Interdependence, Ethnicity and Anti-Apartheid: The Case of TransAfrica

Alan C. Tidwell

University of Kent at Canterbury

Submitted for the Ph.D. in International Relations,
December, 1989.

Interdependence, Ethnicity and Anti-Apartheid: The Case of TransAfrica

Alan C. Tidwell

University of Kent at Canterbury

Submitted for the Ph.D. in International Relations.

This work examines the interaction between the variables of interdependence and ethnicity in the context of American anti-apartheid. As a focus of this work the anti-apartheid group TransAfrica is examined, its connections to other anti-apartheid groups both inside and outside the US, its relationships with other non-anti-apartheid groups, and various state actors. The work provides an examination of the rise of black American political structures within the context of anti-apartheid and it is argued that it is due to the rise of black American political power that there is a considerable black American presence in the anti-apartheid environment. Furthermore, it is argued that black Americans are present in anti-apartheid because of 1) long standing historical trends within black America, 2) the nature of Pan-Africanism, 3) the relative lack of consensus within the black American political community over domestic US issues, and 4) the level of interdependence between black Americans and other members of the African diaspora. As a central theme of this thesis is the claim that black Americans possess real, legitimate, and long standing foreign policy interests that are as important as any domestic concern that that group may have possessed. In order to demonstrate this argument the thesis contains the following chapters: 1) outline of the theoretical framework that describes the interaction between interdependence, ethnicity and anti-apartheid, 2) the history of black American political structures, 3) the conflict in southern Africa, which provides a backdrop against which TransAfrica's actions are measured, 4) the basic elements of TransAfrica, including its funding, issues structure and membership, as well as many of its more prominent actions, 5) examples of TransAfrica as a transnational actor, and 6) a concluding chapter which outlines the illustration that TransAfrica is indeed a transnational actor, which seeks to further the interests of black America by influencing the making of US foreign policy.

Dedicated
to all those who wrote dedications
without insulting at least
one of their friends.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As with any work there are countless people who helped both directly and indirectly with the preparation, writing and editing of this work. I would like to thank all those who gave their time, their attention, and their care to help me in this endeavour. Special thanks go out to my supervisor Dr. A.J.R. Groom for his patience, his kindness and most of all his trust - he never stopped trusting and never lost faith in my capabilities. I would also like to give special thanks for the help of Steve Reilly, he was always willing and able to read and comment on my work; he was never too busy to lend a helping hand. Finally, from the University of Kent I would like to thank Andy Williams, Keith Webb, and Chris Brown who were always willing and useful participants in my work.

Also among those who deserve a special note were those friends who listened to me talk, seemingly endlessly, about my work. Special thanks to John Minton, Paul Brittan, Peter Thurston, Jonathon Phillips, Jacob Moser, Julia Morelli, Clare Cochrane, and all the rest.

I could not leave without noting the assistance, the dedication and the constant emotional and intellectual companionship of my great friend Daniel Rainey, who is in many ways responsible for my pursuit of a Ph.D.

Equally important, but in different ways, for my continued work in higher education are John Burton and Dr. Dennis Sandole, both of whom helped me get to Kent.

None of this would have been possible if it had not been for at least the semblance of emotional stability on my part. To the one who soothed my troubled nights, and gave me the tenderness I needed, I give special thanks to Fiona Pickup. In many ways my success is hers as well.

But most of all, I want to thank my family and especially my mother and father - without their love, support, encouragement, and financial support none of this would have been possible.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION
Transnationalism, Ethnicity and American Anti-Apartheid

The objective of the work, as first envisioned, was to investigate the relationship between the rise of black American power in the US and its impact on the anti-apartheid movement. The black American presence in the anti-apartheid movement is carried out by TransAfrica, a self described 'Black American Lobby for Africa and the Caribbean'. Through TransAfrica the black American polity would influence and join fully the anti-apartheid movement, which would then focus its energies on the US foreign policy process towards South Africa.[1] In this way, black Americans would wield influence on the formation of US foreign policy over issues concerning South Africa. When this work was first begun the rise of black American interest in the problem of apartheid was seen as a logical extension of the civil rights campaign of the 1950's and 1960's, and both were seen as part of the larger attempt to redefine the place of black Americans in the context of American society as a whole.

Over time, it was discovered that this was simply too crude an approach, since it failed to take into account a variety of factors that influenced black Americans. It also assumed wrongly that the civil rights movement was a beginning point in black American political advancement in foreign policy. What became clear over the course of time was that there were a variety of influences upon TransAfrica and the larger black American polity. These influences ranged from the purely domestic and economic to the larger transnational and symbolic. Furthermore, the impact of past actions within the black community carried significant weight for future actions within the black community. So, while it still is true that entry into the foray of anti-apartheid is part of the larger defining process of black America, it is equally true that this process is not new - it is indeed part of a long standing social and historical trend within the black American community. Randall Robinson, Executive Director of TransAfrica explained black interest in South Africa:

> While Americans who value freedom are alike in their abhorrence of white minority rule and apartheid in South Africa, black Americans perhaps are uniquely interested in

[1] Blacks were already involved, but as yet not so organisationally committed.

> the scope and quality of our government's response to the South African system of tyranny. This obtains not only because we are bound to Africa by linkages of race and heritage but more compellingly because we have been provided through our struggle for equality in America a frame of reference for empathetically understanding something of the pain that eighteen million black South Africans have been caused to endure.[2]

Robinson encapsulates the essence of black American interest in South Africa, in as much as there exists the feeling of kindred spirits across the Atlantic, tied together by race, history and experience of oppression. It also became clear, after considerable research that the ethnic and racial divisions within the US, which made the rise of TransAfrica probable, were not ignored by the world at large. What became apparent was that various groups and governments were aware of the strength and appeal that could be carried out by black Americans. Therefore, it is not surprising to have found various groups and TransAfrica joining forces in order to form anti-apartheid alliances.

Of particular interest is the relevance this research has to the world society paradigm. It is easy to cast the past into a series of conclusions, forgetting the highs and lows of past events. In many ways this is what happened in the case of anti-apartheid and 'diaspora politics'. It is easy to forget that many black Americans were deeply interested and moved by questions of foreign policy, especially events in the Caribbean and Africa. As early as the turn of the century there already existed connections between Africans in the US, the Caribbean, and Africa, there was a sense then that the fates of all those of African descent were linked. Even then, it was already becoming clear that the relevance of state boundaries was declining, that interdependence between groups was on the rise.

Furthermore, this work will illustrate that opposing apartheid is not just a political position, but it is rather a way of defining one's position in the world, of identifying who one is and where one stands. Therefore, this work marks a new stage in research into the nature of how people interact - this work seeks to illustrate that people are moved and tied together by more than a simple process of their self-interest or citizenship, and shows that at least for a set of black

[2] Robinson, Randall, "Testimony before the Subcommittees on Africa and International Economic Policy and Trade," *Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion*, Vol. IX, Nos. 1/2, Spring/Summer, 1979, p. 17.

Americans, they are motivated by a sense of history, and a sense of how they are defined and how that definition influences their sense of identity. The label 'black American' is itself a label which carries with it a sense of the social as well as the historical - it is a reference to a specific people in a specific point in time. Through the efforts of TransAfrica and others to be a 'black American' may carry a meaning that now includes a connection with Africa and opposition to apartheid.

There were a number of problems that were encountered in conducting this research. Perhaps the most difficult of all was access to participants in the anti-apartheid movement. A reasonably high level of distrust was encountered, this being due, at least in part, to the belief among many that the South African government uses students to gain information on the anti-apartheid movement. Thus, work on a Ph.D., while seemingly harmless, was treated as suspect. It took a considerable amount of time, and the use of 'contacts' to gain access to various individuals. TransAfrica employees were, by and large, very helpful, though busy. Nii Akuetteh was especially informative and friendly, he was always willing to provide information. Cecilie Counts was, on the other hand, was impossible to gain access to, this despite the help of Akuetteh. The Executive Director, Randall Robinson was extremely difficult to interview, though access was gained for less than an hour. The interview itself proved to be difficult as well, as it turned out that no one had briefed Robinson about any conversations the writer had had with TransAfrica staff members prior to meeting him. The Washington Office on Africa was useful in providing further information about how the anti-apartheid movement operated in Washington, D.C., as was the African-American Institute. Also of some help were staff members of Congressional offices. Yet again, however, these people were busy, as it was the middle of the summer session. Therefore, while they were helpful, they could never offer their total attention. The other major source of information, though, was found in the abundant number of Washington, D.C. libraries, which offered a wide variety of information.

One interesting problem encountered, however, was not one concerning the amount of information, but rather revolved around the type of information received. During the research accusations, usually though not always emanating from anti-anti-apartheid sources, held that

TransAfrica was being influenced by Soviet and Cuban intelligence sources. It was also argued that:

> It should be clear to anyone reviewing TransAfrica's record that its concern at the present time is not "racism" in South Africa but the promotion of radical revolution. In black African countries such as Angola and Mozambique, TransAfrica is not on the side of black advocates of freedom and democracy. Instead, it is on the side of Marxist governments which have been imposed upon unwilling black Africans by Cuban arms and East European military advisers and technicians and which, in many instances, are controlled not by black Africans but by Portugese [sic] and part-Portugese [sic] Marxists,....[3]

At first, it seemed that these accusations were nothing short of ridiculous, yet after discovering cash contributions by members of the Cuban government to TransAfrica the accusations began to take on a more serious note. Following up Cuban and Soviet influence on TransAfrica was not, however, the task of the research undertaken. At the same time, though, it could not be ignored. After much thought, trepidation and argument, it was decided to leave the interpretation of Soviet and Cuban influence up to the reader. Information is provided, the sources given, but conclusions on this matter will be omitted. Thus, the main problem with the research was not one of quantity of information, but rather quality and relevance of information to the original purpose.

Perhaps this would be an appropriate place to point out that the phrase 'black Americans' is more a shorthand reference to a group of black Americans, and should not be taken to imply that *all* black Americans think alike or hold the same opinions. To use the term 'black Americans' in such a way would be nothing short of being an over-generalisation. What is meant here by the use of such a phrase is to classify a given group of black Americans who share many beliefs in common, though surely not all, which revolve primarily around *diaspora politics*. The term diaspora politics is used to signify that set of social and historical events which have influenced the social, political and economic choices of a given group of people. Those who find themselves spread through the world, by virtue of historical accident and not out of their own design, are not limited to black Americans. The Diaspora of the Jews is the beginning point for much of the discussion of diaspora politics.[4] For purposes here, it is simply worth noting that in the US many

[3] Brownfield, Allan, *TransAfrica: A Lobby of the Left*, The Lincoln Institute for Research and Education, Washington, D.C., 1985, p. 34.

[4] Diaspora is capitalized in the case of the Jews because of historical convention.

Jewish Americans support and fund efforts to defend the state of Israel, and it is done in the name of the Diaspora. Unlike Jewish Americans, black Americans have no one state to support, rather a whole host of states exist, of varying political orientations. Jewish Americans, and the Diaspora support the state of Israel, whereas black Americans act in the name of the diaspora itself. Therefore, there is not the same focus of resources and interests as there is in the Jewish Diaspora.[5] The diaspora in the case of black Americans refers to the whole process of the slave trade, the social and cultural dislocation, the severing of ties with social groups, the entry into chattal slavery and the ensuing struggle to end servitude and acquire social, political and economic power. Wilson Jeremiah Moses, in his book entitled *The Golden Age of Black Nationalism, 1850-1925*, gives a fine explanation of where diaspora politics comes from. Moses argues that:

> Slavery was, in a sense the cause of black nationalism [and diaspora politics]. It destroyed the ethnic loyalties of those whom it enslaved; it disastrously eroded traditional culture within a generation or two. But while it tended to strip slaves of their local traditional cultures, it endowed them with a sense of common experience and identity. The slavery experience was shared to some extent by most English-speaking blacks. It was not an experience to be proud of, but it was an experience held in common; therefore, it was the basis of racial unity, unknown among the various traditional peoples of Africa before the slave trade.[6]

Therefore, diaspora politics, in this instance, is a term which refers to people of African descent living somewhere having been historically and socially dislocated from their ancestral culture due to the slave trade. It also refers to people who, by virtue of their common historical experiences are bound together in a unique way.

In the final analysis it will be concluded that TransAfrica represents a step along the way of ethnic and racial empowerment, one with long standing historical precedents. Furthermore, TransAfrica's entry into the anti-apartheid movement may be a signal of the further break up of foreign policy into ethnic specific nodes, where a given group maintains control or at least possesses considerable influence over a given subject. Thus, TransAfrica *represents a continuation of a long standing historical process within black America where foreign policy is*

---

[5] See Tivnan, Edward, *The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy*, Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York, 1987 for more on the 'Israeli lobby' in the US and its relationship to the Diaspora.

[6] Moses, Wilson Jeremiah, *The Golden Age of Black Nationalism, 1850-1925*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1978, p. 16.

viewed, not as the sole domain of white America, but is viewed as vital to the interests of black Americans and where the manipulation of foreign policy can serve the interests of diaspora politics. The problem for black Americans, as seen by TransAfrica, is best put by Randall Robinson in his novel *The Emancipation of Wakefield Clay*.

> Now we have to ask ourself the question: how much collective integration do we want? Do we want a full minority role in the State Department, on the multinational corporation boards, in the Central Intelligence Agency, in the defence establishment? Because if we wus or were to say yes, our cause would be no longer righteous. We'd have to accept some responsibility then for what this country does to its poor as well those millions of other folks in Africa, Asia and everywhere. You see what I'm gettin at, Wake? If we want to go whole hole hog, we can't no longer look at this country just domestically because we gotta know how it deals with our people elsewhere. Because if we say yes and that's what we want, well, right ain't gon be on our side no more, because for our own narrow, selfish, material interest, we will have happily integrated into a system that accepts inequality at home and abroad. That's not an answer because staying outside the system and powerless is no answer either.[7]

Robinson makes clear the importance and centrality of foreign policy to the politics of race relations in the US, and this statement reflects the importance of the diaspora in black American politics. Thus, for Robinson to accept and integrate into the 'system' as it stands is to support that same process that left black Americans without power for so many years, and still does to a large extent. On the case of apartheid, Robinson again provides an excellent and emotive insight into the thinking that informs diaspora politics. He writes:

> How could an American black participate in this dastardly affront to all things decent, this racialist conspiracy? Did not the whole world know the essential nature of apartheid, and the quality of people's pain? This black, this American black - how possibly could he not understand this all too well?[8]

There lies the central problem of US policy towards South Africa. It is fundamentally an American policy, which includes black America, yet how and why would a black American support such a policy? This is the question Robinson asks, and this is the question and issue that TransAfrica addresses.

In order to examine the role of TransAfrica both within the black community and how that

---

[7] Robinson, Randall, *The Emancipation of Wakefield Clay*, Bogle-L'Ouverture Publication, Ltd., London, 1978, p. 18. The paragraph is a commentary of 'Claude' to the protagonist 'Wakefield'.

[8] ibid., p. 62.

has influenced US foreign policy it will be necessary to discuss several topics. First among them is the overall theoretical picture that describes TransAfrica. Thus, chapter one is a discussion of the nature of the transnational world, where state boundaries are in many ways unimportant. It is the lack of boundaries and binding together of groups across state boundaries that necessitates a discussion of ethnicity in foreign policy, as well as the US foreign policy system. It is necessary to discuss how US foreign policy works in order to understand how an ethnic group will seek to influence the outcome of the process.

Chapter two is a discussion of black American political history beginning with the opening of the twentieth century. The emphasis in this chapter is, firstly, on the growth of political structures and complexity, and secondly, on the growing interest in and potency in the field of foreign policy and thirdly, the evolution of anti-apartheid groups and policies. What is clear from chapter two is that while black Americans have had a strong interest in foreign policy, they have not had sufficient power to influence the process. This has been the case for some time, though with the advent of the civil rights movement and ensuing civil empowerment of black Americans, there has been a growing ability on the part of blacks to have an impact on the foreign policy process.

The following chapter is a discussion of the conflict in southern Africa, which holds special relevance for many black Americans in that it is an area containing the last remaining vestige of formally institutionalised white supremacy in government. Chapter three lays out the US interest in southern Africa, the US role in the conflict between East and West, as well as the growing domestic unrest in the region and US involvement in attempting to resolve the dispute. Thus, this chapter provides the backdrop against which TransAfrica must operate, and illustrates the power of the conflicting forces at work - namely those of East versus West as opposed to US anti-racism versus white supremacy.

Chapters one through three present the principle background material for a discussion of TransAfrica. Chapter four sets out the basic elements of who and what TransAfrica is, its history, sources of funding, issues hierarchy, policy goals and interests, ideological objectives, coalitions,

and projects. This chapter provides the basic outline for TransAfrica, and demonstrates that it is indeed an increasingly potent domestic actor in the arena of foreign policy.

In chapter five details the interactions of TransAfrica in the transnational environment are to be found. This includes examining TransAfrica's dealings with other NGO's, state sponsored NGO's, national liberation movements, and states. What will be clear from this chapter is that TransAfrica is a transnational actor, which seeks to further its interests in diaspora politics by making alliances with other transnational actors, and that there is an interest in TransAfrica by other transnational actors as well.

Chapter six, the conclusion, lays out the centrality of TransAfrica to the black American foreign policy effort, and tangentially, to the whole process of defending and furthering the racial defining process. It will be made clear that while TransAfrica can articulate the policy interests of black America perfectly well, they are mostly unable to translate their policy goals and interests to the larger population. Within the black population there exists sufficient salience of anti-apartheid to current and historical conditions to make TransAfrica's efforts to gain an anti-apartheid constituency somewhat more easy. These same conditions, however, are lacking within the larger context of the US.

Also illustrated in chapter six is that TransAfrica is able to make inroads into the foreign policy process, despite a general lack of support from the wider population, because of the increasingly decentralised nature of the decision making process. Thus, as a factor in the domestic sources of foreign policy TransAfrica is an important player because it can marshall sufficient forces within and around Congress to carry out its projects. This is not to say that TransAfrica can progress unimpeded, this is not the case. It is only to say that TransAfrica has relatively greater access to influencing foreign policy than many of its predecessors or many other ethnic lobbies.

In the end, the rise of TransAfrica marks what can only be described as a dilemma for the American polity. It marks, along with actions by Greek-Americans, Turkish-Americans, Jewish-Americans, etc., the breaking up of foreign policy consensus along ethnic lines, into contending clusters of policy interests. TransAfrica's rise signals that the issue of moral authority, or moral

sanctioning of policy is at hand. No longer can foreign policy making be isolated from US domestic pluralism, thus ensuring its domination by a select number of groups. W.E.B. DuBois put it best when he argued:

> One cannot, to be sure, demand of whole nations exceptional moral foresight and heroism; but a certain hard common-sense in facing the complicated phenomena of political life must be expected in every progressive people. In some respects we as a nation seem to lack this; we have the somewhat inchoate idea that we are not destined to be harassed with great social questions, and that even if we are, and fail to answer them, the fault is with the question and not with us. *Consequently we often congratulate ourselves more on getting rid of a problem than on solving it.*[9]

Thus, while debates continue about what the make up of US policy towards South Africa, what is often missed is a more complex and subtle debate about who should make US foreign policy, and what values ought to be reflected in that policy. Thus, underlying the debate over US policy towards South Africa is a much more subtle and perhaps more important question of who makes US foreign policy.

---

[9] DuBois, W.E.B., *The Suppression of the African Slave Trade*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rogue, Louisiana, 1965, pp. 198-199. Emphasis added.

CHAPTER ONE
Interdependence, Ethnicity and US Foreign Policy

Introduction

The relationship between ethnic groups, states and foreign policy is not a clear one, and it may not even be a particularly obvious one. Yet, there is indeed a relationship between ethnic groups, states and foreign policy, a relationship that may not be unimportant in the understanding of how the international environment works. Ethnic ties between people cross state boundaries in such a way that at times may actually ignore the very existence of states, and may even in extreme cases run counter to the general interests of the state. When this happens it is an illustration of the phenomenon of interdependence between groups. This interaction, then, impacts upon how a given state will operate, it impinges upon domestic tranquillity and may effect the legitimacy of the government in power. How a given government will deal with an ethnic group both within and outside its boundaries may indeed become an issue of importance for that ethnic group. This leads to a situation where a group may seek to influence governmental policies, and the government may in return seek to influence the ethnic group. It is a spiral of influence and counter influence, one that cannot be easily stopped for examination. The purpose of this chapter is provide some theoretical insight into the interaction between interdependence, ethnicity and the making of foreign policy, especially in the case of anti-apartheid. In order to gain some insight into how the three interact it will first be necessary to examine the more general areas of 1) interdependence, what it is and how it works, 2) then the domestic sources of foreign policy, 3) the role of groups in an interdependent world, 4) the relationship between interdependence and issues, and 5) ethnicity and how ethnicity may impact upon the international arena. Then, in the more specific case of the US, the topics of 1) pluralism and interest group politics in the US (the channel through which ethnic groups may make themselves felt), 2) the making of US foreign policy, 3) the pathway to influence through the US Congress, and 4) the domestic sources of US foreign policy will be examined.

Underlying this approach to the study of US anti-apartheid is the assumption that the world

is not wholly state-centric, that states are semi-permeable bodies, which are influenced by a variety of non-state factors. It is not the intention here to list and go through all the various influences that may permeate a state, rather only one item shall be dealt with, which broadly speaking can be labeled ethnicity. What makes ethnicity a relevant factor is the relative accessibility to US policy making institutions, and this occurs because of the decentralised pluralist nature of US government.[1] The relationship between US policy towards South Africa and the involvement of many black Americans in anti-apartheid is best viewed through the lenses of interdependence between South Africa and the US, and interdependence between the US non-racial anti-apartheid movement, the black American based anti-apartheid movement and the South African anti-apartheid movement, especially the UDF and ANC. The salience of TransAfrica to this situation comes through the pathway of ethnicity. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the nature of interdependence, in order to understand how ethnicity makes itself felt across state boundaries.

Interdependence

Some have argued that the realist paradigm is dead, this may or may not be an overstatement. What is not an overstatement, however, is that the world has changed considerably over the the course of this century. This change leads to a different perspective of the world from that which might have been used before. The claim that the realist paradigm is dead stems from the observation that "...far reaching changes have taken place in the global system since 1945 [which] challenge not only the concept of sovereignty but also the adequacy of regarding the nation-state as the sole actor in world politics."[2] The rise of multi-national organisations, non-governmental and inter-governmental organisations, interest groups, the spread of mass

---

[1] The pluralist nature of the US government, while opening points of access to many does little to provide an avenue of access for those groups who neither possess the resources or who fall outside the tacitly accepted range of opinion. As a metaphor US pluralism can be viewed as a concert where only a select number have tickets, others clamour to gain entry, and others are simply altogether ignored. For those with access it is a largely free and egalitarian society, for those who fail to gain access or are prevented from entering it is neither free nor egalitarian.

[2] Mansbach, Richard, Donald Lampert and Yale Ferguson, *The Web of World Politics*, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1976, p. 25. States, it can be argued, are targets of influence because they can "...take and enforce decisions." See Willetts, Peter, "Pressure Groups as Transnational Actors," *Pressure Groups in the Global System*, ed. Peter Willetts, Frances Pinter Publishers, London, 1982, p. 23. Thus, the reason any given group is the target of another groups' attempt at influence rests upon its ability to take and enforce decisions. States are obvious targets given their historical role, as well as their huge enforcing machinery.

communication and the rise of man-made globally life threatening technologies all serve to increase human awareness of one another, and increase the sense of inter-relatedness. Thus, "Relationships cut across formal state boundaries and frequently...[make]...nonsense of government efforts to control them at those boundaries."[3] This inter-relatedness can be seen as interdependence. Keohane and Nye define interdependence as a situation "Where there are reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) costly effects of transactions,.... Where interactions do not have significant costly effects, there is simply interconnectedness."[4]

The above definition raises some questions, for example what is meant by costly? Upon what basis should one differentiate between that which is costly and that which is not? Will cost be measured in terms of dead bodies, dollars, symbolic loss? Clearly, there is no objective measure that can be employed that would ascertain these costs. What might be more useful would be to view interdependence through the perspective where a shift in one behaviour leads to a loss of purpose in another. Put differently, the shift in one behaviour leads to a shift in the *raison d'etre* in another. It can be argued that a shift in one's *raison d'etre* is indeed costly in terms of organisational structure and political position. Thus, anti-apartheid groups exist in a situation of interdependence with South Africa, in as much as if apartheid were to vanish tomorrow, there would be a complete and total shift in the very basis of anti-apartheid activists. This example illustrates Keohane and Nye's concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability.[5] Sensitivity is defined as "...interactions within a framework of policies" and "...assumes that the framework remains unchanged."[6] The members of the US anti-apartheid movement are sensitive to changes in the various laws governing relations between South Africa and the US. Changes within this system of laws (policies) may lead to a reaction on the part of either the US government or the anti-apartheid lobbies. Neither the US nor the lobbies are changing their interdependent status due to changes in

---

[3] Mitchell, Chris, "World Society as Cobweb," *Conflict in World Society*, ed. Michael Banks, Wheatsheaf Books, London, 1984, p. 60.

[4] Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1977, p. 9. For a further discussion of interdependence a particularly interesting and useful text is *Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations' Third Debate*, eds. Ray Maghroori and Bennet Ramberg, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1982.

[5] *op. cit.*, Keohane and Nye, p. 12.

[6] *ibid.*, p. 12.

the policies. If, however, apartheid were to end tomorrow, then the anti-apartheid lobbies would cease to exist. In this case they can be said to be vulnerable. Vulnerable interdependence is "...defined as an actor's liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered."[7] The anti-apartheid movement is highly vulnerable to the end of apartheid. They might not go out of existence, but they would have to change their *raison d'etre*, which constitutes a change in the status of their interdependence. These lobbies are also sensitive to changes in the relationship between South Africa and the US, but they are not vulnerable to changes in the relationship between these two states.

Keohane and Nye offer one final concept that is useful here, namely that of complex interdependence. Complex interdependence is characterized by 1) a multiplicity of channels connecting societies, 2) a lack of a hierarchy of issues, and 3) the improbability of the use of military force by one state upon another.[8] The multiplicity of channels refers to the variety of connections between non-governmental, quasi-governmental and governmental actors. A lack of a hierarchy of issues relates to the increasing number of issues that concerns a government at any one time, and the inability to select between issues for a stable agenda.[9] Finally, the high costs of military force, along with the ever present possible spreading of violence makes the use of military force less and less likely. This is not to say that it is impossible to imagine a situation where forces might be used in, for example, South Africa. Yet, given the costs involved there is little or no chance that US military forces would be used in the region. Thus,

> The traditional orientation toward military and security affairs implies that the crucial problems of foreign policy are imposed on states by the actions or threats of other states. These are high politics as opposed to the low politics of economic affairs. Yet, as the complexity of actors and issues in world politics increases, the utility of force declines and the line between domestic policy and foreign policy becomes blurred....[10]

Between South Africa and the US there is a high level of interdependence, in fact there exists a situation of complex interdependence. With the number of scientific, industrial, academic

---

[7] *ibid.*, p. 13.

[8] *ibid.*, pp 24-25.

[9] *ibid.*, p. 26.

[10] *ibid.*, p. 32.

and cultural ties between the two states (multiple channels); with little agreement on what issues are of great importance, yielding a lack of hierarchy of issues (apartheid versus investment, investment versus security, etc.); and the high improbability that either state would used force to gain advantage over the other it may be said that the two exist in a state of complex interdependence. This state of complex interdependence is reflected in the range of business interests interacting in both countries. Furthermore, it is because of the size of economic investment and related strategic importance of South Africa that many in the US are either unable or unwilling to consider actions that would damage that relationship. Equally, it is because of the nature of the racial tension inside South Africa that many in the US are unwilling to consider maintaining the relationship as it now stands. Those supporting business links, as well as those who oppose South Africa, because of racial violence, and many in between, are found in government, thus reflecting the lack of a hierarchy of issues and adding to the confusion of issues as well.

Those groups that concern themselves with issues related to apartheid are subject to the influence of complex interdependence. This is true, partly, because there is a wide variety of issues that relate to apartheid, thus bringing to bear a variety of different interests and concerns on the issue. Additionally, while many groups may agree on a particular objective (i.e. an end to apartheid) they may do so for different reasons. So, while one group may seek economically to undercut South Africa, thus applying pressure for change, another may seek to undercut the regime completely by a total cutting off of foreign investment. Two anti-apartheid groups may seek to have sanctions applied against South Africa, but do so for different reasons. One may seek sanctions as part of an anti-imperialist, class based view of the world, while another may do so for reasons of racial or ethnic survival.[11]

The above discussion makes clear that the world is not a collection of unitary actors, each one being a state. Instead, what hopefully has been demonstrated is that the world consists of a

[11] Thus, a lack of agreement on issues is due not only to the multiplicity of actors, but also the variety of motivations for each of those actors.

number of actors, some of which are states and others which are not. Each actor, however, wields influence over the others, often in an asymmetric way and thus effects the entire system. Furthermore, what has also been shown is that there is no single set of issues that is of overriding importance, indeed there is a multiplicity of issues, all competing with others for a place on the agenda. How this situation comes about can be partly understood through the examination of the impact of domestic politics on the international arena.

The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy

Due to the nature of interdependence, binding together groups inside one state boundary to another within a different state boundary, there arises a condition in which domestic actors influence the way a state may conduct its foreign policy. Thus, one may ask the question why are groups important at all in the study of an interdependent world? Would not the correct focus be on the behaviour of states? It has been argued that:

> Increasing interdependence in the world's economy has redistributed international bargaining power on a number of key issues. As the world has become increasingly aware that its resources are not infinite, and as international norms of behavior have changed, the historic ability of great military powers to impose their will is diminishing.[12]

This argument would indicate that only a redistribution of power has occurred, leading to a variety of states being important actors, yet there is something missing. The same author later makes the point that:

> The economic interdependence of the modern world is more than international. It is also inter-local. Interruption in the flow of a particular exported or imported commodity may or may not seriously disrupt the economy of a nation as a whole, but it is certain to raise hob with particular domestic regions, industries, farmers, or workers.[13]

This is an important point, in as much as it suggests that global integration is wide spread amongst even the smallest units within a state. Therefore, one cannot simply view the actions of a state alone, one must widen one's view to include those bodies that make up a state, and many that lie

---

[12] Manning, Bayless, "The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals", *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 55, January 1977, p. 307.

[13] *ibid.*, p. 309.

across several states.

Thus, the 'billiard ball' model of the world is rejected.[14] It is not enough simply to examine the behaviour of states alone, but vital, in order to understand the world, to examine the behaviour of actors within the state.

> To look at the domestic sources of foreign policy, then, is to look at conditions and activities within the state, instead of only conditions outside it. Such a focus implies that we abandon the assumption that all states are unitary actors, as suggested by the billiard ball metaphor.... Instead, the domestic-sources perspective conforms to the view that "foreign policy of governments is more than simply a series of responses to international stimuli, that forces at work within a society can also contribute to the quality and contents of its external behavior."[15]

Thus, to understand an interdependent world, one must look beyond mere states as actors. To focus solely on states would be to argue that non-state actors were of no importance or use in understanding foreign policy. Clearly, this is absurd. By seeking to understand and determine how domestic events impinge upon foreign policy is perhaps to come a little closer to understanding the realities of how foreign policy decisions are made.

By illustrating the links between domestic activity and foreign policy it should now be apparent why the study of groups and group formation is important. This is surely true in the US, where it must be understood that groups are often the basis from which domestic actions spring and later influence foreign policy. This may also be true, though perhaps less so, in other states, depending upon how easily a given group can gain access to the government. At some point, however, whether a group has formal access or not, a government must take into account the actions and dispositions of groups within its borders, if for no other reason than to suppress them. Ultimately, whether in the interests of a given group or not, governments will react to domestic groups, thus influencing the foreign policy of that state. Therefore, it will be important to understand how groups are viewed in the context of an interdependent world.

---

[14] For a discussion on the billiard ball model and its inadequacies see Burton, J. W., *World Society*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 28-29.

[15] Kegley, Charles W. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: An Introduction", *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, eds. Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1988, p. 2.

Interdependence and Groups

Within the study of interdependence there has been a need to conceptualize those units which come together to wield their influence across state boundaries. This discussion is necessary so that the nature of groups can be understood, which will then allow for a discussion of ethnicity. James Rosenau has developed a scheme which allows one to view the development of these units, it may also provide some useful suggestions on how ethnic divisions may fit into an interdependent world.

The world may be divided into two camps, those who are collected together intentionally and those who are not. Put another way, some people are members of a group because they want to be and some are members of a group, not out of desire, but because they just happen to be. It is not an earth shattering observation, but a necessary one all the same. Rosenau addresses this situation when he discusses intended and unintended aggregation. He states:

> Unintended aggregation occurs when a multiplicity of micro units undertake similar behavior to serve their own private purposes. Each action is designed to serve each micro unit's needs or to advance its goals; but because the actions are all similar even though the needs or goals may be diverse, the actions are summable.[16]

Here micro units may be understood to mean an individual, or another unit. In the case of anti-apartheid, micro units may coalesce into an anti-apartheid collective, and should they behave in an unorganised way, each seeking an end to apartheid, but not coordinating actions with the other, then they may be said to be an unintended aggregation. Rosenau goes on to point out, though, that when "...an unintended micro aggregation is publicly identified and enters the global agenda, it is no longer merely a sum of micro action."[17] Indeed, when this unintended aggregation puts forward spokespersons, they enter the world of interest representation.

Intended aggregation, on the other hand, consists of "...the same behavior by micro units undertaken at the same time and explicitly designed to have consequences for macro structures."[18]

---

[16] Rosenau, James N., *The Study of Global Interdependence*, Frances Pinter Publishers Ltd., London, 1980, p. 79. Also see Berry, Jeffrey M., *Lobbying for the People*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1977, pp. 18-27 for more on aggregation. Also see Olson, Mancur, *The Logic of Collective Action*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, pp. 5-52 where Olson lays out a calculus for what individuals expect to obtain by joining a group.

[17] *op. cit.*, Rosenau, 1980, p. 80.

[18] *ibid.*, p. 80.

Intended aggregation serves the purposes of some macro unit (organisation) and is designed to "...concert the micro behavior and give direction to its cumulative impact."[19] There may also be a situation where aggregation is neither intended nor unintended. Some may join groups, not out of explicit desire, but also not out of some explicit external compulsion. Indeed, many people join social groups out of some vague sense of social pressure or conformity that is neither unintended or intended. The actions of TransAfrica may be said to fall under the heading of intended aggregation, in that they seek to pull together micro behaviour, in concert, in order to yield a particular outcome. Furthermore the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM, see chapter four) is also a macro unit, which is an intended aggregation, wherein it pulls together the various micro units of the anti-apartheid movement and gives those units direction. There are those who do not belong to either group, however, yet in all their beliefs and actions they behave as if they did belong. These non-members can be said to subliminally aggregated, where one cannot determine the intention on their part, yet their actions reflect their current position.

Rosenau also gives further delineation by distinguishing between the types of roles an actor may undertake. There are two roles that an actor may have, one being the primitive role and the other the derivative. The primitive role is defined as "...micro parts of micro units which would not exist if their activities did not span national boundaries."[20] Thus, the primitive role is expressed in a group, for example, which has as its purpose the crossing of state boundaries. Derivative roles, on the other hand, arise within organisations that do not have any transnational relations, yet some behaviour within the organisation has transnational implications.[21] Thus, a retirement fund, which purchases stock in a South African company, has a derivative role in the complex interdependent situation that characterizes relations between South Africa, the US and various non-state groups.

There seems to be a middle ground, however, between the derivative and the primitive roles. Some groups may have as their objective the influence of a situation outside of their own state

[19] *ibid.*, p. 80.
[20] *ibid.*, p. 95.
[21] *ibid.*, p. 95.

boundary, yet they may seek to wield that influence within the borders of their own state. This may be referred to as a modified primitive role. TransAfrica seeks to influence events in South Africa (and elsewhere) in the name of the diaspora, yet it seeks to do so by influencing the foreign policy of the US. Therefore, TransAfrica is exhibiting a modified primitive role, where it would not exist if there was not a binding together of a sociohistorical group across state boundaries (through diaspora politics), and where its behaviour did not seek to influence the relationships that crossed state boundaries.

The process of aggregation and the following primitive or derivative role produces organisations which are designed to deal with and cope with their interests concerning a variety of issues. Any organisation must address itself to issues that concern its membership. Mansbach, et.al. argue that there are at least four "...general types of tasks..." that are "...performed by actors."[22] These tasks are: 1) physical protection and/or security, 2) economic development and regulation, 3) non-economic development and regulation, 4) group status maintenance.[23] These tasks may be translated into issues, with which the group must deal. Indeed, the four tasks may correspond to Rosenau's issue areas. Rosenau argues that "...data compel us to cast our analyses as much in terms of, say, civil-rights political systems, economic-development political systems, and health-and-welfare-political systems...."[24] Thus, groups may be faced with tasks or issues, depending upon how one phrases the question, but what is important is that each is serving virtually the same function. When Rosenau says "...issues may be temporary and situational, issue-areas are persistent and general" he is in many ways reflecting Mansbach's groups tasks.[25] Issues may be ephemeral, but the issue area is everlasting, and this is so because the issue area represents a more basic group task. Whether one views these as being issues or tasks is relatively

---

[22] *op. cit.*, Mansbach, p. 37.

[23] *ibid.*, p. 37.

[24] Rosenau, James N., *External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 1966, p. 74. Also see Rosenau, James N., "Foreign Policy as an Issue-Area," in *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosenau, James N., Free Press, New York, 1967. Brecher et. al. identifies four issue areas: military-security, political-diplomatic, economic-development and cultural-status. See Mansbach and Vasquez, p. 35 and Brecher, M., Blema Steinberg and J. Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 13, Number 1, March 1969, pp. 75-101. Also see Holsti, K. J., *The Dividing Discipline*, Allen & Unwin, Inc., Boston, 1987, pp. 46-47 for more on issue areas.

[25] *op. cit.*, Rosenau, 1966, p. 77.

unimportant, what is important, however, is the recognition that each issue area will have "...different political structures that may be more or less insulated from the overall distribution of economic and military capabilities."[26] Each issue area is so constructed that the power distribution between organisations may make an organisation more effective in one area than in another. Yet, the power distribution may be reversed between the same organisations in a different issue area.

This discussion on the various types of aggregations, intended and unintended, the roles these aggregations may have (primitive, modified primitive or derivative) and the nature of the issues they may deal with provides the basis for a discussion for how ethnic groups may operate within the world of interdependence. The language used thus far may refer to any group, so there as yet has been no limit set. A discussion of ethnicity and interdependence will, however, set limitations on how interdependence is viewed. The nature of issues, however, is not limited by ethnicity; it is worth examining how issues operate within an interdependent world.

Interdependence and Issues

Some groups are better suited for dealing with issues than others, thus the criteria by which such suitability might be determined require analysis. Within the context of anti-apartheid it may be true that the issue is important to many, but it is probably more salient to black Americans than to, for example, Italian Americans. The NAACP may speak with great emotion and persuasiveness on the issue of apartheid, yet there are other black American groups better qualified and with more ability to speak to the issue directly. TransAfrica is probably better suited to addressing black American interests on the issue of apartheid than the NAACP. Yet, on the other hand, the NAACP may be more qualified to address federal government adherence to the Voting Rights Act. The reason this is so is due primarily to what may be termed issue authority, where issue authority is defined as 1) the size of the aggregation collected to deal with the given issue, 2) existence of derivative or primitive roles, with the primitive role being the more directly related to the issue at hand being the more authoritative, and 3) the ability to direct micro units in concert

[26] *op. cit.*, Keohane and Nye, p. 50.

towards the issue at hand. While the NAACP is probably larger in membership than TransAfrica, and certainly older and better known, it does not possess a primitive role in the area of anti-apartheid or foreign policy. Furthermore, the NAACP is primarily a domestic organisation and therefore has few, if any, relations with organisations across state boundaries. Finally, the NAACP does not engage in long term direction of its membership on issues concerning anti-apartheid. Therefore, it can be said that the NAACP, on the issue of anti-apartheid, is not issue authoritative. It can also be said that TransAfrica possess all the necessary attributes to be considered issue authoritative on anti-apartheid.[27]

A final area of importance in the field of issue authority is whether or not an organisation leads or is led in any given endeavour. Quite simply a hierarchy of authority within an issue area can be arranged whereby the most authoritative is placed at the top and the least at the bottom. The most authoritative organisation is the one which initiates the action, or a plurality of the actions, upon which the aggregation acts. TransAfrica's issue authority remains to be seen, both in the context of black America, as well as in the context of anti-apartheid. It remains to be seen whether or not TransAfrica has a wider issue authority, one that influences beyond black America and the anti-apartheid movement, and extends further into the foreign policy agenda of the US.

Issue authority concerns the actions of a group that seeks to wield influence. This is different from the structure of an issue, issue authority is not enough to push forward an issue on to the political agenda. For an issue to gain access to the political agenda it must possess certain characteristics which are: 1) specificity, 2) "...scope of social significance...", 3) relevance, 4) complexity, and 5) "...the degree of categorical precedence...."[28] Specificity refers to how clearly

---

[27] It is also possible for a group to gain some issue authority, not because they gain that status from within the group they represent, but because governments or others groups grant them issue authority. In other words, issue authority can be influenced by the actions of a government. In the case of the NAACP, the government could refuse to discuss black American wishes on policy towards South Africa with any group except the NAACP. Thus, the NAACP would have acquired a certain amount of issue authority because of their access to government. Whether or not black Americans would accept their issue authority is quite another issue.

[28] Cobb, Roger W., and Charles D. Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1983, pp. 96-97. Access is gained to the issue agenda in any number of ways, the characteristics listed here refer, perhaps, more to the issue agenda of the established groups with access to government. Surely there are issues which possess all of these characteristics, yet fail to make their way onto the issue agenda. Teenage unemployment is such an issue where there is a great deal of specificity, it is socially significant, relevant, simple to understand, and one for which there is a considerable amount of categorical precedence. Yet, despite this there is little consideration of the issue. What then is missing? Could it be that there is, at present, no organised group or interest with access to the halls of governmental power that could represent the issue to officials. Thus, in general, Cobb and Elder's model is a useful tool, but fails to ac-

defined an issue is, for example freedom versus the right for all South Africans to vote, the latter being the more specific. The scope of social significance refers to "...whether an issue is peculiar to the immediate disputants or has more general significance."[29] An example of social significance would be the comparison between unemployment of all US citizens versus unemployment of black teenage youth in the inner cities, with the former having the broader scope. Relevance "...denotes the extent to which an issue has short range, circumstantial relevance or more enduring, fundamental relevance."[30] The immediate concern of many in the anti-apartheid movement relates to the imposition of sanctions, whereas the more fundamental question concerns exactly how apartheid will be dismantled and how a new government will be created. Thus, even when issues are put in short term objectives, they possess long term implications.[31] Complexity "...concerns how an issue will be delineated along a continuum from the highly complex and technical to the simple and easily understood."[32] The issue of sanctions is easily understood, there is nothing complex when the anti-apartheid movement employs the term sanctions. It should be noted that from a public relations point of view sanctions is easily understood, it may be quite another matter when one considers the technical problems in implementing sanctions. In discussing the complexity of any issue one must be careful to identify whether or not one is speaking of the public audience or that of the policy maker - complexity will vary due to the sophistication of the target audience. Finally, there is categorical precedence, which "...indicates the extent to which an issue is a routine matter having more or less clear precedents...or, conversely, the extent to which it is extraordinary."[33] Issues that have obvious precedents are easier to manage than those which do not have such obvious precedents. In the case of anti-apartheid sanctions there are obvious precedents, for example, US agreed to UN sanctions against Rhodesia, in order to bring about an

---

count for all issues under all conditions. Perhaps its strength is in its ability to highlight those groups that fail to gain access.

[29] *ibid.*, p. 97. Also see Ahrari, Mohammed, "U.S. Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East", *Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Mohammed Ahrari, Greenwood, New York, 1987, p. 4 for a discussion of Cobb and Elder's model of issue formation and influence.

[30] *op. cit.*, Cobb and Elder, p. 98.

[31] *ibid.*, p. 98.

[32] *ibid.*, pp. 98-99.

[33] *ibid.*, p. 100.

end to the war there and a majority rule government.

The structure of an issue has been examined, as has issue authority. What now needs addressing is the agenda into which the issue moves. What is an agenda in the interdependent world? Mansbach and Vasquez offer a useful model of such an agenda, which they call the global agenda. They define an agenda as "...proposals for allocating stakes in issues over which actors are contending."[34] A global agenda, then, is "...defined as those issues and associated proposals that attract serious attention for either a large number of actors or from those capable of resolving the claims. In other words, the global agenda consists of those elements of individual actors' agenda that overlap."[35] Thus, a global agenda is simply an aggregation of individual agendas, and is created by the greatest overlap among them. There is no hierarchy among the elements on the agenda. The global agenda, as discussed here, does not represent any organised system, rather it simply reflects that agendas are thrown together into what seems to be an unorganised morass. Many issues find themselves on the global agenda, not because of some inherent quality all their own, but rather because they are on the agendas of many states. Therefore, anti-apartheid is on the global agenda, not because of any inherent qualities of its own, but rather because it is on the individual agendas of so many different actors.[36]

In discussing the concept of complex interdependence, it was pointed out that in such a situation there was no hierarchy of issues. The five characteristics of issues helps to illustrate just why that might be the case. Clearly, the issue of anti-apartheid is seen in various lights in the US, and equally seen in a variety of different lights elsewhere. While the issue may be phrased in exactly the same way, for example, it is interpreted differently in two different states. In one state it may be seen as highly socially significant, whereas in another not so significant. Exactly what importance each of these five dimensions do take on is a function of how they are perceived, what pressures are placed on decision makers, the degree of issue authority those representing the issue

[34] Mansbach, Richard W. and John A. Vasquez, *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1981, p. 93.

[35] *ibid.*, p. 94.

[36] Perhaps the best indicator is the Committee Against Apartheid established by the UN. The existence of the Committee suggests, if not world wide consensus on the importance of apartheid, at least a plurality of members states of the UN

possess, and what contending alternatives exist. Likewise, their position on the global agenda is more a product of perception than anything else. That anti-apartheid is on the global agenda is not surprising, but the reasons for its being there, and in what ways its presence is manifested is indeterminate, due primarily to the number of actors involved. In sum, it is obvious that there are a variety of aggregations or actors, each possessing a different perception of what the important issues are. For purposes here one particular type of group generates interest - the ethnic group - how is it formed and what issues may be of importance to it and what impact does it have on an interdependent world?

Ethnicity

The process of unintended aggregation describes well the situation found among ethnic groups. These groups form, not out of choice, but out of circumstance. Once formed, however, there may be intentional aggregation on the part of some members of the ethnic group for any number of purposes. The question arises what is an ethnic group? What importance does it have in an interdependent world?

An ethnic group is composed of members who share common social and historical backgrounds, who are bound together by common decent, may share a common language, and whose aggregation is unintended. Furthermore, the concept of race interacts with that of ethnicity, thus making definitions more difficult. In the above definition it can be argued that one can loose one's ethnic identity by choice, namely one can 'write out of existence' one's ethnic background by changing a name, altering the style of dress, and so on. Race, on the other hand, is not so easily manipulated, one cannot change one's skin colour, or hair and so on. Yet there is no clear cut separation between ethnicity and race, because both are also influenced by the social setting. Thus, a member of the African/black race in North America, may be considered 'coloured' in South Africa, or even 'white' in Brazil depending upon the social perception of his skin, hair, etc. What this suggests is that there is a high degree of social difference between cultures on how race and ethnicity is determined. It is not the purpose here to solve what is otherwise a considerable dispute among academics.[37] For purposes here the terms 'ethnic' and 'sociohistorical group' will

[37] For a discussion of the various theoretical perspectives on ethnicity see Omi, Michael and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York, 1986, especially pages 14-24.

be used interchangeably. Thus, from this definition of an ethnic group it can be understood that one may speak of an ethnic group as consisting of Jews, Cajuns, Basque's, black Americans, and so on. Each of these groups have shared social and historical backgrounds, and have ascribed memberships to their respective ethnic groups.[38] Being a member of an ethnic group fosters a sense of identity, thus creating in the mind of the ethnic member a sense of being that is based upon notions such as what one is instead of what one does and where one lives, etc.[39] The ethnic identity forms the basis for the development of differing visions of the world, based upon shared social and historical backgrounds of ethnic groups members. This identity may be translated into political groups, that is, intended aggregation may be undertaken by members of an ethnic group, for the purpose of protecting or expanding their identities. That there is a political component to ethnic groups is reflected in the following definition of an ethnic group - "...an ethnic group is a distinct cultural minority that wishes to protect its identity and promote its interests politically within the larger society."[40] The above definition gives as the main objective of an ethnic group the political protection of itself. This self awareness brings into being the obvious necessity to engage in intended aggregation. Not only is the political process of ethnic group politics an intended aggregation, but it is also an articulated aggregation. Rosenau defines an articulated aggregation as one which is "...organized in such a way that action can be continuously taken on the behalf of their collective interests."[41]

The development of an articulated aggregation, as part of an ethnic group, is an important step, in as much as it is the articulated aggregation that speaks for ethnic group members. It engages in political discourse, seeks to organise ethnic group members for specific purposes and

---

[38] This emphasis upon social and historical background is based upon the work of Omi and Winant, where they steer clear of many theoretical pitfalls by labelling race a sociohistorical concept. Thus labelled, race becomes a more fluid concept, which can fit under sociohistorical group. A sociohistorical group may also include ethnic groups, thus joining both ethnic and racial groups into one unit of analysis. This is substantially different from the opinion that holds ethnic groups to be fundamentally different from racial groups. For example it is argued by Pettigrew that given the separateness of blacks and whites that "This...highlights a major, though often ignored, point: American black-white relations are qualitatively, not simply quantitatively, different from ethnic relations." See Pettigrew, Thomas F., "Integration and Pluralism," eds. Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A. Taylor, *Eliminating Racism*, Plenum Press, New York, 1988, p. 23.

[39] Suhrke, Astri and Lela Garner Noble, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*, Praeger, New York, 1977, p. 4.

[40] Roucek, Joseph S., and Bernard Eisenberg, "Introduction: The New Awareness", *America's Ethnic Awareness*, eds. Joseph S. Roucek and Bernard Eisenberg, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1982, p. 2.

[41] *op. cit.*, Rosenau, 1980, pp. 146-147.

carries out efforts in the name of the ethnic group. Articulation also requires that the aggregation, speaking for a larger group, engage in a programme of propaganda, or a method of influence, in order to foster its own interests, as well as defend itself against groups who may be opposed.[42] The articulated aggregation represents, through the presentation of issues, the underlying needs of the group. Thus, issues may take on important characteristics in the context of ethnic groups, they may have intrinsic qualities, thus taking on greater importance for the group than otherwise understood. An ethnic groups' demands may be perceived as having only instrumental characteristics, that is the demands or desires may appear to have only bargaining value, as opposed to more basic and intrinsic value.[43] Should the state question or ignore the intrinsic qualities of an ethnic issue the state risks losing any legitimacy in the eyes of the ethnic group. Confusing or purposely misleading states or other groups about what is intrinsic or what is instrumental has benefits for the ethnic group. It may provide a stronger bargaining position for the ethnic group engaged in any given political debate. Thus, the implications of intrinsic versus instrumental may have grave consequences for the state, as well as the international system. By manipulating either the intrinsic or instrumental, and being involved in seeking to assert its interests, and ethnic group influences the future of the state. Therefore,

> As long as the nation-state is recognized as the norm - and principal actor - of the international system, a "domestic" conflict that even implicitly questions that norm and the nature of that actor ceases to be purely "domestic" and automatically acquires international dimensions.[44]

This is so because any group that seeks to alter the nature of the state seeks to alter the nature of the international system. Thus, when an articulated aggregation seeks to change it status within a state and does so because the state is itself called into question, then that aggregation seeks to alter the international system. "Notions of a unitary actor and the submersion of multinational loyalties, even in plural societies, are basic assumptions of the realist school."[45] This creates a paradox, one

---

[42] Truman, David, *The Governmental Process*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1964, p. 213.

[43] *op. cit.*, Mansbach and Vasquez, pp. 103-106 where the authors lay out a model for issue salience. One of the characteristics of issue salience is "...the extent to which these stakes are sought for intrinsic or instrumental purposes." *ibid.*, p. 103.

[44] *op. cit.*, Suhrke and Noble, p. 5.

[45] Watanabe, Paul Y., *Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1984, p. 5, also see p. 174n for discussion of race, ethnicity and the realist school.

that conveniently leads back to interdependence theory. Thus, if the state is considered the norm and the principal actor in the international system, then how can one rectify the actions of the ethnic group? How can a non-state actor significantly influence a state dominated system? Clearly, the state is not the principal nor dominant actor, it is simply an actor in a system with many other types of actors. What is important to remember, however, is that the conclusion that when an ethnic group questions the existence of the state, it still influences the international system, even though the state may not be the principal actor. This is so simply because the existence of an international actor is being questioned, which thus brings that situation out into the international community. This 'internationalization' would exist if, instead of a state, the legitimacy of a large multinational corporate take over were being questioned. Both influence and effect the international environment, but to varying degrees. In sum,

> ...the persistence of ethnic interests often challenges the alleged primacy, at least for notable ethnic sectors, of both class and national identifications as mobilizers of group action. Especially on foreign policy issues affecting ancestral homelands and one's "people," both class and national identifications may become attenuated while ethnic interests come to the fore.[46]

The case of TransAfrica, as a representative of an ethnic group, can be made in the following way. Black Americans have as a major concern the legitimacy of many US policies, for example during "...the late 1970's, ...black leaders continued to contrast sharply with those of the majority of Americans on major issues of economic policy and minority gains."[47] This dissensus along with statements such as those made by Rev. King, labelling the US government the most violent in the world, clearly indicate a calling into question of the legitimacy of the US government in relation to representing the interests of black Americans.[48] The civil rights movement was an attempt to amend the laws of the US, which had the effect of removing roadblocks to international legitimacy. What was discovered by some black Americans, however, was that the legitimacy of the US did not rest solely on legal matters. There were deeper rifts

---

[46] *ibid.*, p. 5.

[47] *op. cit.*, Roucek and Eisenberg, p. 17.

[48] For more on King on the Vietnam War see Garrow, David J., *Being the Cross: Marting Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1988, pp. 527-574.

between black Americans and other Americans than the legal impediments to political and economic participation.

Central to the dispute between the US government and TransAfrica is a disagreement over which issue area should dominate relations with South Africa. For TransAfrica the central issue is group status, whereas for the US government the central issue is economic protection and regulation. Thus, a situation arises where "trade-and-aid" issues are opposed to "racial relevance" issues.[49] Rosenau predicts that

> Other things being equal, the more the top policy-making positions of a society require their occupants to attach racial relevance to external situations, the less likely will they be inclined to take account of economic considerations and thus the greater will be the foreign conflict behavior they undertake or recommend.[50]

Thus, what is suggested here is that should the US shift its emphasis away from the issue area of economic protection and regulation and towards group maintenance, a group maintenance that has as its central core racial or ethnic issues, the more likely it is that the US government would enter into conflict behaviour with South Africa. This is clearly indicated in the move towards sanctions against South Africa, which after all are seen as inherently conflictual. Whether or not this is desirable depends upon whether or not one is willing to view conflict as an acceptable phenomena.

Thus, it seems that ethnicity is a force which does indeed influence the behaviour of states, as well as other groups. Ethnic groups may seek to alter a situation in order to achieve greater protection for their identity. In this process, they challenge the ruling order and thus influence the international system. Ethnic groups influence the US through a variety of means, but the most direct and of greatest concern here is ethnic group influence using interest group politics. Thus, it is necessary to consider how interest group politics operate in the US and how ethnic groups may make use of this system.

---

[49] Rosenau, James N., *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, Frances Pinter Publishers Ltd., London, 1980A, p. 425.

[50] *ibid.*, p. 439.

Pluralism and Interest Group Politics in the US

Earlier it was argued that relationships that crossed national boundaries were far more complex than relationships between states. Not only do states interact with one another, but a wide variety of aggregated or organised interests also interact with states, other organised interests or a combination of the two. The task at hand is to join together two disparate schools, one representing the realm of transnational actors and the other representing domestic actors. What Rosenau called articulated aggregations can otherwise be called organised interests, pressure groups, or interest groups. The terminology at this point can be very confusing, so in order to clarify the confusion some definitions are in order.

Unfortunately, different people mean different things when using the terms interest group, pressure group, and organised interests. "Political scientists have disputed whether the better term is 'pressure' or 'interest' group, and some have suggested that the term 'interest group' should be reserved for economic groups such as business or labour."[51] Another difference, perhaps, between pressure and interest groups is that one group may be representing business or other non-voluntary, non-membership based groups, whereas another group may indeed be representing just such a body. The focus of this work is on membership based groups and so little will be said about business and labour groups. All these groups operate in the context of the American pluralist political system, which means that the system is designed in such a way as to encourage group formation and the interaction between groups and governments.[52] The primary focus for these groups is Congress, in as much as Congress has many more points of contact available than other parts of government, and more importantly, Congressmen are more susceptible to changes in the behaviour of the electorate (since their electorate is smaller than the President's, it takes less influence on the part of a group to influence the outcome of an election, thus Congressmen live

[51] Wilson, Graham K., *Interest Groups in the United States*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981, p. 4. There has been much written on this subject, Peter Willetts in his essay entitled "Pressure Groups as Transnational Actors" lays out a taxonomy of groups including sectional economic groups, professional associations, recreational, welfare agencies, religious organisations, communal, political parties, and specific issue promotional groups. See Willetts, Peter, "Pressure Groups as Transnational Actors," *Pressure Groups in the Global System*, ed. Peter Willetts, Frances Pinter Publishers, London, 1982, pp. 1-27. This taxonomy is not used here because it is clumsy and is perhaps too limited to the western experience.

[52] As before, there is a question as to just how open the system really is. If nothing else, the system is designed to encourage the formation and interaction of *some* groups, within a given socioeconomic and ideological range.

under the constant threat of being voted out of office).[53] Thus, in an interdependent world, the US may be very suspectable to the influences of transnational movements and policies.[54]

In order to understand how the interdependent world makes itself felt in the US political system, it is important to understand what the entry points are and how they may be described.[55] The major entry point is the interest or pressure group. What follows is a discussion of those groups. Some would have it that pressure groups represent altruistic objectives, as opposed to the self-interest of business and labour.[56] Yet again, some would see pressure group, interest group and organised interest as interchangeable.[57] Out of this confusion come several points. First, it is obvious that groups exist that represent somebody to government, with the purpose of influencing government decisions. Second, some of these groups have members who join the group as a by-product of their voluntary membership in some other group. For example, physicians may join the American Medical Association, they do so because they first made the voluntary decision to become doctors, and only later joined the AMA as a by-product of their voluntary decision. These groups are in many ways different from groups that can be called primarily voluntary. There are groups which seek members, but place no restrictions on what type of individual is seeking membership. The only prerequisite to membership is a willingness to join that group; there are no intervening prerequisites. Thus, many animal rights groups do not require members to own animals, to have educational or professional backgrounds, they need only feel the impulse to join.

---

[53] Congress is the primary target of membership groups, who may be dealing with non-technical issues. Groups representing the interests of business or labour may focus more on technical issues, and therefore be more interested in issues of regulation and large legislation.

[54] For a useful discussion on the various schools of thought regarding US pluralist theory, see Kelso, William Alton, *American Democratic Theory*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1978, especially pages 3-36 in that these provide the basic overview. Also useful is McKay, David, *Politics and Power in the USA*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, UK, 1987, pp. 125-150, especially pp. 133-142. Kelso argues that US pluralism is not a free market for the competition of political groups, but rather that it is skewed towards interests that possess the resources to compete in the system. It is held that pluralism is composed of groups, some of which may achieve dominance in the marketplace of political influence. These groups may then freeze out other groups which may otherwise seek entry into the marketplace.

[55] It would be incorrect to argue that only the US was susceptible to the influences of an interdependent world. Indeed, it is argued by Skjelsback that "Economically developed, pluralistic societies are clearly more likely to have a multitude of national interest groups than are less developed, less pluralistic societies. In addition, these societies are also more likely to have interest groups that will expand transnationally." See Skjelsback, Kjell, "The Growth of International Nongovernmental Organization in the Twentieth Century", *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, eds. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1981, p. 84. Clearly, the more pluralistic the society, the more access points are open to transnational influence. Thus, pluralism is a major engine of interdependence.

[56] *op. cit.*, Wilson, p. 4.

[57] Schlozman, Kay Lehrman, and John T. Tierney, *Organized Interest and American Democracy*, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, pp. 9-12.

A distinction can be made between a voluntary interest group and a pressure group. The voluntary interest group possesses a membership which joins based solely on a voluntary basis, there is no compulsion to join, no prior status required of the member. Under the heading of voluntary interest group there may be a subheading, where there may be quasi-voluntary groups, where individuals join because of some other group membership (which is itself voluntary). These two groups are different from a pressure group, where a group represents a whole class of individuals whether they wish to be represented or not. From the standpoint of a pressure group, those being represented are not volunteers, rather the volunteering is done by the pressure group on someone else's behalf. Pressure groups, of course, may have members, but their joining makes no difference on the issue of who the group claims to represent. The interest group is labelled as such because it represents the self-interests of its members, whereas the pressure group gets its name by virtue of the pressure it applies on behalf of all people. Admittedly, the labels are somewhat arbitrary, but the point still stands, there is a difference between the kinds of groups that seek to represent and influence government. For purposes here, interest groups and pressure groups will be used interchangeably when discussing TransAfrica, this despite the fact that TransAfrica is a pressure group given the above taxonomy.[58].

The US Constitution and its implementation creates fertile ground for the development and operation of aggregated groups. This is not the place to go into the Constitutional arrangements that make the development of aggregated groups possible, these arrangements are well known.[59] The point that is most open and available for aggregated groups is the Legislature, namely Congress. It is Congress that must pass legislation into law, appropriate funds for such legislation, amend bills, sponsor bills, and otherwise empower and make possible future action by the other branches of government.

---

[58] Unfortunately, the label of 'interest group' is used both as a major category and a sub-heading within the same category. So, the interest group label both represents a whole set of groups that behave politcally, as well as the specific sub-heading of those political groups which represent the interests of business, etc.

[59] Perhaps the most instructive on the development of groups within a Constitutional framework is articulated by James Madison in *Federalist Papers* Number 10 and Number 51, in *The Federalist*, Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay and James Madison, Everyman's Library, J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1937.

