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“Must I be Called a Parricide”

The Experiences and Perceptions of Georgia

Loyalists, 1779-90

Presented to the School of History at the University of Kent, in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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December 30th, 2019

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Acknowledgements

Jean-Jacques Rousseau thought of gratitude as a duty which ought to be paid. It is in that spirit that I acknowledge the many debts I have accrued over the past four years to individuals and groups without whom completing this thesis would not have been possible.

To begin, I must thank the University of Kent's school of history, the Bolt scholarship trustees, and the CHASE partnership for financing my study. The good faith these groups have shown to me has been, frankly, humbling and I hope I have been able to show that it was not misplaced.

I owe my gratitude also to colleagues and mentors in history – to Dr. Timothy Bowman, Dr. Juliette Pattinson, Dr. Mark Hurst, Dr. Phillip Boobbyer, Dr. Kirsty Corrigan, Professor Timothy Lockley, Jonathan Beer, Rob Brown, Faye Beesley, and a whole host of others – who have gone out of their way to help and encourage me along my doctoral journey. You have read chapters and applications; you have cleared up my administrative messes; you have loaned materials; you have given me feedback and advice; and some of you I know supported me without solicitation when it appeared as if my project might not get off the ground. How lucky I am to have been able to call on you all.

To my friends and family – a whole plethora of people, they know who they are, who I have turned to at the end of sometimes challenging days for a cuddle, a laugh, and a pint – no words could ever capture the depth of my appreciation and love for you.

When things have gotten grey or stale (as they occasionally can do) you have picked me up and given me renewed energy. Above all, I give thanks to my never disinterested and always loving parents. Whether facing triumph or disaster, they have supported me in every conceivable way. Anything I have achieved or go on to achieve, I owe to them. I hope I have made them proud.

Last, but by no means least, I cannot begin to express my thankfulness for my never orthodox and always inspiring supervisory team. To Dr. Ambrogio Caiani – for your sagacity and your diligence as well as your openness and encouragement – this thesis is all the better for your input and I am truly grateful that you agreed to step-in when needed. You have pushed me to think more broadly about my subject and undoubtedly made me a more complete researcher. To Dr. Ben Marsh – who has supervised me at every stage of my postgraduate life – nothing I say here could ever truly repay the trust you have placed in me, the patience you have shown me, and the support you have given me. You have been a role model in every sense. Being your student has been a privilege I will cherish beyond any academic achievement.

Abstract

The Loyalists of the American Revolution suffered the most abject kind of failure. They lost the argument, the war, their place in society, and (until comparatively recently) their place in history. Vilified in Whig ideology, at times dispossessed and uprooted, the Loyalists witnessed the Revolution at first hand and were its most immediate casualties. Understanding the character of the Revolution, the nature of imperial identities, and the development of American society postwar requires their stories be attended to sympathetically and in detail.

This thesis canvasses the experiences and perceptions of Loyalists from Georgia. Heeding J.M. Bumsted's now thirty-year old call, I work to contemplate and accept these individuals on their own terms – for what they were as well as for what they were not – by considering how they culturally, rhetorically, and socially responded to the up-ending of their colonial American world.¹ To this end, it explores the ways they engaged with each other, the British state, and the emerging American Republic by attending to where, when, and how individuals spoke to issues relating to allegiance, identity, and belonging both during and after the War of Independence. Above all, I question the extent to which their region – Georgia's distinctive locale as well as its singular colonial and wartime trajectories – fed into their self-understanding as well as the ways local circumstances and inflections shaped the architecture of their identities as Loyalists. In taking a localised approach, I have not sought to displace the work of historians who

¹ J.M Bumsted, *Understanding the Loyalists*, Centre for Canadian Studies: Mount Allison University (New Brunswick, 1986), p.39.

have primarily looked to examine the Loyalists' transnational face. Rather, by narrowing the field of vision and reflecting on the ways individuals in a particular sphere scaled their loyalty, I have worked to wrap layers of meaning around the scholarly centre they helped established.

Throughout this thesis, I make three essential assertions. Firstly, I argue that by unpacking the ways Georgia loyalty emerged and evolved, it is possible to begin to get a clearer sense of the importance of local conditions and experiences to the development of Loyalist identity. I show that whilst always interacting with transnational experiences of allegiance and identity, the Georgia Loyalists' sense of self and belonging was pinned more firmly to their distinctive locale than has hitherto been acknowledged. Secondly, I contend that by turning to the words and actions of a broad constituency of Loyalist voices – laid bare in their public performances of allegiance, their appeals to the *Loyal Claims Commission*, and their petitions for citizenship after the war – important counterpoints to more common views deriving from military or political histories may be found, adding layers to the scholarly centre which has been established over the last forty years or so. In so doing, I indicate what is distinctive about the Georgia Loyalists' sense of self and belonging as well as what may have tied them to other 'friends of government' across the colonies (notably their sense of loss and betrayal, Francophobia, and their obvious contempt for the leaders of independence and republicanism). And finally, I argue that by analysing and synthesising the Georgia Loyalists' experiences and by recognising the importance of local inflections to the shaping of their perceptions, we arrive at a new understanding of Loyalist identity as a dialogic, provincialised mode that was framed by the particular context it was produced in as well as the broader transnational and imperial scene. In so doing, it becomes possible to think in new ways

about the nature of loyalism and imperial attachment during the revolutionary epoch, and to refine the basis upon which the analysis of transatlantic affiliations has traditionally operated (that is to say with a predominant concern for high culture and politics often at the expense of more parochial practices or elements which comprise the majority of individuals' experiences).

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Introduction

In *Letters from an American Farmer* (1782), J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur posits his account of the development of an American identity and sense of belonging. In it, Crèvecoeur calls attention to the continuities between Europeans and British North Americans as well as the crucial differences which made for something distinctly American. This sense of dual identity and ancestry permeates the entire text. It is given its clearest expression, though, in a particular part of the closing chapter (“Letter XII: Distresses of a Frontier Man”). Unable or unwilling to get to grips with the demands of the War of Independence, Crèvecoeur’s semi-autobiographical narrator ‘Farmer James’ struggles to pledge himself to either the British or the American sides and seeks inspiration. His peroration is worth quoting in full for what it has to say regarding the questions of allegiance, identity, and belonging during the American Revolution:

Alas, how should I unravel an argument, in which reason herself hath given way to brutality and bloodshed! What then must I do? I ask the wisest lawyers, and ablest casuists; for I mean honestly. Great Source of wisdom! Inspire me with light sufficient to guide my benighted steps out of this intricate maze! Shall I discard all my ancient principles, shall I renounce that name, that nation which I held once so respectable? I feel the powerful attraction; the sentiments they inspired grew with my earliest knowledge and were grafted upon the first rudiments of my education. On the other hand, shall I arm myself against that country where I first drew breath, against the playmates of my youth, my bosom friends, my

*acquaintance? The idea makes me shudder! Must I be called a parricide, a traitor, a villain, lose the esteem of all those whom I love to preserve my own, be shunned like a rattlesnake, or be pointed at like a bear?*²

Framed as a prayer, Farmer James' plea for wisdom revolves around personal ties rather than wider political issues. The high ideals of the revolutionary contest are, in this light, cast as secondary concerns to thoughts of a more workaday, ordinary nature. Through his hero, Crèvecoeur presents the conflict in the American colonies as primarily a local and a civil matter which pitted otherwise agreeable friends and neighbours against each other. The Revolution was ultimately unsatisfactory for Farmer James not only because he, like most Americans up to 1775, cherished the historical, commercial, and affective links with the British Empire, but also because of the fractures it caused in a once peaceful and prosperous community that had given his life and outlook a meaningful and stable foundation.

In this thesis, I examine the stories of Loyalists in Georgia who, like Crèvecoeur's Farmer James, found their world turned upside-down by the fight over American independence. I trace the experiences and perceptions of persons from there who, in the last instance, sided with Britain during the war but struggled with the challenge of reconstituting a firm sense of self and place during a period of imperial reconfiguration which appeared to leave them lost in a curious identity gap somewhere between being British and American. Prior to the war, this gap was neatly abridged by the personal

² J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, *Letters from an American Farmer and Sketches of Eighteenth-Century America*, E.P. Dutton (New York, 1957), pp.201-2.

designation 'colonial American'. This label had at once compressed the distance between faithful subjects in the colonies and their counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic, and easily conjugated their basic American-ness with their status as members of Britain's imperial family. The Revolution, however, obliterated this previously comfortable bifurcation and cast those who in some way opposed America's extrication from the Empire into a kind of notional (and eventually, in certain cases, very real) wilderness. At its heart, my study looks to unpack the ways 'friends of government' in Georgia responded to the disassembling of the world they knew and reflects on how they engaged with critical questions of allegiance, identity, and belonging during a period when none of these things could just be assumed any longer. It questions the extent to which region – Georgia's distinctive locale as well as its particular colonial and wartime schemas – fed into their self-understanding at a time of profound flux and unpicks how local circumstances impacted the architecture of their identification with the British Empire. In particular, it attends to where and how typologies relating to royalism, political culture, environment, material culture, and community were called upon by individuals at various points and contemplates the ways they implicitly and explicitly contoured their faces as Loyalists. In so doing, I argue that, at its core, loyalism in Georgia was a dynamic but essentially parochial identity that was spun around locally rooted thought materials.³ These thought materials comprised various symbols, histories, scencescapes, and networks which brought to bear a context specific set of memories, habits, roles, and relationships which framed how individuals viewed the Empire, understood their place within it, and responded to its fracturing. They were, in

³ See William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions*, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 2001), pp.94-5.

essence, instruments of self-location which connoted fixity and familiarity at a time of manifestly disquieting change. As such, I argue that loyalism was not a purely political or transnational 'essence'. It was, rather, a fundamentally dialogic and provincialised modality that was fashioned by the particular conditions it was produced in as well as the broader American and imperial scene.

Georgia, I argue, is an especially useful and important case study for the analysis of Loyalist identity and its links to region. The province's late 'founding', its early dependence on parliamentary handouts, and its broadly positive experience of royal government after mid-century coagulated to ensure that prior to the War of Independence, Tories in Georgia comprised a larger percentage of the overall population there than in any other of the American colonies.⁴ Georgia, furthermore, was the only colony which was returned to royal government during the Revolution. Despite the overwhelming savageness of the war in the region, Loyalists there were afforded more opportunity and space than those elsewhere to give action and voice to the basis of their identification with the British Empire. Because of their singular histories and their sheer numbers, how Georgia Loyalists articulated their sense of self and place during and after the war should matter to any student of the Revolution and its so-called losers. By contemplating the ways local pressures and orientations inflected the Loyalist face there – by moving the point of focus from the transnational to the particular – I argue that it becomes possible to begin to give full definition to the scope of Loyalist identity and to think in new ways about the nature of imperial attachments (as well as

⁴ See Wallace Brown, *The King's Friends: The Composition and Motives of the American Loyalist Claimants*, Brown University Press (Providence, 1966), p.253.

the difficulties centralised authorities faced when trying to mobilise them) across the Empire.

Any kind of sensitive or subtle appreciation of loyalism in America (especially the loyalism of individuals like Crèvecoeur's farmer who, like many colonists, felt deeply ambivalent about the break with Britain) was definitively absent from the earliest histories of the Revolution. Some writers, as Eileen Ka-May Cheng points out, simply omitted the Loyalists from their work, making only occasional allusion to them.⁵ In his history of the Revolution, for example, John Lendrum made only passing reference to the American Tories.⁶ John Daly Burk likewise largely overlooked the Revolution's disaffected in his multi-volume history of Virginia.⁷ Others, however, sought to actively vilify the Loyalists and cast them, as George Billias puts it, as "the first un-Americans".⁸ Following the Paineite caricature, they worked to portray supporters of the crown in America as "servile" and "slavish" elite Tory anglophiles.⁹ For radical Patriots like Paine, alienating and disenfranchising their enemies in this way – emptying the terms 'Loyalist' and 'Tory' of any conceptual meaning by using them purely as *ad hominem*s – was critical to ensuring the Revolution's long term success. Indeed, imaginings of national unity and consensus that were so fundamental to the Patriot narrative of the war in large part depended on the marginalisation of the Loyalists as venal, cruel, and

⁵ Eileen Ka-May Cheng, "American Historical Writers and the Loyalists 1788-1856: Dissent, Consensus, and American Nationality", *Journal of the Early Republic* (hereafter noted as *JER*), vol.23:4 (2003), p.496.

⁶ John Lendrum, *A Concise and Impartial History of the American Revolution*, I.Thomas and E.T. Andrews (Boston, 1795).

⁷ John Daly Burk, *This History of Virginia: From its First Settlement to the Present Day*, Dickson & Pescud (Petersburg, 1804-16).

⁸ George A. Billias, "The First Un-Americans: The Loyalists in American Historiography," *Perspectives on Early American History: Essays in Honour of Richard B. Morris*, eds. George A. Billias and Alden T. Vaughan, Harper and Row (New York, 1973), pp.282-324.

⁹ Thomas Paine, "The American Crisis: Essay Number I" (December 23rd, 1776), *Thomas Paine: Rights of Man, Common Sense, and other Political Writings*, ed. Mark Philp, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2009), p.78.

backward-looking cowards. In his two-volume history of the American Revolution, published just six years after the cessation of hostilities, David Ramsay energetically denigrated those who fought against independence. In the second volume, Ramsay – a committed Whig who served South Carolina as member of the Continental Congress between November 1785 and May 1786 and later as president of the state senate between 1792 and 1797 – described how virtuous “husbandmen, merchants, mechanics, and fishermen” won independence from Britain and her corrupt supporters.¹⁰ Ramsay, in essence, whitewashes the nation’s founding moment as beyond reproof, granting only token acknowledgment to those who opposed it by casting them as curiously passive and helpless actors fighting to uphold a depraved and inevitably doomed polity. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Mercy Otis Warren was equally virulent (if not more so) in her condemnation of the Loyalists. The sister of James Otis junior and wife of Doctor James Warren, Mercy was also personally involved in the coming of the independence movement and did not attempt to hide her contempt for those who opposed it. In her *History of the Rise, Progress, and Termination of the American Revolution* (1805), Mercy echoed Ramsay by portraying the war and its aftermath as a boon of liberty and the actions of Loyalists and British officials as self-evidently tyrannous.¹¹ She was especially scornful of former the formal royal governor of Massachusetts Thomas Hutchinson. Whilst she reluctantly acknowledged some of his

¹⁰ David Ramsay, *The History of the American Revolution: Volume II*, R. Aitkin & Son (Philadelphia, 1789), p.315. Ramsay’s work as a politician, historian, and social commentator is ably considered by Peter C. Messer in "From a Revolutionary History to a History of Revolution: David Ramsay and the American Revolution.", *JER*, vol.22:2 (2002), pp.205-33.

¹¹ Mercy Otis Warren, *History of the Rise, Progress, and Termination of the American Revolution, Interspersed with Biographical, Political, and Moral Observations*, Manning & Loring (Boston, 1805).

private virtues, Warren singled Hutchinson out as “insinuating, haughty, and ambitious” with “the extreme of avarice” marking each feature of his character.¹²

By the mid-nineteenth century, such tropes were planted firmly at the heart of the standard historical depiction of the Revolution’s losers. Writing in 1859, for example, M.A. Moore described those who joined the Loyalist militia in the South Carolina backcountry as “the most profligate and corrupt men in the country”.¹³ Attacks of this kind on Loyalists were a staple of nineteenth-century fiction also. William Gilmore Simms, for example, published series of historical novels based on Revolutionary South Carolina in which he frequently attacked Loyalist figures. In *The Scout* (1864), Simms describes Loyalist partisans in the state as practitioners of “lust, and murder, and spoliation.”¹⁴ In *Joscelyn* (1869), he portrayed Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Brown – who, as the “King’s Ranger”, was one of the more notable Loyalist figures in the southern arena of the Revolution – as “a savage, a brute, in many respects, ferocious and cruel.”¹⁵ Simms’ condemnations of the Loyalists echoed the cries of Patriot sympathisers in the Lower South during the Revolution. One French observer, the marquis de Chastellux, for example, defamed America’s Tories as “a numerous band of traitors and robbers, which English policy decorated with the name *Loyalists*.”¹⁶ As the Canadian historian Thomas Raddall observed, for Patriot Americans the struggle for independence was an epic story that needed to be written in an epic fashion with scant regard for the other side of the

¹² Ibid., pp.45-6. Billias took Warren’s unflattering portrayal of Hutchinson as symptomatic of how the earliest historians of the Revolution viewed the Loyalists. See Billias, “The First Un-Americans”, *Perspectives on Early American History*, pp.284-5.

¹³ M.A. Moore, *The Life of General Edward Lacey*, Douglass, Evins & Co. (Spartanburg, 1859), p.11.

¹⁴ William Gilmore Simms, *The Scout, or the Black Riders of Congaree*, Redfield Co. (New York, 1854), p.160.

¹⁵ Simms, *Joscelyn*, Reprint Co. (Spartanburg, 1976), pp.296-8.

¹⁶ As quoted in Jim Picuch, *Three Peoples, One King: Loyalists, Indians, and Slaves in the Revolutionary South 1775-1782*, University of South Carolina Press (Columbia, 2013), p.3.

argument where it in any way diminished the glory of the rebels' achievements.¹⁷ Simply put, the Loyalists were omitted from the early histories of the war except to confirm their marginal and villainous status. To do otherwise was to potentially put at risk the 'clean' story of the national founding.

The Paineite stereotype of the American Tories has proven remarkably durable. Whilst not engaging in the same kind of vicious anti-Tory or anti-British language, all too often subsequent historians have (albeit tacitly) broadly accepted the Patriot schema. Questions about what loyalism in America was or what made someone a Loyalist have, until recently, often been treated as incidental or irrelevant. In *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (1968), for instance, Bernard Bailyn emphasised the primacy of radical Whig ideology and argued that the colonial revolutionaries possessed a genuine conviction that Britain and her supporters sought to establish an oligarchic-style order which would destroy liberty in America.¹⁸ This conspiracy mindset, Bailyn contended, injected moral passions and idealistic impulses into the minds of the Revolution's leaders as they condemned as oppressive the whole system by which the Empire was governed.¹⁹ Whilst masterfully accounting for Whig motivations and outlook, Bailyn's analysis left little room for any positive assessment of the Loyalists. In truth, it appears that Bailyn could not understand how "any sensible and well-informed person could possibly have opposed the Revolution."²⁰ This view was overtly illustrated

¹⁷ Thomas Raddall, *Tarleton's Legion*, Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society (Liverpool, 1949), pp.1-2.

¹⁸ Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, 1992).

¹⁹ Bailyn, "The Central Themes of the American Revolution: An Interpretation", in *Essays on the American Revolution*, eds. Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson, University of North Carolina Press (Chapel Hill, 1973), p.7.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.16.

in *The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson* (1974). Here, Bailyn used Hutchinson – an elite, ideologically committed conservative at a time of radical upheaval who (perhaps not so coincidentally) was also targeted by post-revolutionary Patriot writers such as Mercy Otis Warren – as a silo for Loyalist perceptions. In the process, he presented a general picture of American Tories as misguided, inept, cowardly, self-interested, and out of touch with the realities of the time.²¹

A number of other scholars have reinforced this image of the American Tories. In his study of their role in British military planning, for example, Paul H. Smith described ‘friends of government’ as “conservative, cautious” and “disinclined to commit [themselves] boldly.” Smith continued, stating that Britain’s supporters in America were “more likely to hesitate than to volunteer, to watch from the side-lines than to fight openly.”²² Smith’s conclusions mirrored those of Wallace Brown in *The Good Americans* (1969) who characterised South Carolina’s Loyalists as “exceptionally open to the charge of timidity.”²³ This kind of assessment of the Loyalists, in many respects, reflected that of British military commanders during the war. Lieutenant-General Charles, Earl Cornwallis, commander of the British southern department, described Loyalists in South Carolina during the winter of 1780 as “dastardly and pusillanimous.”²⁴ Anne Gorman Condon has perhaps summed this long-held consensus up best, stating that “historians

²¹ Bailyn, *The Trial of Thomas Hutchinson*, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, 1974).

²² Paul H. Smith, *Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British Revolutionary Policy*, University of North Carolina Press (Chapel Hill, 1964), p.58.

²³ Wallace Brown, *The Good Americans: The Loyalists in the American Revolution*, William Morrow & Co. Inc (New York, 1969), p.65.

²⁴ Charles, Earl Cornwallis to Alexander Leslie, November 12th 1780, in *Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis*, vol.I, ed. Derek Charles Ross, J. Murray (London, 1859), p.69.

[have been] inclined to dismiss the Loyalists as weak, unimaginative hangers-on, as lackeys of the crown”.²⁵

More recently, there have been scholars who have sought to reframe the study of the Loyalists in such a way that does not reinscribe their marginality. These historians have worked to reject the negativism which had surrounded the Loyalists and clouded the appreciation of who they were and what they believed. Foremost amongst them has been Robert M. Calhoon. In his seminal article “The Loyalist Perception” (1973), Calhoon traces the trajectory of Loyalist thought as it passed through various stages from the enunciation of principle, to the search for accommodation, to a final appeal to doctrine.²⁶ As they faced the twin pressures of British incompetence and Patriot aggression, Calhoon shows the Loyalists as being engendered with a touch of realism and an implacable determination which would later serve them well as they established new political and social orders in North America and the Caribbean after the war. Calhoon’s mantle has since been picked up by a batch of early-American scholars. In her essay “Marching to a Different Drummer”, Condon is strident in her defence of the American Loyalists, portraying them as politically committed and sensitive as well as possessing an intelligent appreciation for and understanding of ideas regarding the foundations of British liberty and the unity of the Empire.²⁷ In *The Liberty We Seek* (1983), Janice Potter-Mackinnon is equally fervent in her attempt to rescue the Loyalists

²⁵ Anne Gorman Condon, “Foundations of Loyalism”, in *The Loyal Americans: The Military Role of the Loyalist Provincial Corps and their Settlement in British North America 1775-84*, ed. Robert S. Allen, National Museums of Canada (Ottawa, 1783), p.2.

²⁶ Robert M. Calhoon, “The Loyalist Perception”, *Tory Insurgents: The Loyalist Perception and other Essays*, eds. Robert M. Calhoon, Timothy M. Barnes, and Robert S. Davis, The University of South Carolina Press (Columbia, 2010), pp.3-14.

²⁷ Condon, “Marching to a Different Drummer: The Political Philosophy of the American Loyalists” in *Red, White, and True Blue: The Loyalists in the Revolution*, ed. Esmond Wright, AMS Press (New York, 1976), pp.17-8.

from the obscurity to which they had for so long been condemned. Her thorough and sympathetic analysis of the well-known polemical literature produced by a range of crown officials and Anglican clergymen – namely Peter Oliver, Jonathan Sewell, Daniel Leonard, Thomas Hutchinson, Thomas Bradbury Chandler, Samuel Seabury, Charles Inglis, and Myles Cooper – is brought convincingly together and packaged as a case for a common ideology that was held jointly by Loyalists everywhere.²⁸ These works – along with the analyses of Wallace Brown and Mary-Beth Norton which have separately broken down the composition of the crown’s supporters and demonstrated that they were drawn from every conceivable background – have formed the basis of the study of loyalism in America during the late-eighteenth century since the 1970s.²⁹ They have, to a significant degree, refilled American loyalism with a degree of political and ideological meaning that was for so long unduly lacking. They have taken the Loyalists from a position of alienation to part of the scholarly mainstream, making it the consensus that the War of Independence and the events which succeeded it can only be comprehended fully with a proper appreciation for those who found themselves on the losing side of that conflict.

These contributions have been salutary and necessary. They have, though, tended to suffer from the implicit assumption that loyalism and Loyalist identity in America meant the same thing in all cases and in all places. Potter-Mackinnon attempted to defend herself from such accusations. Looking at New York and Massachusetts, Potter-Mackinnon insisted that in spite of the manifold cultural and

²⁸ Janice Potter-Mackinnon, *The Liberty We Seek: Loyalist Ideology in Colonial New York and Massachusetts*, Harvard University Press, (Cambridge, 1983).

²⁹ Brown, *The King’s Friends*; Mary-Beth Norton, *The British Americans: The Loyalist Exiles in England 1774-1789*, Little Brown (Toronto, 1972).

social differences between the two provinces, a broad reliance on a common set of ideas, totems, and allegories rose to the surface which, for the most part, overrode local variances, evincing the presence of a shared ideological outlook which principally defined loyalism's corporate spirit. Whilst no one would deny that cosmopolitan New York diverged greatly from Massachusetts' puritan ideal (however dim that utopian vision of the Bay colony had become by the late-eighteenth century) Potter-Mackinnon's central point is undermined by her general dependence on the private papers and official pronouncement of 'big figures' to support her argument. These men, as John Tyler acknowledges, were drawn from the same social pool and, crucially, were able to access and mirror each other's arguments through a burgeoning print industry.³⁰ By focussing on this narrow clique, Potter-Mackinnon (like Bailyn and other scholars) effectively telescopes Loyalist identity into a political emanation wrapped around universally understood but still abstract concepts relating to the British constitution and imperial governance espoused by a small group of elite Tory men. This approach, I submit, unsatisfactorily, accounts for the textures and subtleties of individuals' identification with the Empire – of the ways local inflections interacted with and complicated the transnational tableau – and fails to get to grips with the ways ordinary actors from particular regions internally organised and gave expression to their sense of place and belonging within Britain's imperial family.

The broad direction of Loyalist scholarship since the 1970s – which has sought earnestly to examine the basis of the American Tories' general outlook and brought much needed colour to their historical portrait – urges further inquiry exploring the

³⁰ John Tyler review of "The Liberty We Seek" by Pooter-Mackinnon, *New England Quarterly*, vol.56:4 (1983), pp.622-5.

roots of individuals' identification with the Empire over time and place. This, I would suggest, anticipates the need for a regional approach to the study of loyalism which attends to the ways it was shaped according to circumstances in particular locales at various points in time. This approach, I maintain, does not detract from the work of scholars such as Calhoun and Potter-Mackinnon (on whose shoulders I stand). It seeks, rather, to draw from the fringes in order to add layers to the centre they and others established. In taking this approach, it is assumed that where conditions, histories, and experiences differed, the basis upon which persons formed and reformed their particular identities as Loyalists would differ too. In other words, it is presupposed that even if, at times, Loyalists from across America called upon similar ideas, tropes, and symbols, their precise meaning and serviceability varied in line with local rhythms and imperatives. Deconstructing how individuals from distinct regions responded to the ebb and flow of the war and its aftermath – tracking the ways they spoke to typologies and issues of identity and belonging – can grant insight into some essential truths regarding loyalism, the Empire, and the development of American society, as well as the importance of place and local networks to individuals caught between the reworking of the former and the emergence of the latter.

Founded in 1733, Georgia was the youngest colony at the outbreak of the War of Independence. It was very much a frontier society and was sparsely populated. By 1751, the colony's population stood at approximately 2,300 (consisting of 1,900 white and 400 blacks). When compared to South Carolina's estimated population of over

64,000 at the time, it is plain that Georgia initially attracted few settlers.³¹ Georgia also faced multiple and continual security threats from within and without the colony. The upper part of St. Paul parish in the north-east of the province, down the eastern border through St. George, to St. Matthew, the upper and lower part of St. Philip, St. John, and St. Andrew parish, were all bordered by Creek Indian territory. St. John, St. Andrew, St. Patrick, St. Thomas, and St. Mary parishes were all in close proximity to the Spanish along the Florida peninsula. All of Georgia (with the exception of the ceded lands, St. Paul, St George, and St. Matthew parishes) had a seacoast with numerous penetrating river ways.

Figure 1.1: Marion R. Hemperley, Map of Colonial Georgia 1773-77, Georgia Surveyor General Department (Atlanta, 1979)



³¹ John J. McCusker and Russel R. Menard, *The Economy of British America 1607-1789*, University of North Carolina Press (Chapel Hill, 1985), p.172.

Figure 1.2: A map of colonial Georgia and Florida (1763), Hargrett library rare maps collection, map number 1763W7 (University of Georgia, Athens)



Georgia was, in short, an extremely dangerous and contested strip of land, vulnerable to threats from raiding parties of every imaginable kind. Perhaps most significantly, Georgia was for the majority of its early history vastly politically and economically underdeveloped. As Leslie Hall has shown, of the 2,840 individual land grants handed out between 1733 and 1752, all but 329 were for fifty acres or less, indicating that the bulk of settlers were of limited means.³² The great mass of these new inhabitants operated as little more than subsistence farmers in the backcountry. As late as the early-1750s, as few as ten residents were worth more than £500 each.³³ This fact greatly impacted the development of early Georgia. Lacking circulating specie and without a

³² Ibid., p.172; Leslie Hall, *Land and Allegiance in Revolutionary Georgia*, University of Georgia Press (Athens, 2001), p.3.

³³ Ibid., p.15.

secure tax base for the raising of revenues, the province's political economy in the 1740s, in truth, resembled that of Virginia in the 1640s. It was a painful irony that a province founded on a philanthropic vision – to give poor white settler the chance to acquire land and gain personal independence – was also a place where until the mid-eighteenth century, inhabitants struggled to feed themselves, the estimated mortality rate was as high as 17 per cent, and where two-thirds of the population were squeezed into the towns of Savannah, Augusta, and Frederica, or the villages of Darien and Ebenezer.³⁴ While New England was enjoying a boom in fishing and trade, and the Chesapeake Bay region was entering its golden age of tobacco, for the first twenty years of her colonial life Georgia looked like a somewhat crippled province.³⁵ As Timothy Lockley points out, visitors to the low-country would frequently make remarks about the tattered appearance and hand-to-mouth existence of rural non-slaveholders there.³⁶ During these precarious early years, only extraordinary inflows of capital from Britain (mostly in the form of military aid centred on Frederica) kept Georgia's creaky financial edifice afloat.³⁷ The imperial link was, in other words, desperately needed in Trustee Georgia. A fledgling, frontier society, painfully aware of its distance from and reliance

³⁴ Paul M. Pressley, *On the Rim of the Caribbean: Colonial Georgia and the British Atlantic World*, University of Georgia Press (Athens, 2013), p.19

³⁵ See Randall M. Miller, "The Failure of the Colony of Georgia Under the Trustees," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* (hereafter noted as *GHQ*), vol.53:1 (1969), pp.1-17; Milton Ready, *The Castle-Builders: Georgia's Economy Under the Trustees 1732-1754*, Arno Press (New York, 1978).

³⁶ Timothy Lockley, *Lines in the Sand: Race and Class in Lowcountry Georgia 1750-1860*, University of Georgia Press (Athens, 2001), p.27.

³⁷ Georgia's role as a defensive buffer against Spanish Florida and bulwark for the Carolinas in the run-up to the War of Jenkins Ear encouraged a typically niggardly Parliament to invest £108,000 in the first ten years of the colony's existence, a figure without precedent in the history of British North America. After the defeat of the Spanish at Bloody Marsh in 1741, though, the largesse of Parliament began to dry up. Over the next five years, Parliament approved only £16,000 and for the period 1748 to 1749 made no appropriation whatsoever. See Table I (Public and Private Investment in Georgia 1732-1752) in Paul Taylor, "Colonising Georgia 1732-1752: A Statistical Note", *William and Mary Quarterly* (hereafter noted as *WMQ*), vol.3:22 (1965), p.121. For the role of the military in Georgia's early colonial story see Larry Ivers, *British Drums on the Southern Frontier: The Military Colonization of Georgia, 1733-1749*, University of North Carolina Press (Chapel Hill, 1974).

on the metropole, Georgia's attachment to Britain was existential and, in many ways, ingrained in the province's political and social memory from its conception.

The green shoots of colonial Georgia's socio-economic maturation only began to appear during the early-1750s. Georgia's progress coincided with the inauguration of royal government in province. After the colony reverted to direct royal control in June 1752, land grants of 500 acres were awarded for the first time under a headright system, enabling those with money and enslaved peoples (the use of which was eventually legally mandated in Georgia in 1750) to establish themselves on sizable holdings. A 'planter elite' subsequently emerged, monopolising much of Georgia's prime rice cultivating regions along its 126 mile coastline.³⁸ This elite possessed the experience and connections, as well as the means, to develop commercially viable cash crops (primarily rice and indigo) which would form the basis of the colony's future prosperity.³⁹ They included men such as Lachlan McGillivray, Jonathan Bryan, William Knox, William and Joseph Gibbons, James Habersham, Sir James Wright, and John Graham. These men – the typical subjects of so much Loyalist hamartography – represented those closest to the corridors of power in colonial Georgia. With the exception of Bryan, they all worked closely together and shaped the typography of late-colonial Georgia's political economy. John Graham, James Read, and Lewis Johnson served on the governor's council. Joseph Clay, nephew of James Habersham, was figure noted among the ruling ranks. As were

³⁸ Allan Gallay, *The Formation of a Planter Elite: Jonathan Bryan and the Southern Colonial Frontier*, University of Georgia Press (Athens, 1989), pp.90-7, p.101. See also David Potter jnr., "The Rise of the Plantation System in Georgia," *GHQ*, vol.16:2 (1932), pp.114-35.

³⁹ Concise explorations of the introduction of enslaved labour in Georgia see H.B. Fant, "The Prohibition Policy of the Trustees for Establishing the Colony of America", *GHQ*, vol.17:4 (1933), pp.286-96; Ralph Gray and Betty Wood, "The Transition from Indentured Servitude to Involuntary Servitude", *Explorations in Economic History*, vol.13:4 (1976), pp.353-70; Betty Wood, "Thomas Stephens and the Introduction of Black Slavery in Georgia", *GHQ*, vol.58:1 (1974), pp.24-40. For the development of cash crops in Georgia after mid-century see Pressley, *On the Rim of the Caribbean*.

Edward Telfair and Nathaniel Hall who were married to Sally and Nancy Gibbons, daughters of the rich and powerful Gibbons brothers. They had a direct and temporal connection to the Empire and to Britain. Their power and status as landowners and royal office holders relied on the strength of British institutions and the patronage of the crown.⁴⁰

Georgia's coastline was further expanded by roughly thirty miles by the cession of 2,400,000 acres of Creek land under the Treaty of Augusta (1763). The treaty made available for settlement the coastal area between the Altamaha and St. Mary's river and north of Ebenezer Creek to the Little River above the trading town of Augusta.⁴¹ Whilst elite planters used this extra land grab to expand their operations, a number of smaller farmers also benefitted. Thought to contain some of the best piedmont land in the Lower South, the opening-up of the inland area between Ebenezer and Augusta attracted settlers from Europe as well as neighbouring provinces who were able to develop holdings of grain and livestock.⁴² These new settlers dramatically increased the size of Georgia's population over the succeeding ten years. Although still small by the standards of their colonial neighbours, Georgia's population between 1752 and 1773 exploded to over 33,000 individuals, composed of approximately 18,000 whites and 15,000 black slaves.⁴³

⁴⁰ In all, as much as 25% of Georgia's total rice crop at this time was concentrated in the hands of as few as twelve individuals. Rice was absolutely the coin of Georgia. With it, planters could pay off overseers, hire field-hands, the carpenters that made the barrels for rice, and bartered for goods from stores in Savannah or Sunbury. See Pressley, *On the Rim of the Caribbean*, p.156.

⁴¹ Julia Floyd Smith, *Slavery and Rice Culture in Low Country Georgia 1750-1860*, University of Tennessee Press (Knoxville, 1985), pp.21-7.

⁴² Hall, *Land and Allegiance*, p.9.

⁴³ By way of comparison, North Carolina's population in 1770 stood at approximately 197,200 and South Carolina 124,200. See Harry Roy Merrens, *Colonial North Carolina in the Eighteenth Century: A Study in Historical Geography*, University of North Carolina Press (Chapel Hill, 1964); McCusker and Menard, *The*

These new white colonists were buying in at an excellent time. The cumulative effects of the War of Jenkins Ear (1739-48) and the Seven Years War (1756-63) had severely inhibited rice production in the Carolinas.⁴⁴ At the same time, demand in northern Europe for rice, especially in the Netherlands and Germany, was rising from the late 1750s onwards as a series of poor harvests in combination with demographic pressures strained food supplies there.⁴⁵ There was, in other words, a supply-side gap in a market which was getting bigger. Georgia's planters, farmers, and merchants were able and keen to fill this hole. The volume of Georgia's rice exports increased from a meagre 600 barrels in 1757 to an estimated 28,000 barrels in 1772 which went to markets across Europe and North America.⁴⁶ With decreases in shipping costs as vessels grew larger and turnaround times shorter, profits from rice sales soared as prices climbed by more than 50 per cent between 1760 and 1775.⁴⁷ This 'rice boom', as John McCusker and Russell Menard have shown, in many ways laid the foundations for broad based growth across Georgia's colonial economy. The shipbuilding, deerskin, lumber, and indigo export trades (76 per cent of which was tied to the British market) all benefitted from investment brought about by the spread effects of rice sales.⁴⁸

Economy of British North America, p.158. There is no clear information as to whether the explosion of the black slave population was exclusively or just primarily due to the expansion of large plantation holdings by elite planters on the coastal plains, but commensurate increases in the white population would suggest that a large portion of new settlers either brought with them or acquired slaves in Georgia.

⁴⁴ Walter B. Edgar, *South Carolina: A History*, University of South Carolina Press (Columbia, 1977), p.146.

⁴⁵ Pressley, *On the Rim of the Caribbean*, p.155

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.155-7

⁴⁷ Kenneth Morgan, "The Organisation of the Colonial Rice Trade", *WMQ*, vol.52:3 (1995), pp.433-52; Douglas C. Wilms, "The Development of Rice Culture in Eighteenth Century Georgia", *Southeastern Geographer*, vol.12:1 (2013), pp.45-57.

