

**The Four Powers Multinational Force In Lebanon 1982-84:
Peacekeeping or Intervention**

by

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Dedicated to my Mother and in
memory of my Father,

for Nadine

It is, therefore, a great source of virtue for the practiced mind to learn, bit by bit, first to change about in visible and transitory things, so that afterwards it may be able to leave them behind altogether. The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign land. The tender soul has fixed his love on one spot in the world; the strong man has extended his love to all places; the perfect man has extinguished his.

Hugo of St. Victor, *Didascalicon*, trans.

J. Taylor, 1961

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis has been to carry out a case study of the Multinational Force in Beirut as an experiment of a non-United Nations peacekeeping technique in the management of that country's protracted conflict. It aims to assess why the Multinational Force may have succeeded or failed in its mission, with a view to recording these factors of success and failure - in such a way that future peacekeeping operations can benefit from them. Thus, the analysis offered grapples the thorny issue of whether the Multinational Force in Beirut was a 'peacekeeping force', an 'interventionist action', or was it 'an adjunct to or instrument of a policy designed for peacemaking'. To acquaint the reader with the experiment in and experience of the Multinational Force we emphasise that its very 'presence' brought a new actor into the Lebanon conflict. Hence, the subsequent effects of the Force on the already present internal and external protagonists are taken up. Furthermore, special emphasis was placed on the political and diplomatic circumstances leading to the decision and deployment of the Force, the nature of its mandate, and the ultimate disposition of its operations. Whilst stressing that non-U.N. peacekeeping in the Lebanon conflict has come to mean whatever those apply have wished it to mean, the study concludes by arguing that the Multinational Force in Beirut came to an unhappy end because it departed from the traditional modes of peacekeeping. Its demise did not occur in a vacuum, nor was the Force another victim of the Lebanon conflict. The destiny of the Multinational Force was not necessarily failure and yet its presence, rather than facilitating peace, proved to be a catalyst for the outbreak of war.

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INTRODUCTION

International and multinational peacekeeping is a novel means in the contemporary international system for the management of conflict and crisis situations which endanger international peace and security. Historically, at least since the Second World War, most peacekeeping undertakings have, in the main, been the responsibility of the United Nations. At present the concept of peacekeeping occupies a narrow niche in international conflict management. It is, however, an important niche - and it is an extremely sensitive one that is also relatively vaguely defined.

In fact, there is no 'official' definition or authoritative interpretation, but over the years certain principles, or attributes essential to the techniques of peacekeeping for its successful application, have been deduced and articulated. This, however, is not to imply that only the United Nations can engage in peacekeeping, but that in practice the term has predominantly been defined in the U.N. context. As an *ad hoc* measure primarily developed within the U.N. peacekeeping became an instrument not mentioned in the Charter. It has become customary to place it between Chapter 6 of the Charter that deals with peaceful settlement of disputes and the rarely called upon enforcement measures of Chapter 7.

The principles which have developed as a result of this *ad hoc* peacekeeping experience are important for two reasons; first of all they provide the troops on the ground with an explicit set of rules for their conduct which is internationally recognized, and secondly, they emphasise for the benefit of sponsors, hosts, donors and managers what the international community will recognize as a legitimate peacekeeping undertaking and ergo, what it will not. As regards this second aspect, the significance of these principles has grown more important in the current decade when a number of forces have been launched and deployed outside the aegis of the United Nations.

The value of peacekeeping cannot be appreciated without at the same time appreciating its limitations. Invariably, one country's peacekeeping activities have turned out to be the deployment of an intervention force in the view of another. In this study, peacekeeping is taken to mean operations undertaken by the U.N., an *ad hoc* multinational body or a regional organization with the use of military personnel and formations, *not* in a fighting or enforcement role, but interposed as a mechanism to signify and bring an end to hostilities and as a buffer between hostile forces. In effect, peacekeeping

serves as an internationally constituted pretext for the parties to stop fighting and as a mechanism to ensure the cessation of organized manifest violence and thereby provide an important precondition for future political dialogue.

In this context, a paramount purpose or function of a peacekeeping element is to stabilize the physical and social environment in ways that facilitate movement towards the containment of conflict, and thus pave the way for the parties to a conflict to move towards a settlement or resolution. A peacekeeping element does not prevent the parties from continuing to wage their conflict by all available means except violence. It is for this reason that a distinction is made in this study between 'conflict settlement' and 'conflict resolution'. Peacekeeping is essentially related to the use of violence and as such is an instrument for conflict settlement which removes organized overt violence. Furthermore, peacekeeping cannot, of itself, resolve a conflict, it may or may not be a technique for moving towards a resolution, which only occurs when the parties no longer feel the conflict is functional, even when no constraints are put upon them.

In 1988, the United Nations was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its peacekeeping operations. The decision of the Nobel Committee was generally applauded. It should not be forgotten, however, that the applause would have been much more muted if the prize had been given four or five years previously. Then, international peacekeeping had gone through a number of interesting and important twists and turns. In the wake of the Camp David accords and Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the United Nations was circumvented as a venue for negotiating on Middle Eastern questions. The result was that despite a favourable view of U.N. peacekeeping, two major multinational operations were instituted outside United Nations' auspices: that in the Sinai Peninsula, which continues in full operation; and the Multinational Force in Beirut, which ceased to exist in March 1984. In many ways, the emergence of such non-U.N. operations established precedents and offered striking lessons on how, and how not, to structure and manage a peacekeeping force.

The purpose of this study, therefore, has been to carry out a case study of the Multinational Force in Beirut (MNF) as an experiment of a non-U.N. peacekeeping technique in the management of Lebanon's protracted conflict. At the same time it is to assess why the MNF may have succeeded or

failed in its mission, with a view to recording these factors of success and failure in such a way that future peacekeeping operations can benefit from them. As we shall see in the conclusion, unless there is continuous effort to record whatever lessons that can be of benefit, successive forces will deploy sometimes at the same areas as before, such as Lebanon, without the benefit of any insight from previous forces, often to their detriment and that of others.

For Lebanon, as this study suggests, illustrates the type of country in which the insertion of a peacekeeping force or operation may be judged desirable, if not necessarily feasible, in order to maintain delicate regional and international strategic balances. Nevertheless, Beirut must be considered as a most unsuitable environment for a peacekeeping force. For in 1982 events in Lebanon transformed the terms in which scholars and policymakers must henceforth think about the utilities and options for enlisting peacekeepers in the Lebanon conflict. A most significant event occurred in the summer of 1982. In the wake of the Israeli invasion, the United States in collaboration with France and Italy organized the Multinational Force which went into Beirut in August to supervise the evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). After the PLO evacuation was effected, the Multinational Force departed from Beirut. Subsequent to the assassination of Lebanon's President-elect Bashir Gemayel and massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in West Beirut, the United Nations Security Council then tried to send U.N. peacekeepers into Beirut. Not only Israel but also the Lebanese Government resisted the move and called instead for the return of the Multinational Force. Once redeployed in Beirut, the American, French, Italian and latterly British troops were to help to restore internal security and extend the Lebanese government's authority in the country. Thereafter, the United States and the other partners in the Multinational Force were committed for nearly eighteen months in support of a narrowly based and weak regime.

These events posed novel questions about peacekeeping options in the Lebanon conflict. What was the 'mission' of the four powers' Multinational Force in Beirut? Was the Multinational Force of Americans and Europeans a 'neutral' peacekeeper or did it degenerate into just another militia in the so called Lebanese civil war, attempting to impose an alien order? What misjudgements led to the mistakes and troubles encountered by the Multinational Force? Could they have been avoided by a United

Nations' force in the face of Lebanon's endemic internal strife? A key question must be whether a better understanding of the Multinational Force experience and its sad aftermath offers lessons for future peacekeeping, and is multinational peacekeeping a viable option in the Lebanon conflict?

The Multinational Force was not, in fact, the first third-party peacekeeping mechanism in Lebanon. In 1958, the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was established to observe to what extent Egypt and Syria were giving material support to rebels in Lebanon. While continuing in this task, it became a U.N. body whose very presence would permit the otherwise unlikely withdrawal of foreign powers who had become embroiled in the situation. In 1976, the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) was sent in composed of Syrians, who made up the overwhelming majority, and a bewildered assortment of other Arab troops from Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the two Yemens and the United Arab Emirates. The Arab Deterrent Force remained the 'fig leaf' of justification for Syria's presence thereafter as the other contingents slipped away. The ADF is hard to place in any recognized category; its role seems to lie outside the scope of a normal peacekeeping operation because in some way or another it failed to adhere to the stringent principles of peacekeeping.*

It might have been expected that by 1982 and with the experience derived from the United Nations 'Interim' Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) - deployed in 1978 and which continues in full operations, there would have been greater understanding of how to approach the complexities into which MNF-I, which by-and-large accomplished its allotted task through supervising the departure of the PLO and then MNF-II were thrust. Although the mandating agents were different, nonetheless, there were similarities. Both MNF and UNIFIL were deployed, initially, to act between the various Lebanese protagonists and the Israeli Defense Forces. Neither had an effective buffer zone, MNF-II much less so than UNIFIL. Both were subjected to considerable violence from the parties concerned, and finally both operated in the rather unusual environment of Lebanon.

* One experience worth noting here is creation of the Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Although the troops had the authorization of the Organization of American States, as a matter of fact, it was given *ex post facto* after unilateral U.S. intervention whose purpose was to prevent a communist take-over in the Dominican Republic.

Perspective and Rationale

Some five years have passed since the last contingents of the Multinational Force left Beirut. Their two tours of duty - identified as MNF-I and MNF-II - are seen today as distant enterprises which were drawn into the maelstrom of what is misleadingly called Lebanon's civil war. What the two MNFs attempted to do, and the way their soldiers conducted themselves, is today most remembered in the West for the two gigantic suicide 'truckbombings' on 23 October 1983, which claimed the lives of 241 American Marines and 58 French Paratroopers. Yet as this thesis seeks to demonstrate, the Multinational Force can be understood only in the broader context and complex history of a series of successful and not-so-successful efforts to enlist third-party peacekeeping in the protracted Lebanese conflict. More crucially, the Multinational Force in Beirut is a subject which has been curiously neglected in academic work and analysis. The aim of this study sets out to help to put right this omission.

Little written so far about the Multinational Force has used documents or interviews to illuminate the actions of the parties involved. At the same time much consideration of the MNF to date has been from the point of the four powers concerned and not from that of parties who might be considered to be on the receiving end, that is the Lebanese and the Palestinians. The reasons are easy to find. In Israel, the 1982 war has been a matter for bitter, partisan dispute since it began, colouring the large amount of material which has been published so far. Lebanon is still torn by war, while the Palestinian movement until recently has been riven by dissension. As a result, few Lebanese or Palestinians have had the chance to record their view of the events.

As for other actors such as the United States, Britain, France, Italy and Syria, none is in the habit of releasing sensitive documents on still vital issues very quickly (if ever). At the same time, relatively little has been said for publication by those individuals who were in positions of responsibility in 1982-1984. While this thesis was being written most of them were still at their posts, and still engaged in dealing with the direct consequences of their decisions during that time.

Methodology and the Problem of Sources

Nevertheless, one ought not to be daunted by this problem of sources to undertake this extremely difficult study of the Multinational Force's experience in the hope that it forms a useful contribution to understanding peacekeeping. Although unable to provide all the answers, I have tried to shed light on the questions raised in the course of this study. Having identified key decision-makers or participants in the events, I was fortunate enough to have interviewed some of the Lebanese, American and British officials involved. In a research visit to Beirut in November 1988, interviews were conducted with Dr. Salim al-Hoss, Prime Minister of Lebanon, Walid Junblatt, the Druze leader, Karim Pakradouni, Vice-Chairman of the Maronite Christian Lebanese Forces, who was senior advisor and confidant to both Lebanese ex-President Elias Sarkis and the late President-elect Bashir Gemayel, and Nabih Berri, the leader of the Shi'ite Muslim Amal militia. In London I interviewed Richard Murphy, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and former U.S. Ambassador in Damascus, and Richard Palmer, former British Military Attaché in Beirut.

Another category of sources comprises publications issued by the press in both the participating countries during the period of the Multinational Force including the two leading Lebanese Arabic dailies - *Al-Nahar* and *Al-Safir* (in addition to others published in English, such as the weekly *Monday Morning* and the *Daily Star*). Clearly, the material in all these categories suffers from a variety of potentially serious drawbacks. The first is the most obvious: much of the material reflects the perspective of one or other party to the conflict. While this feature of most of the sources must be borne in mind throughout, in no way does it detract from the value of this material or from the validity of the perspective(s) it represents. Where possible, it has been checked against other sources, and against recollections of participants in the events, which diminishes somewhat this problem.

Structure and Organization

In this study we argue that techniques of peacekeeping constitute a *form* of third party intervention because the stated purpose is that of contributing towards the containment or termination of conflict. In principle, peacekeeping is different from intervention. In the real world, however, the distinction between protecting and enforcing peace is often ambiguous and a matter of continuous

interpretation and political controversy. We are, in fact, dealing with a continuum extending from disinterested peacekeeping to partisan intervention. How do we place the Multinational Force in Beirut on this continuum? With the aim to arrive at some analytical definition of the types and forms of intervention which are prevalent in the Lebanon conflict, Chapter One consists of an examination of theories of intervention from comparative, theoretical and definitional perspectives.

In general, a peacekeeping presence or mechanism can be thought of as a third-party occupying a conflict management role, whereby intervention occurs in the form of a wide spectrum of function and activity running the gamut from a more or less passive to a more active role. Functions have ranged from observation and reporting on a potential source of international tension to the prevention of further hostilities in an existing conflict, the restoration of internal order, and the promotion of conditions for a peaceful settlement. With respect to its usefulness as a device or technique in terms of conflict control and management, peacekeeping can only function under certain conditions. If these conditions are transgressed or lacking, peacekeeping will either function ineffectively or will cease to function at all and most probably evolve into some other form of intervention. These 'essentials' or principal components of the peacekeeping technique are the subject of Chapter Two.

The present conflict cannot be explained except as a legacy of Lebanon's turbulent history. Chapter Three, therefore, traces the evolution of the Lebanese political system by providing the reader with an overview of the several historical processes, the complexity and subtleties of which was reflected in the subsequent history of the Lebanese polity. While acknowledging the presence of sufficient internal political and social ingredients to create a potential for conflict, the chapter also emphasizes a central theme to Lebanon's history - the role of external intervention.

Lebanon was a country with barely thirty years of independence when it erupted into war in 1975. Chapter Four tries to explain why political strife and instability were endemic to Lebanon, and why the Lebanese people were finally driven to settle their differences on the battlefield. The religious antagonisms, the cultural divide, and weakness of government had been apparent for decades. They made Lebanon what it was: a country with no unity, a country without a sense of nationhood, a country whose citizens were loyal not to the state but to their religious communities. It was thus a country

without immunity to those more modern problems caused by rapid economic growth and social dislocation. The Lebanese were not able to agree on these issues just as they were unable to agree on what to do about the Palestinian Movement. By the early 1970s it seems that every new political development merely led to a deepening of those divisions that had bedevilled the country for so long.

In order to account for the experiment in and actual experience of the Multinational Force in Beirut in both its incarnations - MNF-I and MNF-II - it would be extremely facile to do so without reference to the environment into which it was thrust. This necessity implies a close study of the War of 1982 and the events which transformed the politics of Lebanon. To this end Chapter Five highlights the political, diplomatic and military circumstances leading to the decision and insertion of the Multinational Force, the nature of its mandate and the ultimate disposition of its mission.

Chapter Six offers an analysis and assessment on the experiment of the Multinational Force in Beirut which, in many ways, underscores the primacy of the political in peacekeeping. It grapples the thorny issue of whether the Multinational Force in Beirut was a 'peacekeeping force', an 'interventionist action', or was it an 'instrument or adjunct of a policy designed for peacemaking'.

There was clearly a need for the four contingents, namely, the Americans, French, Italians and the British to believe in their mission and while this may have provided some initial fervor and commitment to their roles, equally it blinded the respective MNF-II authorities to the realities of the situation on the ground. With time, each of the contingents acquired a local purpose and identity arising from different interpretation of its mission. In this context, Chapter Seven presents an account of their respective roles. Although the concentration here is perforce on the Multinational Force, the success or failure of the Force's mission depended on how the four contingents were viewed by the various Lebanese protagonists and other interested parties, for example Israel and Syria. Hence, where the discussion requires treatment of these actors' reactions - to both MNF-I and MNF-II - an attempt is made to highlight where possible their impacts on the events.

In conclusion, Chapter Eight argues that the Multinational Force in Beirut came to an unhappy end because it departed from the traditional modes of peacekeeping. The Force's ill-fated experience underscores again the primacy of the political in peacekeeping. Its demise did not occur in a vacuum,

nor was the Force simply another victim of the Lebanese conflict. The environment in which the MNF operated was in part shaped by the policies and the actions of both Lebanese and non-Lebanese, including the policies of the four states that provided the constituent forces of the MNF. The destiny of the MNF was not necessarily failure. It might have produced a very different outcome if it was recognized for what it was, a successful effort in securing a modest period of time to provide a breathing space in which diplomacy might capture success, or suffer frustration or failure. As it happened, the Multinational Force's presence, rather than facilitating peace, proved to be a catalyst for the 'outbreak of war'. Peacekeeping is a concept still in its infancy. It can only work when it is allowed to work. What makes that frightening is what it suggests about peace itself: we only keep it when we want it.

CHAPTER ONE

Intervention: The need for an analytical definition

Throughout its turbulent political history there have always been factors within Lebanese society that not only produce conflict, but also encourage and even invite intervention in its domestic affairs. The peculiarities of Lebanon as a fragmented society have made it an attractive target for external involvement in local situations of discord often as a means for the settlement of scores among regional, or world powers, or a combination of both. As is frequently the case, appearances are deceptive and in Lebanese politics, what seemed to be a remarkable talent for flexibility and give and take in foreign and domestic policy, actually concealed the failure of Lebanon's political system to resolve its internal and external problems. So in 1975, when civil war broke out, the Lebanese government was paralysed and the country was exposed to the danger of foreign intervention. Since no indigenous faction or protagonist had an advantage in terms of military power, all without exception were dependent in various ways upon foreign sources. And hence, military and political expediences required the enlistment of foreign powers so as to advance their respective goals as the war progressed. Intervention was thus endemic.

The purpose of this chapter is to survey the theoretical literature on intervention. The aim is to arrive at some analytical or operational definition of certain types or forms of intervention which are prevalent in the Lebanese context. Under the widest possible interpretation, almost anything which one state does in relation to another could be construed as intervention. Any study that seeks to demonstrate what constitutes intervention is thus confronted with the very real problem of arriving at some definition of what is meant by the term bearing in mind that such a definition is almost inevitably going to be prescriptive, for example, embodying certain value preferences. The simple reason for this is that intervention itself is not normatively neutral because it carries with it certain connotations which may or may not be acceptable to all.

Without losing sight of these observations, our purpose in this chapter will be to point out the major features of intervention. Such an undertaking is, however, pursued in the belief that established usage, however obscure and contradictory, provides the major clues to the location of intervention as a

type of event in international relations. We will, by way of a survey of the theoretical literature on intervention, attempt to analyse those usages by breaking down the idea of intervention into its component parts. Our analysis, therefore, will focus on the actor that embarks upon intervention, the target actor that is intervened upon, the types or forms of intervention, the activity of intervention itself, and the purposes of this activity and the context within which it takes place including the role and attitudes of third parties.

Since the concept of intervention is surrounded by so much contention, perhaps we would do better in terms of deepening our understanding to concentrate our efforts on determining an analytical definition. In other words, we must try to identify the essential nature of intervention and to capture the essence within a single idea. Only then can we hope to get at the heart of what intervention is all about. Rosenau has claimed that "... the essence of intervention reveals itself to be highly variable". [1] Yet it is contended here that the essence of a concept is constant within a given system. If the essence changes then the concept is not the same one. What may vary within the international system is the operational definition, but the actual nature of the phenomenon is static. If this cannot be claimed, then it is doubtful such concepts have any validity at all in analysing international affairs. It would be doubtful, too, whether an identifiable system actually exists. Thomas and Thomas have suggested that: "The essence of intervention is an attempt to compel ...". [2] This essential nature is expressed in some operational definitions, albeit within the context of a state-centric approach. The idea that actors other than the state can perform interventionary activities *vis-à-vis* states receives scant attention in the traditional and modern writings on the theme. Definitions of intervention can be expected to reflect this.

Authors have long been grappling with the problem of defining intervention, but with very little success. Rosenau has remarked that "the concept of intervention suffers from a lack of definitional clarity". The idea of ambiguity is borne out in a statement by Richard Little: "Actions varying from the donation of foreign aid to the use of military force are described as [intervention] in the international system." [3] The implication here is that the term declines in utility as an analytical concept as a

[1] James N Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.13 (1969), p.155.

[2] *Ibid.*, p.157.

[3] Richard Little, *Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars*. London: Martin Robertson and Company Ltd., 1975, p.7.

function of the widening of the range of phenomena to which it is attributed. Thus, a basic observation which has to be faced head-on at the outset is that there can be no universally acceptable definition of intervention. Moreover, even if such an absolute definition were possible, this would still leave unanswered the problem of how to cope with a phenomenon that does not always originate in another state - for example the activities and influence of multinational corporations. Interstate reciprocity would not be sufficient for coping with this. The absence of a meta-system, or a transcendent authority to which parties could refer, means that there can be no last word on the issue. [4] Thus, a single operational definition is precluded because it would not be of universal validity.

These limitations become all the more apparent when the definition of what constitutes intervention is in question. At this juncture, the inherent definitional problems warrant some elaboration. The literature is full of efforts to determine what constitutes the 'essence' of intervention, and yet, as is true with many other important concepts in international relations, there is no generally accepted definition. As might be expected, each observer and researcher has defined the concept in a manner suitable to his or her preferred methodological orientation or chosen focus of study. [5] These definitions, nevertheless, have a number of elements in common, in that most students of the subject agree what constitutes its salient features. In this connection, Howard Wriggins, for example, proposes a continuum moving from influence by way of involvement and intervention to clandestine intervention. [6] The first is benign while the second suggest something closer and more continuous than influence, with the idea of shared ends and mutually acceptable means. The third, intervention, connotes action in another's territory, but where activities are not mutually acceptable. The fourth refers to affecting a state's will through actions on its territory of which it is unaware. Although superficially an exacting categorization this spectrum is not of great value. It fails to provide us with any clear demarcations. If we take

[4] J.N. Moore, "The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict", in J.N. Moore (ed), *Law and the Indo-China War*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1975, pp.119-130. See the article cited for a valuable discussion of the problem of definition.

[5] R. Little, *Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars*. London: Martin Robertson and Company Limited 1975. Little here claims that the model or concept though limited "is tailored to an application at the level of the international system. it cannot be applied in all areas and this reduces its usefulness in the task of developing a general theory". But what is of value here, despite the limitations, is the attempt made to examine the attitudes and perceptions of decision-makers to illustrate theoretical propositions about international response(s) to Civil War.

[6] Cited in J.N. Rosenau, 'Intervention', *op.cit.*, p.168.

only the example of intervention, we can see that ambiguity is rampant. We are told of activities not being "mutually acceptable", but we are not told to whom. In the case of civil war, for example, intervention by an outside power may be at the request of the existing government. Conversely, recognition by an outside power of *de facto* control by an insurgent group of a portion of the state may be considered as intervention by the government which formally claims sovereign powers over the whole of the state. For recognition transforms a formerly dyadic interaction into a triadic one. Some authors have advocated that "inaction" be regarded as intervention, where action would have resulted in a different outcome. [7] While it is not difficult for an external actor to modify its behaviour so as to remain uninvolved, it has been argued that no external actor remains uninvolved in a civil war. According to Modelski, interventionary behaviour on the part of external actors can be explained by the logic of the international political system. For, as he claims:

"Even though a country may decide not to act at all, to do nothing and to say nothing, then by this very fact it, too, helps - sometimes unwittingly - to mould the outcome of the process: for by refusing to act it helps the stronger party to suppress the weaker, irrespective of the merit of the case." [8]

Hence, Wiggins definition, on closer examination, has certain drawbacks.

Other writers have also attempted more rigorous definitions. Falk has distinguished between five types of intervention: unilateral intervention, counter-intervention, collective intervention, regional intervention and universal intervention. Little suggests an escalation ladder. Yet the problem with all these definitions is that basically they are descriptive. They are not applicable across the board in space, let alone in time, even within the confines of the contemporary international system. Rosenau points to this problem when he protests that:

[7] See A. Thomas and A.J. Thomas, *Non-Intervention: The Law and its Import in the Americas*. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1956, p.68.

[8] For a summary of the literature that adheres to this logic, see George Modelski, "The International Relations of Internal War" in J.N. Rosenau (ed) *International Aspects of Civil Strife*. Princeton: New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1964, pp.23-24.

"Ambiguous and contradictory formulations characterize the voluminous moral, legal and strategic writings on the subject, and as a result, intervention has come to be treated as synonymous with influence." [9]

Yet he seems to have set himself an impossible task. While his suggestion is useful in that it offers us two characteristics of interventionary behaviour (they are the "convention-breaking" character of the action, and the "authority oriented" nature of the behaviour), it falls somewhat short of his target by being too specific. Furthermore, Rosenau's guidelines, and hence his definition, are limiting, in that essentially they take into account only traditional conceptions of intervention. For example, Rosenau asserts that:

"an intervention begins when one national society explicitly, purposefully, and abruptly undertakes to alter or preserve one or more essential structures of another society through military means, and it ends when the effort is either successful, abandoned, or routinized." [10]

Rosenau further explains that the concept of intervention "refers to an action and a process - to a single sequence of behaviour, the initiation and termination of which is easily discernible and the characteristics of which are dependent on the use or threat of force". [11] Such a definition, however, is not without its inadequacies. First, Rosenau implies that intervention is a clear action, having a definite beginning, middle, and end. Yet if we accept that a whole range of behaviour other than acts of military force can be identified as interventionary, then we run into problems. Second, Rosenau assumes consistency in alignment on the part of the intervener, acting either to alter or preserve authority structures in the target state. Third, his emphasis on purposeful and abrupt intervention overlooks possible fluctuations in the intervener's level of commitment. A more satisfactory definition should distinguish between two key dimensions of intervention, the *direction* and *intensity* of an intervener's commitment. Because most interveners maintain consistency in alignments with either incumbents or insurgents in a target state, theorists tend to assume that the purpose of intervention is to preserve or alter

[9] J.N. Rosenau, 'Intervention', *op.cit.*, p.166.

[10] J.N. Rosenau, "Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited", in *Conflict Behaviour and Linkage Politics*, ed. Jonathan Wilkenfeld (New York: David McKay, 1973), p.38.

[11] *Ibid.*, p.38.

existing authority structures. However, a closer look calls into question whether interveners ever fully embrace the political goals of the actors they support in a target state. In some instances, it may well be the case that an intervener's key objective is not to advance the cause of any particular party, but rather to assure that a target state's authority structures were compatible with its own preferences.

Formerly, intervention amounted largely to the physical coercion of one state by another, and this could be identified easily by troops crossing a border. However, this is no longer the case. Coercion is expressed in a variety of ways including the wide spread use of economic and psychological pressure, and by actors other than the state. Interventionary behaviour today, therefore, is less clear-cut; the grey area has increased, and a black and white formula for identifying the occurrence of intervention is of limited utility. It is argued here, however, that even if a definite beginning, middle and end cannot be identified, this does not mean to say that intervention has not occurred. For intervention in the present international context is not necessarily a sharply defined, clear-cut activity; it may, for example, be on-going. Rosenau contends that without a definition such as his own, "... the line that differentiates the presence of intervention from its absence remains elusive." [12] But if we think of the changes taking place in the contemporary international system and their implications, then the implausibility of trying to discern such a line using his criteria becomes apparent. Although Rosenau describes intervention well as being directed to the "authority structure of the target society", he misses possible degrees of intervention by excluding from this the internal or external policies or capabilities of such societies. Cases of military intervention generally are directed at the decision-making process rather than at individual decisions, but other forms of coercion, such as economic sanctions, may be aimed at particular policies or capabilities.

The implications of such limitations for the study of intervention are manifold. To identify intervention in terms of coercive interference which involves the actual use or threat of force is inadequate. The concepts of coercion, use of force, of a state's political affairs, and of interference are too vague. In order to concentrate on such concerns, some writers have broadened the definition of intervention by enlarging one or all of its conditions. For example, other forms of coercion not involving threat or use

[12] J.N. Rosenau, 'Intervention', *op.cit.*, p.154.

of force such as threats to impose economic sanctions or subversion could be allowed into the definition. The purpose of interventionary behaviour, so the argument runs, is the same as that of all other forms of foreign policy, namely, to induce the other actor do what he would not otherwise do, or not to do something that he would do otherwise. But how this is achieved can take on a variety of forms and therefore has to include other interventionary types or devices:

"economic pressures on other states; diplomatic demand backed up with political threats to force a state to curb freedom of speech, press, and radio; fifth column activities; the inciting of another state's people to rise against its government; and a multitude of other refined techniques of interference must in many instances come under the heading of intervention." [13]

In this view, intervention is marked by compulsion rather than merely by the actual use of force or physical coercion. Thus, economic assistance has been claimed to constitute an instrument of intervention because political conditions are often attached.

Intervention was formerly regarded as the "physical coercion" of one state by another. This perception of intervention was largely the product of the conventional liberal separation of economics and politics into two distinct spheres. Hence, customary definitions of intervention distinguish two broad targets for the activity of intervention, namely, the domestic affairs of a state and its external affairs - the relations it has with another state or states. [14] This is a useful distinction in that it is sensitive to the difference between an 'external' act which addresses itself to a state's foreign relations, and an 'internal' act which seeks to penetrate and meddle in the domestic affairs of the state in question. However, the distinction between internal and external intervention is not always so clear. Was American intervention in the Lebanon in 1958 internal intervention to shore up a shaky pro-Western regime against threats from within, or external intervention to ward off threats from abroad? Moreover, such an approach virtually precluded any discussion or analysis of economic activities in the political context of the violation of sovereign authority.

[13] *Ibid.*, p.154.

[14] For example, see Michael H. Cardozo, "Intervention: Benefaction as Justification", in Roland J. Stanger (ed.): *Essays on Intervention*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967, pp.62-84.

Now, however, the dimensions of intervention are acknowledged as being more far-reaching. Whereas forms of interventionary activity other than those involving the military have been recognised only to a very limited extent before, the changes that the international system has undergone, and continues to undergo, highlight other types of intervention - economic and psychological, for example. Recognition of these developments is, of course, largely a product of the contemporary blurring of politics and economics, the realization that these fields cannot be separated easily, and the consequent upgrading of economic questions into the area of high politics. Alongside this has come the recognition that the actors who can use intervention as an instrument of policy have increased in number and type.

Intervention involves modifications of the behaviour of people and groups in the target state that otherwise would not have occurred if the intervening actor had not engaged in such activities. Thus, influence is both a central purpose and process of intervention. Rosenau claims, intervention should simply be identified with influence, "... since intervention subsumes influence processes that span national boundaries and that weave their way through extraordinarily complex networks, ...". [15] However, such a view abounds with problems in that the measurement of influence is indeed one of if not the most difficult problem of political analysis. Not only is an objective analysis of influence fraught with difficulties but so also is any subjective form of analysis. For among many other tasks, it requires linking changes in political behaviour to a specific set of actors who sought to evoke them and there is always the possibility that behaviour deemed to represent intended effects or influence would have occurred even with the absence of efforts to produce it by the intervenor.

Even so, it may be that a more useful definition is offered by Max Beloff, where he describes intervention as "the attempt by one state to affect the internal structure and external behaviour of other states through various degree of *coercion*." [16] It is this element of compulsion that is taken here as a starting point for understanding what is meant by intervention in the contemporary system. Since a fundamental attribute of sovereign status is that a government is theoretically omnipotent within the

[15] J.N. Rosenau, 'Intervention', *op.cit.*, p.160.

[16] Max, Beloff, "Reflection on Intervention", In M. Beloff, (ed.), *The Intellectual in Politics*, London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1970, p.227.

territorial boundaries of its respective state, then any externally imposed attempt to limit that right and power which is not desired or welcomed by the incumbent government amounts to intervention. [17] Further, any coercive attempt to usurp the decision-making capability of a theoretically sovereign state which does not originate within that state can be regarded as nothing less than intervention. It is this element of *compulsion* which is regarded as the essential nature of interventionary activity in this analysis. Moreover, it is acknowledged here that such compulsion may originate in a variety of sources (not only the state), and it may be expressed in a variety of forms. In this respect, one cannot dismiss the fact that the underlying consensus regarding the necessity of the state as the basic unit of political organization in international affairs remains. For politicians often state interest is still seen to prevail over other interests. Politics is still seen frequently by them as a zero-sum game, where a loss for one state means a gain for another, and gains are seen to come from a finite stock, at least on matters of vital interests. This consensus about the state can help in a study of intervention. For it provides a baseline against which to evaluate, examine and interpret intervention. The idea of sovereign authority provides a yardstick against which to measure intervention, for any inroads made on state sovereignty indicate that a greater or lesser degree, the non-intervention norm has been violated.

By emphasising intrusion into internal affairs of a state, it allows us to distinguish intervention from actions which are designed to affect a state's external behaviour but not its domestic politics. Furthermore, the stress on coercion makes it possible to distinguish between acts of intervention and non-coercive types of power projection. Thus, the most important implication of defining intervention as a coercive intrusion into the internal affairs of another state is that the definition does not distinguish between actions on behalf of governments, action against governments, and actions in instances where no clear governmental authority exists. This lack of distinction is deliberate. The word intervention carries with it a negative moral and legal connotation in a world ostensibly devoted to the concepts of sovereignty and self-determination. There is a large body of international opinion which maintains that intervention is wrong and inadmissible as a form of state behaviour, as well as being illegal.

[17] See, for example, Michael Akehurst, "Humanitarian Intervention", *Intervention in World Politics*, Hedley Bull, (ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, pp.95-118. Akehurst has portrayed intervention as action taken against the will of the government in whose state the intrusion occurs.

However, such a definition is inadequate without further precision. In order to avoid opprobrium, therefore, there is a temptation on the part of those actors who do interfere in the internal affairs of other states to define intervention selectively. Governments using the term tend to apply it to actions taken by their adversaries and to deny its applicability to their own actions. In other words, actors cum interveners attempt to define the scope of the concept in such a way as to reflect and further their own political interests. Beneath these self-interested and somewhat disingenuous attempts to limit the applicability of the concept, there does exist a genuine and profound moral divide. This concerns the concept of legitimacy and the attempt to link it to the definition of intervention. The negative connotation inherent in the word intervention is reflected in the tendency to limit its use to situations in which intervention is deemed illegitimate. The legitimacy of an intervention is usually judged in terms of the perceived legitimacy of the internal beneficiary of the assistance. Unfortunately, there is deep disagreement on what the sources of a group's or a regime's legitimacy are, on how legitimacy should be judged, and on who should do the judging. As noted above, the term intervention describes a broad range of activities that encompasses many if not most of the activities directed by one state toward another, including relations among friendly states. These activities can be political, diplomatic, economic or military. They can have various levels of intensity and scope, representing the balance among the intervener's interests, power, and opportunities on the one side and vulnerabilities of the target state on the other. For example, a strong state offers less windows of opportunity for intervention than an unstable weak state. Moreover, the determination to bear the costs of resistance must be taken into account. The balance among these factors provides the initial incentive by suggesting a rationale for intervention based upon calculation of comparative risk of limited liability — that is, judgements based on cost-benefit analysis related to the likelihood of success and its costs determine in part the willingness to intervene as in the subjective expected-utility approach. [18]

Yet, intervention decisions, as we shall see later, involve a much more complicated set of considerations, and at the same time are not always the result of rational calculations that the expected util-

[18] See M. Beloff, "Reflections on Intervention". In M. Beloff (ed.) *The Intellectual in Politics*, London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1970, pp.225-234.

ity approach would like us to believe that decision-makers follow. [19] Furthermore, intervention decisions and their implementation have highly visible consequences. They are made by the highest level decision-makers, imposing on them a substantial commitment due to the high stakes and risks involved. This in turn affects the nature of interests that may trigger this type of state craft. Obviously the interests involved must be considered a high priority. In most cases it is vital national interests, either in themselves or due to the symbolic meaning of the values that trigger intervention. For example, it can be a symbol of national resolve or credibility. Rarely will intervention be triggered by a single type of interest. It is more likely to be triggered and justified by multiple interests, thus making the stakes compatible with the high risks involved, and enabling decision-makers to form as broad as possible a domestic consensus in favour of that risky venture and as a result helping to reduce some of their direct responsibility for failure if it occurs. As a consequence, intervention is triggered and justified by some combination of the following interests: territorial acquisition, protection of social or ethnic groups, protection of economic interests, protection of diplomatic interests (for example, embassies, diplomats), protection of military-strategic interests (for example, military bases, access to important air, sea and land lines of communication), preserving or changing the regional power balance, and ideological motivations. [20] In reality it is not always easy to draw a clear line between those types of interests; they are often intermingled. For example, protection of a particular ethnic or religious group can be related to an ideology or serve economic and strategic interests (for example, Israel's intervention in Lebanon). Moreover, the interests of interveners and their clients are not necessarily congruent but are more likely to be complementary.

In order to account for intervention, it is necessary to examine not only the the incentives of the intervening actor but also the characteristics of the international system, of the target state and of

[19] The relevance of the subjective expected utility approach has been questioned both on general grounds by psychologists and with specific regard to the appropriateness to foreign policy decision-making. M. Patchen, *Resolving Disputes Between Nations: Coercion or Conciliation?*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1988, pp.104-106.

[20] F.S. Pearson, "Foreign Military Interventions and Domestic Disputes". *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.18, 1974, pp.259-289.

the environment which are conducive to intervention. [21] Moreover, at all three levels - that of the international system, that of the intervening actor, and that of the target environment - a set of factors is operating which evoke or constrain interventionist behaviour. Acts of intervention are the result of a complex and dynamic interaction among factors internal to both target and intervening states and matters relating to the position of both *vis-à-vis* the rest of the international system. [22] A comprehensive analysis will have to look at constraints and influences on intervention decisions at three levels: the international system, the state (the intervening and the target), and the decision-makers.

Intervention decisions are taken within a specific international setting and are affected by the attributes of the international system within which such decisions are made and implemented. Understanding the relationship between system attributes and intervention may provide decision-makers with clues as to the odds that their act of intervention will be considered legitimate by other actors (even if not formally recognized as legal) and as to how third parties are likely to react.

Systemic attributes affecting intervention are of two kinds, those that are general and are not system structure specific (bipolar versus multipolar), and those that are inherent in the systems structure. Systemic attributes affect both the opportunities and incentives for intervention. [23] Different systems have different rules regarding the tolerance (which is different from legality) for the use of coercive intervention as an instrument of foreign policy. The difference among systems with regard to the encouragement, diffusion, suppression, and isolation of internal wars affects the opportunities for intervention, and whether the system's climate is favourable to insurgents or incumbent governments affects the incentive for intervention. [24] This in turn influences the level of risk regarding the reac-

[21] See C.R. Mitchell, "Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties", *International Studies Quarterly*, 14 (June 1970), p.184. In Mitchell's view, any investigation into the problem of foreign intervention must begin with an analysis of four key aspects of the problem. These are: (1) factors associated with the disrupted state - i.e., the political system within which the conflict occurs: (2) factors within the intervening state(s) or actors: (3) factors associated with the patterns of linkage between the domestic groups - i.e. the belligerents - and external parties: and (4) factors in the international political system.

[22] O.R. Young, "Systemic Bases of Intervention", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.22 (1968), p.177. Here Young attempts to explain intervention by reference to the structural and contextual characteristics of the international system in which it occurs. He defines intervention as "organized and systematic activities across recognized boundaries aimed at affecting the political authority structure of the target."

[23] Note that opportunity for intervention is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for it to take place.

[24] See George Modelski, "The International Relations of Internal War", in J.N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, pp.14-44.

tions of third parties which will be discussed below. We shall note at this point that the problem of predicting third parties' responses is an issue that haunts not only intervening small states but even the superpowers. It has become a particularly salient consideration in the post 1945 era when nuclearization of superpower competition added the danger of possible nuclear escalation to the risk calculus of foreign intervention. It has also made more essential than ever the need to define clearly and reach mutual understanding as to the domains of preponderance of each superpower and the borders of these domains. Intervention by one superpower in the domain of the other has been perceived to be *casus belli* which requires the other superpower's conventional military response and would significantly increase probability of nuclear escalation. Yet many regions in the Third World, have retained a status of grey areas, where explicit rules do not exist and tacit rules are fuzzy and where uncertainty prevails regarding the reaction of one superpower to large scale intervention by the other superpower. [25]

In broad empirical terms it could be argued that a number of system level developments have made intervention since 1945 a mixed venture, in terms of the risks involved which might escalate into nuclear war, thereby reducing the incentive to intervene in the other superpower's sphere of influence even when the opportunity to intervene is there. At the same time, because of the reduced risk of this type of intervention, in its own sphere of influence the dominant power will be more likely to use intervention as an instrument of statecraft, everything else being equal. Similarly, mutual deterrence makes intervention in grey areas, when the opportunity offers itself, less risky as counter-intervention, in particular, if the form of deployment of combat troops by the rival superpower is less likely to take place. Furthermore, military guarantees to non-nuclear nations (that are not within the sphere of influence of another superpower), as the price of their adherence to the non-proliferation treaty, increase the likelihood of intervention. [26]

Conversely, the international arms trade and the proliferation of arms suppliers has made the transfer of modern weapon systems available to any customer willing to pay. That has increased

[25] For a discussion of tacit rules of behaviour and superpower spheres of influence, see P. Kcal, *Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance*, New York: Martin Press, 1983.

[26] A. Yarmolinsky, "American Foreign Policy and the Decision to Intervene". *Journal of International Affairs*, vol.22, pp.177-187.

significantly Third World countries' military forces and raised substantially the material and human costs of intervention to the intervening state, thus causing a decrease in incentives. What is more, explicit international norms such as self-determination and sovereignty have made foreign military intervention morally illegitimate and difficult to justify. [27] This contributes to the reluctance of states, particularly the Western powers, to intervene forcibly, directly and openly especially by using large scale military force for extended periods of time that will make it look more an all out act of aggression rather than another type of involvement in the affairs of another state. [28] Halpern has observed that in an anarchic system of sovereign states enjoying alleged equality and mutual independence of action, "any state that intervenes in the internal affairs of another undermines the institutional and legal foundations on which its own existence rests". For it subverts the very foundation of a system which by its very nature is unstable. This instability results from the fact that states are *not* equal, given the extreme variations in levels of power among them. Intervention allows stronger countries to "exploit the rules and opportunities of the international system to enlarge their power over others ..."

[29]

However, intervention may not always have a deleterious effect. As Halpern explains, intervention may be a necessary tool to achieve stability within the state-system as well as freedom for states' inhabitants.

"... [I]ntervention, by subverting the sovereignty of national independence, may further undermine the only rules of the game that now maintain order, yet when only intervention may be able to restore the free operation of these rules, save freedom in a nation or, indeed, help to create a more secure and more freely interdependent world order." [30]

Thus, seen as a two-edged sword, Halpern has found that intervention can be "right" or "wrong" "or

[27] For discussion of the rationale for and a review of the evolution of the non-intervention norm in international politics, see R. Little, *Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars*, Totowa: Roman and Littlefield, 1975; C. Thomas, *New States, Sovereignty and Intervention*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985; and R.J. Vincent, *Nonintervention and International Order*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. Two views are offered for the emergence of the nonintervention norm. One states that it is a moral-ethical principle The other states that it is a practical rule derived from experience and designed to discourage states from getting involved in unstable and ambiguous situations.

[28] H. Bull (ed.), *Intervention in World Politics*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.

[29] Manfred Halpern, *Morality and Politics of Intervention*, New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1963, p.7.

[30] *Ibid.*, p.7.

simultaneously illegal and justifiable". [31] The difference depends upon both the "principles it creates or destroys and the contingencies of circumstances." [32] It is Halpern's belief that in diplomacy there are no distinctions between coercion and persuasion. "In international affairs, coercion begins at the moment of persuasion". For "no serious great power tries to persuade another nation unless it means to convince", and its success depends "not merely on the soundness of its arguments but also upon the coercive weight of power that each interested nation experienced or wished to avoid experiencing". The distinction between the terms of coercion and persuasion "does not lie in the separation of power and persuasion, but in the difference among the means and ends of power and persuasion ... or among types of intervention". [33]

There are additional problems of defining "intervention", [34] stemming in part from the perspective of the observer. Luard points out no state calls its own acts "intervention". Rather, one's such undertakings often reflect euphemistic "assistance" to forestall "intervention" by another state. Of course, for others the labels are simply reversed to describe *their* relationship to the state subject to this attention. Thus, "intervention is what other people do, not what we do ourselves". [35] This penchant for avoiding labelling one's action "intervention" surely results from most interventionary excursions having been seen by other

[31] A. D'Amato, however, believes that "the notion that any act can be 'illegal, yet justified' substitutes paradox for analysis". In *American Journal of International Law*, (January 1984), p.199.

[32] M. Halpern, *op.cit.*, p.7.

[33] *Ibid.*, pp.9-10. Halpern's early 1960s dissection of the US military intervention in Lebanon in 1958 (pp.12-14), provides a rare and invaluable contemplation of this form of international relations. A chronic problem that pervades US foreign policy management is that its decision horizon all too frequently is that of only the crisis-management, short-term problem solution mind-set. For example, it seems doubtful that the Eisenhower Administration considered the long-term effects of its actions in Lebanon. Halpern offers an insight into how the effects of the US presence in Lebanon in 1958 helped to create the internal Lebanese political and social disorder that again stimulated intervention there in 1982. (The US supported a government that refused to rearrange power sharing among the main religious communities there to more accurately reflect Lebanon's demographics. The result was a social minority dominating the political system, over the will and interests of the majority of the population.) The benefit of Halpern's analysis is its explication of how decisions of the past influenced circumstances today. By extrapolation, it becomes clearer how today's action (or inaction) may affect the future. And questions of the utility of military intervention as a tool of a largely self-interested foreign policy surely result. Did the US profit in the long term by intervening in Lebanon in 1958? Did *Lebanon* benefit from it?

[34] M. Halpern in *Morality and Politics of Intervention*, p.8, called the lack of a common definition of intervention and aggression "the two acts most likely to destroy the sovereignty, independence and equality of any participant in the system, or ... even the system itself". The quarter-century intervening since Halpern wrote has seen advances in defining the terms (e.g. the UN Declaration on aggression), and even in state practice in regard to them, but little progress in the system's ability to forestall either, especially when the perpetrator is a superpower.

[35] Evan Luard, "Collective Intervention", p.157, in H. Bull (ed.), *Intervention in World Politics*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

states as "manifestly self-interested: undertaken in the interests of the power which undertakes the intervening". [36] What is more, it is *unitary* intervention, intervention by a larger, more powerful individual state within the domain of a smaller and weaker one which is seen as inherently selfish for the intervening party, and exploitative of the state subject to intrusion.

Luard finds *collective* intervention, that "authorized by some international body having widespread legitimacy", to be more desirable, a concept developed to "counter or deter unilateral intervention". [37] Collective action enjoys a legitimacy not usually attributable to the unitary variety, because it is thought to reflect a consensus of the parties as to its goals and purposes. Whereas unitary intervention's purposes are invariably predicated on *self-interest*. [38] Although Luard contends that forces of several states who intervene within another state, relying upon only the authority of the states intervening (that is, states not acting under the authority of a formal international organization) might also be "collective" he prefers to call these "multilateral" or "multinational". [39] This last point is pertinent to this study because the American, French, Italian (and later, British) presence in Lebanon was called a "multinational" force by the sponsor-states. [40]

To understand these systemic interventionary behaviours more fully and in more comprehensive and abstract terms, it will be useful now to compare the opportunities, incentives, and deterrents for foreign intervention that are inherent in two historically dominant international systems: the balance of power and bipolar systems. "In general, the more extensive the disparities in power, the greater the opportunities for intervention". [41] It will become particularly tempting to use intervention "during periods when distribution of power is changing more rapidly than the distribution of other values" [42] through the process of competitive intervention.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] *Ibid.*, pp.162, 163.

[38] *Ibid.*

[39] *Ibid.*, pp.161-162.

[40] United States leaders occasionally referred to the Multinational Force in Beirut ("MNF") as representing a "collective" action.

[41] O.R. Young, "Intervention and International Systems", *Journal of International Affairs*, vol.22, p.180.

[42] *Ibid.*, p.183.

When the balance-of-power system functions well, it should limit the opportunities and incentives for intervention, although it does not prevent intervention altogether. The system is supposed to protect the independence of weaker states through the deterring of interventions by stronger states. The shifting of alliances in face of threats to the balance requires that such shifts be independent of the nature of the regime and domestic order. Moreover, the more dispersed the structure of the international system the less the likelihood that radical change will result from a single development in the system. Hence domestic upheaval and its potential consequences will be perceived as less threatening, and consequently are less likely to trigger intervention behaviour and the risks it may entail.

It would be probably correct to maintain that in a balance of power system there is a strong incentive to insulate internal political instability from external intervention. Yet this statement will be particularly valid with regard to states essential to the preservation of the balance either by being important powers or by other characteristics they have, such as geostrategic position that gives them a role in reducing friction between major powers, for example, buffer states. [43] There is, however, in a balance of power system, an incentive to apply the norm of non-intervention as uniformly as possible (even to non-essential actors) because of the precedent effect. That makes it easier to mobilize action by the major powers against intervention that could destabilize the balance of power, and raise the threshold against engaging in armed intervention. Intervention behaviour even towards a marginal state may have an eroding effect on the general norm, in particular in cases of "twilight-zone violations". [44] However, you can have intervention to stabilise the system as well as being inhibited by fear of a rival intervention.

Nonetheless, collective (or multilateral) intervention, or collusion among some of the great powers in order to divide the spoils among them is not precluded. An alliance among intervening major powers can also serve as a cushion against competitive intervention escalating into a confrontation between the competing major powers, thus reducing the risks inherent in unilateral intervention

[43] For a discussion of buffer states and their relations with great powers, see M.G. Partem, "The Buffer System in International Relations". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1983, vol.27, pp.3-26; and T.E. Ross, "Buffer States: A Geographer's Perspective", in J. Chay and T.E. Ross (eds.) *Buffer States in World Politics*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1986, pp.11-28.

[44] M.A. Kaplan, "Intervention in Internal War: Some Systemic Sources". In J.N. Rosenau (ed.) *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, p.102.

regarding a third party reaction. It should, however, be noted that the balance-of-power system did not always work to fend off intervention because alignments against the aggressor seemed to be too costly. On other occasions intervention did not necessarily contradict the interests of the system's major actors because they simply did not care, or were completely indifferent toward the nature of the domestic regime that will result from a particular case of intervention. Hence, intervention by an external actor on behalf of one domestic actor or another did not cause a sense of threat. Furthermore, intervention could take place in a balance of power system where civil wars could effect "elements of the international environment that are of interest to major powers, but do not bring into question either the underlying structure of the system or the ordering of the major powers within it". [45] Limited stakes thus sometimes allowed for intervention even at the risk of creating a precedent.

The situation is very different in a bipolar system be it loose or tight. In this sense the only difference between a loose bipolar and a tight bipolar system is that in the latter case intervention is used mainly as an instrument of the bloc leader or by smaller states when they act as proxies for the bloc leader. Bloc leaders will disallow not only extra-bloc intervention in their bloc but also intra-bloc intervention by secondary members of their own bloc that was not cleared by them in order to preserve bloc cohesiveness and unity. They are also likely to disallow independent extra-bloc intervention in order not to be drawn into an armed confrontation with the rival bloc leader. Moreover, because in a tight bipolar system any state actor is closely identified with one of the blocs, interventions tend to be mainly of the intra-bloc type. Extra-bloc intervention, in a country belonging to the other bloc, will be relatively rare because of the high probability of resulting inter-bloc conflict.

In a loose bipolar system, the control of bloc leaders over the weaker members declines. Thus weaker states may sometimes pursue their own interests without the blessing or even in defiance of bloc leader's wishes. Hence, even smaller client states may use the instrument of intervention in serving their own interests and not only as proxies for the major powers (for example, Israel's and Syria's intervention in Lebanon). Moreover, as bloc leaders have less means to influence the domestic stability of bloc members, the probability of domestic instability increases. The combination of an increased

[45] E.M. Forman, "Civil War as a Source of International Violence", *Journal of Politics*, vol.34, p.1127.

number of cases of domestic instability and the looseness of the system provide more opportunities for both extra-bloc intervention (not necessarily by the bloc leader). The incentives for intervention will depend, however, on other factors such as the potential intervener's past experience and his estimates of the risks involved.

It can be inferred from the discussion so far that intervention is, as a rule, a more widespread phenomenon in bipolar systems for reasons related both to available opportunities and incentives. This trend has been further enhanced since 1945 by additional factors. First, the ideological contest representing two competing conceptions of both domestic and international order injected a sense of zero-sumness into superpower relations in periods of tight bipolarity, encouraging intervention to prevent defections from one bloc to the rival bloc. Second, because in the current loose bipolar international system, there are more 'targets of opportunity', weak new states facing serious internal rifts and tensions, which are relatively low risk targets of intervention, while the restraints imposed by the system's structure in the balance-of-power system are weakened. [46] Still these opportunities were sometimes moderated by the nuclear stand-off that forced the superpowers to limit their goals by aiming for changing the international environment through incrementally affecting the domestic politics of smaller countries rather than encouraging step-level changes by confronting directly each other through foreign military intervention.

Third, the more tightly the system is structured, the potential shift of allegiances of a country seem to be more threatening. Domestic upheaval that could change the status quo seem to invite immediate intervention especially when the rivalry is ideologically intense. [47] Each bloc has an interest in preventing change in the domestic political systems of its own members that could affect

[46] See George Modelski, "The International Relations of Internal War", in J.N. Rosenau (ed.) *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, 1964, p.20. Modelski argues that "every internal war creates a demand for foreign intervention". Moreover, he himself adds the caveat that "the demand may not always be satisfied ... that is, potential intervening actors may not want to seize the opportunity for intervention." In fact, Foreman argues that "because of the immense cost of general war, particularly but not exclusively in this century, declaration of general war tended to be made with great reluctance and not particular frequency ... Either one or both of the potential interveners, reluctant to wage general war, will decide to withdraw or to abstain from acting at all for fear that the opponent in the system is determined to have its own way in the civil war regardless of the risk of general war". E.M. Forman, "Civil War as a Source of International Violence", *Journal of Politics*, vol.34, p.1122.

[47] Some of the subsequent discussion was stimulated by Stanley Hoffman (ed.), *Intervention in World Politics*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986; M.A. Kaplan, "Intervention in Internal War: Some Systemic Sources". In J.N. Rosenau (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.92-121; and J.N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol.13, no.4, pp.149-171.

their bloc membership, and at the same time has an interest in supporting such change in political systems of the adversary bloc members. This creates, of course, an incentive for intervention when the level of risk seems acceptable.

Finally, the arguments with regard to the effects of systemic variables that were made in the context of the global international system applies to the subsystem level as well. But at the subsystem level another factor is also relevant. When the distribution of power is more equal, among participants in local conflicts, the opportunities for extra-regional intervention invited by a local participant declines. But the more unequal the distribution of power, the higher the likelihood that a weaker party may be forced to invite extra-regional intervention to compensate for the power imbalance, thus providing a window of opportunity for intervention. Yet such intervention carries a high risk of antagonizing regional powers that may perceive extra-regional intervention as interference in their sphere of influence, and thus it may cost the intervening power the deterioration of relations with these powers. This risk must be weighed when assessing the costs of intervention compared with ensuing benefits.

Intervention always involves the risk of a third party response. A third country's response to intervention reflects its threat perception stemming from an assessment, often based on a worst case analysis, of the potential strategic implications of the intervention. In other cases it may consider a response necessary in face of what it regards as a challenge to its credibility and international status. One way to avoid such a response is by establishing a tacit or explicit mutual understanding as to the purpose and limits of intervention, pacifying the third party's fears (for example, the 'red lines' understanding between Syria and Israel in Lebanon). [48] Such an agreement will be more stable if it does not reduce the effectiveness of intervention as an instrument of statecraft in achieving the intervener's goals and is not seen as a threat to the vital interests of the third party.

A third party response to intervention can take a number of forms or options which have risk implications that are dissimilar in gravity. The first option, that of direct counter-intervention, when it involves the two superpowers risks the outbreak of a World War, or at least significantly raises the costs of achieving the goals set for intervention by requiring either the deployment of more combat

[48] For a discussion on this see chapter four.

troops than was originally anticipated or, alternatively, by raising the costs of goal achievement to the troops deployed in terms of casualties. A second option, that of direct military involvement, has the impact of raising the cost of goal achievement to the intervener. This is achieved by making local resistance to intervention more resilient and effective. In both the first and second reaction options the recognition by the intervention target of the effects of external support raises the morale and confidence of the target and its willingness to resist. Thus the target is likely to take a more stubborn position and is less likely to make easy concessions to the intervening power.

A third option, reaction by non-military involvement, raises mostly the non-military costs of intervention beyond those calculated, such as undermining international legitimacy. Since intervention is often counter-normative, in an international system emphasising sovereignty, the intervening power can only rarely unleash the full scope of its military capability for fear of being denounced as an uninhibited aggressor facing the possibility of completely losing external legitimacy. Thus, its strategy and tactics is often based on the use of limited force at the cost of relative inefficiency. Moreover, intervention operations are executed in a mostly civilian environment, unlike wars which are usually carried out in military zones. The lines between civil sectors and combat zones, where different rules of conduct apply, are fuzzy or non-existent. The question of who is the enemy and who is a non-combatant often has no clear answer. It raises very serious moral questions regarding where the rules of war apply and where civil rules of conduct apply. This ambiguity imposes significant restrictions on the way military power can be implemented. An army untrained and unprepared to deal with these types of problems will find itself frustrated, denied of optimally reaching its objectives and yet is expected to show results in a manner it considered ill-fitting the circumstances. At the same time it is faced with growing external and internal criticisms at home and abroad that seriously undermine morale, even further eroding its capability to carry out its missions effectively and within a short time.

The key to intervention is the ability to make relevant decisions and to implement them successfully. That means being able to define, and sustain, the level of force necessary to achieve the intervention goals at an acceptable cost. The capabilities required are those necessary for effective management of both the domestic and external environments. Yet as shall be argued, the successful manage-

ment of the domestic and external environments are interdependent, as are the various dimensions of capability. A decline in external environment management effectiveness will directly affect the ability successfully to carry out the intervention. That will then feed back into the domestic system and exacerbate the problem of domestic management with further mutual repercussions.

In this context, legitimacy is a vital component in the calculations leading to a decision and for the success of most major policies and, as such, extremely important in assessing political capabilities. It is particularly important when the costs of the policy are high, its normative justification disputed or not transparent, and the benefits not immediately obvious or realizable. Legitimacy for foreign policy contains two dimensions — cognitive and normative — and two targets, domestic and external. Normative legitimacy establishes the desirability of a policy in terms of its being consistent with fundamental national and international values, while cognitive legitimacy requires that the leadership prove that its policies are feasible. [49]

The external sources of legitimacy are foreign governments and the more elusive 'world public opinion'. The intervening government will attempt to convince allies and foes abroad that it knows what it is doing and that its policies will produce the desired results. At the same time it will cloak intervention with an aura of legitimacy by attempting to persuade these external actors that intervention is in line with the norms, ethics, and laws of international society, for example, through quoting an invitation to intervene from the target country's government. [50] If intervention succeeds, the risk of international criticism, and sanctions and the resultant diplomatic embarrassment and costs as well as the risks of counterintervention will decline. Similarly, if allies are convinced that the policy of intervention is appropriate and will be successful in meeting the interveners' goals, they may either support it actively, for example, by sending a symbolic contingent of their military forces or allowing the use of bases in their territory, or support it diplomatically when challenged in international fora. These

[49] See A.L. George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy". In O.R. Holsti, R.M. Salverson and A.L. George (eds.), *Change in the International System*, Boulder: Westview, 1980, pp.233-262.

[50] See H.W. Brands, "Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada". *Political Science Quarterly*, (1987-88), vol.102, pp.607-624; and R. Little, *Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars*, Toronto: Roman and Littlefield, 1975.

allies will also not perceive their relationship with the intervener or his capabilities to carry out the other commitments to be at stake. This state of affairs will probably reduce the risk that they will either seek alternative alliances or take other steps that may be construed by the intervener as a cost, such as de-emphasising their links with the intervener. At the same time the intervener's rivals may find it diplomatically and morally more difficult to engage in counterintervention and will assess the probability of the success of counterintervention as quite low and the risks of failure high, and thus may be deterred from direct counterintervention even though they may engage in lower intensity involvement (for example, covert operations). These arguments are particularly valid when the third party in question is an open society that is well aware of events occurring beyond the national borders, and where public opinion is a significant input to government decisions. [51]

Furthermore, intervention is one of the foreign policy issues most likely to become a subject of domestication. Domestic legitimacy like external legitimacy involves a cognitive and normative dimension. Belief by the public that their government knows what it is doing and that its policy will result in the desired outcomes makes costs and sacrifices more acceptable even when they are relatively high. But when the public doubts the efficiency of the policy as well as its morality, even relatively low costs will be considered a burden not worth bearing. Domestic opposition to a policy, even when it is passive undermines the probability of its success and, particularly in democratic societies, undercuts decision-makers' freedom of action in general and, more specifically, the capability to escalate, even when they are convinced that escalation is necessary to reach the intervention goals. The combination of domestic resistance and disaffection and the possible failure of a high-stakes policy raises not only the perceived risks to the national interest(s), but is often seen as posing a challenge to the decision-maker's personal interest, such as survival in office or being judged positively by history and future generations.

External and domestic legitimacy are not unrelated. When a policy loses domestic legitimacy the effect is also to erode its legitimacy as well in the view of external actors. Similarly, the decline in

[51] See H.K. Tillema and J.R. Van Wingen, "Law and Power in Military Intervention". *International Studies Quarterly*, (1982), vol.26, pp.220-250.

external legitimacy will lead to questioning of the policy's validity by the public at home, and in the longer run if the policy's costs are rising while its benefits are not obvious or seem dubious, it is likely to lead to erosion of domestic legitimacy with all the resultant consequences discussed above. It should be noted, however, that in order for the decline of external legitimacy to affect domestic legitimacy it requires that the domestic public be aware of the attitudes of foreign governments and world public opinion. It means that such linkages are more likely to occur when the intervener's society is an open one, allowing the free flow of information through the mass media. [52]

International criticism of an authoritarian regime may not be able to provide arguments for the domestic debate over intervention policy, because such a debate is generally impossible, and the access to the target's society by the critic is blocked. But even then the leadership in the authoritarian society is often aware and sensitive to international criticism because of the practical, political, and other implications it may have to deal with, or because competing factions within the elite may use international criticism to strengthen their position (for example, the case of Soviet response to international criticism of their intervention in Afghanistan). It should be noted, however, that not all international critics will have the same impact. Perceptions of partiality, importance and influence of the critic in the international community and its power to attract followers that would threaten to create a bandwagon effect will be important in affecting the interveners calculations of the costs attributed to international criticism.

This said, the political environment in the target state is an essential aspect of any adequate explanation or account, in that it determines the permissive conditions in which intervention takes place. While it may be somewhat tautological to say that deep-seated divisions are a precondition

[52] For means of dealing with international criticism to reduce its effectiveness, see L.G. Stenelo, *The International Critic*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.

of intervention in a state caught up in the throes of internal war, it is nonetheless significant. [53] It is all the more probable that a society is likely to be a target of intervention when it is generally lacking in political integration and chronically unstable, and with a population which has little, if any, commitment to central political authority. This lack of integration often reflects deep-seated ethnic, religious and class conflicts within a polity that in turn provokes external intervention. The resort to violence and insurgency, often culminating in a state of internal war, creates in internal actors new needs, which in general can only be satisfied by external actors. [54]

Intervention is system-relevant behaviour in the sense that its purpose cannot be understood except in reference to the system to which the situation prompting intervention is relevant. What this suggests is that intervention must be viewed from the perspective of the factors that make internal wars salient to components of external systems. The components of external systems to which an internal war is salient may belong to a national system, a transnational system, and an international system. These components may be concerned over the implications of an internal war for their position or role in each or all of these systems. Their decision to intervene may stem from the relationship between their interests in any or all of these systems and the issues and circumstances of an internal war. An internal war may be relevant to the decision-makers of the government or another national system because of its salience to their roles or position or power as a unit of (1) a national system whose interests they are responsible for promoting in the international system, and (2) a transnational system through which they are linked to other groups. The decision-making group may respond to an internal

[53] In much of the research relating to intervention in civil conflict in the target state (most of it theoretical as opposed to data-based research), it has been hypothesized: (1) that violent conflict is more likely to attract foreign conflict and attention than non-violent conflict. See J.N. Rosenau, "Internal War as an International Event", in J.N. Rosenau (ed), *op.cit.*, pp.45-91; and (2) that decision-makers pay most attention to "domestic conflict of wide scope which might result in significant alterations of the existing authority structures of the nation in which such disruption occurs". Thus, "Structural war" inside a country - i.e. civil conflicts concerning many substructures of a society and that society's domestic or foreign policies as opposed to conflicts about personnel (i.e. coups), or about the structure of political roles ("authority wars") - is said to be most likely to attract foreign intervention, see *Ibid*, p.66. The general theoretical premises of these hypotheses are that: (1) people are more interested in violent than in non-violent situations and that there is great uncertainty and potential threat in rapidly changing violent situations; (2) as internal conflicts spread, and as they involve an increasing number of universal values, they "have greater relevance for the internal affairs and foreign policies of other nations". *Ibid*, pp.50-60. See also M.A. Kaplan, "Intervention in Internal War: Some Systemic Sources", 1967, pp.92-122. J.N. Rosenau, "The Concept of Intervention", *Journal of International Affairs*, XXXII (Summer), pp.165-76.

[54] See for example, G. Modelski, "The International Relations of Internal War", in J.N. Rosenau (ed), *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, pp.14-44. According to Modelski, interventionary behaviour on the part of the external parties can be explained by the *logic* of the international political system and 'inevitable' appeal to external parties for assistance by the original belligerents.

war as a situation salient to any or all of these system-relevant roles. For example, in most instances of invitational intervention, an appeal for outside support is issued by one of the parties to civil strife. Whether or not the recipient of the appeal responds positively depends on the nature and intensity of prior links between the elites and societal groups in the two states. [55] If these linkages are strong, a decision to intervene is seen merely as an extension of a prior commitment. [56] From the appellant's perspective, however, a request for assistance is generally issued reluctantly. Recognizing the risks of involving an external actor in their quarrel, the parties to civil strife delay as long as possible before reaching their 'threshold of appeal'. The normative overtones of appeals may profoundly affect perceptions of the legitimacy of the intervention both within the target state and the rest of the international community. However, it is inaccurate to counterpose invitational motives with other incentives for intervention as if they were mutually exclusive. For the analyst, it is not sufficient to ask who made the first move in initiating intervention. An intervener may harbour penetrational ambitions, even if its intervention was initially solicited by an appellant. [57] Having responded to an invitation does not bind an intervener subsequently to conformity to the policy preferences of an appellant. At what level, therefore, are invitational explanations helpful in understanding an intervener's motives? Surely, receiving an invitation for assistance affects an actor's calculations of the costs of intervening in civil strife within the target state. Moreover, the external parties are likely to respond favourably to these requests because of the 'rules' of the international political system. These rules compel the parties to whom the appeals are made to intervene lest they allow some other party to gain control or substantial influence over the affairs of the war-torn society. Thus, the overriding goal of any intervener is to realize its objectives in the target at an acceptable cost. Yet even if the intervener is a *rational* actor pursuing clear-cut objectives, calculations of costs involves considerable uncertainty. Observing the evolution

[55] See C.R. Mitchell, *op.cit.*, p.190.

[56] *Ibid.*, p.187. The central thesis in this regard is that "further involvement into a situation of violent civil strife is really an extension of an already existing commitment."

[57] In conformity to a realist view of international politics, the intervener seeks an outcome to the conflict that maximizes its influence in the target state. In so doing, the intervener seeks to ward off challenges to and even enhance, its status in the local balance of power. See Richard Little, *Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars*, 1975, pp.16-17. Exclusive emphasis on penetrational objectives, however, would overlook the defensive motives of a would be intervener. Elites in one state may intervene in an unstable contiguous state because of the apprehension over potential imitative unrest at home, known as the 'fear of contagion'. This phenomenon may be especially pronounced if the intervener's society has cleavages parallel to those in the target state. See Frederic Pearson, "Foreign Military Intervention and Domestic Disputes", *International Studies Quarterly*, 18 (September 1974), pp.266-267.

of civil strife in another state raises doubts over who is likely to 'win' the confrontation and what the consequences of 'winning' will be for each side.[58] The intervener may assist the side it favours as a means of decreasing uncertainty. However, inability to assess correctly the balance of forces between contending parties in the target state may undermine the intervener's intent. Instead of decreasing uncertainty, intervention may actually increase unpredictability by reinforcing chronic elite and institutional instability. [59] In fact, empirical studies suggest that the level of conflict in a target state generally increases after an outside party intervenes, falsifying the intervener's common expectation that its actions will restore stability. [60]

Viewed in this context, it is not being argued that internal conflict and lack of integration are *necessary* conditions for interventionary behaviour. No more are they *sufficient* ones: external actors must have some reason(s) of their own for becoming involved in an internal conflict in another country. Hence, any account of intervention must examine the basic motives and characteristics of external actors. Like any field of human action, international politics does not lend itself totally to unambiguous interpretation. The search for the best possible interpretation requires among other things consideration of the evaluations presented by the actors concerned. Such statements are necessarily good, albeit defensible, evidence for their intentions. In the light of further evidence not at present available, such as state papers or personal memoirs, the conclusions may in the future be overturned. But this does not create grounds for scepticism of a general nature but rather shows the possibilities, albeit within the limitations of the evidence, for the ascription of intentions to actors.

In discussing motives, it must be stressed that the analysis is highly speculative. Even when relevant documents are available, motives for a specific policy are often obscure, since the written word may not reflect the thinking of those involved. The task is even more intractable when, as in the case of more recent events, such sources are seldom available at all. One is forced in such instances to

[58] The limitations of the "rationality assumption" in realist theories are evaluated in Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond", in *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, ed. Ada W. Finifter, Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1983, pp.508, 529, 531.

[59] Ted Gurr, "The Relevance of Theories of Internal Violence for the Control of Intervention", in *Law and Civil War in the Modern World*, ed. John N. Moore, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974, pp.73-75.

[60] Frederic Pearson, "Foreign Military Interventions and Domestic Disputes", *International Studies Quarterly*, 18 (September 1974), pp.279-283.

induce a rationale for an action from the events themselves, viewed in this context of the overall behaviour and historical and cultural traditions of the actor(s) in question. The problem is further complicated by the fact that the intervening actor is not a monolithic entity, but is complex, being composed of various competing and co-operating groups, each with its own set of motives, which may coincide with, complement or contradict those other groups. Policy is generally just as much the result of bargains struck among these groups as it is of the decision of a single determining personality. In this kind of policy-making context, different decision-makers may support an action for different reasons. Hence, it is improbable that one can account for policies in terms of single motives, or maintain with certainty that a single motive is the determining one.

However, any treatment of the motives for intervention must also be balanced by a consideration of the constraints under which the intervener must operate. Any external power or actor considering an act of intervention is faced with a number of constraints on its ability to do so. These must be weighed against those factors which favour intervention in any decision about whether and to what extent to become embroiled in a conflict inside another state. They are material (economic and military), political and normative, and they originate in the international system as a whole, the intervening state, and the target environment. It is only in considering these constraints that one can discover why intervention does not occur in some cases where the permissive conditions are present and where basic motivations for it are strong, whereas in others it does occur.

While conditions in the target environment, the structure of the international system, the motivation and constraints of external actors are all important in establishing the context in which a decision to intervene is taken, they are not sufficient to explain why an act of intervention takes place at a specific time and why this particular policy is chosen. The decision to intervene may well be a response to catalytic events in the target state, to sudden changes in the fortunes of local allies or adversaries and in the type and level of involvement by other external actors. These events radically alter the trade-off of costs and benefits faced by the intervening actor in such a way as to make the option of intervention appear either irresistible or unavoidable. In this most immediate sense, intervention is a product of crisis and rapid change in political conditions in the target state. This faces the external

actor with the choice of defeat - bringing with it the loss of prior investment, humiliating withdrawal, loss of prestige, and gains to rivals - or else decisive escalation. Alternatively, it may present the potential intervener with a dramatic and ephemeral opportunity to realize long-standing and fundamental political ends. Perhaps the most important characteristic of such crises is the speed with which events occur and fortunes change. It is this which militates against the employment of other instruments - which generally take longer to have an effect and are in any case often inappropriate for affecting the outcomes of an armed civil conflict. With respect to consequences or outcomes, intervention may bring the intervening actor short-term political gains (influence and prestige, the weakening of adversaries) and military gains, but even in the short term it is a highly risky undertaking with significant chances of failure. In the longer term, intervention is likely to be unrewarding. The military instrument may perhaps buy time, but it is too blunt to resolve the political and social conflicts which provoked the intrusion. In fact, it may encourage local clients to believe that they need not address the grievances and aspirations of their rivals, it may impede the target state's political integration. Furthermore, even where intervention succeeds in advancing a local client's interests, the influence gained thereby is by no means absolute and permanent. The local actor's debt to his external benefactor does not prevent him from pursuing policies inimical to the latter.

From the above discussion, is it possible to develop a recipe for successful intervention? It should be noted that even when the balance of capabilities and international systemic incentives favour the intervening actor, some attributes of the target state can have important, even decisive, influence over the short- and long-term success or failure of intervention because of the interactive effects of target attributes with intervener's and third party's calculations. When the target society is socially cohesive, has a popularly supported government, and the client is organizationally and militarily competent the chances of success can increase significantly, especially when compared with intervention on behalf of opposition groups. By contrast, chronic instability and prolonged internal conflict resulting from, and in turn exacerbating, a lack of social cohesion reduce the probability of success

in the long term, since it is difficult in such circumstances for external actors to impose a lasting solution to the problems which occasion intervention. [61] This is evident in the present study. Also important is the organizational and military competence of the local client, as the experience of the Multinational Force in Beirut (hereafter 'MNF') suggests. Second, the probability of success depends to a degree on the objectives and nature of the intervener. With respect to objectives the broader they are, the less likely they are to be achieved. Finally, the probability of success is conditioned by the international *context* in which intervention occurs and more specifically, by the degree of involvement in the target state of other actors or the degree to which competitive involvement is likely to ensue. An external actor's involvement is far more likely to succeed if its client's adversaries are not closely linked to foreign powers and also if its intervention does not provoke others to intervene. The latter condition depends in turn on the extent to which the interests of other external actors are at stake, on the degree to which their forces are already committed elsewhere, and on the domestic constraints they face in contemplating counter-intervention.

By contrast, the objectives of an intervener have a very low probability of being successfully attained in unintegrated societies. This is especially so where there are deep and lasting animosities between different communities and where the different groups contending for power have longstanding ties to, and commitments from external actors. It is also the case where the external actor's client is actively opposed by large sections of the population and is poorly organized and militarily incompetent. Success is also problematic where the external actor's resolve is weak, domestic opposition to the intervention is significant and the influence of public opinion upon the policy-making process is high. Finally, where intervention is likely to provoke counter-intervention by third parties, objectives are difficult to achieve. These criteria are of course a matter of commonsense, but it is evident that, in contemplating intervention, external actors frequently do not approach these issues in a systematic way, or else lack information to be able to make such an evaluation.

Closely related to the above discussion of optimal and actual intervention is the question of time

[61] N. Macfarlane, *Intervention and Regional Security*. Adelphi Papers, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985, no. 196, pp.37-39.

dimension. Time is a particularly salient element in cases of long-term extended intervention, but plays a role in the decision-making process of short-term intervention as well. The amount of time available to decision-makers to make their decision can be crucial in determining the nature of the decision-making process as well as its quality. More specifically, the shorter the time available for deliberation and consideration, the more likely are decisions to be based on core values, beliefs, schemata, stereotypes, historical analogies, organizational standard operation procedures and cultural biases, and the less likely to be based on a well considered and calculated evaluation of alternative options and their short- and long-term consequences. Commitment to the policy of intervention will thus have to be made faster and at a relatively early stage. The effects of feedback will be limited even at the early stages, and rigidities will prematurely dominate policies not allowing for necessary adjustment unless they are marginal. These constraints on the quality of decisions will be even further enhanced by the stress and anxiety effects created by a combination of the short time and high stakes involved. [62]

The element of time may have a positive effect on testing the assertions and assumption guiding the policy of intervention, by providing perspective and opportunity to learn from experience by trial and error. It thus helps in the reduction of uncertainties and lack of knowledge both about the intervener (for example, is the domestic public capable of carrying the cost of intervention for an extended period of time), the target (for example, how much is that target actor willing to sacrifice in order to deny success to the intervener?), and the international environment (for example, does it recognise and legitimize a *fait accompli* even if it is counternormative?). These make time a necessary, although not a sufficient, condition for learning and adjustment.

Where time does not seem to reduce uncertainties but rather to enhance them or add new ones, and when a clear cut successful resolution of these

[62] See, for example, O.R. Holsti and A.L. George, "The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy-Makers". In C.P. Cotter (ed.) *Political Science Annual, Vol.6: Individual Decision Making*, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975, pp.255-319.

uncertainties does not seem obvious, interveners may be facing a growing problem in mobilizing domestic and international support for the policy of intervention. [63] An important problem in calculating the cost effectiveness of a policy of intervention, is the inconsistency that is likely to be found between short- and long-term consequences. Yet, decision-makers are likely to give the most consideration and weight to the short term consequences and less consideration to the long-term consequences. Politically it is more useful to exploit the immediate short-term vivid success for advancing their political interests, gaining popularity and perpetuating themselves in power. But there are also other reasons for this bias. The prospect of long term negative results is ambiguous and uncertain, and thus not easy to envision, and, as such, the accuracy of the calculation of costs is low. The opposite is true of the short-term results. "An intervention is successful in the short term when its military and immediate political objectives are satisfied. Its success in the longer term must be judged in terms of the durability of the political solution which has resulted, the degree to which the internal forces against whom the intervention was aimed remain active, the nature of the political and strategic advantages accruing to the intervener, and the extent to which intervention has resulted in long-term and costly commitments of the intervener's military forces and other resources." [64] It is thus preferable to limit intervention to a short-term period, taking into account that even the results of a successful intervention tend to be eroded in the long-term, especially when the objectives concern the use of force by another actor or third party. [65]

The analysis in this chapter underscores the complexity and difficulty in considering the issue of how to define intervention. For the purpose of this study, however, we are in need of an analytical definition of intervention which eliminates the most glaring deficiencies and inconsistencies of the above-mentioned plethora of definitions. Therefore, the following definition is offered:

[63] There is evidence for greater reluctance by decision makers to commit themselves to hostile intervention in another country is domestic conflict than to interfere to affect specific policies. Because in the first case the probability of stalemated, long-lasting and costly intervention seems greater. See, for example, F.S. Pearson, "Foreign Military Interventions and Domestic Disputes". *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.18, pp.259-289.

[64] N. Macfarlane, *Intervention and Regional Security*. Adelphi Papers, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984, no.196, p.32.

[65] B.M. Blechman and S.S. Kaplan, *Force Without War*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978, pp.88, 102.

Intervention is defined as the organized and systematic use of coercion by one state or non-state actor in order to change or prevent change in the political structure of another state or in its internal or external policies, action or capabilities. As a *coercive activity*, it is thus distinguished from influence or non-coercive interaction: without such a distinction the concept is meaningless, given the degree of interaction between actors in international affairs. The type of coercion involved may be economic, military, cultural or diplomatic.

This definition draws on and is a composite of other definitions of intervention and contains elements from each, but is not fully congruent with any of these earlier definitions. [66]

[66] R. Little, "Revisiting Intervention: A Survey of Recent Developments". *Review of International Studies*, vol.13, pp.49-60; F.S. Pearson, "Foreign Military Interventions and Domestic Disputes". *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.18, pp.259-289; F.S. Pearson, "Geographic Proximity and Foreign Military Intervention", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol.18, pp.432-460; F.S. Pearson and R. Baumann, "Foreign Military Intervention by Large and Small Powers", *International Interactions*, vol.1, pp.273-278; J.N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol.13, no.4, pp.149-171; U. Schwarz, *Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern World*, New York: Oceana, 1970; C. Thomas, *New States, Sovereignty and Intervention*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985; O.R. Young, "Intervention and International Systems", *Journal of International Affairs*, 1968, vol.22, pp.177-187.

CHAPTER TWO

The Fundamentals of Peacekeeping

Lebanon, as this study will attempt to highlight, could come increasingly to illustrate the type of country in which the insertion of a peacekeeping force or operations will be judged as desirable, if not necessarily feasible, in order to maintain delicate regional and international strategic balances. The more so, in that like many small countries, Lebanon is unable to provide for its own security. It is located simultaneously at the fault lines of conflicting regional and international strategic interests. In 1982, as in the past, the regional conflict between Israel, the PLO and Syria spilt over violently onto Lebanese territory exacerbating even further Lebanon's internal cleavages and unbridled feuds. The potential threats this poses to both regional and international order is obvious.

Although most peacekeeping undertaking in the past has, in the main, been the responsibility of the United Nations, [1] major regional organizations have also mounted such operations with varying degrees of success. For present purposes, it is our contention that both U.N. and non-U.N. peacekeeping can be equally effective provided certain prerequisites and conditions exist. These requisites can be grouped into six main attributes or principles which, if transgressed, move the undertaking from peacekeeping to some other form of third-party intervention. It is, therefore, important to identify and discuss these six touchstones of a peacekeeping operation in its various stages - at inception, formation, deployment, operation and termination. Some elements are imperative, others, while desirable for a highly effective operation, are not necessary. In this context, some analysis will be offered by way of comparing a U.N. peacekeeping model with multinational (non-U.N.) operations. Before embarking on an enquiry into these six essential principles it is useful to outline the meaning of the concept and examine how the pattern of activity evolved.

[1] The United Nations, for example, has assumed a function in a number of conflicts, sending both military units and groups of military observers in so-called peacekeeping operations. More extensive operations have been undertaken in the Middle East in 1956-1967, in the Congo in 1960-1964, in Cyprus since 1964 and again in the Middle East following the 1973 conflict, and most recently in Lebanon since 1978 to the present. Groups of observers have been working in Greece in 1947-1952, in Kashmir since 1949, in India and Pakistan 1965-1967, in Lebanon in 1958, in the Middle East since 1949. In 1985 the United Nations published a survey of its operation up to that time. *The Blue Helmets: A review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1985.

The Concept of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping as a general concept in international relations has a rather broad meaning. It has been applied on different occasions to describe a wide range of measures, actions or proposals of varying degrees of comprehensiveness that have generally been intended or designed to maintain some semblance of peace in conflict situations, for example, to diminish the likelihood of overt violence. Peacekeeping can include *inter alia* everything from a one-man presence, through mediatory and conciliatory missions, observers and on to formally organized peacekeeping forces. [2] 'Peacekeeping' is one of those words to which a wide variety of meaning may justifiably be attached. Since the Second World War, however, it has become a term of art. While not only the United Nations can engage in peacekeeping, in practice the word is defined in the UN context. There is no 'official' definition or authoritative interpretation, but over the years certain principles, or attributes essential to a 'genuine' peacekeeping operation and nearly always necessary for its success, have been deduced and articulated. Although the various aspects of such a 'UN peacekeeping paradigm' are inherently interdependent, it may still be useful to break them down and examine how they compare with a non-UN approach.

To begin with, the International Peace Academy has provided the following explanation of the term Peacekeeping:

"the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between states (or forces) through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally using the multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain order" [3]

This definition implies that peacekeeping involves the interpositioning of an international presence in one form or another in a conflict situation. The objective of peacekeeping is, essentially, to prevent overt violence from breaking out or to contain or curtail it where it has already broken out. Peacekeeping is thus designed to create an environment that is conducive to the eventual settlement or resolution

[2] A. James, *The Politics of Peacekeeping*, New York: Praeger, 1969.

[3] *Peacekeepers' Handbook*. Edited and produced by the International Peace Academy, New York: Pergamon Press 1978, Chapter 3, Section 3, p.22.

of conflict. [4] Peacekeeping is but one step on the road towards a lasting settlement, a resolution of a given conflict. Conflict is often defined as the existence of incompatible political objectives. Incompatibility is the core of the conflict, but it is always associated with two other dimensions, namely, conflict behaviour and conflict attitudes. Peacekeeping relates to these two dimensions when the parties to a conflict *accept* a peacekeeping element in their relationship or implicitly renounce a particular nasty kind of conflict behaviour such as the use of arms. The peacekeeping force or presence is charged with the task of helping the parties to avoid violence. Other forms of conflict behaviour - propaganda, economic sanctions, competition for allies and political support, appeals to world opinion, and such like - are not proscribed. A peacekeeping element does not prevent the parties from continuing to wage their conflict by all available means except violence. In this perspective, peacekeeping is little more than a stop-gap measure, but it can be a helpful condition for starting a process towards conflict resolution. The value of peacekeeping cannot be appreciated without at the same time appreciating its limitations. As one observer put it: "Peacekeeping ensures 'controlled impasse'" [5] Peacekeeping is a diplomatic tool, not a solution. It can be a useful element in the search for a settlement, but it will rarely be sufficient in itself. If this is appreciated, much of the negative criticism would disappear, as peacekeeping has been rather successful in obtaining limited objectives.

By a peacekeeping element, one understands actions of a military or para-military nature decided upon in response to a specific threat, or actual breach of international peace, whereby a potential or actual crisis or conflict situation presents a challenge that requires a more comprehensive peace effort than that which local parties themselves could provide. Groom observes:

[4] See A.J.R. Groom, 'Power Politics, Palliatives and Peacekeeping', Unpublished Monograph, University of Kent, Canterbury, November 1981, p.23. Commenting on the subject, Groom makes the following distinction between "conflict settlement" and "conflict resolution" for which peacekeeping actions are being taken. In his words "Conflict settlement occurs when organised manifest violence is eliminated, but when the parties remain at odds. Thus, if the force that eliminates overt violence is removed conflict is likely to be resumed. Conflict resolution occurs when the parties no longer feel the pursuance of their conflict to be functional, even when no constraints are put upon them. Clearly peacekeeping frequently goes no further than the stage of conflict settlement."

[5] See George L. Sherry, "The United Nations, Internal Conflict and American Security", in *Political Science Quarterly*, 1C (1986).

Peacekeeping purports to be the management of a conflict at the behest of the parties with the support of the world community and thus does not constitute intervention in the sense of it being a non-legitimized transaction. Yet the consensus for this form of conflict management is fragile and a peacekeeping operation could (and has) easily degenerate into intervention. [6]

This implies first, that, each conflict situation has international overtones. [7] International peacekeeping is a kind of action which, when accorded the consent and voluntary cooperation of all parties concerned, may help to improve the chances for a settlement or an eventual resolution of the conflict without involving the parties to a conflict in any coercive actions.

Peacekeeping is fundamentally more a political than a military undertaking, and its military attributes are direct consequences of its political nature. At the core of the concept of peacekeeping is the prohibition of the use of armed force to further the goals of the operation. This principle finds expression in the rules of engagement of an operation. Armed force is permitted only in self-defence, including "resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties". [8] The moment resort to force outside this framework is made, the operation ceases to be 'peacekeeping' and becomes 'enforcement'. More importantly, the operation will have lost "any reasonable hope of remedying the situation as well. It will cease to be above the conflict and will have become part of it". [9] What is more, the consent of the hosts will presumably not be available for enforcement action against them. [10]

We must be careful, nevertheless, in stating categorically that peacekeeping is *not* enforcement action because peacekeeping activities can be performed in various guises. It is apparent that peace-

[6] A.J.R. Groom, *op.cit.*, p.36.

[7] D.W. Bowett, *United Nations Forces*, New York: Stevens and Sons, 1981. In our view, the presence of a peacekeeping force might be called for even in circumstances falling short of a threat to the peace if the situation was one leading to international friction, but was not an imminent threat to peace.

[8] United Nations document S/11052/Rev.1, paragraph 4d, 27 October 1973. This is the first report of Secretary General Kurt Waldheim on UNEF II, which laid down certain "general considerations" that have served as a guide in all subsequent peacekeeping operations. Most of the concepts have their origins in the Hammarskjold era.

[9] Brian Urquhart, 'Peacekeeping: A View from the Operational Center', in Henry Wiseman, ed., *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*, New York: Pergamon for the International Peace Academy, 1983, p.165.

[10] See articles by A. Di Blase, 'The Role of the Host State's Consent with Regard to Non-Coercive Actions by the United Nations', in A. Cassese (ed.), *United Nations Peacekeeping, Legal Essays*, International Publishers B.V., The Netherlands, 1978, pp.55-84.

keeping operations function as a means for pacific settlement of disputes, but it is difficult to draw a line which will ensure, in every particular case, that a peacekeeping force will not resort to coercive measures. For example, an internal war situation poses additional problems for the peacekeeping operation in the sense that it is difficult to preserve the delicate line between the maintenance of peace and interference with basic issues that are perceived to be at stake. As Goodrich rightly points out:

"peacekeeping operations have invariably been undertaken, not for the purpose of influencing the conduct of states by coercive methods, but rather to assist in the implementation of agreements reached and incidental thereto, to perform such functions as observe, report and assist in the settlement of minor differences and perform local police functions, and in general to do those things that are thought to contribute to the ultimate goal of peaceful settlement or adjustment". [11]

It follows that a peacekeeping operation constitutes a form of third party intervention because the stated purpose is that of contributing towards the containment or termination of conflict. In principle, peacekeeping is different from intervention. However, in the real world the distinction between protecting and enforcing peace is often ambiguous and a matter of continuous interpretation and political controversy. We are in fact dealing with a continuum extending from disinterested peacekeeping to partisan intervention. The question thus arises, how do we place the Multinational Force (hereinafter 'MNF') on this continuum? Moreover, is this form of third party intervention acceptable to all parties to a conflict. By acceptability is meant that peacekeeping operations by virtue of their presence are evidently a form of third party intervention not objected to by any party to a conflict. [12] Several commentators, Touval included, have chosen to link this rationale as follows:

[11] See L.M. Goodrich, *The United Nations in a Changing World*, New York. Columbia University Press, 1974, pp.149-150.

[12] Saadia Touval, 'Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations', *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol.1 (Fall, 1975), p.51. Commenting on the subject of third party intervention as a method of international conflict management that involves a variety of forms ranging from military intervention to the furnishing of good offices, Touval notes that the term 'intermediaries' denotes "third parties that intervened diplomatically in a conflict with the stated purpose of contributing towards its abatement or termination, and their intervention is accepted by the parties".

