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Hegemony and Urban Space

The Case of the Turkish Capital Ankara

A Thesis Submitted in Part Fulfilment for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy

At the
University of Kent at Canterbury

H. Tarik Sengul

July 1998

ABSTRACT

Hegemony and Urban Space: The case of the Turkish Capital Ankara

Cities are social products resulting from conflicting interests. Urban space is produced, reproduced and transformed through the action of interest-driven human agency who strive for different outcomes. Some see urban space as a living place, whereas some others perceive it as a source of speculative gaining or use it as an arena of representation for a particular identity. While actors change urban space with their strategies, schemes and projects, they do so always under a specific structural context. In this respect, the relationship between strategy and structure stands as one of the basic problems of urban social and political analysis. The thesis develops a strategic relational approach to the state and the urban question which overcomes some of the difficulties of the structure-agency nexus, and applies it to the study of first the Turkish state, and then to the analysis of its capital Ankara.

Having shown that the dominant, state-centred perspectives in Turkey analyses the state and the urban question around a misleading duality, such as the élite versus the masses and the state versus civil society, it is argued that a relational understanding of the state and the urban question which overcomes the dualities, between the society and the state, is the more productive.

A study of the Turkish state and its capital Ankara is hardly possible without referring to the Kemalist project. For this reason, the Kemalist project is placed at the centre of analysis and argued that Kemalism needs to be seen as a bourgeois revolution with nation state formation as its most distinctive aspect. Having shown that the Kemalist project denied the real communities that were a part of Ottoman tradition, in favour of an imagined community which was thought to be Western-looking, secular and modern, it is revealed that the most important spatial dimension of this denial was the rejection of the Imperial capital, Istanbul, in favour of a small Anatolian town, Ankara.

As a symbol, arena and means of this transformation, Ankara exhibited all the contradictions of this refusal in the form of a duality between the old town inherited from the Ottoman period, and the new town which was built by the republican regime. The duality took a new form and gained new dimensions after the Second World War with the massive population influx into the city from the rural areas, as the emerging squatters at the outskirts of the city outnumbered the established population of the city in a short space of time.

This case study of Ankara dwelled upon the view that although the cultural and identity dimensions, which are the central concerns of the mainstream literature, are important ones in the understanding of the development of the city, economic and material interests are central to an exhaustive understanding of the socio-spatial change the city underwent, as Ankara has not been only a capital but also a capitalist' city where exchange value overrides other forms of value.

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A generous scholarship from the Middle East Technical University made this study possible. I am grateful for this generosity.

I also owe a huge debt to my parents. This thesis is dedicated to my mother and to the memory of my father who was a squatter dweller, a radical Kemalist and a dedicated parent.

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Cities are battle fields of conflicting social forces and interests. They are products of conflict, struggle and negotiation between different actors employing different objectives, strategies and projects towards urban space. While some groups conceive urban space as a living place, the others see it in terms of money and profit making. For some others, it is a theatre of identity. Often, these projects are irreconcilable and clash with each other. It is possible to see urban space as an outcome of these conflicts and struggles.

In these struggles, capital cities hold a specific place as political command centres. Because of their strategic positions, they become an important arena of hegemonic struggles. In this thesis, my objective is to study the Turkish capital, Ankara, as an arena of struggles for hegemony between 1923 and 1980.

As is well known, Ankara became the capital of a newly founded Turkish Republic when it replaced the imperial capital, Istanbul in 1923. The relocation of the capital to Ankara was not an ordinary decision as every new social and political order tends to create its own space as a part of its hegemonic strategy. As in other cases such as St Petersburg and Brasilia, the decision marked a break with the past and began a new period which was characterised by the formation of the Turkish nation state. After having becoming a new capital, Ankara immediately turned to be the most important socio-spatial element and laboratory for the Kemalist project, where the preliminary models of the new nation state were produced.

Whereas the city was conceived as a central element in a new modern and Western-looking model of society, the actual city, the modernising elite found in their arrival did not quite fit into this ideal. The clash between the real communities and the imagined one was inevitable in the decades following the relocation of the capital in Ankara. The conflict was not only cultural. The changing fortune of the city created a condition for speculative gains around the urban land and who would appropriate the emerging rent became another conflict-ridden issue in the city during the 1920s and the 1930s.

In the wake of the World War II, the city began to face another crisis as it became one of the most attractive targets for a migrant population. In a short time the city, which was designated as a model of the Western type of modernity, turned to be a city with the highest number of squatters with seventy percent of its population living in these illegal dwellings.

Such a dramatic trajectory deserves a rigorous examination and there has been considerable literature from various perspectives which gives an account of the development of Ankara. In my view, however, this literature has at least two major weaknesses.

The first is that it suffers from empiricism. That is, most of the work on Ankara does not go beyond providing a chronological account of the events in the development of the city. This does not mean, however, that the existing literature, has not been affected implicitly or explicitly by any theoretical current. I will claim that, although their concepts are not employed systematically, there is a considerable influence of the Chicago school and Weberian perspectives on the study of Ankara. Moreover, we might

talk of a peculiar marriage of the Chicago school and a Weberian perspective as will be seen in the course of the thesis.

The clearest manifestation of the impact of these perspectives, which is the second weakness of current literature, is the perception of the major conflict in and over the city as that of an elite-mass confrontation. While the Kemalist elite was seen as the major driving force behind the modernist project towards the city, the native population of the city and the migrant population were seen as the masses whose interest was, by and large, in contradiction with that of the elite. Although the recent debate on this issue has turned to focus on a dualism between the state and civil society; the main concern remained the same.

Accordingly, two major positions emerges out of this perception. The first one, the state centred view has attributed a progressive role to Kemalism and the Kemalist elite in creating a modern city. The failures of the Kemalist project have been seen as due to deviations from the principle of the project. The second view, that is, the civil society-centred view, considers the Kemalist project as an elitist one in that it excluded the non-modern sections of the society from its project. In turn, its failures are explained with reference to this exclusionary elitist strategy.

Given these debates, it is not surprising that the literature has been dominated by the Weberian and Chicago school perspectives as the former takes the state as its home domain while the latter focuses upon community. In turn, the main debate on the development of Ankara has become predominantly politico-culturalist in that the main

focus is on the creation of a modern city though the meaning of modernism depends on the side taken..

Unfortunately, the debate developing around the dualism between the state/elite and civil society/masses confuses as much as it clarifies in the sense that it focuses upon a very particular aspect of the Ankara experience, that is its cultural dimension, and excludes the economic material dimension of the development of the city. And wherever, this dimension is taken into consideration its treatment is unsatisfactory since the political conflicts are only conceptualised in elite\mass terms. It is so unusual to find a reference to the class formation and class conflict in order to provide a macro level framework for the debate. It is at this point that the absence of a political economy perspective which would provide a macro level perspective by drawing upon the economic and class dimensions of urban conflict and social change becomes apparent.

This thesis is an attempt in this direction. It aims to introduce a political economy perspective to the debate on the development of Ankara. While the main approach of the thesis does not refuse the importance of certain aspects of the existing debate such as the role played by the state in the development of Ankara and the conflicts between the state elite and the so called masses, its main emphasis is upon the conflicts emerging out of the distribution of material economic interests and class formation in the city. It argues that without taking these dimensions into account, the culturalist focus becomes not only one sided but also distorted.

An Outline of the Thesis

Chapter I reviews the literature on state theory and urban social theory. After discussing the main theories of the state and the urban, it criticises the main theories in both fields and shows their weaknesses.

Chapter II is an attempt to employ a more synthetic framework to the study of the state and the urban. Drawing upon Gramsci and Jessop, a strategic relational approach is defended in both fields to overcome the main weaknesses of existing theories. Such a perspective would allow one to study the projects and strategies of different classes and social forces to form hegemony at both national and urban levels.

Chapter III explores the trajectory of the Kemalist project. It rejects those interpretations which conceive Kemalism as a project which, either represents a complete break with the Ottoman heritage to form a modern, Western looking society, or identifies a continuity in terms of state tradition. Rather, it proposes a reading of Kemalism which conceptualises it as a particular entry into capitalist modernity. In that sense, Kemalism is seen, not only a nation state formation project in a Weberian sense, but also as a project aimed at forming a capitalist economy. In this sense, it is a class-based hegemonic project alongside its national popular elements and in line with the changing balance of class forces the hegemonic position of the Kemalist project has been redefined.

Chapter IV turns to the urban level and examines the trajectory of urbanisation in Turkey and attempts at periodising this urban experience. It defines three distinctive periods on the basis of the changing social base and political forces in Turkish cities. The first period (1923-50) is characterised by the urbanisation of the state whereas, the second period (1950-80) is distinguished by the urbanisation of labour power. The third period (1980- and after) is a period dominated by the urbanisation of capital. Although the paper proposes three distinctive periods characterised by three different forces, it does not assume sharp breaks between consecutive periods. Rather, it employs an approach which sees each round of urbanisation as a layer and hence allows certain continuities in interaction between layers.

The following two chapters comprises a case study of Ankara between 1923 and 1980. In other words, the case of Ankara is studied with reference to first two periods defined above, namely the urbanisation of the state and the urbanisation of labour-power. The study of the last period was not included in the case study partly due to the fact that, comparing to the last period, the first two periods present an interesting case in terms of the problematic this thesis set out to tackle, that is, the so-called elite versus masses or the state versus civil society dichotomy.

Chapter V focuses on the first round of urbanisation, that is, characterised by the urbanisation of the (nation)state. It is shown that in the case of Ankara, this period can be studied as not only the urbanisation of the state but also the middle class. By making the state and the middle class the key elements of the hegemonic bloc, their project is discussed with reference to the establishment of middle class hegemony in the city.

Chapter VI examines the second round of urbanisation which is characterised by the urbanisation of labour power. The main focus in this chapter is on the challenge faced by middle class hegemony in the city due to the rapid migration to the city starting from the mid-1940s. While the fate of middle class hegemony in the city is discussed in the face of the massive population influx of the rural population into the city, the main emphasis is placed upon the projects of the latter groups *vis a vis* the middle classes and the state in the city.

The concluding section provides an overall evaluation of the city in relation to different rounds of urbanisation and projects emerged each round.

Method

The research on which this thesis is based is mainly a qualitative one. The data examined includes:

- memoirs, especially for the first period where various memoirs exist for leading names of the Kemalist regime such as Ismet Inonu, Halif Rifki Atay.
- Planning documents and the Planning Committee Reports. As we shall see there are three distinctive planning attempts between 1923 and 1980, and each attempt at planning provides important clues for the hegemonic projects and forces of the each period. This requires a discursive reading of these documents and reports.
- Daily newspapers: which provide one of the major sources for the thesis. It is worth noting that the newspapers did not serve only as a source of information for a particular event but also as a source of discursive analysis of a certain period. Given that it is a tradition in Turkey that newspapers have served as a forum in which

leading politicians and bureaucrats, whom I call organic intellectuals of alternative hegemonic projects, air their views, they provided important insight into the understanding of the projects of different periods. The newspapers traced and used in the case study of Ankara are the followings:

Hakimiyet-I Milliye (1928-35)

Ulus (1946-65)

Aksam (1962-65)

Cumhuriyet (1947-75)

Milliyet (1970-80)

- Publications of State Statistical Institute (SSI) regarding population, employment and other social indicators.
- Municipal records, research reports and publications including planning documents.
- Secondary sources (articles\books\reports etc), which were not only employed as a source but also used critically to reveal the failures and shortcomings of the existing literature on Ankara.

Last point I would like to make is that all these data and information gain meaning within a theoretical framework. Despite the hegemonic view that there is no superiority among alternative perspectives as they are discursively constituted, my contention is that reality still stands as the final reference point in the judgement of alternative perspectives. It is the claim and objective of this thesis to make a contribution to the understanding and change of the reality with which it deals.

CHAPTER I:

THEORIES OF THE STATE AND THE URBAN: A LITERATURE REVIEW

CHAPTER I: THEORIES OF THE STATE AND THE URBAN: A LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1. Introduction

Urban areas are one of the most prominent battle fields of conflicting interests. These struggles take place in and over urban space. Whilst urban space is subjected to these struggles, the very same social forces behind them, consciously or unconsciously, produce, reproduce and transform it. In this sense, these struggles in and over space are also about power. To control space, it is necessary to struggle for power. The converse is also true. As space is a container of social power, any struggle to change power relations must also dominate space (Lefebvre 1979). Thus, various interests, with different purposes, of different classes, groups and individuals, constitute the material basis of urban social and spatial change.

In capitalist societies, the state is at the centre of this conflict-ridden process. Especially in the urban context, the maintenance of the formal and substantial integrity of territory is one of the main commonly accepted functions of the state. Furthermore, it can also facilitate certain cohesion to these conflicting agents by virtue of its authority. In spite of the centrality of the state to urban process, it is difficult to claim that we have enough knowledge of it. In my view, such a vagueness creates important problems in urban studies as well as in other fields, since every study, implicitly or explicitly, is based on a conception of the state. In the following section I examine the existing literature on state theory. Then, I go on to evaluate the repercussions of each theory of the state for urban studies.

I. II. Theories of the State

I expose different conceptions of the state under two main headings: state centred and society centred perspectives, even if sometimes it is difficult to include certain approaches especially within the society centred approach.

I. II. I. Society-Centred Approach(es)

There is a common assumption of various perspectives within the society-centred approach that makes calling them society-centred possible; any rigorous analysis of the state must refer beyond the state, to the society as a primary source for explanation. Yet, apart from this starting point, there are important differences and incompatibilities between them. In the plenitude of approaches, I consider only three of them: the 'instrumentalist' approach, which seeks to describe the power and influence of the ruling class in the operation of the state structure; the 'structuralist' approach, which examines the state as an element of capitalist formation; and the capital logic perspective, which describes the state as a functionary of capital.

In the instrumentalist view, state policies and interventions are explained with reference to the interests of the dominant class. According to Miliband (1977) basic objectives of the state are the maintenance of the class system and the development of social institutions to serve capitalist interests. Through the documentation of the links between the state élite and the ruling class in terms of cultural and material affinities, it is argued that the state acts as an agent of the ruling class. These attempts, however, have never clarified whether such a link, hence direct participation of the ruling class in the state, is

a cause or effect. Apart from this flaw and wide variation in the social background of the state élite, there is no room to consider the effects of the state apparatus on the society in the absence of any distinction between class power and state power. The instrumentalist approach fails to identify the structural elements of the society as well.

The structuralist approach begins to analyse the state by rejecting the instrumentalist view on the ground that the state is structurally rather than contingently capitalist. Direct control of the capitalist class in the state apparatus is not necessary. Instead, the state performs certain functions due to an objective relation with the overarching social formation. Thus, functions of the state are broadly determined by the structure of the society rather than the agencies occupying positions of power. For Poulantzas (1973), the state is not an autonomous entity, but reflects the balance of power among classes and their fractions. This facilitates a (relative) autonomy to the state *vis-a-vis* the classes. Hence, the state may not always act instrumentally for the dominant class. Nevertheless, in the end, the state preserves the long-term dominance of the ruling class due to its structural determination. Even if such a conception seems to provide a certain base for the analysis of the state in its own right through the concept of relative autonomy, its autonomy makes no difference in the long run due to the structural determination of the state.

In my view, the structural determination of the state and state as a distillation of class struggle are two different and contradictory conceptions whose relation is not made clear within structuralist-state theory. Despite its more sophisticated foundation, there are other criticisms offered. It is argued that the structuralist view is unable to take into

consideration the historical evolution of the state apparatus. Thus, it is also unable to distinguish between expected and actual behaviours of the state.

Capital logic approach argues that the celebrated dichotomy between instrumentalist and structuralist views is false and misleading since both approaches simply reiterate the connection between class and the state. Against such an orientation, they examine the separation of the economic and the political (Holloway and Piccotto 1978 p.14). Such a separation is vital in the provision of the general conditions of capital accumulation and reproduction. Because, they go on to argue, no individual or competing capital can ensure the reproduction of the whole. In this sense, their main focus is on the link between capital accumulation and the state. They conceive the capitalist state as a political support of the capital accumulation process, its form as a corresponding political repercussion of the current developmental stage of production and its functions as corresponding to the needs of class domination. In this sense, their basic concern is the derivation of the state from the rules of functioning of capital. Despite the important insights of this approach, it bears important functionalist connotations. Also, it has an inherent tendency towards reducing the political to an epiphenomenon of the economy. Further, there is also an important problem in terms of the insensitivity to the historical evaluation of the state apparatus.

In sum, it is impossible to argue that there is a comprehensive approach with regard to the realm of the state within a society-centred understanding. As Jessop rightly points out there are two different, but by no means incompatible, points of view: capital and class-theoretical approaches. The class-theoretical approach emphasises the agency aspect of capitalist societies at the expense of structural aspects. It examines the specific

conjunctures, hegemonic struggles, balance of forces, different forms of struggles to understand the change in the form and functions of the state. The capital-theoretical approach, on the other hand, focuses on the laws of the capital accumulation and its internal dynamics. In other words, contrary to the class-theoretical approach, the emphasis is on the structural aspects of the capitalist mode of production. Yet, neither of them has paid enough attention to the state itself and the state's own logic or struggles. State-centred approach(es) are important in this regard.

I. II. II. State-Centred Approaches

Contrary to society-centred approaches, the main defining feature of state-centred approaches is their claim that the state has its own interests apart from the interests of other social forces and that they are quite different from the interests of other agencies. Separating the state and society in this way, they focus on bureaucratic politics and organisational aspects of the state as a power container. In their recent study, 'Bringing the State Back In,' Skocpol and her colloquies have developed two different versions of state-centred theorisation.

In the first version, it is argued that the state has its own special interests by virtue of its insertion into an international order as well as its unique responsibilities in the protection of internal order. In this sense, the state should be considered an independent variable rather than a derivative of the economic level. There are rules and procedures peculiar to the politics as well as agencies such as politicians, managers, and the military. In this sense, the state consists of an institutional ensemble and agencies. It is clear that there is a reversal of the society-centred explanations. The strong emphasis of

the society-centred approaches is replaced by the emphasis on the state. Hence, explanations run from the state to the society.

In the second version, however, there is a loose conception of the state and considerable difference from the first one. Here the state is considered as 'potentially autonomous' rather than necessarily autonomous. It is stated that when the state is autonomous it doesn't necessarily mean that the state can gain and realise this autonomy in all circumstances. The degree of autonomy depends on its instruments and resources, and these are seen as intervening variables between the formulation of the state goals and their subsequent implementation and the material resources controlled by the state. For this reason, the autonomy of the state is a concrete and contingent issue rather than an abstract and universal fact. It depends on certain conditions and changes from time to time (Skocpol 1985).

There are many vague points in both formulations. It is, for instance, not clear whether they are rejecting the society-centred approach entirely or whether they are suggesting a combination between the state and society-centred approaches. Furthermore, there is no consideration of what factor(s) determine the resources available to the state. In my view, the essential value of the state-centred approach is in its emphasis on the internal structure, mechanisms and processes of the state, as well as its insistence on the differential interests of the state's actors. Nevertheless, when the state-centred approach starts to emphasise the other aspects of the society, the limitations of its framework begins to appear. By the same token, the essential value of the society-centred approach can be seen in its emphasis on the external environment of the state. Nevertheless, it, too, seems to lose its power when it moves towards the internal domain of the state

(see Friedland and Alford 1985). Yet, the problems in the analysis of the state become acute due to the lack of communication between different perspectives. In the following section, I will examine the state of the art in urban studies with respect to the very same issue.

I. III. Theories of the Urban

The reflections of capital and class-logic approaches to the society and the state are quite evident in urban studies. I examine the capital-logic view in the case of Harvey (1978, 1982, 1985a, 1985b, 1989), the class (action) theoretical view in the case of Castells (1983, 1989) and the state-centred view with reference to Pahl (1975, 1977). Such a review, of course, doesn't cover all approaches in the field, nor represents all those studying similar perspectives. But, they represent most mature extensions of each above mentioned approach in urban studies. I expose and evaluate these perspectives around three main headings: the conception of the urban, the agency-structure dialectic and the state in the urban context.

I. III. I. The Conception of the Urban

In their alternative conceptions of the urban, Harvey emphasises the specificity of urban process in the circulation process of capital, whereas Castells locates the consumption and struggles around it to the focus of the urban. Pahl, on the other hand, puts the urban managers to the centre of the urban system. I set out and evaluate their positions in relation to the specificity question.

Central to Harvey's approach is the idea that the urbanisation of capital, the reproduction of labour power and the formation of an urban consciousness can be explained through the logic of capital in general, and specifically in the circulation process. In his relatively early works (1976, 1978), Harvey pointed out two points of contact between the capital accumulation process and urban process; in the secondary circuit through the production of the built environment and in the tertiary circuit through the social expenditures to reproduce the labour power.

Inevitable competition between the capitalists, leading to a drive to invest in new technologies, results in a crisis of over-accumulation. By the switching of investments from the primary to the secondary circuit, capitalism is able to overcome the over-accumulation problem temporarily. This means switching of investment to the partly built-environment. Thus, investments in the built environment are seen as the way of stabilisation of the capitalist economy during periods of crisis. The same process is experienced in the tertiary circuit of capital. Capital accumulation processes and urbanisation processes meet here, around social expenditure, to reproduce labour power. Investments in this circuit involve again the built environment, housing, transportation etc. which is necessary for the reproduction of labour power.

Nevertheless, these solutions are always temporary because of the unstable structure of the capital-accumulation process. In the face of a permanent condition of crisis, the uneven development of capitalism makes it possible for capitalists to move from one place to another to increase their rate of profit. Thus, capital is withdrawn from one developed area and reinvested in another (no matter which region or Country) underdeveloped area. Capitalism creates new built environments whereas it destroys it

in another place (Harvey 1982, 1985a). In the end, capital in the search of profit creates a built environment which reflects its competition and instability (Harvey 1985a p.135).

His recent works apply a similar understanding to a much broader evaluation of urban process in capitalist societies. He categorises urban experiences of the societies according to the dominant regime of accumulation. He uses the concepts of the Keynesian and post-Keynesian city to show their relations to Fordist and post-Fordist regimes of accumulation. He argues that the Keynesian city was shaped as a consumption artifact and its social, economic and political life organised around the theme of state-backed, debt-financed consumption. This demand-side urbanisation sought to stabilise capitalism through the maintenance of effective demand. Thus, the Keynesian city put emphasis over the spatial division of consumption, since the success of the Keynesian project depends on the mass mobilisation of the spirit of consumer sovereignty (Harvey 1985a Chp.8). However for Harvey, 'The collapse of the Keynesian program changed all that' (ibid p.211). In parallel to the changes in the economic structures,

'urbanisation has, like everything else, dramatically changed its spots... A combination of shrinking markets, unemployment, rapid shifts in spatial constraints and the global division of labour, capital flight, plant closings, technological financial reorganisations lay at the root of that pressure... Fixed capital investments and physical infrastructures in existing locations were consequently threatened with massive devaluation, thus undermining the property tax base' (ibid p.216).

Amidst these conditions ruling class alliances in urban regions were forced to adopt a much more competitive posture around four options: the options of the production workshop, of the consumption artifact, of command functions, and of the locus of redistributed surplus.

In sum, Harvey conceptualises the urban in the framework of capital accumulation processes. For him, 'the urban process implies the creation of a material physical infrastructure for production, circulation, exchange and consumption' (Harvey 1978 p.113).

Another formulation(s) of the specificity of the urban was set out by Castells during the early 1970s. Castells position can be considered in two phases: structuralist and action-oriented periods.

In his early writings Castells theorised the city by starting with a theory of a capitalist mode of production consisting of three levels. He argued that the theory of urban space is an integral part of the general social theory:

To analyse space as an expression of the social structure amounts, therefore to studying its shaping by elements of the economic system, the political system and the social practices that derive from them' (Castells 1977 p.126).

The political system organises urban space through functions of domination and legitimisation. The ideological system marks space with a network of signs. The specificity of urban space, however, is attached to the economic domain. Within this domain, he turned to consumption for the definition urban space since production is organised at higher levels. Thus, he concluded that urban social theory should concern itself with the analysis of the social organisation of consumption, hence reproduction of labour power.

Castells, however, never argues that other processes do not take place in the urban context. His argument is that, only the consumption moment s specific to the urban level. For him,

'urban organisation is not, then, a simple arrangement of spatial forms, but rather these forms are the expression of the processes of collective treatment of the daily consumption patterns of households' (Castells 1978 p.16).

In sum, the essential link between the capitalist mode of production and urban development is established through collective consumption which is supposed to specify the urban.

In his later works, Castells retains collective consumption as the defining factor of the urban, despite important changes in his theoretical position. He adds two new dimensions to his later formulation: community culture and community politics. Contrary to the sophisticated elaboration of collective consumption inherited from previous framework, these new aspects of the urban are quite vague. In this sense, although Castells seems to retain the idea of the specificity of urban, it is now not clear what this specificity attached to the urban is (see Castells 1983 Part 6).

A third approach to specifying the urban was developed in Rex's and Pahl's works. They both attempted to show that 'the specific task of urban sociology was to study and explain the ways in which inequalities in the city arose out of the actions of 'urban managers' (that is individuals such as estate agents, local authority bureaucrats, social workers and so on) who controlled access to strategic urban resources such as housing' (Saunders 1985 p.72). As Pickvance points out, 'the perspective this gave rise to was

one in which urban managers were seen as independent variables, i.e. as causally responsible for patterns of urban resource allocation' (Pickvance 1984 p.37).

The idea that the urban managers constitute an independent sociological variable is modified in Pahl's later work (Pahl 1977, 1979). In the face of intense criticisms, Pahl accepted that the urban managers are constrained both by the operation of the market and the central state. Hence, urban managers came to be seen as intervening and mediating variables in urban analysis rather than independent ones in his later approach.

To sum up, I would argue that, despite lack of communication and intense debates among different conceptions of the urban, there is a clear division of labour in the works of Harvey, Castells, and Pahl. Harvey and (early) Castells focus on the economic domain of the urban. Pahl, on the other hand, places emphasis on the political processes in the urban domain. Whereas Harvey argues that there are two points of contact between capital accumulation processes and urban process -the construction of built environment in the secondary circuit and social expenditures to reproduce labour power- in fact, he is always keen to study the first contact point; i.e. the construction of the built environment. Ironically, the second point has constituted a basis for the works of Castells. Moreover, whereas Castells is quite insistent on specifying the urban field with certain academic concern, Harvey is rather reluctant to do this. He sees space, following Lefebvre, as an indistinguishable part of the capital accumulation process.

As far as the 'specificity question' is concerned, I think there are important compatibility among these three perspectives. Harvey refers to the external environment and constraints of the urban process rather than to the urban process itself. In this sense his

employment of the term urban 'regions' is not accidental. Harvey in fact addresses the 'regional question'. On the other hand, Castells and Pahl refer to the two substantial characteristics of the urban -collective consumption and the urban political process. Yet, this doesn't mean that their conceptions can simply be put together. There are important problems to be overcome in relation to the conception of the agency-structure relationship in the urban context.

I. III. II. The Conception of Agency-Structure Dialectic

There is now a growing recognition of the importance of the agency-structure dialectic. But, as Smith points out 'this awareness has not yet been fully extended to the realm of urban studies where structural and social action perspectives tend to be treated as antithetical' (Smith 1984 p.12; cf. Pickvance 1984).

As I have already shown, Harvey's argument that the logic of capital accumulation is the basic cause of urban development shows his emphasis on structure at the expense of agency. For Pahl, on the other hand, agency has a priority *vis-a-vis* the structures. Castells position(s) is quite interesting in this regard. Contrary to his previous position on this issue, in his later studies he makes an attempt to recapture human agency, but in my view at the expense of structures.

Harvey's explanation of the urban phenomenon, as I have shown in specificity debate, revolves around the logic of capital accumulation and problems which arise from it. Even in his later rather flexible essays, Harvey retains the view that capital accumulation processes explain everything; changes in the social and spatial structures of the city are

explained with reference to the internal contradictions of capital. In the end, although Harvey doesn't employ a structuralist-Marxist framework, there is a little room to appreciate the historical role of the human agency in producing and reproducing the urban space. The only source of urban change in the last instance is reduced to the competition of the capitalists, and 'secondarily' to the conflict between wage-labour and capitalist.

Thus, in the small place he allows for agency, Harvey puts emphasis on class relations. Harvey argues that class relations are central to all other social relations. In fact, he does recognise that divisions and stratifications in the urban areas could not be covered by only class relations. He admits, for instance, the importance of other interests operating in the built environment. In his later essays, he conceives of five primary loci of consciousness formation: individuals, family, community, state and class (Harvey 1985a p.252). Yet, after an evaluation of these 'locus of consciousness formation,' he concludes that 'the circulation of capital is so fundamental to the ways we gain and use our collective and individual social power that we have no option except to put its class relations at the centre of our analysis. There is a sense in which class relations invade and dominate all other loci of consciousness formation' (ibid p.264). In the end, Harvey's judgement is that urban conflicts are displaced problems of over-accumulation.

The most striking change in Castells position concerns his new conception of the agency-structure relationship. Contrary to his previous (structuralist-Marxist) position, Castells puts considerable emphasis on agency in urban social change. In his self criticism, he argued against both a high level of abstraction and the neglect of the (urban) actors in structuralist-Marxism. He criticised his previous position on the

grounds that 'to the physical determinism of human ecology or to the cultural idealism of the Wirthian tradition, Marxism tended to respond by reducing the city and the space to the logic of capital' (Castells 1983 p.297). Yet, for him, such an approach is far from explaining urban issues.

'...technology per se or the structure of the economy itself are not the driving force behind the process of urbanisation. Economic factors and technological process do play a major role in establishing the shape and meaning of space. But this role is determined, as well as the economy and technology themselves, by the social process through which humankind appropriates space and constructs a social organisation relentlessly challenged by the production of new values and the emergence of new social interests' (Castells 1983 p.291).

Urban actors are now not only classes and class-determined social movements, but various groups arisen out of different interests, oppressed groups as well as classes.

Castells puts this point in the following long quotation:

[spatial forms] express and perform the interests of the dominant class according to a given mode of production and to a specific mode of development. They will express and implement the power relationship of the state in an historically defined society. They will be realised and shaped by the process of gender domination and by state-enforced family life. At the same time, spatial forms will be earmarked by the resistance from exploited class, from oppressed subjects, and from dominated women. And the work of such a contradictory historical process on the space will be accomplished on an already inherited spatial form, the production of former history and the support of new interests, projects, protests, and dreams. Finally time to time, social movements will arise to challenge the meaning of spatial structure and therefore attempt new functions and new forms'(Castells 1983 p.4).

Contrary to his former position, Castells is reluctant to place class at the centre of the urban question. For him, class relations and struggles are no longer fundamental to understand urban conflict. They are important but by no means a primary source of urban social change. The autonomous role of the state and gender relationships are as important as class relationships. Nevertheless, he doesn't reject the possibility of a connection between the 'dynamics of social classes and the formation and outcome of urban social movements' as in the Glasgow case (ibid p.67). He goes on to argue that 'So neither the assimilation of urban conflicts to class struggle nor the entire independence of both processes of social change can be sustained. On the contrary, only by focusing

on the interaction between the social dynamics of class struggle and urban dynamics whose content must be redefined in each historical situation, are we able to understand social change in a comprehensive manner. Furthermore the hierarchy of determination between classes and cities varies according to each historical formation'(ibid p.68). Nevertheless, despite such positive insight, Castells replaces Harvey's idealisation of class relations with the idealisation of social movements. Castells argues that a new urban meaning can be produced by one of the four societal forces: dominant class, dominated classes, social movements and urban social movements. Castells' hypothesis is that 'only urban social movements are urban-oriented mobilisations that influence structural social change and transform the urban meanings. The symmetrical opposite to this hypothesis is not necessarily true'(ibid p.305). This conclusion leads Castells to underestimate other forms of organisation and struggles such as the state and the political parties and struggles around them, although, following Poulantzas, he mentions the autonomy enjoyed by state. I will return to this issue in the following section.

Despite the clear emphasis of Castells on actors, he admits the importance of the structure of the society. For him, 'the meaning of the city is not produced arbitrarily by a particular social actor or by an undetermined conflict between many actors. The very process of social definition and the outcome of such a process relies upon the structure of society and upon that structure's particular mode of historical development' (ibid p.305). However, there are important problems with concepts that Castells introduced to locate his analysis of urban change in the broader context of a theory of social change. Such concepts as modes of industrial and informational development, seems to be undeveloped moreover, arbitrary. In the lack of clarity of these structural elements,

Castells falls easily into eclecticism and voluntarism. The neglect of a political and economic context is not surprising for this reason (cf. Pickvance 1985).

In the discussion of the content definition of the urban, I have argued that Pahl specifies the city as a system of resource allocation. For him, the fundamental object of study of urban sociology is urban managers whose actions affect the inequalities in the city. Hence, there is an explicit emphasis on urban managers and their goals, values, assumptions and ideologies. Pahl summarises his earlier position in respect to the agency-structure relationship as follows:

'in my original formulation of the position I emphasised that access to any scarce urban resource or facility could be seen as comprising two elements: the spatial element, which could be expressed in terms of time/cost distance; and the social element, which included on the one hand the rules and procedures which defined access for populations, defined in both social and spatial terms... and, on the other hand, the interpretation and administration of these rules and procedures by local managers or gatekeepers' (Pahl 1977 p.50).

For Pahl both, spatial and social, elements operate to a considerable extent independently of the economic and political system. For instance, he argues that 'these spatial constraints on the distribution of resources operate to a greater or lesser degree independent of the economic and political order' (Pahl 1975 p.249).

By the same token, he claims that urban space is a material resource and urban managers who are responsible for deciding locations and distributions can manipulate it according to their goals and values. These managers were also supposed to be independent of structural constraints. In the end, Pahl summarises his earlier position as follows:

'a truly urban sociology should be concerned with the social and spatial constraints on access to scarce urban resources and facilities as dependent variables and the managers or controllers of the urban system which I take as the independent variable' (Pahl 1975 p.219).

It is clear that Pahl emphasises the agency side of the society while the structural aspects are remarkably neglected in parallel to Weberian concerns with the goals and values of human agency. However, in the face of criticism that he attributes too much power and influence to the urban managers at the expense of more broader political forces, assuming independence of managers from *vis-a-vis* economic structures, Pahl amended his model by suggesting that urban managers are mediating and intervening variables rather than independent ones. Accordingly, Pahl puts emphasis on the relationship between the central state and private sector in his later works.

I. III. III. Conception of the State in the Urban Context

In the preceding part, it has become clear that the state has a central place in Pahl's approach. The same is not true for both Harvey and Castells. They always give priority to other societal forces and structures *vis-a-vis* the state. Nevertheless, this doesn't mean that they exclude the state totally from their analysis. It is important, but not primary, a dependent rather than independent variable on contrary to Pahl's conception. Since Pahl's position has been explained in the preceding part, I go on to examine Harvey's and Castells' theorisation of the state.

Harvey (1987) assigned to the state two basic roles in relation to the urban process; the channelling of investments from primary to other circuits of capital, and displacing the class struggle around the built environment. As Gottdiener (1987) points out in this

conception, the state's ontological status is nothing other than as the agent of capital in general.

In his later works, although Harvey retains the substance of this previous conception, his new position on the state becomes controversial and eclectic at many points. The role assigned to the state becomes more central than in the previous conception as can be seen in the following passage:

'the state, finally, has to be omnipresent within (and not external to, as many theories of the state seem to propose) all facets of this circulation process, compensating the market failure; creating long term investments, regulating the family as well as the uses of money, time, space, and capital in key ways' (Harvey 1985b p.265).

The same orientation to centralise the state to the social relation is more clear in his treatment of local alliance formation. There, the local state is treated as the political means of the articulation of various interests within the urban region. Because, in comparison to other societal agents, the state is more convenient for this purpose:

First, territory and the integrity of territory is the objective of its personnel... Second, by virtue of its authority, it can give firmer shape and cohesion to regional class alliances through the institutions of law, governance, political participation and negotiation, repression and military might. Third, it can impose relatively firm boundaries on otherwise porous and unstable geographical edges. Finally, by virtue of its powers to tax and to control fiscal and monetary policy, it can actively promote and sustain that structured regional coherence to production and consumption to which capitalism in any case tends to undertake infrastructural investments that individual capitalists could not tackle' (Harvey 1985a p.152).

Furthermore, Harvey also admits the importance of particular interests formed within the state apparatus. He, for instance, argues that 'the bearers of managerial expertise can use the state apparatus as a medium to advance their interest. By doing this in the name of the public interest they can project a bureaucratic-managerial consciousness onto the whole society. For this reason, Harvey asserts that the state is more than a cohesive apparatus. It also internalises and projects its own specific forms of consciousness (ibid p.260-68).

In my view, Harvey's attempt to inject a more flexible theorisation of the state into his capital logic approach and creates an eclectic model. This can be attributed to his basic assumption that there is one logic of capital. In fact, there are likely to be several possible logic of capital and politics is about the struggle among these different logic. Let me put it another way, once we accept that, like Harvey, there is only one logic of capital, there is no reason to search for relatively autonomous (urban) politics.


Castells' treatment of the state is similar to Harvey's theorisation of the state with regards to its relation with dominant mode of production. Castells identifies the state with dominant social relations. He even dismisses the political parties as a part of the state apparatus. For this reason, he emphasises the importance of non-institutional channels, i.e. urban social movements, to accomplish the radical transformation of the urban space. By the same token, he makes a strict distinction between political parties and urban social movements. Because,

'the political system is aimed at the state, is dependent upon the state, and is a part of the state. Therefore to some extent it institutionalises some forms of social domination and accept the rules of bargaining with such forms. At the other end of the scale, social movements exit, develop and relate to civil society and are necessarily limited to, or bounded by, the rules of game and the institutionalisation of dominant values and norms. This is why social movements are the source of social innovation while political parties or coalitions are the instruments of social bargaining'(Castells 1983 p.294).

Thus urban social movements are considered as alternative organisations to the state institutions in Castells' formulation. Whereas urban social movements represent the civil society, political parties are a part of the state system. Whereas social movements cause social innovation, political parties can afford social bargaining. For this reason, their function are institutional maintenance and social reproduction rather than institutional

change and social transformation. The latter can only be achieved by urban social movements (see Figure I.I).

Figure I.I *Antagonistic and Compatible Relations in Urban Change*



Source: Smith and Tardanico 1987 p.97

There are important flaws in Castells' conception of the state. Surprisingly, Castells seems to consider the state as a simple instrument of the dominant class. He emphasises the role of the state to regulate social relations in the interests of the dominant class at least as far as his conception of social movements is concerned. But he neglects the fact that the state performs this function under the pressure of various forces. For this reason, there is no reasonable excuse to exclude the state system in the achievement of radical change in the urban structure. Especially the local state, in many case, is used by radical groups in order to give a new urban meaning to cities. The problem partly results from Castells' idea that the state system, including political parties, is a homogenous and monolithic unity. This is not true for either state apparatuses or political parties. There are important contradictions, hierarchies and disarticulations between different branches of the state and especially between the central and local state, as well as among the central and local branches of political parties.

In sum, contrary to Pahl's treatment of the state, neither Harvey nor Castells consider the state as other than a functionary of the capital-accumulation process. Pahl, on the other hand, emphasises the importance of the state, but in this case, at the expense of more general processes and structures.

I. IV. Conclusion

This short review of the current literature has shown that there is no convincing theorisation of the state in either state-centred or society-centred camps. There are rather well-structured dichotomies not only between these two perspectives but also between the approaches within the same perspective. Whereas society-centred approaches put the society at the centre of the theorisation of the state, it is the other way around in the case of state-centred explanations. Further, there is a dichotomy between class and capital-logic theorisations of the state within the society-centred approach. Whereas the class-logic approach emphasises the struggles around the state as a primary explanatory source, the capital-logic view gives the priority to the imperatives of capital accumulation in the same regard.

This implicit division of labour and lack of communication among them create important problems in every field of the social sciences. Because each perspective, as Alford and Friedland point out, has contributed something to our understanding of the state (Alford and Friedland 1985). In my view, there are important lessons in this insight for urban studies. I now go on to examine the state of art in urban studies with reference to the previous debate.

The comparison of these three perspectives in urban studies has shown that there are major differences between their conception of the urban, the agency-structure dialectic in this particular domain, and the state at the local level. These are shown in Table I.I

Table I.I *Conception of Urban in Harvey, Castells and Pahl*

	HARVEY	CASTELLS	PAHL
DEFINITION OF URBAN	Built Environment	Collective Consumption Community Culture Community Politics	Allocative System
PRIMARY AGENT	Social Classes	Urban Social Movements	Urban Managers
CENTRALITY OF STATE	External	External	Central

For a research strategy which utilises from these perspectives, there seems to be three possibilities (see Pickvance 1984). In the first alternative, which is the most common strategy, one of these 'alternative' frameworks is taken as a base for the research. The reasoning here is that these alternative frameworks are incommensurable. Because they have different conceptual universes, i.e. sets of concepts which cannot be translated into observable measures and ask different questions. I think all of the three perspectives reviewed above use this sort of strategy in their researches. In turn, this means an absence of communication between them. The second position is to use different theories in an eclectic way. This would follow from the positivist position that there is no problem of incommensurability since every concept can be operationalised

(Saunders' dual-state thesis is a good example of this point). In my view neither of these positions is acceptable.

The third position asserts that 'while every paradigm has its own set of concepts, it does not follow that they are mutually incomprehensible. It is possible for people to think themselves into different conceptual universes'. Further, it can again be argued that 'observation while theory-influenced is not totally theory-determined'(Pickvance 1984 p.45). This is because each paradigm has an (low-level) area of communication. This understanding can pave the way for joint use of the 'insights' of different perspectives without falling into eclecticism. I examine this possibility in these three examples. In my view, Harvey's framework embraces more broader and general aspects of social processes such as capital accumulation, uneven development and so on. On the other hand, Pahl refers to more specific aspects of social relations such as attitudes of urban managers. Castells, to a certain extent, refers to more pluralistic aspects of the society as far as urban social movements are concerned. Nevertheless, I don't purpose a simple articulation of these approaches. Because, it seems to me that, without solving certain problems it again leads the research into eclecticism. First of all, each perspective , mentioned above, make claims at every level of abstraction, although their object of study refers to certain levels. For this reason, eclecticism can only be avoided by using them on different levels. Then, the question remaining is how to either eliminate or integrate their extensions to different levels of abstraction. By the same token, every approach is far from being unproblematic even in its proper level of abstraction. Harvey's capital-logic approach is a good example in this regard. To assume that there is only one logic of capital is not acceptable at any level of abstraction as a starting point. Similarly, the role of the state cannot be restricted to the lower levels of abstraction

since in the manipulation of these alternative logic the state takes an important part. This makes it, then, difficult to restrict the study of the state to one level of abstraction. In other words, it refers to the indivisibility of the micro and the macro, as well as abstract and concrete.

In my view, the argument advanced by Friedland and Alford, (1985) that each perspective has a home domain and emphasises a particular aspect of social relations, is a starting assumption for a new framework aimed at overcoming the barriers created by preceding perspectives and articulating the macro and the micro and abstract and concrete within the same framework without falling into trap of eclecticism.

CHAPTER II:

A THEORY OF THE SOCIETY, THE STATE AND THE URBAN

CHAPTER II: A THEORY OF THE SOCIETY, THE STATE AND THE URBAN

II. I. Introduction:

In the preceding chapter, I have argued that there is a well-established division of labour among alternative theories of the state and the urban question in the sense that each theory has a distinctive home domain. In turn, this division of labour prevents an exhaustive understanding of the state and the urban question and we need to develop a synthetic framework without falling into the trap of eclecticism.

This chapter aims to expose such an alternative framework for the analysis of the state and the urban question. In the first part of the chapter, by largely drawing upon Gramsci (1971) and Jessop (1983, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990), I will present a middle-range theorisation of the state to close the gap between the capital and class theoretical approaches.

In the second part of the chapter, I shall attempt to integrate this top-down perspective with a bottom-up understanding of the very same social processes through a detailed examination of recent developments in urban studies as urban areas are important battlefields of the alternative accumulation strategies, state strategies, and hegemonic projects. They become dominant in general through gaining the battles in these localities. Whereas these projects and strategies produce, reproduce and transform these localities, the local social structures do not remain

silent in this process. The end product is an outcome of interaction of these top-down and bottom-up processes.

II. II. A Strategic Relational Approach to the State-Society Relationship

In my view, Gramsci provides an important starting point for developing middle-range concepts to create a synthetic framework which would bridge the gap between, at least, class and capital logic approaches. His concepts such as ‘hegemony’ and ‘integral state’ as well as ‘power block’ and ‘organic intellectuals’ provide important conceptual devices for a strategic relational analysis.

Gramsci’s approach to state-society relationships has important insights beyond those of positivistic-deterministic approaches in that it shows that there is no pre-destined line of development independent of projects and strategies of human agency. This view is very clear in his view of the relationship between the structure and strategy:

‘Politics in fact is at any given time the reflection of the tendencies of development in the structure, but it is not necessarily the case that these tendencies must be realised. A structural phase can be concretely studied and analysed only after it has gone through this whole process of development, and not during the process itself, except hypothetically...From this can be deduced that a particular political act may have been an error of calculation on the part of the leaders of the dominant classes... Mechanical historical materialism does not allow for the possibility of error, but assumes that every political act is determined, immediately, by the structure, and therefore as a real and permanent (in the sense of achieved) modification of the structure. The principle of error is a complex one: one may be dealing with an individual impulse based on mistaken calculations or equally it may be a manifestation of the attempts of specific groups or sects to take over hegemony within the directive groupings, attempts which may well be unsuccessful. (Gramsci 1971; 408).

Likewise, in Gramsci, projects and strategies of the actors are analysed not only in the framework of economic relations but also in relation to cultural, religious, moral and political factors. His approach is most clear when he analyses the establishment of hegemony in a particular society. For him, ‘hegemony was equally concerned with

cultural religious, philosophical and moral factors, set within a wider theoretical model which included the economic mode of production as fundamental but not fully determining' (Bocock 1986; 85).

I will not go further here as I will discuss these issues below. However, it is important to point out that Gramsci's views are not always clear and consistent. Therefore they led to very different perspectives and one of the unfortunate developments is the recent post-Marxist reception of Gramscian thought. The open-ended character of Gramsci's enterprise led some, like Laclau and Mouffe, to argue for a discursive constitution of hegemony which leaves everything to contingency (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). I think this interpretation of Gramsci partly finds its roots and justification in the fact that Gramsci is less interested in defining abstract logic of the economy or in the role of the state as an 'ideal collective capitalist' in a mode of production than in designating the complicated relations among various of social forces involved in the exercise of state power in a given social formation (Jessop 1982). I think that is why we need to articulate the Gramscian view with a refined capital logic which can provide a structural context to the Gramscian strategic-relational approach.

I think Jessop provides such a framework and in what follows I will mainly concentrate on his strategic relational framework. Such an intermediate perspective could show that there are alternative logic of capital (as against to capital logic) as well as structural limits (as opposed to capital logic). Further, such an approach can also provide room to analyse the logic(s) of the state as well. Following Jessop, I analyse the alternative logic of capital through accumulation strategies, field of

struggles through hegemonic projects and alliance strategies, and finally the state(s) through the state (projects) strategies.

II. II. I. Value Form:

In my view, most of the alternative approaches including that of Laclau and Moufe disregards one basic point at the outset: a proper understanding of the value form which is an important determinant of underlying relations in capitalist societies. It is a value form that places limits on contingency and makes only a limited number of strategies possible.

For any rigorous analysis of the capitalist state, value form is an important starting point as an important determinant of underlying relations in the capitalist societies. It frames the matrix of capitalist development that takes numerous forms in capitalist societies. As Jessop puts it,

'Value form as a social relation comprises a number of interconnected elements that are organically linked as different moments in the overall reproduction of capital relations. These include such form as the commodity, the wage, money, prices, taxes, profits of enterprise, interest, rent and so forth. In their unity as interconnected elements of the value form these moments define the parameters of accumulation and delimit the sorts of economic crises which can develop within capitalism' (Jessop 1983 p.151).

For instance, in a capitalist society, there are structural limits to decomodification or to nationalisation of the economic enterprise. However, the value form should not be considered, as some variants of capital logic school do, as a structural constraint which fully determines the course of accumulation. Because, the very same value form, as an important determinant of capitalist social relations, itself depends on certain extra-economic factors and mechanisms to provide unity or certain degree of harmony among different moments (Jessop 1990). For instance, the very substance

of value depends on capital's ability to dominate wage labour, and, in turn, this domination depends on many factors outside the immediate economic realm. In this regard, a considerable indeterminacy and margin for variation exist in the form the capitalist development takes. These variations are the complex resultant of the changing balance of power and the course of the capital accumulation process can take various direction according to this balance. For this reason, although the basic parameters of capitalism are defined by the value form, it is necessary to go beyond this to conceive the nature and dynamic of particular capitalist economies as well as extra economic factors and forces.

