middle classes. Thus, the solution to the problem became in itself a source of new and more fundamental problem. Public housing emerged as a mechanism through which the middle sectors could profit at the expense of squatters. Lacking sufficient income and adequate occupational status, the "marginal" population was denied access to the proposed solution for its marginality' (Perlman, 1976, pp.104-105).

Moreover, these projects also failed to meet the needs of the people who were supposed to use them. As Ward points out:

> 'In addition to failure for financial reasons it is argued that housing projects have not recognised the needs of the urban poor: the concentration upon issues of sound building design and adequate sanitation ignores the importance of location, in particular proximity to workplace for the whole household. Even where transport is subsidised, low-income households cannot readily afford the time lost by a one-and-a-half or two hour bus ride in from the suburbs. The prohibition upon hawking, petty retailing and manufacturing in housing projects; the limited space available in homes; the break-up of social networks have all, on occasions, reduced the effectiveness of the proposed solution' (Ward, 1982, pp.2-3).

As a result of the unsuccessful implementation of conventional housing policies, migrants and other sections of the urban poor continued to build their own homes with their own resources in the newly emerging squatter areas. This spontaneous self-help housing construction spread very rapidly in Latin American cities reaching 10-15% of the growth rate whereas the overall city growth rate was 5-7% (Ward, 1982, p.3).

***Neo-Modernisation Policies and Their Implementation:***

In the late 1960s the failure of modernisation policies was accepted to a large extent and alternative solutions were launched by followers of both liberal and radical perspectives. However, the policy recommendations which changed the development patterns of the Third World came from within the liberal perspective mainly as a critique of Keynesian-type development policies. These alternative policies were termed "Redistribution With Growth" strategies. Since these policies did not point out the structural problems caused by capitalism, as does the radical perspective, they can be included within the framework of the liberal approach and also be treated, as Burgess suggests, as examples of neo-modernisation theory.

The idea of "redistribution with growth strategies" was first introduced by Chenery and these strategies became an influential policy of the World Bank during the 1970s and 1980s. These strategies argued that Keynesian policies towards the maintenance of sufficient demand had raised inflation and unemployment rates in Third World countries. What should have been done was rather 'the progressive redistribution of the new increments in growth towards the poor rather than through the redistribution of existing assets and income, which was regarded as politically and economically unfeasible' (Burgess, 1992, p.80). Within this general framework "redistribution with growth" suggested an increase in the real income of the poor, the establishment of labour-intensive industrialisation, the deregulation of the informal sector and the transfer of public expenditure towards the needs of the poor such as health, education, transport and infrastructure. In housing, on the other hand, the policy recommendation was to encourage self-help housing.

Parallel to these policies, within the general picture of the rapidly expanding squatter settlements, much research, which questioned previous beliefs about the squatter settlements, had been carried out. In particular Mangin (1967) questioned the validity of some myths relating to squatter settlements which stressed their lack of integration into urban life. In relation to squatter settlements, he advocated spontaneous self-help housing as a solution to the housing problem of the urban poor.

The most influential studies of squatter settlements were carried out by Abrams and later by Turner, both of whom also worked with the United Nations and influenced its housing policies. They both put an emphasis on the deficiencies of existing low-cost

housing projects and advocated self-help housing production. Their policy recommendations were also in harmony with the "redistribution with growth" strategies and therefore could be supported by international agencies such as the World Bank. In this context, during the 1970s and the 1980s the state-supported type of self-help housing projects, which were being implemented throughout the Third World, were internationally sponsored.

The implementation of redistribution with growth strategies in the housing domain, in this context, was mainly shaped by Turner's ideas about self-help housing. Turner presents an extended view of his ideas about this issue in his two books: *Freedom to Build* (Turner and Fitcher, 1972) and *Housing by People: Towards the Autonomy in Building Environments* (Turner, 1976). In these books he discusses four basic aspects of housing: the concept of housing, the value of housing, the production of housing and policy recommendations towards housing.

According to Turner, housing should be regarded as a verb rather than as a noun, since it involves a process rather than being just a shelter. Therefore, to consider the house only as an object is a mistake. He explains his concept as follows:

> 'In English the word 'housing' means both the stock of dwelling units (a noun) and the process by which that stock is created and maintained (a verb)... As the cases show, the performance of housing, i.e. what it does for people is not described by housing standards, i.e. what it is, materially speaking' (Turner, 1976, pp.60-1).

Turner goes on to explain the value of housing, and argues that the material value of housing does not indicate the value of housing to people who use it. He defines the former aspect of housing value as 'market-value' and the latter as 'use-value'. He argues that the market value of housing only covers what it is, but not what it does, and therefore cannot be used in measuring real housing value. He stresses the importance of use-value, in the context of housing, by putting an emphasis upon the limited supply. The fact of scarcity leads him to insist on the necessity of another concept different from that of market-value. As he puts it:

> 'On the issue of value - in housing or in any other activity generating personal goods and services - the choice is between the values of procedures and products do for people and their environment, and the material values of the things themselves. In other words, it is the issue of use-value versus market-value' (Turner, 1976, p.153).

The concept of housing and its use-value constitute a base for the development of Turner's ideas about the production of housing. He distinguishes between two main types of housing production: autonomous and heteronomous systems, which relate to the self-help and conventional/formal housing production respectively. He then examines these categories in terms of three components of housing production -planning, construction and management- which involve three different types of actors - users, suppliers and regulators. According to him, these actors have different interests in the housing production process which can be satisfied at different levels according to the housing-production systems.

Turner defines heteronomous systems as highly centralised, hierarchical, large organisations whose products are high in quality and cost but low in use-value. Since they produce the standardised housing unit their ability to match the varying housing demands of different segments of the population is very low. Besides, since the productivity of such organisations diminishes in the long-run, they also misuse scarce resources. He explains this point as follows:

> 'This investment in heteronomous technologies has proved both expensive and of only marginal benefit. It has done very little in the way of providing for the vital needs of the great majority of people' (Turner, 1976, pp.43-6).

According to Turner, autonomous systems, on the other hand, can overcome the deficiencies of large-scale organisations. They produce housing units which are low in cost but high in use-value. Thus, housing produced by such systems can meet the needs of the users and efficiently utilise the household's income in housing production.

While Turner advocates autonomous housing-production, he also appreciates the need for some kind of an organised system. As he points out:

> 'It is argued that housing and, by implication, all other personal and locally specific services, must be autonomous. It is also argued that this autonomy is far from absolute -for it depends on access to essential resources. In housing, for instance, local autonomy and direct or indirect dweller-control depend on the availability of appropriate tools and materials (or technology), of land and finance. In general, the accessibility of these basic resources is a function of law and its administration, and these, in turn are functions of central authority' (Turner, 1976, p.17).

In sum, in the context of housing-production policy, Turner recommends self-help housing production in a different way from that experienced in most of the Third World countries at that time. He favours state supported and state initiated types of self-help housing rather than spontaneous self-help. In this regard, for him, a certain level of state involvement in self-help housing production is not inconsistent with autonomous housing development. He makes this distinction as follows:

> 'The current practices of literal self-help home-building by undernourished and overworked people without credit, with inadequate tools and poor materials is not presented here as a model. Many have accused Mangin, myself and others of romanticising the truly hard conditions of ordinary people in most Third World cities because they fail to differentiate between the practices we describe and the principles we perceive' (Turner, 1976, pp.127-8).

Another important point in Turner's policy recommendations concerns the need for restrictions on heteronomous system-operations in the realm of housing production. He does not suggest the total replacement of heteronomous systems by autonomous ones. Instead, he suggests the restriction of each system to particular stages of the housing production process. For instance, modified planning legislation and provision of basic infrastructure should be done by central and local governments whereas the rest of the process can be left to the dweller's-control.

As mentioned before, Turner's housing principles and policy recommendations were highly suited to redistribution with growth strategies. They were immediately accepted

by the World Bank as the main housing policies for the Third World. As Burgess puts it:

> 'After 1973 the World Bank diversified its sectoral lending by complementing traditional loans for basic economic infrastructure with lending specifically directed at RWG goals...By the end of the McNamara presidency (1981) between one-third and one-half of all World Bank lending was 'poverty oriented'. Lending for urban development, water supply and sewerage, and small-scale enterprises was increased to about 9 per cent of total World Bank commitments, and around $1.6 billion was committed to fifty-two urban projects over the years 1972-1981' (Burgess, 1992, p.81).

The basic goals of the World Bank in the housing domain could be listed as 'home ownership and security of tenure in land and housing; the need for self-help contributions; the incorporation of progressive development procedures; the reduction in standards; access to financial resources; and access to and development of appropriate technologies and materials' (Burgess, 1991, p.82). In the implementation stage, these goals were reflected in real life by focusing on particular projects such as site-and-services, upgrading and self-help housing. In accordance with these projects both small-scale enterprises and the informal sector were encouraged to take part in different parts and stages of the projects.

Consequently, state-supported and state-initiated types of self-help housing policies were implemented in Third World countries between 1972 and 1984 under the sponsorship of the World Bank. However, experience showed that they were far from solving the housing problems of the urban poor. Burgess groups the deficiencies of these projects under four headings (Burgess, 1991, p.83-4).

First, the low level of output. According to World Bank reports, only 9 million people in Third World countries could gain access to these projects during the implementation period, whereas the required annual number of housing units were 8.7 million.

Second, the uneven distribution of lending for self-help housing. Implementation showed that the great majority of projects have been concentrated in the semi-periphery countries and their primate or large cities.

Third, the exclusion of the poor. Site-and-services and upgrading projects evaluation reports showed that after completion the poor were replaced by the middle class. The reason was that the cost of improvements was reflected in increased rents to a level that low-income people could not afford.

Fourth, the reduction in the planning, design and technical standards of housing. The idea of 'full-cost recovery' ended up with the low quality products that could be afforded by the low-income groups. The other side of these reductions in standards was the sharp increase in the maintenance cost of the projects.

### 1.2.2 RADICAL APPROACH

#### 1.2.2.1 Dependency Theory

Marxist approaches to development can be grouped under the general heading of dependency theory although this term is sometimes used synonymously with the world system and underdevelopment theories. Dependency theory was developed as a

reaction to the analyses and policies of the modernisation school. The basic argument of this approach is simply that underdevelopment is the 'key feature of the world capitalist system' (Harrison, 1988, p.62).

According to dependency theory, centre and periphery are interdependent with one another within the global economic system. Since the trade relation between Latin America and capitalist world is adjusted towards the demands of the centre, this interdependency is the main reason for the development on the latter and the underdevelopment of the former.

Frank, the most important name in dependency theory, attacked the modernist assumption that traditionalism is the main reason for underdevelopment. Rather, he argued that the penetration of capitalism into the Third World countries is the main reason for underdevelopment. In fact, development and underdevelopment, for him, are not independent from each other but are two different outcomes of the same economic system, which is capitalism.

Based on his work on Latin America, Frank developed the idea of three 'contradictions' which characterise the metropole-satellite (centre-periphery) relations. The first contradiction explains the expropriation of surplus value of the region by the external monopolies that could have been used for the development of the region itself (the contradiction of monopolistic expropriation of economic surplus). This transfer of surplus value causes the second contradiction, since the process of transfer continues, centre and periphery became polarised by the development of capitalism (the

contradiction of metropole-satellite polarisation). And finally these two contradictions lead to the third one which enables the existence and continuity of capitalism (the contradiction of continuity in change). This chain of surplus extraction (i.e. continuous exploitation of the periphery by the centre), is therefore, the inevitable outcome of underdevelopment. Frank (1967) calls this process the development of underdevelopment. However, his theory cannot always explain the means of this surplus transfer from periphery to centre.

At this point Emmanuel's theory of unequal exchange is relevant (Emmanuel, 1972). According to him, existing trade relations and the international division of labour both benefit the centre at the expense of the periphery and this is how the centre transfers the surplus from the periphery. He argues that the periphery supplies the centre with agricultural products which embody large amounts of cheap labour in return for industrial products which embody small amounts of expensive labour. This causes the terms of trade between centre and periphery to be in favour of the former and at the same time devalues the exports of the latter.

Mainly by drawing from Emmanuel's theory of unequal exchange, Amin attempted to develop the theory of accumulation (Amin, 1974). He introduced the concept of productivity in terms of wage differences between centre and periphery. According to him, although the periphery uses similar technologies in a given exporting sector to the centre, the periphery pays less to their workers. Therefore, the unequal exchange

between centre and periphery occurs simply because the wage differentials are greater than those justified by differences in productivity.

He also estimated the amount of unequal exchange between centre and periphery as 1.5% of the product of the centre or 15% of the product of the periphery. According to him, this amount of expropriated surplus from the periphery is sufficient to prevent the development of the periphery, which in turn it has to borrow from as financial aid (Peet, 1991).

In the later interpretations of the dependency school, world systems theory has emerged based on a new version of historical analysis. It was first articulated by Febvre and Bloch, the founders of the French journal: "*Annales: economies, societies, civilisations*". Later their contribution to the social sciences was described as the 'Annales School'. Wallerstein (1974) was the first to connect the thinking of the Annales School with development theory. According to Wallerstein, the history of the world is the development of a single social entity which contains a single division of labour and dependent economic interchanges between all sectors and areas. He explains the history of the world capitalist economy in the context of the logic of capitalism, which he defines as increasing profit by increasing production and by expanding the market. In other words, the centre-periphery dichotomy is the direct result of the same capitalist system which operates through the international division of labour and transfers surplus from periphery to centre.

Wallerstein then developed the idea of a new world economy, which includes the third group of countries that he calls the semi-periphery. This group, as Harrison puts it, is 'an intermediate category which acts as a buffer, separating the core and the periphery, which produces high-wage and low-wage products. It is exploited by the core but in turn exploits the periphery' (Harrison, 1988, p.87).

Wallerstein introduced the concept of flexibility of the countries in terms of their economic development by this third category. However, he also emphasized that while some countries change their position from semi-periphery to centre or from centre to periphery the nature of the world system does not change. In another words, all countries cannot develop at the same time since the operation of the world system requires inequality between centre and periphery countries.

In the context of urbanisation, this unequal interrelation model has been applied to the dual structure of Third World cities. Basically, dependency theory, unlike modernisation theory, 'tries to explain the existence of squatter settlements and the growth of the informal sector by exogenous rather than endogenous factors' (Keles, 1988: 20). It rejects the dual society thesis by claiming that duality exists within cities not because of the existence of a feudal structure but because of the exploitative relationship between developed and underdeveloped parts of the society.

In relation to urbanisation in general, the concept of an exploitative relationship between developed and underdeveloped parts of the world was adopted by dependency theorists to explain the existence of the primate city seen in most Third World countries.

According to McGee, for instance, the type of interrelation between the developed country and the primate city of the underdeveloped country can be found in the interrelation between primate city and other less developed parts of the country. He argues that the primate city extracts surplus value from the rest of the country, and especially from the rural areas (McGee, 1971). This process is supported by state policies in the Third World, since some economies of scale could be achieved in this way. As Gilbert and Gugler point out:

> 'One of the incidental outcomes of 'modern' administration and efforts of planning economic development has been the accentuated growth of urban complexes. Whatever the level of industrial development, national governments have sought to mobilise savings and centralise decisions over the allocation of investment. Thus the surplus created in rural areas and in the hinterlands of provincial cities tends to be channelled towards the primate city' (Gilbert and Gugler, 1983, p.47).

Dependency theory rejects the concept of marginality in the sense that the marginals are the socially, economically, politically and spatially unintegrated part of the society. It also criticises the idea that marginality is a temporary situation peculiar to the transition period. Instead, it emphasises the permanent and irreversible characteristics of marginality which help the capital accumulation process in general.

Perlman, in her book, *The Myth of Marginality*, questioned the general ideas on marginality imposed by modernisation theory. She rejected the assumption that migrants living in squatter areas are 'marginals' in all senses who lack the ability to integrate into urban life. Rather she showed that migrants are socially well organised and make wide use of urban amenities and institutions; economically they work in the

sectors of economy that support capital accumulation in the industrial sector; and politically they can bargain with politicians when their benefits are at stake (Perlman, 1976).

Quijano, one of the main contributors to this debate, argued that 'marginality reflected a particular manner of social integration and participation rather than non-integration or non-participation as the modernisation theorists claimed' (Kay, 1989, p.101). His arguments about marginality focus on capital-intensive industrialisation as a type of development. According to him, this type of industrialisation creates masses of unemployed in underdeveloped countries due to the introduction of new technologies in industry. He calls the unemployed masses a 'marginal pole'. However, he does not equate this surplus labour power with the 'industrial reserve army'. According to him, 'those who are marginalised by the dynamic of capital-intensive industrialisation find work in those sectors of the economy in which there is little or no possibility for capital accumulation' (Roberts, 1978, p.161). These sectors cover the small-scale services, such as petty trade and repair, which mostly exist in urban areas. Quijano differentiates these marginals into two groups: the marginal petty bourgeoisie and the marginal proletariat. According to him, the first group occupies the self-employed small-scale jobs which serve both the proletariat, and marginal and non-marginal petty bourgeoisie in urban centres. The marginal proletariat, on the other hand, are employed in temporary, labour-intensive sectors (i.e. construction, manual services etc.).

Like Quijano, Nun, another important name in this discussion, agrees that, what he calls the 'marginal mass' does not perform the same functions as the industrial reserve army in the 19th century. He argues that since the unemployed or underemployed population in Latin America and other Third World countries cannot compete for the jobs in capital-intensive industries, which require skilled labour-power, they cannot threaten the position of workers in such industries. Therefore, it would be a mistake to accept them as an industrial reserve army. Nun therefore emphasizes the irreversibility of marginality by claiming that the economic dependency of the Third World cannot allow any changes towards labour-intensive industrialisation. Gilbert and Ward summarise the main point of the analysis of both Quijano and Nun as follows:

> 'Unlike their nineteenth century English counterparts, this marginal mass did not constitute an 'industrial reserve army' ready to be integrated in times of economic expansion. Rather they were afunctional to an increasingly capital intensive and technological industrialisation process requiring a skilled labour force....As a consequence, incomes remained low, and since governments were unable to improve the situation of this group, petty services, unemployment and shanty housing proliferated' (Gilbert and Ward, 1982, p.83).

In short, dependency theory regards the existence of marginality as the critical constraint for capital accumulation. As Roberts puts it, marginality is both means and ends of the capital accumulation process.

> 'The expressions of marginality -squatter settlements, labour-intensive occupations with low productivity, subsistence standards of living, low levels of demand for educational and other services- are produced by the necessities of capital accumulation in the dominant economic sector. Marginality

> provides an effective means of reducing demands on scarce capital, while contributing transitionally to its accumulation' (Roberts, 1978, p.164).

In sum, dependency theory views the patterns of urbanisation in underdeveloped countries as conditioned by the development of capitalism. It follows that the existence of squatter settlements and informal sectors in the Third World cities are the permanent results of the capital accumulation process within the capitalist system which also requires them in order to survive.

#### 1.2.2.2 Articulation of Modes of Production Theory

As we have seen, the radical theories considered so far have emphasised the external constraints on Third World development and urbanisation. In doing so they neglect the importance of internal structures and relations. The importance of such internal structures and relations led radical theorists to construct a new perspective. This new approach attempts to explain the existing social formation in a particular society in terms of the articulation of the different modes of production that contains. Articulation theorists, unlike dependency theorists, view Third World social formations as the product of an adjustment process of pre-capitalist structures to the dominant capitalist system rather than as simply being exploited by it.

Although articulation theory is rooted in the work of Marx and Engels on pre-capitalist modes of production, the work of Althusser and Balibar was crucial in actually developing the theory. Simply, according to them, each mode of production has a different structure. Since any society contains several modes of production in its social

formation, it is possible to analyse this social formation by identifying the process of articulation of these modes.

Within the general framework of structural Marxism, theorists using this approach tried to establish the development stages of the articulation process by using Rosa Luxemburg's explanation of the development of capitalism. Very briefly Luxemburg argues that the limited domestic market conditions in developed countries force capital to move to the periphery. Establishment of capitalism in the periphery leads to the conflict between capitalist and non-capitalist structures (capitalism vs. 'natural economy') and in order to survive capitalism must overcome this struggle.

From this starting point, articulation theory argued that the development of capitalism in the Third World did not eradicate pre-capitalist modes of production. Rather both capitalist and pre-capitalist structures survived side by side in such countries through the articulation of the latter to the former. Wolpe, one of the most important writers on articulation theory, describes this articulation process as follows:

> 'It refers to the relationship between the reproduction of the capitalist economy on the one hand and the reproduction of productive units organised according to pre-capitalist relations and forces of production on the other' (Wolpe, 1980, p.41).

This relationship determines the level of development of capitalism in the periphery. In other words, the extent to which capitalism can develop in the Third World is dependent upon the degree of resistance of pre-capitalist modes. And for articulation

theory 'the prior existence of non-capitalist modes makes it inevitable that capitalist development in the Third World will be restricted and uneven' (Harrison, 1988, p.131).

In relation to the nature and the outcome of this process of articulation, there are at least three different approaches: The first one considers these articulated structures as transitional; the second one argues that there is a contradictory process of dissolution and conservation; the third one conceives articulated structures as a mode of production in their own right (Ward and Macoloo, 1992, p.62). Burgess, for instance, from this third perspective argues that these articulated structures contribute to the capital accumulation process in various ways (Burgess, 1990). In the context of urban social formations, these articulation processes can be seen in the permanency of the petty-commodity mode of production. In other words, the coexistence of pre-capitalist, petty-commodity and capitalist modes of production within the same society is explained by their articulation. As Ward and Macoloo point out:

> 'In rejecting 'dualist' structures, scholars working in cities in developing countries increasingly refer to 'petty-commodity' mode of production which dovetails with the more hegemonic peripheral capitalist mode... The petty-commodity sector cheapens the reproduction cost of those working within the capitalist mode, and also directly provides undervalued or underpaid goods and services to the dominant capitalist form upon terms that the latter determines' (Ward and Macoloo, 1992, p.62).

As the above quotation clearly reveals, the marginalisation of the urban poor in terms of their contribution to the economy should be questioned. For articulation theorists, the expansion of petty-commodity production in articulation with capitalist production

makes it possible ever-expanding labour power to be absorbed while cheapening the reproduction cost of labour in capitalist production. The importance of labour-intensive, small-scale sectors is much higher in economies where capital is scarce as has been the usual case in the Third World. This point was emphasised by the analysis of Olivera of the city of Sao Paulo. As Roberts points out:

> 'Olivera claims that in a situation of relative capital scarcity it is necessary for the industrial sector to make use of the services of a labour-intensive tertiary sector. The existence of small-scale commercial and transport activities and of repair and maintenance activities organised in labour-intensive ways, facilitates the distribution of the industrial product and saves capital. Consequently, industrialisation develops on the basis of labour-intensive services which are not well remunerated and which add to capitalist accumulation....Concentration of employment in the tertiary sector is consequently not due to the 'inflation' of such sector, but results from the expansion of industrial production in a situation in which capital is reserved for production activities' (Roberts, 1978, pp.167-8).

Articulation theorists explain the existence of squatter settlements and shantytowns in a similar way to the existence of petty-commodity production. Again, in the same study 'Olivera ...points out that the self-construction of housing by the working class (*favelas* or shanty towns) constitutes an effective subsidy to the capitalist class by lowering the urban subsistence costs of the workers' (Roberts, 1978, p.168). In this context, squatter settlements are neither temporary, as modernisation theory argues, nor necessarily permanent as a result of an exploitative relationship with other sectors of the urban capitalist system as dependency theory suggests. Instead they, continue to exist in urban areas through a series of modification processes that result in articulation to other parts of the urban areas in economic, political, social and physical terms.

In relation to the policy recommendations towards the self-help housing following from the neo-modernisation perspective, Burgess argues that they were no more than the recognition of the coexistence and articulation of different modes of housing production. As was mentioned before, neo-modernisation policies suggested the encouragement of self-help housing through the implementation of state-supported projects which includes technical and financial help. These projects, for Burgess, were also the result of the need for state intervention into the capital accumulation process. As he puts it:

> 'Turner's policy recommendations must be understood as an attempt to stimulate the growth and the expansion of petty-commodity housing, given the failure of industrial housing to satisfy the needs of progressively larger sectors of the population' (Burgess, 1982, pp.86-7).

In his analysis of self-help housing implementation, Burgess, unlike Turner, emphasises its commodity status by arguing that in capitalist societies goods are produced by agents other than consumers. 'However, the auto-production and consumption of a house does not in itself mean we can understand it outside of the process of commodity formation' (Burgess, 1982, p.61). He supports this claim by arguing that firstly, the production of self-help housing consumes commercial goods which have exchange-value and secondly, that it uses labour input in different ways (either by increasing working hours or by using paid labour). From this point he concludes that:

> 'In every instance this labour gives a new value to the materials used, including the recycled throwaways as well as the commercially-supplied materials. The house then, being a product of human labour and incorporating a determined labour-time, is given a price on the market, which could be realised if the producer turned his use-value into an

> exchange-value by putting it up for sale and/or rent' (Burgess, 1982, p.61).

In short, as Ward and Macoloo put it, 'exchange-value is generated as the house and its constituent elements (land, dwelling structure, services, location, security etc.) are valorised through the efforts of the household and other actors who intervene in the production and commercialisation of the residential unit. Thus, housing is a commodity which is valorised according to the modes of production of which it forms an integral part' (Ward and Macoloo, 1992, p.61).

In a more detailed analysis of modes of housing production in the Third World, Burgess identifies industrialised and petty-commodity modes. He then divides the petty-commodity mode of housing production into two parts which he calls manufactured and artisanal modes. He examines the production, exchange and consumption processes in each mode of production in terms of the difference between them in the acquisition and development of land, in the provision of construction materials and in the construction process (Burgess, 1989, p.117).

The main feature of the industrial mode of housing production is the production of housing units as real commodities. In other words, in this mode of housing production the agents of production and consumption are totally differentiated from each other. There are also many different interest groups operating at particular stages of the production such as finance capital, construction capital, land developers, architects etc..

The industrial form of housing production invests a considerable amount of money in land, in industrialised/prefabricated building materials and in wage labour at the beginning of the process and uses standardised design and construction technologies. These procedures lead to high quality products with high prices. The high cost of the end product, as Burgess points out, means that it is far from being the solution to the increasing housing problems of the Third World:

> 'This commodity is confronted by consumers who are profoundly differentiated according to their incomes, giving rise to distinct spheres of circulation for the housing commodities produced by the various forms. Poorly paid wage workers and the unemployed and underemployed masses with subsistence incomes cannot constitute themselves into 'effective demand' for industrial housing despite their great need. Effective demand is confined to the high and medium income groups and this exclusion constitutes a major reason for the Latin American housing problem' (Burgess, 1989, p.119).

In the context of Third World urbanisation, the industrial form of housing production dominates and also articulates the other forms by determining the boundaries of their operation areas and the terms of this operation. Burgess explains this articulation process as follows:

> 'The articulation occurs through the industrial form's domination of land, building materials and financial markets, and manifests itself in the dependence of other forms on industrial technologies, commodities and specialist skills; in the overall determination of prices and acceptable qualities in building material markets; in the spatial allocation of land for different residential uses; and in definitions of performance and specification' (Burgess, 1989, p.120)

In this articulation process, the other modes of housing production, not only are able to operate in the production domain, but at the same time are able to reproduce themselves. Burgess gives three reasons for this actual situation: First, the difficulty of capital accumulation in the industrial form of housing production; the second, is the position of the state policies over the protection of the manufactured form (i.e. incentives, subsidies and contracts) in order to prevent unemployment; and the third one is the vital role of the artisanal mode of housing production to meet the housing needs of the poor.

In the other sector of housing production there are manufactured and artisanal modes of production which together constitute the petty-commodity mode. The manufactured mode produces housing as a commodity by using simple production materials and techniques and manual labour but other than the consumer himself. In this mode, the scale of operation determines the type of labour to be used and quality of building materials to be purchased. As Ward and Macoloo point out:

> 'Production is small-scale, and is often organised and led by a master builder or by an architect utilising labour contracted through personal networks, thereby exposing it to exploitation and underpayment...Design systems are small-scale, and inputs are drawn from both the local manufacture of building materials as well as from the industrialised sector' (Ward and Macoloo, 1992, p.63).

The relative cheapness of production inputs is supposed to lead to a low-price product but 'low productivity, limited economies of scale and rudimentary technology result in a commodity that remains unaffordable by the majority of the population' (Burgess, 1989,

p.122). However, it provides the majority of housing for the middle and upper-middle income groups in most of the Third World countries.

The second type of petty-commodity housing production is the artisanal/self-help mode. In this mode two types of housing production can be seen: the pure or pre-capitalist, and the real or non-capitalist artisanal mode of production (Burgess, 1989, p.127). As mentioned earlier, the penetration of capitalism and urbanisation resulted in the exclusion of the urban poor from the formal land market and the creation and expansion of the informal one. And during this process, housing production in the artisanal mode has changed gradually from pre-capitalist to non-capitalist form. While in the former form land had been acquired through invasion, in the latter it started to be realised through illegal subdivision. Land acquired either through the invasion of empty private or public land or through illegal subdivision, was valorised by improvements, such as the provision of an infrastructure, legalisation etc., over time. This valorisation process of land gave it a real commodity status although it was still illegal.

Artisanal housing production on such land embodies the same producer and consumer agents. In other words, the person who builds the house is at the same time the person who uses it. The possibility of this mode depends greatly on the ability of households to save from their subsistence incomes and to utilise their family or kin-related relationships. The construction materials in the pure artisanal form were usually very simple and even primitive such as recycled waste. Later on, while the real artisanal form becomes dominant over the pure one, low-priced materials from manufactured and as well as industrial forms entered the process. In a similar way, wage labour also

started to be hired. Burgess explains the production processes of each artisanal forms as follows:

> '...in the pure artisanal form land is invaded without payment; it is developed through self-help family labour and subsistence incomes; it uses 'collected' or 'self-produced' materials that are not commodities; the resident is in control of the design and production process; and the house is produced for self-consumption not exchange. However, in contemporary capitalist social formations the real artisanal form is subordinated to the dominant capitalist mode with its tendencies to deepen the social division of labour and to generalise commodity production and exchange; and to create and expand land, building materials and financial markets in activities organised by the other forms. The resulting articulation process determines the character and dynamics of the artisanal form' (Burgess, 1989, pp.127-8).

In sum, Burgess places the mode of housing production within the general framework of the capital accumulation process. For him, 'the peripheral expansion of capitalism resulted in the transformation and penetration of self-built (artisanal) forms of housing production and consumption by 'manufactured' and 'industrialised' forms and which resulted in the commodification of self-help housing' (Ward and Macoloo, 1992, p.61).

For Burgess, the domination of the industrial form over the manufactured and artisanal forms is realised by the increasing volume of production of construction materials and the monopolisation of the land market. However, this domination process is largely shaped by state intervention. As Ward and Macoloo put it:

> 'The process is intensified by state intervention: to control illegal land development; to regularise (legalise) housing tenure; to provide infrastructure; and to implement taxation and

> authorisation policies –all of which deform and undermine many of the economies hitherto obtained' (Ward and Macoloo, 1992, p.64).

In other words, through the penetration of the capitalist mode of production, together with state intervention, the pre-capitalist mode of housing production has been converted into the non-capitalist one with accompanying increasing exchange-value, and over time this mode has articulated with the industrial mode. As Burgess points out:

> '...the self-help school argued that the cost of state housing could be lowered by modifying artisanal practices through their exposure to capitalist forms of production and exchange. Although its ideological frame of reference prevented it from identifying the issue as such, in effect its fundamental argument was that the further articulation of the artisanal form by the capitalist mode through state intervention could result in a relative cheapening of housing, and make it more accessible to wide segments of the population' (Burgess, 1992, p.86).

Contrary to these expectations, however, the articulation of the industrialised mode of housing production with the petty-commodity mode through state intervention made it even more difficult for the low-income groups to access housing due to the increasing costs.

Consequently, neo-modernisation strategies in the Third World are far from providing a solution to the problems of the urban poor. Instead, the implementation of such projects showed that the self-help nature of housing production has changed and articulated with the industrial mode through state intervention while excluding the majority of people who really need it from its products.

### 1.2.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Most of the underdeveloped countries have experienced a very rapid rate of urbanisation after the Second World War. They faced, not surprisingly, many problems brought about by this rapid urbanisation, among which the provision of housing appeared as the major one. Failure of governments to produce enough housing units ended with the mushrooming of squatter settlements in the peripheries of large cities.

In the early literature, as well as in government policies, squatter settlements were seen as temporary and transitional phenomenon, which would disappear as development occurred. However, the subsequent experience of these countries proved that this assumption of modernisation theory was simply wrong. Squatter settlements have not only become permanent but have also been consolidated. Later on, the neo-modernisation perspective has not only accepted the permanent nature of squatter settlements but also showed them to be a democratic and grassroots solution to the housing problem of the poor.

On the radical side, writers of the dependency school have seen these settlements as the characteristic feature of underdevelopment. In this sense, they were seen as permanent and stagnant without having their own dynamics. The articulation approach challenged this view, arguing that although capitalist relations in this sector are dominant, within these limits squatter settlements have their own dynamics too. In this context, the articulation approach seems to offers a better framework for studying squatter-settlement formation.

In relation to the transformation of squatter areas, on the other hand, each approach provides different standpoints even though they do not explicitly suggest anything on the issue. However, it can be concluded that, modernisation theory, within the framework of unilinear development patterns, suggests that these settlements would be transformed into the modern/conventional housing stocks at some point. The assumptions of the dependency school, on the other hand, suggest the opposite. It argues that, since the existence of squatter areas is explained as both means and ends of the capital accumulation process, their position in urban social, economic and physical spheres are, therefore, permanent. Finally, the articulation approach suggests almost nothing about squatter settlements' transformation as it concentrates mainly on their production stage.

## 1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING SQUATTER SETTLEMENT TRANSFORMATION IN THE THIRD WORLD

As seen in the previous section of the chapter, the literature on formation of squatter settlements in Third World countries is by no means rare. However, most of this academic work has focused on the patterns and problems of rapid urbanisation experienced in these countries. In this regard, unauthorised housing settlements, and the social and economic problems associated with it, have been the main research foci. Studies of the transformation of unauthorised housing settlements, on the other hand, are limited to studies of government instigated slum/squatter clearance. This is mostly due to the fact that the practices of such countries are largely restricted either to the clearance or to a few rehabilitation projects.

In this section of the chapter, the aim is to construct a theoretical framework to understand the transformation of squatter settlements. It is not intended here to present a full account of theories relating to all possible housing transformation patterns (i.e. renovation, redevelopment, rehabilitation etc.). Rather, a systematic approach to explaining why some squatter settlements are being transformed at some point is presented based on theories of gentrification.

In what follows, firstly, a brief account of the gentrification debate is presented to act as a general framework for the discussion. Having briefly examined the concept of gentrification, different approaches (i.e. demand and supply side explanations) to the explanation of gentrification are summarised. Special emphasis is placed on the Rent Gap Theory of N. Smith from which a theoretical basis for analysing the experiences of Third World countries could be constructed. The third and final part of this section assesses the above mentioned theory in relation to the transformation of the unauthorised housing stock in Third World countries.

### 1.3.1 THE DEFINITION OF AND DISCUSSIONS ON GENTRIFICATION

Gentrification can be defined as the displacement of the working class by the middle class in an area. It is usually but not necessarily associated with inner-city areas. Generally, gentrification involves the physical improvement of an area as well as its socio-economic changes. Hamnett describes it as:

> 'Simultaneously a physical, economic, social and cultural phenomenon. Gentrification commonly involves the

> invasion by middle-class or higher-income groups of previously working-class neighbourhoods..... It involves the physical renovation or rehabilitation of what was frequently highly deteriorated housing stock and its upgrading to meet requirements of its new owners' (Hamnett, 1991, p.175).

Smith, the proponent of the importance of the broader economic dynamics in the process, accepts these main features of the phenomenon but also adds to them its effects on the housing market as well. He defines it as follows:

> 'The crucial point about gentrification is that it involves not only a social change but also.... a physical change in the housing stock and an economic change in the land and housing market' (Smith, 1979. p540).

The physical, social and economic changes brought about by gentrification are, therefore, the key features of the process. Savage and Warde argue that these are closely related to each other. As they put it:

> 'Gentrification, like other forms of segregation, is an expression of inequality and social closure. However, it is governed as much by forms of household organisation as by capitalist logic. The rise of gentrification is also the story of the rise of new forms of middle-class social groups, and thus shows how the formation of particular urban spaces is intimately tied up with the development of social groups themselves' (Savage and Warde, 1993, p.85).

Even though such definitions help to identify the gentrification process, the diversity of forms the phenomenon takes makes it hard to identify. In one area, gentrification may take place through individual households buying a house and renovating it; or, a landlord may do the same thing for him/herself, or to rent it. Developers may buy an old building to demolish it and build a new one instead. And finally, the public sector

may be interested in such activities for different reasons and may improve the area to create investment opportunities for the private sector by providing new zoning decisions and building codes.

In order to have a clear starting point, I will use Warde's classification of gentrification. Warde describes four main aspects of the gentrification process. According to him:

> 1. It is a process of resettlement and social concentration, a process of displacement of one group of residents with another of higher social status, entailing new patterns of social segregation.
> 2. It is a transformation in the built environment, via building work, that exhibits some common distinctive, aesthetic features and the emergence of certain types of local service provision.
> 3. It is a gathering together of persons with a putatively shared culture and life-style, or at least shared, class related, consumer preferences.
> 4. It is an economic reordering of property values, a commercial opportunity for the construction industry, and, generally, an extension of the system of the private ownership of domestic property' (Warde, 1991, p.225).