"A third party may be accepted as a mediator not because both original parties to the conflict desire the third party involvement, but rather because they consider accepting the third party in this role preferable to rejecting it ... Acceptance is a preferred alternative in a choice situation." [13]

In addition to this, conventional wisdom states that peacekeeping must be based on a consensus among the parties involved. But who are the parties involved in a given conflict? In some conflicts they may include the great powers or at least, the permanent members of the Security Council. In other contexts they may embrace all or a group of states in the region in which the conflict is staged. In yet another context they may comprise contending factions and forces within polities or nations, or a combination of all these categories. In this study it will be shown that Lebanon is a typical example of such combined categories.

It has been argued thus far that the paramount purpose or function of a peacekeeping operation is to stabilize the physical and social environment in ways that facilitate movement towards the containment of conflict and thus pave the way for parties to a conflict to move towards a settlement or resolution. In general, a peacekeeping presence or force can be thought of as a third party occupying a conflict management role, whereby intervention occurs in the form of a wide spectrum of functions and activity running the gamut from a more or less passive to a more active role. Functions have ranged from observation and reporting on a potential source of international tension to the prevention of further hostilities in an already existing conflict, the restoration of internal order, and the promotion of conditions for a peaceful settlement. For our purposes, we may distinguish between peacekeeping operations which involve interposition of military forces along an international border or cease fire-lines and those which imply insertion of peacekeeping forces into an internal or civil war situation. The former will involve policing salient lines of demarcation, while the latter requires supervision and control of a fluid checkerboard of movements and deployments by the contending forces. The complexity of an internal war is magnified if it involves policing truces in cities, particularly in capital cities where the battle for control of streets and blocks of buildings mirrors directly the battle for con-

[13] S. Touval, *op.cit.*, 1975, p.52.

control and influence over the national government. The complexity and nature of the environment for peacekeeping affect the appropriateness and effectiveness of tactics for peacekeeping. The latter must be tailored to the circumstances at hand, but remain distinct and distinguishable from the military tactics of the contending forces and the traditional tactics employed by intervention forces. On the basis of the aforementioned, attention can turn now to a detailed examination of the 'essentials', 'musts' or constituents of a 'genuine' type of multinational peacekeeping operation or force.

The Consent and Cooperation of the local parties to the Conflict

Conventionally speaking, all measures taken on the territory of a given state by a foreign power or actor, including an international or regional organization, constitute an interference with the sovereignty of this state, and one in general lawful only if exercised with consent. The act of consent, the essential matter to the character of any peacekeeping operation or presence, must define, on the one hand, the rights of the peacekeeping force, which are necessary for the accomplishment of its role to maintain the peace and for the implementation of its specific mandate within the scope of the operation, and, on the other, the rights following from the sovereignty of the host state, since without the latter very little can be done. This consent extends not just to the 'sovereign state' but to all the effective parties to the dispute. When there is full agreement on the mandate of the force and its methods of operation, relations with the host(s) present little difficulty. [14] When there is no such agreement these relations can be very difficult. Thus, a political consensus embracing all parties and actors with important interests in the outcome of the conflict is the first essential to an effective peacekeeping operation.

Broad Political Support

Another principle of peacekeeping is that the operation must command broad political support. For a peacekeeping force to be possible, a political consensus is necessary among the international community and at a minimum the major powers must either agree to its establishment or at least not oppose it. The superpowers, at least, have become more aware of the dangers of getting involved in local wars. They are often inclined to avoid direct involvement in confused local conflicts which they

[14] Alan James, *op.cit.*, 1969, pp.1-5.

cannot solve and which could mean loss of prestige. Moreover, these powers are often interested in preventing each other from intervening in local conflicts, the more so when they do not consider that their more important interests are directly involved in a conflict. In such cases they may not have their own direct intervention under consideration as an option and so a peacekeeping operation or force may be the preferable solution for them. [15]

In this respect, to be effective, a peacekeeping undertaking requires a political consensus of the great powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. [16] Where one is lacking or lukewarm, it is not likely that a peacekeeping force can be sanctioned. Traditionally, the United States has been perceived as more supportive than their Soviet counterparts who in the early years of peacekeeping repeatedly expressed resentment and criticism toward these operations. This should, of course, be linked to the dominant position the US had in the UN in the first post war period and which it utilized to launch operations like the controversial 'police action' in Korea, and to the controversy that arose between the superpowers over the much disputed operation in the Congo, *Opération des Nations Unies au Congo* (ONUC). However, as the basis for American dominance declined — especially in the 1970s — there was a clear tendency towards reduced support in Washington as well, especially after Reagan came into power. The past decade represents therefore a maximum point when it comes to superpower obstructionism of the UN and peacekeeping. The examples are numerous: the Soviets started by withdrawing the support for the second emergency force, UNEFII, after the Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel thereby forcing the U.S. to establish a verification mechanism outside the UN, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). The Americans for their part, after being a key player in negotiating UN resolution 435 on Namibia, became supporters of South African obstructionism until the breakthrough in 1989. Similarly, UNIFIL was established upon an American

[15] Oran Young, *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967, p.177.

[16] In fact, one of the main reasons for the creation of peacekeeping was the post war political rivalry between the major powers which paralysed the UN and its Security Council. The absence of a convergence of superpower interests and mutual suspicion hindered the organization from using the tools at its disposal in armed conflicts. Hence peacekeeping, but this has not meant that the peacekeepers received the necessary support instead. On the contrary, with few exceptions, these operations have been hampered repeatedly, either by lack of will by the parties that the peacekeepers initially were sent to serve, or by the Superpowers. See Indarjit Rikhye, *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping*, London: C. Hurst and Company, 1984, pp.221-248.

initiative, but the rapidly declining support it received after Reagan came into power, was a key factor that allowed Israel to adopt its hostile attitude towards the peacekeepers in Southern Lebanon.

Presumably in some international crisis situations the United Nations approach of a peacekeeping force provides a buffer between the superpowers thereby helping to avoid their being dragged into a confrontation on behalf of client states or allies directly involved in the crisis. The superpowers also have the choice of taking action in support of a peacekeeping force without committing their own troops to the undertaking. [17] A UN umbrella suggests a more equitable distribution of peacekeeping burdens, a general political consensus for the force, and widespread interest in efforts at resolving the basic causes of the crisis, at least by states contributing troops or other support. Peacekeeping operations or forces of the UN type offer some major advantages but also entails certain disadvantages over a non UN approach to managing an international crisis situation. Some of the advantages and disadvantages are intrinsic; others relate more to the specific crisis at hand, the identity of the parties directly involved or the degree to which interests of parties concerned are affected.

Whatever the rationale offered for its decision to take action in a crisis situation, no single state or alliance enjoys the same degree of legitimacy and consensual support that the United Nations can in some cases muster. [18] Invariably, the U.N. is able to focus worldwide attention on major international crisis situations, particularly those which do not directly involve the two superpowers. The United Nations attracts widespread political support for its peacekeeping ventures partly because, as Dag Hammarskjold taught, peacekeepers in international disputes or crisis situations could often insulate the conflict from superpower confrontation. (One of Dag Hammarskjold's rules was that

[17] Witness the three new UN-operations established most recently: United Nations Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIMOG), and United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM). Obviously, this new and promising role for the UN is closely linked to the improved relations between the superpowers that we have witnessed since Gorbachev came into power. Combined with a growing awareness in Moscow and Washington of the need for a new approach towards regional conflicts, this has, on several occasions, resulted in a convergence of interests that has led them to the UN Security Council instead of continuing to rely on unilateral actions. See *Economist*, October 1, 1988, pp.41-42.

[18] United Nations peacekeeping represents the concern of a constituency which extends beyond the area of actual conflict. 'The concern of the international community' is both a cliché and a reality. It does not mean that all or most member governments are intensely preoccupied with the conflict and its potential outcomes. Even so the winning coalition represents a formidable amount of political power and influence which the parties to the conflict may find difficult to withstand. In short, the UN has an unequalled position as an "authoritative expositor of international values". UN peacekeepers symbolize these values. An attack on a UN force deployed to uphold international values is different from an attack on other multinational forces without this moral clout. See Ramesh Thakur, *International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: United Nations Authority and Multinational Force*. Boulder: Westview, 1987, p.112.

permanent members of the Security Council, particularly the superpowers, were not acceptable as peacekeepers because they inevitably infected the peacekeeping element with their ideological biases.)

Of course, the United Nations is not immune to the erosion of a political consensus. In fact, as the Congo and UNEF II demonstrated, when world consensus on the value of a peacekeeping venture disintegrates, both the political underpinnings in the Security Council and offers by contributors vanish, and the operation must be terminated. Hence, a most obvious and perhaps significant advantage is that a non-United Nations peacekeeping operation or force can be established when a politically divided Security Council is unable to approve the creation of a U.N. one. The inability of the United Nations to act because of divided political views could have serious consequences for peace in international conflicts and crisis situations. With their veto power the five permanent members of the Security Council can prevent or adversely affect the formation and continuation of an effective U.N. peacekeeping force.

In this respect, non-U.N. peacekeeping advantages lay in the greater flexibility and freedom from politicized constraints so characteristic of Security Council decision-making, where extraneous concerns are often grafted onto peacekeeping decisions and thus impair their efficacy. Yet another advantage of a non-U.N. peacekeeping force is that it does not depend on the weakest link in the world political consensus, nor does it need to run the gauntlet in the Security Council to assure its survival, but if there is no Security Council agreement the risk of effective sabotage is very high. By the same token, the lack of a broad political base that would have been derived from Security Council authorization raises misgivings about the genuine *international* character and legitimacy of the force. Thus, the task of attracting a broadly based group of participants is complicated. Moreover, the U.N. approach enables governments better to obtain domestic consent to contribute troops and other resources to a peacekeeping force.

The United Nations has a wider range of countries from which to choose and their capacity to help and their acceptability to the parties as well as finance are the principal limiting factor. Additional constraints such as constitutional and political inhibit some countries from contributing to a non-U.N. force, for example, the Nordics, Dutch, Irish and Japanese among others. Thus, Sweden declined to

participate in the Multinational Force in Beirut because of political misgivings and constitutional impediments. Finland would not consider serving in a non-U.N. force. Even France was at first reluctant to go into Lebanon as part of a multinational force without United Nations blessing and U.N. cover, though in the end it bowed to Gemayel's plea. The Multinational Force in Beirut was a *bona fide*, non-U.N. multinational peacekeeping force but of a somewhat special type. It was, among others, an ad hoc creation designed to meet an urgent requirement under difficult circumstances, a subject we shall return to in Chapters five and six. The Multinational Force in Beirut (MNF) had no parent organization other than the governments of the four contributing countries.

The problem of recruitment has another aspect which appears to give advantage to the United Nations. The U.N. Secretariat has more experience and flexibility in seeking troop-contributors; it also knows where to look. In effect, recruitment has become institutionalized. The United Nations also can draw on existing peacekeeping operations to man the first phase of a new venture. The nucleus of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was formed within days of Security Council authorization by detaching troops from Canadian, Iranian and Swedish units serving with UNEF and UNDOF. On the other hand, the constraints of acting through the U.N. may seem less attractive than unilateral intervention. In the case of the MNF, the United States had to improvise procedures to help recruit a suitable force to assure political and logistical support. Peacekeeping has traditionally been a domain and a responsibility of the United Nations, it has acquired a great deal of expertise in the field. To create a non-U.N. peacekeeping force derogates from the prestige of the United Nations and thus weakens an institution which the world community looks upon as a major instrument for maintaining peace. Further, one would believe that it is in the interest of the international community, including the two superpowers, to continue to place primary reliance on the United Nations for peacekeeping operations in the trouble spots of the world. When a U.N. force enters the field, it operates presumably with the prestige of the United Nations. On the other hand, a non-U.N. operation has to develop its own kudos to be credible with the conflicting parties and to recruit participating states.

In weighing the advantages and disadvantages of a peacekeeping operation one must bear in mind that the nature of the conflict, the attitude of the parties to the conflict and the type of environ-

ment in which a peacekeeping operation takes place have an important bearing on the effectiveness of the operation quite apart from whether it is of the U.N. or non-U.N. mode. The characteristics of specific conflicts constitute an important set of intervening variables. The dissimilarity of conflict situations makes generalizations about peacekeeping operations difficult. However, there are common features which can form the basis of research and analysis. Thus, it will be necessary in the case of the Multinational Force in Beirut, to give an historical introduction to the conflict which led to its deployment. In this historical exposition particular emphasis is placed on those factors which had bearing on the task of MNF's mission. The parties to the conflict, their goals and their interests must be identified. The MNF encountered many different parties and factions and a very complicated pattern of conflict dimensions. Emphasis must also be put on the interplay between local conflicts and conflicts on the regional and global level. The deployment of the MNF required a degree of agreement. Patterns of residence, geography, the military strength of the different parties and the like are also important features of the conflict situation. They may undergo considerable change during the course of the conflict.

The significance of the consent of the host on whose territory a peacekeeping force operates and the absence of enforcement action on the part of the mandated force, is obvious but it is, nevertheless, a complex matter fraught with difficulties. Nowhere is this more so than in peacekeeping operations in internal conflicts (e.g. the Lebanon conflict) where consent may have been obtained from the host government but not from other parties to the conflict. This has several overtones for a peacekeeping operation. First it means that in any peacekeeping effort the parties most directly concerned have to agree on the need to act and consent must be granted to the form of action to be taken. Moreover, the force in question should not appear as being imposed on the hosts, or it would risk constituency pressures directed against it. In order to be compatible with the element of consent, as far as is feasible, there is a need for establishing the right kind of relationship between the peacekeeper and the parties to a conflict so as to strengthen the credibility and viability of the Force. Nowhere is this more problematic than in a situation of internal conflict whereby the consensual basis of a peacekeeping operation or presence is not so clear. Legally, the host government's consent to the peacekeeping element is

sufficient. However, in practical, political terms, it is much more difficult to gain the consent of the parties to the conflict on the necessity for a peacekeeping operation or presence, and thus a toleration of all its activities in its operational area.

Indeed, in many situations, it may be difficult to identify the parties to a conflict. Yet, even if it is not possible to identify who the parties are, the demand for a peacekeeping operation, because of the volatile nature of the situation, may well be strong. Thus, the whole problem of consent and the form of activity of a 'peacekeeping' intervention in what are basically internal war situations needs very serious attention. It would be foolish to intervene without paying such attention, all the more so since a host country can easily make the conduct of a peacekeeping operation impossible by withdrawing its cooperation in a myriad of possible ways. [19] In such untidy situations, this is tantamount to saying that the peacekeeping operation should be as compatible with the security interests of everyone involved as is possible. The use of the word 'parties' signifies that the cooperation of the host government is not enough. "Any determined party, reasonably well-armed, can defy a peacekeeping force effectively". [20] Among other things the force should enjoy freedom of movement, be granted necessary privileges and immunities, and receive cooperation in logistic arrangements. No peacekeeping operation receives all the assistance it needs, and no party (perhaps save for the permanent Council members in the U.N.) has a general veto over its action, but a bare minimum of cooperation is necessary to preserve its viability. Whatever the context, cooperation and broad-based support is also important to preserve the fact and the appearance of impartiality or neutrality of the force.

The Principle of Impartiality

It has always been emphasised that any peacekeeping operation must above all strive to behave in such a way as not to be of a partisan character. Its creation must aim not prejudice the solution of political issues at stake. Moreover, it must not be used either to protect certain positions of any one party to a conflict or to oblige a party to accept a certain political result or to influence the political balance. In an internal conflict, the peacekeeping forces may not support either the legal government or

[19] A.J.R. Groom, *op.cit.*, p.42.

[20] Urquhart, *op.cit.*, p.164.

the insurgents or any other party to the conflict. The efforts of the force can only aim at restoring the calm and creating a better climate, where finding a political solution can be pursued. In all events, a peacekeeping force must not be seen by way of its attitudes and actions as favouring one side or the other. Otherwise its value as an impartial intermediary is impaired. Each side or party to the conflict wherein the peacekeeping force operates has to feel that the force is doing its job properly. [21]

Although the peacekeeping force must be 'for' its mandate, in practice, this is fraught with problems. For instance, in an internal conflict situation a peacekeeping force enters the area of operations with the consent of the host government and its mandate often is to assist that government. The commitment to support the host government, however, may put the force in conflict with the other contending protagonists. The problem, then, lies in any commitment to such support and its requirement that it be impartial and operate only with the consent and cooperation of all the parties to the conflict. Given that the host country's government in most cases is a party to the conflict, it may be difficult to obtain an agreement which assures freedom of action for the peacekeeper and a non-partisan posture. In internal wars it may be difficult to be dependent on the incumbent government — formally and *de facto* — and at the same time be perceived as *neutral* by groups in the opposition. The relation between the MNF contingents and the parties to the Lebanon conflict will be the subject of further investigation and assessment below.

Consequently, the principle of 'impartiality' is an indispensable condition for a more effective peacekeeping operation or presence for two reasons: first, as a necessary condition for the acceptance (in effect consent) by the parties to a conflict, and second for effective performance of functions.

Young claims,

... the existence of a meaningful role for a third party will depend on the party's being perceived as an impartial participant (in the sense of having nothing to gain from aiding either protagonist and in the sense of being able to control any feelings of (favouritism) in the eyes of the principal protagonists. [22]

[21] Elmore Jackson, *Meeting of Minds*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1952, p.129. Jackson stresses the point with respect to the likelihood of such an eventuality by warning thus: "It would be difficult, if not impossible, for a mediator who was dis-trusted by one of the parties, to carry out any useful functions".

[22] O.R. Young, *op.cit.*, p.81.

In this connection, impartiality is to be considered as one among other "basis qualities" of an intermediary and that "a high score in such areas as impartiality ... would seem to be at the heart of successful intervention in many situations". [23] Yet, in practical terms, the compliance to and application of the principle of impartiality becomes more problematic in many respects. For complete impartiality is impossible because it is not an objective phenomenon, but rather a subjective perception and it only exists when it is perceived to exist by all the parties concerned. Franck has summed up the matter in the following terms:

"the impartiality of the international decision maker is not the absence of partiality, but rather a partiality to the values and mores of the international community ... (Where he differs from the parties, and the only unique quality he brings to a dispute, is that his subjectivity is not that of a disputant.) His detachment gives him an opportunity to make a subjective determination on the basis of the greatest possible openness, sensitivity and receptivity." [24]

However, this emphasis on partiality is, in practicable terms, fraught with difficulty in that the perceptions of partiality differ among the contending parties. Impartial behaviour in the eyes of some parties may seem partial from the point of view of other parties to the same conflict.

Conversely, if for the sake of argument we were to substitute the assumption of 'impartiality' with that of 'bias', the whole perspective changes. Looked at this way, two questions arise in the case of a biased peacekeeping operation or presence. First, why are intermediaries in the form of, say, a peacekeeping element or forces even though perceived as biased, acceptable to the host(s)? Second, does their 'bias' inhibit them in performing the functions which an unbiased force can play? Any plausible explanation to such questions must be sought in the realm of the interests, motivations, and evaluations of other alternatives as perceived by the contending parties. Such an explanation may be found in the reduction and termination of violence of an overt sort as well as increased security for the local population since these are usually thought to be the most important element in the formal goals of any peacekeeping operation.

[23] *Ibid.*, p.51.

[24] See T.M. Franck, *The Structure of Impartiality*, London: Macmillan, 1968, p.261.

In such instances, a conflict situation makes generalizations about peacekeeping operations difficult in that no situation is a replica of a previous one. Nevertheless, insofar as the execution of a peacekeeping operation's role is concerned there is the further need to focus attention on the manner in which stated objectives govern the performance of peacekeeping operations. In this connection the parties to the conflict, their goals and their interests must be identified. A point of departure for all this would be the nature and scope of the mandate derived from an agreement (between hosts, sponsors, managers and donors alike) to mount a peacekeeping operation, whether of the United Nations' types or non-U.N. such as the Multinational Force in Beirut in the Lebanon conflict.

Since the decision to mount and in turn deploy a peacekeeping operation emanates from a mutual collaboration between the host, sponsor, manager and donor, it follows that the performance of such tasks and duties should be carried out in forms embodying such collaboration and especially so with regard to the questions of presence and maintenance. Viewed in this context, hosts, sponsors, managers and donors must be willing to compromise their respective positions in order to achieve a mutually agreed set of objectives. Even so, the formal goal(s) may be so general that it does not serve as a good indicator of the purported objectives or goals of the peacekeeper's mandate. Consequentially this makes necessary an examination of the more or less informal goals. By the same logic and in view of their perceived interests and expectations of the presence of even a biased peacekeeping operation in some situations, parties to a conflict may accept such a force, not as a step towards a negotiated settlement, but on the contrary, as a way of winning or buying time to prepare for a future military confrontation. That is to say, parties most directly involved in a conflict as well as third parties will invariably judge a peacekeeping operation not just in terms of fulfilling its responsibility, for example, its ability to provide an atmosphere as stable and tension-free as possible so that the other instruments of conflict settlement are enabled to carry out their roles more successfully.

Furthermore, the acceptability and effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation or force will depend on its ability to maintain effective liaison with all the contending parties in order to prevent incidents from igniting large scale violence and clear up ambiguities and misunderstandings. Peacekeeping involves a continuing mediatory role at the field level. That effect is different and separate

from the peacemaking effort at the political and diplomatic levels. However, careful attention must be paid to the political alignment of the peacekeeping operation and the peacemaking effort at the diplomatic level to prevent either activity from jeopardising or preempting the other. For such purposes tight coordination and consistency in the standing operation procedures applied by the peacekeeping forces would seem to be of critical importance.

A Clear, Restricted Mandate

If a peacekeeping operation is to place itself above reproach and criticism in its relations to the parties to a conflict as most would argue it should, then it must embrace a mandate which is carefully drafted, specific, well defined and unambiguous — that is restricted in scope and application and not open to varying interpretation — if a peacekeeping operation is to be a viable tool in the management of any conflict situation. As such, past experience suggests that an important aspect of the peacekeeper's mandate is the need to be clear about what the force is and what it is not. Confusion over this point can be avoided providing that the mandate outlines the overall role of the force which, if not explicitly stated, then at minimum can be clearly implied from the listing of the specific tasks and duties it is to perform. When the mandate is clear and based on terms to which there is specific agreement, peacekeeping does not present great problems so long as the parties concerned are prepared to stick to their agreement. Arguably, if the mandate is to be cast in ambiguous or unrealistic terms it may give rise to difficulties later regarding application or interpretation, and thus risk an untenable role for the peacekeeping force. It should also be clearly understood that the mandating agent is unlikely to produce a mandate that is crystal clear if there are differing views on such key points as to the size and nature of the force, its composition and structure of command, its pattern of deployment and operational codes of behaviour and the like.

Furthermore, the mandate of the force and the problems (both natural and man-made) it can anticipate will determine, to a major degree, the organization, recruitment and composition of the force. In a given conflict not all potential mandating authorities may be equally acceptable to all parties, nor will every contingent always be acceptable to the local parties to the conflict. This was the case for at least two of the contingents in the MNF, namely the American and to a lesser extent the French units of the

force. Therefore, another important and desirable aspect of the mandate which needs careful attention from the very beginning concerns linkage of the mandate to assessing the political-military environment in which the peacekeeping force will operate. As mentioned above, consent may be given in principle for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation on a country's territory but not for particular aspects of the operation. For example, consider the case of a specific military contingent from any country which because of its geographical position or for other reasons might be considered as possibly having a special interest in the situation which has made necessary the peacekeeping operation. Usually, in such cases, this is likely to mean that there exist serious objections by a host against participation by a specific contributing country to the peacekeeping undertaking.

In this connection, whether any single state will authorize the use of its national forces to participate in a peacekeeping operation must take into account the force's objectives as reflected by the pertinent force mandate. In certain instances, the host, sponsoring, and donor states may consider it necessary to review their original or initial consent. This is crucial if the mandate which launched an operation changes either through evolution as the operation progresses or by the adoption of a new directive(s) or mandate response to changing conditions or to reflect a new consensus.

Consent is not, once rendered (by host, sponsor and donor) for a peacekeeping operation to take place, a contractual relationship nor is it given for all times. It is easy to see that it is not enough for a multinational peacekeeping operation to secure merely an initial consensus from the host, sponsor and donor, it must continue to receive it. There may be circumstances arising where a change or modification in the original mandate could be considered to be encompassed within the terms of the initial consent. Likewise, there may well be changes in the mandate that clearly go beyond the original consent. Initial consensus may change under the pressure of events and altered expectations, including those created by the peacekeeping instruments. Nevertheless, the concept or assumption of acceptability remains of crucial importance. The interested parties must prefer the presence of a peacekeeping force with the attendant constraints on freedom of action to unencumbered violence. Peacekeeping forces may enable the contending parties to refrain from violence by increasing the expectation that the opposite party or parties exercise the same restraint. A commitment to restraint is likely to depend on

reciprocity. The peacekeeping instrument can enhance the assurance of reciprocity through interposition, observation and reporting. Hence the need for a distinction between the 'initial consensus' for the setting up of a peacekeeping operation and the 'continuing consensus' for its maintenance. [25] The distinction although valid in the abstract, is not nearly so easy to sustain in practice. What, for instance, happens if an operation ceases to enjoy the confidence and continued support of one of the parties to a conflict? Likewise, what if the contributing state(s) at any time during the operation disagree with the amended force mandate and thus may choose to withdraw from the force?

At the same time it is inconceivable that a donor government would allow its forces to be used in an operation that it opposes. Thus, an effort is perhaps made at the time the mandate is drafted to tie it into a broader package of confidence-building measures. Past experience suggests that linkage can provide a strong incentive to the local parties to carry out their commitments, since by doing so foreign troops may be withdrawn, security enhanced, tensions decreased, and the like. Linkage also keeps the local parties focussed on the need to do something more than merely strengthening the status quo. It is important to note that peacekeeping forces tend to favour the status quo since it inhibits violent change. And, obviously, some parties to a conflict are likely to be more satisfied with the conditions of the moment than others. Therefore, one must be realistic that linkage is not always possible, a cease-fire or separation of military forces, unrelated to broader considerations may be the best obtainable under the prevailing political-military conditions. In this connection, it is a desirable practice to put some time limitations on the mandate. The prospect of a termination date tends to help focus thinking and planning by all interested parties on establishing a more permanent, more stable situation. In contrast, an open-ended mandate tends to freeze the status quo without encouraging the local parties to look beyond the immediate situation and to work for some mutual longer term accommodations. Moreover, experience shows that stabilizing a tense situation may require a very long time. Even when relative peace

[25] See R. Tandon, 'Consensus and Authority behind the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations', *International Organization*, 1967, pp.227-330, for a critique concerning the fact that the distinction between 'initial consensus' and 'continuous consensus' is difficult to make in practice, and, in any event, there is no need for an ideal consensus. Commenting elsewhere, H. Letner proposes that the following categories of countries should be included in the 'continuing consensus': the permanent members of the Security Council with the U.S. and the Soviet Union forming a "critical sub-category"; the parties to the dispute; the country on whose territory the operation takes place; the group of states that contribute to the force and states which, because of geographical proximity or ideological identification, have an intense interest in the situation. See H.H. Letner, "The Political Responsibility and Accountability of the United-Nations Secretary-General", *Journal of Politics*, Vol.27, No.4, November 1965, pp.449-450.

obtains, there is no guarantee that underlying political controversies will be ameliorated or settled. In other words, once the concerned parties give their approval to the terms of mandate, there is a desire (it is hoped) to work to counter this tendency.

The failure to do so is astounding. One has to accept that political reconciliation after a traumatic war takes time. Thus the breathing space provided by the peacekeepers is helpful. But all involved have from the outset to accept that it is a space and not an end. Mechanisms ensuring that the belligerents are led onto the difficult path to reconciliation must be implemented. As already noted, the task of the peacekeeping mode is to create a momentum for the conciliatory forces — or the peacemakers — not becoming a guarantee for those who perceive the status quo of 'no peace, no war' preferable. [26] However, it is far easier to point to this as a problem than it is to prescribe the cure. As long as the adversaries find that the time is not ripe for political dialogue, there has been little the peacekeepers could do. Withdrawing the peacekeeping mechanism is a virtual declaration of defeat as it inevitably will destabilize the situation it contained and thereby again increase the chances of renewed or intensified hostilities. What is more, excessive expectations and misperceptions concerning what peacekeepers actually are sent to accomplish, can make the operations easy targets for political opponents. Agreement on a formal mandate does not necessarily mean agreement on perceptions and expectations vis-a-vis a peacekeeping force or operation and how it fits the political and other security needs of adversaries. Nor does it ensure that the effectiveness of the force will be measured by the same criteria. Therefore, the fate and fortunes of any peacekeeping undertaking, whether under U.N. auspices or otherwise, depends on the ability of the parties as well as the peacekeepers to reconcile the often widely differing interpretations of the formal mandate and the disparate expectations regarding the peacekeeping role.

It is usually claimed, with justice, that given a negotiated compromise in the Security Council, a U.N. mandate is likely to be non-specific, ill-defined, ambiguous, and often unrealistic, thereby complicating the peacekeeping operation. A case in point, of course, is the unrealistic mandate and

[26] Raimo Vayrynen, "Third Parties in the Resolution of Regional Conflicts", *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol.18, No.3, 1987.

conflicting expectations that severely constrained the effectiveness of UNIFIL. [27] But this need not be the case. As the origins and experience of UNDOF demonstrate, a mandate and terms of reference derived from a disengagement agreement between adversaries — which both are therefore motivated to observe — can produce a realistic basis for U.N. peacekeeping. By the same token, a non-U.N. Multinational force such as the Multinational Force in Beirut can be plagued by a vague and ill-defined mandate and loose operating procedures — a subject we shall return to in Chapter Six. So one must conclude that favourable political circumstances and the existence of an agreement between the parties largely determine the specificity and realism of the mandate.

Freedom of Movement and the Use of Force

The element of consent has a further aspect, in that an actual or potential peacekeeping operation should have freedom of movement within its area of operations and all such facilitative arrangements regarding access to that area as are necessary for carrying out its assigned tasks and duties. The force should not have to fight its way onto the scene of operations. Presumably, the consent and cooperation of the host(s) state should make this unnecessary and thus permit the peacekeeping force to deploy more quickly than if the latter had to be transported in a fighting fashion or fight its way into the operational area. Attendant to the required need for a peacekeeping force to have unimpeded access to its entire area of responsibility is the need to be clear on such military action role(s) if any — that is whether standing procedure and operational codes of field behaviour as found in the mandate's terms of reference prescribe limitations on the use of force. As mentioned above, a peacekeeping action is usually meant to represent a temporary solution, for example, as a means for reducing the violence of a conflict situation and also for lowering the emotional level to facilitate a more amenable process for potential negotiations likely to take place between the contending parties. Moreover such action is founded on the premise that peaceful and not enforcement methods will be used to help achieve solutions in conflict and violence situations. In this connection, a peacekeeping force has a part to play either in helping to provide a suitable framework for negotiations to take place between parties to a

[27] Marianne Heiberg and Johan Holst, "Peacekeeping in Lebanon", *Survival*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, September/October 1986.

conflict, or eventually as guarantors of any settlement. It follows, therefore, that whatever actions or tasks a peacekeeping force so undertakes will presumably preclude any military action against one or the other of the local parties. The principle that pacific solutions should be sought by disputants and set in train by disinterested peacekeepers without having to resort to enforcement measures is also fundamental.

Restraint in the use of force and stringent rules of engagement and fire affect the ability of a peacekeeping operation or presence to protect the peace rather than become a party to its disruption. Measured self-protection or defence has a different impact on the process of escalation from indiscriminate retaliation. Military leadership and effective command, control, communication and intelligence procedures and systems will affect the ability of a peacekeeping force to maintain a credible position of impartiality and respect. Accordingly we must assess the Multinational Force in Beirut with regard to how it achieved or failed to achieve military effectiveness.

Thus it is necessary not to lose sight of the fact that an international peacekeeping presence on the conflictual scene is basically a military non-combatant force armed with light weapons which permit its troops only the inherent right of immediate personal self-defence. [28] Needless to say, it is evident that the notion of impartiality would not be compatible with a peacekeeping force authorized to use weapons for reason(s) other than self-defence. The right of self-defence presupposes the existence of imminent exceptional circumstances which do not permit any other solution than the use of weapons. Therefore, the use of self-defence needs to be judicious to show the determination of peacekeeping troops to do their job yet avoiding the degree of force used at a level where peacekeeping troops are considered hostile and partial. In other words, troops engaged in peacekeeping operations are prohibited to take the initiative in the use of weapons. Moreover a peacekeeping operation's authority flows from the identity and reputation of the sponsoring authority rather than from the barrels of its guns. It is often argued that the effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation is inversely related to

[28] For a discussion concerning the ambiguity on the 'non-coercive' nature of peacekeeping operations, see H. Gagnon, 'Peace Forces and the Veto: The Relevance of Consent', *International Organization*, 1967, p.821. However, since the peacekeeping operations are organized and carried out on the prior conclusion of special agreements pursuant to the limitations on enforcement measures, the occasional and temporary use of force does not suffice for their assimilation with the enforcement measures.

the amount of force it employs. This is so, in that in many instances the contending parties will attempt to draw the peacekeeping force into the conflict at hand, through provocation or enticement. Hence, a peacekeeping force must tread a fine line avoiding provocation as well as appeasement. How did the MNF straddle the horns of this dilemma?

In concluding this chapter, we have to admit that we could only provide a basic description and discussion of the prerequisites and conditions of a 'genuine' peacekeeping force or operations. As such, the elements of such a force as elaborated above may not be exhaustive and not all of them may be essential for the effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation in any given case. Nevertheless, something like the following must obtain:

- (1) The consent and cooperation of the local parties to the conflict;
- (2) Broad political support, including the two superpowers;
- (3) Appearance of impartiality;
- (4) Clear and appropriate mandate;
- (5) Freedom of movement and non-use of force;
- (6) No enforcement action.

These by now have become the *sine qua non* of a peacekeeping undertaking.

However, over and above these provisions there are a number of other considerations which can cause grave problems by their omission. First of all the political agreement, which provides the authority for a peacekeeping force to operate, must be recognized by all forces and their surrogates who are in the likely area of operations and who may, by their lack of cooperation, diminish the chances of success of the operation. This is critically important in the case of an internally (as opposed to interstate) deployed force, where care must be taken to protect the force's impartial status where it is deployed at the request of a host nation government whose own authority in the state may be weakened by insurrection or civil war. Secondly, it cannot be maintained with much conviction that the reason peacekeeping forces succeed or fail in their task is primarily a matter of whether they are United Nations or non-UN forces. A UN peacekeeping force or operation can succeed or fail for exactly the

same reasons as a non-UN force. Finally, the most important factor in the success of a peacekeeping operation seems to be the effectiveness of the political agreement which underpins the deployment and task of the peacekeeping force itself. If this agreement fails to provide for a workable armistice, ceasefire or discontinuation of hostilities, then no matter how well-conceived and excellently conducted the peacekeeping operations may be, the peacekeeping mechanism on its own cannot forestall the conditions which may ultimately lead to its failure. However, this is not to underrate the importance of having an efficient military peacekeeping force; it is quite possible that a workable political agreement could be hopelessly undermined by a poorly conducted operation which failed to respond to the pressures and demands that are endemic to peacekeeping.

CHAPTER THREE

Lebanon: An Historical Background

Introduction

Lebanon's history is marked by some prodigious reversals of fortune. In modern times it has experienced numerous cases of external intervention and civil wars which have helped to shape the course of its troubled history. The tragic situation in Lebanon, now in its fourteenth year, is peculiarly reminiscent of the disturbances in the country during the nineteenth century. Fundamental to the theme of conflict and consensus between 1820 and 1975 is the main line of historical connection between the old Mount Lebanon and the present Lebanon. Even though history has little to reveal on how to end the present Lebanese crisis since there is no historical precedent for the sort of consensus now needed, nonetheless, it can explain how Lebanon came to exist, to what extent it succeeded, and to what extent it failed and why.

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the evolution of the Lebanese political system by providing the reader with an overview of the several historical processes, the complexity and subtleties of which was reflected also in subsequent history of the Lebanese polity. In this connection, the chapter sets out the demographic, social and political developments during the nineteenth century which were to influence the structure of Lebanon's community and the country's politics of the twentieth century. Furthermore, it points to the role of foreign intervention in Lebanese history, while conceding the presence of sufficient internal political and social ingredients to create a potential for conflict. The history of Lebanon since the first part of the nineteenth century does not in fact present cycles of alternation between conflict and consensus but rather a succession of collisions between one organized political force and another. In tracing the evolution of the Lebanese entity, it is useful to distinguish between its territory, its population, and its political system.

Political History: From the Ottoman Period to Independence

From the end of the sixteenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century Mount Lebanon's history was essentially one of two communities: Druze and Maronite Catholics. The name Mount

Lebanon applied originally to the northern part of the Mountain. [1] With the migration of the growing Maronite population, the name gradually encompassed the whole mountain. The rugged Mountain had traditionally attracted minority communities — heterodox Muslims and Christians — that in the later Middle Ages and early modern period sought refuge from the governments of Sunni Muslim empires (Mamluks and Ottoman) that dominated the region. The Druze and Maronite were the two principal communities of Mount Lebanon, but Shi'ite, Melchites (Christians of the Eastern Church of Byzantium), and Sunnis became associated with the Lebanese entity either through living at the Mountain's peripheral regions or coming under the authority of the Lebanese emirate (1516-1841).

The Lebanese State, in the form which has been generally recognized throughout most of the twentieth century, gained its independence in 1943. Yet, a political system which was specifically Lebanese in nature that is, both separate from the regimes of its neighbours, and embodying important elements of internal, inter-sect co-existence, had been in the making in Mount Lebanon since the sixteenth century. When Ottoman Selim I defeated the Mamluks (rulers of Syria and Egypt) in 1516, the Ottoman conqueror named the Druze leader Fahkr al-Din I 'Sultan of the Mountain'. His grandson Fahkr al-Din II (ruled 1586-1635) is regarded as the father of modern Lebanon. Fahkr al-Din II was able to unite the Mountain with the Shouf into the 'Emirate of Mount Lebanon', giving it a distinct political life and a solid economic base, its thriving economy attracting immigrants from other areas. [2] In its heyday, under Fahkr al-Din (1586-1635) the Emirate was characterized on the one hand by its virtual autonomy within the framework of the Ottoman Empire, and Druze-Maronite cooperation, which transcended the rigid religious and communal lines known elsewhere in the region. On the other, by the extension of the emir's authority into other parts of Ottoman Syria and the development of Mount Lebanon's relationship with Latin-Catholic Europe.

[1] Mount Lebanon was the ancestral home of both the Druze and the Maronites. As a political entity, it included the mountainous hinterland of Beirut lying west of the Bekka Valley, to the north and south of the main Beirut-Damascus highway. Northwards, Mount Lebanon reached the environs of Sunnite Tripoli and Southwards those of Sunnite Sidon. See A.L. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria, including Lebanon and Palestine*, New York: St. Martin's, 1969, pp.17-20.

[2] The Druze, a splinter sect of Islam born in the eleventh century, sought refuge from persecution in the Shouf mountain region. Druze participation in the wars against the crusaders gave rise to a warrior aristocracy, among which Druze emirs emerged as paramount following the Ottoman conquest. See Fahim I. Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon*, Washington, D.C., Middle East Institute, 1961, pp.9-12.

During Fahkr al-Din II's reign the Ottomans did not interfere much in the internal affairs of the emirate, since they regarded it as a 'tax farm'. [3] As Hitti contends:

"As vassals of the new lord the Lebanese chiefs then acted independently on the domestic level, offered no military service and transmitted their holdings to their children. They exacted taxes and duties and at times even concluded treaties with foreign powers. Ottoman sultans, no less than Arab caliphs, concentrated on more serious and urgent problems, considering it expedient to let alone those few mountaineers." [4]

In this setting, social stratification in the Emirate consisted of two main socio-economic groups, lord and peasant. Peasants were subdivided into landowners and tenants. Social relations in such a feudal system were somewhat secular. However, in the *Iqtaa* (feudal) system, party groupings cut across religious lines. [5] Although the Druze landlords were more influential than their Maronite counterparts, "nevertheless, it is clear that religious affiliation was not a factor in shaping the politics of the Imarah (emirate) before the end of the eighteenth century." [6]

Then, Druze landlords were more powerful than their Maronite counterparts, since they had a strong social organization and since the Druze were historically the pillars of the Emirate while the Maronites had been integrated relatively recently. While Maronite lords were not much better off than their peasants, influential Druze lords exercised political and economic power in areas outside their villages. [7] In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, Druze power was gradually sapped in clan conflicts, while that of the Maronites rose. The Maronite sect originated in the Orontes River Valley in Syria with a seventh-century split in the Melkite Church (Eastern Church of Byzantium) that may have reflected "a revolt of rural Syrian Christians against the traditional urban ecclesiastical control". [8]

[3] See K.S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, New York, Praeger, 1965, pp.3-7.

[4] See Philip Hitti, *A Short History of Lebanon*. London, Macmillan, 1965, p.144.

[5] Iliya F. Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon 1711-1845*. New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1968, pp.46-47.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Salibi, *op.cit.*, p.10.

[8] K. Salibi, *Syria Under Islam 634-1097*. Beirut: Khayats, 1977, p.30.

During the Crusades, Maronites of the Mountain became allies of the European Christian intruders, and in the twelfth century united their church with Rome. [9] Three main features shaped the modern character and development of the Maronite community. First, its virtual monopoly over the silk industry, revived by Fakr al-Din II, facilitated Maronite economic ascendancy and political cohesion, and encouraged the development of a Maronite bourgeoisie, providing a livelihood for peasants, workers, artisans, and merchants. As a result, a growing Maronite population gradually filtered southward to become numerically predominant in traditional Druze areas. Second, due to land donations by notables and acquisitions by the monastic orders, the Maronite church by the end of the eighteenth century had become "the largest, most organized, and wealthiest organization in the whole of Mount Lebanon", strong enough to free itself from dependence on the feudal lords with whom it had been allied. [10]

Close links to the Catholic powers, France and in Italy, increasingly benefited the Maronite community. Following the so-called capitulation treaties, the first of which was concluded by Suleiman the Magnificent with France in 1535, Christianity became a passport to profitable association with Europeans and their enterprises. As Catholics, Maronites won French consular protection and employment as interpreters, clerks and commercial agents in consulates and in the trading stations of French companies. Finally, of the major sects in Mount Lebanon, the Maronite community alone was located almost exclusively in the Mountain, and so acquired a geographic as well as a religious identity. As these identities overtime effectively merged into one, Mount Lebanon became for the Maronites their "historic homeland and a national tradition and national myth evolved, assiduously cultivated by the Maronite church". [11]

During the 1700s the Chehabis (converts to Christianity from Islam) were ruling the Emirate. The long reign of Emir Bashir Chehab II (a Maronite) reinforced the tradition and legacy of a strong

[9] For further elaboration on this point see I.F. Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon 1711-1845*, *op.cit.*, pp.13-18. Under the influence of the Crusaders, Maronite relations with Rome became significant in the twelfth century. Rome's influence also touched upon Maronite religious doctrines. It was not until 1439, however, that partial union with Rome was achieved at the Council of Florence. Full union was effected only in 1736 at the Synod of *Al Luwzayyah*.

[10] Harik, *op.cit.*, p.125.

[11] See Robert Haddad, *Syrian Christians in Muslim Society*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970, p.58.

central authority exercised over Mount Lebanon and the areas adjacent to it. Bashir II, who ruled the Emirate from 1788 to 1840, depended upon Druze lords to fight his contenders, and also encouraged the complete integration of the Maronites into the Emirate, as they were needed as labourers and scribes. For these reasons, Maronites were treated on an equal basis with Druze and Muslims. They were also allowed to own land and to participate in the politics of the Emirate.

Bashir II's commitment to westernization and his war efforts demanded an ever increasing budget which he sought to bolster by levying more taxes on the peasantry. The peasantry came out openly against Bashir II in the *ammiyah* (commoners') revolt of 1820. [12] As a consequence, the *ammiyah* revolt and the alliances concocted around it were powerful enough to depose Bashir II, who fled the emirate to Syria. Within two years, however, Bashir II had arranged with the Ottoman ruler to return to the Mountain, where he immediately began to reconcile the Druze lords.

The revolt of 1820 was significant in various ways. First, it was organized into village communes, with each village electing a representative to a general council. This was something unheard of in the feudal system. Second, commoners and clergy exercised leadership roles. Finally, Church ideology overlapped with peasant communal ideas and was effective in challenging the feudal system. The new relationship the peasants were championing sought to transcend the patron-client one.

Meanwhile, Bashir II had arranged with the Ottoman ruler to return to the Mountain, where he immediately began to reconcile the Druze lords. Once this was done, he sent his son to collect taxes from the peasants to meet his financial obligations to the Ottomans. Peasants protested, and in the event Bashir II agreed to their demands of equal treatment with the Druze lords in tax matters. Certain political demands, however, were not acceptable to Bashir, who still had most of his support base among Druze lords loyal to the Ottomans. The demand that the emir ruling over them should not be appointed by the Ottoman ruler but should be one of them (a reference to Bashir's wavering religious affiliation, "Christian by baptism, Moslem by matrimony, Druze through convenience, rather than conviction ...") [13] precipitated fighting.

[12] Philip Hitti, *Lebanon in History*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1962, p.416.

[13] Hitti, *op.cit.*, p.417.

The outcome of the fighting was disastrous for the *ammiyah* and the nobility that supported it. Most of the Druze lords became supporters of the Junblatt family, who aided Bashir II in the battles against the *ammiyah* revolt. When Bashir II fled to Egypt due to a quarrel with the Ottoman ruler, the Junblatts became extremely powerful. On his return from exile, Bashir II felt very uncomfortable about the rising new power in the Emirate. From 1822 until 1825 Bashir II worked to consolidate his position in the Emirate. To this end he searched for new allies. He found the Church and the masses most useful in suppressing Druze competition. The most powerful Druze and Maronite families were completely subdued. The effects of this were far-reaching. Although the feudal system remained a viable institution, it nevertheless underwent fundamental structural changes. The Church entered the political scene as a challenger to the lords, thus curtailing much of their previous power. A relationship between Bashir II and the Maronite patriarch emerged, and the latter was encouraged to settle differences among the Maronite lords. At times the Patriarch was even capable of intervening with the emir on behalf of Druze lords. "Thus, the patriarch became a man of much political influence, but not a holder of political office." [14]

What the Church could not achieve through the *ammiyah* revolt, it came closer to achieving through its alliance with Bashir II. As a powerful institution, the Church aspired for dominant power in the polity of Mount Lebanon. To this end, the Church encouraged in various ways — through writing, its daily contact with the peasantry, etc., the breakdown of social relations between the Druze and the Maronites and gave this a sectarian flavour. The goal of a Christian emirate, dominated by a church which enjoyed mass support, brought together the weak Maronite lords in an alliance with the Church against the Druze lords. [15]

The Egyptian Intervention and Occupation of Mount Lebanon and Syria 1831-40

Meanwhile, Egypt was preparing to conquer Syria. The church allied itself with the Egyptian conqueror, Ibrahim Pasha, and his ally Bashir II. Bashir was interested in getting rid of Ottoman influence over the Emirate of Mount Lebanon, which he thought Ibrahim Pasha would aid him in

[14] Harik, *op.cit.*, p.232.

[15] *Ibid*, p.241.

doing. The church also found it propitious to ally with Egypt to get rid of the Ottomans and their allies, the Druze lords. In this way, the church thought that it could get closer to its goal of a Maronite emirate. When Egypt invaded Syria in 1831, the church was extremely effective in mobilizing Maronite peasants to fight in Bashir II's army. Bashir utilized sectarian sentiments to incite the Maronite peasants to fight the Druze lords. [16]

Despite the fact that Egyptian tax policies were unpopular among the peasantry, and despite the problems that the clergy had in explaining to the peasants the reasons behind the Maronite alliance, the clergy did not want the tax issue to become a hurdle in the way of an exclusive, church-dominated Maronite Mount Lebanon, which they thought the Egyptian connection would help to secure. This, however, remained an unrealized goal. After Egypt's rule became firmly established in Syria, Ibrahim Pasha became lukewarm towards Bashir II and the church, and began contemplating radical changes for the Mountain. The clergy did not appreciate what they regarded as an encroachment on their privileges, and immediately asked the French Consul in Beirut to intervene and prevent such an occurrence. [17]

In essence, the clergy sought to keep all forces balanced in their bid for a Christian emirate. The people, however, were unable to carry the tax burden and contend with forced labour and the fear of conscription in the Egyptian army. Although the clergy and the Mountain nobility were not really pleased with the situation either, they were unable to take action in favour of the people against Bashir II and Ibrahim Pasha. Druze peasants were also unable to act single-handedly against Ibrahim Pasha in Mount Lebanon, since they were leaderless. Their lords were still outside the Emirate after they had been crushed resisting Egypt's conquest of Syria. What is more, the Egyptian occupation accelerated the advance of the Maronite community. Ibrahim Pasha's political policies of enforcing equal rights for Christians and Jews, employing Maronites throughout his administration, greatly benefited the community. The same was true of his economic policies: the Mountain's foreign trade, reoriented from Asia to Europe, expanded enormously, making Beirut the principal port of the eastern Mediter-

[16] *Ibid*, pp.235-8.

[17] *Ibid*, p.249.

anean and the centre of more and more European merchant, trading and banking houses. The result was radically to alter the status of the Maronite and Druze communities: Maronites who had been the serfs of the Druze lords before the arrival of the Egyptians had become the chief moneylenders of these same lords by the time they departed. [18]

The 1840 Revolt Against the Egyptians

Yet it was following a widespread popular rebellion by all sects against the Egyptians' occupation that a British, Austrian and Ottoman military expedition ousted the Egyptians in 1840. The popular upheaval produced, as one Middle East scholar has noted, the first written document in which the different sects refer to a common territory as their country:

"We the undersigned Druze, Christians, Mutawilah —
Shi'as and Muslims who are known as inhabitants of
Mount Lebanon." [19]

In the event divergence between the church and the peasants prompted the alliance of Druze and Maronite peasants who led the 1840 revolt against the Egyptians. The rebellion was similar to the Ammiah (commoners) revolt of 1820 in its organization and goals. It called for government reorganization, less taxation, an end to forced labour, and to the privileges of Druze lords since "Lebanon is not the property of the Druze, it is ours ..." [20] The leadership was made up of the peasantry, while the lords who joined the 1840 revolt were among the followers. [21]

The peasants petitioned the Maronite patriarch with their grievances, but to no avail. The church, however, reversed its position and supported the revolt. This move coincided with the Treaty of London, which committed the European powers to oust Ibrahim Pasha from Mount Lebanon and Syria. In September of 1840, British, Austrian and Ottoman troops landed in Jounieh and encouraged the Maronites to revolt against the Egyptians. [22] With this foreign support, the peasants succeeded in overthrowing the Egyptian yoke. The Ottomans appeased the Maronite peasants by exempting them

[18] William Polk, *The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788-1848: A Study in the Impact of the West on the Middle East*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963, p.137.

[19] Ilya Harik, 'The Iqtaa System in Lebanon', *Middle East Journal*, No.4, Autumn 1965, pp.405-21.

[20] Harik, 'Politics and Change', *op.cit.*, p.249.

[21] Hitti, *op.cit.*, p.245.

[22] Harik, 'Politics and Change', *op.cit.*, p.245.

from taxes for a period of three years. They also agreed to reorganize the Emirate of Mount Lebanon, since, like the peasants, they were interested in curtailing the influence of the emir. The Ottomans wanted to centralize the political system in the Emirate so that they could control it. To this end, they agreed with the European powers to oust Bashir II and appoint Bashir III as ruler of the Emirate.

The Dual Qa'imaqamiyya: 1842-58

The departure of the Egyptians and the fall of Bashir II was followed by two decades of turmoil marked by clashes between Druzes and Maronites and by an experiment in partition. This was the dual *Qa'imaqamiyya* (two governorates), which partitioned Mount Lebanon administratively between a Druze and a Maronite *qa'immaqam* (lieutenant-governor), each ruling his own sect and responsible to the Ottoman governor in Beirut. Partition sharpened sectarian cleavages, and a second outbreak of Druze-Maronite fighting in 1845 led to a revision of terms of *Qa'imaqamiyya*. This reinforced the power of both the feudal families and the heads of the sectarian communities. The new provisions called for the appointment of the *qu'immaqam* from one of the leading feudal families in consultation with the notables and the clergy. A council of twelve chosen by the heads of the religious communities (two each from the six major communities) assumed judiciary, tax assessment, and tax collection functions. So began the process by which sectarian institutions, based on religious communities, partially replaced and were partially combined with feudal institutions. [23]

With the fall of Bashir II and the accession of Bashir III, a new period in the history of Lebanon began. Until the last few months of his reign Bashir II had remained master of the internal politics of his Emirate, able to keep under control the sectarian and partisan divisions which his own policy often helped to create. As Salibi contends:

[23] Salibi, *op.cit.*, pp.112-113.

It was difficult for Bashir II, after 1798, to avoid involving Lebanon in the Eastern Question. The general situation in Syria and the Ottoman Empire, and the direct influence of Europe in Lebanon, forced the Lebanese Emirate to become involved, while the situation inside the country made the process hard to resist ... the Emir's external entanglements ultimately led to his downfall and the collapse of the Emirate and left the country in utter turmoil." [24]

But with his disappearance from the scene the situation in Mount Lebanon was highly unstable. Scarcely had Bashir III succeeded to the Emirate when the Druze and other feudal chiefs who had been forced to leave the Mountain in the last years of Egyptian rule began to return home, to lay fresh claims to the rights, privileges and feudal holdings they had lost in the previous reign. The Maronite church, meanwhile, was still pursuing its goal of a Maronite Emirate. This led the church to solidify its alliance with Bashir III, who was looking for a support base among the population. The returning Druze lords, however, saw such an alliance as an encroachment on their rights to freedom. What also worried the Druze lords was the Ottoman intention of reorganizing the Emirate. Such a reorganization necessitated limiting the power of the Druze and Maronite lords. [25]

To avoid any premature eruption of hostilities, the church found it propitious, at times, to mediate between the Druze lords and Bashir III. Bashir's lack of tact in dealing with these lords had completely alienated them and eventually led to the 1841 hostilities. [26] The result was frustrating to the clergy. While they sided with Bashir III and sent him troops made up of Maronite commoners, this army could not act due to internal bickering and the lack of a unified leadership. While the Church and the peasants were out to destroy the feudal system, the Maronite lords were opposed to this position. On the one hand, they could not break away from the peasants, who were fighting their common enemy — the Druze lords. On the other hand, the demise of the feudal system was definitely not to their advantage. Ultimately, they sided with their Druze counterparts against the Maronite peasants.

In 1842 the Ottomans replaced Bashir III with an Ottoman ruler. Displeased with this alternative, the European powers intervened and called for a new arrangement within which they could exert

[24] *Ibid*, p.18.

[25] Harik, *op.cit.*, p.253.

[26] *Ibid*, p.262.

more influence in Mount Lebanon. In 1843 the European powers initiated the two-governorate system known as the *Qa'imaqamiyya*. This comprised a northern governorate which was predominately Maronite and a southern governorate with Druze lords but mostly Christian peasantry. From the very beginning the dual *Qa'imaqamiyya* presented serious difficulties. As Salibi has noted:

"In the original scheme presented by Metternich, the Christian and Druze Kaymakams were to be each responsible for his own co-religionists. This, in practice, meant that no strict boundary between the two administrative districts would be possible, and that in the Druze Kaymakamate, in particular, the authority of the Christian Kaymakam would conflict with that of the Druze feudal chiefs." [27]

In 1845 clashes between Druze and Maronites brought about a situation in the southern governorate that stripped the Druze lords of most of their power over their Maronite subjects. The inclusion of intermediaries between Maronite subjects and their Druze chiefs further eroded the feudal system in Mount Lebanon and contributed to the rise of sectarian sensitivities. The Maronite church at this time claimed that "it was easier for Christians to die than consent to live under Druze rule". [28]

Such sectarianism encouraged by the Church and by the European powers was absent during the revolts of 1820 and 1840. Hitti contends that the *ammiyah* (the commoners) "starting from a wide base, with the thesis that all sons of the Arabic tongue constituted one nation toward the realization of which they all should strive, the nascent pan-Arab movement was soon confronted with specific local problems resulting in its fragmentation". [29] Whatever the case, the *ammiyah* spirit was sacrificed to the sectarian conflict which the church utilized to reach the goal of a Maronite emirate. However, this goal was not attained and in the course of a few years led to another round of open class warfare that assumed the semblances of religious warfare. In the event, Mount Lebanon was to remain divided into a Druze and a Christian *Qa'imaqamiyya*, each headed by a *qa'im maqam* appointed and removed by the Ottoman ruler. As such, the new arrangement dealt a severe blow to the feudal system. In that, in each governorate the *qa'im maqam* replaced the authority of the emir and the feudal lords. The auto-

[27] Salibi, *op.cit.*, p.65.

[28] Harik, 'Politics and Change', *op.cit.*, p.271.

[29] Hitti, *op.cit.*, p.478.

nomous institutions with which it endowed Lebanon were "significant in two ways: externally, they implied the formal recognition of the country's special status; domestically, they marked the first step towards modernizing the country's administration." [30]

The situation in Mount Lebanon in the period following such political reorganization was extremely complex. In the southern districts the tyranny of the Druze chiefs and their agents had brought antagonism between Christians and Druzes almost to the point of crisis. Here the British supported the Druzes while the French supported the Christians. In the northern districts, the situation was no less intense. There the Maronite peasantry and clergy stood clearly opposed to the feudal families, the British aiding the latter while the French, and to a lesser extent the Austrians, threw their weight on the side of the former. The Ottomans, meanwhile, encouraged the divisions in the Christian *Qa'imaqamiyya* and shifted their support from one side to another as the occasion required. The unrest which had distracted Mount Lebanon since the downfall of Bashir II, however, reached its climax in 1858-60 in a general outburst of violence which affected nearly every part of the country.

The Period of the Mutasarrifiyya and Government of Mount Lebanon: 1860-1920

In this section we examine, albeit briefly, the period of the *Mutasarrifiyya* (governorate) system in Mount Lebanon, the combination of factors that have given the Lebanese question both something of its special character and its destructive complexity. During the nineteenth century the Lebanese question featured occasionally as an aspect of the larger Eastern question. A certain symmetry even existed between the two. Where the latter was largely defined by the great European powers in their relations with a mosaic of people in the Ottoman Empire under the contentious sovereignty of the Porte, the former was more specifically defined by the interaction of France and Britain in their relations with Lebanon's sectarian mosaic under the government of the Porte. By the early twentieth century, however, the symmetry gave way to sharp contrast, for where the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the retreat of Europe substantially redefined the larger problem, the basic outline of the Lebanese question persists to this day.

[30] Salibi, *op.cit.*, p.72.

In this light, the life of the *Mutasarrifiyya*, spanning over half a century of Lebanese history, and sandwiched between periods of both more turbulent socio-economic and political change and more forceful intervention, reveals some interesting continuities and discontinuities in the problem that intermittently plagued both Lebanon and the region. At its inception in 1861, the *Mutasarrifiyya* of Mount Lebanon involved a people deeply divided against itself. Except for the Maronite Church, there was not a single group of leaders or an organization which could speak for a significant number of the Lebanese. As for the Church, its generally sectarian stance concerning local issues and heavy reliance on France in external relations seriously impaired its ability to act as a representative for the entire population of the Mountain.

For the period from 1840 to 1860, the sources of Mount Lebanon's troubles which were to be characterized by continual warfare and religious intolerance over land, taxes, and feudal privileges climaxed in the 1858 peasant revolt in Kisrwan, centre of the French-owned silk industry. Maronite clerics took a leading part in inciting the peasants and townspeople against the Druze chiefs, occupied and cultivated their lands and established self-ruling communes. In the following two years, class conflict was soon transformed into sectarian war. The various foreign powers were stirring sectarian conflict through the support they gave the competing factions. The British supported the Druze, the French the Maronites and the Russians the Greek Orthodox. Although the conflict seemed to be motivated by sectarian allegiance, the underlying causes were competition over which powers (local and foreign) were to control the political and economic destiny of Mount Lebanon and the area in general. [31] For as Harik contends, "though the whole conflict was strongly sectarian in 1860, it continued to have the dimensions of class division". [32]

In the ensuing turn of events, Britain, France and other powers agreed to send troops to bring an end to the conflict in which the less numerous but more warlike Druze at first routed their Maronite enemies. When, however, French troops landed in Lebanon, the Ottoman Fuad Pasha was already in full control of the situation. He had already clamped down on those directly responsible for the massa-

[31] Salibi, *op.cit.*, p.87.

[32] Hitti, *op.cit.*, p.439.

ces. [33] As a subsequent development, in the autumn of 1860, an international commission met to negotiate an agreement for the political reorganization of Lebanon. The commission represented Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia, and was presided over by Fuad Pasha, who represented Ottoman interests. By 1861 the commission reached an agreement, the 'Réglement Organique. This accord established the Mutasarrifiyya (governorate) system that united Lebanon (the two governorates) under an Ottoman ruler and abolished feudalism in the Mountain. [34]

What is more, Mount Lebanon was separated from the rest of the Ottoman empire and placed under a privileged regime based on a large measure of autonomy, which allowed it to have its own system of local government which it was to retain until 1915. Under the new Ottoman administration, Lebanon was divided into six (later seven) districts according to the distribution of religions in the population. The *Mutassarif* (governor) was appointed by the Ottoman Sultan, subject to the approval of the European Powers. [35] The *Mutassarif* was always a non-Lebanese Christian and an Ottoman subject aided by a central administrative council of twelve. This council was made up of four Maronites, three Druzes, two Greek Orthodox, one Shi'ite and one Sunni (both Muslim sects) and one Greek Catholic. [36] For the next half century the country maintained stability. However, as one writer contends, "... instead of political representation being based on class lines openly and directly, the Mutasarrifiyya system legitimized sectarian representation and foreign intervention", [37] in Lebanon and in the area generally.

Despite the bitter civil war of 1860, the principle of consensus politics did not altogether disappear. In fact the *pluralist model in Lebanon's* development was preserved and the country was ideally placed to take full advantage of the expansion of trade, services, and communication triggered by the

[33] Hitti, *op.cit.*, p.439.

[34] *Ibid*, p.441. See also Salibi, *op.cit.*, p.108.

[35] A. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay*. London, Oxford University Press, 1946, pp.148-149.

[36] Salibi, *op.cit.*, p.110.

[37] See B.J. Odeh, *Lebanon; Dynamics of Conflict*. London, Zed Books Ltd., 1985, p.39.

industrial revolution in Europe. [38] The rapid growth of Beirut as a leading Arab centre of political, economic and intellectual activities dates from this troubled period. [39] But there was also the other side of the coin. The European intervention was not impartial. It openly favoured the Maronite 'thesis' and caused profound disillusionment in the Druze camp. The Druzes became more suspicious of western-sponsored consensus politics and more insular in their outlook. Some of their deep-seated phobias have become more virulent through the civil war of 1958, and more especially because of what happened in the Shouf mountains in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of 1982.


Indeed, the *Mutasarrifiyya* arrangement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had a clear Christian majority and character, and a political system that offered representation and a share of political power to minority communities. It was an exceptional entity in its Muslim environment, and its tentative existence owed much to European intervention and support. Indeed, when World War I broke out, the Ottoman government abolished the 1861 arrangements and in 1915 established direct rule over Mount Lebanon. [40]

A sizeable segment of the Maronite community refused to reconcile itself to the 'small Lebanon' of the 1861-1915 period and demanded that all the area united by the Lebanese emirate be included in the new Lebanese entity (see map 1). Without Beirut and much of its agricultural and commercial hinterland, the *Mutasarrifiyya* appeared to the Maronite nationalists as a poor and weak version of the Lebanon to which they aspired. Their time came after 1918, when France secured a mandate for Syria and Lebanon. Some of the authors of French policy in the Levant supported the Maronite militants'

[38] The creation of a 'community of sentiment' is a powerful integrative force. A community of sentiment is a community which shares the belief in a common state idea, and a common set of values. The state-idea is founded on a shared political culture and shared values, especially political values. The state-idea describes a set of distinctive purposes to which the bulk of the population subscribes. Societies which are not successful in uniting the various groups of society around some common body of values and symbols, are *malintegrated*. Malintegration characterizes many ex-colonial states which were united only around the idea of gaining independence and freeing themselves from colonial domination. Once this task was accomplished, these new states failed in the establishment of a national consensus on specific priorities. The state-idea of Lebanon was first shaped by the Maronites of Mount Lebanon during the mid-nineteenth century. An ideology, 'the ideology of the Mountain' for the first time introduced the idea of a 'nation' into the Lebanese context. It also stressed the idea of religious pluralism for the 'nation', with Sunni, Druze and Maronites allied together under the idea of a nation, in which the Maronites would have seniority. For a more extensive discussion on this, see A. Hourani, 'Ideologies of the Mountain and the City', in R. Owen (ed.), *Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon*, (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), pp.31-41.

[39] See R. Owen (ed.), *Essays on the Lebanese Crisis*, *op.cit.*

[40] On the history of the autonomous *Mutasarrifiyya*, see J.P. Spagnolo, *France and Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1914*. London, Ithaca Press, 1977.



Map 1. Smaller and Greater Lebanon. The Autonomous Province 1861-1915 and Lebanon since 1920.

demands, arguing that Lebanon's economic viability should therefore be bolstered. Thus, when on September 1, 1920, the French added parts of Ottoman Syria to the original territory of the autonomous province of Mount Lebanon, they created a completely distinct state — Greater Lebanon.

The Establishment of a 'Greater Lebanon'

The *Réglement* of 1864 was to remain the basis of both political and administrative organization in Mount Lebanon until 1920. By then, the repercussions from the broader geographical developments of a world war were to cause a significant break in the system of rule in Mount Lebanon thus throwing the country into yet another transition period. This fact once again underscored the extreme vulnerability of a political system located, like the Lebanese system, in an area of enduring strategic importance to outside powers. The outcome of World War I spelled the final defeat of the Ottoman Empire, and the realities of the European balance of power favoured France in the division of the Ottoman heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean. At San Remo in 1920, the French obtained from their allies the promise of the Mandates for Lebanon and Syria. [41]

With the opportunity to dismember the Ottoman Empire, the French, no longer torn between conflicting objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean, were able to focus on their claims in the Arab regions of the Empire. [42]. In that same year, they created the Mandated State of 'Greater Lebanon' as the new state was called. [43] It included in its boundaries the autonomous province of 1860, and to this were now attached the three principal Sunnite coastal cities of Beirut (formerly the capital of the Ottoman province of Beirut), Tripoli, and Sidon, the hinterlands of the two latter cities, as well as the entire Bekka valley. The population of the Tripoli hinterland was largely Sunnite Muslim or Greek

[41] There are a number of careful studies on the French mandate and the period preceding it. George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, London: Hamilton, 1938, is something of a classic even if it is now considered to exaggerate the extent of Arab nationalism before World War I. On this point see Zeine Zeine, *Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism*, Beirut: Khayat's, 1958. Zeine argued that among the mass of Arab people, Arab nationalism began to replace loyalty to the Ottoman Empire only after 1908.

[42] On the history of the autonomous *Mutasarrifiya*, see John P. Spagnolo, *France and Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1914*, London: Ithaca Press, 1977.

[43] See Stephen H. Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate*, London, Oxford University Press, 1958, p.99.

Orthodox, that of the Sidon hinterland and the Bekka valley largely Shi'ite.[44]

As such, the French expectation was the new state, namely, present day Lebanon would be Maronite dominated and would thus become a permanent French dependency in the Muslim Middle East. [45] Furthermore, they assumed rightly or wrongly that the traditionally ambiguous relations between their Christian allies and the surrounding Muslim communities would help the Maronites to enable France to retain this part of its Empire. [46]. Indeed, this aggrandisement, reminiscent of the hegemony exercised only intermittently by the historic feudal leaders of Mount Lebanon during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, also altered significantly the relative distribution of the sectarian populations in Lebanon. The Maronites remained the single largest sect, but no longer in a majority. All the Christian sects combined did retain a small majority over the Muslims, but the Sunnis and Shi'as emerged respectively as the second and third largest sects in the enlarged state. [47]

How would these two Muslim sects or communities react to being brought into a system which for centuries had been dominated by Maronites and Druzes, and, conversely, how would the system react to their inclusion? On the one hand, to begin with, the French Mandate not only reintroduced confessionalism into Lebanese political life but the French also held the key positions in Administration and were responsible for the foreign policy of Lebanon. [48] However, the divisions among the

[44] *Ibid.*, pp.88-93. The contribution of urban coastal Lebanon — for example, Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre — to the state-idea was its emphasis on a pluralistic society, in which all religious communities would coexist, within a common framework. This initial state-idea was reinforced when the 'Lebanese' became antagonistic to the Ottoman Empire in their struggle for autonomous status. K. Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War: 1958-1976*, New York: Caravan Books, 1976, pp.155-6, and A. Kelidar, 'Lebanon: The Collapse of a State', *Conflict Studies*, no. 74, 1976, pp.1-19.

[45] The French accepted the Maronites' demands and expanded the territory of Lebanon to include the coastal plain, in addition to Mount Lebanon, with the towns of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon and Tyre, and the Beqaa, which had traditional ties with Syria. See A. Kelidar, 'Lebanon: The Collapse of a State', *op.cit.*, p.17; K. Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, *op.cit.*, p.161.

[46] See C.M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, *France Overseas*, London: Thames and Hudson, 1981, pp.175-181; on the demands of the Maronites; see also John P Spagnola "Mount Lebanon, France and Daud Pasha: A Study of Some Aspects of Political Habituation", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, No. 2 (1971), pp.148-67.

[47] The experience of the *Mutasarrifly* was vital in inculcating the principle of 'confessionalist' political culture. Allocation of government positions on the basis of religious sect meant that government served as a trustee for the interests of the various communal groups. The leader of each group strove to ensure that his clients received their due measure of benefits and privileges. This system was representative in a narrow sense, but did not advance a participatory democracy in which "a team of leaders, backed by the majority of public opinion, carry out a coherent programme of state action within the limits of a national consensus." See Crow, 'Religious Sectarianism in the Lebanese Political System', *Journal of Politics*, XXIV (August 1962), p.261.

[48] As for the other sects residing in what was to become Lebanon, the Shi'ite Muslims, the Druze, the Greek Orthodox and the Armenians resented the supremacy of the Maronites and the insignificant position accorded to the Armenians under the emerging political system. I. Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon*, New York, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984, p.38.

various sects or religious minorities on a sectarian basis was accompanied by different political ideologies concerning the identity and the future of the Lebanese State. [49] Not surprisingly, French influence had increased among the Maronites and Catholics of Lebanon, strengthening their political consciousness as Christians traditionally attached to the West and not to the Arab East. [50] They advocated Lebanese Christian statehood and was suspicious of an Arab State with a Muslim majority. Another school of thought regarded Lebanon as a Mediterranean country, as a bridge between East and West. It emphasized the Phoenician origin of the Lebanese as a different people from the Arabs. [51] This school of thought was later propagated by the Phalange party during the present conflict. A third group believed that Lebanon formed a part of a Syrian Nation in the Fertile Crescent with an Arab face and culture and was supported by the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party. [52] On the other hand, Arab nationalism which emerged in the late nineteenth century among educated Christians had gained great support among young Muslims. Such schools of thought regarded Lebanon as an integral part of the whole Arab world. Along with these main currents of political thought, other secondary and sometimes compromising political groups had emerged by the time Lebanon was granted independence.

[49] For an analytical background and argument as to the transcendent importance of ethnic identification in Lebanon, see Samir Khalaf, *Persistence and Change in 19th Century Lebanon: A Sociological Essay*, Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1979. Also well worth consulting are articles by Paul Starr, particularly "Ethnic Categories and Identifications in Lebanon: A Descriptive Investigation", *Urban Life*, April 1978, pp.111-142. A recent survey is Joseph Chamie, "Religious Groups in Lebanon: A Descriptive Investigation", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 2 (1980), pp.175-187.

[50] In the 1920s and 1930 it was often suggested that France, incapable of coming to terms with the Sunni Arab nationalism prevalent in the Syrian interior, ought to base its position in the Levant on a coastal rampart or anvil of Alawis and Maronites. The Alawis of Syria were trying to develop an alliance with the Maronites, particularly with those in the coastal region contiguous to the Alawi region. Thus Emile Eddé in 1932 wrote in a memorandum to the *Quai d'Orsay* that "France has a great economic and political interest in consolidating her position, at least on the Syrian coast ... In order to reach this kind of consolidation it would be wise to keep and develop French administration at both Alexandretta and the Alawi region and expedite the territorial reduction of Lebanon". See Meir Zamir, "Smaller and Greater Lebanon — The Squaring of a Circle?", *Jerusalem Cathedra*, 2 (1982), pp.259-71.

[51] This was a consequence of a Maronite sense of separate nationhood that was refined and reached its peak in the mandatory period. The Maronites wished Lebanon to be a classical Mediterranean civilization like the Phoenician civilization. Lebanon, for them, was hellinized and westernized, and more important, non-Islamic and non-Arabic. See A. Hourani, 'Ideologies of the Mountain', in R. Owen (ed.), *Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon*, op.cit. Typical of this period of nation-building was the Maronites' fostering of the myth that they were the 'heirs of Phoenicia'. Phoenicia provided the Maronites with a pre-Islamic and non-Arabic culture; therefore, it served as an appropriate model. In the above cited edited work see the essay by T. Khalaf, 'The Phalange and the Maronite Community'; see also D. Gordon, *Lebanon — The Fragmented Nation*, London: Croom Helm, 1980, p.42.

[52] The troubled decade of the 1930s produced political parties of a new type, parties influenced in style and ideology by the rising fascist parties in Europe. The Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, better known as the PPS (Parti Populaire Syrien), began as a secret organization. Its founder and leader, Antuon Saadeh, a Greek Orthodox advocated a doctrine of Syrian nationalism dedicated to the reunification of 'natural Syria', complete secularization, and the eradication of feudalism. This mission, especially its emphasis on secularism, articulated the orientation of the Greek Orthodox community based in the context of a geographic Syria and hence destined to a permanent co-existence with a Muslim majority. See Robert Haddad, op.cit., p.86.

[53]

Confronted with the problem of containing the opposition to their domination as evinced by these competing political currents, the French were not able to benefit from their creation. They had not made sufficient allowance for the contradictions in their relations with the Lebanese clients, particularly the Maronites. As had already become evident before the First World War, French interests determined the nature and direction of the economic development of Lebanon without adequately taking into account Lebanese interests. [54] Furthermore, French appreciation of the intrinsic worth of Lebanese political institutions remained clouded by French self-interest. Nor were they able to foresee the ultimate consequences for themselves of the constitutional principles and sectarian political practices that were carried over from the *Mutasarrifiya* to the Greater Lebanese State. As Longrigg has stated:

There was error, perhaps self-deception, in the French estimate of two things. One of these was the degree of popular support they enjoyed or would enjoy in Syria, which ... they seriously overestimated; the other was the strength of the Nationalist Movement, which for all its faults and weakness, they gravely undervalued". [55]

Not surprisingly, French policy faced a serious challenge from the Muslims who formed a powerful and large minority with their own Arab aspirations contrary to those of Christian Lebanese nationalists.

Nevertheless, Lebanese political traditions encouraged some sectarian interaction in a secular political arena. In one more instance of the paradoxical consequences of external intervention or meddling, it was the French who imposed on the Muslims in Lebanon the military constraints that induced the preliminary acceptance among them of the enlarged Lebanese political entity. Gradually, the Muslims began to participate in the politics of accommodation, cutting across religious lines, until

[53] On the history of the PPS in Syria and Lebanon, see Labib Zuwiyya Yamak, *The Syrian Social Nationalist Party: An Ideological Analysis*, Cambridge: Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969, M. Van Dusen, 'Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria', *Middle East Journal*, 26 (1972), pp.123-36.

[54] During the French Mandatory period, the alliance between Muslims and Christians continued, whenever their interests coincided. The emergence of a prosperous middle class, comprising both Christians and Muslims, assisted in this process of establishing a closer relationship. See R. Owen, 'The Political Economy of Grand Liban', in R. Owen (ed.), *Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon*, London: Ithaca Press, 1976, pp.23-32. There was even a group of Sunni Muslims who had anti-Ottoman attitudes, which developed after Young Turks took over. See K. Salibi, 'Crossroads to Civil War', *op.cit.*, p.151; For a detailed discussion see A. Hourani, *op.cit.*, pp.106-107.

[55] See S.H. Longrigg, pp.98-100.

enough of them achieved a qualified appreciation of what was becoming a peculiarly Lebanese system of political interdependence. [56]

The removal, however, of the French dimension from Lebanese politics and the latter's attainment of independence and sovereignty in the 1940s was possible because of a fortunate combination of external and internal factors that were prompted by another world war of cataclysmic proportions. [57] Internally, what was happening in Lebanon at the time was a power struggle between the Muslim and Christian elites on the one hand, and the French on the other. In 1943, during the course of the Second World War, Christian and Muslim leaders combined to wrest their country's independence by skillfully taking advantages of the perennial rivalry in the imperial objectives of Britain and France.

In order to do so, though, the two leading Lebanese Statesmen of the day, the Maronite Bishara Al-Khuri and the Sunni Muslim, Riad Al-Sulh, adopted an unwritten consensus, which came to be known as — '*Mithaq al-Watani*' — the 'National Pact'. [58] As such the National Pact consecrated confessionalism and gave Lebanon its peculiar political arrangement. [59] It defined the ambiguous relations of the two communities with France and the Arab World by finding in Lebanese independence reason for the one, namely, the Maronites to forego the traditional French connection, and for the other, that is the Sunnis, to accept looser ties with the neighbouring Arab States. It is important to note that, as an informal understanding, the 'National Pact' was not adopted as part of the Constitution of 1926. The National Pact, made possible an independent Lebanon. The Muslim political establishment recognized the legitimacy of a sovereign Lebanese entity in return for the Christian communities' willingness to share power and recognition of at least partial Arab character of this entity. The distribution of power among the various communities according to their presumed numerical strength - by then a traditional pattern in Lebanon - was also agreed upon. Christian supremacy in the state was

[56] But the Sunni Muslims of Lebanon refused to participate in the new institutions which were established by the constitution. Their nationalist and anti-Western attitudes increased in the 1920s, especially after the 1925-27 revolt in Syria. M. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon*. New York, Random House, 1968, pp.40-46.

[57] *Ibid*, pp.40-43. Both communities combined their forces to free Lebanon from French rule.

[58] See Clovis Maksoud, 'Lebanon and Arab Nationalism'; in *Politics in Lebanon*, Leonard Binder (ed.), New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1966, p.241. In his view the '*Mithaq al-Watani*' was a bulwark against the disruptive potential of irrational confessionalism and equally a roadblock that prevented the emergence of a rational and secular alternative to confessional politics".

[59] See Ralph Crow, *op.cit.*, pp.256-258.

exemplified in the decision to elect a Maronite as its powerful president and to establish a ratio of six Christian deputies to every five Muslim deputies in parliament. [60] The Lebanese polity was *not* based on the presumed existence of a Lebanese nation but a confederation of protonational communities, each of which claimed ultimate allegiance of its members. [61] Through the new arrangement, the ruling élite was to be able to guarantee itself mass following based upon sect or *Zaim* (patron-client) relationships. [62]

The political character of post 1943 Lebanon was based on the political institutions of the French mandatory period and on the National Pact. It was unique, complex, and its inherent flaws were quite evident. [63] It was conservative by definition, as an ascriptive system based on the preservation of the status quo. With confessionalism as a cornerstone of the political system, religious leaders and other traditional leaders and interests kept their prominence within their respective communities. This conservative bias was further reinforced by other characteristics of the political system, for example, the electoral system which served to preserve the position of community of notables (*Zu'ama*) and to hinder the development of parliamentary political parties across communal and regional boundaries. [64] By electing parliamentary members through regional lists, the *Zu'ama* were practically assured of elections and could carry with them into parliament a number of clients. Often the *Zu'ama* would function alongside the formal and bureaucratic structures, offering services and protection and demanding allegiance, votes, and sometimes participation in violent conflict. [65] The Lebanese parliament

[60] This ratio is according to their respective proportions in the population, based on the 1932 census. See E. Khoury, *The Crisis in the Lebanese System*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1976, pp.7-10.

[61] Lebanon was established as a state before a Lebanese nation could develop. The loyalty of the Lebanese was always first a loyalty to family and to religious community. The Lebanese have not, until now, defined themselves as Lebanese but as Shia, Druze, Sunni, Maronite and the like. See H. Barakat, 'The Social Context', in E. Haley and R. Snider (eds.), *Lebanon in Crisis*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1979, pp.4-9; see also D. Gordon, *Lebanon — The Fragmented Nation*, op.cit., pp.142-145.

[62] See Samir Khalaf, 'Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon', *Middle East Studies*, 4, No.3 (April 1968), p.247. Each community had a political *Ziam*, a term used in feudal times for the overlord who in return for the personal loyalty of his followers, assumed obligations on their behalf. This relationship of fealty, in Khalaf's words "though predominantly a feudal institution ... is still very much alive in both form and content in contemporary political life ... There is hardly a phase of the political process untouched by it".

[63] Thus, the state idea of Lebanon was fragile from its very beginning and the Lebanese were never able to overcome the cleavages between those Lebanese who identified with the Arab world and those who identified with the West. E. Salem, 'Lebanon's Political Maze: The Search for Peace in a Turbulent Land', *The Middle East Journal*, vol.33, 1979, pp.444-448.

[64] See Arnold Hotlinger, 'Zu'ama in Historical Perspective', in L. Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon*. New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1966, pp.85-105.

[65] *Ibid*, p.93.

thus reflected the web of relationships among the traditional foci of power in the country. Moreover, it was for a rather long period virtually closed to new contenders. Furthermore, in upholding the principles of confessionalism and class, the Lebanese political system acquired an archaic, complex, and inevitably found itself challenged by the political attitudes prevailing in most of the outside world. The 'balance of power' that confessionalism and the National Pact had represented was not expected to last long. Writing in the late 1940s, Albert Hourani contended that: "a state so deeply divided both in structure and in ideas as the Lebanese republic and without any unifying national spirit could not continue to exist, at least in its present form, unless there were some external power controlling it closely and intervening continually in its affairs." [66]

In May 1945, the Allied Powers won the war in Europe. The Lebanese then expected that the French would renounce their remaining military powers in the country. But instead, the French immediately set about reinforcing their garrison in Lebanon. And they told the government in Lebanon that they wanted to reinstate the special treaties which had formerly given France such wide powers over the former's foreign, defence and economic policies. The behaviour of the French outraged local opinion and a number of open clashes erupted between the local population and the arriving French reinforcements. At that point, the British stepped in. Forcefully, they told the French to abandon their ambitions in Lebanon, and to promise to evacuate their troops from there. [67]

The French had only recently won their own liberation from Nazi Germany, so they were still very dependent on the British military in the Middle East as elsewhere. Once they had understood the seriousness of the British demands, they rapidly agreed to comply. The Lebanese were indeed fortunate that their moves towards independence had been viewed with favour by Britain, which throughout that decade remained the single strongest power in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Of course, the main motivation of the British was probably little linked to any intrinsic desire to do the Lebanese a good turn. The first British priority in Lebanon in that period is much more likely to have

[66] See A.H. Hourani, *Minorities in the Arab World* London, Oxford University Press, 1947, p.87.

[67] See K. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, *op.cit.*, pp.183-189. In point of fact, during the War de Gaulle had promised Lebanon its independence. However, when the Vichy forces were defeated in the Arab Middle East, de Gaulle reneged on his promise. Instead he sought to revert to the 1936 Franco-Lebanese Treaty, under which France was given certain economic concessions.

been their reluctance to see the re-emergence of French influence in the region, but whatever the motivations of the British, their decision proved a happy one for the Lebanese. Moreover, it soon became clear in the post-war years that the major regional concern of the British was to reduce a colonial presence which had become over extended and burdensome there, rather than to seek aggressively to expand it. For the Lebanese, this meant that the crucial first years of the country's independence were spent under the general umbrella of a world power which happily for them, sought to keep its own intervention in their system to a minimum. Thereafter, by the end of 1946, the French had completed their withdrawal from Lebanon. Since November 1943, Lebanon had enjoyed many elements of political independence. To this was now added for the first time ever in modern times the full sovereignty of the local government.

Conclusion

The evolution of the Lebanese political entity, with its attendant political and social institutions, is, in many ways, the product of its dependence on external powers. For Lebanon was not and never had been an integrated and united country. Its loose political organization — along sectarian, communal lines — harkening back many a century, remains in place, effectively blocking progressive evolution. Therein lie the roots of violence and dissension marking much of its history. What is more, this structure also suited the political and economic strategies of the colonial and imperialist powers, as well as the local clients of the economy that developed in Lebanon under their aegis.

In Mount Lebanon, these self-governing sectarian communities offered the European colonial powers an avenue through which to extend their influence in the Ottoman Empire. The relationship between the European powers and the heads of these communities became that of patron and client: France 'protected' the Maronite Catholics; Austria, the Greek Catholics; Russia, the Greek Orthodox Christians; and Britain, the Druze. The patron-client bond tying sectarian leaders to one or other of the European powers disrupted co-existence among the minority communities, nurtured hostility between them and the Muslim majority, and troubled their relation with the Ottoman authorities. Moreover, the polity which evolved in this historical setting, lacks even the capacity to resolve internal conflict without resort to external intervention. Witness the role of foreign intervention in the three conflicts

during the early to mid part of the nineteenth century: the first civil war of 1841, caused by internal conflicts and external interventions, and culminating in the establishment of the dual *Qa'imaqamiyya* (governorate) system; the Maronite-Druze conflict of 1845; and the third conflict of 1860 which culminated in the unity of the Mountain under the *Réglement Organique* of 1861.

As the Lebanese gradually came to assume more and more power during the French mandatory period, a rift between the Maronites — the most fervent partisans of Greater Lebanon and the principal line of continuity from the Mount Lebanon of the nineteenth century — occurred leading to various alliances with governments and other parties, inevitably involving notables from other communities. In its relations with the Maronites, France took into account two considerations — negotiating with the Syrian nationalists and establishing closer ties with other religious communities in Lebanon — both of which posed a threat to Greater Lebanon and the Maronites. To safeguard the Lebanese entity, the Maronites were to contract alliances with the Lebanese Muslims. However, the subsequent crisis of 1943, was to rock the very foundation of the national entity. Even so, this same period was marked by a general desire and call for independence, and a consolidation of ties with Arab countries. The Maronites were to join forces with the Lebanese Muslims, equally opposed to the French presence, and realize the independence of Lebanon. But the nation, which can only be inter-communal and which alone could safeguard the national entity of Greater Lebanon remained a missing link. In the Chapter which follows, we examine the breakdown of consensus in 1975, which raised once again the controversy surrounding the Lebanese entity.

CHAPTER IV

The Struggle Over Lebanon

Introduction

The collapse of the Lebanese state was not preordained. Lebanon fell apart because it could not withstand the 'spill over' pressures of being kept at the point of inter-Arab, Arab-Israeli, Palestinian-Israeli conflicts and superpower rivalry in the region. The turning point was probably induced by the outcome of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Lebanon had no direct part in that war but could not shield itself against the profound repercussions that it had on the Arab world as a whole. What has been going on in Lebanon since 1975 has been essentially a civil war involving a quarrel among Lebanese nationals — more clearly so since 1982, when the Palestinian dimension to the hostilities was reduced to virtual eradication. Just as certainly, Arab and non-Arab regional and international parties have been embroiled in the Lebanon conflict from the very start and continue to be so. Indeed neutral and even belligerent parties in Lebanon often refuse to recognise the situation in the country as being principally an internal conflict, insisting instead, that what Lebanon has actually experienced for well over a decade has been, more than anything else, 'Wars of Others' (as the expression goes), fought on its soil and principally at its expense, by deluded or paid Lebanese proxies. If these 'wars of others' have no particular bearing on Lebanon, why did they come to be fought out on the Lebanese national territory rather than somewhere else? More importantly, why do the different internal parties to the conflict in Lebanon persist in articulating their different positions with respect to the quarrels among them in national as well as regional and international terms?

However, external interventions or meddlings did not comprise all the seeds of Lebanon's collapse into the throes of civil war. [1] For such seeds were embedded in its confessional make up, its lack of genuine national identity, and in the congenital incapacity of its political leaders, with a few

[1] In writing about Lebanon, particularly Lebanon since 1975, nomenclature presents a problem. Alignments were based only partially upon class, religion, or ideology. This was not a class war, although class consciousness played a role in it; it was not a war of Christian against Muslim, although in terms of numbers on either side this would be true; and it was not a clash simply between left and right, although 'leftist' and Marxist predominated on the one side. Even the term 'Civil War' itself, some would argue, is a misnomer biased in favour of the view that the Lebanese system had collapsed because of internal flaws rather than because it has been attacked by extrinsic forces. But terms are necessary to describe what has occurred. Arbitrarily in part, and without prejudging the interpretation of the conflict, the term 'Civil War' will be employed because it has gained general currency.

exceptions, to put national interest before sect, clan or self. In fact, one of the central themes that runs throughout this chapter concerns the apparent paradoxes and inherent systemic weaknesses which by 1975 had undermined completely the political foundation upon which sovereignty in Lebanon was predicated. As it stands today, the country, with its jigsaw population of Christian and Muslim sects — the Christian and Muslim side being roughly equal in effective power if not in numbers — was first constituted as a territorial state in 1920. It was given its present boundaries by France in agreement with Britain by mandate of what was then the League of Nations. Lebanon's territory was put together from fragments of what were formerly Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The same was true of other countries constituted from formerly Ottoman Arab territory during the same period: most particularly with respect to Syria, Palestine, Transjordan (today Jordan) and Iraq. No less than Lebanon, all these countries as they stand today were artificially created by France or Britain as the mandatory powers in charge of the region after the First World War. The only difference was that Lebanon was created by France in consultation with the Christian sector of the local population. The project for this Lebanese State, however, was originally envisaged by the Christians of the country — more specifically by those of the Maronite sect who acquired and still retain the paramount political control of the Lebanese system. The Muslim communities were never really consulted about the Lebanese project before it was transformed into a reality and imposed upon them; and for a long time after, these communities refused to accord the country their willing allegiance.

When it became increasingly clear that Lebanon was there to stay, the Muslim sector of the population, by and large, grudgingly agreed to accept the country as a functioning state, but not as the nation-state which the Christians wanted it to be. The Muslim argument was that the Lebanese were not historically a nation by themselves, as the Christian political establishment claimed they were, but part of a greater Arab nation, their territory being historically part of Arab Syria. Moreover, the Muslim side in Lebanon continued to resent the Christian control of the Lebanese political system, which prompted it to obstruct the policies of the state at every turning point, compromising the independence of these policies to the advantage of external parties, normally with external support which was spontaneous or solicited.

