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LEADERSHIP EFFICACY AND WEBERIAN CHARISMA :
The Case of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952-1970)

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BA , MA.

**A dissertation submitted to the Department of Politics for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
International Relations.**

Rutherford College, University of Kent.
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the present study is two fold (I) To examine the essential components of leadership in general and charismatic leadership in particular, and (II) to construct a generalized model pertaining to the emergence, consolidation and termination of charismatic leadership. In other words, it is an attempt to analyze and explain the various theories on political leadership and scrutinize the Weberian concept of charisma. Above that, the basic objective of the thesis is the application of political theory and the conceptual framework of charisma to the case of Gamal Abdel Nasser, ruler of Egypt from 1952 until his premature death in 1970. Special focus is made in the aftermath of the 1967 War and the reinstatement of Nasser as Egypt's leader by popular mandate, following his decision to resign.

The thesis is divided into three sections: The first section, Framework of Analysis and Theoretical Perspective, looks at (I) the definitions, functions and approaches of Political Leadership, and; (II) The study, formulation and critique of Weberian Charisma. The second section, the role dynamics, politics, and impact of Gamal Abdel Nasser, constructs (I) a Political Biography of Nasser (1918-1970) and, (II) Nasser's cognitive perceptions and the politics of Arab Nationalism. The third section looks at Nasser's leadership impact on the Arabs with specific reference to the 1967 June War. Also included in this section, is a generalized model of charismatic political leadership.

As conceptualized by Weber, charisma (the gift of Grace) referred to 'a certain quality of an individual personally by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary man and treated as enclosed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.' The present thesis has attempted to apply the theory of political leadership and the conceptual tool of charisma to the case study of Nasser's Egypt (1952-1970). In view of Nasser's unique and pervasive role in Egyptian politics, the primary focus of inquiry is the leader himself as he interacted with the political environment of his time. In the course of one's investigation, several elements of Weber's formulation of charismatic authority have been revised. Thus, a number of exceptions to Weber's formulation are brought into context. Following this, a generalized model of charismatic political leadership is drawn from this case study.

**In memory of Gamal Abdel Nasser ,
a man of exceptional ability,
energy and compassion.**

Political action is not undertaken by angels but by human beings. Political leadership is not a ruthless and sharp sword but rather a process of balance...between various possibilities and, in many cases, between obvious risks.

**- Gamal Abdel Nasser,
(1918-1970).**

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April 1990.

M.E.S. Hassouna.

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INTRODUCTION

An unidentified philosopher once said that there are at least three subjects (and probably a dozen more) on which no wise man should ever attempt to write: Love, genius, and leadership. Of the three, the last is the most mysterious, the most capricious, and the most unpredictable. No amount of training, no sedulous nurturing by the family or the social group, no long line of ancestry piously dedicated to the eventual flowering of a leader has ever proved a sure means of developing leaders.

History, which affords us a comfortable insight into the mistakes of others, may explain actions long after the event, but the decisions through which some become leaders while others are crushed in defeat cannot, in most cases, be anticipated.

Wherever one turns today, the cry is for more and better leadership. The pervasiveness of this demand, however, is hardly indicative of its underlying causes. Nor does this pervasiveness explain just what it is that people expect of leaders. People face a general sense of a vital need for leadership.

Before the last echoes of the thunderous shouting, "Nasser, Nasser!" have faded altogether from our memories, it is well to pause to inquire into the nature of man's quest for leadership. As long as man has lived in society, whether in primitive families or in complex twentieth-century national communities, he has sought and found leaders. Some of his leaders have been 'good', others - 'bad'. Some have led to progress while others have disappointed their people and led them to ruin. But always, there have been leaders.

Recognizing its grave importance to him, man has struggled with the problem of leadership for centuries. He has studied the problem, speculated about it, and proposed many solutions to it but these have not proved to be universally

applicable.

Throughout the centuries of civilization, leadership not only in the abstract but also in the concrete experience of everybody living has been one of the most controversial subjects. Partially answered questions have been asked concerning the philosophical and the biological aspects of the phenomenon of leadership. Definitions have been formulated, but most of them have created undefinable feelings of incompleteness. It is indeed a most puzzling question to try to explain objectively why some members of a group move definitely to the top, while others remain relatively stationary or move upward only short distances.

Nevertheless, students of political leadership have produced numerous reports which list the so-called 'traits of leadership'.¹ Such lists, of which there are a multitude, are either posed with complete generality or are presented for 'good' and 'bad' leadership. Recent research has produced such lists which distinguish "democratic", "autocratic", "bossist", "charismatic", etc., from each other.

Most of these lists may be discounted on the grounds that any experienced layman could sit down and make up equally good lists. Furthermore, the lists usually allow abundant exceptions: many leaders lack many characteristics; many non-leaders exhibit most of the traits; and the leader in one situation may not be the leader in another.

Leadership involves social interaction. To the extent that one identifies a pattern of leadership, it would be safe to assume that this pattern has a functional relationship to the structure of the group or the society within which the pattern has emerged. It follows that a change in the leadership pattern cannot easily take place without simultaneously affecting the structure and also, that a change in the structure cannot but affect the prevailing pattern of leadership. In others words,

¹W. H. Cowley, "Three Distinctions in the Study of Leaders", JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, XXIII, June, 1928, pp.144-157. For a thorough critique of the trait approach, see Alvin W. Gouldner, STUDIES IN LEADERSHIP, New York : Harper and Brothers, 1950, pp. 212-25.

even though revolutions may be 'exportable', as some militant leaders proclaim today, leadership cannot - as a rule - be 'importable'.

The structure of any given society at a certain time in its history is determined by its historical, social, cultural, economic, and geographic aspects, as well as by its unique character which is a mysterious blend of those factors. Therefore, leadership in different societies must be perceived, treated, and studied as separate entities. On this assumption, any attempt to study comparative leadership must be preceded by an extensive study of the above stated affecting factors.

Another way to study comparative leadership is to observe the behaviour of the leaders of the societies involved. Leadership can be seen as a relationship between an individual and a group built around some common interest and behaving in a manner directed or determined by the leader. Creative leadership emerges when an individual becomes identified with a value or complex of values. This type of leadership is different from the ordinary representative leadership because it attempts to bring in innovations - an undertaking which cannot be restricted to one society or group of analogous societies. Endeavours to innovate may be traceable to indigenous sources as well as to social influences. Fantastic ambitions and irrational motivations as such are not incompatible with creative leadership. In all societies, including democracies, these two factors may even be a necessary ingredient for a leader to appeal to the society and its leadership demands. These factors have been most obvious in the figure of the charismatic leader.

The central theme of this thesis is concerned with the idea of charismatic leadership. The current emphasis on behaviorism in the study of charismatic leadership stimulates students of political leadership to investigate case studies without particularly focusing on the cultural heritage, the social structure or the economic aspects of the societies involved in such a project.

The main weapon of the charismatic leader is personal magnetism. His charm conveys not only his magical power but also his delicate need for support and reinforcement. The charismatic leader needs his followers as much as the actor needs his audience. In this interdependence the charismatic leader maintains the cohesion of the group or society largely by identifying himself with myth.

The charismatic leader becomes able to communicate to his followers a sense of continuity between himself and his mission and their legendary heroes and their missions. And since a myth remains the same as long as it is felt as such, he and his claims are legitimated by his ability to clothe himself with the mantle of myth.

In 'developed' societies, charismatic leadership at the present time appears to be of minor importance simply because the faith in a charismatic leader is not sufficiently strong or general to provide an adequate basis for legitimizing radical institutional changes. In 'underdeveloped', or 'developing countries', as they are sometimes called, the political institutions do not seem to be so rigidly established as their counterparts in developed nations. Also, the socialization processes seem to be still in the process of expanding to include a larger number of institutions than in the past. It has been argued that charismatic leadership in traditional societies is probably the most appreciated, the most welcomed, and the most effective type of leadership to effect social or political change.

This thesis will have two major objectives: a general one which will be discussed in the first part of this study; and a specific one which will be analyzed in the next two parts of the work.

The first objective is to peruse carefully the literature on political leadership to determine how the phenomenon of leadership has been defined, analyzed, conceptualized, and categorized. This objective will be attained through a two stage process. First, the author will discuss the general problem facing students

of political leadership in obtaining an adequate definition of political leadership. This will include analysing the works of some recent scholars who have been concerned with political leadership, identifying its functions and the different approaches of studying the subject. Secondly, the concept of political charisma as first presented by Max Weber is formulated and critiqued. It is felt that since the leadership case in question calls in charisma to assist in our analysis, the concept of charisma itself has to be looked at thoroughly. The essentially ambiguous Weberian formulation, which does not emphasize the social milieu from which charisma emerges, has led to confusion, misunderstanding, and dissent among scholars. One major contribution of this thesis lies in the effort to clarify the concept of charismatic political leadership, to rid it of possible inconsistencies, and, most important, to construct and apply a model to it. While the model draws its inspiration from the great German thinker, it was necessary to go beyond him. It is indeed curious that while the notion of charisma has been used extensively – even abused – only a few have seen fit to modify and/or expand it.

Clearly, then, the current literature regarding the subject of political charisma varies widely between those who consider it a useful analytical tool, and those who dismiss it as too nebulous or amorphous. In this situation, one is faced with the problem of choice. If one is determined to be open minded, the only alternative is to plunge into the thickets of intellectual discourse and try to steer through the complicated and tortuous mazes in order to attain the clarity of understanding. This has been the essential ethos underlying Chapters One and Two, entitled "Political Leadership" and "Weberian Charisma."

The second objective of this thesis is to present, analyze, and study a case of charismatic leadership: President Gamal Abdel-Nasser (1918-1970) of the United Arab Republic (Egypt). The study will apply the suggested concept of charismatization to the leadership of Nasser in order to analyse and conceptualize the phenomena associated with the emergence, maintenance, and consolidation of

charismatic leadership.

In the application of the charismatic leadership model to the case of Egypt, one emphasizes that Nasser's charismatic authority was restricted, up to 1952-1953, to a small circle of colleagues. Thereafter, and especially after the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, he emerged as a charismatic leader not only in Egypt but also throughout the Arab world. With the formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958, Nasser's charisma reached its zenith. However, Syria's secession from the UAR in 1961 marked the beginning of the process of erosion of charisma. With the stalemate in the Yemeni Civil War - despite substantial Egyptian support, and particularly with the stunning defeat in the 1967 June War, Nasser's charisma was thought by many to have reached its nadir. His presumed extraordinary powers began to be doubted as his appeal dwindled. Consistent with the model, his charisma was undermined by repeated failures. Given that Chapter Five makes a case study of Nasser's resignation and subsequent return to power following the 1967 War, an exception to Weber's rule will be brought into context.

Nasser symbolized a distinctive brand of charismatic leadership. Utilizing his charisma, he succeeded in communicating to his people a great sense of identity, pride, and honour. As a Pan-Arab leader, he became a legendary hero among his followers. His person, attitude, and ideology was turned by his followers into solid bodies of myth which have remained for decades in the Arab world. The espousal by Nasser of the idea and practice of 'aggressive presidency' and 'massist politics' enhanced the reputation of his brand of leadership and indeed made it worthy of fresh studies by modern students of political leadership.

From the initial stages of research, it became transparent that the concepts of political leadership and Weberian Charisma lacked theoretical rigour and clarity, especially when applied to the proposed empirical study of Nasser's Egypt. Thus,

it became clear that one had to devise a means by which to fashion charismatic leadership with a more rigorous base. This is the aim of Chapter Four which utilize linguistic analysis to establish Nasser's terminology as the 'vehicles' of charisma.

To conclude, the writer would like to emphasize that this thesis is concerned with the study of leadership patterns. It highlights the leadership images that Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to project to his followers. The study neither attempts to present a detailed biography of Nasser nor claims to offer a complete picture of all the dimensions of his life. Such associated questions pertaining to the economic, social, political, or educational aspects, while not ignored or bypassed, are not presented in minute detail as they would be in a historical coverage.

With these guidelines, let us proceed to designate and explain the methodology and the assumptions concerning the subject of political leadership.

PART ONE

FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

CHAPTER ONE

THE CONCEPT OF LEADERSHIP : A GENERAL DEFINITION AND THEORY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The objective of this Chapter is to develop an understanding of the nature, function, and scope of "political leadership". Its aim is to provide a general definition for "political leadership", an essentially contestable concept,¹ and encompass a more general theoretical reach by providing a synthesis of a multitude of theoretical perspectives. While one may desire to narrow down on only political aspects, the need to borrow important theoretical perspectives from interrelated fields will prove necessary. And, in pursuing this task, various lines of elaboration will be merged with the aim of adding new conceptualizations and theoretical insights. In addition, the search for an all encompassing perspective of political leadership is considered desirable since it is felt that instead of modifying the "environment" to suit our analytic model, one should change frameworks to fit the "environment". However, such an undertaking is understandably without difficulties. As Edinger has observed:

The variety in scope, theory, method, and data presented...in....studies of political leadership may cause one to wonder whether a comprehensive approach can ever be achieved. The answer, as one social psychologist recently suggested, depends largely upon one's aspirations. The editor of this symposium shares the belief that the task of integration may be difficult but not impossible, provided one's approach

¹One has labeled "Political Leadership", an essentially contestable concept, since, as Edinger has so profoundly put it: "As social scientists have learned to probe beneath the manifest aspects of leadership and have correspondingly more sensitive to the relevance of numerous and complex latent facts, they have found it more difficult to agree on what leadership is and does". See Lewis Edinger (ed), POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN INDUSTRIALISED SOCIETIES, New York : John Willey & Sons, 1967, p.13. For a discussion on the inevitability of essentially contestable concepts in social science see William E. Connolly, TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE, Oxford : Martin Robertson, 1983, pp.10-44.

is broad enough to encompass research by all the social sciences on many societies and political systems.²

A general perspective used to construct a comprehensive perspective on political leadership can run the risk of being so abstract that it would have little value. Keeping this in mind, one is to be continuously reminded of Kaplan's warning that "...great generality is achieved at the cost of trivializing the generalization."³ However, as "political leadership" is an analytic construct that is developed to separate, identify and clarify variables that form a "whole",⁴ only an "implicit definition" can be provided from a specific theory, from which a general meaning can be inferred.⁵ Such a definition is provided by Paige who states that:

"Political leadership" is the behavior of persons in positions of authority, their competitors, and these both in interaction with either members of society as manifested in the past, present, and probable future throughout the world. This means not only the behavior of persons in positions of highest authority but also those at intermediate and lower levels: not only monarchs, presidents, and premiers, but, governors, provincial chairmen, and mayors, as well as village chiefs, headmen, and leaders of party cells. It means not only single personalities but also the "collective leadership" of aggregate bodies, and those both not in isolation but in interaction with "followers". It means leadership not only in one type of institution (e.g. party, legislation, or bureaucracy or process e.g. policy decision, election or revolution) but across them all. It means not only men but women; not only incumbents but competitors and revolutionaries; not only those who rule by moral suasion and reasoned agreement but those who gain compliance by fear and force; not only the admirable but the despicable, not only the "successful" but those who "fall".⁶

²Edinger, POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN INDUSTRIALISED SOCIETIES, op.cit., p.25.

³Abraham Kaplan, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY: Methodology for Behavioral Science, San Francisco : Chandler Press, 1964, p.108.

⁴A similar problem is encountered when attempting to define what is meant by "ideology".

⁵Kaplan, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY, op.cit., p.73.

⁶See Glenn D. Paige, THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, London : The Free Press, 1977, pp.1-2.

Briefly put, political leadership, focuses on what Easton has called the 'authoritative allocation of values' in a community and involves both the attempt to exercise and the actual exercise of power to make policy - choices between alternative courses of action affecting this allocation.⁷ The analysis of the interaction between the decision-makers and those who are subject to the decisions, as well as those groups or individuals vying to influence certain decisions that will in turn realize their values and interests, comprises the study of political leadership. Almond and Coleman put political leadership to include not only leader-follower relationships but, also the interaction between different leaders, between the leaders of one political group and the members of another, between potential leaders and political followers, and between actual and aspiring leaders.⁸ Lastly, in terms of role analysis, political leadership is the placement of an actor or group of actors within a "collectivity" in the pursuance of values and interests that are desired by a community.⁹

1.2 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

The following pages will attempt to examine and review the various definition and approaches of leadership as they exist in social and political literature. The first section of this Chapter, will examine the multitude of factors present in trying to formulate a definition of leadership. The section concludes with a "general" i.e. functional definition of leadership that utilizes an interdisciplinary approach and seeks to show it as a relationship and process between a person exerting influence and those that are influenced.

The second section of the Chapter seeks to identify the functions of leadership and review the theoretical approaches to the study of political leadership. These

⁷See David Easton, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, New York : Knopf Publishers Co., 1953, p.13.

⁸See Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds), THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPING AREAS, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1960, pp.5-58.

⁹See W. Oimstead, SOCIAL GROUPS, ROLES, AND LEADERSHIP, Michigan : Michigan State University, 1961, pp.83-87.

approaches may be identified as: The situational approach, the genetic approach, the personality approach, the psychoanalytic approach, the psychohistorical approach, the prophetic-caliphal approach and the charismatic approach.

1.3 THE NEED FOR DEFINITION

Historically the concept of leadership has been most difficult to define. Inevitably one becomes bogged down in such interminable questions as to what constitutes leadership. Is leadership a function of personality, society or fate? What is the degree of interdependence between the leader and follower? Considering these questions from the point of view of empirical studies only, leadership is an omnibus term indiscriminately applied to such varied activities as playground leader, committee chairman, club president, business executive, state politician or chief of staff.

However, it has been widely noted that in attempting to give clarity and precision to a term, one has had to furnish a definition for it.¹⁰ A definition involves purpose and method. The purpose of a definition is what it is trying to do; and the method is the means which it adopts to achieve its purpose. In linking these two together, one has to explain the formal properties of definitions and the meaning and use of stipulative definitions in terms of the words 'leadership'¹¹ and

¹⁰The word 'definition' is represented here as a search for a certain kind of 'conventional' statement that explains all the properties of a particular matter. For a discussion on the attributes of definitions see Richard Robinson, DEFINITION, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1954, p.163.

¹¹The word 'leadership' itself can be traced at least as far back as early Greek and Latin, and it is derived from the verb to act. Hannah Arendt shows that the two Greek verbs archein "to begin, to lead, and finally to act" and gerere "to pass through, to achieve, to furnish" correspond to the latin verbs agere "to set into motion, to lead" and gerere (the original meaning of which was "to bear"). It was believed that each action is divided into two parts: the beginning, made by a single person, and the achievement, performed by others, who, by "bearing" and "finishing" the enterprise, see it through. See Hannah Arendt THE HUMAN CONDITION, Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1958, pp.188-189. Thus, the two words distinguishing the verb 'to act' in both Greek and Latin are closely related. The beginner or leader depends upon others for help; the followers are dependent upon him for an occasion to act. In time,

'leader'.

Formal properties of definitions have been identified as "[1]...an abstraction of particular identifying attributes from a potentially infinite number of attributes possessed by a phenomenon; [2]...neither right nor wrong but only more or less useful; [3]...an analytic statement; it says nothing about the real world, but only about the use of words."¹² In other words, a definition is a rule for mutual transformation of words in the same language.

Of the various types of definitions that have been formulated, stipulation has been noted to embrace most of the major concept usages in social science. What is meant by a stipulative definition, is the explicit and self conscious setting up of the meaning-relation between some word and some object, the act of assigning an object to a name (or a name to an object), not the act of recording an already existing assignment. In short, stipulation is the special meaning given to a word for a particular purpose. When one stipulates that a certain thing is to be the meaning of a certain word, the word may or may not have previously existed as a name for something else.

A stipulative definition stipulates that, whatever the word may mean in other communications, it is best for the rest of this communication to be taken as having no meaning whatever except the one now stipulated. In this respect, the essential and constant element is the deliberate, arbitrary, selfconscious choice of a name for a certain thing, or of a thing for a certain name. Whether this

suggests Arendt, the original interdependence of action between the leader and the follower becomes split into two different functions - the function of giving commands, which becomes the prerogative of the leader, and the function of executing them, which becomes the duty of his followers. Contrary to what many social scientists believe, leadership as far back as early Greece and Rome did not necessarily mean that followers were completely dependent upon leaders. There was - as is the case today - a range of interdependence within which leaders and followers interacted. A successful leader may have claimed for himself what actually was the achievement of many, and perhaps through this claim the leader monopolized the strength of his followers without whose help he would not have achieved anything. It is probable that in this way the delusion of extraordinary strength arose and with it the phenomenon of the 'great man' who is powerful because he is alone.

¹²Robinson, DEFINITION, op.cit., p.169.

Individual choice agrees with or differs from the common usage of the word defined, and whether there is any common usage of it or not, is irrelevant to the essence of stipulation. Stipulations often consist merely in adopting one of the many common meanings of a common word and discarding the rest, that is, announcing which of the established meanings one is going to use.

Why has one chosen to stipulate in the use of the terms 'leadership' and 'leader'? In other words, what are the ulterior purposes of stipulative definitions? By stipulation, one hopes to gain the removal of an ambiguity and an avoidance of the inconvenience caused by the ambiguity. The case of 'leadership' is obvious.

The concept of leadership, like that of ideology, has largely lost its value for the social sciences, although it remains indispensable to general discourse. There are a great variety of ways in which one individual stands out from others in social situations and in which the one may be said, therefore to be 'leading' the others. So diverse are these ways that any one concept attempting to encompass them all, as 'leadership' does, loses the specificity and precision that is necessary to scientific thinking. Stipulation is thus a means of ensuring that one is talking about the same thing when one uses the same word.

Stipulation of the above kind may involve no new rule of meaning; it is merely the choice of one established rule and the rejection of others. In this, the immediate benefit would be the improvement of concepts, the creation of new concepts and, approaching the subject under study with a new set of conceptions. When one doubts and disagrees whether a given behaviour can be labelled 'leadership' and that someone with some 'unique' qualities qualifies to be called a 'leader' then, one needs to clarify the application of these terms.

Bearing this in mind, the writer of this thesis will discuss leadership as a process by which one individual consistently exerts more impact than others on the nature and direction of group activity. While a leader is one "who makes things happen that would not happen otherwise"¹³ we can also make a distinction between leadership as defined by position, or, headship and leadership as defined by the relationship between leaders and followers, or leadership. Headship is associated with the "rights and duties of an office or status in a hierarchical structure, whether in a formal organization or an informally stratified collectivity."¹⁴ Headship is identified with superior position, and followership with subordinate ones. It is maintained through an organized system, and it implies a considerable distance between the group members and the head. Leadership, too, is associated with the one who shapes the actions of others. But the focus here is not on role, or position, but on the special nature of the relationship between leader and followers. Leaders, in contrast to heads, are accorded their authority spontaneously by group members who, it turns out, follow because they want to rather than because they must.

Can political leadership be distinguished from other forms of leadership? One is of the opinion that, to a certain degree, it can. Ordinarily, political leadership refers to control over public policy decisions. Political leaders derive their authority from the fact that they occupy a high office in a legally sanctioned government which, by virtue of its legitimacy, has the power and authority to choose between alternative goals and courses of action. In other words, the 'political' of political leadership "establishes the general organizational context. Explicitly or implicitly, political is taken to refer to the state and to governmental processes."¹⁵

¹³Andrew McFarland, *POWER AND LEADERSHIP IN PLURALIST SYSTEMS*, Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1981, p.10.

¹⁴Lewis J. Edinger, "The Comparative Analysis of Political Leadership", *COMPARATIVE POLITICS*, 17, January, 1975, p.255.

¹⁵*ibid.*, p.257.

In line with the above mentioned distinction between headship, leadership, heads and leaders, the next question seems obvious: Who are the political leaders? Political leaders can be identified in two ways: [1] they occupy formal offices or are members of official ruling groups or decision making bodies; or [2] it can be demonstrated that what happened did so because leaders made it happen. We can prove leadership only "when it can be shown that those said to be followers would otherwise have behaved differently".¹⁶

A general definition of leadership must thus start from the effect that leaders have or may have on their society. This is the cornerstone of the inquiry. The aim is to see whether this impact is due to some characteristics of leaders - personal characteristics, for instance - or to certain powers, normally institutional, that they hold. It is the impact, as a dependent variable, that justifies our examination of what the independent variables - for example, personality and institutional instruments - constitute. Thus, it is fair to state that the general framework pursued is provided by the goal of the analysis - the analysis of the impact of leaders on society.

A serious - and legitimate - warning, however must be made at the onset: this work attempts to show that leadership is a behavioural concept : the definition of leadership must be therefore behavioural. If this is so, 'what leaders are' has to be determined. One can easily discover positional leaders, but the determination of behavioural leaders is not so simple. *Prima facie* , leadership appears related to power: a leader (in the behavioural sense) is a person who is able to modify the course of events. But the operationalization of power is elusive, as is well known. The operationalization of behavioural leadership is consequently equally difficult to achieve. In this respect, one attempts to define leadership within the context of organized groups.

¹⁶ibid., p.259.

SECTION ONE : THE THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LEADERSHIP:

DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS

1.4 INTRODUCTION

The issue of language, or more precisely political vocabulary, has not managed to keep up with the dynamic changes visible in our time of transition. This statement could effectively be related to political leadership as well as to other political dimensions that have become by necessity full of misnomers. Motivated by this conviction and the need for some systematic frame of reference however rough, one is obliged to formulate a general but useful definition of political leadership. A quick review of the literature on leadership will indicate various attempts to study leadership as an interaction of characteristic traits and a status position relative to other individuals who are not too clearly related to him/her. Little effort has gone into discovering what leadership stands for, resulting in an unsatisfactory conceptualization. James MacGregor Burns in his analysis of leadership literature reflected on this when he stated that:

...Political leadership is one of the widely noted and reported and least understood phenomena in modern politics. If you doubt this, glance at the indexes of any seven hundred works that deal with political leaders but have little concept of, or reference to the role of political leadership which must, in my view be part of a more general theory of social or historical causation. Hence the student of political leadership must deal with the most refractory questions of political power and social change. Brilliant work has been done on countless aspects of political leadership. But we lack a general theory.

Because we lack a general theory of political leadership, we may be tempted to resort to the opposite strategy - the hypothesizing of a limitless assortment of psychological, social, and political variables in the shaping of political leadership and the making of history. This strategy would be the safest and the least rewarding...¹⁷

Jenkins comes to a similar conclusion when investigating literature on the selection of leaders:

...The situation does not appear to be a particularly happy one with regard to the deriving of general principles or of setting up a systematic theory of leadership from the available information. A few statements may be set forth, however, that appear to hold for the findings of a number of the investigations reviewed; the list should be thought of as a series of hypotheses for further investigation.¹⁸

As a result of these theoretical and conceptual difficulties, definitional problems arise. However, various definitions have been given to leadership and, general consensus has revolved round the proposition that what characterizes leadership is the varying degree of ability that influences the behaviour of others in a social relationship.¹⁹ A social relationship, viewed from a structural - functionalist perspective involves the notions of purpose, function, structure, interdependence, and equilibrium; each of which must be open to critical and interpretative reappraisal.²⁰ "Purpose" is generally taken to mean the utility of specifying goals for each relationship or structure.²¹ "Function" deals ultimately with objective consequences, but they may be perceived as objectives, processes, or results from various points of view and for various purposes.²² "Structure" can be taken to mean the working parts of a social system that either turn resources into services or boosts the potential of system service.²³

¹⁷See James MacGregor Burns, "Wellsprings of Political Leadership", AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. LXXI, March, 1977, p.266.

¹⁸See William O. Jenkins, "A Review of Leadership Studies with Particular Reference to Military Problems", PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 1947, Vol. 49, No.1., p.75.

¹⁹See Bernard M. Bass, LEADERSHIP, PSYCHOLOGY, AND ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR, New York : Harper, 1960, pp.65-69.

²⁰Talcott Parsons, STRUCTURE AND PROCESS IN MODERN SOCIETIES, Glencoe, Illinois : The Free Press, 1960, pp.149-150.

²¹See Chalmers Johnson, REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE, Boston : Little, Brown, 1966, p.49.

²²Oran Young, SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Englewood Cliffs : Prentice Hall, 1968, p.27.

"Interdependence" is a consequence of the insufficiency of a single structure in performing the overall tasks of social systems.²⁴ "Equilibrium" is a state where "...mechanisms constrain and secure a chain of mutual adjustment among the variables..."²⁵ are present in a social relationship.

Another analytic difficulty present in the literature is encountered when trying to establish and clarify a conceptual demarcation between leaders and followers, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the leader - follower distinction is one of degree, and not kind. Secondly, individuals may be leaders in one situation and followers in another.²⁶ The dividing line between these two roles is neither clear cut nor stationary. One has the impression that Bogardus sought to draw a distinction between 'individuality', which refers to those distinguishing traits that set one person off from another, and 'sociality', which is composed of those traits that identify one person with another. Bogardus' notion indicates that the individuality of a person interacts with the sociability of the group and produces tailored patterns of leadership.²⁷ At the same time, a difficulty arises when attributes of a small group are applied to larger political communities and organizations.²⁸

The problem of coming to some general agreement about the "precise" meaning of leadership is especially acute when one's objective is to construct a framework

²³See Niel Smelser, THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR, New York : The Free Press, 1963, p.15.

²⁴See Gabriel Almond and S. Bingham Powell Jr., COMPARATIVE POLITICS : A Development Approach, Boston : Little, Brown, 1966, pp.58-61.

²⁵Robert Merton, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE, Glencoe, Illinois : The Free Press, 1957, pp.72-73.

²⁶See Thomas S. Cohn, THE STUDY OF LEADERSHIP, Danville : Interstate Publishers, 1958, pp.74-75.

²⁷Emory S. Bogardus, LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP, New York : Appleton - Century, Inc., 1934, p.4.

²⁸For a good example of this, see William A. Gamson, "Reputation and Resources in Community Politics" in THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol.72, No.2., September, 1966, pp.87-99.

from which many different types of leaders and varying leader - follower situations can be viewed. Hence, for simple heuristic purposes, one can use three major definitional categories in order to clarify the various leadership concepts.²⁹ They will be discussed in the following order:

1. The Positional - Ascriptive Definition.
2. The Behavioural - Descriptive Definition.
3. The Cognitive - Attitudinal Definition.

1.5 THE POSITIONAL - ASCRIPTIVE DEFINITION

This category deals with a range of institutional definitions which frame leadership within the context of status, duties, or obligations that arise from individuals holding office or any positions that are objectively identified and linked with formal or informal authority. The analysis involved in this definitional classification mostly comprises of a circular description between those holding office and their "working" environment.

1.6 THE BEHAVIOURAL - DESCRIPTIVE DEFINITION

The emphasis of this category is on how well one carries out one's leadership in terms of influence and induction of compliance or commitment. Here, leadership is seen as "...the process by which an agent induces a subordinate to behave in a desired manner."³⁰ Central to this sort of definition classification is the relationship between the leadership and the group i.e. the to-and-fro, stimulus-response or push-pull relationship. According to Gerth and Mills:

Leadership, most broadly conceived, is a relation

²⁹These classifications are derived from Lewis J. Edinger (ed), POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN INDUSTRIALISED SOCIETIES, New York : John Willey & Sons, 1967, pp.56-68.

³⁰W.G. Bemas, "Leadership Theory and Administrative Behaviour : The Problems of Authority", ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 1959, 4, pp.259-260.

between leader and led in which the leader influences more than he is influenced, because of the leader, those who are led act or feel differently than they otherwise would. As a power relation, leadership may be known to both leader and led, or unknown to either or both...³¹

Under the Behavioural-Descriptive definition, leadership, "the act of leading" leads to the establishment of four basic factors in the relationship. The first factor, the leader, deals with the ability and personal and material potential to goal accomplishment.³² The second factor, the followers, who possess the relevant abilities and personal characteristics.³³ The third factor is the "setting" where "...leadership takes place in, is conditioned by, effects, and is affected by its environment."³⁴ The last factor, the task, is taken to be a problem to be solved, an occasion for decision, or a discrepancy between actual and desirable state of affairs. Tasks are viewed both as perceived by the leadership and as "objectively" given.³⁵ The leader-follower aspect in this category regards leadership not only in terms of personal qualities but, as an integral part of the group structure and those "individuals", the led. Also, of equal importance are the reasons why the leader is followed by "the led", why the leader is admired, respected or feared; whether leadership can offer rewards and punishment; or whether the leadership authority in relation to "the led" is legitimized by habit, charisma, tradition, or on a legal-rational basis.³⁶

³¹Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, CHARACTER AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE : The Psychology of Social Institutions, London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd, 1970, p.405.

³²E.P. Hollander, "Emergent Leadership and Social Influence", in Luigi Petrullo and Bernard M. Bass (eds.), LEADERSHIP AND INTERPERSONAL, New York : Holt Publication, 1961, pp.68-69.

³³T.E. Stephenson, "The Leader-Follower Relationship", SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 1959, 7, pp.179-195.

³⁴Paige, reflecting on political leadership labels this variable the "setting" and asserts that it "is a major challenge facing political studies to determine which partial aspects of an environment or which total configurations of environmental characteristics are casually related to political leadership behaviour" in Glenn D. Paige, THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, London: The Free Press, 1977, p.124.

³⁵See Fred E. Fiedler in "Leadership", GENERAL LEARNING CORPORATION MODULE, Mornstown: General Learning Press, 1971, p.12.

1.7 THE COGNITIVE - ATTITUDINAL DEFINITION

This definitional category deals with leadership in terms of the subjective perception of an individual where regardless of the "settings" or "tasks", an individual holds the subjective notion that he has a mandate either to lead or be led.³⁷

1.8 LEADERSHIP AND POWER

It follows from the above that leadership evaluation will be determined by both the researcher's definition and the behaviour model one chooses to apply. And, developing definitions can serve important purposes: Firstly, it can identify the object to be observed. Secondly, it can satisfy or avoid a particular value orientation or practical implication. Thirdly, and most vital, it can provide the development of a theory with a basis. Fourthly, it can identify a form of practice. A definition of leadership can be one of group processes and movement, or one of an art of inducing compliance, or it can be one of that treats this factor in terms of power differentials, initiation of structure and role differentiation.³⁸ In attempting to define leadership a complex set of variables and concepts must be brought into play. Among the many variables on leadership, six have been identified as the most vital ones: personality,³⁹ role,⁴⁰ organization,⁴¹

³⁶See Weber's pure types of legitimate authority: Rational, Traditional or Charisma in MAX WEBER : ON CHARISMA AND INSTITUTION BUILDING, edited by S.N. Eisenstadt. Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 1968, p.46.

³⁷See Eric Hoffer, THE TRUE BELIEVER, New York : Mentor Books, 1951, for an elaboration on the nature of revolutionary actors and followers.

³⁸For a review of different definitions and conceptions of leadership refer to B.M. Bass, LEADERSHIP, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOR, New York : Harper, 1960.

³⁹The term 'personality' has been observed to lack uniform meaning. Within psychology, a commonly accepted definition of 'personality' cannot be reached. Gordon Allport in his PERSONALITY lists no less than fifty types of definitions (New York :

task,⁴² values,⁴³ and setting.⁴⁴ Among the various concepts, leadership may involve the following: personality in action, induction of compliance, influence, influence relation, power differential, modes of tendency, status position and effect of interaction. Thus, by taking into account these purposes, variables and concepts, a definition of leadership should not only identify leaders and reflect on the means by which they secured their leadership but, also account for the maintenance and continuance of leadership.⁴⁵ Thus, from an observer's

Holt, 1937, pp. 24-54). However, the term's referent is to an 'inferred entity', a construct that accounts for and regulates an individual's behaviour as it responds to stimulus, rather than a directly observed phenomenon. Furthermore, to political scientists, different connotations are inferred from the term. Here, the usage of 'personality' excludes political attitudes and refers to inner conflict and manifestations of ego defences.

⁴⁰ Role, one of the most complex concepts in social science, has a range of definitions. A role, according to Levinson, can be defined in three alternative ways: "(a) the structurally given demands (norms, expectations, taboos, responsibilities, and the like) associated with a given social position; (b) the member's orientation or conception of the part he is to play in the organization; (c) the ways in which members of a position act (with or without conscious intention) in accord with or in violation of a given set of organizational 'norms'" in D.J. Levinson, "Role, Personality, and Social Structure in the Organisational Setting", JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1959, 58, pp.170-180.

⁴¹By 'organisation', what is meant in the broad sense is social interaction among dyads, small groups, formal organizations, institutions, ad hoc collectives, horizontal social strata, vertical societal segments, and whole political communities.

⁴²The term 'task' has often been intertwined with that of 'role'. However, there is a difference. 'Task' is taken to mean an assigned position where goals, procedures, and function are clearly specified to and by group members. It has been observed that one of the leadership roles is on task allocation and task motivation, shortly referred to as role task. Refer to Walter A. Hill and D. Hughes, "Leader Behavior as a Function of Task Type" in ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE, London : University Press, 1974, pp. 83-96.

⁴³'Values' are taken to be standards that influence choices and commitments to 'end states of existence' and 'modes of conduct'. The importance of values is echoed by Meyer who states: "All potential action demands choice, which is based on a system of values". See Alfred G. Meyer, LENINISM, New York : Praeger, 1957, p.287.

⁴⁴Given that leadership takes place in an environment and is conditioned by, affects and is affected by it, leadership behaviour will be determined by partial or total configurations of the environmental characteristics. Thus, the term 'setting' is employed as a symbol of the environment. The idea of 'setting' links leadership with those relevant aspects of such fields as geography, technology, economics, demography and cultural anthropology. For a striking example of this, see Jomo Kenyatta, SUFFERING WITHOUT BITTERNESS, London : Secker & Warburg, 1967, and FACING MOUNT KENYA, London : Secker & Warburg, 1966.

⁴⁵For an interdisciplinary "paradigm" for leadership analysis refer to the model set out by Richard T. Morris and Melvin Seeman, "The Problem of Leadership : An Interdisciplinary Approach", AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 1950, Vol. LVIX, pp.149-155, where they examine group and individual variables in terms of

view, the definitions of leadership are as many as the persons who have attempted to define it.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, as Fiedler points out,⁴⁷ similarities between the multitude of definitions allow for a functional sociological classification scheme, which can be formulated as such:⁴⁸

1. Leadership as a differentiated role.
2. Leadership as structural initiation.
3. Leadership as personality and its effects.
4. Leadership as a process of achievement of objectives.
5. Leadership as a form of persuasion.
6. Leadership as an act.
7. Leadership as a process of influencing activities.
8. Leadership as polarisation of group process.
9. Leadership as an art of inducing commitment and compliance.
10. Leadership as a power relation.

conditioners, concomitants, determiners and behaviour in terms of maintenance and continuance.

⁴⁶Paige in his *SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP*, op.cit., has suggested that a sampling of how leaders themselves view what it is they do may help to understand political leadership: "Leadership as Decision and Persuasion: "Leadership is the ability to decide what is to be done, and then to get others to want to do it. (D.D. Eisenhower). Leadership as Influence by Example: "The essence is to be more revolutionary and set the example" (Che Guevara). Leadership as Creative Brutality Based upon Hostilities against Out group Enemies: "...The leader of genius must have the ability to make different opponents appear as if they belonged in the same category.." (Adolf Hitler). Leadership as Satisfaction of Follower Needs: "Serve the people" (Mao Tse Tung). Leadership as Task Performance: "The essence of leadership is the successful resolution of problems and the successful attaining of objectives." (Paul H. Nitze). Leadership as Slave or Master of Circumstance: "If we do not win, we will blame neither heaven nor earth but only ourselves" (Mao Tse Tung). Taken as a whole these concepts suggest that political leadership comprises decisional initiative, pacific and coercive persuasion, the exacerbation or reduction of conflict, follower need satisfaction as related to task accomplishment, and action within an influencing but partly influenciable situational context..." pp.65-66.

⁴⁷F.E. Fiedler, "A Contingency Model of Leadership Effectiveness" in L. Berkowitz (ed), *ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY*, Vol. 1., London : Academic Press, 1964.

⁴⁸This typology is adopted from Ralph M. Stogdill, *THE HANDBOOK OF LEADERSHIP : A Survey of Theory of Research*. New York : Free Press, 1974, pp.7-15. It has been stated in many other works in one form or the other. For another set of typologies see, Barbara Kellerman, "Leadership as a Political Act" in *LEADERSHIP : Multidisciplinary Perspectives* edited by Barbara Kellerman, New Jersey : Prentice Hall, Inc., 1984., pp.63-89.

Leadership can be defined as a form of relationship between persons where one or several persons act in conformance with the request of another.⁴⁹ This definition emphasizes leadership as a differential power relationship among members of a group. Leadership, as a power relation, can be conceptualized as "a resultant of the maximum force which A can induce on B minus the maximum resisting force which B can mobilize in the opposite direction."⁵⁰ As a form of influence relationship, leadership power, in Dahl's terms, "refers to subsets of relations among social units such that the behavior of one or more units to the responsive units, depend in some circumstances on the behavior of other units (the controlling units)."⁵¹ From this stimulus-response conceptualization, one can derive two essential factors which Warriner puts as:

...(a) a communication requesting someone to do something, an 'indication' followed by (b) an action, performed by the person to whom the request was directed, which is carried out and is consistent with the 'indication'. The latter element may be termed "the response", for simplicity of expression.⁵²

In their common usage, power and influence cannot be used interchangeably since power is the ability to exert a degree of control over persons, things and events while influence is used more to suggest the exercise of persuasion rather than control⁵³.

⁴⁹Charles K. Warriner, "Leadership in the Small Group", AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 1950, 60, pp.361-369.

⁵⁰J.R.P. French & D. Raven, "The Bases of Social Power" in D. Cartwright, STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER, Ann Arbor : University of Michigan, 1959, p.84.

⁵¹Robert A. Dahl, "Power" In THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, New York : Macmillan and Free Press, 1968, Vol.12, p.407.

⁵²Warriner, "Leadership in the Small Group", op.cit., p.367.

⁵³The conceptual confusion surrounding 'power' and 'influence' (the warp and woof in the dynamics of social organization) has given rise to a debate since they are impossible to define in a satisfactory way. In a number of definitions, power and influence are introduced as the capacity to determine the actions of others in accordance with the will or the purposes of the holder of power or influence. See Max Weber in his WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT, Berlin : Köln, 1964, p.38.

Bierstedt offers a classical distinction between influence and power when he said:

Influence does not require power, and power may dispose with influence. Influence can convert a friend, but power coerces friend and foe alike.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, while power and influence constitute different processes, they are intertwined since the leadership may have to use both when involved in certain circumstances and with particular followers. Even elected or appointed leadership must rely on influence, i.e. the sense of persuasion, and complement it with power. And, in order to avoid resistance and negative feelings among followers, leadership, elected or appointed, may have to use persuasion in many more instances rather than to employ the power that is supposedly at their disposal.

In practice, leadership as a power relation has two features: the ability to exert power, in the sense of controlling others and events, and the capacity to defend against power.⁵⁵ As Weber in his theory of power wrote: "Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance."⁵⁶ Several bases of power as exercised by leadership have been identified.⁵⁷ Legitimate power is akin to the concept of leadership authority in as far as leadership acceptability is concerned. Within this context, Janda has defined leadership as:

...a particular type of power relationship characterized by a group member's perception that

⁵⁴R. Bierstedt, "An Analysis of Social Power", AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 1950, Vol.15., pp.730-738, p.731.

⁵⁵See D. Cartwright (ed), STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER, Ann Arbor : Research Center for Group Dynamics, University of Michigan, 1959, for an elaboration on 'counter power'.

⁵⁶Max Weber, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, (Translated and edited by T. Parsons and A.M. Henderson), New York : Oxford University Press, 1947, p.152.

⁵⁷French and Raven, "The Bases of Social Power", op.cit., p.85.

another group member has the right to prescribe behavior patterns for the former regarding his activity as a member of a particular group...⁵⁸

Reward or coercive power deals with the gains or the losses that will accrue to group members for compliance or non-compliance. The degree by which group members will identify with the leadership represent referent power i.e. 'likeability'.⁵⁹ Lastly, expert power arises when group members value the leadership's specialized knowledge or distinctive competence in satisfying group needs or in accomplishing goals. More so, when dealing with group needs and goals:

Leadership...is a relation between leader and led in which the leader influences more than he is influenced: because of the leader, those who are led act or feel differently than they otherwise would. As a power relation, leadership may be known to both leader and led, or unknown to either or both; it may be close up or long distance; it may occur at a single cross road in the lives of the both, or only in the life of the follower, after the leader is long dead, it may affect only a momentary decision, or it may dominate the life of the led.⁶⁰

So far the above discussion has centered on the essential stimulus response nature of the leadership concept as a power relation. However, leadership in this respect can also be equated with control of the interaction process. Thus, as Bass has put it, "...when the goals of one member, A, is that of changing another, B, or when B's change in behavior will reward A or reinforce A's behavior, A's effort to

⁵⁸K.F. Janda, "Towards the Explication of the Concept of Leadership in Terms of the Concept of Power", HUMAN RELATIONS, 1960, 13, pp.345-363, p.348. Janda defines power as "the ability to cause other persons to adjust their behavior in conformance with communicated behavior patterns." For a discussion on two different perspectives of power in relationship to leadership see Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power", AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 56, 1962, pp.947-52.

⁵⁹See R.M. Stogdill, "Personal Factors Associated with Leadership : A Survey of the Literature", JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 25, 1948, pp.35-71, for a survey on the determination of the traits and characteristics of leaders.

⁶⁰Gerth and Mills, CHARACTER AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE, op.cit., p.405.

obtain the goals is leadership.⁶¹ Adding to this, Homans points to an essential criteria in defining leadership as a power relation in the interaction process:

The leader is at the center of the web of interaction; much interaction flows towards him and away from him. But it is impossible to define the leader merely by saying that he is the person who must often originate the interaction for the other members of the group. He must also know the content of his orders and the degree to which they are obeyed. A member of the group may make a suggestion to the rest, and they would greet it with scornful laughter. He has originated interaction to which the others have responded, but the response is not the one he wished and he is obviously not a leader. The high social rank of the leader and the respect that is accorded to him are determined by the fact that he originates interaction for the group, by giving orders that are in fact obeyed.⁶²

While a member with ability can successfully persuade others to follow him, a member with power can coerce others to follow. His power may derive from his personality or his position. A powerful person can directly reinforce the behaviour of others by granting or denying rewards or punishments to the others, depending on their behaviour. A person has power over others if he controls what the others want. If the other members are not motivated to gain these goals, the control does not yield power. The stronger the motivation, the greater the resulting power.

Coercion occurs when members publicly but not privately comply with the suggestions or direction of another member. But the inhibition of their own preferences results in dissatisfaction and frustration, which in turn may lead to a variety of attempts to reduce the frustration. Coercion may produce hostility among the coerced. Or the less powerful members may withdraw from the situation. Or they may over-react, resulting in a loss in task effectiveness. Or

⁶¹B.M. Bass, LEADERSHIP, PSYCHOLOGY, AND ORGANISATION BEHAVIOR, New York : Harper, 1960, p.281.

⁶²George C. Homans, THE HUMAN GROUP, New York : Harcourt, Brace, 1950, p.48.

they may compensate by forming a new informal organization to counter the frustrating effects of being coerced.⁶³

Power provides successful coercive leadership but it is not as likely to be effective as far as the coerced members are concerned. To lead successfully and permissively, a member must have the power to impose restrictions on what other members are permitted to do, and he must have the ability to know when such restrictions are necessary and when he would do better to avoid such impositions. While power used to coerce will produce hostility, withdrawal, apathy, 'forced' behaviour toward irrelevant goals, the same power, coupled with ability, can be used permissively. Permissiveness is less likely to result in hostility and withdrawal since the goals selected by those led permissively are likely to be relevant to them.⁶⁴

Thus, essentially, to understand the nature of leadership requires understanding the essence of power, for leadership is a special form of power. The two essentials of power are motivation and resources. The two are interrelated. Lacking motive, resource diminishes; lacking resource, motive lies idle. Lacking either one, power collapses. Because both resources and motive are needed, and because both may be in short supply, power is an elusive and limited thing. Central to a concept of power is the role of purpose. Power has been defined as the production of intended effects, but the crux of the matter lies in the dimensions of 'intent'. The relationship between the nature, intensity, persistence and scope of purpose defines the exercise of power in leadership as a collective act. This approach carries on the assumption that power is first of all

⁶³R. White and R.L. Lippitt, "Leadership Behavior and Member Reaction in Three Social Climates" in D. Cartwright and A. Zander (eds), *GROUP DYNAMICS*, New York : Row, Peterson, 1956, pp.79-82.

⁶⁴D. Pelz, "Leadership Within a Hierarchical Organization", *JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES*, Vol.VII, 1951, pp.98-99.

a relationship and not merely an entity to be passed around like an item; that it involves the intention or purpose of both power holder and power recipient; and hence it is collective, not merely the behaviour of one person. On these assumptions, the power process is viewed as one in which power holders, possessing certain motives and goals, have the capacity to secure changes in the behaviour of a respondent, by utilizing resources in their power base, including factors of skill, relative to the targets of their power-wielding and necessary to secure such changes. This view of power deals with three elements in the process: the motives and resources of power holders; the motives and resources of power recipients; and the relationship among all these.⁶⁵ To define power not as a property or entity or possession but as a relationship in which two or more persons tap motivational bases in one another and bring varying resources to bear in the process is to perceive power as drawing a vast range of human behaviour into its orbit. The arena of power is no longer the exclusive preserve of a power elite or an establishment or persons with legitimacy.⁶⁶ Power is ubiquitous and permeates human relationships. It exists whether or not it is quested for.

Given that power can take multifarious, ubiquitous, and subtle forms and is

⁶⁵One feels that we are so accustomed to observing persons with power drives or complexes, so sensitive to leaders with the 'will to power', so exposed to studies finding the source of the power urge in early deprivation, that we tend to assume the power motive to be exclusively that of seeking to dominate the behaviour of others. To this, David MacClelland asks: "...must all experiences of power have as their ultimate goal the exercise of power over others?" See David C. McClelland, *POWER : The Inner Experience*, New York : Irvington, 1975, p.17; see also D.G. Winter, *THE POWER MOTIVE*, New York : Free Press, 1973, p.34.

⁶⁶The existence of power and leadership in the form of a stream of multiple direct and indirect forces operating over time is often seen as part of the sequences of events of history that are beyond the control of identifiable persons capable of foreseeing developments and powerful enough to influence them and hence to be held accountable for them. From this, one can reject the 'gee whiz' approach to power that often takes the form of the automatic presumption of 'elite control' of communities, groups, institutions, entire nations. 'Elitism' is often used as a concept that presupposes the existence of the very degree and kind of power that is to be estimated and analyzed. Such elite theories commit the gross error of equating power and leadership with the assumed power bases of preconceived leaders and power holders, without considering the crucial role of motivations of leaders and followers.

reflected in an infinite number of combinations and particularities in specific contexts, it can still be broken down into certain attributes. Dahl's breakdown of the reach and magnitude of power reveals three dimensions: distribution, scope and domain. Distribution is the concentration and dispersion of power among persons of diverse influence in various political, social, and economic locations such as geographical areas, castes and classes, status positions, skill groups, communication centers, and the like. Scope is the extent to which power is generalized over a wide range or is specialized. Persons who are relatively powerful in relation to one kind of activity may be relatively weak in other power relationships. Lastly, domain is the number and nature of power respondents influenced by power wielders compared to those who are not.⁶⁷ But, whatever the dimensions or context, the fundamental process remains the same: power wielders draw from their power bases resources relevant to their own motives and the motives and resources of others upon whom they exercise power. Power shows many faces and takes many forms; it may exist as an overwhelming presence or as a potential that can be drawn at will. But all this has to have something in common: it must be relevant to the motivations of the power recipients.

Leadership is an aspect of power, but it is also a separate and vital process in itself. We have noted that 'power' over other persons is exercised when potential power wielders, motivated to achieve certain goals of their own, marshal in their power base resources (economic, military, institutional, or skill) that enable them to influence the behaviour of respondents to those goals. This is done in order to realize the purpose of the power wielders, whether or not these are also the goals of the respondents. Power wielders also exercise influence by mobilizing their own power base in such a way as to establish direct physical

⁶⁷Dahl, "Power", op.cit., p.408.

control over other's behaviour.

Leadership is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, perhaps in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage and satisfy the motives of followers. This is done to realize goals mutually held by both leaders and followers. Not only must motivation be relevant, as in power generally, but its purposes must be realized and satisfied. Leadership is exercised in a condition of conflict or competition in which leaders contend in appealing to the motive bases of potential followers. Naked power, on the other hand, admits of no competition or conflict.

Leaders are a particular kind of power holders. Like power, leadership is relational, collective, and purposeful. Leadership shares with power the central function of achieving purpose. But the reach and domain of leadership are, in the short range at least, more limited than power. Leaders do not obliterate followers' motives though they may arouse certain motives and ignore others. They lead creatures and not things. To control things - money, energy, tools, mineral resources - is an act of power, not leadership, for things have no motives. Power wielders may treat people as things.⁶⁸ Leaders may not. Along this line of thought, one can assert that all leaders are actual or potential power holders, but not all power holders are leaders.⁶⁹

⁶⁸See Richard Hughes, *THE FOX IN THE ATTIC*, New York : Harper & Row, 1962, p.266, in regards to Hitler seeing the universe as containing no persons other than himself, only 'things'.

⁶⁹It need not be emphasized that the leader is a very special, very circumscribed, but potentially the most effective of power holders, judged by the degree of intended 'real change' finally achieved. The crucial variable is, again, the purpose. Leadership has been defined as leaders making followers do what followers would not otherwise do, or as leaders making followers do what the leaders want them to do. Leadership can also be defined as leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals that represent the values and the motivations - the wants and needs, the aspiration and expectations - of both leaders and followers. And the genius of leadership lies in the manner in which leaders see and act on their own and their followers' values and motivations.

Leadership, unlike naked power wielding, is thus inseparable from followers' needs and goals. The essence of the leader - follower relation is the interaction of persons with different levels of motivations and of power potential, including skill, in pursuit of a common or at least joint purpose. That interaction, however, takes two fundamentally different forms. The first form is where leadership occurs when one person takes the initiative in making contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of valued things. The exchange could be economic, political or psychological. Each party to the bargain is conscious of the power resources and attitudes of the other. Their purposes are related, at least to the extent that the purposes stand within the bargaining process and can be advanced by maintaining that process. But beyond this the relationship does not go. The bargainers have no enduring purpose that holds them together; hence they may go their separate ways. A leadership act took place, but it was not one that binds leader and follower together in a mutual and continuing pursuit of a higher purpose.⁷⁰

The other form of interaction occurs when one or more purposes engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation. Their purposes might have started out as separate but related and become fused. Power bases are linked not as counterweights but as mutual support for common purpose. This sort of interaction ultimately becomes 'moral' in that it raises the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both leader and led, and it thus has a transforming effect on both. A striking example of this is Gandhi, who aroused and elevated the hopes and demands of millions of Indians and whose life and personality was enhanced in the process. This 'transcending leadership' is dynamic leadership in that the leaders throw themselves into a relationship with followers who will feel 'elevated' by it and often become more active themselves, thereby creating new cadres of leaders. Naked power wielding

⁷⁰This form of leadership is sometimes referred to as transactional leadership.

can neither be transactional, transcending or transforming; only leadership can be.

Leaders and followers may be inseparable in function, but they are not the same. The leader takes the initiative in making the leader-led connection; it is the leader who creates the links that allow communication and exchange to take place. The leader is more skillful in evaluating followers' motives, anticipating their responses to an initiative, and estimating their power bases, than the reverse. Leaders continue to take the major part in maintaining and effectuating the relationship with followers and will have the major role in ultimately carrying out the combined purpose of leaders and followers. Finally, and most important by far, leaders address themselves to followers' wants, needs and other motivations, as well as to their own, and thus they serve as an independent force in changing the makeup of the followers' motive base through gratifying their motives.

Certain forms of power and certain forms of leadership are near to the extremes of the power/coercion continuum. One is the kind of absolute power that, Lord Acton felt, 'corrupts absolutely' which in the opinion of many, also coerces absolutely.⁷¹ The essence of this kind of power is the capacity of power wielders, given the necessary motivation, to override the motive and power bases of their targets.⁷² At the other extreme is leadership so sensitive to the

⁷¹For an elaboration on this see R.M. Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations", AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 1962, 27, pp.31-41. Included within this dimension, are the single minded power wielders who fit the classical images of Machiavelli or Hobbes or Nietzsche, or at least the portraits of modern power theorists. These consciously exploit their external resources (economic, social, psychological, and institutional) and their 'effectance' their training, skill, and competence, to make persons and things do what they want done. The key factor here is 'what they want done'.

⁷²Consider the testimony of one Soviet linguist and dissident who spoke of the ordinary citizen's attitude to the government: "With us, it is there, like the wind, like a wall, like the sky. It is something permanent, unchangeable. So the individual acquiesces, does not dream of changing it - except a few, few people..." In Hendrick

motives of potential followers that the roles of leader and follower becomes virtually interdependent.⁷³ Whether the leadership relationship is transactional or transforming, in it the motives, values, and goals of leader and led have merged.

Smith, THE RUSSIANS, New York : Ballantine, 1976, p.339.

⁷³The power resources and the motivations of leaders are measured by the extent to which their promises and programmes are carried out. Note that the variables are the double ones of intent (a function of motivation) and of capacity (a function of power base), but the test of the extent and quality of power and leadership is the degree of actual accomplishment of the promised changes. For a discussion on the dimensionality of power refer to Steven Lukes, POWER : A Radical Approach, London : The Macmillan Press, 1974, pp.26-34.

SECTION TWO : THE FUNCTIONS OF AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES
TO LEADERSHIP.

The concept of leadership as an established social role seeks to account for and understand the activities and relationships between the leadership and followers in terms of their characteristic and unique interaction.⁷⁴ In order to develop a specific framework from which one can examine the functions of leadership, one has to reiterate the established premise that any group member occupies the position of leadership when he successfully initiates group action and, thus affects the coordination of group behaviour.⁷⁵ Consequently, one must be aware of the ends that are being served by the leadership and their contribution to 'effective' performance.⁷⁶ William F. Whyte in his *STREET CORNER SOCIETY* has used the concept of 'origination of action' as the defining criteria for leadership function. This concept, apparently, is dependent upon interaction and the procedures for defining the end-point in an interactional unit.⁷⁷ Thus, 'the origination of actions' or, what Chapple and Coon call 'the first action in a sequence' can be described as:

The observation of the order in which people act in a simple operation, and will be found very useful in describing the relations of individuals in groups. Its importance lies in the fact that once two individuals have been conditioned to maintain an order in which one of them habitually originates action to the other, we are dealing with the rudiments of leadership.⁷⁸

The function of leadership within the conception of interaction will be an

⁷⁴R.M. Stogdill, *INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR AND GROUP ACHIEVEMENT*, New York : Oxford University Press, 1959, p.112.

⁷⁵J.K. Hemphill, "Why People Attempt to Lead" in Luigi Petrullo and Bernard M. Bass, eds, *LEADERSHIP AND INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR*, New York : Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961, pp.201-204.

⁷⁶Effective performance is used here to refer to group syntality and synergy as being satisfied by group leadership.

⁷⁷William F. Whyte, *STREET CORNER SOCIETY : The Social Structure of an Italian Slum*, Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1943, pp.257-63.

⁷⁸E.D. Chapple and C.S. Coon, *PRINCIPLES OF ANTHROPOLOGY*, New York : Henry Holt & Co., 1942, p.705.

aggregate of roles in a formal and highly differentiated structure that is to, a greater extent due to environment necessities. The stable composition of the group and the lack of social assurance on the part of the members vis-a-vis the environment often contributes toward producing a very high rate of social interaction within the group. The group structure is a product of these interactions. Out of these interactions arises a system of mutual obligations which is fundamental to group cohesion. As Whyte points out:

...the code of the street corner boy requires him to help his friends when he can and to refrain from doing anything to harm him...The leader is the focal point for the organization of his group. In this absence the members of the gang are divided into a number of small groups; there is no common activity or general conversation. When the leader appears, the situation changes strikingly. The smaller units form into one large group. The conversation becomes general and unified action frequently follows. The leader becomes the central point in the discussion. When the leader leaves the group, unity gives way to division which existed before his appearance.⁷⁹

The concept of 'function' deals ultimately with processes, results, or objective consequences. On the other hand, role is the differentiated manifestation of the function of leaders in contributing to the social systems' coordination. In this view, the functional emphasis of leadership will reflect on the most frequently played roles with the accompanying leadership style to indicate its organizational mode.

As leadership functions deals with the relationship between the 'leader' and the followers of a group, a stimulus-response relationship, the concept of function will include among many other factors, that of communication. Thus leadership becomes:

A behavioural process consisting of stimulating

⁷⁹William Foote Whyte, "Leader-Follower Relations in Street-Corner Society", in Harold Proshansky and Bernard Seidenberg, BASIC STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, p.519.

persons, called 'followers' to act integratively toward the achievement of group goals. It is primarily a function of the situation within which it occurs, through significantly influenced by personal traits and status role.⁸⁰

Thus, one of the functions of leadership (apart from being the totality of influencing relationships emanating from a particular individual that serves as a guiding force) is the coordination of efforts essential to a system of cooperation which requires an organized system of communication. Centers or points of interconnections in such a communication system can only operate through the centers of leadership. One of the functions of leadership can be said to be one of communication facilitation as far as communication is to be coordinated through 'central positions'. It follows from then that the vitality, maintenance and endurance of the group will depend on the functions of leadership.⁸¹ Thorton Roby in his work on the executive functions in small groups, made a general inference in terms of the leadership function and group behaviour. In effect, this conceptualization,

...is intended to cover the entire process by means of which group actions are selected from a pool of potential actions. This process entails the direction or reception of information; storage of this information; transmission of information; calculations; refinements and extrapolations based on information; and the final processes that are casually classed as judgemental or decision making...⁸²

The essential functions of group leadership are, firstly, to provide the system of communication; secondly, to promote the securing of essential efforts, and thirdly to formulate and define purpose. Since the elements of group organization are

⁸⁰See N.P. Tillmans definition of 'leadership' in THE DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Edited by Joseph Dunam, New York : The Philosophical Library, 1964, p.396.

⁸¹See C. Shannon and W. Weaver, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION, Urbana : University of Illinois, 1949, for an elaboration on the importance of group 'centers' or leaders in the control and distribution of communication among a collectivity.

⁸²Thorton R. Roby, "The Executive Function in Small Groups", in LEADERSHIP AND INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR by Luigi Petrullo and Bernard M. Bass, eds, New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961, pp.82-83.

interrelated and interdependent, the leadership functions follow this course. This point is explained within the interaction process by Chapple and Arensberg who state that:

Given two individuals, we observe that one of the two manifests the first unit of actions which is then followed by a unit of action manifested by the second individual. The first unit is regarded as the stimulus and the second unit the response. The distinction between the two is that the first action is not preceded by an action of the other individual in the second pair.⁸³

And, more explicitly:

...when we state that interaction is taking place, we base this statement upon our observation that one of our individuals changes his motor pattern and that change is followed by a change in the pattern of the other. In other words, we see that after one individual changes his previous motor pattern and adapts to a new one and the other individual still is maintaining his previous condition, if then the second individual manifests a change pattern immediately following the change in the first individual, we have what we have previously defined as interaction...⁸⁴

Within this interaction process, the need of a definite system of communication creates the first role of the leader and signifies the immediate start of the leadership function. Given that group organization will initially be conceived in the mind of the leadership establishing the means of communication will have to call in a selection of 'lieutenants', i.e. creation of positions, that in turn will create a system of communication. And, the very first task of that system of communication will most likely be the selection of a leadership.⁸⁵ In this theme, the leadership function is a relationship between those exerting influence

⁸³Elliot D. Chapple and Conrad M. Arensberg, "Measuring Human Relations : An Introduction to the Study of the Interaction of Individuals", GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY MONOGRAPHS, XXII, 1940, p.56.

⁸⁴Chapple and Arensberg, "Measuring Human Relation...", op.cit., p.26.

⁸⁵E. Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communication : An Up-to-date report on a Hypothesis", PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, 1957, 21, pp.61-78.

and those who are influenced, and is best seen within the framework of group processes. Therefore, the establishment and maintenance of a communication system, is the primary task of the leadership. This process involves the selection of lieutenants, the offering of incentives, the securing of an informal organization where the lieutenants share the property of compatibility. This property, in turn, has the chief function of expanding the communication accompanied with the reduction of formal decisions; minimizing undesirable influence and promotion of desirable influences that are in harmony with the scheme of formal responsibilities.⁸⁶

The second leadership function is to secure essential personal services from group members. This process encompasses, firstly, the 'recruitment' of personnel with the aim of establishing cooperative relationships. And, secondly, the eliciting of such persons' who are 'pulled' to the 'tangible character of membership'.⁸⁷ It follows from this that the effort to recruit persons who by the general appeal are brought into contact with an organization, becomes the most regular and routine work of securing contributors. Here, the eliciting of the quantity and quality of efforts from group adherents will determine the actual outputs of efficiency and influence, which are the real materials of the group's organization.⁸⁸

The third leadership function is that of formulating and defining purposes, objectives, ends of the group. It has already been stated that purpose is the aggregate of action that is a produce of the decisions relative to purpose and

⁸⁶Daniel Katz and Paul Lazerfeld, PERSONAL INFLUENCE, New York : Free Press, 1956.

⁸⁷For an elaboration on this, consider the testimony of one Hitler's followers; quoted in Theodore Abot's WHY HITLER CAME TO POWER, New York : Prentice Hall, 1938, p.146. It states: "I was attracted to the National Socialist Party because it did not indulge in the high promises other parties made in their campaign literature. On the contrary, we were told that we must suffer and sacrifice; that the end of our striving must be a greater Germany rather than personal aggrandizement."

⁸⁸See Fay D. Havron and D. Goodacre, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SMALL MILITARY UNITS, Washington, D.C : Institute for Research in Human Relations, 1951. For an illustration on the maintenance of morale, scheme of inducements, the maintenance of schemes of deterrents, supervision and control, inspection, education and training.

environment and result in the achievement of concrete acts.⁸⁹ Purpose must also be something that is accepted by all the contributors to the system of efforts. Purpose can be broken down into specific objectives that can be ordered in the time as well as specializations. It becomes more apparent that leadership functions will include, formulations, redefinitions, break into detail, and decide on the innumerable simultaneous and progressive actions that constitute the synthesis of purpose.⁹⁰

Hence a core aspect of the leadership function is the assignment of responsibility – the delegation of objective authority. The potential aspect of authority would be in, as discussed above, structuring the system of communication. The other aspect of authority would include the actual decision and conduct which makes a working system out of the group. Hence, the organization for work specification, i.e. the definition of purpose, will mould the activity, the responsibility, and the specification of those who make the last contributions to attain the final concrete objectives. What binds this authority, responsibility and individual capability together in a meaningful whole is the indispensable coordination that requires a pyramiding of roles and that to-and-fro, up-and-down-the-line coordination of purposeful decisions to maintain the vitality of action, concrete interaction, mutual adjustment, and ultimately, the fulfillment of purpose and objectives.⁹¹

Of the various assertions one has made of leadership functions, one of the necessities for integrated behaviour has to do with the compatibility of goals and values of group members to the potential values of various responses that it may get. One function of leadership may be to emphasize the existing congruence of

⁸⁹Douglas McGregor, "Conditions of Effective Leadership in the Industrial Organization" in the JOURNAL OF CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY, 1944, VIII, pp.55-63.

⁹⁰See Chapter 3 of E.P. Hollander, LEADERS, GROUPS AND INFLUENCE, New York : Oxford University Press, 1964, where the experience of the organizational leader as related to the group., pp.30-41.

⁹¹See Alex Bavelas, "Leadership : Man and Function", ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Vol.4, 4, March 1960, pp.491-498.

goals and to achieve these goals.⁹² Given that the intelligent choice of response is essential to effective group action, one of the leadership functions would be to ensure that a balance exists between the processing of information relevant to the group and its potential to respond. This can be done by the recruitment of specialized personnel to deal with one or the other functions so as to ensure that balance.⁹³ The decision making function of the leadership calls upon for the provision of a structure that incorporates the relationships between information and action.⁹⁴ Another function would be to insure that the leadership structure executes its functions as it is supposed to. What this means is, taking the example of information processing, that basically if a certain piece of information is required then the leadership must guarantee the availability, accuracy and timing of the material in order to make a selection that constitutes an 'optimal response' to a stimulus (via an available option) and then proceed to interpret feedback.⁹⁵

So far, one has dealt with functions of organization leadership. However, leadership functions on a group level can be enumerated under two sets which have been identified as: 'task functions', i.e. functions undertaken in order to rationally select and achieve goals; 'maintenance' i.e. functions connected with those emotional 'intangible' areas required in group development, maintenance and viability.⁹⁶

These functional dimensions as recognized by interested observers in group

⁹²Richard E. Andrews, LEADERSHIP AND SUPERVISION, Washington, D.C. : U.S. Civil Service Commission, No.9, 1955, p.23.

⁹³J. Marschak, "Towards an Economic Theory of Organization and Information" in R.M. Thrall, C.H. Coombs, and R.L. Davis (eds.), DECISION PROCESSES, New York : Wiley, 1954, pp.46-47.

⁹⁴See Thorton R. Roby, "The Mechanics of Environmental Adjustment", BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, 1959, 4, pp.107-119.

⁹⁵Roby, "The Mechanics of", op.cit., p.110.

⁹⁶These two sets of functions have been used widely by Davis, Mooney, Reiley, Katz and Kahn. Parsons and Bales have developed these two sets and labelled them 'instrumental' and 'expressive' as discussed below in the text. See Talcott Parsons, Robert F. Bales and Edward A. Shils in WORKING PAPERS IN THE THEORY OF ACTION, New York : The Free Press, 1953, p.64.

conditions have been given a wider classification under the labels, the 'instrumental' and 'expressive' as coined by Parsons and Bales.⁹⁷ By the 'instrumental function' one is referring to the control of a functional social system in terms of performing tasks that are goal oriented i.e. those actions that contribute to the maintenance and effectiveness of the organization. By the 'expressive function' one refers to the reactions in the social - emotional areas that prevail between the leadership and the led. Amitai Etzioni in his "Dual Leadership in Complex Organizations", elaborated on this, claiming:

The distinction between expressive and instrumental orientations is not limited to a classification of leadership. All acts can be classified as expressive or instrumental. Roles can be classified according to the prevalence of one kind of act over the other. Moreover, the same analytical distinction can be applied to the functional needs of social systems. Here, instrumental refers to the need to acquire resources, or means, and to allocate them among the various role - clusters in the system, and expressive, to the need to maintain the integration of various parts of the system with each other as well as with its normative system. Role clusters can then be classified as devoted primarily to the service of one or another functional need...⁹⁸

Hence, if the leadership contribution to the co-ordination of social systems is to be a function of the role it plays, i.e. an indicator of its organizational mode (be it instrumental or expressive), then situational facets have to be borne in mind. This is felt so due to the reason that roles will be chosen when responding to the group's environmental problems, which includes the follower's bearing on the role and the styles of leadership.⁹⁹ It follows from then, that in order to

⁹⁷See Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales in *Ibid*, "The Dimensions of Action-Space", where they state: "...the essential approach was to think of the small group as a functioning social system. It was held that such a system would have four main 'functional problems' which are described, respectively, as those of *adaptation* to conditions of the external situation, of *instrumental* control over parts of the situation in the performance of goal oriented tasks, of the *management* and *expression* of sentiments and tensions of the members and of *preserving* the social integration of members with each other as a solidarity collectivity.." (p.64).

⁹⁸Amitai Etzioni, "Dual Leadership in Complex Organizations", *AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW*, 30, October, 1965, p.689.

⁹⁹A well known formulation on this issue comes from Greenstein who stated that the

maximize the organizational effectiveness of the group, a 'harmonization' between the instrumental and expressive modes of leadership is essential. When this harmonization is ensured, the organization's effectiveness will be enhanced by making the expressive mode leadership serve the organization's instrumental needs. These modes of leadership come into conflict when the instrumental preferences of an organization bear down on the expressive preferences and thus a balance is required for 'normal' functioning.¹⁰⁰

The instrumental and expressive orientations of leadership will affect task leadership in a group as it attempts to set the structure of goal achievement, work performance, making decisions, initiating and directing action while performing professional and technical speciality.¹⁰¹ On the other hand, social leadership will attempt to maintain group morale and harmony by 'knowing' subordinate and showing consideration for them, keeping channels of communication open, training the group to work as a team and accepting personal responsibility and setting an example.¹⁰² Along this line of thought, the solutions to organizational problems will be provided by the leadership assuming both of these orientations. As Gusfield in his "Functional Areas of Leadership" points out:

Occupying an office of leadership, the leader is subject to two sets of role demands and to dual functions. As an articulator of the movement in the total society, he must learn the limits and possibility of actions in the light of the power and ideologies of influential persons and organizations outside of the movement. He must attempt to sway these to the uses

likelihood of personal impact varies (1) the degree to which the actions take place in an environment which admits of restructuring, (2) the location of the actor in the environment, and (3) the actor's peculiar strengths or weaknesses. In Fred I. Greenstein, PERSONALITY AND POLITICS : Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization, Chicago : Markham Publishing Company, 1971, pp.42-45.

¹⁰⁰Etzioni, "Dual Leadership in Complex Organizations", op.cit., p.696.

¹⁰¹L. Carter, "Leadership and Social Group Behavior" in M. Sherif and M.O. Wilson (eds.), GROUP RELATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS, New York : Harper, 1953, pp.257-284.

¹⁰²J.G. Jenkins, "Nominating Technique as a Method of Evaluating Air Group Morale", JOURNAL OF AVIATION MEDICINE, 19, pp.12-19.

of the movement as best as may be done . However , as the mobilizer of commitment to the movement, he is expected to express the sharp disjunction between the values of the society and those of the movement.

Janus-like, the leader stands in one place, facing two different ways. In one direction he is the head of the movement - the major embodiment of commitment to the values and program. Here he faces inward, toward the goals and ideals of the adherents. In the other directions he functions as a negotiator and communicator between the external environment and the internal one. In one function, that of mobilization, he breathes the fire and brimstone of enthusiastic mission. In the other function, that of articulation, he pours the oil of bargaining, compromise, and the common culture.¹⁰³

Deducing from this, one may consider the primary mode in complex organization to be the instrumental one. However, during periods of rapid change, the expressive mode can assume increasing importance within the group structure. Given that expressive leadership is capable of moulding and maintaining the emotional bonds between leader and led, integration can be restored once the instruments' responses have failed to maintain social control and order. It is also quite clear that a single leader can shift between the modes of leadership, maintaining an instrumental capacity while at the same time, maintaining followers' loyalty through expressive behaviour.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, the overall performance of an organization can be enhanced by the creation of strong social ties - a contribution that can arise from the expressive mode of leadership.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³Joseph R. Gusfield, "Functional Areas of Leadership in Social Movements", THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY, 7, Spring, 1966, pp.140-141.

¹⁰⁴For an outstanding example bearing on this point consult Allan Bullock's HITLER : A Study in Tyranny, Book 1, Chapter II, "The Years of Struggle 1919-24", p.113. New York : Bantam Books, 1958.

¹⁰⁵For an elaboration on this facet refer to Havron and Goodacre, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SMALL MILITARY UNITS, op.cit. Also, a more specialized study by Edward A. Shils and Moris Janowitz reflects on this point in "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II" in THE PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, Summer, 1948, where a basic hypothesis is provided: "It appears that a soldier's ability to resist is a function of the capacity of his immediate primary group (his squad or section) to avoid social disintegration. When the individual's immediate group, and its supporting formations, not his basic organic needs, offered him affection and esteem from both officers and comrades, supplied him with a sense of power and adequately regulated his relations with authority. The element of self-concern in battle, which would lead to

In these terms one comes close to the notion of leadership not only as an organizational function but, one of personal quality. Under this concept, one may ask the question, 'How is the leader identified?' From the preceding discussion, it becomes evident that leadership means 'different things to different people'.¹⁰⁶ However, Shartle and Morris offer four criteria frequently used to identify leaders. A leader can be identified as:

1. An individual who exercises positive influence upon others.
2. An individual who exercises the most influence in the goal setting or goal achievement of the group or the organization.
3. An individual who is elected by the group as leader.
4. An individual who is given office or position of apparently high influence potential.¹⁰⁷

Morris' listing of leadership criteria includes the previous four postulates and also adds five others concerning leadership behaviour, which includes:

1. Any positive influence act.
2. Behaviour of any individual that makes a difference in the behaviour or the characteristics of the group.
3. Behaviour of an individual when he is directing the

disruption of the effective functioning of his primary group, was minimized." (p.281)

¹⁰⁶When one considers Cattell's conception of leadership as involving a group member's effect upon group syntality (in Raymond B. Cattell, "New Concepts for Measuring Leadership in Terms of Group Syntality", HUMAN RELATIONS, IV, 1951, pp.161-184.) and Stogdill's definition of leadership as "the process of influencing the activities of an organized group in its effort toward goal setting and goal achievement" (Ralph M. Stogdill, "Personal Factors Associated with Leadership : A Survey of the Literature", JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, XXV, Jan 1948, pp.35-71) it is clear that each conception of leadership has a fairly explicit meaning, and bears different implications for research and theory.

¹⁰⁷See Carroll Shartle, "Studies in Naval Leadership" in Harold Guetzkow, GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN, Pittsburgh : Carnegie Press, 1951, pp.119-133, and Richard Morris, "The Problem of Leadership : An Interdisciplinary Approach", AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, LVIX, September, 1950.

activities of a group.

4. All the behaviour of an individual selected as leader.

5. Behaviour involved in the execution of a given position.¹⁰⁸

It can be suggested that from a review of the literature on leadership, these criteria have been utilized to identify leaders but, as stated in the beginning of this chapter, there exists a dilemma in the study of leadership.¹⁰⁹ Dean attempts to explain this dilemma by providing four useful overviews on leadership. As he stated:¹¹⁰

1. Little comparability exists among leadership studies in the aggregate, for those studies, guided by widely different notions of the phenomenon called leadership, have not concerned themselves with common phenomena.

2. Much of the research on leadership has been influenced by a conception which, upon inspection, blurs into another more fundamental concept employed in the study of group processes.

3. The study of leadership has suffered under a dubious distinction between 'leadership' and 'headship' which has adversely conditioned much of the conceptualization of leadership.¹¹¹

4. The study of leadership has emerged as a separate field in the study of group processes and has been conducted as if leadership were a totally unique

¹⁰⁸Morris, "The Problem of Leadership...", op.cit., pp.149-155.

¹⁰⁹See John B. Miner, "The Uncertain Future of the Leadership Concept : Revisions and Clarification" in THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, Volume 18, Number 3, pp.293-307, where he offers a Behavioral treatment of the limitations of leadership. As he states: "The leadership paradigm was developed out of the study of small groups and group dynamics, the initial focus was on emergent leadership. To the extent that we are concerned with the functioning of organizations, not isolated work groups (and, increasingly, organizations are the focus of our theoretical and repeated attempts attention), the small group models have proved inadequate. Repeated attempts to extrapolate from the work group level have not resulted in viable macro theories..." pp.293-294.

¹¹⁰Dwight Dean, DYNAMIC SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, New York : Random House, 1969, pp.458-461.

¹¹¹An attempt to differentiate between leadership and headship has been made by Charles R. Hollowman, "Leadership and Headship : There is a Difference", in PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION, 31, 4, July-August, 1968, pp.38-44.

phenomenon, although virtually all the existing conceptions of leadership can be explicated in terms of more basic concepts of social psychology.

Although these reservations on the field of leadership echoed by Dean and reflected in other forms by many authors, including Burns and Jenkins, lead one to evaluate the many difficulties in differentiating between different conceptualizations, the tracing of common notions provides one with some approaches by which one can discuss and analyze leadership. These approaches may be discussed in the following order:

1. The situational approach,
2. The genetic approach,
3. The personality approach,
4. The psychoanalytic approach,
5. The psychohistorical approach,
6. The prophetic-caliphal approach, and,
7. The charismatic approach.

(1) The Situational Approach

The situational approach suggests that leaders must have situations or moments that will bring their genius to the fore, and without these situations, many men go down in history unknown.¹¹² William James suggested that great events often occur by a proper marriage between the personality of the leader and the nature of the situation, and that leadership is not simply a personal quality, although the line between the personality and the situation is not clear. James' argument reconciles an older analysis presented by Hegel and Fichte. They introduced the 'time spirit' (Zeitgeist) theory which emphasized that situations call upon personalities to play required roles in the fulfillment of destiny.¹¹³ Hegel

¹¹²William James, "The Dilemma of Determinism" from his THE WILL TO BELIEVE, New York : Dover Publications, 1956, p.26.

thought he saw in Germany the spirit or culture which would serve as the basis for unity if a German hero appeared and accepted the role of leadership. In this sense, the great man becomes the instrument of historic forces. He is great in the sense that he understands the invincible logic of events and cooperates with history. The situational approach emphasizes that occasion makes the 'great man' rather than the other way round. There are probably, according to this approach, very limited choices for man, and even fewer opportunities to reach self-chosen ends.

The situationalists might not view Hitler as personally powerful, although he may have had an exceptionally strong personality. Hitler, they assume, generated his power through the skillful exploitation of a 'ripe situation'. Nasser's famous statement concerning the situation in Egypt before the 1952 revolution illustrates this point very vividly: "A role in search of an actor".¹¹⁴ Nasser often used his role as an illustration of human instrument of the "revolution which was the only way out."¹¹⁵ British imperialism, the corrupt monarchy, feudal overlords and the disparities in the social structure constituted the climate which triggered popular dissatisfaction and thus offered a stage for the 'actor'.

Another example always forwarded by the situationalists is that of Theodore Roosevelt. The situation of the United States then was that of a nation which held in its hands the fate of other nations for the coming years. He saw that the people enjoyed exceptional advantages, but were menaced by certain lurking dangers. With this picture in mind, he settled to the conclusion that "here is the task, and I have got to do it."¹¹⁶

¹¹³H.S. Jennings, THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN NATURE, New York : W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1930, p.9.

¹¹⁴Amal Abdul Nasser, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION, Cairo : Maslahiat al Isti'amat Press, 1966, p.52.

¹¹⁵Nasser, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION, op.cit., p.53.

¹¹⁶ibid., p.92.

Thus, the conclusion the situationalists would come to is that situation, and not the individual, is the foremost and determining factor.

(2) The Genetic Approach

It was not too long ago that many persons considered that lineage determined one's fate. Francis Galton, Will Durant, Herbert E. Walter and Havelock Ellis were among the various intellectuals of their day who applied their biological knowledge and openly declared that, despite obstacles and unfavourable circumstances, genius is hereditary and is bound to assert itself.¹¹⁷ They claimed that superior achievement required the inheritance of superior inherited traits while, at the same time, differentiating between superior, normal and defective genes. 'Integration' occurs when a couple mate and the offspring may be either superior or inferior to either parent. However, the rules that govern a set of integration are not known.¹¹⁸

The question that is often raised on this approach is: Can the crossing of genes be comprehended and thus controlled to produce superior offspring? The influence of environment on the gene is widely acknowledged by many biologists. The genetic result, in terms of a personality trait, depends on the surroundings of the germ itself, and on the cells and hormones in contact with the germ cell. Hereditary studies seem to have supported the biologist's environmental gene theory. Jennings provides evidence that points out heredity in the study of monozygotic twins was affected by the process of their gene development.¹¹⁹ Whatever the geneticists have to say about their genetic calculations, it seems that they admit the environmental nature in the making of leaders.

¹¹⁷Francis Galton, HEREDITARY GENIUS, London : MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1892. Will Durant, ADVENTURES IN GENIUS, New York : Simon and Schuster, 1931, Havelock Ellis, A STUDY IN BRITISH GENIUS, London : Hurst and Blackett, Ltd., 1904, and Herbert E. Walter, GENETICS, New York : The Macmillan Company, 1930.

¹²⁰Jennings, THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN NATURE, op.cit., p.384.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p.145.

'What is the formula of interaction between the environment and the genes?' would be the second question in this connection. The answer, as provided by Jennings, may be that personalities and leadership traits are 'products of development, and development is always through the interaction of the materials of inheritance (the genes) and other things (environmental effects)-¹²⁰ The genetic theory, which does not provide clear guidelines on its rules and methodology, cautions eugenicists on predictions that can become dangerous and most unwise. This caution on the biology of leadership, while stating the 'common mistakes':

1. It is fallacious 'to sum up heredity in the maxim that like produces like'. Geniuses do not always produce geniuses. Perhaps they do, rarely. However, inferior parents may produce superior offspring.
2. It is fallacious to assume that, although all human 'characteristics' are inherited, heredity is all important in human affairs. Heredity has to be taken into consideration, but it need not be worshipped.
3. It is fallacious to claim that 'characteristics' are not alterable by environment. If the process of adaptation is often obscure, it need not therefore be denied.
4. It is also fallacious to assert that biological dogma, widely proclaimed and believed by many in social, economic and political circles, requires an aristocratic constitution of society. If genes, special ability, and hence, leadership, may come from apparently inferior patterns, a democratic organization of society is wise. The offspring of the inferior must not be condemned to inferior social roles by autocratic overlords.¹²¹

Finally, in conclusion, given that the validity of the genetic approach is highly questionable, its influence has diminished rapidly.

¹²⁰ *ibid.*, p.209.

¹²¹ *ibid.*, p.211.

(3) The Personality Approach

By far the most elaborate body of leadership material is based on the theory that leadership is a result of the personal traits and characteristics of the leader. In this perspective, leadership has a relationship to individual virtue where a person is able to perform in ways different from and superior to his fellows and thus he qualifies for leadership.¹²² One point worth mentioning is that a great deal of individuality may not produce superiority and thus may not result in leadership. Superior individuality as demonstrated by any leader must be expressed in such a way that it would be appreciated by the social group or its possessor will not be a leader.

This approach emphasizes the role of personality where the leader may ascend through the combination of a strong personality with a vigorous assertive ego and a steady determination to accomplish certain goals and objectives he perceives as important. Steady determination and a strong personality in a leader on many occasions earned him the label 'born leader'. Proponents of the personality approach tend to make a distinction between the egoistic model and the genetic model. The examples of De Gaulle,¹²³ Nasser and Sukarno¹²⁴ were probably self evident. None of these were born to superior parents; however, they apparently were dominant egoists who showed early characteristics of leadership.

Ordway Tead in his analysis of this personality type described the egoistic leader:

They impose themselves; their will to power is inordinate and insatiable. They strive on the passion for authority and the thirst for obedience....They are forces to reckon with, for people come to be convinced that in submission for them they are caught up into a larger whole and come to desire, somewhat

¹²²Emory S. Bogardus, *LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP*, New York : Appleton-Century, Inc., 1934, p.4.

¹²³See Monique Clague, "Conceptions of Leadership : Charles de Gaulle and Max Weber", *POLITICAL THEORY*, Vol.3. No.4, November, 1975, pp.423-439.

¹²⁴See Paul R. Dettman, "Leaders and Structures in 'Third World' Politics : Contrasting Approaches to Legitimacy", *COMPARATIVE POLITICS*, 1974, January, Vol.6, No.2, pp.245-269.

hypnotically, despairingly or mistakenly, what the leader desires.¹²⁵

James Martin, elaborating further on the structure of personality into three major components: habits, attitudes, and traits; analysing them in two different approaches - the static and the dynamic.¹²⁶ The combination of these three elements of personality form a pattern of characteristics peculiar to the individual making him identifiable as a unique person. A person may share many of the cultural and group characteristics but the combination, intensity and degree of these characteristics will represent a unique 'whole'. Given that no one personality can be perfectly integrated, psychologists believe a functional interrelationship among the personality characteristics of any individual will be present. It is equally possible to expect that some persons will have a sufficient number of similar characteristics to justify a cautious usage of the term 'personality type'. The effect of culture on personality may be such that certain personality 'types' are more or less identifiable.¹²⁷

Thus, if one was to make a valid conclusion on how egoistic individuals become leaders, then it would be that a realization of this personality 'type' must be so challenging, stimulating and provoking as to drive their leadership capabilities into existence. The implication of this statement goes against the earlier situational approach and leaves the person responsible for the creation of the situation rather than vice versa.

The personality model can be divided into three common subtypes : the bossist, the paternalistic and the autocratic. The 'bossist' subtype, originated by Munro in his *PERSONALITY IN POLITICS*, is found more common in local government than in state or national government. The 'boss' is an outgoing person, perhaps

¹²⁵Ordway Tead, *THE ART OF LEADERSHIP*, New York : Whittlesey House, 1935, p.26.

¹²⁶James Martin, *THE TOLERANT PERSONALITY*, Detroit : Wayne State University Press, 1964., p.34.

¹²⁷Howard Wriggins, *THE RULER'S IMPERATIVE : Strategies for Survival in Asia and Africa*, New York : Columbia University Press, 1970, p.90.

extroverted, a 'dubious individual', a shrewd master who plays upon human feelings. He ranges from the coarse, crude foreman in a factory, to the smooth and sophisticated politician who displays direct, partisan and autocratic behavior.¹²⁸ Usually calling himself the 'realist', with knowledge of the inside moves of the game, he denounces the writers of politics and governments as mere 'theorists'. Knowing his business well, the boss will grab whatever useful tangibles come his way, retain as much as he can, and may divide the rest with his associates.¹²⁹ Always having to demonstrate superior individuality and skill, he ascends to leadership status by manipulating a combination of industrial abilities, good judgment, perseverance, brute force, and good fortune and has nobody to thank for it but himself.¹³⁰

The 'boss' is not a man of military training, but it is astonishing how well he applies, in his own sphere, the axioms of military science. Having informants, spies and a miniature 'fifth column' in the enemy's camp, he has access to information that is in most cases accurate. He creates a spoils system, dependent on his cunning, which provides the boss with his power base. A spoils system brings the 'boss' to power and it is this spoils system that in the main contributes to keep him in power.¹³¹

Autocratic leadership emphasizes a state of affairs where persons are ruled without consulting them. It wields an iron club and leads in terms of its own wishes, wants, desires; it shapes the action of others in terms of its plans and justifies its doings in terms of its superiority. The autocratic leader is not only objective, overt and positive but proceeds aggressively and obtrusively. He commands and organizes; sometimes moving with precision and sometimes not. Autocratic leadership restricts the freedom of others but exercises great freedom

¹²⁸William Bennett Munro, PERSONALITY IN POLITICS, New York : The MacMillan Company, 1925, p.67.

¹²⁹Harold Zink, CITY BOSSES IN THE UNITED STATES, Durham, N.C. : Duke University Press, 1930, p.53.

¹³⁰Clay Felker, THE POWER GAME, New York : Simon and Shuster, 1968, p.73.

¹³¹Munro, PERSONALITY IN POLITICS, op.cit., pp. 69-70.

and embodies the law according to its own designs. In the extreme, this leadership can instill dark fear in the hearts and minds of its subjects and makes ruthlessness the standard operating procedure.¹³²

Paternalistic leadership is probably the most commonly found. Here, leaders act fatherlike and consider the welfare and purpose of their followers. They may dominate the group attitudes, goals and objectives if these seem ill-advised. In case of errors and mistakes made by the group, the paternalistic leadership assumes accountability. Thus, the leadership safeguards against errors by undertaking to make the decisive decisions.¹³³

The main weakness of the autocratic and paternalistic leadership is that when the leadership is lost, the group is left helpless. Under both models, the members become dependent on the leadership since they do not have the opportunity to acquire experience of leadership for themselves. The main fault of these two models is that they do not provide for the development of members' initiatives for leadership.

(4) The Psychoanalytic Approach

This approach constitutes the foundation of some influential contemporary studies of leadership. Pioneered by Freud, it assumes that since irrationality and emotionality characterizes group behaviour, the key to understanding a collective phenomena is leadership. As he writes:

...a group is...as intolerant as it is obedient to authority. It respects force and can only be slightly influenced by kindness, which it regards merely as a form of weakness. What it demands of its heroes is strength, or even violence. It wants to be ruled and oppressed and to fear its masters.¹³⁴

¹³²Tead, THE ART OF LEADERSHIP, op.cit., p.20.

¹³³ibid., p.23.

Freud believed that the cohesion of group members is based upon their common libidinal/emotional identification with the leader. The followers' emotional bond to the leader stems, specifically, from their individual inner dynamics which, in eternal tension, seek to resolve the conflict between the ego -rationality principle on the one hand, and the id - instinctual forces, and superego - social/moral imperatives. Since the followers are incapable of measuring up to their ego ideal (as reflected by the super ego), the leader is substituted for the ego ideal. The leader, on his part, stands in sharp psychological contrast to the members of the group. "...He may be of a masterful nature, absolutely narcissistic, self-confident and independent."¹³⁵

The basis of Freud's leadership approach is the controversial 'primal horde' theory, where at the start of human society, rebellious sons kill their tyrannical father, initiate a fraternal society which later experiences the need for strong leadership that in turn leads to religion, totemism and deity. All this represents the reincarnation of the murdered father. "...The leader of the group is still the dreaded primal father...the primal father is the group ideal, which governs the ego in place of the ego ideal..."¹³⁶

Building on the influential nature of Freud's work, Harold D. Lasswell focused directly upon the inner (psychological) dynamics of the political man, whose relentless pursuit of power enables the person to compensate for feelings of inadequacy and low self esteem. In other words, political personality is seen as the power centered personality that maintains its personal 'integrity' only through the pursuit and exercise of power. Postulating on several political personality types,¹³⁷ Lasswell identifies three major ones: the agitator, the

¹³⁴See Sigmund Freud, *GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO*, New York : Bantam Books, 1921, p.14.

¹³⁵Freud, *GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO*, op.cit., p.71.

¹³⁶ibid., p.76.

¹³⁷To speak of 'type' is to say that each personality is, of course different in fine detail, but nevertheless important similarities can be extracted. These similarities allow for the claim that two or more leaders are of the same type.

administrator and the theorist:

The essential mark of the agitator is the high value which he places on the emotional response of the public...The agitator has come by his name honestly, for he is enough agitated about public policy to communicate his excitement to those about him.¹³⁸

[The administrator is tied] to the members of his own environment, whose relations he seeks to coordinate. The administrator is a co-ordinator of effort in continuing activity.¹³⁹

Marx, [the theorist], wanted to impress himself upon mankind, certainly...But more: Marx wanted unreserved admiration for the products of his mind. He toiled through years of isolation and poverty to make his assertions impregnable. It was more important to gain theoretical completeness than to modify his technique of social intercourse.¹⁴⁰

Lasswell concluded that although three different types of individual responses are made to particular situations, a general formula that explains why they all became 'political men' can be constructed: " $p \} d \} r = P$ ", where p equals private motives; d equals displacement onto a public object; r equals rationalization in terms of public interest; P equals the political man; and $\}$ equals transformed into.¹⁴¹ This broad conceptualization known as 'the displacement hypothesis' serves as a theoretical justification to see persons that get involved in social movements and revolutions as displacing private motives upon public objects.