Each of these processes is necessary before an urban renovation or redevelopment process can be labelled *gentrification*.

It can be drawn from above mentioned definitions that the gentrification process has two main aspects: one is related to the changes in physical environment and its economic dynamics (production/supply side) and the other is related to the social and cultural composition, as well as consumption orientations, of the residents (consumption/demand side). These two, in fact, comprise the main streams of the

gentrification debates, even though alternative explanations (i.e., gender dimension of the phenomenon) have also been involved.

These two explanations, in fact, find a theoretical base in two competing perspectives: neo-classical and neo-Marxist, in which the consumption and production, agency and structure, culture and capital, and demand and supply dichotomies have been placed respectively. In the following part of the chapter, I will summarise these two explanations under the headings of demand and supply-side explanations.

### 1.3.2 DEMAND-SIDE EXPLANATIONS

Demand or consumption-side explanations of gentrification emphasise the importance of changing consumer types, and therefore consumer demands. These new types of consumers with specialised preferences are said to be the driving force behind what has been experienced as gentrification in Western countries. It is argued that, rather than higher income groups moving out and the housing filtering down, these groups moved *back to the cities* giving gentrification a push.

Supporters of consumption-side explanations have been inspired by the "post-industrial city" argument of David Ley. In his paper, 'Liberal Ideology and the Post-Industrial City' (Ley, 1980), Ley emphasised the growing importance of changing lifestyles, and in due course, their repercussions in urban debates. According to him, the new consumption styles are in fact an outcome of a 'newly emerging class'

which is totally different from the 19th century working class. The members of this 'new middle class' are white-collar workers, mostly employed in the tertiary sector in professional and managerial occupations. And their refined taste for consumption, in due course, determines their land-use decisions in the post-industrial city.

Following these arguments, Beauregard, in an attempt to integrate the 'structure-agency' dichotomy into the gentrification debate, placed emphasis upon agency. He argues that:

> 'The explanation for gentrification begins with the presence of "gentrifiers" the necessary agents and beneficiaries of the gentrification process, and the directions taken by their reproduction and consumption' (Beauregard, 19986, p.41).

He goes on to argue that what makes gentrification possible is mainly this new type of individual. He places them at the heart of gentrification and claims that without their presence the whole process would have been impossible. According to him:

> 'First, the demand for inexpensive, inner-city housing is not a new phenomenon, nor is the existence of politically and economically vulnerable social groups. However, the existence of affluent, professional and ostensibly "afamilial" households in central cities has become much more pronounced during these last few decades. Secondly, and more importantly, the gentrifiers are often, though seldom alone, the agents of the gentrification process and thus provide the motivations and aspirations that shape it. In this way agency is structured into our theorising. Lastly, without this group the whole process ceases to exist' (Beauregard, 1986, p.41).

The appreciation of the role of gentrifiers to that extent raises the question of how these people happened to be located in inner-city areas to initiate the gentrification

process. The answer to this question is crucial as it embodies the basic arguments of consumption-side explanations.

As mentioned above, the explanation starts with the growth of white-collar employees in a restructuring economy. Before World War II, the manufacturing sector, offering job opportunities to the semi-skilled labour, was located in the main cities of the capitalist world. Afterwards, this started to change and there was a continuous decline of the manufacturing sector in favour of the service sector.

The service sector, in fact, consisted of two sets of employment: retail, office and similar service employment, which require less-skilled labour with relatively lower wages; and professional and managerial jobs in the same sectors as well as in the business headquarters. The latter is different from the former in terms of both skill requirements and wages.

Locational preferences of the manufacturing employees were to be close to industrial zones leaving inner-city areas to the unemployed and lower-income groups. Later on, the first group of the service sector employed these inner-city residents while the second type of service sector job (i.e. professional) was occupied by employees from the suburbs. The argument here is that, this group, with their distinct locational preferences, constituted the potential gentrifiers. An oversimplifying explanation goes on to argue that their presence formed the necessary conditions for initiating the gentrification process. As Beauregard puts it:

> 'The point is that employment opportunities for professionals and managers are becoming dominant within central cities. Admittedly, this could result in no additional professionals and managers living within these cities, since they could commute from the suburbs. It does establish, however, a necessary condition for an urban gentry to arise' (Beauregard, 1986, p.42).

The point which needs to be explained here is why some of these professionals and managers moved to the inner-city areas rather than living in the suburbs. Some writers put emphasis upon the distinctive consumption preferences of particular fractions of the middle-class. Others explain it by changing gender relations and the reinforcement of social and economic position of women.

According to the first group, since consumption is now becoming a way of manifestation of class differences, the involvement of the middle class in the gentrification process can be explained in this context. The proliferation of luxury shopping precincts, restaurants and so on in inner-city areas is, therefore not accidental. As Jager explains:

> 'The consumption objects become generalised in advanced industrial societies. This forces class differentiation to be based upon a refinement of consumption objects, which are not only differentiated but must be consumed in a particular way - demonstratively and distinctively.... Conspicuous consumption is expressed not just through symbolic investment in housing but through more traditional middle-class consumption concerns such as dress, entertainment, and restaurants which are further key components in the new inner-urban life-style' (Jager, 1986, p.90).

Others, who seek to put the gender dimension of the phenomena into the discussion, argue that the composition of people living in gentrified areas are significantly

different from that of those living in other parts of the cities. Warde lists these distinctive characteristics as follows:

> 'The limited empirical evidence available ...suggests that key features of the population of gentrified enclaves are as follows: a female population increasing faster than the male population; an unusually high proportion of young and single women; very high proportions of women in professional and technical occupations; high levels of academic credentials; a high proportion of dual-earner households, but few families; the presence of young single professional women; and the postponement of marriage and childbearing' (Warde, 1991, p.228).

In the light of such empirical evidence, some feminist writers expressed their dissatisfaction with consumption and production-side explanations. Without rejecting them totally, they emphasised the necessity of integration between the two. As Rose puts it:

> 'The analytical separation of production and consumption, which has plagued urban geography in particular, is seen by feminists to be artificial, it is argued that a dynamic urban theory must focus on their interrelationship' (Rose, 1989, p.119).

In doing so, they use the analysis of demographic changes and increasing women's participation in the labour force and explain these changes in relation to the dynamics of economic restructuring. However, they insist on the importance of the changing position of women in this restructuring process and make it clear that '.. one should not subsume these changes in women's situation within the general logic of economic restructuring' (Rose, 1989, p.120).

Explanations of the role of women in gentrification stress their changing socio-economic position in the society. As more and more women worked in paid jobs, the number of dual-earner and single-women households has also increased. As for the first group, this paved the way for most of the women to reorientate their dual role in the labour market and the home. In this context, as inner-city areas offer proximity to work, more middle-class women have chosen to live in such areas as gentrifiers rather than living in suburbs. Rose explains this point as follows:

> '.... middle-class women with both "career" jobs and children might well opt to become gentrifiers, in order to reduce the time-space constraints resulting from their dual roles; for this type of woman, too, the inner city would be a more supportive and convenient environment than the low-density suburb geared toward the traditional family' (Rose, 1989, p.119).

In short, demand-side explanations place the new middle-class at the heart of the gentrification process arguing that their increasing market power has manipulated the housing market towards gentrification. In this sense, the involvement of women in the gentrification process can be explained in the context of the emergence of the new middle class of which they are part. But, from the feminist point of view, the whole process cannot be subsumed to the restructuring of the middle-class, and women's roles should be considered on their own rights.

### 1.3.3 SUPPLY-SIDE EXPLANATIONS

Supply-side explanations of gentrification originate from dissatisfaction with previously discussed consumption and demand-based explanations. The need to

include the production side of the process in the discussion inevitably put the urban land and housing market and their operations in the capitalist system and the role of the institutional actors (i.e., developers and mortgage finance institutions) into the debate.

The basic argument of production-side interpretations of the phenomenon is the dominance of economic forces in (re)production of urban space. Gentrification, in this regard, can only be explained within the rules of operation of urban land and housing markets. In a capitalist economy, unless the supply-conditions are fulfilled, gentrification would not be possible.

In an attempt to clarify the supply conditions of gentrifiable housing Smith introduced his well-known theory of the 'rent gap' (Smith, 1979). For him, gentrification should be explained in the context of long-term shifts of investment and disinvestment in the built environment.

Smith clarifies the origins of redevelopment in urban areas by five processes all of which, as he puts it, 'can provide a first approximation toward an integrated explanation of the different facets of gentrification and urban restructuring' (Smith, 1986, p.22). These are:

a. suburbanisation and emergence of rent gap;
b. the deindustrialisation of advanced capitalist economies and the growth of white-collar employment;
c. the spatial centralisation and simultaneous decentralisation of capital;
d. the falling rate of profit and cyclical movement of capital;

e. demographic changes and changes in consumption pattern (Smith, 1986, p.22).

In what follows, I will explain the suburbanisation and emergence of the rent gap in the context of the cyclical movement of investment and disinvestment in the built environment, as these constitute the main arguments in supply-side explanations.

#### 1.3.3.1 The Rent Gap Theory

In his 1979 article, "Toward a Theory of Gentrification: A Back to the City Movement by Capital not People" Smith defines the rent gap as 'the disparity between the *potential ground rent* level and the *actual* [capitalised] *ground rent* capitalised under the present land use' (Smith, 1979, p.545). Here, the potential ground rent refers to 'the amount that could be capitalised under the land's "highest and best use" (in planners' parlance) – or at least under a higher and better use' (Smith, 1996, p.62). Actual or capitalised ground rent, on the other hand, is defined as 'the actual quantity of ground rent that is appropriated by the landowner, given the present land use' (Smith, 1996, p.62). Once the gap between these two occurs in a particular place it means that it is profitable for redevelopment. As he put it:

> 'Capital flows where the rate of return is highest, and the movement of capital to the suburbs along with the continual depreciation of inner city capital, eventually produces the rent gap. When this gap grows sufficiently large, rehabilitation (or for that matter, renewal) can begin to challenge the rates of return available elsewhere and capital flows back in' (Smith, 1979, p.546).

The explicit assumption here is that the movement of capital toward the source of the largest expected profit (e.g. the suburbs) results in the disinvestment in the inner

parts of the city. But, in due course, this deteriorates the inner-city areas and creates an opportunity for the rent gap to grow and eventually leads to reinvestment in such areas. In other words, he suggests those three successive processes of investment, disinvestment and reinvestment shape the built environment in capitalist societies.

The first step of this cyclical explanation is suburbanisation. For him, it has to be seen as a two-sided process: At the local level, it is the decentralisation of capital, but at the (inter)national level it is the centralisation of it. To be more precise, suburbanisation could be regarded as the decentralisation of investment in the built environment since it manifests itself through the development in the outskirts of the cities.

Involvement of capital in the suburbanisation process can be explained by the availability of relatively "cheap" land on the peripheries of big cities. According to Smith, the actual or capitalised ground-rent level of suburban areas determines this spatial preference. From the gentrification point of view, the importance of relatively low-ground rent levels in the periphery is their effects on the ground-rent level of inner city areas. The initiation of the suburbanisation process reduces the investment in inner-city areas. As the level of disinvestment becomes severe, the house prices fall, and so does the capitalised ground rent. However, the value of rent that can possibly be obtained by any kind of redevelopment continues to rise causing the emergence of the rent gap in the area. At the point where the rent gap becomes big enough, reinvestment will happen. For Smith, the emergence of the rent gap is mainly due to the devalorization of capital invested in inner city areas. As he puts it:

> 'The rent gap is produced primarily by capital devalorization (which diminishes the proportion of the ground rent able to be capitalised) and also by continued urban development and expansion (which has historically raised the potential ground rent level in the inner city)' (Smith, 1996, pp.67-68).

Unless the gap between potential and capitalised ground-rent levels becomes wide enough, redevelopment cannot be expected 'since if the present use succeeded in capitalising all or most of the ground rent, little economic benefit could be derived from redevelopment' (Smith, 1996, p.68). Gentrification can only occur at the point where 'developers can purchase structures cheaply, can pay the developer's costs and profit for rehabilitation can pay interest on mortgage and construction loans, and can then sell the end product for a sale price that leaves a satisfactory return to the developer' (Smith, 1996, p.68).

These explanations related to rent gap theory refer to the changes in land and housing markets and responses of interest groups to these changes at the local level. However, Smith also argues that gentrification should be seen as a part of wider economic changes taking place roughly since the beginning of 1980s. To be more precise, it should be understood in the context of the "uneven development" of global as well as national economies. He suggests that at the urban level, uneven development can be observed in the suburbanisation process as it developed simultaneously with the decline of inner-city areas.

As is well known, the capitalist economic system operates through the successive processes of accumulation, falling rate of profit and overproduction, and crisis. To overcome the periods of crisis, capital, usually, tends to shift to the areas where the

profit rate is high (i.e., built environment). The property boom experienced in capitalist cities in the late 1960s and early 1970s is the manifestation of this shift of capital to the built environment. Recent developments in inner-city areas can be explained by the similar movement of capital towards the built environment.

In short, for Smith, gentrification is a natural product of the needs of capital, a means for a broader-economic restructuring process. As he put it 'gentrification, and the redevelopment process of which it is a part, is a systematic occurrence of late capitalist urban development' (Smith, 1996, p.89). Smith supports this argument by pointing out that, in the U.S. much gentrification was initiated by state, private financial institutions and professional developers and not 'by the exercise of those individual consumer preferences' (Smith, 1996, p.68).

To sum up, in the explanation of the whole process the fundamental emphasis is placed upon the fulfilment of supply conditions (i.e., occurrence of the rent gap) for the producers. Within this framework, the role of individual preferences is rejected and gentrifiers are subsumed to be 'merely the passive handmaidens of capitalist requirements' (Hamnett, 1991, p.179). In his later works, Smith's insistence on the primacy of economic forces in the production of the urban environment remained almost unchanged (Smith, 1986). However, he accepted the role of gentrifiers in the process and attempted to include the changes in demographic composition and consumption patterns of gentrifiers in his explanations. But, in his recent book he still argues that 'the relationship between production and consumption is symbiotic,

but it is a symbiosis in which the movement of capital in search of profit dominates' (Smith 1996, p.57).

It should be noted, however, that the demand and supply-based explanations are not totally distinct. The rising value of land is a reflection of increased demand as well as of developers' activity. Smith is, therefore, wrong to say that his approach excludes consumer demand.

### 1.3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE RELEVANCE OF GENTRIFICATION DEBATE IN THE CONTEXT OF UNAUTHORISED HOUSING REDEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD

As mentioned before, the transformation of unauthorised housing areas has not been fully examined yet. Theories explaining gentrification process in Western countries, in this regard, are thought to provide a starting point for the construction of a similar framework for the Third World experiences, even though they have involved redevelopment rather than renovation or rehabilitation.

When the two sides of the gentrification explanations are considered, the supply-side seems to be more relevant for a satisfactory explanation of similar redevelopment processes of Third World countries. However, this is not to suggest that the Rent Gap theory does not have its own limitations. An important criticism of the theory's total neglect of the role of individuals in the gentrification process, is relevant in unauthorised housing redevelopment as well. The role of landowners, for instance, in the initiation of legalisation process and in redevelopment decisions, and their

clientalistic relationship with the state should not be underestimated. Therefore, any attempt to apply rent gap theory to the redevelopment of such settlements should refer to the role of these individuals too.

Demand-side arguments, on the other hand, have little relevance as "new middle class" and "gender issues" have not been significant yet in the context of Third World urbanisation. Rather, it is argued that redevelopment occurs if and only if the "supply conditions" both economically and politically are met.

Here, it can be argued that demand for scarcely provided urban land will determine the initiation of redevelopment. And unauthorised housing areas located in highly valuable inner-city areas will be the focal point of this demand. However, the legal situation of such areas makes it harder to assume that whenever the demand for urban land is high redevelopment takes place automatically. Without necessary legal arrangements, such as legalisation, new zoning decisions and building codes, and more importantly new density decisions, redevelopment would not happen. In other words, first, the supply conditions are provided by the public sector, then comes the redevelopment either by public or private sectors or both.

If we explain all these by the terminology of the rent gap theory, the actual ground rent refers to the negligible amount of money capitalised by renting an existing squatter dwelling. This rent is very small, compared to the ones in authorised parts, as the quality of dwellings and services provided to them are considerably low. Potential ground rent, on the other hand, represents the rent that would be obtained

under the land's 'highest and best use' (i.e. after legalisation and/or redevelopment). This rent will obviously be much higher than the capitalised/actual rent, and redevelopment will take place.

In the context of unauthorised housing transformation, demand could only be crucial at this point of the whole process. Since not all the areas with similar rent gap levels could be redeveloped simultaneously, demand will determine the which one will be. Obviously, low-density inner-city areas adjacent to the authorised housing stock will be the first candidates for redevelopment, since the level of rent gap is high enough and the demand for housing in the area is also substantial.

## 1.4 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, theories explaining the two main development processes (i.e. formation and transformation) of squatter settlements in Third World countries were reviewed. Firstly, different approaches to squatter-settlement formation were discussed in order to reveal the social, economic and political conditions from which such settlements emerged.

Secondly, theories of gentrification were evaluated as an attempt to form a theoretical framework for the squatter settlements' transformation in Third World countries. Here, the main focus was placed upon the Rent Gap theory. It was argued that the Rent Gap theory could be applied to Third World squatter-settlement transformation as a structural framework.

In the light of this theoretical review, in what follows, the thesis will focus on the Turkish experiences in general and that of Ankara in particular, in relation to the squatter settlements' formation and transformation. First, the process of formation and evolution of such settlements in Ankara will be presented to form a basis for further discussions. And then special emphasis will be placed on the explanation of the transformation processes experienced in the two squatter settlements of Ankara.

# CHAPTER 2:

# FORMATION OF GECEKONDUS IN ANKARA

## 2.1 INTRODUCTION

After the Second World War, Turkey too experienced very rapid urbanisation which resulted in, among other things, the emergence of unauthorised settlements, namely *Gecekondu*[1] areas. First they were built on unclaimed, mainly public, land. However, this later changed when it became a common practice to buy a plot through illegal subdivision (with shared title deeds) and to build a house on it without construction permission, i.e., outside the formal land and housing markets. This process was encouraged through government policies towards the gecekondu settlements which either relaxed the regulations or directly pardoned them. In this chapter, I will examine these changes by focusing upon the gecekondus of Ankara.

[1]I will use the term gecekondu in this study as a concept which covers the illegal settlements built on public or private lands and with or without private or shared title deeds. Therefore a gecekondu can refer to any housing which is illegal in terms of the process of the acquisition of land or construction or both.

Despite the fact that urbanisation accelerated from the 1940s in the country as a whole, Ankara experienced a rapid urbanisation during the early 1920s following its designation as the new capital of the country. For this reason, it is convenient to start our examination of gecekondus of Ankara from that point.

We divide the presentation into four periods. First we examine the period between the declaration of Ankara as a new capital in 1923 and 1950. The second period is that of the second wave of migration to Ankara which is the starting point of the permanency of gecekondus which took place roughly in a decade. The third period, between 1960 and 1980, will reveal the real dynamics of the transformation of gecekondus from simple shacks to the means of new investment both by government and by gecekondu owners. And lastly, in the fourth period (1980-onwards) the more recent developments in gecekondu settlements will be evaluated. In this part, new government policies towards the gecekondu settlements and their possible outcomes in the urban land and housing market will be discussed.

## 2.2 THE 1923-1950 PERIOD

Before the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and the declaration of Ankara as the new capital at that time, the city was a small agricultural town with a population of around 30 000 (see Table 2.1). Being a new capital led to a new set of roles for the city in the economic sphere along with the political one. The city, which had previously relied upon agricultural production, was now converted into the new political centre. The

reflection of this conversion in space was the construction of the new capital which had to match the new modern, western type of living requirements.

**Table 2.1 Population of Ankara**

| Year | Population |
|---|---|
| 1880 | 27 825 |
| 1881 | 25 595 |
| 1882 | 32 000 |
| 1890 | 25-30 000 |
| 1900 | 32 051 |
| 1902 | 33 768 |
| **1927** | **74 553** |
| 1935 | 122 720 |
| 1940 | 157 242 |
| 1945 | 226 712 |
| 1950 | 289 197 |
| 1955 | 451 241 |
| 1960 | 650 067 |
| 1965 | 905 660 |
| 1970 | 1 467 404 |
| 1975 | 1 997 980 |
| 1980 | 2 561 767 |
| 1985 | 2 879 157 |
| 1990 | 3 326 626 |

Source: Drawn from Senyapili, 1985, p.156 and SSI, Population Census

It could be predicted, despite the lack of statistical data for that time, that the population of Ankara started to increase just after 1920 with the establishment of the Grand National Assembly and that it accelerated later on, after 1923. This increase was mainly due to the increasing number of civil servants being employed in government departments. At that time, Ankara had a built-up area as small as 140 ha. The existing housing stock was scarcely adequate for its existing inhabitants, and, inevitably, newcomers faced severe

housing shortages immediately. Deputies and civil servants, for example, had to rent one of the shared houses in the old city (Atay, 1985, p.351).

Since the creation of a new nation was symbolised by the creation of the new capital, its planned development had always been the main aim of the new élites who gathered around Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the ruling Republican Populist Party (RPP). As Danielson and Keles summarised:

> 'Modernisation was the driving force of the Turkish revolution. Ataturk's overwhelming objective was to remold Turkey into a modern nation, with Western Europe's political, economic, and social structures providing the model for the new Turkey. ...After the revolution, urbanisation was widely equated with the modernisation, and cities seen as the economic and social vanguard of a modernised society. Ankara was developed to symbolise the new Turkey, a planned modern city on the model of the great European capitals' (Danielson and Keles, 1985, p.10).

In line with this general argument, as a first attempt to control and direct the city's development and also to provide the basic services such as water supply and electricity, a special local administration was established (by law no. 417) in 1924. This law replaced the municipality by a special unit under the control of the Interior Minister and with an appointed governor rather than an elected mayor. However, there were 24 elected city councillors but their posts were liable to abolition by cabinet resolution. Hence, it had a centralised structure despite being a local administrative body.

A year later, approximately four square kilometres of land in the south of the old city were expropriated at a very low price -as low as 1TL per square meter- to be used in implementation of the master plan for the development of the city prepared by a German planner, Lorcher. However, it was sold in less than a decade by auction to the speculators by the local government (Tankut, 1990, p.224). 'The land thus acquired under a semi-authoritarian administration was not used rationally. ...The municipality had to pay large sums to repurchase, in later years, the same land it had sold, for the implementation of its master plan' (Keles, 1990, p.148).

The construction of new quarters of the city, which were called the New City, started immediately. In 1926, according to a contemporary daily newspaper of that time, 405 housing units were under construction (Tankut, 1990, p.27).

Within the construction process, three new sectors were introduced into the city economy. These were construction, trade and service sectors (Senyapili, 1985, p.43). At the very beginning, only the construction sector showed much expansion; the other two started to develop later on. These new job opportunities attracted some workers from the rural areas which had already become unprecedented due to the impact of the Independence War. However, it should be pointed out that the scale of rural-urban migration was very limited, if not negligible, when compared to the migration of the 1950s.

The early immigrants, usually single men, first tried to find a place to live in the old centre where the new job opportunities were located. At that time, such opportunities were limited to the construction of new avenues and buildings. The common practice to get access to one of these construction sites was to wait for a developer who would pick up the workers of the day, usually in one of the coffee houses in the old city centre. Therefore, to live nearby this labour market was vitally important for them. However, it was not so easy to get a place, even a single room, in the old city centre partly due to the limited number of housing units available and partly due to the prices which were much higher than workers could afford. On the other hand, even to try to rent a house from the New City was out of the question.

Given the harsh realities of this alien environment, the only way out for the newcomer was to build his own *shack*[2]. To find an empty plot of land in the old city centre was not a big problem. An area nearby the old centre, namely Altindag, a 900-1000 m. hill[3], where regular housing development was impossible solved this problem. It was also, as Payne puts it, 'close to the bazaars and other employment areas and therefore attractive to migrants' (Payne, 1982, p.18). Altindag Hill was the first place for the frontier shacks which were later to be converted into the first gecekondus of the city. The number of these shacks, at the beginning of the 1920s, had increased slightly, but they were far beyond the scale of being a neighbourhood.

---

[2]For this period, I use the term "shack" quite deliberately instead of gecekondu, since as far as their building standards are concerned, they were far beyond the quality of a gecekondu. However, this does not necessarily mean that all the gecekondus built later on have the quality of proper housing standards. Therefore, this term shows only the relative poor quality of early squatters.

It should be pointed out at this point that the emergence of illegal housings in Ankara presents a rather different pattern from that of other big cities like Istanbul. In Ankara, since the main reason for rural-urban migration was the special role of being capital rather than being an industrial centre, the first gecekondus emerged in the centre. In other words, it was the job opportunities in the service and construction sectors located in the city centre, not industry, which attracted the rural population[4].

By the year 1927, Ankara's population had reached around 75 000. The scale of development and the quality of the physical environment of the city were worrying the élites who took the initiatives in creating the new capital. Despite the failure of the first plan, there was still a strong belief in the necessity of planned development among the state élites and the people as well. As a result, a limited competition for a new plan was held in 1927. Three planners were invited to Ankara in 1927 to make the necessary pre-evaluations and to prepare the city's development plan for a population of 300000. A special local administrative body had listed the demands which were asked to be fulfilled.

In two years time, all the planners prepared their proposals and then submitted them to the special jury in Ankara. The jury, mostly composed of state élites, awarded the first prize to Jansen's plan in 1929. The final plan, however, was approved in 1932. The dispersed shacks of the 1920s had started to become neighbourhoods by that time. Their

---

[3] The average height of Ankara is 800 m.

[4] However, in other big cities, such as Istanbul, the peripheries of the city where the industries were located were the optimal location for the gecekondus.

number had reached such a level that Jansen, in his plan, had to designate an area nearby the old city as a *Working Class Quarter*, although this was never implemented.

In the first half of the 1930s, Ankara had undergone a great deal of construction both planned and unplanned. Together with the New City some other new quarters had started to emerge in the Southeast of the old city as well. In the city as a whole, low income groups had located mostly in the old city centre and partly in the southeastern part. Middle and upper-middle income groups, on the other hand were located in the New City while upper income groups preferred and could afford to live in separate villas in the vineyards which surrounded the city at that time. Table 2.2. gives some idea of this distribution in space by showing the numbers of different types of buildings in different parts of the city.

**Table 2.2 Spatial Distribution of Buildings in Terms of Their Use (1935)**

| Type | Old City | New City | South-eastern Part | Vine Yards | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Single House | 11 402 | 838 | 943 | 2 696 | 15 897 |
| Apartment | 182 | 156 | 12 | 1 | 351 |
| Pension | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 12 |
| Hotel | 40 | 1 | - | - | 41 |
| Inn | 31 | - | - | 6 | 37 |
| Single Room | 72 | 11 | 7 | 25 | 115 |
| Shack | 822 | 23 | 17 | 75 | 937 |
| **Total** | **12 558** | **1 030** | **890** | **2 804** | **17 937** |

Source: Senyapili, 1985, p.207

As can be seen from the table, there were three main types of housing at that time: single detached houses with gardens, four-five storey apartment blocks, and finally shacks. The first group, which was located in New City and southeastern part, were for the middle and

upper-middle income groups (i.e. civil servants). Others in the old city were occupied by the old residents of the city, while the ones in the vine yards were for the upper-income groups. Apartment blocks in the old city were mostly rented by the lower-middle income groups. The wealthier, on the other hand, could afford the ones in the New City. Needless to say, shacks in all parts of the city were for low-income groups.

The implementation of the Jansen plan faced serious difficulties by the end of the 1930s. The reason behind this was mainly increasing demand for urban land. This encouraged land speculation by all social groups, and thus accelerated the exclusion of low-income groups from the formal land and urban markets.

The housing needs of the middle classes were also increasing in parallel with the increasing number of civil servants. Although some attempts had been made to solve the problem, such as the payment of rent allowances to civil servants, these were not enough to keep pace with the increasing demand. The response of middle-income groups to the problem was different from that of low-income groups in that they organised a housing cooperative in 1935 and managed to get their houses by 1938. For this period, we can conclude that middle-income groups were still able to afford formal housing market prices and were not forced to seek other solutions in the informal one.

Towards the end of the 1930s, unauthorised shacks started to be a subject of National Assembly discussions. It was now obvious that Jansen's plan did not match the increasing housing needs of the new residents of the city. However, the only legislation relating to

them, Law no. 486, was about the demolition of such buildings where the owner did not have legal title to the land on which shack was built. However, since the law enabled the authorities to demolish only uninhabited buildings and required a court decision otherwise, in practice, it did not work even for this purpose, let alone the prevention of such actions. However, at that time, things had started to change. The government was not so hostile as it was at the beginning and demolition was not used so often as a solution as before. More importantly, there were opinions regarding the shacks as a sensible, though temporary, solution to the problem. These were the first signs of the realisation of the housing problem of the poor. As Senyapili quotes, Sükrü Kaya, the Home Secretary of the time, emphasised the positive aspects of the shacks when he addressed to National Assembly as follows:

> 'Even though it is against the (development) plan, a shack means to me a roof for one person during the winter. This .... comforts me while walking in the cold nights, as I think, at least, they are not sleeping at rough' (quoted in Senyapili, 1983, p.58).

This changing political environment along with the ineffectiveness of the current law, led the passing of two others at the end of the 1940s. In 1948, the first law (no. 5218) directly related to the unauthorised development problem of Ankara was enacted and just two weeks later a second and more comprehensive one followed the former (no. 5228). According to the first law, a) public lands which were invaded by the squatters could be officially allocated to the squatters at very low prices and b) some empty public plots were to be sold to those who wanted to build their own homes on them. The second law, on the other hand, included all the cities with the same problem and permitted the Turkish Real

Estate and Credit Bank to give housing credits (up to 75% of construction cost with 5% interest rate) to eligible individuals or housing cooperatives (Official Gazette, 22/6/1948, no. 6938 and 6/7/1948, no. 6950). In fact, middle-income groups benefited from this policy, rather than the low-income groups, and a middle-income residential area, Yenimahalle, was built by the help of the above mentioned housing credits.

These two laws were based on the acceptance of gecekondus as a permanent reality and were the first example of toleration on this particular subject. In other words, as I discuss it below in detail, with the coming 1950 general elections, for the first time the voting potential of the gecekondu population was recognised by the ruling RPP.

In sum, at the end of the 1940s, the preconditions for the transformation of the shacks into gecekondus were almost met both spatially and politically. In the economic sphere, on the other hand, a base for the new and massive wave of migration from rural areas were being completed. The 1940s decade saw a set of structural changes in the Turkish economic and political system. These changes had important repercussions on the urbanisation process of the country in general and that of Ankara in particular. In the following section, I will give a brief account of these changes that took place in the economic as well as political domains.

### 2.1.1 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE 1950s MIGRATION

The development strategies of the new nation, which can be described as etatist, had brought about a certain level of economic growth during the 1930s. This was possible, despite the world economic crisis, through state-owned enterprises supported by strong protectionist policies. However, when the 1940s came, together with the negative impacts of the Second World War the Turkish economy had started to decline. As Keyder puts it:

> 'The beginning of World War II signalled an end to the etatist success story. Between 1932 and 1939 manufacturing output had doubled, with a quarter of this volume produced in state enterprises. From the peak of 1939 to the trough of 1945, there was a rapid decline with the 1945 figure only 20 per cent higher than 1932. Agricultural production had also declined to 40 per cent of its 1939 level' (Keyder, 1987, p.110).

At the end of the Second World War, the increasing discontent of the people with the single-party regime coupled with the impact of economic decline paved the way for an opposition party to be formed (the Democratic Party, DP). With the establishment of the DP in 1946, Turkey entered the multi-party era. Four years later, in the 1950 general elections the DP, supported by merchants, entrepreneurs and landowners, came to the power with an overwhelming majority. The rural population, namely farmers, peasants and agricultural labours, played an important role in this election, since they made up the vast majority of the total population and hence the electorate. In other words, it can be concluded that the rural population made a choice in favour of the DP who promised liberalisation in every aspect of life. As Karpat puts it:

> '..conditions in many rural areas deteriorated not only because of lack of investment and modernisation in agriculture, but also because the ruling élite sought to improve a few cities as models of progress and modernity through heavy taxation of the peasants. Eventually, the peasants turned against the ruling Republican Party and ...voted it out of power in 1950' (Karpat, 1976, p.56).

This power shift, together with the increasing impact of the United States in the world economy as a whole, caused etatist and protectionist development strategies to be replaced by those of foreign-capital oriented ones. The main feature of these new strategies was to focus on exporting agricultural goods while importing manufactured ones. What followed was the mass mechanisation of agriculture funded by the 'Marshall Plan' (see Table 2.3).

**Table 2.3 Number of Tractors and Area of Cultivated Lands in Turkey, 1940-1967**

| Year | Number of Tractors | Cultivated Area (000 ha) |
|---|---|---|
| 1940 | 1 066 | 14 600 |
| 1945 | 1 156 | 12 664 |
| 1946 | 1 356 | 13 093 |
| 1947 | 1 556 | 13 575 |
| 1948 | 1 756 | 13 900 |
| 1949 | 9 170 | 13 264 |
| 1950 | 16 585 | 14 552 |
| 1955 | 40 282 | 20 998 |
| 1960 | 42 136 | 23 264 |
| 1965 | 54 668 | 23 841 |
| 1966 | 65 103 | 23 982 |
| 1967 | 74 982 | 23 836 |

Source: Senyapili, 1985, p.213

Between 1948 and 1950 some $164 million was obtained through this aid, 22 per cent of which was spent on agriculture, mainly for mechanisation (Senyapili, 1985, p.73). The number of tractors used in agriculture rose from 1 066 in 1940, to 9 170 in 1949. This number was nearly doubled in 1950 reaching 16 585. By the year 1955 more than 40 000 tractors were in use in agriculture.

This made most of the landless agricultural employees redundant. According to Karpat 'about 1 million farmers were dislocated by some 40 000 tractors introduced in this period' (Karpat, 1976, p.156). As there were no employment opportunities in their villages, migration to the big cities was the only option for them. Although the main effect of mechanisation in agriculture on the migration to Ankara was seen after 1950, during the 1940s it was still attracting the rural population with expectations of finding employment opportunities in the capital city. As a result, between 1940 and 1950, the population of Ankara increased from 157 242 to 289 197.

## 2.3 THE 1950-1960 PERIOD

The period of 1950-1960 was characterised by massive rural-urban migration as an outcome of the above mentioned economic and political changes, which, among the other things, converted a labour intensive agricultural production system to a capital intensive one. The consequence of this migration from the urbanisation point of view was an increase in the number of gecekondus in the urban centres. Ankara was no exception in this regard and received a share of this massive influx. Between 1950 and 1960 the

population of Ankara increased from 289 197 to 650 067. The average annual population growth rate of Ankara during this decade reached its maximum level of 11.3% where it was about 7% between 1927 and 1950 (Keles and Kano, 1987, p.55).

As mentioned before, most of the immigrants were either small landowners who could not compete with their larger counterparts, or landless agricultural wage labourers who were redundant due to mechanisation. They were, therefore, by and large, unskilled labourers whose first priority was to find a job in the city. However, the job opportunities in Ankara at that time were not very promising. The city did not have any substantial industry to employ these workers except for a small number of small foods processing factories. Although the service sector had increased in size compared with the previous period, it was not developed and specialised enough yet for the same purpose. Table 2.4 shows this increase in the contribution of the service sector to the city's economy as a whole.

**Table 2.4 Contribution of Different Sectors to the City's Economy (value added)**

| Sectors | 1935 | 1960 | 1965 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agriculture | 46.4 | 28.7 | 15.1 |
| Industry | 18.8 | 22.3 | 27.0 |
| Services | 34.8 | 49.0 | 57.9 |

Source: Senyapili, 1985:220

As can be clearly seen from the table, service sector employment opportunities, to a certain extent, attracted the rural population to Ankara. However, people's expectations of

Ankara were also high since the city possessed both capital and metropolitan city characteristics.

The situation in the housing sphere, on the other hand, remained almost unchanged. Nothing significant had been done either to improve or increase the existing housing stock for the poor since the 1948 legislation. The lack of legislative, economic and political measures was still dominant in housing policy and at the same time was the main reason behind the accelerated process of unauthorised housing development in Ankara, as well as in other big cities. As Danielson and Keles puts it:

> 'Regular housing has been even less available for urban newcomers than jobs in the modern sector of the urban economy. The flood of rural dwellers generated demands for low-cost housing in the cities that could be met by neither the private market nor government. Most private housing is too expensive for the poor newcomers, and the government has been unwilling to make the enormous investments that would be needed to supply housing for the millions who migrated to the cities after 1950' (Danielson and Keles, 1985, p.41).

In 1953, following increasing concern among the élites about the need for legislative sanctions for gecekondu development, another law was enacted (no. 6188). With this law, all the gecekondus built before 1953 were to be legalised and empty public lands could be allocated to potential gecekondu builders (O. G., 29/7/1953, no. 8352). 'Also, there was a threat to those who would build houses on someone else's land after this law went into effect. With the Municipal Council decision, their houses would summarily be demolished during the construction phase; if they had already been settled, only a fifteen-day notice

need be given' (Heper, 1978: 20). However, this law, like the other two, could neither prevent gecekondu development nor increase the amount of housing for the poor.