The number of groups present in Washington, D.C., with close access to Congress has risen considerably over time. "Fully 40 percent of the organizations having offices in Washington have been founded since 1960 and 25 percent since 1970."[60] In percentage terms the groups that have grown most are citizen's groups, social welfare and civil rights groups, increasing by 67 percent, 79 percent and 56 percent respectively since 1960.[61] This growth has occurred for a variety of reasons, some possible are: 1) greater interest in political issues and a decline in party allegiance, 2) increased affluence bringing into question aspects of life previously labelled as uneconomic for change, 3) increased willingness of the middle class to become interested in politics, 4) changes in technology making access to citizens and decision makers easier.[62] Yet, while these groups have grown in number, they have not spread their interest in the US populace evenly. The oft quoted Schattschneider claimed "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent."[63] Indeed, this contention is upheld, where "only 10 percent of those who never went beyond grade school, as opposed to 73 percent of those with graduate training, are organization members."[64] This corresponds to the socioeconomic model of participation, where participation in the political process is said to be "...highly skewed in the direction of upper-status groups."[65] Thus, the more we move up the scale of status, the more we would expect increasing levels of participation, and conversely the lower the status then the lower the participation. Generally speaking this is true, yet there is a notable exception. One would expect that black Americans, because of their over-representation on the lower end of the status scales, to have overall lower levels of participation. Yet Verba and Nie discovered that blacks

> ...participate less than whites but more than one would expect given their social and economic conditions. And among those blacks who manifest some consciousness of group identification, the rate of participation is as high as that of whites and higher than one would expect given their other social characteristics.[66]

---

[60] *op. cit.*, Schlozman and Tierney, p. 75.

[61] *ibid.*, p. 75.

[62] *op. cit.*, Wilson, p. 86.

[63] Schattschneider quoted in Gamson, William A., *The Strategy of Social Protest*, Dorsey Press, Homewood, Illinois, 1975, p. 9.

[64] *op. cit.*, Schlozman and Tierney, p. 60.

[65] Verba, Sidney and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987, p. 14.

[66] *ibid.*, p. 159.

It seems reasonable to point out that there are intervening factors that may increase participation of less well off groups. One possible factor for the relatively higher rate of political participation, when one accounts for factors such as wealth, education and so on, is ethnicity. Ethnicity then becomes, in words of Milton Gordon, a situation of "...man defending the honour or welfare of his ethnic group is man defending himself."[67] Ethnicity, in conclusion, generates a tendency towards self-protection that may not be found among non-ethnics, which may lead to behaviour not found in other groups lacking the sociohistorical bond. In some instances this self-protecting behaviour is joined to a myriad of other groups, drawn mostly from the middle class, who seek to defend their interests before Congress. Therefore, for ethnic groups to wield any influence, they must fight their way through the jungle of middle class, business and labour interests. This is true in policies that are considered the exclusive realm of 'domestic' politics, as well as those considered in the realm of 'foreign'.

US Foreign Policy

US foreign policy making has been dominated, since 1945, primarily by the office of the President. While Congress has not had an unimportant role, the President has been the one to possess the lion's share of power. As an illustration of the power of the Presidency military force has been used abroad 165 times by 1970 (of course added to that are two operations in Lebanon, several incidents with Libya, the Grenada action, the hostage rescue attempt in Iran, and so on.)[68] Furthermore, over 1,100 treaties have been signed, with the Executive signing over 5,000 executive agreements between 1940 and 1970, thus bypassing Congressional oversight.[69] Furthermore, the Executive has the most direct access, and Constitutional mandate to run the instruments of statecraft, namely the military, State Department, the Department of Defense, the

---

[67] *op. cit.*, Watanabe, p. 10.

[68] Hodgson, Godfrey, "Congress and American Foreign Policy", The Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Chatham House Papers*, Number 2, London, 1979, p. 2.

[69] *ibid.*, p. 2. As a further illustration of the dominance of the Executive over the Senate see Johnson, L.K., *The Making of International Agreements: Congress Confronts the Executive*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1984. Johnson argues that for many of the more important international agreements that the Presidency has taken over from the Senate, leaving the Senate to ratify treaties that are regarded as less significant. This, however, is clearly not the case in the instances of arms control treaties, though it could be the case of the Panama Canal Treaty, where one could argue that that treaty carries only *de jure* importance.

Central Intelligence Agency, and others.[70] Thus, there are obvious Constitutional and bureaucratic reasons as to why the Executive has possessed such a strong hold over foreign policy. It is due to this centralisation that foreign policy has been considered the realm for those in the know, and not open for the general public.[71] Few can gain access to the White House to make their influence felt, and those that do possess sufficient power have had access for some time and so have already made themselves felt.[72] For ethnic lobbies, the centralisation of power in the hands of the President has meant that many groups have not been able to use their influence, though there have been some notable exceptions such as the 'Israeli' lobby. Thus, the ethnic lobbies, as with others, must turn to Congress in order to make themselves heard and felt.

Several overriding and contradictory themes found in US foreign policy since independence include isolationism, and the more outward looking internationalism, imperialism, and interventionism, though for purposes here the last three will be conceptually drawn together under internationalism.[73] Since 1945 the isolationist theme has not been a dominant component of US foreign policy. Indeed, isolationist thought has not been able to gain a foothold since 1945 (though this does not mean that the tradition of isolationism is dead, but rather that it has not been able to gain ascendancy). The relative strength of US internationalism may be driven by anti-communism, or it is possible that anti-communism is driven by internationalism, or finally, there may be an interaction between the two. In 1947 the US made firm its commitment to opposing

---

[70] See Nincic, Miroslav, *United States Foreign Policy: Choices and Tradeoffs*, CQ Press, Washington, D.C., 1988, pp. 10-19 for more on the instruments of foreign policy. For a more detailed discussion also see Kegley, Jr., Charles, W. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1987, pp. 80-146.

[71] There is some evidence that indicates that the public is more in the know than previously has been the case. Levering argues that the US public is better educated, more sophisticated, and better travelled than in the past. Thus, he states: "Perhaps the most hopeful development during the past sixty years has been the increased sophistication of large portions of the public in regard to foreign affairs." See Levering, Ralph B., *The Public and American Foreign Policy , 1918 - 1978*, William Morrow & Co., Inc., New York, 1978, p. 159. Despite this increased sophistication, there still is little general interest in foreign policy matters among the US public. See *op. cit.*, Nincic, pp. 59-61 for more on US public disinterest in foreign policy matters.

[72] There is evidence that indicates that Democratic Presidents are somewhat more open and available to ethnic groups, though this is not always the case. TransAfrica, as will be illustrated later, was able to gain access to the Carter White House, primarily because the electoral role played by black Americans in Carter's victory.

[73] *op. cit.*, Kegley and Wittkopf, 1987, pp. 36-39. To some internationalism may be seen as an extension of Wilsonian policies including involvement and use of the United Nations. Imperialism refers to a broad range of events including the Spanish American War, seizure of Puerto Rico, the Phillipines, and Cuba. There is also the neo-imperialist perspective of US expansionism represented by Cold War involvement in Korea and Vietnam. Finally, one can view interventionism as simply US involvement in a variety of foreign areas as an outgrowth of *realpolik* thinking. It is unimportant here to determine which label best fits, what is important to illustrate is that there has been a tension between looking into the US and looking outside the US.

communist or Soviet expansion, and thus its commitment to an internationalist perspective. This commitment stemmed from the deteriorating security situation in Greece and Turkey, and the UK government's inability to continue to assist these countries with economic aid. Therefore, in 1947 President Truman called for aid to both Turkey and Greece. He also proclaimed, "I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugations by armed minorities or by outside pressure."[74] Thus, in addition to protecting US interests and securing US markets around the world, US foreign policy has been aimed at halting the perceived threat of communism. This commitment to internationalism, and avoidance of isolationism, is protected and furthered by the preponderance of Presidential power in foreign policy. Thus the President is insulated from many sectional interests that might otherwise seek to impose an isolationist, or at least non-internationalist perspective on US foreign policy.

Presidential power, however, is not as rock solid as one might think. The Executive's power in foreign policy matters rests primarily on four pillars, one being the President's role as commander in chief of the armed forces, secondly, his role as head of the US bureaucracy, thirdly, his Constitutionally mandated task of negotiating treaties, and fourthly his relationship with Congress. The first three of these 'powers' are legally sanctioned and are best viewed as Presidential authorities, whereas the fourth and perhaps the most important, is not a legally sanctioned authority, yet it carries considerable influence over Presidential ability or power to wield his legally sanctioned roles. Congress possesses the role of allocating funds, raising taxes to supply the needs of the Executive, and the Senate is responsible for ratifying treaties and approving Presidential appointments. The Congress, then, carries considerable ability to influence and control Presidential actions. Furthermore, Congress holds the key to declaring war on other states, which may or may not be important as wars which are conducted without Congressional approval raises whether or not this role is important. In many ways Congress can be said to be the body that sanctions and sanctifies Presidential actions. In the past Congress has been somewhat unwilling to use its role as sanctifier, or rather, it has been unwilling to desanctify Presidential

[74] Truman quoted in Spanier, John, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, CBS College Publishing, New York, 1983, p. 31.

actions. Only in a few cases has Congress acted against Presidential wishes in major foreign policy actions, as for example, when the Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles following World War I. Throughout the past 25 years, however, Congress has been asserting itself in the foreign policy world, and especially as sanctifier in a far greater number of foreign policy questions than hitherto. Thus, with Congress playing a more active role and seeking to curtail Presidential power in the making of foreign policy, questions of the conduct of US foreign policy become far more complex as they have a greater number of influences bearing upon them. One such influence is that of ethnic aggregations and their representatives seeking to influence foreign policy decisions through Congress.

Pathway to Influence: Congress

It may be useful for ethnic groups to create an articulated aggregation, indeed, it should not be surprising when that does occur. What is needed, however, for the ethnic group to be effective in defending its identity, is access to those in power. In the US that access is gained most easily through Congress. Easy access to Congress comes because of the number of access points - there are a larger number of elected decision makers in Congress who are in contact with the public than in any other part of the government. Over the past twenty five years Congress has become much more accessible than in the past, this is due to a number of reforms that have taken place during that twenty five year period.

During the late 1960's and early 1970's there was, within Congress, a considerable degree of pressure demanding reform of the ways in which Congress considered and enacted legislation. While there were many reforms that took place of primary interest are in those reforms that influence the conduct of foreign policy. American foreign policy has been described as the "shuttlecock of American politics."[75] While the Executive may enter into negotiations with other governments, it is the Senate that must ratify treaties, the Executive may seek to supply foreign aid, but it is Congress which appropriates the funds - neither the Executive or Congress is able to

[75] Whalen, C. W., *The House and Foreign Policy: The Irony of Congressional Reform*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1982, p. 11.

conduct foreign policy on their own, the restrictions of the Constitution demand that they both remain uneasy bedfellows. The contest is not over who runs foreign policy, but rather over who leads. Many of the reforms in the foreign policy area affected the President's ability to dominate foreign policy.

As the Vietnam war wound down and the domestic entanglement of Watergate spread, Congress asserted itself into the realm of foreign policy.[76] The most striking shift from Presidential power came in the guise of the 1973 War Powers Act, which curtailed the President's ability to engage in military action outside the US without Congressional approval.[77] Other changes, though less dramatic, have also altered the face of foreign policy conduct. Two significant changes occurred in Congress, one was the opening of all subcommittee and committee hearings to the public (with the exception of national security issues and discussion involving 'personal character'),[78] and the recording of floor votes on bill amendments.[79] Not only, then, were hearings a matter of public record, but so too were the opinions and statements of individual House members. Subcommittees and committees could be used as public platforms, pressuring for a particular cause or policy.[80] The recording of floor votes also placed the opinions and behaviour of each member of the House on public display, again opening them to greater pressure from outside.

On the fiscal side Congress also asserted itself. With the passage of the Congressional Budget Act (1974), Congress was able to limit and to a certain level control the spending of appropriated funds by the President. The Act allowed Congress to "...control presidential impoundments...", which has previously been used by the President to keep unspent money allocated by Congress for specific programmes.[81] Another area in which Congress has asserted

---

[76] See *ibid.*, pp. 10-25. Also see Abshire, David, "Foreign Policy Makers: President vs. Congress", *The Growing Power of Congress*, eds. David M. Abshire and Ralph D. Nurnberger, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, California, 1981, pp. 22-114, especially pp. 72-91.

[77] *op. cit.*, Whalen, pp. 40-42. The War Powers Act seems to have had little impact upon whether or not the US becomes involved in military actions. The War Powers Act may be best viewed as an insurgent Congress, seeking to erode Presidential power in the conduct of foreign policy.

[78] *ibid.*, p. 30.

[79] *ibid.*, p. 35.

[80] The power of the Congressional Committee can be seen the televising of the Iran-Contra hearings, and the impact those hearings had on the Reagan Administration.

[81] *ibid.*, p. 44.

itself in fiscal matters of foreign policy has been an increased willingness to cut off military and foreign aid assistance. A notable illustration of this was the Congressional action to cut off military aid to Turkey following the Turkish military intervention of Cyprus in 1974, contrary to Presidential wishes.[82] The end result of the process of reform was an increase in the public exposure of Congressional members, which in turn made them more vulnerable to public pressure.[83] Associated with this opening up process was a greater willingness on the part of Congress to take actions in the foreign policy world contrary to the desires of the Executive branch. Along with these changes came an increase in the efforts by interest groups to influence the creation of foreign policy.

Some of the major motivations for aggregated groups becoming involved in foreign policy are: 1) clear cut linkage between foreign policy and economic issues, 2) growing interdependence between groups (including ethnic ties), and 3) the decline of immediate support for foreign policies, associated with an increase in ideological commitments on the part of the American public.[84] Much of this has been mentioned above, it all amounts to a growing willingness to see the foreign policy area as one which is debatable. The manner in which aggregated groups address foreign policy has changed over time. Before the impact of Vietnam and Watergate took hold, and before and while Congressional reform was under way, organised groups were attending to issues of foreign policy. For example, the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) was involved in seeking to manipulate foreign policy to its own advantage. ITT lobbied members of the Nixon Administration to take actions against Chilean communist Salvador Allenda and his party.[85] While this type of attention to the Executive branch has not ceased, there has been over the years an increasing desire and logic to using Congress as access points for influence. Whether

---

[82] Purvis, Hoyt, "Tracing the Congressional Role: U.S. Foreign Policy and Turkey," *Legislating Foreign Policy*, eds. Hoyt Purvis and Steven J. Baker, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1984, p. 55. The battle between Congress and the Executive over the funding of the Contras is another example of Congressional insurgency into the realm of foreign policy.

[83] Other Congressional changes included the increase in the members of staff, increases in Congressional resources freeing them from the Executive, breakdown in party authority and an increase in the relative autonomy of members of Congress from any formal discipline.

[84] Uslaner, Eric M., "One Nation, Many Voices: Interest Groups in Foreign Policy Making," *Interest Group Politics*, eds. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C., 1986, p. 239.

[85] *op. cit.*, Wilson, p. 68. Allende was a Marxist-Leninist and was considered a threat to Western security by the Nixon Administration, and ITT believed him a threat to their corporate interests. ITT, of course, is far different from an altruistic pressure group.

the points of access are in the Executive or Legislative branches of government, one thing is certain, the only way interest groups can wield their influence is through the use of persuasion or propaganda.[86] As David Truman argues:

> Being almost inevitably minorities in the total population, organized interest groups must find some means of allying themselves with other groups and of mobilizing their "fellow-travelers" if they hope to compete successfully for the attention and indulgence of other groups and of government institutions.[87]

One way groups mobilize individuals and ally themselves with other groups is done through the work of the propagandist, the other being through the use of coalition building. The use of the term 'propagandist' should not be seen as necessarily pejorative, rather only descriptive. Yet, due to their minority status various interests in the US will seek to influence members, as well as those non-members who still adhere to the policies of a given interest. This has been true in domestic policy questions for some years, certainly since the New Deal years, and it is becoming more the case in foreign policy.

The rise of voluntary interest groups and pressure groups has taken on great importance in the world of foreign policy. For example, the nuclear freeze movement was a tremendously large and powerful (though some what short lived) aggregated group. The nuclear freeze movement, a coalition of peace groups with rekindled membership had lobbied Congress to pass resolutions calling for a freeze in the development and deployment of nuclear weapons. A non-binding resolution supported by the freeze movement had passed the House, the movement had also managed to have passed a variety of local legislation declaring various cities and townships as 'nuclear free zones.' While the movement failed to freeze the deployment of nuclear weapons it was able to pressure the Administration to modify "...its arms control proposals to make them somewhat more negotiable."[88] The nuclear freeze movement is illustrative of the growth of articulated aggregations with ideological commitments. It is also an example of a pressure group,

---

[86] The Judiciary is also a target of influence, though it is somewhat less pliant as the other two. As an example of the Judiciary's role as a target one need only look at the rise of the Civil Rights Movement and the central role played by the Judiciary as the means of effecting change.

[87] *op. cit.*, Truman, p. 214.

[88] Waller, Douglas C., *Congress and the Nuclear Freeze: An Inside Look at the Politics of a Mass Movement*, University of Massachussetts Press, Amherst, Massachussetts, 1987, p. 291.

in that the nuclear freeze movement claimed to speak for the interests of all people. A freeze supporter put it this way, "...the world's other problems become meaningless if we don't solve this one - and do it quickly."[89]

The pathway for pressure groups to influence is indeed through Congress, which has provided itself with increasing power and authority from which to act. Already the reforms instituted in Congress in the past 25 years make it a body upon which any number of influences can be brought to bear. No longer is foreign policy an area where Congress has little influence, and no longer is foreign policy dominated only by strategic interests. Sectional, domestic, and transnational concerns now bring their influence and energies to bear upon the actions and activities of Congress, which then influences the actions of other governmental and non-governmental agencies and bodies. While the Executive, including the White House and and bureaucracy, are still very much in command of the foreign policy process, they are increasingly subject to Congressional pressure and oversight. The pressures brought to bear on Congress are transferred to influence the behaviour of the Executive in the conduct of foreign policy.

The Domestic Sources of US Foreign Policy

The nuclear freeze movement, however, is an unusual example of aggregated group seeking to influence foreign policy. More typically existing groups, rather than *ad hoc* groups, seek to influence the Congressional role in foreign policy. This sort of involvement of interest groups in foreign policy matters is termed 'intermestic' politics.

> "Intermestic issues" refers to those matters of international relations which, by their very nature, closely involve the domestic economy of a nation. In the United States, such issues as international trade, oil imports, immigration, and transnational pollution (acid rain, etc.) are "intermestic" for they all combine American foreign relations with the state of economic health of the nation....[90]

---

[89] *ibid.*, p. 38.

[90] Barilleax, Ryan J., "The President, 'Intermestic' Issues, and the Risks of Policy Leadership", *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy*, eds. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1988, p. 178. Also see Bayless Manning, "The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals", *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 55, January, 1977, pp. 306-324. Manning coined the term 'intermestic affairs' and meant it to apply to economic interdependence.

Intermestic issues concern economic issues, which means that they include a considerable range of human activities. Given that intermestic issues concern areas of economy, it is not surprising to discover that Congress regards intermestic issues to be domestic ones.[91] Put another way, intermestic issues because of their localized repercussions influence the behaviour of a Congressman in much the same way as a plant closure would. Yet, it also demands that the Congressman deal with the issue, not only as a domestic one, but as a foreign policy issue as well. Thus, much of the Congressman's behaviour may be couched in the language of foreign policy, when in fact, much of his rationale for decision making is based on domestic concerns or vice versa. To talk about intermestic issues is to recognize the deeply interdependent nature of the world, and in this case, how it manifests itself in the domestic scene of the US.

Intermestic issues may not, however, concern themselves with only economic issues.[92] Indeed, limiting attention to economic issues may unnecessarily curtail the scope of study. The key factor of intermestic issues revolves around the functioning of foreign policy questions *as if* they were domestic issues. It is equally possible, or so it would seem, to have a domestic policy issue that functioned *as if* it were a foreign policy question. This too could be regarded an intermestic issue if intermestic issues were widened to include those issues that took on the characteristics of two seemingly opposed policy arenas - namely the mixing of foreign and domestic policy questions.

An illustration of intermestic affairs, where foreign policy takes on the characteristics of domestic policy is illustrated by many of the actions of the 'Jewish lobby'. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), representing Jewish Americans in support of Israel (and therefore perhaps better termed the Israeli lobby), has lobbied long and hard on a variety of issues.

---

[91] *op. cit.*, Barilleax, p. 187.

[92] Since it has been argued that interdependence is more than mere economic interdependence, it is reasonable to argue that intermestic affairs cover more than mere economic issues. An illustration of an issue which had little in the way of economic considerations was the end of detente, which, it has been argued, ended not because of only strategic considerations, but also much in response to domestic US activities. It is argued that "...detente was in many respects an aberration from the main thrust of American foreign policy..., and as such, was vulnerable to those forces in American political life which were inherently hostile towards Moscow." See Williams, Phil, "Detente and US Domestic Politics", *International Affairs*, Volume 61, Number 3, Summer 1985, pp. 431-432. Surely there are economic considerations, for the US, within the context of detente, but Williams argues that these were not over overriding importance in determining the fate of detente.

For example AIPAC worked to block the sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia (the sale was approved). In another example, AIPAC sought, with Senate assistance, to sponsor legislation that would tie "non-discriminatory trade [with the USSR] with freedom of emigration."[93] The bill was passed in the Senate and became law, and is now known as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1974. The legislation "...so angered the Soviets that, upon adoption..., they cancelled the 1972 Soviet-American trade agreement and stopped payment on World War II lend-lease debts."[94] It would be incorrect, however, to ascribe the passage Jackson-Vanik Amendment solely to the power of AIPAC. "The lobby succeeded in placing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment on the legislative agenda and having it adopted; however, that success was a function not only of lobby pressure, but also of the relative political weakness of..." the opponents of the Amendment.[95] Finally, the efforts of the American Agricultural Movement find their place in foreign policy discussions. Partly out of anger at governmental actions in putting in place grain embargos against the USSR and cutting off of farm aid packages to Poland and the USSR and continued neglect by various Administrations, farmers' organised in order that their interests were represented in Washington.[96] Obviously, farmers primary interests will be in domestic issues, yet they have a great deal to gain by foreign assistance and food sale programmes. In each case, the farmers and the Israeli lobby, the intermestic issues consisted of foreign policy issues which had adopted the characteristics of domestic concerns. As yet no example has been provided of an intermestic issue in which a domestic concern takes on the characteristic of a foreign policy issue. *The study of TransAfrica may provide such an example, where the domestic concerns of race are put into a transnational context and made the stuff of foreign policy concern.* This may be an example of a situation where no solid national consensus on policy toward South Africa has been formed,

---

[93] Mathias, Jr., Charles McC., "Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy," in *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 59, Number 5, 1981, p. 995.

[94] *ibid.*, p. 995.

[95] Bard, Mitchell, "Ethnic Group Influence on Middle East Policy - How and When: The Cases of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and the Sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia", *Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Mohammed E. Ahrari, Greenwood Press, New York, 1987, p. 62. This is general true of most lobbies, in that they do not possess overwhelming power as such, but may have sufficient power relative to their opponents to achieve a policy victory.

[96] Cigler, Allan J., "From Protest Group to Interest Group: The Making of American Agriculture Movement Inc.," in *Interest Group Politics*, eds. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C., 1986, p. 49.

sufficient in its power to thwart the interests of other groups within the state. Furthermore, it is an example of the coming together of people, far apart geographically, yet brought close together by sociohistorical circumstance. In coming together, this group may be able to influence the course of foreign policy making in the US in such a way as to meaningfully influence the course of future conduct of US international behaviour. It is the entry of ethnic groups into an already breaking down foreign policy consensus that makes this process possible.

The above examples, the Israeli lobbies and the farmers movement are reasonably typical of the types of organised lobby efforts that participate in intermestic affairs. They also illustrate just how complex the 'public agenda' may become. Farmers wish for good relations between the US and USSR, in order to facilitate grain sales, whereas the Israeli lobby wishes the relationship with the USSR to be predicated on emigration rights for Soviet Jews. Thus, farmers and Jews may be pitted against one another in issues concerning the USSR. On other issues they may be allied together, and still on others they may not be involved at all. It is necessary to address how issues (including intermestic issues) are placed on the foreign policy agenda and what types of issues may be placed there.

For issues to be considered by decision makers, however, they must first be placed on the agenda. Cobb and Elder offer two types of agenda that are relevant here. The first is the systemic agenda, which "...consists of all issues that are commonly perceived by members of the political community as meriting public attention and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental authority."[97] Issues on the systemic agenda will be "...fairly abstract and general...that do little more than identify a problem area."[98] Such issues as racism, education, peace and environment are issues found on the systemic agenda, there are no real proposals here, rather mostly generalities.

The systemic agenda is different from the institutional agenda "...which may be defined as that set of items explicitly up for active and serious consideration of authoritative decision

---

[97] *op. cit.*, Cobb and Elder, p. 85.

[98] *ibid.*, p. 87.

makers."[99] The institutional agenda contains issues that are more or less clearly defined, their scope is much narrower than the systemic agenda. Instead of a general opposition to racism, for example, the institutional agenda will contain specific information and instructions on the Voting Rights Act of 1965. From the standpoint of anti-apartheid, the issue on the systemic agenda is vaguely stated as ridding the world of apartheid, whereas the institutional agenda is made up of specific legislation and actions designed to deal with ending apartheid.

The two are interrelated in as much as the systemic agenda represents the public commitment and support for actions taken by decision makers on items found on the institutional agenda. Whether the systemic agenda leads to the creation of the institutional agenda or the other way around is open to question. On issues of race there is some evidence that Congress leads the way for the creation the systemic agenda - "...the public [is] responding to the issue cues of Congress, not the other way around."[100] Yet, one need only recall that during the late 1950's and early 1960's that there was considerable agitation before Congress considered in any meaningful way racial issues. It is not at all clear which agenda leads to the creation of the other, but if we take the nuclear freeze movement as an illustration it seems apparent that on many issues the systemic agenda leads to input for the institutional agenda. How issues cross from the systemic to the institutional agenda is a worthy question.

As systemic agenda issues are formed they are escorted by the aggregation of individuals around that issue. Those individuals may seek to gain access to the institutional agenda by one of two means, they may either follow the rules or they may break the rules in an attempt order to have their issues placed on the institutional agenda. In the US items move from the systemic to the institutional agenda (following the rules) by aggregated groups and individuals petitioning their elected representatives, by filing legal actions, or by voting. They may also use the intermediary of the press and mass media to represent their issues. Should these methods fail, they

---

[99] *ibid.*, p. 86.

[100] Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson, "The Politics and Policy of Race in Congress," in *Congress and Policy Change*, eds. Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Leroy N. Rieselbach, and Lawrence C. Dodd, Agathon Press, Inc., New York, 1986, p. 91.

may employ rule breaking methods (or they may give up). Rule breaking methods may be both legal and illegal, but they violate the normative principles of agenda entrance. Protests, boycotts, sit-ins and variations of violence may be used to gain access to the institutional agenda.[101] Black Americans, in attempting to have issues of race placed on the institutional agenda employed both means. It was not, however, until rule breaking methods were employed that issues of race, as seen by black Americans, were placed fully on the institutional agenda, and also took on greater significance on the systemic agenda.[102]

In order for a group to move issues from the systemic to the institutional agenda, however, they must possess the necessary resources to do so. As Verba and Nie point out, however, political participation decreases as one moves down the socioeconomic scale. Therefore, groups who crowd the lower end will be less likely to participate in the political system. Black Americans tend to be located nearer to the bottom of the scale, therefore they would not be expected to be well organised. Yet, black Americans did organise. How could this be? Verba and Nie provide an answer. As mentioned earlier, they discovered that blacks participate more than one would expect given the overall lower socioeconomic status. They argue that black Americans possess a sense of group consciousness and community that compensates for their relatively lower socioeconomic status. In the Chicago mayoral election of 1983, where the black candidate, Harold Washington, won there is an illustrative result of group cohesiveness. In 1983, before the election, black voter registration "...was over 10 percent greater than in predominantly white wards."[103] One would have expected, based on Verba and Nie's work, to see black voter registration higher than expected for their socioeconomic status. Furthermore, Washington won all 20 black wards, as well as two Hispanic wards. What explains this outcome? Removing the issues of race Washington would have won a more evenly distributed result, taking some Hispanic and white wards as well as losing some black wards, yet this was not the case. One could also argue that his

---

101 See *op. cit., Gamson*, pp. 8-9.

102 Rule breaking was also used extensively by whites who wished to keep black Americans unempowered.

103 Preston, Michael B., "The Election of Harold Washington: An Examination of the SES in the 1983 Chicago Mayoral Election," in *The New Black Politics: The Search for Political Power*, eds. Michael B. Preston, Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr., and Paul L. Puryear, Longman, New York, 1987, p. 159.

victory was a function of economics. Washington did win in all black wards, where the mean median income is roughly $6000 less than the white. One, however, would then also expect him to win all the Hispanic wards, where the mean median income is roughly the same as the black, but he did not.[104] Furthermore, one would have expected him to lose wards that had mean median incomes nearing those of his opponent. (The mean median income for his opponents' voters was roughly $21,000.) Yet, Washington won wards with mean median incomes of over $19,000 in three cases, all of which were won with a majority of over 90 percent. Clearly, if income is related to his victory it is only secondarily so, with race and ethnicity playing the overwhelming factor.

This electoral sociohistorical group unity figures prominently in the conduct of interest group politics. After all, interest groups have as their function the influencing of government, and what better way to influence government than to have an impact upon electoral outcome. Black involvement in election politics has been present for some years. It has been most prevalent, however, since 1976 when black voters cast their ballots heavily in favour of Carter, with their votes playing a significant role in his Presidential victory.[105] Following the 1976 campaign Jesse Jackson twice ran for the Democratic nomination in 1984 and 1988 respectively. These electoral efforts highlight that blacks can indeed play an important role in the election process, yet they face some fundamental problems. First, the size and unity of voting behaviour (based upon common perceptions of the relevant political issues) of the black population hinders progress in the electoral field. According the 1980 census the black American population was 26.5 million,[106] of whom 17 million were of voting age.[107] Out of that 17 million 10.4 million, by 1982, actually registered to vote.[108] An indicator of the further reduced voting strength of blacks is that in 1982 only 7.6 million voted.[109] Thus, as a bloc, blacks represent a relatively weak force except where they hold

---

[104] *ibid.*, pp. 164-171.

[105] Walters, Ronald W., *Black Presidential Politics in America: A Strategic Approach*, State University of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1988, p. 33-36.

[106] Matney, William C., and Dwight L. Johnson, *America's Black Population: 1970 to 1982, A Statistical View*, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1983, p. 1. The size of the population combined with the collective behaviour and collective interest is the the primary point.

[107] *ibid.*, p. 23.

[108] *ibid.*, p. 23.

[109] *ibid.*, p. 23.

political power.

A second problem blacks have, as a sociohistorical group, is that the US electorate is at best ambivalent about relations with Africa. While blacks may be motivated on questions of Africa, or other elements of diaspora politics, those themes carry little weight for the non-African population. This requires black leaders to cast issues in more than diaspora political terms. On South Africa, it is not an appeal only to oppressed blacks, but more generally to human rights that wins over a larger block of supporters. In making this move, however, black leaders risk losing control of their own destiny. Thus, in electoral politics, black leaders face a dilemma, on the one hand they may seek to widen their constituency, yet on the other to do so may loosen their grip over the issue itself. Thus, the very ethnicity that provides for high levels of political cohesion also leads to limitations on political action. The lack of population size and the limitations of ethnic group cohesion create two non-institutional roadblocks to increases in black political power.

In conclusion, groups will form around issues, such as poverty or education, but groups may also form around group consciousness, or identity. It is clear that one cannot say that race is not a central feature of the formation of some groups. Indeed, the above example of the Chicago election tends to suggest that in the aggregation of groups race and ethnicity plays an important role. It is also evident from the above example, that groups may move issues concerning them from the systemic agenda to the institutional agenda, and that this may include issues revolving around ethnicity.

Conclusion

The concepts of interdependence, ethnicity, and the domestic sources of foreign policy are necessary for a proper understanding of TransAfrica and anti-apartheid. They provide the basis upon which an understanding of US racial conflict can be gained, and how that conflict both influenced the behaviour of the US government in the conduct of foreign policy and how foreign policy influenced black Americans, especially in the issue of anti-apartheid.

Interdependence theory holds that the world is not made up of state actors alone, but rather

provides a picture of a plethora of actors, some more powerful than others, but all interacting and significantly influencing one another. Beyond simple interdependence it was shown that complex interdependence is a situation where actors may find that they cannot reasonably contemplate the use of force against one another and are therefore trapped, neither being able to leave the other, nor destroy that other. Instead, the two are forced to live with one another, unable to force their own particular issues on the other. Thus, there is a situation where there is no clear cut picture of what the hierarchy of issues may be, instead there is only an anarchical situation where various issues vie with one another for a place on the agenda.

It is in this situation of interdependence, where states are not the only actors, that domestic politics becomes so important. The internal conflicts, for example, or the domestic economic needs of segments of a population, or the ethnic divisions within a state may greatly influence that states' behaviour in relation to other actors. Thus, the outward behaviour of a state (or other actors) is influenced not only by that actors' wishes, but by that actors' interactions with other bodies. Therefore, the world may not be viewed as a billiard ball table, with balls bouncing off one another. Instead, to understand the world it is necessary to look inside each ball in order to gain a better understanding of how it operates.

Domestic politics is driven by the formation of groups, or aggregations, some of which form intentionally and others which do not. Ethnic groups are unintentional aggregations, formed not by choice, but by history and circumstance. Some groups which form have as their purpose the influencing of the transnational environment, others do not have that as their purpose, but still manage to influence the transnational environment all the same. What was also pointed out was that all groups have basic tasks that they must undertake, and that the search to fulfill these tasks leads to many of the worlds conflicts.

No matter what group may be formed, it may only be effective if it carries out the interests and desires of a group of people, for whom it was intended to act. Therefore, a group must have issue authority, or the authority to speak on behalf of a set of people. Furthermore, any group that seeks to deal with issues in a public format must present those issues in such a way as to be

effective. That is any issues must have the qualities of specificity, social significance, social relevance, complexity (the less complex the better), and precedence in order to succeed.[110] This is true for any group wishing to put its issues forward into consideration.

Unintended aggregations, that is ethnic groups, must follow these guidelines. While an ethnic group may be a sociohistorical group, that is one formed by social and historical conditions, it must put its issues forward in such a way that makes them relevant to the political audience at hand. Thus, some ethnic groups may form an articulated aggregation, one which acts as spokesman for the group, and seeks to translate ethnic issues into ones that can be understood and acted upon by other groups. The major issue for an ethnic group is its sense of identity, and those issues that represent 'one's own people', and it is this which leads many ethnic issues to cross state boundaries and become truly transnational.

Ethnic groups, as with many other unintended and intended aggregations in the US participate in the American pluralist system. In this situation groups, either interest or pressure groups, seek to influence government in the allocation of resources and values. These groups are not arranged in an egalitarian and stable way, rather they are over represented by middle class members, leaving out many of the less resource rich. Despite this there has been a huge increase in the number of groups seeking influence with the US government in the last years, and there has also been some movement of formerly disenfranchised groups into positions of influence. TransAfrica's birth represents just one such group which thirty years ago struggled to make itself felt in Washington.

Thirty years ago it was far more difficult to have access to Congress, and if one did have access to Congress then and wished to influence foreign policy, it was probably difficult if not impossible to do so. Foreign policy has formerly been primarily the world of the President, yet with significant Congressional reform and legal actions (such as the War Powers Act and a greater

[110] As an illustration of the 'insider' nature of this model, one must ask who is judging what is socially significant? Already mentioned, this model is perhaps best viewed as being useful for those issues that are represented by groups which have already 'made it'. Again, this suggests that the Cobb and Elder model has certain weaknesses, yet it is still useful in trying to understand ethnicity and foreign policy interaction. The reader should, none the less, be aware of its short comings.

willingness to cut of funding from Presidential programmes) Congress is now much more able to influence actions of foreign policy. Now, Congress is far more able to influence the actions of the Executive Branch, and is far more willing to take an active role in the forming of US foreign policy.

Thus, with a reformed and reshaped Congress, and a larger number of groups seeking to influence US policies, it can be shown that there is indeed a domestic source to US foreign policy. One way that it manifests itself is through intermestic affairs, or a situation where a foreign policy issue takes on the characteristics of a domestic policy. Thus, Congress has far greater say over the issue than might otherwise be the case, and the public has a far greater input into the issue than otherwise. A situation is created where domestic concerns, such as ethnicity, are played out in the halls of Congress and take on national and international importance.

The remainder of this work is dedicated to examining the impact of TransAfrica on US foreign policy toward South Africa. To do this it is necessary to understand the history of group formation in the US and how black Americans came to organise themselves. This discussion includes the growing sense of self-protection and growing identity that black Americans exhibited, as well as their entry into the institutional agenda through electoral and interest politics. Next, it is important that an understanding of the international pressures faced by the US in southern Africa be examined. This includes past US involvement in the area, as well as US actions to carry out a policy that more and more is subjected to domestic or intermestic needs. From that point onward the case of TransAfrica itself can be addressed.

CHAPTER TWO
From the Negro to Afro-American: The Story of Black American Political Growth

For several decades, and perhaps as long ago as the turn of the century, there has been reflected by black Americans a political behaviour that is unique to their sociohistorical setting, with the characteristics of a group which has been either unenfranchised or disenfranchised. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate what that political culture is and how it came into being. Furthermore, this chapter will direct attention to the development of black American foreign policy interests, wherein it is argued that foreign policy represents one area where blacks can attain group consensus with little or no significant dissensus, and thus maintain domestic strength in the face of perceived hostility towards black American interests.

This chapter also provides the reader with an opportunity to gain some insight into what kind of environment led to the creation of TransAfrica. It is argued that TransAfrica comes out of a tradition among some parts of black America that view foreign policy as a right and proper place of interest for black Americans. Therefore, this chapter lays out the intellectual and historical tradition from which TransAfrica operates.

There are three main elements to this chapter. First, the development of black American political structures will be examined. That is, how did blacks form political units? What types of units were developed and why? Second, the various historical foreign policy interests will be reviewed, with the objective of demonstrating that blacks have had an interest in the formulation of US foreign policy. Third, the adoption of anti-apartheid as a meaningful and important foreign policy initiative will be examined. This last item will briefly investigate how black Americans became involved with anti-apartheid.

Black Political Structures

The development of black American political structures can be divided into three parts: post Reconstruction era, civil rights era, and finally the post-segregation era. These are not firm divisions, rather they are loose divisions made mostly for the ease of the writer, but with some

attention to the historical events that characterize them.

Post Reconstruction

What is perhaps most important about the post Reconstruction era are three events, each in their own way laying the grounds for struggles and victories in the future. First, the debate between Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois, and second, the rise of Marcus Garvey and his Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) and finally DuBois' Pan-Africanism. Each had an impact on black political development, sometimes enhancing the power of blacks, and others doing little to enhance it.

Symbolic of the situation in which black politics had found itself at the turn of the century was the debate between DuBois and Washington. Washington had been for some time an advocate of economic and industrial advance for the black population, leaving politics aside. In 1895 Washington

> ...called upon both whites and blacks to "put down their buckets" where they were, to come to terms with one another, and to draw upon the rich resources that each afforded the other. Black people had been loyal to their masters during the war, they had labored faithfully, and they would be loyal to white employers now and work "without strikes and labour wars". The white South after emancipation had given black people " a man's chance in the commercial world". For future progress, black and white had only to band together again,.... [1]

Blacks and whites were being asked to work together and the black was also being asked to be a second class white citizen, that is to leave behind what made black 'culture' unique. Washington was went on to state:

> The wisest among my race understand that the agitation of questions of social equality is the extremest folly and that progress in the enjoyment of all the privileges that will come to us must be the result of severe constant struggle rather than of artificial forcing.[2]

With that statement Washington denounced all political action by blacks and instead pursued a course of 'self help' within the context of a subordinate political position. As with so many unpleasant arrangements, they can be tolerable so long as the partners are benevolent, but as soon

---

[1] Williamson, Joel, *The Crucible of Race*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 71.

[2] Logan, Rayford W., *The Betrayal of the Negro*, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London, 1969, p. 280.

as one or both become malevolent the arrangement breaks down. Joel Williamson lists several features that led to the breakdown of the Washington arrangement. First, the political fortunes of those Washington dealt with were changing - they were losing their governmental posts and influence. [3] Next, was the shift away from agrarianism towards industrialization.[4] This cut deeply into the implicit separateness of Washington's plan, wherein blacks and whites could and would work together provided they were kept culturally and physically apart - they need only work in concert, not live together. This may have been considered fine for agrarian lifestyles, but not the industrial. Finally, there was a revolt among many blacks against the idea that economic reform was enough, that accommodating the white man was sufficient. This is where DuBois entered the picture.

The debate which would guide black political action into the future centred around whether or not black advancement would come through political enlightenment or through commercial success. Washington held that jobs took precedence over ballots, whereas DuBois sought to acquire political power for blacks to redress social ailments that hindered black advancement.[5] The essence of the conflict between the two men centred on education, where Washington sought to establish a series of technical training institutions for the betterment of blacks. DuBois did not disagree with this approach, though he added a new layer, wherein a group of blacks would receive a more refined and liberal education. This group who had received the finer education would then take on the role of the 'talented tenth', or the vanguard to the struggle to improve the lot of the black American. DuBois wrote in 1903 that:

> The Negro Race, like all races, is going to be saved by its exceptional men. The problem of education, then, among Negroes must first of all deal with the Talented Tenth; it is the problem of developing the Best of this race that they may guide the Mass away from the contamination and death of the Worst, in their own and other races. .... If we make money the object of man-training, we shall develop money-makers but not necessarily men; if we make technical skill the object of education, we may possess artisans but not, in nature, men. Men we shall have only as we make manhood the object of the work of the schools - intelligence, broad sympathy,

---

[3] *op. cit.*, Williamson, p. 72.

[4] *ibid.*, p. 72.

[5] Rudwick, Elliot M., *W.E.B. DuBois: A Study in Minority Group Leadership*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1960, p. 61.

> knowledge of the world that was and is, and the relation of men to it - this is the curriculum of that Higher Education which must underlie true life.[6]

Clearly, DuBois rejects Washington's emphasis on technical training as the course forward and puts in its place the role of a vanguard to lead the way forward. The above mention of 'manhood' should not be taken as a reference to some sort of pejorative concept of *machismo* rather it should be viewed as a reference to the coming of age or the development of strong political and social institutions and resources of black Americans. Therefore, the 'talented tenth' can be seen as the vanguard in a teleological struggle, the objective of which is full equality and the ability to direct one's own future.

One of the manifestations of the debate within the black community was the meeting at Niagara, New York, in which a group of black intellectuals and leaders grouped together in order to discuss ways in which black interests could be protected and advanced. DuBois was the moving force behind the Niagara Movement, which brought together a portion of the 'talented tenth'.[7] The objective of the Niagara Movement was to develop a programme of action that countered the more austere and limited actions of Washington and his followers. In a telling statement the Movement proclaimed:

> We want to *pull down* nothing but we don't propose to be pulled down.... We believe in *taking what we can get* but we don't believe in being satisfied with it and in permitting anybody for a moment to imagine we're satisfied.[8]

It is clear that the Niagara Movement seen from the perspective of Washington supporters was radical in its orientation, they did not espouse cooperation as a vehicle for progress.

The Niagara Movement suffered, however, attacks from both black and white supporters of Washington. Slowly but surely the Movement suffered a painful and acrimonious death, caused both by the actions of Washington and his supporters as well as by its own internal tensions.[9] The movement, however, did not pass into history as an unimportant footnote. Indeed, despite its

---

[6] "The Talented Tenth", W.E.B. DuBois, from "The Negro Problem" as reprinted in *DuBois: Writings*, ed. Nathan Huggins, The Library of America, New York, 1986, p. 842.

[7] *op. cit.*, Rudwick, p. 94.

[8] *ibid.*, p. 95, emphasis original.

[9] *ibid.*, p. 117. Also see Meier, August and Elliot M. Rudwick, *From Plantation to Ghetto*, Constable, London, 1970, pp. 208-209.

problems it did represent the voice of opposition to Washington and his perceived accommodationist attitude. The Niagara Movement was to prove important in the founding of the Negro National Council, later the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). In 1909, a year before the collapse of the Movement there issued a call by Oswald Garrison Villard, former supporter of Washington, to form "a strong central defense committee..." for the protection of black Americans.[10] Villard's call led to the formation of the Negro National Council, into which came a selection of men from the Niagara Movement, who would later influence the course of the future NAACP. The Negro National Council followed DuBois lead in seeking not economic advancement, but instead political.[11] In this way, DuBois started his long association with the NAACP as editor of its journal the *Crisis*.

DuBois was no small character in the formation of the 20th century struggle of the black American. Indeed, DuBois left his mark not only on the course of black political efforts, in the guise of limiting accommodationism, and working on the development of the NAACP, but he also led the growing spirit of Pan-Africanism. DuBois had help, however, in this effort from a not too friendly corner in the guise of Marcus Garvey, leader of United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA).

Garvey, a native of Jamaica, had moved to the US following his political ventures in Jamaica under the ideological flag of Washingtonism. Indeed, Garvey had been in contact with Washington in 1915, the year of the latter's death.[12] Garvey had sought to develop an ideology not dissimilar to that of Washington, in as much as both sought and pursued a segregationist-like policy. Garvey's policy was simply 'Africa for Africans' and he was as much a racial separatist as his white opponents. Garvey

> ...contended that whites would always be racist and insisted that the Negro must develop "a distinct racial type of civilization of his own and...work out his salvation in his motherland, all to be accomplished under the stimulus and influence of the slogan, 'Africa for the Africans, at home and abroad.'" On a more practical level he urged Negroes to support black businesses, and the UNIA itself organized a chain of

[10] *op. cit.*, Meier and Rudwick, p. 209.

[11] *op. cit.*, Rudwick, p. 121.

[12] Martin, Tony, *Race First*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1976, p. 281.

> groceries, restaurants, laundries, a hotel, a doll factory, and a printing plant. Thousands bought stock in UNIA's black Star Steamship Line, which proposed to establish a commercial link between the United States, the West Indies, and Africa.[13]

Up until that time, the early 1920's, there had never been such a large grouping of blacks, and a group that cut across national boundaries. Garvey's UNIA was the populist side of DuBois' intellectual Pan-Africanism.

Perhaps the most important motivating factor in DuBois pursuit of Pan-Africanism came at the end of World War I when

> ...a number of Negroes in the United States had been talking about the advisability and necessity of having the American Negro and the Negroes of the world represented in some way before the Peace Congress. The problems of Africa were going to be discussed; the question of the color bar was coming up; but there was no provision, so far as we could see, to allow the Negro to speak for himself.[14]

Clearly, DuBois saw the decolonisation of Africa as part and parcel of the freeing of the black American. Behind the Pan-Africanist Congresses lay rather simple plans. DuBois explains:

> My plans as they developed had in them nothing spectacular nor revolutionary. If in the decades or a century they resulted in such world organization of black men as would oppose a united front to European aggression, that certainly would not have been beyond my dream. But on the other hand, in practical reality, I knew the power and guns of Europe and America, and what we wanted to do was in the face of this power to sit down hand in hand with colored groups and across the council table to learn of each other, our condition, our aspirations, our chances for concerted thought and action. Out of this there might come, not race war and opposition, but broader co-operation with the white rulers of the world, and a chance for peaceful and accelerated development of black folk.[15]

The war demonstrated to DuBois "...the interdependence of race relations on the national and international scenes."[16] Unlike the Garvey plan, which called for the eventual repatriation of West Indian and US blacks to Africa, DuBois instead sought simply to employ the unified needs of what he perceived to be colonialised and oppressed people. Garvey's 'Africa for the Africans' possessed far greater appeal to the common man and woman, in as much as Garvey used the trappings of a club and the Boy Scouts to draw the public to his message. DuBois evaded such

---

[13] *op. cit.*, Meier and Rudwick, pp. 226-227.

[14] DuBois, W.E.B., *Dusk of Dawn*, in *op. cit.*, Huggins (ed.), p. 745.

[15] *ibid.*, pp. 754-755.

[16] Heald, Morrel, and Lawrence S. Kaplan, *Culture and Diplomacy*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1977, p. 312.

trappings, which is perhaps the best reflection of the conflict between the two, each fighting for his piece of the Pan-Africanist territory.

In the end, DuBois' Pan-Africanism secured elite and educated interest in the notion of Pan-Africanism. Garvey, on the other hand, despite the crudity of his appeals, demonstrated that US and West Indian blacks could be motivated behind appeals to 'Africa' - that Africa could be a popular rallying point behind which the black masses could be organised.

Not unexpectedly, though, US blacks were far more interested in their own political enfranchisement than that of others. That is not a callous attitude, far from it, it is simply common sense. While DuBois' organised efforts into Pan-Africanism gave way to disorganisation and Garvey's UNIA eventually collapsed out of its own corruptness, there was on the horizon the growth of major political structures that would further the cause of black American enfranchisement. Still, DuBois warning in 1903 that "...the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line" cannot go ignored, for it set the tone of US politics for the remainder of the century.[17] What the post reconstruction era did was to create a tone for the majority of the twentieth century. Washington's accommodationist stance and economic programme had been put to the side, and in its place came a political programme, one of enfranchisement and access to power through the ballot box. This would characterize the US racial scene for the next fifty years, if not longer.

Civil Rights Era[18]

Most important of all the groups that began in the early part of the century is the NAACP, of which DuBois was a central member. The NAACP would prove important in the transition between post-reconstruction politics and the birth of civil rights actions. Above all the term civil rights is a legalistic one, and it is precisely here that the NAACP carried out its work. Only in the latter stages of the civil rights movement was there a concerted effort to use civil disobedience as a

---

[17] DuBois, W.E.B., *The Souls of Black Folk*, in *op. cit.*, Huggins (ed.), p. 359.

[18] This phrase is used, not to indicate a brief period of history between 1954-1963, but rather to indicate a period of time, roughly equal with the end of World War I when the use of civil court action became the predominant method employed by black American leadership to further the cause of equal rights.

tool of influence, prior to that the courts were the main venue for the struggle. [19] The choice of the courts as the battle ground over which to fight the battle of racial equality was not a haphazard effort. Indeed, the action reflected divisions and choices within the black community. Many who had opposed Washington's economic accommodationism had also been early members of the NAACP, so therefore it is not surprising that the NAACP concentrates on civil reform and not economic. The NAACP did not seek a redistribution of wealth, but rather access to Constitutional guarantees of equality under the law and full protection of all that the Constitution offered.[20]

In order to dismantle the legal underpinnings of segregation (the main hindrance to full participation) the NAACP attacked the 1896 Supreme Court Ruling of Plessy v. Fergusson, which upheld the concept of 'separate but equal' social institutions and amenities. The NAACP began a series of legal actions, but it was not until the mid-1930's that the organisation was able to undertake a programmatic attack on Plessy v. Fergusson. The objective of the legal battle was to attack 'separate but equal' educational institutions and thus "...amass victory after victory, selecting the right cases to litigate and establishing precedent in a clear, ever-broadening line,..." thus making desegregation in schools all but complete. [21] The NAACP began by filing suits on behalf of plaintiffs who sought admission to law school, and here the NAACP were victorious, though they were not able to attack the basis for Plessy v. Fergusson.[22] Each legal victory, though, brought them closer to the eventual destruction of Plessy v. Fergusson.

The opportunity for victory came on May 17, 1954, when the Supreme Court ruled on

---

[19] This is not to imply that 1) there were no actions towards the empowerment of black Americans other than those undertaken in the courts, 2) that the NAACP was the only group making any efforts in this direction, or 3) that the NAACP was somehow totally unique in its position. The NAACP was simply the most effective of all civil rights groups over the period between the early 1920's and the passage of the civil rights legislation of the mid-1960's. Furthermore, the purpose here is not to give a history lesson on black American politics but more to highlight those events and groups that added to the growing political complexity of black America.

[20] Cruise, Harold, *Plural but Equal*, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1987, p. 75. The choice of the Judiciary as the place to concentrate black American resources was not haphazard, as has been mentioned. The choice of the Judiciary came also because there was little other choice. Blacks had been effectively cut out of Congress, given the inability of most Southern blacks to vote, and the effect of gerrymandering equally isolated what black voting power there was. Access to the White House was difficult, and even with the little support blacks got from F.D. Roosevelt it was done with little enthusiasm and faced pressure in Congress against any liberalizing effect. Thus, the politics of the day did much to determine how the NAACP took on the unequal application of the law. There was far too little power to be able to influence Congress, the Executive was rarely willing or able to assist the cause, thus leaving only the Judiciary.

[21] Williams, Juan, *Eyes on the Prize*, Penguin Books, New York, 1988, p. 11.

[22] *ibid.*, pp. 11-17.

Brown v. the Board of Education, Topeka, Kansas.[23] Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren stated:

> Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteeed by the Fourteenth Amendment.[24]

The following year the Court "...ordered boards of education to draw up desegregation plans 'with all deliberate speed.' Within the next twelve months 350 school boards representing nine Southern states had desegregated without much opposition."[25] The Court decision, despite a lack of opposition in many localities, caused a major uproar within the South.

Most memorable, and certainly the most threatening white reaction to the integration order occurred in 1957, in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Arkansas state court had instructed that Little Rock schools were not to "...initiate the desegregation plan."[26] "A federal court overruled the state jurists, but Governor Faubus ordered the state's national guard to forbid nine black children to enter the high school."[27] What followed was a confrontation between Federal authority and anti-integrationists in the South. President Eisenhower nationalized the Arkansas national guard, in order that the integration plan would be carried out.[28] The tensions between black and white populations prohibited the opening of the Little Rock schools in the years 1958 and 1959.[29] "The weeks and months of intimidation and harassment of the children on the part of white students and their parents suggested how bitter and harsh the resistance could be."[30] What was also clearly demonstrated was that the NAACP had helped unlock some powerful forces within the US.

---

[23] This case actually was a series of cases covering the issue of segregated education facilities. It has become known as Brown v. the Board of Education because of the tradition within the Supreme Court to label all such groupings by the first case to appear in the list of sub-cases.

[24] Franklin, John Hope, *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1980, p. 409.

[25] Marable, Manning, *Race, Reform, and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction in Black America, 1945-1982*, Macmillan Press, London, 1984, p. 43. School districts in the South were segregated, which often reflected the segregated nature of the communities. Therefore, areas with small black populations desegregated fairly easily, whereas areas with a large black population segregated from the white led to a situation where integration was a perceived against white isolation.

[26] *ibid.*, p. 45.

[27] *ibid.*, p. 45.

[28] White, John, *Black Leadership in America, 1895-1968*, Longman, London, 1985, p. 125.

[29] *op. cit.*, Marable, p. 45.

[30] *op. cit.*, Franklin, p. 460.

While the NAACP kept mostly to the courtrooms, it was also clear that they had a penchant for finding, following or simply being around violence. Earlier in the century, before the Brown v. the Board of Education decision, the NAACP had done

> ...extraordinary service...in legal defence of victims of race riots and unjust judicial proceedings. It secured the release of the imprisoned Houston soldiers; it successfully defended the Negroes charged with insurrection in the Elain riot; and in numerous cases it worked to prevent miscarriages of justice against innocent black people.[31]

The NAACP was itself, of course, non-violent, and indeed the organisation worked to maintain itself always within the law. Violence and unjustness seemed to follow the NAACP around, mostly because the NAACP was dealing with correcting injustices.

Following the Brown decision there came an increasing tension, which was felt in part by the rise of local area protests. The 'bureaucratic strategies' of the NAACP were to become obsolete and much maligned, in part due to their own victories and in part due to their inability to deal with white reactions.[32] In 1955 there began in Montgomery, Alabama a protest action that would change the face of US race relations forever. The contest began quite quietly when Rosa Parks was arrested for sitting in the 'whites only' section of a city bus. As a response to the arrest, the Reverend E.D. Nixon called a meeting of black city leaders.[33] He called for a "...a direct-action black protest against the treatment of Mrs. Parks, and on behalf of all Southern black exposed to the ritual humiliation of Jim Crow."[34] Nixon and others formed the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA) in order to run the bus boycott. Martin Luther King, Jr., a Baptist minister, was elected president of the MIA.[35] As the boycott proceeded it gained ever widening support both inside and outside the US. In the US the NAACP, United Auto Workers (UAW), the Congress of Racial Equality, A. Phillip Randolph and others all offered either rhetorical or financial support. The NAACP "...donated generously through its numerous local chapters..." and the UAW "...sent a check for $35,000."[36] From outside the US the boycott received donations

---

[31] *op. cit.*, Meier and Rudwick, p. 224.

[32] Morris, Aldon D., *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement*, The Free Press, New York, 1984, p. 38.

[33] Nixon was the local chapter head of both the NAACP and the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. See *op. cit.*, White, p. 126.

[34] *ibid.*, p. 126.

[35] King, Martin Luther, Jr., *Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story*, Harper, New York, 1959, p. 54.

[36] Lewis, David Levering, *King: A Biography*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1978, p. 71.

from "Singapore, Tokoyo, New Delhi, London, and Paris and hundreds of other cities...."[37] On November 13, 1956 the Supreme Court overturned segregation on the Montgomery busses.[38] The boycott gained both national and international attention - the issue of US race relations was now firmly planted on the international agenda for all to see. Also out of the campaign arose the Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC), which represented many of the ministers who had been involved in the campaign.[39] Perhaps most important to come out of the campaign was the obvious willingness of black leadership to use boycotts and other forms of direct action protest.[40] Thus, the organisational hold that the NAACP had held on the black community was fading, to be replaced by less legalistic and more direct forms of political influence.

From the mid-1950's onward there were a growing number of protest groups, each of which in one way or another influenced the course of the growing political movement. The Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), an offshoot of the SCLC, was founded to absorb and use the growing number of students who were involved in sit-ins and protests.[41] In its early days SNCC echoed Reverend King's non-violent direct action approach to change, however over time, SNCC would move more and more towards the radical end of the spectrum of political change. Eventually, SNCC would, in the guise of Stokely Carmichael, use the Black Power phrase and urge more violent means to change.[42] SNCC's conversion to more violent means of change caused a split within the ranks of the civil rights movement that would never really be healed.

> Roy Wilkins of the NAACP was the first major black leader who vigorously denounced SNCC and the Black power slogan. "No matter how endlessly they try to explain it, the term 'black power' means anti-white power," Wilkins told delegates to the annual NAACP convention held in July 1966.[43]

---

[37] *ibid.*, p. 71.

[38] *op. cit.*, Marable, 1984, p. 45.

[39] The SCLC represented the arrival of the power of black churches in the Civil Rights Movement, in as much as they brought to the movement the ready made pool of skilled and semi-skilled personnel from which the movement could draw. This is clearly illustrated in the involvement of many church members in key positions during the Montgomery Bus Boycott.

[40] *op. cit.*, Lewis, pp. 85-86.

[41] Zinn, Howard, *SNCC: The New Abolitionists*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1965, p. 33.

[42] Carson, Clayborne, *In Struggle*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1981, p. 215.

[43] *ibid.*, p. 219.

Between the Black Power split and the rise of these other groups there occurred a significant event that greatly influenced the organisation of the movement. Following the March on Washington, in 1963 (where King made his famous 'I Have a Dream' speech) the Kennedy Administration sought to introduce into Congress a Civil Rights Bill which would alleviate many of the problems encountered thus far.

The Kennedy Civil Rights Bill of 1963 when submitted to Congress sought to give "...the Attorney General authority to initiate suits to desegregate schools, establishe[d] a Community Relations Service to accommodate local racial conflicts," nullify discrimination in public facilities receiving federal support, and use federal grants for training both black and white poor.[44] The Bill stayed in Congress for some time, the target of a great deal of debate. A coalition of liberals, who regarded the legislation weak, pushed the Administration further to the left.[45] The slide to the left of the Administration's Civil Rights Bill was caused partly by the President's desire to "...get the Negroes out of the streets...."[46] The assassination of Kennedy did nothing to derail the bill, indeed former Senate Majority Leader, President Johnson urged his party to support the old Kennedy legislation and on July 2, 1964 the Civil Rights Act was signed.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not the first bill to carry the 'civil rights' title, there had been other acts in 1957 and 1960. The 1964 act was "...by far the most comprehensive piece of legislation affecting blacks rights in this century."[47] The major components of the bill were:

> (1) sixth-grade education was established as a presumption of literacy for voting purpose; (2) segregation and discrimination in places of public accommodation...were outlawed; (3) public facilities...were desegregated; (4) the attorney general was authorized to file desegregation suits; (5) discrimination was outlawed in federally assisted activities; (6) virtually all discrimination by all employers and unions was outlawed; (7) the attorney general was authorized to intervene in suits which persons alleged denial of equal protection of laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.[48]

---

[44] Waskow, Arthur. I., *From Race-Riot to Sit-In, 1919 to the 1960's: A Study in the Connections between Conflict and Violence*, Doubleday, Garden City, New Jersey, 1967, p. 245.

[45] *ibid.*, p. 248.

[46] *ibid.*, p. 248.

[47] Pinkney, Alphonso, *The Myth of Black Progress*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 4.

[48] *ibid.*, p. 4. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is considered, along with the Civil Rights Act, to provide the basis for black American enfranchisement. The Voting Rights Act removed the explicit legal barriers to voting in the US, and led to a large increase in the number of black American elected officials. See Franklin, John Hope, and Alfred A. Moss, Jr., *From Slavery to Freedom*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1988, pp. 462-463, for more on the Voting Rights Act and the rise of the black elected official.

Despite the passage of the bill "...Congress and the Administration discovered only two weeks later that the new act had not prevented the outbreak of the worst big-city racial violence in twenty-one years."[49] Clearly, while the Administration had made efforts to reduce domestic tensions by throwing its weight behind the civil rights legislation it had been unable to cool the growing urban tensions. Instead, what the Administration faced was growing radicalism on all sides. The growing radicalism was caused by the rise in some corners of extremism, which demanded responses from other more main line groups. Perhaps one of the best examples of growing US extremism came in the guise of Malcolm X, a member of the Nation of Islam.

The Nation of Islam, led by Elijah Muhammad, was founded in 1930, though it experienced its greatest growth in the 1950's.[50] The Nation sought to recruit ghetto youth and transform them into 'respectable' people.[51] One Nation of Islam recruit was named Malcolm X, formerly Malcolm Little. Malcolm X became the Nation's primary spokesman, and in 1954 "...became the minister of Harlem's Temple No. 7...."[52] Malcolm X articulated the views of the Nation, which were primarily separatist and nationalist.[53] The separatism and nationalism espoused by the Nation of Islam was not new in black America, it reflected earlier calls by Marcus Garvey and others. Integrationists both loathed and feared Malcolm X, primarily because he opposed integration so strenuously. Malcolm X had proclaimed, "We want separation..." and "No sane black man really wants integration!"[54] While in 1945 the Nation had only 1000 members, "...by 1960...membership was between 65,000 to 100,000 nationwide."[55] The growth of the Nation and its rhetoric caused many civil rights leaders great distress, not to mention many in the US government.

Malcolm X sought to alter the character of the black American struggle. He argued: "How is the black man going to get 'civil rights' before he first wins his 'human rights'?"[56] Thus, in the

---

[49] *op. cit.*, Waskow, p. 254.

[50] *op. cit.*, White, p. 100.

[51] *op. cit.*, Marable, 1984, p. 60.

[52] *ibid.*, p. 61.

[53] *op. cit.*, White, p. 105.

[54] Malcolm X and Alex Haley, *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1985, pp. 347-348.

[55] *op. cit.*, Marable, 1984, p. 60.