Positing a particular type of political man - the revolutionary leader - E. Victor Wolfenstein's in *THE REVOLUTIONARY PERSONALITY*¹⁴² offers an essentially Freudian interpretation of Lenin, Trotsky and Gandhi, and employing Erikson's

¹³⁸Harold Lasswell, *PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS*, Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1930, p.78.

¹³⁹ibid., p.127.

¹⁴⁰ibid., p.53.

¹⁴¹ibid., p.75.

¹⁴²E. Victor Wolfenstein, *THE REVOLUTIONARY PERSONALITY*, Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1971.

eight stages of personality development - oral, anal, genital, latency, adolescence, young manhood, adulthood, maturity - focused on the Oedipus complex in locating the motivational dynamics that drive men towards revolutionary action:

Turning then to adolescence, we found the following situation to be common to all three men. Each had an unusually ambivalent relationship with his father....When the nature of the youth's relation to paternal authority, is very much at issue, it is extremely likely that the individual will be responsive to occupations, of which revolutionary activity is one, which allow him to work through his conflicts and hopefully resolve them...The revolutionary is one who escapes from the burdens of Oedipal guilt and ambivalence by carrying his conflict with authority into the political realm.¹⁴³

In this manner the revolutionist dichotomises his world, and with it the emotional complex of his ambivalent feelings toward his father. As a consequence his feelings of guilt are substantially reduced, so that in all three cases we saw men turning from introspection and inaction to vigorous pursuance of their revolutionary vocations.¹⁴⁴

Stimulating as this may be,¹⁴⁵ the psychoanalytic approach to leadership is faced with difficulties of validity. These studies, many authorities have observed, are highly speculative and do not lend themselves to scientific criteria - especially verification and replication. Providing at best a parochial explanation to leadership, they are applicable to numbered individuals and leave out historical and socioeconomic variables that play a vital part in emergent leadership. Also, the extent of psychological data that goes into these studies is in most cases unavailable.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ibid., p.305.

¹⁴⁴ibid., p.309.

¹⁴⁵For more information on typologies of political leaders refer to James David Barber, THE PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1977.

¹⁴⁶One can only imagine the formidable task a psychoanalyst may face trying to 'uncover' the necessary psychological data concerning leaders from secondary sources.

(5) The Psychohistorical Approach

Unlike the psychoanalytic perspective that deals solely with the inner dynamics of personality, the psychohistorical approach attempts to place personality dynamics in the context of society and history. Pioneered by Erik H. Erikson, this approach represents a fusion of psychology and history evolving around personal crisis, historical drama, adolescence and adulthood. The eight distinct and successive developmental stages, noted earlier, evolve in a sociohistorical setting and each contributes towards the progressive differentiation of the personality. A 'turning point' or 'crisis' marks each of these stages leading to the growth of a psychosocial personality. In organizing his study, Erikson uses the pivotal 'Event' around which he constructs a 'scenario' of identity crisis and personality dynamics.¹⁴⁷

Erikson's work on Martin Luther emphasizes the central concern of 'identity crisis' that deals with personal wholeness, integrity and continuity. The 'Event' is an account where Luther, most probably in his early twenties, has what appeared as a fit in his monastery's choir. Erikson regards this incident as the illustration for Luther's 'identity crisis' that is located in his childhood and home life.¹⁴⁸ By advocating his reformist attitude, Erikson claims, Luther was among the chosen individuals "called upon...to lift his individual patienthood to the level of a universal one and try to solve for all what he could not solve for himself".¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷See Erik H. Erikson's, "The Nature of Clinical Evidence" in *INSIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY*, New York : W.W. Norton, 1964.

¹⁴⁸Refer to Erik H. Erikson, *YOUNG MAN LUTHER*, New York : W.W. Norton, 1958, where his parents and tutors are said to be strict disciplinarians and Luther is portrayed as rebellious, violent, moody, bad tempered and hating. At university level he studies under radical theologians who question the teachings of the Catholic Church and thus influence young Luther. Becoming a monk in an austere monastery and ordained as a priest, Luther used his priesthood training to formulate 'Lutheranism' (mostly contained in the ninety five theses emphasizing the priesthood of all believers and condemning the Church hierarchy) as a legitimate weapon in his attack on the Catholic Church. By doing this he spoke on behalf of the thousands who shared the same judgements but had neither the resources nor the capacity to challenge the existing order.

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p.67

Another of the cases Erikson has undertaken is that of discovering the psychohistorical evidence of Mahatma Gandhi. In this case, the focus is 'generativity crisis' that is, whether or not one develops the capacity to establish and guide the next generation - either in terms of actual fatherhood or symbolically in terms of accomplishments or 'works'. The 'Event' around which Erikson constructs his study of Gandhi is the textile strike of 1918 at Ahmedabad, which is viewed, at least by Erikson, to be the starting point of the Indian labour union movement. Important in this 'Event' is the impact it had on Gandhi's life, especially in terms of engineering non-violence as a transformative technique based on the ritual belief of political fasting. It was from then that Gandhi leads the mass movement of national civil disobedience.¹⁵⁰

According to Erikson's analysis, in responding to a crisis of generativity characteristic of his adulthood, Gandhi expounded and practised non-violence to a process of nation building as well as self-creation. Thus, in transforming the negative inferiority identity of the Indians in their relations with the British, Gandhi was able to transform his own negative self image into one that was more satisfying to his inner needs.¹⁵¹ In this, one witnesses the coalescence of historical imperative and personal drama 'prodding' a great leader to adopt a historical setting to his personal needs.

Bruce Mazlish's *THE REVOLUTIONARY ASCETIC* provides a specialized psychohistorical study of revolutionary leaders. Relying upon the work of Freud and Weber and using a cluster of traits, he delineates the revolutionary ascetic that consists of two components: narcissism and self denial, control and sacrifice. Along with Freud's indications of the leader having few libidinal ties to others (i.e. incapable of feelings and emotions) Mazlish applies the notion of 'displaced libido' (i.e. displacing libidinal ties into an abstraction) to Cromwell, Robespierre, Lenin, and Mao. Each of these leaders exhibited the same

¹⁵⁰See Erik H. Erikson, *GANDHI'S TRUTH*, New York : W.W. Norton, 1969, p.34.

¹⁵¹Erik H. Erikson, "On the Nature of Psycho-Historical Evidence: In Search of Gandhi", *DAEDALUS*, 97, 1968, pp.695-730.

behavioural pattern, differing only in their sociohistorical context; making them glorify: "...the Revolution, the People, Humanity, or Virtue..."¹⁵²

On the second component of ascetism, Mazlish borrows from Weber the idea of transforming a religious concept and its placement "...under the banner of revolutionary activity..."¹⁵³ making "...the traits of displaced libido and asceticism...highly functional in the real world of revolution..."¹⁵⁴ The followers, perceiving the leader's ascetic qualities as 'superhuman' and 'godlike', are bound together by the identification they have for the leader who by offering victory as well as salvation acquires a hypnotic hold over them.

The main weakness of the sociohistorical approach is that, even when overcoming some of the limitations of the psychoanalytic perspective, it is still embedded in some of the latter's intuitive and non-scientific aspects. Questions of scientific rigour, the operationalization of the many psychological categories and of locating the necessary psychohistorical data are ever present. Similarly, this perspective is limited to very few individuals.¹⁵⁵

(6) The Prophetic-Caliphal Approach

This approach arises from the traditional Moslem philosophy of leadership that is based upon the belief that rulership is a gift bestowed and pre-destined by God, and the ruler will be accountable for it before God on the Day of Judgment. The implication here is that the ruler theoretically does not own his power and accordingly is not accountable for it to his fellowmen. Various verses from the

¹⁵²See Bruce Mazlish, THE REVOLUTIONARY ASCETIC, New York : Basic Books, 1976, P.23.

¹⁵³ibid., p.5.

¹⁵⁴ibid., p.34.

¹⁵⁵For another example of this, refer to E.H. Erikson, "Gandhi's Autobiography : The Leader as a Child", THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR, Autumn, 1966.

Holy Koran are interpreted to confirm that theory. The ruler, be he a Caliph, a Sultan, or a Wali,¹⁵⁶ or one appointed by them, is "God's shadow on earth"; and the "divine shadow is here assimilated to the divine effulgence."¹⁵⁷ Other men must therefore love and obey the ruler who, for his part, must rule them justly. The ruler's accountability to God for his conduct is stated on the authority of a saying ascribed to the Prophet Mohammed that "unjust rule does not last long".¹⁵⁸

The qualifications for the Moslem leader were physical and moral. The physical are: adulthood, sanity, liberty (non slave), male sex and sound sight and hearing.¹⁵⁹ The moral are: military prowess, administrative competence, piety and knowledge. Obviously, the qualifications of the 'Moslem leader' are very similar to those pertinent to the Western-leader type which are basically, justice, courage, knowledge, good health and competence. The process of reaching leadership was where God nominated the leader, the electoral college was the ulama,¹⁶⁰ and the leader pleased the Almighty by guiding the followers who were in most cases passive, except when the leader forfeited the qualifications for justice and morality. In these terms the political process was the Caliph's responsibility and any theory of democracy was absent.

From the above analysis, it becomes obvious that leadership was perceived in terms of mysterious and religious obligations. The leader-follower relations were to a great extent not accounted for and the leaderships' 'operational codes'

¹⁵⁶The three terms Caliph, Sultan, and Wali are Arabic titles meaning respectively: "successor of the Prophet charged with sacred as well as secular leadership", "possessor of power", usually appointed by a Caliph, and 'governor of a province', usually appointed by the Sultan. See Caesar E. Farah, ISLAM : Beliefs and Observances, New York : Barron's Educational Series, 1968, for a detailed account on Islamic political thought.

¹⁵⁷See Abduhamid Al Ghazali, ADVICE FOR KINGS, Translated from Persian by F.R.C. Bagley, London : Oxford University Press, 1915, pp. xi-xli.

¹⁵⁸See E.I.J. Rosenthal, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM, Cambridge : University Press, 1958, pp. 113-114.

¹⁵⁹Al Ghazali, ADVICE FOR KINGS, op.cit., p.V.

¹⁶⁰ulama, an Arabic word, means a council of religious elders.

seem to have been non - existent.

An attempt has been made to operationalize some aspects of the dynamics of Arab leadership based on Moslem political thought. This abstraction consists of four elements and two submodels. The four elements are personalism, individualism, lack of institutionalization, and importance of the 'great man'. The two submodels are the prophetic model and the caliphal model. A comprehensive dynamic system of leadership relationship co-ordinates these four elements and the two submodels.¹⁶¹

Personalism refers to a subjective, personalistic and highly emotional relationship between a person and other people and things. 'Objectivity' if anything at all can be called so, is present only to a small degree. On the other hand, individualism represents a tendency to make decisions regardless of group opinion, or in spite of it. These two elements are viewed as complementing and reinforcing each other and whose combined effect is the lack of institutionalization. Lack of institutionalization denotes that the means for solving leadership problems are ineffective or even absent. Given this the prophetic-caliphal model undermines institutions and the combined effect of personalism, individualism and lack of institutionalization creates a vacuum. This vacuum so created, as a result of the weak binding effect of institutions i.e. ways and means of doing things, the lack of an overriding ideology or a dominant group, can be filled by the quality of a leader. The interaction of personalism, individualism and the lack of institutionalization maintain a strong predisposition for the arrival of the great man who, as though completing a set, accepts his role as the fourth element.¹⁶²

The followers' perceptions of the leader and their attitudes to him become the defining criterion in differentiating between a great man and an ordinary one.

¹⁶¹This typology is adopted from Bashir Khadra's THE PROPHETIC-CALIPHAL MODEL : A Theory of the Arab Concept of Leadership, Amman : Cobary Press, 1982.

¹⁶²See Philip Hitti, HISTORY OF THE ARABS, New York : MacMillan, 1951, pp. 27-28.

The 'prophetic' leader or the 'great man' will only be accepted by the followers if he performs a 'miracle' or something 'extraordinary' and will most likely exercise a leadership that manifests free will, solidarity, drive and unity of action. On the other hand, the 'caliphal' leader, the ordinary, possessing neither superior qualities nor extraordinary capabilities will be termed by the others as the 'average' and will exercise authority: maintaining himself mostly by coercion and authoritarian devices. However, the distinction between the caliphatic and prophetic models, like that of authority and leadership, is a matter of degree and not kind. At best, they can be viewed as a spectrum where leadership variations occur but, nevertheless, display an anti-establishment mode of leadership. Issues of succession, accession and other leadership problems take different directions in the two submodels. In the caliphal sub-model, force, coercion and lack of confidence result in the lack of institutionalization. While in the prophetic model, the lack of institutionalization arises from the belief and trust in the leader.¹⁶³

It should be noted that this leadership approach involves three participants: the leaders, the potential contestants, and the followers. To operationalize any of the elements of the prophetic-caliphal model, an analysis of the interaction of the three participants is to be considered.

The primary significance of this model is that it points out the prominence of the 'great man' in a system's development, continuity and progress. However, its most visible weakness is that dependence on the great individual increases risks and uncertainties in the development process which is compounded by the factors of chance and unpredictability of the emergence of the 'great leader'. It may be of some validity to assert that a period of stability, development and identification exists when the 'great man' is available, but political development requires more certainty, popular participation, continuity of leadership, a minimum of conflict and more unifying agents, like ideology and institutions. Given this, it is felt

¹⁶³See Khadra, THE PROPHETIC-CALIPHAL MODEL, op. cit., p.13.

that the monistic and absolutist tendencies that arise from the anti-institutional prophetic-caliphal model can only be suppressed or modified if an emphasis is made on ideology and the fostering of political organizations accompanied by an institutionalized groupist spirit.

(7) The Charismatic Approach

Perhaps the most prominent approach to leadership revolves around the concept of charisma. The charismatic leader is distinguished from other leaders by his capacity to inspire loyalty toward himself as the source of authority,¹⁶⁴ apart from an established status.¹⁶⁵ The main weapon of the charismatic leader is personal magnetism and charm that conveys not only his magical power but also his delicate need for support and reinforcement. The charismatic leader needs his followers as much as the actor needs his audience. In this interdependence the charismatic leader maintains the cohesion of the group or society largely by identifying himself with myth. The charismatic leader is able to communicate to his followers a sense of continuity between himself and his mission and their

¹⁶⁴One can identify charismatic authority only in terms of the extent to which it is acknowledged by the followers and the only 'proof' of a leader's charismatic inspiration is its recognition as genuine by the followers. It is not so much what the leader is but how he is regarded by those subject to his authority that is decisive for the validity of charisma. Charisma is a state of mind which resides in the perceptions of the followers. As Weber tells us, "What is alone important is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, by his 'followers' or 'disciples'." In Max Weber, *THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION*, (Translated by H.R. Henderson and Talcott Parsons) London : William Hodge and Co., Ltd., 1947, p.331.

¹⁶⁵According to Max Weber the link between the charismatic hero and his followers is direct; it is not mediated by established institutions. The charismatic hero occupies no office within established religions or military organizations. See Max Weber, *ECONOMY AND SOCIETY*, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 3 Vols, New York : Bedminster Press, 1968, I, pp.241-242. Elsewhere, Weber claims: "The charismatic hero does not deduce his authority from codes and statutes, as is the case with the jurisdiction of office; nor does he deduce his authority from traditional custom or feudal vows of faith, as is the case of patrimonial power... The charismatic leader gains and maintains authority solely by proving his strength in life. If he wants to be a prophet, he must perform miracles; if he wants to be a war lord, he must perform heroic deeds." See Max Weber, "The Sociology of Charismatic Authority" in *FROM MAX WEBER : Essays in Sociology*, edited and translated by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, New York : Oxford University Press, 1946, pp.248-249.

legendary heroes and their missions. And since a myth remains the same as long as it is felt such, he and his claims are legitimated by his ability to clothe himself with the mantle of myth.¹⁶⁶

The term 'charismatic leader' has recently attained widespread and almost debased currency.¹⁶⁷ In the past, it was occasionally applied to Lenin, Roosevelt and Hitler. It was noted that nearly every leader with marked popular appeal, especially those of new states, is indiscriminately tagged as charismatic. In the absence of clear cut specifications of traits of personality or behaviour shared those many leaders¹⁶⁸ to whom charisma has been attributed and of any inventory of the common characteristics of the publics who have been susceptible to charismatic appeal, it is not surprising that scholars should question the meaning and utility of the concept of charisma.

Max Weber's 'charisma', a creative and compelling ideal - typical conceptual tool, was adapted from the vocabulary of the church historian Rudolf Sohm, who associated it with the world of religion and divinely inspired leaders, claiming that "...the charisma is from God...and the service to which the charisma calls is a service imposed from God, and an office in the service of the church, and not of any local community..."¹⁶⁹ Weber's secularization of 'charismatic authority'¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁶The notion of charismatic response and 'epic myth' is taken from the work of A.R. Willner and D. Willner's work on charisma. Refer to "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders", ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, 358, March, 1965, pp. 77-88. and THE SPELLBINDERS : Charismatic Political Leadership , New Haven : Yale University Press, 1984.

¹⁶⁷See K.J. Ratnam, "Charisma and Political Leadership", POLITICAL STUDIES, XXI, No.3, September, 1964, pp.341-354 for a critique of the contemporary uses of the concept.

¹⁶⁸Ben Gurion, Churchill, De Gaulle, Peron, Sukarno, Nasser, Toure, Lumumba, Nehru, Jomo Kenyatta and Kennedy are just a few of the noted charismatic political leaders in history. A contemporary example of a religious leader (notably with a political mandate) that has been called charismatic is the Ayatollah Rohollah Khomeini. Refer to Micheal S. Kimmel and Rahmat Tavakol, "Against Satan : Charisma and Tradition in Iran", in Ronald M. Glassman and William H. Swatos, Jr. In SOCIETY, CHARISMA AND SOCIAL CHANGE , New York : Wiley, 1984, pp.101-112.

¹⁶⁹Quoted from Arthur Shwelter, THE AGE OF CHARISMA, Chicago : Nelson Hall, 1984, pp.151-152. Karl Lowenstein in his MAX WEBER'S POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF OUR TIME. (Amherst : University of Massachusetts Press, 1966, p.79) also observes that: "fundamentally,... the locus of charisma is the world of

served to create a theoretical yardstick by means of which to denote one of his three classical 'ideal types' of authority on the basis of legitimacy claims. He distinguished among firstly, 'traditional authority' whose claim is based on "an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions"; secondly, 'rational or legal authority' grounded on the belief in the legality of rules and in the right of those holding authoritative positions by virtue of those rules to issue commands, and, thirdly, 'charismatic or personal authority', that rests on "devotion to the specific sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative pattern or order revealed by him".¹⁷¹ Charismatic authority, according to Weber, differs from the other two in being unstable,¹⁷² even if recurrent, and tends to be 'routinized' into one of the other two types.¹⁷³

One point that seems to recur in the literature on charismatic leadership is that the term 'charisma' cannot be properly applied to leaders whose 'call' neither comes from God nor can be considered divinely inspired in the specifically

religion"; Or in the case of Wolfgang Mommsen "...charisma ...is a form of spiritual energy oriented to other - worldly ideals which are in more or less sharp contrast to the facts of daily life." In Wolfgang Mommsen, "Max Weber's Political Sociology and his Philosophy of World History", INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL, 17, pp.23-45, p. 33. However, in the case of modern charismatic leaders, the religious element is nearly absent. An exception to this is the case of the Ayatollah Rohollah Khomeini as discussed above.

¹⁷⁰The term 'charisma', writes Weber, "...will be applied to a certain quality of an individual by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a 'leader'..." in THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, op.cit., pp. 328-29. See also H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds) FROM MAX WEBER : Essays in Sociology, New York : Oxford University Press, 1946, pp.78-79.

¹⁷¹Weber, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, op.cit., p.328.

¹⁷²Much of Weber's 'theory of revolution' is drawn from his discussion of charisma, which he terms "the specifically creative revolutionary force of history and denotes an anti-order attribute." Quoted in William H. Swatos, Jr., "The Disenchantment of Charisma : On Revolution in a Rationalized World", in Glassman and Swatos (eds.), SOCIETY, CHARISMA AND SOCIAL CHANGE, op.cit., p.129.

¹⁷³This notion of 'routinization' has led to the charge that Weber used the concept of charisma ambiguously, that is, on the one hand, characterizing certain classes of people in particular situations and, on the other hand, as a more general quality that can be institutionalized.

religious sense. On the grounds that the works of 'Luther' and 'Hitler' should not be classified together, Weber's extension of an originally Christian concept to include leaders who advocate a darkly secular fervor is deplored.¹⁷⁴ The lack of realism of this notion leads one to recognize that the empirical manifestation of charismatic leadership is one and the same thing whether in the service of the 'good' or the 'bad'.

Therefore, the term 'charisma' is redefined, without departing from Weber's premise; that is, the leader's capacity to elicit from his followers a combination of acquiescence, allegiance, and reverence in establishing his base of authority. Any leader who has this effect on his group is endowed with charisma.

The 'charismatic process' is one of interaction between the leader and his followers. In the course of this interaction the leader transmits, and the followers accept, his presentation of himself as their pre-destined leader, his definitions of their world as it is and as it ought to be, and his conviction of his mission and their duty to shape it. In actuality, the process is more complicated because it involves several groups of followers and several stages of validation. There is the small group of the 'elect' or 'disciples', the initial group whom the leader first inspires as a beach-head into the society. There is, also, the public at large which, in turn, can be divided into those of modern orientation toward order. In the societies with which this research is concerned, further divisions may exist along ethnic, tribal, religious, regional, and national lines. The nationally significant charismatic leader must command the loyalty of all or most of these sectors.

To understand how a charismatic leader functions, it seems advisable to distinguish two levels on which his appeal is communicated and responded to: the first level is that of grievances and special interests of each group; significance

¹⁷⁴For an example of this refer to Carl J. Friedrich, "Political Leadership and the Problem of Charismatic Power", THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, XXIII, February, 1961, pp.3-24.

of these grievances and interests is probably greatest during the stage in which the charismatic leader mobilizes the population in opposition to a prevailing order and in assertion of the possibility of a new order. In developing nations or areas in transition from colonial rule to independence, this stage is naturally that of opposition to the rule of a colonial power. In developed nations, this stage is seen in terms of determining the reforms of the adverse party (such as the situation in the United States or the United Kingdom) or attacking previous cult worshipping systems (as happened in the Soviet Union under Krushchev).

While the attraction exercised by the charismatic leader can, in part, be attributed to his ability to focus and channel diverse grievances and interests in a common appeal, this explanation is insufficient to account for the acceptance of a given leader. Nor does charismatic attraction show how a leader maintains charisma in the conditions of uncertainty and fractionalization which follow the attainment of the common goals. Ironically enough, this attraction exercised by charismatic leaders could not explain why the followers maintain their support (or augment it) to these leaders when they were defeated or humiliated by foreign or internal forces.

Ann Ruth Willner suggests that the charisma of a leader is bound up with, and may even depend upon, his assimilation in the thoughts and feelings of a populace, and his assimilation in the people's sacred figures, divine beings, or heroes.¹⁷⁵ Their actions, states Willner, and the context of these actions encountered in myths, express the fundamental values of a culture, including its basic categories for organizing experience and trying to resolve basic cultural and human dilemmas.

Of the overlapping and conflicting theories of myth to be found in anthropological literature, all seem to regard myths as tales referring to events that took place in the past, usually a legendary past. Levi-Strauss points out that "what gives

¹⁷⁵Ann Ruth Willner, CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, Research Monograph, No.32, Princeton, N.J. : Center of International Studies, 1968, pp.84-85.

myth an operational value is that the specific pattern is timeless; it explains the present and the past as the future."¹⁷⁶ A prime example of Strauss' explanation was given by the late French President Pompidou when he expressed to the French people, after the death of President De Gaulle, that "his spirit will always lead France and the French people....France is now a widow."¹⁷⁷ Strauss contends that recent events in a people's politics, particularly those marking a major transition or extraordinary occurrence in public life, can become endowed with the quality of myth if they fit in or can be fitted into a pattern of a traditional myth or a body of myths. In these terms, the charismatic leader communicates to his followers a sense of continuity between himself and their missions.¹⁷⁸ How a particular leader does this was described by Willner as a 'cultural management'. In a similar way, Miles Copeland, in his *GAME OF NATIONS*, called the same phenomena a 'strategy' which is played by charismatic leaders in part consciously and in part unconsciously and intuitively.¹⁷⁹

The particular 'strategy' of individual charismatic leaders could be subjected to investigation. Elements of such strategies might be broken into categories: rhetoric employed in speeches, simile, metaphor, and allusions used in myths and history; gestures and movements used in actions; and modes used in handling crises. While this list can be refined and extended, it suggests some of the categories in terms of which the charismatic appeal of leadership can be analyzed.¹⁸⁰

It should be stressed that the elements of the behavioural patterns of each leader vary from culture to culture and from society to society. However, specific to the charismatic leader in all cultures is the role of the myth in the validation of

¹⁷⁶Claude Levi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth", *THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN FOLKLORE*, LXVIII, September, 1955, p.430.

¹⁷⁷THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, November 11, 1970, p.1.

¹⁷⁸Willner, CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, op.cit., p.83.

¹⁷⁹Miles Copeland, *THE GAME OF NATIONS*, New York : Simon and Shuster, 1969, p.121.

¹⁸⁰An illustration of specific details of even a single leader would require an elaboration of the myths and values of his culture and lack of space.

his authority. His appeal can best be understood and accepted by reference to the body of myth prevalent in his culture.¹⁸¹ The charismatic leader is charismatic because, in the breakdown of other means of legitimizing authority, he is able to evoke and associate with himself the sacred symbols of the culture. It follows that the charismatic appeal of a leader is, by definition, limited to those who share the traditions of a given culture, that is, to those who understand and respond to the symbols expressed in the myths a charismatic leader evokes. Nasser in the mid-sixties was a charismatic to the Egyptian people as he was to the Syrians, Libyans, and Sudanese. The change here is definitely related to the modifications in the Arab myths and traditions (in addition to other factors, i.e., communication systems and propaganda techniques) which Nasser evoked in the Arab peoples as one nation.¹⁸²

This argument should not suggest that charismatic leaders achieve power or retain it by charisma alone. Charismatic appeal provides the source and legitimization of authority in a certain society for a certain period of time. Other supports may be needed (sometimes required) to maintain power, especially when charismatic appeal begins to decline.¹⁸³

The basic mission of a charismatic leader in any society can be broadly stated as: (1) to destroy the older order, completely or partially (political, social, economic or all of them together); and (2) to build a new and a more adequate (often termed better) order.¹⁸⁴ A valid question which is often raised with

¹⁸¹Bronislaw Malinowski, "Myth in Primitive Psychology" in his *MAGIC, SCIENCE AND RELIGION*, Boston : Beacon Press, 1948, pp.96-108.

¹⁸²At this juncture, the dichotomy that is inherent in the study of charismatic leaders should be established. We are accustomed to thinking of charismatic leaders as those who are bent on bringing about sweeping changes. However, some charismatic movements have as their focus the preservation of tradition. Still, others aspire to bring about some changes while maintaining some traditions. This dichotomy is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six.

¹⁸³David Apter, *GHANA IN TRANSITION*, New York : Atheneum Publishers, 1963, pp.328-329. Apter argues that charisma can decline in favour of a secular authority or, as he found in Ghana, as a result of conflict with traditional authority.

¹⁸⁴Williner, *CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP*, op.cit., p.86.

regard to the second point, adequate to whom? To the new members of the society or to the leaders of the new regime? Or both? Another question, of course, is what happens when the interests of the people conflict with the interests of the regime? The answers to these questions probably can be obtained only if new concepts of 'political integration' and 'political participation' are applied, as presented by David Easton, Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba, David Apter, and others.¹⁸⁵ Naturally, the new order (system) cannot be initiated against the proclaimed or implied wishes of the populace unless it is propagated with vigour. Also it becomes strategically hazardous to the new system if it fails to capture the public appeal especially in the early stages of its emergence. It, therefore, becomes imperative for political leaders to structure a socio-economic and a political system which attracts maximum popular appeal and, at the same time, minimizes the leadership risks the regime has to encounter.

In developing nations, as well as in rich nations, political, economic, social and ecological problems often spring to the fore when development projects are introduced to the populace. The end products of these dilemmas are often seen in terms of national unity or disunity (with regard to major development issues). Disunity might develop in a grave manner so as to threaten the cohesion, sovereignty or independence of the nation. The Civil War in the United States was a prime example; the situation in the Congo in 1961 or in Jordan in 1970 are also excellent examples. In these situations, the charismatic leader (Lincoln, Mobutu, and King Hussein, respectively) may be single symbols of unity surmounting the diversity and the primary means of creating consensus on objectives. Nasser faced several situations of disunity during his rule. However, he floated high above the complexities of the issues and became the only visible embodiment of the nation as a whole.

¹⁸⁵For detailed information on the theories of political integration and political participation, see the following references: Gabriel Almond, *STUDY OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS*, Boston : Little, Brown, 1966; Karl Deutsch, *NERVES OF GOVERNMENT* New York : Free Press, 1963; Lucian Pye, *POLITICS, PERSONALITY AND NATION BUILDING* New Haven : Yale University Press, 1962.; Robert Dahl, *MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS* Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Hall, 1970; David Easton, *A FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Hall, 1965.

The charismatic leader can be seen as a double visaged Janus projecting himself, on the one hand, as the omniscient himself, and, on the other hand, as the new man of the people, who leads them and shares with the trials of revolutionary renewal. The charismatic leader in developing nations often seeks to conserve his charisma and subdue factionalism under the umbrella of the single party regime which serves a double function.¹⁸⁶ Joint participation in regime sponsored organizational activities, even if partially or originally coerced, often creates a sense of solidarity among the people, a sense of identification with the regime's goals, and a sense of accomplishment that gives some meaning to nationalism.

Of major significance to the charismatic leader is the creation of a national identity on the international scene. His speeches, remarks, and gestures become ideological indications which must be contended with in the international community. The presence and prominence of charismatic leaders in distant capitals and their exertion of obvious influence on international conferences give their peoples a sense of national identity and pride. Great examples in contemporary history are Churchill, Kennedy, Nehru, Nasser, and Khrushchev.

While charismatic leadership may contribute in many ways to the consolidation of the state, its exercise has often indicated the delay of institutionalism and political continuity needed for concrete tasks of development. A charismatic leader may become trapped by his own symbols and substitute symbolic action as ends instead of means. Viewing himself as the indispensable father of the country and the only one who holds its destiny, he may convert it - consciously, subconsciously or unconsciously - to an arbitrary state. Charismatic leadership, as a rule, does not provide for orderly succession, though in several cases it did under uncommon conditions.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁶Willner, CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, op.cit., p.87.

¹⁸⁷President Nasser, some months before he died on September 28, 1970, hastily made provisions for, Anwar al Sadat's succession to the rulership of the United Arab Republic in case he (Nasser) become unable to preside. The reason for this hasty and arbitrary decision was explained by AL AHRAM, (October 17, 1970) as a response by Nasser when he discovered about an assassination attempt plotted against his life in a forthcoming trip.

Finally, it is noteworthy to indicate that there appears to be no correlation between charismatic leadership and recognized systems. It exists - and might exist - in democracies, theocracies or autocracies. It existed -and might exist- under capitalist systems, as well as under communists systems. It was common - and is common - in traditional societies and in developed societies. The charismatic leader might be a Christian, a Jew or Moslem, as well as a pagan or atheist. The charismatic approach focuses on the leader's ability and performance rather than on the constitutional technicalities of legitimacy and political philosophies. Charismatic leadership is hard to define, but "it is there, go and use it", to quote Thomas Edison when he described electricity. Charismatic leadership, in this respect, might either turn a nation on, or it might keep the populace, as well as the leader, in political darkness. Charismatic leaders are hard to find and are harder to depose; it is the people who help charismatic leadership emerge, and ironically it is these same people who stimulate its fall.

CHAPTER TWO

THE STUDY OF WEBERIAN CHARISMA : A GENERAL DEFINITION AND THEORY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In Chapter One, the various approaches to political leadership were analysed and the importance of the charismatic approach to leadership was emphasized. Given that the charismatic typology is the central category utilized in this study, it becomes crucial to examine the meaning of the concept "Charismatic Leader" in Western political thought. This is the aim of the second Chapter. Although the historically assumed charismatic personality is evident, the emphasis here is on the contemporary meaning of the concept.¹ In the process of examining the basic ingredients of "Charismatic Personality" within the Western context, the investigator renders a critique of the literature and discusses the validity of Max Weber's classification of authority and contemporary analysis of 'Charismatic Political Leadership' such as that by Richard R. Fagen, Ann Ruth Willner, and James W. Downton. Hence, this Chapter deals specifically with three broad questions:

1. What are the typologies of 'Charismatic Leaders'?
2. Are charismatic leaders by definition authoritarian?
3. What motivates an individual to follow a charismatic personality?

¹For the origins of the concept and its entry into contemporary usage, refer to Daniel Bell, "Sociodicy : A Guide to Modern Usage", AMERICAN SCHOLAR, 35, Autumn, 1966, pp.702-05. *Barakah* is the Arabic word which roughly translates as charisma. The first scholar to equate charisma with *Barakah* was the late Gustave Von Grunebaum in connection with the person of Prophet Mohammed; see MEDIEVAL ISLAM 2nd Edition, Chicago : Chicago University Press, 1953, p.92. Another word closely associated with *Barakah* is *Birr* which H.A.R. Gibb calls "the crown of true belief". See STUDIES ON THE CIVILIZATION OF ISLAM, Boston : Boston Press, 1968, pp.191-2. Arabic equivalents of charismatic leadership include *Qiyadah Mubarakah*, or *Qiyadah Rashidah*.

Methodologically, this study is based on the Weberian axiom that social scientists has always differentiated between routine and extraordinary leadership². That is, the author accepts the forementioned generalization as a valid theoretical assertion. And by doing so, the core argument of whether there is such a thing as 'charisma' in a technological age is avoided.³ In addition, the concept "charisma" is used here in a strictly technical manner and thus is devoid of 'moral' implications.⁴

This Chapter deals with the concept of 'charismatic political authority' and the various forms it takes in society such as hero worship and the demagogic based mass leader. One is particularly interested in the Western world's perception of the 'charismatic leader', since much has already been written about the charismatic phenomenon in the so called Third World system of states.⁵ So much in fact that scholars of the area wondered whether it is a sound practice to brand all political pre-eminence among non-Western states 'charismatic' or to believe that the Third World has become a perpetual source of charisma. A significant segment of literature about the Third World, views the regimes of many developing states as the projection of the personality of their leaders.

²See Max Weber *ECONOMY AND SOCIETY*, New York : Bedminster Press, 1968, pp.241-242.

³The reader may sense a sidestep on this issue. However, a distinction can be made between 'media enhanced personalities' and political leaders who possess Weber's 'pure charisma'. For an elaboration on this, see Joseph Bensman and Michael Givant, "Charisma and Modernity : The Use and Abuse of a Concept", *SOCIAL RESEARCH*, 69, Winter, 1975, pp.571-80.

⁴Edward Shils reflects on the importance of using 'charisma' as a value free concept. See Edward Shils in "Charisma, Order and Status", *AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW*, Vol. 30, 1965, No.1-6, pp.199-213. For criticisms on the concept of Charisma and its contemporary usages, see especially: Carl J. Friedrich, "Political Leadership and the Problem of Charismatic Power", 23, Feb, 1966, pp.3-24; K.J. Ratnam, "Charisma and Political Leadership", *POLITICAL STUDIES*, XXI, 1964, pp. 341-54; and Karl Lowenstein, *MAX WEBER'S POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF OUR TIME*, Amherst : University of Massachusetts Press, 1966, pp.74-88.

⁵A few 'charismatic leaders' of the Third World, according to the literature, were Nasser, Peron, Nehru, Mao, Castro, Sukarno, Kenyatta, Nkrumah, and U'Nu. The reader is referred to Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Study of Leadership", in Dankwart Rustow, ed., *PHILOSOPHERS AND KINGS*, New York : George Braziller, 1970; W. Howard Wriggins, *THE RULER'S IMPERATIVE : Strategies for Survival in Africa*, New York : Columbia University Press, 1969, and Paul R. Dettman, "Leaders and Structures in 'Third World' Politics : Contrasting Approaches to Legitimacy", *COMPARATIVE POLITICS*, Jan, 1974, pp.245-269.

According to this view, if one is to understand and explain Third World politics one must grasp the political philosophy of its leaders, because it is their personalities, their relationships with the associates and the masses which form the core of political life. In other words, the charismatic leader overshadows political programmes, policies, ideology, and institutional structure such as parties or pressure groups. Moreover, for these scholars of Third World charisma and even movements - such as Nasserism, Peronism, Nkrumaism, and Guided Democracy (Sukarno) are defined by means of an individual. All such movements and the regimes which they generate are seen as the self-expression of these founder-leaders. The 'charismatic legitimation' of Mao, Nasser or Sukarno, emerged when their respective nations rejected the legitimacy of the colonial or neo-colonial rule and established mass supported political systems, which they thought would secure their independence.⁶

Charismatic studies are generally not 'rooted' as far as Third World states are concerned, neither do they take into consideration prevailing economic and political forms and modes, despite their claims of doing so. Furthermore, monopolistic uses of the propaganda apparatus by the leader aimed at reaching and holding a sizeable segment of the populace and his psychological control have been ignored. As a consequence, political alternatives available to the masses are not fully known, leaving the impression that the prevailing ruler is not only ideal, but also irreplaceable.⁷ In this Chapter, the writer examines the qualitative difference concerning charisma and attempts a general explanation of its nature in the hope of defining its philosophical and political formulations. Secondly, a partial explanation for the ahistorical approach to charisma by many scholars is to be found in the fact that they have used the same general approach for the study of the concept irrespective of its geographic manifestation. This approach, because of its 'universality' seriously underestimates 'uniqueness', which is

⁶See Ruth Gunther, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire Building in the New States", *WORLD POLITICS*, 20, Jan, 1968 and, Stuart R. Schram, "Mao Tse Tung as a Charismatic Leader", *ASIAN SURVEY*, Vol.7, 1967, pp.382-86.

⁷Jean Lacouture, *THE DEMIGODS : Charismatic Leadership in the Third World*, New York : Knopf Press, 1970, p.15.

inevitable, particularly in an age where social and other environmental factors have been enshrined as key variables of political analysis.⁸

2.2 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

One's study of the concept 'charisma' - both in a historical and contemporary setting - can be neither exhaustive nor definitive. The present work, while an in-depth analysis based on diverse data, attempts to set the social and political boundaries which determine the emergence of charismatic authority and the characterization of individuals as 'charismatic'. Prior to doing that, identification of basic concepts such as Leadership, Charismatic Leadership, Epic Myth, and the Cult of Personality, are vital in order to render them amenable to use in an empirical study such as the present one. Deliberately, one uses the notion 'identification' rather than 'definition' since the latter implies a degree of rigidity, which in one's view is not useful when dealing with political concepts, which have been considered as products of socio-historical and environmental factors. Furthermore, identification of concepts via their main characteristics and context is methodologically more helpful in the process of data integration and the formulation of meaningful generalizations.⁹

As used in Chapter One, the concept 'leadership' means among other things, the presence of a pre-eminent individual, who, in a given socio historical setting and by virtue of his ability has created and sustained a mass following. To some extent our definition of the concept follows the one suggested by Nathaniel P. Tillman.¹⁰ Yet, it differs in the sense that one suggests that 'sustenance' of

⁸See Juhani Freud, THE SOCIOLOGY OF MAX WEBER, New York : Pantheon, 1968, pp. 232-34.

⁹For further elaboration on this point refer to "Conjectural Knowledge", in Karl Popper, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE : An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1979, pp.21-28.

¹⁰Nathaniel P. Tillman, Jr. DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1979, p.308, writes that leadership is "a behavioural process consisting of stimulating persons, called followers, to act integratively toward the achievement of

followers is as important a characteristic, as its creation. In any other sense, Tillman's general definition of leadership as a 'behavioural process consisting of stimulating persons...to act integratively toward achievement of group goals' is accepted and used here with identical meaning.

'Charismatic Leadership' is nothing more nor less than a sub-category of 'Leadership' in general.¹¹ One may say then, that the general characteristics which are deemed as helpful in identifying an 'ordinary' leader are present in the charismatic one as well. In order to distinguish them, therefore, one must add the special ingredient(s) which would justify a charismatic leader's claim to 'exceptionality': i.e. the source of legitimacy of authority by a charismatic leader is central to its identification and constitutes its main differentiating elements compared to the 'ordinary'.¹² In one view, 'charismatic leadership', is identifiable by the explicit or implicit claim that a divine, or super power, has arbitrated the authority of its possessor and the masses so perceive it. This could very well be a 'myth' or a well constructed political category based on assumptions and perceptions. The result, nevertheless, is that such leaders have been called 'saviours of the people' and 'enlighteners of the masses'. One attempts to determine under what conditions they emerge.¹³ At this stage, if one was to

group goals. It is primarily a function of the situation within which it occurs, though significantly influenced by personal traits and states-role. Traditional conceptions overemphasized heroism (The Great Man Theory) or universal traits and types. The study of leadership requires the recognition of the primary importance of the situation; the distinctions between actual, potential, and pseudo leaders; variations in techniques and roles; projected images; and the character and responses of non-leaders". Also see Robert W. Cox, "The Executive Head : An Essay on Leadership", INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, Vol.23, No.2, Spring, 1969, pp.214-16.

¹¹Robert C. Tucker, "The Theory of Charismatic Leadership", DAEDALUS, Vol. 97, Summer, 1968, pp.731-758.

¹²See Max Weber, "The Three Types of Legitimate Rule", BERKELY PUBLICATIONS IN SOCIETY AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol.4, No.1, Summer, 1958, p.7.

¹³H.H. Gerth & C. Mills (Transl) FROM MAX WEBER : Essays in Sociology, New York : Knopf, 1946, p.52. In their introductory note in this volume, Gerth and Mills speak of charismatic leaders as "self - appointed leaders who are followed by those who are in distress and who need to follow the leader because they believe him to be extra ordinarily qualified". "In consequence of this, the person who possesses it is thought to have either divinely instilled or "exemplary leadership" powers or at least extraordinary qualities which most persons cannot acquire. It is entirely irrelevant conceptually whether the characteristics in question is 'objectively' true from an ethical, aesthetic, or any other viewpoint. It is important rather that it should be so regarded by those who are charismatically dominated, i.e. the disciples". Max Weber,

venture a generalization, one would note that historically, such personalities appeared in time of political stresses, economic deprivations, mass persecutions, and mass apathy. Essentially, the same conditions provide the ingredients for the emergence of a related 'leadership' type, which is known as the 'cult of personality'. Cult of personality means that this type of leadership is devoid of any claims to divine authority or naturally granted gifts. On the contrary, the 'cult of personality' leadership type can be said to lack the elements of the 'natural gifts' which are then artificially created by masterful manipulation of mass media and the means of coercion.

One recognizes that not all scholars agree with the identification of key concepts around which this Chapter revolves. Yet, in substance, the suggested identifications do not diverge significantly from those used by the scholars of political 'leadership and its typologies'.¹⁴ Nevertheless, one must offer additional commentary on the type of leadership which provides and justifies the 'charismatic'. Generally speaking, a charismatic leader is an individual whose pre-eminence rests on the susceptibility of the people to certain of his appearances and modes of behaviour which augment an ever-present belief among the masses irrespective of cultural background that there can be an individual endowed with unusual gifts commanding obedience and deference. At least, this is the general notion derived from the literature on the subject. Yet placed in the

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, op.cit., p.140. Also see Reinhard Bendix, "Charismatic Leadership and Domination", MAX WEBER : An Intellectual Portrait, London : Methuen & Co Ltd, 1962, pp.298-328.

¹⁴For example, refer to: James V. Downton, Jr., REBEL LEADERSHIP : Commitment and Charisma in the Revolutionary Process, New York : The Free Press, 1973; Max Weber, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, New York : Oxford University Press, 1947; FROM MAX WEBER : Essays in Sociology, translated by H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, Philadelphia : Fortress Press, 1965; and MAX WEBER ON CHARISMA AND INSTITUTE BUILDING, translated by S.N. Eisenstadt, Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1968; Jane Gardner, ed., LEADERSHIP AND THE CULT OF PERSONALITY, London : J.M. Dent and Sons, 1974; Richard R. Fagen, "Charismatic Authority and the Leadership of Fidel Castro", WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY, June, 1965, pp.278-282; A.R. Willner and D. Willner, "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders", ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, 358, March, 1965, pp.77-88; and A.R. Willner, CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP : A Theory, Princeton : Princeton University Center of International Studies, No.32, 1970.

context of modern European history, such notions are inadequately explained and often distorted by the ideological cleavages that charismatically generated 'movements' have caused. Furthermore, there has been a distance interjected between the masses and leaders and, all too often, 'charisma' is as much the product of myth as it is the product of such skills as oratory, heroism, wisdom, and generosity. One's purpose here is to delineate the sources of charisma and, to the extent possible, seek to formulate and broaden criteria by which one can separate 'myth' from reality. In so doing - emphasis will be placed on the Weberian theoretical interpretations of 'myth' and its political implications.¹⁵ Secondly, a working definition of the concept of myth has to be provided - a concept which appears to be an integral element in the 'creation' and maintenance of a charismatic following.

'Myth' is used here in its dynamic dimension, i.e. the belief that it contributes to social change while it also changes and adopts the new realities.¹⁶ That being the case, a 'myth' cannot be appropriately identified with lower levels of socio-political development, but it is present in all systems regardless of their sophistication. For one's purposes one accepts the prevailing meaning of political myth and the fact that included in its meaning are such elements as 'fiction', 'nonexistence', and even falsity. However, fundamental in one's effort is the understanding that what the masses of people believe is as real as reality itself, when it comes to engage in social action or social engineering.¹⁷ Thus, the

¹⁵Since this thesis talks of Nasser as a charismatic leader, it is vital to point out that "Nasser's success in mobilizing Arabs behind his movement should be attributed, in large degree, to his remarkable myth-making ability - Pan Arabism (Arab Unity) remains a myth in the Sorelian sense despite its ideological embellishments, because many Arab writers agree that it is primarily based on 'feeling'. Such a myth cannot be easily refuted by conventional logic, and therefore constitutes a potent instrument in the hands of the Egyptian elite to mobilize the Arab masses and drive them to revolutionary action". See Richard H. Dekmejian, EGYPT UNDER NASSER: A Study in Political Dynamics, New York : State University of New York Press, 1972, pp.56-57.

¹⁶According to the French syndicalist, George Sorel, a myth is "a body of images capable of evoking sentiment instinctively". See George Sorel, REFLECTIONS ON VIOLENCE, Trans. T.E. Hume, New York : Alfred Knopf, 1914, p.32. Concepts similar to Sorel's myth include: Plato's 'Noble Lie', Mosca's 'Political Formula', Pareto's 'Derivations' and Lasswell's 'Political Myth'.

¹⁷The myth does not easily lend itself to rational analysis, for it is based on intuition, instinct, and belief. It is specifically designed to create cohesion, inspiration and dynamism in a revolutionary movement. It is noticed that effective

important consideration is the universalities myth offer and their value as an explanatory device of political action. If people believe in the transcendence of the supernatural they can come to accept its personification as well. In the final analysis the myth rests on faith.¹⁸ Needless to add, that political movements have emerged as a result of true faith in concepts which go beyond empirical study or testing.¹⁹ There has been socio-political myth par excellence and it is one's purpose to examine such phenomena as well.

2.3 THEORETICAL PARAMETERS OF WEBERIAN CHARISMA

Any in-depth analysis of political charisma requires delineation of its theoretical and practical parameters. Thus, there is an imperative need for the limited objectives of this Chapter.

As a first priority, it must be stated that one is primarily concerned here with 'secular' rather than 'religious' charisma. At the same time, it is essential to keep in mind that in the history of Western civilization the dividing line between 'divine' and 'political' and religious charisma was never defined. From the time of Pope Gelasius, who accepted the dubious theory of the 'Two Swords' to the present, one has witnessed what can be called a peculiar, if not deliberate, confusion of 'secular' and 'religious' power, without this phenomenon ever having been seriously studied by authorities on political leadership.

myth making is a necessary prerequisite for successful national integration. Since myth serves as the popularizer of ideology the two should be regarded as inseparable. Myth making simplifies the doctrinal intricacies of the ideology bringing the doctrine to the level of the masses. See George Sabine, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY, 3rd Edition, New York : University Press, 1961, p.894.

¹⁸As sincerely stated by Marion Levy, Jr., in MODERNIZATION AND THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETIES, 2 Vols, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1966, p.350, "In the eyes of a true follower of a charismatic leader...the fact that the leader says a given thing is right makes it right."

¹⁹See Arthur Schweitzer, "Hitler's Dictatorial Charisma", THE AGE OF CHARISMA, Chicago : Nelson Hall, 1984, pp.65-93.

In this thesis, one has adopted the basic theoretical categories of Max Weber and his early definition of leadership, since the author believes these categories, even though far from definitive, best serve the need of leadership differentiation. Weber, in his work, takes for granted the fact that secular charismatic authority is a type of rulership resting on popular enthusiasm and acceptance of its existence. As such, it is fundamentally different from the other two types of authority dealt with by Weber, i.e., traditional and rational-legal.

The power wielded by a charismatic is derived from a source different from that of a traditional ruler, and equally different from the power of a leader selected by means of legal/rational procedures. A charismatic political leader, who derives his power from the latter two sources (i.e., tradition/coercion, or law), may augment it with psychological factors resulting from beliefs in myths and personal talents, and the utilization of deception. This means, that the socio-political environment of 'charismatic' leadership vary perceptibly from 'underdeveloped' to 'post industrial'. One's research supports the proposition that the level of development of a given society alone is not a force which prevents or generates non-rational authority. As a matter of fact, technologically advanced societies are, and have been equally susceptible to the emergence of charismatic and therefore non-rational authority.²⁰ Because charisma is the least developed by the three types of authority defined by Weber, the basic problem facing us is one of conceptualization. The theoretical ambiguity, which is apparent in Weber's *THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION*, pervades even contemporary literature.²¹

²⁰Compare with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr's, argument that one ought not to apply the notion of charisma to leaders in a democracy, in "On Heroic Leadership", *ENCOUNTER*, 15, Dec, 1960, 7. The writer is of the opinion that such attempts to reverse the definition of charismatic leadership are neither logically nor scientifically tenable. They illustrate a kind of reasoning backward. The consequences of a phenomenon are confused with and substituted for the actual phenomenon. The charismatic phenomenon is not the same thing as its many possible consequences and cannot be logically defined on the basis of any of them.

²¹Here it is noted that charismatic political leadership has had an unbroken continuity as a socio-historical phenomenon for as long as there has been a Western civilization. Weber's charisma writings are chiefly to be found in two works: *THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION* and *POLITICS AS A VOCATION*. Also see Dennis H. Wrong, "Max Weber : The Scholar as Hero", *COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY FORUM*, 1962, Vol.15, Summer, pp.31-37.

Simply speaking, the Weberian theory is much too broad in its formulations. Being broad, it has diminished theoretical relevance. As a result, a significant amount of research on the subject is neither conclusive, nor scientifically verifiable. For example, one scholar stresses the concept of charisma and its utility in 'institution-building', another scholar studies party charisma, and yet another scholar is only interested in the psychological dimension of the charismatic leader-follower relationship.²² The implication of this observation is that scholars have not arrived at a common ground concerning the components of charisma.²³

2.4 CHARISMA AND POWER

In the introduction a working definition of charisma was offered. Yet, as is the case with other concepts, there is no agreement as to the components of power. In Morgenthau's view, the content and use of power, depend on a wide range of political and cultural factors, so that the concept itself covers all social relationships that define the control of man over man, ranging from outright violence to subtle psychological ties.²⁴ Whether it is expressed in Stalin's derisive comment, "How many divisions has the Pope?" or more subtly as the 'political will' to defend oneself, or in Robert Dahl's terms as the ability to shift the probability of outcomes, power invariably means influence of one actor over another.²⁵ However, for these purposes, the concept 'power' means the ability

²²S.N. Eisenstadt, MAX WEBER ON CHARISMA AND INSTITUTION BUILDING, op.cit.; I. Horowitz, "Party Charisma : Political Parties and Principles in Third World Nations", INDIAN SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 3, October, 1965, pp.53-74; W.G. Runciman, "Charismatic Legitimacy and One Party Rule in Ghana", ARCHIVES OF EUROPEAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETIES, 4, 1963, pp.145-165; and J.R. Downton, REBEL LEADERSHIP : Commitment and Charisma in the Revolutionary Process, op. cit.

²³Strictly speaking, it is not accurate to pin the charismatic label on every political leader who displays qualities which attract the loyalty of large numbers of people. Charisma is a concept generally reserved for those unique persons in history who have a profound break from the bonds of routinized activity and who have been a revolutionary force in the history of their society.

²⁴Hans J. Morgenthau, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS : The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd Edition, New York : Knopf, 1960, p.9.

²⁵Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power", BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, 11, 1956, pp.201-215.

of one to influence and to a great extent determine the behaviour of others in accordance with one's own wishes. Thus, like power, charisma is not a property, it is a relationship of an individual to others and of an individual to his environment. Hand in hand with this, when one speaks of charisma as a quality, obviously one is talking neither about real or innate gifts, nor about demonstrable traits of psychology or character. What is involved is the impact exerted upon environment, the 'effect' of behaviour. Charisma is, to a great extent, a sociological, not a personal, quality. In the same way, ideas of charismatic type and milieu must be understood sociologically. Charismatic qualities are in the realm of belief: they are the radiation of a personality in the beliefs of others.

Power is a socio-political phenomenon rarely absent from any human relationship. It is not surprising, therefore that systematic studies of the concept have appeared throughout history. Philosophers and political theorists from the days of Plato and Aristotle have been interested in power and its political and social consequences of subordination and superordination. Yet, the earliest studies of authority, which viewed it as the sanction to exercise power, were concerned chiefly with its ethical connotations. Max Weber's discussion of charisma and legitimate political authority marks a major departure from earlier interpretations.

As stated in the introduction, the central theme of the present study in 'charismatic leadership', which is considered a special kind of political power. Charisma is a type of leadership first identified by Weber. This being the case, Weber's analysis of charisma and its relationship to power serves as this Chapter's major point of departure.

Dahl's formulation is: "The power of an actor, A, would seem to be adequately defined by the measure M which is the difference in the probability of an event, given certain action by A, and the probability of the event given no such action by A". p.214.

SECTION ONE : WEBERIAN CHARISMA THEORY :
FORMULATION AND CRITIQUE.

In order to understand Weber's formulation of Charismatic authority, one will have to place it in the general context of his methodology, his theory of domination and authority, and his analysis of social change. Max Weber's method combines typology and Verstehen. This means that his method starts with a situation and seeks to find a basic idea involved in it. Interest is in the content of the idea, which is found through Verstehen or sympathetic empathy,²⁶ the basic device by means of which Weber made the transfer from social action to general social life is a typology of a phenomenon. He developed the method of Verstehen, the construction of typologies (also called ideal types) of behaviour, and used this approach to comparatively study society by such typologies. In doing so, Weber was faced with two problems relative to the meaning of behaviour.

First, the problem of the conceptualization of behaviour is complicated by the fact that its meaning blurs into non-meaningful forms. Weber perceived this problem as one for interpretation. To the degree that behaviour is rational (in a logical scientific sense or 2+2=4 sense), it is understandable directly without further ado. Beyond this, empathic understanding (sympathetic understanding of behaviour on the basis of one's own) is of great assistance in explaining conduct. Thus, one does not have to undergo another person's experience in order to understand him/her. This is the method of Verstehen or empathic understanding which Weber employed in his studies of legitimate political order.

Weber's second problem is related to verification. Verstehen is not a complete method in itself. Verification of subjective interpretation by comparison with the concrete course of events is indispensable. Unfortunately, this type of verification is feasible only in cases susceptible to psychological experimentation. For the rest, there remains only the alternative of comparing

²⁶Max Weber, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE, New York : MacMillan Company, 1944, pp.52, 53, 55, 60.

the largest possible number of historical or contemporary cases which, while otherwise similar, differ in one decisive point of their relation to the particular motive or factor being investigated.

In Weber's approach one finds elements of the concrete and elements of the historical. Ideal types, as analytical tools for understanding leadership, for example, are hypothetically concrete entities, constructed out of their relevant components by the researcher for the purpose of precise measurement. In other words, the ideal-type is an abstraction. Bureaucracy, too, is an ideal type. In Weber's writings there are two kinds of ideal-types. The first is historically derived (bureaucracy, for example) while the second ideal-type category is theoretically derived, i.e. charisma and charismatic domination. Further elaboration on this point is necessary.

Domination, as historical fact, rests on that the premise that there was someone who asserted leadership. Logically if one leads, others must follow. In this illustration, A dominates B, who is subordinate to A. This situation of domination and subordination may occur between A and B in many different areas of their lives and on many occasions. For analytic convenience, one confines one's interest in domination to political life. That is, to the domination of a society, organizations, political parties, or movements by one person or a few. In figures 1,2, and 3²⁷ this arrangement is applicable, a domination subordination relation prevails between A and B, regardless of whether A is one or few imposing his/their will on B, an entire collectivity.


By the above process, Weber created three ideal-types of authority: Charisma, rational-legal, and traditional. His distinction among types are drawn in terms of who has authority and the basis on which leadership is accorded to those exercising it by the persons over whom it is exercised. In other words, Weber identifies the generic phenomenon of leadership by examining the conditions

²⁷See pp. 87-88.

under which it emerges and the purposes for which it is exercised, claimed, or accorded. Finally, he attempts to distinguish among types of leadership in terms of the reasons that it is accorded to individual types or groups of people.

The distinctions he makes are important for two reasons. First, authority works differently in the systems he deals with: the charismatic rulership is created by those who are subject to it, it rests on the followers' belief in the qualities of the leader; the legal regime prevails where rules determine the relationship between the leader and those he leads; and, the traditional system, is one where custom prescribes the relationships between the leader and the rest of the community. Secondly, recruitment patterns for leadership differs in each of the three types that Weber identifies. Indeed, his general theory of domination is an attempt to show that authority and leadership recruitment work differently in the three systems. The following figures²⁸ summarize the Weberian theory of domination in politics discussed in this Chapter.²⁹

FIGURE 1
Weber's Power Theory



²⁸These diagrams are derived directly from any of Max Weber's works. Thence, the reader is advised to consult Weber's work *passim*.

²⁹The tables represent Weber's ideas as expressed in THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, *op.cit.* The ideas are not offered in one place, therefore, one suggests that the reader read *passim*.

FIGURE 2

Weber's Notion of Authority.

Non Legitimate Authority.

B obeys A without feeling it is correct; the role of threat or actual violence.

Legitimate Authority.

B obeys A because there is a quality of 'oughtness' associated with A's domination

FIGURE 3

Weber's Analysis of Legitimate Authority.

Legitimate Authority

Legitimate authority is characterized by a quality of 'oughtness', which is derived from three things.

Charisma
A & B
A believes in his own extraordinary qualities and that it is B's duty to obey.

B believes it is duty to obey/follow A because A has charisma.

Traditional
A & B
B obeys A because of custom.

Rational Legal
A & B
B obeys A because it is lawful to do so.

The theoretical framework for charisma is derived from Weber's general analysis of domination discussed in his *THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION*.³⁰ In the Weberian thought, domination and power are linked concepts. Power (macht) is defined by Weber as "the probability that an actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance, (and) regardless of the basis on which this probability rests."³¹

³⁰ibid., pp.324-33, 341-45, 358-66, 382-86.

This generic concept denotes the possibility of imposing one's will on a single person and an entire collectivity. Weber essentially confined his interest to the latter, the domination of a society, an organization or a movement by one person or a few. The only manifestation of power he analysed in detail is Herrschaft, which refers particularly to the power exercised over a collectivity by a leader or ruling group. Domination, the word used to translate Herrschaft essentially conveys this meaning.³²

As indicated in Weber's analysis, domination via authority is a special type of power. Authority is a power relationship in which, the person who imposes his will on others, the ruler, believes that he has a right to the exercise of power both for the leader and the led. These beliefs determine the relative stability of domination (authority) as well as serve as criteria for distinguishing between the systems.³³

In addition to the beliefs of legitimation, there is the notion of administrative apparatus. Leadership, when exercised over a large number of people, necessitates an administrative staff which will facilitate communication between the leader and his followers. Bureaucracy is a modern term for the apparatus mentioned above. Together the beliefs and the bureaucracy provide the two criteria for the institution of Weber's theory of domination, and one must therefore relate these types to it analytically and empirically.

³¹Ibid., p.139.

³²Weber distinguishes two forms of domination of primary importance: "domination by virtue of a constellation of interest...and domination by virtue of authority". Ibid., p.140. The former rests chiefly on control over economic conditions. Superior economic resources make it possible to influence people by controlling the means of their existence so that their self-interest dictates that they act in certain ways. The pure case is monopoly. Authority rests on social positions in which is vested the legitimate right to command, backed by sanctioning power and complemented obedience. The pure case in modern society is a bureaucratic hierarchy.

³³Weber developed a typology paralleling the fundamental modes of stabilizing socio-political relations. Power may be legitimized rationally, on the basis of the belief in the legality of the rules/laws; it may be legitimized charismatically, when it is thought to rest on the magical or other personal properties of an individual; or it may be legitimized traditionally, claiming to rest on immemorial custom.

Charisma stems from the Greek verb charizo which means literally 'gift of grace'. Since Weber's work on leadership, charisma has come to refer to the perception of an exceptional quality by virtue of which one emerges as a leader.³⁴ The charismatic leader - whether a prophet, a hero or a demagogue - justifies his domination (Herrschaft) by his extraordinary capacities and deeds. His disciples accept his authority because they have faith in his person.

Under this type of authority, the administrative apparatus in a state is very loose and unstable. The most trusted disciples usually play the role of the intermediary between the leader and the masses. On the other hand, under the system of traditional domination, the legitimation of power is based on the belief in the past, in the rightness and appropriateness of the customary way of doing things. According to Weber, here legitimacy rests on an:

established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of these exercising authority over them...Obedience is owed to the person of the chief who occupies the traditional sanctioned position of authority and who is bound by tradition.³⁵

The traditional leader is one who is obeyed by virtue of his inherited status. His leadership and power are fixed by custom. When this type of authority, typical in the patriarchal household, is exercised over a society, the administrative apparatus takes the form of patrimonial or feudal rule. In the patrimonial form of traditional domination, the governmental officials are personal retainers (servants, relatives, favourites) who usually depend on their leader for remuneration. On the other hand, the feudal apparatus has a greater degree of autonomy in the sense that officials are not personal dependents, but exercise

³⁴The word charisma has a history that goes back over 3,000 years to the Greek city state system. The verb charizo, the source of charisma and charity, means a gift, to freely give. According to one source, the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, the word charisma means "a free gift or favour especially vouchsafed by God, a grace, a talent". OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, Vol.2, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1933, p.288. Charisma is traced to institution building and bureaucracy via the Christian church: "Church offices are... impossible without charismatic endowment." p.288.

³⁵Weber, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, op.cit., p.328.

independent jurisdiction, and usually own their domain. Under legal domination, the belief in the rightness of law is the basis of legitimacy. The masses obey rules, not because they believe that they are enacted by a charismatic or traditional leader, but because they 'believe' that the proper procedures were followed in issuing the rules. The leader holds his position in accordance with legal procedures, be it appointment or election, and the power he exercises is limited by legally sanctioned rules and tenure. The typical administrative apparatus corresponding to the legal type of leadership is called bureaucracy and is characterized by impersonality. Rules delineate in a rational way the hierarchy of the apparatus, the rights and duties of every position, the method of recruitment, promotions, and so on.³⁶

The three types discussed above are never found in pure form. Real political systems constitute a mixture of elements pertaining to all three types. Nevertheless, for Weber, the typology is useful as an analytical tool and helps the researcher to identify the various combination of legal, charismatic and traditional elements in a real political system, as well as to find the reasons for the discrepancies between ideal-type and reality.

Weber found a synthesis for social structure and change in terms of his theories of domination and social change. For him, social change finds its point of focus in the conflict of three general principles, namely, traditionalism, rationality, and charisma. Much of the tension in society is between traditionalization and the disruptive influence of rationalization. But both of these principles have frequently appeared in conflict with the charismatic principle as is the case with the following of some individual because of presumed magical, supernatural or other personal properties. Alexander the Great, Napoleon, and Hitler are examples in point. Charisma, in turn, by its highly personal nature must be

³⁶Ibid., p.328. Weber says that the legal order basis on "a belief in the 'legality' of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands...Obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order". Also see, Gerth and Mills eds., FROM MAX WEBER, op.cit., pp.221-224.

transformed (routinized) into a rational or traditional form if the movement structures and organizations it establishes are not to perish.

Weber's view of change constitutes a dialectical explanation of history. In terms of conception of social development, his analysis of domination, especially charismatic leadership, is a crucial element. In his thinking of dialectical development of the societal level, charisma and bureaucracy are juxtaposed as opposed forces. Insofar, as the charismatic leader is synonymous with the 'creative personality', charismatic leadership is contrasted with the 'technical personality' of bureaucratic oriented society. The Hegelian doctrine of conflict between contradictory elements entered into the Weberian conception of the historical process. However, the conflict, according to Weber, lay in the principles of tradition, rationality, and charisma.

Hence like Hegel and Marx, Weber believed that there is a discoverable direction or laws of historic movement and that it is the role of the analyst to identify expressions or manifestations of conditions and to understand their bases in historical terms. He clearly identified a trend towards bureaucratization in Western civilization. Specifically, his view of the historic process is charisma-routinization dialectic. He perceived a tendency toward the increasing rationalization of the world and the decline of charismatic leadership.

Accordingly, scientific progress and bureaucracy are the enemies of charisma, because they undermine the 'hero myth'. Put in other words, science and bureaucracy have contributed to the 'disenchantment of the world' by destroying the belief in heroes and supernatural, and by failing to put a new normative belief system in their place. The normative system is the source of belief in charisma. In the introduction the question was raised whether charismatic leadership today is a vestigial attitude among Third World nations, one that will wither away and present no threat to the complete bureaucratization of these societies, or whether it is a phenomenon which is present even among people who

have made the most progress in material and bureaucratic terms. Max Weber, if alive today and asked this question, would, one believes, answer that the latter is the case since contemporary Western society suffers the consequences of industrial alienation and powerlessness, which generate conditions making the 'charismatic leader' an appealing political type, who is perceived by his followers as the person who has the 'solution (s)' to all problems. Furthermore, charisma is a universal phenomenon and has persisted in all historic periods, including the present one. Specifically, charisma persists and cannot be strictly classified as a survival of the past even if it is nurtured by hero worship and an old belief system. Rather it must be considered an integral feature of the Third World system of states. And, conversely, also an outgrowth of the very factors that was intended to eliminate the 'irrational' in political life, i.e. rationality, science, impersonalization, and bureaucratization.

The simplest statement that can be made about the Weberian dialectical view, is that Max Weber had a notion of historical change whether it appears explicit or not. As one reads Weber, one sees the charismatic, traditional and legal bureaucratic types of domination as constituting successive stages through which all societies will pass sooner or later. Clearly, the contemporary period, at least in the advanced Western states, is dominated by the legal order, as evident by the increasing bureaucratization of life. However, elements of the 'traditional' and 'charismatic' are still in existence and continue to have an impact on political life in both Western and Third World political communities.³⁷

Weber's definition of charisma include most of the elements generally acknowledged as pertaining to the 'charismatic leader'. He describes it as:

A certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and

³⁷It is observed that some scholars would disagree with this interpretation of Weber on this point. Parsons and Lipset et al, who have spent their lives trying to protect Weber's reputation, would probably argue that the typology (Charisma, traditional, legal) was constructed by Weber for purely analytical purposes and it is not based on any preconception about the direction and meaning of either historical movement or political development.

treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are of divine or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as leader.³⁸

Weber described the power of charisma as relying on personality and how the individual is regarded by his followers or disciples. That is, there are two major factors in a charismatic leader-follower authority relationship. First, there is an analytical distinction between the 'charismatic' and the 'ordinary.' The charismatic is perceived as an extraordinary event or quality, one which is in contrast to elements of orderly social life. Therefore, the test of the 'great' hero (a charismatic type) lies in his ability to leave a continuous impact on an institutional structure (state or religion). In other words, to transform social life or structure by infusing into it some of his charismatic vision. Second, it is essential that the charismatic individual be recognized or regarded as such: "This recognition" according to Weber, "is a matter of complete personal devotion arising out of enthusiasm, or of despair or hope".³⁹ Consequently, the followers create the charismatic leader. The charisma is his but the authority is the by product/result of the intense and personal nature of the masses response to charisma. In Weber's own words, it is recognition of "what is alone important". As he put it "it is recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is decisive for the validity of charisma."⁴⁰

As noted above, Weber emphasized the relational aspect of charismatic leadership. Dr. Ann Ruth Willner says that a close reading of Weber makes:

It is clear that he, no less than contemporary students of leadership, recognized that leadership is a relational phenomenon, involving the interaction of leader and the followers towards goals and within the context of situations....As Weber repeatedly emphasized, it is not necessarily what the leader is but how he is perceived by his followers that is

³⁸Weber, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, op.cit., p.359.

³⁹Ibid., p.359

⁴⁰A.R. Willner, CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP : A Theory, op.cit., p.4.

decisive for the validity of charisma.⁴¹

Moreover, Weber examined and emphasized the 'charismatic' in the area of religion and politics. There is the charismatic domination as exercised in the religious sphere by the prophet, and in the political sphere by the elected war lord, the demagogue, and the political party leader.⁴² In his analysis of *POLITICS AS A VOCATION*, he observes that charismatic leadership has always been with us, in all places and in all epochs. It has emerged in two major categories, the magician and the prophet on the one hand, and the elected war lord, the gang leader and Condottieri (leader of a band of mercenary professional soldiers) on the other hand.⁴³ Political leadership in the form of 'demagogue' and 'party leader' are indigenous to the Western world. Yet, all charismatic leaders have a mission and calling.

It is possible to derive from the theoretical insights of Weber a number of propositions about charisma and the mechanism of legitimation.⁴⁴ Max Weber treats the charismatic politician as a product of his following. The type of leader emerges when his followers' belief system convince them that an individual is behaving in a way appropriate for one who claims charismatic legitimacy. Such a belief system which itself is the product of socio-historical conditions, defines the mode of behaviour of masses and leadership alike, setting forth particular criteria for political legitimacy and prescribing the acceptable subtype of charismatic leadership. The important role played by adherents makes it necessary that greater emphasis should be devoted to their beliefs than to the

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.4.

⁴² Weber, *POLITICS AS A VOCATION*, *op.cit.*, pp.3-4.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp.3-4.

⁴⁴ Five points extracted from Weber's work regarding charismatic authority are discussed in Richard Fagen's article, "Charismatic Authority and the Leadership of Fidel Castro", *WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY*, June, Vol.18, 1965, pp.278-279. There are as follows: (a) The charismatic leader is the creation of his followers; (b) An 'individual personality' or leader capable of generating a charismatic authority relationship in one context may fail completely to generate that relationship in some other context; (c) the leader does not regard himself either as chosen by or as solely dependent on his followers, but rather as 'elected' from above to fulfill a mission; (d) the behaviour of the charismatic leader in power is anti-bureaucratic; and, (e) charismatic authority is unstable, tending to be transformed (routinized) through time.

transcendental characteristics and function of the leader. In addition, it is evident that charismatic authority is related to a specific context. Typically, an individual who emerges as a charismatic leader, tends to credit his authority not to a following, but rather to a higher agency. Thus, such a leader regards himself as 'called' or 'chosen' from above to fulfill a personal mission. He believes that the legitimacy of his authority is derived from God or history, and, consequently, his followers are under divine duty to obey. Since the attitudes and goals he espouses are usually the antithesis of legal and traditional ones, they are unlikely to outlive his own existence. Therefore, the charismatic leader is not likely to produce stable and enduring institutions and movements. This type of authority is unstable, tending to be transformed over time, into either traditional or rational forms, and charisma is routinized in political life when the leader links his attitudes and goals to structures, such as, parties, movements and institutions. Thus, charisma can be routinized to the event that a leader's aura of legitimacy is transformed to a political party, which preserves and promulgates his ideas after his death.

In any analytical discussion of Weberian charisma theory, several observations are in order. First, Max Weber is to be credited as being the first theorist to recognize and to systematically describe charisma. There are numerous discussions of leadership, as has been shown in the previous Chapter. The ideas which Weber presents, however, are unique. In discussing leadership, he was careful to distinguish between authority of the traditional and legal types (power invested in a position, e.g. King or president) and personal power or charisma emanating from the individual attributes of the person.

Secondly, Weber is partially responsible for the confusion in current or post Weberian charisma studies, because he failed to complete the analysis of the concept of charisma. For example, charismatic authority is not as systematically explored as the other types. James V. Downton makes the same point:

...Weber's...treatment of charismatic authority is the weakest link in his typology. It is quite apparent that his analysis of charisma lacks the depth and systematic exploration that he gave to both the traditional and rational legal types of authority. Although he elevated charisma to an important place within his theory of social change, the concept was scarcely developed beyond the elementary point of definition.⁴⁵

The point made here is that the concept charisma is less than fully developed. Moreover, one can say that Weber has not fully defined the theory of charisma. His contribution is a broad definition, which quite often has been indiscriminately applied by scholars and laypersons. Let us turn, then, to a critical review of recent studies bearing on the success or failure of the charismatic leadership literature as it relates to the systematic exploration of the charismatic personality in politics.

Weber's 'theory' of charisma manifests the weakness of never having been operationalized by its originator. The German sociologist never did conduct an empirical study using his ideas dealing with types of leadership.⁴⁶ Thus, when one talks about empirical Weberian studies of Charisma, one is not referring to Max Weber's studies alone but rather to scholars such as Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, S.N. Eisenstadt, Ann Ruth Willner, Richard R. Fagen, Reinhard Bendix and others.⁴⁷ They are classified as Weberians because they take Weber as their point of departure, and generally speaking, they are less critical of the weakness of Weber's treatment of charisma than some other scholars such as James Downton. They are, however, selective in borrowing from the master. For example, Shils emphasizes the creative aspect of charisma, while Eisenstadt has written a classic study on the subject which focuses on the institution building role of the concept.

⁴⁵Downton, *REBEL LEADERSHIP*, op.cit., p.272.

⁴⁶A close reading of both Reinhard Bendix's *MAX WEBER : An Intellectual Portrait*, New York : Peter Smith, 1962, and S. N. Eisenstadt's *MAX WEBER ON CHARISMA AND INSTITUTION BUILDING*, op.cit., suggest that Weber did not empirically test his notion of charisma beyond drawing upon his great knowledge of history and this only to construct the charisma ideal-type.

⁴⁷It is the writer's judgement that those named above should be called Weberians.

Fagen, on the other hand, has isolated five propositions from Weber's charisma analysis, and has applied them directly to a specific political figure. A different point of view is offered by Willner, who argues that the charismatic leader's emergence is tied to his utilization of symbolic ideological dimension of culture in order to build support for himself and /or his movement. This being the case, this type 'leadership' while manifesting cultural patterns and societal elements, is not bound by time and place.⁴⁸

The differing emphasis of Weberian studies shows, in a concrete way, that the charisma concept is rich in meaning. Stated another way, charisma is a confusing concept and no two writers agree as to what it actually means. According to Lacouture even its definition is problematic and so is its meaning as a cause of a movement. Thus, he states:

...The nexus or connection between charismatic leaders and followers is thought to be 'special', 'unusual,' 'extraordinary,' 'very different', 'exceptional', 'magic', 'religious', etc. For some leaders designated as charismatic, this connection is claimed to be the person's (1) oratory, (2) ideology, (3) or his power of example. In short, the nexus vary from leader to leader, sometimes it changes during the period of leadership and it may encompass one or all of the various claimed nexuses.⁴⁹

In fact, the best a person can do to explain leaders that are designated as charismatic is to go and get various examples and testimonies from numerous sources to state that, 'oratory' was the nexus, or ideology or something else or all of these...which proves the elusive nature and reality of charisma.⁵⁰

Similarly, James Downton and K.J. Ratnam argue that Max Weber is to blame for what they perceive as confusion in the literature of charisma. They assert that

⁴⁸See and compare A.R. Willner's CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP : A Theory, op.cit., and, Willner and Willner's "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leadership", op.cit. In the latter study, the authors made a stronger argument for linking the emergence of charismatic leadership mythology than A.R. Willner made in her book (the former).

⁴⁹Lacouture, THE DEMIGODS : Charismatic Political Movements in the Third World, op.cit., p.32.

⁵⁰ibid., p.33.

Weber's intentions were not clear, and describe him as: emphasizing the psychological aspect of the leader-follower relationship only to shift to stressing the social dimensions, with the expected result that conceptualizing charisma becomes difficult, if not impossible.⁵¹ An especially confusing element is the haphazard use of personal psychological aspects with social dynamics attributed to these aspects.

Before proceeding any further in discussing post-Max Weber views of charisma, it is important to establish several premises. First, it is not necessarily accurate to state that Weber's perceptions of charisma is 'confusing', as has been stated by several scholars. Secondly, no scholar, seriously doubts the existence of the phenomena Weber labelled charisma. However, it becomes a highly problematic concept one attempts to identify decisive attributes to the category one calls 'charismatic political leadership'. If there has been and still is a question on the meaning and underpinnings of the concept charisma in the current literature, in the view of this writer, it has an identifiable origin: namely, too many writers have not found the balance between the 'psychological' and 'social' components of the concept and an equal number of them blame it all on Weber's own lack of focus on these two aspects. To do that is to criticize a scholar long dead on the basis of ex post facto evidence and by contemporary emphasis on psycho-analytical political science. That particular problem is not only present in the treatment of Weber, but also in the treatment of many other scholars of the 19th century and the classic era. However, in the instance of Weber, not only did a historical analysis play a role in the misunderstanding of his theory, but also the way it became known to a significantly biased Anglo-Saxon world. As one scholar has pointed out, Weber's categories have become available to the political scientist and other scholars, by bits and pieces and often in such a manner that secondary elements of his theory have been elevated to primary concepts.⁵²

⁵¹K.J. Ralnam, "Charisma and Political Leadership", POLITICAL STUDIES, 12, 1964, pp. 341-354.

⁵²A.W. Singham, THE HERO AND THE CROWD IN A COLONIAL POLITY, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1968, p.16.

Above all, following the current trends, there is too much emphasis on the 'psychological' versus the 'social' aspect of charisma. Even so, too many questions concerning its origin, content and impact remain unanswered. For example, how do certain individuals acquire the magical, mysterious gift of charisma? Why do people obey charismatic leaders? The answers one finds to these questions in a sense, reflect the various analytical approaches. As noted, there are three schools of thought: the concept of charisma is discussed in terms either of the social structure, the psychological make up of the leader and/or his followers, or the combined social and psychological.

The theoretical debate on the role of environment variables in the conditions of the emergence and effectiveness of the charismatic personality is still inconclusive.⁵³ The question of whether "the leader is representative of his people or a marginal man within his society?" summarizes the sociological debate. One answer is that the leader is a marginal individual, both in terms of personal traits and his social standing in the society. A prominent exponent of this view, Sigmund Neumann states: "The leader has no friends, no equals. He must abstain from the conform of intimacy. He trusts nobody...That is the price he has to pay for being 'superhuman'".⁵⁴ But, it may also be that a leader's 'marginality' and apparent aloofness are the external manifestations of his weakness. In other words, they are his mask. For Max Weber, however, the 'marginal man' could be a person straddling two cultures, which is essentially

⁵³It is important to note that there is only one definition of charisma that encompasses all the manifestations of the charismatic, offered by Max Weber: "...extraordinary quality of a person, regardless of whether this quality is actual, alleged, or presumed. Charismatic, hence, shall refer to a rule over men, to which the governed submit...the legitimacy of their rule rests upon the belief in magical powers, revelations, and hero worship. The source of these beliefs is the providing of the charismatic successes, that is, through the welfare of the governed. Such beliefs and the claimed authority resting on them therefore disappears, or threaten to disappear, as soon as proof is lacking and as soon as the charismatically qualified person appears to be devoid of his magical power or forsaken by his god. Charismatic rule is not managed according to concrete revelations and inspirations, and in this sense, charismatic authority is 'irrational'. It is 'revolutionary' in the sense of not being bound to the existing: 'it is written - but I say unto you...." See Max Weber, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, op.cit., p.264.

⁵⁴See Sigmund Neumann, PERMANENT REVOLUTION : Totalitarianism in the Age of the International Civil War, New York : Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, pp.59-60.

what Neumann meant by the phenomenon of marginality.⁵⁵ In the Weberian philosophy, the demagogic charismatic leader is the 'in between classes' individual.

In both sociocultural and geopolitical terms the leader's outsider status is evidenced by intense feelings of nationalism. Napoleon, Ataturk, Stalin, and Hitler are examples in this point. Their nationalism is derived from their marginal national/ethnic group of their states. Neumann notes that Napoleon, Ataturk and Hitler, for instance, were born outside of the countries they came to rule or along their frontiers.⁵⁶ Moreover, they did not belong to the dominant ethnic group of multi-ethnic political communities, and often "their most receptive years are spent outside of these countries."⁵⁷

Thus, it can be argued that marginal individuals are not at all easy with their environment, which produces a lack of balance in their social relations. Psychological and social marginality is the motivation or drive which cause an individual to become the mouthpiece of an interest, a class, an ethnic group's nationalistic desires, or an ideology/revolution. Willner followed Neumann in defining marginality in both personal and cultural terms. For her marginality has advantages and its own dialectical tendency toward motion. Marginal individuals are never static. They are motivated by frustration of their status - as persons straddling two cultures - and appeal to frustrated and marginal peoples in their societies. She advocates the "plural possibility identifications"

⁵⁵The reader who is interested in the marginality literature is referred to Robert E. Park in 'Introduction' to Everett V. Stonequist, "The Marginal Man", AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 6, May, 1929; E. Hughes, "Social Change and Status Politics : Essays on the Marginal Man", PHYLON, X, 1, 1949; and, Frantz Fanon, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH, New York : Grove Press, 1966, and BLACK SKINS, WHITE MASKS, New York : Grove Press, 1967.

⁵⁶G. M. Burns, in ROOSEVELT : The Lion and the Fox, New York : Harcourt, 1956. It is a striking fact that some of the great popular leaders of our time have risen to power from outside of the national 'heartland'. Lloyd George came not from England but from Wales, Hitler not from Prussia but from Austria, Stalin not from Mother Russia but from Georgia, MacDonald not from England but from Northern Scotland, just as Napoleon was not a Frenchman but a Corsican. In a geographical sense Roosevelt was not an outlander, but in a cultural sense he was". p.22.

⁵⁷Neumann, PERMANENT REVOLUTION, op.cit., p.59.



thesis, which views the charismatic leader as an individual, who is marginal by virtue of social origins and early exposure to varied environments, and who is identified with or is capable of identifying with several different groups or segments of society which serve as his/her base of support as a leader.⁵⁸

Therefore, the backgrounds of charismatic political leaders indicate that they had the advantages, as well as strains, of multiple perspectives on the world. That is, they were able, because of their class, religion, education, ethnic or rural/urban provenance marginality in social and psychological terms, to appeal and respond to members of different strata or segments of their societies. A consideration of the leader and the crowd is in order. That is briefly, one must examine the following of movements via the charismatic/mass hero and the crowd.

Social movements are mass enterprises involving persons who have real or supposed grievances against the present institutional order. Available evidence on the organizational aspects of political leaders characterized as 'charismatic' indicates that they led social movements. All have been the centers of attention of mass movements either while alive or after death. Such movements existed to vent grievances. Generally speaking, grievances may be of two kinds. First, grievances may be limited to individual structures (e.g. Churches or governments) that are distasteful, annoying, or actively stultifying to certain individuals or groups. Second, other grievances may be more general and may reflect a change in mass attitudes toward the entire institutional order. Most leaders of social movements fall somewhere between those dissatisfied with their status in a single institution, and those who are alienated from the existing political order. It is necessary to pay attention to the nature of alienation, because alienated individuals and groups are the raw materials of mass movements. Economic factors produce frustration and alienation. Frustrated and alienated persons and groups may be physically and economically uprooted. This is related to how the social economic order impacts on the political system.

⁵⁸Willner, CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP : A Theory, op.cit., pp.50-51.

In terms of both numbers and enthusiasm of support, however, certain groups have been among the most vulnerable to social movements, especially those of the totalitarian variety. William Kornhauser singles out intellectuals, lower middle class business men, and farm workers. They have in common a lack of enthusiasm for the existing political order and the need to identify with something or someone.⁵⁹ The appeal of a charismatic personality may span generations. As it was observed, Hitler symbolized different things to persons of different generations. Similarly, Ataturk and Napoleon constructed 'movements' based on diverse elements, but they infused these movements with qualitatively different ideologies. Napoleon and Ataturk, like Hitler, were responsible for restoring economic security to their respective nations, and were national leaders who probably became symbols of the quality of manliness to the youth of France and Turkey. Hitler, on the other hand, was the man who in the eyes of the older generations restored order and security. As Shils and Janowitz observe:

For older men, who lived through the unemployment of the closing years of the Weimar Republic and who experienced the joy of being reinstated in gainful employment by Nazi full employment policies, Hitler was above all the man who had provided economic security.⁶⁰

For another generation, Hitler played an important role in its psychological development. "For men of the generation between 23-35" Shils and Janowitz note "who had first experienced Hitler's charisma in the struggles to establish their manliness during late adolescence, Hitler was the prototype of strength and masculinity".⁶¹ And finally, it is asserted that:

for the younger Nazi youth he was a father substitute, providing the vigilant discipline and the repression of dangerous impulses both in the individual and the social environment; for them he had the additional

⁵⁹William Kornhauser, THE POLITICS OF MASS SOCIETY, Glencoe, Illinois : The Free Press, 1959, pp.55-78.

⁶⁰Edward A. Shils and M. Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht", PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, Summer, 1948, p.289.

⁶¹ibid., p.287.

merit of legitimating revolt against the family and traditional restraints.⁶²

Thus, the generalization to be made on the basis of our investigation is that the charismatic type does not constitute a specific or psychologically identifiable type. To the extent that such an individual is psychologically different from his following or the population at large, he shares these tendencies with other so-called 'political personalities' in general. From both psychological and sociological perspectives, the charismatic person is, generally speaking a marginal individual, able to make a broad appeal to the masses. As to his social origins, he may come from any ethnic, racial, religious, class group, but is able to identify with and be accepted by a range of groups. To understand the public opinion - here called charismatic response - which is a factor in the emergence of this type of leader, two arguments are offered. (a) that alienation is related to the 'charismatic' element, and (b) that there is always the desire to be worshipped and the desire to worship.

The political scientist who studies charisma usually depends on some discipline, such as psychology, to point out to him the importance of personality and its role in politics and the method by which it ought to be studied. Without wishing to underrate the utility of social psychology, it must be stressed that history and folklore are equally useful sources in the study of political personality. Certain types of historical and folkloristic research are essential to understand the progress of charismatic leadership research. Here, the term 'charismatic studies' is used in its adjectival form and speaks of 'charismatic' type of studies rather than 'charisma'. By engaging in research of 'charismatic personality', in other words, one does not intend a novel concept but to produce a work that links several existing and related notions about the subject matter.

Since World War II there have been a series of terms used to describe 'personal authority' some of which have achieved general acceptance. Cult of personality,

⁶²ibid., p.287.

individualistic leadership, authoritarian dictator, and marginal man, all have acquired some use in the past thirty years or so. While 'charismatic research' suggests a special relationship between variants of leadership, more generally it designates the relationship of types of popular leadership as a whole, subsuming all non-traditional and non-legal/rational types of leaders. The task of charismatic research, in one's view, is to lay the foundation for an adequate understanding of the response of the followers in creating a charismatic leader or any of its variants. It may be argued that many scholars have dealt with the subject and for a considerable period of time. That may be true, but most studies are partial and inadequate. The fact is that the political myth of heroism, the true nexus between the thought and feeling of a populace, and emergence of charismatic authority has been largely neglected. It has not been studied in its own right. Cuthbertson argues this point as follows:

Students of politics have neglected myths, although myth has been treated as a construct in political theory since the time of Plato. Political mythology, however, is rarely analyzed in specific terms.⁶³

According to Cuthbertson, today myth and epic have been neglected by economic determinists, "who have pigeonholed them in the superstructure", and by behaviorists, and by social scientists as well.⁶⁴ There are several reasons why myths are poorly used by social scientists. Among them, that (1) social scientists define myth in broad sketchy terms, but (2) the few political theorists who do use myth, erroneously perceive it only in terms of its totalitarian nature. The author argues that myth has a greater capacity to build as well as destroy political order vis-a-vis the revolutionary function of messianic, cultural, catastrophic, utopian and iconoclastic myth categories. Related to one of the four myth categories, the political messianic myth, is the emergence of a hero, or prophet or the individual with supernatural power. One might say that the charismatic individual is usually associated with messianic tradition, thus

⁶³Cuthbertson Cuthbertson, POLITICAL MYTH AND EPIC, East Lansing : Michigan State University Press 1975, p.15.

⁶⁴Ibid., p.14.

linking charisma and political myth.

Many of the standard studies of charisma contain little data on the role of the political myth.⁶⁵ In most cases authors deal with the charismatic leader's ability to focus and channel diverse grievances and interests in a common appeal and little else. They have in other words, abstracted from charisma an internal quality and activity. Social and expressive aspects of the concept 'charisma' have been attended to only when they have intruded inescapably in attempts to define the appeal that charismatic leaders hold for the masses. And this because one can hardly characterize the attraction of charismatic leadership without noting that certain personal qualities identify the role of a leader, while other qualities explain his mass following. But a more exact or general study of the charismatic individual - who legitimizes his claim to a leadership role by associating himself with the heroes and myths of the culture - has been by and large left aside.

The point above is that political scientists have used the data on the emergence of charismatic leadership, but they abstracted it from its folklore context. They have usually bypassed the social underpinnings to explain what charisma is, or is not. There is, for example, discussion of the contemporary meanings of the concept, the importance of variant (the demagogue) versus another variant (the revolutionary), and its impact upon social issues and the masses. However, rarely do they specify what one would need to know to recognize an instance of what has been called 'cultural management'. That is, the strategies used by "the charismatic leader to legitimize his claim by associating with himself the sacred symbols of the culture".⁶⁶

Ann Ruth Willner is one of a small group of writers who have emphasized the role of the 'Hero Myth' in charismatic research; and, Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills have linked Weber's discussion of charisma to Hero Worship. According to Gerth

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, p.2.

⁶⁶ A.R. Willner and D. Willner, "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders", *op.cit.*, p.77.

and Mills, Max Weber, followed in the footsteps of Thomas Carlyle, and used the term 'charisma' to explain the developments caused by the heroic personality/individual. In an edited work, Gerth and Mills say:

Weber's conception of the charismatic leader as continuation of a 'philosophy of history' that after Carlyle's *HEROES AND HERO WORSHIP* has influenced a great deal of nineteenth century history writing.⁶⁷

Willner explicitly links charisma and myth, when she observes that:

The charisma of a leader is bound up with and, indeed, may even depend upon his becoming assimilated, in the thought and feelings of a populace, to its sacred figures, divine beings, or heroes. Their actions and the content of these actions, recounted in myth, express the fundamental values of a culture, including its basic categories for organizing experience and trying to resolve basic cultural and human dilemmas.⁶⁸

The charismatic leader, one suggests, is able to communicate to his followers a sense of continuity between himself and their legendary heroes and their mission.⁶⁹

The simplest statement that can be made about a charismatic leader is that he is a hero of some sort. To advance beyond it, it is necessary to attempt to take the 'hero' apart and to isolate him for a separate examination of his attributes which appear to have been the most influential in bringing about a sense of awe and reverence among his followers. This awe is at the core of charismatic response. Naturally, such a study requires an examination of epic heroism, which according to Cuthbertson, has its own type of politics:

Political myth is the mechanism of charisma, linking the hero to the community. Myth is a primary source for legitimizing and maintaining political power. The deprivation of myth is the beginning of power politics.

⁶⁷Gerth and Mills, eds., *FROM MAX WEBER : Essays in Sociology*, op.cit., p.53.

⁶⁸Willner and Willner, "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders", op.cit., p.82.

⁶⁹ibid., p.83.

Myth custodians are power holders. Myth establishes moral consensus in the community and is accompanied by social sanctions. Myth stabilizes the relationship of the individual to politics by restricting the purely organic state with the element of moral purposiveness.⁷⁰

This broad definition which also highlights Max Weber's contention that charismatic leadership has existed everywhere and at all times, and that, in particular terms, a leader so defined is not that difficult to recognize. The key to the mythical qualities of such leaders is to be found in their superhumanness. In the political myth context, the epic hero is a phenomenon that answers these two conditions.

Yet, myths have been considered "a system of dialectical logic", which can be constructed as a substructure in all human thought.⁷¹ Thus, in the 'epic hero' it is possible to discover patterned elements of belief present in heroes of all societies, though the concrete manifestation of these elements would vary according to the particularities of each community, and with them the meaning of the epic hero.

The word 'hero' has been given many meanings, varying from the all encompassing definition, "a mythological or legendary figure often of divine descent endowed with great strength or ability" to the more limited one of 'a man admired for his achievement and qualities'.⁷² It is within the limits of the former definition that the epic hero derives its meaning.

⁷⁰Cuthbertson, POLITICAL MYTH AND EPIC, op.cit., p.156.

⁷¹Claude Levi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth", JOURNAL OF AMERICAN FOLKLORE, 68, 1955, pp.236-241.

⁷²THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 2nd Vol., 1971, pp.389-390.