Two other major changes took place a year later, as far as the planned development of Ankara is concerned. One of them was the enacting of the Flat Ownership Law (no. 6217) which allowed people living in separate flats of the same building to have their private ownership rights and title deeds. Before this law, such ownership was forbidden since the owner of the land was allowed to reserve all rights in everything on it including building. Therefore, to a certain extent, this was a barrier against higher densities in the urban areas. However, as Keles and Kano put it, the new law '...spurred construction of apartments. Available serviced land within the Jansen Plan, which had been obsolete by then, was limited. The belt of squatter settlements, on the other hand, made middle to high-income residential housing developments at the periphery less desirable. As a consequence, the energy released by the 1954 Law focused on the 'authorised housing stock' of 'New Ankara' formed in the 1930s and 1940s. A process of reconstruction had been unleashed' (Keles and Kano, 1987, p.63).

The other development was the preparation of the city's new development plan. In 1954, yet another international competition was held. The jury, chaired by Sir Patrick Abercombie, awarded the first prize to the plan prepared by two Turkish planners, Resit Uybadın and Nihat Yucel in 1955. Two years later, in 1957, the final draft of their plan was approved and put into operation. This new plan, too, proposed development on north-south directions of the city based on 'grid plan' principles. However, it totally

ignored the city's existing dual structure, which was comprised of authorised and unauthorised parts.

It can be argued that, as far as the authorised part of the city is concerned, this plan, together with the Flat Ownership Law, was the main reason behind the emergence of the 'build-sell' or 'demolish-build-sell' type of construction processes carried out by small-scale private developers. For the gecekondu settlements, on the other hand, the plan proposed nothing either for the prevention or rehabilitation of them. There was also no policy for the housing provision for the poor.

Within this general economic and political setting, the number of gecekondus in Ankara increased from 12 000 in 1950 to 70 000 in 1960 providing housing for a population rising from 62 000 to 364 000 (see Table 2.5). They started to surround all of the authorised parts of the city since empty public land in the inner city was no longer available. By the end of the 1950s, the number of gecekondu *mahalles*[5] was 62 out of a total of 116 (Senyapili, 1985, p.235). The quality of gecekondus improved during this decade. More durable construction materials, such as cynder blocks, brick and concrete started to be used.

[5]Mahalle is the Turkish name of the smallest local administrative unit which also has an elected headman (*muhtar* in Turkish). Although muhtars have not got any significant duty other than the registration of births and deaths and approval of the residence within the mahalle boundaries, they played an important role in the provision of urban services by mediating between residents and municipalities in almost all gecekondu neighborhoods.

Parallel to this consolidation, they started to gain permanency in the economic sphere, namely in urban land and housing markets, as well. For instance, informal markets started to be established which allowed the gecekondus to be rented, sold or bought. Meanwhile the provision of some urban services, i.e. electricity and roads, had become gradually available parallel to the increasing political bargaining power of the gecekondu residents. These improvements also made them environmentally more enhanced. Indeed, they all, as Keles and Kano put it, were the 'natural outcome of gradual improvements in the social standing of immigrants' (Keles and Kano, 1987, p.57).

## 2.4 THE 1960-1980 PERIOD

The sharp population increase during the 1960s made the situation even worse for the poor as far as their housing situation was concerned. As the population increased so did the number of gecekondus (see Table 2.5). By the mid-1960s, more than half of the Ankara's urban population was living in gecekondus. While the old gecekondus were being transformed, the new ones were mushrooming at the peripheries of the city. But, in the inner-city areas (especially in Altindag) 'environmental conditions did not improve much for one reason or another, and therefore the upwardly mobile families left and were replaced by less well-to-do newcomers' (Keles and Kano, 1987, p.67). However, gecekondus located in the peripheries of the city, on the other hand, were being improved either by the provision of municipal services or by investment by the families themselves.

Since by 1960 almost the entire process of gecekondu building had been commercialised (in terms of acquisition of land, access to construction materials and employment of wage labour albeit in limited numbers etc.), it was not so easy any more for the newcomers of the 1960s to find an empty public plot and to build a gecekondu 'overnight' on it. In other words, the self-help nature of the whole process had been changed with the consolidation of the informal market in this particular area. Therefore, the practice of buying or renting a house, which started in the first generation inner-city gecekondu areas, was becoming more common in newly emerging neighbourhoods as well.

**Table 2.5 Number of Gecekondus in Ankara**

| Year | # of Gecekondus | Pop. of Gecekondus | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1950 | 12 000 | 62 400 | 21.8 |
| 1960 | 70 000 | 364 000 | 56.0 |
| 1966 | 100 000 | 520 000 | 57.4 |
| 1970 | 144 000 | 748 000 | 60.6 |
| 1975 | 202 000 | 1 156 000 | 64.9 |
| 1978 | 240 000 | 1 300 000 | 68.4 |
| 1980 | 275 000 | 1 450 000 | 72.4 |
| 1990 | 350 000 | 1 750 000 | 58.3 |

Source: Keles, 1993, p.384

The formation of an informal market in gecekondu production led to the emergence of a new type of land acquisition: *shared title*[6] land ownership. In this type of ownership 'residents hold title deeds to shares of a large parcel of land, which is legal according to the Turkish civil code. The subdivision of that land and construction of dwellings, however,

are unauthorised' (Yonder, 1987, p.215). From the shared title holders' point of view, it is a source of security in terms of land tenure, despite the illegality of the building on it.

As the scarcity of available public land increased in urban areas so did the frequency of the invasion of private land. Landlords who failed to get rid of the gecekondus built on their lands eventually had to sell their land to those who owned the gecekondus. In the course of this process, to buy a plot from the landowner who previously divided his own empty land for the same purpose became so common that later on it was practised by some non-owners as well. As Payne points out:

> 'For some time, this process occupied a minute part of total low-income housing provision, but generated very substantial profits for successful entrepreneurs. As the scope of their operation increased, they were gradually able to obtain tracts of unclaimed public land in various parts of the city and hold them in reserve until market conditions justified their release' (Payne, 1982, p.133).

The 1960s started with the military intervention (1960). In the 1961 Constitution, prepared under the military regime, the new development strategy of the nation was declared as the public-sector oriented one. According to the constitution, to guide the nation's development, Five-Year Development Plans were to be provided by the state. In this context, the First Five-Year Development Plan was prepared by the State Planning Organisation for the period 1963-1968. In relation to the gecekondus, the plan proposed two main policies: 1) to provide economic and social measures for creating employment

---

[6] This term is used in Turkish as a synonymous to unauthorised/illegal subdivision.

opportunities in cities in order to keep pace with the increasing number of migrants. 2) to increase the number of authorised housing units in order to prevent demand for gecekondus.

In line with these policies, by the mid 1960s, the need for new and comprehensive legislation once again came to be a part of the government's agenda and Gecekondu Law (no. 775) was enacted in 1966. The law had three proposals: improvement, demolition and prevention. According to the law, public land within the municipal boundaries was to pass without any payment to the municipalities in order to be used for the purposes mentioned in the law. Gecekondus that could be improved were not to be demolished but to be upgraded. However, those without any hope of improvement and located on land unsuitable for housing, on the other hand, were to be eradicated. But, these decisions applied only when the municipality provided alternative housing for their residents. In terms of prevention, the law enabled the municipalities to build low-cost housing units for the poor. In order to realise the above mentioned goals, a special fund was also established by the same law (O. G., 30/7/1966, no. 12362). Four basic mechanisms were proposed by the law for the prevention of gecekondus. These were:

- 'the construction by the state of apartment units for low-income families. These units would be 62-70 $m^2$ ... [with] the balance to be paid in monthly instalments over 20 years;
- the construction of detached, core-type housing units of 31 $m^2$ with loans to help the owner to extend his building;
- the allocation of prepared sites and building projects with loans for self-help housing;
- the allocation of sites and credits to existing or specially formed non-profit housing co-operatives' (Eke, 1982, p.11).

In practice, the law could do nothing significant in terms of prevention. Local governments could expropriate land for housing the poor through the 'Gecekondu Prevention Projects'. However, although ten years later, fifteen projects had been planned for Ankara and only two of them had been realised. In fact, none could 'reach the target groups. They ended up as middle-income housing projects of limited scope' (Keles and Kano, 1987, pp.68-69).

On the improvement side, however, for the first time the government had acknowledged the contribution that gecekondus made to the supply of housing demand of the low-income groups and emphasised the need to improve them. As far as the government's previous approaches towards the problem are concerned, this was a complete policy reverse in that the difficulties of planned development were now being accepted. As Payne points out; 'the emphasis which this legislation put on the upgrading of self-help housing represents a radical departure from conventional approaches in an urbanising country' (Payne, 1982, p.124). This legislation was, in fact, much in harmony with the neo-modernisation policies that started to be applied in most of the Latin American countries, which, very briefly, acknowledged the positive aspects of self-help housing production and proposed them as a solution.

Following the 1966 law, partly due to the increasing political pressure from the gecekondu dwellers and mostly due to having limited resources to relocate them in the authorised housing units, local governments concentrated mainly on the upgrading project. With the help of the local people, many gecekondu areas managed to get some basic urban services. 'Approximately 60 per cent of municipal housing budgets were spent specifically in the

provision of infrastructure, including improvements to local roads and paths, street lighting and electrical power, public water supply and, on a limited scale, mains sewerage' (Payne, 1982, p.125). In the allocation of the limited municipal resources through the gecekondu settlements, the ability of muhtars in terms of expressing the needs of their mahalles played a crucial role, 'though there was inevitably a tendency to favour areas which the political affiliation of the mahalle leaders and the local authorities were the same' (Payne, 1977, p.169).

In terms of demolition, on the other hand, local authorities were rather reluctant to act. Although the law emphasised that all gecekondus which were built after the enacting of the law were to be demolished, only three areas in Ankara were eradicated (one near the Presidential Palace and the other two in inner-city areas where the natural conditions were not suitable for residential purposes). In all three areas, however, as the law proposed, the municipality re-housed all the dislocated inhabitants.

By the early 1970s, nearly three quarters of a million people, 60.6% of Ankara's total population, were living in gecekondus, which literally surrounded the city (see Figure 2.1). The gecekondus were also becoming more heterogeneous in terms of the population composition in a sense that the dwellers were no longer only low-income rural immigrants. Since the gecekondus offered cheaper housing alternatives, the number of middle-income families living in such areas was increasing too. Among them, public service employees and lower-rank civil servants who previously would not have been thought as gecekondu dwellers were in the majority. One of the gecekondu surveys, which was conducted by

Figure 2.1 Gecekondu Settlements in Ankara




Source:Danielson and Keles, 1987, p.164

State Planning Organisation in 1987, shows that 49.7% of the total working survey population in Ankara were indeed white collar workers who worked as personnel in the armed forces, health, administrative, educational, municipal, etc. sectors, while the 29% were blue-collars and the share of people who were self-employed was only 5.9% (State Planning Organisation, 1991, p.55). These figures also indicate the peculiarity of Ankara as a capital city when compared to the other big cities and, in particular, the role of the public sector as a major employer.

The need for a new development plan, both for the authorised and the unauthorised parts of the city, was becoming more inevitable as the gecekondus were spreading with the changing faces. To be able to get a more realistic plan the Ankara Metropolitan Area Planning Bureau had been established in 1969. Its main task was 'to design a comprehensive plan for Ankara for the year 1990 with a maximum population of 3.6 million' (Keles and Kano, 1987, p.69). The new plan was completed by this bureau in 1975 and approved in 1982. However, it was used as a major guide for development in-between these dates. The 1957 plan, on the other hand, was also implemented during that period. In practice, the new plan was being implemented outside the boundaries of the former one through local 'implementation plans'.

One of the important decisions taken by this bureau was the so-called west corridor development proposal. In accordance with this proposal, the social-democrat municipality of Ankara, one of whose top priorities had always been the development of low-cost housing settlements, initiated a low-income housing project, 'Akkondu Project' which was

later renamed as Batikent (West Town) in 1973. This project was carried out with the same spirit by the new social democrat mayor Vedat Dalokay, who was elected in 1979. It was to be a housing district under public-sector ownership which would be rented out to the urban poor. Danielson and Keles quote the main aim of the project from one of the brochures published by the Kent-Koop[7] as follows: 'This new city is being built primarily for confronting the vast housing demands of the newcomers in Ankara ...People who are living in squatter settlements will have the chance to live with the minimum necessary standards' (quoted in Danielson and Keles, 1987, pp.187-188). However, this project too, in the course of implementation, ended up as a middle or even upper-middle income housing project based upon private home ownership. The main reason behind this failure was the conflict between Mayor Dalokay and the central government which resulted in the financial crisis of the municipality.

The failure of government to produce cheap serviced land and/or housing for both low and lower-middle income groups through such projects, helped the gecekondus to reach yet another new stage, a transformation into authorised housing stocks. By the mid-1970s, land for regular housing development had already run out in the planned parts of the city. Gecekondu settlements adjacent to these planned housing areas with a good deal of semi-serviced urban land was offering a cheaper alternative for the production of serviced land for further development. In fact, the transformation of such gecekondu areas could only be made possible by the preparation of the redevelopment plans. These were local plans to be

[7]This is the name of the Union of Housing Cooperatives which was established in 1979. The main task of this nongovernmental agency was to organise small housing cooperatives and to provide both technical and financial assistance for housing production.

implemented in the existing gecekondu settlements, usually with higher density decisions. Through these plans gecekondu owners were to have an authorised plot together with redevelopment rights.

For the gecekondu owners this was not only a means of legal security but economic security as well. For most of the gecekondu owners, if not all, therefore, to sell their 'user rights' to one of the small-scale private developers in return for two or more flats in the newly developed apartment block was a good and, indeed, an irresistible deal. As Danielson and Keles put it, 'with a critical assist from government which had given the squatter something to sell by legalising what had been illegally acquired, some gecekondu dwellers moved in one generation from impoverished squatters to owners of substantial city properties' (Danielson and Keles, 1987, p.170).

Such plans during the 1970s, however, were used in rather limited scale when compared to the experiences of late 1980s. But, whatever the chance of being taken into account by the local authorities, gecekondu owners kept pressing them for the preparation of such plans at every possible occasion, largely by using their vote potential as bargaining power. Ironically, with the realisation of those plans, low-income housing settlements were being converted into the middle-income neighbourhoods while their tenants were being forced to seek other cheaper alternatives in the distant outskirts of the city.

In effect, this relocation process was one of the repercussions of the changing self-help nature of gecekondus towards a market-oriented one. As Keles points out:

> 'At the beginning, until the early 1960s, the self-help and mutual aid nature of squatting was clearly evident. Building a squatter dwelling was a joint effort of family members, relatives, and friends, with no assistance from the public authorities. ...The structures were built mainly for self-use, and renting out was an exceptionally rare phenomenon. However, during the late 1960s and 1970s, ...the squatting process gradually became commercialised in the sense that attempts to let the units in order to benefit from their exchange value, became more common' (Keles, 1990, p.163).

In other words, as Payne correctly foresees from his researches in Ankara in the early 1970s, 'the expansion of the 'exchange value' market would squeeze other processes in which 'use values' predominated, and control both the options and terms on which housing was available to the poor' (Payne, 1977, p.198).

In sum, by the 1980s, Ankara had an intensified housing problem which was not restricted to low-income groups but extended to middle and upper-middle income groups as well. While the former were struggling to find cheaper alternatives in the peripheries of the city, the latter were continuing to try to escape from the highly polluted, high density inner-city residential areas which had been once built for them.

## 2.5 THE 1980s

This decade sees a number of new government initiatives towards the gecekondus, which has opened a new era for the gecekondu owners, as well as the other interest groups who operate in both the formal and informal urban land and housing markets.

Before evaluating these rather major changes made by the government, it is useful to have an overall idea about the stage reached by the gecekondus in the country as a whole at that time. The total number of gecekondus in the country had nearly doubled between 1970 and 1980 from 600 000 units to 1 150 000 and were accommodating 3 000 000 residents in 1970 and 5 750 000 in 1980 (see Table 2.6). Ankara shared a similar trend in this regard (see Table 2.5).

**Table 2.6 Number of Gecekondus in Turkey**

| Year | # of Gecekondus | Pop. of gecekondus | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1955 | 50 000 | 250 000 | 4.7 |
| 1960 | 240 000 | 1 200 000 | 16.4 |
| 1965 | 430 000 | 2 150 000 | 22.9 |
| 1970 | 600 000 | 3 000 000 | 23.6 |
| 1980 | 1 150 000 | 5 750 000 | 26.1 |
| 1990 | 1 750 000 | 8 750 000 | 33.9 |

Source: Keles, 1993, p.383

Generally, the spatial distribution of unauthorised housing settlements in Ankara has shown a similar pattern with that of previous periods (i.e. expansion towards the outer parts of the city while continuing to surround the planned parts). At the same time, the tendency for outward movement of middle-income groups has become accelerated. This increasing demand was met by medium-size private development firms and/or cooperatives in order to build housing estates beyond the gecekondu belt with the encouragement of the new measures. In other words, the underlying philosophy behind the

new liberal government's housing policy was no longer to develop, or to try to develop, low-cost housing settlements as it was before, but to encourage private-sector development which primarily went to middle and high-income groups. In fact, this included making the availability of housing credits easier and wider for the prospective housing owners at the national level and providing serviced land for private firms at the local.

In reality, however, this type of housing supply for middle-income groups was very limited. Keles and Kano summarise these developments in middle-income housing as follows:

> 'Indeed, the demand proved rather flimsy in market terms on the one hand, securing serviced land was expensive if not impossible without considerable public subsidy on the other. In this connection, most of the small and medium-size cooperatives formed with the purpose of settling beyond the squatters failed and remained as speculative endeavours. Only a handful of large cooperatives ..., all in the Ankara-Eskisehir corridor of 'South Ankara' succeeded to generate some housing. As a rule, private firms shied away from settlement projects beyond the belt of squatters for the same reason' (Keles and Kano, 1987, p.74).

In the meantime, a special planning team[8] was appointed by the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality in 1985 to prepare a new development plan for the year 2015. Very briefly, the main goal of this plan, which broadly accepts the main west-corridor development

[8] This planning team was constituted of academics from the Middle East Technical University, Department of City and Regional Planning

decision of the Ankara Metropolitan Planning Bureau, was the decentralised[9] macro-form which is in fact, as I discuss in detail in the next chapter, going to conflict with the outcomes of the decisions taken for the unauthorised part of the city.

These new changes for the gecekondus came just after the victory of the Motherland Party (MP) in the first general elections after the 1980 Military Coup. With the introduction of new legislation the liberal MP intended to satisfy the demands of the gecekondu population for political reasons, to an unprecedented extent. In accordance with their intention to integrate the gecekondu population into the 'new right project', a first step was taken by the enacting of the new law (no. 2805) about the gecekondus in 1983. A year later another one (no. 2981), which spells out the implementation of the previous one in detail, followed it. They were not different from the previous counterparts in the sense that, they too regarded an amnesty as the basic solution to the problem. What follows this general policy was to pardon all the gecekondus built upon the public land before 1981[10] and all other type of unauthorised buildings (in terms of construction process) by relaxing the relevant building codes (O. G., 21/3/1983, no. 17 994 and 8/3/1984, no. 18 335). According to the law, local governments were to prepare Improvement Plans of designated gecekondu areas in order to be able to allocate the public land to the gecekondu owners. In order to be eligible for land allocation, the law required the

[9]This macro-form consists of separate sub-centres outside the existing built-up area of Ankara which are connected to each other and to the existing centre by an effective transportation network; and it will be achieved both by developing new settlements and by improving the existing ones wherever possible.

[10]This deadline was the date when the military government tried to prohibit the construction of gecekondus with a resolution.

gecekondu owners not to be owners of any other land suitable for construction in the same or neighbouring municipalities.

Two years later, however, another law (no. 3290), which introduced further relaxations was enacted. Firstly, the number of gecekondus included was broadened by extending the previous deadline until 1985. Secondly and more importantly, the need for improvement plans was abolished. Now public lands invaded by gecekondus could be allocated even if the improvement plan of the area had not been completed yet (O. G., 7/6/1986, no. 19 130).

The immediate response first from the Municipality of Ankara[11] of that time and later from the district municipalities to these new legislations was the preparation of Improvement Plans. These plans are the legal documents which not only approve the gecekondus as legal housing but also include the technical planning decisions such as new zoning with new and usually higher densities. Therefore, their impact on the urban housing and land markets is very sufficient since they paved a new way for the redevelopment process in the gecekondu areas. As Keles and Kano put it: 'Authorisation' of the 'unauthorised housing', relaxation of building codes and lowering of environmental standards, ... pleased smaller building contractors. The belt of squatters was now opened for 'authorised'

[11]In 1984 a law (no. 3030) reorganising the local governments which proposed two levels administration model to the big cities was enacted. By that, former Municipality of Ankara was converted into Ankara Metropolitan Municipality and also five other district municipalities were established.

redevelopment (Keles and Kano, 1987, p.76). This was, indeed, an unavoidable outcome which had been experienced in the authorised part of the city's housing during the 1970s.

In sum, as mentioned before, these latest legal changes in the unauthorised part of the city are the most radical ones taken so far. However, with their implementation, not only is the existing situation accepted *de facto* as a solution to the accumulated problems of gecekondus, but also further ones are being invited such as intensified land speculation.

## 2.6 CONCLUSION

Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic and the declaration of the city as the new capital the population of Ankara started to increase at an unprecedented rate. During these early days, the city's planned development was the top priority of the new élites who wanted to create a new capital as a symbol of the creation of a new nation. In line with the modernisation goal of the new state élites, the first development plan for Ankara was prepared as early as 1924 by a German planner, Lorcher, and put into implementation immediately. This was followed by several others, and between 1924-1986 five development plans were prepared for the controlled development of the city.

Even during the early days Ankara was attracting people from rural areas as a capital city. Available housing stock, on the other hand, was far beyond meeting this increasing demand. The only solution for newcomers was to build their own *shacks*.

These were the first signs of the unauthorised housing development that would become known as *gecekondu* development.

Government responses to the unauthorised housing development were very hostile at that time. Obviously, these shacks were not in harmony with the modernisation goal of the new nation, and therefore, should be eradicated. The first law in relation to these unauthorised dwellings was enacted 1924. In line with general opinion, this first legislation only proposed the eradication of such dwellings as they were regarded as unacceptable for the new capital.

Through the end of the 1940s, these dispersed shacks started to gain permanency and to be transformed into gecekondu mahalles. Meanwhile, the voting potential of the gecekondu residents began to be recognised by the authorities as well as by the political parties. This increasing bargaining power of the gecekondu residents also changed the manner of policies towards them. First amnesty law was enacted in 1948 and ever since then the political power of the gecekondu residents played a crucial role in government policies towards them. In almost all pre-election periods the number of gecekondu dwellings grew in accordance with the amnesty promises of political parties.

The 1950s started with rural-urban influx as a result of the structural changes in agricultural production. Ankara, too, was one of the main destinations of this massive migration. This also contributed to the further increase in the number of gecekondu

dwellings in the city and by the 1960s gecekondu settlements started to surround the whole city. At the same time, their self-help nature had also been replaced by the commercialisation of the whole gecekondu production process. On the government side, with the impact of the neo-modernisation policies of that time, positive aspects of gecekondu production started to be emphasised. The 1966 legislation, in this regard, was an example of this policy in which the up-grading/improvement of gecekondu settlements rather than their eradication was spelled out for the first time.

Through these improvements, amid varying degrees, gecekondu settlements consolidated their position in the urban physical sphere during the 1960s and early 1970s. The gecekondu owners' bargaining power in the urban political and economic domains had also strengthened during the 1970s. With the implementations of a few 'improvement plans' some gecekondu owners even became land speculators. After these limited implementations, the priority of the gecekondu owners shifted from obtaining title deeds to having redevelopment rights for their land.

These expectations of the gecekondu owners were fulfilled by the liberal government which came to the power just after the 1980 military intervention. Redevelopment rights were given to all gecekondu owners through 'Improvement Plans' and implementation started immediately. This was the most comprehensive and radical action taken by the government so far. Their physical, economic, political and social repercussions, however, will be discussed in detail in the next chapters.

When we examine the unauthorised housing development experience of Ankara in relation to the theories discussed in Chapter 1, we can argue that modernisation theory explains the evolutionary nature of such settlements better than the dependency and articulation of modes-of-production schools. However, it fails to explain the permanency of gecekondu settlements in the urban sphere. It also remains incorrect in suggesting that the people living in gecekondu areas are marginals who cannot integrate to the urban way of life.

The dependency school, on the other hand, gives an explanation of the permanent characteristics of these settlements, but wrongly suggests that the dual structure of the city is an outcome of an exploitative relationship between authorised and unauthorised parts, and therefore has a stagnant feature. As I have already shown, gecekondu settlements have their own dynamics too, and people living in these areas are by no means passive receivers of the policies taken by governments towards them.

At this point, the articulation of modes-of-production theory gives a better explanation, since it suggests that there is a mutual relationship between authorised and unauthorised parts of the city. It also correctly describes how the production process of gecekondu dwellings was articulated to formal housing production and how their use-value was replaced by their exchange-value through time.

# CHAPTER 3:
# MEANS OF TRANSFORMATION:
# IMPROVEMENT PLANS

## 3.1 INTRODUCTION

So far I have examined the development of gecekondus in Ankara and the government's responses to this development which has ranged from hostile eradication to encouraging legislation depending on the degree of bargaining power of the gecekondu dwellers. As mentioned earlier, before the 1983 legislation all the efforts made by governments were piecemeal and just enough to keep the expectations of gecekondu owners alive until the next elections. Recent policies, however, are very different from their earlier counterparts both in their extent and aims. Their impact, therefore, on the urban political and economic domain have been wider and more influential. In this chapter, I will evaluate these recent policies and developments (i.e., 1983 legislation and afterwards) regarding the gecekondus. In this rather broad context, however, I will particularly focus on the Improvement Plans which were the most important outcome of above mentioned legislation.

First, I will examine the concept of Improvement Plans and the conjuncture in which these plans originated. Different planning approaches within the general framework of Improvement Plans and their pros and cons will be reviewed in this part. In the second section, I will present the empirical findings of my research conducted in the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality (AMM) and in other district municipalities of Ankara in relation to these plans. In this section, Improvement Planning works of each district municipality will be described in order to give a general background of the situation. The potential implications (i.e., physical, economic, political and cultural) of the implementation of these plans and the position of different interest groups *vis-à-vis* their implementation will be discussed in the third section. The aim of the general overview of the implementation process is to pave the way for the following empirical chapters where I examine in detail two different types of transformation (i.e. by market forces and the public sector) in two different gecekondu areas (i.e., 19 Mayis and Dikmen Valley).

## 3.2 IMPROVEMENT PLANS

As was discussed in the previous chapter, following the victory in 1983 general elections, the Motherland Party initiated a series of pieces of legislation regarding gecekondus (Law nos. 2805, 2981 and 3290). Their basic aim was to legalise gecekondus and consequently to gain the political support of land "owners".

Mere legalisation, however, would not have guaranteed the full support of the gecekondu owners. Legalisation had been used several times by almost all previous

governments to varying degrees and, in fact, had become old-fashioned. What gecekondu owners really wanted was to obtain 'redevelopment' rights to the land they owned/occupied. The Motherland Party accepted these demands since they fitted well with their own political interests. They, therefore, used the Improvement Plans as a bribe[1] for the 1984 local elections. In this context, the Improvement Plans came to be a political as well as economic solution to the requirements of both sides.

In what follows, I will discuss both the scope and the objective of these Improvement Plans, and the different planning approaches by which they could be implemented, as an introduction to the empirical section.

### 3.2.1 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE IMPROVEMENT PLANS

The concept of Improvement Plans was first introduced by the gecekondu amnesty law (no. 2805) in 1983. Two further laws (nos. 2981 and 3290) followed this one, in 1984 and 1986 respectively. These three laws had almost the same objectives but each was more comprehensive than its predecessor. The first law stated that all gecekondus built before 2. 6. 1981[2] were to be legalised. This deadline was retained in the second law as well. In the third successive law however, it had been extended to 10 .11. 1985. In this way, all gecekondus built between these two dates were legalised. This extension is quite important as it shows to what extent gecekondu amnesty law could

[1] 'Election Investment' is used in Turkish as a phrase for the same expression
[2] As was mentioned before, this was the deadline of a National Security Council (special legislative body established by the military regime) declaration which forbade gecekondu construction thereafter.

be politically significant for the government and also to what extent political pressure by the gecekondu owners could be successful.

In relation to the preparation and implementation of Improvement Plans on the other hand, nothing was changed by these laws. In the relevant law, Improvement Plans are defined as follows:

> 'Improvement Plans are the urban development plans which enable the unauthorised and unhealthy housing areas to be converted into regular and healthy ones through the provision of urban services by following the present land-use and ownership patterns of the settlement as much as possible.'(Official Gazette, 21/8/1983, 18146).

From this definition it is possible to consider these plans a technical tool for the provision of basic infrastructural facilities (i.e., roads, water and sewage systems etc.) in unauthorised areas to improve their living conditions. However, behind this rather harmless 'improvement' discourse are the political concerns that express themselves in the requirement of legalisation. In other words, although it is quite possible to 'improve' a gecekondu area without changing the legal position of each individual gecekondu "owner" (i.e. without legalisation), this option was ruled out by the government right from the start. Instead, legalisation was at the very heart of the improvement process.

It has been indicated that all gecekondus within the settlement to be improved were to be authorised according to the new plan before any implementation. This means that, unless the Improvement Plan of a gecekondu area was approved by the local

authorities and individual title deeds are issued, the 'improvement' process of an area could not be launched.

From the government's point of view, however, the necessity of legalisation for improvement is by no means a contradiction since its underling concern was political not physical/environmental. By associating redevelopment rights with the title deeds, the government had in mind the forthcoming 1984 Local Elections. As I discuss this later in the chapter, this policy proved to be successful and the Motherland Party won control of almost all the major municipalities including the Metropolitan Municipalities of Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir.

In short, Improvement Plans have become the key element in gecekondu amnesty legislation. In fact, in line with the hopes of the gecekondu owners, Improvement Plans became synonymous with Redevelopment Plans. I would therefore argue that these plans should be regarded as a means of realising a political end; obtaining the political support of gecekondu owners in return for giving them title deeds and redevelopment permission.

### 3.2.2 THE TECHNICAL PROCEDURE FOR PREPARING IMPROVEMENT PLANS

Once a gecekondu area has been designated for the preparation of an Improvement Plan, the first stage is the completion of land-use plans of the area together with a current map of land ownership. This defines the legal and physical structure of the area to be planned.

Planners then work on this land-use plan to prepare the future image of the settlement by employing one or more planning strategies (i.e., redevelopment, conservation and clearance). At this stage the new ownership pattern of the settlement together with the physical structure is determined. To be more precise, the new size and location of each plot is redefined by the planners by using technical guidelines provided by law.

In this process, some of the land (a maximum of 35% of the plot size) is compulsorily expropriated for public facilities (i.e., parks, schools, health centres, and the like) and other parts are merged together to create an adequate-sized building plot size (a minimum of 400 $m^2$ required by law). The owners, whose land is totally used for public services, are given another plot or shares of several plots in the planned area as compensation. The result is that almost all the boundaries of individual plots change. Since the land is first put together and then the public share is taken away from this total, and finally plots are redistributed according to the individual shares regardless of the previous locations, such plans are often called *'dough plans'* by gecekondu owners.

In some cases, the new location is less desirable as far as future development is concerned. In other cases, the result is worse still if the compensation consists of more than one share in different plots. In such cases the owner has to negotiate with every single share holder over redevelopment. Obviously, this diminishes the prospective profit that would have been obtained otherwise.

Figure 3.1 gives an idea of the new ownership patters brought about by the plan to an existing gecekondu area. Although it is an example from the 1970s' limited implementation of redevelopment plans, discussed in previous chapter, the principles of planning are exactly the same in the case of the Improvement Plans.

After being completed by the planners, the Improvement Plan for the area is exhibited publicly and an opportunity is given for legal appeals. As result of these appeals, the original Improvement Plan of the area might be changed. Here, the bargaining power of the interest groups is crucial. Gecekondu owners can apply for an increase in the number of storeys in a building on their plots or for cancellation of the demolition of individual gecekondus. After these revisions on the plan, at the final stage, the technical implementation of the plans is made by the map engineers. This means the application of the new land-ownership pattern to the cadastral maps. When this is completed the plan is approved by the municipality and new title deeds are issued.

In short, this final plan provides a blueprint for implementation during the improvement process.

### 3.2.3 DIFFERENT TYPES OF PLANNING STRATEGIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF IMPROVEMENT PLANS

As I have already indicated, the main aim of the Improvement Plans is stated by the law (no.2805) as the improvement of the gecekondu areas. Within this framework however, alternative planning strategies can be used. These strategies can be labelled redevelopment,

Figure 2.1 The" Improvement Plan" Overlaid on Existing Gecekondu Area




Source:Payne, 1977, p.193

conservation and clearance. The decision as to which of these strategies is to be implemented depends upon the needs of the area and, more importantly, upon the intentions of the local authorities. The underlying philosophy behind this critical decision will become clear when these different planning strategies are defined. I will review each of these strategies in terms of their technical meanings as well as their economic and political effects on different interest groups.

If ***redevelopment*** is chosen as a planning strategy this means that the whole area is to be transformed. In other words, the new plan will definitely propose higher density building besides other standard measures such as the provision of urban services. It is this crucial point that makes these plans so important for gecekondu owners and the other interest groups such as developers. From the gecekondu owner's point of view, the plan results in a higher exchange-value for his/her asset since it allows redevelopment. Moreover, for the developers, redevelopment plans mean new job opportunities in a relatively small and very competitive market.

***Conservation***, on the other hand, can be considered as the exact opposite of the previous planning strategy if it is used on its own. The main aim of this strategy is to legalise the gecekondus as regular housing units. It includes the basic planning decisions mentioned above by mostly accepting the existing land-use pattern in order to avoid unnecessary demolition, expropriation and relocation decisions which are costly to the municipality. This strategy is very unpopular with gecekondu owners, since it brings nothing new or profitable to the gecekondu owners except for a few public services like paved roads,

which do not mean very much to them. The legalisation of their gecekondus, on the other hand, does not make a significant change in reality since demolition is very unlikely.

The third strategy, ***clearance,*** is used only when it is really necessary, for technical reasons for example, to have some space for the public service areas or to open a new road. Since it is generally used together with the redevelopment approach, those who lose their houses are either given another plot ready for redevelopment within the planning area or are compensated for their losses. In this way, it is intended to reduce the potential tension between the gecekondu owners and local authorities.

## 3.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IMPROVEMENT PLANS IN ANKARA

In this section I will discuss the changes taking place in the unauthorised housing stock of Ankara. But, since the local authorities are responsible for the preparation of the Improvement Plans and are therefore the major actors in this story, I will first give a brief account of the local government structure of Ankara.

### 3.3.1 THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE OF ANKARA

Until 1984 all cities, regardless of their size, had a single municipal administration consisting of a mayor and a city council. After 1984, when the metropolitan municipality law (no. 3030) came into force, Ankara, like any other metropolitan city, became a two-

tiered municipal administration: the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality (AMM) and five district municipalities: Altindag, Cankaya, Kecioren, Mamak and Yenimahalle (Figure 3.2). Generally, the AMM acts as a coordinator between the district municipalities and supervises the major planning and development projects. In this context, projects which are related to the entire city and therefore need to be handled as a whole are carried out by the AMM. One of these is the Ankara Light Rail Transportation Project which cuts across the whole city and requires relatively big financial resources.

District municipalities, on the other hand, provide the basic municipal services for their own territories. The construction of public buildings and areas, cleansing works like garbage collection and other local municipal duties are among the responsibilities of district municipalities.

The preparation and approval of the development plans are no exception in this two-tiered decision-making system. The master plan (scale 1/5000) for the city's development is made by the AMM whereas the implementation plans, including Improvement Plans, (scale 1/1000) are left to the district municipalities. In other words, the structural plan that guides the development of city as a whole is the responsibility of the AMM. What district municipalities do, in terms of planning, is to apply these general decisions in their own districts and suggest necessary plan revisions to the AMM. In this sense, the structural plan decisions are by no means rigid or inflexible, as the final approval of the implementation plans, on the other hand, is left to the district municipalities. The AMM, however, may change this by the AMM City Council resolution. This makes the district

Figure 3.2 District Municipalities of Ankara Metropolitan Area



municipalities, to a certain extent, dependent on the AMM. Thus, as I will discuss in detail, concentration of the pressures from the gecekondu owners on the district municipalities as the responsible institution for the preparation of the Improvement Plans creates conflicts between the district municipalities and the AMM, who has not been vulnerable to similar pressures.

### 3.3.2 THE IMPROVEMENT PLANNING PROCESS IN ANKARA

After the necessary legal framework was passed by the central government, the Municipality of Ankara, which was the only municipal body responsible for the whole city at that time, immediately launched improvement planning studies and at the end of 1983 22 gecekondu settlements were designated for this purpose. This quick response, to a certain extent, shows the degree of pressure that gecekondu owners placed on the local government.

After the establishment of district municipalities in 1984, all these planning works were handed over to the district municipalities. At that time, both the central government and local governments of Ankara (i.e. AMM and the five district municipalities) were under the control of the Motherland Party. Thus, there were no political or ideological disputes over implementing national policies at the local level.

The only difficulty that district municipalities faced at the beginning was the lack of technicians (i.e. city planners and the like) in their planning departments. This problem partly resulted from the fact that these municipalities were recently established and partly

due to the amount of planning work that the relevant departments had to tackle. However, the preparation of Improvement Plans was politically as well as economically vital. Gecekondu owners have been gearing up for the redevelopment decisions. Local governments, on the other hand, were ready to do this favour in return for their political support. In a short period of time, this initial, and rather technical, problem was soon overcome by the municipalities. The first Improvement Plans were completed as early as 1987. Table 3.1 shows the progress made by each district municipality in their Improvement Plans year by year up to 1992.