In sum, the view that there are countless alternative strategies to be followed is not true given the limits put by the value form and it is equally wrong to assume that there is only one logic of capital which is determined beforehand. Instead there are various alternatives open to different social forces within the limits placed by value form.

II. II. II. Accumulation Strategies:

Thus, following Jessop, it is possible to argue that there is no single path to growth and nothing taken for granted if we say that a dominant strategy will be the best one for the interests of prime mover. In a given economy, there are possibilities for alternative paths of development which may be called competing accumulation strategies and under certain enabling and constraining conditions one of these competing strategies with its specific mode of growth becomes dominant. The important point however, as Jessop points out, is:

'given the complex and overdetermined structure of mode of growth, one couldn't calculate an effective and most effective strategy to maintain it. The relative success or failure of a strategy depends on unacknowledged structural conditions of action which may alter as well as changing the balance of forces (including changing organisational capacities and strategies) relevant to its successful realisation'. (Jessop 1988; 158).

In this sense, it is also clear that all strategies do not have equal chances. Strategies, however, are always realised in specific structural contexts that should be seen as an ensemble of structural constraints and conjectural opportunities for different social forces. What is a constraint for some forces could be a conjectural opportunity for others (Jessop 1988 p.158). Jessop goes on to argue that alternative strategies could exist to the extent that:

'a)calculating subjects are differentially located in relation to the structure (so that some structure presents them with a different ensemble of constraints and opportunities); b)calculate their strategies over different time horizons and/or spatial boundaries; c)engage in strategic contact over a more or less extensive social terrain embracing fields of action (economic, political, juridical, moral, educational etc.); and enter into different types of alliance with other social forces'(ibid p.150).

In such a competitive environment, once one strategy together with a growth model becomes dominant it means that it provides the unity among the different moments in the circuit of capital under the hegemony of one fraction. Nevertheless, even then, there is still space for alternative strategies and for conflict between and within the classes rather than the elimination and transcendence of them. Rather, such a domination provides a 'relatively' stable framework within which competition and conflicting interests can be contained without disturbing the overall unity of the circuit of capital.

Furthermore, other than a plurality of strategies, there are several tactics which can be followed in pursuit of a given strategy. The existence of alternative tactics is

important for the flexibility of the dominant strategy *vis-a-vis* the alternative strategies, since they create a margin of manoeuvre.

In sum, such an approach is able to consider the economic sphere from both the points of view of structures which find its expression through the value-form and effects of market forces and action through the accumulation strategies which in turn reproduce and transform these structures.

II. II. III. State Strategies:

The fact is that, whatever the accumulation strategy with mode of growth becomes dominant, its success depends on the establishment of a correspondence between patterns of production and consumption. As is mentioned before, such a correspondence cannot be established only through a market mechanism. For this reason, regulationists point to the necessity of a regulatory mechanism(s). They introduce the concept of the 'mode of regulation' to examine the extra-economic conditions and mechanisms of the accumulation. A mode of regulation can be defined as:

'the totality of institutional forms, networks and norms (explicit or implicit), which together secure the compatibility of typical modes of contact in the context of an accumulation regime, corresponding as much to the changing balance of social relations as to their more general conflictual properties'(Lipietz 1986 p.121).

In this sense, it refers to the interaction of a complex configuration of norms and institutions rather than only to the state. They involve traditional norms and hierarchies including family and churches alongside social and political institutions such as, associations, media, the political and administrative system, law and market(Haeusler and Hirsch 1989;303).

Regulationists, however, insist that the regulative system shouldn't be considered as a conflict-free unity. Instead contradictions exist within and between the elements of the regulative system. Haeusler and Hirsch go on to argue that:

'market and state intervention, formal law and traditional norms, bureaucracy and family represent different forms of regulation that correlate (for example state regulation of money, guaranteed private property) as well as contrast (such as compulsory production limits). The regulatory process is based on the institutionalisation of social antagonisms and (class-)conflicts, and therefore can never be functionally secured but always entails conflicts and confrontations. Regulation is thus fundamentally a crisis-prone process and disturbances represent a functional principle (Haeusler and Hirsch 1989 p.305).

In this plenty of regulatory mechanisms and institutions, the state represents the centre of the institutionalised regulative network by its relationship to the complete network of regulative instances. Like capital, state is a form of determined social relation. For this reason it must be examined in relation, not only, to distinctive institutional form (as in the state centred approach) but also to the changing balance of political forces determined by the factors located beyond the forms of the state as such (Jessop 1990;206). In this sense, the state should also be considered not only a regulatory mechanism, but also as an institutionalised condensation of contradictory social relations which itself needs regulation.

In capitalist societies, the relations between economic and political spheres constitute one of the most important areas of tension. More specifically the main debate on this issue concentrates on the functionality of state intervention for the capitalist accumulation process. Most of the society-centred approaches claim that state intervention is central to the capital accumulation process and that there are tight links between the economic and political spheres, whereas others such as Hindess

and Hirst seem to argue that there is a necessary non correspondence between the state and economic sphere. Both understandings on this particular issue seems to be unsatisfactory. It is the basic contention here that a correspondence, albeit loose rather than tight, seems to be possible but must be constructed in the course of a struggle whose outcome is always contingent (Jessop 1990 p.206; Pickvance 1980 p.46). I will go on to examine this point in detail to show why there is a problem of correspondence and to what extent.

The most prominent feature of the relations between the economic and political spheres is the 'particularisation' of the capitalist state. The particularisation of the state is facilitated by the exclusion of extra-economic coercion from the circuit of capital. However, this makes the functionality of the state problematical. Because the very same particularisation and institutional separation facilitate the dislocation between the activities of the state and requirements of capital (Jessop 1990 p.206).

In sum, we can conclude that there is a correspondence between the state and the economic realm which is provided by value form but this correspondence can only be established in the course of struggle. For this reason, this correspondence and functionality of the state for the economy should be conceived around a loose-link model rather than a tight one (Pickvance 1980)¹.

¹ At a more concrete level, Pickvance identifies four reasons for thinking that there is a substantial amount of dislocation between economic and political domains. First, the state is subject to contradictory demands by classes, or fractions of capital rather than a single demand. Secondly, different branches of the state develop strong patron-client relationships between their corresponding fractions of capital. Such relations hinder the meeting of collective needs. Third, there is no mutual compatibility between different demands and as the scale of intervention grows the probability of incompatibility increases. Finally, the state's resources are limited and prevent the performance of functions (Pickvance 1980 pp.46-47).

This conception paves the way for the analysis of the state as a form-determined condensation of the balance of class forces engaged in struggle within as well as outside the state, and as a complex institutional ensemble that shapes and conditions the whole political process. Such an understanding considers the state as not an independent entity and endorses a selectivity of the state but doesn't suggest that its effects always favour one class or sets of interest. As Jessop puts it:

'indeed the complexity of the state system is deemed to be such that its functional unity cannot be taken for granted and any coherence that exists among its activities is supposed to be forged in the ace of structural tensions and internal political struggles. This implies in turn that state forms have significant effects on the calculation of political interests and thus on the composition of the dynamic of political forces. These forces may well attempt to use the state but neither they, nor it, can be seen as neutral transmission belts of interests which are fully determined elsewhere in society. Conversely, if state forms and forms of political organisation have these effects, it is legitimate for political forces to struggle to change them to their advantage'(Jessop 1990 p.149).

In this context, the State can be analysed around the strategies in a similar way to the economy. By following Jessop I argue that the state is the site, the generator, and product of strategies (Jessop 1990 p.260).

The state system as the site of the strategies can be conceived as a system of strategic selectivity in the sense that it is more open to some strategies than others.

'Thus a given type of state, a given state form, a given form of regime, will be more accessible to some forces than others according to the strategies they adopt to gain state power; and it will be more suited to the pursuit of some types of economic or political strategy than others because of the modes of the intervention resources which characterise that system'(Jessop 1990 p.260).

Strategic selectivity is different from structural selectivity in that it refers to the relational character of this selectivity. That is, there are different chances for different strategies which can be followed by the same social force. Such a conception is able to escape from the trap of structuralism and voluntarism. It avoids a voluntaristic explanation because it assumes that the strategic selectivity of structures refers to the

fact that there is an unequal chance for every strategy. It also prevents a conception of structures that gives chance to only one choice. In this sense, although strategic selectivity makes some strategies more likely than others, the formulation of strategies depends on the agency. For this reason, the success of a strategy both depends on structural conditions, both enabling and constraining, and the ability of agency to formulate the strategy in a proper way.

Secondly, the state also represents a site where strategies are studied. The assumption that the capitalist state has an institutional and functional unity is not persuasive. Even when the formal unity of the state system is provided, this does not ensure its substantive unity as the state is also the site of struggles and rivalries among its different branches. Hence, it is hardly possible to understand either the unity of the state system or the activities of the state without referring to political strategies. Through formulation of political strategies the state can act as a unified political force and state managers play a central role in the formulation of these strategies.

Finally, the state is also the product of strategies. The formal and substantial aspects of the state can be conceived in and through past political strategies and struggles. That is, the past patterns of strategic selectivity and the strategies adopted to transform it provides a structural context for the current strategic selectivity and strategies.

In line with this understanding, Jessop defines the state strategy as:

'a pattern of intervention in the economy which: (a) favours the course of an accumulation strategy and flow of material benefits to the requisite social base; and (b) constructs forms of representation that systematically favour the access of the key sectors and social groups to sites of political and economic power'(Jessop et.al 1988 p.159).

In addition to these three aspects -forms of representation, forms of intervention and forms of articulation of state as an institutional ensemble- of the state as form, there are two substantial dimensions which link the state and other political forces; social basis of the state and hegemonic project around which the exercise of state power is centred. These two aspects are important not only to link the state to society but also to conceive the relationship between accumulation and state strategies.

II. II. IV. Social Base and Hegemonic Project:

Social bases refers to 'the specific configuration of social forces, however identified as subjects and (dis-)organised as political actors, that supports the basic structure of the state system, its mode of operation and its objectives'(Jessop 1990 p. 297). Such a support is always conflict-ridden. Yet the conflicts over specific policies is not inconsistent with the consensus which constitutes the basis of support as long as such conflict occurs within the limits of accepted policy paradigm and institutional framework. Further,

'it should also be noted that the social bases of the state are heterogeneous and the different social forces will vary in their degree of commitment to the state. At the same time there will be considerable variation in the mix of material concessions, symbolic rewards and repression directed through the state to different social forces'(Jessop ibid p.207).

This brings us to the hegemonic project. Because the construction of an unstable equilibrium of compromise between various social forces depends largely on the

existence of a hegemonic project, Gramsci makes a distinction between force and consent. He argues that the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as 'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership'. A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to 'liquidate', or to subjugate by armed force: it leads kindred and allied groups' (Gramsci 1971; 58). However, Gramsci 'went on to link these two concepts together to define what he termed 'the integral state' as the combination of hegemony armoured with coercive power. The integral state is 'political society plus civil society, in other words, hegemony protected by the armour of coercion' (Bocock 1986; 26).

Jessop defines hegemony in broad terms as 'the interpolation and organisation of different 'class relevant' (but not necessarily class-conscious) forces under the political, intellectual and moral leadership of a particular class (or class fraction) or, more precisely, its political, intellectual and moral spokesmen' (Jessop 1990; 208). Through the hegemonic project, it is possible to resolve the tension between particular interests and the general interests. Such a project requires,

'the mobilisation of support behind a concrete national-popular program of action which asserts a general interest in the pursuit of objectives that explicitly or implicitly advance the long-term interests of the hegemonic class (fraction) and which also privileges particular economic corporate interests compatible with this programme' (ibid p.208).

Further, it prevents the pursuit of other particular interests that are incompatible with it whereas the hegemonic project sometimes sacrifices the short term interests of the forces mobilised behind the project (Gramsci 1971, Bertramsen 1991).

Hegemony, in this sense, refers to a situation in which one hegemonic project has achieved domination over the other rival projects. As in the case of state and accumulation strategies, there is always the possibility for the existence of competing hegemonic projects. The domination of one hegemonic project does not necessarily mean that other projects are totally removed from the scene. The domination of one project

'does not prevent the dominant project from being challenged by or encountering other counter-hegemonic projects, but means only that some options have been eliminated, in part because they cannot mobilise the means to subvert a given hegemonic project's dominant position and institute themselves as dominant. Thus a given articulation between the ideological and the institutional features of a dominant hegemonic project implies that although, in principle, any hegemonic project is just as likely to be formulated as any other, it might simply fail to provide the structural moments which are necessary for its persistence, stability and durability'(Bertramsen 1990 p.114).

Hegemonic project can be seen as a binding element of accumulation and state strategies. Hegemony is derived from leadership won via the provision and elaboration of a generally accepted accumulation strategy defined as a specific economic growth model and state strategy. As Jessop emphasises, the stability and long term durability of hegemonic project depends on the provision of particular conditions such as a specific form of organisation of the production, a specific form of the state. However, the link between them can only be established during the course of daily practice and struggles. In this sense, one to one correspondence cannot be assumed between them.

Hegemonic projects and accumulation strategies are not identical in the sense that while accumulation strategies are directly concerned with economic expansion, hence oriented primarily to the relation of production and to the balance of class forces, hegemonic projects are oriented to rather broader issues involving not only

economic relations but also the field of civil society and the state (Jessop 1990). The hegemonic project in this sense refers to the national-popular and not simply to class relations (Gramsci 1971). The important point however, is that there is a possibility of dislocation and inconsistency between them in specific situation. It is obvious however that accumulation and hegemony will be most safe when there is a strong harmony between them.

The relationship between the hegemonic project and state strategies should be considered in the same framework. Neither the formal unity, limiting conflicts among its various sections and managers, nor its substantial unity, capacity successfully to carry out its global political function of maintaining social cohesion, can be entirely accomplished without blending the state strategies with a national-popular project.

II. II. V. Concluding Remarks

Such an approach can provide a base for a middle-range theorisation in order to overcome the problems inherited from capital and class theoretical approaches.

It provides a conceptual framework to examine the alternative logic of capital in terms of competing accumulation strategies by relating them to the basic forms of capital relations and the specific structural organisation, and to the modes of economic calculation and strategic capacities of relevant economic forces.

Likewise, the alternative logic of state organisation can be examined through competing state strategies and projects, again by relating them to the same structural conditions and strategic capacities in the sphere of the state.

Finally, the field of class and popular struggles can be examined in terms of competing hegemonic projects and alliance strategies by relating them to the social forms and structural context. Such a framework is more promising than capital and class logic.

Yet, one problem remains unresolved in this approach, though I do not think it is intrinsic to it. The strategic-relational approach developed by Jessop so far reflects top-down perspective, and in this respect it shares the problem of spatial amnesia with the other theories of the state. In my view, it suffers less from this problem than do the other rival approaches. Nevertheless, my conviction is that it is open and promising to be articulated with a bottom-up approach to get a complete picture of social relations.

Mainly the problem is that it situates all these social relations and processes in a way that they proceed as though the world existed on the head of a pin, as though they were spatially undifferentiated. There is an implicit assumption here that social processes such as capital accumulation, class conflict and state intervention are general processes which are independent of space (cf, Giddens 1984).

If we want to understand these processes and their political implications, we need to be quite conscious of the fact that general processes, such as accumulation strategies,

are constituted from the beginning in many places and they are only general in the sense that their spatial dimensions are not those of a single place (Duncan 1989a). As

Duncan points out:

'this artificial distinction between general and local emerges from a conflation of our mental processes of abstraction with what actually happens in reality. Thus we may mentally abstract theories of the state, say, from the places where real states are created and reproduced. This abstraction can be useful enough for theoretical analysis, which is after all a vital part of any research... But we should not be fooled by our own abstractions into imagining that processes can actually exist in an abstract way... States, for instance, can only exist concretely and hence enmeshed in all manner of contingent relations including spatial ones. Abstract theories of 'the capitalist state' can only be a starting point in explaining what states do'(Duncan 1989a p.134).

Unfortunately, the current literature in all social sciences is dominated by an understanding which assumes that there are only general processes occurring on the head of a pin. In this context it is not difficult to see a direct link between this attitude towards social processes and the dominance of the 'top-down' perspective in the literature (see Pickvance 1985). As Pickvance points out, this top-down perspective is essential and there should not be an argument with it: 'However, it has led to neglect the 'bottom-up' pressures from 'cities', 'regions', etc. (Pickvance 1985 p.120).For this reason, we need to complement the top-down analysis with a bottom-up one.

These two types of analysis have direct bearing on our discussion on hegemonic projects, and state and accumulation strategies. For instance, is it possible to achieve societal hegemony without making it local? Does the state keep its unity without controlling at least considerable amounts of its local extensions? Could an accumulation strategy become dominant without a corresponding 'spatial division of labour'? Moreover, are all these so-called general processes independent of

bottom-up or grassroots pressures and struggles? It is clear that the preceding top-down perspective must be complemented with a bottom-up one to get a complete picture of previously discussed issues².

In the following section I will extend my analysis of hegemonic projects, state and accumulation strategies to the local (urban) level to complete the analysis developed in the first section of this chapter.

II. II. A Strategic Relational Approach to the Local (Urban).

I will start with a discussion of the meaning and content definition of the local(locality)³ (Section I) since only after we clear the meaning of the local can we proceed to a discussion of various forms of interaction between the local-scale processes and higher-scale processes (Section II). In the light of these discussion I will examine the local political processes with a special emphasis on local projects competing for hegemony (Section III). Then I will sum up the debate in the concluding section.

² Indeed, I shall suggest that such an intention (integrating top-down and bottom-up perspective) requires much more examination in relation to the relationship between the social and space. But the problem is more complex than referred. When I allude, for instance, to the relationship between the global and the local, this does not include only a spatial relation. More obviously, the local cannot be identified with the spatial. Because the relationship between global and local, and local itself, refer to 'two interconnected sets of processes, the social and spatial, which happen to produce particular combinations of social relations within a given geographically delimited area' (Urry 1987). Then, to explain, for instance, local social relations one must consider both the relationship between the social and spatial, and the very nature of social relations themselves in this geographically delimited area.

³ I will use the concepts, 'local', 'locality' and 'urban' interchangeably. This is mainly due to the changing jargon in urban studies between 1970s and 1990s. While the concept 'urban' was the popular in 1970s, during the 1990s, the concepts, 'local' and 'locality' became popular. Although I am aware of the vagueness of the concept of local, I use it to denote the urban scale. The reason to prefer to use the concepts, local and locality is to provide a coherence with the literature I use in this section.

II. II. I. Defining the Local:

As I mentioned above, the relationship between different scales refers to the problematic relationship between the social and spatial. For this reason any attempt aimed at understanding a particular scale, such as a local one, has to deal with this problematic relation.

In the social sciences and particularly in urban sociology, there has been a long dominance of ideas that 'spatial processes' operate in some ways independently of social processes and that spatial patterns can be considered for their own right. Accordingly, as in the case of Chicago school, it has been assumed that so-called 'spatial relations' are the analytical basis for understanding urban systems. The physical shape of cities as well as relations among people living in these places are assumed to be determined by these spatial relations. This understanding was representing an absolutist view of the space which assumes a strict separation between social and spatial.

This way of thinking came under fire in the late 1960s, mainly, by Marxist researchers in the field. It was argued that there was no such spatial process independent of social processes. Instead, there are only social processes acting in a spatial context. Further, it is also argued that since space is produced by society, it is nothing other than society. This view is based on a relativist view of space which asserts that space cannot have substance as it exists as a relation between the objects.

In recent years, as a third round, an approach which is critical of both understandings, has been growing around a *relational understanding of space*. Although they accept the starting assumption of Castells, they reject his final judgement that the spatial is social since it is produced by society. It is argued that it is quite right to assume that space is not something existing outside society and rather produced by society and that, space can only exist as a relation between objects which have substance. Space, on the other hand, doesn't have substance. However, by modifying the relativist view in one important way, it is argued that:

For even though spatial relations are created by natural and social objects, it doesn't follow that the effects of these spatial relations can simply be reduced to the causal effects that these objects possess. Having been constituted by objects, spatial relations may taken go on to affect how, in what ways and even if these objects and their causal powers then relate... This spatial effect is still a secondary effect, and basic causes...still reside in substance objects... But spatial relations now make a difference to how social and natural process work'(Duncan 1989a p.132).

Despite my reservations on the realist view of science, I think such a middle position between spatial fetishism and amnesia is more promising than the preceding conceptions⁴.

In my view, the relational approach is better equipped to understand the society-space relationship, and if we accept this view, then, we have to start the definition of the local with its social constituents (since space is constituted by the social objects even if the former cannot be reduced to the latter). Put simply, the prime question we need to tackle is what specifies the locality. Nevertheless, the answer to this question is not that straightforward since each specific event takes place in a locality does not

⁴Such a conception can help to overcome over-abstract accounts of social relations which leave no room for the variation of these relations in space and (time), hence, for human agency in creating these variations. Nevertheless, I am not identifying structures with national or international scales and agency with a substantial and local scale. Nor do I identify the general with social and local with spatial. My only contention is to argue that any social processes, no matter whether local or national, are constituted in space and (time).

mean it is specific to that particular locality. Then, we need to face the classical distinction between 'of locality' and 'in locality'. My contention is that since the locality does not represent any more a power container as it was the case in city states (Saunders 1985), it is not possible to identify a social relation which characterise the locality *independent* of national and global scales. Nevertheless, this does not mean there is nothing specific to locality, and there are attempts to identify the specificity of locality in connection with the higher scales such as national and global ones⁵.

The current literature highlights this point very well. In this regard there seems to be two subsequent orientations in the literature with regard to the analysis of relations between different spatial scales and their specificities. The first approach is based on the 'scale division of labour'. It 'refers to the division of activities between different levels of the hierarchy of spatial scales, the territories composing it, therefore being nested'(see Cox and Mair 1991). Castells is the forerunner of this approach, as I have shown in Chapter I. As Cox and Mair point out, Castells(1977) identified the urban scale with collective consumption and the regional scale with industrial production. Taylor(1982) equated the local scale with everyday experience, the national scale with political structures and the global scale with economic structure. Smith (1984), on the other hand, identified the urban scale with the equalisation of abstract labour,

⁵ In this sense, as Duncan points out, 'there is after all no necessary reason why causal mechanisms should only operate on a world scale or even a national scale. We know that social mechanisms are historically specific as people create particular societies... But, by the same token, we must admit spatial specificity. Capitalism has never been a total world system and the depth of its social penetration varies from place to place... But if we are to admit the national scale based on an appreciation of national specificities then there is no good reason to reject, a priori, the local scale' (Duncan 1989b;235).

(daily labour markets) and the global scale with the universalisation of wage labour (capitalist production system). The national scale is defined with political control over labour, whereas the regional scale was said to differentiate different production sectors (Cox and Mair 1991 p.200).

The value of such attempts to determine the specificity of each spatial scale is clear. Yet, in my view they conceptualise the locality at a either too high level of abstraction, as in the case of Smith who equates the local scale with the equalisation of abstract labour (daily labour market), or too concrete as in the case of Taylor which identifies the local scale with everyday life⁶. They either exclude many issues, such as urban land and locational conflicts as in the case of Castells and Smith, or conceive the locality as a chaotic place where everything takes place.

In my own view, we can specify four socio-spatial processes as being characteristic of locality⁷. The first one, following Castells, is the process of collective consumption. The second one is the processes arising out of issues around urban land such as spatial proximity. Although some attention has been paid to urban land (Gottdiener (1985) and Scott (1980)), the urban land question remained as one of the neglected issue in urban studies. I think struggles given around urban land constitutes

⁶For instance, in the case of Castells, the identification of the urban with the consumption practices is derived from an Althusserian conception of modes of production. Such a conception excludes many practices which can be included in the content definition of locality.

⁷ My own content definition bears important similarities with Pickvance's (1985b). He outlines three social processes as being characteristics of the urban. The first one is the process of collective consumption as in Castells' and Dunleavy's formulations. The second one is the processes arising out of spatial proximity as in the Cox's (1978) and Scott's (1980) conceptions. Local level political processes are the third one which can be included to the content of urban. Pickvance's content definition of urban overcomes 'some' of the difficulties which are peculiar to previous conceptions. However, it does not cover important issues which are particularly central to urban/local processes such as urban land and local dependence.

one of the distinctive issue which specifies the locality. The third one concerns the local political processes around the local state. These are mainly social elements of the content definition of local scale.

These three issues are central to the local-level social and political relations and holds a central position in local-level social conflicts. But they are hardly the only issues around which different groups form the locality as a spatial fix. I think there is another aspect which provides a base for defining the locality as a meaningful scale, and that is, local dependency (See Cox and Mair (1991) and Harvey (1985a)).

Different actors in a different degree become dependent to a locality. The working class becomes tied to a locality through the labour and housing markets. Likewise, petty producers and small-scale enterprises invest in a locality and their future becomes very much dependent upon the prosperity of that particular locality. Even the big businesses which invest in a particular locality, though to a much lesser extent, becomes tied to the locality. This is the main that factor brings a structured coherence to a locality (Harvey 1985a) and makes the locality a meaningful unit of analysis.

Related to this issue is the definition of the boundaries of the locality. It is on this point rather than on the content definition I find the labour-market an important determinant. In other words, despite criticisms, I think the local labour market might

be a useful criterion in drawing the boundaries of locality⁸. (Cooke 1987, Warde 1990, Smith 1984).

II. II. II. Relating the Locality to Higher Scales:

It is clear, on the one hand, that general processes does not fully explain what is going on in particular place. But, it is again true that it is impossible understand this uniqueness without referring to general processes since 'the social and economic structure of any given local area will be a complex result of combination of that area's succession of roles within the series of wider, national and international spatial division of labour' (Massey 1978 p.116). The methodological question, as Massey puts it, is how to keep a grip on the generality of events, the wider processes lying behind them, without losing sight of the individuality of the form of their occurrence. Despite her emphasis on the successive role of a locality within the series of wider, national and international spatial division of labour, Massey does not pursue this aspect and concentrate on the uniqueness of the locality. However, we can find in Harvey, what is missing as an intermediary step in Massey's analysis.

There are important insights into such intermediate steps in Harvey's classification of alternative options for localities within the larger division of labour. The options are 'divided into four types, roughly emphasising the contrasts between cities as workshops for production; cities as consumption artifacts; cities as centres of

⁸ They also argue against the validity of local labour market as legitimating criterion for the locality. They assert that, first of all, it is difficult to characterise the local labour market in the sense that some jobs may have very different labour market characteristics in various places. If a set of jobs in any place which are open to all residents of that locality characterises the locality, they go on to argue that it seems to be impossible. Because, in one place there are a variety of segmented labour markets. Further, the spatial boundaries of any labour market for different groups are likely vary. Then, it is

information, finance capital and administration; and cities as redistributive centres' (Harvey, 1985b:269,1985a). However these four options are not mutually exclusive and some cities may do well on more than one option. Before going to study each unique city or locality, it seems to me possible to find certain common points among the cities that have common functions on the basis of these options. Having the workshop functions, for instance, gives important clues about the cities' employment structure, consumption pattern, political culture so forth. In this sense, before jumping into the uniqueness of each city/locality, it might be useful to study these alternative options for cities and consider each locality with reference to its place within this spatial division of labour.

Although Harvey's approach provides important insights into a satisfactory understanding of local and higher level processes, it does not provides us with a methodological point of view on the study of the interaction between different geographical scales, and without such a perspective, a satisfactory understanding of this interaction becomes difficult, if not impossible.

Duncan and Goodwin (1989) provide a proper starting point with regard to the two sorts of relations between a locality and higher levels by considering the above debate on the spatiality of the social. They make a distinction between contingent local variations and causal local processes. The former refers to the contingent effects of a spatial pattern peculiar to the locality. The latter, on the other hand,

difficult, if not impossible to employ the local labour market to define he boundaries of locality (Duncan and Savage 1989 pp.187-8).

implies local specificity of generative social relations (Duncan and Goodwin 1988; Duncan 1989b; of Urry 1987).

In the first example, the difference that local processes make on national level processes can be identified with spatial contingency. Let me take the example in Figure II. I.. We observe a state intervention in the housing field. Further, we also see the concentration of investments in certain localities rather than others. In this case the previous concentration of substandard housing in this particular locality was to affect, contingently, where the investment on housing took place rather than causing it.

By the second kind of relation, a concentration of investments is observed. But in this case, such a concentration is attributed to the struggles given by the locally specific social forces as is seen in Figure II.II. Here, causal local processes are socially generative. In this sense, variation is not a matter of the contingent effects of spatial patterns. By the same token, it is helpful to return relative merits of bottom-up and top-down approaches in these two specific examples. For the first case, (spatial contingency) top-down explanations are more explanatory than the bottom-up ones due to the fact that causal mechanism and processes take place on a more broader framework than the local level. Nevertheless, this abstract research must be complemented by bottom-up concrete research to show how the spatial features of locality will affect this social process. In the second case, on the other hand, there is a local causal process which requires abstract research as well. In this regard, bottom-up explanations are as important as top-down explanations. In sum, in any

case, it is necessary to use these perspectives together even if their relative merits change according to the case in hand.

Figure II. I. Contingent local variation: the case of local housing





Figure II. II. Casual local variation: the case of council housing



Source: Duncan and Goodwin, 1988, p. 59

Up to this point, I have intended to show that there is no such general process that are independent of spatial structures in general, and of geographically delimited countless localities specifically. Nevertheless, I don't claim that these locally

produced mechanisms are the only, even most important ones, and there is no general social processes as such. It is clear that general processes are at least as important as local processes. Rather, my contention is to show that there are local variations as a matter of the contingent effects of spatial arrangements as well as local causal variations. I have argued, at the beginning of this section that in order to grasp local-social relations, one must consider both the relationship between the social and spatial and the very nature of social relations themselves in this geographically delimited area. I have shown the importance of space for the social relations as a contingent factor. The very same debate has also shown the importance of the local social relations themselves *vis-a-vis* general social relations, when I have examined the 'local causal variation'. Now, I go on to examine these local relations in the light of preceding debates.

II. II. III. Local Projects and Strategies:

Even if there are important disagreements in the conceptualisation of local social relations and spatial structures, there is an agreement that they do matter. In the light of these debates I go on to examine (social and spatial) constitutions of the hegemonic project, the state and accumulation strategies at the local (urban) level.

So far, we saw that there can be two types of relation between national (or global) and local processes; local contingency and local causal variation, and seldomly we can also see a locality effect. I think this classification provides us an important starting point for the analysis of hegemonic projects, state and accumulation strategies with reference to their local dimension.

In the preceding section, I discussed the hegemonic project through a top-down understanding. Now, I would like to complete the discussion by relating it to local contingency and locally derived processes. What the analysis above has shown is that a hegemonic project can interact with local-level processes in two ways. On the one hand, can be affected by local processes contingently. For instance, a locality, due to its strategic location, lets say as a port city, might become important for a hegemonic project which is based on an export-oriented growth strategy. Here, the locality might become vital for this hegemonic project due to its strategic location which can be considered a contingent factor. It is quite likely that this particular locality would become a winner within this hegemonic project and locally powerful groups would exploit this fortune to the end.

On the other hand, the locality can create its fortune by either acting in line with the hegemonic project or sometimes, perhaps seldomly, acting against it. For instance, a local alliance may judge the hegemonic project and its spatial logic and act accordingly. This would bring a locality into a better situation in the spatial division of labour. More dramatically, a local alliance can act against the hegemonic project by following its politico-cultural tradition. In this case, it would act as a counter-hegemonic project. By and large, in this kind of situation, the local hegemonic project is stimulated by political rather than economic corporate concerns. The success of this kind of counter-hegemonic mobilisation depends upon various factors ranging from the mobilisation of resources to the leadership and its strategies. More importantly however, the success is also determined by overcoming the scale problem. That is, a counter-hegemonic project would hardly be successful against a hegemonic project which is organised at a nation-state level unless it goes beyond its

local boundaries by forming alliances with similar projects or by becoming a part of a national-level organisation which itself represents a counter-hegemonic project.

In sum, there seems to be three alternatives in front of localities *vis-a-vis* the national-level hegemonic project. It can remain passive and get contingently effected by it. It might become active and use the opportunities to improve its position in the spatial division of labour. Finally, it might act against the hegemonic project as a counter-hegemonic force either individually at the local level or as a part of a nationwide counter-hegemonic project.

Having analysed the position of a locality *vis-a-vis* the national-level hegemonic project, I would like to turn to the local level itself. Such an analysis is necessary because any alliance does pursue a position. Locality itself hardly becomes a conflict-free unity. There are always alternative projects of different group and classes towards the locality and these groups need not to be locally dependent groups. As we saw above, a national-level hegemonic project assumes a spatial division of labour among the localities. It is not that seldom that some cities become a specific target of these projects due to their strategic importance for the project. It is a common practice nowadays to promote some cities as finance centres and a world cities. These kinds of projects often brings international, national and local forces together to promote the city.

In some other cases, local coalitions try to promote and revitalise the fortune of the city. This is the situation for many cities that specialised as a workshops in the previous round of the spatial division of labour. Cities like Manchester and Liverpool

are the best known example of these kinds of cities. Led by locally powerful groups, the projects in these cities aims at establishing hegemony in the city around a discourse which emphasises the common interests of the whole city and, as I will discuss in more detail below, the local state often plays an articulatory role in the formation of the local coalition and establishment of hegemony at the local level.

Those local projects that aimed at gaining a better position in the spatial division of labour by exploiting the opportunities created by the national-level hegemonic project are not the only option. It may not be as often and as easy as these kinds of projects; there might be a local level project which challenges the parameters of higher level projects as well as the local-level power structure. It might try to bring popular forces together to form a counter hegemony in the locality. It is obvious that the change of success for them is limited comparing those who remain in line with the dominant economic and political relations in and above locality. The GLC experience in London can be seen as an example of this kind of attempt and it was eliminated by the Thatcher Government for the reason that it challenged the Thatcherite project.

There is another group of projects which is different from the examples mentioned above in that, although they are involved in local-level issues such as collective consumption, neighbourhood quality, their struggle concentrates on a part of the locality rather than the whole locality. Urban social movements are usual examples of these kind of partial projects towards the city. They usually but not necessarily come into conflict with the dominant project in the city. Yet, as they organise

themselves around issues, they disappear when either they achieve their objective or they realise that it is impossible to achieve.

I will discuss local-level projects in detail by referring to six main constitutive dimensions. The *focal point of the project* refers to the way in which urban space is articulated into the project. That is, a project might see the urban space as source of profit (exchange value), or it can be seen as a space for daily use (use value), or a means of expression of an identity (identity value). By *type of space*, I understand either a concrete space as a living place or an abstract space which serves as an exchange or identity value. *Social base and leading force* refer to a social base to which the project is directed and to the main social force which leads the project by articulating a social base into the project. *Locus of consciousness* refers to different loci such as the individual, household, community, state and class. *Institutional forms* refer to the institutional forms the project is organised into and to the attitude taken towards the (local) state. Finally, *urban planning* constitutes an important dimension and battle field of hegemonic struggles. In what follows in this section, I aim to provide a detailed account of these dimensions.

In terms of the focal point of project, Logan and Molotch (1987) provide a good introduction⁹. The basic points of their approach can be summarised as follows:

Urban space is a social product arising out of the negotiation of the tension that

⁹ In their recent study Logan and Molotch (1987) have proposed a theoretical framework for urban studies, which aims to overcome shortcomings of existing capital and action-oriented approaches to the urban question. Their aim is no less than to overcome the duality between agency and structure as well as that between global and local for urban studies. In this sense, their work provides a convenient starting point for a strategic relational approach to urban studies. Yet, their study is too restrictive to contain all the elements of the urban question which I discussed above. There is also economic reductionism in their approach.

exists between use value and exchange value. They argue that any given piece of real estate has both a use value and an exchange value. An apartment building, for example, provides a 'home' for resident (use value) while at the same time generating rent for resident (exchange value) (Logan and Molotch, 1987; 2). This duality defines the structural location of urban actors. That is,

'individuals and groups differ on which aspect (use or exchange) is most crucial to their own lives. For example, place represents residence or production site; for others, places represent a commodity for buying, selling or renting to somebody else' (ibid. p. 2).

In sum, the conflict between use and exchange value constitutes the material basis of urban conflicts¹⁰. They further argue that,

'this conflict closely determines the shape of the city, the distribution of people, and the way they live together. Similarly in the light of this tension we can better understand the political dynamics of cities, regions and discover how inequalities in and between places -a stratification of place as well as of individuals and groups- are established and maintained' (ibid. p. 2).

I agree with Logan and Molotch in that urban space is 'a battle ground between those who wish to use the city as a means for enhancing the use values of citizens and those for whom the city is an asset in money making projects involving urban space'.

However, there is a third kind of purpose in the use of urban space which is not directly captured by use and exchange values. There is sometimes a very specific purpose of consumption that is to enhance one's identity (see Warde, 1992; 18)¹¹.

Warde argues that:

¹⁰In fact, understanding the urban conflict around the conflict between use and exchange value is hardly original. Lefebvre (1979) represents one of the first who pointed to this duality as the central conflict of capitalist urbanisation. I will apply his insights in the following parts of this section.

¹¹In my view, the distinction between use and exchange values employed by Marx belongs to a level of abstraction where there is no place for identity value. I think the employment of identity value is possible in a lower level of abstraction where cultural and political categories also play their part. In *Das Capital*, where Marx discuss the value, exchange and use value there is no discussion of the state or cultural issues either.

"The sociological literature has some grasp of this -it is embedded in Weber's analysis of status, Veblen's concept of conspicuous consumption and Bourdieu's notion of distinction. Style, status, group identification, etc., are aspects of identity-value, where people choose to display commodities or engage in different spheres of consumption with a view to expressing their identity. Certain objects, and participation in certain activities are coveted for their social-symbolic value, placing the consumer in a social circle" (Warde, 1992; 18).

Thus it is possible to argue that the built environment itself and certain (collective) means of consumption become not only the source of use and exchange value but also 'a positional commodity through which some individuals and groups define their identity and mark a distinction (see Bourdieu, 1984)¹². One of the striking examples of this aspect is the use of urban space by 'marginal groups' such as gay communities. While they use urban space as a place of residence, they equally emphasise their identity in this use.

In sum, we can argue that the urban-development process is an overdetermined outcome of continuing struggle between the conflicting purposes of various individuals, groups and organisations. Some of these struggles are specific to the urban. I share Logan's and Molotch's view that the principal opposition is between those who pursue use values around urban land and certain commodities subject to state intervention, and those who see those items as a source of exchange value, by adding an identity dimension¹³.

¹²Nevertheless, identity value should not be considered as something outside economic relations. The general relation between different forms of value is ultimately determined by economic struggles. It is especially quite fragile against the exchange value. That is, there is convertibility between identity and exchange values. Housing, for instance, is an excellent example of these complex relations. Gentrified housing confers social status, meaning and prestige but has also a use and exchange value. While the location, history and architecture of the housing make a distinction for the owner, the very same features can be convertible to exchange value. This example shows that spatial proximity is also important in terms of identity value.

¹³ Zukin(1992) defines two types of built environments: landscape and vernacular. 'Landscapes' are always constituted by asymmetrical power and forms around institutions such as markets. It is the place of the powerful. 'Vernacular', on the other hand, refers to the built environment of the powerless. It is more immediate and private whereas landscape is more 'public'. This extremity is blurred by the

On the other hand, while arguing that the localities are constituted and transformed by conflicting interests, this does not mean that the changes are not equal for different groups. Neither are interests established freely without taking structures which are constraining and enabling. As Lake (1990) points out:

"The case for an 'interest-driven social construction of cities' will always be incomplete if it ignores the prior questions of how and why interests are established. Activists are surely important, but only as they have become spectacularly adept at exploiting the potentialities offered by capitalist structure. A focus on agents and their interests demands elucidation of the structures that provide opportunities for the pursuit and realisation of particular kinds of interests through particular ways and means in particular times and places" (Lake, 1990; 180).

In this sense, renters, local capital, residents, politicians and their plans, dreams and strategies beg the context. As far as the economic context concerned, I find Harvey's approach useful in that it establishes a link between a dominant regime of accumulation and dominant mode of urbanisation. In my view it has heuristic value. Harvey argues that there has been a correspondence between a Keynesian (Fordist) regime of accumulation and the urban experience of that period. For him, 'the Keynesian city was shaped as a consumption artifact and its social, economic, and political life organised around the theme of state-backed, debt-financed consumption' in line with the dominant regime of accumulation (Harvey, 1985a; 206). This model of urbanisation not only reflected the logic of Keynesian economic policies, but was also a constituting part of it by opening new investment opportunities for over-accumulated capital. He finds similar relationships between a post-Fordist (Keynesian) regime of accumulation and a post-Keynesian city.

intervention of the state but never superseded. There is always a battle between landscape and vernacular to transform each other. Usually, vernacular becomes landscape and loses the battle. Yet, it appears in another place.

Now my argument is that the potentialities offered by this economic context for urban actors who search for use value were relatively high during the long post-war period of the Keynesian regime of accumulation. It would not be wrong to argue that in the current context of so-called post-fordist regimes of accumulation it is other way around. The changing combination of wage/profit and consumption/investment rates in favour of capital associated with lower rates of unionisation, reduction of internal labour markets to a smaller core workforce, and lower rates of militancy created a structural context pressing the urban actors to search for a maximum amount of exchange value (Pretecielle, 1981; 9). Thus, it seems to me quite important to understand these structural conditions, both constraining and enabling the actors.

The type of value dominating urban space is very much related to the *type of space*.

Following Lefebvre, I will define two types of spaces: abstract and concrete spaces (Lefebvre 1991). Gregory summarises this conception very succinctly:

'Lefebvre's account is based on the distinction between exchange value and use value that lies at the heart of Marx's analysis of the commodity. Whereas Marx's critique of political economy privileged history over geography, however, Lefebvre tries to make the 'silent spaces' of Capital speak. He transform Marx's original opposition into one between the 'abstract space' of capitalism's economic and political systems -externalised, rationalised, sanctioned- and the swirling, kaleidoscopic 'lived space' of everyday life. The tension between these spaces transcends a distinction between integration and differentiation that admits of no final solution'(Gregory 1994:275).

In this sense, abstract space is produced by two interrelated processes. The first one is the commodification of and through space, which inserts property relations at the centre of space whereby space itself becomes a commodity bought and sold in the market. The second one is the bureaucratisation of and through space. Space does not only become a means of control and surveillance but also itself subjected to these processes. On the other hand, concrete space refers to space of everyday life where there is a continuous treat of the capitalist economy and the state to colonise concrete

space and turn it to abstract space. In this sense, urban space has different uses. It might be a subject and arena of capital accumulation and profit. At the same time it can be again a subject and arena of surveillance, control and bureaucratisation. Finally, it can be a space of daily life where, in a capitalist society, its main functions appears to be the reproduction of labour power.

In these struggles, different projects targets a different *locus of consciousness*. As, we discussed in Chapter I, Harvey defines five loci of urban consciousness: individualism, family, community, the state and class. I will agree with Harvey on that 'no one locus of consciousness-formation can be understood independently of its relation to the others. It is the total patterning of interrelations between them that counts'(Harvey 1985b). I will go further, however, to argue that each project towards the city implicitly or explicitly proposes a specific patterning of consciousness-formation which places some of these loci in front of the others. For instance, a new right project proposes a special patterning which places individualism at the centre of the locus of urban consciousness, while the family and community stand as second tiers of consciousness-formation. The state, except its law and order functions, and class have entirely refused to play a role as the locus of consciousness-formation. This is perhaps nothing other than reversal of a pattern of consciousness-formation in Keynesian city where the class and state as welfare state played central roles compared to individualism and the family.

It should also be noted that there might be a obstructive relationship between different locus of consciousness. One of the classical examples is the one between class and community. It has been shown that in many studies, among the migrant

population, the formation of consciousness within an ethnic community has played an obstructive role for the formation of consciousness on the basis of class (see Rex and Moore (1967), also Pickvance (1977)). For this reason, the patterning and articulation of different locus of consciousness constitute an important aspect of the formation of a project and this articulation plays a substantial role in the success of it. It should also be noted that a specific articulation of a different locus of consciousness of a certain period might become an obstacle in the following round of urbanisation. For instance, while the community based consciousness plays a positive role for the capitalist class for a certain period, since it prevents the development of class-based consciousness among the working class, the very same community-based consciousness might become obstructive itself in another period for the same class, since it becomes an obstacle for capital accumulation.

Creating a pattern of urban consciousness within a *social base* is very much related to the social, economic and cultural characteristics of the very same social base. One of the determinant of the properties of the social base in a locality is the locality's succession of roles within the wider national and international division of labour. That is, if a locality has been a workshop and production centre, then one of the features of the social base would be a working-class existence and culture in the social base; and for a finance and command centre, middle-class existence would be very pressing in the social base. It is not my claim however that the whole characteristic of the social base could be read off from the role of the locality in the spatial division of labour. Although we can have some inference for the ethnic and gender-based characteristics of the locality on this basis, nevertheless, a satisfactory understanding of them requires specific research into the very same social base.

Another issue regarding the social base is the relationship between the project towards the city and the social base it targets. I will argue that a project targeting the whole locality has two different strategies towards the social base. The first one is that the project could be a *one locality (city) project* in the sense that it is expansive as much as it could afford towards the social base. The second one is a *two localities (cities) project* which targets a core section of the social base and which is central to the project and excludes those who would not be economically and politically significant for the project¹⁴.

In the transformation of the targeted social base into a social base, a hegemonic project needs to transcend short-term material interests. By using Gramsci's language, this involves transcending economic-corporate interests for political ones (Gramsci 1971;161). Any project competing for local hegemony has to achieve this in order to gain the hegemony.

In the transformation of the social base into a social force, as is well-known, Gramsci devotes a crucial role to 'organic intellectuals' in transcending the economic corporate interests in favour of politico-ideological ones by creating a corresponding form of consciousness in the social base. In this sense, we can define a group of organic intellectuals for an urban project as well. But I will divert from the Gramscian understanding of the role allocated for the organic intellectual for the reason that Gramsci creates a strong dualism between the masses and organic

intellectuals in terms of level of consciousness¹⁵. In my view there might be some role for the leadership and organic intellectuals in the creation of a political consciousness. But I see their main role in the articulation of different aspects of the project and social forces within and around a project. At the local level, the organic intellectual contains vast array of groups and people including politicians, bureaucrats, academics, planners and so on.

Achievements of this objective is also very much dependent upon 'the availability of organisational forms to act as vehicles for the social force' (Pickvance 1977;180). We can classify these organisation on the basis of their followers and members objectives in local politics: use value, exchange value and identity value-seeking organisations. We can also categorise them on the basis of their attitudes towards the formalised political system. They can either reject being a part of the formalised political system in order to escape the constraint imposed by institutional politics as in the case of urban social movements (Castells 1977, 1983), or can become a part of it and use institutional channels such as local political parties. While the former type of organisations puts pressures from without, the latter types advance their interest within the formal political system.

¹⁴ Of course, both cases are ideal types in the sense that there will always be considerable exclusion under a one city project and there will be always concessions to the excluded to keep them under control.

¹⁵For a criticism of this elite-mass model see Furedi (1992;258-60). Furedi points out that Gramsci underestimates the potential of masses and overestimates the capacity of intellectuals to teach, and it is a mistake to reduce the learning process to education by knowledge transfer from elite to masses. This view ignores the fact that real learning comes from experience. As Furedi asserts 'experience shows that consciousness is susceptible to great fluctuations and becomes transformed as reality changes' (Furedi 1992; 259). While agreeing with this criticism, I will argue that there is a great role played by leadership and organic intellectuals in organising the struggle. This does not simply refer to a teaching function. The most crucial function of leadership is to articulate different aspects of the project into a coherent whole.

In this sense, the local state emerges as the most important institutional structure in local politics. As Logan and Molotch admit, 'urban governments became battle grounds between those who wish to use the city as a means for enhancing the use values of citizens and those for whom the city is an asset in money-making projects involving urban space'. Yet, their analysis of the state suddenly turns into an instrumentalist one when they argue that the space entrepreneurs are hegemonic and local governments are mere tools to generate growth (Logan and Molotch, 1990; 87)¹⁶. This is more likely but not necessarily the case. From time to time, the local state can be captured by those who seek use values in urban space. The local state, as a part of state apparatus, is a form-determined social relation in the sense that it is a distinctive institutional form as well as a relation reflecting the balance of political forces in society. Given this characteristic, it is open to the pressures of those who seek use values in urban space. The degree to which the local state responds to these pressures are determined by the balance of power among contradictory local forces.