2.5 CONCLUSION

The consideration raised at the outset of this Chapter was: How does the Weberian thesis that people have always differentiated between 'leadership' of the routine and extraordinary types, square historically with what one knows of man's attitude to political authority. In many important respects political attitudes and practices do square with what Max Weber and Weberian writers (particularly Ann Ruth Willner) have noted about charismatic authority. From historical and philosophical sources, one can establish the presence of the 'charismatic' in the existence of unique individuals who by virtue of their 'exceptionality' ought to be deferred to and obeyed, vis-a-vis, the epic hero, prophet, saint, demagogue, founder of the new movement (both spiritual and secular), and party leader. In addition, it is evident that leaders have used the concepts 'charisma' and 'cult of the personality' to enhance their status as secular rulers and the control of political life of communities. Kings, tyrants and political leaders, whether they imposed their rule, exploited public opinion or were granted it by election - all needed to have their office established: i.e. legitimated their rulership to those who were subject to its authority by claiming by virtue of the office to possess charisma or generate awe and hero worship. Traditionally, in the West, leaders who wanted either to acquire power and/ or rationalize the possession of power and its exercise, often have identified themselves to the masses as 'saviours of the people', 'enlighteners of the masses', and, likened their positions of power, office to 'divine rule', or a uniquely personal mission. Thus, one's initial conclusion is that the Weberian thesis is valid, that is, the charismatic leader type has existed for the entire period of Western civilization: in no period or society, was the 'charismatic' absent. Put differently, charismatic leadership has been an integral part of the Western tradition, its political philosophy and practice.

It is pointed out that the charismatic leader may be identified by the enthusiasm by which his public appearances, words, and actions are met with among the population. His following is almost never the whole population, but its

commitment to him is the best evidence available that he is in fact recognized by it as 'charismatic'. Although it is true that all leaders have more than 'natural qualities', it is only the 'charismatic ones' who are perceived as having either natural qualities to an extraordinary degree or as being superhuman. With these (charismatic) individuals the ability to generate enthusiasm is greater than with other leaders. Such individuals are in certain cases not motivated solely (if at all) to obtain power, to be of service to others. Nor are they motivated by the ordinary reasons for choosing politics as a career. With various degrees of emphasis, charismatic leaders view themselves as 'agents' of a higher authority than the existent state, and they expect to be recognized as such. Many, if not all of them give every indication that they are themselves true believers in something, which lies beyond the ordinary range of human experience and perception. And they expect those who are closest to their persons, also, to be true believers. Their emergence to power stirs up a good deal of emotionalism among their followers and among those who are not prepared either to acknowledge a new source of charisma or for a revolutionary change. For the charismatic leader and those he leads, existential social and political relationships are artificial, static, and in need of transformation. The transformation is to proceed in accordance with the leader's inspiration. The inspiration may be political, for example, Hitler's belief in his unique mission to construct a politically greater Germany, the One Thousand Year Reich. Thus, in regard to the charismatic leader's impact, the evidence present upholds the following generalizations. Such a leader, for his followers, is considered outside or above the law or social norms.

The charismatic leader's purpose is to generate a new 'consciousness' for those who will accept and later for all, irrespective of their willingness to accept his authority as 'charismatic'. According to Harvey Wheeler,

Man creates for himself a divine master who proceeds to teach man new ways, out of which emerge new cultural forms, which in turn requires men to adopt

Arguably, equating a charismatic leader with the notion 'divinity' is not inappropriate because some charismatic followers do so. When it comes to telling their followers, what is in accordance with the will of God, or, is historically possible, the charismatic leader is perceived by his followers as one who is a superhuman, a god, or intimate with God. The charismatic leader's ability to stimulate or assist in the process of the development of a 'new consciousness' while never directly addressed by Max Weber's writing on charisma, nevertheless, is inherent in his notion that charisma is a revolutionary force. Downton's discussion of specific case studies, drawn from historical and contemporary 'great' figures, offers data on the revolutionary aspect of charisma. The point one made relative to 'new consciousness' is that idea (the seed of new consciousness) is linked to charismatic personalities. That is, a new mode of thought is often traceable to an idea originating with or given a particularly appealing twist by a charismatic leader. One does not wish to get into the debate as to whether idea or material is more important. For example, Marxist and non-Marxist (as well as many disputants) are divided on this point. One simply states here that, while pursuing a Weberian thesis, a number of writers found evidence that charismatic leadership played a role in the generation of new consciousness. Charisma, as noted, is a revolutionary force itself, it destroys old institutions, and replaces them with ones more attuned to current needs. Wheeler sketches this process as follows:

But men (charismatic leader and his followers) with new consciousness are new men and new men need to declare the old gods dead and to create new and more appropriate gods to go with their new consciousness and their new needs, and so on.⁷⁴

The above does not mean either that there is an irreversible trend toward charismatics in Western civilization or that charismatic leaders may affect

⁷³Harvey Wheeler, "The Phenomenon of God", THE CENTER MAGAZINE, March/May, 1971, p.23.

⁷⁴Ibid., p.23.

changes in the historical process unaided by followers' commitment and a favourable socio-historical environment. The data shows the contrary is the case. One might, therefore, say that there are some individuals (charismatic) who can generate loyalties to themselves, which ordinarily rest with traditional and rational legal systems. And, for such an individual, the status quo (the pre-emergence situation) continued survival can only be interpreted as the failure of a mission. Hence, the charismatic leader, in some cases, measures his effect (success of his mission) in terms of destruction, modification of something which predates his emergence, and he offers a substitution of his own creation for what had existed.

One found leadership to be a behavioural process involving a leader, followers, and socio-historical situation. Each element is of equal importance. A leader must conform to the society's or group's idea of what is acceptable qualified criteria for leadership. However, during extraordinary times, the group seeks out individuals who are 'deviant' for special leadership roles. Hence, such leadership may not only deviate from norms, but is expected to do, and would fail if it tried to behave, for example, as a routine-type leader would, since by definition, the situation requiring recognition of the 'charismatic' is not one which can be dealt with by ordinary or routine means. One has observed that most studies treat leadership (particularly the charismatic type) as a personality variable rather than a situational one. The present study's data suggest otherwise: leadership is clearly a function of both situation and personality.

A major conclusion is that the charismatic individual does not constitute specific psychologically identifiable types. To the extent that such individuals are markedly different, psychologically, from their followership or the populace, their share tendencies with other so-called neurotic political personalities. From both psychological and sociological perspectives, it was found, that the charismatic person may be a marginal individual, who is able to make a broad appeal to the masses because of his very marginality.

Three approaches to the influence of socio-cultural and personality factors on the choice of political careers and the appeal of the demagogue variant charismatic personality, viz., Lasswell, Neumann, and Willner were offered. The Lasswell-Neumann explanations were rejected, and that of Willner accepted as having the greatest explanatory power of the three, because Willner's analysis dealt with specifically the charismatic leader and recognized and emphasized the appeal aspect of the charismatic leader. The other two, while providing some insights, made it difficult to generalize from politician per se or, even demagogue as a category, to charismatic leaders in particular.

Finally, it is noted that the essence of charisma cannot be found in the work of a single theorist. The concept charisma is still in need of refinement if it is to be a useful tool in political analysis. Fagen has put it very well, when speaking of charismatic studies. He commented that they "represent in part a very genuine groping about for a conceptual framework which might be of service in the analysis of Twentieth Century politics".⁷⁵ Max Weber did not systematize his views and insights regarding charismatic authority as well as he did those he had relating to traditional rational legal systems of authority. Although some others have tried to complete the task Weber only begun no one as yet has been successful in making of charisma anything but a provocative notion.

Charisma, today, is more nor less an unfinished conceptual framework. However, within the seventy years since Weber coined the 'charisma' some scholars (Weberians, particularly Willner, Fagen, and Bendix) have made contributions to the framework. I have in turn borrowed both directly from Weber and the forementioned analysts. The analysis of charisma used in this study is the distillation of the insights of these Weberian writers. For example, the notion of 'charismatic response', comes from Willner; also, from her, one took, the notion that the 'epic myth' contained valuable insights on charisma. Fagen's synthesis of Weber makes one's work easier than it would have been otherwise. In fact, the

⁷⁵Fagen, "Charismatic Authority and the Leadership of Fidel Castro", op.cit., p.278.

five propositions he abstracted from Weber constitutes minimum criteria for identifying a charismatic political leader. Adding Willner's indexes (particularly, charismatic response) to it, a researcher has the beginnings of an empirical based framework adequate to locate, identify and categorize that elusive politician, the charismatic leader.

PART TWO

THE ROLE DYNAMICS, POLITICS AND IMPACT OF GAMAL ABDEL NASSER

CHAPTER THREE

A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF GAMAL ABDEL NASSER (1918-1970):

Personality, Traits, Motives, Images and Role Dynamics.

3.1 INTRODUCTION¹

The objective of this Chapter is to develop an understanding of the personality, traits, motives, images and role dynamics of Gamal Abdel Nasser, from the time of assuming office as the sovereign of Egypt till his death in 1970. Its aim is to provide an empirical picture of Nasser's life, thought, political socialization and eventually, his emergence to leadership status not only in Egypt but, in the Arab world as a whole.

A political portrait of Gamal Abdel Nasser can be a difficult and controversial exercise since the reconstruction of his life calls on the writer to strike a balance, between, on the one hand, molding him into a hero,² and, on the other, examining the subject in the light of critical relief in the negative sense of the word.³ In trying to avoid these two extremes, one contends that there will be as many versions of Nasser as there are students who wish to write about

¹A note on the translation. Because the Arabic language has its own alphabet, there is no standard English language spelling for Arabic words. Common nouns are spelled as they are most usually reproduced in English. An attempt has been made to spell all book titles and names as their writers spell them in translation.

²See for example Robert St. John, *THE BOSS*. New York : McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960. And consider Derek Hopwood's comments "...the title gives a foretaste of the style, popular, intimate, a little sensational. It was a day by day, sometimes minute by minute, account of Abdel Nasser's rise to power. All the tricks of the trade are employed : conversations are recalled in exact detail, the village rather than the cosmopolitan background stressed, the homely family man portrayed with a taste for transversely stripped ties and American movies. The reader is left with a vivid impression of the events of his life and his character - real or imagined - but with little else..." Derek Hopwood, "Some Western Views of the Egyptian Revolution" in P.J. Vatikiotis (ed), *EGYPT SINCE THE REVOLUTION*, New York : George Allen & Unwin, 1968, pp.181-195.

³Of the latest works within this framework, see Tawfiq Al Hakim, *AWDAT AL WA'I* (The Return of Consciousness) Translated by Bayly Winder, London : The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1986, and the reply by Mohamed Auda *AL WA'I AL MAFKUD* (The Lost Consciousness : A Reply to Tawfiq Al Hakim) Cairo : Dar al Kahera al Haditha, 1987.

him.⁴

This undertaking, however, is not a biography of Nasser in the conventional, narrative sense⁵ nor is it an attempt to link Nasser's words and actions to his organic or psychic makeup.⁶ What is attempted is the constant handling of the subject as a more or less independent variable - or to use Sidney Hook's terminology, an "event making Man"⁷ portrayed as a 'unique individual', manipulating and being manipulated by the setting.

One's purpose of political biography is to allow one to understand not only what our chief actor did, but why. Thus, a political biography is also a case history which should move one to the realizations of the actions of the chief actor as an aspirant and incumbent of a position, and, the successes or failures of that individual in different situations. In studying Gamal Abdel Nasser personality, role and setting one intends to develop a reconstruction by linkage politics around the following themes: 'National Independence', 'Able Leadership', 'Flexibility of Action', 'Arab Nationalism', 'Unity of Ranks and Aims', 'Non-Alignment', 'Positive Neutrality', 'Anti Colonialism', and 'Revolutionary Socialism'.

⁴The position here is by no means one of the 'relativity of history'. Rather, the point is that there can be no history without a point of view, and every historian should make his or her own view explicit. To write the history that interests one is not to distort or misuse history. To quote Popper: "The only way out of this difficulty is, I believe, consciously to introduce a preconceived selective point of view into one's history; that is, to write that history which interests us. This does not mean that we twist the facts until they fit into a framework of preconceived ideas, or that we may neglect the facts that do not fit. On the contrary, all available evidence which has a bearing on our point of view should be considered carefully and objectively...but it means that we need not worry about all those facts and aspects which have no bearing upon our point of view and which therefore do not interest us." See Karl Popper, THE POVERTY OF HISTORICISM, New York : Harper Torchbooks, 1964, p.150.

⁵For an example of this see Peter Mansfield, NASSER, London : Methuen Educational Ltd., 1969.

⁶The vulgarization of the psychoanalytic model and its overly dogmatic application, along with the impression that the Freudian approach was inclined to slight situational variables far too much, has led to its rejection as an inadequate conceptual framework for contemporary political biography.

⁷Sidney Hook, THE HERO IN HISTORY, Boston : Boston Press, 1943, p.116.

3.2 OBJECTIVES

The following pages will attempt to examine and review the political impact of Gamal Abdel Nasser on interacting with Egypt's case history, his rise to power, and the events that led to his regime's legitimization based on charisma and foreign policy. The first section of this Chapter Three deals with leadership efficacy and points of departure. This section examines the colonial legacy, the preoccupation with National Independence and the *ancien regime*, the Free Officers Movement, The Evacuation Agreement, the Baghdad Pact, Israel and the Palestine Question.

The second section of this Chapter looks at Nasser's charisma in initiating various foreign policy moves. The Bandung Conference, the Czech Deal and the Adoption of Arab Nationalism are discussed. A conclusion attempts to evaluate all the contents of Chapter Three in terms of Nasser's prestige, stature and political impact on the Egyptian and Arab peoples.

3.3 LEADERSHIP, LEGITIMACY AND CHARISMA

The quest of legitimacy, according to Dahl, is the process by which a leader strives for mass acceptability on the bases of some ideological justification for his position of leadership. To the extent that the people accept these ideological justifications, the leadership is considered legitimate. At the general level, the particular strategy that a leader follows to acquire legitimation is usually determined by his relationship to the prevailing ideological milieu.⁸ Thus an analysis of the historical conditions and social processes that gives rise to charismatic eruptions in the social and political structure must be mentioned.⁹

⁸See Robert R. Dahl, "Further Reflections on the Elitist Theory of Democracy", AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 60, June, 1966, pp.296-395.

⁹Peter Blau, "Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory of Authority", AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 57, 1963, pp.305-309.

Due to its elusive nature, charisma has been given diverse meanings and interpretations by scholars.¹⁰ At least in one respect Weber's writings can be cited as a source of ambiguity. In discussing the relative importance and interaction of the psychological and the social aspects of charismatic authority, he emphasized the former, "...a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least, specifically, exceptional qualities."¹¹ In this sense, therefore, charisma is a 'gift of grace' that exists independently from the social context. Yet Weber went on to recognize the need for the social acknowledgement of charisma without which the leader's possession of this gift becomes insignificant. Although an individual may feel in himself the possession of gifts of grace, these become relevant only when recognized by others, charisma is viewed here as a relationship between leader and follower vis-a-vis the political and social environment rather than, solely, the personal attribute of the leader. The leader reveals himself through heroic performance and a messianic message. These two components are mutually reinforcing, the leader's performance may represent the unfolding of his message, or the message may contain his programme for heroic activity.

The initiation of the charismatic relationship depends on whether the leader's performance-message fits the crisis situation. If the leader's performance and messages are not correctly attuned to the cultural ethos and the deeply felt needs and expectations of the crisis-torn society, the process will not begin. The leader's performance should be a type that is regarded as exemplary, extraordinary, or heroic by the leader's own society. The accompanying message typically contains a bold prescription to remedy the prevailing crisis situation, as well as a utopian promise for the future. While attuned to the need's and

¹⁰See K.J. Ratnam, "Charisma and Political Leadership", POLITICAL STUDIES, XXI, No.3, September, 1964, pp.341-354; and, Claude Ake, "Charismatic Legitimation and Political Integration.", COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY, Vol.9, No.1, October, 1966, pp.1-13.

¹¹Max Weber, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, Translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, New York : Oxford University Press, 1947, pp.358-359.

problems of the existing society, the message includes values and modes of behaviour significantly different from those in practice. Yet the revolutionary nature of the message does not preclude the selective incorporation of certain of the prevailing values and symbols. In this sense there is a latent blend and continuity between the old and the new; the leader may selectively invoke history, myth, and past heroes to reinforce the sanctity of his mission. To capture a mass audience, he propagates the highlights of the message in simple and explicit terms. On the basis of the promises - reinforced by heroic activity - the leader establishes an initial charismatic bond with the masses.

The personal qualities of the leader constitute another dynamic variable in promoting the leader-follower interaction. A leader's possession of exemplary qualities is always determined by his society, according to its peculiar culturally-derived criteria. In terms of his own milieu, the potential charismatic is an outstanding personality, endowed with great dynamism, sensitivity, and resourcefulness. These personal gifts become instrumental in imparting to his followers the values and maxims of the message. Judging by more universal criteria, he is also a revolutionary inclined to take major risks.

The leader proceeds to affect a value transformation on the basis of the legitimacy flowing from the nascent charismatic relationship. Increasingly, he exercises a diffuse and intense influence over the normative orientations of the masses. Thus, the leader fills the value -belief vacuum created by the social crisis with his own belief system or ideology as promulgated in his message. As the new values, perspectives and policies of the leader find acceptance among the masses, they can be said to become subject to his charisma and he becomes their charismatic leader. In view of the reciprocal relationship, the notion that the charismatic "...is always the creation of his followers,"¹² explains half the story. It is necessary to add: to the extent that the leader has succeeded in

¹²Richard Fagan, "Charismatic Authority and the Leadership of Fidel Castro", THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY, Vol.18, 1965, pp.275-284.

imparting his value to his followers, they are his creation.

One of the principal criticisms of "charisma" is that the term lacks any rigour and thereby defies analysis. Some social scientists maintain that there must be operational indices for identifying and measuring the extent of charismatic appeal. There is much validity to the charge that there are no direct operational indices for measuring charisma empirically. Such a situation is readily admitted by various scholars. But, just as much as there may be no direct indices for measuring charisma empirically, the use of indirect indices such as the 'establishment of the message' can provide a high face plausibility in validating the presence of charisma. For the purpose of establishing the assertion that Nasser was a charismatic leader in three senses: Egyptian, Anti-Imperialist, and Arab nationalist, one has emphasized the context or setting within which charisma operated (the formative years, 1952-1956) together with the message as reflected in political action. Thus the methodology encompasses triangulations and the impressions of people as recorded by the authorities cited. The concept of triangulation has also been utilized in reference to the various historical events, e.g., the Baghdad Pact and the creation of Israel. The Suez Crisis of 1956 has been eschewed to a larger extent because, as pointed out, the crisis had no fundamental connection with Suez, the Canal or the Canal company. In addition, the nationalization of the Suez Canal is linked with the power politics of the Aswan High Dam, an issue that 'opens another kettle of fish,' and, is beyond the scope of this Chapter. What follows is an inquiry into the factors that constitute what one has opted to call the political biography of Gamal Nasser.

SECTION ONE : LEADERSHIP EFFICACY AND POINTS OF DEPARTURE

Historiographers have always contended that every revolution is shaped by the history of its people and their interpretations of the formative events of their past.¹³ Egypt, in the middle of the twentieth century, experienced certain factors that fermented a revolutionary atmosphere; the pressures of industrialization, the dislocations of the Second World War coupled with the loss of the 1948 Palestine War. Thus to the majority of Egyptians, revolution meant on the one hand, the negation of Egypt's colonial past and, on the other, promise of political community.¹⁴ Yet, to understand fully the exhilaration of the revolutionary period, 1952-1970, the colonial legacy deserves to be mentioned.¹⁵

3.4 THE COLONIAL LEGACY AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

Egypt's colonization can be said to have begun with the commercial penetration of the 19th Century, including direct British occupation, and ended with Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956. The domination of the British dates from 1839, when they intervened effectively to curtail the power of the Albanian officer Mohammed Ali (1805-1849), the founder of the last foreign dynasty to rule over Egyptians. However, it was only in the wake of the successful army revolt of 1882 by Colonel Ahmed Orabi, the first hero of Egyptian nationalism,

¹³Nadav Safran, *EGYPT IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY : An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952*, Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1951, Chapter Four. See also Charles Wendell, *THE EVOLUTION OF THE EGYPTIAN NATIONAL IMAGE*, London : University of California Press, 1972, pp.78-120.

¹⁴Jacques Berque, *EGYPT : Imperialism and Revolution*, London : Faber and Faber, 1972. Also see James C. Davies, "Towards a Theory of Revolution", *AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW*, Vol.27, Feb, 1962.

¹⁵The problem of the researcher here is to describe the colonization of Egypt from the point of view of the nationalist revolutionary. The method used is that of situational analysis, as distinguished from that of 'sympathetic' or 'empathic' understanding through subjective reenactment. For clarification of the methodological distinction see, Karl Popper, *OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE : An Evolutionary Approach*, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1979, p.27.

that direct British occupation was brought into being. The year 1919 was one of nationalist revolt with Saad Zaghloul, a popular nationalist leader, giving voice to the popular resentment of foreign rule. This continued wave of armed rebellion and strikes exerted pressure on Britain to unilaterally end its established protectorate and Egypt declared an independent monarchy in 1922.¹⁶ In actuality this declaration served only to veil the continuance of British powers that assumed the responsibilities of securing communication, Egyptian defence, and protection of capitulations. A later 1936 agreement¹⁷ did officially end the British occupation of Egypt but not the end of various grievances, as Fabumni points out:

The humiliating British occupation, the lack of sufficient political power or industrial strength, and Britain's disinclination to treat Egypt as a full sovereign state...even despite the treaty of 1936, gave rise to politico-psychological tensions. Egyptian feelings of inferiority was expressed in fierce and aggressive bitterness and resentment.¹⁸

Although events in Egypt were dominated by the British, one widely recognized failure was in the creation of a genuine political community, i.e. one that commands allegiance on the basic moral authority for the individual. Instead, British rule succeeded in imposing and stabilizing a colonial authority with the aid of indigenous allies - the Egyptian (Turko-Albanian) monarchy, the aristocracy, and occasionally the nationalist Wafd Party¹⁹ - the four main political forces in the country until the Nasserite revolution of 23 July

¹⁶See P.J. Vatikiotis, *THE MODERN HISTORY OF EGYPT : From Mohammed Ali to Mubarak*, London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985, pp.169-296.

¹⁷In this year, 1936, the Egyptian army opened its officers corps to some of the Middle and Lower classes. Nasser was a member of the second entry of such men, and officer cadet at the age of 19 in the Abbasiya Military Academy.

¹⁸In L.A. Fabumni, *THE SUDAN IN ANGLO EGYPTIAN RELATIONS : A Case Study in Power Politics, 1800-1956*, London : Longman, 1960, p.413. "Between 1882 and 1922, Britain declared sixty-six times its intention of withdrawing from Egypt, but the frequency of their repetition robbed the British words of credence." Quoted from Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Weni, *MIDDLE EAST CRISIS*, London : Penguin, 1957, p.36.

¹⁹Witness the 4th February 1942 incident when Sir Miles Lampson (later, Lord Killearn), the British Ambassador forced King Farouk at gun point to recall the pro British Wafd cabinet to power and to clamp down on other parties that harboured pro Axis sentiments. This incident was later to add another bitter note in Anglo Egyptian history. See Miles Copeland, *THE GAME OF NATIONS*, New York : Simon and Schuster, 1969, p.98.

1952.²⁰ Thus, one recognizes in Egypt's history the process of colonization and its inevitable result : The rise of nationalist resistance. That recognition provides orientation for the analysis of the successful nationalist revolutionaries, The Free Officers and their leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser.²¹

The foreign domination of Egypt had some unique characteristics. Large scale settlement by the British was absent, nor were Egypt's elites totally excluded from political activity. However, the power to affect crucial decisions regarding the course of Egypt's history was a monopoly of the British.²² Nevertheless, just enough of a taste of political power tantalized the indigenous elite who were kept off balance in a position of calculated inferiority not without racist overtones. As Albert Memmi observed, in his classical study of the colonial experience,; "It is remarkable that racism is a part of all colonialism under all conditions."²³ British colonialism in Egypt proved no exception with Lord Cromer, the British pro Consul from 1882 to 1907, best recording the racist underside of British colonial rule. In his *MODERN EGYPT*,²⁴ Cromer defends Britain's role in civilizing "barbarous" Egypt leading one to understand the cultural amnesia of the colonized Egyptian : better to forget the 'defects' of his religion, the 'inferiority' of his culture and 'slovenly' of his personality. To become human, in the eyes of Cromer, was to depart from the barbarism and cultural wreckage of a 'subject race'. But to go where?, the question begs to be asked. The Egyptian knew well that to retrieve his personality is not by assimilation, for by adopting the ways of the colonizer is to become nothing but a clever monkey, a good imitator, never the genuine article. In writing *MODERN EGYPT*, Cromer unintentionally reveals the frustration of the colonized : for the colonized Egyptian, there was no way out except to throw off the yoke of imperialism, disillusionment, and press forward to collective salvation.²⁵

²⁰Tom Little, *EGYPT*, London : Ernest Benn, 1958, pp.112-113.

²¹See Anwar El Sadat, *REVOLT ON THE NILE*. New York : John Day, 1957.

²²See Anthony Nutting, *NASSER*, London : Constable, 1972. See Chapter on the "Years of Subsistence".

²³See Albert Memmi, *PORTRAIT DU COLONISE : Precede du Portrait du Colonisateur*, Paris : Buchet Chaste, 1957, quoted in Safran, *EGYPT*, op.cit., p.57.

²⁴See Lord Cromer, *MODERN EGYPT*, Vol.II, London : Macmillan, 1908, pp.150-174.

Nationalist revolutionaries, like Nasser in his early life, faced up to the trauma of colonization and by claiming history as an ally they attempted to shake the certitude of ruling aliens and undercut their tendency to eternalize the status quo. Thus, it was the straightforward national cause – independence from foreign rule – that moved Egyptians in an earnest and exalted state.²⁶ As Nasser was to express to his closest school friend Hassan el Nashar in September 1935:

Today the situation is critical and Egypt is in an impasse. It seems to me that the country is dying. Despair is great. Who can end it?...Where are the men ready to give their lives for the independence of the country? Where is the man who can build the country so that the weak and humiliated Egyptian can stand up again and live free and independent? Where is dignity? Where is nationalism? Where is the so called activity of our youth?...They say the Egyptian is a coward, that he is afraid of the slightest sound. He needs a leader to lead him in the struggle of his country. By these means this same Egyptian would become a thunder clap which would make the walls of tyranny tremble.

Mustafa Kamil (an Egyptian Nationalist) said: "If my heart moves from right to left, if the pyramids move, if the Nile changes its course, I shall not change my principles".

We have said several times that we are going to work together to wake the nation from its sleep, to bring surging forth the forces hidden within individuals. But, alas, so far nothing has been carried out.

My dear fellow, I expect you at my place to discuss these matters on 4 September, 1935 at four in the afternoon. I hope you won't fail to come.²⁷

²⁵See Ahmed Abdallah, *THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AND NATIONAL POLITICS IN EGYPT, 1923-1973*, London : Al Saqi Books, 1985.

²⁶A similar point is reflected in Gamal Abdel Nasser, *THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION*, as he later summed up the political activities of Egyptians in terms of 'positive action' which was later subject to 'revision': "At a certain phase of my life, 'positive action' meant enthusiasm. But I later came to realize that I ought not to be alone in that enthusiasm. To be effective, it had to be communicated to others. I was then a student at the *EI NAHDA* school (fittingly the 'reawakening'), leading many demonstrations in those days, shouting myself hoarse, followed by other fellow students, in our insistent demand for complete independence. But it was to no avail – our cries died into faint echoes that moved no mountains and blasted no rocks. Then I came to believe that 'positive action' could be found in the solidarity and agreement of all leaders of the nation. So our rebellious, roaring ranks went around visiting these leaders in their homes, calling on them, in the name of Egypt's youth, to agree on concerted action..." (Washington : Public Affairs Press, 1955, p.31.)

Thus, for the occupied Egyptian an understanding of the origins and consequences of British rule was crucial, since they faced a situation for which their traditional culture provided little orientation. To understand the Egyptian nationalist revolutionary one must grapple with Cromer's Egypt : a new 'exotic', and profoundly disorienting situation, as depicted by Nasser's experience:

The truth, however, is I did not feel at ease within myself...I had within me a feeling of distraction which was a mixture of complex and intermingling factors: of patriotism, religion, compassion, cruelty, faith, suspicion, knowledge and ignorance.²⁸

The full implication of this was that behaviour could no longer reliably be guided by traditional patterns. The Egyptian culture no longer existed: it had been shattered by the process of British colonization. The domination of a global multifaceted Western expansion made the Egyptian nationalist recognize that real power lay outside the national boundaries and that Egypt had been drawn into a global web of Western economic and political forces beyond its control.²⁹ History also revealed to the Egyptian that national resistance had been crushed by British power. Equally important was history's confirmation of the colonial situation as an objectively verifiable reality characterized not only by the damming of nationalist aspirations but also the destruction of Egypt's past. Finally, history revealed to the colonized Egyptian that resistance was part of his legacy and the only way to be rescued from the racism of colonial rule.³⁰ The call for revolution was increasingly heard as 'the logic of the situation' was seen as a need for 'repossession of the world' and that 'call for its remaking' led to a multiplicity of nationalist orientation : reformist Islam - symbolized by the Moslem Brotherhood (*Ikhwan*),³¹ liberal nationalism - symbolized by the

²⁷As quoted in Robert Stephens, *NASSER : A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY*, London : Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1971, p.35.

²⁸Quoted from Derek Hopwood, *EGYPT : Politics and Society, 1945-1984*, London : Allen & Unwin, 1985, p.35.

²⁹Peter Mansfield, *THE BRITISH IN EGYPT*, London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971, p.49.

³⁰See P.M. Holt, *POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN EGYPT*, London : School of Oriental and African Studies, 1967, pp.136-161.

³¹See Richard P. Mitchell, *SOCIETY OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERS*, London : Oxford

Wafd,³² National Socialism symbolized by the Young Egypt Party (*Misr el Fatat*)³³ and the various Communist parties. From the wide array of contenders for the nationalist mantle it was the Free Officers led by Gamal Abdel Nasser that ultimately destroyed the monarchy and eliminated the colonial presence.³⁴ It was from their coup d'etat of July 1952 that the instruments were forged to make possible a real break with the colonial past. And it was Nasser who led the Egyptian people at Suez in 1956, when the colonial legacy was at last repudiated. The Free Officers, in effect, added a new dimension to the Egyptian political structure and became the rallying point for most opposition groups. They, as other groups had, regarded independence as a prerequisite to reform and pledged that:

Among the objectives of the Free Officers in the launching of a campaign against corruption in all its aspects, against bribery, favouritism and abuse of influence. But we should not combat such evils unless we are completely freed from imperialism. Any other step would be tantamount to an unpardonable treachery to the fatherland.³⁵

University Press, 1969; Christina Phelps Harris, NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION IN EGYPT : The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood, The Hague : Mouton, 1964, and Hassan el Banna, COLLECTION OF THE LETTERS OF THE MARTYR IMAM HASSAN EL BANNA (in Arabic) Beirut : Dar al Andalus, 1965.

³²See Jacob M. Landau, PARLIAMENTS AND PARTIES IN EGYPT, Tel Aviv : Israel Publishing House, 1953, pp.54-89.

³³See James P. Jankowski, EGYPT'S YOUNG REBELS : 'Young Egypt', 1933-52, Stanford : Hoover Institution Press, 1975.

³⁴On the military coup d'etat of July 1952 which overthrew the monarchy and the ancien regime, see Rashed el Barawy, THE MILITARY COUP IN EGYPT : An Analytic Study, Cairo : Renaissance Bookstore, 1952; Jean and Simone Lacouture, EGYPT IN TRANSITION, London : Methuen, 1979; Jean Lacouture, NASSER : A Biography, U.S.A. : Alfred Knopf, Inc., 1973; P.J. Vatikiotis, NASSER AND HIS GENERATION, London : Croom Helm, 1978; P.J. Vatikiotis, THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS : Pattern for New Nations?, Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1961; Anwar Abdel Malik, EGYPT : Military Society, Translated by Charles L. Markhann, New York : Random House, 1968.

³⁵Quoted from El Barawy, MILITARY COUP, op.cit., p.200. See also T. Cayler Young, "The Crisis in the Near East", SOCIAL FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ed. Sydney Nettleton Fisher, Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1955, p.253.

3.5 THE FREE OFFICERS MOVEMENT (*Al Zubat al Ahrar*)³⁶

As was stated previously, in responding to nationalist revulsion against the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the then Wafd government liberalized the admission policy of the Military Academy, opening the doors of the Academy to native Egyptian youth, regardless of family background, social class, or economic status.³⁷ Eighteen months later, a new class of twenty year old lieutenants graduated. Of the eleven men who composed the founding committee of the Free Officer group in late 1949, eight entered the Academy in 1936. These were Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, Major Abdel Hakim Amer, Wing commander Abdel Latif El Boghdadi, Lieutenant Colonel Anwar El Sadat, Lieutenant Colonel Husein Shafel, Lieutenant Colonel Zakariyya Mohieddin, and Major Salah Salem. Major Kamal Al Din Husein and squadron leader Hassan Ibrahim, also members of the founding committee were graduated from the Military Academy a year later in 1939. Another member, Major Khaled Mohieddin, graduated in 1940. Five of the Free Officers group were born in 1918, two in 1917, and one each in 1920, 1921, and 1922. The average age of the members of the Revolution Council in 1952 was thirty three years. Only three of them had higher education other than military training. With one exception all had seen active service in the Palestine War.³⁸ Excluding General Muhammed Naguib, the figurehead of the

³⁶A prediction of revolution for Egypt at mid century would have required no great prescience. As Shiekh Mustafa Abdel Razek said in April 1946, "Two generations of young men, whom we do not know, are now growing up. They will change the face of Egypt". Quoted in Lacouture, NASSER, op.cit., p.125. But, to have predicted that a coup d'etat by a band of military conspirators would have been an extraordinary accomplishment. After the July coup, an impression of inevitability was created and largely accepted by both hostile and sympathetic Western observers. However, the regime's own myth that the Free Officer rule was the necessary outcome of the complex sequence of events involving the rise of nationalist resistance and the disintegration of the old order is misleading, since it makes it difficult to accurately assess the Free Officers Movement. One contends that an unvarnished view of their origins and their earlier struggles for power is crucial for the understanding of their development from an unknown secret society to Egypt's ruling elite. A sense of historical contingency, centering around Gamal Abdel Nasser, goes hand in hand with the analysis of the Free Officers movement.

³⁷See footnote 17.

³⁸See Jean Lacouture, NASSER : A Biography, U.S.A. : Alfred Knopf, Inc., 1973; Also see "Nasser's Memoirs of the First Palestine War", translated by Walid Khalidi, JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES, Winter, 1973, Vol.II, No.2.

1952 Revolution, all had been involved in some kind of political activity earlier in their careers. Most of these officers were of humble beginning, from all parts of Egypt. Their fathers and grandfathers were peasant farmers, small owners, or minor officials. However, outside the core group, one finds other adherents to the Free Officers movements of aristocratic background and comfortable economic status. Such, for example, were wing Commander Ali Sabri and his brother Hasan Sabri. The same is true of Colonel Sarwat Okasha.³⁹

Secondary schooling during the early thirties meant constant contact with the pre-1936 agitation directed against the British, and also over Palestine and the Suez Canal. Student political activities of those days were under the influence of the ultra nationalist Wafd. Moreover, these young men attended the Military Academy during the period of an all-nationalist government. During the Second World War, they witnessed the greatest concentration of British troops ever seen in the Middle East, and found their duties limited by the British, who were wary of them.⁴⁰ Some of them even hoped for an Axis victory as a short cut to the fulfilment of national aspirations.⁴¹ Many of them were impressed by the mobilization capability of Europe's Fascist military state and derided the hardships that faced the democracies of the era. Ironically, those who attended staff college were introduced by British instructors to the systematic study of political history of the Middle East. It is reported that British instructors of the Staff College stated that Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar El Sadat, Zakariyya Muheiddin and Abdel Hakim Amer were exceptional and highly motivated students with a genuine interest in social reform.⁴² It is also observed that political education of Gamal Abdel Nasser was most intense and thus merits some mention.

³⁹See El Barawy, *MILITARY COUP*, op.cit., pp.69-74.

⁴⁰See Anwar El Sadat, *REVOLT ON THE NILE*, New York : John Day, 1957.

⁴¹El Sadat was later to cooperate with two Nazi spies during W.W.II. See El Sadat, *REVOLT ON THE NILE*, op.cit., and his *SEARCH FOR IDENTITY*, New York : Harper & Row, 1977.

⁴²Lacouture, *EGYPT IN TRANSITION*, op.cit., see the Chapter on "A Short History of the Free Officers", pp.98-106.

Contrary to popular belief, Gamal Abdel Nasser was not born in Benni Murr of Assiut Province, but in the city of Alexandria.⁴³ Although his father, Abdel Nasser Hussein, in his capacity as an assistant postmaster, was frequently transferred from one place to another, it was in Alexandria and Cairo – the two cities of Egypt – that Nasser received his primary, secondary, and military education. He was exposed at an early age to both sides of the Egyptian environment: Upper Egypt in the Said, and Lower Egypt, or the Delta region, in al Beheira where he began his schooling in the Khatatiba primary school. The remainder of his elementary schooling was completed in Alexandria and Cairo. His secondary schooling began in Helwan, outside Cairo, continued in the Ras el Tin secondary school in Cairo in 1936. The location of the schools Nasser attended at an early age influenced his political orientation. It is well known among Egyptians that the Nahda School in Cairo was always in the forefront of political demonstrations.⁴⁴

Political demonstrations were commonplace among Egyptian secondary school students in the thirties. Nasser's experience in this regard began in Alexandria and continued through 1936 in Cairo. The period 1930-35 was one in which the constitution was abolished, parliaments suspended, and rule was by royal decree. The Wafd, which was still the party of the masses, was able to rally most of the students in demonstrations against Ismael Sidky's government in 1930, and against succeeding governments, until the Wafd returned to power in 1936. It is almost certain that Nasser was at the time a Wafd sympathizer, if not a follower. His attachment to the cause of the party was perhaps strengthened a year later when the Wafd made it possible for him, as well as other secondary school graduates, to enter the Military Academy. His first application for admission to the Academy, immediately upon graduation from secondary school in June 1936, was turned down. He proceeded to enroll in the College of Law in Cairo, where he spent five months between October 1936 and February 1937.⁴⁵ Later, he re-

⁴³Compare, Stephens, NASSER, op.cit., p.12; Lecouture, NASSER, op.cit., p.24; St. John, THE BOSS, op.cit., p.44.

⁴⁴Mansfield, NASSER, op.cit., p.84.

⁴⁵P.J. Vatikiotis, NASSER AND HIS GENERATION, London : Croom Helm, 1978, pp.83.

applied for admission to the Academy and was accepted.

Other events influenced the development of Nasser's political career. Graduating as a Second Lieutenant from the Military in 1938, he was posted with a line infantry outfit in Mankabad, Assiut province, in Upper Egypt. His promotion was rather fast. He reached the rank of Captain in September 1943, at the same time receiving an appointment as instructor in the Military Academy. All this occurred soon after an event that left a deep impression on many Egyptians: the Palace incident in February 1942, when a British ultimatum to King Farouk supported by tanks led to a change of government.⁴⁶

Thus, to recapitulate briefly what has been said, for Gamal Abdel Nasser, early school life was spent mixing study with militant activity and demonstrating both against the British presence and Egyptian politicians. He was exposed to all political currents of the time, including the Wafd, Young Egypt, and the National Party. He felt personally and with adolescent intensity the problems of Egypt, perhaps more intensely than his fellows. He called these days 'feverish' and a period of boiling over. As he wrote in *THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION*: "The present situation is critical...we are just about to bid life farewell and meet death. Despair is a solid structure; and who is to demolish it?"⁴⁷ A serious youth, known by his lecturers as 'extraordinarily mature for his age', he began to internalise Egypt's problems, following the pattern of those future leaders who seem to bear within themselves all the problems of their society. He was also searching for a pattern for his own life. Reaching adolescence and adulthood he was attracted to the discipline and the study of military life and gained quick promotion. He was later to write "throughout my life I had faith in militarism."⁴⁸ Having graduated from the Abbasiya Military Academy, he was

⁴⁶St. John, *THE BOSS*, op.cit., p.61.

⁴⁷Quoted from p.47.

⁴⁸Nasser, *THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION*, op.cit., p.20. Anthony Eden, in a letter of reply to Marshall Bulganin on 17 September 1956 distorted this reference as evidence of Nasser's self confessed addiction to 'militarism'. Anthony Eden, *FULL CIRCLE*, Boston : Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1960, p.487.

posted to Mankabed in Upper Egypt where he met Abdel Hakim Amer, Zakariyya Muhiaddin, and Anwar El Sadat. Sadat was later to depict an insightful picture of Nasser:

My impression was that he was a serious minded youth who did not share his fellows' interest in jesting; nor would he allow anyone to be frivolous with him as this, he felt, would be an insult to his dignity. Most of my colleagues, therefore, kept their distance from him....he had obviously erected an almost insuperable barrier between himself and other people.⁴⁹

By this time, Gamal Abdel Nasser had certain definite political aims. No doubt, like many other young Egyptians, he felt humiliation over the easy compliance of his government with British dictation. He was aware, too, of the economic and social backwardness of Egypt. Evidence of this is found in Sadat's *REVOLT OF THE NILE*, as well as Nasser's statement.

Nasser's sophistication in politics began with his attendance of Staff and Command College between 1945 and 1948, followed by his appointment as instructor in the Army Administration School in July 1949. Between these assignments, he had seen duty in the Palestine Campaign, including a difficult siege at Falluja. By the time he was assigned to the Staff College as instructor in November 1951, his political ideas had taken definite shape, and plans for revolutionary action had already taken the form of the Free Officers movement. Nowhere in Nasser's activity prior to the Coup of July 23, 1952 is there any suggestion of rash behaviour. With the exception of his own admissions of complicity in the attempted assassination of a prominent political figure, which, according to the *PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION*, he later regretted, there is no known instance in which Nasser engaged in unpremeditated acts of violence. Although intensely political, Nasser must, contrary to the common view, be considered cautious, deliberate and calculating.⁵⁰

⁴⁹Sadat, *THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY*, op.cit., p.114.

⁵⁰Some authors have dwelled on this aspect and come to the conclusion that to Nasser everything was a conspiracy shrouded in deep mystery. They seek to explain his flair for intrigue. See Vatikiotis, *NASSER AND HIS GENERATION*, op.cit., p.210; St. John, *THE BOSS*, op.cit., p.83.

If one was to analyze in detail the background of every officer active in the Free Officers movement one would find at least one common factor behind their involvement in politics: frustration with an autocratic regime which could not handle the question of Anglo-Egyptian relations and, worse still, betrayed the army in battle. A corollary force affecting their political behaviour was identification of the ruling institution as an evil to be dispelled like the foreign occupying power. Further reasons for the political concern of this army officer group emerge from an examination of how and when the Free Officers group was organized. Recruitment techniques for membership in the group are also revealing. One might accept one or more accounts of the formation of the Free Officers group as given by some of the founding members themselves. Anwar El Sadat, in his account, talks of two branches organized within the movement; one military under the command of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the other civilian under his own command. Infiltration of army commands and secret recruitment of sympathetic officers had, according to El Sadat, brought membership by 1947 to the number one thousand.⁵¹

In his *EGYPT*, Tom Little accepts Sadat's account, but other analysts speculate that between 1941 and 1949 there was no organized group of Free Officers. Rather, many of the Free Officers operated independently of each other, collaborating, infiltrating army personnel and spreading their message, which was then vague, for many of the officers continued to adhere or belong to one or other of the organized political groups, such as Misr el Fatat, The Muslim Brethren, and the Communist party.⁵²

Any cohesion among these officers was based until 1949 entirely on their personal relations and contacts. There was a nucleus of officers who were contemporaries in the Military Academy and Staff College, many of whom served

⁵¹El Sadat, *IN SEARCH OF IDENTITY*, op.cit., p.114. For a sharply contradictory account on the role of Sadat, see Mohammed Helkal, *AUTUMN OF FURY*, London : Andre Deutsch, 1983, p.42.

⁵²Vatikiotis, *THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS*, op.cit., pp.64-66.

together in various commands and capacities. One hears and reads about relations between Nasser, El Sadat, and Zakariyya Muhieddin in Mankabad on their first army post assignment. Similar relationships and close friendships between Nasser and Abdel Hakim Amer developed while both were serving in the Sudan. Naturally, these were strengthened during the Palestine War. It was the war in Palestine which decisively placed the Free Officers on course toward revolution. Nasser was a commanding officer of a unit of the Egyptian Army which moved into Palestine. He was immediately dismayed by the inefficiency and the lack of preparation of the Egyptians who were fighting against greatly inferior numbers. The slaughter distressed him and he himself was wounded in the chest. In the battle for the Negev Desert which began in October 1948 Nasser and his unit were trapped at Falluja near Beersheba and, together with several other Free Officers, held out against Israeli forces and were eventually able to counter-attack. In retrospect, he saw this episode as a symbol of a determination to pursue the real fight against all those forces which oppressed Egypt. As he later wrote "We were fighting in Palestine but our dreams were in Egypt".⁵³ He was also noted to have been deeply moved by the words of a dying colleague: "The real battle is in Egypt".⁵⁴ However, it would be hasty to presume any ideological cohesion between these men in their early contacts, or any collective conspiracy based on neatly organized plans for revolutionary action. Not all of the Free Officers acquired political aspirations - even views - by way of revolutionary activity, adherence to, or affiliation with one or another of the existing political and religious groups. Many of them may well have been 'converted' politically by their colleagues over a long period, during which they maintained contact with one another.

The activities of the Free Officers in 1950 and during most of 1951 were confined to, firstly, the publishing and circulating of pamphlets - attacking government officials and the King - among members of the armed forces as well as students and other civilian groups, secondly, efforts to infiltrate army commands

⁵³See Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit., p.82.

⁵⁴See Nasser, "Nasser's Memoirs of the First Palestine War", op.cit., p.19.

for the recruitment of members. Non-member sympathizers were sought among civilian groups opposed to the status quo. The committee also enlisted the support of opposition journalists who, in 1950 and 1951, were conducting a vigorous press campaign against the King. Through these journalists the Free Officers were able to air their grievances. Rashed El Barawy in *THE MILITARY COUP IN EGYPT* states that as early as 1945 a group of officers issued secret circulations under the general heading, 'The Army Gives a Warning', signed "the Free Officers". These circulars were allegedly concerned with evacuation of British troops from Egyptian soil and demanded vigorous action by the Egyptian government to achieve this end.⁵⁵

Within the army the Society of Free Officers used the cell system. A cell consisted of not more than five to ten members with the link between these cells being in the hands of Nasser. An intelligence network was possible because members of the Executive were placed in staff positions close to the Army High Command; Major Salah Salem, for example, had access to the office of the Chief of Staff, whereas Lieutenant Colonel El Sadat managed a contact with the Palace through the King's private physician.⁵⁶

Circumstances during this period have led some analysts to doubt the authenticity of the Free Officers and conclude that the military never occupied a vanguard role in the nationalist movement. This is recognized by Nasser and other Free Officers but, despite the fact that the Egyptian military as an institution had forfeited its identification with the nationalist inclination, men of highly nationalist orientation did undertake military careers. Available biographical data on the men who played a central role in the revolution suggest that their nationalist orientation had already been formed before joining the military.⁵⁷ The Palestine experience convinced Nasser and his associates that the King and his

⁵⁵El Barawy, *MILITARY COUP*, op.cit., p.312.

⁵⁶See El Sadat, *REVOLT ON THE NILE*, op.cit., p.87.

⁵⁷Abdel Latif Al Boghdadi's, *MEMOIRS*, Part 1 and 2, (In Arabic), Cairo : Al Maktab al Misri al Hadith, 1977.

government were not interested in the nation or army's welfare. Thus the Free Officers were equating national liberation with the destruction of the *ancien regime*. It is postulated that Nasser at the time had seriously accepted the idea that the army should lead in bringing political and social change. The assumption of a political role for themselves was nevertheless encouraged by the fact that in neighbouring Arab states army officers were replacing traditional civilian leadership on the grounds of treason, incompetence and unrepresentativeness. It has been suggested by students of Arab politics that a career in the army was an avenue to bringing about sociopolitical and economic changes. Majid Khadduri in his *INDEPENDENT IRAQ* argues this role for officers in Middle Eastern Armies.⁵⁸

The fact that ideological persuasions of the young men who coalesced around Nasser covered the full range of political thought from right to left, from Moslem fundamentalism to Marxism, impelled Nasser to minimize these differences probably due to the exigencies of conspiracy. With great skill he maintained the unity of the core participants by avoiding discussion of the kind of society the Free Officers eventually would build. Attention was riveted instead on the immediate task of consummating the revolution. Ideological differences were submerged in an emotionally powerful nationalism, which evoked the shared dream of an Egyptian independence and sovereignty. Thus it was Nasser's appreciation of the clear cut military hierarchies which induced him to reason that, in a revolutionary situation, the military could be an important organizational weapon:

The situation demanded the existence of a force set in one cohesive framework, far removed from the conflict between individuals and classes, and drawn from the heart of the people. A force composed of men able to trust each other; a force with enough material strength as its disposal to guarantee a swift and decisive action. The conditions could be met by the Army only.⁵⁹

⁵⁸See Majid Khadduri, *INDEPENDENT IRAQ*, in his chapter "The Army Officer : His Role in Middle Eastern Politics", London : Oxford University Press, 1951, pp.71-82.

⁵⁹Quoted from St. John, *THE BOSS*, op.cit., p.36.

Post-1952 Egyptian analysts have tended to draw parallels between Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952 and Ahmad Orabi Pasha in 1882. Nasser, like Orabi, rallied native Egyptian army officers against those persons identified with the ruling institution or monarch. Both men prefaced their movements with a demand for reform in the military establishment. Orabi sought the Ministry of War for himself, whereas the Free Officers seventy years later sought appointment of a senior ranking officer, General Muhammed Naguib, acceptable to them. Both Nasser and Orabi were 'underdogs', men derived from the people. There is, however, a sharp distinction, advantageous to Nasser, which Orabi could not have hoped for in his time: the Egyptian army after seventy years had achieved a greater degree of Egyptianization. The political experience of Army officers in 1952 was derived from thirty years of intense Egyptian nationalism, culminating in their participation in an all Arab national struggle for Palestine in 1948 and 1949. The Orabi Revolt in 1887 was not bound up with the aspirations of a sophisticated Egyptian nationalist class, as was Nasser's Free Officer's movement.

Thus, the Free Officers saw themselves as vindicators of the promise of Egypt's nationalist movement. That claim was challenged, by the Muslim Brethren among others. Yet through their efforts to destroy Egypt's colonial dependency, Nasser and the Free Officers did give new meaning to a history that for the majority had become meaningless. By seizing power and using it to destroy the material and cultural structures of colonial domination, they placed the revolutionary transformation of Egypt and the redefinition of its roles in global politics on the historical agenda. The coup d'etat moved towards revolution. The process of building an authentic political community was at last begun. Egypt's revolutionaries aimed to transform their society, and that transformation was itself part of the global drama of decolonization and national renaissance. Within a concretely defined historical situation, the meaning of Nasser's actions must be understood within the links between leadership, charisma, power and ideas.

The official mythology of Nasser and the Free Officers was that, once they had conceptualized their purported role as that of a vanguard, i.e. sweeping away the *ancien regime*, they would step aside allowing the Egyptian people to take command of their destiny. However, as it turned out, reality dashed his hopes as the Free Officers were 'compelled' by circumstances to retain the reins of power. It was this notion of Nasser as a 'reluctant dictator' that gained credence evidenced by, firstly, the absence of a Free Officers blueprint for the new society and, secondly, Nasser's early avoidance of publicity. Furthermore, Nasser established the argument:

I ordered that no name be given any publicity except that of Naguib's. I wanted all the light cast on him. I gave this order principally to avoid a split in the Free Officers. We were all of us either thirty two, thirty-three, or thirty-four years old, except Khaled Mohelddin, who was a little younger. We were all equal in rank. I know how the British and our internal enemies would try to pit us one against the other, if we gave them a chance. But if we had the sense to let an older man like Naguib be the figurehead, we could retain our unity.⁶⁰

Seen in this light, the evidence leads to the view that the Free Officers intended to wield decisive power, but to wield it directly and, in the same spirit, Nasser claimed that:

For a long time it [the vanguard of Free Officers] waited. Crowds did eventually come, and they come in endless droves - but how different is the reality from the dream. The masses that came were disunited, divided groups of stragglers. The sacred advance toward the great objective was stalled, and the picture that emerged that day looked dark and ominous; it bode danger. At this moment I felt with sorrow and bitterness, that the task of the vanguard, far from being completed, had only begun.⁶¹

Henceforth, to complete the Nasser-Orabi parallel : "Nasser took his experience from the failures of his forerunners, concluding from Orabi that the army must

⁶⁰St. John, THE BOSS, op.cit., Chapter 9, pp.98-99.

⁶¹Nasser, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION, op.cit., pp.33-34.

be truly national, from Mustafa Kamal that words were not enough, and from the experience of the 1919 rebellion that there was nothing so treacherous to his cause as the Egyptian ruling class".⁶²

3.6 THE ARMY MOVEMENT AND THE PRIORITY OF EGYPT'S INDEPENDENCE

In *EGYPT'S LIBERATION :THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION*, Nasser reiterated that "any study of the struggles of [the Egyptian] people...would discover that the Revolution [Army Movement] of July 23rd marks the realization of the hope held by the people of Egypt...of self government and complete sovereignty."⁶³ Surprisingly, although the stalemate in Anglo-Egyptian negotiations had preoccupied the old regime and had been one factor precipitating the army movement, the proclamations of General Headquarters and the personal statements of Naguib were relatively casual regarding this issue.⁶⁴ Only slight reference to Egypt's foreign relations was made in connection with the *ancien regime* in an attempt to strip it of any virtue in the eyes of Egyptian and world public opinion. The omission reflected the temporary indifference of Egyptians, who had been preoccupied with the internal plight of the country during the few months of the *ancien regime* and who were weary of so many promises of independence for Egypt.⁶⁵ The army officers silence reflected fear of British intervention, a fear made more vivid by the psychological impact of the presence of British troops in the Canal Zone base. Thus, the army officers emphasized internal reform and refrained from any official action that might incite foreign residents to seek the protection of foreign powers.⁶⁶

⁶²Tom Little, *MODERN EGYPT*, London : Ernest Benn Limited, p.142. See also, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, "The Transformation of the Egyptian Elite : Prelude to the Urabi Revolt", *THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL*, XXI, No.3, Summer, 1967, pp.325-44.

⁶³Quoted from p.18.

⁶⁴EI Barawy, *MILITARY COUP*, op.cit., pp.54, 207-209.

⁶⁵Vatikiotis, *THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS*, op.cit., pp.40-41.

⁶⁶EI Barawy, *MILITARY COUP*, op.cit., pp.35-36.

Since the avowed causes and objectives of Nasser and the Free Officers movement were primarily domestic problems, it might appear irrelevant to have chosen the above mentioned themes to illustrate Nasser's role dynamics as the subject of this Chapter. To the contrary, it is the shift from the preoccupation with Egypt's independence to concern with Egypt's external problems that constituted the fundamental 'elevation' of Nasser from a mere national leader to a household name in the Arab, African and Asian circles. In addition to this shift, it was the conduct of Nasser's foreign policy and his achievements of international stature rather than the implementation of internal reform that made others recognize the charismatic dimension of his leadership.

In his proclamation as the leader of the Army movement, Nasser put the responsibility for the deterioration of Egypt's internal conditions and external relations squarely on the shoulders of the *ancien regime*. Later he considered such deterioration impossible without the support of Egypt's political parties and blamed the conditions on them instead. Nasser went so far as to state that "the removal of the ex-King was not our primary objective - which could have belittled the idea of a revolution - our main objective is to install a sound governmental system to replace the corrupt one".⁶⁷ The *ancien regime* could not have operated without the cooperation or the acquiescence of the politicians of the old regime. In fact, many old regime politicians⁶⁸ shared in the *ancien regime's* deeds, which were, to some extent, a reflection of the abnormal conditions⁶⁹ in Egypt more than the weakness and corruption of the politicians involved.

The army and the civilian agencies were purged.⁷⁰ In the meantime, the

⁶⁷Translated from Gamal Abdel Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS JAMAL ABD AL NASIR (Speeches of President Gamal Abdel Nasser) 3 Vols., Cairo : Malabi's Majlis al Khadamat, Vol.1, p.34, see also p.43.

⁶⁸Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit., p.34, El Barawy, MILITARY COUP, op.cit., p.108.

⁶⁹El Barawy, MILITARY COUP, op.cit., p.128.

⁷⁰El Barawy, MILITARY COUP, op.cit., pp.212-214, Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., p.138. See the adverse impact in Walter R. Sharp, "Bureaucracy and Politics - Egyptian Model" in TOWARDS THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,

government fixed lower prices for essential commodities and home rentals and took other public welfare measures.⁷¹ But the Army Movement objectives which had been most strongly emphasized in the proclamations were "restoration of sound constitutional life" and "exercise of true parliamentary life."

Nasser explained that when the army officers "carried out this revolution they never thought to rule, or lead; [their] first object was to restore the true constitutional life". He even went so far as to state that "...their first intent was restoration of the dissolved parliament."⁷² This would have meant the return of the Wafd majority. On another occasion Nasser qualified the meaning of this promise by stating that the army stipulated as prerequisite for the reconvening of the dissolved parliament that the Wafd party carry out agrarian reform and eliminate the capitalists' monopolistic influence on government so that the poverty stricken masses would be relieved from exploitation by the wealthy.⁷³ Discontent from most groups,⁷⁴ disturbances, and disagreement on these issues eventually precipitated Mohammed Naguib's taking over of the premiership.⁷⁵

Mohammed Naguib's first step as Premier was to issue the decree⁷⁶ of agrarian reform⁷⁷ which, to the army officers, was tantamount to an ideology.⁷⁸ His

ed., William J. Siffin, Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1957, p.160.

⁷¹Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, *op.cit.*, p.140; El Barawy, MILITARY COUP, *op.cit.*, pp.242-45.

⁷²Translated from Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, I, December, 20, 1953, pp.163-64. This promise was reiterated on April 12, 1954, *ibid.*, pp. 198-200. See also Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, *op.cit.*, p.136.

⁷³Doreen Warriner, LAND REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST : A Study of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, London : Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1957, pp. 10-15; El Barawy, MILITARY COUP, *op.cit.*, pp.62-84, 212-13.

⁷⁴Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, *op.cit.*, pp. 145, 148-51, 153-54.

⁷⁵*ibid.*, pp.145-66; El Barawy, MILITARY COUP, *op.cit.*, pp.27-28; Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, I, pp.164, 200-01. Contrast with Walter Z. Laqueur, NASSER'S EGYPT, London : Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1957, p.5.

⁷⁶For the constitutionality of the decrees and approval of the state Council, see Jacob M. Landau, PARLIAMENTS AND PARTIES IN EGYPT, Tel Aviv : Israel Publishing House, 1953.

⁷⁷"Up to the time of 1955, an area of 250,000 acres had been distributed to 69,000 families, comprising about 415,000 persons..." out of a population of 22 million". Quoted from Warriner, LAND REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, *op.cit.*,

second major step was issuance of regulations for the reorganization of political parties.⁷⁹

The reorganization and purge of the political parties developed into a prolonged attack against some of the leaders of the Wafd and other parties rather than being focused on the reform of party programmes.⁸⁰ The Free Officers were determined to disarm the political parties of any legal and constitutional basis for renewal of their activities. On December 9, 1952, Mohammed Naguib abrogated the Constitution of 1923 and appointed a committee of fifty members with a wide range of representation⁸¹ to draft a new constitution to be submitted to public referendum. The problem of licensing political parties ended on January 16, 1953, when all parties, except the Muslim Brotherhood which claimed to be a religious society not a political party, were banned.

Next, a transitional period of three years to prepare the citizenry for a democratic life was declared, and a provisional constitution was proclaimed.⁸² The Command Council, composed of those officers who were the founding members of the Free Officers, was renamed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and became the actual governing body of Egypt.⁸³ The cabinet was to become responsible to it rather than to the people. The provisional constitution invested in "the council of the revolution and the council of ministers...(the Power) to consider the general policy of the state and...to supervise the work of individual ministers."⁸⁴ The voting procedure within the RCC and the inclusion of most of

p.35. See also pp.31-49. Keith Wheelock, *NASSER'S NEW EGYPT : A Critical Analysis*, New York : Praeger, 1960, p.77. Contrast the above with Laqueur, *EGYPT IN TRANSITION*, op.cit., pp.5-15.

⁷⁸Warriner, *LAND REFORM*, op.cit., p.10.

⁷⁹Naguib, *EGYPT'S DESTINY*, op.cit., p.151.

⁸⁰ibid., pp.152-153.

⁸¹Nasser, *EGYPT'S LIBERATION*, op.cit., p.77. For the legality of this move, see Landau, *PARLIAMENTS AND PARTIES IN EGYPT*, op.cit., p.191; Vatikiotis, *THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS*, op.cit., p.82.

⁸²The provisional constitution is cited in Naguib, *EGYPT'S DESTINY*, op.cit., pp.155-66.

⁸³See Articles VII-IX of the provisional constitution in *ibid.*, p.166.

Nasser's supporters in it assured Nasser's control of it. Appointment of other loyal army officers to higher Civil Service jobs assured the RCC control of governmental machinery and implementation of new regime policies.

On May 5, 1953, the committee of fifty, which had been chosen to draft a new constitution, recommended a republican type of government for Egypt. Without submitting the committee's recommendation for public referendum the new regime approved the recommendation on June 17 and abolished the monarchy.⁸⁵ On the following day Egypt was proclaimed a republic, and Mohammed Naguib was declared provisional President for the duration of the transition period. At the same time he retained the post of Prime Minister. Thus, within a year, all aspects of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary life came to an official end - the subjects were even omitted from public school curriculum⁸⁶ - and the new regime actually became military⁸⁷ and absolute in character.⁸⁸

The alliance of the officers with the well organized and well disciplined Muslim Brotherhood shifted the center of power away from the Wafd Party. The people relied on the army as a result of the failure of old regime governments to satisfy their ever increasing needs and desires.⁸⁹ As the first Egyptian professional group exposed to modern technology and ideas on a large scale, the officers were

⁸⁴Quoted from Article XI of the provisional constitution in *Ibid.*, p.166.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, pp.176-77.

⁸⁶Ahmad Atiyyat, *QAMUS AL THAWRAH AL MISRIYYAH*, (Dictionary of the Egyptian Revolution), 1st ed, Cairo : Maktabat al Anglo al Masriyyah, 1954, p.158.

⁸⁷The Egyptian Army officers by overthrowing the *ancien regime* and consequently taking over the reins of government, were proof of the ideas of Ibn Khaldun of the predominant role of the army during the period of decline, fall, and rise of regime, or Mao Tse Tung stated, "Whenever one wants to seize state power and keep it must have a strong army...All political power grows out of the barrel of the gun". Quoted from *PEKING REVIEW*, December, 5, 1961, p.9, in Earnest Kux, "Communist Tactics in Non-Aligned countries and the ideological Quarrel Between Moscow and Peking". in *NEW NATIONS IN A DIVIDED WORLD : The International Relations of the Afro Asian States*, ed. Kurt London, New York : Praeger, 1963, p.271.

⁸⁸Landau, *PARLIAMENTS AND PARTIES IN EGYPT*, *op.cit.*, pp.178-79.

⁸⁹Morroe Berger, *MILITARY ELITE AND SOCIAL CHANGE : Egypt Since Napoleon*. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Center for International Studies, Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 1960, pp.1-2; Vatikiotis, *THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS*, *op.cit.*, pp.242-43, 250.

imbued with radical and vigorous notions about the modernization of Egyptian society.⁹⁰ The continued presence of British troops in Egyptian soil and armed conflicts with Israel increased their stature. Their revolution, without support from or commitment to any other group,⁹¹ bolstered Nasser's claim that at this stage carrying out both the declared and undeclared objectives of the Army movement "could be met only by the Army",⁹² and not by the hesitant, reluctant, and conservative politicians of the old regime.⁹³

In the meantime the Egyptian Army officers were mindful of the achievements of Turkey and Iran. The examples set by these military governments were neither uncommon to military regimes in the Middle East nor in conflict with the Egyptian military officers' ideological background and their strong inclination towards an authoritarian regime.⁹⁴ By abrogating the Constitution of 1923 and eliminating even the slightest aspects of parliamentary life, Nasser deprived himself of the bases for legitimacy. To negate the charges of his opponents he denied any desire to govern and likened his task to that of guardian in charge for a limited period to protect the sacred inherited rights of the people from the corrupt politicians of the old regime and the agents of imperialism.⁹⁵ When they liquidated parliamentary life they did not repudiate it completely, for the Sixth and ultimate principle of their movement was "the establishment of a sound democratic regime"⁹⁶ with freedom and liberty for the country but not necessarily for the individual.⁹⁷

⁹⁰Berger, *MILITARY ELITE*, op.cit., pp. 3, 4, 27-28.; Vatikiotis, *THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS*, op.cit., pp.217, 240-47.

⁹¹Vatikiotis, *THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS*, op.cit., pp.75, 77.

⁹²Quoted from Nasser, *EGYPT'S LIBERATION*, op.cit., p.42.

⁹³Khadduri is of the opinion that backing down on established democracy is not unusual with military regimes. See Khadduri in *SOCIAL FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST*, edited by Sydney Nettleton Fisher, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955, pp.178-79.

⁹⁴Vatikiotis, *THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS*, op.cit., pp.XII, 71-72, 83-84.

⁹⁵Nasser, *EGYPT'S LIBERATION*, op.cit., pp.42, 71-72.

⁹⁶Quoted from Nasser, *KHUTUB AL RA'IS*, op.cit., III, p.546. See also *Ibid.*, I, pp.198-199. See Articles III and IV of the programme of the Liberation Rally in Naguib, *EGYPT'S DESTINY*, op.cit., p.164 and p.136.

⁹⁷Morroe Berger, *THE ARAB WORLD TODAY*, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962, pp.49-52, pp.33-34.

The Army officers, by evoking the Islamic ideals of equality, brotherhood, and social justice, sought legitimacy as the leaders of a really indigenous democratic system as opposed to the alien, imported parliamentary system of the old regime.⁹⁸ Appeals to Islamic ideals and the glorification of the early Muslim period were also intended to please the Muslim Brotherhood. The army officers flocked to the pulpits of the mosque to preach their new ideals purportedly inspired by religious principles. At the same time they realized the need for organized popular support to counterbalance the parties and groups of the old regime and to prevent the accumulation of power in the hands of any rivals, including the Muslim Brotherhood.⁹⁹ They also wanted to offset any defections, and more importantly, they wanted to control and direct the various students and professional organizations. For these purposes the army officers created a new organization which they named *Hay'at al Tahrir* ('Liberation Organization', commonly known in English as the Liberation Rally) to distinguish it from a political party and to disassociate it from the evils they attributed to the old political parties. Nasser emphasized the Liberation Rally's national character and objectives in the motto, "Unity, Discipline, and Work",¹⁰⁰ under a new liberation banner.¹⁰¹

Thus with the overthrow of the *ancien regime* and later the elimination of political parties, two forces influenced the power structure in Egypt - the army and the British, still the most important pillar in Egypt's politics. After securing internal support Nasser felt confident to attack the British occupation of

⁹⁸Bruce M. Brothwick, "The Islamic Sermon as a Channel of Political Communication", THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XXI, No.3., Summer, 1967, pp.299-300; Vatikiotis, THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS, op.cit., pp.80, 241; Berger, MILITARY ELITE, op.cit., pp.21-22; Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., pp.172-74; Laqueur, NASSER'S EGYPT, op.cit., pp.20-22, pp.26-27.

⁹⁹Vatikiotis, NASSER AND HIS GENERATION, op.cit., pp.79-80; 83; Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., pp.161-64. Tom R. Little, "Egypt Since the Coup d'Etat of 1952", WORLD TODAY, X, April, 1954, p.142; Berger, MILITARY ELITE, op.cit., p.27.

¹⁰⁰Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., p.179.

¹⁰¹The Liberation flag, which became the flag of the United Arab Republic in 1958, consists "of red, white and black horizontal bars (signifying the new blood of the future, the purity of our ideals, and the black corruption of the past)..." Quoted from *Ibid.*, p.165.

Egypt. To justify these drastic changes in Egyptian politics, Nasser preposterously asserted that the British occupation was made possible by support from rulers of Egypt and their proteges¹⁰² - who ruled in name only.¹⁰³ Nasser claimed that without such local aid imperialism would have found itself isolated and with no advantage in remaining in Egypt. At the very least it would have easily been forced to evacuate. One way, then to combat imperialism was to expose and fight its Egyptian collaborators.¹⁰⁴ Such an accusation negated the real hegemony of British military and diplomatic power.¹⁰⁵ However, in a more realistic admission, Nasser warned that imperialism, which developed various disguises under such names as protection, mutual defence, and alliance, would not leave the country willingly and peacefully.¹⁰⁶ In addition, he deplored the old regimes futile methods of combating imperialism by street demonstrations.¹⁰⁷ Nasser stipulated that to guarantee a victory against imperialism all Egyptians should take military training and pool their energies in preparation for an all out national struggle (not guerrilla Warfare), thus making it too costly and risky for imperialists to remain.¹⁰⁸ Partial opposition, in addition to being costly and unfair, would not guarantee ultimate victory.

In one of his first and most important policy speeches, on March 28, 1955, at the Military Academy, Nasser designated six points as principles for the new regime. The first principle was elimination of imperialism and imperialist 'stooges' ('traitors') among the Egyptians. He admitted the existence of two schools of

¹⁰²Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, III, op.cit., pp.546, 652-53. Contrast with Albert Hourani, "The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement : Some Causes and Implications", THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, IX, No.3, p.241.

¹⁰³Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, III, op.cit., pp.653, 665.

¹⁰⁴ibid., III, pp.662-63.

¹⁰⁵"The most important fact about the occupation is that it was imposed by acts of force". Quoted from Hourani, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, IX, No.3, p.241. "But it should be remembered that political power results in a psychological relation between those who exercise such power and those upon whom it is exercised. It gives the former control over the minds and actions of the latter". Quoted from Fabumni, op.cit., p.202. For Nasser's awareness of this psychological relations, see his KHUTUB AL RA'IS, I, p.105.

¹⁰⁶Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, I, pp.105-106, III, pp. 652-54.

¹⁰⁷ibid., I, pp.150-51.

¹⁰⁸ibid., pp.105-06, Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit., pp.50-51.

thought - one that advocated the elimination of imperialism first and the maintenance of the revolution and a second that advocated liquidation of imperialist 'stooges' first and then elimination of imperialism. Before coming to power, Nasser said he was of the first school of thought. But now he resolved to eliminate the imperialist 'stooges' first, by whom he actually meant the enemies of his regime.¹⁰⁹ Then he laid down in order of priority five additional principle which became the objectives of Nasser. "His second principle was the elimination of feudalism; the third, the elimination of monopolies and control of government by capital; the fourth, the establishment of a strong national army; the fifth, the establishment of social justice; and the sixth, establishment of sound democratic life".¹¹⁰

Fighting the native agents of imperialism before the imperialists themselves marked a complete departure in the Egyptian attitudes towards the British.¹¹¹ Up to this point, Egyptians had thought of the native rulers as branches of the tree of imperialism with the foreign master as the roots. The prevailing concept had been that if the native servants were eliminated, imperialism could create or bring in new ones; whereas if the root of the tree (i.e. foreign rule) were removed, the native agents would wither. This view was remnant of the prevailing supremacy of British imperialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, after the Second World War, the shift of the center of power in international politics from Europe to the United States and the Soviet Union, the weakening of Great Britain, the emergence of the Afro-Asian peoples, and the establishment of the United Nations had a tremendous effect on Anglo-Egyptians relations and caused basic changes in the character of colonialism. The continuation of British occupation after the Second World War was not based on the sheer might of British forces in the canal zone alone, but on

¹⁰⁹ibid., pp.162-63.

¹¹⁰Translated from ibid., p.546.

¹¹¹Hisham Sharabi, NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION IN THE ARAB WORLD, Princeton, N.J. : Van Nostrand, 1966, "A traitor is usually a political enemy; the highest form of treason is to be an 'agent' or 'lackey' of imperialism". p.99.

the legal foundation of a treaty concluded with native Egyptians. Removal of these Egyptians would deprive the British of legal grounds as well as material support. Nasser attempted to export this device by especially advising the Sudan¹¹² and later Morocco¹¹³ not to minimize the danger of imperialist stooges, the elimination of which would be an arduous job to be undertaken before fighting imperialism. He described the shift in priority as a "point of departure...the greatest victory Egypt ever achieved".¹¹⁴ Nasser attempted to impress upon the Egyptians that the Army movement was a 'revolution' and not a coup d'etat and emphasized that "it was a revolution against imperialism and reaction, a revolution expressing the hopes of the country."¹¹⁵

Although these six principles were originally outlined by Nasser after concluding the Evacuation Agreement, partly to divert the attention of the Egyptians, Nasser described the Evacuation Agreement as the 'end of the smaller struggle' and the achievement of Egypt's independence as the beginning of the largest struggle, "which would be the struggle to eliminate all residues of imperialism such as social injustice and economic deprivation".¹¹⁶ It should be stressed that the six principles were neither a spontaneous response to a special occasion nor designed to serve limited political expediency. Rather they were a planned, well understood set of objectives of the Army movement that Nasser later adopted. The fact that he persistently reiterated these six points in speeches abroad and at home is evidence of their importance. To capture the admiration of his Egyptian audience, Nasser asserted that "the objectives of the revolution...were 'not' but your objectives...its aims were laid down by you, your fathers and

¹¹²Even as early as August 26, 1953, Gamal Abdel Nasser, MAJMUA'T KHUTAB WA TASRIHAT WA BAYANAT AL RA'IS JAMAL 'ABD AL NASIR. (Collections of speeches, statements and announcements of President Gamal Abdel Nasser) in 4 parts, Cairo : Maslahat al Isti'amat, 1960, Part I, p.57, in drawing a parallel between Egypt and Morocco stated, "Morocco will achieve its freedom and independence from the French only after the Moroccan people unite and purge themselves from traitors. For imperialism will not last in a country which purged its ranks from its enemy and the traitors".

¹¹³Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, III, p.512.

¹¹⁴Translated from Ibid., p.505, See also Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit., p.58.

¹¹⁵Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, III, pp.625-26.

¹¹⁶Nasser, MAJMUA'T KHUTAB, Part I, pp.738, 749.

grandfathers."¹¹⁷ However, he did not specify these objectives and admitted that "the issues were not written, but rather emanated from our aspirations".¹¹⁸ This is not an attempt to deprive the leaders of the Army movement of any grasp of political concepts, nor to undermine their ability in planning or organization. Rather the Army Movement's original lack of any definite plan or ideology was an element of its strength and a source of flexibility that might explain the developments in its political structure and the different trends in its policies and methods in responding to changing internal and external conditions.¹¹⁹

In abstract terms Nasser traced the various stages in the development of these aspirations and described how they "began in the form of a vague hope, then developed in a defined idea, and finally into a practical programme at midnight July 23rd".¹²⁰ It is the development of these aspirations among the Egyptians - primarily in Nasser - and his methods of trying to fulfill them that this Chapter endeavours to discern so it might help explain the various trends of Nasser's domestic and foreign leadership.

3.7 NASSER AND THE EVACUATION TREATY

In the midst of the quarrel with the Egyptian political parties and after the abrogation of the 1923 Constitution, Naguib declared, "the constitution of our movement is the determination for the evacuation of the last foreign soldier from our soil."¹²¹ On another occasion he stated that in relations with Great Britain the Egyptians "have two alternatives and no third one - either evacuation or

¹¹⁷Translated from Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, III, p.676.

¹¹⁸Translated from Ibid., III, p.676. See also Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit., p.58.

¹¹⁹Warriner, LAND REFORM, op.cit., pp.10-11; Valikiotis, THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS, op.cit., p.68; Berger, MILITARY ELITE, op.cit., p.23; John S. Badeau, "Introduction", THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION, by Gamal Abdel Nasser, Buffalo, N.Y.: Smith, Keynes and Marshall, 1959, p.17.

¹²⁰Quoted from Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit., p.28.

¹²¹Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., pp.215; Fabumni, op.cit., p.304.

annihilation".¹²² Nasser, meanwhile, continued to attribute the causes of various acute problems, including the bitter quarrel with Israel, to the existence of imperialism.¹²³ Neither the tightening of the siege at Falluja, Palestine, nor the delicate task of negotiating the Rhodes Armistice with Israel distracted him from Egypt's independence.¹²⁴ Nasser knew that Egypt was in no position to force the British out of Egypt, whether by negative tactics (such as abrogation of the 1936 treaty), by mass demonstration, by resorting to the United Nation, or by open armed conflict. On the other hand, he was also aware the British would not leave without pressure.¹²⁵ Thus he resorted to a multitude of methods as the situation justified, but continued to place great emphasis on negotiation. He attempted to persuade the powers friendly with Britain, in particular the United States, to exert pressure on her to reach agreement with Egypt and sought mediation by such friendly countries as Pakistan and India.¹²⁶ His indifferent silence towards Israel gave currency to the rumour that the new regime might consider a settlement with Israel after concluding an evacuation agreement with Britain.¹²⁷ However, the Egyptians did not hesitate to resort to guerrilla warfare to worsen the living conditions of the British forces in the Canal Zone.¹²⁸ Thus, when the unfruitful negotiations with the British in the fall of 1953 were postponed indefinitely, Nasser launched a vigorous propaganda campaign urging Egyptians to join the National Guard and to prepare for the battle

¹²²Attiyyat, QAMUS AL THAWRA, op.cit., p.156.

¹²³Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit., pp.24, 76, 98; Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, I, p.152; Bodeau, THE PHILOSOPHY, op.cit., pp.18-19; Little, WORLD TODAY, X, p.145.

¹²⁴Apparently Nasser relished the Israeli officer, Yernham Cohen, who wrote regarding Nasser, "the subject which Gamal Abdel Nasser always talked about with me...was the struggle...against the English and how we organized the underground resistance movement against them...and how we were able to muster world public opinion behind us". Quoted in Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit., p.24.

¹²⁵Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, op.cit., III, p.105.

¹²⁶ibid., I, pp.150-51, 160, and Attiyat, op.cit., pp.156, 160, 162, refer to the opening of military training camps and speeches of Nasser and Naguib. See also Little, EGYPT, op.cit., p.244.

¹²⁷Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., pp.216, 220, 231, Fabumni, op.cit., pp.309-10; Lacouture, NASSER, op.cit., pp.212-14.

¹²⁸See Hassanein Abdel Kader, "Egyptian Public Opinion in the Post-Revolution Era", EGYPTIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, No.40, July, 1964, pp.124-42, maintains that the establishment of guerilla warfare was primarily to fight the British, not the Israelis. Fabumni, op.cit., p.314, quoted a description of the deplorable deteriorating condition of the British service men in the Canal Zone.

to liberate the fatherland from the usurpers - the British imperialists.

The foray with the British in the Canal Zone did not last long. In early 1954 Nasser was involved in a struggle with Naguib - the gravest struggle of his political career - and the whole country appeared to be on the verge of civil war.¹²⁹ The army movement was jeopardized by the split within the Free Officers. As a result of the schism between Nasser and Naguib, it appeared as if the military regime and Naguib became the rallying point of old and new groups that opposed Nasser.¹³⁰ On the surface, the personal quarrel¹³¹ gave the impression that Naguib favoured restoration of constitutional life while Nasser was for the maintenance of military rule and, further, that in the negotiation with the British, Naguib was for complete and prompt evacuation while Nasser was more conciliatory. Accusations of selfishness, secret collaboration or compromising relations with the British were used by both sides. The strong opposition in the cavalry clearly indicated that Nasser was in serious trouble, and it was his shrewd leadership and ability for survival that saved him and his regime. Naguib's reinstatement as President proved the gravity of the situation and his strength as a rival.¹³² With such a popular opponent Nasser demonstrated his mastery of intrigue¹³³ to such an extent that Naguib later described Nasser's manoeuvres as tantamount to "a second coup d'etat".¹³⁴ Whereas Naguib relied on popular support, Nasser first strengthened his grip on

¹²⁹"Merry-go Round", NEWSWEEK, XLIII, April 26, 1946, p.47.

¹³⁰Tom R. Little, "Changes of Leadership in Egypt", WORLD TODAY, XI, February, 1955, p.52; Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., p.200; Vatikiotis, THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS, op.cit., pp.88-90.

¹³¹Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., pp.160, 189-98, 203-07, spelled out his view and those of his opponents within the Revolutionary Command Council; See also Robert St. John, THE BOSS, op.cit., pp.140-42.

¹³²Lacouture, EGYPT IN TRANSITION, op.cit., pp.183-84; St. John, THE BOSS, op.cit., pp.166-68. Both describe the seriousness of the opposition and mutiny against Nasser. See also Little, WORLD TODAY, X, p.148. Vatikiotis, NASSER AND HIS GENERATION, op.cit., pp.91-92, contends that Nasser regretted the original decision to accept the reinstatement of Naguib.

¹³³Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, pp.206-08; Little, WORLD TODAY, XI, pp.252-53; Vatikiotis, NASSER AND HIS GENERATION, op.cit., p.91; St. John, THE BOSS, op.cit., pp.158-59.

¹³⁴Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., p.208.

key positions in the army and police where power counts and then in the Labour unions with mass sit-down strikes.

In the midst of this power struggle and the concurrent fight with the Muslim Brotherhood, Nasser decided to come to an agreement with the British.¹³⁵ Thus, guerrilla activities in the Canal Zone suddenly ceased and calm prevailed. This abrupt change was partly because Nasser was in no way ready to accept the responsibility posed by the British threat to take retaliatory measures if the hostile actions did not cease.¹³⁶ However, the more important reason was to free Nasser's hands to crush his rivals at home.¹³⁷ To win Great Britain and the United States to his side, Nasser labelled his opponents Communist stooges and Muslim fanatics.¹³⁸ Further, he showed willingness to compromise to reach a settlement with the British. The British, aware of Nasser's internal difficulties,¹³⁹ contacted the Muslim Brotherhood in an attempt to use the rivalry among Egyptian groups to increase their bargaining power with Nasser.¹⁴⁰ The British were also anxious to reach an agreement with Nasser as a

¹³⁵The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood, succeeded in launching their strongest attempt to overthrow Nasser's regime in 1965 after ten years of being crushed indicate the strength and entrenchment of their organization. See Kemal H. Karpat, ed., *POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST*, New York : Praeger, 1968, pp.116-17.

¹³⁶Little, *WORLD TODAY*, X, p.250; Little, *EGYPT*, op.cit., p.146; and Marlowe, *FOUR ASPECTS OF EGYPT*, op.cit., pp.391, 400, attribute the guerrilla warfare to the Muslim Brotherhood as a means of embarrassing Nasser, contrast with Ishak Musa al Husain, *THE MOSLEM BRETHEN : The Greatest of Modern Islamic Movements*, Beirut : Kayats's College Book Cooperative, 1956, p.133.

¹³⁷St.John, *THE BOSS*, op.cit., p.155; Lacouture, *NASSER*, op.cit., p.208; Little, *WORLD TODAY*, XI, p.56; Fabumni, op.cit., p.315.

¹³⁸Nagulb, *EGYPT'S DESTINY*, op.cit., p.187, El Sadat, *REVOLT ON THE NILE*, op.cit., pp.78-79; Gamal Abdel Nasser, "The Egyptian Revolution", *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, XXXIII, No.2, January, 1955, p.209; Jefferson Caffery, "Recent Developments in Egypt", *THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY*, edited by Harvey P. Hall, Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1955, p.117.

¹³⁹Al Husain, *THE MOSLEM BRETHEN*, op.cit., p.133.

¹⁴⁰See a summary of the Nasser regime accusation of the Brotherhood connivance with the British in Egypt, Revolutionary Command Council, "The Great Plot for the overthrow of the present regime prepared by the Muslim Brethen and the men of the British embassy in Cairo : Dissolution of the Muslim Brethen and closing of its general headquarters and branches in Egypt." *AL AHRAM*, Jan 15, 1954, translated in *MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS*, V, March, 1954, pp.44-100, cited in Kemal Karpat, *POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST*, New York : Frederick A. Praeger, 1968, p.116 and p.117.

prelude to improving Anglo-Arab relations.¹⁴¹

There was also international pressure by friendly powers on both Egypt and Great Britain to reach a settlement satisfactory to Egypt's aspirations. Nasser first compromised and agreed to include Turkey as a member of the Arab Collective Security under which the British would be allowed to reoccupy the canal base if any one of the member countries were attacked by an outside power. He also agreed to extend from fifteen to twenty months the period for complete evacuation of the canal base. The British government matched the Egyptian concession by agreeing that Iran be excluded from those countries which if attacked would be cause for the reoccupation of the canal base and also by agreeing that British technicians remaining to service the canal would not wear military uniforms.¹⁴² Finally, on July 27, 1954, the Egyptian and British representatives initiated the Heads of Agreement (later known as the Evacuation Agreement), which on October, 19, 1954, was ratified and became effective.¹⁴³ Accordingly, Nasser was hailed by the Egyptian propaganda machine as the 'hero of evacuation'.

Conclusion of the Evacuation Agreement was received with a mixture of apprehension and rejoicing at home and abroad - from the Neutrals, the Communists, the Western Bloc, the Arab countries, and Israeli and Zionist quarters. In England, opposition to the Treaty came from the extremists (who

¹⁴¹Little, EGYPT, op.cit., pp.244-45, and Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., pp.225-26, assert that Britain made the first concession. Contrast with Lacouture, EGYPT IN TRANSITION, op.cit., pp. 206-08; Fabumni, op.cit., pp.225-26; Marlowe, FOUR ASPECTS OF EGYPT, op.cit., p.400.

¹⁴²However, Nasser previously considered "the first default...to resemble imperialism in a particular Khakhi uniform". Nasser, KHUTAB AL RA'IS, I, p.105. See also Fabumni, pp.308-09. Nasser did not hesitate to launch a criticism of Churchill for insisting on the British wearing the Khakhi uniform as a vital issue.

¹⁴³Anthony Nutting, who signed the treaty for Britain, described how deeply moved Nasser was by what he took to be a resolution of the national question for Egypt: "Even in this sentient atmosphere, his sense of humour did not desert him. As his aide, Ali Sabry, put the treaty in front of me for signature, I discovered that my fountain pen had run out of ink and I had to borrow Nasser's. Then, having signed my name, as an automatic reflex I put the pen in my breast pocket. Nasser held out his hand and with a broad grin said, "I think you have already got enough out of me in this treaty. Please can I have my pen back". See Anthony Nutting, NASSER, London : Constable, 1972, p.72.

became known as the Suez Rebels) of the Conservative government. But, on the whole, the British government and public accepted the Agreement in the hope that it would open a new chapter in Anglo-Egyptian relations and serve as a prelude to the establishment of the long awaited Western defence system for the Middle East. In the West the agreement was hailed as an act of statesmanship that would lead to closer relationships with Egypt.¹⁴⁴ India, the leading neutral power, as well as pro Western Pakistan, congratulated both sides and hoped the new government would remove the friction between the signatories, contribute to Middle Eastern stability and tranquillity, and strengthen world peace.¹⁴⁵ Israel's apprehension that British withdrawal from the Suez Canal base might remove restraints on Egypt in seeking a second war with Israel was allayed by the British.¹⁴⁶ The Communist countries attacked the Anglo-Egyptian agreement as an imperialist conspiracy leading to a Middle East defence system.¹⁴⁷ Generally, the Arab governments, especially Pro Western ones such as Iraq, enthusiastically welcomed the Anglo Egyptian agreement as a good model for Anglo-Arab relations and as a nucleus for strengthening Middle East defence.¹⁴⁸ On the other hand, Arab nationalists, particularly the 'progressive' ones, did not share their governments views and bitterly denounced the Nasser for betraying Egypt's liberation. The evacuation agreement aroused suspicions that Nasser and the new regime were part of a Western master plan to check communism by establishing strong military regimes favouring social reform to replace obsolete para constitutional governments in the Middle East.¹⁴⁹ In addition, rumours of peace with Israel inflamed the Arab public.

Nasser and his supporters considered the agreement a document for the liberation of Egypt from more than seventy-two years of British occupation. Public

¹⁴⁴Fabumni, *op.cit.*, pp. 315-17.

¹⁴⁵*Ibid.*, pp.317-18; Little, *EGYPT*, *op.cit.*, pp.245-46.

¹⁴⁶Hourani, *THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL*, IX, No.3, p.239; Fabumni, *op.cit.*, pp.317-18.

¹⁴⁷Fabumni, *op.cit.*, p.318. Y. Bochkaryan, "False Friends of the Arabs", *NEW TIMES*, Moscow, No.2, 1954, pp.11-15, attributes the agreement and coups to American politics and conspiracies.

¹⁴⁸Fabumni, *op.cit.*, p.319.

¹⁴⁹Little, *EGYPT*, *op.cit.*, pp.255-56; Al Husain, *THE MOSLEM BRETHERN*, *op.cit.*, p.133; Lacouture, *NASSER*, *op.cit.*, p.208.

opinion, however, was sharply divided on its value. On July 27, 1954, the day of the initiation of the Heads of Agreements which Nasser described as "the implementation of the great objectives of the Revolution...An agreement to end the occupation and arrange the evacuation of the British troops...from Egypt".¹⁵⁰ Nasser's supporters flocked to the streets of Cairo to celebrate the finalisation of the agreement and to hail him as the 'Hero of the Evacuation'. On the other hand, the initiation of the agreement gave the opposition a final chance to rally the public against Nasser's military rule. Criticism of the agreement involved President Naguib but primarily came from the powerful Muslim Brotherhood, the dissolved Wafd party, the Communists, and almost all major political groups in Egypt.¹⁵¹ The criticism concentrated on the following points: (1) That the agreement was a step backward in the struggle towards the liberation of Egypt; (2) that it was less advantageous than previous treaties that the last Wafd government proposed, the refusal of which cost Egypt heavily in lives and property; (3) that the agreement embodied the essence of mutual defence with Great Britain, this time with the addition of Turkey; (4) that the agreement was the nucleus for an overall Western plan for the defence of the Middle East linking the fate of Arab states to that of their usurpers; that it was a prelude to peace with Israel, the liquidation of the Palestine question, and permission for Israel to use the Suez canal; and (5) that although the 1936 Treaty would expire in just two years, the Evacuation Agreement indefinitely linked the fate of Egypt with that of Great Britain. Opposition to the agreement grew throughout the summer of 1954 and reached a peak in the attempt on Nasser's life in October 26, 1954.

Thus, the Evacuation Agreement was a major event in the history of Egypt; it was a great improvement over the treaty of Preferential Alliance of 1936, and it broke the deadlock in Anglo Egyptian negotiations that had persisted since 1946. A balance sheet of advantages of the Evacuation Agreement indicates that Nasser

¹⁵⁰Al Rafi'i, THAWRAT 23 YULYAH, op.cit., p.190.

¹⁵¹Al Husain, THE MOSLEM BRETHEN, op.cit., p.136, states that the Muslim Brotherhood distributed a criticism of the treaty by Naguib while he was still president. See also Lacouture, NASSER, op.cit., p.208.

indeed merits credit as the 'Hero of Evacuation' - because he concluded the Evacuation Agreement with all the risks involved, not because of the excellence of its provisions. Conclusions of the Agreement removed one of the serious problems in Anglo-Egyptian relations. Even though Arab nationalists regarded the Evacuation Agreement as a step backwards in the achievement of Egypt's independence, Nasser had sought the agreement "for two steps forward" in accordance with an ancient but not very well known Umayyad tradition of submission to the adversary¹⁵² and in accordance with Leninist tradition.¹⁵³ In other words, Nasser sought to neutralize the British in his search for full control of power in Egypt.¹⁵⁴ The positive consequence of the Evacuation Agreement was the complete transformation of Egypt's power structure into one single organ, Nasser's military regime.

However, in as much as the Evacuation Treaty gave Nasser complete control of the power structure in Egypt, it generated new problems. Nasser said, "Every time the revolution achieved a new success, a new and heavy burden was also thrown upon my shoulders".¹⁵⁵ The primary burden was opposition within the Arab World. Therefore, after the attempt on his life and the consequent elimination of the Muslim Brotherhood, Nasser began to tour the country to sell the Agreement to the Egyptians which he likened to those involving concessions or loss of territories concluded by such major powers as the Federal Republic of Germany, France and even Great Britain.¹⁵⁶ Nasser pointed out that none of the citizens of those countries described the agreements as treason, but rather accepted them as acts of statesmanship. Despite losing popularity with both Egyptian political groups and the masses, Nasser thought conclusion of the Agreement would be in

¹⁵²Both Mu'awiya, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, and 'Abd al Malek, the greatest Umayyad Caliph, did not hesitate in their civil strife and struggle for power to pay tribute to Byzantin, the enemy of Islamdom. Majid Khadduri, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM, Baltimore : The John Hopkins Press, 1955, pp.215-16.

¹⁵³For Lenin's submissiveness to the Germans in concluding the Agreement of Brest Litovsk, see Isaac Deutscher, STALIN : A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY, New York : Oxford University Press, 1949, pp.185-87.

¹⁵⁴Mosoa Onoe, "Some Factors in the Communist View of Neutrality", NEW NATIONS, London : Constable, 1973, p.96.

¹⁵⁵Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit., p.59.

¹⁵⁶Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, III, pp.512-13.

the best interest of his rule. According to President Naguib, Nasser believed that he "could afford to alienate every segment of Egyptian public opinion if necessary, in order to achieve our goals".¹⁵⁷ Indeed, even if the treaty had not provided for the total and prompt evacuation of British troops, it did provide Nasser with an opportunity for eliminating his rivals within Egypt (the 'imperialist stooges') and this is another instance of his departure from being solely preoccupied with the problem of independence. The new regimes relations with other Arab countries, especially Syria and Saudi Arabia, were not cordial, and its prestige reached its nadir after the execution of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders.¹⁵⁸ On the other hand, Great Britain in particular and the West in general were expecting Nasser to join some sort of Middle East defence system.¹⁵⁹ On his part, Nasser, troubled at home and unpopular in the neighbouring Arab countries, was in a precarious position and in no hurry to join such a system. The current of events in 1955 pushed him away from the West instead. That year began with the Baghdad Pact,¹⁶⁰ the Israeli attack, and the Bandung Conference - events which led to the adoption first of positive neutralism and later Arab Nationalism.