⁴⁸ McCusker and Menard, *The Economy of British North America*, pp.18-34. Their essential argument was that as an export sector expands in response to demand, there are "spread effects" which induce investment in other parts of the economy. The weakness of this thesis, as Pressley points out, are many. It leaves out, for example, the complexity of peoples and cultures as well as the growth of communication and trade infrastructure and fits best as an explanation of the initial stages of settlement. Nevertheless,

As Lorenzo Sabine points out in his 1847 survey of the American Loyalists, legislation passed by the British parliament (which for a time rocked the corporate soul of the Empire and caused such consternation elsewhere on the continent) were met with a muted response in Georgia. Whilst they squeezed the profit margins of the merchants which dominated the societies of the middle and northern colonies, the Sugar Act (1764) and the Tea Act (1773) largely bypassed Georgia's planters and small-holders who dealt primarily in export of raw produce.⁴⁹ The imperial connection had thus largely worked well for Georgia. In the two decades prior to the War of Independence, Georgia had grown from little more than a small trading outpost of Charleston to a significant player in the British Atlantic's commercial world.⁵⁰ The province's economy was growing, and its burgeoning population did not lack for opportunities to acquire land, expand their fortunes, and gain some kind of influence. This made considerable numbers of colonial Georgians "The best friends of Great Britain".⁵¹ Their attachment was not a conservative stance. It was, rather, a pragmatic one which was formed as a result of their positive experience of royal government under

the staple argument retains its validity with regard to Georgia in its most essential sense: that rice allowed Georgia's economy to grow to the extent that allowed for other exports to develop. See Pressley, *On the Rim of the Caribbean*, p.169.

⁴⁹ Lorenzo Sabine, *The American Loyalists: or, Biographical sketches of adherents to the British crown in the war of the revolution alphabetically arranged with a preliminary historical essay*, C.C. Little and J. Brown (Boston, 1847), pp.49-51. It should be noted that under Sir James Wright's governorship, the worst excesses of the Stamp Act controversy also largely bypassed Georgia. See Ashley C. Ellefson, "The Stamp Act in Georgia", *GHQ*, vol.46:1 (1962), pp.1-19; Randall M. Miller, "Stamp Act in Colonial Georgia," *GHQ*, vol.56:3 (1972), pp.318-31.

⁵⁰ For concise explorations of Georgia's relationship with South Carolina prior to the Revolution see Francis Harrold, "Colonial Sibling: Georgia's Relationship with South Carolina during the Pre-Revolutionary Period", *GHQ*, vol.73:4 (1989), pp.707-44; Phinizy Spalding, "South Carolina and Georgia: The Early Days," *South Carolina Historical Magazine*, vol.69:2 (1968), pp.83-96.

⁵¹ John Graham to General James Grant (1775), as quoted in *The Price of Loyalty: Tory Writings from the Revolutionary Era*, ed. Catherine S. Crary, McGraw-Hill (New York, 1973), p.269. Graham's assessment was shared by Wallace Brown in *The King's Friends* who showed that the strength of Tory sentiment in Georgia out-ran almost all other colonies with the possible exception of New York. See *The King's Friends*, p.253.

which, as Georgia's Chief Justice Anthony Stokes observed, it was thought that "every man that had industry became opulent."⁵²

Georgia's particular colonial background shaped the nature of the ensuing war there. The conflict in Georgia was not only different in degree but different in kind. To begin, the onset of armed fighting came later to the province than anywhere else on the continent. Revolutionary sentiment (precisely because attachments to Britain were so ingrained and 'real') was slow to ferment and Georgia's radical faction moved cautiously. Indeed, the radical faction, as Kenneth Coleman, Harvey H. Jackson, and Jim Piecuch all attest, was split on the kind of course they should take.⁵³ On the one side, there was the conservative wing. These men came primarily from Christ Church parish and had long since dominated the state House of Assembly. Many had direct links to Governor Wright and other royal officials. Whilst they opposed certain elements of British policy, they hoped to achieve reform within the existing system. On the other side of the divide, there was the popular or 'country' faction made up principally of merchants from St. John parish of New England puritan stock. These men favoured radical resistance to Britain and wished to have Georgia join other colonies in meeting at the Continental Congress in New York. These splits were testament to the size of the Tory presence in Georgia and mitigated against independence supporters adopting the warlike stance of, say, their South Carolinian neighbours. Writing in the early-nineteenth century, the historian Hugh McCall summed-up the circumstances best, stating that:

⁵² Anthony Stokes, *A View of the Constitution of the British Colonies in North America and the West Indies at the Time the Civil War Broke Out on the Continent of America*, B. White (London, 1783), p.139.

⁵³ Kenneth Coleman, *The Revolution in Georgia 1763-1789*, University of Georgia Press (Athens, 1958); Harvey H. Jackson, "Consensus and Conflict: Factional Politics in Revolutionary Georgia 1774-1777", *GHQ*, vol.59 (1975), pp.388-401; Piecuch, *Three Peoples, One King*.

*The situation of Georgia was inauspicious. It was but thinly inhabited on a territory about one hundred and fifty miles from north to south; and about thirty miles from east to west. It presented a western frontier of two hundred and fifty miles. It had on the north-west the Cherokees; on the west, the Creeks; on the south, a refugee banditti in Florida; and on the east, the influence of governor Wright, who controlled the king's ship's on the sea-coast. The population of the eastern district of the province, was composed of white people and negro slaves; the latter, the most numerous, the former but few in number.*⁵⁴

In short, common sense demanded that Georgia's Whig party proceed watchfully. They knew they could ill afford to push ahead regardless of the special context they were operating in for fear their cause would meet an early demise. Instead, as McCall put it, "from surrounding dangers, their measures were adopted with a cautious circumspection."⁵⁵

From these messy beginnings came an even messier war. As scholars of the War of Independence have near universally acknowledged – from Carole Watterson Troxler, to Ed Cashin, to Robert Davis junior – the contest in Georgia stood out from other arenas of combat for the sheer degree of brutality that was evident there. Both British and Patriot camps engaged in what East Florida governor Patrick Tonyn described as

⁵⁴ Hugh McCall, *The History of Georgia, Containing Brief Sketches on the Most Remarkable Events, up the Present Day*, Sermour & Williams (Savannah, 1816), vol.2, p.48.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

“irregular frontier warfare”.⁵⁶ As they had done before the war, plundering parties from inside and outside the province harassed Georgia’s inhabitants without much by way of any official discouragement. Pirate bands raided along Georgia’s vast coastline and river networks, whilst British and American troops operating in the backcountry regularly destroyed or appropriated the property of ordinary colonists. During their retreat from Charleston to Savannah in early 1781, for instance, forces under the command of Lieutenant-Governor James Mark Prevost – the younger brother of the British commander in Georgia, Augustine Prevost – employed a program of violent pacification. By all accounts, American and British, Prevost’s men indulged in unbridled plunder as they swept through the rich coastal settlements of South Carolina and Georgia, burning houses, and destroying crops as they went.⁵⁷

Patriot hands were not clean in this regard either. Despite the assessments of Don Higginbotham and Walter Edgar, who almost exclusively blame Britain’s supporters for wartime atrocities in the southern backcountry, republican forces in Georgia also readily embraced a policy of outright viciousness.⁵⁸ As Elizabeth Lightenstone Johnston remarked in her much-quoted memoir, “all, gentle and simple” faced harassment from radical groups or liberty gangs with any who refused to join or spoke against their cause being “imprisoned, tarred and feathered.”⁵⁹ (Indeed, stories of such punishments for

⁵⁶ Governor Patrick Tonyn as quoted in Robert M. Calhoon, “The Floridas, the Western Frontier, and Vermont: Thoughts on the Hinterland Loyalists”, in *Eighteenth-Century Florida: Life on the Frontier*, ed. S. Proctor, University of Florida Press (Gainesville, 1976), p.7

⁵⁷ Sylvia Frey, *Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age*, Princeton University Press (New Jersey, 1991), pp.90-1.

⁵⁸ Don Higginbotham, “Reflections on the War of Independence, Modern Guerrilla Warfare, and the War in Vietnam”, in *Arms and Independence: The Military Character of the Revolution*, eds. Ronald Hoffman and P.J. Albert, University of Virginia Press (Charlottesville, 1984), pp.5-7; Walter B. Edgar, *Partisans and Redcoats: The Southern Conflict That Turned the Tide of the American Revolution*, William Morrow & Co. Inc. (New York, 2001), pp.xvi-xvii.

⁵⁹ Elizabeth Lightenstone Johnston, *Recollections of Georgia Loyalists*, M.F. Mansfield & Co. (London, 1901), p.44.

suspected Tories – particularly tar and feathering – are common in histories of the Revolution in the Lower South and many will be noted during the course of this thesis). Johnston's 'recollections' were echoed by historian Jim Piecuch who claimed that even women did not escape Whig persecution. Female Loyalists, Piecuch noted, were "consigned to much the same fate as their male relatives ... verbally abused, imprisoned, and threatened with bodily harm even when they had not taken an active role in opposing the rebel cause."⁶⁰ Sir John Fortescue was even more emphatic in describing the atrocities committed by the rebel militia. He argued that their intimidatory tactics in the South amounted to "a form of terrorism ... that soon degenerated into indiscriminate robbery and violence" leading to Loyalist retaliation and "a civil war of unsurpassed ferocity."⁶¹ The rebel militia captain James McKay, for example, was notorious for roving along Savannah's swamps with his men, attacking supply boats and traders bound for Augusta. So renowned was McKay that in the summer of 1780 Governor Wright was compelled to send word to The Viscount Sackville, George Germain, then Secretary of State for the colonies detailing his concerns regarding McKay's activities. In it, Wright complained how McKay had "Stop't, robbed and plundered several boats" on the banks of the Savannah river. Later that year, the royal government offered a reward of £500 for McKay's capture or death, an enormous sum.⁶² Most infamous of all plunderers, though, was Daniel McGirth. For the major part of the

⁶⁰ Piecuch, *Three Peoples, One King*, p.61; Ben Marsh, "Women and the American Revolution in Georgia", *GHQ*, vol.88:2 (2004), pp.157-78

⁶¹ John Fortescue, *The War of Independence: The British Army in North America 1775-1783*, Pen & Sword (Barnsley, 2001), p.259.

⁶² As quoted in Ed Cashin, *The King's Ranger: Thomas Brown and the American Revolution on the Southern Frontier*, Fordham University Press (New York, 1989), pp.125-6.

conflict, McGirth might be best described as a professional raider, going from rebel, to Loyalist, to unaligned marauder during the course of the war.

The savageness of the war and the perennial menace of banditti made the Loyalists' want for British protection near universal. During the early part of the Revolution, when Whig forces were in the ascendancy in Georgia, this desire was disappointed. Following the fall of royal government in the province in February 1776, Charles Inglis commented that Loyalists would turn-out for the crown there but for the want of "any rational support".⁶³ During this period, Georgia's Loyalists were painfully conscious of their minority status.⁶⁴ Their sheer multifariousness as a group – being made up of Royal office holders, religious pacifists as well as Scots Presbyterians and English Anglicans, pro-British Indian traders, backcountry southern farmers, as well as isolated individuals everywhere who were compelled by custom, instinct, or resentment to oppose independence – naturally lent itself to assumptions that the Loyalists would always be a minority. They justifiably, therefore, shared a suspicion of a political order based on the idea of the 'common good' if it was defined by what they saw as a hostile majority. Lacking any kind of institutional or military cover, clusters of Loyalists thus took to forming their own responses to the Revolution. Some, as described by Higginbotham, Edgar, and Fortescue, took to building their own little insurgencies: unsupported violent offshoots which more than played their part in the backcountry civil war. Many, as Hall has discussed, by contrast sought to avoid violence altogether. They attempted to

⁶³ As quoted in Piecuch, *Three Peoples, One King*, p.129.

⁶⁴ William H. Nelson, *The American Tory*, Northeastern University Press (Boston, 1992), p.91. Nelson's concise phrase has, Ralph A. Brown suggested, become the 'go to' for students of the Revolution seeking to unpick Loyalist thought. It has helped draw scholars away from the tangled but attractive histories of individual Tories, fostering a degree of conceptual meaning to Loyalism in America. See R.A. Brown's review of *The American Tory* in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, vol.342:1 (1962), pp.188-9.

maintain a sort of tenuous neutrality in the hope of remaining inoffensive to both causes. John Jamieson, for example, chose to take an oath of neutrality in 1776, promising to take no part in the struggle against the rebels or his land be forfeit. John Henderson – who took and broke several oaths issued by the state government throughout the war – signed a similar oath to Jamieson 1776, as well as paying a bond of £15,000 as a guarantee that he would not take an active part against the Americans.⁶⁵ These men represented a body of Loyalists in Georgia who hoped for Britain to prevail, but above all wished not to be harassed or relieved of their property. They thus strained to live as unobtrusively as possible, remaining publicly tight-lipped about their allegiances and adjusting themselves to the *fait accompli* of the Revolution in a quiet manner.

As the war progressed, however, these covert Loyalists found their outward neutrality increasingly difficult to sustain. Rebel authorities were gradually forced to abandon the pretence that theirs was a liberal movement, with the liberty of dissent having become a dispensable luxury by early 1777. In South Carolina, for instance, the rebel government passed a law requiring its inhabitants to take an oath of allegiance to the state and to Congress. Those who refused to renounce their loyalty to the King and take the oath were banished from the state and required to leave within sixty days. Whilst some left voluntarily, others such as George Harland Hartley – the organist at St. Michael's church in Charleston – were forced to leave, with Hartley himself losing an annual income of £450 and nearly 2,000 acres of land as a result.⁶⁶ In September 1777,

⁶⁵ *The Royal Commission on the Losses and Services of American Loyalists 1783-1785: Being the Notes of Mr. Daniel Parker Coke M.P. One of the Commissioners During that Period*, ed. Hugh Edward Egerton, Arno Press (New York, 1969), pp.61-3, pp.341-2.

⁶⁶ As quoted in Piecuch, *Three Peoples, One King*, p.94.

Georgia took similar steps against the Loyalists with the Assembly's passage of "An Act for the Expulsion of the Internal Enemies of this State".⁶⁷ These acts allowed Patriot lawmakers to isolate and expose systematically the Loyalists. They were a form of political cleansing designed to ferret out opposition. They forced quiet Loyalists to unseat their fence, compromising them in the eyes of the British whilst simultaneously deterring them from fighting for the Crown. If they signed Congress' oath they were declared a rebel by the British, and if they refused to sign, they were declared an enemy of the state by the Patriots (precisely the scenario feared by Crèvecoeur's Farmer James).⁶⁸ They were, in many ways, the legal means by which the wartime binary, which so many Loyalists struggled to fit neatly into, was established. Understandably, with seemingly little alternative, many Georgia Loyalists chose to sign Patriot oaths. Crucially, though, the signers of these oaths did so without revealing their motivations or inner impulses which prompted their actions. These individuals worked the political system to suit their needs, meeting the requirements of the civil authorities in order to escape forced exile and persecution. It should always be noted that no one knew who was going to prevail in the conflict. This huge imponderable gives context to the supposedly myopic outlook of Georgia's friends of government. The signing of oaths became a pliant tool Loyalists could use for the preservation of self in that uncertain environment: a form of survivalist pragmatism born of a desire to live as inconspicuously as possible whilst it was necessary to do so.

⁶⁷ See Paul V. Lutz, "The Oath of Absolution", *GHQ*, vol.53:3, pp.330-4.

⁶⁸ These acts were largely successful in so much that they engendered a mistrust of the Loyalists amongst Britain's military commanders. Early in 1781, for example, General Charles Grey wrote to Britain's Commander in Chief General Sir Henry Clinton warning him that he should "put no confidence in any of those *loyal* Americans ... Many are spies upon you, sending home what they know will please." See Nelson, *The American Tory*, p.143.

The chance for these Loyalists to unveil themselves came in the winter of 1778-9 as British forces embarked on their southern campaign. Having recaptured Savannah on December 29th, 1778, and gained control of the backcountry by the end of January, royal rule was formally re-established in Georgia until the summer 1782 making it the only province where this was accomplished. As Martha Condray Searcy notes, British officials hoped that following its reconquest, Georgia would act as a base for further operations and as a model colony to showcase the benefits of the imperial connection. If this experiment succeeded, it would be replicated in the next colony to be conquered (which was expected to be South Carolina) and so northward up the Atlantic coast.⁶⁹ The experiment, however, was never fully carried out. As he arrived back in Savannah on March 8th, 1779, following his *sojourn* in England, Wright found the province to be far from militarily secure. Indeed, no sooner had General Sir Archibald Campbell conquered Augusta in late January 1779 than he abandoned it again a mere two weeks later. Backcountry Loyalists searching for substantial evidence of Britain's determination to hold the region were thus left thoroughly disheartened. Colonel John Dooley noted as much when he reported in a letter to Samuel Elbert "that a number of People that had Taken the oath of allegiance to the King" now professed themselves supporters of the rebel cause having found that they were without any kind of martial support.⁷⁰ In the absence of a sizeable British military presence, the door was left open for Whig forces under the control of Colonel Andrew Pickens and Elijah Clarke to regain much of their former strength there until they formally regained control of the area around Wilkes

⁶⁹ Martha Condray Searcy, "1779: The First Year of the British Occupation of Georgia", *GHQ*, vol.67:2 (1983), p.170.

⁷⁰ Colonel John Dooly to Samuel Elbert (February 16th, 1779) as quoted in Piecuch, *Three Peoples, One King*, p.94.

county in the summer of 1781 after victory during the second battle at the garrison of Augusta. From that point on until the end of the war, two rival governments operated in Georgia and competed for the allegiance of inhabitants there. Georgia was thus made into the frontline of the entire contest in America: the continent's nebulous underbelly where two different versions of America's future were simultaneously dramatized. Consequently, Georgia's inhabitants became, for a time, the lead actors in a bloody national and imperial melodrama. Georgia, in other words, was not a peripheral arena and the Georgia Tories were not a peripheral group of people. Understanding the history of the Revolution, the postwar settlement, and the character of loyalism in America necessitates a commentary on their experiences and perceptions.

In this thesis, I attend to two pivotal periods – or, perhaps more suitably, confrontations – when Georgia's friends of government laid bare the rudiments of their group character and its evolution. These episodes comprise the British occupation of the state during the Revolution and the loss of the war which forced individuals to decide whether they wanted to flee Georgia for another part of the king's dominions or remain in the new republic. They were selected because they represent fundamental turning points for Georgia's Loyalist population: moments when they contended with the dilemma of either intensifying, relaxing, or repudiating their identification with the British Empire in order to meet the demands of the time and place they were in. They each constituted potentially destructive junctures when individuals faced the very real possibility of becoming lost in the middle of the imperial schism as impassive victims of change that they were unable to comprehend or effectively respond to. Crucially,

though, they were also potentially constructive occasions when persons had the chance to give voice to and act out how they saw themselves and others. For that reason, the sources I have relied upon in this thesis have been approached with caution. Of course, no source is ever purely objective, but perhaps the personal narratives, artistic reflections, and public petitions at the core of my study are less so than most. But the way people tell their stories – what they stress and what they do not, as well as the allegories and discourses they lean on – is as informing to history as any piece of putatively concrete evidence. They capture aspects of human experiences left out of more explicitly straightforward sources and are vital for understanding how the Revolution and its aftermath affected and was viewed by *all* of its stakeholders.

In chapter one, I look at public displays of loyalism after British forces reconquered the province in the winter of 1778-9. This was a chance for Britain's supporters in Georgia to finally slip the veil after over three years of living under Patriot control. This was a moment when Tories or anti-Association types could construct and give body to their new identities as Loyalists at war (a label which only became seasonable once the Revolution began and their status as colonial Americans was thrown into question). Importantly, after being reconquered, Georgia was made effectively into the frontline of the campaign to re-subdue the American colonies from the bottom-up. In this section, though, martial expressions of support for Britain are not considered. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the military involvements of southern Loyalists have already undergone thoroughgoing examinations by Piecuch and Ed Cashin and there would appear little reason to re-tread this well-covered ground. Secondly, whilst the study of the Loyalists' militia units and fighting men is doubtlessly essential, armed encounters were significantly fewer and for that reason arguably less important

than more ordinary expressions of fealty. Fighting for the crown was a very definitive act of allegiance. But most of what loyalism in Georgia was took place below this level. In this chapter, therefore, I explore loyalism in Georgia as it appeared on the street, on the page, and on the stage. Taking examples from Tory verse, theatre productions, newspaper stories, toasts, and celebration days, I examine the tropes, symbols, discourses made use of by Britain's supporters as they contrived to 'other' their rebellious adversaries and forge their identity as Loyalists at war. I argue that in response to the chaos of the war and the concomitant uncertainty over their new subject positions, Loyalists in Georgia turned symbolically to the monarchy in order to crystallise key tenets of their sense of self and belonging and foster a well of groupness with other actors. As such, the monarchy acted as the basis of a public associational culture which functioned to imaginatively link loyal individuals over time and space to other faithful members of the king's imperial family (especially those in Britain). Rather than bridge any kind of gap with subjects on the other side of the Atlantic, though, the Georgia Loyalists' symbolic elevation of the monarchy revealed a crisis of imperial communication as it served effectively to confirm their basic distance and difference from Britons in the mother country for whom the king was an altogether less Olympian figure. In so doing, the Georgia Loyalists underlined the essential provinciality of their identification with the Empire.

After this, I turn to the period following Britain's evacuation of Savannah in July 1782. Having had the tantalising prospect of a re-royalised America dangled in front of them only to see it lost again (a further blow that Britain's supporters in other colonies were spared) Georgia's friends of government were faced with having to make a simple yet painful choice: to leave for another part of the King's dominions – surrounded,

presumably, by subjects they had worked to imaginatively draw themselves closer to during the war – or stay in the New Republic amongst their revolutionary enemies. In chapters two and three, I consider the experiences and perceptions of Georgia Loyalists who opted for the former through their appeals to the Loyalist Claims Commission (1783-9). These papers – consisting of the pleas of individuals scattered across the British Atlantic world for restitution from the authorities in London for their losses and services during the war – are amongst the richest source sets detailing the Loyalists' own reflections on the conflict as well as their diasporic journeys. They have formed the basis of several monograph length studies of the American Loyalists – from Brown's *The King's Friends* and Norton's *The British Americans*, to more recently Maya Jasanoff *Liberty's Exiles* – which have looked to establish their precise make-up as well as explore their wartime and refugee encounters.⁷¹ They are, in short, the best compendia of relatively uninterrupted narrative from the lips and pens of a large body of Loyalists (most of whom have never got a hearing) which shed light on the ways they responded to the war and their subsequent banishment from America. The Commission records, though, comprise a set of somewhat bifurcated documents. Individuals' appeals were typically split into two distinct sections: one was a part-journalistic account of their revolutionary lives and the other was a schedule of loss listing items which were sequestered or destroyed during the war for which they specifically sought compensation. Both sections, I contend, separately illuminate the basis of the Georgia Loyalists' sense of self and place postwar as well as the ways both were pinned fundamentally to region. A

⁷¹ Brown, *The King's Friends*; Norton, *The British Americans*; Maya Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World*, Harper Press (London, 2011).

dual investigation of the Commission records is, I submit, subsequently warranted and necessary.

Chapter two thus encompasses a qualitative analysis of the material elements of the Georgia Loyalist exiles' appeals to the Commission. In it, the lost assets Georgia Loyalists specifically sought compensation for (as well as, importantly, the lost assets they did not) are broken down and their expressive import is considered. What they prioritised, I conclude, was chiefly their lost swamps, human chattel property, and agricultural produce. I contend that, as part of appeals compiled at a time of intense imaginative and physical turbulence by individuals battling questions relating to their status and identity, these privileged commodities represented a set of emotional as well as economic concerns. They were the underpinnings of Georgia's socio-economic development after mid-century and, to a large degree, defined the Loyalist claimants' colonial taskscape into which they had decanted their embodied sense of belonging as imperial subjects. The prevalence of these lost possessions in the claims of Georgia Loyalist exiles', I argue, reflected their need for fixity amidst unsettling change and testifies to the continued essentiality of Georgia's distinctive locale to their reflexive, provincialised sense of self and place after the peace.

In chapter three, I examine the rhetoric of the Georgia Loyalist refugees' appeals to the Commission. In contrast with chapter two (in which I look to extract qualitative meaning from a source set which appears ostensibly ripe for a quantitative study) in this section I work to quantify and seek out patterns in the Loyalists' qualitative reflections which they submitted alongside their schedules of loss. In these memorials, appellants laid-out the broad trajectories of their late colonial, revolutionary, and postwar lives.

They were, in essence, their little ‘fictions’ recounting their experiences which were presented as arguments for their right to compensation. These fictions were defined chiefly by two seemingly discordant languages: the language of dependency and the language of dislocation. These languages, I argue, pointed to the development of an awkward doubleness which seemingly fettered the Georgia Loyalists’ after the war. This doubleness spoke fundamentally to apprehensions felt in the wake of their curt banishment from their homes (which, following the revivification of royal rule in their region during the Revolution, must have felt like a distant possibility only a short while beforehand) as well as their forced transition from being colonial Americans to being another as yet undefined group of people within the imperial polity. It was, in other words, suggestive of the fact that despite continuing to cling to their imperial identities, they were often wracked with sensations of detachment and disorientation as they faced having to internally reorganise their sense of self and place as subjects of the Empire in new locales to which they fled for safety but did not feel in any way rooted in.

In the final chapter, I chronicle the trials of those Tories who sought to remain in Georgia after the peace. Eschewing exile, these individuals – having been attainted, confiscated of their possessions, and banished – faced down the potential Patriot backlash and set about reingratiating themselves with their recent rivals. Looking at the petitions they submitted to the new state authorities requesting absolution, I unpack the ways hopeful Tory reintegrators set about dissolving their former allegiances – pivoting seemingly very abruptly away from their bearing as members of the king’s imperial family – and making themselves reincorporate-able as citizens in the New Republic. Aided by the decision of lawmakers in the Assembly to pursue only a limited form of revolutionary justice, I argue that those erstwhile friends of government in

Georgia who were able to attain clemency did so ultimately because they sought and won the support of their fellow inhabitants. The process of their reintegration back into Georgian society – which was secured in the quotidian realm by everyday interactions with other ordinary actors – called to attention an associational disposition which had emerged during the revolutionary contest and continued to surface after the peace. Whereas once this group predilection drove them to cultivate imagined linkages with other subjects in the Empire through monarchalist displays and discourses, though, one-time Loyalists in Georgia after the war orientated themselves toward the propagation of local, tangible networks which could facilitate their pursuit of clemency. The importance of these conjunctive assemblages to an erstwhile Tory's case, I argue, subsequently helped define citizenship in Georgia after the Revolution as fundamentally democratic, volitional, and localised: an office demanding the active determination of an indicted Loyalist as well as the consent of the communities into which they would be reabsorbed as trusted denizens of the New Republic.

In sum, this thesis canvasses the ways the Revolution and its aftermath disrupted the Georgia Loyalists sense of self, place, and belonging. Throughout, I elucidate how they responded to the provinces' especially violent break with Britain and the subsequent disillusion of their colonial American identities. I consider the ways they articulated their identification with the British Empire and argue that it was fundamentally shaped by and tied to Georgia's distinctive locale and history. As a consequence, I submit that loyalism in Georgia was a manifestation of a particular identity at its most dynamic which existed there as an affective sensibility within a wider spectrum of experience and was moderated *inter alia* according to immediate imperatives. Accounting for the experiences and perceptions of the Georgia Loyalists

(whose colonial and wartime schemas were particular in their trajectory as well as their type) is essential to understanding the broad character of loyalism in America during the revolutionary epoch. As a large body of actors who dwelled in a still overlooked but pivotal revolutionary arena – the focal point for Britain’s entire military campaign after 1778 as well as the only colony to be reconquered by the crown’s supporters – comprehending the ways they gave body to their loyalism is immensely important and necessary. My regionally focussed study indicates how rather than being a static political ideology or essence, loyalism was a reflexive mode which was scaled in line with local rhythms and contexts. It highlights the fact that individuals in different locales had their own orbits and orientations which gave their identities as Loyalists a distinct style and challenges any kind of compound view of imperial attachments. It consequently calls attention to the size of the challenge posed by the Revolution to Loyalists who needed to reconsolidate their sense of self and place as well as to imperial authorities who struggled to mobilise them or account for their fundamental multiformity.

**“Let Songs of Triumph Every Voice Employ”: Loyalist Identity and Popular Political
Culture in Georgia during the British Occupation, 1779-82**

On April 23rd, 1742, the inhabitants of Savannah gathered to celebrate Saint George’s day. The colony’s secretary, William Stephens, ordered the British flag be hoisted, with “most of the people assembled at noon, expecting to drink the King’s health”.⁷² As secretary of the colony, Stephens had stated that he hoped the display would “promote unity, if possible”, arranging a cannon salute and wine for the population to those ends.⁷³ It was with no small sense of satisfaction, then, that he noted how the patriotic celebrations had created amongst the city’s inhabitants “a better concurrence and good temper toward one another ... than appeared for a while past.”⁷⁴ These kinds of events provided a chance for individuals to express their pride in and thanks for the imperial connection, making that which at times seemed remote – emotionally as well as physically – feel more immediate and personal. They linked subjects to the state (personified by the king) and the state to its subjects in a mutually reinforcing show of unity, belonging, and strength.

As Brendan McConville points out, these kinds of demonstrations were more than just colourful or invigorating ways for communities to express a sense of attachment to the mother country.⁷⁵ They were essential in a colonial world that was

⁷² *The Journal of William Stephens 1741-1743*, vol.1, ed. Ellis Merton Coulter, University of Georgia Press (Athens, 1959), p.68.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.69.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p.68.

⁷⁵ Brendan McConville, *The King’s Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America 1688-1776*, University of North Carolina Press (Chapel Hill, 2006), p.73. See also Harold E. Davis, *The Fledgling Province: Social and Cultural life in Colonial Georgia 1733-1776*, University of North Carolina Press (Chapel Hill, 1976).

beset with unpredictability, plagued with conflict, and rife with social and political discord. As the youngest colony with a small and thinly scattered population – spattered with white colonists from a variety of backgrounds as well as masses of imported enslaved peoples (especially post-1750) and surrounded by Native tribes – such thoughts speak particularly loudly to Georgia’s history. What is more, a nagging mindfulness of the perception that they were socially and politically inferior to individuals in the mother country – prompted, no doubt, by Georgia’s historic reliance on British aid for its economic survival, especially prior to mid-century – nurtured a chauvinistic yearning amongst white colonists there for British ‘civilisation’ and pushed them to passionately affirm their devotion to and membership of a glorious imperial union. By emphasising themes of empire and monarchy, these kinds of displays supplied individuals with much needed symbolic consistency and reassurance. They helped them think about themselves as belonging to a single imperial unit with integrated histories and systems of governance and served as the basis for the growth of a political culture that remained intensely royalised until 1775.⁷⁶

As the imperial crisis spilled into Revolution, though, Patriot Americans set about reconceptualising the nation cleansed of all imperial and royalist influences. As Peter Shaw, Simon Newman, and Benjamin Irvin have separately shown, independence supporters in power as well as those ‘out of doors’ collaborated in the creation of a new ceremonial and political culture comprising an assortment of sacred objects and rites

⁷⁶ As Eric Nelson has recently suggested, America’s political culture and structures in many ways remained royalised thereafter. See *The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University (Cambridge MA, 2014).

which combined to give America its new face.⁷⁷ In so doing, they sought to dismantle the hallmarks and civic traditions of the old regime and imaginatively whitewash America's public realm of all traces of the connection with Britain. In Georgia, this whitewashing took on an especially grim and brutal air. From the flight of royal governor Sir James Wright in February 1776 to the British invasion under Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Campbell in December 1778, independence supporters there set about expunging from the province all vestiges of British rule, both personal and figurative. Suspected Tories, for example, were regularly beaten and publicly humiliated by liberty gangs in ceremonious processions. They were subsequently forced into exile and their property appropriated or in some cases destroyed. The mission to purge Georgia of all British or royalist markers, however, was perhaps best exemplified by popular acts of symbolic anti-royal aggression during the war: attacks on monarchical symbols and statuary, the burning effigies, and the staging of mock funerals. One such funeral took place in Savannah on August 10th, 1776. Some of the town's inhabitants gathered in a "very solemn funeral procession" and marched to the local courthouse to witness the burial of George III's effigy. As the effigy was committed to the ground, the eulogist stated his and the crowd's hope that he would never be resurrected, denoting the

⁷⁷ Peter Shaw, *American Patriots and the Rituals of Revolution*, Harvard University Press (Boston, 1981); Simon P. Newman, *Parades and the Politics of the Street: Festive Culture in the Early American Republic*, University of Pennsylvania Press (Philadelphia, 1999); Benjamin H. Irvin, *Clothed in Robes of Sovereignty: The Continental Congress and the People Out of Doors*, Oxford University Press (New York, 2011). The term 'out of doors' refers to an eighteenth-century British phrase used to distinguish between popular political action and discourse from official proceedings. In America, the term has typically been applied to the 'mobs' or crowds that gathered in favour of independence who drew on the vernacular of folk ritual and expressed their political agency in the form of direct and often violent protest. As Gordon S. Wood explains, such extra-official actions "were not the anarchic uprisings of the poor ... rather they represented a common form of political protest and political action in both England and the colonies during the eighteenth-century by groups who could find no alternative institutional expression for their demands". See *The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787*, University of North Carolina Press (Chapel Hill, 1969), p.319.

destruction of the King's political existence in America.⁷⁸ These kinds of activities were destructive moments for British rule and Britain's supporters in America. They amounted to a cultural campaign by Patriot Americans to bury their colonial past and so pave the way for their rebirth as an independent nation.

The reconquest of Georgia during the winter of 1778-9, however, halted the Patriots' endeavours there. As the only colony which was returned to 'good government' during the war, Georgia was, for a time, turned effectively into the frontline in the struggle to suppress the Revolution from the bottom-up. It was, to a large extent, the focal point of Britain's entire endeavour in America from 1778 onwards. British military planners deemed that if Georgia could be held, the colony could act as a base for British forces fighting northward up the Atlantic coastline and as a model showcasing all the benefits of the imperial connection to the rest of the continent. This strategy relied explicitly on the support of Georgia's sizable Tory population (thought to be proportionally the largest in the colonies).⁷⁹ To these ends, individuals could, of course, enlist and fight in a Loyalist regiment or militia unit. This was the most barefaced way any person could assist in the restoration of royal authority in Georgia.⁸⁰ But most of what loyalism was in Georgia happened outside the martial arena and involved individuals' participation in more ordinary expressions of allegiance and belonging. With the necessary time, space, and institutional cover, Loyalists in Georgia were able to contribute to the revivification of the royal America to a degree surpassing their

⁷⁸ As reported in the *Connecticut Journal*, October 30th, 1776, as quoted in Irvin, *Clothed in Robes of Sovereignty*, p.140.

⁷⁹ See Brown, *The King's Friends*, p.253.

⁸⁰ The contributions of Loyalist fighting men in south have been well-covered by Jim Piecuch and Ed Cashin, with both repulsing the image of the craven Tory malingerer. See Jim Piecuch, *Three Peoples, One King*; Ed Cashin, *The King's Ranger*.

counterparts elsewhere by engaging in their own cultural campaign. In so doing, they emblematised their cause and crafted a distinctive Loyalist face there. Because Georgia was marked out as the *cunabuli* of the royalist cause after 1778 – a model colony for the rebirth of British America which drew the attention of sympathetic transnational voices such as the poet Jonathan Odell – how this face appeared and the cultural materials it was constructed with matters to the study of loyalism's broad mosaic.

To date, though, the study of loyalism in revolutionary America as it appeared away from the battlefield is yet to receive the attention it deserves. There has been minimal scholarly concern for the way individuals gave body to their cause and identities as Loyalists during the war without the use of a Ferguson rifle or Brown Bess musket. A select band of historians have examined particular Loyalist events during the war (such as the Meschianza in Philadelphia in May 1778) or the work of individual public writers (such as Odell) which gave the royalist cause something close to a cultural voice and appearance.⁸¹ Such studies, however, are certainly fewer and narrower in focus than those exploring Patriot ceremonial and political culture. Philip Gould's examination of loyalism in revolutionary New York and Pennsylvania is the notable exception. In *Writing*

⁸¹ For the Meschianza see David S. Shields and Fredrika J. Teute "The Meschianza: Sum of All Fetes", *JER*, vol.35 (2015), pp.185-214. The studies on Odell are more numerous. Nearly a century after the end of the Revolution, for example, Winthrop Sargent made a concerted effort to reassemble Odell's poetry and essays in two valuable but incomplete editions: *The Loyalist Poetry of the Revolution* (1857) and *The Loyal Verses of Joseph Stansbury and Doctor Odell* (1860). In 1961, Joan Johnston Anderson edited a collection of Odell's poetry from unpublished papers housed in the New Brunswick Museum, Saint John, for an M.A. thesis completed at the University of British Columbia. Ten years later, Pastora San Juan Cafferty collated fifty-one poems by Stansbury and Odell as part of a Ph.D. dissertation submitted at George Washington University entitled *Loyalist Rhapsodies* (1971). More recently, Cynthia Dubin Edelberg sought to fully contextualise Odell's work in *Jonathan Odell: Loyalist Poet of the American Revolution*, Duke University Press (Durham, 1987). Tracing his career from his time as an Anglican minister in 1760s New Jersey, to the besieged and isolated author he became in exile post-war, Edelberg ties Odell's writings to the specific circumstances in which they were produced, recreating the little understood world of the Loyalists with his contributions – the tropes he engages in, his choice of subjects, his use of historical allusion – at its heart.

the Rebellion (2013), Gould draws on examples from balladry, theatre, newspaper extracts, and political pamphlets in order to unpick the content, tenor, and purpose of Loyalist cultural performances in his selected provinces. His work lays bare the ways friends of government there collaborated in an array of public displays to combat the various crises they were confronted with. In the process, Gould demonstrates positively that understanding the semiotics of the Loyalists' public displays of fealty and politically tinged cultural modes is central to discerning the rudiments of their identity and outlook. What they adopted or ignored from an endless assortment of available actions, anthems, poetry, emblems, idioms, and historical tales speaks directly to how they viewed themselves or, at least, how it wished to be viewed by others.⁸²

Following Gould's example, in this chapter I look at the ways individuals in Georgia gave voice and action to their support for the crown's cause on the stage, in the street, and on the page during the British occupation of the province (1779-82). Taking from verse, theatre productions, newspaper stories, toasts, and celebration days, I examine the tropes, symbols, and discourses made use of by Britain's supporters in Georgia as they worked to 'other' their rebellious adversaries and craft their distinctive identity as Loyalists at war. Facing the chaos of the war and the shattering of their previously settled subject positions as colonial Americans, I argue that Georgia's friends of government turned ultimately to the monarchy as a powerful symbolic totem around which they could coalesce and consolidate themselves into a choate group capable of beating back the revolutionary tide. Around the monarchy, they built a popular political culture which functioned to promote a worldview, foster obedience, instil belief, and

⁸² Philip Gould, *Writing the Rebellion: Loyalists and the Literature of Politics in British America*, Oxford University Press (New York, 2013).

imaginatively link loyal Georgians with other members of the King's imperial family across space and time in a dynamic system of communal construction and self-location. This culture was saturated with ghostly imaginings of an idealised golden age of peace and prosperity embodied by the king. These imaginings involved the tacit acknowledgment of the disintegration (or near disintegration) of this vaunted past. Crucially, they also involved an element of regeneration, holding out the promise of salvation and recuperation if royal rule could be securely restored, which helped transform fatality into continuity and give the crisis meaning. By overlaying earlier colonial practices and orientating their cultural campaign around the monarch as a personification of province's halcyon days under royal rule, I argue that Loyalists in Georgia pinned their sense of self and belonging firmly to their region.