Several conclusions can be drawn from this table. Firstly, all the district municipalities had made a start and completed some part of the Improvement Plans for their own districts by 1987. These fragmented plans in fact constituted nearly 20% of the total gecekondu area to be planned in this early stage. This suggests that technical problems were not a serious obstacle for at least some district municipalities. Secondly, Mamak municipality (District 4), made the fastest progress completing more than one-third of its total gecekondu area (33.9%) in the first year. In contrast, Yenimahalle municipality (District 5) made the slowest progress.

In the preparation of the Improvement Plans the peak rate of approval of 21.3% was reached in 1989. This might be explained by the local elections held in 1989, since the matter was highly politicised and became a crucial issue for local politics at that time.

**Table 3.1 Area Covered (ha) by Improvement Plans Approved Each Year in the Different District Municipalities and in Total***

| | District 1 | District 2 | District 3 | District 4 | District 5 | Tot. | Average Cumulative Coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***1987 area*** | 158 | 588 | 341 | 1227 | 125 | 2439 | |
| *%* | 6.5 | 27.1 | 13.7 | 33.9 | 5.7 | 18.9 | 18.9 |
| ***1988 area*** | - | 567 | 736 | - | 564 | 1867 | |
| *%* | - | 26.1 | 29.6 | - | 25.6 | 14.5 | 33.4 |
| ***1989 area*** | 299 | 154 | 431 | 1744 | 129 | 2757 | |
| *%* | 12.3 | 7.1 | 17.3 | 48.3 | 5.8 | 21.3 | 54.7 |
| ***1990 area*** | 843 | 32 | 176 | 644 | 83 | 1778 | |
| *%* | 34.7 | 1.4 | 7.1 | 17.8 | 3.8 | 13.7 | 68.4 |
| ***1991 area*** | 520 | - | 278 | - | - | 798 | |
| *%* | 21.4 | - | 11.2 | - | - | 6.2 | 74.6 |
| ***1992 area*** | 170 | 54 | 157 | - | 98 | 479 | |
| *%* | 7.0 | 2.5 | 6.3 | - | 4.4 | 3.7 | 78.3 |
| ***Total area*** | 1990 | 1395 | 2119 | 3615 | 999 | 10118 | |
| *%* | 81.9 | 64.2 | 85.2 | 100.0 | 45.2 | 78.3 | |

Source: Drawn from Ankara Kent Butununde Islah Imar Planı Calısmaları, Gecekondu Alanları Cerceve Butunu Acıklama Raporu, Camur 1991, and research conducted in the district municipalities.

* Districts 1,2,3,4 and 5 represent Altindag, Cankaya, Kecioren, Mamak and Yenimahalle respectively.

In the 1989 local elections, the Motherland Party lost control of the AMM as well as all the other district municipalities to the Social Democrat Populist Party (SDPP). This power shift made no difference to the continuation of the Improvement Planning works, since public pressure from gecekondu owners was so strong that the party in charge of the municipality had no real choice but to continue to implement the plan. The discontinuation of these planning works would have been disastrous for the new municipal

administrations. However, as I discuss later, conflicts between the AMM and the district municipalities over the rationale for these plans started immediately.

Very briefly, the AMM supported the implementation of Ankara 2015 Plan proposals, discussed in the previous chapter. In fact, one of the planners who took part in the preparation of this plan was appointed as the head of the Planning Department of the AMM. He immediately set up an *Improvement Planning Co-ordination Committee,* consisting of the five district municipalities and the AMM, with the intention of controlling the Improvement Plan process. In one of the Co-ordination Committee reports the head of the AMM Planning Department stated that 'Improvement Plans should be interpreted as the tools for 'improving' the physical/environmental conditions of the gecekondu areas not for redeveloping them. If we redevelop all the gecekondu areas to the extent that the district municipalities are gearing up, we would be putting reservations on the healthier development of the city' (Co-ordination Committee Report, 1989, p.2).

In the following years after 1989, preparation of the Improvement Plans had been carried out, despite these pressures from the AMM. By the end of 1992, more than three-quarters of the total gecekondu area (78.3%) in Ankara had been planned in varying proportions depending on the districts (see Table 3.2).

For example, Mamak municipality (District 4) had planned all the gecekondu areas by the end of 1990, whereas Yenimahalle municipality (District 5) managed to complete only 40.9% of the total gecekondu area in the district within the same period of time (see Table

3.1). One of the main reasons behind these different proportions is the political position of each individual municipality towards the Improvement Plans. Mamak municipality is a good example in this regard. 98% of the total housing stock in the district is unauthorised. Nevertheless, it is the first and only municipality to have finished the planning of all gecekondu areas. I would, therefore, argue that pressures from the gecekondu owners contributed to this high score. Since Mamak has the highest gecekondu proportion, one might expect pressures from them would be relatively more effective than in any of the other districts.

**Table 3.2 Summary of the Improvement Planning Works at the end of 1992**

| | District 1 | District 2 | District 3 | District 4 | District 5 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***Total area with IPs*** | 1990 | 1395 | 2119 | 3615 | 999 | 10118 |
| *%* | 81.9 | 64.2 | 85.2 | 100.0 | 45.2 | 78.3 |
| ***Unplanned area*** | 437 | 776 | 368 | - | 1207 | 2788 |
| *%* | 18.1 | 35.8 | 14.8 | - | 54.8 | 21.7 |
| ***Total gecekondu area*** | **2427** | **2171** | **2487** | **3615** | **2206** | **12906** |

Source: Same as Table 3.1

The distribution of the Improvement Plans according to the different planning strategies used, on the other hand, shows rather interesting figures, and highlights the real intention of the 'improvement' discourse (see Table 3.3). This shows that redevelopment plans constitute the overwhelming bulk of the total plans prepared by the district municipalities

with 61.7%. This ratio is even higher when the proportion of other redevelopment-related plans (i.e., redevelopment/conservation, redevelopment/clearance) are taken into consideration (83.9 %). In Yenimahalle (District 5), for instance, redevelopment and redevelopment-related plans constitute all the Improvement Plans prepared. In fact, such plans can be regarded as 'redevelopment only' plans since the proportion of 'conserved' and 'cleared' areas is almost negligible in the total planned area.

**Table 3.3 Distribution of Improvement Plans According to Different Planning Approaches**

| | | District 1 | District 2 | District 3 | District 4 | District 5 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***Redev.*** | ***area*** | 1416 | 1166 | 1731 | 1506 | 424 | **6243** |
| | *%* | 71.1 | 83.6 | 81.7 | 41.6 | 42.5 | **61.7** |
| ***Consr.*** | ***area*** | - | 96 | - | - | - | **96** |
| | *%* | - | 6.9 | - | - | - | **0.9** |
| ***Redev/*** | ***area*** | - | 133 | - | 1249 | 350 | **1732** |
| ***Cons.*** | *%* | - | 9.5 | - | 34.6 | 35.0 | **17.1** |
| ***Redev/*** | ***area*** | 67 | - | 226 | - | 225 | **518** |
| ***Clear.*** | *%* | 3.4 | - | 10.7 | - | 22.5 | **5.1** |
| ***Revis.*** | ***area*** | 507 | - | 162 | 860 | - | **1529** |
| | *%* | 25.5 | - | 7.6 | 23.8 | - | **15.1** |
| ***Total*** | ***area*** | 1990 | 1395 | 2119 | 3615 | 999 | **10118** |
| | *%* | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | **100.0** |

Source: Same as Table 3.1

Conservation plans on their own were used by only one district municipality and their share (0.7% within the total area) is very small. Contrary to the implementations, however, one might expect that conservation would be the first step through the improvement process and therefore should constitute the most frequent type of the Improvement Plans not the least common one.

Another important figure in Table 3.3 is the share of clearance plans. These plans were not employed on their own by any of the district municipalities, even though there are many gecekondu areas which should be cleared, such as those in geologically unsuitable areas. As can be seen, clearance was used only together with redevelopment and even in combination represented only 4.0% of the total of Improvement Plans.

In short, all these figures in Table 3.3 suggest that Improvement Plans are largely synonymous with redevelopment plans in all district municipalities of Ankara.

## 3.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE IMPROVEMENT PLANS

As I have already shown, the series of laws starting from 1983 and their implementations in the unauthorised part of the housing stock proved to be the most comprehensive one ever experienced. Parallel to this extensive implementation by all district municipalities their repercussions will be expected to be more influential than any other planning decisions of this kind. In this section of the chapter I will evaluate the potential impact of the Improvement Plans. My aim is to discuss the physical, economic, political and cultural implications of the plans and raise some questions which will be answered by the case

studies conducted in two different gecekondu areas. These questions are organised towards the clarification of variations in two different types of transformation and as well as their implications.

### 3.4.1 PHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS

The physical implications of the Improvement Plans could be regarded as the most significant of all. From the very beginning, the overt intention of these plans has been to make improvements in the gecekondu areas. By 'improvement', here, was meant the provision of urban services which are inadequate in such areas. However, as just shown, these Improvement Plans were mostly redevelopment plans which led to drastic physical changes, and this fact made the physical implications of such plans even more important.

One of the most significant changes that these redevelopment-oriented plans will bring about is higher densities since they propose an increase in both population and construction densities. Table 3.4 shows the existing and proposed populations and gross densities (pop/ha) of the gecekondu settlements in each district municipality.

As can be seen from the table, it is proposed that the population of gecekondu settlements will be at least doubled with the implementation of the Improvement Plans. In some cases this means more than a doubling of existing densities. For instance, in District 2 the maximum proposed density is 243 per/ha, whereas maximum existing density for the same district is as small as 89 per/ha.

**Table 3.4 Existing and Proposed Populations and Densities (person/ha) in Gecekondu Areas***

| | Area(ha) (a) | Existing Pop. (b) | Proposed Pop. (c) | Existing Density (b/a) | Proposed Density (c/a) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Dist.1** | 1990 | 250850 | 503580 | 126 | 253 |
| **Dist. 2** | 1395 | 125002 | 336455 | 90 | 263 |
| **Dist. 3** | 2119 | 244881 | 657755 | 116 | 310 |
| **Dist. 4** | 3615 | 322772 | 670036 | 89 | 185 |
| **Dist. 5** | 999 | 236647 | 543829 | 137 | 544 |

Source: Same as Table 3.1

*Existing density refers to the number of person per hectare living in the gecekondu areas before redevelopment. Proposed density shows the same ratio which would be reached after the implementation of Improvement Plans.

These extremely high-density levels were due to the absence of development plans. As mentioned before, development plans were to be prepared by the AMM to guide the district municipalities in the preparation of implementation plans for their own districts. Density decisions, as well as zoning decisions, are laid down in this plan. Obviously, district municipalities took advantage of the absence of such plans in determining density decisions.

An increase in densities on such a scale obviously invites serious physical as well as social problems (eg., inadequate provision of health, educational and recreational facilities, overcrowded living environments, lack of adequate water, electricity and sewage systems etc.). Any attempt to solve them requires improvement of both the quality and quantity of the existing social and physical infrastructure. Such provision, however, means large sums

of extra costs to the municipalities, who often seek to avoid making such investments. Hence, some of the district municipalities are more able to meet these costs than others.

Another important outcome of these density decisions is the new macro-form for the city. The scale of population increase, located mainly in the fringe of the city, in fact, produces a totally different macro-form from that proposed in the Ankara Master Plan for the year 2015. What was proposed in this plan was a "decentralised" macro-form which was argued to be more advantageous than a compact one. As was explained in the previous chapter, by decentralisation, here, is meant the development of sub-centres outside the build-up area which are connected to the city centre by the effective transportation network. The main argument behind this was that the problems which had already accumulated as a result of the existing compact macro-form would be made worse if the same development pattern was followed. Among the problems listed, air pollution took the first position. The others were mainly cost-related, e.g., increased investment spending on the improvement of existing infrastructure and the demolish-build type of redevelopment process. In sum, in order to overcome such problems and to prevent new ones it was argued that the decentralisation of the population was best.

Obviously, the accommodation of additional population in newly redeveloped gecekondu areas will give little chance for the full implementation of this proposal and will make the above mentioned problems more likely. As mentioned before, recognition of this fact led to conflict between the AMM planning department and other five district municipalities. Generally, the AMM planning department held the view that what is planned by the district municipalities could cause adverse effects on

the city's future development. According to their reasoning, the economic and technical impacts of such plans were undesirable and even totally inappropriate. Moreover, they would be irreversible if fully implemented.

In short, as far as the physical implications of the Improvement Plans are concerned our analysis suggests a rather gloomy picture. However, variations in both districts and modes of transformation remain to be discussed in the case studies. What I will try to show in the two case studies is: first, how and to what extent the physical requirements of the newly developing areas were taken into consideration by the two district municipalities concerned while the transformation was taking place; second, I will examine whether the new environments created by the Improvement Plans can really be regarded as an improvement in the gecekondu areas. In this way I will try to demonstrate the differences, if any, between transformation by market mechanism and that by public sector agencies in terms of physical implications. For example, the allocation of public service areas (ie., schools, health centres, green areas), the provision of physical infrastructure etc., in two areas will be examined.

### 3.4.2 ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

The economic implications of the Improvement Plans are, perhaps, the most controversial of all. This is because they mostly take the form of redevelopment plans.

It is generally argued that the economic effects of the Improvement Plans are to facilitate land speculation by gecekondu owners. The previous cases, which had been experienced

during the 1970s in some gecekondu areas, support this argument. However. as discussed in the previous chapter, at that time, the redevelopment of gecekondu areas took place only where there was a need for urban land for the planed development of the city. Some semi-serviced gecekondu areas adjacent to the authorised neighbourhoods served this demand and were redeveloped. Nevertheless, although it was very narrow in its scope, the speculative gains of individual gecekondu owners as well as the developers were considerable.

Today's Improvement Plans, on the other hand, are different and there are some indications that not every gecekondu area or gecekondu owner may see speculative gains. The heterogeneity of the gecekondu areas in terms of location and ownership pattern seem to determine the chance of speculative gain.

Improvement Plans cover almost all parts of the gecekondu areas, no matter where they are. This means that, in the end, all gecekondu owners will get the right to redevelop their plots. Therefore, there will be an over-supply of land which enables developers to make choices among them, and the land will be in locations of different alternatives throughout the city. In other words, the level of rent gap (which emerges as a result of the redevelopment decisions) in different gecekondu areas will be very close to each other. However, this does not necessarily mean that all these areas will redevelop at the same time. Some gecekondu areas will be more attractive to developers than the others. In particular those which are adjacent to the planned areas will be the first ones to be redeveloped while the others will have to wait their turn as the possibility of selling flats in these areas will be much higher than that of those in remote parts of the city. Likewise,

those, which are located in the path of the city's development, have more chance than those in the less desirable areas. In other words, given the high level of rent gap, redevelopment will take place in the areas where the demand for authorised housing is also high.

The ownership pattern of the gecekondu settlements is another factor that affects the redevelopment process. The size of the gecekondu plots differs from very small ones, which are just enough for a small gecekondu to relatively large ones with larger gecekondus and their gardens. Whether a block of flats can be built on the plot depends primarily on its size. Small landowners will have to share a larger plot in order to meet the minimum plot size for redevelopment while owners of bigger plots will not need to do this. The former are obviously a disadvantage when compared with the latter in terms of their bargaining power with the developers.

From the developers' point of view, it seems that the Improvement Plans might bring about more job opportunities. However, it must also be taken into account that the competition among those small-scale developers may force them to compromise for relatively small returns.

On the same issue, the AMM planning department argues that the Improvement Plans are totally unacceptable in economic terms. For them, the Improvement Plans will encourage land speculation and increase the number of small developers in the market, which will probably increase the overall housing costs compared with mass housing production carried out by large-scale public/private developing companies. Improvement of existing

infrastructure also needs large investments which should be considered as an additional cost to the above mentioned ones (The AMM, Improvement Planning Co-ordination Committee Reports, 1989).

Transformation of gecekondu areas will also affect the former gecekondu residents, especially the gecekondu tenants. Some tenant families living in the gecekondus will not be able to afford to live in the newly redeveloped residential areas and will be forced to move to relatively cheaper areas. In other words, the gecekondu owners will have benefited from the process while the tenants will have lost what they had. It could, therefore, be argued that the position of gecekondu owners would be against the gecekondu tenants.

In short, questions such as, 'who is going to be the gainers and who the losers (gecekondu owners or gecekondu tenants or developers or residents outside gecekondu areas or the city as a whole) in the end', remain to be answered in the empirical part. In chapters 5 and 6, I will try to answer them by examining these two interest groups in terms of the benefits they gain from the Improvement Plans in one of the gecekondu areas redeveloped by the developers (19 Mayis). In the second gecekondu area (Dikmen Valley) I will focus on the position of the gecekondu owners vis-à-vis a redevelopment scheme handled by the municipality not by the individual developers. The position of the former gecekondu residents will also be evaluated in the case studies.

### 3.4.3 POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

The political implications of the Improvement Plans can be analysed on two levels: The first one is the effects of the Improvement Plans on the general political attitudes of gecekondu dwellers, and the second one is the changes in local politics due to the implementation of such plans itself.

As was shown in the previous chapter, ever since the early 1960s, acceptance of the gecekondu population as a substantial part of the voters by governments has always influenced policies towards them. Promises about the provision of services and legalisation have been repeated in almost all national and local pre-election campaigns. It can be argued that the response of the gecekondu population to these policies has changed from one of opportunism to a more radical one, while their relatively vulnerable position in the city has been changing towards a more powerful and demanding one. In the early days of gecekondu development, insecurity in the urban economic and physical realm led gecekondu dwellers to side politically with conservative parties. When they started to be more powerful in economic and physical terms their political attitudes started to become more assertive.

Election results after 1960 support this argument (see Table 3.5). During the 1960s, the gecekondu population supported the centre-right Justice Party (JP) as a result of their insecure position. In the next decade, however, their expectations increased parallel to their improved position in urban economic and political domains. In elections held in the

1970s, they continuously supported the centre-left Republican Populist Party (RPP) with the expectation of policies favouring them.

In the 1965 national elections, more than half (52.5%) of the gecekondu population in Ankara supported the JP, however, this ratio gradually decreased to just above one quarter (27.7%) in the 1973 national elections. Parallel to the decrease in the votes of the JP, the RPP increased their support among the gecekondu dwellers in Ankara from 25.8% to 45.9% in the same elections.

**Table 3.5 Party Support in National Elections by Gecekondus in Ankara (%)**

| | 1965 | 1969 | 1973 |
|---|---|---|---|
| ***JP*** | 52.5 | 43.4 | 27.7 |
| ***RPP*** | 25.8 | 30.1 | 45.9 |
| ***Others*** | 21.7 | 26.5 | 26.4 |

Source: Drawn from Danielson and Keles, 1985, pp.107-9

As mentioned earlier, after the military regime (1980-1983), the liberal Motherland Party took office in the 1983 general elections. They immediately launched a new set of legalisation and improvement policies for the gecekondus before the 1984 local elections. This played a major part in shifting gecekondu dwellers from their previous alliances with the RPP. The MP won control of almost all major cities apparently with the help of the gecekondu population as well. In Ankara the MP won control of all district municipalities as well as the AMM. Ironically, in the 1989 local elections, voters, including the

gecekondu population, turned against the MP and voted it out in all the major cities. This time the SDPP came to power in the AMM and other district municipalities in Ankara. This result could be interpreted as irrational behaviour on the part of the gecekondu population, given that it was the MP which had initiated the large-scale legalisation and improvement policy. But it is also possible to argue that this result was mainly due to the fact that people generally were fed up with the centre-right national government, and the local elections provided a chance to show it.

These two different election results, in fact, make it necessary to be more careful in interpreting the political behaviour of the gecekondu population. It would be wrong to conclude that the gecekondu population has always been integrated into the system if their interests are at stake. The opposite, on the other hand, might not be true either, since there is evidence to refuse it. We shall follow up the question of, in which gecekondu areas and under what circumstances the political behaviour of the gecekondu population would change in the case studies in chapters 5 and 6.

The influence of Improvement Plans on local politics appears much more significant. From the beginning of the initiation of the Improvement Plans the issue has attracted a great deal of interest from the gecekondu owners. Since they were well aware of the potential benefits of the implementation of different planning approaches, gecekondu owners put pressure upon the local governments and tried in every possible way to persuade them to choose more profitable redevelopment plans. To have an idea about the extent to which this pressure can be successful in local politics, I quote here from the head of the planning department of the Mamak municipality (District 4). As a professional, rather than a

politician, he explains the situation that he had to face during the preparation of the Improvement Plans as follows:

> 'Among the departments of the municipality we are the one from which local people expect more. Since the gecekondus constitute nearly 85% of total housing stock in our district any issue related to the gecekondu used to attract a great deal of interest. Particularly, when the preparation of Improvement Plans came to the agenda this concern was converted into pressure upon us as a planning department. However, this pressure was not as simple as a small favour that a handful of gecekondu owners ask for themselves. It was, I can say, pretty organised and more effective since the majority of the city councillors are at the same time gecekondu owners. Under these circumstances, no one could escape from considering these demands. We too, in due course of the planning works, had to take them into account and even had to compromise. Having completed the plans is not the end of the story, we have yet another hurdle to be overcome: the AMM planning department. Although we both agree on the negative impacts of the plans on the city's development technically, we have to advocate the plans against this department because of political reasons'[3] (interview with H. Topal, head of the planning department of Mamak Municipality).

Similar political pressure, expressed by the head of the planning department, has been experienced in all other district municipalities to varying degrees. Every planning department had to face the fact that they could not simply ignore such pressure. This made them consider the demands seriously and sometimes make changes in the Improvement Plans. The ratio of revision plans within the total area with Improvement Plans supports this argument. These plans cover 15.9% of the total planned areas. This means that after being announced, some of the plans had been appealed against by gecekondu owners and

[3] As the district municipalities are much more vulnerable to the political pressures from the gecekondu owners, they usually choose to act in favour of them instead of implementing rational and sound policies.

this eventually led to the amendment of 15.9% of total Improvement Plans mostly in favour of gecekondu owners.

In the following chapters I will discuss in detail how such political pressure was successful in two different gecekondu areas. I will also examine whether the mode of transformation made any difference in the realisation of them.

### 3.4.4 CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS

Gecekondu settlements have always been the places where the people from the same town or village and of the same ethnic and religious origin settled together. Much has been written on this issue (Karpat, 1976; Ersoy, 1985; Senyapili, 1987). These studies show that almost all gecekondu settlements retain the characteristics of village life of their inhabitants in terms of cultural and religious customs and traditions. In other words, people living in the gecekondus create a model of their village within the urban areas in social and, to a certain extent, physical terms.

Maintenance of traditional values and life styles provides a sort of *community identity* for its members which, in turn, creates solidarity among them. Solidarity and community identity were very important for the newcomers who were encircled by an alien, if not hostile, environment in the city. It could be argued therefore that, for them, being an Alevi[4]

[4]Alevi is the name for Turks who belonged to the Shi'ite sect of Islam

or a Sunni[5] or a member of a certain town or village means much more than being an outsider in the city.

In addition to its psychological role, this communal life brought many material benefits to its members as well. At the beginning, it played the crucial role in many areas ranging from finding an empty plot and building a gecekondu on it, to finding a job. Most of these would not have been achieved easily without the solidarity among community members. Later on, in most of the gecekondu mahalles, these community ties have been retained by their members, although some characteristic aspect of it disappeared inevitably.

However, with the implementation of the Improvement Plans, most of the residents (ie., gecekondu tenants) in the gecekondu mahalles will be moved from their old mahalles. This will obviously affect the communal life styles of these settlements. In some cases, it might totally destroy it, or in some others these regional and religious customs and traditions might be preserved to a certain degree.

The arrival of new residents to the newly developed apartment blocks will also change the social structure of the area. Characteristics such as education level, employment status, family size etc., of the new residents will be different from those of the old ones. The significance of these differences is important in understanding the new social structure of the residents.

[5]Orthodox Muslims

In the case studies, I will make a comparison between the gecekondu mahalles before and after redevelopment in relation to their life styles and community identities. I will show the extent to which the changes in the environment distorted the life styles of the gecekondu dwellers and their reaction to these changes. The social structure of the new residential areas will also be evaluated. My aim will be to find out whether the characteristics of previous community still exist, and if not, what has replaced it.

## 3.5 CONCLUSION

After the 1983 legislation, municipalities in Ankara devoted their planning efforts mostly to the preparation of Improvement Plans. In the relevant law, Improvement Plans are defined as plans which provide the technical means for the 'improvement' of the gecekondu areas. By improvement is meant the rehabilitation of such areas through the provision of urban services, like roads and public service areas which are otherwise either inadequate or non-existent. The Improvement Plans were also required to follow the existing land-use pattern as much as possible. Total demolition of the gecekondu areas (clearance strategy), in this regard, is seen as a strategy as long as it helps improvement.

In applying the law, however, though different planning strategies could have been employed to bring about the 'improvement' of the gecekondu areas, the large majority took the form of redevelopment plans which covered more than 80% of the total planned area of Ankara.

Immediately after the power shift in the local government from the MP to the SDPP these plans caused controversy between the AMM and the other five district municipalities. The AMM holds the view that the implementation of Improvement Plans as redevelopment plans will bring about physical and economic disaster as far as the city's future development is concerned. Their view is that Improvement Plans should be used as a way of improving gecekondu areas rather than a way of redeveloping them, which in fact enables the implementation of the Ankara 2015 Development Plan. District municipalities, on the other hand, had to advocate their plans against the AMM since they are more open to political pressures from the gecekondu owners. Parallel to this policy they completed a majority of the plans in a very short period of time. By the end of 1992, more than 75% of the total gecekondu areas in Ankara had been planned.

When we look at the implications of these plans it seems that they are inadequate to create healthy living environments since they mostly ignore the improvement of necessary infrastructure. Economically, it can be said that they are inefficient as long as the other housing production alternatives are concerned since they caused land speculation and the dominance of small-scale developers in the housing market. However, these arguments are of varying relevance to the different gecekondu areas depending on their municipality's policies and their location. In this regard, the political and cultural implications of the improvement plans in different gecekondu areas are perhaps the most distinctive ones. Different political attitudes can be observed among the different gecekondu areas during the planning process. The cultural implications, on the other hand, are the most obvious

since the old community structure of the gecekondu areas will inevitably loosen with the displacement of some of the residents by the newcomers as a result of the redevelopment of these areas.

In the following chapters the implementation process of Improvement Plans together with their potential implications outlined above will be discussed in the cases of two different gecekondu areas of Ankara.

# CHAPTER 4:
# GENERAL INTRODUCTION
# TO THE CASE STUDIES

In the previous chapter, I discussed the developments following the 1983 legislation in relation to the gecekondu settlements of Ankara by focusing upon the Improvement Planning experience of the different districts' municipalities. My aim was to give an overall idea as to the circumstances in which these plans were prepared as well as the potential outcomes of their implementations.

The arguments outlined will be evaluated in the next two chapters by examining two different gecekondu settlements from two different districts. The first one is 19 Mayis Mahallesi in Kecioren District, and the second one is Dikmen Valley in Cankaya District. The aim, here, is to show the variations in the way in which these plans were prepared and implemented, and in the implications of these different implementation modes.

Before going any further into the case studies, I will give a brief description of each district in order to provide a base for the further discussions. It is not intended, here, to present a full account of the development of the two districts. Rather, the aim is to outline their socio-economic backgrounds so as to improve our understanding of the

implementation of different redevelopment processes (ie., redevelopment by market actors and by the public sector).

## 4.1 KECIOREN DISTRICT

Kecioren is one of the five administrative districts in Ankara. It covers an area of 7595 ha in the northern part of the city of which gecekondu areas constitute 55% of the total land and has a population of 462 000 (in 1992).. This high ratio is partly due to its location, which extends beyond the planned area, and partly due to the low land prices which reflect the fact that the city's development has not been directed towards it. Therefore, it is mainly a low and lower-middle income residential area (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2).

The planned part of Kecioren has been developed according to the 1957 Uybadin-Yucel Plan, but this part covers only 1795 ha out of the 7595 ha. This plan, as discussed in Chapter 2, was insufficient for the needs of the city in general and in particular failed to anticipate the scale of gecekondu development. Hence, it underestimated demand for urban land in Kecioren as well as in other districts where the built-up area extended beyond the municipal boundary of Ankara at that time.

The problems of the planned part of the district have accumulated at the same time as those of the unplanned part of the district. The municipality of Ankara tried to solve the problems of this part of the city either by making exceptions to the plan or by making some modifications to it as it did in many other areas. However, these efforts were

Figure 4.1 Distribution of Income Groups in Ankara 1970




Source: Ankara 1985'den 2015'e. 1986. p.167

Figure 4.2 Distribution of Income Groups in Ankara, 1980




Source: Ankara 1985'den 2015'e, 1986, p;168

piecemeal and failed to yield any solution due to the well-known lack of financial, political and legislative measures.

According to one report prepared by the Planning Department of Kecioren Municipality the 1957 plan contained a lot of inappropriate decisions and in addition made it difficult to plan the adjacent parts too. Planners in the Planning Department of the municipality blame this plan for the lack of green areas and a designated commercial centre, and for the inefficient transportation system in the district. Any attempt to overcome such problems, according to the same report, would require a revision of plans and a large sum of money for expropriation which could be spent on many other things (Kecioren Belediyesi, 1989, p.4).

The first gecekondus emerged in the district in the early 1960s on unclaimed public and private land. By the end of the 1970s, mostly through illegal subdivision, the planned part of the district was literally surrounded by gecekondu mahalles.

In 1984, Kecioren, together with the other administrative districts, became a separate municipality under the control of the Liberal MP. Since then, all the planning activities as well as the other municipal duties have been carried out by the Kecioren municipality itself. The Planning Department of the municipality is responsible for both the revision of the 1957 plan and preparation of the Improvement Plans. After the 1989 local elections, the SDPP came to the power in Kecioren municipality. However, as we will see, this did not change the general policy concerning the preparation of Improvement Plans. In fact, the planners who initiated the Improvement Plans when the MP was in

power did not change either, although the head of the Planning Department was replaced.

In short, it can be concluded that Kecioren is one of the many low and lower-middle residential districts which experienced long-standing problems of chronic underprovision of urban services in general and housing in particular (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4).

## 4.2 CANKAYA DISTRICT

Cankaya is located in the south of Ankara, which has been the most prestigious part of the city since the early days of the republic. In the first plan (1932) the southern part of the city was proposed as the main urban development corridor. During the implementation of this plan, due to increasing land speculation, middle-income groups were forced to solve their housing needs outside the planned part of the city through housing co-operatives, leaving the planned areas to the upper-income groups. Even in those days, Cankaya was the most expensive part of the city in terms of land and housing prices.

It continued to develop as a prestigious part of the city, and most of the important public buildings (i.e. the Residence of the President, the National Assembly, most of the ministries, embassies and so on) were built in the area. By the late 1960s and 1970s, the area had become the most favoured part of the city for higher-income groups. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of income groups in Ankara in 1970. As can be seen, the

highest three income groups are mainly located in Cankaya district, even though some of the upper-middle income groups could still be seen in other districts (i.e. Yenimahalle and Kecioren). In the mid-1970s, private housing companies (i.e. OR-AN and MESA) aiming at producing housing units for the upper-income groups were also active in the district. This not only attracted more higher-income families to the area but also led to increased land and housing prices.

But the fact of being the most prestigious part of the city could not prevent the area from being invaded by the gecekondus. As in all peripheral parts of the city, gecekondus started to mushroom in Cankaya as well. As Figures 4.1 and 4.2 clearly show the highest and lowest income groups started to live side by side in the Cankaya area.

Parallel to the increasing land prices in the planned part of the district, land held by the gecekondu owners (either invaded or possessed through illegal subdivisions/'shared title deeds') became very attractive and valuable too. In view of the increasing demand for urban land in the district some parts of these gecekondu areas were planned by the municipality and converted into authorised housing districts by small-scale developers.

By 1980, segregation between income groups had become more clear-cut in Ankara (see Figure 4.2). The contrast between the south and north parts of the city was particularly apparent. The highest two income groups located in Cankaya together with most of the upper-middle income groups, leaving northern parts of the city to the lower income groups. During the 1980s, the government launched new policies to encourage

the production of rental housing for public sector employees whose housing problems had been getting worse for years. Some of these new housing areas were developed in the Cankaya district. Their targeted income groups were, however, middle and upper-middle income groups. In the late 1980s, two more housing developments, one for deputies and the other for diplomats based in Ankara, were built in the area which made an additional contribution to its reputation as the most prestigious part of the city.

In sum, Cankaya has always been the 'shop-window' of Ankara, which almost everybody longs to live in. The existence of gecekondus, therefore, created more discontent among the residents as well as the authorities than in any other district, since they were regarded as out of place in the district (see Figure 4.4).

## 4.3 ABOUT THE CASE STUDY AREAS

With this background information about the districts in mind, I will now discuss the case study areas and the reasons for their selection. A detailed examination of these gecekondu settlements, as well as their development history, however, will be postponed until the relevant chapters.

The first gecekondu area, 19 Mayis, is one of the 43 mahalles in the Kecioren district. Some part of it had been included in the 1957 plan and, hence, developed as an authorised housing area. The first gecekondus emerged in the mahalle at the beginning of the 1960s, just next to this authorised housing area. It continued its growth and development until the early 1970s. By the end of the 1970s, it was a

well-established gecekondu area in Ankara and had all urban infrastructural facilities. It was chosen among the other gecekondu areas in Kecioren District as a case study area because of its physical location. It was adjacent to the planned/authorised part of the district and, therefore, was one of the first areas in which Improvement Plans were prepared, and where transformation by apartment buildings occurred.

The second case study area, Dikmen Valley, is situated in the middle of Cankaya district. It is surrounded by the authorised housing areas. It stretches between the upper-income residential areas (such as housing estates for deputies and diplomats) and the city centre. It has been designated as a green area in all the development plans prepared for the city. However, this did not prevent the emergence of the first gecekondus in the Valley in the early 1960s. When the implementation of Improvement Plans came onto the agenda, it was the unique example of the transformation carried out by the public sector, although this was followed by some other projects in Cankaya District. Its first phase had been completed at the time of the survey, and, it was therefore, included in the study as an example of this type of transformation.

In the following chapters the arguments outlined in Chapter 3 in relation to the Improvement Plans will be discussed and the variations in implementation of these plans between different districts and different municipalities will be shown.

Figure 4.3 Views from a typical gecekondu area in Ankara

Figure 4.4 A view from an authorised residential area in the Kecioren District

Figure 4.5 Views from an upper-middle income residential area in the Cankaya District

# CHAPTER 5:

# TRANSFORMATION BY MARKET FORCES:

# THE CASE OF 19 MAYIS MAHALLESI

## 5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I present the first of two case studies and examine the most common type of transformation experienced by almost all gecekondu areas: transformation by market forces. My aim is to provide a more detailed picture about what I have already discussed in general in relation to the implementation of Improvement Plans. By 'market forces' here is meant a type of spatial transformation without any public intervention except for plan preparation. To be more precise, it is a type of transformation where redevelopment of the gecekondu areas is carried out by private developers according to the current situation of the market.

In the following sections, I evaluate the implementation of Improvement Plans in one of the district municipalities, Kecioren Municipality, and discuss this type of transformation

process in one of its gecekondu settlements, 19 Mayis. The first section is devoted to the analysis of the role of the Kecioren municipality in relation to the improvement plans. In the second section, the whole process of both the implementation of the Improvement Plans and the transformation by market forces is discussed with reference to the experiences of 19 Mayis. Implications of this type of transformation are examined in the last section.

## 5.2 THE CASE OF KECIOREN DISTRICT

### 5.2.1 THE IMPROVEMENT PLANNING PROCESS IN THE KECIOREN MUNICIPALITY

Since the establishment of the Kecioren Municipality in 1984 the main job of its planning department has been the preparation of the Improvement Plans. As a response to pressure from the gecekondu owners, 1508 ha. of the gecekondu area had been planned by the year 1989, a figure which rose to 2119 ha. by the end of 1992. 18 gecekondu mahalles had been planned by the end of 1992.

Throughout this planning process the municipality faced several difficulties. The main obstacle at the beginning was the lack of development plans necessary for the successful implementation plans, including Improvement Plans. As mentioned before, according to Metropolitan Municipality Law (no. 3030) development plans (scale 1:5000) and implementation plans (scale 1:1000) are to be prepared by the metropolitan municipality and the district municipalities respectively. However, when the preparation of the Improvement Plans came on to the agenda no development plans were ready to guide the

Improvement Plans either for Kecioren or for the other districts. The absence of such plans made the situation more complicated for the planning department which had to complete the Improvement Plans in a very short period of time. In the report by the Kecioren Planning Department this problem was identified as the reason for piecemeal and eclectic planning:

> 'According to the Metropolitan Municipality Law, development plans should have been prepared by the AMM. The lack of these plans made it necessary for all of the district municipalities to prepare their own development plans which were, to a certain extent, essential for the Improvement Plans. We, too, decided to prepare our own development plans when we launched Improvement Planning works. However, we had to abandon this since the completion of Improvement Plans took priority. As a result, plans became eclectic which would not have been the case if we had development plans beforehand' (ibid, p.12).