¹⁵⁷Naguib, *EGYPT'S DESTINY*, op.cit., p.191, Nasser stated a similar opinion in his *EGYPT'S LIBERATION*, op.cit., p.74.

¹⁵⁸Little, *EGYPT*, op.cit., pp.255-56; St. John, *THE BOSS*, op.cit., p.186; Al Husaini, *THE MUSLIM BRETHEN*, op.cit., p.136.

¹⁵⁹Fabumni, op.cit., pp.315-16, 319.

¹⁶⁰It has always been contended that the timing and implications of the Baghdad Pact led Nasser to reject it at first hand. The fact that Dulles and Eden shifted the emphasis from Nasser's Egypt to Nuri al Sa'id of Iraq further alienated Nasser and, Eden's later attempts to woo Hussein's Jordan in joining the Pact, went against an earlier promise by Eden to Nasser that he would not attempt any further 'lining up of conservative states' against Egypt. The dismissal of Glupp Pasha of the Arab Legion by Hussein and the deteriorating Suez Crisis and aftermath made Nasser adopt a 'policy of no return.' From then on, Nasser's use of the word 'imperialist' came to mean Britain, Israel, France, the United States, and to a certain extent the Soviet Union. The word 'stooge' was used as a label against all those Arabs who challenged Nasser at various points in time. See Richard Hofstadter (ed.) *EGYPT AND NASSER*, Vol. I,II,III. A FACT ON FILE PUBLICATION, U.S.A. : Fact on File, Inc, 1973, for the documented sequence of events during Nasser's regime.

3.8 NASSER AND THE BAGHDAD PACT

Egypt' prominent political, strategical, commercial, cultural, and religious position made her the first Arab country (1946) to be approached by Britain concerning the idea of establishing a Middle East Defence system. Various British efforts to deal individually with the other Arab states (with or without the aid of Turkey) did not fare any better than the first attempt to conclude previous draft proposals with the *ancien regime*. All Western efforts to get the Arabs in any defence commitment were considered as attempts to maintain the status quo and, in particular, to safeguard the gains of Israel.¹⁶¹ The League of Arab States reacted with their own regional Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Resolution (The Arab Collective Security Pact), which was drafted in April 13, 1950, signed on June 17, 1950, and was ratified on August 23, 1952.¹⁶² Nasser went even further and denounced any military pact, regardless of its objectives, including the Arab Collective Security Pact.¹⁶³ However, from the very beginning of the Army movement, Nasser had sought understanding, aid, and cooperation with the United States and the West on new bases.¹⁶⁴ His efforts climaxed in the Evacuation Agreement which laid the foundation for regional collective defence system that included Turkey and was a common denominator between a Western defence system and the Arab Collective Security Pact. The Evacuation Agreement reads in part:

¹⁶¹See J.C. Hurewitz, DIPLOMACY IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, Vol. I: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD, 1535-1914; Vol.II: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD, 1914-1956. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1956, Vol.II, pp.308-11.

¹⁶²League of Arab States, COLLECTION OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS PASSED BY THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES OR SIGNED WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS), Cairo: Matabi Dar al Nasher lil Jami'at al Misriyyah, 196-, pp.18-25.

¹⁶³El Barawy, MILITARY COUP, op.cit., pp.208-10.

¹⁶⁴Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., p.235; Lacouture, EGYPT IN TRANSITION, op.cit., p.208. See Gamal Abdel Nasser, "Egypt's Prime Minister, Lt. Col., Gamal Abdel Nasser: What Should the U.S. do in the Middle East?" Interviewed by John Low in U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, XXXVII, September, 3, 1954, pp.26-32, where Nasser outlined that the major problem facing the Arab world was not the possibility of outside Communist invasion, but rather internal infiltration by Communists making actual and potential political capital out of the economic underdevelopment, exploitation and poverty. Nasser was of the opinion that internal Communism was 'borne out of poverty.'

Article 4: In the event of an armed attack by an outside power or any country...partly to the treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League states,...or on Turkey, Egypt shall afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as may be necessary in order to place the Base on a war footing.

Article 5: In the event of a threat of an armed attack by outside power on any country mentioned above...There shall be immediate consultation between Egypt and the United Kingdom.¹⁶⁵

To further reckon with the West Nasser repeatedly stated that internal communists were the most serious threat to Egypt and to the developing world and bragged about the harsh methods used to eliminate them in Egypt.¹⁶⁶ In addition, Nasser gave public assurances that "if there is ever a government here that wants to be on the side of the Russians, I don't think it can be this government".¹⁶⁷ Furthermore, Nasser chided most of the Arab countries for not being able to comprehend the realism of Egypt's deal with the West.¹⁶⁸ However, the accommodation between Egypt and the West was shortlived. On January 6, 1955, the announcement by the governments of Turkey and Iraq of their intention to conclude a pact of mutual cooperation¹⁶⁹ provoked Nasser's government to furious attack.¹⁷⁰ Since the Baghdad Pact was the manifestation of Dulles's Northern tier concept by which different military organizations joined together to combat any communist danger, Nasser's outrageous attack was not anticipated by Western observers and was difficult for them to understand.¹⁷¹ The announcement of the Turko-Iraqi Agreement "so enraged Nasser that at times he almost collapsed physically".¹⁷² Nasser openly declared an all out political war

¹⁶⁵Quoted from Hurewitz, *DIPLOMACY*, II, op.cit., p.384.

¹⁶⁶Nasser, *U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT*, XXXVIII, Sept. 3, 1954, p.26.

¹⁶⁷ibid., p.32; See Lacouture, *NASSER*, op.cit., pp.209-10.

¹⁶⁸Little, *EGYPT*, op.cit., p.256.

¹⁶⁹See text and statement in Hurewitz, *DIPLOMACY*, II, op.cit., pp.390-91. See also Mohammed Khalil, ed, *THE ARAB STATES AND THE LEAGUE : A Documentary Record*, 2 Vols., Beirut : Khayats, 1962, II, p.285.

¹⁷⁰See Lacouture, *NASSER*, op.cit., p.210; Little, *EGYPT*, op.cit., pp.262-63; St. John, *THE BOSS*, op.cit., p.189.

¹⁷¹Nasser, *MAJMU'AT KHUTAB*, Part I, p.295 (March 31, 1955); See Arun Kanti Das, "Anglo Egyptian Relations in Retrospect", *MODERN REVIEW*, Calcutta, CII, No.5, November, 1957, pp.359-69, p.366.

¹⁷²Wilton Wynn, *NASSER OF EGYPT : The Search for Dignity*, Cambridge, Mass : Arlington Books, 1959, p.112. "On top of it all, the Baghdad Pact challenged Egypt's leadership of the Arab world. Egyptians regarded it as an attempt by the West to build

against Nuri al Sa'id, the Iraqi Prime Minister, and mobilised all his energy for the effort.

Although Nasser began his tirade against the Turko-Iraqi pact from the moment it was announced, he picked out the weak and unpopular Special Agreement later ratified by Iraq and Great Britain in accordance with article I of the pact as a focal point of his criticism and outrage.¹⁷³ Therefore one will deal with both as one instrument unless otherwise specified.

The primary purpose of the Baghdad Pact was claimed to be "the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region which necessitates taking the required measure in accordance with articles 51 of the United Nations Charter".¹⁷⁴ The Pact was aimed at strengthening the governments of the member states and coping with the internal subversive activities of local communists. For this purpose a committee to fight subversion was established. Although the founders of the Baghdad Pact relied on repressive measures to cope with the spread of communism, they belatedly realized the insufficiency of such measures.¹⁷⁵ The objectives of the Special Agreement between Iraq and Great Britain were spelled out by the Prime Minister of Iraq when he introduced the draft of the Special Agreement of 1930; second, to cement and strengthen the bonds of brotherhood and security of the member states of the Arab Collective Pact, and third, to improve relations with the countries of the region for their security and to cope with the Zionist influence.¹⁷⁶ When Anthony Eden, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, introduced the Bill of Special Agreement at the British parliament, he evaluated the real benefits of the Baghdad Pact for

up Iraq as a competitor to Egypt as regional leader. Nasser regarded this as proof of Western hostility to his regime."

¹⁷³Walid Khalidi, "Nasser and the Arab World", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV, No.4., April, 1959, pp.30-34, 51.

¹⁷⁴Hurewitz, DIPLOMACY, II, op.cit., p.390.

¹⁷⁵David L. Morison, "Arab Affairs Through Soviet Eyes", MIDDLE EASTERN FORUM, XXXVII, No.1, January, 1961, pp.11-36.

¹⁷⁶See Hasan al Dujayli, MITHAQ BAGHDAD. (The Baghdad Pact) in Arabic. Baghdad : Matba'at al Raitah, 1956, p.129-30.

Great Britain: (1) Britain's membership would raise her prestige and increase her influence in the Middle East, and (2) enable her to maintain peace and stability in the area and to minimize international tension.¹⁷⁷ During the debate, Anthony Nutting, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, stressed that British strategical interest centered around strengthening the Northern Tier of NATO, which would require mutual cooperation with the concerned states of the region.¹⁷⁸ Adnan Menderes, the Prime Minister of Turkey, hailed Britain's joining the pact as a great event which would fill the political vacuum and restore peace, confidence, and stability in the Middle East.¹⁷⁹

Comparison of the British Evacuation Agreement with Egypt and the Special Agreement with Iraq clearly points up Egypt's relative independence from Britain in comparison to Iraq's dependence on British support.¹⁸⁰ This provided a basis for Egypt's characterization of the Special Agreement as a step backward in the independence movements of Arab countries - a step which erased Nasser's laborious effort to exclude, from the Evacuation Agreement, attack or threat of attack on Iran as a cause for the British to reactivate the Suez Canal base.¹⁸¹

Nasser charged that Iraq had violated its obligation under the Arab Collective Security Pact by concluding the Baghdad Pact, thereby causing the split among the Arab states. However, there were splits even before the pact.¹⁸² The irony is that Nasser and his supporters¹⁸³ who had previously denounced "the [Arab]

¹⁷⁷Ibid., pp.90, 121-22.

¹⁷⁸Eli Kedourie, "Pan Arabism and the British Policy", THE MIDDLE EAST IN TRANSITION : Studies in Contemporary History, ed. Walter Z. Laqueur, New York : Praeger, 1958. p.111.

¹⁷⁹al Dujayli, MITHAQ BAGHDAD, op.cit., p.9-10.

¹⁸⁰See Article 5 of the Baghdad Pact in Hurewitz, DIPLOMACY, II, op.cit., p.392. There is no comparable article in the Evacuation Treaty.

¹⁸¹According to Little, EGYPT, op.cit., pp.259, 262, Nasser tacitly approved the inclusion of Iran. Later, after the signing of the Baghdad Pact, Egypt accused Iraq of undoing Egypt's efforts. See Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., p.281. This provides evidence that Egypt's attacks on Iraq were a distortion of facts.

¹⁸²Sami Hakim, COVENANT OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND ARAB UNITY, 1st ed., Cairo : Maktabat al Anglo al Misriya, 1966, pp.84-86, 95-105. The right of a member state to conclude a treaty was reiterated in the latest debate on the Baghdad Pact in early 1955. See Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., p.238.

¹⁸³Fayez Sayegh (ed), THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, Boston : Boston Press, 1975, p.180.

Collective Security Pact under imperialism¹⁸⁴ had the nerve to condemn Iraq for allegedly violating it, foregoing her obligation under the Covenant of the Arab League, and not consulting its members.¹⁸⁵ In fact, the preamble of the Baghdad Pact emphasized adherence to and even endorsement of the Arab Collective Security Pact more emphatically than the Evacuation Agreement did. Indeed, the differences between Iraq and Egypt were not new at the creation of the Arab League.¹⁸⁶ The new element was that the Baghdad Pact created division along ideological rather than along dynastic lines¹⁸⁷ and was used to pit and instigate one Arab government against another¹⁸⁸ after they achieved a relative degree of independence from Great Britain. Egypt had not submitted the draft of the Evacuation Agreement to the Arab League, but expected its full support and endorsement for her claims more than Iraq or any other independent Arab country.¹⁸⁹ Supporters of the Baghdad Pact and opponents of Nasser attribute Egyptian criticism of the Pact to Nasser's personal egotism¹⁹⁰ and his jealousy of Nuri al Sa'id who "stole the limelight"¹⁹¹ from him by concluding the Pact, an act which Nasser considered a personal insult. Many attributed Nasser's attack to the fact that it was the "Baghdad Pact" and not the "Cairo Pact",¹⁹² an argument suggesting the traditional rivalry between the governments of Iraq¹⁹³ and Egypt

¹⁸⁴Quoted from El Barawy, *MILITARY COUP*, op.cit., p.209.

¹⁸⁵See Al Dujayli, *MITHAQ BAGHDAD*, op.cit., pp.149-50.

¹⁸⁶Tom R. Little, "The Arab League : A Reassessment", *THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL*, X, No.2, Spring, 1956, pp.140-41.

¹⁸⁷Fayez Sayegh, "Recent Trends Toward Arab Unity", *LANDS EAST*, II, No.3, April, 1958, pp.10-12; Al Dujayli, *MITHAQ BAGHDAD*, op.cit., p.49; J.C. Hurewitz, *MIDDLE EAST POLITICS : The Military Dimension*, New York : Praeger, 1969, p.461, acknowledges Western instigation.

¹⁸⁸St. John, *THE BOSS*, op.cit., p.190; Nasser, *MAJMU'AT KHUTAB*, Part I, p.120, April 19, 1954.

¹⁸⁹See Lacouture, *NASSER*, op.cit., p.209; Little, *EGYPT*, op.cit., pp.258-59.

¹⁹⁰Khalil, *THE ARAB STATES*, II, op.cit., p.264; St. John, *THE BOSS*, op.cit., p.190. But Little, *EGYPT*, op.cit., p.262, maintains a different view.

¹⁹¹Lord Birdwood, *NURI AS SA'ID : A STUDY IN ARAB LEADERSHIP*, London : Cassel, 1959, p.231. Tom R. Little, "Review of NURI AS SA'ID", *MIDDLE EAST FORUM*, XXXV, No.9, November, 1959, p.37, ridicules this interpretation.

¹⁹²Nasser, *SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS*, 1958, February, 26, 1958, p.50 denied such charges. A later statement of Nasser concerning the pact in which he said that "if the new organization...which comprises, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, is a defence organization and has no hostile policy towards the Arab countries, then the question of the pact will become a domestic matter for its signatories... substantiated these charges". Quoted from Nasser, *SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS*, April-June, 1960, p.162.

much more than a personality clash between their leaders.¹⁹⁴ Others charged that although Nasser showed very little interest in the affairs of the other Arab states, he would not tolerate any Arab state adopting a foreign policy which would not reconcile with Egypt's.¹⁹⁵ Egypt's sudden vituperative propaganda against the government of Iraq was considered meddling in the affairs of a sovereign Arab states,¹⁹⁶ which antagonized even those Iraqis who had never approved of Nuri al Sa'id's policy.¹⁹⁷ This led to charging Egypt with neo-imperialism among the Arab and African countries - a charge which became louder and more frequent as Nasser's rivals were overthrown or replaced by pro-Nasser sympathizers.¹⁹⁸ Still others charged that Nasser's attack against the Baghdad Pact was in part bad faith or a change in policy evidencing immaturity on the part of Nasser.¹⁹⁹ Nasser in turn accused Great Britain and to a lesser extent, the United States, of changing their amicable policy to one harmful to Egypt.²⁰⁰ Indeed, Nasser was adamant about not signing an evacuation treaty with Great Britain if it were conditioned upon entering a military pact with the West.²⁰¹ Nasser also suspected that Nuri al Sa'id secret contacts and subsequent agreements with Pakistan, Turkey, and the United States were aimed at undermining and isolating Egypt.²⁰² Persistent denials by Turkish and Iraqi leaders of any prospect of

¹⁹³Kamal Salibi, "Crusades, Mongols and Mamluks", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXVI, No.7, 1960, pp.31-34, 46-47; Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., p.268; and Peter Malcolm Holt, EGYPT AND THE FERTILE CRESCENT, 1516-1922 : A Political History, London : Longmans, 1966, pp.18-19, 300-01.

¹⁹⁴See Nasser's view of Nuri Al Sa'id in Little, EGYPT, op.cit., pp. 256-57; Al Dujayli, MITHAQ BAGHDAD, op.cit., p.50. Contrast with Nuri Al Sa'id's view of Nasser in Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., pp.256, 275.

¹⁹⁵Laqueur, NASSER'S EGYPT, op.cit., p.29; Nasser MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, pp.349, 382, 460.

¹⁹⁶Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., p.279; al Dujayli, MITHAQ BAGHDAD, op.cit., pp.149-50.

¹⁹⁷Little, EGYPT, op.cit., p.263.

¹⁹⁸Das, MODERN REVIEW, CII, No. 5, Laqueur, NASSER'S EGYPT, op.cit., p.27.

¹⁹⁹Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, pp.459, 460, 656. See accusation and Eden's claims of Nasser's bad faith in Wheelock, NASSER'S NEW EGYPT, op.cit., p.235.

²⁰⁰Miles Copeland, THE GAME OF NATIONS, op.cit., pp.76-77.

²⁰¹Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, pp.120, 460; Nasser, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, XXXVII, September 3, 1954, p.27; Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., pp.236-37; Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958, pp.250-51, July 27, 1958; Gamal Abdel Nasser, "Where I Stand and Why", LIFE, XLVII, No.3, July 20, 1959, p.97; Little, EGYPT, op.cit., pp.261-62; Lacouture, NASSER, op.cit., p.210.

²⁰²Little, EGYPT, op.cit., pp.259-60. First, the concluding of the agreement of

Iraq's joining the Pakistani-Turkish Pact allayed Nasser's suspicion of Nuri al Sa'id.²⁰³ Furthermore, the assurance of the Iraqi Ambassador Musa al Shabandar²⁰⁴ that nothing would lead to the establishment of a Western military pact without Iraq's consulting the members of the Arab Collective Security Pact²⁰⁵ assured Egypt her future plans for and role in the security pact were intact.

The announcement of establishment of the Baghdad Pact shortly after these assurances infuriated Nasser, for it presented him with a diplomatic *FAIT ACCOMPLI*. In the presence of the pact initiated by Turkey, Egypt either would have to join the Baghdad Pact on more or less equal footing with Iraq instead of enjoying hegemony as she did in the Arab League or, even worse, would have to face isolation.²⁰⁶ Inherent in the controversy was the conflict between Nasser's desire and Western interest. Nasser's intention of establishing, organizing, and strengthening an Arab collective defence system, which would probably include Turkey, and of seeking Western arms and support without signing a defence treaty with the West was considered unacceptable.²⁰⁷ Nasser claimed not to feel it necessary to "sit down and write a confession that we are on the side of the West".²⁰⁸ This provoked Fadil al Jamali, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Prime Minister, to ridicule Nasser saying, "The West will not supply

Friendly Cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey on April 2, 1954 (Text in Hurewitz, *DIPLOMACY*, II, op.cit., pp.345-6; second, the concluding by Iraq of a Military Assistance Agreement with the United States on April 21, 1954 (text in *ibid.*, pp.346-8); and later the announcement of the initiation of a pact of Turkish Iraqi cooperation justified Nasser's suspicion.

²⁰³Little, *EGYPT*, op.cit., pp.260-61. Nasser was sure Iraq would not join the Pakistani-Turkish Pact and received assurance from Fadil al Jamali, Prime Minister of Iraq. See Nasser, *MAJMU'AT KHUTAB*, Part I, p.120, for statement by Nasser on April 19, 1954.

²⁰⁴See Little, *EGYPT*, op.cit., p.260, and Khalil, *THE ARAB STATES*, II, op.cit., p.272, for the Iraqi version of these assurances. Contrast with the Egyptian version in Khalil, *THE ARAB STATES*, II, op.cit., pp.283-84.

²⁰⁵Khalil, *THE ARAB STATES*, op.cit., II, p.284. See also Little, *EGYPT*, op.cit., p.59.

²⁰⁶See Nasser, *SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS*, April-June, 1960, p.162 (April 24, 1960); Little, *EGYPT*, pp.262-63; St. John, *THE BOSS*, op.cit., pp.189-90.

²⁰⁷Nasser, *U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT*, XXXVII, September 3, 1954, p.30; Khalil, *THE ARAB STATES*, op.cit., II, pp.282, 284; Nasser, *MAJMU'AT KHUTAB*, Part I, pp.458-59.

²⁰⁸Nasser, *U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT*, XXXVII, September, 3, 1954, p.32.

these arms for the sake of your black coloured eyes, but only if you come to an understanding with it".²⁰⁹ Nasser's plan was unpalatable and even unthinkable to the West, not only because Western interests - especially concerning Israel - would conflict with those of Egypt and other Arab countries, but also because the Western powers never felt that Egypt had the ability to defend the Canal Zone, let alone to help other Arab countries.²¹⁰ Ultimately there was a conflict of interests between an Arab collective defence system and a Western defence system for the Middle East. The Arab bloc itself pursued contradictory objectives. The foreign ministers of the Arab League stated in December 1954, they would not allow or approve any alliance "concluded outside the Collective Security Pact". At the same time, they sought "co-operation with the West on the basis of solving Arab problems justly, and strengthening the Arabs by supplying them with arms".²¹¹ Nasser was hoping to gain time to implement some of his social reform programme with long awaited Western aid.²¹² In order to consolidate his regime and, in the meantime, to patch the rift with some Arab countries²¹³ and restore any Middle Eastern defence system. The West was hoping that Egypt and other Arab countries would realize the Communist danger and drop their objections to the Baghdad Pact.²¹⁴ Others would maintain that Nasser was dissatisfied with the slowness, quantity, and type of Western aid he was receiving and with its ineffectiveness in pacifying the Egyptians. Realizing the difficulty of achieving peace and prosperity in Egypt and the skepticism which greeted his newly adopted pro Western policy, Nasser found it much easier to appeal to the emotions of the

²⁰⁹Quoted from Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, op.cit., II, p.233. See the interpretation of reasonableness in achieving national interest in Hourani, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, IX, No.3, pp.254-55.

²¹⁰For a change of British attitude, see Lacouture, EGYPT IN TRANSITION, pp.204-05. According to Little, EGYPT, op.cit., p.243, "Colonel Nasser... said that Egypt was ready to maintain the base and, as the Egyptian army was incapable of doing so, would accept British technicians if Britain did not intend a veiled 'occupation". Nasser admitted his weakness in his MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, pp.208-9. For the material values of the Suez base, see Fabumni, op.cit., pp.141-42.

²¹¹Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., p.285.

²¹²Lacouture, EGYPT IN TRANSITION, op.cit., pp. 208, 210; Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., pp.263, 284. See Nasser's criticism of Point Four in Nasser, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, XXXVII, September 3, 1954, p.29.

²¹³Little, EGYPT, op.cit., p.262; Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.177; St. John, THE BOSS, op.cit., pp.186-187.

²¹⁴Little, EGYPT, op.cit., p.262.

Egyptians and other Arabs²¹⁵ and direct their wrath against the unpopular al Sa'id and his Baghdad Pact despite the risk of antagonizing the West. On the other hand, Nasser and other opponents of the Baghdad Pact did not believe in the inevitability of an all-out nuclear war between Communist and non-Communist countries.²¹⁶ Instead Nasser believed that the fear of mutual annihilation would be a strong deterrent against a third world war. If war were to erupt, by refusing the West the use of their soil for military bases the Arabs hoped to remain neutral.²¹⁷ Further, the Arabs felt that the cold war was a struggle for world domination,²¹⁸ and they lost confidence in both sides after the loss of Palestine.²¹⁹ Further, the meager capital resources of the Arab countries were badly needed for social and economic development and were not adequate for expensive modern weaponry. Above all, to newly independent nations such as Egypt and the other Arab countries the policy of non alignment and neutrality became synonymous with sovereignty and resistance to alliance, especially with former masters.²²⁰ What Egypt wanted 'was not a pax britannica, americana, or sovietica, but just peace".²²¹

Besides divisions in the Arab world,²²² the Baghdad Pact suffered a more serious

²¹⁵Tom R. Little, "Nasser and the Cold War Strategy", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV, No.4 (April, 1959), pp.23-24; Nasser, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, XXXVII, September 3, 1954, pp.28-29. See the differences in Nasser's approach to Egypt's economic problems in Charles Issawi, EGYPT IN REVOLUTION : Economic Analysis, London : Oxford University Press, 1963, pp.53-55; Walter Z. Laqueur, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST, London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959, p.215; Wheelock, NASSER'S NEW EGYPT, op.cit., pp.222-23.

²¹⁶Nasser, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, XXXVII, September 3, 1954, pp.31-32. See also Wheelock, NASSER'S NEW EGYPT, op.cit., p.236.

²¹⁷Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958, p.234, July 22, 1958; See George Hanna, PACTS OR TRAPS, (in Arabic), al Harithiyat, No.6, Beirut : Dar al 'ilm lil Malayyin, 1955, pp.65-66.

²¹⁸Nasser, *ibid.*, 1958, p.49.

²¹⁹*ibid.*, p.49.

²²⁰Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958, p.208, June 21, 1958; Charles P. Schleicher, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS : Cooperation and Conflict, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962, pp.296-98.

²²¹Schleicher, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, op.cit., p.299.

²²²L.S. Amery, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTIONS, 2nd ed. London : Oxford University Press, 1953, p.157, stipulates this factor as a prerequisite of an alliance. In contrast, Schleicher, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, op.cit., pp.307-08, emphasizes the subjective or national interest more than common background in the formulation of an alliance.

weakness from subjective or human relations.²²³ One fundamental prerequisite of military alliances is that the enemy be clear and known and that his potential threat be real to all members.²²⁴ In the case of the Baghdad Pact, the Iraqis in particular and the Arabs in general had never experienced Russian occupation; there were no Russian bases, troops, or economic concessions in the Middle East; until recently there were not even diplomatic relations between Russia and other Arab countries.²²⁵ Arabs were concerned with Western colonialism, concessions, military bases, and recently and more seriously, with Zionism and Israel.²²⁶

Nevertheless, even radical Arab nationalists stated that "if the Arabs were free today from colonialism, foreign occupation, Zionist threat and dismemberment and had to take a stand in global struggle, a stand which would be closest to their ideals and national interest, they would take the side of the Western democracies rather than most of the Eastern dictatorships."²²⁷ Why? Apart from the atheist overtones of Marxism-Leninism, it was widely remembered by the Arabs that the Soviet Union recognized and approved the partition plan for Palestine, supported Israel with arms at her inception, endorsed her admission to the United Nations, and gave her diplomatic and moral support.²²⁸

Therefore, Nuri al Sa'id's attempt to warn his fellow Iraqis of the gravity of the remote but potential danger of Russia and Communism and to minimize or ignore the existence of British troops on Iraqi soil was doomed to failure.²²⁹ His

²²³Inis Claude, *SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES : The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, 2nd ed., New York : Random House, 1959.

²²⁴Hans Kelsen, "Collective Security and Collective Self Defense under the Charter of the United Nations", *THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW*, XLII, No.4, October, 1948, pp.183-84; Schleicher, *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*, op.cit., pp.313, 315.

²²⁵On the other hand, there are the inductive factors for the spread of communism stated in Bernard Lewis, "The Middle East Reaction to Soviet Pressures", *THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL*, X, No.2, Spring, 1956, pp.129, 132-3.

²²⁶Nasser, *MAJMU'AT KHUTAB*, Part I, p.289.

²²⁷Quoted from George J. Tomeh, "Syria and Neutralism", *THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM*, edited by Fayez A. Sayegh, op.cit., p.124.

²²⁸Alfred M. Lilienthal, *WHAT PRICE ISRAEL*, Chicago : Henry Regnery, 1953, pp.148, 158, 222-23.

²²⁹Al Dujayli, *MITHAQ BAGHDAD*, op.cit., p.152.

premises for siding with the West were that he could drive a wedge between the West and Israel, force the latter toward the East, and thereby drain or weaken Israel's real strength.²³⁰ His over-emphasis of the Russian danger rather than that of Zionism was contradictory to his past stands. During the Second World War Nuri al Sa'id regarded "the Palestine question as the root of all the evils which disturbed and weakened Anglo-Iraqi relations. Any improvement in this respect will tend to improve and strengthen these relations".²³¹ In a quarrel between the West and Communist Russia, Nuri al Sa'id expressed the same sourness about the Zionists: "Israel is the clear and present danger, Communism secondary".²³² Secretary of State Dulles also unequivocally stated that the Arabs "are more fearful of Zionism than of Communism, and they fear most the United States become the backer of expansionist Zionism".²³³ The most outrageous stand of the Western powers was their persistent pressure on the Arab countries to join a military pact against Russia with whom the Arab countries had no direct involvement and the refusal of the West, especially the United States, to be even neutral in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Instead the West gave generously and without conditions full military, financial, and moral support to Israel, some of whose settlers from Russia and Eastern Europe were inclined toward Communist ideas and institutions.²³⁴ It is this Arab resentment against joining any Western defence pact much more than the soundness of Nasser's views, the cleverness of his approach, or the righteousness of his claim that explains his success and the rise of his popularity.

Thus, in general, the Baghdad Pact was hailed by its members and in the West as an act of statesmanship and a bold daring step by Nuri al Sa'id. However, it was

²³⁰Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., p.273. See also al Dujayli, MITHAQ BAGHDAD, op.cit., pp.29, 53, 60-61, 63, 76, 83. Indeed, any rapprochement of the Arabs with the West invokes Zionist worries and fears more than the arms the Arabs obtain do.

²³¹Quoted from Majid Khadduri, INDEPENDENT IRAQ : A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1932, London : Oxford University Press, 1951, p.170.

²³²Quoted from Nuri al Sa'id, "Martyred Iraqi Premier Leaves a Last Testament", LIFE, XLV, No.4, July 28, 1958, p.26.

²³³Hurewitz, DIPLOMACY, II, op.cit., p.341.

²³⁴For a rigorous, myth shattering account on the origins of the 'special relationship' of the West's support for Israel see, Noam Chomsky, THE FATEFUL TRIANGLE : The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians, U.S.A. : South End Press, 1983.

received with coolness by Israel,²³⁵ with resentment and scepticism by neutralist India, with antagonism by the Communist bloc²³⁶ who called it an imperialist plan, and with furious opposition by Nasser and Arab nationalists. The fact that no other Arab country other than Iraq joined the pact and the strong opposition of the Arabs to the pact further explains Arab reaction to Nasser's foreign policy in the next two years. Conclusion of the Baghdad pact diverted the wrath of the Arab nationalists from Nasser to the already unpopular Nuri al Sa'id.²³⁷ More importantly, Nasser's opposition to military pacts brought him, after a turbulent, bloody month, in line with the mainstream of Egyptian thinking. Thus he diffused the opposition and temporarily consolidated his regime. The results of his opposition to the Baghdad Pact demonstrated Nasser's power and influence, in the negative sense, by preventing other Arab countries from joining the pact. Opposition to the pact overshadowed all of Nasser's activities and directed "all of Egypt's efforts toward the Arab countries and the opposition against the membership of any Arab country in any regional organization that does not emanate from the Arab countries".²³⁸ Nasser did not confine himself to mere objection. As a counterattack against the Baghdad Pact he vitalized the Arab Collective Security Pact by establishing the Mutual Defence Pact between Egypt and Syria on October 20, 1955,²³⁹ followed a similar pact with Saudi Arabia on October 27, 1955,²⁴⁰ a pact with the Hashemite Jordan on March 8-17, 1956,²⁴¹ and even with Yemen on April 21, 1956.²⁴² These pacts created the Joint Arab command, thereby virtually isolating the Pro Western Iraqi government from the rest of the Arab countries.²⁴³ As a result, Nasser

²³⁵The linking and equalizing of Israel's opposition to the Baghdad Pact with Nasser's criticism of the Pact were ridiculed in the House of Commons. See al Dujayli, MITHAQ BAGHDAD, op.cit., p.63.

²³⁶Hurewitz, DIPLOMACY, II, op.cit., p.415.

²³⁷Albert Hourani, "The Decline of the West in the Middle East, II", INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, XXIX, April, 1953, p.168, Lacouture, EGYPT IN TRANSITION, op.cit., p.221; Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT, op.cit., p.108.

²³⁸Translated from Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.460.

²³⁹See Text in the MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, X, No.1, Winter 1956, pp.77-79.

²⁴⁰See Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., pp.242-45.

²⁴¹See Ibid., pp.287-89.

²⁴²See Ibid., pp.250-3.

²⁴³See Little, EGYPT, op.cit., p.263.

restored and enhanced Egypt's leadership, revived her interest in strengthening the Arab League and the Collective Security Pact, and looked to the adoption of Arab nationalism for Egypt.²⁴⁴

The Baghdad Pact shaped the divisions among and within Arab countries along the lines of foreign policy rather than along the dynastic lines of the past: "For the Baghdad Pact was the starting point of the great struggle between the advocates of complete independence...and the agents of imperialism, who work...in order to turn the whole Arab world into a part of the British sphere of influence".²⁴⁵ After the Evacuation Agreement Nasser began moving toward rapprochement with the West. Conclusion of the Baghdad Pact, as Nasser put it, "made useless the greatest opportunity which the concluding of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of October, 1954, provided",²⁴⁶ for the Baghdad Pact marked the "end of the semi truce"²⁴⁷ and the beginning of Nasser's rift with the West. "From the Baghdad Pact onwards, British policy consisted of a series of defeats or retreats culminating in the futile invasion of Egypt at the end of 1956".²⁴⁸ Nasser complained that the British government did not stop with the Baghdad Pact, but continued political and economic pressure against other Arab countries to join it. Hence, Nasser was reacting to British pressure.²⁴⁹ The results were "a series of external political events which led, by a complex process of reaction and interaction, to the most unforeseen results".²⁵⁰ The Egyptian government claimed that all "the events which befell the Arabs in 1955 and 1956 were only

²⁴⁴See Gamal Abdel Nasser, "Interview with Premier Nasser: After Suez, a Powerful Arab World?" interviewed by Sam Sauki, NEWSWEEK, XLIV, July 26, 1954, p.38. Nasser began to steer toward wooing Arab peoples and governments. See Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, I, p.141, November 29, 1953.

²⁴⁵Khalili, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., p.279.

²⁴⁶Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, I, p.460, March 26, 1956.

²⁴⁷Ibid., p.460.

²⁴⁸Little, EGYPT, op.cit., p.261.

²⁴⁹Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.459. Contrast with the British claim that they did everything to appease Nasser. See Wheelock, NASSER'S NEW EGYPT, op.cit., p.235. See also Mohammed Heikal, NASSER : The Cairo Documents, U.S.A : Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1972, where Nasser is reported to have said "I do not act. I react". p.54. Witness the CIA attempt to bribe Nasser with \$3 million in Heikal, also Copeland, THE GAME OF NATIONS, op.cit., p.112.

²⁵⁰Issawi, EGYPT IN REVOLUTION, op.cit., p.55.

the outcome of the signing of the Baghdad Pact".²⁵¹ Among these events was the Israeli attack of the Gaza Strip on February 28, 1955.

3.9 NASSER, ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINE QUESTION²⁵²

The gravity of the February 1955 attack was not in the military engagements, the type of weapons used, the number of armed forces engaged, or the number of casualties, and certainly not in the amount of territory exchanged. Its significance was not even in the immediate reaction: rather it was in its impact on the formulation of Nasser's future policies and on his priorities. However, to be able to appreciate the significance of these policies and their implications, together with the reasons why Nasser and the Arabs adopted such policies, the historical setting deserves to be mentioned.

Although Palestine was an Arab Muslim country, the establishment of a national home for the Jews there was essentially a problem first for Syria and then for Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Egyptians, least involved in the Palestine problem,²⁵³ were less antagonistic than other Arabs to the Zionist movement.²⁵⁴ Their attitude may be explained partly by the active role of some Egyptian Jews in Egypt's national movement and partly by the preoccupation of the Egyptians with independence.²⁵⁵ However, Egypt gradually began to realize the impact of

²⁵¹Khalil, THE ARAB STATES,II, op.cit., p.279.

²⁵²The problem for the researcher when dealing with the Arab-Israeli-Palestine conflict is to avoid using terminology that may be considered to be unwittingly endorsing the status quo. But, rather to question the relevance of the use of semantics. For an elaboration on this point, see L. Hamalian, "The Middle East : The Semantics of the Palestine Question", ISSUES, IX, No.3, Autumn, 1965, pp.24-33.

²⁵³See Zaghlul's statement in Georgiana G. Stevens, ed., THE UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964, p.15.

²⁵⁴Don Peretz, "Report on the U.A.R - Israeli Relations", MIDDLE EAST REPORT 1959: NATIONALISM, NEUTRALISM, COMMUNISM : The Struggle for Power, Ed. William Sands Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1959, p.34. Elmer Berger, WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SO!, New York : American Council for Judaism, 1955, pp.12, 14. John Marlowe, FOUR ASPECTS OF EGYPT, London :Allen & Unwin, 1966, pp.330, 338.

²⁵⁵Jacob M. Landau, "Abu Naddarah : An Egyptian Jewish Nationalist", JOURNAL OF JEWISH STUDIES, III, No.1, 1952, pp.30-1, 37, 42-3. Landau refers to some anti-Jewish incidents, but in general the feeling discerned was anti-European and anti-Christian.

Palestine primarily because of religious sentiment, but also partly because of commercial, geographical, strategical and, consequently, political factors, and because a national home for the Jews was considered a spearhead for world Jewry and Western imperialism. Furthermore, during World War II and after the establishment of the League of Arab States, Egypt gradually became interested in and identified with the problems of other Arab countries, especially the Palestine problem. Section 5 of the Alexandria Protocol of October 7, 1944, later Annex B of the Charter of the League of Arab States, and the granting of permission for a Palestinian representative to attend the Arab League meetings signified the importance of Palestine to the Arab states.²⁵⁶ The situation in Palestine deteriorated after the Second World War, and the British - feeling unable to continue or, more likely, simply yielding to Zionist and American pressure²⁵⁷ - relinquished their mandate and referred the case to the United Nations. Pressure on member states by private Zionist groups wrested a resolution from the United Nations recommending the partition of Palestine into two states - one Arab and the other Jewish.²⁵⁸ This partition resulted in a chaotic state of war.²⁵⁹ The United States government, the chief sponsor of the November 1947 Partition Plan, realized its implementation would result in further bloodshed and turmoil. Accordingly, on May 14, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution which:

Taking account of the present situation in regard to Palestine,...

1. Empowers a United Nations Mediator in Palestine...to exercise the following functions...

(iii) Promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine...

Relieves the Palestine Commission from the further exercise of responsibilities under resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁶See Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., pp.55, 61, respectively, for the provisions.

²⁵⁷See Regina Sharif, NON JEWISH ZIONISM : Its Roots In Western History, London : The Zed Press, 1985.

²⁵⁸Lillenthal, WHAT PRICE ISRAEL, op.cit., pp.48-80.

²⁵⁹Hurewitz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, op.cit., p.457.

²⁶⁰U.N. Document a/565, General Assembly : Official Records : Third Session: Supplement No.1, Lake Success, 1948, pp.5-6, 8-9. Quoted from Hurewitz,

Contrary to what in the West is generally called Israel's "War of Independence or Liberation" against intervention by Arab states, most of the Palestinian populated major cities and coastal land reserved by the Partition Plan for the would-be Arab state were occupied by Zionist forces prior to the entry of the Arab states into Palestine on May 15, 1948. This was affirmed by Ben Gurion who later testified that "until the British left, no Jewish settlement, however remote, was entered or seized by the Arabs, while the Haganah...captured many Arab positions and liberated Tiberias and Haifa, Jaffa and Safed."²⁶¹ Thus, despite support from other Arab countries, the Palestinian armed forces proved defenceless against the well-trained Zionist forces:

There were...eighty thousand Palestinian Jewish men...Such overwhelming force could not be marshalled by the Palestinian Arabs, probably not even together with the Arabs of the adjoining countries.²⁶²

Also, apparently a quarter of a million Palestinian Arabs either fled, were deliberately expelled according to Plan Dalet, or were terrified (witness the whispering campaigns) and left their homes and property.²⁶³ "In the face of these brutal crimes against humanity in a contiguous country and against humanity in a contiguous country and against the Arabs of Palestine who are strongly bound by many ties to the people of neighbouring Arab States", the Egyptian government could not remain indifferent.²⁶⁴ Thus Egypt and other members of the League of Arab States felt obligated to take collective action to defend a sister Arab country which lies between the Arab East and Arab West and which has special historical and religious significance²⁶⁵ to the Arabs and

DIPLOMACY, II, op.cit., p.460.

²⁶¹David Ben Gurion, REBIRTH AND DESTINY OF ISRAEL, New York : Philosophical Library, 1954, p.530. See also Hurewitz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, II, op.cit., p.457.

²⁶²Quoted from Salo W. Baron, "Prospects of Peace in Palestine", THE NEAR EAST : Problems and Prospects, Ed. Philip W. Ireland. Lectures on the Harris Foundation, 1942, Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1942, p.121.

²⁶³Walid Khalidi, "Plan Dalet : Master Plan", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXVII, No.9, November, 1961, pp.23-28.

²⁶⁴Quoted from EGYPT AND THE U.N., in Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., p.56.

²⁶⁵Ibid., II, p.558.

Muslims –second only to Mecca and Medina. Such action is politically expedient. The right to such collective action is guaranteed under the Charter of the United Nations.²⁶⁶ In addition, Palestine is especially important to Egypt geopolitically and historically as her only land linkage with the countries of the Arab East. The importance and linkage of Palestine to Egypt from historic times was echoed by Nasser's "clear awareness that Rafah was not the real outer boundary of our country, and that our own security required the defence of the boundaries of the sister Arab states among whom we were placed by fate".²⁶⁷ For he "was certain that what was happening in Palestine could happen in any of the Arab states".²⁶⁸

In addition, Egypt felt that the establishment of a modern progressive Western state on her border would physically separate her from the rest of the Arabs and also present a potentially serious threat to her developing industry and commerce in that region.²⁶⁹ In addition Egypt had her own immediate objectives for entering Palestine.²⁷⁰ The outcome of the Arab expedition in the Palestine War was disastrous. The Arabs failed to wrest from the Zionists the lands retained for them in the Partition Plan already occupied by the latter. Instead the Israelis seized more of the land that had been allotted to the Arabs, a development which resulted in an even larger number of Arabs being made homeless. The entry of Arab armies into Palestine made the Arabs appear to be the aggressors.²⁷¹

²⁶⁶ *ibid.*, II, p.560.

²⁶⁷ Quoted from Nasser, *EGYPT'S LIBERATION*, *op.cit.*, p.94. Nasser was further convinced when a state of mourning was announced in the Israeli Knesset during withdrawal of Israeli troops in 1957. See Nasser, *SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS*, January-March, 1960, pp.118-19, March 7, 1960.

²⁶⁸ Quoted from Nasser, *EGYPT'S LIBERATION*, *op.cit.*, pp.97-98. Nasser's worries and fears became reality when hundreds of thousands of Egyptians, Syrians, and Jordanians were expelled or evacuated as a result and consequence of Israeli occupation after the June 1967 War. See *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, February 13, 1970, p.34.

²⁶⁹ Charles D. Cremeans, *THE ARABS AND THE WORLD : Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy*, New York : Praeger, 1963, p.94. Eliahu Sassoon in Guela Cohen (Moderator), "How to Speak to the Arabs : A Maariv Round Table", *THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL*, XVIII, No. 2, Spring, 1964, p.148; Marlowe, *FOUR ASPECTS OF EGYPT*, *op.cit.*, p.327.

²⁷⁰ Marlowe, *FOUR ASPECTS OF EGYPT*, *op.cit.*, p.237. The direct objective of Egypt in the entry into Palestine was to prevent Prince Abdullah of Transjordan from annexing the part of Palestine assigned to the Arabs to his domain. Martial law was declared by Egypt not to protect or secure the army but to quiet opposition and divert the attention of the people from their plight. See El Barawy, *MILITARY COUP*, *op.cit.*, pp.160-61.

²⁷¹ Naguib, *EGYPT'S DESTINY*, *op.cit.*, p.17. Cecil Hourani, "The Moment of Truth :

Thereby, the Israelis won both militarily and diplomatically.²⁷²

The Arab states were quick to blame their defeat²⁷³ on the interference of the United Nations; the economic, political, and military pressure of all the major powers – East and West – against them,²⁷⁴ and the major powers' unqualified support of the Zionists. The statement of Abdul Rahman Azzam (nicknamed Abu al Kalam, 'talkative') of the League of Arab States that if the Arabs "had not accepted the armistice of June 1948, they would never have been defeated in Palestine",²⁷⁵ is a typical excuse of the Arab governments in covering up their weaknesses instead of learning their real causes.²⁷⁶ The Arab officers who fought in Palestine added to the list of causes: corruption, Arab diplomacy, lack of preparation and modern weapons, inefficiency of the Arab armies, lack of coordination and of a unified Arab command,²⁷⁷ and in some cases, the treason of some Arab governments, especially the Egyptian *ancien regime's* defective arms scandal.²⁷⁸ The truth was "in the face of the enemy the Arabs were not a state, but petty states, groups, not a nation; each fearing and anxiously watching the other and intriguing against it".²⁷⁹ Consequently, the Arabs accepted the second truce of July 18, 1948 in compliance with the Security Council Resolution and sought other means to handle the Palestine problem. Although Egypt was the last

Towards a Middle East Dialogue", THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER : A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict, ed. Walter Z. Laqueur, New York : Bantam Books, 1969, p.246.

²⁷²John H. Davis, THE EVASIVE PEACE : A Study of the Zionist/Arab Problem, London : John Murray, 1968.

²⁷³Nasser, THE PHILOSOPHY, op.cit., pp.98-99, rightly refers to Arab self-deception in never admitting publicly and solemnly that their failure was in leadership and self description.

²⁷⁴Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., pp.18-19; El Sadat, REVOLT ON THE NILE, op.cit., p.91; Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1950, p.584, October 9, 1959. Marlowe, FOUR ASPECTS OF EGYPT, op.cit., p.329, contends that the time of the first truce the Arabs had proven incapable of defeating the Zionists.

²⁷⁵In EGYPT AND THE U.N., quoted from Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., p.57.

²⁷⁶Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958, p.72, March 2, 1958.

²⁷⁷ibid., p.72.

²⁷⁸For details on this, refer to Copeland, THE GAME OF NATIONS, op.cit., pp.34-67; El Sadat, REVOLT ON THE NILE, p.42; Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit., pp.55-60. Hoflander, FACT ON FILE PUBLICATION, Vol.I, p.45.

²⁷⁹Quoted from Musa al Alami, "The Lesson of Palestine", THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, III, No.4, October, 1949, p.385.

Arab country to be involved in the Palestine War and was the least enthusiastic, at the end of the war she found herself the only country fighting Israel. Desertion by the others outraged all major factions in Egypt and drove a wedge between Egypt and the other Arab governments.²⁸⁰

Israel's main purpose in concentrating on Egypt in 1948 was that "without Egypt, no other Arab state will talk".²⁸¹ Hence, the Israeli attack of late 1948 and early 1949 against Egypt forced her to conclude the Armistice Agreement of February 24, 1949, with Israel which resulted in the backing down of the other Arab countries. Thus Israel's attack against Egypt achieved the Israeli objectives in bringing Egypt to the peace table in February 1949.

The main objectives of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel as stated in Article I were "promoting the return to permanent peace in Palestine and...mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the Parties". Peace between the parties was to be based on the conditions of Articles II (2):

No element of the land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either Party, including non regular forces shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other Party...or shall advance beyond or pass over any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Line.

and Article IV (3):

It is emphasized that it is not the purpose of this agreement to establish, to recognize, to strengthen, or to weaken or nullify, in any way, any territorial, custodial, or other rights, claims or interests which

²⁸⁰Nasser tried to play down Egyptian disinterestedness in Palestine by attributing it to "a campaign of conspiracies and intrigues [that] was waged [by some Egyptians] saying that the Arabs and those who joined the Arabs were the source of defeat and conspiracy." Quoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1959, p.256, July 23, 1959. See also Marlowe, FOUR ASPECTS OF EGYPT, op.cit., pp.330-31, 338, 351, and AL AHRAM, Cairo, Daily Issues, 1948-1949.

²⁸¹Quoted from Ben Gurion in THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 18, 1967, p.16. This statement is also reproduced in I.F. STONE'S WEEKLY, Washington, D.C., XV, No.23, July 3, 1967, p.1.

may be asserted by either Party in the area of Palestine or any part or locality thereof covered by the Agreement.²⁸²

The same principles and provisions were restated in Article II of the Israeli-Lebanese Agreement of March 23, 1949,²⁸³ in Articles III (3) and IV of the Israeli-Jordanian Agreement of April 3, 1949,²⁸⁴ and in the Article II of the Israeli-Syrian Agreement of July 20, 1949.²⁸⁵

In defiance of the unequivocal prohibitions against any military move or gains under the armistice agreements the Israelis occupied the Gulf and Port of Eliaf in March 1949,²⁸⁶ thereby completely separating Egypt from the rest of the Arab countries and adding a serious source of contention²⁸⁷ between Israel and Egypt. Israeli occupation of Eliaf further complicated the already existing Egyptian blockade of ships and goods destined for Israel through the Suez Canal by extending the blockade to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran on the grounds that Egypt was still technically in a state of war²⁸⁸ with Israel.²⁸⁹

²⁸²Quoted from the text as reproduced in Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., pp.585-86. The Israelis cling to Article I while the Arabs hold fast to Articles II (2) and IV (3).

²⁸³Ibid., p.596.

²⁸⁴Ibid., p.601.

²⁸⁵Ibid., p.608.

²⁸⁶See justification given in Moshe Dayan, "Israel's Border and Security Problems", FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XXXIII, No.2, January, 1955, p.253. See also Anthony S. Reyner, "The Strait of Tiran and the Sovereignty of the Sea", THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XXI, No.3, Summer, 1967, p.404, which states, "The Palestine Mandate had a corridor to the Gulf of Aqaba. In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly did not include this short coast in the Palestine 'partition plan', which the Arab states refused to accept".

²⁸⁷Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.220, September 13, 1954; Part I, p.658, June 14, 1957; Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT, op.cit., pp.130-31; Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., p.228. See also the vitality of Eliaf to Israeli trade and relations with African countries in Kamil Al Sharif, "The Challenge of Nigeria", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXVII, No.1, January, 1961, p.36; Abba Eban "The Outlook for Peace in the Middle East", PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, XXVI, No.3, May 1957, p.313. For Weizmann's visit to Truman concerning this issue, see Lilienthal, WHAT PRICE ISRAEL, op.cit., p.70.

²⁸⁸Israel clings to Articles I and IV of the Suez Canal Convention, the former of which reads in part:

"Article I: The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag." "The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of the blockade".

Quoted from text reproduced in Hurewitz, DIPLOMACY, I, op.cit., p.203.

On the other hand, Egypt holds fast to Article X, which modifies other articles by

Other immediate sources of friction and actual fighting between Egypt and Israel were the armistice line and the demilitarized zones. The nature and function of the Armistice Agreement of February 24, 1949, between Israel and Egypt are defined by Article V (2):

The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine Question.²⁹⁰

Land originally reserved by the United Nations Partition Plan for the indigenous Arab people of Palestine that had fallen under Israeli control was annexed to Israel; while any land originally allotted to Israel to which she had not yet extended her control in 1948-1949 was considered to belong to Israel. Thus, Israel persistently advanced in the demilitarized zone, subjected it to her jurisdiction, and expelled more Palestinian Arabs.²⁹¹ Israel, in the name of self-defence and security, expanded beyond the United Nations Partition Plan and the Armistice Agreements of 1949.²⁹²

stating 'provisions of Articles IV,V,VII shall not interfere with the measures which His Majesty the Sultan and his Highness the Khedive...might find it necessary to take for securing by their own forces the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order'. p.204.

²⁸⁹Maguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., pp.228-29, 232, argues that the embargo was temporary. Nasser justified the blockade because it involved national territorial waters. See Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.658. See also p.220; Nasser SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, January-March, 1960, pp.143-45, March 3, 1960; April-June, 1960, p.163 ,April 24, 1960.

²⁹⁰Quoted from Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., p.586.

²⁹¹THE NEW YORK TIMES, February, 26, 1960, pp.1, 3. See also the opposition of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) to Israel's abuse of authority in the demilitarized zone in E.H. Hutchinson, VIOLENT TRUCE : A Military Observer Looks at the Arab Israeli Conflict, 1951-55, New York : Devin Adair, 1956, p.111; Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD, op.cit., p.199; Fred J. Khoury, "The U.S. and the U.N. and the Jordan River Issue", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XL, No.4, May, 1964, p.21. Both Arabs and Israelis crossed the armistice lines to commit violence and aggression and were censured by the United Nations, but the scope, magnitude, planning and role of government were sharply different. See Fayez A. Sayegh, THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, Information Papers No.2, New York : The Arab Information Center, 1956, p.6 which refers to U.N. Document and Report S/3660 of 27 September, 1956, Part. 1. See also Hutchinson, VIOLENT TRUCE, op.cit., pp.90-92.

²⁹²Hutchinson, VIOLENT TRUCE, op.cit., pp.112-13. The maps on these pages illustrate the aggrandizement of Israel from 1947 to 1949.

The most tragic consequence of the establishment of Israel is the plight of the Palestinian refugees who were deliberately expelled according to Plan Dalet from their homes before, during, and after the Palestinian War of 1948.²⁹³ The General Assembly's resolution of December 11, 1948, in Article XI, which has been reiterated at almost every United Nations annual meeting, "resolved that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and the compensations should be paid for loss or damage to property".²⁹⁴ However, Israel in cooperation with the Zionist organizations, instead conducted an all out campaign abroad to perpetuate the misery of displaced Jews²⁹⁵ in some countries to pressure them to migrate to Israel.²⁹⁶ Even in democratic and prosperous countries where Jews have achieved political, social, and economic rights and privileges and are relatively satisfied, they have been subjected to moral pressure and religious defamation.²⁹⁷ Thereby Israel is making physically impossible the restoration of the Arabs to their homes on the grounds of endangering its own security. Article I of the Law of return of 1950, passed by the Knesset on July 5, 1950, declares: "Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh"... "Oleh" is interpreted...as "a Jew immigrating to Israel for settlement".²⁹⁸ Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister of Israel, defiantly stated that "Israel categorically rejects the insidious proposal of freedom of choice of the refugees", a declaration which aroused the fear of the Egyptians and other Arabs that some extra territory must be found for the refugees at their expense.²⁹⁹

²⁹³Don Peretz, "The Arab Refugees : A Changing Problem", FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XLI, No.3, April, 1963, p.564 points out to the plight of the unskilled Palestinian refugee worsened and that rehabilitation, repatriation, economic prosperity, or settlement of the refugees would not solve the problem, but it spreads resentment to Israel and has turned into a political and psychological problem of homelessness.

²⁹⁴Quoted from Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, op.cit., II, p.584.

²⁹⁵Lilienthal, WHAT PRICE ISRAEL, op.cit., pp.34, 36-7.

²⁹⁶Elmer Berger, WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SO!, op.cit., p.13, cited "the ruthless and cynical activities of Zionism which is willing to play with the destiny of 50,000 Jews (in Egypt) for a little money and in order to be able to take out a few hundred a year to Israel". See also pp.15, 109.

²⁹⁷"Ben Gurion...did not scruple to quote Jewish scripture...Every day spent abroad, he pointed out, violate the precept of the Talmud that says, "Whoever dwells outside the land of Israel is considered to have no God". TIME, January, 6, 1961, p.30. For reaction in the United States, see THE NEW YORK TIMES, December 30, 1960, p.4.

²⁹⁸Quoted in Fayez A. Sayegh, THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT, op.cit., p.49.

Another source of friction has been the Arab economic boycott of Israel which has probably been more irritating to the Israelis than the Arab military or diplomatic offensive. However, since the Israelis are not dependent on Arab markets and economies they can endure this boycott. All these problems derived from the original problem of Palestine and their solutions depend on a settlement of the general problem.

The United Nations Conciliation Commission was entrusted with the difficult task of settlement of the Palestine Question in its entirety in 1949.³⁰⁰ As a result of its work both Israel and the Arabs agreed to the Lausanne Protocol of May, 12, 1949, which reads in part:

The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, anxious to achieve as quickly as possible the objectives of the General Assembly's Resolution of December 11, 1948, regarding refugees, the respect of their rights and the preservation of their property, as well as territorial and other questions, has proposed to the Delegation of Israel and to the Delegations of the Arab States that the "Working Documents" attached hereto, be taken as basis for discussion with the Commission.³⁰¹

The resolution admitting Israel to the United Nations on May 11, 1949, stated in part:

Recalling its resolutions of 29 November 1947 and 11 December 1948 and taking note of the declarations and explanations made by the representative of the Government of Israel before the ad hoc Political Committee in respect to the implementation of the said resolutions,

The General Assembly...decides to admit Israel to membership in the United Nations.³⁰²

²⁹⁹Statement of Ben Gurion in the Knesset as quoted in Cremeans, *THE ARABS AND THE WORLD*, op.cit., p.203.

³⁰⁰Khalil, *THE ARAB STATES*, II, op.cit., pp.583-84.

³⁰¹Quoted from Ibid., II, p.607.

³⁰²The U.N. General Assembly Document 273/III, May 11, 1949, Quoted from Ibid., II, p.607.

Once admitted to the United Nations, Israel began to avoid implementation of the Lausanne Protocol,³⁰³ stipulated conditions that rendered impossible the convening of the Conciliation Commission,³⁰⁴ and insisted on direct negotiation with the Arabs without United Nations supervision. Finally, Israel ruled unilaterally that entry of the regular armies of the Arab states into Palestine on May 15, 1948, "made all the United Nations resolutions on Palestine null and void".³⁰⁵ Upon Israel's deliberate violation of the armistice agreements by occupying Eliat, in view of Israel's procrastination in implementing United Nations resolutions, and in fear that Israel might pressure Jordan to sign a peace treaty, the Arab League passed the following resolution on April 13, 1950:

No member State of the Arab League may negotiate or conclude a separate peace (treaty) or any (other) political, military or economic agreement with Israel. Any state which takes any such course shall be considered to have withdrawn from the Arab League forthwith in accordance with Article 18 of the Pact of the League.³⁰⁶

Before evaluating Nasser's policy toward Israel it is important to examine the elements of this most complicated conflict and its prospect. One will start with the establishment of Israel and the use of force.

The establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine was from the outset created by force. For:

No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners,

³⁰³Fayez A. Sayegh, THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT, op.cit., pp.41-42.

³⁰⁴Israeli criticism of the value of the United Nations Conciliation Commission to Israel is expressed by Eliahu Sassoon (the Israeli who did most of the negotiating) in Cohen, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XVIII, No.2, p.147. Contrast the suspicion of Egyptian Arabs in Elmer Berger, WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SO!, op.cit., pp.26-106, and Alfred M. Lillenthal, THERE GOES THE MIDDLE EAST, New York : Devin Adair, 1957, p.121, who maintains that Israel rejected United Nations supervision in their negotiation with the Arabs to have a free hand in dictating their conditions and to release herself from any obligations.

³⁰⁵Quoted from ISRAEL DIGEST, New York : Israel Office of Information, VI, No.46, November 10, 1955, pp.1-2 in Fayez A. Sayegh, THE RECORD OF ISRAEL AT THE UNITED NATIONS, Information Papers No.3., New York : Arab Information Center, 1957, p.123.

³⁰⁶Quoted in Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., p.167.

believed that the Zionist programme could be carried out except by force of arms...Decisions requiring armies to carry out are sometimes necessary, but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of serious injustice.³⁰⁷

From the outset, the King-Crane Commission warned against subjugation of the Palestinians emphasizing that:

To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure the land, would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted and of the people's rights.³⁰⁸

Since 1947 and more emphatically in the Alexandria Protocol of October 7, 1944, the Arabs warned in vain that "there can be no greater injustice and aggression than solving the problem of the Jews of Europe by another injustice, i.e. by inflicting injustice on the Arabs of Palestine".³⁰⁹ President Franklin D. Roosevelt who wanted peace between the Arabs and the Jews "in 1945 believed that a Jewish state could be established and maintained in Palestine only through military...[force]".³¹⁰ Likewise, the United States, the architect of the United Nations Partition Plan, realized the chaos that ensued in Palestine and the difficulty of implementing the plan without further bloodshed. Consequently, the United Nations resolved postponement of the implementation of the Partition Plan. Thus, Israel was brought into being by:

Not an agreed decision but force of arms and all that the United Nations was able to do afterwards was to take note of the fact and try to prevent any further change from being made by similar methods (by the Arabs).³¹¹

³⁰⁷Quoted from George Antonius, THE ARAB AWAKENING : The Story of the Arab National Movement, London : Hamish Hamilton, 1938, p.449.

³⁰⁸Quoted from Harry N. Howard, THE KING-CRANE COMMISSION, Beirut : Kyatas, 1963, p.350.

³⁰⁹Quoted from Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., p.55.

³¹⁰Quoted from United States Government papers made public for the first time in THE NEW YORK TIMES, May 19, 1961, p.27 in Lillenthal, WHAT PRICE ISRAEL, op.cit., pp.91-93 who criticizes Franklin D. Roosevelt and his sympathy with Zionism.

³¹¹Quoted from Thomas Edward Maurice McKitterick, FABIAN INTERNATIONAL ESSAYS, New York : Praeger, 1957, p.121, in Tomeh, THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, edited by

Even liberals and humanitarians unmasked their intentions by stating that "there is only one test of whether an ethnic community is indeed a nation. That test is war".³¹² For war:

...is manifested by the physical struggle of armies to occupy the same space each seeking to annihilate, disarm, or capture the other; by the political struggle of nations to achieve policies against the resistance of others; by the ideological struggle of peoples to preserve or extend ways of life and value systems; and by the legal struggle of states to acquire titles, to vindicate claims, to prevent violence, or to punish offences by recognized procedures or regulated violence.³¹³

As for the Israeli clamour concerning the Arab threats of throwing them into the sea, annihilating them, suffocating them by economic boycott, or isolating them internationally, or of the "Arab second round" or Nasser's "sacred march", "not one of these aims has been attained. None of them is even remotely in sight".³¹⁴

However, these threats of Arab belligerency played into the hands of the Israelis. Nasser belatedly admitted the harmfulness of his bombastic statements and said that while the Arabs were stating their position toward the Israelis, the latter actually attacked the Arabs.³¹⁵ In truth, "A conqueror", said Clausewitz, "is always a lover of peace, he would like to make his entry into [another] state unopposed".³¹⁶ A similar statement was echoed by Eban, "Peace in the Middle

Fayez A. Sayegh, op.cit., p.123.

³¹²Quoted from Richard H.S. Crossman, "Palestine Regained", ENCOUNTER, XIV, No.7, July, 1960, p.47. In Michael E. Fancher, "Commentary : Dr. Ralph Bunche, Mythical Knight in Jerusalem", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XLII, No.1, Winter, 1966, p.65.

³¹³Quoted from Quincy Wright, PROBLEMS OF STABILITY AND PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Berkeley and Los Angeles : University of California Press, 1954, p.149.

³¹⁴Quoted from Abba Eban, "Reality and Vision in the Middle East", FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XLIII, No.4, July, 1965, p.628.

³¹⁵With regard to Israeli fear of Arab threats, Nasser said, "I am sorry that only Israeli charges are remembered...And don't forget, when you speak of Israeli apprehensions, that they are the ones who launched attack on us in 1955, 1956 and 1967". Quoted from Gamal Abdel Nasser, "Nasser Talks" an exclusive interview by William Attwood, LOOK, March, 19, 1968, p.64, see also p.62. See also Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, pp.429-30, November 8, 1955, p.783, January 16, 1958; Gamal Abdel Nasser, "A Talk with President Nasser" an exclusive interview by Arnold de Borchgrave, NEWSWEEK, February, 10, 1969, pp.33-34.

East can only be produced by those who have the capacity to make war in the Middle East".³¹⁷ For "war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with an admixture of other means".³¹⁸ Likewise, "peace is a continuation of conflicts only by other means".³¹⁹ In reality, as confessed by Israeli statements, the Israeli capability³²⁰ to choose the time and place of any large operation and ability to wage the war have been demonstrated since 1947. From the outset in 1947 the Israelis understood their objectives and worked to achieve them:

In the period of transition, as it were, from war to peace, it is our business to put all our energy into our re-enforcement....Every year, every month, validates our positive achievements: our wider bounds, the advance of Jewish Jerusalem and its embodiment into the State...are far more convincing than any formal recommendation of the United Nations that is stillborn.³²¹

The Israelis achieved their objectives by *FAIT ACCOMPLI* in 1948, 1949, 1956, and 1967 and afterwards sought to maintain the status quo:³²²

First, that so long as a 'right of conquest', and its cousin a right a right by 'fait accompli', remain on the books they represent a failure of the hope of peace through justice, and constitute an open invitation to aggression and craft. Second, that so far as the Middle East is concerned, any appeal to fait accompli is an

³¹⁶Quoted in Norman L. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, *THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS*, London : MacMillan, 1962, p.455.

³¹⁷Statement by Abba Eban quoted in *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, June 26, 1968, p.4.

³¹⁸Quoted from Karl Von Clausewitz, *WAR, POLITICS, AND POWER : Selections from ON WAR, AND I BELIEVE AND PROFESS*, Trans. & ed. by Edward M. Collins, Chicago : Henry Regnery, 1962, p.255.

³¹⁹Soviet Marshall Shaposhnikov quoted in Padelford and Lincoln, *THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS*, op.cit. p.25.

³²⁰According to Pinhas Rosen, Israeli Minister of Justice, "The Premier and all other members of the Cabinet are convinced there will be no war because our neighbours would not dare to attack us and because we have no intention of attacking anybody". Quoted from *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, February 27, 1960, p.7.

³²¹Quoted from Ben Gurion, *REBIRTH AND DESTINY OF ISRAEL*, op.cit., p.484. In similar vein , Dayan, *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, XXXIII, No.2, p.267, belittled international order. See also Hutchinson , *VIOLENT TRUCE*, op.cit., p.133.

³²²U.S. Congress, House of representatives, "A New Status Quo in the Middle East" by Benjamin S. Rosenthal of New York in the House of Representatives, March 19, 1968, 1968, *CONGRESSIONAL RECORD*, Vol. 114, Part 6, pp.7054-7056, Paper edition, pp.2045-2048 in George B. de Huszar, et al., *BASIC AMERICAN DOCUMENTS*, Ames, Iowa : Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1953., pp.114-15.

indictment of all who have contributed to a result thus confessed indefensible...

...But there is no fait accompli, nothing which on the basis of a persistent repudiation of the original agreement, and the desolation of eight hundred citizens...can set up a claim of right...³²³

Since the Arab-Israeli conflict concerns the existence of the Arabs and the Zionists in Palestine and also includes all aspects of their lives it may be considered the most complex conflict in modern times. First, each side is strongly convinced of its historical, legal, moral, and geographical claim to Palestine. The Arabs emphasize their being the majority of the population in Palestine³²⁴ for thousands of years and assert, therefore, that neither the Balfour Declaration,³²⁵ and the Palestine Mandate, nor the eventual United Nations Partition Plan of 1947 take this away. Nevertheless, the establishment of Israel "was done in the name of self-determination".³²⁶ The validity of these British declarations and promises was revealed in the Balfour memorandum which

³²³Quoted from William Ernest Hocking, "What is a...Fait Accompli?" REPRINT FROM AFME NEWS AND MIDDLE EAST DIGEST, I, Nos.3, 4, 5, April, May, June, 1957, quoted in de Huszar, BASIC AMERICAN DOCUMENTS, op.cit., pp.45-49.

³²⁴Though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasonable...the minority possess their equal rights, which equal law must protect, and to violate would be oppression". Quoted from George B. de Huszar et al. eds., BASIC AMERICAN DOCUMENTS, op.cit., pp.114-15. "We say that the pursuit of a value is legitimate if, and only if, we have the reason to expect that it will not inflict intolerable damage upon any other value which is also vitally important damage upon any other value which is also vitally important to us". Quoted from Karl W. Deutsch, POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: How People decide Their Fate, Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1970, p.13. See the concept of majority rule versus minority rights in John C. Livingstone and Robert G. Thompson, THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED, New York : Macmillan, 1963, pp.50-52. See also George Hourani, "Palestine as a Problem of Ethics", MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION BULLETIN, III, No.1, February 15, 1969, pp.17-18. For the Jewish claim, see pp.18-19, 24; Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD, op.cit., pp.180-97.

³²⁵"As far as Palestine is concerned the Powers have made no statement of fact which is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which, at least in the letter, they have not always intended to violate". Quoted from a memorandum by Lord Balfour in Government of Great Britain, DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, IV, reproduced in Soraya Antonius, "An Arab Looks at Britain", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXVI, No.4, April, 1960, p.29.

³²⁶From a lecture by Donald C. Blaisdell, "Can Responsible Foreign Policy be made Democratically?" delivered at the American Council for Judaism in New York, June 8, 1960, p.3, quoted in Tomeh, THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, edited by Fayez A. Sayegh, op.cit., p.123.

stated:

In Palestine we do not propose to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants...Zionism [is] of far greater import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land...³²⁷

Further, from the Arab viewpoint, Israel is completely alien to the Middle East, is inhabited by people brought from far away, and is maintained by the Western Imperialists against the will of the Arabs as a spearhead for Europe in the Middle East.³²⁸ Even the founders of Israel have confessed that "Israel is a part of the Middle East only in geography":³²⁹

Ben Gurion said today that Israel faced a graver danger from her own growing Levantine atmosphere than from the hostile Arab states that lie at the nation's frontiers...

...The Premier said that almost 55 per cent of those who migrated to the state since its beginning came from Africa and Asia.

"If, heaven forbid, we do not succeed, there is a danger that the coming generation may transform Israel into a Levantine state".³³⁰

The Arabs rejected Israel because "the artificial creation and imposition of an alien and religiously exclusively community on the lands inhabited by an indigenous Arab people of Palestine was a forced transplantation which the organism rejects".³³¹ With equal vigour the Israelis assert they are reclaiming or 'liberating' part of their Eretz Israel ('Historical Israel') and that they are

³²⁷Quoted from a memorandum by Lord Balfour in Government of Great Britain, DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, IV, reproduced in Soraya Antonius, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXVI, No.4, p.29.

³²⁸Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958, p.105, March 11, 1958; John S. Bodeau, "The Problem of Stability among Middle East Governments", THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY, Harvey P. Hall, ed, Washington, D.C.:The Middle East Institute, 1955, p.24.

³²⁹Quoted from Ben Gurion, REBIRTH AND DESTINY OF ISRAEL, op.cit., p.489. This view was echoed by Abba Eban "Affinity is now more important than vicinity". Quoted from FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XLIII, No.4, p.631. See also Eban, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, XXVI, No.3, p.115.

³³⁰Quoted from THE NEW YORK TIMES, October 25, 1960, p.5. This also appeared in the TIMES, January 6, 1961, p.30.

³³¹Quoted from Ferial Ghazoul, THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 3, 1969, p.30.

entitled to carve out a small portion of their ancestral land to their modern nation state.³³² Otherwise, they assert, it would "have been an indelible disgrace to the human conscience if a world...had not been able to carve out this tiny notch of territory to be the sanctuary of the sudden recuperation of the Zionists in Palestine and the renewal of its sovereignty in its original home".³³³ They claim the Jews "more than Greece and Rome, have determined the spiritual evolution of all succeeding generations". Thus any attempt on the part of the Arabs to restore their homeland by force would be regarded as aggression against international order and law.³³⁴

Once Israel was established the Zionists denied the Arabs their inalienable right to live in Palestine on the basis that they did not come back to Israel in order to "work and shed our blood for a binational state".³³⁵ After the establishment of Israel either side could not accept the other as a partner.³³⁶ Each contender mistrusts the other side, believing that it would only adhere temporarily to those aspects of an international agreement³³⁷ advantageous to it.³³⁸ By indicating her willingness since 1947 to meet with the Arabs anywhere any time for the sake of

³³²Eban, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, XXVI, No.3, p.115. For evaluation of the validity of the Jewish historical right from moral, religious, historical and political bases, see Alfred Guillame, ZIONISTS AND THE BIBLE, New York : Palestine Arab Refugee Office, 1956, pp.2, 4. See also the views of the King-Crane Commission on the political rationale or justification of the claims of the Zionists in Howard, p.351. "That they have a 'right' to Palestine, based on an occupation of two thousand years ago, can hardly be seriously considered". Quoted from report of the King-Crane Commission reproduced in Howard, THE KING-CRANE COMMISSION, op.cit., p.351.

³³³Quoted from Eban, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, XXVI, No.3, p.112, 115.

³³⁴ibid., pp.112, 115.

³³⁵Quoted from Pinhas Sapir, one of the founders of Israel, in THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 23, 1969, p.2.

³³⁶George Hourani, MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION BULLETIN, III, No.1, p.25. See the realistic and reverse views of some Zionists and Arab commandos. AL FATAH, reversed its previous Arab stand and now accepts a bilingual and binational state. See ATLAS, XVII, No.3, March, 1969, p.27; XVII, No.4, April, 1969, p.20.

³³⁷For accusations against the Israelis, See Elmer Berger, WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SO!, pp.26, 106. See also Husayn in Cohen (moderator), THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XVIII, No.2, p.155. Charges were levelled against the Arabs by Dayan, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XXXIII, No.2, pp.254-56.

³³⁸Dayan, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XXXIII, No.2, p.255; David Ben Gurion, "An Exclusive Interview by William Attwood : Ben Gurion Talks", LOOK, XXII, No.8, April 15, 1958, p.99.

peace, Israel scored a tangible diplomatic victory.³³⁹ The Israelis, unlike the Arab refugees, were at ease to offer peace talks with the Arabs in general broad terms without specific proposals necessary for fruitful negotiations. What the Israelis need "is not to speak of peace or to speak the truth to the Arabs; it is to believe in this new 'truth'".³⁴⁰ The Israelis want direct face-to-face talks without any United Nations or international supervision so that Israel would have a free hand in dealing with the Arabs.³⁴¹

The complexity of the Arab-Israeli conflict lies in its involvement in the Cold War - mainly the unqualified support and commitment of the West (particularly the United States) achieved by Zionist influence and propaganda.³⁴² In fact, one American Rabbi has said, "Important and responsible Arabs, the Ichud group (liberal and moderate Israeli group), Mr. Dulles and Mr. Byroade have all agreed - independently and in different language - that the core of this problem is in the attitudes of American Jews".³⁴³ Although having supported the Arab case since 1952, the Soviet Union did not become established as pro-Arab until 1955. The local Communist parties of the Arab states and Israel were caught between condoning and denouncing the Zionist movement and Israel in accordance with the fluctuation of Soviet policy and in complete disregard of the fate of local Communist parties in both Israel and the Arab states.³⁴⁴ It should be emphasized that it is not in the interest of Russia to see Israel destroyed. "The French bet that Moscow will prevent the Arabs from destroying Israel - the only factor that induces the angry Arabs to lean on Russia".³⁴⁵ Just as in the case of

³³⁹Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.657, June 14, 1957; p.665, July 1, 1957. For Ben Gurion's reply, see Ben Gurion, LOOK, XXII, No.8, p.95. For evaluation of Israel's peace efforts, see Hadawi, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XL, No.2, pp.28-29. The tragedy of the Arabs is that while they might at best prevent the State of Israel from expansion they were talking about its destruction. See Cecil Hourani, THE ISRAEL ARAB READER, edited by Walter Z. Laqueur, op.cit., p.246.

³⁴⁰Husayn in Cohen, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XVIII, No.2, p.155.

³⁴¹Elmer Berger, WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SO!, op.cit., pp.26, 106.

³⁴²See Noam Chomsky, THE FATEFUL TRIANGLE, op.cit., pp.1-43.

³⁴³Quoted from Elmer Berger, WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SO!, op.cit., p.101. See also p.105; Peretz, MIDDLE EAST REPORT 1959, p.35; Edward H. Buehrig, "The Arab World and the United States", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIII, No.7, July, 1958, pp.9-10.

³⁴⁴Walter Z. Laqueur, COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, New York : Praeger, 1956, pp.45, 110-11.

the Partition Plan, Russia would win by either alternative: keeping the discord and keeping the edge or by overflowing Israel with large numbers of Communist Jews from Eastern Europe and Russia as a foothold for Communism in the Middle East.³⁴⁶ The Israeli military preponderance vis a vis the Arab military vulnerability and diplomatic futility make inconceivable any direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries. In such a diplomatic stalemate it might be possible to utilize "parliamentary diplomacy" of the United Nations for peaceful settlement.³⁴⁷ However, this is feasible only if the super powers have a tacit understanding that renewed Arab-Israeli fighting might bring them to head on collision despite themselves³⁴⁸ and thus impose a settlement³⁴⁹ upon the reluctant Israelis and the less reluctant Arabs similar to the 1947 Partition Plan of Palestine.³⁵⁰

Indeed, among all Egypt's vital foreign problems Palestine³⁵¹ was the only one referred to in the first proclamation of the Army Movement of July 1952, as justification for the movement. However, the reference was not to renew Egypt's pledge to restore the rights of the Arabs in Palestine, but to illustrate the degree of corruption, inefficiency, and adventurism of the *ancien regime*. Nasser's regime, noted for religious tolerance toward non-Muslim communities in Egypt, gave meaning to the motto, "Religion belongs to God; and the Fatherland belongs to all".³⁵² Nevertheless, when it came to Israel, Nasser was quick to recognize that

³⁴⁵Quoted from C.L. Sulzberger, "Logic's Power of Vice Versa", THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 28, 1970, p.38.

³⁴⁶"Forum Comments", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXII, December, 1957, p.3; Laqueur, COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM, op.cit., p.268; "No Easing of Mideast War Danger", U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, LXV, No.4, July 22, 1968, p.60.

³⁴⁷Charles Henry Alexandrowicz, "The Secretariat and the Secretary General", INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY, XI, 1962, p.120 reproduced in Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER, Vol.III, THE UNITED NATIONS, New York : World Law Fund, 1966, p.313. See also U Thant's moral pressure in THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 29, 1969, p.1.

³⁴⁸John C. Campell, THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE MUTED COLD WAR, Denver, Colorado : University of Denver, 1964, p.31.

³⁴⁹See text of the Russian proposal in THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 11, 1969, p.2.

³⁵⁰For U.A.R resentment, of the imposed settlement see THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 14, 1969, p.2; June 23, 1969, p.11. For Israeli resentment, see THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 19, 1969, p.12; March 31, 1969, p.1.

³⁵¹El Barawy, MILITARY COUP, op.cit., pp.203, 205.

³⁵²James Batal, "Notes on the New Egypt", MUSLIM WORLD, XLIV, July-October, 1954,

"Even Israel itself is but a result of imperialism".³⁵³ Nasser's amicable gestures toward Israel were due to American promises of support for Egypt³⁵⁴ in wresting an agreement from the British on evacuation³⁵⁵ in return for Nasser's agreeing to peaceful settlement with Israel. Nasser also hoped to secure the Western economic and technical assistance necessary to achieve social reform and raise Egypt's standard of living, which he called the greatest struggle.³⁵⁶ Even if Nasser was planning a second round against Israel, he realized Egypt was in no position to fight Israel before strengthening his armed forces or before British evacuation.³⁵⁷ Emphasis on social and economic improvement³⁵⁸ was, moreover, a reflection of Nasser's realization that the the defeats of the Egyptians and Arabs were caused mainly by their weakness³⁵⁹ rather than the strength of the Israelis. The dedication and efficiency of the Israelis was reflected in the morale of Egypt's army officers.³⁶⁰ In essence, Nasser assumed that if the Egyptian government were to grow strong and popular, it would become able to negotiate with Israel without fear of popular uprising.³⁶¹ At the outset, Nasser did not want to divert

pp.227-35; Mary Rowlatt, "The Egyptian Situation", CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, July 1, 1953, pp.19-23 and Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., pp.173-74.

³⁵³Quoted from Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit., p.98. See also George Kirk, "The Role of the Military in Society and Government : Egypt", THE MILITARY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, Columbus : Ohio State University Press, 1963, p.75.

³⁵⁴Lacouture, NASSER, op.cit., pp.232-33. Nasser complained about and resented the Western policy of "imposed peace" with Israel which he termed "surrender" in his MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, pp.199-201, 431, 460, 673, and Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, January-March, 1960, pp.142-43, March 3, 1960.

³⁵⁵See Elmer Berger, WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SO!, op.cit., p.20 regarding the harm that would befall Egypt by continuing the war with Israel.

³⁵⁶Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, January-March, 1960, pp.142-43, March 3, 1960; Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, I, pp.460, 668; Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., pp.220-21, 227. An Israeli writer noticed that "the old slogans of independence and unity are in the process of being superseded by the call for social reform". Quoted from David Ariel, "The Decline of the Gods", HAMIZRAH HEHADASH, IV, Spring, 1953, pp.161-67.

³⁵⁷Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, pp.87, 690.

³⁵⁸An Israeli writer considered that "the various reforms promulgated by the Nasser regime - economic, social, political - are aimed at creating the indispensable background for building an army of one million men who will redeem Egypt's lost honour and satisfy her national aspirations". Quoted from K. Kaddish, "The Egyptian Revolution and its Dangers", BETRAM, September, 15, 1952, pp.26-28.

³⁵⁹Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.690, See Elmer Berger, WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SO!, op.cit., p.20, and Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT, op.cit., p.132.

³⁶⁰Lacouture, NASSER, op.cit., p.232.

³⁶¹Elmer Berger, WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SO!, op.cit., p.20.

the wrath of Egyptians against any external power, whether Israel or Britain. Instead, Nasser considered "the greatest internal enemies of the people...the Communists who serve foreign rulers, the Moslem Brotherhood which seeks rule by assassination in an era that has outlived such practices, and the old time politicians who would like to re-establish exploitation."³⁶² Nasser went as far as any Arab leader ever dared³⁶³ by implicitly seeking Israeli endorsement of Egypt's policy and deploring that "Israel, by opposing the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Canal Zone unfortunately is acting willingly or unwillingly, like the Communists".³⁶⁴ Even, more boldly, though not known to many Arabs at the time, he abandoned the blockade and allowed passage of goods or ships under the United Nations flag to and from Israel through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran.³⁶⁵ Nasser's rapprochement with the unpopular, pro Western Nuri al Sa'id and with Turkey, his endorsement of Anthony Eden's proposals,³⁶⁶ and his preference for settling the Palestine problem on the basis of the Bernadotte and the United Nations Partition Plans even after the February 1955 Israeli attack,³⁶⁷ encouraged Western and Israeli leaders to speculate seriously on Nasser's willingness to accommodate the West, especially in regard to Palestine.³⁶⁸ The fact that Nasser sent one of his most trusted men, Col. Anwar El Sadat, to probe the feelings of Iraq and other Arab governments toward Egypt's desire to settle the Palestine problem lest they attack his regime was another sign of his desire for peaceful settlement with Israel.³⁶⁹ Nasser's inclination

³⁶²Quoted from Nasser, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XXXIII, No.2, January, 1955, p.209.

³⁶³Little, EGYPT, op.cit., p.255; Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT, op.cit., pp.131, 139.

³⁶⁴Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.220, December 13, 1954. See also pp.119-20, 431.

³⁶⁵Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cit., p.186; Wheelock, NASSER'S NEW EGYPT, op.cit., p.222.

³⁶⁶Nasser considered that Eden's proposals would mitigate tensions in the Middle East. See Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.430, November 12, 1955.

³⁶⁷Ibid., p.430. Later Nasser was less reserved in endorsement of Eden's proposal. See pp.433-34, and Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT, op.cit., p.131.

³⁶⁸"To the latter British Labour M.P. Maurice Orbach, Nasser spoke of his 'hopes' and his lively sympathy for Mr. Sharett". Quoted from Lacouture, NASSER, op.cit., p.233. See also Wheelock, NASSER'S NEW EGYPT, op.cit., p.209. Contrast with Laqueur, NASSER'S EGYPT, pp.23, 35.

³⁶⁹Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT, op.cit., p.130; Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., p.273; Laqueur, NASSER'S EGYPT, op.cit., p.23, contends that "in Col. Nasser's frequent interviews with foreign journalists...he is at pains to explain that Israel can have peace at the price of unspecified territorial concessions. Privately, the leaders of the Junta have made it clear that they would regard such concessions as a first step

Inspired an American journalist to state, "I had watched the Palestine problem closely for a decade, and I knew that there never had been such a good chance of getting a settlement".³⁷⁰

Despite this, Dayan charged that Nasser was no different from other Arab leaders in denying Israel the right to exist and that Nasser was no less inflammatory than other Arab leaders in their propaganda and their belligerent political attitude.³⁷¹ In order to evaluate the gravity of the Israeli attack of February 1955 it should be emphasized that almost all of the pending problems and sources of friction between Egypt and Israel were inherited from the old regime, and their settlement is linked with the overall solution of the Palestine problem.

The Israelis claimed the February 1955 attack was provoked by Egyptian infiltrators and saboteurs³⁷² who terrorized the peaceful civilian inhabitants on the border.³⁷³ Israel claimed that penetrations by her troops were necessary to chase Egyptian intruders from Israeli territory and to prevent recurrence of

lowards the complete dismemberment of Israel". Balance this view with Peretz, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XLI, No.3, April, 1963, p.558, which contends that "in most Arab lands there is...less freedom of expression, especially on such a sensitive subject as the Arab Israeli dispute". See also p.559.

³⁷⁰Quoted from Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT, op.cit., p.130.

³⁷¹Moshe Dayan attributed Nasser with saying "Israel is an artificial state which must disappear"...to a representative of the Greek newspaper KATHIMERININ, on May 8, 1954". Quoted from Dayan, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XXXIII, No.2, p.255. St.John, THE BOSS p.188, attributed Nasser with saying on March 4, 1954, "If we go to battle again we can retrieve all that we lost...The time for action and not for words is approaching". In a thorough search of all of Nasser's speeches and interviews no trace was found of any reference to such an interview or statement by Nasser as the one cited by Dayan. The statement was made after the Israeli attack of February 1955.

³⁷²Dayan, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XXXIII, No.2, p.263. See also Ben Gurion, LOOK, XXII, No.8, p.95; St.John,THE BOSS, op.cit., p.188. However, both Moshe Dayan and Ben Gurion were later accused of carrying out the mysterious secret mission. See Fayez A. Sayegh, ed. THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cit., p.192.

³⁷³Israel's "claim was not substantiated by Henry Byroade, the American Ambassador in Cairo, United Nations Mixed Armistice Commission reports, and THE NEW YORK TIMES chronology for the preceding six months". Quoted from Wheelock, NASSER'S NEW EGYPT, op.cit., p.222. On the other hand, Nasser MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.658, June 14, 1957, p.690, July 20, 1957, denied the existence of the FEDAYYIN prior to the February 1955 attack. Lacouture, NASSER, op.cit., p.236, Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT, op.cit., p.113; and Fayez A. Sayegh, ed, THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, p.192, appear to support Nasser's views. See also Hutchinson, VIOLENT TRUCE, op.cit., pp.116-19.

Incursions into her territory, thereby preventing a major war with Egypt and other Arab countries.³⁷⁴ Israel's purported desire for a peaceful border and peace with Egypt and her Arab neighbours is negated "by Israel's reluctance to allow freedom of movement to United Nations observers, by her abrogation of three Local Commander Agreements, by the usurping of United of United Nations powers and rights, and by her refusal to grant minor concessions along the border that would represent no material loss to Israel but would mean a livelihood to a number of Arab families".³⁷⁵ According to Moshe Brilliant:

Those bloody "border incidents" are seldom accidental...They are retaliation, part of a deliberate plan to force the Arabs to the peace table. Some call it "realistic", others "cynical" - but it promises to be effective.³⁷⁶

Other objectives of the border incidents cited by critics of Israel were to alert the major Western powers and remind them of their commitments to protect and maintain Israel.³⁷⁷ Others attribute the February 1955 attack to the border incidents near the Al Auja demilitarized zone; others to the blockade of the Suez Canal and the BAT GALIM incident in September 1954; and still others to Israeli impatience with Nasser after Egypt concluded the Evacuation Agreement with Great Britain.³⁷⁸ It seems more reasonable that the February attack was part of the activist tough policy adopted by Ben Gurion to bring the Arab states to a peace conference. Still another source attributes the attack to Israel's miscalculation of Egypt's indifference toward Arab problems and of the strife with Iraq against the Baghdad Pact which might cause Egypt to sign a separate peace treaty with Israel.³⁷⁹ At any rate, the Israelis, after Nasser refused to sign the Baghdad Pact, began to consider his rise to power a serious menace.³⁸⁰

³⁷⁴Lacouture, EGYPT IN TRANSITION, op.cit., p.235.

³⁷⁵Quoted from Moshe Brilliant in HARPER'S, March, 1955, in Hutchinson, VIOLENT TRUCE, op.cit., p.116.

³⁷⁶Quoted in Ibid., p.116.

³⁷⁷Ibid., p.120; Elmer Berger, WHO KNOWS BETTER MUST SAY SO!, op.cit., p.13.

³⁷⁸Lacouture, NASSER, op.cit., p.233.

³⁷⁹Fayez A. Sayegh, ed. THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, pp.188-89.

³⁸⁰Hutchinson, VIOLENT TRUCE, op.cit., p.121; Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD, op.cit., p.190; Dayan, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XXXIII, No.2, p.255; Eban, PROCEEDINGS OF

Further, critics of Israel attribute the border incidents to an attempt to maintain tension in order to justify arousing mistrust against the Arabs³⁸¹ and kindling the Israeli's spirit causing them to forego their differences and unite. Further, the border incidents were thought to be a testing ground for the strength of Israel against her Arab neighbours and could be used as intimidation and deterrent eventually to subdue the Arabs and bring them to the negotiating table.³⁸² On the other hand, the border incident policy may have been implementation of a sound geopolitical reality of the Middle East:

The definition of this [geopolitical reality] is that there can be no ruling over Jordan without rule over the Euphrates and the Nile...
It is better that we decide over whose dead body the unity of the region will be.³⁸³

Such objectives are not just those of the fanatical and radical Israelis, but:

Every Zionist wants, as you want, fulfilment of the State of Israel within her 'historic borders', but very few Zionist are willing to admit this. Only when this desire becomes a reality, as in the case of the capture of Sinai and the Gaza Strip do they celebrate the rise of "the Third Kingdom of Israel".³⁸⁴

This idea is also found in the programme commitment of a large number of Israeli political parties³⁸⁵ and of the World Zionist Organization movement,³⁸⁶ in the Israeli press, and even in official statements and announcements by those who

THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, XXVI, No.3, p.115. Even after the humiliating defeat of Nasser in June 1967 the Israelis consider Egypt of all the Arab states as the only threat to Israel. THE NEW YORK TIMES, June, 4, 1968, p.1.

³⁸¹J.C. Hurewitz, "Regional and International Politics in the Middle East", THE UNITED STATES, op.cit., p.98.

³⁸²Hutchinson, VIOLENT TRUCE, op.cit., pp.121, 134.

³⁸³Quoted from Cohen, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XVIII, No.2, p.159.

³⁸⁴Quoted from Rashid Husayn in Ibid., pp.154-55. See also p.162; Lacouture, NASSER, op.cit., p.238. This prediction and experience materialized into reality after Israel's second occupation of Sinai since June 1967.

³⁸⁵See excerpts from the programmes of the Israeli political parties in Hutchinson, VIOLENT TRUCE, op.cit., pp.127-28, and Fayez A. Sayegh, THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT, op.cit., pp.71-72.

³⁸⁶See quotation from Nahum Goldmann in Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD, op.cit., p.185.

deny any such aggrandizement of Israel. Ben Gurion clearly stated Israel's overall objectives as follows:

It has already been said that when the State was established it had only six per cent of the Jewish people remaining alive after the Nazi Cataclysm. It must now be said that it has been established in only a portion of the land of Israel.³⁸⁷

At another time he said, "The creation of the new State by no means derogates from the scope of historical Eretz Israel".³⁸⁸

Others have a more subtle design for the establishment of Eretz Israel, the first stage of which is to talk about achieving defensible borders.³⁸⁹ Other Israeli leaders have spoken more belligerently and openly than Dayan concerning Israeli objectives in the border incidents. The magazine FRONTPAGE of July 29, 1954, reported that Menachim Begin, who by his own admission distinguished himself by erasing the city of Dir Yassin and accomplishing the massacre of all its population in the 1947-1948 war, "proposes to carry out limited military operations from time to time, for the annexation of various areas".³⁹⁰ In terms of a *FAIT ACCOMPLI*, the international reality of power politics, and a preventive war policy, Yaacov Libernam, a member of Israel's Herut party, stated in New York in January 1956, that "Israel should take the offensive immediately and capture strategic points along its border".³⁹¹ He correctly predicted that "world opinion would accept his proposed course after it was successful".³⁹²

³⁸⁷Quoted from State of Israel, GOVERNMENT YEAR BOOK, 5713 (1952), p.15, (in Introduction), in Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD, op.cit., p.185

³⁸⁸Quoted from Ibid., 5716, 1955, p.320.

³⁸⁹In 1955, Moshe Dayan stated, "The term 'frontier security' has little meaning in the context of Israel's geography. The entire country is a frontier and the whole rhythm of national life is affected by any hostile activity from the territory of neighbouring states". Quoted from Dayan, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XXXIII, No.2, p.250 and compare with the "defensible boundaries" objective which was embodied in the United Nations Security Council resolution of November 1967 and was made one of the principles for future peaceful political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. See THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 23, 1967, p.5.

³⁹⁰Quoted in Hutchinson, VIOLENT TRUCE, op.cit., p.133.

³⁹¹Quoted in Ibid., p.133.

³⁹²Quoted in Ibid., p.133. Western public opinion became resigned to the de facto occupation of Sinai, Jerusalem, the Western Bank of Jordan and the Golan Heights by

The Israeli investigations of 1960-1961, which resulted in its most lengthy and serious cabinet crisis, indicated that an unauthorised spy mission led to the Israeli attack of February 1955 against Egypt, infuriated Nasser, and torpedoed Egyptian Israeli relations. The essence of this episode, commonly referred to as the Lavon Affair after Pinhas Lavon (then Minister of Defence), is as follows.³⁹³ Neither Lavon nor Prime Minister Sharett knew about the mysterious spy mission at the time. A secret mission into Egypt was engineered by Ben Gurion while out of office and conducted with the cooperation of some high officials of the Ministry of Defence. The capture of the spy ring, the execution of some of its leaders, and the imprisonment of others provoked one of the most extensive anti-Nasser propaganda campaigns in the West by Israel and her sympathizers. Nasser's critics underplayed the importance of the spy ring (the Jon Darling Network) and vehemently attacked him for his harsh measures and for using the episode to relieve his internal trouble and to create a *cause celebre*³⁹⁴ to impress the Arab Prime Ministers who were attending an Arab League meeting.