The Christians, more particularly the Maronites, were not prepared to yield to Muslim demands for a greater share in power-sharing. In part this was because they were determined to retain the paramount powers and prerogatives which they had, and which they would not willingly relinquish. Moreover, they feared genuinely that the conditional rather than total Muslim loyalty to Lebanon could not be trusted at the higher levels of decision-making. The Christians in the Arab world at large were no more than dispersed minorities in overwhelmingly Islamic surroundings. Those of Lebanon, no matter the question of relative numbers, enjoyed the special advantage of having a state under their control to guarantee what they regarded as their identity and security; therefore, from the beginning, they were highly vigilant with respect to the sovereignty and independence of the Lebanese state from the Arab world. The Muslims in Lebanon, as in the rest of the Arab world, understood the nature of this special Christian Lebanese position, but would not readily admit to its validity; they normally argued against their better knowledge and judgement that the fears of their Christian compatriots were more imagined rather than real. On the other hand, the Muslim Lebanese communities had justified grievances against the established political system in the country to which the Christians would not make the minimum of the required accommodation. The Christian-Muslim quarrel lies at the root of the Lebanese national conflict, and therefore of the civil war in the country which remains unresolved until the present moment. The harder the Christians pressed their point on this matter, the harder the Muslims retaliated, in kind; and the reverse was equally true. In the light of this, we may say that political allegiance in Lebanon, from the moment of its independence to the present, has had to fumble its way between two obligations: one to the interests of the sovereign territorial state and the other to the imperatives of inter Arab politics and regional disputes. What were the regional disputes about? Also, to what extent was Lebanon a party to them?

The purpose of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, it is to examine why this should be so: to analyze the 'linkages' between external interventions and internal civil strife in the Lebanese conflict, and in so doing, to examine the extent to which this relationship constituted a deeper cause underlying the collapse of the Lebanese state. Here it is to be admitted, that while some key policy issues and determinants of problems and actors concerned in the on-going conflict can be identified, and that

while activities can be enumerated, the evaluation of cause and effect of any contentious issue may not always be obvious. Secondly, and so as to further our understanding of Lebanon, it is essential to pay close attention throughout this study to one other aspect of its politics, namely, that of interventionist elements and policies. Finally, to undertake such a treatment, it is also necessary to examine the interaction between both the internal strife and external intervention. For it is here that it can be seen that in certain instances external intervention did provoke a series of inter-communal conflicts and that the two phenomena are linked. In other instances, however, external intervention and counter-intervention did bring the various religious communities together, despite their deep-seated rivalries. Strange as it may seem, sometimes agreement was possible and an imperfect consensus did emerge despite a civil war situation. A great deal of research has yet to be done to clarify the nature and dynamics of such linkage. [2]

One other theme that could be developed here is that the civil war and the subsequent protracted conflict were partly the result of the interplay between internal Lebanese developments and external ones. Most important among the external developments were the Arab-Israeli conflict and inter-Arab tensions that were themselves exacerbated by this conflict. This said, a definitional clarification is called for. External intervention is here defined as:

[2] Here it is not being argued that local conflict and lack of integration are necessary conditions for intervention. No more are they sufficient ones, external actors must have some reason of their own for becoming involved in an internal conflict in another country; moreover, external actors can be sucked in to a conflict. See Chapter One.

"... the organized and systematic use of coercion by one state or non-state actor in order to change or prevent change in the political structure of another state or in its internal or external policies, actions or capabilities. As a coercive activity, it is distinguished from influence or non-coercive interaction: without such a distinction the term is meaningless, given the degree of interaction between actors in international affairs. The type of coercion involved may be economic, military, cultural or diplomatic." [3]

Historians, Scholars, and Students alike, have sought many varied interpretations of the Lebanon conflict. For example, Hudson in *The Precarious Republic Revisited*, [4] reaffirmed his thesis that Lebanon's political system proved unable to cope with additional strains to which it had been subjected by the Palestinian armed presence, particularly after 1967. Odeh, among others, emphasised the socio-economic dimension of the Lebanese conflict that resulted from accumulated tension between privileged and under-privileged elements of Lebanese society. [5] Writers such as Salibi emphasize the religious cleavages in Lebanon, assuming they constitute the main contradiction in Lebanese society. In fact, Salibi's book *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976*, [6] is full of assertions that the wars of 1958 and 1975 were the result and continuation of sectarian politics, or more specifically, Christian-versus-Muslim politics. It is not the intention here to challenge the validity of these explanations of Lebanon's crisis.

The War For Lebanon: 1975-81

In many ways the current civil war in Lebanon is a culmination of a confrontation that has been

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- [3] One theme we hope to develop here is that in addition to having reasons to intervene, external actor(s) also face constraints on their actions. Both motives and constraints may be constant over time and space, or they may be a variable in content and strength with respect to specific historical and geo-political realities. Consequently, in discussing motives of external actors, it must be stressed that the analysis is highly speculative. Even when the relevant documents are available, motives for a specific policy (i.e. of the covert type) are often obscure, since the written word may not reflect the thinking of those involved. The task is even more intractable when, as in the case of more recent events, such sources are seldom available at all. One is forced in such instances to induce a rationale for action from the events themselves, viewed in the context of the overall behaviour and historical and cultural traditions of the powers in question. Hence, it is for such reasons, among others, that the definition of intervention endorsed here excludes covert policies and behaviour. See Chapter One.
- [4] Michael Hudson, *The Precarious Republic Revisited: Reflections on the Collapse of Pluralistic Politics in Lebanon*, Washington, D.C.: Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1955.
See also *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon*, New York: Random House, 1968.
- [5] See B J Odeh, *Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict*, London: Zed Books Ltd., 1985.
- [6] K. Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976*, New York: Delmar, 1976.

building up between the forces of change and the forces for maintaining the established order against all odds and quite often in opposition to the professed principles of society and government. What is more, the very factors which led to the outbreak of the war and the course it took began with a series of gradual developments, expedited perhaps by extraneous factors. First, there was the powerful impact of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The Arab defeat and the emergence of a strong Palestinian presence inside the country from 1968 onwards, constituted a manifold challenge to the Lebanese state and forced the Lebanese government of the day to make decisions harmful to the stability of Lebanon's political system.

To begin with it involved an awakening of dormant religious sectarian tensions, which grew on occasions to overshadow other expressed or implied sources and causes of conflict. The war which began in 1975 between Lebanese Christians and Palestinians with their constituent organizations became a cardinal issue and a catalyst for other developments. It also assumed different dimensions soon after its outbreak. As the tension between Lebanese Christians and Palestinians, who are mainly Muslims, heightened and intensified, Lebanese Muslims joined in on the side of the Palestinians; the conflict thereupon took a religious appearance, which is at least to some extent deceptive. As the war followed its course, the actual motive behind the conflict began to emerge as a regional and international interest in settling the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which Lebanon up until the late 1960's and early 1970's was only indirectly and remotely involved.

Ever since independence it was clear that Lebanon could not easily follow a policy opposed to that of its Arab neighbours in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict or that of relations with the great powers, but it was *not* so clear that the surrounding states would have an interest in making use of any kind of inner fragmentation for their own purposes. [7] What seems to be clear so far is that religiously divided Lebanese played unwittingly, or at least unwillingly, into the hands of other parties concerned, in one way or another, with the settlement of the broader Middle-East conflict.

The same happened in 1958, when the vicissitudes of Pan Arabism led by President Nasser of

[7] For the rough sea in which Lebanon has had to navigate, see Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War, Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals 1958-1970*, 3rd ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Egypt, transformed the Lebanese polity into two fighting camps. The Muslims, supporting Nasser, saw in Arab Nationalism a force which would strengthen their position on social reform and Pan-Arabism, while the Christians saw in it a Muslim bid to dominate them. The civil war which followed was consequently dominated by religious tension. While the real issue(s) behind it, with its external ramifications, was something entirely different.

Though it began as an internal problem, the 1958 Lebanese crisis became a regional and then an international crisis involving an East-West confrontation. The significance of the crisis is the evidence it gives of the closely interwoven and inseparable relation between domestic and external factors in determining the country's political life, and of the precarious balance on which the Lebanese polity was established. Further, it indicates the danger inherent in adopting policies which do not have the approval or support of the majority of the Lebanese people or which involve foreign powers and are at the same time subject to controversy in the Arab States. The upsurge of messianic Pan-Arab nationalism under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, plus the Egyptian-Iraqi rivalry (and the Great Power rivalry superimposed on it), set the regional scene for the explosion in 1958.

In the event, the polarization of Arab regional politics intensified sectarian sensitivities inside Lebanon. [8] Gamal Abdel Nasser's growing challenge to the West stirred Sunni Muslims to demand a united Lebanese stand against American imperialism and deepened their already existing discontent over their inconsequential share in political power. Nasser's intrepidity before the Western powers inspired the poor and uneducated middle strata of many sects, to rally to the banner of Arab nationalism and Nasser, its leader. This in turn excited the fears of the Lebanese Christian nationalists. [9] Nasserism offered an external focus of loyalty for Lebanon's Muslims, to the detriment of their attach-

[8] Pan-Arabism was frequently misused as it readily provided free licence for ambitious Arab states or regimes to impinge on the sovereign prerogatives of other states or regimes and destabilize them in favour of their special policies, whatever they were. In some cases, there were no real state interests to be served by such impingements, which reduced them to moves in a game: one in which different Arab parties tested their strength in trying to victimize others. Lebanon as a sovereign state was a victim of such games which involved trespasses on its sovereignty in a particular way, because the pan-Arab opposition in the country welcomed and often invited external Arab interventions in Lebanese affairs in the name of the pan-Arab ideal. On this and more see Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

[9] Michael Hudson, 'The Precarious Republic; Political Modernization in Lebanon', *op.cit.*, p.286, pp.288-291; see also the interesting but partisan account of the civil war of 1958 in Camille Chamoun, *Crise au Moyen Orient* [Crisis in the Middle East], Paris: Gallimard, 1963.

ment to the Lebanese state. Why accept a secondary position in a state dominated by Christians with ambivalent attitudes to Arabism, when Arabism was about to enjoy its finest hour? Christian leaders were sharply divided as to the best response to these developments. Some favoured a conciliatory and flexible policy which would enable Lebanon to weather the storm. Others headed by Camille Chamoun, then Lebanon's President, advocated a resolute policy based on unambivalent cooperation with the West and the conservative Arab states against the wave of revolutionary Pan-Arab nationalism. The problem was further compounded by Chamoun's decision to modify the constitution to enable his re-election for a second consecutive term. Some Christian and Muslim politicians opposed this, and during 1957 elections Chamoun sought to exclude them from the new Parliament. [10]

Inspired by his own boldness, as much as by the promptings of external powers, Chamoun pushed on with an anti-Nasser Policy, exemplified by his endorsement of the Eisenhower Doctrine propounded in early 1957 to contain both communism and radicalism in the Middle East. [11] To this end Chamoun proceeded with an electoral reform calculated to consider amending the Constitution and to pass certain legislation that was favourable to himself. So as to reduce the influence of the pro-Nasser elements, he manipulated the 1957 parliamentary election in an attempt to unseat opponents and help his supporters to Parliament. [12] Not surprisingly, the opposition's disapproval of Chamoun's foreign policy towards the Arab States aggravated the Christian-Muslim cleavages. Chamoun's moves amounted in the view of the opposition, to an alignment with foreign powers against Arab States (i.e. Egypt and Syria).

[10] On the 1958 civil war, see Kamal Salibi, *Modern History of Lebanon*, pp.198-204; M. Hudson, 'Precarious Republic', *op.cit.*, pp.108-16; Malcolm Kerr, "Lebanese Views on the 1958 Crisis", *Middle East Journal*, 15 (Spring 1961), pp.211-217; and Camille Chamoun, *Crise au Moyen Orient*, Paris: Gallimard, 1963.

[11] The assumption prevailing in Washington was that the gradual elimination of Nasser's influence would keep the Arab States under Western influence. In short, United States policy worked for the maintenance of the *status quo*, and it was supported by some Arab regimes. In the words of Morgenthau, "Our policy has been to defend the status quo in the Middle East by supporting as allies those states who would accept our support; and both the commitment of the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine serve to implement this policy". H.J. Morgenthau, *The Impasse of American Foreign Policy*, Volume 2, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, p.289.

[12] The elections of 1957 placed outside the Parliament important political leaders such as Kamal Junblatt, Saeb Salam, and Ahmad Al-Asad. These, and others, were noted for their popularity in their respective electoral districts. Whether the results were forfeited or not, it appears that the election of 1957 was a major cause of the Lebanese crisis of 1958. The feeling of Muslim leaders that Chamoun's government was trying to undermine their interests and disregard their political disposition toward friendlier relations in the Arab States seems to be one of the major causes of the crisis. For a full discussion of the above points see Elie Salem, 'Cabinet Politics in Lebanon', *Middle East Journal*, 21 (Fall 1967), pp.492-495.

Though the leaders of the opposition never questioned Lebanon's independence and sovereignty, they were charged by Chamoun with demagoguery and with co-operating with Egypt and Syria to the detriment of Lebanon's integrity. On March 8, 1958, the conflict between the opposition as expressed in the Union National Front and the Chamounists reached a turning point. Nassib Matni, a Maronite journalist, was assassinated. The UNF accused the government and President Chamoun personally of being responsible for the killing of Matni. Moreover, it declared a general strike throughout Lebanon and asked for the immediate resignation of Chamoun and the formation of a caretaker cabinet until a new President was elected. [13] With the ensuing turn of events, Chamoun's domestic and foreign policies resulted in Lebanon being plunged into anarchy beginning in May 1958, but by the time the United States Marines had landed in July 1958 and a death toll of some 2,000 lives, a stalemate had already been reached.

On July 15, 1958, U.S. Marines first landed on the beaches of Lebanon in what has proved to be an example of direct military intervention by the United States in the Middle East. Within weeks, 14,000 U.S. Marines were deployed in Lebanon. By October, however, the crisis was over and all U.S. forces had withdrawn with virtually no casualties. In retrospect, many observers debated the wisdom of the U.S. use of force in Lebanon, and wondered why the U.S. intervened. There are various explanations. For example, Kerr has argued that the primary reason was to prevent a chain-reaction that could have led to another Arab-Israeli war. [14] Whereas Quandt, in contrast, has contended it was because President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles wanted to deter Soviet expansion in the Middle East and to check the growing influence of Nasser in the Arab countries. [15] In other words, that intervention was aimed primarily against communism and Nasserism. A third explanation, that

[13] The Union National Front (UNF) represented the opposition which was predominately Muslims. The supporters of Chamoun were predominately Christian. A third force represented the neutral Muslim and Christian political forces in Lebanon. Confessionalism was an element in the internal crisis, but the crisis could not be described as a confessional one that divided the Lebanese into two conflicting (Christian-Muslim) camps. The emergence of the third force, together with the fact that leading spiritual and political leaders of the Christian communities supported the cause of the opposition prevented the crisis from turning into a confessional one. For this see, Malcolm Kerr, 'The Lebanese Civil War', in Evan Luard, (ed.). *The International Regulation of Civil Wars*, London: Thames and Hudson, 1972, p.77.

[14] See Malcolm Kerr, 'The Lebanese Civil War', *op.cit.*, pp.76-79, Michael Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, *op.cit.*, p.108, pp.109-114.

[15] W.B. Quandt, 'Lebanon, 1958 and Jordan 1970', in Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, eds., *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979, pp.222-257.

the Americans came in to save the Presidency of Camille Chamoun is, of course, much less plausible. The United States made it clear as early as 9 May 1958 that troops would not be sent in to keep the President in office after the expiry of his term. Regardless of the plausibility of such explanations, the American decision to intervene remains a highly speculative issue. Nothing is known for certain about the external background of the civil war of 1958, and much regarding the outside interests involved in the present conflict and the crisis of 1958, can be more or less accurately surmised from circumstantial evidence. However, concrete information about the roles of various external parties and internal protagonists is still lacking and unlikely to be known in the near future.

The U.S. intervention in Lebanon stimulated a search for a political solution to the crisis. A successor to Chamoun had to be found who was acceptable to the Arab nationalists as well as the Christian community. General Fuad Chehab, head of the army, quickly emerged as a man capable of attracting broad support. He had the advantage of being relatively non-partisan, not tied to the traditional establishment, and sufficiently neutralist in his ideology to be tolerated by the Nasserists. In the event, Chehab had a smooth accession to the Presidency and subsequently named one of the leaders of the opposition elements, Rashid Karami, as Prime Minister. Had it not been for the election of a new President, the Lebanese crisis could have dragged on longer than it did. [16] Be that as it may, the 1958 crisis left Lebanon with innumerable problems. Most important among these was the need to lead the country back to political stability, to restore law and order, and to ameliorate economic activities and conditions. [17] These problems needed the immediate attention of the new regime. In fact, they were the chief concern of Lebanese government during the early years of the Chehab administration. The year 1958 was a period of depression and stagnation for the Lebanese economy. [18] The losses that

[16] Elie Salem, 'Cabinet Politics in Lebanon', *Middle East Journal*, 21, Fall 1967, p.496. In his study on Cabinet politics in Lebanon, Salem pointed out "the crisis [more accurately the civil war] of 1958 revealed beyond doubt that in a moment of truth local leaders and established families held greater control of their followers than did the central government, each religious and communal group has its own pyramid of power and its own internal source of strength, and it is with these pyramids that the cabinet must deal and at times even negotiate."

[17] During the Chehab administration, in the early 1960s, the government expanded its investment in the infrastructure of the south, north and the Beqaa, and brought public services, such as water, electricity, roads and schools to the rural areas. Yet these regions still ranked below Mount Lebanon (especially the province of Kisrewan) and the wealthy areas of Beirut. J. Toubi, 'Social Dynamic: in War Torn Lebanon', *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, no.17, 1980, pp.96-7.

[18] The discontent among the less advantaged classes was first revealed in the 1958 Civil War. R. Owen, 'The Political Economy of Grand Liban', in R. Owen (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.27-32.

were endured during the crisis were a result of the drop in production, services and tourist trade, the damage in property, the flight of capital, and discontinuity in governmental services. [19] Consequently a number of socio-economic reforms were agreed upon, in principle, to accommodate some of the demands of the masses. [20]

However, no sooner had the U.S. troops withdrawn from the country and Lebanon's internal conditions as well as its relations with the Nasserism returned to normality, then Lebanon's foreign policy began to assume new perspectives. These perspectives centred on the concept of neutrality towards the East-West conflict and neutrality towards the acrimonious inter-Arab bickerings. Generally, the emphasis on neutralism under the Presidency of Fuad Chehab (1958-64) and later that of Charles Helou (1964-70), was not considered as something novel. Rather it was considered a cornerstone of traditional Lebanese foreign policy, particularly in relations to the Arab States; moreover, it was considered as one of the main principles of the Lebanese National Pact of 1943.

Lebanon's wish to remain 'neutral' in the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War in June 1967, lest Israel attack, concomitant with other regional and domestic development brought about a major political crisis in the country. [21] Lebanon was once more put before the mirror, thus revealing her schizophrenic character: without the Arab world Lebanon was unable to survive economically. Given the dependence of its essentially mercantile economy on Arab import and export markets, the fact that tourists from the Arab countries provided Lebanon with a substantial source of income and also that several Arab States were recipients of Lebanese emigrants and were centres for Lebanese business

[19] The prosperous Lebanese economy did not benefit all sectors of society. By and large, there was close agreement between the interests of the political leaders and the commercial and financial elite. Often the country was run as a company, surrendering the interests of the public to the interests of the business elite. According to some estimates, the wealth benefited only four per cent of the population. A. Azmeh, 'The Progressive Forces', in R. Owen (ed.), *Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon*, London: Ithaca Press, 1976, pp.59-72. That wealth and income was not distributed equitably is reflected in the following data: in 1959, nine per cent of the population was defined as very poor; 40 per cent as poor; 30 per cent as average; 14 per cent as well-off and four per cent as rich. C. Issawi, 'Economic Development and Political Liberalism in Lebanon', in L. Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966, op.cit., pp.69-84; M. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, op.cit., p.65

[66] On Chehab's presidency and reforms, see Kamal Salibi, 'Lebanon under Fouad Chehab 1958-1964', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 2 (1966), pp.211-26; and Michael Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, p.297-331. On economic and administrative reform, see George Grassmuck and Kamal Salibi, rev. ed., *Reformed Administration in Lebanon*, Beirut: Catholic Press, 1964; Adnan Iskandar, *Bureaucracy in Lebanon*, Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1964; and Abdo Baaklini, *Legislative and Political Development: Lebanon 1872-1972*, Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1976.

[21] When other Arab governments offered Egyptian and Syrian troops to defend Lebanon's southern border, Lebanon emphatically rejected the offer on the grounds that such Arab military presence on her territory would compromise her sovereignty. K. Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976*, New York, Caravan Books, 1976, p.24.

activities made it possible for other Arab states to exert economic pressures on Lebanon in inter-Arab as well as international affairs. [22] In short, Arab States could always threaten to restrict, if not curtail, Lebanese interests in their territories to force a change in Lebanon's political stances.

The Palestinian Presence

As the decade drew to a close, a fundamental issue began to intrude on the relationship. Palestinian guerrilla operations directed against Israel - either across the Lebanese-Israeli border or against Israel targets in Europe - began to provoke vigorous Israeli reprisals. The Lebanese conservatives were particularly alarmed after the Israeli raid on Beirut International Airport, and by the end of 1968 they began their efforts to bring the Palestinians under control. The Lebanese army (controlled by Maronite officers) had to make a choice between resisting Israeli raids or containing the Palestinian resistance movement. They decided to contain the Palestinians, and this cast the army as a repressive instrument controlled by the Christians' ruling elites rather than as a national army entrusted with the task of defending the country against external threat to its national security and survival. [23] When fighting became widespread in October 1969, Syria acted to force the Lebanese government to desist from its confrontation with the Palestinians: it closed its borders with Lebanon and sent Syrian-controlled armed Palestinians to occupy some Lebanese border towns. [24] The Lebanese turned to Nasser for help in this matter, the Egyptian leader proved no counterpoise to Syria. The issue was not simply whether Lebanon would show solidarity with Arab States (in this instance Syria and Egypt) against Israel, it was whether the Lebanese state would allow its territory to be used for the conduct of a guerrilla war against a powerful neighbour and would submit in the take over of a substantial parts of

[22] The economy of Lebanon was founded on the basis of *laissez faire*, for example, total free enterprise for all and almost no governmental intervention in the economy. The economy is strongly service-oriented and depend heavily on income from abroad. The present structure of the Lebanese economy developed mostly after independence, as Lebanon became an entrepot between Europe and the oil-rich region of the Middle East. By far the most important factor in Lebanon's post-independence economic development was its emergence as a major centre of finance. Lebanese prosperity relied on a pool of capital, fed to a large extent by the inflow of funds from the Arab oil-producing States, as well as remittances from Lebanese emigrants. The financial attraction of Lebanon was based on favourable interest rates, banking secrecy, the relative stability of Lebanon's political situation, and the general liberal and permissive stand taken on economic and political matters. See S. Nasr, 'The Crisis of Lebanese Capitalism', *MERIP*, vol.8, no.10, 1978, *op.cit.*, pp.3-13, M. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, *op.cit.*, pp.63-65.

[23] See K. Salibi, *op.cit.*, p.41.

[24] Fuad Jabber, 'The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics', in William Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973, pp.213-215.

its territory by the Palestinian Resistance Movement. To no avail, some Maronite Christian leaders pleadingly reminded the Syrians that neither Syria nor any other Arab State permitted such things. [25] Syria and Egypt kept tight control over Palestinians and allowed no guerrilla operations from their own territory, but Syria responded to the pleas of the Lebanese by lecturing them sternly on their duty to the Arab resistance against Israel. [26]

The crisis ended with the signing of the Cairo Agreement on 3 November 1969 between the Lebanese and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereafter PLO). [27] Under the agreement, Lebanon recognized the Palestinian Movement's right to take charge of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. It was a fateful step for Lebanon. In effect, the Cairo Agreement legitimized an armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon. [28] It tried to reconcile and regulate this presence with Lebanese sovereignty, an exercise which turned out to resemble an attempt to square the circle. [29] The conflict between the PLO and the Lebanese state came to a head again in the spring of 1973 after an Israeli assassination or Commando teams killed three PLO spokesmen in Beirut. The Israeli raid precipitated a political crisis that eventually led to fighting between the Lebanese Army and Palestinian and Lebanese leftist forces. In a replay of the 1969 crisis, armed Palestinians began to cross from Syria into Lebanon and to attack Lebanese army and security positions. President Suleiman Franjeh hastened to assure the Syrians that he would not allow a 'Black May' in Lebanon - an allusion to the 'Black September' of 1970 in Jordan - but he would also not allow the Palestinians to act as an

[25] Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Kataeb Party, the largest Maronite-dominated political and military organization, warned that the crisis:

"is not a Lebanese internal crisis but a difference between two independent and sovereign states in which one is openly attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of the other. The whole problem is clear; it is no longer the action of the fida'iyyun; it is our system, our regime, our institutions which are destroyed under the cover of the Palestinian commandos and the sacred cause of Palestine."

Quoted in John Entelis, 'Palestinian Revolutionism in Lebanese Politics: The Christian Response', *Muslim World*, 62, No.4, October 1972, pp.340-341.

[26] Salibi, *op.cit.*, p.58.

[27] The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was originally founded by the Arab League, and represented the interests of various regimes (particularly Nasser's Egypt) more than of the Palestinians. Organizations such as Yasser Arafat's *El-Fatah* were highly critical of the original PLO. However, following the 1967 Arab debacle, the old PLO leadership was discredited, and was taken over by the more independent Palestinian organizations. This process was completed by the election of Arafat to the PLO chairmanship. For a more in-depth historical account, see Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

[28] Note the text of the 1969 Cairo Accords in Walid Khalidi and Majed Khadduri (eds.), *International Documents on Palestine*, Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1972.

[29] See Hussein Sirriyyeh, 'The Palestinian Armed Presence in Lebanon Since 1967', in R. Owen (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.79. See also Salibi, *op.cit.*, pp.42-43.

"occupying army". In this instance the fighting ended with an agreement that reaffirmed the 1969 Cairo Accord. Lebanon, in one analyst's words, was "turned into a powder keg with a fuse attached, and there was no telling when it would be made to explode." [30]

Undoubtedly, the Lebanese government accepted the Cairo Agreement in order to placate Muslim and progressive opinion at home and, in this way, to prevent a rupture between Christians and Muslims in the country. They hoped also to maintain good relations with the major Arab countries on whose tolerance and financial backing depended Lebanon's sovereignty and independence. They also hoped to escape Israel's reprisal. All hope was in vain. In essence, the armed presence of the Palestinian Movement was becoming deep rooted among the masses, and the Lebanese progressive forces were also in full support of the Resistance. Having become more and more discontent with the political status quo, the progressive forces and the under-privileged Lebanese found in the Resistance a natural ally in the face of the State. Not only did the Palestinian Resistance Movement serve as a model for both the articulation and diffusion of radical ideas, but it also kindled the willingness on the part of the progressive forces to unite and press for attempts at political reforms. [31] To augment this further, was the presence of about 300,000 Palestinians which were to constitute a living proof of the organic link between Lebanon and the Arab World. These Palestinians contributed heavily to Lebanon's economic development (cheap, skilled labour, remittances from abroad, etc.), yet, for the most part, they did not share in the gains. Their lot was comparable to that of the majority of the Lebanese population who lived in the extremely under-developed areas of the country.

Indeed, long before the outbreak of the civil war in 1975, the political system which with its limited checks and balances, such as the National Pact of 1943, promoted the dominance of some religious communities and groups (particularly the Maronites) over others and secured the conditions needed for

[30] See Salibi, *op.cit.*, p.70.

[31] For many Lebanese, identification with the Palestinian cause became a symbol of opposition to the Lebanese 'establishment'. Discontent with the regime derived from an assortment of grievances, but "the advent of the Palestinians upon the scene ... [provided] a vividly visible symbol around which political positions aligned themselves". See Aziz al-Azmeh, "The Progressive Forces", in R. Owen (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.65.

self-perpetuation of the traditional elites. [32] At the same time, however, that very same system proved its inability to transform and face challenging and overdue problems, which were to underline a characteristic behaviour pattern directly connected with the Civil War and inherently rooted in the Lebanese social and political structure. [33]

What was more, a lack of consensus on fundamentals such as on a constitution, a popular national pact, a political order for the country, and above all, on the national identity of Lebanon was to bring profoundly disquieting changes to the country. Consequently, relationships between the diverse religious communities wavered between conflict and accommodation. The pro-system forces were unable to undo what had transpired historically into a situation which would help the social formation from rupture. [34] The Palestinian Movement progressively usurped Lebanese authority and took over the functions of government in most of Southern Lebanon. Israeli raids in the south destroyed the authority of traditional Shi'ite Muslim leaders - the men who played the game of Lebanese politics and had a stake in the system, and sent hundreds of thousands of Shiites in flight northwards to the slums of Beirut where they became radicalized. [35]

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- [32] Scholars who without the benefit of hindsight viewed the Lebanese scene pessimistically include Michael Hudson and Halim Barakat. Hudson's main thesis was that with rapid social modernization Lebanon failed to develop the institutions necessary to bear the load of rising expectations. He quoted Samuel Huntington to the effect that "non-Western countries of today can have political modernization or they can have democratic pluralism; but they cannot normally have both". Samuel Huntington, 'Political Modernization: America vs. Europe', *World Politics*, April 1966, p.412, quoted in Michael Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, *op.cit.*, p.13. Hudson later indicated that he felt events had confirmed his diagnosis, see Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy*, *op.cit.*, pp.284-291.
- [33] The educational system, including the universities, has enhanced cultural diversity and reinforced the stratified social mosaic of Lebanon. Most importantly, it has prevented a growth of a Lebanese identity because schools, as a major mechanism of socialization, have socialized the young generation 'vertically', with their own religious communities, and not horizontally, into their class or society at large. H. Barakat, *Lebanon in Strife: Students Prelude to the Civil War*, Austin, University of Texas Press 1977. Barakat found that most of the Muslim students in Muslim schools identified themselves as progressive, as supporters of Socialist Democracy, as Pan-Arabist and Pro-Palestinians, while Christians, who studied in private schools, identified themselves as conservative, as supporters of liberal democracy, were for an independent Lebanon and against the Palestinians. As a consequence, the spread of education in Lebanon expanded the stratum of people deeply involved in the Lebanese identity crisis, and it did not contribute to the nation-building potential but had disintegrated effects. See also H. Barakat, 'Social and Political Integration in Lebanon: A Case of Social Mosaic', *Middle East Journal*, XXVII (Summer 1973).
- [34] Because of the existence of many of the weaknesses of the Lebanese system, such as lack of any consensus, the growing gap between rich and poor, government corruption and inefficiency, and its rigid sectarian structure, Lebanon was unable to reform itself. The Chehab reform, for example, according to Barakat, amounted to little and in no way adapted Lebanon's irresponsible laissez-faire system to the need for social transformation and for social justice. Lebanon, he implied was condemned to disintegration and could be saved only by a radical revolution. Halim Barakat, 'The Social Context', in P. Edward Haley and Lewis W. Snider (eds.), *Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues*, Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1979, pp.1-20.
- [35] Many of the migrants and refugees were poor Shi'ites whose convergence from South Lebanon and the Beqaa created the poverty belts of Beirut. A Soffer, 'Lebanon — Where Demography is the Core of Politics and Life', *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.22, no.2, 1986, pp.197-205.

The dynamics of such developments intensified the internal contradictions within the Lebanese polity. Anti-system political parties were on the ascendancy as more people retracted their allegiance from the Zuama or traditional political leaders. This was, however, contradictory to the interests of the dominant classes of Lebanon's political and social formations. [36] Since the State was a power centre of the Maronite and Muslim sectors of the establishment, any erosion of this class's power was regarded as anathema. This meant that the class which stood to lose from such threats, real or perceived, was compelled to oppose the progressive movement in a significant way. Given the situation in early 1975, this meant nothing short of a calculated full-scale military offensive against this nascent progressive movement to stop it dead in its tracks. Support for the Palestinian Resistance Movement was a cause célèbre for the progressive or anti-establishment forces in Lebanon and the issue became a catalyst polarizing the Lebanese political environment. [37]

At this juncture and for analytical purpose, a caveat is warranted; this analysis of the domestic Lebanese conflict, which developed into civil war in the summer of 1975, distinguishes the two warring camps as status quo or pro-establishment and progressive or anti-establishment. As was the case in the 1958 crisis, the complexity of the present conflict - that it was more than religious strife, [38] or

[36] Through a sophisticated patron-client system merchants and traditional rural-based politicians formed an alliance which was very finely and continuously tuned to changes in the delicate balance of power among the different forces in the country. This is the 'system' about which a lot has been said and about which there is no final word. See, for example, Malcolm Kerr, 'Political decision-making in a confessional democracy', in L. Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966; Michael Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, *op.cit.*; Leila T. Meo, *Lebanon: Improbable Nation. A Study in Political Development*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965.

[37] For interpretations in this vein, see J.P. Entelis, *Pluralism and Party Transformation in Lebanon: Al-Kata'ib, 1936-1970* Leiden, Netherlands, E.J. Brill, 1974, Entelis contends that

"[Lebanon's] experience has demonstrated that an accommodative attitude toward parochial interests can actually accelerate national integration, enhance the legitimacy of the political system, and maximize the possibility of peaceful adjustment of social conflicts. Moreover, the adaptive elements of Lebanon's modernization process have helped to cope with internal tensions and discontinuities resulting from rapid social change."

As the history of Lebanon has shown, the long-awaited society Entelis speaks of has failed to obtain. Instead of helping Lebanon to 'cope', the country's 'modernizing' structures have legalised unequal relationships in politics and economics among the population and region.

[38] The outbreak of War in 1975 makes it imperative to reassess the inadequacy of the thesis that Lebanon's politics represent a contention between Christians and Muslims. To most writers in the conventional literature, the outbreak of the war was the result and continuation of sectarian politics, or more specifically, Christian versus Muslim politics. As a leading representative of this school of literature, Salibi's writing tries to conjure up in the reader's mind images of the Muslims competing with or fighting the Christians in an effort by each of those religious groups to protect its existence and interests. What is so unsatisfactory in this categorization is the sense of the absolute that it is embedded in. Things are not that clear-cut. Hence, it is inadequate and too reductionist. According to the Salibi, the interests of Muslims (all Muslims) lie in Pan-Arabism. The interests of Christian (all Christians) lie in Lebanonism. Salibi does not analyse the reason for Muslims being Pan-Arab or for Christians being Lebanonists. Further, he does not analyse the relationship between the Muslim bourgeoisie and the Muslim masses, the Christian bourgeoisie and the Christian masses, or the bourgeoisie that is *in fact* multi-confessional, and the confessional and other cleavages in the polity that may have much to do with the Lebanese conflict. See K. Salibi, *op.cit.*, pp.171-196.

a Palestinian-Lebanese conflict, or purely class - is suggested by some of the following facts. Firstly, the status quo camp or coalition controlled by Maronite leaders received substantial support from a number of Muslim leaders, factions and countries. For instance, some of them, mainly the more feudal-style leaders of the Shi'ite community, came to opt for maintaining their links with their Maronite counterparts. Others, like the Druze leader Kamal Junblatt, veered towards the Palestinian leadership. But the majority of the old-style Sunni *Zuama* found themselves caught unhappily in the middle, virtually immobilized by the contending stress and strains thrust upon them. The Sunni bosses were thus unable to take much effective action in any direction, either to shore up their alliance with the Maronites or to give much effective backing to the Palestinians. The Sunni leaders were further hampered by the political traditions of their own community, which had seen itself throughout the centuries more as a legitimate part of a larger state structure than as a sect pursuing its own interests. [39] The resulting paralysis of the traditional Sunni leaders in the years following 1967 harmed the Lebanese system, for it struck at the heart of the whole National Pact system on which the country's very independence had been based. For the Sunni leaders had been one of the two main parties (the other being the Maronites) which had contracted the National Pact (*Mithaq al-Witani*) in 1943. Their paralysis thus opened the way for the emergence of new political forces not envisaged in, or necessarily consistent with, the National Pact. Secondly, the revision or anti-establishment camp or coalition was joined and supported by groups and organizations with diverse orientations, i.e. nationalist, socialist and religious. Thirdly, a significant segment of Lebanese Christians sided with the leftist camp while some Lebanese Muslims sided with the rightist camp. Fourthly, but most tragically, groups on both sides were involved in indiscriminate attacks, torture, and killing using the Lebanese birth certificate, which specifies one's religion, as the only evidence to justify their acts. Lastly, some

[39] Power in Lebanon does not necessarily lie within the Parliament or in the parties, but in the prominent clans of clerics, semi-feudal lords, political bosses, and some bankers, businessmen and professionals, the *Zuama* as they are called. Many of the political and economic issues may be agreed upon among the *Zuama* — outside the regular political framework though all the important clans have representatives in the Parliament and among government ranks. These traditional leaders, especially the Muslim leaders, have been affected by the process of radicalization and pan-Arabism which penetrated the Lebanese political system in the 1970s and became very powerful. The Sunni leaders especially (Salams, Sulhs, Karamis), lost support among the Muslim masses, and Shi'ite traditional leaders such as the Assads, Osseiran, and Himadeh were replaced by radical Shi'ite leaders such as Musa al-Sadr and Nabih Berri, and lost much of their power among the Shi'ite masses, as did the traditional Arslan clan which was overcome by the radical Junblatt in the struggle for supremacy among the Druze. D. Gordon, 'Lebanon — The Fragmented Nation', 1980, *op.cit.*, pp.10-105; Hudson, 'The Precarious Republic', *op.cit.*; Khalidi, 'Conflict and Violence in Lebanon', *op.cit.*, pp.43-45.

upper class Muslims have fought on the leftist or revisionist side, while some poor Christians have fought on the rightist or status quo side.

Hence, for our purpose, the most reliable method of classifying the participants in the civil war, then, is not by religion or class but by the division between those who seek basic and comprehensive changes from those who would maintain the existing order. But it should be noted that as the war raged on, external intervention by Syria in the early summer of 1976 and later by Israel in the spring of 1978 resulted in the formation of a third grouping, that of clients and supporters of Syria and Israel respectively.

On the eve of the Lebanese Civil War, the status quo coalition relied on the Maronite leaders, for not all the Lebanese Christian communities supported its political line. In point of fact, parties with Christian-Maronite orientation and their affiliated members were the backbone of the Maronite community's political and military power. [40] As such, this rightist camp was composed of (1) the Phalange (Al-Kataib), a highly organized political party led by Pierre Gemayel, and his sons Bashir and Amin; (2) the National Liberal Party led by the former president of the Lebanese State, Camille Chamoun and his sons Dany and Dory; (3) the Maronite order of Monks headed by Cherbel Kassis; (4) the militia of former president Suleiman Franjeh and his son Tony, who was killed in a Phalangist attack in June 1978; and (5) factions of the Lebanese Army and other small organizations.

Arrayed against these groups was a Lebanese nationalist progressive front composed of the Progressive Socialist Party, [41], headed by Kamal Junblatt, who was killed in an ambush in the spring of 1977; the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party; the Lebanese Communist Party; the Organization of Communist Action; Al-Mourabitoun - a Nasserist Movement; the Arab Ba'ath socialist party; the Arab

[40] The Maronites constitute 80 per cent of the Phalange, and Christians constitute 90 per cent of the party's membership. It is probably the most sectarian party of all. M. Deeb, *The Lebanese War*, New York: Praeger, 1980, p.25.

[41] The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) was founded by Kamal Junblatt and the PSP reflected his ideas. Throughout most of his career he was to work more or less consistently toward the goal of transforming Lebanon from an aggregate of sects into a modern nation, acknowledging its place in, and close links with the Arab and Afro-Asian worlds. However, he saw not Arab unity but the achievement of Lebanon's internal unity as the first imperative. Junblatt was highly conscious of the fact that much of the educated middle class, practically all non-traditional groups, and all the newly politicized younger generation were excluded from the political system. He sought, therefore, to reform the system to permit their participation. To this end he was again and again to bring together progressive groups, parties, and personalities to create the opposition lacking in Parliament, and so set in motion a genuine political reform movement which began to challenge the Lebanese system.

Lebanese Army; and other small organizations and factions. This Lebanese National Movement (LNM) allied itself with the Palestinian Resistance Movement on the eve of the conflict. [42]

The initial incident that triggered Lebanese civil strife was ostensibly a domestic, socio-economic issue. [43] The fishermen of the Southern coastal city of Sidon and other coastal towns were angered when the Government granted exclusive fishing rights along the coastline to the newly created Protein Company. This modern, high-technology company threatened the livelihood of a large portion of Sidon's primarily Muslim population. Resentment was exacerbated by the fact that former President Camille Chamoun, the target of Muslim animosity during the 1958 civil war, and leader of the predominantly Maronite National Liberal Party, was Chairman of the Protein Company's Board and owned a large percentage of its assets. On 26 February 1975, the Lebanese Communist Party and other leftist parties organized a demonstration in Sidon, agitating for the revocation of the Protein Company's licence. After the Army was sent to break up the demonstrations, a general strike was called by left-wing groups in Sidon and later, in Beirut and Tripoli. Meanwhile, port workers disrupted operations along the entire Lebanese coastline, and the wave of strikes threatened to spread. In the wake of such events, troops were sent to restore order and heavy fighting continued for several days. On 2 March, demonstrators accepted a cease-fire on the condition that the Army withdrew from the city. The Lebanese Cabinet, arrived at a compromise proposal whereby the Protein Company would

[42] The other political parties which dominate Lebanon's politics are little more than coalitions of various individuals clustered around one Zaim (leader) or another. The Constitutional Union Party is the Khoury party, the National Bloc is Ede's party, and the National Liberal Party is Chamoun's party. Their influence is limited to a small number of people. Coincidentally perhaps, most of these parties have powerful territorial strongholds in the respective community concentrations or in the territorial turf of an important clan, the Shouf is the territorial base of the Junblatt and Arslan clans, Tripoli is the home base of the Sunni Karami, while Zghorta is the power-base of the Maronite clan of Faranjieh. The Beqaa is influenced by the two Shi'ite clans of Himadehs and Haidars and by the Greek Catholic clan of Skaf. Mount Lebanon is a base of the Christian Maronite leaders — the Chehabs, Eddes, and Gemayels. See H. Vocke, *The Lebanese War*, London: C Hurst, 1976, pp.23-30. It is noteworthy that no Sunni or Shi'ite Zaim has ever succeeded in organizing a political party in any viable way and was unable to defend his clientele either during or after the outbreak of the ongoing conflict, see also, M. Hudson, 'The Precarious Republic', *op.cit.*, pp.125-167; W. Khalidi, 'Conflict and Violence in Lebanon', *op.cit.*, p.97.

[43] The Lebanese conflict, in its purely domestic aspect, may be as old as independent Lebanon. According to one opinion: "No precise date can be given to the beginning of the Lebanese War. Even the year is in question, some maintaining that the crisis of 1975 was merely a continuation of those of 1969 and 1973. Perhaps the civil war had no real beginning, just as it appears to have no end. It was certainly not preceded by ultimata and grandiose declarations. It simply grew from small, isolated incidents, which steadily became larger and less isolated, until eventually they followed each other so closely that it was impossible to separate them." See David Gilmour, *Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians*, London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980, p.180.

only be permitted to operate eighteen miles of offshore, so as not to interfere with the small fishing boats closer to the coast. [44]

The 'fisheries dispute' has been designated as the opening round of the Lebanese Civil War, marking the point at which a significantly higher and sustained level of violence was manifested. However, most portentous for later development was a controversy over the use of the Army to control civil strife. [45] Issues raised included the appropriate channels of authority for ordering Army action; the propriety of the Army's role; and challenges posed to the Army's integrity by forebodings of internal dissent. [46] The decision to use the Army in the 26 February demonstrations in Sidon ignored the instructions of the Sunni Prime Minister, Rashid Al-Sulh. Instead, the Maronite Commander, General Iskander Ghanim, assumed personal charge of the Army's conduct, maintaining contact with President Franjeh throughout the crisis. The Sunni establishment considered the use of the Army as an instrument of the Maronite presidency and the lack of deference to the Sunni premiership an intolerable affront. The Prime Minister was faulted for having disgraced the Sunni community by accepting a slight to his authority by the Army commander. For their part, Sunni leaders demanded that the Prime Minister be replaced immediately by a more forceful leader. [47]

On the substance of the Army's role, its critics complained that democratic liberties were violated when the Army fired on demonstrators in Sidon. Instead of firing on civilians, they argued, the Army should be defending Lebanon's border from Israeli raids. The Lebanese Nationalist Movement (LNM) joined in criticizing the use of the Army, and Kamal Jumblatt called for the immediate resignation of the Army commander Ghanim. To assure that in the future the Army would perform its

[44] K. Salibi, *op.cit.*, pp.92-93.

[45] Lebanese cabinets have risen and fallen frequently, whenever the status quo changed, when there were arguments between ministers over the authority of their offices, and when ministers released themselves from any governmental collective responsibility. Between 1926 and 1964, Lebanon had 46 different governments; between 1964 and 1979, 22 different cabinets have been appointed. G. Butros, *Who is Who in Lebanon 1980-2*, Beirut: Publihec Publications, 1980, pp.145-171; see also R. Muir, *Modern Political Geography*, New York: Halsted Press, 1975. But the epitome of executive weakness is reflected in its disintegrated army. The Lebanese army, which was kept deliberately small (6,000 men in 1956/57; 10,000 in 1966/67) and underarmed, played its first disintegrating role in 1958, when Chehab, the Commander, refused to obey President Chamoun's order to use the army against the Muslim rebels. J. Randall, *Going all the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon*, Rev. ed., New York: Vintage Books, 1983, p.54; W. Khalidi, 'Conflict and Violence in Lebanon', *op.cit.*, pp.44-45.

[46] Khalidi, *op.cit.*, p.48.

[47] Michael Hudson, 'The Palestinian Factor in the Lebanese Civil War', *op.cit.*, p.270.

appropriate functions, the Muslim leaders further demanded a reorganization of the Army command into a Military Command Council whose membership would be equally divided between Christians and Muslims. [48] The new council would then be answerable to the government as a whole, rather than to the Maronite President. Meanwhile, members of the Christian establishment forcefully vindicated the Army's role in the Sidon incidents. Thousands of students joined demonstrations in support of the Army, held in predominantly Christian East Beirut. In the event, the Maronite leaders of the Kata'ib and National liberal parties rejected the Muslim proposal for a new military Command Council. [49]

Hoping to defuse tensions over the Army's role, President Franjeh referred the issue of Army reform to a special committee for study. The government was particularly concerned by manifestations of tension within the Army in the wake of the Sidon events. When Maruf Sa'd, a popular Sunni leader, died of wounds inflicted during the Sidon demonstration, intense fighting occurred between Maronite and Muslim recruits in the Lebanese Army. These clashes were an early indication of the Army's potential for internal disintegration. [50] Controversy over the Army's role was further accentuated because of alleged participation by Palestinians in clashes with the Army. At that point, Christian political spokesmen seized on this participation as evidence of Palestinian interference in internal Lebanese affairs. They cited a co-ordinated Palestinian and radical plot to undermine not only the Army but the Lebanese political system as a whole. Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance, however, vigorously denied any connection between the Resistance and the Sidon events. [51]

However, the event most commonly identified with the start of the Lebanese Civil War was an outgrowth of escalating Christian-Palestinian tensions on 13 April 1975, when PLO militiamen fired at crowds outside a Maronite Church — that was being inaugurated by the Kata'ib or Phalange leader

[48] In the 1950s and 1960s Muslim politicians repeatedly demanded a national service law that would transform the army into a predominantly Muslim force. They claimed that the army was a 'Maronite' army, based on the fact that 62 per cent of the Officers were Christians, and the Commander always a Christian Maronite. Khalidi showed that Muslims had a slight edge over the Christians among the rank and file (53 per cent:47 per cent), while the officer-class composition was 65:35 per cent in favour of the Christians. See W. Khalidi, *op.cit.*, pp.67-68.

[49] K. Salibi, *op.cit.*, pp.92-97; Khalidi, *op.cit.*, pp.44-45.

[50] W. Khalidi, *op.cit.*, p.44; M. Hudson, "The Palestinian Factor in the Lebanese Civil War", *The Middle East Journal*, 32, 3 (Summer 1978), p.270.

[51] K. Salibi, *op.cit.*, pp.92 - 94.

Pierre Gemayel — in 'Ayn al-Rammana, a Christian suburb of Beirut. [52] Three people, including the bodyguard of the Kata'ib party leader, were killed. In apparent retaliation, a bus filled with Palestinians from refugee camps around Beirut was ambushed later that day while passing through 'Ayn al-Rammana, and all 27 passengers on board were shot. The assailants were presumed to be members of the Kata'ib party. Kata'ib-Palestinian armed clashes continued over the following weeks, despite a cease fire agreement on 16 April.

Consequently, the debate over responsibility for the 'Ayn al-Rammana incident raised the broader issue of the Palestinians' status in Lebanon. Leaders of the Resistance believed that the Kata'ib precipitated the 'Ayn al-Rammana episode to provoke the guerrillas and challenge their status in Lebanon. In view of weak Lebanese authority, however, the Kata'ib may have had political motivations for provoking confrontation with the Resistance at this stage. [53] Perhaps the Kata'ib wished to prove that their cooperation was vital to any attempt to restore stability to Lebanon. By showing their capacity to bring about a breakdown of order, they wanted to convince the Muslim leadership, in particular, that they must be formally associated in power. In this respect, the Kata'ib stand had widespread support, not only among Maronites, but among other Christian groups as well. [54]

For their part, leaders of the Lebanese National Movement further demanded the immediate dissolution of the Kata'ib party and the exclusion of two Kata'ib ministers serving on the Lebanese Cabinet. President Franjeh, in turn, criticized the LNM's stance and refused to accede to its demands for reprisals against the Kata'ib. [55] On 23 May 1975, in an unorthodox and unprecedented manner, Franjeh appointed a military Cabinet under the premiership of Brig. Nur al-Din Al-Rifa'i, a retired commander of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces. Although the President was constitutionally

[52] The *Phalanges Libanaises* — a name which was gradually replaced by its Arabic equivalent, *Kataeb*, after 1943 was founded by Pierre Gemayel, who participated in the 1936 Berlin Olympics as captain of a football team. Impressed by the Hitler Youth and other paramilitary youth organizations in Europe, Gemayel returned to Lebanon to found the *Phalanges Libanaises* as a youth sporting club. It combined features of the Hitler Youth, Franco's Falange, and a traditional *Zaim* grouping around the Gemayel family. Like the other organizations in Lebanon, it was authoritarian and its leader all powerful. The *Kataeb's* mission was to promote Lebanese nationalism. While it professed to be non-sectarian, its membership remained overwhelmingly Catholic and all its officials were Catholic. Its political positions coincided with those advanced by the Maronite community.

[53] Hussein Sirriyyeh, "The Palestinian Armed Presence in Lebanon since 1967", in R. Owen (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.82; Salibi, *op.cit.*, pp.97-98.

[54] K. Salibi, *op.cit.*, pp.96 - 101, 104-105.

[55] *Ibid.*, p.105-106.

authorized to designate any Sunni Muslim to form a government, subject to parliamentary approval, his move remains highly puzzling. [56] After concurring in the partial deployment of the Army in the Fisheries dispute, and then shying away from its use at the 'Ayn Al-Rammana, he abruptly embraced the extreme option of military government. While Franjeh's own political calculations are unclear, the political repercussions were unquestionably devastating.

The President's move sparked a united and wide-ranging coalition in Opposition, simultaneously alarming Syria sufficiently to prompt its first diplomatic initiative. One analyst speculates that because of precedents for indirect Syrian intervention during clashes between Lebanese authorities and the Palestinian Resistance in 1969 and 1973, Syrian leaders may have felt pressured to intervene if the military Cabinet provoked similar clashes. What is more, Syria's leaders were apprehensive about repercussions of the turmoil in Lebanon for stability in Syria. Both Lebanese and Syrian societies are fragmented along religious, and to a lesser extent, ethnic, regional and socio-economic lines. In each country, predominant political influence has been exercised by members of one sectarian group.

The outbreak and spread of violence in Lebanon obviously aroused Syrian anxieties, prompting President Assad's revealing statement (in mid-June 1975) that "[I]t is difficult to draw a line between Lebanon's security in its broadest sense and Syria's security." [57] Implicit in this statement was an early articulation of Syrian fear of the 'contagion effect' from Lebanese civil strife - a theme that would surface more frequently and vociferously later. One reason for Syrian anxiety over the fighting in June 1975 was an incipient trend towards defacto partition of Lebanon. The geographic scope of the Lebanese civil strife, which had been concentrated in the Beirut vicinity from April until June, spread both east and north. In the eastern Bekka Valley, an isolated Maronite village was attacked by local Shi'ite in June. Further evidence of Shi'a military preparations was accidentally disclosed when an explosion occurred near Ba'albek early in July in a camp run by the Palestinian group, Fatah. At this site, a group of Shi'ites were being trained in planting land mines. The Shi'a leader, Musa al-Sadr, announced that the men killed in the accident were members of a new Shi'ite organization called Amal

[56] *Ibid.*

[57] Cited in Adeed Dawisha, *Syria and the Lebanese Crisis* New York: St. Martin's, 1980, p.89.

(meaning 'hope'), which was prepared in coordination with Fatah - to participate in the fight against a 'Christian Lebanon'. The revelation of Amal's existence aroused Christian apprehension about active Shi'ite involvement, not in defending the South, but rather in the next round of civil strife.

Tension erupted in the Northern, Sunni-dominated city of Tripoli. Shops and offices owned by Maronites from the adjacent, Maronite-dominated town of Zgharta were targets of attack. As a result, many Maronites began to flee from Tripoli, reinforcing a trend toward greater confessional homogeneity. Another indication of trouble in the north was the emergence in July of the Zgharta Liberation Army, organized by the President's son, Tony Franjieh. Its significance derived from the status of the Franjieh clan in its native town and political base of Zgharta. The Maronites of Zgharta were disturbed by the growing popularity of the Kata'ib party among Christians after the 'Ayn al-Rammana incidents. By sponsoring the Zgharta Liberation Army the President's son wished to show that his clan, too, was prepared to defend the Maronite cause. [58]

By the time the Cabinet crisis was overcome, Maronite leaders began to refer openly to the possibility of partitioning Lebanon if the conflict could not be resolved. At different junctures, the theme of partition sounded like a scare tactic by the Maronites, a fall-back measure or emergency plan if all else failed; or a positively appealing contingency. In addition, Maronite leaders had indicated that if they could not curb the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon, they might be willing to "reconsider their position on many questions". [59] This meant that the older, mandatory boundaries of Lebanon might form a satisfactory basis for designating a separate Christian republic, comprising Mount Lebanon with the addition of the Christian sector of Beirut. This was hardly a status quo position, but rather a return to the idea of a small, predominantly Christian Lebanon. The Maronite political leadership did not relish such a course of action but raised it time and again as a last resort should the preservation of the Lebanese political system prove to be utterly impossible. Invariably, such references to *taqsim*, or partition, were distressing to Lebanese who felt a stake in the continued political integrity of Lebanon. [60]

[58] K. Salibi, *op.cit.*, pp.116-121.

[59] Khalidi, *op.cit.*, p.98.

[60] K. Salibi, *op.cit.*, pp.116-123.

The Maronites' last resort was anathema to Lebanese Muslims, Palestinians, and Syrians, because a compact Christian State in a partitioned and smaller Lebanon was considered to be a 'Second Israel', and hence its establishment was to be opposed with all means. [60a] Although the Palestinians were appalled by the possibility of partition, their growing involvement in the fighting on the revisionist (predominantly Muslim) side strengthened the Maronites conviction that the old Lebanon could no longer be sustained, and it also helped to bring about a change in Syrian policy. Syria would never accept the partition of Lebanon. The Lebanese, Syria maintained, had two alternatives: either they could live together within the existing Lebanese State as a unified and independent nation or else, if the country was partitioned, Syria would intervene immediately and reincorporate the whole of Lebanon into Syria. [60b]

As a result of close historic ties as well as geographic proximity, there was no other state more critical to Syria's regional ambitions. Syria's unwillingness to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon after independence symbolized a lingering irredentist claim. [61] Lebanon has always seemed an anomaly to Syria, a product of foreign intervention. This attitude of course, overlooks Lebanon's distinctive characteristics, but there is an element of truth in it. Prior to the establishment of the 'Greater Lebanon' State in 1920 by the French, a large part of present Lebanon, excluding Mount Lebanon and some coastal areas, was part of Syria. Naturally, France's action was not applauded in Syria. The King-Crane Commission, sent to Syria and Palestine in 1919 by President Wilson, reported that a majority of Syrians opposed separate status for Lebanon and, at most, would accept autonomy for Maronite Mount Lebanon within a Syrian State. [62] When Lebanon became independent in 1943, Syria would gladly have undone the handiwork of French colonialism on its western borders. The

[60a] Kerr, 'Syrian Intervention', pp.17-19.

[60b] Dawisha, *op.cit.*, pp.101-106.

[61] Lebanon's territory has been a paramount feature of the Syrian State's attitude to its western neighbour since the 1920s. Such irredentist claim to all or part of Lebanon was inspired by nationalist ideologies, Syrian or Arab. The maximalist claim viewed the Syrian and Lebanese states as part of a broader entity 'Sham al Kubra' 'Bilad al Sham'. As for the minimalist, this is based on the belief that the detachment of territory from Syrian provinces in 1920 to create Greater Lebanon was an unjust and unlawful act which ought to be rectified. See A.H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon*, London, Oxford University Press, 1946, *passim*.

[62] The investigating Commission concluded: "In Mt. Lebanon ... the Druzes and the Greek Orthodox desired union with Syria because they were afraid of Maronite domination and also feared France. But so did the Protestants and some other Christians, who sincerely believed in Syrian nationalism ... Finally the Moslems of Mt. Lebanon, like those of Syria proper, desired union". Quoted in Harry N. Howard, *The King-Crane Commission*, Beirut, Khayats, 1963, pp.130-131.

French, however, gave the Syrians no chance to do so; they proclaimed Lebanon's independence shortly ahead of Syria's. In the years that immediately followed, Syria continued to talk about 'reincorporating' Lebanon. But Syrian governments, until the ascendancy of the Assad regime in 1970, were too weak and too entangled in Syria's own domestic turmoil, and they changed too frequently to do more than talk. Lebanon, meanwhile, gained recognition as an independent state and status in the international community; it joined the U.N. and became a founding and active member of the Arab League. With time, Syria gradually came to terms with Lebanon's separate existence, though it never formally accepted its new neighbour. Publicly Syrian governments refrained from making claims to all or parts of Lebanon. Aspiration for the union of Syria and Lebanon were, however, sustained in the doctrine of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, which functioned both in Syria and Lebanon. In addition, advocates of pan-Arab unity, or *qawmiyyah* foresaw the emergence of a larger Arab entity of which Syria and Lebanon would merely constitute two regions.

Lebanon's role as the major base for the Palestinian Resistance raised the stakes still higher for Syria, whose title as champion of the Palestinian cause was integral to its claims to Arab leadership. Although a state of modest size and resources, Syria aspired to become a regional power, and had gained recognition for that status in its immediate Arab environment by the eve of the Lebanese Civil War. Syrian foreign policy, increasingly activist since the consolidation of power by President Hafiz al-Assad in the early 1970s, was bound to regard Lebanon as central to its sphere of influence. Furthermore, Assad made no secret that he coveted Nasser's fallen mantle as champion of Arab nationalism and of the Palestinian cause. It was obvious also that Syria under strong leadership would be able to exert a more decisive influence in Lebanon. Thus, whenever the conflict passed through a critical stage, Syria intervened to mediate and, in so doing, Syria found itself more and more 'sucked' into the Lebanese cauldron that it had, perhaps unintentionally but nonetheless substantially, contributed to bringing to the boil. In the event, as the objectives of the Lebanese parties presented polar dangers of either partition or radicalization of Lebanon, the Syrian leaders dramatically escalated the level of

Syria's commitment in Lebanon, and they did so in response to Syrian policy imperatives, not because of appeals by parties to the Lebanese conflict. [63]

The Syrian Intervention

The outbreak of civil strife in Lebanon presented both opportunities and risks for the Syrian leadership. Successful resolution of the crisis by Syria would enhance its Arab nationalist credentials, increasing its influence over Lebanon and the PLO. An unfavourable outcome to Lebanon's civil conflict, however, would benefit regional rivals at Syria's expense. [64] Although Syria was more intimately acquainted with Lebanon's political circumstances than are many interveners, it was not the only one influential there. In concrete terms, Syria wanted to put an end to the festering conflict as quickly as possible because it feared the situation might be exploited by Israel, Egypt, or some other power for their own ends. The 'Arabization' or 'internationalization' of the conflict was anathema to Syria. [65] In other words, Syria did not see a prolongation of the fighting as serving its own best interests. Moreover, negative repercussions of Lebanese strife could also spill over and disrupt the stability of the Syrian regime.

To forestall such a chain of events, that is partition or the 'arabization' and hence internationalization of the conflict - Syrian President Assad worked with the then Lebanese President Franjieh to arrive at a political compromise. The latter travelled to Damascus on 7 February to crystalize the Syrian proposals before presenting them to the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on 14 February 1976. Certainly Syria's key objective was not to advance the cause of any party in Lebanon's internal strife, but rather to ensure that Lebanon's authority structures were compatible with Syria's interests, and the preservation of the status of the Palestinian Resistance Movement/PLO in Lebanon. What is more, the Syrian leadership believed that the proposed reform plan would be acceptable in resolving the

[63] See Adee I. Dawisha, 'Syria and the Lebanese Crisis', *op.cit.*, and Itamar Rabinovich, 'The Limits of Military Power: Syria's Role', in P.E. Haley and L.W. Snider, eds., *Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues*, Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1979, pp.55-73.

[64] The outbreak, the course, and the outcome of the Lebanese civil war were all influenced by the changes in the system of inter-Arab relations in the early 1970s: primarily the decline in Egypt's position and the concomitant rise in influence of the oil-producing states and Syria. See Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "The New Arab Political Order: Implications for the 1980's", in Malcolm Kerr and El Sayed Yassin (eds.), *Rich and Poor States in the Middle East*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982, pp.319-47.

[65] See A.I. Dawisha, 'Syria and the Lebanese Crisis', *op.cit.*, p.88-91.

Lebanese crisis. [65a]

The Syrian regime was distressed when the leader of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), Kamal Junblatt, refused to accept the plan advanced by Syria for reforming the Lebanese political system. He complained that the Constitutional Document "contained only a few timid" [66] concessions but even these were balanced by a re-affirmation of some traditional customs. Syria realized that its proposals fell short of demands for a radical redistribution of power advanced by the LNM. Nevertheless, as the principal supplier of military assistance to the Movement, Syria expected to exact political compliance. [66a] Even more devastating from the Syrian perspective were unexpected problems in exercising influence over the PLO. The ultimate source of frustration was the stubborn refusal by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to break ranks with the LNM after Syrian-LNM relations went sour. The long standing dependence of the PLO on Syria as its major backer in the Arab World politically and militarily had convinced the Syrians that they could manipulate Arafat's behaviour. [67]

Ostensibly, the Constitutional Document, as proposed, provided for modifications of Lebanese political institutions to favour Lebanon's Muslim majority. The President, Prime Minister, and President of the Chamber of Deputies would continue to be Maronite Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Shi'a Muslim respectively, thus preserving an essential tenet of confessionalism. However, in accordance with the long standing Muslim call for *Musharakah*, or meaningful participation in government, the Prime Minister would be elected by the Parliament, rather than be appointed by the President. The number of deputies in Parliament would be raised from 99 to 110 of whom one-half would be Christian and one-half Muslims. This new distribution would supersede the hitherto traditional six-to-five ratio favouring the Christians, but would not correspond to the country's Muslim majority. In this respect, the Constitutional Document (referred to by some Lebanese as the 'Damascus Agreement') might be

[65a] Kerr, 'Syrian Intervention', *op.cit.*, pp.22-24; Khalidi, 'Conflict and Violence', *op.cit.*, pp.66-67.

[66] See Kamal Junblatt, *I Speak for Lebanon*, London: Zed Press, 1982, p.16.

[66a] Rabinovich, 'Limits of Military Power', *op.cit.*, pp.71-74; Hudson, 'The Palestinian Factor', *op.cit.*, p.273.

[67] This conflict, which had its roots in the longstanding desire of the Syrian regime of President Hafez al-Assad to establish its control over the PLO, had been seriously aggravated by recent quarrels. Among other things, these had to do with the Fahd plan (a stillborn Saudi project for a Middle East settlement named after the then Saudi Crown Prince, drawn up in collaboration with the PLO, but ignoring Damascus), and alleged Fatah backing for domestic enemies of the Assad regime and for opponents of Syria's role in Lebanon. All the specific issues in dispute were symptomatic of a deep malaise in Palestinian-Syrian relations. For a more extensive discussion on this subject, see Rashid Khaledi, "The Assad Regime and the Palestinian Resistance", *Arab Studies Quarterly* (Fall 1984), 6(4), pp.259-266.

considered a written, revised version of the National Pact of 1943. [68]

From the start, however, groups with vested interests were committed to obstructing the political reform plan as envisaged. The first were the establishment leaders and *Za'ims* who benefited from confessionalism and feared a loss of privileges if the system was dismantled. The most positive endorsement of the Syrian proposal came from the pro-establishment coalition - that is the Maronite Christians. Having witnessed the repercussions of Syrian military support for their rivals, Maronite leaders hoped that by embracing the Constitutional Document they would persuade Syria to support them instead. [69] The prime exponent of this view was President Franjeh himself. Traditional Muslim political figures by and large endorsed the Constitutional Document, while stating that they would have preferred more all-encompassing political reforms. [70] The most enthusiastic advocate of the 'Damascus Agreement' was Imam Musa al-Sadr, who emerged during this phase of the war as an outspoken supporter of Syria's policies in Lebanon. Sadr expressed a great deal of optimism and complete satisfaction with the Constitutional Document - a somewhat ironic stance since the accord provided no tangible political or socio-economic benefits to the deprived Shi'a Muslim community. Among prominent Sunni politicians, Prime Minister Rashid Karami actively endorsed the Syrian proposals, Karami had long believed that Syria must play a crucial role in resolving the Lebanese crisis. This, however, was not because of the distinctiveness of the Syrian proposals for reform, whose broad outlines resembled those advocated by many Lebanese politicians. But rather, Karami believed that a Lebanese solution would not be implementable because of the paralysis of the state apparatus and its weakness and fragmentations. For Karami, and his supporters, "there was no alternative to accepting the Syrian intervention to fill the vacuum of authority". [71]

[68] See Walid Khalidi, *op.cit.*, pp.52-53.

[69] On 23 February 1976, the Lebanese Katch/Phalange Party held an emergency meeting and decided to confirm its belief in what it termed 'the Lebanese Framework' and the secularization of the State and announced its support of the Constitutional Document and the Syrian initiative. Even so, the Phalange party nonetheless attacked the Constitutional Document because it gave more clout to the Muslims at the expense of the Maronite interests. See W. Skaf, *Lebanon's War*, Beirut: Dar al-Masseerah, 1977, p.233.

[70] The Constitutional Document was hailed by Syria as the most important event in Lebanon since the National Pact of 1943. However, it came under attack from many quarters. For instance, Saeb Salam and Abdullah Yafi (representing the Sunni Muslim elite) attacked the Constitutional Document as they regarded it as a measure that would consecrate confessionalism. See Skaf, *op.cit.*, p.231.

[71] Cited in *Al-Nahar*, (Beirut Arabic daily), 1 February 1976.

An incipient break between many traditional Muslim politicians and Kamal Junblatt arose as the latter began to express strong reservations about Syrian's diplomatic initiative. Although he had participated, along with prominent Muslim leaders, both in the 'Aramoun Summit' (on 19 January 1976) that solicited Syrian assistance as well as in a subsequent meeting at Aramoun on 30 January with the Syrian delegation to Lebanon, Junblatt's initial posture of welcoming Syrian involvement turned gradually to ambivalence and then to hostility. [71a] This process coincided with changing perceptions of Syria's fidelity in supporting the Lebanese National Movement's stand in the conflict. His attempt to bar the Lebanese Kataeb Party and its allies in the Lebanese Front coalition from any future Lebanese Cabinet, so as to isolate the party from Lebanese politics provoked many parliamentarians. Such a position did not bode well with the Muslim establishment which wanted to leave its option open as regards the Kataeb/Phalange party.

The implications of Junblatt's and the LNM's serious quarrel with the Syrians were far reaching. Largely because of Junblatt's objections, the Constitutional Document was never enacted by the Lebanese Parliament. Moreover, the associated Syrian diplomatic goal of promoting a wider 'National unity' cabinet foundered as discussions came to a stalemate. In domestic terms, the seeds for the attenuation of the Lebanese National Movement were laid when Musa al-Sadr as well as the Lebanese branch of the Syrian Ba'ath Party and the Union of the Forces of the Working People embraced the Syrian initiative. These groups ultimately parted company with Junblatt as his split with Syria deepened. Henceforth, the LNM consisted only of Junblatt's Progressive Socialist Party, the Nasserists — 'Mourabitoun', the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the Communists, and the Lebanese branch of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party. Moreover, Junblatt's shift of attitude toward Syria was eventually mirrored in the position of the Palestinian Movement - PLO.

The Palestinian leadership, while officially welcoming Syrian mediatory efforts from the outside, increasingly shared Junblatt's suspicions of Syrian intent. Syrian annoyance over opposition to the Constitutional Document turned to alarm when the Lebanese Army disintegrated in March. The Lebanese Army (estimated at 19,000 men on the eve of its collapse) splintered into several components

[71a] Dawisha, *op.cit.*, pp.181-182; Salibi, *op.cit.*, p.95.

- on sectarian lines. For the rank and file there were major alternatives to remaining loyal to the Lebanese Army. [72] One was to join Ahmad al-Khatib's Lebanese Arab Army (LAA), which gained control of most of the barracks located primarily in heavily Muslim areas. [73] Another option was to join individual militias, such as Christian Militias led by the Maronite Colonels Antoine Barakat and Fuad Malik. [74] For Syria, the disintegration of the Lebanese Army had profound repercussions. There was no longer any indigenous Lebanese force capable of preserving order, let alone of implementing a comprehensive set of political reforms. Moreover, the disintegration of the army effectively disposed of Syria's reform plan. Lieutenant al-Khatib, dismissed the Constitutional Document because "it does not provide a fundamental solution to the Lebanese crisis and the minor reforms it proposes are not commensurate with the sacrifice that has been made. In any case, the Civil War is not over as neither side has achieved what it wanted." [75]

The Syrians viewed the formation of the LAA and the Ahdab coup attempt as efforts orchestrated by Lebanese politicians (primarily Kamal Junblatt) to subvert Syrian's mediatory efforts. Several analysts confirm that the Lebanese National Movement as well as the PLO were implicated in the military developments of early March. Michael Hudson contends that both the formation of the LAA and the Ahdab coup "enjoy the blessings if not the actual instigation of Al-Fatah". [76] In Walid Khalidi's view, Kamal Junblatt was stalling in negotiations with the Syrian mediatory mission over formation of a unity government "in anticipation of the Arab mutiny". [77] The situation was further complicated by a series of Israeli raids on Lebanese towns and Palestinian refugee camps during the month of April. In so doing, Israel wanted to strengthen the rightist Christian forces' position.

[72] See Walid Khalidi, *op.cit.*, p.67.

[73] Lieutenant Ahmed al Khatib, a Muslim from the Shouf region, announced in January that several units had rallied to the standard of 'The Lebanese Arab Army'. Garrisons, barracks and several crucial artillery positions overlooking the Litani river valley and the Israeli border in South Lebanon followed Lieutenant Khatib's lead. They arrested Maronite commanders, replaced them with Muslims, and at least forty tank crews joined the mutiny with their tanks. Christian units sided with the Maronite militias. Various other groups of officers issued manifestos or declarations calling for reform, and Brigadier General Hanna Said, the Maronite appointed commander-in-chief by President Franjich, offered an amnesty for those rejoining the ranks. It was too late. See John Bulloch, *Death of a Country, The Civil War in Lebanon*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977, pp.155-157.

[74] Khalidi, *op.cit.*, pp.67-68.

[75] Quoted in John Bulloch, *Death of a Country: the Civil War in Lebanon*, *op.cit.*, p.118.

[76] Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Factor in the Lebanese Civil War", *The Middle East Journal*, No.32 (Summer 1978), p.272.

[77] W. Khalidi, *op.cit.*, p.67.

As a consequence, on the domestic level a broad political consensus soon crystallized around the call for Franjeh's resignation. However, Franjeh refused to abide by the resolution, declaring that he was constitutionally empowered to complete his term. Attempting to oblige Franjeh to step down, the LNM forces and units of the LAA launched a joint attack on the Presidential Palace. Under personal duress, President Franjeh appealed to Syria for assistance. Syria responded by striking a bargain with Franjeh, whereby the Lebanese President agreed to the constitutional amendment arranging the early election of his successor, six months before the end of his term in September 1976. In exchange, Syria pledged to use troops at its disposal to protect the President Palace. In carrying out its side of the bargain, Syria drew not only on Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) units already deployed in Beirut, but also on Syrian Army regulars posing as members of *Sa'iqah*, the Syrian sponsored Palestinian guerrilla organization. Despite the efforts of these forces to safeguard the palace, artillery strikes by Kataeb/Phalange forces and the LNM obliged the President to flee, seeking refuge in the Maronite controlled area of Mount Lebanon, north east of Beirut.

The attack on the Presidential Palace was a joint offensive by the LNM and the Lebanese Arab Army (LAA). They were successful in dislodging the Kataeb/Phalange from the long contested hotel area in Beirut, and attacked the heartland of Maronite territory in Mount Lebanon north of Beirut-Damascus highway. This offensive yielded control of important road junctions and partial disarmament of the population, but not direct occupation of the area under attack. [78] Despite evidence of involvement by Palestinian Militiamen in the LNM-LAA military offensive in March 1977, the PLO leadership remained cautious in its public posture. Yasser Arafat attempted to avoid antagonizing Syria unduly, which continued to supply the arms to the anti-establishment forces. Accordingly, Arafat undertook the role of mediator between the LNM and Syria. [79] However, the mediatory mission did not meet with Syrian satisfaction. Until that time, Syria continued to support its traditional allies in Lebanon albeit with diminished enthusiasm. A shift in alignments reflected the Syrian leadership's assessment that Syria's interests no longer coincided with those of the LNM. Thus, when

[78] *Ibid.*, pp.54-55.

[79] *Ibid.*, pp.55; see also M. Hudson, "The Palestinian Factor", *op.cit.*, p.272.

the traditional recipients of Syrian largesse (the Lebanese National Movement and the PLO) refused Syrian diplomatic proposals, they were punished. Acceptance of the Syrian reform plan by the pro-establishment/Lebanese Forces coalition was then rewarded by generous support.

At this stage, Syria's options in Lebanon were closely tied to the outcome of elections for a successor to President Franjieh. [80] The candidates for election, although both Maronite Christian, appealed to different constituencies. Elias Sarkis, narrowly defeated by Franjieh in his candidature for the presidency in 1970, was favoured by the Kataeb and the National Liberal Party as well as by Prime Minister Rashid Karami. By contrast, Raymond Eddé was an early critic of Syria's role in Lebanon, whereas Sarkis was expected to be pliant to Syrian influences. The official Syrian position was that the election of the Lebanese President was an internal Lebanese matter, and Syria would not interfere. [81] However, a Kataeb delegation returning from Damascus noted Syrian support for Sarkis, adding that President Assad was committed to pursuing the Syrian initiative at all costs. For its part, the Palestinian Movement was cautious in its posture toward the presidential election. While its implicit support for Eddé's candidacy was obvious, open confrontation with Syria over the issue was avoided.

Once the election was over, President-elect Sarkis expressed hopes of building the political consensus lacking at the electoral session in Parliament and promised to maintain "Lebanon's sovereignty and its territorial and national integrity". [82] Contending Lebanese groups spelled out terms for co-operation with the Sarkis regime. Spokesmen for the LNM indicated, first, that they would assess Sarkis's commitment to political reform and, in particular, to the abolition of political confessionalism. [83] Second, they insisted that security should be a Lebanese matter, without involvement by any external deterrent force, Syrian or non-Syrian. The Kataeb, by contrast, wanted to pursue the Syrian

[80] Khalidi, *op.cit.*, p.181.

Marius Deeb, *The Lebanese Civil War* New York: Praeger Press, 1980, pp.123-129, p.130. The author suggests that the sense of crisis that had grown up among Syria's leaders by late March 1976 increased substantially when it became clear that President Franjieh would have to step down in May. Syria's leaders thus decided to take a much more active role in determining Lebanese affairs in the summer of 1976 than they had ever done before, both because the civil war appeared to be taking a turn that presented them with a decidedly greater level of perceived threat and because this trend affected Franjieh with whom they had especially close ties. See also Itamar Rabinovich, 'The Limits of Military Power: Syria's Role', in P.E. Hailey and Lewis W. Snider (eds.), *Lebanon in Crisis, op.cit.*, pp.61-62.

[81] Kamal Salibi, *op.cit.*, p.179.

[82] See W. Khalidi, *op.cit.*, pp.193-194.

[83] *Ibid.*

diplomatic initiative and sustain the Syrian-sponsored deterrent force. Hopes generated by the prospect of a new 'national unity' Cabinet soon soured into disillusionment when President Franjeh announced that he did not intend to resign until the formal conclusion of his term of office in September 1976. Syria may have acquiesced in Franjeh's unwillingness to resign, because it benefited indirectly from having a known figure in office and possibly also from having the domestic Lebanese situation unresolved. The LNM coalition and Junblatt, in particular, admonished Franjeh as 'Syria's man' and accused Syria of the wish to delay the resignation of Franjeh, so that they could infiltrate and be everywhere in preparation for stirring up problems into the country. [84]

A new wave of violence broke out. The LNM forces waged a serious battle for the control of the Beirut port, and the struggle for control of Maronite bastions in Mount Lebanon was resumed with active participation by Khatib's Lebanese Arab Army. By then, Syria had recognized its failure to disrupt the alliance between the Palestinian Movement and the LNM. Moreover, at this point, a domestic Lebanese debate surfaced over authorization for the entry of Syrian-sponsored Palestinian forces. In essence, Lebanese politicians were disputing whether Syria's intervention to that point should be viewed as having been invited and, if so, who bore responsibility for issuing the invitation. The debate is highly revealing of shifts in attitude toward Syria's role among the parties to the Lebanese civil strife. One theory advanced by Kamal Junblatt was that Syria had encouraged the Kataeb/Phalange to increase the level of violence in Lebanon so as to provide a pretext for Syria's deepening entanglement. This, however, does not reflect all the picture in that, once President Assad and his advisors decided on the entry of 12,000 Syrian Army troops into Lebanon in the first week of June 1976, it was a move which dramatically contrasted with the tentative nature of Syria's previous commitments in Lebanon. [85]

The immediate precipitant for direct Syrian military engagement was an attack on two Maronite villages in northern Lebanon by 'maverick' units of the Lebanese Arab Army in May 1976. Residents of the villages sent a telegram to President Assad, appealing for Syrian assistance. In a subsequent

[84] See Kamal Junblatt, *op.cit.*, p.18.

[85] See Marius Deeb, *The Lebanese Civil War, op.cit.*, p.130. Syria's leaders, according to Deeb, appear to have refused even to entertain the possibility of a 'military solution' to the fighting in Lebanon as late as 10 March 1976.

justification of Syria's response, Prime Minister Karami suggested that Syria's intervention was "motivated by nationalist and humanist sentiments, in response to the request of a group of citizens who were in a state of despair and fear, prompting them to appeal for assistance to sister Syria". [86] In any event, a fully-fledged debate followed in Lebanon about the propriety of the Syrian intervention, along with speculation over its possible course. Supporters of the intervention argued that it would be limited in goals and duration. The role of the Syrian forces would be confined to preserving security in troubled areas and regulating the entry of weapons into the country. Once security obtained, a round table discussion between domestic Lebanese parties could open the way to a political settlement. Lebanon would then reach an agreement with Syria limiting the duration of the latter's military presence, subject to renewal at the request of the Lebanese authorities and parties to the Lebanese conflict. The most enthusiastic proponents of this view were members of the Maronite coalition, the Lebanese Front endorsed the Syrian intervention without qualification citing statements by Foreign Minister Khaddam reiterating Syrian commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon. Kataeb Party leader Pierre Gemayel called for a "security accord with a Syrian guarantee in preparation for a political solution". [87] For his part, President Franjeh insisted that he did not know beforehand of Syria's plan to intervene, and President-elect Sarkis also denied foreknowledge. Franjeh justified the intervention as a necessary means for implementing the Constitutional Document.

Opponents of the Syrian intervention argued that a Lebanese political solution could not be achieved "under the shadow of the Syrian forces". [88] They viewed the Syrian military pressure as an attempt to impose a 'Pax Syriana', under the guise of implementing the Constitutional Document. The LNM argued that Syria was intent on "a scheme of effective occupation" [89] whose ultimate goal was to achieve the partition of Lebanon, as advocated by the Lebanese Front. The imputation of Syrian designs for partition was articulated most forcefully by Raymond Eddé, the outspoken Maronite critic of Syria's intervention. What Syria really wanted as a result of its intervention, he charged, was to

[86] Khalidi, *op.cit.*, pp.58-59.

[87] Gemayel went on to say that "only Syria has the ability to impose peace", adding that "If the current political efforts failed military action will be the only alternative". See *Al-Amal*, Beirut, September 8, 1976.

[88] *Ibid.*

[89] *Ibid.*

annex the Bekka, Tripoli, and the Akkar (the region north of Tripoli, linking the Lebanese coast to the Bekka) as its ultimate share once Lebanon was partitioned. [90]

While it may be speculated whether the ultimate objective of Syria's intervention was to facilitate a political settlement or to promote partition, its immediate objective was certainly not realized. The Syrians had hoped that their large-scale offensive would deal a crushing blow to the wayward Palestinian Resistance and Lebanese National Movement, to force them to stop contesting Syria's will in Lebanon. [91] Having failed to achieve acquiescence to its preferred political solution by the LNM or to disrupt the alliance between LNM and the Palestinians through political leverage, Syria was determined to pursue the same outcome through coercion. Then, a choice was made by the Syrian leaders, who:

"apparently preferred to resort to military action, at least for a limited further period, rather than accept mediated agreement which would leave them having failed to assert their ascendancy over the leftist Palestinian front in Lebanon, or over what had come to be their own right wing clients.[92]

On 7 June 1976 with the tacit approval of the Lebanese government, the U.S., and Israel, Syria sent 30,000 troops into Lebanon. [93] These troops, supported by hundreds of tanks, routed the progressive forces in a matter of weeks, Syrian troops captured a number of PLO camps in Southern Lebanon and supported Christian forces in their take over of the Palestinian refugee camps near Beirut. The spectacle of Palestinians loyal to Yasser Arafat fighting Palestinians loyal to Hafiz al-Assad alongside Syrian army units prompted recriminations between the PLO leader and Syria. Arafat flatly

[90] Syria's policy of indirect intervention reached a deadlock in January 1976. This was brought about by a major development, namely, the Phalangists and some of their allies, having realized that they could not defend their status quo in the entirety of Lebanon, opted for a partition and the establishment of a virtual Christian state in part of Lebanon. F. Stoakes, 'The Supervigilants: The Lebanese Kata'eb Party as Builder, Surrogate and Defender of the State', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Volume 2 (October, 1975), pp.215-231.

[91] *Ibid.*

[92] See Malcolm Kerr, 'The Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: An Interpretation'. Paper presented at the conference of the Middle East Association, New York, November 1982, pp.16-17.

[93] From the point of view of Damascus, the dangers of American and Israeli reaction could be averted by co-ordinating Syria's moves with the United States and by using Syrian units of the Palestine Liberation Army that would be more palatable to Israel than fully-fledged Syrian army units. On the co-ordination of Syrian policy with the U.S., see John Bulloch, '*Death of a Country*', *op.cit.*, pp.106-109; W.B. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, pp.281-284. For a scathing analysis of U.S. reaction to the 'Syrian constructive role in Lebanon', see *An-Nahar*, Beirut Arabic Daily, January 30, 1976.

charged that Syria was attempting to "liquidate" the Palestinian Movement. [94] Palestinian-LNM bitterness was deepened by the conviction that Syria's intervention had tilted the military balance increasingly in favour of the Christian coalition, thus enabling a new Maronite military offensive. The Kataeb/Phalange and the Chamoun controlled militias launched major attacks on 22 June 1976 directed against Beirut slums controlled by the LNM as well as Palestinian refugee camps. The strategic rationale of the Maronite offensive, as in earlier Beirut attacks, was to remove hostile enclaves impeding communications between East Beirut and Maronite controlled territories to the north and east. [95] For their part, the LNM-Palestinian forces viewed the Maronite campaign as a prelude to partition of the country. [96] Ironically, most of the inhabitants of *Jisr al-Basha*, which fell to its attackers, on 1 July, were Maronite Palestinians. In *Tel al-Za'atar*, which withstood the siege for many more weeks, only 17,000 of the 30,000 inhabitants were Palestinian. Most of the others were Shi'a refugees who had fled from South Lebanon to seek employment in the eastern suburbs of Beirut, which had the highest concentration of light industries in the country. [97] In the upshot, the leaders of the Palestinian-LNM Alliance accused Syria of complicity in the siege of *Jisr al-Basha* and *Tel al-Za'atar*, although much of the evidence cited was indirect. Syrian pressures against the Palestinian and LNM forces in many part of the country drained the latter's energies and potential, preventing them from mounting an effective defence of the camps. Nevertheless, the Phalangist-dominated pro-establishment Christian forces voiced reservations about the extent of Syrian support for their cause. They complained that the Syrian blockade — part of a strategy of attrition against the predominantly Muslim anti-establishment coalition that Syrian policy pursued throughout the country — of arms and supplies to the Palestinian-LNM forces was not as complete as it could have been. They also suspected that Syria was deliberately permitting loopholes in the blockade, so that the military balance would not shift completely in favour of one side, thus compromising Syria's flexibility. [98]

[94] W. Khalidi, *op.cit.*, p.59.

[95] In January 1976, the leaders of the 'Lebanese Front' for example, Suleiman Franjieh, Camille Chamoun and Cherbel Kassis, issued a communiqué in the name of a 'Maronite Summit', declaring that the main conflict in Lebanon was between Lebanese and Palestinians. See *An-Nahar*, (Beirut Arabic Daily), January 14, 1976, p.1.

[96] *Ibid.*

[97] W. Khalidi, *op.cit.*, pp.59-60.

[98] *Ibid.*

As the military balance increasingly favoured the Lebanese Front coalition, a hardening of political positions and escalation of political rhetoric by the Lebanese protagonists occurred. Then, Kataeb/Phalange spokesman asserted that no cease-fire could be achieved unless the Palestinians were disarmed. [99] After the fall of *Jisr al-Basha* refugee camp and success in the Maronite offensives in the north, Bashir Gemayel, military commander of the Kataeb party's forces, called for the "liberation" of all Lebanese territory from the hold of the Palestinian-LNM Alliance. [100] Tony Franjeh, son of the Lebanese President and Commander of Maronite militia men in the north, also called for the "full liberation" of the country. [101] For his part, Kamal Junblatt maintained that the LNM perceived Syria as the main obstacle to national reconciliation in Lebanon. [102] Early in July, he asserted that a cease-fire agreement was only possible if Syria withdrew from Lebanon. [103] Some months later, Junblatt contended that "all doors to an agreement" were closed and that Syria must be confronted by every possible means. [104] The sharpening of Junblatt's antagonism with Syrians was not, however, duplicated by his Palestinian coalition partners. Under extreme duress from the continuing siege of the *Tel al-Za'atar* camp, the Palestinian leadership opted for a more conciliatory course with Damascus.

On 11 July, Yasser Arafat appealed to all Arab countries to engage in mediation efforts. Then, on 22 July, the PLO Executive Committee opened negotiations in Damascus, two days after a new Syrian offensive began against Palestinian-LNM positions in the mountains east of Beirut. Only following negotiations between Syria and the PLO was an ostensible reconciliation reached culminating in a joint communiqué. In addition to an agreement to conclude the fighting, an ambiguous pledge of "non-interference" in Lebanon's internal affairs was included. [105] Palestinians could construe the clause as a call for Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, while Syria could interpret it as an admonition to

[99] For the right wing Kataeb/Phalange, the battler of *Tel al-Za'atar* was waged to end abuses and infractions committed in and around the camp. In the words of Karim Pakradouni — then a member of the Political Bureau of the Kataeb — "... the end of *Tel al-Za'atar* is the end of Palestinian expansionism on Lebanese territory which is nothing else but the application of the Cairo Agreement". See *Monday Morning*, Beirut English Weekly, No. 213, July 12-88, 1976, p.8.

[100] K. Salibi, *op.cit.*, pp.82-87.

[101] *Ibid.*

[102] *Ibid.*

[103] Kamal Junblatt, *op.cit.*, pp.214-215.

[104] *Ibid.*, p.215.

[105] W. Khalidi, *op.cit.*, p.59.

the PLO to cease its alliance. In the wake of such developments, other Arab countries did, however, begin to take an active interest in the fate of the Palestinians and in the overall Lebanese conflict after Syria's massive intervention occurred. Distressed by the pace of Syria's offensive against the LNM and Palestinian forces, Saudi Arabia on 15 October issued a call for a mini summit at its capital, Riyadh, the following day of taking binding decisions. President Assad was persuaded to attend, and a special Saudi plane was sent to bring Yasser Arafat from Lebanon. Lebanese President Sarkis was also invited, as were representatives of Egypt and Kuwait.

This forum then worked out a series of agreements to resolve the Lebanese crisis, which were ratified by a full plenary summit of the Arab League in Cairo on 25 and 26 October 1976. [106] The resolutions of the Riyadh and Cairo summits addressed two central issues - creation of an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) to restore security in Lebanon and elaboration of a framework for Lebanese-Palestinian relations. In the realm of domestic security, the cease-fire accord concluded on 16 October was to be implemented in all areas of confrontation by 21 October. All the Lebanese and Palestinian armed groups were to withdraw to positions occupied before the outbreak of the Civil War, and all heavy weapons were to be confiscated by the Lebanese army. To enforce these security measures, the Arab League decided to transform the 2,500 man peacekeeping force created the previous June into a 30,000 man Arab Deterrent Force (ADF). The ADF would be under the command officially of Lebanese President Sarkis, who would determine the size of Syria's contribution relative to that of other Arab States. In practice, the failure of the Arab League to designate the composition of the ADF at the outset assured continued Syrian predominance. There was a tacit understanding among the Arab leaders and the countries that mattered — Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Kuwait — that the Syrian position had to be accepted and that the 30,000 soldiers of the 'peacekeeping' force called for in the resolution would in fact be the Syrian army then in Lebanon. Of the twenty-one members of the Arab League, only Iraq and Libya failed to join the consensus. [107]

Although the formation of the inter-Arab force might be considered a reversal for the Syrians, in

[106] *Ibid.*, pp.63-64.