[56] *op. cit.*, Malcolm X and Haley, p. 274.

early 1960's Malcolm X took the case of the black American to the international forum. "In 1964, Malcolm made a tour of the Middle East and Africa, where he was received by heads of state, politicians and students."[57] Malcolm X returned to lobby members of the Organization of African Unity, his purpose was to gain support for "...his moves to indict the American government before the United Nations...."[58] Within the Nation of Islam tensions grew between Elijah Muhammed and Malcolm X, eventually leading to his leaving the Nation and starting his own organisation, called the Moslem Mosque Inc. There is some evidence to suggest that Malcolm X was not quite the radical anti-integrationist many thought him to be. He once "...confided to Coretta [wife of Martin Luther King] that he counted on his militant reputation to scare whites to her husband's cause."[59] On February 21, 1965 Malcolm X was assassinated, yet his influence was considerable in moving the US race relations debate very much away from Constitutionalist proposals and towards more fundamental shifts in relations between white and black Americans.

The civil rights era marked the upsurge in efforts to secure political enfranchisement. The movement helped in "...facilitating the growth, development, and diversification of the black middle class and by removing the legal basis of status inferiority, contributed to the development of a black ethnic tradition."[60] It was also an era in which the tactical use of demonstrations and other tactics of influence were increasingly used with great success. This change, away from the relative quiet of the courtroom to the noisy streets, indicated an upsurge in the popularity among black Americans of the political enfranchisement equation. The civil rights era also held within it the seeds of real division within the black America itself. The rise of Malcolm X, and other radicals, demonstrated that the civil rights leadership had not addressed all the needs and wishes of all black Americans, and this leadership problem would mark the period that followed.

---

[57] *op. cit.*, White, p. 111.

[58] *ibid.*, p. 113.

[59] *op. cit.*, Lewis, p. 268.

[60] Smith, Robert C., "Black Power and the Transformation from Protest to Politics", *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 96, 1981, p. 434.

Post Segregation Era

The consensus, such as it was, on race relations was breaking down from inside the black community. No longer was there a near-universal commitment to non-violence, and what was left was on the wane - no longer were a few groups urging nonviolence, instead there were a variety of groups and positions, each vying for influence within the black community. Some groups, such as Malcolm X's Nation of Islam were very much on the periphery of the political spectrum, whereas SNCC and the Congress of Racial Equality were both central to the spectrum and both quickly moving in radical directions.[61] The radicals were given a boost with the birth of Black Power and the Black Panthers.

The cleavage of the black leadership is nowhere more obvious than in the events that surround the birth of the phrase Black Power. In June, 1966 when James Meredith (who had been involved in a much earlier integration issue) began a march that would take him from Memphis, Tennessee to Jackson, Mississippi. Meredith, just as his march began, was shot by a sniper.[62] "When Meredith was shot..., King joined with Stokely Carmichael of SNCC and Floyd McKissick of CORE in a march through the state."[63] The general tenor of the march was growing less pleasant with every mile. During a brief break in the march Carmichael proclaimed before an audience: "I'm not going to beg the white man of anything I deserve...I'm going to take it."[64] McKissick was equally distraught, and King was left with the job of trying to maintain a unified front, but was meeting with little success. As the march continued tensions continued to rise. At Greenwood, Mississippi before a black audience Carmichael used the phrase Black Power. Carmichael "...issued instructions that, from Greenwood on..., shibboleths of nonviolence were to

---

[61] CORE was an offshoot of the Fellowship of Reconstruction (FOR), a pacifist organisation. CORE had committed itself to non-violence and had established a strong relationship with King and the SCLC. That CORE was dedicated to non-violence and anti-colonialism is clearly illustrated by George Houser, who was a former leader of CORE and had left to form the American Committee on Africa (ACOA). During the early part of the 1960's CORE led a series of demonstrations through the South which were known as the "Freedom Rides", and were aimed at desegregating transportation facilities in the South. With time, however, CORE began its movement towards the radical, eventually losing much of its non-violence rhetoric, supporting Black Power and removing all whites from the organisation. For an excellent discussion of CORE see Meier, Anthoy and Elliot Rudwick, *CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942-68*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973.

[62] *op. cit.*, Marable, p. 104.

[63] *op. cit.*, White, p. 140.

[64] *op. cit.*, Lewis, p. 322.

be exorcised."[65] King was walking difficult ground, he pleaded with Carmichael and McKissick to drop the Black Power slogan, but met with no success. Carmichael's reply was clear and unequivocal: "Power is the only thing respected in this world, and we must get it at any cost."[66] "Within two weeks, 'black power' sparked a national debate, dividing old friends, and bringing to an abrupt halt the last vestiges of unity between the left and right wings of the desegregation movement."[67] What the Black Power event signalled was a shift away from the simple equation of access to power through the fair implementation of the law to a situation where who had what power to do what, where and when. This was a momentous event, because in a sense black American politics has never returned to the seemingly simple days of fair implementation of the law, instead it has gone to the more basic question of who has the power to make which laws?

The radical arm of black politics was further enhanced by the creation of the Black Panthers. The Panthers were founded in October, 1966 in Oakland, California.[68] The Panthers were led by Huey Newton, Bobby Seale and Eldridge Cleaver, and later briefly joined by Stokely Carmichael. The active membership of the Panthers may have peaked at five thousand with chapters in many parts of the US.[69] The Panthers argued for radical reform of the US economy and a change in white attitudes towards blacks. [70] Carmichael argued:

> Ultimately, the economic foundations of this country must be shaken if black people are to control their lives. The colonies of the United States - and this includes the black ghettos within its borders, North and South - must be liberated. ...a powerful few have been maintained at the expense of the poor and voiceless colored masses. .... For racism to die, a totally different America must be born.[71]

---

[65] *ibid.*, p. 325.

[66] *ibid.*, p. 325.

[67] *op. cit.*, Marable, p. 105.

[67] The radicalization of black American politics included the observation that while one could be integrated, it was quite another to ask what was into what was one being integrated? Much of the critique by the radical groups, such as the Black Panthers and others, was based upon the observation that much of the inequality in the US was based not only on racial divisions, but also on the divisions of economic well being. Therefore, it was fair game to question the basis of the US economic system.

[68] Draper, Theodore, *The Rediscovery of Black Nationalism*, Secker & Warburg, London, 1970, p. 97.

[69] *ibid.*, p. 100.

[70] Newton, Huey, "The Black Panther Party," *Racial Conflict: Tension and Change in American Society*, ed. Gary Marx, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1971, pp. 200-204.

[71] Carmichael, Stokely, "What We Want," *Racial Conflict: Tension and Change in American Society*, ed. Gary Marx, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1971, p. 189.

The Panthers, like others, had come to see that integration did little to alter the conditions of many blacks. Non-violence was rejected by the militant Panthers, who had organised armed patrols as part of their efforts. In a clear illustration of just how much the Panthers had rejected non-violence a Panther pamphlet urged the following: "Black people must now move, from the grassroots up through the perfumed circles of the Black bourgeoisie, to *seize* by any means necessary a proportionate share of the power vested and collected in the structure of America."[72] The Panthers, however, were not a force that would last in the US.

> The Federal Bureau of Investigation declared the Black Panthers to be dangerous and subversive. They became the target of what appeared to be a concerted effort to eliminate them as an effective radical organization. By 1980 the Black Panthers were scarcely a shadow of what they had been.[73]

The violence that the Panthers preached was not a long term trend in US politics, but many of the issues that the Panthers raised stayed on long past the Black Panther Party.

As protests waxed and waned their leaders began to find ways of making their influence and power more permanent, such as finding themselves in elected office. Following the Voting Rights Act of 1965 there was an increase in the number of black elected officials.[74] Julian Bond, for example, former member of SNCC, had been elected to the Georgia State House[75], and William Clay, former CORE member, was elected to the US House of Representatives.[76] One year after the passage of the Voting Rights Act there were 97 black members of state legislatures, and by 1973 there over two hundred blacks in state legislatures, as well as six black members of Congress.[77] The 1970's marked a clear movement away from protest politics and the politics of violence to the politics of influence and debate. Yet, it was still influenced by the experiences of the past. "In 1971,... the Congressional Black Caucus [CBC] was formed..." and had as its purpose the presenting of "...a unified voice for Black America..." in Congress.[78] The most senior member of

---

[72] *op. cit.*, Draper, pp. 101-102.

[73] *op. cit.*, Franklin, p. 485.

[74] The Voting Rights Act of 1965 removed the major legal impediments to voting erected by states. Thus, many blacks who had previously been ineligible to vote by virtue of intimidation, literacy requirements or the like were now able to vote.

[75] *op. cit.*, Marable, p. 112.

[76] *ibid.*, p. 136.

[77] *op. cit.*, Franklin, p. 488.

[78] *op. cit.*, Marable, p. 136.

the CBC was Rep. Charles Diggs (D-MI), who later chaired the House Subcommittee on African Affairs and the House Committee on the District of Columbia.

To match the growing number of black elected officials there came a call from Richard Hatcher, mayor of Gary, Indiana, Rep. Diggs, and poet-writer Imamu Amiri Baraka (formerly LerRoi Jones) for a political convention to discuss and hammer out black America's response and position on a variety of political issues.[79] The convention, held in Gary, Indiana was a landmark, in as much as it was a first in trying to gain a political consensus from which black elected officials could operate. Out of the convention came the claim that:

> ...the black politics of Gary must accept major responsibility for creating both the atmosphere and the program for fundamental, far-ranging change in America - it is the challenge to consolidate and organize our own black role as the vanguard for a new society. To accept that challenge is to move to an independent black politics.[80]

While there may have been a call for a mandate that would lead to "far-ranging change" there were a few problems with achieving it in reality. Namely, the convention delegates were unable to agree on policies on bussing and US policy towards Israel, and what came out of the convention were statements that opposed both bussing and US support for Israel. The convention at Gary illustrated the problems of trying to achieve political consensus within the black population. There were too many groups, with too many divergent interests for black Americans to come together as a whole. That may not have been true when blacks were grouped together and all discriminated against, but when one considered other policy issues there were simply too many splits to achieve a unified set of policy initiatives.

As blacks were organising the economy was taking a sour turn. "During the 1970's, inflation averaged a little over 7 percent annually, more than triple the average for the previous two decades...", and unemployment was increasing.[81] As blacks demanded a larger slice of the economic pie, their white supporters began to back away.[82] Also, during this period the US middle

---

[79] *op.cit.*, Franklin, p. 490. For more on the rise and importance of Richard Hatcher see Greer, Edward, *Big Steel: Black Politics and Corporate Power in Gary, Indiana*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1979.

[80] Daniels, Ron, "National Black Political Assembly: Building Independent Black Politics in the 1980's," *Black Scholar*, Volume 15, Number 14, July-August 1984, p. 35.

[81] *op. cit.*, Pinkney, p. 21.

[82] *ibid.*, p. 20.

class was increasingly investing resources into special interest groups.[83] Many of the white middle class members had previously supported blacks, and while they continued that support, their efforts were focused elsewhere.[84] It was not until 1976, with the election of Southern Democrat James E. Carter that blacks regained some of their previous footholds.

Blacks played a significant role in the election of Carter. "More than 90 percent of all black voters supported Jimmy Carter,...."[85] Carter appointed a significant number of blacks to high positions, including Patricia Harris as Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Andrew Young (former member of SNCC) as Ambassador to the UN, and Ambassadors to Spain, Roumania, and East Germany.[86] Despite these rewards for heavy and key support of Carter, there was considerable fall out with Carter among the black community. Carter had targeted inflation, not employment, as the main issue in the economy, he also launched no new social welfare programmes, much to the dismay of black leaders.[87] A variety of black leaders met in August, 1977, to announce "...that they had been 'betrayed', and that Carter was practising a policy of 'callous neglect' towards blacks."[88] Further anger arose when Carter sought the resignation of UN Ambassador Young after he had "...held an informal discussion with a representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization."[89] Carter's appointment of black career diplomat Donald McHenry did little to appease blacks angered by the forced resignation of Young. Yet, even with black irritation at Carter they knew that they had someone with whom they could negotiate and bargain.

All this is not to say that blacks were now unable to come together on at least some issues, indeed this is simply not true. Generally speaking, within rather large limits black Americans have achieved a high degree of consensus. This consensus is a product of both the civil rights movement and the Black Power campaign, whereby a sense of 'communal solidarity' was greatly

---

[83] *op. cit.*, Wilson, p. 138.
[84] *op. cit.*, Pinkney, p.20.
[85] *op. cit.*, Franklin, p. 493.
[86] *ibid.*, p. 493.
[87] *op. cit.*, Marable, p. 187.
[88] *ibid.*, p. 184.
[89] *ibid.*, p. 187.

enhanced.[90] Blacks still vote predominately for the Democratic Party, thus giving leaders leverage to affect influence in Presidential elections. Furthermore, blacks generally speaking continue to be economically disadvantaged and therefore a number of economic programmes continue to appeal. With political enfranchisement, however, has come a growing middle class, and with that middle class there has also come a growing divide within the black community. Disputes over policy and a general inability to achieve the same level of influence that blacks had during the 1960's and early 1970's has forced many in leadership positions to cast around for new issues. One place where consensus may be achieved with relative ease is in foreign policy, primarily because the process of opposition can be effectively conducted through Congress, via the CBC, and because many foreign policy issues influence domestic conditions only marginally.[91] Therefore, foreign policy can be seen as a safe issue around which black leaders can organise their constituencies.

In order to understand how black Americans operate within the foreign policy context it will be necessary to review some earlier attempts on the part of black leadership to influence foreign policy.

Blacks and Foreign Policy

Black Americans have never had a large influence in US foreign policy, primarily because they had for so long suffered from political disenfranchisement. Thus, they were never able to develop sufficient political bodies and constituencies that would allow them to influence the formulation of foreign policy. In addition, there has rarely been an obvious role for blacks to play in foreign policy. Africa has rarely figured largely in the plans of the US, and usually only did so when European powers were involved there too. The Caribbean, another spot of high African population, sits in the US's 'backyard' and is influenced primarily out of US trade and strategic interests - from the perspective of foreign policy elites, it is too central and too important to the US to allow US policy towards that region to be dictated, let alone greatly influenced by a racial or

[90] *op. cit.*, Smith, pp. 434-437.

[91] This does not negate the domestic-foreign link. Rather, in the process of agenda setting foreign policy may take a generally lower position vis a vis other issues. Also, many foreign policy issues fail to carry heavy domestic costs, therefore issues of trade with the Eastern bloc have more domestic economic impact than issues of a symbolic nature.

ethnic group. Therefore, black Americans have not had an overwhelming influence on US foreign policy.[92]

While blacks have not had an overly important role to play in the formation and execution of US foreign policy, they have been involved in some events that figure in the history of US international relations. These included the development of Pan-Africanism, the opposition to Italy's invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia), the development of the Council on African Affairs, and the impact of the Civil Rights Movement (1954-1965) on black involvement in foreign policy.

Pan-Africanism was developed primarily, in the US, by the efforts of W.E.B. DuBois at the turn of the last century. It began

> ...as an organized movement really...around 1900. Black intellectuals in the United States, Africa, and the West Indies became more militant in their demands for equal rights. They defended the independence of the black states of Liberia, Ethiopia, and Haiti, and they called for more political rights for Africans in the colonies.[93]

This demand for political rights came in part out of a cross fertilization of ideas which was occurring because blacks from one part of the world were meeting blacks in another. Black American missionaries traveled to Africa and saw the problems there and blacks from Africa traveled to the US and saw the problems there as well.[94] In 1919, DuBois attended the Versailles Peace Conference, both for the NAACP as well as a leader of the the Pan-African Congress.[95] That Congress adopted the following items:

> It proclaimed the need for international laws to protect the natives; for land to be held in trust; for the prevention of exploitation by foreign capital; for the abolition of slavery and capital punishment; for the right of education, and, finally, it insisted that "the natives of Africa must have the right to participate in the Government as fast as their development permits..."[96]

---

[92] The argument that black Americans are primarily involved and interested in domestic policy is made by Jake C. Miller. Miller argues that: "Black Americans have exerted only minimal influence upon the various governmental agencies, and this limited input has been, largely, in the field of domestic matters, rather than international affairs." See Miller, Jake C., "Black Legislators and African-American Relations, 1970-1975", *Journal of Black Studies*, Volume 10, Number 2, December 1979, p. 246.

[93] Duignan, Peter and L. H. Gann, *The United States and Africa*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 263-264. For more on black American involvement in foreign policy see Longmyer, Kenneth, "Black American Demands", *Foreign Policy*, Number 60, Fall 1985, pp. 3-17.

[94] *ibid.*, p. 262. Africans who came to study in the US included Kwame Nkruma of Lincoln University, Hastings Banda of Meharry College, and A.B. Xuma at the Tuskegee Institute. See *op. cit.*, Duignan and Gann, p. 262. Also see Chirenje, J. Mutero, *Ethiopianism and Afro-Americans in Southern Africa, 1883-1916*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1987.

[95] *ibid.*, p. 265.

[96] Legum, Colin, *Pan-Africanism*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1965, p. 29.

DuBois and the Congress participants had sought to use their presence at the Versailles Peace Conference to influence the course of events in Africa. "DuBois wanted rule [of Africa] by an international body for the development of the African peoples, rather than administration of the former German colonies by other colonial powers."[97] Whether or not DuBois and the Pan-African Congress was successful is in question. Colonel House, chief aide to President Wilson is to have said "...to DuBois that 'colonies and peoples of color played practically no part in the Congress of Versailles, except as pawns to satisfy the greed of colonial powers.'"[98] This contrasts with DuBois own claim that "The Congress specifically asked that the German colonies be turned over to an international organization instead of being handled by the various colonial powers."[99] Thus, the foray into the world of international relations was at least significant, in as much as it marked an attempt on a large and grand scale to organise black opinion for the purpose of influencing international opinion. Later, Pan-African Congresses were held in 1921, 1923, 1927, 1945, and 1974.[100] In all but the last Congress black Americans played a dominant role, with DuBois was the central figure.[101] The following Pan-African Congresses were nothing like the early ones, they lost much of their appeal, as they were continually dominated by DuBois, other US middle and upper class blacks and white liberals. Yet, Pan-Africanism had left its mark and would continue to show its influence for years to come.

Pan-Africanism is not only an event that happened every several years, it was also an idea. As an idea it has influenced black American behaviour for many years. One example of such influence comes from the 1930's following Italy's invasion of Abyssinia.

> In December, 1934, the Italian government of Benito Mussolini used the pretext of a border clash between Italian and Ethiopian troops...to initiate a campaign to turn Ethiopia into an Italian colony. When Mussolini broadcast a humiliating set of demands upon the Abyssinia government and began mobilizing troops for duty in

---

[97] *op. cit.*, Duignan and Gann, p. 266. The Peace Conference had divided up former colonies among colonial states, but under a mandate system which would be operated by the League of Nations.

[98] Challenor, Herschelle Sullivan, "The Influence of Black Americans on U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa", *Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, edited by Abdul Aziz Said, Praeger Publishers, 1981, p. 152.

[99] DuBois quoted in *op. cit.*, Duignan and Gann, p. 267.

[100] *op. cit.*, Challenor, p. 168. The 1974 Congress was the first held on the African continent and was called by Julius Nyere, President of Tanzania, C.L.R. James, Trinidadian author and academic, and Courtland Cox, former member of SNCC Central Committee.

[101] See *op. cit.*, Legum, p. 24-37 for a further discussion of DuBois role.

East Africa, his actions aroused enormous indignation in...

New York and the rest of urban black communities in the US.[102] The US position on the Italian invasion was one of neutrality, refusing to implement sanctions against Italy for the invasion of Abyssinia.[103] As an illustration of just how powerful the image of Abyssinia being invaded was the alignment between Garvey's UNIA and the Communist Party in New York City. The Communist Party had been working for some time trying to break UNIA's hold on the black populous and the Abyssinian affair provided such an opening. The Communist Party and UNIA agreed to work together in opposing the Italian move into Abyssinia.[104] That black nationalists should work with black and white communists on the issue of Abyssinia is perhaps not too surprising.

> Ethiopia had special meaning to blacks in the new world. Not only did a group in Jamaica, Chicago, and New York - the Ras Tafarians - consider themselves direct descendants of Ethiopians brought to the new world during the slave trade, but also the Bible passage, "Ethiopia shall stretch forth her hands to the world," gave the black faithful hope for a better future. Certain nationalist or emigrationist groups incorporated the word Ethiopia into their names.[105]

The Abyssinian conflict also demonstrated just how disinterested and isolationist many Americans were. As a result of Mussolini's actions Congress had passed the "Neutrality Resolution which imposed a mandatory embargo on the export of 'arms, ammunition, or implements of war' for the use of belligerents...."[106] Despite this action, exports to Italy actually increased following the Italian military action in Abyssinia.[107] The Italian affair brought out the anger of black Americans many of whom saw the Italian effort as another case of white racism at work against African interests.

The black community's response went far beyond the joining of two large political groups, namely the Communists and UNIA. There sprung into being a variety of groups seeking to defend Abyssinian interests. They were: the National Council of Friends of Ethiopia, Nationalist Negro

---

102 Naison, Mark, *Communists in Harlem during the Depression*, Grove Press, Inc., New York, 1984, p. 138.

103 *op. cit.*, Challenor, p. 155.

104 See *op. cit.*, Naison, pp. 138-139.

105 *op. cit.*, Challenor, p. 155.

106 Emerson, Rupert, *Africa and United States Policy*, Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1967, p. 18.

107 *ibid.*, p. 18.

Movement, United Aid to Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian Pacific Movement.[108] The NAACP was also involved in pressing for US action in the face of Italian action in Africa. The NAACP sought to pressure the State Department and when that did not work, they

> ...joined the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and urged black Congressman Arthur W. Mitchell (D-Ill.) and others to oppose an amendment to the 1935 Neutrality Bill that would have enabled only Italy, and not Ethiopia, to continue wartime trade with the United States.[109]

None of these efforts succeeded in freeing Abyssinia, nor ending US neutrality. So, the case of Abyssinia presents a picture of attempted influence, but an attempt which ended in failure.

One of the problems encountered by the Abyssinian campaign was that there was no professional organisation designed to deal with African issues, which also carried with it the prestige of known black leaders. While there were organisations, including the NAACP who worked on behalf of Abyssinia, none could either mobilize enough interest or do so professionally in order to gain some relief from the Federal government. That situation was changed somewhat by the Council on African Affairs (CAA). The CAA was set up by Max Yergan, who in 1937 set up the International Committee on Africa, and would later include include Paul Robeson the famous black performer.[110] The committee, in 1939, became known as the Council on African Affairs, and had as one of its objective the collection of "...food, clothing and money from American friends and sympathizers to help destitute..." blacks in Africa.[111] The other work of the CAA centred on South Africa, and consisted of petitions, protests and publications.[112] Yergan was from South Africa and had in the opinion of George Padmore (an early Pan-Africanist and prominent actor in diaspora politics) not earned himself a very good reputation. Padmore says in a letter to W.E.B. DuBois that:

> ...I do not know the man personally, but there are now quite a number of South African Negro doctors here in England...I have had the opportunity of getting their opinions on Yergan. To say the least, it is very low.

---

[108] *op. cit.*, Challenor, p. 156.

[109] *ibid.*, pp. 156-157.

[110] *op. cit.*, Duignan and Gann, p. 340. For more on the CAA and Robeson's role see Duberman, Martin Bauml, *Paul Robeson*, Bodley Head Ltd., London, 1989.

[111] Padmore, George, *Pan-Africanism or Communism*, Dennis Dobson, London, 1956, p. 315.

[112] *op. cit.*, Duignan and Gann, p. 340.

> .... He is so disliked that it affected his work among the Africans and contributed to his having to leave South Africa.[113]

Padmore was not the only one to have a low opinion of Yergan, there were many who thought correctly that the CAA had strong links with the Communist Party in the US and took a Marxist line on many issues. Yet, despite this and Padmore's dislike of Yergan, and his clear statements to DuBois, DuBois joined the CAA. Thus, the CAA was able to have the attraction of both DuBois and Robeson as leaders of the organisation. Part of DuBois motivation for joining the CAA is reflected in a note sent to NAACP head Walter White. Writing about the NAACP DuBois says:

> In its relations to Africa and the social problems there, this organization is facing a problem similar to that of the whole United States, in the question of the relation of this country to other countries of the world. The unrest and agitation and developments in Africa especially during the last twenty-five years is moving toward such a crescendo. .... This organization, of course, at liberty entirely to ignore this by maintaining that our problems have to do with the United States and that there we have more than enough to keep us busy and to use our available funds; and that we should leave the problems of Africa to some other organization.[114]

DuBois then gives his reason for such an organisational capability, namely that diaspora Africans should be brought "...into sympathetic and effective coordination."[115] Thus, through coordination the 'problem of the twentieth century' could finally receive relief.

The CAA was never able to play the role of creating effective coordination, not on a Pan-Africanist scale, nor on the smaller South African. Instead, in 1948 Max Yergan "...broke with the CAA...and became an active anti-communist, testifying against the council before congressional hearings on subversive organizations in the 1950's."[116] The Council perished in 1955 out of neglect, government pressure and exposure. Thus, the CAA had acted for a short period as a lobby for Africa, representing the interests of many black Americans, but it was unable to keep going. Yet, the CAA set the tone for future efforts, demonstrating that such an organisation could operate, if it was careful and that it could attract the interest of black Americans.

---

[113] Letter from George Padmore to W.E.B. DuBois, August 9, 1946, *The Correspondence of W.E.B. DuBois: Volume III*, ed. Herbert Aptheker, The University of Massachusetts Press, 1978, pp. 146-147.

[114] Letter from W.E.B DuBois to Walter White, 2 December, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 167.

[115] *ibid.*, p. 168.

[116] *op. cit.*, Duignan and Gann, p. 341.

The period of the Civil Rights Movement (1954-1965) witnessed a great rise in the attention of the world to black American politics, as well as an increase of interest by black Americans in issues of foreign policy. Perhaps most notable for black Americans during this time were the dramatic events in Africa at the time. Former colonies were being given their independence, some by way of violence (Algeria for instance) others by less bloody means. John Lewis, member of SNCC, said of growing African independence:

> Sure we identified with the blacks in Africa, and we were thrilled by what was going on. Here were black people, talking of freedom and liberation and independence, thousands of miles away. We could hardly miss the lesson for ourselves. *They were getting their freedom, and we still didn't have ours in what we believed was a free country*. We couldn't even get a hamburger and a Coke at the soda fountain. Maybe we were slow in realizing what this meant to us, but then things started moving together. What was happening in Africa, finally, had tremendous influence on us.[117]

Ghana had gained its independence in 1957, and was led by African nationalist Kwame Nkruma, who had studied in the US. The lesson was not lost on black Americans that their freedom would also come, but only through their efforts. As a further illustration of black American interest in Africa and issues of foreign policy the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLCA) met in 1961 to consider issues of Africa. The conference had been called by CORE, SCLC the NAACP and others and issued the following statement:

> We rededicate and reaffirm our ethnic bond with and historic concern for the people of Africa and our complete solidarity with their aspirations for freedom, human rights and independence. We commit ourselves to a wholesale involvement in the affairs of Africa and the yearning of the African people for full freedom, and we call upon the entire Negro community in the United States to join with us in this commitment to the end that our total influence as a group will be used to aid Africans in their march toward freedom.[118]

ANLCA eventually disintegrated partly out of a lack of organisation and partly due to White House disinterest in the group.[119] Changing black American interest in Africa and the world was wonderfully demonstrated in Stokely Carmichael's election in 1966 to the leadership of SNCC. He received invitations to "...North Vietnam, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Japan, the Soviet Union, and Israel. With the exception of Israel, SNCC workers visited all of these nations during

---

[117] *op. cit.*, Williams, p. 139, emphasis added.

[118] *op. cit.*, Challenor, p. 162.

[119] *ibid.*, p. 163.

1966 and 1967."[120] These invitations and and other actions illustrate the quick leftward pace of black American interest in Africa. Carmichael sought "...to establish the revolutionary credentials of Afro-Americans in the eyes of Third World revolutionaries."[121] Thus, linking the efforts overseas to that of a small group of black Americans seeking to use violence as a means to an end.[122] Carmichael's efforts overseas were not always successful, indeed the ANC said of Carmichael that he "...excelled...in meaningless and arrogant demagoguery." [123]

In the more moderate leftward slide in the black leadership was Martin Luther King's decision to condemn the war in Vietnam. King had been circumspect in his actions and opinions of the war, and while he was never a supporter of the war he had been careful never to denounce the war, because that might frighten some of his supporters away. This logic, however, fell to the wayside in 1967, when on April 4 King stated his opposition to the war.[124] King said at the press conference:

> I knew that I could never again raise my voice against the violence of the oppressed in the ghettos without having first spoken clearly to the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today - my own government.[125]

That spring King would join the peace movement in the US, thus linking the Civil Rights Movement (such as it was) to the peace movement.[126] By joining the Civil Rights Movement to the peace movement King had placed himself squarely in opposition to the Johnson Administration. This did not please many black American leaders who viewed a positive relationship with Johnson as an important part of the total effort for full participation and equal rights.

The black American movement into areas of foreign policy was further accentuated by the

---

[120] *op. cit.*, Carson, p. 272.

[121] *ibid.*, p. 276. Carmichael is not necessarily representative of all black Americans, yet his actions and his notoriety indicate a trend within black American politics of a leftward slide in matters of foreign policy.

[122] What this end was is hard to define. Sometimes it meant full racial equality along with a 'Workers' state, other times it meant a fully segregated black American state, which would deal with the world on its own terms.

[123] *ibid.*, p. 277.

[124] Garrow, David J., *Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1988, p. 552.

[125] King in *op. cit.*, Garrow, p. 552.

[126] *ibid.*, p. 558.

establishment of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) in 1971. The CBC brought black American interests together within Congress and one of the interests brought to the fore was black American foreign policy interest.[127] The CBC provides symbolic and institutional access to the making of foreign policy where none or little existed before. With the CBC black Americans have greater ability to influence foreign policy, and part of that influence must necessarily focus on Africa, or as Rep. Parren Mitchell (D-MD) put it Africa is "...an obligatory sphere of interest for every Black Congressman."[128] It is through the conduit of the CBC, and major civil rights organisations that black American interest in foreign policy and especially issues relating to South Africa come into being.

Black American involvement in foreign policy has served two purposes. First, it has provided a pathway through which black Americans can address their own domestic problems within the wider context of diaspora politics. Thus, a link between different African populations can be established, with all of the parallel's that may entail. Second, attention to foreign policy has provided a useful point of tacit agreement between segments of the black American population. Foreign policy issues entail, usually, little domestic currency, instead, they can be handled freely, usually without fear of politcal fallout. Thus, many segments of the black American population could come together on the issue of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, even Garvey's anti-communist UNIA could join forces with the Communist Party over this issue.

Black America's Entry into Anti-Apartheid

Black American interest in South Africa, as mentioned in the earlier example of the CAA, pre-dates the 1948 imposition of apartheid in South Africa. Ending apartheid and white domination of southern Africa, as well as all of Africa, has been a primary objective of various Pan-Africanists, as well as people of other political motivations. There can be no doubt, however, that black Americans have generally supported this perspective (as there have been and are many non-Africans who seek to end 'white' domination of Africa). As with black American interest in

[127] See *op. cit.*, Challenor, p. 166.

[128] *op. cit.*, Miller, p. 247.

foreign policy, interest in opposing apartheid has become more and more complexly organised. As with foreign policy interests in general, interest in opposing apartheid has moved from the rather refined, yet closed, halls of various Pan-Africanist Congresses, gone into the street, and now has become part of the mainstream of black American politics.

Already, the themes of Pan-Africanist Congresses have been discussed, with their emphasis on freeing Africa from European domination. DuBois' efforts helped to add to the small influence of the CAA, thus continuing his influence on Pan-Africanist issues. Yet, just a few years after his death in 1963 opposition to apartheid was being led by those same men who took black American issues out into the larger world. On March 21, 1966 five members of SNCC were arrested at the South African consulate in New York City, for having committed acts of "...disorderly conduct and unlawful intrusion on real property."[129] Arrested were SNCC members John Lewis (Chairman), James Forman (Executive Secretary), Cleveland Sellers (programme director), William Hall (staff member), and William Ricks (Field Secretary).[130] The protest took place to oppose the "...inhumane and barbaric system of apartheid..." and on the anniversary of the Sharpeville killings.[131]

A year earlier Rev. King also became involved in the opposition to apartheid when he issued a fund raising letter on behalf of six South African blacks who sought political asylum in the US. The six were members of a dance troop which had passed through New York City, and had since let their visas expire. Rev. King's fund raising letter, issued on behalf of a human rights group, said "...it is sometimes hard to think about the plight of others fighting for freedom."[132] King's

---

[129] "South African Aide Arrests 5 in Sit-In at Consulate Here", *New York Times*, March 22, 1966, p. 37. This was not the only protest involving young black activists. As with so much of the activities of SNCC, they joined forces with various peace groups, and other members of the left. Thus, demonstrations took place involving students from both SNCC and leftist groups. These demonstrations included: December 25, 1965 members of the NAACP and Brooklyn College demonstrating against US policy towards South Africa in the UN, April 19, 1968 students protest at Princeton asking the University to sell off its $100 million worth of stocks, December 13, 1968 Harvard law students demonstrate against campus recruitment by Chase Manhattan Bank which issues loans to South Africa, March 15, 1972 300 black students demonstrate against shipping facilities in Louisiana being used to import Rhodesia chrome, and finally April 20, 1972 24 blacks from Harvard University take over an building on campus protesting Harvard's decision to keep its $18 million dollar worth of stocks in Gulf Oil (which was said to be operating in support of Portuguese colonial policy in Africa). See "More History to Make", *Southern Africa*, Volume XII, Number 7, September 1979, pp. 25-26.

[130] *op. cit.*, *New York Times*, March 22, 1966, p. 37.

[131] *ibid.*, p. 37.

[132] Kihss, Peter, "Dr. King Asks Aid for 6 Zulus Seeking Asylum", *New York Times*, April 5, 1965, p. 10.

support for those seeking to flee South Africa did not mark the limit of his opposition to apartheid. King's SCLC also entered the fray when Rev. James Bevel, a man with whom King did not always agree with, said: "We will go to Harlem...and do something about housing and income. There are too many people who do not have enough to live on. Then we will go to South Africa and start a movement there."[133] Bevel's comments reflect an even earlier opinion of King in which he said "...we must join in a nonviolent action to bring freedom and justice to South Africa by a massive movement for economic sanctions."[134] During the mid-1960's there was a growing trend among some black Americans towards the use of direct action and protest in civil rights issues, equally there was a willingness to use these methods to attack apartheid.

Perhaps the most important single event in the movement of black Americans into the anti-apartheid effort came in 1970 through the efforts of the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers' Movement (PRWM).[135] Polaroid had contracted with South Africa to sell equipment that would have been used for photographs to be used in South African's pass books. Black workers of Polaroid took actions, including boycotts, demonstrations and other activities to press Polaroid to end its involvement with South Africa. Polaroid sought to end the crisis by refusing to sell goods which could be used to enforce apartheid, yet this did not meet with much approval. In the end this event led to three outcomes:

> First, Polaroid publicly committed itself to the argument that enlightened corporate involvement could help end racism in South Africa. This argument was clearly not new, but Polaroid was the first company to assume the challenge of demonstrating that corporate involvement was effective in transforming the structure of apartheid. Second, the Polaroid campaign, spearheaded by the corporation's black employees, enjoyed greater credibility than had previous actions against American corporations. ....
>
> Third, and related to the first point, is that Polaroid's own position added substantial heat and passion to the ongoing debate between advocates of corporate reform and proponents of disengagement as alternative ways of ending apartheid.[136]

---

[133] Herbers, John, "New Rights Campaigns Charted", *New York Times*, March 28, 1965, Section IV, p. 6.

[134] "Dr. King Bids West Act on South Africa", Special to the New York Times, *New York Times*, December 8, 1964, p. 53.

[135] White, Phillip V., "The Black American Constituency for Southern Africa: 1940-1980", *The American People and South Africa*, ed. Alfred O. Hero and John Barratt, D.C. Heath and Company, 1981, p. 89.

[136] *ibid.*, p. 90.

Thus, in 1970, black Americans had demonstrated that they could influence corporate behaviour, that it was indeed possible to force a multinational to change its transnational behaviour. Furthermore, the Polaroid incident demonstrated that black Americans were a force to be reckoned with in the context of opposition to apartheid.

That these interests in opposing apartheid and other interests in foreign policy have been articulated into the day to day political debate has been due largely to the actions of the CBC. Rep. Diggs (D-MI), chairman of the CBC and the House Subcommittee on Africa brought a great deal of attention to the problems of southern Africa, including Portuguese colonialism, Rhodesian UDI, and of course apartheid. Thus, Diggs presence on the Subcommittee focused attention on the international aspects of US domestic racial policy. With growing interest in Africa and a growing ability on the part of black Americans to influence the foreign policy scene, there was an increased amount of pressure on the US government to alter its policies. These pressures became clear during the annual African Liberation Day, which in 1972 included protests at the Portuguese, and South African embassies as well as the State Department.[137] This activity demonstrated black American interest in the issue of apartheid and southern African independence. This interest gave policy makers and black elected officials greater ability to wield influence on the subject of southern African independence.

Dr. Ron Walters argues in "African-American Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy" that what was missing from effective black American influence was not an interest on the part of black Americans in foreign policy, but rather that no *"organized policy constituency"* existed.[138] It is largely due to this observation that TransAfrica was created. TransAfrica was intended to take advantage of an existing interest in foreign policy, but to do so in a way that provides a more coherent and systematic use of a policy constituency.

---

137 Walters, Ron, "African-American Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy", in *Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Mohammed E. Ahrari, Greenwood Press, 1987, p. 72.

138 *ibid.*, p. 72. The creation of an organised policy constituency should not be taken to mean that once a body is created that it will lead its followers onward. Rather, the constituency organisation is an interactive process, one in which the constituency influences the organisation and where the organisation influences the constituency.

A policy constituency would not, however, be useful if it had insufficient power or leverage to make itself felt. Therefore, TransAfrica enters into a world in which it must work with other groups, some of whom may not be up with or be joined by other groups in order to make itself felt. There is no doubt that TransAfrica is one of the most important anti-apartheid groups in the US. The remainder of this chapter will provide a brief overview of those other groups that are involved with TransAfrica.

The major elements of US anti-apartheid include the involvement of various religious, student and black American groups. Only after the establishment of the CBC, the rise to power of Rep. Diggs to the Subcommittee on Africa and the establishment of TransAfrica was the black American polity *deeply and effectively* involved in anti-apartheid issues. Since then there have arisen the 'Big Three' of the anti-apartheid movement including the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), the Washington Office on Africa (WOA), and TransAfrica.

Generally speaking anti-apartheid is made up of two major thrusts, one coming under the heading of economic disengagement and the other under the heading of total disengagement. The former is reformist and the later is in the broadest sense revolutionary.[139] The reformist option seeks to first use US investment in South Africa as a way of altering or influencing South African government behaviour with regard to apartheid. Investment may be manipulated in a variety of ways to gain a response from South Africa, the two major methods of manipulation being corporate responsibility and divestment. The

> ...advocates of corporate responsibility maintain that those who are affected by the business should help to shape its policies; that is, business decisions should be made more public by having greater citizen participation in their formulation whether the policy is about consumer product safety, the manufacture of weapons, the hiring of women and ethnic minorities, or involvement in South Africa.[140]

Divestment, on the other hand, is aimed more at delinking US corporate bodies from South Africa altogether, and this is done by a given body divesting itself of investments in either South Africa

---

[139] See Shepherd, George W., *Anti-Apartheid: Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of South Africa*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1977, pp. 43-44.

[140] Love, Janice, *People's Participation in Foreign Policy Making: Evaluating the US Anti-Apartheid Movement*, Ph.D. dissertation, 1983, p. 84.

itself or in companies who themselves hold investments in South Africa.[141] As a rule the corporate responsibility approach is rejected by the mainstream anti-apartheid groups because of its emphasis upon reform, and making investment comfortable for the investor, as opposed to radically changing the situation in South Africa. That the corporate responsibility approach has been rejected is best reflected by the reaction of anti-apartheid groups to the Sullivan Principles.[142]

The Sullivan Principles were devised in 1977 by Rev. Leon Sullivan, black minister and board member of General Motors Corporation. The Sullivan principles include the following:

- non-segregated work place
- fair employment practices
- equal pay
- training for non-whites, in order to elevate non-whites to positions of greater responsibility
- increased numbers of non-whites in management and administrative positions
- improvement of employee non-work environment (i.e. housing, transport, etc.)[143]

Sullivan's intention in drawing up the principles was to "...bring the actions and influence of American companies in South Africa to bear against the racist practices, customs, and apartheid laws of that country."[144] The Sullivan Principles brought to the South African scene a set of ideas that had been used with success in the US, namely the use of employment regulations to alter hiring, and therefore alter economic conditions. The signatories of the Sullivan Principles, who operated facilities in South Africa, would be monitored by the Arthur D. Little Company, a research firm. Corporate compliance, then, would act as a catalyst of change in South Africa. It would only be through corporate compliance with the Principles that would make their use more than a public relations coup. Indeed, there were those who argued that the Principles were irrelevant to change in South Africa. Jennifer Davis, an anti-apartheid activist with the American Committee on Africa, argued that "...codes of conduct are irrelevant to the basic struggle for freedom...."[145] One reason why codes of conduct may be of no value to the basic struggle for

---

[141] *ibid.*, p. 87.

[142] This is not to be taken that the corporate responsibility approach has been totally rejected, but rather it is rejected as being the only tool for influencing South Africa. Furthermore, many aspects of corporate responsibility still serve useful purposes for the anti-apartheid movement, in as much as they may help to advertise the movement's goals.

[143] Morlan, Gail, "Sullivan Code - Cleaning up the Corporate Image", *Southern Africa*, Volume XII, Number 7, September 1979, p. 14.

[144] Sullivan, Leon, "The Sullivan Principles and Change in South Africa", *Africa Report*, Volume XXIX, Number 3, May-June, 1984, p. 48.

[145] Davis, Jennifer, "Breaking the Links", *Southern Africa*, Volume XII, Number 7, September 1979, p. 13.

freedom is that they may be easily manipulated. A company may be able to claim that it is a signatory of the Sullivan Principles, and yet may not implement them. This is indeed the case in many instances where compliance may be only partial or non-existent.[146]

Under the heading of total disengagement anti-apartheid groups seek to totally isolate the Pretoria government and the policies of apartheid. Often, but not always, total disengagement includes elements of Marxist-Leninism and/or anti-capitalism/anti-imperialism. The main tool in the total disengagement approach is the call for sanctions against South Africa. Sanctions are seen as a way of isolating Pretoria, cutting off Western economic support for South Africa and causing disruption in the ability of the white minority to operate the state.[147] The dismantling of apartheid may come through violent revolution, or it may come in the guise of negotiations, but in either case, it is spurred on by sanctions. This total disengagement policy may also include the total or virtual cessation of diplomatic links with South Africa. Some groups may support many positions on sanctions, yet may not wish to support revolution within South Africa, and equally, some groups favouring total disengagement may support divestment programmes in the US, but do so only for tactical reasons, not because it serves the interests of reform.

The US anti-apartheid movement, it can be argued, found its roots in the South African National Party victory in 1948, when that party sought to establish apartheid.[148] The US anti-apartheid movement found its beginnings in an offshoot of the growing civil rights movement, especially through the efforts of George Houser, leader of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). Houser, along with A. Phillip Randolph, of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, worked to establish the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) in 1952.[149] ACOA, formerly Americans for South African Resistance, sought to change South Africa radically, thus moving

---

[146] Dunn, Truman, "Slouching Toward Reform - US Corporations Under Apartheid", *Southern Africa*, Volume XII, Number 7, September 1979, p. 16.

[147] Sanctions are part of the the UN validated actions that can be taken against states which are perceived to be operating in violation of the principles of good behaviour between states. Specifically, Article 41 of the UN Charter provides member states with the option of using economic sanctions against such states.

[148] Many of the features of apartheid were already there in place, but it was the National Party victory that made apartheid a central feature of South African political life.

[149] Metz, Steven, *The Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Formation of American Policy Toward South Africa, 1969-1981*, Ph.D. dissertation, 1985, p. 84.

away from any sort of gradualism, or reformist option. ACOA's stance in the 1950's was regarded as radical[150] when it "...requested the United States to support 'the reestablishment of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa,' which Western powers had opposed because it interfered with domestic jurisdiction.[151] ACOA was concerned, however, with more than apartheid and South Africa - Houser and his staff concerned themselves with other African issues. Yet, even in the 1950's anti-apartheid was beginning to take off. Houser himself had been a participant in the US civil rights movement, but ACOA and Houser were more interested in anti-colonial issues than exclusively those of apartheid. ACOA's position in US anti-apartheid was, however, central in the development of the movement.

> Under the leadership of Reverend George Houser, the American Committee on Africa was instrumental in the first major anti-apartheid effort in the U.S. - a campaign in the 1960's to end an open line of credit provided to the South African government by a consortium of American banks.[152]

ACOA has also

> ...lobbied the U.S. government to take a more stridently anti-apartheid stand, including...support for black South African nationalists visiting the United States and the United Nations, and the provision of funds for legal defense and welfare of political prisoners in South Africa.[153]

As part of the effort to influence government, ACOA published *Africa Today* as its main propaganda organ.[154] While ACOA has played a leadership role in the past, it has received considerable competition for access to influence in Washington by the Washington Office on Africa (WOA).

The Washington Office on Africa (WOA) was created as an offshoot of ACOA when ACOA sought access to Washington and Capitol Hill in January, 1969.[155] The ACOA Washington effort, however, failed, and so ACOA's Washington office became, with church

---

150 *ibid.*, p. 382 for more on ACOA' radicalism.

151 *op. cit.*, Shepherd, p. 36.

152 Metz, Steven, "The Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Populist Instinct in American Politics", *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume CI, Number 3, 1986, p. 382.

153 *op. cit.*, Metz, 1985, p. 86.

154 *Africa Today* is now published by the University of Denver. See *ibid*, p. 85.

155 *ibid.*, Metz, 1985, p. 86.

support, the WOA. WOA is located directly across from the Capitol and near Congressional offices, therefore, making it ideal for lobbying efforts. WOA has strong relations with various members of Capitol Hill, including Rep. Dellums (now chair of the CBC) as well as members of the House Subcommittee on Africa. An illustration of WOA's strength and influence on Capitol Hill is reflected in the following statement by Rep. Julian Dixon (D-CA) made when he was chairman of the CBC. Dixon said, "We have [the CBC] collaborated with interested organizations such as TransAfrica and the Washington Office on Africa to seek congressional support for stronger policies against apartheid."[156] As reflected by WOA's location as well as Dixon's comments, it is intended more as a lobbying group than a mass movement effort.[157] WOA is funded by a variety of religious and labour organisations, and maintains close contacts with these organisations. Currently, WOA is perhaps the most active organisation on Capitol Hill seeking to influence Congressional action on South Africa. Like ACOA WOA publishes its own magazine, called Washington Notes on Africa. The activity level may be high on WOA's part, but their effectiveness may not be quite as high. Perhaps more influential among Congressmen is the African American Institute, which is unlike WOA and ACOA, in that it does not seek the total disengagement strategy.

The African American Institute (AAI) began operating in 1953[158] and functions primarily as an educational facility. Due to its receipt of federal funds, AAI is prohibited from lobbying Congress, though the process of education comes close to being lobbying. AAI seeks to educate Congressional members, via talks and visits to southern Africa, on matters concerning the region.[159] In this way, one could say that AAI hopes that the situation will speak for itself. Unlike ACOA or WOA, AAI has no interest in the development of a popular following, since they are not a membership based organisation in the same way as ACOA or WOA. Both ACOA and WOA seek to collect a membership for the purpose of influence and funding. Yet, it should be clear that

---

[156] Dixon, Julian C., "The Congressional Black Caucus and U.S. Policy in Southern Africa", *Africa Report*, Volume 29, Number 3, May-June 1984, p. 13.

[157] *op. cit.*, Metz, 1986, p. 383.

[158] *op. cit.*, Shepherd, p. 33.

[159] *Creevey interview*, July, 1988, Washington, D.C.

AAI is interested in altering US policy towards South Africa. Due to their funding, they cannot participate in the debate in the same manner as can WOA and ACOA, yet they are supportive of the ACOA's and WOA's actions.

In conclusion, it has been illustrated that anti-apartheid is not a new phenomenon, but stems from a long tradition of opposition. Furthermore, that the groups which are involved are varied in their outlook, ranging from partial disengagement to total disengagement. Finally, it has been demonstrated that the total disengagement camp is by far the most active and more influential in the movement. The rejection of the Sullivan Principles signalled the end for the partial disengagement groups, and a victory for the total disengagement side. Yet, it should be pointed out that nothing is written in stone in the movement, people and ideas are fluid and move in and out. Therefore, the partial disengagement camp is still operative if for no other reason than they are supported at times by the total disengagement groups for tactical reasons.

It should be clear too that the groups mentioned above are not the only groups involved in opposing apartheid. There are countless small groups, and even some larger that have not been mentioned here. What has been provided, though, is an illustration of the main themes of anti-apartheid in the US. What has also been demonstrated is that anti-apartheid movement has had links with the civil rights movement and that those links continue to this day. As with the civil rights movement, the ultimate objective for the anti-apartheid movement is to influence government action, thus the presence of groups in Washington.

Conclusion

Throughout this chapter it has been attempted to demonstrate that black Americans have been deeply involved in the US political system, as well as active participants in the development of the world at large. By seeking their own political empowerment, black Americans have come to carry a substantial voice, though they as yet have not been able to wield substantial influence on foreign policy. Beginning at the turn of the century black Americans have been increasingly active and successful in winning political empowerment in the US. Along with that trend has been an increasing interest in foreign policy, though without the same level of success as was achieved

during the domestic fight. Of the foreign policy issues that attract black American attention none is more powerful than opposition to apartheid. The power of that attraction stems partly out of the tradition of Pan-Africanism, which ties together all those of the African diaspora. The other attraction comes out of the civil rights experiences of black Americans, many of whom may identify anti-apartheid as being an extension of the civil rights movement.

What has also come out of this chapter, hopefully, is the sense that there is no unified, monolithic notion of being black - that there is ideological diversity within black America. This diversity, however, does not prevent there from being various overwhelming points of agreement, one of those being opposition to apartheid. Put another way, opposition to apartheid is perhaps the one foreign policy issue, perhaps the only issue, in which all black Americans can be unified. This unity of position may not be one which stems from total agreement on tactics, but rather total unity on the ultimate objective, namely the eradication of apartheid. Thus, beginning with the Pan-Africanist congresses, and running throughout the existence of the Council on African Affairs and throughout the civil rights movement, there have been attempts to eradicate the racial system that has evolved in South Africa. This is not so because the individuals all came to the issue with the same ideological perspective (i.e. capitalist v. communist, Stalinist v. Trotskyite), but rather they came to the issue with the same commitment to eradicating a racial system that kept members of their racial group down.

While there is this commitment to eradicating the racial system of South Africa, there may also be present in any given individual a set of other ideological commitments. Therefore, because of the various groups of anti-colonialists who were and are committed to opposing apartheid, it is not surprising to see black Americans working with these groups. These anti-colonialists provide important allies for black Americans in seeking their objectives. This was true, to some extent, in the civil rights movement, and is no less true today in the anti-apartheid movement. TransAfrica draws on a long and rich tradition within the black American community, one that includes appealing to and using non-US groups, agencies and bodies to further their own goals. This should not be surprising, not just from the viewpoint of historical trends, but also from the

perspective that TransAfrica is a group that is concerned with an international issue. This interest demands that they work with and are associated with groups outside the US.

In the final analysis black American involvement in foreign policy has as its goal the enhancement of black American lives in the US. This is not to say that there is not a deep and real concern among black Americans for others of the diaspora. Instead, through defending the interests of diaspora Africans, black Americans seek to place their own signature on US foreign policy, that US foreign policy must defend the interests of not only those of white Europeans (as forerunners of Americans), but blacks of the diaspora as well (equally forerunners of Americans).

CHAPTER THREE
The United States and Conflict in Southern Africa

The conflict in southern Africa, while important in its own right, is examined here in order to understand how it intersects with the US foreign policy process. It is argued here that the conflict(s) in southern Africa has played an important role in the development of TransAfrica in the US. The events that will be addressed are: the Angolan Civil War, the signing of the Nkomati Accord, the conflict in South Africa and the changes in Washington, and finally, the independence of Zimbabwe. Each one of these areas has influenced TransAfrica, or involved them in some way. It is also important to point out that the nature of US policy towards southern Africa is driven primarily by vague US policy commitments, and reactions to crisis situations; like most US foreign policy southern Africa policy is one dominated by crisis management. Given that US policy is reacting to events in southern Africa (Administrations tend to react when a crisis occurs in southern Africa, or when East-West [strategic] relations demand it, but rarely before hand), and that southern Africa has been low on the US foreign policy agenda, there has been ample room for anti-apartheid organisations to attempt to influence policy by going through the back door of Congress. This is so partly because there is less Administration attention to the region during these lulls in activity. Therefore, when there was an event occurring in southern Africa that caused the Administration to act, there was provided a window of opportunity for anti-apartheid groups who were already present lobbying Congress to use their influence in order to effect the outcome. This chapter, then, is concerned with such windows of opportunity. So, this chapter is not written to provide the reader with an in depth understanding of conflict in southern Africa, but more to offer an idea of the issues that affected TransAfrica.

United States Foreign Policy in Africa

Unlike some European powers, the United States never possessed a colony in Africa.[1] This fact, and its underlying cause of US isolationism, has influenced US relations with Africa probably more than any other single factor, primarily because by way of that fact the US had a different

[1] Though Liberia came very close to being a colony, it never quite reached that level of interest in the US.

starting point in its relations with Africa. Other influences, generally speaking, on US relations with Africa have stemmed from American anti-colonialism, the large African population, trade with Africa, and strategic considerations of the East-West conflict. It is this last item which has most effected US policy towards Africa in recent years.

US anti-colonialist credentials stem, of course, from the US war of independence, when some British colonial dependencies in North America separated themselves from the growing Empire. From that moment onward many in the world identified the US with anti-British and anti-colonial sentiments. This anti-colonialism, however, "...has undoubtedly lost much of its earlier sharp cutting edge as the American position in the world has changed."[2] Much of the patina of US anti-colonialism was already wearing off by the turn of the century. This is best illustrated by the growth of US imperialism in the Phillipines, Cuba, Haiti, and Puerto Rico, as well as in Africa by the US 'neutralism' in the Boer War. The US was 'neutral' only in name, and indeed, assisted the British in their war with the Boers, this despite a populist affinity, especially among some Irish Americans in support of the Boers. The US sought to use British expansionism as a device for opening new markets for US goods, establishing a policy of "hitchhiking imperialism".[3] The image of US anti-colonialism did not die there in the Boer War, but already it was clear that the US was moving away from its earlier Anglophobia and towards its status as world power. The US position as anti-colonialist power was reasserted during and following World War II when the US insisted that Great Britain give up her colonial possessions, as reflected in the Atlantic Charter, despite Churchill's claim that the end of colonialism did not apply to the UK.[4] This anti-colonialism, however, was not based so much upon Anglophobia, or necessarily on any great commitment to self-determination, but more so on having access to markets throughout the world. Removing Britain's control over these markets would provide the US with opportunity to make itself felt directly, replacing the hitchhiking with direct access.[5] With the advent of NATO, the

---

[2] Emerson, Rupert, "The Character of American Interests in Africa," *The United States in Africa*, ed. Walter Goldschmidt, Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, New York, 1964, p. 33.

[3] Noer, Thomas J., *Briton, Boer, and Yankee: The United States and South Africa, 1870-1914*, Kent State University Press, 1978, p.26.

[4] Emerson, Rupert, *Africa and United States Policy*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1967, p. 19.

[5] See Ambrose, Stephen E., *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy 1938-1970*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1973, pp. 17-19.

issue of Africa and the involvement of NATO had reached a new plateau.

> The original Brussels Treaty in March 1948 had spoken only of an "armed attack in Europe" (Article 4). Article 4... went further in defining an armed attack as an attack on North America or Western Europe, including the Algerian departments of France. Although the defence area was defined specifically to exclude the area south of the Tropic of Cancer 22 1/2 (degrees) north of the equator, these treaty arrangements did not signify complete agreement among the contracting parties.[6]

The US, over time, however, found that consensus on such a position was not altogether difficult to obtain, despite some European opposition.[7]

This rise of the cold war and Soviet interest in Africa created stumbling blocks to US anti-colonial positions. The US found itself in the position of opposing rising Soviet influence and interest in Africa. Thus, "'Keeping the cold war out of Africa' meant excluding the Soviet Union while allowing free rein to Western influence."[8] Indeed,

> As the Soviet menace waxed, Washington grew more concerned with Moscow's real and suspected designs than with the future of the Western colonial empires in Africa. Preoccupied with the restoration of Europe and the rise of Russian power, the U.S. government was content to regard the bulk of the African continent as a colonial appendage of Western Europe, although some Marshall Plan aid was to be used in the colonies. .... Even during the 1950s the global policy of containing Soviet expansion took absolute priority over African matters. .... Washington had no wish to quarrel with its European supporters over the affairs of a continent known to so few of America's citizens.[9]

Clearly, the post war world was one in which anti-colonialism ranked a clear second to opposing the USSR. The US, while wishing to see the European powers dispose of their colonial possessions, was unwilling to enter into a confrontation with them over how and when independence would come.

Indeed, it was not until 1957, the year of Ghana's independence, that the US developed the African Affairs section within in the Department of State.[10] As a further reflection of the status

---

[6] Coker, Christopher, *NATO, The Warsaw Pact and Africa*, The Macmillan Press, LTD., London, 1985, p.6.

[7] The British were difficult to persuade, but eventually came round. The French, on the other hand, were a different matter. DeGualle's involvement in Algeria created problems for the US in its anti-colonialist stance. A major issue between the US and colonial powers centred on the use of NATO equipment in wars of a colonial nature.

[8] Minter, William, *King Solomon's Mine Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa*, Basic Books Publishers, Inc., New York, 1986, p. 144.

[9] Duignan, Peter & L.H. Gann, *The United States and Africa: A History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p.285.

[10] Rubin, Barry, *Secrets of State*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1987, p. 85.

African affairs have in the US policy process, the Bureau of African Affairs (AF) is "...the least important of the regional bureaus, a distinction due mainly to the nature of the region's problems and the low priority accorded it by top policymakers."[11] It is true that under both Kennedy and Carter African issues became more important, as is illustrated by Kennedy's development of the Peace Corps and support for some of the forces of national liberation[12] and Carter's human rights policy.[13] Thus, the issue of independence for the Congo and the rise of Patrice Lumumba was not one of rising nationalism, for example, but rather one of opposing Soviet influence. [14] It clearly illustrated the tug of two poles in US policy making, namely anti-colonial and pro-independence versus containment of Soviet influence.

There are three main areas of US interest in southern Africa, which combine to influence how the US deals with the region, they are economic, strategic and humanitarian.[15] Of major importance to the US in its relationship to Africa and especially southern Africa is the importation of African minerals. This issue is often tied into the strategic East/West issue, in as much as the importation of various minerals (chrome, gold, platinum, etc.) is considered important for the production of US defence related items. Therefore, should the importation of those products be terminated, there would ensue a shortfall in US production of such goods, leading to a battlefield shortage. "It is frequently argued that South Africa is the only source of supply other than the Soviet Union for these critical commodities."[16] For example, South Africa is the world's largest producer (1986) in chromium, gold, manganese, platinum, and vanadium.[17] South Africa is also

---

[11] *ibid.*, p.138. Kennedy, recognizing the linkage between African issues and the rise of domestic US racial violence appointed Governor G. Mennan Williams as head of the AF. Williams had a reputation as a "vigorous champion of liberal causes,...." See *op. cit.*, Emerson, 1967, p. 25. Thus, Kennedy's action illustrates how US foreign policy issues can be used to influence US domestic situations. Secretary of State Dean Rusk argued that: "The biggest single burden that we carry on our backs in our foreign relations in the 1960's is the problem of racial discrimination here at home." Rusk quoted in *ibid.*, p. 57.

[12] See *op. cit.*, Duignan & Gunn, p. 291 and this chapter section on the Angolan Civil War.

[13] *op. cit.*, Rubin, p. 138.

[14] Lumumba had sought the assistance of the US in removing Belgian troops who were in the Congo in order to protect Belgian interests. Lumumba was turned down by the US and then sought and received assistance from the USSR. This led the US to firmly oppose Lumumba and seek his removal. See *op. cit.*, Minter, pp. 144-146.

[15] Shepherd, George W., Jr., *The Politics of African Nationalism*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, pp 174-189 for a discussion of these three elements.

[16] Christenson, Phillip L., "United States - South African Economic Relations: Major Issues in the United States", *The American People and South Africa*, ed. Alfred O. Hero, Jr. & John Barratt, Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachussetts, 1981, p. 57.

[17] *South Africa 1987-1988 Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa*, 13th edition, Bureau of Information, Perskor Printers, Johannesburg, 1987/88, p. 324.

the world's number two producer in coal, diamonds, and uranium.[18] Other products that originate in Africa are oil (Nigeria and Angola), copper (Zambia), and a variety of others. Therefore, it is safe to say that there is a considerable qualitative trade relationship with Africa. South Africa, because of the large role it plays in the production and shipment of these goods takes on strategic importance. There is the argument that the USSR would, by way of its influence on the ANC, seek to hinder the flow of goods to the US. This argument ignores the economic needs that already exist in South Africa, no matter who is in power in South Africa, the government of the day will need all the proceeds from the sale of mineral goods.[19] It was during the early and mid 1970's that US planners became aware of the relative importance of South Africa, with regard to resources and strategic planning.

> The strategic importance of the region had also been amplified in 1973 by the October War, which had once again illustrated the need for alternatives to the Suez Canal and, even more importantly, had proved how vulnerable the West could be to the political manipulation of supplies of raw materials. For the first time, southern Africa's deposits of strategic minerals became a crucial consideration during discussions of policy toward the region.[20]

It is the notion of influencing mineral wealth in the Western world that also leads to viewing South Africa as a strategic partner. In South Africa Simonstown naval base is a substantial base in terms of size and modernity, having been used by the British navy up until the early 1970's when the treaty was broken off at the request of the UK. US naval forces ceased calling at Simonstown in the mid-1960's because of the problem of apartheid, this despite the bases usefulness as a stop over point to and from South Vietnam. The base was also seen as useful in opposing Soviet naval expansion in the Indian Ocean. The expansion of the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean has led some to argue that this is an attempt at trade interdiction. The Soviet fleet would position itself in such a way as to harrass and interfere with Western shipping. One of the most effective methods that the USSR could use to influence Western shipping revolves around the control of choke points, namely those areas through which "...oil tankers and vessels with nonfuel minerals bound for the

---

[18] *ibid.*, p. 324.

[19] See Campbell, Kurt, *Soviet Policy towards South Africa*, Macmillan Press, London, 1986, pp. 94-126.

[20] *op. cit.*, Metz, p. 202.