My analysis has been contingent on the stability of certain key terms. The words 'popular', 'political', 'culture', and 'identity' are sufficiently amorphous to make some sort of clarification hazardous but essential to the subsequent chapter. Natalie Zemon Davis provides perhaps the best concise definition of 'popular', using it to characterise "beliefs ... practices and festivities widely dispersed in a given society."⁸³ Paula Baker describes 'political' in a similarly broad and effectual way, defining it as any action (formal and informal) taken by individuals and groups "to affect the course or behaviour of government or the community".⁸⁴ Marshall Sahlins' understanding of culture as consisting of a series of "ingredients" – comprising a cluster of motifs, myths, and memories – which actors use to negotiate their relationship to other individuals and

⁸³ Natalie Zemon Davis, "Toward Mixtures and Margins", *American Historical Review*, vol.97 (1992), p.1411.

⁸⁴ Paula Baker, "The Domestication of Politics: Women and American Political Society 1780-1920", *American Historical Review*, vol.89 (1984), p.622.

official bodies over place and time is also eminently serviceable.⁸⁵ The word ‘identity, though, is potentially more challenging. It is an especially bulky and loaded term. It is, however, usefully disaggregated by Frederick Cooper and Rogers Brubaker into three branches: clarification, self-understanding, and commonality.⁸⁶ Their idea was to more readily distinguish between fluid, looser forms of identity and instances where strongly bounded notions of connectivity permit collective character to climb to the surface. The third branch, commonality, is especially salutary and pertinent to my study. It concerns the fraught attempt to engender a sense of ‘groupness’ and speaks to the relational ties that link people together (including kinship, friendship, memory, and habit). Given the Loyalists heterogenous group make-up – as well as the demands of conducting a war – this distinction is important. For Georgia Loyalists, the particular volatility of the war in their region, the terrible insecurity of daily life, their experience of persecution and harassment, and their inescapable similarity to their opponents, created a thirst for a stable sense of commonality amongst themselves and with their imperial brethren in the metropole which could anchor their sense of self and belonging.

In this chapter, I adapt the understanding of these terms in order to unpick the ways Georgia Loyalists made monarchialist performances, productions, and discourses the fount of their cultural campaign to knit themselves together, self-locate, and bring order to chaos. My analysis relies heavily on the *Royal Georgia Gazette* (the state’s Loyalist newspaper which returned to circulation with the restoration of royal rule in early 1779). Newspapers are fundamental to the creation of a genuinely popular political

⁸⁵ Marshall Sahlins, *Islands of History*, University of Chicago Press (Chicago, 1985), p.144.

⁸⁶ Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond Identity”, *Theory and Society*, vol.29:1 (2000), pp.14-21.

culture. The *Gazette* carried adverts for political meetings, published new songs, and gave notice of royalist red-letter days. Whilst many individuals participated directly in collectivised, associational expressions of allegiance to Britain – singing songs and joining processions and so on – countless more were reading about them or listening to others read aloud about them in coffeehouses, taverns, and street squares.⁸⁷ The audience for Loyalist productions, discourses, and displays was thus expanded greatly by newspapers, carrying them beyond the confines of any single community which afforded their content a greater reach and significance than it would have otherwise attained. In short, the *Gazette* acted as diffuser of centripetal images, stories, and discourses around which friends of government orientated themselves and made possible the creation of a unified Loyalist consciousness in Georgia. This consciousness was forged through a mass field of communication which encouraged loyal Georgians to imagine themselves as belonging to a larger constituency of transatlantic Britons with whom they shared values, histories, and mores.

Examining Loyalist identity and popular political culture in this way offers a chance to make sense of how they sought to respond to the chaos of the war, promote their wartime worldview, foster a sense of groupness, inspire collective action, and reconsolidate a sense of self and belonging. It also affords the opportunity to refocus our appreciation of the corporate soul of the empire as it was perceived by those away from the metropole at a time of imperial configuration. Contrary to the image of the imperial subject closely aligned to their brethren in the mother-country – conjoined by

⁸⁷ For a useful discussion on the convergence of textual and oral forms in colonial America, see Sandra F. Gustafson, *Eloquence is Power: Oratory and Performance in Early America*, North Carolina University Press (Chapel Hill, 2000), pp.xvi-xviii.

an imagined net of culture, kinship, and clientship – Georgia Loyalists constructed a vision of transoceanic Britishness that was, in many ways, peculiar to themselves. This vision, I argue, was broadly marked by its divergence from (rather than closeness to) the prevailing sensibilities of subjects in the metropole and was pinned firmly to their region.

Georgia's Loyalists had at their disposal a near boundless array of images and tropes to make use of in their performances and productions. They inhabited a world abundant with national iconographic riches. What they chose to emphasise thus reflected their particular response to the circumstances they found themselves in and their experience of the conflict. When looking at the displays and discourses of the Georgia Loyalists, therefore, the study of context is crucial. As David Cannadine points out, to study the context of nationalistic performances, traditions, and discourses is not just a way of attaining more information. Rather, it is a way to gain greater insight as to their meaning and purpose.⁸⁸ For Loyalists in Georgia, the most important context to take into account was their experience of harassment and persecution at the hands of independence supporters during the period of Patriot rule (February 1776 to December 1778). This experience comprised a series of deaths and dismemberments – sometimes figurative and sometimes very real – that coloured how they viewed themselves and others.

Perhaps because they sought the conflict with Britain and her supporters, American Patriots were quicker to pin-point potential enemies and take actions against

⁸⁸ David Cannadine, "The Context, Meaning, and Performance of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the Invention of Tradition c.1820-1977", *The Invention of Tradition*, eds. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 1983), p.105.

them. Such efforts reached their early national apogee with the publication of Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* (1776). In that pamphlet – the most successful of the revolutionary period and itself central to ritualised Patriot readings across the colonies – Paine admonished the British constitution as absurd and farcical, stating that:

*the same constitution which gives the commons a power to check the king by withholding supplies, gives afterwards the king a power to check the commons, by empowering him to reject their other bills ... A mere absurdity!*⁸⁹

Following in the tradition of Richard Price and John Cartwright, Paine rejected the 'end of history' view regarding the Glorious Revolution as well as the colonies' constitutional settlement with Britain. He refused to accept that the slipshod political pragmatism that followed in any way represented a final solution to the problems of the time. Instead, Paine declared there to be nothing remarkable about the British constitution as it appeared in the late-eighteenth century, finding it suitable only "for the dark and slavish times in which it was erected ... when the world was so overrun with tyranny, that the least remove therefrom was a glorious rescue."⁹⁰ He continued his assault by rejecting the *lingua franca* of the Revolution as filial conflict and the idea of Britain as a caring mother. Colonists who had fled to America from Britain, he claimed, did so "not from

⁸⁹ Thomas Paine, "Common Sense", in *Thomas Paine*, p.11. Although numbers have varied, best estimates suggest that anywhere between 100,000 and 150,000 copies were sold within a year of its release. See Trish Loughran, "Disseminating Common Sense: Thomas Paine and the Problem of the early American Bestseller", *American Literature*, vol.78:1 (2006), p.6.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.7.

the tender embraces of the mother, but from the cruelty of the monster.”⁹¹ Those who supported the imperial connection were thus held out to be somehow morally and intellectually lacking. In fact, as Paine goes on to say, it was only the interested, the weak, or the credulous who could maintain their support for the imperial connection.⁹²

Identifying the royalist cause and its supporters in this way – using tropes that also filled the resolutions of Congress and were reprinted in every sympathetic publication from Boston to Savannah – gave Patriots definitive antagonists to focus their fight on. In the first instance, this fight took the form of extra-legal persecution with suspected Tories subjected to beatings and humiliation dished-out by ‘liberty gangs’. Dr. Thomas Taylor – an immigrant surgeon who arrived in Savannah in December 1775 – recorded in his diary the kinds of abuses suffered by anyone thought to be “a warm stickler for Government”. On December 16th, 1775, he noted that a mob of “about an hundred dissolute fellows” surrounded his house. He was knocked-down with the butt-end of a musket and then “tied to a tree while yet insensible, and tarred and feathered.”⁹³ Taylor’s experience mirrored that of Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Brown. In the summer of 1775, Brown took a leading role in the fight against the Continental Association. Such actions made Brown a marked man and on the evening of August 2nd members of the local Committee of Safety surrounded his house and demanded he take the Association’s oath. Brown, however, refused. The committeemen consequently rushed-on him, ransacking his house and battering him. Having fractured his skull, Brown’s attackers went on to burn his feet (earning him the mocking nickname

⁹¹ Ibid., p.22.

⁹² Ibid., pp.25-7.

⁹³ Robert S. Davis jr., “A Georgia Loyalist’s Perspective on the American Revolution: The Letters of Dr. Thomas Taylor”, *GHQ*, vol.81:1 (1997), p.126.

“Burnfoot”), tar and feather him, and shave off his hair, before parading him around Augusta and tying him to a tree.⁹⁴ John Hopkins – a river pilot from Savannah – experienced a similar trauma. Hopkins claimed that at nine o’clock in the evening on July 25th, 1775, a group of men consisting of bricklayers and carpenters broke into his house and took him outside. They then proceeded to tar and feather him and parade him up and down Savannah’s streets for three hours with many in the mob making their intent to do the same to all the Tories in the town openly known.⁹⁵ These types of scenes were frequent across America. In South Carolina, for instance, a British gunner called George Walker was tarred and feathered for refusing to join a toast damning George III. He was then carted from one tory house to another and forced “to drink damnation” to those inside.⁹⁶ These kinds of incidents affected more than just the specific individuals targeted on a given day. There was a pattern to these events: a mob procession followed by physical attack (usually involving a tar and feathering), undertaken in the full view of the community. They were overtly political acts of ritualised public degradation. They were symbolic expressions of power designed to bolster the hegemony of one group over another which reinforced the principles of social discipline and conformity.

Accompanying these extra-legal forms of persecution were a series of legislative sanctions. In early 1777, the South Carolina assembly passed a banishment act requiring all those who had not sworn fealty to the rebel government to surrender their possessions and leave the province within forty days.⁹⁷ In Georgia, such injunctions came slightly later. The delay, in large part, had two causes: the high number of Loyalists

⁹⁴ As described in Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, pp.25-9.

⁹⁵ Deposition of John Hopkins given to Anthony Stokes, July 29th, 1775, Sir James Wright papers, MS 0884, Collections of Georgia Historical Society (Savannah, Georgia)

⁹⁶ As quoted by Piecuch in *Three Peoples, One King*, p.46.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.94.

in the province vis-a-vis elsewhere and factional divisions between moderate and radical Whigs which paralysed the rebel state machinery. A sizable band of conservatives within the Patriot assembly – predominantly from the Christ Church parish – retained strong ties to royalist leaders. They opposed British policy but sought reform from within the system. Members of this group were at odds with more militant representatives – chiefly from St. John’s parish to the south of Christ Church whose inhabitants descended from New England immigrants – who wanted more power to flow to congresses and extra-official meetings.⁹⁸ John Adam Treutlen – a wealthy merchant and landowner who was governor of the province between May 1777 and January 1778 – wrote that “our small friends, the Tories, within our bowels, are so very numerous ... that our efforts against these enemies of American freedom have hitherto been languid and ineffectual.”⁹⁹ “An Act for the Expulsion of the Internal Enemies of this State” was finally passed on September 16th, 1777 to counter the Tory threat. It established twelve-member committees in each county to test the inhabitants’ commitment to independence. Those who failed to satisfy the committee were deemed enemies of the state and would have to leave Georgia within forty days, forfeiting half of their property in the process.¹⁰⁰

Taken in concert with mob intimidation and violence, such acts worked to isolate Georgia’s Tory population. They helped to foster confidence in the Patriot cause and eroded Loyalists’ faith in the eventual success of theirs. A French visitor in Charleston

⁹⁸ Harvey H. Jackson, “Consensus and Conflict: Factional Politics in Revolutionary Georgia 1774-1777”, *GHQ*, vol.59:4 (1975), pp.389-91; Leslie Hall, *Land and Allegiance*, pp.31-3, p.42, pp.59-63.

⁹⁹ John Adam Truetlen letter to John Hancock regarding the traitorous actions of George McIntosh, June 19th, 1777, MS 807, Collections of the Georgia Historical Society (Savannah, Georgia).

¹⁰⁰ For further detail regarding the history of the act see Heard Robertson, “Georgia’s Banishment and Expulsion Act of September 16th 1777”, *GHQ*, vol.55:2 (1971), pp.274-82.

noted as much after witnessing a celebration on June 28th, 1777. Marking the anniversary of the repulse of the British attack on the city, he observed that rebels there were re-enthused whilst Tories were made despondent.¹⁰¹ The effect was to entrench the Loyalists' sense of being in an irreversible retreat, weakening whatever warrior spirit might have existed within them to the point where British officials often complained at the lack of active support they received from friends of government.¹⁰² These were, in other words, destructive events, eroding the physical presence of Britain in America and upturning the world in which Loyalists had made their lives to that point.

These destructive events, however, also (somewhat perversely) acted as constructive opportunities. They were moments when an enemy was made visible for Loyalists to focus their antagonisms on. A key subtext to the Revolution, from the Loyalists' perspective, was the realisation of the limits and inadequacies of existing identity categories. This reality was tragically highlighted with the death of Major John Andre, aide-de-camp of General Sir Henry Clinton. Having arranged the defection of Major-General Benedict Arnold, Andre made his way from New Jersey to New York. With a pass from Arnold (whose defection would not be made public for a few days) he replaced his gold-embroidered British staff-officer's jacket with a plain crimson coat in the hope of slipping past Rebel sentries unnoticed. On his way, however, Andre was stopped by three Patriot militiamen searching for deserters. In a spasm of anxiety, Andre asked them to which party they belonged. They deftly parried the question, replying:

¹⁰¹ Piecuch, *Three Peoples, One King*, p.96.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, pp.87-9.

“Yours”. At this point, Andre’s guard slipped, and he exposed himself as a British officer in need of assistance. He was subsequently hanged on October 2nd, 1780.¹⁰³

The vexed question of confused identities was especially pertinent to Georgia. Unlike in the New England and middle provinces, revolutionary fealties in Georgia were not so clearly split along religiously sectarian lines.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, Georgia’s porous backcountry – coupled with the presence of raiding banditti gangs and multiple other transient groups – made the issue of telling ally from adversary during the war a particularly troubling one. The Royal Georgia Gazette elucidated the matter, warning that “As it may be impossible ... to distinguish friend from foe, and travellers on their lawful business from such as may be out on very evil designs, great care and caution is recommended to honest men”.¹⁰⁵ Whether Loyalist or Patriot, individuals in Georgia (with the exception of slaves and Native Americans) had to deal with opponents who looked, sounded, and generally lived as they did. Simply put, the War of Independence there was not reducible to a clean ‘us versus them’ dichotomy based on easily discernible parameters of difference which persons could rail against and attack. This was, in many ways, a civil conflict between unnatural enemies where the degree of separation between belligerents was uncomfortably slim.¹⁰⁶ Both sides needed to

¹⁰³ For an account of John Andre’s death see Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World 1600-1850*, Jonathan Cape (London, 2002), pp.204-7.

¹⁰⁴ As Wallace Brown and Dror Wahrman have shown, in the northern and middle American colonies independence supporters overwhelmingly belonged to a Puritan sect of some sort and Loyalists tended to belong to the Anglican tradition. In Georgia, however, Scottish Presbyterians sided with the royalist cause in greater numbers than elsewhere. See Brown, *The King’s Friends*; Dror Wahrman, “The English Problem of Identity in the American Revolution”, *The American Historical Review*, vol.106:4 (2001), pp.1236-62.

¹⁰⁵ “A Caution to Honest Travellers”, Thursday May 10th, 1781, *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), p.1.

¹⁰⁶ Allan Ramsay, the Scottish artist, perhaps surmised the situation best. He stated that the War of Independence was not a dispute between foreign and domestic enemies, but between new communities of men who found they belonged totally to neither of those categories. see Allan Ramsay, *Letters on the Present Disturbances in Great Britain and her American Provinces*, London (1777), p.20.

distinguish themselves as a necessary first step toward filling their communities with a definitive sense of purpose and self. For the Patriots, this differentiation was marked by acts of violence against the Revolution's disaffected. For Loyalists in Georgia, though, it was precisely this experience of harassment that provided them with the imaginative material they needed to distance themselves from their revolutionary adversaries. In a conflict where the wall that usually descends between combatants – based on ethnicity, nationality, or religion – proved remarkably unclear, this experience, although painful, was essential. It enabled supporters of the crown to diagnose the Patriots as malignant 'others' and ascribe them with traits that would mark them out not as their colonial brethren of former days, but as an enemy it was their duty to confront.


The opportunity for Loyalists in Georgia to do this came after the winter of 1778-9. The primary reason for this delay was simple: Loyalists on the ground there lacked the institutional and military cover necessary for them to distinguish themselves openly from their rebel counterparts. They were living under Patriot authority and surrounded on all sides (it seemed) by committed Whigs. They simply could not risk setting themselves up against the Liberty Gangs or Committees of Safety for fear of the reprisals that would surely follow. Sir James Wright stated as much in a report dated the 9th June, 1775, sent to William Legge, 2nd Earl of Dartmouth, then Secretary of State for the Colonies. In it, Wright made clear his belief that although there were still many friends of government in the province, a large number would not risk "the resentment of the people for want of proper support and protection".¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ Governor Sir James Wright report to William Legge, 2nd Earl of Dartmouth, 9th June 1775, *James Wright papers*, MS 0884, Collections Georgia Historical Society (Savannah, Georgia).

This support came in November 1778 in the shape of some twenty-five-hundred troops travelling south from New York. With General Sir Henry Clinton having replaced General William Howe as Commander-in-Chief in North America in May 1778, Britain launched her southern campaign that autumn and set about the invasion of Georgia led by Major-General Augustine Prevost and Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell.¹⁰⁸ With Whig fighters unable to offer any serious resistance, Savannah was recaptured on December 29th, 1778. Sir James Wright was reinstated officially as governor the following summer. The southern campaign made Georgia the focus of Britain's entire military strategy in America. It turned the province from a peripheral but prosperous outpost of the empire into the centre of the effort to prevent its break-up. Its initial success in Georgia represented a distinctive moment. As the only province where royal government was formally re-established, friends of government in Georgia were, unlike elsewhere in the colonies (with the possible exception of New York), afforded the space necessary to openly engage in the Revolution's contest of performances and discourses and so crystallise key tenets of their identity and outlook.

¹⁰⁸ To this point, under the command of General William Howe, Britain's approach to the war was defined by a strategy of confinement rather than conquest. Howe in particular had earned the ire of many Loyalists who viewed his unwillingness to conduct an aggressive crusade as selling them short. For what I consider the best account of the early failures of British military leadership during the War of Independence, see Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy recent intervention *The Men Who Lost America: British Command during the Revolutionary War and the Preservation of Empire*, Yale University Press (London, 2013).

Figure 2.1: Plan of the town of Savannah taken from the Rebels on the December 29th, 1778, Hargrett library rare maps collection, map number 1778C3a (University of Georgia, Athens)



This was done in the first instance by denouncing the revolutionaries' alliance with France. The decision of France to side openly with the Americans in February 1778, coupled with their movements in the Caribbean that autumn, heightened the sense that British supremacy in the Atlantic world was under threat.¹⁰⁹ Indeed, Loyalists from across the colonies voiced their alarm regarding this turn of events. The Boston royal official Samuel Curwen, for instance, detailed his concerns in panicked tones:

¹⁰⁹ French involvement in the conflict began unofficially in 1775, secretly shipping supplies to the Continental army. French support for the Revolution was formalised on February 6th, 1778, with the signing of the Treaty of Alliance which recognised the United States as independent and sovereign. See Jonathan R. Dull, *A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution*, Yale University Press (New Haven, 1991).

*This fatal treaty is at length executed: the coup de grace is given to British glory – its sun is set – alas, how fallen! How short-sighted is human wisdom, how weak is human power at best! The roar of the British lion will no more be heard; the French cock may now crow and strut undisturbed.*¹¹⁰

Curwen went on to declare that “a war with France is dreaded; there is a fear of general bankruptcy.”¹¹¹ The fall of Dominica to the French was of particular concern. In their possession since 1761, the island’s surrender represented a strategic and psychological blow to the British. It enabled France to take control of a communications choke point in the Leeward-Winward island chain and, in many ways, signified the overhaul of British gains made during the Seven Years War when her power had reached its zenith.

The alliance was of singular concern for supporters of the crown in Georgia. During September and October 1779, a combined force of French and American fighters laid siege to Savannah (a mere nine months after royal government had been re-established there). On the morning of Thursday September 16th, the French General, Charles Hector, Count d’Estaing, sent a letter to Augustine Prevost demanding the town’s surrender (notably not to Patriot American authorities, but to the French King). Prevost, of course, refused, stating that “he hoped that Count had a better opinion of him, and the British army he had the honour to command, than to expect they would surrender the town”. The following day, it was unanimously decided by the Council of

¹¹⁰ Samuel Curwen to the Reverend Isaac Smith, February 25th, 1778, as quoted in Crary ed., *The Price of Loyalty*, p.310.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.311.

War – presided over governor Sir James Wright and lieutenant-governor John Graham – that “the town should be defended to the last extremity and that this resolution should be made known to the French General”.¹¹² Over the subsequent three weeks, French and American troops established their positions around Savannah and shelled the town with near daily cannonade fire for the six days between October 2nd and 8th. The siege reached a crescendo at daybreak Saturday October 9th with a combined attack by French and American troops to the right of the royalist lines on the Spring Hill redoubt, on the road leading from Savannah to Ebenezer. The morning “being very foggy”, it was said, favoured their assault, which lasted for about an hour.¹¹³ The twin forces, however, were “beat back and most shamefully retreated” despite enjoying numerical and environmental advantages. In total, it was estimated that circa eight-hundred out of a total of over two-thousand French and American fighters were either killed, wounded, or went missing in the attack, with several deserters fleeing to the royalist lines.¹¹⁴ From that day, long range attacks by French artillery dwindled until the siege was finally lifted on October 17th.

¹¹² Account of the Siege of Savannah taken from the “Royal Georgia Gazette”, November 15th, 1779, as recorded in *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society*, vol.5:1, Savannah (1901), pp.131-2.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp.133-5.

¹¹⁴ These casualties included d’Estaing himself who was shot in the arm and the thigh as well as Brigadier General Casimir Pulaski who “received a grape shot in his loin” and later died. For a comparison, royalist losses numbered sixteen killed – including the much vaunted “Captain Jarves” who led the Loyalist riposte on the Ebenezer road – and thirty-five wounded. See the *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society*, vol.5:1, pp.135-7.

Figure: 2.2: Plan of the siege of Savannah, with the joint attack of the French and Americans on October 9th, 1779, Hargrett library rare maps collection, map number 1779P4 (University of Georgia, Athens)



After their victory at the siege of Savannah, anti-Gallic themes became central to the Loyalists' cultural campaign in Georgia. On November 24th, 1779, for instance, the *Gazette* published a poem by Odell entitled *The Feu de Joie*.¹¹⁵ Odell's intervention is a telling moment. This was a transnational Loyalist voice focussing on and magnifying events in Georgia. By turning his eye south from New York, Odell identifies Georgia as the centre of the crown's cause. In this poem, Odell celebrates the defeat of Franco-

¹¹⁵ A "feu de joie", meaning "fire of joy", is a form of formal celebratory gunfire consisting of a celebratory rifle salute. The title mockingly refers to the rebel practice of signalling victory with a round of shots, a custom which infuriated Washington who worried constantly about shortages of ammunition. See David L. Salay, "The Production of Gunpowder in Pennsylvania During the American Revolution," *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, vol. 99:4 (Oct. 1975), p.422.

American forces during the siege of Savannah. He began by lampooning the recent failures of French troops under the command of d’Estaing. During the war, d’Estaing had participated in the failed Franco-American siege of Newport, Rhode Island, during August 1778.¹¹⁶ Then, in July 1779, having failed to prevent the British capture of St. Lucia the previous December, d’Estaing’s fleet began operations to take Grenada in retaliation. Having occupied the island for just two days, and despite again enjoying a numerical advantage, d’Estaing scrambled to sail his troops away from the island after the arrival of a British detachment headed by Admiral John Byron. Following a somewhat disorganised battle, d’Estaing made for Savannah to join with the Americans looking to retake the then British-held town.¹¹⁷ Describing d’Estaing as “the Lost Sheep”, Odell proceeds to make these failures known to all:

The French, entangle in a dreadful scrap,

From the West Indies made a fine escape.

Arriv’d upon the coast, the scene was chang’d:

Uncivil winds their armaments derrang’d;

Their first reception was exceeding rough;

Howe’er they landed: landed sure enough.

¹¹⁶ See Philip Colomb, *Naval Warfare: its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated*, W.H. Allen (London, 1895); Ira Gruber, *The Howe Brothers and the American Revolution*, Atheneum Press (New York, 1972).

¹¹⁷ See Colomb, *Naval Warfare*; Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660–1783*, Hill and Wang (New York, 1957); Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy, *An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean*, University of Pennsylvania Press (Philadelphia, 2000).

Ashore, they vapour and defy the Storm,

*And soon with Lincoln's troops and junction form.*¹¹⁸

Linking the French and the Americans in a “junction”, Odell makes the ineptitude and cowardice of the former (proven by their “fine escape”) also the property of the latter. This insinuation – that Patriot Americans were spineless and militarily incompetent – is made explicit in stanza thirteen:

Such desperate efforts the battalions then

Disorder and dismay and rout begin.

The worn brigades from sight recoiling swerve;

Their courage drops, they faint in every nerve.

Yet still remains an excellent force –

Bring to the charge the Continental Force,

What ails these Braggadocios of the Land?

*Won't they come forward? – stiff as Posts they stand.*¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ Joan Johnston Anderson, *A Collection of the Poems of Jonathan Odell with a Biographical and Critical Introduction*, M.A. dissertation (University of British Columbia, 1961), p.54.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.55.

The tone here is unmistakably sardonic. The Continentals' failure to come properly to the aid of their routed allies – instead of making the charge they stood “stiff as Posts” – became the subject of Loyalist burlesque.¹²⁰ These were not the Patriot fighters Congress and Whiggish publications had boasted of. These were false heroes who froze at the sight of a defeat and were thus demonstrably unable to defend citizens under their aegis as they claimed they could.

Such charges, though serious, paled in comparison to more egregious arraignments levelled at French troops in Odell's poem. His fiercest rebuke is delivered in the fourth stanza:

Plunder's the word; but plunder soon is o'er.

Rob folks of all, and you can rob no more.

Live stock or dead, they capture and condemn:

Come Whig, come Tory, 'tis the same to them.

The Continental gentry stand aghast

To see their good allies devour so fast.

And these the troops of Louis, Friend of men?

They're rather Tygers, loosen'd from a den.¹²¹

¹²⁰ For the best exploration of Loyalist burlesque, see Gould, *Writing the Rebellion*, chapters 2 and 3.

¹²¹ Anderson, *A Collection of Poems*, p.52.

Odell's sensitivity to the toll the war took on ordinary colonists is plain to see here.¹²² This concern, though, was not without a political purpose. By identifying the French as ravenous plunderers, Odell calls into question the virtue of those who would have such "Tygers" as allies. The Continentals may "stand aghast" at the behaviour of their accomplices but having "loosen'd" the French from their "den" the responsibility (as far as Odell was concerned) was ultimately theirs.

The threat of the 'tyger' was particularly resonant in Georgia, especially in the backcountry. The war there was, by and large, defined by the use of irregular, guerrilla style tactics. Sylvia Frey encapsulated the situation best, describing the fighting in the backcountry as "predatory" and "self-perpetuating", with raiding banditti gangs a regular sight along the borders with East Florida and South Carolina.¹²³ The image of the French 'tyger' played directly to this experience, stoking fears of wild, bloodthirsty foreign bands plunging an already demoralised province further into a state of turmoil. The image of the "tyger" also functioned effectively as a dog-whistle calling forth the well-established trope of the barbarous and animal-like savage. This image was central to the founding of colonial America. In particular, it retained powerful grip on the minds of Georgia's white settler population during the revolutionary epoch (and beyond). It was, of course, employed traditionally against Native peoples. In his *Discourse of Western Planting* (1584), Richard Hakluyt continually emphasised the primitiveness and savageness of native Americans tribes.¹²⁴ A century later, in his pamphlet *New York*

¹²² This is a consistent theme throughout this poem as well as in Odell's other wartime works. In stanza four especially, Odell makes clear who the objects of his concern were, expressing sorrow for the "sore sigh'd mother", her terrified babes, and the trembling merchant.

¹²³ Frey, *Water from the Rock*, p.82.

¹²⁴ Richard Hakluyt, *Discourse of Western Planting: A Particuler Discourse Concerninge the Greate Necessitie and Manifoldde Commodityes that are Like to Growe to this Relame of Englande by the Westerne Discoureries Lately Attempted* (1584), Hakluyt Society (London, 1993).

Considered and Improved (1695), the Reverend John Miller drew on much the same language, describing “natural Indians” as “devilish and barbarous”.¹²⁵ As Roy Harvey Pearce has shown, the widespread belief that civilised men were once like those in the preliterate societies they ‘discovered’ in North America – a belief he refers to as “savageism” – nurtured a conviction that such people and such societies needed to be destroyed if progress and civilisation were to be realised.¹²⁶ The idea of the savage, in essence, acted as a dehumanising conceit that designated Native peoples as intellectually and morally lower, justifying their maltreatment and displacement. Using it against the revolutionaries’ gallic allies fulfilled much the same function. It made plain that the French as ‘tygers’ (and by extension the Patriot Americans who had taken them as their allies) stood apart from humane and civilised peoples, to be viewed and treated as contaminants to any good society.

This kind of characterisation of the revolutionaries’ French allies appeared in various guises regularly in the *Gazette*. One particularly ripe example commenting on “French Perfidy” appeared on October 11th, 1781. The piece retells the story of Louis XIV’s underhand takeover of Sicily. As a condition of marrying his sister, the author noted, Louis promised King Philip IV of Spain that he would renounce “whatever pretensions he might have to his [Philip’s] territories”. Louis, however, “contrary to common generosity” reneged and “stripped his brother-in-law ... of one of his finest kingdoms”. When under Spanish rule, so the story went, the city of Messina (capital of Sicily) made for “a very considerable figure” which “few cities went beyond” in terms of

¹²⁵ Reverend John Miller, *New Yorke Considered and Improved* (1695), Burrows (Cleveland, 1903).

¹²⁶ Roy Harvey Pearce, *The Savages of America: A Study of the Indian and the Idea of Civilisation*, The John Hopkins Press (Baltimore, 1953).

trade and beauty. Following Louis' land-grab, though, Messina was plunged "into a deep ruin without resource" and its population "groaned for some years under the French yoke." The writer added that when the Monsieur de la Feuillade became Viceroy in February 1768, it was believed by the city's inhabitants that he would provide for and protect them. They were, however, betrayed and after emptying the garrison of men and materials, Feuillade left the city defenceless and at "the mercy of the incensed Spanish." This affair was held out by the author to be a fine example of the "generosity, faith and friendship" of the French.¹²⁷

The story of French perfidy appeared less than four months after Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Brown surrendered Augusta to General Andrew Pickens and less than two months after the Patriot legislature was able to meet there for the first time in over a year, leaving Georgia with two competing governments and the rebels in control of the backcountry. Loyalists there were in full retreat. The majority fled for the cover of Savannah, some took to hiding in swamplands, and others (if neither of these options were possible) endeavoured to conceal their allegiances by any means available to them, which occasionally included siding with the Patriots. Indeed, Wright noted how the surrender at Augusta had severely dampened the spirits of the crown's supporters in Georgia and that without sufficient support or motivation nearly 8,000, most of them Loyalists, would be lost to the revolutionaries.¹²⁸ In such perilous times, the production and distribution of stories involving a familiar adversary served an important pedagogical and rallying function. The lesson in this case could not have been clearer:

¹²⁷ "A Curious Case of French Perfidy", October 11th, 1781, *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), p.3.

¹²⁸ Governor Sir James Wright to Lieutenant-Colonel Nisbet Balfour, July 27th, 1781, *Report on American Manuscripts in the Royal Institution of Great Britain*, vol.2, Mackie and Co. (London, 1904), p.315.

that French rule was a hazard to the progress of civilisation and where French armies trod, disgrace and ruin followed. As they were read privately and retold out loud, such stories distilled for their audience a history of gallic avarice, asset-stripping, and moral vacuity. Georgia, having matured into prosperity under royal rule prior to the Revolution, was in danger of becoming the next Messina under French and Patriot control. It was thus the duty of all loyal inhabitants to continue to fight against the imposition of what would be an inevitably degenerate regime.

The kind of epithets employed against the French by Odell and in the *Gazette* were part of a long tradition of Francophobia in British popular political culture. They were almost identical in content and tenor to those made use of when fear of a Jacobite revolt was high during the first decades of the eighteenth-century and also amid the invasion crisis during the 1740s. As Linda Colley points out, during these times of peril, anti-French tropes served as a powerful cement binding the various corners of Britain together.¹²⁹ In the absence of any overwhelming consensus or homogenising drivers, Britons could at least agree on their dissimilarity with the French. By foregrounding virulent anti-French discourse in their cultural campaign – by disparaging the French in poetry and in the press – Loyalists in Georgia sought to do much the same thing. The resurfacing of Francophobia in Georgia during the Revolution, however, was more than an atavistic hangover of earlier times. It was of contemporaneous import to the architecture of loyalism there for two reasons. Firstly, anti-French tropes and discourses provided a channel for individuals to assuage anxieties felt in the face of the French threat which was at their door and had laid siege to Savannah. Because we know that

¹²⁹ Colley, *Britons*, p.17

Britain and her allies would eventually triumph at Waterloo, it is easy to assume that the protracted imperial duel with France between 1689 and 1815 was destined for success. But, as Colley makes clear, right until the close of the nineteenth century, most members of Britain's imperial family viewed France as their most dangerous rival.¹³⁰ France had a larger population, vast commercial resources, and an exceptionally powerful set of armed forces. Their support for the revolutionaries made the threat of the loss of the thirteen colonies – along with their Caribbean possessions followed by possible terminal imperial decline – an unsettlingly real potentiality. Francophobic allegories which highlighted their moral, physical, and intellectual shortcomings served to weaken (in their own minds at least) their most powerful enemy. They thus made the challenge they posed, which was immediately perceived by loyal Georgians, internally manageable.

Perhaps more importantly though, in a war that ruptured the identity of British-Americans in Georgia and forced them to rethink the boundaries of their sense of self, Francophobic discourses and allegories were useful and instantly available instruments for self-location. Anti-French stories and poems – which were made germane by the presence of French forces in the region – brought the contest into the orbit of an imperial conflict with which they were already conversant. They thus prompted loyal Georgians (many of whom carried the memory of the French menace during the 1760s with them through to the invasion of the province by d'Estaing forces) to historicise the Revolution and think of it as an extension of an older contest. Consequently, they helped them think of those who took the French as their allies not as persons with whom they

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.24-5.

ostensibly had much in common (or perhaps even knew personally prior to the war) but as a kind of invidious fifth column collaborating with Britain's historic enemy to reverse the progress of the Empire and the successes which had been achieved in Georgia under royal rule. Francophonic stories and displays were thus elemental to the Georgia Loyalists' efforts to imaginatively distance themselves from their former colonial brethren and so re-secure their subject positions within the imperial polity. They were, in short, imperially grown but locally inspired vehicles for the expression of difference with their rebellious counterparts which were vital to the construction of their wartime identity.

Loyal Georgians, however, also made sure to distance themselves from their revolutionary opponents directly. By discrediting independence supporters as duplicitous, uncivilised, self-interested, and effeminate, Loyalist discourses and performances worked to undermine the legitimacy of the republican cause. Their purpose was to demystify and devalue the Revolution by unmasking its leading advocates. To the onlooking audience, active Patriots were held out as a people apart, lying outside the embrace of the imperial family (which was, in effect, to be outside of civilisation). In an era of radical and unwelcome change, this notion was both consoling and profoundly necessary. It made it easier to maintain faith in the idea of a united Empire of which they were a part and helped forestall their slide into what one British parliamentarian saw as the danger of "supine despair".¹³¹

They did this first by portraying the conflict as the work of a small cabal of ambitious plotters. This was certainly the view in Britain. The *Gazette* reported on the

¹³¹ As reported on January 25th, 1781, *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), p.1.

February 15th, 1781, that the King believed the outbreak of the conflict was down to “a faction that wishes to rule over the whole republic, and is ever ready to sacrifice the publick good to its own private views.”¹³² Staged on September 27th, 1781, at a small theatre on Broughton Street, Savannah, a performance of *The Tragedy of Jane Shore* iterated exactly this belief in a subtle, yet distinct way.¹³³ Written in 1714 by William Rowe, the play recounts the story of Elizabeth Shore.¹³⁴ In it, Shore – described by Rowe as a kind woman – encourages William, Lord Hastings (her then lover) to oppose Richard III’s usurpation of the throne following the death of his brother Edward IV in April 1483.¹³⁵ He duly did so. But having ascended to the throne in any case, a vengeful Richard set about punishing Shore and Hastings. The former was made to repent publicly and held at Ludgate gaol for many years whilst the latter was summarily executed in the Tower of London.

The parallels between the Loyalists’ own situation in Georgia and what was being shown to them on the stage were plain for all to see. It is consequently hard to avoid the impression that the choice to reprise this particular play during the war was made with this parallel mind. For friends of government in the audience, reflected back at them were a set of characters and circumstances that must have seemed remarkably relatable. The revolutionary leaders, of course, were personified by Richard: conniving

¹³² As reported on the February 15th, 1781, *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), p.1.