This Israeli attack on Egypt without any tangible provocation³⁹⁵ and the killing of some thirty-eight Egyptian soldiers and wounding of another thirty-three, the blowing up of Egyptian police and military posts, and the deep penetration of Israeli forces aroused general world criticisms of Israel,³⁹⁶ even from some sources hitherto quite favourable.

Israel since 1967.

³⁹³The essence of the Lavon Affair connects it with discovery of the spy ring in Egypt and the role of Ben Gurion. See THE NEW YORK TIMES, October 24, 1960, p.3; November 17, 1960, p.5; December 26, 1960, p.4; January 13, 1961, p.4; March 1, 1961, p.5. See also Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cit., pp.190-92.

³⁹⁴St. John, THE BOSS, op.cit., p.187, and Lacouture, EGYPT IN TRANSITION, op.cit., p.234, both played down the importance of the spy ring. Contrast with Nasser's indignation in his MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.187 pressed alarm about the harm that the spy ring might have inflicted upon Egypt at a time when relations with the West were at the best and relations with Israel were quiet. This was before the execution of the Muslim Brothers who had made an attempt on his life. See also Fayez A. Sayegh ed, THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, p.190, and Hutchinson, VIOLENT TRUCE, op.cit., p.116, concerning the fairness of the trial.

³⁹⁵Wheelock, NASSER'S NEW EGYPT, op.cit., p.222; Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cit., p.186.

³⁹⁶Lacouture, NASSER, op.cit., p.236.

The question which arises out of all this is: Why should Nasser have been so preoccupied with this particular Israeli attack on Gaza? The territorial objectives of Israel and her activist defence since 1953 were not unknown to Nasser.³⁹⁷ The explanations are that Nasser had become more experienced with the manner in which Israel implemented international agreements and resolutions, and he greatly doubted the sincerity of Israel. Nasser stressed that "the facts which appeared after the dissipation of the smoke of the raid on Gaza were a point of departure in our thinking and in the trends of events of the whole regime".³⁹⁸ The Israeli attack was made with modern weapons, and it was the first massive attack on territory under Egyptian control since 1949 for which the Israeli government openly took direct responsibility.³⁹⁹ Nasser linked the Israeli attack with the continuation of Egypt's opposition to military alliances and assertion of independence. He felt the Gaza attack was part of a Western Plan to force Egypt to join the Baghdad Pact or suffer humiliation at the hands of the Israelis. Consequently, credence would be given to the views of the Western powers and pro Western Arab governments regarding the feebleness of Egypt's military forces and Egypt's ability to defend herself and other Arab countries against Russian onslaught.⁴⁰⁰ This would point up to Nasser his need of Western aid.

It was even more depressing to Nasser that the poor showing of the Egyptian army was exploited by his Arab rivals to undermine his struggle to restore his role of leadership since the Baghdad Pact.⁴⁰¹ The immediate result of the Israeli attack of February 1955 was a violent upsurge of Egyptian sentiment against the Israelis which Nasser could not ignore. But, above all:

³⁹⁷According to Cremeans, *THE ARABS AND THE WORLD*, op.cit., p.200, the Israelis launched their active defence in Autumn 1953. See also Nasser, *MAJMU'AT KHUTAB*, Part I, p.783, January 27, 1957.

³⁹⁸Translated from Nasser, *MAJMU'AT KHUTAB*, Part I, p.691, July 22, 1957. See also p.416 (Nasser's statement on October 1, 1955). Wynn, *NASSER OF EGYPT*, op.cit., p.122, considers the Gaza attack the second point of departure of Nasser's policy.

³⁹⁹Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., *THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM*, op.cit., p.193.

⁴⁰⁰Nasser, *MAJMU'AT KHUTAB*, Part I, p.691.

⁴⁰¹Wheelock, *NASSER'S NEW EGYPT*, op.cit., p.218; St. John, *THE BOSS*, op.cit., pp.189-90.

The one matter that had concerned Nasser most was the attitude of the young Egyptian army officers toward him and the revolution. This was more vital than getting British soldiers off Egyptian soil.⁴⁰²

The February 1955 attack put Nasser in a real predicament. He could not retaliate in kind without courting military defeat and disaster to his regime; neither could he ignore or stifle the boiling anger of the Egyptian people and in particular of the army. First he consoled himself with the moral victory which the Mixed Armistice Commission and the United Nations Security Council⁴⁰³ provided by indicting Israel. However, the Arabs were no longer impressed with the moral value of condemnations by the United Nations since Israel had repeatedly defied United Nations resolutions with impunity.⁴⁰⁴ Therefore, Nasser resorted to halfway measures - retaliation against Israel by launching guerrilla warfare and establishing the FEDAYYIN (literally, "suicide squad" or 'self sacrifice") composed mainly of Palestinians.⁴⁰⁵ In so doing, he avoided direct confrontations between the Egyptian and Israeli armies; yet he showed the Israeli attack did not go unchallenged. More important, he conducted a vigorous propaganda campaign to dramatize the engagements with the Israelis real or, in some cases, fictitious - to pacify the public and bolster their morale, a manoeuvre which later in 1967 proved too reckless.⁴⁰⁶ Border clashes with Israel and verbal attacks against Zionism removed Nasser's stigma of making peace with Israel and aligning of Arab leadership after Bandung conference of 1955. The hesitation of the West to provide Nasser with weapons convinced him

⁴⁰²Quoted from St. John, *THE BOSS*, op.cit., p.204. Wynn, *NASSER OF EGYPT*, op.cit., p.116 stated similar views - "The Gaza attacks led to the one thing Nasser always had feared most - trouble inside his army".

⁴⁰³Khalil, *THE ARAB STATES*, II, op.cit., p.634. It appears that Nasser did not resort to the FEDAYYIN until February 1955.

⁴⁰⁴Nasser, *MAJMU'AT KHUTAB*, Part I, p.279, March 3, 1955, and p.349, July 9, 1955, recasts his doubts on the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council.

⁴⁰⁵Ibid., p.658, June 14, 1957; Lacouture, *NASSER*, op.cit., p.236; Wynn, *NASSER OF EGYPT*, op.cit., p.126. Dayan, *FOREIGN POLICY*, XXXIII, No.2, p.263 in 1955 alluded to the appearance of well trained guerrillas on the Egyptian side in late 1954 and earlier.

⁴⁰⁶Lacouture, *NASSER*, op.cit., p.237; Wynn, *NASSER OF EGYPT*, op.cit., pp.126-28; *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, October 26, 1960, pp.1, 6. Nasser again took pride in the activities of the EL FATAH and other organizations. See Nasser, *NEWSWEEK*, Feb. 10, 1969, p.34.

that he would have to look elsewhere.

Until the Israeli attack of February 1955, Nasser believed that the defeat of the Arab armies in the Palestine War of 1948 was due to the weakness and inefficiency of the Egyptians much more than the cleverness and strength of the Israelis. After the February attack Nasser concluded that economic development would not do the Egyptians any good if they were unable to defend their independence, protect the factories, and preserve their achievement in social, economic, industrial, and technological fields.⁴⁰⁷ Thus, the Lavon Affair led many Western diplomats to conclude that the Israeli attack of February 1955 was the fateful event that "tipped off...Nasser to what he was really up against and was responsible for decisions to seek arms from the Soviet Union".⁴⁰⁸

The uncompromising nature of the dispute, the adamant stand of the Arabs and the Israelis against each other, the image each held of each other, the disagreement among the super powers, the inability and ineffectiveness of the United Nations to impose a settlement, and the inability to use a piecemeal tactic precluded any compromise or peaceful settlement. Then, "only the build up of military and diplomatic strength vis a vis the other party appeared a practical course of action."⁴⁰⁹ Nasser, through attendance and participation of the Bandung Conference, found what he had been impatiently seeking.

⁴⁰⁷Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.469, Nasser, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, XXXVII, pp.27-28, Dorsey, THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY, op.cit., pp.78-9; Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1959, p.354., Desmond Stewart, YOUNG EGYPT, London : Allen Wingate, 1958, p.185.

⁴⁰⁸THE NEW YORK TIMES, October 26, 1960, pp.1, 6.

⁴⁰⁹Quoted from Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD, op.cit., p.190.

SECTION TWO : CHARISMA AND FOREIGN POLICY

3.10 NASSER, BANDUNG AND POSITIVE NEUTRALITY

Positive neutrality as a foreign policy was not entirely innovational in Egyptian history but had its roots in Egypt's geographical position and status.⁴¹⁰ Egypt's location,⁴¹¹ her international trade routes, and her complex international waterway, prepared her for neutrality in international affairs.⁴¹²

Despite Nasser's "rejection of Military Pacts" or "Joint Defence" with the West and his call for positive and "clear neutrality",⁴¹³ he gave the impression that once the British agreed to evacuate Egyptian soil and Egypt became sovereign there would be free co-operation with the West for the defence of the Middle East. The Evacuation Agreement of 1954 made it even more difficult than before for Egypt to maintain neutrality legally if war should erupt between Great Britain and the Communist bloc because of Egypt's obligations under the treaty, the stationing of British troops on Egyptian soil, and the proximity of Egypt to Western military bases in the area.⁴¹⁴ In the meantime, however, Nasser gradually began to grasp the reality of the existence of a balance of terror and the possibility of mutual annihilation⁴¹⁵ which would make a world war between the two blocs less likely. He saw that once the British evacuated Egyptian soil they would not have legitimate reasons to reactivate the Suez Canal base. The paradox is that inasmuch as Nasser was anxious to expel the British from Egypt, he was

⁴¹⁰"According to the Law of Nations now in force, neutrality means simply and solely non participation in a war". Quoted from Walter Hofer, NEUTRALITY AS THE PRINCIPLE OF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY, Zurich : Schweitzer Spiegel Verlag, 1957, p.5.

⁴¹¹Charles Issawi, EGYPT IN REVOLUTION : An Economic Survey, London : Oxford University Press, 1954, pp.10-11. The cost was the loss of Egypt's independence for more than two thousand years.

⁴¹²Cromer, MODERN EGYPT, II, op.cit., pp.384-87.

⁴¹³In El Barawy, MILITARY COUP, op.cit., pp.210-11; Little, EGYPT, op.cit., p.258.

⁴¹⁴"The question is not whether we are being neutral, but rather it is a problem of not being subjugated to control of a foreign power". Translated from Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.430. See also Leonard Binder, THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, New York : John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964.

⁴¹⁵Nasser, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, XXXVII, September 3, 1954, p.54.

also interested in free cooperation with West and in seeking Western economic, military, and diplomatic assistance.

Nasser was acutely aware of the need for foreign capital and technical aid to achieve his social and economic programme.⁴¹⁶ In an attempt to attract capital the new regime removed previous obstacles to foreign investment and introduced new concessions and inducements.⁴¹⁷ Nasser hoped (or was led to hope) that American aid would be forthcoming as soon as he signed an agreement with Great Britain.⁴¹⁸ But at the beginning of 1955, despite these efforts, foreign capital was not forthcoming.⁴¹⁹ By then Nasser realized that the achievement of Egypt's independence was much simpler than achieving Egypt's complex social and economic development.⁴²⁰ However, the economic reforms Nasser had achieved by then were commendable in comparison to those of the *ancien regime* or other Arab countries, but they were far short of the rising expectation of the Egyptians⁴²¹ and were ineffective in dispelling discontent.⁴²² At the time Nasser received an invitation to the Bandung Conference he was faced with many problems - his popularity among the Arab countries, his battle with al Sa'id over the Baghdad Pact, and the Israeli military challenge. In addition he was troubled at home with discontent - even among the Free Officers - as a result of the frictions his government was encountering at home and abroad.⁴²³

⁴¹⁶Nasser's main disappointment upon seizing power was the availability of resources; see also Little, *WORLD TODAY*, XI, February, 1955, p.58; Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., *THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM*, op.cit., p.185.

⁴¹⁷Little, *WORLD TODAY*, X, April, 1954, p.146; El Barawy, *MILITARY COUP*, op.cit., p.71; Naguib, *EGYPT'S DESTINY*, op.cit., pp.168-69, 239-40.

⁴¹⁸Little, *WORLD TODAY*, XI, February, 1955, pp.57-58; Nolte, *THE UNITED STATES*, op.cit., p.158.

⁴¹⁹Criticism of the kind and quantity of American aid was leveled by both Nasser, *U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT*, XXXVII, September 3, 1954, p.29, and Nolte, *THE UNITED STATES*, op.cit., p.158. Richard Nolte was designated American Ambassador to the U.A.R. during the June war of 1967.

⁴²⁰Lacouture, *NASSER*, op.cit., p.208.

⁴²¹The American Universities Field Staff, *EXPECTANT PEOPLES : Nationalism and Development*, K.H. Silvert, New York : Random House, 1963, p.29.

⁴²²Binder, *THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION*, op.cit., p.269, is of the opinion that Middle Eastern governments accept foreign aid simply "as a means of staying in power". See also Nolte, *THE UNITED STATES*, op.cit., p.149; Hurewitz, *THE UNITED STATES*, op.cit., p.111.

⁴²³Wynn, *NASSER OF EGYPT*, op.cit., pp.116-17.

Nasser was not immediately enthusiastic about the Bandung Conference.⁴²⁴ The conference was to include countries with a vast cultural, economic, ethnic, linguistic, and ideological differences,⁴²⁵ making any worthwhile agreement miraculous. The general impression was that even if the Afro-Asian conference were actually to materialize, it would "turn...into an afternoon tea meeting".⁴²⁶ However, the success of Pakistan in excluding Israel from the conference and in even denying Israel the privilege of sending observers,⁴²⁷ the persuasion of Nehru,⁴²⁸ and the endorsement of the Bandung Conference by the League of Arab countries in attending the conference looked more promising. Also, the conference would give him temporary relief from his trouble at home.

Despite their diversity the sponsoring countries had enough common goals, as indicated in their letter of invitation, to convene an international conference to achieve the following objectives:

- (a) To consider social, economic, and cultural problems and relations of the countries represented;
- (b) to consider problems of special interest to Asian and African peoples...problems affecting national sovereignty and of racialism and colonialism;
- (c) to view the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in the world today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.

The firing spirit for calling the conference was to protest against "the failure of the Western powers to consult with them and to share with them sufficiently in decisions affecting the countries of Asia".⁴²⁹ Other undeclared, immediate

⁴²⁴Ibid., p.115.; Georgiana Stevens, "Arab Neutralism and Bandung", THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XI, No.2, Spring, 1957, p.145.

⁴²⁵George McTurnan Kahin, THE ASIAN AFRICAN CONFERENCE : Bandung, Indonesia, April, 1955, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956, pp.2-3.

⁴²⁶See William Sands, "Middle East Background", THE UNITED STATES, op.cit., p.15.

⁴²⁷Kahin, THE ASIAN AFRICAN CONFERENCE, op.cit., p.3; Stevens, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XI, No.2, p.145.

⁴²⁸Stevens, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XI, No.2, p.146; Little, EGYPT, op.cit., p.264; St John, THE BOSS, op.cit., pp.160, 191; Lacouture, NASSER, op.cit., p.222.

⁴²⁹Quoted from text of the invitation reproduced in Kahin, THE ASIAN AFRICAN CONFERENCE, op.cit., pp.3-4.; Also see Khalid I. Babaa and Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., "Nonalignment as a Diplomatic and Ideological Credo", THE ANNALS, CCCLXII,

objectives primarily concerned China's relations with her neighbours and the fear that China's deteriorating relations with the United States might endanger international peace. Also, the sponsoring nations intended to attempt to reduce China's dependence on Russia and to foster establishment of an independent Chinese policy. Whatever Nehru's influence on Nasser, their immediate common interest⁴³⁰ was their strong opposition to the Baghdad Pact. Nehru's opposition was based on his resentment at Pakistan's receiving military and economic aid from the West under the Pact's provisions. Nasser, infuriated by Iraq's pursuing a policy independent from his own, feared being isolated from the other Arab countries who might join the pact and Iraq's resuming her pre-World War II, leadership in the Arab world. Nehru hoped to enlist Egypt, the leader of the Arab and Islamic countries, to the camp of nonalignment and peaceful coexistence as an antidote to Pakistan's indulgence in Western regional alliances. For his part, Nasser felt it important to win the support of Nehru for Palestine and other causes of independence. The welcome Nasser received at Bandung from such international leaders as Nehru, Chou En lai, U'Nu of Burma, and Sukarno of Indonesia had a profound impact upon the shaping of his foreign policy in line with the nonaligned powers.⁴³¹ More important, the Bandung Conference pointed out to Nasser the alternative to complete dependence on the Western powers in political, economic, and possibly military fields.⁴³² Nasser urgently needed a market for Egyptian cotton after the West's refusal to buy it. Chou En Lai's readiness to purchase Egyptian cotton and his suggestion that other members of the Eastern bloc would do the same, in the opinion of most informed writers, were the determining factors in Nasser's adoption of positive neutrality.⁴³³ The cordial relations between Nasser and Chou En Lai opened a channel for a more serious problem, the possibility of an arms deal with the Communist bloc. Thus, Nasser found moral strength and profit in joining the non aligned nations and

November, 1965, pp.7-8.

⁴³⁰Little, EGYPT, op.cit., p.264.

⁴³¹Tom R. Little, "Nasser and the Cold War Strategy", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV, No.4, April, 1959, pp.22-26.

⁴³²Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cit., pp.196-97.

⁴³³Little, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV, No.4, pp.23-25, 48-49; Little, EGYPT, op.cit., p.266; Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.461.

discovered the value and significance of Egypt's leading an Arab neutral bloc.⁴³⁴ Nasser took the lead at Bandung in proposing support of the Palestinians and North African's right for independence, freedom, and self determination. Indeed, the Bandung Conference was a victory for Nasser and all Arabs because of the unanimous support given to their causes in Palestine and Algeria.⁴³⁵ Nasser recognized that his "visit to India was a turning point in my political understanding. I learned and realized that the only wise policy for us would be (one) of positive neutrality and nonalignment".⁴³⁶

Aside from misinterpretations and conflicts, the meeting at Bandung became a historical event in the annals of the Afro-Asian peoples. The importance of the Bandung resolutions is not in the unanimity with which they were adopted, nor in the loftiness of their principles, nor in the scope and vitality of the subjects covered. Rather, their importance lies in their acceptance by and their impact on the conferees, the Communist bloc, and the Western powers. The success of the Bandung Conference suggested the establishment of liaison offices and/or the convening of another conference of the Afro-Asian countries. Indeed, the principles of Bandung were recognized as the pillars of the foreign policies of these Afro-Asian countries - even substituting for the Charter of the United Nations.⁴³⁷ The Bandung principles were made even more meaningful by their unqualified reinforcement first by the Communist bloc and later reluctantly by the West.

Ideologically, traditionally, diplomatically and strategically, Communist Russia opposes neutrality and nonalignment. Communist leaders - Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and Khrushchey - leave no room for the existence of neutrality. Lenin derided the

⁴³⁴Cremeans, *THE ARABS AND THE WORLD*, op.cit., p.145. Contrast with Little, *EGYPT*, op.cit., p.267, who underplays the significance of Nasser leading the Arabs.

⁴³⁵Kahin, *THE ASIAN AFRICAN CONFERENCE*, op.cit., pp.12, 17.

⁴³⁶Quoted in Wheelock, *NASSER'S NEW EGYPT*, op.cit., p.225, from Rustom S. Karanjia, *ARAB DAWN*, London : Lawrence & Wishart, 1959, p.187.

⁴³⁷Stevens, *THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL*, XI, No.2, p.148.

neutrality concept:

Any kind of propaganda of neutralism is either a hypocritical cover for counter revolution or an appearance of complete unconsciousness...The idea of neutralism is nothing but a mistaken and contemptible pretext.⁴³⁸

Although Stalin is credited with originating the concept of "peaceful coexistence", he suspiciously attacked:

neutralism (which)...*"connives at aggression and unleashes war."* It represented an impermissible passiveness that set out *"not to prevent the aggressors from doing evil things"*.⁴³⁹

Likewise, Mao denied the existence of neutrality and strongly advised:

The Chinese people either lean to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. *There is no exception to this rule. To sit on the fence is impossible, and there is no third path...Neutrality is a hoax. The third path does not exist.*⁴⁴⁰

Until 1955 most Arab countries were opposed to having any commercial, cultural, or diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.⁴⁴¹ Khrushchev's rise to power, the cold war stalemate, the adoption of peaceful coexistence,⁴⁴² the fear of mutual annihilation and the balance of terror, the conviction of the soundness and ultimate victory of the Communist system,⁴⁴³ and the fertile opportunity in

⁴³⁸Quoted from V.I. Lenin, WORKS, Moscow : Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, 1950, XXIX, in Mosca Onoe, "Some Factors in the Communist View of Neutrality", NEW NATIONS, London : Constable, 1956, p.92.

⁴³⁹ibid., p.92.

⁴⁴⁰Quoted in Onoe, NEW NATIONS, op.cit., p.93.

⁴⁴¹For an explanation of Russia's inactivity in the Middle East. See Binder, THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION, op.cit., pp.257-58.

⁴⁴²For an advocacy of peaceful coexistence, see Nikita S. Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence", FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XXXVIII, October, 1959, pp.1-18. For a sharp criticism, see George F. Kennan, "Peaceful Coexistence : A Western View", FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XXXVIII, No.2, January, 1960, pp.171-90.

⁴⁴³Schliecher, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, op.cit., pp.89-90.

the Middle East⁴⁴⁴ encouraged the Soviet Union and created a favourable condition for Egypt. From 1952 the Soviet Union gradually began to support Egyptian and Arab causes but did not actively enter the field until 1955.⁴⁴⁵ The unexpected conciliatory attitude of the Chinese toward India, their conciliatory attitude toward other Afro-Asian countries, and their vigorous support of the Palestinian and other Arab causes won the admiration and appreciation of Nasser and the Arabs. Nasser wanted to break Great Britain's monopoly over Egypt and to be free to establish political, cultural, and commercial relations with other powers. He found the opportunity in Bandung. Conversely, the United States, who, except for a short interruption during World War I, had been a leading neutral country until 1941, took the lead in attacking nonalignment and positive neutrality. John Foster Dulles made the preposterous charge that to adopt an independent or neutral policy and be indifferent to the Cold War was not only impractical and unattainable but "the principle of neutrality...except under very exceptional circumstance...is an immoral and shortsighted conception."⁴⁴⁶ This criticism brought a sharp rebuff from an Arab writer:

To pass impartial judgement does not require that a neutralist select the midpoint between two positions. Nor does an impartial position have to be equidistant from both extremes. Moreover, a neutralist rejects the thesis that, in order to be impartial he must balance his judgements which appear to favour one bloc by an equal number of judgements favouring the other.⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴⁴Manfred Halpern, THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963, pp.400-04.

⁴⁴⁵Panachi In Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cit., p.116.

⁴⁴⁶Quoted from John Foster Dulles, "The Cost of Peace", DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, XXXIV, June 18, 1956, pp.999-1000, In Muhammad al Farra In Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cit., pp.235-36.

⁴⁴⁷Quoted from Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cit., pp.93-94.

By taking an active part in the drafting of the Bandung resolution⁴⁴⁸ Nasser became credited with the term "positive neutrality".⁴⁴⁹ Positive neutrality did not mean negativism. To the contrary, it meant an active role in world affairs, in the prevention of war, and especially in matters of liberation versus colonialism. In Nasser's words "World Peace does not mean 'no war'; it requires co-operative efforts for the creation of political stability, economic development and social justice".⁴⁵⁰ Positive neutrality gave the slogans of Nasser's regime a new philosophical content and international outlook.⁴⁵¹ It broke the Western monopoly in commerce and opened alternatives in arms purchases and other deals with the Eastern bloc.⁴⁵² Nasser's own status as one of the leading members (Nehru, Nkrumah, Sukarno, and Tito) of the non aligned bloc⁴⁵³ enabled him gradually to supplement and, for a while, to replace the six objectives of the Army movement with the ten Bandung principles.⁴⁵⁴

As defined by Nasser, "A social ideology takes root only when it expresses the hearts, minds and souls of those who adopt it". And, "the social ideology of a nation is...a natural evolution carried to its fulfilment".⁴⁵⁵ Whether positive neutrality is to be considered a "policy",⁴⁵⁶ an "idea", a "belief", a "faith",⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁴⁸Schleicher, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, op.cit., pp.299-301; Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah on Neutralism", NEUTRALISM AND NONALIGNMENT : The New States in World Affairs, ed. Laurence W. Martin, New York : Praeger, 1962, p.95.

⁴⁴⁹'Abd al Mun'im Shumays, 'ASHR SANAWAT FI MASHRIQ AL SHAMS, [Ten Years during the Rise of the Sun], Cairo : al Dar al Qawmiyyah lil Tiba'ah wa-al Nashr, 1962, pp.32, 36; Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.735.

⁴⁵⁰Translated from Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, III, p.579, Speech at Bandung, April 19, 1955; See also Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., pp.987-88.

⁴⁵¹"I learned and realized that the only wise policy for us would be one of positive neutrality and nonaligned." Quoted from Karanjia, THE ARAB DAWN, op.cit., p.187, in Wheelock, NASSER'S NEW EGYPT, op.cit., p.225. "Nehru's influence...gave the rudimentary neutrality of Egypt a philosophical content". Quoted from Little, EGYPT, op.cit., p.264.

⁴⁵²Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cit., p.196.

⁴⁵³Cremins, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD, op.cit., p.145.

⁴⁵⁴Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, III, p.572; See Kahin, THE ASIAN AFRICAN CONFERENCE, op.cit., pp.84-85 for THE TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE.

⁴⁵⁵Quoted from Nasser's statement in MIDDLE EAST NEWS DISPATCH in MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXVI, No.4, April, 1960, p.21.

⁴⁵⁶"When we proclaim a policy of non alignment and positive neutrality we mean that

and "ideology"⁴⁵⁸ or a "frame of mind",⁴⁵⁹ Nasser used the term interchangeably with nonalignment⁴⁶⁰ and adopted it as an ideology for Egypt. At one time Nasser equated positive neutrality with "Arab nationalism...[which] means positive neutrality and non alignment".⁴⁶¹ He later equated it with "a socialist, democratic and co-operative system."⁴⁶² And later "Arab Socialism" was added.⁴⁶³ Literally speaking, the Arabic term for positive neutrality, hiyad ijabi, means: ijabi,⁴⁶⁴ "positive reaction", hiyad⁴⁶⁵ "neutrality" and thus differs from the legal and traditional concept of neutrality.⁴⁶⁶ Although Nasser reiterated the principle of coexistence, he did not use the word to mean peaceful cohabitation with imperialism or Zionism.⁴⁶⁷ "It is the policy rather than the internal logic or philosophical foundation which gives the meaning of the

we shall stand by the people". Quoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958, p.100, March 9, 1958. "Positive neutralism is neither a principle nor an ideology, but a specific policy expressing a principle and a definite ideological commitment". Quoted from *Ibid.*, p.101.

⁴⁵⁷Giovanni Sartori, "Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems", THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, LXIII, No.2, June, 1969, p.401, discusses the difference between an idea and faith

⁴⁵⁸"The national revolution has developed into a faith in positive neutrality and non alignment". Quoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, July, 1960, p.6; Contrast with Hofer, who concluded, "To sum up, we may say that neutrality cannot of its very nature become a philosophy, a political ideology, still less a way of life; it is simply an instrument...of foreign policy." Quoted from Hofer, NEUTRALISM AS THE PRINCIPLE OF SWISS FOREIGN POLICY, *op.cit.*, p.39.

⁴⁵⁹Binder, THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION, *op.cit.*, pp.241-48.

⁴⁶⁰Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958, p.100, March 9, 1958.

⁴⁶¹Quoted from Nasser's SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958, p.288.

⁴⁶²*Ibid.*, p.288

⁴⁶³"Adoption of socialism as the socioeconometric system of the state added an ideological dimension to the neutralism of the U.A.R", quoted from Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, *op.cit.*, p.216. See also Binder, THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION, *op.cit.*, p.248.

⁴⁶⁴Hans Wehr, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN WRITTEN ARABIC, ed., J. Milton Cowan, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961, p.1049. (philosophically : constructive and sure rather than sceptical).

⁴⁶⁵Hans Wehr, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN WRITTEN ARABIC, edited by J. Milton Cowan, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, p.221.

⁴⁶⁶"The policy India has sought to pursue is not a negative and neutral policy. It is a positive and vital policy. It is a positive and vital policy that flows from our struggle for freedom". Quoted from Jawharlal Nehru in Babaa and Crabb, THE ANNALS, CCCLXII, November, 1965, p.8.

⁴⁶⁷Muhammad Badawi and Muhammad Tal'at al-Ghanimi, THE CREATIVE REVOLUTION IN ARABIC SOCIETY (in Arabic), 1st ed., Alexandria : Mansha'at al-Ma'arif, 1961 p.132.

theory".⁴⁶⁸ Nasser assessed his positive neutrality⁴⁶⁹ during his speech on the nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956, as "a dam out of...glory and dignity, freedom and independence....a dam against (foreign) ambitions." He then described his positive aspect of neutrality in its all-embracing scope:

Egypt has advocated peace and the implementation of human rights. Egypt has advocated those principles which were recognized by the United Nations...freedom, the right of self determination, the eradication of imperialism, peaceful coexistence, non alignment...We will be hostile to those who are hostile to us, and will be at peace with those who are at peace with us.⁴⁷⁰

Regardless of what others think of Nasser's positive neutrality, it became the permanent pillar of Egypt's foreign policy, its instrument, ideology, and philosophy.

Positive neutrality appealed to all major segments of the Egyptian nationalists.⁴⁷¹ For the first time since the end of 1954 even those who were disenchanted with Nasser rallied around him on this issue. For neutrality was synonymous with independence and freedom, principles which unite the Egyptians. Further, positive neutrality provided the new regime with a palatable ideology bearing Nasser's trademark and differing from the slogans of rival nationalistic elements. It was a philosophy and ideology with a scope extending beyond the Nile Valley or the Muslim Brotherhood. Nasser's speculation became a reality:

That the discussion of this Conference would be a point of departure...[and] the beginning of a new role toward the achievement of peace and justice..⁴⁷²

⁴⁶⁸Quoted from Binder, THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION, op.cit., p.199.

⁴⁶⁹See definition of "Positive Neutrality" in Khalid I. Babaa, "Arab Positive Neutrality", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XLI, No.1., Winter, 1965, p.12. See also Binder, THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION, op.cit., p.248; Michael Brecher, "Neutralism : An Analysis", INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, XVIII, No.3, Summer, 1962, p.224.

⁴⁷⁰Quoted in Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., p.767; See also Badawi, THE CREATIVE REVOLUTION IN ARABIC SOCIETY, op.cit., pp.130-31.

⁴⁷¹Lacouture, NASSER, op.cit., p.221-22.

Coming back home I found out from the response it had that it is the only possible policy which could get the broadest support from the Arab people.⁴⁷³

Since Bandung it has become the fashion to invoke the "Bandung spirit" on every possible occasion.⁴⁷⁴

Furthermore, after the Bandung Conference, Nasser discovered that "every citizen in the Arab region was calling for nonalignment and positive neutrality and will believe in it",⁴⁷⁵ and "Nasser progressively developed the doctrine of neutralism, putting it into the frame of Arab nationalism",⁴⁷⁶ which has a deep seated feeling of neutrality. Nasser's adoption of positive neutrality coincided with the aspiration of Arab nationalism⁴⁷⁷ and gained for him the leadership in the Arab world.⁴⁷⁸ An Egyptian writer went further and claimed Nasser's "Arab nationalism not only aspired the course of positive neutrality but imposed it".⁴⁷⁹ The writer concluded, "If President Nasser had been the guide of Arab nationalism, this nationalism would not have materialized except in the shadow of positive neutrality and nonalignment".⁴⁸⁰ Concerning military alliances and the Baghdad Pact Nasser was aware that "all Arab peoples rejected [the Baghdad Pact] and considered it as continuation of foreign domination".⁴⁸¹ Even Arab governments, both pro-Western and Neutralist ones, rejected the pact.⁴⁸² "For every new prime minister who came to power lately, started his rule by

⁴⁷²Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, III, p.580.

⁴⁷³Quoted from Karanjia, p.187, in Wheelock, NASSER'S NEW EGYPT, op.cit., p.225.

⁴⁷⁴Quoted from Stevens, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XI, No.2, p.148.

⁴⁷⁵Translated from Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.74.

⁴⁷⁶Quoted from Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD, op.cit., p.145.

⁴⁷⁷See Albert Hourani, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, XXIX, April, 1953, pp.168-70.

⁴⁷⁸Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cit., p.178; Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD, op.cit., p.145; Antoine Jazza, "A Critique of Nasserism", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV, No.4, April, 1959, p.18.

⁴⁷⁹Translated from Shumays, 'ASHR SANAWAT, op.cit., p.36.

⁴⁸⁰ibid., p.32.

⁴⁸¹Translated from Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.640.

⁴⁸²"All these traditionalist states are neutral though they do not have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, because it has become impossible for an Arab state to be anything else". Quoted from John C. Campbell, THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE MUTED COLD WAR, Monograph I, 1964-65, p.21. See a list of Arab stands and status in Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cit., p.165.

disassociating himself from joining that pact".⁴⁸³ "Political power is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised."⁴⁸⁴ Thus, Nasser's presence at the Bandung Conference enabled him to take an independent stand from the West and to oppose the Western powers⁴⁸⁵ and to prevent them from including Egypt or other Arab countries in the Baghdad Pact. Nasser successfully used his positive neutrality as the most effective means to overwhelm his Arab rivals, first Nuri al Sa'id and later Qasim and others.⁴⁸⁶ Surprisingly, although Israel was the first Middle Eastern country to recognize Red China, Chou En Lai emerged more intransigent than the Arabs in supporting Palestinian rights.⁴⁸⁷

In conclusion, the adoption of positive neutrality by Nasser caused the West to lose confidence in him and made the split among the other Arab countries more acute.⁴⁸⁸ But consequently, his "policy of positive neutrality and non alignment emerged victorious and all the world recognized it including the two super powers, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S".⁴⁸⁹ He was courted by the Communists and from 1958 through 1966 by the West, and until 1967 he succeeded in maintaining a balance between them.⁴⁹⁰ Once Egypt felt relatively free from direct attack she

⁴⁸³Translated from Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.460.

⁴⁸⁴Quoted from Hans J. Morgenthau, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS : The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd ed., New York : Knopf, 1962, p.29.

⁴⁸⁵The negative aspect of power which is " a more common form of power on the international level is the ability...to prevent another nation taking action considered undesirable". Ibid., p.111.

⁴⁸⁶Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958, p.100; Halpern, THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, op.cit., p.403; Binder, THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION, op.cit., p.269; Hurewitz, THE UNITED STATES, op.cit., pp.111, 149.

⁴⁸⁷Kahin, THE ASIAN AFRICAN CONFERENCE, op.cit., p.16.

⁴⁸⁸Gamal Abdel Nasser, ADAM AL 'INHIYAZ ; Min Aqwal al Ra'is Gamal Abdel Nasser [Nonalignment : From Speeches of President Gamal Abdel Nasser] Cairo : al Dar al Qawmiyyah Lil Tiba'ah wa-al Nashr, ca, 1965, p.25.

⁴⁸⁹Nasser, ADAM AL 'INHIYAZ, op.cit., p.29. See also Nasser's speech on November 27, 1958, in Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, I, op.cit., p.627.

⁴⁹⁰"Positive neutrality seems to be based on balancing the two power blocs against each other and sometimes trying to play them off". Quoted from Jansen, "India and the Arab World", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXVI, No.4, April, 1960, p.20.

followed a policy of independence and gradually began to exert her influence and power.⁴⁹¹ Thus, Nasser declared:

The fourth battle of assertion of our independence was the defining of our independence...i.e., the assertion of our international personality and the course of our policy....Our battle for assertion of our independent personality was intertwined with the battle of search for arms and the attendance at Bandung.⁴⁹²

The arms deal and the Bandung Conference were two 'battles' in the same 'war', the 'war' of assertion of independence.⁴⁹³

3.11 NASSER AND THE CZECH ARMS DEAL

The three pillars of power in Islamic society are the men of the sword, the men of letters, and the men of religion. Today as well as in the past the men of the sword are perhaps the most important.⁴⁹⁴ Inasmuch as a modern army is the hallmark of sovereignty,⁴⁹⁵ newly developing countries like Egypt gave military development⁴⁹⁶ priority over social or economic development. Vulnerability to outside attack and the need for Western protection at a time when Egypt was striving for independence made the development of a modern army essential in

⁴⁹¹Fayez A. Sayegh, ed. *THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM*, op.cit., pp.111, 115, 214.

⁴⁹²Translated from Nasser, *MAJMU'AT KHUTAB*, Part 1, p.692.

⁴⁹³See Shumays, *'ASHR SANAWAT*, op.cit., pp.30-31, for similar statements.

⁴⁹⁴"Men of the sword [are] the guardians of the state". Majid Khadduri, *WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM*, Baltimore : The John Hopkins Press, 1955, pp.87-88.

⁴⁹⁵"The Arabs generally conceive of their independence in terms of three factors: armed strength, economic strength and independence of initiative in the field of foreign relations". Quoted from Nadim Dimeshkie, "The Impact of the Cold War on the Arab World", *MIDDLE EAST FORUM*, XXXIX, No.10, December, 1963, p.18. "One major mark of independence and influence...is military strength, and the development of a national army is therefore a natural concomitant of independence". Quoted from Badeau, *THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY*, edited by Harvey P. Hall, op.cit., p.29.

⁴⁹⁶Hurewitz, *MIDDLE EAST POLITICS*, op.cit., pp.447-48. "A growing portion of state budgets goes for military expenditure". Quoted from Badeau, *THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY*, op.cit., p.29. See also Sami Shawkat, "The Profession of Death", translation from his *HADHIH AHDAFUNA* [These are our Aims] in *ARAB NATIONALISM : An Anthology*, Ed. Sylvia G. Halm, Berkeley : University of California Press, 1962, pp.97-98.

The fact that the movement of July 23, 1952, was an army movement and that its leaders were professional military men meant that armaments would take a high priority among its objectives.⁴⁹⁸ Furthermore, since the Egyptian army assumed responsibility for defending Egypt and the Arab Eastern countries after British evacuation, acquisition of arms became more imperative.⁴⁹⁹ Accordingly, the establishment of a strong, modern Egyptian army was the major objective declared by the army leaders on July 23, 1952; afterwards it became one of Nasser's major objectives. One reason for Nasser's making concessions in concluding the Evacuation Agreement with Britain in 1954 was to remove the American reservations about supplying Egypt with modern weapons. The fighting with Israel after February 1955, the West's failure to check Israel, Western procrastination in providing Nasser with promised weapons, and the continued pressure on Egypt and other Arab countries to join a Western defence system for the Middle East led to a feverish search for weapons from any source. The conclusion of an arms deal in September 1955 with the Communists was the first time Nasser had initiated an act instead of reacting. It led to fierce reaction from his opponents and wild jubilation among his supporters.

Nasser repeatedly asserted that the "battle against military alliance imposed upon us from outside powers led to the fighting on the truce line with Israel - mainly the famous Israeli attack against Gaza on February 28, 1955". He continued, "Thus the third battle in the series of assertion of independence [is the] battle against arms monopoly".⁵⁰⁰ Nasser gave the following reasons for concluding the Russian arms deal. First, the arms deal broke Western imperialism's monopoly over supplying the Egyptians with weapons⁵⁰¹ and was an assertion of national

⁴⁹⁷Badeau, THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY, op.cit., p.29.

⁴⁹⁸Nasser, KHUTAB AL RA'IS, III, pp.546, 558, 586. The building of a modern Egyptian army vacillated in rank between the fourth, fifth, and sixth objectives of the Army Movement.

⁴⁹⁹Hurewitz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, op.cit., pp.126, 129.

⁵⁰⁰Translated from Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, pp.690-91, July 22, 1957.

sovereignty.⁵⁰² Further, the Russian arms deal was considered essential to the exercise of positive neutrality.⁵⁰³ It aimed at restoring to the Arabs their dignity and their defence and the emancipation of the Arab countries still under the 'Imperialistic yoke', and at strengthening the Arab Collective Security Pact.⁵⁰⁴ Above all, it aimed at protecting Egyptian factories and fields,⁵⁰⁵ the fulfilment of the army movement and economic independence⁵⁰⁶ for the maintenance of social democratic life. The modernization of the army has played a great role⁵⁰⁷ in the modernization of Egyptian society in education, health, industry, and social integration, and in development of a modern Western semi-state.⁵⁰⁸ Nasser's indignation towards the West intensified when he became aware that "Israel's army has been able to obtain arms from England, France, Belgium, Canada, Italy and from various other states", and that "it can always find someone to supply it arms". And while the Western Press confessed "that Israel's army can defeat all the Arab armies combined, the British, American, and French governments not only denied Nasser needed weapons⁵⁰⁹ but instigated

⁵⁰¹Hurewitz, DIPLOMACY, II, op.cit., pp.404-05 Nasser's announcement of the purchase of the Czech arms was on September 25, 1955.

⁵⁰²Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958, p.107, March 11, 1958; 1959, p.215. "More significantly, Arabs saw the action of Egypt as a dramatic assertion of the sovereign right" of Egypt. Quoted from Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cit., p.197.

⁵⁰³"Some might say that we want neutrality but only the strong could achieve neutrality." Translated from Nasser MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.208, (August 21, 1954). "The arms transaction was the first expression and positive neutralism the name." Quoted from Fayez A. Sayegh, ed. THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cit., p.148.

⁵⁰⁴Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958, p.180, May 15, 1958. "It is our duty to protect the Arab people so they may not be turned into refugees as Zionists and imperialists had turned the Palestine people into refugees", p.354.

⁵⁰⁵"If we were to build our country economically and industrially, then we must depend on a strong national army to protect these buildings and achievements". Translated from Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part II, p.581, July 30, 1959.

⁵⁰⁶"Above all we had to establish an economic independence over monopoly and the domination of government by capitalism. Then we have had to establish the principles of social friendship, build a strong national army and lay the foundations of a sound democracy". Quoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958, p.180.

⁵⁰⁷Morroe Berger, MILITARY ELITE, op.cit., p.7; Stewart, YOUNG EGYPT, op.cit., p.185; Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., pp.68-69.

⁵⁰⁸The Russian concept of modernization is industrialization and nationalization of Western enterprise. See W.W. Kulski, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE, New York : Lippincott, 1964, pp.338-345.

⁵⁰⁹In Nasser's speech on the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, he revealed a British newspaper's saying, "We know that every time the Arabs get angry we gave them weapons like dolls with which to play". Quoted in Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II.

their allies to refuse to provide him weapons. However, "anger over the Anglo-American arrangements for the military modernization of Iraq, no less - and probably more - than fear of Israel's military might, helped condition Egypt for the initial acceptance of Soviet weapons".⁵¹⁰ Equally antagonizing to Nasser was the policy of the West - especially of Great Britain until 1955 - of providing the Arab countries with weapons (obsolete ones)⁵¹¹ to achieve the political objectives of "divide and rule".⁵¹² Western denial of arms for Egypt might be considered one of the greatest diplomatic blunders in the Cold War.⁵¹³ Eventually, however, Nasser made the agreement with the Communist bloc "to supply arms in accordance with our needs...on a commercial basis". This act infuriated the West and paved the way for Russia establishing a foothold in the Middle East after an attempt of two centuries.⁵¹⁴ Nasser's opposition to the Baghdad Pact and Egypt's leadership among the Afro-Asian countries made the courting of him decisive to Communism's gaining a foothold in the Middle East.⁵¹⁵ Russia's new tactic toward Egypt also marked the end of the Stalinist era that was characterized by Russian caution and inactivity in the Middle East.⁵¹⁶

op.cit., p.755. See also THE NEW YORK TIMES, October 26, 1968, p.6.

⁵¹⁰Quoted from Hurewitz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, op.cit., p.464.

⁵¹¹See Anthony Nutting, NO END OF A LESSON : The Story of Suez, London : Constable, 1967, p.113.

⁵¹²Hurewitz, DIPLOMACY, op.cit., pp.461, 464; Campbell, THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE MUTED COLD WAR, op.cit., pp.6-7.

⁵¹³"Nasser concluded that nothing in the way of arms then in prospect from the West could save Egypt and he must seek massive support elsewhere". Quoted from THE NEW YORK TIMES, October, 26, 1960, p.6.

⁵¹⁴See the early attitude of Russia in Ivor Spector, "Programme of Action of the Communist Party of Egypt", reproduced in THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, X, No.4, Fall, 1956, pp.427-37. See also Walter Z Laqueur COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956, pp.31, 42-46. For an Egyptian perspective on Communism in the Middle East see Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, SPHINX AND COMMISSAR : The Rise and Decline of Soviet Power, London : Constable, 1972, Chapter One "The First Red Waves".

⁵¹⁵"Our success in Communist construction will be of exceptional significance for the destinies of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America". Quoted from Nikita S. Khrushchev, in Kux, NEW NATIONS, op.cit., p.258. See also Campell, THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE MUTED COLD WAR, op.cit., pp.24, 28.

⁵¹⁶Laqueur, COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM, op.cit., p.260; Binder, THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION, op.cit., p.250; Campbell, THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE MUTED COLD WAR, op.cit., p.25. "Moscow devised its present Middle Eastern policy in 1955 after the Geneva summit made it plain that no nation was prepared to risk nuclear war, almost regardless of provocation". Quoted from C. L. Sulzberger, THE NEW YORK TIMES, February, 7, 1969, p.34.

The West reacted to Nasser's announcement of the arms deal with outrage and denunciation,⁵¹⁷ fearing other Arab countries would follow Nasser's example and open the Arab East to Communist infiltration.⁵¹⁸ Nasser ridiculed "such fears while it is your government which is pushing us towards what you are afraid may befall us".⁵¹⁹ Pro-Western Arab governments restlessly pressed the West to provide them with weapons of the same quality and under similarly generous conditions to match Nasser's impressive arsenal.⁵²⁰ Nasser had reached the position where he was able to provide assistance to other liberation movements, a development which caused more problems for the Western powers.⁵²¹ Most of Nasser's critics recognize his internal reforms and achievements, but they attribute the arms deal to a scheme to extricate himself from the internal problems posed by his failures in implementing promised reforms. They claim that he found it much simpler to divert the wrath of Egyptian and Arab public opinion toward outsiders, especially Israel, by restoring the traditional practice of blaming outsiders for all the evils that had befallen Egyptian society.⁵²² Others called Nasser a man of bad faith who was trying to play East against West to get the best out of both.⁵²³ Still others thought that such massive arms were unnecessary and beyond the capacity of the Egyptian army to command and that Nasser's primary purpose was political and psychological - to silence his Arab rivals and threaten Israel.⁵²⁴ Some considered the arms deal a diplomatic and

⁵¹⁷"Dismay was the first reaction of the Western powers, followed by an anxious search for some way to reverse from the momentous change in Egypt's historic policy". Quoted in Cremeans, *THE ARABS AND THE WORLD*, op.cit., p.146. See also Wynn, *NASSER OF EGYPT*, op.cit., p.121; Jeannette Clarvoe Tierney, *THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST :1956*, Cambridge : Center of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1958, p.29.

⁵¹⁸"In contrast among the Arabs "little concern was felt about opening the door to Russian influence". Quoted from Cremeans, *THE ARABS AND THE WORLD*, op.cit., p.146. See also Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., *THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM*, op.cit., pp.200, 202; Wynn, *NASSER OF EGYPT*, op.cit., p.121.

⁵¹⁹Quoted from Nasser, *SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS*, 1958, p.367.

⁵²⁰Implied in *Ibid.*, p.367.

⁵²¹Walter Z. Laqueur, *THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST*, London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959.

⁵²²Wheelock, *NASSER'S NEW EGYPT*, op.cit., p.223; Lacouture, *NASSER*, op.cit., p.208.

⁵²³Wynn, *NASSER OF EGYPT*, op.cit., p.121; Nolte, Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., *THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM*, op.cit., p.199.

⁵²⁴Laqueur, *THE SOVIET UNION*, op.cit., p.221; Hurewitz, *MIDDLE EAST POLITICS*, op.cit., pp.463-64.

economic risk.⁵²⁵

However, most of these critics, willingly or unintentionally, omitted the role of the British, and "indeed, the bitterness of the Egyptian-Iraqi dispute, no less than that of the Arab-Israeli dispute, could not fully be appreciated without examining the arms-purveying policies of the Western powers". The Western powers were using their monopoly of arms supply to the Arab governments and Israel to play one rival against another, accordingly "dividing and ruling" among rival Arab governments and to wield political power in the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁵²⁶ However, some pro-Israeli critics underestimate the role of the Baghdad Pact or the Israeli attack in Nasser's actions. If attack by a hostile neighbouring country which is still legally in a state of war with violent truce cannot be considered a cause for Nasser to seek arms to defend himself and his regime, then for what purposes do states maintain and equip armies? When the Western powers sold modern weapons to the Arab countries under their direct or indirect control, critics never raised the question of the gravity of the implication nor did they fear that small countries might lose their economic and political independence.⁵²⁷ The fact that a deal with Russia was intolerable in the light of Western communist phobia was heavily exploited by the Israelis to entice American and Western opinion which until then had the same newspapers carefully overlooked the fact that "Israel had done so seven and a half years before - the only difference between the two transactions being that, while Israel had paid for the arms it had purchased from Czechoslovakia in American dollars, donated ostensibly for charitable causes, Egypt was now disposing of its surplus cotton in exchange for arms".⁵²⁸ The further irony was that objections should come from Western powers, the champions of "free enterprise" and "free trade" among nations,⁵²⁹ "as if, being denied in the West, Egypt was not entitled to look

⁵²⁵ "President Nasser's policy towards Russia at that time was suspected of no more than foolish involvement". Quoted from Little, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV, No.4, p.24.

⁵²⁶ Quoted from Hurewitz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, op.cit., pp.461-2.

⁵²⁷ Laqueur, THE SOVIET UNION, op.cit., p.221; C.M. Woodhouse, "The Western Case against Nasserism", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV, No.4, April, 1959, p.49.

⁵²⁸ Quoted from Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cit., p.199.

elsewhere".⁵³⁰

Conclusion of an arms deal with Russia by Nasser, regardless of volume, disturbed the military superiority of Israel (which the West preferred to call a balance)⁵³¹ by which is "meant enough arms for Israel from all available sources to enable her to defend herself against all Arab challengers without the need for direct United States intervention in any war".⁵³² Based upon such superiority, "Israel had developed a policy of maintaining its demonstrated military advantage, as the most reliable defence arrangement":

But once...Czechoslovakia with Soviet blessings, began to sell heavy military equipment to Egypt at substantial discount, a sense of insecurity spread through Israel...This departure (was) liable to bring about a revolutionary and ominous change in Israel's security situation.⁵³³

Therefore, the Israeli government declared that they "reserve for themselves full freedom of action at the time and in the manner (they) shall find suitable."⁵³⁴ The gravity of the arms deal can only be evaluated in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. For if these weapons are ever used, as they were in 1956 and 1967, it would be against the other side. In most countries of the world military men play a leading role in shaping the policies of their governments. But Israel is a "state in a 'Garrison'",⁵³⁵ "a nation in Arms".⁵³⁶ The total life of Israel - its

⁵²⁹Ibid., p.198.

⁵³⁰Quoted from Nolte, THE UNITED STATES, op.cit., p.162.

⁵³¹Nasser's indignation against such Western standards of equality is evident in his tirade on the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., p.755.

⁵³²Quoted from THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 16, 1967, p.11. "Ben Gurion's position was that so long as Israel maintained military superiority (which he preferred to call military balance) over the combined forces of the Arab states, and so long as it could successfully preserve and rectify its borders by retaliatory raids, it would be safe". Quoted from Amos Perlmutter, "The Israeli Army in Politics : The Persistence of the Civilian over the Military", WORLD POLITICS, XX, No.4, July, 1968, p.626. "The equilibrium, rather, was fixed by Israel's scientific, technological, and industrial superiority, which the Arab states could not reasonably expect to match in the foreseeable future". Quoted from Hurewitz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, op.cit., p.451. See also see a similar statement in THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 24, 1970, p.3.

⁵³³Quoted from Hurewitz, DIPLOMACY, II, op.cit., pp.406, 409.

⁵³⁴Quoted from Moshe Sharett, October 18, 1955, in Ibid., p.407.

military, its industry, its economy, its policy, its ideology, and even its culture - is centered around the conflict with the Arabs. Threat and even the actual Israeli preventive war in 1967 were condoned by writers who are considered advocates of world peace and order.⁵³⁷

The earnest desire of Nasser and the other army officers⁵³⁸ was to see "an Egypt free and strong".⁵³⁹ In Nasser's thought the power of Egypt and the Arab states is to be found in three basic sources - strategical location, vast oil and raw material resources, and vast population.⁵⁴⁰ Nasser's geopolitical approach is reminiscent made known by the British geographer, Halford Mackinder,⁵⁴¹ the American naval officer Alfred Mahan, and later the German founders of the

⁵³⁵Grand strategy - which combined the military effort with political, economic, psychological and diplomatic campaign - was the responsibility of the War Cabinet". Quoted from Leo Helman, "War in the Middle East : An Israeli View", MILITARY REVIEW, XLVII, No.9, September, 1967, p.58. "The generally accepted national goals of Israel are : defence of the nation; development of a viable economy; creation of socially integrated nation". Quoted from Irving Heymount, "Israeli Defence Forces", MILITARY REVIEW, XLVII, No.2, February, 1967, p.39. "The issues of war and peace and of policy toward the Arabs from 1948 to the 1967 war have commanded the highest priority in the ideology and practices of the political institutions of Israel and above all of its military". Quoted from Perimutter, WORLD POLITICS, XX, No.4, p.626. See also pp.637, 639.

⁵³⁶Quoted from Ben Halpern, "The Military in Israel", THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES, ed., John J. Johnson, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962, p.350. Contrast with J.C. Hurewitz, "The Role of the Military in Society and Government in Israel", THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY, op.cit., p.103; Hurewitz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, op.cit., p.373.

⁵³⁷Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas de Katsenbach, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, New York : John Wiley & Sons, 1961, p.212.

⁵³⁸Desire is not enough to achieve objectives. Dedication and sacrifice are preconditions. See Eugene Staley, THE FUTURE OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES : Political Implications of Economic Development, New York : Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961, pp.218-9.

⁵³⁹Quoted from Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit., p.49. See also p.78.

⁵⁴⁰ibid., pp.105-07. See Ahmad Khalidi, "An Appraisal of the Arab-Israeli Military Balance", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XLIII, No.3, pp.55-57. Contrast with Hasan Mustafa, ARAB MILITARY COOPERATION : Its History, Importance, Organization and Objectives. [In Arabic] Beirut : Dar al Tall'ah, 1965, pp.153-55. Mustafa points out that the Arab's vast geographical area is a hindrance under current conditions and makes it difficult to move Egyptian forces to Israeli borders. On the other hand, Israel's poor geographical location causes her to be on the offensive. See Halford J. Mackinder, DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND REALITY : A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, New York : Henry Holt, 1942, pp.139-40. Mackinder's basic theory of strategical location and safe basis gives consideration to social organism.

⁵⁴¹Even Mackinder, DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND REALITY, op.cit., p.139, "gave final consideration to the economic reality of man power".

geopolitical school⁵⁴² as well as the Communists.⁵⁴³ Whereas Ben Gurion considered "geography...in the main, a static element", he conceived the "decisive aspects of dynamism, creation and growth".⁵⁴⁴ Nasser belatedly realized that geographical positions and raw materials could be a source of weakness⁵⁴⁵ if not utilized and protected.⁵⁴⁶ With financial resources and modern weapons⁵⁴⁷ Nasser believed, "We are 23 million and there is no reason why we cannot build an army of hundreds of thousands".⁵⁴⁸ Nasser's estimate even in terms of the number of soldiers proved illusory.⁵⁴⁹ For Israel with its population of 2.5 millions could mobilize at least ten percent of its population (250-300 thousand), while the bordering Arab countries with a population of approximately 45 millions could mobilize less than one percent of their population (about 300 thousand), and many of these could not be put immediately into the battlefield. "The Egyptians refused to believe that Israel achieved its military superiority largely by its own efforts and ingenuity and not, as they insisted, with the collusion of the Western powers"⁵⁵⁰ The Arabs' vast geographical area,

⁵⁴²Ibid., p.VIII, Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, Princeton, N.J. : Van Nostrand, 1962, pp.334-35.

⁵⁴³Lenin wrote in 1923, "The outcome of the struggle depends in the last resort on the fact that Russia, India, and China, etc., constitute the vast majority of mankind". Quoted in Laqueur, COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM, op.cit., p.293.

⁵⁴⁴Quoted from Ben Gurion, REBIRTH AND DESTINY, op.cit., p.489.

⁵⁴⁵Eventually Nasser realized that strategical location and resources "proved to contribute to our weakness. Our strategical position was the main cause of our occupation. The same applies with equal vigour to our great wealth and immense resources". Quoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958, p.133., March 30, 1958.

⁵⁴⁶Ibid., p.134.

⁵⁴⁷"Abd al Nasir saw the arms problem of Egypt arising primarily from modern weapons starvation". Quoted from Hurewitz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, op.cit., p.138. "The great powers have prevented any of these weapons from reaching us." Quoted from Nasser, NEWSWEEK, XLIV, July 26, 1954, p.38. See also Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., p.18; El Barawy, MILITARY COUP, op.cit., p.193. Mustafa, ARAB MILITARY CO-OPERATION, op.cit., pp.139-40, was more realistic contending that the Arab numerical superiority was actually unattainable and was less mobile than the Israeli forces. After the tragedy of the 1967 war Nasser realized that "the problem is not in the airplanes, really,... [It is in the] pilots. We have more planes than pilots, the Israelis have two pilots for every airplane". Quoted from THE NEW YORK TIMES, February, 9, 1970, p.8.

⁵⁴⁸Quoted from Nasser, NEWSWEEK, XLIV, July 26, 1954, p.38.

⁵⁴⁹Heiman, MILITARY REVIEW, XLVII, No.9, p.65, estimated the Israeli army to be 250-300 thousand and the Arabs, 300 thousand, i.e., "Israel mobilized 10 per cent; Arabs one half per cent". p.65. A similar account is found in Hurewitz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, op.cit., table 19 estimates the active and bordering Arab states have 400 thousand soldiers and Israel about the same, p.450.

⁵⁵⁰Quoted from Hurewitz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, op.cit., p.138.

population, and raw materials played into the hands of the Israelis, who pictured themselves as David, the Arabs as Goliath.⁵⁵¹ In reality, the situation was reversed. There have been several attempts to measure the military strength of the Israelis in comparison to the Arabs in general and the Egyptians in particular.⁵⁵² The wide discrepancy and uncertainty may reflect the axiom that "figures do not lie, but liars can figure".

Even with correct information on the quantity of weapons it would still be difficult to assess the impact of the arms deal on Egypt's military strength. In order to measure the military power of any state consideration must be given not just to the immediate military value, the quantity, and the quality of arms available,⁵⁵³ but also to the deviation, conversion, development, and future invention of material and services.⁵⁵⁴ These factors reflect the scientific progress, technological developments, and productive capacity of the state to supply its army.⁵⁵⁵ For military power is interdependent with other types of

⁵⁵¹Ben-Gurion, LOOK, XXII, No.8, p.95; Heiman, MILITARY REVIEW, XLVII, No.9, pp.65-66. "Israel's domain is about 1/400th of that from which the Arab people have been liberated". Quoted from Eban, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, XXVI, No.3, p.114. "Arab independence stretches through 13 sovereign states across 4,000,000 square miles with a total population of 100,000,000. Israel is a single sovereignty established in a small area of 8,000 square miles with a population of only 2 and one half million. The Arab preponderance is thus reflected in territory, population, mineral wealth, strategic importance and a formidable capacity for diplomatic manoeuvre, especially in international organizations where numbers count". Quoted from Eban, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XLIII, No.4, p.627.

⁵⁵²For an Arab view on evaluation of Arab-Israeli strength prior to the June 1967 war, see Ahmad Khalidi, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XLII, No.3, pp.58-60; Mustafa, ARAB MILITARY CO-OPERATION, op.cit., pp.148-54; Campbell, THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE MUTED COLD WAR, op.cit., p.17; Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT, op.cit., p.120.

⁵⁵³"In a quantitative race the key question is 'How much?'. In a qualitative race, it is 'How soon?'. A quantitative race requires continuous expansion of military resources, a qualitative race continuous redeployment of them...A qualitative race, however, tends to be a competition of elites rather than masses". Quoted from Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Pre Requisite and Results", PUBLIC POLICY: A Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University, 1958, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1958, pp.75-77, reproduced in Hurewitz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, op.cit., p.445.

⁵⁵⁴Stephen B. Jones, "The Power Inventory and National Strategy", WORLD POLITICS, VI, No.4, July, 1954, pp.428-30.

⁵⁵⁵"The successful Powers' of the future, [Leopold S. Amery] predicted, would be 'those which have the greatest industrial basis'. It would 'not matter whether they are in the center of a continent or an island; those people who have the industrial power and the power of invention and science will be able to defeat all others'".

power - economic, psychological, political, or technological.⁵⁵⁶ Thus, the military strength of a country which imports armaments cannot be measured by the amount and type of equipment import alone. It is impossible to measure the military power of a country without taking into account the spiritual, non-material aspects of its people: their leadership, organization, morale, training to use their weapons, dedication to their cause, and ability to fight.⁵⁵⁷ Even potential allies or enemies must be included. It is these psychological factors that are often determinant.⁵⁵⁸ Unfortunately, the only accurate test of military strength is actual combat.⁵⁵⁹ After the arms deal of 1955 Nasser maintained a standing army equipped with the most sophisticated conventional weapons better than those used by the combined Arab armies actively engaged in fighting with Israel since 1948. Egypt also was able to manufacture jet fighters and other modern weapons, indicating her progress in industrial and technological development resulting from the modernization of the army. In short, the Russian arms deal increased Egypt's military and industrial capacity in relation to the other Arab countries, which reinforced Egyptian hegemony in political, cultural, and religious leadership, if not in financial matters. Yet between 1948 and 1967 Egypt's power in relation to Israel's had declined woefully.

Nasser had complained that "in the comedy of the war of 1948 that befell upon you the Egyptian army...did not have the chance to fight but was a victim of stabbing...of treason, conniving, armistice and Israel's allies".⁵⁶⁰ Nasser

Quoted from Sprout & Sprout, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, op.cit., p.338, quoting Leopold S. Amery, "The Successful Powers", THE GEOGRAPHICAL JOURNAL, London, April, 1964, p.441.

⁵⁵⁶Organski, WORLD POLITICS, op.cit., pp.195-96; Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, POWER AND SOCIETY : A Framework for Political Inquiry, New Haven, Conn : Yale University Press, 1950, pp.92-94. "This is not to argue that geographic variables no longer have political significance. In many situations the mountains, deserts, oceans, and other geographic realities still present obstacles to political undertaking, both military and non military". Quoted from Sprout & Sprout, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, op.cit., p.39.

⁵⁵⁷Organski, WORLD POLITICS, op.cit., pp.173-74, 178, 181-84.

⁵⁵⁸Jones, WORLD POLITICS, VI, No.4, p.447; Lasswell and Kaplan, POWER AND SOCIETY, op.cit., p.295; Organski, WORLD POLITICS, op.cit., pp.202-04.

⁵⁵⁹Organski, WORLD POLITICS, op.cit., pp.150, 440-41.

⁵⁶⁰Translated from Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.280, March 3, 1955.

repeatedly attributed the Egyptian defeat⁵⁶¹ to lack of unified command,⁵⁶² the complex and rigid organization of the Egyptian army,⁵⁶³ and poor leadership,⁵⁶⁴ but not to a lack of fighting spirit. In a manner reminiscent of the illusion of the Ottoman Sublime Porte regarding the reaction of the mighty French armies of the 1799 Napoleon Expedition to Syria to the sight of his moustache, Nasser envisioned "the Israeli soldier in Iraq al Manshiyyah in 1948...frightened and fleeing on the first sight of Nasser and the Egyptians and leaving behind tanks and armor."⁵⁶⁵ Under such a delusion Nasser was unable to assess the strength of the Egyptian forces in 1956 or in 1967. It is difficult to estimate the real strength of the Egyptian forces in the 1956 or 1967 wars. Despite most tangible evidence and unbiased reports, Nasser's refusal to admit or acknowledge that the Israelis were capable of providing one of the best fighting armies in the Middle East without any outside support⁵⁶⁶ led to a disastrous defeat in 1967⁵⁶⁷ and almost brought the Arab armies and the Arab nation to the brink of disintegration. And, it became apparent that the strategy of the June 1967 war was pre-planned, as General Hod stated:

Sixteen years planning had gone into those initial 80 minutes. "We lived with the plan, we ate the plan, we slept on the plan. Constantly we perfected it".⁵⁶⁸

The possibility of annexing part of Old Jerusalem had been seriously considered since 1964,⁵⁶⁹ and the Arabs "provided the pretexts [the Israelis] had difficulty

⁵⁶¹Mustafa, ARAB MILITARY CO-OPERATION, op.cit., pp.117-48. Mustafa pointed out the urgent need, objectives, and value of unified Arab military command. See also pp.117, 130-33.

⁵⁶²Both in 1956 and in 1967 "Egypt, Jordan and Syrian had a military alliance...We proved it was just a paper pact". Quoted from Ben Gurion, LOOK, XXII, No.8, p.96. See also Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, THE SIX DAY WAR, London : Heinemann, 1967, p.90; Tom R. Little, MODERN EGYPT, New York : Praeger, 1967, p.274.

⁵⁶³Helman, MILITARY REVIEW, XLVII, No.9, p.59.

⁵⁶⁴Naguib, EGYPT'S DESTINY, op.cit., p.16, Little, MODERN EGYPT, p.275.

⁵⁶⁵Translated from Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part 1, p.280, March 3, 1955.

⁵⁶⁶"The Egyptians refused to believe that Israel achieved its military superiority largely by its own efforts and ingenuity and not, as they insisted, with the collusion of the Western powers". Quoted from Hurewitz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, op.cit., p.138.

⁵⁶⁷Cecil Hourani in Walter Z. Laqueur, ed., THE ISRAELI-ARAB READER, op.cit., p.245.

⁵⁶⁸Quoted from Randolph and Winston Churchill, THE SIX DAY WAR, op.cit., pp.62-63, 65-66, and p.91.

⁵⁶⁹Jerusalem's master plan drawn up in 1964, was meant to outline development for

in inventing themselves".⁵⁷⁰

The June 1967 war was precipitated by Nasser's policy of brinkmanship which made palatable to world opinion the Israeli claim of exercise of preventive war.⁵⁷¹ The Egyptians and the other Arabs have only themselves to blame for being taken by surprise.⁵⁷² The devastating defeat of the Arabs and their resultant disillusionment may be attributed to poor Egyptian training,⁵⁷³ inability to use the Russian weapons,⁵⁷⁴ and poor intelligence which drastically underestimated the strength of the Israelis.⁵⁷⁵ In addition, Nasser was framed in the supposition that "being in the possession of some of the more spectacular instruments of modern warfare [it gave him the]...illusion of having become a modern military power" was tested and proven in Egypt in 1967.⁵⁷⁶

Nevertheless, it was the arms deal with Russia that put Nasser into the orbit of Arab leadership. Therefore, its importance is not in the actual military strength

fifty years...The planning team had clear instructions to take into account the possibility of ultimate reunification and to make provisions for 'interconnection and integration' of the two sectors". Quoted from THE NEW YORK TIMES, May 12, 1969, p.24.

⁵⁷⁰Quoted from Cecil Hourani in Walter Z. Laqueur, ed., THE ISRAELI-ARAB READER, op.cit., p.256.

⁵⁷¹Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD, op.cit., p.145. "Once Nasser had taken the first step there was a very strong temptation to advance further towards the brink. And then, at a certain point, retreat became impossible". Quoted from Walter Z. Laqueur, THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM : The Origins of the Arab Israeli Conflict, 1967, New York : MacMillan, 1968, p.82.

⁵⁷²Laqueur, THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM, op.cit., pp.105-06.

⁵⁷³"Egyptian officers, however, still scandalize their mentors by continuing polo at the Gezira Club in Cairo. The discipline of the Red Army is not for Egyptian youth". Quoted from THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 16, 1968, p.3.

⁵⁷⁴For the impressive role of the Russian advisers since the June 1967 war, see THE NEW YORK TIMES, October 22, 1968, p.12..

⁵⁷⁵The excellence of Israeli intelligence was a decisive factor in their victory in 1967. See Helman, MILITARY REVIEW, XLVII, No.9, p.60. Contrast with dismal Egyptian intelligence cited in THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 10, 1967, p.12.

⁵⁷⁶Nasser attributed the loss of the 1967 war first to American and British air attacks (THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 10, 1967, p.12) and then to an "unusual aid"; Mohammed Heikal's account, THE NEW YORK TIMES, October 7, 1967, p.1. Finally, Nasser claimed that the Egyptian defeat "was not so much of the Israelis cleverness, but the conceit and complacency of our generals". Quoted from Nasser, NEWSWEEK, February, 10, 1969, p.34. See also Heikal's criticism of Egyptian officers in THE NEW YORK TIMES, October 14, 1967, p.4; October 21, 1967, p.2.

with which it imbued the Egyptians, rather it is in the psychological, political, and even economic significance of giving Nasser a blank cheque for Arab leadership. The West at first attempted to reconcile Nasser to its camp by hastily offering generous economic aid of the sort he had long sought and even arms similar to those supplied under the Russian arms deal and on more generous terms than in the past. But it is doubtful that the West underbid Russian prices.⁵⁷⁷ The more concessions the West made to Nasser the more convinced the Arabs became in Nasser's strategy. The Czech arms deal brought the Arab East into the Cold War and opened the door of the Middle East and Africa to the Soviet Union which caused the West and pro-Western Middle Eastern governments great discomfort. The West feared that the arms deal would make Nasser dependent on the Soviet Union, especially after June 1967.⁵⁷⁸ Nasser and his supporters pointed out that the soundness of his policy in dealing with the Russians resulted in both East and West competing to woo him with aid of all kinds. The West did not fear that Egypt might compromise herself by obtaining arms from a major power until the Russian arms deal was announced.

Only then did the West worry that Egypt might be mortgaging her cotton and diverting her meager resources from badly needed welfare programmes to armaments.⁵⁷⁹ However, Egypt then had the smallest per capita military expenditure of any Middle Eastern country except Lebanon.⁵⁸⁰ The pro Western Arab governments, parties, and groups joined the West in attacking Nasser as having sold out the Middle East to satisfy personal ambitions, and the cry rose to check Nasser while he was still weak.⁵⁸¹ "Militant Western 'neutrophobia [was] ready to go all the way even to the 'brink of war', in order to deter or to defeat

⁵⁷⁷Hurewitz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, op.cit., p.463.

⁵⁷⁸For evaluation of Arab leaders' views of Nasser's dependence on or independence from Russia even after the June 1967 war, see THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 16, 1968, p.3. See reaffirmation in Ibid., January 15, 1969, p.16. "Eastern European informants have been arguing that Soviet influence here had been greatly exaggerated in the Western press". Quoted from Ibid., p.16.

⁵⁷⁹"When you are in debt to somebody, you are always in a strong position. Debtors are always stronger than creditors". Quoted from Nasser, NEWSWEEK, February 10, 1969, p.36.

⁵⁸⁰Hurewitz, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, op.cit., pp.447, 448.

⁵⁸¹Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT, op.cit., pp.120-21. That chance was to avail itself in the Suez Crisis and subsequently the Tripartite invasion.

neutralism and assertive Egyptian Positive Neutralism."⁵⁸² Thus, the mistake of the West in fighting Arab nationalism under the guise of stemming the advance of Communism instead of differentiating between Arab nationalism and Communism resulted in forging an alliance between Arab nationalism and Communism instead.⁵⁸³ The same error was made designating the Communist bloc as "Eastern", thereby identifying it with the Afro-Asian countries, and further in describing any reform movement as Communist inspired and thus crediting Communism with reform. Surely identifying Arab nationalism with Communism was wholeheartedly welcomed by the Soviet Union in order to identify itself with the Afro-Asian-Arab liberation movement. The British concentrated on their plan to get rid of Nasser - a plan reminiscent of Palmerstone's plan to curb Mohammed Ali in order to eliminate Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire. The more the West attacked Nasser the more popular he became and the closer his cooperation with Russia. The drift from the West was climaxed in the 1956 Tripartite 'military intervention' in Egypt.⁵⁸⁴

⁵⁸²Quoted from Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM, op.cit., p.200.

⁵⁸³Campbell, THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE MUTED COLD WAR, op.cit., p.9.

⁵⁸⁴"In 1956 two successive crises were created by the nationalization of the Canal Company and by the invasion of Egypt. The act of nationalization completed the destruction of the balance of power in the Middle East: the Anglo-French invasion sought to restore that balance in Western interests. The decisions which led Israel, France and Britain in their combined assault on Egypt were taken separately between January and May of 1956, several months before the nationalization of the Canal Company. The Suez crisis thus had no fundamental connection with Suez, with the Canal or with the Canal Company. That crisis emerged rather from the conflict between the West and Arab nationalism, from the aspiration of the Arabs to liquidate the empire of the infidel within the realm of Islam and from the determination of the West to maintain its Arab empire. France needed Algeria and England needed Iraq to retain their status as Great Powers....The Suez Crisis marked a turning point in the history of Europe, Asia, Africa and Egypt if not in that of England or of the Middle East. It gave as great a stimulus to the Asian renaissance as the victory of Japan in 1905 so that the evacuation from Port Said was hailed as the equivalent of Salamis. It also stimulated African endeavors to secure full independence from Europe, diverted American attention from the invasion of Cuba by Fidel Castro on 2 December 1956 and so helped to bring new centers of world revolution into existence. In Egypt the Anglo-French-Israeli assault failed to overthrow Nasser but strengthened his position immensely and unexpectedly, making the revolution popular as never before and rallying to his support the richer classes impoverished by his policies. The war destroyed British influence in Egypt as completely as the 1840 crisis had done. It revealed the bankruptcy of the legend of French civilization in Egypt, ending the role of Levantine communities as intermediaries between East and West, the history of the Jewish community after 2,200 years and the Alexandrian period of cosmopolitan and semi-colonial Egypt...." Quoted from EAST AND WEST OF SUEZ : The Suez Canal in

Perhaps the Russians got the best of the deal by supplying military hardware which otherwise would have become obsolete.⁵⁸⁵ But what more could the Arabs ask than to have the friendship of a major super power in their grave struggle against Israel and Western 'Imperialistic' powers?⁵⁸⁶ "The agreement, hailed in the Arab world as a blow to colonialism, projected the U.S.S.R. into the Middle East as a champion of Arab nationalism and catapulted Nasser to a position as its unchallenged leader."⁵⁸⁷ However, the irony is that:

Soviet penetration into the Middle East, far from threatening Israel, has raised a convenient smokescreen, for where the United States finds Communism, she seldom looks further under the woodpile. In this connection it is important to remember that until Suez the Communist party was the only political group in the Arab countries that advocated peace with Israel.⁵⁸⁸

The creation of Israel was the "leverage the Soviets used to spread their influence in the Arab world. If it were not for Israel, Russia would be less welcome in that area".⁵⁸⁹ "But the fact remains that Russia won its new influence in the Middle East almost by default".⁵⁹⁰

The arms deal was a diplomatic defeat for the West.⁵⁹¹ The more the quality and

History, 1854-1956, by D.A. Farnie, Oxford : The Clarendon Press, 1969. pp.718, 740.

⁵⁸⁵"Thus, both sides to the transactions may regard them as economically advantageous, depending upon their own subjective valuation of the products involved." Quoted from Robert Loring Allen, MIDDLE EASTERN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, EASTERN EUROPE, AND MAINLAND CHINA, Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia, p.52.

⁵⁸⁶"As influential, perhaps even more influential than the economic considerations, is the fact that the Arabs seem to feel that they have found an ally in their political and military difficulties with Israel and a fellow protagonist against Western powers". Quoted from *Ibid.*, p.65.

⁵⁸⁷"The new Soviet approach made it possible for the Arab masses to applaud the Soviet Union as a powerful friend without thinking about Communist ideology". Quoted from Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT, *op.cit.*, p.122.

⁵⁸⁸Quoted from "Forum Comments", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXII, December, 1957, p.3. Another statement echoing to the same tune, "The French bet that Moscow will prevent the Arabs from destroying Israel - the only factor that induces the angry Arab to lean on Russia". Quoted from Sulzberger, THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 28, 1970, p.38.

⁵⁸⁹Quoted from U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, LXV, No.4, p.60. For a similar statement see NEWSWEEK, February, 17, 1969, p.46.

⁵⁹⁰NEWSWEEK, February, 17, 1969, p.46.

quantity of the Russian arms were revealed the higher Nasser's popularity rose in the Arab countries. The arms deal pacified the army and healed the schisms within the ruling group. Nasser's leadership become unquestionable.⁵⁹² The arms deal not only opened for the Arabs new sources for the type and quantity of weapons they needed; it proved new markets for their raw materials and semi-industrial products and made possible an alternative for importing machinery and equipment. One economic and technical consequence of the arms deal and the Arab-Israeli arms race was the engagement of Egypt in production of some of the most sophisticated conventional weapons such as supersonic jets and rockets, which, in terms of standards of industrialization, was a great accomplishment for an impoverished country.⁵⁹³ However, even suppression of Nasser would not have definitely eliminated Russian influence, for Western policy in the Arab East transformed the area into fertile soil for Communism.⁵⁹⁴ The crown of Nasser's victory came when his Arab adversaries - his arch enemy, Nuri al Sa'id of Iraq⁵⁹⁵ - publicly supported and endorsed him. Thus, the arms deal with Russia:

Was not just another trade agreement...The agreement stressed Egypt's independence, and was instrumental in making Egyptian leadership acceptable to most Arabs.⁵⁹⁶

⁵⁹¹ "Perhaps more exciting to the Arabs than anything else, however, was the reaction in Washington. Dulles looked panicky. He quickly dispatched his Assistant Secretary of State, George Allen, to Cairo on a breathless mission which nobody yet can explain. The Egyptian press was delighted. In the old days, Egyptians had to crawl to Washington, Washington has come crawling to Cairo". Quoted from Wynn, *NASSER OF EGYPT*, op.cit., p.120.

⁵⁹² Ibid., pp.120-22; Allen, *MIDDLE EASTERN ECONOMIC RELATIONS*, op.cit., p.123.

⁵⁹³ Hurewitz, *MIDDLE EAST POLITICS*, pp.474-75; Mustafa, *ARAB MILITARY CO-OPERATION*, op.cit., pp.137, 150.

⁵⁹⁴ Nasser, *LIFE*, XLVII, No.3, pp.96-110, or Nasser, *MAJMU'AT KHUTAB*, Part II, p.457, July 14, 1959. Nasser blamed Nuri al Sa'id and the West for the spread of Communism in Iraq and other Arab countries which did not have diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. and in which Communist party activity was not legitimate.

⁵⁹⁵ "What could President Jamal 'Abd an Nasir do but seek the assistance of Russian arms when he found that he was unable to safeguard the very existence of Egypt and repel the aggression against her through the (help of) Western powers?" Quoted from Khalil, *THE ARAB STATES*, II, op.cit., pp.272-73. For a similar statement by Nuri al Sa'id, see Khalil, *THE ARAB STATES*, II, op.cit., pp.273-74. For the stands of other Arab leaders, see Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., *THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM*, op.cit., p.201.

⁵⁹⁶ Quoted from Salah El Serafy, "Economic Development by Revolution : The Case of the U.A.R.", *THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL*, XVII, No.3, Summer, 1963, p.222.

Nevertheless, the important thing is that:

The reaction in the Arab world was hysterical. Overnight, Nasser's popularity skyrocketed to heights never achieved by a modern Arab leader. He was the new Saladin, the new Prophet, the all powerful hero, the saviour of the Arab world. Arab refugees in their camps went wild with celebrations. Nasser's photo went up everywhere.⁵⁹⁷

3.12 NASSER AND ARAB NATIONALISM

Nationalism has been one of the most dynamic forces in modern society. Like any other social phenomenon, it has developed in scope and objectives even within the same country.⁵⁹⁸ Nevertheless, certain of its elements remain relatively common.⁵⁹⁹ Foremost among them are: speaking a common language; inhabiting the same territory; having the same ancestry and history; confessing the same religion; adhering to the same ideology, culture, or philosophy; adhering to the same ideology, culture, or philosophy; desiring to live together; benefiting from material and economic integration; developing a community of interest or objectives; possessing a common fear of insecurity; or falling under the same administrative jurisdiction. The existence of one or more of these elements creates a feeling (genuine or fictitious) of belonging to the same nation which is different from all other nations (and is usually believed to be superior to all others). The consummation of nationalism is the formation of the sovereign state.⁶⁰⁰ Likewise, the methods for the creation and development of nationalism vary.⁶⁰¹

⁵⁹⁷Quoted from Wynn, *NASSER OF EGYPT*, op.cit., pp.119-20.

⁵⁹⁸For the development of German nationalism, for instance, see Louis L. Snyder, ed., *THE DYNAMICS OF NATIONALISM : Readings in its Meaning and Development*, Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1964, p.369. See the definition of 'nation', 'nationality', 'nationalism', and other derivatives as given by eminent authors, leaders and dictionaries in *Ibid.*, "Appendix", pp.369-73. See also C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, "The Ummah-Analytic Approach", *STUDIA ISLAMICA*, X, 1959, pp.5-22.

⁵⁹⁹Snyder, *THE DYNAMICS OF NATIONALISM*, op.cit., pp. xvi-xviii.

⁶⁰⁰Schleicher, *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*, op.cit., pp.32, 49.

⁶⁰¹*Ibid.*, 4-63. Examples of methods and means used are schools, mass media, emblems and symbols, institutions and organizations.

There is almost unanimity of opinion that the Arabic language is the spirit and *raison d'être* of Arab nationalism.⁶⁰² After the fall of Baghdad in 1258 Egypt had been one of the most important centres of Arabic language and literature and since the Napoleon expedition (1798-1801) which had restored her hegemony. Nevertheless, a separatist, secular Egyptian nationalist movement began to develop. Some Egyptian nationalists claimed that the Arabic language and culture which developed in Egypt are territorial in character and are not conditioned by general Arabic civilization.⁶⁰³ To complete the estrangement of Egypt from other Arabic speaking countries, Egyptianization of Arabic (i.e. the use of spoken Egyptian instead of classical Arabic) was attempted, and the suggestion was made to replace the Arabic alphabet with the Latin alphabet as had done in Turkey.⁶⁰⁴ These attempts originated with and were inspired by Europeans on the pretext of their making it easier for Egypt to modernize by liberating herself from the shackles of classical Arabic. They were echoed among nationalist Egyptians who advocated disassociation from the Arabs. On the positive side, even those who strongly advocated a Mediterranean culture differentiated between culture (which they considered nationalistic territorial attitude) and civilization⁶⁰⁵ (which they considered universal because it is material and scientific) and advocated strong cooperation among Arab states.⁶⁰⁶ Aside from its support in cultural areas, Arabic, the language of the Quran, was being exalted in line with Islamic tradition by all the politico-religious reformist parties and societies.⁶⁰⁷ For the Prophet,⁶⁰⁸ his successors, and puritan Muslim leaders all considered the

⁶⁰²Anwar G. Chejne, "Arabic : Its Significance and Place in Arab Muslim Society", THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XIX, No.4, Autumn, 1965, p.459; L.M. Kenny, "Sati' al Husri's Views on Arab Nationalism", THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XVII, No.3, Summer, 1963, pp.239, 254.

⁶⁰³Kenny, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XVII, No.3, p.239 refutes the territoriality of Arabic literature.

⁶⁰⁴Muhammad Rif'at, POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF MODERN ARABIC IDEAS (in Arabic) Cairo : Dar al Ma'arif, 1964, pp.36-37.

⁶⁰⁵ibid., pp.177 distinguishes between culture (which is national, territorial and spiritual) and civilization (which is scientific, material and universal). Elie Salem, "Islam as a Basis of Arab Search for Ideology", STUDIES IN ISLAM, II, No.2, April, 1965, pp.79-86.

⁶⁰⁶Chejne, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XIX, No.4, pp.451-55.

⁶⁰⁷ibid., p.456.

⁶⁰⁸E.A. Speisler, "Cultural Factors in Social Factors in Social Dynamics in the Near

use and protection of Arabic an act of faith and a prerequisite for learning Islam.⁶⁰⁹ Such indivisibility between Islam as a religion and Arabs as a people proved the statement that "Arab nationalism was a result of defending Islam".⁶¹⁰ Even different Egyptian secular political groups and parties considered education and teaching in Arabic as patriotic duties.⁶¹¹ Moreover, Egyptian governments since the time of Orabi considered maintenance and protection of Arab antiquities a national duty.

History has also become the inspiration of Arab nationalism.⁶¹² It has said that "[Arabs] live in their splendid past as an escape from the miserable present".⁶¹³ Mohammed Ali's personal ambition to build an imperial dynasty was the genesis of the idea of establishing a modern Arab state;⁶¹⁴ however, his attempt to modernize Egypt resulted in the revival of Arabic for translation.⁶¹⁵ In the same vein, we can analyze Islam in the relationship between Arab and Egyptian nationalism. Islam is the religion of most Arabs and Egyptians. And even the non-Muslim Arabs are influenced by Islamic culture. It has been the advocates of a secular Egyptian nationalism (mostly the Copts) who wanted to discontinue Arabic and to dissociate Egypt from the Arabs. The Copts were afraid of being overwhelmed by a large Muslim majority. Inasmuch as the Arab people and their language were predominant among the Muslims in early Islam, paradoxically

East", SOCIAL FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, edited by Sydney Nettleton Fisher, op.cit., p.19; Fabumni, op.cit., pp.215-16.

⁶⁰⁹Fabumni, op.cit., p.217.

⁶¹⁰C. Ernest Dawn, "Arab Islam in the Modern Age", THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XIX, No.4, Autumn, 1965, p.443.

⁶¹¹Jacob, M. Landau, "Al Afghani's Pan Islamic Project", ISLAMIC CULTURE, XXVII, No.3, July, 1952, pp.51.

⁶¹²Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part II, p.194, September 7, 1960. "...the region is one, and its conditions, its problems, and its future and even the enemy are the same...". See Richard H. Dekmejian, EGYPT UNDER NASSER : A Study in Political Dynamics, Albany, N.Y. : State University of New York, p.103, "...this circle is as much a part of us as we are a part of it, that our history has mixed with it and that its interests are linked with ours...We have suffered the same hardships, lived the same crisis..."

⁶¹³Nabih Amin Faris and Muhammad Tawfik, THE CRESCENT IN CRISIS : An Interpretative Study of the Modern Arab World, Lawrence : University of Kansas Press, 1955. p.25.

⁶¹⁴George Antonius, THE ARAB AWAKENING, op.cit., p.33.

⁶¹⁵Faris and Muhammad Husayn, THE CRESCENT, op.cit., p.86.

history reveals that the Muslims Arabs,⁶¹⁶ especially the Sunnis,⁶¹⁷ became predominant in the early stage of the Arab nationalist movement.

The awakening of the Arabs to the real danger of the Zionist movement in Palestine and the universal trend toward regional and international community encouraged the establishment of the Arab League.⁶¹⁸ Egypt's desire to seek the support of the Arab states in her struggle for independence was the greatest determining factor in her role in establishing the Arab League. The Arab League with regard to its scope and activities was a compromise between various forces. The designation of the organization as the League of Arab States and the selection of Cairo as its headquarters and an Egyptian as Secretary-General reflected Egypt's leadership.⁶¹⁹ On the other hand, the Arab states, in the face of increasing Zionist danger in Palestine, were willing to accept and recognize Egypt's leadership.⁶²⁰

With Nasser coming to power primarily as a consequence of the Egyptian defeat in the Palestine War of 1948, he did not want to involve himself in any external problems of Arab or non-Arab countries. The first application and manifestation of the re-evaluation of Egypt's foreign policy was the replacement of Abd al Rahman Azzam as Secretary-General of the Arab League.⁶²¹ Nasser "believed that the League was part of the great deception practised upon the people of the region; it talked too much and did too little".⁶²² Nasser paid lip service to Arab causes,

⁶¹⁶"The fraternal sentiment of Islam takes the place of the national sentiment. In fact, Arab masses in every Arab country look to the masses of the other Arab countries as brothers unified by Islam in the first place and by Arabism in the second". Quoted from Faris and Muhammad Husayn, *THE CRESCENT*, op.cit., p.27.

⁶¹⁷See Nasser's position against the Shi'ites: "They might succeed temporarily by relying on elements of separatists (Shu'bists) which for centuries hated Arabs but they will never succeed in putting out the spirit in the soul of real Arabs." Translated from *MAJMU'AT KHUTAB*, Part II, p.356; See also Cremeans, *THE ARABS AND THE WORLD*, op.cit., p.76; Albert Hourani, *INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS*, XXIX, April, 1953, p.177; Binder, *THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION*, op.cit., p.206.

⁶¹⁸Laqueur, *THE MIDDLE EAST IN TRANSITION*, op.cit., p.105.

⁶¹⁹Laqueur, *THE MIDDLE EAST IN TRANSITION*, op.cit., p.102, the proposed federation or loose confederation became a league among sovereign states. Even the name "League" was initiated by Egyptian delegates.

⁶²⁰Albert Hourani, *INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS*, XXIX, April, 1953, p.179.

⁶²¹Little, *EGYPT*, op.cit., p.256.

having lost any hope in the League's effectiveness. "They [the Arab leaders]...do nothing except talk. Arab unity is imaginary, not a real thing".⁶²³ Thus Nasser steered an independent path for the achievement of Egypt's objectives. Nasser put it squarely, "We the Arab nations and our leaders are the main cause for the loss of Palestine".⁶²⁴ Nasser's indifference toward Arab causes was not shown by a lack of bombastic speeches and lavish support but was reflected in the programmes of such government organizations as the Liberation Rally.⁶²⁵ Establishment of "friendly relations with all Arab states" and "a regional pact" were placed at the bottom of the objectives of the only popular governmental organization just before the general "friendly relations with all friendly powers".⁶²⁶ On another occasion Nasser said in ridicule,⁶²⁷ "The Arab bond (league) is not real and up till now has been a mythical link".⁶²⁸ His indifference to the prospect of "whether Syria unites with Iraq, Jordan or even Turkey"⁶²⁹ and his designation of the Arab states as nations⁶³⁰ demonstrated lack of sympathy for Arab feeling and lack of Arab nationalism and unity. Nevertheless, despite this indifference, Nasser would not tolerate any Arab country pursuing any policy that would conflict with its own. Nasser's opposition came with the announcement of the Baghdad Pact. Then Egypt proposed a fully unified Arab military command and co-operation in other fields.

The Egyptian Minister of National Guidance expressed annoyance stating, "But, I

⁶²²Quoted from *Ibid.*, p.256.

⁶²³Quoted from Nasser in Wheelock, *NASSER'S NEW EGYPT*, op.cit., p.218; See also El Barawy, *MILITARY COUP*, op.cit., p.209.

⁶²⁴Translated from Nasser, *KHUTUB AL RA'IS*, I, p.153.

⁶²⁵"While the Egyptian broadcasting station pledged Egyptian blood and treasure to the Arab cause, Nasser himself showed a dangerous restraint in his references to Israel, and there were reports from foreigners that he might be prepared to make peace". Quoted from Little, *EGYPT*, op.cit., p.255.

⁶²⁶Naguib, *EGYPT'S DESTINY*, op.cit., p.164.

⁶²⁷Although the Egyptian and Arab nationalists considered Nasser's first three years in power the low point in his popularity, others, mainly Westerners, considered this period his finest. See Wheelock, *NASSER'S NEW EGYPT*, op.cit., pp.220-23. "Nasser had never been so unpopular". Quoted from Wynn, *NASSER OF EGYPT*, op.cit., pp.107, 110. See also Dayan, *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, XXXIII, No.2, p.225; Issawi, *EGYPT IN REVOLUTION*, op.cit., p.54.

⁶²⁸Translated from Nasser, *KHUTUB AL RA'IS*, I, p.156, December 13, 1953.

⁶²⁹*Ibid.*, p.157.

⁶³⁰*Ibid.*, p.153.

regret to say, we heard the opposite view from Iraq with regard to foreign policy and defence, and we heard no views on the matter from the other Arab countries."⁶³¹ On the other hand, as settlement with the British appeared to be forthcoming and as there were signs of a thaw in the Cold War between East and West, Nasser valued the reactivation of Egypt's leadership of Arab countries.⁶³² Even before concluding the agreement with the British, Nasser tried to defend his previous indifference to Arab causes by saying he "did not want to deceive or fool the Arab citizens and just say sweet words, but [we have] laid down a firm policy in our relation with our brethren Arabs, whose results would be realized in the coming days".⁶³³

Salah Salem, the then Minister of National Guidance, echoed Nasser's view that Egyptians must "look at our country and act in the light of our interest, but at the same time we feel that we are bound by a vital link, Arab nationhood, which was not as important to Egyptian statesmen in the past as it is now." Nasser elaborated:

[We] believed that the problems of the Arabs are problems of Egyptians too, and if the problem of [British] occupation exhausted the largest part of the energies of Egyptians, it never distracted us from participation in any effort for the emancipation of Arab countries. No doubt the future will witness new pictures in this important area of the world.⁶³⁴

Increasingly Nasser began to identify with Arab causes and to champion Arab rights until on January 16, 1956, the preamble of the new Egyptian constitution proclaimed Egypt "an organic part of a greater Arab unity", and Article I stated that "the Egyptian people are an integral part of the Arab nation".⁶³⁵ And on June 23, 1956, the Egyptian people, as expected, approved the constitution

⁶³¹ Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., p.237.

⁶³² Wheelock, NASSER'S NEW EGYPT, op.cit., pp.218-9, 221-2.

⁶³³ Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, I, p.141.

⁶³⁴ Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part I, p.177, July 23, 1954.