Likewise it would not be wrong to see the local state, like the overall state apparatuses, as a site, generator and product of strategies towards the locality. I will not go into detail here as I discussed this issues in the first section, I will only discuss those issues which are distinctive in relation to the local state. The local state is a site where its structure is more open to some groups than others depending on the strategies followed by these groups. This refers to the fact that there are different changes for different strategies followed by the same forces. For instance, use-value

¹⁶ Their pessimism is partly due to the fact that they work on the specific case of United States cities, where business and local government have had very close relation in local politics. For this reason their analysis of the local state is victim to empiricism.

seeking groups could demand some changes to have access to the local state with certain strategies and no change at all with some other strategies. The local state is also a site where strategies are elaborated in the sense that local managers plays a crucial role in providing the unity of the local state apparatus *vis-a-vis* contradictory demands and pressures within and without the local state. Finally, it is a product of strategies in that it is a product of past political strategies.

Local state strategies are the overdetermined outcome of these three dimensions and refer to (a) specific form of intervention in the local economy, (b) a specific form of representation of interests within the local state apparatus(es) and (c) a specific form of the internal organisation of the local state. A project would become hegemonic to the extent that it has a privileged position to determine who would be benefited at the expense of others regarding these three areas. In this sense, it would not be an exaggeration to argue that the local state constitutes the most strategic institutional locus of struggles for local hegemony.

If the local state represents the most important institution at the local level, urban planning constitute one of the most strategic niches within the web of instrumentalities of the (local) state. I define urban planning as a means of state intervention in the urban development process towards the production, use and management of the built environment. It contains such a vast area from the regulation of the field of collective consumption (Castells 1977), to the maintenance and reproduction of fixed capital including urban land (Harvey 1978), and the regulation of spatial organisation which facilitates the circulation. In line with its function in the production and reproduction of the capitalist city, it is like the state, a

form-determined social relation. On the one hand, it is an arena of conflicting interests and reflects the balance of political power between these conflicting interests such as those who search for exchange value and those who search use values. On the other hand, it is an institution with its own organisation, personnel and rules, which provides the planners who monopolise the knowledge with considerable power and autonomy. In this context, a successful hegemony requires to having a degree of power on the planning processes. In case of the establishment of this hegemony on the planning itself, under the guise of the 'technical neutrality of planning', the development plan regarding the locality can become a blue print of the local hegemonic project. However, it would be a fatal mistake to consider planning as a simple tool in the hand of locally hegemonic forces. Urban planing is a very complex and Janus-faced process which might become an impediment for the very same social forces. This is partly due to the fact that while hegemony requires continuous redefinition of its objectives and strategies, planning is less flexible, as it assign functions and roles to urban space for a certain period¹⁷. Besides, it is very rare that a project which becomes hegemonic has a chance to form its own development plan but inherits a planning framework of the previous period. In turn, either it adapts itself by manipulating itself or tries to eliminate itself for a new one. In this sense, although planning becomes an important institution for the hegemonic project to capture, it is a conflict-ridden one which needs to be tackled by the hegemonic project in due course.

¹⁷ That is partly why there has been a move from a so-called static comprehensive planning to a more flexible strategic planning in most of the capitalist countries during the last two decades or so. This change can be considered a response to the transition to post-Keynesian city from a Keynesian one.

II. III. Concluding Remarks:

In this section of Chapter II, I have shown that the social relations and processes such as the hegemonic project, state and accumulation strategies and their outcomes do not take place on the head of a pin. Rather, they take place in countless localities and therefore spatially differentiated. Embarking upon this understanding, I approached these processes with a bottom-up understanding. I have first illustrated the forms of interaction between the so-called general processes and the local one. It became clear that the local processes might effect the general one contingently or they can make a difference through locally casual processes. What this classification demonstrated is that localities are not only the places that can make a difference on the general processes such as struggles for hegemony, but they themselves become an arena of these struggles as such. In other words, the locality may become a target of hegemonic projects of different groups who are fighting for hegemony at the local level to advance their interest.

I have shown that those who see the locality around similar interest may assemble around a project to establish hegemony over the locality. A local hegemonic project contains various elements ranging from a leadership to a social base. I argued that there are two main strategies in front of a project regarding the social base. It might aim at an expansive hegemony by targeting ideally the support of the entire population of the locality (one locality project). Alternatively, it can aim at a more limited hegemony by excluding certain sections of the social base which is not strategically important for the construction of hegemony (two localities project). I have also argued that the mobilisation of the targeted social base is not an automatic

process which requires the creation of a pattern of consciousness in line with the basic premises of the hegemonic project. In this process, the leadership, institutional framework, including the local state, plays a central part. Nevertheless, even when the hegemony is established successfully, there will be resistance and alternative projects fighting for alternative hegemony.

In the following four chapters I will analyse the trajectory of the Turkish state (Chapter III), Turkish urbanisation (Chapter IV), and the case of state capital Ankara (Chapter V, and VI) through the theoretical framework developed in this chapter.

If the definition of the a bourgeois revolution is restricted to successful installation of a legal and political framework in which the free development of capitalist property relations is assured, there is no necessary reason why a 'bourgeois revolution' need to be the direct work of the bourgeoisie' (Gareth Stedman Jones; 1977).

It was Revolution itself that created the consciousness of the strata between aristocracy and the people as a middle class or classe moyenne...It was middle class in two senses. In the first place, the Third Estate, which declared itself to be 'the nation' in 1798, was, speaking operationally, not the nation itself but what the Abbe Sieyes...called 'available classes' of that Estate; namely in the world of Colin Lucas, 'the solid, unified group of professional men', the middle rank of society... That they also saw themselves, quite sincerely, as representing the interests of the entire nation...In the second place, the 'available classes' of the Third Estate who thus naturally became the shapers of the new France were in the middle in another sense. They found themselves politically and socially opposed to both the aristocracy above and the people below (E. J. Hobsbawn; 1990).

CHAPTER III:

THE KEMALIST PROJECT AND ITS TRAJECTORY

CHAPTER III. THE KEMALIST PROJECT AND ITS TRAJECTORY

III. I. Introduction

The Kemalist project has held a very special position vis-a-vis the other political projects in Turkey. Any political project claiming a space in Turkish politics has to measure itself against the Kemalist project which has defined the parameters of the political system. In a way, the Kemalist project functions as a yardstick by which other projects define themselves. In certain cases, it becomes the 'other' of the alternative projects. In others, it serves as a point of departure by providing guidelines. In turn, it is not surprising to see its marks on other projects. Whereas its secularism and so-called revolutionary aspects have appealed to some quarters of the left, its nationalism and totalitarian character have seduced the radical right. Even, for the religious right, for whom the Kemalist project provided its other, it has become a major problem to define itself vis-a-vis the Kemalist project and eradicate the secular political system.

For the same reasons, any study referring to the post-independence politics of Turkey cannot avoid an encounter with Kemalism at some point. Such an encounter is *a sine qua non* for this thesis too, as it studies the development of the state capital, Ankara, as an integral part of nation-state formation. This chapter sets out to discuss Kemalism as a nation-state formation project and evaluate its trajectory in the light of the theoretical framework proposed in the chapter II.

There are considerable difficulties in providing a clear definition of Kemalism and its project. In the first place, the legend and myth created around Kemalism have erected major ideological and political barriers. Likewise, the distorted accounts of Ottoman history as the *other* of the Kemalist project contribute to the problems in providing an account of the latter. Secondly, as discussed earlier, the lack of a clear perspective on the state - society relationship obstructs a satisfactory theorisation of Kemalism as the latter stands at the very cross-section of this relationship. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, it is difficult to define a hard core of Kemalism which is not subject to revision, as even in its very hard core, Kemalism has remained vulnerable to manipulation and change in the face of external pressures. It is not difficult to see the reflections of these ambiguities and confusions in current perspectives on the Kemalist project. In this chapter my objective is to provide an alternative perspective on Kemalism by drawing upon the strategic relational approach.

Section II provides a discussion on the nature of Ottoman society and state as a background. Section III turns to the Kemalist project. It analyses the main components of this project and proposes to study it in three distinctive periods. Section IV concentrates on the *formation* period (1923-1950). Section V explores the second stage (1950 -1980) which is characterised by an attempt towards *political and economic consolidation* whereas Section VI examines the *fragmentation* of the nation-state formation project in the face of emerging alternative projects. The concluding Section provides an overall assessment of the Kemalist project.

III. II. The Ottoman Background

I will start with an analysis of the state-society relationship in the Ottoman Empire and this will direct us to the question of the nature of Ottoman society. Yet, this is a muddy area since, contrary to its Western counterparts, the nature of the Ottoman social formation has remained very controversial. Pointing to the obvious differences of the Ottoman empire in its political economic and partly cultural organisation, the main question has been raised as to whether Ottoman society was a feudal one, as once Western societies were very commonly defined. By and large the answer to this question has been negative¹.

In the case of the liberal tradition, the Ottoman state is largely conceived as a military and political organisation where the society and economy are reduced to supports of this military- political organisation. The state is then placed in the centre of the analysis at the expense of economy and society. While the economy is seen in terms of the expansion of the Ottoman military, the society is reduced to the foot soldiers of the state and military or taxpayer-subjects². It is then argued that in the face of this strong state tradition there was no civil society similar to that of the West.

¹ In the West, through Hegel, Enlightenment writers and later especially through Weber's writings, different strands of orientalism in the evaluation of the Ottoman Empire became a standard view and have not been challenged until recently. Yet, this outlook towards the East in general and Ottoman society in particular is not limited to the West; a similar kind of orientalism is a very established one in Turkish historiography too.

²Not surprisingly there has been no major study at all exploring the peasantry until recently, which comprised the majority of Ottoman society, in its own right. The main focus remained on the state.

On the radical side, the Asiatic mode-of-production thesis constitutes the Marxist version of orientalism in Turkish historiography. Taking its cue from Marx's early writings on the 'East' (for his later view, see Shanin 1986), it is argued that the Ottoman social formation was characterised by the Asiatic mode of production and Asiatic despotism (Divitcioglu 1971, Keyder 1976). The main feature of this particular formation was the existence of a very developed hydraulic state and a homogeneous agrarian social-base which are not divided into classes or other social groupings. The absence of civil society, and existence of a strong and despotic state, 'oriental despotism' emerged as the characterising feature of the Ottoman social formation³.

The main problem for these perspectives is that they do not distinguish different levels of abstraction in the analysis of the nature of the Ottoman Empire⁴. I propose to study it at two different levels, that is level of mode of production, of social formation. By making these distinctions I believe it will be possible to avoid some of the confusions of the above perspectives.

At the level of mode of production, as Berktaý argues, the basic relation is the relation of the direct producers to the means of production. Once seen in this way,

³The use of the concept of Oriental despotism is not limited to radical circles. It has been largely used by liberal circles as well to show the negative character of the Ottoman political structure vis-a-vis its Western counterparts. (See, for instance, Ozbudun 1976). He expresses the standard orientalist understanding of the Ottoman society in the following way: 'Thus, with no feudalism comparable to that of Western Europe, no hereditary aristocracy, no independent church hierarchy, no strong and independent merchant class, no self-governing cities, and with a ruling institution (i.e., the administration and the army) staffed with slaves, the Ottoman Empire represented a close approximation of an Oriental despotism (Ozbudun 1976; 28).

⁴ On the distinction between mode of production and social formation with regard to the Eastern question, see: Wickham (1985) and Berktaý (1987).

there is no reason not to call the Ottoman Empire a feudal society like its Western counterparts since, as far as the relationship of the peasantry to the land is concerned, there is no difference between them (Berktaş 1987). This level of analysis does not contain the political and legal aspects, and this is the basic mistake the above theories make when they conceive the Ottoman Empire through the legal ownership of the land or the political aspects of it such as the role of the state as the pivotal element.

Where these legal and political elements gain importance is at the level of social formation. It is at this level that the specificity of Ottoman social formation vis-a-vis other social formations including the Western ones are found. That is once accepted that the Ottoman social formation was a feudal one, it is possible to proceed to the level of social formation to analyse the specificity and differences of Ottoman social formation. Then, we can introduce the important elements of it such as state ownership on the land, and the centrality of the state in the extraction and distribution of the agricultural surplus.

Making this distinction between these two levels of analysis is extremely important, since it allows us to see the fact that the state itself, which is seen as almost an independent and determining element of the Ottoman Empire when this distinction is collapsed, is subsumed under the very same relations of production and its laws.

Thus, as opposed to conventional historiography, it is more fruitful to study the Ottoman Empire by not only placing the state at the heart of economic relations, but also inserting the latter in the heart of the former. The history of Ottoman social formation can then be seen in a different light as a history of struggles around the

extraction of the surplus rather than the struggle for political domination in its own right without diminishing the specificity of the political domain.

An appropriate starting point is to challenge the dominant view that due to the lack of hereditary aristocracy, the state was the only social force in Ottoman social formation. In fact, contrary to this view, there was a hereditary aristocracy which consisted of traditional notables and clan chiefs, which was a part of the ruling class, which lay outside the state structure until the 1420s (Holdon 1993). After the military success and following strengthening of the state apparatus, their autonomy was weakened vis-a-vis the state. As Holdon (1993) shows, the conflict between the state and the hereditary aristocracy was mainly over the extraction of agricultural surplus, and the introduction of the institution of 'levy boys' by the state was a conscious strategy to place limits on the political and economic power of the traditional Turkish aristocracy. Although this strategy proved effective in limiting the power of this group, it never led to the total demise of this group. This was a turning point in Ottoman history in terms of the relationship between the economy and society. The administrative and class structure of Ottoman society became interwoven in such a way that the ruling class became organised largely within the state.

As pointed out above, this can be seen as giving enormous strength to the state. Yet, there is another dimension to this claimed strength. With this intertwining, the state became not only the locus of political conflicts emanating from its own logic, but also of the conflicts resulting from the extraction and appropriation processes of the surplus. A careful reading of the conflicts and struggle between the different

segments of the state apparatus would show that most of them were over the appropriation of agricultural surplus. This is not the case within the different factions in the political centre but more importantly between the political centre and the local potentates. In this sense the subjection of the state to conflicts at two different domains was a source of weakness and continuous instability.

It is clear that during the period from the thirteenth to sixteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire was expanding these conflicts were minimised by the increasing absolute surplus, and therefore strengthening political centre. Yet, once this growth came to an end, the contradictions and struggles within the state came to the fore immediately.

The analysis so far has showed that the intermingling of the state and economy, as a result of a particular strategy of the state élites, created a condition of the organisation of dominant classes within the state. As I showed, despite the claim that the structural involvement of the state in the economy constituted its strength, it also created vulnerability for the state since the state itself became a 'direct' arena of conflicts stemming from the process of the extraction and distribution of surplus.

The sixteenth century represents a clear break in the history of the Ottoman empire. On the one hand, the struggles between the central and local forces over the extraction of surplus, which itself started to decline due to the lack of improvement in agriculture and in the face of increasing population; and on the other hand, the end of military expansionism brought about the decline of the Ottoman empire and started a process leading to its integration into the European world economy as a

peripheral economy (Islamoglu-Inan 1987).

The long period, starting from the sixteen century up to the demise of the Ottoman empire in the wake of the World War I, should be understood as the history of struggle between central and local forces on the one hand and conflict and accommodation of the Ottoman empire to the European world economy on the other. While the former conflict developed around the centralisation/restoration of central authority or the decentralisation/strengthening of local forces which underlies the tension in the processes of surplus extraction, the latter took the form of resistance or accommodation to the integration into the European World economy. In turn, this double pressure weakened the authority of the political centre progressively. At the beginning of nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was on the point of collapse.

In response to these external and internal pressures, the idea of reforming the political and economic structure started to come to the fore. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, two different strategies emerged at the political centre. Whereas the conservative Sultan and his entourage followed a damage-limitation strategy in the absence of a long-term project, a group of bureaucrats, inspired by the political and economic structure of the West, started to contemplate economic and political reform. The purpose of the reforms was to restore the weakened authority of the centre vis-a-vis the local notables, as well as to rationalise and modernise the political centre itself by strengthening the position of the bureaucracy vis-a-vis the ruling dynasty within a constitutional framework.

Thus, the penetration of capitalism into the economy created an important tension

between the economy and political structure since the Ottoman political structure obstructed the development of capitalism. The attempts, starting from the Tanzimat until the proclamation of the republic in 1923, were in the direction of resolving this tension. After 1908 these attempts became more systematic and aimed at the structural transformation of Ottoman society towards the formation of a nation-state and capitalist economy. War conditions endowed the reformist political centre with considerable strength, enabling it to centralise political power, which was itself a condition of nation-state formation. Yet the War ended with the defeat of the Ottomans, and the CUP domination and its project came to an end.

To what extent then does the Kemalist project represent a complete break with the Ottoman tradition? This review shows that so far as the basic concern of the Kemalist project, that is, nation-state formation, is concerned, there is a continuity rather than a break with the earlier period. In the following section I will look at the very same relation during the Independence war.

III. III. The Kemalist Project as a Bourgeois Revolution

Those who did not see the Ottoman social formation as a feudal one, with a similar reasoning, did not see the Kemalist revolution as a bourgeois revolution which aimed at bringing an end to the feudal society in favour of a capitalist one. The Kemalist revolution was seen as a continuation of the Ottoman patrimonial state tradition. In that sense Kemalism was not a bourgeois revolution. Rather it was seen as an impediment for the development of a bourgeois class. The etatist policies of the 1930s were evoked as the main evidence of this supposedly obstructive attitude

towards the capitalist class (Kansu 1997).

The modernisation perspective might be considered as an academic reflection of the Kemalist project's official discourse⁵. In line with this discourse, the modernisation perspective perceives the Kemalist project as a definite rupture from the Ottoman predecessor towards the building of a modern nation in the image of the West. Hence, under the Kemalist leadership the Ottoman past, which was stagnant, religious, irrational and anti-modern, was rejected in favour of a modern and Western society which is developmental, secular and rational. The Kemalist project is contemplated as a revolution inwardly against the Ottoman elements and outwardly against the Western powers to raise the country to their level⁶. While Kemal Ataturk (father of Turks) was treated as a genius, the Kemalist state is considered to be the motor force behind the creation of a new society. In the very same sense, the boundary between the former and the latter is lifted and they are treated as one by giving a prime role to the state as a father figure. In this perspective the Kemalist project is seen as a non class-based project which aims to watch the interests of the nation as a whole.

In my view both perspectives perceive the Kemalist revolution as a state centred one. They both did not attach a class connection to it. Contrary to this view I will

⁵ The source of this view can be found in the Kemalist project itself and it has been disseminated throughout society by different means from school textbooks to state radio and televisions for years. (See Karal (1981) and Kili (1980) for the most sophisticated academic representation of this perspective).

⁶ A radical version of this perspective, largely inspired by the etatist policies of the 1930s, contemplates the Kemalist project as a state based revolution against the imperialist centre to create an independent economy at the periphery. In line with the Kemalist claim of being above classes,

places the Kemalist project into a class perspective as a bourgeois revolution. The Kemalist project, in the first place, as a particular appropriation of the '*project of modernity*' at the periphery, and then, to proceed to conceive it more specifically as a nation-state formation project. This might seem to be a very controversial argument partly due to the fact that some of the important elements of this project, such as the promotion of freedom and democracy, did not exist in the case of the Kemalist project.

The association of Kemalism with the modernity project has been denied by some writers on the basis of its totalitarian and anti-democratic nature (Koker (1991)). The weakness of this view is that it treats modernity as a monolithic and even project in space and time. The point is that like its most prominent element and motor force, capitalism, modernity itself is an uneven project and once emerged in Europe it found its way to the rest of the world through different paths. This unevenness is not only related to the diffusion paths of modernity but also involves an unevenness in the basic components of modernity. In the case of Turkey, like many other peripheral countries, it is not odd to assume a relationship between the top-down, externally induced but internally led, nature of modernity and the authoritarian nature of the Kemalist project as the promoter of this project. It is in this sense that, I will argue for a view placing the Kemalist project within this global but uneven project⁷. As

Kemalism is seen as a classless project. In this perspective too, the Kemalist project represents a complete break with the Ottoman past.

⁷Related to this point, it is also another mistake to assume always a positive role to the Enlightenment project as the promoter of freedom and democracy. In the first place, violence and anti-democratic means were largely used in the West itself, especially in its early stages, and as Habermas reminded us, the enlightenment project always had a dark side. Given the fact that, especially during the etatist period, the Kemalist regime was largely inspired by Fascist experiences in Europe especially that of Italy, recognising the dark side of the Enlightenment gains a special importance for a better understanding of Turkish experience. Another misconception of this view is to see the establishment

Therborn (1995) shows there are different paths to and through modernity and the case of the Kemalist project this was a top-down one.

There remains to be answered, however, the question of the class nature of the Kemalist project. An alternative view which this thesis proposes, is to understand the Kemalist project in the context of a *regency* relationship between the Kemalist elite and the bourgeoisie where the project of modernity was carried out by the former due to the premature development of the latter⁸. Due to this very relationship, there are more far-reaching dimensions of the Kemalist project than a nation-state formation project in that the Kemalist project played a role which a hegemonic project would not normally play by not only targeting the nation-state formation, but also a formation of a modern economy as well as aiming to create a consensus around this transformation. Nevertheless, as we will see in this regard, the continuity of the Kemalist project was based upon coercion rather than consensus. In this sense, the Kemalist project became a dominant rather than a hegemonic project.

Yet, it is not enough to label the Kemalist project as a modernist project with special emphasis upon its nation-state formation mission. We need to define the basic components of this project. That is, a satisfactory account of the Kemalist project

of democracy as a natural dimension of the project of modernity rather than seeing it as an outcome of political struggles. Above all these, rather than binary oppositions, it is more proper to see modernity as a global project, and judge it, not only on the basis of what it achieved in the West, but also in the 'rest'.

⁸The analogy of Regency is drawn from Ollman (1993). Ollman applies the concept of regency to the former Soviet Union to explain the relationship between the Communist Party and the working class. His analogy strictly refers to the legal meaning of the regency whereas my use of the concept refers to the structural relationship between the state elite and the bourgeois class. In this sense there is no proclaimed representation of the bourgeoisie by the Kemalist elite. Instead, there is a structural representation of the bourgeoisie, which is also relatively autonomous from the latter, as largely referred by the Marxist corpus.

requires us to illustrate its distinctive features both in general and with regard to its particular mission of nation-state formation.

I would like to distinguish three different higher order features of the Kemalist project. In other words, the Kemalist project has three crucial components. These are *state formation* in the political domain, *nation formation* in the cultural domain and *developmentalism* in the economic domain⁹.

It is of course possible to contain all these three features under the rubric of nation-state formation since in most of the newly formed nation-states, particular development strategy and cultural/ideological framework within which the new imagined community is formed, have been present. Nevertheless, keeping their interrelated nature in mind, I would prefer to analyse the analytically different features of the Kemalist project by concentrating on different phases of the Kemalist project.

It is possible to identify three different stages in this trajectory. The first one is the formation years, which lasted from the end of the Independence War to the beginning of the 1950s. The second period represents an attempt towards political and economic consolidation between 1950 and 1980. The third one is the period since then, within which the Kemalist project has become fragmented and started to disintegrate, although it has not yet completely dissolved. In what follows in this

⁹As a matter of fact, these are the main issues which have emerged in most of the late Third World nation-states (Hawthorn 1991). Nevertheless, there are important differences among them in terms of their relative importance.

chapter I aim to analyse these three consecutive periods respectively.

III. IV. Formation of a Turkish Nation-state (1923-1950)

The previous section has shown that Kemalists took over the nation-state formation mission of the CUP in a more radical way and carried it to an extreme by denying the entire heritage of the Ottoman empire. Whatever its continuity with certain trends towards nation-state formation, the Kemalist project also contains important elements in its imagination and practices which were not inherited from its predecessors and deserve some attention

As a largely cultural process, *nation formation* contains the formation or more properly discovery of a national identity. In the case of the Kemalist project, this was a Turkish identity which was defined as opposed to an Ottoman identity. Yet, in the public front the presentation of this process of the creation of new identity was quite different. In the first place Kemalists argued that the Turkish identity was not an innovation but a discovery in that it was already there but repressed for centuries by the forced Ottoman identity. It was an identity waiting to be emancipated from the Ottoman establishment. In this very same sense, the Turkish identity was a relational identity defined with reference to Ottoman identity. Whereas the latter was religious, barbarian, oriental and decaying, the former was a secular, civilised and Western identity with its language, alphabet, manners, dress and life style. In reality, the former was nothing other than a particular and orientalist perception of the Western identity rather than a repressed Turkish identity. Thus, the Turkish identity and the community of which the former is the founding stone were an imagined identity and

community. Once the Kemalist rhetoric is left aside, there was no Turkish identity as such could be defined without referring to the identity which was condemned by the Kemalist as the Ottoman identity.

With respect to *State formation*, the main issue for the Kemalist project was the displacement of the Ottoman patrimonial political structures, which were largely interwoven with Islamic rule, in favour of a republic equipped with the institutions of Western societies. Not surprisingly, the political structure of the West, particularly that of France, was the model. One of the striking features of this transformation was the secularisation of the political system by severing the relation between the state and religion. Furthermore, the patrimonial structure was to be replaced by a constitutional and parliamentary political system based on the rational- bureaucratic authority. In turn this was nothing less than a political as well as a cultural revolution.

As a third dimension, the establishment of a *capitalist economic structure* was another target for the Kemalist project as the driving force of the newly emerging nation-state. The dominant idea in line with the overall ideology of nation-state formation was the formation of a bourgeois class among Turks by using the experience of the West. As discussed, the leaning towards the formation of a national economy with its own national bourgeoisie had emerged as an idea and had to an extent developed during the last years of the Ottoman empire. During the war, the replacement of the bourgeoisie constituted by the minorities by a Turkish one gained pace. Nevertheless, its size and the scale of its capital accumulation were too limited to be the driving force of the new nation-state. Furthermore, the overall economic

structure had been paralysed by the long war. In this sense the formation of a modern and capitalist economic structure was a task waiting to be fulfilled in the new period.

In what follows in this chapter I will first look at the social and economic base as the reality dimension and the state and accumulation strategies as the means of the creation and imposition of this project on this reality.

The Kemalist project was committed to the modernisation of the country and the formation of a modern, urban and secular individual and society around this imagined Turkish identity. Yet the social base did not match the one imagined by the Kemalists. Whereas the imagined Turkish identity was constituted by an entity which was urban and secular with its life style, dress, manners and political and social opinions, the real population over which this identity was to be imposed was mainly rural, committed to Islam as its religious, patriarchal and traditional social base.

As the Kemalist leadership was quite aware, the transformation of this social base could only take place through top-down processes. Yet, this was not an easy task at all. There was no well developed bourgeois class and culture which could serve as a driving force for this transformation. During the war years, the minorities which constituted the bourgeoisie had left the country, and although important steps were taken in this regard, Moslem-Turkish groups were still premature to replace the former group. Furthermore, whereas the reforms and westernisation policies of the Tanzimat period were actively backed by western powers and supported by the bourgeois class of Istanbul -constituted minorities, for the Kemalist project, though having more strong desire in this direction, there could not be similar support in the

wake of the Independence War.

As far as other active social forces are concerned, the situation was equally bleak for the Kemalists to get support for their project. In the wake of the Independence war the main social forces constituted by the military and political elite, large landlords and the merchant bourgeoisie of Anatolia were gathered around the Independence movement and were largely represented in the Assembly. Ironically, however, the main bulk of the independence movement and the Assembly in Ankara did not follow the line of the Kemalist leadership in its contemplation of the future. The Kemalists, in fact, constituted a tiny minority of the movement and in the Assembly, and held the leadership thanks to the personal prestige of Mustafa Kemal as the military and political hero in the eyes of the public. For the majority, represented mainly by the local notables and landlords as well as the newly rising native bourgeoisie, the main objective was to liberate the country from invasion and to restore the old order from which they had considerably benefited. Even if they gave consent to the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922, the religious authority of the Caliphate was not in question, and around this authority, the majority of the independence movement, which was also majority in the first parliament, was expecting to gather after the independence.

As far as the economic base is concerned, it was not any better to facilitate the formation of a modern capitalist-economy which would have been the material base of the new nation-state. Agricultural production, which had declined during the long war constituted the backbone of the inherited economy. There was little industry in the Western part of the country. The Kemalists were aware of the fact that the

transformation of the society in the direction of their project could not be realised by only superstructural reforms. There was a need for an urban economy based upon an industrial sector. Yet, the main group which could be the agent of this transformation, the entrepreneurial minorities, were forced to leave the country and despite the slow emergence of a Turkish bourgeoisie their accumulation and experience were too limited to be the driving force of the transformation towards an industrial economy.

In sum, there was a big gap between the social and economic bases of the imagined community of the Kemalist project and the real communities. The only way to bridge this gap was thus the intervention of the state in every domain. In the following section, I will provide an account of how a distinctive pattern of modernity from above emerged when this imagined community, which was typically inspired by the experience of the West, met the real community through state strategies.

I will start with the *reorganisation of the political system* since through this restructuring the Kemalists not only redefined the state structure and its *internal organisation* but also used them as a way of taking the control of the whole state apparatus in the face of considerable opposition within and without the political system¹⁰.

Thus, a clash between the majority and the Kemalist faction was inevitable. For

¹⁰ As mentioned before, the main bulk of the independence movement, which was represented in the first Assembly, was not in line with the Kemalist leadership in the contemplation of the future of the post Independence society. For the majority, despite their denouncement of the authority of the Sultan in the face of his hostility to the independence movement, there was no radical thought about the

Kemalists, a restoration of the old order was unacceptable. Exploiting Kemal's prestige as the leader of successful Independence War, the Kemalists started to eliminate the opposition through anti-democratic methods. The People's party was established as the only party (later it became the Republican People's Party (RPP)) of the mono party-period with the membership of most of the newly elected MPs. Then, power gradually shifted from the parliament to the party over which Kemal exerted great control. The important decisions were first taken in the party, then approved by the assembly.

These changes did not totally remove the opposition but they did put the Kemalist leadership in a more comfortable position to embark upon its project. There was still an opposition to the Kemalist leadership within parliament as well as society¹¹. There was a campaign organised by Istanbul-based groups which were suspicious of the Kemalist leadership and its project. Basing its power in Ankara, the Kemalist faction dealt its most important blows to the Istanbul-based opposition with the proclamation of Ankara as the seat of the government on 10 October and of the republic on 29 October 1923. These decision exacerbated the hostility between the Istanbul-based opposition and the Ankara-based Kemalist government. In the following months the focus of the opposition shifted to the status of the Caliph. They started a campaign for the restoration of the authority of the Caliph who was still

restructuring of the whole political system. Most of the representatives in Ankara were in favour of a restoration of the old order with minor changes (Ahmad 1993).

¹¹ The opposition to the Kemalist regime was not limited to the political system. There was considerable dismay at the grassroots level due to the top-down reforms. The secularisation of political and social life was creating important tensions among the public. The first big explosion came in 1925 from the Southeast where the Kurdish population constituted a majority. As Keyder put it 'this was a full scale insurrection with religious and separatist overtones, which aimed at challenging the tribal oligarchy and the central authority which was in implicit alliance with it' (Keyder 1987: 83).

legally the head of the state and of the Islamic World. In response, the Kemalist regime abolished the caliphate as the last big institutional opposition stronghold.

Having curbed the power of opposition within the political system as well as at the grassroots, the cultural revolution gained pace inwardly towards the *state* and outwardly towards the *nation* after 1925¹².

The nature as well as the way in which the reforms were carried out by the Kemalist regime created considerable discontent among the public. The resistance to the reforms was repressed by force. During this period, as Zucher notes, ‘under the Law on the Maintenance of Order nearly 7500 people were arrested and 660 were executed’ (Zucher 1993; 181). Among them, ironically, there were members of the CUP which provided the social and political base for the rise of the Kemalist project as well as ordinary members of the public who did not comply with the law which had prohibited the fez. Towards the end of the decade there was a very tense situation throughout the country. However, the rising discontent of the public was not only due to the superstructural reforms of the Kemalist regime, the state of the economy was also to blame for the rising discontent.

There was a similar dilemma for the Kemalist regime in the economic sphere. The

¹² Power centres of the religious order outside the state system such as religious shrines and the dervish convents were closed down in 1925. While criminal law was secularised by severing its relation with the Seriate, the Swiss Civil Code was adopted in 1926, giving women equal civil rights with men. In the same year, the Western calendar was introduced. Finally in 1928, an article of the constitution asserting that Islam was the religion of the state was deleted to constitutionalise the secular nature of the state. Moreover, Arabic script was replaced by the Latin one along with the adoption of European numerals. The Kemalist project did not stop short with these reforms which basically targeted the public sphere but also intervened in the private sphere too, for instance, by forbidding the fez, which was considered to be a symbol of Oriental-Ottoman dress, in favour of the hat which was used by ‘civilised’ nations.

main pillars of the Independence Movement were the large landlords and rural-based merchant capital in alliance with the dissident state and military elements of Ottoman bureaucracy. Not surprisingly, the accumulation strategy of the early years reflected the alliance between the state elite and large landlords and agriculturally based merchant groups. To determine the economic strategy to be followed, an economic congress was held in 1923 in Izmir with the active participation of merchant capital and large-landed interests. A common desire for a liberal accumulation strategy was expressed and resolutions of the congress more or less guided the economic strategies of the early years¹³.

However, these policies and the alliance with large farmers and agriculturally based merchant groups were in contradiction with the industrial, urbanised and western-looking society which the Kemalist elite had in mind, though the superstructural reforms were in line with the former. Spatially speaking, the Kemalist elite of the early years was pro-urban with an anti-urban economic strategy. Policies such as the establishment of the land tithe in 1925 making

"the development of industry and the growth of urban areas much more difficult" was an outcome of "the implicit alliance which had been formed between the government and large farmers during the War of Liberation... There was.... also an element of concession given to large farmers to secure their complicity in the face of superstructural reforms by the bureaucracy during this period" (Birtek and Keyder, 1975: 451).

The pragmatic and piecemeal approaches of the 1920s, started to come to an end at

¹³ As Gulalp points out, according to the resolution of congress, 'the Turkish economy was to remain open; foreign capital was to be welcomed; the motto was liberalism, the encouragement of private enterprise' (Gulalp, 1985: 334). In this period, in the search for modernisation and westernisation relied upon a capitalist economy, though agriculturally based; the principal role of the state was defined as the creation of a national bourgeoisie through measures such as tax exemption, credits and the contracting of public works by the state. In sum, the years between 1923 and 1930 were

the end of the decade in the case of economic policy. The economy was faced with a double difficulty. Internally, not surprisingly, the continuous encouragement and development of an agricultural periphery, had not brought about the structural transformation in the economy to which the political centre was deeply committed. Likewise, as Ramazanoglu points out 'Turkish private capital had little incentive to invest in the development of Turkish industry when quicker and easier profits could be made under the liberal foreign-trade regime imposed by the Lausanne Treaty, through import and export trade' (Ramazanoglu, 1985: 61). Externally, the difficulties of the economy were compounded by the impact of the Great Depression (Keyder 1981). Worsening economic conditions in the form of decreasing export earnings and a trade deficit were followed by an extensive discontent in every section of society.

Before discussing the changes taking place in the economic and political domains, a brief examination of the *forms of interest representation* in the early years is in order. As the previous debate has shown, despite the establishment of liberal democracy from the beginning, while *pluralist* representation was out of the question due to the rejection of plurality of the society in favour of a unitary identity represented by the state itself, *parliamentarianism* remained a formal and ineffective channel of representation (due to the lack of a multi-party system). Instead *corporatism* emerged as the dominant form of interest representation. The Economic Congress held in Izmir in 1923 to determine the economic strategy of the early years was an early indicator of this tendency. While there were representatives from all organised

characterised by an open economy and active state support for private accumulation (Boratav, 1981: 167).

groups in society including the working class, the real members of this corporatist structure were the bourgeoisie and big landlords, the two principal allies of the Kemalist regime since the beginning of the Independence War. In line with this corporatist structure, the state used the *raison d'état* whenever necessary to silence the opposition. The heaviest form of this repression was used against the *proto-social movement type* of organisation as in the case of the Kurdish uprising. The Kemalist regime disseminated one of the principles of the Kemalist project, that politics could be made only within the institutional structure defined by the regime¹⁴.

Nevertheless, there were important contradictions in the dominant mode of representation. The alliance formed with the big landlords was creating important anomalies as far as the overall project, which assumed an urban and industrial economy and society, was concerned¹⁵. As emphasised earlier, important concessions were given at the expense of urban sectors of the economy and society to overcome the discontent created by the reforms on the rural sector. However, once the economic crisis deepened at the end of the 1920s, the contradiction of this alliance came to the fore more sharply and ended with a loosening of the alliance, if not to the total exclusion of the land-owning classes.

In sum, the Kemalist regime and its project came to a crisis point at the end of the

¹⁴This understanding imposed upon society usually through coercive means has become very effective in constraining the politics within institutional channels. The scarcity of the social movements in the Turkish political scene until recently can be partly explained by this historical strategy of the Kemalist project.

¹⁵One of the strategy of the Kemalist regime was to keep control over the rural classes through the big landlords. In this the *clientalistic* relations between the peasants and the landlords played an important role by creating an informal form of representation in the state through the big landlords and even now continues to play a considerable role in the integration of the rural classes into the political system.

1920s. In the political domain there was considerable discontent and disturbance among the public due to the nature of the imposed reforms and the worsening economic conditions. The failure to create a bourgeoisie which could be the driving force of the economy created a declining belief in the liberal accumulation-strategy of the early years. The world economic crises of 1929 strengthened this suspicion and created an environment for a more closed and state-led accumulation strategy. With the realisation that the future of the Kemalist project largely depended upon strengthening the economy, the statist group started to take control and the Kemalist regime started to head towards a new accumulation strategy at the very beginning of 1930s. Under the so-called etatist policies, the state, step-by-step started to take control of the economy. The crux of this change was that the role of the state changed from being the *subsidiser* of the capitalist class to the direct *provider*. In other words, the state was taking over the *regency* role on the grounds that the capitalist class was still too weak to take control after a period of trial of the latter as the driving force of the economy.

The main feature of the new accumulation-strategy was import-substitution based upon domestic inputs and substitution of imports of basic consumer goods through domestic production carried out by state enterprises. This policy was pursued successfully during the first decade of the etatist period. As Birtek points out

"the increase of the share of industry and its domination of economic expansion is clear: The overall economic expansion in money terms, between the averages of 1925-29 and 1933-41 is 9.8%, and in comparing these two periods the share of industry increases by 81.1 percent" (Birtek, 1985: 410).

Thus, state sponsored liberalism was replaced by the direct involvement of the state in the economy. Priority for agriculture was replaced by priority for industry. As

Birtek points out, in this structural context

'etatism may be viewed as the culmination of a search for structures to support a particular political centre. The success of Etatism can be construed as the effort to restructure economic forms to match the political transformations of the previous period (1923-30) under the direction of the political centre' (Birtek, 1985: 409).

Even though there were a highly centralised economy in the hands of the Kemalist bureaucracy and a considerable deviation from 'free market' ideology, the policies of the 1930s did not represent a so-called 'non-capitalist path'. As Pamuk points out

'during the 1930s the nascent bourgeoisie benefited from etatism by obtaining marketing monopolies through the state economic enterprises, exclusive import licenses, credit from state controlled banks under very favourable terms and lucrative contracts from state firms to undertake major construction projects' (Pamuk, 1981: 26).

In this sense, even if the entrepreneurial characteristic of the state is quite clear for this period, it was complementary rather than contradictory to the interests of private capital since the distinguishing feature of the state enterprises was their scale in terms of invested capital, which was beyond the capacity of private capital for the time being. The First Five Year Industrialisation Plan had emphasised this complementary relation¹⁶.

In one sense, the state was still promoting a capitalist class, but in that case, in the front seat and for industrial rather than agricultural or trade sectors. One of the interesting points in relation to the recruitment of an entrepreneurial class is that the state bureaucracy itself took a very active part in this and a considerable number of entrepreneurs were recruited from the bureaucracy itself during the 1930s. In this

¹⁶ Is Bankasi, the officially promoted private bank, provided the link between the state bureaucracy and private capital. As Keyder puts it: 'Its board of directors consisted of thirteen deputies and its links with public banks and state enterprises were intricate and strong. Industrialists regarded the bank as their platform when bargaining had to be carried out with the bureaucracy' (Keyder, 1987: 106). The Bank's 'participation in national industry had grown to 50 per cent of all national banks and by 1937 it held 38 per cent of the deposits in the national bank' (ibid: 106).

period, 74.2 per cent of the all entrepreneurs came from the state bureaucracy while in previous and later periods this proportion was well below this figure (Soral 1974).

As the economy got stronger the state gained more power in the political domain as well. After the failure of the strategy to contain the growing opposition within a controlled opposition party,¹⁷ the Kemalist fraction started to take a more authoritarian attitude which found its reflection in the forms of representation and internal organisation of the state. While the reform programme continued to be enforced, *raison d'état* remained the main strategy to suppress the opposition, but in a more aggressive way¹⁸. The main channels of representation within and without the state were closed to all groups but the capitalist class which continued to be represented within the state through corporate channels. In sum, in terms of representation, the interest-representation etatist period strengthened the *state corporatism* of the 1920s by excluding the land-owning classes and by fortifying it by *raison d'état*.

In line with those changes, the state apparatus became more *centralised* in its internal organisation. The performance of many economic functions through the establishment of the state enterprises in addition to the construction of road and rail

¹⁷As has already been mentioned, the discontent arrived at a peak at the end of the 1920s in the face of economic problems and authoritarianism of the Kemalist state along with the enforced socio-cultural reforms. Unaware of the growing opposition, the Kemalist fraction attempted to control it through channelling it to a 'controlled opposition party' (the Free Party). However, the support, especially in the urban centres, for the Party reached such a level that the Party was banned by the Kemalist regime for fear of losing control.

¹⁸ A press law was passed by the Assembly enabling the government to prohibit the opposition press from damaging 'national unity'. In 1933, around a hundred members of the teaching staff of Istanbul University were expelled. In 1935 the Turkish Women's Association was banned. More strikingly, in 1936, strikes were outlawed and the political rights of the working class were limited.

links, energy and communication facilities provided the state with greater autonomy and an economic and political basis for further centralisation. In turn, once such a centralisation started, the internal logic of the bureaucracy stimulated further development towards the centralisation and domination of executive branches over the others.

While state structure became more centralised during this period, to increase the control of the political centre over the localities, the establishment of local government in every locality with a population over 2000 became obligatory. This was nothing other than a part of the attempt to establish the authority of the political centre over the localities. In a similar vein, the political centre attempted to establish new institutions within and without the state structure to spread reforms, and in turn, to gain the support of the masses. Whereas the Institute of Turkish Language and Institute of Turkish History were established to work in the processing of the formation of a new Turkish national identity, 'People's Houses' in cities and towns and 'People's Rooms' in the villages were established to disseminate these ideas and policies at the grassroots level.

If etatism had enjoyed considerable success during the 1930s, it started to decline at the beginning of the 1940s and disappeared by the end of the decade. On the one hand, the weakening alliance between the capitalist class and the increasing discontent of the public, the adverse conditions of the world economy, and following the world war on the other hand, etatist policies and the position of the state as the promoter of etatism had weakened.

As has been mentioned before, etatism facilitated a great deal of capital accumulation in the hands of the bourgeoisie through tax exemptions and other incentives. The rate of accumulation by the Turkish bourgeoisie accelerated in the War years through the black market and the heavy taxation of non-Muslim groups and the agricultural sector. Thus, at the end of the Second World War, there was a capitalist class asking for a more liberal economy

With the challenge of the bourgeoisie the Kemalist elite's failure to set up a social base for its power became clear. The main problem for the Kemalist regime was its failure to distribute the benefits of the considerable industrialisation to the popular classes. In the urban areas, neither working class nor petty bourgeoisie were happy with the etatist policies which largely excluded them. Large landowners as well as the small peasantry had suffered from falling prices throughout the period of etatist policies. The austerity policies of the War years contributed hugely to the discontent of the public.

Likewise, the increasing authoritarianism of the Kemalist regime was another source of extensive public discontent. Thus, due to its lack of any major allies the survival of the Kemalist regime and its project relied on anti-democratic means, though World War II had ended with the defeat of the fascist regimes in Europe and the victory of liberal democracies. Having taken its place within the Western World after the war, there was not too much choice for the Kemalist regime other than to introduce a multi-party system.

III. V. An Attempt to Integrate Society into the Kemalist Project (1950 - 1980)

The preceding chapters have demonstrated that the Kemalist project emerged as a nation-state formation project by ignoring the real communities in favour of an imagined community which was distinctively modern, secular and Western and failed to establish its hegemony in society. Due to its lack of a social base, the Kemalist regime chose a totalitarian and non-participatory strategy towards the masses to remain in power. Yet, when the transition to multi-party rule became inevitable in the wake of the World War II, the official party of Kemalism, the RPP, eventually had to pay the price by losing office to the Democratic Party in 1950. This was a challenge to the statist and secular aspects of the Kemalist project by the bourgeoisie and land-owning class with the support of traditional popular classes including the peasantry.

This power shift brought an end to the First Republic and marginalised the Kemalist project between 1950 and 1960¹⁹. However, this interruption did not bring about the demise of the Kemalist project. While the military intervention of 1960 led to the establishment of the Second Republic, it also opened the way for the restoration of the Kemalist project with a new vision.

During the Second Republic which started with the military intervention of 1960

¹⁹As far as the economic domain is concerned, the modernisation programme of the Kemalist project, which was mainly urban-biased, was turned upside down in favour of the modernisation of rural areas. Perhaps, an unintended consequence of this change was the continuation, rather than abandonment, of the modernisation programme initiated by the Kemalist project, in this case, in rural Turkey.

and lasted until the occurrence of another military coup in 1980, the Kemalist project underwent an unprecedented transformation with the revision of some of its main pillars, but it remained an important element of the political system until the 1980s.

In this second phase, the Kemalist project can be considered as an attempt towards the completion of the modernisation programme with the introduction of multi-party democracy. In this sense, whether the introduction of a multi-party system was a conscious choice or the result of external pressure, in its second phase, the Kemalist project became a systematic programme to lead the democratisation processes in addition to its commitment to economic consolidation.

To comprehend the Kemalist project in its second phase, it is necessary to understand it in the context of three developments, since its main opposition in this phase took shape as a response to these changes. The first one is, as I partly discussed the military, the economic and political integration of Turkey into the Western world under US leadership. The second is the economic and political consequences of the policies of DP governments in office between 1950 and 1960. The third is the changing social and economic base of political power starting in the wake of the World War II.

Since the first point was briefly discussed in the previous section, I will discuss the others in the next sections. The first section provides an overview of the DP period (1950-1960), while the second analyses the changing social and economic base and main forces. The third section examines the 1960 constitution as a blueprint for the

neo-Kemalist project, while the fourth section turns to a discussion of the implementation of the project during this period. The concluding section provides an overview of the period with reference to the successes and failures of the neo-Kemalist project.

'In the previous section, it was argued that the DP was born within the RPP as a new party which represents, by and large, the landed and bourgeois classes, and its challenge was carrying the marks of an opposition to the statism and secularism of the RPP. In other words, the rhetoric upon which the Democrats dwelled was a programmatic negation of the RPP period' (Ahmad 1993).

In effect, the DP represented a *populist* mobilisation led by the strengthened bourgeoisie and land-owning classes, incorporating the peasantry and other popular classes into its anti-statist and anti-secular discourse. When it came to power with the support of these groups, the emphasis placed upon a liberal accumulation-strategy in favour of the bourgeoisie was accompanied a religious rhetoric appealing to the traditional section of the society.

In its early years in office, the DP government was relatively comfortable. The liberalisation programme had already started to gain pace²⁰. The emphasis shifted from industrialisation to export oriented agriculture thanks to the Marshall Aid of this period. The Turkish economy enjoyed considerable growth during the early years of the DP government as a result of the increase in the price of agricultural products on the world market. On the political front, enjoying broad public support, the DP looked more democratic than the RPP of the previous period, although there was no substantial change regarding the democratisation of political life.

²⁰ In fact the shift from state-led industrialisation to export-oriented agricultural growth had already started in the Turkish economy as early as 1947 into joining the Marshall programme. In this sense the power change can be seen as an accommodation with the changing economic strategy

Though the DP government was re-elected in 1954, difficulties in both economic and political spheres were on the doorstep. The economic boom came to an end as a result of changing international economic balances at the expense of the agricultural sector in that there was no longer any big market for agricultural products. Consequently, the Turkish economy started to enter a recession as early as 1953.

As soon as difficulties appeared in the economic sphere, the dilemmas and contradictions of the DP came to the fore. At the heart of these contradictions was the incompatibility between the expectations of the urban and rural sections of the DP base.