¹³³ An advert for the staging of “The Tragedy of Jane Shore”, Thursday September 21st, 1781, *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), p.2.

¹³⁴ Elizabeth was re-christened as ‘Jane’ by Thomas Heywood who made her the focal point of his play, *Edward IV*, in 1599.

¹³⁵ The basis of Richard III’s claim to the throne was that his brother’s sons – Edward and Richard – were the products of a bigamous marriage and therefore could not inherit the throne. Such claims, though believable given Edward’s reputation with women, were never proven beyond doubt with many, such as Henry Stafford, 2nd Duke of Buckingham, believing them to be a fabrication conceived to install Richard as King.

and acquisitive tyrants who, by nefarious methods, were high-jacking power for themselves. Supporters of the crown in Georgia were, by contrast, the 'Shores' and 'Hastings' of their day: bravely opposing the imposition of an unjust and unwanted regime. As with stories that sought to warn of the dangers of the Franco-American alliance, the *Tragedy of Jane Shore* – by virtue of the relatability of its cast and its context – had an important instructive role. Despite their sufferings, Shore and Hastings were ultimately vindicated. Richard's reign was short-lived and plagued by opposition. After narrowly surviving an uprising led by supporters of Edward IV in October 1483, he was killed at the Battle of Bosworth in August 1485 during Henry Tudor's rebellion. For members of the audience, the lesson was again a simple one. In the five months prior to the play's staging, British forces had suffered two decisive losses in the South at the Battles of King's Mountain and Cowpens, both of which were reported widely. But as Shore and Hastings (as well as the cause they sided with) eventually triumphed, so too would those who stood against the leaders of independence if only they remained committed. The purpose of Richard's power grab – like their revolutionary adversaries – was not to address a valid wrong or further a righteous cause. It was to satisfy an appetite for means and status that could not have otherwise been acquired. But, being built on ambition, cunning, and ruthlessness, it lacked the proper foundation needed to sustain a just order and was therefore doomed to fail. This was a soothing notion for Georgia Loyalists. It allowed them to engage in the encouraging fantasy that, despite recent losses, their eventual victory was assured, and the successes of the revolutionaries were neither sustainable nor inevitable.

The idea that the Revolution was an illegitimate usurpation of a good order was put out in various forms throughout the provinces. Following the British success on Long

Island on August 2nd, 1776, for instance, a two-act farce entitled *The Battle of Brooklyn* opened in New York. The farce, presumably of Loyalist origin, ridiculed the Rebel leadership as incompetent and scheming, and regular Whig troops as credulous. In act one: scene four, the character of George Washington is seen in conversation in with General John Sullivan of New Hampshire. During the exchange, Washington exclaims:

*Our soldiers are a standing miracle to me; they desine sensibly upon matters that are unimportant to them and resign their powers of thinking to us in a case where their all is at stake and do not yet discover that we make them the engines of our power at the expence of all that is dear and sacred to them!*¹³⁶

Here, Washington's character is presented as a conniving and consciously malevolent commander leading a gullible multitude astray from their natural allegiances. His purpose was not to further a just cause. Rather, it was to beguile unthinking independence supporters in order to increase his wealth and power. He stands, in effect, as a proxy for all of the Revolution's leaders who were held to have nurtured baseless discontent amongst otherwise happy subjects and prompted them to mindlessly take up arms against Britain. This view of the independence movement was based entirely on circular reasoning. The acceptance of any one of its assumptions necessitates the acceptance of the others. Since clear-sighted Americans had no grounds for grievance, the war itself could not be justified in any serious way. Since the war could not be

¹³⁶ *The Battle of Brooklyn: A Farce in Two Acts*, New York (1776), Act 1: Scene 4, p.24, printed for J. Rivington, University of California Libraries, accessed through www.archive.org.

justified, it followed that it could not possibly be supported by anyone other than the disordered or the dishonest. The circle was self-contained and utterly misleading. It nonetheless enabled Loyalists to imaginatively limit the scope and the danger of the Revolution and think of themselves as belonging to a wider community of right-thinking individuals advancing a truly just cause.

These themes were echoed by Odell in his poem *The Word of Congress* (1779). In it, "Truth's unerring pencil" condemns the Patriot authorities as a "hydra-headed form, with harpies claws" whose mission had been to "Fill with rage the poor distracted crowd; / Whilst Discord claps her hands, and shouts aloud."¹³⁷ It is the description of the Congress as a hydra which stands out in this passage. The second labour of Hercules was the destruction of the hydra of Lerna. As Hercules cut-off one after another of the hydra's heads, two new ones would grow in their place. With help from his nephew, Iolaus, he eventually killed the monster by striking at the central head and cauterising the stump with a flaming branch. From the earliest days of English imperial expansion, colonial officials found in this story a convenient metaphor. Hercules, the greatest of the Greek heroes, was a useful and inspiring symbol for their jurisdiction and the rightness of their rule. Conversely, the hydra was a handy antithetical symbol for those acting against the established order which was, by definition, a grotesque and monstrous act.¹³⁸ Using the image of the hydra against Congress laid bare the Loyalist belief that the conflict was not the result of popularly held sentiments but was instead the work of a minority of agitators that formed the corpus of the rebel leadership. Patriot leaders

¹³⁷ Anderson, *A Collection of Poems*, pp.42-3.

¹³⁸ Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: The Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic*, Verso (London, 2012), pp.2-3.

were thought of as the central head sustaining the rest of the revolutionary monster. Once it was cut off and cauterised – that is to say once the Revolution’s leaders were exposed as the fraudulent and avaricious hacks friends of government perceived them to be – support for the independence campaign, it was believed, would dissipate and Britain’s victory in America would be secured. This form of attack helped explain away the Revolution as a movement built on sand, engineered by small group of conspirators who worked “not from principle, but Lucre”.¹³⁹

The hydra metaphor, as Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker have shown, was also pregnant with status undertones. Along with terms like ‘mob’ and ‘motley group’, it christened those it was used against as base and barbaric and distanced them from polite society where *real* men were reared. It conjured up images of frenzy and uncontrolled power. It thus spoke directly to the Loyalists’ fear that the war would undo the calcified social hierarchies upon which good order (as the they saw it) was based. Such fears were underscored by Odell as he portrayed ordinary Patriot Americans as “rage-filled” and “distracted”. These labels worked to reinforce the idea that the Revolution was not an expression of reasoned political grievance. Rebellious Americans, so the logic went, had simply lost sight of the reciprocal benefits wrought by the imperial connection as a result of the artifices and manoeuvrings of the Revolution’s monstrous leaders. This point was made explicitly by Bermuda’s Lieutenant-Governor George Bruere in a speech given to the Georgia Assembly which was printed in the *Gazette* on

¹³⁹ Hannah Griffiths writing as “Fidelia”, as quoted in *The English Literatures of America 1500-1800*, eds. Myra Jehlen and Michael Warner, Routledge (London, 1997), p.1084. No single figure was targeted more in this regard than Paine. In *The Word of Congress*, Paine is denounced as a “scribbling imp”, a “hireling author”, and a “True son of Grubbstreet”. The figure of the Grubb Street hireling was a familiar one in early modern English culture, a writer whose mercenary work was demonised by critics such as Alexander Pope and Samuel Johnson who feared the commercialisation of print. For a discussion on the historical construction of the ‘Grubb Street hireling’, see Gould, *Writing the Rebellion*, chp.4.

September 27th, 1781. Bruere lamented how “the machinations of the artful, restless, wicked, and ambitious” had prevailed so far on “a credulous infatuated people as to take up arms against the best sovereign and the mildest government”.¹⁴⁰ Crucially, though, these kinds of labels – credulous, distracted, infatuated, rage-filled – carried a sense of impermanence. They were weighted with the implication that support for independence was but a momentary malaise of sorts which, with the proper exposure to reason, could be cured.¹⁴¹ This language strained at consensus and was based near totally on the fanciful belief that former ties would eventually reassert themselves amongst the great mass of Patriot Americans given times. It thus worked to recast the independence movement as something which lacked a truly popular foundation and helped friends of government reconceptualise their troubles as the temporary result of misplaced resentments.

Despite its implied transience, references to the rage of Patriots were an ever-present part of the Georgia Loyalists’ campaign to discredit their enemies and the cause they fought for. Published in the *Gazette* on August 16th, 1781, for example, a poem by William Whitehead (the British poet laureate) contemplated the “Rage of War”:

Still does the Rage of War prevail,

Still thirsts for Blood th’ insatiate Spear?

Wast not, ye Winds, th’ invidious Tale,

¹⁴⁰ A speech of Lieutenant-Governor Bruere given to the Assembly of Bermuda on the 19th June last, Thursday September 27th, 1781, *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), p.1.

¹⁴¹ See Robert M. Calhoon, “The Uses of Reason in Political Upheaval”, *Tory Insurgents*, pp.109-21.

*Nor let th' untutor'd Nations hear
That Passion baffles Reason's boasted Reign,
And Half the peopled World is civilised in vain.
What are Morals, what are Laws,
What Religion's sacred Name?
Nor Morals soften, nor Religion awes;
Pure tho' the Precepts flow, the Actions are the same.
Revenge and Pride, and deadly Hate,
And Av'rice tainting deep the Mind,
With all the Fury Feinds that wait
As tort'ring Plagues on human Kind,
When shown in their own native Light,
In Truth's clean Mirror, heav'nly bright,
Like real Monsters rise;
But let Illusion's pow'rful Wind
Transform, arrange, the hideous Band,
They cheat us in Disguise.¹⁴²*

¹⁴² "Ode for his Majesty's Birth-Day", 16th August 1781, *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), p.4.

Whitehead's poem was written as an "Ode for his Majesty's Birth Day". Such odes were composed annually by the poet laureate and published regularly in newspapers and periodicals on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet, this was the only *official* birthday ode to appear in the *Gazette* throughout the war. It was, in other words, an exceptional decision to publish it. Its message, therefore, appears to some extent tailored to circumstances in Georgia in the summer of 1781. On June 5th, the day after the King's birthday, rebel forces commanded by Elijah Clarke scored another decisive victory at Augusta, consolidating their control of the area around Wilkes county. Georgia was literally a province split in two: half Patriot controlled, and half Loyalist controlled. (Of course, given the relative size of the Tory population in Georgia, the state was split down the middle long before this point). Whitehead's ode spoke directly to this division. The rage, passions, and tainted minds he refers to did not, it seems, belong to all colonists. Rather, he suggests that they were specifically the property of a "hideous band" and the "Monsters" who had forsaken morality and the law in favour of rebellion. As Odell had done in *The Word of Congress*, Whitehead's poem worked to cast the Revolution's leaders (as well as, to a more limited extent, their followers) as unstable and mentally flawed. The natural corollary of this point was that the ends they pursued were equally unsound. Whitehead's poem thus reiterated the view that the Revolution was not genuinely popular movement. It was, rather, a cause foisted on an otherwise content people by a 'select band' who sought only the promotion of their self-interest. He makes the point clear in the final line: "they cheat *us* in disguise". The use of the collective pronoun "us" posits the existence of an audience of like-minds as well as an even larger community who had been cheated out of their wits and natural allegiances by furious and avaricious hucksters disguised as men of virtue and 'pure precepts'.

Whitehead's poem sat in a crowded field of commentaries in the *Gazette* which discussed the fury and rage of independence supporters. One piece noted with frustration the blind fanaticism of those who "led astray by ignorance and malice ... will hearken to nothing but their own rage and delusions".¹⁴³ Another lamented how "former friends and neighbours, instead of securing peace ... should be actuated by folly, presumption, rage, and despair".¹⁴⁴ In almost all cases, the revolutionaries' rage was framed in terms of absurdity, even lunacy. Such portrayals lay at the heart of a rhetorical powerplay through which status was asserted and the idea of 'fitness' established. In so doing, anti-independence discourses in Georgia worked to condemn the revolutionaries in two ways. First, they cast Patriot Americans as the wrong *type* of men. Eighteenth century British-American society cautioned male subjects to act with a high degree of emotional control. Not only had the Patriots failed to meet these expectations, they had wildly deviated from them. Their fury, comprising a cocktail of ignorance and an as yet unfulfilled appetite for power, was evidence of their social degeneracy. These were base men unable to discipline their own minds and lacking the patience and imagination to register their supposed grievances in a manner expected of statesmen. By extension, anti-independence discourses also questioned whether the revolutionaries were, in fact, *real* men at all. Accusations of rage and disorder were deliberately emasculating. In eighteenth century America, masculinity was a precarious disposition that was vulnerable to decay.¹⁴⁵ The Patriots' anger was symptomatic of such decay. It was thought of as linked intimately to a weakness of will and mind that was commonly

¹⁴³ "An Evil man Seeketh only Rebellion", September 28th, 1780, *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), p.1.

¹⁴⁴ "A Caution to Honest Travellers", Thursday May 10th, 1781, *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), p.1.

¹⁴⁵ Stephen Dudink, John Tosh, and Karen Hagermann, "Masculinity in Politics and War in the Age of Democratic Revolutions 1750-1850", in *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History*, eds. Stephen Dudink and Karen Hagermann, Manchester University Press (Manchester, 2004), p.11.

associated with contemporary ideas of femininity. In the Loyalists' calculus, their opponents' inability to govern their own emotions translated into an unmanly inability to act effectively and responsibly as heads of households and, by extension, heads of society. Notions of gender thus became embedded in the revolutionaries' subaltern status. The Revolution's leaders were lesser statesmen because, simply, they were lesser men: less civilised, less disciplined, and thus less qualified to rule.

There was, however, an obvious problem with this formulation. The Loyalists were themselves engaged in a war that required them to indulge in the occasional expression of rage: on the page, in coffeehouses, and in theatres, as well as on the battlefield. One new song in Georgia, for example, which celebrated the volunteers of Augusta, was scorched with the rhetoric of rage. The song was a typical call to arms:

Come join, my brave lads, come all from afar,

We're all Volunteers, all ready for war;

Our service is free, for honour we fight,

Regardless of hardships by day or by night.

Chorus: Then all draw your swords, and constantly sing,

Success to our Troops, our Country, and King.

.....

They've plunder'd our houses, attempted our lives,

Drove off from their homes our children and wives;

Such plundering miscreants no mercy can crave,

Such murdering villains no mercy shall have.

Chorus: Then all draw your swords, and constantly sing,

Success to our Troops, our Country, and King

Then think not of plunder, but rush on the foe,

Pursue them, my boys, with blow after blow,

Till in their own blood we see them all welter,

Or behind the Blue Mountains retreat for a shelter

Chorus: Then all draw your swords, and constantly sing,

Success to our Troops, our Country, and King.¹⁴⁶

At first sight, such calls for revenge and bloodshed appear motivated by the same anger that characterised the Patriots' political and social malfeasance. There was, however, a crucial difference in the way Loyalists framed their anger *vis-à-vis* their enemies. This difference rested on the idea of communal defence. Loyalists in Georgia inhabited

¹⁴⁶ "The Volunteers of Augusta: A New Song to the Tune of The Lilies of France", October 4th, 1781, *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), p.2.

perhaps the most hotly contested strip of land anywhere in America during the Revolution. They were on the frontline of the campaign to rebuild royal America. The conflict there was bleak and bloody. In this context, their anger was not just permissible but vitally important. It was driven, so they claimed, by a desire to protect their homes, wives, and children from “plundering miscreants” and “murdering villains”. Their fury was thus rational and compassionate. It was packaged as fundamentally linked to the administration of justice and inspired by a sense of duty to those under their care that was central to the idea of the father and the guardian. This was a quintessentially masculine form of anger, infused with honour and virtue. It was held out as superior in every way to their rivals’ rage which was, by contrast, the result of an effeminate lack of emotional control and their selfish pursuit of means and power.

The Georgia Loyalists’ campaign to ‘other’ their enemies (Patriot American as well as French) may be broadly defined by a simple dichotomy: an appeal to positive ends – the abrogation of the independence movement and the restoration of British America – with negative warnings about the threat posed by those who had brought war to a once free and happy society. It worked to strip the revolutionaries of their pretences to virtue and thus undermine entirely the cause they fought for. As such, Loyalist performances and discourses in Georgia, which were conceived to assail independence supporters and their French allies, were simultaneously backward and forward-looking. They implicitly pointed to a time of success and prosperity in the colony under royal rule and contrasted it with the disaster and destitution they warned would follow a rebel victory. They were thus didactic tools which were pinned firmly to their regional experiences, conceived to rally and reassure their audience that their future interests were best served by supporting the maintenance of the imperial connection

which had previously worked so well for them. Importantly, they were also tools for self-location. They prompted loyal Georgians to imaginatively orientate themselves away from their rebellious counterparts by constructing a wall of difference based on moral and intellectual uprightness with individuals they often looked, sounded, and acted like. They thus helped mitigate the discomfort felt by individuals whose ostensible American-ness rubbed awkwardly against their identities as subjects of the British Empire.

Having established what they were not, it was critical for Loyalists in Georgia to construct a compelling picture of what they *were*. The Revolution had left them with a feeling that part of their past – and thus a part of themselves – had been brutally amputated. They sought (in part) to correct this by placing the butchers of that past outside the orbit of the intellectually and morally sound. Negative warnings regarding the wrongheadedness of the revolutionaries and the cause they espoused, though, were insubstantial in and of themselves. They lacked the sanguine optimism needed to rally a constituency broad and united enough to conceivably stand-up to the independence movement and to consolidate a positive sense of self and belonging. Given the savageness of the war in Georgia, the terrible instability of daily life there, and their nagging similarity to their revolutionary foes, Loyalists in Georgia needed to nurture a well of groupness with other members of Britain's imperial family with which they could anchor their sense of place and belonging as subjects of the Empire.

In the midst of the crisis they found themselves in, though, Loyalists in Georgia were forced to question what could possibly provide the unity they craved. One obvious answer was military success. Martial victories provided rallying flashes for the crown's

supporters in Georgia, allowing them to think of themselves as sharing in a moment of joy and relief with their fellow Brits in other colonies and in the mother country too. Following the repulse of Franco-American troops from Savannah in the Autumn of 1779, for instance, festivities to mark the triumph were organised and enjoyed across the colony. On October 22nd, Georgia's Executive Council announced a province-wide day of public thanksgiving for "the late deliverance and preservation of this town [Savannah]".¹⁴⁷ These festivities were subsequently made into an annual event. As secretary of the Georgia Loyalist Society, Captain Alexander McGoun – a Savannah merchant who had emigrated to the colony in early 1775 – advertised an event in the *Royal Georgia Gazette* on September 28th, 1780, to commemorate "the memorable 9th October".¹⁴⁸ The Loyalist Society's commemorations came just a matter of weeks after the Executive Council ordered public celebrations on the reduction of Charleston by British forces under General Sir Henry Clinton. Bonfires were lit and bread, rum, and cheese were brought for the populace and militia based in Savannah at the Council's expense, costing £33.12.¹⁴⁹

Military successes, though, were by their nature transitory and fleeting. This was perhaps truer in Georgia than anywhere else in the colonies, especially in the backcountry where triumph regularly followed disaster for supporters on both sides of the conflict. Simply put, martial victories were not enduring enough to successfully

¹⁴⁷ *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society*, vol.10, Savannah (1952), p.52.

¹⁴⁸ *Royal Georgia Gazette*, Thursday September 28th (Savannah), p.3.

¹⁴⁹ The siege of Charleston lasted from March 29th to May 12th and in conjunction with the victory at Savannah provided a much-needed boon to royalist forces following the collapse of the northern campaign and the withdrawal from Philadelphia in 1778. For a good account of the successful British siege and later defence of the town see Carl P. Borick, *A Gallant Defense: The Siege of Charleston 1780*, Columbia University Press (New York, 2003). For accounts of the Council's expenses for these celebrations see *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society*, vol.10, pp.109-10.

foster a deep and sustaining sense of internal group commonality that would allow Loyalists in Georgia to solder themselves into something like a cogent bloc of like minds. If friends of government there were to successfully do this, whatever it was they organised their performances, social events, and public discourse around needed to be sufficiently broad and diuturnal enough to bridge the manifold individual differences that defined the loyal population there. Some figures, events, or ideas simply did not possess the necessary symbolic weight to do this. What they leant on thus reflected what might be thought of the essential core of their sense of self that was shaped by the demands of the moment. Faced with the tumult of the war, Loyalists in Georgia filled their collective identity by looking backwards and turning to history. Not just any history, of course, but a history all Loyalists there shared: the history of Georgia under royal rule (the world they knew before the war) plotted in a particular way around the figure of the king.

The nucleus of the Georgia Loyalists' groupness – the emblematic wellspring from which all the tributaries of their common self flowed – was the monarchy. From the earliest days of colonial America, monarchicalist displays and discourses dominated the public scene. As Newman points out, this was especially true in the southern provinces *vis-à-vis* their neighbours in New England and the middle Atlantic region.¹⁵⁰ During the late-1730s and early-1740s, for instance, newly arrived settlers in Savannah annually remembered George II's coronation with "gun-firing and drinking healths to the Royal family ... under the flag".¹⁵¹ These kinds of performances gave ordinary individuals (who usually possessed no public voice) the chance to profess their thanks

¹⁵⁰ Newman, *Parades and the Politics of the Street*, p.13.

¹⁵¹ As quoted in McConville, *The King's Three Faces*, p.67.

for the imperial connection and express their attachment to the mother country. They helped to imaginatively link disparate subjects to other persons in far off locales and prompted them to think of themselves as belonging to a larger, more glorious imperial family. During the Revolution, as their continued membership of that family became subject to uncertainty, Loyalists in Georgia overlaid such practices. Throughout the war, the monarchy gave a positive focus to their public discourses and performances. In January 1781, for instance, a dance “To celebrate the Queen’s Birth-Night” was advertised in the *Gazette*, with all who wished to attend promised “tea, coffee and cake as usual”.¹⁵² Loyalist fighting men in Georgia kept the King especially close to mind during their soldierly gatherings and martial ceremonies. Indeed, they were actively encouraged to do so. Upon signing-up, recruits to the King’s Own Regiment, quartered in Savannah during late-1781, were given a crown that was to be used expressly “to drink to his majesty’s health.”¹⁵³ Earlier in the year, in celebration of George III’s forty-fourth birthday, sailors at Fort Prevost (Savannah) fired a cannon salute at noon. The festivities were continued into the afternoon with “genteel entertainment ... illuminations, bonfires, and other demonstrations of joy” marking the day.¹⁵⁴

Accounts of royalist celebrations from elsewhere in the colonies also made their way into the consciousness of Georgia’s loyal inhabitants via the *Gazette*. News of Prince William Henry’s visit to New York, for example, reached Savannah in late-1781. The prince, it was said, was greeted with a full military parade followed by a “fine dinner” and was met with the “happy approval” of all loyal subjects there (the news of which

¹⁵² As advertised on January 11th, 1781, *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), p.2.

¹⁵³ As advertised on November 29th, 1781, *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), p.3. This advert for volunteers to the King’s Own Regiment was repeated across several editions during late-1781.

¹⁵⁴ As reported on June 7th, 1781, *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), p.3.

was presumably met with an equally happy reception in re-royalised Georgia).¹⁵⁵ Importantly, Georgia Loyalists were also able to engage with monarchical red-letter days that were taking place in Britain and make them part of their social world through the *Gazette*. Perhaps of greatest significance in this regard was the birth of George III's son, Prince Alfred. Congratulatory notices were reprinted across several editions of the *Gazette* – to be read privately as well as aloud amongst crowds – with complete transcriptions of a House of Commons' motion signalling their happiness at the birth and the good health of the Queen.¹⁵⁶ By carrying such notices, the *Gazette* served an important intermediary role. They helped loyal Georgians think of themselves as being linked to other faithful subjects who shared their desire to celebrate the monarchy and in so doing affirm their attachment to Britain. They brought into view a larger constituency of like minds with whom they shared habits, tastes, affections, fealties, and histories (an essential thought for Georgia's loyal inhabitants who, at several points, feared becoming a subjugated minority cut-off from all means of support).

These kinds of royalist celebrations worked on several levels and fulfilled multiple functions. These functions can be divided as having external consequences (consequences which affected how Loyalists in Georgia appeared to others) and internal consequences (consequences that affected how Loyalists in Georgia thought of themselves). The external functions were primarily social and political. Events like dances and toast-givings – which were usually enjoyed in conjunction with some kind of civic feast – were most obviously recreational affairs. They provided an outlet for basic

¹⁵⁵ As reported on December 27th, 1781, *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), p.1.

¹⁵⁶ As reported on January 25th, 1781, *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), p.1. This notice was repeated across several editions during the early months of 1781.

social needs and respite from day-to-day antagonisms, serving as festive counterpoints to the strictures and the drudgery of wartime.¹⁵⁷ Crucially, as Mona Ozouf has shown in the context of the French Revolution, these types of events acted as convivial safety-valves, preventing the temptation of intemperance – which, as a reactionary stance, is always present at times of distress – from spilling into daily life.¹⁵⁸ They took these potentially distracting forms of activity and siloed them into specific occasions of communal bonding based around the single, unifying idea of celebrating the monarchy. Beneath this layer of conviviality, though, pro-monarchist displays and occasion days also acted as re-enforcers of civic authority. They were public reminders of who was in charge and carried the implicit threat of sanction if conformity was not sufficiently demonstrated. They were a way for the ruling party to exert its hegemony and bolster its claims of popular support and legitimacy. Of course, in the context of a coercive war, it should not be assumed that everyone who attended a pro-monarchist display or listened to, say, a poem about the king's birthday were invested fully in the royalist cause. In Savannah following the restoration of royal rule, for instance, some there may have been former Patriots simply wishing to conceal their true leanings. As a province where authority changed hands during the war, Georgia (and especially Savannah) was a place where performances of allegiance were conducted in full view of erstwhile enemies. But the absolute sincerity of participants and onlookers was, in any case, less important than the overall effect they helped to create: the outward appearance of a harmonious community organised around the monarchy.

¹⁵⁷ Edward Muir, *Rituals in Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge 1997), pp.57-8

¹⁵⁸ Mona Ozouf, *Festivals of the French Revolution*, Harvard University Press (Cambridge MA, 1988), p.4.

Royalist celebrations and discourses also satisfied more intimate internal functions that were self-consciously directed toward the Loyalists themselves. Crucially, they provided a countervailing point of order amidst manifest chaos. With a few notable exceptions, monarchy was historically associated with, and in many ways inseparable from, notions of consistency and continuity. Importantly, for many individuals in Georgia royal rule was also historically associated with prosperity and stability. In a world where governing social paradigms once thought to be immutable were being uprooted and replaced, the monarchy acted as an allegorical umbilical cord to a space in time in which they had confidence. Such sentiments were most powerfully expressed in Georgia in an ode published “On His Majesty’s Birth-Day” (an *unofficial* birthday ode):

Return, O Golden Age, make war and discord cease,

Grant George’s warmest wish, and all the nation peace.

May justice, mercy, truth, his royal throne maintain,

*And Friends and Rebels see our God and George does reign.*¹⁵⁹

Here, celebrating the monarch became a way to implicitly celebrate the society and the “Golden Age” he presided over. It drew attention the privileges colonial Americans previously enjoyed – prosperity, justice, mercy, truth – and suggestively contrasted them to the discord that had been wrought by the Revolution. After the patriots had ceremoniously buried him, the Georgia Loyalists worked to resurrect the king in America

¹⁵⁹ “On His Majesty’s Birth-Day”, 7th June 1781, *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), p.3.

as a symbol of an idealised age of economic, social, and cultural vitalisation they wished to resurrect. Crucially, by recalling this age, loyal Georgians also brought to mind its regular routines and scenes: the hidden, local rhythms which defined individuals' lives as colonial Georgians around which they wrapped their embodied, reflexive sense of self and place. In so doing, they mapped the cultural construction of their identity as supporters of the crown during the war directly against their provincial histories as colonial Georgians which conveyed fixity and steadiness amidst manifestly unsettling change.

By recasting time and space in this way, friends of government in Georgia also sought to create a well of groupness amongst themselves based on their common memory of a happy colonial heritage brought to mind by the figure of the king. Performances and discourses orientated around the monarchy helped to smooth out any internal differences amongst loyal Georgians, pulling together often fractious and disparate individuals by allowing their shared status as subjects under the crown to rise to the top. This was especially important for Loyalists in Georgia from 1781 onwards. As previously noted, with the loss of Augusta in June that year and what looked like the irretrievable ceding of control in the backcountry, Georgia was made into a divided province. The British experiment – to make “an easy conquest” of the rest of the country from the bottom-up following the establishment of firm control in Georgia – had seemingly failed.¹⁶⁰ Indeed, James Wright stated his concern in blunt terms in a letter to the 1st Viscount Sackville, George Germain, Secretary of State for the colonies, on

¹⁶⁰ Sir James Wright expressed the belief that the country would become an “easy conquest” following victory at the siege of Savannah in a letter to the 1st Viscount Sackville, George Germain, Secretary of State for the colonies, November 9th, 1779. See *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society*, vol.3, Savannah (1873), p.271.

January 18th, 1782. Whilst reiterating the province's general fealty to the King, Wright stated that lacking renewed support from Britain, many naturally loyal inhabitants (as he saw them) had "from necessity" joined the ranks of continental forces gathering on the South Carolina border lead by Major-General Nathaniel Greene and Brigadier-General Anthony Wayne.¹⁶¹ In this fractured and dispiriting environment, the monarchy provided friends of government with a single, positive point of focus around which they could collectively co-ordinate themselves. Reading a royalist poem, listening to a pro-monarchist song, attending a dance, or observing a toast prompted Georgia Loyalists to imagine themselves as belonging to a larger local constituency, forestalling thoughts of group shrinkage and decline. They helped individuals' part-recreate the experience of life as it had been and reaffirm the links of habit and thought they had with other loyal Georgians.

Importantly, by orientating their identity and popular political culture around the monarchy, Loyalists in Georgia worked to re-secure their place within the transoceanic community of imperial Britons. The idea of transatlantic affiliations – of Britishness itself – was a precarious construct in the late-eighteenth century. The national achievements upon which such notions were built – the Hanoverian succession, the Whig supremacy, the union between England and Scotland – were fragile.¹⁶² This conceptual delicacy was thrown into sharp relief in America by the Revolution which was marked by the precipitous slipping-away of Britain's physical and authoritative presence in the colonies. At this violently transitional moment, the Loyalists worked to secure a sense

¹⁶¹ Sir James Wright to the 1st Viscount Sackville, George Germain, Secretary of State for the colonies, January 18th, 1782, *ibid.*, p.362.

¹⁶² Timothy M. Barnes and Robert M. Calhoon, "Loyalist Discourse and the Moderation of the American Revolution", *Tory Insurgents*, p.161.

of self, and demonstrate their closeness to Britain, by bringing the king to America. Stories, parades, toasts, and poems which celebrated the monarchy brought the king into the view of ordinary colonists, making that which was distant seem tangible. Significantly, they also allowed Loyalists in Georgia to think of themselves as intimately linked to Britons in the metropole according to an emotional and calendrical simultaneity based on a shared attachment to the monarchy. When friends of government there celebrated a royal birthday by reading a poem, for instance, they did so in the understandable belief that subjects in Britain were also engaging in some sort of similar activity. They thus created amongst the crown's supporters in Georgia an imagined sense of parallelism with their brethren in the heart of the Empire. In so doing, the king was made into a kind of omnipotent father: a figure who was everywhere at once, knitting various parts of his family together, through whom all imperial anxieties could be assuaged and addressed.

The ground upon which the Loyalists attempted to build their groupness, however, brought into focus the existence of an imaginary gap in Britain's imperial family. Although the king was everywhere a powerful foundation for notions of national and imperial belonging, the degree of strength to which this was manifest differed greatly for Loyalists *vis-à-vis* Britons in the home islands. The Georgia Loyalists' attachment to the king, for all the reasons already noted, was passionate. Monarchy-focussed displays and productions in Georgia during the war were, in the Geertzian sense, 'models'. They were, in essence, scaled-down versions of royal Georgia (as the Loyalists imagined it) before the Revolution and through which they offered their authentic view of how the state and Empire ought to be put-together with the king at

its heart.¹⁶³ He was, in other words, the figure around which loyal Georgians arbitrated their relationship to each other and the state. The monarchy thus provided an imaginative framework with which individuals could secure their sense of place and belonging.¹⁶⁴ The logic imparted by the Georgia Loyalists' royalist political culture thus suggests they viewed the monarch as the essential location of sovereignty in the Empire.¹⁶⁵ The king was a conduit through which Georgia's loyal inhabitants understood imperial structures and their place within them.

Symbolically elevating the monarchy in this way, though, rubbed uncomfortably against the prevailing sensibilities of subjects in Britain (especially in the metropole). Regard for the monarchy there was altogether more ordinary. It was supported by the established state church, long held but diminishingly important customs, a rigid social structure, a tightly controlled land tenure system, and (perhaps most importantly) physical immediacy.¹⁶⁶ But, as Cannadine points out, the king in eighteenth century England was not a symbolically "Olympian" figure. The limited cultural influence of London, coupled with uneven economic development nationally, made any sense of national affinity appear weak in comparison with communal attachments. In this highly decentralised environment, the scope for presenting a ceremoniously enhanced monarchy was restricted.¹⁶⁷ Where the monarchy was overtly celebrated, it was more

¹⁶³ Muir, *Rituals in Early Modern Europe*, p.230.

¹⁶⁴ This view of the monarchy, as Eric Nelson has recently demonstrated, was broadly shared by Patriot Americans who also made the king central to their political thought and their conception of Empire. As Nelson shows, before the Revolution, the Continental Congress petitioned the king (not parliament) as loyal subjects in the hope *he* would address their concerns. After the Revolution began, the king (thanks largely to the work of Thomas Paine) was made the focus of the Patriots' enmity and was personally indicted for not having intervened on colonists' behalf against the tyrannous actions of his ministers. See *The Royalist Revolution*, pp.109-10.

¹⁶⁵ McConville, *The King's Three Faces*, p.249.

¹⁶⁶ McConville, *The King's Three Faces*, p.106.

¹⁶⁷ Cannadine, "The Context, Meaning, and Performance of Ritual", *The Invention of Tradition*, p.110.

often than not for its governmental value rather than its social or cultural value. The sacred qualities that were poured into the king's person by Loyalists in Georgia (as well as in, say, seventeenth and sixteenth century England) was in eighteenth century England saved for the hallowed constitution.¹⁶⁸ Instead of narrowing the Atlantic gap, therefore, the Georgia Loyalists' choice to absorb themselves in monarchical themes served to re-emphasise it. Annoyingly similar yet frustratingly different to both their Patriot counterparts and Britons across the Atlantic, they were left standing on a shifting ground of uncertainty. This stance reflected a tortured passage from one state of being – as colonial *British-Americans* – into another less secure category with a tenuous relationship to both Britain and America. This was not so much an issue of being two things at once as oppose to being neither and alone.¹⁶⁹ The Georgia Loyalists' experience of harassment and persecution – as well as their physical separation from Britain which undoubtedly incubated an imaginative distance that was hard to bridge once the cracks in the corporate soul of the Empire were brought to light by the war – made maintaining either American or imperial subject positions almost impossible. In this way, the Revolution did not merely disrupt the structures that helped forge and maintain transatlantic connections. It revealed a crisis of communication and identification within the empire itself, the recognition of which challenges the notion of the Loyalists as 'easy' anglophiles as well as the idea of an imaginatively unified, hierarchical imperial community comprising multiple peripheries which uniformly orbited and took their lead from a single, all-pervasive centre.

¹⁶⁸ Jacqueline Hill, "Loyalty and Monarchy in Ireland c.1660-1840", *Loyalism and the Formation of the British World 1775-1914*, eds. Allan Blackstock and Frank O'Gorman, The Boydell Press (Woodbridge, 2014), pp.87-91.

¹⁶⁹ Gould, *Writing the Rebellion*, p.10.

The Georgia Loyalists' experience of the Revolution was, in many ways, defined by their distinctive encounters with harassment and persecution. They were tarred and feathered, dragged around in the back of carts, humiliated, and beaten. These kinds of ordeals, to a large extent, shaped how 'friends of government' were viewed by contemporaries as well as later historians who to date struggle with the image of the victimised and submissive subject, wilted like a salted snail before their rebel adversaries. These ordeals, though, were met with a concerted campaign in Georgia to resuscitate that which the Patriots had hoped to choke out of existence – Britain's physical and political presence in America – and reconstitute a sense of group selfhood. Loyalists in Georgia did this (away from the battlefield) on street-squares, in taverns and coffeehouses, in theatres, and on the page. In so doing, they worked to solder themselves into a core of mutually comprehensible actors, organised around a set of widely identifiable allegories, tropes, and discourses, that was imaginatively fortified and equipped to resist the independence movement.

This resistance revolved first around the 'othering' of their revolutionary foes. Drawing on the long history of Francophobia – stretching back through eighteenth century and the Seven Years War which remained, for many colonists, a very recent memory – as well as their immediate experience of the French threat during the siege of Savannah, Loyalists in Georgia endeavoured to bring the Revolution into the orbit of a longer imperial conflict with Britain's historic enemy. They sought to indict their revolutionary adversaries by proxy, linking them with the historic crimes of their gallic allies. They also sought to impeach Patriot leaders directly, characterising them as

uncivilised, conniving, self-interested, and generally inferior. In so doing, anti-Whig displays, poems, plays, and performances functioned to make the Revolution fancifully manageable by dressing it up as an illegitimate movement bound for ruin. They served as negative tools for self-location as they worked to build a wall of separation from their rebellious colonial brethren who, by and large, looked and acted like them based on notions of encephalic and moral fitness.