In addition to this major problem, the limited number of planners and other technical staff who were carrying out the planning works was another difficulty. As a result of this not all of the plans could be completed by the planning department of the municipality. Intensified demand for plans made it necessary to contract out some of them to private planning bureaus, although these plans had been checked by the planning department in order to maintain consistency among them. They admit that this included making revisions to them (ibid, p.14).

Nevertheless, none of such problems proved to be serious obstacles that would cause any delay in the preparation of the Improvement Plans. In one way or another, with or without development plans or enough planners, planning works went ahead.

In general, Improvement Plans were interpreted by the municipality as a tool for transforming the gecekondu areas into regular housing districts (i.e. residential areas with multi-storey apartment blocks). Within this general policy, redevelopment has been accepted as a main planning strategy. As it was stated in the report by the Kecioren Municipality Planning Department, during the planning process the municipality took the gecekondu owners' opinions into account through the mediation of muhtars (ibid, p.13). As one of the planners from the Planning Department put it, 'it would not be wrong to argue that the demand of gecekondu owners, by and large, dictated the main planning policies for the Municipality' (interview with G. Kara).

Consequently, redevelopment policy was encouraged and implemented by 'arranging the building plot sizes ranging between 400-800 $m^2$ and giving building permission up to 3-4 storeys which was thought to bring speculative gains to the owner and therefore to accelerate the redevelopment process' (ibid, p.13). Obviously, by the application of this plot size (which should be 400 $m^2$ at minimum) together with 3-4 storey building permission, it was made attractive for the private developers to invest in such redevelopment schemes.

It is quite interesting that the planning department of the municipality, who consider themselves very different from the politicians, admits that the pressures from the gecekondu owners were the main obstacle to their preparation of 'proper' plans by which they meant less dense housing areas provided by all necessary public service areas (i.e.,

areas for parks, schools, health services, etc.) at adequate levels. They maintain that '35%[1] of the expropriation without any payments allowed by the law could not be implemented everywhere. For instance, in one of the districts this ratio remained at 25%, obviously leaving the mahalle short of social service areas' (ibid, p.19). Table 5.1 shows the minimum required for social services and the areas actually allocated in one of the mahalles which were listed by the same report to emphasise the above mentioned problems.

**Table 5.1 Minimum Required and Actually Allocated Social Service Areas in One Mahalle (mahalle no.1)**

| | minimum $m^2$/person | total required area | allocated area |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nursery | 0.7 | 17360 | 1620 |
| Primary sch. | 2.5 | 62000 | 18280 |
| Secondary sch. | 1.8 | 44640 | - |
| High sch. | 2.0 | 49600 | - |
| Green areas | 7.0 | 173600 | 18040 |
| Health | 0.5 | 12400 | - |
| Socio-cultural | 0.8 | 19840 | 2090 |
| Administrative | 0.6 | 14880 | 16770 |
| Commercial | 1.7 | 42160 | - |

Source: ibid, p.18/i

The crucial point in this example is that the areas for health, educational and commercial facilities were totally ignored by the plan. The other service areas, on the other hand, remained much below the standards required by that size of the population (24 800 in this case). For instance, the total green areas were only 18040 $m^2$ whereas it should have been

[1] As discussed in Chapter 3, this ratio is the maximum amount of land, determined by the law, that could be expropriated by the municipalities without any payments to the owner to be used for the public service areas.

173600 $m^2$. Only the area for administrative uses was more than required indicating that the municipality had been biased for its own needs.

In addition to these deficiencies relating to the availability of services, the changed social composition of the area created by the plans was also a matter of concern to the planning department. In the same report, emphasis was placed upon the blight of gecekondu tenants who would be replaced by better-off families after the redevelopment process, and the need for a policy and action for these families was urged. However, the Planning Department had no measures changing this.

As mentioned before, after the completion of the Improvement Plan for an area it was exhibited to the public to give an opportunity for legal appeals. Again in the same report it was pointed out that the number of appeals for the rearrangement of the plots to the municipality was quite high (ibid, pp. 14-15). The fact that the Improvement Plan took away individual private plots and replaced them by shares of jointly owned plots constituted the major source of complaints, since almost every single gecekondu owner wanted to have a private building plot or at least to share a plot with someone they knew.

When the planning department finished all the revisions, the technical application of the plan was made by the map engineers. For the municipality, this technical implementation meant an extra financial burden since it had to be contracted out to the private engineering bureaus. This was due to the scale of the job and the deadline which was far beyond the capacity of the planning department in the municipality. Its total estimated cost to the municipality was 1 billion TL (around £500 000). It was agreed, however, with the private

bureaus, to pay the first half on signing the contract and the rest when the job had been finished. This enabled the municipality to consider the above mentioned formal complaints from the gecekondu owners and to make alterations accordingly.

In short, Improvement Plans were the long-awaited answer to the expectations of the gecekondu owners; and Kecioren municipality, like others, tried to meet these expectations as fully and as quickly as possible. At the beginning, the bargaining power of the gecekondu owners played the most important role in the selection of the planning strategy, namely redevelopment. None of the technical problems could prevent the Improvement Plans from being completed and neither did the change of political power at the municipal level. At each stage of the planning process, demands from the gecekondu owners have perceived one of the main criterion in achieving a successful plan and considered seriously whenever possible, although this would cause irreversible problems.

In this context, the role of the planners was subsumed to bring these demands to life by preparing Improvement Plans accordingly. The position of councillors were also important in this process: 'They acted as interest groups in their own rights. Although only six of them were gecekondu owners themselves; the others were also in favour of the gecekondu owners' (interview with G. Kara). In the plan preparation process, therefore, it can be argued that political preferences were much more significant than any other concern (i.e., environmental, social etc.).

## 5.3 19 MAYIS MAHALLESI

In this section I will discuss the transformation of gecekondu areas by market forces by examining the experience of one of the gecekondu settlements, namely, 19 Mayis Mahallesi. First, I will give a very brief account of the historical development of the mahalle, before I discuss the spatial, economic, political and cultural implications of the plans in this particular gecekondu area..

### 5.3.1 HISTORY OF THE MAHALLE

19 Mayis is one of the 43 mahalles in Kecioren. Some part of it developed according to the 1957 plan. However, in the early 1960s, the first gecekondus emerged in the mahalle adjacent to this authorised part.

The general tendency for people to live close to their relatives or friends or to people from the same town or of the same religious origin among the newcomers was practiced in this particular gecekondu area at that time as well. The residents originated mostly from eastern Turkey, from Malatya and Sivas, and from the Alevi sect, and came to the area through the internal networks of their community. In the early stages of gecekondu development, this regional and religious closeness among the community provided some sort of solidarity amongst its members. It helped people in finding plots, cheap labour and construction materials.

The story of gecekondu development in this mahalle is not different from that of many others. The first gecekondus were constructed on the edges of the planned part being unaware of the fact that the land was not publicly owned. When the owner, who was from Ankara, found out that his land was invaded by the gecekondus, he concluded that to sell it to the gecekondu owners was the most sensible decision and he did so. In an interview with the grandson of one of the owners of these first gecekondus, who was a policeman then, he told the story of these early days as follows:

> 'A fellow-countryman had helped my grandfather to find this plot. Together with the others, who were also from our hometown, Malatya, they had finished a room in one night and moved into it. Later they had carried out construction of the additional rooms and other parts. Those who had helped him in construction had also built their own gecekondus in a nearby area by the same way. At the beginning, they didn't know that the land belonged to someone; they thought it was public. When the owner realised that the gecekondus had been built on it, he had decided to sell it in order to settle the matter. After negotiations, they fixed the price and agreed to pay it in instalments over three years' (interview with A. R. Oktay).

Among those first settlers, there was a civil servant as well. He, too, found his plot with the help of his friends who also arranged a builder for him. His experience of the construction of his gecekondu is as follows:

> 'Since I was a full-time state employee I could not help the construction, but my wife and my son went to the construction site every single day. After [our house was] being demolished by the authorities, they stayed there over night as well. When it was convenient to live in, we all moved into it. Construction, however, continued for a long time'[2] (interview with M. Sengul).

[2]This is a common practice among the gecekondu owners. After having completed one or two rooms they move into it, but construction of the other parts continues parallel to the improvement in their household budgets.

Obviously, there were no urban services of any kind either physical or social at that time. People had to carry water for daily use from a nearby fountain; pits were dug for domestic sewage and so on. However, this had changed gradually while the gecekondus were being consolidated.

The Gecekondu Beautification Association of 19 Mayis Mahallesi was established in 1963 to solve the problems of the mahalle, and it played an important role in the provision of services. In the foundation period, the first residents of the mahalle were the leaders. M. Sengul together with I. Oktay led the other few to establish the Beautification Association of Danisment Vineyards (the name of the mahalle at that time). They assumed leadership positions and initiated the campaigns for provision of services. Those few founders, however, did not possess any position of religious authority. The religious leader of the community, named *dede* (grandfather) among Alevis, belonged to another family. In other words, the community leaders were those who advocated integration into city life, not those who identified themselves with the Alevi tradition[3].

This association organised the community members in making demands from the municipality for the provision of water supply, a sewage system and electricity in 1965. As the leader of the association puts it:

> 'After the establishment I. Oktay and I took the leadership positions. We were meeting regularly with the other members of the community, mostly in my house, to discuss the problems of our mahalle. The lack of a water supply and sewage system was

[3]Karpat observed similar things in terms of community and religious leadership in his study in one of the gecekondu mahalles of Istanbul (Karpat, 1976).

> the main sources of concern. We decided to make an application to the municipality for their provision. But we knew that a simple application would not have amounted to more than a place in the waiting list among the other applications. We raised some money from the community, which was not too much, and arranged the people who would voluntarily work when they were needed. We took our plan to the municipality. After some negotiations, they accepted to supply the pipes for the sewage. Our residents together with the municipal workers constructed the system in 1965' (interview with M. Sengul).

Water supply and electricity were also achieved through this association in 1966 and 1967 respectively. In the provision of those services, however, the community neither raised money nor participated in the construction work. They put pressure on the municipality through written requests and meetings. As I show later in the chapter, the close relationship with the Republican People's Party (RPP) also played an important role in the provision of these services. After the completion of the provision of these services, the association dissolved itself. Nevertheless, later on, this tradition of acting together for the community remained.

The construction of new gecekondus in the area continued until the early 1970s. By the late 1970s, 19 Mayis had become one of the well-established gecekondu mahalles in the district.

## 5.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE IMPROVEMENT PLANS IN THE MAHALLE

The Improvement Plan for 19 Mayis Mahallesi was completed and approved in July 1988 (Figure 5.1). After formal complaints from the gecekondu owners about the plan

Figure 5.3 Improvement Plan for 19 Mayis



decisions, it was revised by the municipality within a year, and the final version of the plan was approved in August 1989 and put into implementation. Immediately after this, the transformation of gecekondus into apartment blocks had started. By December 1992, almost 20% of the total area had been redeveloped and new blocks were being constructed. One year later, by December 1993, more than 30% of the whole mahalle had been redeveloped together with roads and other public areas (i.e., parks, open market area, etc.). The redevelopment of the whole area had been completed at the end of 1995 (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3).

In the following parts, I will discuss the implications of the transformation carried out according to the market mechanism in the mahalle. The aims are to analyse the newly emerging neighbourhood in terms of its physical/environmental, economic, political, cultural characteristics and to make a comparison, whenever possible, between past and present. The discussion in this part is based upon interviews with developers, planners and local politicians and questionnaires which were completed by the previous gecekondu owners and the new residents.

### 5.4.1 PHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS

As in all other gecekondu mahalles in the district, the Improvement Plan of 19 Mayis Mahallesi is, in fact, a redevelopment plan. It covers an area of 641982 $m^2$ (nearly 65 ha) for new building-plots as well as for the public service areas (see Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.2 19 Mayis during the redevelopment

Figure 5.3 19 Mayis after the redevelopment

Immediately after the approval of the plan the apartment blocks started to be built one after the other and the new physical fabric of the mahalle began to be clear. It was no longer a low-rise, low-density residential area. Instead, with most blocks at least four storeys high it was being converted into one of the highest density residential areas. The allocation of land between different uses proposed by the Improvement Plan backs this rough observation (see Table 5.2).

**Table 5.2 Land-Use in 19 Mayis**

| | Area (ha) | % |
|---|---|---|
| *Housing* | 50.5 | 69.6 |
| *Green Areas* | 4.0 | 5.5 |
| *Education* | 1.4 | 2.1 |
| *Religious* | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| *Roads* | 16.3 | 22.5 |
| ***TOTAL*** | **71.4** | **100.0** |

Source: Kecioren Belediyesi Imar Dairesi Raporu

As can be seen from Table 5.2, green areas constitute only 5.5% of the total planned area. If the previous situation of the mahalle (where almost all of the houses used to have their own gardens) is taken into the consideration, it wouldn't be wrong to judge that the newly emerging neighbourhood, as one of the old residents puts it, will be one of those *cement*

*piles*[4]. The areas for housing and roads, on the other hand, take the largest two shares in the plan, with 69.6% and 22.5% respectively, which are, in fact, two main preconditions of redevelopment.

As mentioned before, in the whole area 4 storeys was accepted as a maximum for the redevelopment of the gecekondus by the Planning Department of the Kecioren Municipality. This means at least four times increase in population of the area. Public service areas are expected to be increased proportionally to the additional population but this does not seem to be the case. When we compare the proposed population of the mahalle, which is 25 000, with the actually allocated public service areas, it becomes more clear that these areas are far from being adequate.

Table 5.3 shows the minimum required public service areas for that size of population and the area actually allocated by the Improvement Plan for 19 Mayis. These standards are the minimum legal figures for the urban social service areas which are imposed by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing.

As Table 5.3 indicates, there is no space either for health or for administrative facilities or even for a small shopping centre. The need for secondary and high schools were also ignored. Similarly, green areas are also inadequate, less than one quarter of what is really needed by that size of population (4 ha. instead of 17.5 ha.).

[4]A Turkish expression which is used to describe the high density built-up areas with a very small proportion of green areas, similar to 'concrete jungle'.

**Table 5.3 Minimum Required and Actually Allocated Social Service Areas in 19 Mayis**

| | *Min. Req. $m^2$/person* | *Total Req. Area $m^2$* | *Actual Allocation Area $m^2$* |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Nursery* | 0.7 | 17 500 | - |
| *Primary Sch.* | 2.5 | 62 500 | 14 775 |
| Secondary Sch. | 1.8 | 45 000 | - |
| *High Sch.* | 2.0 | 50 000 | - |
| *Green Areas* | 7.0 | 175 000 | 40 000 |
| *Health* | 0.5 | 12 500 | - |
| *Soc. Cultrl.* | 0.8 | 20 000 | 2 550 |
| *Administrative* | 0.6 | 15 000 | - |
| *Commercial* | 1.7 | 42 500 | - |

Source: Drawn from minimum required standards and previous table

The infrastructure situation, except for roads, is no better than that of public areas. Sewage, water and electricity supply systems, which have been operating since the 1960s are now being used for the new physical structure of the mahalle. Nothing has been done to improve it so far, and nothing has been planned for the future either. It might not be wrong to predict that, when the whole redevelopment process is completed, the existing infrastructure will be even more inadequate. The power cuts, which started to happen in the newly developed part of the area due to the failure in the cable system of the electricity network, support this prediction.

The changing spatial characteristics of the mahalle gives rise to a great deal of concern, even from the former gecekondu owners who have benefited most from the redevelopment decisions. Asked about the new spatial and environmental quality of the mahalle 92% (23 out of 25) of the residents surveyed (who lived in the area before the redevelopment) stated that it is becoming more dense and that there will be a lack of enough green areas, whereas only 8% (2 out of 25) stated that it is going to be better. However, almost all of the respondents (96%) acknowledged the improved housing conditions compared with the previous gecekondus (19 Mayis survey).

When we look at the physical characteristics of the newly built apartment blocks however, we can hardly agree that they are much better than the gecekondus. High technology and mass-production materials such as ready-made concrete blocks, which are the essentials of the industrial type of housing production were not used by these small-scale developers. Instead the building method used for most of the apartments are slightly better than building gecekondus. The most striking characteristics of these blocks is the relatively low quality of construction materials that were used. Financial limitations of the developers are the main reason behind this. Most of them lack modern comfort as well. For instance, in the survey sample, only 1 (out of 19) apartment blocks had a central-heating system, the rest relied on traditional heating methods (e.g. coal or wood stows).

Most of the buildings (12 out of 19) have 8-16 flats, although it is still possible to find 26 flats in one block. The number of the flats per floor ranges between 2 and 4, depending on the plot size. Most of the flats (82.3%) are 90-100 $m^2$, which is enough for at least 2 separate bedrooms, 11.7% are less than 90 $m^2$, whereas only 6% are bigger than 100 $m^2$.

These figures show better standards than the previous gecekondus since most of the gecekondus were around 60-70 $m^2$ with at most two bedrooms.

Since the construction ratio[5] per plot is high (0.65), all the apartment blocks have very small gardens which are not functional for any kind of use except car parking.

In short, it can be argued that the Improvement Plan for 19 Mayis fits very well into the purpose of the redevelopment of gecekondus, but not as much to the improvement of the mahalle since the plan provides only the construction of new apartment blocks not adequate public facilities. As I have already shown, the Improvement Plan for the gecekondu area did not bring any substantial improvement to the mahalle. So far, some new roads have been opened and others have been widened. All the other indications (i.e., lack of public service areas, high-density decisions etc.) back the idea that the environment, which is being created in place of the gecekondus, will not be better than the previous one as far as the spatial quality of the area is concerned.

### 5.4.2 ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

The plan decisions that allowed redevelopment of the gecekondu areas encouraged the speculative expectations of both gecekondu owners and developers in the area. These two constitute the main interest groups who are directly affected by the Improvement Plan especially during the implementation period. In what follows firstly, I will discuss these

[5]This ratio is determined by the Improvement Plan and defines how much of the total building plot can be used for construction.

two interest groups in relation to the economic implications of the plan implementation. Secondly, I will focus on the newly developed residential area. Here, new residents of the mahalle, owners and tenants in the new flats, will be examined separately in order to be able to define the new economic characteristics of the area.

#### 5.4.2.1 During the redevelopment

As mentioned before, with the preparation of the Improvement Plans, a rent gap has emerged in all gecekondu areas in the district. However, since 19 Mayis was adjacent to the planned part, there was also a substantial demand for apartment block development in the area. This accelerated the redevelopment process in the area, and it was one of the first to be redeveloped among the others with similar rent gap levels. In fact, even before the approval of the plan by the municipality, informal negotiations between gecekondu owners and developers had already begun, and immediately after approval, construction work started.

The usual procedure for redeveloping a building-plot is for the owner to make contact with a developer. Once this has been done, then comes the negotiation stage in which the terms of agreement are settled. At this stage, landowners usually choose to give up their plots in return for one or more of the new flats. If no agreement can be reached in these negotiations, gecekondu owners try out developers until they find the one who will accept their terms. When the deal has been settled between the two parties, a legal document is produced which is signed by both of them. In this document the terms of agreement (i.e. the proportion of flats to be given to the landowner, the duration of the construction and

some other things specified by the both sides) are identified as a guarantee of the agreement.

In 19 Mayis, the value of the building-plot amounts roughly to between 30-50% of the total value of the apartment block, depending on the location of the plot and the number of the shareholders of the plot. The payment to the landowners is generally made by allocating ownership of the flats in the new apartment block. In some cases, a certain amount of money is added as well. This amount is less than the market price of a flat and used as a middle-solution when the two parts cannot agree on the number of flats they claim. Table 5.4 shows the distribution of 'exchange rates' in relation to the number of shareholders. This term is used for describing the gecekondu owners' share in the newly developed apartment blocks in return for their land. An exchange rate of 45%, for instance, means that the owner of the plot (or shareholders of the plot) will have the 45% of the total flats in the new apartment block.

**Table 5.4 Distribution of the Exchange Rates by Number of Shareholders of the Building Plot**

| *num. of shareholders* | *25-29%* | *30-34%* | *35-39%* | *40-50%* | *50%+* | *Total* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *1* | 1 | - | - | 3 | - | 4 |
| *2* | - | 1 | 2 | 6 | - | 9 |
| *3* | - | 1 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 10 |
| *4* | - | - | 1 | 2 | - | 3 |
| *4+* | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| ***Total*** | **1** | **2** | **4** | **18** | **1** | **26** |

Source: 19 Mayis Survey

As can be seen from the table, exchange rates between 40-50% constitute the majority of agreements. This shows the extent of the bargaining power of the gecekondu owners. However, it should also be pointed out that only 3 of these redevelopment cases (out of 18) have one shareholder. The remaining 15 have to share this rate with the other gecekondu owner(s) who have a share in the same plot. In the case where there are 4 shareholders, for instance, this reduces to 10-12% for each individual shareholder. In an apartment block with 10 flats, this means only one flat per shareholder. But these two examples can be accepted as extreme cases for the area, since most of the building-plots have 2 or 3 shareholders. This means a typical figure of 2 or 3 flats for each shareholder which in fact satisfies their expectations.

Most of the people whose plot was under construction were preparing to move into one of the new flat(s) and to give the other(s) to their children, if they needed it, or to rent it out. Others, whose plots had already been redeveloped at that time, were living in the new flats. None of those who were asked if they had any plan to move to another mahalle or district in Ankara answered that they had no intention to do so. They had no plan to make any investment with the capital that they would make out of this redevelopment (by selling their flats) either.

The other main interest group acting in the redevelopment process is the private developers. In 19 Mayis, the private developers carrying out the construction are all small-scale businessmen who operate on a local basis. They usually build 1 apartment block per year. More than half of the developers interviewed (10 out of 18) were the people who live in the either same or nearby area.

For all of the developers interviewed in the area (18 in total) the method used to acquire land for apartment block building was to make a deal with the landowners. In other words, none of them were working on a plot that they had owned or bought beforehand. In this way, these small-scale developers avoided tying up money in land in advance of construction.

During the construction period, developers raised money for their expenditures from two other sources: their own funds, and advance payments by the house buyers. In this context, it is important to point out that none of the developers used bank loans. Advance payments by the house buyers constituted the main source of their credit. 58.4% of total housing units that they owned (73 out of 125) had been sold either before or during the construction. This made it easier for them to carry out construction. Few of them, only 5 developers, had some other construction-related businesses such as construction material wholesaling.

The technology used in the construction also shows the extent of their financial abilities. All the developers use traditional construction methods rather than using modern ones such as tunnel moulds. These technologies cannot compete with the traditional construction methods which usually involve using cheap labour power. In all construction sites, developers pay minimum wages to their employees, except for few building masters who were paid more.

All the developers agreed that after the Improvement Plans their business showed a remarkable improvement. In fact, 8 of the developers (out of 18) who were interviewed

had entered the business in Kecioren after the Improvement Plans were completed. However, they also emphasised that the terms of construction had been getting gradually worse for them since 1989. The average exchange rate in return for the building-plot was around 35% at that time, but later this ratio has reached to 45-50% and the landowners were pressing to get even more. As mentioned before, this indicates the increasing bargaining power of the gecekondu owners in an area where the demand for authorised development is also increasing.

#### 5.4.2.2 After the redevelopment

19 Mayis, like many other gecekondu areas, was a lower-middle and low-income residential area. Tenants constituted the majority of low-income families whereas most of the gecekondu owners were mainly from the lower-middle income group. However, our survey shows that 19 Mayis is being converted into a middle-income residential area, despite the fact that owners fit this category much more than the tenants. Table 5.5 gives the previous location of the current residents of the mahalle to give an idea about the people who chose to live in the area.

Half of the residents (26 out of 51) are from outside the neighbourhood. They were mostly from other neighbourhoods of the Kecioren District who could afford the housing prices or rent in the area.

**Table 5.5 Previous Location of the Current Residents**

| | owners | tenants | total |
|---|---|---|---|
| In the same neighbourhood Before Redevelopment | 18 | 7 | 25 |
| In the same District (Kecioren) | 9 | 13 | 22 |
| In another District | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Outside Ankara | 1 | - | 1 |
| TOTAL | 30 | 21 | 51 |

Source: 19 Mayıs Survey

Table 5.6 summarises the income structure of the families at the time of the survey. It supports the above mentioned idea that 19 Mayis is becoming predominantly a middle-income residential area. It should be noted that in December 1993, when the survey was conducted, the legal minimum wage was 1.56 million TL/month.

**Table 5.6 Income Structure (in million TL/month, December 1993)**

| | owners | tenants | total |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Total Household Income* | 7.56 | 6.08 | 6.72 |
| *Per Capita Household Inc.* | 2.22 | 1.50 | 1.89 |
| *Male Income* | 6.12 | 5.40 | 5.78 |
| *Female Income* | 3.71 | - | 3.71 |

Source: 19 Mayis survey

As far as the average total household income is concerned, which is 7.56 million TL/month for owners and 6.08 million TL/month for tenants, owners and tenants do not show any significant difference. However, per capita household income indicates that owners are more than 40% better off than the tenants, by 2.22 million TL/month to 1.5 million TL/month. This is because the size of tenant households is larger than that of the owners.

Table 5.6 also demonstrates some important points about female employment in the area. While none of the females in tenant households work, in paid work only few women do in owners households (7 out of 30). In fact, those who work earn a considerably lower income than their partners (3.71 million TL/month compared to 6.12 million TL/month). This feature, however, is not peculiar to this area and reflects the general characteristics of the female employment pattern among the less educated, middle-income families where the males are still regarded as the main breadwinner.

Table 5.7 shows the employment structure of 19 Mayis by tenure group. Here, four main employment categories (i.e. worker, civil servant, self-employed, pensioner) are given. Among these categories, self-employment takes the first place, with 41.2% of total respondents. Civil servants and workers follow this with 23.5% and 19.6% respectively. These two figures indicate that total number of persons in 'paid jobs' (workers and civil servants) in fact, constitutes the highest proportion, compared to self-employment (43.1% to 41.2%).

Similar patterns can be observed in each tenure group. Self-employment is again highest among both owners and tenants (43.3% and 38.1% respectively). The types of occupation in self-employment consist in a number of small-to-medium scale jobs. Owners occupy relatively larger scale ones, which sometimes requires employing a few people, such as running a bakery or a coffee house and selling fresh fruits and vegetables at open markets. Most of the self-employed tenants, on the other hand, work as taxi drivers or as craftsmen in small shops.

**Table 5.7 Employment Status by Tenure (Head of Households)**

| | owners | | tenants | | total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| *Worker* | 5 | 16.7 | 5 | 23.8 | 10 | 19.6 |
| *Civil Servants* | 6 | 20.0 | 6 | 28.5 | 12 | 23.5 |
| *Self Employed* | 13 | 43.3 | 8 | 38.1 | 21 | 41.2 |
| *Pensioner (worker)* | 1 | 3.3 | 1 | 4.8 | 2 | 3.9 |
| *Pensioner (civil serv.)* | 5 | 16.7 | 1 | 4.8 | 6 | 11.8 |
| **Total** | **30** | **100.0** | **21** | **100.0** | **51** | **100.0** |

Source: 19 Mayis Survey

Civil servants and workers come second and third after self-employment in both tenure groups. The proportion of civil servants is 20.0% for owners compared with 28.5% for tenants. Workers constitute 16.7% and 23.8%, owners and tenants respectively. Another significant point in Table 5.7 is that owners have a higher proportion of pensioners (20.0% to 9.6). The fairly considerable lump-sum retirement payments, which are the biggest

opportunity to become a homeowner for most of the middle-income families, play an important role in this higher proportion.

19 Mayis, together with the other redeveloping gecekondu areas, offers cheaper alternatives to potential home buyers than most of the already developed authorised parts of the city. When the owners were asked what was their main reason for buying a home was from this particular neighbourhood, 19 out of 23 said that fair prices together with other reasons attracted them[6].

Owners were also asked about the sources of capital used for buying the flats. Savings of the family throughout the years, which have been mostly invested in gold and foreign currency, seem to be the main source of finance (see Table 5.8).

**Table 5.8 How People Became Flat Owners**

| | # | % |
|---|---|---|
| *1. By Purchase:* | | |
| *a. family savings* | 12 | 40.0 |
| *b. lump-sum retirement payments* | 6 | 20.0 |
| *c. bank credits* | 1 | 3.3 |
| *2. Exchange of plot share* | 7 | 23.4 |
| *3. Acquired from parents* | 4 | 13.3 |
| ***Total*** | **30** | **100.0** |

Source: 19 Mayis survey

[6]Since this question was asked only to those who actually bought their homes, but not to those who exchanged them in turn for their redevelopment rights, the total number remains at 23.

40% (12 out of 30) stated that they used only family savings as an initial capital (3 of the 12 had also borrowed money from close relatives). 20% said that lump-sum retirement payments were the main source even though they had to add family savings to it . Only one owner used bank credits again in addition to his personal savings. 7 of the total owners were previous land owners who did not need to pay anything for their new flats. In the survey sample, there were also 4 owners who acquired their flats from their parents (who were the land owners before) without any payment.

Available data also suggests that newly emerging neighbourhood offered reasonable alternatives to the middle-income tenants, but not much to those who used to live in gecekondus as tenants. Since the monthly rents for the new flats are much higher than the rents for gecekondus, most of the low-income tenants could no longer afford it. For this reason, in the survey there were only 7 tenant households (out of 21) who had lived in one of the gecekondus as tenants.

All of the tenants declared that, besides other things, relatively low rents in the area drew them to 19 Mayis. The average rent in the survey area was 1 640 000 TL/month. At the time of the survey the average rent for newly developed, same-size flats in Cankaya district, for instance, was between 4 500 000-5 500 000 TL/month[7]. On average, tenant households pay 26.9% of their total households' income in rent.

As Table 5.9 shows one-third of the tenants pay 21-30% of their income in rent, whereas 23.8% and 28.5% pay 15-20% and 31-40% of their incomes in rent respectively. There

[7] *Hurriyet Gazetesi*, 23 December 1993

was only one tenant in each of the 41-50% and 51-60% rent:income ratio groups which was highly exceptional for the study area.

**Table 5.9 Rent: Income Ratios**

| % of income paid in rent | # | % |
|---|---|---|
| *15-20* | 5 | 23.8 |
| *21-30* | 7 | 33.3 |
| *31-40* | 6 | 28.5 |
| *41-50* | 1 | 4.7 |
| *51-60* | 1 | 4.7 |
| ***Total*** | **21** | **100.0** |

Source: 19 Mayis survey

In sum, with the implementation of the Improvement Plans it seems that previous gecekondu owners and the developers alike benefited most from the redevelopment process. Gecekondu owners became owners of at least 2 new flats, and developers had an opportunity to expand their operating area and consequently to make profit out of it. After redevelopment, on the other hand, it became clear that the real losers had been the previous gecekondu tenants, who mostly could not afford to live in the same area any more.

### 5.4.3 POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Since the establishment of the mahalle, residents have always supported left-wing parties. Traditionally, Alevis in Turkey have always been more democratic and radical than any other ethnic or religious group. In this context, it could be argued that their religious origin played an important role in this support.

During the 1960s and the 1970s the RPP benefited from the support of Alevis at the national level, and this particular gecekondu area was no exception in this regard. Local branches of the RPP were established in the late 1960s in the area and many of the community members joined the party and took an active role in its organisation. One of those activists, in fact, was selected as a Member of Parliament in the 1983 elections by the centre-left People's Party and became Minister of Justice in the 1991 coalition government. He lived in his gecekondu until 1987 and then moved to an apartment in the same mahalle where he is still living.

In the decades of the second generation, the RPP was not radical enough in terms of its political agenda. During the 1970s, 19 Mayis and its neighbouring mahalles became one of the places where left-wing youth organisations became established. Unlike the first generation, their demands were more radical and aimed at changing the political and economic system in favour of the poor. In fact, as in other areas, they were repressed by the military regime in the 1980-1983 period.

In both the 1983 general and 1984 local elections residents of the mahalle supported the centre-left Populist Party (PP), the successor of the RPP. To a certain extent, this caused them to be discriminated against by the MP-controlled municipality in distribution of some municipal services. For instance, while the number of bus services were increased and the new buses were put into service in other areas nothing had been done for this part of the district.

However, in the preparation of the Improvement Plans, this did not happen. The municipality started the planning process of this area at the same time as the others. People living in the area did not alienate themselves from the municipality, even though they did not vote for it. For example, during the planning process they tried to affect the municipality's planning decisions. In fact, all of the previous gecekondu owners, when I asked about this issue, admitted that they kept in touch with the MP municipal administration during the 1984-1989 period in order to have better plans for their area.

This high interest in politics and particularly in local politics was mainly due to their vulnerable position *vis-à-vis* the authorities. Their dependence on the municipality for urban services also played an important role in this high level of interest in politics. However, after redevelopment this characteristic of the mahalle had started to change. Survey data indicates a diminishing interest in politics among the residents.

Table 5.10 shows the degree of interest in local politics among the residents. As seen from the table, owners and tenants show a similar pattern of interest. Those who gave the

answer that they are interested in local politics constitute 63.5% of the total respondents. However, despite this high ratio, none of them were members of any political party or local organisation. By 'being interested in local politics' they just mean being aware of what is happening in their neighbourhood. However, before redevelopment most of the people living in 19 Mayis were the members of the centre-left RPP, and the party had an office there.

**Table 5. 10 Interest in Local Politics**

| | owners | | tenants | | total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| *Interested in* | 17 | 57.1 | 15 | 67.8 | 32 | 63.5 |
| *Not interested in* | 7 | 23.8 | 3 | 16.1 | 10 | 19.2 |
| *Didn't answer* | 6 | 19.1 | 3 | 16.1 | 9 | 17.3 |
| ***Total*** | **30** | **100.00** | **21** | **100.00** | **51** | **100.00** |

Source: 19 Mayis Survey

Initiation of the Improvement Plans by the MP did not affect the traditional voting behaviour of the mahalle. In the next local elections held in 1989, they again supported the SDPP (successor of the PP). In Table 5.11, the party support of the residents of the mahalle in 1989 local elections is given.

As can be seen from Table 5.11, the old residents of the mahalle who answered the question (24 out of 25) in the survey overwhelmingly supported the SDPP in the 1989

local elections. 83.3% of the total respondents who lived in the same area before redevelopment stated that they voted for the SDPP. The liberal MP who initiated the Improvement Plans for the gecekondus took second place by 12.5%, and the centre-right True Path Party (TPP) came in third place. But nobody declared that they had voted either for the Islamic fundamentalist Welfare Party (WP) or for the Democratic Left Party (DLP).

**Table 5.11 Reported Party Support in 1989 Local Elections by Residents Who Previously Lived in the 19 Mayis**

| | # | % |
|---|---|---|
| *DLP* | - | 0.0 |
| *MP* | 3 | 12.5 |
| *SDPP* | 20 | 83.3 |
| *TPP* | 1 | 4.2 |
| *WP* | - | 0.0 |
| ***Total*** | **24** | **100.0** |

Source: 19 Mayis survey

When we look at the distribution of votes in the same elections among all the current residents (including those who were not living in the same mahalle at that time) we can see the effect of the arrival of new residents more clearly (see Table 5.12).

**Table 5.12 Reported Party Support in 1989 Local Elections by Current Residents**

| | # | % |
|---|---|---|
| *DLP* | 1 | 2.8 |
| *MP* | 5 | 13.9 |
| *SDPP* | 22 | 61.1 |
| *TPP* | 7 | 19.4 |
| *WP* | 1 | 2.8 |
| ***Total*** | **36** | **100.0** |

Source: 19 Mayis Survey

Of the total respondents who answered the question (36 out of 51), 61.1% voted for the SDPP in 1989, which is considerably less compared with the 83.3% figure for old residents. The TPP and MP took second and third places with 19.4% and 13.9% respectively (those two parties had only been supported by 4.2% and 12.5%4 of the old residents). Another difference between the two tables is that the WP has gained some votes from the new residents which is extremely unusual for that neighbourhood even though it was negligible. This is important as it shows the degree of loosening political unity among the residents after redevelopment.

The respondents were also asked for their voting intentions at the local elections to be held in March 1994. Table 5.13 gives a further idea about the political views of the mahalle.

**Table 5.13 Expected Voting in the March 1994 Local Elections by the Current Residents**

| | # | % |
|---|---|---|
| *DLP* | 3 | 8.3 |
| *MP* | 2 | 5.6 |
| *SDPP* | 14 | 38.9 |
| *TPP* | 2 | 5.6 |
| *WP* | 5 | 13.9 |
| *Haven't decided* | 10 | 27.7 |
| ***Total*** | **36** | **100.0** |

Source: 19 Mayis survey

Of the total respondents only 38.9% pronounced that they were definitely going to vote for the SDPP. Another 8.3% said that their votes were for the DLP, making the total centre-left votes 47.2%. In line with the general unease with the SDPP municipalities all over the country, the SDPP lost support in this particular neighbourhood too. 5 of the 10 respondents, who had not decided at that time, declared that they were going to vote for Melih Gokcek, no matter which party's candidate he was going to be. This support was mainly due to the fact that he was the mayor of the Kecioren municipality from the MP between 1984-1989, when the preparation of Improvement Plans was launched. In fact, Melih Gokcek became the WP's candidate for the mayor of the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality and was elected to this post in the March 1994 local elections.

When we compared the 1989 (during the preparation of Improvement Plans) and 1994 (after the implementation of the Improvement Plans) local election preferences, it was clear that support for the centre-left parties (DLP and SDPP) had dramatically decreased from 63.9% to 47.2%. Centre-right MP and TPP had also lost their supports from the residents of the area. The real change was experienced in the votes for the Islamic fundamentalist WP, who managed to increase its support in the area from 2.8% to 13.9%. In fact, when we add those who declared that they would vote for M. Gokcek, this figure reaches 27.7%.