While the rural classes enjoyed the priority given to the agricultural sector, and the populism of the DP targeting the religious orientations of these classes, the DP in power did not bring about any substantial improvement in the political sphere. The promise of decentralising political power, increasing the rights and freedoms of individuals, remained largely unfulfilled. Thus, contrary to its promises, the DP did not change the political system inherited from the RPP. While its challenge to the latter remained superficial, the DP government took advantage of centralised political and economic power²¹. The unfulfilled promises regarding democratisation and the priority given to the rural areas started to create disillusionment especially

²¹ As far as the DP-led challenge to Kemalism is concerned, it remained at the level of the Kemalist project and hardly stretched the Kemalist state structure. Even at the former level, the challenge was limited to the RPP and intelligentsia. The army remained totally outside the target of the DP whereas the penetration into the bureaucracy remained limited. During its ten years in office, the DP remained ever increasingly apprehensive towards these groups within the state apparatus and failed to establish its hegemony over the all branches of the state structure. Two strategic elements of the state apparatuses, a considerable section of the bureaucracy and the military remained loyal to the Kemalist project.

among the urban groups during the mid-1950s. In the face of ever increasing opposition, the DP became more and more authoritarian.

Likewise, having faced the difficulties of the agricultural based economy, the liberalisation of the early years was replaced during the mid-1950s with state control. Yet, the DP government used the decentralised power in a very arbitrary way to solve urgent problems and had no long term perspective. Towards the end of the decade even the Istanbul-based capitalist class started to withdraw its support from the DP government. Nonetheless, the election held in 1957 ended in the victory of DP thanks to its continuing popularity in rural Turkey, which constituted more than 60 per cent of the total population. Nevertheless, the election results showed an increasing split between urban and rural sections of the population.

In this sense, the election did not solve the political crisis but deepened it. While unrest and opposition were growing in the large cities, the DP government did not avoid the use of the same anti-democratic means such as banning newspapers and arbitrary arrests which had been used before by the RPP governments. Moreover, the DP government became more aggressive the more widespread unrest and opposition became and vice versa. There was a crisis of the political system at the end of 1950s in the sense that there was a progressive increase of discontent in the urban centres whereas in rural areas the support for the DP was intact. At the end of the 1950s there was a rural-urban divide in Turkey and a political crisis as a reflection of it.

The 'solution' came from the military. Like the urban-based groups, the military was dissatisfied with the instability of the economy and the political situation²². Despite its formal separation from politics, there was a close link between the army and the RPP via the personality of Ismet Inonu, who came from a military background, and due to the deep commitment to the Kemalist project among the military cadres (Zurcher 1993). The policies of the DP were seen largely as a deviation from Kemalism. In the face of increasing unrest in the large cities, the military started to see itself as the only power capable of salvaging the Kemalist project. Eventually, when demonstrations started in Ankara and spread to the other major cities at the beginning of 1960 and the government responded to these protests by employing more force and violence, the way for military intervention was open. The military seized power in May 1960 with a coup which opened the way for the Second Republic and of the second phase of the Kemalist project.

Thus, with the intervention of the army in 1960, the second republic period started and the Kemalist project took a new turn with the emerging alliance between the RPP- led civil wing and the military. As indicated earlier, the second republic and the second phase of the Kemalist project lasted for more or less twenty years, starting with the military coup of 1960 and ending with another coup in 1980. This period can be divided into two stages with contrasting degrees of stability. Whereas the first decade (1960-1971) witnessed the stability of the alliance and institutionalisation of

²² There was another reason for the increasing discontent among the military cadres. It was related to the progressive worsening status and the economic condition of the military staff. The economic situation of the military was worsened starting from the beginning of the World War II, and there was no improvement during the DP power. Especially in the lower ranks of the military there was a widespread discontent and will to change the decline of the military. This factor immensely effected the decision of the military to take over power (Vaner (1987). Ahmad (1993)).

the basic objectives of the Kemalist project, the following decade (1971-1980) saw the destabilisation of the Kemalist project with the breaking up of the military and the RPP and the start of a process of the fragmentation of the Kemalist project.

In the economic domain, the Kemalist project renegotiated its economic programme with the capitalist class once again. It was true that the agricultural-based liberal accumulation strategy of the DP period had failed. Yet, this did not mean a return to the etatist policies of the 1930s as happened after the failure of liberal accumulation-strategy of the 1920s. There was now a considerable degree of capital accumulation in the hands of the capitalist class. Thus, both sides had to negotiate their roles in the new strategy. The emergence of the import-substitution industrialisation-strategy was a product of this negotiation between the state and the capitalist class in the early 1960s.

The 1960 Constitution is quite revealing in respect of understanding the Kemalist project in its second phase. For this reason it is appropriate to examine the constitution briefly with reference to the three components of the state strategies: namely, forms of interest representation, internal organisation, and intervention in the economy.

In terms of the internal organisation of the state structure, the most important feature of the new constitution, as a reaction to the almost unlimited power of the DP in the previous period, was its determination to balance the power of the executive, especially of the government, vis-a-vis the judiciary and legislative institutions, by strengthening the latter. To serve this aim an independent constitutional court was

established and endowed with the power to prevent the violation of the constitution by the political parties in power. A senate, whose members were partly elected and partly appointed by the president, was created in addition to the existing assembly to balance the power of the latter.

The most novel but also most paradoxical aspect of the Kemalist project, which was concretised in the constitution, was related to the field of interest representation. It is generally agreed that the 1960 constitution opened new channels of representation for groups who had not found them in the earlier periods. But it is also true that, as a reaction to the DP period, there was a suspicious attitude towards certain forms of interest representation particularly among the army section of the alliance. Despite its commitment to representative democracy in general, the army fraction was very suspicious of *parliamentarianism*. As discussed above, to limit the power of elected politicians, numerous new institutions and mechanisms were introduced through the constitution. More importantly, the army retained certain powers, some of them constitutional and others tacitly accepted by everybody, as the *raison d'état* to interfere whenever necessary.

One of the most important aspects of the constitution and of the Kemalist project of this period regarding interest representation was the intention to move from *state corporatism* to *societal corporatism*. In the first phase, Kemalism largely excluded the working class from representative mechanisms. The recognition of the worker's right to strike (which had been forbidden in the first period) in the new constitution was important in this regard. This move was in line with the RPP's desire to create a

social base in urban areas²³. With respect to the Kemalist claim to be 'above social groups', it was not contradictory, but more complementary in that it was aiming to include a social class which was mainly excluded during the First republic. In line with the 'above the classes' politics the establishment of parties and other organisations affiliated with communism remained outlawed in this period too. With regard to religion the constitution remained very vague despite the fact that one of the reasons behind the military intervention was the extensive use of the religious themes by the DP in office. This was in fact a trend started at the end of the World War by the RPP to gain support. In its second phase the Kemalist project preferred not to use the restrictive and bold approach of the first republic period which had alienated it from the masses. The strategy shifted towards keeping religion under control rather than totally dismissing it.

In relation to the forms of intervention, the distinctive aspect of the Kemalist project was institutionalisation of the idea of planned development through the constitution. This was a reaction to the chaotic economic policies of the previous period. The establishment of a planning organisation was required by the constitution to organise and co-ordinate economic strategies. To serve this objective, five-year development plans became compulsory and their preparation was assigned to the State Planning Organisation. This pointed to the new division of labour between the state and capital. The state was no longer in the driving seat of the economy as it was in the

²³ Two important factors affected the RPP's rethinking of its identity and social base during the multi-party period. The first was that the RPP realised that, given the massive support of the DP in rural areas, its own potential strength lay in the urban centres which were more in tune with its project. The second was the massive migration that started with the mechanisation of the agriculture in 1950s as a result of Marshall aid. Large urban centres became the main targets of this migration. Apart from the dynamism created by this massive migration, there was also a considerable middle-class existence in large cities. These changes led the Kemalist elite to consider itself as an urban-based party.

1930s, yet, it was strong enough to resist leaving the economy to the capitalist class around a liberal accumulation-strategy. Thus, the state became a primary regulatory institution of the economy in addition to its direct involvement in it through the state economic enterprises.

The Kemalist alliance completed the restructuring of the political system and the reformulation of the Kemalist project in a year and half. First, the constitution was put to a referendum. Although the constitution was approved by the public, the high percentage of 'no' votes (40 per cent) with a 17 per cent level of non-voting was a blow to the Kemalists since it showed that there was no widespread support for the new project, especially in rural areas. The problem became more obvious in the first elections held in 1961. Yet, once again the elitist modernism of the Kemalist project faced the same problem; a lack of popular support. The civil arm of the Kemalist alliance, the RPP, failed to win a majority in the elections, receiving 37 per cent of the votes, while the two opposition parties, which were heirs of the banned DP, secured approximately 48 per cent of the votes. Rural Turkey especially, stayed loyal to the DP, whose policies had favoured the rural sector of the economy during its reign. This voting behaviour showed that the Kemalist project had fallen short of providing itself with a large enough social base to facilitate the full implementation of the Kemalist project under democratic conditions²⁴.

²⁴ As mentioned, rural Turkey had not forgotten the policies of the DP which favoured the rural classes. For the Kemalist alliance however, there was not the same kind of clear choice. Its commitment was more to the urban middle-class and the intelligentsia. Thus, once again the Kemalist project faced an identity crisis which was evident from the lack of popular support and remained an elitist movement in the early years of the second phase.

Although the RPP was the largest single party, the parties which were the heirs of the DP were holding more seats in the assembly. Yet, the military had not withdrawn from political process despite the restoration of party politics. The main heir of the DP, the Justice Party, was forced by the military to form a coalition government with the RPP. As a result of this pressure from the military, the RPP managed to remain in power until 1965 by forming coalition governments whose legitimacy was dubious in the public eye because of the implicit support given to the party by the army. After a disastrous local election performance in the 1964 local election, the RPP lost further ground in the 1965 general elections and left the office to the JP which was the clear winner. Nevertheless, during this period the fundamental structures and institutions proposed by the constitution were put into effect.

One of the most important was the institutionalisation of the 'import-substitution industrialisation-strategy' which was thought to be a base for social democratic/corporatist consensus. It is difficult to argue that the second objective was achieved, but import substitution created an inward-oriented market strategy which favoured industrial capital at the expense of small capital and the petite bourgeoisie. Surrounded by structural constraints, and extensive institutional regulations, the subsequent JP dominated governments remained tied to this strategy reluctantly despite the resentment of their social base (Keyder 1987;147). Nevertheless, the unprecedented growth of the economy between 1960 and 1970 helped the continuation of import-substitution industrialisation in an increasingly tense political environment.

Starting from early 1950s, and gaining pace during the 1960s, the urban areas, especially large cities, started to undergo a major transformation as a result of the massive migration from the rural areas. The squatter settlements, as will be discussed in detail in the following chapter, housed almost half of the population of the large cities. In other words, the social base of the cities was quite different from that seen in the 1930s and 1940s.

In the face of continuing failure of the RPP, the second half of the 1960s witnessed a new attempt by the RPP to recapture a social base by appealing more and more to the newly emerging groups in the cities as a result of rapid migration from rural areas and industrialisation. Towards the end of 1970s, the official position of the party was redefined as "centre of the left"²⁵. There was however a strong conservative group within the party who were suspicious of the change the party was undergoing and their resistance was obstructing the progressive wing's efforts to define a clear identity for the party.

The new accumulation-strategy and the changing social base of the cities did not only cause changes within the RPP (Gunes-Ayata1993). It started to change the overall political climate of the country dramatically, especially in the second half of the 1960s. For the first time in the political history of the country the radical left started to emerge from the shadows of the repressive political conditions. Radical mobilisation started within the intelligentsia, then developed among the students, and

²⁵ For the RPP, this was the first time a clear attempt had been made to go beyond traditional Kemalist 'above the class' politics. Yet, as the term, 'centre of the left' shows there was still the same concern to control, in this case all the left, by staying in the middle, if not above.

radical left ideas started to flourish among the workers. The socialist "Workers Party" and the first radical confederation of trade unions, "Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Union (DISK), were products of this mobilisation at the end of 1960s²⁶. University students also got organised through clubs, and then political movements. Towards the end of the decade, the radical left was strong enough to shake the political and economic establishment. DISK succeeded in organising a large section of the workers in a very short time and became a major power centre for radical politics, while the WP, for the first time in the Turkish history, succeeded in electing an MP in 1967.

The radicalisation of the urban centres had its most dramatic effect on the RPP wing of the Kemalist project. The shift towards the left, which had already started, gained momentum at the end of the 1960s. The RPP started to use more radical language and rhetoric. This time, the RPP had to compete with a socialist movement which was absent in previous decades. "This order should change" became the motto of the RPP. This move was aimed at restraining the rise of the radical left (Gunes-Ayata 1993). In order to broaden its social base the RPP continued to apply a populist strategy appealing to the masses with an anti-elitist rhetoric²⁷. There was an increase in the votes of the party even if it was not enough for the party to gain power.

²⁶ These were the first successful political organisation on the left to be established out of the Kemalist establishment. Yet, as I will show they failed to distinguish themselves from the RPP after the further shift of the RPP towards the left in the early 1970s.

²⁷ Ironically, the anti-elitism of the RPP during the 1970s was nothing other than a reaction to its own history. Yet, there was no such self-criticism among the rank and file of the RPP. Instead, the anti-elitism of this period was a very loose and vague rhetoric employed to impress the masses. In reality the RPP remained an elitist organisation. The promise to create a Scandinavian type of social democracy was an example of the elitism of the RPP (see Ecevit 1975).

However, there was a cost of this move towards the left for the party. In the face of the radicalisation of the party on the one hand, the party came to a split point, on the other, the historical alliance between party and the army reached at a point of break-up.

The unrest was not however limited to the Kemalist alliance. Towards the end of the decade the urban centres started to witness unrest mainly led by the students. The intensity of this unrest and violence increased in the early 1970s. The workers also started to express their discontent. The problems were not limited to the political domain. In the economy, the easy stage of the import-substitution industrialisation had come to an end at the beginning of the 1970s; and the fast growth of the 1960s was no longer available. The capitalist class which was reluctantly accepting an enforced peace with labour, was not happy with this balance and expressed its discontent with the deepening economic crises. Nor was there consensus on the right. The JP was challenged from nationalist and Islamist wings. At the beginning of the 1970s, the JP government was in a very shaky position as it tried to handle the deepening economic and political crises in the country.

This economic and political unrest found an echo within the military. Its 1960 intervention, and the subsequent involvement of the military in politics at least in the first half of the 1960s, led the military to see itself as the "final protector of law and order." With the spreading violence and unrest the view that the time was right for another intervention gained popularity. After a short struggle between the left and right-wings within the military, the latter which held the left including the working classes responsible for the chaotic situation of the country took the initiative and

intervened on the 27th of March 1971 through a military coup.

Thus, in terms of its ideology and consequences the 1971 military intervention was very different from the 1960 intervention in many respects. This time the left leaning faction within the military lost the leadership to the conservatives and was completely excluded from the leadership. This meant the total domination of the section within the military which was hostile to the move of the RPP to the left, thus ending the long term alliance between the two as the main pillars of the Kemalist project and eroding the hopes of certain sections of the intelligentsia which expected another progressive coup from the military. In other words, while the 1960 intervention had laid the foundation of the Kemalist project, the 1971 coup started a process of fragmentation of the Kemalist project and the political forces behind it. The collapse of the Kemalist alliance led to an important turn in the trajectory of the Kemalist project. There was no longer a single project. Instead there were two projects, one promoted by the RPP, and the other championed by the military.

The military restricted its objectives to the immediate restoration of law and order in the political domain, and stability in the economic domain. The main target turned out to be a different section of the left, ranging from intellectuals and students to working class. While the overt objective was the restoration of law and order the covert agenda was the restriction of workers rights which had resulted from the consensus seeking 1960 constitution. Despite imprisonments and other repressive measures, the efforts to curb the power of the left, and especially the radicalised working class, in favour of the capitalist classes were ineffective. The military imposed governments were all too short-lived to implement any long-term project. In

its search for legitimacy, the military did not dissolve the parliament. Instead, it imposed technocratic governments on parliament. Although the country was governed by these governments for almost three years, they were all insecure and ineffective due to the lack of strong support from political parties. Eventually, the military intervention came to an end with the 1973 elections without bringing any substantial change to the political and economic structures.

The collapsing alliance with the military brought about important changes in the RPP. When the leadership of the party gave support to the technocratic government promoted by the military in the wake of the military intervention, the veteran leader of the party, Ismet Inonu, was successfully challenged by the leader of the left-wing group, Bulent Ecevit (Gunes-Ayata 1990). The changing leadership meant a further shift to the left and led to the departure of the conservative group from the party. It also underlined the irreversibility of the collapse of the alliance between the RPP and the military. The dominance of the left in the party created a bolder emphasis upon the popular classes as the social base for the party. Following a populist strategy, the emphasis was placed upon all the exploited groups from the urban working-class to the small peasantry²⁸.

When the general elections were held in 1973 the RPP was the main beneficiary with 34 per cent. The party had progressively attracted the support of the squatters and middle class in the large cities as well as of the small peasantry. Opposite to the left, the votes were not divided on the left. In order to topple the right, the left

gathered around the RPP²⁹. The obvious loser was the JP with a 30 per cent vote down from 46.5 per cent in 1969. This was largely because of the fragmentation of the votes on the right among the various parties.

Although the RPP became the largest party in the parliament, it was short of forming a government by itself. Ironically this party, which had a history characterised by secularism, approached the National Salvation Party which was mainly a moderate religious-based party. The coalition government formed by these two parties survived less than a year and was replaced by a coalition government formed by the major right-wing parties in the JP's leadership. The so called "National Front" governments remained in power until the 1977 elections, even if they did not have enough strength and integrity to bring any solution to the mounting political and economic crises of the country. In the absence of a long-term vision or project, the National Front applied very eclectic policies which undermined the integrity of the state apparatus itself. The lack of direction in the economy reached such a level that the anti-statist bourgeoisie itself started showing signs of discontent (Zurcher 1993).

The general discontent was reflected in the 1977 election results. The RPP benefited from the disastrous performance of the National Front by increasing its vote to 42 per cent. Yet, this result did not secure enough seats for the RPP to win power. The JP

²⁸ Nevertheless, for the RPP this was a populist move rather than a move towards becoming a class based party. The leadership always put a distance between its social democratic orientation and socialism.

²⁹ Starting from late 1960s, a large section of the socialist left in Turkey supported the RPP in order to prevent the right from capturing power, and this strategy continued until recently. Furthermore, the socialist left also collaborated with the RPP when the latter held the power at the national and local level. In this strategy the ambiguous political strategy of the RPP, which contained radical elements along with the statist ones, played an important role. I will provide rich examples of this collaboration in the discussion of the Ankara experience of this period in the following chapters.

also increased its vote as a reaction to the divisions of the right to 37 percent. There was still a majority of the right in the parliament, and the Second National Front was formed again under the JP's leadership. Amidst the political and economic instability it did not survive long and was replaced by a RPP government with the aid of defectors from the JP in January 1978. Yet, like the National Front governments, the Ecevit government collapsed in October 1979 leading to Demirel's return to power (Ahmad 1993).

The 1970s was thus a decade of economic and political instability in Turkey. As far as the political domain is concerned, there was no longer a dominant, or hegemonic, state project due to the collapse of the alliance between the military and the RPP-intelligentsia in the early 1970s. Likewise the strategy of the JP to embrace the whole right stretching from big capital to the conservative popular elements, proved to be a failure from the beginning of the decade. A similar fragmentation process was experienced on the right as well. The result was short-lived coalition governments which were not able to implement any long-term strategy in their fight for daily survival.

The most dramatic consequences of this political instability was in the economic domain where the import substitution industrialisation strategy had reached the limits of its easy stages in the late 1960s. Yet, there was no clear state strategy to intervene to solve the emerging crises. Planned development had been abandoned due to ideological reasons, and partly due to the weakness and short-terms of the coalition governments (Ahmad 1993).

The striking consequences of the fused political and economic crises were an overall discontent in almost all sections of the society and ever-increasing political violence and terror (Zurcher 1993). Large cities, including Ankara and Istanbul, had become the target of political violence and terror. The army, which now had a well-established vision in its own ranks as well as in the society as the guardian of the law and order, was not happy with the developments and once again intervened in September 1980 to fulfil a task which had not been fulfilled after the 1971 coup. While the intervention interrupted the democracy it also brought an end to the second republic which itself ironically emerged out of another military intervention in 1960.

III. V. Towards Fragmentation and Marginalisation (1980 and After)!

In this thesis three main phases are identified in the trajectory of the Kemalist project. Whereas the Kemalist project emerged as a challenge to the heritage of the Ottoman tradition in order to give a new direction to society in its second phase, it became more moderate with respect to its leadership mission by tuning itself with the emerging trends in the society. The third phase represents a continuation of this trend in that the Kemalist project became fragmented and marginalised and to a large extent began to lose its leadership role in the face of emerging projects in the period starting with the military coup of 1980.

The military coup brought the Second Republic to an end and started a period of fragmentation and marginalisation of the Kemalist project despite its claim to salvage the Kemalist republic which was threatened. It is not true on the other hand,

to claim that the fragmentation and marginalisation process of the Kemalist project started with the military coup of 1980. The beginning of this process goes back to the military coup of 1971 when the political and military wings of the Kemalist project split due to increasing ideological and political differences. The military coup of 1980 on the other hand, represents the culmination of this process. If the point of fragmentation and marginalisation is taken as the military coup of 1980 rather than that of 1971, it is also because of the fact that, whereas during the 1970s there was no serious alternative vision and projects strong enough to challenge the Kemalist project despite its weaknesses, the process starting with the military intervention of 1980 led to the emergence of alternative visions and projects which have been strong enough to challenge the basic premises of the Kemalist project. In what follows in this section, contrary to the previous ones, the emphasis is placed upon these alternative visions and projects rather than the Kemalist project in order to understand the fragmentation of the latter.

The post military-coup period gave rise to the formation, or more accurately strengthening, of three alternative projects which have undermined the basic premises of the Kemalist project, namely statism, secularism, and nationalism. These are the challenges of the bourgeoisie together with globalisation, the rise of Islamic movements, and of Kurdish nationalism. Nevertheless, it is still too early to argue that Kemalism has been totally defeated since the result of these confrontations remains to be seen. Yet, one thing is clear: even if the Kemalist project survives, it will be very different from its predecessor in scope and content. In what follows in this section I would like to analyse the material context of the rise of these alternative projects and their interaction with the Kemalist project.

In the first place, ironically, world capitalism in its globalisation processes started to arrive at a point in the late 1970s where it began to undermine its own product, the nation-state, in favour of a more open economic and partly political units. At the national level the increasing power of the bourgeois classes starting from the early 1970s attempted to break the induced alliance of the 1970s and aimed to fight for the hegemony of a two nation project (For a different view see Keyder 1987).

The IMF and World Bank-induced stabilisation programme of 1980 which was implemented mainly under the military governments served this aim; the import-substitution industrialisation-strategy came to an end in favour of an export-oriented growth strategy. The changing strategy pointed to two facts: firstly, while the idea of developmentalism remains intact, the national characteristics of the developmentalism has marginalised vis-a-vis the international forces as well as a section of the capitalist class which were integrated with those international forces; the second fact related to this, the relative autonomy of the state vis-a-vis these forces was largely reduced and the state became more instrumental with those forces than under the partnership model.

Thus, in the mid-1980s, it became apparent that there was now a two-nation project based upon an export-oriented growth strategy as opposed to the one-nation project of the post-1960 period raised upon a import substitution industrialisation-strategy.

'The implementation of the structural adjustment programme in Turkey was accompanied by a significant increase in income inequality and by a marked decline in the share of workers and other fixed-income groups. Real wages fell dramatically. The transfer was achieved by legal and constitutional restrictions on union activity in the 1980-3 period. The process of redistribution assumed a more subtle form in the post-1983 phase, with a rising rate of inflation acting as a forced

saving-mechanism, thereby transferring income to both the Government and business sectors from fixed-income groups' (Kirkpatrick and Onis 1991;35).

The real beneficiary of this redistribution was the-export oriented section of the capitalist class. As a matter of fact, most members of this group were industrialists of the import-substitution industrialisation period³⁰.

The post-1980 period not only witnessed the rise of a bourgeois class and global capitalist forces. In line with rising nationalism throughout the world, it also witnessed the upsurge of Kurdish nationalism starting from early 1980. The Kurdish uprising became a serious threat to the territorial integrity of the Turkish republic. Moreover, the Kurdish question and uprising not only constituted a threat to the territorial integrity of the Turkish republic but also to the Turkish identity in that one of the prime ideas of the Kemalist project was of an imagined Turkish identity for the whole population living within its territory. In sum, Turkish nationalism is under threat in this case, not by a global but a rather 'regional movement', that is, Kurdish nationalism.

The third threat is the rise of the Islamic movement in Turkey. Given the fact that the Kemalist revolution was a cultural revolution against the Islamic tradition of the Ottoman Empire, the irony of the rise of the Islamic movement for the Kemalist project is self-evident (Gulalp, 1992). The irony turned to a sour reality for the

³⁰ Eralp point to this fact in following way: 'Those who were supposed to be the main actors in the different development policies were the same industrialists who, with substantial support from the state had been transformed from merchants into industrialists in the 1950s. Again, it was through state support that import-substituting industrialists were transformed into exporters in the years following 1980' (Eralp 1990: 220).

Kemalist establishment as the pro-Islamic Welfare Party took control of many municipalities in the local elections of 1994, including the Ankara and Istanbul metropolitan municipalities just before becoming the largest party in parliament in the 1995.

In sum, by the mid-1990s, the Kemalist project has become fragmented and, the integrity of the nation-state, which is a historical product of the Kemalist project, is under attack from at least three different fronts: global capitalism, Kurdish nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism.

Given the fact that each of these challenges has historical roots and attempted to challenge the Kemalist project in different periods, then, whether these challenges represent the return of the repressed, rather than the outcome of recent developments emerges as an interesting question waiting to be answered.

III. VI. Conclusion

The processes leading to the rise of political Islam in the post-1980 period is not just a maturation of a historical movement or, put differently, does not simply represent the return of the repressed which had so long suffered under the hegemony of the Kemalist project. There is of course a historical dimension. But the answer as to why there has been a breakthrough for political Islam in the early 1990s needs to be sought in the political, economic and cultural dynamics of the post-1980 period.

In the economic domain, the dynamics of the recent rise of political Islam lies in the

changing accumulation strategy from a ISS which provided larger segments of the society with a share from the economic growth to an export-oriented strategy which is exclusionary towards the working people and traditional petty bourgeoisie. In the political domain, in the absence of a new vision and project, the Kemalist left, contrary to the previous period, failed to be the voice of these latter groups. The success of the Welfare party comes largely from the fact that it was the only party having a radical rhetoric which opposes the opening of the economy to the 'West' and its consequences, not only for working people, but also for those sections of the capitalist class which are oriented to the internal market.

CHAPTER IV:

ON THE TRAJECTORY OF URBANISATION IN TURKEY

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IV.1. Introduction

By placing a special emphasis on the Kemalist project, the previous chapter overviewed the economic, political as well as cultural contexts in which Ankara had flourished and developed as the state capital. This chapter aims to complete the discussion on the contextual features of Ankara's development by examining the macro-spatial contextual features of the relevant period with a special emphasis on the processes of urbanisation. In reviewing the general pattern of urbanisation, this chapter also aims to provide an introduction to the discussion of the case of Ankara as well as a measure against which the distinctive and common features of the Ankara experience can be assessed.

Turkey has a very rich history of urbanisation. During the Ottoman empire, Istanbul represented a unique case. Using Braudel's description of it, "it was not a town; an urban monster and composite metropolis" (Braudel 1972;253). Likewise, Ankara exhibited another unique and interesting example of urbanisation as the state promoted capital in the early years of the republic. The processes of rapid urbanisation in the wake of World War II brought a grassroots dimension to this urban experience with the unprecedented influx of the rural masses into large cities. Finally, the 1980s witnessed the enrichment of the urban experience with the rising interest of global and local capital to the cities, along with many groups including political Islam.

Despite this urban experience, the literature on this subject has not been developed until quite recently. Although there existed a limited literature on the cities before being dominated by the architects and foreign experts, the first systematic literature started to emerge in the mid-1960s as a response to rapid urbanisation starting from early 1950s. The newly emerging literature followed two currents: one concentrated on the societal aspects of urbanisation; the other on the political/institutional aspects of it.

On the societal side, the first systematic analysis of Turkish cities came from an approach that was inspired by the Chicago school. This inspiration was more than a coincidence in that the scale of urbanisation and the problems this massive urbanisation brought was seemingly similar to those experienced in Chicago at the turn of the century. Despite considerable differences between these two experiences, problems such as the location of the new groups in the cities, their political, cultural and economic integration as well as their mobility in the city, which once inspired Chicago sociologists, were common themes and played an important role in the penetration of this school of thought into Turkish urban-studies literature.

Consequently, while the agenda of urban-studies literature during the 1960s and 1970s was determined largely by the rapid urbanisation of the large cities, with a special emphasis on the new immigrants and their problems, the theoretical tools of these investigations were mainly provided by the Chicago school (See Kiray 1967, 1975, 1982).

Undoubtedly these studies made important contributions to the understanding of internal structures of the cities during this period. Yet, they were not without their problems. In the first, place they suffered from the well-known problems of the Chicago school such as empiricism and positivism. Further, there were limitations in applying a framework, which was developed out of the experience of a US city, to Turkish cities. Not surprisingly, many basic premises of this approach were challenged from within (Senyapili 1978; 1981) as well as from without this approach (Ersoy 1985). Nevertheless, the study of the social structures of these cities have been dominated by the sociological problematic of the Chicago school.

The study of the political and institutional processes in Turkish cities has been dominated by mainly Weberian and radical Weberian frameworks which problematised the role of the state in urban development with a special emphasis on the central-local government relationship (see Keles (1993), Tekeli (1992)). In the face of a heavily centralised structure, the main concern was with the decentralisation of power. The strengthening of the municipalities came to be a dominant concern of this literature dating from the late 1960s and gained momentum during the 1970s with the increasing conflict between the left wing controlled municipalities and central government. Yet, lacking a theoretical debate on the state and local state, this strand of literature was guided by a normative bias towards the decentralisation of power on the basis of a faith in local government as a democratic form of governance¹.

¹The problem of lack of a theoretical perspective on the local state became clear when the right took control of most of the municipalities in mid-1980s and it became clear that the local government was not inherently more democratic than the central government.

The 1980s witnessed a different phase in the urbanisation processes in Turkey. While cities became theatres of accumulation, the number of urban actors and their conflicts increased and diversified in comparison to the previous periods. In the face of this challenge, it would not be an exaggeration to talk about a crisis of urban studies as an ill-equipped and under-theorised discipline. Dominated by an empiricist and micro-level understanding of urban phenomena, the current literature has a great deal of difficulty in understanding these macro-level challenges.

If there is a crisis in the understanding of urban processes in Turkey, one of the prime reasons for this is the marginal penetration of a political-economy perspective into the urban studies discipline as a macro-level framework. In the absence of a political-economy perspective which problematises capital accumulation, the reproduction of labour power, as well as role of the cities in a global world, it seems to be hardly possible to study the urban experience of the 1990s.

Yet, the current tendency seems to be taking us in another direction. Once again following on the footsteps of the West, postmodernist approaches are becoming popular in Turkish urban studies (Isik 1995). In search of recognition of difference and vernacular, they not only have the potential to obstruct the development of macro approaches, but also provide the current urban studies literature, characterised by empiricism and micro-level approaches, with methodological and theoretical justification and legitimisation.

This chapter is an attempt to make a counter argument. It aims to bring a macro

perspective -which largely but not exclusively draws upon a political-economy perspective- to the study of Turkish cities². However, it does not claim to provide a comprehensive theory. Instead, it aims to periodise the urbanisation processes in Turkey as a preliminary step to a more comprehensive framework and proposes a preliminary theoretical guideline to approach each period by drawing upon the strategic relational approach to urban politics developed in the second chapter.

IV. II. A Periodisation of the Urban Experience of Turkey

Theoretical discussion in chapter II made it clear that spatial structures are neither independent nor simple reflections of social processes, but integral to them. Likewise, one should not see the urban experience of Turkey as an isolated development or as simple reflections of accumulation strategies and state strategies. Instead, the former should be understood in the context of the latter without reducing it to the effect of the latter.

For this reason neither accumulation nor state strategies can be the sole base of the periodisation of the urban processes. A more sensitive approach, which takes these variables into account without diminishing the importance of spatial elements, is one which treats the changing balance of power in the political arena of the cities as the main determinant in the periodisation of urban processes. It is important, however, to

²The idea that every macro-level totalising theorisation is inherently repressive and inattentive of difference is one of the misconceptions in the recent 'postmodernist' literature. Along with such repressive theorisation within Marxist tradition, there are quite successful totalising ones which are neither repressive nor incapable of accommodating the difference. The theories of uneven development and articulation of mode of productions are two examples of totalising theorisation which do not diminish the importance of difference.

point out that the changing balance of political forces in cities itself depends on different factors including the state and accumulation strategies.

By following this understanding, I have identified three distinctive periods in the development of Turkish cities³;

Period I: Urbanisation of the State: 1923-50

Period II: Urbanisation of Labour Power: 1950-80

Period III: Urbanisation of Capital: 1980 and after

It is necessary to make a few important points in order to avoid possible misunderstandings on the periodisation of urbanisation above. The first important point is that although every periodisation, including the one proposed in this thesis, necessarily implies breaks between periods, it does not mean that these breaks are clear. Even in the most radical breaks, it is possible to recognise the residues of previous periods. Such is the case in the above periodisation. Although I have divided the processes of urbanisation into three periods, each characterised by a distinctive logic, this does not imply that each period eradicated the actors and structures of the previous period, or worse, that it emerged out of nothing. Rather, I will argue for a dialectical relationship between the structures and actors of different periods. By this, I mean that while the structures and actors of a given period were born during the preceding

³ From this overlapping it does not follow that urban processes are the simple reflection of the Kemalist project or strategies. In reality they both are part of the same processes, and the impact between them is not one-directional. As we saw in the previous section that in the reformulation of the Kemalist project one of the factor playing an important part was the rapid urbanisation of the 1950s and 1960s. In that sense as, I discussed in the theoretical section, the social is inherently spatial though there is a value in not reducing them each other.

period(s) and, at a certain stage of its development, challenged the structure and actors of this period, the successful challenges brought the dominance of certain actors and structures to an end rather than eliminating their influence completely. In sum, by perceiving each period as a layer which has been covered and changed, but not totally eradicated by new rounds or layers, I argue for a certain degree of continuity as well as change between successive periods⁴.

A second point, which is related to the previous one, is that the periodisation is based on the characterisation of the political agenda of the cities by a particular group and/or logic. I use the concept 'characterisation' rather than 'hegemony' or 'domination' deliberately to avoid leading to the false conclusion that in each period one particular group is the main beneficiary in economic as well as in political terms. As I will show later, this is not necessarily the case. Being politically active, for instance, does not necessarily always mean being the winner in economic terms. Secondly, in either case, 'domination' or 'characterisation' of a period by a group does not mean that other groups are passive and receptive. Though a certain group(s) may place its/their mark on the city, other groups overtly or covertly place their resistance against the dominant order on the space or in certain situations where they adapt themselves to the prevailing strategy or project in the city. That is, although there appears to be one group at the centre of the political arena of the city, there are other groups taking part in the constitution of the city. Table IV.I sums up the main contours of the production and use of urban space in Turkey in line with the above mentioned understanding which is discussed in more detail in the theoretical section.

⁴On this point, I have Doreen Massey's 'geological metaphor' in my mind (see Massey 1984).

Table IV.1. *Production and Use of Urban Space*

	First Period:1923-50	Second Period:1950-80	Third Period:1980-
Characterising Element	The State	Labour Power	Capital
Focal Point	Identity Value	Use Value	Exchange Value
Type of Space	Abstract Space	Concrete Space	Abstract Space
Consumption/Use of Space	Surveillance & Control/ Bureaucratisation	Reproduction of Labour Power	Capital Accumulation
Locus of Urban Consciousness	The state	Community/ Class	Individual

In what follows in this chapter, I will analyse each period in turn. Having provided a brief overview of Ottoman urbanisation and the Ottoman urban system as a background in section II, I will discuss the urbanisation of the (nation) state, labour-power, and capital in Sections III, IV and V respectively. The concluding section provides an overall evaluation of Turkish urbanisation.

In the analysis of each period, I will review the social base of the cities, and strategies of the central and local governments towards the cities. In doing this I will show the forms of the administrative structure of the cities, the forms of interest representation in these structures and the forms of intervention in urban space by local and central

governments. While the first two components of the state strategies towards urban space provide an account of *local political processes*, the forms of intervention concentrate upon the two other key spheres of urban politics, namely, *urban land and collective consumption*.

IV. III. Urbanisation and the Urban System in the Ottoman Empire

To begin with, the conventional wisdom that, whereas the cities of the West were power containers, the cities of the east, including Ottoman ones, did not have an autonomous status, or a relatively autonomous administrative structure in the face of highly centralised political systems, needs to be confronted⁵. In the preceding chapter, I have challenged certain aspects of this alleged dichotomy at the political and economical levels. Here, I shall continue to do so by arguing that there are important distortions in both aspects of this comparison.

In the first place, the argument that cities in the West were autonomous and corporate entities is a highly disputed one in that the supposed dichotomy between town and countryside is largely superficial and in that the supposed corporate identity and autonomy of European cities was immensely diminished by the absolutist states (Merington 1976).

On the Ottoman side of this comparison, there is a similar distortion regarding the

⁵See Giddens (1985) and Saunders (1984) for the power-container argument. For a counter view see Katznelson 1992. For the Ottoman cities see Heper (1989), Mardin (1995).

corporate structures of the cities. The arguments that 'in the Ottoman polity the periphery was totally subdued by the centre'(Heper 1989), and that, they lacked a corporate identity (Ozbudun 1976) are highly misleading.⁶ As an alternative to these views, I shall seek to demonstrate that the authority and control of the Ottoman political centre gradually weakened from the centre towards the periphery and that, there is enough evidence indicating that at least some of the cities enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the political centre, even in the most centralised stages of the Ottoman political system (Faroqhi 1993).

The hierarchical organisation of the cities in terms of their administrative structure is put forward as one piece of the evidence in favour of an argument for non- autonomous cities. In order to counter the argument, it is necessary to begin with this point. At the top of the hierarchical, administrative and city system was Istanbul -as the seat of empire starting from 1453 up until its collapse. The city was the residence of the sultan as well as being the centre of the administrative, military, and fiscal institutions and other bureaus of the empire. Indeed, Istanbul was incomparably superior to other cities and towns in terms of size, population and built environment (Braudel 1972; 252).

The remaining territories of the empire were divided into *sancaks* which were under the rule of *sancakbeyis* who were appointed from Istanbul. The *sancaks* were part of a larger unit, namely *provinces* whose highest appointed officer was the *beylerbeyi* (provincial governor). *Sancaks* were divided into smaller units called *kazas* . In this

⁶In a recent article, Mardin (1995) explains the difference between the East and the West with regard to the development of civil society with the presence and absence of corporate cities.

administrative system the *sancak* stood as the basic administrative unit in which under the *sancakbeyi* there were a number of government officials including the fiscal and military registers, the *kadi*, responsible for justice, as well as the *subasi* who was the head of the security organisation (Ortayli 1978).

It was through this hierarchical organisational structure that the flow of surplus and military manpower from the localities to the political centre in Istanbul was said to be secured. In this respect, the uneven economic and spatial development between the capital and other localities are given as further evidence of the highly centralised organisation of the empire. It is beyond any doubt that Istanbul presented itself as a urban monster throughout the Ottoman period vis-a-vis the other cities and towns under Ottoman rule, and that there was a great deal of uneven development in favour of Istanbul. Yet, this evidence does not show that the other towns enjoyed no autonomy and lacked a corporate structure.

Once the empiricist and official lines of historiography are questioned, another picture of the cities with their administrative and political organisations starts to come to light which denies the findings of official historiography. In the first place, the hierarchical organisational structure of the Ottoman state, which assumes a chain of command starting from Istanbul down to the remotest *kazas*, remained by and large on paper. In reality, the relationship between the political centre in Istanbul and other localities was more complicated and less hierarchical. The crux of the matter is that those who filled the so-called administrative positions were not simple functionaries of the political centre. By and large, these governors, and other important officials came from locally

powerful groups who were at times in conflict with the political centre, which in turn, had to negotiate with these groups to retain control over these localities. Zubaida succinctly points to this fact as follows:

The starting point for most Middle Eastern countries is some kind of segmented political organisation consisting of a ruling dynasty whose direct rule does not extend far beyond its capital or seat of power, but which exercises some (variable) authority over its (theoretical) territory by uneasy alliances with local power structures in different parts of the territory, and the manipulation of structures in different parts of the territory, and the manipulation of antagonisms between different magnates, war lords, tribes, and so on. The rulers may develop close ties to the social and economic life of the major cities which are their seats of power, as was clearly the case of Istanbul and some other major Ottoman cities, but not to the bulk of the population in the rural and tribal areas, who remain generally tied to local networks and powers with various relations to the centre (Zubaida 1993; 124).

In this respect, the relationship between the localities and the political centre varied according to the balance of power between the local magnates and notables and the political centre. Therefore, it is difficult to establish an overall pattern for the Ottoman cities with respect to their autonomy from the centre. However, what stands out is that the relation between them was far from being a simple superior-subordinate relationship, as far as most of the Ottoman cities and towns outside the vicinity of the Istanbul are concerned.

It is possible to see the impact of these complicated relations with the political centre in the internal political and economic organisation of the cities. It is for instance a well-known fact that the non-payment of the locally collected taxes by the local officers to the political centre was a very common practice and, in return, the tolerance of this kind of violation by the local representative of the centre was the usual solution.

As far as the economic structure of the cities are concerned, 'the craft guilds (*ahi-ism*) were the main organisation. Especially in the early periods when the political centre was

weak, '*ahis* performed a number of public functions and become a political force in the cities' (Inalcik 1973; 152). With the strengthening of political authority during the classic period (1300-1600) the centre followed a strategy of undermining the power of the guild organisations. Nevertheless, even after this recentralisation, they still kept a certain degree of autonomy from the centre in performing the local functions such as negotiating with merchants of other cities and protecting their cities. In this respect, Faroqhi (1993) considers them semi-dependent rather than dependent on the political centre.

Urban services and functions were likewise largely under the control and responsibility of the foundations (*vakifs*). Despite some control by the political centre, *vakifs* were financially and administratively autonomous foundations. They were especially strong in big cities whereas their existence was continuously undermined by the political centre in other cities. In this respect, it is not possible to see a local government organisation which is responsible for the urban services in the Ottoman empire until the end of nineteenth century. Only then was the first municipal organisation established in Istanbul to provide urban services. In other cities the provision of urban services remained the responsibility of *vakif* organisations. The lack of a strong, local-government organisation in localities is generally taken as evidence and consequence of strong centralisation (Heper 1989). As a matter of fact, the same evidence, in my view, is compatible with a weak central authority unable to insert its authority and power in localities. In this respect, under Ottoman rule, quoting Zubaida once again,

'...with the already noted exception of the major cities, the state remains external to the communities and social structures over which it rules, and in this respect constitutes a major contrast to the modern state' (Zubaida 1993; 125).

This point is important in distinguishing the modern nation state and the imperial state.

Then it is in order to turn to the republic period to see the difference the modern nation state makes to the cities and their politico-administrative organisations.

IV. IV. The Territorialisation and Urbanisation of the (Nation) State:1923-50

In the theoretical chapter it became clear that social processes do not take place on the head of a pin. They not only occur in space but also through space. The formation of the nation state is a case *par excellence* in this regard. In other words, the territory of a nation-state is not just an arena in which nation-state formation projects are unfolded, but also a medium through which they are produced and put into effect. As already discussed in the theoretical section, although national states define themselves in a more larger territorial unit, urban space is an important dimension of this spatiality. My argument in this section is that in the study of the territorial politics of Turkey between 1923 and 1950, including the urban level, needs to be studied in the context of nation-state formation. In what follows in this section, I would like to first look at the spatiality of nation and state-formation processes briefly at national and regional levels, and then move to the urban level.


At the national level, the most important spatial element of nation-state formation is the idea of a homeland. As the idea of a homeland is against the expansionist nature of the Ottoman empire, there was no emphasis on a particular territory as the homeland during Ottoman rule. Contrary to this strategy, Anatolia played an important role as the “mythical” homeland of the Turkish nation in the process of nation building in the republic period. The dichotomy between the homeland, Anatolia, as the victim of

neglect of the thousand years of Ottoman rule, and Istanbul, as the symbol of the old order, was extensively used by the Kemalist elite in the creation of a national identity and consciousness. As I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter, one of the reasons behind the emergence of Ankara as an alternative to Istanbul was its association with Anatolia as opposed to Istanbul's established rivalry. Anatolia as the homeland was the foundation stone of the new territorial identity of the new republic (Rivkin 1965).

The Kemalist elite, step-by-step became aware of the fact that the success of the formation of the nation and the state in this homeland largely depended on the deployment of the authority of the state throughout this homeland. This required the penetration of the state into the civil society by means of consent and force. While the centralisation and territorialisation of political power are seen as preconditions of the deployment of state's authority, they came to realise that they had to be armoured by consent. This was circumscribed by the creation of citizenship.


It is possible to observe these concerns in two key aspects of the spatial policy of this period; the location decisions of state economic enterprises, and the creation of a transportation network. Almost all of the state economic enterprises were located outside Istanbul and other developed areas of Anatolia in a dispersed pattern (Compare Figures IV. I and IV. II). Thus, especially after 1930, with the etatist policies, the spatial location of industrial enterprises, to a large extent, followed a pattern reflecting the 'denouncement' of Istanbul in favour of Anatolia. By spreading out state economic enterprises all over the country, this action continued to support the change in the

Figure IV. I. Industrial Investments and Railways in 1918



Source: Beaumont, 1988, p461

Figure IV. II. Industrial Investments and Railways in 1950



Source: Rivkin, 1965, p.71

population distribution, already created by the transfer of the state capital to Ankara, in favour of Anatolia (Compare Figures IV. III and IV. IV). The small cities like Nazilli, Kirikkale and Eregli in this period, where state enterprises were built, were the most dramatically growing cities. While overall annual growth of these cities was 5.0 per cent during this decade, in large cities like Izmir and Istanbul (with the exception of Ankara), population increases remained around 1.4 per cent (see Table IV. II).

Table IV. II. Urban Growth in Large Cities and Industrial Centres

<i>Provinces (city centre)</i>	<i>1927</i>	<i>1935</i>	<i>1940</i>	<i>1945</i>	<i>1950</i>	<i>1955</i>
Ankara	74 784	122 720	157 242	226 712	288 537	451 241
Istanbul	690 857	741 143	793 949	860 558	983 041	1 268 771
Izmir	153 924	170 959	183 762	198 396	227 578	296 559
Adana	72 577	76 473	88 119	100 780	117 642	168 628
Kirikkale	-	-	-	14 496	15 750	27 807
Eregli	5 180	5 843	5 415	6 360	7 132	7 878
Nazilli	9 325	12 005	16 478	18 986	25 106	31 487


Source: State Statistical Institute, Statistics Annual, 1959

The strategy of dispersing industries was expressed in the Republican Party Program as follows:

the industrial undertakings shall not be concentrated in certain parts of the country, but shall instead, be spread all over the country taking into consideration the economic factors" (Party Program of RPP, 1935. quoted in Rivkin, 1965).


One of the explanations of this spatial policy lies in the relative autonomy enjoyed by the state during this period, especially vis-a-vis the capitalist classes. Nevertheless, this does reach the point where the voluntaristic and idealistic explanations such as the 'above the classes' nature of the state or the egalitarianism of the Kemalist regime explain these policies. Although it is necessary to acknowledge a degree of voluntarism in these decisions, it is also necessary to emphasise two causal factors, one from above

Figure IV.III. Cities by Population Size, 1927



Source: Rivkin, 1965, p.39

Figure IV. IV. Cities by Population Size, 1950



Source: Rivkin, 1965, p.39

and the other from below. From above, these spatial policies were part of nation and state-building processes to which the Kemalist elite committed itself; that is, the formation of a new nation state -which is also different in its spatial organisation from the Ottoman Empire- required a certain degree of penetration of the state into civil society not only through force but also by consent. Equally as important however, there was also a bottom-up pressure that forced the state to divert its attention to those parts of the country which had been neglected for a long time. The Kurdish uprising in the Eastern part and general discontent throughout the country were important in strengthening the Kemalist elite's belief that modernisation, mainly through industrialisation but also through urbanisation, was a condition of 'national unity' which is an important prerequisite of the nation and state-building process.