[107] Dawisha, *op.cit.*, pp.137-138.

practice this was not so. In the first place, Syrian and Palestinian units - pliable to Syria - were to be assigned to the force, in addition to units recruited from various Arab states. No guidelines were elaborated for the relative size of the Syrian component, nor was a date set for the withdrawal of regular Syrian forces. What happened in practice was that after acceptance of the cease-fire agreement, Syrian soldiers donned white helmets representing a new Pan-Arab function, and only "a smattering of troops from other countries for cosmetic effect" were sent by other Arab states. [108] Furthermore, the allocation of 90 million dollars by the Arab League for the ADF in effect amounted to a subsidy for an enduring Syrian military presence in Lebanon. The Assad regime had narrowly turned a potential disaster into a triumph. The intervention had been unpopular and costly, and it had been made even more expensive by Saudi Arabia's decision to cut off its financial subsidy. But, in the end, nineteen Arab countries accepted the Syrian role and Saudi aid was restored. Assad's prestige in the Arab world had increased and the position of his government at home had also improved. As for Lebanon, the Syrian action had blocked the partition of the country and it had prevented an Israeli invasion of the south. But this was essentially a negative success. Syria had prevented things from getting much worse but it did not appear to have much to offer as to how to make them better. [109]

For a time, the Lebanese civil war was over, but Syria was in Lebanon to stay. From Syria's vantage point, the Arab consensus endorsed its pre-eminence in Lebanon, and the prospects of consolidating Syrian hegemony appeared excellent. Clearly, Syria was not seeking to annex Lebanon — that was an unrealistic and indeed not an advantageous policy goal. None the less Syrian influence might be ensured, without the burden of maintaining a large military presence in Lebanon, by continuing to cultivate a Lebanese clientele and by shaping a pliant central government in Beirut. The pursuit of these goals was likely to meet with success; but it exacted an immediate price that the Assad regime, especially in the midst of a severe domestic crisis, found hard to pay. Then there were other difficulties. The alliance with the Maronite Christian forces was artificial, but another about-face would provoke a conflict with the most important domestic Lebanese force. That coalition of Christian

[108] *Ibid.*, p.67.

[109] Dawisha, *op.cit.*, pp.136-139.

forces, the Syrians knew very well, maintained close ties with Israel whose interests and involvement in Lebanon had already curtailed Syria's freedom of action. [110]

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict in Lebanon presented Syria with yet another dilemma. The Syrian leadership had no desire to prevent the PLO from launching raids against Israel from South Lebanon, but found it increasingly difficult not to react to Israel's pre-emptive and punitive strikes, aerial reconnaissance, and raids into Lebanon. Yet, despite the apparent radicalization and ideological nature of the regime and the chronic state of Syrian-Israeli relations, Syria conducted its contest with Israel in Lebanon with remarkable pragmatism. Syria's and Israel's long-term goals in Lebanon were conflicting. For a brief period in 1976, they both supported the same party, but as a rule they backed rival protagonists in the struggle for Lebanon. In this struggle, Syria, it seemed calculated Israel's interests and capabilities carefully and sought to minimize direct confrontation. On the Israeli side, Menachem Begin, who became Prime Minister in the spring of 1977, was not so schooled in the complexity of Lebanese politics. Nonetheless, he was inclined to see the predicament of the Lebanese Maronite Christians as an extension of Israel's own. [111] After its 1976 intervention, the Syrian army stayed in Lebanon, and it conducted itself in the arbitrary manner of an occupation force. Lebanese Christian militias repeatedly clashed with Syrian army units. Soon the Maronite Christian came to regard Syria as no less a threat than the Palestinians and Muslims. It became increasingly difficult for Israel to tread softly in a Lebanon that after 1970 was the PLO's principal base. Israel was, in fact, in a harsh dilemma. In establishing itself in Lebanon and its autonomy and activity, the PLO took advantage of the Lebanese State's weakened position and contributed to its disintegration. Israel, by staging pre-emptive and punitive raids, reduced PLO pressures on its own border, but played into the hands of those who sought to weaken the State further and transform it into an entity far less acceptable to Israel.

By the winter of 1976 such a transformation appeared imminent. The collapse of the Lebanese state and political system, the ascendancy of the PLO and its Lebanese allies, and the spectre of Syrian

[110] See Itamar Rabinovich, 'Limits of Military Power: Syria's Role', in P.E. Haley and L.W. Snider (eds.), *op.cit.*, pp.55, 71-72.

[111] I. Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon: 1970-1985, op.cit.*, pp.114-120.

intervention persuaded the Begin government that the status quo in Lebanon could be preserved no longer. Thus, assistance to the Christian militias was stepped up and Jerusalem repeatedly warned that Israel would not allow the existence of Maronite Christians to be put in jeopardy. [112] However, for the first two years of his term of office, Begin was absorbed in making a peace with Egypt that culminated with the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in 1979. Furthermore, Israel's preoccupation with the Palestinians in South Lebanon overshadowed interest in the Lebanese crisis as a whole. At the same time, Syria's relations with the PLO gradually improved. In the South, Israel built an elaborate defence system along the Lebanese border, supported Christian militias led by Major Saad Haddad, and time and again struck Palestinian targets in Lebanon. It was generally an effective strategy, but the occasional Palestinian penetration of the defence system was dramatic, even traumatic.

In 1978 blood flowed in more than one war in Lebanon. The 'Syrian-Lebanese War' (in the phraseology of the Lebanese Front/Phalangists, which deliberately provoked it) began on February 6 at Fayadiya army barracks in East Beirut, when a Lebanese officer fired an anti-aircraft gun at a roadblock erected by the predominantly Syrian ADF and killed at least six soldiers. [113]

Enter the Israelis

Some months after the Fayadiya affair, Israel invaded the South of Lebanon. This combined air, sea and ground assault came three days after a Palestinian movement operation inside Israel. On 11 March 1978, Palestinian guerrillas commandeered an Israeli bus filled with Israelis. With a unit of Israel's anti-terrorist police pursuing it, the bus crashed inevitably killing many passengers. This horrifying attack left thirty-seven Israelis dead and eighty wounded, mostly by Israeli police bullets. Much criticism of the police for not trying to rescue the passengers was made in Israel. The incidence of such appalling acts of violence was, however, more a symptom of the protracted conflict than a threat to Israel's security. The Israeli government, nonetheless, found in the attack the pretext and

[112] *Ibid.*, p.119.

[113] The ADF had set up the roadblock upon hearing that the barracks Commander planned to transfer to the Phalangist forces a shipment of newly arrived U.S. military equipment intended for the Lebanese Army. The Fayadiya incident brought to the surface the festering question of the unreformed Lebanese Army. The Commander-in-Chief Boutros Khoury failed to comply with ADF demands for the handover of the officers responsible for the attack on the Syrian soldiers.

justification for a major escalation of its involvement in Lebanon. The Palestinian operation itself was a reply to Israel's ever more aggressive policies in South Lebanon and its highly publicized alliance with Major Saad Haddad's forces, as well as its expansion and speed-up of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and the exclusion of more than 4 million Palestinians from any part in deciding their own future and that of their homeland.

Israel did not long pretend that its invasion was a retaliation for the Palestinian operation. Its objective was to establish a 'security belt' along the border. Some Israeli sources revealed that a military incursion into Lebanon to set up such a belt had been under study for two years. [114] Another objective of the so-called 'Litani Operation' was "to wipe out the Palestinians once and for all". [115] Here Israel failed dismally, but it caused numerous casualties and much destruction and failed to solve the problem. And it did have several important consequences.

The 'Litani Operation' was based on the assumption that the problem of South Lebanon could be solved, or at least neutralized, by destroying the PLO's military strength south of the Litani River without attempting to resolve the larger Lebanese crisis. [116] Nowhere did Israeli forces succeed in breaking Palestinian resistance. The Palestinians — outnumbered roughly fifteen to one and without tanks, heavy anti-aircraft guns, or planes — stood up for six days to an Israeli army equipped with the world's most sophisticated weapons, including cluster bombs. These it used with devastating effect, against, among other places, two Palestinian refugee camps south of Tyre. [117] Prime Minister Begin announced that Israel had achieved its goals, yet Israeli troops were still fighting all along the line. When compelled to withdraw, Palestinian fighters did so successfully, and most succeeded in reaching the north with their heavy weapons intact.

The fight put up by the Palestinians made the Israelis see that the invasion was increasingly "a failure and mistake", [118] and forced them to abandon further military entanglement in Lebanon.

[114] See Abraham R. Wagner, 'Israel', in P. Edward Hailey and Lewis W. Snider, eds., *op.cit.*, p.100.

[115] Ezer Weizmann quoted in *Sunday Times*, London, 19 March 1978.

[116] A.R. Wagner, 'Israel', in P.E. Hailey and L.W. Snider (eds.), *op.cit.*, pp.102-103.

[117] *Ibid.*, p.102.

[118] Ze'ev Schiff, 'Lebanon: Motivations and Interests in Israel's Policy', *Middle East Journal*, 38 (Spring 1984), p.221.

Although Israel conducted an operation of great magnitude, it resisted the temptation to become involved in the conflict that developed between Syria and the Phalange in Beirut. What is more, Israel by then was actively involved with its 'good-fence' policy with the Maronite Christian communities in the South, whereby the latter turned more and more to Israel for military support of all kinds as well as for economic aid. Israel aided the Christians in the north when the Israeli airforce flew warning missions above Beirut, but the Begin government, as mentioned previously, was determined not to be drawn into war with Syria over Lebanon's future. [119]

The Israeli invasion came at a particularly sensitive moment for the Americans. The centre of American Middle East policy had shifted to obtaining a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in which a Soviet role would be excluded. The process was still in its fragile infancy. An Israeli occupation of Lebanon would have brought it to an abrupt halt. Yet the U.S. officials reacted calmly to the Israeli invasion, judging that it "would ultimately make a solution easier". [120] Then U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance dismissed Israel's unauthorized use of American weapons as "a complex question" [121] and Begin's hints that Israeli troops might remain in Lebanon as a matter for "U.S. counselling". [122] Ze'ev Schiff, senior military commentator of the Israel paper, *Ha'arietz*, reported on 21 March 1978:

"There is no doubt the Americans knew about the operation beforehand ... If they had wanted to, they would, undoubtedly, have been able to delay and probably to prevent the operation altogether ... American silence was tantamount to endorsement." [123]

Only when Begin declared his mission accomplished with the occupation of a 'security belt' along the border, did Washington move to allow a UN Security Council resolution demanding an Israeli pullback to the Israel-Lebanon frontier. Washington was concerned that open U.S. compliance with Israel's takeover of the border strip might torpedo Sadat's 'peace efforts'. [124]

[119] *Ibid*, pp.219-224.

[120] *New York Times*, March 16, 1978.

[121] *Ibid*.

[122] Ze'ev Schiff, *op.cit.*, p.223.

[123] Cited in Walid Khalidi, *op.cit.*, p.179.

[124] Any hint of American acquiescence in the occupation by Israel of yet another Arab country would deliver the coup de grace to whatever was left of Sadat's peace efforts. Moreover, Begin had to be disabused of expecting to divert the forthcoming talks with Carter from an overall Middle East settlement to a discussion of the Lebanese situation. See Ze'ev Schiff, 'Lebanon: Motivations and Interests in Israel's Policy', *Middle East Journal*, 38 (Spring 1984), p.223.

Under normal circumstances the activities of the Israeli army south of the *Red Line* [125] had not aroused undue concern in the international community as local reprisals had, in the past, been carried out in a limited and unostentatious manner. However, in this case, it was clearly an overt operation of war, massive in scale and flagrant in style. President Carter reacted swiftly to the events by introducing a resolution in the Security Council which called for the withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and the establishment of an 'interim' United Nations peacekeeping force. Whatever Israel may have felt about the justice of her reprisals against the PLO, diplomatically she was in a weak position. As the proposed U.N. force was not to be stationed in Israel, she could not prevent its deployment, even though it was to be in an area over which she was becoming accustomed to exert an increasing influence. The Begin government was careful not to bring itself into a confrontation attitude which might jeopardise the possibility of a United States-sponsored settlement in the Sinai. [126] A certain amount of pressure may have been applied to the Israelis to accept the U.N. package, for it also mattered a great deal to President Carter that his peace initiative in the Sinai was not undone by the events in Lebanon. [127]

On 19 March 1978, the United States' proposal was adopted - Security Council Resolution 425 by a vote of 12 in favour, with two abstentions - the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. China did not

[125] This was the informal and indirect understanding negotiated in 1976 by the United States between Syria and Israel, which defined the limits of Syria's intervention in Lebanon and made it acceptable to Israel. As such it came to be known in Israeli political parlance as 'the red line' in Lebanon. See Itamar Rabinovitch, "The Limits of Military Power", in P.E. Hailey and L.W. Snider (eds.), *op.cit.*, pp.74-75. For its part, Syria reportedly informed the United States that its forces would refrain from advancing close to the Lebanese-Israeli border and would restrict their operations to the north of the Litani River as much as possible. Although Israel eventually became more flexible in its definition of the 'red line', Israel conveyed warnings through the United States that a major Syrian military presence or large-scale reinfiltration of guerrillas in Southern Lebanon would not be tolerated. See Robert Stookey, 'The United States', in P.E. Hailey and L.W. Snider (eds.), *op.cit.*, pp.238-239.

[126] The main features of the Carter administration's attitude were clear enough by 16 March 1978: a quick end to the latest cycle of violence was necessary "to keep attention focused on the basic problems which produced it". The only solution to these problems lay "in a search for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects". As for Lebanon, its territorial integrity was of fundamental concern to the U.S. An important objective was the extension of the authority of the Lebanese government to southern Lebanon. Arrangements to promote stability there, "including a U.N. role", were being explored. Israel was expected to withdraw "fairly soon". See *New York Times*, 17 and 18 March 1978, p.1.

[127] See Itamar Rabinovich, 'The War for Lebanon 1970-1985', *op.cit.*, p.91. According to Rabinovich, the "... Carter Administration abandoned its original Middle East policy and replaced it with a reluctant endorsement of the Egyptian-Israeli dialogue and peace negotiations, putting aside its dialogue with Syria and its hoped-for dialogue with the Palestinians. But still the Lebanese crisis remained a marginal issue for the United States, completely overshadowed by the Camp David Accords, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and the events in Iran. In the euphoria immediately after the Camp David conference, resolution of the Lebanese crisis was mentioned, but the idea was abandoned as difficulties arose in the Camp David Accords".

participate in the vote. [128] Resolution 425 authorized the then Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to publish his terms of reference for the peacekeeping force of what came to be known as the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). It also stipulated what actions the force was to carry out in Lebanon in a way that amplified Resolution 425 without actually spelling out how these objectives were to be achieved. [129] As such, the UNIFIL's Mandate was to confirm the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, restore international peace and security, and assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. While these negotiations were taking place in New York, calling on governments to provide troop contingents and other support for UNIFIL, the IDF continued their advance northwards. They failed to uproot the PLO from their stronghold in the Tyre pocket, but managed to invest the area as far as the Litani river. The Israeli objective appears to have been twofold. Ostensibly they appeared to have been influenced by the currently expressed views that the area of operations for the anticipated peacekeeping force would correspond to that which was about to be evacuated by the IDF; enlarging the area, they felt, would therefore increase the size of the U.N. buffer zone. [130] More realistically perhaps, this advance to the Litani River gave the Israeli troops a further chance to hunt and destroy as much of the PLO infrastructure before the UNIFIL force took charge and prevented any further Israeli military operations. The Israelis advanced a further 25 kilometres between the promulgation of Resolution 425 and the arrival of the UNIFIL to its area of operations. During their subsequent withdrawal, Israeli military units continued to operate there in spite of the declaration by the U.N. Secretary General to the effect that they had withdrawn.

By late March UNIFIL deployment had commenced and by June the force consisted of some 6,000 personnel recruited from nine countries: Canada, France, Fiji, Iran, Ireland, Nepal, Nigeria, Nor-

[128] Resolution 425 called *inter alia* upon Israel to "withdraw forthwith" from "all Lebanon", and provided for the establishment of a United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon — dubbed UNIFIL. Published in *New York Times*, 20 March 1978.

[129] To this effect Resolution 426 constituted the Security Council's endorsement of Waldheim's recommendation on the implementation of Resolution 425. Waldheim envisaged a two-stage operation. In the first, the U.N. Force would confirm Israel's withdrawal to the international border. Once this was achieved, the force would establish "an area of operation". It would supervise the cessation of hostilities, "control movement", and take measures to restore Lebanese sovereignty. At a preliminary estimate, the force was to be 4000 strong; its initial mandate would be for six months. See *Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 425 (1978)*, S/12611, 19 March 1978.

[130] Alan James, "Painful Peacekeeping: The United Nations in Lebanon 1978-1982, *International Journal*, 38 (Autumn 1983).

way and Senegal. Both the number of personnel and the troop contributing countries have varied over time. As the Israeli forces withdrew in stages, UNIFIL took over the territory occupied during 'Operation Litani'. However, the control over a zone adjacent to the international border was not transferred to UNIFIL, but to Israel's proxy, the local Christian Militia lead by Major Saad Haddad. [131] This enclave split UNIFIL's area of operation in two, leaving the Nepalese and Norwegian infantry battalions in the eastern area, and thus isolated from the others.

The Christian town of Marjayoun, the site of Major Haddad's headquarters, dominated the gap between UNIFIL's eastern and western area of operation. In this way they were able to restrict UNIFIL's freedom of movement by operating road blocks and occasionally ambushing U.N. vehicles. They attacked UNIFIL positions and UNIFIL soldiers were kidnapped and brutally murdered, and there was a general level of violence directed against them.

Once deployed, UNIFIL troops also met with violent resistance from the PLO as the former spent a considerable amount of personnel and energy resisting PLO attempts to re-establish its control in the South of Lebanon. Conversely, the PLO successfully repulsed efforts by the French battalion to extend UNIFIL's area of operation to the Tyre region. The PLO rationale for this reaction was two-fold: first of all they maintained that, under the Cairo Agreement of 1968, they were entitled to remain in the area and, according to their interpretation of it, continue their operations against Israel from South Lebanon; secondly, in the case of the contested locations within UNIFIL's area of operation such as the Tyre pocket, where they had remained throughout the Israeli invasion, they maintained these could not be taken over by UNIFIL in the same way as the rest of the region from the withdrawing Israeli forces. At the end of the day, however, it was eventually agreed that UNIFIL's presence would be confined to areas which had been physically occupied by Israeli troops. As for the armed PLO elements that had held their positions during the Israeli occupation, they would be allowed to stay within UNIFIL's zone of deployment, and to receive non-military supplies. [132] The city of Tyre

[131] When this frontier zone was turned over to Major Haddad's force in June, Israeli military leaders ordered local mayors and Mukhtars to cooperate with him because "he represents the Israeli army". See Abraham R. Wagner, "Israel", in P. Edward Haley and Lewis W. Snider, (eds.), *op.cit.*, p.104.

[132] Alan James, 'Painful Peacekeeping', *op.cit.*, p.620.

remained an armed PLO stronghold, and most of the subsequent PLO attempts at infiltration through UNIFIL lines originated in the Tyre pocket.

Although the initial reaction of the PLO to UNIFIL's arrival was similar to that of the Haddad forces, later the Palestinians proved to be more co-operative and 'rational' in their dealings with the U.N. forces. [133] Having a representative at the United Nations, and being therefore exposed to condemnation and finger-pointing in the international community, the Palestinians were more accountable for their activities than Haddad. Furthermore, Arafat did attempt from time to time to improve his relations with UNIFIL by assuring the former that he would control his infiltrations and liaise more effectively. However, like Haddad, he too suffered from internal pressures. The PLO was also a factional organization and many of the extremists were anti-Arafat, anti-peace, "and tended to be interested in blowing things up". [134] Not surprisingly, the attempts made to set up a liaison system at battalion level with UNIFIL failed to obtain, in part because the Palestinian liaison officers had not the means to restrain their own breakaway factions from behaving in a lawless and violent manner.

From an Israeli point of view, securing its northern frontier was not something which would be easily delegated to a third party, particularly in a sensitive area where there was a history of repeated incursions and attacks. What is more, the PLO, they knew, were likely to acquire long range indirect fire weapons and could target Israel from beyond the UNIFIL area of operations; also they had in the past attacked from the sea. So whatever the efficacy of UNIFIL, troops of the PLO could still strike Israel and in turn the IDF had to be capable of striking back. For this reason the Israelis have, ever since UNIFIL's initial deployment, continuously been at great pains to discredit its credibility so that they can claim that the U.N. presence offers no protection and thereby exercise their moral right to protect themselves. For these reasons the Israelis had taken steps to ensure that they remained entirely in control of their own frontier security by placing Haddad's militia forces as a screen which they could

[133] See Nathan A. Pelevits, *Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from the Sinai and Lebanon*, Boulder: Westview, 1984, p.4, pp.30-32.

[134] Naomi J. Weinberger, 'Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon', *Middle East Journal*, Vol.37, No.3 (Summer 1983), op.cit., p.350.

deploy to their requirements beyond their borders. [135] Thus, the ten-kilometre enclave provided Israel with a zone of action against Palestinian infiltration without incurring international opprobrium for confronting U.N. troops. In effect, however, inability to establish control over its area of operation limited UNIFIL's capacity to deal constructively with PLO armed groups.

As a result of this situation UNIFIL faced continual and controversial problems because political considerations were allowed to override an inadequate and unrealistic mandate. [136] By the time the deployment of UNIFIL was effected the influence of the government in Beirut was restricted to the areas where the central government could also enforce military control. However, as the Army had ceased to be an effective force, this had considerably reduced the government's ability to uphold the law in areas which chose to resist them. Nevertheless, Lebanon was skillfully represented in the U.N. and continued to press for a U.N. solution to her problems. It is possible that in order to make these proposals, Ambassador Ghassan Tuani (for Lebanon) may have inadvertently given the impression that his government and armed forces had more influence in Lebanon than was the case. There was a danger that U.N. troops in South Lebanon would, in reality, become a proxy force, in this case acting to re-establish the government of Lebanon in areas in which they had long since lost control.

In some instances, the sudden arrival of large numbers of well-disciplined international troops in an area of conflict can cause a momentary lull in the tempo of violence which allows the peacekeepers to establish themselves as a credible presence before the local combatants grow accustomed to their arrival and restart hostilities. For UNIFIL there was no such honeymoon period in that there was no law or enforceable mandate which was sufficiently recognized by all the local forces to constitute an authority for UNIFIL's mission and activities in South Lebanon. It was unrealistic to imagine — in view of the inherent weaknesses of the Lebanese Government and the contrasting strength and concentration of the PLO in South Lebanon — that UNIFIL could assist the Sarkis government in ensuring

[135] It also highlighted the problems Israel had in controlling its Lebanese protégé — as the leaders of a small state experienced in the subtleties of patron-client relations (from the other side), the Israeli authorities could appreciate the difficulties of controlling the actions of a seemingly fully dependent client. See Itamar Rabinovich, "The Problem of South Lebanon", in C. Legum and H. Shaked (eds.), *Middle East Contemporary Survey 1978-79*, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980, pp.673-76.

[136] See Brian Urquhart, 'Peacekeeping: A View from the Operation Center', in H. Wiseman, ed., *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*, New York: Pergamon, 1983, p.164.

the return of its effective authority even in the most favourable circumstances. Conversely, the presence of UNIFIL failed to deter Israel and the PLO from attacking each other. On the ground the reasons for this were that the PLO continued their build up outside the UNIFIL zone in the area north of the Litani river. By acquiring long fire weapons, the PLO were able by 1981 to attack Israeli territory from beyond the Force's area of operations; similarly they were able to attack from the sea. These activities could take place in spite of the presence of UNIFIL and they provoked Israeli retaliation which was also carried out without encroaching upon the UNIFIL's zone. Moreover, the Lebanese government was unable to cooperate effectively due to its inherent weakness, and the Israelis were manifestly unco-operative but usually managed to conceal this by the oblique manner in which they brought pressure to bear on UNIFIL. *The PLO, at times, tried to co-operate but their extremists were quite unaccountable.* The most obstructive party in the whole situation was the Haddad-led Militia forces. *If UNIFIL failed to fulfill in its tasks, which were primarily to supervise the Israeli withdrawal and then prevent further violence and restore the Lebanese government, it was because the nuances of the situation was not recognized and the limitations of the mandate itself.*

The Force was given a threefold task. [137] First, it was to confirm the Israeli withdrawal. Formally, this took place over the next three months, but in reality it was incomplete. Secondly, UNIFIL was to restore international peace and security. This large requirement was interpreted to mean that it would do its best to prevent further fighting between Israel and the PLO, and towards this end would try to prevent the Force's area of operation from being used for any hostile activity. [138] And thirdly, it was to help the government of Lebanon re-establish its authority in the area. This last provision was little more than a ritual nod in the direction of the orthodox position that a State's government should be in control of all its territory. In fact, sovereign Lebanon had become a shell within which a plethora of armed elements were asserting themselves. And from an internal perspective the Lebanese government was but one of these. Thus, in practice UNIFIL's chief task was to ensure that it was in control of its area of operation and that armed elements were kept out.

[137] See UN Security Council Resolution 425, 19 March 1978.

[138] See UN Document S/12611, 19 March 1978, para. 2(d).

This was not going to be easy. For UNIFIL, in common with all United Nations forces except Korea, had been set up as a 'peacekeeping' operation. This meant that it was relatively lightly armed, and that these arms were for defensive purposes only. In other words, it was not meant (and was therefore not equipped) to achieve its aims by the threat or use of force. However, the area which it was supposed to control was one which was highly prized by the PLO, most of whose locally-based fighters had been forcibly ejected by the recent Israeli operation. For this very reason the Israelis, on departing, had left what quickly became a puppet militia in the southernmost strip of Lebanon — the 'enclave' was ostensibly controlled by Major Haddad's so called De Facto Forces and later by General Lahad's South Lebanese Army. They made sure that this militia was adequately supplied with weapons. It was intended as a reliable buffer against the PLO, and there was little prospect that UNIFIL would be allowed to deploy effectively in that area.

As it happened, the Force was prevented from deploying in its total area of operations between the Litani River and the Israeli border. Thus in the early months of its life UNIFIL was confronted by a situation which appeared to lack a basic prerequisite for successful peacekeeping — the co-operation of the immediate parties. And even if in time this co-operation proved to be forthcoming, so that UNIFIL was able to create an area of peace in South Lebanon, there were no grounds for thinking that the UN could hand over to a government enjoying nationwide legitimacy and effective authority. In the absence of such a government, a UN withdrawal would almost certainly precipitate a forceful reappearance of the original problem. Thus on the most optimistic view, UNIFIL was in for a long stay. And there were many indications that it would encounter much travail.

From the start, the operational difficulties encountered by UNIFIL in carrying out the terms of its mandate were magnified by the absence of consistent political support and engagement by the mandating authority, namely, the Security Council. The United States, with the concurrence of the other Council members, was chiefly interested in getting Israel out of Lebanon in short order, as the invasion was threatening the Middle East 'peace process', on which the Americans were quietly but determinely embarked. So the Force was quickly set up. In an attempt to emphasise that it should be seen as a short-term measure, and that the underlying problem remained to be dealt with, the word 'interim' was

proposed to be included in the title of the Force. [139] This was accepted; but it was no guarantee against a troublesome longevity. What is more, the United States later on subordinated its support for UNIFIL to its diplomatic priorities in the Middle East and the pursuit of its peacemaking process outside the framework of the United Nations. In fact, the now defunct agreement of May 17, 1983, between Lebanon and Israel, which was negotiated under U.S. auspices, contained significant military concessions to Israel in Southern Lebanon. These concessions were clearly incompatible with UNIFIL control of its assigned area of operation.

The above assessment would seem harsh, most especially to the thousands of troops that made up UNIFIL and the employees of the U.N. who gave their time and, in some cases, their lives to achieve a better situation. Indeed, it must be said that by their presence the immediate area of the Force's area of operation has become a better place in which the local people can live. They are protected from the gratuitous violence and the unsavoury practices of the armed militias. By staying in the area the U.N. troops also provided a base for further U.N. operations in Lebanon to be deployed at short notice. However, it must be said that on the one occasion when there was a requirement for an instant force to be deployed to Beirut, in August and September 1982, there was not a consensus in the Security Council which might have allowed this to happen.

By the spring of 1979, the Sarkis government was under strong Arab and international pressures to carry through military reforms which, among other things, required that the Lebanese Army be restructured without delay, so that it could assure its national responsibilities. [140] This pressure was aimed at compelling President Sarkis to take action against Major Haddad's forces in the border enclave, action he refused to take without parallel action against the PLO. And in early April, as part of an effort to re-establish a symbol of authority in the South, the government sent an army contingent to the area. The Beirut government hoped that the army's presence in the UNIFIL zone would free UNIFIL to move into Haddad's Israeli-controlled enclave, and enhance the Lebanese Army's prestige

[139] Weinberger, *op.cit.*, p.349.

[140] Arab pressures were exercised on behalf of these reforms when the Sudan withdrew 600 troops from the ADF in mid-February; Saudi Arabia took out its 1,200 men in mid-March; the United Arab Emirates, its contingent not long after. Other international pressures emanated from Washington and Paris, which had undertaken to sell the reformed army equipment and weapons.

and morale throughout the country. Syria was an enthusiastic supporter of the idea; the PLO was prepared to tolerate the Army's presence; the Haddad militia was determined to resist the move; and Israel was split on whether or not to support Haddad's forces. The U.S. received firm assurances from Israel that the Lebanese Army would not be molested in its drive south. Yet the first attempt to introduce a Lebanese Army unit, in July-August 1978, was frustrated when the Israelis authorized the unleashing of the Haddad forces against the Army in the town of *Kawkaba*, in the northwestern section of the UNIFIL zone. [141]

It required protracted negotiations to get the Lebanese Army soldiers deployed in the UNIFIL area of operations in April 1979. Yet as the then Lebanese Prime Minister, Salim al-Hoss, pointed out, Israel had only to oppose this arrangement for the Western powers to withdraw their support for the Lebanese initiative, and on 12 April 1979, Israel handed the border strip to Haddad. After receiving this enclave, Haddad proclaimed his independent 'State of Free Lebanon', at the same time attacking the Lebanese army contingent in its push southward by way of the coastal road. This extraordinary reaction was also induced by the Sarkis government's earlier effort to delegitimize his position. Until 1979, despite close co-operation with Israel, Haddad retained his military rank and position, apparently because the Beirut government had seen that as a way of asserting its authority in Southern Lebanon. Eventually, however, the army unit managed nonetheless to push ahead to the town of Tibnine in the UNIFIL zone. There UNIFIL itself was subjected to one of the most violent attacks ever by Haddad's forces. "No one aided us in the UNIFIL zone" Hoss said later. "Major Haddad brought Israeli forces into the enclave which UNIFIL could not repress. The problem of the south demands an international decision which has not been taken." [142] It never was taken. From about the same time, Israeli military operations intensified, climaxing in aerial confrontation between Israeli and Syrian planes in September 1979. UNIFIL was clearly never capable of defeating militarily an Israeli attempt to cross the border. Conversely, by handing over control to the Haddad militia forces, the Israeli army sidestepped neatly this restraint on its activity.

[141] See N. Weinberger, 'Peacekeeping Options', *op.cit.*, pp.352-353.

[142] Quoted in David C. Gordon, *op.cit.*, p.162.

On 26 March 1979, Israel and Egypt signed the Camp David agreement, providing for the return to Egypt of territory in exchange for a peace treaty between the two states. The accord included an autonomy plan for Palestinians, but only for those of the West Bank and Gaza, that is, for less than a third of the Palestinian people, many of whose land Israel had confiscated. This so-called autonomy excluded carefully the right to national self-determination and statehood. It was to be implemented sometime in the future through a step-by-step process, with Israel reserving for itself a decisive veto power over any agreement and the right to demand annexation of the West Bank and Gaza after a five-year transition period. Camp David, in the words of a distinguished Palestinian writer, Fayeze Sayegh, condemned Palestinians "to permanent loss of Palestinian national identity, to permanent exile and statelessness, to permanent separation from one another and from Palestine, to a life without hope and meaning." [143] The accord was to have profound repercussions on Lebanon in the Summer of 1982.

If Israel, PLO, and the Haddad militia forces were the prime movers in the destabilization of South Lebanon, Bashir Gemayel's Phalange masterminded the destabilization of the legal Lebanese State and Elias Sarkis's presidency. This was accomplished even though Gemayel in 1976 had joined with Damascus to make Sarkis President, and in spite of the fact that the Kataeb party traditionally posed as the defender of the existing state and its institutions. By early 1979, however, Christian State-building was proceeding successfully in the area between the Beirut-Damascus highway in central Lebanon and Zghorta in the north. Gemayel's state could already boast its own army, police forces, and judicial, fiscal, and tax systems. His policy throughout this period was one of blocking any and all attempts to reunify state institutions or to extend the authority of the Sarkis government. Moreover, widespread Christian support for Gemayel's actions could not be taken for granted. Christian opposition to the Maronite political right - which has always claimed to speak for all the Christians - was a constant element in every Christian community including the Maronite. [144]

[143] Fayeze A. Sayegh, 'The Camp David Agreement and the Palestine Problem', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 8, No.2 (Winter 1979).

[144] Lebanon's Christians have never been socially or politically homogeneous. The protracted war sharpened the contradiction between the Arabist and universalist vocation of the Greek Orthodox and the anti-Muslim, anti-Arab doctrine of the Lebanese Front Maronites (who are themselves Arabs, although they claim descent from the Phoenicians). Only the Orthodox bourgeoisie of East Beirut have joined the Maronites. The Greek Catholic community split after the outbreak of the civil war; a rightist current remained in East Beirut. But other currents existed, such as the Greek Catholics of Palestinian origin who live in West Beirut, and many of Syrian origin in Zahle and elsewhere. Traditionally, much of the Greek Catholic community has supported the Palestinian cause.

With time, Gemayel and his Phalangist forces sought to expand their mandate and their demographic and territorial bases by becoming the representative authority for all of Lebanese Christians, not just the Maronites. This search was most notably embodied in the establishment of a Phalangist military and political presence in the predominantly Greek Catholic city of Zahle - capital of the Bekka. The move to Zahle and the effort to link it to the Maronite heartland by a direct road beyond Syria's control were interpreted by Syria as an attempt to change the *status quo ante* and to undermine Syria's position in the part of Lebanon most vital to its interests. The Bekka which Syria had controlled directly since 1976, was not contested but was strategically crucial for the Syrians. If Israel ever sought to outflank Syria's main defence line, it could do so either through Northern Jordan or through the Bekka Valley. The latter option was the more likely, and a strong Syrian defensive line there, seemed vital to Syria's military and political leadership. In this regard, Syrian leaders were apprehensive of a road being built to link the Maronite heartland in the north with Israel's protégé Haddad in the south. During the winter of 1980-81, Syria and the Phalange were in conflict over Zahle and the road from Zahle to the Maronite Heartland. They each sought to capture Mount Sanin, at the eastern edge of Mount Lebanon, a position dominating Zahle on one side and affording access toward Jounieh and the Maronite enclave on the other, but in March 1981, the conflict assumed entirely different and ominous dimensions. A Phalangist unit, trying to take control of a strategically located bridge in Zahle, trapped a Syrian unit and inflicted heavy casualties. In April 1981, Syria retaliated by imposing a 90-day siege on Zahle, punctuated with massive sustained shelling of the Phalangist Militia as well as Zahle's civilian population. The severity and ferocity of the Syrian response was undoubtedly a reflection of the gravity of the challenge as perceived in Damascus: apparently not only Zahle and eastern Lebanon but Syria's position and investment throughout Lebanon were at stake. What is more, the Zahle battle made clear that Syria would not permit any further extension of Lebanese Front/Phalange control beyond the traditional enclave, and that Syria was determined to halt any expansion of Israeli influence in Lebanon. At the same time, the various protagonists in Lebanon were already positioning themselves for the 1982 presidential elections and the extension of the Phalange's area of influence could have far-reaching ramifications for its own and Syria's position.

The Syrian regime must have known that this fierce counterattack in Zahle was likely to bring an Israeli reaction. The Begin government, aware of its Phalange ally's plans in Zahle responded when in April 1981 Israeli aircraft shot down two Syrian helicopters harassing Phalange troops still on Mount Sanin. In retaliation the Assad regime installed Soviet SAM - surface-to-air-missiles - in the Bekka Valley, a calculated risk that took into account Syria's friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and American fears that an Israeli attack could touch off an explosion damaging to American interests in the Gulf Oil States, on the other. Israel's threat to destroy the missile batteries prompted President Reagan to dispatch his Special Envoy for the Middle East, Philip Habib, to defuse the crisis. Although Habib failed to remove the missiles from Lebanon, he did persuade the Begin government to refrain from attacking them. [145]

Then, in a diversion from the 'missile crisis', Begin made another incautious pledge. No more Palestinian rockets would fall on Kiryat Shimona. But they soon did. Begin himself provoked the heaviest bombardment that Kiryat Shimona and other northern towns and settlements had ever experienced. On 10 July 1981 Israel launched large-scale air, naval, and artillery attacks against Palestinians and Lebanese in Southern Lebanon. In the escalating cycle of violence, the PLO launched artillery and rocket attacks on Northern Israel ('Galilee') from behind rather than through UNIFIL's area of operation. After some ten days of fighting, the hostilities were brought to an end by the exertions of Philip Habib. He negotiated, with Saudi Arabia's help, a vague and laconic cease-fire - "All hostile activities between Israeli territory and Lebanese territory will cease". [146] The peace was relative rather than absolute. The Bekka 'missile crisis' remained unresolved. The Syrians remained unhappy with the July 1981 cease-fire because it was concluded without Syrian involvement, because it strengthened the PLO's political independence - anathema to Syrian interests - and because it threatened to downgrade the Syrian role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Israelis were even more at odds; the Begin government had been manoeuvred into according *de facto* status to the PLO as a recognized party in a cease-fire deal brought about by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

[145] See Itamar Rabinovich, "The Lebanese Missile Crisis of 1981, in C. Legum and H. Shaked (eds.), *Middle East Contemporary Survey 1980-1981*, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982, *op.cit.*, pp.167-81.

[146] See N. Weinberger, 'Peacekeeping Options', *op.cit.*, p.359.

The July 1981 crisis was an important event in the transition from the earlier phases of the Lebanese conflict to the War of 1982. It demonstrated both the PLO's capacity to launch attacks into the northern part of Israel from its territorial bases in Southern Lebanon, and Israel's policy of pre-emptive and reprisal attacks into Lebanon. The cease-fire did not solve, or even alleviate the problem; it merely froze it. All the parties to conflict realized that when a Palestinian-Israeli conflict re-erupted along the Lebanese-Israeli border it would not be limited. By suspending the issue, the July 1981 cease-fire served also to place it in the context of the broader political developments that shaped the course of events of the Lebanon and Arab-Israeli conflicts during the following year, a year during which the nature and scope of the war which broke out in Lebanon in June 1982 was determined.

In concluding this Chapter, it must be said that it is very difficult to distinguish the national and international perspectives of the struggle over Lebanon from the regional perspectives. This is partly because the regional considerations in the conflict of the Near East are also international considerations. Indeed, the regional generates the international to an extraordinary degree: in the jargon of international relations, an extreme example of sub-system dominance which can be clearly seen in the policies and activities of its neighbours. It has been their rivalry on Lebanese soil which in many ways has contributed to condemning Lebanon to being a passive spectator of its own fate rather than an active participant in the international system.

Yet Lebanon's importance in the international unfolding of events is indisputable. Not only has it long provided the focus for Syrian-Israeli rivalry and the superpower rivalry associated therewith, but it has also been the focal point for the determination of the future of the Palestinians. But all this is only symptomatic of something more deep-rooted. For at the roots of Lebanon's ordeal stand, undoubtedly, the precariousness of the internal consensus among the various sects and the failure of the Lebanese system to accommodate, through political reforms, the underlying social and demographic changes. What is more, the rival Lebanese sect leaders and warlords, despite their proverbial cunning and astuteness, have overplayed their foreign sponsorship to the extent of virtually becoming its hostages, thus compromising their own freedom of action and decision making.

Lebanon is therefore not a country of which the role in international politics can readily be

described. But Lebanon does serve as a conduit from local to regional considerations, from regional to international (certainly in terms of Arab politics) and from the international level to superpower level. Hence, if no account is taken of the external pressures and the concerns of the immediate environment bearing down on Lebanon, neither the intensity nor the course followed by the conflict can be fully grasped. In analytical and practical terms, three major environmental dimensions of the Lebanese conflict for the period 1975 - 1981 can be discerned here. For Lebanon's central conflict has been obscured and complicated during these years by a host of other developments. A main factor that led to the 1975 outbreak was the contradiction between the *raison d'etat* of Lebanon and the *raison de revolution* of the Palestinian Movement; two irreconcilable logics. In fact, the autonomy, for example, extra-territoriality and other privileges, enjoyed by the Palestinians was a central issue in the 1975 - 1976 conflict, and the question of the legitimacy and control of Palestinian guerrilla activity, in and from Lebanon, remained an unresolved problem between 1976 and 1982. Israel has been a major actor throughout the Lebanese crisis. Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian relations, in addition to Israel's policies towards the Lebanese contending parties, have affected to a great extent the course of events in Lebanon amid this period and were to have major repercussions in the War of 1982, as we shall see in the Chapter that follows.

CHAPTER FIVE

The War of 1982 and the Travails of the Multinational Force in Beirut 1982 - 1984

In the summer of 1982 American Marines arrived in Beirut to constitute, with French and Italian contingents, a Multinational Force (MNF) to supervise the evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and thereby forestall an Israeli invasion of the city. The U.S. Special Envoy Philip Habib had also offered a written, albeit ambiguous, undertaking guaranteeing the security of the Palestinian civilians remaining in Beirut. When this mission was effectively accomplished, the Multinational Force departed from Lebanon two weeks ahead of schedule by early September.

Following the departure of the PLO, there was a sense of hope on the part of the Western countries and the Lebanese government that a sovereign, pluralistic and peaceful Lebanon would begin to emerge. This was not to be, as the atmosphere of optimism was shattered with the assassination of Bashir Gemayel — who had been elected President of Lebanon two days before MNF's arrival — on September 14, 1982. The next day, September 15, Israel's Minister of Defence, Ariel Sharon, ordered his troops to enter West Beirut to 'prevent chaos'. Under the cover of Israel's military presence, Christian gunmen entered the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila in West Beirut and systematically massacred men, women and children. In response to an urgent request by the new Lebanese President, Amin Gemayel, the United States, again in collaboration with France and Italy, dispatched a new multinational force to Beirut.

The mandate of the second Multinational Force (MNF II), which eventually came to include a British contingent, was contained in an exchange of notes between the government of Lebanon and the troop contributing countries. It stated that the MNF II was to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide a multinational presence to assist the government of Lebanon and its army in the Beirut area and to facilitate the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty and authority over the capital in order to assure the safety of the population in the area.

As it happened, MNF II became eventually entangled in Lebanon's internecine conflict, although initially most of the protagonists had welcomed the MNF's protective role. In fact, the MNF initially

enjoyed consensus on the assumption that it was coming to interpose between withdrawing foreign forces and protect the refugee camps. Then a spirit of reconciliation seemed to exist in Beirut and Lebanon appeared destined for a second chance. However, the mission proved ultimately disastrous, not least for American aspirations in Lebanon.

Whatever one might argue about the merits or demerits of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the fact is that it crystallized an opportune moment that would be either exploited or squandered. This assertion may seem to be a strange one, considering the tragedies that demarcate the subsequent eighteen months of the Multinational Force's tenure in Lebanon, but the outcome was not predetermined. Quite the contrary, there is good reason to believe that the tragedies might have been avoided, and that 1982 would be remembered as a different sort of watershed than it turned out to be.

The purpose of this Chapter is to examine the process by which the Multinational Force was brought into being. In order to account for the experiment in and actual experience of the Multinational Force it is imperative to give reference to the environment into which it was thrust. This implies a close study of the War of 1982 and the events which were to transform the politics of Lebanon.

Pretexts for the War

On 6 June, 1982, Israel launched its long-threatened invasion of Lebanon [1]. The pretext which Israel invoked for launching 'Operation Peace for Galilee' was the establishment of a *cordon sanitaire* extending 25 miles northward from the Lebanese-Israeli border. From the area Palestinian 'terrorists' would be driven out in order to eliminate the dangers of attacks across the border on Israeli settlements

[1] Books on the War of 1982 by journalists predominate. These include: Dan Bavly and Eliahu Salpeter, *Fire in Beirut: Israel's War in Lebanon with the PLO*, New York: Stein and Day, 1984; John Bullock, *Final Conflict: The War in Lebanon*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977; Tony Clifton and Catherine Levoy, *God Cried*, London: Quartet Books, 1983; Michael Jausen, *The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon*, London: Zed Press, 1982; Amnon Kapeliouk, *Sabra and Shatila: Inquiry into a Massacre*, Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1984; Selim Nassib with Caroline Tisdall, *Beirut: Frontline Story*, London: Pluto Press, 1983; Jonathan Randall, *Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon*, Rev. ed., New York: Vintage Books, 1983; and Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. Several other books are devoted wholly or in part to the war: Richard A. Gabriel, *Operation Peace for Galilee*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1984; Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of Independence through Lebanon*, Rev.ed., New York: Vintage Books, 1984; Raphael Israeli, ed., *PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1983; and Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon 1970-1983*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984. For a full listing, please see bibliography.

in Galilee [2]. Of course, Galilee's demonstrated vulnerability to PLO bombardment during the 1981 fighting placed the issue of the safety of the area's inhabitants foremost in the Israeli public mind, and made this a major political issue. However, 'Operation Peace for Galilee' and the objectives implied by the war's shrewdly chosen code name went far beyond, since those who planned it had set their sights much farther afield. Indeed, Israel's allegation that its invasion aimed at stopping Palestinian guerrilla attacks on Israeli settlements in Galilee was spurious because there were then no guerrilla attacks to be stopped. All guerrilla attacks completely ceased after the cease-fire which was arranged by Ambassador Philip Habib, the U.S. Special Envoy, between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on 24 July, 1981.[3] The PLO scrupulously respected the cease-fire despite a provocative bombing of Palestinian positions on 21 April, 1982. Only after Israeli aircraft again bombed the Palestinians on 9 May, 1982 causing 71 casualties did they retaliate by firing rockets into Galilee. This was the only action taken by the Palestinians subsequent to the cease-fire agreed in 1981 before Israel launched the war of June, 1982. A peaceful border, however, was not the issue pre-occupying Israeli decision-makers. According to Professor Yehoshua Porath, one of Israel's finest historians, the decision to invade:

"resulted from the fact that the cease-fire had held ... Yasser Arafat had succeeded in doing the impossible. He managed an indirect agreement, through American mediation, with Israel and even managed to keep it for a whole year ... this was a disaster for Israel. If the PLO agreed upon and maintained a cease-fire they may in the future agree to a more far-reaching political settlement and maintain that too." [4]

In other words, the PLO was attacked not because it was assaulting Israelis but because it was not assaulting them. It had become respectable and had made large diplomatic gains in the international

[2] The term 'terrorism' is used and abused, both in the Middle East and in other troubled areas elsewhere. Often both sides to a conflict use it simply as an epithet for their enemy. Efforts to make the definition more objective lead in one way or another to identifying 'terrorism' with 'any act of politically-inspired violence which consciously harms unarmed civilians'. By this definition, many attacks carried out by the PLO would certainly be defined as 'terrorist'; so would many of the bombing raids carried out by the Israeli air forces, using means of mass destruction far more powerful than those in the hands of the PLO.

[3] The cease-fire put an end to the massive Israeli military operation against the Palestinians in Beirut and South Lebanon which lasted two weeks in July, 1981 and caused the death of 500 and the wounding of 1,200 civilians as compared with 5 killed and 40 wounded in Israel.

[4] See *Ha'aretz*, 25 June 1982. Also quoted in David Gilmour, *Lebanon: The Fractured Country*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983, p.163.

community. The moderation and responsibility which Yasser Arafat had been showing were an obvious threat to the expansionist aims of Israel's leaders and for that reason the PLO had to be destroyed. For Prime Minister Begin, his fellow ministers, and Israel's senior generals, war was necessary because of three things, only indirectly related to Galilee, which they found intolerable. First, the PLO's exploitation of its commitment to the ceasefire allowed it to pose as a responsible political actor and demand participation in international negotiations. Second, the PLO's ability in July 1981 to defy Israel militarily, in spite of the vast military disparity between them, had enhanced its political and diplomatic stature. Finally, these new realities had an effect on the West Bank and other occupied Palestinian areas the Begin government was committed to annex. [5]

'Operation Peace for Galilee' was in a real sense a war for the future disposition of Palestine, in fact, the next stage of Israel's continuous war against Palestinian nationalism. [6] The pretext of security for Galilee was a fake. Israel did not intend to establish, as it claimed, a *cordon sanitaire* 25 miles from the Lebanese border because the advance of its army (which started on 6 June 1982) did not stop at this line but continued at full speed towards Beirut, bypassing the coastal cities of Tyre and Sidon where it encountered fierce Palestinian resistance, and three days later reaching the outskirts of Beirut where the Palestinian infrastructure was centred; Israel merely called it "the nerve centre of international terrorism". [7] During Israel's siege of West Beirut in July 1982 Begin claimed that "nothing happened in this war that was not planned", [8] and we can, therefore, assume that the professed aim of creating a 25 mile *cordons sanitaire* was untrue, even at the time it was stated. Even when the world was being told about the war's ostensible objective, Israeli officers were being briefed that the real aims were to advance as far north as the Beirut-Damascus road. [9] The Israeli aim was thus not simply to drive back the PLO from the border region, thereby making Galilee 'safe' for its Israeli inhabitants.

[5] See Noam Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians*, Boston, South End Press, 1983, pp.190-198.

[6] See *Report of the International Commission, Israel in Lebanon*, London, Ithaca Press, 1983; Franklin P. Lamb (ed.), *Reason, Not the Need*, Nottingham, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1984; 'The War in Lebanon', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vols 44/55 (1982), Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1984; George W. Ball, *Error and Betrayal in Lebanon*, Washington, Foundation for Middle East Peace, Washington, 1984; S.V. and W.T. Mallison, *Armed Conflict in Lebanon*, Washington, American Educational Trust, 1985.

[7] The words of Israel's Defence Minister Ariel Sharon quoted in *The New York Times*, 8 June, 1982.

[8] *Jerusalem Post*, 27 July 1982.

[9] *Guardian*, 20 October 1982.

It was rather to destroy utterly the PLO, thus making the West Bank and Gaza strip 'safe' for annexation. [10] Shattering both the PLO's military power and its claim to be a major political actor would end the danger that Israel might at some stage be forced to negotiate with it, and thus come to terms with Palestinian nationalism. If the PLO was annihilated in Beirut, argued Ariel Sharon, Israel's Defence Minister, at the time, then the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, who regard the PLO as their sole legitimate representative, would become more amenable to Israel's policy towards them. As Sharon himself explained, "the bigger the blow and the more we damage the PLO infrastructure, the more the Arabs in Judea and Samaria and Gaza will be ready to negotiate with us and establish co-existence" [11] - in other words, the easier Israel would find it to colonize and perhaps annex the occupied territories of Arab Palestine.

From the outset of his premiership - indeed throughout his political life - Menachem Begin has had one consistent aim: to extend Israel's frontiers to include Judea, Samaria - i.e. the West Bank - and the Gaza Strip. He and his supporters see these as included in the Old Testament 'Land of Israel' (Eretz Israel) and Israel's right through the Scriptures which precludes any territorial compromise. After coming to power in 1977, Begin used the negotiating process to establish for Israel (as he saw it) the most favourable conditions to force international acceptance of his intentions. To this end he agreed to return to Egypt all of Israeli-occupied Sinai, seized in the 1967 war, but not part of 'Eretz Israel'. In return, he expected to secure international acquiescence to Israel's absorbing the West Bank and Gaza. In an article in *Foreign Affairs*, the then Israeli Foreign Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, put forward his position on this subject:

"Israel has made it clear at Camp David and since it has a claim to Sovereignty over Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. In order, however, to keep a door open to a solution that will be acceptable to the parties as envisaged at Camp David, Israel has deliberately refrained from exercising its right under this claim." [12]

Professor Yuval Ne'eman, the then leader of the Tehiya ('Renaissance') Party and with a seat in the

[10] See Michael Jansen, *Why Israel Invaded Lebanon*, London, Zed Press, 1982, p.10.

[11] See *The Times*, London, 5 August 1982.

[12] See Yitzhak Shamir, 'Israel's Role in a Changing Middle East', *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1982, p.792.

Begin Cabinet, put the argument more succinctly:

"This [Lebanon] war is in two parts: one is what is happening up there in Lebanon, and the other is to create a situation in which there would be practically nowhere, no place left, to create a Palestinian State ... It is now a matter of working every day and every month to accelerate the Jewish colonization of Judea and Samaria and Gaza." [13]

A second pretext which Israel invoked was that by waging war it was acting in self-defence against attacks made on Jews in Europe. Israel referred to a number of incidents in which Jews had been attacked or killed in Europe and, without any proof, imputed them to the PLO. Even the attempted assassination of Israel's Ambassador in London on 3 June, 1982 was attributed by Israel to the PLO when, in fact, as officially established by the UK Government, it was committed by Palestinians opposed to the PLO. It is fitting to cite here John Reddaway's comment upon this flimsy argument:

"To try to make out that a number of isolated attacks on Jews, by unidentified assailants in Europe, presented such a danger to the State of Israel as to justify its invasion of a neighbouring state in the Middle East is making a mockery of the concept of self-defence". [14]

It is also relevant to refer in this context to the testimony of George W. Ball, former U.S. Under-Secretary of State, given in July, 1982 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

"The invasion of Lebanon was not a defensive action; it was an attempt to crush the only legitimate and recognised Palestinian opposition so that Israel could proceed unchallenged to absorb the occupied area". [15]

In the events that followed, it would soon become clear that Israel's war aims were not only to drive the Palestinians out of South Lebanon, but in addition sought the destruction of the PLO as a military and political force, and the crushing of Palestinian nationalism as only one step in a much grander plan.

[16] In the event, Israel sought also to achieve the following objectives - either set from the outset of

[13] Quoted in Christopher Hitchens, 'Mr Begin's Grand Design', *Spectator*, 28 August 1982; also quoted in *The Observer*, 7 August, 1982.

[14] John Reddaway, 'Israel and Nuremberg, Are Israel's Leaders Guilty of War Crimes?', in *Middle East International*, 16 August 1983, pp.10-13.

[15] See *Middle East International*, 20 August, 1982, p.12.

[16] Israeli Chief of Staff, Rafael Eitan, explicitly asserted on Israeli television that removing the PLO would eliminate the Palestinian problem and allow terms to be dictated to the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. See *The Jerusalem Post*, 24 September 1982 and the comments made by former Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban.

the 'Peace for Galilee' campaign or emerging in the course of it as the Arabs and the international community did so little to oppose it - were threefold:

- (1) to eliminate PLO influence in the West Bank and Gaza in the expectation that, being deprived of PLO support, the Palestinians in the occupied territories would drop their opposition to Israeli rule, submit to the Camp David formula of autonomy and facilitate Israel's annexation of the West Bank and Gaza.
- (2) to expel the PLO, its armed forces and the Palestine refugees from Lebanon. This objective was shared by Israel's phalangist allies.
- (3) to establish in Lebanon a friendly Lebanese Government - which meant a Lebanon dominated by a pro-Israel Maronite Christian government - with which Israel could conclude a peace treaty similar to that which was made with Egypt. [17]

The Camp David accords and the peace treaty with Egypt were significant for Israel in that they were intended to be the first steps towards a peace agreement with other Arab states. This was the war designed to lead to the breakthrough of a peace agreement with Lebanon and put an end to missile attacks on Kiryat Shmona in Northern Galilee; it would change the entire political structure of the Middle East. The attitude was that these objectives would be achieved in a stroke. This was apparent in the Israeli conception that defeating the PLO and Syrian troops in battle would enable Israel to win the war and dictate a 'new order' in Lebanon tantamount to changing the face of the Middle East and the conditions of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Israel's War of 1982 was not undertaken for security, nor in self-defence, nor in retaliation. It was waged in execution of Israel's policy to destroy the PLO and to annihilate the Palestinian National Movement. Michael Jansen pointed out that Israel's aggression in 1982 differed only in degree, not in kind, from earlier Israeli operations against the PLO.[18] In fact, the war was planned several months before it was launched. According to the *New York Times* of 26 February, 1982, Moshe Arens, Israel's

[17] Israel's basic war aims are ably analyzed and documented in Noam Chomsky, *op.cit.*, pp.198-207. Chomsky devotes two Chapters totalling some 260 pages to the 1982 War and its aftermath.

[18] Michael Jansen, *op.cit.*, p.116.

Ambassador in Washington, predicted that Israel would have to take military action in Southern Lebanon and that this would be a matter of time. On 14 August, 1982, Ariel Sharon, Israel's Defence Minister and architect of the war, told the *Jerusalem Post* that he had been planning the operation in Lebanon since he took office in July, 1981. General Rafael Eitan, the Israeli Chief of Staff, disclosed that "the Israeli invasion of Lebanon had been planned to take place in July, 1981 and had been postponed after the cease-fire arranged by Philip Habib, the U.S. Envoy".[19] Jacobo Timerman, a Jewish writer, summarised the position by describing the War of 1982 as "one whose preparation was known to everybody, whose necessity was never demonstrated and whose reasons were fabricated".[20] Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, two leading Israel journalists, have described Israel's war in Lebanon in the following critical terms:

Born of the ambition of one wilful, reckless man,
Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon was anchored in delusion,
propelled by deceit, and bound to end in calamity. [21]

This is the broad context in which to place the Israeli military operations in Lebanon and the War of 1982.

There can be little doubt, from all the evidence, that the optimal Israeli plan was to move swiftly up the coastal route (see Map 2), devastating all resistance along the way, and to smash into West Beirut to finish off the job while the enemy was in disarray and the world too stunned to react. [22] According to some observers, Israeli military did not opt for the strategy of waging war against the civilian population when it realized the high cost of attempting to take West Beirut by storm, which was apparently its original intention.[23] Since the Lebanese army was not a force to be reckoned with,

[19] *Financial Times*, 3 July, 1982.


[20] Jacobo Timerman, *The Longest War*, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1982, p.17.

[21] Z Schiff and Ya'ari, *op.cit.*, p.301.

[22] See Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israel Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of Independence Through Lebanon*, p.345. According to Herzog, former President of Israel and former Chief of Military Intelligence: "The policy laid down was for the forces to advance and reach the final objectives as rapidly as possible. Note also Sharon and Eytan's concern with the slowness of the advance in an article by Amnon Kapeliouk, *Al-Hamishmar*, July 9, 1982. In an August 6, 1982 interview in *Davar* an Israeli officer stated that three brigades backed by nine warships and four squadrons of planes took this long to take complete control of Damour — a town on the environs of Beirut — as resistance reappeared after it was "cleared". He adds that Sharon and Eytan were "constantly and violently shouting that the allotted time was up, and Damour had still not fallen."

[23] For discussion of this question see, *Report of the International Commission*, pp.143-145. The reasons for this are unclear: the most likely is the lack of a cabinet decision to enter the city, combined with a fear of casualties. Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, p.181, argue that the Israeli Cabinet "never ordered or sanctioned the IDF's entry into Beirut".

Map 2. Israel's Lebanese campaign of June 1982, major routes of advance



Source: The Economist, August 1983.

and indeed had cooperated with the Israelis to a certain degree, the task of defending West Beirut fell to some 15,000 fighters loyal to the PLO and its allied forces. These allies included both members of the Lebanese National Movement militias and around 3,000 Syrian troops who had been cut off from their own command during the encirclement, against the combined forces of Israel and its Lebanese Maronite allies which by 13 June, 1982, had completely surrounded West Beirut. An Israeli takeover of the Green line on 2 July drew the noose tighter.

Accordingly, between 10 June and 12 August, 1982 bombardments were carried out with the latest deadly and destructive American weapons: cluster bombs, phosphorus bombs and suction bombs.[24] The bombings were indiscriminate: refugee camps, residential quarters, apartment buildings, schools, air-raid shelters, hospitals and embassies were hit spreading death and destruction everywhere in the city's western sector. To increase the terror, the bombing was accompanied by the dropping of leaflets warning the inhabitants to leave the city to save their lives. The International Commission stated that it considers that the Israeli plan was to terrorise the population, so as to make the situation for the PLO untenable bringing to bear on it the wrath of the population for the horrors of the siege. But although 200,000 of the 500,000 living in West Beirut left, the terror bombing failed to break the spirit of those who remained or the PLO and other defenders.[25] Simultaneously with the terror bombings the Israeli army imposed a blockade on West Beirut: water, foodstuffs, electricity and petrol were cut off. Contrary to all civilised rules, even the entry of medicines, blood and medical equipment for hospitals, and, on certain occasions, that of doctors, surgeons and nurses, was not allowed into West Beirut, and this, despite the protests of the International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations resolutions. A complete famine was avoided by reasons of the few convoys allowed to pass and because the PLO distributed free the foodstuffs, especially flour, taken from its stocks.[26]

[24] For a description of these weapons and their devastating effects, see *Report of the International Commission, Israel in Lebanon*, London, Ithaca Press., 1983, p.153, and pp.229-234; Franklin P. Lamb (ed.), *Reason, Not the Need*, Nottingham, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1984), pp.420-500; Kevin Danaher, 'Israel's Use of Cluster Bombs in Lebanon', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 44/45, (1982), pp.48-et seq. One cluster bomb releases some 600-700 bomblets which can kill every human being in an area the size of a football field.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp.159-160.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp.153-160.

Like the bombardments the blockade affected the civilian population above all. [27] For this reason it was contrary to the laws of war and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 which prohibits the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. The whole world which followed the horrors of the war in the press reports, on radio and television was appalled by Israel's ruthlessness during the siege of Beirut. Dennis Walters, a British MP, expressed the revulsion felt everywhere in a letter to *The Times* (7 August, 1982) in which he said:

"For seven weeks now the Israeli Air Force, equipped with the full and latest might of American air power, has been pouring its high explosives and cluster bombs on military and civilian targets alike while the Israeli artillery and the Navy bombard the city from land and sea. Cruel psychological warfare, involving the cutting of water and electricity, shooting up food convoys and holding up medical supplies, have all been used. Elementary decency and humanity call for immediate action." [28]

The Security Council demanded from Israel on 19 June (resolution 512), 4 July (resolution 513), 29 July (resolution 515) and again on 12 August (resolution 518) the lifting of the blockade on vital facilities, such as water, electricity, food, and medical supplies for the civilian population. Israel, however, flouted those resolutions.

Having achieved most of its military war aims in Lebanon, Israel began looking forward to making the political gains which lay behind the decision to go to war. Right from the start of the invasion, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), ranked fourth in the world by Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, clearly enjoyed overwhelming superiority in men - at the start of the invasion the Israelis had a superiority in numbers of at least four to one and by the end it was at least six to one - arms, and equipment, as well as the advantage of collaboration by sectors of the Lebanese population as well as members of the government. [29] Although the Lebanese cabinet at the start of the invasion called on the army to oppose the aggression by all means at its disposal, Commander-in-Chief Pierre Khoury failed to order

[27] The Beirut newspaper *Al-Nahar* estimated that from the invasion to the end of the siege of Beirut, 17,825 people had been killed, 30,103 wounded in all of Lebanon. According to the Israeli government, Israel had lost 340 dead and some 2,000 wounded. *Al-Nahar*, Beirut Arabic daily, September 2, 1982.

[28] See *The Times*, 7 August 1982

[29] The International Institute for Strategic Studies (I.I.S.S.) ranked Israel as the world's fourth military power, after the U.S., U.S.S.R. and China, from the I.I.S.S. annual reference work, *The Military Balance 1982-1983*, pp.58-59.

the army to resist; it remained in its barracks throughout the invasion. The President, Elias Sarkis, neither protested nor condemned Israel's siege of West Beirut, or its use of weapons of mass destruction to devastate large parts of the capital and to maim and kill hundreds of Lebanese as well as Palestinians. He did not even protest over Israel's occupation of Baabda, the seat of the presidential palace.

With military preponderance clearly in its favour, the Israeli siege of the capital went on inexorably as the backdrop to a period of intensive political activity in which Israel with its stranglehold on West Beirut, and occupation of about one-third of the country, clearly had a powerful bargaining position. Thus, as at every stage in the events of the summer of 1982, it was Israel which made the first move in the political phases of the War (to lay down its terms for a settlement). It also equated its own position in Lebanon with that of the Syrian forces, present in Lebanon by Arab League mandate at Lebanon's request, and the Palestinian forces present in Lebanon under the terms of the Cairo Agreement.[30]

Ideally, what Israel wanted was to have Lebanon south of Beirut controlled by a Phalangist National Army, and a 40 kilometre stretch down to the border guarded by an international force dominated by the Americans, along the lines of the Multinational force in Sinai. Israel was not keen on a United Nations force, believing UNIFIL had not fulfilled its proper function south of the Litani river since it was placed there after the 1978 invasion.[31]

Indeed, implementation of this plan required the prior ouster of the PLO and its fighters from West Beirut. The steadfastness of both its civilian population and its defenders made this no easy task. The Israeli siege caused much suffering, but it did not succeed either in breaking the spirit of West Beirutis or in turning them against the Palestinian and LNM defenders of the city. People were free to leave if and when they wished, and many did so, often only to return in periods of relative calm.[32] Israel's psychological warfare - its mock air attacks, dire warnings and threats in radio broadcasts, and

[30] After clashes between Palestinian fighters and Lebanese security forces in 1969, the Lebanese government and the PLO signed an agreement in Cairo regulating the presence of the Palestinian Resistance in Lebanon. On several occasions before and during the Israel invasion, the Lebanese Government was reported to have abrogated the agreement, but the PLO insists that the agreement still holds.

[31] On UNIFIL, see Chapter four.

[32] Rough estimates of the number who left vary between 100,000 and 200,000 out of a population of 500,000.

in leaflets dropped from planes urging Beirutis to flee or meet certain death - evoked fear among some but, as often as not, derision and scorn. On the whole, West Beirutis met Israeli's all-too-real bombardments from air, sea, and land with fortitude mixed with fatalism. Yet, almost from the start of the invasion the PLO realized its departure would later become an inevitable fact. The PLO's Yasser Arafat, according to Lebanese leaders, was indeed looking for a way out of a strength-sapping siege or all-out, final conflict with the Israeli army. But his public pronouncements were that the PLO would stand and fight. That the PLO was prepared to evacuate Beirut was first formally signalled in a letter Arafat gave to Muslim leaders in Beirut on July 3, 1982. [33] Thereafter, in the long drawn out negotiations and amid the intense fighting, the issues evolved, not over whether the evacuation would take place, but the conditions under which this would occur.

What is more, Lebanese public opinion was volatile and subject to constant shifts. As an example, many Lebanese who were bitterly critical of the PLO before June 1982 fought alongside it against overwhelming odds during the war. From late June on there had been a constant improvement in relations between the PLO and its erstwhile allies, as Lebanese leaders from the then Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan to the Druze leader Walid Junblatt and the Shia leader Nabih Berri accepted that the PLO was willing to leave under certain specific conditions and guarantees. They realized and began to declare publicly, that the delay in obtaining a settlement, and the resulting punishment of Beirut and its population, were the result of the stubbornness of Israel in holding to its demands for virtually complete PLO capitulation. [34] Even so, the poor state of pre-war Palestinian-Lebanese relations had a vital impact on the PLO when the Israeli invasion began and its foes demanded that it leave Lebanon. [35] The Israel invasion did not succeed in annihilating the PLO. As *Newsweek's* Tony Clifton pointed out:

[33] See Thomas L. Friedman, 'Reporter's Notebook', in *The New York Times*, August 20, 1982, p.1; reported also in *Al-Safir*, July 5, 1982.

[34] See, for example, the statements of the then Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan, Saeb Salam, Walid Junblatt, and Nabih Berri on 5 July, *Al-Safir*, July 6, 1982, p.1, the first of many in this regard.

[35] Initial Lebanese reactions, even among the Muslims, to the Israeli invasion were, on the whole, less unfavourable than one might have expected. Journalists reported that most Lebanese wanted the PLO to evacuate Lebanon and catalogued the grievances of many Lebanese who had lived under PLO authority and their disillusionment with the Palestinian cause. David Ignatius, *Wall Street Journal*, June 25, 1982; David Shipley, *New York Times*, July 25, 1982.

The Palestinians ... fought off one of the most powerful armies in the world. I have no doubt having seen the intensity of the bombing and shelling of West Beirut, that the Israelis wanted to get into West Beirut to kill or drag PLO fighters into captivity ... I do not think that Israel spent billions of dollars, sacrificed hundreds of its young men and blackened its name in the civilized world just so that Yasir Arafat and George Habash and their men could fly off as heroes to the capitals of the Arab World. The guerrillas ... did what all the combined Arab armies have never been able to do: they denied Israel its victory. [36]

Although the Palestinians were fighting the strongest army in the Middle East, single-handed, without air power and without any assistance from the Arab States, they rejected Israel's terms. The terms which Israel sought to impose without a cease-fire and under the pressure of fierce bombardment were the laying down by the PLO of its arms and its unconditional surrender. Yasser Arafat declared that the PLO would make of Beirut another Stalingrad. Arafat's declaration was no empty threat. Despite the huge disparity in numbers, weapons and armaments, the Palestinian soldiers displayed exceptional courage in standing up to the Israeli army. Two seasoned Israeli war correspondents who covered the war paid tribute to the Palestinian fighters for their "bravery", for fighting "like tigers to the end", for "their noble stand" which their victors would not deny. They further observed that "the Israeli victors were astounded by the extraordinary valor of their adversaries".[37]

The efficiency, dedication, and elan with which the PLO, the LNM, and other popular organizations worked together to meet the emergencies created by the siege contributed much to the solidarity that developed among the fighters, their active supporters, and the general population. [38] As a result, a remarkable feeling of solidarity developed between them and high morale prevailed throughout the siege. However, because of huge civilian losses and large-scale destruction of Beirut, the Lebanese Government suggested that the PLO withdraw from the city. In the second week of July the PLO agreed with the Lebanese Government to pull out of Beirut subject to agreement on the conditions of withdrawal and subject also to guarantees for the safety of Palestinian civilians remaining in Lebanon.

[36] See Tony Clifton in *Monday Morning*, August 30 - September 5, 1982.

[37] Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *op.cit.*, pp.122, 127, 129, 142.

[38] See Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon 1970-1983*. praises the PLO for its military performance and strategy and states: "The PLO performed quite well in the limited fighting that took place during the siege", p.135, pp.152-154.

Negotiations for PLO withdrawal

Negotiations for the PLO's withdrawal from Beirut began at the outset of the Israeli invasion. They were initiated by US Ambassador Philip Habib who was sent by President Reagan to arrange for the withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut. Such a withdrawal was a basic Israeli demand to which the U.S. had agreed. The negotiations with the PLO were conducted by the Lebanese Government. Since neither the PLO nor Israel would speak directly with the other, indirect negotiations were soon adopted. A two-way negotiating chain was established which ran from the Israelis, through the United States, and the Lebanese government in the persons of the Christian President, Elias Sarkis, and the Sunni Muslim, Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan, to the Joint Forces leadership under PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and then back again. [39] The presence and role of the United States in this chain was to prove of crucial importance to the nature of the final outcome of the negotiations, that is the deployment of MNF.

The negotiations of July and August 1982 were by no means the first instance of contacts between the PLO leadership and the United States government. The two sides had made their first direct contacts with each other in November 1973. [40] In the wake of the Israeli invasion, however, the deterioration of the security situation brought the U.S. embassy in West Beirut to the decision that if it were to continue operation at all, it would have to coordinate with the PLO security apparatus there. The coordination that resulted meant, in effect, that the largest of the PLO member-groups, Yasser Arafat's *El-Fatah*, guaranteed the safety of U.S. installations in West Beirut, in return for a somewhat nebulous *quid pro quo*. [41] Strictly speaking, such coordination did not fall within the definition of 'negotiations'. In any case, the U.S. and the PLO, found they had to deal with each other, albeit indirectly.

[39] See Rashid Khalidi, *Under Siege: PLO Decision-making during the 1982 War*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp.99-131.

[40] For details of these contacts, see H. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* Boston: Little, Brown, Co. 1982, p.503 and pp.624-29: but those contacts came to very little, and in September 1975, the U.S. formally promised the Israeli government that it would not "recognize or negotiate with the PLO, so long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338". See also *International Documents on Palestine*, 1975, Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1978, pp.267-268.

[41] Sami al Banna, 'The Defense of Beirut', *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Spring 1983, pp.110-112.

Throughout the negotiations, both the PLO leaders and their Lebanese Muslim counterparts were acting under the same duress of near-constant Israeli military pressure; but it should be noted that their varied positions resulted in these two groups having widely differing strategy preferences. In view of all this, the overriding interest of the Lebanese Muslims was a speedy resolution of the crisis and restoration of calm to West Beirut, whereas the PLO saw it as in its interest to try to drag out the negotiations, hoping that a change in world public opinion or other factors might lead to marginal improvements in the outcome. In retrospect, this may seem like an exercise in futility, but it did not appear to be so at the time. Past experience taught that most of Israel's wars had ended within a matter of days by an international consensus operating through the United Nations.[42]

Moreover, when confronted with a major Israeli escalation in the past, the PLO almost routinely requested the Arab States, the Soviet Union, the European Community and the non-aligned and Islamic blocs at the United Nations to use their assumed influence to press for United States action to restrain Israel. The Palestinian leaders' expectation that something similar would eventually take place, and therefore that the PLO had only to hold out until then, ultimately proved incorrect; but it was not totally unfounded. It was reinforced by the passage of Security Council resolution 509 late on June 6, the first day of the invasion with the U.S. voting in favour. This demanded that "Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally withdraw to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon", and an immediate halt to hostilities. For this to happen, however, hard decisions would have been necessary in Washington. These the Reagan administration was not willing to take. This at the time was demonstrated when Israel continued its advance, and when the tone of U.S. pronouncements changed perceptibly. [43]

The first signal of this change was a U.S. veto on June 8 of a Security Council draft resolution which would have condemned Israel for non-compliance with Security Council resolution 509, and which stated that sanctions against it would be considered if it did not halt its invasion within six

[42] This was true of the 1956, 1967 and 1973 conflicts, which were halted in this fashion in five, six and eighteen days respectively, as well as of Israel's 1978 invasion of South Lebanon and the 1981 cross-border fighting, both of which lasted for a matter of days (seven and nine respectively).

[43] See Trudy Rubin, 'In topsy-turvy Lebanon, U.S. now wants Israel to stay', *Christian Science Monitor*, 8 June 1983.

hours. [44] All Security Council members except the United States were in favour of this draft. But from this point on, the United Nations was virtually paralyzed by an American refusal to consider any serious measures against Israel. In the upshot, the Reagan administration decided to support Israel, in the apparent hope of utilizing Israel's invasion of Lebanon to achieve U.S. regional objectives, vis-à-vis the PLO, Syria, and the Soviet Union, and in the process to transform the Lebanese internal situation. This position did not change during the war. In a sense, it remained unaltered until the withdrawal of U.S. Marines from Beirut in February 1984. Secretary of State Alexander Haig's description of the war as providing "a historic opportunity to deal with the problem of Lebanon" which created "a fresh opportunity to complete the Camp David peace process", and "opens up extraordinary opportunities for a dynamic American diplomacy throughout the Middle East" [45] summed up the basic attitude toward the situation emerging from Israel's invasion of most leading members of the Reagan Administration, including the President and Haig's successor, George Shultz. In the words of two leading Israeli war correspondents:

"... Israel could not have asked for a better spokesman for its cause than Secretary of State Alexander Haig. Washington - unsolicited, it seemed - was going to do its part by protecting Israel's political flank, giving Menachem Begin good reason to feel that he was standing on solid ground." [46]

The authors report that when Begin made a trip to Washington during the second week of the War, the White House was known to be unhappy that the IDF had entered Beirut. Still Haig insisted on arranging a visit between Begin and President Reagan, advising Begin in advance of the meeting, "Hold out for what you want". As the meeting concluded and the participants took their leave, Haig was seen to give Begin a surreptitious thumbs up sign. [47]

Questions have been raised regarding the role played by the U.S. Government in the War in Lebanon. There exist some disturbing facts. First, there is the question of whether the war was launched by Israel with U.S. encouragement, approval or acquiescence. Ariel Sharon, Israel's Defence

[44] See Security Council Resolution 509, 6 June 1982.

[45] See *Middle East International*, 21 June 1982.

[46] Z. Schiff and E. Ya'ari, *op.cit.*, p.31.

[47] *Ibid.*, p.202.

Minister at the time and the architect of the War, visited Washington from 22 to 27 May, 1982 and, according to a later statement, he disclosed to the U.S. Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, the Israeli plan to invade Lebanon, to destroy the PLO, and to install a strong and friendly government in Beirut which would conclude a peace treaty with Israel. Sharon declared to the press that Haig approved the plan, but the latter denied that he gave his approval. Alexander Haig's denial has been questioned in several quarters. Two Israeli journalists in their book on the War in Lebanon have said that Sharon came out of his meeting with what he considered as a "tacit agreement to a limited military operation".[48] S.V. and W.T. Mallison are highly critical of Alexander Haig's role in the War of 1982 and charge him with making inaccurate statements concerning the War in his book *Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy*. [49] *Newsweek* magazine stated: "Reagan administration officials denounced the invasion in public - but in private, many shared Sharon's goals. Insiders contend that Secretary of State Alexander Haig even gave Sharon a green for the venture - a charge Haig has denied".[50] President Carter has confirmed that the U.S. had advance knowledge of Israel's invasion plan and that "General Haig gave the green light".[51] At a press conference on 30 June, President Reagan denied having given a 'green light' to Israel to attack West Beirut, but he approved of Israeli demands that all PLO forces must leave Lebanon. [52] In any event, whether or not Alexander Haig gave the 'green light' it seems fairly clear that there was, at least, tacit approval by the American administration.

A second disquieting fact is the U.S. supply, and acquiescence in Israel's use of aircraft and weapons (phosphorous, fragmentation, cluster and suction bombs) during the siege of the PLO in Beirut. These weapons were given by the U.S. to Israel for self-defence, not for aggression, devastation and mass slaughter of civilians. Criticism of the U.S. government's failure to stop the slaughter with American weapons has come from many quarters. A Washington attorney, Franklin P. Lamb has

[48] *Ibid.*, p.74.

[49] S.V. and W.T. Mallison, *op.cit.*, pp.83-84.

[50] *Newsweek*, 20 February, 1984.

[51] See Schiff and Ya'ari, *op.cit.*, and Ze'ev Schiff 'The Green Light', *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1983, Volume 50, pp.73-85, for more on war planning and the extent to which prior knowledge of it was widespread in Washington.

[52] See *New York Times*, 1 July 1982.

pointed out that, "The White House, the State Department, the Pentagon and the CIA have all conceded that Israel flagrantly violated U.S. arms laws during its invasion of Lebanon by its use of cluster bombs, not to mention other U.S. arms. Yet, despite these findings, neither the President nor the Congress has acted to enforce the clear requirements of either the 1952 Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement or the 1976 Arms Export Control Act".[53] Former Under-Secretary of State, George W. Ball said in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 1982:

'Our most valuable asset is our standing as a nation and a people committed to justice and humanity, and we diminish ourselves when we allow our weapons [including cluster bombs] to be used in Israel's sanguinary adventure without even a whimper of protest. We are made to appear as an accessory to Israel's brutal invasion - or at least as a nation too weak and irresolute to restrain our client state whose military strength largely derives from our gift of deadly arms and whose economic life depends on the constant blood transfusion of our economic aid'. [54]

Still another disturbing fact was the negative attitude of the U.S. Government at the UN with regard to the War. Although the U.S. concurred with Security Council resolutions that called for Israel's unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon (resolution 509), [55] for respect of the rights of civilians (resolution 512) [56] and for lifting its blockade on vital facilities and supplies to the besieged civilian population (resolutions 513, 512 and 519), [57] on several occasions it adopted a position that differed from the international community and deviated from the principles of the UN Charter:

- It vetoed on 9 June 1982 a Security Council resolution which condemned Israel and called for an immediate cease-fire. [58]
- It vetoed on 26 June a Security Council resolution which called for an Israeli withdrawal. On the same day it voted against General Assembly resolution ES-7/5 which noted that the Security Council had failed to take effective and practical measures to ensure implementation of its resolutions and condemned Israel for its non-compliance. This resolution was

[53] See Franklin P. Lamb (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.433.

[54] See *Middle East International*, 20 August, 1982, p.12.

[55] See Security Council Resolution 509 (1982) (6 June).

[56] See Security Council Resolution 512 (1982) (19 June).

[57] See Security Council Resolution 520 (1982) (10 August).

[58] See Security Council Resolution 509 (1982) (6 June).

adopted on 26 June 1982 by 127 votes to 2 against (Israel and the U.S.) with no abstentions. [59]

- It abstained on 4 August 1982 from Security Council resolution 517 which was adopted by all other members of the Council and which censured Israel for its failure to comply with its previous resolutions. [60]
- It vetoed on 7 August 1982 a Security Council resolution which condemned Israel and called for the imposition of an embargo on supplies of arms to it. [61]

For their part, the PLO had little intention of making things easy for the United States, which they considered responsible in a large part for the severe casualties the Israelis were inflicting upon them. The attitude of the PLO leadership towards the U.S. had long been characterized by the major contradiction that, whereas they craved recognition from the U.S., and American help in realizing their national goal, they also strongly blamed the U.S. for the actions of an Israel which they surmised would have been more pliable without the massive infusion of American arms and money it had received since 1967. [62] From an early stage in their negotiations with the United States, PLO negotiators were preoccupied with securing firm guarantees for the security of the Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in West Beirut who would be left at the mercy of the Israeli army and its Lebanese allies after a PLO evacuation. Concern about this problem was heightened by the harsh behaviour of Israeli forces toward Palestinian civilians in occupied South Lebanon, and the massacres of Druze civilians in the Shouf Mountains in late June by Phalangist forces after the IDF facilitated their entry into the region.

This preoccupation eventually became a central focus of concerns of the PLO leadership. Thus, to achieve this end, the PLO leaders inspired largely by a desire to secure ironclad guarantees from the safety of the PLO civilian population, set about obtaining clear and unequivocal guarantees from Philip Habib, the U.S. special envoy at the time. [63] Although the 'Habib Plan' called for the withdrawal of

[59] See U.N. Document S/15455 (26 June 1982).

[60] See Security Council Resolution 517 (1982) (4 August).

[61] See Security Council Resolution 518 (12 August).

[62] Ball, *op.cit.*, p.49; see also Faisal Hourani, 'Harb al-Shuhur al-thalatha wal-raqm alladhi istahal Shatbahu' [The three-month war and the factor which could not be eliminated]. *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, August, September, October 1982, pp.5-17.

[63] Khalidi, *op.cit.*, p.109.

the PLO's forces and leadership from Beirut, the PLO insisted on certain additional, highly significant provisions. These included prior arrival of guarantees for the security and safety of the Palestinian civilians left behind in the refugee camps. However, this was to be an exceedingly difficult task for many reasons as the subsequent events suggest. One was that the U.S. envoy was being asked to guarantee not the behaviour of his own country, but rather that of its most independent-minded ally, Israel, and of the Phalangist-dominated Lebanese Forces (LF). Neither had a reputation for responsiveness to the pleas of Americans or other good behaviour when the well-being of Palestinian civilians was at stake.

In the minds of those on the Palestinian side throughout the negotiations was the spectre of *Tel Al-Za'atar*. There, after a three months siege, and in spite of the collapse of the camp's defences and the presence on the scene of representatives of the International Red Cross, the Lebanese right-wing militias had perpetrated a large-scale massacre on August 12, 1976. Many hundreds of people had been killed after the fall of the camps, nearly all of them non-combatants.[64] In view of this tragic history, what the Palestinians feared was that after the departure of the PLO forces it would allow these same militias to finish in the refugee camps of Beirut in 1982 what they had started at *Tal al-Za'atar* and other Palestinian camps in 1976. As it happened, guarantees for the Palestinian civilians and camps became the main thing the PLO was seeking after a certain point in the negotiations.

Collapse of Negotiations

As the negotiations for the PLO withdrawal were about to produce agreement, they suffered a severe setback as the Israeli Defence Forces kept threatening to move further into West Beirut if progress was not made quickly, thus putting the United States under increasing pressures. The intensification of the bombing of West Beirut led Saeb Salam, a former Lebanese Prime Minister in charge of negotiations with the PLO, to declare on 31 July that Israel did not want a PLO pull-out, but planned to destroy it as a military and political force. [65] In August, the Israeli forces made their most

[64] For details of the massacre see Randal, *op.cit.*, pp.90-91, p.130; and H. Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp.75-79. Both were present at the fall of the camp.

[65] *Al-Nahar*, Beirut Arabic daily, 31 July 1982.

serious attempt to breach West Beirut's ground defences along several axes. The fact that they were unable to achieve this probably helped to persuade some Israeli cabinet members to lay more stress on reaching a negotiated agreement than they had hitherto (Defence Minister Sharon, however, still reportedly preferred to take the city by force.) [66] Then on August 12 the Israelis kept up an eleven-hour barrage of West Beirut from air, sea and land. [67]

As a result of such massive and indiscriminate bombings, the negotiations for a PLO withdrawal collapsed. Shafiq al-Wassan, the Lebanese Prime Minister, told Philip Habib that talks could not continue under 'the blackmail and pressure' of the Israel raids and Saeb Salam asked Philip Habib 'to go home'. [68] The collapse of the negotiations and the savage bombardments of West Beirut prompted President Reagan to telephone Menachem Begin on 12 August, expressing his 'shock' and 'outrage' at the bombing of West Beirut which he described as a 'holocaust'. President Reagan demanded a halt to the bombing and shelling of West Beirut or else he would call back Philip Habib and cancel the American mediation. The disclosure that President Reagan had accused Israel of a 'holocaust' was made by Prime Minister Begin himself in a press conference during which he declared that he had been 'deeply hurt' by President Reagan in the telephone call of 12 August, in which he had described the intense Israeli bombing of West Beirut by the words: 'This is holocaust'. [69] President Reagan's telephone call to Prime Minister Begin was followed by a White House Statement which said:

"The President expressed his outrage over this latest round of massive military actions and emphasized that Israel's actions halted Ambassador Habib's negotiations for a peaceful resolution of the Beirut Crisis when they were at a point of success. The result has been more needless destruction and bloodshed." [70]

On the same day the U.S. at last joined the fourteen other members of the Security Council in approving resolution 518 which "demanded" strict observance of the Council's resolutions concerning the immediate cessation of all military activities in Lebanon, and particularly, in and around Beirut, the

[66] Schiff and Yaari, *op.cit.*, p.223.

[67] See Carole Collins, 'Chronology of the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, June - August 1982', in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, No. 44/45, Summer/Fall 1982, p.189.

[68] Reported in *Al-Nahar*, Beirut Arabic daily, 16 August 1982.

[69] See *International Herald Tribune*, 30 August, 1982.

[70] *New York Times*, 13 August 1982.

immediate lifting of the food blockade, and Israel's co-operation in the effective deployment of UN observers (whom it had previously prevented from assuming their functions). As a result, a cease-fire came into force on 12 August which allowed the settlement of the final details of the plan for the departure of the PLO from Beirut.

The PLO Withdrawal

After repeated PLO proposals which insisted on definite U.S. guarantees as part of any evacuation accord, the U.S. chief negotiator, Philip Habib, recognized a major hurdle had been cleared, in that the concern of the Palestinians was well founded. The crucial development which persuaded the PLO leadership to support the evacuation agreement was Habib's despatch of two letters to Lebanese Prime Minister Wazzan. In one of these, Habib wrote:

"With reference to our many discussions ... I am pleased to inform you that the government of Israel has assured the United States government that the plan for the departure of the PLO is acceptable. On the basis of these assurances, the United States government is confident that the government of Israel will not interfere with the implementation of this plan for the departure of the PLO leadership, offices and combatants in a manner which will:

- (a) assure the safety of such departing personnel;
- (b) assure the safety of other persons in the area ...

I would also like to assure you that the United States government fully recognizes the importance of these assurances from the government of Israel and that my government will do its utmost to ensure that these assurances are scrupulously observed." [71]

Much of this language was reiterated in the fourth clause of the departure plan, as officially published by the United States on August 20, 1982. That read, in part:

[71] Milton Viorst, 'America's Broken Pledge to the PLO', *The Washington Post*, December 19, 1982, pp.C1-C2; See also *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1982, Washington, Department of State, 1985, p.835.

"4. Safeguards ... Law-abiding Palestinian non-combatants left behind in Beirut, including families of those who have departed, will be subject to Lebanese laws and regulations. The Governments of Lebanon and the United States will provide appropriate guarantees of safety in the following ways ...

The United States will provide its guarantees on the basis of assurances received from the Government of Israel and from the leadership of certain Lebanese groups with which it has been in touch." [72]

On the basis of these assurances, the so-called 'Habib plan' also included a schedule of departure of the PLO to various Arab countries and envisaged the despatch to Beirut of the Multinational Force (MNF I) composed of French, Italian and American forces which would come to Lebanon upon the request of the Lebanese Government. Israel accepted the terms of the Habib plan when they turned out to be perhaps the way to guarantee the evacuation of the PLO and its forces from Beirut - one of its war objectives - without having to break into West Beirut by military force.

Then between 21 August, 1982 and 1 September and under the watchful eyes of American, French and Italian contingents of MNF, some 12,000 Palestinians - according to U.S. counts of actual departure - left Beirut and headed for nine different Arab destinations.[73] Lebanese officials said 14,420 Palestinian fighters had departed from Beirut during the twelve day evacuation. The Habib plan did not address the departure of Syrian and Palestinian forces located in northern Lebanon and the eastern Bekka Valley. An estimated 30,000 Syrian troops and several thousand Palestinian fighters were entrenched there. The last PLO forces left Beirut by sea for Syria on 1 September; U.S. Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger said in Beirut that the role of the U.S. Marines there was "pretty much over". [74] No later than nine days after the departure of the PLO, the Multinational Force hastened to withdraw. The withdrawal was carried out between 10 and 13 September and was opposed by Lebanon because, under the evacuation plan which had been agreed upon, the MNF was expected to remain until 26 September. Thus, in so doing, the MNF unilaterally repudiated the second part of its mission: the protection of Palestinian and other civilians. On the MNF's departure the effective

[72] See the agreement of August 20, 1982, as reproduced in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1982*, Washington, Department of State, 1985 - hereinafter AFPCD, 1982, p.837.