⁶³⁵ Quoted from Chejne, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XI, No.3, p.266. See also Curtis F. Jones, "The New Egyptian Constitution", THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, X, No.3, Summer, 1956, pp.300-06.

overwhelmingly.⁶³⁶ Other Arab countries made similar provisions in their constitutions.⁶³⁷ But none of these constitutional provisions and statements stirred up anxiety and excitement among the Arabs as much as Egypt's, the most important Arab country.⁶³⁸

Nasser did not describe the Egyptian constitution and the adoption of Arab nationalism as major events in Egypt's history, instead, he gave the impression that the idea of Arab nationalism had developed in him gradually, recalling that "the first glimmers of Arab awareness began to steal into my consciousness when I was a student in secondary school:

Then a kind of understanding began to develop when I became a student in the Military Academy...Things grew still clearer and the underlying realities became apparent when (I was) in the General Staff College.⁶³⁹

Nevertheless, a critical survey of Nasser's speeches made during his first fourteen months in office reveals that he dealt with almost every important subject except "Arab nationalism". At the same time, he took the liberty of ridiculing other Arab states. The first time Nasser mentioned "Arabism" was in an address to the Chiefs of Staff of the Arab armies on August 25, 1953 which began: "Chiefs of Staff : Brethren in Arabism and Islam".⁶⁴⁰ The most elaborate detailed mention of Arab nationalism was in his *PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION*.⁶⁴¹ Even then Nasser continued to use the term "Arab nation" in referring to the Arab people who inhabit different Arab countries, while the

⁶³⁶Jones, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, X, No.3, Summer, 1956, p.304.

⁶³⁷See Chejne, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XI, No.3, pp.265-66, Egypt is the new convert, the largest and the most important.

⁶³⁸Cecil Hourani, "The New Egyptian Constitution", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXI, May, 1956, pp.7-9, describes the Egyptian constitution as an instrument of policy rather than a set of fundamental principles of constitution.

⁶³⁹From Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit., pp.89, 90. Repeated in an interview to Desmond Stewart, YOUNG EGYPT, op.cit., p.186.

⁶⁴⁰Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, I, p.87.

⁶⁴¹Ibid., pp.88-98, 102-09. According to St. John, THE BOSS, op.cit., pp.193-95, even part of this book was actually written by Mohammed Hassanein Heikal.

correct term is "the Arab nation" to which all Arab people belong.⁶⁴² But, after the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the term "Arab nationalism" was used in Nasser's speeches as often as "Egyptian nationalism" and after the Tripartite Invasion and the establishment of the United Arab Republic, Nasser's use of the term surpassed his use of any other terms, including "Positive Neutrality".⁶⁴³ Even after the establishment of the United Arab Republic and later federation with Yemen and establishment of the United Arab States, which was Nasser's climax in the achievement of Arab unity, Arab nationalism was not completely entrenched in Egypt as the dissolution of the United Arab Republic and the discarding of Yemen on the fall of 1961 showed. The Egyptians' reaction and embitterment was shown through Nasser's spokesman, Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, who admitted "that there existed in fact no real and positive ties between the Arab peoples in Egypt and Syria to establish the union - except for one thing, namely, Nasir, his personality and popularity".⁶⁴⁴ However, once Nasser adopted Arab nationalism and Egypt declared herself part of the Arab land, Arab nationalism and ideologies became the monopolistic property of Nasser and the Egyptians.

Nasser's definition of an Arab as "any who speaks Arabic, as his mother tongue" and his definition of Arab nationalism approached the definition accepted by Pan-Arabists.⁶⁴⁵ According to Nasser, Arab nationalism is "Unity of conscience, which is represented in the unity of history. Unity of thought, which is represented in unity of language".⁶⁴⁶ On a later occasion Nasser concluded: "Hence if the Arabs have unity of conscience and unity of thought, then this clearly means that the Arabs are one nation".⁶⁴⁷

⁶⁴²Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, I, p.153.

⁶⁴³For a chronological development of Nasser's use of the terms, "Non Alignment", "Positive Neutrality", and "Arab Nationalism" see Nasser MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Parts I to VI.

⁶⁴⁴Translated from AL AHRAM, October 6, 1961, and reproduced in A. Loya, "Radio Propaganda of the United Arab Republic - An Analysis", MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, XIII, No.4, April, 1962, p.109.

⁶⁴⁵Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part II, p.194, July, 9, 1960.

⁶⁴⁶Quoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, April-June, 1960, p.11.

⁶⁴⁷Nasser, MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part III, p.194, July 9, 1960.

Epistemologically speaking, Arab unity nationalism is traceable to four interrelated powers - intuition, rationalism, experience, and tradition. Abd al Nasir and other proponents of the ideology repeatedly stated that the tenets of Arab unity reside in Arab hearts. In their efforts to ascertain the 'feeling' of nationalism, most Arab theorists resort to the heart. While the process of discovering the fundamental truth of the ideology is a private endeavor for each Arab, the collective will of the Arab people was to be articulated by the leader of the nationalist movement, Gamal Abd al Nasir, who himself relied on intuition (in addition to other means of gauging the popular will) as an epistemological tool to 'reach' the hearts of the people and interpret their aspirations. The heavy reliance of Nasir and Nasirite ideologues upon the intuition approach should not be surprising considering that nationalism is the child of emotion and feeling. In pursuing the broad aims of the ideology, the Nasirites are, at times, less concerned with the practical and the rational and more with the desirable.⁶⁴⁸

Previously, in defining the objectives of Arab nationalism, Nasser had said they "center on Liberty, on sovereignty, on dignity, on integrity, on unity - the unity of the Arab Nation - so that we can strengthen and consolidate the pillars of Arab Nationalism which unites the hearts of all Arabs in all parts of the Arab World".⁶⁴⁹ Nasser's favourite theme equated Arab nationalism with "complete independence from any foreign influence and its political content is positive neutrality between the two power blocs".⁶⁵⁰ In short, Nasser's definition of Arab nationalism and ideology⁶⁵¹ came very close to the definitions of the medieval,⁶⁵² inter war,⁶⁵³ and postwar⁶⁵⁴ periods. Finally, Nasser imbued

⁶⁴⁸See Dekmejian, EGYPT UNDER NASSER, op.cit., p.102.

⁶⁴⁹Quoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1958, pp.28-29.

⁶⁵⁰Quoted from Ibid., 1959, p.532.

⁶⁵¹Nasser did not "like to enunciate any doctrine that might lead people to create propaganda against it. Such a doctrine will, nevertheless, develop with the development of Arab nationalism." Quoted from Ibid., 1958, p.403.

⁶⁵²According to the medieval definition, an Arab is one "1. Whose mother tongue is Arabic; 2. Who is born to Arabs, and whose residence is the Arab Fatherland". Translated from Muhammad Al Kittani, ARABISM OF IBN TAYMIYYAH, Cairo : Ti'baa el Majlis, 1963, pp.734-35.

⁶⁵³During the inter war period the following definitions were used:

"THE ARABS: All who are Arab in their language, culture, and loyalty [defined...as 'national feeling'], those are the Arabs...

"The Arab Homeland: It is the land which has been, or is, inhabited by an Arab majority." Quoted from Khalid, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., pp.34-54.

⁶⁵⁴The following definition is characteristic of the post war period: "The present day

Arab nationalism with his positive neutrality and Arab Socialism and gave it his personal impression, which altogether is called "Nasserism".⁶⁵⁵ In adopting Arab nationalism Nasser linked Egypt's fate with that of the Arab East.⁶⁵⁶

Nasser, wanting to eliminate all slogans of the old regime's political parties which lacked definite clear ideology⁶⁵⁷ and, in the meantime, to give the appearance of a new and revolutionary regime,⁶⁵⁸ sought an ideology.⁶⁵⁹ Positive neutrality, which was adopted as an ideology for the new regime, was one of the few points that could rally all the major political segments of Egyptian society, and it became the pivot of Egyptian foreign policy. Nasser quickly discerned that "positive neutrality and nonalignment are terms that have appeared in the Arab region which every Arab believes in and calls for".⁶⁶⁰ Thus shrewdly defined, "Arab nationalism means positive neutrality and non-alignment; it means that our policy springs from our conscience".⁶⁶¹ Then, "during the spring and summer of 1955 Nasser progressively developed the doctrine of neutralism, fitting it into the frame of Arab nationalism".⁶⁶² The crystallization of a clear

Arabs are all those who inhabit the Arab world, speak the Arabic language, take pride in Arab history, cherish the general Arab feeling, and share in the characteristics of Arab mentality, irrespective of their religious affiliation and their racial descent." Quoted from Faris and Muhammad Husayn, *THE CRESCENT*, op.cit., p.8.

⁶⁵⁵Cremeans, *THE ARABS AND THE WORLD*, op.cit., pp.62-145. "Nasser's actions and policies have invariably either carried forward (perhaps more spectacularly than before) trends already inaugurated in the Arab world, or translated into action and strong popular desires for new policies". Quoted from Fayez A. Sayegh, "Nasser and Arab Nationalism", *MIDDLE EAST FORUM*, XXIV, No.4, April, 1959, p.16.

⁶⁵⁶J.W.D. Gray, "Arab Nationalism : Abdin Against the Wafd", *MIDDLE EAST FORUM*, XXXVIII, No.2, February, 1962, pp.17-19; Albert Hourani, *THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL*, IX, No.3, p.251.

⁶⁵⁷Safran, *EGYPT IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY*, op.cit., pp.245, 250, 255. "It would be misleading to understand that evolution and to envisage the problems and needs of present and future ideological development only in intellectual terms." p.250.

⁶⁵⁸"Instead, the men who made the revolution have tried to combine some of the basic elements of both Liberal Reformism into a new indigenous nationalism to serve as the foundation of a modern Egyptian community". Ibid., p.255.

⁶⁵⁹"The ideology is the political myth functioning to preserve the social structure; the utopia to supplant it". Quoted from Lasswell and Kaplan, *POWER AND SOCIETY*, op.cit., p.123.

⁶⁶⁰Nasser, *MAJMU'AT KHUTAB*, Part I, p.743.

⁶⁶¹"We were always inspired in our action by Arab nationalism, Arab independence, their attachment to positive neutrality and opposition to Zionism and Israel". Nasser, *MAJMU'AT KHUTAB*, Part I, pp.649-50.

⁶⁶²Quoted from Cremeans, *THE ARABS AND THE WORLD*, op.cit., p.145.

and definite ideology⁶⁶³ made it possible for Nasser to indoctrinate Egyptians⁶⁶⁴ with Arab nationalism. Further, the sphere of Arab nationalism was large enough to serve as the foundation of Pan-Islam⁶⁶⁵ and Pan-Africanism.⁶⁶⁶ It was large enough to remain in the Mediterranean zone, on the one hand, and, in the meantime, to encompass the Sudan. The official adoption of Arab nationalization was to Arabize the Egyptians and to legitimize Nasser's activities and ambition.⁶⁶⁷

For some reason it seems to me that within the Arab circle there is a role, wandering aimlessly in search of a hero. And I do not know why it seems to me that this role, exhausted by its wanderings, has at last settled down, tired and weary, near the borders of our country and is beckoning to us to move, to take up its lines, to put on its costume, since no one else is qualified to play it....We alone, by virtue of our place, can perform the role.⁶⁶⁸

Nasser spelled out the many facets, objectives, and purposes of the ideology: "Arab nationalism is not merely a political movement; but it is a social philosophy as well; it is a sentimental call and a joint interest; it is a strategic necessity".⁶⁶⁹ An Egyptian writer outlined Egyptian foreign policy and the pivotal role of positive neutrality:

Positive neutrality is the internal axis of our foreign policy, the link of the internal structure of our nation and Arab nationalism and emanated from our history [and] experience and dictated our important geographical and strategic position between East and West and also connects us to Afro-Asian solidarity and global peace.⁶⁷⁰

⁶⁶³Nissim Rejwan, "Arab Nationalism : In Search of an Ideology", THE MIDDLE EAST IN TRANSITION, op.cit., pp.147-65.

⁶⁶⁴Nasser argued that "a social ideology takes root only when it expresses the hearts, minds and souls of those who adopt it...The heart of the nation is its aspirations. Its mind is its present conditions and its soul is its history". Quoted from MIDDLE EAST NEWS DISPATCH, Translated in MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXVI, No.4, April, 1960, p.21.

⁶⁶⁵Ibrahim Jum'ah, EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC NATIONALISM, [In Arabic], Cairo : Kosta Tasomas Press, 1944, pp.3-4, 50-56.

⁶⁶⁶Anwar Zaglamah, GREATER EGYPT : Africa for the Africans [In Arabic] Cairo : Maktabat al Anglo al Misriyyah, 1955, pp.158.

⁶⁶⁷James Heyworth-Dunne, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL TRENDS IN MODERN EGYPT, Washington, D.C.: Dunne Press, 1950, p.11.

⁶⁶⁸Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit., pp.87-88, p.114.

⁶⁶⁹Quoted from Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1959, p.22.

The elements of mystique and myth in both Egyptian⁶⁷¹ and Arab⁶⁷² nationalism would serve as an actual outline for Nasser. Admittedly, there are also elements in both Islam and Arabism that conflict with each other.⁶⁷³ Whatever its claims,⁶⁷⁴ there is no ideology that could satisfy all human desires and aspirations.⁶⁷⁵ At any rate, an extensive propaganda campaign⁶⁷⁶ was carried out to prove to the Arabs that Egypt was an Arab country. Nasser took the lead in overcoming the longstanding Egyptian attitude of estrangement from Arab nationalism: "We firmly believe that we are part of the Arab nation. We cannot regard it with the eyes of a stranger".⁶⁷⁷ In his zeal to extract proof that Egypt is an Arab country Nasser went so far as to claim "that the Revolution of the 23rd of July was an Arab and not an Egyptian revolution because it sprang from Arab soil, blood, hearts".⁶⁷⁸

Since the establishment of the Arab League Egypt has been officially acknowledged by the other Arab governments as "the biggest Arab Sister". Egypt's adoption of Arab nationalism after long hesitation was jubilantly welcomed by the Pan-

⁶⁷⁰Albert Hourani, *INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS*, XXIX, April, 1953, p.37.

⁶⁷¹As for the mystical element of Egyptian nationalism, "nationalism is a sentiment...the feeling of the worth and dignity of man, of the bounty of God and his care, of the meaning of existence itself." See Safran, *EGYPT IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY*, op.cit., p.87.

⁶⁷²See the mystical element in Abd al Latif Sharabi's definition of Arab nationalism in Haim, *ARAB NATIONALISM*, op.cit., pp.225-26.

⁶⁷³Sharabi, *NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION*, op.cit., pp.4-5.

⁶⁷⁴"Ideologies have historically served to fill the needs of men, usually attempting to bridge the gap between the prevailing limits of reason and the psychological needs of man within society". Quoted from Charles O. Lerche, Jr., and Abdul A. Sa'id, *CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963, p.221.

⁶⁷⁵"Probably no one ideology embraces all life...It follows, therefore, that a particular individual may, and ordinarily does, adhere to several ideologies. And he may do so despite that fact that they contain elements and logical incompatibility". Schleicher, *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*, op.cit., p.74.

⁶⁷⁶"In a society with a stable social structure, the ideology is a matter of consensus, not opinion". Quoted from Lasswell and Kaplan, *POWER AND SOCIETY*, op.cit., p.123. "Nations which abruptly came into being or which undergo a metamorphosis are naturally in greater need of explicit ideological guidance, and the Arab nation belongs to this category." Quoted from Hazem Zaki Nuselbeh, *THE IDEAS OF ARAB NATIONALISM*, Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1956, p.221.

⁶⁷⁷Quoted from Nasser, *SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS*, 1958, p.143.

⁶⁷⁸Nasser, *MAJMU'AT KHUTAB*, Part IV, p.432.

Arabists.⁶⁷⁹ Egypt's support was needed in the struggle for Palestine.⁶⁸⁰ Egypt was already a recognized leader in the Arab states,⁶⁸¹ and Nasser's leadership as spokesman of the Arab nationalists, whose aspirations fitted his ambition,⁶⁸² was acknowledged.⁶⁸³ Therefore, most Arab governments who might have disagreed with him feared to oppose him openly. Thus, inasmuch as Nasser's influence benefited from his position as the head of Egypt, Egypt benefited from Nasser's leadership. Nasser was able to raise his image and enhance Egypt's interests in the triangular interplay of national, regional, and global interests. His bold policies and 'progressive' brand of Arab nationalism appealed to Arab nationalists and rendered him the mouthpiece of the Arabs.⁶⁸⁴

In turn, his eminent position with the nonaligned group, Nehru-Nasser-Nkrumah, made him attractive to the Communist bloc and won him an international stature even in the West never before attained by any Middle Eastern leader.⁶⁸⁵ Nasser's international stature⁶⁸⁶ enhanced his prestige,⁶⁸⁷ consolidated his regime at home, and gave him further freedom of action on the international scene. Nasser in turn diverted most of his energy to more vigorously backing Arab causes of liberation and independence to keep Arab support and enthusiasm kindled.⁶⁸⁸

⁶⁷⁹The Egyptians were always aware of the preponderance of their position. P. L. Kendall, "The Ambivalent Character of Nationalism Among Egyptian Professionals", PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, XX, No.1, Spring, 1956, p.286; Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit., pp.86, 89; Valikiotis, NASSER AND HIS GENERATION, op.cit., p.200.

⁶⁸⁰"In the Arab world, her position as the center of Arab culture...and the fear that if they do not follow her lead she will make a separate peace with Israel, have so far secured her predominance". Quoted from Albert Hourani, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XI, No.3, p.264;

⁶⁸¹ibid., p.250.

⁶⁸²Chejne, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XI, No.3, p.265. According to Wheelock, NASSER'S NEW EGYPT, op.cit., pp.232-33, Nasser's call "for the liberation of the Arab world from Morocco to Baghdad...was not incompatible with the broad aims of Arab nationalism that independent Arab countries, like Egypt, should help liberate those areas still under foreign domination".

⁶⁸³Fayez A. Sayegh, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV, No.4, p.17; Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD, op.cit., pp.62, 145.

⁶⁸⁴Nasser, THE PHILOSOPHY, op.cit., p.101.

⁶⁸⁵Campell, THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE MUTED COLD WAR, op.cit., p.19.

⁶⁸⁶Little, EGYPT, op.cit., p.165. Lacouture, NASSER, op.cit., pp.223-24, 266; Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD, op.cit., p.146; Wheelock, NASSER'S NEW EGYPT, op.cit., pp.225-26.

⁶⁸⁷Lacouture, EGYPT IN TRANSITION, op.cit., p.221.

⁶⁸⁸Fayez A. Sayegh, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV, No.4, pp.16-17.

Such Arab support of Nasser did not count much in a military showdown, but it was effective in political and economic fields.⁶⁸⁹

However, Nasser's increased popularity and strengthened prestige were not without losses. In as much as Nasser's support of Arab causes won him prestige abroad and consolidated his position at home, his vigour in supporting the Arabs in Algeria, Aden, and Africa⁶⁹⁰ invoked the wrath of the West and the Zionists.⁶⁹¹ To maintain his Arab leadership Nasser had to outbid his Arab rivals in the verbal battle against Western imperialism and Zionism. That led to the squabbles with other Arab countries⁶⁹² which climaxed in the Yemeni civil war, 1965 and led ultimately to the defeat of June 1967. After this Nasser's ambitions in other Arab countries were deterred temporarily, but until his death he remained the uncontested leader of the Arabs.⁶⁹³ In short, in adopting Arab nationalism, Nasser, willingly or unwillingly, linked the destiny of Egypt with that of the Arab countries but, in the meantime, guaranteed its leadership of these countries regardless of the fact that Egypt was a new convert of Arabism:

Thus, if Damascus and Baghdad claim pre-eminence in Arabism, it was and still is in Cairo that its advocates can expound and nurture it. Although Mecca and Jerusalem may represent all that is holy in Islam, it was and still is in the Azhar University at Cairo that religious thought, teaching, and orthodox Muslim pronouncements are molded and diffused.⁶⁹⁴

⁶⁸⁹NASSER, THE PHILOSOPHY, op.cit., p.100. See also Lacouture, NASSER, op.cit., pp.223-24.

⁶⁹⁰Wheelock, NASSER'S NEW EGYPT, op.cit., p.225; Issawi, EGYPT IN REVOLUTION, op.cit., p.312.

⁶⁹¹Lacouture, NASSER, op.cit., p.221; Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT, op.cit., p.154. For Anglo-French complaints and futile effort to pacify Nasser to quit, see Wheelock, NASSER'S NEW EGYPT, op.cit., pp.233-35.

⁶⁹²Little, MODERN EGYPT, op.cit., pp.183-97.

⁶⁹³John S. Badeau, THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO THE ARAB WORLD, New York : Row, 1968, p.150.

⁶⁹⁴Quoted from Vatikiotis, NASSER AND HIS GENERATION, op.cit., p.200.

3.12 CONCLUSION

This conclusion attempts to evaluate the impact of Nasser's leadership on Egypt's power structure and international stature.

The capability of a state to achieve its objectives depends on their feasibility and clarity,⁶⁹⁵ on the state's powers,⁶⁹⁶ its ideology, type of leadership, and form of government; and consequently, on the international setting. In general, its capability of achieving its objectives runs parallel with its resources and means of development of its gross national product.⁶⁹⁷ For economic power is a determinant of the other forms of power - political, military, or cultural.⁶⁹⁸ The political power of a state or of an individual is very difficult to measure,⁶⁹⁹ for it is relative and much more psychological than concrete. Further, a state's capability varies from time to time depending on whether there is war or peace or on the kind of leadership the state has. Egypt has been endowed with a vital geographical, commercial, and strategical position. This position has occasionally been used by a major power to control and influence countries to the east and south. On the other hand, throughout most of her history Egypt has fallen under the influence of a major power because of her inability either to use or to protect these positions.

The tangible gains that accrued to Egypt under the leadership of Nasser might have been impressive by Egyptian standards, but they do not explain the tremendous increase in the international stature, power, and influence of Egypt. Therefore,

⁶⁹⁵Organski, *WORLD POLITICS*, op.cit., pp.76-77; Charles O. Lerche, Jr., *FOREIGN POLICY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1961, pp.11,13-14.

⁶⁹⁶For a discussion of the various models and approaches to the study of power and types of power, see Allan Kornberg and Simon D. Perry, "Conceptual Models of Power and their Applicability to Empirical Research in Politics", *POLITICAL SCIENCE*, No.1, March, 1966, pp.52-54.

⁶⁹⁷David O. Wilkinson, *COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS : Framework and Methods*, Belmont : Dickenson, 1969, pp.42-43.

⁶⁹⁸Lasswell and Kaplan, *SOCIETY AND POWER*, op.cit., pp.93-97.

⁶⁹⁹See Kornberg and Perry, *POLITICAL SCIENCE*, XVIII, No.1, pp.65-68, for the difficulties and shortcomings of applicability of major models and approaches of power.

one must consider the political objectives of power,⁷⁰⁰ which requires taking into account geographical, historical, cultural, ethnic, and ideological factors along with the character of leadership. The next factor to be considered is the capability of the state - mainly, the change of government, type of leadership, and ideology. Indeed, the intangible assets of Nasser's Egypt matched and even surpassed her material strength. Egypt has been the center of Arabic culture and Islamic religion. There is a close interrelation and interdependence among the various material, political, personal, social, moral, and psychological forms of power, and the increase or decrease in one type of power might result in opposite or similar changes in other types of power.⁷⁰¹

The elimination of Naguib and other new rivals to Nasser, and the consequent crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood (for which purpose Nasser did not hesitate to use the negotiation with the British on the Evacuation Agreement as leverage) resulted at the end of 1954 in the concentration of political power - including foreign policy - in the hands of Nasser.⁷⁰² A relevant assertion declares, "[The more charismatic the leader] the more power can be mobilized to support any given policy, and consequently the more effective is policy; or...the more charismatic the leadership, the more policy tends to be active, expansionist or revolutionary".⁷⁰³

Gamal Abdel Nasser, in referring to the Army Movement, pressed his Egyptian listeners to "never forget that it was a revolution and not a coup".⁷⁰⁴ At the outset, Nasser never mentioned the term 'revolution' with regard to the movement in his proclamations, communiques, or official announcements,⁷⁰⁵ nor was the

⁷⁰⁰According to Lasswell and Kaplan, *SOCIETY AND POWER*, op.cit., p.92, all types of power have political objectives and connotations.

⁷⁰¹For the interdependence of powers, see *Ibid.*, pp.93-94, and Organski, *WORLD POLITICS*, op.cit., pp.215-16.

⁷⁰²Hisham B. Sharabi, "Power and Leadership in the Arab World", *ORBIS*, VII, No.3, Fall, 1963, p.583. "In the contemporary Arab world, personalized power is the basis of all types of domination and control". p.593. See also p.590, for control of army and administration.

⁷⁰³Quoted from Wilkinson, *COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS*, op.cit., p.114.

⁷⁰⁴Nasser, *KHUTUB AL RA'IS*, III, p.505.

⁷⁰⁵Little, *WORLD TODAY*, X, April, 1954, p.146.

term 'revolution' common in official or non official usage. The term 'revolution' was not used officially until September 7, 1952, in reference to the meeting of the Command Council on the occasion of Mohammed Naguib's takeover as Prime Minister.⁷⁰⁶ After February 1953, with the complete military takeover of government, the terms 'revolution' and 'revolutionary' were ascribed to everything related to the Army Movement or its leader. Even if the motto and programme of the Liberation Rally, 'unity, discipline, and work', were arbitrarily considered an ideology, and even if the agrarian reform and other social welfare programmes were based on ideological principles, the number of people affected by these measures would be too small to justify calling the steps revolutionary.⁷⁰⁷ For the fundamental characteristic of a revolution:

Lies in the fact that it is not merely a violent and profound modification of the social organization but a major shift in the relations between social classes...the dominance of the upper class is destroyed and the lower class emancipates itself from the economic exploitation buttressed by political subordination.⁷⁰⁸

If according to these criteria the term 'revolution' is difficult to apply to Nasser's regime at that stage, then "while they are still under way the word 'revolutionary' can only qualify methods, intentions or aspirations".⁷⁰⁹ It is important to find out what Nasser meant by describing the Army movement as 'a revolution' and not a 'coup d'etat'. Nasser gave the answer himself by describing the nature of the Army Movement as "a revolution against imperialism and reaction, a revolution expressing the hopes of the country".⁷¹⁰ Even if the Army

⁷⁰⁶Ibid., p.140.

⁷⁰⁷Dankwart A. Rustow, THE MILITARY IN MIDDLE EAST SOCIETY AND POLITICS, Washington : The Brookings Institution, 1963, p.16 states "The distinction between military coups and military revolutions must properly rest not upon any differences in the technique by which it is seized but rather upon the scope and success of the reform program which is subsequently enacted".

⁷⁰⁸Quoted from Alfred Muesel, "Revolution and Counter Revolution", ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE, ed. Edwin R.A. Seligman, XXII, 1942, p.367.

⁷⁰⁹El Serafy, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, XVII, No.3, p.215. Nasser later considered 'the revolution...the end, the objective'. SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1959, p.567. Then he described the Army Movement in these words, "Ours was a [revolution] undertaken or spearheaded by the army. Revolutions launched by armies are the most difficult types of revolutions", p.569. "Armies are not political organizations. The staging of revolutions is not their line". p.569.

Movement could be considered a revolution or a step toward revolution, one is interested in discovering its impact on the objectives of Egypt's stature.⁷¹¹ For in a revolution the relation of a government with foreign governments may be affected, but not the necessities imposed upon it by its geographical position, its history, its need to live. Nasser echoed similar views:

This is our role as determined for us by the history of our nation. There is no choice....We cannot look at the map of the world without seeing our own place upon it, and that our role is dictated by that place.⁷¹²

The lack⁷¹³ of any policy objectives⁷¹⁴ of the new regime was almost complete in the matter of Egypt's foreign affairs. However, a review of the secret pamphlets of the organization of Free Officers and the writings of the new regime's supporters reveals that the objectives of Nasser and the Free Officers were: (1) independence, (2) clear neutrality which involves rejection of imperialistic pacts, and (3) purifying the inter-Arab Collective Security Pact.⁷¹⁵ Similarly, the Liberation Rally's programme stressed the new regime's objectives of evacuation and friendly relations with Arab Asian countries. Likewise, in Nasser's elaborate speech at the Bandung Conference in 1955⁷¹⁶ and in the

⁷¹⁰Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, III, p.505. See also Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit., p.58.

⁷¹¹However, later after the regime was well established Nasser had better comprehension and description of the nature of the Army Movement. He described it as a 'leap' or renaissance. See Nasser, SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, 1959, p.571, July 2, 1959.

⁷¹²Quoted from Nasser, EGYPT'S LIBERATION, op.cit., pp.76, 85.

⁷¹³Nasser admits that when the Free Officers took up arms against the existing government their 'victory was not assured at all' and, therefore, the Free Officers were so preoccupied with their own fate that they did not have time to think of what they 'were going to do after [their] victory'. Translated from Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, I, p.163.

⁷¹⁴Unlike most major conceptual models of power, Kornberg and Perry, POLITICAL SCIENCE, XVIII, No.1, p.66, point to the necessity to take into consideration of the goals and objectives of a person in a study and approach of power.

⁷¹⁵El Barawy, MILITARY COUP, op.cit., pp.207-11.

⁷¹⁶Nasser outlined Egyptian foreign policy as: (1) support of self-determination for all nations, (2) support of United Nations principles for the maintenance of inter-national peace and security, and (3) extension of co-operation among the Afro-Asian bloc. Then finally, he adopted the five conditions or prerequisites of the principles of peaceful coexistence. See Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, III, pp.573-74.

provisions of the National Charter of 1962,⁷¹⁷ Egypt's foreign policy was laid down in general and global terms rather than in specific and articulate objectives. Common among all these general objectives was the desire, like that of Nasser, for Egypt to be free, independent and strong.

On the other hand, *EGYPT'S LIBERATION* delineated the spheres of Egypt's foreign policy as centered around (1) the Arabic region, (2) the Black African continent, and (3) the Islamic world.⁷¹⁸ A more academic study reveals that the objectives of Egypt's foreign policy, historically, geographically, and culturally, have been directed toward the Nilotic and African, Islamic, Mediterranean, and Arabic spheres in that order.⁷¹⁹ Nasser's adoption of positive neutrality first, followed by adoption of Arab nationalism and finally Arab Socialism and Arab Unity, reversed the priority of Egypt's foreign policy objectives. The Syrian Ba'ath (Renaissance) party or, in fact, any political party may claim the initiative in advocating neutrality and socialism, but positive neutrality is associated with and branded by Nasser who implemented it as an instrument of his government.⁷²⁰ The new element is that Nasser accepted the principles of positive neutrality a symbol of his new regime with his personal imprint, and perhaps in a fit of absentmindedness Nasser grabbed Arab leadership. What accounts for the effectiveness of an ideology,⁷²¹ at least in the short run, is not its rationale or

⁷¹⁷"War on imperialism and domination...in all its shapes and masks..."

"Labouring to consolidate peace, since the atmosphere and possibilities of peace are the only favourable chance for the protection of national progress.

"Lastly, international cooperation for the sake of prosperity, since the common prosperity of all peoples is no longer divisible and to achieve it, collective cooperation has now become imperative."

Quoted from United Arab Republic, *THE CHARTER* Cairo : U.A.R. Information Department, 1962, p.100 in Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., *THE DYNAMICS OF NEUTRALISM*, op.cit., pp.223-24.

⁷¹⁸Nasser, *EGYPT'S LIBERATION*, op.cit., p.88.

⁷¹⁹See Boutros Boutros Ghali, "The Foreign Policy of Egypt (United Arab Republic)". *FOREIGN POLICIES IN A WORLD OF CHANGE*, ed., Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson, New York : Harper & Row, 1963, pp.335.

⁷²⁰One irony is that Nasser who adopted the Ba'ath trio of "unity, freedom and socialism", unblushingly accused the Ba'ath of being professional pinchers of slogans and symbols from others. Nasser, *MAJMU'AT KHUTAB*, Part IV, p.468, October 22, 1963. The Ba'ath accused Nasser of stealing their slogans. Vatikiotis, *NASSER AND HIS GENERATION*, op.cit., pp.168-69.

⁷²¹Even states like Russia with an official ideology of Communism do not adhere to the letters of Karl Marx's and Lenin's principles in the conduct of relations with non-Communist states. See Henry B. Mayo, "Theory, Ideology, and Foreign Policy", *WORLD*

the soundness and authenticity of its foundation but rather the degree to which the people believe in it⁷²² and its function in preserving social structure and political institutions.⁷²³ "Hence it has been said that almost 'any practical construction can be put on almost any theory'".⁷²⁴ In the case of Nasser, his adoption of positive neutrality was because of the necessity of uniting all the important segments of the country so that they might win their political independence from British imperialism.⁷²⁵ Likewise, neutrality is one objective that all major segments of Arab nationalists would agree upon and would equate with independence. Thus Nasser's adoption of positive neutrality became a rallying point. Other Arab governments claimed to have or promised to follow such a policy, but Nasser adopted it, implemented it, and propagandized for it. Furthermore Egypt is the publication center of the Arabic world and Nasser was aware of the interdependence⁷²⁶ between other economic, cultural, and scientific activities and the propaganda of words.⁷²⁷

Small nations resort to propaganda and diplomatic manoeuvres to compensate for their lack in material resources and strength. Nasser inherited from the old regime a well established, articulate propaganda machine with a long tradition traceable to the Fatimid and Al Azhar universities.⁷²⁸ He also inherited the largest number of newspapers and magazines extant in any Arab country. Radio Cairo, the Voice of the Arabs, the Voice of Islam had a large audience in other Arab

PRESSURES ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, ed., Marian D. Irish, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964, p.18. "There is seldom, if ever, any close logical connection between a political philosophy and its political application". p.25.

⁷²²Sartori, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, LXIII, No.2, p.398.

⁷²³Lasswell and Kaplan, SOCIETY AND POWER, op.cit., p.123.

⁷²⁴Quoted from Mayo, WORLD PRESSURES, op.cit., p.26.

⁷²⁵ibid., p.26.

⁷²⁶Andrew H. Berding, "Balance Sheet in the War of Idea", in Urban G. Whitaker, Jr., ed., PROPAGANDA AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, San Francisco, Calif.: Chandler, 1962, pp.132-35.

⁷²⁷"Propaganda consists of the planned use of any form of public or mass produced communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given group for a specific public purpose, whether military, economic or political". Quoted from Paul. M.A. Linebarger, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1948, p.39, in Whitaker, PROPAGANDA, op.cit., p.5.

⁷²⁸p.J. Vatikiotis, THE MODERN HISTORY OF EGYPT, New York : Praeger, 1969, p.167.

countries.⁷²⁹ More important, the Voice of the Arabs and Radio Cairo were so successful that they competed with the propaganda of the major powers.⁷³⁰ Egypt supplied 3,000 volume libraries to 125 Islamic centers on five continents, and her tireless printing presses flooded Africa with inexpensive copies of the Quran and pamphlets that shrewdly blended the word of Allah with the word of Nasser.

Nasser filled his propaganda with such simple slogans as "positive neutrality", which was becoming synonymous with independence and which is considered credible in light of local experience.⁷³¹ Although every Afro-Asian, Arab, or Muslim government has been advocating Arab nationalism, anti Zionism, other Arab governments were unable to compete with Nasser's offensive. In the first place good propaganda alone cannot put over unacceptable policies. Nasser succeeded better than others because he told the Arab people what they felt for and what they wanted to hear.⁷³² Admirers of Nasser attribute his success in the Arab countries to the fact that he implemented a policy according to the aspirations of the Arabs.⁷³³ This still does not explain Nasser's success among Africans, Asians, and Moslems in general:

In relations with Lebanon, Egyptian policy gives priority to Arab policy because of the Lebanese Christian majority. When Egypt was dealing with the non-Muslim Chief of the south of the Sudan, emphasis was placed on African and Nilotic solidarity. Emphasis on Muslim solidarity is essential in dealings with a country like Afghanistan.⁷³⁴

In addition to this shrewd skill, Nasser's success in consolidating his regime and

⁷²⁹Loya, MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS, XIII, No.4, p.98 talks of the importance of the radio as a vital piece of furniture in Arab homes.

⁷³⁰See Nadim Makdisi, "Battle of Words : Radio Broadcasting in the Arab World", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXV, No.5, May, 1959, p.30, for the reason for the success of the Voice of the Arabs over all others.

⁷³¹Arthur Krock, "Why we are losing the Psychological War", THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, December, 8, 1957, pp.12, 91, reproduced in Whitaker, PROPAGANDA, op.cit., pp.123-24.

⁷³²H.A.R. Philby, "Nasser and the West", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV, No.4., April, 1959, p.41.

⁷³³See Sharabi, ORBIS, Vol. VII, Fall, No.3, 1963, p.590, for the role of charismatic leadership in the Arab world. Also refer to Elie Salem, "Emerging Government in the Arab World", ORBIS, Vol. VI, Spring, 1962, No.1, pp.102-118.

⁷³⁴Quoted from Boutros Ghali, FOREIGN POLICIES, op.cit., p.322.

power, his ability to obtain the highest per capita aid from the Soviet Union and almost the same generous aid from the West, and the rise of his own international stature was the envy of the Afro-Asian countries and became a pattern to be emulated. What made success more possible for Nasser was the fact that he was the charismatic leader of Egypt and he utilized this position to enhance the principles he adopted, mainly Arab nationalism. The other major element in the components of Nasser's capability was the world setting with the stalemate of the Cold War. What made it possible for Nasser to play an increasing role in regional and world politics is the balance of terror in the Cold war. Nasser believed that, with the unwavering belief of both the East and the West in their superiority, and ultimate victory of their own systems, he was able to manoeuvre around their 'peaceful competition' to win foreign aid⁷³⁵ and use his propaganda. Nasser demonstrated his extraordinary political acumen in this Cold War stalemate by taking advantage of both East and West to a far greater extent than any other nonaligned country was able to do and far beyond the limit Egypt's material and political power alone would permit.⁷³⁶

The success of Nasser and the failure of his rivals may be attributed to the fact that from the beginning he was the recognized leader of the Free Officers.⁷³⁷ This was due in part to his personalised leadership, experience, and the similarity of his background with the founding members of the Free Officers -

⁷³⁵Leo Tansky, U.S AND U.S.S.R. AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES : A Comparative Study of India, Turkey, and the U.A.R., New York : Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967, pp.18-19, Table No.3. Iraq received \$16 million between July 1945 and June 20, 1958, while the U.A.R. received \$26 million. Pakistan received \$424 million, while India received \$617 million. Israel received \$513 million, while all Arab countries including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia received \$299.2 million in the same period. See also pp.11-13. Comparison of U.S. and U.S.S.R. foreign aid between July 1954 and June 1965 shows that India received from the U.S.S.R. \$1,022 million or 20.3 per cent of Soviet foreign aid. The nonaligned U.A.R. and India received from the U.S. \$1,173 million and \$5,901 million respectively. U.S. allies, Pakistan and Turkey, received \$2,891 million and \$1,873 million, respectively, from the U.S. during the same period.

⁷³⁶Albert Hourani, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, Summer, 1955, IX, No.3, p.255. "But reasonableness in politics takes the form of intelligent pursuit of national interests, and the way in which a nation pursues its interests will depend upon the means at its disposal". p.240.

⁷³⁷EI Sadat, REVOLT ON THE NILE, op.cit., p.18.

attributes which enabled him to mold them into a cohesive working group.⁷³⁸ To be sure, most of the Free Officers fell into disgrace with Nasser at one time or another, but none was executed or banished altogether as happens in other dictatorships such as Communist Russia, Iraq, or Syria.⁷³⁹ Nasser buttressed his position by formulating the Liberation Rally, the Arab Socialist Union and regimenting the labour unions and other professional organizations to give his regime popular bases. By strengthening his control of army and governmental organizations his regime gained strength and power. This consolidation made it possible for Nasser to be more active in foreign affairs.

It would be ludicrous to talk about measuring the power of a small state like Egypt from 1952-1970 since Egypt started off by being a semi independent state within the British sphere of influence and reached international stature in the early 60's. However, it is precisely this change from semi-independence to international stature and the fact that *Nasser's Egypt increased so much in status and prestige in such a short period that makes the study of Nasser more attractive.* To measure the influence and prestige of any state is quite difficult.⁷⁴⁰ Nevertheless, in abstract terms, two prerequisites must be taken into consideration: first, how other countries perceive the power, influence, and prestige of a state (which does not necessarily reflect the real and actual strength), and second, how the performance of that state measures up to the expectation of others.⁷⁴¹ In the first place, the British, French, and Israeli governments, in depicting Nasser as another Hitler to justify getting rid of him,

⁷³⁸Valikiotis, THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS, op.cit., pp.45-50.

⁷³⁹See El Sadat, REVOLT ON THE NILE, op.cit., pp.VI-VII, for the fate of these officers.

⁷⁴⁰Kornberg and Perry, POLITICAL SCIENCE, XVIII, No.1, pp.57-58, criticized James G. March, "Measurement Concepts In the Theory of Influence", JOURNAL OF POLITICS, XIX, May, 1957, pp.202-26 and James G. March, "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence", POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, ed. Heinz Eulau et al, Glencoe Illinois : The Free Press, 1956, pp.380-84. for omission of internalized values or 'stored' influence.

⁷⁴¹"One component of a nation's prestige is the belief of others that the nation has the will and the capability to bring about whatever it indicates as its serious intentions...A second component of prestige is the respect and agreement which the other nations and peoples hold for what they understand to underlie a nation's policy". Quoted from Paul H. Nitze, "The Secretary and Foreign Policy," THE SECRETARY OF STATE, ed. Don K. Price, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Hall, 1960, pp.15-17. In Whitaker, PROPAGANDA, op.cit., p.20

were first victims of their own false propoganda which led them to disagreement on the methods of getting rid of Nasser and gave him the chance to survive the Suez crisis of 1956.⁷⁴² On the other hand, inflation of Nasser by Western propoganda gave him an illusion of importance beyond his capability.⁷⁴³ Thus, Western propoganda inflated Nasser's prestige in the eyes of world opinion and generated belief in Nasser's claims, especially among the Arabs.

Public opinion is elusive and difficult to measure even in democratic, advanced, and stable societies.⁷⁴⁴ And it is more difficult to measure the prestige of Nasser in terms of public opinion because there are publics and subpublics of Arab opinion in each Arab country. Yet public opinion is powerful, and all governments, even non-democratic ones, have to reckon with it. In January 1955, Nasser's opposition to the Baghdad Pact and his adoption of positive neutrality caused the Arabs to overlook his previous suppression of Egyptian nationalists and his rapprochement with Israel. In terms of popularity, Nasser's announcement of the Russian arms deal rallied the Arab nationalists behind him:

On the streets of Amman, vendors sold his picture for a nickel apiece and never had a big enough supply to meet the demand. In the shops of Damascus, Beirut, and even Baghdad, Nasser's photo invariably was displayed. Mothers named their new-born babies "Gamal".⁷⁴⁵

⁷⁴²Terrence Robertson, *CRISIS : The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy*, New York : Atheneum, 1964, pp.136, 139.

⁷⁴³For an account of how the West built up Nasser by their attack, see Lacouture, *NASSER*, op.cit., p.221. "People like to imagine that without the Egyptian 'big brother' the Algerian rebels would lay down their arms. This is a striking instance of the silly attitude which for years consisted in 'building up' Nasser, making him into a giant, a terror, inflating him in such terms that he could not help thinking it was his due, so that he used the same terms in talking with those Arabs, the Egyptians, who were least taken in by his charm" . p.221. Compare with the Wynn's analysis: "The leader of a poor and weak country, who knew in his heart that his army still was no match for little Israel, was played up by the West as if he were a major power on a level with Soviet Russia". *NASSER OF EGYPT*, op.cit., p.154.

⁷⁴⁴For definitions of public opinion and subpublics of opinion, see James MacGregor Burns and Jack Walter Peltason, *GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE : The Dynamics of American National State and Local Government*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966, pp.226-28.

⁷⁴⁵Quoted from Wynn, *NASSER OF EGYPT*, op.cit., p.120.

After the arms deal, an American diplomat observed:

"If Nasser ran for president in Lebanon, Syria, or Jordan today, he would be elected unanimously."⁷⁴⁶

Even in the heat of the Tripartite 'military intervention' of Egypt in 1956 the Syrians longed for more portraits of Nasser.⁷⁴⁷ Shortly after the fourteenth of July the portrait of Nasser was placed above the portraits of the Iraqi leaders, Qasim and Aref, who had overthrown the Hashemite government. When Nasser announced his resignation in the June War of 1967 mass support for him in Cairo and in other Arab capitals restored his tarnished power.⁷⁴⁸

However, through Nasser's harshness, his propaganda, and his embarrassment of his rivals, he was caught and pressed by his opponents, Hussein of Jordan and Faisal of Saudi Arabia, to the brinkmanship of the 1967 war.⁷⁴⁹ Furthermore, many nationalists in other Arab countries (local or separatist) resented Egypt's meddling in their local affairs. However, it was Nasser's stand against Israel, his Arms deal, and his stand against the West that made him the idol of the Arab world. Some of Nasser's critics attribute his indulgence in foreign policy to a desire to escape from dealing with domestic problems and to blame the imperialistic powers for Egypt's seemingly insurmountable problems.⁷⁵⁰ Hence, it was easier to deal with foreign problems than with domestic ones.⁷⁵¹ True,

⁷⁴⁶Wilbur L. Schramm, ed., ONE DAY IN THE WORLD'S PRESS : Fourteen Great Newspapers on a Day of Crisis, Stanford, Calif : Stanford University Press, 1959, pp.82.

⁷⁴⁷Ibid., p.84.

⁷⁴⁸Some authorities have claimed that it was a theatrical trick organized by Nasser's close political supporters, but it does not explain how the simultaneous reaction happened in other Arab capitals. See Leland Bowie, "Charisma, Weber and Nasir", MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, Vol. 30, 1976, pp.141-157; John P. Entelis, "Nasser's Egypt : The Failure of Charismatic Leadership", ORBIS, 18, No.2, Summer 1974, pp.451-464. Compare with Dekmejian, EGYPT UNDER NASSER, op.cit., "The central role of the charismatic phenomenon and its constituent ingredients was dramatically validated with the reinstatement of Abd Al Nasir on 9th June...After all, his activities as leader were the concrete manifestation of the nationalist ideological message which most Egyptian had shared and supported". EGYPT UNDER NASSER, op.cit., p.245.

⁷⁴⁹See Laqueur, THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM, op.cit., p.63.

⁷⁵⁰Robert C. Good, "State Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States", NEUTRALISM AND NONALIGNMENT, op.cit., p.5.

⁷⁵¹The climax of such charges were voiced by Laqueur, THE SOVIET UNION, op.cit.,

some of Nasser's measures during the nationalization of the Suez Canal were calculated risks undertaken to eradicate the vestiges of imperialism. However, the events precipitated by Nasser's miscalculation and brinkmanship on June 1967 resulted in grave and ignoble defeat.⁷⁵² Nevertheless, Nasser's survival of the 1967 war proved him to be the grand master of politics. The most valid serious criticism of Nasser is that his inability to achieve "collective solidarity" resulted in "low collective action capacity", the deplorable condition during the June War of 1967.⁷⁵³ Nasser recognized and acknowledged its gravity but did little more than oratory and draft charters.⁷⁵⁴

Whether Nasser would have been able to restore Egypt's freedom and independence in relation to the two super powers would have depended on whether the West was willing to settle its differences with him and offer him a face saving agreement. Otherwise, he would have been left with the choice of Egypt's becoming a Communist satellite or falling into a Western sphere.⁷⁵⁵

The measure of the power of a small state internationally is its ability to resist interference and maintain independence from major powers. Since 1952, Nasser succeeded in resisting Western pressure. He declined to join a Western sponsored regional military pact, rejected Western sponsored regional military pact, rejected Western pressure to impose a peace treaty with Israel, refused to refrain from diplomatic relations with Red China, and refused to recognize and

p.215. Who would not take advantage of a favourable international situation to win his independence and assert himself in international politics.

⁷⁵²Laqueur, THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM, op.cit., pp.104-05. John Badeau maintained that Nasser's amazing popularity made him "more confident in leadership, more calculating in his appeal to the crowd, and more ready to enforce internal control". Nasser, THE PHILOSOPHY, op.cit., p.20.

⁷⁵³Wilkinson, COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS, op.cit., p.52.

⁷⁵⁴Nasser, KHUTUB AL RA'IS, Part III, p.667; Nasser MAJMU'AT KHUTAB, Part III, pp.571-72.

⁷⁵⁵Few Western critics would like to admit that the United States was "far from willing to let new nations go their own way in choosing a form of government. No nation, new or old, can be thoroughly respectable in American eyes unless it adopts the ideas and institutions of constitutionalism democracy". Quoted from Frederick Watkins, "Colonialism, Dictatorship, and the American Political Tradition", WORLD PRESSURES, op.cit., p.100

accept Western trusteeship of the Tripartite Declaration or the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. Most Arab governments did reject all the above. What distinguished Nasser from other Arab leaders was that he transferred his successful resistance to western pressure into an independent path and freedom, first by concluding the arms deal with Russia and establishing commercial and diplomatic relations with Red China, consequently, by launching an offensive against the Baghdad Pact by establishing the Arab Joint Command with Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen thereby virtually isolating Iraq and the Baghdad Pact, and by nationalizing the Suez Canal to counteract Western withdrawal of the Aswan Dam offer.⁷⁵⁶

The Tripartite 'military intervention' of Egypt in 1956 signaled the failure of Western political pressure.⁷⁵⁷ Nasser, withstanding the Tripartite onslaught, turned his inevitable military defeat into political triumph. True, Nasser's military machine was crippled, Egypt's economy was paralyzed, and the West quarantined Egypt to bring Nasser down by economic and political pressure. However, the outcome of the Tripartite fiasco was exactly opposite to Western expectation. French interest in the Arab East was eliminated altogether. British interest received a fatal blow. Nasser's Arab rivals were discredited, and their positions were weakened, eventually they were eliminated. Politically, Nasser emerged more popular and his leadership and regime more secure than prior to the Tripartite '56 War. Nasser's rejection of the Eisenhower Doctrine completed Egypt's political and economic independence. "The basis of Nasser's strength [was] not Soviet arms nor economic aid, but his close identification with the main stream of Arab national feeling".⁷⁵⁸

Nasser's acceptance of the American peace proposal (the Rogers Plan) with Israel

⁷⁵⁶For the statement of the Arab Joint Command on November 30, 1956, see Khalil, THE ARAB STATES, II, op.cit., pp.254-55.

⁷⁵⁷"When violence becomes an actuality, it signifies the abdication of political power in favor of military or pseudo-military power". Quoted from Morgenthau, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS, op.cit., pp.28-29. See also Claude, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES, op.cit., pp.40-43; Lasswell and Kaplan, SOCIETY AND POWER, op.cit., pp.100-01.

⁷⁵⁸Philby, MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV, No.4, p.41.

in July 1970 tarnished his image, caused disenchantment among Arab nationalists, Palestinians, Algerians, Iraqis, and Syrians, and marked the decline of his popularity to one of its lowest ebbs.⁷⁵⁹ The eruption of fighting in Jordan between Palestinian commandos and King Hussein's Arab Legion further alienated Nasser from the Arabs. However, Nasser's success in summoning the Arab leaders (including King Hussein and the PLO) and getting them to agree on a truce to end the fighting balanced the criticism that was leveled against Nasser during the civil strife in Jordan. It proved to be his last political move.

Nasser's sudden death on September 29, 1970 resembled a meteorite that brightens the whole sky as it burns while falling through airspace. His funeral in Cairo was drowned in a tumultuous sea of human beings who came to say farewell and was echoed simultaneously by funeral processions in Arab and Islamic big cities and capitals.⁷⁶⁰ The mourning in most Black African nonaligned countries, the communist bloc and even in the West marked the all time high point of Nasser's popularity and career and possible of any leader in modern times. Death elevated Nasser's status in the Arab countries to sainthood with each Arab leader exhausting himself in emulating Nasser's policies and principles. Since Nasser's leadership was highly personalised and dependent on allegiance his death weakened any prospect of Arab Unity. Further, Nasser after his death was recognized by the West and even the Israelis as a stabilizing factor in the Arab East.

⁷⁵⁹THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 29, 1970, pp.1,4.

⁷⁶⁰ibid., September 29, 1970, pp.1,16; October 2, 1970, pp.1,16-17.

CHAPTER FOUR

NASSER'S COGNITIVE PERCEPTIONS AND THE POLITICS OF ARAB NATIONALISM: RELEVANCE, MEANING AND CONSTRUCTION IN THE CHARISMATIC SETTING

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In the preceding Chapter, one saw the evolution of a charismatic relationship between Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Egyptian and Arab masses. In addition, one saw that there were at least two perspectives – Egyptian and Arab – which had been irreconcilably competing for Nasser's role dynamics and leadership stature, and, that each of these perspectives attempts to influence the Egyptian leader in both domestic and foreign policy choices and decisions. The most pertinent questions that need to be answered now are: What were Nasser's perceptions of Arab Unity? Which of these perspectives had the greatest impact on his foreign policy towards Arab Unity? This Chapter is an attempt to answer these two questions.

4.2 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

Chapter Four is divided in two sections. The first addresses itself to the meaning and relevance of the cognitive perceptions to our study of charismatic leadership. The second deals with the problem of constructing and tackling Nasser's perceptions of Arab Unity.

Many writers have attempted to interpret the political ideologies and beliefs of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Several works have been written on Nasser's views on Egypt, the Arabs and the world at large.¹ The methods used in most of these writings

¹Fawzy Abdul Razzak has listed, in an excellent annotated bibliography, 107 Arabic

were not considered objectives and the interpretations given were faulty, to say the least. Not all of these writings attempted to address the issue of Nasser's ideological beliefs and philosophical views. For these reasons, only a few of these sources have been selected for review. It should be noted that the books that have been selected did not tackle Nasser's ideological beliefs either with the same 'objectivity' or with the same enthusiasm or space allocation. For example, while a writer like Vatikiotis² allocates only a few pages to the issue of Nasser's beliefs, one sees other scholars like Dajmal and Leroy³ writing mainly on the Egyptian leader's beliefs and ideology. The lack of 'objectivity' and 'rigour' in most of these writings is quite clear. It is not impossible for any interested observer to draw a correlation between the political attitude of the writer and the method of analysis he followed in his work. This is not surprising, as Rokeach states:

A person with a particular attitude is predisposed to selectively perceive; recognize; recall; judge; learn; interpret; forget; and think in ways congruent with his attitudes and such selective responses may be directed towards an object or situation or the maintenance of the belief itself.⁴

Though one is not interested in drawing that correlation, it does not seem "too far fetched" as an idea to classify these writings according to the attitudes of their writers. Thus the major works that have been selected on Nasser can be classified in terms of Leftist, Nasserite, Arab Nationalistic and Western

books on Nasser. Fawzy Abdul Razzak, "Nasser : Documents and Sources in Arabic", MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, Vol.30, No.4, Autumn, 1976, pp.545-550; Also in a comprehensive survey of writings on the Middle East, the Harvard Library has presented most of the works on the same subject. ARABIC HISTORICAL WRITINGS, 1973, Cambridge Mass : Harvard University Library, 1974, 147 pages; Also see Amnon Toren (ed.), A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BOOKS ON NASSER'S EGYPT, 1952-1970, Tel Aviv : The Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, University of Tel Aviv, 1972, 93 pages.

²Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS : Pattern for New Nations? Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1961; and, NASSER AND HIS GENERATION London : Croom Helm, 1978, especially Chapter 12 where the writer addresses himself to Nasser's ideology.

³Jack Dajmal and Marie Leroy, GAMAL ABDEL NASSER, Paris : Seghers, 1967.

⁴See M.J. Rokeach, "Structural Theory of Attitude Dynamics", PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, 24, 1960, pp.319-340, p.320.

Interpretations.⁵ It has been observed that none of these writings tackled the issue of Nasser's ideology and beliefs with a detailed criteria of validity.

These interpretations of Nasser can be classified in the final analysis into two categories. First: there are those writings which relied on Nasser's own words by quoting directly from his speeches and major philosophical works. In this category one can refer to the Nasserite and to some of the Western writings. The problem with these writings lies in that the authors quoted Nasser whenever it suited them. Other quotations which could have disclaimed their arguments were disregarded. One has seen an illustrative example in Silberman's article referred to earlier. Silberman has quoted only to prove his point. He has ignored those parts which could have refuted his point completely, if properly quoted. Thus, while Silberman chose to read one passage which listed the Arabs with the foreign conquerors of Egypt, he chose not to refer to another passage in which Nasser referred to the Arab circle as 'our circle'.

Secondly, there are those writings which shy away from the text and rely mainly on the writer's own interpretations of the leader's words without referring to or quoting from his speeches or major philosophical works. In this category, one can list those Western oriented and Communist interpretations of Nasser. The problem with these writings is quite obvious. The writer's own views are substituted for those of the leader.

If the Egyptian leader's ideological beliefs and perceptions were thus misinterpreted, it should not be at all surprising if his policies likewise were. In fact, this is exactly the case.⁶ It is clear that the above-mentioned methods

⁵For a Leftist interpretation of the Egyptian Leader's beliefs, see T. Shaker, NATIONAL LIBERATION AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN EGYPT, Beirut : Dar el Farabi, 1972; Ghali Shukri, "An Introduction to Nasser's Thoughts", EL FIKRI ARABI, 4/5 Sept-Oct, 1978, pp.67-94. For a Western interpretation, see Gad Silberman, "National Identity in Nasserist Ideology, 1952-1970", ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES, Vol.8, No.1, 1972; and for a Nasserite (Arab Nationalist) interpretation, see S. Ahmed, NASSER AND THE ARAB REVOLUTION, Beirut : Dar el Wahda, 1973.

⁶A faulty analysis of Egyptian policy in the Arab world has been presented by several writers. In the previous Chapter, the Western point of view of Egyptian Arab Policy after the 1952 Revolution has been analysed.

of interpreting the leader's ideological beliefs proved to be biased and unreliable. The methods used in such writings (whether Communist with no reliance on the text; or Western or Nasserite with their inherently eclectic nature) is not acceptable. For this reason, one concludes that such writings are not suitable for the purpose of constructing Nasser's perceptions of Egyptian identity. A more suitable, and consequently more 'objective', method for a more accurate interpretation of the leader's ideological beliefs is, therefore, required.

4.3 THE NEED FOR A RIGOROUS METHOD

In order to have a more accurate reading of a leader's ideology, a *qualitative* analysis of content has been used. Serious consideration was given to the possibility of using a quantitative mode of linguistic analysis. Since the content analysis approach made its appearance among American sociologists in the fifties, who were fascinated with the introduction of quantitative methods in the field,⁷ it has been used frequently in the social sciences including Political Science. From its name, it is clear that the approach analyses the 'content' of a message, be it a speech, a written word or the like. It attempts to understand a 'text' by first formulating certain questions about concepts that represent - in the mind of the researcher - certain values. By accounting the frequency of a particular concept in the 'text', the researcher draws a correlation between the rate of frequency of that concept and the values he assigned it.⁸

A major problem of content analysis lies in the fact that it can predetermine the questions to be answered.⁹ Thus, this 'contextual' method of analysis reveals only what the analyst wishes to reveal. In a sense this is true of all research in

⁷B. Berelson, *CONTENT ANALYSIS IN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH*, Glencoe Hill : The Free Press, 1952.

⁸In his study of Arab nationalist thought, El Sayyid Yassin has used this method of content analysis. See El Sayyid Yassin *CONTENT ANALYSIS OF ARAB NATIONALIST THOUGHT : AN INTRODUCTION*, Beirut : Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1980.

⁹S. Moscovici, & P. Henry. "Problèmes de L'Analyse du Contenu," *LANGUAGE*, No.11, 1968.

that the explanatory categories established by the analyst constrain what can be concluded. However, with respect to content analysis, due to the nature of language, this limitation appears far more damaging than in other areas of research. The utility of a categorisation (classification) is dependent on the range of non-classified behaviours/concepts to which the classification is also relevant. Quantitative content analysis tends to restrict understanding through extensive categorisation rather than extending understanding. This basic inability of quantitative content analysis arises from the attempt to encapsulate in quantitative terms the extreme subtleties of language. Were it the case that language was stable and uniform in all circumstances, then such methods could be used, but context is so important in meaning, and the use of signals in politics so full of nuance, that it is difficult to see how this approach could usefully be used in this work.

Given that the content analysis approach does not lend itself adequately to the interpretation of the leaders beliefs and ideology, the approach used in this chapter, is more of a qualitative and interpretive one. With this qualitative approach, the content of the leader's speeches are analysed in terms of the use of vocabulary and its immediate context. Given that the selected speeches of the leader include a cognitive evaluative and affective component, the leader's self image and value judgements have to be considered.

Since the analysis is limited to only one part of Nasser's ideological beliefs (those beliefs and perceptions concerning Arab Unity), Semantics Analysis is a more suitable method to use. The Semantics' argument is simple and clear. "Words have no meaning if they stand alone, only in a contextural structure" Thus, a concept like 'national identity' will have its fullest meaningful substance when examined in the light of a related vocabulary that gives it its real content. Thus, content is still being analysed but in the context of the message. The semantic method allows one to go beyond the immediate content and covers a wide

range of vocabulary which qualifies the concepts and gives them their *raison d'être*. Take, for example, the concept of 'Arab Nationalism'. While content analysis will focus mainly on this particular concept, with semantic and contextual understanding it is possible to go beyond that level and tackle several other related concepts such as 'Arab Unity', 'Arab Land', 'Arab people', 'Arab conscience'...etc, with the same attention. It is with the aid of this approach that one can construct Nasser's perceptions of the country's identity in the remaining pages of this Chapter.

4.4 TWO OBJECTIONS AND A REBUTTAL

The first objection is raised by the Cognitive Process Model. Since this model will be used in this Chapter, it is felt that this argument ought to be reconciled with that of the Social Process. It has been argued that in the time of crisis – where many factors have to be accounted for – leaders may not represent any of the elite groups' perceptions or beliefs. They may act on their own relying entirely on their own belief systems and Cognitive Perceptions. Though this study does not involve decisions of the type that can be characterized as crisis decisions, the model that has been opted for is the Cognitive Process one with the aim for testing it. Unity among the Arab peoples is an issue of belief and perceptions and, as such, the cognitive process model can still be used to uncover the role of these beliefs and perceptions in leadership decisions. These decisions do not have to be crisis decisions to be studied by the Cognitive Process Model. The proponents of the model have made wide claims about its applicability. An effort will be made to test the validity of the model and the claims of its adherents as well.

The second objection comes from the Social Process model itself. It has been argued that leader's own words cannot reveal his true beliefs. Thus, Brodin argues:

Official statements and public utterances of decision makers do not necessarily reveal their real perceptions and beliefs.¹⁰

A leader's belief system (BS) has the functions to 'simplify the perceptions of reality and to provide him with 'diagnostic propensities' as well as 'choice propensities'.¹¹ Beliefs serve as a 'prism' that influences the leader's perceptions of the flow of political events and his definitions or estimates of particular situations. They also provide norms and standards that influence his choice of strategy and tactics, and his structuring and weighing of alternative courses of actions.¹² Thus, a leader's BS functions to orient him in the world: to interpret it, to evaluate it, to provide action rules for different situations, to indicate goals and means to achieve these goals. Such a function of the BS is often called the 'pragmatic function'. This means that the BS is policy relevant.

For this reason, some secondary sources have been used and the writer's understanding of the language of the leader is intended to complement any lack of soundness in the method of reading the leader's writings and speeches. The prime goal here is to understand the images held by the Egyptian decision leader concerning, among other forces, Arab Unity. Image is a complex structure and, as such, needs a more sophisticated and complex approach to unveil it.

Images can be the direct and indirect experiences that individuals cannot recall. Therefore, in trying to understand an image held by a certain leader about an object - about what the object is like (be it national sovereignty, international organizations, a specific decision, or opinions on specific leadership issues) - the analyst should not limit his field of inquiry to the mere verbalizations of the leader about that object, but also should concentrate on "the conceptions of the object that are implicit in the ways he relates himself to it".¹³ Some indirect

¹⁰K. Brodin, "Belief System, Doctrines and Perceptions", COOPERATION AND CONFLICT, 2, 1972: pp.97-112, p.103.

¹¹Alexander L. George, PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, London : Greenwood Press, 1973, p.16.

¹²ibid., p.16.

research devices should, therefore, be employed such as observation of, or questions about, behaviour. In this, the secondary sources find their usefulness. The advantage the analyst would get from looking at held images is characterised by Kelman as follows:

Images in this sense make it easier to link behavior towards objects directly and specifically to the perceived characteristic of these objectives; and to deal with the cognitive structures of people's conceptions of these objects (which vary widely) and with the mixed and often contradictory evaluations of these objects.¹⁴

For these reasons, the sources that have been consulted in constructing Nasser's perceptions of Egyptian national identity are primary (leader's own writings, speeches, and official documents) and secondary (other's writings on them). However, before indulging in the analysis of constructing Nasser's beliefs, a test of validity should be mentioned in regard to:

1. Spontaneous (Press conferences, Interviews and Minutes versus Premeditated documents (Books and Articles).
2. Monologic (Minutes, Press Interviews, and Private communications) and Dialogic documents (Dialogue between Nasser and Others).
3. Ghost-Written versus Authentic Documents.

Additionally, attention is given to domestic versus foreign audiences and, masses versus intellectual audiences.

In regard to the first set of documents, the validity test is based on the assumption that the more carefully and deliberately planned the message, the more remote the link between the subject's attitude and the message content. The only significant variation was in the case of the belief about the role of the

¹³H.C. Kelman (ed.), INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR : A Social Psychological Analysis, New York, Holt : Rhinehart & Winston, 1965, p.27.

¹⁴Ibid., p.27.

political leader in controlling historical developments. In spontaneously articulated documents, Nasser viewed his role as an active one. However, in premeditated documents, he conceptualized his role as passive.

In the second set of documents, the test is predicated on the assumption that "Nasser is perhaps at his best in face to face discussions. Challenge seems to bring out his deepest thoughts."¹⁵ Documents such as Nasser's debates with members of the National Congress in 1961 or his discussions with the leaders of Syria and Iraq in 1963,¹⁶ are seen as more accurate indicators of Nasser's beliefs than any other documents. Sayegh's expectations were found to be accurate in the case of beliefs about risk acceptance. Nasser tended to express acceptance of high risks in monologic documents whereas he tended to put an injunction against the pursuit of high risks in dialogic documents.

In the third set of documents, one compared the content of the beliefs articulated in *THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION*, a document that has been widely cited as having been ghost written, with the content of documents authentically articulated by Nasser in the same year. The result of the analysis reveals no significant pattern of variation. In other words, what was in *THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION* falls within the mainstream of Nasser's beliefs and perceptions.

In the first set of audiences, the relationship between the distribution of beliefs and the types of audiences was examined. Presumably the sincerity of Nasser could be questioned if it was found that he presented one set of beliefs to one type of audience and another set of beliefs to another type of audience. In other words, if the data were valid, the distribution of Nasser's beliefs would remain basically the same regardless of the the type of audience. An example is the case of military force. Nasser argued against resort to military force to domestic and

¹⁵See Fayez A Sayegh, "The Theoretical Structure of Nasser's Arab Socialism" in Albert Hourani (ed.), *MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS*, No.4, St. Anthony's Papers, No.17, Oxford University Press, 1967, pp.9-55, p.34.

¹⁶For detailed texts of these discussions see Malcolm Kerr, *THE ARAB COLD WAR : Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Rivals, 1958-1970*, Third Edition, 1981, London : Oxford University Press.

foreign audiences, qualifying it with a belief in the utility of force as a deterrent to the adversary in the domestic audience case. In the second set of audiences, if it was demonstrated that Nasser articulated the same beliefs in addressing both types of audience, then it can be concluded with some confidence that the data truly reflect Nasser's beliefs. The rationale of the test is based on the hypothesis which states that "a small audience composed of people who can check the veracity of communication is likely to elicit a sincere expression of the speaker's beliefs rather than audiences composed of masses".¹⁷ Across the board, the type of audience did not have any discernible impact on the articulation of any of Nasser's beliefs.¹⁸

¹⁷See Robert Axelord, "Schema Theory : An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition", AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1973, 67, pp.124-166, p.153.

¹⁸A complementary test is based on the hypothesis argued by Yehoshafat Harkaby in ARAB ATTITUDES TO ISRAEL, Jerusalem : Israel University Press, 1972, p.390, which states that "Arab public proclamations are more significant than the soft words articulated in interviews with foreign observers". In other words, Harkaby contends that Arab (including Nasser's) articulations to domestic audiences vary significantly from utterances to foreign audiences. Harkaby argues that his hypothesis applies only to Arab leaders. He contends that in the case of American leaders, private conversations indicate their true beliefs, while their speeches to audiences of voters are a matter of 'politics' in the pejorative sense. Paradoxically, Harkaby (1972, p.414) refutes this distinction by arguing five pages later that " the pronouncements of Arab leaders are often made for exhibitionist and tactical purposes and have no profound significance". However, such arguments did not prompt him to question the wisdom of his reliance upon such pronouncements to understand the Arab attitudes toward Israel.

SECTION ONE : THE RELEVANCY AND MEANING OF THE
LEADER'S COGNITIVE PERCEPTIONS.

It is the contention of this Chapter that a political leader's policy is determined by the official perception of the situation and the nation's interest. A political leader's perceptions of what advocates of Real Politik call 'Objective Reality' are as important as reality itself. It is strongly argued in the leadership literature that the 'individuals constitute the ultimate focus of action' and that individual decision-makers act and speak for the nation state. As Kelman argues, "to know what is in the minds of men at the point of an internationally relevant action is an important input to the study of the behavior of the nation states".¹⁹ This is the main argument which sprang out of the various leadership approaches mentioned in the first Chapter.

In the area of leadership efficacy, one sees that public speeches and statements of such individuals - in this case Gamal Abdel Nasser - must assume a vital importance in this respect. All major decisions concerning the domestic or foreign policies of Egypt were made by certain individuals (and most often by the President alone), and it is toward the leader's perceptions and actions that one must return in order to comprehend the relationship between our two variables (Charismatic Leadership and Arab Unity). This means that when Egypt is mentioned, one really means the political leader who makes major leadership decisions.²⁰

Moreover, in the case of Egypt, cognitive perceptions of the leaders are also relevant from another perspective. Holsti states:

Moreover, perceptions are seen to be especially important in decisions made at the pinnacle of a hierarchy by leaders who are relatively free from

¹⁹Kelman, C. Herbert, "The Role of the Individual in International Relations : Some Conceptual and Methodological Considerations", JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 14,1970, pp.1-17.

²⁰This is of course a reminiscent of the celebrated French dictum of Louis XIV "L'Etat, C'est Moi."

organizational and other constraints.²¹

If the observer closely examines the role of the Egyptian leader, one will almost certainly be convinced that Nasser fits Holsti's remark rather neatly. After all, an Egyptian President commands a great deal of authority and is relatively free from organizational restraint. As a matter of fact this has been a constant characteristic of the Egyptian political system since the days of the old. And it has been suggested that, in Egypt, the executive branch of government will always be strong and that the chief executive will always be in charge in every sense of the word.

While one agrees with the Sprouts that 'no deterministic (i.e. causal) relationship should be asserted between the environmental factors on the one hand, and attributes or actions of political leaders, or a certain state of affairs on the other',²² the fact remains that Egypt has always had a powerful central government that subordinated all subnational units to its authority which sometimes bordered on despotism. From the time of Mohammed Ali until the present, the central governments in Cairo has always controlled all subnational units (localities, provinces, etc.) not only through the hiring and firing of local executives, bureaucrats and even the 'so-called' popular councils. This highly centralized character of the Egyptian system of government which dates back to the Pharaonic ages was noted by several observers of Egyptian society including K. Wittfogel.²³ In post-revolutionary Egypt, this character has been further legitimized by the Egyptian constitution which is structured in a way that made the President the most powerful man in the country and assured the supremacy of the President vis-a-vis the Legislature and the Judiciary.

²¹Holsti, O.R., "Foreign Policy Formulation Viewed Cognitively", in Robert Axelord (ed.), STRUCTURE OF DECISION, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1976, pp.30-31.

²²M & H. Sprout, THE ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE IN HUMAN AFFAIRS, London : Greenwood Press, 1979, p.42.

²³Karl Wittfogel, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM : A Comparative Study in Total Power. New Haven : Yale University Press, 1963, p.12 and passim. Consider Wittfogel's thesis that a direct and immutable relation that links the water system to bureaucratic despotism, the programme of land reclamation to the chief engineer's absolute rule over rural society.

As Chief Executive, the Egyptian President retains the constitutional right to initiate, ratify and block legislation; to draw major policies; to convoke and dissolve the legislature; and to appoint and dismiss members of the cabinet as well as members of the Supreme Court.²⁴ All Egyptian Presidents utilize their powers with a great degree of effectiveness especially in the area of foreign policy to the extent that 'when one says Egyptian foreign policy, one always means one thing: the President's leadership policy, internal and external.' Gamal Abdel Nasser could be rightly regarded as the sole and final arbiter, the main architect and the only formulator of the country's leadership policy during his tenure. Referring to his vast powers in decision-making, Nasser had once stated that:

No one in the country can make a decision or even offer his viewpoint on any foreign policy issue or matter before checking with me personally.²⁵

The Egyptian President has become the pivotal point of the Egyptian political system. This becomes understandable only when one takes into consideration the concept of leadership. Leadership is the crux of the executive power. Generally speaking, with the increasing demand for leadership, many theoretical attempts have been made in the direction of 'discovering' the qualities and traits of the leader. Yet, the fact of the matter is that these qualities depend to a great extent upon the conditions under which leadership operates.²⁶ It is possible, however, to mention certain functional aspects of a leader. Such aspects, as Carl J. Friedrich explains, are:

1. The leader's representativeness;
2. The leader's capacity to offer solutions to commonly recognized problems; and
3. The leader's capacity to foresee problems that are not yet generally recognized, to bring them into clear view and to dramatize their urgency. That is to say, the ability to generate and radiate emotions (emphasis added).²⁷

²⁴See the permanent constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt especially articles 73-152 for more details.

²⁵Hafez Munir, "The Secret History of Nasser's Regime", ROSE EL YOUSSEF, 2 May, 1976, pp.11.

²⁶See for example Chester I. Barnard, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE (1938); T.N. Whitehead, LEADERSHIP IN A FREE SOCIETY (1936) and, Ordway Tead, THE ART OF LEADERSHIP (1935).

Charismatic movements in general, and particularly those of recent times, are bound with leaders of this type. The person who well-anticipates (and offers solutions to) future problems facing his group will naturally seem more qualified to lead as he appears more superior to his fellows. As a leader, he will be in a position to retain vast powers whereby all other institutions will be reduced to a mere subservient role to him. Carl J. Friedrich states:

...a government leadership always represents many concrete problems; some are very small and specific, others vast and comprehensive. The man who suggests a convincing solution acquires leadership as others follow his lead...a successful leader commands a large margin of freedom from communal restraint.²⁸

Moreover, if a leader is seen by his people as possessing certain qualities that are not ordinarily accessible to ordinary men, he is said to be a charismatic leader. Such a charismatic leader would normally have vast powers in steering his nation towards the achievements of its objectives. Thus, the key issue of Charismatic Political Leadership is how the people perceive the leader.

Many authorities have come to the conclusion that Nasser was one such a charismatic leader.²⁹ He retained vast powers in his hands and reduced the other institutions to the mere subservient role of 'helpers' to the Executive. It should not be surprising, therefore, that a man of Nasser's calibre did enjoy such vast powers in a society like Egypt where all previous rulers were foreigners; and where the people have traditionally been accustomed to allow their leaders assume such vast powers.³⁰ It has been clearly pointed out that constitutional life in post revolutionary Egypt had evolved the person (and the powers of) the

²⁷Carl J. Friedrich, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY : Theory and Practice in Europe and America, Boston : Ginn and Company, 1950, p.352.

²⁸Ibid., p.352.

²⁹In an interview with the writer Sir Anthony Nutting said that "If the words 'Political Charisma' were not invented before Gamal Abdel Nasser's time, they would have been created then. Abdel Nasser was seen by many of his followers as the true embodiment of Political Charisma", October, 1988, London.

³⁰In the same interview, Sir Anthony was quoted as saying "The Egyptian people, as a general rule are politically docile and hence tend to allow their rulers supreme powers, which is not usual in the Third World setting, witness Nehru's India".

President who was the source of political and constitutional legitimacy.³¹ Nor should it be a surprise that Nasser - the engineer of the revolution and the main architect of the Egyptian post-revolution political system - had rejected Montesquieu's theory of 'the Separation of Powers' as unrealistic. On July 2, 1962, before the National Congress of Popular Forces - which ratified the National Charter - Nasser contended:

Some people would like to argue that the 'Executive' branch of the government should be separate from the 'legislature'. This is known as the theory of the 'Separation of Powers'. As a matter of fact, this theory has never been applied in any country. Has ever the Executive been totally separate from the legislature anywhere in the world?"³²

Moreover, Nasser had repeatedly reaffirmed his views on the nature of the relationship that should exist between branches of government. In the Seventh Meeting of the Trilateral Talks for the proposed unity between Syria, Iraq and Egypt, Nasser said:

I believe that the principle of the 'Separation of Powers' is a great deceit...Why? I will tell you why. Because, in reality, there is no such thing as 'Separation' between the branches of government. Even in England, it has always been the case that the party that commands a majority in the parliament holds the reigns of government; Executive and Legislative alike. Thus, the political leadership that commands the majority will always have two things under its control: the Executive and the Legislative powers."³³

Being consistent with himself, Nasser had appointed Mohammed Abu Nusseir - who held the same views as Nasser himself on the principle of separation of powers - to the post of Minister of Justice. This appointment was politically motivated, i.e. to further Nasser's influence and to tighten the screws around the members of the Judiciary who started to voice their discontent with the regime and began to

³¹See R. Hrair Dekmejian, EGYPT UNDER NASSER : A Study in Political Dynamics, Albany : State University of New York Press, 1971, pp.63-78.

³²Nasser's Speech, AL AHRAM, July 3, 1962, pp.1-2.

³³Imam Abdullah, THE MASSACRE OF THE JUDICIARY, Cairo : Publishing House, 1976, pp.24-46.

jockey for political power particularly following the 1967 defeat. With the Nusseir appointment, Nasser engaged to stifle the opposition and to enhance his own position.³⁴

By rejecting the theory of the Separation of Powers, Nasser had established a pattern of government based on FUSION OF POWERS instead. In that pattern, all other institutions were reduced to a mere subservient role to that of the President. Thus, the cabinet, the Assembly, the Military, the 'Ulama' and all other political institutions were totally under the control of the head of state.³⁵

4.5 MEANING OF COGNITIVE PERCEPTIONS

Cognition is an all-inclusive concept which contains all other conceptual concepts such as beliefs, images, perceptions or values. For example, it is possible to cognize without believing or even forming a prior image about an effect, but it is almost impossible to believe without cognizing. The term is derived from the word Cogna which means, "to think about many things and bring them together in a unified way".³⁶ This means to form an image about the effect. Image has been defined as:

The organized representation of an object in an individual cognitive system. The core of an image is the perceived character of the object to which it refers - the individual's conception of what this object is like. Image is an inferred construct, however, rather than a mere description of the way the object is phenomenally experienced."³⁷

The image of an object is always associated with various specific memories

³⁴In an interview with the writer, Peter Mansfield said that "The post 1967 wave of political dissent within the country was as a direct result of Nasser's loss of influence and hence the loosening of the executive's power over the country". October, 1988, London.

³⁵For more information on Presidential Power see, Dekmejian, EGYPT UNDER NASSER, op.cit., pp.196-8; Charles Cremeans, THE ARABS AND THE WORLD : Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy, London : Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, pp.32-41

³⁶6. Reed, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ANOMALOUS PERCEPTION, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1972, p.13.

³⁷Ibid., p.24.

(past); expectations (future); various generalized beliefs and opinions regarding the object. The image in a broader definition includes not only "the individual's conception of the object at present, but also his view of its past, and future".³⁸

If an individual likes or dislikes, favours or opposes, approaches or avoids an effect, one is then talking about attitudes. When an image is complex and differentiated, it would then be appropriate to speak of "a number of attitudes".³⁹ Images have some tendency to relate to different impressions of the object to each other so that "they hang together in a unified whole".⁴⁰ In other words, "Images are not just an accumulation of discrete components, but sorting out these components into a more coherent and efficient structure".⁴¹ Therefore, among the elements that constitute the image, there will always be a tendency towards consistency so that the image can be coherent and organized, even though it contains contradictions and ambiguities.⁴²

Images play an important role in the individual's conception of the object (and behaviour towards it) Therefore, understanding what Walter Lippman calls "pictures in our heads",⁴³ is crucial to understanding human behaviour. If that behaviour is a political decision - where the stakes are normally high - probing into the images held in the leader's mind seems to be a worthwhile undertaking. After all, it is these images that (sometimes) determines policy outcomes. In this context, Boulding argues that "decision makers do not respond to the situation, but to their images of the situation and that behaviour is usually directed to the fulfilment of images formed in the past for the future".⁴⁴

A belief is any simple proposition, conscious or unconscious, inferred from what

³⁸ Ibid., p.24.

³⁹ Ibid., p.24.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.24.

⁴¹ Ibid., p.24.

⁴² Ibid., p.24.

⁴³ Walter Lippman, PUBLIC OPINION, New York : Free Press, 1965, pp.10-12.

⁴⁴ Kenneth E. Boulding, THE IMAGE : Knowledge in Life and Society, London : Crescent Press, 1961.

a person says or does, and capable of being preceded by the phrase 'I believe...or the phrase 'my belief is'. The content of a belief may describe an object or a situation as true or false; evaluate it as good or bad; or advocate a certain course of action as desirable or undesirable. Yet, all beliefs are predisposition to action. Crutchfield and Kretch state:

Whether or not the content of a belief is to describe, evaluate or advocate an action, or do all three, all beliefs are predispositions to action; and they are part of attitudes. An attitude incorporates two or more beliefs whereas a belief is part and parcel of an attitude.⁴⁵

A belief system is an inter-related set of affect-laden cognitions concerning some aspects of the psychological world of a single individual.⁴⁶ Kretch and Crutchfield assert that every belief (having a cognitive component) is a predisposition to action. The kind of action a belief leads to is 'dictated' strictly by the context of that belief. Beliefs are divided into: central beliefs (a change in which triggers a chain reaction of changes in other beliefs) and non-central beliefs (a change in which does not necessarily result in a subsequent change in other beliefs). Central beliefs usually remain relatively more stable than non-central or secondary beliefs. Non-central beliefs are usually subject to change and, therefore, are less stable, yet they do not affect the central ones.

All studies in the field share the common assumption that man strives to maintain consistency between the cognitive, affective and behavioural components within a single belief; between two or more related beliefs and attitudes entering into a total system of beliefs.

An attitude has, therefore, been defined as 'a relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner.'⁴⁷ Thus, beliefs, attitudes, and images - all authorities

⁴⁵David Kretch and Richard Crutchfield, THEORY AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, New York : McGraw Hill, 1948, p.153.

⁴⁶ibid., p.154.

agree - are dispositions to action in a preferential way towards the object or situation under investigation. Perception is a by-product of attitudes, beliefs and images.

Social perception is a difficult concept to define. It is generally concerned with the effects of social and cultural factors on man's cognitive structuring of his psychological and social environment. Since the 'social' has come to often mean, in social-psychological parlance, 'motivational factors' in perception⁴⁸ human behaviour has been accounted for by more than merely one attitude, i.e. by an image. According to Rokeach, Ballachey, Crutchfield and many others, behaviour is determined by a number of attitudes, wants, and situational conditions rather than by a single attitude. "Attitude test scores alone are usually not enough to predict behaviour".⁴⁹

From the distinction cited above between the various perceptual concepts - beliefs, perceptions, attitudes...etc - the cognitive perceptions that one will be looking at are merely the images held in Gamal Abdel Nasser's head about the role of Egypt's position in the Arab world and the politics of Arab Nationalism. Since it is our contention that the image of 'Arab Unity' held by the Egyptian leader, Nasser, constitute the most essential element in determining his leadership decisions towards Arab Unity, the question arises is what those images were.

In building Nasser's perceptions of national identity, one has used, as was said previously, primary as well as secondary sources. Because the secondary sources are lacking in methodological rigour, one has relied more heavily on the primary sources (speeches and philosophical writings of Nasser, 1952-1970).

⁴⁷M.J. Rokeach, "Structural Theory of Attitude Dynamics", PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, 24, 1960, pp.319-340, p.320.

⁴⁸Perception involves the awareness and recognition of social objects present in one's immediate sensory field and impressions experienced at an earlier time.

⁴⁹Rokeach, "Structural Theory of Attitude Dynamics", op.cit., p.154.

4.6 NASSER'S PERCEPTIONS OF EGYPTIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

Charismatic leaders do not necessarily cultivate strong political institutions during their life in office. Institutionalization has been noted by the Weberians as incompatible with charismatic leadership. It has been observed that Charismatic leaders always act alone in mobilizing the masses and personify authority. They do not, in the majority of cases, rely on political institutions. Thus, the relationship between them and the masses is always a direct one.

If Nasser is to be taken as a truly charismatic leader,⁵⁰ then, as such, no meaningful political institutions existed besides him. Therefore, the heavy burden of political communication with the Egyptian people rested solely with Nasser who - due to the political circumstances of that era - relied mainly on the spoken word, i.e., the political discourse. The political speech of the leader was the main vehicle of interaction with the Egyptian and, regionally, the Arab masses.⁵¹ Beside the political speech, there were some philosophical writings. Such writings were mainly addressed to the learned stratum of the Egyptian and Arab people. The examination of such speeches and writings give a fairly comprehensive idea about Nasser's perceptions and beliefs concerning Arab Unity and Nationalism.

Since it would be redundant and time-consuming to examine all of Nasser's speeches, only some twenty four of them have been chosen for review. In selecting this sample, a two-dimensional criterion has been applied : the political

⁵⁰See Jean Lacouture, *THE DEMIGODS : Charismatic Leadership in the Third World; "Gamal Abdel Nasser : Leader and Institution"*, New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1970, pp.81-138.

⁵¹Consider Nasser's utterances to an American Ambassador, John Badeau, in Egypt: "...the main weapon of the revolution is the masses. I have always been able to move these masses to defend themselves against any danger. The weapon of the Arab revolution is the masses. So perhaps quiet diplomacy would suit the United states, but quiet diplomacy would not suit us because I would be cut off from the support of my masses. If I am to be ready with my weapon I must always be ready to talk to the Arab people...Otherwise I would be facing the battle without my weapon". Quoted in Mohrez Mahmoud El Hussini, *SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS, 1945-85*, London : Macmillan Press, 1988, p.171.

occasion of the speech; and the kind of audience the speech was addressed to.

Having applied the Semantics Method - outlined earlier - to the selected sample of speeches, one has come to the following definite conclusion about Nasser's perceptions of Egyptian national identity. Nasser did not consider Egypt as a nation but, rather, as part and parcel of the Great Arab Ummah. This was a steady belief in Nasser's mind and not merely a notion dictated by the circumstances of the hour that the Egyptian leader entertained for a while and had to give up at a later time. It was a deep rooted belief of the kind religions require of their adherents. The observer notes that Nasser's speeches reflected his belief that Egypt was part of the Arab world. Against all odds, Nasser's firm belief in the Arabness of Egypt never wavered. He continued to maintain that belief even when almost all the Arab world were adamantly against him and unquestionably opposed to his policies.

To qualify this general conclusion, the analysis of the selected sample of the leader's words has revealed the following:

4.7 QAWMI (NATIONALISM) VERSUS WATANI (PATRIOTISM)

There are two different sets of vocabulary relevant to Egyptian and Arab Nationalism. These two sets of vocabulary have sometimes caused a great deal of confusion for those who attempted to analyze Nasser's perceptions of Arab Unity. Silberman is a very good example to cite in this regard. The confusion - whether in Silberman's example⁵² or in others like it - occurs due to the writers' lack of knowledge - or at least lack of command - of the Arabic language. Nasser spoke in Arabic. Any scholar who attempts to interpret Nasser's views must do so with a sufficient ability to understand that language. For example, Nasser chose his vocabulary in a careful manner. His Qawmi vocabulary set differed completely

⁵²See Gad Silberman, "National Identity in Nasserist Ideology", ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES, Vol.8, No.1, 1972.

from his Watani vocabulary set. A thorough review of the sample of speeches indicates that Nasser never intermingled the two sets together. Thus, for Arab Nationalism, Nasser used the word Qawmiyah (meaning nationalism); and for Egyptian Nationalism, he used the words Wataniyah (meaning patriotism). The adjectives 'Qawmi' and 'Watani' mean 'National' and 'patriotic' respectively. Apparently, Nasser never on any occasion used -not even once - the former when referring to Egypt or to the Egyptians.

4.8 THE CONCEPT OF THE UMMAH

Since Nasser's Arab Policies aiming to unite the Arab World did not appear before the mid-fifties, it was a natural thing for the local (the Watani) vocabulary in Nasser's speeches and writings to emerge before the regional (the Qawmi) one. This was another source of confusion for any Western observers and analysts who inferred from this fact that a change in the ideological beliefs of the leader did occur. Consequently, they set out to find reasons for that perceived change and were guided by their faulty readings of the leaders' beliefs to the external environment. The fact of the matter is quite contrary.

Nasser used the Watani vocabulary from the beginning of his coup d'etat, this means that he had had a good chance to use the Qawmi vocabulary from the start. He could have, for example, described Egypt as an Ummah before he embarked on his regional policies which were geared to achieve a degree of 'Arab unity'. Yet, Nasser had not done so. The Egyptian state was never referred to as an Ummah. Moreover, from its first appearances in 1956 in Nasser's writings and speeches, the word Ummah was used to describe the Arabs. Since then, the word was never - as it was never before - used to describe Egypt. This concept, Ummah was systematically used by Nasser to describe only the Arab world. Egypt was seen as an integral part of the Arab world and never as an Ummah by itself. Such a meticulous usage of the Arabic language suggests that Nasser did in fact

distinguish between Qawmi and the Watani vocabulary. And that he did so on purpose and out of a philosophical belief about the identity of Egypt and its role in achieving Arab Unity.

Before 1954, Nasser used terms like the 'Arab Circle' and the 'Arab Region' when referring to the Arab world. But even then, Nasser used to refer to the entire area as one region being laden with the same problems, heading for the same future and bound for the same destiny. It was only in 1954 that Nasser revealed the real regional goal of the 1952 Revolution. According to Nasser, the goal of the Egyptian revolution of 1952 was "that the Arabs become a united Ummah." It is apparent that the Arabs, in Nasser's language, become an Ummah (for he never doubted the existence of the Arab Ummah), but, he said "to become a united Ummah (for it was obvious that the Ummah was divided).

This revelation by Nasser of the regional goals of the Free Officers was repeated quite often afterwards. Thus, in 1954 and 1955 the goal was stressed in Nasser's major speeches. In 1955 he affirmed that 'our Arab policy aims at making the Arab Ummah united'.⁵³ And, on January 16, 1956, the Egyptian constitution legitimized Nasser's perceptions that "The Egyptian people constitute an integral part of the Arab Ummah". From that date on, Egypt was referred to as Al Watan and the Arab World as Al Ummah in all of Nasser's speeches and writing.⁵⁴

It should be noted that this disclosure by Nasser of the regional goals of the Egyptian revolution came in 1954. It is not a coincidence that in that year the British had to leave Egypt. After the British had been ousted from Egypt, it should not be surprising that the leaders of the revolutionary regime were a

⁵³Nasser, "A Speech on July 22nd 1955", NASSER'S DOCUMENTS, op.cit., p.63.

⁵⁴Before 1956, Nasser was in the habit of using terms like UNITED UMMAH and one UMMAH whenever he referred to the Arab World. These two concepts became the Arab Ummah from 1956 on. However, sometimes the Watani vocabulary was carefully borrowed by Nasser to be used in the Qawmi (Arab) sense. Thus, on March 30th, 1968, Nasser used the term Al Watanyih Al Arabiyah. But such borrowing remained limited. It was an exception which should confirm, rather than negate, the general rule Nasser followed in using these terms. See NASSER'S DOCUMENTS, op.cit., p.398.

little bit encouraged to disclose their real policy goals vis-à-vis the Arab world. Nasser himself referred to this point in 1954 when he said:

Egypt has begun a new phase with the Arabs...The Goal of our revolution has always been to make the Arabs a united Ummah. It is true that the problem of the existence of the British on Egyptian soil had occupied most of our time and efforts exerted for the liberation of the Arab lands.⁵⁵

That perception of Egypt as an Arab country continued to exist as part of Nasser's belief system - and a guide to his regional and Arab policies - until his death in September, 1970. Here, once again, one finds oneself in sharp contradiction with Silberman's interpretation of Nasser's ideological beliefs. Silberman argues that following the 1967 defeat, Nasser's concept of the Arab Ummah waned as the leader's perception of national identity took a turn toward Egyptian nationalism. Silberman misread the Egyptian leader in this respect as well. For, while it is true that Nasser de-escalated his call on the Arabs to unite in that particular period in Egypt's history, nothing indicated that the Egyptian leader gave up his ideal of Arab unity. A careful examination of our selected sample of his speeches revealed that Nasser's main emphasis in that period was on 'a united Arab stand against Israel.' Nasser's call on all Arabs to 'close the ranks' and 'fight until the last man' in order to regain the Arab land lost to Israel in the War, should not be seen as a sign of giving up the ideal of Arab Unity or for turning towards Egyptian nationalism. As a matter of fact, in that particular period of Egypt's history, Nasser's usage of the word Ummah - and its related vocabulary - was more visible than ever before in Nasser's speeches and writings. For example, the term was repeated by Nasser over 200 times in the period between 1967 and his death in 1970

⁵⁵Gamal Abdel Nasser, "A Speech on July 22nd, 1954", NASSER'S DOCUMENTS, op cit, p.117.