The impact of the Kemalist regime's concern for legitimacy and control over the Anatolian population was also obvious in the railway policies of this period. During Ottoman rule the railway network was concentrated in the western part of Anatolia. Especially during the etatist period, there was a conscious effort to expand the railway network to the neglected parts of the country in line with the location policy of the state economic enterprises (Compare Figures IV. I and IV. II). Given the discontent of the masses this policy was a result of both legitimacy and control over the territory of the new nation state.

In search of integration and control over the territory of the new nation state, the efforts of the Kemalist regime were not limited to national and regional levels. Similar policies started to dominate the urban level, especially during the etatist period. Two of these

policies are worth mentioning: the establishment of local government units in localities with a population of over 2000, and an extensive planning activity in many localities.

As discussed earlier, during the Ottoman period only Istanbul had a structured local administration, and a similar administrative structure was set up in Ankara in the early years of the republic. There were no similar units in other localities. The provincial governor was the principal agent of the political centre in cities. In 1930, the first comprehensive municipal law was introduced to allow the establishment of municipal administrations in those localities with a population over 2000. While the law proposed an administrative unit with numerous functions, the financial and technical means were left to the central government to facilitate the control of the political centre over localities. Given the fact that there was considerable opposition to the Kemalist regime, especially in small localities, it is not difficult to see the rationale behind the policy to reduce the role of local government to that of a local agent of the political centre.

The etatist period also witnessed considerable activity in the planning domain. In the early years, the main planning activity was concentrated upon Ankara and a few other cities destroyed during the war. In line with the planned development approach of the etatist period, the planning was extended to other cities. The preparation and implementation of development plans were defined as compulsory duties of municipalities by the municipal law of 1930. In effect, this regulation was nothing other than the preparation of a development plan for each locality with a population over 2000 (Tekeli, 1980). This is striking evidence of the political centre's intention to insert its authority over localities in the sense that development planning represents a powerful

expression of political authority. Through development planning, the political centre not only aimed at regulating urban space but also created a condition of surveillance by coding the urban space from the streets and roads to the location and numbers of the houses.

Yet, in effect, the insertion of authority from the political centre into the localities required tremendous financial and technical resources, which the Kemalist regime could ill-afford in the wake of a long war and following the World depression of 1930. In the face of scarce resources, the priority was progressively given to industrial development at the expense of secondary and tertiary circuits. In the case of development planning, the obligatory preparation of the plans for those localities over a population of 2000 was dropped and development plan preparation was made compulsory only for the localities over 20 000 (Tekeli, 1980). In fact, the preparation of plans did not take place in all these localities, and even when a plan existed, the implementation remained limited due to the lack of financial and technical resources. At the end of the 1950s, for instance, only 58.5 per cent of municipalities had prepared development plans while the implementation of these plans were quite rare (Keles and Payne 1986).

These limitations were also clear in the case of municipal finance. As discussed the municipalities became responsible for numerous functions following the municipal law of 1930. Yet, due to the lack of finance and personnel, municipalities failed even to fulfil their obligatory functions. Most of them were in debt during this period and had difficulty in paying the salaries of their staff (Tekeli 1978).

Nevertheless, these efforts were important in showing the Kemalist regime's attempt to exert its authority and control in localities throughout this period in the process of becoming a nation state. Yet, at the end of World War II, especially in large cities already weak and the authority of the state started to be challenged by the massive influx of the rural population into urban areas, and the focus of urban conflicts started to shift from the state to the society. In the following section I will discuss this second phase of urbanisation.

IV. V. Urbanisation of Labour Power: 1950-1980

The most important spatial features of the DP power, in office between 1950 and 1960, as discussed earlier, were its anti-urban and pro-rural accumulation and state strategies. Yet, this does not mean that urban areas were not affected by these policies. Ironically, the impact of the agriculture-oriented policies was as large in cities as in the rural areas (Keyder, 1987). While the modernisation of the agricultural sector created surplus labour in this sector, the cities, especially the large ones, became the target of this surplus population starting from the early 1950s and continuing during the 1960s and 1970s at an increasing pace. In this sense, the rapid migration and urbanisation of the peasants to form massive labour pools in the large cities was the single most important characterising feature of the period between the 1950s and the late 1970s (See Table IV. III).

Table IV. III. Urban Population Growth 1927-1980

Population of Urban Area(000)	Percentage of Total Urban Population (and Number of Cities)							
	1927		1945		1975		1980	
10-20	24.0	(38)	23.2	(58)	12.5	(154)	10.8	(166)
20-50	28.9	(23)	25.0	(30)	16.5	(89)	15.2	(112)
50-100	9.3	(3)	11.5	(6)	9.5	(24)	10.7	(23)
Over 1000	37.8	(2)	40.3	(4)	61.5	(25)	63.3	(29)
Total	100.0	(66)	100.0	(98)	100.0	(292)	100.0	(330)

Source: Keles and Payne, 1984, P. 178

The rapid urbanisation brought important changes in the spatial, social and political structure of the large cities. In terms of the spatial structure of the cities, the most important dimension of this transformation was the challenge of a new form of social space; that is, space of vernacular of the new comers to the dominant landscape. The mushrooming squatter settlements on the outskirts of the cities as well as inner areas, which had been left empty due to their unsuitability for development, created striking contrasts between the authorised and unauthorised housing areas. Thus, the large cities started to display very awkward and conflict-ridden spatial structures as early as the late 1950s with the mushrooming of the squatter areas in and around the existing built environment (See Table IV. IV for the Growth of Squatter Dwellings and Squatter Population)

The juxtaposition of two contradictory spaces next to each other was the spatial dimension of an emerging conflict between exchange and identity value on the one hand and use value on the other. The invasion of urban land by squatter settlers for the intention of use was nothing other than annihilation of the state authority which guarantees private property and market exchange. In other words, this violation amounted to a challenge to the abstract space of the state which were characterised by

identity value and of private capital characterised by the exchange value in favour of a concrete space of the squatters which was characterised by use value.

Table IV. IV. The Growth of Gecekondus and Gecekondu Population

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total Urban Population</i>	<i>Gecekondu Population (000s)</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Total Urban Housing Units (000s)</i>	<i>Number of Gecekondus (000s)</i>	<i>%</i>
	(1)	(2)	(2/1)	(3)	(4)	(4/3)
1955	5 324 397	250	4.69	1 050	50	4.76
1960	7 307 816	1 200	16.42	1 440	240	16.67
1965	9 395 159	2 150	22.88	1 880	430	22.87
1967	10 437 233	2 250	21.56	2 100	450	21.43
1970	12 734 761	3 000	23.55	2 800	600	21.43
1980	20 330 065	4 750	23.36	4 500	950	21.11

Source: Keles and Payne, 1984, P. 181

I will argue, however, that this challenge from squatter areas was an unintended consequence of macro processes rather than the result of a project of squatters to challenge the political order and its space⁷. The transformation taking place in the agricultural sector had forced them to move to cities where neither jobs nor accommodation were available. Thus, invasion of land appeared as an inevitable move for newcomers in search of survival in large cities. In this respect, even if the emerging built environment and the way in which it emerged constituted a threat to the state and logic of capitalist urbanisation, it was not a full-blown challenge of an emerging alternative project; the project of squatters was not an alternative either in its scale or in its objectives. It was rather micro-scale, one aiming at becoming urbanites at any cost, as the return to the village was not a viable option anymore.

⁷This is a very striking example and evidence of why space is important for and integral to social processes and why the former cannot be reduced to the latter. That is, even if the squatter residents did not intend to create a challenge to these space, their creation leads to a contradiction which cannot be either reduced to or isolated from social relations.

This argument is consistent with the voting behaviour of the squatters. In the early years of their arrival in the cities they voted for the right-wing parties, but gradually their support shifted to the left-wing parties. The most common explanation for this voting behaviour is that while squatters in the early years of their arrival at cities saw themselves as well-off with reference to their conditions in the village, their point of reference shifted to native residents of the cities, so they turned to the left-wing parties which promised social justice and improvements for the urban poor (Senyapili 1978, Keles and Danielson 1985).

If the newcomers were not able to develop an alternative project collectively despite the potential of the act of invasion as a challenge to the dominant political and spatial order, it can not be explained with reference to their level of consciousness, since their level of consciousness is not shaped by only objective conditions but also by political organisations⁸. In this respect it is apt to look at the attitude of political parties and other political organisations towards the squatters. As was discussed in the previous chapter, in the 1950s and early 1960s there was no serious left wing mobilisation. It was only in the late 1960s and early 1970s that left wing parties, including the socialist ones, targeted the squatters and squatters responded overwhelmingly by giving support at the national and local elections. For this reason, it is necessary to understand the political transformation that the squatters underwent should be understood in the context of both their objective conditions and the political structure surrounding them.

⁸I am referring here to a collective project which challenges consciously political and economic order and its space. Otherwise, the squatter settlers had their projects at household and neighbourhood levels which aimed at becoming an integral part of the city, and as will be discussed in the following pages, they followed very carefully drawn strategies from the beginning.

In this respect it is also useful to look at government policies towards the squatters from the early years. It is however necessary to look at, first, the state and accumulation strategies of this period with respect to urbanisation. As discussed in the earlier section, after ten years of agriculture-oriented accumulation and state strategies, import substitution industrialisation came to the fore until the end of the 1970s. One of the prominent features of this developmentalist strategy was to contain the resources in the primary circuit as much as possible. In line with the emphasis on production the main component of the spatial policies of this period, especially during the 1960s and early 1970s, was regional planning. A number of regional plans were prepared during this period to overcome regional inequalities (Rodwin 1970; Rivkin 1965).

The consequence of this strategy for urbanisation was the minimisation of the flow of state and private investments into urbanisation. In terms of state strategies, this strategy found its expression through state intervention, in the form of minimum intervention in collective consumption and the continuation of centralisation in relation to the internal organisation of the state⁹. Thus, while the state and private capital were not eager to invest in urbanisation and support the ever-increasing need for housing and other urban services and infrastructure, the initial reactions of the state to the mushrooming squatter areas -which were nothing other than a solution of the newcomers to the housing problem initiated on their own- were prohibition and demolition as a deterrent.

⁹If minimum state involvement was possible in the key areas of collective consumption, this was partly possible because of the fact that, especially in the early years of their arrival in cities, the squatters restricted their horizons to the gaining of the state recognition of their settlements rather than pressing for the active involvement of the state in the provision of the means of collective consumption.(Karpal 1976).

This policy might be seen as an irrational one as the state itself did not produce a policy towards the provision of enough housing for the newcomers. Yet, there was a reason behind this prohibition and demolition policy as the squatters were violating both the very basis of private-property and therefore state authority as the guarantor of the protection of private property rights. Therefore, the prohibition and demolition of representational spaces next to the spaces of representation were part of an attempt by the state to remind the newcomers of the authority of the state and the primacy of exchange value over use value in the production of urban space.

In the face of massive migration it would be optimistic to expect these policies to stop the invasion of the outskirts of the cities by the squatters. The squatter settlements continued to mushroom at an unprecedented pace despite the threat of demolition. While the examples of demolition and prohibition existed in some areas, state policies towards the squatter settlements started to be more favourable starting from the early 1960s.

There were different factors behind the changing attitude of the state towards the squatter phenomenon. In the first place, demolition and prohibition might help the state to remind the newcomers of state authority and power as well as the rule of capitalist urbanisation, but the lack of any alternative solution produced by the state to squatting could create a legitimisation crisis for the state. Furthermore, the number of squatter dwellers had reached a level where it was not possible for any political party to ignore their bargaining power in the early 1960s with the restoration of a multi-party system. Finally, it also became clear to the state as well as to private capital that squatter housing, as an alternative to the other forms of housing provision was functional for the

import-substitution strategy by reducing the cost of reproduction of labour power to the state and private capital (Keyder 1987).

The first comprehensive positive approach to squatter housing can be found in the First Five -Year Plan for national development prepared by the State Planning Organisation in 1963. The plan proposed improvement rather than demolition as a solution to the housing problem of the newcomers (Danielson and Keles 1985). This approach found its reflection in the Squatter Law of 1966.

The legalisation of squatter settlements, and provision of basic services such as electricity and water can, in one sense, be seen as a success for squatter settlers in imposing their demands upon the state. Yet, there is another dimension which seems to be missing in the relevant literature. It is that the policies of recognition of the squatters by the state, through the giving of title deeds, the provision of main urban services, and even numbering the squatter dwellings, imply an attempt on the part of the state to reassert its authority and control over these settlements and to reintegrate the squatters under the logic of capitalist urbanisation in which exchange value subdues use value. Once this process had taken place, the squatter dwellers not only received recognition and services, but also became tax payers in respect of their officially recognised dwellings and land plots, registered in municipal records and could sell and buy squatter plots and dwellings in the legal market.

I would not claim that the changing attitude of the state towards the squatters brought a complete solution for both sides and integrated squatter dwellers into the formal

political and economic structure of the cities once and for all. My point is rather to show the complexity of the problem. Otherwise, the tension and conflicts between squatters and state continued to dominate the political agenda of the cities during the late 1960s and in the following decade by taking on new dimensions as explained below.

In its third stage, the squatter dwellers, having gained certain rights, raised their expectations regarding the state to a new level. Their point of comparison was no longer the rural area; by comparing themselves with the other sections of the city and built environment, they now claimed to be full citizens with the same rights not only to the basic services such as electricity and water but also to roads, schools, and other services. In other words, they were demanding an extension of the state recognition of their settlements with title deeds and basic services to the planning of their neighbourhoods as in the authorised part of the city.

Now that the squatter dwellers constituted almost more than half of the total population of the large cities, it was not surprising to see splits within the state created by the squatters. As a matter of fact, starting from the early 1960s, there was a certain degree of inconsistency in state policies regarding squatter settlements especially between the central and local governments. Yet, such inconsistencies were a reflection of opportunistic differences rather than ideological splits among different branches and levels of the state apparatus¹⁰. The real split within the state, which was rooted in the

¹⁰One of the common examples was that when municipalities were trying to deter the squatting by demolition and prohibition during the general-election periods the central government would refuse to provide a police force to support the municipal demolition teams.

ideological and political differences towards the squatters, started to emerge in the early 1970s with the ideological shift in the RPP to the left. The RPP concentrated on the squatters and urban poor in its urban policy programme. To start with, the local politicians in the RPP ranks started to propose, though not programmatically, policies to solve the squatter housing problem on the one hand and to improve the conditions of the existing ones by providing services and infrastructure to these settlements on the other. Although it was not systematic at the beginning, new programmes which prioritised the squatters and their needs against the established dwellers, and which placed use value against exchange value began to emerge in large cities. The RPP did not wait to pick up the fruits of this shift towards the squatters. In almost all of the large city municipalities the RPP took power in the local election of 1973 (See Table IV. V.).

The RPP kept control of municipalities in large cities including Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir between 1973 and 1980 by renewing its local election success in 1977. During this whole period, the large city municipalities started to advance more large scale and systematic policies for running the municipalities. In the second half of the 1970s, they had a strategy towards the cities they controlled. This strategy involved the decentralisation of power to the municipalities from the political centre, opening up of the representative channel to the masses, primarily to the squatter dwellers, and the collectivisation of the means of collective consumption, that is, prioritising use value over exchange value including urban land. The main components of this strategy, which was named 'the New Municipalism', was developed in the as it was implemented rather than being planned in advance (Tekeli 1992).

Table IV.V. The performance of the RPP in the 1973 Local Elections

<i>Population of Urban Areas (000)</i>	<i>Average Population (000)</i>	<i>% of the RPP Controlled Municipalities</i>
Over 500	1.623	100.0
100-500	181	70.8
75-'00	87	33.7
50-75	59	37.5
25-50	35	37.5
10-25	15	40.4
Under 10	4	31.6

Source: Turkcan, 1982, p.212

The changing ideology and practices of municipalities during the 1970s created important tensions and antagonisms between the left-wing municipalities and the successive central government which were controlled by conservative parties with the exception of two short intervals. On the one hand, the political centre did not respond positively to the demands coming from municipalities to decentralise the political system to strengthen municipalities. If the political centre made any change during this period in this respect, it took place in the other direction to further centralise and curb the power of municipalities. On the other hand, when municipalities attempted to initiate new projects by using their existing resources and power, the central government usually attempted to obstruct them. In this respect the 1970s witnessed the turning of the large cities into battlegrounds between the central government and the municipalities (Tekeli and Ortayli, 1978).

Nevertheless, the RPP-controlled municipalities brought a new dimension to urban politics of large cities despite the persistent obstruction by the political centre. They managed to initiate important projects in various areas of collective consumption ranging from housing to transportation and continued to place pressure on the political centre to decentralise power. In this manner, they contributed to the deepening of the

crisis of the political system during the 1970s. In turn, when the military took power, all mayors of the large-city municipalities were sacked and city councils were dissolved. In other words, the military intervention of 1980 brought an end to the new Municipalism movement which developed as a response to the needs of and pressures from rapidly urbanising urban poor.

IV. VI. The Urbanisation of Capital: 1980 and After

In the preceding chapter the transition from an import-substitution industrialisation strategy to an export-promotion strategy was discussed. One of the features of this transition was that the military played a key role by repressing political opposition. Economic and political restructuring started during the early 1980s as part of world-wide changes promoted by international institutions such as the IMF and The World Bank. These also marked a new stage in the urban experience of Turkey with regard to the economic, political, cultural as well as the spatial structure of the cities.

The changing of accumulation strategy from import-substitution to export-promotion changed the relationship between primary, secondary and tertiary circuits of capital accumulation. The withdrawal from industrial investments in the primary sector, both in state and private sectors, created an interest and tendency to invest in the secondary and tertiary circuits.

One of the important consequences of this redressing of the balance between the circuits of capital accumulation was that the large cities became one of the main loci of private

and state investments. Nevertheless investment in the cities had been very selective. While the built environment and infrastructure, especially communication and transportation, were favoured ones, investments in the means of collective consumption, except housing, remained very limited during this period. The shifting interest of capital in the cities was a novel development in Turkey since during the previous periods, the interest of big capital, in both private and public sectors, remained in the primary circuit, that is, in industrial investments, while the cities were left to small-scale capital. The post-1980 period witnessed a diversification of interests and political forces in the cities. The increasing centrality of cities to capital-accumulation processes attracted various groups, from big construction companies to foreign banks (Eraydin 1987).

This change brought a new logic to the urban experience of Turkey. The profit motive represented by exchange value and spaces of representation, had started to prevail over all other logic and spaces, including representational space which was characterised by use value. The domination of use value and representational space by exchange value and spaces of representation led to the emergence of new political, cultural and spatial forms in cities.

The change in state strategies from urban managerialism to entrepreneurialism had emerged as one of the prominent feature of the newly arising political forms in urban space. The military regime played a prominent role in this change by removing elected politicians and key officers from municipalities, and then, starting a rationalisation and privatisation of municipal services and activities. In this regard, this period needs to be

analysed in two stages: the transition under military rule (1980-1983), and the following period which was dominated by urban entrepreneurialism. In this restructuring of the municipalities, the objective of the military regime was two-fold. On the one hand, considering the cities, especially the large ones as the main sources of chaos and disorder, the immediate aim of the military regime was to re-establish law and order. Its second aim was a rather long-term objective to displace the managerialist policies of the previous period, such as the state provision of means of collective consumption, which were also seen as one of the dynamics behind the anarchy and terror in the urban centres, in favour of more entrepreneurial urban administrations and practices (Tekeli 1992).

It is possible to see the marks of these two concerns in the strategies of the military-regime period towards the cities. Concerning representation, one of the first actions of the military regime was to remove most of the elected mayors and to dissolve city councils. The elected mayors were replaced by the mayors appointed by the Ministry of the Interior in large cities and mayors appointed by provincial governor in the small cities. In many cases appointed mayors were ex-army officers and retired governors (Acaroglu and Atauz, 1982). In relation to the internal organisation of city administration, the main aim was directed toward to the centralisation of the municipalities by strengthening their executive branches against the elected representatives. During this period, many small municipalities around large-city municipalities were annexed to the latter as part of a rationalisation and centralisation strategy. With regard to state intervention, the main strategy appeared to be a rationalisation and privatisation of provision together with full-cost charging for urban

services. In the provision of urban services the subsidies were abolished in favour of true-cost pricing. Again as part of the rationalisation, the number of personnel working in municipalities was reduced gradually (Sengul 1993).

When the military regime decided to return to democracy in 1983, the authority of the state were reasserted in the urban spaces, and the basic principals of the transition from urban managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism were drawn up and to an extent put into effect (Sengul 1993).

Following the success of the Motherland Party, which was established by the main architects of the liberalisation programme, local elections were held in March 1984. Just before the local elections, the municipal administrations of the metropolitan cities were restructured on the basis of the constitution of 1980 which allowed the establishment of special administrations in metropolitan cities. These included a two-tier administrative structure (a metropolitan municipality and number of district municipalities) with additional powers in comparison to other municipalities. While both metropolitan and district municipalities had elected mayors and councils, the former were dominant over the latter. For example, many of the planning decisions as well as budgets of the district municipalities required the approval of the metropolitan municipality.

In the local election following this restructuring, the Motherland Party took control of most of the municipalities, including all metropolitan and district municipalities . Since the Motherland Party was the most keen promoter of the liberalisation programme, its

control over most of the municipalities guaranteed the continuation and further strengthening of entrepreneurial practices in the cities. One of the distinguishing feature of municipalities in this period as opposed to the military period was the considerable increase in municipal incomes and expenditures after the Motherland Party came to power. Between 1980 and 1984, the revenues of the municipalities coming from the Bank of Provinces increased threefold. There was a similar increase in the revenues coming from the central government. This was an important deviation from the municipal policies of the military period as well as from the experiences of Western countries (Keles 1992; Tekeli 1993).

This deviation is an important indicator of the fact that the cities became central to accumulation and state strategies. As I argued above, the withdrawal from productive investments had created a shift to the secondary and tertiary circuits. This does not however explain why public investment shifted to these sectors and particularly to the built environment rather than lead to a state policy of austerity. This question can be answered by referring to the political role of the cities in the establishment of the post-1980 order. I will argue that, especially after the return to the democracy, the cities were used in the strengthening of the accumulation and state strategies of the post-1980 period which were inserted from above under the military regime (Sengul 1993). In terms of state strategies, investment in the built environment massively contributed to the formation of a social base for the political and economic order of the post-1980 period in a democratic environment. Through contracting out and other methods, municipalities transferred substantial amounts of resources to the locally powerful groups to create a social base for the Motherland Party which did not have a grassroots

organisation¹¹. Furthermore, the motherland party used urban investments in the cities, and the obvious inadequacies of the infrastructure, housing and other services, to divert attention from the tensions created by the liberalisation programme.

Behind this urban populism, investment in urban areas was not only used to create the political forms of the post-1980 order, but also as a novel way of transferring income to certain sections of the capitalist class, which had taken place previously in the primary circuit through the import-substitution industrialisation strategy.

One of the dramatic impacts of the increasing importance of the cities in capital accumulation processes was that various groups which had not been previously involved in urbanisation started to turn their eyes to the cities. The big construction companies, both national and international, became involved in big construction projects such as underground railways, mass housing, and infrastructure. The flow of big-scale capital was not limited to state contracts. Once the cities became central to capital accumulation and urban rents became an important source of capital accumulation, private capital also started to invest in the built environment. Shopping malls, five star-hotels, and business centres started to cover the horizons of the large cities at an unprecedented speed.

The interest in cities was not limited to big capital. The entrance of powerful actors into the urban arena did not, at least immediately, marginalise the other social groups such as squatter dwellers. They remained important actors in the urban domain. What changed

¹¹For a case study which looks at the privatisation of municipal services in relation to party formation see (Sengul 1989) and Sengul and Aksoy (1991).

however, was their logic towards urban processes in an environment where the logic of capital started to dominate the cities. The urban populism of the Motherland Party played an important role in this process. In this period, all existing squatter settlements were not only legalised but a process was started of preparing development plans for all squatter neighbourhoods. These plans aimed to transform them into apartment blocks through private development (Municipal Action Plan 1992). In turn, the squatter residents were to acquire a few flats from these apartment blocks. Thus, squatters suddenly found themselves in a potential renter position. Although in uneven and *ad hoc* ways, this scheme is currently being implemented. The importance of this redevelopment scheme in the squatter areas was the integration of the squatter residents into the logic of capital in urbanisation by bringing them into the urban land market as land owners¹².

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume a complete integration of squatters into the logic of capital in urban areas for two reasons. In the first place the squatters, like all other groups, do not act only on the basis of their interest in one area, that is, their property ownership. The other reason is that the squatter settlements and their residents do not constitute a homogenous group in terms of their political and cultural values, and their economic situations are in terms of their location in the cities. From the very beginning, squatters have constituted a very heterogeneous group with regard to their ethnic, political and economic background. But, the changing accumulation and state strategies of the post-1980 period created further fragmentation and differentiation

¹²It is not difficult to see the similarity between this policy and the home-ownership policy of Thatcherism through the sale of council houses.

among the squatters on the basis of their position in the production sector.

The differentiation and fragmentation of the post-1980 period is not limited to the squatters. It also created important divisions and fragmentation and differentiation among the capitalist class as well as the middle class and in return, this fragmentation has reflected upon political processes. One of the consequences was the fragmentation of political parties. In the previous section, I illustrated that the political system based upon two parties had come to an end in favour of a more fragmented political structure. This became especially obvious in the early 1990s. At the urban level, this fragmentation and instability appeared in the form of a shift of power among the different political parties. For instance, in the local elections of 1984, the Motherland Party took control of almost all of the metropolitan municipalities, while in the following elections in 1989 the Social Democratic Populist Party won almost all metropolitan municipalities. The local elections of 1994 not only removed this party from power but also created a more complicated and fragmented situation. In the first place, massive shifts from one party to another throughout all the metropolitan municipalities came to an end in favour of a more pluralistic power division among the political parties. For instance, while control of the Istanbul and Ankara metropolitan municipalities was won by the pro-Islamic Welfare Party, the Motherland Party took control of the Izmir metropolitan municipality. More interestingly, in some of the district municipalities of these large cities, other political parties such as the Republican People's Party and the True Path Party won control. In this respect, it would not be wrong to argue that the fragmentation and diversification processes were intensified by the state and accumulation strategies of the period found in the local political processes

in the form of fragmentation of power among different parties.

A short consideration of the spatial dimension of the increasing interest of capital in cities and the following diversification and fragmentation is necessary in order to complete the debate in this section. I would argue that the post-1980 period witnessed the diversification and fragmentation of urban space in line with the social and economic fragmentation and polarisation. So-called dual cities became more fragmented and multi-layered in respect to their centres as well as their residential areas. In terms of residential differentiation, the duality of squatter-apartment blocks had been replaced by more diversified housing areas. The middle and upper middle-income groups had started to move outside the cities to newly emerging satellite towns (Ayata and Ayata 1996). Likewise, the squatter areas became more diversified due to development plans, which created a hierarchy among squatters on the basis of their suitability for the transformation into apartment blocks. Nevertheless, the most clear appearance of fragmentation and diversification in the urban spaces became obvious in the city centres. The dual-city centres of the previous period had been replaced by polycentric structures with the emergence of alternative centres and sub-centres as a response to residential diversification and fragmentation.

While the increasing interest of capital in the cities created more diversified and fragmented political, economic and spatial structures and processes, it also contributed to the inequalities at the expense of the urban poor. Social and economic inequalities, which had been already deepened by export-oriented accumulation and state strategies, were increased by entrepreneurial policies at the urban level. A careful analysis points to

a polarisation along with this fragmentation and diversification of social and spatial structures of the cities during the 1990s (Ayata and Ayata 1996).

Given these ever-increasing inequalities and polarisation, ironically there seems to have been no emerging project on the left to represent the urban poor. In this respect, one of the distinguishing features of the 1980s and 1990s compared to the 1970s is that, while there was mobilisation within the RPP and other left-wing organisations in order to represent the urban poor, the left in general lost this mission in the politically and ideologically muddy environment of the 1980s. Yet, the failure of the left to come up with a radical project at the national and local levels reflects the impact of the ideological and political onslaught on these avant guard rather than the social base. The most dramatic and ironic evidence for this argument is that the representation of the urban poor had been picked up successfully by the pro-Islamic Welfare Party, starting from the mid-1980s, around a radical ideology which emphasised social justice, equality and similar themes which were capitalised by the left during the 1970s and brought the control of the many municipalities, including Istanbul and Ankara under metropolitan municipalities¹³.

IV. VII. Conclusion

In this chapter I have sought to give a synoptic account of urbanisation in Turkey. In doing so, I have provided a periodisation which divides the urban experience of Turkey into three distinctive periods as well as some theoretical tools to analyse each period.

¹³However, it should also be noted that the Welfare Party partly owes this success in the local elections to the fragmentation of the votes among various parties. This fragmentation allowed them to win the municipalities with about 20 per cent of the vote.

Underlying this periodisation is the assumption that, although there are continuities between stages, each period has peculiar aspects which distinguish it from the others. For the first period, this was the assertion of the nation state over its territory in general but also in urban space in particular. In the analysis of urban space with regard to the territorialisation of the nation state, I have claimed that while the state is the home domain of the analysis of urban processes, the entry point is identity value. During the second period, on the other hand, a different logic became dominant in urban processes. Rapid urbanisation as a result of a massive population influx from rural areas turned the cities into labour pools. This sea of change brought a new logic to the urban scenes. While labour power became the home domain of urban analysis, this time use value constituted the point of entry. The early 1980s witnessed another stage in the urban experience of Turkey. Changing accumulation and state strategies in line with the globalisation tendencies of the World system led the cities to become more central to capital accumulation processes. In turn, while capital became the home domain of urban analysis, the point of entry was exchange value.

Throughout this chapter I have attempted to prove the validity of this periodisation and usefulness of the theoretical means I have proposed for the study of individual cities. In this sense, the level of analysis employed and the evidences drew upon were macro level.. In what follows in the next three chapters, in line with the periodisation provided above, the development of Ankara is analysed in a more micro scale; each chapter focuses on one of the periods discussed above and through the theoretical framework developed in the theoretical part which is partly employed in this chapter. It should be noted however, that the development of the city cannot be read from the macro-level

evaluation of urbanisation provided above, since each city and each level of analysis has its own specificity which cannot be derived from the macro level.

If the fundamental premise of Brasilia's foundation is that it should signal the dawn of a new Brazil, then it is precisely its exemplary uniqueness among Brazilian Cities that defines it as a blueprint of development. This utopian difference between capital and nation meant that the planning of Brasilia had to negate Brazil as it existed. Thus, the Master Plan presents the founding of the city as if it had no history . Similarly, the government intended to unveil the built city as if it were without a history of construction and occupation' (Holston 1989: 199).

CHAPTER V:

ANKARA 1923-50: URBANISATION OF THE STATE

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V. I. Introduction

In Chapter III, I have analysed the nation-state formation processes which led to the transfer of the capital of the new Turkish republic from Istanbul to Ankara. We saw that relying upon an ideologico-cultural, framework characterised by western, modern and secular values, the Kemalist regime tried to create an 'imagined community' and 'national identity' which in practice were nothing other than a rejection of 'real communities' and 'identities' within the territory of the new nation-state. Having shown the main contours and contradictions of the Kemalist nation-state formation project I concentrated on the spatial dimensions of this project. Though I emphasised certain aspects of Ankara's role in this process, I did not elaborate on the development of the city itself at a micro-level.

This chapter takes up this issue and examines the development of the city itself at a rather micro-level from the vantage point of the Kemalist nation-state formation project. It is worth noting however, that while the chapter examines the development of the city in the context of the nation-state formation project, it does not treat the former as a reflection of the latter. Instead, the development of the city at the micro-level is considered as a process integral to nation-state formation processes and as having distinctive aspects which cannot be derived from the latter. In other words, the chapter aims at linking the micro-level analysis of the development of the city to the macro-level discussed in the previous chapter¹.

¹ In doing so, it challenges two dominant tendencies in the literature on the development of Ankara. The first tendency is the empiricism which dominates the dominant literature. Although there is a great deal of study over the development of Ankara, they are mostly empirical, and these lack a theoretical rigour. In this sense, the theoretical evaluations do not go beyond common sense conclusions. The second

Section II covers a brief examination of the dynamics and reasons behind the relocation of the capital of the new Turkish republic in Ankara. This analysis reveals the main contours of the Kemalist project towards the city at a macro-level. Realisation of these macro-level intentions requires the Kemalist élite to confront the realities of that the city of Ankara was by no means a clean slate with its long history. Section III provides a brief history of the city as a backdrop to the later developments including the years covering the Independence War. Section IV concentrates on the development of the city after becoming the capital and provides a detailed account of how the Kemalist regime sought to implement its project on the city in the face of opposition from different quarters. The final section provides a balance sheet of the Kemalist project at the end of the period, comparing initial intentions and actual outcomes.

V. II. Ankara as the Capital of the New Turkish Republic

In Chapter II I have argued that the formation of a nation-state does not take place on the head of a pin. It is not created only in space but also through space. In other words, the territory of a nation-state is not just an arena in which nation-state formation projects are unfolded but also a medium through which they are produced and implemented.

The Kemalist nation-state formation processes are no exception in this regard. I have shown in Chapter IV that from the very beginning the Kemalist regime was quite aware of the spatiality of nation-state formation and this fact played a central role in its policies. In what follows in this section, my objective is to discuss this spatial

shortcoming which is quite related to the former, is rather ideological in that there is a tendency to idealise the Kemalist project and explain the failures in a voluntarist manner with the individual mistakes. Contrary to this interpretation, I will show that there are structural along with strategic factors determining the fate of the Kemalist project towards Ankara.

awareness in the case of Ankara as the city that exhibits the most central element of this spatiality.

To begin with, it should be stated that if the Kemalist project towards the creation of a new Society should be studied with reference to the Ottoman past, the role and position of Ankara as the new capital needs to be studied with reference to the old capital Istanbul.

As is well-known, the opposition between Istanbul and Ankara (Anatolia) started with the denouncement of the authority of the Istanbul government by the Kemalist-led independence movement due to the collaboration of the former with the Allied forces. In turn, the Istanbul government outlawed the resistance movement and its leadership cadres, including Mustafa Kemal. This led the resistance movement to move to Anatolia, and to establish a *de facto* government there. Spatially speaking, starting from the beginning of the Independence War, there was a clear division between Istanbul and Anatolia (Ankara).

After the congresses held in Erzurum and Sivas with the participation of nascent Turkish merchants and large land-owning classes as main forces, the Grand National Assembly was formed which consisted mainly of the same groups established in Ankara in 1920. The location of the Independence Movement in Ankara was the first step of the process of Ankara's becoming the state capital.

The location of the headquarters of Independence Movement in Ankara was not an arbitrary decision. Despite its archaic physical structure, the city was centrally located in

Anatolia. Apart from this geographical advantage in terms of co-ordination and centralisation of the *ad hoc* regional resistance groups, Ankara had better communication and transportation networks with railway and telegram connection. The antagonism between the Istanbul government and Ankara reached its peak point after the gathering of the Great Assembly in Ankara.

When the war ended in 1923, the location of the new capital as well as the nature of the new regime were still question marks. With regard to the location of the capital, there were two options: restoration of the capital status of Istanbul, or creating a new capital in Ankara.

These two alternatives were nothing other than spatial expression of two conflicting projects. The conflict was between the intention of conservative groups to restore the old regime in Istanbul and the desire of the Kemalists to create a nation-state by making a radical break with the Ottoman past. In the view of Kemalists, going back to Istanbul was the first step towards restoration of the old regime.

Ironically, however, the main bulk of the independence movement was not in line with the Kemalist leadership in this respect. The Kemalists, in fact, had constituted a tiny minority within the movement. For the majority, represented mainly by the local notables and landlords as well as a newly rising native bourgeoisie, the main objective was to liberate the country from invasion and to restore the old order from which they once benefited considerably. Even if they gave consent to the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922, the religious authority of the Caliphate was not in question and around this authority, the majority of the independence movement, which was also majority in the first parliament, was expecting to gather after independence.

For the Kemalist circle on the other hand, Istanbul was the capital of the multi-national Ottoman empire and the seat of the Caliphate as the head of the Islamic World with which the Kemalists wanted to make a complete break. The British Ambassador to Istanbul reported the view of one of the Kemalist MPs in the Assembly in the following way:

'Jelal Nuri Bey [a Kemalist MP] concluded by stating that Constantinople had been the capital of the International Ottoman Empire while Angora was the capital of a free state' (From Hamderson to Foreign Office, E.10370/199/44-Pub. Rec. Off.).

For a Kemalist, Istanbul was the symbol of a corrupt Ottoman empire and identity. On the other hand, Ankara was going to be a clean slate for a fresh start for and symbol of the new, modern nation-state. Yet, Ankara was not contemplated only as a symbol of a new nation-state. It was, more importantly, going to be a laboratory where the Kemalist regime would create a new cultural identity and export it to the remaining sections of the society.

The Kemalist's insistence on Ankara, however, had more material reasons alongside the symbolic ones. Kemalists were well aware of the fact that the creation of a new Turkish identity and imagined community very much depended upon the penetration of the state into civil society. This was to a large extent lacking in the case of the Ottoman empire².

²As we saw in Chapter IV, there was little investment by the Ottoman state in the interior and eastern part of Anatolia. Almost all of the industrial investments and a considerable part of the transportation network was in the Western part of the country and the ever-increasing economic and political dominance of Istanbul was the main factor reproducing this unevenness.

Hence, as we partly saw in chapter III the transfer of the political centre could be a step to reverse this tendency. By doing this, the Kemalists were expecting also to reverse the alienation of the Anatolian population. That is, the Kemalist from the very beginning saw the city as a growth pole for the reversal of the backwardness of Anatolia, and this was one of the main themes during the assembly debates as to the transfer of the capital to Ankara. In the Assembly, according to a British High Commissioner, Kemalists had brought up this point as follows:

'They must resist and endure the mud of Angora in winter and its dust in summer in order to work for the welfare of Anatolia. Jelal Nuri Bey continued that, with Constantinople as capital, little thought was given to Anatolia, and instanced the construction of railways, not to meet local governments, but as a result of Anglo-German relations... From the economic point of view there was no need for the chief centre of trade of country to be the capital' (ibid).

In sum, the transfer of capital to Ankara was not only symbolic but was also a political and economic dimension of the nation-state formation project. By doing this the Kemalist regime was aiming to penetrate into the civil society.

Along with these political and ideological concerns, there was a more immediate political reason behind the Kemalists' insistence on Ankara. As we saw earlier Chapters, the Kemalists were a minority within the Independence Movement and had a tiny majority in the Assembly. Under these circumstances for the Kemalists, going back to Istanbul was political suicide and the first step of restoration of the old order. Thus, Ankara was the most strategic trench in which Kemalists were determined to fight against the conservative elements. Kemal and his narrow circle saw the transfer of capital from Istanbul to Ankara as a means of crushing the opposition and a first step towards the creation of a modern nation-state.

On the other hand, this was a difficult project, if not impossible. There was no faith in Ankara even within the Kemalist faction. Atay, a witness of this period and a close associate of Kemal, points to the belief, even within the Kemalist group, that Ankara was a transitory capital and that when the time came, they would return to Istanbul or, at least, to a more convenient place (Atay, 1968: 419)³.

It was not difficult to understand this lack of commitment to Ankara in the face of the dramatic differences between the two cities: Istanbul, with a population exceeding 870 000 by the end of the 18th century and with a cosmopolitan population was the economic and political as well as the cultural heartland of the Ottoman Empire. Ferdinand Brudel describes the Imperial Capital, Istanbul, in following way:

‘Istanbul was cast in the image of the immense Turkish Empire which was so rapidly created. The city as a whole developed at the same rate as the Empire. It numbered perhaps 80 000 inhabitant after the conquest in 1478; 400 000 between 1520 and 1535; 700 000 according to westerners at the end of the century; it foreshadowed the development of London and Paris in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries... Constantinople was not a town; it was an urban monster, a composite metropolis. Its site made it a divided city and this was the source both of its greatness and its difficulties, certainly of its greatness’ (Bruadel 1972; 252).

Increasing contact with the West during the *Tanzimat* period brought a European dimension to economic and cultural life. The first modern municipal organisation was set up in 1854 in the most cosmopolitan part of the city to provide the basic urban services. Urban services such as electricity, gas water supplies and a tramway were in service, at least in modern parts of the city. Thus at the beginning of 1920s, Istanbul was still incomparably magnificent, despite the adverse conditions of the war years.

Ankara, on the other hand, posed quite a different picture at the end of the War. As we will see below in detail, it had been a traditional town in Anatolia with a population never exceeding 30 000. Though the city was a relatively important mohair production and processing centre at the cross-section of caravan routes with a trade potential and first *sanjak*, - then a provincial centre in the Ottoman administrative system - the transfer of the surplus to the primate city Istanbul had not led the city to be urbanised. In this sense, in the late Ottoman period, the city had a poorly built environment and physical infrastructure. Furthermore, a major fire had destroyed a considerable part of the city.

When the centre of the Independence War moved to the city, it was, by no means, ready to host the newcomers. As I discuss in the next section, in the face of the acute housing crisis for the new groups as well as the 'archaic' social and cultural life led many of the Istanbul-originated élite to think of the city as a temporary shelter in the face of the war conditions. A prominent figure of the Kemalist regime portrays 1920s' Ankara in his memoir as follows:

'I do not think that a tiny backward Anatolian town of today is more archaic than Ankara of those days. Apart from the Assembly, there was no place to spend the day. The centre was so primitive that it was impossible to a decorate table with a set of plates and the same set of cutlery' (Atay 1968; 352).

Reluctance to accept Ankara as the new capital was not restricted to the Turkish groups. From the very beginning, almost all of the foreign countries started to make objections to having their embassies move from Istanbul to Ankara. Britain was the most reluctant

³ In fact, most of the members of Kemalist fraction were native Istanbulians and many of them had left their families when they joined the Independence cause. Even in 1927, the number of married men was

one among others. A Foreign Office communication revealed the reason for the impossibility of opening an embassy in Ankara due to the archaic physical and social infrastructure of the city. In a letter written to the French and Italian ambassadors by the British Foreign Minister, Lord Curzon, after asking what strategy was going to be followed in case of such a relocation, he emphasised that:

'It will probably be thought desirable in any case that the diplomatic missions shall remain at Constantinople rather than at Angora, where local conditions will render it practically impossible, at any rate for some time to come, for the Diplomatic Corps to reside with any degree of dignity or comfort' (F. O. 371/9163/E. 7948/7734/44).

Except for the Soviet Union, most of the foreign countries took a similar position against the decision to transfer the capital to Ankara. Of course, there was some truth in the reluctance of foreign embassies against Ankara due to the archaic conditions of Ankara. But to a large extent, there was also a suspicion against the Kemalists and their intentions. The restoration of the old order would have been more preferable for the Western countries.

Despite the opposition coming from different quarters, the Kemalist group was determined to make Ankara the permanent capital of the country. Mustafa Kemal's close associate, Ismet Inonu initiated the process which led to the declaration of Ankara as the new capital:

'The outstanding event of the past week has been the acceptance by the Grand National Assembly of a motion submitted by Ismet Pasha for the inclusion in the Constitutional Charter of a special clause fixing Angora as the seat of the Government of the new Turkey. After having been fully discussed in committee and secret party meetings, the draft clause was finally submitted at a plenary session of the Assembly on the 13th instant. Few voices were raised in favour of Constantinople, and the speakers who did so were subjected to frequent interruption. The debate was therefore brought to a speedy conclusion, and though some twenty Deputies abstained from voting, the motion was accepted by a large majority' (From Handerson to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Public Record Office, London, E. 10368/199/44).

more than married women in Ankara (Population Census of 1927).

Thus, Ankara was proclaimed as the new capital of the new Turkey on 13th November, 1923. The same correspondence also notes that the Assembly's decision was welcomed and greeted in the new capital with scenes of great rejoicing. However, it is claimed, these scenes and the acceptance of the majority were misleading:

'It may, however, be noted as one more proof of the control still exercised by Mustafa Kemal over the present Assembly, that at the close of the sitting one of the Deputies who had disclosed himself opposed to the return of the capital to Constantinople is reported in the press as having announced that at heart everyone was in favour of the former capital, but that they had to conform to the decision taken at the secret party meeting' (ibid, p.62).

The correspondence also reports the closer control and repression over the leaders of the opposition during this process:

'Although undoubtedly growing bolder, the opposition groups are, however, still walking with considerable worries. Reouf Bey... is at present the guest of Refet Pasha. Both are stated to be closely watched by government agents. Nevertheless, Reouf is reported to be about to proceed to Angora... He has abstained from making any public declaration' (ibid, p.62).

Whatever method they used, the proclamation of Ankara as the new seat of the government was a boost to the morale of Kemalists and blow to that of conservatives, and a historical point marking the irreversible change in the balance of power in favour of Kemalists. It also opened the way for the Kemalists to create a "modern" nation-state.

This review has shown that for the Kemalist regime, Ankara was a pivotal element in the new society the Kemalist project aimed to create. This was a modern, secular, Western-looking society. Ankara was not simply a symbol of this society. The city at its very heart along with being a symbol of the new regime and its aspirations as the new

capital, was seen as a model for the new society. For the Kemalist project the city was an arena where its project would produce and unfold.

This was partly due to the fact that the Kemalists' control was limited to the higher levels of the state apparatus. In the lower levels of the state apparatus as well as in the society, support for the Kemalist project was very limited⁴. Being aware of this fact, the Kemalist regime started to apply a top-down perspective which sought to conquer the society with an avant-guard strategy. Ankara was important in that sense. By concentrating its limited power, the regime was going to create a model society in this city, and then the same model was going to be exported to the rest of the society within time. In this sense, the success of the city was very vital for the success of the regime and its society project⁵. Thus the city was reflecting all the main features of the Kemalist nation-state project. In this sense apart from its use value as the capital where republican regime function through public offices etc., the city had a *identity value* in the production of a new society by being a model of it.

The problem however was that the society project of the Kemalist élite was very different from the existing social and spatial structure of the city. Ankara was a city with a Muslim population and traditional way of life matching the Ottoman way of life

⁴This is a very common situation in post(semi)colonial societies where similar modernisation and westernisation strategies were put into implementation by the political élite. For India, for instance, see (Kaviraj;1991).

⁵Ankara did not represent a model for the urbanisation of the rest of the country. As a laboratory, it aimed to create models for the whole country on even non -urban issues. For instance, Mustafa Kemal had bought land just outside the city to establish a model farm to introduce modern techniques and methods to the Turkish farmers.

rather than a western and modern one as the Kemalist élite contemplated to create. Likewise, the built environment in the old town part showed a village characteristic rather than a modern western city. In other words, there was a considerable gap between the Kemalist imagination and the realities of the city. The *social and spatial base* of the city did not match the one proposed by the Kemalist project towards the city. In order to understand the contradictions and problems the Kemalist regime faced in the following periods it is necessary to look at the historical evolution of the city.

V. III. Ankara as a Small Anatolian Town: Historical Background

It has become clear in the previous section that the refusal of Istanbul as a part of Ottoman heritage was the main reason in Ankara's becoming the capital of the new republic. That is, Istanbul was identified with the Ottoman and partly with Islam as the centre of Caliphship, whereas Anatolia was seen as the territory of the Turkish identity and victim of the Ottoman political centre in Istanbul. Thus, this section also sets out to question this assumption of the Kemalist élite with reference to Ankara.

There is no precise information as to when Ankara first emerged as an Anatolian city. The existing evidence however suggests that the city was established around 20th century BC by the Hittites and since then, unlike many other Anatolian cities, Ankara

has been continuously inhabited. After the Hittites, the city was controlled by Lydians and Galatians, for whom the city served as the capital for a short period⁶.


The city was taken over by the Romans during the first century BC, and enjoyed considerable prosperity as a trade and military centre (Figure V. I). In the prosperous periods it is believed that the population of the city exceeded 100 000. However, after the 3rd century BC, the city started to fluctuate with the decline of the empire and never recaptured the prosperity it had once enjoyed.

The city fell under the control of the Selcuks in the 11th century and the Ottomans in the 14th century. During the Ottoman period, the city became a provincial centre. Due to its strategic location, the city also preserved its trade-centre function. Around 30 boarding houses and inns existed in the city during the 16th and 17th centuries showing the importance of the function of the city as a regional centre. Mohair production and processing were also important to the economy of the city. At the beginning of the 17th century the population of the city was around 30 000 (Akcura 1970).