West..." must pass, and equally areas that are narrow thus making them amenable to naval control.[21] The use of South Africa as a force to oppose the USSR naval expansion in the region lacks credibility, in as much as while the USSR may have forces in the region, South Africa has far too little internal stability to conduct itself as a major operator within NATO.[22] Nor is South Africa central to NATO itself, despite its position on the Cape, one of the sitting aside a 'choke point' of international trans-oceanic shipping.[23]

This is so due to South Africa's distance from the main NATO battlefields, it is too far away, thus demanding too much expenditure to make it operationally central to NATO. The Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, issued in January, 1987 said:

> South Africa's position aside the sea-lanes around the Cape of Good Hope is frequently used as an argument in favor of South Africa's military importance, but the apparent consensus among U.S. defense planners is that these sea-lanes are under minimal threat and that the active collaboration of the South African Government would not significantly increase our [US] ability to protect them.[24]

The report goes on to point out, with regard to mineral interdiction, that:

> Aside from certain minerals categorized as critical or strategic, the immediate material interests of the United States in South Africa are relatively modest. Less than one percent of U.S foreign trade and less than one percent of U.S. direct investment overseas is in South Africa
>
> ...we have concluded that the potential impact of such a denial is not sufficient cause to determine U.S. policy toward South Africa.[25]

It would be wrong, however, to draw from these points that the issue of mineral interdiction, Soviet control of choke points, and the viability of shipping lanes that South Africa is strategically unimportant. This would ignore the very clear points on South Africa's importance listed above,

---

[21] *Strategic Minerals: A Resource Crisis*, Council on Economics and National Security, conference report, Rear Admiral William C. Mott, conference introduction, 1981, p.21.

[22] South Africa may not have sufficient forces to counter USSR strength, but keeping South Africa out of any naval basing strategy of the USSR can be considered a considerable victory. Thus, it may not be only the size of forces contributed to NATO, for example, but it also may important that South Africa prevents its geographical position from being used by those who would otherwise support any expansion move guided by Moscow based planners.

[23] Those choke points are: in the Middle East, the Straits of Hormuz, Greater and Lesser Tunb, Bahrain Islands, Jazirah Al Masira, and Socotra, and along the Indian Ocean coast of Africa those points are, Diego Garcia, Mauritus, Mozambique Channel, and the Cape of Good Hope (Simonstown).

[24] *A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa: The Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa*, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., January, 1987, p. 3.

[25] *ibid.*, p. 3.

however what is also clear is that there are a variety of factors that go into making US policy toward South Africa, and the issues of mineral availability, choke points and the more generalized control of shipping are important, but in and of themselves are insufficient to determine US foreign policy.

Ultimately South Africa is not central to the maintenance of Western interests. This is clearly shown by the imposition of a US arms embargo in 1963.

> On August 7, 1963, the United States voted in the Security Council for a voluntary arms embargo, but some days before doing so Stevenson [US UN Ambassador] had declared that the United States would act unilaterally to sell no arms after the end of the year. He also stated that existing contracts for external defense would be fulfilled and he reserved the right to modify the policy if needed in the future for 'common defense.'[26]

Several points are clear from the above, not least of which is that the US is willing, when conditions demand it, to act in such a way that is clearly contrary to the interests of South Africa. While it is true that they are willing to act against South Africa, they are equally insistent on protecting their own interests, and therefore, Ambassador Stevenson's caveat of "common defense." Many have complained that the voluntary US arms embargo is weak, yet there can be little doubt that in 1963 the unilateral action by the US carried considerable weight, both at home where domestic turmoil was on the increase, and internationally where South Africa was still in the midst of its own crisis. The arms embargo became an issue again in the 1970's under the Carter Administration, and it again illustrates that South Africa is not seen as central to US interests. With rising violence in South Africa and authoritarian responses from the government the UN considered sanctions against South Africa. The Western nations in response, not wishing to impose economic sanctions due to domestic economic, strategic and other considerations, sought instead to make mandatory the voluntary arms embargo. Therefore, on November 4, 1977 the Security Council proclaimed a "...mandatory embargo on arms and related materials of all types."[27] The mandatory embargo has many of the same problems that the voluntary embargo had,

---

[26] Karis, Thomas, "United States Policy toward South Africa," *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis*, eds. Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1982, p. 327.

[27] *ibid.*, p. 351. Of course the arms embargo is a sanction against South Africa, but it is not the larger mandatory embargo against all trade with South Africa. For purposes here it will not be regarded as a sanction against South Africa, the type being suggested by many anti-apartheid groups and states.

it is weak, easily violated and is set against a state that already possess considerable military industrial capability. Yet, the symbolism of the embargo is inescapable, as is the influence it has on the debate about South Africa.

In a very real way, the embargo illustrates the fundamental problems the US has with regard to South Africa, and southern Africa as a whole. The embargo indeed did prevent weapons from going to South Africa, but it did not prevent other states from selling those weapons, nor did it prevent South Africa from manufacturing its own. Only recently during the Angolan conflict was there any sign that the arms embargo was beginning to have any real effect on South African military actions. Therefore, the act was in many ways an empty gesture, demonstrating US 'moral abhorrence' of apartheid, yet doing very little about it. This is very much the same situation in which most US policy towards the region finds itself, bashed and buffeted by the constraints of international trade, strategic relationships and heavily influenced by domestic conflict. During the Nixon Administration there was an attempt to realize a new policy in the region, yet this too failed. The National Security Council produced NSSM 39, which laid out five options, any one of which would steer the US foreign policy towards southern Africa through troubled waters. Those options were:

> ...first, the so-called "Acheson" option, after the views of the former Secretary of State, called for normalization of American relations with the white regimes [the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, Rhodesia, and South Africa]. The second option called for a partial relaxation of American measures against these regimes, together with increased aid for black Africa, especially South Africa's neighbours like Botswana, and diplomatic efforts to resolve tensions between the white governments and their neighbours. The third was very similar to existing policy: maintain relations with both white and black African governments along existing lines and sustain a stated policy of opposition to both racism and violence. A fourth option included decreased contacts with the white regimes. And a fifth suggested the possibility of simply severing U.S. ties in the area to avoid having a stake in either side should the situation blow up.[28]

Option number two was chosen as the best, despite State Department criticism that "...once adopted, the policy would prove sticky - the United States would be unable to abandon it if it did not work", from then on option two was called the 'tar baby' option.[29] The adoption of option two

---

[28] Lake, Anthony, *The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy toward Southern Rhodesia*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1976, p. 128.

[29] *ibid.*, p. 129.

signalled a perceived 'tilt' towards Pretoria, one which once adopted would be hard to alter.[30] The 'tar baby' option, in many ways, has not changed since, despite a variety of names, including Kissinger's policy of 'communication' which was another word for diplomacy, or Carter's emphasis on human rights. A shift away from the assumptions of option two, and the most substantive shift, is that the victories of national liberation movements in southern Africa ended the erroneous assertion that the "whites were here to stay". Thus, before Kissinger left office in January 1977, it was clear that there was a new situation in southern Africa.

> This situation began to change when black movements in southern Africa demonstrated their capacity to seize power. If they were aided by communist arms, it was still ominous that for the first time Africans had shown a capacity to use Soviet aid decisively, undeterred by all the Western hostility to such a collaboration. After Vietnam such victories were bound to have a profound psychological impact on Americans and Africans alike. They seemed to point to a fundamental change in international relations and to underline a certain American impuissance in the face of this transformation in the world distribution of power. After the fall of Portugal's dictatorship, all that remained of the inter-imperial order in Africa were Britain's failing powers in Rhodesia, and a framework of postcolonial dependencies....[31]

The Carter Administration:

> ...recognized that the anti-apartheid movement was too dedicated and vociferous to be totally ignored, but did not have enough of a mass following to directly influence policy. Thus, like Kissinger, the Carter administration [sic] concluded that the best compromise was to pursue a moderate policy which would not challenge tangible American interests in South Africa and which would take into consideration the limits of U.S. influence, while at the same time making some concessions to the anti-apartheid movement in terms of heightened rhetorical hostility toward apartheid.[32]

Like those before him, Carter was in the position of having to condemn apartheid for domestic reasons, yet at the same time maintain solid relations with South Africa for business and strategic reasons. The combination led to a policy that was confused and essentially weak.

Similar to the Carter policy was the Reagan policy of constructive engagement, as envisioned by former academic Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker. Crocker saw the

---

[30] The name 'tar baby' coming from the story of Brer Rabbit, in which Brer Fox makes a baby out of tar to attract and capture Brer Rabbit.

[31] Nolutshungu, Sam C., "South African Policy and United States Options in Southern Africa", *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985, p. 57.

[32] Metz, Steve, *The Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Formulation of American Policy toward South Africa, 1969-1981*, Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1985, reprinted by University Microfilms International, Dissertation Information Service, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1987, pp. 384-385.

main objective of US policy being the removal of Soviet influence from southern Africa, only then with the East-West conflict out of the way could the regional issues be addressed. The major objectives of constructive engagement were:

> ...(1) that South Africa's overwhelming economic and military predominance in southern Africa and its powerful internal security apparatus would, at least in the short term, enable Pretoria to "manage" internal and external pressures for change; (2) that the Botha government could be induced to agree to an internationally accepted settlement in Namibia if South African withdrawl from Namibia were linked to a withdrawl of Cuban troops from Angola and the prospect of an improvement in U.S.-South African relations; (3) that an early Namibian settlement would set in motion a self-reinforcing spiral of positive developments in South Africa and the region, thus validating the constructive engagement approach; and (4) that progress could be made more quickly on apartheid issues if the U.S. Government used official, rather than public, channels for its criticism and pressure.[33]

It remains to be seen whether or not this approach does indeed work. Many have declared constructive engagement dead, this despite the developments in 1989 on the independence of Namibia being put into operation with free elections, cease-fire in Angola, Angolan recognition of Savimbi's UNITA, Mozambique's willingness to talk with the MNR, Soviet removal of military advisors from Mozambique, and meetings between the South African government and the Soviet government.

From the above points, and from earlier chapters, it should be clear that Africa and more specifically South Africa, is important only at times of strategic crisis, or when domestic politics make it important. The vehicle that makes South Africa domestically important is, primarily, the concerns of black Americans.

> ...Americans have... a stake in South Africa because of the potentially serious domestic ramifications that a bitter and bloody race war there could have within the United States. A protracted armed conflict between whites and blacks could create racially divisive political tensions among Americans.[34]

South Africa, in a rather contradictory way, is important in the US primarily because of its impact on the domestic tranquility. From the strategic point of view, South Africa becomes important too, despite the fact that this then puts strategic interests in direct conflict with the interests of

---

[33] *op. cit., A U.S. Policy toward South Africa: The Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa*, pp. 36-37.

[34] *ibid.*, p. 3.

many black Americans. Viewed from the perspective of strategic interests, South Africa and the rest of southern Africa are important mostly because it has been effected in Soviet (and its allies) efforts to extend influence into the region. The strategic perspective leaves the interests of diaspora politics behind. The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to examining the impact that the strategic factor has had on US policy towards South Africa.

The Angolan Civil War

Angola plays an important role in the US debate over involvement in southern African conflicts for a number of reasons. Most important stem from the conduct of the Civil War in its early stages, when there were three groups vying for power and equally three state powers using the conflict to expand their interests in the region. The Civil War erupted following the Portuguese coup, which removed fascists from the government and signalled an end to Portuguese colonialism in southern Africa. The three groups fighting for control in the region were the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). During October and November of 1975 there were a series of events that greatly effected the region. Those events included the military intervention into Angola by a South African armoured column, the movement of US backed troops into northern Angola, the vast quantity of Soviet military assistance to the MPLA, and the arrival of large numbers of Cuban combat troops. These events served to create a situation where East-West rivalries were played out in southern Africa, so much so that Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State said: "The principal element in the deterioration of [U.S.] relations with the Soviet Union is Soviet actions in Angola."[35] The conflict became a global one after the failure of the Alvor agreement, which was intended to create a Transitional Government to run Angola until elections could be held.[36] The agreement did not hold, as factional fighting broke out, and there "...followed...a virtual invasion of northern Angola by FNLA forces supported by units of the Zairean army." [37] Thus, the Alvor agreement failed, as did

[35] Marcum, "A Quarter Century of War", *Angola, Mozambique, and the West*, ed. Helen Kitchen, Praeger with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, New York, 1987, p.17.

[36] Soremekun, F., *The Road to Independence*, University of Ife Press, Ife-Ife, Nigeria, 1983, pp.111-114.

its follower the Nakuru agreement, signed in June, 1975.[38] The following is a discussion of the events that make up the conflict in Angola and its relevance to the West.

On November 11, 1975, in a ceremony in Luanda the capital of Angola, the Portuguese handed the reins of government over to a group of Angolans who claimed to be the rightful government of Angola. In the outskirts of the city, however, a Civil War raged on, bringing into question to whole issue of Angolan independence. For the purposes of this chapter the story of the Angolan Civil War starts here, although it is far more complex than one might otherwise conclude from the presentation here. It was, however, the process of Angolan independence that brought global attention to this part of Africa. Angolan independence became a more likely event after the Portuguese coup of April 25, 1974, when a group calling itself the Armed Forces Movement ousted the Caetano regime.[39] While the Portuguese coup signalled a changed in policy towards colonial possessions, it also signalled an intensification of the conflict within Angola itself. Three groups vied for control of Angola, they were the MPLA, FNLA, UNITA. Each of these groups had its plans for the future of Angola, and each had supporters from the international realm.

The MPLA, the most powerful of the three at the time of independence was made up of mostly urban intelligencia and mesticos (people of African/European decent),[40] as well as people of the Mbundu tribe.[41] Internationally the MPLA was supported by "...other African liberation movements and...the socialist countries and the Scandinavian states."[42] By 1977, the MPLA had declared itself a Marxist-Leninist party,[43] thus validating the already strong material links between it and the USSR.

> By January 1976, the Soviet union had sent the Angolans $200 million worth of arms including MiG-21 aircraft, T-34 and T-54 tanks, armoured personnel carriers, SAM-7 surface-to-surface missiles and 122mm. Katyusha rockets. The Soviet Union also sent several hundred military advisers to Angola following independence to assist in

---

[37] Somerville, K., *Angola: Politics, Economics, and Society*, Frances Pinter, London, 1986, p.42.

[38] *ibid.*, p.43.

[39] *ibid.*, p.40. For more on the Portuguese coup see Robinson, R.A., *Contemporary Portugal: A History*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1979, pp. 194-275.

[40] *op. cit.*, Soremekun, p.6.

[41] *op. cit.*, Marcum, p. 18.

[42] *op. cit.*, Somerville, p.36.

[43] *ibid.*, p.20.

building the national armed forces. [44]

What is clear is that the MPLA were well supported by the USSR, they also received important assistance from Cuba. Aid from the USSR had been interrupted for a brief period of time, after the MPLA suffered a series of internal disputes.[45] While aid from the USSR had been briefly halted in 1973, the Cuban government continued and maintained its support of the MPLA, thus perhaps proving the Cubans to be the MPLA's strongest ally.[46] In August, 1974, the USSR announced that they recognized the MPLA as the sole representative of the Angolan people.[47] Thus, at least one actor in the East-West rivalry had proclaimed without doubt who they supported in the Civil War.

Soviet support for the MPLA dated back as early as June, 1961, and has continued in varying degrees since.[48] Cuban support for the MPLA was equally long, having its roots in Che Guevera's escapades in Africa, where he had met with Neto, the then leader of the MPLA, in Brazzaville.[49] The support of Cuba has been consistent from 1965, unlike the USSR which has interrupted aid twice to the MPLA, once in 1963-64 and again after 1972.[50] Cuban military

---

[44] *ibid.*, p.162. There is a Soviet interest in Africa and especially South Africa, as is clearly illustrated by the military support the USSR gives to the ANC, the MPLA and FRELIMO, yet it would be wrong to say that their interest and involvement in southern Africa is new. While Russia did not possess colonies in Africa, nor have very strong ties to Africa, there were still some connections. Prior to the Revolution in 1917, during the Japanese-Russian War, the Russian navy stopped in southern Africa along the way to Japan. The Russian fleet stopped in what is now Angola, at Great Fish Bay, then under Portuguese rule. See Hough, Richard, *The Fleet that had to Die*, The Quality Book Club, London, 1958, p. 85. The fleet also stopped off for a time in the Madagascar straits before setting off across the Indian Ocean. Russia also sent medical and military personnel to South Africa during the Boer War in order to assist the Boers against the British. See *op. cit.*, Campbell, p. 9. The USSR also had interest in South Africa, in as much as the oldest African communist party is the CP of South Africa (CPSA), which was founded "...on July 30, 1921, with an almost exclusively white membership of several hundred." See Johns, Sheridan, "The Comintern, South Africa and the Black Diaspora", *The Review of Politics*, Volume 37, Number 2, April 1975, p. 201. In the late 1920's ANC President General James Gumede visited Moscow, as did other ANC members, this also reflected the USSR's interest in South Africa. See Benson, Mary, *Struggle for a Birth Right*, International Defence and Aid Fund, London, 1985, pp. 50-51. Gumede also found friends in the CPSA, though no formal links were established at that time. *op. cit.*, Johns, p. 203. For an excellent discussion of Soviet interest in South Africa Campbell's *Soviet Policy towards South Africa* is probably the best in giving details of the relationship. For purposes here though, it is enough to say that the USSR has an interest in southern and South Africa that dates back at least 90 years, perhaps further. It is therefore incorrect to claim that the USSR has no legitimate interests in South Africa.

[45] Marcum, J. "United States Options in Angola", *Angola, Mozambique, and the West*, ed. Helen Kitchen, Praeger with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, New York, 1987, p.38

[46] Gunn, G., "Cuba and Angola", *Angola, Mozambique and the West*, ed. Helen Kitchen, Praeger with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, New York, 1987, p.72.

[47] Stockwell, John, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story*, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1978, p.67.

[48] *op. cit.*, Somerville, p.28.

[49] Bridgland, F., *Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa*, Coronet Books, Sevenoaks, England, 1986, p.77. Savimbi makes the claim that Guevera rejected Neto and the MPLA as bourgeois and that Guevera had sided with Savimbi in the Angolan freedom struggle. It is not clear whether this is true, or whether Savimbi is misrepresenting the case. What is clear is that Cuba had an interest in Angola as far back as 1964 and had dealings with their future ally. Furthermore, LeoGrande claims that the meeting between Neto and Guevera occurred in 1965, not 1964. See LeoGrande, William, *Cuba's Foreign Policy in Africa, 1959-1980*, Institute for International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, California, 1980, for more. Also see *op. cit.*, p.33.

[50] LeoGrande, William, *Cuba's Foreign Policy in Africa, 1959-1980*, p.15. Cuban involvement in Africa, or indeed

assistance to the MPLA began in 1965, following Che's failed expedition in which he attempted to organise the overthrow of the Congolese (Zaire) government, while that action failed, some of the forces he commanded stayed on to assist with training the MPLA.[51] Cuban support for the MPLA was based upon the latter's ideological sophistication. "Not only was the MPLA the oldest liberation movement in Angola, but it was also by far the most ideologically sophisticated; founded in 1956, it appears to have been directly descended from the merger of the Angolan Communist Party with several radical nationalist groups."[52] Cuba's interest was therefore primarily ideological, given that Cuba could gain little materially from its relations with Africa. This is somewhat different from Soviet interests in the region, where they can gain strategic payoffs beyond those of ideology - thus while Cuba may have different interests than the USSR, it can make use of the Soviet capabilities in the region.[53] That the Angolan Civil War would interest the US was based partly on direct East-West involvement in Angola - the long standing dispute between the US and Cuba would now be transferred to Angola. Also involved in Angola were Zaire, China, and various European states from both sides of the ideological dividing line. By 1976 a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation had been concluded between the USSR and the MPLA government, later by 1977 treaties also existed between the MPLA and a number of the Eastern European states and Cuba.[54]

The FNLA found its support in northern Angola, among the Bakongo people, and was led by Holden Roberto, who directed the movement from Kinshasa, Zaire.[55] Roberto also received assistance from the Chinese, Zaire, and the US, though the US was to prove to be the largest donor

---

outside of Latin America has been widespread. The Cubans have been involved in large campaigns in Ethiopia, where they maintained a force of roughly 10,000. See Marshall, Peter, *Cuba Libre*, Unwin Paperbacks, London, 1988, p. 257. Castro's armed forces have also been involved in Algeria, where they assisted Algerian forces in a border clash with Morocco. See Szulc, Tad, "Cuba Began Role in Zanzibar in '61", *New York Times*, January 23, 1964, p. 3. Other places of Cuban involvement, in and around Africa, have been Tanzania, Ghana, and Somalia. The Cubans also have used Dar es Salaam as a base of operations, where they established a training school for guerilla warfare. See *ibid.*, p. 1. Cuba has also sent troops to "...South Yemen (600-700 Cuban military personnel in 1973-75) and Syria (500-700 tank troops in 1973-74.)" Gonzalez, Edward, "Complexities of Cuban Foreign Policy", *Problems of Communism*, Volume XXVI, November-December 1977, p. 6.

[51] *op. cit.*, LeoGrande, p.13.

[52] *ibid.*, p.13.

[53] Albright, David, "The USSR, its Communist Allies, and Southern Africa", *Munger Africana Library Notes*, Number 55, November, 1980, p.5.

[54] *op. cit.*, Somerville, p.51.

[55] *op. cit.*, Soremekun, p.5.

of aid.[56] The US, during the Kennedy Administration, thought it wise to support the FNLA and Roberto, so in 1961 "...some covert financial support..." was provided, although it was later ceased when the NATO ally and colonial government in Lisbon objected.[57] Roberto's Chinese assistance was sizeable, including "Within a month of the Lisbon coup...450 tons of weapons and 125 military instructors...."[58] The FNLA's political programme was tied up primarily in tribalism, and to a certain extent was manipulated by the Portuguese mercenaries.[59] Roberto's FNLA was the favourite of the Ford Administration, having received extensive funding from the CIA.[60] At first, the objective of the US operations in Angola was to "...avoid a *cheap Neto victory...*" (Neto was president of the MPLA and later following his death was replaced by Eduard dos Santos).[61] Thus, the goal was not to leave the FNLA victor, but to simply impose large costs on the the MPLA, thus making the MPLA more amenable to Western influence by weakening their bargaining position. As events on the Angolan battlefield changed, with the introduction of Cuban military forces, the CIA sought to change the conditions of its involvement in Angola, seeking in mid-November to increase spending, *with the objective of a military victory.* [62] Due primarily to the funding of the FNLA and the growth of the conflict between the US and USSR in Angola, the US Congress passed the Clark Amendment, which was "A ban on the expenditure of US military funds in Angola, except to gather intelligence...."[63] The Clark Amendment was based upon the idea that the US would refuse to fight any war in southern Africa. Senator Dick Clark, the amendment's author, argued:

> ...we must make clear our intention not to be involved militarily directly or indirectly, covertly or overtly, in any war that might occur in Southern Africa. Above all, we must make it abundantly clear that our global interests of frustrating Soviet power do not extend to supporting oppressive minorities in a race war in Southern Africa.[64]

---

[56] See *op. cit.*, Stockwell, *passim*. Stockwell's text deals with this issue most extensively.

[57] *op. cit.*, Duignan & Gann, p. 291.

[58] *op. cit.*, Somerville, p.41.

[59] See *op. cit.*, Stockwell, pp.121-122, for illustration.

[60] See *ibid.*, *passim*, where the book contains extensive material on the relationship between the US and the FNLA.

[61] *ibid.*, p.53.

[62] *ibid.*, pp.20-21.

[63] Hanlon, Joseph, *Begger Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, Catholic Institute for International Relations in collaboration with James Currey and the Indiana University Press, London, 1986, p.157.

[64] Clark, Dick, "American Policy Toward Southern Africa Under A New Administration", *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, Volume X, Numbers 1/2, spring/summer, 1980, p.78.

Prior to, and partly the cause of the passage of the Clark Amendment, the conflict in southern Africa was becoming increasingly internationalized. Roberto's forces, in 1975, with foreign assistance as well as support of Zairean military units began to move southward from northern Angola. The introduction of Zairean troops led to increased arms deliveries from the USSR, as well as an agreement by Cuba to increase its number of advisers to roughly 230 by June 1975.[65] The FNLA failed to finish off both the MPLA and Cuban forces around Luanda, and were subsequently driven back. This failure constituted the end, for all intents and purposes, of the FNLA as a military force in Angola (as well as an instrument of Western power), though they were not completely removed from northern Angola until 1985.[66] The MPLA has also defused some of the ethnic conflict (that expressed itself through the FNLA/MPLA dispute) by increasing the number of Bakongo people on the Political Bureau[67] thereby at least creating some sensitivity to Bakongo needs in the government. Roberto has since vanished, though he appeared in 1983 in the United States. [68] This attempt at a come back failed, however, to earn him a place in the Angolan conflict, and Roberto has since faded away.

The final group, UNITA, was far less important in the early conduct of the Civil War than in the later stages. UNITA is led by Jonas Savimbi, and is based primarily on the tribal group the Ovimbundu, who occupy the southern region of Angola and the northern region of Namibia.[69] UNITA has been supported by the People's Republic of China, the US, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and South Africa, with the latter being its most consistent supporter and supplier of goods.[70] UNITA was founded in 1966, two years after Savimbi had quit as foreign minister of the FNLA.[71] The group first gained world notoriety when they were joined by South African armour units in a

---

[65] *op. cit.*, LeoGrande, p.17.

[66] *op. cit.*, Hanlon, p.165. Some FNLA forces were taken on by South Africa to form the 32nd "Buffalo" battalion, which operated out of Namibia, and "...took part in almost every major operation in Namibia and Angola since the unit was formed in 1976." See "South Africa pulls out 32nd Battalion", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, April 29, 1989, p. 731.

[67] op. cit., Marcum, "A Quarter Century of War", p.23.

[68] *ibid.*, p.23.

[69] *op. cit.*, Bridgland, p. 128, the claim that UNITA is a tribal organisation, claiming that this is too simple a view - he is probably right not only for UNITA, but the other liberation movements as well.

[70] See *op. cit.*, Stockwell, pp. 265-266, p.185 on South African support, and p.52 for Chinese support and UNITA see Marcum, John, "The Politics of Survival," *Angola, Mozambique, and the West*, ed. Helen Kitchen, Praeger with the Centre for Stategic and International Studies, New York, 1987, p.8.

[71] *op. cit.*, Soremekun, p.7.

drive towards Luanda in 1975. This drive towards Luanda is believed by many to have caused the MPLA to request Cuban aid in protecting the capital. November 5, 1975 Cuba agreed to airlift troops into the capital to protect it from the combined UNITA/South African column, by November 8 the "...first combat unit landed...." [72]

> The initial airlift of Cuban troops to Angola, which began on 7 November, was carried out in old Cuban converted freighters and obsolete commercial aeroplanes. It was only after the United States put pressure on Barbados and other countries to deny Cuba refuelling rights that the Soviet Union began to supply transport aircraft to the Cubans, beginning in January 1976. By this time there were already an estimated 6,000 Cubans in Angola....[73]

Cuban forces stayed in Angola, and between November, 1975 and March, 1976 there were "...between 18,000 and 36,000 Cubans..." in Angola.[74] The combined UNITA/South African force, which caused the introduction of such large numbers of Cubans, failed to reach the capital despite a string of victories along the way. When the US decided to withdraw their covert forces from Angola, the South Africans quickly left too, leaving behind UNITA to face the combined forces of the MPLA and Cubans. Savimbi received the last nine million dollars left in the CIA's Angola task force fund, and so was the only US supported group left in Angola.[75] From that point onward, UNITA was to survive out of its alliance with South Africa, which while helping to keep UNITA alive in the field led also to much of UNITA's international isolation. As a sign of UNITA's isolation, Zambia, an early ally, had turned its back following the MPLA/Cuban victory.[76]

It is at this point that the Angolan Civil War changes character. There are those who hold that it was over when the MPLA took Luanda, and that what followed is simply a war of aggression carried out by South Africa against Angola, using UNITA as a proxy. There are those, however, who hold UNITA to be a legitimate contender for power in Angola and that their alliance with South Africa is one of convenience. Whatever the nature of the war, it is certain that

---

[72] *op. cit.*, LeoGrande, p.19.

[73] Shearman, Peter, *The Soviet Union and Cuba*, Chatham House Papers, Number 38, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1987, p. 41.

[74] *op. cit.*, LeoGrande, p.19.

[75] *op. cit.*, Bridgland, p.233.

[76] *ibid.*, pp. 251-252.

following the failure of US policy in the region that the MPLA took control of the reins of power and has since been the sole recognized government in Angola. This was achieved partly out of the collapse of the US/South Africa sponsored opposition and partly out of the considerable Soviet/Cuban assistance to the MPLA regime.

The conflict in Angola remained at a low ebb for some years, though actions by the various forces did occur. UNITA, having little power, was a relatively easy target for the MPLA, who by 1979 had all but destroyed UNITA's operational capacity.[77] This was due, in part, to the lack of support from the Carter White House, where an emphasis on human rights did little to encourage Pretoria's involvement in Angola. Furthermore, there were:

> Several factors [which] inclined the Carter administration [sic] to a visibly more pro-African position. A black American constituency showing increased interest in African liberation had played a supportive role in Carter's election. In September 1976 a Black Leadership Conference on South Africa had endorsed support for southern African liberation movements, backed comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa, and decided to found a lobbying organization, TransAfrica. .... The Angolan intervention, followed by the Soweto uprising, had raised spectres of U.S. involvement in another Vietnam-like fiasco. For large numbers of Americans, liberal human-rights sentiment or anti-interventionist caution raised doubts about the Washington-Pretoria connection, while academic and diplomatic specialists deplored the globalism that pervaded U.S. policies toward Third World areas. [78]

Joseph Hanlon argues that it was the election of Reagan that most changed the nature of the conflict in southern Africa, in that Carter had served to restrain some of the more aggressive tendencies of South Africa foreign policy.[79] Whether this is true or not does not change the fact that in 1981, the year of Reagan's inauguration there was a major change in the nature of the conflict in Angola. As a sign of the change Operation Protea, consisting of 5,000 members of the SADF and beginning in August of 1981, was launched against southern Angola. [80] The stated objective of the SADF action was to move against SAM-3 and SAM-6 anti-aircraft missile sites,

---

[77] *op. cit.*, Hanlon, p.158.

[78] *op. cit.*, Minter, p.280.

[79] *op. cit.*, Hanlon, p.159. Nolutshungu makes the observation that "...since the election of President Reagan, with his far more sympathetic policy toward South Africa, the pressure on neighbouring [southern African] states has been intensified." See *op. cit.*, Nolutshungu, p. 60.

[80] *op. cit.*, Hanlon, p.159. There is some controversy over the size of the South Africa incursion into Angola, it is argued in Africa Contemporary Record that the size of the force was more in the region of 12,000. See Cervenka, Zdenek, and Colin Legum, "Cuba and Africa in 1981: Fidel Castro's Changing Priorities," *Africa Contemporary Record*, ed. Colin Legum, Africana Publishing Company, New York, Volume XIV, 1981-82, p. A203.

which were said to be protecting SWAPO forces.[81] The SADF maintained a force in southern Angola, along a 70km strip until April, 1985.[82] The South African action led to condemnation in the UN, though the US vetoed any action by the Security Council.[83] The USSR used the South African operation as an opportunity to condemn US actions, by "...repeatedly challenging the US representative to state openly whether or not he supported Pretoria."[84] The Soviet challenge came in the face of what seemed to be a shift in the see saw movement of US policy towards the region.

A few months earlier documents leaked and presented to the OAU suggested that there might have been some collusion between the US and South Africa, though the evidence was shaky at best. The OAU responded, during the thirty-seventh ordinary session held on June 15-26, 1981, by declaring Washington and Pretoria were locked in an 'unholy alliance'.[85] The condemnation by the OAU of the US and South Africa said:

> [The OAU] Denounces the emerging unholy alliance between Pretoria and Washington characterized by baseless hostility against Angola and their collusion to intensify acts of destabilization in that country, as well as to misrepresent the nature of the colonial conflict in Namibia as one of global strategic considerations.[86]

The event of the press leak reflects OAU anger at the change of attitude in Washington, where global considerations were to take precedence over regional ones, and this change in focus would be reflected in Washington's efforts to resolve the Namibian issue. The Soviet Ambassador could then, because of the leaked State Department documents, question what Washington's policy was and on which side Washington stood. The new policy in Washington was the brainchild of

---

[81] Legum, Colin, "The Southern African Crisis: Darkness at the End fo the Tunnel," *Africa Contemporary Record*, ed. Colin Legum, Africana Publishing Company, New York, Volume XIV, 1981-82, p. A19. SWAPO, or the South-West African People's Organization, founded in 1957 as the Ovamboland People's Organization, and which has as its aim the removal of South African rule over South-West Africa (Namibia). SWAPO has been led by Sam Nujoma since its founding out of the OPO in 1960. SWAPO also founded, in 1963 the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), which receives considerable support from the MPLA government in Angola. See *Namibia in the 1980's*, The Catholic Institute for International Relations and the British Council of Churches, London, 1981, p. 12-15. SWAPO is primarily founded among the Ovambo-speaking people of Namibia, and has over time received support from the USSR and other Eastern bloc states, which has at times earned it the ire of the US, and of course South Africa. See Dugard, John, *The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute*, University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 1973, pp. 216-220 for more on SWAPO. SWAPO is also recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people by the UN General Assembly, thus receiving a considerable amount of international support.

[82] *op. cit.*, Hanlon, pp.159-162.

[83] *op. cit.*, Legum, 1981-82, p.A19.

[84] *ibid.*, p.A20.

[85] *ibid.*, p. A154 also see chapter four the section entitled "TransAfrica and the Press Leak".

[86] OAU resolution on Namibia, Res. 853 (XXXVII), reprinted in *Africa Contemporary Record*, ed. Colin Legum, Africana Publishing Company, New York, Volume XIV, 1981-82, p. C-5.

Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker and termed 'constructive engagement' which had as a major centre piece the resolution of the Namibian issue, and simultaneously resolving the East-West question in southern Africa.

> [Crocker] ...had written prolifically about U.S. foreign policy in Africa, offering what he billed as a hardheaded alternative to the "romantic illusion" of Carter "regionalist" policies. United States policy, he argued, should take account of both the Soviet threat and local realities, and "raise the price of Soviet involvement in both regional and global terms."[87]

So, while South Africa was increasing its involvement in southern Angola, there was also an increased desire in Washington to take a more aggressive approach towards solving the problems in southern Africa. While this was done more out of a desire to limit any damage to the US global position, many hoped that it would have benefits for the southern African region as well.

Operation Protea signaled a change in South Africa actions the objective being one of regional control, and if that control was gained by the fall of the MPLA government, so be it, otherwise a policy of destabilization would suffice. South African operations also signalled a reintensification of the conflict, where the South African troops would actively operate within the borders of Angola. South African military actions came at roughly the same time as the stated desire by many in the Reagan Administration to repeal the Clark Amendment, as well as the associated drive in the Administration to provide military support for UNITA.[88] Along with this move to support Savimbi came the linkage of implementation UN resolution 435 to the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. South African actions, though, could indeed make actions by the Reagan Administration to repeal the Clark Amendment difficult. In 1981 the State Department said:

> ...the issue of Cuban withdrawl from Angola, while in no way part of a Namibia settlement package,... it is nonetheless, the kind of thing which, if there is progress, could make a decisive contribution to the effort in Namibia.[89]

---

[87] *op. cit.*, Minter, p. 311.

[88] See Oudes, Bruce, "The United States and Africa: The Reagan Difference," *Africa Contemporary Record*, ed. Colin Legum, Volume XIV, 1981-82, Africana Publishing Company, New York, pp. A156-A157.

[89] *op. cit.*, Legum, 1981-82, p. A25.

The State Department went on to comment that the settlement of the Angolan situation is tied deeply to the settlement of the Namibian issue. What is clear is that the linkage of Cuban troops to the implementation of SCR 435 is primarily a US demand. The Western Contact Group, which was a US sponsored effort to resolve the Namibian impasse, was begun in the Carter Administration, founded in part by Donald McHenry (who later served as Ambassador to the UN under Carter) and was made up of the UK, France, West Germany, Canada, and the US, was charged with seeking a resolution to the Namibian impasse.[90] The Group suffered a split over the issue of linkage, leaving only the US pursuing the Cuban issue and its relationship to the settlement of Namibian independence.[91] In order to soften the language of linkage, the US developed the idea of the "...parallel movement..." namely "...pressing for simultaneous progress toward a Cuban pullout and a Namibian settlement."[92] During this period, between January, 1981 and August, 1981 Assistant Secretary of State Crocker's confirmation in the Senate had been held up by Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), but once the Cuban linkage had been established many of Helms' right wing criticisms of Crocker fell by the wayside.[93] The policy of constructive engagement, by August, 1981, was fully underway, though unfortunately it coincided with SADF Operation Protea.

While Crocker was trying to resolve the Namibian issue, and thereby defusing much of the East-West conflict in Angola, the South Africans were busy with the policy of regional destabilization. South Africa had launched an operation into Lesotho against the ANC.[94] The SAAF shot down a Mozambican MiG,[95] and there was growing support by South Africa of the Mozambican MNR. The SADF was not the only destabilizing feature, from the US point of view, there were 18,000 Cuban, 450 East German, and 700 Soviet advisors in Angola, serving in various military capacities, ranging from training to piloting aircraft.[96] Furthermore, by November, 1982 it

---

[90] *op. cit.*, Karis, p. 345.

[91] *op. cit.*, Legum, 1981-82, pp. A14-A15.

[92] Jaster, Robert, *South Africa in Namibia: The Botha Strategy*, University Press of America, Lanham, Maryland, 1985, p.87.

[93] *op. cit.*, Minter, pp.311-312. also in "America and South Africa", *The Economist*, March 30, 1985, p.19.

[94] "South Africa: Evolution by Violence and Government by Manipulation," *Africa Contemporary Record*, ed. Colin Legum, Volume XV, 1982-83, Africana Publishing Company, New York, p.B714.

[95] *ibid.*, p.B715.

[96] *ibid.*, p.B600.

was clear that the Contact Group had failed, "Only U.S. urging prevented its formal dissolution in 1982."[97] The South African actions, however, were perhaps most damaging to US attempts in the region, in that part of Crocker's policy was based upon the sensibility of the South Africans - that they would come to see that reform was in their best interests. Many asked how could the South Africans be trusted when they engage in such aggressive behaviour?

The SADF launched a major operation into Angolan territory on December 6, 1983, involving anywhere between 2,000[98] and 10,000 troops.[99] The objective of Operation Askari had been to "...preempt a planned SWAPO incursion."[100] Operation Askari, however, marked a major turning point in the conflict in southern Africa, in as much as it marked a major confrontation between the USSR and South Africa. "Soviet satellite reconnaissance monitored the maneuver leading to Askari in November, 1983."[101] Thus, the USSR had prior knowledge of Askari and issued a warning to the South African Ambassador in New York that any "...challenge [to] the Cuban defence positions south of Luanda could not be tolerated."[102]

During this time there was also a major diplomatic undertaking in progress. With the Contact Group initiatives collapsed, the US, South Africa and Angola undertook a new set of initiatives. These talks were intended to achieve three objectives. The first being a cease fire in southern Angola, "...followed by simultaneous withdrawl of South African forces from Angola and of Cuban and Angolan troops to a line 150 miles north of the border...", [103] and finally a promise to remove all Cuban troops in exchange for the implementation of SCR 435.[104] On December 15, just nine days after the commencement of Operation Askari, the "...South Africans proposed to the UN Secretary-General a thirty-day mutual force disengagement to being 31 January 1984."[105] This cleared the way for the formation of a joint monitoring commission, and

97 *op. cit.*, Jaster, 1985, p.88.
98 *ibid.*, p. 92.
99 *op. cit.*, "America and South Africa", p. 20.
100 *op. cit.*, Jaster, 1985, p. 92.
101 *op. cit.*, "America and South Africa", p.21.
102 *ibid.*, p.21.
103 *op. cit.*, Jaster, 1985, p.89.
104 *ibid.*, p.89.
105 *ibid.*, p. 90.

this has been codified under the name of the Lusaka Accord, which "...was agreed on 16 February 1984 by Pik Botha, Angolan Interior Minister Alexandre Rodrigues, and Chester Crocker."[106] The SADF began to withdraw forces from the area they had occupied during Operation Askari, and the withdrawl continued until July 2, 1984, when South Africa announced a cessation to the withdrawl.[107] The South Africans would not conclude the withdrawl until the spring of 1985.[108] That the Lusaka Accord did not yield Namibian independence was seen as a sign that the policy of constructive engagement was a failure, at least up to that point.[109] Crocker argued, however, that:

> The Lusaka agreement of last February built sufficient mutual confidence to permit the negotiations to enter into a new phase. Late last Summer it became clear that we had moved beyond the stage of rhetorical debate on the issue of "linkage" - whether Cuban troop withdrawl and Namibian independence should be related. Cuban troop withdrawl is, as practical matter, and with the support of all concerned, being discussed in the context of the implementation of Resolution 435.[110]

Crocker makes clear an important point, that the issue of Cuban troop withdrawl was for all intents and purposes already deeply tied to the question of Namibian independence. Proclaiming the death of constructive engagement became more a political act of domestic opposition than a serious analytical comment on the tools of policy available for addressing the problems of southern Africa.

While the scope of this study does not include events since 1986 it is worth noting that Cuba, the US, Angola, South Africa and the USSR have all come together in talks which have yielded an end to South African control of Namibia, provided implementation of SCR 435, as well as introduced an on again, off again cease fire between the MPLA and UNITA. In addition to the implementation of SCR 435, Cuba has agreed to withdraw its troops from Angola, which number roughly 50,000 in 1989. The settlement of this dispute can be seen as a success of constructive engagement. Whether it has any meaningful impact on the long term chances of peace in the

---

[106] *op. cit.*, Hanlon, p.160.

[107] *ibid.*, pp.160-161.

[108] *ibid.*, p.162.

[109] Clough, Michael and Donald Jordan, "The United States and Africa 1984: How Constructive is 'Constructive Engagement'," *Africa Contemporary Record*, ed. Colin Legum, Volume XVII, 1984-85, Africana Publishing Company, New York, p. A223.

[110] *ibid.*, p. A224.

region remains to be seen.

The Nkomati Accord and After

The Portuguese coup was the catalyst for not only Angola's rise to independence, but Mozambique as well. (It sparked off increased efforts of independence movements in all Portuguese African holdings, Angola and Mozambique being the most relevant to this discussion.) The Mozambican situation, however, was much different than that of Angola, in as much as there was little opposition to the national liberation movement FRELIMO taking power. This was very much unlike the situation in Angola, where there were a number of ideological, ethnic, and strategic divisions that added to the complexity of the war of independence. During the independence process Mozambique suffered mostly from Rhodesian sponsored rebels, known as the MNR, who's task it was to provide opposition to ZANU forces hiding in Mozambique.[111]

While Mozambique may not have had the same level of internal opposition as Angola, it still suffered from not only the small MNR forces, but also it's proximity to South Africa. For example, in 1979 "South Africa imposed *de facto* sanctions on Mozambique," by routing traffic away from Mozambican ports.[112] While sanctions may not be armed intervention, it remains an influential and effective method for one nation to impose its will on another. Thus, the budding nation of Mozambique has been hard pressed by South Africa and has had to use caution in its actions. This caution is best reflected in Mozambique's signing of the Nkomati Accord on March 16, 1984. The Accord (a non-aggression pact) required that Mozambique remove most ANC forces from Mozambican territory.[113] "Although Maputo pledged its continued 'moral, political, and diplomatic' support for the African National Congress...."[114] Despite this moral, political, and diplomatic support, "By mid-June 1984, some 800 ANC members had been expelled from

[111] The MNR was founded by Rhodesian Intelligence, the CIO, with the intention of operating against ZANU, while they were still outside of Rhodesia. See Flower, Ken, *Serving Secretly*, John Murray, London, 1987, pp. 300-302, wherein Flower has reproduced documents on the founding of MNR. Flower reports that when the MNR had finished their task in opposing ZANU in Mozambique, as well as destabilizing the FRELIMO government, that many decided to place themselves under South African control. See *ibid.*, Flower, p. 262.

[112] *op. cit.*, Hanlon, p. 135.

[113] Jaster, Robert, *South Africa and its Neighbours: The Dynamics of Regional Conflict*, Adelphi Papers, Number 209, Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1986, p.28.

[114] *op. cit.*, Minter, p.331.

Mozambique."[115] Clearly, the Nkomati Accord did little to favour or support the ANC. Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC, has argued that the Nkomati Accord led to the explosion of violence in South Africa in September, 1984, and that the uprising was in part a popular reaction to the South Africa attempt to hinder ANC actions by having them removed from Mozambique.[116] "The Nkomati accord [sic] with Mozambique had cut guerrilla activities from 56 attacks in the whole of 1983 to 44 in 1984. But the effect was only temporary. In 1985, insurgent strikes trebled to a new annual high of 136...."[117] So, Mozambique had been removed from the ANC's military support scenario, but clearly that did not limit the ultimate ability of the ANC to stage guerrilla actions. In exchange for removing ANC forces from Mozambique, FRELIMO sought and received South African pledges to end support for the MNR, who by that time were receiving extensive South African support, now that the Rhodesian UDI government was out of the way. Also included in the entire Nkomati package were "...a number of economic agreements to sweeten the pot for Machel...."[118] The Nkomati Accord provided Pretoria with a foreign policy success, one that the South African government were quick to make use of. P.W. Botha, and his Foreign Minister R.F. Botha travelled throughout Europe following the signing of the agreement in an attempt to capitalize on their newly found peace making image.[119]

The Nkomati Accord signalled a true shift in the alignment of forces in southern Africa, and it signalled a victory for the National Party Government in Pretoria. The Nkomati Accord, while not strictly a US initiative, was indeed supported and urged forward by the US. While the US had not led the movement towards the conclusion of the Accord, it had at least acted to push the agreement along.[120] US involvement in Nkomati consisted, primarily, of offering increased assistance to Mozambique, in order to provide further enticements to Mozambique.[121]

---

[115] *op. cit.*, Jaster, 1986, p.28.

[116] "Oliver Tambo, President, the African National Congress", Interview by Margaret A. Novicki, *Africa Report*, July-August, 1985, p.35.

[117] Davis, Stephen, M., *Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1987, pp. 145-146.

[118] *op. cit.*, Jaster, 1986, p.29.

[119] *op. cit.*, Minter, p.331.

[120] *op. cit.*, Clough and Jordan, p. A226.

[121] *ibid.*, p. A226.

> He [Machel] had been encouraged in this belief by State Department officials who had argued that the accord with South Africa would make economic and other assistance more palatable in Congress. In fact, shortly after the accord was signed, a congressional ban on development aid to Mozambique was quietly lifted; and in early 1985 the Administration proposed to give Mozambique development assistance totalling $7.5m in addition to a $25.7mk food relief package. [122]

Clearly, the US had an interest in what was going on in Mozambique and they saw Nkomati as having a variety of payoffs, not least of which was increased US influence by way of increased aid. The Accord was seen by Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker as one of vital importance. He said about the Accord and US involvement in the process that:

> ...it would be a mistake for us to state that we and the United States take responsibility for that accomplishment [the Nkomati Accord]. We have, however, played a role. And it's an important role. We have sought to be a catalyst. And I think what we've been doing for the past 3 years or so is to seek to acquire a pattern of credibility with all the key parties at stake in this, in that set of relationships, and at the same time, to make clear that there is an alternative to simple openended escalation of crossborder violence, conflict, and polarization.[123]

For the US, then, Nkomati was the by-product of efforts undertaken in the name of constructive engagement, and was a vindication of the success of Crocker's policy, in that it was a way of increasing regional stability, while reducing Soviet influence in the region. Nkomati was also seen as a way of delinking Mozambique and the USSR and leading Mozambique towards the West. [124] Secretary of State Shultz said in the spring of 1985 that:

> ...we have helped move Mozambique away form heavy dependence upon the Soviet camp and closer to true nonalignment. We demonstrated to Mozambique that its best interests are served by closer cooperation with the West and by rejection of confrontation with South Africa. The trend of our relations with Mozambique is positive and needs further encouragement.[125]

That the USSR was not happy about the Nkomati Accord is likely. "The Soviet Union has criticised the accord for 'breaking South Africa out of diplomatic isolation on the continent'."[126] It seems that the USSR was concerned that the Accord might have an impact upon regional stability

---

[122] *ibid.*, p. A226.

[123] "Constructive Engagement and Linkage", interview with Chester Crocker, *American Foreign Policy Documents*, 1984, Document 415, May 16, 1984, p.822.

[124] The Accord may indeed act to offset the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in 1977, with the USSR. See *op. cit.*, Campbell, p.143.

[125] "We are Engaged as a Force for Peace and Constructive Change Throughout Southern Africa", address by Secretary of State Shultz, April 16, 1985, *American Foreign Policy Documents*, 1985, p.833.

[126] *op. cit.*, Campbell, p.144.

by increasing South Africa's influence. There was also some indication that the USSR saw the Nkomati Accord and the ensuing process as a threat to the Mozambican revolution, this perceived threat was addressed when the USSR issued a statement at "...the ninth anniversary of Mozambique independence, [which held] a warning to 'defend the revolution against the intrigues of internal and foreign enemies'."[127] It may be safe to say that the USSR understood the threat that the Accord could bring to its regional policies, and that it is probably equally safe to say to that the USSR also saw it in its interests to counter the Nkomati process. Surely damaging to the interests of the USSR was the agreement to oust much of the ANC from Mozambique. The USSR has an excellent record in supporting national liberation movements in Africa, providing arms and training. [128] Therefore, not only did Nkomati threaten to let the cat out of the bag, so to speak, but it also threatened to cripple a long time Soviet ally, namely the ANC, and the Soviet image of strong support for national liberation movements.

The signing of the Accord was intended to help bring Mozambique out of the Soviet sphere of influence, and for Mozambique it was to improve its lot by increasing regional security, and therefore, increasing internal stability. This was not the case, as when the FRELIMO government discovered that the MNR was indeed continuing to operate with South African assistance. Just prior to the signing of the Accord the MNR received large assistance from South Africa, this was to be known as the 'golden hand shake'.[129] Following the 'golden hand shake' it also became clear that South Africa was continuing to supply the MNR. The discovery of continued contacts between the MNR the SADF came about following the seizure of MNR documents by Mozambican and Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique - the documents clearly illustrated that there was continued contact between the MNR and SADF in spite of the Nkomati Accord.[130] During "...August 1985, the Mozambicans found a log book recording the comings and goings at the base

---

[127] *ibid.*, p.145.

[128] Defosses, Helen, "The USSR and Africa" *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, Volume XVI, Number 1, 1987, p.5. Defosses argues that the USSR's aid to national liberation movements is often dictated more by strategic interests than any other. She says: "...Soviet levels of aid, as well as the recipients, have often been chosen more to respond to competition with the Chinese than to respond to the needs of the movements themselves." This may be true of the ANC, but if so, then the ANC has been well suited to Soviet interests for many years.

[129] *op. cit.*, Hanlon, p.145 and *op. cit.*, Jaster, 1986, p.30.

[130] *op. cit.*, Hanlon, p.149 and *op. cit.*, Minter, p.332.

[the MNR base]. An angry President Samora Machel summoned Foreign Minister Pik Botha to Maputo on 16 September and accused Pretoria of violating Nkomati."[131] These revelations came about at the same time as foreign assistance for Mozambique was under consideration in Washington, D.C. This assistance included "...a $15 million increase in economic aid to Mozambique and... a proposed $3.2 million program for the provision of military training and non-lethal supplies such as uniforms, boots, radios, and jeeps."[132] The Reagan Administration sought to offset Mozambique's problems by initiating a programme of security assistance, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Wisner explained that:

> By providing nonlethal items such as uniforms, communications equipment, trucks, and training, we are working in parallel with our allies to reinforce Mozambique's support of regional stability by offering an alternative to total dependence on the East bloc for military supply.[133]

The Administration in Washington was walking a fine line between opposing the far right in Congress and supporting the workings of the Nkomati Accord, including assistance in opposing the MNR.

While the South Africans were being accused of violating the Accord, there were also efforts underway in Washington, by right wing members of Congress, to supply the MNR, in the same way that was envisioned for UNITA.[134] The attempt to support the MNR came about following the repeal of the Clark Amendment, and while the funding drive for the MNR was not successful, it did cause some disturbance of relations between Mozambique and the US. There was the impression, among many, that there was a strong desire in Washington circles to support the MNR, based solely on the premise that Mozambique was a Marxist state. This view had little connection to Mozambican realities and tended to ignore the assistance Mozambique had given during the Zimbabwe peace process, as well as Mozambique's increasingly pro-Western stance.

---

131 *op. cit.*, Hanlon, p.149.

132 Booker, Salih, "The Other Engagement", *Africa Report*, Jan.-Feb., 1986, p. 52.

133 "Fiscal Year 1986 Assistance Requests for Sub-Sahara Africa", statement before the House Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Wisner, March 5, 1985, *American Foreign Policy Documents*, 1985, p.807.

134 *op. cit.*, Booker, p. 52.

South Africa's Unrest

The problems affecting southern Africa were, of course, not limited to Mozambique and Angola. In terms of immediate strategic threat to the West Angola was clearly at the top of the list, with the presence of Cuban troops and Warsaw Pact advisors constituting the major threat. Mozambique presented a strategic threat because of its Marxist-Leninist alignment and relative ideological closeness to the USSR, though it was clear to many that wedges could be inserted to prize Mozambique away from the USSR and her allies. South Africa, on the other hand, presented a far more complex set of challenges to the US. Violence in South Africa was, it could be argued, a strategic threat, in as much as one could for see far off in the future domestic violence halting mineral production and a government unfriendly to the West coming into power. For the West the unfriendly government would come in the guise of the African National Congress (ANC) with its links to the USSR.

The ANC was founded in 1912[135] as a non-violent protest group, there was little that was revolutionary about it. The original purpose of the ANC was, as Pixley ka Isaka Seme, first Treasurer-General, put it, to form a "...national union for the purpose of creating national unity and defending our rights and privileges."[136] After many reincarnations, however, the ANC finally became a fully fledged national liberation movement, complete with a military arm, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) or the MK. Umkhonto was founded following the Sharpeville killings and subsequent banning of the ANC and became an integral part of the ANC's struggle against the white minority regime. The logic behind the founding of Umkhonto, and the shift towards the use of violence is explained by Francis Meli, member of the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC. Meli argues that:

> The leaders of the liberation movement believed *that as a result of the racist regime's policy* of violence, a reciprocal "violence" by the black people had become inevitable and that unless there was responsible leadership to channel the feelings of the people into organized resistance, there would be outbreaks of terrorism which would produce

---

[135] Meli, Francis, *South Africa Belongs to Us: A History of the ANC*, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1988, p. 36 and Benson, Mary, *South Africa: Struggle for a Birthright*, International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, London, 1985, p. 25.

[136] *op. cit.*, Benson, p. 25.

intense bitterness and hostility between various national groups in South Africa.[137]

Umkhonto owes is existence to the 'inevitable' nature of the racial conflict in South Africa, and to interpret Meli, the founding of the MK stems mostly out of a realization that the ANC would not achieve its goals if it did not keep pace with the situation and the people. Ergo, the founding of Umkhonto was a reasonable and almost predicatable response to the increasing violence and power of the National Party.[138]

By the early 1960's the ANC could launch a carefully laid out plan of sabotage in order to bring pressure to bear upon the government. The sabotage campaign, which had as an objective increasing pressure on the South African government (leading perhaps to open warfare), failed to ignite the populace. With the arrest of many ANC personnel, including Nelson Mandela, the man who had led the sabotage campaign, the ANC became an exile movement. The South African government was able to recoup some of its security loses by breaking up the MK. Following the the Sharpeville massacre, in which 69 of people were killed and the ensuing sabotage campaign led by the MK, the South African regime faced considerable security threats, as well as a loss of international status. The arrest of Mandela and others signalled that South Africa would use authoritarian and draconian measures to secure itself against internal threats. While the South African government was busy with internal security the ANC leadership was also at work repairing damage done, engaging itself in a variety of activities outside of the country. Perhaps most notable among these was the alliance with ZAPU in Rhodesia and Zambia.[139] Both ZAPU and the ANC received substantial aid from the USSR and other Eastern European states, and the joining of forces can be seen as a cost cutting attempt to revitalize the ANC in light of their losses, as well as increasing the fortunes of ZAPU. Not until after 1976 would the ANC come anywhere close to being a strong force for national liberation.

---

[137] *op. cit.*, Meli, p.147, emphasis original.

[138] See Lodge, Tom, *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*, Longman, London, 1983, p.234.

[139] *op. cit.*, Lodge, p. 297. The ANC and ZAPU had joined forces in an attempt to increase regional pressure by attacking both the white governments in Rhodesia and South Africa. The joint effort failed to bring down either the Rhodesian UDI government or the apartheid regime in South Africa.

In June, 1976 riots broke out in Soweto, a suburb of Johannesburg, ostensibly over the issue over the teaching of Afrikaans in schools, leading to the death of 575 and another 2389 wounded.[140] Many of those involved in Soweto were children, thus following the riots many fled to neighbouring states to seek refuge. [141] The years around the Soweto killings saw the ANC increase in size, prior to 1975 the ANC outside South Africa was around 1000, "...five years later it stood at nine thousand." [142] The ANC had gained a reputation for armed resistance to the Pretoria regime, and so many arrived at ANC camps - the riots in Soweto served to help recruit new cadres for the ANC. Soweto also served to bring world attention back to the Republic. Like Sharpeville, Soweto focused the actions of many in the International community on South Africa and its racial tensions.

The violence also had an impact on US policy, in as much as the human rights policy, as seen by the Carter Administration, was further amplified and made seemingly more fitting to the context of South Africa. Thus, with Carter's policy of human rights and the involvement of black Americans in the policy process the South African conflict was somewhat removed from the context of East-West conflict and seen in regional terms. This change in emphasis provided greater access by US anti-apartheid groups to the White House. These groups also had access and contact with the ANC, and often supported positions which were also supported by the ANC.

The ANC saw its strength grow considerably in the 1970's, membership expanded greatly and its ability to launch armed attacks from positions in Angola (via Namibia) and Mozambique was enhanced.[143] The ANC had recovered much of its military strength since 1976, when "...authorities attributed an average of just two incidents every six months to the ANC. Ten years later, the number had...[increased] to an average of more than five bombings, raids, or assassinations each week."[144] While in Washington there was an Administration that if not more

---

[140] *op. cit.*, Lodge, p.330.

[141] *op. cit.*, Davis, p.57. Davis argues that of the 12,000 who 'escaped' South Africa roughly 75 per cent joined the ANC.

[142] op. cit., Davis, p. 57. Also Radu, M., "The African National Congress: Cadres and Credo" *Problems in Communism*, Volume XXXVI, July-August, 1987 claims that the MK membership stands at somewhere between 8,000 and 10,000, with between 300 to 1,000 cadres inside South Africa. See *ibid.*, Radu, p. 13. Clearly, that number does not include non-Umkhonto members of the ANC, and would indicate that the membership of the ANC is far larger than Davis' 9,000.

[143] *op. cit.*, Davis, pp. 43-47.

[144] *ibid.*, p. 145.

friendly, was at least less hostile. Despite the growth, the size of its arsenal, and the width and depth of international support, the ANC had not been able to muster a credible threat to Pretoria's rule. In August and September 1984 and continuing for some time, violence broke out in many parts of the Republic, in response to the Constitutional reforms instituted by the Botha government which led to the Coloured and Indian election.[145] The Constitutional reforms were implemented as part of the National Party's reform process, and were voted into existence by a two thirds majority of white voters.[146]

The uprising was led in part by the newly formed United Democratic Front, and while there was substantial violence there was an equally high proportion of non-violent acts, such as the labour stay away in November, 1984.[147] The ANC was caught off guard by the rising and was forced to act quickly to catch up with the people. The uprising along with the signing of the Nkomati Accord signalled a real blow to the credibility of the ANC as a leading force of change in South Africa. Yet, they were able to quickly gain some footing, and claimed to be leading the revolt. By the beginning of 1985 the NEC announced to its membership South Africa should be made ungovernable. Making South Africa ungovernable consisted what has become known as the four pillars of the struggle. Oliver Tambo described them as:

> ...first, the vanguard role of the underground structures of the ANC; second, the united mass political action of the people, third, the armed offensive spearheaded by Umkhonto we Sizwe; and fourth, the international campaign to isolate the apartheid regime while winning world-wide moral, political and material support for the struggle.[148]

These four elements make up the foundation of the effort to dislodge white minority rule from South Africa. The ANC has been able, since the call to make South Africa ungovernable, to cast itself in a leading role in the uprising against white minority rule. By July, 1985, South Africa was

---

[145] Gutteridge, William, "The South African Crisis: Time for International Action", *Conflict Studies*, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Number 179, 1985, p.4.

[146] Carter, Gwendolen, *Continuity and Change in Southern Africa*, Crossroads Press, Los Angeles, 1985, p. 15. The constitutional reforms called for a tripartite assembly, one House for the whites, one for the coloured and one for the Asians. While the coloured and Asian houses possess some power, they have little ability to influence the white house.

[147] *op. cit.*, Gutteridge, p. 5.

[148] Tambo, Oliver, "Render South Africa Ungovernable", *Sechaba*, March 1985, p. 9. These elements had been laid out a year earlier, but they still constituted the main thrust of the ANC's action.

indeed considered 'ungovernable' and the existing government put into place a 'state of emergency' (on July 20, 1985), which effectively removed criminal liabilities in police and military efforts to end the violence, as well as substantial controls over the press.[149]

This ANC call became the focus of much anti-apartheid work inside and outside South Africa, and put the ANC back on track as a leading force of change inside the Republic. Together with the UDF a campaign to undermine the strength and authority of the National Party government was underway.

In 1983 Dr. Allan Boseak, head of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, spoke in favour of a coalition or front to lead actions against the Pretoria regime. This front, which Boseak called for, became known as the United Democratic Front (UDF), a coalition of groups committed to opposing the South African white minority regime.

> The UDF was launched on August 20, 1983. Earlier in the year, addressing the anti-South African Indian Council (anti-SAIC) campaign, Dr. Allan Boseak had advocated the "politics of refusal" as the "only dignified response blacks [could] give in this situation" - that is, the attempted co-opting of Indians and "coloureds" through the new constitutional proposals. To succeed in their opposition to this legal imposition, he said, blacks needed a "united front."[150]

Before the UDF was banned in 1988 it had been successful in becoming the international repository of legitimate protest to the South African regime. In the autumn of 1984 the UDF, which included several hundred smaller groups, led a series of non-violent protests against the white minority regime.[151] This, along with the increasingly violent television pictures coming out of South Africa added to the impression that the Republic it quickly crumbling.[152] The rising tide of violence in South Africa, along with the cutting off of the ANC from Mozambique (and the associated compensation by the ANC for the loss), and the rise of the UDF put pressure on the

---

[149] *op. cit.*, Carter, p. 19. The state of emergency was first put into place "...in Johannesburg and the Eastern Cape in June 1985, later extended to the Western Cape. It was lifted in March 1986, but as violent deaths increased (to 214 in May), a national state of emergency was declared on 12 June 1986 along with restrictions on the reporting of the unrest." Smith, David, *Apartheid in South Africa*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 83-84. It seems as if South Africa has entered a perpetual state of emergency, where draconian measures are the rule rather than the exception. Also see Ormond, Roger, *The Apartheid Handbook*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1986.

[150] Motlhabi, Mokgethi, *Challenge to Apartheid*, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1988, p.83.