4.9 THE POLITICAL EXPRESSION OF THE UMMAH

Nasser saw an ephemeral phase in the multitude of the Arab states. The Ummah has always had one logical expression in Nasser's mind. That expression was to take the form of an Arab state which will encompass all present Arab mini states. Thus, for Nasser Egypt was only a part of the Ummah. In fact, he had affirmed the Arabness of Egypt from the moment he ousted the British and emerged triumphant over Naguib in the March 1954 crisis within the RCC. In *THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION* (written in 1953), he referred to the Arab circle as a Sense of Belonging ("it is from us and we are from it"). Likewise, in all of his official writings and documents, Nasser had repeatedly confirmed the Arabness of Egypt. Thus, the Constitution of 1956, the National Charter of 1962, and the March 30th Declaration of 1968, all went the way to represent Nasser's perceptions of Arabness of Egypt. In the March 30th declaration, for example and contrary to what Silberman likes to believe, Nasser said:

It is important that the constitution emphasize the Egyptians belonging to the Arab Ummah; a belonging of history of struggle and of destiny. An organic unity above all individuals and phases of struggle.⁵⁶

All this leads us to the conclusion that Nasser's perception of Egypt was simply Arab. He saw Egypt as part of an Ummah; the Arab Ummah and in no way an Ummah by itself. According to Nasser, Egypt's role was to struggle for the Arab Unity; Egypt's army was to fight for the entire Ummah; and Egypt's revolution was to help all Arab revolutions for the achievement of Arab Unity.

⁵⁶Gamal Abdel Nasser, "A Speech to the Intellectuals at Cairo University for presenting the March Declaration, 1968", *NASSER'S DOCUMENTS*, op.cit., p.250.

**SECTION TWO : THE ROLE OF NASSER'S PERCEPTION IN LEADERSHIP ROLE
AND POLICY TOWARDS ARABISM: OPERATIONALISATION AND CONSTRUCTION**

In order to render the Cognitive Process Model amenable to the analysis of the role of Nasser's perception of national identity in his leadership role towards Arab Unity, the following operationalisation seems appropriate.⁵⁷

The leader's perceptions of Arab Unity (PAU) represent only one part of his belief systems. For a leader's belief system (or part of it) to be used in connection with some sort of explanation, it can be seen in three possible ways: It can be used as dependent, intervening or independent variable. And as such it poses its own logical questions which require logical answers. The following abbreviations will be used to facilitate the task of operationalising the model:

(BS) Belief System;

(PAU) Perceptions of Arab Unity;

(AC) action; a,b,c,.....n (any independent variable) and

(DM) the decision making process.

(a) (PAU) AS AN INTERVENING VARIABLE

Two scenarios are possible in this case: One, an autocratic leader:

a -- PAU -- AC

Where (a) stands for any independent factor(s) -- such as incoming information for example -- that may affect a leader's actions after being 'filtered' through his BS.

Two, a democratic leader: **a PAU -- DM -- AC**

Where decisions are made collectively (by a group), one is faced with a process of action and interaction.

⁵⁷The version of the cognitive model chosen in this work is drawn mainly from one source. Christler Johnson, (ed.), COGNITIVE DYNAMICS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, New York : Martin, 1982, pp.210.

(b) PAU AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

In this case, the relevant questions include: How are beliefs formed and changed? How does a leader draw analogies and learn historical 'lessons'? What factors determine a leader's perceptions?⁵⁸ The following scenarios are possible:

a-AC-DM-----PAU.

and, with reciprocity:

PAU-----AC

(c) BS (PAU) AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:

As an independent variable, PAU can be represented as follows:

PAU-----AC

Where PAU causes AC. But, since no one can assert that actions are determined by the (BS) alone, the following relationship is both appropriate and inevitable:

PAU-a-b-c-----n-----AC

Needless to say that one is interested in the last scenario; i.e. in PAU as an independent variable which can be represented in this simple form:

PAU-----AC

The problem then becomes how to separate a leader's (BS) (or PAU) from other independent variables (a,b,...n) in order to assess what effect each of such variables has on the action(s).

Since a leader's (BS) is a disposition to action, it is by definition policy-relevant. However, an actor's (BS) is a latent structure which cannot be directly observed but only be constructed by inference. The question that arises then is what are the valid indicators that clearly reveal to a leader's beliefs and at the same time avoid circularities? A leader's (BS) can be inferred from his verbal statements and/or from his actions (with the understanding that such actions may

⁵⁸O.R. Holsti and J.N. Rosenau, "Vietnam Consensus and the Belief Systems of American Leaders", WORLD POLITICS, 32, January, 1979, pp.1-56, p.20.

well be influenced by several other factors other than the leader's BS.) The function of explicit statements is called 'expressive': i.e. to justify actions, to persuade other actors....etc.⁵⁹

This leads to the following question. Do leader's express what they perceive; and do they perceive what they express? It is true that all leaders verbal statements may or may not represent his BS. And, it is equally true that, in politics - for obvious reasons - a leader's verbal statements do not often represent his BS. But how often and when? Thus, three dimensions are considered: a leader's BS; his Verbal Statements (VS); and his Actions (AC). These dimensions can be represented as follows:

BS = VS-----AC

The question is whether or not VS represent BS, and whether or not (BS) is expressed by (VS). Fortunately, the main concern here is only with a fraction of the leader's (BS); with cognitive beliefs (beliefs which are neither true nor false). The answer to this question is straightforward. If a leader's statements are supported or followed by actions that are consistent with his statements, they must then be taken to express the leader's (BS). Thus, if (AC) is consistent with his (VS), it is highly plausible that they represent his (BS).

That is exactly what one will be doing in the remaining part of this Chapter. An effort is made to capture those beliefs of Nasser which relates to the issue of Arab Nationalism and Pan-Arabism.

⁵⁹H.E. Himmelstrand, "Depoliticization and Political Involvement" in E. Allardt and S. Rokkan, (eds.), MASS POLITICS, New York : Free Press, 1970, p.20.

4.10 THE ROLE OF NASSER'S (PAU) IN HIS LEADERSHIP ROLE TOWARDS ARAB NATIONALISM (LRTAN)

In this section, an attempt will be made to relate Nasser's leadership role - decisions and actions - towards Arab Nationalism to his perceptions of Arab Unity. Based on this, Nasser's PAU can be rendered amenable to this analysis through the following operationalisation:

Perception I:

The Arabs form an Ummah.
It comprises all Arabic speaking
peoples from the Atlantic Ocean
in the West to the Arabian Gulf in the East.
They form an indivisible Ummah:

- (Ia). Historically;
- (Ib). Linguistically;
- (Ic). Geographically; and
- (Id). Spiritually.

Perception II:

Egypt belongs to the Arab Ummah.
It is an integral part of the Ummah.
Egypt is not an Ummah by itself,
though it is a sovereign state.

- (IIa). Egypt belongs organically to the Arab Ummah.
- (IIb). Egypt belongs geographically to the Arab Ummah.
- (IIc). Egypt belongs historically to the Arab Ummah.
- (IId). Egypt belongs spiritually to the Arab Ummah.

Perception III:

The Ummah is in a divided state.

- (IIIa). This state is an ephemeral one.
- (IIIb). Only in this stage of dividedness,
would the Ummah allow the existence of
local or Subregional units (Egypt, Syria, Iraq...etc.)

Perception IV:

The cause of this dividedness of the Ummah is imperialism.

- (IVa). Israel (Zionism) is the spearhead of imperialism.
- (IVb). It precludes Arab Unity.

Perception V:

Unity will be achieved if imperialism ceases to interfere in Arab affairs or/ and if Israel as a nation - ceases to exist.

Perception VI:

Arab Unity should be achieved through stages (Functional Approach).

Perception VII:

The enemies of the Arab Ummah are:

- (VIIa). Imperialism;**
- (VIIb). Israel (Zionism); and**
- (VIIc). Reactionary Arab rulers.**

(Tables 1, 2, and 3 at the end of this Chapter provide a summary of these categorizations.)

The Nasserite era will be divided into five phases. This periodization is taken from Nasser. In a major speech celebrating the Day of the Union with Syria nine years later - exactly on Feb, 22nd, 1967 - Nasser divided the period from 1952 to 1967 into four stages and assigned each stage a title of its own. These titles reflect clearly Nasser's own thinking of the Arab World. All the titles were used with reference to the Arab World; and particularly to Arab Unity. Thus, he gave the following periodization: From 1953 to 1957 was called 'closing the ranks' stage; from 1957-1963, was called 'uniting goals before united ranks' stage; from 1963 to 1966, was called 'united efforts for Palestine' stage; and from February 1966 to June 1967, was called 'unity of the revolutionary forces' stage. The period from June 1967 until Nasser's death in September 1970 one may call, 'the call for a united Arab stand' stage.⁶⁰ It is clear that Nasser's main concern in this final stage was to regain the Arab land lost by the warring Arab states of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the 1967 war.

⁶⁰Gamal Abdel Nasser, "A Speech on the Occasion of the Day of Arab Unity, Feb 22nd, 1967", **NASSER'S DOCUMENTS: Speeches, Declarations and Statements**, Cairo : Center for Political & Strategic Studies at AL AHRAM, 1973, 27 pages.

One will examine the role of Nasser's PAU - as obtained from the primary sources⁶¹ - in his LRTAN as history recounts it. The five phases will be reduced to four only as each of the periods from 1961-67 and the period from 1967-70 will be considered as one phase.

4.11 PHASE ONE : CLOSING THE RANKS. 1952 - 1957:

Insofar as Nasser's leadership role was concerned, this phase was characterized by the struggle for Egyptian independence 1952-1954; the struggle for Arab independence and the rejection of the Baghdad Pact 1955-56 and the struggle for Egyptian natural right of self determination (the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company (1956)); and the failure of the Tri-Partite military intervention against Egypt (1956).

4.11.1. NASSER'S EARLY YEAR'S: 1952-1954.

The first two years of Nasser's regime witnessed an almost total absence of mentioning the Arab world; much less Arab unity. Jockeying for political power

⁶¹The chosen sample of the speeches is evenly distributed over the eighteen years of 'Nasser's rule'. The speeches are also evenly distributed over the above mentioned stages. These stages are as follows:

1. The February 22nd speech. It became Nasser's tradition to deliver a speech on that day celebrating the union with Syria in 1958. From 1959 on this speech is included.
2. The May 1st speech. Since Nasser's socialist programmes got off the ground in 1961, this speech became a routine speech.
3. The June 5th commemorating the Egyptian defeat began in June 1968.
4. The July 23rd speech began in 1953 and is being delivered until the present. This is the day of the Revolution of 1952.
5. One has also chosen several other speeches with dealt with a particular political circumstance, such as the 1956 speech on the occasion of the nationalization of the Suez Company; the speech of September 30th, 1961 on the occasion of the Syrian secession from the union...etc.

Nasser's major philosophical writings were consulted as well. These are: Gamal Abdel Nasser THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION, Cairo : Ministry of Information, 1953, 56 pages.; THE NATIONAL CHARTER, Cairo : Ministry of Information, 1962, 124 pages; and THE DECLARATION OF MARCH 30TH, Cairo : Ministry of Information, 1968, 9 pages.

among the coup's leaders, coupled with their eagerness to consolidate their power base and protecting and legitimizing their rule, was the apparent reason for such total disregard to the Arab world. For it was not until the power struggle was settled and security for the new regime was felt assured – especially after the ousting of British forces from Egypt – that the Arab world began to dominate Nasser's vocabulary and policy. Indeed, it was not until after Nasser had emerged victorious from the internal power struggle within the Revolutionary Command Council and a relative degree of legitimacy was achieved that the Arab world started to gradually appear in Nasser's vocabulary and leadership policy.

4.11.2. THE YEARS: 1954-1957:

From 1954 onwards, Nasser began to reveal his ideological views regarding Egyptian relationship with Arab world. And by the end of 1955, Egypt had moved firmly from the 'periphery' to the 'core' of Arab politics. It was during these years that Nasser's image was tremendously enhanced that he became the chief protagonist of the Arab Nationalist Movement. This new role for Egypt was legitimized by Nasser when, for the first time in Egypt's history, the first article of the 1956 constitution declared that:

Egypt is a sovereign independent Arab state and the Egyptian people are an integral part of the Arab Ummah.

This radical change effected by Nasser was due in most part to his deep convictions of Egypt being an Arab country. To be sure, there were several pressures on Nasser – emanating from the internal as well as the external environment – to pursue an active Arab policy. But Nasser did not need any pressure from outside to convince him of the necessity for change in Egypt's leadership status. And, it was his PAU that actually made the difference. To have an assessment of the role of his PAU one must examine the pressures of the external and the internal environments and the alternative courses of actions that

were available to the leader at the time.

4.11.3 THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

Perhaps one of the main foundations of strength of Nasser's ideas concerning Egypt's Arab role was the fact that the Arab World, and more specifically the Arab masses, were prepared to welcome such a leading revolutionary role to be assumed by Nasser. One must bear in mind that at that time the Arab World was still frustrated by the first defeat in the conflict over Palestine, generally dominated by British and French colonialism, and mostly overwhelmed by conservative ruling elites. As Professor Ali Hillal Dessouki stated:

The situation in the Arab World was so conducive to the establishment of Nasser's credibility among the Arab peoples that his charisma captured the imagination of the peoples early and before any concrete plans towards this area were put into effect.⁶²

Through his policies were geared at eliminating the power-base of the 'ancien regime' in Egypt, coupled with his management of Egyptian relations with the West, Nasser's prestige as a new leader of the hero-seeking Arab World soared high. As far as the pressures from the external environment are concerned, Nasser's active Arab policy could rightly be seen as a response to the outpouring of emotions by the Arab masses. It could also be seen as a strategic or tactical move on Nasser's part in his efforts to curb the hegemonical influence of colonial powers in the area: What the Arab masses were aspiring to achieve. The issue can be simply stated as follows: The Arab masses 'demanded' that Nasser play an Arab - rather than merely an Egyptian role:

Arab responses was strong and spontaneous. General strikes took place in Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, the Sudan, Libya, the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms and even Morocco...Nasser was amazed and almost overwhelmed by this response. Reciprocating, he set out to create the Arab Nationalist Ideology.⁶³

⁶²In an interview with the writer, June, 1988, London.

The explanation of Nasser's charismatic leadership in terms of the external imperatives alone tends to ignore half the picture and obscures the other half. Nasser's Arab ideology was not a by-product of this 'conductive' Arab situation. Nasser's ideological beliefs owes much to his PAU.

4.11.4 NASSER'S PAU

It is most probable that what really encouraged the Egyptian leader the most in his perception of this new Egyptian role, beside the positive Arab stance following the Suez Crisis, was his apparent deep rooted-convictions that Egypt was an 'Arab country' and that he personally was the expression of the Arabness of Egypt. In his *THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION*, (written some time in 1953-54 almost two years before the Suez Canal crisis) Nasser had decisive thoughts on the identity of Egypt vis-a-vis Arab Unity. While the Islamic and African dimensions of this identity were not overlooked,⁶⁴ the Arab aspect of it was given clear and full prominence and was dealt with in a different way from a political perspective. Nasser affirmed Egypt's belonging to the Arab circle (PAU) which led him to conclude that Egypt not only belonged to - but was also qualified to play a leading revolutionary role in - the Arab world which, Nasser said, "was in search of a hero." Of that role, he wrote:

We cannot look stupidly at a map of the world not realizing our place in it and the role destined for us by that place.⁶⁵

Truthful to this belief, Nasser perceived in the Baghdad Pact an attempt to "isolate Egypt from the rest of its sisterly Arab states".⁶⁶ Perhaps the most

⁶³Willard Range, "An Interpretation of Nasserism", WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY, XII, 1959, p.1008.

⁶⁴The Islamic world, and the African continent were thought of in terms of an Islamic conference to be held during the Muslims' yearly pilgrimage to Mecca, and an African Institute to be established in Cairo to contribute to Liberation struggle in Sub-Saharan Africa. See Gamal Abdel Nasser, *THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION*, Cairo :The National Publication House, 1954, pp.49-70.

⁶⁵Nasser, *THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION*, op.cit., p.59.

significant change in Nasser's statements was the fact that while in 1953 he used to refer to the Arabs as "the Arabs" or as the "Arab area", he began from 1954 on to refer to them as a 'nation' or as 'a unified nation'. As a matter of fact, as early as August 1st, 1954 Nasser told THE SUNDAY TIMES in an interview that, "Our people will have to think strategically after this Treaty (meaning the Evacuation Treaty). Until now we have only been able to think of Egypt."⁶⁷ Moreover, a month earlier, and exactly on July 23rd, Nasser revealed for the first time, what others believed the 'hidden goal' of the Egyptian Revolution. Speaking on behalf of the RCC, on the 2nd anniversary of the revolution, Nasser said, "...the real goal of our movement was to make the Arabs a united Ummah."⁶⁸

Thus, one can clearly see that Nasser's PAU was quite salient during this stage which was merely a preparatory one. A stage that would soon lead to more involvement in the area on the part of Egypt in the name of Arab Unity. No serious active policy toward Arab Unity was pursued in this phase.

4.12 PHASE TWO : UNITING THE RANKS (1958-1961)

This phase witnessed the process in which concept of Arab nationalism reached its peak; the golden years of Nasser's image as an Arab leader; and the beginning of real commitments by Egypt to the Arabs, commitments that - with the passage of time - proved to be quite costly, not only to Nasser, but also to Egypt and its image in the Arab World. All unification attempts in this stage (either initiated by Egypt or by other Arab states) ended in failure. The most important factor in this process was Nasser's perception of Egypt being an Arab country. This phase was characterized by the Union with Syria in February 1958; and the dissolution of the Union in September 1961.

⁶⁶Nasser, SPEECHES, DOCUMENTS AND DECLARATIONS, op.cit., p.222.

⁶⁷THE SUNDAY TIMES, August, 1st, 1954, p.1.

⁶⁸Nasser, SPEECHES, DOCUMENTS AND DECLARATIONS, op.cit., p.177.

This phase began as early as 1956, when Nasser elevated the idea and, thus, the strategic blueprint of Pan-Arabism to that of Arab Nationalism. It was in 1956 that Nasser began to use the term the 'Arab Ummah' when describing what had hitherto been called the Arabs. Anwar Abdel Malek has pointed out that, "many young writers, journalists and nationalists began to theorize for the new regime as early as 1953. And it was then that these nationalist theorists established their connections with the Syrian Ba'athist group".⁶⁹ To Nasser, Arab Nationalism was to take the form of the integral unity of the sovereign Arab states. Thus, the United Arab Republic - which joined Egypt with Syria in 1958 - was formed as a nucleus for total Arab Unity.

Nasser's Arab policy was - to a great extent - a response to various stimuli from the internal (Egyptian), the regional (Arab and Israeli) and the international (Great Powers) environments. And it was Nasser's perception of these stimuli that made the difference. Among these stimuli was his PAU. A close look at these factors is, therefore, in place.

4.12.1 THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

The external (regional and international) environment played a significant role in directing Egyptian foreign policy; particularly towards the Arab world. In the mid-fifties, the external pressure came mostly from the West; particularly from the U.S.A. When the Eisenhower administration succumbed to the pressure mounted by a great number of interest groups, such as the Baghdad Pact members, U.S. Senators for cotton producing states, the Jewish Lobby and Israel, Secretary of state Dulles withdrew his offer of aid for the construction of the High Dam. Nasser's response to this cancellation was the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. It was during this crisis and the tripartite military intervention that

⁶⁹Anwar Abdel Malek, *EGYPT : MILITARY SOCIETY, The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change Under Nasser*, translated by Charles Lam Markmann, New York : Vintage Books, 1968, p.256.

followed it, that Nasser had to stress and intensify Egypt's identification with Arab Nationalism. In a major speech on June 1, 1956 Nasser repeated his discourse on the need for a strong national army to 'better resist the forces of the Baghdad Pact'.⁷⁰

America's response to those events in the Middle East, especially to the British and French loss of position, power, and prestige (as a result of the Suez fiasco) was the declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine in June 1957. The doctrine was meant to fill what Dulles saw as the 'vacuum of Power' that the West's retreat has created. In response to what Dulles perceived as the growing Soviet influence in the Arab World, the Doctrine reveals much of how American decision makers viewed the situation in the region. Eisenhower stated that, "all this instability had been heightened and, at times, manipulated by the Soviet Union or (to use Dulles' own words) by 'International Communism'⁷¹ The Soviets were seen as attempting to dominate the Middle East for reasons of "power politics".⁷² The U.S. in order to demonstrate their support for the independence of the 'freedom-loving nations of the area', pledged economic and military aid to them and the possible use of US armed forces 'to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations facing the threat of internal communism'.⁷³ Thus, in this statement of policy, it is clear that the Middle East was perceived as an essentially homogeneous region whose major threat was the spectre of 'International Communism'. The possibility that some Arab nations might view the U.S., Europe, Israel, or other Arab states as greater threats was discarded. By this declaration of policy, the U.S. had decided to play an active role within the Arab World that would prevent the rise and expansion of governments which were considered to be unfriendly to the U.S. (Egypt for example). and, therefore, by the implication that "those who were not with us, were against us", were in fact perceived as part of 'World Communism'.

⁷⁰Nasser, SPEECHES, DOCUMENTS AND DECLARATIONS, op cit, Vol.6, pp.122.

⁷¹State Department Bulletin, November 21, 1955, p.845.

⁷²Senate Foreign Relations Committee, A SELECTED CHRONOLOGY AND BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE MIDDLE EAST, Washington : Government Printing Office, 90th Congress, 1st session, Committees Print, June 6, 1967, p.109.

⁷³ibid., pp.78-81.

As Syria joined Egypt, and Qasim took power in Iraq, the U.S. perceived an erosion of its influence in the region. Therefore, a day after Qasim took power in Iraq, the U.S. landed marines in Lebanon and the British sent paratroopers into Jordan in order to support the Pro-Western regimes in those states.⁷⁴

By now, Nasser's leadership in the Arab World could be considered in the final analysis as pursuing three major goals:

1. the struggle for the independence of the Arab World from colonialism, imperialism or any foreign power seeking to dominate the area (it is clear that Nasser perceived the US as such a power).
2. The quest for unifying the Arab countries; and
3. The support for revolutionary regimes in the area.⁷⁵

Egyptian policy towards Algeria in the fifties, and towards South Yemen in the sixties are clear cases in the context of the first element. On the other hand, the merger with Syria (1958-1961) and the various successive attempts to have a federal union with Syria, Iraq, and later on with Libya throughout the sixties and until Nasser's death in 1970, are testimonials of the second element. Undoubtedly, the Egyptian military intervention in Yemen (1962-67) is most representative of the third element.

In toto, Nasser's leadership at this stage could be viewed as expressing a revolutionary leading role in the Arab World. Indeed, this is the key for any proper understanding of the response to this policy. These responses served as feedback to Nasser's policy and led to responses by the Egyptian leader as well. Egypt's revolutionary policy made it almost inevitable for the conservative Arab regimes not to look at Nasser with deep suspicions even in times of inter-Arab detente. On the other hand, the leading character of such a hegemonial role induced an endemic crisis with other Arab revolutionary regimes. Reasons are

⁷⁴This marked the climax of American policy of Active Intervention in the Middle East. While the Military action achieved its short-run goals, over the long-run it served to deepen the suspicion of the U.S. in the Arab World.

⁷⁵Professor Ali Hillal Dessouki in an interview with the writer, June, 1988, London.

clear on both sides. Conservative Arab regimes feared to be overthrown either from inside by Nasser's sympathizers among the members of alienated elites supported by the masses, or from outside by Nasser's outright plots and machinations. As early as 1956, Nasser himself pointed to the fear expressed in foreign newspapers as follows:

Arab Nationalism began to show its existence and its truth. I read an article on Arab nationalism in a foreign newspaper, and it said "Arab Nationalism became a danger after 1952 and after the writing of *THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION ...*"⁷⁶

This might suggest that Nasser's Arab policy was a function of the external environment. The fact of the matter is that Nasser's image of Egypt as an Arab country destined to play a leading role in the forefront of Arab solidarity and Unity, was not merely a response to these outside (regional and/or international) factors. Nasser's PAU played a major part in shaping Egypt's role towards this end. Thus, the external environment can then be seen in terms of mounting pressure from the West (particularly the U.S.A), a deep rooted suspicion and fear of Nasser in the Arab world and the Israeli sector. This external environment was not, however, the only cause of active Arab involvement. His PAU played a significant role as well.

4.12.2 NASSER'S PAU

Perhaps it is interesting to know that Nasser's increasing involvement in the Arab World was neither truly initiated nor fully controlled by him. Nasser himself used to say, "I do not act, I react".⁷⁷ For example, Nasser's most

⁷⁶Nasser, *SPEECHES, DOCUMENTS AND DECLARATIONS*, op.cit., Vol.7, p.1393. A major source of embarrassment in Nasser's relations with Arab revolutionary regimes was the extent to which these regimes were willing to commit themselves to what by now became known as the 'Nasserite Line'. This explains why Nasser's relations with the conservative Saudi regime under Saud and Faisal were similar in many respects to his relations with the revolutionary regime in Iraq under Kassem.

⁷⁷This was often recognized by many observers of Egyptian politics. For example, Miles Copeland, an ex-CIA agent stationed in the Middle East states: "He (Nasser) had

dramatic decision to accept full unity with Syria, in February 1958, constituting the most crucial step towards involving Egypt more and more in Arab politics, was reluctantly made. Nasser rejected several Syrian overtures for union with Egypt arguing that "the time was not right" and that "any union should at least take five or six years to prepare."⁷⁸ However, this should not be taken to mean that he was responding to the external environment without beliefs and convictions of his own.

A distinction should be made between Nasser's PAU - which calls for Arab Unity on the one hand - and his reluctance to accept the 1958 merger with Syria on the other. For Nasser had always believed that such unity would have to come about (by itself) as a result of a long functional process in which political unity would be the final step.

4.13 PHASE THREE: THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE 1961-67:

This phase was characterized by the dissolution of the union in 1961; and the failure of the Tri-Partite agreement with Iraq and Syria in December 1963. The collapse of the union with Syria in September 1961, was enough a 'setback' for Nasser to abandon such an activist Arab policy. Arab solidarity became no more a goal of Egypt's foreign policy. According to the National Charter, declared by Nasser in 1962, Arab reactionary rulers had allied themselves with colonialism and it became inevitable that he attacked both.⁷⁹

no wish to rule the Arab world, or the World of Islam or Africa or any other World...he only wanted to decide their Arab foreign policy vis-a-vis great powers". Miles Copeland, THE GAME OF NATIONS : The Amorality of Power Politics, New York : Simon and Schuster, 1969, p.196. Compare with Sir Anthony Nutting's remarks to the writer in an interview, where he stated that "The one thing Nasser misunderstood was in seeing that the Arab masses wanted him to rule them. It was quite the contrary. Those Arab masses who were enthusiastically waving the banner of Nasserism and Arab Nationalism were searching for their own Nasserites who would follow Nasser's policies, instead of being ruled by Nasser himself". October, 1988, London.

⁷⁸Robert Stephens, NASSER : A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY, London : Allen Lane, 1971, p.273.

⁷⁹Gamal Abdel Nasser, THE NATIONAL CHARTER, Cairo : The National Publication

On the other hand, the Syrian secession as a major setback to Nasser was more than an encouragement to the conservative Arab regimes. As a matter of fact, one of the most conflictual periods in inter-Arab regimes ensued. The secession itself, as was later revealed, was in part encouraged and financed by the conservative Arab states.

The Yemen emerged after the September 1962 revolution as the most decisive arena of conflict between revolutionary and conservative Arabs. With the failure of the Yemeni revolution to extend its influence to many of the tribes, Egypt came to the help of the revolution with increasing military involvement, while Saudi Arabia was providing the tribes with financial and military aid.⁸⁰ The border clashes between Algeria and Morocco were another example characteristic of this period. In this case too, there was a direct Egyptian intervention in support of Algeria.

On March 8, 1963, Damascus was the scene of a coup d'état against the secessionist party. A coalition of civilian and military Ba'athists seized power in Syria. One month earlier Baghdad witnessed the Coup that put Abdel Salam Arif in power and ended Qasim's rule. With revolutionary regimes in both Syria and Iraq, talks about a merger of the two states with Egypt seemed plausible to all parties concerned. Therefore, Cairo witnessed protracted negotiations or Unity Talks (March 14 - April 14, 1963) between the Egyptian leader and the National Revolutionary Command Councils of the two regimes of Syria and Iraq. The talks ended in an agreement to unite - in the future - following a 25 months transition period.

The agreement was, in fact, nothing more than a 'Declaration of Intent' due to its general and vague nature. The leaders did not agree on any political institutions such as the constitution; or the National Assembly; or even the formation of any

House, 1962, p.40.

⁸⁰For more details about the Yemeni episode, see THE EGYPTIAN INTERVENTION IN YEMEN (62-67) : A published Ph.D. dissertation. By Ahmed Youssef, Cairo : University of Cairo Press, Egypt.

political parties for mobilizing the revolution in Iraq and Syria. As a matter of fact, the agreement was influenced by Nasser's belief that economic unity should precede any political unity. The Syrian experience was also still vivid in the mind of the Egyptian leader who insisted on a transitional period. Such a period was to allow for the formation of acceptable coalitions in Syria and Iraq. However, as referred to earlier, arrests, purges, accusations, and mutual recriminations in both Syria and Iraq spilled over and ended with Nasser's denunciation of the Trilateral Cairo Talks and Agreements.

Another attempt between Syria and Iraq was made in the same year. The two countries wanted to form a military and economic union, but when Arif -via a Coup d'Etat on Nov, 18, 1963 - came to power this attempt ended in failure. An attempt to unite had also begun between Iraq and Egypt in December 1963, when Arif - by now the President of Iraq - became on good terms with Nasser. A merger agreement was signed in Cairo in 1965. As the 1967 war broke out, all such attempts ended without achieving the dream of unity between any two Arab countries.

From the preceding chronology of events, one can conclude that at this stage of Pan-Arabism (1954-1967), Egypt's Nasser had a clear vision of Egypt's Arab identity and what was needed to achieve Arab Unity. It is true that the ideology was a rationale for an Arab cooperation but mainly by virtue of being a rationale for Arab unity among Arab states. The external environment was not the dominant catalyst that prodded Nasser into a merger nor was it the major reason for his entry into both the Arab League and the Palestinian conflict. The external environment was mainly a constraint on Nasser's endeavours to achieve a Unity that was in harmony with his beliefs and verbal statements. Wynn was able to succinctly sum up Nasser's era as follows:

Stung by the secession of Syria in 1961, bogged down by the tribal/feudal war in Yemen, blocked by the conservative Arab States almost at every turn and

spurned by other fellow Arab nationalists and 'revolutionaries', Nasser stumbled into the war of June 1967 with Israel which marked the end of this phase of Pan-Arabism and brought Nasser's Arab Policy to a rather tragic close.⁸¹

4.14 PHASE FOUR : ARAB SOLIDARITY (1967-1970):

This phase was characterized by Arab solidarity for the restoration of Arab lands lost to Israel in the 1967 war. The new atmosphere created by the war lasted more or less until Nasser's death in September 1970. However, it should not be surprising to say that the new developments in Egypt's two adjacent neighbours, the Sudan and Libya, in May and September 1969 respectively, when pro-Nasser revolutionary regimes were established in both countries, would have led Nasser to change his mind, had it not been for his death in 1970.

4.14.1 A Case Study : The Merger with Syria: 1958:

In this section, the role played by Nasser's PAU in his decision to accept Syrian offer to form a merger between the two countries in February 1958 will be examined. One will introduce the environment of the decision; the leader's PAU; the alternative policy choices available and the decision process.

4.14.2 THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

It has already pointed that by the end of 1955, Egypt had moved firmly from the 'Periphery' to the 'core' of Arab affairs and as such had become the focus not only of the Arab Political situation, but also, and perhaps most relevant, of its ideological manifestation, The Arab Nationalist Movement. It has also been noted

⁸¹Wilton Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT : The Search for Dignity, Cambridge, Mass : Arlington Book, 1959, p.125.

that this new role for Egypt was legitimized by the 1956 'temporary' constitution which declared Egypt as a sovereign independent Arab state and the Egyptian people as an integral part of the Arab nation. As Egypt joined Syria in 1958 and formed the United Arab Republic, this legitimacy was further consolidated; and Arab Unity seemed attainable. As Nasser emerged as the only Arab personality capable of expressing the hopes and ambitions of the Arab masses, he was almost 'idolized in the region'.⁸² His political tactics during the Suez Crisis, his arms deal with Czechoslovakia and his political victory in the Anglo-French-Israeli 1956 military intervention made him the epitome of all the Arabs. In a word, he became almost a 'saviour' of the entire region.⁸³ At this point in time, the entire environment became highly charged with the feelings of Arab Nationalism. Vatikiotis describes the atmosphere:

Exactly by 1958, a radical change was sweeping the area as every Arab revolutionary leader saw himself as a Nasserite irrespective of his willingness to relinquish his sovereign status in favour of Egyptian domination.⁸⁴

Given this state of affairs in the region, it was natural, for Arab masses to look up to Nasser for the fulfilment of their political aspirations, hence the Syrian's overtures to the Egyptian leader. Late in 1957, there was much controversy and political uncertainty in Damascus as not one single political party was able to command a substantial majority. A problem of orientation reigned in the country. The Syrian President, Al Kuwatly, was seeking closer ties with Saudi Arabia on the one hand. On the other hand, Leftists (Particularly the Ba'athist Party) were calling for Arab unity and socialism and were backed by the U.S.S.R, and the Rightists (particularly the People's Party) were tilting towards unity with Iraq and were backed by the West.

⁸²Anthony Nutting, *NASSER*, New York : Dutton, 1972, p.196.

⁸³Nutting, *NASSER*, *op.cit.*, p.198.

⁸⁴P.J. Vatikiotis, "The Foreign Policy of Egypt" In R.C. Macridis (ed.), *FOREIGN POLICY IN WORLD POLITICS*, London : Prentice Hall Inc, 1962, p.336.

By the nature of things, the Ba'athists were the ideal candidates for approaching - and thereby putting pressure on - Nasser for an immediate merger. They did and were rebuffed many times by Nasser who judged the time was not right for an immediate merger. It is now known that their attempts to merge with Egypt began in 1955. Yet, in February, 1958, some twenty high ranking Syrian Army officers flew to Cairo - without governmental sanction - to tell the Egyptian leader that merger was the only viable way to end the state of chaos and confusion reigning in their country.⁸⁵ Nasser reluctantly accepted but stipulated that the Syrian Army be de-politicized and that all political parties be banned. To Nasser's satisfaction the Syrians agreed. Hence the birth of the United Arab Republic comprising Egypt and Syria and opening the door to any other Arab state that wishes to join in the near future.

In sum, the external environment of the decision can be seen in terms of (a) the psychological euphoria prevailing in the area and calling for Arab unity; (b) the mounting pressure emanating from the West on both Egypt and Syria; and (c) the existence of Israel. The external environment was indeed conducive to the conclusion of the merger.

4.14.3 THE INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

Each of the two countries had its own circumstances which constituted the internal environment conducive to the merger. The Syrian political situation earlier has been examined. A look at the internal Egyptian situation before the merger merits mention. As Heikal in his weekly editorial of AL AHRAM once wrote: "Egypt benefits from its foreign policy rather than being burdened with it."⁸⁶ This utilitarian principle is applicable to Egyptian foreign policy in the Arab world. Nasser did not always act out of ideological considerations alone. It is true that his beliefs played a role but it is equally true that 'rational' leaders

⁸⁵Patrick Seale, THE STRUGGLE FOR SYRIA, Baltimore : John Hopkins Press, 1944, pp.94-103.

⁸⁶AL AHRAM, Dec.31, 1965, p.1.

always calculate the benefits and in the case of Nasser such calculation was always subservient to his beliefs. The case of the merger with Syria is a good example. Nasser came to believe that in order for him to achieve his goals of independence, development and Arab Unity – and above all to stay in power – adequate funds for social and economic development must be available. Voluntary domestic and foreign investment was very slim and could not be relied upon.⁸⁷ Foreign grants were, therefore, required. Nasser's active Arab policy precluded the possibility of receiving any funds from the West. Thus, the internal situation was conducive to an active Nasserite Arab policy. However, the utilitarian economic factor should be discounted in the case of the Syrian merger. Syria had very few material assets to offer Egypt. What was the key reason that made Nasser reverse himself and agree to unite with the Syrians? The answer lies partly in Nasser's PAU.

4.14.4 NASSER'S PAU

Two aspects of Nasser's PAU were salient during this episode. First, there was his unshakeable belief that Egypt is, first and foremost an Arab nation: PAU-A. And, secondly, there was his belief that gradual functional integration was the only viable way to achieve Arab Unity: PAU-VI. On February 3, 1958, Nasser stated that:

the Arabs enjoy basic harmony of interests which clearly manifested in the unity of the language, culture and history....They also enjoy a basic harmony of mind and consciousness which transcends and supercedes all other differences and divisions.⁸⁸

As to his PAU-A, in a newspaper interview in March 1957, Nasser confirmed

⁸⁷Amin has shown that less investment was attracted during the years 1952-1954 than during the years 1949-1951. See Amin Galal, "The Egyptian Economy and the Revolution" in P.J. Vatikiotis, (ed.), EGYPT SINCE THE REVOLUTION, London : George Allen & Unwin, 1968, p.45.

⁸⁸Nasser, AL AHRAM, p.1-2.

Arab States and the Shiekdoms which remained in the hands of conservative elites and (as well as Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq) were more determined than ever to preserve their sovereignty and resources. In an almost immediate defensive response, Iraq and Jordan joined to form the Arab Federated Union. Soon after that, Yemen came out of its self-imposed isolation to join the U.A.R.

The formation of the U.A.R. led to an intensification in Pan-Arab activities. It proved, however, to be a catalyst in the configuration of power and forces in the area. On the one hand, conservative Arab regimes, fearing Nasser and Nasserism, started to rally themselves in a series of defensive unions and treaties in order to preserve their own sovereignties. They, however, continued to pay lip service to the concept of Pan-Arabism. On the other hand, a series of agreements between the revolutionary regimes took place but, even here, Arab Unity remained more of a dream than reality.

As for the Arab Federated Union, the U.A.R. spared no effort to attack it and label it as the 'product of imperialistic stooges.' When the referendum was held in Iraq and Jordan to confirm the Union, Nasser, via Radio Cairo, instigated the Jordanian and Iraqi populace to boycott the voting. Nasser's propaganda campaign against the union was so powerful that most of the voters stayed home and boycotted the ballots. On the other side of the equation, the incorporation of the Yemen into the U.A.R. was in harmony with the constitution which stressed that all Arab states may join. Besides, the Yemen could be a strategic spot for exporting the Arab nationalist ideology into adjacent Saudi Arabia. The involvement with Yemen later proved to be Nasser's 'Vietnam.'

The secession of 1961 was a fatal blow to Arab Unity, but it did not mark the end of Pan-Arab endeavours, for Nasser refused to view the collapse of the union as a failure of Arab Nationalism. Thus, while one may be willing to agree to Nutting's argument that Nasser feared that if he did not accept the repeated advances of the

Syrians for unity with Egypt, Syria might have fallen in the hands of the Iraqis or the Saudis, one adds a qualifier to it. Nasser's PAU played a role in the Syrian merger.⁹¹ It then becomes apparent that Nasser had a regional (i.e. Arab) policy of his own and that his Arab policy did indeed originate primarily for his own beliefs as well as from his perception of the situation and his PAU.

⁹¹Nutting, NASSER, *op.cit.*, p.211.

Table 1

| Perception | Subjects | Contents |
|---------------------------------------|---|--|
| I: Ia: Ib: Ic. | The Arabs from the Atlantic to the Arabian Gulf. | Form an Ummah. Elements are: Language; History; Geography; and Religion. |
| II: IIa: IIb: | State of the Ummah. | The Ummah is in a state of Dividedness. But this is: An ephemeral state. It allows the existence of sub-regional Sovereignties. |
| III: IIIa: IIIb: | Causes of this state. | Imperialism is the cause of this division of the Ummah: Israel (Zionism) is the spearhead of imperialism; It precludes Arab Unity |
| IV: IVa: IVb: IVc: | Enemies of the Ummah. | Foreign and local enemies: Imperialism; Israel; and Reactionary Arab Forces; (Arab Rulers). |
| V: Va: Vb: | Conditions for Arab Unity. | Cutting of influence of the enemies of the Ummah: Removal of Israel; and stopping imperialistic manoeuvres against the Ummah. |
| VI: | Method of Arab Unity. | Unity by stages, i.e. a neo- |

Table 2

| Perceptions | Subject | Content |
|--|---|--|
| A: | Egypt's Identity | Egypt belongs to the Arab Ummah: Linguistically; Geographically; Historically; and Spiritually. |
| A1: A2: A3: A4: | | |
| B: | Egypt's position within the Ummah. | A central position: |
| B1: B2: B3: B4: | | History; Population; Military; and Culture. |
| C: | Egypt's role within the Ummah. | Leadership role: (Struggle for Unity) |
| C1: C2: | | Militarily (Fight for Unity) Political (export the revolution) |

Table 3.

Watani Vs. Qawmi Terms in Nasser's Vocabulary

| Watani (local) | Qawmi (Arab National) |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Fatherland | Arab Fatherland |
| People | Arab People *1954 |
| Community | Arab Community *1955 |
| Masses | Arab Masses *1957 |
| Land | Arab Land |
| Revolution | Arab Revolution |
| National Cohesion | Arab Cohesion |
| Reactionary Forces | Arab Reactionary Forces |
| Wataniyah | Qawmiyah Arabiyah |
| Egyptianism | Arabism |
| Egypt (Al Watan) | The Arab Ummah *1956 |

* - The year in front of the concept indicates the first time the concept was used by Nasser.

PART THREE

**THE CHARISMATIC RESPONSE AND LEADERSHIP EFFECT OF
GAMAL ABDEL NASSER**

CHAPTER FIVE

NASSER'S IMPACT ON THE ARABS : THE CASE OF THE 1967 WAR¹

The man is at once feline and massive. His square build speaks of a peasant ancestry, the long remembrance of stubborn, fleshy gestures, the recompense of a heavy, miserable diet over many generations. But this son of the Middle Valley also carries Arab descent in his blood: a Bedouin strain had pursued for several centuries in Bani Murr District the synthesis of Ishmael and Pharaoh. Perhaps this gives his physique that deliberate alertness, his face that sharp breadth, his eyes that brooding nostalgia behind their hard, almost green, gaze. The Arab has risen ponderously, one might say, from his long submergence in the soil of Egypt.²

5.1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES

The objective of Chapter Five is to provide an inquiry into the impact of Gamal Abdel Nasser on the Arab world during his leadership. A case study, which is the focus of the thesis, makes special reference to the events leading up to the 1967 War, the defeat of the Arab armies by Israel, Nasser's resignation and his subsequent reinstatement to the presidency.³ The questions addressed are basically: What were the events that led up to the June 1967 War? What of the defeat? What were the presumed reasons for Nasser's resignation? And, what were the supposed reasons for his reinstatement?

¹For an Arab perspective of the 1967 War see Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, (ed.) THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFRONTATION OF JUNE, 1967 : An Arab Perspective, Evanston, Illinois : Northwestern University Press, 1970. For an Israeli view of the conflict and the War, see Abba Eban, MY COUNTRY, London : Clarendon Press, 1971 and THE VOICE OF ISRAEL, New York : Albany, New York Press, 1973. For a Western perspective see Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, THE SIX DAY WAR, London : Heinemann, 1967; Walter Laqueur, THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM, New York : Macmillan, 1968.

²Jacques Berque, CULTURAL EXPRESSION IN ARAB SOCIETY TODAY, Trans. Robert W. Stookey, Austin, Texas : The University of Texas Press, 1978, pp.15-16.

³The objectives of this case study is to attempt and specify the trend of events in May and June 1967 and to examine the response of the Egyptian and Arab masses in the aftermath of the June 1967 defeat. In other words, one aims to make an objective and qualitative assessment of the charismatic component of Nasser's leadership that enabled him to retain office.

5.2 METHODOLOGY

An inquiry into the role of personalities in politics necessarily raises questions of scope and method. For instance, can one consider political leaders as 'authors' of political movements or merely as 'instruments' who somehow appear on the political scene to achieve social demands?⁴ Considerable disagreement surrounds this question among writers: at one end of the spectrum are those who endorse the 'great man' theory (Carlyle's hero), and at the other end are those who consider leaders as mere 'puppets' (Herbert Spencer) who derive their power from a public desirous of changing social conditions.⁵ If either of these views is regarded as valid, the outstanding interest would be the motivations of the leader⁶ : whether he was motivated by sheer political ambition or by a set of ideas and ideals (ultimate goals).⁷ Even if it was assumed, for the sake of analysis, that political ambition dominates the minds of most leaders, for such ambition to be pursued, it would appear necessary for the leader to be identified with some overriding goals in order to justify publicly his political involvement.⁸

Apart from goals and methods, the role of personalities may be examined from another perspective. For example, one should examine who the leaders are. Do they come from a privileged small group within society, or are they the acknowledged leaders of a much larger circle of people, among whom there may be

⁴Morroe Berger, "Social and Political Change in the Moslem-Arab", *WORLD POLITICS*, X, July, 1958, p.342.

⁵Peter Amann, "Revolution : A Redefinition", *POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY*, LXXVII, March, 1962.

⁶Gordon W. Allport, "Motivation in Personality : Reply to Mr. Bertocci", *PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW*, XLVII, November, 1940, p.162.

⁷For an interesting comment on the correlation between ideas and reality, consider Fouad Ajami's "The End of Pan-Arabism", in *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, Winter 1978/1979, pp.355-373, "Political ideas make their own realities. Often in defiance of logic, they hold men and are in turn held by them, creating a world in their own image, only to play themselves out in the end, shackled by routine problems not foreseen by those who spun the myth, or living past their prime and ceasing to move people sufficiently. Or, political ideas turn to ashes and leave behind them a trail of errors, suffering and devastation". p.355.

⁸Ann Gifford adopts this position in examining charismatic appeal. See "An Application of Weber's Concept of Charisma", *BERKELEY PUBLICATION IN SOCIETY AND INSTITUTIONS*, 1, Spring, 1955, pp.40-49.

others who fill important political roles? Here, again, there is considerable disagreement among writers.⁹ Some contend, for example, that in the less advanced societies, it is the paramount leader who is most likely to play a decisive role in politics;¹⁰ others maintain that it is not so much the qualities of the individual leader as it is the political system which determines who the leader will be and the nature of his political role.¹¹ For example, in a democracy, a political leader may be a spokesman either for the group in power, or for any one of a number of groups contesting for power; in authoritarian systems, political power and political leadership are the monopoly of the few at the top.¹²

If one assumes that the most decisive political roles are performed by the few at the top, the question arises whether it is better to study them collectively or separately, assuming in the latter case that each leader has his own goals and methods.¹³ The former approach, which is popular among experts in the behavioural sciences, seems to presuppose that leaders ordinarily react similarly to stimuli and in accordance with a recognizable pattern of political behaviour. If this were to be the approach, the function of the investigator would be to study the outward conduct of the political leaders of a given society and to formulate from their conduct a generalized behaviour pattern of leadership in that society. While this method might well prove illuminating, it tends to ignore other variables, such as social morality and cultural values, which in certain societies,

⁹For a good discussion of these conflicting positions refer to Richard Neustadt, *PRESIDENTIAL POWER : The Politics of Leadership*, New York : John Wiley & Sons, 1960.

¹⁰This position is advocated by Ruth Gunther, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonism, and Empire-Building in the New States", *WORLD POLITICS*, 20, Jan, 1968, p.196.

¹¹This argument can be found in Orrin E. Klapps, *SYMBOLIC LEADERS*, Chicago : Aldine Press, 1964.

¹²Karl W. Deutsch, *POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT : How People Decide Their Fate*, Boston, Mass: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970, p.28.

¹³Robert C. Tucker in "The Theory of Charismatic Leadership", *DAEDALUS*, 97, Summer, 1968, p.754, discusses the virtues of both approaches coming to the conclusions that each single leader is unique and thence generalizations can only be issue specific and not across the board. For a criticism of Tucker's position, see Stanley Stark, "Toward a Psychology of Charisma : The Innovation Viewpoint of Robert Tucker", *PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORT*, 23, 1968, pp.1163-1166.

govern the minds and actions of leaders to a larger extent than in others.¹⁴

In this Chapter, which seeks to investigate the role and impact of Gamal Abdel Nasser on the Arab World, one's approach will be to describe and analyze the individual skills and the general level of sophistication of a leader who, in the eyes of many observers, played a significant role in the Arab world. In addition, one is to determine the relevance of Nasser's values and goals to the conditions existing in the Arab countries.¹⁵ While particular attention will be given to these variables, the general patterns of political behaviour will not be ignored, since they are likely to sharpen one's insight into the leadership role that Gamal Abdel Nasser played. This method may strike the reader as idealistic, since it seeks to explore the relationship of such intangible variables as values, skills, and sophistication to the role of charismatic leadership in politics. However, these variables will not be studied in the abstract but rather in relation to the particular event in which Nasser was involved, namely the June 1967 War and its aftermath - a viable test of political charisma. Consequently, one's method might well be what Eulau called 'empirical idealism', since it views ideas and ideals not as abstract principles but as guidelines for political action, and because it endeavours to investigate the extent to which such guidelines have relevance to reality.¹⁶

¹⁴Gabriel A. Almond. "Democracy and the New Nations". STANFORD TODAY. IV, Autumn, 1964.

¹⁵Manfred Halpern, THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1963.

¹⁶For more elaboration on this point see Heinz Eulau, et al., POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, Glencoe, Illinois : The Free Press, 1956, pp.78-92.

5.3 NASSER : THE POLITICAL LEADER¹⁷

Gamal Abdel Nasser once stated that he was a revolutionary and not a politician.

He wrote:

Every people on earth goes through two revolutions: a political revolution by which it wrests the right to govern itself from the hand of tyranny, or from the army stationed upon its soil against its will; and a social revolution, involving the conflict of classes which settles down when justice is secured for the citizens of the united nation.¹⁸

In analyzing the political history of post-1952 Egypt, Maxime Rodinson concludes that the two main goals of Nasserism were national independence and modernization.¹⁹ Among the important political achievements of Nasser's revolution were (1) the expulsion of foreign influence, and (2) the strengthening of the pride and dignity of the Egyptian people.²⁰ The successes and failures of Nasser's political programmes rested to a great degree upon his ability to guide Egypt through the stormy seas of international politics. It was in this broader area that the Egyptian president expended most of his political energy, and it was here that he witnessed his greatest triumphs and his greatest defeats. His tenure as leader of Egypt was clouded by deep problems directly associated with the Arab-Israeli confrontation, the American-Soviet cold war, the general drive for Arab unity, and the differing Arab stances concerning the entire issue of social and political change. Events such as the Czech Arms deal, the destruction of the Baghdad Pact, The Nationalization of the Suez Canal, Egypt's liberation from France and Britain, and the failure of the Eisenhower Doctrine to constrain Nasser brought together the masses of Egyptians and Arabs behind Nasser, who had proved to them that Egypt was an independent nation whose dignity could no longer

¹⁷It is recognized that to the Egyptian audience, Nasser was first and foremost their head of state. However, to the majority of the Arabs, Nasser stood for the realization of the Pan-Arab vision. A distinction in types of audiences is worth noting. Jean and Simone Lacouture, *EGYPT IN TRANSITION*, London : Methuen, 1979, p.33.

¹⁸Gamal Abdel Nasser, *EGYPT'S LIBERATION : The Philosophy of the Revolution*, Washington, D.C. : Public Affairs Press, 1955, pp.39-40.

¹⁹See Maxime Rodinson, "The Political System" in *EGYPT SINCE THE REVOLUTION*, ed. by P.J. Vatikiotis, New York : Frederick A. Praeger, 1968, pp.87-113.

²⁰Interview with Sir Anthony Nutting, November, 1988, London.

be trampled upon.²¹ The significance of the Suez crisis "reached far beyond the event itself, causing a revolutionary transformation of the technocratic, reformist government".²² It was a "charismatic situation"²³ that helped invest Nasser with extraordinary powers as a political leader.

These early successes were of sufficient magnitude to enable both Nasser and Egypt to ride out later disasters. The most serious of these was the June War of 1967, in which Israel (in an impressive and swift military campaign) left Egypt battered and demoralized. Nasser, who must bear much of the blame for occasioning the conflict, resigned his position, to be called back only hours later by the Egyptian people, who seemingly genuinely wanted and demanded his leadership²⁴ (to be examined in detail later on in this Chapter). It is largely held that Nasser's reinstatement was the product of a popular mandate. And, it is in this spirit that Nasser began to describe the 1967 defeat as a 'setback'. Using the example of Churchill after Dunkirk, Nasser was to claim that Egypt had lost not a war but a battle. However, the existence of Israel haunted Nasser's rule, and he was never able to confront this situation with the same style and success with which he addressed other thorny problems.²⁵

²¹J.P. Entelis, "Nationalism, Nasserism and the Arab World : Contemporary Arab Nationalism under Nasser and its Effect on Egypt's Approach toward Inter-Arab Affairs", ARAB JOURNALS, IV, No.1, 1966-67, pp.35-42.

²²Jean Lacouture, THE DEMIGODS : Charismatic Leadership in the Third World, Trans. by Patricia Wolf, New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1970, p.110.

²³Ibid., p.110.

²⁴Sir Anthony Nutting in an interview with the author, November, 1988, London. Dr. Henry Kissinger was later to write with professional puzzlement about Nasser's attitude after the June defeat. "...Nasser insisted on Israel's unconditional withdrawal from all the occupied territories, but he never explained what incentive Israel had for withdrawal in the face of his ambiguous non-belligerency...Nasser counted on us to extricate himself from the consequences of his recklessness in 1967. But he was unwilling to relinquish his role as champion of radical Arab Nationalism which forced him into a strident anti-American posture on almost all international issues". Henry Kissinger, THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS, London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979, p.312.

²⁵Charles Douglas, THE ARABS AND ISRAEL, London : Beadley Head, 1968, pp.52-54. Israeli politicians and leaders saw Nasser as one of their greatest enemies. At the onset of the 1956 War, Ben Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister is quoted as saying: "Gamal Abdel Nasser is the enemy number one of Israel who...has sullied Israel's name in the entire world by defining it as the spearhead of international imperialism in the region" .

Gamal Abdel Nasser's leadership broke with many of the patterns of traditional patrimonial rule. Although strongly authoritarian, Nasser's techniques did not include the promotion of self-deification.²⁶ "The RAIS always thought that if a leader portrayed himself a some sort of a god, the populace would fear rather than respect him".²⁷ It is true that his image was protected and polished by his governmental and security forces, but he resisted pressures to invest huge resources in the glorification of his person.²⁸ "Nasser's entourage and the public to a certain extent noted his simplicity in dress and to his last days, 'maintained class loyalty'".²⁹ There were no statues of Nasser, for example, dotting the Egyptian landscape. Nor did his face adorn postage stamps and currency.³⁰ The Egyptian President consciously sought to transcend the temptation to permit and promote personal exaltation and hero worship.³¹ One keen Western observer of Egyptian affairs wrote that "nothing irritates Nasser more than being treated like a modern Pharaoh".³²

It may be said that a truly charismatic personality need not build monuments to himself and myths for his people. The leader's charisma is based on his extraordinary actions. In Nasser's case, the leader also eschewed any special connection with the Divine, whether it be in terms of common ancestry or private visions.³³ "The secular nature of Nasser's reforms and political programmes put him in certain ways on the same footage with Kemal Ataturk".³⁴ Although he never attacked the Islamic clerics in Egypt, at the same time he did not attempt to build any particular intimate political relations with them.³⁵ The fact that

²⁶Ali Sabri, reply to questionnaire, July, 1989, Cairo.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Tawfiq Al Hakim, THE RETURN OF CONSCIOUSNESS, Translated by Bayly Winder, London : The MacMillan Press, 1985, p.58.

³¹Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, Political Documentary on British Television, Channel Four Programme, NASSER, 14th November, 1986. Recorded footage.

³²Jean Lacouture, NASSER : A Political Biography, London : Constable, 1973, p.213.

³³In an interview with Fathy el Gouly, January 1989, London.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵For an investigation of Nasser's relationship to Islam, see Josef Muzikar, "Arab Nationalism and Islam", ARCHIV ORIENTALI, 43, 1975, pp.193-323. In an interview, Fouad Ajami, May 28th, 1989, New York, contends that Islam did not have a significant

Nasser's leadership is traceable neither to manufactured mythology nor to religious connections indicates how divorced his leadership was from the traditional mold.³⁶ "The Islamic religion did not have a significant influence on Nasser's diplomacy or foreign policy."³⁷ It is precisely this kind of charisma that invested Nasser with the special strength necessary to maintain power and to promote deep change in the face of formidable problems, both internal and external.³⁸

5.4 NASSER IN THE EYES OF THE OBSERVER: A Recapitulation

Gamal Abdel Nasser appeared to Western writers as the Arab leader whose ambition conflicted with essential Western interests; therefore his policies and methods were looked upon by the West with suspicion and disfavour.³⁹ He was not unaware of misrepresentations, but he took no serious steps to correct them. Some of his actions and angry public statements⁴⁰ weighed against him and led

influence on Nasser's diplomacy or foreign policy. A reply in effect refuting P.J. Vatikiotis essay, "Islam and the Foreign Policy", in P.M. Holt (ed.) ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, London : School of Oriental and African Studies, 1965, pp.120-137.

³⁶Dunkwart Rustow, reply to questionnaire, New York, April, 1989.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸For elaboration on this see Morroe Berger, THE ARAB WORLD TODAY, Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday & Co., 1962, p.78. And, in his monograph, MILITARY ELITE AND SOCIAL CHANGE : Egypt since Napoleon, Research Monograph, No.6. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Center for International Studies, Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 1960.

³⁹Consider Robert Stephens statement on how the Western World viewed Nasser: "Nasser left his mark on nearly twenty years of Egyptian, Arab and world history. An anti-colonist who extended his concern to the newly liberated countries of the Third World, he has been acclaimed as a nationalist liberator - and condemned as a warmonger". See "Nasser: A Reassessment", ARAB PAPERS, No.8, Arab Research Center, London, p.9. For an interesting account of how the Western World generally views the Arabs and their political thoughts, see Michael Adams, "Good" and "Bad" Arabs", MIDDLE EAST FORUM, XXXIV, January, 1959, pp.13-15.

⁴⁰For an example of one of the harsh public statements made by Nasser to President Johnson, on the subject of food aid, Nasser was reported to have said: "The American Ambassador says that our behavior is not acceptable. Well, let us tell them that those who do not accept our behavior can go and drink from the sea....We will cut the tongues of anybody who talks badly about us....We don't mind troubles. But we are not going to accept pressure. We are not going to accept gangsterism by cowboys". Quoted in William J. Burns, ECONOMIC AID AND AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD EGYPT 1955-1981, Albany : State University of New York Press, 1985, pp.159-160.

many Westerners to confuse his goals with his rhetorical statements.⁴¹ Thence, an examination of his goals is vital in order to delineate his leadership role. Nasser possessed a practical turn of mind and tried to solve problems by tackling them one after the other in order of their urgency.⁴² Yet he felt he was committed to certain national goals which were considered almost sacrosanct and therefore not subject to compromises.⁴³ As a native Egyptian who grew up in a social environment sensitive to deprivation, Nasser sought to voice his countrymen's grievances against social fetters⁴⁴ on the one hand, and to seek national freedom from foreign rule on the other.⁴⁵ Influenced by emotional as well as socioeconomic forces, Nasser may well be regarded as essentially belonging to what one might stipulate as an 'ideological'⁴⁶ rather than to a 'realistic'⁴⁷ school of leaders. Yet it would be wrong to depict him as merely a doctrinaire unwilling to modify his actions in the light of experience.⁴⁸ After he seized power by force, he tried to achieve his objectives by peaceful and practical methods,⁴⁹ or as he said, by trial and error.⁵⁰ What were those

⁴¹Mohammed Naguib, KUNTU RAISAN LI MISR (In Arabic), Cairo : Al Maktab al Masri al Hadith, 1981, p.33.

⁴²Abdel Latif Al Boghdadi, MEMOIRS, (In Arabic) Vol.2, Cairo : Al Maktab al Masri al Hadith, p.310.

⁴³Gamal Abdel Nasser, "Where I Stand and Why", LIFE, XLVII, No.3, July 20, 1959, pp.96-110. Compare with Wilton Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT : The Search for Dignity, Cambridge, Mass : Arlington Books, 1959, p.121.

⁴⁴Al Boghdadi, MEMOIRS, op.cit., p.312.

⁴⁵ Nasser, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION, op.cit., pp.32-38.

⁴⁶The criteria used here to denote an 'ideological leadership' is where leaders regard goals as overriding. They are also prepared to use revolutionary means to achieve their goals. The fact that the regimes established by revolutions often fail to pursue their declared goals is often overlooked, though such leaders frequently continue to assert that their goals will be achieved ultimately. Such leaders are usually the spokesmen for a particular ideology: in Nasser's case 'Pan Arabism' and 'Arab Nationalism'.

⁴⁷A 'realistic leadership' is used here to denote leaders who occupy an 'intermediate position' in that they realize that the goals they pursue, while embodying their countrymen's hopes and expectations, must be modified by reality if they are ever to be realized. Men in this group are usually prepared to limit themselves to goals that they believe can be achieved, and to disregard or to modify others. In short, they are leaders who are prepared to subordinate ideals to realities. These leaders often seem to possess greater flexibility and, therefore, a greater capacity for political survival than those who are less inclined to compromise with reality.

⁴⁸Al Boghdadi, MEMOIRS, op.cit., p.313.

⁴⁹Naguib, KUNTU RAISAN LI MISR, op.cit., pp.143-144.

⁵⁰Nasser, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION, op.cit., p.28.

objectives or ultimate goals?

First and foremost was the achievement of Egypt's full independence, which meant in practice the elimination of all encroachments on the country's sovereignty, whether resulting from military occupation, treaty stipulations, or political pressures. Nasser also sought to insure Egypt's national security from foreign dangers. The insistence that Egyptians should be free to manage their own affairs was the product of a strong and compelling emotional force and not merely the cherished desire of intellectuals.⁵¹

As an ideological objective, Nasser was demanding recognition not only of Egypt's own sovereign rights and of other dependent countries that desired full independence, especially the Arab countries that had not yet achieved any form of independence, but also the countries and peoples of Africa and Asia who were still struggling to achieve freedom from colonial rule.⁵² In the pursuit of ideological goals, Nasser went so far as to antagonize some Western powers – France and Britain in particular – by extending help to some countries struggling for independence; but he was not prepared to go to war with them unless they deliberately sought to encroach on his country. In the Summer of 1967, Nasser felt that deliberate encroachment on Syria and Jordan was, rightly or wrongly, instigated by Israel with the blessing of the United States.⁵³ And Nasser, in

⁵¹Gamal Abdel Nasser, "The Egyptian Revolution", FOREIGN AFFAIRS, XXXIII, No.2, January, 1955, pp.199-211.

⁵²Nasser, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION, op.cit., p.56.

⁵³One must remember that Nasser officially accused the United States of participating in the destruction of the Egyptian air fields during the Six Day War. See AL AHRAM, June 10, 1967. Moreover, during the October 1973 War, the Egyptian Press reminded the Egyptian public again that the U.S. government and Israel had worked actively to remove Nasser from the scene in 1967. See AKHBAR EL YOM, October 11, 1973. Peter Mansfield in THE ARABS postulated that "Neither Nasser nor King Hussein were able to sustain the charge of direct Anglo-US military intervention and soon abandoned it. Yet the vaguer, but scarcely less damaging, accusation of collusion remained and was accepted by most of the Arabs. One reason was the simple fact that there had been collusion in 1956, which Britain had still not admitted. Another was the subsequent failure of Britain and the US, especially the latter, in the United Nations and elsewhere in the international field. The US government gave the impression of being unwilling to do anything that might offend the Israeli state. If in 1967 the US government had done no more than give the green light to the Israelis to go it alone, with a promise to intervene if things went badly for them, did this not amount to collusion?" London : Pelican Books, 1985, p.284.

turn, had to resort to some sort of action if he was to maintain his leadership role in the Arab world. However, to explain the breakout of the June 1967 hostilities and their aftermath, it is imperative to examine the events that preceded it.

5.5 PRELUDE TO THE JUNE 1967 WAR : A Conventional View⁵⁴

Ever since the days of the Suez War, Nasser's policy towards Israel could be regarded as being very conservative.⁵⁵ Nasser was concentrating on Egyptian domestic change and on developments within the Arab states together with the rest of the Third World. Israel's Minister of Labour, Yigal Allon, was quoted as stating that:

While Egypt contributes most of the money for Shukairy's Organization (The Palestinian Liberation Army) and permits him to recruit his membership in the Gaza strip and to have his main offices in Egypt itself, it has not permitted any hostile activities across the Gaza border into Israel since the Sinai campaign.⁵⁶

Thus, out of the 121 incidents of 'sabotage' by Arab countries against Israel

⁵⁴A 'definitive' analysis of the immediate causes of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War can only be made possible if hitherto secret documents are published. Too many unanswered questions lie in the way of the researcher's inquiry into the roles and intentions of the two superpowers as well as the combatants themselves. However, one visible factor that had a direct bearing on the conflict were the activities of the Palestinian Fedayyin groups. Prof. Ali Hillal Dessouki, in an interview with the writer, contends that one of the primary catalysts of the Six Day War were the Palestinian Fedayyin units operating against Israel. He recalls that the guerilla activities of the displaced Palestinians had played a similar role with respect to the 1956 war. However, this should not be taken as a single factor explanation given that a multitude of other factors were also at work in both wars. London, June, 1988.

⁵⁵In his attempts to make peace with Israel, Nasser's ideological aim had always been the restoration of Palestinian territorial rights. A full analysis of these attempts are discussed in Elmore Jackson, *MIDDLE EAST MISSION : The Story of the Major Bid for Peace in the Time of Nasser and Ben Gurion*, London : W.W. Norton, 1983; See David Ben-Gurion, *MY TALKS WITH ARAB LEADERS*, Translated from the Hebrew by Angela Rubinstein and Misha Luvish, New York : Third Press, 1975, p.148. Also, Saadia Touval, *THE PEACE BROKERS: Mediators in the Arab Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979*, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1982, pp.134-164.

⁵⁶Quoted in Michael E. Fander, "Commentary : Dr. Ralph Bunche, Mythical Knight in Jerusalem", *MIDDLE EAST FORUM*, XIII, No.1, Winter, 1966, pp.56-70.

between January 3, 1965 and June 3, 1967, only five were attributed to Egypt as compared to 63 for Jordan and 34 for Syria. There was not a single incident of 'sabotage' from the Egyptian border between February 1965 and May 27, 1967, a few days before the War, when an Israeli halftruck was damaged by a mine in the Kerim Shalom area.⁵⁷ The Palestinians, Syrians and Jordanians put great pressure on Egypt during this period to permit Fedayyin type raids, but Nasser steadfastly refused.⁵⁸

On the Israeli side, prospects for peace were much better since the pre-Suez period. This time, Levi Eshkol, a moderate remained in power and was not deposed by a Hard-Liner, in the fashion Ben Gurion deposed Moshe Sharett in the pre 1956 era.⁵⁹ With Abba Eban's appointment as Foreign Minister, Eshkol initiated a more independent foreign policy, less reliant on the United States and, pursued a policy of ending the restriction on the Israeli Arab population⁶⁰. In addition, the majority of Israelis, including most of the 'hards', desired a period of 'no-war' with the Arab states. There was, by all account, a widespread and almost paralyzing fear in Israel at the prospects of another war. Israel, despite American support, felt more isolated than before, and the massive Arab armaments made even a victory look very costly.⁶¹

If it is true, for argument's sake, that neither the Israelis nor the Egyptians wanted war, how did it come to pass? One contributory reason is certainly superpower rivalry in the Middle East between the Soviet Union and the U.S.⁶²

⁵⁷See Robert Burrowes and Douglas Muzzies, "The Road to the Six Day War : Aspects of an Enumerative History of Four Arab States and Israel 1965-1967", JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol.16, No.2, 1972, pp.211-226.

⁵⁸Anthony Nutting, NASSER, London : Constable, 1972, p.263.

⁵⁹See Moshe Sharett, MAKING OF POLICY : The Diaries of Moshe Sharett, Tel Aviv : Am Oved Publishers, 1968.

⁶⁰Eban, MY COUNTRY, op.cit., p.155.

⁶¹See Nadav Safran, FROM WAR TO WAR : The Arab-Israeli Confrontation 1948-1967, New York : Pegasus, 1969, pp.212-221. For details of the arms purchases by the local actors see THE NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE issues March 21st, 27th and 29th, 1967. Also in THE WASHINGTON POST, April 1st, 2nd, and 6th, 1967; THE LONDON TIMES, May 12th, 13th, and 18th, 1967.

⁶²Jacob Coleman Hurewitz, SOVIET-AMERICAN RIVALRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, New

It had its own momentum, independent of the locals, and led during the period immediately preceding the war to a spiraling arms race.⁶³

Local inter-Arab political tensions also played a major role. The leftist Ba'ath regime took a militant rhetorical position in favour of an all-out guerilla war against Israel, based on what it claimed was the Vietnamese model.⁶⁴ The Ba'athists were to blame the Egyptians for the lack of momentum between this drive, and accused the Egyptians of peaceful coexistence with Israel.⁶⁵ It is true that the Ahmed Shukairy led Liberation Front which the Egyptians funded was restricted by the government to frantic radio broadcasts.⁶⁶ The raids themselves were conducted by Yasser Arafat's AL FATAH movement which the Syrians controlled.⁶⁷

The Soviet Union was forced to support the Syrians, even though they were pursuing what the Russians elsewhere would have considered a policy of adventurism. The Sino-Soviet dispute had boxed the Soviets in.⁶⁸ They were under pressure to demonstrate their revolutionary sincerity and the Syrians played on this. In addition, the Soviets had been continuously kept off balance by Nasser's independent and unpredictable style, and preferred the politics of the Syrian Ba'athists who had at least a revolutionary vocabulary and a doctrinaire

York : Praeger, 1969, p.201.

⁶³Hisham Sharabi, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL : The Lethal Dilemma, New York : Pegasus, 1969, p.141. Burrowes and Muzzies express a similar position: "Conceivably a fine grained analysis of the three week escalation to war could meaningfully be limited to local actors. However, any attempt to relate what happened after May 14 to the events of early 1967, late 1966, or earlier will have to look beyond the Arab-Israeli dyad. The basis of a plausible explanation does not seem to be contained therein." "The Road to the Six day War:...", op.cit., pp.224-225.

⁶⁴Walter Z. Laqueur, THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM : The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967, New York : The Macmillan Co., 1968.

⁶⁵Safran, FROM WAR TO WAR, op.cit., p.289. Malcolm H. Kerr, THE ARAB COLD WAR : Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Rivals, 1958-1970, 3rd Edition, London : Heinemann, 1987, p.127.

⁶⁶BBC SWB/2473/A/1-20.

⁶⁷Sharabi, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL : The Lethal Dilemma, op.cit., p.162.

⁶⁸The Sino-Soviet split made it clear to Nasser that he could no longer use West against East since the East no longer represented a bloc. Nasser's Cold War card which he had so successfully used in previous years was thus weakening.

party.⁶⁹ Nasser's non-alignment distressed the Russians who then welcomed the existence of a regime to the 'left' of him in the Middle East. The frequent use of the words 'Imperialists' and 'Zionist' by the Syrian regime may have impressed the Soviets but, its crude anti-Zionism was little different from that of its 'reactionary' Arab neighbours.⁷⁰

On Nasser's part, he had by the beginning of 1966, in political rhetoric, declared war on the United States and Britain - a course which inexorably drove him towards disaster, augmented by what Sir Anthony Nutting described as:

...a chain reaction of sickness and suspicion, over reaction and misjudgement. Desperately striving to retain the initiative in the Middle East, he committed Egypt to a series of adventures and undertakings far beyond what her capacities could sustain, so that, instead of moulding events to his design, he found himself reacting ever more impetuously to the actions of others who, whether by their own or his choosing, had become his enemies.⁷¹

Thus, what were those adventures and misperceptions that undermined Nasser's often prudent and cautious outlook? One was the Yemen War. In his determination to evict the British from Aden, Nasser reinforced his troops in Yemen until a large proportion his army was engaged in Southern Arabia.⁷² And, in attempting to thwart the Anglo-American conspiracies which he believed were being hatched for him, Nasser proclaimed that the Egyptian army would remain in the Yemen until the British were forced to leave the area.⁷³ "Nasser, in effect had assumed the 'defensive offensive' in his struggle to maintain the political initiative in the South Arabian peninsula."⁷⁴ Meanwhile, Radio Cairo, characteristically continued to spread invective on imperialism and the CIA who

⁶⁹See Patrick Seale, *ASAD : The Struggle for the Middle East*, London : IB Taurus, 1989, pp.62-81.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, pp.90-91.

⁷¹Anthony Nutting, *NASSER : A Political Biography*, London : Constable, 1971, p.383.

⁷²McGeorge Bundy, *THE PATTERN OF RESPONSIBILITY*, New York : Augustus M. Kelly, 1972, p.125.

⁷³In an interview with Peter Mansfield, October, 1988, London; *AL AHRAM*, 15th May 1964, *THE TIMES*, 23rd July, 1964

⁷⁴*Ibid.*

were accused in the most vile terms of helping the Yemeni Royalists on behalf of their British and Saudi allies.⁷⁵

In order to understand the Yemeni War from the then Egyptian view, one has to put it in the context of a supposedly American-Saudi Axis in the Middle East. This Axis, according to Robert Stephens, "aimed at toppling Nasser's regime, and implementing Eisenhower's political theory of filling the vacuum left by the Anglo-French powers and transferring Arab Leadership to the House of Saud."⁷⁶ It was against this background of regional and international events that the Yemeni war broke out. The war in the Yemen baffled all parties concerned and King Saud had to turn his attention from attacking Nasser in Cairo to facing the danger on his borders instead.⁷⁷

The 'revolution' in Yemen was by no means instigated by Nasser's Egypt and it is difficult to estimate the influence of Nasser's brand of Arab Nationalism on those who aimed to abolish the parochial Imamate, whose leader, the Imam, made a name for himself in brutally repressing any form of dissent.⁷⁸ When the Yemeni 'revolution' finally succeeded and the Republic was proclaimed, Saudi Arabia regarded the event as a direct threat to its own security and thus sought to nip it in the bud.⁷⁹ The Yemeni Republic called on Egypt for help and, Nasser responded - on the grounds of both ideological commitment and self-interest.⁸⁰ Thence, special Egyptian forces were sent to Yemen with the aim of bolstering the Republic. Following this, Saudi and Jordanian support for the Royalist forces steadily expanded making the Egyptian army increasingly beleaguered in a hostile and unfamiliar environment.⁸¹

⁷⁵MIDDLE EAST FORUM, 21st September, Vol.17, No.48, 1966; BBC SWB ME/3064/A/3.

⁷⁶In an interview with the writer, November, 1988, London. A similar point of view is aired by Mohammed Auda in "Nasser : The Revolution Continues", ARAB PAPERS, No.8, Arab Research Center : August, 1981, p.28.

⁷⁷Kerr, THE ARAB COLD WAR, op.cit., pp.89-94.

⁷⁸Dana Adam Schmidt, YEMEN : The Unknown War, London : Bodley Head, 1968, p.89.

⁷⁹Schmidt, YEMEN :The Unknown War, op.cit., pp.121-123.

⁸⁰President Gamal Abdel Nasser's SPEECHES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS, Cairo, Information Bureau, Vol. 5, 1964, p.531.

In February 1966, the British Government indicated that on reconsideration they would not after all require a military base in Aden after independence. Nasser was suspicious of this and any proposals for ceasefire mediation in the Yemen were one and all summarily rejected in Cairo. "In private he was reported to have sarcastically remarked that 'as the noose tightens around the beast, it cultivates benevolence'".⁸² Nasser, who obviously was asking too much, placed on Egypt's dwindling resources extensive undertakings that could prove economically unfeasible and politically severely constraining. Notwithstanding these commitments, Nasser was about to take upon himself the further, and, as it was shortly to prove, fatal obligation to defend Syria against attack from any one of her neighbouring states.⁸³

This additional undertaking was moulded by events which had begun in June, 1965 when Ben Bella was overthrown in Algeria in a 'Palace Coup' staged by Colonel Houari Boumediene, the then Defence Minister. Nasser was reported to have seen this event as one that could prove chaotic. Firstly, "he suspected that the imperialist powers were behind this, since Algeria's uncompromising nationalism had been a constant threat to their regional interests."⁸⁴ Secondly, any shift by Algeria in inter-Arab relations would adversely change the balance of power in the Arab World.⁸⁵ So, when Boumedienne quickly aligned himself with his Moroccan and Tunisian neighbours, both of whom were among Egypt's staunchest opponents, Nasser began to woo the Hafiz regime in Syria with suggestion of support on the Palestine question. Eight months later, however, in February

⁸¹Ahmad Kamal Al Turbji, *THE ARAB ARMED FORCES IN YEMEN (In Arabic)*, Cairo : Al Dar al Qawmiyyah lil Nashr, 1966.

⁸²Sir Anthony Nutting, in an interview with the writer, November, 1988, London

⁸³Kerr, *THE ARAB COLD WAR*, op.cit., p.101.

⁸⁴Ali Sabri, reply to questionnaire, July, 1989, Cairo.

⁸⁵Ibid. At this self-same juncture, Cairo heard that Nkrumah had been overthrown. To Nasser's incurable suspicion, this development only served to reconfirm his theory that the imperialist powers were engaged in a major counter offensive to destabilize 'progressive' Third World countries. Thus, it was time to close ranks and sink differences. No less worrying was the news that his best, if not only, friend Abdel Salem Arif of Iraq had been killed in a helicopter crash near Basra. Added to all this, Iraq's stability was further threatened by a fresh outbreak of heavy fighting with the fractious Kurds only a few days before Arif's untimely death. Richard Hofstader, *EGYPT AND NASSER : A Fact on File Publication Series, Vol. 2, U.S.A. : Fact on File, Inc, 1973, p.301*

1966, the Secretary-General of the Syrian Ba'ath Party, General Salah Jadid staged another Coup in Damascus and Nuri el Din al Attassi was proclaimed President of Syria. This change of leadership produced a more leftward trend in Syria's foreign policy, which, from the point of Nasser's mixed fortunes, made it crucial for Egypt to 'control' Syria vis-a-vis Israel and the Palestine question.⁸⁶

As the new relationship between Syria and Egypt warmed, Nasser launched into a series of violent denunciations of the pro-Western Arab rulers with whom, he claimed, cooperation against Israel had become futile and impossible.⁸⁷ Contending that he had been deceived by their protestations of solidarity, he declared that these 'reactionaries' had proved quite useless in the conflict with the Israeli invader and, in Nasser's words, had shown that "their hatred for Egypt was greater than for Israel."⁸⁸ He even indulged in the fanciful threat to wage a preventive war or develop atomic weapons should Israel acquire such arms from her Western backers.⁸⁹

As Nasser's renewed assault on the 'reactionaries' gained momentum,⁹⁰ Egypt's frontiers remained relatively secure, thanks to the protection of the UNEF forces. However, those of Israel's other Arab neighbours were not. On the contrary, they were as vulnerable as ever to the Ben Gurion kind of 'reprisal' raids that constituted the pillar of Israel's policy of 'swift retaliation'.⁹¹ Nasser knew well that Palestinian national ambitions could all too easily run away with them and any fiery utterances or the smallest of Fedayyin raids could cause

⁸⁶Seale, *ASAD : The Struggle for the Middle East*, op.cit., pp.101. William B. Quandt, *THE POLITICS OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM*, Santa Monica : The Rand Corporation, 1971, p.139.

⁸⁷Kerr, *THE ARAB COLD WAR*, op.cit., p.121.

⁸⁸Burrowes and Muzzies, "The Road to the Six Day War...", op.cit., p.228.

⁸⁹Eban, *THE VOICE OF ISRAEL*, op.cit., p.48.

⁹⁰Husseln of Jordan and Feisal of Saudi Arabia were singled out for verbal indictments in his public utterances. Referring to Hussein as a CIA agent and Feisal as 'the bearded one', the rift between Nasser and the 'reactionaries' became intensely personified.

⁹¹Robert St. John, *BEN GURION*, London : Jarrods, 1964, p.199.

incalculable trouble. Nasser was also well aware that, while the Fedayyin were prevented from engaging the Israelis from Egyptian territory by the presence of UNEF, and from Jordan and Lebanon by order of Amman and Beirut, the Syrians were allowing the Fedayyin to train and operate from Syrian territory.⁹²

All these considerations made it essential for Cairo to gain some degree of control over the action and policies of the Attasi regime. For, if Nasser had learned anything from the days of the Union, it was the difficulty of quarantining the rashness of the Syrians especially when it came to the Palestinian issue.⁹³ With Ben Bella and Araf gone, and with the conservative Arab States alienated, Nasser had become dangerously isolated. No longer could he manipulate his fellow leaders with the tact and success that he had been able to previously.⁹⁴ Therefore, the bitter fact for Nasser was that whatever lines he took on Israel, he was surely to be attacked by his fellow Arabs.⁹⁵ Within such a constraint, Nasser came to the conclusion that the only way to keep the initiative in Egypt's hands was to impose a restraining influence on the Syrian army and hence on the Palestinian guerrillas operating from Syrian territory. This could only be achieved by a defence agreement with the regime in Damascus, which he was able to get.⁹⁶

Nasser in those days, contrary to widely held opinions, "had not changed his mind about the futility of the Arabs in trying to restore the Palestinians to their lost lands by force of arms".⁹⁷ If he had to prevent the Arab world from being dragged into a third round with Israel, provoked by Syria, Nasser felt that Egypt's security required the control of Syrian military planning at the earliest opportunity.⁹⁸ Therefore, quite apart from any question of leadership in the

⁹²See Laqueur, *THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM*, op.cit., p.231.

⁹³Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, *YEARS OF UPHEAVAL* (In Arabic), Cairo : Markhaz el Ahrām lil Targama wal Nashr, 1989, pp.281-301

⁹⁴Sir Anthony Nutting in an interview, November, 1988, London.

⁹⁵Interview with Peter Mansfield, October, 1988, London.

⁹⁶Richard Hofstader (ed.), *EGYPT AND NASSER*, Vol II, A Fact on File Publication, op.cit., p.103.

⁹⁷Interview with Peter Mansfield, October, 1988, London.

⁹⁸Interview with Prof. Ali Hillal Dessouki, June, 1988, London.

Arab world, Nasser believed that if the Western powers were gunning for him again, nothing could better help their plans than for Egypt to be embroiled in a war with Israel in which the weight of world opinion would be against the Arabs.⁹⁹

If there was ever any doubt in Nasser's mind about the logic of these conclusions, events were soon to dispel them. For one, Israel had started to administer the most punishing retaliatory raids for any minor Fedayyin action.¹⁰⁰ The Syrians, on their part, resisted and called, in vain, for the Egyptians to come to their rescue. Since the deployment of Egyptian troops on Syrian soil was not included in the defence treaty, Nasser could do little but engage in more rhetorical threats against Israel, further aggravating the political climate of the region.¹⁰¹ At various press conferences, he was reported to have reiterated that: "We will not accept any possibility of co-existence with Israel".¹⁰²

At this point in time, Nasser began to act on some highly disturbing intelligence about American strategy in relation to the Middle East. From his Ambassador to Brussels, Nasser was to learn that Washington was now working on a new policy for the defence of American interests in the Middle East, based on an active Israeli role.¹⁰³ With the announcement that American military aircraft were on their way to Israel, Nasser, more than ever convinced that the clock was being put back ten years, now decided that the recent attacks on Syria were, like the Gaza raid in 1955, the prelude to Western and Israeli action to stamp out Arab Nationalism.¹⁰⁴ The rift between Egypt and the United States was beyond repair since the days when Nasser and Johnson collided on the issue of wheat sales to

⁹⁹Interview with Abdel Majid Farid, April, 1988, London.

¹⁰⁰Abu-Lughod, THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFRONTATION OF JUNE 1967, op.cit., pp.122-123.

¹⁰¹In an interview with Fathy el Ghoully, January, 1989, London.

¹⁰²Quoted in Abba Eban's speech at the Special Assembly of the United Nations, 19 June, 1967. Walter Laqueur, THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM, op.cit., Appendix 10, p.336; pp.328-348.

¹⁰³Ali Sabri, reply to questionnaire, July, 1989, Cairo

¹⁰⁴Interview with Sir Anthony Nutting, November, 1988, London.

Egypt. Thus no Egyptian-U.S. dialogue would have achieved any reduction in tensions.¹⁰⁵

As Jordan suffered a heavy retaliation raid by Israel, King Hussein had found the answer to the vilifications of Nasser and Radio Cairo.¹⁰⁶ From then on the Jordanian press and radio maintained attacks on Nasser that were designed to challenge his de facto hands off policy on Israel.¹⁰⁷ And, indeed, because of its domestic economic problems and military involvement in the Yemen, needless to add, the leading Arab state had done little to provoke Israel, except rhetorically.¹⁰⁸ Radio Amman was to portray Nasser's role as betraying the Arab cause and declared in one its many statements that:

Since 1956 Abd an Nasir has been the only leader of an Arab state having common borders with the usurped part of Palestine who lives in peace and tranquility with Israel...His treason has reached the point of disregarding violation of Egyptian airspace by the Israeli airforce, and by not resisting them...In his attitude towards Damascus, Gaza and the Tiran straits, Abd an Nasir is no longer a party to anything remotely related to Palestine or the Palestine question.¹⁰⁹

With the war of words between Egypt and Jordan, Nasser was forced to counter these allegations and by doing so, made three moves that sealed the fate of the Arab armies. Firstly, he requested the UNEF to withdraw from Sharm el Sheik and border posts.¹¹⁰ Secondly, he closed the Gulf of Aqaba, an international

¹⁰⁵Ali Sabri, reply to questionnaire, July, 1989, Cairo.

¹⁰⁶This action by the IDF, the Sammu Raid on November 1966, considerably added to the existing tension and became one of the landmarks in the road to the 1967 June War.

¹⁰⁷Radio Amman maintained that, firstly, Nasser was hiding behind UNEF's skirts and avoiding combat with the enemy. Secondly, were the shipments to Israel via the Gulf of Aqaba which the Egyptians had open since the withdrawal of the tripartite troops from the Sinai after the Suez debacle. Thirdly, and most heinous of all, Cairo was intending to negotiate a separate peace settlement with Israel by selling out the West Bank. In an interview with Sir Anthony Nutting, November, 1988, London.

¹⁰⁸Laqueur, THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM, op.cit., p.83.

¹⁰⁹THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 23, 1967, pp.2-3; quoted in Laqueur, THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM, op.cit., p.232.

¹¹⁰The United Nations Official Chronology states that Egypt requested a partial withdrawal of UNEF forces and, in fact, Egyptian troops did not physically occupy Sharm el Sheik until three days after U Thant had ordered U.N. forces to pull out. At the same time, it seems somewhat strange that, with so much at stake, U Thant suggested that he would meet Nasser in Cairo only after he had received a formal

waterway, which caused an outcry in the West.¹¹¹ Finally, Nasser ordered his army to take up positions in the Sinai.¹¹²

Overnight Nasser became once more the hero of the Arab world. Even the Arab radio stations that had been lambasting him earlier cheered this singular act of defiance. The jeerings and taunts of yesterday evaporated. What remained after the prolonged and bitter fray was the euphoric chorus of jubilation. But unknown to the teeming Arab nationalists who come out onto the streets to praise and acclaim Nasser, no-one, save the ever watchful Israelis, seemed to realize that now their military preparedness would prove its worth. The Israelis, who had for all the ten years after the Suez War worked and perfected plans to recover all and more than they had been obliged to abandon in 1956, would soon achieve part of their political strategy - "the destruction of Nasser, or at least humiliating him beyond hope of recovering his prestige as an Arab leader".¹¹³ Ben Gurion's fears that Nasser was the man who would "raise the spirits of the Arabs, change their character and turn them into a fighting nation" would be alleviated for the time being.¹¹⁴ Nasser who was aware of his reputation and seeking a political

request for the total withdrawal of UNEF. As Nasser welcomed the idea of a visit, it is the fact that the Secretary General did not set forth for yet another four days, by which time the President had finally decided to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. In addition, the majority of contributing nations to the U.N. Force agreed that Egypt was acting within her rights and that it was not for them to oppose her request for UNEF's withdrawal. British and American protests about the Egyptian action gave Nasser the impression that UNEF was thought of as some kind of occupation army placed in the Middle East to perform Anglo-American bidding. With the Americans pre-emptorily telling Nasser to comply with whatever the Secretary-General suggested, any hope for negotiation with Cairo was thus removed. See the UNITED NATIONS OFFICIAL CHRONOLOGY, May 1st to June 30th, 1967, New York : United Nations Publications, 1968, pp.311-347. Also see The TIMES, May 18th, 1967, "U Thant Warning over Middle East Crisis : Egypt Demands Withdrawal of United Nations Force", p.1. For a detailed analysis of the role of the U.N. troops in the Sinai, see Major General Rikhye, THE SINAI BLUNDER : Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967, U.S.A : Frank Cass, 1980

¹¹¹See The TIMES, May 22nd, 1967, "Danger of Clash in Tiran Straits", May 23rd, 1967, "Egypt Closes Gulf of Aqaba to Israel's Ships : Defiant Move by Nasser Raises Middle East Tension". Compare with coverage in The OBSERVER and The GUARDIAN of the same dates.

¹¹²See report in the LONDON TIMES, May 24th, 1967, "Five Arab Nations Now Mobilized : Cairo Says its Own Troops Are On Border", pp.1, 3-5; AL AHRAM, 25th May, 1967; AL NAHAR, Beirut, 26th May 1967.

¹¹³Sir Anthony Nutting, November, 1988, London.

¹¹⁴Ben Gurion, MY TALKS WITH ARAB LEADERS, op.cit., p.294; Interview with Peter

victory without war, found himself taking a set of irreversible decisions that pushed the situation towards the brink.¹¹⁵

The prime questions to be addressed in the light of the multitude of factors that are essential in understanding the June 1967 War are: Firstly, what are the possible explanations for Egyptian and Israeli over-reaction? Secondly, what were the probable intentions of the local actors in the conflict? And, lastly, where does all this fit into the study of charismatic political leadership?

Soviet supplied intelligence about the vulnerability of Syria and Israel's armed concentration on the Syrian border is one much repeated explanation for Egypt's over-reaction.¹¹⁶ Thus, the subsequent Egyptian moves were designed to thwart the Israeli threat. However, if these moves were to culminate in an attack on Israel, which serves as a justification for the subsequent Israeli pre-emptive air strikes on 5 June, it hardly represents an objective assessment of Nasser's intentions. Considering the Egyptian situation soberly in the pre-war period, which presumably Nasser did, an immediate war with Israel was not feasible, even if Egypt was to make the first strike. With the deployment of his best units in Yemen and his reputed misgivings about the efficiency of his army, it is difficult to see how Nasser's Egypt would manage 'the ultimate battle with the Zionist state.' Being in a position where he alone controlled the decision making process, one must assume that Nasser was rational, in that he did not overestimate the strengths of the Syrian and Jordanian armed forces.¹¹⁷

If the foregoing hypothesis is correct then it is conceivable that Nasser's intention was to engineer another political victory, as in the years past, by

Mansfield, October, 1988, London.

¹¹⁵Miles Copeland, *THE GAME OF NATIONS*, London : Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1969, p.238.

¹¹⁶See Mohammed Heikal, *SPHINX AND COMMISSAR : The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East*, London : Collins, 1978, p.182; Mohammed Heikal, *NASSER : The Cairo Documents*, New York : Doubleday, 1973, p.121.

¹¹⁷Sir Anthony Nutting, November, 1988, London.

brinkmanship. Dispatching messages to the Indian and Chinese leaders on his intentions and sending his Prime Minister to Washington just prior to the Israel attack may have been an attempt to withdraw from the brink. The resort to high level diplomacy tends to strengthen the thesis that it was not Nasser's intention to start an armed conflict.¹¹⁸ It appears that all Nasser seemed to be looking for was a limited political victory that would strengthen the regime at home and particularly in the Arab sphere.¹¹⁹

On the other side of the coin, the Israeli decision making process that culminated in the 5th June surprise attack has been a subject of inquiry. What compelled Israel to choose the most extreme of the four basic options – a preemptive strike – remains unclear to historians.¹²⁰ Another option, diplomacy, was discarded after a brief two week trial.¹²¹ A third option, would have been the testing of Egypt's resolve by dispatching one Israeli ship through the Tiran Straits. This would have shifted the onus of armed aggression onto the U.A.R, had she chosen to enforce the blockade. Finally, a limited armed action to force open the straits could have been attempted by Israel.¹²²

What apparently escaped the attention of Egyptian policy-makers was the deeply held Israeli fear of encirclement and extermination.¹²³ The massing of Arab armies on Israel's borders hit at the central aspect of contemporary Israeli national character that springs from the ghetto experience of Jewish history. The resort to total war was ultimately triggered off by the Israeli population's fear

¹¹⁸Copeland, THE GAME OF NATIONS, op.cit., p.236.

¹¹⁹Kerr comes to a similar conclusion when he states "Nasser's...objective went beyond simply deterring Israel: it was to score a political victory over her, and then to receive that acclaim and reap the rewards in the Arab political arena that would surely follow. In short, Nasser's concern began not with Israel but with Syria, and pointed eventually not to Sharm al-Shaikh, still less to Tel Aviv, but to the chanceries and the streets of the Arab world". Malcolm Kerr, THE ARAB COLD WAR, op.cit., p.127.

¹²⁰Bernard Kuiholm, THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR IN THE NEAR EAST, Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1980, p.301.

¹²¹Heikal, SPHINX AND COMMISSAR, op.cit., p.172.

¹²²The last two options were suggested to the Israeli coalition cabinet by General Dayan between May 22nd and 23rd. In Moshe Dayan, THE STORY OF MY LIFE, London : Sphere Books, 1978, pp.481-483.

¹²³Eban, MY COUNTRY, op.cit., p.205.

with the political ambitions of certain hawkish Israeli leaders playing a part in the final decision. Israel temporarily solved its security problem by defeating the Arab armies. But, likewise, the Six Day War set in motion a constellation of powerful forces, whose impact was felt in the 1973 Ramadan War and is constantly felt to this very day.¹²⁴

Hence, to recapitulate all that has been said, Nasser's gambles and political bluffs of May 1967 brought him to the morning of June 5, when he waited for over six hours to learn that his air force had been wiped out on the ground in less than fifty minutes. What happened after this is described by Jean Lacouture:

The RAIS was too experienced a strategist to nurse any further hopes. For four days running he tried to manoeuvre, to get help from the USSR and the United Nations, even the USA. Towards midday on the 9th, he saw defeat staring at him. And his instinctive reaction was to personalize it as one of his responsibilities. Convening the staff of the Arab Socialist Unions, he announced his decision to resign in favour of Zakaria Moheiddin. He incarnated defeat as completely as he had incarnated the nation. He was disaster personified.