The decline of the empire during the 17th century and the shift of trade routes towards the oceans affected the city adversely, but the city did not decline like many other Anatolian cities, thanks to mohair production and export. The population of the city at the beginning of the 19th century was still over 30 000 (Akture 1978). Yet, the trade

⁶It is worth noting that during the 1930s, the official historical doctrine attempted to impose the view that the early roots of the "Turkish race" goes back to the Hittites and other early civilisations. This was a conscious attempt to dissect the relationship between Turks and Ottomans as well as to create a territorial identity and belonging to the Anatolian population. For a detailed elaboration see Kushner (1977).

Figure V. I. Roman Road System During the II-III Centuries



Source: Akcura, 1970

agreement of 1838, which lifted protective measures on domestic production, made a devastating effect on mohair production in the hinterland of the city. However, the city managed to survive and at the end of the century its population was still around 30 000.

However, the already stagnating economy of the city was gravely hit by the adverse conditions of World War I. While the city tried to survive the negative conditions of the war years, the final cut came from a big fire which wiped out a considerable part of the housing stock of the city. Thus at the beginning of the 1920s, Ankara was a city with a population which had fallen to 20 000 and a shrinking economy (Akcura 1970).

Before turning to the Independence War years of Ankara, it is necessary to look at its social and ethnic structure in order to understand the social basis of the Kemalist project. It is a well-known fact that the so-called 'Turkification and Islamisation process' started in Asia Minor in the 11th century and by the end of 13th century, almost all of Asia Minor was controlled by Turks, and the majority of Asia Minor's population was Muslim (Wagstaff 1985;186-8). However, this process did not eliminate other nationalities and ethnic groups. Throughout the Ottoman period, the non-Muslim minorities comprised an important part of the population. In many Anatolian cities minorities constituted a quarter of the population.

Ankara was no exception to this trend. The city had a very cosmopolitan ethnic population structure until the end of the Ottoman period. During the 19th century a third

of Ankara's population was constituted by non-Muslim minorities which mainly consisted of Jews, Armenians, and Greeks (Denel 1981;132).

According to British counsellor Bernham, at the end of the 19th century, in the economic life of the city there was a clear division of labour among ethnic groups: the Muslim groups were mainly in the agricultural sector and traditional craft business while the Greeks and Armenians held control of trade and prestigious professions such as lawyers and doctors. A similar description is given for the early twentieth century by Vehbi Koc⁷ in his memoir as follows:

'The population of Ankara consisted mostly of Moslem Turks, with Christian and Jewish minorities. The Christians worked hard, made a good living, ate well, dressed well and had pleasant houses. They kept their holidays on Sundays. Before the declaration of the Republic, The Christians were not drafted into the army, but paid a tax instead. Because of this exemption they had an advantage in business. The Turks were mostly hodjas, grocers, night watchmen and shopkeepers.....The only tradesmen in Ankara at that time were the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. The Moslem Turks, although they were the real rulers of the country, were usually the employees of these three minorities, and generally led simple lives. The best homes, shops and summer houses belonged to the non-Moslems. On Sundays they strolled about dressed in fine clothes, ate and drank well, and enjoyed themselves. In the spring and fall the main streets of Ankara thronged with well-dressed Christian and Jewish families (Koc 1991;6)

These minorities were also dominant in the cultural and educational life of the city. It is possible to see the centrality of the minority groups in the administrative apparatus of the city. In the regional and local councils of the city the minorities held half of the council seats. For instance, three members of the local council out of six were non-Muslim in 1872 (Denel 1984;133). Given the fact that economic power and property ownership were important in becoming a member of the council, this representation

⁷Vehbi Koc is an important name as a native member of the city. Starting with small-scale trade he has become the biggest industrialist of Republican Turkey. As I will discuss later, the contracts he undertook during the construction of Ankara are an important source of his initial accumulation.

structure also shows the dominance of the non-Muslim groups in the economic life of the city.

The ethnic and economic structures of the city found their reflection in urban space. In the first place, the neighbourhoods were divided from each other on the basis of ethnic identity and named on this basis. Wealth also found its expression in the housing type and quality. The wealthy minorities lived in better houses and almost all of them had houses outside the city. There were more than 2000 summer houses outside the city which were used as second houses. The wealthy section of the Muslim population also had houses outside the city:

'Coraklik was inhabited by Moslem families like our own, whereas Kecioren, a little further away, was inhabited by Catholics and Armenians. Their well-kept orchards and fine houses and gardens were much admired. The rich Christians spent the summer in Kecioren, Etlik, or Cankaya. Only the Jews did not move to summer houses' (ibid.p.10)

Yet during the war years this structure of the city underwent a radical change. While the long war led to a stagnant economic life in the city, the adverse conditions of the war years for the minorities, as in many other cities, resulted in the forced emigration of the minority population from the city. As I mentioned before, the minorities constituted more than a quarter of the city's population. In the first population census of the republican period, the minorities constituted three per cent of the city population. In this sense, the city lost the most wealthy section of its population.

As in many other cities however, in Ankara too, the local Muslim élite started to take over the business as well as property left by the minorities. Thus, despite all the adverse

conditions of the war years, the Muslim merchant class in Ankara benefited from the War unlike other groups.

Despite the fact that the local Muslim élite benefited from the departure of the minorities, the impact of the war years was very obvious on the economy and built environment of the city, when the headquarters of the Independence Movement started to arrive in the city.

V. IV. Towards a Dual City: Independence War Years

A new period started in the city's history with the move of the headquarters of the independence movement during the last days of 1919. The political and military leadership cadres of the movement started to settle in the city. The population influx was further boosted with the decision to gather the national assembly in the city in April 1920. The provincial representatives from all over the country started to pour into the city. The social and demographic structures of the city underwent a dramatic change in a very short time. One of the striking features of the newly emerging social structure was a duality between the native population and the new-comers.

Ankara at the beginning of the 1920s neither socially nor spatially was ready to accommodate the newly arriving population. The housing stock was very limited and a considerable part of it was destroyed by a big fire before the arrival of the independence movement. Thus a housing crises was inevitable with the first arrivals. The housing

problem was handled in two different ways. Some of the new groups started to settle in summer cottages outside the city. This group was the more higher circle of the movement and Kemal himself was among them. He chose his residence in the southern outskirts of the city. The majority, on the other hand, settled in the existing housing stock by renting single rooms from the natives. In the face of the difficult living conditions in the city, most of the newcomers did not bring their families.

The urban poor of the city was very cautious about the changes the city started to undergo with the move of the headquarters of the Independence Movement. As many of the leading names of the Kemalist fraction wrote later in their memoirs, from the very beginning the poor section of the local population was not happy with the settlement of the headquarters of the Independence Movement and with the subsequent settlement of the new regime in the city⁸. One of the leading members of the Kemalist fraction spelled out the dismay of the local population in his memoirs as follows:

'The native population was not happy with the state's staying in the city. They thought that life was going to be very expensive and they were going to be swallowed up among the population pouring into the city' (Atay 1968;352).

⁸ The social relations between newcomers and the native population was more complicated. Before discussing this however, it is necessary to challenge the myth that the population of Ankara overwhelmingly supported the independence movement and welcomed the settlement of the headquarters of the independence movement in the city and its further staying. In the previous section, I have shown that the driving forces behind the independence movement was the alliance of Muslim merchant capital, a section of the Ottoman political and military élite and the big landlords. It is not difficult to understand the support given by this group to the Ottoman political élite given the fact that during the war years they appropriated considerable wealth by taking over the businesses and properties of the minority groups. In Ankara too, there was a similar situation and the local élite rather than the whole city, as it was claimed, gave support to the independence war. Akyuz (1981) makes a bold statement that Ankara supported the independence movement and the war against the Western Allies. The evidence she provides however shows that the support came from the local élite. There is no evidence, on the other hand that there was a similar feeling among the local population.

Furthermore, the move of the large section of the new-comers to the inner city intensified the cultural confrontation between two groups. The confrontation between them became a subject for the novels of this period. Karaosmanoglu, another leading member of the Kemalist intelligentsia, gave a vivid picture of this confrontation on a neighbourhood basis between a republican bureaucrat and his wife who came from Istanbul and the local population because of cultural differences⁹.

Yet, the dismay and uneasiness was not one directional. From the very beginning it is possible to observe the exclusion of the native population by the republican élite and vice versa:

'The natives called us foreign and would not join us. I wanted to buy a piece of land from a local. He took me to his land around Cankaya. I did not understand anything about what he said about the border and trees in the land plot. Dialect and accent were so different between us' (Atay 1968;352).

The cultural values and life style of these two groups were so different that the sociable interaction between them was almost non-existent. Thus, as soon as the republican élite arrived at the city, it started to create its own space. There were particular coffee-houses, restaurants and other social facilities which were taken over by the new groups. The social gatherings of the republican élite were entirely among the members of this group with few exceptions. The native population was to watch this new way of life as outsiders:

'We weren't even saluting each other since those who were in the street or who met in the municipal garden or in the restaurant were the same people. We were missing the days where we could socialise.

⁹The wife of the idealist bureaucrat had found the living conditions and surrounding environment unbearable and unhygienic while the locals were annoyed by their life style. As a result of this conflict the locals had wanted them to leave the neighbourhood. The novel reflects the feelings and observation of the writer as one of the leading names of the Kemalist intelligence of the period.

There was no place apart from garden of the Assembly to spend the day, and we fancied of being invited to the residence of Mustafa Kemal. If we were not invited, we would meet in a corner of the restaurant where we could drink' (Atay 1968;352).

I will argue in this section that while at a national level the regime defined the role and future of the city on the basis of its contradiction with the old regime in Istanbul, at the city level the future of the city was, to a large extent, defined with reference to the conflict between the natives and new residents of the city. In other words, my point of departure in this section is the view that at the city level the "other" of the Kemalist project towards the city was its native residents. Thus, it is crucial to examine the relationship between them to understand the future development of the city. However, it is necessary to identify the internal structure of the two populations since neither was homogenous in terms of their economic, political, and cultural backgrounds.

As far as the native population is concerned, as I have already discussed the majority of the urban population was constituted by Muslim-Turks, and the bulk of the this population was in the agricultural and craft and petty production sectors. After the induced departure of the minority groups, control of trade passed to the relatively rich Muslim. There were however still a tiny and relatively well-off minority group in the city.

The new population, which started to pour into city after the head quarters of the Independence Movement moved to the city and culminated when the city became the capital of the new republic, was not a homogenous group. As we saw earlier, the main force behind the Independence Movement was an alliance of Muslim merchant capital.

big landlords and a dissident section of the Ottoman political and military élite under the leadership of the Kemalist fraction. In terms of political and cultural/ideological commitments, there were no big similarities among this group. Apart from the Kemalist fraction and a tiny section of the Ottoman political élite, there was no strong commitment to westernisation and modernisation associated with secular values. In contrast, most of the representatives who came from Anatolia were in the hope of the restoration of the old regime and strongly committed to Islam. The important point is however, that the Kemalist fraction eliminated these groups from the corridors of political power and dominated the state apparatus. As I will discuss despite the fact that the Kemalist fraction was a tiny minority, it was able to dominate the state apparatuses by largely using anti-democratic means. The commitment of this group to Western, modern, and secular values and life style was quite contradictory with those of the native population as well as remaining part of the political élite which came to the city after 1920 from different sections of Anatolia.

In this cultural and political context, it is possible to identify four main groups in relation to the local politics: (i) the Kemalist/modernist section of the state élite; (ii) the traditional and conservative section of the state élite; (iii) the land-owner local élite; (iv) the remaining part of the local population

At the cultural level the conflict and contradiction was between the modernist section of the state élite and the other three groups. In fact this conflict was nothing other than a localisation of the conflicts between the Kemalist regime, which was an avant-garde of

the westernisation and secularisation project, and a large section of the Anatolian population which was non-secular and traditional. That is Kemalism was once again facing the same problem. That is, the social base in the city was not keen to be changed in the direction of westernisation and secularisation. The anti-religious attitudes of the Kemalist regime were the main sources of conflict.

Yet the contradictions between the regime and local population was more dramatic than appeared at the national level. The contrast between the new élite of the city and native population in terms of life style was much more common place and concrete than any other place since the new élite and the local population were sharing the same city.

V. V. Two Cities Project

As we saw earlier, even for the majority of the Kemalists, Ankara was a temporary refuge to carry out the Independence War. When it ended, the dominant view was to return to Istanbul. These hopes were dashed with the insistence of the narrow circle of the Kemalist élite on Ankara as the new capital. With the proclamation of the city as the new capital, every section of the republican élite had to consider their situation within this new situation.

This rethinking was very much dependent on rethinking the development perspective of the city itself. First of all, the city had become the capital of the new republic and this function was going to place important loads on the city. Most of the public offices were

functioning in unsuitable places such as schools and houses. Given their permanence in the city now, they needed suitable places. Besides, as we discussed above, the city now was both a symbol of the new regime and a model of a society-in-the-making. The state of the city was far from reflecting these ideals. Furthermore, the state élite including the Members of Parliament accepted these conditions with the thought of the temporality of the circumstances. Now permanently in the city, they wanted to settle in decent houses and brought their families. Further, with the determination of the city as the capital of the new republic boosted the migration into the city. The population of the city started to increase in an unprecedented scale (See Table V. I)

Table V.I. Population of Ankara between 1927-1950

<i>Years</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>
1927			74 553
1935	74 809	47 911	122 720
1940	90 953	66 289	157 242
1945	137 058	89 654	226 712
1950	174 964	114 233	289 197

Source: Development Committee Report, 1954, p.51

In this sense, the transformation of the city was inevitable. Yet, the direction of this transformation was not clear. There were two clear alternatives: the improvement of the existing town with the renewal and reconstruction of the areas destroyed by fire and the directing of further developments around the existing town, or leaving the old town and building a new one for the new regime and newcomers. The first option was to think of Ankara as a city by integrating the new developments with the old town. The second one was a two-cities project contemplating two different cities side by side.

The cultural collision between the traditional section of the native population and the modernist section of the new comers was an important input to this decision. The experience of the Independence War years had shown that the gap between these groups was quite big. The establishment of the new town for the republican élite was more tempting than staying in the existing town. But this choice was not without its own problems. In the first place, as we saw above, the Kemalist regime declared its disdain for its neglect of Anatolia, and the declaration of Ankara was shown as a sign of the defence of Anatolia. For this reason, leaving old Ankara to its own destiny was nothing other than repeating the same kind of attitude the Kemalist criticised. On the other hand, establishing a modern city standing for the image of the new regime was much easier.

There was another input to the decision to be made between these two alternatives. The land prices had increased in the old town with the arrival of the Independence movement in Ankara and had shot up with the proclamation of the city as the new capital (See Table V.II). Those who foresaw the future started to buy land. Given the high land prices in the old town, they were buying land in the area between the old town and Mustafa Kemal's residence in Cankaya.

Table V. II. Land Prices in Ankara

Year	Land Price Index	Wholesale Commodity Price Index
1924	2	21
1953	100	100
1969	1855	299

Source; Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement; quoted in Marcussen (1982)

Thus, at the economic level, the main conflict was about the distribution of rent which derived from the unprecedented growth the city underwent. Naturally, when the new state élite moved into the city, the native population had a monopoly of ownership of urban land. Under these conditions, the question was who would appropriate the rent resulting from the development of the city. While ownership of the urban land by the native population was providing it with an advantage in the appropriation of the values in the city, the state élite had the advantage of being in control of the state apparatus which was able to direct the pattern of urban development. Thus, given these relative advantages of the two groups, the sources of the economic conflict between the state élite and landed section of the local population was the appropriation and distribution of the urban rents in a fast-growing city.

In the end, these tensions and contradictions, which are rooted in the differentiation of cultural and ideological values and economic interests, resulted in the creation of a dual city. That is, as I will discuss below in detail, the Kemalist regime preferred to build a new city that was not very much related to the old one, and in the following periods, to a large extent, the development of the city was determined by the two-cities project of the Kemalist regime¹⁰. Thus. The social duality between the traditional and modern sections during the Independence war years, started to find its expression in urban space after the

¹⁰In the emergence of this dualism one of the first and most decisive moments was Mustafa Kemal's decision to live in a house outside the city. Following him, many of the leadership cadres were to find their accommodation outside the city. Initially these decision might be seen as the result of the lack of accommodation available in the city. However, by staying permanently outside the city Kemal was to strengthen the dualism between the two groups and latter developments were to show that Kemal's

proclamation of the city as the new capital. In what follows in this chapter I will examine the development and fate of this two cities project.

In sum, the society project of the Kemalist élite was very different from the existing social and spatial structure of the city. Ankara was a city with a Muslim population and a traditional way of life matching the Ottoman way of life rather than a western and modern one as the Kemalist élite contemplated to create. Likewise the built environment in the old town part showed a village characteristic rather than a modern western city. Once again the Kemalist regime came to a point of denial of reality in favour of an imagined city. The denial had however another rationale. As we shall see later, in and through the imagined city the republican élite could take the lions share from the development rather than giving it to the local landowners. Thus, the two-nations project of the Kemalism at national level turned to be a two-cities project at the city level.

In what follows in this section I will show the emergence and development of the two cities project in the city's space from a historical perspective by concentrating on state strategies - the forms of representation, intervention and internal organisation of the state apparatus with regard to the development of the city during this period.

In the formation of this duality through the two-cities project, state strategies played a central role by allowing certain interests, represented in local politics, which intervened upon development through the planning and reorganising of the local government

decision to live outside the existing city was not an accident but a conscious decision. The new élite was aiming to create its own space outside the existing city.

structure. In line with these strategies, I will analyse the Kemalist project in its three different phases: a period of eclecticism and pragmatism: 1923-1928; planned development:1928-38; the return of eclecticism and the collapse of the Kemalist project:1938-50. I will analyse the development of the city in the context of the Kemalist project by following these stages.

V. V. I. A Period of Eclecticism and Pragmatism:1923-28

It is a well-known fact that in the period of political and economic restructuring in most underdeveloped countries it is not uncommon for leaders to relocate the capital city as a sign of a break with the past. Capital cities like Brasilia, Chandigarh, and St Petersburg are the products of these kinds of developments. Despite its similarity to these cities on this point, the Ankara experience departs from the others in two respects. Firstly, it was not a clean slate in the sense that there was a pre-existing city to take into consideration. Secondly, when the city became the capital, there was no comprehensive plan to follow in the development of the city. Instead, the development of the city was dominated by an eclectic and pragmatic approach especially in the early years.

The pragmatism and eclecticism of the early years can be partly explained by the fact that in the wake of a long war, there was no sufficient financial and technical resources which could be devoted to the city for such a massive development.

There were, however, further and probably more important ideological and material reasons behind this pragmatism and eclecticism. In the first place, as discussed in the preceding section, the Kemalist regime was highly committed to liberalism, and an ideology which had no affinity with planning. Given this ideological outlook, it would be unrealistic to expect the Kemalist regime to approach the city with a holistic perspective which put planning in front of the market. This does not mean, on the other hand, that there was non-involvement of the state in the development of the city. As one of the native residents of the city put it in 1923, 'Ankara was a city of non-availables ... There was no road, no telephone, no bricks, no builder. When the first car came to the city, everybody went to station to see it'(Koc 1980). For this reason, there was a need for active involvement of the state in the development of the city. The point is that, in the early years, this intervention was very *ad hoc* and lacked a long-term perspective

In the first place, there was not a proper local government organisation to solve the problems of this underdeveloped city. There was a municipality. Yet it was not able to carry out the duties which are required of a capital city. The first important step in the development of the city was taken with the establishment of a new local government structure (*Sehremaneti*) in 1924.

As a matter of fact, the model for the new local administration (*Sehremaneti*) was borrowed from Istanbul. During the Ottoman period Istanbul had a local government that was responsible for the provision of collective services and infrastructure. This had

a special status which did not exist in other cities¹¹. Although the Kemalists' relentlessly criticised the Ottoman period with regard to the privileges given to Istanbul at the expense of rest of the country¹², the new regime was to choose the same strategy by privileging Ankara with a special administration.

In the establishment of the Ankara *Sehremaneti*, the republican regime followed a more centralising strategy than followed in Istanbul during the Ottoman period. In the case of the Istanbul *Sehremaneti*, there was a mayor appointed by the central government and a municipal council whose members were elected among the members of the local community who owned property and paid a certain amount of tax. In the case of Ankara, while the mayor was still appointed by the central government, the rules for council membership were changed. A property ownership criterion would have meant the exclusion of the republican élite from membership of the council since most of it did not yet own property in the city and would have led to the absolute dominance of the native property owners. Thus by not applying this rule the regime solved this problem and instead the centre appointed twenty-four members of the council. Thus, by eliminating the native property owners from the city administration, the republican élite was not

¹¹The local governments and councils outside Istanbul were mainly responsible for the collection of the taxes rather than the provision of urban services. The latter area was left largely to voluntary organisations (*vakif*) and foundations. See Tekeli (1981) and Ortayli (1978) on the local government structure of the Ottoman empire.

¹²As a matter of fact, when the special bill was brought to the Assembly, there was another bill in the Assembly regarding the establishment of the local government in all towns and cities. The opposition challenged the special status given to Ankara and unsuccessfully attempted to legislate the establishment of the local government in Ankara together with the other cities. Eventually, this attempt failed and while the Ankara *Sehremaneti* was established in 1924, The legislation of the other bill regarding the establishment of the local government was postponed until 1930.

only able to control the local government but also to take control of city's development pattern.

The *Sehremaneti* was established immediately after the relevant law was passed, and after a few month the mayor of Istanbul was appointed to Ankara as the new mayor of the city. With the establishment of the municipal administration, the construction and infrastructure works gained pace in the city and the dominance of the republican élite became more apparent.

The early attempts of the municipality in relation to construction of the city involved the establishment of plants for the production of building materials such as timber, bricks and cement as well as gas storage and bread production plants. There were, however, two-large scale problems awaiting immediate attention of the municipality. Firstly, there was an urgent need for public buildings to fulfil the functions of a capital city. Most of the ministries and public offices either did not have any buildings or were accommodated in temporary buildings which were not suitable for the purpose. Secondly, there was an acute housing problem for the republican politicians and bureaucrats. The agenda of the political regime was determined by these two issues in the city in the early years.

The most important action of the municipality with regard to these two problems was the compulsory purchases of 4 000 000 m² urban land for the future development of the

city. I will analyse this purchase in detail since it is one of the most important decisions in the development of the city.

As I pointed out earlier there was a sharp conflict between native property-owners and the republican élite regarding the development perspective of the city on the basis of the appropriation of the exchange values which would arise from it. Not surprisingly, local property-owners were in favour of a development within and around the existing city. The new élite, who came to the city after 1920, did not own property within the city. They started, however, to buy land outside the city, especially in the southern outskirts of the city, after Mustafa Kemal choose this area for his residence, as did most of the republican élite. Hence, for this group, the development of the city outside the existing built area of the city was vital to appropriate the speculative values that would stem from the rapid development of the city.

In 1924, the government introduced a bill to the Assembly to provide a legal base for this purchase. The debate that took place in the Assembly during the discussion of the bill is interesting in two regards. First, it shows the governments intention to set up a new town outside the old one. The government view on the establishment of a new town was expressed in the following way:

'The ministry of Interior had to make a choice between the improvement and development of old town and establishment of a new town and finds the second option more viable and rational in the face of difficulties in the implementation of the first option as well as the great expense of developing the old town. Currently, the state of the streets and their length were in such a unsuitable situation that their repair would cost much more than the cost of building a new town... The land prices shot up in such a rate that, in the centre of the old town a square meter of land was around 100 TL. Besides, it is impossible to renew the old town as it would lead to a massive housing crisis.. In civilised countries, the dominant strategy is always to develop a new town by using modern techniques around the old town and improve the old one in due course' (Assembly Minutes, Vol. 15; translated by Keles and Yavuz (1974)).

As it can be understood from the discussion, there was a strong opposition to the government view. They were against the establishment of a new town at the expense of the old town. Instead, they were proposing to develop the old town. One of the MPs put the issue in the following way:

'The most convenient policy for Ankara is to improve the old town, to make it more habitable. We cannot leave such a big town aside for the sake of couple of hundred houses. This does not fit our realities. We have a very tight budget and the municipality almost does not have a budget. We try to develop the city by lending money to the municipality. For this reason, I do not find it reasonable to give this money for a project proposing development outside the existing town' (ibid. p.265).

According to the bill, the Municipality was entitled to subject an area, which is between the old town and Mustafa Kemal's residence in Cankaya, to compulsory purchase by paying the owners fifteen-times more than the declared tax value of their land in 1915.

The point was that the market value of this land was much higher than the amount proposed in the bill. This was defended by the government in the Assembly in the following way:

'in none of the civilised societies are big increases in urban land values (due to social and natural reasons) handed over to the owners. These values would belong to the locality or whole society. In such cases, most of the governments either increase the existing taxes on land, either eight or ten-times, or subject the land in question to compulsory purchase to sell it later on from higher prices or give it for long term-lease' (ibid p. 260).

The massive compulsory purchase of land made in 1924 by the municipality between the existing built area of the city and Kemal's residence was a turning point in the balance of between local property-owners and the Republican élite in terms of the development perspective of the city. The purchase favoured the latter group and showed that Ankara's future was lying outside the existent city at the expense of local land-owners (See Figure V. II).

The compulsory purchase realised by the municipality had important features in terms of the appropriation of the exchange values created by rapid development. In the first place, the way in which the compulsory purchase took place was important. According to the Constitution of 1924, the payment for the land subject to compulsory purchase was to be made on the basis of its real value and payment should have been made immediately. In the compulsory purchase of 4 000 000 m² of land there were important deviations from this regulation. In the first place, the municipality made the purchase on the basis of the tax value of the land rather than the real value. In this way, the cost of the land to the municipality was a fraction of its real value. However, the most controversial aspect of the purchase was that it was to be used to built houses for sale. According to municipal law, housing construction was not among the compulsory duties of the municipality (Tankut 1990:34)¹³.

Immediately after the compulsory purchase, the municipality initiated a planning activity and asked a foreign architect to prepare two plans, one for the old town and one for the new development area which was to be called later "New Town." The plan prepared by Lorchler for the old town was rejected by the municipal council on the basis of 'its inapplicability', and the other one prepared for the new town, which was mainly

¹³As a matter of fact, although there was an acute housing crisis for the new republican bureaucracy in the city, apart from this very limited experience, in line with the liberal ideology of the early years there was no housing project undertaken by the municipality for this group. While housing production was left to individual initiatives, for those section of the civil servants who were living in rented accommodation, the regime preferred to pay housing allowance (Senyapili 1985; Tekeli 1979).

limited to a housing project, was put into effect immediately¹⁴. The houses constructed within this project were for sale by the municipality to the mainly new population of the city. The remaining area of land acquired by the municipality was to be transferred to the new élite through auctions. It was quite often possible to see auction announcements in the newspapers (for and example see *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* 27 May 1929)¹⁵. In the end the land which was taken from the local landowners at well below its market value on the basis of public interest was to be transferred to the new élite of the city. Atay summarises this process as follows:

‘A German came to set up the nuclei of the new town. Yet this district was an area where only rich could effort to buy a house. Until Saracoglu apartments were built low and middle income civil servants lived in poor houses. I knew a mathematics teacher who lived in one room with two children, wife and mother-in-law. On the other hand the new town had filled with apartments and villas in a short time’ (Atay 1968;421)

The main defence advanced to justify the development of the city outside the "old town" was the high level of land prices. Indeed, after the move of the republican élite in Ankara and especially with the realisation of the fact that the city was about to become the permanent capital of the new republic, land prices in the old town shot up rapidly (see Table V. III)¹⁶. Thus it was claimed that shifting the development of the city from the old city to new area would curb land speculation, and lower land prices. The Lochler plan was prepared to provide cheap houses for the new-comers. Yet, with the plan, land

¹⁴ It is quite likely that the planner asked to prepare a plan for the old one as well in order to avoid the charge of neglect of the old town. Then, on the basis of technical problems the plan was not applied to the old town.

¹⁵ The municipality had continued to sell the land plots acquired through the compulsory purchase after 1930 after this policy was reversed as I will discuss later. In the *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (18 March 1932), for instance, the municipality was organising an auction to sell eight land plots in the new city part.

¹⁶ Table V.III. provides the figure for the end of the period. It is worth nothing that even after the shifting emphasis towards the new town, the land prices in the central areas of the old town continued to be very high.

speculation became worst than before. Atay points to this development in the following way;

‘We immediately indulged in land speculation. Everybody was so keen to buy a land plot to keep and then sell in the future. We were not in a state of mind to think that land speculation was the main enemy of the development of cities’ (Atay 1968).

While those pursued their own private interest in the city by conceiving it around exchange value, the local government also had become a tool of these interests. It was clear that there was no clear long-term policy to create a city which fit the image of the society the Kemalist regime declared to create. When these short-term interests were overcome in favour of a common good, in the lack of a long-term plan and perspective, these policies were *ad hoc* based on individual initiatives. For instance, In 1925, Mustafa Kemal, with his own money, bought 20 000 hectare of land in the West of the city to establish a farm to form a model of modern farming, as well as a leisure centre for the city. Yet, this initiative, like many others, was not a part of a holistic view on the development of the city.

Meanwhile, in the lack of a comprehensive development plan for the city and a determinate authority, the development of the city was controlled by speculation-oriented initiatives. In all parts of the city, but especially in the new town part, there were uncontrolled developments. Likewise, the land prices were shooting up to such an extent that especially low-ranking civil servants were not able to afford buying a house.

Table V.III. Land Prices in Ankara (1953)

OLD TOWN		Price TL/m ²	NEW TOWN		Price TL/m ²
1. Ulus			6. Sıhhiye		
On Anafartalar Street		1500-2500	Vicinity of Ataturk Boulv.		60
Inner Sections		800-1300	Between Sarar Primary Sch.		40
On Bankalar Street		1500-2000	Between Refik Saydam		40
Inner Sections		800-1000	7. Bakanliklar		
On Cankiri Street		800-1000	Between Cankaya on the Blv.		200-500
On Istasyon Street		500-1000	Vicinity of the New Nat. Assembly		50
2. Cıkrıkıclar Yokusu			Guvencvleri Casino Section		40
On the Road		60-80	8. Yenisehir		
Inner Sections		30-40	Kızılai and Ataturk Boulevard		800-1000
On the Hisar Road		60-100	On Ziya Gokalp Street		200
Inner Sections		50-80	Mithatpasa Street		100
On the Karaoglan Str.		1000-1500	Between Kızılai and Bakanliklar		300-500
Inner Sections		500-800	Inner Sections		40
3. Samanpazari Section			9. Cankaya		
Central Section		500-800	On the Asphalt		60-100
Behind Fortress		200-500	Inner Sections		30
Between Adliye on the Str.		800-1000	Between 14 Mayıs District		20
Inner Sections		40-60	Between Kucukesat		15-20
Vicinity of Fortress		30-50	Kavaklıdere District		20
Inner Fortress		10-15.20	Kavaklıdere on the Boulevard		30
4. Bentderesi			Kavaklıdere Inner Sections		15-20
Vicinity of the Bridge		100-200	10. Bahcelievler		
Between the Hisar Road		200-500	Central section		30
Turgutreis District		30-50	Between Orman Ciftligi		20
Inner Sections of Turgutreis		10-20	Between Balgat		10
5. Akkopru			Balgat Village		10
On the Street		50	Between Anıt-Kabir		20
Inner Sections		30	Between Maltepe		20
Between The Istasyon Str.		150	Vicinity of Orman Ciftligi		10

Source: Development Committee Report, 1954, pp. 96-97

Thus, at the end of the first five years of Ankara's development, there was a rapid but chaotic development in the city. Apart from a limited and piecemeal attempt at planning, the city was developing through private initiatives. It would not be wrong to argue that the Kemalist leadership was not successful in leading the development of the city by going beyond economic corporate interests.

It was only towards the end of 1920s, that the regime started to realise that the prevention of this chaotic development was only possible if a holistic perspective and

idea of planned development had started to emerge in Kemalist circles. It should be noted that this realisation was partly related to the changing accumulation strategies of the period towards state-led development, which is called Etatism after the failure of the liberal accumulation strategy of the early years. The Kemalist leadership began to concede that without a conscious leadership and an escaping economic-corporate position, the creation of a modern city which represents the values of the Kemalist project was impossible.

V. V. II. Planned Development:1928-1938

Thus, the chaotic physical development of the city and the manipulation of the development of the city by the landed interests became the major concern of the higher circles of the Kemalist élite. This in turn gave rise to pressure for obtaining a comprehensive plan to lead the development of the city and for establishing of a new organisational structure responsible for the development within this plan as the existing municipality became very receptive to speculative pressures.

The disorganised development of Ankara in the early years was not only due to the lack of planning which paved the way for arbitrary development and land speculation. The fact is that this was possible only because the responsible institution, namely the municipality, was very weak and open to manipulation of the powerful landed interests. The new regime had eliminated the local landowners from local government by closing representative channels to these groups. Yet, the new élite, which became dominant

within the local government immediately started to use its position to replace the local land-owners in land speculation. When disastrous consequences of this abuse started to be obvious, there was a realisation at the highest circles of the regime that without restructuring the administrative structure of the city and excluding these new interest groups the destiny of planned development would not be different from the early years. Thus, the narrow circle around Mustafa Kemal became convinced that in order to overcome these speculation-oriented pressures it was necessary to get a comprehensive development plan for the city as well as a new administrative structure which could lead the planning and implementation processes.

In 1927, it was decided to choose a development plan for the overall city through and international competition. Three foreign architects were invited to take part in the competition. These were, two German architects, H. Jansen, who was the winner of the competition for Berlin's plan, and M. Brix, and one French architect, L. Jusseley.

While the architects prepared their plans, a new organisation, which was going to be solely responsible from the planning activities of the city, was set up. The new planning organisation was independent from the municipality and the latter had no authority over the former. The Directorate of Development For Ankara (DDA) was established in 1928 and it was responsible to the Ministry of the Interior, that is, to the central government.

In the discussions about the establishment of the DDA in the Assembly, the government pointed to the weakness of the municipality as the main reason behind the establishment

of the DDA(The Assembly minutes:26/5/1928). The technical and personnel problems of the municipality were very obvious. Yet rather than strengthening the municipality, the government preferred to set up a new organisation. This point was made by some of the opposition MPs during the Assembly discussions. They objected to the establishment of a new organisation at the expense of the municipality. Instead of establishing a new organisation, they were arguing, the municipality could be strengthened (Assembly Minutes; 26/5/1928). Yet, these criticisms were ignored and the law was passed in May 1928. After the enactment of the law establishing the DDA, the opposition continued to criticise the establishment of the DDA as well as its decision in the Assembly at every opportunity¹⁷.

It is a fact that there was a constant opposition to the Kemalist regime in the Assembly. In that sense, the opposition to the DDA can be seen as a part of this overall attitude. However, there was a more concrete reason. As we saw in a quote from Atay earlier, a considerable part of the MPs had indulged in land speculation. It was quite likely that there was a concern for protecting the existing status quo underlying this opposition.

The establishment of the DDA redressed the balance of power in local politics by redefining the internal organisation of the local government and channels of representation. The municipality and dominant interest groups were to a large extent excluded from the planning process with the take over of planning activities by the DDA. In other words, by further centralising the local government structure of the city,

¹⁷One of the criticisms was the employment of the foreign planners and the high wages paid to them.

in a way the higher circle of the Kemalist regime was trying to eliminate the lower circles of the republican élite and other organised interest groups who were mainly responsible for speculation and chaotic developments.

The jury constituted for the selection of Ankara's development plan reflected the changing balance of power very clearly. The jury for the selection of the project was chosen by the Directorate of Development for Ankara. A striking point in the composition of the jury was that almost all its members of were close to the Kemalist circle of the republican élite (Tekeli and Okyay 1981:128).

The first jury were constituted by twenty-six members. Later this number found to high and the number of the members of the final jury was reduced to six members¹⁸. In this second jury too, there was an overall dominance of the Kemalist circle. The interesting feature of the second jury was that the mayor of the city, who was largely responsible for the pre-1928 implementation in the city, was not among the jury members.

The complete exclusion of the municipality from the planning process created considerable tension between the DDA and the municipality. Atay, who was a member of the DDA describes this conflict as follows:

'A planning commission was set up. I was the head of this commission. The late governor/mayor of the city was a member in the commission. He resented being a mayor who had nothing, but had to accept the decisions taken by a foreign expert from the first day. Since he could not oppose overtly, he took the way of continuous obstruction' (Atay 1968:424).

¹⁸Although the competition was an international one, there was no foreign expert in either of the juries. Apart from two engineer members of the jury, there were four MPs and two of these MPs were also originally engineers (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (Daily Newspaper) 16 May 1929)

There was however an overall dominance of the Kemalist group in the commission and the DDA, despite obstruction and opposition coming from different groups who took the responsibility of the planning activities.

Three planners submitted their plans in 1928. In the evaluation of the plans by the jury one of the basic criteria was the previously determined demands of the city administration from the planners. The planners were informed about these demands and asked to be taken into consideration in their plans. I think, among others, three of these expectations are worth mentioning:

Firstly, the plan for the city should have been prepared for a population between 250 000 - 300 000 and for a 50-year time period. There was no explanation on what basis these targets were chosen.

Secondly, while the boulevard between the old city and the Kemal residence was given to the planners as the development direction of the city, the planners were asked to take the existing developments in the New Town as an input. As a matter of fact, the location of Kemal's residence and the big boulevard opened between the old town and this residence, as well as wide-spread developments that took place between them had already determined the development direction of the city.

The third expectation of the city administration from the planners was to provide an integration between the old town and the new development area without changing the

fabric of the old town dramatically. This would require a substantial amount of investment, and the municipality was not keen to spend it in the old town. The preference was for the new town. However, as a result of the developments taking place in the Yenisehir area in the late 1920s the duality between the old and new town was so clear that the expectation of the city administration from the planners was to bridge the gap between the old and the new towns without big investments in the old town. This condition suggests that there was already a concern regarding the emerging dualism between old and new town. It is also interesting to learn from the newspapers of the time, though it was not mentioned anywhere, the planners were also asked to design a working-class neighbourhood (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*: 27 May 1929)

The jury did not have any difficulty in its decision¹⁹. The Jansen plan was chosen in consultation with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and with his approval in 1929²⁰ (See Figure V. III and IV). The Jansen plan was in line with the expectations of the regime. It had interpreted the terms of references of the competition well. As far as important plan decisions are concerned Jansen's plan fell in between the other two plans. Brix's plan was too simple and rough while Jusseley's plan was too monumental and expensive.

¹⁹There is no jury report available today despite the fact that in the newspapers of that day it is mentioned that the jury had prepared a detailed report on the assessment of the three projects (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye* 16 May 1929). However, the newspaper itself provided a detailed account of the jury decision and the factors effecting it. Since two members of the Jury, Rifki Atay and Celal Esat were writing for the same newspaper it is quite likely that this detailed information was provided by them. For this reason, I will rely on the newspaper information on this point.

²⁰The jury member and head of the planning commission, Atay notes that from the very beginning Mustafa Kemal had been involved in the planning process directly. He was often briefed by Jansen himself (Atay 1968).

Jansen's plan was not expensive but sufficiently detailed and sensitive to the expectation of the regime (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye* 27 May 1929).

The most important success of the plan was that while it placed the emphasis upon the new town, it did this in a modest way such that the dualism was less clear than the other plans. On the other hand, the old town was preserved with certain small interventions such as new access roads and small scale renovations. Connection between the new town and old town was provided by a major boulevard. In this respect, Brix's plan had not suggested substantial change to the old town with a conservatist understanding; whereas Jausseley's plan proposed a wide-spread renewal in the old town. Jansen's plan followed a middle way strategy in relation to the old town by strengthening the link between the old and new town without too much changing of the fabric of the old town (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye* ,27 May 1929)


The main development area of the city in Jansen's plan was defined around the boulevard opened between the old town and The Kemals' residence. Thus the main housing development area was proposed in the south of the city. The plan was also proposing a large zone of public offices over this boulevard. In Jansen's plan it was almost only in this part that there was an emphasis on monumentality. One of the interesting features of the Jansen plan was that it was proposing a housing development area for the workers in the west. Jusseley, on the other hand was proposing to rebuilt the city by extensive demolition in the old and new part of the city. This proposal was quite contradictory with the expectation of the city administration in that it was expensive as

Figure V. III. Competition Project by Jansen



Source: Ankara Master Plan report

Figure V. IV. Ankara City Plan by Jansen



Source: Ankara Master Plan report

well as too radical. In the third plan, the proposals were not detailed enough (Tankut 1990:53-4, Tekeli 1980).

Yet, the plan prepared by Jansen was a competition project and not applicable (Figure V. III). The preparation of the plan was going to take more than three years, and it was put into implementation in 1932 (Figure V. IV). However, the main decision of the plan had been taken as a guide to control the developments of the transition period in the rapidly growing city.

Jansen's Plan was approved and officially put into implementation in July 1932. Yet, in the face of difficulties I will discuss shortly, it is difficult to argue that the plan could lead the development of the city and curb speculative developments. In effect, although the plan was prepared for the whole city, some of its proposals could not find a chance to be implemented. Before discussing its failures and reasons behind them, it is apt to look at the areas the plan that could have a chance to be implemented.

The most successful element of Jansen's plan was the proposal to develop a zone of state offices and buildings. Despite certain changes, a zone of state buildings was constructed along the main boulevard. Given the urgent need for the public offices, it is easy to understand the quick implementation of this plan proposal.

In a similar way, in the New City part, a housing estate, namely Saracoglu Mahallesi, constructed for the bureaucrats, was proposed by the plan to solve the acute housing crisis the republican bureaucrats faced since the early 1920s. Similarly, Bahcelievler

Housing Estate which was thought to be a housing co-operative for the civil servants was successfully realised in the following years (See Figure V. V).


As far as two main targets of the plan are concerned, - the integration of the old and new town parts, and the development of the new city within a plan - it is possible to say that the plan failed to fulfil them. I will discuss them respectively.

The main strategy of the plan towards the old town was minimum intervention. While the houses within the castle were forbidden to be demolished or altered radically, in other areas redevelopment was left to the owners (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye* 4 March 1932).

As a result of this policy, while there was a renewal along the main roads and central areas by demolishing the old buildings and erecting apartment blocks. On the other hand, little change took place in the inner part of the old town, where usually urban poor were living. Thus, the plan stayed ineffective in bridging the ever-widening gap between the old and new city parts. While the new city part developed in an unprecedented manner, there was little improvement in the old town except the areas along the main roads which served as a commercial and government centre.

As far as the new town section is concerned, where the main developments that had proposed in the plan were, the success of the Jansen's plan was limited. Successful implementations were, on the other hand, by and large, in those areas where the public sector was the developer. But even in these kinds of development proposals the plan's success was limited because of financial difficulties. As far as public sector

Figure V. V. Bahcelievler Housing Cooperative



- | | | | |
|------------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------------|
| A. EINZELHÄUSER | E. KLUBHAUS | I. LÄDEN | N. AUSSICHTSTERRASSE |
| B. DOPPELHÄUSER | F. SCHULE | K. MARKTPLATZ | O. TENNIS-PLÄTZE |
| C. REIHENHÄUSER | G. KINDERCARTEN | L. GARAGEN | P. SCHWIMMBECKEN |
| D. TRANSFORMATOR | H. KASINO | M. POST, POLIZEI | Q. SPIELPLATZ |

implementation is concerned, the main reason of failure of the Jansen's plan was financial. Given the fact that the Jansen's plan was prepared and put into implementation in early 1930s, the years the Turkish economy felt the impact of the World Depression of the 1929 most heavily, it is not difficult to contemplate the problem. In the lack of financial resources many of the compulsory purchases, which were necessary for the plan implementation, were either postponed or dropped completely²¹.

The main failure of the plan however was in the private part of the plan implementation, where the plan was supposed to regulate and control as well as guide private initiatives. As I discussed in the early years the main problem for the city was the chaotic development taking place as a result of speculation-oriented developments. Thus, one of the stated expectation of the Kemalist regime was for the plan to bring order to the cities development by preventing chaotic developments. As an experienced planner, Jansen was quite aware of the power of the landed interests.

The failure of the plan in controlling the development of the city is very clear in the following figures (Tankut, 1990). The total number of the buildings constructed between 1926 and 1933 was 1709. On the other hand, the number of the buildings in the newly developing parts of the city was around 2493. Given the fact that some of the construction permissions were taken for the redevelopment in the old city area, it is not difficult to understand the extent of the developments that took place outside the plan

²¹ The proposal of a construction of zone of public offices and public housing for the republican bureaucrats was at the heart of Jansen's proposal. Even in the compulsory purchase of the land for these zones, Atay notes that the prime minister had refused to provide the necessary finance completely (Atay 1969:420)

decisions. Furthermore, even in those developments where there is permission taken from either the municipality or from the DDA, there were deviations from the actual plan decision as a result of pressure exerted by politicians or bureaucrats²². Nonetheless the existence of the plan and the loyalty of the planners to the plan decisions placed some limits on speculation-oriented developments. Throughout the planned period, the planners and the DDA became a target of the groups who saw the plan as an obstacle to their intention to use the city as exchange space.

It was not, however, only speculation-oriented action which was preventing the successful implementation of the plan decisions. The economic crisis as well as the priorities given to the other areas created a financial strain on the plan as I briefly discussed before. In turn, the plan failed to catch the rapid developments taking place in the city. One of the important problems was to provide housing for the new migrants who arrive especially from rural areas. The new capital did look attractive for the rural poor who did not have a skill. There was a considerable migration of this group to the city starting from the early years. The housing crisis was apparent for this group as early as 1927. The working-class neighbourhood asked from the planner in the 1928 competition was a result of the concern stemming from the lack of housing for this group. In the Jansen plan, in the west of the city near the industrial district, there was a neighbourhood proposal for the working class (See Figure V. VI). Yet, it is not possible

²²It is a fact that the establishment of the DDA did not finish the political manipulations coming from different quarters. It is interesting to note that at least on one occasion there was a "request" from the planners to revise the plan decisions that were coming by Kemal himself, regarding one of his relatives' building construction. The planner was said to complain about this intervention and said that his request was accepted just because it came from the president (see Atay 1968 for details).


to see any move towards the realisation of this proposal during the implementation period.

In the lack of a policy towards these new urban poor, the first squatters started to emerge as early as the late 1920s and became a major issue in the early 1930s. The first squatters, more correctly shacks, emerged in those areas left outside the plan because of the unsuitable nature of the area due to the steepness of the slope, or being otherwise deficient. One of the main areas where squatters emerged was near the old centre, and the other was near the area designated in the Jansen plan as the working-class neighbourhood.

The initial reaction of the city administration to these developments was to demolish them. In the *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* demolition of 137 shacks were reported. However, the city administration as well as the government were quite aware of the lack of policy towards the newcomers housing needs and there was a recognition of this failure. For this reason, the determination to prevent squatting was not that strong.

At the end of the 1930s, the authority of the DDA was weakened by, on the one hand, the developments taking place outside the plan decision, on the other by the continuous opposition it faced at national and local levels. Starting from the establishment years, there was a fierce opposition to the DDA and to the foreign planners under the banner of nationalism, while at the local level the municipality became the centre of a similar opposition to the DDA.

Figure V. VI. Working Class Quarter



Source: Ankara Master Plan report

In the mid-1930s the changing balance of power in favour of the municipality and the mayor became obvious with the departures of some members of the DDA who supported the Jansen plan and planned development. Atay, who was a fierce defendant of the Jansen plan, left the planning commission. Subsequently the DDA was taken away from being under the responsibility of Ministry of the Interior and given to the control of the municipality in 1937. This change was signalling the end of the "planned" period and the return of pragmatism and eclecticism in the development process of Ankara.

V. V. III. The Return of Pragmatism

There was an opposition to the foreign planner, namely Jansen, from the very beginning as mentioned earlier. The pretext was that there was no need to bring a foreign planner in by paying large amounts of money from the limited resources of the country. In reality, a considerable part of this opposition was against the planned development itself rather than planner because of the fact that in the absence of the plan it was easy to use the city as a source of speculative gains. Jansen was very aware of this fact and tried to resist the attempts to use the city's developments for this aim. His uncompromising attitude was creating important tensions between the DDA and these interest groups. In the mid-1930s the argument of the opposition was that the plan had completed its function by giving a direction to the development of the city. Thus, there was no reason to keep an expensive planning team. As a matter of fact, by putting the DDA under the

control of the municipality the opposition was in a much more stronger position than before. In 1938, Jansen's contract was finishing. It was an opportunity to get rid of him by not renewing his contract. Despite the fact that the plan was still in implementation, the group led by the Mayor of Ankara succeeded in terminating Jansen's contract and the last element of planned development also disappeared.

The years following the termination of Jansen's contract was a period of financial austerity due to the beginning of World War II. Although Turkey did not enter the war, it applied a war economy. The impact of this policy on the city was the considerable reduction in the financial resources allocated to the city. Most of the major project was stopped due to lack of finance. Thus, the project of establishing a modern city after being undermined by the speculation-oriented activities of the various groups including the republican elite had a final stroke with the break of the World War II.