[151] *op. cit.*, Minter, p.334. and *op. cit.*, Carter, pp. 16-17.

[152] *op. cit.*, Minter, p.335.

ANC to act, and this they did, quickly seeking to take their place at centre stage. This was due, in part, to their organisation and history, as well as their desire to led the uprising in the Republic. Thus, in 1985 the ANC shifted tactics from the "...twenty-five-year-old armed struggle to the promotion of general insurrection...."[153] Thus, the ANC became, with little doubt, a major organisation opposing the white minority regime, largely due to their willingness to conduct revolutionary activity inside South Africa, as well as their international connections, and experience at operating outside the law of the Republic.[154] While the ANC was perhaps the most important organisation opposing the National Party led regime, it had considerable assistance from the UDF.

The UDF was not part of the ANC, however, it did possess many of the same goals as the national liberation movement. [155] Thus, the UDF and the ANC provided opposition to the South African regime unlike any that had been seen before. Equally, the ANC and UDF were both faced with something neither had seen before, namely a National Party Government in the midst of domestic reforms, aimed at altering the domestic political terrain. What their target was depended upon who you asked, but broadly speaking, the reforms began to undo many of the apartheid laws of the past. For example, the Mixed Marriages Act has been repealed, thus allowing inter-racial marriage. The pass law system, which required non-whites to carry a passbook with them and show it on demand to the authorities, has been abolished, and replaced by "The Abolition of Influx Control Act of 1986, which abolished the old passbook and replaced it with a uniform identity document for both whites and blacks (but one still coded according to race)."[156] Thus, even with

---

[153] Coker, Christopher, *The United States and South Africa, 1968-1985: Constructive Engagement and its Critics*, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1986, p.196.

[154] Neither the UDF or other organisations were as well placed as the ANC for such a role, in that they either did not have the international connections, or they did not have the willingness or training to engage in violence.

[155] There is some argument as to whether or not the UDF is wholly independent. Radu argues that the UDF is a legal front for the ANC. Radu states: "It [the UDF] is co-chaired by Albertina Sisulu (Walter's wife), and 'former' ANC leaer Archie Gumede." See *op. cit.*, Radu, p. 13. Davis also makes the point that there is a great overlap between the ANC and the UDF. He states: "The UDF's leadership also reflected a Congress background. Among those names as 'patrons' were imprisoned ANC chiefs Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Govan Mbeki. The active national officials were, in many instances, people long associated with the ANC. See *op. cit.*, Davis, p.88. One place where many may get confused is in the nature of much of the UDF ideology, where there is similarity between much of 'Marxist' prescriptions of the ANC and the *Can South Africa Survive?*, ed. John D. Brewer, Macmillan Press, London, 1989, pp. 206-230.

[156] *op. cit., A U.S. Policy toward South Africa: The Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa*, p. 21.

Constitutional and other reforms, it is hard to know whether there is genuine movement in dismantling apartheid.[157]

> Evidence of reforms, or at least relaxation of apartheid, is more convincing at the "petty" and local scale. Formal job reservation has gone, except in the mines...and racial differences in pay are being phased out. Facilities such as hotels, restaurants, cinemas, busses and beaches have been widely desegregated, with individual local authorities taking the initiative in forcing central government's hand.[158]

Facing the National Party reform process the ANC had at its disposal the military arm, along with many of the international links, and the UDF possessed many of the connections inside South Africa that the ANC, because of its banning, was unable to utilize. Therefore, the uprising against the white minority government was, while not wholly orchestrated, far better organised than it had ever been in the past. The organisation of the opposition proved difficult for the Reagan Administration. While on one hand wishing to coax Pretoria into reforms, it could not on the other hand sit and watch both the strategic situation crumble inside South Africa, and at the same time be seen to helping those forces that stood in the way of 'history'. Put another way, the uprising inside South Africa, led by the UDF and the ANC, threatened all that Washington had worked for, both by chipping away at the strategic balance in the region, as well as putting the Reagan Administration on what appeared to be the side of oppression and racism.

South African Violence and Changes in Washington

The combined impact of the television pictures and increased violence in South Africa, as well as the domestic defeat of the American left at the hands of the Republicans and Ronald Reagan, created a situation wherein opposition to US policy towards South Africa was likely. Opposition came in the guise of a series of protests in front of the South African Embassy in Washington. "The black-led demonstrations symbolized the commitment of U.S. black leadership to have a role in U.S. policy toward South Africa."[159] While the protests may have been black led, they were not reflective of only black American opinion. Indeed, the protests not only resulted

---

[157] See *Mission to South Africa: The Commonwealth Report*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1986, pp. 23-47 for a discussion of the reform process.

[158] *op. cit.*, Smith, p. 91.

[159] *op. cit.*, Minter, p.335.

from events in South Africa, but also from the defeat of the Democrats in 1984 - the protests were a reaction by the left in the US to their loss. The actions in front of the Embassy had as their objective the release of all political prisoners in South Africa, full political rights, and finally, the end of constructive engagement.[160] The protests were coordinated between events in South Africa as well as in the US Congress. [161] Along with the protests came a sanctions package in Congress, which was led by Democrats in Congress including Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA). A sanctions package was put together in Congress and passed out of the House, though the Senate passed a much softer version of the bill, sending the bill to Conference. As "...the Senate was about to take up the compromise bill, Reagan announced his own economic sanctions against South Africa...."[162] Reagan's Executive Order called for a banning on the importation of Krugerands, the minting of a new US gold coin to replace the loss of the Krugerand, the banning of new loans by US banks to the white minority government, ended exportation of computer equipment to apartheid enforcing agencies, ended the export of all material for nuclear uses, established an Advisory Committee to oversee the process of change in South Africa, encouraged fair employment practices by US companies operating in the Republic, banned the importation of arms manufactured in South Africa, established a fund for scholarships for black students, encouraged agencies to purchase goods and services from minority owned bodies in South Africa, and finally established a fund for the defence of anti-apartheid activists.[163] Following the Congressional actions in 1985 there came the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, which added stronger measures to the sanctions list. This legislation was driven not only by Democratic members of the House and Senate, but was also led by Senate Republicans. The CAAA-86 called for bans on the importation on "...South African iron, steel, sugar and other

---

[160] *op. cit.*, Carter, p. 22.

[161] Coker argues that this is not the case, he claims that the Congressional action was quite separate from other anti-apartheid actions. Indeed, as will be shown in later chapters this is not the case, indeed, it is argued that there was a considerable amount of coordination between the anti-apartheid movement and actions in Congress. The only thing that the anti-apartheid movement was unable to do was hold on to the legislation for long enough to assure that it looked the way they wanted it to. See *op. cit.*, Coker 1986, p. 214 for his appraisal of the Congressional actions and the anti-apartheid movement.

[162] *Congressional Quarterly 1985 Almanac*, ed. Mary W. Cohen, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C., 1986, p. 40.

[163] See *ibid.*, pp. 83-85.

agricultural products, and a prohibition on exports to South Africa of petroleum products."[164] Further actions included banning new investment in South Africa and further limitations on the importation of South African coal, uranium, textiles and flights between the Republic and the US.[165] The legislation was vetoed by President Reagan on September 26, 1986. Reagan argued that "The Administration has no quarrel with the declared purpose of this measure...."[166] Yet, he went on to say:

> ...while we vigorously support the purpose of this legislation, declaring economic warfare against the people of South Africa would be destructive not only of their efforts to peacefully end apartheid, but also of the opportunity to replace it with a free society.[167]

The President's veto, however, was overriden in the Senate by a vote of 78 to 21 and was considered at the time to "...mark the most serious defeat Reagan...suffered on a foreign issue and one of the most stunning blows of his presidency."[168] Despite the Republican majority in the Senate, the Reagan Administration was unable to maintain a firm hold on US foreign policy in southern Africa.

The movement of the US Congress towards sanctions stems from a variety of factors. The Congress has traditionally been the place where opposition to the National Party government has

---

[164] "The Next Step: Sanctions Take Effect", *Congressional Quarterly*, October 4, 1986, p. 2338.

[165] *ibid.*, p. 2338. The Act also contained measures demanding that the US not support negotiations until such time as the ANC renounces violence, provided too that the South African government enters negotiations without conditions. Thomas J. Redden, Jr., argued in "The US Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986: Anti-Apartheid or Anti-African National Congress?" that the CAAA amendment regarding the ANC is an effort by conservatives to "...deny political legitimacy to the ANC." See Redden, Jr., Thomas, J., "The US Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986: Anti-Apartheid or Anti-African National Congress?", *African Affairs*, Volume 7, Number 349, October 1988, p. 605. This may indeed be the case that conservatives may have tried to delegitimatize the ANC in the US, but it is far from likely that the act was in any real sense 'anti-ANC'. There is a huge difference between writing laws and enforcing them. Around the time of the passage of the constitution the US had raised excise taxes, but waited several years before enforcing the law. Other laws go enacted, but unenforced. It seems likely that in the context of international affairs that this legislation would go unheeded, unless of course there is great domestic fury over it. Thus, it would become an intermestic issue, but this is not in and of itself enough to label the CAAA-86 an 'anti-ANC' piece of legislation. More properly, it reflects the by-product of a compromise and the symbol of the role of intermestic politics in the formulation of US foreign policy. Conservatives facing an election in November of 1986 would have been searching for issues upon which to fight, and opposing the real or imagined links between the ANC and 'international communism' would be consistent with conservative electioneering.

[166] "Reagan Message on South Africa Sanctions Veto", *Congressional Quarterly*, October 4, 1986, p. 2370.

[167] *ibid.*, p. 2370.

[168] Felton, John, "Hill Overrides Veto of South Africa Sanctions", *Congressional Quarterly*, October 4, 1986, p. 2338. The President was also required to report back to the Congress on the viability or need or imposing further sanctions against South Africa. This the Administration did on October 1, 1987 in a report entitled "Progress Toward Ending the System of Apartheid." In that report the Administration said that "...the imposition of additional economic sanctions at this time would not be helpful in the achievement of the objectives which Congress, the American people, and I share." See *Progress Toward Ending the System of Apartheid*, 100th Congress, 1st Session, House Document 100-109, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1987, p. 11.

been articulated. There have been a variety of actions taken in the House and Senate against South Africa that also run counter to the given US administration's point of view. This has been true, especially, when Administrations have been considered 'friendly' to National Party government, whether if they were in fact, the point remains that under the Republican administrations there has been a trend for Congress to oppose US policy toward South Africa. Actions in Congress were very much pushed onward when Rep. Charles Diggs (D-MI) took over the chairmanship of the House Subcommittee on Africa in 1969, his hearings were aimed at raising the issue of apartheid in Congress.[169] Prior to the anti-apartheid legislation passed in 1985 no bill

> ...on South Africa has ever been reported out of the committee or committees to which they were referred. It is important that even bills introduced by reportedly powerful influences such as former Subcommittee on Africa chairman Charles Diggs or his successor, Steven Solarz, have never been reported out to the full committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. [170]

The majority of actions taken against South Africa have been done through Executive authority, as for instance the case of the voluntary arms embargo, or even in the case of the mandatory embargo. In the case of the mandatory embargo it was carried out through the Export Control Act, which"...allows the government to control the export of any item."[171] Other successful actions can be undertaken in Congress, but they are done by way of amendment, namely amending existing or pending legislation. This was done, for example, in the case of Export-Import Bank Authorization Bill of 1978, through the "...Evans amendment, which limited access to Export-Import Bank (Exim bank) facilities to borrowers..." who failed to implement, or were making progress in implementing fair employment practices. [172]

It is not surprising to find, then, in the face of a well articulated Administration policy, such as constructive engagement, that there is considerable opposition in the Congress. Furthermore, a "...striking feature of the early 1980's was the extent to which the American political right, dispossessed of its once over-riding concern for South Africa's strategic importance, became

---

[169] *op. cit.*, Karis, p. 337, also see chapter two.

[170] *op. cit.*, Christenson, p. 61.

[171] *ibid.*, p. 63.

[172] *ibid.*, p. 62.

markedly more critical of apartheid as an economic system, not as a political creed."[173] That the political right was opposed to apartheid became clear after the beginning of the protests in Washington. Thirty five conservative members of the House of Representatives "...wrote a letter to South African Ambassador Bernardus G. Fourie threatening to support limits on U.S. investment and other economic sanctions 'unless certain economic and civil rights guarantees for all persons are in place.'"[174] As a sign that the right had not completely given up their former ways, there was an effort, among some, to extend sanctions against the Pretoria government as well as the USSR. They were, however, unable to achieve the goal of dual sanctions against both.[175]

Increasingly, the violence in the South Africa led to the first real public consideration of US policy in southern Africa - the debate had left the rarified air of the National Security Council, as in Nixon's day when policy changes towards southern Africa were hidden, and entered for better or worse the public domain of Congress and the media. There was real domestic concern over the issue of apartheid and the US relationship to the apartheid state. This domestic concern, however, had little support in the Administration. Assistant Secretary of State Crocker was clearly opposed to sanctions against the Pretoria regime, or any other actions that would interfere with the process of constructive engagement. Crocker said of disinvestment that it was "Orwellian perversity in proposing such measures in the name of liberal and humanitarian goals."[176] The Administration was never totally dismissive of actions against South Africa, but it was always very careful to pick and choose items that were already close to current policy. For example, refusing to sell goods to agencies that enforce apartheid, a policy that the Reagan Administration supported, and one also that was already in place. [177] The Assistant Secretary of State said of sanctions that they

---

173 *op. cit.*, Coker, 1986, p.199.

174 *op. cit.*, *Congressional Quarterly 1985 Almanac*, p.85. It would be incorrect, however, to assume that the right wing in the US had done a complete change in its view towards South Africa. Many on the right were still doggedly holding on to the image of Pretoria as a guard against the encroachment of 'communism'.

175 *op. cit.*, *Congressional Quarterly 1985 Almanac*, p. 85.

176 Chester Crocker in *op. cit.*, Coker, 1986, p. 215.

177 "Constructive Engagement and South Africa", McFarlane interview, *American Foreign Policy*, 1985, p. 858.

> ...would be counterproductive: They are more likely to strengthen resistance to change than to strengthen the forces of reform. Moreover, they do not even put us, as some say, "on the side of right." If our moral imperative as Americans is to encourage freedom and reform, we must reject sanctions; We do not enhance our ability to influence change by eliminating ourselves as an actor.[178]

The size of the opposition to the Reagan Administration's continued pursuit of constructive engagement as well as the continued violence and domestic concern over the issue of US relations to South Africa led to the Administration changing its position on sanctions. The President issued the executive order, in order to avoid confrontation in Congress (as the President had said, he would "have to veto" the Congressional bill), which put into place the weakest components of the Congressional action.[179] The Reagan Administration's effort to stem the perceived encroachment of Congress into foreign policy failed, however, as indicated by the 1986 Congressional override of Reagan's veto of sanctions legislation.

Zimbabwe's Independence

Zimbabwe's independence offers a useful example of both involvement of the US in southern Africa, as well as a model for how many in the US wish US policy to be conducted in Africa. The most important aspects of the Zimbabwe conflict for purposes here begin in 1977, the first year of the Carter Administration and the founding year of TransAfrica.

The process began on November 11, 1965, when Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front declared a Unilateral Declaration of Independence.[180] UDI effectively nullified any intentions of the British Government to implement majority rule in Rhodesia. The white leadership in Rhodesia, by taking unilateral action, declared their intention to secure white rule in Rhodesia for all time forward. UDI also placed the British Government in difficulty, in as much as it came at at time when the Government was in the process of granting independence to its colonial holdings in Africa. The white action in Rhodesia clearly threatened Britain's position vis a vis other African states and

---

[178] "Administration Position on Sanctions Against South Africa", Chester Crocker, *American Foreign Policy*, 1985, p. 835.

[179] "I am Signing Today an Executive Order that Will Put into Place a Set of Measures...Aimed Against the Machinery of Apartheid", Ronald Reagan, *American Foreign Policy*, 1985, pp. 861-864.

[180] *op. cit.*, Minter, p.202.

parties. In order to secure an end to the UDI government led by Ian Smith, Great Britain called for and and won UN support for sanctions against Rhodesia. The US "...joined Britain in supporting the first U.N. imposition of mandatory sanctions, that is, selective economic sanctions on the rebel regime,...."[181]

In opposition to the UDI regime were several groups, including the two major political and military forces of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). The former was headed by Joshua Nkomo and received the majority of its military and diplomatic support from the Warsaw Pact countries, including the USSR. The latter, a splinter from ZAPU, was led by Robert Mugabe, and received the majority of its support from the PRC. While the two groups were opposed to each other, they were able, in the face of the conflict in Zimbabwe, to come together for the purposes of negotiations and form the Patriotic Front (PF). The divisions between ZAPU and ZANU were a combination of ethnic and ideological factors, with ZAPU being less committed to revolutionary doctrines and largely based among the Ndeble people, whereas Mugabe espoused a commitment to revolutionary ideals and gained his support largely from the Shona people. ZAPU operated largely out of Zambia, building up forces there for infiltration into Rhodesia, during the 1960's they cooperated with the South African ANC in an effort to improve their opposition to the white forces in southern Africa. ZANU, on the other hand, operated both inside Zimbabwe as well as in Mozambique. FRELIMO, which came to power in 1975, offered safe haven to ZANU forces, and in retaliation for FRELIMO support the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) helped form the MNR. The MNR was intended to oppose ZANU, as well as cause internal disruption of the newly formed Mozambique. (See section on Nkomati Accord.)

Rhodesia became an issue of increased US interest following the introduction of Cuban troops and Soviet advisors into Angola. Secretary of State Kissinger instituted a process of negotiation with South Africa, as well as the Smith regime over the issue of majority rule in Rhodesia.[182] Kissinger sought to achieve majority rule in South Africa in time, the most important

[181] *op. cit.*, Karis, p. 330.

[182] *op. cit.*, Karis, p.338 and Utley, Garrick, *Globalism or Regionalism? United States Policy Towards Southern Afri-*

action, however, was to secure South African assistance in persuading the UDI government to move towards majority rule.[183] The logic behind Kissinger's action is clear, the increased involvement of the USSR in southern Africa presented a strategic threat to the US. Therefore, unrest in southern Africa presented an opportunity to Soviet backed forces and therefore a threat to US interests. One way to avoid Soviet domination in the region was to secure, quickly, majority rule, which would then reduce local tensions.

Thus, the US brought itself in to discussions of Namibian and Rhodesian independence. Rhodesia was seen as the most important of the conflicts, however, primarily because the war there was already deadly, whereas the conflict in Namibia was not yet of high intensity.[184] Indeed, there were some vague similarities between what had happened in Angola and what was happening in Rhodesia. Both possessed domestic opposition groups that fought the colonial regime and who at various times fought each other. One of the domestic groups also received support from the USSR and Cuba, this being the case in both Angola and Rhodesia.[185] There were of course many more differences between the two conflicts than similarities, but from the US point of view the similarities of foreign involvement were enough to suggest a repeat in Rhodesia of what had happened in Angola. Indeed, "...March 1976 Henry Kissinger warned Cuba against possible intervention in Rhodesia."[186] Then, "...he said that the United States was wholly committed to a rapid, just, and African solution in Rhodesia."[187]

Kissinger, and the US Administration, facing increased tension in the region threw out option two of the NSSM 39, which had envisioned progress and influence coming through the white led governments in the region. The fall of the Portuguese and their evacuation from Africa, and the following escalation of the war against the Smith regime all signalled an end to the 'Tar

---

ca, Adelphi Papers, Number 154, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1979, p. 17.

[183] *op. cit.*, Karis, p.338.

[184] See O'Meara, Patrick, "Zimbabwe: The Politics of Independence", *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis*, eds. Gwendolen Carter and Patrick O'Meara, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1982, pp.33-34.

[185] In 1978 ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo "...announced that 75 Cuban military advisers were helping train his army." See Jaster, Robert, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front-Line States: Experience and Prospects*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Number 180, 1983, p.8.

[186] *op. cit.*, O'Meara, p.33.

[187] *ibid.*, p.33.

Baby' option.[188] The question now was how to keep pace with majority rule, while at the same time maintaining a strategic advantage in the region.

Kissinger's solution to the problem was to seek a quick fix to the Rhodesian conflict. This necessitated shuttle diplomacy through the region. He met with Smith and South African Prime Minister John Vorster in an attempt to gain concessions from Smith and elicit Vorster's assistance on resolving the regional dispute. Kissinger went on

> ...whirlwind tours of southern Africa in April and September 1976 [that] led to Smith's dramatic announcement that he accepted "majority rule within two years," on terms that Kissinger said were acceptable to the Frontline presidents. The apparent agreement fell apart within days, however, as it emerged that Smith was thinking of "responsible government" with a qualified franchise and that Kissinger had agreed that whites would control the transitional government, including the key security ministries.[189]

It seems obvious that while Option 2 might have been dead much of the thinking that went into it was not. Kissinger's apparent inability to gain regional consensus on the proposed plan was made most obvious when Frontline presidents rejected the Kissinger plan, despite his earlier claims to have negotiated with them.[190]

When Carter took over the White House he took over the remains of the failed Nixon-Ford programme. Carter, however, brought with him a different commitment to southern Africa, one not based solely upon global strategic considerations, but also one which had as a major feature a commitment to human rights. The Carter Administration was driven by "...an appreciation of the aims of African nationalism, a commitment to majority rule, and a belief that the perpetuation of a white minority regime in South Africa would endanger the long-range interests of the West."[191] A further consideration in the Carter White House was using the settlement of conflicts in the region as examples of what could be done in South Africa. Thus, Andrew Young[192], Ambassador to the UN, former member of the CBC, and former assistant to Martin Luther King, Jr. "...said on June

---

[188] *op. cit.*, Uttley, pp. 5-6.

[189] *op. cit.*, Minter, pp. 274-275.

[190] *op. cit.*, O'Meara, p.34.

[191] *op. cit.*, Karis, p.340. and *op. cit.*, Carter, pp. 28-29.

[192] Uttley makes the point that Young's main experience is within the civil rights movement in the US and further that Young had "...an enduring faith in the ability of blacks and whites to live together." See *op. cit.*, Uttley, p. 8.

20, 1978, 'My feeling is that the best way to get South Africa to make changes is to demonstrate' that whites and blacks in Namibia and Rhodesia 'can get along well and continue to survive.'"[193] Clearly, then, resolution of the Rhodesian conflict was seen as a catalyst of change in southern Africa, and not only an attempt to prevent Soviet and Cuban penetration. With the commitment to a Rhodesian resolution the Carter Administration gave its assistance to the Labour government in the United Kingdom in an effort to resolve the Rhodesian deadlock. Foreign Secretary David Owen, with the assistance of Ambassador Young, sought to push forward the almost non-existent peace process in the region. Having failed in Geneva in 1976 and 1977 when the Patriotic Front (PF, combination of ZAPU and ZANU) and the Smith regime failed to come to an understanding. In place of the failed Geneva discussions the US and UK came up with a set of proposals designed to get the talks back on track. "The Anglo-American proposals...called for a British Resident Commissioner to run a transitional government for six months leading to elections and independence, and a UN force to monitor a ceasefire,...", however, the plan was rejected by the PF.[194] The Anglo-American efforts were seen as naive. Ken Flower, head of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation argued:

> ...Owen and Young displayed considerable naivety in their understanding of the situation on the ground and appeared oblivious to all that their predecessors had achieved. They certainly ignored the most vital factor - that without Vorster's arm-twisting neither Kissinger nor anyone else could have got Smith [Rhodesian prime minister] to concede majority rule....[195]

The Carter Administration had distanced itself from South Africa and thereby distanced itself from the sources of influence it had available in the region.

The Rhodesians were, despite US and UK efforts, busy themselves trying to sort out their difficulties. Smith had decided to push forward an internal settlement, which would maintain white position within Rhodesia, but equally limit African nationalist sentiment. In other words, Smith sought a settlement that kept whites in power, and brought Africans into power as well, but denied access to the government of the African nationalist groups ZANU and ZAPU. "In March

---

[193] *op. cit.*, Karis, p. 344.

[194] *op. cit.*, Jaster, 1983, p. 6 and see *op. cit.*, Utley, p. 9.

[195] *op. cit.*, Flower, p. 183.

[1978] the Smith Government announced that agreement had been reached with internal black political leaders on a transition government was established to bring about a cease-fire, draft a new constitution, and arrange for general elections."[196] The 'internal settlement' as it became known received considerable support from a variety of groups in the West, not least of which were Republican Senators in the US and the Conservative Party in the UK.[197] In Congress, against the wishes of the Carter White House, there was a move afoot to repeal sanctions against Rhodesia altogether.[198] Movement within the US, by TransAfrica, to "...alert the Organization of African Unity...that the Congress might lift Rhodesian sanctions following Smith's announcement of the internal settlement..." led to the OAU condemnation of Congressional actions against sanctions.[199] Any action by the Congress that supported an internal settlement would do little to win friends in Africa. Therefore, the internal settlement, despite support from various groups, did not gain approval where it counted most, namely in the White House or at 10 Downing St. Washington was most adamant about rejecting the internal settlement.

> ...Ambassador Andrew Young on March 14, 1978, maintained that since the internal settlement did not include all nationalist leaders it could divide rather than unify the people of Zimbabwe. Furthermore, he charged that the Salisbury plan produced a transitional arrangement of shared responsibility that would allow Smith to hold effective power and to wield a veto."[200]

Clearly, there was little governmental support for the internal settlement.

While there was no governmental support for the internal settlement there was also declining support among the allies of ZAPU and ZANU to perpetuate the crisis. Front line presidents were in need of a resolution to the crisis, both Zambia and Mozambique were suffering losses of income, as well as suffering threats to their internal security.[201] Rhodesian security forces had also crossed national borders in pursuit of their opponents, as for instance against

---

196 *op. cit.*, Jaster, 1983, p.9.

197 See *ibid.*, p.9 and *op. cit.*, Minter, pp. 300-301.

198 Challenor, Herschelle Sullivan, "The Influence of Black Americans on U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa", *Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Abdul Aziz Said, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1981, p. 171.

199 *ibid.*, p. 171.

200 *op. cit.*, O'Meara, p.41.

201 Zambia, it has been argued, lost up to $750 million as a result of implementing sanctions against Rhodesia, and Mozambique $100 million annually. See *op. cit.* Jaster, 1983, p.9.

Mozambique, which had "...claimed that Rhodesian raids had killed 1,800 nationals...."[202]

Pressure for settlement from the Frontline states as well as from the British Government, which had itself changed its line partly due to demands from the Commonwealth states.[203] UN Ambassador Young has argued that pressure from Nigeria was crucial in changing the position of the Conservative Party leadership. Young states:

> ...in the course of the negotiations to produce the Lancaster House agreement [the agreement that ended the conflict in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe] a vivid and powerful demonstration occurred of the new weight and importance of African economic power - namely that of Nigeria. ...Nigeria did not hesitate to use its economic power to put pressure on Britain, nationalizing the holdings of British Petroleum in Nigeria, dumping 500 million pounds sterling onto currency markets, and rejecting a bid from a British firm for a $200-million port-development project.
>
> Privately the then military government of Nigeria made it very clear that this economic "shot across the bow" was designed to...warn the Prime Minister not to ignore Nigeria's sensitivities on southern African issues.[204]

Thus, the combined effects of these sources of influence led the the convening of the Lancaster House talks, held in London and beginning on September 10, 1979. The talks were held between delegations representing the current Zimbabwe-Rhodesian government (as its name became following the internal settlement), and the Patriotic Front which included ZAPU and ZANU. Chairing the talks were the British led by Lord Carrington, the Government's Foreign Secretary.[205] By the end of the talks, which occurred on December 21, 1979[206] the following points had been agreed:

- full suffrage
- guarantee of 20 white seats in 100 seat chamber
- transition period, led by British Governor General
- cease fire
- British supervised elections.

Thus, the process of Zimbabwean independence was completed with the implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement. The US, while not playing a central role, did contribute to the

---

[202] *ibid.*, p. 9.

[203] See *op. cit.*, Jaster, 1983, pp.11-12.

[204] Young, Andrew, "The United States and Africa", *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 59, Number 3, 1981, p.653.

[205] See Davidow, Jeffrey, *A Peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1984, pp. 33-49 for a full discussion of the membership and make up of the contending delegations.

[206] *op. cit.*, Jaster, 1983, p.17.

process. Ambassador Young argued that it did so by being influenced, like the British, by the role of Nigeria (which had become the US largest African trading partner), and by the growth of the black American constituency in the US.[207] These inputs led the US to attempt to gain a settlement by using what influence it had over the participants. The Carter Administration

> ...had been broadly and publicly supportive of the British during the conference. Ambassador Kingman Brewster...had played active, behind-the-scenes roles, facilitating communication between London and Washington and among the London actors.[208]

One of the most important tasks undertaken by the Carter Administration had been the repeal of the Byrd Amendment, which had permitted the US to circumvent UN sanctions and import chrome and other minerals from Rhodesia. The Byrd Amendment became law in November 17, 1971, thus placing the US in violation of mandatory UN sanctions against Rhodesia. The arguments in favour of the Byrd Amendment included US reliance on the USSR for chrome, as well as a rather obvious desire to support the UDI government of Ian Smith on the part of US conservatives.[209] The Carter Administration had worked for the repeal of the amendment in 1977.[210] The Carter Administration saw the use of sanctions against Rhodesia as well as against the internal settlement state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, as a method of ensuring progress in the talks. Furthermore, the Carter Administration was using the possibility of lifting sanctions as a signal of approval and as a way of bestowing legitimacy upon whatever new regime may take over in Zimbabwe. Not only would the lifting of sanctions give legitimacy to whatever new regime there may be, but also it would allow the flow of goods into the faltering economic entity of Zimbabwe. That the US did not lift sanctions in place against the Muzorewea regime is credited, in part, with moving the British towards seeking a solution that included the Patriotic Front.[211]

The Lancaster House agreement substantiated that violent revolution was not the only pathway forward in seeking to transfer power away from a minority regime to a majority. Clearly,

---

[207] *op. cit.*, Young, pp 651-656.

[208] *op. cit.*, Davidow, p. 86.

[209] See *op. cit.*, Lake, pp. 198-199.

[210] *op. cit.*, Minter, p.299.

[211] *op. cit.*, Davidow, p.26.

the talks had demonstrated that not only could transfer be undertaken, but more so for the US that it could undertake an effective and constructive role in the region beyond the constraints of East-West rivalries. This is not to say, however, that the East-West rivalry was unimportant in the context of the talks, but that it was not the only issue at hand.

Conclusion

From the above it should be clear that US involvement in southern Africa is largely reactive, in as much as it has followed more than initiated events. This is true in the context of Angola, where the US simply responded to a deteriorating situation in Angola, instead of taking an active interest in preventing the deterioration. It is also largely true of actions in South Africa, as well Mozambique - in both states the US has tended to wait for things to happen, as opposed to making them happen. This is not entirely the case in Zimbabwe where the US took an active role in the peace process, and it is not true in the case of the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique (an exception to the rule). The reason for this reactive policy is due to two major factors, one being that Africa is on the periphery of US interests and stirs little interest, and secondly, many see South Africa as the regional actor which can take care of many Western interests - both a point of strength for the West as well as a point of weakness earning criticism from others. Southern Africa has become important in the last ten years primarily because of the wars of independence, the wealth that the victors of those wars would control and finally the impact of East-West relations in the region. Once, or if, the East-West relationship be clarified in the region so that conflict is well below military means, there should also be a reduction in East-West interest in the region, this is because of the reduced risks in the perceived gains of the other in the region. The reduction in East-West conflict also puts a spotlight on South Africa. No longer can whites use the threat of Marxist-Leninist regimes as a justification for inhibiting the process of dismantling apartheid.

South Africa will continue to be an important issue in the West, and the US, through the conduit of racial conflict. Due to the large African population in the US, South Africa will continue to be of some importance to the US. Thus, even if the strategic position of the West in

southern Africa is secured, South Africa will continue to play a role in the US, if not the West as a whole.

CHAPTER FOUR
The Black Lobby for Africa and the Caribbean

TransAfrica is both an international and domestic actor, it is the purpose of this chapter to examine both roles, and highlight some of the internestic qualities of the 'Black Lobby for Africa and the Caribbean'.[1] This chapter will include the history of TransAfrica, its organisational structure, as well as a discussion of some of the more relevant and important elements that make up TransAfrica. The discussion of TransAfrica's structural environment will include the founding of TransAfrica, its organisational structure, membership size and chapter structure, sources of financial support, and finally their issue structure. Afterwards, an examination of some of the coalitions formed by TransAfrica, will be considered, including those with the Southern Africa Working Group, Artists and Athletes Against Apartheid, and the African National Congress. Finally, four areas of interests will be discussed. These are 1) TransAfrica's involvement in a press leak early in the Reagan Administration, 2) the publication of an article that arguably forms the basis for many of TransAfrica's actions beginning in late 1984 and running through 1985, 3) the Embassy protests and the associated formation of the Free South Africa Movement, and finally 4) TransAfrica's involvement in the Angola conflict. This chapter will acquaint the reader with the details of who TransAfrica is, who it cooperates with, who it opposes, and why it does what it does.

TransAfrica's Beginnings

TransAfrica was begun as a result of a meeting called by the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). The meeting, held on September 25-26, 1976, was entitled the Black Leadership Conference on Africa.[2] The justification for the founding of TransAfrica is as follows:

> Because of the conspicuous absence of Afro-Americans in high level international affairs positions and the general subordination, if not neglect, of African/Caribbean priorities, a private advocacy organization was envisioned as a counterbalance by the

[1] TransAfrica has changed their description to the "Afro-American Lobby for Africa and the Caribbean", the change occurred with the last year (1989).

[2] Robinson, Randall, "Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Africa and International Economic Policy and Trade," *Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion*, Volume IX, Numbers 1/2, Spring/Summer, 1979, p. 17, and *History of TransAfrica*, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C., undated, p. 1.

> 130 leaders present hailing from public office, the civil rights movement, business, labor, religion, civic associations, and educational institutions.[3]

The role of this new organisation was to serve the interests of black Americans, the foreign policy interests of black America, on issues relating to Africa and the Caribbean. What is implicitly clear, from their claim to be the Black Lobby for Africa and the Caribbean, is that the 'private advocacy organization' was to serve the interests of diaspora politics in the US.

TransAfrica was begun after the work of an *ad hoc* committee, chaired by Randall Robinson, which included with Dr. Willard Johnson and Herschelle Challenor. Challenor has since served as the UNESCO Washington Liaison Office director, as well as serving on the board of TransAfrica. Johnson later served on the board of TransAfrica and has been active with TransAfrica local chapters. The *ad hoc* committee "formulated an organizational design and investigated funding possibilities."[4] TransAfrica was incorporated on July 1, 1977, and later received funding from the National Council of Churches (NCC) and the Board of Global Ministries/United Methodist Church.[5] The organisation was at first run out of Rep. Charles Diggs (D-MI) office "...until...enough funds (were found) to start a separate office...."[6] Since 1977 TransAfrica has received grants from other religious groups, as well as non-religious bodies. Furthermore, TransAfrica now sports up to date offices, and is no longer reliant upon Congressional graces. It is located in the same building as SANE, the anti-nuclear group, which like TransAfrica acts as a lobby.

TransAfrica's beginning in Diggs' office came about because of Diggs' position as chair of the House Subcommittee on Africa, as well as his senior position among black Congressmen. Starting out of Diggs' office assisted TransAfrica greatly, in as much as it was there that important contacts were made on Capitol Hill and staff learned their trade. As an illustration of their success, TransAfrica was able to join the fight for repeal of the Byrd Amendment (see Chapter

---

[3] *ibid.*, p. 1.

[4] *ibid.*, p.1.

[5] *ibid.*, p.1. TransAfrica, according to Herschelle Challenor, was founded in September 1977. See Challenor, Herschelle, "The Influence of Black Americans on U.S. Foreign Policy toward Africa", *Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Abdul Aziz Said, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1981, p. 170.

[6] Brownfield, Allan, *TransAfrica: A Lobby for the Left*, The Lincoln Institute, Washington, D.C., 1985, p.9.

three), which had allowed the US to violate UN sanctions.

During this fight against white rule in Rhodesia TransAfrica demonstrated that it was a powerful force, in as much as it was able to "alert the Organization of Africa Unity during its annual meeting in 1978 that the Congress might lift Rhodesian sanctions following Smith's announcement of the internal settlement on March 3, 1978,...."[7] The Byrd Amendment was removed and sanctions put in place against Rhodesia. TransAfrica also worked to help defeat a variety of Congressional measures that would have in one way or another assisted the white minority regime in Salisbury. This included defeating the Hayakawa-McGovern bill which would have sent observers to the internal settlement elections, which were won by Muzorewa.[8] TransAfrica's success was due, in part, to the fact that its leaders were able to meet with President Carter a number of times, as well as with senior State Department and National Security Council officials.[9] As an illustration of the position of TransAfrica the Executive Director said of Carter's commitment to maintain sanctions against Rhodesia that:

> In our meeting with Carter, he said unequivocally that the sanctions wouldn't be lifted at the point that the British governor arrives in Salisbury. He said to us clearly that the sanctions would extend up until the time of the elections or the beginning of the electoral process. We take him in good faith and quite seriously on that point.[10]

Generally speaking, TransAfrica was able to wield influence on the subject of Rhodesia, not only because the administration was willing to listen, but also because TransAfrica represented the black community. Blacks had been crucial in the Carter victory in 1976, and so held some influence over Carter's actions. In this way, TransAfrica was a fully fledged lobby group, using its influence to achieve its goals.

Organisational Structure

TransAfrica is composed of a variety of sub-units including TransAfrica Forum, the non-profit arm of TransAfrica. TransAfrica Forum (TAF) was founded in 1981 and serves as the

---

[7] *op. cit.*, Challenor, p. 171.

[8] *ibid.*, p. 172.

[9] White, Phillip, V., "The Black American Constituency for Southern Africa, 1940-1980", *The American People and Southern Africa*, ed. Alfred O. Hero, Jr. and John Barratt, Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1981, p. 95.

[10] Randall Robinson quoted in *ibid.*, p. 95.

informational and propaganda arm of TransAfrica, though its claim is educational and research. Serving on the Board of Directors of TransAfrica Forum have been Dr. Willard Johnson, TransAfrica Chairman and co-founder the Honorable Richard Hatcher, mayor of Gary, Indiana, tennis pro and leader of Artists and Athletes Against Apartheid (AAAA) Arthur Ashe, and TransAfrica Executive Director Randall Robinson.[11] Nii Akuetteh, Research Fellow for TAF describes the difference between TAF and TransAfrica as being two-fold; the former does not lobby, whereas the latter does, the former is tax-exempt and latter is not.[12] As Akuetteh points out, TAF's role is to provide information to the public, media and Congress[13], which includes putting information in the best light for the purposes of the lobby, thus providing an important service towards the success of TransAfrica.

In addition to TransAfrica Forum, TransAfrica operates a mass mail writing system known as 'Action Alert'. In this system letters are sent out to TransAfrica members according to their Congressional district. Members then respond by writing or visiting their Senator or House member and urging them to support or oppose a given bill, depending upon the instructions found in the Action Alert. An illustration of the instructions found in Action Alert is found in the August 1987 memo. It read:

> Your Representative and Senators will be at home during the district work period, August 8 thru [sic] September 8, 1987. Please call or visit them while they are there to express your opinion on the issues outlined below. The more pressure they receive from their constituents, the better. We need all the help we can get to turn back the tide of right-wing initiatives aimed at Africa and the Caribbean.[14]

Following these instructions are a series of bills before committees in either chamber of the Congress, and other legislative matters. Not all these may be concerning Africa or the Caribbean. As in the August, 1987 Action Alert, there were also calls for opposition to funding of the Contras and opposition to the appointment of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court. Both are examples of how the Action Alert has been used to address issues not found within the self-described bounds

---

[11] *Information Digest*, December 28, 1984, ed. John Rees, Baltimore, Maryland, p. 384.

[12] Akuetteh interview, May 11, 1988, Washington, D.C.

[13] Akuetteh interview, May 11, 1988, Washington, D.C.

[14] *TransAfrica Action Alert*, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C., August, 1987.

of TransAfrica. Appealing to members on issues outside of the declared interest area may serve an important function of building coalition strength, gaining allies for the more specific purposes of diaspora politics.

TransAfrica also used mass mailings to reach the public at large. The mass mailing firm of Craver, Matthews, Smith & Company handled the organisation's attempts to influence opinion and raise funds in 1985. The 1985 effort consisted of a "...four page letter from South African Bishop Desmond Tutu, and a response card asking for donations ranging from $20 to $500."[15] The mailing list is made up of lists from the Democratic National Committee, Common Cause, Public Citizen, Congress Watch, The American Civil Liberties Union, and the Physicians for Social Responsibility.[16]

TransAfrica attempts to reach its members and the public through a variety of means. TAF publishes bi-monthly *Issue Brief*, the *African Writers Series*, and the journal entitled *TransAfrica Forum*. TransAfrica also produces several Newsletters a year, not to mention the above mass mailings. Finally, TransAfrica utilizes the mass media to great effect. Much of the genius of TransAfrica's media manipulation comes in the guise of Randall Robinson, founder and Executive Director of TransAfrica. Robinson, a graduate of Harvard Law School, had prior experience on how to manipulate the media while at law school. There he was involved with protests against Portuguese presence in Angola, as well as actions taken against Gulf Oil's involvement in Angola. At one point Robinson was involved in the occupation of Harvard University's President's office.[17] Robinson also learned about the Washington press corps while serving as Rep. Charles Diggs Administrative Assistant.[18] Finally, and perhaps most imponderable of all is the influence of his late brother Max Robinson. Max Robinson worked for several years as a television news anchor man in Washington, D.C. and later became the first black American to regularly host a national network evening news.

---

[15] Nadle, Marlene, "Shifting Media Interest Determines Mail Strategy for Anti-Apartheid Group," *DM News*, December 15, 1985, p. 18

[16] *ibid.*, p.18

[17] O'Donnell, Frank, "The Invisible Man", *Regardies*, September, 1986, p.94.

[18] *op. cit.*, Robinson, 1979, p. 17.

Members, Chapters and Finance

The mainstay of any lobbying effort is a membership, and to a lesser extent followers who do not formally join the cause. Lobbying groups, however, find it hard to survive without a dues paying membership. Without a sizeable membership and following, no lobbying effort is likely to succeed. TransAfrica is no exception to the fact that it needs members to carry out its desires, to fund its efforts and to spread the message. Despite TransAfrica's claim of a membership of around 10,000 there is evidence that the actual size may be smaller.[19] To determine its size one can examine the reports filed quarterly and held in the House Clerk's Office. These reports are required by all lobbies as stipulated under the Regulation of Lobbying Act. The reports contain financial disclosure statements, as well as the total number of published items. Therefore, it is known how many newsletters TransAfrica publishes (or claims to publish) in a given quarter. If one assumes that each member of TransAfrica receives a newsletter, then the total membership can be calculated. In each calculation one can further assume that a few of the newsletters do not go to members, but are used as incentives for potential members, as well as to inform members of Congress. Therefore, in 1978, during the third quarter TransAfrica reported a total of 2,500 copies of their newsletter were printed. Given that the total printed probably exceeds the total needed for members, one can assume that the membership for that period was roughly 2000-2500. In the first quarter of 1984 there were 3500 printed, thus yielding a membership between 3000 and 3500. The highest number of newsletter printed was in 1984, that total being 5500. Then, in the first quarter of 1987 TransAfrica reports 1500 copies, a drop of 4000 since 1984. None of the figures mentioned thus far are near the reported membership size of 10,000. There is, however, some evidence to the contrary that may make the figure of 10,000 plausible. If one uses the smallest donation size of TransAfrica, that being $12.50, and divides that into the quarterly receipts from dues and the like, then one can estimate that during the first three quarters of 1986, for instance, that their membership size would be (roughly) 500 for the first quarter, 9600 for the second, and

---

[19] *TransAfrica: The Black World's Bridge to US Foreign Policy Legislators*, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C., undated, and Beals, Greg, "TransAfrica: Africa's Ally in Washington", *Southern Africa*, April, 1983, p.3 -- both claim TransAfrica's membership to be about 10,000.

2770 for the third. Clearly, on this basis it would be possible for the membership to be 10,000. How then can this problem be resolved? What is certain is that if TransAfrica has a membership of 10,000 it does not offer each member a newsletter, and this may seem rather unusual for a lobby group. If it does not give a newsletter to each member, then the membership of 10,000 is somewhat more likely, but still questionable. The above calculation was based on the smallest possible donation size, one which does not include the usual perks of lobby group membership (such as in TransAfrica's case a free subscription to the *TransAfrica Forum* journal and a gold pin for larger donations). It is more likely that TransAfrica's membership rests somewhere between 1000 and 10,000, with the greater likelihood being towards the middle or lower end of the scale. There always is the possibility that TransAfrica has group memberships instead of individual ones. Therefore, the claim of 10,000 is based upon the size of the groups that join TransAfrica. The dispute over claimed versus real membership size is not unusual. This inflated membership size would give the appearance of a larger constituency, and therefore greater powers of influence. Whether this is TransAfrica's logic is not clear.

TransAfrica makes use of its membership through organising itself into membership chapters, which are organised along geographical lines. Chapters exist in such cities as Boston, Cincinnati, Houston, Los Angeles, and Baltimore. Akuetteh explained that the chapter's members "get together with members to spread [an] issue", which is done by members pressuring those of a given Congressional constituency.[20] TransAfrica, that is the main office in Washington, D.C., provides information and advice to the local chapters, but little else. The link between the chapters and TransAfrica is voluntary, that is there is no mandatory link between the two groups. Akuetteh said that the chapters had been "very helpful", but also that they "could be more helpful".[21] Currently, there is no staff member that is assigned to act as liaison between the various chapters and TransAfrica. There is, however, some attempt to coordinate activities between TransAfrica and the chapters. *TransAfrica News*, the official newsletter of the group, printed a reminder to

[20] Akuetteh interview, June 1, 1988, Washington, D.C.

[21] Akuetteh interview, June 1, 1988, Washington, D.C.

members, which read: "The annual TransAfrica membership/Chapter meeting will be held on June 6, 1987 from 10:00a.m. to 1:00p.m. at the Washington Hilton Hotel in Washington, D.C. All members are advised to attend."[22] The annual meeting was to be held the night after the Annual Conference, a clear attempt to maximize the presence of their membership.

The twelve local chapters also raise funds for TransAfrica, as for example on May 13, 1985 when TransAfrica received $48,000 from the Los Angeles Chapter.[23] These chapters also contribute to local anti-apartheid activities. Finally, local chapters and members will monitor sanctions and boycotts against South Africa. For example, Akuetteh reported that local members and chapters located in port cities will report on what is entering the port. This is done in conjunction at times with the longshoremen's union of a given port.[24] Clearly, these chapters are useful local units which assist in pressuring Congress, as well as serving as local fund raising. How effective the chapters are is somewhat unclear, though the remainder of this chapter will shed some light on that question.

Membership is one way TransAfrica receives financial support. It also has a variety of other fund raising activities, and like most lobbies is forever searching for sources of funding. TransAfrica, however, claims to be very careful about from whom they receive money. Akuetteh stated that money could buy influence, he especially pointed out that TransAfrica is careful so as not to receive money from either the CIA or the South African government.[25] Therefore, who funds TransAfrica is an important issue, keeping in mind that whoever gives them money passes some sort of legitimacy test. Most notable, in terms of the size of donation, has been the NCC, who in 1978 gave $15,000. That year TransAfrica reported an income of $70,895, and thus the NCC gift looms large in TransAfrica's prospects.[26] Other donors reported in various filings with the House Clerks office include the Phelps-Stokes Fund, the United Black Fund and the Booker T. Washington Foundation, all three of which are reputable black American charity organisations.

---

[22] *TransAfrica News*, Volume 7, Number 2, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C., p. 5

[23] See 2nd quarter, 1985, TransAfrica report, *Clerk's Report*, House of Representatives.

[24] Akuetteh interview, June 1, 1988, Washington, D.C.

[25] Akuetteh interview, June 1, 1988, Washington, D.C.

[26] See TransAfrica's 4th quarter, 1978, *Clerk's Report*, House of Representatives Clerk's office.

Also on record of having donated to TransAfrica are various unions, including the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists (CBTU), and the Pittsburgh Steelworkers. Various business interests have also donated to TransAfrica, for example, CBS Records, Equitable Life Assurance, and the Adolph Coors Company. Thus, having reviewed this list one might assume that TransAfrica receives its funding from reputable organisations, the largest donors having left of centre political images. What begins to raise questions, however, are donations from foreign entities such as the Libyan Jamarhiriya (diplomatic mission), the Liberian Embassy, the Embassy of the Ivory Coast, Kuwait Embassy, and most notable of all in the second quarter of 1984 a donation from the Cuban Interests Section, located in the Czechoslovakian Embassy.[27] The total donations from foreign governments amount to a considerable total of the TransAfrica budget - the total is probably in the neighbourhood of $20,000 - it is therefore significant.[28] Also of significance are statements made by TransAfrica staff members who state that TransAfrica does not and has never received money from foreign governments. Robinson said in 1987 that "We never collected a cent from any foreign nation."[29] Nii Akuetteh said during an interview that TransAfrica received "no money from foreign governments", then later he said that they received "no help from foreign governments".[30] The Foreign Agents Registration Act requires registry of lobbies who work on behalf of a foreign government or organisation, the receipt of money from foreign governments in this case raises the possibility that the Act may be invoked. The receipt of money from organisations and states outside the US is, if nothing else, an indication of the transnational nature of the lobby.

---

[27] TransAfrica's relationship with foreign governments will be discussed in Chapter 5.

[28] This is a considerable sum when on accounts for it over time. While the annual receipts from such donations are on the order of $3000 a year, and appear small, they are indeed significant. They become significant when one considers that they may pay, for example, 10% of the Executive Director's salary annually. The point being that in an organisation which is tight on funds any amount that alleviates the responsibilities of the fund raising machinery is useful.

[29] Robinson quoted in the *Christian Science Monitor*, reprinted in the *Wall Street Journal* editorial, "Keeping Company", August 9, 1988.

[30] Akuetteh interview, June 1, 1988, Washington, D.C.

TransAfrica's Issue Structure

While TransAfrica has made its mark in the world through its role in anti-apartheid activities, it does involve itself in other issues. These issues have categorical precedence within the black American community, and reflect a commitment to diaspora politics. Akuetteh placed the issues in a hierarchy of importance, indicating that they may shift places due to external factors. The most important issue, by far, was southern Africa, which seemingly extends beyond the issue of apartheid. Robinson said in the first issue of *TransAfrica Forum:*

> ...the crisis in southern Africa is not caused at root by the Cuban forces helping Angola defend itself, or by the Soviet Union's assistance of (sic) the African National Congress (ANC) or, for that matter, by the much discussed Marxism of the South West African People's Organization.[31]

Robinson goes on to place the responsibility for southern Africa's woes squarely on the shoulders of South Africa.[32] As Akuetteh put it, it was "a regional problem caused by an internal problem", the internal problem being, of course, apartheid.[33]

The pathway through which South Africa will cease to be a regional problem can only come about if internal pressure is supported by international pressure. Robinson said: "The Botha Government will seriously consider negotiations with South Africa's black leaders only if it finds itself tightly wedged between high-pressure and complex internal and external forces. Internal pressures have been building since 1984, but external pressure...has lagged behind."[34] Therefore, sanctions against South Africa become the primary objective of TransAfrica when considering the issue complex of southern Africa. It is through sanctions that TransAfrica expects much of the issue complex of southern Africa to receive redress.

The second tier of issues concerns economic assistance, primarily to African states, and to a lesser degree the Caribbean states. [35] TransAfrica begins its analysis of the development issue with this statement: "Of the twenty-five poorest countries in the world, eighteen are in Sub-

---

[31] Randall Robinson, quoted in *op. cit., Information Digest*, December 28, 1984, p. 384.

[32] *ibid.*, p. 384

[33] Akuetteh interview, May 11, 1988, Washington, D.C.

[34] Robinson, Randall, "Turn up Heat on Pretoria," *New York Times*, May 10, 1987, p.A23

[35] Akuetteh interview, May 11, 1988, Washington, D.C.

Saharan Africa."[36] TransAfrica also point out that with the "rising energy costs, world-wide inflation, and the reduction in foreign assistance from both the US and other quarters" that African nations are left with "staggering debt burdens which these nations cannot reasonably be expected to pay back within one or two generations."[37] Indeed, TransAfrica goes further in assessing US treatment of Africa:

> Emphasis is placed on enhancing profit capacity of the private sector (domestic capitalists) and foreign investors (western capitalists). Where the majority of citizens are concerned, however, a cap is placed on the consumption of the essentials of life...so as to free or divert more funds to the capitalist sector. The IMF has argued that "...only if large corporations invest and begin exporting from a country, will the country get out of the debt." Such conditionality measures in the IMF "rescue kit" are punitive on the broad masses of the people but indeed coincide with the interests of the Western banks whose financial assets are tied up in these countries.[38]

What is clear is that TransAfrica is not supportive of US policy, either with aid to Africa, nor towards the IMF. It is easily inferred from the above that TransAfrica's resolution of the problem comes first in removing IMF conditionality on bail-outs of foreign borrowers and secondly that African debt be written off in part or totally.

A third tier of issues concerns trade, primarily with the Caribbean. The focus was to reduce barriers between the Caribbean and the US, thus increasing the flow of goods from the Caribbean. For instance, TransAfrica was able to help secure "lower tariffs on imported Jamaican rum".[39] TransAfrica also supports normalization of at least economic relations with Cuba. They have asked whether there was the "political will" to alter the "checkmate stage" that the US and Cuba found themselves in. TransAfrica placed the issues of Cuban-US normalization on several points including "Miami's Cuban community", "American distrust of the Cuban regime's 'communist' character" and generally implied that normalization could only come once Washington was able to rid itself of various interferences.[40] The issue of Cuba, a potentially large market in Caribbean terms, is clearly a question of reducing economic barriers for trade.

---

[36] *Issue Brief*, June, 1982, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C., p. 4.

[37] *ibid.*, p. 3.

[38] *Issue Brief*, December 1984-January 1985, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C., p. 3.

[39] *op. cit., History of TransAfrica*, p. 1.

[40] *Issue Brief*, May, 1982, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C., p. 5.

Associated with the issue of trade is TransAfrica's view of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, or CBI.[41] TransAfrica has stated: "...that one of the best things that can happen to economic development in the Caribbean - and indeed in every part of the Third World - is a good... discussion of what is wrong and right with current terms of trade...."[42] The above demonstrate that TransAfrica considers the issue of trade from a variety of governmental actions from normalization of relations with Cuba to the Reagan Administration's CBI.

Finally, TransAfrica has also been involved in supporting the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara, opposing the Duvallier regime in Haiti, and has reviewed the conflicts in Chad and the Sudan. TransAfrica has argued for sanctions against Israel, this coming through a telegram sent to President Reagan. Along with these issues TransAfrica has worked on immigration policy in the US, world health issues and AIDS.[43] In each of these cases TransAfrica has opposed, or at least, been critical of the current US policy. This brief survey hopefully has given the reader an idea of the kinds of issue TransAfrica has dealt with and how they have seen those issues. TransAfrica, because of their interest in New Caledonia and Nicaragua, cannot be said to be wholly interested in the Caribbean and Africa. Therefore, not only can it can be said that TransAfrica generally opposes some US policies in Africa and the Caribbean, but has interests that are wider than the simple Caribbean and African issues.[44] Furthermore, its interests extend beyond simple Pan-Africanism, again because of its interest in New Caledonia and Nicaragua. What is clear, then, is that while TransAfrica's main interests are indeed covered within its descriptive phrase of being a Black Lobby for Africa and the Caribbean, it is equally clear that it has a wider interest.[45]

The above discussion of TransAfrica's interest hierarchy provides sufficient information that indicates that TransAfrica is indeed involved in issues which place it on the left of US political discourse. In the following section TransAfrica's domestic coalitions will be examined - this will

---

[41] The CBI was developed by the Reagan Administration to assist in the developing the economic health of Caribbean states.

[42] *op. cit., Issue Brief*, December 1984 - January 1985, p. 4.

[43] Akuetteh interview, May 11, 1988, Washington, D.C.

[44] That TransAfrica opposes Administration policies is not surprising, in that that is what the business of lobbying is all about. It would be foolish to expect otherwise.

[45] Brownfield, Allan, and J. Michael Waller, *The Revolutionary Lobby*, Council for Inter-American Security and Inter-American Security Educational Institute, 1985, p. 41-42 for a brief account of TransAfrica and non-African issues.

provide some further insight into how it operates and with whom.

Southern Africa Working Group (SAWG)

The Southern Africa Working Group (SAWG) is a domestic activist coalition which has as its object the imposition of sanctions against South Africa, and improving the relationship between the US and Angola and Mozambique. SAWG was founded by TransAfrica and the Washington Office on Africa (WOA), who with thirty seven activists met for the first time on January 4, 1979. [46] The objective of SAWG is to "...co-ordinate legislative strategies on southern Africa."[47] SAWG is supported by the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), Amnesty International (AI), Clergy and Laity Concerned (CALC), CBTU, Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law, Members of Congress for Peace through Law, National Coalition of Black Lawyers (NCBL), Women Strike for Peace, and World Peacemakers. Since 1979 SAWG has grown from roughly thirty seven groups to one hundred and fifty. [48]

While SAWG has grown in size, it has also grown in clout on Capitol Hill. SAWG lobbies by identifying 'swing votes' in Congress, and then identifies SAWG allies in that district and asks them to contact their representative. [49] Thus, the Congressional member would receive a number of letters on a vote which they had not expected to get any letters. The Congressional member will be faced with a "ground swell" of support for a particular vote.[50] This system that SAWG uses is employed to create the image of a popular opinion swing, or the creation of a grassroots movement where there is little or none.

In addition to the letter writing campaign SAWG sponsors lobbying activities on Capitol Hill. In 1988 the lobbying activity was called the National Anti-Apartheid Action and Lobby Day. SAWG worked to bring groups in from throughout the country (church, labour, etc.) and have

---

[46] *Information Digest*, February 13, 1981, ed. John Rees, Baltimore, Maryland, p. 27.

[47] From WOA mailing May 9, 1979, as quoted in *ibid.*, p. 27.

[48] From a leaflet of the *National Anti-Apartheid Action and Lobby Day*, run by SAWG.

[49] The system she describes is similar to the TransAfrica Action Alert. Eide interview, May 5, 1988, Washington, D.C.

[50] Eide interview, May 5, 1988, Washington, D.C.

them move throughout the offices of members of Congress.[51] These activists stop and leave letters with the Congressional aides and otherwise indicate their position.[52] The 1988 lobbying day was timed to coincide with Congressional consideration of HR 1580, a comprehensive sanctions bill. This bill had been sponsored by Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA) and Rep. Ron Dellums (D-CA).

Originally, SAWG was organisationally more tied to TransAfrica, in as much as SAWG used TransAfrica as its return address.[53] Currently, however, SAWG uses WOA's address instead, with two other organisations as contacts, namely the United Church of Christ (located in the same building as WOA) and Bread for the World, also located in Washington, D.C. TransAfrica seems to be less active in SAWG than it was in 1979.

During the summer of 1988 the writer had the opportunity of attending one of SAWG's meetings (June 7, 1988). The meeting was chaired by Damu Smith, head of WOA and formerly of AFSC. Smith, who attended the ANC's 1987 Arusha Conference, was accompanied at the SAWG meeting by Janet Craswell also of WOA. The meeting was attended by a variety of people, mostly from labour and religious organisations. Also in attendance was a representative of SWAPO, as well as a staff member of Ron Dellums office. The Dellums presence was not unimportant, in that since they were to discuss HR 1580, a bill sponsored by Dellums', it made sense for one of his staff members to be present. Members of Dellums' office also make sense when one considers a comment made by Pamela Creevey, Director of the Congressional Staff Program at the African American Institute (AAI). She claimed that Bob Brauer, Special Counsel to Dellums, was the force behind SAWG and the Congressional lobbying efforts.[54] This is further supported by SAWG meeting agenda for March 1, 1988 which indicates "Congressman Dellums' office has scheduled a second national strategy meeting on H.R. 1580/S.556 for March 8 [sic]".[55] This clearly indicates that the strategy for action on HR 1580 comes from Dellums' office, and along with Creevey's comment one can infer that it comes from Brauer.

---

[51] Eide interview, May 5, 1988, Washington, D.C.

[52] Eide interview, May 5, 1988, Washington, D.C.

[53] *op. cit., Information Digest*, February 13, 1981, p. 32.

[54] Creevey interview, July, 1988, Washington, D.C.

[55] From SAWG meeting agenda, for March 1, 1988.

Dellums' position takes on further importance when one considers that Dellums first expressed his "...outrage at apartheid..." in 1972.[56] At that time it had little impact, his calls for sanctions against apartheid and South Africa received little popular attention or support. It was Dellums intention to utilize the CBC and progressive members of Congress to change US policy toward South Africa.[57] Hazel Ross Robinson, former employee of TransAfrica, wife of Randall Robinson, and Foreign Policy National Defence advisor for Rep. William Gray (D-PA) indicated that as time passed the Dellums approach became more acceptable. [58] She indicated that it was the objective of the anti-apartheid movement to move towards the Dellums bill. Towards that end strategy sessions were held which were attended by Stephen Solarz and Rep. H. Wolpe, both members of the House and the former having served as Chair of the Subcommittee on Africa and the latter being the current Chair. Also in attendance were CBC members Crockett, Gray and Dellums, as well as members of the anti-apartheid movement, including Randall Robinson.[59]

Artists and Athletes Against Apartheid (AAAA)

Artists and Athletes Against Apartheid (AAAA), was founded in September, 1983, primarily through the actions of TransAfrica and TransAfrica board member Harry Belafonte and TransAfrica Forum board member Arthur Ashe. The founding of AAAA serves as a landmark event in the building of TransAfrica's lobbying power, and its ability to act as an agitational force. The objective of AAAA, as articulated by founder Arthur Ashe is to demonstrate that "...there are many people who would have the opportunity to perform in South Africa but chose not to do so on moral grounds...."[60] AAAA provides the anti-apartheid movement with high visibility artists and athletes, all of whom attract the attention of the media. Thus, they can more easily advertise their unwillingness to perform in South Africa, and thus, their boycott serves a greater agitational purpose.

---

[56] Brauer interview, May 6, 1988, Washington, D.C.

[57] Brauer interview, May 6, 1988, Washington, D.C.

[58] Hazel Ross Robinson interview, June 21, 1988, Washington, D.C.

[59] HR Robinson interview, June 21, 1988, Washington, D.C.

[60] Verdon, Lexie, "Boycotting S. Africa", *Washington Post*, September 13, 1983, p.B9.