In short, these figures show to what extent redevelopment could cause change in the political behaviour of the whole mahalle, which used to be one of the centre-left strongholds.

### 5.4.4 CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS

As mentioned before, the people living in the 19 Mayis settlement were mostly from the same region and had the same religious origin. From the very beginning, these two features have shaped the communal identity of the mahalle. People living there identified themselves as a member of the Alevi and the Malatya or Sivas community.

However, it could be argued that religious origin was the dominant identity rather than regional identity. For instance, the people from other regions were also Alevi. Historically, Alevis have always been discriminated against, if not oppressed, by the Sunni majority. In

that sense, to live within an Alevi community provided a sort of security for most of people in the mahalle who suffered from discrimination and oppression in their lives.

In the early days, this communal identity created solidarity among them and helped the establishment of the mahalle in physical and social terms. Later on, during the consolidation period, again it provided a basis for the community to act together. For instance, community identity and solidarity were crucial in the provision of services where both financial and labour participation were needed.

In this section I will show that this social and cultural closeness started to weaken with the arrival of new residents and the departure of some old ones. The family structure and educational characteristics of the mahalle were also altered after redevelopment. In the following part these three, demographic characteristics, family structure and education, together with the new life style in the apartment buildings will be discussed based on the survey.

#### 5.4.4.1 Demographic Characteristics

When we look at the place of origin of the new residents who had migrated to Ankara we can easily observe the degree of diversity. Cities like Sivas and Malatya are no longer the main places of origin as they were before. New ones have been added to the list, such as Konya, Corum (central Anatolian cities) and Erzurum, Erzincan (eastern Anatolian cities) preventing any clear majority in favour of either of them.

Similarly, the ethnic and religious origin of the residents shows no sign of dominance among any group. Before redevelopment, 19 Mayis was known as an Alevi neighbourhood. However, as Table 5.14 shows, this is no longer the case.

**Table 5.14 Religious Sects**

| | owners | | tenants | | total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| *Alevi* | 14 | 46.6 | 4 | 19.1 | 18 | 35.3 |
| *Sunni* | 5 | 16.7 | 8 | 38.1 | 13 | 25.5 |
| *Didn't answer* | 11 | 36.7 | 9 | 42.8 | 20 | 39.2[8] |
| ***Total*** | **30** | **100.0** | **21** | **100.0** | **51** | **100.0** |

Source: 19 Mayis survey

The percentage of Alevis among the owners is more than double that of tenants among those who gave their religion. This is partly due to the higher ratio of owners who lived in the same mahalle before and partly due to the willingness of previous gecekondu owners to sell their surplus flats to the Alevis. The latter argument could also apply to those renting out the flats, but among the other criteria sought by owners, religious sect comes after income level, number of children and the like. In addition, the tenants are considered as temporary residents of the mahalle rather than permanent ones. As a result, the number of Sunni families among the tenants is twice as great as the number of Alevi families.

[8]They, to a certain extent, can be counted as Sunni, since they might be the ones who wouldn't wish to declare their religious identity openly in an area which used to be known as Alevi neighbourhood.

In sum, as the total figures indicate, the number of Alevi and Sunni families, which are 18 and 13 respectively, make it hard to suggest that the newly emerging neighbourhood is one of the Alevi neighbourhoods as it was before.

#### 5.4.4.2 Family Structure

The family structure of the current residents, which is also essential to understand the patterns of their social life, shows similarities between the different tenure groups. As Table 5.15 shows, both owners and tenants have similar family sizes (4.25 for owners and 4.28 for tenants).

**Table 5.15 Family Structure by Tenure**

| | Owners | Tenants | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Family Size* | 4.25 | 4.28 | 4.09 |
| *Number of Children* | 2.52 | 2.05 | 2.30 |
| *Age-Male (Head of Household)* | 42.30 | 36.80 | 39.90 |
| *Age-Female (wife)* | 38.10 | 33.20 | 36.10 |

Source: 19 Mayis survey

Tenant households, however, have slightly fewer children than owners (2.05 compared to 2.52). They are also younger than the owners. Among the males, tenant heads are 5.5

years younger than owners. Similarly women (wives) in tenant families are 4.9 years older than their owner counterparts.

These figures support the general tendency among the average middle-income families that they become homeowners at later ages unless they inherit their house. In 19 Mayis too, most of the homeowners are in their late 40s or early 50s. Only 4 out of 30 homeowners were under 35 and all of them have got their flats from their parents who were gecekondu owners before.

#### 5.4.4.3 Education

In terms of education, families show sharp differences according to gender as well as tenure (see Tables 5.16, 17, and 18).

**Table 5. 16 Education by Gender**

| | Male | | Female | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % |
| *Literate* | 2 | 4.2 | 13 | 25.5 |
| *Primary School* | 25 | 48.0 | 20 | 39.2 |
| *Secondary School* | 7 | 14.6 | 5 | 9.8 |
| *High School* | 14 | 27.0 | 10 | 19.6 |
| *Higher Education* | 3 | 6.2 | 3 | 5.9 |
| ***Total*** | **51** | **100.0** | **51** | **100.00** |

Source: 19 Mayis Survey

Of all women, a quarter is just literate and nearly 40% have got only a primary school certificate. These ratios are very low, especially when taking into account that primary school education is compulsory in Turkey. Those two figures altogether constitute 64.7% of total women, indicating that the vast majority of wives are unskilled and poorly educated.

The parallel proportions for males, on the other hand, are 4.2% and 48% respectively. The proportion of women who have got a high school or higher education degree is 25.5%, whereas 33.2% of men have got the same degrees.

Between the tenure groups, however, there are some differences in relation to gender (see Tables 5.17 and 5.18).

**Table 5.17 Education by Gender (owners)**

| | Male | | Female | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % |
| *Literate* | 2 | 7.2 | 10 | 32.3 |
| *Primary School* | 14 | 46.4 | 10 | 32.3 |
| *Secondary School* | 4 | 14.2 | 2 | 6.4 |
| *High School* | 8 | 25.0 | 5 | 19.3 |
| *Higher Education* | 2 | 7.2 | 3 | 9.7 |
| ***Total*** | **30** | **100.0** | **30** | **100.0** |

Source: 19 Mayis Survey

**Table 5.18 Education by Gender (tenants)**

| | Male | | Female | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % |
| *Literate* | 0 | 0.0 | 3 | 15.0 |
| *Primary School* | 10 | 50.0 | 10 | 50.0 |
| *Secondary School* | 3 | 15.0 | 3 | 15.0 |
| *High School* | 6 | 30.0 | 5 | 20.0 |
| *Higher Education* | 2 | 5.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| ***Total*** | **21** | **100.0** | **21** | **100.0** |

Source: 19 Mayis Survey

Among the owners, 64.6% of females are either literate or have a primary school certificate, whereas among tenants this figure remains as low as 20%. The proportion of high school or higher education degree holders in different tenure groups, on the other hand, shows similar distribution according to gender. For men, the figures are 32.2% and 35.0% in owner and tenant families respectively. For women, however, it is 29.0% among the owners and 20.0% among the tenants.

These figures suggest that the two different tenure groups are very similar to each other in terms of their educational features, patterns which are, in fact, closely related to their economic situation.

#### 5.4.4.4 Life in the Apartment Building

Another important change stated by the respondents is the changing pattern of relationships among neighbours after redevelopment. As mentioned before, solidarity among the gecekondu dwellers was one of the main characteristics of the mahalle. More importantly, for most of them it was crucial first for settling down in a new environment and later for becoming integrated into it. However, this close relationship among the gecekondu dwellers seems to be loosening. Old residents of the mahalle call this new way of life the "apartment type of living", distinguishing its formality and lack of friendship from the gecekondu times. When asked about which one (gecekondu or apartment) they prefer, almost all of them admitted that they would like to live in gecekondus, as far as the quality of relationships amongst the neighbours is concerned. In an extended interview, one of those old residents, expressed her concern about the new relationships with her neighbours as follows:

> 'The whole mahalle was like an extended family when we were living in gecekondus. Everybody used to do favours for each other whenever it was needed. These favours could be anything from borrowing small items or even money, to baby-sitting or helping children in their schoolwork. We used to spend our spare time together with our neighbours day and night. We didn't need to make arrangements beforehand for women-only gatherings. Now we make phone calls next door for the same purpose. Unlike today, in those days everything was quite informal and more friendly. Men were also very close to each other even though they were out at work during the day. They used to help each other, and whenever it was necessary to do something relating to the mahalle they used to act together. Now, my husband, for instance, doesn't even know the names of most of the neighbours living in this apartment' (interview with Fatma Kucuk).

Ratios for meeting-frequency with neighbours back this argument. Among the total female respondents, 42.3% meet their neighbours once-a-week which requires a notice beforehand. 23.1% stated that they met their neighbours twice a month or less with the same formal arrangements. Only 34.6% said that they meet almost everyday without any formal arrangements. When it is taken into account that the vast majority of them are housewives with relatively more spare time for such occasions (i.e. meeting with neighbours) closer relationships would be expected[9].

Men, on the other hand, are less likely to meet with their neighbours unless it is really necessary. One of the respondents who has been living in the same mahalle since 1964 commented about his new relation with other neighbours as follows:

> 'We, together with the other neighbours, built this mahalle out of nothing. If we had not acted together we wouldn't have achieved what we have got today. But now everybody is so selfish, nobody cares for anybody else. For instance, it took several weeks for me to find somebody from my own apartment to mend the roof. Since they are not living on the top floor, they don't bother with what is happening when it rains' (interview with Bektas Aktas).

These two opinions summarise the new life-style in the neighbourhood very well and make clear that most of the residents who lived in the area before the redevelopment have not got used to it yet. It seems that, for most of them, community relations will never be the same again as they used to be.

---

[9]Ayata and Ayata, in their household surveys in Ankara, observed that meeting frequency with neighbours are much higher in the gecekondu areas than that of middle or upper-middle income residential areas. According to their survey, three quartes of the respondents in the Zafertepe gecekondu area stated that they visited their neighbours everyday, whereas in Oran (an upper-income residential area) once-a-week constituted the majority of answers (Ayata and Ayata, 1996).

## 5.5 CONCLUSION

In this chapter the transformation of a gecekondu area guided by market mechanisms has been discussed. In this context, 19 Mayis provided a good case for the study as it has been transformed very rapidly. Its location, in a low and middle-income residential area, Kecioren, also made a contribution to showing how the transformation could be handled in such an area by private developers.

By following 1983 legislation, the Kecioren municipality prepared the Improvement Plan for 19 Mayis and other gecekondu areas in the district. This plan, as gecekondu owners hoped, was a redevelopment plan, and immediately after approval by the municipality implementation was started. From that point on, everything related to the plan implementation was left to the initiatives of the gecekondu owners and the deals between them and private developers. This was, however, hardly unexpected for the gecekondu owners. In fact, in line with common practice, they would not expect any other way of redeveloping their plots.

With the implementation of the Improvement Plan, not only has the physical fabric of 19 Mayis changed, but the economic, social and political features of the neighbourhood have also been affected.

Since public services were not allocated as much space as required the district started to become one of the densest residential areas. People living in the area are also aware of this

declining environmental quality, even though most of them stated that they were quite happy with their new flats.

As the redevelopment process was left in the hands of the small-scale developers, the outcome, as expected widely, turned out to be an 'authorised' lower-middle and middle-income residential area. The physical characteristics of the new blocks indicate that they are relatively low in quality and therefore offer cheaper alternatives to the potential homebuyers and tenants.

In economic terms, at the end of the redevelopment process, gecekondu owners and private developers became the most advantageous among the other interest groups involved. Previous tenants of the mahalle, in this regard, were the worst victim of the whole process as they no longer could afford to live in the same area.

The income and employment structure of the residents support the idea that it is now mostly for the above mentioned income groups and not for either the low-income or upper-middle income groups. The former cannot afford to live in the area, while the latter prefer to live in better areas where the environmental and housing qualities are higher.

Social and cultural divisions among the new residents are another change brought about by redevelopment. People from different places of origin and from different religious sects have loosened the community ties from which the old residents both enjoyed and benefited before.

In line with these divisions, political choices of the residents have also become differentiated. Beside the general disinterest in local politics, people were no longer strong supporters of the left-wing parties as it was expected from any of the Alevi-dominated communities. More surprisingly, there were people who openly declared that they support the Islamic fundamentalists, which was highly exceptional for the area before the transformation.

# CHAPTER 6:
# TRANSFORMATION BY PUBLIC SECTOR:
# THE CASE OF DIKMEN VALLEY

## 6.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I will discuss the second type of Improvement Planning which was implemented in another district municipality of Ankara, namely Cankaya. This example is different from the previous case in the way in which such plans are interpreted and implemented. In one particular gecekondu area in Cankaya district, Dikmen Valley, the implementation as well as the preparation of the Improvement Plan has been carried out by the municipality itself, rather than by the 'market mechanisms' as was the case in 19 Mayis.

The chapter first gives a brief account of the Improvement Planning works of Cankaya municipality in order to give a general background to implementation of the Dikmen Valley Project. Then, in the second section, special emphasis is put on the Dikmen Valley gecekondu area where the whole redevelopment process has been handled by the municipality. In this section, the whole process of plan preparation and

implementation in the Valley is evaluated. The third and main section of the chapter discusses the spatial, economic, political and cultural implications of this type of improvement planning.

## 6.2 THE CASE OF CANKAYA DISTRICT:

### 6.2.1 THE IMPROVEMENT PLANNING PROCESS IN THE CANKAYA MUNICIPALITY

The initiation of the Improvement Planning works in Cankaya municipality, as in other municipalities of Ankara, dates back to 1987 when the MP was in power. It can be argued that, in preparing these plans Cankaya municipality followed a similar pattern to other district municipalities.

By the time of the 1989 local elections, nearly one-third of the total gecekondu areas (1309 ha. out of 2171 ha.) had already been planned by the Motherland Party (MP) municipality. In the following period, after the Social Democrat Populist Party (SDPP) came to office, preparation of the Improvement Plans continued since the matter had been highly politicised by then. However, the initial momentum slowed down. In 1990 and 1991 none of the gecekondu areas were planned by the new municipality. But, 150 ha. of the Dikmen Valley Project was being completed.

Unlike the majority of district municipalities, Cankaya municipality also implemented a so-called 'two-phase' approach to redevelopment in some gecekondu areas. In this approach, which was used by only two district municipalities, namely Cankaya and Yenimahalle, in the first phase the municipality only reorganises ownership rights and

issues new title deeds, but does not prepare any plan at all. In the second phase, gecekondu owners collectively are expected to submit an agreed redevelopment plan proposal to the municipality, which is then finalised by the planning department and approved by the council. This type of planning approach has been employed in 11 gecekondu areas in Cankaya, which constitutes more than one-third of the total planned areas for the 'redevelopment' type in Cankaya.

In short, Cankaya municipality, together with other municipalities, was quick in responding to the expectations of the gecekondu owners by preparing Improvement Plans. Since a confrontation with gecekondu owners is not something which the municipality can afford to risk, the vast majority of plans have been completed in a short period of time. However, in some cases, semi-finished two-phase plans have also been implemented as a middle solution to both gecekondu owners' expectations and the municipality's obligations towards these expectations. This type of planning was employed by the municipality as a way of controlling urban development in the district where the speculative gains would be the highest in the city. From the gecekondu owners' point of view these plans, in fact, only secure their ownership rights unless they act together for the preparation of a redevelopment plan.

In this way, the municipality could prevent both the immediate redevelopments of the gecekondu areas and political pressure, to a certain extent, that gecekondu owners would have otherwise exerted since it is very unlikely that all the gecekondu owners in the area will act together and prepare a redevelopment plan which satisfies all. In fact,

by 1992, none of these gecekondu areas designated for two-phased Improvement Plans could propose an Improvement Plan for their area[1].

After this brief summary of Improvement Planning works of the Cankaya Municipality, we now will focus on the redevelopment process of Dikmen Valley gecekondu area.

## 6.3 DIKMEN VALLEY

### 6.3.1 PLANNING HISTORY OF THE VALLEY

Dikmen Valley is situated in the middle of Cankaya district between two densely populated authorised housing areas. It is one of the valleys in the south of the city, which extends towards the city centre (Figure 6.1).

In the first plan prepared for Ankara during the 1930s, the Jansen Plan, the Dikmen area was excluded like many other places in the vicinity of the then city centre. In the Uybadin-Yucel Plan (1957), the Dikmen area together with its neighbouring areas were designated as a housing areas, but Dikmen Valley, like the other valleys, was proposed as one of the green areas in the southern part of Ankara. However, during the implementation of this plan nothing was done related to this 'green area' decision.

[1] Cankaya Belediyesi Calisma Raporu, 1990-1991, p. 35

Figure 6.1 Location of the Valley




Source: Dikmen Valley, Housing and Environmental Development Project Report, no date, p.6

As a result, the first gecekondus started to be built in the Valley in the early 1960s in the false hope that a petty-industrial area was to be developed there. The 'pioneer' wave of families invaded the public land which was available at that time in the Valley. However, in the later stages, during the 1970s, land had to be bought by the newcomers.[2]

The rapid gecekondu development in the Valley made the implementation of the 1957 plan decisions even more difficult. When this plan was ratified in 1982, Dikmen Valley was again proposed as a green area despite the existence of a large number of gecekondus. By that time, Dikmen Valley had already become one of the biggest gecekondu areas of Ankara with some 2 000 dwellings.

Based upon this revised plan, the 'Dikmen Valley Green Area Project' was prepared and approved by the city council of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality in 1986[3]. Immediately afterwards, Cankaya municipality attempted to implement it. However, it quickly became obvious that this project was unrealistic, since it did not take account of the 2000 well-established gecekondu dwellings in the area and their legal position after the 1985 Gecekondu Amnesty Law. As a result, the project was fiercely resisted by gecekondu owners who put pressure on the local authorities to stop the plan. They even appealed to the Prime Minister as well. Consequently, after negotiations, they succeeded in getting the implementation of the project suspended.

---

[2]Interview with T. Bilgen, one of the earliest residents of the Valley.

Until 1989, none of the planning decisions related to the Valley could be implemented. The main reason for the constant failure to implement the plan was the ever-increasing number of gecekondus being built in the Valley. To avoid political and economic repercussions no planning decisions could be implemented, especially ones which required either expropriation or the evacuation of huge tracts of land.

In 1989, the SDPP won the local elections in Cankaya as it did in all the other districts of the city and the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality. This power shift from the liberal MP to the SDPP was believed, by the Planning Department of the AMM, to be an opportunity to implement the Ankara Structural Plan for the year 2015 which was prepared in 1987. As mentioned before, soon after the elections, the planning team who prepared the Ankara 2015 plan, started to act as an advisory body to the AMM, and one of its fellow planners was appointed as the head of the AMM Planning Department.

As discussed earlier, this plan basically aimed at reducing the high density within the built-up areas by creating decentralised new settlements and by creating green corridors whenever possible within the existing built-up areas. In this context, Dikmen Valley was thought to provide one of the green corridors, which extend from the *green belt* (also proposed by the Ankara 2015 plan), into the city centre, by the AMM Planning Department who actively took part in the preparation of the Ankara 2015 Plan.

---

[3]This was a development plan (1/5000 scale) which the AMM was responsible for its preparation. Implementation plan based on it (1/100 scale), on the other hand, was under the responsibility of the Cankaya municipality.

### 6.3.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF A SPECIFIC IMPROVEMENT PLAN IN THE VALLEY

When the Improvement Planning works were launched for all gecekondu areas in the district, Cankaya municipality acted rather reluctantly in the case of the Dikmen Valley. One of the reasons for this was the contradiction between the existing Dikmen Valley Green Area Plan decisions and the existence of gecekondu occupants with newly acquired ownership rights. In addition to this problem, it was both politically and economically unsatisfactory. Firstly, it proposed clearance of all the gecekondus existing in the area which was obviously not to the liking of gecekondu owners. Secondly, it also required large sums of money for the expropriation of land from gecekondu owners most of whom became legal owners of land after the 1985 legislation.

The main reason, however, for not preparing an Improvement Plan for the Valley was the peculiarity of the area in spatial and economic terms. As mentioned before, the Dikmen Valley gecekondu area was located between two authorised housing areas in Cankaya, where the land and housing prices are some of the highest in the city. In this sense, it was unique, in spatial/physical terms, among the other gecekondu areas, most of which were located in the peripheries of the city. This made Cankaya municipality rule out the option of preparing a standard Improvement Plan. In this way, I will argue, the municipality took the initiative to restrict the potential speculative gains of the gecekondu owners, and increase its own shares.

The initial decision to launch a large-scale and special project rather than an Improvement Plan, which could tackle the complicated legal situation of some 2000 gecekondu dwellings in the area, meant that it had to be handled by the Cankaya municipality together with the AMM. Soon after, studies were launched towards preparing a redevelopment project for the Valley, which would satisfy gecekondu owners as well as the municipality. For this purpose, a special company, the Metropolitan Development Corporation (MDC), was appointed as the responsible body for the project which was named the Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project.

The reason why they use the MDC was mainly economic. The intentions of the both municipalities (the AMM and Cankaya Municipality) were to be in charge of the whole process starting from plan preparation to redevelopment. Only in this way could they guarantee the gains of the municipality and that of the private firms who would take part in the redevelopment process. Otherwise, redevelopment could have taken place in the hands of the gecekondu owners and small-scale private developers, which brings nothing profitable to the municipality.

Before going any further in the examination of this special Improvement Plan, I will first briefly review the aims and activities of the MDC.

#### 6.3.2.1 Metropolitan Development Corporation

The MDC was founded in 1986 by the AMM and the other eight district municipalities (i.e. Altindag, Cankaya, Kecioren, Mamak, Yenimahalle, Sincan, Etimesgut and Golbasi). Its board of directors consists of the mayors of these eight district municipalities and it is chaired by the mayor of the AMM. At that time, the company was mainly involved with housing production and its name was the Housing Development Corporation. After 1989 with the appointment of new mayors, the functions of the company were reassessed and widened and it was renamed. Form a report produced by the MDC its main aims are listed as follows:

> '- to direct the results of the urbanisation process in Turkey towards the creation of contemporary urban environments
> -to be a leader in high quality construction in newly formed urban areas and in the *transformation of existing ones*
> -to search for, develop and implement solutions that reflect the contemporary level in planning, architecture and environmental disciplines in organisations for all kinds of urban functions.
> -to develop creative projects which bring exemplary solutions to the *implementation of laws and regulations in rapid transfer of all valuable resources to rational uses to reduce the housing deficit*
> -to serve all bodies acting in these fields, including municipalities, public authorities, co-operatives etc.' (report published by the MDC, no date, my emphasis).

These rather wide-ranging aims in fact focus on one main issue: the production of mass housing. The MDC claims to deal with every single requirement of this complex process from planning to finance and production. Within the framework of those services the MDC has undertaken major housing, transportation and other development projects in Ankara and as well as a neighbouring city (i.e. Eskisehir). Among these projects held in Ankara mass-housing projects in the so-called 'west-corridor'

development area took the major part of its activities. In all these projects, the MDC has prepared architectural and engineering designs and in some of them has acted as a developer and/or as an organisation and finance consultant. The Dikmen Valley Housing Development and Environmental Project, however, has been the most comprehensive one ever undertaken by the company.

Currently 345 staff are employed in the MDC. 41 of them work in the planning and design department, 197 in the technical section and 107 in the finance and administration department.

#### 6.3.2.2 Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project

In accordance with Ankara 2015 plan decisions and the granting of new ownership rights to gecekondu owners under the 1985 Gecekondu Amnesty Law, the Dikmen Valley gecekondu area was reassessed, and preparation of a special redevelopment project was launched by the MDC in late 1989. Omer Kiral, then head of the MDC, explains how the final decision was taken by the MDC and the municipality as follows:

> '...In short Dikmen Valley was both unsafe, in physical terms, and unhealthy. The housing problem of the people in the Valley took the first priority and we tried to solve this problem. Preparation of an improvement plan, which would propose the conservation of the area at most, was among the alternatives. However, immediately it appeared that this was not possible because of the geological and topographical peculiarities of the area. On the other hand, Ankara 2015 was proposing the Valley to be kept as a green area. We discussed the transformation of the Valley into a housing area but decided that this would be contradictory with the plan decision. In the end, we agreed on keeping the Valley as a green area and launching a housing

> program for the inhabitants of the Valley' (*Yapi*, May 1992, pp.69-70).

After making the final decision, the MDC started to implement this special redevelopment project from which both gecekondu owners and the municipality were expected to benefit. In the following part I will examine the Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project (hereafter Dikmen Valley Project) in terms of its objectives, main technical features and implementation process.

***Objectives of the Dikmen Valley Project:***

Redevelopment, in a special way or not, was the only course available to the MDC, since its untold aim was to create an investment opportunity for the private construction firms and also to make a profit from the redevelopment process through the sales of the flats and shopping units. In a report published by the MDC the prime objectives of the project are stated as follows:

> '-To create a green corridor running into central areas through which air can circulate... To make a significant contribution towards the elimination of the inadequacy of open green spaces in Ankara.
> -To provide a cultural, recreational, commercial and social centre that will serve the whole city and which will became a well-planned contemporary landmark for the city' (report published by the MDC, no date, p.1).

In addition to these objectives, the MDC was claiming that the current situation of inhabitants of the Valley was also taken into account since they wanted to prevent, or at least to minimise, the confrontation with gecekondu owners. However, in the

concluding part of the above mentioned objectives, the MDC describes the role of the project in so doing as follows:

> '-To supply the Valley's inhabitants with high quality housing, upgraded urban technical and social infrastructure by using basically self-financed mechanism and a participationary planning approach.
> -To realise public-private sector collaboration on a higher level within the framework of this project... and to consequently encourage concentration of private sector investments in the direction of local planning strategies, therefore enabling feasibility and shorter repayment periods for local government infrastructure investments without loss of time and capacity' (ibid, p.1).

These last two objectives, in fact, express the main aim of implementing this special redevelopment plan. While, on the one hand, redevelopment has been directed by the municipality so as to control the distribution of rent, the legitimacy of this action, on the other hand, has also been maintained by offering a 'fair deal' to the real owners of the land and housing in the Valley. In other words, as the MDC put it 'public-private sector collaboration' which enables 'feasibility and shorter repayment periods' was promoted as if it was the only possible means of provision of 'high quality housing, upgraded technical and social infrastructure' (ibid, p.3). However, these objectives could have also been achieved by implementation of a standard Improvement Plan too, which makes municipalities responsible for the provision of all these facilities.

The target population of the project claimed by the MDC supports the idea that the project goes beyond the limits of an ordinary redevelopment plan. However, the project does not mention anything about the financial interests of the municipality and other interest groups (i.e. development companies). Those who will benefit from the project,

according to the MDC, are people living in the Valley before the implementation of the project, people living on the two sides of the Valley in the authorised parts and finally the whole city. The MDC puts the benefits of people living in the Valley as follows:

> '...those living in the Valley shall benefit from a qualitative transformation of their living conditions. Present physical problems, which are mainly the lack of basic infrastructure..., the hazard of floods, the poor quality of self-built squatter houses shall be eliminated. Furthermore, their present illegal situation arising from settling in an unplanned area and their dubious ownership rights will be handled and they will be entitled to legal possession of the newly built houses. Thus, legal ambiguity and the resulting insecurity will be overcome' (ibid, p.1).

The above mentioned argument on the 'ambiguous' or even 'illegal' position of the gecekondu owners vis-à-vis the laws, in fact, does not reflect the reality. All the gecekondus built before October 1985, long before the Dikmen Valley Project came on to the agenda, had the right to become legal. I would, therefore, argue that the reason why the MDC argued in this way is that they intended to present and to stress the project as if it was the only way of legalising them. However, the Cankaya Municipality, too, could prepare an Improvement Plan and issue the title deeds accordingly without involvement of the MDC.

In sum, it was argued by the municipality, and the MDC as well, that the decision as to implementation of this special redevelopment project in the Valley was the most rational one among other alternatives for the gecekondu owners and the other two population groups mentioned above. In addition, they claimed that it will leave the

Valley as a green area while rehousing its inhabitants. However, as we will see the project would guarantee the interest of the municipality but not that of the gecekondu owners.

***Main Features of the Dikmen Valley Project:***

The Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project was prepared by the MDC and approved by the City Council of the AMM in August 1990 (Figure 6.2). It covers the whole area of the Valley which is around 158 ha. (5 km. in length and 300 m. in width on average). The main land uses proposed by the project are housing, green spaces and recreation, commerce and services, education, health and roads. Table 6.1 shows the amount of space allocated to land uses in the project.

Total housing areas take about 15% of the project site. This total allows the municipality both to rehouse the gecekondu owners and to develop some extra land, which could generate an income to cover the cost of the project. In the plan, it is proposed that these developments will take place linearly on the upper slopes of the Valley leaving the bottom as green space. In this way, it is argued that integration of the new apartments with the peripheral areas (i.e. existing authorised housing districts) will be achieved, which in turn would enable the use of existing transport, service and other facilities by the inhabitants.

Figure 6.2 Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project (1st Phase)




Source: Dikmen Valley Project Report published by MDC

**Table 6.1 Land-Use Distribution in Valley According to the Project**

| Use | Area (ha.) | % |
|---|---|---|
| *Housing* | 22.99 | 14.50 |
| *Education* | 3.46 | 2.18 |
| *Health* | 0.93 | 0.59 |
| *Commerce & Services* | 7.69 | 4.85 |
| *Green & Recreation 'Culturepark'* | 103.49 | 65.26 |
| *Roads* | 20.02 | 12.62 |
| ***TOTAL*** | **158.58** | **100.00** |

Source: Report published by the MDC, no date, p.3

Green areas and other recreational facilities have the largest share in the plan (about 65% of total land). In this massive green area, namely Culturepark, however, there are some buildings for special functions, which, it is claimed, will not exceed 10% of the total green area. These include a science and technology park, sports facilities, special educational areas, kindergarten, library, museums, masque, music and meeting hall and touristic artisanal production centres.

Another important element of the project is the 'Culture Bridge' even though very little is mentioned about it in the reports. It consists mainly of two towers or 'Gate Buildings', and a bridge, which connects them. It is located at the north end of the Valley and contains 60 offices and shops and 219 housing units in 26-storey tower blocks. This particular building is the one from which the project expects to make most

of the profits through the sale of its housing and commercial units. It is argued that this will ensure the financial viability of the project, which would not have been possible, if an ordinary Improvement Plan had been adopted. In fact, the design of this building and construction materials used for it are very distinctive from those allocated to the gecekondu owners (see Figures 6.4 and 6.5). The building contains 'ultra-luxury' flats, as was put in the advertisements, with all up-to-date facilities. In 1996, when they were completed, the market price of one of these flats in 'Culture Bridge' was announced as 38 billion TL., which was almost 15 times more than the market price of the ones given to the gecekondu owners.

To sum up, the project proposes that the Valley to be converted into a prestigious, and mainly green area in which other functions can be located as well. While some of the flats in the new apartment buildings will serve to rehouse the inhabitants of the Valley, the 'Culture Bridge' with its luxury flats and offices will ensure the financial viability of the scheme for the municipality by attracting more well-off families and new businesses to the area. The economic and social implications of the plan, however, will be discussed later in the chapter.

***Implementation Process of the Dikmen Valley Project:***

Having this blueprint in hand was only one, and maybe the easiest, part of the story. Residents of the Valley had to be assured about the project which was the most difficult task for the municipality and for the MDC. Gecekondu owners in the Valley, like those in the different gecekondu areas of Ankara, were expecting to have an ordinary

redevelopment plan too. From the very beginning, however, the municipality and the MDC were aware of the difficulties lying in front of them.

In line with the intention of reassuring the inhabitants of the Valley, the MDC started to establish a dialogue with them. In September 1989, a questionnaire survey was carried out by the MDC in the area. According to this survey, there were more than 10 000 people living in over 2 000 gecekondus in the Valley. It soon became clear that about 1500 of these gecekondus were built before October 1985, the deadline of the 1985 Gecekondu Amnesty Law, and therefore could be entitled to ownership rights.

After it had settled the issue of ownership rights, the MDC started to make contact with these people. First, meetings were held by the locally elected people, namely muhtars. Then, personal contact was made with 15% of 'entitled'[4] owners, and finally written information was distributed to the rest. At the end of the long discussions, it was agreed upon to form "the entitled owners' co-operatives" on the grounds that they 'could work in co-operation with the Grater Ankara Municipality (the AMM), protect the rights of the inhabitants at the highest level, and organise the transfer of continuous, accurate and first-hand information to them' (report published by the MDC, no date, p.5). Five co-operatives were set up accordingly in June 1990 and since then further negotiations have been carried out through their mediation.

During this time, a special office, Dikmen Valley Project Communications Office, was opened in a nearby area to make the flow of information easier. The MDC also

[4]Those are the ones who built their gecekondus before October 1985, and therefore, are eligible for the Gecekondu Amnesty Law.

published brochures and produced a 26-minute documentary film in order to present the project. In addition to these, a monthly newsletter, Dikmen Vadimiz (Our Dikmen Valley) was started by the MDC and distributed to the inhabitants to keep them informed.

In August 1991 entitled owners started to make applications to enable them to take part in the project, as their written consent indicating that they accepted the project were required. By this way, the possibility of legal actions, which would be taken by gecekondu owners against the MDC, was prevented. At the end of this process, contracts were signed with 335 entitled owners which constituted the total number of gecekondu owners whose gecekondus were located in the first implementation zone. Two months later 'Housing Certificates' guaranteeing the ownership rights of gecekondu owners in the new apartment blocks were distributed. After receiving these certificates, gecekondu owners started to move out of their gecekondus and demolish them.

Gecekondu owners who moved out of their houses moved temporarily to the flats, which they could afford with the aid of 'Rent Help' from the MDC. The amount of this 'Rent Help' was 600000 TL/month and was supplemented by a 30% annual increase, which kept pace with rising rents. People in the gecekondus as tenants, on the other hand, were promised empty, serviced land in other areas to build their own houses. 163 of those tenants, who left their gecekondus, applied for this scheme. Yet, the municipality failed to keep its promise claiming that they could not find any suitable land for such development.

## 6.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIKMEN VALLEY PROJECT

In April 1992, the construction of apartment blocks and the Culture Bridge started in the Valley. Two years later, in April 1994 the construction of the blocks were finished and the first inhabitants had started to move in. By January 1995, around 400 families were living in the area. The first phase of the project was completed by the end of 1996 (Figures 6.3, 4 and 5).

In this section I set out to discuss the implications of the project in physical/environmental, economic, political and cultural terms. I will present the results of the research conducted in the Valley after the implementation of the first phase of the project.

### 6.4.1 PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS

As mentioned earlier the Dikmen Valley Project covers an area of about 150 ha. in which it is proposed to create one of the biggest green spaces in Ankara. Given this fact, the main emphasis has been placed on this aspect of the project more than anything else by the MDC and local authorities as well. It has been claimed that the implementation of the project is essential, if not vital, for the city's future.

These arguments in fact, as discussed earlier, were based upon the Ankara 2015 structural plan proposals in which the importance of the valleys for a healthier urban environment is stressed. In other words, the municipality argued that this objective paved the way for the implementation of the Dikmen Valley Project.

Figure 6.3 Dikmen Valley after the redevelopment

Figure 6.4 Apartment blocks allocated to the gecekondu owners

Figure 6.4 The "Culture Bridge"





In justifying the project the municipality has claimed that the general principle of the Ankara 2015 plan was fulfilled, by and large, by the MDC by allocating more than 65% of total area to green spaces and recreational facilities in Dikmen Valley (see Table 6.1). It argued that this green area will serve not only the residents of Cankaya but also those in the city as well. One of the ex-senior planners of the MDC and the project stated that the amount of green space per person in Ankara will be increased by 0.4 $m^2$ when the project is completed[5].

However, although the project was presented as a partial implementation of the Ankara 2015 plan, there are some points which raise questions about the validity of this claim. First of all, one of the main objectives of the Ankara 2015 plan was the transformation of the whole Valley into a green space free of any of the other functions which at present cover 35% of the area. Hence, it is clear that the Dikmen Valley Project represents an important deviation from the Ankara 2015 plan.

Another senior planner, who took part in the preparation of the Ankara 2015 plan, points to a further deviation from the 2015 plan in the following way:

> 'One of the basic objectives of the Ankara 2015 structural plan, which was claimed as a provider of the main aims of the Dikmen Valley Project, was determined as "decentralisation".... In this context, the allocation of land for construction within the high-density residential area contradicts this aim'[6].

---

[5]Kuntsal, K., 1993, 'Dikmen Vadisi Projesi', in *Ankara Soylesileri*, TMMOB Mimarlar Odasi Ankara Subesi Yayinlari, p. 13

[6]Gunay, B., 1993, 'Dikmen Vadisi Projesi Uzerine Degerlendirme', in *Ankara Soylesileri*, TMMOB Mimarlar Odasi Ankara Subesi Yayinlari, p. 22

In addition to those failures in meeting the requirements of green space and decentralisation decisions the Dikmen Valley Project also contradicts another main objective of the Ankara 2015 plan by creating yet another focal point in the south. The Ankara 2015 plan had proposed promotion of the old CBD in the northern part of the city, namely Ulus, as the new CBD which would have required prevention of any development in the south. It was argued that this new centre would discourage further development in the south while serving the new residential areas to be located mainly in the 'west corridor'.

However, construction of a cultural and commercial centre in the Valley on such a big scale will undoubtedly lead to a growing volume of users of these facilities and activities in the south. Additionally, it will also cause transformations in nearby areas by exacerbating the existing infrastructure and transportation problems.