After knocking the Revolution down, friends of government set about trying to revivify positively royal Georgia. After the restoration of British rule there, the war in the province became truly double-fronted: it was a contest of discourses, social performances, and symbols as well as rifles, cannonades, and blades. As Georgia became the focal point of Britain's resurgent military campaign after the winter of 1778-9, Georgia was transformed into an avant-garde battleground for the restoration of royalism in America. With the necessary time, space, and institutional cover, Georgia's loyal inhabitants were designated the primary players in that exercise. They were able (I submit to a greater extent than their counterparts in other colonies) to give body and action to their identification with the Empire as Loyalists at war. Overlaying earlier colonial practices, Georgia's friends of government leant symbolically on the figure of the king. Contained subterraneously within public displays and discourses which foregrounded the monarchy, I argue, were the elements with which Loyalists in Georgia attempted to reorganise and promote a positive political culture and distinctive sense of self during the war. This reorganisation was necessitated by the Revolution which, in a very real way, started the world over again and shattered their previously settled identity as colonial Americans. The figure of the king was placed at the heart of this reorganisation: the essential ingredient in what might be thought of as the Georgia

Loyalists' wartime group mythology. Imaginings of an idealise past – of growth, prosperity, peace, and regular routines – were brought to life in poems, toasts, and celebrations built around the monarch. Like all myths, the idea of this past did not need to be absolutely true for it to fulfil its restorative purpose. It was a part of a story Georgia Loyalists told themselves over and over, with all its contradictions, until it was accepted as part of their identity.¹⁷⁰ This story was, in essence, the story of their region which functioned a prism through which they located themselves in a world that had been turned upside-down. It helped them to recreate bonds and imaginatively return to a place in time that had been undone by the Revolution, acting as an anchor for their sense of self and a source of groupness in the face of division and uncertainty.

¹⁷⁰ Thomas Moore, *Rituals of the Imagination*, Pagasus Foundation (Cambridge, 1983), p.26.

**“An Account of their Losses Sustained”: the material contents of the appeals of
Georgia petitioners to the Loyalist Claims Commission, 1783-89**

Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown on October 19th, 1781, marked the effective end of British military operations in America. Although royal officials in Savannah continued to hold titular authority there for a further nine months, the town was finally evacuated by the British on July 11th, 1782. Royal governor Wright, along with several other office holders and military commanders, headed for Charleston. At the same time, a group of British regulars led by General Alured Clarke escaped to New York whilst Thomas Brown led a mixed group of rangers and Native American allies to Saint Augustine. The remaining British soldiers were transported to the West Indies aboard the frigate HMS Zebra and the sloop of war HMS Vulture.¹⁷¹

With the loss of all military and civil support and the defeat of their cause confirmed, Loyalists in Georgia were left with a decision to make: “To go – or not to go”?¹⁷² It was, in many ways, a simple yet unimaginably tortuous choice. Reaching a decision involved the juggling of multiple emotional and practical crosscurrents, with individuals working-out their own solutions according to their personal circumstances. Was it better to stay in a familiar land, but amongst former enemies “Whose wounds, yet fresh, may urge their desperate hands”?¹⁷³ Or should they make the leap and try to start their lives anew in a strange, possibly wilderness environment with all the risks that

¹⁷¹ See Edward Cashin, “Revolutionary War in Georgia”, www.newgeorgiaencyclopedia.org, March 26th, 2005.

¹⁷² “The Tory’s Soliloquy”, *The New York Morning Post*, November 7th, 1783 (author unknown), as quoted in *The Price of Loyalty*, pp.391-2.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.392.

journey portended? Jacob Bühler was one such Georgia Loyalist who opted for the latter. A native of Germany, Bühler came to the province in 1770 and established himself as a storekeeper in Ebenezer. Having refused to sign the Patriot association, though, Bühler was obliged to lay low in Georgia's backcountry woods until the arrival of British troops under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Campbell in December 1778. Thereafter, Bühler was commissioned as a captain in the Loyalist militia but was captured during the Siege of Savannah "by a party of Pollaskies [Pulaski's] Dragoons ... and was weeks held in confinement" before being exchanged.¹⁷⁴ Following the loss of the war, Bühler fled to Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia, leaving behind his worldly possessions which were later confiscated and sold by the new state authorities. As of January 12th, 1784, Bühler began petitioning the British government for remuneration for the loss of property – comprising a house, land, slaves, stores, and sundry furniture – to the value of £440. These losses, he claimed, were the direct result of his fealty to the British cause.¹⁷⁵ After two years of successive appeals, Bühler was finally awarded the sum of just £160.¹⁷⁶

Bühler's account of dispossession and dislocation mirrors those of the 208 other Georgia Loyalists who petitioned the British government for restitution in lieu of their losses and services during the War of Independence. Having doled out provisional indemnity payments between 1775 and 1783, the British ministry (under pressure from the Loyalists themselves with the support of a handful of notable domestic figures)

¹⁷⁴ Memorial forwarded by Colonel James Robertson on behalf of Jacob Bühler, January 17th, 1784, American Loyalist Claims Commission Records, The National Archives (Kew), Audit Office papers, series 13/38, p.140.

¹⁷⁵ Jacob Bühler schedule of estate, attached to a memorial dated May 6th, 1786, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 12/5, pp.14-5.

¹⁷⁶ The case of Jacob Bühler, Certificate 981, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 12/109

moved post-war to set-up a formal body to consider the compensation claims of America's friends of government: *The Loyalist Claims Commission*. From September 1783 until May 1789, Loyalists were able to submit their appeals. In them, friends of government from Georgia and the other twelve colonies laid bare the strictures of their lives during and after the Revolution, detailing the material losses they had suffered for which they sought restitution. These first-hand accounts (as documented in the Commission records held at the National Archives) articulate how Loyalists responded to the loss of the war, their place in society, and their property. They have formed the basis of a number of studies which have worked to reshape the history of the Revolution as one of ordeals as well as ideals. Wallace Brown's *The King's Friends* provided the first thorough analysis of the Loyalist petitioners, unpacking the demographics of the claimants through a careful breakdown of the assorted sub-groups that appear within the papers.¹⁷⁷ From this, Brown was able to sketch out the broad socio-economic composition of loyalism in each colony, bringing to bear the distinctions in wealth and outlook between and within the variegated occupational groups, religious clusters, ethnicities, and (significantly for my own study) regions which combined to grant the American Loyalists their uniquely multifarious character. Following Brown, the studies of Robert S. Lambert, William I. Roberts III, and Robert G. Mitchell have detailed the sacrifices made by 'Friends of Government' in support of the crown.¹⁷⁸ Separately, each sought to question whether the founding myth of the Loyalists as ideologically empty and politically uncommitted cowards was in any way sustainable given the scale of their

¹⁷⁷ Brown, *The King's Friends*.

¹⁷⁸ Robert S. Lambert, "The Confiscation of Loyalist Property in Georgia, 1782-1786", *WMQ*, vol.20:1 (1963), pp.80-94; Robert G. Mitchell, "The Losses and Compensation of Georgia Loyalists", *GHQ*, vol.68:2 (1984), pp.233-43; William I. Roberts III, "The Losses of a Loyalist Merchant in Georgia During the Revolution", *GHQ*, vol.52:3 (1968), pp.270-6.

losses in the service of British rule. Whilst all stressed the problems of the Commission records as sources, each emphasised the enormous price paid by colonists – economically, physically, and emotionally – for their fealty to the crown. More recently, in an approach best exemplified by Maya Jasanoff in *Liberty's Exiles*, historians have utilised the claims papers in order to place the Loyalists at the heart of the Atlantic world story during the age of the Second British Empire.¹⁷⁹ Their focus has settled primarily on the peculiar trials faced by refugees of the Revolution – crop failures, illness, the breaking of kinship ties and so on – as well the make-up of Loyalist communities in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and the Caribbean during the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.

Whilst such studies have mapped out the quantitative aspects of the claims – totting up the Loyalists' losses as a measure of the challenges they faced post-war – the qualitative features of the *Commission Records* – focussing on the materials claimed for and their symbolic importance – have been largely passed over as point of analysis. Yes, their appeals comprise pecuniary tallies of loss, misfortune, and hardship. More than that, though, they are reflections of the Loyalists' lives as colonial Americans. They lay bare the means individuals had built their lives around which had given them purpose and significance. They are, in other words, outlines of their everyday experiences in royal America. In this chapter, therefore, the Georgia Loyalists' claims are not used in order to quantitatively track the economic fall of certain individuals. Rather, they are utilised as a way to explore the ways individuals spoke to issues of belonging postwar through privileged possessions and to test claims made in chapter one regarding the essential

¹⁷⁹ Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles*.

provinciality of their identity. My analysis focusses on the types of property specified and (importantly) not specified by Georgia's Loyalist exiles for which they sought compensation. In so doing, I assume the essentiality of material possessions to individuals' reflexive sense of self and place. Possessions are, as Tim Edensor points out, the tangible fixtures of actors' quotidian worlds.¹⁸⁰ They provide the focal points of regular routines and existential practices. Although they appear as inanimate bystanders, they are imbued with context specific memories around which personal and collective narratives are spun. They connect individuals instinctively to a time and place when those commodities were used as well as the networks they helped forge and maintain. It is, for example, impossible for me to think about my cricket bat without also bringing to mind the places I have enjoyed playing at and the people I played there with. It would have also been impossible for me to play at all without my bat (although, at times, I admit to having played as if I were empty-handed at the crease). Accordingly, to separate individuals from their formational relationship with their possessions is to suggest an illusory independence that neither have. Material commodities (especially those prized during periods of crisis) are critical to embodied, habitual ways actors organise their lives, self-locate, and form a sense of belonging.¹⁸¹ By breaking down the material contents of their schedules of loss and considering their symbolic import, I argue that light may be shed on the elemental basis of the Georgia Loyalists' sense of self and belonging as banished individuals after the peace.

¹⁸⁰ Tim Edensor, *National Identity, Popular Culture, and Everyday Life*, Berg Publishers (New York, 2002), pp.103-4.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.106.

In their appeals to the Commission, Loyalist exiles from Georgia did not request compensation for anything like all of their property which was destroyed or sequestered during the war. Despite apparently having every reason not to do so, they limited what they appealed for restitution for. Their submissions are overwhelmingly dominated by appeals for redress for the loss of land (mostly described as swamps), agricultural produce (chiefly rice and indigo), and human chattel property. These assets, it seems, were privileged at the expense of other lost possessions which doubtlessly could have added value to their claim and potentially increased their final settlement. They thus reflected, I argue, a set of emotional as well as economic concerns which were forced to the surface by their particular wartime and diasporic experiences. These were the means that drew many to settle in Georgia in the first instance and subsequently built their lives and fortunes there up with. They were the physical markers of their colonial world and the foundation of the taskscapes of their particular imperial vista around which they had orientated themselves prior to the war. To a large extent, they defined the landscape of the empire for them. They did this, most obviously, because they were what they saw as they travelled around the colony. Importantly, they were the key elements which combined to make-up the sites around which the matrix of imperial trade and politics revolved in Georgia. In short they connoted fixity, familiarity, and prosperity in a period of radical and unwelcome change (change that was, I would suggest, all the more destabilising for loyal Georgians who, unlike their counterparts from elsewhere in the colonies, had come withing touching distance of seeing royal America restored in their province during the war only to see it snatched away from them again). Their predominance in the Georgia Loyalists' schedules of loss, I contend, is evidence of the continued essentiality of their colonial taskscape to their reflexive,

embodied sense of self and belonging, their emotional import as anchors of their identities if anything heightened by the upheaval of displacement.

The language of objects, however, is malleable and idiosyncratic. Across places and times, the same commodities may be viewed and valued differently. A warm fleece, for instance, is innately more valuable to someone in Boston, Massachusetts, during wintertime than it is to someone in southern Florida during the middle of July. Ideas about what certain objects mean and how they are thought of can also clash. When Georgia's Loyalist refugees took their cases to the authorities in London, they were faced with commissioners who did not value their treasured swamps or recognise them as vital parts of their imperial landscape. To the commissioners, the image of the swamp was associated with notions of neglect, decay, and failure which sat awkwardly in the post-war metropolitan environment as officialdom in London worked hard to re-emphasise the Empire's virility and strength after the loss of the thirteen colonies.¹⁸² Exploring the material content of the Georgia Loyalists' claims thus reveals a jarring mismatch between their vision of the Empire and that of the imperial authorities in the capital. During the war, the Georgia Loyalists' symbolic reliance on the figure of the king spoke to their imaginative misalignment with the 'heart' of the Empire. After the war, I contend, this misalignment was rearticulated by a set of material priorities set down in their petitions for remuneration from the British government. This is not to question their investment in or commitment to the Empire or ideas of transatlantic unionism after the loss of America. Rather, it is to put a spotlight on the Empire's essential polycentricism and conceptual elasticity that was thrown into sharp relief by the

¹⁸² Colley, *Britons*, chapter 3:4.

Revolution and the postwar settlement. It did not look or feel the same to all people in all places. The objects and physical settings which made the Empire 'work' and tangible were equally diverse. By materially reassembling the Empire as it was in Georgia in their petitions, Loyalists from there made this multifariousness (which had long existed as an undercurrent within the imperial polity) visible, demonstrating how their identification with the imperial family and their identities as Loyalists were dynamic constructs shaped by their regional context.

The Commission records must, of course, be read in light of the particular circumstances in which they were produced. In other words, they must be read with caution. The Loyalists' claims were, in short, testimonies of self-interest. They were appeals devised in the wake of a destructive war by refugees in often strange and friendless new surroundings seeking compensation for losses of property that was either destroyed, expropriated, or left behind in their flight. The Loyalists' claims are thus defined fundamentally by an element of calculation. They were pleas conceived to access the means with which they could rebuild their lives and were composed with the view of those who would be their benefactors in mind.

This calculating bent began with the Loyalist campaign to establish the Claims Commission. The issue of war indemnities for the Loyalists had been discussed almost as soon as the first shots rang out at Lexington and Concord on April 19th, 1775. During the war, the Treasury had made ad hoc subsistence payments to hundreds forced to flee

their homes, rising to a sum of nearly £70,000 by 1783.¹⁸³ Such measures, however, fell short of the Loyalists' expectations. Most received only what former Massachusetts Governor Thomas Hutchinson referred to as "good words".¹⁸⁴ Even when individuals were granted some form of stipend, the exactness with which ministerial officials conducted their business left many with the impression that every expedient was used by British authorities to deny them their dues. Applicants were required to attend the Treasury in person to receive their payments, which often proved impossible for those living outside London; clerks deducted a fee from each sum paid; and Milward Rowe – Chief Clerk to the Treasury – was the only official authorised to make payments, meaning that if he were away or otherwise indisposed no one could collect their allowance.¹⁸⁵

These short-term settlements, though, were intended as a temporary wartime measure only. They represented a simple, yet cumbersome charity operation of sorts, handing out minimal support in order to assuage the worst excesses of wartime privation suffered by Loyalist refugees. Once the war was won – as the Loyalists as well as everyone in Britain had expected would happen swiftly – applicants could simply return to their homes and recover their lost assets, meaning there would be no cause for them to receive further payments. The loss of the war, however, put paid to such hopes and expectations. The offhand system of pay-outs that had existed in wartime thus no longer fulfilled the needs of the Loyalist exiles. What they required was a formal

¹⁸³ John Eardley-Wilmot, *Historical View of the Commission for Enquiring into the Losses, Services, and Claims of the American Loyalists at the Close of the War between Great Britain and her Colonies in 1783: with an Account of the Compensation Granted to them by Parliament in 1785 and 1788*, London (1815), pp.15-22.

¹⁸⁴ Norton, *The British Americans*, p.52.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p.60.

body to consider their compensation claims for property and employment now recognised as permanently lost. Thus, in a well-co-ordinated lobbying campaign, a board of Loyalist agents – headed by Georgia’s former royal governor Sir James Wright – took their cause to officials in London. They proposed the levying of a general tax on subjects in Britain in order to raise funds for the restitution of Loyalists who had borne the physical and material cost of imperial defence most directly. They argued that justice demanded “the expences, burdens, and sacrifices” necessary for the preservation of society be “equally distributed and proportionably sustained by all [in Britain].”¹⁸⁶ The board’s assertions were distilled in a short pamphlet (possibly written by Joseph Galloway) entitled *The Case and Claims of American Loyalists Impartially Stated and Considered* (1783).¹⁸⁷ In it, compensation for the crown’s supporters in America was packaged as part of a bargain they had made with the British state which parliament was required to make good on. This notion rested on the Lockean idea that “protection and allegiance are reciprocal duties between the State and the subject”.¹⁸⁸ As a result of their fidelity to Britain, the Loyalists had lost everything. But the state, having sent a military force to America which “was not competent to take the field”, had manifestly defaulted on their end of deal.¹⁸⁹ They had demonstrably failed to protect the Loyalists despite having repeatedly promised to do so. In *The Case and Claims*, the Loyalists’ view of the contractual imbalance between the state and the subject brought to light by the Revolution was made plain:

¹⁸⁶ *The Case and Claims of the American Loyalists Impartially Stated and Considered*, Printed By Order of their Agents, London (1783), p.17.

¹⁸⁷ I say Galloway may have been the author as remarkably similar points were raised in his *Observations on the Fifth Article of the Treat with America and on the Necessity of Appointing a Judicial Enquiry into the Merits and Losses of the American Loyalists*, London (1783).

¹⁸⁸ *The Case and Claims of the American Loyalists*, p.7.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p.16.

Thus encouraged by the resolutions and acts of the British Parliament, thus continually called upon by his Majesty, his Commissioners and Generals acting in his name, and under the authority of Parliament, and firmly relying upon the established rights of citizens, and the Royal and national faith so repeatedly pledged for their protection and indemnification, the Loyalists, who now claim the justice due to them as subjects, did not hesitate the part they were bound to take. The protection and justice due to them from the state, and the duty they owed in return, was always before them. Imprest with the perfect confidence of the first, they [the Loyalists] resolved not to be deficient in the last.¹⁹⁰

This point was subtly reinforced in a supplementary campaign pamphlet detailing “The Particular Case of the Georgia Loyalists”.¹⁹¹ A large portion of the text is dedicated to quoting directly from letters and proclamations from British ministers reassuring Georgians of their commitment to the colony once royal rule had been re-established there in early 1779. In one letter from “Whitehall” dated September 7th, 1779, the King’s faithful subjects in Georgia were encouraged to “stand boldly forth” confident in the knowledge that forces sent there would be “sufficient for that purpose”.¹⁹² In quoting this letter, the mismatch between the promise and the reality of British state protection during the war was deftly called to attention, for a mere four months after the

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p.15.

¹⁹¹ *The Particular Case of the Georgia Loyalists: In Addition to the General Case and Claims of the American Loyalists which was Lately Published by Order of their Agents*, London (1783).

¹⁹² Ibid., p.6.

September message had been sent, Sir James Wright penned a letter of his own to George Germain, Secretary of State for the colonies, in which he decried the lack of military presence in the colony following the launch of the South Carolina campaign which had left inhabitants there “naked and defenceless”.¹⁹³ Having lost the war, it was self-evident that British forces in Georgia (as well as the rest of the continent) were anything but ‘sufficient’. The board of agents thus contended that the Loyalists, having been attainted, banished, and stripped of their estates “in direct consequence of [their] virtuous and meritorious conduct”, were entitled to reparations as a *right*.¹⁹⁴ If satisfaction was not granted, the board made clear, Britain would stand revealed to the world as an unjust and oppressive state.¹⁹⁵

These sentiments were shared by many in Britain for whom a sense of national honour was bound up with seeing to the fair treatment of worthy subjects. Such attitudes were brought to bear in the parliamentary debates which accompanied negotiations for the Treaty of Paris. Signed on September 3rd, 1783, the treaty included no concrete provisions for the safeguarding of the Loyalists or their property. Whilst articles five and six supposedly provided protection of their persons and their interests, there was no assurance that local committees would observe these terms or that the

¹⁹³ Sir James Wright to the 1st Viscount Sackville, George Germain, Secretary of State for the colonies, November 6th, 1779, *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society*, vol.3, p.269.

¹⁹⁴ *The Particular Case of the Georgia Loyalists*, p.16.

¹⁹⁵ This point is shrewdly reinforced in *The Case and Claims of the American Loyalists*, pp.27-33. Across those pages, numerous examples of states throughout history which had compensated or shown proper consideration for subjects in territories lost in course of a war. Poignantly, the French state’s concern for her subjects in Quebec at the cessation of the Seven Years War is cited as an honourable example. The French, the author observes, were “so tenacious of the safety and protection of her subjects, that she insisted on, and it was accordingly agreed, that the Canadians should retain their property, and that such as did not chuse to become the subjects of Great Britain, but wished to return to their former allegiance, should have the right to dispose of their property to the best advantage”. In so doing, the obvious question was posed that if France – Britain’s main imperial rival – could deliver for their subjects in such a way, why would Britain not also?

states would follow the recommendations of Congress to treat supporters of the crown with due equity and restore the estates of Loyalists who had not borne arms against the independence cause. Indeed, Congress possessed neither the power nor the inclination to do anything other than 'recommend' measures and individuals in the states who had "risen from obscurity to power and eminence" had little reason to comply "least they should lose the estates they purchased for a trifle".¹⁹⁶ As one Loyalist put it upon hearing the terms of the Paris treaty, friends of government in America were left with little choice "but to submit to the tyranny of exalting enemies or to settle in a new country."¹⁹⁷ During the Paris talks, the 2nd Earl Shelburne, William Petty, then Prime Minister, had feared the political consequences of being seen to neglect the American Loyalists. He was right to. When the terms of the treaty came up for questions in Parliament, the opposition vigorously denounced them. The 2nd Earl Guildford, Frederick North, the former Prime Minister, lamented that "Never was the honour of the nation so grossly abused as in the desertion of those men, who are now exposed to every punishment that desertion and poverty can inflict."¹⁹⁸ Edmund Burke, North's ally in the Commons, described the post-war settlement regarding the treatment of the Loyalists as a "gross libel on the national character".¹⁹⁹ It was, though, the MP and playwright Richard Sheridan who put it most starkly. The diminution of the British Empire in the eyes of the world, Sheridan declared, was bad enough:

¹⁹⁶ William Smith to Major-General Sir Guy Carleton, July 25th, 1783, as quoted in *The Price of Loyalty*, p.361.

¹⁹⁷ As quoted from Esther Clark Wright, *The Loyalists of New Brunswick*, E.C. Wright (Fredericton, 1955), p.6.

¹⁹⁸ Debate of February 17th, 1783, William Cobbett's *Parliamentary History of England*, vol.23, T.C. Hansard (London 1814), columns 452-3.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, column 468.

But this, alarming and calamitous as it was, was nothing when compared with another of the crimes of the present peace – the cession of men into the hands of their enemies, and delivering over to confiscation, tyranny, resentment, and oppression, the unhappy men who trusted our fair promises and deceitful words.²⁰⁰

The Loyalist agents and their political supporters thus framed the case for compensation as a matter of national prestige. By raising the spectre of Britain being seen as diminished and disgraced power, they played on fears of terminal imperial decline. They calculated correctly that following the loss of the thirteen colonies – combined with the flowering discomfiture surrounding the Paris treaty’s proposed arrangements – authorities in London would be overwhelmingly concerned with revamping the nation’s image as a virtuous and strong imperial state able to take care of its subjects.

Thus, in the summer of 1783, the board’s efforts were eventually successful as Parliament passed an act to establish a five-man commission “to enquire into the losses and services of all such persons who have suffered in their rights, properties, and professions, during the late unhappy dissensions in America, in consequence of their loyalty to his majesty, and attachment to the British government.” It was headed by MPs John Eardley-Wilmot and Daniel Parker Coke, the obvious choices given their previous involvement in the payment of Loyalist claims during wartime. Two veterans of the war

²⁰⁰ Ibid., column 481.

– Colonel Robert Kingston and Colonel Thomas Dundas – and a civil servant by the name of John Marsh also served as commissioners.²⁰¹ Together, they were tasked with verifying each claimant’s loyalty, the value of their property or office, and to recommend an offer of settlement (with the final decision belonging to Parliament). In mid-September 1783, the Commission opened the doors of its offices in Lincoln’s Inn Field and heard its first deponents.

The commissioners’ first task was to fix the parameters of their endeavour. The bill which created the Commission was ostensibly broad. It gave the commissioners the authority to investigate claims in detail, rather than survey them in general terms. They were, furthermore, empowered to look at the cases of refugees of all descriptions, not just those particularly penalised by the Paris treaty.²⁰² Crucially, however, in what George Chalmers called “the most significant clause of the whole act”, consideration was limited to those persons injured “in consequence of their loyalty”.²⁰³ This wording had dual implications. Firstly, it meant that incontestable proof of loyalty was required of those seeking redress. It also meant that all losses claimed for would have to be shown to have resulted directly from the petitioner’s fidelity to the crown. The rationale for including this prerequisite was two-fold. Most obviously, it prevented fallacious Whig sympathisers from submitting potentially successful claims, thereby scoring a double victory over the British state. More importantly though, given the size of the Commission’s task – both in terms of bureaucratic scale and the amount of losses they were faced with having to cover – the loyalty proviso worked to contract the scope of

²⁰¹ Eardley-Wilmot, *Historical View of the Commission*, p.60.

²⁰² Norton, *The British Americans*, p.192.

²⁰³ As quoted in *Ibid.*, p.193.

the enquiry and, as a consequence, the size of the remittance bill resulting therefrom. Indeed, wherever they could, the British authorities sought to mitigate their liability regarding the Loyalists. Their policy, in the end, was one of partial restitution only.²⁰⁴

In light of the commissioners' parsimonious approach, Loyalist refugees worked hard to shape their appeals in such a way that would ensure they received the largest award possible. The template for success in this regard was laid out in the advisory pamphlet *Directions to the American Loyalists in Order to Enable Them to State Their Cases by Way of Memorial to the Honourable Commissioners* (1783). Officially unattributed (although, from looking at the content, it was likely produced jointly by the Loyalist agents) it encouraged exiles to read the compensation act closely and not to submit false claims. It also provided sample forms for memorials, witness lists, loss schedules, depositions, and powers of attorney, making for a somewhat prosaic set of final documents. The major piece of advice it contained, though, boiled down to a simple formula: essentially, the more a claimant could show they had suffered for the cause, the better chance they stood of being granted a satisfactory award. Some Loyalist refugee petitioners did this in the first instance by emphasising the physical hardship they had endured in service of the crown. In a supporting memorial to the claim of Lieutenant-Colonel John Douglass, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Brown declared that

²⁰⁴ All told, 3,225 claims were presented to the commission requesting £10,358,413.30 in compensation payments.²⁰⁴ In Georgia, 209 claims were submitted soliciting for £873,703.42 in lost assets. Such sums, according to Pitt, were simply not in Britain's power to grant. In the end, the commission handed out £3,033,091.20 in compensation payments, or 29.28 per cent of the original claimed for total. The Georgia petitioners received £259,153 in awards, or 29.66 per cent of their initial appeals. My numbers here are different to Brown, *The Kings Friends* (144) and Mitchell, "The Losses and Compensation of Georgia Loyalists" (150). My numbers regarding the Georgia claimants are taken from the *Commission Records* and include any claimants with material interests in Georgia, including a number who resided primarily elsewhere in colonies during and prior to the War of Independence (most commonly South Carolina or East Florida). For Pitt's comments, see Eardley-Wilmot, *Historical View of the Commission*, pp.69-72.

Douglass had behaved with gallantry in battle against General Anthony Wayne despite having been “grievously shot through the body”.²⁰⁵ As a captain in the militia, Henry Ferguson details having also been shot and “grievously wounded” twice whilst protecting the King’s stores in Savannah – once in February 1779 and again in July 1781 – in addition to “having lost considerable property”.²⁰⁶ Loyalist petitioners from across the thirteen colonies consistently presented the commissioners with a panoply of images involving clean-cut uniforms and graphic mutilations earned in the defence of the realm. These images were at once romantic and tragic, impregnating the claimant with an air of valour and stoicism that defined the cult of heroism at the heart of Britain’s national epic during the late-eighteenth century.²⁰⁷ In so doing, friends of government soliciting for redress portrayed themselves as subjects whose extraordinary actions in the face of overwhelming odds demanded exceptional recognition. They made their petitions testaments of honourable actions taken on the basis of which claims for restitution were justified. This was something all claimants sought to do in some way. To those ends, they called on their fellow Loyalists to corroborate their claims with certificates of support. These certificates comprised a fundamental element of each claim, consisting of testimonials from notable Georgian Loyalists (most commonly Sir James Wright or John Graham) as well neighbours, business partners, friends, and family attesting to the claimant’s loyalty, character, and service to Britain. These certificates, like much of the petition documents, tended to follow a certain blueprint:

²⁰⁵ Col. Thomas Brown supporting memorial for the claim of Lt. Col. John Douglass [undated], *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/34, p.333.

²⁰⁶ Memorial of Henry Ferguson, November 11th, 1785, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 12/101, p.260.

²⁰⁷ For a discussion of the British cult of heroism in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries see Colley, *Britons*, pp.178-89.

To the honourable Commissioners ... I 'A', beg leave to mention to that during the late unhappy rebellion 'B' did on all occasions manifest themselves with the greatest zeal for his Majesty's government, and that in consequence of their conduct the whole of their property has been confiscated, I thus humbly beg leave to recommend 'B' as an object worthy of relief and support...

In supporting the claim of another, each memorialist justified the claims of all. In short, they jointly asserted that having “at every hazard, and in the face of the most imminent danger ... stepped forth in defence of the supreme authority of the state”, they had “in an especial manner, an incontestable right to national justice and public protection” and encouraged the commissioners to believe the same.²⁰⁸

Perhaps, though, the most important calculation made by Loyalist refugee petitioners concerned the monetary values they attached to their lost assets. As James Simpson correctly predicted, the most “intricate and difficult” part of the commissioners’ task would be to determine the precise worth of a petitioner’s property.²⁰⁹ Valuations for property seized or destroyed during the war as recorded in the Loyalists’ claims do not seem to have been subject to any kind of robust system of standardisation. If they were, neither the board of agents’ notes nor any individual appeal show this to be so. Furthermore, it was for obvious reasons difficult (if not impossible) for petitioners to provide formal evidence for the value of their possessions.

²⁰⁸ *The Case and Claims of the American Loyalists*, p.35.

²⁰⁹ As quoted in Norton, *The British Americans*, p.194.

The best the overwhelming majority could do was to affix memorials from fellow Loyalists – with whom interests were often interlaced – testifying to the accuracy of the figures they forwarded. Valuations claimants attributed to their possessions were thus submitted to the Commission as estimates only. As estimates, they were subject to a number of considerations, not least of all thoughts of likely returns.

With the commissioner's niggardly approach in mind, some petitioners took to upscaling the values put forward in their claim at every conceivable opportunity. Given the widespread belief that the British authorities would not meet their demands in full (which, of course, turned out to be correct) many Loyalist refugees came to the conclusion that it would be prudent to bump-up their valuations so that after the inevitable reductions were made, they would receive a settlement amount that was acceptable to them. John Davies of South Carolina freely admitted to adopting this ploy during his statement to the commissioners in which he declared that he had been advised by "several gentlemen" to appraise the value of his lost cattle above their actual worth "as it would be reduced by the Commission" in any case.²¹⁰ Appealing on behalf of their father, John Polson senior, John and Hugh Polson (once of Savannah) appear to have anticipated accusations of overvaluation and justify the figures they presented as reasonable. They protested that given their confiscated property was sold by the Patriot authorities for less than it would be worth "were it sold under their own directions", they "hope[d] the Honourable Commission appointed by Parliament will not consider it unreasonable to value all their land" at £4,606.²¹¹ Jermyn Wright, the bachelor older

²¹⁰ As quoted in Eugene R. Fingerhut, "Uses and Abuses of the American Loyalists' Claims: A Critique of Quantitative Analysis", *W&MQ*, vol.vol.25:2 (1968), p.252.

²¹¹ John and Hugh Polson supporting memorial for the claim of John Polson senior, 24th July 1788, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/36c, p.1098.

brother of Georgia royal governor and Loyalist agent-in-chief Sir James Wright, constructed almost his entire petition as a defence of the practice of overvaluation. His claim (undated) was for the value of £500 and was split into two sections: one dealing with the result of a retaliatory attack by a rebel raiding party in response to property seizures by the *King's Rangers* and the other with cargo impressed by the British army. If, Wright stated, his request for £400 in recompense for the damage to his property caused by a rebel gang was thought too much, he asked the commissioners to consider also "my cattle and other property, appraised at £360" that were previously stolen for which he had not received any compensation as fulfilling the sum.²¹² Wright continued in the same tack in his second section. Again, Wright asked that if his valuation of cargo taken from his "petteaugre" (a small boat) for the use of the King's soldiers garrisoned at St. Augustine was considered inflated, then, he suggested, his servants' assistance in "building a stockade for his Majesty's soldiers ... with the additional loss of my saws, axes, and working tools employed about making the stockade" for which he had not received any payment should serve to meet the £100 total.²¹³ Wright's plea, in essence, rested on the idea that his commitment to the British cause was itself of value and ought to be recognised independently of any claims for lost property. His mere preparedness to risk his possessions and place them at the disposal of British forces when needed functioned as a sort of adjunctive claim which served to cover for any subtractions the commissioners might have imposed. In other words, he quantified his wartime allegiances and made them into a material element within his petition. In so doing, Wright creates for himself a certain amount of bargaining space. He acknowledges that

²¹² The Claim of Jermyrn Wright, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/37, p.636.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, pp.636-7.

his estimations may appear inflated. He nonetheless submitted his swollen figures and opened them up for examination by the commissioners in what appears as something like a dialogue, or negotiation, for compensation. His claim was thus inscribed with the tone of the haggler with every appearance of having been put together with an inbuilt cushion against the potential of arbitrary reductions.

Other Loyalist petitioners, though, emphasised how they had in fact underplayed the value of their claims. At first glance, given the exiles' natural desire to secure as much compensation as possible, the decision to employ this ruse appears somewhat odd. It was, however, believed by the board of agents that if petitioners worked to show they had limited their claims, the British authorities would be more willing to cover the remaining but still sizable amount. Indeed, from their conception, exile organisations sought to reduce the total sum requested from the British government by individual petitioners in the hope of bringing the commissioners to sympathise with their plight. In February and June 1783, for instance, special committees from South Carolina and Virginia were convened at the suggestion of the agents in order to examine the composite losses of Loyalist refugees. Their goal, according to former Virginia governor Henry Dunmore, was to reduce the amount Loyalists were claiming for in the expectation that smaller demands stood a better chance of securing the maximum award possible.²¹⁴

Once the Commission had been officially established, countless Loyalist petitioners from across the colonies composed their appeals in keeping with this rationale. In their claims, they stressed their desire not to be seen as a burden on the

²¹⁴ Henry Dunmore to Thomas Dundas, October 7th, 1783, NA, AO 12/107, p.56.

state and so requested only modest returns on their actual losses in that spirit. Thomas Young, once said to have been the richest man in colonial Georgia, makes the point explicitly. In a petition dated February 20th, 1790, Young declared that he might have “brought forward a Claim for the whole Amount of his Losses” but that it was not his “Object to add to the Burdens of the State”. When he finally brought forward his claim in July 1788, he declared that “it did not amount to Half the Sum” were he to have sold his property before the War of Independence.²¹⁵ Elizabeth D’erbage struck much the same tone. The widow of George, Master Register and Examiner of the Court of Chancery in Georgia, Elizabeth declared three times in her petition dated June 15th, 1789, that she had undervalued her deceased husband’s property as she did not wish to be overly burdensome on the state.²¹⁶

Both Young and D’erbage hint at the expectations they had of expanding their fortunes before such prospects were dashed by the Revolution. They were joined in this regard by dozens of other petitioners from Georgia who fell over themselves to declare how they had been of substantial means prior to the war or how their property was amongst the most desirable and promising in the province. In a supporting memorial sworn before the commission on May 9th, 1789, Henry Yonge testified that Captain James Taylor – a Scots merchant in Savannah then deceased – had indeed been of “considerable property” and had goods “to a very considerable value” seized by the rebels after the war.²¹⁷ Yonge’s statement closely resembles that given by John Lichtenstein in support of the claim of George Barry. Before fleeing Georgia for St.

²¹⁵ Thomas Young memorial, February 20th, 1790, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/38, p.326.

²¹⁶ Elizabeth D’erbage memorial, June 15th, 1789, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/34, p.310.

²¹⁷ Henry Young supporting memorial for the claim of John Buchanan, May 9th, 1787, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/34, p.148.

Augustine in April 1776, Lichtenstein stated that Barry was “possessed of considerable property, consisting of slaves and three tracts of land ... with sheep, hogs, goats, and cattle”.²¹⁸ George Baillie was even more grandiose in his description of a 650 acre tract on the Satilla River that was confiscated by Rebel authorities as being “a very valuable swamp on the best pitch of tide and the first quality for raising rice or indigo.”²¹⁹ Baillie’s assertions regarding the fruitfulness of his seized land were matched by those of George Kincaid in a schedule of his estate forwarded on June 16th, 1783. Kincaid described a 214 acre plot situated on the Onslow River that was sequestered in May 1782 as “rich tide swamp land ... all improved, ditched and banked, with good and substantial flood gates ... a large barn and machine house, rice machine, overseer’s house, kitchen, rice house and negro houses.”²²⁰ Such appeals testifying to the loss of material status were habitually accompanied by some reference to the success of business ventures that were prematurely ended with the loss of the war. The claim of Samuel Douglass stands out in this regard. In a memorial sworn before the commission on March 16th, 1784, Douglass stated that by his involvement in “the guinea trade and other lucrative branches of commerce” he had acquired “a very considerable independent fortune which consisted of valuable lands and slaves” as well as debts due to him in the course of his mercantile transactions.²²¹ These petitioners worked hard to make the prospects of which they had been robbed known to the commissioners. They subtly made this unfulfilled potential a part of their negotiation for restitution as something they were

²¹⁸ John Lichtenstein supporting memorial for the claim of George Barry [undated], *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/34, P.82.

²¹⁹ George Baillie schedule of estates, attached to a memorial dated March 25th, 1784, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/34, p.40.

²²⁰ George Kincaid schedule of estates, attached to a memorial dated June 16th, 1783, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/36A, p.231.

²²¹ Memorial forwarded William Greenwood and William Higginson on behalf of Samuel Douglass, March 16th, 1784, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/34, p.375.

willing to forgo in return for the remainder of their request. This acted as a way of demonstrating the restraint with which they computed their losses which was presented as part of their continued service to the state for which they deserved recognition in the form of the full redemption of the remainder of their claims. Such manoeuvring was perhaps best demonstrated by Jonathon Becker. In a supporting memorial for Jacob Bühler's claim, Becker stated that Bühler's estimates were a "true, just, and an undervaluation" of his losses.²²² Becker's wordplay is revealing. True and undervalued are discordant terms. Bühler's estimates could not have been both at the same time. The word "just", therefore, becomes important here. An untrue statement, if made in pursuit of just ends, can itself be just. As a wilfully inaccurate estimate, Bühler's undervaluation was, by definition, untrue. But, by framing his memorial in the way he did – by stressing how Bühler had not sought to extract more from the commissioners than strictly necessary – Becker, however inelegantly, portrayed Bühler as a worthy candidate for restitution. Undervaluation was, in short, presented as a virtue which deserved reward. Pleading undervaluation thus appears as a rhetorical contrivance indicative of a calculating bent that many petitioners adopted when submitting the value of their losses to the British authorities. It was, simply, conceived to convince the commissioners of the justness of an appeal and the moral need to grant appellants what they asked for on that basis.