In 1983, however, there was little popular interest in South Africa, and that situation did not change until after the Embassy protests began. Therefore, the AAAA actions were significant in that they provided at least one story for the media of US opposition to apartheid. AAAA members utilized their popular appeal and "...recorded public service radio messages and appeared at press conferences...."[61] Thus, they increased the public awareness of the apartheid issue, or at least they *attempted* to increase public awareness. AAAA did not come of age until the Embassy protests got underway. Then, AAAA members proved themselves crucial to the Embassy protest success, they were able to attract the attention of the media as others could not. What is clear is that by examining the headlines of the newspapers that the 'personalities' played a vital role in attracting that media attention. Such headlines as "Arthur Ashe Jailed in Apartheid Protest",[62] "Clergy, Boxer Protest at Embassy"[63], "Belafonte is Arrested at S. African Embassy"[64], and "Stevie Wonder Arrested in Apartheid Protest"[65] all added to the power of the demonstrations. As Robinson acknowledged in an interview with this writer that these artists and athletes proved vital to the success of the protests.[66]

TransAfrica's role in the creation of the AAAA was central. "TransAfrica provides staff support as well as policy guidance and strategic initiatives for the organization."[67] At various times AAAA has used TransAfrica's mailing address as its own in addition to the above mentioned coordination. Also available to AAAA is TransAfrica's information network among TransAfrica's members. For example, TransAfrica advertised the "South Africa Freedom Classic" tennis match, which was run by AAAA and TransAfrica. In this instance, TransAfrica advertised the sales of tickets and described the tennis match as a "watershed in US sports history".[68]

---

[61] Maren, Michael, "Building a Constituency Against Apartheid", *Africa Report*, May-June, 1984, p.59.

[62] Barker, K., "Arthur Ashe Jailed in Apartheid Protest", *Washington Post*, January 12, 1985.

[63] Anderson, John Ward, "Clergy, Boxer Protest at Embassy", *Washington Post*, December 14, 1984.

[64] Barker, K., "Belafonte is Arrested at S. African Embassy", *Washington Post*, February 1, 1985.

[65] Barker, K., "Stevie Wonder Arrested in Apartheid Protest", *Washington Post, February 15, 1985.*

[66] *Robinson, Randall, interview, TransAfrica, July, 1988, Washington, D.C.*

[67] *op. cit., TransAfrica: The Black World's Bridge to US Foreign Policy Legislators*, p. 1.

[68] *TransAfrica News*, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C., Fall, 1984, p. 6. It was a watershed event because it marked the coming together of tennis players raising money for anti-apartheid.

There can be little doubt that the AAAA has been important in TransAfrica's efforts against apartheid. Clearly, AAAA supplied much of the needed 'draw' for the Embassy protests - without the celebrities the protests would probably have failed to attract sufficient media attention. Yet, the AAAA gives two veterans of the anti-apartheid struggle a place to use their talents. Arthur Ashe, for example, had been involved in an effort to persuade the United States Olympic Committee to " 'use its influence' to continue the ban against South Africa's participation in the 1968 Olympic Games...."[69] Ashe had also been involved in a controversy of some size when he performed in South Africa in 1974. "Ashe felt he could bridge this problem by making contacts with black South Africans during this tour."[70] Belafonte had been involved in various political endeavours for some time, but has been helpful in opposition to apartheid especially. In 1966 he provided bail money for members of the SNCC who had held a sit-in at the South African consulate in New York City. [71] The parallel between the 1966 sit-in and the 1984 sit-in is striking, particularly when one considers the presence of Belafonte around both events.

TransAfrica and the ANC

Perhaps not surprisingly the relationship between TransAfrica and the ANC is of great importance in the study of TransAfrica. This is so because TransAfrica is not involved in only domestic US politics, but is deeply involved in the efforts of the ANC to achieve victory in South Africa. This connection may not be obvious, therefore, in this section the role of TransAfrica plays in the ANC's fight will be examined.

TransAfrica's role in assisting the ANC can be best understood if the question is asked - what can TransAfrica do for the ANC that the ANC cannot do for itself? In chapter three the Four Pillars of the ANC's struggle against apartheid were described, they are: 1) developing the underground structures of the ANC, 2) "...united mass political action of the people...", 3) pursuing the "...armed offensive spearheaded by Umkhonto we Sizwe..." and 4) "...the international

[69] Koppett, Leonard, "Robinson Urges So. African Ban", *New York Times*, February 9, 1968, p. 58.

[70] Shepherd, George, *Anti-Apartheid: Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of South Africa*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1977, pp. 149-150.

[71] "South African Aide Arrests 5 in Sit-In at Consulate Here", *New York Times*, March 22, 1966, p. 37.

campaign to isolate the apartheid regime while winning world-wide moral, political and material support for the struggle."[72] TransAfrica is involved in the ANC's Fourth Pillar, both in isolating apartheid, as well as attempting to improve moral, political and material support. The evidence for this is varied and is well beyond the obvious statement that any action that hinders South Africa supports the ANC.

TransAfrica's own involvement in the Fourth Pillar comes through their urging both the Executive and Congress to impose sanctions on South Africa. Robinson said in 1980:

> TransAfrica urges the Congress immediately to pass a sense of the Congress resolution urging the President to submit to the United Nations Security Council a resolution mandating comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa pursuant to chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.[73]

Robinson has argued for sanctions for some time, and he has based his support for sanctions on a variety of things. In 1985 he argued:

> We can no longer justify to ourselves the double standard under which we impose severe sanctions on other governments around the world, while treating South Africa with infinite patience at the expense of its 22 million black majority.[74]

He has also called for sanctions against South Africa arguing that "...the Pretoria government will never negotiate with blacks toward a democratic outcome absent strong western economic pressure." [75] This statement is significantly different from an earlier one made in 1980 before the House Subcommittee on Africa, when Robinson said "Nobody expects it [sanctions] now to completely cripple that economy. It is just one part of two, the other being the guerrilla struggle."[76] Here Robinson is implicitly recognizing that TransAfrica's effort in supporting sanctions against South Africa can only pay off when joined with the armed struggle.

That there is at least a tacit alliance between the ANC and black American political

---

[72] Tambo, Oliver, "Render South Africa Ungovernable", *Sechaba*, March, 1985, p.9.

[73] From testimony of R. Robinson before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade on Africa and International Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Congress, second session, *US Policy Toward South Africa*, 1980, p. 711.

[74] *The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985, Hearings and Markup*, before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade on Africa, 99th Congress, p. 217.

[75] Robinson, Randall, "Black and White Sanctions", *Washington Post*, October 4, 1985, p. C5.

[76] *op. cit., US Policy Toward South Africa*, p. 735.

organisations can be of little doubt. American anti-apartheid support for the ANC, as well as TransAfrica's and Robinson's is not surprising. Nor, perhaps, is its support for the armed struggle, led by the ANC against the South African regime. Furthermore, the ANC's support for and reliance upon black American political structures is clearly reflected in the statements of David Ndaba, administrative secretary for the ANC's Observer Mission to the UN. He said:

> We will appeal to the Black people of this country to take their place as the leading force of the anti-apartheid movement in this country.
>
> ....
>
> We are confident that sooner than later the Black Americans will become the *vital* force in all anti-apartheid activities in this country.
>
> ...it won't be until the Afro-Americans have taken the struggles...to the same level as Americans did in opposing the war in Vietnam that we will finally achieve our freedom.
>
> ...but the international community and Afro-Americans here can really play a complementary role. What we are saying is that this complementary role is indispensable. We can no longer do without your support, and the time for that support is now.[77]

Ndaba's comments clearly indicate that the black community was to provide an important component to the ANC struggle. This is a useful illustration of the intermestic nature of the dispute. US race relations are in part influenced by and in part influence events outside the US. Ndaba's comments also highlight a growing sense of interdependence between the ANC and some black Americans - both see the other as symbols of each others progress. It is no wonder that the Black Lobby for Africa and the Caribbean should take part in this effort to oppose the South African government.

It should be clear that the ANC does rely upon TransAfrica for political, financial and material support. It also seems that the racial divisions in the US are being used to serve the purposes of the ANC, though the relationship between the ANC and some black Americans is based upon far more than any oversimplified notion of manipulation. Evidence that the ANC and TransAfrica (as well as other black leaders) work together to coordinate opposition to apartheid

---

[77] Sales, William, "Making South Africa Ungovernable ANC Strategy for the 80's", *Black Scholar*, November-December, 1984, p. 14, emphasis original.

also exists. That evidence will be laid out in a chapter five. What can be concluded in general, however, is that TransAfrica works to some extent to sponsor and assist the activities of the ANC in the US and South Africa. Thus, with groups like TransAfrica supporting the ANC it is reasonable to argue that the international component of the ANC's Four Pillars is strong, though not so strong as to have universal sanctions against South Africa. What had been left behind, still in need of work, was the domestic organisation of the ANC in South Africa.[78]

TransAfrica and the Press Leak

Randall Robinson clashed with the Reagan Administration in mid-1981. In May of 1981 Robinson leaked to the press a set of documents that covered discussions between Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker and South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha and Defence Minister Magnus Malan. These discussions, which had taken place in mid-April, 1981,[79] contained the impression that there was underway a rapprochement between Washington and Pretoria. For example, Crocker was said to have indicated that the current Administration would have more 'backbone' than the previous one.[80] For anti-apartheid activists there was one line which was perhaps the most offensive: "USG (United States Government) believes it would be possible to improve US/South African relations if Namibia were no longer an issue."[81] The idea that a rapprochement could exist after resolution of the Namibia issue would surely come as a surprise for those who oppose apartheid and what they see to be all its manifestations, of which Namibia is only one.

One possible explanation as to how Robinson got a hold of these documents is that he received them from conservative Republican Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC). [82] It is argued that Helms wanted to hinder the more liberal Crocker's Senate confirmation, so in order to discredit

---

[78] Motlhabi, Mokgethi, *Challenge to Apartheid*, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1988, p. 115.

[79] The documents were leaked on May 31, 1981, see Danaher, Kevin, *In Whose Interest?*, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., 1985, p. 154.

[80] *Namibia: The Crisis in United States Policy Toward Southern Africa*, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C., 1983, p. 43 - the leaked documents are reprinted by TransAfrica therein.

[81] *ibid.*, p. 44.

[82] Barber, Simon, "Shadows on the Wall", *Optima*, Volume 35, Number 2, June, 1987, p.72.

Crocker, he released the documents to Robinson.

> The documents, believed to have been telexed direct to Helms' office by senior members of South African intelligence, were calculated to confirm the left in its wishful preconception that the administration intended a virtual alliance with apartheid.[83]

What Robinson's intentions were, and how he got the documents seemed to be of little importance to the then Secretary of State, Alexander Haig. Haig sent Richard Hatcher, Chairman of the Board of TransAfrica, a letter stating that he "...would not meet with a black delegation that included Robinson."[84] Clearly, Robinson gained the ire of the Secretary of State and Robinson never met with the Reagan Administration. Having taken the documents before the American public, they were brought back out during a conference in Washington. There SWAPO spokesmen used them to denounce the Reagan Administration.[85] The leaked documents continued to prove useful when Robinson took them to the OAU conference in Nairobi. On the 27th of June, 1981, the OAU issued a condemnation of the Reagan Administration, accusing the US of "collusion with the South African racists...."[86]

> The disclosures fuelled a suspicion of secret conspiracy between US and SA [South Africa], and Randall Robinson's distribution of the memoranda in the corridors of the OAU Summit exacerbated the African reaction. ...the OAU, abandoning all sense of restraint, accused the US of 'sinister' motives to pervert Namibian independence....[87]

Those who wished to prosecute an anti-Reagan campaign were provided with useful ammunition by Robinson and TransAfrica, the opponents of Washington and Pretoria could now proclaim the 'unholy alliance' between the two states. The leaked documents proved to be a propaganda victory for TransAfrica, the left and the opponents of 'constructive engagement'.

TransAfrica also used the leaked documents to its own advantage when in 1983 it published a report entitled *Namibia: The Crisis in United States Policy Toward Southern Africa*. The report was co-sponsored by 23 other groups [88] and contained a variety of recommendations on Namibian

---

[83] *ibid.*, p. 72.

[84] Trescott, Jacquiline, "TransAfrica's Debate", *Washington Post*, June 7, 1982.

[85] *op. cit.*, Brownfield, p.12.

[86] *op. cit.*, Danaher, p. 155.

[87] Albright, David, "The USSR and Africa in 1982: Quest for Global Power Status," *Africa Contemporary Record*, ed. Colin Legum, Volume XV, Africana Publishing Company, New York, p. A157.

[88] The Co-sponsors of the report were Africa Committee, NCC; African Heritage Studies Association; American Com-

independence. The recommendations were:

> -implementation of UN resolution 435
> -passage in the US Congress of legislation seeking to implement UN resolution 435 and urging a "...firmer position with South Africa"
> -increased closeness between the State Department and other members of the Western Contact Group in seeking a "...more aggressive negotiating strategy with the South Africans...."[89]

Should the proposed talks with South Africa prove unproductive, TransAfrica recommended an end to "...bilateral relations with South Africa...." [90] This would include ending the training of the South African Coast Guard in the US, lowering the number or abolishing all South African honorary consulates and defence attache's in the US, "reimposition of export controls" and "...refusal to receive South African dignitaries...."[91]

Associated with the call for support for UN resolution 435 TransAfrica said, "The United States should remove the issue of the Cuban presence in Angola from the negotiations on Namibian independence."[92] The authors go on to say that the US has given "...aid and comfort to South Africa's intransigence...and that the US has facilitated the imposition of apartheid on Namibia."[93] TransAfrica offers its interpretation of what Cuban troops will do, once Namibia is resolved - "...there is every reason to believe that the Angolans will themselves initiate the withdrawal of Cuban troops when Namibia is independent and when the South African threat to Luanda is removed."[94] This may not be quite what the Cuban and Angolans meant at the time. In the same report TransAfrica has reprinted the *Joint Statement of the Ministers of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba on the 21st Anniversary of the Heroic 4th of*

---

mittee on Africa; Americans for Democratic Action; American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Black American Political Association of California; Coalition of Black Trade Unionists; Congressional Black Caucus; Congress of National Black Churches; Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Inc.; International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers; International United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW; Lutheran World Ministers; National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; National Bar Association; National Black Caucus of Local Elected Officials; National Council of Negro Women; National Urban League; Phelps-Stokes Fund; Southern Africa Support Project; Southern Christian Leadership Conference; TransAfrica; United Church of Christs, Commission for Racial Justice; and Washington Office on Africa.

[89] *op. cit., Namibia: The Crisis in United States Policy Toward Southern Africa*, p. v.

[90] *ibid.*, p. vi.

[91] *ibid.*, p. vi.

[92] *ibid.*, p.v.

[93] *ibid.*, p. v.

[94] *ibid.*, p. 30.

February Marking the Launching of the Armed Struggle that in 1975 Brought Independence to Angola, issued on February 4, 1982 in Luanda, Angola. In this joint statement, the authors make clear that both Angola and Cuba reject any linkage between the UN resolution 435 and the presence of Cuban troops. Cuban troops would withdraw when "...each and every eventuality of acts of aggression or armed invasion cease to exist."[95] This read somewhat differently than TransAfrica's interpretation that there is "every reason to believe" the Cubans will pull out. It has since become clear that it would take five years for agreement to be reached on this issue. Cuban troops are leaving Angola only now and there is some evidence that suggests only after the intercession of Gorbachev (following the Reagan-Gorbachev summit). That TransAfrica supported the Cuban/Angolan position, and made it somewhat more palatable in its report would surely have been appreciated by both Angola and Cuba. Whether or not TransAfrica actually had the same understanding on the issue of Cuban withdrawal is not clear, and may not be important.

TransAfrica did not let the issue of Cuban troops in Angola go at the publication of the Namibia report. It continued to pursue it for some time. In September, 1984, TransAfrica, through the African Writer Series, published a statement by Paulino Pinto Joao, who at the time was Information Director for the MPLA Workers Party. He said of the Cuban linkage issue,

> A...pernicious American complication of the region's problem is the Reagan administration's [sic] linkage of Cuban troops in Angola to Namibia's independence. The linkage constitutes attempted introduction of a new and unrelated element in the international framework for resolving the Namibian issues - UN Resolution 435.[96]

Pinto Joao put it most simply when he wrote "The U.S. must abandon its linkage policy."[97]

It seems that TransAfrica has concurred with both the Cuban and Angolan positions on Cuban troop presence.[98] Not only has it supported that position, but it has sought to propagate that position domestically in the US as well. Evidence of that comes both in their issuing the Namibia report, as well as publishing the writings of an Angolan official. Finally, the documents that

---

[95] *ibid.*, p. 43.

[96] *TransAfrica, African Writer Series*, September 1984, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C., p. 1.

[97] *ibid.*, p. 1.

[98] Also their opposition to linkage generally agreed with the positions taken by members of the Western Contact Group, excluding of course the US.

TransAfrica leaked to the press in May, 1981, had been used by SWAPO to denounce the US position, by the ANC to do much the same, and by the OAU. Then, TransAfrica was able to use the document as part of its report to denounce, yet again, US positions regarding Namibia and Angola. In the process of denouncing US positions, TransAfrica took up the positions of Cuba and Angola. Thus, TransAfrica has been able to use the leaked State Department material in supporting Angolan and Cuban positions on the presence of Cubans in Angola, as well as opposing US positions on Namibian independence. The usage of this material not only assisted TransAfrica at home, but equally had sufficient potential to influence US activities so as to be deemed useful to the Cuban and Angolan government. The press leak also illustrated the interaction between domestic and foreign policy, and showed it to be truly *intermestic*.

The press leak is only one example of TransAfrica in operation, but it begins to illustrate how it operates and where its interests lie. A better example of TransAfrica in action comes from the period of the Embassy protests and the associated actions. The Embassy protests marked the zenith of TransAfrica's power as an actor in the international market place. This rise in power, however, did not come about unplanned or haphazardly. It was a combination of luck and good planning on the part of TransAfrica and its allies that led to the series of successes in 1984-86.

TransAfrica, Anti-Apartheid, and International Solidarity

Understanding the goals of the anti-apartheid movement, as represented by FSAM (Free South Africa Movement, see below), TransAfrica and the Southern Africa Support Project (SASP), has been greatly enhanced by the publication of "Notes on Building International Solidarity in the United States", by Cecelie Counts, Sylvia Hill and Sandra Hill.[99] This article presents "...an attempt to analyze the experiences in solidarity work of the Southern Africa Support Project (SASP)."[100] In its own right, any report on SASP is important because of its role in FSAM and in organising the Embassy protests. This article, however, is far more important than that, in

[99] The article appears in *Black Scholar*, November-December, 1984, pp.44-52.

[100] Counts, Cecelie, Sylvia Hill and Sandra Hill, "Notes on Building International Solidarity in the United States", *Black Scholar*, November-December, 1984, p. 44. Attempts to build international solidarity are not new, indeed, this is one of the features of an interdependent world. For an example of another attempt at building international solidarity see Burbach, Roger, and Orland Nunez, *Fire in the Americas: Forging a Revolutionary Agenda*, Verso, London, 1987.

as much as Cecelie Counts is and was a staff member of TransAfrica and played a central role in organising and running the Embassy protests.[101] Sylvia Hill sits on the steering committee of FSAM and is deeply involved in the day to day operation of the protests. Therefore, this article presents insights into the thinking of the people planning, coordinating and running the protests. It is likely that while the article claims to address the work of SASP it is still more useful because it tells us much about the objectives and intentions of those who run the TransAfrica as well as the intention of its actions. It is interesting to note that the publication of the article occurs at the very beginning of the Embassy protests. Thus, it is argued, that this article serves as a programmatic piece for the anti-apartheid movement. It is worth examining this article at some length to understand its implications.

The objective of the authors is clearly stated in the opening paragraph. They state:

> As United States foreign policy increasingly assumes a posture of gunboat diplomacy and state-sponsored terrorism, U.S. public opinion becomes very important as a potentially decisive factor to influence foreign policy actions. Building momentum through visible public action, however, has been difficult whether this action has been to oppose foreign policy in southern Africa, the Caribbean or Central America.[102]

The authors seek to understand why there has been little movement against foreign policy issues, and further, they wonder what to do about it. What seems to have motivated this need to examine the problem in the US was the military intervention into Grenada, and the ensuing "...lack of massive public outcry by the black community against the U.S. invasion...."[103] The authors go on to say that there is a gap in the general understanding of how one builds international solidarity, therefore they seek to "...scientifically examine the problematic of U.S. solidarity work."[104]

They offer up a definition of solidarity work as:

> (1) the existence of a set of ideas, themes, objectives and slogans which are a framework for the thinking of groups throughout a historical time frame; (2) organizational forms which usually are alternatives to the State apparatus or other institutional forms sponsored by liberal elements of the society; (3) the explicit or

---

[101] Akuetteh pointed out that Ms. Counts was indeed responsible for planning and organising the protests. Akuetteh interview, June 1, 1988, Washington, D.C.

[102] *op. cit.*, Counts, Hill and Hill, p.44.

[103] *ibid.*, p. 44.

[104] *ibid.*, p. 44.

> implicit purpose, expressed in content, if not always its form, of challenging or changing the social relations between the struggling people of the world and African-Americans, as they exist given the power of U.S. imperialism.[105]

What should be clear from the above is that the intention of solidarity work is to create a set of ideas, within an organisational context, and link up the fate of black Americans to the fate of others in the world. What is also clear is that the fate of these groups is in large part dictated by what the authors call "U.S. imperialism", there can be little doubt that the enemy in this case is US imperialism, which goes undefined by the authors. They go on to list several cases of linkage between national liberation groups and "African-Americans", but one case stands out as most important to the authors, and this is the linkage between the Council on African Affairs, led by Paul Robeson and W.E.B. DuBois and black miners in South Africa. The authors claim that the Council was able to mobilize 10,000 people to protest "...the atrocities of apartheid."[106] The authors later contradict themselves when they claim that the Council organised 8,000 people to support the black South Africa miners, this being done in the late 1930's.[107] Not only is there the obvious numerical contradiction, but there is also some dispute as to when Robeson joined the CAA, though he was acting as the Chairman in 1941.[108] Furthermore, it would be have been difficult to protest against the atrocities of apartheid in the late 1930's given the fact that apartheid as such did not exist at that time.[109] This issue of linkage and its manifestation will become important later.

As first order of priority, the authors discuss the problems of combating "...negative perceptions of progressive countries and liberation movements that are perpetuated through media disinformation and misinformation."[110] Clearly, one cannot conduct solidarity work with groups or countries that are labelled at home as being 'terrorists' or the like. The vehicle that

---

[105] *ibid.*, p. 45.

[106] *ibid.*, p. 45.

[107] *ibid.*, p. 51.

[108] *op. cit.*, Shepherd, p. 61. Also see Duberman, Martin Bauml, *Paul Robeson*, Bodley Head, London, 1989.

[109] Of course, one can argue that the forms of apartheid were surely present prior to 1948, but the obvious confusion of the authors is worthy of note. The linkage between black Americans and black South Africans in the above case seems rather small, and perhaps illustrates more of an attempt at linkage than any real linkage.

[110] *op. cit.*, Counts, Hill and Hill, p. 46.

communicates these perceptions is the media, and it is also through the media that negative images can be countered. The authors suggest that "functional illiteracy" dictates the use of "multicolor visual art" to counter negative media images.[111] Functional illiteracy is defined as "...the tendency to choose means other than reading to obtain information...."[112] It is due to this functional illiteracy, and the lack of "resources to produce and distribute multicolor visual art" that "progressive organizations...[fail] to raise black community consciousness...."[113] In other words, there is too little money in the coffers of such groups to pay the necessary costs of gaining access to various media outlets. The obvious answer to such a problem, as the lack of money, is to find ways of gaining access to the non-reading forms of media that do not entail payment, or in other words getting the message on the evening news. Robinson comments further, early in 1984, on the problems involved in stopping with just getting the message out. He said:

> Press coverage is only one step,.... In order to change society we have to reach critical mass. That means moving people from feeling to applied feeling - a letter, a phone call, a visit, a concern expressed, an outrage articulated to a state legislator or a congressman. That's difficult to organize. Very little of it is self-directed. The prod has to come from somewhere and that's what we're paid to do.[114]

The writers focus on how to get into the press, while Robinson points out that the problem is not just attention, but it is getting people to act. Thus, he highlights the objective of propaganda, namely getting people to engage in action on behalf of the articulated aggregation.

Within the black American community there has been built up over the years a reasonably strong organisational capability in the churches. Any group seeking to build up international solidarity would clearly like to have access to such an asset. The problem is in obtaining access to the churches is clearly illustrated by the authors:

> For the vast numbers of church-going people within the black community, the labels of Soviet-backed, communist, and Marxist-Leninist generate images of people who are against religion. This view is perpetrated through systematic campaigns which have accelerated due to the increasingly strong links between fundamentalist religions and right-wing political groups.[115]

---

111 *ibid.*, p. 46.

112 *ibid.*, p. 46.

113 *ibid.*, p. 46.

114 Maren, Michael, "Building a Constituency Against Apartheid", *Africa Report*, May-June 1984, p. 59.

115 *op cit.*, Counts, Hill and Hill, p. 48.

The problem of gaining access to churches is that those who seek church favour support groups or states which are labelled "Soviet-backed, communist and Marxist-Leninist". Therefore, the job of the solidarity groups is to try and counter those labels. The authors suggest that instead of using the tactic of avoiding the use of ideological terminology, that the groups use the "...opportunity to inform the public."[116] Thus, discussing international support may take on characteristics not unlike political agitation.

The authors rightly distinguish between words and actions. They point out that a solidarity movement is of little value if people do not feel attached to the issues at hand. "One of the main problems with building a solidarity movement is that the issues of foreign policy, militarism, monopoly capitalism and imperialism are not rooted in the social reality of the people."[117] The problem may be put in a slightly different way, the issues surrounding foreign policy, military action, capitalism and imperialism are not obvious to many on a day to day basis, or in Cobb and Elder's scheme they may lack relevance, but the movement must attempt to make these issues a daily concern. Therefore, they are fighting the problem of these issues being out of sight out of mind, therefore, thus issue saliency is vital to the expansion of the solidarity movement. They cite a case of successful linkage when Louisiana dockworkers refused to unload cargo from ships carrying Rhodesian chrome. [118] Thus, actions were able to taken that were within their social reality, the actions were within their sight. Therefore, in the issue of South Africa, the question becomes how does one go about building actions that people can undertake in order to show their solidarity with overseas groups or states. What was discovered by the authors is not too surprising. They found that when they "...were able to show concrete relationships between oppression here and in South Africa, the greater visible support...[they]...were able to mobilize."[119]

Ultimately all these actions, the building of solidarity, must be aimed at someone. So, who

---

[116] *ibid.*, p. 48.
[117] *ibid.*, p. 49.
[118] *ibid.*, p. 49.
[119] *ibid.*, p. 50.

is the audience? The first target is the general public, or in the language of the article, the objective is to "...raise mass public consciousness."[120] The other audience, or in their rubric the other sector, consists of "...youth, labor and the church."[121] They go on to say:

> When support of a national liberation movement is a primary objective, the question of who you are organizing can be answered by a simple, "everyone". While some strata have a greater potential to make certain kinds of responses than others, the problem for the organizer is to discern how to absorb different ranges of energies and commitments in concerted action.[122]

To put this another way, the objective is to organise everyone, but the authors also understand that specific groups bring with them the resources of their institution, and that the problem for the organiser is trying to figure out how to use a given sector in a way that is most productive. It is also pointed out a 'strategic' motivation for organising "everyone": "...everyone you are not organizing to be on your side, the opposition is organizing to be on their side."[123] Forming alliances with people you do not like is justified in as much as it is a defensive strategy, it prevents the opposition from increasing its size.

In closing their article they offer the whole justification for the piece. Their article is motivated by "political urgency", in that they call for a "redoubling" of efforts in order to "...build an effective movement in solidarity with the peoples of southern Africa."[124] This is so because of "The heightened level of struggle against the apartheid regime demands that we build a national movement capable of challenging US policy...."[125]

It seems safe to say that this article represented a unique and important insight into how the anti-apartheid campaign has been organised and what its objectives have been. This is supported not only because of the central role played by the authors in the movement itself, but also because of the ways in which the movement has reflected the article. What is also clear is that the movement is not intended to be solely one of opposition to apartheid. Indeed, it seems that the

---

[120] *ibid.*, p. 51.

[121] *ibid.*, p. 51.

[122] *ibid.*, p. 51.

[123] *ibid.*, p. 51. Robinson highlighted the problem in a slightly different way when he argued that they "...must make sure that the movement is broadened beyond the believers talking to the believers." See *op. cit.*, Maren, p. 59.

[124] *op. cit., Counts, Hill, and Hill, p.52.*

[125] *ibid.*, p. 52.

opposition to apartheid has as much to do with changing the political conditions for black Americans as it does with altering the conditions in South Africa. In sum, it seems that the objective of the anti-apartheid movement was to help in creating revolutionary conditions in South Africa, and through that process create a new environment in the US, one more open to the demands of black Americans. This creation of revolutionary conditions and the role black Americans play in that process is clearly spelled out by David Ndaba in an earlier section. By linking the future of black Americans to other revolutionary movements, it is clear that one is to pull the other along, so that as black America advances so does the ANC, or visa versa. Thus, the linkage creates a situation where an advance for one is an advance for both. Other objectives, such as opposing the Reagan Administration are clearly present. This process of linkage creates a situation whereby black America is seen to be aligning itself with a regime that is seen as illegitimate by the Federal government. This places black America in a difficult position, but one not unexpected by the demands of an intermestic situation.

The Embassy Protests and the Free South Africa Movement

The autumn of 1984 brought an upsurge in violence in South Africa, as well as an explosion of interest in the US on the subject of apartheid. The events that led to the explosion are many and varied, a few of the more important were the creation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983, the passage of a new South African constitution, the explosion of violence in South Africa in September, 1984, the signing of the Lusaka and Nkomati Accords, and the ANC declaration to make South Africa ungovernable, and finally the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Desmond Tutu. All these events served to make South Africa newsworthy, and reflected a growing tension inside the Republic. Yet, South Africa had not proved to be an issue of any great importance during the 1984 Presidential election, for example Jesse Jackson said he had been unable to achieve any greater attention for South Africa and its problems.[126] The Reagan election victory also signalled,

[126] Clough, Michael and Donald Jordan, "The United States and Africa 1984: How Constructive is 'Constructive Engagement'?, *Africa Contemporary Record*, ed. Colin Legum, Volume XVII, Africana Publishing Company, New York, p. A220. The Jackson campaign probably did sensitize many to black concerns, but the campaign failed to make apartheid an issue for the Presidential season. For more on the Jackson campaign see Reed, Jr., Adolph, *The Jesse Jackson Phenomenon*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1986. Also useful on the Jackson campaign is Marable, Manning, *Black American Politics: From the Washington Marches to Jesse Jackson*, Verso, London, 1985.

in TransAfrica's opinion, a further shift in support of South Africa.

> What concerns anti-apartheid activists even more is the strong signal that during a second term under the guise of closing America's trade deficit and of restructuring America's global security strategy, Reagan intends to increase the inducements given South Africa.[127]

Clearly, if the ANC was to further its goal of heightened international solidarity, if the perceived Reagan policy of supporting South Africa were to be opposed, and if Americans were to have an impact on apartheid, more would have to be done.

In late November 1984, and running throughout 1985, a series of protests took over the sidewalk in front of the South African Embassy in Washington, D.C. The protests began when Washington, D.C. Delegate Walter Fauntroy (D-DC), US Civil Rights Commission member Mary Berry and TransAfrica Executive Director Randall Robinson were arrested for unlawful entry at the South African Embassy. [128] The trio had met with Ambassador Fourie to discuss the arrest of 13 labour leaders by the South African government. Also at the original sit-in was Eleanor Holmes Norton, former chair of the Equal Opportunities Commission and now Professor of Law at Georgetown University. Her role was to leave the sit-in and present the protesters case to the media.[129] "TransAfrica...scheduled a news conference for..." the 23rd of November, after Robinson, Fauntroy and Berry spent the evening in gaol.[130] At that press conference, held at the Rayburn House Office Building, the trio announced the formation of the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM). The FSAM would include "...labor, church and political groups...involved in 'direct action', including daily sit-ins and demonstrations, at the embassy and at South African consulates throughout the country."[131] The protests led to the arrest of over 3000 people, including 23 Congressmen.[132] During the same week as the first Embassy protest, and as an indication of the level of planning that may have gone into the protests, there was action planned against shipping coming into San Fransisco Bay from South Africa.[133] There had been a planned demonstration by

---

127 *Issue Brief*, October-November, 1984, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C., p. 3.

128 Smith, Phillip, "Fauntroy Released in Sit-In Case", *Washington Post*, November 23, 1984, p. B1

129 *ibid.*, p. B6.

130 *ibid.*, p. B6.

131 Milloy, Courtland, "Blacks Form 'Free S. Africa Movement'", *Washington Post*, November 24, 1984, p. C1.

132 "10 Years of Victories", *Washington Afro-American*, May 26, 1987.

133 This is not to say that there is proof of planning between the Longshoremen and TransAfrica. Yet, there is some cir-

250 supporters and members of the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union against the unloading of a ship carrying South African cargo.[134] The ship was eventually unloaded on December 3, 1984 by court order.[135] This action resulted in the founding of the Bay Area Free South Africa Movement, which affiliated with the Free South Africa Movement (see below), and signalled that the actions in Washington were not an isolated action against apartheid.[136]

In all the discussions undertaken, in order to write this chapter, regarding TransAfrica among Washington policy makers and others there was complete unanimity on the importance of the Embassy protests - they had been crucial for the passage of the Anti-Apartheid legislation in 1985 and the following Presidential Executive Order imposing weak sanctions against South Africa. Not only were the protests recognized in the US for their importance, South Africans also signalled their significance. Archbishop Desmond Tutu said, "Whatever you do to protest this evil system does not go without notice among those for whom it has been done,...."[137]

In order to understand the power of the FSAM it is necessary to understand their goals, and how they were organised to achieve those goals. Robinson stated the over-riding goal of the FSAM as being "...challenging Ronald Reagan's policy of constructive engagement, which only gives comfort to an oppressive regime as its policies worsen."[138] At the time of the protests, though, there were more specific goals of seeking the release of 13 South African trade union leaders from detention, securing release of political prisoners, and beginning negotiations between the South African government and representatives of the black community.[139] Not only were there the stated goals, but there was also the implicit goal, namely that any attention and opposition to

---

cumstantial evidence including 1) Akuetteh's point of TransAfrica's history of working with Longshoremen in monitoring sanctions, 2) the actions taken earlier to oppose the importation of Rhodesian goods had been mentioned in the article on International Solidarity, and 3) the timing of the action. All three build at least some circumstantial evidence that there was indeed coordination between the two groups.

134 "Challenge Constructive Engagement", *Work in Progress*, South African Research Service, Johannesburg, Number 36, April 1985, p. 7.

135 *ibid.*, p. 8.

136 *ibid.*, p. 9.

137 Barker, Karlyn and Chris Spolar, "Tutu Hails Embassy Protesters," *Washington Post*, December 3, 1984, p. B1.

138 *op. cit.*, Milloy, Nov. 24, 1984, p. C1.

139 *op. cit.*, Barker and Anderson, p. A13. TransAfrica described constructive engagement as "...a cynical effort to make South Africa America's policeman in the region, charged with making that region safe for the U.S., the West, and capitalism." See *op. cit.*, *Issue Brief*, October-November 1984, p. 3. In the same *Issue Brief*, TransAfrica pointed out that "Critics of constructive engagement thus make a very strong case that the implementation of the policy has resulted in a perception of strong American support of apartheid and consequent damage to American interests." *ibid.*, p. 4.

the Reagan policy was a plus for diaspora politics. As Robinson said earlier in 1984, "Even when we lose, we win...."[140] Even if none of the FSAM's specific goals were attained, they had already won one victory, they had opposed the Reagan Administration policy in a way that gained considerable public attention.[141] That was no small victory, rather it was an important one in opposing apartheid and constructive engagement.

In order to broaden their appeal as much as possible, the leaders of the FSAM were also careful to point out that the movement was not a "black movement", but one that appealed to others as well.[142] They "...issued an appeal to white trade unionists whose interest would also be hurt by 'slave labor pools' of South Africa."[143] While there may have been this appeal to multiracialism, it is still true that the steering committee was made up only of black Americans. So, while whites did participate in the protests, the movement was itself led by blacks. Akuetteh said of the FSAM that its goal was to force the US government and business to end their support for South Africa - clearly, the protests were part of that goal.[144] Thus, the FSAM has sought to create a broad based coalition of groups to work in opposition to the Reagan Administration on issues concerning South Africa. Groups that form the FSAM include ACOA, WOA, United Methodist Church office for the UN, AFSC, CALC, Episcopal Churchpeople for South Africa, IDAF, and Unity in Action (the Patrice Lumumba Coalition).[145] On the steering committee are Randall Robinson, Mary Berry, Walter Fauntroy, Sylvia Hill (of SASP), and Roger Wilkins (of the Institute for Policy Studies, or IPS).[146] The coalition of groups began to show itself on November 28, 1984, when William Simons, president of the Washington Teachers Union was arrested outside the Embassy.[147] That, combined with the arrest of Marc Stepp, vice president of

---

[140] Maren, Michael, "Building a Constituency Against Apartheid", *Africa Report*, May-June 1984, p. 59.

[141] The South African government later released the detained labour leaders.

[142] *op. cit.*, Milloy, November 24, 1984, p. C4.

[143] *ibid.*, p. C4.

[144] Akuetteh interview, June 1, 1988, Washington, D.C.

[145] *op. cit.*, *Information Digest*, December 28, 1984, p. 390.

[146] At the founding of the FSAM its steering committee members were Randall Robinson (co-chair), Walter Fauntroy (co-chair), Mary Francis Berry, Rev. Joseph Lowery (Southern Christian Leadership Council), William Lucy (CBTU), Benjamin Hooks (NAACP), Bishop John Adams (Chairman of the Congress of Black Churches), Eleanor Holmes Norton, Sylvia Hill and Jesse Jackson. See *ibid.*, pp. 389-390.

[147] Marriott, Michel and Saundra Saperstein, "Protest Grows at Embassy," *Washington Post*, November, 28, 1984, p. A1.

the United Auto Workers, demonstrated that unions would support the FSAM. [148] Also within a week of the first protest there occurred sympathetic actions in Boston and Los Angeles, targeted against South African consulates.[149] Both Boston and Los Angeles are homes of TransAfrica chapters, and presumably had a role in organising the protests.

For the protests to have had an impact on the Reagan Administration, Congress and the American public they had to appeal to the media first - that is there had to be a story, complete with pictures for the T.V. This they were able to accomplish from the beginning when they had the press present at the original arrest (the third scheduled meeting, the other two having been delayed), and have continued to have the press present.[150] Since that first protest the FSAM had been able to keep up media attention. Robinson, leading the FSAM effort, "...made sure his staff alerted 30 media outlets to any celebrity arrests."[151] Celebrities arrested at the Embassy included "...Senator Lowell Weicker, 23 House members, Stevie Wonder, Harry Belafonte, Judy Collins, Amy Carter, Coretta Scott King, Jess Jackson, NOW President Eleanor Smeal, Tony Randall, Arthur Ashe, and DC mayor Marion Barry's wife, Effi."[152] This list of notables goes on, but this should be enough to indicate that a variety of 'newsworthy' people were arrested, enough to keep the story in the news. As was pointed out by Counts, Hill and Hill in their article on International Solidarity, one of the major problems the solidarity movement faces is finding outlets for their message. The protests, using 'stars', clearly served that purpose. As Ms. Counts herself put it, "It's a question of balancing schedules and not having all the big name people go at once...."[153] The objective was to spread the notables over a period of time, and therefore maintain media and public interest. Thus, the campaign is able to achieve non-reading medium access that it would not otherwise achieve. Roger Wilkins, member of the FSAM steering committee and IPS senior

---

[148] Barker, Karlyn and Michel Marriott, "1960's Tactics Revived for Embassy Sit-Ins," *Washington Post*, November 29, 1984, p.A1.

[149] *op. cit.*, Saperstein and Marriott, November 28, 1984, p. A12.

[150] Radcliffe, Donnie, "Ambassador Bernardus Fourie: Standing Firm at the Storm's Center," *Washington Post*, February 5, 1985, pp. B1 and B4.

[151] *op. cit.*, O'Donnell, p. 96.

[152] *ibid.*, p. 96.

[153] Barker, Karlyn and John Ward Anderson, "Kings Daughter Arrested at Embassy", *Washington Post*, November 30, 1984, p. A13.

fellow said of the protests:

> Once it (the FSAM) took off, there were protests around the country in 28 cities and they (the press) had to pay attention to this anti-apartheid stuff.... You began to ger [sic] articles in major magazines like Newsweek and People which gave the impression that the whole movement was spontaneous, that it sort of strang [sic] full-grown from the consciousness of white American when, in fact, black Americans created it, started it, kept it alive....[154]

As a clear indication of the success of the protests the Washington Post-ABC news poll was published in late January, 1985. The poll, published barely two months after the protests began, clearly demonstrates their impact. "Among people who are aware of the protests and who have formed an opinion one way or another, about 7 in every 10 say that they approve of the demonstrations."[155] Put another way, roughly 41 million supported the protests, 19 million disapproved and 110 had not heard of them, or had not opinion of them. [156] Clearly, while 41 million supporters is not a majority, it is a sizeable minority, one that would be hard to ignore. It is a clear indication that the objective of getting media attention had been neatly accomplished.

The protests gave rise to a whole set of activities, perhaps coordinated, that involved TransAfrica and the FSAM. Among the most important were the visit to South Africa by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), the introduction to the Congress of legislation calling for sanctions against South Africa, and a boycott against Shell Oil. In each of these actions TransAfrica and the FSAM were deeply involved.

First in the chronology was the visit to South Africa by Senator Kennedy. The idea for the trip originated during a luncheon, held on October 4, 1984, organised for Bishop Tutu of the Anglican Church and Reverand Boesak of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches. Both Tutu and Boesak were (and are) members of the now banned UDF. Boesak, in fact, is given credit for having originated the idea of the UDF and has played a central role in the UDF's operation.[157] At the lunch with Tutu and Boesak were Frank Ferrari, of the African-American Institute (AAI),

---

[154] *Issue Brief*, June-July, 1985, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C., p. 1.

[155] Sussman, Barry, "Apartheid Protests Supported by Most Who Know of Them," *Washington Post*, January 27, 1985, p. A23.

[156] *ibid.*, p. A23.

[157] *op. cit.*, Motlhabi, pp. 82-83.

Senator Kennedy and Kennedy's National Security Advisor Gregory Craig.[158] During lunch Kennedy was given and he accepted an invitation to visit South Africa.[159] Between having the acceptance of the invitation and going to South Africa the Embassy protests began and Desmond Tutu was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Thus, the Kennedy visit took place in the midst of greater world attention.

Kennedy arrived in Johannesburg on January 5, 1985, welcomed by a mixed reception of backers and detractors. Those who opposed Kennedy's visit were primarily of the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), who chanted "Kennedy Go Home".[160] Clearly, the objective of the visit was to "...give impetus to the struggle against apartheid by providing a vital link between anti-apartheid campaigns here [in South Africa] and in the United States."[161] Part of this linkage would be the denouncement of the US foreign policy in South Africa, specifically the Reagan Administration's policy of constructive engagement. Kennedy carefully stayed away from any direct criticisms of the policy, but gave vent to an alternative policy that obviated the policy of the Administration. The Senator indicated that "...Americans would not be satisfied with the repetition of generalities 'without real movement toward a new reality in South Africa'."[162] The US Ambassador to South Africa interpreted Kennedy as supporting divestment and followed Kennedy's statements with warnings about "economic naivete".[163] By the time Kennedy left South Africa he had managed to meet with Winnie Mandela, wife of the imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela, he also met with US officials and South African businessmen. The Senator also became embroiled in a public dispute with the Reagan Administration over policy in South Africa, he equally gave the South African government ammunition against his visit and supporters - the South African government could now claim that not all blacks supported Kennedy, one had only

---

[158] DuBoulay, Shirley, *Tutu: Voice of the Voiceless*, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1988, p. 217. Kennedy and Ferrari both attended the North American Regional Conference for Action Against Apartheid, held in New York City, June 18-21, 1984. See *Report on the North American Regional Conference for Action Against Apartheid*, UN General Assembly, August 29, 1984, UN Doc A/AC.115/L.614.

[159] *op. cit.*, DuBoulay, p. 217.

[160] Sparks, Allister, "S. Africans Jeer, Cheer Sen. Kennedy", *Washington Post*, January 6, 1985, p. A19.

[161] *ibid.*, p. A19.

[162] Healy, Robert, "US Rebuts Kennedy on Divestiture", *Washington Post*, January 9, 1985, p. A18.

[163] *ibid.*, p. A18.

to look at the AZAPO protests to see that.[164]

While the Kennedy visit may have failed to present a polished and united front to the world, it did, nonetheless, help keep the issue of apartheid in the forefront of a public debate. In the US the effect of the trip combined with the continuing Embassy protests made sure that the apartheid issue was kept in the news. Hardly surprising anyone, when Kennedy arrived back in the US he called for legislation to impose sanctions against South Africa and termed the Reagan Administration's policy of constructive engagement a failure.[165] When Kennedy made his pronouncements he did so with the leaders of the FSAM at his side, saying that the protests had "...brought this issue home."[166] Before the news conference Kennedy conferred with Fauntroy and Robinson on his trip and "...discussed upcoming legislation that would cut US trade and other ties with South Africa."[167] Kennedy went on to introduce, along with Senator Lowell Weicker (who was arrested at the Embassy) Senate Bill 635, which called for a ban on new investment, prohibited the buying of Krugerrands, ended new loans to the South African government, and ended sales of computer goods to the South African government.[168] While the Kennedy legislation failed to pass in the Senate similar legislation did pass the House, and ended up as a stronger version of the President's Executive Order (see chapter three).

It seems that while there is no concrete evidence, there is circumstantial evidence that would indicate that the South Africa trip by Kennedy and the subsequent introduction of sanctions legislation to the Congress was part of a larger coordinated effort between Kennedy and TransAfrica and the FSAM. The evidence consists of the fact that Ferrari, Kennedy, and Robinson all attended the North American Regional meeting in June of 1984, that in October, 1984 Kennedy and Ferrari met with Boesak and Tutu to discuss a possible trip to South Africa, and that the Embassy protests had been planned for some time before November 21. Whether or not any

---

164 *op. cit.*, Motlhabi, p.102.

165 Barker, K., "Kennedy Says S. Africa Policy a Failure, Calls for Sanctions", *Washington Post*, January 17, 1985, p. A20.

166 *ibid.*, p. A20.

167 *ibid.*, p. A20.

168 "Hill Pressure Leads to South African Sanctions", *1985 Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, ed. Mary W. Cohn, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C., 1986, p. 88.

members of the FSAM were in attendance at the luncheon is not known, but clearly roughly six weeks between the visit by Tutu and Boesak and the Embassy protest would have been ample time for the leaders of the FSAM to find out about the Kennedy trip. Furthermore, on January 2, 1985 Robinson indicated that the protests were going to grow in parallel with the Congressional action on sanctions.[169] Given the coordination of the protests to actions in the House and Senate, and Kennedy's news conference held in tandem with members of the FSAM it is entirely possible that the Kennedy trip was held in conjunction with the growing protests, having as a goal the passage of sanctions through the Congress.

The significance of the boycott against Shell Oil is at one time an event that pales in significance when compared to TransAfrica's (and the FSAM's) role in pushing US sanctions through the Congress, it is at another time one of the most important events in US anti-apartheid. In many respects the Shell boycott is not too important, it had little visible impact on the public. Should one, however, wish to consider the impact the Shell boycott had on coalition formation, then it is a watershed event.

The February-March, 1986 TransAfrica *Issue Brief* gives a hint of the importance of the labour/anti-apartheid coalition:

> Events over the last two years do create grounds for an optimistic contemplation of the role of American unions will play in South Africa in the coming months. Many national unions and diverse locals have adopted clearer and more realistic positions in South Africa. The AFL-CIO for one appears less leery of associating with non-labor, anti-apartheid forces. Affiliates of the AFL-CIO in major cities across the US have been vital to the sustenance of the Free South Africa Movement.[170]

What labour gave the anti-apartheid movement was a membership base, facilities, financial support, and perhaps most of all, labour gave the anti-apartheid movement power on Capitol Hill. It should should not be forgotten that labour would also bring with it heightened working class solidarity across national boundaries. Therefore, the Shell boycott is of some transnational, interdependent importance that should not be ignored.

---

[169] "Apartheid Foes Vow to Push for Sanctions", *Washington Post*, January 3, 1985, p. A24.

[170] *Issue Brief*, February-March, 1986, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C., p. 7.

The boycott of Shell Oil is a joint venture, led by the FSAM and the United Mine Workers (UMW). The genesis of the boycott, aside from the emphasis placed on enforcing the boycott by anti-apartheid groups, comes from the July 25, 1985 arrest of Richard Trumka, President of the UMW, in front of the South African Embassy, along with other FSAM members. Upon arrest Trumka "...announced that his union will escalate its opposition to South Africa's racial policies and seek to ban importation of the white-ruled nation's coal and coal products."[171] Specifically, Trumka "...said his union...filed a petition with the US Customs Service in an effort to stop coal imports produced by 'slave labor'...."[172] On September 4, 1985 Trumka increased his union's involvement by announcing the founding of the South African Miners Aid Fund and considering, in public, a sympathy strike to assist South African miners.[173] Finally, on January 9, 1986 the UMW along with the FSAM announced the start of the Shell boycott. (This is not the first boycott of Shell, the World Council of Churches had been running one for several months before.) The FSAM proclaimed in its statement before the press conference that it was "...undertaking an economic educational campaign against Shell Oil Company...."[174] In an attempt to repeat the Embassy protests leaders of the FSAM occupied the offices of Shell Oil Company in Washington, D.C. The sit-in was considered "an appropriate way to mark the birth of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. according to [Walter] Fauntroy" (member of the FSAM steering committee).[175]

In explaining and justifying the campaign the organisers point out that apartheid provides a "supply of cheap black labor" for corporations and that apartheid affects US labour by undercutting US produced goods, increasing corporate profits so that they can attack US workers, and "create a climate for employers to demand lower standard of living for Americans...." [176] The organisers of the boycott explain why Shell is the target of the boycott:

---

171 Barker, K., "UMW to Escalate Protests Against South Africa", *Washington Post*, July 26, 1985, p. C5.

172 *ibid.*, p. C5.

173 Barker, K., "UMWA Sets South African Miners' Fund", *Washington Post*, Sept. 5, 1985, p. A25.

174 *FSAM -Statement of the Free South Africa Movement Announcing the initiation of its Economic Educational Campaign Against the Shell Oil Company*, January 9, 1986, p. 1.

175 "Apartheid Foes Sit-in at Shell Oil", *Washington Post*, January 16, 1986, p. C5.

176 *Boycott Shell: A Guide to the Shell Boycott Campaign*, pp. 3-6.

> The Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies is a major sustainer of the racist system of apartheid in South Africa. Through its supply of oil Royal Dutch/Shell provides a vital natural resource that South Africa does not possess. By refining that oil and providing it to Pretoria's military and police, Royal Dutch/Shell directly fuels the wheels of oppression. Significantly, South African law defines oil as a "munition of war." By investing large amounts of capital in South Africa, Royal Dutch/Shell helps prop up the crisis-ridden South African economy.[177]

It would appear that a major target of the boycott are both the South African police and military forces. The military is a target because of their role in both extending South African influence beyond state borders into the Frontline States, as well as maintaining control over Namibia. The police also rely upon petrol, it fuels their vehicles which are used to transport police to and from areas where the South African government feel a police presence is needed. Any capacity to inhibit either the military's efforts against the Frontline States and Namibia, or the operation of the police in South Africa would obviously be a plus from the FSAM's point of view. Yet, the choice of Shell Oil made "no sense", this according to "Helen Kitchen, the director of the African Studies Program at Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies. .... 'It was a very surprising choice in terms of American-South African relations.'"[178] A boycott against Shell Oil, which produces not only oil, but mines South African coal as well, may seem odd in at least one significant way. The boycott would have no real direct impact on consumers in South Africa, nor would it be universally felt in the US. Shell Oil, a UK based multinational, does not possess an exclusive trade relationship with the US, nor is it the largest oil company in the US. Given that Shell Oil may not have been the best choice in international terms, leads one to consider the domestic reasons. The UMW had been in conflict with Shell for some time before the boycott, the UMW tried to prevent South African coal from entering the US for some time.[179] Therefore, the choice of Shell may be, at least in part, advantageous for the UMW, and the FSAM may simply have piggy-backed along.[180] Regardless of the motivation for choosing Shell Oil the purpose of the boycott of a multinational corporation was to agitate for public action and then draw attention

---

[177] *The Case against Royal Dutch/Shell*, issued by the FSAM and UMW, p. 1.

[178] *op. cit.*, O'Donnell, p. 100.

[179] *ibid.*, p. 100.

[180] There may also be a personal motivation as well, during my interview with Randall Robinson he indicated that he had a high regard for Richard Trumka - the boycott could well be the by-product of the fact that Robinson and Trumka have a great deal in common.

to other multinationals. Robinson said that the boycott "...will focus on Shell, but into the debate will come the names of other corporations - Exxon, Caltex, Mobil, IBM, Burroughs."[181]

Perhaps one of the best illustrations of Trumka and the UMW's motivations in the oil boycott comes comes from Richard Trumka himself. Trumka is quoted by George Meyers, Politbureau member and Chairman of the Labor Department of the Central Committee of the CPUSA. Meyers reports Trumka as saying:

> "It is time for us to fight for a foreign policy which is supportive of working people around the world," adding "If we do not, we will find ourselves under the guns of corporate profiteers." Trumpka [sic] went on to attack US foreign policy, emphasising that it is designed to "make the world safe for corporate profiteers" and that it "backs dictators of any stripe who will maintain a 'good business climate' and by keeping down wages and keeping workers from organising. [182]

Trumka's statement makes clear his commitment to a foreign policy motivated by other than business interests and profit. This is part of the opposition to multinational presence in South Africa.[183]

The Embassy protests offered the FSAM and more generally black Americans a brief window of power and influence. They were able, using the forms and personalities of the Civil Rights Movement, to capture a place in the daily agenda of the US, but they were unable to seize the emotion and commitment of the citizenry at large. Within the black community it was clear that the protests were part of a much longer historical trend. Jesse Jackson pointed out in late 1984 that the work by TransAfrica was the continuation of work started by SNCC and Malcolm X. Jackson said, "We're seeing the blossoming of flowers that have been budding for years."[184] The impact of the Embassy protests and the rise of the FSAM is clearly illustrated by spread of anti-

---

[181] *op. cit.*, O'Donnell, p. 100.

[182] Meyers, George, "Fresh Winds Sweeping Through the Ranks of Labour", *World Marxist Review*, August, 1986, p.76.

[183] This boycott, which called on people to cut up their Shell credit cards and send them back to the company, offered a fine solution to the situation in which the social reality of Americans could link up with the situation in South Africa. To put it simply, the place where one buys petrol is owned by people who support racism in South Africa, therefore, one should not support racism by buying their products. The link between the Shell boycott and the article on International Solidarity is tenuous, and hard to prove. It may be stretching the argument a bit too far to hold that the Shell boycott is a repeat of the solidarity work done in support for the South African miners earlier in the century as pointed out in the programmatic article on International Solidarity. There is little doubt, however, that the Shell boycott, either intentionally or otherwise, represented another step in executing the vision reflected in the International Solidarity article, where actions take on meaning to those carrying them out, thus establishing a firm link in the mind of the populace.

[184] *op. cit.*, Barker and Spolar, p. B7.

apartheid activities in the years that followed the embassy actions. Not only had 2000 people been arrested in connection with embassy protests by February, 1985, but furthermore "16 colleges and universities had decided to divest..." their investments from South Africa.[185] FSAM had also given further impetus to the already underway divestment campaign in localities, leading New Jersey to divest $2.8 billion and California $40 billion from their pension schemes.[186] What they were also able to accomplish was a set of weak sanctions against South Africa, first passed by Congress and then later issued by Executive Order. TransAfrica has not limited itself in its anti-apartheid activities, it has also actively opposed US policy towards Angola.

TransAfrica and Angola

TransAfrica's involvement in anti-apartheid is well illustrated in their opposition to the South African regime, support for sanctions, support for the oil boycott and their fund raising efforts on the behalf of the ANC. Their opposition activities do not end there, however, because they have widened their opposition to a more general one, of opposing the actions of the white minority regime. Thus, TransAfrica's support for the Marxist regime in Luanda, one opposed by official US policy, reflects a more general behaviour.

Of all the positions taken by TransAfrica perhaps the most controversial is their stance on Angola. Angola represents a microcosm of the conflicts between the East and West, between North and South, and is a place where US foreign policy has reflected those larger conflicts. TransAfrica's policy has, at the very least, always been opposed to that of the Reagan Administration, and at others has been clearly supportive of the Cubans. TransAfrica's interest in Angola stems not simply out of its general mission (i.e. its interest in Africa) but more so out of its opposition to apartheid - it is TransAfrica's anti-apartheid stance that drives its support for the Angolan MPLA and opposition to Savimbi and UNITA.

TransAfrica's concern in Angola is several fold. First, TransAfrica opposes US support for

---

[185] Walters, Ronald W., "African-American Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy Toward South Africa", *Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Mohammed E. Ahrari, Greenwood Press, New York, 1987, p.76.

[186] *ibid.*, p. 77.

Jonas Savimbi and UNITA. Second, it has supported the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and have opposed any linkage between UN resolution 435 and the removal of Cuban troops. Finally, it sought to legitimize the Angolan government and has the US government grant Angola the most favoured nation trading status.

In order to comprehend the centrality of the Angolan Civil War to TransAfrica we may turn to its own description of its founding. It is stated that:

> In 1977, after furious Congressional debate over CIA involvement in anti-government military activity against the new Government in Angola, leading black Americans including members of the Congressional Black Caucus, other state and local elected officials, academicians, artists and others committed themselves to meeting the need for a permanent mechanism to evaluate and influence US foreign policy. TransAfrica was the outgrowth of that commitment.[187]

The passage of the Clark Amendment cut off all US covert aid for forces opposed to the MPLA government in Angola, as well as other covert aid for forces in southern Africa. Not all black Americans felt the same need to support the new government in Angola. Indeed, Roy Innis, head of the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) sought to enlist a black American medical force to "assist anti-communist forces..." in Angola.[188] Innis and CORE were criticized by the former leader of CORE James Farmer, who also served in the Nixon Administration.[189] Therefore, the battle against CORE and UNITA is also a battle in favour of the Clark Amendment, and one in support of the the MPLA. The Cuban government also entered the act by sponsoring a briefing for Americans, mostly black, on the issue of Cuban involvement in Angola. Innis was invited to the briefing as well as Carlton Goodlet, chairman of the National Newspaper Publishers Association - Black Press of America. [190] This interest of the Cubans in black Americans is a theme which has been seen for some time, since at least Castro's visit to Harlem in 1960.[191]

---

187 *op. cit., TransAfrica: The Black World's Bridge to US Foreign Policy Legislators*, p. 1.

188 Johnson, Thomas A., "Core Says Blacks Sign for Angola", *New York Times*, February 11, 1976, p. 7.

189 Johnson, Thomas A., "Blacks Assail CORE on Angola Recruits", *New York Times*, February 14, 1976, p.3.

190 "Officials in Cuba Invite Americans to Angola Briefing", *New York Times*, special to the *New York Times*, February 22, 1976, p.6. Goodlet serves on TransAfrica's Board of Directors, and has been a member of the SNCC Central Committee and the World Peace Council.

191 Castro stayed in a Harlem hotel during his visit to the United Nations. While there he met with various black leaders including Malcolm X. See Szulc, Tad, *Fidel: A Critical Portrait*, Avon Books, New York, 1986, pp. 580-584.

The rationale for TransAfrica's support for the Clark Amendment and opposition to Savimbi is multi-faceted. UNITA is seen by TransAfrica as being a part of South Africa's strategy of 'grand apartheid' (wherein South Africa creates regional dependence on its transportation routes and productive facilities.) TransAfrica's writers state "Pretoria uses them [UNITA and RENAMO] to actively subvert the two countries [Angola and Mozambique] that could provide alternative transportation routes [to those in South Africa]."[192] Thus, opposition becomes a manifestation of anti-apartheid. This is equally seen in the writings of Prexy Nesbitt, former board member of TransAfrica and Senior Fellow of IPS. Nesbitt writes in 1985:

> The Frontline States, particularly Angola, form the backbone for the liberation movements. They have provided supplies; they are the source of a rear base for the ANC and SWAPO; they are the sites where victims of apartheid's repression can be brought. For this reason, South Africa and their friends in Washington, have done everything in their power to destabilize and overthrow the Frontline States.[193]

Nesbitt not only links up the conflicts in Angola and Mozambique with South African regional military policy, but also clearly indicates that these conflicts have an impact upon liberation movements. In a clear statement of TransAfrica's intentions, the Summer 1987 *Issue Brief* contains the following statement: "...it is clear that anti-apartheid activists must take UNITA, Renamo and their supporters seriously. Complacency may well be fatal. And yet we must neither accept nor imply that these two apartheid surrogates enjoy wide support that indicates their legitimacy."[194] Obviously, the point here is to ensure that neither of these movements gain the glimmer of legitimacy, which is one of the major purposes of a lobby when mobilizing support, to limit opponents legitimacy while improving one's own.

As a clear illustration of just how violently opposed TransAfrica is to UNITA, Robinson has said that "UNITA and Renamo work in tandem with their apartheid masters: while Pretoria brutalizes South Africans and Namibians, UNITA and Renamo murder, maim, and terrorize Angolans and Mozambicans." [195] Again, in the same issue brief TransAfrica's writers asserted

---

[192] *Issue Brief*, Summer, 1987, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C., p. 4.

[193] Nesbitt, Prexy, "Expanding the Horizons of the U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement", *Black Scholar*, November, 1985, p. 44.

[194] *op. cit., Issue Brief*, Summer, 1987, p. 5.

[195] *ibid.*, p. 7.

UNITA is a "vicious, anti-black" racist organisation.[196] There can be no doubt that Robinson and TransAfrica firmly oppose UNITA.

Savimbi's UNITA opposed not only MPLA troops, but Cuban troops as well. The Cuban troops in Angola created the basis for the Reagan Administration's unwillingness to further independence talks on Namibia until those troops were removed. TransAfrica has clearly defended the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. In 1983 in a report issues by a collection of groups (including ACOA, AFSCME, CBTU, CBC, UAW, NAACP,SASP SCLC, WOA, and the Urban League), but copywritten to TransAfrica and written by TransAfrica staff, the authors called for the US to drop linkage of Cuban troops to Namibian independence.[197] It has also been claimed that "Angola's security cannot...be assured without the help of the Cuban troops."[198] This statement is a near perfect reflection of a statement made by Fidel Castro to Randall Robinson in 1982. He said, "If the withdrawal of the Cuban troops had taken place, the independence of Angola would have been endangered."[199] Robinson finds agreements with others not only on the issue of the importance of Cuban troops, but on the issue of linkage between UN resolution 435 and the Cuban troops. Paulo Jorge, Angolan Foreign Minister, is quoted in an interview printed in TransAfrica *Issue Brief* (Sept. 1982) as stating, "We...clearly reject this linkage."[200]

TransAfrica's position on Angola is important because it demonstrates that International Solidarity is reflected in its strong support for liberation movements. What is curious is that TransAfrica does not support UNITA, a movement with indigenous support in Angola. Clearly, it seems that a calculation has been made and that the leaders of TransAfrica have decided that they would rather support the MPLA than UNITA. The logic behind the support of the MPLA over UNITA may not be explained through diaspora politics. Both the MPLA and UNITA receive support from non-African sources, or proto-colonialists (the USSR or the USA), though UNITA does receive assistance from South Africa, and this may be enough to disqualify them from the

---

[196] *ibid.*, p. 5.