[73] These included 8,300 Palestinian soldiers loyal to the PLO, and 3,600 (pro-Syrian) Palestine Liberation Army.

[74] See *Middle East Journal*, 37 (Winter 1983), p.70.

responsibility for supervising the security of the Palestinian civilians was transferred to the Lebanese Government. However, in some respects it could be argued that the moral responsibility for their welfare still lay with the Multinational Force, in particular the United States. Since the Lebanese Government was evidently unable to exert much influence in Beirut even before the IDF siege, it was expecting a great deal to imagine that their effectiveness would increase during the brief period of MNF1 mission, especially in view of the known hostility of the Christian Militias towards the Palestinians, militias from which the government derived considerable support. This is a subject to which we shall return in the next chapter.

Events Following the PLO Withdrawal and the Departure of the Multinational Force from Beirut

Two days before the Multinational Force's arrival in Beirut, Bashir Gemayel had been elected President of Lebanon in an Israeli stage-managed election as much as that of Elias Sarkis was directed by Syria in 1976. The election on 23 August 1982 took place under the shadow of Israeli guns and against the background of bribery and intimidation by the Phalange. [75]. For a moment it seemed that the ambitious political goals underlying Gemayel's supporters in Israel had pinned great hopes on his election and even prepared the draft of a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel to be signed by the President-elect. [76]

Relations between the President-elect and his Israeli sponsors, however, did not develop smoothly. Once he had assumed the supreme national office Gemayel began to distance himself from Israel. Having ridden to power on the back of the Israeli army, he was anxious to demonstrate his

[75] The election of Bashir Gemayel as President, was highly problematical. Gemayel was elected on the second ballot by fifty-seven votes out of a bare quorum of sixty-two (there were five blank votes) in the military barracks within Israeli-controlled territory in Beirut, with the aid of a minority of Muslim and Druze votes; there remained a question of whether his election would receive national legitimization. Technically the election was legal and constitutional, but as many of the Kataeb 'Phalangist' leader's opponents were quick to insist, it had taken place under the protection of the Israelis and with the use of tactics of bribery and intimidation by the Phalangists. Before the election Muslim leaders meeting at the home of former Prime Minister Saeb Salam had called for a boycott of the election, and after the election they issued a statement that, although it did not exclude accepting the verdict, did refer to the election's "factional, dictatorial and fascist features" and described the election as having taken place while the "national public will was crippled by the Israeli military occupation". Rashid Karami, the veteran Sunnite leader, denounced the election; Walid Junblatt stated, "Lebanon has now entered a huge prison"; and homes and businesses of a number of deputies who had voted for Gemayel were blown up. *Al-Safir*, Beirut Arabic daily, 24 August 1982.

[76] Schiff and Yaari, *op.cit.*, pp.284-287.

independence, to widen his domestic political base and to emphasise the Arab orientation rather than the Israeli orientation of his foreign policy. The rift between the former allies manifested itself during a meeting between Gemayel and Begin held on 2 September in Nahariyya, in northern Israel. While Gemayel preferred the relationship with Israel to remain informal and pragmatic, Begin insisted on full and open normalization and the signing of a formal peace treaty. [77]

The future of Major Saad Haddad and his Israeli-backed militia in southern Lebanon was another major bone of contention. While Gemayel wanted Haddad to present himself for a court martial for desertion from the Lebanese army, Begin made it clear that Israel would not desert her loyal and effective ally and suggested his appointment as the Commander of the south or Chief of Staff of the Lebanese army. [78] Nothing was settled at this meeting, Begin went away complaining about Gemayel's ingratitude and evasiveness while the President-elect went away resentful at being treated like a child and fearful that instead of helping him to impose his authority over the whole country, Israel would consolidate its own grip over the south with the help of Major Haddad. [79] Two days later, Sharon leaked an account of the 'secret meeting' to the press, a furious Bashir Gemayel hastened to declare publicly that only the Lebanese Parliament could decide the question of a treaty. Thereafter, Gemayel started to call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon. Sharon, in turn, threatened in the absence of a peace treaty to establish an Israeli security zone in South Lebanon, in which Saad Haddad would have the leading role. In rejecting the Israeli demands Bashir Gemayel was expressing far more than his own views. He knew all too well that Begin's ultimatum would be clearly unacceptable to the Muslim Lebanese and even to more moderate Phalangists; they were not prepared to be liberated from the Palestinians and Syrians only to submit to the *Diktats* of Israel. What is more, such a peace treaty (were it to be agreed to) would spell economic and political disaster for a Lebanon highly dependent both on its transit trade with the Arab World, and on the sale of its own industrial and agricultural products to Arab countries, as well as on Arab tourism. Among those most adversely affected would be the Maronite community and, in particular, the business and upper class elements.

[77] Schiff and Yaari, *op.cit.*, pp.294-295.

[78] *Ibid.*, p.296.

[79] Bashir Gemayel later complained that he "had been treated like a bell-boy". See M. Jansen, *op.cit.*, p.93.

[80]

On 14 September, the day following the departure of the Multinational Force, Bashir Gemayel, the Phalangist military leader and President-elect of Lebanon, and some thirty of his associates, were killed in an explosion which blew up the Phalangist headquarters in East Beirut. The authors of the deed are unknown. On the evening of the same day, Prime Minister Begin and Defence Minister Sharon took the decision for the immediate entry of the IDF into West Beirut. [81] The decision to occupy West Beirut violated the undertaking given by Israel to observe the cease-fire and also breached the conditions of the agreement for the evacuation of the PLO. On the morning of 15 September the IDF moved into West Beirut and had completely occupied it by the following day, notwithstanding the protests of the Lebanese and U.S. Governments. The IDF, however, did not enter the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, but encircled and sealed them off with troops and tanks. Prime Minister Begin stated that the move had been made to ensure against any breakdown of law and order in the city; but on the same day, President Reagan's official spokesman issued a statement that said that the reported Israeli move, "... is contrary to assurances given to us by the Israelis both in Washington and in Israel. We fully support the Lebanese Government's call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces, which are in clear violation of the cease-fire understanding to which Israel is a party. There is no justification in our view for Israel's continued military presence in West Beirut, and we call for an immediate pullback." [82] On 17 September 1982, the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the Israeli advance into West Beirut and demanded the withdrawal of its forces to 14 September positions. [83] Then Yasser Arafat issued a call from Rome for the return of the three-nation MNF to Beirut. [84]

However, the Israeli forces did not pull back; and from 16 September to 18 September terrible massacres were carried out in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, by Phalangist militiamen who had been brought into the camps under IDF auspices. Thousands of unarmed and defenceless Palestinian

[80] *Ibid.*, pp.96-98.

[81] See *New York Times*, 15 September 1982.

[82] See *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1982 (Washington: Department of State, 1985, p.859).

[83] See U.N. Security Council Resolution 520 (1982) (17 September).

[84] See *New York Times*, 17 September 1982.

refugees - old men, women and children - were butchered in an orgy of savage killing.[85] The precise number of victims of the massacre may never be exactly determined. The International Committee of the Red Cross counted 1,500 at the time, but by 22 September this count had risen to 2,400. On the following day 350 bodies were uncovered so that the total then ascertained had reached 2,750.[86] In an analysis of the Report made by the Israeli Commission of Inquiry, established in September 1982 to inquire into the massacre, [87] the Israeli journalist Amnon Kapeliouk points out that to the number of bodies found after the massacre one should add three categories of victims: (a) those buried in mass graves whose number cannot be ascertained because the Lebanese authorities forbade their opening; (b) those that were buried under the ruins of houses and (c) those that were taken alive to unknown destinations, but never returned. The bodies of some of them were found by the side of roads leading to the Southern parts of Lebanon. Kapeliouk asserts that the number of victims may be 3,000 to 3,500, one quarter of whom were Lebanese while the remainder were Palestinians. He also underscored the admission that "all forces operating inside the camps were under authority of the IDF and acting according to its directions".[88] The Kahan report which was released in February 1983, also placed "indirect responsibility" for the killings on Sharon, criticised Begin and Shamir, and recommended that three senior generals, including Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan, be relieved of their duties. In a debate in the Knesset on 22 September 1982 Sharon admitted that the Israeli Army coordinated the entry of the militias into Sabra and Shatila camps and lit up the camps with flares during the nights of the massacre. [89]

The massacre of Sabra and Shatila was not an act of revenge by the Phalangists against the

[85] On this massacre, see the *Report of the Israeli Commissioner of Inquiry* into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut, 1983, an official translation of which was published in the *Jerusalem Post*, 9 February 1983, which can also be found in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol 47, 1983; *Israel in Lebanon, Report of the International Commission*, Ithaca Press, London, 1983; Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1984; Amnon Kapeliouk, *Sabra et Chatila. Enquete sur un Massacre*, Paris, Seuil, 1982; *The Beirut Massacre*, New York, Press Profile, Claremont Research and Publications, 1984.

[86] See Report of the International Commission, *op.cit.*, p.176.

[87] The Israeli Commission of Inquiry into the Sabra and Shatila massacre was established on 28 September by the Israel Government albeit reluctantly under internal and external pressures. It was composed of Yitzhak Kahan, President of the Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, a justice of the Supreme Court, and Yona Efrat, a retired general. The Commission examined the responsibility of both Israel and individual political and military leaders in respect of the Massacre.

[88] Amnon Kapeliouk, *op.cit.*, pp.92-94.

[89] See *Middle East Journal*, 37 (Winter 1983), p.73.

Palestinian refugees for the assassination of their leader Bashir Gemayel. First, his assassins were not identified and there was no suggestion that the Palestinians were implicated in or had any connection with it. Second, the massacre was planned some months in advance of Gemayel's assassination. The military correspondent of *Haaretz* reported for his paper on 28 September, 1982 that:

... this was not a spontaneous act of vengeance for the murder of Bashir Gemayel, but an operation planned in advance, aimed at effecting a mass exodus by the Palestinians from Beirut and Lebanon ... It appears that for some weeks the Phalange leaders had been known to talk about the need to take action to expel the Palestinians from all of Lebanon. [90]

In fact, there were two motivations for the massacre: one motivation on the part of the Phalangist militiamen, the other motivation on the part of Israel. The Phalangist were opposed to the presence of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and the Phalangist political programme aimed at their elimination from the country. The Israeli Commission of Inquiry (also referred to as the Kahan Commission), states in its report that during the meetings that the heads of Mossad (Israeli secret service) held with Bashir Gemayel, he revealed his intentions to eliminate the Palestinian problem in Lebanon when he came to power - even if that meant resorting to aberrant methods. There was a feeling among experienced Israeli intelligence officers that in the event that the Phalangist had an opportunity to massacre Palestinians, they would take advantage of it.[91] The Israeli Commission therefore rejected the plea that Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Begin did not foresee the danger of a massacre of Palestinians. Knowing all this, the IDF and Mossad planned with the Phalangists the 'purification' operation in the camps and co-operated in its execution.[92]

On the other hand, there existed a motivation for the massacre on the part of Israel. Whereas resort to massacre of the Palestinians as a means of causing their exodus from Lebanon was simply a statement of intention on the part of the Phalangists before the Sabra and Shatila, in the case of certain Israeli leaders resort to massacre of the Palestinians was a policy which was successfully pursued from 1948. The International Commission of Inquiry stated:

[90] See *The Beirut Massacre*, New York, Press Profile, Claremont Research and Publications, 1984, p.32.

[91] See the *Report of the Israeli Commission of Inquiry*, *op.cit.*, p.4.

[92] See *Report of the International Commission*, *op.cit.*, p.170.

The Commission can also not overlook the extent to which Israeli participation in prior massacres directed against Palestinian people creates a most disturbing pattern of a political struggle carried on by means of mass terror directed at the civilians, including women, children and the aged. [93]

Thus Kapeliouk wrote: 'A small massacre to frighten the Palestinians and lead them to escape from Lebanon; a new Deir Yassin, this time by Phalangists as surrogates'.[94] Terror had led to the exodus of a large number of Palestinians in 1948. Even had there been "2,000 terrorists" (read Palestinian), as Israel and its phalangists allies pretended, their presence would not have justified Israel's entry into West Beirut and the camps in flagrant violation of the Habib agreement. When the news of the massacre spread worldwide and it became known that Israel had authorised the entry of the killers into the Sabra and Shatila camps, there was universal indignation and a demand for Begin's resignation. The Israeli authorities then sought to smother the scandal by a blatant distortion of the facts. A communiqué issued by the Israeli Cabinet on 20 September indignantly declared that the charges made against Israel's forces were without foundation and that the government rejected them "with contempt that they deserve".[95] The communiqué also alleged that the 'terrorists' (read Palestinians) had violated the evacuation agreement by leaving 2,000 'terrorists' behind.

There were, in fact, no 'terrorists', no military personnel whatsoever in the camps, as both Israeli and Phalangists leaders knew. [96] Had PLO forces remained, the Phalangists and the IDF might not have dared to carry out such ghastly and deplorable acts. The allegation that 2,000 PLO men were left behind in the camps was rejected by Lebanese Prime Minister Shafiq Al-Wazzan who is quoted by the *Washington Post* on 18 September as saying that Israel's allegation, specifically those of Defence Minister Sharon, about PLO guerrillas remaining was "a disingenuous excuse to justify the invasion he had already planned".[97] Moreover, the allegation must also be rejected on the basis of simple logic. If there were any truth in the suggestion that 2,000 PLO fighters were left in the camps it is unbelievable

[93] *Ibid.*, pp.182-183.

[94] See *Le Monde Diplomatique*, June 1983, p.21.

[95] The Israeli Cabinet's communiqué was run as a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* and was published in other media, for example, *The Times* of 20 September, 1982.

[96] See Schiff and Ya'ari, *op.cit.*, p.251.

[97] See *Washington Post*, 18 September, 1982.

and incongruous that Israel would send 150 Lebanese militiamen 'to mop them up', particularly after the PLO fighters had resisted successfully for over two months the onslaught and the might of the entire Israeli army. Such logic is confirmed by the International Commission's findings which stated that:

"There was absolutely no resistance to the massacres ... The militiamen suffered virtually no casualties in their execution of the massacres ... there were no signs of even the slightest resistance ... an Oxfam field worker cites a sporting pellet gun lying beside the corpse of a young boy as epitomising the total defenseless of the camps population". [98]

A combination of circumstances heightened the impact of this ghastly event. World attention was already focussed on Beirut. Intrepid journalists and TV newsmen brought the horror of the massacre into every home during the weekend of 18 and 19 September when the public had time to watch and react. The initiative to respond to the events in Beirut lay with the Americans; they enjoyed the closest relationship with the Israelis, they had provided the diplomatic vehicle in the negotiations for the withdrawal of the PLO and had the independent means to deploy troops swiftly into the theatre. The option to deploy a U.N. force to Beirut was never seriously considered by the State Department. The current opinion at that time was fairly unconvinced of the U.N.'s ability to make an impact on the situation. This attitude was reinforced by Israel's dismissive attitude towards UNIFIL; the Pentagon on the other hand, emphasised its ability to meet the demand for an instant force in Beirut. Nevertheless, the concept of deploying a U.N. force,[99] constituted from elements of UNIFIL, was encouraged by the Soviet Union and tactically agreed to by the Lebanese until 19 September. On 20 September, Lawrence Eagleburger, U.S. State Department's Under-secretary for political affairs, announced that the Israelis and the Lebanese (in spite of Lebanon's position the day before) were unwilling to support a U.N. solution. On the same day, President Reagan announced to the nation his intention to deploy the United States Marines as part of a Multinational force to include contingents from France and Italy. According to Geoffrey Kemp, former National Security adviser to President Reagan, "there was little

[98] See *Report of the International Commission, op.cit.*, p.170, p.178.

[99] United Nations Security Council Resolution 521, 19 September 1982, authorized the Secretary General to explore this possibility.

discussion or argument about this decision. In an emotional and reactive response to a tragic event, influenced by the feeling that the U.S. had assumed responsibility for the safety of the Palestinians and that our friends the Israelis had allowed the worst to happen ... sending back the MNF was the least we could do".[100] In his emotional address, President Reagan told the nation, "First and foremost, we seek the restoration of a strong and stable central government in that country brought into being by orderly and constitutional processes", and later, "peace in Beirut is only a first step, together with the people of Lebanon, we seek the removal of all foreign military forces from that country".[101] This came after President Reagan on 18 September expressed "outrage and revulsion" and "demanded an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces". [102]

The Re-entry of the Multinational Force and the Autumn of Euphoria

Under U.S. pressure Israel withdrew its troops from Beirut on 26 September and three days later at the Lebanese Government's request, the Multinational Force (MNF II) comprising American, French and Italian contingents, returned to Beirut. An Exchange of Notes was made between the Lebanese Government and the United States, France and Italy which conferred some legality to their 'presence' and activities. Although these were carried out bilaterally, each agreement, including later the British one, contained the same mandate which was to:

"... provide an interposition Force at agreed locations and thereby provide a multinational presence to assist the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese Armed Forces in order to establish an environment that would allow the Lebanese Armed Forces to discharge their responsibilities; to help the Lebanese Government to end the violence in the area and assure civilian safety; to facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty over the Beirut area." [103]

No specific functions were assigned in the constitutive instruments. The separate MNF-II contingents were to "carry out appropriate activities" consistent with the mandate. Command authority, however,

[100] Geoffrey Kemp, 'The America Peacekeeping Role in Lebanon, 1982-84'. A presentation made at the NUPI conference at Oslo, Norway, October 1985.

[101] *New York Times*, 21 September 1982.

[102] See U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, 82 (November 1982), p.69.

[103] Exchange of Notes, Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros and Ambassador Robert Dillon, 25 September 1982. Similar agreements were concluded with France, Italy and Britain.

would again be exercised "exclusively" by each contingent. [104] Arrangements for the departure of the MNF-II were left open, though the agreement specified that the force would be needed "only for a limited period to meet the urgent requirements posed by the current situation". [105]

On 21 September, Amin Gemayel, Bashir's elder brother, was elected to the Presidency by the Lebanese Government. When Amin Gemayel took office on September 23, Lebanon was occupied by 30,000 Israeli troops, 70,000 Syrian, and 8,000 PLO guerrillas. Israel controlled all of Lebanon south of Beirut. The Syrians - and the PLO guerrillas under their control - occupied most of the Bekka Valley north of the Beirut-Damascus highway and all of northern Lebanon including Tripoli. The Lebanese government controlled Beirut and the corridor to the north of Jounieh (see Map 3). By then, the Lebanese people had witnessed nearly eight years of warfare that had killed 75,000 of their fellow Lebanese and wounded some 140,000 or more. In 1982 alone, the country had been invaded by Israel, their President-elect had been assassinated, and much of Beirut had been devastated. [106]


Yet, amazingly, there was glimpses of optimism at this time. Amin Gemayel is a Maronite Christian and a Phalangist, but when he took office many Lebanese Muslims as well as Christians believed that he would be willing to adopt a policy that would lead to national reconciliation among the various confessional communities. The stationing of the Multinational Force in Beirut added to the sense of optimism, and many Lebanese particularly welcomed the American presence. Gemayel's first steps as President were generally applauded. In October he travelled to the U.S. to ask for economic aid in rebuilding Lebanon's shattered economy. He also asked for military aid to rebuild the army, so that the government could extend its control to a larger part of the country; and also for American assistance to help get the Syrian and Israeli military presence out of Lebanon.

[104] See *Appendix* for President Reagan's Communication to Congress, 29 September 1982.

[105] See *Appendix*, for example, the Lebanon-United States Exchange of Letters of 25 September 1982.

[106] *The Washington Post*, December 2, 1982. The best figures on wartime casualties is 19,085 killed and 30,302 wounded, according to an official Lebanese police report. No official count of PLO casualties was ever issued; according to the police report, 84% of casualties in Beirut were civilians. Of 1100 combatants killed there, 45.6% were Palestinian, 37.2% Lebanese, 10.1% Syrian, and 7.1% other nationalities.

Map 3. The Divisions of Lebanon in 1982



Source: B.J. Odeh, Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict, London, Zed Books Ltd., 1985.

From this point on, the United States was to play an increasingly active role in Lebanese affairs. [107] American policy then had three major objectives: the first was to obtain the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country; the second was to assist the Gemayel government in the latter's efforts to extend its control throughout the entire country; and the third was to obtain for Israel a secure northern border. To this effect, whilst American diplomats - working closely with the Gemayel government and the Israeli government - toiled to find a formula so as to effect the withdrawal of the foreign troops present in Lebanon, the American marines began their task of helping rebuild the Lebanese army which had never recovered from the 1975-76 civil war. Because the diplomats worked behind closed doors, the Marines were the visible symbol of American efforts to put an end to the continuing tragedy in Lebanon. Their presence convinced many Lebanese that the U.S. was committed to the support of the Gemayel government and this commitment would be enough to end the strife. Ghassen Tuani, Lebanon's ambassador to the U.N. during the eventful years of 1977-1982, explained that the U.S. backed MNF had broad appeal among his country's many political-religious groups. [108] This mood of optimism was also shared by American policymakers once the MNF was redeployed back in Beirut following the outrages at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, President Reagan assured the U.S. Congress that the Marines would be needed "only for a limited time to meet the urgent requirement posed by the current situation." He added, "There is no intention or expectation that the U.S. armed forces will become involved in hostilities".[109] It was widely believed in Washington that the Marines would be home by Christmas that year. [110]

The mood of wary optimism continued throughout the first half of 1983, but not without more violent incidents. The PLO Research Centre in Beirut was blown up by a car bomb in February, killing

[107] From 1976 to 1982 the essence of U.S. policy toward Lebanon did not change and did not give the Lebanese crisis a high priority on the Middle East agenda. As such, the U.S. primarily wanted to prevent an acute crisis that would threaten regional stability of and the success of its policies elsewhere in the Middle East. See R. Stookey, 'The United States', in P.E. Haley and L.W. Snider, eds., *Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues*, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1979, pp.225-48. However, since 1982 subtle changes occurred in Washington's policy toward Lebanon when Reagan came to power. On the evolution of the Reagan Administration on the Lebanese conflict, see essay by Ze'ev Schiff, 'The Green Light', *Foreign Policy* (March 1983), pp.73-85.

[108] Quoted by Naomi John Weinberger in 'Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon', *Middle East Journal* 37 (Summer 1983), p.358.

[109] See *Appendix*, President Reagan's Message to Congress, 29 September, 1982.

[110] Richard W. Nelson, 'Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model', *International Affairs*, 61 (Winter 1984-1985), p.74.

eighteen people. In April the U.S. Embassy was destroyed by another car bomb, killing sixty-three people. And in March 1983, the American marines contingent of the MNF was attacked for the first time, though none were killed. But generally, the level of violence was down and the war-weary Lebanese people used the respite to assess the damage to their country and to begin the rebuilding process. Much of the destruction had been caused during the Israeli invasion, but some dated back to 1975. It was estimated then, that to rebuild all that had been destroyed would cost 18 billion U.S. dollars. [111]

Negotiations for the Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Lebanon

As tentative plans were being made to renew the economy, Lebanese, Israeli and American negotiators sought ways to get all foreign troops out of Lebanon. Philip Habib, President Reagan's special envoy, met with the Lebanese and Israelis for the first time in December of 1982. Each of them had very different priorities. The Lebanese wanted to discuss the withdrawal of the Israeli army and were prepared, as a concession, to make some security arrangements along their mutual border. Withdrawal, however, was not the Israelis' chief concern. They were prepared to go if they got what they asked for, but they were quite happy to stay if the Lebanese proved to be uncooperative. The first thing they wanted was "normalization of relations" between the two countries, if possible a formal peace treaty but if not, something that closely resembled one. Their next concern was to erect a powerful 'security' barrier over Southern Lebanon. The Defence Minister Ariel Sharon demanded that Israel should retain military bases in the area. He also insisted that the Lebanese should put Saad Haddad in charge of the south. [112] The Beirut government rejected both of these suggestions, arguing that Israel had only one legitimate demand, and that was that Lebanon should never again be used as a base for operations against it. Negotiations between the two countries remained barren, however. Their meetings continued throughout the first three months of 1983, but in April Habib notified the President that a number of points were holding up the completion of an agreement. The Reagan Peace Initiative had,

[111] Moreover, the Israeli invasion cost the industrial sector alone 2.2 billion Lebanese pounds and a 70 per cent drop in productivity. Lebanon's economic losses in seven years of civil strife were put at 125 billion Lebanese pounds (roughly \$25 billion) by a Lebanese Trades Union Council study. 'Economic Report', *Al-Safir*, Beirut, June 15, 1984.

[112] Schiff and Yaari, *op.cit.*, pp.284-287.

by then, received a good hearing among most of the Arab countries which led to expectations that the Reagan Plan might work, provided, of course, Lebanon was settled. Until Israel was out of Lebanon, no Arab leader was going to invest political capital in the Plan. The Begin government, meanwhile, had angrily rejected the Reagan Plan, and it became clear that the longer the Lebanon problem lingered on, the less chances for its adoption. [113] Thus, on the issue of Israeli military withdrawal from Lebanon, Israel pursued the tactic of prolonging the haggling over such frivolous questions as the venue of negotiations and the level of negotiations.

More substantively, Israeli negotiators presented a list of demands that were bound to undermine President Gemayel's fragile political consensus, and, most important, infuriate Syrian leaders. The Gemayel government was under pressure from Muslim elements not to grant Israel the special rights it demanded in Southern Lebanon. Such concessions, they contended, would amount to a humiliating and disguised annexation by Israel of the South, which was largely peopled by Shi'a Muslims. Israel spoke repeatedly of 'security arrangements', but what security arrangements could defend the settlements in Northern Galilee and with whom should they be made?

In late April of 1983, President Reagan sent his Secretary of State, George Shultz, to the Middle East to help with the unresolved issues. On the way to Lebanon, Shultz visited Egypt, where he and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak discussed the Reagan Plan, which envisaged a Palestinian homeland affiliated with Jordan. From Egypt, Shultz travelled to Israel and then on to Beirut, arriving there on 28th April, 1983. By May 6 Shultz was able to get an Israeli and Lebanese agreement to the withdrawal accord. Basically, the Agreement which the United States endorsed as a witness "... was a step less than a full peace treaty".[114] In the agreement and its supplements, Israel and Lebanon pledged

[113] President Reagan's 'Peace initiative' of September 1, 1982, called for substantial though not total Israel withdrawal from the occupied territories, (territory that Israel came to control in the wake of the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973) and proposed Palestinian self-government in a West Bank entity linked with Jordan. Reagan's plan was widely perceived as a political and psychological advantage for the Palestinians. For, although rejecting an independent Palestinian State, it also rejected Israeli sovereignty over, or permanent control of, the West Bank and Gaza. Reagan, moreover, called on Israel immediately to halt construction of settlements in the occupied territories. In reply, Israel accelerated its seizure of Palestinian land. By the end of 1984, it had taken 52 per cent of the land of the occupied territories, chiefly for use by the military and by some 45,000 Jewish settlers, directly established in over a hundred settlements. Israeli plans for the occupied territories call for installing 100,000 more Jewish settlers by the year 2000 according to a report by Israel's West Bank Data Project directed by Meron Benvenisti, former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem. See Meron Benvenisti, *The West Bank Data Project*, New York, American Enterprise Institute, DC, 1984. All figures on Israel's confiscation of land and settlement policies in the West Bank are from Benvenisti's study, pp.27-28, p.23, p.32.

[114] David Shipler, *New York Times*, May 18, 1983, p.21

"to live in peace with each other", "declare the termination of the state of war between them", and define the border as unviolable. Each country was required to prevent the use of its territory by armed elements for attacks on the other. [115] In immediate practical terms, the accord provided for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon and for the establishment of a security zone in South Lebanon, so that PLO guerrillas would not be able to attack Northern Israeli settlements from Lebanese territory. In declaring his praise of the agreement, President Reagan confirmed this when he reportedly said that the agreement "can lead to the restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty throughout its territory while also insuring that Southern Lebanon will not again become a base for hostile actions against Israel." In the upshot, President Reagan went on to hail the accord that was formally signed on May 17, as "a positive step toward peace in the Middle East". As to the Marines and future of the MNF, he said they might have to remain there for "quite a period". [116]

We shall return to this issue in more detail in Chapter six. Suffice it to say here, there were problems with the agreement right from the beginning. Except for the U.S. direct involvement in negotiations, no one was happy with the 17 May agreement. Even though major concessions to Israel were included in secret protocols, with the published text containing only those understandings least offensive to Muslim public opinion, [117] nevertheless, to most Lebanese (including many Maronites) and for Syria, it represented an excessive reduction of Lebanon's sovereignty and they were also offended by the "normalization of relations" promise it contained. To Israel, meanwhile, the accord offered less control over South Lebanon than it hoped to achieve while lacking the character of a full peace treaty with Lebanon.

But, if the 17 May agreement made Israel unhappy, it undermined critically Gemayel's position in Lebanon. For one thing Israel made its withdrawal contingent upon the simultaneous withdrawal of Syrian and PLO forces. [118] Gemayel was aware of the weakness of the agreement when he said,

[115] See *Appendix* for the official English text of the 17 May 1983 agreement.

[116] See G.H. Jansen, 'Who gains what from the Withdrawal Agreement' in *Middle East International*, 27 May 1983.

[117] Bilal Sadiq, 'The 17 May agreement', *Al-Safir*, Beirut, January 31, 1983.

[118] As late as March Syria had been willing to have a simultaneous withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian and PLO forces, but on April 16 the Syrian government newspaper *Tishrin* stated that Syria would not even discuss the withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon until all Israeli troops had left the country. Cited in Reuters report, *New York Times*, April 17, 1983.

"The danger is, signing an agreement with Israel without obtaining the withdrawal of Syria ... then Israel will refuse to withdraw. You will have a paper without any importance, any value." [119] To compound things further, Gemayel — because of highly visible American involvement in the negotiations - was inevitably accused of caving in to the United States, while disgruntled factions in Lebanon expressed outrage at the degree of concessions to Israel. Caught between these forces, Gemayel tried desperately to temporize, evading formal ratification of the Accord so as to placate the Muslims, while implying an intention to ratify to please the right-wing Christians. Syria had been excluded from the 17 May negotiations and not only felt unobliged by the agreement but actively sought its failure. [120] When George Schultz flew to Damascus on 7 May 1983, Syrian leaders were apparently expecting that he would discuss with them such modifications of the Agreement with Israel as they might require, instead Shultz simply outlined the terms that had been agreed with the Israelis, presenting them as a *fait accompli* and suggesting no concessions whatever to satisfy Syria's security needs.[121] In the circumstances, Syria's basic concerns were twofold, first, that Syria and Israel were being treated as 'co-equal' occupiers of Lebanese territory when, in fact, Syria had been invited in 1976 (with tacit Israeli support at the time) to protect the Maronite Christians. The Syrian 'peacekeeping role' had been authorized *ex post facto*, by the Arab League. [122] The second Syrian concern was that Israel not be allowed to profit from its invasion of Lebanon by undermining the essentially Arab character of Lebanon and its close historic ties with Syria and the Arab hinterland. Given such policy concerns, it was clear that Syria would do everything in its powers to make life difficult for the Gemayel government by using surrogates and traditional opponents to continue pressure on the regime, including violence. [123]

[119] Quoted in the *Daily Star*, Beirut, May 19, 1983.

[120] Former President Camille Chamoun, and at the time of MNF's presence, the President of Maronite 'Lebanese Front, which groups his National Liberal Party and Pierre Gemayel's Phalangist Party, vehemently attacked Syria, whose motive in rejecting the 17 May accord "was to destroy Lebanon and extend its domination over as many parts of Lebanon as it can". *An-Nahar*, Beirut Arabic daily, 19 September 1983.

[121] Claudia Wright, 'All Systems Stop', *Middle East International*, May 27, 1983, pp.3-4.

[122] For a more detailed analysis of Syria's intervention refer to Chapter four.

[123] Syria began to issue increasingly bellicose threats — threats that involved Soviet support for Syria in case of war. Thus on May 9, 1983 Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddum noted in an interview that if war broke out between Israel and Syria, "We believe that the USSR will fulfill its commitments in accordance with the [Soviet-Syrian] treaty". Cited in *Monday Morning*, (Beirut English weekly), 9 May 1983.

Even before Lebanon signed the 17 May agreement, President Assad, playing upon the confessional^[124] conflicts within Lebanese society, mobilized Syria's proxies to fight it, most notably the Druze leader, Walid Junblatt, to the point where the latter's cooperation with Gemayel was non-existent. A meeting on 14 May at former Lebanese President Suleiman Franjeh's home brought together many key figures: former Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karami, Druze leader and Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) President Walid Junblatt; and other opponents of the Gemayel regime and its policies. This gathering gave birth to the National Salvation Front (NSF) which in turn had two principal objectives: to block ratification of the 17 May accord and to undermine the hegemony the Kateab/Phalangists had achieved by their takeover of the State apparatus. The many who dismissed the 'NSF' as an incongruous mix of leaders representing minor currents soon proved mistaken. ^[125] The 'NSF' appeared at a time of rising dismay and anger against the government in the non-Maronite communities. ^[126] The opposition's position, best illustrated by Junblatt's pronouncements, highlighted the main reasons for the erosion of the Gemayel regime's credibility: its acceptance of the 17 May accord; its failure to carry out to a conclusion the official inquiry into the Sabra-Shatilla massacre; its granting of many advantages to the Kateab/Phalangists, and the Maronite hierarchy at the expense of all other communities; and above all, its attempts to establish a one-party state. ^[127]

Such allegations were not unfounded. On becoming President, Amin Gemayel had insisted that Parliament grant him exceptional powers, including the power to legislate by decree. Most parliamentarians agreed with Selim Al-Hoss that this demand far exceeded "What is necessary and required for

[124] 'Confessional' here is used in its Lebanese context as a translation of the Arabic term *ta'ifiyya* which refers collectively to the religious and ethnic sects to which the Lebanese give their loyalty in preference to the nation as a whole.

[125] Syria continued to escalate its political and military pressure to undermine the 17 May Israeli-Lebanese agreement. On the political front it formed an alignment, the 'National Salvation Front' with a group of Lebanese leaders opposed to the agreement and to the policies of the Gemayel government, including former Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karami, former President Suleiman Franjeh, Druze leader Walid Junblatt, and Lebanese Communist Party First Secretary George Hawi. See report by Robin Wright, *Christian Science Monitor*, May 17, 1983.

[126] The President's refusal even to discuss reforms assured the National Salvation Front a large constituency. To President Amin Gemayel, the NSF was "a new conspiracy from without ... an opposition from a foreign helicopter" — because the Druze leader, Walid Junblatt, often used a Syrian helicopter — that would soon disappear because "there are Lebanese people and Lebanese officials determined to destroy the conspiracy". Amin Gemayel to a Lebanese-American audience in Detroit. See *Middle Eastern Reporter*, July 25, 1983, p.12.

[127] As the Syrian foreign minister stressed in May 1983: "We came in [to Lebanon] at the request of the Christians in 1976 to avoid Muslim domination. We will not allow Christian domination of the Muslims now". Abdu al-Halim Khaddam quoted in the *Daily Telegraph*, 17 May 1983.

the present stage", since such powers would cancel Parliament's role. [128] Nevertheless, under the pressures of Parliament Speaker, Kamel-al-Asaad, they granted these powers in sixteen of the thirty areas demanded by Gemayel. The first decree issued by the President introduced press censorship for the first time in Lebanon's modern history, and many publications moved elsewhere. Over the following year, of 161 legislative decrees issued by the President, fifty were in areas not included in the Parliamentary Mandate. Some politicians charged that Gemayel had used the emergency powers "to set up dictatorial rule". [129] As an example, in order to make Ibrahim Tannous - for the past nine years head of the Kateab/Phalange military training - the army commander-in-chief, the President passed over forty-one officers of higher grades and qualifications and greater length of service. All forty-one resigned. Tannous' lack of experience, if nothing else, made him totally unfit for this position. His sole qualification was his commitment for the Kateab/Phalange forces. Misuse of the exceptional powers granted by the Lebanese Parliament, however, was not confined to the issue of the Army, but extended to the state structures that Bashir Gemayel had appropriated for the Kateab/Phalange in the years of civil war served as the basis for Phalangist command of key state institutions. In other words, the rapidity with which the Phalangists achieved domination over the State machinery owed much to the existence of its own fully functioning 'State'.

What is more, the Reagan Administration also promoted the identification of Kateab/Phalange and State institutions. In April of 1983 high-level American officials in Washington told a visiting delegation of the French National Assembly's foreign affairs commission led by Maurice Fauré, of the administration's satisfaction over the "rapid process" made by the Lebanese army, and in particular over the fact that "the army's cooperation with the Christian militias has become very good". [130] These American officials added: "The ensemble of the organized forces (army, militia, and gendarmerie) will be capable of maintaining order in two-thirds of the country." [131] The praise Washington lavished on Lebanon's so-called 'new army', then being trained by the American military advisors,

[128] Cited in the *Daily Star*, Beirut English daily, 14 June 1983.

[129] Former Prime Minister Saeb Salam, originally a strong supporter of President Amin Gemayel — in a press conference on September 4, 1983. Quoted in the *Daily Star*, Beirut, September 5, 1983, p.1.

[130] Cited in the *Daily Star*, Beirut English daily, 14 April 1983.

[131] See *Washington Post*, April 12, 1983.

however, contrasted sharply with the conclusions of a 15 March 1983, U.S. congressional study which found the army "in very poor conditions ... existing mainly on paper ... and requiring two years to equip and train five brigades".[132] In assigning the Lebanese army the role of bolstering the Phalange dominated Lebanese Forces militias, the Reagan Administration stripped it of any pretension to a national identity, thus reducing the army to no more than an auxiliary of the Kateab/Phalange militias. This approach also meant that the American Marines soon appeared to many Lebanese much like just another local militia. [133] At the same time, the United States was seen by the opponents of the Maronite Christians as providing preferential material support to the predominantly Maronite units in the Lebanese Army, and thereby indirectly to the Phalangists. [134] That this charge is an unfair one insofar as the United States was assiduously striving to reconstruct the army through training and equipping of the communally mixed battalions, in no way changes the fact that it was widely held.

The situation in Lebanon continued to worsen during the summer of 1983. The major issues were the continual Syrian hostility to the 17 May agreement coupled with growing tension within Lebanon as the Lebanese Armed Forces prepared to expand their role in anticipation of an Israeli withdrawal and growing frustrations in Israel of the coolness and lack of cooperation between themselves and the Gemayel government. As summer wore on, the IDF found themselves acting as 'peacekeepers' between the Druze, the Phalange militias and LAF. This was not a role that the Begin government had had in mind for Israel when the agreement with Gemayel was reached. In the Shouf Mountains, where Druze and Christian villages nestled side by side, there were fierce artillery duels whereby Israeli troops were often caught in the middle and their casualties mounted. In the year between the June 1982 invasion of Lebanon and mid-1983, more than five hundred Israelis were killed and at least

[132] See *New York Times*, 16 March 1983.

[133] Interview by this writer with Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss, Beirut, 19 November 1988.

[134] This interpretation is based on this writer's conversation with Nabib Berri, leader of the Shi'ite Muslim 'Amal' militia, Beirut, 19 November 1988.

three thousand wounded - a very high casualty count for a country of little more than three million people. [135] Public opposition to the war was mounting, in Israel, and a vociferous Peace Now Movement was demanding that troops be brought home. In the event, Israel's patience with Lebanon was beginning to wear thin. [136] In an attempt to reduce their loss, Israeli leaders made plans to withdraw from the environs around Beirut and the Shouf mountains. The plan was to redeploy the Israeli troops to positions along the Awwali River north of Sidon: with a smaller area to defend, the Israelis would be able to send thousands of its troops back to Israel.

The Mountain War

On 27 August, the IDF began to do what everyone else had wanted all along, but which some now, ironically, opposed. It began to withdraw from some of the positions it held in Beirut and in the Shouf. When Israel announced its intentions in July, the U.S. asked it to reconsider, because it feared that an Israel withdrawal would precipitate renewed fighting between the Christian and Druze militias, each of whom sought to control the mountains. Then the Druze leader, cautioned:

"[T]he violence threatens an explosion whose repercussions no one can foresee. We want the army of all the Lebanese, not just one faction, we shall - and I say it openly - resist the entrance of the army into the Shouf." [137]

This is exactly what happened. Factional fighting involving the Syrian supported militias, comprising the Druze with elements of the Shia and the PLO, and the LAF and their attending Christian militias erupted immediately and grew much worse when, by 4 September, the IDF had completed their partial withdrawal back to the Awwali River. The Shi'ite Amal - like the Druze - PSP - were now demanding that the Gemayel government scrap the 17 May agreement with Israel. Druze leader, Junblatt, declared

[135] Ze'ev Schiff, 'Our War of Attrition in Lebanon', *Ha'aretz*, April 15, 1983. According to Schiff the growing losses indicate, among other things, that "Israel cannot be regarded as the victor in this war. This conclusion is inescapable ... Anyone counting the number of dead and wounded during the recent months and comparing it with enemy casualties will find that we have had far more wounded than the terrorists. This appears to be the first time in any Israeli-Arab war that losses have occurred in this proportion".

[136] There has been deep unease in Israel at the meagre results of the war. Reflecting this mood, an Israeli journalist wrote: "Israel is ... smarting from the effects of a misadventure whose likes it has never experienced in its history and whose conclusion appears to be beyond its ken." And in the words of former Foreign Minister Abba Eban, the war has cost more Israeli lives "than all the world's terrorists had been able to inflict on Israelis in all the decades ...". See Ehud Yarri, 'Israel's Dilemma in Lebanon', *Middle East Insight*, April/May, 1984, pp.18-23; see also Anthony Lewis, 'The Lebanon Debacle', *The New York Times*, June 4, 1982, p.A19, who cites Eban, for a devastating critique of what Eban calls Israel's "misbegotten war".

[137] Walid Junblatt as quoted in *The Guardian*, London, July 16, 1983.

a 'state of war' with the Gemayel government and emphatically ruled out any talks for national reconciliation. [138] The optimism that had been felt at the beginning of the year was shattered as the situation had deteriorated to civil war. The MNF II were still bound by their original mandate to support the Lebanese Government.

By early September, negotiations with Syria and semi-cordiality were not enough to prevent the War of the Mountains. In rejecting the U.S. negotiated Lebanon-Israel agreement, Syria essentially challenged the Americans in Lebanon to the extent of encouraging its Lebanese allies to come to the brink of overthrowing Amin Gemayel, on whom the Americans had pinned more of their credibility and prestige than on any other Arab leader at the time. [139] In this process, Syria's Lebanese allies attacked and killed U.S. Marines. The conflict appeared to be heading towards dangerous new waters, because it was a period during which the U.S. role in Lebanon changed significantly due to the escalation of confessional fighting and direct involvement of U.S. forces in retaliatory military action. Meanwhile, Syria continued to play a strong but cautious hand in all this. Keeping up its rejection of the Lebanon-Israel accord (a repository of U.S. prestige), the Syrian leadership resisted American and Lebanese desires to see a United Nations observer force in the Lebanese Mountains in areas vacated by Israeli troops. Syria, it seemed, was not ready to accept the 'American Solution' in Lebanon, and thus it repeated its demand that the Multinational Force, as well as the Israelis, must leave the country before the Syrians would.

Unable to yield to either Syrian or Israeli demands being pushed so forcefully on him, the embattled Gemayel had few options in what increasingly became a fatal position. He had, by that time, already committed to the mountain battle the only army units which he could fully trust to hold together in a situation of inexorable sectarian strain. Salvation had to come from outside. But his American backers, who had fully committed themselves to Lebanon's liberation and reunification under U.S. patronage, found themselves in a bind. By then American diplomacy had failed to secure a

[138] *Ibid.*

[139] By this time Washington was waking up to the failing of its diplomacy: Syria had been allowed to rearm while the Lebanese government which it opposed was woefully precarious. It was time to rethink basic strategy and attempt to engage Assad in a belated dialogue. For a contribution to the Washington debate at the time, see Talcott W. Seelye (U.S. Ambassador to Syria, 1978-81), 'A More Careful Look at Assad's Syria', *International Herald Tribune*, 21 July 1983.

grip on either the Syrians or Israelis. [140] The other partners of MNF, found their commitment put them in a somewhat invidious position. Whilst they wanted to see a restored and sovereign Lebanon, they had little or no influence with Israel or Syria. In purely military terms, things had slid to a point where powerful military intervention was required if Gemayel's position was to be secured. Such action, so it seemed in retrospect, was also needed if American diplomacy were to be reinforced by the U.S. military presence rather than be undermined by the spectacle of U.S. military marines cowering to Gemayel's opponents. In the events leading to the precipitous unilateral withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the Shouf Mountains, it had been the U.S. hope that an agreement between Junblatt and Gemayel could be reached which would allow the LAF to replace the IDF in the 'peacekeeping' role in the Shouf without posing a direct threat to either the Druze or Phalange militias. Indeed, for this to work close detailed cooperation between the IDF and LAF was necessary. [141] For a host of reasons, this did not obtain. For one thing, Israel pulled back without coordination with the LAF and in spite of U.S. pressure to delay the withdrawal process. Yet another was the refusal of the countries contributing to the MNF to send their troops into the Shouf and the inability of the LAF to fill the vacuum in that area left by the Israeli redeployment. Furthermore, in turning to the U.N. for assistance, the Gemayel government was not only seeking a U.N. cease-fire, but also wanted to use the international body for a showdown with Syria. [142]

As sectarian violence in the central region mountains continued amid fierce artillery battles, American, Saudi and Lebanese mediators intensified their efforts to negotiate a cease-fire. Druze militia forces opened heavy attacks against Lebanese army troops in the mountain village of Suq al-Gharb.

[140] In the confused circumstances of 1982 an American policy toward Lebanon was formulated that was predicated on the anticipated gradual consolidation of Amin Gemayel's administration and the State's authority. Unlike his brother, Amin Gemayel was to base his government on dialogue with the Maronites' traditional partners, as well as, it was hoped, with new ones. Israel would evacuate its troops in return for an agreement, negotiated under American auspices, and the prospect of that withdrawal would be used in order to obtain a comparable (though not necessarily a simultaneous and identical) Syrian evacuation. The pursuit of these negotiations should not interfere with the implementation of President Reagan's plan, announced on September 1, 1982, on the assumption that the Lebanese crisis was safely on the road to a satisfactory solution. In the course of the next eighteen months, the assumptions on which this policy was based were proved false and its goals unattainable. For critiques of U.S. policy in Lebanon written from two contradictory vantage points, see R.G. Neumann, 'Asad and the Future of the Middle East', *Foreign Affairs*, 62, Winter 1983-84, pp.237-256; and Michael Ledeen, 'The Lesson of Lebanon', *Commentary*, May 1984, pp.15-22.

[141] David Lennon, 'Israel and Lebanon, Awakening to Reality', *Middle East International*, September 30, 1983, pp.8-10. As Lennon comments suggest, Gemayel at that time tried still another appeal to Israel for help. Israel rejected these appeals from what it considered "the ungrateful Christians".

[142] *Ibid.*

The Druze began firing at American marines stationed at the Beirut International Airport, two Marines were killed by a mortar round; these were the MNF's first combat casualties. Although it was initially open to doubt whether the Druze and Shia shellings which fell into the MNF compounds were actually directed against the troops within, by then it was clear that the French and American contingents were considered as part of the war between the Government forces on one side, and the Druze and Shia forces on the other. The Druze leader, Walid Junblatt, implicated the U.S. Marines and others of the MNF when he told a press conference in Damascus:

"It looks as if the MNF is getting more and more one-sided to President Amin Gemayel's regime ... if this continues, we shall demand the departure of the MNF to where it came from. We want no fleets in our waters, we want no new colonialism." [143]

Even as sniper attacks, artillery, rocket and mortar fire began to increase, the U.S. Administration saw no need to revise its policy in Lebanon, including the role of the MNF.

By the first week of September, the American contingent was frequently engaged in combat with the Muslim militias, but was operating within the limits of self-defence. The fighting in the mountains overlooking Beirut was fierce, and on 6 September, two more marines, as well as a number of French troops, were killed, and on the following day, in a show of force, France and the United States began sending reconnaissance flights over Druze - and Syrian-held positions in the mountains and in the Bekka Valley. [144] President Reagan, meanwhile, ordered an increase in the size of the U.S. fleet off the Lebanese coast, and on 13 September gave the Marines permission to call on naval planes and the navy's big guns for protection. After the arrival of the battleship *New Jersey*, with its 16-inch guns capable of hurling one-ton shells up to twenty-five miles, American fire power was obviously able to wreak terrible destruction from a distance in support of the embattled Lebanese army. By 9 September, the fighting in the Shouf centered on the town of Suq Al-Gharb where the Druze militia, with

[143] Quoted in *Al-Nahar*, Beirut, 14 September 1983.

[144] This 'show of force' was not confined to the Americans, France sent Super Etendard jets to the skies over Beirut for the first time on 7 September 1983 after two soldiers were killed. Then Defence Minister Charles Hernu warned: "If the fire does not stop immediately we will demolish the batteries". The French and the Americans who on the same day carried out similar missions by flying F-14s from the U.S. aircraft carrier *Eisenhower*, maintained the fire was coming from areas under the control of Druze militiamen. *Al-Nahar*, Beirut Arabic daily, 8 September 1983.

some Palestinian involvement and clear Syrian support, failed to score a break through and close the door on Beirut, partly because American offshore fire power 'intervened' to turn the tide of battle.

[145] The Reagan Administration decided to make its stand in the struggle for this town.

There is reason to believe that this was more a political than a military posture. The town was not as important strategically as the U.S. officials within the Reagan Administration made it out to be; and the fact that the fighting had become focused there was largely coincidental. The central character in the political drama was U.S. Special Ambassador, Robert McFarlane. He judged that the symbolism of an LAF defeat at Suq Al-Gharb might well bring down the Gemayel government. He advised direct and extensive U.S. support of the LAF; he was supported by Secretary of State George Shultz, but opposed by Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger.

To effect such a policy, the Ground Commander of the U.S. MNF was granted the authority to request U.S. warships to shell the mainland, [146] as well as carry out air strikes, in order to defend U.S. or other MNF forces, and to assist the LAF defend positions of strategic importance. The authorization had Suq Al-Gharb in mind, but was not limited to it. [147] Later, it was explained that the new authority was based on a determination that the defence of Suq Al-Gharb was essential to the safety of the Marines. Even so, this argument was based not principally on an effort to remain within the peace-keeping mandate, but on the need to justify the new activism of the Marines to the U.S. Congress, which ever since the first Marine fatality, was demanding a voice in the matter. [148] Back on the ground in Beirut, the issue was still not settled. Promptly after President Reagan granted the new

[145] The Beirut daily *Al-Safir*, 6 September 1983 quoted Walid Junblatt, the Druze leader, as warning all MNF contingents, most especially the Americans, that they were running a great risk and could become directly involved in the civil war. He remarked: "MNF is a guise to assisting the non-legitimate powers the Phalange and the Israelis".

[146] See the *Report of the Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, 23 October 1983* (the Long Commission Report), 20 December 1983, p.32. The new authority was based on a determination by the U.S. national command authorities that "the successful defense of Suq-al-Gharb was essential to the safety" of the marines.

[147] The more activist posture and rules of engagement for the marines, in addition to the increased aid to the Lebanese army, were portrayed as consistent with the original objective. Then, Secretary of State George Shultz told the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees on September 21, 1983: "From the beginning, we have had essentially three policy objectives in Lebanon: the withdrawal of all external forces ...; a sovereign, independent Lebanon dedicated to national unity and able to exercise its authority throughout its national territory; and security for Israel's northern border." *Washington Post*, September 22, 1983.

[148] Pressures mounted in Congress to change the bargain worked out with the Reagan Administration that had authorised the President to keep the marines in Lebanon until April 1985. See *Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution*, October 12, 1983. The text of this resolution appears in the *Appendix*.

authority, McFarlane pressed the USMNF Commander to request naval bombardment. The Commander, Col. Timothy Geraghty, hesitated, on the basis of his military appraisal of the situation and his awareness that such action would provoke retaliation. Geraghty also realized that naval shelling would end any claims on neutrality on the part of the USMNF. It would seem that the Marine Commander, untrained in the delicate art of peacekeeping, understood it far better than the American diplomatic envoy. Perhaps to add to the ironies that pervaded U.S. policy, McFarlane and Shultz, who came down on the opposite side of the USMNF Commander and the military hierarchy, are both former Marine officers.

So as to prevent the fall of Suq Al-Gharb, the Lebanese army's last strong hold in the Shouf, American policy-makers appeared eager to use their impressive fire power against the opponent forces. Marine officers stationed themselves in the area beside the Lebanese army to pinpoint targets and direct American and Lebanese return fire against Druze and Syrian positions. The Marines conducted all battlefield intelligence necessary for the direction of offshore and onshore fire and took command of the war in an operation which was *neither* defensive nor minor. [149] "We will not permit the fall of Suq Al-Gharb", the White House proclaimed on 20 September, at a time when the Marines were firing more than 600 shells a day on the town's attackers. [150]

American intervention saved Suq Al-Gharb, but the shift of the American role in the MNF from one of protecting Lebanese civilians to that of participating in the war alarmed its partners in the MNF. On 21-22 September 1983, the Ambassadors of Britain, France and Italy visited the White House to implore the Reagan Administration not to involve their countries in the expanding war in Lebanon.[151] In Paris, the French Prime Minister bluntly warned that the conflict in Lebanon was "one of civil strife which Lebanon tries to turn into an international crisis involving the United States and Soviet-backed governments"[152] President Reagan, however, boasted that American naval power, especially the presence of the USS *New Jersey*, was the real reason for Druze and Syrian acceptance of

[149] This was against artillery positions that were firing on or near U.S. positions. See report by David Ottaway, *Washington Post*, September 18, 1983.

[150] *New York Times*, 21 September, p.A.6.

[151] Claudia Wright, 'Puppet Masters', *New Statesman*, September 30, 1983.

[152] See Jim Muir, 'Lebanon: Arena of Conflict, Crucible of Peace', *Middle East journal*, 38 (Spring 1984), pp.211-214.

the cease fire of 25 September. [153]

With the cease-fire, the 'Mountain War' reached a state of at least temporary equilibrium between the two local sides and their external supporters, and this was reflected in the cease-fire agreement. The Maronite Phalange militias suffered a "humiliating collapse", the seeds of which were sown when they first went into the mountains on the heel of Israel's entry into the region. [154] The Lebanese Armed Forces gained nationwide 'kudos' for its spirited and skilled defence of some mountain positions, [155] earlier held by the Phalangists, especially at Suq Al-Gharb. But the Army's efforts to expand its area of control were beaten back, and its chances of securing the entire mountain area by force appeared remote indeed. For the cease-fire had left the Druze in control of the Shouf. It also assured Syria, owing to its support for the Druze in the Mountain War, a part in any discussion of a settlement. The cease-fire also demanded a 'National dialogue' among the contending parties to settle the issues at stake. This was scheduled for 31 October in Geneva, Switzerland. In the circumstances, the U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz said the mission of U.S. Marines in the MNF would not change, but that the cease-fire would make their job a bit more "comfortable by removing them from the crossfire"[156] Furthermore, the Reagan Administration had hoped that the cease-fire would remove it from the crossfire on Capital Hill in Washington, where both parties in Congress had been sparring with each other and with the White House over granting the President the authority to keep American troops in Lebanon.

For nearly a fortnight, the Reagan Administration had to lobby hard to head off a congressional effort - sparked by the deaths of four Marines in Beirut - to invoke the 1973 War Powers Act, which requires presidential consultation with Congress if U.S. forces abroad face "imminent hostilities". [157] For the Reagan Administration the parliamentary confrontation unhappily coincided with a steep

[153] For the text of the ceasefire agreement, see the Associated Press (AP) report in the *New York Times*, September 27 1983.

[154] Muir, *op.cit.*, p.215.

[155] *Ibid.*

[156] See *New York Times*, September 29, 1983.

[157] The U.S. Congress determined that as of 29 August the American Marines were engaged in armed hostilities, rendering the controversial War Powers Act operative. Reagan signed the compromise bill, but expressed reservations about this and other aspects. See *Appendix* for the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Public Law 98-119, October 12, 1983.

escalation of hostilities around Beirut and the U.S. role in them. The increasing violence made Congress all the more 'jittery', as it became clear to the street militias that the MNF troops were unlikely to use their heavy weapons to ferret them out of their enclaves in the city, so their boldness increased and they began to reassert themselves. Despite rising popular opposition to Reagan's Lebanon policy, and Reagan's direct challenge to Congress's own constitutional prerogatives, Congress chose the course of submission to the executive's will. In the upshot, Congress granted Reagan the authority to maintain U.S. participation in the MNF for eighteen months. The size of the Marines was to be limited to 1,200 men; U.S. air and sea forces outside Lebanon would be allowed to take "protective measures", but not offensive actions, to guard the safety of the USMNF troops. The compromise was endorsed by congressional leaders of both parties, although some Democrat members continued to argue that eighteen months was too long a period. [158]

On 24 October, early on a Sunday morning, a suicide commando drove a truck laden with explosives into the American Marines' Headquarters near the Beirut Airport; the explosion killed 241 Marines. Only minutes later, a similar operation demolished the French battalion's main centre at Jnah, near Beirut's southern outskirts, killing 58 paratroopers. And on 4 November, another suicide attack destroyed the Israeli military governor's headquarters in Tyre, killing sixty people: twenty eight Israeli troops and thirty-two Palestinians and Lebanese detainees held for questioning on "terrorist activity". In the climate of the Presidential election campaign, the bombings took on a great significance in the American media.

The identity of the perpetrators of the truck bombings was never discovered. However, judging from his remarks to journalists at the White House on the same day, President Reagan had spoken of the "bestial nature of those who would assume power "in Lebanon by acts of this kind, went on to speak of forces which had to be "stopped from taking over the Middle East". [159] As such, President Reagan regarded Lebanon primarily as an extension of the wider East-West confrontation and viewed the American role there principally in terms of Israeli interests and perceptions. This was reflected in

[158] *Ibid.*

[159] *See Washington Post, 25 October, 1983.*

the significant slant in his and other U.S. official statements in the aftermath of the bombings. White House spokesman, Larry Speakes, who initially had vowed that "We intend to respond to this criminal act", [160] went on to say (a day later) that "Soviet, Syrian and Iranian" interests were "poised to take over" in Lebanon. If opinion was divided on assigning responsibility for the 24 October bombing, it was even more sharply at variance on the appropriate response. Some wanted the American Marines to be brought home, whilst others favoured retaliating against the Beirut slaughter. Some influential people were prepared to launch a joint U.S.-Israeli action to punish the Syrians and eject the Soviet Union from the Middle East. For example, Henry Kissinger and others, with some support at the high levels in the Reagan administration, wanted to put the process of political reconciliation in Lebanon on hold while the U.S. and Israel took joint action against Syria. [161] However, not all Americans seemed willing to support plunging deeper into the Lebanese quagmire. The other partners of the MNF-II were alarmed at suggestions of armed reprisal against Syria, and as a consequence their attitude was one of recognizing Syrian as well as Israeli security concerns; and to try and strike an even-handed approach between the various Lebanese communities and groups. [162] For example, Britain's Shadow Foreign Secretary Denis Healey claimed that the U.S. was "divided" from its partners over MNF-II objectives. He went on to describe the American goal as being to create a Lebanese state run by a "fascist Phalange" dominated Maronite Christian minority. Britain, Italy and France, on the other hand, favoured a settlement that would produce a shift in the internal balance of power towards the Muslim majority. "I think it is very important that we use our influence either to get an immediate settlement or get those forces out." [163]

The U.S. Sixth Fleet's bombardment of opposition forces fighting the Gemayel government in their bid to control Suq Al-Gharb could have been the immediate provocation touching off the attacks on the American 'Peacekeepers', just as French fighter bomber raids on opposition groups could have been the immediate provocation for the attack on the French paratroopers. President Reagan placed

[160] *Ibid.*

[161] See W.B. Quandt, 'Reagan's Lebanon Policy: Trial and Error', *Middle East Journal*, Vol.38 (Spring 1984), pp.247-49.

[162] See Patrick Seale, 'The Seeds of the Beirut Carnage', *The Observer*, 30 October 1983; *The Economist*, 29 October 1983, pp.28-31.

[163] See *The Times*, London, 19 September 1983.

"part of the blame" for the death of the Marines on Syria. [164] Israel, too, implicated Syria as responsible for the explosion against its Tyre installation: within six hours of the explosion, Israeli fighter bombers attacked Syrian-backed Palestinian forces near Bhamdoun 'in reprisal'. However, the mainspring for these operations is perhaps to be found elsewhere. Opposition to France's pro-Iraq policy in the Gulf War could partly explain the attack on the French contingent. As for the assault on the American Marines, the explanation cuts deeper: [165] there was the U.S. refusal to insist on Israeli compliance with the U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for an immediate Israeli withdrawal; there was the massive and illegal Israeli use of U.S. arms during the advance across the South and the battle and siege of Beirut, in which the thousands of Lebanese civilian victims were largely Shi'ite. Then, later on, there was the U.S. re-equipping and training of the Lebanese army, which promptly used its new equipment and expertise against its own Lebanese people, especially Muslims and the disadvantaged. For the majority of Lebanese, the Lebanese Shi'ite in particular, had, so it seemed, a long account to settle with American and Israeli policies in their occupied country.

After the ouster of the PLO from Beirut, the Shi'ites wondered when the Israeli troops would end their occupation and withdraw from the South and other regions of the country. [166] Under the pretext of keeping the peace, the Israelis began distributing clandestinely to both the Maronite-Christians and the Druze in the Shouf, weapons that were captured from the Palestinians. The ensuing conflagrations which flared on the heels of the departing Israelis diverted attention from the overwhelming IDF presence elsewhere in the country, a presence which seemed to be searching for a justification. Meanwhile, the Shi'is kept their cool and watched as month after month Israeli patrols went by in American-made jeeps. Later, at the Awwali bridge checkpoint, [167] Shi'a farmers watched subsidised Israeli goods slip through to Beirut markets, while their own produce rotted in the

[164] Muir, *op.cit.*, p.217.

[165] For the United States role, see Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War, op.cit.*, pp.61-77.

[166] For how many Israelis now assessed the war, see Edward Walsh, 'Rockets in Galilee Symbolize Futility of Israel's Role in Lebanon', *Washington Post*, February 13, 1984, p.A19. Rockets were fired at Galilee in February, March, April and August 1984, and repeatedly in early 1985. An early assessment of Israel's new problem with the Shi'as is by John Kifner, 'Southern Lebanon: A Trauma for Both Sides', *New York Times*, July 22, 1983, p.1.

[167] As Sidon parliamentarian Nazih Bizri reported, if travellers were not deterred by long hours of waiting, police dogs were sometimes set upon them to drive them away. At the Awwali Bridge Israelis sometimes beat travellers with sticks, pelted them with stones, forced them to kneel for long periods on stony ground, or fired over the heads of those in the act of crossing the bridge. Nazih Bizri, interview by Mona al-Said, *Monday Morning*, November 28 - December 4, 1983.

sun. Frequent Israeli checks on the coast road made travel intolerably sluggish. [168] The Lebanese multitudes were required to get passes to use the road, a process which was often interminable and humiliating. Still the shi'as and other Lebanese kept their cool as they heard American-made Israeli planes break the sound barrier overhead. When would the Israelis leave?

After the first year of occupation, it was not rare to witness the occupying soldier take advantage of the vanquished Lebanese - in particular the Shia of the South. Banana and orange groves were destroyed when the Israelis used them as bivouac sites. Buildings were commandeered as were electrical power and water resources. Israeli engineers constructed huge electronic towers for infra-red and radar detection on the mountains of the Barouk cedars to monitor Syrian army movements in the Bekka Valley. Concrete bunkers were replacing wooden huts at checkpoints; Israeli encampments had well-paved roads and quarters were both winterised and air conditioned. The occupier seemed to be settling in for good. [169] The inhabitants of the occupied South Lebanon as elsewhere were growing restless, there was no talk of unconditional Israeli withdrawal.

Following the destruction of the American Embassy in April, 1983 - when sixty-three people including seventeen Americans were killed in a similar suicide bombing operation - the killing of the Marines should have awakened the U.S. administration to the need to re-examine its policy. For as one former Reagan Administration official recounted:

[168] Restricted movement to and from the south deprived the area of its natural markets in the Chouf and Western Bekka. (Similar restrictions were applied in the Israeli-occupied Bekka with similar devastating effects.) Israeli road checkpoints were essential to this economic war: they not only multiplied the cost of transport six or more times but also gave Israeli trucks and produce a decisive advantage in reaching wholesale markets ahead of Lebanese trucks. Exports from the south had virtually ceased by early 1984 while, according to Nazih Bizri, millions of Lebanese pounds' worth of Israeli fruits, vegetables, industrial goods, and machinery were being sent through to all parts of Lebanon. Nazih Bizri, cited in 'How to Kill an Economy', *Monday Morning*, January 23-29, 1984.

[169] Bizri called this treatment part of a deliberate campaign to drive Lebanese out of the south "so that Israel can establish settlements, as it has done on the West Bank, and so convert South Lebanon into Israel's North Bank". Nazih Bizri, interview by Mona al-Said, *Monday Morning*, November 28-December 4, 1983.

"So we were obviously the target of considerable hatred by at least one element of the body politic of Lebanon presumably call it the extremist Shi'ite elements. Many Lebanese have said since then that the attack on the Embassy could only have been welcomed by Damascus as a signal to the Americans. But the Syrians never accepted any responsibilities for it and we have no evidence to tie them to the attack on the Embassy. Obviously you do not blow up the Embassy just for the fun of it. Somebody was trying to strike a blow against the U.S. as early as April 1983, which meant they planned it you tell me as early as February-March 1983. So before the contour of the May 17 Agreement was set." [170]

But both the Americans and the French preferred to hold either Syria or Shi'a extremists, or both, responsible. The French, if not the Americans, were aware of the equivocal basis of their contingent's presence in Lebanon. On 7 October, Claude Cheyson, then foreign minister, indicated that the presence of the French contingent in Beirut "Of which the military role is practically terminated" is a "symbol of the support of France for the structure of Lebanon, for the freely elected Lebanese President and for Lebanese unity, which France will support whatever may happen". [171] But most Lebanese did not accept the structure and unity of Lebanon in its present form. In this context, therefore, it was essential that the Gemayel government should demonstrate the sincerity of its own approach to the process of 'national reconciliation' between the different factions in Lebanon. There had been much ground for suspicion that Gemayel was in the hands of the Phalangists and that the Phalangists had not renounced their ambition of retaining control of Lebanon's destiny. So long as the Americans appeared to be tolerating, if not encouraging, such ambitions, it was widely seen as fraud, especially when the French and American contingents by deed and declaration were becoming increasingly identified with the fortunes of the Gemayel government.

The British and Italians, however, maintained a more neutral position. The Italians achieved this by continuing to provide protection for the Shia and Palestinian communities (who supported the anti-government forces in the Shouf war) in their area as well as operating a field hospital. The British, on the other hand, kept a close liaison with both sides of the struggle and, in November, were asked to provide a neutral security presence to cover the continuing cease-fire talks. The events in Lebanon

[170] Interview by the writer with Richard Murphy, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs in the Reagan Administration 1983-1989, London, 3 May 1989.

[171] Cited in the *International Herald Tribune*, Paris, October 7, 1983.

helped shape a new British attitude to the Middle East and U.S. policy in the region. Initially the British force was sent to help hold the ring between the various factions for as long as they were engaged in negotiations. It was *not sent* to support President Gemayel's attempts to reassert his authority through military force. Concessions in the British view, had to be made and a new government formed. This point was made in a cable to the Lebanese government prior to the U.S. withdrawal announcement which said that if the Lebanese army attacked, the British force would be endangered and would consequently withdraw. The same message was in effect sent to each of the other parties involved: make war and we withdraw, talk and we will help. It was an even-handed policy, applied to Gemayel, the Christian militias, the Amal-Druze alliance, the Americans and the Israelis. In the House of Commons on 8 February 1984, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, made it abundantly clear that neither the 17 May Agreement nor anything else should stand in the way of a political settlement:

"I entirely endorse what (opposition foreign affairs Spokesman Denis Healey) said about the importance of recognizing the role and interests of Syria in the region and the importance also of ensuring that the 17 May agreement, while it made provisions for withdrawal of Israeli forces while it is necessary to make secure Israel's northern frontier, should not be allowed to become an obstacle to the necessary settlement." [172]

The urgent meeting to begin national dialogue immediately demanded by the terms of the 25 September cease-fire agreement, compelled President Gemayel to drop his insistence that withdrawal of all foreign forces precede 'National dialogue'. This condition was intended to postpone dialogue indefinitely. Druze leader Walid Junblatt and the Syrian backed opposition, abandoned their uncompromising bellicosity, quietly forgetting their demands that the Lebanese army leave the mountains and that Prime Minister Wazzan must resign before any truce could be called. For their part the right-wing Christian militia factions gave up their earlier refusal to contemplate dialogue on a new Lebanese formula before state sovereignty had been restored throughout the country. This implied a willingness to return to the 'no Victor, no Vanquished' slogan which prevailed after earlier rounds of conflict in Lebanon - a recognition that the country could only hold together through balance and consent, and that no faction could claim victory and try to impose its will on the others, as the

[172] *The Times*, London, 9 February 1984.

Phalangists/Kataeb had been accused of trying to do. The battle of the mountains must certainly have awakened the right-wing militias to the realization that their dreams of ruling the country were unrealistic, and that the Israelis would only give them what they were prepared to pay for.

Against this background, the issue that soon dominated the Geneva Conference and gave it significance, however, was the insistence of Syria and the Lebanese opposition on the abrogation of the 17 May Agreement. All those present gave President Gemayel a unanimous mandate (an achievement in itself) to visit Washington and other capitals to win consent for the Agreement's replacement by mutual guarantees of border security, in return for which Israel would withdraw from Lebanon. [172] Presumably, the new formula would exclude all the political, economic and military concessions wrung from Lebanon by American and Israeli pressures. Some twenty-four hours before Gemayel's arrival in Washington on 1 December, to seek abrogation of the 17 May Accord, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and President Reagan signed a new strategic alliance agreement. Gemayel's mission was stillborn when he was told, none too gently, by his American counterpart to concentrate his government's efforts on the domestic situation and leave Syria and its supporters to the U.S. and Israel. His instructions were to establish close relations with Israel, and to rely on Israeli help in extending his government's writ over the Syrian-occupied parts of Lebanon. Gemayel was also told to discuss any revisions with the 17 May withdrawal accord with Israel (Israel had already rejected any changes whatsoever in the accord). In the event, Washington's refusal to heed the demands made by Gemayel to make the necessary modifications in the 17 May agreement.

The new American-Israeli strategic alliance angered and alarmed the Arab World, where it was perceived as an insult as well as a threat. The agreement provided for more American financial aid to Israel and even closer political and military ties. These included the formation of a joint commission to face "the Soviet menace to their common interests in the Middle East"; [174] the stockpiling of Ameri-

[172] Other proposals considered included a population census, in which only two major groups, Christians and Muslims would be mentioned, without reference to religious communities. All sides agreed on the principle of parity between Muslims and Christians in Parliament, the establishment of a high constitutional court and a supreme court with power over the President and his ministers. There had also been calls from Muslim leaders for the creation of a senate and the institution of a vice-presidency to create a more representative system.

[174] See Godfrey Jansen, 'How Real is the Soviet Threat', *Middle East Reporter*, December 8, 1983, pp.13-14.

can military supplies in Israel, making Israel a forward supply base for American and Israeli action in the area; the American purchase of Israeli-produced armaments and other American measures to improve Israel's financial position; and joint American-Israeli manoeuvres in the Mediterranean. [175] What is more, by proclaiming the objective of the new strategic alliance to be the ouster of Soviet influence from the Middle East, the United States and Israel advertised their intentions to maintain an Israeli presence in Lebanon to help the United States fight Syria. Realizing that President Assad had already vetoed the 17 May Accord - by refusing to withdraw Syrian troops from Lebanon until all Israeli troops had departed - the U.S. and Israel set out to make him change his mind. [176]

On 4 December, four days after the signature of the American-Israeli Strategic Agreement, a heavy American air attack on Syrian positions in the mountains east of Beirut was perceived throughout the Arab World as the closest the United States had ever come to war with an Arab country. The attack took place only twenty-four hours after Israeli fighter bombers had hit Syrian targets in Central Lebanon. Arabs saw in these coordinated American-Israel strikes the first product of the new Strategic Alliance. [177] This notwithstanding, the outcome of the air strikes proved disastrous, two American planes were gunned down by Syrian ground fire, and two others crashed in Syria. One pilot died of his wounds, the other was captured - the captured pilot, a black American named Robert Goodman, was subsequently released in response to the initiatives of American politician Jesse Jackson - such loss was the first since Vietnam. [178] Less than two days after the unsuccessful American air strikes, U.S. Marine positions at Beirut Airport came under a four-and-a-half-hour barrage of shelling - the heaviest bombardment - which killed eight Marines. In retaliation - and determined to change the balance of power on the ground by weakening Syria and the Lebanese opposition forces - the Americans

[175] See William Lee, 'Hard on the Accord, Reagan Opts for Force', *Middle East International*, 9 December 1983, pp.3-5.

[176] On the U.S.-Israeli Strategic Alliance, *The Guardian*, London, December 3, 1983, editorialized the following: "Israel does extremely well on the security agreement concluded by Mr Shamir with President Reagan. What does the United States get in return? Votes for the Republicans next time round, of course, but what else? On the face of it, the U.S. makes totally unnecessary concessions to the Israel view of the Middle East developments and signals to the conservative Arab regimes that it is losing patience with them. The deal would make more sense if the Arab regimes had not been influential in putting a brake on Syria, but they have done that (and so, incidentally, has the Soviet Union). It would make sense if the U.S. expected to acquire a new and dramatic leverage over Israel policy on the West Bank, but there is no mention so far of any decision by the Israeli government, which rejected the Reagan plan outright to reconsider it".

[177] Lee, *op.cit.*, p.5.

[178] The Reagan Administration had not even tried to effect the captured pilot's release through diplomatic overtures to Syria. See *Economist*, 7 January 1984, pp.25-26.

for the first time activated the *New Jersey's* sixteen-inch guns in order to hit at Syrian anti-aircraft positions deep inside Syrian-controlled territory in Lebanon's northeast and Bekka regions.

The Syrian-backed National Salvation Front meanwhile codified its own demands, which included the neutralization of the Lebanese army, the withdrawal of the Multinational Force, the abrogation of the 17 May agreement with Israel, and the 'de-phalangisation' of the State apparatus. [179] Given the balance of forces, at the time, the strength of these demands lay not only in the military power of the Syrian-backed opposition, but also in the fact that by now they enjoyed the support of even the most conservative elements. Was there anything that the Gemayel government could offer to appease its opponents and their Syrian supporters? At first sight, it seemed that things had gone too far for that, and that Gemayel the man himself had become unacceptable. In the strictly military arena, there seemed to be little that Gemayel and his American backers could do to retrieve their positions without the risk of compounding the disaster.

Like Gemayel, the Americans faced stark choices, and not many of them. The presence of the U.S. Marines on the ground had clearly been doomed for many months since the 24 October truck bombing attack and the decision to withdraw was bowing belatedly to the inevitable. Every additional Marine casualty prompted more calls from the American media and from members of Congress, then, on their Christmas holiday break, for a pull-out. [180] All along, the MNF countries were insisting they would stay and complete their mission, though on 14 December 1983, Reagan, in an apparent attempt to pressure the Gemayel government to reach some kind of political consensus in the country, said that though Lebanon was "vital" to U.S. national interest, but "if there was a complete collapse and there was no possibility of restoring order, there would be no purpose in the multinational force". [181] The

[179] The Shi'a Amal movement led by Nabih Berri - which did not join the National Salvation Front - tried to go beyond sectarian rhetoric, declaring: "Forty years after the National Pact, we should all reflect together about a participation formula based on the slogan: One Lebanon for all its sons without discrimination". Like the NSF, Berri demanded the replacement of the 1943 National Pact by a new pact "based on the effective participation of the Muslims in power". See *Middle Eastern Reporter*, August 21, 1983, pp.12-13.

[180] On December 22, 1983, seventy congressmen urged the House leadership to review the American military involvement in Lebanon because the marines role had changed from "neutral peacekeepers to active participants in a civil conflict". In an article in the *New York Times*, December 11, 1983, former Defence Secretary Harold Brown concluded that in using naval guns to defend Gemayel's army against the Syrian-backed Lebanese opposition militias, the United States had taken on a mission with an unattainable goal that could risk war with Syria. He called for the withdrawal of the marines even at the cost of an arrangement with Syria that would involve a de facto partition of Lebanon.

[181] See *New York Times*, 15 December 1983, p.18.

same day Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said that Britain had no plans to withdraw its troops, but that the commitment was not "indefinite". [182] By the middle of December 1983, however, Gemayel tried to repel his opponents' demands for political reforms yet again. Finally in the latter part of December, Italy, where public demands for withdrawal of MNF troops were mounting, announced a plan for the "gradual reduction" of its contingent. [183] France, on 2 January 1984, announced that it would soon redeploy 500 of its troops to UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon. [184] France denied that this presaged a complete pull-out. Meanwhile, President Reagan remained "very adamant" in his intention to keep the Marines in Lebanon. In Britain, the government quieted the storm and received general endorsement of its views that an immediate withdrawal would sabotage any hope for peace and national reconciliation in Lebanon. [185]

The situation during January continued to deteriorate as the fighting and sniping at MNF troops persisted. Then on 2 February, the Lebanese Army and the Muslim Militias battled in the southern suburbs of Beirut. As the fighting escalated, both sides started to use artillery and mortar and soon the fighting and shelling spread into East and West Beirut. But the most decisive turning point came on 4 February when the Shi'ite Amal leader, Nabih Berri, called on his supporters in the Lebanese Army to disobey combat orders. For many months, Berri had refrained from taking this fateful step, knowing that the army and the state were instruments that had to be preserved if there were to be any hope of retrieving the largely Shi'ite southern, eastern and northern regions from Israeli and Syrian occupation. On the morrow of the uprising, the army's brigades, although remaining administratively dependent on the Defence Ministry, were distributed among the major sects according to the sectarian identity of their officers and men. Confirmed at the Lausanne Conference of 12-20 March 1984, this system, while preserving a balance of forces on the ground, meant that the army had become no more than a

[182] *Ibid.*

[183] See *The Times*, London, 31 December 1983.

[184] *The Daily Star*, Beirut English daily, 2 January 1984.

[185] In a television interview on January 4, 1984, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said there could be no possibility of a pull-out by the multinational force, including the British contingent, because it would "leave a vacuum". Concerns about the MNF are detailed in Thomas L. Friedman, 'American Air Strikes Change the Game in the Middle East', *New York Times*, December 11, 1983; 'Huffing and Puffing over Tory Foreign Policy', *Economist*, December 10, 1983; 'British Tell Gemayels They Don't Plan to Pullout', *Financial Times*, December 15, 1983; and Michael Dobbs, 'Beirut Bombs Shatter Allies Resolve', *Washington Post*, December 28, 1983.

collection of sectarian brigades, often hostile to each other, incapable of establishing or keeping order, and frequently participating in battles between the sectarian parties and between the different regions of the country.

Then on 5 February, Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan and the entire Lebanese cabinet resigned. The United States urged the Lebanese President to form a new cabinet and to include Shi'ite and Druze. Only then did Gemayel declare that "everything is negotiable", but he made no specific mention of the opposition's demand that he rescind the 17 May agreement with Israel. [186] With the fighting escalating by the hour, increased numbers of soldiers began to desert the Lebanese Army. This was to mark the beginning of the process that would shift the balance of power to the Muslims. The Israeli invasion in June 1982 had tipped the balance in favour of the Christians - especially the Maronites. Now the Syrians and their predominantly Muslim allies were gaining the upper hand, and they soon made their demands known: they wanted Gemayel to resign.

On 7 February, in some of the fiercest fighting, the Shi'ite Amal and Druze Militia forces took control of all West Beirut from the Lebanese Army. As Gemayel saw his position weakening, he called on the leaders of the opposition to return to Switzerland for a new round of talks on 'National Reconciliation'. Junblatt and Berri refused to even discuss the matter. "No national unity can be established", Junblatt said, "as long as Amin Gemayel remains President". [187] Later that day, the White House released a statement announcing that the Marines would begin shortly a "redeployment" to ships offshore. At the same time, President Reagan "authorized U.S. naval forces, under the existing mandate of the MNF, to provide naval gunfire and air support against any units firing into greater Beirut from parts of Lebanon controlled by Syria, as well as against any units directly attacking American or MNF personnel and facilities". [188]

This change in policy by Reagan was due to the steadily worsening political and military situation in Lebanon. Many congressional leaders applauded President Reagan's decision because the sta-

[186] Quoted in *Al-Nahar*, Beirut Arabic daily, 6 February 1984.

[187] Quoted in *Al-Safir*, Beirut Arabic daily, 7 February 1984.

[188] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 20 (13 February 1984); see also *Washington Post*, 8 February 1984, p.A.25 for the reprinted text.

tioning of the Marines in Beirut was becoming increasingly unpopular in the United States. But at the same time, the move was an admission that American policy in Lebanon had failed. Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger, meanwhile, denied that the redeployment decision represented a major shift in policy, remarking in testimony to Congress that "the Marines are being redeployed two and one half to three miles to the West". [189] The deployment was punctuated by a sequence of spiralling violence, the *New Jersey* and two other warships resumed intense bombardment of Syrian and Druze positions in the eastern mountains. In turn, Syrian, Druze, and Amal units continued to exchange artillery shells with the U.S. forces and ship with the fighting intensifying to include small arms and mortar attacks. French officials reportedly rejected the notion that the U.S. naval and air fire would "help protect" the French contingent, instead, suggesting that "the result would be exactly the reverse". [190]

Reagan's decisions to 'redeploy' and step-up attacks on anti-government positions were taken, the President asserted, "after consultation with our MNF partners". [191] It was widely reported, however, that the decision had been made several days earlier and that the other countries were "informed" but not consulted. On 8 February, exactly one year after its arrival, the British contingent was withdrawn to a ship offshore. British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe indicated that recent consultation with MNF partners was apparently unilateral, and was conveyed to the others "without seeking their approval". [192] France, which had made no commitment to withdraw its troops - in part to emphasize its colonial ties with Lebanon and its independence from U.S. policies - viewed the U.N. as the best way out of the Lebanon quagmire. To this effect, a French proposal was put to the Security Council to replace MNF with a U.N. force - possibly using troops from UNIFIL, but precluding use of permanent member contingents - to take up positions in Beirut as soon as all the elements of the MNF had withdrawn. Gemayel supported the French proposal as part of a package deal with his opponents that included the abrogation of the 17 May accord with Israel.

[189] *Washington Post*, 19 February 1984, p.A.2.

[190] *Washington Post*, 9 February 1984, p.A.2.

[191] Cited is Claudia Wright, 'Reagan's First Retreat's, *Middle East International*, February 17, 1983, pp.6-7.

[192] *Washington Post*, 9 February, 1984, p.A.23.

While consultations took place at the U.N., Italy on 20 February, withdrew 1400 troops in its MNF contingent. Six days later, the remaining U.S. Marines departed from Lebanon, their locations immediately occupied by Shi'ite militia forces and rebel Lebanese army units hostile to the Gemayel government. As U.S. warships continued their bombardments, the French contingent was the only remnant of the MNF still ashore. On 29 February, the French proposal was defeated in the Security Council. In some quarters, France was criticized for pushing the proposal too quickly, allowing *insufficient time for a consensus to develop, and some felt that France would use the vote as a pretext for withdrawing its troops.* True or not, on 23 March 1984, President Mitterrand announced the imminent withdrawal of the French contingent, saying that "the mission that they are there for has been fulfilled and we cannot be one of the factors intervening in what is a Civil War". [193]

By the end of March the mission was all over. At the weekly meetings of the MNFII coordinating committees [194] schedules for that month were cancelled and at the end of the month the Government of President Amin Gemayel officially dissolved the Multinational Force. On 30 March 1984 President Reagan announced that the American role had formally ended, and the next day troops of the French contingent embarked at Beirut's port. Although their departure was heralded by a military band, and Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson and Defence Minister Charles Hernu were on hand to receive salutes, there was no hiding the fact that the MNF-II venture had been discredited. In regard to its primary objective to restore the sovereignty and extend the influence of the Lebanese government, the second Multinational Force left behind a government whose authority had diminished since their arrival in 1982, an whose area of influence had shrunk considerably. It could be argued that they had also failed to protect the Palestinians; however, this particular factor of their failure is open to a number of counter arguments. Finally, the American-sponsored 17 May Agreement between Israel and Lebanon was abandoned.

[193] *Washington Post*, 24 March 1984, p.A.2.

[194] As was the case with MNF-I, coordination was provided through the liaison and coordination committee which met regularly under Lebanese Government Chairmanships and included Ambassadors and Contingent Commanders from the contributing countries, as well as Lebanese Armed Forces representatives. In addition, there were regular meetings of the subsidiary military committee, at which such matters as the patrol programme were determined. Liaison Officers from the Lebanese Armed Forces were attached to each contingents, and the contingents provided officers to man a central operations room at the Presidential Palace.

These issues among others we shall return to below, suffice it to say, with the MNF-II out of his country, President Gemayel had few options before him. [195] The option he chose was to go to Syria and confer with President Assad. It was clear that Gemayel's political survival was dependent upon his cancelling the security agreement with Israel, despite Israeli warnings that they would stay indefinitely in Southern Lebanon if this happened. [196] In early March of 1984, Gemayel agreed to scrap the 17 May agreement, and Junblatt and Berri dropped their demands that he resign. Gemayel and his opponents once again travelled to Switzerland, where they held more unsuccessful talks on 'National Reconciliation' and 'unity'. It seemed clear that Syria held the strongest hand and would dictate the terms of any possible settlement.

[195] According to reports in the Beirut press, Wadi Haddad, then a top advisor to President Gemayel, had asked the Reagan Administration to provide American air and naval firepower to defeat any new military attacks by the government's Syrian-backed opponents. But a frustrated Shultz was understood to have told Haddad his hands were tied, and this prompted Gemayel to go to Damascus. See *An-Nahar*, February 24, 1984; *The Daily Star*, February 27, 1984.

[196] Jim Muir, 'The Stark Options Facing Reagan and Gemayel', *Middle East International*, February 17, 1984, pp.6-8.

CHAPTER SIX

The Multinational Force in Beirut: Peacekeeping,

Intervention or Peacemaking?

In Chapter five an attempt was made to provide the reader with a descriptive account of the War of 1982 and, in so doing, to highlight the political, diplomatic and military circumstances leading to the decision to send the Multinational Force to Lebanon (MNF), the nature of its mandate and the ultimate disposition of its operation. In this Chapter an analysis and assessment is intended of the experiment of MNF which in many ways underscores the primacy of the political in peacekeeping. In this context, the discussion explores the troubled issue of whether MNF was a 'peacekeeping force', an 'interventionist action', or an 'instrument or an adjunct of a policy designed for peacemaking'.

The complexity and nature of the environment for peacekeeping affect the appropriateness and effectiveness of tactics for peacekeeping. For instance, in an international conflict situation the use of a peacekeeping technique often involves the interposition of forces along salient lines of demarcation such as an international border or a cease-fire agreement. Whereas the insertion of a peacekeeping force into an internal or civil war situation must be tailored to the circumstances at hand, but remain distinct and distinguishable from the military tactics of the contending parties and those employed by intervention forces.

In such a setting, a peacekeeping force enters the area of operations with the consent of the host government and its mission is primarily to fulfill its mandate and not to support the policies of the host government especially when the latter, for example, although the legal government, is but one party to the internal conflict. As we shall see, the mandate of the second Multinational Force in Beirut (MNF-II) became a blurred one as the host government sought to get the MNF-II to support its policies rather than fulfill the mandate assigned to the Force. As a consequence, the MNF-II as a 'peacekeeping' venture was discredited.

As previously noted, one principle of peacekeeping is that an operation's mandate and assigned functions must be appropriate and reasonably unambiguous. There should be some rational, coherent, political and military strategy into which the peacekeeping function properly fits. Both times it entered

Beirut, the Multinational Force was vaguely obligated to assist in the "restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the government of Lebanon over the Beirut area." [1] The central difference, however, is that in the case of the first Multinational Force (MNF-I), this mandate was expressly linked to the withdrawal of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The real mandate of that operation was to relieve the Israeli siege of West Beirut and to monitor the evacuation of the PLO leadership, combatants and other personnel from Beirut, which, as a by-product, was to contribute to the restoration of government authority. As noted in the previous Chapter, the plan was for a thirty day deployment and the mission was effectively carried out in this respect. [2] Two paramount flaws in MNF-I operation, however, came to plague MNF-II. One was the ambiguity about the presumed obligations undertaken by the United States "to guarantee the safety of the Palestinian civilians" remaining in Beirut after the departure of the PLO, [3] and the other was the pressure for the earliest possible withdrawal from Beirut of MNF-I. Given the pressures to terminate the mission, the contingents were pulled out on 10 September 1982 (a little more than two weeks after they were deployed) and almost two weeks short of the thirty days envisaged in the mandate. In fact, less than a week after the Marines and other contingents of MNF-I arrived in Beirut, U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger declared the Marines "had accomplished their task". [4] Although not specifying when they would leave, the Defense Secretary saw no particular duty nor the need that would "require anyone to stay more than a few days". [5]

[1] See *Appendix*, for example of the Lebanon-USA Exchange of Letters, 25 September 1982, similar notes were concluded with the other MNF countries' governments.

[2] See *Appendix* for Lebanon: Plans for the PLO Evacuation from West Beirut.

[3] See *Appendix* for Exchange of Notes U.S.A.-Lebanon requesting U.S. contribution to MNF.

[4] *The New York Times*, 2 September 1982.