The valuations Loyalist petitioners attached to their lost property most obviously hint at the general socio-economic position of individual claimants prior to the war. They also suggest there were those who, for a range of reasons unpacked by Jasanoff and

²²² Jonathon Becker supporting memorial for the claim of Jacob Bühler, January 17th, 1784, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/90, p.168.

Norton amongst others, were unable to submit a claim for compensation.²²³ The figures presented by appellants to the commissioners, however, were not pure reflections of worth and loss. They were arrived at as a result of a series of calculations made in order to fulfil their natural desire to attain the highest return possible on their requests and assume the means with which they could rebuild their lives. Whether overplaying their hands or pleading undervaluation, individuals strategised and shaped their appeals in such a way they believed would give the best chance of achieving something close to satisfaction. In short, they quantified that which had been taken from them as a result of their loyalty, at least in part, in order to meet the demands of what was a negotiation with the British state for restitution.

The Loyalist petitioners made choices regarding *how* they valued their lost possessions. Crucially though, they also made choices regarding *which* of their lost possessions they valued. Even in instances where, as Eardley-Wilmot noted, petitioners were liable to include too much in their claims rather than too little, Loyalist refugees did not appeal for compensation for anything like all of the property they had lost as a result of the war.²²⁴ Of course, as Katherine Rieder points out, it is surely correct to presume that the exiles did not, in fact, leave everything behind in their flight.²²⁵ They doubtlessly took some clothes with them and perhaps even a few personal treasures

²²³ The claim's process was drawn out, often required an expensive trip to London in order to submit a claim to the commissioner's in person, and necessitated the petitioner be literate. For marginalised groups – women, African Americans, or those without money and connections – submitting a claim proved almost impossible. See Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles*, pp.125-32; Norton, "Eighteenth-Century American Women in Peace and War: The Case of the Loyalists", *WMQ*, vol.33:3 (1976), pp.388-9.

²²⁴ Eardley-Wilmot, *Historical View of the Commission*, p.64.

²²⁵ Katherine Rieder, "The Remainder of Our Effects we Must Leave Behind: American Loyalists and the Meaning of Things", in *New Views of New England: Studies in Material and Visual Culture 1630-1830*, ed. John W. Tyler, Publication of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts (Boston, 2012), pp.97-127.

too. But, even allowing for this undocumented probability, the schedules of loss forwarded by Georgia's friends of government appear somewhat narrow in terms of their material contents. Detailing the loss of certain assets plainly took precedence over others. It is impossible to say unequivocally if this was the result of a conscious decision taken by individuals in order to purposefully present a specific, thought-out image to the commissioners. The material contents of the Georgia Loyalists' petitions – that which they sought compensation for – are, nonetheless, curiously undiversified. Interestingly, the prioritising of particular assets by Georgia Loyalists did not always absolutely match up to sober thoughts of what interests were worth the most monetarily and could therefore be claimed back on for the largest amount. The items they specified in their schedules of losses thus represented something like a set of material preferences: possessions which, for some reason or another, were important enough to the claimants to mention.

In order to ascertain what the specific material priorities of the Georgia Loyalist petitioners were, each claim was disaggregated according to particular losses mentioned by individuals which they desired restitution for. After this, the value attached to each loss in each claim was noted. From this, the proportion of each claim accounted for by certain losses was calculated. The lost assets were then ranked according to the percentage weight they accounted for in each appeal. Whether material interests were shared by petitioners from across the various sub-groupings of the Georgia Loyalist refugee population was tested thereafter. This was done in order to assess whether the claims of persons from different backgrounds might disclose a set of unifying material priorities. To this end, the Georgia Loyalists' claims were also

broken-down according to the sex and the occupation of each petitioner.²²⁶ In all, Loyalists petitioners from Georgia belonged to five general occupational categories: planters or farmers, merchants, professionals (namely doctors, lawyers, or members of the clergy), artisan traders, and royal officials. Naturally, there was a certain amount of crossover here. Petitioners regularly identified themselves as having held multiples roles. Royal officials, for instance, were also often planters, and planters frequently referred to themselves as merchants too. Sometimes, individuals stated that they were all three simultaneously. Where petitioners were recorded as having had multiple occupations, I imposed no judgement as to whether they were primarily, say, a planter as opposed to a royal official or a merchant in a way that would conveniently but synthetically allow for neat comparisons to be drawn between claimants along occupational lines as could be done if only the sex of the claimants was considered. Thus, the material interests and valuations specified by, for instance, Sir James Wright (who was, of course, not only colonial Georgia's most prominent royal official but also one of the province's wealthiest planter-merchants) were included in the breakdowns of the claims for royal officials, merchants, and planters individually. The final disaggregated figures for the claims of male and female Loyalists, as well as for individuals in each of the five occupational sub-groups identified, are presented in the table below [figure 3.1].

²²⁶ Although many black Georgians fought for the Loyalist cause during the war, race was not a category of analysis available to me here. In the Georgia records, there is only one black petitioner: William Prince. Prince, however, included no details in his claim regarding what lost possessions he sought compensation for. His claim was finally rejected on the basis that the evidence for his losses came "from a very suspicious quarter to which we [the commission] can pay no credit". See the claim of William Prince, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 12/99, p.353.

Figure 3.1: table breakdown of the material priorities of Loyalist claimants from Georgia (1783-9)

	LAND	BUILDINGS	SLAVES	LIVESTOCK	CROPS	PLANTATION TOOLS	CONSUMER ASSETS
PLANTERS/ FARMERS Appealed for a total of £494,025.40	£245,178.60 (49.63%)	£20,948.26 (4.24%)	£47,738.73 (10.07%)	£16,348.43 (3.31%)	£76,731.88 (15.53%)	£5,513.30 (1.12%)	£5,205.20 (1.05%)
MERCHANTS/ TRADERS Appealed for a total of £410,335.39	£197,143.31 (48.04%)	£21,925.22 (5.34%)	£32,598.51 (7.94%)	£8,447.73 (2.06%)	£48,870.29 (11.91%)	£3,179.16 (0.77%)	£3,863.07 (0.94%)
PROFESSIONALS Appealed for a total of £52,261.63	£14,073.23 (26.93%)	£5,971 (11.43%)	£5,835 (11.16%)	£1,487.57 (2.85%)	£7,918.81 (15.15%)	£265 (0.51%)	£1,606.67 (3.11%)
ROYAL OFFICIALS Appealed for a total of £317,175.99	£150,657.7 (47.50%)	£19,843.66 (6.26%)	£35,026.3 (11.04%)	£7,115 (2.24%)	£37,588.22 (11.84%)	£1,382.20 (0.42%)	£5,948.35 (1.88%)
ARTISANS Appealed for a total of £15,756.50	£2,917.13 (18.51%)	£1,220 (7.74%)	£1,452 (9.22%)	£2,982.60 (18.93%)	£782.50 (4.67%)	£160.20 (1.09%)	£575.79 (3.41%)
FEMALE CLAIMANTS Appealed for a total of £54,491.87	£22,486.01 (41.26%)	£4,919 (9.03%)	£6,440 (11.82%)	£1,433.86 (2.63%)	£2,337.92 (4.29%)	£107.90 (0.19%)	£1,182.75 (2.17%)
MALE CLAIMANTS Appealed for a total of £819,211.55	£367,380.66 (44.85%)	£35,336 (4.13%)	£67,072.10 (8.14%)	£25,846.7 (3.16%)	£99,275.53 (12.12%)	£6,799.77 (0.83%)	£10,172.54 (1.24%)

A few things should be noted here. The table does not account for *all* the losses stated by every Georgia Loyalist refugee. Some losses noted in the claims were, frankly, too particular or idiosyncratic to warrant inclusion. Their consideration, I would suggest, adds nothing substantive to the analysis of the Georgia claimants. The figures for each concern in the table are, moreover, confused by the fact that in a number of petitions (usually from smaller appellants) specific concerns are not given valuations. Rather, they are simply presented amongst a number of losses with only a grand total for the sum presented at the bottom of the claim. The table does denote, however, what the primary concerns of the Georgia Loyalist refugees were, how much they appealed for in total, and the proportion of this total amount which was accounted for by each concern.²²⁷

The Georgia Loyalists privileged their lost land above all other interests prescribed in their appeals. Of the £873,703.42 they petitioned for, £389,866.67 (or 44.62 per cent) was tied to lost land. Land dominated the appeals of male and female Loyalists, accounting for 44.85 per cent of the total appealed for by male claimants and 41.26 per cent of the total appealed for by female claimants. The same is true merchants (48.04 per cent), planters and farmers (49.63 per cent), and royal officials (47.50 per cent). The figures for artisan traders and professional are comparatively lower, with 18.51 per cent and 26.95 per cent of the total value of their claims apportioned to their

²²⁷ The total requested by Loyalist refugees from Georgia was £873,7003.42. Because I did not seek to spit claimants' occupations neatly but arbitrarily, the appealed for amounts in the left column far outweigh the total figure for all Loyalists claimants. The percentages noted in each sub-section relate to the proportion of the total of that group's overall claim amount taken-up by a specific concern. So, for example, all those who identified themselves as planters or farmer in some way (which includes some who also identified themselves, for instance, as royal officials or merchants or both) appealed for a total of £494,025.40. Of this total, their stated losses for destroyed or sequestered land was £245,178.60 (or 49.63% of the total they claimed for as a group).

lost land. Yet, land was still by some way their largest concern in their claims. Lost land was thus privileged in the appeals of Georgia Loyalist claimants from all backgrounds.

The type of land which was privileged by the Georgia petitioners is important to note. In their claims, appellants dedicated more time detailing the particulars of their lost land than any other concern they specified. The auxiliary information which accompanied appeals for lost land was extensive and the physical space claimants gave to descriptions of their former landed holdings in their petitions surpassed all other losses for which they sought restitution. Indeed, appellants were remarkably precise in this regard, outlining distinguishing geographic features, its uses (or even potential uses), what was built on it (if anything), and the circumstances under which it was acquired and lost. Isaac Baillou, for example, managed to find space to spell out the exact purchase history of four tracts of land as well as a dwelling house consisting of fourteen rooms, two kitchens and “a garden well cropped and planted with fruited trees”.²²⁸ Three plots amounting to 750 acres were situated in the parish of St. Philip. One was granted to him by his father on June 29th, 1771, whilst the others were granted by George Fox and William Blake on January 3rd, 1774, and October 15th, 1774, respectively. Baillou valued these lands at ten shillings per acre, amounting to £375. The fourth plot of land containing 45 acres in the parish of Christ Church was purchased from the Prevost Marshal for £26 on an unspecified date by virtue of an execution obtained by Chief Justice Anthony Stokes.²²⁹ By far, though, the detail which most frequently appeared in association with the Georgia Loyalists’ lost land was the descriptor

²²⁸ Isaac Bailliou schedule of estate, attached to a memorial dated June 13th, 1787, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/34, pp.52-8.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.52.

“swamp”. In a schedule dated December 6th, 1786, for example, Peter Edwards – a clerk in the Georgia prothonotary’s office who escaped to East Florida in February 1776 – catalogued two tracts of land and a mansion house “neatly fitted with two brick chymneys, a stable and other out buildings.”²³⁰ One tract of 500 acres Edwards’ states as situated on “cedar swamp west side of St. John’s River” and another of 525 acres set “in the Twelve Mile Swamp ... about twelve miles northwest of St. Augustine”.²³¹ James Hume, once a Member of Council in Georgia and Chief Justice of East Florida, similarly described his Cypress Grove plantation as being “situated on six mile creek St. John’s river containing by grant 2500 acres, 905 of which is swamp and oak land” with 23 acres of the swamp land “prepared for and planted in rice, and upwards of 40 acres of oak land ... cleared and prepared for Indian corn”.²³² John Miller, a merchant, likewise detailed a 650 acre lost tract purchased from his brother William Miller situated sixteen miles north-west of Savannah as being “150 acres inland rice swamp (cleared), 70 acres highland provision ground and the rest uncultivated swamp ... and pasture ground”.²³³

The second largest material concern in Georgia Loyalists’ appeals was that which grew on their land and the lost profits resulting therefrom. This produce was primarily made-up from turpentine, indigo, lumber, and (most importantly of all) rice. In all, these concerns accounted for 11.63 per cent (or £101,613.45) of the total appealed for Georgia Loyalist refugees. For planters (15.53 per cent), merchants (11.91 per cent), professionals (15.15 per cent), and royal officials (11.84 per cent), the proportion of the

²³⁰ Peter Edwards schedule of estate, attached to a memorial dated December 6th, 1786, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 12/3, pp.283-4.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, p.283.

²³² James Hume schedule of estate, attached to a memorial dated August 29th, 1786, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 12/5, pp.59-60.

²³³ John Miller schedule of estate, attached to a memorial dated December 14th, 1787, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/36C, p.720.

total amount appealed for which was tied to agricultural produce was broadly similar and more or less corresponded with the average figure for Georgia petitioners as a whole. Artisan traders were the only occupational group to diverge significantly from this pattern. Just 4.67 per cent of the total sum of their requests were apportioned to agricultural products. This is, no doubt, linked in some way to artisan traders having appealed for less land (individually and collectively) than their planter, merchant, professional, or royal official counterparts and stems, most likely, from the fact that their livelihoods were in general not quite so dependent on land or the fruits it bore. It is the difference between male and female claimants here, though, which is most noticeable. 12.12 per cent of the total value of the claims of male petitioners was tied to products of their lands. For female claimants, however, this figure is just 4.29 per cent. This divergence, I would suggest, is at least in part explained by female claimants' conscious gendering of their appeals. As Ben Marsh and Linda Kerber separately discuss, the Revolution presented women with opportunities to become involved in activities and arenas that were hitherto outside their 'realm'. The chaos of the war placed women on both sides of the revolutionary divide in unfamiliar positions where the parochialism of normative gender roles was a bar to successfully navigating the trials before them.²³⁴ When appealing to the Commission, though, Loyalist women, as Norton suggests, reverted to type. They downplayed their involvement in un-domestic affairs (most notably when it came to matters of business) and emphasised their essential Rousseaunian femininity in the hope of pricking the sensibilities of the male commissioners' in London.²³⁵ This slant, it appears, was very much at play in the claims

²³⁴ Marsh, "Women and the American Revolution in Georgia", pp.157-78; Linda K. Kerber, *Women and the Republic: Intellect and Ideology*, North Carolina University Press (Chapel Hill, 1980), chapter 2.

²³⁵ Norton, "Eighteenth-Century American Women in Peace and War", pp.396-7.

of female petitioners from Georgia who sought to avoid the impression they possessed any precise knowledge of the plantation industry by, by and large, not talking about the economy of the land (except in extremely general terms) and by not stipulating the loss of any commercial crops.

Despite such differences, each of the various sub-groups of Georgia Loyalists discussed here ranked the loss of products such as rice, turpentine, indigo, and lumber, at the very least, amongst their three or four most significant concerns in their claims. In conjunction with the expansion of the fur trade, the emergence of commercially viable cash crops in Georgia during the late-1750s helped pave the way for the colony's social and economic maturation. Rice, in particular, was considered to be the coin of the realm. Even by producing just a few barrels, individuals could purchase slaves or trade them for goods from stores at Savannah or Sunbury. By specifying the loss of these goods, petitioners simultaneously harked back to a time of prosperity and suggestively pointed forward to a future of burgeoning exports and the fortunes that came with them. This future potential was laid bare by appellants who commonly gave the crop yields they had expected of their swamp lands had the Revolution not put a stop to their progress. Lieutenant-Colonel John McGillivray, for example, declared that at the time of Georgia's evacuation in June 1782 his Vale Royal plantation was "planted and growing and in excellent order 54 acres of rice swamp ... 100 bushels of corn ... and 8,000 bushels of potatoes".²³⁶ John Graham stated that he had sometime in 1781 "completely banked in and settled the new river swamp which was an addition of 130 acres of rice so that I

²³⁶ Memorial of John McGillivray, November 1st, 1784, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/36B, p.564.

had a right to expect my income this year would have exceeded the former ones.”²³⁷ Individuals who offered these kinds of speculations regarding what they could have produced and sold from their land sought to achieve the same thing as those who stressed how successful their businesses had been prior to the war. They raised the possibility of a future in Georgia that the colonists had come within touching distance of realising but had been prematurely swept from underneath their feet. In so doing, as products of their swamps, these losses underscored the importance of the Georgia claimants most coveted possession. They signified what could have been achieved on the back of their swamps had they been able to retain them.

After their lands and the goods that grew on them, the third largest concern Georgia refugees’ petitions was their lost human chattel property. In all, Georgia memorialists stated that the loss of their slaves had cost them £75,512.10, amounting to 8.41 per cent of the total they requested from the British government after the war. This average figure broadly corresponds with that for each of the sub-sets of claimants from Georgia to a greater extent than any other interests for which they sought compensation (with the exception of land). 8.19 per cent of the total appealed for by male petitioners was tied to the loss of enslaved peoples. For female claimants, this figure was trivially higher at 11.82 per cent. The figures for planters (10.07 per cent), merchants (7.94 per cent), professionals (11.16 per cent), artisan traders (9.22 per cent), and royal officials (11.04 per cent) also largely fit in with this trend.

²³⁷ John Graham schedule of estate, attached to a memorial dated January 5th, 1787, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/106A, p.174.

As with their swamps, the importance of the human chattel property to the Georgia claimants was underscored by the time and effort they spent describing their lost enslaved peoples. The ancillary information which accompanied their appeals for compensation for their lost slaves was as comprehensive as that which was adjoined to their sequestered or destroyed land. Appellants listed their names and gender, whether they saw active service during the war, who they were taken away by and when, and whether they possessed any particular skills that added to their value. Henry Ferguson, for instance, makes special mention of “one young negro man a carpenter, taken by a banditti that plundered ... the British laws, being then abolished, and no remedy to be had on that account, 27 years old”. In the same schedule, Ferguson lists “one negro man, a cooper, 30 years old”; two field slaves, one fifty and one seventeen years old; and finally “one young negro wench an excellent cook, washer and dresser of linen and likewise a good weaver”.²³⁸ James Hume refers to four male slaves in particular – Jack “a negro driver and jobbing carpenter”; Jamaica “a cooper”; Frank “a cooper and field slave”; and Jack “a gardener and complete gentleman’s servant” – among seventy slaves, all of whom are named, lost to him from his Retreat and Cypress Grove plantations between 1779 and 1783.²³⁹ James Butler – a militia captain, a planter in the parish of St. Philip, and member of the Commons House of Assembly – itemised by name seven slaves (one young girl, two men, and four women) plundered by rebel colonels John Twiggs and John Baker on June 2nd, 1779, six slaves (four men and two women) plundered on March 27th, 1780, and two male slaves taken by Rebel colonel John Cooper

²³⁸ Henry Ferguson schedule of estate, attached to a memorial [undated], *Commission Records*, NA, AO 12/3, p.96.

²³⁹ James Hume schedule of estate, attached to a memorial [undated], *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/35, p.328.

on April 29th, 1780.²⁴⁰ Butler also went on to specify a number of slaves, again by name, employed during the Siege of Savannah “in raising works for the defence of that place” as well as twenty-two of his slaves who had died between 1779 and 1783.²⁴¹

After these three primary concerns, the Georgia Loyalist refugees filled their claims (to varying amounts) with requests for compensation for destroyed buildings, sequestered livestock, forsaken plantation tools or agricultural equipment, and lost salaries. To a lesser extent, they also regularly appealed for compensation for the loss of arms and ammunition, boats, and fur skins. These were possessions Georgia refugees, by and large, thought important enough to mention. But in order to understand the claims of Georgia Loyalists in their entirety, attention should be also paid to the types of lost possessions appellants minimised or neglected to mention altogether. For as sure as it was a choice to privilege the types of lost possessions they did, it was also plainly a decision (whether mindfully or unintentionally) to overlook certain types of losses too.

Prior to the war, imported consumer luxuries were central to the construction of the colonists’ material identities as imperial subjects. As Timothy Breen and Brenden McConville have shown, the trade in these goods helped bind the American provinces to Britain economically and culturally.²⁴² Whilst it is impossible to know precisely who or how many persons owned such items, a general rising prosperity amongst colonial Americans during the second-third of the eighteenth century meant that greater

²⁴⁰ James Butler schedule of estate, attached to a memorial dated March 1st, 1784, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 12/4, pp.398-400.

²⁴¹ General Augustine Prevost supporting memorial for the claim of James Butler, November 1st, 1784, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/38, p.257; James Butler schedule of estate, attached to a memorial [undated], *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/34, p.185.

²⁴² Timothy H. Breen, *The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence*, Oxford University Press (New York, 2004), p.xv; McConville, *The King’s Three Faces*, pp.119-21.

numbers than ever before possessed the wherewithal to purchase them and thereby affirm their place as British subjects in the privacy of their own homes.²⁴³ The hunger for these kinds of imperial desires in Georgia prior to the Revolution is apparent even from a cursory glance of the classified section of the *Gazette*. Alongside the usual spattering of runaway slave bulletins, notices of sales describing consumer goods of all varieties are ever present. One advert from Wednesday March 14th 1770 listed the sale of “a handsome Wilton carpet ... some neat men’s, women’s and children’s shoes ... [and] a new set of furniture check bed curtains”.²⁴⁴ Another on Wednesday April 4th offering a reward for the return of property stolen by two Frenchmen listed such items as “a piece of furniture lace white and green, a few yards of rich silk ... several Italian flowers, French wax beads ... above all, a fine set of ear-rings ... and a necklace upon black velvet of emeralds and rubies set gold, green, red and white stones”.²⁴⁵ These types of commodities, according to Breen, acted as something like the material filaments of the Empire.²⁴⁶ Owning them allowed ordinary colonists to imagine themselves as looking and acting like their fellow imperial subjects in the metropole, sharing their manners and mores. To that extent, they served much the same intended function as pro-monarchist displays and discourse during the war. They helped to redress fears

²⁴³ During the mid-1740s, Great Britain exported to the mainland American colonies merchandise to the value of £871,658. In 1771, this total reached a pre-revolutionary high of £4,576,944. See Jacob M. Price, “New Time Series for Scotland’s and Britain’s Trade with the Thirteen Colonies and States 1740 t 1791”, *W&MQ*, vol.32:2 (1975), Appendix IIB, pp.324-5.

²⁴⁴ Advert of Sale, *Georgia Gazette*, Wednesday March 14th, 1770, issue: 336, p.2. This advert was repeated on Wednesday March 21st, issue: 337, p.4; Wednesday April 18th, issue: 341, p.4; Wednesday April 24th, issue: 342, p.4; Wednesday May 2nd, issue: 343, p.4; Wednesday May 9th, issue: 344, p.4; Wednesday May 16th, issue: 345, p.4.

²⁴⁵ Advert for the return of stolen items, *Georgia Gazette*, Wednesday April 4th, 1770, issue: 339, p.4. This advert was repeated on Wednesdays April 11th, issue: 340, p.5.

²⁴⁶ Breen, *The Marketplace of Revolution*, p.43.

regarding their separateness from the 'motherland' and masked anxieties concerning their own provinciality.

The petitions of Georgia Loyalists, though, are marked by an almost total absence of any claims for compensation for imported luxuries or personal treasures which were lost to them. Although, as noted, some individuals were likely able to take with them into exile a few possessions of this kind, some items (possibly of great worth) were also almost certainly destroyed, left behind, or pilfered by opportunistic Whigs. Yet, out of the 209 claims submitted by Loyalist refugees from Georgia, a full 124 contained no specific reference to any commodities of this type, be they textiles, earthenware, furniture, portraits, books, glassware, or jewellery. All told, these kinds of possession accounted for just 1.3 per cent (or £11,344.29) of the total requested by claimants from Georgia. The sum sought for the loss of such goods comprised a trifling 1.24 per cent of the total requested by male claimants and 2.17 per cent of the total appealed for by female claimants. They constituted a mere 1.05 per cent of the compensation appeals of planters as group, 0.94 per cent of merchants' appeals, and 1.88 per cent of the claims of royal officials. They constitute a marginally higher proportion of the restitution requests of professionals (3.11 per cent) and artisan traders (3.41 per cent), but not to the extent that such commodities appear as anything other than very much minor concerns in their appeals.

Tellingly, the details which made vivid and gave colour to the Georgia Loyalists' lost swamps and human chattel property in the pages of their appeals are conspicuous by their absence with regard to consumer imports. Where they are mentioned at all, they are almost universally listed hastily alongside such bundling phrases as 'sundry',

'household', 'several', or 'a variety of'. Elizabeth Lyle – the widow of Samuel Agnew, a planter – simply listed such items as “wearing apparel, household furniture, bed and bedding, buttons and buckles.”²⁴⁷ John Friermuth, too, lumped his consumer concerns together as “household furniture, body clothing ... twelve yards of white lining, six hand cercheafs [and] twenty-five yards of wooling cloath”.²⁴⁸ Such generic descriptions reveal nothing about the origins of these commodities and suggest little about what these claimants thought about their quality. Above all, they convey a sense of ambivalence as to their actual worth. Unlike their other concerns, there appears to be a carelessness about what impression they gave the commissioners when presenting their losses for these consumer imports. It is consequently difficult to avoid the conclusion that such possessions were viewed by the Georgia petitioners as somewhat sacrificable trinkets in what was (as previously noted) an uncertain negotiation with the British authorities for satisfaction.

The material contents of the Georgia Loyalists' claims were not a random assortment of possessions jumbled together as a tally of losses. The lost property for which they specifically sought compensation was privileged as a result of choices that were made. It is difficult to avoid this conclusion given that appellants did not petition for anything close to all of their property which was sequestered or destroyed during the war (even allowing for the fact that individuals did not enter exile without any of their possessions whatsoever). Why they overwhelmingly made the choices they did –

²⁴⁷ Elizabeth Lyle's schedule of estate, attached to a memorial dated May 23rd, 1786 *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/24, pp.339-40.

²⁴⁸ John Friermuth's schedule of estate, attached to a memorial dated April 15th, 1786, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/25, p.186.

namely, to prioritise the loss of their swamps, rice profits, and slaves and to minimise or overlook altogether any lost imported or consumer desires – clearly requires an explanation.

It was, in part, plainly economically driven. Enslaved peoples and land were, in raw commercial terms, the most valuable possessions the petitioners owned. Whilst exact prices are difficult to verify, Loyalist refugees from Georgia valued their land at an average of 10 shillings per acre. Thus, a single, medium-sized 300 acre plot on the Savannah river, for instance, was generally valued in the region of £150. It was common for Georgia Loyalists to claim for the loss of several lots of this size, with some larger claimants appealing for compensation for the loss of multiple lots of up to 500 acres. The monetary value of bondspeople was, in comparison to other forms of property, also high. A single country-born or seasoned male slave was typically priced at somewhere between £28 and £36 in Georgia during the 1750s.²⁴⁹ The purchasing of slaves was easily the largest outlay for individuals who sought to become a part of Georgia's burgeoning plantation economy at mid-century, accounting for up to 60 per cent of the cost of establishing a medium sized holding.²⁵⁰ That land (coupled with the products of the land) and human chattel property were the largest interests in the Georgia Loyalists' claims is thus, in a sense, unsurprising. But, if choices about what to claim for were made purely in line with hard-nosed financial arithmetic, there would be little reason, it seems, not to see listed amongst the losses of Georgia Loyalists (particularly those with larger estates) examples of, for instance, expensive glassware, mahogany bookshelves, or

²⁴⁹ These prices are taken from Betty Wood, *Slavery in Colonial Georgia 1730-1775*, The University of Georgia Press (Athens, 1984), pp.96-7; Frey, *Water from the Rock*, p.10; Hall, *Land and Allegiance*, p.8.

²⁵⁰ Klaus G. Leowald, Beverley Staricka, and Paul S. Taylor, "Johann Martin Bolzious Answers a Questionnaire on Carolina and Georgia: Part I", *WMQ*, vol.14 (1957), p.261

silver dining sets in favour of, say, cattle or grain stores, on a more regular basis. But the Georgia Loyalists did not do this. This begs the question why, in an enterprise conceived to satisfy economic needs, were the material contents of their claims compiled in such a way that at times did not absolutely correspond with this purpose?

The most obvious answer is that claimants believed certain losses were more likely to be compensated for than others. At first thought, this explanation seems eminently plausible. It fits in with the calculating approach claimants generally adopted when, for instance, affixing monetary values to their lost property. It appears also to provide a practicable solution to the problem of Georgia Loyalists minimising or overlooking the loss of particular high-priced possessions. If they did not realistically expect that such losses would be reimbursed, there would be little reason to highlight or even include them in their final request. In the end, though, this answer proves somewhat unsatisfactory. In their advisory pamphlets, the board of agents made no recommendations to memorialists regarding which (if any) losses they would be wise to privilege. There is also nothing in the Commission records to suggest that claimants or the British authorities took the view that particular losses deserved to be made up for and others, for whatever reason, did not. There is, furthermore, no evidence which supports the idea that petitioners whose requests were predicated on, say, their lost land to a greater extent than other claimants were overtly favoured by the commissioners when it came to doling-out final settlements either.

A more compelling answer, I submit, is that the disruption of the war and their subsequent exile caused Loyalist refugees to think about their lost possessions in such a way that did not totally accord priority to their economic value. The Loyalists' claims

were not constructed in a vacuum. They were compiled in a climate of tumult, uncertainty, and despair. With the war lost, Georgia's friends of government fled their homes in the summer of 1782. Via St. Augustine and New York, they made their way to the barren wilds of Nova Scotia, the turbulent shores of the Caribbean, and the grey skies of the mother country. They left behind everything – the networks, the sights, the sounds, and (most obviously) the possessions – upon which they had built their lives as subjects of the British Empire in Georgia. Importantly, the war meant that the personal designation which they had hitherto always been known by – colonial Americans – had to be left behind also. This title was (as discussed in the previous chapter) no longer usable as a result of the events of the war. The loss of the War of Independence thus precipitated an emotional upheaval as well as a physical upheaval. This upheaval, I would suggest, was more keenly felt by Georgia's friends of government than their counterparts elsewhere if only because they were briefly given cause for hope following the restoration of royal rule in their region. Their claims and everything that was poured into them were, in large part, products of these violently unsettling circumstances. What they specified must, therefore, be considered as emotional as well as economic concerns. The possessions they privileged in their claims, I propose, reveal part of the memorialists' reflexive, emotional self which was brought to the surface by the experience of the war and exile. Their land, the agricultural goods they exported, and their human chattel property – rather than any imported consumer desires – were the relics around which they built their lives and constructed their personal narratives. Their attachment to them was thus fundamentally historical. The mandating of the use of slaves in 1750, the near simultaneous opening up of lands under in the upcountry under royal government, and the emergence of commercially viable cash crops combined to

transform Georgia from little more than a minor outpost of Charleston at mid-century to a significant and vibrant port province in the Atlantic economy in the space of ten years or so. They provided the basis for whatever power and prosperity individuals there were able to accrue for themselves.²⁵¹ The assets privileged by the Georgia Loyalists in their appeals were, in other words, their foundational material interests in defence of which they turned out for the royalist cause, their emotional significance amplified postwar by their physical remoteness from the place and the time they had flourished in. They were the material elements into which their habit-bodies were sedimented. These identities, as Pierre Bourdieu notes, operated below the conscious level and were the result of constant quotidian engagements out of which the sinews and rhythms of their sense of self and place were unmindfully sewn together.²⁵² They were the assets which, in exile, most powerfully instigated a set of involuntary reminiscences and earlier sensual experiences from which they could draw solace, their evocation rearing notions of fixity and prosperity which claimants hoped to once again make real parts of their lives.

²⁵¹ The history of slavery in Georgia is unique. Trustee Georgia was conceived as a slave-free (but not anti-slavery) province. With the economy struggling though, many, in particular large numbers of lowland Scots, thought the answer to reverse the colony's dire fortunes was to legally mandate the institution of slave labour. As a consequence of mounting popular pressure, the Trustees prohibition of slavery eventually proved untenable and in 1750 the ban was formally overturned (although many simply saw this as little more than recognising *de jure* what had long been practiced *de facto*, with many slaves noted as having been illegally employed on several plantations from as early as 1746).

See F. Linden, "Economic Democracy in the Slave South: An Appraisal of Some Recent Views", *Journal of Negro History*, vol.31 (1946), pp.14-89; R.Q. Mallard, *Plantation Life Before Emancipation*, Whittet & Shepperson (Richmond, 1892); H.B. Fant, "The Prohibition Policy of the Trustees for Establishing the Colony of America", pp.286-96; Gray and Wood, "The Transition from Indentured Servitude to Involuntary Servitude", pp.353-70; Wood, "Thomas Stephens and the Introduction of Black Slavery in Georgia", pp.24-40. For the best account of the emergence of cash crops Georgia and their importance to the colony's socio-economic maturation during the 1750s and 1760s see Paul Pressley, *On the Rim of the Caribbean*.

²⁵² Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 1977), p.82; Edensor, *National Identity*, pp.54-6.

Importantly, by privileging their lost land, agricultural profits, and slaves, Georgia Loyalist claimants re-articulated a sense of provincial distinctiveness which first emerged out of their monarchalist displays and discourses during the war. As explored in the previous chapter, during the conflict Georgia's friends of government worked to ward-off the troubling implications of the imperial schism for their colonial American identity by placing the monarchy at the heart of their political culture. They symbolically leant on the figure of the king as an allegorical bridge to their fellow imperial subjects everywhere (especially in the metropole) and to a place in time in which their allegiances were grounded. Rather than closing the Atlantic gap, though, loyal Georgians' symbolic elevation of the king served effectively to imaginatively isolate them from their imperial cousins in Britain. In so doing, they underscored the basic provinciality of their identities as Loyalists at war. In their claims to the Commission postwar, Georgia Loyalist exiles rearticulated their quintessentially regionalised orientation. By prioritising their swamps, rice plants, and slaves, they recreated the vast visage of their corner of the Empire as it looked, felt, and sounded to them prior to the War of Independence. These iconic sites – what Anthony Smith refers to as “sacred centres” – brought to mind the Georgia Loyalists' imagined glorious past (the same past recalled by loyal Georgians during the war in pro-monarchist displays and discourses).²⁵³ They were panoramas into which Georgia Loyalists decanted personal meaning and orbited their individual and collective mythos around. Prior to the Revolution, these particular sites were absorbed as part of the larger, elastic imperial body. After the loss of the war and the consecration of the imperial schism, however, they chafed with increasing discomfort against

²⁵³ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, University of Nevada Press (London, 1991), p.16.

metropolitan sensibilities, most notably those of the commissioners who, it seems, neither recognised nor appreciated them as part of their imperial vista. This incongruity was poignantly voiced by Coke who, in his notes on the Commission, described the swamps of the former southern colonies to which the Georgia petitioners attached such importance as “dismal”.²⁵⁴

There is no evidence in the Commission records to suggest that Coke was in any way out of step with Eardley-Wilmot or any of his other colleagues in this view. He plainly regarded them as anything but rich, fruitful, or sacred. Instead, he noted what he saw as their essential shabbiness. If it was in line with intellectual ripples circulating in Britain at this time, this negative assessment was not merely an aesthetic one. It was a moral one too. Whilst noting colonial planters’ “marks of opulence”, certain elements in London society began during the last third of the eighteenth century to denounce the means with which they had acquired them: namely, by the use of enslaved labour.²⁵⁵ In 1772, for instance, Maurice Morgann – a colonial administrator and previously a political advisor to the Earl of Shelburne, then President of the Board of Trade – produced his *Plan for the Abolition of the Slavery in the West Indies*. Morgann’s plan bespoke a sharp contempt for colonial planters and proposed the purchase and subsequent liberation of West Indian slaves in order to establish a new colony in Pensacola that he thought would guarantee British supremacy in America.²⁵⁶ The publication of Morgann’s plan roughly

²⁵⁴ *The Royal Commission on the Losses and Services of American Loyalists*, p.363.

²⁵⁵ Jeffrey Young, *Domesticating Slavery: The Master Class in Georgia and South Carolina 1670-1837*, University of North Carolina Press (Chapel Hill, 1999), pp.39-40.

²⁵⁶ Morgann’s plan was followed by similar intervention from the Reverend James Ramsay in 1778 who argued for the education and emancipation of West Indian Slaves) and Bishop John Hinchcliffe who, in 1781, submitted a bill to parliament to soften and reduce the institution of human bondage in the Caribbean, with both, like Morgann, articulating a pronounced disregard for the masters. See Christopher Brown, “Empire Without Slaves: British Concepts of Emancipation in the Age of the American Revolution”,

coincided with Justice William Murray, 1st Earl Mansfield's ruling in the *Somerset vs. Stewart* case. In his final judgement, Mansfield concluded that in the absence of specific legislation slavery was contrary to natural law. Whilst pro-slavery commentators of the time argued that Mansfield had not intended to free slaves or even to soften human bondage where it existed – citing his judgement in *R. vs. The Inhabitants of Harborton* (1786) – it is noteworthy that in no legal case post-Somerset did a court uphold a master's claim to a slave's service as a *slave* in Britain.²⁵⁷ In other words, the ownership of slaves post-Somerset was no longer an absolute right of imperial subjects, but a local right within the Empire. Even in this localised state though, colonial planters did not escape the censure of metropolitan writers and thinkers like Morgann. Of course, the impact of Mansfield's verdict and the articulations of early anti-slavery scribes should not be overstated. Their effect was, admittedly, limited. Yet, such interventions signalled the beginnings of conceptual change in Britain (in particular in the metropole) regarding the place of slavery in the Empire which plainly set its face against colonists for whom the use of enslaved labour seemed essential, casting them as some kind of second tier imperial subjects: grasping, tasteless, dissolute, and, in fact, not British at all.

It is perhaps a touch ironic that the global economic networks which spawned and maintained the plantation society in Georgia also provided avenues for colonists'

WMQ, vol.56:2 (1999), pp.276-9 and p.286. For an analysis of the geopolitical reasons for the growth of the abolition movement in Britain during the late-eighteenth century, see another of Brown's works *Moral Capital: The Foundations of British Abolitionism*, University of North Carolina Press (Chapel Hill, 2006).