Towards the end of the period, there were two radically different towns in Ankara. In terms of their physical and social structures they exhibited a duality. It is possible to follow the dramatic difference between the new and old town parts of the city in the following tables which provide a detailed account of the building conditions and standards in the new and old part of the city in the mid-1930s (see Tables V.IV and V.V).

As far as housing conditions are concerned, the main housing stock of the city was still in the old town with 12 558 housing units. The majority of these houses were

constructed before 1920 and in the lack of maintenance most of them were in very bad conditions. There were 182 apartments blocks, some of which were constructed after 1920. There were also 822 shacks. In the newly developing part of the city (New town and Cebeci) there were 1781 detached and semi detached houses mainly made up of concrete and bricks. There were also 168 apartment blocks. There were only 40 shacks in this section of the city. In the periphery of the city, there were 2696 summer (vineyard) houses which were from the pre-1923 period.

Table V. IV. Building types and functions (1935)

<i>Building Type</i>	<i>Districts</i>				
	<i>Old Town</i>	<i>New Town</i>	<i>Cebeci</i>	<i>Vineyards</i>	<i>Total</i>
Residential Buildings					
House	11 402	838	943	2696	15 879
Apartment	182	156	12	1	351
Bed & Breakfast	9	1	1	1	12
Hotel	40	1	-	-	41
Boarding House	31	-	-	6	37
Single Room	72	11	7	25	115
Shack	822	23	17	75	937
Total	12 558	1 030	980	2 804	17 372
Commercial Buildings					
Shop	2 447	116	57	74	2 694
Shopping Precinct	9	-	-	-	9
Factory	33	6	4	26	69
Bath	8	-	-	-	8
Bakery	41	-	3	5	49
Garage	59	70	3	37	169
Stable	338	2	27	319	686
Storage	511	18	9	101	639
Other Buildings	38	2	-	10	50
Total	3 484	214	103	572	4 373
Public and Official Buildings					
School	42	7	12	10	71
Military Barracks	-	-	-	1	1
Official Buildings	422	100	29	406	957
Mosque	81	-	-	10	91
Church	1	-	-	1	2
Synagogue	2	-	-	-	2
Entertainment	7	1	-	-	8
Total	568	109	57	429	1 163
General Total	16 610	1 353	1 140	3 805	22 908

Source: State Statistical Institute, Statistics Annual, 1935

Table V. V. Service Provision in Old and New Towns

	Water Supply			Electricity			Gas					
	Provided	Not provided	Unknown	Total	Provided	Not provided	Unknown	Total	Provided	Not provided	Unknown	Total
OLD TOWN												
House	1 113	11 418	27	12 558	3 632	8 899	27	12 558	211	12 320	27	12 558
Entertainment	444	3 006	34	3 484	1 637	1 813	34	3 484	44	3 406	34	3 484
Public And Official Buildings	214	349	5	568	394	169	5	568	25	538	5	568
Total	1 771	14 773	66	16 610	5 663	10 881	66	16 610	280	16 264	66	16 610
NEW TOWN												
House	915	113	2	1 030	969	59	2	1 030	829	199	2	1 030
Entertainment	113	101	-	214	162	52	-	214	63	151	-	214
Public And Official Buildings	71	35	3	109	75	31	3	109	59	47	3	109
Total	1 099	249	5	1 353	1 206	142	5	1 353	951	397	5	1 353
CEBECI												
House	77	900	3	980	567	410	3	980	51	926	3	980
Entertainment	11	91	1	103	41	61	1	103	1	101	1	103
Public And Official Buildings	33	24	-	57	48	9	-	57	5	52	-	57
Total	121	1 015	4	1 140	656	480	4	1 140	57	1 079	4	1 140
VINEYARDS												
House	153	2 633	18	2 804	363	2 423	18	2 749	37	2 749	18	2 804
Entertainment	35	537	-	572	71	501	-	572	-	572	-	572
Public And Official Buildings	78	350	1	429	141	287	1	429	22	406	1	429
Total	266	3 520	19	3 805	575	3 211	19	3 805	59	3 727	19	3 805
TOTAL												
House	2 258	15 064	50	17 372	5 531	11 791	50	17 372	1 128	16 194	50	17 372
Entertainment	603	3 735	35	4 373	1 911	2 427	35	4 373	108	4 230	35	4 373
Public And Official Buildings	396	758	9	1 163	658	496	9	1 163	111	1 043	9	1 163
Grand Total	3 257	19 557	94	22 908	8 100	14 714	94	22 908	1 347	21 467	94	22 908

Source: State Statistical Institute, Building Statistics, 1935, pp. 67-68

the new town (See Table V.IV)²³. As a matter of fact this duality was also obvious in the occupational structure of the city. While there was a considerable weight of those working in the state related jobs, number of those who works in unskilled works was quite high (See Table V. VI) .

Table V. VI Distribution of Ankara's Population According to Professional Groups

	1927		1935		1940		1945	
	Popul.	%	Popul.	%	Popul.	%	Popul.	%
Agriculture	10 419	14.0	5 588	4.6	5 220	3.3	6 217	2.7
Industry and Small Crafts	6 775	9.1	17 911	14.7	16 979	10.8	21 335	9.4
Commerce	4 813	6.5	6 775	5.5	7 371	4.7	11 913	5.2
Transportation	489	0.6	4 336	3.5	3 455	2.2	7 256	3.2
General Administration and Services, Professional Services	18 052	24.2	20 414	16.6	30 129	19.2	49 769	22.0
Home Economics, Personal Services	-	-	2 738	2.2	2 709	1.7	2 408	1.1
Total of Professionals	40 548	54.4	57 762	47.1	65 863	41.9	98 898	43.6
Without Profession or Profession Unknown	34 005	45.6	64 958	52.9	91 379	58.1	127 814	56.4
Grand Total	74 553	100	122 720	100	157 242	100	226 712	100

Source: Development Committee Report, 1954, p.53

That is, towards the end of period the duality was quite obvious in both social and spatial structure of the city.

²³This was a reflection of the difference between the attitude of the Kemalist regimes and the native population towards the religion. Secularism was one of the consistently emphasised aspects of Kemalism on space. The regime discouraged the construction of mosques in the city throughout this period. For this reason, Ankara was often called as "the city without minarets"(Ahmad 1993).

V. VI. Conclusion

In this concluding section I would like to evaluate the overall period by concentrating on the Kemalist project with reference to its initial objectives and the outcomes at the end of period. As we saw earlier, the proclamation of Ankara as the capital in the wake of the Independence War was a conscious strategy of the Kemalist regime. The city was seen as the most important spatial dimension of the Kemalist nation-state formation project. It was not only a symbol but also a means through which the Kemalist regime wanted to advance its project. The city was conceived as a model of the society in the making. It is possible to argue that the Kemalist regime succeeded in achieving some of these objectives. As a matter of fact, comparing Istanbul and Ankara in terms of their scale, spatial structure and historical heritage, the denouncement of Istanbul in favour of Ankara was a success on its own right. Through moving the state capital inland and implementing similar spatial policies which we reviewed in chapter IV, the Kemalist regime challenged the primacy of Istanbul in favour of Anatolia and succeeded in this challenge.

The success of the Kemalist regime at the local level is a question mark. I would like to evaluate the balance sheet of the Kemalist project towards the city with reference to different dimensions of its project. In the first place, the Kemalist project was about creating a capital city which represents the larger societal project that Kemalism stands for. That is to say, that besides its capital city functions, the city was an arena of *identity*

of the new regime. At this level, *the focal point of the project* was to create a city which represents the identity of the new regime

Ironically, what was a strength for the Kemalist regime at the national level was a weakness at the local level. The denial of Ottoman heritage for a new Western-looking society created a major dilemma for the reason that Ankara was not a clean slate and in terms of its social and cultural structure the existing town was representing all those so-called Ottoman heritage traits. As we saw, the Kemalist project became *a two-cities project* by excluding a large section of the old town population. It took the *new middle class* of the city as its *social base*.

On the other hand, Ankara was not only a capital city but also a capitalist city where the exchange value played a central role. In a city growing as fast as Ankara, land speculation was almost inevitable and the appropriation of speculative gains was the other important factor playing a part in the transformation of Kemalist project into a two-cities project. By creating its own space the new middle class did not want to leave the emerging speculative gains to the traditional middle-class of old town. But, it should immediately be noted that this did not lead to the total exclusion of the traditional middle class from the two-cities project. Since the centre of the city was still in the old town, the traditional middle class, who formed a monopoly of the commercial activities in the city, benefited immensely from the changing fortune of the city. In this respect, they were integrated into the project through these kinds of concessions. On the other hand those who saw the city in terms of use values solely as a living place were

excluded from the project. This included a large section of the old town population (traditional urban poor), the new urban poor, who migrated to the city with the hope of finding a job, and even the lower ranks of the civil servants who could not afford to buy a house or land. Given this middle-class base that the Kemalist project relied on, it would not be wrong to argue the urbanisation of the state during this period was also the urbanisation of the middle classes.

The rent-seeking activities of the middle class became a major factor in the determination of the destiny of the Kemalist project towards Ankara. Especially in the early years, the dominance of a liberal ideology created a suitable environment for those (new and traditional middle-class populations) who sought to make money out of the city through land speculation. Thus, from the very beginning, there was a tension and contradiction between those who saw the city in terms of identity value and those who saw it in terms of exchange value.

The success of the Kemalist project was very much dependent upon the solution of this problem. This required the transcendence of immediate economic interests (the economic-corporate phase) for broader political interests (the ethico-political phase); but the Kemalist leadership failed to persuade its own cadres let aside the broader social base that the project relied on. Even if the Kemalist leadership made an attempt during the 1930s, the success was very limited, and in a short while those who were excluded due to their speculative concerns took the lead again. In this sense, neither the Kemalist leadership nor the project itself succeeded to establish hegemony. That is, while

excluding a large section of social base of the city (most of the native population as well as the new urban poor arriving from other parts of the country), the Kemalist leadership failed to persuade its own social base to go beyond narrow interests. That is, the strategy of placing the state as the main *locus of urban consciousness* did not succeed. Instead, individualism emerged as the dominant locus of urban consciousness. In turn, this undermined the success of the Kemalist project in creating a modern city which represents the success of the Kemalist project.

At the end of the period, Ankara was a divided city. On the one hand, there was an old town of the native population. Except its central parts, which were also used by the new-middle class of the city, it benefited from the rising fortune of the city. Most of the native population living in this part were excluded from major services such as electricity and water. Likewise they were not a part of the newly emerging social and cultural life of the city. On the other hand, there was the new town of the new middle-class population of the city. They were the main beneficiaries of the transformation that the city underwent. While they were in control of the development direction of the city, to a large extent, they used this power to exploit the fortune of the city to their own benefit. They saw the city as a capitalist city rather than a capital city. It is this view that emerged as hegemonic at the end of the period and determined the development of the city in the following periods as well, as we will see in the next chapter.

They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented.

Karl Marx, *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*

[The modern state is] ‘the creation of the middle class, first a means to break down feudalism, then a means to crush the emancipatory aspiration of the producers, the working class’

Karl Marx, *Writings on the Paris Commune*

CHAPTER VI:

ANKARA 1950-1980: URBANISATION OF LABOUR POWER

CHAPTER VI: ANKARA 1950-1980: URBANISATION OF LABOUR POWER

VI. I. Introduction

The late 1940s witnessed the beginning of a new period in the urban experience of Turkey. As we saw in chapter IV, large cities underwent a rapid urbanisation as a result of the massive influx of the rural population into the cities. I have argued that the experience of large cities during a 30-year period (1950-80) is characterised by the urbanisation of labour power. The chief objective of this chapter is to study the urbanisation of Ankara during this period in the context of the urbanisation of labour power. Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of this period, I would like to expose and elaborate the main arguments of the chapter.

Large cities underwent a rapid urbanisation during this period, and Ankara was no exception to this trend. But what distinguished it was that the rapid urbanisation had started much earlier in Ankara than in other cities due to the rising attraction of the city as the new capital of the country. In turn, this peculiar feature played a determining role in Ankara's much faster growth in comparison to other large cities. Thus when the massive population influx started with the rural push, it did not create new problems for the city, but contributed to already burgeoning ones.

This does not suggest however a simple continuity between these two periods in the case of Ankara. Although a degree of continuity can be identified in terms of the rapid rate of urbanisation and the problems it brought about, the qualitative changes

taking place in the social base and social forces in the city, owing to the massive rural-originated migration, progressively changed the balance of political forces in the political arena of the city, and in this respect, it justifies the claim that a new period had begun in the urban experience of Ankara¹.

In this context, the study of this period dwells upon two interrelated arguments: one regarding the break, and the other related to the continuity between these two consecutive periods. The first point refers to the break between these periods and asserts that, as I claimed above, the urbanisation of Ankara was characterised by the urbanisation of labour power, therefore, it should be examined primarily with reference to processes of working class formation. In other words, Ankara needs to be studied as the locale(s) of working-class formation. This refers to two interrelated processes: the spatiality of working-class formation in the sense that the working-class came into being as a class in and through urban space; and the fact that the very same processes created a built environment which bore the mark of this class. Such an understanding allow us to see the formation of the working-class with reference not only to the working place but also to the living place and to consider the activity and inactivity of the working-class around different loci of consciousness².

¹ During the first period although there was a rural-originated in-migration to Ankara, the main bulk of the migration was intra-urban, whereas it was the other way around during the second period (see Table).

² I do not apply a structural definition of class. My approach is more akin to the one applied by Thompson in that 'it is indeed 'experience' and not simply an objective 'assemblage' that unites these heterogeneous groups into a class' (Meiksins-Wood 1995; 91). In a similar way, Draper argues that 'the way in which a given society divides up into classes is specific to its own social relations... There is no rule of thumb definition... The point can be settled... only by concrete examination of the overall social relations of the society' (Draper 1977; 507).

The shift from urbanisation of the (nation) state to the urbanisation of labour power brought important changes in the production and use of urban space. Whilst the point of entry shifted from the state to labour power, by replacing the conflict between the identity value and use value, the conflict between use and exchange values became the prime urban conflict. In line with these changes, the abstract space of the former period was challenged by concrete spaces as the locales of the reproduction of labour power. In turn, community and class, as rivals to each other, became important as the locus of urban consciousness in the course of the second period.

The second point refers to continuity and argues that the study of the second round of the urbanisation of Ankara needs to refer to the former round of urbanisation and the main forces of the former period, namely the state and the middle class. This is necessary not just because they provided a background for and contextual features of the latter period but also due to the fact that first layer of urbanisation and the dominant forces of this period did not die out with the emergence of a second layer but continued to shape the city in interaction with the social forces of the second period. For this reason, the second period can only be grasped and understood by reference to the dominant forces and the project of the former period since the latter constituted the main reference point for the emerging working class population of the city in the formation of strategies in work and living places.

In the preceding chapter it was shown that the urbanisation of the state created a built environment not only for the state but also for its functionaries and their allies. This could be read as the urbanisation of the middle classes. Thus the rise of the working class and its neighbourhoods in the city did not pose a challenge only to the state but

also to the middle-class and its norms which were dominant in the city till the end of World War II. I will show that the built environment of the middle class of the city constituted the other of the built environment of the working class and vice versa. In other words, starting from the early 1950s, these two groups started to define their environment with reference to each other. Nevertheless, this was symmetrical in the sense that while the middle-class population of the city, which became established during the first period, saw the newcomers as a threat to its life style and built environment, the latter group saw the former as a model despite the fact that they formed a distinctive urban presence.

Finally the urbanisation of the working class needs to be understood with reference to the state. Here the point is to take the distinctiveness of Ankara as the state capital into account in the formation of the working class. The state played a more prominent role in Ankara than in other large cities in the urbanisation and spatial constitution of the working class. Given the fact that Ankara had not been an industrial centre but the state capital, the state rather than the capital constitutes the other of the working class in relation, not only to the place of work but also to the place of residence. Regarding the work place, the state became an important employer for the new working-class population of the city. In the context of residence, even if the state was not involved actively in providing accommodation and infrastructures for the new population, they still remained dependent on the state in those issues such as the legalisation of the squatter settlements and provision of basic services and amenities.

In sum, in what follows in this chapter, I will analyse the production and use of urban space in Ankara during the second period in the context of a working-class formation which itself needs to be understood with reference to the state and the established population of the city.

Section II discusses the changing social base and spatial structure resulting from the massive influx of rural people in the city. Section III concentrates on the responses of the middle class and the state as the key elements of the dominant bloc in the city, to 'the urbanisation of peasants'. While analysing the changing responses by this bloc, their project which was continuing from the first period, is also traced. Section IV explores the possibility of an alternative counter-project by the new migrant population of the city. After showing the problems of formation of such an alternative project, attention is then turned to the impediments concerning the transformation of the social base constituted by the squatters into a social force. Having shown that only towards the late 1960s and early 1970s did it become possible for the squatters, to a certain extent, to go beyond their immediate economic interest and gain a degree of long-term political perspective, Section V concentrates on these changing attitudes and their reflection on the local state. It discusses the mobilisation from above on behalf of the working class and urban poor at the local government level and gains around this project. It also points to the dilemmas and shortcomings of the radicalisation of city politics from above. The final section provides an overall evaluation of the period.

VI. II. Changing Social Base and Spatial Structure

In the preceding chapter, we saw that at the end of the first period, there were two cities: the first one was the old town with its native population, and the new town with its middle-class population. In this divided city the point of contact between these two sections was the city centre, and even within this centre there was a strict separation of the spaces used by these two groups. However, the population of the city was not limited to these two groups for in the course of first period a group of urban poor coming mainly from rural areas had emerged. Yet, they were still marginal *vis-a-vis* the two groups and they settled either within or in the surrounding areas of the old town. They partly articulated into the socio-spatial fabric of the old town. Nevertheless, they remained marginal in the social and political life of the city during the first period. When the city became a focus of rapid migration, it was this group whose weight dramatically increased and created a unprecedented change in the social base and spatial structure of the city.

As mentioned earlier, in the wake of World War II, a new phase had begun for Ankara as the rural masses crowded into the city. While the population of the city was around 225000 in 1945, it almost tripled in 15 years to reach 650 000 in 1960. The city continued to grow at a rapid rate during the 1960s and by 1970 it reached to 1 209 000. As in the first period, Ankara was ranked as the fastest growing city (see Table VI. I).

Table VI. I. Growth of Main Cities 1940-70

Cities	Index= 100(1940)
Ankara (administrative centre)	769
Istanbul (industry, trade, port)	283
Izmir (trade and port)	283
Eskisehir (regional centre)	356
Kayseri (regional centre)	319

Source: Urban Development Strategy

Needless to say, such unprecedented population growth within a short space of time brought dramatic changes to the city in terms of its social base and spatial structure. The most dramatic effect of this rapid population influx was the massive sprawl of squatter settlements in and around the city. I will turn to this issue later, for now, I would like to concentrate on the different aspects of the new social base in the city.

While the process of rapid urbanisation led to the emergence of new urban poor in the city, the most visible spatial consequence of this group was the booming of squatter areas around the city. As briefly mentioned earlier, the first squatters of the first period mushroomed in and around the old town. As one researcher put it, while the squatting became a widespread phenomenon during the second period, the process continued in a similar fashion so that the squatters first emerged in the old town section, spreading to other parts in due course.

'While the city is divided into two central parts- a 'middle-class' area to the south and the old centre to the north- most migrants settle in the squatter housing estates, Gecekondu, which spring out from the old centre and which are starting to spread around the southern part of the city' (Levine 1973; 358).

Thus, after occupying the old town, squatters started to spread out to other parts of the city, including the outskirts of the middle-class neighbourhoods in the southern part of the city. The speed of this process was dramatic. Although there is no reliable information regarding the number of squatter houses for the early years, it is

estimated that while this number was around 12,000 with over 60,000 people living in them in 1950, it reached 70,000 with 364,000 inhabitants in 1960 (see Table VI. II). The growth of squatter housing continued unabated in the following two decades and at the end of the period more than 70 per cent of the city population was living in squatter housing.

TABLE VI. II. Squatter Housing In Ankara: 1950 – 1980

	Number of Squatter Houses	Number of People Living in Squatter Housing	Percent of Urban Population Living in Squatter Housing
1950	12,000	62,400	21.8
1960	70,000	364,000	56.0
1970	144,000	748,000	60.6
1980	275,000	1,450,000	72.4

SOURCE: Keles and Danielson, 1985

This dramatic change in the social and spatial base of the city could be expected to be reflected in the balance of power and state strategies of this period. Inevitably, the massive influx of the migrant population changed the socio-spatial structure of the city on an unprecedented scale. But it is problematic to interpret this change as an outcome of a conscious strategy. Especially regarding the earlier years, if there was any strategy on the part of the migrant population it was a survival strategy rather than a strategy that was part of a political project towards the city. In other words, the motivation behind the act of squatting was in general economic, in the sense that it aimed at satisfying the immediate housing need of the squatter population, and no further political objective was defined especially in the early years of the period.

Problems related to the transformation of this social base into a social force remained unexplored, and as stated earlier, one of the objectives of this chapter is to deal with

them. Perhaps, one of the best ways to do this is to begin with the strategies of the middle-class and the state during this period as they constituted the main reference point in the urbanisation of the working class. We can then turn to the working class itself later on.

VI. III. Middle-Class Domination after Squatters!

As we saw in the last chapter, although weakened towards the end of the first period there was still a middle-class domination in the city at the beginning of the second period. This domination was progressively undermined by the contradiction between the two interrelated objectives of the project. The formation of a modern city in line with the lifestyle of the middle-class was obstructed by the rent-seeking activities of the members of the same class. For the state the very same conflict emerged in the form of a contradiction between the formation of a national identity and the establishment of the conditions of private-property relations to which urban space was central. Thus, already troubled by these internal contradictions, middle-class hegemony in the city came under new attack from the massive influx of the rural masses into the city and the subsequent mushrooming of the squatter neighbourhoods. It is now necessary to look at the positions of the two important elements of the hegemonic block, the middle-class and the state, *vis-a-vis* the rapid population influx and expansion of squatter settlements in the city.

In the wake of World War II, the agenda of the middle-class as now the established population of the city was conditioned by a concern for protecting their modern city and identity against the invasion of outsiders. This concern was not different from

that in the former period in that while the native population during the first period was seen as the main threat, at the beginning of the second period the migrant population started to be seen as the main threat, not only to the lifestyle of the middle-class, but also to the institution of private property due to their illegal occupation of either state or privately owned lands in the outskirts of the city. In this respect, at the beginning of the second period, middle-class hegemony continued to be based on a two-cities project and remained exclusionary as far as the immigrant population was concerned.

It is extremely informative to look at the newspapers of this period in order to understand the perception and attitudes of both middle-class and the state élite towards the squatters since, as was also true in the first period, newspaper columnists and editors acted as the 'organic intellectuals' of the middle-class hegemonic projects towards the city. The following quotation from the editorial of a main daily newspaper reflects the typical reaction of the middle-class to the squatter settlements:

'While we try to build cities like Ankara and think of abolishing the shanty houses, we cannot welcome the mushrooming of thousands of low-quality squatters in and around the city. One of the main problems squatters pose for the city is that they threaten public health as well as law and order in the city. Without water, electricity, a sewage system, they can be a source of contagious diseases which might infect the whole city. Due to the lack of police stations, these dark places can be a habitat for those criminals who would violate the security and safety of the city. For all these reasons, they should be prevented from spreading out all over the city' (Cumhuriyet, December 1949).

While the above quotation placed the emphasis on the threat directed towards the life-style of the middle-class, the following points to the violation of private property by the squatters:

'The prevailing political regime in Turkey today rises upon the principal of respecting people's property. If this is the principle, is it not a fact that to erect a squatter on someone else's property is attacking property rights and leading to another ideology? Are not those right when they say that on the roof of squatters red flags are flying rather than old shoes?' (Ulus, 22 August 1948).

This kind of statement did not necessarily belong to the full-blown liberals. One of the well-known names of the statist wing during the first period, Falih Rifki Atay, put the matter in following way:

'It justifiably became common among the squatting people to say that let's first occupy the land and erect a squatter, afterwards the state would somehow bring the necessary services such as electricity, water and gas. For this reason, the violation of property rights increased at a rate that had never happened before. ..Bolshevism should not be sought in the rags of students but in the violation of property rights' (Atay, 1949).

Then, for the same circles the solution was that squatter settlements should not be allowed to mushroom in the city as they violate the basic premise of the system, that is, property rights. Even when the existence of the squatter development in the city was accepted as a permanent rather than a transitory phenomenon, the emphasis was placed upon the restoration of private property rights by the state by compensating those whose property was subjected to the invasion:

'Migrating from one place to another is a right of every citizen. Yet, if there is no place in the migrated place, then there is no right for him to settle in that place by force. As we came back from a hospital when there is no bed available, those who push the city gates should return or be sent back' (Cumhuriyet, 3 January 1959)

'In the first place we need to prevent this disease from spreading out. Therefore, the further development of squatter housing would not be justifiable. The authorities should-in what ever way they choose- explain this to the citizens who do not respect prevailing laws. Then, the existing squatter settlements should be brought into line with the regulations. The government should take the ownership of those invaded lands by paying the price of the land to the original owner. Then, it should sell to the squatter dwellers with long-term instalments and of a cheap price. If these lands were given to them for free and this became a common practice, then it would be impossible to prevent others from asking the same favour. If you do not give then like the others, they would do the same, that is, they would invade the land. In this way, the squatter dwellers would be entitled to title deeds and then basic services such as roads, electricity, and a sewage system' (Cumhuriyet 3 November 1949).

The measures proposed were not limited to those mentioned above. As a matter of fact, at the end of the first period, as we have seen, there was a housing crisis in the city affecting the lower middle-class. The rapid urbanisation of the second period deepened this crisis bringing it to a point whereby nobody denied that the state should interfere in solving the crisis. For this reason, even for those who proposed

the above measures, the state had to take some positive steps to solve the crisis. In other words, we see an emphasis on the father state alongside an authoritative one.

'It is a well-known fact that today there is a group of people in our cities and towns who live on a day-to-day basis, going hungry if a job is not found that day. They live under bridges, in old reservoirs and in such accommodation which would be difficult even to call a shack in order to protect themselves from harsh weather. It is a well-known fact that the government is dealing with the building of cheap and hygienic houses. The Saracoglu housing estate was an outcome of the government's attempt to solve the housing problem of the civil servants who suffered and still suffer from the housing shortages. The housing question which I emphasise does not only regard the provision of houses of those who are over a certain level of welfare. Perhaps more importantly, the problem is of the very poor groups' (Ulus, 29 November 1946).

Thus, at the end of the war the political agenda of the city was dominated by the housing crisis. The crisis which had affected the lower ranks of the state bureaucracy in the course of first period became a full-blown one in the wake of the World War II with the massive influx of rural poor into the city, and in the late 1940s, it reached a level that began to threaten middle-class hegemony in the city. At this point it is necessary to turn to the state strategies of the early years to see the position of the state in the face of a challenge coming from the migrant masses.

As we saw, there were a suspicious attitude towards squatter housing in the early years of the second period. It is not surprising to find this reflected in the state policies of the 1940s. The state remained sandwiched between two contradictory pressures. On the one hand, the squatter settlements were a challenge to the property rights of which the state was the guarantor, and as we saw above, they were seen as a threat to the socio-spatial environment of the middle-class. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the state *vis-a-vis* the squatter citizens was in jeopardy when the preventive measures such as demolition were applied, especially in view of the fact that the state did not offer any alternative solution. In the end, the dilemma for the state was resolved in a way in which, while middle-class hegemony in the city

continued with the active intervention of the state in support of it, non-policy making was applied in the case of the squatter population, as if they did not exist. Given that the main priority for the squatter population was to stay in the city by escaping demolition and similar policies, and that there was a lack of any radicalism among the squatters, the non-intervention policy of the state was preferred by the migrant population.

As we saw earlier during the first period, the dominant policy towards squatter development was deterrence such as threats of demolition. In the wake of the War, the same policy remained intact. Yet, this time the scale of squatting was massive and demolition remained symbolic in the sense that while thousands were built, the number of demolished squatters did not exceed a couple of dozen.

However the problem reached a level that could no longer be ignored by the state. Parallel to this deepening crisis, the government became vulnerable to the pressures from different quarters to respond to it one way or another. Ironically, the squatting groups were not limited only to the migrant population. There was also a considerable number of low-rank civil servants who settled in squatter areas. Some studies show that they consisted of around 10 per cent of the squatter dwellers in the early years (Yorukhan 1968).

The first striking policy initiative by the government was the Gecekondu Amnesty Act of 1948. Although the act was not introduced as an amnesty law, it was in the first place, an amnesty act that legalised most of the squatters then existing in the

city. But more importantly, the act entitled the municipalities to provide urban land for needy individuals to build their own houses³.

Behind the discourse of solving the squatter housing problem, which was emphasised during the discussions in the Assembly, the law targeted the low-rank civil servants. According to law, only those who had been residents in the city for at least one year were eligible for this scheme. Besides, beneficiaries were required to have a permanent income. Under these conditions, a large part of the squatter dwellers, and newcomers who were likely to see squatting as a solution, were excluded since they could not meet the requirements defined by the law. In this sense, although the law was formally targeting all groups, in fact the beneficiaries of this scheme were mainly civil servants (Tokman 1985).

On the basis of this law, the municipality made a compulsory purchase of 105 hectares of land in the north-west of the city which was later to be called Yenimahalle. The area was divided into lots between 175 and 300 square metres and offered to those who were eligible on a 10-year payment basis at the true cost price. As mentioned above, the main beneficiaries of this scheme were civil servants, and with the collaboration of central and local governments a new (lower) middle-class quarter emerged in the city with a population of 20 000 towards the beginning of the 1950s. Thus, the implementation following law 5218 helped the civil servants solve their housing crisis, while the migrant population was excluded. For the latter group,

³ According to Municipal Law 1580 of 1930, the municipalities were only entitled to develop urban land and build houses for renting. For this reason, the new law allowed the municipalities to develop urban land for private development.

the main benefit of the law was the legalisation of the squatter settlements established before the enactment of the law.

This logic dominated state strategies during the 1950s, while the squatters continued to mushroom during this time. The main policy continued to ignore and not to acknowledge the problem. Except for a handful of demolitions, the state closed its eyes to the problem as if it did not exist. While non-policy making was the main strategy towards the squatters, the attention paid by the state for the authorised section of the city was in line with expectations of the middle-class.

At the beginning of the 1950s, the city had already reached a population which the Jansen Plan had projected for it in 1970. In other words, the developments taking place in the authorised part were going beyond the plan boundaries. In the early 1950s, the main debate regarding the city was about the need for a new plan and this need started to be voiced frequently in the newspaper columns. For instance, one of the prominent members of the Kemalist intellectual circle, who was involved in the planning activities of the former period, was calling the authorities to act swiftly to get a new plan for the city (Atay, *Ulus*, 13 May 1948)

In line with this expectation, a commission which was called 'the Development Committee' was established to determine the basic needs of the city. The members of the committee were the mayor and governor of the city along with the heads of various departments of ministries such as public works and public health. There were also members in the committee from the universities and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In 1953, the committee prepared a report which laid out the

expectations and needs the new plan should take into account. The most striking feature of the report was that although there were considerable number of squatters in the city at the date of completion of the report, there was no reference to the squatters in the report. Instead, the Development Committee Report identified the lack of a cultural centre and facilities as the main problem and the provision of these as the main priority of the new plan:

'One of the first needs of the city is a Cultural Centre suitable for a modern city like Ankara; established with due consideration to the relations and ties existing between the present educational and scientific establishments and the related societies and installations... It is necessary for the future of greater Turkey and for Ankara with a million population to have State Opera, State Theatre, and a large concert hall or house, State Conservatory, Academy of Fine Arts,... outdoor and indoor, cold and warm swimming pools....only under these conditions Ankara may become a cultural centre and a modern State Capital' (Development Committee Report, 1954; 119).

Ironically, the Committee Report, while the squatter settlements surrounded the whole city towards the mid-1950s, defined the lack of cultural facilities as the main problem. Yet, despite its emphasis on the cultural centre, the hidden agenda behind the report was the opening up of new development areas for authorised developments. As mentioned above, the development area defined by the Jansen Plan was full and there was an urgent need for new development areas. For this reason, after making the development of a cultural centre a priority, the report designated the 'determination of city development boundaries' as the first urgent need of the city. Interestingly, the planners were asked to contain the plan boundaries within the municipal boundaries. In turn, that meant leaving not only a considerable part of the squatter developments outside the plan control but also making these areas vulnerable to further development. As we shall see later on, most of the squatter developments of the following years would take place outside the municipal and plan boundaries

As proposed by the report, an international jury was formed including internationally established planners and architects such as Patrick Abercrombie and Luigi Piccinato. The jury chose a plan prepared by two Turkish architects, Rasit Uybadin and Nihat Yucel, among a dozen plans. The second and third winners were German and Swiss architects respectively.

The Uybadin-Yucel Plan took two inputs as given: the main decisions of the Jansen Plan, and more importantly, existing development trends in the city. In this sense, the plan extended the Jansen Plan in line with existing growth tendencies (See Figure VI. D). In other words, the new plan was not a radical plan which challenged market trends. Instead, it aimed at placing them within a framework. Like the Jansen Plan, it placed emphasis on the north-south axis as the development direction. It also continued to use the rectangular building islands which were proposed by the Jansen Plan as a part of the garden city idea.

The plan and the priorities it set out once again showed that despite the massive influx of the rural population and concomitant mushrooming of squatter housing in the city, middle-class hegemony was intact in the 1950s. As one planner points out:

'Although the plan negated the squatters they were there; encircling the regular housing zones, inhabiting areas reserved for green uses within an organic framework. The landless and jobless peasants were overwhelmingly migrating and producing their own environment. It was a natural environment evolving with its own logic generating its own physical fabric' (Gunay 1988:37).

Meanwhile, explosive urban growth continued during the 1950s, and the population of the city grew to 650 000 in 1960. Towards the end of the 1950s, the number of squatters were and the squatter dwellers were comprising per cent of the city population; and they were no longer contained in the old town section of the city.



Squatters Cling to a Hillside



Squatters on an Unsuitable Cliffside



Squatter Settlements Straddling a Main Road



A View of Squatter Settlements in the Old Town Area of Ankara

Rather, they were encircling the city. Thus, at the beginning of 1960s, the spatial structure of the city was different from the structure characterised by two cities; the old and new towns. Now there was a third city which had sprung out of the old town, but which encircled the whole city⁴. In a way, this situation reflected the relative position of the middle-class and the migrant population. While the former occupied the central part of the city, it was surrounded by the rural-originated masses. As argued above, the latter was not as antagonistic as the middle-class perceived it. Nevertheless, in the face of the irresistible influx of the migrant population, the middle classes narrowed their perspective to the authorised part of the city, and denied the existence of the migrant population. Yet, starting from the early 1960s, this position became untenable for both the middle-class and the state.

In the first place, the scale of the problem reached a point where denial was no longer possible. The squatter districts were no longer restricted to certain parts of the city. They penetrated even into those parts which were known as middle-class neighbourhoods. Likewise, the city centres became a concentration point of the 'informal' sector activities of the squatter population. In other words, the living and work places of the migrant population were so visible and pressing that in the early 1960s it was impossible to deny the 'problem'.

⁴ One of the leading left-wing Kemalist columnists describes the Ankara of this period in the following way: 'Forty-five per cent of Ankara's population lives in squatters. Ataturk's ideal was to set up a modern city in the place of destroyed section and old town which was on the skirts of the Altindag. We destroyed this ideal like the other ones. It is possible now to observe three Ankaras like three Turkeys; Ankara of Sultanate, Ankara of Ataturk...Ankara of Democracy (Party Politics) (Cumhuriyet, 13 January 1963, Ilhan Selcuk). It is worth nothing that the development of squatters as the third city is blamed on the transition to multi-party rule. The defeatist rhetoric is very evident in the tone of the article.'

If the attitude to the squatters became more positive during this period, this cannot be explained solely by the massive scale of the problem. Perhaps by a continuity from the 1950s, the increasing strategic importance of squatters as a massive urban vote stock for the political parties also played a part in the tolerance they received from different governments with the restoration of multi-party rule after the 1960 intervention. Ironically, the most intensive squatter development took place in the city during election periods as the parties in power closed their eyes to these developments due to their immediate political concerns.

More importantly, however, there was a marked change in the political climate in the early 1960s. As discussed in Chapter III, starting with the military intervention of 1960, the balance of power shifted in a direction which favoured the state-led development strategies *vis-a-vis* the market one. However, the new project was different from the Kemalist project of the 1930s in that, while the latter was based on the idea of an organic society, the former started to recognise class divisions and aimed at finding a position in this class-divided society. As a result of this search, the Kemalist project became sensitive to the working class.

The reflection of this shift in the urban domain was a more sympathetic attitude towards the squatters. One of the main changes was the recognition of the squatters as a non-transitory phenomenon. While perception shifted from denial to acceptance, the need for reform became the main element of the strategy. In other words, while the squatter was now seen as an undeniable element of the urban structure, they were perceived, by the state and middle-class, within an integrative discourse which still

saw the squatters as a category that needed to be integrated by improving their social and spatial conditions. This was consistent with the state-led developmentalism and planning ideology of the 1960s.

By referring to the housing crisis in Ankara and other large cities, the prime minister of post-1960 period, Inonu, was declaring that, especially for the urban poor, housing provision was a duty of the state (*Cumhuriyet* 16 April 1962). Similarly, the Minister of Reconstruction and Settlements announced that the squatters were not going to be torn down without the provision of alternative cheap housing by the state.

Likewise the conception of squatter housing underwent an important change in the early 1960s, with the increasing emphasis on the positive aspects of squatter housing; and there were other reasons than the immediate political concerns of political parties in power underlying this changing attitude. After pointing to the failure of deterrence policies against squatter housing and to the inevitability of the future spread of squatter housing, one of the emerging left-wing organic intellectuals of this period, Dogan Avcioglu, put the new position in following way:

'In other words, while the population of cities was increasing, priority should be given to productive investments. This would prevent directing a large portion of existing resources to housing investment. For this reason, there is no way other than accepting squatter housing as the cheapest way of solving the housing need. Whatever we do, the number of squatter dwellings would increase in the years to come... Given the facts that it is impossible to prevent the further increase in the number of squatter housing and to allocate a very big resource to the housing investments, it is the only sensible solution to rationalise squatter housing development and to provide necessary services to these areas. For this reason, by giving up squatter demolition, it is necessary to allocate large areas for squatters. The state should provide these areas with water, electricity, sewage system, schools and transportation, and provide technical help to the squatter-building people. In this way, the squatter dwellers who give an example of hard work and self sacrifice by meeting their own housing needs would avoid the threat of demolition and find some comfort. With increasing wealth, the primitive squatters would be upgraded to more solid and adequate accommodations. At later stages of economic development, the state would come forward with a policy that would target the eradication of squatters (Ulus, 8 July, 1961).

It is worth noting that this new position represents a major shift in the policies towards the squatters from a negative attitude to a more positive approach. In this context, the new approach started to see the squatters as a solution rather than a problem. This is especially important in the context of the new developmentalism which points to the concentration of investments in the industrial sphere and the minimisation of so-called unproductive investments.

The first five-year development plan approached the problem along these lines: A committee report prepared with the participation of the representatives of the universities, ministries and municipalities as well as experts from the State Planning Organisation summarises the emerging approach the squatters in the following way:

- It is impossible to get rid of all gecekondu neighbourhoods. For social, cultural, sanitary, urbanistic reasons, these areas cannot be left to their destinies. The most reasonable way of handling the problem is to bring these squatter district to a situation in which their control could be possible.
- To this end, only those squatter dwellings which cannot be improved should be torn down, in the other districts, where the squatters do not create problems, the main services and utilities should be provided immediately.
- In order to prevent the development of new squatter districts, pre-designated or controlled squatter zones should be developed.
- Rural-urban migration should be prevented and should by no means be encouraged.
- Regarding the rehabilitation of the squatter zones, priority should be given to self-help schemes.
- The help should be limited to those who own more than one squatter house.
- The state owned lands in those squatter rehabilitation and prevention zones should not be transferred to the individuals; leasing on a 40-50 year basis should be applied.
- The penetration of squatters into strategic areas of the city should be prevented (Ulus, 6 May 1964).

The first comprehensive legal framework regarding squatter housing came with the Squatter Law of 1966 which bore the marks of the understanding summarised above.

By and large, while the central government, namely the Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement, was responsible for the overall implementation of policy, the municipalities were given limited responsibilities such as granting land deeds for those squatters built on public land. The law was proposing various policies regarding the legalisation, improvements, and prevention of squatter housing. As the

law was implementing the above mentioned policy proposals, I will evaluate the implementation of the law in Ankara without repeating the details of the law.

As it had the largest percentage of squatter dwellings in Turkey, Ankara became the main focus of implementation. In terms of prevention, the main policy was the establishment of squatter prevention zones. To this end, between 1965 and 1976, 3208.3 hectares of land were subjected to compulsory purchase for establishing 15 prevention zones. Nevertheless, implementation remained limited to two zones, Aktepe and Sincan (Senyapili and Turel 1996;10). The schemes failed to attract the squatters as the costs were high and controls were strict in comparison to erecting a squatter in an unauthorised area. In this sense, the success of the prevention policy was limited. Likewise, the increase in the number of squatters after the enforcement of law proved the failure of the prohibition policy as well. The implementation of the law was relatively successful with respect to improvement and legalisation. Yet, the provision of public utilities and title deeds was not a solution but only a commitment to squatter housing. In sum, the squatter law of 1966 proved to be a failure as far as the prevention of squatter housing is concerned. Rather, it was a legal symbol of the shift of policy from a negative to a positive approach to squatter development.

While the attitude towards the squatters changed in a more positive direction, there was no slow down in the rate of urbanisation during the 1960s and the population of the city reached 1.209.000 by 1970. The main source of this increase was still migration from rural areas (predominantly from Central and Eastern Anatolia). The annual inflow was 30.000 persons between 1955-60, 36.000 in 1960-65 and 45.000 between 1965 and 1970. There were on the other hand, important differences

between the early years and the 1960s influx in terms of the employment and living place experience of the incoming population. Firstly, the late comers were arriving into the city through a network formed by the first arrivals. In the early 1960s, there were visible squatter neighbourhoods in the city formed on the basis of ethnicity and kin networks. (Senyapili 1981; Ersoy 1985). Secondly, partly due to these networks and partly due to the expanding economy of the city, the newcomers were integrating into the economic structure of the city more quickly than its predecessors. Likewise, there also an improvement in the jobs taken by the incoming population.

Despite the improvement in the conditions of living and workplace, the duality between the social, political, cultural and spatial structures of the middle-class and squatter population towards the end of 1960s remained intact.

At this time, the squatters became the majority of the city population. There were important implications of this change for the social structure of the city. According to a survey conducted by the Ankara Metropolitan Area Master Plan Bureau, the population distribution of the city on the basis of income distribution was as follows: 52 per cent low-income households (with net income of less than 1200 TL per month), 39 middle-income households (1200-2750 TL per month), and 9 per cent high-income (more than 2750 TL). The overwhelming majority of the low-income population was constituted by the squatter population. As is shown in the Table V.

III. at the end of the decade, more than half of the city population (51%) was living in squatter settlements. It is interesting to note that the number of households was smaller than that of those living in the planned area, 43 and 53 per cent respectively.

Table VI. III. Planned and Unplanned Residential Areas, 1970


<i>Area Definition</i>	<i>Households (%)</i>	<i>Population (%)</i>	<i>Gross Land Area (%)</i>
Planned	53.0	43.0	31.0
Unplanned			
Pre-plan area (old quarter)	4.0	4.8	3.0
Illegal condominiums	1.0	1.2	
Squatters	42.0	51.0	66.0
Total Unplanned	47.0	57.0	69.0
Grand Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Ankara Metropolitan Area Master Plan Bureau, Urban Development Strategy

There was also a spatial duality in the city. The duality between the new and old towns of the first period was now replaced by the duality between the cities of the middle-class and of the squatters. In the course of development of the city, the old town lost its political importance and had become a part of the squatters domain by becoming their centre. Figure VI. II shows the duality and segregation between the middle-class and working class residential areas (squatter districts) in the city. In terms of income distribution a similar situation can be observed which matches the spatial segregation (Figure VI. III).

Although the attitude of both middle-class and the state changed in a more positive direction during the 1960s, this helped to consolidate the duality between the middle-class neighbourhoods and the squatter ones. The so-called positive attitude never aimed at eradicating the socio-spatial inequalities between these two sections. While the above mentioned policy was applied to squatters, the middle-classes continued to advance their interest in the so-called authorised section of the city. As we discussed above, the Yucel-Uybadin plan re-tailored the development opportunities for the

Figure VI. II. Socio-Spatial Segregation In Ankara (1970)



Source: Ankara Metropolitan Planning Bureau


middle-class by providing a planning framework for the growth trends already created by the middle-class. As one of the planners put it, the plan was further manipulated by speculative concerns during the 1960s:

'When the population pressures become more and more visible, the Urban Development Council did not make any effort to draw up a new plan, but simply started playing with densities. The city was divided into zones and each was subject to a maximum building height limit. Furthermore, projections and depths of the buildings were considered to increase the density. This system was well-suited to the small private developer, who purchased the urban parcel, constructed an apartment block in it and sold each dwelling unit to separate owners. The system also suited those who would readily buy and inhabit the dwelling unit. The consequent physical fabric is dull and monotonous with no regard for urban space or for replacing the older garden city environment of the city. Under these circumstances, the authors of the plan abandoned their position as controllers of the plan (Gunay 1985).

Thus during the 1960s, along with growth taking place in the unplanned area, there was a rapid expansion of speculatively oriented development in the authorised part of the city. One of the interesting features of this development was that once again the exchange value was the driving force behind urban development in urban space of the middle-classes despite the continuing rhetorical emphasis on the identity value of urban space.

Another feature of this trend was the consolidation of a formation of a new centre that was distinct from the old centre, and which served the middle-classes. As we saw in the preceding chapter, during the first period, despite the duality and segregation between old and new towns, both parts used the same centre, even if there was segregation within it. While there were developments pointing to the formation of a centre for the middle-class, they were embryonic during this period. In the course of second period, a centre for the new town emerged progressively. By the end of 1960s, there were two visible centres which reflected the socio-spatial duality between the middle-class and working class. While the old centre became the centre of the squatter population, the middle-class progressively retreated from using the

Figure VI. III. Income Distribution in Ankara



Source: Ankara Metropolitan Planning Bureau

old centre in favour of the new one. Thus, with the emergence of the new centre, the duality between two groups became more complete (See Figure VI. IV for old and new centres).















In sum, Ankara was a divided city in the mid-1960s. So far, I have evaluated this process with reference to the middle-class and the state. As far as the migrant population is concerned, I have treated them as if they were passive agents of this process. A full understanding of this process requires that attention be paid to their strategies and projects towards the city.


VI. III. The Squatters: From Social Base To Social Force

Placing the emphasis on the project and strategies of the migrant population is important in order to answer the question to what extent they were incorporated into middle-class hegemony and to what extent they mobilised to challenge middle-class hegemony and thus become a counter hegemonic force with its own project towards the city. Furthermore, as class formation takes place in and through concrete struggles, we can also understand the processes of class formation through the analysis of these strategies and struggles.

To begin with, it should be stated that these struggles and strategies of the migrant population underwent an important transformation in the course of this period. From the mid-1940s to the late 1960s, there was a lack of political radicalism among the migrant population. Only in the early 1970s, did a certain degree of mobilisation towards a more radical agenda take place among squatter dwellers, and even during

Figure VI. IV. Divided Centres

- Kaynak — Ref.:
Yersel Araştırma:
Local Investigations:
- MERKEZ BÖLÜMLERİ:**
SECTIONS OF THE CENTER
-  Yoğun Bölmeler — Intensive Sections
 -  Yarı Yoğun Bölmeler: Semi Intensive Sections:
 -  Merkez Uzantıları: Extensions of the center:
 -  Mali Merkez: Financial Center:
 -  Karmaşık Kullanışlar: Heterogenous land-uses:
 -  Prestij Bölümü — Prestige Area
 -  Geleneksel Bölüm — The Section of Traditional Act.
 -  Merkez Kapıları — Access points to the center:
- MERKEZLERİ ÇEVRELEYEN KULLANIŞLAR:**
USES SURROUNDING THE CENTERS:
-  Fakir iskan — Poor housing.
 -  Ruhsatlı iskan — Regular housing.
 -  Devlet Daireleri — Public offices.
 -  Küçük Sanatlar — Workshops
 -  Ekstansif kullanım alanları: Extensive land-use areas:
 -  Geniş yeşil alanlar: Large green areas:



this period the emerging radicalism was very limited and fragile as I will show below. The immediate question we need to tackle is thus the reason for the lack of radicalism among the migrant population especially during the 1950s and 1960s.