[5] *Ibid.*

It can only be speculated what might have happened if the first MNF had remained through the month, but clearly the premature departure was not unrelated to the course of events later. [6] The pressure brought to bear by Israel contributed indirectly to a sharper definition of MNF-I objectives, [7] which among other things constituted the difference between MNF-I and MNF-II. In retrospect, however, Israel's firm insistence on a prompt MNF-I withdrawal from Beirut proved to be a serious mistake. However, the insistence on MNF-I's early withdrawal was not solely that of the Israelis. According to Karim Pakradouni, pressures were also brought to bear:

"... [a]t an explicit request from Bashir Gemayel and President Sarkis it was decided that Bashir should not take over the Government in the presence of foreign troops on Lebanese soil, so the perception of Bashir, Sarkis and the Phalange was that this was a foreign army which came and performed a definite task which was to save Beirut from the Israeli destruction and to save Yasser Arafat from the fist of Israel ... The reaction was that it is better for Bashir to take oath without the presence of American and French troops on Lebanese soil, and that because our slogan that Bashir had launched for the whole of Lebanese solution was to get all the foreign armies out of Lebanon and we considered that their presence in Lebanon as foreign armies was not possible because after that we were to ask for the withdrawal of the Syrians, the Israelis and the Palestinian armies that was from Bashir's position." [8]

Had the first Multinational Force remained in Beirut for the duration of the thirty day mandate for its deployment until the central government found its feet in the Western sector of the city, it would not have prevented the assassination of President-elect Bashir Gemayel. Yet there is reason to believe that it would have successfully averted the subsequent Sabra and Shatilla massacres.

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- [6] Naomi Weinberger, 'Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon', *Middle East Journal*, Summer 1983, p.357. Weinberger quotes former Lebanese Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam, a party to the negotiations on the agreement, as charging that "without any formal notice, they [the Americans] withdrew against the engagement they gave us and they gave the Palestinians ... They left too soon and they were responsible no doubt for those ... horribles massacres ...". It is worth recalling, however, that during the negotiations in July on conditions for departure of the troops and leaders, the PLO demanded that an international force serve alongside the Lebanese army to guarantee the safety of Palestinian civilians remaining in Beirut; but such a provision, linking the MNF's deployments to such a guarantee was not part of the agreement between the Lebanese government and the contributing countries nor of the departure plan. Whether oral assurances or a separate written guarantee for the safety of civilians were given is not known. In any event it should be noted that it was the Government of Lebanon and the Christian militia that initially opposed such a force. See *Appendix, Lebanon: Plan for the PLO Evacuation from West Beirut*. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs Current Policy No. 415.
- [7] In the case of MNF-I the mandate and mission of the force were politically and militarily precise, well defined and feasible, judged worthwhile by all parties, limited in time and, very importantly, understood more or less in the same way by all those concerned. Arguably this characteristic of MNF-I formed a core reason for its success. See *Appendix* for the mandate establishing MNF-I.
- [8] Interview by the writer with Karim Pakradouni, Vice-Chairman of the Maronite Christian Lebanese Forces, was senior advisor and confidant to both Lebanese ex-President Sarkis and to the late President-elect Bashir Gemayel. Beirut, 15 November 1988.

By withdrawing prematurely, the MNF-I failed in the second part of its mission - the protection of Palestinian and other civilians. As a consequence the effective responsibility for supervising the security of the Palestinian civilians was transferred to the Lebanese Government. However, in some respects it could be argued that the moral responsibility for their welfare still lay with the MNF-I contributors, in particular the United States, since the Lebanese Government was evidently unable to exert much influence in Beirut even before the Israeli invasion. It was expecting a lot to imagine that its effectiveness would increase during the brief period of MNF-I's mission especially in view of the known hostility of the Maronite Christian militias towards the Palestinians, militias from which the Beirut government derived considerable support.

Moreover, Israel's success in the war was at its peak when the first Multinational Force was posted to Beirut. Then the PLO evacuation was effected, while Israel's ally, Bashir Gemayel, was elected President of Lebanon. When the second Multinational Force came, however, the Lebanon War was in a state of decline. Israel was thoroughly shaken by the massacre of Palestinians by Christian militias entering the camps under the aegis of the Israeli army. The pressure of public opinion in Israel against the War swelled to unusual proportions. It called for a quick withdrawal from Lebanon, the sacking of the Defence Minister and for a Commission of Enquiry on the War. At the same time, international public opinion mounted against Israel. [9] The assassination of Bashir Gemayel demonstrated that the chances of Israel achieving its far-reaching war objectives were fading fast. Up to that point, the Reagan Administration was prepared to come to terms with the war and reap its benefits, a subject to which we shall return, but then the United States decided to take more stringent measures to demonstrate its repudiation of certain Israeli actions in Lebanon.

Under such circumstances, the emotional factor prevalent - most especially in the wake of the assassination of the President-elect and the massacres at Sabra and Shatilla - should not be discounted. Lebanon was in turmoil, and the need for some kind of stabilizing influence was most apparent. Nearly all interested parties either supported or tolerated the decision for the return of the Multinational Force which in effect was an American decision in a period of Lebanese political vacuum. It was also

[9] For a more detailed discussion refer to Chapter five.

an expression of U.S. and Western commitment in Lebanon and the Middle East, designed to maintain an effective crisis management role and dissuade the Soviets and their allies in the region. The views of Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss are unwavering and to the point:

"... [I]t was really obvious that America wanted to promote or develop a role in Lebanon and the atmosphere in Lebanon beginning with the mandate of former President Amin Gemayel was amenable to that sort of initiative. So they undertook and the Lebanese government then went along. It was no secret the MNF came under American leadership and American initiative. The British came a little late on the scene but it was upon the request of the American administration." [10]

Be that as it may, the Americans made the cardinal error as other MNF contingents did, of bringing with them not just a generalized mandate but a whole system of western ideas and values which were to be grafted onto the Lebanese reality. If Gemayel was elected then Lebanon would be a democracy which had to be defended, thus the importance of those adjectives 'free, independent and sovereign'. Was not Lebanon to be defended like all other democracies? Were not the enemies of the MNF-II the enemies of democracy and were they not indeed supported by the Syrians who were supported by the Soviets? [11]

Most mandates tend to be encrusted in generalities, rhetorical messages and symbolic expressions. The mission of a peacekeeping force is what it actually sets out to do. In the case of MNF-II, the mandate and mission became different almost from the beginning. The MNF-II mandate with its clauses concerning "an interposition force at agreed locations" and "restoration of Lebanese sovereignty", [12] reflected a severe under-estimation of Beirut as a peacekeeping theatre, the nature of the sectarian conflicts within the city and the structural vulnerabilities of the Lebanese government and army. Arguably when the MNF-II ceased to 'interpose' between the Lebanese, Israelis, Syrians and the PLO and switched its attention to interposing between the warring militias, its mandate became

[10] Interview by this writer with Salim al-Hoss, Beirut, 19 November 1988.

[11] In an interviews to counter growing American demands for withdrawal of the Marines, President Gemayel said that this would mean the end of democracy in Lebanon and would endanger Western interests in the Middle East. If the Marines went, "there would not be a new President to replace Amin Gemayel but a Revolutionary Council under Soviet control". See *Washington Post*, 4 December 1983.

[12] See *Appendix* for Exchanges of Letters, Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros and Ambassador Dillon, 25 September 1982. Similar agreements were concluded with France, Italy and Britain. The mandate as organized above is distilled from these instruments since it is nowhere clearly spelt out.

inappropriate if not impossible. But the inherent problems stemming from this factor were gravely compounded by a range of other factors.

Although MNF-I had been a carefully organized force, with a detailed plan and clear orders, the same cannot be said for MNF-II. Well-placed Lebanese and Americans describe the Force variously as an attempt to fill a policy void, an emotional and reactive response to a tragic event, as an attempt to salvage the Reagan Plan of September 1, 1982, or as a bold move by the United States to assert American influence and put Lebanon together again and secure the withdrawal of all foreign forces. In such a move this meant that the United States would use its influence and put great pressure on Israel and Syria to agree to troop withdrawals and for Gemayel to agree to internal reforms in Lebanon, but none of them claim the MNF-I's mission or rationale was carefully drawn. For as subsequent events seemingly demonstrate, such a bold posture was not possible unless the United States and its MNF-II partners were to assume a much wider role throughout Lebanon than any of them wanted. It would have meant introducing U.S. ground forces, as distinct from the Marines, and being prepared, if necessary, to give an ultimatum to the Syrians and the Israelis to withdraw.

From this point of view, MNF-II erred with the idea of attaining wide and unrealistic objectives which were defined in a general way, making them both politically and militarily nebulous. Giving assistance to "restoring Lebanese sovereignty" was too vague a definition, especially when it concerned a country where there were foreign troops and scores of armed militias in addition to Lebanon's own army. As such, the objectives were unrealistic since the Lebanese government existed on paper only. Despite some symbols, such as the presidential palace and an army consisting of units of the various communities, it, in fact, had no control over the territory even before the Israeli invasion. For years the Beirut government could not maintain law and order in the country and was helpless in the face of the plethora of militias and armed elements. Those who devised the MNF-II had the mistaken idea that by its very presence, the MNF could help the central government. As Richard Murphy was to recount:

"... [S]ymbolic is one of the ways we saw MNF's presence and we assumed that - as it turned out incorrectly - this symbolic role would be acceptable and desirable for the Lebanese and not just President Gemayel ... But it did not work like so many other things have not worked in Lebanon." [13]

Yet by undertaking these missions MNF-II became a party to the Lebanese internal conflict and was dragged into the Lebanese civil war unawares, which in itself made the mission impossible and turned many groups against the MNF-II. When the Americans participated in the negotiations and in the signing of the May 17 peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon - a subject we shall return to - they "compromised their role". As Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss contends:

"... the fact that they came here at the request of the official authorities, the government of former President Amin Gemayel could not keep himself above the conflict. He was a direct party to the conflict. The Multinational Force aligned itself naturally, identified itself with the official authorities and before long found themselves as party to the conflict ..." [14]

Even if the Gemayel government had been above the internal conflict and more capable, the mission undertaken by the MNF-II bordered on the impossible. Unlike MNF's first tour of duty which initially enjoyed consensus on the assumption that it was coming to interpose between the withdrawing forces and protect the refugee camps, MNF-II found itself in a conflictual environment where some of the parties involved rejected it. For example, Marwan Hamadeh, a key advisor to Druze leader Walid Junblatt and a former cabinet minister himself, stated his community's position as follows:

"We [the Druze] have not launched a war against Washington and its European allies. When the Multinational Force *first* came to Beirut, we were not against it. We thought it was coming as a buffer force to protect civilians, and protect civil and democratic rights in Beirut. A few months later, the Multinational Force began to deviate - though I would like to exclude the British and the Italians because they did not slip into the same errors as the Americans, and then the French alongside the Americans." [15]

In any case, the mistaken outline of MNF-II's objectives lead to a basic error in the use of military force in the existing conditions of the Lebanese arena. As will be elaborated below, the MNF-II was a

[13] Interview by this writer with Richard Murphy, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs in the Reagan Administration 1983-1989, London, 3 May 1989.

[14] Interview by this writer with Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss, Beirut, 19 November 1988.

[15] In an interview with Mona es-Said, *Monday Morning*, Beirut, English-language weekly, 20-26 February 1984, pp.56-62.

force which had become powerless. The firepower which was at the disposal of the force could not settle the conflict in the middle of a drawn-out civil war. Both Syria and Israel learned this from their own experience before the insertion of MNF-II in Lebanon.

The Misuse of Force and What of the Consequences

As was elaborated in Chapter two, peacekeeping is fundamentally more a political than a military undertaking, and its attributes are direct consequences of its political nature. At the core of the peacekeeping technique is the prohibition of the use of armed force to further the goals of the operation. The use of force is permitted only in self-defence, including resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties. Once resort to force outside this framework is made, the operation ceases to be 'peacekeeping' and becomes 'enforcement action'. More crucially, the operation will then probably have lost any reasonable chances of remedying the situation. It will cease to be above the conflict and will have become part of it.

The MNF-II managed to heed the principle for nearly a year, even while its soldiers endured harassment and attacks. The force operated under 'normal peacetime rules of engagement'. In late August 1983, the American Marines first engaged in combat, but a case could be made that this action was taken in self-defence. The early September 'show of force' warplane flights over Beirut could be described as threats of force, but this too is arguable. Whether the warship shelling on the mainland during early September 1983 in response to Druze gunfire on the Marines was part of the MNF-II and included under the self-defence umbrella is yet another question.

What is not in much doubt is that on 12 September, when the Reagan Administration gave the Marines authority to order naval artillery and air strikes 'to help the Lebanese army', that authority was then employed although the defence of Suq al-Gharb was in keeping with MNF-II objectives and was a necessary step in returning sovereignty to Lebanon. However, the MNF-II, and especially the Americans, were clearly out of the peacekeeping business. Contrary to the official position of the U.S. government, the combat involvement was direct military support and not self-defence. The Marines' position was not endangered during the battle for Suq al-Gharb. Though it is doubtful that 'defensive' naval gunfire to protect the Marines was ever perceived as a logical act of a neutral force, the gunfire at

Suq al-Gharb could only be that of a partisan and intervention force. The assessment of the Druze leader, Walid Junblatt, does little to mitigate such doubt:

It is very purely technical issue. I mean if you were to mention this issue it is very difficult to say it is self-defence or not self-defence. We were also in the position of self-defence because we were faced in the area next to the airport. We can see the Lebanese army positions and Americans and the Marines were hitting at us was firing to us. How could we differentiate between the American attitude and the Lebanese army attitude. It was really impossible ... really impossible." [16]

In any event, the Americans, and to a lesser extent the French, tried to substitute military power for authoritative peacekeeping as the anti-Gemayel opposition factions questioned, and in their turn challenged, its authority. Attempts to respond to these challenges by force - the only means available to the MNF-II most especially the American and French units - converted its role from third-party peacekeeping to factional participant. Indeed, so blatant had been the U.S. backing for the Lebanese army (seen by all other factions as a party to the conflict) that Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss renamed the marines *Itt'had Ishtiraki Quwwat Reagan* (in brief, "Reagan's Forces"), or in other words, just another local party to the Lebanon conflict. [17]

The United States did argue that the military success of the Lebanese army was "essential to the safety of the Marines", but this stretches the concept of self-defence beyond its bounds. [18] In fact, an irony that needs to be illuminated here is that the MNF-II mandate provided that the Lebanese army would "ensure the protection" of MNF-II personnel. Lebanese protection of the force was - in the words of the Long Commission - a "condition precedent" to the insertion of American troops. [19] Thus, one purpose of US ground, air and naval fire was to 'assist' the Lebanese army to protect the Marines. Even if the self-defence provision extended to protection of the other MNF-II contingents, and even if the concept of 'pre-emptive' self-defence is acceptable, this grant of authority ended a true peacekeeping role for the United States. The 7 February 1984 authorization went even further,

[16] Interview by this writer with Walid Junblatt, Beirut, 18 November 1988.

[17] Cited in *Al-Safir*, Beirut Arabic daily, 14 September 1983.

[18] See *Appendix* for the Report of the Department of Defense Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 (the Long Commission Report), 20 December 1983.

[19] *Ibid.*

dropping any pretence of a self-defence argument. Virtually any action which might further the goals of the overall operation could be justified in the same way, and it is precisely that fact to which the non-use of force principle is addressed.

Peacekeeping forces do not make policy; they reflect and suffer the policies of their governments and sponsors. If the premises for those policies are flawed, the peacekeepers can only deal with the consequences of the defects; they cannot do more. Peacekeepers cannot make peace, they can only buy time. Even in an inflammable setting like Lebanon, the tendency is for the deployed peacekeeping force to give an illusion of freezing the situation. In point of fact, the situation is seldom frozen and it certainly was not in Lebanon. In other words, the MNF-II was imposed on top of a developing and dynamic situation that posed difficult problems for diplomats, problems which were no less urgent by virtue of MNF-II's presence. If the MNF-II came to be seen as part of the problem, rather than a means to a solution, it is because the force could only facilitate diplomacy, it could not be a substitute for it.

The *misuse* of force would obviously never have come about if progress of the kind envisioned at the outset of the Multinational Force's second deployment in Lebanon had been achieved. There are, of course, limits on the ability of any power to influence the course of events. This, however, only illustrates the enormous distance between the goals of the MNF-II countries in Lebanon and the steps they were prepared to take to attain those goals. If the United States was prepared to go so far as to bombard Lebanon in order to achieve MNF's goals, as it eventually did, then perhaps it should have pressed much, much harder for a political victory in the early period. For as Pakradouni contended, albeit retrospectively:

"...[I]f the political plan that the Multi-National Force in Beirut worked for had succeeded and took quick advantage of its success because the time factor is very important in this matter then the 'MNF' could have been a successful plan and I declare that it did not fail in the technical of military sense but rather in the political sense." [20]

How might things have turned out if Israeli forces had withdrawn in 1982, and the MNF-II had

[20] Interview by this writer with Karim Pakradouni, Beirut, 15 November 1988.

somehow temporarily filled the void? This admittedly is not so much a lesson based on the Multinational Force as on the circumstances of Lebanon, where insufficient attention was paid to the fact that shifting factions and changing alliances had allowed fleeting opportunities to slip away. Here we are pointedly focusing on the shelling and misuse of firepower during the Mountain War of September 1983, and not on the devastating terrorist attacks of October 1983, because the latter were in no small part a reaction to the former. Without these spectacular attacks, the final days of the MNF-II might have been different and might have come later than they did.

Some American Marine officers told journalists in the days before they left Beirut that it was the Israeli withdrawal from the Shouf mountains in September 1983 that doomed MNF-II; that after the Israeli withdrawal, the battles between Druze and Phalange would inevitably involve the Americans as well. Yet the fighting in the Shouf was going on for months before the Israeli withdrawal. Nor does the argument take account of Syrian ruthlessness, not to say cynicism. Once the Americans had become engaged in combat with Muslim militias, the Syrians were free to increase the stakes with comparatively little cost to themselves. The Soviets, realizing that Beirut bay was fast becoming a NATO base, were in no mood to restrain Syrian enthusiasm for an American debacle. Indeed, Syria and the Soviets did not believe that getting the MNF-II to pull out would, as some in the Reagan Administration claimed, give them the Middle East. [21] Damascus and Moscow saw in the MNF-II presence in Beirut a chance to "play cat to the American mouse", knowing that the U.S. and the MNF-II, weary of taking casualties on behalf of the Gemayel regime, would inevitably throw in the towel. [22] Syria was prepared to stay the course and carry the costs of the naval bombardments. In return, the Syrians portrayed themselves to the rest of the world as "the good guy resisting the bully", and as the battles went on, the ambassadors of Italy and Britain could be seen in Damascus, explaining to the Syrians that their contingents were not involved in the fighting. [23]

To assert that the MNF-II role had been transformed from peacekeeping to enforcement is not to

[21] *Al-Safir*, Beirut Arabic daily, 16 February 1984.

[22] *Ibid.*, 16 February 1984, reported in a lengthy article with the following title: 'Murphy's Calculation - Withdrawal of Marines: Loss of the Middle East!?'.

[23] *Al-Nahar*, Beirut Arabic daily, 2 December 1983.

say that *per se* it failed. To be sure, the managers and sponsors of MNF-II were faced with an overwhelming array of political and military problems. Evaluating those decisions on the basis of whether they conformed to the principles of peacekeeping is not as prudent as saying that those decision makers could not seemingly decide, up to the very end, if they were 'keeping the peace', or fighting a war, or both, or neither. It is equally debatable whether a United Nations force would have been more successful in the same circumstances, although the U.N. would probably not have been the target of such hostility.

Why not a United Nations Force

One aspect that emerges from the decision to send the MNF back into Beirut involves an alternative to that decision. There was one viable alternative that probably should have been given more serious consideration. Here reference is made to the use of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in lieu of the Multinational Force. This option was indeed supported to some degree in the beginning by the United States and some other relevant parties such as the Lebanese government of President Sarkis, and the United Nations itself was standing ready to move UNIFIL troops northwards. In this regard, a U.N. Security Council resolution 521 requested the Secretary General as a matter of urgency to consult with the Government of Lebanon and others on the possible deployment of U.N. forces to assist the central government "in ensuring full protection for the civilian population in and around Beirut". [24] There was no follow up, the Gemayel government preferred the 'clout' of a United States, French and Italian presence, and Israel was unimpressed with the argument. The Reagan administration could probably have influenced these two parties had it tried seriously, but it was not particularly disposed to press hard for a United Nations role. For the atmosphere was one such that even if the U.N. option should have been proposed at the time "there might have been some vetoes", Hoss continues:

[24] See United Nations Security Council Resolution 521, 1982, 19 September.

It was not proposed officially and there was a deliberate attempt to circumvent the U.N. But that was not really the issue. It was not really the issue because at stake was the need to face up to the Israelis particularly. You would have to think of a force whose constitution would be in a position to face up to the Israelis specifically. This could not have been possible nor feasible if a U.N. force was composed or constituted, in the way we know traditionally. Much of any U.N. force or international force as the one we have in the South under the label UNIFIL, much of it comes from the Third World countries or less than major world powers - friendly nations in Europe etc., but not the major powers. In that case who would guarantee that such a force would be effective. You see it cannot be effective so the presence of such forces as in the Multinational Force: Americans, British, French, Italians, etc. would carry the kind of weight the Israelis cannot ignore. So it had to be composed in a way that the traditional U.N. force is not usually. If a U.N. force was to be formed, I am sure there would be no Americans, British, and such like powers. There might be Swedish, Norwegian, there would be Indians... [25]

Yet in the aftermath of the invasion and the PLO expulsion from Beirut, the Israelis had no wish to see a United Nations presence or operation maintained in Lebanon. The cost to the Israelis in casualties, domestic opposition and international opinion may have been too high for them to hand over the fruits of the invasion to a body they saw as deeply hostile to Israel. Moreover, the invasion had resulted in a major Soviet strategic retreat in the entire Middle East. It was not altogether difficult for the Begin government to convince the Reagan administration of the folly of permitting a Soviet re-entry, through the back door, with a Security Council veto. As Prime Minister Salim Al-Hoss stated in an interview with the writer, "never before in modern history had the aggressor been permitted to dictate the form and composition of the peacekeeping force its aggression had made necessary". [26] If it be so, this poses the question of what effect, if any, did this have on the fortunes of the Multinational Force's mission, and was the absence of an international authority, for example, the United Nation's Security Council, relevant?

It is most interesting to note that the MNF-II was not seen as a peacekeeping venture that should be thought of as *excluding* a role for the U.N. The U.S. Congressional Joint Resolution (S.J. Resolu-

[25] Interview by this writer with Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss, Beirut, November 1988.

[26] Interview by the author with Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss, Beirut, 19 November 1988.

tion 159, October 21 1983) entitled *Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution*, which was needed to give statutory authorization under the War Powers Act for continuing the U.S. presence in MNF-II, makes a clear call for efforts to get the U.N. involved. The Resolution states (Section 5c) that

"It is the sense of the Congress that, not later than one year after the date of enactment of this joint resolution and at least once a year thereafter, the United States should discuss with other members of the Security Council of the United Nations the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping force to assume the responsibilities of the Multinational Force in Lebanon." [27]

Yet, there was a clear design to avoid the involvement of the Soviet Union, because of its inevitable major role in any U.N. action. In fact, when the idea of deploying an international force to Beirut was first considered in July 1982, the Soviet Union announced that it would support the use of a United Nations' force necessary for peacekeeping, but objected to the injection of U.S. forces into the area. [28] That is an important point to note because the United States would later (in February 1984) excuse its failure to arrange a U.N. solution by claiming that the Soviet Union had blocked its (U.S.) preference for a United Nations force. Although the U.S. was right on the point, it had preferred a U.N. solution, but it was Israel that opposed the proposal and not the Soviet Union. Be that as it may, when the operations of the Multinational force took place, "... it was carried out outside the U.N., that is to say, without an international decision emanating from the U.N., and that is because the United States wanted to take on her sole account the solution of the Lebanese problem without the participation of the Soviet Union because it wanted to link the Israeli military victory with an American political success and that as she did not want to give a role to the Soviet Union and it did not want that Israel monopolizes the whole role." [29] Indeed, had the U.N. option been endorsed the Soviet Union "was the first to offer to send its troops but the United States refused." [30]

[27] See *Appendix* for Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Public Law 98-119, 78th Congress, 97 Stat 805-808, October 12, 1983.

[28] *Christian Science Monitor*, July 21, 1982, p.2.

[29] Interview by the writer with Karim Pakradouni, Vice-Chairman of the Maronite Christian Lebanese Forces, who was senior advisor and confidant to both Lebanese ex-President Sarkis and to the late President-elect Bashir Gemayel, Beirut, 15 November 1988.

[30] *Ibid.*

In any event, Washington seemed confident that it was in a position to sponsor alone a settlement of the question, if unrestrained by the unpredictable limitations that the Security Council was likely to develop. This policy was exactly the opposite of what the United States resorted to in the wake of the Israeli invasion of March 1978. UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in South Lebanon) was then proposed to the Security Council by the U.S. Government, and the creation of the Force was made possible only through American sponsorship and support, in tacit agreement with the Soviet Union. Whereas UNIFIL had a claim to universality of representation, and was therefore committed to some form of international consensus, the MNF-II lacked the claim and the commitment, for the Security Council was merely informed of its formation and of its terms of reference. These were *not* the expressions of an international decision, but of multilateral negotiations that involved only the governments and parties concerned.

Hence, the commitment of MNF-II was to a policy not based on international consensus. The character of internationality or universality which the new peacekeeping force could have acquired through a U.N. consensus was overlooked for the sake of political efficacy, and greater freedom of action on policy objectives. In MNF's experience a change in the political context and in the balance of forces rendered the application of the basic rules of peacekeeping totally unrealistic. Indeed, the notions of 'acceptance by all parties' as a precondition for action, 'non-intervention in conflict' or the 'use of limited force in self-defence' against the unlimited use of force by 'non-legitimate armed elements' — those notions and others, became vexing problems for MNF-II and thus placed its components into difficult and somewhat ambivalent positions, a subject we shall return to when discussion is made of the roles of the MNF-II actors.

The sequence of misjudgements and misadventures meant that by the end of 1983, the MNF-II had lost its credibility and any attempt to patch it up as a 'peacekeeping' mechanism could not be expected to last for long, given its fragile political complexion. It was curious that it took the MNF-II contributing countries so long to realize that a United Nations force might have achieved what their troops failed to accomplish. They had no real training in peacekeeping — except the British who had served in the U.N. in Cyprus and the French who had contributed to UNIFIL — and no serious co-

ordination. There was no overall command. The larger the national force involved, the more its actions became circumscribed by outside interests. The Americans felt this most of all. It has already been said that U.S. diplomacy in Lebanon became "boxed in by the need to protect American soldiers and by pressure of public opinion to have the attacks on them punished". [31] In the event, policy turned towards finding an honourable exit.

The Gemayel government wanted some international presence and saw the United Nations as the only option — but it was too late. True, by the end of 1983 a consensus had emerged both in the West and at the U.N. that stabilizing the central and northern sectors of Lebanon over the longer range would require replacing the MNF-II with a U.N.-affiliated presence. Some favoured U.N. observers, but opinion crystallized around the conviction that only a U.N. peacekeeping force like UNIFIL (and perhaps drawn from UNIFIL) held any promise of stabilizing the crisis once the MNF-II disengaged.

Against this background, France took the lead in the diplomatic effort to pick up the shattered pieces of the West's policy in Lebanon by working to have United Nations' forces brought in to replace the MNF, and its initiative picked up wide support, particularly from the British, Italian, Egyptian and Netherlands delegations at the U.N. The United States had been cautious about the idea, wary of sending wrong signals to Syria and admitting defeat for its policy. It favoured the proposal in principle but with the caveat that the wishes of the Beirut government was the critical element and, in any event, that the U.N. option was workable only if factional fighting were brought under control and the political situation in Beirut stabilized. The U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar endorsed the proposal subject to certain prerequisites being satisfied; (1) not only would the Lebanese government have to issue a formal request, but a political arrangement would have to be devised to assure the cooperation of all warring factions; (2) a durable political consensus would need to be mustered for Security Council authorization and mandate, including Soviet assent to withhold the veto; and (3) troops would have to come from countries that were acceptable to all parties. Since the Syrian-backed factional leaders opposed any third-party involvement in Lebanon at that time, it was clear that points (1) and (3) would not be satisfied. In this respect, the comments of Salim al-Hoss are pertinent:

[31] Jonathan Power, 'A U.N. Force has a Few Advantages'; *International Herald Tribune*, (Paris), December 29-30, 1984.

"Then you could not envision the possibility of a U.N. force coming to play a role in resolving the internal conflict in Lebanon. They have a very obvious mission to perform in South Lebanon. That is where we are facing up to occupation and an external enemy. They have a very specific role there to play, but I cannot envision their playing a role in internal affairs here. So if there ever has to be a solution in Lebanon it will not involve any external - I mean U.N. forces. [32]

Although the French draft resolution proposed to deploy a U.N. force in the Beirut area to monitor a recently-arranged cease fire and to protect civilians, once MNF-II had left Lebanese soil and territorial waters, and it was supported by the West and the nonaligned (except for India). By now, however, Syria and the Lebanese Muslim opposition elements were in the ascendancy, and were unwilling to invite a more neutral party to share control. Furthermore, amendments offered by the Soviet Union were patently unacceptable to the United States and France, particularly those calling for the immediate departure of the Multinational Force and cessation of U.S. naval bombardments (but not of Syrian artillery shelling Beirut to which the naval fire was in response). The result was retaliation on a scale that killed few militiamen but destroyed any residual Muslim sympathy.

In any event, on 29 February 1984, the Soviet Union vetoed the French sponsored resolution, thus blocking a constructive move that would help damp down conflict in the Beirut area and, from the standpoint of the MNF-II participants, provide cover for the MNF-II's departure. Many at the United Nations regarded the Soviet stand as a diplomatic mistake, but Moscow had its reasons. Apart from the usual reservations about peacekeeping, the U.S.S.R. opposed U.N. or any third-party intervention in internal conflicts where the recognized, legitimate government was pro-Western. An even more persuasive reason for Moscow was that a U.N. force replacing the MNF would extricate the United States and the West generally from the humiliating position into which it had been swept by the course of events. The Soviets used the veto to block a move to legalize "American armed interference in the affairs of another state". Replacing the "so-called multinational force" with a U.N. presence would just allow the transfer of the marines from shore to ships and give the White House an opportunity to continue bombing and shelling Lebanese territory.[33]

[32] Interview by this writer with Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss, Beirut, 19 November 1988.

[33] Soviet spokesman Sergey Losev quoted in *The Times*, London, 3 March 1984.

With the balance of forces moving in favour of the Syrian-backed Muslim militias and the Lebanese Army in disarray, any peacekeeping presence, even under UN auspices, was seen as working to the advantage of the Gemayel government. As Walid Junblatt, the Druze leader who had been among the Lebanese leaders welcoming the arrival of the MNF-II, told an interviewer for Beirut's *Al-Safir* at the end of January 1984: the MNF should withdraw unconditionally since it had come to represent support for a "hated system" and there was no need for a U.N. replacement even in the shape of unarmed observers since it would only cause the partition of Lebanon. [34] The time for third-party peacekeeping had passed.

The denouement dramatized an important principle in peacekeeping that the side that holds the weaker hand favours enlisting international peacekeepers in a conflict so as to halt a deterioration in its position. By the same token the side that perceives itself as winning resists the intervention of peacekeepers. Whether it succeeds in this strategy depends on the balance of political power in the Security Council. The events that unfolded in the Security Council in February 1984 demonstrated again that in *Third World conflicts, particularly internal conflicts, United Nations peacekeeping can be enlisted only when two factors are present: when the non-permanent majority in the Council, is united in favouring U.N. involvement (which was true in this case) and East-West concerns are not major factor in the conflict (which was not the case here).* The United States and the Soviet Union must agree that it is in their joint interest to insulate an area from superpower rivalry and that stability is to be preferred to gaining political and strategic advantage(s).

A Peacemaker in the Guise of a Peacekeeper

All four contributing countries to the second Multinational Force were NATO allies and some had prior historical involvements in Lebanon's contemporary history. Therefore, it was not surprising that each country should bring to its interpretation of the mandate its own particular blend of sympathies and vested interests. This discrepancy of interpretation was encouraged by the fact that MNF-II operated without political co-ordination or an integrated command, but it was American interests and

[34] *Al-Safir*, Beirut Arabic daily, 28 January 1984.

attitudes that most affected the eventual fate of MNF-II. Faulty political judgement certainly was one factor, but in relation to peacekeeping generally, a more important element was also involved. It can be argued that the central reason why the MNF-II failed so dismally was because it became militarily subordinated to the implementation of an American policy designed to establish Lebanon as a unified western oriented state at peace with Israel. In pursuit of this objective, nearly all the accepted rules of peacekeeping were broken and replaced by attempts to enforce a particular version of 'peace' against massive opposition and the intractable hostility of Syria.

That Lebanon was more or less able to maintain sovereignty over its disputed territory during some thirty years of independence despite the vicissitudes of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the spasmodic politics of pan-Arabism is perhaps more surprising than the eventual collapse of its sovereign and territorial integrity. Certainly Lebanon's political integrity was not the consequence of its military power nor its diplomatic skill. It was rather the product of the regional and international constellation of forces which contrived to maintain the Lebanese political entity - for both positive and negative reasons. Even in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon could not be fully on one side or the other. True, it is an Arab State, a member of the Arab League, but the Arabs always accepted the fact that Lebanon cannot play a role like, say, Syria. This was not the problem: it has always been an accepted fact for the Arabs and the West. The problem lay in the fact that while some governments wished to see Lebanon persist, others wished to deny their opponents some potential advantages which might result from a diminution of Lebanese sovereignty.

Since the viability of the Lebanese State was an indispensable component of the arrangement which provided a 'buffer' separating Israel and Syria, its collapse since 1975 caused consternation in both Damascus and Tel Aviv. Although Syria and Israel each benefitted in their relations with one another from the continued existence of the Lebanese State, neither expended many resources towards maintaining that buffering function. Indeed, this buffer role was not the conscious and rationally chosen goal of Lebanese foreign policy. It was rather the consequence of systemic features, including both the pressure of external forces and a significant internal effort to maintain independence. The internal political breakdown of the Lebanese State threatened the buffer arrangement and compelled

both Israel and Syria to seek new ways of protecting respective interests which had been served by the presence of an independent Lebanon. While each considered the possibility and in fact has tried to establish a puppet government that would serve its own purposes, neither persisted when they realized their rival was capable of a vigorous challenge within Lebanon itself. As a consequence, Israel consistently sought to keep both the Lebanese government and Lebanese territory neutral in the Palestine conflict, while Syria sought to prevent Israel from gaining any strategic advantage by means of the use of Lebanese territory.

A Peacekeeping force must tread a fine line, avoiding provocation as well as appeasement. How did the Multinational Force deal with this dilemma? It did not. The U.S. policy of "restoring the sovereignty of Lebanon" ignored the fact that this sovereignty was vested in a Maronite Christian presidency and army whose initial political power had come about as a direct result of the Israeli invasion of 6 June 1982 and Israel's relationship with Christian Phalangist militia - of which Bashir and Amin Gemayel were leading figures. Only the Italians pursued the original objective of the MNF's return - to protect the Palestinians who survived the September 1982 massacres. There was *no* long-term policy, only short-term political objectives which immediately became muddled by U.S. interest in a new Washington-Tel Aviv strategic alliance. [35]

If there had been any doubt about this, detractors had only to listen to what U.S. Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger had to say in Jerusalem in November, 1983. He offered to "reinvigorate the strategic dialogue" with Israel — previously suspended after Israel's raid on Iraq's nuclear reactor and Israel's invasion of Lebanon. [36] It seemed that after a year of friction — even after the Israeli harassment around Beirut of which the Marines had complained — Israel and the United States were returning to full co-ordination, especially over Lebanon. Moshe Arens, the Israeli Defence

[35] According to former President Jimmy Carter, the Reagan Administration failed "... to recognize the very important role that Syria must play in any overall settlement of the Middle East dispute, in particular that related to Lebanon". Another wrong step was the agreement reached between Reagan and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to upgrade military ties. The strategic-cooperation accords included a decision to set up a U.S.-Israeli committee to consider combined military planning, joint maneuvers and stockpiling of American equipment in Israel. As for the Marines' presence and the MNF it should be "either replaced by a U.S. force or ... by a more neutral force, because I think the American presence has lost its element of neutrality". Interview with Mona es-Said, *Monday Morning*, Beirut, 9-15 January 1984.

[36] Indeed, following Israel's signing of the U.S. mediated agreement with Lebanon, U.S.-Israeli relations improved markedly and the U.S. government decided to release the seventy-five F-16 fighter bombers for sale to Israel. See report by John Goshko, *Washington Post*, May 17, 1983.

Minister then hinted that Israel might co-ordinate military action with the United States in Lebanon. And there was little doubt about the soil on which such policies could flourish. The agreement of May 17, 1983, Eagleburger told Arens, "is essential. We value it and we stand by it. We will defend the May 17th agreement". [37]

To the Muslim groups, the message seemed clear. The MNF-II was now an instrument of U.S.-Israeli policy. Eagleburger actually spoke of co-operating with Israel on problems in Lebanon and it was announced that an Israeli delegation would go to Washington within a month to discuss strategic co-operation. It was therefore inevitable that America's strengthened ties with Israel would be regarded as an identity of interests. Whatever Israel did now in Lebanon would be seen also as an American act. If ever the 17 May agreement was fated to collapse, it was now.

In any event, the May 17 agreement was all the more unacceptable to the anti-government opposition because it was a way of closing the door on national reconciliation in Lebanon and on some kind of a compromise with Syria under which the latter would withdraw its troops along with the remaining elements of armed Palestinians. [38] This would make it possible for the Lebanese state to extend its authority into the areas which would be evacuated by the withdrawal of foreign forces. However, as neither the Syrians nor the Palestinians were a party to the treaty, it was unclear how their removal would be guaranteed.

Syria and the Multinational Force

By continuing to keep its troops in Lebanon, Syria was seeking to pressure the Lebanese government of President Amin Gemayel to grant Damascus security guarantees similar to the ones Israel obtained in the U.S. sponsored 17 May Agreement. The Syrian regime was concerned that Israel had gained security advantages in South Lebanon which infringed Lebanese sovereignty and unity as well as the security of Syria and all the Arabs. In a newspaper interview at the time, Assad declared:

[37] U.S. Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, quoted in the *New York Times*, 3 November 1983.

[38] The opposition of Syria, an important factor in any genuine, comprehensive Lebanese settlement provided early warning of the difficulties that lay ahead. In a speech, broadcast by Damascus radio 29 June 1983, President Assad declared: "We want Lebanon to be an independent and unified state. We do not want it Israeli but Arab. The conditions imposed on Lebanon in the agreement have not been imposed on any state in the world, not even those which were entirely occupied and crushed as was Germany during World War Two." Reported in *Monday Morning*, 4th July 1983, p.37.

"It is a mistake for anyone to believe or think, that we will ever leave Lebanon as a morsel which it is easy for the Israelis to swallow because Lebanon is an Arab country to which we are bound by a common history and a common destiny." [39]

Although the Israelis could live with a Syrian zone of influence in Lebanon, an Israeli zone of influence was unacceptable to the Syrians because they were the weaker of the two. [40] For Syria's military planners Lebanon's territory is of great importance. Syria's line of defence (both before and after June 1982) could be outflanked by an Israeli force coming through Lebanese territory and attacking Syria from its soft western underbelly. In the words of one former American Ambassador to Damascus, "there is a real concern in Syria about any issue effecting the position or the ability of Israel to enhance its military position is seen as a clear danger to Syria ... they may not be right but they think that in seeing the Lebanese agreement in that way". [41] In offensive terms Syria (or other Arab) troops stationed in Lebanon could activate a dormant front, improve Syria's posture vis-à-vis Israel, and force the Israelis to allocate to the Lebanese border units which otherwise would have been deployed or used on the Syrian front. For such reasons among others, Damascus was committed to preventing Lebanon from becoming a satellite pro-western country that could join with Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in forming a 'moderate' alliance that could reduce Syria's influence in the region. To this effect "... Syria adopted a strategic position in the region related to a position against the Camp David accords. If Syria agrees on the 17 May agreement then it will have no argument not to accept the Camp David agreement and not to accept the return of Egypt to the Arab League and not to accept that Israeli-Syrian negotiations take place in the Golan". [42]

What angered the Syrians was that their presence in Lebanon should be rated by the Gemayel government in the same category as that of Israel's. They could, indeed, have pointed to the 1976

[39] Assad interview with Lally Weymouth, *Los Angeles Times*, 14 August 1983.

[40] In an apparent reference to the 17 May Agreement's provision for a "security zone" for Israel in South Lebanon, the Syrian President declared: "We cannot allow Israel to be 20 kilometres from Damascus as laid down in the Israeli-American agreement which they are trying to impose on Lebanon." President Hafiz al-Assad quoted in 'Who will fill the Vacuum?', *Monday Morning*, Beirut English-language weekly, 4 July 1983, p.17.

[41] Interview by this writer with Richard Murphy, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs in the Reagan Administration 1983-1989, London, 3rd May 1989.

[42] Interview by this writer with Karim Pakradouni, Beirut, 15 November 1988.

Lebanese government which invited a Syrian presence, whereas the Israelis were invaders. Alleging that the 17 May agreement rewarded Israel in effect for its invasion, Syria and its Lebanese allies accused the Gemayel government of scuttling hopes of any political reconciliation and igniting fresh strife in collusion with American and Israeli leaders. By then it was absolutely essential for the Gemayel government to show within a reasonable period of time that it could achieve at least the beginnings of a withdrawal plan. However, when Syria stiffened its terms on the question of withdrawal and made it known that it would consider quitting Lebanon only if Israel pulled out unconditionally, if the Multinational Force withdrew, if Lebanon was ruled by a government of national unity and if the 17 May Agreement was torn up, it left Damascus with a virtual power of veto over the accord's implementation. Assad, the Syrian President, was emphatic when he declared "America master-minded this agreement. America has to abrogate it". [43] But the problem of how to get the Syrian army out of Lebanon remained unresolved. To cover themselves, the Israelis asked Washington for a private pledge, incorporated in a side letter, that they would not be obliged to implement the accord so long as the Syrian, and indeed Palestinian, forces had not withdrawn from Lebanon. [44]

One might wonder about the reasons that prompted the United States to 'mediate' the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations. Richard Murphy, at the time U.S. Under Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia Affairs, offered the following insight with respect to U.S. policy then:

"The Administration did not start trying to mediate an understanding between Lebanon and Israel on the assumption that Syria would move to destroy such an understanding. Obviously the administration thought that there was a serious prospect of developing a more stable situation in Southern Lebanon. I think as negotiations proceeded they grew into a more ambitious set of arrangements between Lebanon and Israel then may have been intended by Washington at least in its origins. There was also a constant reassurance to our negotiators by the Lebanese not to worry about Syria and that Lebanon was keeping Damascus fully informed on the scope and the progress of the negotiations so there would be no surprises. In fact, this seems not to have been done particularly in the last several weeks before the May 17 agreement was initialled." [45]

Even so, Washington's main error of judgement in its approach to the Lebanese dilemma lay in

[43] See Assad interview with Lally Weymouth, *Los Angeles Times*, 14 August 1983.

[44] *Al-Safir*, Beirut Arabic daily, 19 May 1983.

[45] Interview by the writer with Richard Murphy, United States Assistant-Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs in the Reagan Administration 1983-1989 London, 3 May 1989.

underestimating Syria's influence in a country with whom it has many genuine and historic ties. As the Shi'ite leader Nabih Berri remarked, "you may ignore history, but not geography", [46] but this geopolitical realism did not prevent the United States, or some of the Lebanese from adopting political paths designed to circumscribe Syria's influence.

In repeatedly assuring the world that Syria would withdraw its troops if a Lebanese-Israeli agreement was reached, the U.S., it can be said, mis-stated Syria's position. [47] Syrian leaders, especially President Hafiz al-Assad, had made it clear that its troops would leave Lebanon only after Israeli forces had withdrawn and then only if the Lebanese government's authority extended to the Israel-Lebanon border. But that condition was far from satisfied by the May 17 agreement; Israel had adamantly rejected an unconditional withdrawal, insisting instead on concessions that seriously compromised Lebanese sovereignty. One may well wonder at the value of an agreement with Lebanon to which Syria, the major force in that country, was not a party. Israel made its withdrawal from Lebanon conditional on a Syrian withdrawal but without asking the Syrians what they thought about the matter. Moreover, when it came to getting foreign forces to pull out the Gemayel government and the U.S. administration made the 'mistake' of putting all their efforts, early too much, on obtaining an Israeli-Lebanese agreement. In this connection, some remarks of Pakradouni are particularly pertinent in the present context. As Pakradouni recounts, had:

"the Americans had seen what Syria wants and what are the interests that she wants, because Syria disagrees to work on the basis of an Israeli-Syrian agreement and because of its opposition toward the Israeli-Egyptian agreement, such an agreement will fall down ... We are opposing the concept proper and told Philip Habib of our agreement to an opposite mechanism. We negotiate with Syria for the withdrawal and after that we negotiate with Israel. Because Israel agrees or might agree on a Syro-Lebanese agreement and can deal with it, whereas Syria cannot live with an Israeli-Lebanese agreement." [48]

In the Syrian view, why should the Syrians comply with an agreement from which they were

[46] Nabih Berri, the leader of the Shia Muslim Amal Militia, in conversation with the writer, Beirut, 19 November 1988.

[47] The United States, which somewhat naively had expected a Syrian withdrawal as soon as Israel agreed to one, now sought to assuage Syrian opposition in a letter from Reagan to Assad in which the U.S. President indicated that the United States was still pressing for Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. See report by David Landau, *Jerusalem Post*, April 22, 1983.

[48] Interview by this writer with Karim Pakradouni, Beirut, 15 November 1988.

excluded? Syria had warned the Reagan Administration well in advance that it would reject any agreement giving Israel political and military gains in Lebanon. In a speech to the Syrian Parliament, the then Foreign Minister Abdel-Halim Khaddum said Syria officially informed the United States on 26 April 1983 that "any gains that Israel will achieve in Lebanon will lead to the prolongation of the Syrian army's stay until those gains are eliminated." [49] It should have been obvious, therefore, that the Americans would have to exercise some diplomacy with the Assad regime. Astonishingly, the U.S. Administration decided initially to ignore Syria altogether and later to try to bully her into accepting the agreement. At no time did Washington offer the Syrians an incentive to cooperate. [50] As Philip Habib told a British journalist at the time, "We know Syria won't willingly accept the terms of this accord. It must now accept them unwillingly". [51] Against this background, it is hardly surprising that Syria sought to torpedo it. In some respects Israel had done the work for them, because the war Israel launched had served to strengthen the Syrian influence in Lebanon. It, therefore, did not require great effort by the Syrians to prevent the Israelis from arriving at security arrangements with the Lebanese government. What is more, a peace treaty would have stirred up dissent among the various Lebanese factions, making it impossible to maintain a stable political order. For Lebanon, a peace treaty with Israel and peace among its various communities are incompatible. Similarly, expelling the Syrians from Lebanon would have meant Israel occupying the entire country.

What is more, events have shown that all issues in the region are integrally connected. To separate the Lebanon issue from the regional one meant that the United States and Israel were not willing to conclude a comprehensive settlement. The United States, however, excused itself by saying that such an agreement would facilitate the withdrawal of all 'foreign' forces from Lebanon thereby creating a better climate for national reconciliation to take place. Regardless of its implications concerning the approach to a settlement of the Lebanese conflict, what made the May 17 agreement

[49] Quoted in *An-Nahar*, Beirut, 27 April 1983.

[50] The U.S. ploy, however, was not successful as Syria appeared to step up tension by allowing guerrillas to infiltrate into Israeli lines to attack Israeli troops while simultaneously accusing the Israeli government of reinforcing its troops in Lebanon's Bekka Valley and of staging "provocative" military exercises on the Golan Heights. See report by Herbert Denton, *Washington Post*, April 22, 1983. Although Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir called the Syrian-induced tension "artificial", Israeli Defence Minister Arens, concerned about Soviet and Syrian intentions, put Israeli troops on alert and indicated that Israel would not leave Lebanon until Syria did. Cited in *Jerusalem Post*, April 24, 1983.

[51] Reported by Patrick Seale in *The Observer*, 30 October 1983.

inexorably non-viable was - as subsequent events were to demonstrate - the fact that it contained inherently untenable commitments on the part of Lebanon from a regional point of view. Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss summed it up rather succinctly in the following statement:

"There seemed to be no chance of a breakthrough in the Lebanese-Israeli deadlock as long as Israel failed to differentiate between what pertains to Lebanon and what pertains to the region; that is, as long as it continues to seek from Lebanon what Lebanon cannot deliver - something it should rather seek from the region in the context of an overall fair settlement of the Middle East problem. Peace and normalization of relations are two prominent cases in point. Israel's insistence on demands which, by their very regional nature, Lebanon cannot accommodate serves only to confirm the worst misgivings of the Lebanese and, for that matter, the Arabs regarding Israel's intentions, and their scepticism as to whether Israel is genuinely interested in peace and stability in the Middle East". [52]

As we shall see below, the May 17 agreement, while avoiding the explicit use of the term 'peace' and 'normalization of relations', did in fact provide for both in substance. In this connection, the accord had such ravaging repercussions on intra-Lebanese relations and on Lebanese-Syrian relations that it gradually came to be viewed as a serious stumbling block obstructing any progress to be achieved in any direction.

The May 17 Agreement: Peace Making?

The May 17 Agreement is perhaps the most important event that occurred after the PLO pull-out from Beirut. Consequently, any line of analysis that seeks to assess the MNF-II experience and unravel the political situation in Lebanon amid the force's tenure must centre around this event. The May 17 agreement was, above all, an imposed one. Despite what the parties to the agreement and the United States claimed, Lebanon was forced to sign the agreement due to Israel's occupation of about half the country. Moreover, the agreement was signed by a Gemayel government which had no control over most of Lebanon and only controlled part of Beirut and which had the allegiance of less than 10 per cent of the population.

[52] Interview by this writer with Selim al-Hoss, Beirut, 19 November 1988.

Israel had wanted a lot from Lebanon - diplomatic relations, freedom of movement of goods and persons, a continued military presence in the south. In the event, these stiff terms especially Israel's drive to subordinate Lebanon's economy to its own and to use Lebanon as its door into the Arab world were - owing to American support on this issue - trimmed down somewhat as a sop to Lebanon's self-esteem and its anxiety about Arab reactions. Then Lebanese Foreign Minister, Elie Salem, put it succinctly: "What would Lebanon gain by opening one door [to Israel] and closing twenty-two doors [to Arab States]?" [53] Lebanon's exports to Arab countries by then had dropped by about half, and Syria threatened to close its borders to Lebanese products if Lebanon ratified the May 17 agreement.

The final text was, nevertheless, an astonishing straight jacket on Lebanon's sovereignty. The agreement formally ended the state of war between Israel and Lebanon, and obliged Lebanon to prohibit any manifestation on its territory of hostility to Israel from guerrilla or terrorist activity. Article 9 demanding that measures be taken within a year to abrogate treaties, laws, and regulations, deemed in conflict with the agreement, [54] would take Lebanon out of the Arab League. Articles 6 and 7 prohibited the entry into, deployment in, or passage through either state of the military forces or military equipment of any state hostile to the other. [55] This prohibition applied to any state not having diplomatic relations with both parties - that is, to all Arab states except Egypt.

Implementation of the Agreement would transform south Lebanon into an Israeli 'security zone' extending northward forty-five kilometres to the Awwali River. Within this zone a second would stretch fifteen kilometres north from the border. Provisions governing these zones clearly revealed Israel's intention to organize a buffer zone in south Lebanon where both its military and political control would be assured. Other salient points of the agreement stipulated the following:

[53] Quoted in Claude Khoury, 'The 17 May Banana Skin', *Monday Morning*, Beirut English weekly, 25 February 1984.

[54] See *Appendix* for the full text of the 17 May 1983 Lebanon-Israel accord.

[55] *Ibid.*

1. Joint Lebanese and Israeli army patrols of unspecified numbers of officers to operate in the south of Lebanon.
2. An important role in the south for Israel's proxy, Saad Haddad [now dead].
3. Limitations on the number of weapons and the specifying of the kinds of weapons that the Lebanese army may be equipped with in the south.
4. Lebanese army limitations to two divisions in the south, with only one of these deployed on Lebanon's border with Israel.
5. A security area which would practically encompass the entire south of Lebanon from the Israeli border to the north of Sidon. [56]

In short, the agreement if implemented would remove Lebanon from the Arab world and place it in Israel's orbit.

In exchange for all this Israel would pull out her troops from Lebanon. Israel, however, would in effect be in control of South Lebanon through her proxy Haddad militia. The conditions that Israel imposed before she would begin her troop withdrawal were unrealistic. First, according to the then Lebanese Foreign Minister Elie Salem, Israel would not have begun her troop withdrawal unless the PLO returned the few Israeli prisoners it was holding. [57] Second, Syrian and PLO forces would have to withdraw from Lebanon before any Israeli withdrawal. The agreement itself did not demand as a condition for Israel's departure the simultaneous departure of Syrian forces. As mentioned above, in a separate United States-Israel exchange of 'letters of understanding', the United States agreed that Israel troops should remain in Lebanon as long as did Syrian and PLO forces.

How the May 17 Agreement was viewed by some of the Lebanese protagonists

In Lebanon, U.S. policy wanted to change the 'rules of the game' when it brokered the May 17 Agreement. The most significant part of the accord as promulgated by the Gemayel government was what it contained in terms of concessions and security arrangements that "imposed unacceptable restrictions on Lebanon's sovereignty" and other provisions which were not capable of implementation.

[56] *Ibid.*

[57] *An-Nahar*, Beirut Arabic daily, 18 May 1983.

[58] The Druze leader, Walid Junblatt, carried this argument further. Terming the accord a "serious error", he pointed out that the May 17 agreement "hides a peace treaty. It is only necessary to read the annexes to be convinced". [59] He also stressed that ratification of the accord would close the door to any possible reconciliation among Lebanon's warring factions, and would prevent an understanding with Syria that would allow it to withdraw its troops. Junblatt continues:

"the agreement was inoperative, and we demanded its abrogation, because it extends Israeli hegemony over Lebanon. It was gravely to the detriment of our sister Syria; we opposed it with her, and took our stand by her side". [60]

In other words, the target of its opponents' criticism was that the May 17 agreement symbolized the triumph of a pro-Israel tilt in Lebanon's foreign policy orientation. The accord was decried as a Phalange-Israeli agreement designed to give supremacy to the Maronite Christians over every other community in Lebanon and to turn the whole country into "an Israeli protectorate". [61]

Even its most ardent defenders could not deny that the existence of the agreement meant Lebanon was willing to treat Israel on the same footing as any Arab country, in particular Syria. Fadi Frem, then commander of the Maronite Christian Phalange militias declared:

"We are for normal relations (with Israel), because Lebanon has until now ... been under the psychological and political domination of Syria ... If we can have normal relations with all our neighbours, I think Lebanon can be free to make its own political decisions and there will be some kind of equilibrium: Syria will not be able to pose such threats as closing the borders or stopping our transit trade anymore." [62]

Other Maronite Christian leaders and allies of the Phalange forces gave support to the May 17 agreement on the grounds that it did "not give Israel anything at the expense of Lebanese sovereignty". Dany Chamoun, son of former President Camille Chamoun and at the time head of his father's Tigers militia, was even more forthright in his condemnation of Syria's attitude as he declared the "accord is

[58] The words quoted are those of Nabih Berri in conversation with the writer, Beirut, 19 November 1988.

[59] Interview by this writer with Walid Junblatt, Beirut, 18 November, 1988.

[60] *Ibid.*

[61] The official Syrian news agency SANA quoted President Assad as telling President Reagan's Special Middle East Envoy that the Lebanese-Israeli accord turned Lebanon into "an Israeli protectorate ..." and that Syrian forces would leave East and North Lebanon "after an agreement with our Lebanese brethren and when all foreign forces, including the Israelis and the Multinational Force, have left the country". As reported in *Al-Safir*, Beirut Arabic daily, 6 January 1984.

[62] Fadi Frem interview with Claude Khoury, *Monday Morning*, Beirut English-language weekly, 23 June, 1983.

law ... Nothing, no Syrian threat, is going to change it." [63]

Conversely, it was against this pro-Israeli tilt and the Gemayel government's signing of the agreement that there was further discord. The anti-Gemayel factions were not being intransigent on this issue. For instance, Walid Junblatt went on record as saying he was prepared to give all the guarantees Israel needs for its security. The Druze leader declared:

"I am not in favour of paying any price [for Israeli withdrawal]. May be the only price we can pay, if we have to pay at all, is to secure the northern border of Israel - I mean the southern part of Lebanon - by imposing a kind of security there through the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL (U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon). No more. We have to stick to the position of principle - that is it." [64]

Irrespective of one's evaluation of the substance of the accord, whether positive or negative, the balance of Lebanese political opinion had decidedly swayed in favour of the demand that the agreement be either abrogated outright, or for it to be renegotiated or amended, so as to make its terms more palatable to the Syrians and the Lebanese opposition. In seeking to resolve this dilemma, Syrian cooperation and American influence with Israel was required when Gemayel sought changes to the May 17 agreement as a way out. For its part, Washington made it clear that despite Syrian objections, the Lebanese-Israeli agreement would not be renegotiated or amended. [65] For as one highly placed American official remarked, albeit after the contours of the May 17 agreement and all subsequent events:

"We did not write the agreement. The Lebanese and the Israeli negotiators did. We mediated and facilitated for it, so that was sound advice. If you want changes it cannot be brought about unilaterally by Washington. That may seem unfair that we are a superpower and if an agreement did not work we should tear it up even though we had negotiated and tell the Israelis to renegotiate. Well we will not do that sort of thing. That is a fundamental misunderstanding about how Americans see their role. We are not that ready to take that kind of an initiative." [66]

If anything, the Reagan Administration took a harder line regarding America's determination to remain

[63] Dany Chamoun, head of one of the Christian militias, interview with Lydia Georgi, *Monday Morning*, Beirut English-language weekly, 18-24 July 1983.

[64] Quoted in *Al-Safir*, Beirut Arabic daily, 21 April 1983.

[65] *Al-Safir*, Beirut Arabic daily, 23 May 1983.

[66] Interview by this writer with Richard Murphy, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and East Asian Affairs in the Reagan Administration 1983-89, London, 3 May 1989.

militarily present in Lebanon as a challenge to possible Soviet-Syrian threats. [67] As far as Washington was concerned, Syria constituted a political obstacle for what America's political purposes were in Lebanon and the Middle East.

In the upshot, Reagan refused to heed the calls of Gemayel to make any modifications in the 17 May Lebanese-Israeli agreement so as to make the accord palatable to the Syrians and the Lebanese opposition. Instead, the Americans told Gemayel that he would find it much easier altering the agreement if he first had "national reconciliation in place" and "the Syrians on their way". [68] The Lebanese President was quoted as telling the Americans:

"Look, my number one concern is the unity of my country, keeping it together. Number two is that I have to preserve the Arab character of Lebanon. Those two factors put enormous constraints on how far, how fast and how much I can do with the Israelis". [69]

Nonetheless, the Americans told Gemayel that it was in his interest to continue "a dialogue" with the Israelis to maintain their confidence. [70]

In point of fact, however, the American position made it the more difficult for Gemayel's effort and the Lebanese to achieve national reconciliation. That was very unfortunate because a solution in Lebanon could not obtain if the May 17 Agreement was not adapted to the needs of the Syrians, at least in part, as a minimum. The problem was further exacerbated by the position Gemayel's opponents had taken when they adopted the Syrian stance which called for the cancellation of the U.S. mediated agreement as a pre-condition for Syria's backing of any Lebanese settlement. In any event, Gemayel's ability to manoeuvre in his efforts to get all foreign forces out of the country were, not surprisingly, curtailed. The message for the Gemayel government and his American backers appeared clear, no peaceful settlement in Lebanon was possible unless Syria and its Lebanese allies' demands were met and Moscow's influence implicitly recognized.

[67] While Moscow was trying to play down the possibility of war, U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, in a speech to the American Jewish Committee in New York, was publicly warning Moscow about its behaviour in Lebanon: "I want to say that the USSR is making a profound and dangerous mistake if it thinks that by resorting to belligerent words and provocative actions, by the obstruction of the Lebanese peace process, it cannot pressure the United States into a retreat from its commitment to the security of Israel". Cited in report by Sam Roberts, *New York Times*, May 14 1983.

[68] See *The New York Times*, 4 December 1983.

[69] Quoted in *Al-Safir*, Beirut, 5 December 1983.

[70] *Ibid.*

To compound matters further, Gemayel's policy during that period of his tenure was aimed at dealing simultaneously with the Israeli occupation on the one hand and the Syrian and Palestinian presence on the other, to the utter neglect or rather detriment of the domestic aspect of the problem. The American role contributed to this approach by focusing exclusively on the issue of foreign troop withdrawals, giving no credence to the Syrian position or taking it for granted. The culmination of this approach was the May 17 Agreement which linked enforcement of the accord to simultaneous Israeli and Syrian withdrawal.

Conclusion

In the above discussion an attempt was made to evaluate the experience of both versions of the Multinational Force in Beirut by comparing their proposed objectives with the degree to which they achieved them. In regard to their primary objective to restore the sovereignty and extend the influence of the Lebanese government, the MNF-II left behind a government whose authority had diminished since their arrival and whose areas of influence circumscribed. Clearly the Force had failed to remove the foreign powers Syria and Israel from Lebanon, as both countries continue to occupy the Bekka and southern Lebanon respectively to this day. It failed to bring peace to Beirut. There were two factors peculiar to Beirut which made the task of any peacekeeping force there extremely difficult. First was the complicated nature of the internal struggle. Second was the internal security threat to any peacekeeping force in the city. In view of these inherent problems, it is possible to argue that the MNF operation was doomed from the start, but this view ignores the spirit of optimism which prevailed until early Spring 1983.

Nevertheless, there were a number of problems which were created by the MNF-II initiative, or at any rate were within its capacity to influence, which also had a fairly heavy impact on the affair. For a start, the situation in Lebanon was complicated by the many faceted nature of the struggle. This was further confused by the political disagreement and unwarranted optimism which obscured the real trend of events. In such a complicated situation as this, it was important to spend time in reviewing current positions and anticipate future options. In retrospect, there were some events which could have been anticipated in this way. In Lebanon, the MNF-II was bound by an agreement to one side of the conflict

so that when hostilities entered a civil war phase, the MNF-II contingents could not act as peacekeepers nor could they rely on their impartial status to protect them. However, no attempt was made to increase their force level so that they could assume a more effective interventionist role, or alter their status and allow them to adopt an impartial position in a peacekeeping role. Even their actions to counter the rising internal security threat were not authorised by any change in their mandate - although the military situation had changed out of all recognition.

If any single event explains the polarization that marked Lebanon amid the MNF-II presence and insured the alienation of the Lebanese opposition from the Force, it was the 17 May agreement. This, in turn, affected the environment of internecine strife and anti-MNF-II violence. The United States, Lebanon, and Israel dickered on the withdrawal negotiations and on ways of ridding Lebanon of its foreign armies of occupation. In the event, the mistake was to view Lebanon as outside of the Arab environment. The anti-Gemayel government factions had the impression that there were efforts to create a 'second Israel' dominated by the Maronite Christians. [71] This had started with the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in 1979. At the same time the May 17 agreement was seen as a step in the direction of splitting off the Maronite Christian heartland from the rest of Lebanon. [72] The MNF-II - most especially the American component - was perceived as a physical means of support for the May 17 agreement, the terms of which were bitterly opposed by Syria and its Lebanese allies in the struggle for power in Lebanon. [73]

Thus, in the view of Syria and its Lebanese allies, the MNF-II came to be seen as little more than an adjunct and buttress to both U.S. and Israeli policies, and these policies did not accord with their interests. For many reasons, Syria wanted the MNF-II and the May 17 agreement to fail. Damascus had long sought the dominant position in Lebanon and feared that any Lebanese-Israeli agreement would strengthen the Israeli position in Lebanon at Syria's expense. In addition, Syria also "could not accept a Camp David next door to her", nor did it wish to see any more Arab states moving to make

[71] This interpretation is based on the interview by this writer with Walid Junblatt, Druze leader, Beirut, 18 November, 1988.

[72] *Ibid.*

[73] This interpretation is based on the interview by this writer with Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss, Beirut, 19 November, 1988.

peace with Israel. [74] Hence the battle for Lebanon 1982-84 - from the Israeli army's invasion in June 1982 to President Gemayel's abrogation in March 1984 of the ill-fated May 17 agreement - can be seen as the decisive engagement in Syria's struggle against Israel's war objectives. Although Israel won the conventional war in 1982, Syria unleashed friends and proxy forces to harry the Israelis and their American allies, until the MNF-II decamped and Israel pulled back to a border zone in the south, abandoning the hope of bringing Beirut under its political control.

In addition, it needs to be remembered that South Lebanon, the territorial focus for the May 17 Agreement, is not only the home for upwards of 50 per cent of the Lebanese Shia Muslim community, but also the spiritual heartland for Shi'ism in Lebanon. To the Shi'ites the South is not simply one of five provinces in Lebanon, but is *Jabal Amil* (Mount Amil), a traditional centre of Shi'ite scholarship. Thus, although the May 17 agreement may have been deemed acceptable by Maronite Christians who consider their roots to be *Jabal Lubnam* (Mount Lebanon), the same cannot be said for those to whom *Jabal Amil* held significant emotive and practical appeal. If any single event insured the alienation of the Shi'ite community from the MNF-II, it was the May 17 agreement. [75] Although little noticed outside of Lebanon, beginning in June 1983 the American contingent found itself in a steady series of clashes emanating from Shi'ite inhabited enclaves that abutted its positions. Thus, the widely criticized American naval shelling into the Shouf mountains in September 1983 was perhaps less a watershed than the culmination of a process of escalation that was already well underway. (In a very real sense the American and French contingents, had come to be seen as closely associated with the anti-Shi'ite policies of President Gemayel, so that hitting the contingents was more or less the functional equivalent of hitting the Lebanese Army.) What the naval gunfire of September 1983 did do was to cement the alliance between the Druze and the Shi'ite of Amal who were even more convinced that they shared the same enemies. In the event, their hostility to MNF-II, except the Italians and the British contingents which were shrewd enough to recognize the significance of Druze and Shi'ite communities from the onset of their deployments, was quite extensive.

[74] Interview by this writer with Walid Junblatt, Druze leader, Beirut, 18 November 1988.

[75] This interpretation is based on a conversation by this writer with Nabih Berri, leader of the Shi'a Muslim Amal Militia, Beirut, 19 November, 1988.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Multinational Force and the Troop Contributing Countries:

Roles and Policies

The burden of this chapter is to present the roles of the four contributing countries, namely the United States, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. There was clearly a need of the four contingents to believe in the MNF mandate and while this may have provided some initial fervor and commitment to their role, it equally blinded the different MNF authorities to the realities of the changing alliances in a highly fluid conflictual environment. Although the concentration here is perforce on the Multinational Force, the success or failure of its mission depended crucially on how the four contingents were viewed by the various Lebanese protagonists and other interested parties, for example, Israel and Syria. Thus, where the discussion requires treatment of these parties' reactions to the MNF - in both missions - an attempt is made to review and highlight their impact on the events as was the case in the previous chapter.

Looking over the Multinational Force in Lebanon in both its two tours of duty - identified as MNF-I and MNF-II - it is important to remember just why the Americans, French and Italians came to Lebanon. The British contribution to the second Multinational Force was agreed with the Amin Gemayel government in different circumstances at a later date. It had, after all, been Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader himself, who had originally requested American Marines be deployed in the Lebanese capital, to guarantee the safe evacuation of his own Palestinian forces from the city. According to Karim Pakradouni, the idea of deploying a multinational force to Beirut was first considered as a possible option:

"When Philip Habib began to negotiate the way out to Yasser Arafat's PLO from the siege of Beirut. It is here that lays its very beginning. The peacekeeping forces were formed on the basis of an American decision as well as Philip Habib's proposal to Washington. But Washington in order not to intervene alone in this region, and so to make its intervention more acceptable, agreed to intervene with the French and later the peacekeeping forces were enlarged by including the Italians, but we can affirm that it was an American-French operation whose primary objective was to lift the siege of Beirut as well as to bring Arafat and the PLO out." [1]

In the event, the Americans had secured in their turn a promise from the Israelis that if the PLO left

[1] Interview by this writer with Karim Pakradouni, Beirut, 15 November, 1988.

Beirut, the Israelis would not invade the now undefended areas in the west of the city where most of the Muslim population and all of the remaining Palestinian civilian population still lived.

The promise was given and no sooner had the PLO evacuated than all the Multinational Forces had left Beirut by early September. This was followed by the launching on 1 September 1982, of the Reagan Middle East peace initiative, and the election of Bashir Gemayel to the Lebanese presidency. In the early days of September there was cautious optimism in Washington that the crisis, which had followed the Israeli invasion in June of that year, might be coming to an end, to be replaced by a more constructive phase in Lebanon's politics and that of the region. This was not to be. On September 14, Bashir Gemayel was assassinated. The next day, September 15, Israeli troops entered West Beirut. Then under the cover of Israel's military presence, Christian militiamen entered the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila in West Beirut and perpetrated massacres. The international outrage had a special impact upon Ronald Reagan and George Schultz; in the upshot the American administration decided to send the Multinational Force — MNF-II — back into Beirut. According to Richard Murphy, formerly the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian affairs in the Reagan Administration, the decision to redeploy the Marines to Beirut was "an emotional and reactive response to a tragic event". There was little discussion about this decision then. Murphy continues:

[T]here was real revulsion at what had happened in Sabra and Shatila and from the beginning it kept key people together in agreeing to have the presence of troops back in Beirut ... Yes there was an element of shock perhaps guilt that innocent civilians have been massacred in the camps and led to a very popular movement in the States. It looked like a very correct decision, to move the troops back into Beirut" [2]

Sending back the MNF was also influenced by the feeling that the United States had assumed responsibility for the safety of the Palestinians and that an American ally, the Israelis, had allowed the worst to happen. Thus, began the second Multinational Force in Lebanon.

The MNF-II returned to Beirut in an atmosphere of wounded conscience, with a sense of responsibility for what had gone before. The return of the MNF was, therefore, to protect the Palestinians and

[2] Interview by the writer with Richard Murphy, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs in Reagan Administration 1983-1989, London, 3 May 1989.

the Muslims in the west Beirut. Indeed, the Italian contingent was specifically given the task of the protection of Sabra and Shatila and part of Bourg el-Barajneh, and with the safeguarding of the lives of the survivors of the massacre. These tragic events were to provide the historical framework in which the MNF forces would return. For it should be remembered here that the American, French and Italian forces came back to Beirut amidst a tide of public opinion which asked why western armies had apparently reneged on their 'guarantees' of safety to civilians. Then the United States was immediately accused by the PLO of having violated such guarantees. A former Reagan Administration official, dismissed the accusation as one that:

they [the PLO] have exaggerated, we were there to get the fighters and leaders out of Lebanon. We did that and Yes we did not foresee the Sabra and Shatila coming. Yes there was an element of shock perhaps guilt that innocent civilians have been massacred in the camps ..." [3]

The focus here is on the initial decision to create the second Multinational Force because once the decision to do so was made, the contributing states obviously had to try to make the Force's mission succeed. Its return was based — and by its very nature, it had to be so based — on the premise of international legitimacy. Thus the MNF-II had to be invited back to Beirut by the legally-constituted Government of Lebanon. One says 'constituted' rather than 'elected' because elections to the presidency of Lebanon do not have quite the same rigour applied to them as in the West. Bashir Gemayel's election had been preceded by the arrival of some "forgetful members of the Lebanese assembly who had been reminded of their electoral duties by the gunmen escorting them to the voting chamber in the lecture hall of an army barracks east of Beirut." [4] Against this background, it was not so much the authority of the Government that was at issue when the MNF-II came back to Beirut. It was the self-evident fact that Amin Gemayel's brother Bashir had been assisted to the Presidency by the Israelis. The latter's new Lebanon was to have been a Christian one, indeed a Christian Phalangist Lebanon, friendly if not loyal to Israel. It was the Christian Phalange — Bashir's men and Amin's political supporters — which now controlled much of the Shouf mountains alongside the Israelis, who

[3] Interview by this writer with Richard Murphy, London, 3 May 1989.

[4] The words quoted are those of Nabih Berri in conversation with this writer, Beirut, 19 November 1988.

controlled much of Sidon and all of Jezzine as well as the Christian heartland north of Beirut.

The Phalange were by the autumn not quite as disenchanted as the Israelis were shortly to become with the figure of Amin Gemayel. Yet it remained the case that Amin Gemayel's crippled presidency was the final result of Israel's adventure in Lebanon. When the second Multinational Force (MNF-II) returned to Beirut, therefore, they set up their encampments and based their authority not on some vibrant, newly restored, popular machinery of government but on the political as well as physical wreckage wrought in the wake of Israel's invasion.

In this context, the redeployment of the second Multinational Force constituted a response to a tragic event, as a result some aspects of the force and the policies which underpinned its presence had been organized with an eye to speed rather than detail. In the initial phases of the operation it was a workable agreement. However, as new situations began to develop, trouble for MNF-II was in the offing, for built into the mandate or terms of the undertaking were contradictions and ambiguities both about the duration and the function of the mission. The force was to be deployed for a limited period "to meet the requirements of the current situation", but long enough to permit the Lebanese army to carry out its security responsibilities in Beirut. In the pledge to help to "restore the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Lebanon" was an implicit and open-ended commitment to help the Lebanese government restore its authority country-wide and to rebuild the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to the point where it could ensure that authority. Therein lay a basic contradiction in the mandate which was never resolved, and in turn was a product of the tendency to define the operational needs in short range terms and the goal in long range terms, so that the mandate called for a "temporary presence" even while the contributing countries pledged - to rid Lebanon of all troops, revitalize the Lebanese army, help to bring national reconciliation and cement the authority of the central government throughout the country - were laudable but nevertheless ambitious in the light of the realities of Lebanon at the time.

Thus, from the start, the effectiveness of MNF-II was impaired, not only by the ambiguity of the mandate, for example, the meaning of the term "presence" - not uncommon in peacekeeping - but by a two-tiered set of objectives, an unstable mix of short-term and long-term objectives. Once deployed

the force's immediate task was to protect the Palestinian refugee camps, and serve as a buffer between the Israeli Defense Forces and the local militias, and to interpose itself between the Israeli and Syrian armies as they withdrew. At the same time, the MNF-II was designed not only to police the withdrawal of foreign forces; it was also intended to provide support and encouragement for the Lebanese army to assume responsibilities for security in the vacated areas. With these commitments, the second Multinational Force plunged into a risky venture without taking full account of the implications.

Although the four contributing countries to the second Multinational Force had broadly agreed to a long-term policy for Lebanon which served as a rationale for their initial deployment, with time, each of the four countries had acquired a local purpose and identity arising from different interpretations and expectations of its mission. In any event, the four countries taking part in the MNF-II did not see their 'mission' in similar terms, on the contrary:

"[E]very state began to act on her own, they intervened together but they pulled out every one of them alone, and this is proof of their differences ... they entered together and everyone went out according to a unilateral decision ... in the end there was no more a multinational force but there was a French force, an American force and an Italian force and every force was acting according to the decision and the interest of its Government and according to its Lebanese perception and its relation with Lebanon." [5]

In view of the disparate expectations of the three contributing countries, namely, the United States, France and Italy, it was unlikely that all three national interests could be negotiated with the same Lebanese government. Nor was any of the three major contributing states willing to sacrifice its independent status in order to achieve a mutually agreed set of objectives. Each country, it seemed, wanted peace in Lebanon based on its own particular terms. This inherent weakness in MNF-II's political profile was greatly exacerbated by the additional complications that stemmed from the totally opposed interests of the Syrians and the Israelis. However successful the MNF-II might turn out to be, it was certain to disappoint a number of national and local expectations.

[5] Interview by the writer with Karim Pakradouni, Beirut, 15 November 1988.

The American Role in the MNF

The Americans, initially saw in their involvement in the MNF-II a chance to restore the territorial integrity of Lebanon by securing a quick agreement on Israeli withdrawal followed by the negotiated removal of the Syrians. There was also an implicit commitment to restore a strong and stable government over a much wider area than just the immediate area of Beirut. In the long-term the United States hoped to establish a thriving western-oriented Lebanon which would enhance their ability to foster a favourable Middle East settlement by this means. When the U.S. Marines returned to Lebanon on 29 September 1982, President Reagan's Administration said that their mission, as non-combatant, was to oversee the withdrawal of foreign forces which included the Israelis, the Syrians and those Palestinians remaining in the east of the country — and to assist the Lebanese government in re-asserting what was called 'national sovereignty'. This, more or less, was the formula around which all other explanations for the MNF-II presence tended to revolve.

Having done so, however, the purpose of their 'presence' in Lebanon and to a lesser extent that of the French became confused as well as confusing. An examination of what the Americans actually said on this subject during their Marines' mission is revealing. For as the months passed, the mandate went through a curious metamorphosis, from humanitarian to political, from political to military, and ultimately — perhaps inevitably — to strategic. It was the mandate of MNF-II, however, that projected the misgivings and ultimately the misdirection that was inherent in the force. More important, however, was the fact that the Americans had far too many vested interests in the Middle East to hold to any 'middle road' in Lebanese politics if those interests were threatened.

Although the degree of support given to Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) of the Gemayel government varied between the MNF-II contingents, the fact remained that from the moment they landed the Multinational Force's status could not be considered as impartial. Nevertheless, the force had the initial consent of all the Lebanese parties with the capacity to impede, harass and frustrate its operation on the assumption that the Multinational Force was coming primarily to protect the Palestinian refugees in

the camps and to interpose between the withdrawing foreign forces, namely, the Israelis, Syrians and Palestinians. [6] Indeed the protective function was not challenged and, except at the very end, the Italian contingent was not threatened. On the other hand, through their "good role assuring the kind of humanitarian relief and help to the Palestinians", the Italians were initially "very scared to be involved but there was a common consensus about their role and no one touched them." [7] Moreover, in terms of the situation on the ground when the MNF was launched, it was not unrealistic to project that outside peacekeeping could help mitigate the Lebanese crisis. Indeed for close to a year the MNF-II helped to maintain stability in the Beirut area. For months none of the four contingents encountered significant interference or opposition to their mission. Initially the MNF mustered more credibility than the Lebanese army. Yet even at this stage of its deployment in Beirut, the MNF-II had become, most especially, the American and to a lesser extent, the French contingent, entangled in attempts to restore a Christian administration, indeed, a Christian Phalangist administration — to use the advantages available to them from Israel's invasion to Christian predominance in Lebanon. The return of MNF-II coincided with the fact that the Lebanese intelligence — the 'Deuxième bureau' was already effectively an instrument of the Phalange, so were some units and individual officers in the Lebanese national army. The intelligence apparatus of the American marines and the French forces were evidently locked at once into the only Lebanese intelligence organization available to them which was, of course, controlled by the Phalange and its sympathizers.

An essential part of what went sour with the second Multinational Force was not so much its involvement in internal conflict per se, but rather the degree of co-mingling with the host government to the point where the 'consent' of key opposition parties was withdrawn and as a consequence the force lost its credibility and effectiveness. This appearance of co-mingling or collaboration became more marked when the American marines became involved in training certain Lebanese army units.

[6] At the beginning officials in Washington were sensitive to the importance of the MNF not taking on the task of ensuring internal stability in Lebanon and of avoiding confrontation with the opposition elements. But in restating the purpose of the MNF in a televised news conference on 17 May 1983, President Reagan said: "The MNF went there to help the new government of Lebanon maintain order until it can organize its military and police to assume control of its borders and its own internal security." The implication was that the Marines would meanwhile take an active role in providing internal security. See also Eric Hamel, *The Root: The Marines in Beirut*, August 1982 - February 1984, New York: Harcourt Brace Jonanovich, 1985, pp.82-83.

[7] Interview by the writer with Walid Junblatt, Beirut, 18 November 1988.

Though a U.S. army training mission, separate from the American contingent in the Multinational Force, was already in place, the Reagan administration agreed to a Lebanese army request to provide Marine trainers in tactics and use of weaponry. [8] A training camp was erected in the northern reaches of Beirut International Airport and the Marines began training the Lebanese Armed Forces in January 1983 in infantry, artillery and armour skills and set up a school for vehicle mechanics. Helicopter training operations were also begun for a Lebanese Air Assault Battalion that included mock vertical assaults and helicopter extractions. U.S. Army trainers, including special forces, were supplying more basic skills and in March 1983, 32 United States M.48 tanks arrived in Beirut for the Lebanese Armed Forces. The United States was the only MNF country to provide training of this magnitude. [9] Thus, the United States became an ally of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Gemayel government, for while the lack of diplomatic progress eventually undermined the peacekeeping efforts, this U.S. military assistance was a major step in eroding the semblance of American neutrality.

The training mission was consistent with U.S. objectives to ensure the survival of the Gemayel government, but a successful peacekeeping operation could *not* be both impartial and allied. In its way this decision was among one of the most crucial taken by MNF-II, for it inextricably linked the intentionally visible American marines to the fate of the Lebanese army and, by extension, identified the Marines and their government completely with the fate and fortunes of the Gemayel government. In this context, Pakradouni offers the following albeit speculative assessment as he asserts:

[8] The U.S. Congress provided, in the *Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act* of 1983 (Public Law 98-43, June 27, 1983, Section 3a) that "In order to support the rebuilding of the armed forces of Lebanon, the Congress finds that the national security interests of the United States would be served by the authorization and appropriation of additional funds to provide training for the Lebanese Armed Forces and by the authorization of additional foreign military sales guarantees to finance procurements by Lebanon of defense articles and defense services for its security requirements". See *Appendix* for "*Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of 1983*". (Public Law 98-43, June 27, 1983).

[9] *The Daily Star*, Beirut English-language daily, 21 March 1983.

"When the multinational forces returned it was for the purpose of protecting the Palestinian camps after the massacres and it was also decided that they will come and deploy with the Lebanese army, and in so doing support the Lebanese army to deploy on the whole Lebanese soil and help it in insuring peace. But as the nature of the second request changed, the position of the multinational force became political, this force which came to help the Lebanese army and to force all the foreign troops out of Lebanon including the Syrian army found itself reduced to play a predetermined political role. That is why they were seen as a tool of the Gemayel regime, first of all they started by the training of the Lebanese army, secondly they deployed together with the Lebanese army in the greater Beirut, and thirdly they made a political request to Amin to start the negotiations with the Israelis and they sent a full team and also Morris Draper the assistant of Philip Habib to start the Israeli negotiations... Thus the plan was expanded and the question was no more one of the camps' protection or getting out persons, but it became an operation related to the restoration of the authority of the state on all its soil. At that moment, I changed my perception by saying that it came in as rule's tool and that its role was transformed. The multinational force failed, not because it intervened and became a tool of the Gemayel regime, but because the regime failed. If Amin Gemayel had succeeded the mission of the peacekeepers would have also succeeded. If the operation to reach an agreement with Israel and with Syria had succeeded, if the Israeli and Syrian armies started to pull out and if the multinational forces had been deployed, this would have been a complete success and the multinational forces would have been considered as having saved Lebanon and solved its crisis. But because they became a regime's tool and they linked their future with this regime it became compulsory that in case the regime fails they fail too, and in case he succeeds they succeed too. [10]

In any case, the visible linkage between the MNF-II and the Lebanese army was highlighted by jointly manned posts and the co-location of Command Posts in the airport area. In the formal mandate one of the objectives was to provide a Multinational 'presence'. Yet from the start the commanding officers charged with translating the mandate into operational terms, were puzzled by the operational

[10] Interview by the writer with Karim Pakradouni, Vice-Chairman of the Maronite Christian Lebanese Forces, was senior advisor and confidant to both Lebanese ex-President Sarkis and to the late President-elect Bashir Gemayel. Beirut, 15 November 1988.

meaning of 'presence'. [11] The mission directive was never precisely defined. Maintaining a non-combat 'presence' presumed a non-hostile environment, a highly restrictive set of rules of engagement, and a premium on 'visibility' to the populace. The Marines' mission in Lebanon, in the words of their naval commander, Captain Morgan France, was basically:

"a mission of presence in support of the Lebanese government. By being here, we are contributing to peace and stability and comforting people. The mere fact that we are here reassured people. Many have told us that the sight of our ships comforts them. That is why we keep moving the ships back and forth, so people in the northern parts of the city can see us as well as the people here in the southern part. One time, when I didn't send the ships north, we got telephone calls asking if we were leaving. We are here to establish presence and let people see us. It's our way of telling them, 'Hey, we're with you'". [12]

In addition, motorized and foot patrols were undertaken to reassure the residents of the poorer Muslim quarters. The routine of patrolling by the Marines in areas adjoining the Beirut airport, such as the Shi'ite quarter of Hay-es Salaam, was intended both to keep the troops occupied and to show the flag. It was also meant to instill a sense of security in the Muslim population of West Beirut. [13]

In the case of the American Marines, they were never comfortable with this unprecedented and vaguely stated 'presence' mission, a mission that "was early proving to be antithetical to its stated doctrine, which is active rather than passive". [14] While the notion of 'presence' proved manageable in the early months, it became less so when the MNF-II was perceived by the Muslim opposition militias as operating in support of the Lebanese army. The Lebanese army itself did nothing to restore the image of the MNF-II. For months, American advisers and diplomats in Beirut had repeatedly warned

[11] That the 'presence' mission presented operational difficulties was realized by the Marine command early on and it became a source of frustration in the wake of Suq al-Gharb. Testifying on November 2, 1983 before a House of Representatives Armed Services Committee investigating security arrangements at the Marine compound in the aftermath of the truck-bombing, Marine Commandant General P.X. Kelly said: "There has been a loose word called 'peacekeeping' that is not a mission and that has never been in our documents ... Our mission was presence. We did not change that mission. However, ... I do believe that the other side, people or forces inimical to us or hostile to us saw a change in the presence mission ... through our support of the Lebanese Armed Forces ... But that is looking at it from the other side. Our mission basically did not change." House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings of Investigations Subcommittee, November-December 1983, H.A.S.C. No. 98-58, released August 1985, p.61.

[12] By July 1983 there was a total of around 4,500 U.S. military personnel in Lebanon at any one time - 3,000 Navy personnel on the ships, 1,200 Marines on shore. In an interview with *The Daily Star*, Beirut English daily, 3 July 1983.

[13] The MNF-II did not deploy permanently to East Beirut but the French, British and Italian contingents did carry out patrolling in the eastern sectors of the city.

[14] The quote is from Eric Hamel, *The Root: The Marines in Beirut, August 1982 - February 1984*, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985, p.53.

Washington that the national army could disintegrate along sectarian lines, taking with them into their respective militias the training — and the equipment — they had received from the United States. In one statement to an American newspaper, a senior State Department official was quoted as saying that "all along there continued to be tacit co-operation" between the Lebanese Army and the Christian Phalange militia. "They talked to each other", he said, "discussed tactics and positions. And that made a lot of people nervous". [15]

When President Gemayel assumed the presidency in the wake of the Israeli invasion, he had a chance to save Lebanon. The Palestinian backbone of the Muslim coalition had been removed by the Israelis. Syria had been weakened politically and militarily by the invasion. The United States stood behind him, and he was in a position to unify the people, if not the land, of Lebanon. He squandered the opportunity, first, because he did not put pressure on his late brother's militia, the Christian Phalange, to evacuate the Shouf and the Aley regions while they were still occupied by Israel. The Phalangist presence was "an irritant" to the Druze community there. [16] Gemayel did nothing to control the Phalange in Christian East Beirut at a time when the *Deuxième Bureau* of his army was arresting hundreds of Muslims and suspected leftists in West Beirut then "under the boots of the Lebanese Army whereby the eastern side was free". [17] The Italian officers found themselves watching helplessly as the people they were supposed to be protecting were taken before their eyes by the soldiers of the Government whom they were supposed to be serving, albeit at one remove. Some of these young prisoners went missing — permanently — and Lebanese troops took from a Palestinian hospital in Sabra and Shatila the very medical equipment that the Italians had just brought into the camps, a new role was drawn up, perhaps one of the first individual orders issued by a national contingent of the MNF-II: officers of the Lebanese *Deuxième Bureau* were not to be permitted to enter the Palestinian camps without prior authorization from the Lebanese President's office at Baabda.

[15] See *New York Times*, March 11, 1984.

[16] The Shouf and Aley regions provided a microcosm of some of the internal problems which the Gemayel government had to surmount if Lebanon is ever to achieve stability. The area is a predominantly Druze community of around 200,000 which felt itself threatened in its ancestral homeland and was "determined to resist forcibly any attempts at occupation" of its areas by the Lebanese Army and a government which they believed was "biased in favour of the Phalangists". See *Appendix III*, Interview by the writer with the Druze leader, Walid Junblatt, Beirut, 18 November 1988.

[17] Interview by this writer with the Druze leader, Walid Junblatt, Beirut, 18 November 1988.

Throughout the period of open conflict, there seemed little that other partners in the MNF-II could do to control these and other events, because the Force was committed to a Gemayel government whose confidence and morale it could not afford to undermine. In a sense they were also trapped by the possibility of becoming targets of anti-Gemayel opposition militias. There was a diplomatic committee in which the ambassadors of the contributing states discussed how they could — or could not — persuade Amin Gemayel to make the political concessions to the Muslim population which were deemed necessary for internal peace. This was rarely admitted although General Joy did speak with frustration about the problem in November 1983; he said:

"... I would rather wish that we had a joint, combined task force, we don't have that. We have kind of what we call a stovepipe relationship back to our national capitals ... in all honesty, one of my objectives is to work for closer working relationships with the other members of the multinational force." [18]

What in fact happened in the last months of MNF-II's existence is that the individual contingents became increasingly isolated from each other, often physically so, and there were those among them — especially the Italians — who were not unhappy at the development. They had no desire to protect western interests in the Gulf nor become the guarantors of the May 17 Agreement.

The government of President Amin Gemayel was to misperceive — and at times encouraged to do so — what the reconstituted MNF-II could do for it. From early 1983, assessments on the duration of MNF-II's stay were largely based on a very optimistic view of the Lebanese army's prospects and the course of events to be expected. Syria, it was assumed, would withdraw its troops soon after an arrangement for Israeli withdrawal was negotiated - and this would happen by the year's end. A rapidly trained and equipped Lebanese army would somehow be immune to the social and confessional fissures within Lebanese society and would quickly evolve into a force able to enforce central government authority. Optimistic reports on progress in training of the Lebanese army kept flowing into Washington, [19] and doubts voiced by some American officials and instructors were discounted.

[18] News conference by U.S. Brigadier General James R. Joy, reported in the *Daily Star*, Beirut, November 21, 1983.

[19] For example, Colonel A.M. Fintel, the American Officer in charge of the Lebanese Army's modernization programme, claimed that "Exceeding all expectations the Army is two years ahead of schedule in the rebuilding program ... and is stronger than any militia in the country, and is willing and able to respond to any attacks by a foreign force. Anyone who still believes that Lebanon is an extension of any other country and acts on its behalf is in for a surprise." See 'The rebirth of the Lebanese Army', *Monday Morning* (Beirut English Language weekly), 13 June 1983, pp.46-47.