[197] *op. cit., Namibia: The Crisis in United States Policy Toward Southern Africa*, p. v.

[198] *Issue Brief*, June-July, 1986, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C., p. 9.

[199] *Issue Brief*, May, 1982, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C., p. 3.

[200] *Issue Brief*, Sept. 1982, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C., p. 5.

support of the diaspora.

Conclusion

Throughout this chapter it has been demonstrated that TransAfrica is an organisation that is driven by a variety of creative impulses, that it is, as an organisation, aware of the past and attempts to use those lessons to drive its political programme. What should also be clear is that despite TransAfrica's wealth of creativity, it has insufficient financial, material and organisational resources to launch its campaign effectively. It clearly possesses a fairly complex and rich political base on which to draw, and it has been able to use the issue of race to its benefit, even when it may not have been fitting to do so (as in the case of Angola). Through a variety of domestic coalitions TransAfrica has been able to weave a web of relationships that in the case of the Embassy protests paid off. Whether it can make use of this web again remains to be seen. What has also been seen is that TransAfrica suffers from the occasional credibility gap, as in the case of the sources of its funding. Despite this it has filled the hole, it has created an organised policy constituency where there had been none.

CHAPTER FIVE
TransAfrica - The International Connections

TransAfrica is an active participant in the transnational environment, this chapter provides examples of some of its activity. TransAfrica's role in a variety of transnational affairs, and especially in intermestic affairs will be illustrated here. It is clear that TransAfrica is not solely a domestic actor, indeed, TransAfrica is an active and prominent participant in the transnational world. What will also be presented here is some evidence that suggests the presence of groups which are allied to and perhaps even manipulated by state actors, as tools of state foreign policy. During the course of research for this work evidence was uncovered which led some to claim that TransAfrica was involved with groups and agencies involved in the conducting of various states foreign policies. While investigating this claim is not the objective of this chapter, it is nonetheless instructive to determine in what ways (if any) this may influence the understanding of TransAfrica. Whether or not this suggests that TransAfrica itself is manipulated will be left to the reader to decide. There is, nonetheless, some useful material in this chapter which illustrates TransAfrica's behaviour as a transnational actor.

Four levels of interaction will be examined in order to understand TransAfrica's involvement in the transnational world. First, TransAfrica's relationship with a state actor will be examined. TransAfrica assisted the People's Republic of Grenada following the rise of the New Jewel Movement there. There is a considerable amount of information available about that relationship and so it may instructive to examine that data. Second, TransAfrica's relationship with government dominated non-state actors will be examined. Specifically, this refers to the most contentious portion of this chapter, namely TransAfrica's involvement with groups which are said to act on behalf of the Soviet bloc.[1] Finally, the relationship between TransAfrica and another non-state actor will be examined. TransAfrica, in their anti-apartheid activities, have been involved with and have assisted the African National Congress in their battle with the South African government. These four items should suggest that TransAfrica is indeed a transnational

[1] It is not the purpose of this chapter to spell out whether or not these groups are indeed Soviet run. The point is to present the data, in as much as it may be instructive regarding TransAfrica as a transnational actor.

actor, and further, that they are an important player in anti-apartheid efforts. It also provides insight into how TransAfrica has used transnational issues to provide input for domestic purposes, thus creating intermestic issues.

TransAfrica and Grenada - NGO and State Meet

TransAfrica and Grenada were joined together in a mutual effort to defend and sponsor the interests of Grenada. This is the case in as much as the two were joined together by race or diaspora politics, the commonality of sociohistorical experiences. Therefore, it will be interesting to see what kind of relationship the two had, and for purposes here to examine what the NGO TransAfrica could offer the People's Republic of Grenada (PRG).

US Relations with Grenada were an issue of some minor importance during the late 1970's and running until the 1983 military intervention. The authors of the earlier mentioned article on International Solidarity (see chapter four) mention Grenada as having been a failed case of building International Solidarity. Therefore, examining the case of Grenada may provide some insight, since it is known that TransAfrica was involved in the Grenada issue. Following the military intervention into Grenada by US forces in 1983 and the subsequent seizure of the PRG government documents researchers are now able to gain some insight into the workings of TransAfrica. This may come as somewhat of a surprise, one might not expect to find anything new about a US lobby group in the government papers of a small Caribbean state, yet within those seized documents comes a variety of references about TransAfrica.

Grenada had been involved in the building of a new 'revolutionary' state, one that was guided by socialist principles, and one that had closely allied itself with Cuba and was seeking closer ties to the USSR. Yet, the PRG was caught in a paradox. On the one hand they needed to obtain aid from Western nations, and on the other, sought to continue the process of the anti-imperialist revolution. The need for aid tempered their ideological commitment, though the leadership "...seemed to believe they could expect massive fraternal assistance from the Soviet Union and its allies..." once they had substantiated their "Marxist-Leninist credentials". [2] Yet, too

[2] Sandford, Gregory and Richard Vigilante, *Grenada: The Untold Story*, Madison Books, Lanham, Maryland, 1984, p.

strong a commitment to Marxist-Leninist principles would offend potential donors of aid, thus the paradox of the PRG foreign policy - "its obvious pro-Soviet stance, but rhetorical non-alignment; its constant, vehement condemnation of 'imperialism'...along with repeated claims of wanting 'good relations' with the United States" put the PRG squarely in the jaws of a dilemma.[3] TransAfrica enters the paradox as the Black American Lobby for the Caribbean and Africa; they defend the PRG and seek to assist in the desired rapprochement with the Reagan Administration. This is done, as mentioned, because of the perceived tie between the PRG and black Americans - both being children of the diaspora.

In 1983 TransAfrica invited PRG Prime Minister Maurice Bishop to address their annual conference in Washington, D.C. Bishop accepted the invitation, which of course would be useful to the Bishop government as it was facing both a hostile US administration and opposition at home. The invitation would provide Bishop with an opportunity to meet government officials and prove to those back home his capacity as leader. The May 4, 1983 Political Bureau outlines the objectives of the meeting:

> 1) conveying to the U.S. press and people the image of our P.M. as a sober and responsible statesman..., 2) To develop firm unshakeable links and bonds of identity with the black community in the U.S.A., 3) To promote Tourism primarily among the Black Community. [4]

Bishop's trip to the US was certainly not unimportant, in fact, it had gained the attention of Gail Reed Rizo, the American born wife of Cuban Ambassador Julian Rizo. Julian Rizo, former Ambassador the the U.N. had also served as a member of the Venceremos Brigade, which served in part to bring US citizens to Cuba, from which DGI recruitments were made. [5] Rizo's role in the Brigade suggests that he has played an intelligence role in addition to his Ambassadorial role. There is other evidence that supports this claim. Geraldo Peraza, former member of the DGI

88.

[3] *ibid.*, p. 88.

[4] Minutes of the Political Bureau, May 4, 1983, in *Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection*, Department of State and Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 93-3.

[5] See Castro Hildalgo, Orlando, *A Spy for Fidel*, E.A. Seeman, Miami, 1971, for more on the intelligence aspects of the Venceremos Brigade, and also *The Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and Subversion*, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Committee of Judiciary, US Senate, 97th Congress, 2nd session. The DGI, or Direccion General de Inteligencia as created in 1961 with the assistance of the USSR and was to serve as Cuba's external intelligence service. See Crozier, Brian, "Soviet Pressures in the Caribbean," *Conflict Studies*, Number 35, May, 1973, p. 5.

testified before a Senate committee that Rizo was indeed a member of the DGI. "Rizo was also a liaison with terrorist organizations in the United States, including the Weathermen, ...the PLO...and organized the Puerto Rican Solidarity Committee in New York, a political support group for the pro-Castro Puerto Rican Socialist party." [6] Given that his wife knew of the Washington visit of Bishop, it may be safe to assume that her husband did as well, and it is therefore also possible that Cuban intelligence may also have known. DGI knowledge of the impending trip and connections to TransAfrica may be unimportant, in as much as their knowing of the trip may not have influenced or changed anything. Yet it remains that the knowledge of the trip and connections to both TransAfrica and the PRG may combine together and prove important.

Gail Reed Rizo wrote a rather revealing letter to the Prime Minister before his trip to the US. In her handwritten letter she says:

> Thus, the importance of accepting the Black Caucus (another governmental level) and Transafrica [sic] invitations -- as important in themselves -- leaving open the possibility of meeting with the Reagan administration [sic] if it were to come off.
>
> I think that any suggestion that accepting these invitations as really a 'cover' for another (larger) purpose (such as a meeting with Reagan) needs to be denied flatly and strongly. After all, what is contained in the suggestion, besides the implication that the PRG is opportunist, is the racist and anti-popular implication - 'why would he come here just because a bunch of Black folks invited him?' [7]

Mrs. Rizo also goes on to make clear who in Washington Bishop can rely upon. She says:

> On the specific meetings, I think I'm too out of touch to be helpful. Parodi from the Cuban Interests Section will be the most clear person on this whole question. [8]

This is an interesting communication, in as much as it reveals a NGO (TransAfrica) assisting one state (PRG), and through that connection becoming involved with another state (Cuba). It also illustrates the process of influencing domestic policy, where one 'domestic' group uses its contacts with the borders of one state to assist another state in its conduct of foreign policy. Whether the trip was a success or not is not at all clear. While Bishop was not able to meet with Reagan, he did

---

[6] Powell, S. Steven, *Covert Cadre*, Green Hill Publishers, Inc., Ottawa, Illinois, 1987, p. 218.

[7] letter from Gail Reed Rizo to PM Maurice Bishop, in *op. cit.*, *Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection*, pp. 31-2 - 31-3.

[8] Rizo letter to Bishop, *ibid.*, pp. 31-34.

meet with National Security Advisor William Clark. It might be expected that such a meeting would be considered important by Bishop, on the contrary, however, it seemed to be unimportant to the PRG Political Bureau. A memo regarding the Bishop trip to the US omitted any mention of the Clark meeting, and instead "...dwelt at length..." on Bishop's success "...in impressing congressmen [sic], black Americans and the media." [9] In other words, those things set out in the May 4, 1983 meeting were achieved and were viewed as important, the Clark meeting seemed less important, perhaps because no rapprochement was achieved (and perhaps none expected).

TransAfrica played an important role in the PRG campaign in the US. Not only had they provided the excuse for Bishop to arrive in the US, but they also provided the political network through their organisation. TransAfrica's invitation to Bishop was not only designed to help the Prime Minister, but TransAfrica sought to get something out of it as well. Dessima Williams, Grenadan Ambassador to the Organisation of American States wrote on April 20, 1983, about the visit to Washington.

> According to Mr. Randall Robinson, the Executive Director of TRANSAFRICA [sic], their invitation to you is to say to the Reagan Administration: 'Maurice Bishop is our man, a black man. You mess with him, you mess with all black Americans. And we are bringing him here to show you that we are friends with him. [10]

What is interesting to note here is that this memo is a fine illustration of a domestic situation having implications and repercussions in the international realm. This memo highlights the internationalization of what might otherwise be thought of as being a domestic issue. Whether Robinson saw the issue of the PRG as instrumental or intrinsic is unclear, it could well be that Robinson's statement is meant only for political bargaining purposes, or it could be that this connection is much more than mere opportunism. Whether the survival of the PRG was considered instrumental or intrinsic, the quotation clearly indicates the role of international solidarity, it is a clear attempt to linke the two fates together, both that of black Americans and Grenada. The Grenadan Ambassador goes on to discuss the issue of race and its relevance to Grenada. She writes:

---

[9] Sandford, Gregory, *The New Jewel Movement*, Department of State, Washington, D.c., 1985, p. 135.

[10] *Information Digest*, December 18, 1984, ed. John Rees, Baltimore, Maryland, p. 386.

> Further, in my opinion both Randall Robinson, but more so the members of the Black Caucus such as Judge [Congressman] George Crockett, want to step up their participation in national politics, and especially in foreign policy. Maurice Bishop and the Grenada Revolution represent very controversial but 'meaty' political issues. As national black politicians, they want 'to score one' both with the black community but particularly with the white establishment *with whom they maintain a love-hate relations. Therefore, this one is a big one for them* in the racial struggle for recognition of 'credible black leadership', and it is also a big one in the anti-Reagan political warfare. [11]

Very clearly, Ambassador Williams assesses the political drive as being one to further the domestic fight, as well as "anti-Reagan political warfare." The statement that the PRG campaign is "a big one for them in the racial struggle for recognition of 'credible black leadership' " is important in that it indicates that at least Williams perceived the PRG to be an issue that would help black American leaders to further their own domestic goals. There is also the suggestion that more than TransAfrica's domestic goals were being attended. The Cubans, it seems, were also gaining or so Williams believed, from the PRG visit to the US. Williams said, "that the Cubans feel that the visit is important, and that we should make the U.S. accountable by requesting assistance" for the PRG.[12]

October 25, 1983 marked the end of the PRG. Six days earlier Maurice Bishop had been killed in a coup. On October 25, 1983 US armed forces landed on the island. Following the military action TransAfrica responded by publishing their longest ever *Issue Brief*. The *Issue Brief* contains articles by the then former Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley (Manley is back in office), Rep. Ronald Dellums (D-CA), Tom Farer, Professor A.W. Singham, Cuban Interests Section Chief Ramon Sanchez-Parodi, and Ambassador Dessima Williams. Manley, Dellums, Williams and Parodi all are involved with the PRG, Cuba and black America, and equally are involved in some way in diaspora politics. Once again, their varied backgrounds illustrate TransAfrica's ability to pull together a body of opinion of a transnational character. Below are some examples of their opinions printed by TransAfrica.

First is Michael Manley, who had established a close relationship with TransAfrica over the

---

[11] *ibid.*, p. 386, emphasis added.

[12] *ibid.*, p. 387.

years, and was a supporter of Castro. Under his rule in Jamaica he had the Jamaica Home Guard receive training from the Cubans, as well as arming them with Cuban weapons. [13] After a sharp decline in tourism in Jamaica (due to island violence) and other economic hardships, "...Manley veered sharply to the left." [14] Manley said in the *Issue Brief:* "It is scandalous for members of a region to regard themselves as having a deeper allegiance and contact with a major superpower than with their own regional colleagues; and we are going to pay dearly for it." [15] Clearly, Manley does not see the US as a Caribbean state, and places regional affinities over others, this despite US territories in the Caribbean, as well as economic ties to the region.

Also writing in the *Issue Brief* was Ron Dellums, at that time member of the CBC and now its chair.[16] In his TransAfrica article Dellums reports that he and other members of Congress met with the Prime Ministers of the Eastern Caribbean States (these were the Prime Ministers on whose behalf the US forces were then acting). Dellums states that:

> ...the Prime Ministers raised their concern that a "leftist" Grenadian government "threatened" the Eastern Caribbean. ...[they] emphasized their desire that the region might have more leaders that reflected their own "moderate views". What they apparantly feared was not an external invasion ..., but rather that improved conditions in Grenada would provide an example to their own citizens that might result in internal opposition....[17]

From the tone of Mr. Dellums comments it is clear that he has no basis for knowing whether or not the Prime Ministers fear internal opposition or not; this is simply his interpretation of their fear. Implicitly Dellums calls into question the legitimacy of various leaders in the Caribbean.

Dellums involvement in Grenada does not begin and end with his TransAfrica article. Indeed, his involvement in Grenada has been extensive and at time characterized by overzealous behaviour. Carlottia Scott, a staff member of Dellums' Congressional office, "...had a romantic relationship with..." Maurice Bishop in 1982.[18] Following the military action in Grenada part of

---

[13] Sim, Richard, and James Anderson, "The Caribbean Strategic Vacuum," *Conflict Studies*, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Number 121, August, 1980, p. 19.

[14] *ibid.*, p. 19.

[15] Manley condemning the military action as well as those island governments who saw fit to support and request the action, *Issue Brief*, November-December 1983, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C., p. 4.

[16] Dellums, a member of the CBC, is also a founding member of the US Peace Council, the US branch of the World Peace Council. Dellums has been involved in at least one Soviet active measures programme, which will be discussed later.

[17] *op. cit., Issue Brief*, November-December, 1983, p. 10.

[18] Brownfield, Allan C., and J. Michael Waller, *The Revolutionary Lobby*, Council for Inter-American Security and the

Bishop's correspondence was seized and therein was found a letter from Ms. Scott.[19] In that letter, written on Dellums' Congressional stationary, Scott wrote:

> ...Ron has become truly committed to Grenada and has some very positive political thinking to share with you. He feels that he can best be of assistance in a counseling manner and hopes to be able to discuss these thoughts in the near future.[20]

Later she comments on Dellums' coming actions in support for Grenada:

> ...Ron vowed to turn this Administration policy around. We are now in the process of pulling together the report for the Armed Services Committee, preparing testimony for the Inter-American Affairs Committee Hearings on Grenada....[21]

She goes on to say that she hopes that "...the report will serve as a basis for a clear understanding and direct counter to the Administration's policy...." [22] While Ms. Scott's relationship probably did not represent any real threat to US security, it does reveal a high degree of involvement by Dellums in diaspora politics.

The involvement of Dellums in diaspora politics is further illustrated when staff members (Carlottia Scott and Barbara Lee) were involved in developing the Grenada/US Friendship Society. [23] Therefore, following the military intervention into Grenada by US forces it is less than surprising that Dellums was upset and wrote attacking the Administration's actions. Thus, despite what can only be termed questionable political behaviour by Dellums' staff members, Dellums has been a central actor in diaspora politics.

Finally, for the purposes here, there is the writing of Ramon Sanchez Parodi, who has already been mentioned. Parodi was head of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, as well as a suspected member of the Cuban DGI. [24] His DGI connections are further supported by Geraldo Peraza's claim that all Cuban diplomats assigned to the US or UN are members of the DGI. [25]

Inter-American Security Educational Institute, Washington, D.C., 1985, p. 71.

[19] *ibid., pp. 116-117.*

[20] *ibid., p. 116.*

[21] *ibid.*, p. 116.

[22] *ibid.*, p. 116.

[23] See PB minutes from December 9, 1981 and PB minutes for September 9, 1981 where Lee is involved in the International Solidarity Day organising. *op. cit., Grenada Overview.*

[24] See *op. cit.*, Powell, p.243.

[25] *op. cit., The Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and Subversion*, p. 14.

Parodi asserts that "The only weapons in Grenada were those to be used by the popular militia in case of invasion." [26] This is in contrast to the equipment sent to Grenada from the USSR - 2000 machine guns, 50 armored personnel carriers, 60 mortars, and 60 anti-tank weapons. [27] This is material only from the USSR, it does not include material from Cuba, North Korea, or Vietnam. What is clear is that Parodi's claim that the weapons were only for the popular militia is a bit overstated. Should Parodi prove to be a member of the Cuban DGI it also suggests that TransAfrica and its *Issue Brief* was being used for purposes beyond those of protecting and furthering the interests of the diaspora and the PRG. Whether this is important or not will be left to the reader to decide.

It would be wrong to leave the issue of the US military action without mentioning TransAfrica's position. It was argued that:

> Since the Cold War of the 1950's, U.S. intervention has been directed towards preventing progressive change, popular insurgency, and social revolution in the region. Again, the threat progressive change has posed is largely to the U.S. business community. If revolutionary governments assume power and are committed to strengthening their national economies or to lessening traditional ties of dependence, then they are perceived to represent a threat to American firms with substantial interests in those countries. [28]

Thus, TransAfrica opposes US intervention in Grenada not on ethnic and racial grounds, but rather on the grounds of the usefulness of social revolution and the end to colonial or dependent relationships. The authors state that the US foreign policy is guided only by business interests, thus leaving out any social interests, which includes ethnicity. It is interesting that TransAfrica does not suggest 'racist' purposes behind the actions of the Reagan Administration, nor do they seek the defend the Grenadian people on the basis of diaspora or ethnic relations.

Throughout this example of TransAfrica's relationship with Grenada it has been apparent that the two have had a relationship from which both stood to benefit. Grenada found a friend and ally inside the US, which could act on its behalf to further its foreign policy interests, by influencing the domestic US scene. TransAfrica acquired a foreign policy issue, one which could

---

[26] *op, cit., Issue Brief*, November-December, 1983, p. 8.

[27] *op. cit.*, Sandford and Vigilante, p. 93.

[28] *op. cit., Issue Brief*, November-December, 1983, p. 2.

be turned into a domestic issue, and thus enter the realm of intermestic affairs. By protecting the revolutionary and diaspora state of Grenada, TransAfrica could also protect and further the goals of black America. Finally, TransAfrica's involvement led them to the attention of the Cuban government. What impact that attention had is unclear, but it seems at the very least a part of the Cuban foreign policy apparatus was aware of and interested in the actions of TransAfrica as they related to Grenada.

The issue of Grenada, however, seemed not to pay off for TransAfrica and black America as a whole. The invasion saw to it that Grenada could not be used as an instrumental issue for the purpose of furthering black American goals. Nor was it much use as an intrinsic issue, because if it did carry intrinsic value, it did nothing more than suggest that the US government was unaware of and perhaps even uncaring about the value that Grenada had for many black Americans. The issue carried no categorical precedence for the majority of Americans. It carried only a small degree of categorical precedence for many black Americans, the only real connection blacks could have felt with Grenada was a sense of ethnic identity with other members of the diaspora, and perhaps some vague historical connection with blacks from the Caribbean. Grenada also carried virtually no relevance to the American public. It was a small island in the Caribbean, with no importance to the majority of Americans. The invasion, furthermore, was probably a relief to many Americans who had just a week earlier witnesses the killing of the Marines in Beruit. Therefore, if the issue had relevance, it was only relevant in that the US was able to 'strike back', albeit at people totally uninvolved in the real issue.

The relationship between Grenada, Cuba and TransAfrica is illustrative of the fact that TransAfrica can indeed be a transnational actor, and that clearly state actors are interested in relations with TransAfrica. While the Grenada connection demonstrates TransAfrica as a transnational actor, it also highlights a failure on their part. They were unable to turn Grenada into a national issue, this being due in part to the very nature and structure of the issue.

TransAfrica, States and NGO's

The title, TransAfrica, States and NGO's may seem a little peculiar, but there is a reason for it. TransAfrica's relationships and transactions with other non-governmental groups will be considered. These NGO's may be considered different from other NGO's, in as much as they are considered by many to have ties with Soviet bloc governments, and indeed, may be considered part of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus. It is not the purpose of this analysis to consider whether or not these NGO's are indeed part of the Soviet bloc foreign policy apparatus, but rather to discern that if there is a connection, what difference would it make to the operation of TransAfrica.

The question of whether or not TransAfrica is involved with government sponsored and controlled NGO's arises because of FBI interest in a meeting which involved TransAfrica and presumably Soviet sponsored groups. FBI interest in these actions is important enough to raise the issue TransAfrica's possible involvement. In order to consider this issue it is important to understand the vantage point used by the FBI. Within in the intelligence services involvement with government sponsored and controlled NGO's comes under the heading of active measures.

The term active measures is a heading under which the covert use of NGO's for foreign policy purposes can be considered. Active measures have been defined in a variety of ways, but the most useful is that provided by the US Department of State. They state:

> The term "active measures" is a literal translation from Russian, "aktivnyye meropriyatiya", which denotes covert or deceptive operations conducted in support of Soviet foreign policy. Active measures are distinct both from espionage and counterintelligence, and from traditional diplomatic and informational activities. The goal of active measures is to influence opinion and/or actions of individuals, governments, and/or publics. [29]

Active measures have also been defined as:

> ...clandestine operations designed to extend Soviet influence and power around the world. As offensive instruments of Soviet foreign policy, they systematically disrupt relations between other nations, discredit Soviet opponents, and influence the policies of foreign governments in favor of Soviet plans and policies. Soviet active measures include operations conducted by Czechoslovak, East German, Polish, Hungarian,

[29] *Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda*, 1986-87, U.S. Department of State, p. viii.

> Bulgarian, and Cuban intelligence services and their proxies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. [30]

Active measures may, for purposes here, be deemed political warfare. Shultz and Godson define political warfare, which they see as being an umbrella concept under which active measures falls, as "...the threat to employ or the actual use of overt and covert political, economic, and military techniques to influence politics and events in foreign countries...." [31] Within the USSR the organisations responsible for active measures, are the International Department of the CPSU (ID), the International Information Department of the CPSU (IID), and the Committee for State Security of the CPSU (KGB). Together these organisations carry out the active measures programme. [32] The methods employed by the Soviets are as follows: placing of forgeries in the media, the use of front groups, the use of local communist parties, the use of friendship societies, the employment of 'agents of influence', disinformation, and political influence operations. [33] These may be used independently of one another, or they may be used in combination. The objective is to influence the policy making climate in the target nation.

There seems to have been little argument that the USSR entered into a phase of active measures programmes to counter Reagan. In May, 1981, Leonid Breznhev stated in a letter to the UN sponsored conference on sanctions against South Africa, held in Paris, that the USSR would take actions to oppose apartheid and support apartheid's opponents. He wrote:

> Active measures in the direction being carried out by the Soviet social organizations, including the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the Soviet Afro-Asian Countries Solidarity Committee, the Soviet Committee for the Defence of Peace, the Committee of Soviet Women, the Committee of Youth Organizations of the

---

[30] Bittman, Ladislav, "The New Image Makers: Soviet Propaganda and Disinformation under Gorbachev", *The New Image Makers*, ed. Ladislav Bittman, Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington, D.C., 1988, p. 23.

[31] Shultz, Richard H., and Roy Godson, *Dezinformatsia*, Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 13.

[32] The International Department is under the CPSU Secretariat, its task is to maintain relations with political parties, non-ruling communist parties, revolutionary groups, as well as national liberation movements. It also controls and oversees the various Soviet International Front organisations, as well as Friendship societies. See Kitrinos, Robert, W., "International Department of the CPSU," *Problems of Communism*, Volume XXXIII, September-October, 1984, p. 54 and *Soviet Active Measures*, House Permanent Committee on Intelligence, US House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1982, p. 220. The IID "...is responsible for improving the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda abroad and Soviet domestic propaganda on foreign policy matters." See *op. cit.*, *Soviet Active Measures*, p. 220. Responsibility for active measures programmes within the KGB "...rests with Service A of the First Chief Directorate." See *op. cit.*, Shultz and Godson, p. 33.

[33] See *Soviet Covert Action: The Forgery Offensive*, Hearings before the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1980, pp. 59-87.

USSR....[34]

Each of these groups listed above are affiliates of larger Soviet run front groups, the most notable of which is the Soviet Committee for the Defence of Peace, which is the national affiliate of the Soviet sponsored World Peace Council (WPC). The WPC is one example of what appears to be an NGO, but may also in fact an apparatus of state foreign policy. The use of the term 'active measures' in Breznhev's letter is no mistake. It is the only example of the term being used publically. There is little doubt that the Soviets launched an active measures programme against Reagan's South Africa policy.

Soviet front organisations are an integral part of Soviet active measures programme. Soviet front groups are the World Peace Council, the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), International Union of Students (IUS), International Union of Journalists (IOJ), and Christian Peace Conference (CPC). [35] The USSR maintains control of these groups by controlling the membership on the Secretariat or other governing bodies as well as through funding. [36] The United States Peace Council (USPC), the US affiliate of the WPC, was founded in November, 1979, and had in its "...key leadership positions..." members of the CPUSA. [37] If the USSR was indeed involved in attempts to manipulate US policy towards South Africa, they would have used their front groups, most notably the WPC and the USPC. While it cannot be said whether or not the USSR did indeed attempt to manipulate the domestic US political debate over the issue of South Africa, it is worth investigating some of the data here, because it throws some light on to TransAfrica. What kind of light it throws and what its implications are is outside the scope of this study.

---

[34] *Measures Taken by Member States and Intergovernmental Organizations in the Light of United Nations Resolutions on Apartheid*, UN Doc. A/CONF.107/5, p. 46, also see *Soviet Active Measures*, 1981, House Permanent Committee on Intelligence.

[35] "International Communist Organizations", *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1984*, ed. Richard Staar, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1985, pp. 428-434.

[36] *op. cit.*, Kitrinos, p. 58.

[37] *op. cit.*, *Soviet Active Measures*, p. 224.

During the summer of 1982 (July 13, 14, 1982) the Select Committee on Intelligence, of the House of Representatives held hearings entitled *Soviet Active Measures*. During the hearings Mr. Ed O'Malley of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provided testimony regarding Soviet active measures. Along with O'Malley were declassified reports covering FBI investigation of active measures in the US. Notable among these was a section of the report entitled "Use of International Front Organizations and CPUSA: Anti-Apartheid Campaign". The report mentions the material cited above, then goes on to say "In the United States, two members of the World Peace Council organised a conference in solidarity with the 'Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa', October 9-11,1981, in New York City." [38] The report continues:

> The organizers served as Chair of the Preparatory Committee Secretariat and Conference Coordinator, respectively. According to their own public documents the Conference organized support for the Soviet position on South Africa, including support to the African National Congress and Southwestern African People's Organization....
>
> The CPUSA, in a letter dated August 19, 1981, to all districts from Thomas Dennis, the Chairman of the Communist Party Nationalities Department, instructed CPUSA members to organize for the October 9-11 conference. It instructed them to get a broad delegation from various areas in the United States to attend this conference....
>
> This example illustrates a commonplace Soviet tactic of creating a conference to focus on an issue for which there exists broad support in a way that direct Soviet involvement is not apparent. [39]

The conference organisers, Lennox S. Hinds and Carl Bloice, each possess their own links to Soviet front groups. Hinds at the time was "U.N. representative of the IADL (International Association of Democratic Lawyers)" an identified front group.[40] Bloice at the time of the conference served on the CPUSA Central Committee and on the US Peace Council.[41] The final member of the organising team was Rep. Ron Dellums (D-CA) from Berkely, California. Dellums, who was one of the founding members of the US Peace Council, and served as the President of the Preparatory Committee.[42] The conference was to be sponsored by the UN

[38] *ibid.*, p. 231.

[39] *ibid.*, pp. 231-232.

[40] *op. cit.*, *Information Digest*, December 28, 1984, p. 378.

[41] *ibid.*, p. 378. A connection between the USPC and TransAfrica exists by way of Carlton Goodlet, member of the USPC and board member of TransAfrica.

[42] See the advertisement in *Southern Africa*, July-August, 1981, p. 15.

Methodist office.

The letter referred to above from Thomas Dennis offers some interesting insights into how the conference was put together. Dennis writes:

> Enclosed are some additional materials to assist you in oranizing to get more elected delegates from your area for the October 9-11 Conference.
>
> 1. A list of additional sponsors. Check to see if there is anyone from your area not yet asked to work on the local organizing effort....
>
> 2. A list of organizations and individuals who attended a Conference Public Investment and South Africa in June of this year. These are potential supporters of this conference for sanctions. Some may be possible delegates. Note the names from your area.[43]

This letter provides some useful information on how the active measures conference was assembled. Firstly, Dennis's letter suggests that he had a list of names of people who attended the earlier conference on public investment. How did he get the list? Either he attended the conference, or knew somebody who did. Secondly, the letter is informative on active measures techniques, in as much as Dennis did not indicate a passing interest in opening the conference to all those who wished to attend, but rather to those who "...are potential supporters of this conference for sanctions." It is clear that his interest is political, rather than educational. His intention seems to be to enlist a series of supporters who will back the CPUSA position, thus perhaps giving the CPUSA a level of legitimacy.

The organisers of the conference were able to obtain a variety of support. Those who sponsored the conference were: American Committee on Africa (ACOA), Coalition of Black Trade Unionists (CBTU), Episcopal Church People for South Africa (ECSA), Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), National Conference of Black Lawyers (NCBL), Operation PUSH (People United to Save Humanity), TransAfrica, and the Washington Office on Africa (WOA).[44] TransAfrica assisted in the organisation of the Conference on Public Investment (as did WOA and ACOA), therefore, given what is known about

[43] *op. cit., Soviet Active Measures*, p. 327.

[44] *op. cit., Information Digest*, December 28, 1984, p. 378.

the organisation of the active measures conference it can be said with some surity that at the very least the active measures conference organisers were able to contact TransAfrica because of their previous involvement with the Conference on Public Investment. This suggests that among NGO's TransAfrica is an important player. It may also suggest that government related NGO's hold TransAfrica as being important for their own state related interests. This process of active measures is somewhat reminiscent of past communist party activities and the development of front groups, where the CPUSA used other groups to support their position, without labelling the position as that of the CPUSA. Thus, the non-communist groups help, knowingly or otherwise, in creating a legitimate image for the CPUSA and USSR positions in the US.[45]

The conference itself hosted "... more than 1,100 delegates"[46], and sought to take action on a variety of themes. Among those themes were: ending rapprochement between the US and South Africa, initiation of "national, regional and local legislative campaigns..." to support total sanctions against South Africa, oppose repeal of the Clark Amendment, end exportation of uranium to South Africa and recognize the MPLA government in Angola.[47] Compare these calls to what TransAfrica has later claimed for itself. They have claimed to have worked against the repeal of the Clark Amendment[48] supported calls for recognition of the MPLA government in Angola[49] and have supported Congressional legislation that opposes nuclear cooperation between the US and South Africa[50] Obviously, there is a great deal of overlap between the two. The question arises, though, as to why there is overlap. Is it due to TransAfrica's involvement with active measures, or more likely is it due to their issue make up and constituency?

The conference then went on to call for "...a campaign to condemn the efforts of the Reagan Administration to characterise the liberation struggles of Southern Africa as global conflicts

---

[45] See Klehr, Harvey, *The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade*, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1984 for more on the use of fronts to legitimize CPUSA position and gain access to the public agenda.

[46] From Gus Newport, Mayor of Berkely, California, Vice President of the WPC and member of the USPC, from *Role of International Solidarity and Action in Support of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa*, August, 1983, UN Centre Against Apartheid, pp.3-4.

[47] *op. cit., Soviet Active Measures*, p. 314.

[48] *History of TransAfrica*, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C., undated, p. 1.

[49] See *United States Foreign Policy and the Black World*, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C., 1988 and *Namibia: The Crisis in United States Foreign Policy in Africa*. TransAfrica, Washington, D.C., 1983.

[50] See TransAfrica's 2nd quarter, 1985 *Clerk's Report*, House of Representatives, Clerk's Office.

between East and West rather then indigenous patriotic movements that they are."[51] This reflects TransAfrica's own position, both that liberation movements are indigenous patriotic movements, and that there is no place for East-West rivalry in southern Africa.[52] Then there were calls to continue and enforce existing embargoes against South Africa, such as the oil embargo.[53] This is important, in as much as active measures efforts always have real world applications. That is to say, they have more than symbolic importance, thus the oil embargo is not an empty action around which allies can rally, but rather has concrete usefulness for Soviet political goals. In this case it can be conjectured that the embargo was designed to place pressure on the South African economy, and help reduce the oil reserves available to the SADF in Angola and Namibia. [54] TransAfrica played a major part in the effort to cut off South African oil by leading the boycott against Shell Oil, and as was pointed out earlier, Randall Robinson desired the boycott to spread so as to affect other multinationals. It is possible to see the effort against Shell Oil, a multinational, in a larger context. At the active measures conference there was a call issued which identified multinationals (or transnationals) as the major culprits in assisting apartheid. The statement said:

> Further recognizing that 500 United States-based transnational corporations profit directly from operations based upon apartheid labor while there are growing instances of corporations closing plants in the United States and relocating in South Africa in order to take advantage of this system, at the expense of workers in both countries as United States corporations use the importation of products produced by the semi-slave labor, such as coal, to keep down the wages of their employees in this country....[55]

This opposition is well suited to the expected Soviet position on transnational corporations. In 1984 the USSR proclaimed through a publication of the USSR Academy of Sciences that:

> The economic policy of the US transnationals is aimed at continuing and strengthening the exploitation of those countries that have rid themselves of colonial domination. ...they create obstacles to the kind of development that accords with the

---

[51] *op. cit., Soviet Active Measures*, p. 315.

[52] See *Issue Brief*, December, 1982, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C. where TransAfrica makes clear its rejection of the East-West rivalry.

[53] *op. cit., Soviet Active Measures*, p. 315.

[54] South Africa produces petroleum products through coal liquification, it has no natural oil deposits, furthermore, OPEC refuses to sell to South Africa, and South Africa's major supplier of Middle Eastern oil had been Iran under the Shah, but when he was ousted the Islamic Government cut off South Africa.

[55] *op. cit., Soviet Active Measures*, p. 315.

> national interests of African countries and in the way they try to retard their social progress....[56]

It is interesting to note that the above statement from the active measures conference mentioned coal specifically. In the article on International Solidarity also mentioned coal and miners in their example of international solidarity between the US and South African Blacks. Furthermore, the reason given for the involvement of the UMW in the Shell boycott was that Shell had engaged in improper practices at its coal mines in the US and had been importing South African coal at the same time. (Thus, Shell could in theory offset the losses at the American mine, by importing cheaper South African coal.) What this suggests is that coal and the supply of energy are important issues both in opposition to apartheid as well as at that time to the Soviet global and strategic interests. The USSR may have considered coal important for military and strategic reasons, which in turn may be based upon their involvement in the war in Angola. A disruption of local supplies of coal may disturb the South African production of energy products enough to influence the way in which the SADF conducted the campaign inside Angola. Therefore, there can be little doubt that any event that influences the South African production of energy in a negative way would have probably been viewed positively among Soviet strategists. In opposing apartheid any impact on the ability of South Africa to produce domestic energy may sufficiently disrupt domestic tranquility, which in turn may influence the capacity of the SADF to act effectively. It is interesting to speculate as to whether or not the idea of boycotting Shell had been raised as early as 1981.

Other actions specified by the active measures conference included an increase of media action in support of the anti-apartheid efforts; organisation of grassroots campaigns against South Africa in local churches and community organisations; providing material and financial support for both SWAPO and the ANC; and ending sports and artistic "collaboration" with South Africa.[57] The call for ending sports and cultural links with South Africa is important in as much as TransAfrica was later instrumental in setting up Artists and Atheletes Against Apartheid, which

---

[56] *The White House and the Black Continent*, ed. Anatoly Gromyko, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1984, p. 42.

[57] *op. cit., Soviet Active Measures*, pp. 314-315.

led the effort in opposing sports and artistic links with South Africa. Those at the conference called for the establishment of "...artists' anti-apartheid coalitions..." which would lead to the dissemination of information within the "...artist community..." about South Africa and apartheid, as well as sponsor benefit concerts and lead efforts to propagandize in the name of SWAPO and the ANC.[58]

As a clear demonstration that the conference was not an isolated domestic US event, Alfred Nzo, Secretary-General of the ANC and member of the NEC was in attendance.[59] Also from the ANC was the, at that time, head of External Relations, P. Mueshihange.[60] So, while many of the actions recommended by the conference involved local actions taken to influence US policy towards South Africa, it is seems that they were not taken in isolation of the larger international environment. This ANC involvement suggests an intermestic quality about the conference, as does the front group participation.

The Embassy protests, while still three years off, may have had as their beginnings a statement published from the conference. The statement read:

> Organize campaigns directed at the State Department by sending statements, letters and telegrams of concern about the South African request to establish new consulates. Further, that these organizations be encouraged to picket those landlords who currently house South African consulates.[61]

While it is not a direct call to protest at the Embassy, it is important because during the later Embassy protests there were also protests at the South African consulates throughout the US. Furthermore, one organisation that practices the sending out of telegrams and letters, and that was well geared to performing such acts was TransAfrica, though of course others were probably equally able. Previously it was pointed out that it runs the Action Alert system, which utilizes their members in campaigns to write letters and send telegrams.

The final declaration issued at the end of the conference called for "...comprehensive and

---

[58] *ibid.*, p. 323.

[59] "US Solidarity Conference", *Sechaba*, January, 1982, p.16.

[60] *ibid.*, p. 16.

[61] *op. cit.*, *Soviet Active Measures*, p. 317.

mandatory economic, military, diplomatic and cultural sanctions..." against South Africa, which included "...an effective oil embargo."[62] The declaration clearly illustrated the logic that makes the US an important player in opposition to apartheid:

> We have a special responsibility to play and are charged with a unique responsibility. It is our government that keeps apartheid alive, feeds it, oils it, and arms it. The heroic people of the ANC and SWAPO are destroying apartheid from within, but only we can end our government's pact with racism, which if not obliterated will destroy us all. This conference proudly takes up this fight and joins the peoples of the world.[63]

It can be deduced that the conference supports the ANC and SWAPO, that their political programme is paramount, and that there is no support for other indigenous anti-apartheid groups that are not allied with either the ANC or SWAPO. This is not surprising as both these organisations are recognized by the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, it can be deduced that the conference had as its task carrying out the wishes of the ANC and SWAPO, as well as a variety of other NGO's and states, because they are seen as the only legitimate opposition in South Africa and Namibia. As a final action, designed to carry on support for the ANC and SWAPO the conference adopted the proposal that the preparatory committee continue on as a coordinating committee for actions against apartheid.[64] Once again, the President of the preparatory committee was Rep. Ron Dellums. Therefore, it can be expected that his actions would to a certain extent reflect the wishes of the committee. Further, those involved with Dellums may also be acting to further the goals of the committee.

In conclusion, it can be said that this conference is a great illustrator of intermestic affairs, in as much as it clearly demonstrates the intermixing of domestic interests and transnational behaviour. For example, any discussion of US boycotts is not only a discussion on symbolic opposition to apartheid, but it is also a device for directly attacking apartheid. Furthermore, it is seeking to alter the domestic economy for foreign policy purposes. In fact, one could almost go so far as to say that the conference was intended to design intermestic projects that would influence

---

[62] *op. cit.*, "US Solidarity Conference", p. 16.

[63] *ibid.*, p. 16.

[64] *ibid.*, p.16.

foreign policy behaviour in the US.

This conference also presents many questions, including to what extent (if any) was this a tool used by Soviet bloc foreign policy interests? This may not, though, be the most important question, because there is no way to tell whether or not 1) the conference was a success form the standpoint of Soviet bloc interests, and 2) there is no way to tell what impact that conference had, it may not have changed any viewpoints or altered the public perception at all. There is evidence which would suggest that TransAfrica has not really changed its behaviour in any substantive way. Since its inception, TransAfrica has been opposed to apartheid, and has also supported to some extent the ANC and SWAPO since 1977. If the groups mentioned above are indeed parts of the Soviet bloc apparatus, they have tried to make use of TransAfrica and surely TransAfrica has tried to make use of them. What is less likely, though, is that TransAfrica is in any way run or operated by these groups. There simply is no firm evidence that would support that point. Perhaps the most that can be said about the conference is that it was carrying out the objectives and interests of the CPUSA. One of the objectives of this conference was to establish domestic support for the CPUSA/USPC position on southern Africa. The conference was to attract a variety of groups who would then give legitimacy to the CPUSA/USPC position. What is unclear is whether the CPUSA was indeed happy with the outcome of the conference, and whether the outcome matched the CPUSA's wishes. From the perspective of successful manipulation of the public, the question arises did the conference matter?

What this type of conference demonstrates, as well as other conferences not so tainted by questions, is that there are a variety of domestic groups, which pay attention to the political interests of other groups, organisations and states. TransAfrica has been involved in several such conferences and it is worth pursuing its involvement in order to understand more about its behaviour and how it may be trying to alter the global agenda with the assistance of many other groups.

TransAfrica and the Government in Waiting: The ANC

The above two cases were attempts at illustrating how TransAfrica interacts with and is involved with states and state sponsored NGO's. This section is intended to illustrate how TransAfrica interacts with a NGO that seeks to become or at least have a major stake in a future state. Thus, TransAfrica's relationship with the ANC will be examined. TransAfrica and the FSAM play a role both in supporting the ANC, as well as receiving input from the ANC - thus it is a two way street. Already much of the detail regarding the relationship between the ANC and TransAfrica has been mentioned (see chapter four). What will be illustrated here is that there is a close relationship between the ANC and TransAfrica and that both groups seek to assist one another in their projects. The linkage between the ANC and TransAfrica leads to the creation of an intermestic environment where the actions of the ANC along with those of TransAfrica combine to take on the features of domestic policy in the US. In order to understand this intermestic relationship it is important to understand the nature of the relationship between the two groups.

At the most basic level there are several known meetings between Randall Robinson and members of the ANC, including the June 8 Washington Conference meeting between Tambo and Robinson, as well as that of October 9-11, at the Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa held in New York, both in 1981, and the 1984 North American Regional Conference. Furthermore, an ANC interviewer was in contact with Robinson in 1979 or earlier.[65]

A further connection between the ANC and TransAfrica is carried in the same issue of *Sechaba* as the Robinson interview. Wyatt Tee Walker, a minister from New York City, and Secretary General of the International Freedom Mobilization (IFM) said that he started the IFM "...through the urging and sponsorship of the African National Congress, of which Oliver Tambo is President, and his permanent representative at the UN is Johnny Makatini." [66] Dr. Walker also

[65] See "Randall Robinson," *Sechaba*, November, 1979, pp. 22-23.

[66] "Dr. Wyotte T. Walker"[sic], *Sechaba*, November, 1979, pp.23-24. Walker worked with the SCLC for several years, along with Dr. King, Ralph Abernathy and Joseph Lowery.

serves as a board member of TransAfrica.[67] Dr. Walker said in his Sechaba interview:

> One of the most important things we have done is that we bombarded the White House and Mr. Carter with telegrams and letters in cooperation with Transafrica [sic] headed by Randall Robinson, for him to keep his position of the sanctions against 'Zimbabwe-Rhodesia'.... This is a part of our overall and broad programme to try to help support the liberation struggle in the region of South Africa.[68]

Clearly, Walker and Robinson have been allied, and the ANC was at the very least having some impact on the IFM and Walker. Through Walker's relationship with the ANC, and his board position with TransAfrica, it seems reasonable to say that TransAfrica and the ANC have a close relationship, though it is unclear exactly what role Walker plays in that relationship.

As expected the ANC holds the Free South Africa Movement, led by TransAfrica and Randall Robinson, in high regard. President Tambo said in 1985:

> We pay tribute to the millions of people involved in the ever-expanding work within the worldwide anti-apartheid movement.... In this context we welcome the momentous campaign undertaken by the people of the United States, which involves legislators, judges, bishops, trade unionists and other outstanding personalities and government officials, and which is targeted on pressuring the Reagan Administration to reverse its support for the Pretoria regime.[69]

The collection of legislators, judges and so on all constitute the FSAM. The FSAM, along with the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, was described as having "...fully exposed the bankruptcy of the policies pursued by the Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan Administrations...."[70] In another Tambo address to the NEC, he referred to the FSAM as "inspiring", and indicated that "...the solidarity movement in the United States..." was led by the FSAM.[71] Tambo gave the movement another sign of support when he wrote in World Marxist Review (the official organ of the CPSU International Department):

> We express our deep appreciation for the magnificent efforts deployed by various anti-apartheid groups, particularly in the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Italy - the major allies of the South African regime- in pressuring their governments and the transnational corporations based in their countries to disengage from bolstering the apartheid economy and its military machinery.[72]

---

[67] *op. cit., Information Digest*, December 28, 1984, p. 381.

[68] *op. cit.*, "Dr. Wyotte T. Walker", p. 24.

[69] "Render South Africa Ungovernable", *Sechaba*, March, 1985, p. 14.

[70] Nzo, Alfred, "65 Years of the South African Communist Party", *Sechaba*, September 1986, p. 21.

[71] "Attack! Advance! Give the Enemy no Quarter!", *Sechaba*, March, 1986, p. 11.

[72] Tambo, Oliver, "Storm over South Africa", *World Marxist Review*, January 1986, p. 87.

Tambo also mentions that the US Congress had forced Reagan to make "...some tactical adjustments" which were largely due to the actions of TransAfrica and the FSAM.[73]

TransAfrica has also assisted in providing financial support for the ANC. Financial and material support are offered to the ANC through the FSAM fund raising efforts and through the South African Support Project (SASP). TransAfrica, along with other members of the FSAM, gave $40,000 in 1987 to the ANC.[74] The SASP has given at least $100,000 (by 1984) in financial and material support to the ANC.[75] SASP not only is a member of the FSAM but has also been deeply involved in the day to day operation of the Embassy protests, taking on the task of the day to day operation.[76] SASP is an organisation which seeks to raise funds and materials for national liberation groups in southern Africa. Its head, Sylvia Hill, member of the FSAM steering committee, helped to convene the Washington Conference in 1981, attended the 1984 North American Regional meeting in New York City, and has met with Oliver Tambo in 1985.

Thus, it seems likely that both the ANC and TransAfrica have a close relationship, and that both interact to assist the other in various domestic and international projects. What seems unlikely though is that the ANC formulates any of the policies or projects for TransAfrica or the FSAM. There is no evidence to support such a claim, though it is possible that the ANC encourages and urges members of TransAfrica or the FSAM in various projects. This assertion may be supported by the Walker involvement in the IFM programme and TransAfrica. What ties the two together, at least from TransAfrica's standpoint, is diaspora politics - a commitment to ending white rule in South Africa. Whether it is diaspora politics that links the ANC to TransAfrica (from the ANC's point of view) is another thing altogether. There are some suggestions, however, mentioned in chapter four, where David Ndaba states that there exists a linkage between the two groups based upon their common African heritage. Whether this represents the NEC view is not clear. The ANC's multiracial stance might, however, suggest

---

[73] *ibid.*, p. 87.

[74] "ANC Breakthrough," *TransAfrica News*, Volume 6, Number 2, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C., p. 1.

[75] *op. cit.*, Counts, Hill and Hill, p. 44.

[76] Barker, Karlyn and Michel Marriott, "Antiapartheid Protest Widens", *Washington Post*, December 4, 1984, p. A8.

otherwise.[77]

TransAfrica and other NGO's

TransAfrica has had dealings with groups other than states, state sponsored NGO's, and governments in waiting. The bulk of TransAfrica's dealings concern other NGO's. This section, then, will examine the nature of TransAfrica's relations with other NGO's and will hopefully offer some understanding of how TransAfrica operates within this environment. In order to examine TransAfrica's relationship to other NGO's it will be useful to look at two conferences held to consider the subject of apartheid. Neither of these conferences include only NGO's, but the NGO presence is sufficiently strong that they may be considered as useful examples of NGO behaviour. These two conferences are fine examples of intermestic affairs at work, whereby linkages and interconnections are formed between those things formerly considered the sole field of international affairs and those considered domestic. The first conference, held in Washington, D.C., was called around the issue of ethnicity, diaspora politics and apartheid. The second, held in New York, was aimed at North American NGO participation in opposing apartheid.

The first conference was hosted by TransAfrica, along with the South Africa Support Project (SASP), run by Sylvia Hill and was entitled "Building Forces Against United States Support for South Africa". The conference, which took place at Howard University and was held on June 8, 1981, issued a National Declaration.[78] The National Declaration was issued on behalf of black Americans. Its authors state:

> Black America's concern grows out of the fact that our oppression and exploitation spring from the same sources as that of the South African masses. The shops that "run way" [refers to jobs that have left the US for some foreign setting] from us here, "run" to oppress our sisters and brothers in South Africa, where the apartheid system artificially supresses the value of their work. We understand that the struggle for South Africa and Namibia is inextricably linked with the struggle for a better life in the United States.[79]

---

[77] This is not to say that diaspora links cannot exist outside of a monoracial setting. Rather, it simply suggests that the multiracial position of the ANC may suggest a lack of commitment to diaspora politics. Therefore, it can be said that while multiracialism does not imply the non-existence of diaspora politics, it does, however, suggest that diaspora may not necessarily be present.

[78] This conference was held four months prior to the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa, held October 9-11, 1981, see above.

[79] *Declaration of the Conference on Building Forces Against United States Support for South Africa Held on 8 June*

Not only does the above paragraph indicate that the causes of racial oppression are the same in each country, but that the causes of an improved future are equally similar. It is also interesting to note that a shorter yet similar version of this paragraph appears in the later active measures conference. The paragraph reads in part: "Further recognizing the interrelationship between unemployment in the United States, runaway shops, the exploitation of labor in Southern Africa and United States investments in Southern Africa...," there then follows a set of instructions aimed at religious and community organisations, who are to act so as to break the interrelationship between all these items.[80] The Washington Conference illustrates the strong interconnection between the US, South Africa and Namibia. This connection is clearly illustrated, once again, by the presence of Oliver Tambo, president of the ANC, Moses Garoeb, Administrative Secretary of SWAPO and representatives of the South African Congress of Trade Unions. [81] Tambo said at the conference: "Not only are you our natural allies but you have inspired us with your struggle."[82] Tambo's mention of the 'natural' alliance is obviously a linkage between black Americans and black South Africans, thus it is a diaspora linkage. This linkage, at this moment, is the conduit through which the ANC become a domestic actor in the US - thus creating intermestic affairs. Clearly, leaders of Southern African liberation movements sought in 1981 to use contacts in the US to bolster their international position. They, too, were willing to use the racial political situation in the US for their own purposes. The conference delegates clearly understood that impact domestic politics can have on foreign policy -"We realize, therefore, that in order to create change in our Government's foreign policy, we must create change here at home." [83] These statements also reflect the later written article by Counts, Hill and Hill, stating the linkage between the fate of US and South African blacks.

Out of the conference came a working group, which had the mandate to follow two specific projects. The first was "...development of a scheme for a mass education drive..." on "...United

---

1981 in Washington, D.C., UN General Assembly, UN Doc A/AC.115/L.552, 1981, p. 4.

[80] *op. cit., Soviet Active Measures*, p. 317.

[81] Danley, Cheryl, "Tambo Meets Black Activists", *Southern Africa*, July-Augusst, 1981, p. 16.

[82] *ibid.*, p. 16.

[83] *op. cit.*, Un Doc A/AC.115/L.552, p. 4.

States foreign policy toward southern Africa...."[84] This first project was further described:

> The working group should devise mechanisms to provide the American people with accurate information and images about the situation in southern Africa. The objective of the drive should be to educate and organize people for action, based not merely on a moral imperative but rather on an understanding of the nature and function of war, racism and oppression the world. These efforts should be based initially in the black American community but should move outward from that base to interact with allied communities, e.g. Hispanics, Asians, native Americans, and all working class people.[85]

This education project was to move away from the subjective revulsion against war, and move to demonstrate the conflict in southern Africa in objective terms, whatever they may be. The second project is the "...preparation of an assessment of the position/locations of black Americans, geographically, professionally, etc., through the United States, in relationship to the implementation process of foreign policy decisions."[86] This second project is obviously related to the first. One cannot concentrate one's efforts in the black community if one does not know who and what is in the black community.

The outcome of this Washington Conference is important to the whole anti-apartheid movement, in that it helped to secure black American support, and involvement with established anti-apartheid projects and groups. The conference helped to validate TransAfrica's role in the black community. Furthermore, it allowed leaders of SWAPO and the ANC to appeal to black American groups, to secure their support for these two national liberation groups.[87] It also provided a useful network development, which could lead to the founding of new contacts and new allies within the US political environment. Thus, the Washington Conference provided a useful step into US domestic politics for the ANC and provided a useful ally for TransAfrica to use in their efforts to influence US foreign policy towards South Africa.

The second conference which deserves mention here occurs three years after the Washington Conference. It is mentioned because it follows a similar pattern to other conferences, in that it

---

[84] *ibid.*, p. 5.

[85] *ibid.*, p. 5.

[86] *ibid.*, p. 5.

[87] Recall earlier that there had been some estrangement between black Americans and the ANC. This is demonstrated by the ANC's reaction to Stokely Carmichael.

brings together many of the same people who attended the 1981 conferences mentioned above. It is important because it occurs just prior to the Embassy protests, and therefore may have served some organisational functions both for the protests as well as the North American region itself. The Conference was entitled the North American Regional Conference for Action Against Apartheid, held in New York City on June 18-21, 1984, on the eighth anniversary of the Soweto uprisings. Convened at the UN, the conference brought together a variety of anti-apartheid activists from all over North America, as well as representatives of groups from all over the world. The conference is important not only because it brought together so many activists, but also because of what was going on in southern Africa at the time. It would be impossible to isolate the events in New York from those in southern Africa. The representatives of the NGO's would certainly be reacting to the events in that region. Up to the time of the conference southern Africa had experienced SADF violence, South African Constitutional reform, an increase in violence within South Africa, and the signing of non-aggression pacts between South Africa and its neighbours (see chapter three). These actions in southern Africa help to mold and to influence the actions taken in New York, which then lead to influence actions taken across North America.

Up until the moment of the North American Conference, what was arguably the most threatening action taken against the anti-apartheid movement and national liberation movements in the entire southern African region had been the signing of the Nkomati Accord, on March 16, 1984 between South Africa and Mozambique. The Accord can be seen as one of the more significant threats to the ANC, in that the ANC possessed 'rear' bases in Mozambique, as well as bases used for training. The ANC would be expelled from Mozambique, thus losing an important resource. Clearly, for the ANC and its allies, there was an incentive to negate the actions of the Accord. Either they had to be vilified or worked to the ANC's advantage, and that would be difficult. The easier path of vilification was the chosen course. Alfred Nzo, General Secretary of the NEC of the ANC stated in *Sechaba* in May, 1984 that:

> The Botha regime knows that no peace has broken out: rather, it has resorted to other means to continue its war for the domination of southern Africa.[88]

[88] "ANC on the Nkomati Accord", *Sechaba*, May 1984, p. 4.

Clearly, the ANC was not willing to applaud the action, nor were they willing to take the different line of action that might make use of the Accord, such as admitting that while they would lose some bases in Mozambique, the Accord was, nonetheless, unimportant. Instead, the ANC reacted with rhetorical violence:

> We are convinced that this regime, which is dripping from head to foot with the blood of thousands of people it has murdered throughout southern Africa, cannot be an architect of justice and peace in our region.[89]

There is little doubt that Nzo and the NEC were less than pleased with the outcome of the Nkomati Accord.

Nzo makes clear, however, that the ANC needed and wanted help from the international community. Nzo said: "We are entitled to expect that all those anywhere in the world, who count themselves among the anti-colonial and anti-racist forces, will join hands with us..." and help over throw the South African government.[90] He goes on to give instructions for what the National Executive want of their allies:

> We are equally certain that the rest of Africa and the world progressive community will continue to deny the Botha regime the legitimacy it craves so desperately, adopt new measures to isolate it and increase their political, diplomatic, moral and material support to the ANC. [91]

What is clear is that the North American Conference was, if not in original intent, going to address the needs of the ANC in fighting the effect of the Nkomati Accord.

The conference had for its agenda the following: 1) review of the situation in southern Africa, 2) review of North American governmental actions "with respect to the struggle for liberation in South Africa....", 3) review of actions taken by local governments, as well as other organizations, 4) review of specific campaigns and proposals for action, and finally 5) a "Declaration and Programme of Action".[92] Attending the conference, from South African national liberation groups were: from ANC Thomas Nkobi, Treasurer General, Johnny Makatini, head of

---

[89] *ibid.*, p. 4.

[90] *ibid.*, p. 5.

[91] *ibid.*, p. 5.

[92] *Report of the North American Regional Conference for Action Against Apartheid*, UN General Assembly, August 29, 1984, UN Doc A/AC.115/L.614, pp. 3-4.

the International Department; from the PAC were Joseph Mkwanazi, Administrative Secretary, Ahmed Gor Ibrahim, Permanent Observer to the UN, and Molese Mafole, chief representative to the US; and from SWAPO were Sam Nujoma, President, Kapuka Mauyala, Central Committee member, and Theo-Ben Gurirab, Permanent Observer to the UN.[93] With the presence of the PAC along with the ANC it is likely that this would have been a lively conference, since there is no love lost between the PAC and the ANC. It is suggestive though, of an agreement between the PAC and the ANC to join forces with regard to creating a strong US anti-apartheid movement. This conference, as far as has been determined, is the only evidence of such a tactical pact between the two groups.

In attendance from the US were a variety of groups and individuals. Among the major anti-apartheid groups and organisations were TransAfrica (represented by Randall Robinson and Board member Willard Johnson), Frank Ferrari and Margaret Novicki of the African American Institute, the American Friends Service Committee, American Committee on Africa, represented by Jennifer Davis and George Houser, Clergy and Laity Concerned, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, the Southern African Support Project, represented by Sylvia Hill, and the Washington Office on Africa, represented by Jean Sindab. [94]

In addition to the American anti-apartheid groups were three other notable Americans, Senator Edward Kennedy, Rt. Honorable Andrew Young, and Rev. Jesse Jackson. Each offered his suggestions for action to be taken. Kennedy called for maintaining export controls to South Africa, stricter interpretation of dual use equipment that may have military use, ending of all new loans by US businesses to the South African government, introduction of heavy fines for all US companies that "...violate United Nations Decree No. 1, which prohibits foreign exploitation of Namibian mineral wealth until Namibia attains independence...."[95] Jackson declared:

---

[93] *ibid.*, pp. 69-70.
[94] *ibid.*, pp. 70-76.
[95] *ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

> This Conference today can be yet another milestone pointing United States public opinion in a new direction, one that insists United States Africa policy be consistent with justice and world peace. This requires a new formula in our relations with South Africa. .... Not one more United States corporation should be licensed to do business in South Africa, and the more than 350 United States corporations already doing business must be given a strictly enforced timetable for coming out of South Africa.[96]

Rt. Honorable Andrew Young made the most optimistic of statements when he said, "We have the resources, we have the awareness, we have the technology to put an end to racism and *apartheid.*"[97] Perhaps for Young the twentieth century, which had brought the tools for increasing awareness and communication on a global scale, would then bring the tools for ending what DuBois saw as the bane of the twentieth century - racism.

Not only were anti-apartheid groups in attendance, but others who had been involved with active measures programmes in the past. These included the Christian Peace Conference, the Women's International Democratic Federation, and the World Federation of Trade Unions - all of which are identified by the FBI as Soviet front groups. Also in attendance was Gus Newport, Vice President of the WPC and mayor of Berkely, California. Another group in attendance, with notable leftist background, was the National Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression (NAARPR), which was represented by CPUSA members Angela Davis, Charlene Mitchell, and Maria Ramos.[98] Charlene Mitchell runs the Afro-American Affairs section of the CPUSA, Davis was the 1984 vice presidential candidate on the CPUSA ticket and serves as the co-chair of the NAARPR (a CPUSA auxiliary). [99] Davis made the keynote address to the North American Regional Conference. While the above list should not be taken to indicate that the conference was an active measures programme, it can be said that at the very least the conference had in attendance those who may have been involved in active measures in the past. It is always possible that this conference could have been used, or at least attempted to be used, by Soviet bloc foreign policy instruments. There is, however, no evidence for this, other than the presence of the above

---

[96] *ibid.*, p. 52.

[97] *ibid.*, p. 61. Emphasis original.

[98] *ibid.*, pp. 72-76.

[99] *Yearbook of International Communist Affairs, 1985*, ed. Richard Staar, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California, pp.131-133.

groups. It is interesting to speculate as to why Angela Davis was allowed to give a keynote address to the conference. The CPUSA is not very representative of US public opinion, and it is unwise to be seen to assist CPUSA members if one wishes to develop a 'middle of the road' constituency. It would make more sense, given that the conference was dealing with opposition to apartheid, to have a member of one of the anti-apartheid groups give a keynote address.