²⁵⁷ William Cotter, "The Somerset Case and the Abolition of Slavery in England", *History*, vol.79:255 (1994), p.41. *Harborton* concerned the rights of an apprentice to claim a hiring where a previous indenture still existed (the apprentice was white and not a former slave). In his judgement, Mansfield was unwilling to extend new relief under the poor law as "it would increase the litigation of the Poor Laws, which are already a disgrace to this country" making his belief clear that no one could recover wages unless there was an actual agreement between the labourer and the person receiving the benefits of the labour that a wage would be paid, allowing for the continuation of slavery *de facto* post-Somerset.

exposure to an emerging cultural ethic which denounced their cold-hearted pursuit of means. By bringing their 'dismal' swamps before the commissioners, Georgia Loyalist claimants testified effectively to their own peculiarity as a group within the imperial family. They demarcated the physical features and boundaries of their Empire which acted as shorthands for their identities and synecdoches through which they communicated their sense self and place in exile which were, I argue, pinned to region. In so doing, they also reflexively drew boundaries between themselves and the British authorities for whom the Empire looked and felt remarkably different, showing how the ingredients of the imperial soul were essentially polysemic and mediated on the ground by everyday experience.

The Commission records read as something like a pseudo-Doomsday book of the Loyalists' colonial world. Rather than mere accountants' ledgers though, dryly enumerating their wartime losses, the Georgia petitioners' appeals for compensation were subject to a series of reflexive and unreflexive choices. These choices show how despite having lost nearly everything, the Georgia Loyalists worked to shape their own postwar destinies, belying the image of unresourceful and utterly impotent evacuees. Guided by the board of agents' advisory pamphlets, individual appellants constructed their claims in a manner they thought would help secure them the greatest reward possible. This did this primarily by strategically estimating the monetary value of their lost assets, adapting their approach by either overplaying or underplaying their hand according to what they thought the likely response of the officials who decided their settlements would be. In so doing, they demonstrated a deep political suppleness and

an awareness of how they could work the system to suit their needs, qualities which, as Keith Mason agrees, were vital to re-establishing themselves in the Atlantic world after the Revolution.²⁵⁸

Crucially, though, Georgia Loyalist claimants not only decided *how* they valued their lost assets but also *which* lost assets they valued. Overwhelmingly, their petitions were filled with claims for compensation for lost land, agricultural profits (usually from rice plants and indigo), and human chattel property. The priority accorded to these types of possessions was not, I argue, purely the result of economic imperatives. Were this so, there would be seem little reason for claimants – especially those with larger estates – to almost uniformly downplay, or jettison from their appeals altogether, expensive imported desires (such as decorative furniture and so on) which would have doubtlessly added to the value of their claim, could almost certainly not have been taken with them into exile, and prior to the Revolution were fundamental to their material identities as imperial subjects. The material content of the claims – that which the Georgia Loyalists’ specifically sought restitution for – were, rather, reflections of their lives as colonial Americans, put together in a period of intense personal as well as physical instability. As products of these circumstances – as appeals compiled by individuals who battled questions relating to their new status and identity in exile following the loss of a long and bloody civil conflict – what filled the Georgia Loyalists’ claims, I contend, reflected a set of emotional as well as economic concerns which were reflexively forced to the surface by their distinctive experience of the war and their subsequent displacement. The Georgia Loyalists’ lost swamps, rice plants, and enslaved peoples were the basis

²⁵⁸ Keith Mason, “Loyalism in British North America in the Age of Revolution c.1775-1812”, *Loyalism and the Formation of the British World*, pp.163-81.

upon which the province's socio-economic development from mid-century was built and whatever wealth or power individuals were able to accrue for themselves secured. Crucially, they were the assets which, to a significant degree, defined their vista of the Empire. They formed the Georgia refugees' colonial task-scape, making-up the familiar sights and sounds around which individuals orientated themselves. They set the scene for everyday routines and interactions by which they marked their lives and understood their place in the world. Wracked with doubt at the disassembling of their material and social worlds – in circumstances where they found themselves having to start again in every conceivable sense – it was understandable and perhaps unsurprising that the Georgia Loyalists should privilege in their appeals possessions which connoted secureness and prosperity.

The language of possessions, though, is never fixed. To different people, in different places, at different times, certain assets are viewed in contrasting ways. Commodities, in other words, are not detached from their environments. Their context gives them meaning. To the commissioners in London, as Coke made plain, the Georgia Loyalists' swamps bespoke a raggedy and struggling scene. To their eyes, swamps stood for anything but richness or prosperity. Rather, for them they aroused imaginings of neglect and decay – moral and aesthetic – which, concerned as they were postwar with rejuvenating Britain's national image as a flourishing and morally upright imperial power, sat uncomfortably on their desks.²⁵⁹ The Georgia Loyalists' privileging of their lost swamps and the assets which made them profitable in their claims thus not only reveals important subterranean elements of their group character, but also sheds light

²⁵⁹ Colley, *Britons*, chapter 3:4; Brown, *Moral Capital*, p.27.

on part of the essential nature of the imperial soul itself. How individuals related to the Empire – what individuals associated with it, how it looked and felt to them, and the ways ideas of Empire and imperial belonging fed into their embodied sense of self – was dynamic and rooted in quotidian interactions which varied from place to place. The material elements of the Georgia Loyalists claims, I therefore submit, function as evidence that the Empire did not consist of a single, rigid centre with many peripheries. Rather, they show how it was comprised of multiple and sometimes distinct centres which individuals recognised as their own and identified with.

“Dependent on the Bounty of this Country”: the rhetoric of the memorials of Georgia petitioners’ to the Loyalist Claims Commission, 1783-89

The privileged possessions specifically enumerated by Georgia petitioners in their appeals to the *Loyalist Claims Commission* served as hard evidence for their wartime allegiances and services. They were the wares they had marked their lives by as colonial Americans and fought so pitifully hard to keep hold of during the War of Independence. They were, in short, the material basis of their particular identities, the loss of which they expected the commissioners in London to make good on. But the Loyalist appellants’ schedules of loss – the lists of destroyed or sequestered assets for which they desired restitution – constituted only part of their overall submissions to the British authorities. By far the largest portion of their appeals was made-up of semi-journalistic accounts of their late colonial, wartime, and postwar activities. These accounts were woven together into narratives of service and sacrifice and presented as arguments for their entitlement to receive a fair settlement of their claim. They comprised more than a set of managed declarations forwarded in order to aid individuals’ pursuit of economic justice, though. They were also made up of instinctual reflections. In their memorials, Loyalist refugees communicated their authentic responses to the events of the war, the Commission process, and their experiences as exiles in their new environs. In so doing (in conjunction with their material inventories of loss) they gave a hearing to fundamental elements of their distinctive sense of self and belonging as imperial subjects which were thrown into sharp relief after the loss of the war.

There had never been a moment in the lives of loyal Americans where their words mattered more to them. Rhetoric had forever been of social and political importance to all Americans, as Sandra Gustafson and Nicole Eustace have separately shown.²⁶⁰ During the colonial epoch, different ways of speaking and writing fed into various assumptions regarding status, education, political and religious sensibilities, habits of thought, and even morality. It was taken for granted that how individuals spoke and wrote – their word choices, their phraseology, and their tone – reflected something fundamental about their personal characters and backgrounds as well as (more obviously) their intentions and outlooks. Throughout the Revolution, rhetoric helped individuals on both sides of the divide militate against the strictures of the war, identify and excoriate an enemy, and solder themselves into a choate bloc of like minds capable of forwarding their cause. But as they approached the commissioners after the war seeking to convince them of the worthiness of their appeals, the Loyalists' rhetoric took on tangible, material consequences. Whether or not they received satisfaction – whether or not they were granted the means with which they could rebuild their lives – depended in large part on how they framed their written and verbal testimonies. So, the decisions individuals made with regard to the terms they couched their appeals in and the weighting they gave to certain words were of great significance.

To date, though, the study of Loyalist rhetoric has somewhat curiously taken an end of world view of 1783.²⁶¹ The vast body of evidence in the Commission records

²⁶⁰ SGustafson, *Eloquence is Power*; Nicole Eustace, *Passion is the Gale: Emotion, Power, and the Coming of the American Revolution*, University of North Carolina Press (Chapel Hill, 2008).

²⁶¹ See Anne Y. Zimmer, "The Rhetoric of American Loyalism", *ghq*, vol.66:2 (1982), pp.145-58; Janice Potter-Mackinnon and Robert M. Calhoon, "The Character and Coherence of the Loyalist Press", *Tory Insurgents*, pp.125-60; Calhoon and Davis, "Loyalist Discourse and the Moderation of the American Revolution", *Tory Insurgents*, pp.160-204. Taken in concert, these works show how the tone and composition

which points to the fact that hundreds of individuals (many of whom have never received a hearing) continued to think, speak, and write as Loyalists long after the ink on the Paris treaty had dried has been mistakenly overlooked.²⁶² In this section, therefore, I attend to the personal testimonies submitted by Georgia Loyalist exiles to the Commission. These testimonies are densely worded documents. They recount each appellant's experiences in Georgia from the time of their settlement to their subsequent banishment after the end of the War of Independence. They convey what they thought about the Revolution as well as their circumstances in exile. What stands out from these documents are their fictional qualities. By fictional I do not mean fabricated (although certain details in some claims undoubtedly were). Rather, as Nathalie Davis does, I use the term because it captures the degree to which the claims were crafted by individuals who shaped their language in order to present an account which appeared to both the reader and the writer as true, meaningful, and explanatory.²⁶³

To get to the heart of these multiple fictions and to establish if there were any common themes across them, I worked to appraise recurring terms and words employed by Georgia Loyalist claimants in order to determine which they leaned on most

of Loyalist rhetoric shifted in accordance with political events prior to and during war. Each have been salutary because despite they demonstrate that Loyalist rhetoric often displayed a capacity to adapt to the changing political moment and was occasionally touched with a degree of elegance as well as force.

²⁶² Another criticism of the study of Loyalist rhetoric is that where it has been looked at, attention has exclusively been given to individuals such as John Joachim Zubly, William Smith, Jonathan Boucher, and Charles Inglis: elite, semi-professional polemicists whose allegiances flowed from their Christian beliefs and whose written works as friends of government were informed largely by the evangelical tradition. See Joseph Locke, "Compelled to Dissent: The Politicisation of Rev. John Joachim Zubly 1760-1776", *GHQ*, vol.94:4 (2010), pp.453-78; Daniel Marjorie, "John Joachim Zubly: Georgia Pamphleteer of the Revolution", *GHQ*, vol.19:1 (1935), pp.1-16;

Leslie Upton, *The Loyal Whig: William Smith of New York and Quebec*, University of Toronto Press (Toronto, 1969); Reginald V. Harris, *Charles Inglis: Missionary, Loyalist, Bishop 1734-1816*, General Board of Religious Education (Toronto, 1937).

²⁶³ Davis, *Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century France*, Stanford University Press (California, 1990), pp.2-3.

often. In other words, whereas in chapter two I endeavoured to distil qualitative meaning from the Georgia Loyalists' schedules of loss, in this section I sought to quantify and seek out patterns in their qualitative reflections. Importantly, in my count I looked at when each petition was submitted and where each claimant resided at the time of their appeal. As Maya Jasanoff, Catherine Crary, and countless other scholars have shown, the Loyalist exiles fanned-out across the late-eighteenth century's Atlantic world in search of their new beginning.²⁶⁴ At the time they submitted their appeals, Georgia Loyalist claimants were most commonly residing in either England, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, the Bahamas, or Jamaica.²⁶⁵ Other destinations from which Georgia petitioners forwarded claims covered by my count include Quebec, Scotland, Ireland, and St. Augustine. In taking this approach, the relationship between individual claimants, their new environs, and the rhetoric of their appeals was situated at the heart of my analysis.²⁶⁶

From my quantitative analysis of the Georgia claimants' rhetoric, two predominant 'languages' emerged: the language of dependence and the language of dislocation. These languages, I argue, bespoke a sharp and (in the context of the

²⁶⁴ Maya Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles*, pp.9-10; *The Price of Loyalty*, ed. Crary, p.390.

²⁶⁵ Where Georgia Loyalists fled to was, in large part, guided by economics. As Carole Watterson Troxler has shown, the office holding class and professionals tended to run to the metropole, larger slave owners relocated to the West Indies (usually Jamaica or the Bahamas), and smaller backcountry farmers settled in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. See Carole Watterson Troxler, *The Migration of Carolina and Georgia Loyalists to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick*, Ph.D. dissertation (University of North Carolina, 1974), p.4.

²⁶⁶ As a result of practical issues associated with handling the Commission records in this way, it was necessary to ignore certain words and terms from the outset. References to the commissioners as "Your Honours", for instance, were dismissed from my count as a commonplace address in late eighteenth-century parliamentary petitioning parlance which was of limited analytical value. So too were any proper nouns, third-person pronouns, job titles, itemised losses, and details peculiar to individuals (such as place of birth, the date of their arrival in Georgia, their salary, and the date and means of their evacuation). The remaining words were tallied and mapped with key terms encompassing the rhetorical heart of the Georgia Loyalists' appeals rising to the top.

Commission process) agonising doubleness. On the one hand, they made it clear how these appellants continued, in the last instance, to define themselves as subjects of the Empire and invest sovereignty in imperial bodies from whom they sought restitution. On the other hand, though, they also gave voice to pronounced sensations of disorientation and detachment in the parts of the Empire to which they had fled but did not in any way feel rooted in. The language of dislocation was, I contend, partly a product of their pronounced shock at the conclusion of the war. Having witnessed and contributed to the revivification of royal rule in their region only a short while beforehand, loyal subjects in Georgia found themselves having to suddenly leave their homes and begin their lives over again in another part of the king's dominions. This was a further disorientating blow Loyalists from elsewhere (though doubtless stunned and saddened by the fall of British America) did not have to contend with. The Georgia Loyalists' fall from triumph to disaster was sharper and more abrupt than their compatriots' in other parts of the continent. This distinctive experience made their dismay at the loss of the war all the more profound and, in many ways, shaped their perceptions and rhetoric as exiles. The language of dislocation, I argue, was also reflective of misgivings that came with individuals having to internally reorganise their sense of self and place in Britain's Atlantic world without the familiar anchors – the roles, the sights and sounds, and the belongings – which had previously reflexively secured both. As such, the rhetoric of the Georgia Loyalist exiles in their appeals to the Commission served to reinforce the cardinal importance of place and their provincial histories to the architecture of their identities after the peace.

Unpacking the rhetoric of the Georgia petitioners in the way I have outlined allows for arguments made in the previous two chapters regarding the basic

parochialism of the Georgia Loyalists' sense of self and belonging, as well as the ideational multifariousness of imperial identities, to be tested and secured. It lays bare the ways Georgia's exiled friends of government struggled to reconcile their lingering identification as members of the king's imperial family – a community they had sought to imaginatively draw themselves closer to during the war – with their embodied, reflexive provinciality in exile. As such, it underscores the importance of Georgia's particular locale and the taskscapes they performed their quotidian routines around as colonial Americans (which were materially reassembled in their schedules of loss) to the Loyalists' self-location in exile. In so doing, I call attention to the Georgia Loyalists' fundamental group distinctiveness which, I argue, it is necessary and essential to understand in order to account for loyalism's broad tessellation during and after the War of Independence.

The Loyalists' claims were put together with an obvious agenda: namely, to receive some kind of remuneration from the British government. If their schedules of loss acted, in essence, as the 'receipts' for their loyalty – the price-tags they affixed to their wartime allegiances – the personal testimonies they submitted alongside them (which comprised by far the largest part of each appeal) were the way individuals pressed their case and substantiated their requests. These memorials were, in effect, stage props in the theatre of persuasion constructed with the gaze of Daniel Parker Coke and his colleagues in mind. They were exercises in the art of self-representation which, as with the valuations which were attached to each appellant's lost assets, were shaped by petitioners in order to give themselves the best chance of receiving the largest award

possible. For that reason, the language choices they made not only reflected what petitioners' thought was important enough for the officials in London to know but also the particular image they wished to convey to their potential sponsors.

Leaping out from the testimonies of Georgia Loyalists – what defines them to a great extent at first sight – is the language of dependency. This language was rooted in the history of Georgia prior to and during the War of Independence. Being the youngest colony, comparatively poor, and sparsely populated, Georgia before the economic boom of the early 1760s was heavily reliant on aid from the British parliament for its survival. To be sure, it is a paradox at the heart of Georgia's story that it was conceived as a province where poor white settlers could attain some degree of personal independence through the purchasing of land, but which was itself dependent on the mother country for succour. For Georgia colonists, the idea of having to rely on Britain was an everyday part of their lives (perhaps to a greater extent than anywhere else in the colonies). For them, professing their dependency on Britain was simply a statement of fact: an unexceptional recognition of the way of things. Indeed, during the crisis of the early-1770s and beyond, Tories in Georgia continually reiterated their desire for British support without which, they believed, some catastrophe would befall them. Responding to the protest of Savannah merchants against the Intolerable Acts on August 10th, 1774, for example, inhabitants in St. Paul's parish organised a petition affirming their loyalty to the king but warned that "back settlements of this province ... would most certainly be laid waste and depopulated, unless we receive such powerful aid and assistance as none but Great Britain can give."²⁶⁷ Appeals to the British authorities for assistance

²⁶⁷ "Resolutions of St. Paul Parish", *Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), October 12th, 1774.

continued throughout the war with Loyalist leaders consistently asserting their need for extra British military support. On June 9th, 1775, just under two months after fighting broke out at Lexington and Concord, Georgia royal governor Sir James Wright wrote to Secretary of State for the Colonies Lord Dartmouth declaring that “There are still many friends to government here” but “for the want of proper support and protections ... [they] are falling off and lessening every day.”²⁶⁸ As rebel forces consolidated their control of the backcountry in the summer of 1781, Wright repeated his warnings in a letter to the 1st Viscount Sackville, George Germain (who had replaced Dartmouth as Secretary of State for the Colonies in November 1775). In it, Wright stated that inhabitants around Augusta and Ebenezer had “taken to the swamps to hide themselves for a time” for the want of British support there.²⁶⁹ The governor’s implication in both of these letters was clear: most Georgians, he thought, were loyal by inclination, but such was their dependence on British assistance for their safety that without it remaining an active and open Loyalist might prove impossible.

Although an everyday part of their colonial and revolutionary heritage, subjects in Georgia were often afflicted with a persistent mindfulness of the perception that they were in some way inferior to subjects in Britain because of their dependency. This mindfulness fostered a popular political culture which was defined by chauvinistic public displays of attachment. These displays functioned to link individuals to the mother country and, as explored in first chapter of this thesis, were a critical part of loyal Georgians’ wartime campaign to revivify royal America in their region. After the loss of

²⁶⁸ Sir James Wright to Lord Dartmouth, June 9th, 1775, *Documents of the American Revolution*, vol.9, p.167.

²⁶⁹ Sir James Wright to the 1st Viscount Sackville, George Germain, Secretary of State for the colonies, June 14th, 1781, *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society*, vol.3, pp.358-9.

the war, though, Georgia's friends of government enthusiastically drew on the well-trodden language of dependency in their petitions for compensation. This language appeared in many forms. By far the most common way Georgia petitioners affirmed their dependent status was to "pray" or "beg" or "crave" the commissioners to consider their case. Every petitioner from Georgia, without exception, pleaded with the commissioners in this way in the hope their appeals would be looked-upon with a kindly eye. In a deeply stirring deposition, Janet Russell – widow of Major David Russell, a planter and Justice of the Peace in colonial Georgia – declared that she "most ardently craves" the assistance of the Commission to alleviate her from "her sore and heavy affliction."²⁷⁰ Nathaniel Hall, a wealthy planter and merchant from Savannah, was reduced to humbly begging that "his case may be taken into consideration" and granted the restitution he thought he deserved.²⁷¹ In a similar such way, Patrick Strachan was left to pray "that his case may be taken into consideration and that such recompense may be allowed him for his losses and services as is granted to others in like circumstances and situation."²⁷² At first glance, such cries seem to belong to the world of standard letter parlance of the late-eighteenth century: an ordinary mode of deferential address too commonplace to be able to draw any great conclusions from. But the Loyalists' claims were not merely polite enquiries. They were really quite desperate suits from manifestly vulnerable individuals for what they thought was a fair hearing of their case. So ubiquitous are examples of appellants begging or praying or craving for the attention of the commissioners in some way – indeed, individuals routinely did this multiple times during the course of a single memorial – that it is

²⁷⁰ Janet Russell memorial, September 29th, 1783, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/36c, p.1241.

²⁷¹ Nathaniel Hall memorial, February 12th, 1787, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/100, p.271.

²⁷² Patrick Strachan memorial, November 22nd, 1783, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/37, p.152.

difficult to escape the impression they believed that such a hearing was not guaranteed. The universal use of such terms thus served to continually reaffirm each claimant's position as a supplicant, dependent on the British state for their economic wellbeing.

This position was reinforced by Georgia Loyalist petitioners who worked hard to explain how they lacked the capacity to help themselves in some way. This occasionally involved declarations of ill-health, infirmity due to old age, or exhaustion. Farquhar Malcolm, a shoemaker from the Ceded Lands, characterised himself as a "distressed old man" suffering from "the infirmities of exhausted nature" whose support in his old age depended entirely on a "humane and generous bounty".²⁷³ Sickness plagued Peter Edwards, a royal official from Savannah, in a different yet just as personal way. As a consequence of being "afflicted with a sick family" – one child already having died and another "lying ill with the small pox" – Edwards stated that he was forced to prolong his sojourn in London with his expenses there increasing "far beyond his expectations" which he was unable to meet without an immediate payment from the authorities there.²⁷⁴ More often, though, Georgia Loyalist petitioners stressed how they were unable to support themselves or their families financially due to the losses they incurred during the war. Robert Reid, a merchant and planter from Skidaway Island, claimed that "being reduced in his circumstances" following the peace, he was "unable to support himself at present without the assistance of government ... to purchase necessaries and supply his immediate needs."²⁷⁵ Reverend Haddon Smith struck much the same tune as Reid, averring that were he to be "disappointed in his expectations" for reward from the

²⁷³ Farquhar Malcolm memorial, March 24th, 1789, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/36b, p.612.

²⁷⁴ Peter Edwards memorial, October 2nd, 1787, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/34, p.462.

²⁷⁵ Robert Reid memorial, June 9th, 1786, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/36c, p.1181.

Commission he could expect “nothing but ruin to himself and his family.”²⁷⁶ Smith would later confirm that he was “a ruined man” after the loss of the war having received only £120 per annum from the Board, a sum he claimed was impossible to support his family on.²⁷⁷ Some appellants simply stated that they were only able to survive by accepting the charity of friends or family whilst their cases were being decided. Grey Elliot – once the Speaker of the Georgia Commons House of Assembly – stated that with every resource having been cut off from him, he found himself “obliged to be burdensome to his friends” until such time he could be granted relief by Parliament.²⁷⁸ George Barry – who after having moved to the Georgia sea islands in 1771 acquired two 500 acre tracts of land in Wrightsborough and one tract in Briar Creek, both of which were obviously lost as a result of the outcome of the war – made a similar claim, stating that after he moved to England from St. Augustine in 1783 he was forced to rely on his connections for subsistence.²⁷⁹

For some petitioners, their need of support and their reliance on Britain was real. Protestations of utter dependence or helplessness from Georgia Loyalist exiles appear overwhelmingly in memorials forwarded after the winter of 1785-6, a couple of years after the Commission opened its doors and individuals began submitting their appeals. Being a rather bulky, bureaucratic machine, the Commission was rarely (if ever) speedy to doll-out its awards. Decisions often took years to reach, leaving petitioners in an increasingly desperate state of suspended animation whilst they waited for their cases

²⁷⁶ Reverend Haddon Smith memorial, September 15th, 1788, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/36c, p.1328.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, October 27th, 1788, AO 13/37, p.89.

²⁷⁸ Memorial of Grey Elliot, April 8th, 1777, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/34, p.466.

²⁷⁹ Memorial of George Barry, September 9th, 1784, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 12/100, p.133. For a lengthier description of George Barry’s story see Mason, “Loyalism in British North America in the Age of Revolution c.1775-1812”, p.172.

to be settled. Even for the most able administrative minds, the task of sifting through the near endless streams of paper, critiquing the mountains of data and testimonials, and deciding on a settlement amount was monumental. Even for some larger appellants who possessed the necessary connections to centres of influence and the wherewithal to access the up-to-date information they required to successfully pursue their claims (such as when the Commission was sitting and what kind of evidence they needed to attach to their schedules) timely resolutions to their cases were not always forthcoming. Jonas Brown described exactly this type of situation and laid bare the consequences he feared were coming. Acting on behalf of his brother the famous “King’s Ranger” Thomas Brown – a former superintendent of Indian affairs during the war, a lieutenant-colonel in the Loyalist militia, and a favourite of East Florida Governor Patrick Tonyn, then residing in the Caicos Islands – Jonas wrote to the Commission on November 17th, 1788, from his home in Kingston-upon-Hull. Striking a decidedly frustrated tone, Jonas expressed his “infinite concern” that four years after his brother submitted his first petition, his case had still not been decided upon. He stressed how “the disappointment [of not yet receiving any compensation] will be productive of the most serious consequences to him [Thomas], and myself, unless their Honours, thro your kind representations, be pleased to afford me some relief.”²⁸⁰ As the years passed by, exiles in England found themselves having to cope with the increasingly high cost of living there; refugees in the Caribbean suffered the consequences of famine, hurricanes, and chenille bug infestations which decimated crops; and settlers in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick endured crippling supply shortages. Individuals confronted with these extra

²⁸⁰ Jonas Brown supporting memorial for the claim of Colonel Thomas Brown, November 17th, 1788, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/38, p.33.

challenges urgently needed to recover at least some portion of the means they had lost as a result of the Revolution. In order to escape a descending spiral of despair, they needed to secure their share of government funds. The longer they went without managing achieve this, the starker their need became, entrenching their dependent status.

Not all memorialists, though, were so utterly helpless or reliant on an immediate hand-out from parliament. Petitioners such as Lieutenant-Governor John Graham, Governor Sir James Wright, and former Chief Justice Anthony Stokes – individuals who comprised the tip of the Loyalist spear in Georgia – remained amongst the best-connected individuals in the age of the second British Empire. They had links to political and trading networks which spanned Atlantic world. Although, these individuals had been deprived of their former offices, as well as a sizable portion of the assets they had accumulated in America, they were patently not wholly powerless or incapable. Yet, just like every other claimant, their memorials were saturated with the language of dependency. They did this because, frankly, they had to. To be blunt, if they wanted to be successful petitioners and earn the remuneration they believed was theirs by right, it made no sense to appear to be doing well or seem unaffected by the outcome of the Revolution. If they did this, they would be selling short the only truly marketable commodity they had to trade on: their suffering for the cause which had rendered them dependent.

Other memorialists stressed their dependence for more specific reasons regarding their appeal. Some did so in order to cover for some kind of deficiency in their claim. This could have involved a lack of accompanying evidence, a failure to appear

before the commissioners to swear an oath in person, or a failure to submit a claim by a given deadline. To these ends, some highlighted their lowly status and lack of proper connections. Joseph Fanner, for instance, was a small farmer whose entire claim – consisting entirely of land and livestock – amounted to just £99.16. In his first memorial dated March 27th, 1786, Fanner affirmed that the reason he had not submitted an earlier petition was because he was “not being of ability” to go to Britain and was in any case “not knowing of any person” that could vouch for what he lost.²⁸¹ Others chose to emphasise their low intellect. Having missed the initial deadline for submitting a claim, William Thomson confessed that he was “altogether ignorant of the time for receiving claims by the late act of parliament” as he could “neither read nor write” and was subsequently without “any means of supporting himself”.²⁸² Isaac Antrobus, by contrast, noted his poor health, stating that he was “utterly incapable of attending the commission of American claims” as he had been “confined to his house by sickness occasioned by the rheumatism corns and tender feet”.²⁸³ Whether Fanner, Thomson, or Antrobus’ excuses were genuine or not, the rhetoric of incapability and impuissance was plainly useful to them as claimants. It served to relieve them of blame for any technical shortcomings which might have hindered their appeal or impacted the final settlement of their claim. Thus, whether made by elites who sought to emphasise how far they had fallen, or by individuals lower down the social scale looking to cover for some kind of mistake they had made when submitting their appeal, declarations of dependency were always necessary but not always straightforwardly genuine. When employed in these kinds of ways, the language of dependency was suggestive of an

²⁸¹ Joseph Fanner memorial, 27th March 1786, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/25, p.167.

²⁸² William Thomson memorial, August 26th, 1785, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/37, p.393.

²⁸³ Isaac Antrobus memorial, October 1787, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/34, p.29.

acute sensitivity to the subtleties of the petitioning process. It demonstrated individuals' astute appreciation of the need to anticipate the possible responses of officials in London and counter them at the outset. This was a kind of forethoughtfulness which paralleled the calculating bent adopted by Georgia Loyalist petitioners who strategically valued their lost possessions in line with thoughts of likely returns. It was, in short, an example of how Georgia's friends of government often weighted the rhetoric of their testimonies with the approach of the commissioners' borne firmly in mind.

Declarations of dependency were almost always surrounded by professions of some kind of distress. The image of the anguished but still faithful subject was a routine motif made use of by Loyalists across the colonies during the war. Having fled to London and heard news of the burning of Falmouth, for example, Edward Oxnard wrote in his diary bemoaning the "extremes of poverty and distress" that had engulfed the colonies and his "tenderest connections" there.²⁸⁴ This was, a Crary points out, a typical reaction of a Loyalist exile to the distant events of the war.²⁸⁵ After the peace, Georgia Loyalist exiles filled their appeals to the Commission with accounts of their sufferings and anguishes. Samuel Douglass, a once prosperous planter and merchant, states that as a result of having to flee Georgia and abandon his property he was "reduced to a situation disagreeable and distressing beyond description".²⁸⁶ Such was the condition of George Johnson and his family that in a supporting memorial for his claim, Sir James Wright pleaded with the Commission to consider them "real objects of pity and compassion".²⁸⁷

²⁸⁴ Diary of Edward Oxnard, December 18th, 1775, University of New Brunswick: The Loyalist Collection, accessed through www.archive.org.

²⁸⁵ Crary ed., *The Price of Loyalty*, p.295.

²⁸⁶ Samuel Douglass memorial, March 16th, 1784, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/34, p.375.

²⁸⁷ Sir James Wright supporting memorial for the claim of George Johnson, October 1st, 1784, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/35, p.482.

John Fox, a merchant of Savannah, described himself as “a considerable sufferer” having been “reduced to great necessity ... [with] no immediate means of support.”²⁸⁸ Supporting the claim of William Lyford, John Graham characterised Lyford, like Fox, as a “considerable sufferer” in “distressed circumstances” as a result of the confiscation of his property and the loss of his employment as a pilot on the Savannah river which, as Lyford later affirmed, was “irreparable”.²⁸⁹ The use of the prefix “considerable” is notable. The exact term “considerable sufferer” was applied to eighteen other Georgia claimants. Supporting the claim of Moses Kirkland, for example, Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell – leader of Britain’s Georgia campaign from 1778 to 1779, then Governor of Jamaica (1781-1786) – described Kirkland as “a very considerable sufferer” as a result of him having to flee America for Jamaica in the summer of 1783, leaving behind his land and property.²⁹⁰ Appealing on behalf of Captain Simon Peterson, Simon Munro likewise portrayed Peterson as “a considerable sufferer in trade and landed property” as a consequence of the “heavy expense necessitate to proceed to the Bahamas, from thence to Europe” following the loss of the war.²⁹¹ The explicit use of the word “considerable” – as well as the synonymous terms “extreme”, “great”, and “heavy” that appear by turns through the Georgia petitions – suggests there was something other than a considerable sufferer. There were, by implication, light sufferers and medium sufferers also. Even more seriously, there were real and ‘un-real’ sufferers too. By using these kinds of qualifiers, petitioners insinuated that there were degrees of

²⁸⁸ John Fox memorial [undated], *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/35, p.72.

²⁸⁹ John Graham supporting memorial for the claim of William Lyford, June 15th, 1787, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/102b, p.1055; William Lyford memorial, November 23rd, 1787, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/102b, p.1061.

²⁹⁰ Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell supporting memorial for the claim of Moses Kirkland, September 15th, 1783, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/36a, p.269.

²⁹¹ Simon Munro supporting memorial for the claim of Captain Simon Peterson, March 22nd, 1784, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/36c, p.1056.

distress endured by supporters of the crown. The image of the suffering Tory, in other words, was a tool of competitive peer display, conferring a sense of honour, stoicism, and worthiness intended to distinguish one appellant from the next. The logic for this tack, as suggested to them by board of agents' advisory pamphlets discussed in the previous chapter, was that the more they could show how far they had fallen, the greater chance they had of receiving an acceptable resolution to their case. This was made plain by certain petitioners who explicitly ranked the hardships experienced by Loyalist exiles and placed themselves at the very top of the scale. In a supporting memorial for the claim of James Hume, for instance, John Graham and Anthony Stokes declared that Hume should be considered "in the first class of sufferers" of the Revolution.²⁹² Here, the word "sufferer" becomes almost interchangeable with Loyalist. This rhetorical aligning was, it seems, purposeful and constructed with its readers (as well as the Commissions' strict rules and finite compensation pot) in mind.

These kinds of professions of suffering were the cornerstones of the petitions' fictive character. Accounts of distress and anguish, though not complete fabrications of course, were at their heart overtly emotional appeals. The linguistic decision to frame their petitions in this way – couching them in terms which emphasised their existential reliance on their anticipated award – was made in order to engage the commissioners on the plane of sentiment and to invite them to be companions in their struggles as oppose to merely observers of them. Attestations of suffering and hardship in the claims of Georgia Loyalists' were thus what J.L. Austin would recognise as perlocutionary performative statements: declarations which possessed a descriptive appearance, but

²⁹² John Graham and Anthony Stokes supporting memorial for the claim of James Hume, March 9th, 1786, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/35, p.358.

which were fundamentally conceived in order to accomplish something and have a real-world effect.²⁹³ By stressing the harshness of their fall from self-sufficiency and prosperousness to dependence and helplessness (a fall made all the sharper for Georgia Loyalists petitioners for whom loss and banishment, following the brief restoration of royal rule in their region during the war, must have felt like a distant possibility only a short while beforehand) Georgia Loyalist petitioners sought to cultivate a compassionate friendship between themselves and their readers and thereby effect a mutual concern amongst the British officials for their plight. In so doing, they hoped to move Daniel Coke, John Eardley-Wilmot, and their colleagues to view their appeals with a degree of sympathy and generosity.²⁹⁴

The language of dependency – of helplessness caused by suffering – was weaponised most poignantly by the small number of female appellants from Georgia. Notions of dependence and deference were embedded at the core of eighteenth century suppositions of womanhood and femininity. These terms were socially prescriptive as well as descriptive. The consequences for colonial women who failed to conform to the demure and submissive image expected of them were potentially profound. They faced ostracism or worse if they defied the constraints imposed on them by socially calcified ideas of feminine propriety.²⁹⁵ The law reflected and reinforced this

²⁹³ John Langshaw Austin, *How to do Things with Words*, Oxford University Press (London, 1962).

²⁹⁴ Sarah Knott, *Sensibility and the American Revolution*, University of North Carolina Press (Chapel Hill, 2009), pp.52-7.

²⁹⁵ The case of Anne Hutchinson comes most prominently to mind here. A key figure in the Antinomian Controversy which shook the infant Massachusetts Bay Colony from 1636 to 1638, Hutchinson regularly challenged the authority of male ministers and broke with normative gender positions by suggesting she were able to directly access divine inspiration and religiously instruct her male peers without necessarily needing to consult scripture. At her trial for sedition, she was charged as: “a woman that hath had a great share in the promoting and divulging of those opinions that are causes of this trouble ... a thing not tolerable nor comely in the sight of God nor fitting for your sex.” Hutchinson was convicted for her supposed crimes and banished from the colony in 1637. For background on Anne Hutchinson and her trial

order. Women could not inherit if there was a suitable male relation in the picture and whatever rights to property they did have (if they married) were assumed by their husbands by the law of coverture. Since it was only individuals with control over property who were deemed able to exercise civic rights, it followed that the vast majority of female subjects could not be public actors in the same way as their fathers, husbands, or sons could.²⁹⁶ Indeed, the whole notion of an autonomous civic actor, as Norton points out, stood in many ways as antithetical to conventions of colonial femininity.²⁹⁷ This particular understanding of women's ambiguous relationship with the state echoed the great treatises of the Enlightenment. As Linda Kerber acknowledges, Condorcet occasionally imagines an autonomous female civic actor, but for Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, women existed only as wives and mothers. Their relationship to the state, in other words, was defined by their relationship to a man.²⁹⁸ The revolutionary authorities, too, treated women as theoretically non-political actors. As Ben Marsh has shown, despite the plethora of new roles enjoyed by women during the Revolution – especially in the Lower South where they often took over the running of family businesses or acted as spies for Royalist forces – British and Patriot administrations failed to account for female subjects in any of their resolves.²⁹⁹ On the March 1st, 1778, for instance, the Patriot government in Savannah required that all white *male* inhabitants over the age of sixteen take an oath of abjuration declaring loyalty to the state and to Congress. A British proclamation issued on January 3rd, 1779, likewise

and banishment from the Massachusetts Bay Colony see Edmund S. Morgan, *The Puritan Dilemma: The Story of John Winthrop*, Little, Brown & Co. (Boston, 1958), chapter 10.

²⁹⁶ Mary-Beth Norton, *Liberty's Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women 1750-1800*, Cornell University Press (New York, 1996), chapter 5.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.125.

²⁹⁸ Kerber, *Women of the Republic*, pp.15-21.

²⁹⁹ Marsh, "Women and the American Revolution in Georgia", pp.169-72.

demanded the allegiance of white *male* subjects over the age of sixteen.³⁰⁰ Neither made any mention of the allegiance of the women of the province. Female inhabitants were plainly taken to be apolitical actors. Their choices and inward inflections were assumed for them according to their husbands' or fathers' decisions and actions. In short, the subsuming of women's individual autonomy and public identities to a male other was a deeply ingrained social and legal modality that was understood and accepted by all.