Thus, in June 1983, U.S. Special Envoy Morris Draper projected that in a "few months" the Lebanese army would have six completed brigades enabling the Lebanese soon to handle their own security. Even as this goal proved elusive, Washington was forecasting at the end of 1983 that by May 1984 eight to ten trained and equipped brigades would be available. [20]

Throughout the summer of 1983 official statements expressed a similar optimism, albeit premised on the shaky assumption that the very presence of the MNF-II would deter attempts to challenge the Gemayel regime's authority while the Lebanese army was being readied, that the balance of forces would not be substantially altered as the army was being rebuilt, and that progress in such rebuilding would soon permit the Lebanese themselves to take charge of these internal security matters so that the MNF-II could be phased out. [21] The appraisals accepted in Washington were that the Lebanese Army faced serious problems but was performing as well as could be expected, considering its religious complexion which was considered an internal problem with which the Gemayel government must deal. Not surprisingly, public reports were always very positive and upbeat in order not to demoralize the Lebanese by undermining their confidence. By denying the reality about the weakness of the Lebanese army, the Americans and their partners it would seem avoided facing the unpalatable choice of reinforcing the MNF-II and actively backstopping the Lebanese Army or abandoning the commitment and withdrawing.

The impending encounter between the Lebanese Army and the Druze and Shi'ite Militias in the War of the Mountain in the late summer of 1983 presaged the disintegration of the MNF-II. It became clear that the Lebanese Army would be actively opposed when it moved outside Beirut but that the MNF would not provide the kind of close support the Gemayel government demanded. Complicating the situation and adding to the self-deception was the ambivalent attitude of the Gemayel regime and the MNF-II toward the presence of the Israeli army in the Shouf mountains. Though it went unstated,

[20] Draper's remarks were reported in *The Washington Post*, 13 June, 1983.

[21] The exaggerated optimism of official Washington was reflected in parts of the press. Thus, Cord Meyer wrote in the *Washington Times*, 23 September 1983 that if the American-trained and equipped Lebanese army could, with the help of U.S. naval gunfire, contain the Druze Militia and others armed by Syria, the Gemayel government stood a chance of negotiating a cease-fire and building a new national consensus. He opined that the Lebanese Army stood a good chance of stopping the Druze from breaking through to join the Shi'ite Amal militia in Beirut in an effort to topple the regime. He gave the Reagan administration credit for the crash programme of aid and training whereby in nine months the Lebanese Army had been "radically transformed" into an "effective fighting force of 22,000".

the strategic assumption was that the relative calm in the area through the summer of 1983 depended on the continued presence of the Israelis as the de facto stabilizer in the Shouf massif where a contest for the area could be expected to erupt once Israeli troops departed. When this happened it would appreciably change the balance of forces, particularly since Syria was not reconciled to the course of events or to the ascendancy of the Gemayel government under MNF-II protection. Syria was bound to take advantage of the Israeli departure from the Shouf mountains to strengthen its position, by impeding any overtures aimed at a political compromise between the Gemayel government and its political adversaries. This was underscored by an assessment offered by Richard Murphy, himself a former U.S. Ambassador to Syria. In his words:

"They [the Lebanese leaders] could not develop an agreement for as Gemayel's presidency went on the Syrians put up higher and higher obstacles between him and the Lebanese opposition finally cutting off any dialogue. Everything had to go by Damascus." [22]

At the same time, Syria by then had ceased licking her wounds and began re-arming with the generous and enthusiastic help of the Soviet Union which was as intent on denying the United States a victory in Lebanon, as the United States was on preventing Soviet gains in the region. [23]

In any event, the Israeli pull-back from the Shouf region posed the moment of truth for the Multinational force and particularly for the United States and the Gemayel regime about the capacity of the Lebanese army to cope and the time it would take to revitalize it, along with the fact that the MNF-II could not and would not respond to Gemayel's plea that the American contingent move out of the bunkers and actively support the Lebanese army in the War of the Mountain. [24] During a visit to the Middle East in early July 1983, George Schultz, then Secretary of State, discouraged any idea that the

[22] Interview by this writer with Richard Murphy, London, 3 May 1989.

[23] Syria obtained new equipment from the Soviet Union valued at perhaps \$2.5 billion American dollars, or in some accounts, roughly double the amount which had been destroyed in the summer of 1982. Just as important, the Soviet Union sent enough surface-to-air missiles (SAMS) manned by around 8,000 military personnel, to act as a powerful deterrent to further attacks on Syrian troops by the Israeli airforces. See Larry L. Fabian, 'The Middle East: war dangers and receding peace prospects', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.62, No.3, 1984, p.634.

[24] See William Quandt, "Reagan's Lebanon Policy: Trial and Error". *The Middle East Journal*, Spring 1984, 38/2, p.245. Quandt has observed that "... considerable advance notice was given to the Lebanese government, but President Gemayel made no move to prepare politically or militarily for the new situation." The same charge can be levelled against the MNF and particularly Washington officialdom. Both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* ran front-page articles a full two months earlier, during the Shultz visit to the area, describing the Israeli plan for a partial withdrawal and noting official concern.

Marines might fill the vacuum left by the departing Israelis or assist the Lebanese army as it moved into vacated areas. When he reportedly said that "to introduce the Multinational Force into any arguably hostile environment is a different concept of what the Multinational Force should do". [25]

Against this background, unless the mandate was altered, there appeared to be no legal basis for the MNF-II's operations which were planned and seemingly carried out in support of the Lebanese army in the Shouf mountain war. Yet, for its part the Reagan Administration insisted until the bitter end, that, despite the changing conditions in Lebanon, and despite the drastically escalated United States role in the form of the new, broad grant of authority to order off-shore shelling, the mandate of the MNF-II was unchanged. Although President Reagan declared that when the Marines were sent to Lebanon he did not expect the country to erupt into an "outright civil war". [26] He saw no necessity to withdraw the Marines, nor change the posture of the MNF-II which by then totally contradicted its original mission, which was "to keep the peace among all the Lebanese". For example, the Druze hoped that the MNF would realize its real role, and remain "a force for peace among all Lebanese communities and not get involved in internal conflicts". [27]

The physical danger in which the MNF-II now operated - and to which the Americans and the French responded - had created its own evidence of political partiality to the Lebanese. When the anti-Gemayel Muslim opposition forces realized this - and that U.S. warships and Marine artillery joined in against them too - the picture appeared to be complete. The Marines were not fighting alongside the Phalange; nor did they wish to. But they were fighting alongside the Lebanese Army, albeit several miles distance from each other against the same enemy. And the Army was permitting the Phalange to stand with them. From that point onwards, the American component not only lost whatever vestige of neutrality it ever had by becoming positively identified as a backer of what was in fact a party to the civil war - the Lebanese army of the Gemayel government - but a war into which the Americans were 'sucked'. In any event, this is how the American role was seen by the Lebanese

[25] Quoted in 'Who will fill the Vacuum? Lebanon rejects Israeli redeployment', *Monday Morning*, Beirut, 4 July 1983.

[26] President Reagan quoted in 'The Mountain War: Deadly Free for All', *Monday Morning*, Beirut, 4 September 1983.

[27] Fuad Salman, The Secretary General of Druze leader Walid Junblatt's Progressive Socialist Party, quoted in 'Druze leadership: The hope for an accord still alive', *Monday Morning*, Beirut, 15 September 1983, p.11.

army's adversaries and most especially Amin Gemayel's opponents. For as one former senior Reagan Administration official recalls, the Marines were caught in the midst of the hostilities that were brought on in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal from the Shouf. In his words:

"Even before the outbreak of the war in the Shouf, because I remember stories of our marines being pinned down by exchange of fire. Maybe it was not directed on their target, but it was going over their heads between East and West Beirut as early as Spring 1983. You see I think things may have seemed more logically separable to us then perhaps they did to the Lebanese. Interpositional to keep the Israelis separate from the Lebanese army and from the militias. Never seen as a personal support to President Amin Gemayel, never. [28]

Here it should be noted that, while each MNF-II contingent had its own rules of engagement, the rules did not differ appreciably. For the American Marines they were normal "peace time rules of engagement": the American force was not to engage in combat. It could, however, exercise the right of self-defence against a hostile threat, in response to hostile acts, or in defence of Lebanese army elements operating with the American component of the MNF-II. But 'hostile act' or hostile threat was not defined. From the start, the commanders realized the fragility of these rules as troops might be drawn into crossfire between the warring factions though they did not expect the peacekeepers themselves to become targets. [29]

As the Long Commission concluded, these rules of engagement were suitable for the early months of the MNF-II deployment when the force was seen as a neutral, stabilizing presence by most of the Lebanese protagonists. But, it noted, "the environment proved to be dynamic and became increasingly hostile to the U.S. MNF component". Thus, the rules of engagement no longer proved effective in the changed environment which required the commander on the spot to be authorized to respond with the force needed to meet any hostile act. [30]

[28] Interview by this writer with Richard Murphy, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs in the Reagan Administration 1983-1989, London, 3 May 1989.

[29] In the course of implementing their mission, each U.S. Marine was required to carry a card with the rules of engagement, to be "fully understood by all members of the U.S. contingent of the MNF". Among the rules in effect in September 1983 were these:
"Do not chamber a round unless instructed to do so by a commissioned officer unless you must act in immediate self-defense where deadly force is authorized." "Call local forces to assist in all self-defense efforts." "Use only the minimum degree of force necessary to accomplish the mission." "Stop the use of force when it is no longer required."
See Report of the Department of Defense Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, 23 October 1983 (The Long Commission Report), 20 December 1983. See also *Appendix* for some excerpts of the report.

[30] *Ibid.*

The flaw in the implementation of the mandate, however, did not lie in restriction on the use of force since these are inherent in peacekeeping. The problem was that the force used was not related to the mission. The flaw lay not in the rules of engagement - though, as the Long Commission notes, these should have been better adapted to the changed conditions under which the MNF-II was operating - but in the fact that the mission itself was not clear or attainable. Once the mission was broadened to include open-ended backing for the Gemayel government and a commitment to rebuild the Lebanese army to the point where it could take over internal security, and once the duration of the MNF-II was linked to the withdrawal of foreign forces, and once it was clear that the MNF-II would not be expanded so that its size would be commensurate with the scope of its duties, adoption of the rules would have had but a marginal effect on the effectiveness of the MNF-II presence.

That said, it was in the immediate aftermath of the October bombing of the Marine headquarters, however, that the long-term implications of the U.S. Marine 'presence' were clarified, at least in the perspective of Washington. The metamorphosis of the MNF-II mandate was now to be completed. Lebanon, it seemed, was no longer to be just a state whose sovereignty should be restored and its people protected. "Peace in Lebanon", President Reagan told newspaper editors in the White House, "is the key to the region's stability now, and in the future. To the extent that the prospect of future stability is heavily influenced by the presence of our forces" stability is "central to our credibility on a global scale". It was clear even from this that Reagan was not just after stability - but stability for a pro-western government. "If Lebanon ends up under the tyranny of forces hostile to the west", he went on, "not only will our strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean be threatened, but also the stability of the entire Middle East including the vast resource areas of the Arabian peninsula." [31] So it had come to this. A month earlier, Casper Weinberger, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, had talked of the need to establish "a sovereign, free, independent, unoccupied Lebanon", conceding that this was "a very difficult and costly business". [32] Yet here was the American President apparently convinced that the mission was to protect nothing less than western interests in the Middle East - indeed, the West's entire

[31] See *The New York Times*, 25 October, 1983, for excerpts of President Reagan's session with the news media.

[32] *Washington Post*, 14 September 1983.

oil supply from the Gulf - which would be an infinitely more costly business and one that would also have to involve Israel. For instance, in the view of the Druze leader, the Americans not only coordinated with the Israelis in their invasion of Lebanon "to get the PLO out" and "they were to fulfill this task by having another presence not direct military presence from the Israelis but the presence from a Multinational force headed by the Americans", to also get a "friendly government" in Lebanon which in turn will agree to provide the United States military facilities in the area - not necessarily in Beirut, but in a place where American Rapid Development Forces can stop and refuel.[33] Junblatt continues:

"I think their [American] presence was just part of a bigger scheme. They were planning to establish some kind of military base or permanent presence in Lebanon. But these plans were not, could not be put into effect after the bombing of the American Marines Headquarters. This reminds us also of the Marines coming in 1958. The Multinational Force is the same denomination of a fleet, foreign fleets coming to support a President. Chamoun at that time now Amin Gemayel against the Lebanese patriots and the Syrians ... Same scheme." [34]

It was one thing for the United States to see in Israel a dependable ally in confronting Soviet activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, but it was quite another for President Reagan to speak, as he did, of the threat in Lebanon to "common" U.S. and Israeli interests. [35] What that meant was the United States view of Israel's policies in Lebanon had undergone a remarkable metamorphosis. It began as the same as that of the French and the Italians, but with time American policy had dragged the Multinational Force into an internal conflict. What was the United States' vital interests in the Middle East? According to one former Reagan Administration official, strategic cooperation with Israel was:

[33] Interview by this writer with Walid Junblatt, the Druze leader, Beirut, 18 November 1988.

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] In a statement upon Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's departure from the White House, Reagan said that during their two days of talks, "We reconfirmed the long-standing bonds of friendship between our two countries and expressed our determination to strengthen and develop them in the cause of our mutual interests posed by increased Soviet involvement in the Middle East", and stressed that the main focus of his meeting with Shamir was "the agony of Lebanon and threat there to our common interests". Cited in *The New York Times*, 2 December 1983.

"always intended by our side and explicitly so to reflect our co-operation with Israel vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its designs and its efforts in the Middle East. It was never a U.S.-Israeli co-operation understanding against the Arab states. I think there was hyperbole in the use of the term 'vital' in describing Lebanon. Was it 'common interest', national interest or vital interest whatever the phrase the President used. That is a phrase which should be used very sparingly in regard to American interests. We had invested a great deal of American energy and prestige into negotiating that 17 May agreement into trying to contribute to stability. I can understand why the President felt comfortable in using that phrase because he had personally been involved, he had the Secretary of State involved. It seemed to be part of the peace fabric in the Middle East which is very much a vital interest that we advance the general peace in that region. But as you quoted in the context of specifically applying to Lebanon it does sound to be like a hyperbole." [36]

Be that as it may, why were these "vital" or "common" interests to be defended in Lebanon? Why should this be done by fighting Syria and the so-called leftist Muslim opposition - there were people in the opposition who were neither leftist nor muslim, but just had a different view of how to resolve the Lebanese conflict.

In any case, how, one may ask, did Lebanon become a foreign policy problem for the United States? For Lebanon has rarely been at the top of the list of U.S. foreign policy concerns. Indeed, in 1958 when American Marines waded ashore in Lebanon, the cause of the intervention had little to do with Lebanon itself. Nor did they become involved in the small-scale civil war that was underway then. Instead, a high-level diplomatic effort was launched to change the makeup of the Lebanese government, a new President was elected, and within months of their arrival the Marines were gone. Not until 1982 did Lebanon once again become the centre of U.S. concerns in the Middle East. Then the Reagan Administration set for itself ambitious objectives in Lebanon: withdrawal of all foreign forces, support for an independent Lebanese government with control over all of its territory, peaceful relations between Lebanon and Israel, and encouragement for the process of political reconciliation within Lebanon.

Few can dispute these stated U.S. objectives in Lebanon. The debate is not so much over ends as

[36] Interview by the writer with Richard Murphy, United States Under-Secretary of State for Near East and East Asia in the Reagan Administration 1983-1989, London, 3 May 1989.

over means. According to Richard Murphy, what the U.S. Administration was least successful in doing had been to adopt realistic means to achieve some or all of its goals. The 'mistakes' have not been intentional but rather of analysis, judgement and execution, as Murphy puts it:

"Well, if we have to talk in terms of mistakes and misjudgements, it was from our side in assuming that a very symbolic force would be a contribution and could be used by all the parties as a cover under which they could work out their political understandings. Either they were not ready to, were not able to, or the Syrians were not in favour of them doing so. You hear different interpretations of the Syrian role throughout that period. Officially, what was said to us by the Syrians was that it was up to the Lebanese, it is their life, we do not take sides. Another fundamental mistake on our part was that we did not put a time limit." [37]

In this perspective, it would seem that a better sense of priorities a, feel for the importance of time, a deeper knowledge of local Lebanese realities and a strategic understanding of Syrian and Israeli motives - all these would have vastly improved the conduct of U.S. policy in Lebanon. The United States does not have vital interests in Lebanon per se. If interests are literally vital, one must be prepared to pay a very high price to defend them. This was not the case in Lebanon, because the U.S. 'presence' in Lebanon became a liability rather than an asset. The point here is not that the United States was powerless to influence events in Lebanon, but rather that military power on a small scale does little good, and it may, in fact, have deflected from more promising initiatives on the diplomatic and political level. In this context, neither a token marine presence nor offshore naval power could, for instance, drive the Syrians out of Lebanon. Israel might have done so, but at a high cost. Nothing less than several divisions of U.S. troops on the ground could have tipped the balance of power decisively in Lebanon. Politically, that was never the intention. For as Murphy was to remark:

[37] Interview by the writer with Richard Murphy, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs in the Reagan Administration 1983-1989, London, 3 May 1989.

"Well we did not succeed in helping, we certainly did not intend to hurt but we did not commit enough troops or design a mission which would have made a substantial impact. But we have never had intentions of doing that. The word 'symbolic' was on the lips of everyone. This is a token symbolic force not to get involved in intra-Lebanese disputes ... We were not involved, we became and were seen to be involved in internal Lebanese politics. But we got involved to try to do something about Lebanese-Israeli relations. That was not our interest in playing political games inside Lebanon. Because we are naive when it comes to Lebanese politics and we firmly believe that the Lebanese are the only ones that can sort out their internal politics ... an outsider cannot do that." [38]

Yet as events came to demonstrate, American policy, in the view of the Lebanese Muslim opposition, ended up buttressing a legal government that lacked legitimacy, and concomitantly earned credit or discredit for what that government did or failed to do. For as Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss, at the time a member of the Gemayel opposition alleged:

"The government of President Amin Gemayel had placed its stakes on the American role... It is no secret that over the first few years of the mandate of former President Amin Gemayel his stakes were completely placed on the Americans. So I think he listened to the American opinion ... that was it actually. I think he [Gemayel] was complying not deciding in that particular period. he was complying with American wishes." [39]

In addition, the American Marines were held to account for the perceived actions of their government. Widely seen within the Maronite Community as the usurper of the position that belonged to his martyred brother Bashir, President Amin Gemayel's precarious situation led him constantly to cast worried glances over his shoulder, and to ignore the demands of the Druze and the Shi'ites. Gemayel talked reconciliation, and his promises to that end may have mollified the Americans and the French, but he insisted that liberation (the removal of foreign forces) must precede reconciliation. This penchant might have been justified if at least symbolic steps towards reconciliation had been taken, but that was not the case. It was clear then (1982-84), "as it remains today, that the dichotomy between reconciliation and the withdrawal of foreign forces is a misleading one". The two processes had to be "pushed simultaneously, rather than in sequence". [40]

[38] *Ibid.*

[39] Interview by the writer with Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss, Beirut, 19 November 1988.

[40] *Ibid.*

In the upshot, the ebullience of Gemayel, it would seem, played an important role in instilling a sense of misplaced confidence and perhaps complacency among the MNF-II contributors which undercut any sense of urgency and minimized the prospect of failure. This is where American policy, in particular, played a crucial role. The United States believed Gemayel would first have to create a strong army, negotiate with Israel and Syria their withdrawals and then discuss political compromise with his opponents. *But a strong army cannot be built on weak foundations.* When it was put under pressure in 1976, it divided. There was every reason to suppose this would happen again. Then there was the fact that the United States failed in its promise to push for a quick Israeli and Syrian withdrawal. In the words of one former advisor to two of Lebanon's Presidents, "had the United States moved more energetically during that period, the outcome might have been different". [41] Opportunities are not permanent, especially in an environment like Lebanon's. Opportunities must be seized before they disappear.

At the same time, even if the demands and positions of the Lebanese opposition were clear, so too were the broader historical developments underlying them. The Amin Gemayel government was formed when the Israeli invasion had tilted the balance of power in Beirut sharply. The Americans, in the view of Gemayel's opponents, inherited this balance and did nothing to change it. More crucially it would seem, American diplomats in Beirut were insufficiently sensitive to the demands of the Lebanese Muslim opposition rather than blithely ignoring them until it became much too late. As Walid Junblatt, the Druze leader was to later remark:

They [the Americans] have compromised their role from the start by bringing to power Bashir Gemayel. Then Amin Gemayel, refusing all claims by us that it is impossible to have a partisan president. Let us have somebody neutral not directly involved in the Lebanese civil war, not be the head of the Phalangist party ... They refused. Then politically speaking they were also directly involved when they sponsored the 17 May agreement. So their physical presence could not but support their policy with Amin Gemayel with the Israelis against the obstacles. We were the obstacles, the Syrians, Amal, and others. [42]

In any case it was not until well into 1983 that the Americans pushed forcefully to see that the

[41] Interview by this writer with Karim Pakradouni, Beirut, 15 November 1988.

[42] Interview by this writer with Walid Junblatt, the Druze leader, 18 November 1988.

Gemayel government took serious account of the Lebanese opposition's demands and by then, it would seem, the position of the Lebanese opposition had hardened dramatically.

It was then that the Druze and Shi'ite militias came to view the American Marines as partisan in the war. The Marines who had come as 'peacekeepers', but because of their defence of the Maronite Christian and Israeli interests, they were now viewed as enemies. Here again the Druze leader did not mince his words as to how his community perceived the American role:

"Yes the Americans became a party to the conflict just after the outbreak of hostilities in September 1983 they were quite directly involved especially when we [the Druze militia forces] were about to take control of the town of Suq al Gharb. They intervened directly and we were repulsed ... they were defending Amin Gemayel and the Lebanese army ... We were not in need of an international force. This was purely an American invention as a direct and logical consequence of their policies." [43]

The conclusion which, on balance, we draw is that it was American interests and attitudes that most effected the eventual fate of the MNF-II. Political misreading certainly was one factor, yet in relation to peacekeeping, a more important element was also involved. It has been argued in the above but also elsewhere, that one of the central reasons why the MNF-II was in the end discredited was because it became politically and militarily subordinate to American policy which it seemed was designed to establish Lebanon as a unified western-oriented state at peace with Israel. As a consequence, many accepted rules of peacekeeping were breached and undoubtedly discredited and weakened the position of the other contingents in MNF-II.

Peacekeeping forces do not make policies, more likely they reflect and suffer the policies of their governments. If the premise for those policies are flawed, the peacekeepers can only deal with the consequences of the defects; they cannot do more. More importantly, peacekeepers cannot make peace they can only buy time, their presence is to provide a pretext which would evoke an atmosphere for the concerned parties to elevate the conflict to less violent means in their bid to achieve a political settlement or solution.

[43] *Ibid.*

The far-reaching programme of the United States to broker peace between Israel and Lebanon and to help the Lebanese Army was, to say the least, not only ambitious and unrealistic in the circumstances, but also undermines a significant peacekeeping function. True there was great unease about the rules of engagement about the mission of the MNF-II but most disturbing was the lack of agreement and understanding about the overall political environment. American policy in Lebanon failed not because of the misuse of the MNF but because of faulty political misreadings in Washington. Without a sound, and realistic plan for bringing about 'internal reconciliation' and the withdrawal of 'foreign forces' from Lebanon little was going to obtain. In that U.S. policy objectives then far exceeded expectations and misperceptions concerning the mission the Marines were sent to accomplish in Lebanon.

The United States had too many vested interests in the Middle East to hold to any middle ground in Lebanese politics if those interests were in need of protection. In more concrete terms, the Reagan Administration had tried to play too many roles in Lebanon and the Middle East. It saw itself variously as the 'peacekeeper' for Lebanon, the protector of Israel, the peacemaker for the region and the bulwark against communism and the Soviet Union. The American role, in the perspective of Washington was being portrayed as important in terms of the East-West struggle, its significance was not confined to one country or even the region. On this view, the American role could not, therefore, be regarded as a peacekeeping one, its function was both to preserve the peace in Beirut and contain Soviet expansion in a strategic region. To hear what President Reagan and other leaders of his Administration were saying, one would think that Lebanon was the strategic centre of the Middle East, a key area of the world.

The American role was never clear. Despite claims to the contrary its ambiguous mission became increasingly controversial as hostilities worsened and the Marines were sucked into the conflict as a 'partisan' force. Through a chain reaction of unintended consequences, their role was to evolve from a neutral third party force into a military ally of the Gemayel government to not only help it maintain authority in the country but to confront the anti-Gemayel opposition militias.

In the case of the MNF, it should be recalled that the American contingent, like its other partners,

had the initial consent of anti-Gemayel government opposition on the assumption that it was coming primarily to protect the Palestinian camps and other inhabitants of Beirut and to interpose between the withdrawing 'foreign' forces. The entanglement of the Marines with the Lebanese army contributed to the downfall of the MNF-II mission. For it linked their actions inextricably with those of the Lebanese army and, by extension, identified the Marines completely with the fate of the Gemayel government. The notion advanced by the Gemayel government that U.S. Marines accompany the Lebanese army as it moved outside the Beirut area was judged imprudent and politically unacceptable. This, however, could not happen, as public backing for the mission was fading rapidly and in the end forced a change in policy, thus leading to the abandonment of these ambitious goals.

Of the constraints on effective functioning of third-party intervention and of peacekeeping and especially of factors that can erode national motivation to keep their troops in the field, none has been so neglected by analysts as the importance of sustaining support in the domestic constituency. Within the MNF-II participating countries - certainly in the U.S. but also elsewhere - once the national troop contingents were exposed to hostile fire, domestic pressure mounted to reduce their vulnerability, and the utility of the mission itself came into question. In the case of the American contingent, ambivalence about sending the troops in the first place, and anxiety about involvement in Lebanon's internal strife and the regional struggle heightened the misgivings about participating in a peacekeeping undertaking that encounters unexpected difficulties. In the U.S., pressure kept mounting for a reassessment of U.S. policy toward the Gemayel government that would produce a disengagement of the Marines. As the MNF-II presence in Lebanon dragged on without perceptible progress in resolving the crisis, and as more casualties were suffered, these pressures intensified. In a post-Vietnam political atmosphere, use of American military power can be sustained politically provided there is a rapid and successful outcome, as in the Grenada operation. The American Marine presence in Lebanon, by contrast, dragged beyond what was politically sustainable.

The firepower the American Marines had at their disposal became a handicap as the home constituency did not, or perhaps could not, understand the concept or status of 'an interpositional force' and when the Marines began to take casualties, politicians and policymakers were under pressure to explain

either why they had so much firepower and failed to use it in retaliation, or act on the ground in a manner which satisfied the public clamour at home. For instance, the decision by the U.S. navy to use for the first time naval gunfire to support the Lebanese army in its battles with anti-Gemayel opposition forces clearly represented a major change in the rules of engagement.

Although the military effects of the offshore shelling were small, the political impact was considerable. For the American public and television audiences such a military posture may have provided a satisfactory display of their naval power in appearing to stem the advance of the anti-government forces, but in Lebanon it ended any hopes that the Multinational Force, and in particular the American contingent, may have had of sustaining a peacekeeping role in the conflict. To the rest of the world, such a policy was seen as a deliberate military move to protect the Gemayel regime and a dangerous escalation in U.S. involvement in that country. Unfortunately, the ill feelings and acts of violence and hostilities generated by the misuse of firepower were in every case directed against the American Marines.

The French Role in the Multinational Force

The French contribution to the Multinational Force has to be seen, like that of other contingents, within the context of its policies towards the Middle East in general and Lebanon in particular. For France, the Multinational Force in Beirut was not born in August 1982, nor did it die in February-March 1984. Participation formed part, albeit a controversial part, of French Middle East policies which had existed before and continued to exist after the operative life of MNF-II. During that period, France had espoused the principle of the need for concerned involvement by the international community in regional conflicts.

In the event, involvement in both MNFs - operations not sponsored by the United Nations - provoked certain dilemmas for France. On the one hand, the feeling that this enterprise was, in the end, a failure only served to strengthen France's belief that the U.N. should be the foremost international vehicle for intervention in regional crises. Behind it lay the aim of limiting the intrusion by foreign powers individually - hence the resort to the U.N. - and respect for the inviolability of their borders.

[44]

[44] The Joint Franco-Austrian declaration on Lebanon on the occasion of President Francois Mitterrand's visit to Vienna on

On the other hand, there was the confluence of several features which made pressing French participation in a peacekeeping force of whatever pedigree. There were France's historical ties to Lebanon and the latter's position in foreign policy. Since the sixteenth century, France had seen itself as the custodian of the Christians in Lebanon and the area. Between 1920 and 1943, France held the ruling mandatory authority over the "State of Greater Lebanon", as it was originally called. [45] This intimacy has meant, too, that events in Lebanon could become issues in French domestic politics. Simultaneously, France has been in the forefront of western countries responding to the plight of the Palestinians by advocating acknowledgement of their rights, particularly those of political representation. Like the Italians and the British they recognised the need to consult with the Palestinians and the Syrians.

A consequence of the events of September 1983 - when Lebanon was once again in the throes of outright civil war - was that the MNF-II partnership began to unravel. From the beginning, as noted, the MNF-II was plagued by a lack of cohesion, both in objectives and in operations, and a tendency on the part of France, in particular, to distance itself from U.S. policy. [46] The French did not see themselves in any way subordinate to the United States, and whether by design or accident, deployed a ground force which was at times equal or superior to the American contingent that was deployed. At the same time, the French were anxious to maintain an independent position in the MNF-II and were at times fairly demonstrative in their efforts to emphasise their separate negotiating position, the more so, as they became sceptical of the American sponsored diplomatic activities and U.S. objectives for Lebanon and the region. [47] In an unusually outspoken criticism of U.S. military strategy, the then

June 16-17, 1982 is cited as an example of this position. See the *International Herald Tribune*, 17 June 1982.

[45] On this point and more refer to Chapter three for a more detailed discussion.

[46] Although the MNF purported to be a Multinational Force, it was not unified. Four loosely coordinated national contingents had separate commands, rules of engagement, and arrangements with the Lebanese government, and each made its own decisions on how best to defend itself and assist the Lebanese army. But some of the contingents opposed a unified structure. France, in particular, insisted on differentiating its presence from that of the United States. A combined command would complicate France's political desire to distance itself from U.S. policies. Flora Lewis observed: "There is really no such thing as a Multinational Force in Beirut. There are Americans, French, Italian and British troops operating separately, without an agreed mission. There is spectacular evidence that each decides whether, when, and where to retaliate"., "More Mideast Muddling", *New York Times*, op.cit., November 28, 1983.

[47] The prevalent French attitude to U.S. policy was reflected in a front-page cartoon in *Le Monde*. It depicted an angry Reagan, backed by U.S. Marines, interrogating a Grenadian peasant and demanding to know: "Where were you at the time of the Beirut bombings?" Three days after the Beirut truck bombings, U.S. Marines stormed onto Grenada. See *Le Monde*, Paris, 27 October 1983.

French External Relations Minister Claude Cheysson, said that the retaliatory strikes by the American Marines in support of the Lebanese army in battles with Muslim opposition forces in the 'Shouf Mountain War' did not seem "the best way of settling the conflict". [48] Although France and the United States were working together within the framework of the MNF-II mandate, apart from that, they did not concert their actions.

In France, there was little public pressure to withdraw its troops given the historical and cultural ties which were widely accepted as justifying French involvement in the MNF-II. Following a flying visit to Beirut - in the wake of the 23 October 1983 bombing in which 59 French paratroopers died along with some 241 American Marines - President Francois Mitterrand dispelled fears of a French withdrawal when he declared:

"In Lebanon, France remains and will remain faithful to its history and its commitment; France has a mission to fulfill." [49]

Nevertheless, questions were raised about France's neutrality, and there was growing concern about French troops becoming targets for terrorist groups as the American Marines were moving closer towards open backing of the Gemayel government in the civil war. The French had no wish to be a part of a war which the United States was transforming into a battle to limit Syrian and Palestinian influence in Lebanon.

The notion of pulling out — difficult at the best of times — was made more difficult by the strong position taken by Jacques Chirac, the Mayor of Paris and leader of the neo-Gaullist coalition. He said in the face of attacks made by the Syrian-backed Druze militia forces which had led to the death of 17 French paratroopers, the Government should have "attacked and destroyed" the Syrian batteries. France, he added, "does not warn twice. When she has warned once, she strikes". [50] The warning indicated France's determination not to bend to what it saw as deliberate acts of intimidation aimed at obtaining the withdrawal of French troops from the MNF-II. Pierre Messmer, a former French Prime Minister stated that a French riposte could bring heavy consequences given the complex

[48] *International Herald Tribune*, Paris, 20 September 1983.

[49] Reported in *Al-Nahar*, Beirut, 25 October 1983.

[50] *International Herald Tribune*, Paris, 22 September 1983.

situation in the field. In his words, "the Government must measure exactly how far it can go in its reaction, indispensable for the security of our soldiers, without bringing France into a bloody Lebanese civil war, which we have not succeeded in preventing." [51] In the circumstances, the Druze militia forces denied it was their gunners who fired on the French and claimed the shelling came from Lebanese Army guns. Moreover, they charged that the proximity of Lebanese Army positions to those of the French contingent were manipulated by the Gemayel government and its army so as to involve the French in the fighting. In the words of one official, "the shelling these troops were subjected to comes from the Lebanese Army position and is aimed at involving the French troops in the fighting in the Mountains." [52]

Yet after French military actions, for instance, the reprisal air raids on Baalbek in the Bekka valley, the French could not maintain the principle that their soldiers were a peacekeeping force. For they did not act like the Italians and the British, whose contingents were attacked once or twice but who did not hit back, even though the French did not get involved in American-type military operations such as the U.S. naval shelling of the Shouf mountain area and aerial reconnaissance missions with carrier based F.14 *Tom cat* photo-equipped aircraft over Beirut. Nevertheless, some Lebanese viewed the U.S. and French positions as partisan and contrary to the claims that the French "were not pushing along the same lines as the Americans", [53]

In view of all this, the French lamented what they saw as the U.S. tendency to portray the American role in the MNF-II as important in terms of the East-West struggle. Although the Soviet Union backed Syria in Lebanon, the French claimed the situation was too complex to be viewed as a struggle between superpower proxies. France also saw merit in the Syrian view that Israeli troops should withdraw from southern Lebanon before the Syrian troops did. While the French were committed to the notion that both forces eventually must leave Lebanon, they were said to view the Israelis as "illegal invaders", in a different category from the Syrians, who were "originally invited in". France was not

[51] Reported in the *Daily Star*, Beirut English daily, 20 September 1983.

[52] Fuad Salman, The Secretary General of Druze leader Walid Junblatt's Progressive Socialist Party, quoted in the *Daily Star*, Beirut English daily, 10 September 1983.

[53] Claude Cheysson, quoted in the *International Herald Tribune*, 7 November 1983.

prepared to accept the division of Lebanon and the Middle East into 'Russo-Syrian' and 'American-Israeli' spheres of influence. [54]

Instead, France wanted to see the MNF-II replaced by a larger U.N. presence which could only have been possible with Soviet and Syrian support, but since there was no U.S.-Soviet co-operation this made one of the bases of a search for a negotiated Lebanese settlement more intractable. It must be said that this French view of the importance of the U.N. role is more an assertion of a principle than a doctrine which had been regularly adhered to earlier. France tended towards a national rather than a multinational role in international crises, particularly if this involved the exclusion of the superpower powers — chiefly, the United States but also, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union. [55]

Thus, in the French view, the MNF was the second best solution. As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, France had tried to obtain U.N. intervention on different levels — but without success. In the Security Council these proposals were first set forth in a draft resolution introduced by the French delegation on 26 June 1982, [56] and this came after a particularly heavy bombardment of West Beirut the day before by Israeli aircraft, naval vessels and artillery from their positions just outside the city. The draft demanded that "all the parties observe an immediate cessation of hostilities throughout Lebanon", and demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces engaged around Beirut to a distance of 10 km from the periphery of that city as a first step towards a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon as well as the simultaneous withdrawal of the Palestinian armed forces from Beirut which would retire to the existing camps. In paragraph 6 of this resolution, the Secretary-General was requested "as an immediate measure, to station United Nations military observers, in agreement with the Government of Lebanon, with instructions to supervise the cease-fire and disengagement in and around Beirut". [57] The French resolution obtained fourteen votes in favour during the vote in the Security Council, but was nevertheless not adopted, because of a veto cast by the

[54] Claude Cheysson, the French External Relations Minister quoted in the *International Herald Tribune*, 5 December 1983.

[55] Evidence of this could be found in the Suez crises in 1956 and the Congo in 1960. The countries of francophone Africa have, for historical reasons, been seen by France as having a special status as, for example, the military interventions in Zaire in 1978 and in recent years in Chad have shown. In short, France does not always put the U.N. first.

[56] United Nations Security Council Document, S/15255/Rev., 2.

[57] *Ibid.*

United States.

This and other frustrations only emphasized the inability of the Security Council to act swiftly and were a further reminder that medium-sized powers can all too easily be squeezed out when the superpowers are involved and, above all, are not in agreement. For France was thwarted in its efforts to get the U.N. involved not just by the United States, but also by the Soviet Union which vetoed a draft French proposal in February 1984. Yet, in reality, many of France's worries about the MNF becoming too closely associated with Western, in particular American, interests were fulfilled even though Paris sought to put some distance between itself and Washington.

The French generally adopted the American line emphasizing the need to re-establish sovereignty although, in the last dark months of the MNF-II's duties in Beirut, there was a shift of emphasis. It was captured in the significant phrase used by Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson when he said that the MNF-II would not "abandon the Lebanese". He said this in December, 1983 long after the suicide bombing against the French battalion headquarters in West Beirut and at a time when the MNF-II itself had already become enmeshed in the civil war. In Cheysson's own words:

[W]e support President Gemayel. We would like Gemayel's Government to represent Lebanon in its entirety so that the process of national reconciliation can continue and lead to a truly representative executive force" [58]

This was at a period when factions in Lebanon were holding what was hopefully called a 'reconciliation' conference in Geneva, and Cheysson vouchsafed the idea that it would be "irresponsible" of the MNF-II to leave Lebanon at such a critical time.

In any event, this became a new refrain, increasingly adopted by the Americans, that MNF-II was there to give the Lebanese more time to work out their differences. The battles between American and French troops and Muslim militias, the U.S. naval bombardments, all were apparently now to be part of the MNF-II's due to buy time for Lebanese politicians. The comments by Cheysson held other clues to France's policies in Lebanon. It was noticeable that France's ambition not to 'abandon the Lebanese' apparently paid little heed to the fact that a large number of Lebanese by then wanted to be


[58] *International Herald Tribune*, Paris, 3 December 1983.

abandoned by the MNF-II. Unconsciously, perhaps, the words applied not so much to the Lebanese but to the Christian Lebanese, those traditional supporters of France and everything French who had been saved before by French troops in the nineteenth century, who had benefitted from France's mandate and who saw in France their principal overseas connection.

One of the physical symbols of MNF-II's own predicament was the shifting perimeter of its own deployment area in Beirut. The French, who initially based almost all their paratroopers in West Beirut or at their ambassador's residence on the 'green line', steadily moved them across the line and finished up in 1984 with all their troops in East Beirut. It was a transition that said as much about French political sympathy as it did about military strategy. The Americans only entered East Beirut after a week in the city but later, under attack from Muslim forces, left their own deployment area within Bourj el-Barajneh and Hay el-Salaam for the terrain immediately surrounding the international airport. The Italians remained throughout in their area around the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla. For their part, the British set up their base in an area with an Israeli tank position across the road in front of them and, later, a Lebanese Army artillery battery on a hill behind them (see map 4).

On balance, the French priorities in having participated in the MNF were of a different sort and their image of Lebanon as a pro-western outpost in the Middle East free from superpower hegemony shaped French actions throughout their presence in that country. Yet ironically, perhaps, the French and the Americans were the most removed from the individuals and groups between whom they wished to establish peace. From a relatively early stage these two dominant contingents had been co-opted by the Gemayel government and the Lebanese army and the groups which supported them, in particular, the Christian population and, more precisely, the Maronite Christian Phalange which was fighting alongside the Lebanese Army against the Druze and Shi'ite militias who in turn were assisted by Palestinian as well as by Syrian artillery. Hence, the French like the American contingent became embroiled by the force and logic of events in the struggle for political power in Lebanon. What is more, both of these contingents increasingly behaved and were viewed as an instrument of enforcement in support of an unpopular and faltering government in a conflict where the major contest was precisely about the legitimacy and authority of the government which the MNF-II was supposed to support. In

Map 4. Beirut: Multinational Force Areas of Responsibility



Source: Middle East International, November 1983.

the end, they emerged as a partisan peacekeeping force rather than an impartial peacekeeping instrument.

The Italian Role in the Multinational Force

The participation of the Italian contingent in the Multinational Force in Beirut was partly the result of a growing trend in Italy's foreign policy towards a greater commitment to a more active role in Middle Eastern politics. Geographically they were the closest country in the MNF-II to the Lebanese theatre. They had a military contingent — their despatch in July 1979 of an army helicopter unit — in the United Nations Interim Force in South Lebanon (UNIFIL), and in recent years their national security had not remained entirely unscathed by the plague of Middle East terrorism. Yet, what had emerged from this more active foreign policy was the feeling that Italy should have a two-track policy with an autonomous approach towards the Middle East but one which at the same time developed in co-ordination — because of Italy's geographic position and its membership of both the European Community (EC) and NATO — with the West's broader interests. Of particular relevance was Italy's adherence to the European Community's Venice Declaration of June 1980 on the Middle East and this has remained a constant feature. This declaration notably included the phrases "the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people ... The Palestinian people ... must be placed in a position ... to exercise fully their right to self-determination ... the PLO, which will have to be associated with the negotiations [over a peace settlement] ...". In short, Italy felt that any long-term solution should include the interests of the Palestinians. [59]

Against this background, Italy's thinking on participating in MNF-I was close to that of France. They shared the view that a United Nations force would have been preferable and that, in the process of attempting to help sort out the chaos in Lebanon, the PLO should not be dismantled because it would have to be, as the Venice declaration asserted, an element in any future peace process. In any

[59] There was also hard-nosed economic arguments for Rome's interest. Italy then was the biggest single exporter to Lebanon. The prize, in terms of Lebanon's reconstruction is huge. In a visit to Rome in October 1982 President Gemayel indicated that the sum needed would be 12 billion American dollars. Lebanon itself would provide one quarter of that sum but the rest would have to come from the outside. To this effect, Italian companies sent scouting missions to Beirut and without powerful and swifiting backing from Rome, opportunities might be lost to competitors. See *Financial Times*, London, 17 November 1982.

event, Italy's involvement in the second Multinational Force in Beirut (MNF-II) came as part of the widespread emotional reaction to the massacres in the Sabra and Shatila refuge camps. Accordingly, their dual objectives in Beirut were to attend to the immediate requirement for stability and the humanitarian needs of the civilian population. As such, these objectives were based on the task assigned to the Italian contingent in accordance with the bilateral agreement drawn up between the Italian and Lebanese governments. These were namely "to be an interposition force in a number of sensitive areas; to assist the Lebanese government and armed forces in restoring their sovereignty in the Beirut area, to protect the civilian population in the sector and to put an end to bloodshed". [59a] Many opinions were expressed on this task. Some found it unfeasible, some ambiguous and others incomprehensible.

Yet the Italians held their ground and were allowed to do so. Of all the contingents, they stayed true to the original mission; that they had come to Beirut to protect people. It was General Angioni, the Italian commander, who put the Italian position most appropriately in September of 1983, exactly a month before the suicide bombings against the American and French contingents of MNF-II. The MNF-II, he said, had come to support the Lebanese Army and the government. But it had also come "to protect the population". He spoke of the Palestinian problem — "the Lebanese people must afford [sic] to resolve the Palestinian problem and to try to find a solution", he said, "also for the people in the Palestinian camps to find an international way, to have an agreement with other countries with the support of the MNF in order to find the best solution for the Palestinian problem". [60] It was only three months later that President Pertini of Italy was to call for the withdrawal of the Italian contingent if they became involved in a Lebanese war, at the same time attacking the Israeli Defence Minister, Ariel Sharon who, he said, should be "banned from society" for his responsibility for the Sabra and Shatila massacres. The Palestinians, said Pertini, should "have a sacrosanct right to a homeland and a country, like the Israelis have". [61] That the Italians showed as much sympathy for the Palestinians as the French felt for the Christian Lebanese was undeniable. The difference, however, was that the Italians

[59a] See *Appendix* for the mandate establishing MNF-II.

[60] General Angioni quoted in the *Daily Star*, Beirut English daily, 24 September 1983.

[61] Comments by President Sandro Pertini reported in the *Daily Star*, 31 December 1983.

were at least abiding by their initial instruction to protect the survivors of the massacre. And as a result, no doubt, they were spared the suicide bombings of October 23, 1983.

It can be argued that the nature of the relationship a peacekeeping force achieves with the population within its area of control is a decisive element determining the operation's success or failure. Stated concisely, a relationship to local civilians predicated on consensus, communication and confidence is a necessary factor for success. A relationship characterized by mounting hostility, suspicion and lack of communication is a sufficient cause for failure. A peacekeeping force requires civilian co-operation and loyalty for a range of purposes: the containment of local violence, military demobilization of civilians, the imposition of military measures - such as curfews - which might otherwise be resisted, mediation and, very importantly, information.

Within MNF-II, like everything else, this relationship varied from contingent to contingent. Only the Italian contingent operated as part of the local environment and it became an active element in restoring 'normal' living conditions. Its soldiers were provided with the training required to acquaint them with the cultural, political and social situation of the people among whom they worked. Operating in a sector that contained mostly Shi'ites and Palestinians, the Italians carefully nurtured contact with the ordinary citizens and the political leaders in their area. Tellingly, it was only the Italians and the British contingents who throughout enjoyed relative security - that departed Lebanon with their reputations intact, if not enhanced.

The British Role in the Multinational Force

In December 1982 the British Government made its decision to respond to the Lebanon Government's request for a British contribution to the second Multinational Force in Beirut (MNF-II) by providing a small military unit of some 80 men for an initial period of three months. The British contingent was deployed to Beirut on 8 February 1983, where it and its successor units remained - growing to about 120 men in the process - until redeployment offshore exactly a year later in the course of events which culminated in the MNF-II's final disbandment. Throughout the period of their contribution to MNF-II, the British maintained that their presence in Lebanon was:

"[t]o provide a multinational presence in Beirut to assist in the restoration of the Lebanese Government Sovereignty [sic] and authority over the Beirut area and provide visible evidence of international support for the Lebanese Government". [62]

This was an interesting statement in that it laid emphasis not so much on the goals which the MNF-II could achieve by itself, but rather on the tasks which others could achieve if there was the effective presence of a peacekeeping force.

From the beginning, it was clear that the MNF-II had no easy task ahead of it. But the circumstances in late 1982 suggested that there was some scope to help in the restoration of peace in Lebanon. The original version of the MNF (from July to September 1982) was made up of American, French and Italian elements, the second version consisted at first of the same participants. The wider-ranging nature of the mandate after September 1982, however, led to early efforts to broaden the basis of participation, and Britain was reportedly one of a large number of countries approached. [63]

In the event, it was only Britain which was prepared to join the initial participants. The force the British contributed was clearly not designed to have much impact on the local situation and was perhaps more a gesture to endorse the MNF-II initiative. The small size of the British contingent may also have been influenced by the concurrent activities in the Falklands/Malvinas war. Although Britain was anxious to support and give credibility to the efforts and sense of commitment that prevailed in the governments of the three original contributions, it became clear that they, the British, too, had their own national perspectives on the events, in particular, the limited degree of support the British Government were later prepared to give to the Amin Gemayel government. When Gemayel visited London from 13 to 15 December 1983, the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, urged him to widen the base of his administration, by bringing in leaders of the opposition so as to create a genuine national government.

[64] The message for Gemayel was clear and the failure to reconstruct his administration could result

[62] For example, see press statement by British Forces, *Daily Star*, Beirut (English language daily), September 16, 1983.

[63] The three original MNF members initially had no success in attracting additional participants. Among the countries reportedly approached were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Greece, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and Turkey. See *International Herald Tribune*, November 15, 1983.

[64] At the same time, Mrs Thatcher was careful to boost Gemayel's personal prestige by arranging his visit to the Queen at Buckingham Palace. This was followed by meetings with opposition party leaders, including Labour's Neil Kinnock and his Shadow Foreign Secretary, Denis Healey, the Liberals' David Steel and SDP's Dr David Owen. *The Times*, London, 15 December 1983.

in the pull-out of the British contingent from the MNF-II.

Although relatively small in size, the British contingent is widely acknowledged to have played a major part in reducing the level of violence, especially during the earlier, more successful months of the MNF-II. Moreover, a British contribution, however small, served the more general political purpose of emphasizing, in a tangible way, British support for the aim of the withdrawal of all foreign forces and armies from Lebanon and the concomitant extension of central government authority. In the House of Commons, Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign Secretary, stated the Government's position and aims in Lebanon as follows:

"... certainly the way to the peaceful resolution of the problems in the Lebanon is the withdrawal of all forces from that country. It is right that we should use every means and influence at our disposal. That is what we are trying to do, but we should not overestimate our influence." [65]

Against the backdrop of the wider British interest in promoting the peace process in the Middle East, assistance in the restoration of stability in Lebanon seemed a vital step which the British Government should be ready to take. There was certainly a general British political consensus to this effect when the decision to participate was taken. According to Richard Luce, then Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the British interest and objective in Lebanon once the troops were dispatched was:

"...[t]o help to provide conditions whereby peace, reconciliation, territorial integrity and the full authority of the Lebanese Government throughout the whole of the Lebanon can be created. In short, we wish to see a stable and independent Lebanon — the type of Lebanon that we saw in the 1950s and 1960s. If that is not the objective, I suggest that the running sore of total instability in the Lebanon would pose and continue to pose a general threat to the stability of the entire Middle East. The stability of the entire Middle East is of grave concern to Britain and the western world, let alone to the parties to the dispute in the Middle East." [66]

The formal basis on which the British contingent was deployed was laid down in an exchange of notes between the British and Lebanese Governments on January 31 1983. These described the man-

[65] *Parliamentary Debates* (HANSARD), Vol.46, 1983-84 session, 18 July - 29 July 1983, p.509.

[66] See House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates* (HANSARD), 24 November 1983; see comments of Richard Luce, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in the Common's debate on Lebanon, pp.258-259.

date of the MNF-II (which had, of course, already been determined with the original three participants) as "to provide an international presence to assist the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the Beirut area". [67] It was intended that this presence should not be a long-term commitment to shore up the Government of Lebanon but that it be "confined to assisting the Lebanese Government and armed forces in the Beirut area only for the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority in the greater Beirut area". [68] To this effect, the particular tasks to be undertaken by the British contingent in conformity with this mandate were to be arranged separately. Although - as noted above - the four components of the MNF-II were each under a national command, the British Government, nonetheless, was urged to disassociate itself from the military actions by the Americans in Lebanon. For instance, Denis Healey, then Shadow Foreign Secretary and Deputy Labour leader whose party supported the decision for the British contribution to MNF-II remarked:

"The Labour Party has been deeply disturbed by the recent escalation of United States military action in Lebanon, which has involved direct intervention in the Lebanese civil war on behalf of a government which by its own admission represents less than 20 per cent of the population." [69]

This position was further underlined by a statement issued by the British Foreign Office, saying "it is for each contingent to take its own decisions about self-defence". [70]

This shift in attitude coupled with the targeting of the American and French contingents of the MNF-II, with the 'terrorist' bomb attacks of October 1983, dramatically illustrated the extent to which perceptions had polarized. In the House of Commons, these tragic events compounded further the already widespread doubts about the British role and purpose of the MNF-II, Dennis Healey's comment in this respect encapsulated the Force's dilemma in the following terms:

"It appears that almost any action taken by the multinational force is regarded by one group or another as hostile to it. Therefore, the only real role of that force is to act as sitting ducks for terrorist attack." [71]

[67] See *Appendix* for the Lebanese-British Exchange of Notes.

[68] See comments of Richard Luce in British House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates* (HANSARD), 24 November 1983, p.560.

[69] *The Times*, London, 22 September 1983.

[70] *The Guardian*, 21 September 1983.

As the debate continued, the British Government was to reconsider the wisdom of continuing to contribute to the MNF-II. However, the British Prime Minister stressed her support for sustaining the British presence in Beirut "so long as there is a properly elected government with properly constituted Lebanese armed forces". [72] Yet she acknowledged that if matters worsened in Lebanon "it may be that we have to reconsider the future of the Multi-national Force" but warned that "a precipitate withdrawal might mean Lebanon had no future". [73] In addition she was insistent that involvement in civil war must be avoided. As a result, careful consideration was naturally given to the future for the MNF-II in the light of these tragic developments, which had greatly increased public awareness of the risk to MNF-II personnel. It was judged, however, that the British contingent "cannot be expected to remain there indefinitely, but it will stay for so long as it plays a useful part in promoting the peace process ..., It is important for the Government of the Lebanon and all the factions and groups in that country to understand the urgent need for them to settle their differences by a process of conciliation, which means changes on all sides. At present, there is no intention to change the role or size of the force but clearly, all those countries contributing to the multinational force will now need to reconsider that matter." [74] In an interview with the Beirut weekly *Monday Morning*, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Wooley, Commander of the British contingent, shared Prime Minister Thatcher's view that the British troops should stick it out, despite mounting domestic pressure - in the wake of the attacks on the American and French contingents - to recall them home. In confirming the widespread impression that his unit had good relations with the various Lebanese parties, Wooley stressed that the British presence was not just a "symbolic" expression of support of the Lebanese government or of United States policy. He continued:

[71] See House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates* (HANSARD), 24 October 1983, p.32.

[72] *Financial Times*, London, 26 September 1983.

[73] *Ibid.*

[74] See House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates* (HANSARD), 24 October 1983. The words quoted are those of Sir Geoffrey Howe, The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, p.32.

"Our presence is more than symbolic ... It has always been made quite clear that the Multinational Force is a temporary arrangement, and therefore it will withdraw sometime. But there are no plans for the British side to withdraw at this stage. We will stay until the task is completed ... Our task is specifically to assist the Lebanese government in extending its authority [and] I believe we are carrying out that task..." [75]

As a result, the government quietened the storm and received general endorsement of its view that an immediate withdrawal would sabotage any hope for peace and national reconciliation in Lebanon.

Yet despite all efforts in 1983 to arrange a viable and enduring ceasefire and make sustained progress towards reconciliation, the Gemayel government proved unwilling or unable to make the necessary concessions to its Lebanese Muslim opposition. As one prominent parliamentarian contended, Lebanese national reconciliation then was possible.

"...[o]nly if the Gemayel Government are prepared to modify the 1943 National Pact to give the 60 per cent Muslim majority in Lebanon a fairer share of power. The Gemayel Government will have no incentive to make those concessions as long as we say, as the Prime Minister did in her joint press conference with President Mitterand last week, that the multinational force will stay until a government of national reconciliation is established. That is especially so as the multinational force has taken the side of the Gemayel Government in the civil war more than once." [76]

In these circumstances of renewed outbreak of heavy factional fighting early in 1984, and the resignation of the Wazzen cabinet, made inescapable the conclusion that there was no longer a useful role for the British contingent to fulfill. When the danger to the troops had also been greatly heightened, the British Government then decided that they should be redeployed offshore until the situation became clearer. Elements remained there for several weeks, but they were finally withdrawn during March with the dissolution of the MNF-II.

Although the MNF-II was finally disbanded without the goal of Lebanese national reconciliation having been achieved, there is no doubt that the British played an important part in contributing to the stability in the Beirut area while they were there, as well as providing an opportunity for political conciliation. In general, the British contingent was welcomed by the people of Beirut as an impartial

[75] Interview with Claude Khoury, *Monday Morning*, Beirut, 16 January 1984, p.47.

[76] See comments of Dennis Healey, MP, House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates* (HANSARD), 24 October 1983, p.32.

cultivator of the conditions for peace. Its involvement in MNF-II was not perceived locally as being intervention in favour of one particular faction. It was less exposed than the French or the American contingents. The tasks which the British undertook illustrate this.

The British contingent's base was, at *Hadath* in south-eastern Beirut in a Druze and Amal area and close to a Lebanese Army position. Thus it was ideally placed in easy view of positions held by most of the conflicting parties within Beirut, and this enabled it to observe and report ceasefire violations by all sides to a committee whose task it was to make representations to the offending parties. The security committee which was set up to co-ordinate ceasefire arrangements following the national reconciliation talks in Geneva in October-November 1983 and met in a building close to the British base, which, with the agreement of all parties, was checked and guarded by the British contingent. Moreover, the contingent with its small and lightly armed scout vehicles mounted regular patrolling tasks throughout most of Beirut — except eventually in the southern sector of the city — to give reassurance to the local population, and to demonstrate British interest in fostering conditions essential to any enduring settlement.

In any case, the patrolling and the later guarding tasks were a particular demonstration of British peacekeeping tactics, emphasizing the development of a friendly contact with the local population and of a reputation for fairness and impartiality in dealing with the various parties involved. Of the other participants in MNF-II only the Italians were equally fortunate with their field hospital and role of protecting the refugee camps. The renunciation of military force, except in clear self-defence, is in any peacekeeping operation a vital element in winning local confidence, and the British contingent was fortunate enough not to have to resort to force.

The conclusion that can be drawn is that the British contingent did much to lessen the tension endured daily by the people of Beirut and to foster the conditions necessary for national reconciliation. Unfortunately this opportunity was not seized, and as a consequence the violence in Lebanon continues. The role of MNF-II, which started as an "interposition force at agreed locations", was inevitably expended for in the end, the MNF-II mission altered in character. At the start, the MNF-II provided support to the Lebanese Army and government of President Amin Gemayel, but by the end of the man-

date, the chief problem for the four contingents was self-defence. Thus, paradoxically, the Lebanese Army, instead of being helped by the MNF-II, had to deploy units and fire support to protect the MNF-II, rather than the other way round.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

Pity the nation that is full of beliefs and empty of religion.

Pity the nation that wears a cloth it does not weave, eats a bread it does not harvest, and drinks a wine that flows not from its own wine press.

Pity the nation that acclaims the bully a hero, and that deems the glittering conqueror bountiful.

Pity a nation that despises a passion in its dream, yet submits in its awakening.

Pity the nation that raises not its voice save when it walks in a funeral, boasts not except among its ruins, and will rebel not save when its neck is laid between the sword and the block.

Pity the nation whose statesman is a fox, whose philosopher is a juggler, and whose art is the art of patching and mimicking.

Pity the nation that welcomes its new ruler with trumpeting, and farewells him with hootings, only to welcome another with trumpeting again.

Pity the nation whose sages are dumb with years and whose strong men are yet in the cradle.

Pity the nation divided into fragments, each fragment deeming itself a nation.

Khalil Gibran *The Garden of the Prophet* (1934).

Lebanon is a harsh teacher. Those who try to ignore its complex realities usually end up paying a high price. Not surprisingly, the Lebanese and other interested parties alike have often failed to grasp what can and cannot be done in Lebanon. The inner collapse of Lebanon's fragile structure wrought by fifteen years of internecine war is the consequence of a combination of its own internal divisions, and its inability to withstand regular intervention from other regional powers pursuing security interests. In turn, the various Lebanese factions have sought to use external powers and patrons to support their own aims. Yet, every power which has intervened in the conflict has faced problems which in the end proved unsurmountable. These problems are endemic to the situation in that country, they are not susceptible to easy solution, and they arise irrespective of the objectives or intentions with which a given power originally entered the Lebanese labyrinth, though few would deny that external intervention, which is at the heart of the Lebanese tragedy, has often exacerbated the problems there.

Indeed, patrons, self-appointed or otherwise, often for considerations unrelated to the indigenous conflict, intercede on behalf of their respective client groups. Instances of such meddling are legion. So are the alibis. External interveners and patrons have never hesitated to use such alibis to rationalize or disguise their interventions. They usually have done so in the name of amity, equity, balance, stability, peace and geographical considerations, if not mercy or the empowerment of threatened communities. At times, like proverbial fools rushing in, they have become embroiled in the country's quagmire.

Had any of the earlier episodes of political violence been more explicitly resolved, by designating a 'winner' and a 'loser' or an all win situation resolving, thereby, the decisive issues as associated with each, then perhaps Lebanon could have been spared much of its subsequent turmoil. If there is, after all, any logic inherent in the structure of war — any war, just or unjust — it is normally a derivative of some of the assumed benefits the victors come to enjoy. For only at the end of the war do the rewards of injuring occur, particularly the enactment of the winner's agenda.

Alas, in Lebanon wars never seem to end in this explicit manner. Hence, the equality of the belligerents has never been transformed into the inequality of victors and vanquished. Despite the intensity, scale and depth of damage and injury, the war goes on. There is perpetual hurt and grief with no hope for deliverance or more than a temporary reprieve. Like a malignant cancer, it grows but refuses to deliver its victim from the anguish of his pain.

It was to Lebanon that the Palestinian fighters went to set up camp after they had been expelled from Jordan in 1970. It was therefore to Lebanon that Israel went, first by air and then on land, to punish Palestinians for 'terrorist' attacks, and in the process, the unwitting Lebanese for harbouring them. As the Lebanese government's authority was eroded, the delicate political balance which held the country together became ever more fragile.

This balance depended on power-sharing between the Christians and the Muslims. Because it was agreed at a time when the Christians were the majority, it became progressively undermined as the Christians moved into minority status, with the arrival of the mostly Muslim Palestinians this became the final straw. The Christians took up arms in 1975 to retrieve their position but have proved unable to achieve this by their own efforts. The Christians have looked beyond Lebanon's borders for help.

Indeed, Syria intervened in the first place in 1976 to protect the Christians. Having done so, it worked to keep the Christians in their place. The next, and more probable, alliance was with Israel. But the Israelis over-extended themselves in 1982 in the hope of expanding their sphere of influence over Lebanon. Israel's drive to Beirut of that year and the dramatic departure of the PLO appeared to be moving things in the right direction for the Christians. The assassination of President-elect Bashir Gemayel led to vicious massacres against Palestinians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila and reinforced fears that the Christians would generally victimise the Muslim population.

Against this background, and in broader terms, the Multinational Force, made up of contingents from the United States, France, Italy and Britain, which had intended to 'keep the peace' until a constitutional authority was re-established and even a Lebanese army reconstituted, could be seen as little more than an interlude or one more version of foreign intervention which came to grief. However, it was more than this in that it represented - apart from the United Nations 'Interim' Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) presence in South Lebanon which has now lasted nearly ten years - the last serious effort from outside the Middle East to regulate that country's protracted conflict. Even so, this assessment misses many of the more positive features as does the caricature that the Multinational Force, in particular in its second tour of duty, was just another 'international militia' and a non-Middle Eastern one at that - which never survived the maelstrom of what is misleadingly called Lebanon's civil war. The Multinational Force cannot be written off as a total failure, since for a while it did succeed in holding the ring thereby buying briefly some time in which politicians and diplomacy might negotiate a settlement. These moments of opportunity were squandered. To that extent, the Multinational Force could be defined as having performed a peacekeeping role.

Like most of the other actors who have become bogged down in Lebanon, the first Multinational Force, which supervised the withdrawal of the PLO, had sufficient support from all sides - even tacitly from the Soviet Union. Syria like its Lebanese allies was in a very weak position and was genuinely concerned for their own safety and that of the Palestinians in their midst. When the Multinational Force returned, the situation was entirely different, and if the new force ever had sufficient political consensus, it did not last long. For inevitably, involvement meant facing the dilemmas of power:

action will, likely as not, alienate some party, either for too much or too little action, or for backing this faction and not that, or for getting too deeply involved, or not deeply enough involved. Moreover, the second Multinational Force ran up against the key obstacle every foreign actor has eventually met in Lebanon: they were fighting Lebanese.

In such circumstances, one has to ask whether the American and French contingents and their governments believed they were still only 'peacekeepers' and that the attacks they made on several Lebanese factions would not have any real consequence. And yet the sad truth is that at that very stage of the Lebanese conflict, the power cum-intervener had clear military superiority - the MNF was no exception - when compared to the local and external forces on the scene. Whether we are talking of the PLO, Syria or Israel. The harder each of them hit, the more local resistance they provoked, and the more intensified the search of their local opponents for a powerful external patron to help right the balance. Indeed, the use of force by external powers has proved futile in almost every case in Lebanon, often provoking exactly the opposite of the desired result. Then again, one can suppose the Americans and the French can be forgiven for assuming that what happened to Palestinians, Syrians and Israelis would not happen to them, for after all the United States is the world's greatest superpower and France was on a 'rescue mission' of the Lebanese entity it created.

The lessons of all this are striking: it is difficult for an external actor directly involved on the ground in Lebanon to avoid being dragged into the vortex of the conflict with unforeseen and frequently unhappy consequences. Because it is neither entirely a civil war nor a simple case of external intervention, it is almost impossible to predict the direction from which danger will come, both literally and figuratively (as the American marines and the French paratroopers have learned to their grief). Any form of association with or support for any one of the Lebanese factions will immediately lead to the enmity of the others, and to complications, with the other's backers. Moreover, after all these years of war, there are so many foreign powers involved that it is extremely difficult to keep track of current alliances with these backers, as factions can and do play them against one another, doublecross them, and often — as exemplified by the Druze during the Shouf Mountain war of 1983 — accept aid from backers who are sworn enemies of each other. In a situation like this, it is prudent to have a clear

understanding of the limitations of peacekeeping.

The experience of the Multinational Force in Lebanon should give added impetus to the notion that peacekeeping should be accepted for its limited utility — to stabilise a crisis and damp down conflict so as to foster an environment conducive to peaceful settlement. It should not itself be seen as an instrument for achieving a settlement. To expect peacekeepers to do more leads to unrealistic expectations and undermines their credibility. The far-reaching programme of the United States to broker peace between Israel and Lebanon and to help reconstitute the Lebanese Army, however, was not only ambitious and probably unrealistic, but also beyond the scope of typical peacekeeping functions.

Peacekeeping forces do not usually make policy; they reflect and suffer the policies of their governments. If the premises for those policies are flawed, the peacekeepers can only deal with the consequences of the defects; they cannot do more. By almost any interpretation, once the American marines were deployed in Beirut, United States policy seemingly became totally preoccupied with the questions of how to force the PLO out of Lebanon with the least bloodshed and how to negotiate the treaty with Lebanon that Israel wanted. In addition they sought to prop up the Gemayel regime, expel the Syrians and create a unified country. Yet events have proved again and again the logic of such a policy is not the key to control of Lebanon's conflict. This is especially so when that policy blundered into a military and political *cul de sac*. Only then did U.S. leaders seek to justify their mistakes by mindless and extravagant rhetoric. To hear what President Reagan and other leaders of his Administration were saying, one would think that Lebanon was the strategic centre of the Middle East, a key area of the world. The United States then, declared President Reagan, had a "vital interest" in that beleaguered country, but what that vital interest was, he never explained. Lebanon possesses no significant military power and is not a menace to its neighbours. It produces no important raw materials, as do the states of the Gulf. Unlike the Arab-Israeli and the Iran-Iraq conflicts, the internecine fighting in Lebanon poses no substantial threat to U.S. interests. In historical terms, Lebanon has been only marginally relevant to American policy.

Why then, did the United States unlike the three other contributing countries to the Multinational

Force become so deeply involved in Lebanon? The answer appears to be simple. Lacking a coherent Lebanon policy of its own, the United States reacted without thought or foresight to policies, decisions and actions of the Israeli government. Seen for the most part through a 'prism of Israeli interests', the American government failed to see what Israel had let it in for in Lebanon. For the United States, 1982 was a 'strategic opportunity', a chance to affirm both order and American influence in Lebanon, without at the same time understanding very much about Lebanon, its people or its politics. As a consequence, American marines paid dearly for that role. To reiterate, the Israeli government had had two objectives in invading Lebanon. The first was to destroy the PLO, not only as a military power but - more importantly - as a political force. At the end of the road, Israel hoped to create a situation whereby it could avoid yielding anything substantive in terms of Palestinian autonomy and could totally ignore any Palestinian claims to self-determination. Israel's second aim in launching the invasion related more to Lebanon than the occupied territories.

With the help of the Maronite Christian Phalange, then headed by Bashir Gemayel, Israel would install Bashir as President of Lebanon. He would establish a government friendly to Israel and amenable to Israeli influence, and it would sign a formal treaty of peace that would satisfy three Israeli ambitions. First, Lebanon would accord Israel full diplomatic relations. This was of prime importance as a major step in Israel's strategic plan to settle with one Arab neighbour at a time. Second, Israel hoped that Lebanon would not demand the relinquishment of occupied territory, in contrast to the Camp David accords with Egypt. On the contrary, the treaty would accord Israel effective control of southern Lebanon, thus providing it both with additional territory and an effective buffer zone. That zone would be useful not only for its defence, but also for facilitating its plans to divert Lebanon's water resources to its own depleting stock. Third, once the new Lebanese government was firmly established, Israel would assist it in expelling the Syrians from Lebanon and extending Bashir Gemayel's writ throughout the rest of the country.

That was the background to the involvement of American marines and the other contingents of the Multinational Force in Lebanon. U.S. policy concentrated on helping Israel achieve its first objective of expelling the PLO. Then it made a strong diplomatic effort to assist Israel to achieve its second

objective of obtaining a peace treaty from the Amin Gemayel government - Amin the brother of the assassinated President-elect Bashir - when the Reagan Administration brokered the May 17, 1983, agreement. While at the same time, by the threat and use of military force, the United States sought to further other aspects of Israel's war objectives by propping up the Gemayel government and stimulating the withdrawal of Syrian forces.

The 17 May 1983 Agreement was based solely on Israeli interests as was made evident by its collapse. The accord's abrogation made it clear that no Lebanese government could concede the degree of derogation of its sovereignty that Israel demanded and still survive. The original scheme had been devised with the Maronite Christians, one of whom, Amin Gemayel, was now President. But the Maronites are only a minority of the population and the majority Muslim elements strongly opposed any substantial concession to Israel, which they regarded (with reason) as the Maronites' friend. In this regard, the United States also failed to see that by supporting the extreme Right wing of the old-guard Lebanese political Establishment, with the solid backing of the predominantly Maronite Christian Phalangist party, they were definitely condemning Lebanon to fall back into instability. As a country of balance and compromise, it could be governed only from the Centre, as the whole of Lebanese political history has demonstrated. There had always been serious upheavals whenever a Lebanese faction had sought to align itself with a foreign power, and had practised local partisan politics.

The United States failed to face the realities of Lebanon. It was clear that the Gemayel government could never extend its writ over the whole country, indeed there was doubt if it could survive at all. It was obvious also that it had no chance whatsoever of consolidating its position with other Lebanese factions as long as the May 17 Agreement gave such favoured treatment to Israel. In view of all this, prudence clearly required that the Marines withdraw before more were hurt or killed, leaving Gemayel free to abrogate the May 17 Agreement and negotiate with the Lebanese opposition. Instead, the Reagan Administration began to portray the United States even more dramatically as the dedicated champion of the Gemayel regime, while at the same time demanding, at Israel's urging, that Gemayel not abrogate the May 17 Agreement.

That the May 17 Agreement — in effect an unofficial peace treaty which was accepted with near

indifference by the Lebanese Christian community, viewed with relief by the Israelis and with something approaching elation by the United States — permitted Israel important military concessions in southern Lebanon was largely overlooked. That it relied upon one of the weakest states in the world — Lebanon — to succeed, was disregarded. That it took no account of Syria's refusal even to indulge in negotiations was ignored. It was, even at the time, doomed to near-certain failure. It was also a sign to those Lebanese Muslim nationalists that the United States wished relations between Lebanon and Israel to be permanent. In obliging the Lebanese government to sign the 17 May Agreement with Israel the United States believed it had achieved a great victory in foreign policy. The Americans, of course, failed to see that this peace was neither honourable nor just and therefore unlikely to last, and that on the contrary, it was a peace imposed on a people worn down by the violence and ravages the Israeli army had inflicted upon it. More seriously, the United States government it would seem failed to perceive that Lebanon, a small country, open to any wind that blew, whose people though indeed exhausted, remained over-politicized and easily manipulated because of its fears and because of its corrupt political and military leaders, prisoners of foreign patronage.

Some countries are unfortunate in the neighbours they happen to have. Lebanon seems to be one of these, but that cannot be changed. The facts, simply stated, are that Syria and Israel are powerful and ambitious neighbours with security and political interests in Lebanon. Both have shown they are prepared to use force to achieve their goals. Israel is militarily stronger, but Syria has more internal allies and probably more staying power as an occupying force, having been in Lebanon since 1976 with several divisions of its armed forces. In the foreseeable future, no Lebanese government that hopes to survive and to govern the whole of Lebanon can be overtly hostile to either Syria or Israel. No Lebanese government will have an army strong enough to challenge either of these regional powers.

The inconsistencies in the American role had become the more obvious. The presence of the Marines was touted as one of a neutral peacekeeper just at a time when Washington was disavowing that neutrality by making a strategic alliance with one of the warring parties, Israel. That was not all, the Reagan Administration continued to pretend that the Marines were playing a peacekeeping role,

even after they had visibly chosen sides and noisily joined in the fighting. By increasingly firing at Druze, Shi'ites and Syrians, the American Marines were behaving more and more and were viewed as merely another of the feuding factions that have bedeviled tragic Lebanon.

Had the Multinational Force in Lebanon kept tightly to its initial mandate of helping stabilize the Beirut area and protect the civilian population — instead of trying to advance the terms of settlement (withdrawal of foreign forces and promoting national reconciliation) — perhaps it would have prevented President Gemayel and his government from committing so many errors. Indeed, perhaps it is because Gemayel thought he could rely not only on his militia and then on his army but also on all the ships and soldiers and contingents that were in Beirut, that he considered himself invincible, invulnerable and free to do whatever he wished in a country where no one, in the final analysis, is free to do whatever he or she wants.

No single event precipitated the demise of the Multinational Force, nor does any single state or party stand out as a villain or hero. Real life and Lebanon are simply too complicated to justify single factor explanations. Thus, the purpose of the present study has not been principally an undertaking to apportion blame or castigate those who participated in what was at base, a brave experiment in the service of peace that went sour. But rather, on matters of substance, for the question must be whether an examination on the scale of this study of the Multinational Force produces information and analysis that may shed light on the nature of Lebanese politics. It is important, too, for the whole Multinational Force experience contains some lessons which might be applicable for peacekeeping operations in the future.

Holding a post-mortem on the Multinational Force in Lebanon reinforces some verities about peacekeeping and highlights some of the perennial problems yet to be solved. Most paramount, the peacekeeping option needs to be approached with a sense of hard-tempered realism. It is just as important not to be misled by the mystique of peacekeeping and past successes into a belief that this option is suitable for more conflicts. What was strikingly evident in the Multinational Force's experiment where chivalry in the service of peace could only produce more war was the unbridgeable and ever-growing gap that developed, month after month, between ideal commitments and feasible action. With hind-

sight it is easy to see why the MNF-II operation in Lebanon went wrong. However, at the time things were not so clear. True there was great unease about the rules of engagement and the mission but most disturbing was the lack of agreement and understanding about the overall political environment. Without a sound and realistic plan for bringing about internal reconciliation and the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, nothing was going to work. The MNF-II could have been given different roles, missions and geographical areas of operation but one seriously doubts it would have ultimately made much difference in the absence of some different political decisions.

Operating in the twilight-zone of diplomacy, with no active domestic or international support, the Force accepted insult and added to injury by assuming a task for which it had not been prepared - neither institutionally nor in terms of its structure and basic terms of reference. It was unrealistic to assign a static mandate to a force acting in a highly dynamic environment, without creating a diplomatic mechanism capable of adjusting the terms of reference of the force to geopolitical changes, and of constantly readjusting the political mandate by virtue of which the Force had been created. Even peace-enforcing becomes adventurous, if pursued beyond the survival expectations of the political arrangements from which it draws its claims to legitimacy. Thus, the problems and potential disasters that were to confront the Multinational Force were not foreseeable in precise terms, but they could have been anticipated in general terms. However, a number of factors clouded the vision of many of the participants in this drama of blood and sorrow. To varying degrees, ignorance, hypocrisy, self-deception, misplaced optimism and hubris were the afflictions of those who were the big players in the drama.

In cases such as Lebanon where external wars are projected into internal conflict, and vice-versa, power becomes powerless, whatever its source or whoever exercises it, and peace can never be restored according to the classic rules of peacekeeping, particularly if the rules are challenged internally, and the peacekeeping force is disabled by superior regional or international powers. Even so, the peacekeeping option should not be excluded in every case. Perhaps the rule of thumb is that if the regional powers with interests in the area of conflict acquiesce and if East-West rivalry can be contained, then peacekeeping can help to provide both a measure of stability and humanitarian services while efforts

are made to move towards a settlement. Perhaps a lesson that can be derived from MNF-II's experience is this: Do not use foreign forces in a 'peacekeeping' operation in settings as fractionalized as Lebanon, especially in the immediate aftermath of an unsettling tragedy. It would, rather, have to be something like this: Once you have decided to mount a peacekeeping operation, try to do it correctly. Careful attention must be made to defining its mandate very clearly, and be prepared to redefine that mandate. Perhaps even more fundamentally, one should understand the concept of peacekeeping, and not ask more of an operation than it will, under the circumstances, be capable of performing.

Related to this is the rule that peacekeepers must avoid partisan entanglement in civil strife to the point where they are seen by the opposition as co-opted into the service of the host government against the contending factions. This is not an unqualified rule but a cautionary principle. The problem here is that in internal conflict, peacekeepers play a paradoxical role. They enter at the request of the host government, often to bolster its authority, yet the peacekeepers must keep sufficient distance from the government to be perceived as impartial in the internal struggle for power if they are to keep the sustained consent of all parties. This rule must be adapted to cases. In Lebanon, the Multinational Force, from the outset, committed itself to support the Gemayel government and its role and presence invited challenge from opposition factions when the balance of forces in the internal struggle shifted to favour those elements. What is more, actors that oppose the purpose can wear down the resolve of troop participants as Syria did in this case. The four nation Multinational Force in Beirut never faced up to the paradox of being a 'temporary' and relatively passive presence whilst the promises to sustain the Gemayel government and revitalize the Lebanese Army - both parties to the internal conflict - were grandiose. Moreover, the pressure to make do with an inadequate force and the failure to recruit troops from a wider circle of participants forced the Multinational Force to undertake an ambitious mission with inadequate means. The negative response in canvassing for a geographical diversification, a serious signal of disenchantment and non-confidence, should have prompted the Gemayel government and the four countries contributing to the Multinational Force to start preparing alternatives. Neither of the two appeared to have understood the message before it became too late.

The reader must judge for himself but it would seem that the Multinational Force in Beirut did

fulfill a successful function for a while but it might have been better served under United Nations auspices. Whether a peacekeeping force is under U.N. or non-U.N. aegis is less important than often imagined. As a rule the United Nations is to be preferred when politically feasible since it can mobilize a broad-based political consensus, draw on a wider community of troop contributors and has an experienced and efficient institutional base on which to rely. However, this is not to exclude particular cases where, for political reasons, the United Nations Security Council fails to act, and indeed where the U.N. context infects a case with extraneous political considerations that can aggravate rather than help to stabilize a situation. In this respect, what comes out clearly is that the Multinational Force in Beirut had the edge on the more laboriously established U.N. peacekeeping operations (which is both international in composition and under one command) in being able to deploy swiftly and have comparative freedom of choice of deployment location. Conversely, the MNF was at a disadvantage through an over-hastily drawn up mandate, and lack of universal support which is implied in U.N. operations.

Whatever the rationale offered for its decision to take action in a crisis situation, no single state or alliance enjoys the same degree of legitimacy and consensual support as the United Nations. That is to say, the political asset of U.N. peacekeeping operations is its international stamp of legitimacy. The U.N. has an unequalled position as a symbol of international values and U.N. peacekeepers reflect these values. Though they are inextricably linked to international diplomacy, peacekeeping operations are still military undertakings, even if there is no enemy. An attack on a U.N. force deployed to uphold international values is different from an attack on other multinational forces without this moral clout. The Multinational Force in Lebanon and the four countries that formed it, namely, the United States, France, Italy and Britain represented too narrow a slice of the international community to be acceptable as peacekeepers. The lack of a broad political base raised misgivings about the genuine international character and legitimacy of the Force.

It will be necessary to rethink this type of multinational operation in the future, but at the same time it is clear that international peacekeeping will remain in demand. Weak and newly independent states may be the type of states needing security from the outside. But a crucial element must be that

there should be a government which has more substance than that of the Lebanese government, which was (and is still) a sad, empty and ineffectual shadow with authority which extends hardly beyond the precincts of the Baabda Presidential Palace. Foreign forces are still on the ground in Lebanon, among them the Syrians and UNIFIL. The former plays a mainly interventionist role, while the latter strives to 'keep the peace'. That UNIFIL still has a function after a decade is probably due to firm decisions having been taken over the nature of that Force's mandates. The Multinational Force in Lebanon was not as fortunate and turned out to be overall neither an interventionist nor a peacekeeping force. The confusion of roles led to its demise. Perhaps, in the end, the Multinational Force was just a tragic player in circumstances in which any U.N. alternative force would have had extreme difficulties in operating. But, in truth, the four contingents were not only exposed to violence on all sides, they were also caught in the 'twilight zone' of diplomacy.

Finally, I would like to conclude this study with a nursery rhyme, since the four contributing countries to the Multinational Force in Lebanon approached the Lebanese adventure with a wide-eyed innocence not normally achieved by adults. The rhyme I have in mind is one that has beguiled many a child:

The grand old Duke of York,
He had ten thousand men.
He marched them up to the top of the hill,
And he marched them down again.

As the reader will recall, the grand old Duke of York, who was the second eldest son of George the Third, was not regarded in his day as very bright. But there was still something to be said for him. He knew when he marched up the hill why he was going there, and he recognized when he got to the top that he was in an untenable situation, so he marched his troops down again. And, finally, when he reached bottom, he knew where he had been and why he had gone there. The Multinational Force in Beirut could have used his counsel.

APPENDIX

MNF-I

LEBANESE NOTE REQUESTING U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO MNF

Beirut
August the 18th, 1982

Ambassador Robert S Dillon U.S. Embassy, Beirut

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to refer to the many conversations between their Excellencies the President of the Republic of Lebanon, the Prime Minister and myself on the one hand, and with Ambassador Philip C. Habib, Special Emissary to the President of the United States of America, on the other hand, as well as to the resolution of the Council of Ministers passed today. I have the honor to refer to the schedule set up by the Government of Lebanon, after consultations with interested parties, in order to assure the withdrawal from Lebanese territory of the Palestinian leaders, offices and combatants related to any organization now in the Beirut area, in a manner which will:

- (1) assure the safety of such departing persons;
- (2) assure the safety of the persons in the area; and
- (3) further the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Government of Lebanon over the Beirut area.

In this context, the Government of Lebanon is proposing to several nations that they contribute forces to serve as a temporary Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut. The mandate of the MNF will be to provide appropriate assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they carry out the foregoing responsibilities, in accordance with the annexed schedule. The MNF may undertake other functions only by mutual agreement. It is understood that, in the event that the withdrawal of the Palestinian personnel referred to above does not take place in accord with the predetermined schedule, the mandate of the MNF will terminate immediately and all MNF personnel will leave Lebanon forthwith.

In the foregoing context, I have the honor to propose that the United States of America deploy a force of approximately 800 personnel to Beirut, subject to the following terms and conditions.

- * The American military force shall carry out appropriate activities consistent with the mandate of the MNF.
- * Command authority over the American force will be exercised exclusively by the United States Government through existing American military channels.
- * The American force will operate in close coordination with the LAF. To assure effective coordination with the LAF, the American force will assign liaison officers to the LAF and the Government of Lebanon will assign liaison officers to the American force. The LAF liaison officers to the American force will, *inter alia*, perform liaison with the civilian population and manifest the authority of the Lebanese Government in all appropriate situations.
- * In carrying out its mission, the American force will not engage in combat. It may, however, exercise the right of self-defense.
- * The American force will depart Lebanon not later than thirty days after its arrival, or sooner at the request of the President of Lebanon or at the direction of the United States Government, or according to the termination of the mandate provided for above.
- * The Government of Lebanon and the LAF will take all measures necessary to ensure the protection of the American force's personnel, to include securing the assurances from all armed elements not now under the authority of the Lebanese Government that they will comply with the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.
- * The American force will enjoy both the degree of freedom of movement and the right to undertake those activities deemed necessary for the performance of its mission or for the support of its personnel. Accordingly, it shall enjoy all facilities necessary for the accomplishment of these

purposes. Personnel in the American force shall enjoy the privileges and immunities accorded the administrative and technical staff of the American Embassy in Beirut, and shall be exempt from immigration and customs requirements, and restrictions on entering or departing Lebanon. Personnel, property and equipment of the American force introduced into Lebanon shall be exempt from any form of tax, duty, charge or levy.

I have the further honor to propose, if the foregoing is acceptable to your Excellency's government, that your Excellency's reply to that effect, together with this note, shall constitute an agreement between our two governments, to enter into force on the date of your Excellency's reply.

Please accept, your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

FOUAD BOUTROS
Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Foreign Affairs

U.S. REPLY

August 20, 1982

I have the honor to refer to your Excellency's note of 18 August 1982 requesting the deployment of an American force to Beirut. I am pleased to inform you on behalf of my government that the United States is prepared to deploy temporarily a force of approximately 800 personnel as part of a Multinational Force (MNF) to provide appropriate assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they carry out their responsibilities concerning the withdrawal of Palestinian personnel in Beirut from Lebanese territory under safe and orderly conditions, in accordance with the schedule annexed to your Excellency's note. It is understood that the presence of such an American force will in this way facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area, an objective which is fully shared by my government.

I have the further honor to inform you that my government accepts the terms and conditions concerning the presence of the American force in the Beirut area as set forth in your note, and that your Excellency's note and this reply accordingly constitute an agreement between our two governments.

ROBERT S. DILLON
Ambassador of the United States of America

LEBANON: PLAN FOR THE PLO EVACUATION FROM WEST BEIRUT

FACT SHEET

Plan for the Departure of the PLO

A plan for the departure from Lebanon of the PLO leaders, offices, and combatants in Beirut has been accepted by the Governments of Lebanon, the troop-contributing countries, and Israel and by the PLO. That plan includes a schedule of departures which is also attached to the bilateral notes exchanged between the Government of Lebanon and the troop-contributing countries.

The PLO will go to various countries in the region including Jordan, Iraq, Tunisia, North Yemen, South Yemen, Syria, Sudan, and Algeria.

Departing PLO personnel will be accompanied by a proportionate share of the military and political leadership throughout all stages of the departure arrangements.

The PLO will turn over to the Lebanese Armed Forces their heavy and crew-served weapons, spare weaponry and equipment along with all munitions left behind in the Beirut area. They and the Arab Deterrent Force will also provide detailed information on the location of mines and booby traps to the Lebanese Armed Forces. On departure, PLO personnel may carry with them an individual side weapon and ammunition.

The Arab Deterrent Force (i.e., the Syrians) and those forces attached to the Arab Deterrent Force will also redeploy from Beirut during the period of the PLO departure. The Syrian military forces will take their equipment with them except for that which, by mutual agreement, is turned over to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

MNF Composition, Area of Operations, and Mission

Force Composition. The multinational force, which will be deployed to the Beirut area at the request of the Government of Lebanon, will be comprised of approximately 400 Italian, 800 French and 800 U.S. military personnel. The U.S. portion of the MNF will be comprised of Marines of the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit presently serving with elements of the Sixth Fleet on duty in the eastern Mediterranean.

Area of Operations. The MNF will operate in and around the Beirut area. It will take up positions and operate from locations determined by mutual agreement between the various national contingents and the Lebanese Armed Forces through the mechanism of a Liaison and Coordination Committee.

Mission. The multinational force will assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in carrying out its responsibilities for insuring the safe and orderly departure from Lebanon of the PLO leaders, offices, and combatants in a manner which will insure the safety of other persons in the area, and which will further the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Government of Lebanon over the Beirut area.

Duration of the MNF Mandate. It has been mutually agreed between the Government of Lebanon and those governments contributing forces to the MNF that these forces will depart Lebanon not later than 30 days after arrival, or sooner at the request of the Government of Lebanon or at the direction of the individual government concerned. There is also provision for the immediate termination of the mandate of the MNF and for its withdrawal from Beirut in the event that the departure from Lebanon of PLO personnel does not take place in accord with the predetermined schedule.

Role and Mission of U.S. Forces in Beirut

U.S. forces will be deployed to Beirut as part of the multinational force based on an agreement between the U.S. Government and the Government of Lebanon.

The U.S. contingent of the multinational force will provide appropriate assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces as they carry out their responsibilities concerning the withdrawal of PLO personnel in Beirut from Lebanese territory under safe and orderly conditions. The presence of U.S. forces also will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area.

U.S. forces will enter Beirut after the evacuation is well underway (probably 5 or 6 days thereafter) in concert with the Italian MNF contingent and the remainder of the French force. Approximately 800 Marines from Sixth Fleet units will be deployed. Command authority for the Marines will be exercised by the National Command Authority (NCA) through normal American military channels (EUCOM). These forces will not engage in combat but may exercise the right of self-defense. They will have freedom of movement and the right to undertake actions necessary to perform their mission or to support their personnel. U.S. personnel will be armed with usual infantry weapons.

Close coordination will be maintained with the Lebanese Armed Forces. There will be an exchange of liaison officers among the elements of the MNF and the Lebanese Armed Forces. A Liaison and Coordination Committee composed of representatives from the U.S., French, Italian, and Lebanese armed forces will assist this process. The Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces are taking measures necessary to insure the protection of U.S. forces including having secured assurances from armed elements that they will comply with the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.

The U.S. contingent will be in Beirut for no more than 30 days.

War Powers Resolution

The War Powers Resolution requires a report to Congress within 48 hours after the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces: (1) into foreign territory while equipped for combat; or (2) into hostilities or situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.

There is no intention or expectation that U.S. forces will become involved in hostilities in Beirut. They will be in Lebanon at the formal request of the Government of Lebanon; we will have assurances regarding the safety and security of the multinational force. Although we cannot rule out isolated acts of violence, all appropriate precautions will be taken to assure the safety of U.S. military personnel during their brief assignment to Lebanon.

These matters will, in any event, be kept under constant review, and the President will report to Congress consistent with the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution.

Agreements and Assurances

U.S. forces will participate in the multinational force in Beirut pursuant to an agreement between the U.S. Government and the Government of Lebanon. That agreement is in the form of an exchange of notes signed by Ambassador Dillon on behalf of the U.S. Government and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Boutros on behalf of the Lebanese Government.

The agreement describes the missions of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the MNF, and the U.S. forces participating in the MNF. It contains provisions concerning command authority for U.S. forces, coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces and immunities of U.S. personnel. Annexed to the agreement is the schedule for the PLO departure from Beirut.