As was pointed out earlier, Nzo had called for world progressives to deny any legitimacy to the Botha regime, and the conference members responded by supporting the statement that: "The South African regime is intensifying repression internally and conducting an aggressive campaign to create the illusion of change in South Africa externally."[100] This is a clear reference to the Nkomati Accord, as well as to the constitutional changes. As a further illustration of implementation of Nzo's directives, the Conference passed the following statement:

> We call for an active educational campaign against the idea that the Reagan Administration has scored a major foreign policy victory through the vehicle of "constructive engagement". This campaign should underscore United States collusion with South African regime on the propagation of apartheid as a foreign policy, witnessed in accords such as Nkomati. It should underscore the propaganda value that both the South African Government and the United States place in a presidential election year; and the campaign should make known the recent historical dynamics of the southern Africa region vis-a-vis United States and South African foreign policy and the resultant "peace through coercion" as represented in agreements such as Nkomati. These accords or agreements are usually signed after intensive and cruel assaults by the armed forces of South African apartheid Government.[101]

The call for an educational programme, which may be better regarded as a call for a propaganda campaign, is clearly in line with Nzo's call for removing any legitimacy from the Botha regime. This campaign would be carried out in the US by the various anti-apartheid groups, including TransAfrica. It is also possible to read the above paragraph as a toned down version of Nzo's treatment of US involvement over the Nkomati Accord. Nzo wrote:

> ...the Reagan administration [sic] of the United States, with its apartheid policy of "constructive engagement", [cannot] be an architect of justice and peace in this region, while it is an angel of war, reaction and repression in other regions of the world, including the United States itself.[102]

---

[100] *op. cit.*, UN Doc A/AC.115/L.614, p.19.

[101] *ibid.*, p. 21.

[102] *op. cit.*, "ANC on the Nkomati Accord", p. 4.

Nzo's 'angel of war' seems an intellectual antecedent of the North American Conference's 'peace through coercion', both implying that peace is unobtainable through constructive engagement. Each statement is an illustration of the interaction between US policy and the local situation in southern Africa. The attention given to both the Nkomati Accord and the efforts of rapprochement by South Africa by the participants of the North American Regional Conference are clear indicators of the intermestic qualities of the Conference.

In its programme of action the conference called for, among other things, local governments passing divestment bills, cessation of IMF loans to South Africa, increased lobbying for divestment, strengthened arms embargo, ending intelligence cooperation with South Africa, enhanced oil embargo actions, an end of cultural contacts with South Africa, and terminating any planned cooperation with South Africa with the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).[103] Calls were also made for an increase in the amount of material and financial assistance offered to the national liberation movements, creation of a grass-roots campaign to educate the public on liberation movements, so they become "...not only anti-apartheid but also pro-national liberation....", [104] and enhanced action by trade unions, including supporting action by dockworkers, with the intention of "...stronger measures..." in implementing the oil and arms embargo against South Africa. [105] It is interesting to note the specific reference to the dock workers in as much as later in October and November of 1984 that the Longshoremen's Union in San Fransisco indeed did undertake actions against South Africa, by refusing to off load cargo. Again, this type of action was also mentioned in the International Solidarity article.

What is interesting about the above is that not only does this list contain the expected list of anti-apartheid actions, but it also contains one item that is suggestive of a propaganda push. The call for recognizing not only an anti-apartheid stance, but a pro-liberation movement stance as well, is interesting because it suggests that part of the objective is not just support for opposition to

---

[103] Terminating any cooperation with the RDF was identified in the active measures conference. The USSR also condemns the RDF, it has said: "In Africa the US administration forms military bases so that is Rapid Deployment Force can interfere in the internal affairs of any of the progressive states." See *op. cit.*, Gromyko, p. 32.

[104] *op. cit.*, UN Doc A/AC.115/L.614, p. 26.

[105] *ibid.*, p. 26.

apartheid, but opposition in a particular way. Put differently, support for liberation movements, instead of only anti-apartheid, leads to the creation of a pro-PLO, pro-Polisario, pro-FMLN, and other such groups. Many who opposed apartheid might be surprised to find themselves supporting some of the above mentioned groups. This position is perhaps rather unusual in the US, where the structure of pro-national liberation movement issues holds little appeal for US public opinion. There is sufficient categorical precedence in the US opposed to pro-national liberation movements virtually assure that this stance failed. Another call in the programme of action is worthy of mention, which says: "...anti-apartheid organizations and individuals...[should] link their concerns with those of organizations and individuals which are engaged in other but such other related issues as Central America and nuclear disarmament."[106] Thus, the anti-apartheid movement seeks to use its ties with other groups, especially in the areas of Central America and nuclear disarmament to build a coalition of forces. In that way, if done successfully, each group can call on the resources of groups outside their own speciality. The anti-apartheid movement, which draws on the transnational themes of anti-colonialism, anti-racism, and diaspora politics seeks to draw on those groups which are connected in transnational ways somewhat different from themselves.

Not only was the conference interested in building coalitions within the US, but it was also interested in building support for one of the major vehicles of change in South Africa, namely the ANC. An illustration of the conference support comes from a report written by Jeanne Woods, of the National Anti-Imperialist Movement in Solidarity with African Liberation (NAIMSA), which was presented to the conference. The report was later reprinted at the request of the Special Committee Against Apartheid, and is entitled *Five Years of Armed Struggle in South Africa*. The report is in part a history of the struggle against South African authorities and in part a prescription

---

[106] *ibid.*, p. 27. The linkage with the nuclear disarmament and freeze groups is an attempt to broaden the base for opposition to apartheid. Jean Sindab, of WOA and who figured prominently in the North American meeting said earlier in 1984: "The freeze movement needs a Third World handle on the issue that they can use to mobilize people other than white middle-class activists. They're not going to make this their top priority, but when there's a critical vote coming on, we can call on them and ask them to pull out some people to do some work for us. See Maren, Michael, "Building a Constituency Against Apartheid", *Africa Report*, May-June 1984, p. 58. Not only does the anti-nuclear connection with anti-apartheid make sense from a tactical point of view, it also figures into (at that time) South Africa's refusal to sign to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and US/South African nuclear collaboration. Both groups had a logic in opposing South Africa, quite apart from the tactical moves of the day.

for continued opposition. In the final pages of the report Woods recounts the ANC's Four Pillars of struggle, and gives special emphasis on the Fourth Pillar. Woods correctly states the Fourth Pillar as: "the international drive to isolate the regime and win worldwide moral, political and material support for the struggle."[107] Woods went on to say:

> In construction of this fourth pillar, the people of the United States have a pivotal role to play. In a real sense, we share a common struggle with the people of South Africa, [and] face a common enemy. [108]

This is an echo of an earlier statement, when the Washington Conference issued the National Declaration, which drew a connection between the fate of South African blacks and the situation in the US, and it is equally similar to the linkage mentioned in building 'International Solidarity'. What this suggests is that those at the conference were aware of the ANC's Fourth Pillar, and knew too the role they had to play in assisting the Fourth Pillar. It also illustrates the relationship between domestic politics in the US and the politics of opposition in southern Africa. It is another illustration of intermestic affairs at work in the US.

In conclusion both the Washington Conference and the North American Regional Conference are useful examples of the nature of NGO behaviour in the US on the issue of apartheid. Each conference has illustrated that there are a variety of NGO's which come together on this issue, and that they do so in order to influence public opinion, which in turn should influence governmental action. The conference also illustrates the importance that the ANC places on such meetings. Both conferences were attended by ranking members of the National Executive Committee. Each conference, furthermore, identified specific actions that would be taken to assist the ANC in their search for ending white rule in South Africa.

In many ways, though, the conferences failed to achieve any major results. This may be due to the relative complexity of the issues presented. For example, how does one explain specific embargos against South Africa to the US electorate? It would be far easier simply to talk in terms of ending all relations with South Africa, because it is conceptually easier to comprehend - it is a

---

[107] Woods, Jeanne, *Five Years of Armed Struggle in South Africa*, 1984, UN Centre Against Apartheid, p.13.

[108] *ibid.*, p. 13.

simple idea, versus the more complex selective actions. While the NGO's may be able to represent their issues to Congress and gain results on Capitol Hill, they seem to have found it far more difficult to persuade the American public on specific actions.

The two conferences, however, also contain the elements of success. In 1981 opposition to apartheid was not a front page issue, yet in 1984 and 1985 it was headline news. This is largely due to the entry of former civil rights activists into the anti-apartheid fray. These activists are best represented by TransAfrica, and it was largely due to their actions that apartheid became a front page issue. The Washington Conference marked the beginning of an organised black American entry into the anti-apartheid movement. It is true that black Americans had been present prior to that, but it was the combination of organisational strength, black elected official power, and the building of coalitions within the black community that led to eventual success.

Conclusion

In this chapter the nature of TransAfrica's involvement with various transnational groups has been considered. The first group examined was the People' Republic of Grenada and TransAfrica's relationship to that group. It became clear from that relationship that TransAfrica does indeed deal with states, and does so based upon the exegencies of diaspora politics. Furthermore, TransAfrica sought, in the case of the PRG, to establish domestic US concerns over an issue more usually considered the realm of foreign policy. Thus, the US relationship to the PRG was in TransAfrica's eyes an intermestic issue. TransAfrica, however, failed to accomplish the creation of a sufficiently strong link between the fate of the PRG and black Americans.

Following the PRG example, TransAfrica's relationship with state sponsored NGO's was examined. The example there was the 1981 active measures conference, where TransAfrica and a number of other groups attended a conference with groups usually identified with Soviet bloc foreign policy instruments. This was an illustration that in the context of transnational relations there may come times when groups, agencies, and the state find themselves in situations which meet the needs of other such groups or agencies. Yet, this situation may not in fact be quite as clear as one may expect. This is so because one set of groups may seek to use another set of

groups for their own purposes, which may not be clearly stated. It also appeared in this example, that while there may be present a certain level of manipulation, it may not matter that much in the final outcome. Put another way, different groups with different interests in the world, may recommend the same actions because it fits their needs. This seems to have been likely in the case in the active measures conference.

TransAfrica's relationship to a government in waiting, namely the ANC, is perhaps one of the best illustrations of intermestic affairs at work. Both the ANC and TransAfrica depended upon one another to carry out many of their wishes. Domestically, TransAfrica speaks with greater authority on the issue of anti-apartheid if it can do so allied with the anti-apartheid group the ANC. The ANC can gain valuable financial support, as well as political support from their relationship and ties to black Americans, which comes through its relationship with TransAfrica.

Finally, TransAfrica and other NGO's clearly demonstrate their transnational character by the actions it takes in concert to influence the course of events in southern Africa. Within the US these NGO's seek to create domestic constituencies for opposition to apartheid, thus creating an intermestic issue. Outside the US these groups operate to cross fertilize movements, provide funding for various projects, and seek to influence the actions of governments in relations to southern Africa. They can be said to be truly creating a global constituency against apartheid.

There can be no doubt that TransAfrica is an important player in the building of that global constituency. The basis for its actions rests on diaspora politics and its manifestation in the US. TransAfrica has demonstrated itself fully capable of influencing and being influenced by governments, national liberation movements, and a variety of NGO's. The actions of TransAfrica also suggest that there is indeed a sizeable domestic constituency in the US on the issue of apartheid. This chapter has shown that TransAfrica has been able to make use of that constituency and has been able to play a meaningful transnational role.

CHAPTER SIX
Conclusion: The Synthesis of Interdependence, Ethnicity and Anti-Apartheid

There are several different points that must be addressed if an understanding of TransAfrica is to be of any value. First, it must be made clear the extent to which TransAfrica is the fulfillment of a long running historical trend. Second, TransAfrica's importance as an anti-apartheid actor, both domestically and in southern Africa must be established, as well as its influence on US foreign policy. It is only by addressing these areas that an understanding of the interaction between interdependence, ethnicity and anti-apartheid can be established. The objective of this work was to establish whether or not and if so the degree to which interdependence, ethnicity and anti-apartheid interact. Having examined TransAfrica and the sociohistorical context in which it finds itself there can be little doubt that there is indeed an interaction between interdependence, ethnicity and anti-apartheid. Yet, in order to grasp exactly the nature of this interaction it is important to address the areas highlighted above.

TransAfrica and the Past

While it is probably true to say that very few black Americans cared much for the issues of foreign policy, it is equally true that few white Americans did either. Thus, like their white brethren, blacks were probably just as isolationist in character. What is also probably true is that while the plurality of whites and blacks cared little or nothing for the international world, there were some who cared very deeply about it. This is the place where any question of interest in foreign policy must begin, in as much as it would be incorrect to equate population size and interest with influence. Those black Americans who were interested in foreign policy were, by and large, the educated leadership of black America. W.E.B. DuBois was one such leader, and it is through DuBois and others in leadership positions that much can be learned about black American interest in foreign policy.

It should be clear that there is a certain lack of consistency within the black community, as within any given ethnic community, about foreign policy interests, opinions were not and are not monolithic. As an illustration of the historical divide in opinions on foreign policy it might be

useful to offer an illustration. Prior to the Spanish American War there appeared an editorial in the *Cleveland Gazette,* which called for black Americans to support the war effort. It read in part:

> Very assuredly every intelligent and loyal black man who feels the least personal concern for his surroundings will not only desire a peaceful settlement of the difficulties, but will in case of an actual break between Spain and our government feel himself in duty bound to lend all aid, encourage and support his government and if need be offer himself in vindication of the national defense.[1]

The call for support is contrasted with the following from *The Richmond Planet:*

> Nearly all the leaders and fighters in the Cuban army of liberation are men who, if in South Carolina..., would be made to ride in the 'Jim Crow Cars,' and would be refused the right to occupy a private residence on Beach St., in Boston.
>
> The question which must be answered in the face of such facts as these at such a time as this is, Shall the Liberty Cause in Cuba be thus betrayed and sacrificed without a determined resistance by liberty men and women everywhere? ... I ask the question because the American Negro cannot become the ally of Imperialism without enslaving his own race...[2]

Together these two illustrate a wide divergence of opinion and attitude among black leadership. This divergence continues today, though surely along different lines. What is always dangerous in any use of history is the desire to draw connections where none exist. Ronald L. Walters, in an essay about anti-slavery, entitled "The Boundaries of Abolitionism" argues this point when he writes:

> Historians in the 1960's overemphasized the parallel between past and present - they gave too much attention to such similarities as civil disobedience, disobedience, 'extreme' language and behavior, and the desire to create a racially egalitarian society. That led to an illusion of connectedness, a false feeling that there must have been a linear progression from the abolitionists to the Freedom Riders and SDS. Yet a characteristic of American radicalism and reform is discontinuity, a failure to sustain movements and institutions across generations. An irony of the post-World War II American Left is that an Indian, Mohandas K. Gandhi, had greater influence on radical nonviolence than our own most prominent nonresistant, William Lloyd Garrison. Antislavery was not a living presence in the 1950s and 1960s; it was rediscovered, largely by academics and not by men and women centrally involved in agitation.[3]

---

[1] "Anticipating the Outbreak of War, 1898," *A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States,* Volume II, ed. Herbert Aptheker, The Citadel Press, New York, 1968, p. 822.

[2] "The Negro's Anti-Imperialism, 1898-99," in *ibid.*, pp. 823-824.

[3] Walter, Ronald G., "The Boundaries of Abolitionism," *Antislavery Reconsidered,* eds. Lewis Perry and Michael Fellman, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1979, p. 8.

Walters makes the point very well, it would be wrong to argue that there is a linear progression from post Civil War reconstruction gains and losses to the rise of TransAfrica. This would be the height of fancy found in the worst kind of historical determinism. What is, however, important to point out is that there are certain structural features that have existed over several decades that lead black Americans to have a vested interest in US foreign policy. These structural features (i.e. military service, disenfranchisement, bargaining tactics, etc.) are reflected in the historical annals of black political behaviour.

In the same essay Walters further points out that antislavery should not be construed as being solely and only an ideological movement. He points out that antislavery had "...an urgency that has never been satisfactorily explained and cannot be in terms of idea alone."[4] This rejection of an overarching ideology in antislavery is suggestive of the current case in anti-apartheid. There is no commitment to a specific ideology in anti-apartheid that unifies all groups. Instead, each seems to come to anti-apartheid for a reason unique to that group. For TransAfrica, the reason revolves around race, though in the writings of TransAfrica there is no commitment to any well organised ideology. Thus, there are no heavy systematic ideological statements from TransAfrica, though there are certainly elements of anti-colonialism, anti-racism and anti-imperialism. These loose commitments, however, are not so much born out of a revolutionary character as they come from the experience of diaspora politics. Thus, the predominant point, or idea, that drives diaspora politics is perhaps best captured by Frederick Douglass who said, "He [the black American] reads of what is being done in the world in resentment of oppression and needs no teacher to make him understand what he reads," the experience of being black and living in the US is all that is needed to explain the building block of race relations of diaspora politics.[5] It is not surprising that there are no strong systematic ideological commitments in the efforts of TransAfrica, only instead a loose collection of ideas pulled together by virtue of the racial experience in the US.

---

[4] ibid., p. 16.

[5] Douglass, Frederick, "Lynch Law in the South," *Civil Rights and the Black American*, eds. Albert P. Blaustein and Robert L. Zangrando, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1968, p. 287.

Yet, it has been argued that TransAfrica and black American concern over foreign policy is the result of a long standing interest in the black community over foreign policy questions. How can this claim be true, if there is no strong ideological tie between the past and the present, if there is no linear relationship between the past and present? What is clear is that there is, as has been said, a structural relationship that is reflected in the annals of history. Furthermore, W.E.B. DuBois and others have started movements which while not organisationally powerful, they are symbolically powerful. Thus, while DuBois and others writing on Pan-Africanism are widely read there is no organisation, as such, which has as its job the carrying out of various prescriptions. Furthermore, DuBois and others are not the champions of any structurally coherent set of ideas, *per se,* rather they made a set of pragmatic tactical proposals, which seek to address the problems of diaspora politics.

During the early part of the twentieth century it was clear that there was a growing interest in diaspora politics. This is reflected in the works of Marcus Garvey, as well as in the efforts of the NAACP in attempting to halt US occupation of Haiti. Again, during the 1940's and well into the 1950's the Council on African Affairs reflected, at least among intellectuals, an interest in US relations with Africa, as well as the opposition to white supremacy in southern Africa. Even with the more immediate and more newsworthy events of the 1950's domestic civil rights campaigns, interest in foreign policy was not unheard of. As has been noted, black Americans were not unaware of nor unaffected by the rise of independent states in Africa. The service of black Americans in South East Asia during the Vietnam War also heightened the awareness of many in the US that there was a vested interest in attending to the making of foreign policy - there were obvious impacts domestically. Therefore, by the mid-1970's, there existed not just an interest in, but a deep commitment to the issues of foreign policy. With the rise of the CBC there was the institutional capacity to deliver influence in the realm of making foreign policy. In order to take advantage of the institutional presence, the CBC created TransAfrica. The key advantage that TransAfrica had over its predecessors was that it was not constrained by being isolated from the voting public. In some way or other past attempts by black groups to influence foreign policy

suffered from the inability to mobilize public opinion and thereby influence Congress or the Executive. Either the black organisation was regarded as too leftist to be credible, or there simply were not enough voting blacks to carry much weight in influencing Congress. In addition to which, Congress itself was relatively weak or at least unwilling in may ways to impede Presidential wishes in foreign policy matters, and was structured in such a way that would keep insurgent movements, such as rising black interests, out of the halls of Capitol Hill. Therefore, with electoral and Congressional reform, two key stumbling blocks had been removed, and the entry of black Americans into foreign policy made more likely.

Also during the twentieth century there has been a growing sense of internationalism on the part of black Americans. This internationalism has grown along side of and at times been similar to 'white' American internationalism. This is part and parcel of diaspora politics, where the

> ...one *essential* quality of black [American leadership]...is the feeling on the part of black individuals that they are responsible for the welfare of other black individuals, or of black people as a collective entity, simply because of a shared racial heritage and destiny.[6]

Thus, with Pan-Africanism and the drive for decolonisation, there was a larger impetus to consider the role of the black American as even more important in the scheme of things. The black American would be the vanguard of the world movement to free and uplift those from the diaspora.

Thus, TransAfrica's presence on the political stage is a by-product of significant social changes within the US, as well a matured and strong sense of the role of black Americans in world politics. In the process of removing European colonialists from Africa, many black Americans have taken this as being an area of unique responsibility. This was reflected early when many black Americans opposed the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, and continued with the opposition to continued white supremacy in southern Africa. Diaspora politics is a response to a situation where the US domestic situation, combined with the international demands a black American response to

---

[6] Moses, Wilson Jeremiah, *The Golden Age of Black Nationalism, 1850-1925*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1978, p. 20. The quote was originally aimed at a discussion of black nationalism, but here seems more appropriately aimed at diaspora politics in general.

apartheid. TransAfrica is, without a doubt, a response to that situation. Organisationally, it represents a refinement of former attempts within black America for a response to the events in Africa and the Caribbean, and America's relationship to them.

TransAfrica and the Politics of Opposition

While it may true that TransAfrica is the continuation of an historical trend begun many years ago. It still remains to determine whether or not it is indeed an effective continuation - put another way, will it make a difference? In order that it make a difference it must be able to influence both the domestic and international environment, as well as the actual process of US foreign policy making towards South Africa. It is almost impossible to tell whether or not TransAfrica has made a difference to anti-apartheid, there is no real objective measure that will yield any insight. What is left is only the ability to suggest some possible impacts that it has had, and to consider whether or not these could have been made without TransAfrica.

Three possible ways to determine TransAfrica's success domestically, internationally and in terms of its impact on US foreign policy suggest themselves. The extent to which parts of TransAfrica's demands appear on the agenda of other groups or agencies, the number and type of groups both domestically and internationally associate themselves with TransAfrica and finally, the degree to which TransAfrica has been able to appeal to the public may be determined. These can serve as indicators of influence.

As has been noted earlier, at the outset of the FSAM and the Embassy protests one of the main issues on its agenda was the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, the end to apartheid and the imposition of one man one vote. Not surprisingly, though, these positions are those of the US, except for the last point, which the US has shied away from. TransAfrica did not originate or sponsor these positions, as they have been part of the language of anti-apartheid for years. TransAfrica's adoption of them may only reflect its position within the anti-apartheid camp. Indeed, upon examination, it seems that TransAfrica has not been able to impose its agenda on the US, though the US government has to a large extent adopted many of the positions shared in the anti-apartheid movement. The US has not, however, adopted TransAfrica's position on

Angola and the settlement of Namibia came about in direct opposition to TransAfrica's position, which called for the continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola.

It seems clear that TransAfrica has not been too successful in having its positions adopted by US policy makers. This is despite TransAfrica's access to Congress and most especially the CBC. The US has taken on many of the middle ground positions in respect to anti-apartheid, such as imposing some sanctions, but has not taken on any of the more extreme actions.

TransAfrica has for several years played a central role in the formation and operation of domestic US anti-apartheid coalitions. Of this there can be no doubt. TransAfrica played a central role in the formation of the Southern Africa Working Group, which led many of the efforts on Capitol Hill against US policy toward South Africa. TransAfrica also played the key role in the formation of the Free South Africa Movement, which became the major actor for two years against constructive engagement and US policy in the southern Africa region. While there were other domestic coalitions against apartheid, these two are the most significant, and TransAfrica played an important, if not important, role in each. Internationally, TransAfrica has been involved with a number of groups and has met a number of groups outside the US. Most important of these groups has been the ANC and the OAU. Robinson has attended a number of OAU meetings, and has played a key role in at least one. TransAfrica's involvement with the ANC is vital, in as much as TransAfrica and the FSAM have supplied publicity and money to the ANC in the US. The help that TransAfrica supplies the ANC is, however, not vital. The ANC would not suffer to any great degree without TransAfrica, though TransAfrica does provide the ANC with a 'natural' partner, being bound by the ties of the diaspora. One of the benefits TransAfrica yields from its strength in the US is the ability to be taken seriously by other actors. This is a similar process to what the Anti-Apartheid Movement (UK) was able to gain following the domestic successes of their arms embargo campaign, in that its domestic campaign yielded a fair amount of international support. As Abdul Minty of AAM has said,

> The fact that AAM was able to mobilize widespread support inside Britain for an end to arms sales made it possible for it to make representations to other governments on this subject with added credibility. .... The relationship between domestic pressure and international action has been very direct on the arms issue as with other

campaigns of a similar nature.[7]

Thus, TransAfrica's successes domestically has made it a more potent actor throughout the world on issues relating to apartheid. In conclusion, it can be said that TransAfrica's role domestically is far more important than its role internationally. This is due mostly to scale and finance, because as has been seen, TransAfrica does have substantial transnational links. Thus, TransAfrica can be said to be a truly internestic actor, with feet firmly planted both within the US and outside.

Finally, the last measure of TransAfrica's abilities can be found in its popular appeal. This is not to ask how many people would vote for or have heard of TransAfrica, but rather to investigate how much impact it has had on the popular conscience of US citizens. One measure that was taken in 1985 showed that 41 million people had heard of the protests being led by TransAfrica and approved of them, and 19 million had heard of them and disapproved. What this illustrates is that TransAfrica was able to lead an effort that influenced roughly 60 million Americans. What is also clear is that the ensuing anti-apartheid actions that were imposed by the Administration and Congress were directly related to the actions taken by TransAfrica. This is supported by many verbal reports out of Washington and elsewhere. Thus, it seems clear that the actions of TransAfrica did influence the course of US foreign policy, in as much as they led to the first anti-apartheid bills ever passed by Congress. Furthermore, it is likely that the issue of US policy toward South Africa is now at a point of no return, in that before apartheid was a distant and obscure issue, and while it still may be distant and obscure to many, there are far more that have heard of it and have an opinion regarding the issue. TransAfrica was able to translate its interests in diaspora politics into an issue that has increasing salience for the American public.

It is important to keep in mind that the successes of TransAfrica, while few in number, are important in terms of US relations with South Africa. Also important in the context of US foreign policy and its impact on US domestic relations and race relations. What the actions of TransAfrica show is that foreign policy can indeed influence domestic relations and vice versa. US domestic

---

[7] Minty, Abdul, "The Anti-Apartheid Movement and Racism in Southern Africa," in *Pressure Groups in the Global System*, ed. Peter Willetts, Francis Pinter Publishers, London, 1982, p. 35.

factors can play upon and influence foreign relations, even at a time when one would expect otherwise. It must be remembered that not too long ago, during the second Cold War, East/West conflict was not so far away. In that setting any prying apart of the US and South Africa was a considerable victory. In 1985 and 1986 Cuban troops were fighting in Angola, the US was supporting and arming UNITA in Angola and the independence of Namibia was very much in dispute. Therefore, the ability to create any kind of a wedge between South Africa and the US was a considerable victory. The size and importance of the victory is further amplified when one considers that at the time the Republicans held a majority in the Senate, Reagan had just won a landslide victory and black Americans had played no important role in the Reagan victory, unlike the Carter victory in 1976. Therefore, TransAfrica had not sufficient leverage to use against the Administration, and yet it was still able to move the Administration to impose limited sanctions against South Africa.

In the final analysis TransAfrica has been an important actor in the making and conduct of US foreign policy towards South Africa. This does not mean that it wields such influence as to be able to veto various US efforts, but it is able at least to influence the course of events. Perhaps its major strength, in view of its abilities to influence policy, is more in the ability to act as a voice for the interests and aspirations of black Americans. Whether it will be able to do so now or in the future is another issue all together.

Implications

The successes of TransAfrica have had a significant impact on the larger issues of US foreign policy consensus, diaspora politics and interdependence. Ever since the passage of the War Powers Act there have been a series question as to the power and strength of the US foreign policy consensus. In terms of the relations between the US and South Africa there has been the dispute between those who view the region as being most importantly one which is beset by East/West rivalry and those who view southern African problems as dominated by the regional destabilisation of South Africa and apartheid. With the end of the Vietnam War and the following heightened interest in Congress over foreign policy issues there has been a growing tendency to

view the world in other than East/West terms. Therefore, there is a strong body of opinion which views the main problem in southern Africa as being South African apartheid. This is not the view, or at least has not been the view of the US, rather Soviet expansionism and intervention has been viewed as the predominant problem.

TransAfrica's entry into anti-apartheid and its ability to focus US policy makers on racial issues, as opposed to East/West issues, signals a possible reduction in the level of 'strategic implications only' thinking, which tends to lead policy makers to ignore many domestic developments. Instead, foreign policy has become more permeable, able to be penetrated by domestic concerns. While this has always been true, to some extent, in the case of South Africa it is most obviously true. What this signals for the larger issue of US foreign policy is that despite a strong executive, the impulses in the domestic environment, and the demands made by both internal and external actors will lead to a situation where more must be taken into account than the strict 'foreign policy interests'. Clearly signalled in the rise of TransAfrica and the shifts in US policy over South Africa is the ever increasing power of the intermestic world.

The shifts in the US policy towards South Africa also signal victory for those who support diaspora politics. While not a total victory, which would have been found in the total isolation of South Africa, it does signal a victory nonetheless. The victory is found in the ability of placing on the agenda of US foreign policy a concern of diaspora politics and having that concern taken seriously. Unlike the days when the NAACP would lobby for the protection of Abyssinia, today black Americans are able to bring to the table the concerns of diaspora politics and have them seriously considered. This is due partly to the growing domestic power of black Americans, in their ability to vote and vote strategically, but also found in their ability to represent the interests of the diaspora. In turn that ability to represent the diaspora signals the growth of and the importance of the interdependent world.

Interdependence among sociohistorical groups is growing in importance partly out of the increased capability found in communications and partly out of the increased impact that actors can have around the world. Arab speaking states can represent the interests of Arab Americans,

hypothetically, through the manipulation of oil reserves. Jewish Americans can influence the economic well being and security of Israel by influencing the US government, and Tamals in India can supply weapons and money to their brethren on Sri Lanka. The world is made up of, to a large extent, interconnections between various sociohistorical groups. These groups, in the context of a world of independent states, and the equal rise of multinational groups and organisations, all combine to create a situation where any given ethnic collective can influence the viability and programme of any other given group or organisation. In the US this increase in interdependence leads to a growth in the level of intermestic politics and pressure to decrease the 'flat' politics of the cold war and balance of power.

In the end, it seemed as if TransAfrica and its efforts marked only a small event in the larger context of world events. Yet, this turns out not to be the case, indeed, the relatively minor success of TransAfrica marks and signals the larger success of ethnic politics. By virtue of the decaying borders between states, there is an increase in the influence events have around the world. Thus, the action of one sociohistorical group may influence and affect another group in quite a different part of the world. The impact that interaction has on relationships between other groups is only, at best, for the realm of speculation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY -- SOURCES CITED

"10 Years of Victories", *Washington Afro-American*, May 26, 1987.

A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa: The Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, U.S. Department of State, January, 1987.

Abshire, David, "Foreign Policy Makers: President vs. Congress", *The Growing Power of Congress*, eds. David M. Abshire and Ralph D. Nurnberger, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, California, 1981.

"Administration Position on Sanctions Against South Africa", Chester Crocker, *American Foreign Policy*, 1985.

Akuetteh interview, May 11, 1988, Washington, D.C.

_____., June 1, 1988, Washington, D.C.

Ahrari, Mohammed, "U.S. Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East", *Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Mohammed Ahrari, Greenwood, New York, 1987.

Albright, David, "The USSR and Africa in 1982: Quest for Global Power Status," *Africa Contemporary Record*, ed. Colin Legum, Volume XV, Africana Publishing Company, New York.

Albright, David, "The USSR, its Communist Allies, and Southern Africa", *Munger Africana Library Notes*, Number 55, November, 1980.

"ANC Breakthrough," *TransAfrica News*, Volume 6, Number 2, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C.

"ANC on the Nkomati Accord", *Sechaba*, May 1984.

"America and South Africa", *The Economist*, March 30, 1985.

Ambrose, Stephen E., *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy 1938-1970*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1973.

Anderson, John Ward, "Clergy, Boxer Protest at Embassy", *Washington Post*, December 14, 1984.

"Anticipating the Outbreak of War, 1898," *A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States*, Volume II, ed. Herbert Aptheker, The Citadel Press, New York, 1968.

"Apartheid Foes Sit-in at Shell Oil", *Washington Post*, January 16, 1986.

"Attack! Advance! Give the Enemy no Quarter!", *Sechaba*, March, 1986.

Barber, Simon, "Shadows on the Wall", *Optima*, Volume 35, Number 2, June, 1987.

Bard, Mitchell, "Ethnic Group Influence on Middle East Policy - How and When: The Cases of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and the Sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia", *Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Mohammed E. Ahrari, Greenwood Press, New York, 1987.

Barilleax, Ryan J., "The President, 'Intermestic' Issues, and the Risks of Policy Leadership", *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy*, eds. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1988.

Barker, K., "Arthur Ashe Jailed in Apartheid Protest", *Washington Post*, January 12, 1985.

_____., "Kennedy Says S. Africa Policy a Failure, Calls for Sanctions", *Washington Post*, January 17, 1985.

_____., "Belafonte is Arrested at S. African Embassy", *Washington Post*, February 1, 1985.

_____., "Stevie Wonder Arrested in Apartheid Protest", *Washington Post*, February 15, 1985.

_____., "UMW to Escalate Protests Against South Africa", *Washington Post*, July 26, 1985.

_____., "UMWA Sets South African Miners' Fund", *Washington Post*, Sept. 5, 1985.

Barker, Karlyn and Chris Spolar, "Tutu Hails Embassy Protesters," *Washington Post*, December 3, 1984.

Barker, Karlyn and John Ward Anderson, "Kings Daughter Arrested at Embassy", *Washington Post*, November 30, 1984.

Barker, Karlyn and Michel Marriott, "1960's Tactics Revived for Embassy Sit-Ins," *Washington*

Post, November 29, 1984.

_____., "Antiapartheid Protest Widens", *Washington Post*, December 4, 1984.

Beals, Greg, "TransAfrica: Africa's Ally in Washington", *Southern Africa*, April, 1983.

Benson, Mary, *South Africa: Struggle for a Birthright*, International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, London, 1985.

Berry, Jeffrey M., *Lobbying for the People*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1977.

Bittman, Ladislav, "The New Image Makers: Soviet Propaganda and Disinformation under Gorbachev", *The New Image Makers*, ed. Ladislav Bittman, Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington, D.C., 1988.

Booker, Salih, "The Other Engagement", *Africa Report*, January-February, 1986.

Boycott Shell: A Guide to the Shell Boycott Campaign, undated.

Brauer interview, May 6, 1988, Washington, D.C.

Brecher, M., Blema Steinberg and J. Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 13, Number 1, March 1969.

Bridgland, F., *Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa*, Coronet Books, Sevenoaks, England, 1986.

Brownfield, Allan C., and J. Michael Waller, *The Revolutionary Lobby*, Council for Inter-American Security and the Inter-American Security Educational Institute, Washington, D.C., 1985.

Brownfield, Allan, *TransAfrica: A Lobby of the Left*, The Lincoln Institute for Research and Education, Washington, D.C., 1985.

Burbach, Roger, and Orland Nunez, *Fire in the Americas: Forging a Revolutionary Agenda*, Verso, London, 1987.

Burton, J. W., *World Society*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972.

Campbell, Kurt, *Soviet Policy towards South Africa*, Macmillan Press, London, 1986.

Carmichael, Stokely, "What We Want," in *Racial Conflict: Tension and Change in American Society,* ed. Gary Marx, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1971.

Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson, "The Politics and Policy of Race in Congress," in *Congress and Policy Change,* eds. Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Leroy N. Rieselbach, and Lawrence C. Dodd, Agathon Press, Inc., New York, 1986.

Carson, Clayborne, *In Struggle,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1981.

Carter, Gwendolen, *Continuity and Change in Southern Africa,* Crossroads Press, Los Angeles, 1985.

Castro Hildalgo, Orlando, *A Spy for Fidel,* E.A. Seeman, Miami, 1971.

Cervenka, Zdenek, and Colin Legum, "Cuba and Africa in 1981: Fidel Catro's Changing Priorities," *Africa Contemporary Record,* ed. Colin Legum, Africana Publishing Company, New York, Volume XIV, 1981-82.

"Challenge Constructive Engagement", *Work in Progress,* South African Research Service, Johannesburg, Number 36, April 1985.

Challenor, Herschelle Sullivan, "The Influence of Black Americans on U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa", *Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy,* ed. Abdul Aziz Said, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1981.

Christenson, Phillip L. "United States - South African Economic Relations: Major Issues in the United States", *The American People and South Africa,* eds. Alfred O. Hero, Jr. and John Barratt, Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachussetts, 1981.

Cigler, Allan J., "From Protest Group to Interest Group: The Making of American Agriculture Movement Inc.," *Interest Group Politics,* eds. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C., 1986.

Clark, Dick, "American Policy Toward Southern Africa Under A New Administration", *Issue: A Journal of Opinion,* Volume X, Numbers 1/2, spring/summer, 1980.

Clough, Michael and Donald Jordan, "The United States and Africa 1984: How Constructive is 'Constructive Engagement'?, *Africa Contemporary Record*, ed. Colin Legum, Volume XVII, Africana Publishing Company, New York.

Cobb, Roger W., and Charles D. Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1983.

Coker, Christopher, *NATO, The Warsaw Pact and Africa*, The Macmillan Press, LTD., London, 1985.

_____., *The United States and South Africa, 1968-1985: Constructive Engagement and its Critics*, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1986.

Congressional Quarterly 1985 Almanac, ed. Mary W. Cohen, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C., 1986.

"Constructive Engagement and South Africa", McFarlane interview, *American Foreign Policy*, 1985.

"Constructive Engagement and Linkage", interview with Chester Crocker, *American Foreign Policy Documents*, 1984, Document 415, May 16, 1984.

Counts, Cecelie, Sylvia Hill and Sandra Hill, "Notes on Building International Solidarity in the United States", *Black Scholar*, November-December, 1984.

Creevey interview, July, 1988, Washington, D.C.

Cruise, Harold, *Plural but Equal*, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1987.

Danaher, Kevin, *In Whose Interest?*, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., 1985.

Daniels, Ron, "National Black Political Assembly: Building Independent Black Politics in the 1980's," *Black Scholar*, Volume 15, Number 14, July/August 1984.

Danley, Cheryl, "Tambo Meets Activists," *Southern Africa*, July-August, 1981.

Davidow, Jeffrey, *A Peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1984.

Davis, Jennifer, "Breaking the Links", *Southern Africa*, Volume XII, Number 7, September 1979.

Davis, Stephen, M., *Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1987.

Declaration of the Conference on Building Forces Against United States Support for South Africa Held on 8 June 1981 in Washington, D.C., UN General Assembly, UN Doc A/AC.115/L.552, 1981.

Defosses, Helen, "The USSR and Africa" *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, Volume XVI, Number 1, 1987.

Dixon, Julian C., "The Congressional Black Caucus and U.S. Policy in Southern Africa", *Africa Report*, Volume 29, Number 3, May-June 1984.

Douglass, Frederick, "Lynch Law in the South," *Civil Rights and the Black American*, eds. Albert P. Blaustein and Robert L. Zangrando, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1968.

"Dr. King Bids West Act on South Africa", Special to the New York Times, *New York Times*, December 8, 1964.

"Dr. Wyotte T. Walker"[sic], *Sechaba*, November, 1979.

Draper, Theodore, *The Rediscovery of Black Nationalism*, Secker & Warburg, London, 1970.

DuBois, W.E.B., *The Suppression of the African Slave Trade*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rogue, Louisiana, 1965.

DuBoulay, Shirley, *Tutu: Voice of the Voiceless*, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1988.

Dugard, John, *The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute*, University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 1973.

Duignan, Peter and L.H. Gann, *The United States and Africa: A History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.

Dunn, Truman, "Slouching Toward Reform - US Corporations Under Apartheid", *Southern Africa*, Volume XII, Number 7, September 1979.

Eide interview, May 5, 1988, Washington, D.C.

Emerson, Rupert, *Africa and United States Policy,* Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1967.

_____., "The Character of American Interests in Africa," *The United States in Africa,* ed. Walter Goldschmidt, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1964.

"Fiscal Year 1986 Assistance Requests for Sub-Sahara Africa", statement before the House Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Wisner, March 5, 1985, *American Foreign Policy Documents,* 1985.

Flower, Ken, *Serving Secretly,* John Murray, London, 1987.

Franklin, John Hope, *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans,* Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1980.

Franklin, John Hope, and Alfred A. Moss, Jr., *From Slavery to Freedom,* Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1988.

FSAM -Statement of the Free South Africa Movement Announcing the initiation of its Economic Educational Campaign Against the Shell Oil Company, January 9, 1986.

Gamson, William A., *The Strategy of Social Protest,* Dorsey Press, Homewood, Illinois, 1975.

Garrow, David J., *Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference,* Jonathan Cape, London, 1988.

Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations' Third Debate, eds. Ray Maghroori and Bennet Ramberg, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1982.

Gonzalez, Edward, "Complexities of Cuban Foreign Policy", *Problems of Communism,* November-December, 1977, Volume XXVI.

Greer, Edward, *Big Steel: Black Politics and Corporate Power in Gary, Indiana,* Monthly Review Press, New York, 1979.

Gunn, G., "Cuba and Angola", *Angola, Mozambique and the West,* ed. Helen Kitchen, Praeger with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, New York, 1987.

Gutteridge, William, "The South African Crisis: Time for International Action", *Conflict Studies*, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Number 179, 1985.

Hanlon, Joseph, *Begger Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, Catholic Institute for International Relations in collaboration with James Currey and the Indiana University Press, London, 1986.

Heald, Morrel, and Lawrence S. Kaplan, *Culture and Diplomacy*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1977.

Healy, Robert, "US Rebuts Kennedy on Divestiture", *Washington Post*, January 9, 1985.

Herbers, John, "New Rights Campaigns Charted", *New York Times*, March 28, 1965, Section IV.

"Hill Overrides Veto of South Africa Sanctions", Felton, John, *Congressional Quarterly*, October 4, 1986.

"Hill Pressure Leads to South African Sanctions", *1985 Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, ed. Mary W. Cohn, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C., 1986.

History of TransAfrica, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C., undated.

Hodgson, Godfrey, "Congress and American Foreign Policy", The Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Chatham House Papers*, Number 2, London, 1979.

Holsti, K. J., *The Dividing Discipline*, Allen & Unwin, Inc., Boston, 1987.

"I am Signing Today an Executive Order that Will Put into Place a Set of Measures...Aimed Against the Machinery of Apartheid", Ronald Reagan, *American Foreign Policy*, 1985.

Information Digest, February 13, 1981, ed. John Rees, Baltimore, Maryland.

_____., December 28, 1984, ed. John Rees, Baltimore, Maryland.

"International Communist Organizations", *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1984*, ed. Richard Staar, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1985.

Issue Brief, May, 1982, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C.

_____., June, 1982, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C.

_____., September, 1982, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C.

_____., December, 1982, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C.

_____., November-December 1983, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C.

_____., October-November, 1984, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C.

_____., December 1984-January 1985, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C.

_____., June-July, 1985, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C.

_____., February-March, 1986, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C.

_____., June-July, 1986, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C.

_____., Summer, 1987, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C.

Jaster, Robert, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front-Line States: Experience and Prospects,* International Institute for Strategic Studies, Number 180, 1983.

_____., *South Africa in Namibia: The Botha Strategy,* University Press of America, Lanham, Maryland, 1985.

_____., *South Africa and its Neighbours: The Dynamics of Regional Conflict,* Adelphi Papers, Number 209, Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1986.

Johnson, L.K., *The Making of International Agreements: Congress Confronts the Executive,* Oxford University Press, New York, 1984.

Johnson, Thomas A., "Core Says Blacks Sign for Angola", *New York Times,* February 11, 1976.

_____., "Blacks Assail CORE on Angola Recruits", *New York Times,* February 14, 1976.

Karis, Thomas, "United States Policy toward South Africa," *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis,* eds. Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1982.

Kegley, Charles W. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: An Introduction", *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence,* eds. Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, St. Martin's Press, New York,

1988.

_____. *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1987.

Kelso, William Alton, *American Democratic Theory*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1978.

Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1977.

Kihss, Peter, "Dr. King Asks Aid for 6 Zulus Seeking Asylum", *New York Times*, April 5, 1965.

King, Martin Luther, Jr., *Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story*, Harper, New York, 1959.

Kitrinos, Robert, W., "International Department of the CPSU," *Problems of Communism*, Volume XXXIII, September-October, 1984.

Klehr, Harvey, *The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade*, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1984.

Koppett, Leonard, "Robinson Urges So. African Ban", *New York Times*, February 9, 1968.

Lake, Anthony, *The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy toward Southern Rhodesia*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1976.

Legum, Colin, *Pan-Africanism*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1965.

_____., "The Southern African Crisis: Darkness at the End fo the Tunnel," *Africa Contemporary Record*, ed. Colin Legum, Africana Publishing Company, New York, Volume XIV, 1981-82.

LeoGrande, William, *Cuba's Foreign Policy in Africa, 1959-1980*, Institute for International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, California, 1980.

Levering, Ralph B., *The Public and American Foreign Policy , 1918 - 1978*, William Morrow & Co., Inc., New York, 1978.

Lewis, David Levering, *King: A Biography*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1978.

Lodge, Tom, *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*, Longman, London, 1983.

Logan, Rayford W., *The Betrayal of the Negro*, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London, 1969.

Longmyer, Kenneth, "Black American Demands", *Foreign Policy*, Number 60, Fall, 1985.

Love, Janice, *People's Participation in Foreign Policy Making: Evaluating the US Anti-Apartheid Movement*, Ph.D. dissertation, 1983.

Malcolm X and Alex Haley, *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1985.

Manning, Bayless, "The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals", *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 55, January 1977.

Mansbach, Richard W. and John A. Vasquez, *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1981.

Mansbach, Richard, Donald Lampert and Yale Ferguson, *The Web of World Politics*, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1976.

Marable, Manning, *Race, Reform, and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction in Black America, 1945-1982*, Macmillan Press, London, 1984.

Marable, Manning, *Black American Politics: From the Washington Marches to Jesse Jackson*, Verso, London, 1985.

Marcum, John, "A Quarter Century of War", *Angola, Mozambique, and the West*, ed. Helen Kitchen, Praeger with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, New York, 1987.

_____., "The Politics of Survival," *Angola, Mozambique, and the West*, ed. Helen Kitchen, Praeger with the Centre for Stategic and International Studies, New York, 1987.

_____., "United States Options in Angola", *Angola, Mozambique, and the West*, ed. Helen Kitchen, Praeger with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, New York, 1987.

Maren, Michael, "Building a Constituency Against Apartheid", *Africa Report*, May-June 1984.

Marriott, Michel and Saundra Saperstein, "Protest Grows at Embassy," *Washington Post*, November, 28, 1984.

Marshall, Peter, *Cuba Libre*, Unwin Paperbacks, London, 1988.

Martin, Tony, *Race First*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1976.

Mathias, Jr., Charles McC., "Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy," in *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 59, Number 5, 1981.

Matney, William C., and Dwight L. Johnson, *America's Black Population: 1970 to 1982, A Statistical View*, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1983.

McKay, David, *Politics and Power in the USA*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, UK, 1987.

Measures Taken by Member States and Intergovernmental Organizations in the Light of United Nations Resolutions on Apartheid, UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/CONF.107/5.

Meier, August and Elliot M. Rudwick, *From Plantation to Ghetto*, Constable, London, 1970.

Meli, Francis, *South Africa Belongs to Us: A History of the ANC*, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1988.

Metz, Steven, *The Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Formulation of American Policy toward South Africa, 1969-1981*, Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1985, reprinted by University Microfilms International, Dissertation Information Service, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1987.

_____., "The Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Populist Instinct in American Politics", *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume CI, Number 3, 1986.

Meyers, George, "Fresh Winds Sweeping Through the Ranks of Labour", *World Marxist Review*, August, 1986.

Miller, Jake C., "Black Legislators and African-American Relations, 1970-1975", *Journal of Black Studies*, Volume 10, Number 2, December 1979.

Milloy, Courtland, "Blacks Form 'Free S. Africa Movement'", *Washington Post*, November 24, 1984.

Minter, William, *King Solomons Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa*, Basic Books Publishers, Inc., New York, 1986.

Minty, Abdul, "The Anti-Apartheid Movement and Racism in Southern Africa," *Pressure Groups in the Global System*, ed. Peter Willetts, Francis Pinter Publishers, London, 1982.

Minutes of the Political Bureau, May 4, 1983, in *Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection*, Department of State and Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 1984.

Mission to South Africa: The Commonwealth Report, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1986.

Mitchell, Chris, "World Society as Cobweb," *Conflict in World Society*, ed. Michael Banks, Wheatsheaf Books, London, 1984.

"More History to Make", *Southern Africa*, Volume XII, Number 7, September 1979.

Morlan, Gail, "Sullivan Code - Cleaning up the Corporate Image", *Southern Africa*, Volume XII, Number 7, September 1979.

Morris, Aldon D., *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement*, The Free Press, New York, 1984.

Moses, Wilson Jeremiah, *The Golden Age of Black Nationalism, 1850-1925*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1978.

Motlhabi, Mokgethi, *Challenge to Apartheid*, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1988.

Nadle, Marlene, "Shifting Media Interest Determines Mail Strategy for Anti-Apartheid Group," *DM News*, December 15, 1985.

Naison, Mark, *Communists in Harlem during the Depression*, Grove Press, Inc., New York, 1984.

Namibia in the 1980's, The Catholic Institute for International Relations and the British Council of Churches, London, 1981.

Namibia: The Crisis in United States Policy Toward Southern Africa, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C., 1983.

National Anti-Apartheid Action and Lobby Day, leaflet, SAWG, Washington, D.C., undated.

Nesbitt, Prexy, "Expanding the Horizons of the U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement", *Black Scholar*, November, 1985.

Newton, Huey, "The Black Panther Party," in *Racial Conflict: Tension and Change in American Society*, ed. Gary Marx, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1971.

Nincic, Miroslav, *United States Foreign Policy: Choices and Tradeoffs*, CQ Press, Washington, D.C., 1988.

Noer, Thomas J., *Briton, Boer, and Yankee: The United States and South Africa, 1870-1914*, Kent State University Press, 1978.

Nolutshungu, Sam C., "South African Policy and United States Options in Southern Africa", *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy*, eds. Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar, University of California Press, Berkely, 1985.

Nzo, Alfred, "65 Years of the South African Communist Party", *Sechaba*, September 1986.

OAU resolution on Namibia, Res. 853 (XXXVII), reprinted in *Africa Contemporary Record*, ed. Colin Legum, Africana Publishing Company, New York, Volume XIV, 1981-82.

O'Donnell, Frank, "The Invisible Man", *Regardies*, September, 1986.

"Officials in Cuba Invite Americans to Angola Briefing", *New York Times*, special to the *New York Times*, February 22, 1976.

"Oliver Tambo, President, the African National Congress", Interview by Margaret A. Novicki, *Africa Report*, July-August, 1985.

Olson, Mancur, *The Logic of Collective Action*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980.

O'Meara, Patrick, "Zimbabwe: The Politics of Independence", in *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis*, eds. Gwendolen Carter and Patrick O'Meara, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1982.

Omi, Michael and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States,* Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York, 1986, especially pages 14-24.

Oudes, Bruce, "The United States and Africa: The Reagan Difference," *Africa Contemporary Record,* ed. Colin Legum, Volume XIV, 1981-82, Africana Publishing Company, New York.

Padmore, George, *Pan-Africanism or Communism,* Dennis Dobson, London, 1956.

Pettigrew, Thomas F., "Integration and Pluralism," eds. Phyllis A. Katz, and Dalmas A. Taylor, *Eliminating Racism,* Plenum Press, New York, 1988.

Pinkney, Alphonso, *The Myth of Black Progress,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986.

Powell, S. Steven, *Covert Cadre,* Green Hill Publishers, Inc., Ottawa, Illinois, 1987.

Preston, Michael B., "The Election of Harold Washington: An Examination of the SES in the 1983 Chicago Mayoral Election," in *The New Black Politics: The Search for Political Power,* eds. Michael B. Preston, Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr., and Paul L. Puryear, Longman, New York, 1987.

Progress Toward Ending the System of Apartheid, 100th Congress, 1st Session, House Document 100-109, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1987.

Purvis, Hoyt, "Tracing the Congressional Role: U.S. Foreign Policy and Turkey," in *Legislating Foreign Policy,* eds. Hoyt Purvis and Steven J. Baker, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1984.

Radcliffe, Donnie, "Ambassador Bernardus Fourie: Standing Firm at the Storm's Center," *Washington Post,* February 5, 1985.

Radu, M., "The African National Congress: Cadres and Credo" *Problems in Communism,* Volume XXXVI, July-August, 1987.

"Randall Robinson," *Sechaba,* November, 1979.

"Reagan Message on South Africa Sanctions Veto", *Congressional Quarterly,* October 4, 1986.

Redden, Jr., Thomas, J., "The US Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986: Anti-Apartheid or Anti-African National Congress?", *African Affairs*, Volume 7, Number 349, October 1988.

Reed, Adolph, Jr., *The Jesse Jackson Phenomenon*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1986.

"Render South Africa Ungovernable", *Sechaba*, March, 1985.

Report of the North American Regional Conference for Action Against Apartheid, UN General Assembly, August 29, 1984, UN Doc A/AC.115/L.614.

Robinson, Hazel Ross interview, June 21, 1988, Washington, D.C.

Robinson, Randall, *The Emancipation of Wakefield Clay*, Bogle-L'Ouverture Publication, Ltd., London, 1978.

_____., "Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Africa and International Economic Policy and Trade," *Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion*, Volume IX, Numbers 1/2, Spring/Summer, 1979.

Robinson, Randall testimony before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade on Africa and International Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Congress, second session, *US Policy Toward South Africa*, 1980.

Robinson, Randall, "Black and White Sanctions", *Washington Post*, October 4, 1985.

_____., "Turn up Heat on Pretoria," *New York Times*, May 10, 1987.

_____., interview, July, 1988, Washington, D.C.

Role of International Solidarity and Action in Support of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa, August, 1983, UN Centre Against Apartheid.

Rosenau, James N., *External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 1966.

_____., "Foreign Policy as an Issue-Area," *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, ed. James N. Rosenau, Free Press, New York, 1967.

_____., *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, Frances Pinter Publishers Ltd., London,

1980.

_____., *The Study of Global Interdependence*, Frances Pinter Publishers Ltd., Londno, 1980.

Roucek, Joseph S., and Bernard Eisenberg, "Introduction: The New Awareness", *America's Ethnic Awareness*, eds. Joseph S. Roucek and Bernard Eisenberg, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1982.

Rubin, Barry, *Secrets of State*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1987.

Rudwick, Elliot M., *W.E.B. DuBois: A Study in Minority Group Leadership*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1960.

Sales, William, "Making South Africa Ungovernable ANC Strategy for the 80's", *Black Scholar*, November-December, 1984.

Sandford, Gregory and Richard Vigilante, *Grenada: The Untold Story*, Madison Books, Lanham, Maryland, 1984.

Sandford, Gregory, *The New Jewel Movement*, Department of State, Washington, D.c., 1985.

SAWG meeting agenda, for March 1, 1988.

Shearman, Peter, *The Soviet Union and Cuba*, Chatham House Papers, Number 38, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1987.

Shepherd, George, *Anti-Apartheid: Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of South Africa*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1977.

_____., *The Politics of African Nationalism*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York.

Shultz, Richard H., and Roy Godson, *Dezinformatsia*, Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington, D.C., 1984.

Sim, Richard, and James Anderson, *The Caribbean Strategic Vacuum*, Conflict Studies, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Number 121, August, 1980.

Skjelsbaek, Kjell, "The Growth of International Nongovernmental Organization in the Twentieth Century", *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, eds. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph

S. Nye, Jr., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1981.

Smith, Phillip, "Fauntroy Released in Sit-In Case", *Washington Post,* November 23, 1984.

Smith, Robert C., "Black Power and the Transformation from Protest to Politics", *Political Science Quarterly,* Volume 96, 1981.

Somerville, K., *Angola: Politics, Economics, and Society,* Frances Pinter, London, 1986.

Soremekun, F., *The Road to Independence,* University of Ife Press, Ife-Ife, Nigeria, 1983.

South Africa 1987-1988 Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa, 13th edition, Bureau of Information, Perskor Printers, Johannesburg, 1987/88.

"South Africa: Evolution by Violence and Government by Manipulation," *Africa Contemporary Record,* ed. Colin Legum, Volume XV, 1982-83, Africana Publishing Company, New York.

"South Africa pulls out 32nd Battalion", *Jane's Defence Weekly,* April 29, 1989.

"South African Aide Arrests 5 in Sit-In at Consulate Here", *New York Times,* March 22, 1966.

"South Africa pulls out 32nd Battalion", *Jane's Defence Weekly,* April 29, 1989.

Soviet Active Measures, House Permanent Committee on Intelligence, US House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1982.

Soviet Covert Action: The Forgery Offensive, Hearings before the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1980.

Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986-87, U.S. Department of State.

Spanier, John, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II,* CBS College Publishing, New York, 1983.

Sparks, Allister, "S. Africans Jeer, Cheer Sen. Kennedy", *Washington Post,* January 6, 1985.

Stockwell, John, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story,* W.W. Norton and Company, New York,

1978.

Strategic Minerals: A Resource Crisis, Council on Economics and National Security, conference report, Rear Admiral William C. Mott, conference introduction, 1981.

Suhrke, Astri and Lela Garner Noble, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations,* Praeger, New York, 1977.

Sullivan, Leon, "The Sullivan Principles and Change in South Africa", *Africa Report,* Volume XXIX, Number 3, May-June, 1984.

Sussman, Barry, "Apartheid Protests Supported by Most Who Know of Them," *Washington Post,* January 27, 1985.

Szulc, Tad, "Cuba Began Role in Zanzibar in '61", *New York Times,* January 23, 1964.

Szulc, Tad, *Fidel: A Critical Portrait,* Avon Books, New York, 1986.

Tambo, Oliver, "Render South Africa Ungovernable", *Sechaba,* March, 1985.

_____., "Storm over South Africa", *World Marxist Review,* January 1986.

The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985, Hearings and Markup, before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade on Africa, 99th Congress.

The Case against Royal Dutch/Shell, issued by the FSAM and UMW, undated.

The Correspondence of W.E.B. DuBois: Volume III, ed. Herbert Aptheker, The University of Massachusetts Press, 1978.

"The Negro's Anti-Imperialism, 1898-99," *A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States,* Volume II, ed. Herbert Aptheker, The Citadel Press, New York, 1968.

"The Next Step: Sanctions Take Effect", *Congressional Quarterly,* October 4, 1986.

The Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and Subversion, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Committee of Judiciary, US Senate, 97th Congress, 2nd session.

"The Talented Tenth", W.E.B. DuBois, from "The Negro Problem" as reprinted *DuBois: Writings,* edited by Nathan Huggins, The Library of America, New York, 1986.

The White House and the Black Continent, ed. Anatoly Gromyko, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1984.

Tivnan, Edward, *The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy*, Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York, 1987.

TransAfrica Action Alert, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C., August, 1987.

TransAfrica, African Writer Series, September 1984, TransAfrica Forum, Washington, D.C.

TransAfrica News, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C., Fall, 1984.

_____., Volume 7, Number 2, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C.

TransAfrica's 4th quarter, 1978, *Clerk's Report*, House of Representatives Clerk's office.

TransAfrica's 2nd quarter, 1985 *Clerk's Report*, House of Representatives, Clerk's Office.

TransAfrica: The Black World's Bridge to US Foreign Policy Legislators, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C., undated.

Trescott, Jacquiline, "TransAfrica's Debate", *Washington Post*, June 7, 1982.

Truman, David, *The Governmental Process*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1964.

United States Foreign Policy and the Black World, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C., 1988.

"US Solidarity Conference", *Sechaba*, January, 1982.

Uslaner, Eric M., "One Nation, Many Voices: Interest Groups in Foreign Policy Making," *Interest Group Politics*, eds. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C., 1986.

Uttley, Garrick, *Globalism or Regionalism? United States Policy Towards Southern Africa*, Adelphi Papers, Number 154, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1979.

Verba, Sidney and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987.

Verdon, Lexie, "Boycotting S. Africa", *Washington Post*, September 13, 1983.

Waller, Douglas C., *Congress and the Nuclear Freeze: An Inside Look at the Politics of a Mass Movement*, University of Massachussetts Press, Amherst, Massachussetts, 1987.

Walters, Ronald W., "African-American Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy Toward South Africa", *Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Mohammed E. Ahrari, Greenwood Press, New York, 1987.

_____., "The Boundaries of Abolitionism," *Antislavery Reconsidered*, eds. Lewis Perry and Michael Fellman, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1979.

_____., *Black Presidential Politics in America: A Strategic Approach*, State University of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1988.

Waskow, Arthur. I., *From Race-Riot to Sit-In, 1919 to the 1960's: A Study in the Connections between Conflict and Violence*, Doubleday, Garden City, New Jersey, 1967.

Watanabe, Paul Y., *Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1984.

"We are Engaged as a Force for Peace and Constructive Change Throughout Southern Africa", address by Secretary of State Shultz, April 16, 1985, *American Foreign Policy Documents*, 1985.

Whalen, C. W., *The House and Foreign Policy: The Irony of Congressional Reform*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1982.

White, John, *Black Leadership in America, 1895-1968*, Longman, London, 1985.

White, Phillip, V., "The Black American Constituency for Southern Africa, 1940-1980", *The American People and Southern Africa*, ed. Alfred O. Hero, Jr. & John Barratt, Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1981.

Willetts, Peter, Pressure Groups as Transnational Actors," *Pressure Groups in the Global System*, ed. Peter Willetts, Frances Pinter Publishers, London, 1982.

Williams, Juan, *Eyes on the Prize*, Penguin Books, New York, 1988.

Williams, Phil, "Detente and US Domestic Politics", *International Affairs*, Volume 61, Number 3, Summer 1985.

Williamson, Joel, *The Crucible of Race*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984.

Wilson, Graham K., *Interest Groups in the United States*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981.

Woods, Jeanne, *Five Years of Armed Struggle in South Africa*, 1984, UN Centre Against Apartheid.

Yearbook of International Communist Affairs, 1985, ed. Richard Staar, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California.

Young, Andrew, "The United States and Africa", *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 59, Number 3, 1981.

Zinn, Howard, *SNCC: The New Abolitionists*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1965.

Abbreviations (Partial List)

ACOA -- American Committee on Africa
AFSC -- American Friends Service Committee
ANC --- African National Congress
CALC -- Clergy and Laity Concerned
CBTU -- Coalition of Black Trade Unionists
CPSA -- Communist Party of South Africa
CPSU -- Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPUSA - Communist Party/USA
FNLA -- National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FSAM -- Free South Africa Movement
IDAF -- International Defense and Aid Fund
MNR --- Mozambican National Reistance
MPLA -- Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NCC --- National Council of Chruches
SADF -- South African Defense Force
SASP -- Southern Africa Support Project
SAWG -- Southern Africa Working Group
SCLC -- Southern Christian Leadership Conference
SWAPO - South West Africa People's Organization
UAW --- United Auto Workers
UDF --- United Democratic Front
UNITA - National Union for Total Independence of Angola
UMW --- United Mine Workers
USPC -- United States Peace Council
WOA --- Washington Office on Africa
WPC --- World Peace Council
ZANU -- Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU -- Zimbabwe African People's Union