Even if it is true that the 1950s and 1960s were characterised by the lack of radicalism on the part of the squatter population, this should not be understood as complete inactivity of this group in the local political arena. On the contrary, from the very beginning the migrant population was very demanding and exerted considerable pressure on the state in order to get what they wanted. The lack of radicalism, on the other hand, should be sought in the very nature of these demands since these demands were defined primarily around economic material interest rather than political interest. In this respect, Cherki's evaluation of the French squatter movement is valid for the Turkish squatters of the 1950s and 1960s:

'Demands...and struggles are still economic in character, in the sense that squatting is seen as a means of satisfying an immediate economic need (housing) ... The political consciousness of the protagonists of the movement, the political aims of the movement, are not defined' (Cherki 1973, quoted in Pickvance 1977; 178).

Initially their main demand was not to be denied the chance to become urbanites. This required in the first place, avoiding demolition. After securing the permanence of their dwellings, they turned to claim the main public utilities in the short term and title deeds for the medium term whereas the transformation of their neighbourhood into planned development areas was defined as a long-term objective.

Yet, it is quite reasonable to argue that none of these claims posed a challenge to the middle-class hegemony in the city. This is true, although as we saw above, especially during the 1950s, there were intensive claims among the middle-class that the act of

squatting was no less than a violation of property rights. It is beyond any doubt that the massive influx of masses into the city and concomitant mushrooming of squatter dwellings in the city did threaten the lifestyle and the urban space of the middle-class. But this was not a conscious strategy on the part of squatter population, which aimed at bringing middle-class hegemony to an end and surrendering its space. Rather, it was an unintended consequence of the migration process. In other respects, the migrant masses were far from being a counter hegemonic force and this situation did not change in the following period, even if they became more and more active in city politics. In other words, they met important difficulties in advancing their demands from immediate economic interests (economic-corporate phase) to long-term political interests (political phase). It is important to understand the factors playing a part in this failure. As we will see below, some of these factors stem from the internal characteristic of the migrant population, from which others emerged in the course of their urbanisation.

Problems of class formation, in a Marxist or Weberian sense, among the squatters are an appropriate starting point for an understanding of their failure in becoming a counter-hegemonic force.

In the first place, the occupational stratification of the squatter population posed an important difficulty in the formation of a unified class since their occupational composition was heterogeneous, ranging from productive to service workers, from civil servants to small entrepreneurs. In research conducted by the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement in 1962, it was found out that petty producers and those who worked in artisanal occupations made up the largest proportion with 28.9

per cent of the squatter work force whereas the workers constituted the second largest group with 25.8 per cent. The small entrepreneurs in the trade sector was made up of 11.5 per cent of the total active work force. Those working in the public sector amounted to 22.5 per cent, and 10.4 per cent civil servant and 12.1 per cent low-rank support staff such as janitors, watchman etc. The unemployed workforce was around 3.2 per cent and the remaining 8.2 per cent were working in various undefined jobs⁵.

Occupational differentiation was not the only impediment to collective action by the squatters. Further, there were divisions even within the same occupational categories. For instance, ethnicity played a divisive role in collective action by creating closed and intimate communities within the workforce. This kind of network has been especially evident in the informal sector (Ersoy 1985; 1992). The informal/formal distinction plays a central role in the internal division of the working class in that, as Roberts states for Latin America, 'both informal workers and informal employers have different sets of interests and levels of income than their formal counterparts' (Roberts 1995). Given these difficulties in forming a unified class and class consciousness, it is necessary to turn to the living place experience of the squatter population of Ankara.

In their analysis of the immigrant population in Sparkbrook, Rex and Moore identify a three stages process of 'integration' into the city. As Pickvance (1977) sums up, these stages are:

⁵ Ankara-Gulveren District squatters research, Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlements, 1964. Similar studies carried out by the same ministry give similar figures regarding the occupational

'a brief stage of anomie when ties to the host society are weakened and employment is the only tie to the host society; the formation of 'an intimate primary sub-community' with others of the same ethnic group providing help with personal problems, a meaningful social world and preventing social isolation; and finally a stage in which the immigrant develops contacts outside this group, exercises his rights as a citizen and eventually leaves the 'colony' life of the immigrant area.'

A similar three stage process of 'integration' can be identified in the case of the migrant population of Ankara. For the first group of migrants in the post-war period, there was again a short period of anomie when the ties with home still existed but settlement in the city was not complete in terms of the work and living environments. The first migrants of the second period, who mainly settled in and around the old town, underwent an experience described above as anomic⁶. After the first arrivals, the first stage got shorter as the followers did not arrive in cities where they were complete strangers. Rather they arrived into a network that was based on ethnicity and kinship relations. Findings from the studies on this area are consistent with this argument. In one of the most comprehensive follow-up research projects carried out in Ankara on the integration of migrant population from a small town close to Ankara, namely Iskilip, the author asserts that:

'Out of 100 neighbourhoods in the city, only one third of them were selected as points of entry by the Iskilip migrants. All those particular neighbourhoods that were first settled had more than one Iskilipian family which had migrated to the city previously. Tentatively, we may argue that this is due to the existence of communication between those in the community of origin and those who had migrated to Ankara before. Hence, for more than half of the migrants the first housing in the city was found with the help of other Iskilipians who had already settled in the city' (Ersoy 1992; 139).

While Iskilipians settled in those areas where there were clusters formed by previously arrived migrants from Iskilip, the kinship network played a prominent role

distribution of the squatter workforce.

⁶ For the migrant environment of the 1940s, Boran depicts a situation which resembles the ghettos of Chicago. Boran, who was a sociologist with a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, reports that these quarters of Ankara where first migrants settled were known as Criminal Quarters. According to police records most of the criminals caught by police were from these neighbourhoods (Boran 1943). Another study points out that, especially in the poor inner-city squatter neighbourhoods, the anomie was more common and persistent than in other neighbourhoods. His findings shows that in Topraklik, one of those squatter neighbourhoods around the old town as opposed to other areas, there was a lack of solidarity and trust among the residents (Yorukhan 1968; 36). In the light of these findings we can argue that the stage of anomie experienced among squatter dwellers differed in different time and space contexts.

in the settlement of late comers. But in the course of time these ties weakened, even if they were not totally broken:

'Of the married migrants, 35 per cent arrived alone in Ankara and for a few months stayed as guests in a relative's or friends house. It was only after renting or constructing a house that they brought their families there. The place where the migrants first lived has shown a drastic change in the last 50 years. For instance, while before 1950, 40 percent of the migrants stayed as guests in a relative's house up to a year, this ratio dropped to 9.5 per cent for those who arrived between 1970 and 1980/ This is due to the weakening social links between migrants and their townsmen in time' (Ersoy 1992: 138).

These findings show that the first and immediate problem over facing the formation of a class consciousness was the existence of an alternative form of consciousness, that is, ethnic consciousness. Entering into an intimate ethnic community prevented the formation of a consciousness on the basis of class interests. The rise of community as the principal locus of urban consciousness prevented the development of a class-based consciousness among the squatter population.

Ironically, while the squatter population formed intimate communities based on ethnic ties, their urban value system, 'which refers to at hierarchical ranking of ways of life in different districts of the city and different types of housing' (Pickvance 1977; 180), was that of the middle-class⁷. I find two important areas through which the migrant population internalised the hegemonic value system via either the middle-class or the state. These are property ownership, and life style.

⁷ Keyder seems to be claiming the opposite of the claim I put forward on this point. According to Keyder, 'Despite conflicts among immigrants to the city, shanty town dwellers shared a background which distinguished them from older urbanites: they saw their new standing as constituting territory gained from an exclusionary élite, however. much as there was a culture that had perpetuated privileges associated with linguistic competence and the ability to emulate European lifestyles. Thus, shanty-towners reproduced in urban context the anti-élite resentment they had carried with them. The strength of this consciousness militated against the perception of class formation as the new axis of the society and alienated the newly urbanised population from class-based politics.' (Keyder 1987) As I will show below, the claim of anti-elitist resentment on the part of squatter dwellers carries some truth. Nevertheless this is misleading in that it underestimates the hegemony of the middle class over the squatters in terms of the urban value system.

In the first place, the squatter population became integrated into the socio-political structure through their internalisation of property relations. From the very beginning, they started to see urban land as a means of accumulation. That is, even if its immediate consumption by the squatter dwellers was due to its use value, they took the middle-class disposition which conceived of urban land as private property and a means of exchange⁸. Even in its earlier stages, squatter housing emerged something for the market. Despite the lack of title deeds, there was an informal squatter housing market where people could buy and sell squatter dwellings which were built on someone else's land.

The very same relations paved the way for the squatters to be integrated into the political system through clientilistic relations with the state. Despite the existence of the informal market, being a part of the formal market which required title deeds was the ultimate aim of the squatter population, and since granting title deeds is in monopoly of the state, it created a clientilistic relation in which consent is produced in return for title deeds. It was not surprising then that on the eve of the elections, the political parties kept promising legalisation and granting title deeds. When the title deeds were secured, the clientilistic relations did not finish since the squatters advanced their demand of being entitled to the redevelopment of their land through development plans. In other words, a form of a clientilistic relation remained intact until the squatter dwellers got the right for their land to be a part of the urban land stock.

⁸ Perhaps, they did not find this so difficult as the property relations in rural Turkey, from which they just broke away, was based on small-scale property ownership.

In line with this internalisation process, the lifestyle of the middle-classes constituted a model for the squatter dwellers. The ladder model was at work in this area too in the sense that the squatters saw their situation in the city as temporary, whereas the final point to be reached was again a middle-class lifestyle including its built environment and consumption norms.

We have shown above that the squatter dwellers contemplated a built environment transformed from squatters to authorised building blocks. In return, their land was seen as a speculative resource. But their desire for this transformation was not only rooted in speculative expectations but also in the lifestyle of the middle-class as a model for squatters. In research conducted in three different squatter districts, it was found that the majority of the squatters wanted to live in the middle-class neighbourhoods if they could afford it (See Table VI. IV).

The same kind of imitation can be found in the consumption norms of the squatters. Especially in the 1960s, there was a dramatic increase in squatters spending on consumer durable. Senyapili points out that in most of the squatter dwellings it was possible to find the main consumer durable as such.⁹

The occupational aspirations of the squatter population also show a certain degree of emulation of the middle-class by the squatters. Research carried out in squatter neighbourhoods point out that the squatter dwellers would have liked to see their

⁹ Most of the studies, including Senyapili's, explain the consumption pattern of the squatter population by the importance of the internal market for the dominant accumulation strategy of the period and assert that the squatters were encouraged to spend on these items to support the accumulation regime. I find that this explanation is functional and *ex post facto*. The real mechanism of the orientation to

children dominantly in civil servant positions (Yorukhan 1968). In this sense, the squatter dwellers took the middle-class population as a model not only in relation to living space but also to workplace.

Table VI. IV. Preferred Districts to Own a House in the Future

Preferred Districts and Income Groups	Tuzlucayir		Akdere		Yildiz		Total		
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	
Etlik-Ayvali	L M	7	3	6	2	2	1	15	2
Kecioren	L M	-		16	6	9	4	25	4
Aktepe	L M	2	1	-		-		2	0
Haskoy	L	-		-		1	0	1	0
Siteler-Ulubey	L M	1	1	1	0	1	0	3	0
Aydinlikevler	M	-		1	0	2	1	3	0
Akkopru-Varlik	L M	-		-		1	0	1	0
Yenimahalle	M	12	6	17	7	8	3	37	5
AOC-Gazi Mahallesi	M	-		2	1	-		2	0
Altindag	L	1	1	-		1	0	2	0
S.pazari-Eski Ankara	L	3	2	-		1	0	4	1
Cebeci	M	13	6	20	8	-		33	5
Kayas	L	1	1	-		-		1	0
Incesu-S.Baglari	L M	-		2	1	-		2	0
K.Esat-K.Dere	M H	13	6	7	3	7	3	27	4
Y.Ayranci-A.Ayranci	M H	4	2	1	0	4	2	9	1
Cankaya-Yildizevler	H	28	14	47	19	85	33	160	23
Dikmen-Ovecler	M H	3	2	7	3	6	2	16	2
Bahceli-Emek	M H	11	5	7	3	3	1	21	3
Maltepe-Anittepe	M	3	2	6	2	2	1	11	2
Yenisehir	M H	22	11	15	6	5	2	42	6
Ulus	M	9	4	3	1	1	0	13	2
Etimesgut	L	-		2	1	-		2	0
Sincan (North)	L	-		1	0	1	0	2	0
Dikmen-OR-AN	M H	-		-		8	3	8	1
The Same District	L	31	15	71	28	95	37	197	28
Unknown		36	18	22	9	11	4	69	10
TOTAL		200	100	254	100	254	100	708	100

SOURCE: Senyapili (1981)

It is now time to turn to the state as it was more central to the urbanisation of the migrant population than the above remarks would imply. In the first place, the state gradually became the single most important employer of the squatter workforce in the city. Given the fact that Ankara as the capital was characterised by the dominance of the service sector, and most of these service sector jobs either in directly or

this consumption pattern needs to be explained by reference to the hegemony of middle-class values

indirectly related to the state sector (See Table VI.V), it is not surprising to find out that the state employed a considerable number of the squatter workforce.

Table VI. V. Sectoral Distribution of the Economically Active Population in Major Cities, 1970

	Percentage Employed in		
	Industry	Services	Other
Istanbul	38.9	56.2	4.9
Ankara	20.1	69.6	10.3
Izmir	34.7	53.6	11.7
Adana	31.7	45.9	22.4
Bursa	40.4	41.1	18.5
Gaziantep	29.3	48.3	20.4
Eskisehir	30.9	53.3	15.6

Source: Ankara Metropolitan Development Bureau Report

According to another study, about 30 per cent of the workforce of the squatter areas were working directly for the state (See Table VI.VI). Roberts point to a similar situation in Latin American cities and asserts that this employment pattern has important repercussions on political organisation and activity:

'In the 1960s and 1970s, we have seen how the state became a major employer in Latin America, particularly in the cities and particularly for non-manual workers. This state dependence did not prevent the formation of worker organisations but it is clear that it reduced their independence. Like the professional associations, they were being formed in the shadow of the state and, often, under its guidance' (Roberts 1995; 194)

State control was not limited to public sector employees. It influenced the labour market and created some sort of dependence in the informal sector as well through a carrot and stick policy, as most of the activities taking place in the informal sector was not fitting into the legal frameworks, it required the implicit consent of the state.

over the squatters.

Table VI. VI. Sectoral Distribution Of The Economically Active Population In Squatter District Of Ankara

	Number Of Household	%
Skilled Labour	264	27.0
Unskilled Worker	114	11.5
Self Employed	169	17.0
State Employee	146	14.5
State Employee (Low Rank)	152	15.0
Unemployed	35	3.5
Agricultural	12	1.0
Unknown	16	1.5
Unanswered	92	9.0
Total	1000	100

Source: Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement

In sum, in the living and workplace the squatter dwellers took their cue from the middle-class and the state and internalised their values. Yet, this inference should not lead to a conclusion that assumes a situation in which the squatter population was intentionally directed to a false consciousness and hence, middle-class hegemony continued without any serious challenge. I think both assumptions would be wrong in their basic premises.

As far as the false-consciousness assumption is concerned, it can be challenged on two grounds. Firstly, the perception of urban living and work environments by the squatters as a ladder which was open to their access was not completely an illusion. The findings of different studies regarding the migrant population of the city point to the fact that the squatter dwellers improved their situation progressively in both work and living place in time¹⁰. Secondly, the squatter dwellers did not remain within the limits drawn by the state or middle-class in their expectations and demands. They progressively pressed the state to get further benefits and concessions which, in various occasions as will be shown below, created important tensions within and between the middle-class and the state.

The latter point brings us to the second argument which regards the middle-class hegemony in the city. It might be argued that as middle-class values became dominant among the squatter dwellers, the middle-class continued to be a hegemonic force in the city. However, there are good reasons to argue against this assumption. In the first place, if the two-city project of the middle-class during the first period became a one-city project progressively during the second period, this was forced by the squatters rather than giving voluntarily by the hegemonic bloc. As we saw above, in the 1940s, and 1950s, the two-city project was defended despite the massive population influx, only in the early 1960s, the inapplicability of a two-cities project was conceded and a progressive move started towards a one-city project which was characterised by a more inclusive strategy towards the squatters.

Yet, this strategy was a conflict-ridden one in that it created important tensions between the dominant middle-classes and the squatters as well as within the hegemonic bloc itself and ended in a certain degree of radicalisation of the squatters and split in the hegemonic bloc towards the beginning of the 1970s.

VI. V. Towards a Radical Agenda: the 1970s

In Chapter III we saw that there was a shift in the accumulation strategy towards import-substitution industrialisation which was more inclusive than the accumulation strategy of the former period regarding the working classes. The introduction of the multi-party system also created the conditions of class-based politics. Although the

¹⁰ See Senyapili (1981), Ersoy (1985).

RPP did not cut its ties with its initial premises, during the 1960s it started to shift towards the left progressively to find a social base for itself among the newly emerging working class. Again we saw in Chapter III, this shift towards a class-based politics had broken the ties between the RPP and its traditional allies such the army by the early 1970s. In turn, especially starting from the late 1960s the alternative state and hegemonic projects created a more unstable political environment in the country due to the lack of single hegemonic project.

Likewise, ensuring unity of the state became a major problem especially during the 1970s. In the first place, the increasing importance of planning gave considerable autonomy to the technocrats and bureaucrats *vis-a-vis* the politicians, and created considerable tension between the legislative and executive bodies. Perhaps more importantly, the local governments, namely municipalities, became an important locus of power in their own right in the 1970s, and, in turn, the relationship between the central and local governments became tense and conflict-ridden.

The local political scene of Ankara became one of the important arenas of these alternative projects and of the resulting instability. In the first place, the city continued to be a focal point of interest for the central government. Starting from the mid-1960s, in line with the rising attractiveness of planned development, the central government decided to form a Planning Bureau, which was later named the Ankara Metropolitan Planning Bureau within the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement. Its main objective was defined as the preparation of a comprehensive

plan for the city for the year 1990 (See Urban Development Strategy)¹¹. The Bureau was formally established in 1969 and through it, the central government aimed at controlling the development pattern of the city.

While the political centre, which was controlled except for short intervals by the conservative right-wing coalitions from the mid-1960s until the end of this period, tried to remain in the driver's seat in the development of the city, as we saw in Chapter IV, there was a shift among the government of the large cities, including Ankara, towards a left-wing agenda. While the Marxist left was rising among the working class and especially among the youth, there was also a shift in the RPP towards the left and, as we saw in the preceding part of this chapter, this shift found its reflection in city politics in the form of a more positive attitude towards the squatters. In a gradual manner, as it can be seen in Table VI. VII, this shift was also reflected among the squatter dwellers and from the late 1960s the RPP started to gain support in squatter districts of the city, support which reached a peak in the local elections of 1973 and brought the RPP to the power at the municipal level.

Under the motto of 'this order must change' the new city administration, under the charismatic mayorship of a well-known left-wing architect, Vedat Dalokay, reflected the main features of the neo-Kemalist project. While claiming the heritage of the Kemalist project of the first period, it was also recognising the inequalities and class

¹¹ The Bureau started to work on the preparation of a comprehensive development plan, before its formal establishment, in 1967. It developed alternative development plans for the city. In the process the Bureau which became dominated by the left-wing technocrats, came into conflict with the central government. The plan prepared by the Bureau could only be approved in 1982. A summary of these works can be found in 'Urban Development Strategy, a Summary: Ankara 1970-1990'.

Table VI. VII. Party Support by Type of Urban Community in Elections

	Percentage of Votes Cast								
	Justice Party			Republican Party	People's Party	Other Parties			
	1965 N	1969 N	1973 L	1965 N	1969 N	1973 L	1965 N	1969 N	1973 L
Istanbul	52.0	47.8	28.5	30.4	33.8	48.9	17.6	18.4	22.6
Gecekondus	62.4	53.8	26.7	19.1	21.8	47.5	18.5	24.4	25.8
Ankara	46.5	42.4	29.2	30.2	36.0	44.8	23.3	21.0	26.0
Gecekondus	52.5	43.4	27.7	25.8	30.1	45.9	21.7	26.5	26.4
Lower middle-class	48.7	47.1	32.4	31.8	32.5	41.9	19.5	20.4	25.7
Middle-class	27.4	24.8	21.8	53.1	60.4	62.6	19.5	14.8	15.6
Upper middle-class	26.8	25.8	24.9	54.1	60.1	57.2	19.1	14.1	17.9
Izmir	62.1	53.2	40.9	29.8	35.1	44.6	8.0	11.7	14.5
Gecekondus	72.1	60.7	36.5	17.0	22.6	44.2	10.9	16.7	19.3
Lower middle-class	73.4	61.3	41.9	17.4	25.7	44.1	9.2	13.0	14.0
Middle-class	65.9	58.9	42.7	25.6	32.3	44.4	8.5	8.8	12.9
Upper middle-class	54.1	46.8	37.8	36.5	43.9	50.4	9.4	9.3	11.8

Source: Keles and Danielson 1985

N: National Elections L: Local Elections

divisions in the city. According to mayor Dalokay, the reason for the latter lay in the break with the Kemalist revolution:

'The decision to make Ankara the capital of the country represents a revolution in its own right. The decision making centre of the country was taken away from an élite environment which was not capable of identifying and integrating itself with the rest of country and moved inland with concerns of integration and identification with the public. This move became a means and symbol of transition from a spatial organisation characterised by external dependence to a nation state which is internally integrated....In today's Ankara, there is no sign of these successes. In a short period of time, speculation-oriented environments achieved prominence misdirecting this successful start' (Dalokay 1973).

While the blame was laid on the speculatively oriented groups and the social order supporting them, the local government level was defined as an alternative power centre which could stop this unfair trend in favour of a more just city. But according to Mayor Dalokay, this change would require a new philosophy of local government which would break away from the impartial mayor and apolitical municipality image:

'The municipalities are seen as the institutions responsible for the administration and planning of the city. Their responsibilities are reduced to the collection of refuse and repairing the sewage system. They should not even be involved in the provision of electricity, school, health, transportation services in the city. They were seen as a technical institutions which serve the existing order and in this sense they are defined as the servant of the ruling classes. However, we would like to define the municipalities in a different light and want to add new missions to it. We would like to create a municipality which could be the voice of poor classes rather than the municipality of the ruling classes and like to give this city and services to them as a present... The previous municipality was providing service to the ruling classes, who run the dominant order, to strengthen them. The new municipality wants to contribute to the creation of a more just social order' (Dalokay 1977).

In line with this understanding the municipality of Ankara started to implement new projects which aimed at creating a new understanding of municipal philosophy that challenged the dominant understanding of the 1960s. Under the leadership of the Ankara municipality a new understanding on local government became dominant and started to find reflection in other cities which were also controlled by the RPP:

'An urban populism emerged that emphasised social justice, municipal autonomy and popular participation in local affairs. These ideas were the most fully developed in Ankara under Republican Mayor Vedat Dalokay who envisaged cities in which all strata participated in municipal governments dedicated to the equitable distribution of city services and were able to curb land speculation and claim the appreciation in land values for public purposes... Priority in the allocation of resources would be given squatter settlements and communal units would be organised to foster increased popular participation in decision making' (Keles and Danielson 1985; 108).

This new approach, which was going to be called later on as 'New Municipalism', was not a part of a strategy Mayor Dalokay had before he took office. As one of the advisor to the municipality during this period put it, the municipality did not have a comprehensive strategy at the outset; the principals of this new approach emerged in the course of implementation (Tekeli 1992).

If Ankara played a central role in the formation of a so-called 'New Municipalism Movement' it owed this partly to its newly emerging left-wing intellectuals who were employed by Mayor Dalokay in the newly established advisory board of the municipality. The advisory board worked closely with the mayor, and most of the

ideas, which guided the NMM in implementation originated from this advisory board¹².

In turn, towards the end of the first period in office, there was a municipal strategy that was shared by most of the other large city municipalities controlled by the RPP.

These principles can be summed up in the following way:

'New Municipalism' in general, favoured more direct and broader involvement of municipalities in the domain of production and management of collective means of consumption, more autonomy for local governments and their consolidation of especially financial aspect. These new considerations were supported with social justice ideals' (Keskinok 1986; 140)

The implementation of these principles was nothing less than a reversal of the state strategy in the urban field which had been dominant since the foundation of the republic. In terms of internal organisation, the new model was aiming at creating an administratively and financially autonomous local government in place of the existing understanding which saw local government as the local arm of the political centre. Likewise, in relation to forms of intervention, the new Municipalism was proposing massive involvement of the municipality in various areas of collective consumption by departing from the minimalist local-government model. Finally, regarding the forms of interest representation, the new understanding proposed a direct involvement of the urban poor and other working class groups in local politics.

In line with this strategy, a concrete project began to emerge gradually. Among others, the most strategic one was the 'Akkondu Project' for the urban poor. This was seen as an alternative to squatter housing. Briefly, according to the development

¹² When they were employed by Mayor Dalokay, most of the members of the advisory board had been victimised by the right-wing government of the period, either sacked or forced to resign from their jobs in public offices and universities. They were either affiliated with Marxism or with radical

plan proposed by the Planning Bureau formed within the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement, the West corridor of the city was designated as the development direction of the city. Following this lead, the municipality proposed to developing a new housing project in this area that would help to solve the housing problem of the urban poor by providing cheap housing. In line with the ideological commitment of the municipality to public ownership, most of the housing units were going to be in public ownership and would be rented to the urban poor by the municipality.

According to the developers of this project:

'the dependent nature of the capitalist development in Turkey on the world capitalist system, as in other less-developed countries, had led to the emergence of a dual social structure: one within this process and the other at the periphery of this process. The manifestation of this duality in the urban housing environment was in the forms of regular housing and squatter housing'. At the heart of this problem lies the institution of private property rights. 'The proposed new built environment can only go beyond previous experience by not allowing the private ownership of urban land.'¹³

In this respect the main pillar of the Akkondu Project was the municipal ownership of the houses built by the municipality.

Public transportation was also again a priority. In this case, the municipality placed an emphasis on the construction of an underground railroad as a mass transit system in the city. Like the Akkondu Project, priority was given to public as opposed to private forms of service provision. Besides, the idea of constructing certain parts of the underground system in Turkey was voiced against the complete construction duties and rewards being given to the foreign firms.

Kemalism. I think this point is important as this situation reflects the marriage of Marxism and Kemalism during the 1970s in the local politics of Ankara.

¹³ Study Report by Mayor's Advisory Committee, p. 143.

Another project was the establishment of control over the key everyday consumption items such as bread and dairy products which were vital for the urban poor. The municipality sought to gain control over the provision of these items, not only by regulating the market, but also by becoming direct producers.

While the municipality initiated an intensive policy discussion regarding these areas, the controversial mayor, Dalokay, was also keen on smashing the dominant opinion of the impartial and apolitical municipality and mayor model. One of the radical actions taken by Mayor Dalokay was to cut off the water supply of the Spanish Embassy as a protest against the execution of five youths in Spain by the military dictatorship. In a short while, the city population got used to the radical actions of the Mayor such as sitting on hunger strike to protest against the financial strain imposed by the central government, or actions such as the confiscation of bread factories by the municipality after unwarranted price increases.

Yet, the political centre controlled by the right-wing coalition during these years was not prepared to accept the newly emerging municipal strategy which challenged most of the accepted principles of local government. Reactions were not limited to financial strain and obstruction and delay of the projects of the municipality which required the approval of the central government. More dramatically, the Ministry of the Interior removed Mayor Dalokay from office for being involved in political actions and ignoring his municipal responsibilities. Yet, this decision was nullified by the Council of the State and he returned to his office within a few days.

Ironically, what the conservative government failed to do was achieved by the political centre of the RPP. It would be a mistake to assume that the fact that the RPP became radical reflected the official line taken by the RPP's national leadership. Rather, the national leadership became increasingly disturbed by the radicalising agenda of its large-city mayors led by Mayor Dalokay. Their programmes were more of a socialist understanding rather than one of the left-of-centre RPP. In turn, most of the radical mayors were deselected with the active involvement of the national leadership. In the local elections of 1977, they were replaced by more moderate mayors who were close to the national leadership. The advisory board also resigned after the departure of Mayor Dalokay.

Doubtlessly this intervention of the RPP headquarters was a blow to the emerging municipal radicalism, which was led by the Mayor of Ankara, Vedat Dalokay, but it did not bring the new Municipalism to an end completely in Ankara. Perhaps they were not as radical as the ones carried under the mayorship of Dalokay, but most of the policies continued to be applied by the new mayor of the city.

The initiatives such as Akkondu and Underground projects were among those the new administration kept intact.

The new mayor, Ali Dincer, took a more moderate stands *vis-a-vis* the central government. He tried not to antagonise the political centre which was controlled, except for a short interval, by the conservative coalition governments for the sake of securing that the central government co-operation for the realisation of the projects. During mayor Vedat Dalokay's administration, the approval of the projects was in

most cases delayed or refused by the central government. The Akkondu project was the main victim of the conflict between the central and local governments as the central government did not co-operate in the compulsory purchase of the land necessary for the project. With a more moderate stand, now the mayor secured the help of the Ministry of Reconstruction for compulsory purchase. The project gained pace with the realisation of the compulsory purchase. 300 000 people were assumed to live at the area in the completion of the project (Batikent Policy Report 1979). The approval of the plan of the project, which is now called Bati Kent Project, was also secured without delay by the new mayor. Further, in order to avoid possible confrontation with the central government the municipality decided to stand down from being the leading force of the project. The responsibility of the project was transferred to a union of housing co-operatives constituted by trade unions, confederations and merchant associations, which was called as Kent-Koop. By doing this the mayor aimed to depoliticise the Bati- Kent project. The fast development and implementation proved the mayor's view.

Yet, the Bati-Kent project turned to be radically different from the Ak-Kondu project of the previous mayor. It lost most of the initial objectives that challenged the dominant value system in the city.

In Dalokay's initial scheme, most of the housing would be inexpensive rental units. But the blueprint developed by municipal and central officials shifted the emphasis to home ownership with only 4500 rental units out of the projected 60 000 dwellings...However lofty Batikent objectives were with 92.5 percent of the units for sale, most of the beneficiaries were bound to be middle-income families who could afford to purchase homes...As in other housing programs. The rhetoric of providing alternatives for squatters faded before economic and political realities (Keles and Danielson 1985; 188).

What the Bati-Kent experience showed in the first place was that there was a strong resistance to going outside the dominant understanding, which was exclusionary

towards the working class and urban poor. The Akkondu project, which was designed for these groups, did have a change to be realised only after it became a project for the middle class. The central government did not allow the municipality, along with the headquarters of the RPP, to develop projects which targeted the working class and urban poor. Even the new mayor who took a more moderate stand faced the obstruction of the central government whenever he intended to apply a policy which challenged existing values. For instance, when he wanted to develop the underground project popularised by the ex-mayor of the city, he met fierce opposition from the central government.

The scheme proposed a rapid transit system with a 25-kilometer line. In order to reduce the cost, a negligible part of the line was underground and the cars were planned to be produced by the Turkish Railway Agency. The central government did not co-operate with the municipality. In return, the municipality began the construction of the metro by relying on its own resources. The central government responded by blocking the project.

The initiatives of the municipality were not always a failure. It succeeded developing a public transportation system. By using the short interval in which the RPP was in power, the municipality purchased 200 buses for public transportation and persuaded the central government agencies to transfer their buses to the municipality to use in public transportation. Special bus lanes were also developed in the busy streets of Ankara. This scheme was a major challenge to the private or semi-private transportation system and it was successful at creating a public transportation system which was almost non-existent until then.

In sum, despite the fierce opposition of the central government, and some moderation in its policies, the new Municipalism in Ankara made a mark in the local politics of Ankara. It challenged an understanding which saw the local government as the local arm of the political centre since the establishment of the Turkish republic. By departing from this local agency model, the RPP-led mayors and their teams, sometimes in conflict with their own party headquarters, aimed at becoming the voice of squatters and the urban poor.

The new Municipalism movement was not an isolated case in terms of its radical stand. Rather, it was a part of rising radicalism in large cities starting from the late 1960s. There were radical mobilisations outside the RPP. Although their impact and support were still limited, Marxist parties were active among the working class. There were also revolutionary organisations finding support, especially from the second-generation squatter dwellers who were dissatisfied with the political system and the RPP¹⁴. They were different from the first-generation squatter dwellers in that they were looking for more radical transformations while their parents' radicalism did not go beyond the line represented by the RPP. These revolutionary organisations became increasingly active in many of the squatter neighbourhoods. They were organising land invasions, helping newcomers in erecting squatters and trying to rise revolutionary consciousness among the squatter dwellers through seminars and educational programmes (Marcussen 1982: 78). Towards the end of 1970s, many

¹⁴ Unfortunately we do not have comprehensive case studies about this period covering these experiences. Marcussen provides two case studies but they are very brief and done just after the military intervention. The account provided here is based on mostly personal experience as I lived one of those neighbourhoods which was controlled by left wing groups.

neighbourhoods were declared 'liberated zones', that is, these areas were declared to be free from state intervention and in control of the revolutionary organisation.

This radical challenge was met with the reaction of radical and militant right wing groups supported by the right-wing governments of this period. The squatter areas become an intense and violent subject of confrontation between these groups ending on many occasions in blood shed¹⁵. Towards the end of 1970s, the city, like the other metropolitan cities, became an arena of political violence. Clashes between armed groups and killings were part of a daily life.

The military intervened in the early hours of September 12th, 1980 by justifying its act with the failure of the civil governments in preventing the terror in the country. Along with revolutionary parties and youth organisations, the RPP-led municipalities were held responsible for the anarchy and terror. Like many other mayors, the mayor of Ankara was sacked by the military government just after the coup. With the appointment of a retired colonel as the new mayor of the city, a period in the development of the city, which is marked by the urbanisation of labour power, came to an end.

Ironically, almost no resistance came from the squatters to the military intervention which crushed most of the organisations active in squatter areas. Most of the squatter dwellers, like the other sections of the local population including the middle class, remained silent if they did not support the military intervention. This experience

¹⁵ For instance, in one of the so-called liberated squatter districts, namely Piyangotepe, nine squatters dwellers were killed as a result of an armed attack by right wing-militants in a coffee house in 1978.

showed that the support for the left in the squatter areas was fragile and that, although the left dominated local politics in 1970s' Ankara, it did not become hegemonic.

VI. VI. Conclusion

We have seen that Ankara experienced a new round of urbanisation starting with the massive influx of rural-originated masses into the city. For this reason, I have argued that this period (1950-80) was characterised by the urbanisation of labour power, as the migrant population constituted the main bulk of the working-class population of the city.

Their arrival led to a massive change in the social and spatial structure of the city. In a short space of time they outnumbered the existing population. While the social base in the city underwent such a dramatic change, the spatial dimension of this change was the mushrooming squatters at the outskirts of the city. Towards the end of the 1960s, more than half of the city population was living in squatters areas.

Despite the dramatic change they caused in the social and spatial structures of the city, the migrant population was far away from becoming a major social force asking for radical changes in the urban order in the early years of their arrival at the city. They failed to go beyond immediate economic interests.

They lacked a class unity-party because they were a very heterogeneous group as far as the occupational structure was concerned. But, neither did they become housing

classes even if there was a material base for this kind of unity. One of the main reasons behind this failure was that for them the prime locus of urban consciousness was the (ethnic) community rather than the classes for some understandable reasons. In the lack of conscious leadership and organisational resources, they remained tied to ethnic relations for a long time as safety networks.

The problems of the transformation of this social base into a (radical) social force can not be explained only with the internal characteristics of the migrant population. We saw that two major forces of local politics, namely the state and the middle class, had important roles in the relative passivity of the migrant population.

The middle class constituted an important reference point for the squatter population especially regarding the living place. Despite the un-welcoming attitude of the middle classes in the early years of their arrival, migrant groups took the middle-class lifestyle and consumption norms and its built environment as a model and ideal for themselves. The availability of social mobility kept this hope of the squatters as a realistic alternative for themselves and for their children. They also internalised the way in which the middle class perceived the urban land, and it did not take them long to see the land they acquired in the city as a channel of accumulation. As a matter of fact, the small land ownership pattern of rural areas helped them immensely in this internalisation process.

It is in this context that the state gained prominence for the squatter dwellers. Even if the state did not welcome them into the city and did not provide them with housing and other services on their arrival, they felt still dependent on the state regarding

various issues, including the legalisation of their squatters through the provision of title deeds and basic services. In a short while a clientalistic relation was formed between the state and the squatter population.

The relations of the squatter dwellers with the middle class and the state began to change starting from the early 1960s. In line with the changing political and economic climate, both the state and at least some sections of the middle class started to take a more positive attitude towards the squatters. The squatters, dwellers also shifted to the left wing parties in line with this large-scale change in the late 1960s.

At the beginning of the 1970s, the new Municipalism movement emerged as a product of this changing political climate. Led by a group of middle-class intellectuals, they set their agenda at the local government level as being the representative of working people and the urban poor. They succeeded gaining the support of these groups and came to power in the early 1970s. The leadership cadres saw this mobilisation as an attempt at establishing a counter-hegemony in the local political life of the city. So did the conservative central government who was still controlled by right-wing parties and attempted to prevent the success of the so-called New Municipalism Movement. In turn, the state become an arena of alternative and conflicting projects.

There was a similar mobilisation among the more radical groups in the city. While the RPP found support among the first generation of squatter dwellers, the revolutionary groups found support among the squatter youth. Towards the end of the 1970s, the squatters were the nest of revolutionary groups. In response to this

mobilisation and increasing unrest in the large cities, the army intervened in September 1980 and did not meet any resistance. The mayor of the city was sacked: the revolutionary movements which were active in squatter areas suddenly disappeared. Perhaps more importantly, the squatters themselves did not show any reaction at all to the military intervention which brought the projects of the left towards the city to an end.

It is important to point to the fact that the mobilisation of the 1970s was not a bottom-up one. Rather, it was a left-wing, middle-class mobilisation as far as the leadership cadres were concerned. That is, it was a mobilisation from above aimed at representing (those who cannot represent themselves) the squatter dwellers.

In a way, both the RPP-centred élite and other revolutionary groups saw themselves as some sort of organic intellectuals of the squatter dwellers. They wanted to inject consciousness into them from outside. Beyond any doubt the new Municipalism movement gained the support of the squatter dwellers in the local elections. In other words, the support that was given to the New Municipalism movement succeeded to get the electoral support of the squatter population. Yet, it hardly went beyond this point in the following years. The New Municipalism failed to become a movement which achieved an opening of channels of participation to its social base. Likewise, although the revolutionary movements were active in squatter areas, the first generation squatter dwellers took a cautious attitude towards them. The support given these groups remained limited to second generation squatter youth. Ironically, the RPP-led municipal movement and other revolutionary organisation that remained failed to achieve the active participation of the urban poor. Furthermore, they

themselves were far away from providing unity within the left. While the RPP was troubled with its internal problems, other radical organisations were highly divided and fragmented into different groups.

It is too easy to put the blame on squatters in their failure to become a social force, and attribute the absence of radicalism among to them to false consciousness. It is also senseless to accuse the squatters for being too opportunistic. People develop their projects and strategies with reference to their experiences. As squatters arrived in the city, city politics was dominated by the middle class. As we saw in the previous chapter, the middle class itself was deeply indulged in speculative activities in the city by enjoying their access to the state. It was this value system the squatter dwellers borrowed from the middle class. In a similar way, the political parties approached them with favours in return for votes. Given these and the reality of social mobility, it is too idealistic to expect a radicalisation of squatter dwellers.

I do not certainly deny the role of intellectuals and organisations in the perception of these experiences and emphasised their role in this process throughout this thesis. Besides, the squatter people showed that they responded when they were offered acceptable choices. Their shift towards the left was the best evidence of this sensitivity in the early 1970s. Yet, the internal divisions and clashes within the left did prevent the development of an alternative hegemonic project which gained the active support of the working class and urban poor.


Despite these divisions the left in general posed a treat to the urban order in the city. The military coup of 1980 was partly a response to this. The coup did not only stop

the rise of the left but also opened a new period in the urban experience of Turkey. I called this new experience and round of urbanisation as the urbanisation of capital. As I discussed in chapter IV the cities became the arenas of capital accumulation. Ankara is one of these arena where five star hotels, huge shopping malls and skyscrapers started to invade the sky of the city. Some squatter areas became an arena of these processes through redevelopment plans. The apartment blocks replaced the squatters by providing the squatter owners with some gains.

There is another face for this process. The city has become more and more polarised as a result of increasing income differences. Poverty has become more dramatic than before in the city. As the late 1960s and 1970 has shown, people learn from their interaction and experiences, and when the reality they confront changes, they change too, and act differently. The changing urban experience of the 1980s and especially 1990s towards intensified exploitation and exclusion in general, and in urban space by capital, opened new possibilities for the working class and urban poor to develop a new form of radicalism, which might have led to the radical transformation of the urban space.

Yet, this cannot be taken for granted. Without alternative projects and organisations which can articulate this progressively growing dismay and unrest among the working class and urban poor, it can lead into different directions. The support given to Islamic fundamentalism is just an example of these kinds of orientations.

HARİTA: 4.2.7 ANKARA ŞEHİRİ CUMHURİYETİ DÖNEMİ GELİŞMESİ 1924-1980



CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

This thesis has had two interrelated objectives. The first was to apply the strategic relational approach which was developed in the field of state theory to overcome the long-discussed duality between agency and structure in urban studies. The second was to apply this approach to Ankara, the capital of Turkey. In what follows, I will evaluate the extent to which these objectives have been achieved. In doing so I will also show how our understanding of Ankara has changed as a result of this intervention, and will identify the implications of the thesis for theory in urban studies and point out areas for future research which this thesis has identified but not tackled.

I have argued that in the field of state theory there is an unproductive duality between capital and class logic accounts and that we can get out of this impasse by applying a strategic relational approach originating in Gramsci's writings and later on fully developed by Jessop. Since a similar impasse has existed in urban studies, I argued that the insights of the strategic relational approach can be applied in this field and provided a framework which conceptualises urban development and change in terms of the strategies and projects of different actors without ignoring the contextual features of urban processes. Hence, I have treated urban space as an arena of conflicting projects and strategies with different time and space horizons. Some of them claim hegemony over the whole city and have a long-term perspective while others fight for a limited hegemony or domination in a single part of the city. In the face of well-organised projects, some groups show very little resistance, but

sometimes, with limited resources, to fight against it to establish a counter hegemony. Without forgetting the structural context, which both limits and facilitates the success of different groups differentially, urban change is conceived as an outcome of the struggles for and against these projects and strategies.

Such an approach is superior to the structuralist and/or capital logic approaches on the one hand, and to contingency and voluntaristic approaches on the other. It is superior to the structuralist approaches in that it does not reduce urban change to the effect of structural logic within which there is only one dominant logic, that of the dominant class. It is also superior to those contingency approaches which see urban space as an arena where anything is possible since there is no structural context at all. In this respect, the strategic relational approach shows a way out of the dualism between structuralism and voluntarism.

In the empirical part, I have applied this understanding to the study of the Turkish state and to the analysis of urban change in the case of Ankara. I have shown that the understanding of the Turkish state and society is trapped within similar unproductive dualism such as between the élite vs. masses or the state vs. civil society. In this respect, I argued for a strategic relational understanding of the Kemalist project which overcomes the duality between state and capital and conceives of political and economic levels as parts of an integral whole. In this sense, the Kemalist project is seen as a special entry into the project of capitalist modernity characterised by a degree of external imposition and selective import from above. In this sense the Kemalist project signified the nation state as the political form, capitalist developmentalism as the economic form and Westernisation as the cultural form of

the same project of modernity. This approach then, overcomes the dualism created between the bureaucracy and the capitalist class.

This approach has important implications for the analysis of the spatial form of this project, the main pillar of which is the formation of Ankara as the new state capital. Ankara did not simply become a symbol but also a vehicle through which the Kemalist project established itself. Alongside its contribution to theory, I believe that the thesis has made important contributions to the study of urban processes in general and at a case-study level.

In the first place, it has provided a theoretically informed account of urbanisation in Turkey. This is an important contribution in the sense that the field has long been characterised by an empiricism which led to a form of analysis that not only took one particular issue, such as squatters as isolated events and concentrated on their particular development without relating it to other events and processes. In the absence of a theoretical framework, this easily led to a naïve empiricism. As a step towards developing a viable theoretical framework, I developed a periodisation of the Turkish urban experience in Chapter IV. I showed that there were three distinctive periods in terms of this experience and that each was characterised by certain elements which gave a degree of unity. I also showed that each period represents a round of urbanisation which is followed by another one in the following period. Using the geological metaphor, I showed that there have been continuities and breaks between periods in terms of social and spatial structures. This is an important step forward to provide a macro-level framework for the study of urban processes in the city.

In line with this periodisation, Chapters V and VI focused upon two consecutive periods in the case study of Ankara; which I characterised as the 'urbanisation of state' and 'urbanisation of labour power'. In these two chapters, the development of Ankara has been studied by taking the entire city as a unit of study. This is the first attempt in this field to focus on the socio-spatial development and change that Ankara underwent after becoming the capital of the Turkish republic.

One of the main contributions of the thesis regarding the case of Ankara is to bring a new perspective by employing the strategic relational approach. The dominant literature has been characterised by the same empiricism mentioned above. Events such as the building process of Ankara, or squatter development have been taken as units of study in isolation with each other. By analysing the development of the city around a 'layer' model, this study has evaluated these developments within a relational framework.

If there was a perspective in the mainstream literature to analyse these events in connection with each other it was a culturalist one in that the main conflict has been conceptualised as that between the modernising *élite* and the traditional native population for the first period. In the following periods this *élite*-mass confrontation has been seen as lying between the very same state *élite* and the squatter population which emerged as a result of the massive influx of population. As opposed to this culturalist framework, the point of departure of this thesis was to evaluate urban conflict by going beyond this simple dichotomy between *élite* and masses. By placing an emphasis on political economy categories such as use and exchange value, class and state formation, this study has demonstrated that cultural conflicts have

been only one dimension of the urban conflict and need to be articulated with other forms of conflicts. In this respect, the conception of urban change and conflict around alternative strategies and projects allows for an articulation of political, economic, cultural as well as spatial dimensions and this is another novel aspect of the thesis to the literature on urbanisation in Turkey. This became most obvious for instance in the study of dualism between the old and new towns of the first period. It has been shown that the conflict was not only based on cultural differences but also on economic interest, that is, the question of who would appropriate the rent in the rapidly growing city.

Studying the city in terms of alternative projects and strategies aimed at establishing hegemony allowed us to see the points of interaction not only in terms of conflict and exclusion but also in terms of inclusion and integration. For instance, we have shown that the squatters' conception of urban conflict is not independent of middle-class hegemony in the city and that it internalises many of the values of the latter.

The theoretical approach of this study has also provided an opportunity to study urban actors and conflicts in terms, not only of what happened, but also of what possibilities were eliminated. It has been demonstrated that middle-class strategies, along with other reasons, created important impediments to the development of class consciousness among the working class population in squatter areas. This has been an area ignored by the mainstream literature.

In sum, the thesis has made a contribution in two areas. At the theoretical level it has developed a strategic relational perspective in urban studies and at the empirical level

it has applied this framework to the study of urbanisation in Turkey through a case study of Ankara.

There are a number of issues identified in the thesis which are either partially tackled or not tackled at all. One of the issues which is important but which the thesis has partly elaborated is that of class formation and urban space. It has been shown that class formation and consciousness are not only subjects for historians or sociologists. Class formation has considerable relevance to urban space. I evaluated this issue in relation to working class formation in the course of the second period but only considered it at a macro level. It became evident in the study that more micro-level research is required to reveal the intimate relationship between space and class formation.

Another issue which requires further research is to apply this periodisation and theoretical framework to the study of other cities to test their validity. Equally further study is necessary to examine the last period, which is discussed in the periodisation but not tackled here since it exceeded the task set out for this thesis. The recent transformation of squatter areas into apartment blocks, mushrooming of skyscrapers, shopping malls, and five-star hotels, not only in Ankara but also in other large cities, the increasing individualisation of social life, and the poverty in the peripheral areas begs for further studies to reveal the logic of capital and its consequences for the cities. It is only by studying this logic, that it is possible to form an alternative project which can create an alternative logic to that of capital. The thesis provides a base for such an analysis.



Survival Strategies: Waiting for Hours for "Cheap Municipal Bread"

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