In accordance with the agreement, the Government of Lebanon has secured assurances from all armed elements not now under the authority of the Lebanese Government that they will comply with the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities. The Government of Israel has provided appropriate assurances.

Role of the ICRC in Moving the PLO from West Beirut

The role envisaged for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in moving the PLO from west Beirut is still being finalized on the basis of discussions in Geneva and Beirut.

In accordance with its charter, the ICRC will be expected to care for the sick and wounded combatants while in transit. Initially, the ICRC will arrange transport and provide medical care for the sick and wounded PLO personnel going to Greece.

Financing the Departure of the PLO From West Beirut

The cost of chartering transport of the PLO combatants to receiving countries will be funded through international organizations. The United States is prepared to provide initial funding from State Department funds.

Estimates regarding the cost of evacuating PLO forces from west Beirut currently range from \$2 to \$4 million. This figure could be increased, however, as the number of people to be transported and their ultimate destinations are finalized.

DEPARTURE PLAN

PLAN FOR THE DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP, OFFICES, AND COMBATANTS IN BEIRUT

1. **Basic Concept.** All the PLO leadership, offices, and combatants in Beirut will leave Lebanon peacefully for pre-arranged destinations in other countries, in accord with the departure schedules and arrangements set out in this plan. The basic concept in this plan is consistent with the objective of the Government of Lebanon that all foreign military forces withdraw from Lebanon.

2. **Cease-fire.** A cease-fire in place will be scrupulously observed by all in Lebanon.

3. **U.N. Observers.** The U.N. Observer Group stationed in the Beirut area will continue its functioning in that area.

4. **Safeguards.** Military forces present in Lebanon — whether Lebanese, Israeli, Syrian, Palestinian, or any other — will in no way interfere with the safe, secure, and timely departure of the PLO leadership, offices, and combatants. Law-abiding Palestinian noncombatants left behind in Beirut, including the families of those who have departed, will be subject to Lebanese laws and regulations. The Governments of Lebanon and the United States will provide appropriate guarantees of safety in the following ways.

- The Lebanese Government will provide its guarantees on the basis of having secured assurances from armed groups with which it has been in touch.
- The United States will provide its guarantees on the basis of assurances received from the Government of Israel and from the leadership of certain Lebanese groups with which it has been in touch.

5. "Departure Day" is defined as the day on which advance elements of the multinational force (MNF) deploy in the Beirut area, in accordance with arrangements worked out in advance among all concerned, and on which the initial group or groups of PLO personnel commence departure from Beirut in accord with the planned schedule.

6. **The Multinational Force.** A temporary multinational force, composed of units from France, Italy, and the United States, will have been formed — at the request of the Lebanese Government — to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in carrying out their responsibilities in this operation. The Lebanese Armed Forces will assure the departure from Lebanon of the PLO leadership, offices, and combatants, from whatever organization in Beirut, in a manner which will:

- (A) Assure the safety of such departing PLO personnel;
- (B) Assure the safety of other persons in the Beirut area; and
- (C) Further the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Government of Lebanon over the Beirut area.

7. **Schedule of departures and Other Arrangements.** The attached schedule of departures is subject to revision as may be necessary because of logistical requirements and because of any necessary shift in the setting of Departure Day. Details concerning the schedule will be forwarded to the Israeli Defense Forces through the Liaison and Coordination Committee. Places of assembly for the departing personnel will be identified by agreement between the Government of Lebanon and the PLO. The PLO will be in touch with governments receiving personnel to coordinate arrival and other arrangements there. If assistance is required the PLO should notify the Government of Lebanon.

8. **MNF Mandate.** In the event that the departure from Lebanon of the PLO personnel referred to above does not take place in accord with the agreed and predetermined schedule, the mandate of the MNF will terminate immediately and all MNF personnel will leave Lebanon forthwith.

9. **Duration of MNF.** It will be mutually agreed between the Lebanese Government and the governments contributing forces to the MNF that the forces of the MNF will depart Lebanon not later than 30 days after arrival, or sooner at the request of the Government of Lebanon or at the direction of the individual government concerned, or in accord with the termination of the mandate of the MNF provided for above.

10. **The PLO leadership** will be responsible for the organization and management of the assembly and the final departure of PLO personnel, from beginning to end, at which time the leaders also will all be gone. Departure arrangements will be coordinated so that departures from Beirut take place at a steady pace, day by day.

11. **Lebanese Armed Forces Contribution.** The Lebanese Army will contribute between seven and eight army battalions to the operation, consisting of between 2,500-3,500 men. In addition, the internal security force will contribute men and assistance as needed.

12. **ICRC.** The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will be able to assist the Government of Lebanon and Lebanese Armed Forces in various ways, including in the organization and management of the evacuation of wounded and all Palestinian and Syrian personnel to appropriate destinations, and in assisting in the chartering and movement of commercial vessels for use in departure by sea to other countries. The Liaison and Coordination Committee will insure that there will be proper coordination with any ICRC activities in this respect.

13. **Departure by Air.** While present plans call for departure by sea and land, departures by air are not foreclosed.

14. Liaison and Coordination:

- The Lebanese Armed Forces will be the primary point of contact for liaison with the PLO as well as with other armed groups and will provide necessary information.
- The Lebanese Armed Forces and MNF will have formed prior to Departure Day a Liaison and Coordination Committee, composed of representatives of the MNF participating governments and the Lebanese Armed Forces. The committee will carry out close and effective liaison with, and provide continuous and detailed information to, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). On behalf of the committee, the Lebanese Armed Forces will continue to carry out close and effective liaison with the PLO and other armed groups in the Beirut area. For convenience, the Liaison and Coordination Committee will have two essential components:

- (A) Supervisory liaison; and
- (B) Military and technical liaison and coordination.

The Liaison and Coordination Committee will act collectively; however, it may designate one or more of its members for primary liaison contact who would of course act on behalf of all.

- Liaison arrangements and consultations will be conducted in such a way as to minimize misunderstandings and to forestall difficulties. Appropriate means of communications between the committee and other groups will be developed for this purpose.
- The Liaison and Coordination Committee will continually monitor and keep all concerned currently informed regarding the implementation of the plan, including any revisions to the departure schedule as may be necessary because of logistical requirements.

15. Duration of Departure. The departure period shall be as short as possible and, in any event, no longer than 2 weeks.

16. Transit Through Lebanon. As part of any departure arrangement, all movements of convoys carrying PLO personnel must be conducted in daylight hours. When moving overland from Beirut to Syria, the convoys should cross the border into Syria with no stops en route. In those instances when convoys of departing PLO personnel pass through positions of the Israeli Defense Forces, whether in the Beirut area or elsewhere in Lebanon, the Israeli Defence Forces will clear the route for the temporary period in which the convoy is running. Similar steps will be taken by other armed groups located in the area of the route the convoy will take.

17. Arms Carried by PLO Personnel. On their departure, PLO personnel will be allowed to carry with them one individual side weapon (pistol, rifle or submachine gun) and ammunition.

18. Heavy and Spare Weaponry and Munitions. The PLO will turn over to the Lebanese Armed Forces as gifts all remaining weaponry in their position, including heavy, crew-served, and spare weaponry and equipment, along with all munitions left behind in the Beirut area. The Lebanese Armed Forces may seek the assistance of elements of the MNF in securing and disposing of the military equipment. The PLO will assist the Lebanese Armed Forces by providing, prior to their departure, full and detailed information as to the location of this military equipment.

19. Mines and Booby Traps. The PLO and the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) will provide the Lebanese Armed Forces and the MNF (through the Lebanese Armed Forces) full and detailed information on the location of mines and booby traps.

20. Movement of PLO Leadership. Arrangements will be made so that departing PLO personnel will be accompanied by a proportionate share of the military and political leadership throughout all stages of the departure operation.

21. Turnover of Prisoners and Remains. The PLO will, through the ICRC, turn over to the Israeli Defense Forces, all Israeli nationals whom they have taken in custody, and the remains, or full and detailed information about the location of the remains, of all Israeli soldiers who have fallen. The PLO will also turn over to the Lebanese Armed Forces all other prisoners whom they have taken in custody and the remains or full and detailed information about the location of the remains, of all other soldiers who have fallen. All arrangements for such turnovers shall be worked out with the ICRC as required prior to Departure Day.

22. Syrian Military Forces. It is noted that arrangements have been made between the Governments of Lebanon and Syria for the deployment of all military personnel of the Arab Deterrent Force from Beirut during the departure period. These forces will be allowed to take their equipment with them, except for that — under mutual agreement between the two governments — which is turned over to the Lebanese Armed Forces. All elements of the Palestinian Liberation Army, whether or not they now or in the past have been attached to the Arab Deterrent Force, will withdraw from Lebanon.

SCHEDULE OF DEPARTURES

August 21, 1982 — Departure Day

The advance elements of the MNF (approximately 350 men) land at the Port of Beirut at about 0500 and deploy in the Beirut port area in preparation for the initial departures of PLO groups by sea.

Meanwhile, the Lebanese Armed Forces deploy to previously agreed positions in the Beirut area, primarily in the so-called demarcation line area, to assist in the departure of PLO personnel. The Lebanese Armed Forces will take over positions occupied by the PLO.

The PLO will insure that National Movement Forces [collection of Lebanese militias] which had occupied these positions jointly with the PLO shall also withdraw.

As the day proceeds, the Lebanese Armed Forces will take up such other positions as necessary to assist in the departure of PLO personnel.

Meanwhile, the initial group of PLO personnel assemble in preparation for departure by sea later in the day (or on August 22). The vessel or vessels to be used for this purpose will arrive at pier on August 21.

The initial groups could include the wounded and ill, who would be transported in accordance with agreed arrangements — by sea or land, or both — to their destinations in other countries.

The initial group or groups of PLO personnel destined for Jordan and Iraq would move from their assembly point to the waiting commercial vessel or vessels for onward transport by sea.

August 22

All groups destined for Jordan or Iraq will have boarded ship and will have sailed from Beirut.

Duplicating the model followed on August 21, PLO groups destined for Tunisia assemble and move to the Port of Beirut for departure by sea.

August 23

All PLO personnel destined for Tunisia complete their assembly and embark on commercial vessel for Tunisia.

PLO personnel destined for South Yemen assemble and move to a vessel for departure then or on August 24.

August 24-25

Assembly and departure by sea of PLO personnel destined for North Yemen.

August 25

Provided that satisfactory logistical arrangements have been completed, the initial groups of PLO personnel destined for Syria assemble and move overland via the Beirut-Damascus highway to Syria.

The advance French elements of the MNF already in the port area will have taken up such other agreed positions on the land route in the Beirut area as necessary to assist in the overland departure of the PLO personnel for Syria.

The Lebanese Armed Forces join with the French in occupying such positions.

(If it should be agreed that these initial groups should go by sea to Syria rather than by land, this departure schedule also is subject to amendments to assure that logistical requirements are met.)

August 26-28 (Approximately)

The remaining forces of the MNF (from the United States, France, and Italy) arrive in the Beirut area and deploy to agreed locations as determined through the Liaison and Coordinating Committee. This movement may be accompanied by the transfer of the advance French elements previously in the port area and elsewhere to other locations in the Beirut area.

August 26-27-28

PLO groups destined for Syria continue to move — by land or sea — to Syria.

August 22-September 4

Turnover to the Lebanese Armed Forces of PLO weaponry, military equipment, and ammunition in a continuing and orderly fashion.

August 29-30-31

Redeployment out of Beirut of the Syrian elements of the ADF.

September 1-4

Completion of the departure to Syria — by land or sea — of all PLO or Palestine Liberation Army personnel destined for Syria.

September 2-3

Assembly and departure by sea of all PLO personnel destined for the Sudan.

Assembly and movement by sea of all PLO personnel destined for Algeria.

September 4-21

The MNF assists the Lebanese Armed Forces in arrangements, as may be agreed between governments concerned, to insure good and lasting security throughout the area of operation.

September 21-26

Departure of MNF.

MNF-II

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, SEPT. 16, 1982

It appears from press reports and eyewitness accounts that the Israelis have now moved into strategic positions throughout west Beirut and control much of that sector of the city. This is contrary to the assurances given to us by the Israelis both in Washington and in Israel.

We fully support the Lebanese Government's call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces, which are in clear violation of the cease-fire understanding to which Israel is a party. There is no justification in our view for Israel's continued military presence in west Beirut, and we call for an immediate pullback.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, SEPT. 18, 1982

I was horrified to learn this morning of the killing of Palestinians which has taken place in Beirut. All people of decency must share our outrage and revulsion over the murders, which included women and children. I express my deepest regrets and condolences to the families of the victims and the broader Palestinian community.

During the negotiations leading to the PLO withdrawal from Beirut, we were assured that Israeli forces would not enter west Beirut. We also understood that following withdrawal, Lebanese Army units would establish control over the city. They were thwarted in this effort by the Israeli occupation that took place, beginning on Wednesday. We strongly opposed Israel's move into west Beirut following the assassination of President-elect Gemayel both because we believed it wrong in principle and for fear that it would provoke further fighting. Israel, by yesterday in military control of Beirut, claimed that its moves would prevent the kind of tragedy which has now occurred.

We have today summoned the Israeli Ambassador to demand that the Israeli Government immediately withdraw its forces from west Beirut to the positions occupied on September 14. We also expect Israel, thereafter, to commence serious negotiations which will first lead to the earliest possible disengagement of Israeli forces from Beirut and, second, to an agreed framework for the early withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Despite and because of the additional bloody trauma which adds to Lebanon's agonies, we urge the Lebanese to unite quickly in support of their government and their constitutional processes and to work for the future they so richly deserve. We will be with them.

This terrible tragedy underscores the desperate need for a true peace in the Middle East, one which takes full account of the needs of the Palestinian people. The initiative I announced on September 1 will be pursued vigorously in order to achieve that goal.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, SEPT. 20, 1982

My fellow Americans, the scenes that the whole world witnessed this past weekend were among the most heart-rending in the long nightmare of Lebanon's agony. Millions of us have seen pictures of the Palestinian victims of this tragedy. There is little that words can add. But there are actions we can and must take to bring that nightmare to an end.

It is not enough for us to view this as some remote event in which we ourselves are not involved. For our friends in Lebanon and Israel, for our friends in Europe and elsewhere in the Middle East, and for us Americans, this tragedy, horrible as it is, reminds us of the absolute imperative of bringing peace to that troubled country and region. By working for peace in the Middle East, we serve the cause of world peace, and the future of mankind.

For the criminals who did this deed, no punishment is enough to remove the blot of their crime. But for the rest of us, there are things that we can learn and things that we must do. The people of Lebanon must have learned that the cycle of massacre upon massacre must end. Children are not avenged by the murder of other children. Israel must have learned that there is no way it can impose its own solutions on hatreds as deep and bitter as those that produced this tragedy. If it seeks to do so, it will only sink more deeply into the quagmire that looms before it. Those outsiders who have fed the flames of civil war in Lebanon for so many years need to learn that the fire will consume them too, if it is not put out. And we must all rededicate ourselves to the cause of peace. I reemphasize my call for early progress to solve the Palestinian issue and repeat the U.S. proposals which are now even more urgent.

For now is not the time for talk alone. Now is a time for action. To act together to restore peace to Beirut; to help a stable government emerge that can restore peace and independence to all of Lebanon; and to bring a just and lasting resolution to the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors, one that satisfies the legitimate rights of the Palestinians who are all too often its victims.

Our basic objectives in Lebanon have not changed, for they are the objectives of the government and the people of Lebanon themselves. First and foremost, we seek the restoration of a strong and stable central government in that country, brought into being by orderly constitutional processes. Lebanon elected a new president 2 short weeks ago only to see him murdered even before he could assume his office. This week a distressed Lebanon will again be electing a new president. May God grant him safety as well as the wisdom and courage to lead his country into a new and happier era.

The international community has an obligation to assist the Government of Lebanon in reasserting authority over all its territory. Foreign forces and armed factions have too long obstructed the legitimate role of the Lebanese Government's security forces. We must pave the way for withdrawal of foreign forces.

The place to begin this task is in Beirut. The Lebanese Government must be permitted to restore internal security in its capital. It cannot do this if foreign forces remain in or near Beirut. With this goal in mind, I have consulted with our French and Italian allies. We have agreed to form a new multinational force, similar to the one which served so well last month, with the mission of enabling the Lebanese Government to resume full sovereignty over its capital, the essential precondition for extending its control over the entire country.

The Lebanese Government, with the support of its people, requested this help. For this multinational force to succeed, it is essential that Israel withdraw from Beirut. With the expected cooperation of all parties, the multinational force will return to Beirut for a limited period of time. Its purpose is not to act as a police force but to make it possible for the lawful authorities of Lebanon to discharge those duties for themselves.

Secretary Shultz, on my behalf, has also reiterated our views to the Government of Israel through its Ambassador in Washington. Unless Israel moves quickly and courageously to withdraw, it will find itself ever more deeply involved in problems that are not its own and which it cannot solve.

The participation of American forces in Beirut will again be for a limited period. But I've concluded there is no alternative to their returning to Lebanon if that country is to have a chance to stand on its own feet.

Peace in Beirut is only a first step. Together with the people of Lebanon, we seek the removal of all foreign military forces from that country. The departure of all foreign forces at the request of the

Lebanese authorities has been widely endorsed by Arab as well as other states. Israel and Syria have both indicated that they have no territorial ambitions in Lebanon and are prepared to withdraw. It is now urgent that specific arrangements for withdrawal of all foreign forces be agreed upon. This must happen very soon. The legitimate security concerns of neighboring states, including particularly the safety of Israel's northern population, must be provided for. But this is not a difficult task if the political will is there. The Lebanese people must be allowed to chart their own future. They must rely solely on Lebanese Armed Forces who are willing and able to bring security to their country. They must be allowed to do so, and the sooner the better.

Ambassador Draper, who has been in close consultation with the parties concerned in Lebanon, will remain in the area to work for the full implementation of our proposal. Ambassador Habib will join him and will represent me at the inauguration of the new President of Lebanon and will consult with the leaders in the area. He will return promptly to Washington to report to me.

Early in the summer our government met its responsibility to help resolve a severe crisis and to relieve the Lebanese people of the crushing burden. We succeeded. Recent events have produced new problems, and we must, again, assume our responsibility.

I am especially anxious to end the agony of Lebanon because it is both right and in our national interest. But I am also determined to press ahead on the broader effort to achieve peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The events in Beirut of last week have served only to reinforce my conviction that such a peace is desperately needed and that the initiative we undertook on September 1 is the right way to proceed. We will not be discouraged or deterred in our efforts to seek peace in Lebanon and a just and lasting peace throughout the Middle East.

All of us must learn the appropriate lessons from this tragedy and assume the responsibilities that it imposes upon us. We owe it to ourselves and to our children. The whole world will be a safer place when this region which has known so much trouble can begin to know peace instead. Both our purpose and our action are peaceful, and we are taking them in a spirit of international cooperation.

Tonight I ask for your prayers and your support as our country continues its vital role as a leader or world peace, the role that all of us as Americans can be proud of.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, SEPT. 23, 1982 (Excerpts)

The situation in the Middle East - I will go over some details that have been talked about in part, or maybe in full, at the Departments of Defense and State earlier today. We're still working out the details of what the Marine force will do when they arrive and consultations with the Italian and French liaison officers in Beirut.

An agreed-upon mandate for the multinational force reads as follows:

The MNF (multinational force) is to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide the MNF presence requested by the Government of Lebanon to assist it and Lebanon's armed forces in the Beirut area. This presence will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area and thereby further its efforts to assure the safety of persons in the area and to bring to an end the violence which has tragically recurred.

These agreed-upon locations are being worked out between the Government of Lebanon, the French, Italians, and the Americans. The force of U.S. Marines, numbering about 800, as previously, will probably go in over the weekend. They are in the eastern Mediterranean at this time. The French are arriving in Beirut.

The Marines are equipped basically as they were the last time they were involved. The rules of engagement are as before, normal self-defense rules.

It is our desire and hope and expectation, based on reports that we have received, that the Israelis will have withdrawn from west Beirut by the end of the week.

LEBANON-USA EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

Deputy Prime Minister Boutros' Letter

September 25, 1982

Your Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to the urgent discussions between representatives of our two Governments concerning the recent tragic events which have occurred in the Beirut area, and to consultations between my Government and the Secretary General of the United Nations pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 521. On behalf of the Republic of Lebanon, I wish to inform your Excellency's Government of the determination of the Government of Lebanon to restore its sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area and thereby to assure the safety of persons in the area and bring an end to violence that has recurred. To this end, Israeli forces will withdraw from the Beirut area.

In its consultations with the Secretary General, the Government of Lebanon has noted that the urgency of the situation requires immediate action, and the Government of Lebanon, therefore, is, in conformity with the objectives in U.N. Security Council Resolution 521, proposing to several nations that they contribute forces to serve as a temporary Multinational Force (MNF) in the Beirut area. The mandate of the MNF will be to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide the multinational presence requested by the Lebanese Government to assist it and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the Beirut area. This presence will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area, and thereby further efforts of my Government to assure the safety of persons in the area and bring to an end the violence which has tragically recurred. The MNF may undertake other functions only by mutual agreement.

In the foregoing context, I have the honor to propose that the United States of America deploy a force of approximately 1200 personnel to Beirut, subject to the following terms and conditions:

- The American military force shall carry out appropriate activities consistent with the mandate of the MNF.
- Command authority over the American force will be exercised exclusively by the United States Government through existing American military channels.
- The LAF and MNF will form a Liaison and Coordination Committee, composed of representatives of the MNF participating governments and chaired by the representatives of my Government. The Liaison and Coordination Committee will have two essential components: (A) Supervisory liaison; and (B) Military and technical liaison and coordination.
- The American force will operate in close coordination with the LAF. To endure effective coordination with the LAF, the American force will assign liaison officers to the LAF and the Government of Lebanon will assign liaison officers to the American force. The LAF liaison officers to the American force will, inter alia, perform liaison with the civilian population and with the U.N. observers and manifest the authority of the Lebanese Government in all appropriate situations. The American force will provide security for LAF personnel operating with the U.S. contingent.
- In carrying out its mission, the American force will not engage in combat. It may, however, exercise the right of self-defense.
- It is understood that the presence of the American force will be needed only for a limited period to meet the urgent requirements posed by the current situation. The MNF contributors and the Government of Lebanon will consult fully concerning the duration of the MNF presence. Arrangement for the departure of the MNF will be the subject of special consultations between the Government of Lebanon and the MNF participating governments. The American force will depart Lebanon upon any request of the Government of Lebanon or upon the decision of the President of the United States.
- The Government of Lebanon and the LAF will take all measures necessary to ensure the protection of the American force's personnel, in include securing assurances from all armed elements not now under the authority of the Lebanese Government that they will refrain from hostilities and not interfere with any activities of the MNF.
- The American force will enjoy both the degree of freedom of movement and the right to undertake those activities deemed necessary for the performance of its mission for the support of its personnel. Accordingly, it shall enjoy the privileges and immunities accorded the administrative and technical staff of the American Embassy in Beirut, and shall be exempt from immigration and customs requirements, and restrictions on entering or departing Lebanon. Personnel,

property and equipment of the American force introduced into Lebanon shall be exempt from any form of tax, duty, charge or levy.

I have the further honor to propose, if the foregoing is acceptable to your Excellency's government, that your Excellency's reply to that effect, together with this note, shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[FOUAD BOUTROS]
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER/MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Ambassador Dillon's Reply

September 25, 1982

Your Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to your Excellency's note of 25 September 1982 requesting the deployment of an American force to the Beirut area. I am pleased to inform you on behalf of my Government that the United States is prepared to deploy temporarily a force of approximately 1200 personnel as part of a Multinational Force (MNF) to establish an environment which will permit the Lebanese armed forces (LAF) to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area. It is understood that the presence of such an American force will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area, an objective which is fully shared by my Government, and thereby further efforts of the Government of Lebanon to assure the safety of persons in the area and bring to an end the violence which has tragically recurred.

I have the further honor to inform you that my Government accepts the terms and conditions concerning the presence of the American force in the Beirut area as set forth in your note, and your Excellency's note and this reply accordingly constitute an agreement between our two Governments.

[ROBERT DILLON]
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, SEPT. 29, 1982

Identical letters addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate

On September 20, 1982, the Government of Lebanon requested the Governments of France, Italy, and the United States to contribute forces to serve as a temporary Multinational Force, the presence of which will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority, and thereby further the efforts of the Government of Lebanon to assure the safety of persons in the area and bring to an end the violence which has tragically recurred.

In response to this request, I have authorized the Armed Forces of the United States to participate in this Multinational Force. In accordance with my desire that the Congress be fully informed on this matter, and consistent with the War Powers Resolution, I am hereby providing a report on the deployment and mission of these members of the United States armed forces.

On September 29, approximately 1200 Marines of a Marine Amphibious Unit began to arrive in Beirut. Their mission is to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide the multinational presence requested by the Lebanese Government to assist it and the Lebanese Armed Forces. In carrying out this mission, the American force will not engage in combat. It may, however, exercise the right of self-defense and will be equipped accordingly. These forces will operate in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as with comparably sized French and Italian military contingents in the Multinational Force. Although it is not possible at this time to predict the precise duration of the presence of U.S. forces in Beirut, our agreement with the Government of Lebanon makes clear that they will be needed only for a limited period to meet the urgent requirements posed by the current situation.

I want to emphasize that, as was the case of the deployment of U.S. forces to Lebanon in August as part of the earlier multinational force, there is no intention or expectation that U.S. Armed Forces

will become involved in hostilities. They are in Lebanon at the formal request of the Government of Lebanon, and our agreement with the Government of Lebanon expressly rules out any combat responsibilities for the U.S. forces. All armed elements in the area have given assurances that they will refrain from hostilities and will not interfere with the activities of the Multinational Force. Although isolated acts of violence can never be ruled out, all appropriate precautions have been taken to ensure the safety of U.S. military personnel during their temporary deployment in Lebanon.

This deployment of the United States Armed Forces is being undertaken pursuant to the President's constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces.

I believe that this step will support the objective of helping to restore the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Lebanon. It is part of the continuing efforts of the United States Government to bring lasting peace to the troubled country, which has too long endured the trials of civil strife and armed conflict.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

MANDATE FOR BRITISH PEACEKEEPING FORCE

The conditions under which a British contingent would participate in the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon were agreed in an exchange of notes between the British and Lebanese governments on January 31, 1983.

A letter written by Mr Elie Salem, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Lebanon, to the British Government said:-

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to the discussions which have taken place between representatives of our two governments concerning the establishment of a temporary Multinational Force (MNF) in the Beirut area. The Mandate of the MNF is to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide a multinational presence to assist the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the Beirut area. This presence will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area, and thereby further efforts of my Government to assure the safety of persons in the area. The MNF may undertake other functions only by mutual agreement among governments. The MNF is currently composed of contingents of the armed forces of France, Italy and the United States of America.

In the foregoing context, I have the honour to propose that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland deploy a force of approximately 100 personnel to Beirut for a period of three months, subject to the following terms and conditions:-

- (i) The British military force shall carry out such tasks as may be agreed between the United Kingdom and Lebanese Governments, consistent with the mandate of the MNF;
- (ii) Command authority over the British force will be exercised exclusively by the British Government through existing British diplomatic and military channels;
- (iii) The LAF and MNF will form a liaison and coordination committee.
- (iv) The British force will operate in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces;
- (v) In carrying out its duties, the British force will not engage in hostilities or other operations of a warlike nature. It may, however, exercise the right of self-defence;
- (vi) Notwithstanding the time limits proposed above, the British Force will depart from Lebanon upon the request of the President of Lebanon or upon the decision of the British Government. Any proposal for renewal of the mandate would be subject to consultation between the Government of the Lebanon and Her Majesty's Government and the agreement of both parties.
- (vii) The Government of Lebanon and the LAF will take measures necessary to ensure that protection of the British force's personnel (to include securing assurances from all armed elements not now under the authority of the Lebanese Government that they will refrain from hostilities and not

interfere with any activities of the MNF);

- (viii) The British force will enjoy both the degree of freedom and movement and the right to undertake those activities deemed necessary for the performance of its mission for the support of its personnel. Accordingly, the members of the British force shall enjoy the privileges and immunities accorded the technical and administrative staff of the British Embassy in Beirut, and shall be exempt from immigrations and customs requirements, and restrictions on entering or departing from Lebanon. The appropriate British authorities may exercise jurisdiction over the British force in accordance with British service law. Personnel, property and equipment of the British force introduced into Lebanon shall be exempt from any form of tax, duty, charge or levy.

I have the further honour to propose, if the foregoing is acceptable to Your Excellency's Government, that Your Excellency's reply to that effect, together with this Note, shall constitute an Agreement between our two governments which shall come into force on the date of Your Excellency's reply.

Mr D A Roberts, British Ambassador in Beirut, said in a reply to Mr Salem:-

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to Your Excellency's Note of January 31, 1983 requesting the deployment of a British force to the Beirut area ...

I am pleased to inform you that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is prepared to deploy for a period of three months a force of approximately 100 personnel.

I have the further honour to inform Your Excellency that my Government accepts the terms and conditions for the presence of the British force in the Beirut area as set forth in your Note, and that Your Excellency's Note and this reply accordingly constitute an Agreement between our two governments which shall come into force today.

Source: *The Times*, 8 December 1983.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON BEIRUT BOMBING, APRIL 18, 1983

Let me begin with a brief statement. As you know, our Embassy in Beirut was the target this morning of a vicious, terrorist bombing. This cowardly act has claimed a number of killed and wounded. It appears that there are some American casualties, but we don't know yet the exact number or the extent of injury.

In cooperation with the Lebanese authorities, we're still verifying the details and identifying the casualties. I commend Ambassador Robert Dillon and his dedicated staff who are carrying on under these traumatic circumstances in the finest tradition of our military and foreign services.

Just a few minutes ago, President Gemayel called me to convey on behalf of the Lebanese people his profound regret and sorrow with regard to this incident and asked me to relay the condolences on behalf of the people of Lebanon to the families of those victims. He also expressed his firm determination that we persevere in the search for peace in that region. And I told President Gemayel that I joined him in those sentiments. This criminal attack on a diplomatic establishment will not deter us from our goals of peace in the region. We will do what we know to be right.

Ambassadors Habib and Draper, who are presently in Beirut, will continue to press in negotiations for the earliest possible, total withdrawal of all external forces.

We also remain committed to the recovery by the Lebanese Government of full sovereignty throughout all of its territory. The people of Lebanon must be given the chance to resume their efforts to lead a normal life, free from violence, without the presence of unauthorized foreign forces on their soil. And to this noble end, I rededicate the efforts of the United States.

PUBLIC LAW 98-119, OCTOBER 12, 1983

Joint Resolution

Providing statutory authorization under the War Powers Resolution for continued United States participation in the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon in order to obtain withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution."

FINDINGS AND PURPOSE

SEC.2(a) The Congress finds that -

- (1) The removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon is an essential United States foreign policy objective in the Middle East;
- (2) in order to restore full control by the Government of Lebanon over its own territory, the United States is currently participating in the multinational peacekeeping force (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the "Multinational Force in Lebanon") which was established in accordance with the exchange of letters between the Governments of the United States and Lebanon dated September 25, 1982;
- (3) the Multinational Force in Lebanon better enables the Government of Lebanon to establish its unity, independence, and territorial integrity;
- (4) progress toward national political reconciliation in Lebanon is necessary; and
- (5) United States Armed Forces participating in the Multinational Force in Lebanon are now in hostilities requiring authorization of their continued presence under the War Powers Resolution.

(b) The Congress determines that the requirements of section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became operative on August 29, 1983. Consistent with section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, the purpose of this joint resolution is to authorize the continued participation of United States Armed Forces in the Multinational Force in Lebanon.

(c) The Congress intends this joint resolution to constitute the necessary specific statutory authorization under the War Powers Resolution for continued participation by United States Armed Forces in the Multinational Force in Lebanon.

AUTHORIZATION FOR CONTINUED PARTICIPATION OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON

SEC 3. The President is authorized, for purposes of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, to continue participation by United States Armed Forces in the Multinational Force in Lebanon, subject to the provisions of section 6 of this joint resolution. Such participation shall be limited to performance of the functions, and shall be subject to the limitations, specified in the agreement establishing the Multinational Force in Lebanon as set forth in the exchange of letters between the Governments of the United States and Lebanon dated September 25, 1982, except that this shall not preclude such protective measures as may be necessary to ensure the safety of the Multinational Force in Lebanon.

REPORTS TO THE CONGRESS

SEC. 4. As required by section 4(c) of the War Powers Resolution, the President shall report periodically to the Congress with respect to the situation in Lebanon, but in no event shall he report less often than once every three months. In addition to providing the information required by that section on the status, scope, and duration of hostilities involving United States Armed Forces, such reports shall describe in detail -

- (1) the activities being performed by the Multinational Force in Lebanon;
- (2) the present composition of the Multinational Force in Lebanon, including a description of the responsibilities and deployment of the armed forces of each participating country;
- (3) the results of efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate the Multinational Force in Lebanon;

- (4) how continued United States participation in the Multinational Force in Lebanon is advancing United States foreign policy interests in the Middle East; and
- (5) what progress has occurred toward national political reconciliation among all Lebanese groups.

STATEMENTS OF POLICY

SEC.5(a) The Congress declares that the participation of the armed forces of other countries in the Multinational Force in Lebanon is essential to maintain the international character of the peace-keeping function in Lebanon.

(b) The Congress believes that it should continue to be the policy of the United States to promote continuing discussions with Israel, Syria, and Lebanon with the objective of bringing about the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon and establishing an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area.

(c) It is the sense of the Congress that, not later than one year after the date of enactment of this joint resolution and at least once a year thereafter, the United States should discuss with the other members of the Security Council of the United Nations the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force to assume the responsibilities of the Multinational Force in Lebanon. An analysis of the implications of the response to such discussions for the continuation of the Multinational Force in Lebanon shall be included in the reports required under paragraph (3) of section 4 of this resolution.

DURATION OF AUTHORIZATION FOR UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON

SEC.6. The participation of the United States Armed Forces in the Multinational Force in Lebanon shall be authorized for purposes of the War Powers Resolution until the end of the eighteen-month period beginning on the date of enactment of this resolution unless the Congress extends such authorization, except that such authorization shall terminate sooner upon the occurrence of any one of the following:

- (1) the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, unless the President determines and certifies to the Congress that continued United States Armed Forces participation in the Multinational Force in Lebanon is required after such withdrawal in order to accomplish the purposes specified in the September 25, 1982, exchange of letters providing for the establishment of the Multinational Force in Lebanon; or
- (2) the assumption by the United Nations or the Government of Lebanon of the responsibilities of the Multinational Force in Lebanon; or
- (3) the implementation of other effective security arrangements in the area; or
- (4) the withdrawal of all other countries from participation in the Multinational Force in Lebanon.

INTERPRETATION OF THIS RESOLUTION

SEC.7 (a) Nothing in this joint resolution shall preclude the President from withdrawing United States Armed Forces participation in the Multinational Force in Lebanon if circumstances warrant, and nothing in this joint resolution shall preclude the Congress by joint resolution from directing such a withdrawal.

(b) Nothing in this joint resolution modifies, limits, or supersedes any provision of the War Powers Resolution or the requirement of section 4(a) of the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of 1983, relating to congressional authorization from any substantial expansion in the number or role of United States Armed Forces in Lebanon.

CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR AMENDMENTS

SEC.8 (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced to amend or repeal this Act shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be. Such joint resolution or bill shall be considered by such committee within fifteen calendar days and may be reported out, together with its recommendations, unless

such House shall otherwise determine pursuant to its rules.

(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such joint resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is referred to the committee of conference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to agree within forty-eight hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.

Approved October 12, 1983.

PRESIDENT'S SESSION WITH NEWS MEDIA, Oct. 24, 1984 [Excerpts]

Yesterday's acts of terrorism in Beirut which killed so many young American and French servicemen were a horrifying reminder of the type of enemy that we face in many critical areas of the world today - vicious, cowardly, and ruthless. Words can never convey the depth of compassion that we feel for those brave men and for their loved ones.

Many Americans are wondering why we must keep our forces in Lebanon. Well, the reason they must stay there until the situation is under control is quite clear: We have vital interests in Lebanon, and our actions in Lebanon are in the cause of world peace. With our allies - England, France, and Italy - we're part of a multinational peacekeeping force seeking a withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and from the Beirut area while the new Lebanese Government undertakes to restore sovereignty throughout that country. By promoting peace in Lebanon, we strengthen the forces for peace throughout the Middle East. This is not a Republican or a Democratic goal but one that all Americans share.

Peace in Lebanon is key to the region's stability now and in the future. To the extent that the prospect for future stability is heavily influenced by the presence of our forces, it is central to our credibility on a global scale. We must not allow international criminals and thugs such as these to undermine the peace in Lebanon.

The struggle for peace is indivisible. We cannot pick and choose where we will support freedom; we can only determine how. If it's lost in one place, all of us lose. If others feel confident that they can intimidate us and our allies in Lebanon, they will become more bold elsewhere. If Lebanon ends up under the tyranny of forces hostile to the West, not only will our strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean be threatened but also the stability of the entire Middle East, including the vast resource areas of the Arabian Peninsula.

In conjunction with our multinational force partners, we're taking measures to strengthen the capabilities of our forces to defend themselves. The United States will not be intimidated by terrorists. We have strong circumstantial evidence linking the perpetrators of this latest atrocity to others that have occurred against us in the recent past, including the bombing of our Embassy in Beirut last April. Every effort will be made to find the criminals responsible for this act of terrorism so this despicable act will not go unpunished.

And now, I know you have some questions.

Q. What are the options? Do we increase the number of troops in Lebanon? Do we withdraw the troops in Lebanon? What do you consider the options to be?

The President. The option that we cannot consider is withdrawing while their mission still remains. And they do have a mission, contrary to what some people have intimated in the last 24 hours

or so. And it is tied in with the effort that we launched more than a year ago to try and bring peace to the total area of the Middle East because of its strategic importance to the whole free world, not just the United States.

I couldn't give you a time on this. The options are - well, I have sent, as of this morning General Kelley, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, is on his way to Lebanon to review again what we can do with regard to improving the defensive measures, the safety measures for the marines who are stationed there. And we are looking at every possible option in that regard. But the mission remains, and it remains as yet unfulfilled, although there's been tremendous success so far.

Q. What specifically is the military mission of the marines?

The President. ... we recognized that what we had to resolve first was this issue: to get Syria, which had crossed from the other border, to get Syria, get Israel, get the PLO organization out of Lebanon and then to have a stabilizing force while a government could be established in Lebanon and their military could then acquire the capability necessary to reinstitute their control over their own borders. And this was why the multinational force went in - to provide that stability so that when the Lebanese forces moved out, as the other forces, the Israelis and the Syrians left, there could be a maintenance of order behind them.

Now that mission remains, and it did have measures of great success. Some 5,000 of the organized PLO militias, as you'll remember, were shipped out of Lebanon. Some of those, we fear, have been infiltrated back in, mainly by way of Syria now. But that was accomplished. A government was established. We have helped very definitely with the training of the Lebanese Army, and they proved the quality of that training recently in the fighting in the hills and around Suq al Gharb. And we think that they have - they don't have the size yet to where they could take over in, let's say, the policing of that area and of the airport and still have enough manpower to go out and restore order as they're supposed to.

So that mission remains. And, as of now, they have finally agreed upon a date and a place for a meeting in which the Government of Lebanon is going to try and bring in representatives of the hostile factions within Lebanon to broaden the base of the government.

So we think that the goal is worthy, and we think that great progress has been made that would not have been made if it were not for the multinational force.

Q. I'm a journalist, but I'm also the wife of a U.S. Marine Corps captain, and as such I am personally grieved over the loss of lives. I am wondering what message you can give to Americans who are frustrated with the loss of life in a region that historically has not known peace - and, many think, will never know peace - and yet, our men are over there as peacekeepers.

The President. I wish there were an instant answer here that would resolve all your concerns.

I understand your concern. I understand all Americans' concern, and I have to say that I don't know of anything that is worse in the job I have than having to make the calls that I have made as a result of these snipings that have taken place in the past.

I wish it could be without hazard, but the alternative is to look at this region which, as I say, is vital. Our allies in Western Europe, the Japanese - it would be a disaster if a force took over the Middle East. And a force is ready to do that, as witness what has taken place in Yemen, in Ethiopia, and now the forces of some several thousand that are theirs in Syria.

The free world cannot stand by and see that happen. Yes, that has been an area torn by strife over the centuries, and yet not too many years ago, before the kind of breakup, Lebanon was a very prosperous, peaceful nation that was kind of known as the Gateway to the East. And we believe it can be again.

Probably no one - or no country was more at war with Israel than Egypt, and yet we saw Egypt and Israel come to a peace treaty and Israel give up the Sinai and so forth that it had conquered in war. We have to believe that this we must strive for, because the alternative could be disaster for all of our world.

Q. I want to ask you, you've addressed it now several times, the issue that we cannot get out of the Middle East. But would you address the other argument that if you're not going to get out, then let's just not put marines back in to replace those who have been killed and wounded to do exactly the same thing in the same place but, if you're going to do a job, go into Lebanon and do it with some real force, which is another argument - *[inaudible]*.

The President. But you see what that entails - and that is the difficult thing - we would then be engaged in the combat. We would be the combat force. We would be fighting against Arab States, and that is not the road to peace. We're still thinking in terms of that long-range peace.

But with the present mission of the multinational force - and remember there are four nations involved there - enlarging their forces, if it would help with the mission they're performing, would be one thing. But to join into the combat and become a part of the combative force, actually all we would really be doing would be increasing the number of targets and risking, really the start of overall conflict and world war.

No, our mission, I think, makes sense. I think it has proven itself so far. The tragedy is coming not really from the warring forces, it is coming from little bands of individuals, literally criminal minded, who now see in the disorder that's going on an opportunity to do what they want to do. And we're going to make every effort we can to minimize the risk but also to find those responsible.

Q. You said that General Kelley is on his way - *[inaudible]* - to recommend more safety measures. If he recommends that more troops be sent in, will you do that? And what other safety measures are you considering?

The President. Well, if this were recommended on the basis that their mission, as I say, could be furthered by some difference in the size of the mission, I would certainly take seriously the recommendation of the man who's the Commandant of the entire Marine Corps.

There are a number of other things to look at, options that have been presented. We know, for example, that we have to find a new headquarters, an operational post for the headquarters, because that was totally destroyed. One of the options being considered is, could part of the support services of that kind be stationed on one of our ships that are offshore there, one of our naval vessels? More improvements in the actual defensive structure? There are any number of options, and that's why an expert is going over there to come back and tell us what can be done.

PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION, OCT. 27, 1983

My fellow Americans:

Some 2 months ago we were shocked by the brutal massacre of 269 men, women and children, more than 60 of them Americans, in the shooting down of a Korean airliner. Now, in these past several days, violence has erupted again, in Lebanon and Grenada.

In Lebanon, we have some 1,600 marines, part of a multinational force that's trying to help the people of Lebanon restore order and stability to that troubled land. Our marines are assigned to the south of the city of Beirut, near the only airport operating in Lebanon. Just a mile or so to the north is the Italian contingent and not far from them, the French and a company of British soldiers.

This past Sunday, at 22 minutes after 6 Beirut time, with dawn just breaking, a truck, looking like a lot of other vehicles in the city, approached the airport on a busy, main road. There was nothing in its appearance to suggest it was any different than the trucks or cars that were normally seen on and around the airport. But this one was different. At the wheel was a young man on a suicide mission.

The truck carried some 2,000 pounds of explosive, but there was no way our marine guards could know this. Their first warning that something was wrong came when the truck crashed through a series of barriers, including a chainlink fence and barbed wire entanglements. The guards opened fire, but it was too late. The truck smashed through the doors of the headquarters building in which our marines were sleeping and instantly exploded. The four-story concrete building collapsed in a pile of rubble.

More than 200 of the sleeping men were killed in that one hideous, insane attack. Many others suffered injury and are hospitalized here or in Europe.

This was not the end of the horror. At almost the same instant, another vehicle on a suicide and murder mission crashed into the headquarters of the French peacekeeping force, an eight-story building, destroying it and killing more than 50 French soldiers.

Prior to this day of horror, there had been several tragedies for our men in the multinational force. Attacks by snipers and mortar fire had taken their toll.

I called bereaved parents and/or widows of the victims to express on behalf of all of us our sorrow and sympathy. Sometimes there were questions. And now many of you are asking: 'Why should our young men be dying in Lebanon? Why is Lebanon important to us?'

Well, it's true, Lebanon is a small country more than five-and-a-half thousand miles from our shores on the edge of what we call the Middle East. But every President who has occupied this office in recent years has recognized that peace in the Middle East is of vital concern to our nation and, indeed, to our allies in Western Europe and Japan. We've been concerned because the Middle East is a powderkeg; four times in the last 30 years, the Arabs and Israelis have gone to war. And each time, the world has teetered near the edge of catastrophe.

The area is key to the economic and political life of the West. Its strategic importance, its energy resources, the Suez Canal, and the well-being of the nearly 200 million people living there - all are vital to us and to world peace. If that key should fall into the hands of a power or powers hostile to the free world, there would be a direct threat to the United States and to our allies.

We have another reason to be involved. Since 1948 our nation has recognized and accepted a moral obligation to assure the continued existence of Israel as a nation. Israel shares our democratic values and is a formidable force an invader of the Middle East would have to reckon with.

For several years, Lebanon has been torn by internal strife. Once a prosperous, peaceful nation, its government had become ineffective in controlling the militias that warred on each other. Sixteen months ago, we were watching on our TV screens the shelling and bombing of Beirut which was being used as a fortress by PLO bands. Hundreds and hundreds of civilians were being killed and wounded in the daily battles.

Syria, which makes no secret of its claim that Lebanon should be a part of a Greater Syria, was occupying a large part of Lebanon. Today, Syria has become a home for 7,000 Soviet advisers and technicians who man a massive amount of Soviet weaponry, including SS-21 ground-to-ground missiles capable of reaching vital areas of Israel.

A little over a year ago, hoping to build on the Camp David accords, which has led to peace between Israel and Egypt, I proposed a peace plan for the Middle East to end the wars between the Arab States and Israel. It was based on U.N. resolutions 242 and 338 and called for a fair and just solution to the Palestinian problem, as well as a fair and just settlement of issues between the Arab States and Israel.

Before the necessary negotiations could begin, it was essential to get all foreign forces out of Lebanon and to end the fighting there. So, why are we there? Well, the answer is straightforward: to help bring peace to Lebanon and stability to the vital Middle East. To that end, the multinational force was created to help stabilize the situation in Lebanon until a government could be established and a Lebanese army mobilized to restore Lebanese sovereignty over its own soil as the foreign forces withdrew. Israel agreed to withdraw as did Syria, but Syria then reneged on its promise. Over 10,000 Palestinians who had been bringing ruin down on Beirut, however, did leave the country.

Lebanon has formed a government under the leadership of President Gemayel, and that government, with our assistance and training, has set up its own army. In only a year's time, that army has been rebuilt. It's a good army, composed of Lebanese of all factions.

A few weeks ago, the Israeli army pulled back to the Awali River in southern Lebanon. Despite fierce resistance by Syrian-backed forces, the Lebanese army was able to hold the line and maintain the defensive perimeter around Beirut.

In the year that our marines have been there, Lebanon has made important steps toward stability and order. The physical presence of the marines lends support to both the Lebanese Government and its army. It allows the hard work of diplomacy to go forward. Indeed, without the peacekeepers from the U.S., France, Italy, and Britain, the efforts to find a peaceful solution in Lebanon would collapse.

As to that narrower question - what exactly is the operational mission of the marines - the answer is, to secure a piece of Beirut, to keep order in their sector, and to prevent the area from becoming a battlefield. Our marines are not just sitting in an airport. Part of their task is to guard that airport. Because of their presence, the airport has remained operational. In addition, they patrol the surrounding area. This is their part - a limited, but essential part - in the larger effort that I've described.

If our marines must be there, I'm asked, why can't we make them safer? Who committed this latest atrocity against them and why?

Well, we'll do everything we can to ensure that our men are safe as possible. We ordered the battleship *New Jersey* to join our naval forces offshore. Without even firing them, the threat of its 16-inch guns silenced those who once fired down on our marines from the hills, and they're a good part of the reason we suddenly had a cease-fire. We're doing our best to make our forces less vulnerable to those who want to snipe at them or send in future suicide missions.

Secretary Shultz called me today from Europe, where he was meeting with the Foreign Ministers of our allies in the multinational force. They remain committed to our task. And plans were made to share information as to how we can improve security for all our men.

We have strong circumstantial evidence that the attack on the marines was directed by terrorists who used the same method to destroy our Embassy in Beirut. Those who directed this atrocity must be dealt justice, and they will be. The obvious purpose behind the sniping and, now, this attack was to weaken American will and force the withdrawal of U.S. and French forces from Lebanon. The clear intent of the terrorists was to eliminate our support of the Lebanese Government and to destroy the ability of the Lebanese people to determine their own destiny.

To answer those who ask if we're serving any purpose in being there, let me answer a question with a question. Would the terrorists have launched their suicide attacks against the multinational force if it were not doing its job? The multinational force was attacked precisely because it is doing the job it was sent to do in Beirut. It is accomplishing its mission.

Now then, where do we go from here? What can we do now to help Lebanon gain greater stability so that our marines can come home? Well, I believe we can take three steps now that will make a difference.

First, we will accelerate the search for peace and stability in that region. Little attention has been paid to the fact that we've had special envoys there working, literally, around the clock to bring the warring factions together. This coming Monday in Geneva, President Gemayel of Lebanon will sit down with other factions from his country to see if national reconciliation can be achieved. He has our firm support. I will soon be announcing a replacement for Bud McFarlane, who was preceded by Phil Habib. Both worked tirelessly and must be credited for much if not most of the progress we've made.

Second, we'll work even more closely with our allies in providing support for the Government of Lebanon and for the rebuilding of a national consensus.

Third, we will ensure that the multinational peacekeeping forces, our marines, are given the greatest possible protection. Our Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Kelley, returned from Lebanon today and will be advising us on steps we can take to improve security. Vice President Bush returned just last night from Beirut and gave me a full report of his brief visit.

Beyond our progress in Lebanon, let us remember that our main goal and purpose is to achieve a broader peace in all of the Middle East. The factions and bitterness that we see in Lebanon are just a microcosm of the difficulties that are spread across much of that region. A peace initiative for the entire Middle East, consistent with the Camp David accords and U.N. resolutions 242 and 338, still offers the best hope for bringing peace to the region.

Let me ask those who say we should get out of Lebanon: If we were to leave Lebanon now, what message would that send to those who foment instability and terrorism? If America were to walk away from Lebanon, what chance would there be for a negotiated settlement, producing a unified democratic Lebanon?

If we turned our backs on Lebanon now, what would be the future of Israel? At stake is the fate of only the second Arab country to negotiate a major agreement with Israel. That's another accomplishment of this past year, the May 17th accord signed by Lebanon and Israel.

If terrorism and intimidation succeed, it'll be a devastating blow to the peace process and to Israel's search for genuine security. It won't just be Lebanon sentenced to a future of chaos. Can the United States, or the free world, for that matter, stand by and see the Middle East incorporated into the Soviet bloc? What of Western Europe and Japan's dependence on Middle East oil for the energy to fuel their industries? The Middle East is, as I've said, vital to our national security and economic well-being.

Brave young men have been taken from us. Many others have been grievously wounded. Are we to tell them their sacrifice was wasted? They gave their lives in defense of our national security every bit as much as any man who ever died fighting in a war. We must not strip every ounce of

meaning and purpose from their courageous sacrifice.

We're a nation with global responsibilities. We're not somewhere else in the world protecting someone else's interests; we're there protecting our own.

I received a message from the father of a marine in Lebanon. He told me, "In a world where we speak of human rights, there is a sad lack of acceptance of responsibility. My son has chosen the acceptance of responsibility for the privilege of living in this country. Certainly in this country one does not inherently have rights unless the responsibility for these rights is accepted." Dr Kenneth Morrison said that while he was waiting to learn if his son was one of the dead. I was thrilled for him to learn today that his son Ross is alive and well and carrying on his duties in Lebanon.

Let us meet our responsibilities. For longer than any of us can remember, the people of the Middle East have lived from war to war with no prospect for any other future. That dreadful cycle must be broken. Why are we there? Well, a Lebanese mother told one of our Ambassadors that her little girl had only attended school 2 of the last 8 years. Now, because of our presence there, she said her daughter could live a normal life.

With patience and firmness, we can help bring peace to that strife-torn region - and make our own lives more secure. Our role is to help the Lebanese put their country together, not to do it for them.

... God bless you, and God bless America.

LONG COMMISSION REPORT, DEC. 20, 1983 [Excerpts]

Report of the Department of Defense Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983

PART ONE - THE MILITARY MISSION

I. MISSION DEVELOPMENT

A. Principal Findings

Following the Sabra and Shatila massacres, a Presidential decision was made that the United States would participate in a Multinational Force (MNF) to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in carrying out its responsibilities in the Beirut area. Ambassador Habib, the President's Special Envoy to the Middle East, was charged with pursuing the diplomatic arrangements necessary for the insertion of U.S. forces into Beirut. His efforts culminated in an Exchange of Diplomatic Notes on 25 September 1982 between the United States and the Government of Lebanon which formed the basis for U.S. participation in the MNF. The national decision having been made, the Secretary of Defense tasked the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to develop the mission statement and to issue the appropriate Alert Order to the Commander in Chief United States European Command (USCINCEUR). Commission discussions with the principals involved disclosed that the mission statement was carefully drafted in coordination with USCINCEUR to ensure that it remained within the limits of national political guidance.

The Joint Operational Planning System (JOPS) Volume IV (Crisis Action System) provides guidance for the conduct of joint planning and execution concerning the use of military forces during emergency or time-sensitive situations.

The mission statement provided to USCINCEUR by the JCS Alert Order of 23 September 1983 read as follows:

To establish an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area. When directed, USCINCEUR will introduce U.S. forces as part of a multinational force presence in the Beirut area to occupy and secure positions along a designated section of the line from south of the Beirut International Airport to a position in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace; be prepared to protect U.S. forces; and, on order, conduct retrograde operations as required.

The wording "... occupy and secure positions along ... the line .." was incorporated into the mission statement by the JCS on the recommendation of USCINCEUR to avoid any inference that the USMNF would be responsible for the security of any given area. Additional mission-related guidance provided in the JCS Alert Order included the direction that:

- The USMNF would not be engaged in combat
- Peacetime rules of engagement would apply (i.e. use of force authorized only in self-defense)

of collocated LAF elements operating with the USMNF.)

--- USCINCEUR would be prepared to extract U.S. forces in Lebanon if required by hostile action.

USCINCEUR repromulgated the mission statement, essentially unchanged, to Commander United States Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) on 24 September 1982. That OPREP-1 message designated CTF 61 (Commander Amphibious Task Force) as Commander, U.S. forces Lebanon and provided the following concept of operations:

... land U.S. Marine Landing Force in Port of Beirut and/or vicinity of Beirut Airport. U.S. forces will move to occupy positions along an assigned section of a line extending from south of Beirut Airport to vicinity of Presidential Palace. Provide security posts at intersections of assigned section of line and major avenues of approach into city of Beirut from south/southeast *to deny passage of hostile armed elements* in order to provide an environment which will permit LAF to carry out their responsibilities in city of Beirut. Commander U.S. Forces will establish and maintain continuous coordination with other MNF units, EUCOM liaison team and LAF. Commander U.S. Forces will provide air/naval gunfire support as required. (Emphasis added)

The USCINCEUR concept of operations also tasked CTF 61 to conduct combined defensive operations with other MNF contingents and the LAF and to be prepared to execute retrograde or withdrawal operations.

The USCINCEUR OPREP-1 tasked CINCUSNAVEUR, when directed, to:

- Employ Navy/Marine forces to land at Beirut.
- Provide required air and naval gunfire support to forces ashore as required.
- Be prepared to conduct withdrawal operations if hostile actions occur.
- Provide liaison teams to each member of the MNF and to the LAF.

That OPREP-1 also included tasking for other Component Commands and supporting CINC's.

On 25 September 1982, JCS modified USCINCEUR's concept of operations for CTF 61 to read "assist LAF to deter passage of hostile armed elements . ." (vice "deny passage of hostile armed elements ...").

The original mission statement was formally modified by directive on four occasions. Change One reduced the estimated number of Israeli Defense Force (IDF) troops in Beirut. Change Two, issued on 6 October 1982, defined the line along which the USMNF was to occupy and secure positions. The third change (undesignated) was issued on 2 November 1982, and expanded the mission to include patrols in the East Beirut area. The fourth change (designated Change Three), was issued on 7 May 1983 and further expanded the mission to allow the USMNF to provide external security for the U.S. Embassy in Beirut.

B. Discussion

Although some operational details were added, the original mission statement was repromulgated unchanged down the chain of command through Alert/Execute Orders and OPREP-1's. CINCUSNAVEUR provided position locations for the USMNF forces ashore in Beirut. Commander Sixth Fleet (COMSIXTHFLT) designated CTF 61 as On-Scene Commander and CTF 62 as Commander U.S. Forces Ashore Lebanon and defined the chain of command. CTF 61 promulgated detailed operational procedures for amphibious shipping, boats and aircraft to facilitate ship-to-shore movement. CTF 62 provided the detailed ship-to-shore movement plan for the MAU [Marine Amphibious Unit] and the concept of operations for the initial three days ashore.

USCINCEUR engaged in some mission analysis (e.g., crafting the concept of operations and working operational constraint wording with JCS) and provided detailed tasking to subordinates and to supporting CINC's. However, the mission statement and the concept of operations were passed down the chain of command with little amplification. As a result, perceptual differences as to the precise meaning and importance of the "presence" role of the USMNF existed throughout the chain of command. Similarly, the exact responsibilities of the USMNF commander regarding the security of Beirut International Airport were not clearly delineated in his mission tasking.

Clarification of the mission tasks and concepts of operations would not only have assisted the USMNF commanders to better understand what was required, it would also have alerted higher headquarters to the differing interpretations of the mission at intermediate levels of command. The absence

of specificity in mission definition below the USCINCEUR level concealed differences of interpretation of the mission and tasking assigned to the USMNF.

The commission's inquiry clearly established that perceptions of the basic mission varied at different levels of command. The MAU commanders, on the ground in Beirut, interpreted their "presence" mission to require the USMNF to be visible but not to appear to be threatening to the populace. This concern was a factor in most decisions made by the MAU Commanders in the employment and disposition of their forces. The MAU Commander regularly assessed the effect of contemplated security actions on the "presence" mission.

Another area in which perceptions varied was the importance of Beirut International Airport (BIA) to the USMNF mission and whether the USMNF had any responsibility to ensure the operation of the airport. While all echelons of the military chain of command understood that the security of BIA was not a part of the mission, perceptions of the USMNF's implicit responsibility for airport operations varied widely. The U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, and others in the State Department, saw an operational airport as an important symbolic and practical demonstration of Lebanese sovereignty. On television on 27 October 1983, the President stated: "Our Marines are not just sitting in an airport. Part of their task is to guard that airport. Because of their presence the airport remained operational." The other MNF commanders asserted to the Commission that, while BIA is not specifically the responsibility of any one MNF contingent, an operational airport is important to the viability of the MNF concept. The MAU Commanders interviewed by the Commission all believed they had some responsibility for ensuring an open airport as an implicit part of their mission.

C. Conclusion

The Commission concludes that the "presence" mission was not interpreted in the same manner by all levels of the chain of command and that perpetual differences regarding that mission, including the responsibility of the USMNF for the security of Beirut International Airport, should have been recognized and corrected by the chain of command.

Official English Text

THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT of May 17, 1983

Following is the full official English text of the Lebanese-Israeli troop withdrawal agreement:

The government of the Republic of Lebanon and the government of the State of Israel,

Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening international peace based on freedom, equality, justice and respect for fundamental human rights,

Reaffirming their faith in the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognizing their right and obligation to live in peace with each other as well as with all states, within secure and recognized boundaries,

Having agreed to declare the termination of the state of war between them,

Desiring to ensure lasting security for both their states and to avoid threats and the use of force between them,

Desiring to establish their mutual relations in the manner provided for in this agreement,

Having delegated their undersigned representative plenipotentiaries, provided with full powers, in order to sign, in the presence of the representative of the United States of America, this agreement,

Having agreed to the following provisions:

Article 1

1. The parties agree and undertake to respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of each other. They consider the existing international boundary between Lebanon and Israel inviolable.

2. The parties confirm that the state of war between Lebanon and Israel has been terminated and no longer exists.

3. Taking into account the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, Israel undertakes to withdraw all its armed forces from Lebanon in accordance with the annex of the present agreement.

Article 2

The parties, being guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, undertake to settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner as to promote international peace and security, and justice.

Article 3

In order to provide maximum security for Lebanon and Israel, the parties agree to establish and implement security arrangements, including the creation of a security region, as provided for in the annex of the present agreement.

Article 4

1. The territory of each party will not be used as a base for hostile or terrorist activity against the other party, its territory, or its people.

2. Each party will prevent the existence or organization of irregular forces, armed bands, organizations, bases, offices or infrastructure, the aims and purposes of which include incursions or any act of terrorism into the territory of the other party, or any other activity aimed at threatening or endangering the security of the other party and safety of its people. To this end all agreements and arrangements enabling the presence and functioning on the territory of either party of elements hostile to the other party are null and void.

3. Without prejudice to the inherent right of self defense in accordance with international law, each party will refrain:

A. From organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in threats or acts of belligerency, subversion, or incitement or any aggression directed against the other party, its population or property, both within its territory and originating therefrom, or in the territory of the other party.

B. From using the territory of the other party for conducting a military attack against the territory of a third state.

C. From intervening in the internal or external affairs of the other party.

4. Each party undertakes to ensure that preventive action and due proceedings will be taken against persons or organizations perpetrating acts in violation of this article.

Article 5

Consistent with the termination of the state of war and within the framework of their constitutional provisions, the parties will abstain from any form of hostile propaganda against each other.

Article 6

Each party will prevent entry into, deployment in, or passage through its territory, its air space and, subject to the right of innocent passage in accordance with international law, its territorial sea, by military forces, armament, or military equipment of any state hostile to the other party.

Article 7

Except as provided in the present agreement, nothing will preclude the deployment on Lebanese territory of international forces requested and accepted by the government of Lebanon to assist in maintaining its authority. New contributors to such forces shall be selected from among states having diplomatic relations with both parties to the present agreement.

Article 8

1.A. Upon entry into force of the present agreement, a Joint Liaison Committee will be established by the parties, in which the United States of America will be a participant, and will commence its functions. This committee will be entrusted with the supervision of the implementation of all areas covered by the present agreement. In matters involving security arrangements, it will deal with unresolved problems referred to it by the Security Arrangements Committee established in

Subparagraph C. below. Decisions of this committee will be taken unanimously.

B. The Joint Liaison Committee will address itself on a continuing basis to the development of mutual relations between Lebanon and Israel, *inter alia* the regulation of the movement of goods, products and persons, communications, etc.

C. Within the framework of the Joint Liaison Committee, there will be a Security Arrangements Committee whose composition and functions are defined in the annex of the present agreement.

D. Subcommittees of the Joint Liaison Committee may be established as the need arises.

E. The Joint Liaison Committee will meet in Lebanon and Israel, alternately.

F. Each party, if it so desires and unless there is an agreed change of status, may maintain a liaison office on the territory of the other party in order to carry out the above-mentioned functions within the framework of the Joint Liaison Committee and to assist in the implementation of the present agreement.

G. The members of the Joint Liaison Committee from each of the parties will be headed by a senior government official.

H. All other matters relating to these liaison offices, their personnel, and the personnel of each party present in the territory of the other party in connection with the implementation of the present agreement will be the subject of a protocol to be concluded between the parties in the Joint Liaison Committee. Pending the conclusion of this protocol, the liaison offices and the above-mentioned personnel will be treated in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Convention on Special Missions of December 8, 1969, including those provisions concerning privileges and immunities. The foregoing is without prejudice to the positions of the parties concerning that convention.

2. During the six-month period after the withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from Lebanon in accordance with Article 1 of the present agreement and the simultaneous restoration of Lebanese government authority along the international boundary between Lebanon and Israel, and in the light of the termination of the state of war, the parties shall initiate, within the Joint Liaison Committee, *bona fide* negotiations in order to conclude agreements on the movement of goods, products and persons and their implementation on a non-discriminatory basis.

Article 9

1. Each of the parties will take, within a time limit of one year as of entry into force of the present agreement, all measures necessary for the abrogation of treaties, laws and regulations deemed in conflict with the present agreement, subject to and in conformity with its constitutional procedures.

2. The parties undertake not to apply existing obligations, enter into any obligations, or adopt laws or regulations in conflict with the present agreement.

Article 10

1. The present agreement shall be ratified by both parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures. It shall enter into force on the exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall supersede the previous agreements between Lebanon and Israel.

2. The annex, the appendix and the map attached thereto, and the agreed minutes to the present agreement shall be considered integral parts thereof.

3. The present agreement may be modified, amended, or superseded by mutual agreement of the parties.

Article 11

1. Disputes between the parties arising out of the interpretation or application of the present agreement will be settled by negotiation in the Joint Liaison Committee. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall be submitted to conciliation and, if unresolved, thereafter to an agreed procedure for a definitive resolution.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 1, disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the annex shall be resolved in the framework of the Security Arrangements Committee and, if unresolved, shall thereafter, at the request of either party, be referred to the Joint Liaison Committee for resolution through negotiation.

Article 12

The present agreement shall be communicated to the Secretariat of the United Nations for registration in conformity with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Khaldeh and Kiryat Shmona this 17th day of May, 1983, in triplicate in four authentic texts in the Arabic, Hebrew, English, and French languages. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English and French texts will be equally authoritative.

Antoine Fattal

David Kimche

For the government of the

For the government of the

Republic of Lebanon

State of Israel

Witnessed by:

Morris Draper

For the government of the United States of America

ANNEXE

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

1. Security Region

A. A security region in which the government of Lebanon undertakes to implement the security arrangements agreed upon in this annex is hereby established.

B. The security region is bounded, as delineated on the map attached to this annex, in the north by a line constituting "Line A", and in the south and east by the Lebanese international boundary.

2. Security Arrangements

The Lebanese authorities will enforce special security measures aimed at detecting and preventing hostile activities as well as the introduction into or movement through the security region of unauthorized armed men or military equipment. The following security arrangements will apply equally throughout the security region except as noted:

A. The Lebanese Army, Lebanese Police, Lebanese Internal Security Forces, and the Lebanese Auxiliary Forces (Ansar), organized under the full authority of the government of Lebanon, are the only organized armed forces and elements permitted in the security region except as designated elsewhere in this annex.

The Security Arrangements Committee may approve the stationing in the security region of other official Lebanese armed elements similar to Ansar.

B. Lebanese Police, Lebanese Internal Security Forces, and Ansar may be stationed in the security region without restrictions as to their numbers. These forces and elements will be equipped only with personal and light automatic weapons and, for the Internal Security Forces, armored scout or commando cars as listed in the appendix.

C. Two Lebanese Army brigades may be stationed in the security region. One will be the Lebanese Army territorial brigade stationed in the area extending from the Lebanese-Israeli boundary to "Line B" delineated on the attached map. The other will be regular Lebanese Army brigade stationed in the area extending from "Line B" to "Line A". These brigades may carry their organic weapons and equipment listed in the appendix. Additional units equipped in accordance with the appendix may be deployed in the security region for training purposes, including the training of conscripts, or, in the case of operational emergency situations, following coordination in accordance with procedures to be established by the Security Arrangements Committee.

D. The existing local units will be integrated as such into the Lebanese Army, in conformity with Lebanese Army regulations. The existing local Civil Guard shall be integrated into Ansar and

accorded a proper status under Lebanese law to enable it to continue guarding the villages in the security region. The process of extending Lebanese authority over these units and Civil Guard, under the supervision of the Security Arrangements Committee, shall start immediately after the entry into force of the present agreement and shall terminate prior to the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

E. Within the security region, Lebanese Army units may maintain their organic anti-aircraft weapons as specified in the appendix. Outside the security region, Lebanon may deploy personal, low, and medium-altitude air defence missiles. After a period of three years from the date of entry into force of the present agreement, the provision concerning the area outside the security region may be reviewed by the Security Arrangements Committee at the request of either party.

F. Military electronic equipment in the security region will be as specified in the appendix. Deployment of ground radars within ten kilometers of the Lebanese-Israeli boundary should be approved by the Security Arrangements Committee. Ground radars throughout the security region will be deployed so that their sector of search does not cross the Lebanese-Israeli boundary. This provision does not apply to civil aviation or air traffic control radars.

G. The provision mentioned in Paragraph E. applies also to anti-aircraft missiles on Lebanese Navy vessels. In the security region, Lebanon may deploy naval elements and establish and maintain naval bases or other shore installations required to accomplish the naval mission. The coastal installations in the security region will be as specified in the appendix.

H. In order to avoid accidents due to misidentification, the Lebanese military authorities will give advance notice of all flights of any kind over the security region according to procedures to be determined by the Security Arrangements Committee. Approval of these flights is not required.

I. (1) The forces, weapons and military equipment which may be stationed, stocked, introduced into, or transported through the security region are only those mentioned in this annex and its appendix.

(2) No infrastructure, auxiliary installations, or equipment capable of assisting the activation of weapons that are not permitted by this annex or its appendix shall be maintained or established in the security region.

(3) These provisions also apply whenever a clause of this annex relates to areas outside the security region.

3. Security Arrangements Committee

A. Within the framework of the Joint Liaison Committee, a Security Arrangements Committee will be established.

B. The Security Arrangements Committee will be composed of an equal number of Lebanese and Israeli representatives, headed by senior officers. A representative of the United States of America will participate in meetings of the committee at the request of either party. Decisions of the Security Arrangements Committee will be reached by agreement of the parties.

C. The Security Arrangements Committee shall supervise the implementation of the security arrangements in the present agreement and this annex and the timetable and modalities, as well as all other aspects relating to withdrawals described in the present agreement and this annex. To this end, and by agreement of the parties, it will:

(1) Supervise the implementation of the undertakings of the parties under the present agreement and this annex.

(2) Establish and operate Joint Supervisory Teams as detailed below.

(3) Address and seek to resolve any problems arising out of the implementation of the security arrangements in the present agreement and this annex and discuss any violation reported by the Joint Supervisory Teams or any complaint concerning a violation submitted by one of the parties.

D. The Security Arrangements Committee shall deal with any complaint submitted to it not later than 24 hours after submission.

E. Meetings of the Security Arrangements Committee shall be held at least once every two weeks in Lebanon and in Israel, alternately. In the event that either party requests a special meeting, it will be convened within 24 hours. The first meeting will be held within 48 hours after the date of entry into force of the present agreement.

F. Joint Supervisory Teams

(1) The Security Arrangements Committee will establish Joint Supervisory Teams (Lebanon-Israel) subordinate to it and composed of an equal number of representatives from each party.

(2) The teams will conduct regular verification of the implementation of the provisions of the security arrangements in the agreement and this annex. The teams shall report immediately any confirmed violations to the Security Arrangements Committee and ascertain that violations have been rectified.

(3) The Security Arrangements Committee shall assign a Joint Supervisory Team, when requested, to check border security arrangements on the Israeli side of the international boundary in accord with Article 4 of the present agreement.

(4) The teams will enjoy freedom of movement in the air, sea, and land as necessary for the performance of their tasks within the security region.

(5) The Security Arrangements Committee will determine all administrative and technical arrangements concerning the functioning of the teams including their working procedures, their number, their manning, their armament, and their equipment.

(6) Upon submission of a report to the Security Arrangements Committee or upon confirmation of a complaint of either party by the teams, the respective party shall immediately, and in any case not later than 24 hours from the report or the confirmation, rectify the violation. The party shall immediately notify the Security Arrangements Committee of the rectification. Upon receiving the notification, the teams will ascertain that the violation has been rectified.

(7) The Joint Supervisory Teams shall be subject to termination upon 90 days notice by either party given at any time after two years from the date of entry into force of the present agreement. Alternative verification arrangements shall be established in advance to such termination through the Joint Liaison Committee. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Joint Liaison Committee may determine at any time that there is no further need for such arrangements.

G. The Security Arrangements Committee will ensure that practical and rapid contacts between the two parties are established along the boundary to prevent incidents and facilitate co-ordination between the forces on the terrain.

4. It is understood that the government of Lebanon may request appropriate action in the United Nations Security Council for one unit of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to be stationed in the Sidon area. The presence of this unit will lend support to the government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces in asserting governmental authority and protection in the Palestinian refugee camp areas. For a period of 12 months, the unit in the Sidon area may send teams to the Palestinian refugee camp areas in the vicinity of Sidon and Tyre to surveil and observe, if requested by the government of Lebanon, following notification to the Security Arrangements Committee. Police and security functions shall remain the sole responsibility of the government of Lebanon, which shall ensure that the provisions of the present agreement shall be fully implemented in these areas.

5. Three months after completion of the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanon, the Security Arrangements Committee will conduct a full-scale review of the adequacy of the security arrangements delineated in this annex in order to improve them.

6. Withdrawal of Israeli Forces

A. Within 8 to 12 weeks of the entry into force of the present agreement, all Israeli forces will have been withdrawn from Lebanon. This is consistent with the objective of Lebanon that all external forces withdraw from Lebanon.

B. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces will maintain continuous liaison during the withdrawal and will exchange all necessary information through the Security Arrangements Committee. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces will cooperate during the withdrawal in order to facilitate the reassertion of the authority of the government of Lebanon as the Israeli armed forces withdraw.

In accordance with the provisions of the annex, the Lebanese Armed Forces may carry, introduce, station, stock, or transport through the security region all weapons and equipment organic to each standard Lebanese Armed Forces brigade. Individual and crew-served weapons, including light automatic weapons normally found in a mechanized infantry unit, are not prohibited by this appendix.

1. Weapon systems listed below, presently organic to each brigade in the security region, are authorized in the numbers shown:

TANKS

- 40 tanks
- 4 medium tracked recovery vehicles

ARMORED CARS

- 10 AML 90/Saladin/etc.

ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS

- 18 155mm towed howitzers (also 105mm/122mm)
- 12 120mm mortars
- 2781mm mortars (mounted on M 125 tracked mortar carriers)

ANTI-TANK WEAPONS

- 112 RPG
- 30 anti-tank weapons (106mm recoilless rifle/TOW/Milan)

AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS

- 12 40mm or less guns (not radar-guided)

2. Brigade communications equipment

- 482 AN/GRC-160
- 74 AN/VRC-46
- 15 AN/VRC-47
- 9 AN/VRC-49
- 43 GRA-39
- 539 TA-312
- 27 SB-22
- 8 SB-993
- 4 AN/GRC-106

3. Brigade surveillance equipment:

- Mortar-locating radars
- Artillery-locating radars
- Ground surveillance radars
- Night observation devices
- Unattended ground sensors

4. In accordance with the provisions of the annexe, armored vehicles for the Internal Security Forces will be as follows:

- 24 armored wheeled vehicles with guns up to 40mm.

5. In accordance with the provisions of the annex, there will be no limitations on the coastal installations in the security region, except on the following four categories:

- Coastal sea surveillance radars: 5
- Coastal defense guns: 15 40mm or less
- Coastal air defense guns: 15 40mm or less (not radar-guided)
- Shore-to-sea missiles: none

6. The Lebanese Army infantry brigade and territorial brigade in the security region are each organised as follows:

• 1 brigade headquarters and head quarters company	off: 14	enl: 173
• 3 infantry battalions	off: 31 EA	enl: 654 EA
• 1 artillery battalion	off: 37	enl: 672
• 1 tank battalion	off: 37	enl: 579
• 3 tank companies		
• 1 reconnaissance company		
• 1 logistics battalion	off: 26	enl: 344
• 1 engineer company	off: 6	enl: 125
• 1 anti-tank company	off: 4	enl: 117
• 1 anti-air artillery company	off: 4	enl: 146
Total 4,341	off: 223	enl: 4,118

AGREED MINUTES

Art. 4.4

Lebanon affirms that Lebanese law includes all measures necessary to ensure implementation of this paragraph.

Art. 6.

Without prejudice to the provisions of the annex regarding the security region, it is agreed that non-combat military aircraft of a foreign state on non-military missions shall not be considered military equipment.

Art. 6

It is agreed that, in the event of disagreement as to whether a particular state is "hostile" for purposes of Article 6 of the agreement, the prohibitions of Article 6 shall be applied to any state which does not maintain diplomatic relations with both parties.

Art. 8.1.B.

It is agreed that, at the request of either party, the Joint Liaison Committee shall begin to examine the question of claims by citizens of either party on properties in the territory of the other party.

Art. 8.1.H.

It is understood that each party will certify to the other if one of its personnel was on official duty or performing official functions at any given time.

Art. 8.2 It is agreed that the negotiations will be concluded as soon as possible.

Art. 9.

It is understood that this provision shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to agreements concluded by the parties pursuant to Article 8, Paragraph 2.

Art. 11.

It is agreed that both parties will request the United States of America to promote the expeditious resolution of disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the present agreement.

Art. 11. It is agreed that the phrase "an agreed procedure for a definitive resolution" means an agreed third-party mechanism which will produce a resolution of the dispute which is binding on the parties.

ANNEX

Para 1.B.

It is agreed that, in that portion of Jabal Baruk shown on the map attachment to the annex, only civilian tele-communications installations, such as television facilities and radars for air traffic control purposes, may be emplaced. The restrictions on weapons and military equipment that are detailed in the appendix to the annex will also apply in that area.

Para 2.D.

The government of Lebanon affirms its decision that the territorial brigade established on April 6, 1983, mentioned in Subparagraph C, will encompass the existing local units which had been formed into a near brigade-sized unit, along with Lebanese Army personnel from among the inhabitants of the security region, in conformity with Lebanese Army regulations. This brigade will be in charge of security in the area extending from the Lebanese-Israeli boundary to "Line B" delineated on the map attachment to the annex. All the Lebanese Armed Forces and elements in this area, including the Lebanese Police, Lebanese Internal Security Forces and Ansar, will be subordinated to the brigade commander. The organization of the existing local units will be adapted, under the supervision of the Security Arrangements Committee, in conformity with the table of organization for the territorial brigade as shown in the appendix.

Para 2.G

1. An area extending from:
33 degrees 15 minutes N
35 degrees 12.6 minutes E;
To:
33 degrees 05.5 minutes N
35 degrees 06.1 minutes E;
To:
33 degrees 15 minutes N
35 degrees 08.2 minutes E;
To:
33 degrees 05.5 minutes N
35 degrees 01.4 minutes E

which is at present closed for civil navigation, will be maintained by Lebanon.

2. In order to prevent incidents, there will be continuous communications between the Southern Command of the Lebanese Navy and the Israeli Navy in order to exchange information concerning suspected vessels. The procedures for the above-mentioned exchange of information will be established by the Security Arrangements Committee.

3. The Lebanese Navy will act promptly in order to ascertain the identity of such suspected vessels. In emergency cases, there will be direct communications between vessels.

Para 3.F.

1. The Joint Supervisory Teams will carry out their functions in recognition of the fact that the responsibility for military, police, and other control operations rests with the Lebanese Armed Forces, Police, and other authorized Lebanese organizations, and not with the Teams.

2. If the Joint Supervisory Teams uncover evidence of a violation or a potential violation, they will contact the proper Lebanese authorities through the Security Arrangements Supervision Centers created pursuant to the agreed minute to Paragraph 3.F.(5) of the annex, in order to assure that Lebanese authorities take appropriate neutralizing and preventive action in a timely way. They will ascertain that the action taken rectified the violation and will report the results to the Security Arrangements Committee.

3. The Joint Supervisory Teams will commence limited activities as early as possible following the coming into force of the agreement for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of the Israel Defense Forces withdrawal arrangements. Their other supervisory and verification activities authorized in the annex will commence with the final withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces.

4. Joint Supervisory Teams will conduct daily verifications if necessary during day and night. Verifications will be carried out on the ground, at sea, and in the air.

5. Each Joint Supervisory Team will be commanded by a Lebanese officer, who will recognize the joint nature of the teams when making decisions in unforeseen situations, during the conduct of the verification mission.

6. While on a mission, the Joint Supervisory Team leader at his discretion could react to any unforeseen situation which could require immediate action. The Team leader will report any such situation and the action taken to the Security Arrangements Supervision Center.

7. The Joint Supervisory Teams will not use force except in self-defense.

8. The Security Arrangements Committee will decide *inter alia* on the pattern of activity of the Joint Supervisory Teams, their weaponry and equipment, their mode of transport, and the areas in which the teams will operate on the basis of the rule of reason and pragmatic considerations. The Security Arrangements Committee will determine the overall pattern of activity with a view to avoiding undue disruption to normal civilian life as well as with a view to preventing the teams from becoming targets of attack.

9. Up to a maximum of eight Joint Supervisory Teams will function simultaneously.

Para 3.F.5.

1. Two Security Arrangements Supervision Centers will be set up by the Security Arrangements Committee in the security region. The exact locations of the centers will be determined by the Security Arrangements Committee in accord with the principle that the centers should be located in the vicinity of Hasbayya and Mayfadun and should not be situated in populated areas.

2. Under the overall direction of the Security Arrangements Committee, the purpose of each center is to:

A) Control, supervise, and direct Joint Supervisory Teams functioning in the sector of the security region assigned to it.

B) Serve as a center of communications connected to the Joint Supervisory Teams and appropriate headquarters.

C) Serve as a meeting place in Lebanon for the Security Arrangements Committee.

D) Receive, analyze, and process all information necessary for the function of the Joint Supervisory Teams, on behalf of the Security Arrangements Committee.

3. Operational arrangements:

A) The Centers will be commanded by Lebanese Army officers.

B) The Centers will function 24 hours a day.

C) The exact number of personnel in each Center will be decided by the Security Arrangements Committee.

D) Israeli personnel will be stationed in Israel when not engaged in activities in the Centers.

E) The government of Lebanon will be responsible for providing security and logistical support for the Centers.

F) The Joint Supervisory Teams will ordinarily commence their missions from the Centers after receiving proper briefing and will complete their missions at the Centers following debriefing.

G) Each Center will contain a situation room, communications equipment, facilities for Security Arrangements Committee meetings, and a briefing and debriefing room.

Para 3.G.

In order to prevent incidents and facilitate coordination between the forces on the terrain, "practical and rapid contacts" will include direct radio and telephone communications between the respective military commanders and their staffs in the immediate border region, as well as direct face-to-face consultations.

CHRONOLOGY

- 1920 France awarded Mandate of Syria and Mount Lebanon after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, established "Greater Lebanon" by joining Mt. Lebanon with several other Syrian Provinces.
- 1926 French decree Lebanese Republic and constitution.
- 1936 Pierre Gemayel founds Phalange Party (*al-Kataib*), a nationalist paramilitary organization, predominantly Maronite Christians, modelled on European fascists.
- 1943 Independence. Lebanese National Pact (*al-mathiq, al-Watani*), Distribution of government power based on religious affiliation in 1932 census.
- 1946 France evacuates Lebanon.
- 1948 Some 120,000 Palestinians, displaced by the creation of the state of Israel, flee to Lebanon.
- 1956-1958 First Lebanese civil war. Status quo frozen by 1958 U.S. military intervention.
- 1967 Arab-Israeli war brings new refugees to Lebanon. PLO raids Israel from Lebanon.
- 1968 Israel attacks Beirut airport, destroys 13 airlines in reprisal for Palestinian hijacking of Israeli jet. Start of conflict in Lebanon over Palestinian issue.
- 1969 Cairo Agreement between Lebanese Government and the PLO, negotiated by Egypt's President Nasser, defines parameters of PLO operations in Lebanon.
- 1970-1971 Jordanian army expels PLO. Most PLO offices and its main base move to Beirut.
- 1972 Israeli ground attack on Lebanon.
- 1973 Israeli commando attack in Beirut kills three Palestinian leaders. Confrontation between Lebanese Army and PLO.
- 1975 February: Fisherman's strike in Sidon repressed by Lebanese Army, unrest spreads to Beirut.
April: Phalange attack on Palestinians sparks large-scale confrontations between militias on the right (mostly Maronite Christians) and a leftist, mostly Muslim, alliance.
August: Lebanese National Movement formed. Amal created as self-defence arm of Shi'ite movement.
- 1976 January: Indirect Syrian intervention in the civil war to prevent National Movement Victory.
February: Syrian efforts to formulate a political compromise in Lebanon.
March: Failure of Syrian effort; abortive coup d'etat by General Aziz al-Ahdab.
June: Full-fledged Syrian invasion, stiff Palestinian opposition.
June - August: Phalangists form Lebanese Forces with other rightist militias to coordinate seizure of *Tel al-Zaatar* refugee camp; hundreds of Palestinians massacred when camp falls.
October: Riyadh and Cairo summits order ceasefire; Arab Deterrent Force formed to legitimise Syrian presence.
- 1977 March: Kamal Junblatt assassinated; Likud takes power in Israel; Bashir Gemayel allies Phalangists/Lebanese Forces more closely with Israel.
July: Shatura Peace accord between Syria, Lebanon, and the PLO envisages withdrawal of Palestinian guerrillas from South Lebanon.
November: Egypt's President Sadat visits Jerusalem; in wake of Palestinian-Israeli clashes across border, Arafat rules out PLO withdrawal from South Lebanon.
- 1978 February: The Fayaadiyya incident, which marks the beginning of Syria's conflict with the Phalangists.

- March: Israeli Army in Operation Litani invades South Lebanon and occupies region south of Litani river except for city of Tyre and surrounding area; Israel creates Saad Haddad's "Army of Free Lebanon" to control buffer zone.
- United Nation Security Council 425 establishes United Nations 'interim' force in Lebanon and calls on Israel to withdraw its forces.
- June: Israel announces decision to withdraw its forces from occupied Lebanese territory. But establishes 'Security zone' and hands it over to Haddad militia.
- July: Government of Lebanon decides to despatch Lebanese Army units to South Lebanon, these units are halted at Kawkaba by Haddad's militia.
- September: Camp David Accords signed.
- 1979 March: Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty.
- April: Haddad's forces prevents deployment of Lebanese Army battalion by shelling UNIFIL Headquarters and position; Haddad proclaims "Free and Independent State of Lebanon" in south.
- 1980 December: First phase of Syrian-Phalangist fighting in Zahle capital of Bekka Valley.
- 1981 April: Second phase of Syrian-Phalangist fighting in Zahle; developed into the missile crisis between Israel and Syria.
- July: Israeli-Palestinian fighting; ceasefire negotiated by U.S. Special Envoy Philip Habib.
- December: Israel annexes Syria's Golan Heights.
- 1982 April 21: Israel breaks ceasefire, bombards southern Lebanon.
- April 25: Israel completes withdrawal from Sinai.
- May 9: As part of mounting tension in South Lebanon, Israel's air force attacks Palestinian targets in Lebanon. PLO retaliates with artillery fire on northern Israel from Tyre pocket.
- June 3: Attempted assassination in London of Shlomo Angov, Israel's ambassador to Britain. Immediate trigger for Israel's invasion.
- June 4-5: Intensive exchanges of fire between PLO and Haddad positions; Israeli air strikes on Palestinian positions in Beirut and South Lebanon.
- June 5: United Nations spokesman says some Israeli tanks and artillery have crossed Lebanese frontier. United Nations Security Council Resolution 508 calls for end to hostilities.
- June 6: Israel, with some 90,000 ground troops, launches massive invasion of Lebanon in "Operation Peace for Galilee". U.N. Security Council Resolution 509 demands Israel's immediate and unconditional withdrawal.
- June 8: UNIFIL area of operation under Israeli control and having to operate behind Israeli lines; United States vetoes draft U.N. Security Council Resolution condemning Israel for not complying with 508 and 509.
- June 19: United Nations Security Council Resolution 512 on aid to civilian population.
- June 26: United States vetoes draft United Nation Security Council Resolution requires all parties in Lebanon to observe ceasefire.
- August: Bashir Gemayel elected President.
- August 19: Government of Lebanon formally requests United States, France and Italy to contribute troops to a Multinational Force to oversee PLO evacuation from Beirut.
- August 21: Evacuation begins.
- September 1: The American, French and Italian Multinational Force withdraws from Beirut two weeks before the termination of the 30 day mandate.
- September 7: Israel requested that Lebanon sign peace treaty to guarantee security of Israel-Lebanon border.

- September 14: President-elect Bashir Gemayel of Lebanon assassinated.
- September 17-18: News of bloody massacres in Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila emerges.
- September 20: Government of Lebanon request reconstitution of the Multinational Force (MNF) which had left after PLO evacuation.
- September 23: Amin Gemayel sworn in as President of Lebanon.
- September 24: The Multinational Force begins return.
- 1983
- April: U.S. Embassy in Beirut bombed.
- May: Israeli-Lebanese withdrawal agreement brokered by the United States; Syria hostile to accord that envisaged peace and normalization of relations between Israel and Lebanon.
- July: Shi'a Muslim militias and Lebanese Army clash in Beirut Shi'a neighbourhoods.
- August: Israel withdraws to Awali River from the Shouf Mountain. National Salvation Front formed to oppose the Gemayel government and the May 17 agreement.
- September: Fighting in Shouf mountain area involves Druze militia, Lebanese Forces/Phalangists, Lebanese Army and U.S. warships. U.S. Congress imposes 18 months limit on Marines stay in Lebanon.
- October: French and U.S. military compounds bombed. "National reconciliation conference" in Geneva between Lebanese factions.
- November: Geneva talks fail. Israeli military headquarters in Tyre attacked; Israel seals off southern Lebanon from north and says it will keep troops in Lebanon and restrict access into Israel-occupied South Lebanon if Lebanon abrogates May 17 agreement.
- December: Reagan and Gemayel refuse to modify May 17 agreement. U.S. attacks Syrian controlled position in Lebanon.
- 1984
- January: Syrian President Assad says Syria will not withdraw from Lebanon until all four MNF contingents and Israeli troops are out of Lebanon.
- France transfers some 500 of its MNF troops to UNIFIL.
- February: Amal and the Druze militia take control of West Beirut. U.S. Marines withdraw from Beirut; Washington steps up air and naval attacks in support of Gemayel. The French, Italian and British components of MNF begin withdrawal from Beirut.
- March: Gemayel declares null and void the unratified May 17 agreement. Abrogation denounced by Israel but welcomed by Syria.
- Second Lebanese reconciliation conference in Lausanne fails.
- French contingent, last remaining members of MNF, completes final withdrawal from Beirut.
- April: "National Unity" government formed; Rashid Karami Prime Minister, cabinet includes Pierre Gemayel, Camille Chamoun, Walid Junblatt, Nabih Berri.

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