At about seven o'clock on the evening of June 9, this is what he told the country very matter of factly on television, his voice, like Egypt, anguished, his expression, like his army, bewildered. Beginning with an account of the disaster, he went on painting details with dismal realism, then suddenly announced just before concluding: "I am retiring from public life..."

The reaction was fascinating, perhaps unprecedented, and cast a strange light on this extreme case of the mythical incarnation of a nation.

Authority remained on the side of the defeated and resigning man...rescued despite incontrovertible evidence that he was doomed. Therein lie the power and significance of Nasser's leadership.

It is not really important to know whether he was sincere that day or was feigning an exit in order to woo public support. In any event, he was taking a chance with a people that had been dealt with a

¹²⁴Michael Adams, "The Foundation of Peace", THE GUARDIAN, 15th June, 1967. Professor Adams postulated that "If the Israelis want a peace as savage as war, what freedom of choice does this leave the Arabs?.....", p.6.

crushing blow. What nation would not have sanctioned the fallen leader's decision?¹²⁵

Egypt's defeat in the June War is not the most significant contemporary development for one's study of Nasser's politics, since few experts expected an Egyptian victory over Israel. Rather it is the persistence of Nasser's image to endure despite the enormity of defeat.¹²⁶ The 1967 war, as Robert Stephens put it:

....seemed to destroy much of Nasser's earlier achievements. Having at last freed Egyptian territory from foreign military occupation with the departure of the British in 1956, Nasser, little more than ten years later, saw Israeli forces occupying the Sinai peninsula and its oilfields. Having gained full control of the Suez Canal, he now saw it closed and useless and with one bank occupied by the Israelis. Having rejected a Western alliance and protection in the pursuit of complete independence and non-alignment, he found himself relying heavily on Soviet military and diplomatic support. Having sought financial and economic aid without political strings, he was faced with foreign indebtedness of £1000 million and dependence on subsidies from Arab governments, including his chief Arab opponent, King Feisal of Saudi Arabia. But events since Nasser's death have confirmed that these setbacks were mostly of a transitory character and had not fundamentally reversed the changes that established Egyptian independence.¹²⁷

Thus the ability of Nasser's political system to adjust itself to the conditions of severe stress after June 1967 testifies to its great absorptive capacity. However, to make a fundamental connection with the analysis of charismatic political leadership a few general points need clarification.

In the first part of the study it was mentioned that a primary element of strength

¹²⁵Jean Lacouture, *THE DEMIGODS*, op.cit., pp.129-130.

¹²⁶Nasser's long time confidant, Mohammed Helkal wrote: "It has to be admitted that in 1967 Nasser failed in one of the fundamental duties of any ruler - he failed to defend the borders of his country. By that failure the legitimacy of his regime was flawed..." *AUTUMN OF FURY*, London : Andre Deutsch, 1983, p.114.

¹²⁷See Robert Stephens, "Nasser, A Reassessment", *ARAB PAPERS*, Number 8, London : Arab Research Centre, p.12.

in personal rule in the Third World was charismatic leadership. The central role of the charismatic phenomenon and its various ingredients was dramatically validated with the reinstatement of Abdel Nasser on 9th June, 1967. The charismatic component came into clear view when one considers how widespread and deep were the feelings shown by the demonstrations in urging Nasser to withdraw his resignation. Although the demonstration may have been guided by some governmental organization, the popular support for Nasser in as crucial time as this surpassed that of a staged affair.¹²⁸ Fouad Ajami, in describing these moments, articulates that:

Nasser's genius and the popular need for belief in someone, in anything - enabled him to rise above the defeat. The leader was dissociated from the defeat and invited to go beyond his political apparatus to purge the elements that had supposedly captured and undermined his revolution...

Part of Nasser no doubt died on June 5, 1967, but another part of him somehow survived for another three years at the helm, assumed the role of resister, and went on to preside over the redefinitions and transformation of Nasserism. The charismatic relationship between him and the masses formed during the bright youthful days of Suez and the non-aligned movement was shattered with the 1967 defeat; another variant, born out of despair and a sense of loss, sustained him until his death. He would stay in power not as a confident, vibrant hero, but as a tragic figure, a symbol of better days, a sign of the will to resist.¹²⁹

¹²⁸Eric Rouleau, a long time observer of Nasser, wrote after that fateful event, "...in the morning, having learned of their defeat, they blamed Nasser alone and were ready to send him packing; that evening, the news of his retirement made them cling to him as their sole refuge, their teacher and breath of life: Gamal, Gamal don't desert us, we need you." Quoted in Jean Lacouture, *THE DEMIGODS*, op.cit., p.130. For other interpretations of the June events, see Mahmoud Hussein, *CLASS CONFLICT IN EGYPT, 1945-1970*, New York : Oxford University Press, 1970, pp.261-69; Isaac Deutscher, "On the Israeli-Arab War", *NEW LEFT REVIEW*, No.44, July-August, 1967, pp.30-45; Anwar Abdel Malek, "Crisis in Nasser's Egypt", *NEW LEFT REVIEW*, September-October, 1967; No.45, pp.67-82. Clement Moore suggest that the demonstrations are to be seen as support for the nation Nasser symbolized rather than for Nasser himself who was responsible for the disastrous defeat. See Moore, "Authoritarian Politics in Uncorporated Society : The Case of Nasser's Egypt", *COMPARATIVE POLITICS*, January 1974, p.200.

¹²⁹See Fouad Ajami, "The Struggle for Egypt's Soul", *FOREIGN POLICY*, Vol. 35, Summer, 1979, p.6.

As earlier emphasized, a basic rule is that defeats do not bode well for charismatic leaders. However, the reinstatement of Nasser to power defied the established pattern for charismatic leaders for a number of reasons. Dekmejian details them as:

...the high degree of residual legitimacy that Nasser possessed by virtue of his leadership performance during the fifties - a legitimacy too great to be erased overnight by a defeat. After all, his activities as leader were the concrete manifestations of the nationalist ideological message which most Egyptians had shared and supported....

...The fact...that...when popular beliefs and aspirations coincided with the politics of the leadership, there is little that external pressures can do to erase the resulting legitimacy...

...The public reaction to the openly expressed Israeli and Western desire to witness his downfall. As in 1956, many Egyptians supported Nasser if only to deny the enemy the satisfaction of success. In a deeper sense, however, by re-instating the President, the Egyptians underlined their reluctance to accept defeat....

...Charisma and the charismatic compulsion to search for new victories that led Nasser to the disastrous brink in early June was also the force that helped him retain office after the defeat.¹³⁰

5.6 THE EVENTS OF JUNE 9th, 1967 : A Qualitative Analysis:¹³¹

For the great majority of Egyptians, June 9th, 1967 was a black day. After rejoicing on the faked reports which Radio Cairo put out hourly the masses were bewildered as they listened to a communique issued by the General Command which said that the Israelis had crossed to the West Bank of the Canal and appealed to the

¹³⁰R. Hrair Dekmejian, *EGYPT UNDER NASSER : A Study in Political Dynamics*, New York, Albany : New York State University Press, 1971, p.245.

¹³¹Since the aim of this case study is to make an assessment of the response of the Egyptian and Arab masses in the aftermath of the June 1967 defeat, one attempts to capture the magnitude of events that illustrate the charismatic component of Nasser's leadership that enabled him to retain office.

world to judge this move. "The communique implied such disgraceful helplessness, submissiveness, and humiliation it made the blood of the Egyptian citizen boil."¹³² Tawfiq Al Hakim, a celebrated Egyptian writer, in capturing the general mood commented:

I did not know the truth until Friday, 9th June, and as the truth dawned consternation seized me...It appeared that we had lost the war in the first hours of 5th June...and when we saw the face of the President on the television screen announcing the defeat and minimizing it by using the word reversal, we could not believe that we were in a such a contemptible position and that Israel was in such a strong one...¹³³

The defeat of June 1967 had been a complete surprise to everybody. "It may be that Egyptians had not expected quick victory, but nobody had been prepared for defeat on such a shattering scale".¹³⁴ It would be difficult to overstate the traumatic effect which the June War had on Egypt and the whole Arab world. For a time everyone was in a state of shock, unable to appreciate the magnitude of the disaster or to face its implications. "There was a tendency to see things in terms of the past - a tendency which to begin with, even Nasser shared".¹³⁵ "Thus, when Podgorny was in Cairo at the end of June 1967, and a question was asked about the Gulf of Aqaba, Nasser answered that whatever it was could be decided 'after the withdrawal'".¹³⁶ He was assuming that the aftermath of 1967 would follow the pattern of Suez.

But just as Suez was an act of national self determination for Egyptians, the outcome of the June War was a cause for unity among the populace. Most Egyptians might have overlooked the catalogue of Nasser's misfortune since 1959, but they could hardly disregard the latest and most grievous of his Real Politik miscalculations. "They had cared little about Saudi or Iraqi rebuffs or about

¹³²Interview with Fathy el Ghoully, January, 1989, London.

¹³³Tawfiq Al Hakim, THE RETURN OF CONSCIOUSNESS, Translated from the Arabic by Bayly Winder, London : Macmillan Press Ltd, 1988, p.42.

¹³⁴Ali Sabri, reply to questionnaire, July, 1989, Cairo.

¹³⁵Interview with Sir Anthony Nutting, November, 1988, London.

¹³⁶Ali Sabri, reply to questionnaire, July, 1989, Cairo.

Syria's secession from the union and, save for those with relatives involved in the fighting, even the war in Yemen had not greatly concerned them."¹³⁷ But they cared deeply about the occupation of Egyptian territory by the Israeli enemy and about the degrading defeat inflicted on their army. The debacle destroyed the army's morale and aroused its resentment. They grew to believe that they had been used by Nasser to play a game which had failed and they were abused by taking the blame for it. "On top of the appalling loss of life in Sinai, the army was now suffering the added humiliation of being the butt of every satirist in Egypt and outside".¹³⁸ Egyptians were shocked at the events which were even more traumatic than the invasion of 1956 had been.

After Suez, "Egyptians believed that they had emerged victorious from that war, or at least if they did not believe they had won the war, they knew they had won the peace".¹³⁹ They had stood up to the might of three states and had not been completely defeated by them. "The regime had weathered the storm and had not fallen".¹⁴⁰ However, the situation on June 9th, 1967 was drastically different.

Three quarters of the Egyptian air force was destroyed, while 12,000 men were killed. The army resisted fiercely, but it was not up to par, especially since it lacked air cover. The gap between the soldiers, who were peasants with little training or technical knowledge, and their officers, showed in the field.¹⁴¹ To make matters worse, the best units of the Egyptian Army were still engaged in the Yemen fighting fellow Arabs. Thus, militarily, the June War totally devastated Egypt's armed power. "On June 9, 1967, when Egypt agreed to cease fire, the entire Egyptian army and air force had been completely destroyed as fighting bodies".¹⁴² Nasser was to say later that on that day there was not a single Egyptian soldier on the West Bank of the Canal to resist an Israeli crossing and

¹³⁷Ibid.

¹³⁸Interview with Sir Anthony Nutting, November, 1988, London.

¹³⁹Interview with Professor Ali Hillal Dessouki, June, 1988, London.

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

¹⁴¹Yehoshafat Harkaby, "The Causes of Arab Defeat in June 1967", ORBIS, Fall, 1967, pp.230-243.

¹⁴²Interview with Peter Mansfield, October, 1988, London.

march on Cairo.¹⁴³ The statement certainly contained a good deal of hyperbole, since reports from Cairo for that day spoke of movements of troops in the capital and flights of air force units over the skies in connection with internal political manoeuvres;¹⁴⁴ nevertheless, it was essentially true that Egypt lay practically defenceless before the Israeli troops, who, however, had no intention of venturing beyond the Canal. This particular consequence of the war proved to be the least enduring.

Politically speaking, the war was bound to affect Egypt's role as leader of the drive for Arab unity through the crashing blow it dealt to Nasser's charisma. "After all, Egypt's commitment to the cause of integral Arab Unity was not something it had thought out and sought in advance, but was rather an objective that was thrust upon it by the logic of Nasser's manoeuvres and the spectacular successes he had achieved".¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, since Egypt did commit itself to the cause of integral Arab unity, the striving for the realization of that ideal did not take the form of wide ranging, systematic endeavours nor did it assume any institutionalized form. Rather, it continued to depend primarily on Nasser's personal charisma and his capacity to manoeuvre in the fluid political conditions of the Arab world. "Since Nasser's charisma itself had arisen out of real or imagined spectacular successes, and since it depended on continued success for its maintenance, the spectacular defeat he suffered in the war was bound to explode it and thus deprive Egypt's drive for Arab unity of its major propellant".¹⁴⁶

On the level of the Egyptian people, "the feeling had grown in the years that they were capable of defeating Israel and regaining part of Palestine. Nasser's earlier declaration that closed the straits of Tiran to Israel-bound ships brought the realization that this might precipitate the long awaited war to defeat Israel.

¹⁴³Ali Sabri, reply to questionnaire, July, 1989, Cairo.

¹⁴⁴Hofstader, EGYPT AND NASSER, A Fact on File Publication, New York : A fact on File Publication, 1973, Vol. III, op.cit., pp.231-234. See The GUARDIAN, 10th June, 1967, pp.2-3.

¹⁴⁵Interview with Robert Stephens, November, 1988, London.

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

Excitement became intense".¹⁴⁷ "Egyptians argued that their *RAIS* would not have risked the military challenge of Israel unless he was convinced that this time he could win".¹⁴⁸

The objectives of the Arabs were described differently in different countries, varying from the destruction of Israel as a state to simply holding the straits of Tiran. Perhaps Nasser put "the position most clearly to members of his National Assembly when he said that he had gone back to the position in 1956 (by closing the strait) and, 'God Willing', would go back to the position of 1948".¹⁴⁹ One must conclude that he intended to return if possible to the partition plan by military action if the Israelis attacked. "It was certainly a widely held view in the Arab world that he would at least regain the land bridge across the Negev to Jordan, and Palestinians of 'revolutionary persuasion' held that he would then make a Palestine state consisting of the West Bank of the Jordan and the Negev".¹⁵⁰

None of these objectives were in mind when Nasser closed the strait of Tiran, but grew with the widening conviction that victory could be achieved. "This was an enterprise into which the Arab people followed Nasser with bright-eyed hope".¹⁵¹ There had been deepening pessimism among most intelligent Arabs, including many Palestinians, who had come to believe that there was no hope of regaining even part of Palestine, and neither in governments nor people was there any thought that a new war for Palestine was about to begin. "Objectives were engendered by emotions fired by hope".¹⁵²

The lightning and comprehensive defeat that came on June 9th, 1967 blew away all these illusions, shook the Egyptian and Arab peoples out of their blinding

¹⁴⁷Interview with Sir Anthony Nutting, November, 1988, London.

¹⁴⁸All Sabri, reply to questionnaire, July, 1989, Cairo.

¹⁴⁹Interview with Robert Stephens, November, 1988, London.

¹⁵⁰Ibid.

¹⁵¹Ibid.

¹⁵²Interview with Sir Anthony Nutting, November, 1988, London.

euphoria. The mood beforehand had been supreme confidence – afterwards astonished disbelief. "How had a small state managed to defeat the combined Arab armies and wipe their air forces' in a matter of minutes' was one of the many questions on the mind of every Arab youth".¹⁵³ The answers to the self questioning were to be found later but for now, "the Egyptian masses came to the conclusion that they would have to rethink their entire strategy and rebuild on a basis of realism".¹⁵⁴ They [the Egyptians] were to soldier on, rebuild their army in the hope that one day they would be strong enough to fight again and regain their lost territories and most of all, their honour and dignity. The determination of the Egyptian people to reinstate Nasser that provided him with a fresh mandate to carry on the fight can be viewed as a Churchillian refusal to contemplate defeat. The Egyptians, like other Arab peoples, insisted on calling their defeat merely a 'setback' – although some were more realistic and called it a 'national calamity' – and carried on with their defiant attitude.¹⁵⁵ The massive demonstrations following Nasser's resignation on June 9, 1967 which induced him to reconsider and stay in power, seem to contradict the suggestion that his charisma was destroyed. "Actually, these demonstrations took place under exceptional circumstances in which masses of people were gripped by a hysterical fear of disaster and an obsessive desire to hold on to the only certainty they knew in the form of Nasser's continued presence".¹⁵⁶ The defeat intensified the bitterness and disillusionment of Egyptians and they tended to blame Israel's supposed international backers, Britain and the United States. "The canard that they provided air cover for Israeli forces did not die easily".¹⁵⁷ Anwar El Sadat in his *SEARCH FOR IDENTITY* was later to write:

...All at once, the wheel of time had been turned back and the days of occupation by a big power were back again – only it would be the United States this time, not Britain. This was the clear implication of Nasser's address, which moved the people deeply, arousing their patriotic ardour, and restoring to them

¹⁵³Interview with Peter Mansfield, July, 1989, London.

¹⁵⁴Ali Sabri, reply to questionnaire, July, 1989, Cairo.

¹⁵⁵Interview with Prof. Ali Hillal Dessouki, June, 1988, London.

¹⁵⁶Ibid.

¹⁵⁷Interview with Peter Mansfield, July, 1989, London.

their capacity for rejection - their sharpest weapon down the centuries. The people were out to defy defeat, to declare their unwillingness to submit to any foreign power, however mighty; their armed forces had been defeated, but their will had not and could not ever be conquered. For seventeen hours the people wouldn't leave the streets of Cairo. They had forgotten everything - even food and drink and sleep and would think of nothing except to adhere to their unity and defy the will of the foreign power that had attempted to control them...¹⁵⁸

This was the outward manifestation of a nation's desperation at the moment of shattering defeat. The masses demanded that Nasser withdraw his resignation and remain in power. "The general feeling motivating the demonstrators was as much a sense of loyalty to the person of the *RAIS* as it was to the feeling of national unity in the face of uncertainty which hung over the political future of the country".¹⁵⁹ The vast majority of Egyptians would not countenance the *RAIS* relinquishing office and their massive demonstrations, only surpassed in size and intensity by those at Nasser's funeral three years later, demanded that he remain at the helm. "Though numbed and dazed by the war, and its immediate aftermath, the public insisted that the *RAIS* assume the role of 'resister'".¹⁶⁰ In effect, the popular demonstrations of June 9 and 10 gave Nasser "a new mandate of sorts"¹⁶¹ and with it, he went on to preside over the 'eradication of the traces of aggression'. "The charismatic relationship between him and the masses formed during the triumphant days of 1956 and 1959 could not be shattered overnight."¹⁶² For the ordinary Egyptian, Egypt's defeat could be explained in these terms. "There were really two states in Egypt before June 1967 : One was the state founded by Nasser (Revolutionary Nasserism) with all its accomplishments; the other was the state of bourgeois bureaucracy - the centers of power - which no doubt presented obstacles in the way of greater accomplishments by Nasserism. Thus, in restoring Nasser to the Presidency, the

¹⁵⁸Anwar El Sadat, *SEARCH OF IDENTITY*, Great Britain : William Collins, 1978, pp.217-218.

¹⁵⁹Interview with Peter Mansfield, July, 1989, London.

¹⁶⁰Interview with Sir Anthony Nutting, November, 1988, London.

¹⁶¹Ibid.

¹⁶²Interview with Fathy el Gouly, January, 1989, London.

masses invited the *RAIS* to seek and purge all those that had undermined Egypt's military performance in the 1967 War.

In analysing the events of June 9th, 1967 one inevitably has to inquire into the extent to which Nasserist values became an accepted part of Egyptian political culture. It is regarded that various aspects of Nasserist thought and practice greatly influenced Egyptian reaction on that fateful day. "One very crucial notion that Egyptians bore in mind while demonstrating for Nasser's continued leadership was that the *RAIS* has always made the themes of 'social justice, equality and the development of the individuals humanity' the core of his ideological message and activity".¹⁶³ This was something that Egyptians had always felt for and supported persistently. "Small wonder that, when an Egyptian is asked to single out the most important accomplishment of the Nasserist revolution, he usually points to the sense of dignity and the human and physical well-being which, he maintains, the revolution has enabled him and his countrymen to experience and enjoy."¹⁶⁴ These basic Nasserite values: Karamah (dignity) and Israr (persistence) influenced the public deeply and helped sustain Egypt through the difficult days of June 1967.

Sadik Abdul Hamid, a character in Najib Mahfuz's *AL MARAYA*, conveys the way in which an average Egyptian viewed the June 1967 War and how the leader and the nation managed to survive: Sadik Abdul Hamid was a man of some education who believed in the 'July 23 Revolution' and was willing to overlook its errors. When the 'catastrophe' happened on June 5, he was overcome with intense grief and despair; he wondered how everybody else managed to retain their sanity and not commit suicide. But then he recovered his composure and came to believe that the continuity of the revolution was the central issue: "The more he heard of the enemies' wish to liquidate the revolution the more firmly he became committed to it until he sincerely believed that the continuity of the revolution was more important than the recovery of the occupied Arab land, for what good is it to

¹⁶³Ibid.

¹⁶⁴Ali Sabri, reply to questionnaire, July, 1989, Cairo.

recover the land and lose ourselves?"¹⁶⁵

Beyond that level of belief, the public in the Arab world demonstrated their allegiance to Nasser and refused to consider his resignation. "They viewed him as a creature of historical forces who believed in Arab Nationalism based on Arab solidarity and on the idea that the Arabs form a single nation."¹⁶⁶ To the Arab masses, Nasser was the first Arab leader to succeed in transforming prior Arab ideas, longings and dreams into tangible reality. "He it was who bridged the chasm separating many Arab hopes from their fulfillment; he it was who took the decisions and supervised their implementation and, in so doing, selected the means and devised the actual plans of enforcement".¹⁶⁷ "By playing the historically decisive role of realizing earlier Arab hopes, he had in effect translated disembodied ideas into concrete realities, giving them in the process distinctive shape and specific form".¹⁶⁸ For, thanks to an Arab propensity to focus on objectives as abstractions to the neglect of their contents, the form of their ultimate embodiments, and the means of their attainment, most Arab nationalist ideas had remained amorphous until Nasser arrived on the scene. "By providing the leadership required for the achievement of these objectives, he had also provided shape and content to the institutions and systems through which they were achieved. To Nasser as midwife, then, Arab Nationalism owes not only the bringing into being, but also the conceptual contents and distinguishing structural features of its principal ideas".¹⁶⁹ "To see Nasser as an expression of the Arab nation and a symbol of its hopes is to understand not only the delirious welcomes with which the Syrian people greeted him in the days of the Union, but the hero welcome, after a recent military defeat, accorded him by the Sudanese people when he came to Khartoum in August 1967, and the nationwide outpouring of sorrow at his death seldom paralleled anywhere".¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁵Najib Mahfuz, *AL MARAYA*, Cairo : The American University of Cairo Press, 1972, p.196.

¹⁶⁶Interview with Fathy el Gouly, January, 1989, London.

¹⁶⁷Interview with Robert Stephens, November, 1988, London.

¹⁶⁸All Sabri, reply to questionnaire, July, 1989, Cairo.

¹⁶⁹Interview with Fathy el Gouly, January, 1989, London.

¹⁷⁰Interview with Sir Anthony Nutting, November, 1988, London.

5.7 CONCLUSION

Thus, the picture, as one has described it, proposes that the Arab defeat in the 1967 War was Nasser's darkest hour. But, in some ways it was also to prove his finest. From the beginning of the war Nasser had made no public utterances. But when he announced the ceasefire after his long silence, it came as a shock.¹⁷¹ It aroused anger and criticism of Nasser, bewilderment that the Egyptian army had been defeated so quickly.¹⁷² For Nasser, defeat was far worse than in 1956. His work of fifteen years, the liberation of Egypt from foreign troops, the establishment of Egyptian control of the Suez Canal, the rebuilding of national self confidence among the Egyptians and the Arabs, all seemed to have been brought to ruin in three disastrous days. In the prospects of a humiliating capitulation what he feared most was not the material loss but the breaking of the morale of the Arab national movement, "the enforced submission of a people who had dared to raise their heads in pride and independence and to seek a better life."¹⁷³ He had risked war above all because he believed that sooner or later the Arabs, and particularly Egypt, must turn and face the power of Israel or live forever at the mercy of Israel's political will and her supposed international backers.¹⁷⁴ "He had run the risk and failed. Nor was there the hope as in 1956 of snatching diplomatic victory from military defeat".¹⁷⁵ He believed that the United States had colluded with the enemy and actively assisting it¹⁷⁶ while the

¹⁷¹AL AHRAM, 8 June, 1967, pp.1-2; AL NAHAR, Beirut, 9 June, 1967, pp.1-2.

¹⁷²Ali Sabri, reply to questionnaire, July, 1989, Cairo.

¹⁷³Interview with Fathy el Gouly, January, 1989, London.

¹⁷⁴Interview with Sir Anthony Nutting, November, 1988, London.

¹⁷⁵Ibid.

¹⁷⁶Writing of May 1967, the Zionist writer Jon Kimche gives a sophisticated but plausible version of what actually happened. He says there were two American policies operating on two distinct levels: "Officially, Americans were correct in every way. They went along with the United Nations, with the British and the French, and endeavoured to find an international solution. But they were convinced that the United Nations would remain ineffective, and that all the British might succeed in doing was to get the Americans involved in a conflict in the Middle East...In secret talks which they had with Yariv and Amit, Israel's military and secret intelligence chiefs, the Pentagon and the CIA were satisfied that Israel could well take care of the situation as long as the great powers did not intervene. The Israelis were, therefore, informed on two distinct levels of the American position. Johnson and Rusk played their version of the Middle East charade with Eban, but they did not realize that Eban was taking it all

Soviet Union did nothing materially to stop them.¹⁷⁷ World opinion was no longer overwhelmingly on Egypt's side as it was in 1956

Faced with this situation, it is not surprising that, as the bad news came pouring in to Nasser, he declared that he was "ready to assume the entire responsibility" for the "setback". He announced that he had decided to give up all his official posts and every political role and became an ordinary citizen.¹⁷⁸ Even before he had finished speaking, there had begun another of those dramatic reversals of fortune that marked his career. As soon as they heard him announce his resignation, people in Cairo began to pour out into the streets and to appear at the windows of their houses shouting for Nasser to stay. "The noise was like a rising storm. A whole people seemed to be in mourning."¹⁷⁹ Tens of thousands gathered round the National Assembly chanting his name. It was estimated that approximately half a million people massed along the five miles from Nasser's home to the centre of Cairo to watch over Nasser during the night and make sure he would go to the National Assembly the next day to withdraw his resignation.¹⁸⁰ Millions more were reported to have poured in Cairo from all over Egypt to make sure that Nasser stayed.¹⁸¹

seriously and was aware of the other half of the American proposal. Helms (head of the CIA) told his Israeli colleagues that Israel would have to conjure up all of her inner strength to withstand pressures from outside. Even the Americans might find it necessary to join in these pressures, for they had to protect themselves at all costs against the suspicion of collusion - and they could do so only by ensuring that there was no collusion. But- and this was conveyed to Yariv rather than spelled out in as many words - if Israel wanted to have tangible results this time, she would have to be solid as a rock and not weaken before, during, or after the actual military encounter." Jon Kimche, PALESTINE OR ISRAEL : The Untold Story of Why we Failed, London : Constable, 1973, pp.257-258.

¹⁷⁷Heikal, SPHINKS AND THE COMMISSAR, op.cit., pp.196-199.

¹⁷⁸For full text of Nasser's resignation Broadcast, June 9, 1967 see Appendix I. Source: Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, editors, THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER : A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict, U.S.A: Viking books, 1984, pp.189-194.

¹⁷⁹Heikal, NASSER : Channel Four Political Documentary, op.cit., Part 3.

¹⁸⁰Interview with Robert Stephens, November, 1988, London; THE OBSERVER, 10th June, 1967 for his commentary and compare with the coverage of this story in the DAILY TELEGRAPH, London, pp.6-8.

¹⁸¹Ibid.

Many people outside Egypt, especially in the West, found this support for Nasser strange, and explicable only in terms of a stage-managed performance. Nasser had led the Egyptians to a national military disaster, yet they were not demanding his head but clamouring for him to stay. Moreover, if they had wanted to get rid of a dictator here was their chance – he was himself offering to go, but they would not let him. How could this be?

This puzzlement reflected partly the continuing failure of many foreigners to understand the nature of Nasser's relationship with the Egyptian people, the decisive element of consent mixed with the authoritarianism of his regime and the significance of what he had achieved inside Egypt itself, compared with his international activities which had chiefly attracted foreign attention. Egyptians did not judge Nasser simply by his success or failure as a military leader, however great his failure then was – and perhaps also the public was even then not fully aware of the extent of the defeat.¹⁸² He was rather the man who had overthrown the King, ended the British occupation, given Egypt full control of the Suez Canal, begun to build the High Dam, carried through the land reform and tried to control rents, build more factories and schools, brought clean water and electricity to many more villages, begun social insurance for workers and, within limits, given many more Egyptians a say in the running of their own affairs. However, this did not mean that Nasser and his regime were immune from criticism or even opposition.

To the less sophisticated majority, used to centuries of authoritarian or paternalistic rule, Nasser had become established as "the father of the nation".¹⁸³ Now, at a moment of calamity, the father figure was about to leave them to their fate. This emotional reaction was strengthened because people, including the more educated and politically conscious, saw Nasser as the symbol of resistance.¹⁸⁴ The Egyptian army had been defeated but not the nation as a whole.

¹⁸²Heikal, NASSER, Channel Four Political Documentary, op.cit., Part 3.

¹⁸³Interview with Robert Stephens, November, 1988, London.

¹⁸⁴Ibid.

The enemy was occupying a large tract of Egyptian territory, but the main part of the country was still intact and needed somehow to be defended. It was the situation of the Soviet Union and Stalin when the Germans reached the gates of Moscow, of Britain and Churchill after Dunkirk, though Egypt's military position was for the moment even more helpless. Egypt and the Arabs had lost a campaign but were not yet ready to surrender.

This was also the reaction all over the Arab world. For Nasser had become the symbol not only of Egyptian resistance but of Arab nationalism. His fall would seem the final proof of Arab defeat and humiliation, the ultimate satisfaction for those who wanted to break the spirit of Arab national revival. Even those who had opposed Nasser's policies were swept along on a wave of deep, spontaneous emotion in urging him not to resign. Perhaps there was also a conviction in this movement that, despite his mistakes and failings, Nasser was the only Arab leader of sufficient stature to deal with the situation in which Egypt and the Arab states now found themselves.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁵Interview with Peter Mansfield, October, 1988, London; and, with Sir Anthony Nutting, November, 1988, London.

CHAPTER SIX

A GENERALIZED MODEL ON CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

6.1 INTRODUCTION

An attempt to formulate a generalized model to clarify the concept and explain the phenomenon of charismatic political leadership has been long in the making. While working on a study of Nasser as a charismatic political leader, one utilized the concept of charisma in was the analysis of a particular case of political leadership.¹ Although the term 'charismatic leader' certainly seemed to have become common and even debased currency, scholarly and systematic scrutiny of the phenomenon as such seemed scarce.² These conditions tempted one to a lengthy exploratory detour into the terrain originally, but sketchily, mapped by Max Weber.³ However, since this thesis sought to examine some components of political leadership in general and charismatic political leadership in particular, its goal is to discover some generalizations pertaining to the emergence, consolidation and termination of charismatic leadership. The leadership of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic (1918-1970) served as a case study. The initial hypothesis that underlay this investigation were:

A- Firstly, charismatic political leadership emerges out of a situation of protracted societal stress or crisis of one kind or another - economic, political,

¹Perhaps the most prominent approach to leadership revolves around the concept of charisma. The charismatic leader is distinguished from other leaders by his capacity to inspire loyalty towards himself as the source of authority, apart from an established status. See Chapter I, Section One, pp. 64-73.

²Fouad Ajami, in an interview with the author, points out that "critical analysis of 'charismatic relationships' which he labels as being of the 'domain of legitimate political partisanship and activism' has been largely absent from political literature. An analysis of how leaders achieve such an effect, of the means by which and the conditions under which this kind of loyalty is generated and maintained, might give us a better intellectual grasp of charismatic leadership". New York, May, 1989.

³Chapter Two, pp. 74-77, seeks to examine the concept 'Charismatic leader' in Western Political Philosophy. The emphasis here is on the contemporary meaning of the concept.

religious, psychological, etc. - frequently in combination. These circumstances and the failure of the existing structure to solve societal problems ultimately leads to the erosion of their legitimacy. A condition of institutional vacuum thus paves the way for the charismatic leader to assert his power. In other words, the impact of the charismatic leaders is always in the context of the circumstances of the country's history.

B- A political leader with charismatic ability (as perceived by his followers) can accomplish certain aims and objectives embedded in the cultural, political and ideological milieu of a nation.

C- A charismatic leader affects a value transformation on the basis of the legitimacy flowing from the nascent charismatic relationship; increasingly, he exercises a diffuse and intense influence over the normative orientations of the masses. As the new values, perspectives and policies of the leader find acceptance among the masses, they can be said to become subject to him and he becomes their charismatic leader. In view of the reciprocal relationship, the notion that the charismatic "...is always the creation of his followers"⁴ is a half truth in the Nasser context. It is necessary to add: to the extent that the leader has succeeded in imparting his values to his followers: They are his creation.

D- Two independent variables perceived as extremely important in understanding charismatic political leadership are personal traits and situational performance.

E- Charismatic potential develops in a leader by a certain merger of his personal traits and his performance style. This merger produces a state of dormant charisma. Dormant charisma flowers when it receives favourable popular support and becomes activated charisma.

F- The effectiveness of charismatic leadership depends on the leader's ability to maintain the charismatic bond between himself and the masses.

Since the objective of this thesis was to develop an understanding of the nature, function, and scope of political leadership, it is imperative to outline what is meant by the phenomenon of political leadership. By this, one has to provide an *ad hoc* definition and comment on the elusive nature of the subject.⁵ Following

⁴Richard Fagen, "Charismatic Authority and the Leadership of Fidel Castro", THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY, Vol.18, 1965, pp.275-284.

this, one aims to revise the concept of charismatic political leadership in the light of the case study. Secondly, the identification of charismatic political leaders merits some mention. And finally, and most important of all, generalizations are drawn on the charismatic personality.

6.2 WHAT IS POLITICAL LEADERSHIP?

Leadership has an elusive, mysterious quality about it. It is easy to recognize, hard to describe, difficult to practice, and almost impossible to create in others on demand. Perhaps no other topic has attracted as much attention from observers, participants, and philosophers - with so little agreement as to the basic facts.⁶ It cannot even be adequately defined. Leadership, like happiness, success, or failure, means different things to different people. Frequently, the leader's themselves are not even aware that they are leading. One of the constant issues in leadership discussion is whether leaders are born or made. Some individuals would have almost certainly left their stamp on history, no matter what their circumstances. Napoleon's influence on war, law, and society; Churchill's impact on the Second World War and British society; Nasser's legacy on Arab Nationalism, Pan-Arabism and Middle East political geography - it is hard to imagine that these men would have lived unnoticed lives, no matter what their situations. In contrast, many leaders seem captive to their time and situation. Perhaps competitive or charismatic leadership is merely an accidental collision between an appropriate person and a precipitating environment.⁷

⁵It is recognized that the manifest aspects of political leadership and the relevance of numerous and complex latent facts, have made it difficult to agree on what the concept is and does. As such, political leadership, like other concepts in social science, is an essentially contestable one.

⁶See Chapter One, pp. 8-10, for a discussion on the intellectual need for a comprehensive perspective on political leadership.

⁷The Marxist school on authority, with its emphasis on social determinism, proposes that 'great men are a necessary response to a social need, and that they would always be present. In Engel's own words: "That a particular man, and no other, emerges at a definite time in a given country is naturally a pure chance. But even if we eliminate him there is always a need for a substitute, and the substitute is found *tout bien que mal*, in the long run he is sure to be found. That Napoleon - this particular Corsican - should have been the military dictator made necessary by the exhausting wars of the

But only the most cynical observer can accept that analysis. The rest of us can see leadership happening routinely all around us or, equally perversely can see the impact of its absence. In pervasive and all too common contrasts, people in positions of power who do not provide the necessary guidance prove just as vividly, by the destructive nature of their passivity, the relevance of the concept of leadership: i.e. 'any action that focuses resources toward a beneficial end'.

Leadership is as old as mankind. It is universal, and inescapable. It exists everywhere; in formal organization and informal bodies such as mass demonstrations. Leadership is, for all intents and purposes, a salient feature of organization. For leadership to exist, of course, there has to be a group; but wherever a group exists, there is always a form of leadership.⁸ Among the various aspects of leadership, political leadership, in particular in the nation state, occupies a special position. It is not that it is intrinsically different in kind or character from leadership in other organizations, but it is rather more visible and, ostensibly at least, vastly more important since it encompasses and incorporates many functions. Within each nation, political leadership can command and reach out widely and extensively; and the rulers of the most important nations have a resonance that carries an international level, some in areas and in a limited number of fields, continue to depend on the leadership of the most important states, while at the regional framework of public life. If one reduces political leaders, both at home and abroad, what remains once everything else has been erased; they are the most universal, the most recognized, the most talked about elements of political life.

Given this recognized importance of political leadership, it is *prima facie* surprising that a general analysis of the phenomenon should be so little advanced.⁹ There has been change in, and indeed a marked awakening to, the

French Republic – that was a matter of chance..." Quoted in Sidney Hook, *THE HERO IN HISTORY*, Boston : Boston Press, 1943, pp.78-79.

⁸Given that this thesis attempts to show that leadership is a behavioural concept, the definition of leadership must therefore be behavioural i.e. defining leadership within the context of organized groups. See Chapter One, Section One, pp. 19-21.

importance to the subject from the mid 1970's. In addition to this, there is no generally accepted definition of the concept, a characteristic that seems to apply also to leadership in general.¹⁰ There is an effort to survey the field, to map out the directions in which the study of political leadership needs to be undertaken; but there is limited concentration on what might be the core element of the concept. Perhaps this is because there is concern not to lose sight of the many ways in which leadership should be examined.

Yet it is not permissible to undertake broad, indeed general, studies of a subject without attempting to delineate as precisely as possible, the boundaries of that subject. Thus, a definition of leadership must be sought even if, because it has to be general, it is of necessity rather vague and may demand further elaboration over time. However, a definition needs to be given in order to clarify the distinction between what should be described as the core, the central aspect of leadership, and elements that are tributaries of or dependent on this core.¹¹

Therefore, what is political leadership? It is manifestly and essentially a phenomenon of power: it is power because it consists of the ability of the one or few who are the top to make others do a number of things (positively or negatively) that they would not or at least might not have done. But, it is not, of course, just any kind of power. It appears to be power exercised from the top down, so to speak: the leader is, in various ways, 'above' the nation (in the case of national political leadership) and can 'guide' the rest of the citizens. However, leaders often guide as well as follow their masses. It might also be added that this ability of the leader is also durable and indeed, in some cases, can be exercised for a long period. Thus it seems possible to define political leadership, and specifically national political leadership, as the power exercised by one or a few

⁹See Chapter One, Section One, pp. 8-9 for a discussion on this aspect.

¹⁰James MacGregor Burns in his analysis reflects on the lack of a general theory on political leadership and the temptations to resort to the hypothesizing of a limitless assortment of psychological, social, and political variables in the shaping of political leadership and the making of history.

¹¹See Chapter One, Section One, p. 23, for a contingency model and a set of typologies on the multidisciplinary perspectives of leadership.

individuals to direct members of the nation towards action.

The potential immensity of such a power of leaders is, of course, immediately apparent: this indeed already provides an insight into what might be one of the reasons why national political leadership poses fundamental questions about its origins, its mode of operation and its effect. Indeed, the potential, and on occasion the actual immensity of the power, also reveals in part why, at first sight surprisingly, political theorists have not studied leadership directly and systematically. Instead, the study of leadership, especially within 18th and 19th Century political theory has tended to be viewed in terms of an examination of the mechanisms by which the actions of leaders would be sufficiently constrained so as not to encroach unduly upon the lives of citizens.

Yet, after a lot of time and effort has been devoted to studying leadership, the time may have come to consider all aspects of leadership, not merely in order to ensure that the lives of citizens are more secure but in order to see how the power of leaders can be positively harnessed for the good of mankind. For if the power of leaders can be exercised to control, dominate and subjugate, it can surely be exercised to uplift, improve and develop. As it is manifest that the condition of mankind deserves amelioration, and as leadership happens to be a power that can affect mankind, it is clearly valuable – indeed, imperative – to see how this power can help to bring about a 'better' state of affairs in our societies. This is particularly so since political leadership appears to be one of the clearest ways in which men and women can be induced to work jointly for the improvement of their lot; leadership seems able, by virtue of what it is, both to bring citizens together in a concerted effort and to do so over time by gradual achievements aimed at a common goal. Thus, while leadership may be a negative tool, it can also be one of the most powerful means of leading to collective action, not just severally and in a direct manner, but in a common endeavour over substantial periods: it can thus result in development for the whole society.

In the course of the last few decades, views about political leadership have begun to change. They are changing in part because the role of leadership itself has altered as a result of the major emphasis given, in the contemporary world, to social and economic development; they are changing also because, as a result, leadership has come to be viewed more positively, more constructively, than in the past; and they are changing, though more slowly, because a close examination of the impact of leaders has made the traditional ideological dichotomy between 'good' and 'bad' leaders seem increasingly unrealistic, as increasingly realistic as the thesis that is held by those who feel that 'leaders do not matter' since they are only agents of history.

Perhaps the most important changes result from the fact that in democratic societies, leadership has come to be concerned principally with the improvement of social and economic conditions. Of course, this role of leadership is neither entirely new nor wholly exclusive. In the past, too, rulers have had to be concerned, to some extent, with the economy and with social life. This economic and social role was not viewed as a primary, let alone principal function of leaders, however; more important, it was not viewed in the context of a dynamic process of development of society.¹² By and large, up to and including the nineteenth century, the most important problems for leaders was to consolidate their authority and power, to maintain peace at home and to ensure that the country was protected externally. For some, the maintenance of internal order had to be the main preoccupation; for others – probably the majority – the main task was to defend their country against the ambitions of other rulers – or else to attempt to increase the size of their territory.¹³

Of course, neither of these functions have disappeared in the Twentieth Century. International relations, peaceful or not, continue to be a major preoccupation for many leaders, and not merely those of the largest nations. As a matter of fact, the

¹²This is especially true with the penetration of the state into society and the assertion of functions and responsibility of political leaders.

¹³See Chapter One, Section Two, pp. 37–45 for a discussion on some of the functions and preoccupations of political leaders.

feeling remains that involvement in world affairs is in some sense more 'exalted' than the 'mere' preoccupation of the whole area covered by the social and economic affairs.¹⁴ Moreover, the 'flight into foreign affairs' is not merely the result of a feeling that to become a leader is to be able to deal with world problems, or indeed that it is necessary to fight colonialism, imperialism or even communism on a world front, as Nasser did. The concern with foreign affairs is also an opportunity, consciously realized or not, systematically or not, to achieve results on the home front by providing a diversion from the daily preoccupations of citizens and by fostering a sense of national identity and pride in the country's achievements.¹⁵

The reason why external and internal purposes have often been mixed is in large part from the fact that leaders have been unable as ever to ensure internal order and maintain themselves in office.¹⁶ The prospects of military coups and other disturbances have affected large numbers of Third World countries during the recent period. Thus, many a leader in these countries has been displaced by a coup or faced some sort of violent disturbance.

Yet, while foreign affairs and internal order continue to be subjects of major preoccupation among contemporary rulers, the main focus of attention has been on universal social and economic problems. These problems are not merely at the centre of the preoccupations of leaders; nor is the lack of concern with development widely interpreted as the main reason why leaders fall. The most crucial point is that social and economic development is viewed as a process which has to take place at a sustained rate if it is to achieve results, a process that, at

¹⁴For a discussion of this in the case of Nasser, see Chapter III, Section one, pp 157-170.

¹⁵Sir Anthony Nutting, in an interview with the author emphasized that "for all his foreign involvements, Nasser helped to give Egypt and the Arabs that sense of dignity which for him was the hallmark of independent nationhood. For despite every reverse that he and the people suffered, Egypt and the whole Arab world would have been the poorer, on spirit as well as material progress, without the dynamic inspiration of his leadership". November, 1988, London.

¹⁶It is recognized that these two factors need to be separated in democratic countries, in contrast to the majority of Third World countries.

the same time, creates tensions while development is taking place. Modern political leaders do not choose to be concerned with the continuous improvement of their societies; they have to take this concern on board or they may not stay in office unless they hold power in a coercive way¹⁷. The population often demands that their lot be improved and, even if they do not, the leaders themselves believe that it is their duty to achieve social and economic progress. This view of leadership as a latent force, to be called or summoned into being by a collective impulse only appears when a collective desire has reached an overwhelming strength. At those times, the desire is not only keenly felt but also personified. It stands before the eyes of the masses in a concrete, plastic and individual shape. The intensity of the collective wish is embodied in the leader.¹⁸

Almost certainly, this change in the principal role of leaders provoked the transformation of attitudes towards leadership that has been noticeable in the course of the last few decades. For if leaders are to be essentially concerned with the 'cure' of social and economic ills, and if this role entails the continuance, guidance and direction of the population, it is simply not possible to dismiss leaders as unimportant. On the contrary: leadership has to be viewed as continuously playing a positive part in developing society. Efforts have therefore to be made to ensure that leaders do fulfil this positive role. This entails, in the first instance, a precise determination of the personal qualities and institutional support that are appropriate.¹⁹

It is understandable that judgements on leaders and on leadership should have so often been negative in the past and even to the present day. So many rulers have been tyrants and despots that the natural reaction has been to try to reduce their power by setting up institutions that acted as many hurdles against encroachments

¹⁷For the motivations of leadership, see Chapter One, Section One, pp. 31-34.

¹⁸E. Gonzales, CUBA UNDER CASTRO : The Limits of Charisma, Boston : Houghton, 1977, pp.23-27; Orrin E. Klapp's, SYMBOLIC LEADERS, Chicago : Aldine Press, 1964, p.23.

¹⁹This thesis is developed by F.I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics : An Attempt to Clear Away Leadership", AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, September, 1967, Vol.61, pp.629-47; Also see Chapter One, Section One, pp.

by the 'executive' power. Consistent with this view, the prevailing effort was directed towards discovering how people could ensure their protection against leadership, not towards determining how leaders could be made best use of.²⁰

Max Weber's model of authority and its analysis helped to change this approach. In the special case of societies in crisis, the German sociologist showed that leaders could be the central point of a new legitimacy. In this he went further than even those who recognized that some exceptional leaders could play a crucial part in helping to bring about the new institutions of the state. For Rousseau's legislator was merely a catalyst; he embodied the views of the people, was better than the people, perhaps his function was to make the population see the light. Weber's charismatic leader genuinely constructed the polity.²¹ He brought together what was divided into many fragments and what, without him, would have remained in fragments. However, Weber's standpoint of the national saviour was partial, because it was concerned only with the extraordinary periods of crisis during which legitimacy had broken down.²²

It may seem unrealistic to claim that the vision of the ideal rulers emerges from the 'ugly mistakes' that occurred in the Twentieth Century with respect to some leaders. Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin are names associated with excesses only; so are the names of the dictators who emerged in the Third World. But other leaders have more than compensated for these mistakes; in addition to Roosevelt, Churchill and Nehru, even some of the more ruthless leaders such as Mao, and some of the more humane 'populists' such as Nasser and Tito, have contributed to the build-up of a composite image, indeed of an 'ideal-type, an ideal type which the reality of contemporary leaders only approximates, but whose characteristics can be identified.²³ This identification is essential because it makes it possible

²⁰See D.D. Searing, "Models and Images of Man and Society in Leadership Theory", JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Feb, 1969, Vol.30, pp.30-1.

²¹See Chapter Two, for details on how the charismatic leader constructs his polity.

²²See Chapter Three, Section One, pp. 121-126; Also Hans H. Toch, "Crisis Situations and Ideological Revolution", PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, Spring 1956, pp.53-67.

²³Joel S. Migdal, "Vision and Practice : The Leader, The State, and the Transformation of Society", INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, January,

to see what personal qualities and institutional types of support are needed if leadership is to fulfil the continuous and positive role that social and economic development – indeed, the survival of the world – manifestly require.²⁴

Lenin once said that the energy of the working class had to be harnessed for the revolution, and that the party, like the pistons of a steam engine, was the means by which this energy could be stored and provide maximum power. A similar remark could be made about leadership. What is required is the discovery of the mechanisms by which the energy of leaders can best be used to the advantage of mankind – not so much by building girders or other protective arrangements, but by finding an outlet and a direction in which the mind, and also the emotions – indeed, the whole personality of leaders – can most profitably be used.²⁵

6.3 THE CONCEPT OF CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERS

A scholar who proposes to identify his research with a concept that has been attacked as ambiguous, that has been seriously questioned as an analytic tool, and that has been considerably debased in popular usage must somehow come to terms with the controversy that has surrounded it. Of the many concepts contemporary social science owes to Max Weber, that of charisma may well be one of the most controversial. Since I am more interested in analyzing a particular type of political leadership than in adding to the elaborate exegesis already surrounding the work of Weber, the question arises as to why I should have chosen the route of rashness rather than of discretion. To analyze the phenomenon that interests me – which I have called charismatic political leadership – I might alternatively have minted a new term, if not necessarily a new concept, as yet untainted by prior

1988, Vol.9, 1, pp.33–36.

²⁴See Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Introduction : Political Leadership from a Comparative Perspective", INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, April, 1988, Vol.9, 2, pp.91–94.

²⁵See Yehezkel Dror, "Visionary Political Leadership : On Improving a Risky Requisite," INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol.9, No.1, January, 1988.

associations. The reason for this choice is fairly simple. I happen to feel that the discipline of political science is already overburdened with overlapping concepts and terms and that restraint rather than inventiveness is in order. Of the conceptual artillery, 'charismatic leadership' most closely approximates the particular political process with which I proposed to deal.

We associate the notion of charismatic leadership with Weber's now classic classification of authority into three ideal types on the basis of their claims to legitimacy. The first type, traditional authority, is derived from 'an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions'. Legal or rational authority is based upon the belief in the legality of rules and on the right of those who occupy posts by virtue of those rules to issue commands. Charismatic authority differs from the other types in two fundamental respects. Traditional and legal rational authority are institutionalized in belief systems and are therefore vested in the role rather than in the person. In contrast, the locus of charismatic authority is in the capacity of a particular person to rouse and maintain belief in himself and his mission as the source of authority.²⁶

Charismatic authority is therefore highly personal. It follows that traditional and legal-rational authority are relatively enduring, whereas charismatic authority is transitory and unstable, being contingent upon the particular person and his continued ability to inspire faith in himself as the fount of authority. While the belief systems underlying the former types provide the legitimate bases for the enactment of leadership roles within them, it is the exercise of charismatic leadership that legitimizes and sustains charismatic authority in this sense, charismatic leadership can be considered the 'purest' form of leadership, for it serves to create the very authoritative component of the belief system upon which it rests.²⁷

²⁶See Chapter Two for Weber's classification of authority, pp. 87-88, figures 1, 2 and 3.

²⁷Ibid., p. 90.

A close reading of Weber makes it clear that he, no less than contemporary students of leadership, recognized that leadership is a relational phenomenon, involving the interaction of leader and followers towards goals and within the context of situations. As Weber emphasizes repeatedly, it is not necessarily what the leader is but how he is perceived by his followers. That is decisive for the validity of charisma. What is alone important is how the individual is actually regarded by those subjects to charismatic authority. Many may feel called to leadership but few, after all, are chosen. What a leader is and does - his personality and actions - may help to shape follower reactions. But crucial to their responses to his call is that which they see in and feel about him. Between an aspiring leader's claim and its acceptance by potential followers are two important mediating factors. One is what he projects and they perceive as desirable in him - his 'image' in the current jargon. Insofar as charisma can be seen as a quality of an individual, it lies in his capacity to project successfully, an image of himself as an extraordinary leader.²⁸

Not mentioned by Weber but essential in understanding the charismatic relationship and especially its projective-perceptual dimension is a second mediating factor. This is the conceptions of the desirable and the extraordinary in a leader shared by members of the group or the society for which leadership is claimed. Since groups and societies can differ in their dominant cultural definitions of preferred leadership qualities, it is not surprising that the attributes of charismatic leaders have varied among societies and among groups within societies.²⁹

It can be argued that what has been asserted so far does not yet adequately

²⁸The cultivation of Nasser's image in terms of the appeal of Arab Nationalism is discussed in Chapter Three, Section Two, pp. 228-241.

²⁹Dennis Kavanagh, "Crisis, Charisma and British Political Leadership : Winston Churchill", Paper delivered at Ninth World Congress of Political Science, Montreal, Aug. 1973; Dankwart A. Rustow, "Ataturk as Founder of a State", in *PHILOSOPHERS AND KINGS : Studies in Leadership*, ed., Dankwart A. Rustow, New York : George Brazillion, 1970, p.209.

discriminate between leadership in general and its charismatic variant. All leadership is relational and is similarly mediated through projections and perceptions of an aspirant leader's claims, attributes, actions, and potential for action and through cultural values relevant to leadership. What then distinguishes these projective-perceptual and cultural aspects of the followers' acceptance of a leader in the charismatic relationship from those same aspects of followers acceptance in any leadership relationship?

What is taken to be the core of Weber's concept implicitly distinguishes charismatic leadership from other leadership in both the affectual or emotional dimension and the cognitive dimension. Admittedly, it can be argued that any emotion or affect is a matter of intensity or degree. Nonetheless, a consideration of some of the emotional responses called forth by or directed toward leaders suggests that there is a qualitative distinction between what might superficially be considered merely different degrees or intensities of the same type of affect.³⁰

Leaders tend to elicit the emotions symbolized by affection and popular leaders can arouse them to a high degree. I would argue that the affect denoted by awe and reverence is not merely an extension of affection and admiration but is also different in kind. Such emotions - devotions, awe, reverence, and, above all, blind faith - are what the charismatic leader generates in his followers. Thus, while the charismatic relationship is far from unique in the fact of an emotional bond between leader and followers, the components of this emotional bond are peculiar to it.³¹

An examination of the cognitive dimension, i.e. the terms in which the leader is perceived, suggests that here also there is a marked distinction between

³⁰See James V. Downton, Jr. "Charisma as a Psychological Exchange", in *REBEL LEADERSHIP: Commitment and Charisma in the Revolutionary Process*, New York: The Free Press, 1973, pp.222-226.

³¹Dorothy Emmet, *FUNCTION, PURPOSE AND POWERS*, New York: Macmillan, 1958, p.242; Ann Ruth Willner and Dorothy Willner, "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders", *ANNALS*, 358, 1965, pp.77-88.

charismatic leadership and other leadership relationships. Even a highly popular leader can afford rather few errors of judgement in the eyes of his followers (unless he holds power in a coercive system) if popularity and support are not to fall away. In the charismatic relationship, once it has been achieved, the leader is relatively immune from such constraints as long as the relationship prevails. In the cognitive dimension, this relationship involves abdication of choice and of judgement by followers and the surrender of the mandate to choose and judge the leader.³²

In these terms, the leader is perceived as somehow more than human, possessing seemingly supernatural gifts of heroism. He is seen as endowed with magical powers, emotionally he is tendered responses appropriate to a demigod, cognitively he is perceived as a demigod. It is not difficult to delineate in contemporary terms the elements entering into this perception and to indicate the basic attributes the leader has for his following. This cognitive dimension can be broken down into its descriptive, normative, and prescriptive components (i.e. what is, what should be, what should be done). By his followers, the charismatic leader is held to be uniquely capable of cognitively structuring or restructuring the world. His orientations are their orientations. For them, it is his existential definitions of past and present, his normative visions of the future, and his prescriptions for action they accept. It therefore can be inferred that they perceive him as outstanding in wisdom, outstanding in presence, and possessing the power to bring into being the goals they share.³³

Here can be brought in other elements of the interaction process in leadership: goal, and situation, as they impinge on the leader-follower relationship. The charismatic leader's proclamation of his goal or mission may play no small part

³²Alexander Mitscherlich, "Changing Patterns of Authority : A Psychiatric Interpretation" in Lewis J. Edinger (ed.) POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETIES, New York : John Wiley & Sons, 1967, pp.26-58.

³³See Edward A. Shils, "Charisma, Order, and Status", AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol.30, No.2, April, 1965, pp.201-203; Also Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman, "Self Portrait of the Fascist Agitator", in Alvin Gouldner (ed.) STUDIES IN LEADERSHIP, New York : Harper & Brothers, 1959, p.99.

in initially generating the charismatic relationship. Insofar as specification of goals can be seen as instrumental in the development of any leadership relationship, in this respect it is not a discriminating factor. However, once the relationship is attained, there is a difference. Then it is undeniable that it is the leader who sets the goals and selects the means. He can change them at will, even into quite opposite ones than those initially specified, without necessarily losing support, as long as the relationship holds. It might be noted in passing that the goals of charismatic leaders are generally expressed in universalistic and transcendental terms and in such fashion as to seem to incorporate the more limited and particularistic goals of various groups of followers.³⁴

Situation also play a major role in the generation of the charismatic relationship, as they do for leader-follower relationships in general. Charismatic affect in followers may initially arise in part because the leader can identify their situations in ways that best satisfy their emotional needs.³⁵ Here again, however, once the charismatic relationship comes into existence, the leader's definitions of subsequent situations becomes article of faith for the followers. As long as the relationship holds, reality for the followers is what the leader declares is to be because it is he who declares it so.³⁶

The maintenance of the charismatic relationship may well depend upon the continued ability to provide 'proofs' or 'miracles'.³⁷ It may be argued, however, that the strongest proof for the existence of such a relationship is the acceptance by a following of the leader's definition of an empirical situation that is manifestly at variance with the definition that would be provided by a non follower or by the hypothetical omniscient, impartial observer. The discrepancy

³⁴Hadley Cantril, *THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS*, New York : John Wiley & Sons, 1963, p.64.

³⁵For a discussion on the situational approach to Political Leadership, see Chapter One, Section Two, pp. 47-49.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 48.

³⁷Max Weber, *THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION*, Translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons: New York : Oxford University Press, 1947, p.358.

between a given 'reality' and what the leader can make it appear to be for his followers is the ultimate test of his specifically charismatic hold on them.³⁸

A charismatic relationship can exist between a leader and his followers without the leader's attaining formal political power or office, as might be exemplified by Gandhi. A charismatic relationship may arise between a leader already in public office and sizable segments of his political public only in the course of his career in office. The 'signs' of charismatic appeal may not even precede a leader's accession to office; in fact, his behaviour in office may serve as one of the means of generating charismatic affect. A contemporary example of this is Ronald Reagan who was initially Governor of California and later President of the United States of America. A charismatic leader may come to power by plebiscitary means, but does not necessarily have to do so. A charismatic leader may, and frequently does, have a revolutionary impact upon the beliefs and behaviour of a small group of followers initially and subsequently upon a larger following. Nevertheless, this does not mean that a charismatic leader is necessarily a revolutionary leader in the sense of attaining office or formal power by revolutionary means; although he may do so. Nor, conversely, does entry into office through revolutionary or other nonplebiscitary means signify the existence of a charismatic relationship extending beyond the circle of the leader and his immediate followers.³⁹

The distinctions made above may be illustrated from an example among national leaders of this century. The case of Nasser exemplifies respectively pre-accession and post-accession generation of charisma by so called revolutionary leaders. Nasser rose to public office through a military career and did not initially gain office through genuine plebiscites. Nasser was initially known merely as one of a group of officers who toppled the Egyptian monarchy. Only later did it become apparent that he had been the mainspring of the coup.

³⁸Stanley Clark, "Toward a Psychology of Charisma : The Innovation Viewpoint of Robert Tucker", PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS, 23, 1968, pp.1163-1166.

³⁹Judith M. Brown, GANDHI'S ROAD TO POWER : Indian Politics, 1915-1922, London : Cambridge University Press, 1972, p.346.

Meanwhile, General Mohammed Naguib, because of his seniority and prestige, had been co-opted to serve as the apparent leader of the new regime. It was he who garnered support for it and seemed to have captured the popular imagination. Yet in the course of time, Nasser in his own right would appear to have generated charismatic support from significant sectors of the Egyptian population, particularly after the takeover of the Suez Canal.⁴⁰

The example of Nasser and the development of charisma in the course of office bring up the problem of mass communications and 'managed' charisma, especially in regard to single party regimes. In the case of Nasser in which a political leader obtained power through a coup and proceeded to control mass media whose resources were then exploited for widespread glorification of the leader, it might be argued that even though charismatic appeal or its appearance results therefore, this is 'spurious' or 'manufactured' charisma.⁴¹

Such a distinction is important mainly for examining the strategies of charismatic legitimation, i.e. the methods by which a leader gains and sustains charismatic support from a large following. It is not relevant for identifying the existence of such a relationship. Just as leaders can attain formal office in different ways, the phenomenon of charismatic leadership can arise in many ways under different sets of circumstances. Whether its genesis is fortuitous or contrived is irrelevant to the fact of its existence, although relevant to the methodological problems that would be involved in determining that fact. Mass communication media can serve as a powerful means for promoting charismatic appeal, but it is doubtful whether they can create it where there is no basis for its generation.⁴² Thus, to assert that charisma or the charismatic relationship

⁴⁰Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, *NASSER, Political Documentary on British Television*, Channel Four Programme, 14th November, 1986. Recorded Footage.

⁴¹For a discussion on this aspect see Joseph Bensman and Michael Givant, "Charisma and Modern : The Use and Abuse of a Concept", *SOCIAL RESEARCH*, 57, Winter, 1975, pp.571-80; Also Ronald Glassman, "Legitimacy and Manufactured Charisma", *SOCIAL RESEARCH*, 69, Winter, 1975, pp.615-636.

⁴²Glassman, "Legitimacy and Manufactured Charisma", *op.cit.*, p.621; John Waite Bowers and Michael M. Osborn, "Attitudinal Effects of Metaphors in Persuasive Speeches", *SPEECH MONOGRAPHS*, 33, June 1966, pp. 127-55.

cannot exist in a modern society because it is created by or becomes the victim of modern technology is to commit the logical fallacy of confusing a phenomenon with the means of its genesis. One finds similarly specious reasoning in arguments to the effect that charismatic leadership is to a greater extent a phenomenon of the pre-industrial world, of the pre-Cartesian West, or of parts of Asia and Africa today, because it has been peculiar to political milieu conditioned exclusively or to a large extent by magical, ritualistic, or mystically religious elements. Certainly there have been close linkages, if not identities, in much of the past world and in parts of the contemporary world between the realm of politics and that of religion or magic. It does not necessarily follow, however, that a divorce between politics on the one hand and religion or magic on the other automatically confers on religion exclusive custody of mysticism, ritual and emotion.⁴³

Another logical fallacy is involved in the over-identification of the phenomenon with its possible consequences and the subsequent reasoning from the latter to the former. We are accustomed to thinking of the charismatic leader as typically mobilizing a following in opposition to a given order and in assertion and pursuit of the possibility of a new order. Yet there are leaders who generate a charismatic relationship and seek to preserve a prevailing order from dissolution. In other words, there can also be charismatic leaders of nativistic movements, as exemplified by the Mahdi of the Sudan.⁴⁴

6.4 THE IDENTIFICATION OF CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

By defining and clarifying the concept of charismatic political leadership one has attempted to provide the foundation of the conceptualized phenomenon. In order to make the concept operational for the purpose of comparative empirical research,

⁴³Thomas Dow Jr., "The Role of Charisma in Modern African Development", SOCIAL FORCES, 46, March, 1969, p.337.

⁴⁴See Richard H. Dekmejian and Margaret J. Wyszomiski, "Charismatic Leadership in Islam : The Mahdi of the Sudan" in COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY, 14, No.2, 1972, pp.193-214.

further guidelines are needed. This section is therefore devoted to the problem of providing guidelines or indicators that can be used to recognize the phenomenon of charismatic political leadership and to identify charismatic political leaders.

The most direct evidence of political charisma might be obtained by survey research directed toward ascertaining the responses of a public to a political leader. One of the many advantages of survey research is the opportunity it affords to discriminate among types of perceptions and their content. Another, depending upon the sample of respondents selected, is the possibility of eliciting the distribution of responses, charismatic or otherwise, among various segments of a public by correlating them with other items of data obtained from the respondents.

I am not aware of surveys specifically designed to test the presence or absence of charismatic political appeal. However, surveys that generally test public attitudes towards political leaders can serve as a useful source of what might be called 'charismatic responses', especially if they include open ended questions whose answers can be coded in accordance with criteria designating charismatic content. It is often difficult or, in some instances, impossible to undertake research of this type on contemporary leaders, not to mention those who have passed into history. Nonetheless other kinds of material gathered for other purposes or stored in government or historical archives can also be a fruitful source of empirical data on charismatic responses.

Less direct evidence, but also useful, are those items found in accounts of scholars, reliable journalists, and others who have had opportunities to observe directly the responses of particular public statements recorded in such accounts and can testify to the incidence, if not the extent, of charismatic perceptions of a political leader. This is particularly true of statements whose content suggests imputations of powers or qualities not found in most leaders. Retroactive evidence of the existence of charismatic appeal of a leader can be obtained in many

ways from former followers. Their convictions seem relatively unshaken by interpretations to the contrary by individuals whose knowledge they respect. "The disinclination of sometime charismatic followers to recognize flaws in the judgement of their leaders is illustrated by the opinion held by such people who claim that Nasser's mistakes could be attributed to the fact that he was misled by his political assistants".⁴⁵

Secondary evidence on the presence of charisma includes the responses of large audiences gathered to hear a speech of a political leader or evidence of demonstrations. One is particularly dependent upon the acuteness, eye for detail, and discriminatory powers of the observer and recorder. It is important, even though difficult in some contexts, to discriminate between spontaneous responses and directed or semi-coerced responses and between enthusiastic reactions of approval to statements on the 'issue' and charismatic acclamation of the person of the leader.⁴⁶

In attempting to discriminate between enthusiastic responses on issues and frenzied acclamation of a leader, such acclamation from audiences, many of whose members understand the 'language' in which a political leader addresses them, might seem significant. However, it is necessary to distinguish between societies and situations in which enthusiasms for, acclamation of, or signs of deference toward a leader are the traditional response to the appearance of any leader and those in which they are not. More reliable indicators of a leader's charismatic hold on a following are examples of actions they have performed at his bidding or on his behalf which run counter to some of their most cherished values.⁴⁷

Reactions to the possibility of the death of a leader can serve as indicators of beliefs in his indispensability. The emotional intensity of responses to the death

⁴⁵Interview with Peter Mansfield, July, 1989, London.

⁴⁶Leland Bowie and R. Hrair Dekmejian, "Nasir's Role and Legacy I and II", THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, Vol.30, No.2, Spring 1976, pp.142-172.

⁴⁷Wilton Wynn, NASSER OF EGYPT : The Search for Dignity, Cambridge, Mass : Arlington Beaks, 1969, pp.134-149.

of a leader, especially when succession is institutionally provided for, might suggest the degree to which his person has been seen as transcending his occupancy of office. There are admittedly problems of isolating the charismatic content of responses to the death of a leader brought about by accident or assassination. The complex emotions generated in many societies by violent death or deliberate murder, including those of shock and horror, can complicate the analysis of emotional responses such as grief, loss, and a sense of abandonment. Martyrdom is not equivalent to charisma, although it may serve to generate postmortem retroactive attribution of charismatic leadership.⁴⁸

To detect the radius of a charismatic relationship, i.e. the size of a charismatic following and its duration would necessitate the search for such indicators over a cross section or sample of followers and over time. Empirical research of this type not only would tell us how far, among whom, and for how long the charismatic appeal of a particular political leader extended, but also would enable us to assess in any particular case the relative weights of the strategies employed in gaining and maintaining a charismatic following. Such empirical research might also help to clarify the relationships between charismatic political leadership and formal political leadership, which can exist in conjunction with each other as well as separately and each of which can serve as one of the means for gaining the other.⁴⁹ Ideally, we should study charismatic leaders who have not gained office as well as those political leaders who have developed a charismatic following either before or only after gaining public office. Similarly, charismatic leadership arising with established political organizations, i.e. charismatic factional leadership, should be studied as well as that commonly associated with the founding of a new political movement.⁵⁰

⁴⁸For a discussion on John F. Kennedy's legacy and how the death of a leader can elevate him/her to sainthood see, Dorothy Willner, "Ritual, Myth and the Murdered President", in *THE REALISM OF THE EXTRA HUMAN*, ed., A. Bharat, The Hague : Mouton, pp.401-420.

⁴⁹M.A. Toth, *THE THEORY OF TWO CHARISMAS*, Washington DC : University Press of America, 1966, pp.67-69.

⁵⁰Mohammed Naguib, *EGYPT'S DESTINY*, New York : Doubleday, 1955, pp.215-216.

Another pattern is that of the leader who is one of several original founders of or who emerges from a political clique that later becomes a charismatic movement. He may have few or no charismatic followers before the accession of his group to formal power and of himself to chief public office. Prior to or soon after the acquiring of power, there may be an internal struggle for leadership in which he emerges triumphant over his rivals and thus becomes in the public eye the personification of the movement. Indeed, the movement itself may have no existence and ideology as such until he develops them. Nasser exemplifies this pattern.⁵¹

6.5 GENERALIZATIONS ON THE CHARISMATIC PERSONALITY

An examination of the conditions for the emergence of the charismatic political phenomenon would be far from complete without consideration for shared personal characteristics of charismatic leaders.

The generation of the charismatic political phenomenon can undoubtedly be explained in part by a convergence of social conditions culminating in a crisis that involves institutional failures to meet a society's needs and of its members' subjective perceptions of and psychological responses to such a crisis. Such an explanation, however, should not neglect the role of the leader as catalyst.⁵² Aspirants for national political leadership frequently face the necessity to mobilize support from diverse groups with traditions and interests somewhat different from their own and from those of that group in their societies which originally supported them. The successful national political leader must often be a man of many faces, capable of arousing and convincing many audiences. If its true for political leaders in general, it is even more so for those who elicit from diverse groups the quality and intensity of support that is charismatic.⁵³

⁵¹Enver M. Koury, *THE PATTERNS OF MASS MOVEMENTS IN ARAB REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE STATES*, The Hague : Mouton, 1970, pp.150-155.

⁵²See Chapter Three, Section One, pp. 127-138 on Nasser's role as leader and catalyst.

What makes for political ambitions and political success is a subject that has long fascinated and will undoubtedly continue to interest students of political leadership. Some have advanced and developed the concept of a particular political personality a character type in pursuit of power over other values. In the effort to find the common denominators or common determinants of such a type, considerable attention has been devoted to the family backgrounds and early histories of successful political leaders, particularly by scholars concerned with the motivational and personality factors underlying the ambitions and behaviour of political leaders.

Other scholars who are interested in accounting for the success of outstanding political figures examine their social origins and early environments from the point of view. The modern charismatic leader has been characterized as 'a marginal man of a marginal group' in the society that he claims to represent and comes to rule.⁵⁴ These charismatic leaders, it is suggested, were motivated by the frustration of their marginality, both social and psychological, and appealed to frustrated and marginal people in their societies. This theme is in accord with the well known hypothesis concerning the displacement of private affect or frustration upon public objects.⁵⁵

The marginality and displacement hypothesis may account in part, or perhaps sufficiently, for those favouring psychoanalytically oriented actions, for the inner drive or motivation toward political leadership by some individuals. Their utility in explaining the success of these men would appear somewhat limited.

⁵³Evidence of this factor is evident in the organizational structure of Nasser's Free Officers where there "...were perhaps as many shades of political belief as there were numbers of Free Officer executives. Views ranged from extreme rightists, Islamic Fundamentalists, and Fascists, to left-wing radical socialists and Communists. Any contention, therefore, that the society embraced a group of officers with a common ideological or political persuasion is erroneous". P.J. Vatiklotis, *THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN POLITICS : Pattern for New Nations?*, Bloomington : Indiana University Press, p.68.

⁵⁴See Chapter One, Section Two, pp. 67-68 for a discussion on the marginality of the charismatic leader.

⁵⁵The displacement hypothesis forms part of the Psychoanalytic Approach to leadership theory. See Chapter One, Section Two, pp. 54-57

Motivation, however strong and enduring, can be only one component of success. The implicit corollary of such theses is the vulnerability of the public to displacement of private frustration. The public may well be frustrated but the different individuals and different groups that constitute any single national political public may also have different bases for frustration and may perceive remedies in different terms. Moreover, although many members of a society may be marginal in some respects to whatever may be considered the society's dominant group, the dimensions of marginality may differ among them and may differ from those of the marginal aspirant leader.⁵⁶

The research in Nasser's background suggests an alternative hypothesis with somewhat greater potential for explaining his success as national leaders in terms of personal environmental factors. This is the thesis of plural possible identifications by virtue of social origins and early exposure to varied environments. Although Nasser may be seen as socially and/or psychologically marginal to any dominant group of his society, by and large he could be identified with or being capable of identifying with several different groups or segments within them.⁵⁷

Social and/or psychological marginality can result in social and/or psychological flexibility. The individual who is neither securely rooted nor stably placed within one social group is less likely to accept, internalize, and express exclusively the values and characteristic behaviour patterns of any single group that one who is. He has the advantages as well as the strains, of multiple perspectives on the world. He is potentially able to communicate with members of different strata or segments of his society in terms that are meaningful to them. He can appear to display a more convincing empathy towards a broader spectrum of his society than can the individual whose exposure to more than one group and its norms has been limited. This plural set of possible identifications can be attributed to one or some combination of three factors that have been

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 55

⁵⁷Enver M. Koury, THE PATTERNS OF MASS MOVEMENTS IN ARAB REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE STATES, op.cit., pp.147-160.

identified in Nasser's case. The first factor is heterogeneity rather than homogeneity of family. The second factor is mobility and/or instability of family during childhood and/or youth of leader. Thirdly, the mobility of the leader and consequent exposure to varied environments during childhood and/or youth.⁵⁸

Nasser was descended, in the paternal line, from a family of Fellahin or peasants from a village on the Nile. His family, however, possessed more land than most fellow village families. His father had been upwardly mobile, had obtained a secondary education, and had become a postmaster. His mother was a relatively cultured urbanite, the daughter of a prosperous building contractor in Alexandria. The period of Nasser's childhood and/or youth was characterized by residential mobility and consequent exposure to and participation in a variety of social milieus. Nasser was only six months old when his family made the first of several moves as his father was transferred from the post to post. He attended school in a village, was sent to Cairo to live with an uncle, then to Alexandria where he lived with his maternal grandparents, then back to Cairo and his uncle, subsequently to a boarding school in Helwan, and again to Cairo and Alexandria. In the course of twelve years, he seems to have attended eight schools in four communities.⁵⁹

In researching the case of Gamal Abdel Nasser as a charismatic leader, certain elements were discovered which enter into the capacity to project the image of an individual endowed with extraordinary powers. It has been suggested that the heterogeneity of background and exposure to a variety of social environments can serve to develop or enhance the ability to communicate with and appeal to various groups in a society in such a fashion as to strengthen the potentially charismatic leader's claim upon each one of them.⁶⁰

⁵⁸For details on this see Peter Mansfield, *NASSER*, London : Methuen Educational Ltd, 1969, pp.61-80.

⁵⁹See Chapter Three, Section One, pp. 129-131, for Nasser's background and education.

⁶⁰Abdel Latif Al Boghdadi, *MEMOIRS*, Part II, Cairo, Alexandria : Al Maktab al Misri al Hadith, 1977, pp.87-93.

Most crucial to the arousal of charismatic perceptions of a leader in a following are the qualities that he projects and that are attributed to him. However, there are considerable variations in cultural definitions of esteemed and extraordinary leadership qualities. It is for this reason that it would seem difficult to discern a set of attributes common to all or most charismatic leaders which can be designed as a 'charismatic cluster'. Moreover, it may well be argued that the existence of cultural difference does not preclude the existence of cultural similarities and that some qualities or the appearance of them may be viewed as extraordinary in all or most societies.

The first characteristic to be noted is that of a high energy level or an extraordinary degree of vitality. Admittedly, this a quality about which available data provide few precise or easily comparable indicators. Energy or vitality can be expressed in many kinds of behaviour. Some individuals are capable of dramatic bursts of energetic or frantic activity followed by periods of lassitude, whereas others maintain a more even but nonetheless heavy output of energy. Observers can be misled into mistaking magnetism or volubility or vigorous and forceful gestures and mannerisms for vitality. The ability to maintain late hours and exist on very little sleep while keeping a heavy schedule of activities seems to be one indicators of high energy. Capacity to work long hours without signs of exhaustion would seem to be another indicator frequently mentioned in references to the 'inexhaustible vitality' or 'prodigious energy' of a charismatic leader. Nasser was reported frequently to maintain a working schedule from early in the morning until early the following morning. Also offered as testimony of untiring energy on the part of the leader has been the exhaustion of those who worked with him or accompanied him on trips.⁶¹

It might be noted that statements about energy and vitality ought to be accepted with some reservations. However, seemingly inexhaustible energy may well be

⁶¹Al Boghdadi, MEMOIRS, op.cit., pp.101-104.

one of the modern functional equivalents of superhuman powers. It is often to the advantage of a leader and his followers to exaggerate his capacities and to develop a myth about his untiring dedication to work and unflagging vitality.

A second characteristic that seems to stand out is presence of mind or composure under conditions of stress and challenge. Many of these leaders have been portrayed as men who have not been easily frightened, disconcerted, or thrown off balance. They have exhibited coolness, imperturbability, and even humour in the face of danger or crisis. Being unmoved, obdurate or stubborn have been characteristic of many of the charismatic leaders. They seem to have carried with them a 'demon' of determination that would not permit them to lose sight of their goals or swerve from a particular tactic they had decided upon, no matter how remote from achievement the goals may have appeared to others or how unwise the tactic. Moved by some intuition or 'inner voice' and not discouraged by the obstacles that seemed insuperable to those around them, they pursued the courses they had set themselves.⁶²

Another characteristic might be described as the capacity to project the image of unusual mental attainments. One is not referring to leaders who can be considered genuine intellectuals who devoted some part of their lives to serious study. It appears, however, that some of the others, primarily men of action and not of scholarly bent, have been able to seize upon information and ideas from many sources and, often by dint of an excellent memory, conveying the impression of possessing a powerful mind and a wide range of knowledge. In addition, charismatic leaders seem to have exhibited a flair for originality and a capacity for innovation in their behaviour as politicians. Either they impinged standard techniques in ways that were novel or unprecedented in their societies or they were sufficiently imaginative to perceive the political potential of new technological development and to utilize it.⁶³

⁶²Koury, THE PATTERNS OF MASS MOVEMENTS IN ARAB REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE STATES, *op.cit.*, p.141.

⁶³Lucian L. Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process", JOURNAL OF POLITICS, XX, August, 1968, pp.469-486.

It might also be noted, in empirical verification of Weber's thesis that charisma rejects rational economic conduct, that a number of these charismatic leaders have displayed a striking lack of interest in or a lack of understanding of economic and financial affairs or both. "Even when charismatic leaders publicly and repeatedly proclaimed their concern with economic reform and betterment they seemed somewhat naive in their approach to problems and programmes in this area".⁶⁴

Finally, and perhaps not unrelated to this element in the leader's magnetism, is a physical attribute common to a number of them - extraordinary eyes. Charismatic leaders have differed so considerably in their physical appearance that one cannot help but note and speculate about the significance of the single physical feature attributed to a number of them. Nasser's eyes were described as having latent hypnotic powers. It would certainly be interesting to ascertain whether eyes, more than other features, tend to be perceived by people as external indicators of personal qualities of an individual. We tend to associate hypnotic ability with eyes. Noses, cheeks, foreheads, and ears that are unusual may be commented upon but rarely in conjunction with qualities of personality or character. Mouths and chins may be associated with strength and weakness in the possessor, but rarely with the implication of exerting force outwardly. The statement that someone can kill with a look suggests the importance attached to eyes. Perhaps some of the charm, magnetism, irresistible persuasiveness, or power attributed to charismatic leaders by those who have had personal encounters with them is related to the effect of their eyes and how they have used them upon others.

6.6 CONCLUSION : THE LEGACY OF CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

As this thesis is been devoted to the study of political leadership in general and

⁶⁴Sir Anthony Nutting, interview with author, November, 1988, London.

charismatic leadership in particular, to conclude by dealing in depth with the legacy of charismatic political leadership would be premature and presumptuous. Even to assess what has been wrought by the charisma of a single leader would be a formidable enterprise and one to yield controversial results. Charismatic leaders and their works have not only been controversial in their lifetime but have remained subject to controversy for decades and even generations after their deaths.⁶⁵

Some journalists seem to have little trouble crediting some leader's accomplishments to their political charisma. Students find this a hazardous task, for there can be considerable difficulty in discerning whether or how much a particular process can be attributed to a leader's charisma rather than other factors. There is admittedly an easy way out of this difficulty in the cases of leaders for whom charisma was salient in gaining power. It can be argued that since their power was derived from their charisma, all that they have done with that power can also be treated as derived from charisma.

Apart from the fact that this approach might be begging the question, it cannot encompass the cases of leaders whose charisma was gained after they obtained power. For when a charismatic political leader achieves the power and authority of public office or when an incumbent of such office achieves charisma, it becomes difficult to disentangle the results that can be attributed to the formal powers of his office. Even when one is able to pinpoint charisma as the prime cause of the success of an act or event, there is still an obstacle. How can one measure the range of the impact at any time or over a period of time? The immediate effects of a charismatic leader are often observable; ultimate impacts may be difficult to detect and measure. Finally, there is a problem of evaluating the impact of charismatic leadership. Here controversy is likely to be endemic. There might be relative consensus, at either end of a spectrum, concerning what followed from the charisma of Gandhi. Agreement about what was wrought by

⁶⁵Al Boghdadi, MEMOIRS, *op.cit.*, p.19.

Nasser's charisma is highly unlikely. Nasser, who is positively perceived by some people as having built an egalitarian society, is negatively seen by others as having wrecked the once prosperous Egyptian economy and substituted a 'liberal' monarchy with a dictatorship. That is why legacies of charismatic leaders have to be rescued from true believers and harsh critics and why we need a basic reconstruction of what the 'great men' left behind them.

Different basic value premises and different subjective preferences yield different assessments of the results of charismatically induced happenings and consequences. And time may change perspectives and assessments. Given these caveats, what can be said about the impact and legacy of charismatic political leadership? Obviously, those who undertake minute historical reconstructions of individual cases of political charisma will emerge with many and varied conclusions. The few observations offered here are all derived from one such case study.

During the stage of a leader's ascent to formal power, political charisma can undoubtedly be a major asset. A charismatically oriented following can be ordered to the polls or onto the streets at will. Its members vociferously demonstrate their leader's popularity, swell audiences, and campaign for him with extraordinary vigour and often at sacrifice to themselves. A leader can use such followers as a means of subtle or overt intimidation, provoking them to demonstrations or boycotts and encouraging violence with the threat of further violence to come. He can restrain them from action or violence if it seems advantageous. He has, in short, a most malleable instrument to use at will.⁶⁶ A charismatic hold on some part of his following permits a leader greater flexibility than leaders without charisma are likely to have. Charismatic leaders are often less constrained. It is true that they may lose some of their supporters if they zig-zag sharply or seem to act contrary to their earlier proclaimed principles. But those who are charismatically oriented to them stay with them and can be counted upon to do so. The almost automatic obedience a leader can

⁶⁶Dankwart A. Rustow, reply to questionnaire, New York, May, 1989.

command from a charismatically oriented following gives him substantial leverage in his manoeuvres with either leaders and groups. Should he wish to dissimulate, a sometimes useful strategy in manoeuvring for power, he can manipulate followers to increase his credibility.

A political leader in power may proclaim and proselytize a measure, policy, a programme. To carry one out, however, requires the efforts of others, no matter how much persuasion, patronage, bargaining, threat, or other tactic he may employ to stimulate them to marshal that effort. A leader's charisma can also play a role in the implementation of his goals. One cannot send back in time survey researchers and pollsters to ascertain how much of the efforts of aides, civil servants, and others was due to their charismatic devotion to the leaders and how much to a sense of duty, agreement, opportunism, fear, or other motives.

One's study of Nasser as a charismatic leader yields the impressions of the contributions of political charisma. The charismatic interplay between leader and followers seems to release considerable energy, at least for a period of time, in support of the major goals of that leader. Accounts of the early periods of Nasser's rule in Egypt stress the energy and enthusiasm of those members of the state who were not opponents or treated as such. Their zeal to forward the new order apparently existed despite the increasing curbs on civil rights and the increasing regimentation. Such observed enthusiasm and energy, however, may not in all instances be correctly credited to charismatic leadership.⁶⁷ If a leader has tapped the latent desires of people and their goals and his desires and goals coincide or overlap, his charisma was not the major catalyst for their zeal. Fairly unambiguous cases of charisma affecting the accomplishment of leadership goals are those in which people implement them at a cost to themselves. When they voluntarily sacrifice something, materially or otherwise, or undergo hardships at the bidding of a leader to further policies that are his rather than theirs, the stimulus would seem to be his charisma.⁶⁸

⁶⁷Peter Mansfield, *NASSER'S EGYPT*, London : Penguin Books Ltd, 1965, p.109.

The implementation of a leader's foreign policy may also be facilitated by his charisma, especially if the policy is one perceived as risky. Those who might oppose the policy within his own country might be hesitant to do so openly, not wanting a confrontation with his charismatically oriented supporters. More important, however, can be the credibility he can gain externally because of his known charismatic constituency.

Reflections on the contributions of political charisma to power and policy can lead to some questions about what charisma has failed to accomplish in these areas. If a charismatic leader can count on almost automatic obedience to his commands from followers, why have some explicit goals of charismatic leaders failed to be realized? One of the obvious factors affecting what a charismatic leader can do is how far his charisma extends. The radius of a public figure's charisma has rarely, if ever, extended to include all or most of those under the official bounds of his authority. Even systems of authority with a strong charismatic component tend to be mixed. A charismatic leader cannot count on constant compliance from followers who are not part of his charismatic constituency and can count on little from his opponents but opposition.

In an open or even partially open political system, the status and resources of those who oppose the charismatic political executive or his policies can limit the extent of charismatic contribution. The uses of political charisma can thus be constrained by the type and rules of the political system within which the charismatic leader operates and by whether and how he chooses to circumvent or change them. Political charisma in and of itself has rarely, if ever, been sufficient to accomplish a complete reordering of a system or a revolution. Nasser, as Egypt's ruler, was willing to persuade the Egyptian masses of his ideas but could not contemplate using force to keep them in that persuasion. Hence, the

⁶⁸Mansfield, *NASSER'S EGYPT*, op.cit., p.119.

magnitude of change accomplished in Egypt was limited to a few areas of the socio-economic sphere. Thus, the limits of what a charismatic leader can do are not only influenced by the size and status of the charismatic constituency and the system within which a leader works. They are also partly determined by what a given charismatic leader may or may not choose to do and by the means he may employ or reject in exploiting his charisma. Apart from the goals a charismatic leader may set himself or his priorities, there is the further limitation of the means or measures that might be employed.

Finally, it is likely that charisma is limited by how far and how often it can be personally projected. The heroic feats by charismatic leaders are infrequent. A charismatic leader who holds office cannot spend the greater part of his day touring the country or communicating through radio or television. In addition, the leader's directives that are communicated to people through various layers of the bureaucratic pyramid may attenuate charismatic effectiveness. Perhaps the ultimate limitation on the effectiveness of political charisma is its inability to prevent a leader from being the object of military coups by army officers if they are both united and determined to do so. It is true that a leader's charisma can help to deter or modify attempts to oust him. However, its effectiveness in such instances may depend upon divisions within the military and the leader's control on the masses. After Nasser's humiliating defeat in 1967, subsequent to his failure to raise significantly the standard of living of the Egyptian masses, there were rumours of impending attempts to oust him. His demonstration of a charismatic hold on the volatile Cairo populace may well have been a major factor in discouraging such attempts.⁶⁹

Whether or not a given leader's charisma has lasted through his tenure of office or his lifetime, some of its effects have often endured much beyond either. It appears that their charisma stimulated political activism on the part of many people who had been apolitical or politically apathetic. As a result of their

⁶⁹Ferdinand Hurni, "Nasser's Domestic Politics", SWISS REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS, June, 1968, Vo.18, pp.13-14.

influence, political participation seems to have increased considerably in their countries. Admittedly, arousal to political awareness and activity through charismatic followership does not necessarily lead to autonomous and educated political judgement. But habits of participation may remain long after their original stimulus is gone and may be rechanneled in various directions. Another consequence of charismatic leadership, although not inevitably a direct one, one has been the lessening of social and status inequalities. A country led by a charismatic leader has often been marked by relatively rigid class and status distinctions and a strong bias in favour of aristocratic elites. But such a leader seems to have selected their own aides and lieutenants from a range of social backgrounds. Posts of power and prestige were not restricted to those of the upper classes. In Nasser's regime, more of these positions appear to have been occupied by those of the middle class origin than in the preceding regime.⁷⁰

Apart from the example in allocation of posts and favours, charismatic leaders, especially in the Third World, usually employ rhetoric and slogans that emphasize social equality and community and that often gave positive reinforcement to their lower strata of their societies. Although it would be difficult to trace the influence of such emphasis on subsequent attitudes and behaviour, there probably were subtle but desirable effects, if only on how the 'lower orders' learned to view themselves. Other action, policies, and programmes that flowed in part from the exercise of charismatic appeal, directly or indirectly, helped to modify social structures and social attitudes. It thus can be argued that by and large increased circulation of elites and increased mobility characterized the rule and legacy of charismatic political leaders. In some instances, certain segments of their societies gained appreciably or social distance among some segments diminished. Such changes continue past the period of the leader. Particularly in the Third World countries, charismatic leadership seems to have contributed to the growth of a sense of national identity and to the development of national unity among their peoples. These two processes, which

⁷⁰See Fouad Ajami, "On Nasser and his Legacy", JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, XI, 1974, pp.41-49.

are often referred to interchangeably, have somewhat different referents, although they are related. National identity refers to people's identification with and beyond local and other parochial identification with their region or class. National unity refers to a basic consensus among disparate groups in a state and a subsequent modicum of shared values for the state to survive. Charismatic leadership seems to have aided the growth of nationhood in several ways. The very presence of charismatic leaders, especially when they travelled, helped to promote it. For those people who had little or no knowledge of the abstract entity of the state, much less loyalty to it, the charismatic leader became the concrete embodiment of an authority higher than those they were accustomed to. For those who saw the state and its national capital as remote, alien, and possibly hostile, the presence of the charismatic leader was an electrifying sign that the 'country' cared about them and their welfare.⁷¹

Charismatic political leaders by and large seem to be strenuous travellers. As a result of this, their messages relating to national identity and unity were likely to have been received and internalized with greater conviction than similar messages from others. Or their messages may have been transmitted and heard more widely than others. Some charismatic leaders have used their charisma to create or help popularize national symbols. Even the use of traditional symbols as an aid to charisma could have a feedback effect so that charisma in turn reinforced the resonance of these symbols.

Perhaps the most lasting legacy of charismatic political leadership is the postmortem charismatic myth in which it becomes clothed. The charismatic leader gains his charisma in part through tapping the traditional myths and

⁷¹For details on the contribution of charisma to nation-building, see Ann R. Willner and Dorothy Willner, "Charismatic Political Leadership as Conservator and Catalyst", in A.R. Davis, ed., *TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES AND MODERN STYLES IN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP*, London and Sydney : Angus and Robertson, 1973, pp.17-28; Thomas Dow, Jr. "The Role of Charisma in Modern African Development", *SOCIAL FORCES*, 46, March, 1969, p.339; Edward Shils, "The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma : Their Bearing and Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries", *WORLD POLITICS*, 1958-59, Vol.II, pp.1-19.

symbols of his society. Subsequently, he and his works take on in turn a mythic quality and become part of the reservoir of myths and symbols for that society and perhaps even for others. He and his deeds are then drawn upon by the leaders and generations that follow. Even those for whom he was not charismatic and those from whom he ceased being so did share in the drama he enacted. And they too transmit its awe and aura to their descendants. Myths of some charismatic leaders seem able to surmount and survive efforts to destroy them by those who succeed these leaders. It is, after all, the 'unbelievable' that helps give rise to charisma, to the awe that sustains it and the myth that succeeds it. The charismatic leader is in a sense the Prometheus of politics who also steals from the gods by stretching political reality beyond the bounds of belief and prediction.

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This study is based largely on published literature in English and Arabic. A note on the translation at the onset of Chapter Three, indicates that as the Arabic language has its own alphabet, there is no standard English language spelling for Arabic words. Common nouns are spelled as they are most usually reproduced in English. An attempt has been made to spell all book titles and names as their writers spell them in translation.

II. Interviews and Correspondence.

Personal interviews and correspondence provided a valuable supplement to documentary evidence. Listed below are the names of those persons who graciously consented to interviews or who responded to my questions by letter, brief descriptions of their professional backgrounds, and the places and dates of interviews or dates of correspondence.

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Director of Middle East Studies at the School for Advanced International Studies,
John Hopkins University,
Personal interview, New York, 14 May, 1989.

Anwar Amin,
Deputy Director of the Arab Research Center,
Personal interview, London, 23 April, 1988.

Ali Hillal Dessouki,
Professor of Economics and Political Science, University of Cairo and
International Institute of Strategic Studies,
Personal interview, London, 24 April, 15 June, 1988.

Abdel Majid Farid,
Director of the Arab Research Center,
Personal interview, London, 21 April, 1988.

Fathy el Gouly,
Political Correspondent, AL AHRAM,
Personal interview, London, 16 January, 1989.

Albert Hourani,
Director of the Middle Eastern Center and Fellow of St. Anthony's College at
Oxford,
Personal interview, London, 13 March, 1988.

Peter Mansfield,
Middle East Journalist,
Personal interview, London, 10 October, 1988 and 16 July, 1989.

Sir Anthony Nutting,
Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the Anthony Eden Cabinet prior to the Suez Crisis,
Personal interview, London, 20 October, 1988.

Dankwart Rustow,
Professor at City University of New York, Department of Political Science,
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Ali Sabri,
Political Assistant to Gamal Abdel Nasser, 1954-1970,
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Robert Stephens,
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