No doubt, despite all these arguments at the technical and academic levels, the project was welcomed by the residents of Cankaya, especially by those who live in the authorised part. Cankaya, being a residential area mostly for the upper-middle and upper-income family groups, has always enjoyed relatively more public spaces in the city. The most attractive green spaces (i.e. Botanik Park, Segmenler Park) are all located in the district. In this context, the project is considered as an important decision by the residents which will eventually make a further contribution to the general environmental quality of their district.

This opinion was shared by the earliest residents of the Valley as well. Almost all of the respondents (41 out of 44) stated that the Valley would be one of the best places in the city provided that it is fully completed. One of them even said that it would be the most attractive place in the whole country. Although not everybody goes that far in appreciating the project; generally everybody regarded it as a success as far as its environmental features are concerned. It is worth noting, however, that these assessments of the residents in and around this area are based upon a lack of information about possibilities such as the transformation of the whole area into green space as originally proposed by the 2015 plan.

In short, in terms of environmental quality, it seems that the project offers a relatively healthy, well-planned and organised redevelopment alternative to what was a gecekondu area with its well-known housing, environmental and infrastructural deficiencies. However, it should be kept in mind that the Valley was not planned as a residential area in the first place. It is also clear that it could have been more beneficial for the whole city, again in environmental terms, if the Valley had been kept as a green area. In this sense, the Ankara 2015 plan was not fully followed as has so often been claimed.

### 6.4.2 ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

The economic implications of the project are perhaps the most critical aspect of the plan for the people previously living in the Valley, as tenants or as gecekondu owners, as well as the municipality itself. Since in this particular case the residents and the

municipality constitute the two main interest groups involved, in what follows I will discuss these two groups in relation to their economic position *vis-à-vis* the project.

If we leave the general discourse of creating a green Valley for Ankara, it will not be difficult to see that there are important economic values at stake for the municipality as well as for the residents. I will argue that one of the important motivations for the transformation of the area by this special method was its high potential economic value, and the desire to control its distribution among the main interest groups.

To be more precise, the *rant gap* for the Dikmen Valley gecekondu area was big enough to secure the redevelopment of the area. 'Capitalised/actual ground rent' obtained by gecekondu owners for their gecekondus before any redevelopment was obviously very low. The 'potential ground rent' level of the Valley, which would be achieved by the implementation of any kind of redevelopment plan, on the other hand, was specially very high compared to the 'capitalised/actual ground rent'. One of the main reasons behind this was the location of the Valley. As mentioned before, it was located between two authorised housing areas where the land and housing prices are considerably high. Therefore, demand for the authorised housing development in this prestigious part of the district was also substantial. Therefore, this high level of rent gap (difference between capitalised and potential ground rents) coupled with the high level of demand made the municipality to implement a special redevelopment scheme for the Valley which would not exclude it from sharing the profit that the project will create.

In the Feasibility Report published by the MDC the reason why this special method of redevelopment was used was explained as follows:

> 'The method envisaged for this project makes use of both the "build-sell" model used extensively in all Turkish cities by contractors in developing single plots and the "build-operate-transfer" model which is being used for some major government projects. In other words, it is needed to involve major contracting firms as developers by using the potential land rents of the Valley. In order to realise this, it is necessary for the Greater Ankara Municipality to complete land expropriation procedures, build infrastructure and finish the landscaping and create a prestigious and attractive area for investments..... The method can be summarised as enabling contracting/finance firms to undertake construction in a prestigious area and to finance the project by sharing the rent' (Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project, Feasibility Report, 1991, p.44).

As clearly stated in the report, the potential economic value of the Valley was seen by the MDC as the driving force of the project. By employing a special redevelopment scheme this economic value was kept under control. In this way, the profits of the municipality and the MDC, together with private firms, were secured while the gecekondu owners were given as little as possible.

The total cost and expected revenue figures of the project highlight the real economic value created through it (see Tables 6.2 and 6.3). Total cost of the project is stated as DM 393.9 million of which DM 83.5 million is to be paid by the municipality. The remaining part will be paid by the MDC or by the private firms employed by the MDC. The work under the responsibility of the municipality is the crucial part of the project, even though it constitutes 21.2% of total cost. Among them land acquisition (DM 38.5 million), construction of infrastructure (DM 13.9 million) and landscaping (DM 13.5

million) take the first places. As mentioned above, these works were seen as the preconditions of the transformation of the Valley by the MDC and made the responsibility of the municipality. In this way, the MDC avoided responsibilities for non-profit making investments.

**Table 6.2 Total Cost of the Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project**

| Cost Item | Cost (DM 1000) |
|---|---|
| *Expropriation* | 38 583.6 |
| *Infrastructure* | 13 904.0 |
| *Building & Landscaping* | 301 634.0 |
| *Project Management* | 4 000.0 |
| *Subtotal* | 358 121.6 |
| *10% Contingency Cost* | 35 812.2 |
| **TOTAL** | **393 933.8** |

Source: ibid, p.39

Another important point in the table is the total expropriation cost of the scheme, which is DM 38.6 million. In another words, the cost of the land to the municipality constitutes less than 10% of the total cost of the project. This indicates how little the municipality paid to the gecekondu owners for their land.

The total revenue of the project from the sales of the housing, shop and office units, on the other hand, was estimated as DM 602.3 million. This makes the net profit DM 208.3 million which will be shared between the municipality and the MDC excluding the gecekondu owners. The exact share of the municipality and the private construction firms were not indicated in any of the reports published by the MDC.

However, in the interview with the ex-senior planners of the MDC, K. Kuntsal, he stated that the share of the AMM and the Cankaya Municipality in the total number of flats and shopping units to be sold was around 40% while the rest was shared by the private companies and the MDC.

**Table 6.3 Total Revenue**

| Revenue Type | Area ($m^2$) | Unit Price ($DM/m^2$) | TOTAL (DM 1 000) |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Housing Sales* | 260 250 | 1 300 | 338 325 |
| *Culture Bridge* | | | 97 750 |
| Housing | 33 000 | 1 750 | 57 750 |
| Shops | 10 000 | 4 000 | 40 000 |
| *Tanyeli Centre* | | | 102 000 |
| Shops | 8 000 | 4 000 | 32 000 |
| Housing | 28 000 | 1 300 | 36 400 |
| Offices | 16 800 | 2 000 | 33 600 |
| *Hosdere Centre* | | | 49 000 |
| Shops | 7 500 | 4 000 | 30 000 |
| Housing | 15 000 | 1 300 | 19 500 |
| *Other Commercial* | 3 500 | 2 000 | 7 000 |
| *Returned Expropriation Payments* | 200 000 | 51.33 | 7 700 |
| **TOTAL REVENUES** | | | **602 275** |

Source: ibid, p.43

These figures clearly indicate why this special redevelopment scheme is used in this part of the city. It is obvious that the municipality and the private firms could have gained nothing; but the gecekondu owners' gains will be much more, if an ordinary Improvement Plan had been implemented in the Valley. In a typical redevelopment

process carried out through a deal between gecekondu owners and developers, gecekondu owners can get at least 2-3 flats, depending on the plot size, from newly developed apartment blocks in exchange for his/her land. In the Dikmen Valley, however, gecekondu owners were offered a single flat in the apartment blocks built in the Valley.

As a matter of fact, it can also be argued that in the end they have got even less than a flat. At the beginning of the implementation each gecekondu was assessed together with their land and given a market value by the 'Value Assessment Committee'[7]. This amount was then deducted from the estimated cost of the new flats. The difference was to be paid in instalments by the gecekondu owners to meet the full cost of flat. According to my research conducted in the Valley, only one gecekondu owner (out of 28) did not owe anything to the municipality as he had 2 gecekondus. The average debt of the gecekondu owners was 35 million TL. each which had to be paid off over a year. They considered this to be impossible in itself, but as we will see later they were liable for maintenance payments which meant that all of them found it hard to meet this payment.

If an ordinary redevelopment plan had been implemented in the Valley each gecekondu owner would have had his or her own plots to redevelop. This would have given them a chance to make their own deal with the developers, as in all other gecekondu areas, and have enabled them to get more than one flat.

[7]This committee is an independent body set up for the establishment of the market value of controversial expropriation cases.

As discussed in the previous chapter, in 19 Mayis the evidence showed that each gecekondu owner had got at least 2 or 3 flats. When the land and housing prices in the Valley, which are among the highest in the city, are taken into account, it becomes more clear how much gecekondu owners lost through this special redevelopment scheme. For instance, at the end of 1994 the average price of a flat in Kecioren was between 6.4 and 9.6 million TL/$m^2$. However, the price of a same sort of flat in Cankaya district was as high as 28-32 million TL/$m^2$ and in the Dikmen area it was between 12-20 million TL/$m^2$[8]. In this sense, gecekondu owners, as one of the major interest groups of the project, can be regarded as losers.

In relation to the economic circumstances in which the Dikmen Valley gecekondu owners found themselves after the redevelopment, they argued that the market value of their land and gecekondus were underestimated by the Value Assessment Committee. In an interview with one of the ex-gecekondu owners, Yucel Isik, who took an active role in the Dikmen Valley Gecekondu Solidarity Association established during the implementation of the project, he attacked the decision of the Committee as follows:

> 'First of all I would like to say that while they have been trying to make a 'breathing passage' to Ankara our own breathing passage is being cut. We are not against the project but how come the price of a $m^2$ of land in Cankaya can be 80 000 TL where price of a metre of the cheapest fabric is 8 000 TL? It is obvious that Value Assessment Committee was misled by the municipality. We are not against the principles of the project but against unjust expropriations and we are not going to give up the search for justice'[9].

---

[8] *Yeni Yuzyil*, 31 December 1994

[9] Vadi Ile Ilgili Gorusler, *Cagdas Cankaya*, Eylul-Ekim 1991, p.27

He was not the only one to be discontented with the valuation of their assets. Other gecekondu owners also admitted that they did not expect the value of their land would be so low. In fact, comparing the prices in the nearby area they 'hoped to get much more than this or at least enough to cover the price of new flats' as another ex-gecekondu owner put it.

On the same issue, the MDC, along with the local authorities believe that when the project is completed the market value of the flats will be much higher than their costs. This would, according to them, compensate what gecekondu owners believed they have lost. Murat Karayalcin, the then mayor of the AMM, named this repayment process a 'rent-sharing expropriation' and advocated this view as follows:

> '..... The total cost of the flats is 137 billion TL, but the market value of these flats will be approximately 500 billion TL.... Initially gecekondu owners do not get anything but they do have an asset which will be much more valuable in the future'[10].

These 'valuable assets', in fact, turned out to be an economic burden for most of the ex-gecekondu owners. The maintenance cost of the new flats was much higher than that of gecekondus. All of the households who responded to the questionnaire admitted that these expenses stretch their budgets. In some cases, these maintenance costs constitute nearly half of the total household income. I would, therefore, argue that this represents another negative outcome of the project for the gecekondu owners.

---

[10]*Cumhuriyet Hafta*, 3-10 Eylul 1992

In order to be able to avoid this financial burden, some of the home owners, all of whom are landlords of the tenants interviewed, preferred to move to cheaper residential areas and let their flats for rent. In this way, they not only avoid the maintenance cost but can also cover both their own rents and the monthly payments to the municipality. In addition to those 16 landlords, 19 of the total owner respondents stated that they were considering doing the same thing. Another 3 said they were planning to sell their flats and, preferably, buy 2 flats in a cheaper area instead (to live in one and rent out the other).

The other main interest group, which has been affected by the project, is the gecekondu tenants. They are the ones who were badly hit by the redevelopment process. Initially, as mentioned earlier, gecekondu tenants were offered an alternative project which promised to provide cheaper, empty, serviced land elsewhere to build their own houses. 163 of such tenants applied for this scheme. However, 'since suitable land for this project could not have been found it had to be abandoned'[11]

As the rents in newly developed apartment blocks are much more expensive than their previous rents this option was completely out of the question for gecekondu tenants. Eventually, they were all forced to move out of the Valley to places where the rents are still low. Survey data shows that none of the tenants living in the new apartment blocks were living in the Valley before the redevelopment.

[11]Interview with K. Kuntsal, ex-senior planner of the MDC.

Evidence from the survey supports the idea that previous (gecekondu) tenants were totally replaced by the upper-middle income families. Table 6.4 shows the current income structure of the Valley. Here gecekondu owners refer to the old residents of the Valley (i.e. ex-gecekondu owners) whereas the tenants are all newcomers.

**Table 6.4 Monthly Average Income of the Residents (in million TL)**

| | gecekondu owners | tenants in new flats | total |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Male* | 5.4 | 10.9 | 7.7 |
| *Female* | - | 7.4 | 7.6 |
| *Total Household Income* | 6.8 | 16.5 | 10.7 |
| *Per capita Household Income* | 2.2 | 5.7 | 3.4 |

Source: Dikmen Valley survey

It is clear from the table that there is a huge gap between the owners and tenants in terms of monthly average household incomes, which are 6.8 million TL/month for owners and 16.5 million TL/month for tenants. The monthly average per capita income figures for owners and tenants (2.2 million TL/month and 5.7 million TL/month respectively) also reflect the same differences.

In sum, it can be argued that Dikmen Valley has been converted into a upper-middle income housing area where previous tenants and more and more gecekondu owners can no longer afford to live. The number of owners who had moved from the area or who were considering doing so, together with the class structure of the newcomers, back this

argument. The municipality and the MDC as the other main interest groups, on the other hand, have emerged as the winner in this particular project. They have succeeded in taking over the area at a minimum cost and making profit out of it, which they also successfully avoided to share with the gecekondu owners.

### 6.4.3 POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

The initiation of the planning works in the Valley led to the politicisation of urban issues among the residents once again. As mentioned before, in 1986, Cankaya municipality, which was then under the control of the MP, had initiated the 'Dikmen Valley Green Area Project' which would have required the total clearance of the Valley to create a green area. However, soon after, the project had to be abandoned due to increasing political pressure from the gecekondu owners. When the SDPP came to power in 1989, gecekondu owners were optimistic about the future of their settlement and hoped to make a 'fair' deal with the SDPP municipality.

For the municipality, on the other hand, it was clear that a repeat of the attempt made by the MP in 1986 would cause similar discontent among the residents of the Valley. For that reason, when they initiated the Dikmen Valley Project they emphasised sharply that they were taking into account the situation of the residents as well. At later stages of the project, Dogan Tasdelen, mayor of Cankaya municipality since 1989, explained the difference between the MP and the SDPP in their attitudes towards the residents of the Valley as follows:

> '... We regard the consideration of the human factor as the main principle of social democracy while we are transforming the Valley, which is full of gecekondus, into a green area.... Gecekondu owners, who the MP wanted to push out from the Valley, were convinced of our proposals and formed five co-operatives. In this way, participation of the residents in each phase of the project has been secured'[12].

Despite such efforts made by the municipality, when the MDC people first approached the gecekondu owners with the idea of the Dikmen Valley Project most of them reacted negatively. Being quite aware of what had been happening in other gecekondu areas, they too wanted to have a regular redevelopment plan.

In 1992, encouraged by this general discontent, some of the gecekondu owners founded a neighbourhood association, the Dikmen Valley Gecekondu Solidarity Association, whose main aim was to organise the gecekondu owners against the Dikmen Valley project. They started by making propaganda against what the local authorities were planning to impose upon them. They called this 'creating consciousness about their own interests'.

They opened an office in the Valley to keep in touch with the residents. They also organised regular meetings in order to discuss alternative planning approaches and raise questions about what could be done against the existing project. At the beginning, interest in the association was very high. Most of the gecekondu owners attended the meetings regularly and a large number of people took an active part in the association.

---

[12]*Cagdas Cankaya*, Eylul-Ekim 1991, no.6, p.24

It could be argued that the Valley had become a political battle-field, with the municipality and the MDC on one side, and the association on the other, who were fighting each other to win the support of the gecekondu owners. While the MDC was getting its messages to more and more gecekondu owners and gaining their support for the project, the association was also trying hard to reverse the process. They prepared a petition to the municipality asking for the preparation of an ordinary redevelopment plan. When this request was turned down they organised a demonstration in one of the major parks in central Ankara which was suppressed by the riot police.

The mayor of the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality also personally visited the Valley together with the MDC people in order to reassure the gecekondu owners about the project. During these negotiations they claimed that the project in hand was the only option. They even threatened the residents with the option of leaving the Valley as it was or perhaps implementing the 1980 Green Area Plan, which proposed total clearance of the area.

Meanwhile, the neighbourhood association was under pressure from the police who, according to one of its founders, were manipulated by the local authorities. In an interview, he explained those days as follows:

> 'Day after day we were gaining more supporters. The authorities were aware of these developments and not happy about them. Police raided our office several times accusing us of acting illegally. I am sure that they acted with the knowledge of the local authorities' (interview with a member of the neighbourhood association who wishes to be anonymous).

Soon after, as a result of these pressures, the association stopped its activities altogether and closed its office in the Valley.

Fearing that nothing was going to be done to their area, gecekondu owners then started to support the project which was offered as the only possible option. As one gecekondu owner put it, they had been 'fed up living in the uncertainty and wanted to settle the matter as soon as possible'. At the same time, they were also disillusioned by the SDPP from whom they had expected more. In this sense, they felt betrayed by the SDPP. In an interview one of the gecekondu owners expresses his view on this issue in the following way:

> '... Atinsoy [mayor of the AMM between 1984-1989] wanted to get it [the Valley] but he found us in front of him. We taught him a lesson at the poll. Now social democrats are pushing us. We wouldn't mind such things from the MP but we do mind if they are from the SDPP'[13].

Eventually, after all these shifts of position by the gecekondu owners, in 1991 all gecekondu owners, whose land was in the first phase of the project, agreed to sign a contract with the MDC which allowed them to start to implement it. In the 1994 local elections, most of the gecekondu owners (all the respondents in the survey) voted for the SDPP candidates believing that they were the only ones who could finish the project since they had initiated it. However, even though the SDPP won the elections in Cankaya district, they lost the AMM to the Islamic Fundamentalist Welfare Party (WP). When they took office, the WP municipality halted the implementation of the project

[13]Vadi Ile Ilgili Gorusler, *Cagdas Cankaya*, Eylul-Ekim 1991, no.6, p.27

accusing the SDPP municipality of corruption in handling the project. The reason behind this was to change the firms contracted by the previous MDC authorities and to make a new deal with those which were politically close to the WP.

However, the WP, too, were aware of the political repercussions of such decisions. In fact, Melih Gokcek, the new mayor of the AMM, was quick to distinguish between the position of the gecekondu owners and the ex-municipal authorities in relation to their suspension decision. He explained this as follows:

> 'The rights of the gecekondu owners are by no means in jeopardy. We are not going to abandon the project, we have just suspended it for a while. What we want to do is to sort out the financial mess left by the SDPP. As soon as we have finished this the implementation of the second phase of the project will be resumed'[14].

During the interviews conducted in the area in January-February 1995 it emerged that such assurances did not convince the people about the future of the project. They believe that, as one of them put it, 'the WP municipality ruined the chance of completing the project'. In fact, as mentioned before, the first phase of the project was completed by the end of 1996.

### 6.4.4 CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS

As in all other gentrified areas, with the implementation of the project, the previous social and cultural structure of the Valley became subject to change. It was clear that the

---

[14] *Hurriyet*, 30 May 1994

people previously living in the Valley would no longer be members of the same community again which had once given them an identity and provided them with a sense of solidarity.

One major outcomes of the project was that, while some of the old residents (all of the tenants) had to move out of the area, some new ones started to move in. As discussed before, the class background of these people was different from that of gecekondu owners. To gain a general idea about the current social structure of the Valley, the educational structure of the residents are given in Tables 6.5 and 6.6.

**Table 6.5 Education by Gender (Gecekondu Owners)**

| | Male | | Female | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % |
| *Illiterate* | 0 | 0.0 | 2 | 8.0 |
| *Literate* | 1 | 4.0 | 6 | 20.0 |
| *Primary Sch.* | 19 | 68.0 | 17 | 60.0 |
| *Secondary Sch.* | 2 | 8.0 | 1 | 4.0 |
| *High Sch.* | 5 | 16.0 | 1 | 4.0 |
| *Higher Ed.* | 1 | 4.0 | 1 | 4.0 |
| ***Total*** | **28** | **100.0** | **28** | **100.0** |

Source: Dikmen Valley survey

**Table 6.6 Education by Gender (Tenants in New Flats)**

| | Male | | Female | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # | % | # | % |
| *Illiterate* | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| *Literate* | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| *Primary Sch.* | 0 | 0.0 | 1 | 6.7 |
| Secondary Sch. | 1 | 6.3 | 2 | 13.3 |
| *High Sch.* | 3 | 18.8 | 3 | 20.0 |
| *Higher Edc.* | 12 | 75.0 | 10 | 60.0 |
| ***Total*** | **16** | **100.0** | **16** | **100.0** |

Source: Dikmen Valley survey

A quick glance at Tables 6.5 and 6.6 suggests that there is huge difference in the education levels of gecekondu owners and tenants in new flats. This difference becomes even greater when the females in both tenure groups are compared. While 75% of males in tenant households have higher education qualifications only 4% of their owner counterparts has got such qualification. The vast majority of males among owner households, who constitute 80% of the total, have either primary or secondary school certificates and therefore can be regarded as less educated. Among the females in owner households, 8% are not even literate while 80% are just literate or have only primary school certificate. Substantial proportions of female tenant households (80%), on the other hand, have either high school diplomas or degrees.

In addition to these differences there are also some others, which make it hard especially for gecekondu owners to share a 'common life' with their neighbours as they did before. Table 6.7 summarises some aspects of family structure of the residents which further emphasise the differences between two groups.

**Table 6.7 Family Structure**

| | Gecekondu Owners | Tenants in New Flats | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Age-men | 59.6 | 41.4 | 53.0 |
| Age-women | 52.3 | 37.1 | 46.7 |
| Family Size | 3.2 | 2.9 | 3.1 |
| Number of children | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.5 |
| Women in work (%) | 3.7 | 73.4 | 28.6 |

Source: Dikmen Valley survey

As Table 6.7 indicates tenants are younger than the owners with similar family sizes. The main difference, however, remains in the working patterns of the women. Only 3.7% of the females in owner households work in paid jobs. Among the tenants, on the other hand, this figure is as high as 73.4%.

In fact, all these differences in terms of socio-economic backgrounds of the old residents and newcomers have led to a kind of social environment where none of these groups could easily attach themselves to it. The relationships between them were very limited. They lived together in the same apartment blocks but hardly knew each other.

All of the owners stated that their previous relationships with their neighbours were better and that they had enjoyed living in such a community. One of the housewives said that the current situation is like 'living in an alien environment, even though it is our own old Valley'. It was obvious that they found it hard to get used to the formal relationships between the residents especially those with newcomers.

Similarly, tenants were not very happy about the social environment either. For most of them it was not what they had prepared to live in. As a result, as mentioned before, they had very limited relationships with the owners. According to one of them, this was because 'they had very little in common in all aspects of life'.

In short, our survey results indicate that the Dikmen Valley has been undergoing a major social and cultural transformation alongside a physical one.

## 6.5 CONCLUSION

The chapter has discussed the transformation of the Dikmen Valley gecekondu area located in a upper-middle and high income district, Cankaya. Unlike the 19 Mayis described in the previous chapter, the area was transformed by the municipality itself by implementing a special Improvement Plan.

Within the general framework of the 1983 legislation, Cankaya municipality, like all other district municipalities of Ankara, launched a policy of improvement for its gecekondu areas. Among these gecekondu areas, Dikmen Valley was of special

importance. Firstly, it was located between existing high-income residential areas and secondly, as one of the valleys of Ankara, it was considered as a crucial location for the well being of the whole city. These two conditions made it economically and politically impossible for the Valley to be the subject of an ordinary redevelopment plan allowed by the 1983 legislation.

At the beginning, the municipality had two options in the Valley. The first was to keep the whole valley as a green area, and the second was to redevelop it through the 1983 legislation (i.e. through implementation of a regular Improvement Plan). Political pressure exerted by the gecekondu owners, however, prevented the implementation of the former. No local government could have faced the political repercussions of the implementation of the Green Area Project. Preparation of an ordinary redevelopment plan, on the other hand, would have meant the transfer of potential economic value, which the Valley possesses, to the gecekondu owners. This was not an easily acceptable alternative for the local authorities, as it totally excluded the municipality from sharing this potential economic value.

In 1989, the Metropolitan Development Corporation was appointed to prepare a special redevelopment plan for the Valley which would meet the above mentioned conditions (i.e. minimising discontent among the gecekondu owners and maximising the economic gains of the municipality).

The project, elaborated by the MDC, was a special interpretation of the Improvement Plans. It proposed the transformation of the Valley into a prestigious housing area

together with commercial centres and other facilities that can hardly be found anywhere else in the city. From the start, the potential economic and social effects of the project have been matters of a political controversy between the residents and the local authorities. However, attempts to change the project were unsuccessful and it was approved by the AMM in 1990. Construction of the first phase of the plan started in 1992, and in mid-1994 gecekondu owners started to move into the flats allocated for them. By 1996, the first phase of the project had been completed.

In spatial terms, the project was a major deviation from the Ankara 2015 plan even though this was denied by the municipality and the MDC. First of all, the Dikmen Valley project was not a plan for transforming the whole valley into a green area, much needed by the city. And secondly, it created one of the most important focal points (both residential and commercial) in the southern part of the city in contradiction with the Ankara 2015 plan.

The economic impacts of the project have been more beneficial for the municipality and for the private firms than for the old residents. While old tenants have been forced to move out of the Valley, gecekondu owners lost, compared to what they might have gained from an ordinary redevelopment plan. The municipality, on the other hand, took over the Valley from the gecekondu owners by forcing them to give up their land at the minimum possible cost. In this way, the potential ground rent had been brought into life through the implementation of a special project and at the same time had been transferred from the gecekondu owners to the municipality and to the MDC. I would argue that by the implementation of a special Improvement Plan in the Valley the

municipality and the private firms secured both the creation and control of economic value, which would have been impossible otherwise.

The economic situation in which previous gecekondu residents found themselves after the implementation of the project supports the above-mentioned argument. A growing number of gecekondu owners are considering moving out of the Valley, as they can no longer afford to live in an upper-middle income residential area. Gecekondu tenants, on the other hand, have totally disappeared from the Valley, as to rent a flat in the area was out of the question.

The social environment created by the project is also problematic for the gecekondu owners as well as for the new tenants. After the implementation, previous lifestyles, relations with the neighbours and so on have all changed for the gecekondu owners. They found it hard to get used to this new atmosphere. New residents also were not happy about the social surroundings, since they had different social background from the gecekondu owners.

In short, from the implementation of a special redevelopment scheme the municipality and the private firms turned out to be the real winners. However, the residents of the city in general and the gecekondu owners in particular, became the losers though for different reasons. The former would have benefited more if the whole Valley had been kept green. The benefit of the latter, on the other hand, would have required the redevelopment of the Valley through a regular Improvement Plan.

# CONCLUSION

The main objective of this thesis has been to provide an account of the recent transformation of squatter settlements into apartment blocks in Ankara with special reference to the political, economic, cultural as well as spatial consequences of this transformation. In this concluding chapter, my aim is to provide a brief summary of the thesis, to examine to what extent it has fulfilled its objectives and what topics remain to be explored in future research.

As in many other developing countries, squatter housing in Turkey represents a novel form of urban housing that has emerged as an answer to the persistent shortage of urban housing. In the face of rapid urbanisation, which was stimulated by rapid migration from rural to urban areas, squatter settlements have mushroomed on the outskirts of large cities as a solution put forward by the immigrant population. Ankara has been no exception to this trend. Thanks to its capital status as well, the city has become the most attractive destination point for the migrant population. Due to the lack of housing, they started to build their own houses on the outskirts of the city. Towards the end of the 1970s more than 60 per cent of city population was living in squatter settlements, far more than other metropolitan cities.

In a short space of time, it was proved that squatter housing is a constitutive element of urban areas rather than a temporary solution that would be replaced by a more proper housing form in due course. However changing its form and progressing in

different directions as well as getting internally differentiated, squatter housing has remained intact in Ankara since the early 1930s. This should not be seen, however, as a sign of stagnation and marginality. Rather, the squatter population continuously improved its living standards and housing conditions by taking active part in city politics.

In the face of persistent pressure from the squatter dwellers, from the very beginning the government made important concessions to the squatter population in terms of improvement and legalisation of squatter dwellings. However until the mid-1980s these concessions remained largely piecemeal and pragmatic as far as the expectations of squatter dwellers are concerned, as the ultimate objective of the squatter dwellers was to gain full planning and construction rights for their land plots so that they could enter the formal housing and land market to enjoy the benefits of booming urban land prices. To give their land to a developer who would erect apartment blocks in return for a part of the flats in that building was the ultimate objective of almost all squatter dwellers.

If this was rarely achieved up until the early 1980s, the mid-1980 witnessed a dramatic change in state policies towards the squatter settlements. Under the so-called new right project, the squatter population was seen as a special target group to be integrated into this project by means of legalisation and the provision of planning and construction rights. In a gradual manner, the squatter dwellers were entitled first to title deeds by an amnesty and then a planning process, in almost all large metropolitan cities, which aimed at a conversion of these squatter areas into planned

urban zones, was initiated by the municipalities. This was nothing other than the beginning of a process leading to a massive transformation of the squatter areas into apartment blocks, which was the ultimate objective of the squatter dwellers themselves.

In this regard, the changing policy towards squatter dwellers, starting from the mid-1980s, should be understood in the context of the changing political and economic climate in Turkey as well as the conditions of the city itself. Liberalisation and free-enterprise ideologies provided the political and ideological background for the transformation of squatter areas into apartment blocks. Ironically, one of the aspects emphasised in this transformation was to see squatter dwellers themselves as entrepreneurs. Thus the right-wing parties used this policy (during the late 1980s and 1990s) as a means to integrate the squatter dwellers into the new right project. However, as I have shown, the left-wing parties that came to power at the local level in the following period did not attempt to reverse this policy.

Local-level dynamics were also important in the preparation and implementation of redevelopment plans. We have seen that, on the one hand, squatter owners who wanted to become a part of the authorised part of the city and benefit from this transformation experienced a long wait. On the other hand, the increasing attractiveness of some squatter areas for the developers due to their position within the city was also a factor leading to redevelopment. When these local dynamics came together with macro level dynamics, redevelopment emerged as a viable policy, and

it did not meet big resistance except among some professional groups such as planners. This is partly why it was put into effect so quickly.

The transformation of the squatter areas should not be treated as a general process, which has affected all squatter areas evenly. As was seen earlier, there are important differences in the implementation process due to the modes of plan preparation and implementation as well as due to the locational position of the squatter areas *vis a vis* authorised built-up areas.

In the thesis, two different modes have been evaluated: transformation undertaken by market actors and by the public sector. I have shown that there were substantial differences in the way in which Improvement Plans were interpreted and implemented. In the first case, as in many other squatter areas, Improvement Plans were regarded as a means to redevelop the squatter areas within the rules of the then current market processes. In the second case, on the other hand, the municipality itself used the Improvement Plans to both control and appropriate potential speculative gains. In line with these different objectives, there were also variations in both plan preparation and implementation processes. While in the market-led redevelopment scheme Improvement Plans were prepared as ordinary redevelopment plans which accepted the small plots as the main units of redevelopment. A more comprehensive approach was applied in the public-led redevelopment project. Nevertheless, it should be noted that involvement of the municipalities in the implementation process remained limited and that small-scale private sector developers have played the major part in the transformation process.

As important as the variation in the policy process is the spatial unevenness among the squatter areas. As we have seen in the case studies, there are important advantages and disadvantages of different squatter areas resulting from their location in the city. That is, while those areas, which are closer to the built up area and especially to the high income, residential areas are more likely to be subjected to the transformation compared to the more remote squatter districts. For this reason, one of the points of departure of the thesis was that, while there is a need for an overall evaluation of the squatter transformation, it is also necessary to carry out detailed case studies to find out the differences resulting from the social and spatial differences.

Thus, in order to analyse this transformation with reference to different groups involved as well as in terms of its consequences for Ankara on the whole, two squatter districts were selected as case study areas. One area was rather at the periphery of the city and underwent a transformation through small-scale private developers, whereas the second area, which was close to the high-income neighbourhoods, was transformed through public sector involvement, namely the municipality. In these two areas the transformation took place differently due to their different locations as well as the means and forms of transformation.

As stated at the beginning of the thesis, this transformation can be analysed in terms of political, economic, cultural as well as spatial repercussions and consequences upon the city on the whole as well as upon the different groups and areas involved in the transformation process. Given the fact that in Ankara and in other large cities, the

squatter population has constituted more than half of the city population, entitling the planning (redevelopment) rights to the squatter areas and opening them to apartment block development, has important consequences upon the city on the whole as well as upon different groups. Before proceeding to the analysis of the case study areas, it was necessary to look at the city as a whole to find out the possible economic, political, cultural as well as spatial consequences of this change. Such an analysis would be useful to provide a base for the case studies by providing an overall picture of the transformation process in the city.

The spatial or physical implications of the development plans and squatter transformation were most apparent as the squatter transformation process implied a massive change in the city in terms of physical environment. Putting it bluntly, redevelopment in the first place was nothing other than the clearance of the squatter settlements and their replacement by high-rise apartment blocks. Such a change would have important spatial repercussions on the future development of the city.

In the first place, such a massive scale of redevelopment amounted to a considerable increase in the population density of the existing built-up area. Ironically, this was reversing the development perspective of the master plan, which proposed a decentralised city form. As the plan focused on a decentralised development perspective at the expense of a compact city form, the strengthening of the sub-centres outside the built-up area was proposed for the year 2015. The main argument for this was the problems, ranging from air pollution to traffic concession, created by the existing compact city form. Thus opening the squatter areas to redevelopment

was nothing other than giving up to the objective of the decentralised city form and strengthening the existing compact form which had already created formidable problems for the city. The population density would inevitable increase in the areas opened to redevelopment and also reduce the attractiveness of sub-centres proposed by the master plan. Indeed, the study carried out in both case study areas has shown that the population density immensely increased as a result of transformation.

The second issue, related to the increase in population density, was the adequacy of services and infrastructure in the built up area. The inadequacy of the physical and social infrastructure in the city is a well-known fact; increasing the density in the built-up area via redevelopment would intensify this problem unless the redevelopment plans designated areas in need of infrastructure and allocated funds for necessary infrastructural facilities. Unfortunately, as we saw in the overall evaluation of the redevelopment plans as well as in the case studies, redevelopment plans were far from being sensitive to social and physical infrastructure standards. In turn, this was pointing to deterioration in the social and physical infrastructure in the built-up areas. This suggestion was confirmed by the findings of the case studies. In terms of the allocation of the collective facilities and common areas, the development plans were not meeting the generally accepted planning standards. In other words, most of the redeveloped areas lacked basic services and facilities. As I have shown, public service areas for schools, parks, commercial and health facilities were usually ignored during the plan preparation, as this required high expropriation payments. This is especially true for the situations where the Improvement Plans were prepared

by the municipalities as standard redevelopment plans, and implementation was left to the market actors (i.e., squatter owners and private developers).

The economic consequences of it upon different interest groups are another important dimension related to the transformation process. In this sense, who the winners and losers are of the transformation schemes require some attention. While the redevelopment policy and its implementation gained popularity among the masses, and especially among the groups involved such as squatter owners and private developers, it is difficult to substantiate the fact that the outcome of this policy was beneficial for all involved.

In the first place, the position of the most important actors of this process, that is the squatter owners, needs to be evaluated in terms of the expected and actual outcomes at the end of redevelopment. As we mentioned earlier, from the early years of their arrival in the city, the native population saw the squatter dwellers as potential land speculators. The unprecedented increases in land prices in the course of their stay in the city led the squatter dwellers themselves to believe in this. In turn, they saw their land as a source of capital accumulation and speculative gain. In this sense, the transformation of their land into authorised building plots became their ultimate goal. In the eyes of squatter dwellers, their land was the biggest asset they had for upward mobility. In other words, their expectations from the transformation were quite high.

Given these high expectations, it is difficult to argue that the redevelopment process fully met the expectations of the squatter dwellers. As we saw, in most cases, where

redevelopment was handled through the initiative of the squatter owners and private developers, they received two or three flats at most. In many cases, these flats were used by the squatter owners themselves and their married sons or daughters. The situation was worse in the case where redevelopment was carried out by the public-private sectors' cooperation. In this case, squatter owners got only one flat in return for their land, on which they also found it hard to meet the maintenance costs. This is not to suggest that the squatter owners were the real losers of this process. The point is that, even if they were not losers, the real benefit they received as a result of the redevelopment was far below their expectations.

Besides, as it was shown in both case studies, squatter owners were not happy with the newly emerging built environment. For most of the squatter dwellers, their dwellings represented a special way of life and a way of attaching themselves to the land, which was established over more than 20 years. Most of the squatter dwellers had a small garden in front of their houses where they could grow vegetables and plants. Redevelopment ended this as well. That is, the squatter dwellers lost control over their land and became shareholders in apartment blocks, which scarcely have a garden.

The developers have emerged as one of the important interest groups in this process. In a way, they emerged as one of the winners from redevelopment. In the case of market-led redevelopment, given the fact that they did not invest in urban land and acquired land from the squatter owners in return for shares, they got in most cases fifty per cent of the total number of flats. A similar perhaps more dramatic situation

emerged when the large-scale development companies became involved in the municipal-led redevelopment scheme as private contractors. In this case, they again received around fifty per cent of the total flats and offices. However, due to their central location and the luxurious nature of the flats produced, their profits were much higher than small developers.

Among the interest groups involved in this redevelopment process, the squatter tenants emerged as the worst effected as the whole process endcd up with their displacement from the areas subject to redevelopment. Most of them could not afford to stay in these areas due to the increasing rents. In this sense, for this group, redevelopment meant further peripherialisation in both a social and a spatial sense since they were pushed further to the peripheral districts of the city.

Perhaps, along with the tenants, the residents of the whole city can be regarded as losers in the sense that the squatter areas were low-density areas with a considerable proportion of green space. The redevelopment schemes handled by the squatter owners and small-scale private developers turned these areas irreversibly into relatively low-quality housing settlements. In turn, this increased the population density in the city without increasing the level of services. As we discussed in terms of the physical implications of transformation, this was quite the opposite of the proposals set out in the existing development plan, which assumed a decentralisation of the residential areas in order to reduce the pressure on the city in terms of population and necessary urban services. Given the fact that more than half of the city's population still lives in squatter areas, the continuation of the redevelopment

projects will lead to an emergence of a compact city, the very macro-form which the city development plan sought to avoid, and lead to a more frustrating urban life for the residents of the city.

Social and cultural implications of redevelopment were not less dramatic given the socio-spatial mobility prompted by it. An inevitable result of this process was considerable residential mobility among different groups. The upgrading of the areas subjected to redevelopment has resulted in the dislocation of certain groups. Ironically, displaced groups were limited to the tenants. While they were the major groups who were most adversely affected by redevelopment, as they could not afford to stay in the upgraded areas, in certain cases, even the squatter owners were part of displaced groups, as they failed to afford to stay in the area. According to the findings of the case studies, while tenants were the main losers in both areas, in the case of public-sector-led development there were squatter owners who were pushed to sell their share in the apartment blocks and leave the area. Because, basically, they were entitled to get one flat as a result of redevelopment. As the housing prices were quite high they sold their flat in the area to buy another one at a much cheaper price and they used the remaining money for survival. On the other hand, private-sector-led development hardly led to displacement of the squatter owners as they received more than one flat. If they had to sell part of their share, they were still able to stay in the area.

The residential mobility prompted by redevelopment has had important bearings on the cultural structure of the city as well. As is well known, the squatter areas

represent a tight network of ethnic communities. Given this structure, one of the expected consequences of redevelopment was the dissolution of these ethnic communities. The case studies have shown this was to a large extent the situation as a considerable part of the previous residents were displaced as a result of the transformation.

While the transformation was something desired by the squatter owners, ironically most of them, in both case study areas, were not happy with the emerging social relations after the transformation. The solidarity formed within the previous community was important for them in coping with the difficulties of urban life. In this sense, in terms of social relations, the real loss for them, at least in some cases, has been the disappearance of the community networks, hence of the solidarity of which they used to be part. Redevelopment led to the move of most of the members of this community out of the district and a return to a lesser degree of community interaction in their new lifestyles. Even if, for some, this might be considered a positive development in terms of the dissolution of traditional relations, as a simple point of fact, the emerging social structure is more individualistic and lacks the solidarity that previous networks had.

Thus, dissolution of ethnic communities has important political repercussions since they formed the social base for the political action of the squatter owners in the previous period. While their local community was the main unit for the mobilisation especially in relation to their squatter dwellings, the local community was also an important locus of political consciousness. Dissolution of these communities leads to

an ambiguous situation, as at the present, there is no emerging alternative locus of consciousness. In this sense, it is possible to say that in terms of previous squatter owners the dissolution of their local community amounts to a loss of political bargaining power.

In what follows, I would like to evaluate the findings of this research for public policy. The most crucial find of this study is that neither public-sector-led nor private-sector led transformation of squatter areas are without fault. Both proved to be inadequate in creating a new built environment that would be acceptable for the squatter population but more importantly for the overall population of the city. As we have seen in the case studies, redevelopment processes did not live up to the expectations of the previous squatter dwellers. Ironically, the private-sector-led better articulated the expectations of the squatter owners. This was partly due to small-scale solutions brought about by the private sector as well as the flexibility of small-scale solutions. If the small-scale developments were more successful than the large-scale solutions, this was partly due to the planning system shaping Turkish cities. Property ownership patterns as well as the rectangular building plots corresponding to the ownership pattern proved to be ineffective to bring out large-scale urban design and solutions. Rather, every single building plot had to be considered as an independent unit. That is partly why small-scale private-sector-led development was more successful compared to the public-sector-led scheme.

Thus, it would not be wrong for the planning institutions to assume part of the responsibility and to its failure to come up with an alternative model in the creation

of built environment. However, it would be wrong to hold the planning system completely responsible for the emerging built environment. The political and ideological choices made by the municipality have also played part in this failure. When the municipality took the initiative in the Dikmen Valley, it acted like a private developer trying to maximise profit. The rent seeking mentality of the last period was quite dominant and the area was turned into a high-income residential neighbourhood in a short space of time. Otherwise, this was a unique opportunity for the municipality to create an alternative built environment that could replace the squatter neighbourhoods without replicating the dominant built environment of the authorised city.

In sum, the overall evaluation of the transformation in Ankara as well as the case studies have shown that the transformation of squatter areas into apartment blocks have important implications for the city, and evidence up until now points to a deterioration in the social and spatial structures of the city. Except for a small group of developers, all the groups involved in the process, albeit in different degrees, seem to be adversely affected by the transformation.

It is in order to discuss the implications of the study of the transformation of squatter areas for the related field and the theory. At the beginning of the thesis, I started with a discussion of alternative perspective on squatter settlement formation and transformation. The discussion of the Turkish case in general and the case studies in particular have shown that existing theories fail to provide an adequate account of the formation of squatter settlements. Modernisation theory seemingly explains the evolutionary nature of these settlements, but fails to clarify why they are permanent

in most of the Third World countries. On this point, dependency school gives an explanation by arguing that the existence of squatter settlements is the direct result of the exploitative relationship between authorised and unauthorised parts of the cities. In this sense, they are not only permanent but also stagnant. Articulation theory, on the other hand, quite rightly rejects this argument on the grounds that squatter settlements are articulated to the authorised parts through a series of modifications. Therefore, they are by no means static but have their own dynamics. Yet, it too fails to give an account of the dynamics behind the transformation of squatter housing.

The important point is that the failures of these approaches become even clearer when they are applied to the transformation of squatter settlements as was shown in the thesis. The dependency approach remains totally silent in the face of the transformation that squatter areas have been undergoing, since they assumed a permanent stagnation for the squatter areas. Ironically, a superficial consideration of squatter transformation would lead one to find modernisation theory as the most explanatory one, in the sense that it has emphasised the transitional aspects of squatter housing and predicted a transformation towards apartment blocks. Yet, a detailed analysis shows that this transformation does not fit the type of transformation that modernisation theory envisages, since the process itself is uneven and does not follow a linear path, which covers all squatters areas. Even the articulation approach is not well equipped to understand this process. What this overall failure has shown is that we need more specific and middle-range theoretical devices to employ for the study of such dynamic processes as squatter transformation. As we saw, modernisation and similar theories remain largely

overgeneralising and insensitive to the political and other contextual features of squatter formation and transformation. This requires both more specific and context-sensitive theories. I argued that it is possible to apply rent gap theory as a more specific theory to fill the gap left by the above-mentioned approaches.

As rent gap theory is based on the uneven development taking place in the city, it illustrates how different quarters of the city get differentiated in terms of social and physical structures and this in turn causes an urge for redevelopment. In this respect, it highlights the differentiation of urban housing in the case of Ankara. Especially, the squatter areas that have developed in an unevenly fashion themselves, represent the underdeveloped section of the city where, in terms of land values, redevelopment seems to be feasible. In a way it gives us some clues regarding the structural factors behind the transformation of squatter areas without referring that much to the actors and their struggles. For this reason, rent gap theory is not a theory that fully explains the dynamics behind the redevelopment of squatter settlements. It rather identifies the main structural factors that exert pressure on redevelopment in squatter areas.

A more satisfactory understanding can only emerge by taking the macro and micro level actors and their struggles into account. I have shown that both macro-level concerns, such as gaining the support of squatter dwellers, as well as micro-level political dynamics are important in the transformation process. For this reason, we need to supplement the macro-level approaches with the micro-level ones related to both the policy process and the actions of the actors in a micro-level situation.

The review of the theories has shown that there is no exhaustive theory of formation and transformation of squatter settlements. Instead, we draw upon different schools to understand and explain this complicated process. In my view, this is quite understandable in light of the fact that there cannot be a specific theory explains squatter formation and transformation in an exhaustive manner as the issue itself is multi-dimensional and covers a wide range of areas. Nevertheless, employing different theories to explain different dimension of this process requires hard work in that, on the one hand, we have to identify the structural dynamics and actors involved in this process; on the other hand, we have to combine the macro processes with the micro ones. Although the thesis has contributed to this objective to a certain extent, it is far from providing a satisfactory theoretical synthesis.

The issues, which remain to be explored, are not limited to the theoretical field. There are important empirical issues, which require further research. In the first place, one topic that was studied partly in the case studies is the possible future implications of redevelopment schemes for the city as a whole. It is obvious that redevelopment is a process which can determine the destiny of the city to a large extent. For this reason, there is a need for further studies to reveal the spatial consequences of this process for the city.

There is also a need for further studies to find out the economic, cultural and political consequences of redevelopment process for the squatter population as well as for the overall city. Although I studied these implications in two communities, we need to know more about it for the city as a whole. It is important to know the changing

cultural and political structure of the newly emerging communities, which are taking the place of the old ones. It is equally important to find out the ex-squatter dwellers' opinions about the redevelopment process and their perception of the gains and loses due to redevelopment.

The case studies have shown that the redevelopment process was a politically motivated one that it did not live up to the expectation of squatter owners and ended up with the displacement of squatter tenants in the short term. Initial findings point to more serious and negative consequences in the long run. For this reason, it is necessary to carry out further research on this issue.

If this study serves as a starting point for future research and reveals part of the early implications of the redevelopment process, it will have served its initial objectives.

# REFERENCES:


ABRAMS, C., 1964, *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanising World*, MIT Press

ALPAR, I. and YENER, S., 1991, *Gecekondu Araştırması*, Ankara: DPT

AMIN, S., 1974, *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment*, London: Monthly Review Press

Ankara Buyuksehir Belediyesi, 1985, *Ankara: 1985'den 2015'e*, . ODTU Sehir ve Bolge Planlama Bolumu Calisma Grubu, Ankara: Ajans Iletim

Ankara Buyuksehir Belediyesi, Imar Daire Baskanligi, 1989, *Islah Imar Planlari Koordinasyon Toplanti Raporlari*, Interim Reports

Ankara Buyuksehir Belediyesi, 1990, *Ankara Kent Butununda Islah Imar Planı Calısmaları*, Imar Daire Baskanligi, Interim Reports

Ankara Buyuksehir Belediyesi, 1991, *Gecekondu Alanlari Cerceve Butunu Aciklama Raporu*, Imar Daire Baskanligi, Interim Reports

AYATA, S., 1989, 'toplumsal cevre olarak gecekondu ve apartman', *Toplum ve Bilim*, no.49

AYATA, S. and AYATA, A., 1996, *Konut Komsuluk ve Kent Kulturu*, Ankara: TOKI

ARMSTRONG, W. and McGEE, T. G., 1985, *Theatres of Accumulation: Studies in Asian and Latin American Urbanisation*, London: Methuen

ATAY, H. R., 1980, *Cankaya*, Ankara: Imge

BADEMLI, R., 1990, '1990'dan 2000'li yillarin Ankara'sina bir bakis', *Ankara Dergisi*, cilt. 1, sayi. 1

BEAUREGARD, R., 1986, 'The chaos and complexity of gentrification', in N. Smith and P. Williams (eds.), *The Gentrification of the City*, London: Allen and Unwin

BONDI, L., 1991, 'Gender division and gentrification: a critique', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 16, pp.190-198

BOURASSA, S. C., 1993, 'The rent gap debunked', *Urban Studies*, vol. 30, no. 10

BURGESS, R., 1982, 'Self-help housing advocacy: a curious form of radicalism. A critique of the work of John F. C. Turner', in P. M. Ward (ed..), *Self-Help Housing a Critique*, Oxford: Alexandrine Press

BURGESS, R., 1989, *The State and the Self-Help Building in Preira, Colombia.* PhD Thesis, London: University College London, Department of Geography

BURGESS, R., 1992, 'Helping some to help themselves: Third World housing policies and development strategies', in K. Mathey (ed.), *Beyond Self-Help Housing*, London: Mansell

BUTLER, T. and HAMNETT, C:, 1994, 'Gentrification, class, and gender', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 12, pp.477-493

CAMUR, K., 1991, *Improvement Plans for Ankara Metropolitan Area*, Unpublished Master Thesis, Ankara: METU

Cankaya Belediyesi, 1992, *Cankaya Belediyesi Calısma Raporu 1990-1991*, Interim Reports

Cankaya Belediyesi, 1993, *Dikmen Vadisi Proje Raporu*, Interim Reports

CASTELLS, M., 1983, *City and the Grassroots.* London: Arnold

COLLINS, T. 1991, 'Legalisation of squatter settlement in Istanbul, Turkey and implications for future squatter growth', *The Journal of Architectural Planning Research*, 8:4

CORBRIDGE, S., 1986, *Capitalist World Development: A Critique of Radical Development Geography*, Hong Kong: Rowman and Littlefield

CUNHA F. S., 1991, 'New trends in organisation and social life in Brazilian favelas', paper presented in *Eight Urban Change and Conflict Conference*, Lancaster University, September 10-13, 1991

DANIELSON, M. N., and KELES, R., 1985, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanisation: Government and Growth in Modern Turkey*, New York: Holmes & Meier

Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project, An Interim Report, Ankara: Metropol A.S.

Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project, 1991, *Feasibility Report*, Ankara: Metropol A.S.

DRAKAKIS-SMITH, D., 1987, *The Third World City*, London: Methuen

DRAKAKIS-SMITH, D., and FIHER, 1975, *Housing Problems in Ankara*, University of Durham

EKE, F., 1982, 'Absorption of low-income groups in Ankara', in D. Diamond and J. B. McLoughlin, (eds.), *Progress in Planning*, vol. 18, Part 1

EMMANUEL, A., 1972, *Unequal Exchange: A study of Imperialism of Trade*, London: New Left Books

ERSOY, M., 1985, *Goc ve Kentsel Butunlesme*, Ankara: S.B.F.

ERSOY, M., 1992, 'Integration of migrants into the urban residential setting of Ankara'. *Ekistic*, vol. 354

FAINSTAIN, S. and FAINSTAIN, N., 1996, 'City planning and political values: an updated view', in S. Campbell and S. Fainstain (eds.), *Reasdings in Planning Theory*, Oxford: Blackwell

FORBES, D. K., 1984, *Theories of Development*, Cambridge: Polity Press

FRANK, A. G., 1967, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies Of Chile and Brazil, London*: Monthly Review Press

GILBERT, A. and Ward, P.M., 1982, 'Low income housing, and the state', in A. Gilbert (eds), *Urbanisation in Contemporary Latin America*, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons Ltd.

GILBERT, A., 1982 (eds), *Urbanisation in Contemporary Latin America*, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons Ltd.

GILBERT, A., 1984a, 'The tenant of self-help housing: choice and constraints in the housing market in less developed countries', *Development and Change*, 14, pp.449-477

GILBERT, A., 1984b, 'Planning, invasions and land speculation: the role of the state in Venezuela', *Third World Planning Review*, 6, (3), pp.225-38

GILGERT, A. and GUGLER, J., 1985, *Cities, Powerty and Development: Urbanisation in the Third World*, London: Oxford University Press

GILBERT, A., and WARD, P. M., 1985, *Housing, the State and the Poor*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

GOKCE, B., 1971, *Gecekondu Gencligi*, Ankara: Hacettepe Universitesi

GUGLER, J., 1988 (ed.), *The Urbanisation of the Third World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

HABITAT (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements), 1982, *Survey of Slum and Squatter Settlements*, Dublin

HAMNETT, C., 1991, 'The blind man and the elephant: the explanation of gentrification', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 16, pp.173-189

HARMS, H., 1982, 'Historical perspectives on the practice and purpose of self-help housing', in M. Ward (ed.), *Self-Help Housing a Critique*, Oxford: Alexandrine Press

HARMS, H., 1992, 'Self-help housing in developed and Third World countries', in K. Mathey (ed), *Beyond Self-Help Housing*, London: Mansell

HARRISON, D., 1988, *Sociology of Modernisation and Development*, London: Unwin Hyman

HARVEY, D., 1985, *The Urbanisation of Capital: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanisation*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press

HEPER, M., 1978, *Gecekondu Policy in Turkey: An Evaluation with a Case Study of Rumeli Hisarustu Squatter Area in Istanbul*, Istanbul: Bogazici University Press

Imar Iskan Bakanligi, 1966, *Ankara-Gulveren Gecekondulari*. Ankara: Dogus Ltd. St. Matbaasi

JACOBSON, L. and PRAKASH, V., (eds), 1971, *Urbanization and National Develpment*, Beverly Hills: Sage

JOHNSTON, R. J. et. al., 1990, *The Dictionary of Human Geography*, (2nd Edition), Oxford: Blackwell

KARPAT, K., 1976, *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanisation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

KAY, C., 1989, *Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment*, London: Routledge

Kecioren Belediyesi, Imar Dairesi, *İmar Calisma Raporu*, Interim Report

Kecioren Belediyesi, 1989, *19 Mayis Mahallesi Islah Imar Plani Plan Raporu*, Interim Report

KELES, R., 1971, *Eski Ankara'da Bir Sehir Tipolojisi*, Ankara: Siyasai Bilgiler Fakultesi

KELES, R., 1988, *Urban Powerty in the Third World: Theoretical Approaches and Policy Options (With Special Reference to the Middle East)*, Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies

KELES, R., 1990, 'Housing Policy in Turkey', in G. Shidlo (ed), *Housing Policy in Developing Countries*, London: Routledge

KELES, R., 1993, *Kentlesme Politikasi*, Ankara: Imge Kitapevi

KELES, R. and KANO, H., 1987, *Housing and the Urban Poor in the Middle East*, Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies

Kent-Koop, 1983, *Batikent New Settlement Project*, Ankara: Ozgun

KEYDER, C., 1987, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, London: Verso

KONGAR, E., 1973, 'Altındag gecekondu bolgesi', *Amme Idaresi Dergisi*, 6 (3), pp.109-138

LARRAIN, J., 1989, *Theories of Development*, Cambridge: Polity Press

MANGIN, W., 1967, 'Latin American squatter settlements: a problem and a solution', *Latin American Research Review*, 2, pp.67-98

MARCUSSEN, L., 1982, *Settlement In Turkey: A Report on the Politics of Housing and Urbanisation.* FSC Publications, Series B, No.7

MARCUSSEN, L., 1990, *Third World Housing in Social and Spatial Development*, Aldershot: Avebury

MATHEY, K., 1992, *Beyond Self-Help Housing*, London: Mansell

McGEE, T. G., 1971, 'Catalysts or cancers?: the role of cities in Asian society', in L. Jacobson and V. Prakashs (eds), *Urbanization and National Develpment*, Beverly Hills: Sage

MOUZELIS, N., 1986, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery*, London: McMillan

NIENTIED, P. and van der LINDEN, J., 1988, 'Approaches to low-income housing in the Third World', in J. Gugler (ed), *The Urbanisation of the Third World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

OGRETMEN, I., 1957, *Ankara'da 158 Gecekondu Hakkinda Monografi*, Ankara: Ankara Universitasi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Yayinlari

OZSOY, A., 1992, 'Dikmen Vadisi ve kultur koprusu uzerine uzerine', *Yapi*, Mayis 1992

PAYNE, G. K., 1977, *Ankara: Housing And Planning in an Expanding City*, A Research Report Submitted to the Social Science Research Council, 3 volumes

PAYNE, G. K., 1982, 'Self-help housing: a critique of the gecekondus of Ankara', in P. Ward (ed), *Self-Help Housing: A Critique*, Oxford: Alexandrine Press

PERLMAN, J. E., 1976, *The Myth of Marginality, Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro*, Berkeley: University of California Press

PEET, R., 1991, *Global Capitalism: Theories of Societal Development*, London: Routledge

PICKVANCE, C. G., 1976, 'On the study of urban social movements', in C. G. Pickvance (ed.), *Urban Sociology: Critical Essays*, London: Tavistock

PICKVANCE, C. G., 1984, 'The structuralist critique in urban studies', in M. Smith, et al. (eds), *Cities in Transformation: Class, Capital and the State*, London: Sage

PICKVANCE, C. G. and PICKVANCE, K., 1994, 'Towards a strategic approach to housing behaviour: a case study of young people's housing strategies in south-east England', *Sociology*, vol. 28, no. 3

QUIJANO, A., 1974, 'The marginal pole of the economy and the marginalised labour force', *Economy and Society*, 3, pp.393-428

ROSE, D., 1989, 'A feminist perspective of employment, restructuring and gentrification: the case of Montreal', in Wolch, J. and Dear, M., (eds.) *The Power of Geography*, London: Unwin Hyman

ROBERTS, B., 1978, *Cities of the Peasants: Explorations in Urban Analysis*, London: Edward Arnold

SAUNDERS, P., 1986, *Social Theory and Urban Question*, (2nd edition), London: Hutchinson

SAVAGE, M., and WARD, A., 1993, *Urban Sociology, Capitalism amd Modernity*, Hong Kong: Macmillan Press

SAYER, A., 1992, *Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach*, (2nd edition), London: Routledge

SCHICK, I. C., and TONAK, A. (eds.), 1987, *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

SENYAPILI, T., 1978, *Butunlesmemis Kentli Nufus Sorumu*, Ankara: ODTU

SENYAPILI, T., 1981, *Gecekondu: Cevre Iscilerin Mekani*, Ankara: ODTU

SENYAPILI, T., 1983, *Ankara Kentinde Gecekondu Gelisimi (1923-1960)*, Ankara: Kent-Koop

SHIDLO, G., (ed), 1990, *Housing Policy in Developing Countries*, London: Routledge

SKINNER, R., 1982, 'Self-help, community organisation and politics: Villa El Salvador, Lima', in P. M. Ward (ed.), *Self-Help Housing: A Critique*, Oxford: Alexandrine Press

SMART, A., 1986, 'Invisible real estate: investigations into squatter property market', *IJURR*, 10, 1, pp.29-45

SMITH, N., 1979, 'Towards a theory of gentrification: a back to the city movement by capital not people', *Journal of American Planning Association*, 45, pp.538-48

SMITH, N., 1996, *The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City*, London: Routledge

SMITH, N. and WILLIAMS, P., (eds.) 1986, *Gentrification of the City*, London: Unwin Hyman

State Planning Organisation, 1991, *Gecekondu Arastirmasi*, Ankara: SPO

State Statistical Institute, 1990, *Population Census*, Ankara: SSI

TANKUT, G., 1984, 'Jansen Plani uygulama sorunlari' *Tarih Icinde Ankara*, Ankara: ODTU

TANKUT, G., 1990, *Bir Baskentin Imari: Ankara 1929-1939*, Ankara: ODTU

TEKELI, I. and ERDER, L., 1978, *Yerlesme Yapisinin Uyum Sureci Olarak Ic Gocler*, Ankara: Hacettepe Universitesi

TEKELI, I. and ILKIN, S., 1984, *Bahcelievlerin Oykusu*. Ankara: Kent-Koop

TEKELI, I., 1991, *Kent Planlamasi Konusmalari*, Ankara: TMMOB Mimarlar Odasi Yayinlari

TIMBERLAICE, M., (ed), 1985, *Urbanization in the World-Economy*, Orlando, Florida: Academic Press

TUREL, A., 1985, 'Ankara'da konut pazarı analizi', in Y. Guloksuz (ed.), *Turkiye I. Sehircilik Kongresi*, ODTU, Sehir ve Bolge Planlama Bolumu, Ankara

TUREL, A., 1993, 'Housing provision in Turkey with limited credit support', paper presented in ENHR Conference in Budapest, Hungary

TURNER, F. J. C. and FITCHER, R., 1976, *Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the Housing Process*, New York: Macmillan

TURNER, F. J. C., 1976, *Housing by People: Towards Autonomy in Building Environments*, London: Marion Boyars

TURNER, F. J. C., 1978, 'Housing in three dimensions: terms of reference for the housing question redefined', *Wold Development*, vol. 6, no. 9/10

TURNER, F. J. C., 1982, 'Issues in self-help and self-managed housing', in P. M. Ward (ed.), *Self-Help Housing: A Critique*, Oxford: Alexandrine Press

WALLERSTEIN, I., 1974, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and and the Origins of the European World Economy in the 16th Century*, Academic Press

WARD, P.M., 1982, 'Introduction and purpose', in P. M. Ward (ed), *Self-Help Housing a Critique*, Oxford: Alexandrine Press

WARD, P.M., 1982 (ed), *Self-Help Housing a Critique*, Oxford: Alexandrine Press

WARD, P. M. and MACOLOO, G. C., (1992), 'Articulation theory and self-help housing practice in the 1990s', *IJURR*, vol. 16, no. 1

WARDE, A., 1991, 'Gentrification as consumption: issues of class and gender', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 8, pp.223-232

YASA, I., 1966, *Ankara'da Gecekondu Aileleri*, Ankara: Saglik ve Sosyal Yardim Bakanligi, Sosyal Hizmetler genel Mudurlugu

YONDER, A., 1981, 'Gecekondu policies and informal land market in Istanbul', *Built Environment*, vol. 8, no. 2

# APPENDIX-I: FIELD SURVEY

The rationale behind the choice of two squatter settlements as case study areas was explained in Chapter 4. The objective of this Appendix is to explain the research strategies employed in the thesis and how the samples of household and private developers' surveys were drawn.

It should be noted that the research regarding the transformation of squatter areas has been carried out at two levels. The first level was a general survey of the transformation process on the whole city. At this level, in order to reveal different aspects of squatter settlement transformation, two different methods and corresponding techniques were employed. Since the transformation process was rather new at the time of the survey, the academic research on the issue was very limited. This led the researcher to employ an '*exploratory type of study*' for a start. In this context, the initial study for the field survey was determined as the construction of the general picture of the transformation process in Ankara. Basically, this included researches in different municipalities of Ankara, in relation to their efforts for the preparation of Improvement Plans and interviews with planners and local authorities. At this early stage, the research was qualitative. Only after the completion of this stage, could it be possible to describe the general framework of the current situation (*descriptive type of study)*.

In the second level of the research two case study areas were chosen to analyse the transformation process in detail. Regarding the case studies, intensive and extensive research strategies were jointly employed (see Sayer. 1992). While the extensive

research aimed at analysing the case study areas by employing formal questionnaires, standardised interviews, and some form of statistical analysis, intensive research involved the study of individual agents in their causal context, interactive interviews, and qualitative analysis.

Thus the main part of the field survey is comprised of the questionnaires given to the gecekondu owners, current residents of the neighbourhoods after the redevelopment, and finally private developers who carried out the redevelopment. This stage was carried out after each questionnaire was tested on a small number of samples. This made the researcher revise the questions and make changes accordingly.

In 19 Mayis, in addition to the extended interviews with neighbourhood heads and elderly residents of the neighbourhood, 15 questionnaires were applied, in December 1992, to the gecekondu owners whose plots:

- had already been developed;
- had been developing (under construction);
- will be developing in the near future.

The basic aim of this household survey was to gather information about:

- the demographic and socio-economic structure of the neighbourhood before the redevelopment;
- how redevelopment processes have been carried out by the initiative of the gecekondu owners and private developers;

- the potential implications of the transformation in physical, social, economic and political terms;
- residents' opinions on the outcome of the transformation process.

In the same neighbourhood, 498 families were living in the newly developed apartment blocks in December 1993. The sampling ratio chosen was 10% and 51 questionnaires (30 to owners, 21 to tenants) were applied to the current residents of the new neighbourhood. The objective, here, was to determine:

- whether the previous social, economic and political structure of the neighbourhood still existed;
- if not, what replaced it;
- residents' opinions on the outcome of the transformation process.

In the Dikmen Valley, on the other hand, at the time of the household survey (January 1995) there were around 400 families living in the new neighbourhood. In accordance with the sampling ratio (10%) 44 questionnaires (28 to ex-gecekondu owners, 16 to tenants) were given to the households who live in the newly developed apartment blocks to obtain the same information outlined above. In line with this aim, people from a neighbourhood organisation established during the construction period and some of the elderly residents of the gecekondu area were also interviewed.

For the examination of the construction phase, 18 private developers who were operating in 19 Mayis were interviewed. Basic aims of this survey were to find out:

- the mechanisms of 'market forces' which controlled the redevelopment process in the area;
- the social and economic characteristics of the private developers;
- the internal organisation of this type of construction;
- the scale and significance of their operation in the market.

In Dikmen Valley, on the other hand, senior planners of the MDC, the responsible body for the redevelopment process of the Valley, were interviewed. In addition, a number of publications of the project and plans were also reviewed for examination of the production side of the project.

The method employed in this study was not without its limitations. First, if the sampling ratio would have been larger than what it was, it could have been possible to draw stronger conclusions on the household survey. Second, if a survey on the tenants could have been included in the study, the implications of the transformation process on each interest group involved would have been complete. However, these two limitations were highly related to the size of the work that was to be undertaken within a short period of time. The researches, which would follow this study, should obviously take these shortcomings into the account.

**QUESTIONNAIRE TO SQUATTER OWNERS:**

DATE:
NUMBER OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE:
NAME OF THE STREET:
NUMBER OF THE HOUSE:

**I. People Living in the House:**

| Relation to HoH | Age | Sex | Education | Job |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

Questions to be answered by the respondent (HoH) :

1. When did you come to Ankara?

2. Where did you come from?

3. What were the main reasons to leave from village?

   a. Insufficient job opportunities
   b. Land or other disputes
   c. Better services and facilities are available in the city
   d. Better job opportunities are available in the city
   e. The city offers higher social status
   f. The city offers better future for children
   g. Relatives/friends are in the city
   h. Other

4. How long have you been living in this particular neighbourhood?

5. Places before you have moved here:

| Period | Place | House Type |
|---|---|---|
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |

6. Why did you prefer to live in this particular neighbourhood?
   a. The location is good for work
   b. The prices were not too high
   c. The land was available
   d. It offered a good investment potential
   e. Relatives/friends lived here

7. Which sect of the Islam do you belong to?

8. Have you got any other house in Ankara?

| Place | House Type | Type of use |
|---|---|---|
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |

9. Jobs you occupied after you moved to Ankara:

| Period | Nature of Job | Work Place | Income |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

10. Are there any other people who works presently in your household? If yes,

| Nature of Job | Income(TL/pm) |
|---|---|
| | |
| | |
| | |

11. What is total income of your household? (TL/pm)

12. How much could you save out of it? (TL/pm)

**II. Land**

13. When did you get your plot?

14. On what basis did you originally occupy your present plot?
   a. Invaded the land (public/private)
   b. Bought from landlord who previously invaded the land without land title
   c. Bought from landlord with shared title deed

15. What size ($m^2$) is it?

16. (If the answer to the 14th question is "b" or "c" ) How much was the land?

17.(If the answer to the 14th question is "a" or "b" ) Do you have a title deed now?

18. When did you get it?

**III. House**

19. When did you buy/build this house?

20. How did you get it?
    a. Bought from landlord who previously built it without necessary building permission
    b. Built it by myself/with the helps of the relatives
    c. Employed a constructor to carry out the work

21. How much did it cost? (TL/m²)

**IV. Local Organisations:**

22. Did you establish any organisation for the improvement of your neighbourhood?

23. If yes, when did you set up it?

24. What kind of services could you get through this organisation?

25. Does it still exist? If dissolved, when?

26. Did you take any active role in this organisation?

27. Did you take any active role in any other political organisation

**V. Services and Facilities:**

28. How many rooms does your house have? (exc. Kitchen and bathroom)

29. Which of the following services are presently available in your house? And when was it provided? By who?

| Service | Date | Agency |
|---|---|---|
| Water | | |
| Sewage | | |
| Electricity | | |
| Telephone | | |

## VI. Redevelopment Process

30. When was the Improvement/Redevelopment Plan of your neighbourhood approved?

31. Did you make any attempt to influence the preparation of the plan before it was completed?

32. If yes, how did you organise it? Did your local organisation play any active role in the preparation of the plan?

33. According to this plan, have you got the individual or shared plot now?

34. How much of your previous plot had been purchased compulsorily (expropriated) by municipality?

35. How much was the price of your land just before the approval of the plan? ($TL/m^2$)

36. How much is it now? ($TL/m^2$)

37. Are you planning to develop your plot according to new plan?

38. If yes, are you going to build it by yourself or are you going to make a contract with a developer?

39. If you are going to build it on your own, how will you finance it?
    a. Through my personal accumulation
    b. By selling the flats in advance

40. If you have already made a contract with a developer, when did you make it?

41. What are the terms of agreement?
    a. Number of flats you get:
    b. Number of shops you get:
    c. Amount of money (cash) you get:

42. How long will it take (did it take) the construction to be finished?

43. How many flats and shops are there in this apartment block?

44. How many share holder are there in this construction?

45. What did they get from the contract?

| **Share Holders** | **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number of flats | | | | |
| Number of shops | | | | |
| Amount of money | | | | |

46. What are the specific regulations in your contract with developer to control the quality of the building materials being used in the construction?

47. What was your reference when you give your plot to developer in terms of your share in the newly developed apartment block?

48. Did you leave your squatter well before the construction started or just before?

49. Where did you move to?

50. How did you finance it?

51. Are you going to live in one of the new flats after the redevelopment?

52. If no, are you planning to buy another flat by selling one or more of those flats that you get from this construction?

53. In which part of the city are you going to buy a flat?

54. Why do you prefer to live in another place?

55. Do you think that relations within the community of your neighbourhood are going to be changed?

56. Do you expect positive or negative changes in your neighbourhood after the redevelopment in terms of building and environmental qualities?

57. Do you have any new investment plan?

**QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE HOUSEHOLD WHO LIVE IN THE NEWLY DEVELOPED APARTMENT BLOCK:**

DATE:
NUMBER OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE:
NAME OF THE STREET:
NUMBER OF THE BUILDING AND THE FLAT:

1. People Living in the House:

| Place of Birth | Age | Sex | Education | Job | Date of coming to Ankara | Relation to HoH |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |

2. Jobs that you occupied until now:

| Period | Nature of Job | Income (TL/pm) |
|---|---|---|
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |

3. Do you own this house or rent it? (If it is rental go to question 9).

4. When did you buy it?

5. How much did it cost?

6. How did you pay? (In advance/instalments)

7. How could you finance it/raise the money?

8. Other houses/land that you have in Ankara:

| Place | House Type | Type of use |
|---|---|---|
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |

9. When did you rent it?

10. How much do you pay? (TL/month)

11. Did you pay any deposit? How much was it?

12. What is your landlord's job?

13. Does he/she have any other houses in rent?

14. Is he/she living in the same neighbourhood?

15. If no where is he living?

12. Places that you lived before you moved to this house?

| **Period** | **Place** | **House Type** | **Rent (TL/pm)** | **Income** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

13. Why did you choose this particular neighbourhood?

a. The location is good for work
b. The rents were not too high
c. Relatives/friends lived here

14. Which sect of the Islam do you belong to?

15. Did you know each other with your neighbours before you moved into this area?

16. How often do you meet with your neighbours?

17. Do you help each other with your neighbours? If yes, in what areas?

18. Did you establish any kind of organisation with your neighbours? If yes, for what purposes?

19. Are you interested in local politics?

20. Are you a member of any kind of local organisation and/or political party?

21. Which party did you vote in the 1989 Local Elections?

22. Which party are you going to vote in the 1994 Local Elections?

Following questions are to be asked to those who lived in the same area before the redevelopment:

23. What is your opinion on the quality of the flat you live?

a. It is better than the gecekondus
b. The construction materials used are low in quality
c. There is problem with heating
d. There are power cuts

24. What is your opinion on the environmental quality of the neighbourhood?

a. It is better than the previous gecekondu area
b. It is worse than the previous gecekondu area
c. It could be better

25. Which one would you prefer, as far as the quality of social life is taken into consideration, gecekondu mahalle or new neighbourhood?

**QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE DEVELOPERS:**

DATE:
NUMBER OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE:

Age:

Sex:

Place of birth:

Education:

1. When did you come to Ankara?
2. When did you start to do this job?
3. Are you registered to any union/association?
4. Have you got any business associate (partner)?
5. How could you rise the initial accumulation to start this job?
6. Are you employing any of your relatives in your business?
7. If yes, are you paying them on the same basis with the other employees?
8. Do you have any other investment in other areas (e.g. trade etc.)
9. Developments that you have done before:

| Year | Place | Duration | Terms of Contract | Number of flats sold | Number of flats rented | Get back money on investment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |

10. Why did you prefer 19 Mayis this time?
11. Ownership pattern of building plot:

-1 owner -fragmented

12. What were the terms of contract with landowner(s)?

13. Who designed the building?

14. How many flats and shops does this apartment have?

15. How many of them are yours?

16. Did you sell any of them so far?

17. If yes, how many and on what basis?

18. How much is the building cost of per $m^2$?

19. How much is the selling price of per $m^2$?

20. Did you make any contact with the local politicians/authorities before you started development of this plot?

21. Are you planning to do other developments in this neighbourhood? If yes, why?

22. Are you planning to do other developments in other parts of the city? If yes, where and why?

23. For how long are you planning to stay in this job?

24. Are you planning to enlarge the scale of your business?