In their memorials, female petitioners from Georgia played directly on themes of feminine subservice and deference. Most tellingly, they rarely (if ever) submitted claims in their own name or justified their appeals on the basis of *their* rights as British subjects. Male petitioners addressed the commission as individuals: subjects with an axiomatic right to restitution by virtue of their direct service to the British cause, whether as a man at arms or as a supplier of material and so on. Female petitioners, by contrast, approached the commissioners cloaked as wives, widows, and mothers, and more often than not served simply as conduits for their spouse's appeal. Susannah Wylly – the wife of former Speaker to the Commons House of Assembly and Clerk to the Royal Council Alexander Wylly, who died in Savannah in January 1781 – was one such claimant. Susannah appealed for the property she had been due to inherit from her husband but was seized during the war. Having left for Jamaica and then to England in August 1783, she applied to the commission for temporary assistance to cover the cost of travel and maintain her family whilst her full claim was considered. The Commission, however, decided that given she was in receipt of an income of £240 per year through the renting

³⁰⁰ For a good discussion of British and Patriot oaths of allegiance, see Hall, *Land and Allegiance*, pp.77-90, and Lambert, "The Confiscation of Loyalist Property in Georgia 1782-1786", pp.80-94.

out of slaves in Jamaica, Susannah “ought not to receive any allowance from government.”³⁰¹ Susannah’s response came swiftly. In a memorial submitted on January 29th, 1784, she declared that being “without any means to support herself, her daughter, and the child of a soldier whom out of charity and compassion she took into her family” she now “humbly prays that you [the commissioners] will be pleased to reconsider her case and grant such temporary allowance as in your wisdom and humanity you shall think her situation may be deserving of.”³⁰² Anne Finlayson’s appeal was remarkably similar in its tone and tenor. The wife of Henry – a Savannah silversmith – and mother of five, Ann and her family fled to Dominica in mid-1782 to avoid Patriot persecution. Within two months of their arrival, though, Henry went “insane” and was thereafter prevented from providing for the family’s future subsistence.³⁰³ On October 25th, 1785, the Commission awarded Ann an allowance of £20 a year commencing from April 5th, 1785.³⁰⁴ This grant though, Ann protested, was not adequate to support her “young and helpless family” with Ann “confined in nursing [her husband] ... which renders her incapable otherwise to provide for them”.³⁰⁵ Three years later, Anne-Jean Simpson adopted the same approach as Finlayson and Wylly. Her husband, John Simpson, had been awarded £100 a year pension by the Commission from January 5th, 1783. Upon his death as a result of gout on November 10th, 1784, however, the sum awarded to Anna-Jean was reduced to £70. Apparently fearing that this support would be reduced even further or withdrawn entirely, Anna-Jean petitioned the commissioners on April 7th,

³⁰¹ The decision of the commission relating to the claim of Susannah Wylly, November 11th, 1783, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 12/100, p.30.

³⁰² The claim of Susannah Wylly, wife of Alexander Wylly, January 29th, 1784, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/37, p.637.

³⁰³ The claim of Ann Finlayson, wife of Henry [undated], *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/34, p.482.

³⁰⁴ *The decision of the commission relating to the case of Ann Finlayson*, October 25th, 1785, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 12/101, p.250.

³⁰⁵ Memorial of Ann Finlayson, November 8th, 1786, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/34, p.486.

1789, affirming that in addition to being left “a helpless and disconsolate widow with five infant children ... if the same [her £70 allowance] should be withdrawn she would be left in very distressed circumstances”.³⁰⁶

Just 26 out of the 208 Georgia Loyalist appellants to the Commission were female. They were responsible for only 6.24 per cent of the total requested by Georgia claimants and received 6.43 per cent of the sum handed-out to them by the commissioners. The male dominance of the Georgia Loyalists’ claims was clear numerically. This pre-eminence, though, was redoubled by female petitioners who subordinated their individuality and telescoped themselves into their traditional feminine roles and identities. They all but erased any direct action they might have personally undertaken in support of the crown’s cause. They continually referred to any services their loyal husbands performed, lingering whenever they could on his corporeal sacrifices which had left them unprotected as wives and mothers. But any references to wartime work they as female subjects may have carried-out – which, as Judith van Buskirk, Norton, and Marsh have separately shown, ranged from simply supplying goods to British forces, to caring for wounded soldiers, to acting as covert operatives – were almost entirely absent from their testimonies.³⁰⁷ They appeared, to the exclusion of almost all other things, simply as executors of their spouse’s case and as crestfallen but still dutiful wives, widows, and mothers. Their service to the state, as Wylly, Finlayson, and Simpson (amongst others) all strove to suggest, was to continue to raise their children in trying circumstances as virtuous imperial subjects. To fulfil this service,

³⁰⁶ Memorial of Anna-Jean Simpson, wife of John, April 7th, 1789, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/37, pp.18-9.

³⁰⁷ Judith van Buskirk, *Generous Enemies: Loyalists and Patriots in Revolutionary New York*, University of Pennsylvania Press (Philadelphia, 2003), pp.51-7; Norton, *Liberty’s Daughters*, chapter 7; Marsh, “Women and the American Revolution in Georgia”, pp.169-72

though, they presented themselves as requiring masculine support which (having been robbed of a capable male protector as a result of the war) fell implicitly to the commissioners in London to provide. Of course, by submitting a petition (regardless of how it was framed and justified) these female memorialists inadvertently undercut the cliché of the helpless damsel. They were, after all, taking steps for themselves to secure their own and their families' wellbeing. In doing so, they demonstrated that they did, in fact, possess a degree of agency which they were minded and able to use. The image of the distressed widow and mother was, nonetheless, central to their appeals. It was expressly affective and evoked a particular kind of gendered moral leverage which in the postwar context – as British policymakers and officials sought desperately to repulse fears of terminal imperial decline by consciously shaping the national image in fundamentally masculinised ways – was politically potent.³⁰⁸

The vocabulary of male dependency was, on the surface at least, less stridently moving. For female petitioners, their reliance on an 'other' was, in a sense, normal: an engrained part of their social and cultural identities which they gave voice to in the rhetoric of their appeals. The declarations of dependence in the testimonies of male claimants from Georgia were not loaded with the same elemental air of permanence. The whole tenor of their appeals suggested that if could only tally their losses, present their evidence to the commissioners, and be granted a satisfactory award, their return to prosperity would be realised. The language of dependency in the claims of male Loyalists from Georgia thus seems somewhat mechanical and less obviously emotive

³⁰⁸ Colley, *Britons*, pp.148-53 and pp.250-2. The average award for female claimants was 30.25 per cent of the total they requested. This figure was incredibly close to the common law right in colonial American and in Britain that widows receive one-third of their deceased husband's estate. Whilst there is no direct evidence that the commissioners consciously adhered to this convention – thereby assuming the role of male protector for the state – the correlation is at least noteworthy.

than their female compatriots. This view, however, first forwarded by Mary-Beth Norton in 1976, requires careful scrutiny. Admitting the loss of independent status – temporary or otherwise – had deeply troubling consequences for a Loyalist man. As R.W. Connell posits, eighteenth century conceptions of manly virility were dependent primarily on two foundational precepts: the subordination of women and an internal hierarchy of inter-male dominance.³⁰⁹ For the eighteenth century man, their place in this hierarchy of manliness was defined by their uncompromising virtue, their capacity for relentless hard work, their physical prowess, and (perhaps most importantly) their economic independence. This hierarchy, though, was dynamic and precarious. At any moment, as Loyalist men discovered, an individual's place in it could be threatened by public disgrace, corporeal or moral weakness, or the loss of independence guaranteed by the ownership of property. In the eighteenth century, then, manliness was an anxiety provoking disposition that was prone to decay. With this in mind, the vocabulary of dependence in the petitions of male Loyalist exiles was freighted with an acute tension and deeply affective undertones. The rhetoric of helplessness, destitution, and infirmity in their appeals – the constant begging or praying or craving for an award – spoke to so much more than merely the experience of material loss. This was male vulnerability laid bare: a particular form of masculine emotionality which accompanied the erosion of a fundamental element of their status as muscular, capable, and honourable civic actors. This may not have been as tear-jerkingly visceral as images of destitute, grief-stricken widows struggling to care for sickly children. But for these male Loyalists claimants, it was felt every bit as keenly.

³⁰⁹ See R.W. Connell, *Gender and Power: Society, the Person, and Sexual Politics*, Polity Press (Oxford, 1987).

Whether female or male, though, the Georgia Loyalist exiles' status as dependents was, in the fictions of their appeals, always framed a being brought about by their resolute support of British dominion in America. It was, so the narrative went, incumbent on them as good imperial subjects to risk all for that connection which had, as so many claimants gleefully reminisced, effectuated the "happy government" under which they had lived prior to the war.³¹⁰ Having risked and lost all, though, their suggestion was clear: they were now entitled to the protections guaranteed by British liberties and it was the obligation of the officials in London to see that they were delivered. The language of dependency – weighted with tinges of service and sacrifice which the state was morally compelled recognise and reward – appears in this way to have been mapped directly against the entreaties laid-out in the Loyalist agents' campaign literature. In *The Case and Claims of American Loyalists*, the point was continually made (in various ways) that having "devoted the whole of their fortunes and their felicity to a religious observance of the conditions and duties of society and the national safety", the nation in return was bound "by the fundamental laws of the society, as by the invariable and eternal principles of natural justice, to make them a compensation."³¹¹ When claimants affirmed their reliance on the state – when they pleaded with the commissioners to make good on their losses and relieve them of their enforced dependence – they were, in essence, parroting this argument. As the Georgia Loyalists had turned out for the British government when it needed them – either by fighting as part of crown's forces in the southern campaign, or by helping to defend Savannah when it was attacked by French and American forces, or taking to the street,

³¹⁰ For examples, refer to the appeals of Jacob Bühler [undated], *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/38, p.141; and George Kincaid [undated], NA, AO 13/36a, p.218.

³¹¹ *The Case and Claims of the American Loyalists*, p.16 and p.37.

the page, and stage to publicly perform their support for royal rule – it was incumbent on the British government to repay their faithfulness now they were reliant on them. This was, distilled, the Lockean idea that the subject and the state were mutually invested in each other. The language of dependency, I argue, thus served to reaffirm effectively each claimant's attachment to the idea of the transoceanic community bound by a series of rights and responsibilities.

For Loyalist refugees from Georgia, their investment in imperial structures and bodies was manifestly existential. Of course, there were those who, as noted, were in a position to make a success of their lives in banishment. To be sure, though, there were many who were desperately reliant on an award from the Commission for their subsistence. These individuals needed to lay claim to their place amongst the “branches of the British nation” if they were to acquire the means they desired.³¹² For friends of government who rejected the republican project in America and ran to another part of the king's dominions, there was no other civic unit to which they could turn for sympathy or succour. The apparatus of the imperial state provided them with a recognisable political framework to cling to in exile. Yet, at the same time as these Loyalist exiles affirmed their dependence on institutions in the metropole and justified their requests of the British government as rightful rewards due to committed subjects, they also gave voice to intense feelings of alienation and disillusion in their new locales. These sensations were attested to in their petitions through the language of dislocation. Unlike

³¹² As quoted in Colley, *Captives*, p.233.

the rhetoric of dependence, testimonies of dislocation – of feeling disconnected and out of place, or disappointed, confused, and anxious – do not seem to have been forwarded with any purposeful argument in mind. Nor does there appear to have been anything in the Loyalist agents' pamphlets to suggest this language was taken from their lead. There was, in truth, little to be gained from attesting to stirrings of distance and disaffection. They were, it seems, truly reactive statements: *bona fide* introspections on the chaos and confusion of the war and their subsequent flight from their former homes. The prominence of the language of dislocation was, in part, a standard reaction to the practical difficulties associated with having to start their lives over again following the loss of the war and their hasty evacuation from Savannah (an evacuation they could not have foreseen happening as they took part in parades, sang songs, and made toasts affirming their devotion to the king after the province was reconquered by Britain during the war). It was also, I contend, a response to the loss of the familiar anchorages – the elements of their taskscapes which comprised the basis of their material schedules – with which they had previously secured their reflexive sense of self and place in the world. The Empire as it had always looked, sounded, felt, and worked for them (not to mention their styles as colonial Americans) no longer existed. Their new environs and positions in the imperial polity were, for the most part, foreign to them. The language of dislocation was, in other words, reflective of their arduous transition from one place – physical and imaginative – to another which was unsettling and profoundly strange to them.

Before going any further, it is perhaps worth clarifying what I mean by the language of dislocation. The term 'dislocation' is, admittedly, semantically less settled than dependence. I do not think it would be possible to offer a single, authoritative

definition here. But that need not be a problem. It is the basic multivalence of dislocation that is salutary to my analysis. As noted, Jasanoff, Potter-Mackinnon, and Calhoun amongst others have separately explored the Loyalist refugees jarring experiences of exile. Their examinations, though, have almost singularly rested on the struggle of friends of government to re-establish themselves beyond the concern for subsistence. But, as I have argued throughout this and the previous chapter, the Loyalists' experience of exile encompassed more than the loss of material status and the fight to re-secure it. It also comprised an emotional and imaginative upheaval defined by their struggle to re-secure their sense of self and place during a period of imperial and personal reconfiguration. The term 'dislocation' is mobilised here precisely for its capacity to cogently capture a whole range of sensations associated with uneasiness and disquiet – from feelings of isolation to confusion and disaffection – which were directly and indirectly testified to by Georgia Loyalists exiles in their appeals to the Commission.

The language of dislocation in the Georgia Loyalists' petitions was, like the language of dependence, multi-layered and communicated in several ways. Some claimants, for instance, gave voice to feelings of dislocation by describing themselves as "strangers" in their new postwar communities. Time after time, Georgia Loyalists who had fled to England, Canada, or the Caribbean after the war – many of whom, it must be remembered, were comparatively recent emigres to America – complained how they lacked friends or connections in their new locales. These complaints came from Loyalists exiles of all types. Having evacuated Savannah late in the summer of 1782, Jermyn Wright – a prosperous planter and brother of Sir James Wright – stated that he had returned to England "a stranger and helpless exile from Rebel persecution" and that he had not yet received "one shilling from government for any thing or matter expended,

lost, suffered or endured by want of protection”.³¹³ Captain James Butler – an equally wealthy and well-connected planter of St. Philip’s parish – also relocated to England after the Revolution (via Saint Augustine and then Jamaica) in August 1784. In a memorial to the Commission on February 14th, 1787, he declared that “on his first arrival” he was an utter “stranger in this country” and was “unacquainted with the mode of applying for temporary subsistence” which had subsequently left him with “no allowance” whatsoever.³¹⁴ As with Butler, Grace Farley – the widow of Samuel, a lawyer and former Speaker of the Commons House Assembly – complained how her friendlessness in London had left her disadvantaged. After her husband’s death in the Bahamas in 1785, Grace travelled to the metropole to submit an appeal for compensation. Upon her arrival in June that year, Grace described herself as “an utter stranger” there and discovered to her horror that, lacking connections to guide her, the time for presenting her case had passed, meaning that she and her daughter had undertaken the long and expensive journey to no purpose at all.³¹⁵ Lydia Corry – the widow of Robert, a planter of St. Philip’s parish who served in the Commissariat of the British army during the war – also stressed her lack of associations to whom she might turn for help. Having fled to Nova Scotia after the war with her husband, Lydia declared how after his death she desired to return to her place of birth in Ireland as she was “an entire stranger” in the town of Halifax and could not rely on anyone there for aid if her case was ignored by officials in London.³¹⁶ Yet another war widow, Janet Russell,

³¹³ Jermyn Wright memorial, September 17th, 1782, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/37, p.546.

³¹⁴ Captain James Butler memorial, February 14th, 1787, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/38, p.102.

³¹⁵ The memorial of Grace Farley, widow of Samuel Farley, May 28th, 1787, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/34, p.471.

³¹⁶ The memorial of Lydia Corry, widow of Robert Corry, May 1st, 1786, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/36c, p.1003.

similarly emphasised the lack of comradeship she enjoyed after leaving America. Following the death of her husband Major David Russell – a one-time planter and Justice of the Peace in Savannah – Janet came to England after a period in Saint Augustine. As she craved “the kind assistance of the humane [commissioners] to assist her in her sore and heavy affliction” she reported that she was “in every respect an utter stranger and also friendless in this country.”³¹⁷ William Goodgion – a former medium-sized storekeeper at Augusta – likewise professed to his friendlessness, stating that he was “an entire stranger in this country [Britain] destitute of friends to recommend to him any employment by which he can obtain a decent livelihood.” As a consequence, he was “under the necessity of contracting pecuniary debts for which he was daily threatened to be arrested and sent to prison”.³¹⁸ It is, however, the petition of George D’Erbage – who had held several royal offices in Georgia, most notably Master Register and Examiner of the Court of Chancery – in which the voice of the friendless Loyalist alien and outcast finds its most shrill articulation. D’Erbage noted that upon his arrival back in England in late 1782, he found:

himself here a stranger, with a family destitute of support ... having received nothing from the government since 1781 or from any office since June 1782 and burdened with a great and increasing debt, and this having spent the flower of his life in a fond expectation that his industry, integrity, and attachment to the

³¹⁷ The memorial of Janet Russell, widow of Major David Russell, September 29th, 1783, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/36c, p.1240.

³¹⁸ William Goodgion memorial, May 23rd, 1787, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/35, pp.105-7.

*service of government so often commended by his superiors would at last be crowned with an adequate and permanent provision.*³¹⁹

Indeed, having spent the “flower of his life” in Georgia, D’Erbage plainly believed that his career there was about to blossom before the Revolution. He had, according to his memorial, managed to win the favour and admiration of influential “superiors” whom he presumably felt could hasten his advancement up the ranks of the colonial service. To his obvious chagrin, however, D’Erbage discovered that as a refugee – apparently disconnected from the circles and personal networks which had been so useful to him in Georgia – opportunities to gain some kind of position and acquire influence were not so easy to come by. His experience was common for Loyalist exiles throughout the second British Empire (especially in the metropole) who laboured to regain some measure of the status they had once enjoyed as colonial Americans. All but a lucky few, as Charles Ritcheson and Norton point out, were unsuccessful.³²⁰ Having tried and failed to secure a position in England, for example, Benjamin Thompson concluded that “England is not the place for a Loyalist to make his way.”³²¹ Shortly before his death in the summer of 1780, Thomas Hutchinson – the former royal governor of Massachusetts and reported court favourite – lamented the lack of prospects for Loyalist exiles.³²² Writing in his diary, Hutchinson decried that “We Americans are plenty ... Some of us at first coming, are apt to think ourselves of importance, but other people do not think so,

³¹⁹ George D’Erbage memorial [undated], *Commission Records*, NA, AO 12/4, p.79.

³²⁰ Norton, *The British Americans*, p.216; Charles R. Ritcheson, “Loyalist Influence on British Policy Toward the United States After the War”, *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, vol.7:1 (1973), p.11.

³²¹ Benjamin Thompson to Sir Robert Keith, as quoted in Norton, *The British Americans*, p.236.

³²² Ritcheson, “Loyalist Influence on British Policy”, p.7.

and few, if any of us are much consulted, or enquired after.”³²³ D’Erbage and his other Loyalist ‘strangers’ consequently cut remote, beleaguered, and frustrated figures. By describing themselves as strangers – by drawing attention to their detachment from any kind of personal support system or their lack of opportunity – the Georgia Loyalist petitioners articulated a sense of separateness from their new places of settlement. They plainly thought of themselves as a minority segment apart from (rather than a part of) the societies they ran to after the war: cut-off from meaningful and reliable networks and exposed to hardships which (as D’Erbage’s testimony makes clear) added the misery of neglect to the wretchedness of dispossession.

During the war, Loyalists in Georgia worked hard to draw themselves imaginatively closer to their fellow subjects in other parts of the Empire. With discourses and displays orientated around the monarch, they sought to create a fanciful community with other members of the king’s imperial family who they thought of as sharing their values, desires, and habits. In so doing, they endeavoured effectively to militate against fears of group shrinkage and isolation felt in the face of a burgeoning revolutionary movement and insecurity over their subject positions in the British Empire. Their postwar experiences of seclusion and separateness, detailed in their memorials, were made all the more wounding for having so vigorously engaged in, acted out, and given body to this mirage of the imperial family which did not survive contact with the reality in their new locales after the war. Instead of welcome, support, or affirmations of mutuality, wherever Georgia Loyalist exiles settled – be it in the Caribbean, the Canadian provinces, or Britain – they were met with a certain amount of mistrust and even ire

³²³ Thomas Hutchinson, as quoted in Nelson, *The American Tory*, p.159.

from their fellow subjects who were already there. In the Bahamas, for instance, as Michael Craton and Gail Saunders have both noted, the island's original denizens were deeply resentful of the Loyalists who flooded there from September 1783 onwards and discriminated against them where they could.³²⁴ Royal governor John Robert Maxwell had an especially low opinion of the new arrivals, describing them as "the most tormenting and dissatisfied people on earth."³²⁵ Maxwell's deputy and eventual successor Lieutenant-Governor John Edward Powell went even further. After a group of Loyalists led by Peter Dean (a former member of the Georgia Commons House Assembly) contested the result of the elections of the House of Assembly in early 1785, Powell declared the Loyalist bloc to be as "seditiously mad" as the revolutionaries in America.³²⁶ Powell's views were shared by the 1st Viscount Sydney, Thomas Townshend, then Home Secretary in Britain. Referring to the disturbances surrounding the 1785 elections, he declared that "It is not a little extraordinary that men who profess to have suffered for their loyalty to the crown, and adherence to the British constitution, should so forget themselves, and the duty they owe to His Majesty, as to be guilty of the most daring attempts against His royal authority, and that constitution."³²⁷ The Loyalist exiles'

³²⁴ Michael Craton, *A History of the Bahamas*, Collins (New York, 1962), pp.166-8; Gail Saunders, *Bahamian Loyalists and their Slaves*, Macmillan (London, 1983), pp.66-7.

³²⁵ Governor John Robert Maxwell as quoted in Craton, *A History of the Bahamas*, p.167.

³²⁶ Lieutenant-Governor John Edward Powell as quoted in Mason, "Loyalism in British North America in the Age of Revolution c.1775-1812", p.176. The elections to the House of Assembly were called by Maxwell in November 1784 before he left for England early the following year. The result saw the 'old guard' consolidate their power. To the Loyalist faction, however, the result smacked of a stitch-up. They circulated a protest claiming that the Prevost Marshal John Baker had had arbitrarily declared for six established settlers in Nassau and the Western Districts of New Providence, when Loyalist candidates had received a majority in the poll. Their protest, though, was summarily dismissed and a copy of their protest was ordered by the Speaker of the House to be publicly burnt by the common hangman outside the courthouse door. The victory of the old party seemed completed as the House later passed measures against the recalcitrant Loyalists and sat continuously until 1794. Not until a third administration under the 4th Earl Dunmore, John Murray, former governor of Virginia, did the spirit of division subside and the Loyalists gain representation in the Assembly. See Craton, *A History of the Bahamas*, pp.168-9.

³²⁷ 1st Viscount Sydney, Thomas Townshend, as quoted in Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles*, p.266.

early experiences in the Canadian provinces were, in many ways, very similar. As Keith Mason and Neil Mackinnon have pointed out, new settlers regularly clashed with local officials and established inhabitants there.³²⁸ Nova Scotia governor John Parr, like Maxwell, appeared to have little respect for the refugees, decrying their lack of education and talent. In a letter to the 2nd Earl Shelburne, William Petty, he described them as “composed of the dregs and banditti [of the former American colonies]” and accused them of “being not burthened with loyalty, a specious name which they made use of.”³²⁹ Parr’s unflattering view of the Loyalists was shared by other members of the local officialdom. The surveyor general John Morris, for instance, thought that the refugees were greedy and ungrateful, claiming that nothing could be done to satisfy them.³³⁰ Hostility between the Loyalists and the pre-Loyalists was evident throughout the province during the first, fraught years after the war. In Halifax, Annapolis, and Pictou, old and new settlers rubbed antagonistically alongside each other. Old inhabitants saw the new hordes of arrivals as a threat and feared the denigration of their positions. Jacob Bailey made the issue sound widespread, describing how Loyalists there were treated “not only as runaways, strolers, and vagabonds ... but as the most abhorred despicable miscreants in God, Almighty’s creation.”³³¹ It was, though, in Britain – above all in London – where Loyalist exiles were met with perhaps their frostiest reception. This would have been, without doubt, extremely jolting for them. Despite not being the closest place geographically to escape to after the war, England was in many ways the

³²⁸ Mason, “Loyalism in British North America in the Age of Revolution c.1775-1812”, p.176; Neil Mackinnon, *This Unfriendly Soil: The Loyalist Experience in Nova Scotia 1783-91*, McGill-Queens University Press (Montreal, 1986), chapter 7.

³²⁹ Governor John Parr to the 2nd Earl Shelburne, William Petty, October 9th, 1789, as quoted in Mackinnon, *This Unfriendly Soil*, p.93.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.95-6.

³³¹ Jacob Bailey as quoted in *ibid.*, p.99.

obvious choice for the Loyalists to begin rebuilding their lives. Quite apart from the fact that London was the headquarters of the Commission, England commanded a strength of attachment – based on language, culture, and heritage – no other locale could match. The exiles thought, not unreasonably, that such ties, as well as their wartime services, would guarantee them the compassion and admiration of their imperial kin there. Whatever warmth they were initially met with, however, quickly faded. On September 16th, 1783, for instance, an article entitled “Impartial Reason” in the *Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser* appeared to question the need to sympathise with the Loyalists’ plight at all, stating that in every “state commotion” a few must suffer.³³² The Loyalists were sensitive to this air of apathy which floated toward them from their fellow citizens. One emigre in London noted that very few people there were in any way hospitable to the Loyalists and how even fewer “pittied the fate of the refugees.”³³³ Refugees in London were also continually charged with being self-serving, greedy, and untrustworthy (critiques which struck much the same tone as that of the Paineite revolutionaries). Writing to Prime Minister Shelburne from New York in the summer of 1782, Maurice Morgann – Shelburne’s confidential secretary – warned that the Loyalists were not to be trusted and that their advice to government was based solely on grasping self-interest.³³⁴ As unjust as it doubtlessly was, the image of the unscrupulous and avaricious hack seeking self-advancement on the public charge had fastened itself upon the Loyalists in the minds of English subjects and policymakers. This view was echoed by the commissioners in their regular reports to parliament. In their first reported given on

³³² “Impartial Reason”, *Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser* (London), September 16th, 1783.

³³³ Oxnard diary, October 18th, 1776, UNB, www.archive.org.

³³⁴ Maurice Morgann to 2nd Earl of Shelburne, Prime Minister William Petty, June 12th, 1782, *William Petty, 1st Marquis of Lansdowne, 2nd Earl of Shelburne papers*, William L. Clements library, manuscripts division, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor), vol.68, pp.373-87.

August 12th, 1784, the commissioners effectively indicted the Loyalist petitioners as a bunch of charlatans and swindlers, stating that their appeals were grossly inflated.³³⁵ This judgement was repeated in the Commission's fifth report released in April 1786, where it was noted that the petitioners would "rather include too much than too little" in their claims.³³⁶ To be received with this kind of suspicion and contempt in the heart of the empire they had served and defended must have been peculiarly galling and disaffecting. It conferred on the exiles there an anxious sense of separateness: of being familiar yet different, of being close yet distant, of being so similar in so many ways to their fellow subject yet being ultimately shunned by them. This tension made England – once thought of as the dearest and most trusted refuge for friends of the crown in America – an unexpectedly alienating place to be, a reality made all the more bewildering by the closeness of the events of the Revolution in which they had done all they could to emphasise their essential Britishness.

It is important to note, however, that the Georgia Loyalists' sense of seclusion in their new locales after the war was also partially the result of their own inclinations. Loyalist refugees quickly discovered that they had but one consolation in exile: they shared their experience with others who had fled America for their loyalty to the crown.³³⁷ They therefore often took to grouping together. As Norton has shown, refugees in London, for example, would often cluster together in concentrated neighbourhoods. Exiles from New England, for instance, tended to huddle in the areas

³³⁵ Eardley-Wilmot, *Historical View of the Commission*, p.111.

³³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.64. This view can perhaps partially explain why officials adopted such a parsimonious approach when doling-out awards. Although, in all, only 10 claims were dismissed for outright fraud, 343 were completely "disallowed" and the average award was only 37 per cent of each original claim. For Georgia, 28 were formally disallowed and the average award was only 29.66 per cent of each original claim.

³³⁷ Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles*, p.123.

between Westminster and Haymarket. Those from the Middle Colonies generally resettled near Soho or Red Lion Square.³³⁸ From my analysis of the petitions of Georgia Loyalists who had fled to London, refugees from there appear to have been inclined, by and large, to take up residence around the Strand and the Thames.³³⁹ These individuals exhibited behaviour to be expected of any group of persons forcibly pushed into exile. Across the diaspora, friends of government sought out their fellow sufferers and formed their own micro-communities. Refugees were naturally attracted to locales where they would be more likely come across familiar faces and be able to return to habitual modes of being. They tried to obtain American goods, maintained customary ways of socialising (such as meeting in coffee houses and so on), kept themselves informed of affairs in their former locales, formed electoral blocs (most notably in the Canadian provinces and the West Indies), and associated themselves almost exclusively with those who shared their experiences.³⁴⁰ In so doing, they were able to indulge in the idea – even just for a short time, even just superficially – that the war had not irreparably altered their lives or shattered their easy identification as imperial subjects.

Even if they were able to maintain this illusion for a little while, though, the foreignness of the exiles' new environs was too glaring for them not to notice. They could not escape the new reality of their lives for they were reminded wherever they looked just how different the Empire was to the one they had always known. They had

³³⁸ Norton, *The British Americans*, pp.62-7.

³³⁹ I was unable to secure the exact locations of Loyalist exiles who fled to either the Canadian provinces or the West Indies as they did not with any regularity mention precisely where they had settled in the same way those in London did. Rather than any give any street names, exiles in the Caribbean or Canada simply gave the city in which they resided, which was obviously no basis to offer any kind of solid conclusions as to whether or not they clustered together.

³⁴⁰ Norton, *The British Americans*, pp.62-3; Mackinnon, *This Unfriendly Soil*, chapter 7; Craton, *A History of the Bahamas*, pp.167-9.

run to places which looked, felt, sounded, and likely even smelt differently to their homes in Georgia. This was not the Empire they recognised or felt at ease in. This sense of discordance with their surroundings was conveyed by the Georgia Loyalist petitioners who almost always made it plain in some way how it was not, in fact, their choice to leave their homes in Georgia to begin with. Georgia claimants continually referred to the fact that they had been forced or obliged to abandon their homes and uproot their lives. Petitioning on behalf of her husband William Clark – a former tavern keeper then working in the West Indies – Catherine Clarke described how having been harassed and persecuted by the “promoters of the late rebellion”, her husband “for the preservation of his life was with his family compelled to abandon his habitation leaving behind his stock in trade and negroes.”³⁴¹ William Read, a planter in St. George’s parish, similarly described how he was “early in the rebellion forced to quit his habitation and take refuge at Saint Augustine” where he was “reduced to the necessity of serving as a private soldier in the East Florida Rangers”.³⁴² The voice of the displaced and disaffected subject finds perhaps its most gripping and authentic expression, though, in the appeal of Reverend James Brown. An Anglican minister in St. George’s parish, Reverend Brown stayed in St. Augustine for a while following the evacuation of Savannah before East Florida was ceded to Spain in the Paris peace treaty. From there, Brown travelled to New York with troops led by Sir Guy Carleton and from there finally to England. In a memorial to the Commission dated March 11th, 1784, Brown appealed for a return on “unavoidable expenses and loss attending to being so much tossed about from one part of the world to another, under such disadvantageous circumstances as [he] had ever

³⁴¹ Catherine Clarke supporting memorial for the claim of William Clarke, December 21st, 1785, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/34, p.242.

³⁴² William Read memorial, October 20th, 1783, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/92, p.234.

been in since the breaking out of the late disturbances in America.”³⁴³ Brown’s testimony is revealing worded. Notably, he does not say that he even had the choice to run from his American home like Read or Clark. He was, rather, simply “tossed” from it. He plainly felt that with the loss of the war and his status as a colonial American, he had gone from being a subject to an object: a something rather than a someone, easily disregarded when larger concerns took precedence. In so doing, he subtly yet firmly imparts a keen sense of betrayal felt by many involuntary exiles who believed their interests had been sacrificed by British officials in a diplomatic trade-off for peace, as the Paris treaty ceded their rights in America to a potentially vengeful Congress and gave up East Florida (where many Georgia Loyalists had at least chosen to relocate to) to Catholic Spain. Brown’s remarks, though, are perhaps most noteworthy for their tangible air of disorientation and detachment. His phrasing – the way he notes, almost numbly, his uprooting from one anonymous region to another – suggests he had somehow lost track of his own movements. He could, in effect, no longer locate himself. Caught up in Carleton’s rushed and shoddily planned withdrawal from New York, it appears as if Brown had become almost lost in a world which was unfamiliar to him, lacking any kind of personal or material moorings with which he could habituate himself. Wherever he scuttled to for safety, it seems as though he was unable to rediscover any semblance of fixity or sense of belonging that he evidently craved. The places which could provide both, I hazard to suggest, were those Brown and his fellow refugees were forced to flee from and (by implication) would still be residing given the proper

³⁴³ Reverend William Brown memorial, March 11th, 1784, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/34, p.7.

protection: the plantations and the paddy-fields, the public buildings and squares, which defined their colonial setting in Georgia.

The exiles' sense of disharmony with their new surroundings was, however, most caustically expressed by those who described them as strange or baffling places in some way. Strikingly, these types of statements appear most often in the petitions of Georgia Loyalists who had fled to England (in particular London). Simon Paterson was one such appellant. A native Scot, Paterson settled in Sunbury in 1774 as a merchant and later acted as a captain in the local militia and as a member of the Commons House of Assembly during the British occupation of the province. When Savannah was evacuated, Paterson escaped to Charleston and then to London via St. Augustine. Upon his eventual arrival in the metropole, Paterson lamented how he was "left in a strange country with very little support".³⁴⁴ Paterson near enough repeated himself in a subsequent memorial submitted three months later, plaintively explaining to the commissioners how "being in a strange country" he was left "almost destitute of the common necessaries of life".³⁴⁵ Susannah Wylly (the aforementioned widow of Alexander, one of Georgia most prominent royal officials) was likewise struck by the strangeness of the metropole. With "no provision being [yet] made for her support", Susannah – careful, as ever, to emphasise her status as a mother and a widow – decried how she and her daughter had been left "exposed to every difficulty that could attend the want of money in a strange place". It was William Brown, though, who set down his sense of strangeness upon arriving in London most fervently. Like Paterson, Brown was a native Scot who served as Comptroller and Searcher at the Port of Savannah between 1767 and 1776

³⁴⁴ Simon Paterson memorial, December 22nd, 1784, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/36c, p.1060.

³⁴⁵ Simon Paterson memorial, March 24th, 1785, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/36c, p.1071.

and was described as “a Gentleman of considerable Income” by his fellow Loyalist James Hume (although by the standards of the colonial elite this seems like a slight exaggeration).³⁴⁶ He, his wife, and six children were forced to escape to East Florida following the collapse of Royal government in Georgia in February 1776. Brown remained in St. Augustine throughout the course of the war, serving as *aide-de-camp* to Governor Patrick Tonyn, a Justice of the Peace, a Lieutenant Colonel in the militia, and later as Speaker of the East Florida House Assembly. Thereafter, Brown stayed to supervise the handover of East Florida to Spanish in 1783, before travelling to London in early 1785. From as early as November 2nd, 1776, Brown had petitioned the British government for temporary subsistence payments amounting to £110 per annum following the loss of offices he held in Georgia prior to the Revolution. Upon relocating to the metropole – having failed, like Wylly, to secure anything like the awards he had hoped for – Brown pleaded with the commissioners to reconsider his case. Brown’s appeal, even by the standards of his fellow Georgia sufferers, is noteworthy for its all-encompassing tone of desperation and dislocation, deploring how he could not:

Remain much longer in this most expensive place where I have been near four months out of eight confined with severe rheumatism from cold taken upon passage home and change of climate ... nor is it the species of suffering only, but the sensibility of the sufferers also that pleads strongly, of which I am importunately possessed of too great a share for my present condition ...

³⁴⁶ James Hume affidavit, sworn before The Commission for Loyalist Claims February 28th, 1787, Commission Records, NA, A0 13/38, p.97.

*Standing upon the precipice of penury in a strange place, especially this place, where there is even competition for hard labour, exposed to temptations of every kind.*³⁴⁷

Brown was manifestly uncomfortable in the so-called heart of the British Empire. He was, he declared, caught between “absolute Scylla and Charibdis” there, professing his desire to leave were it not for his ill-health.³⁴⁸ It seems everything about the metropole – the climate, the temptations, how the city felt and looked to him – made him feel out of place and ill at ease. It was all so unsettling and unfamiliar: from the unrelenting grey skies and biting damp; to the sheer crush of bodies jostling for their share of the dusty roadside; to the smog-filled skyline festooned with the monumental trappings imperial grandeur. It was, to say the least, jarring by comparison with the setting to which Brown and his fellow London based exiles were accustomed: their own imperial heartland in which they grew to become Loyalists, comprising the vast swamps of rice plants worked by enslaved peoples which they materially reformulated in their schedules of loss.

London based exiles were, of course, not alone in describing their new locales as strange in some way. Refugees from Georgia who had headed to the West Indies also used this language. For twelve years prior to the War of Independence, Charles William Mackinen was “comfortably settled upon the island of Skidaway ... where he cultivated his lands as a planter to his great emolument and advantage”.³⁴⁹ After the fall of royal government there, though, Mackinen fled with his family to St. Augustine. In February

³⁴⁷ *William Brown to John Forster esq.*, June 16th, 1786, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/38, p.88.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁹ Charles William Mackinen memorial, April 17th, 1784, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/36b, p.598.

1780, he died, leaving behind his wife Helen and four children. When peace was declared, Helen and her family went to Jamaica. In a memorial forwarded on her behalf by her attorney in London John Simpson – which was filled with every gendered trope conceived to prick the sensibilities of the male commissioners’ imaginable – Helen described how after her relocation, she had been “left destitute in a strange place without friends or assistance ... a disconsolate widow with a helpless young family without the means of procuring for them a necessary subsistence.”³⁵⁰ Lieutenant-Colonel William Young was another who headed for the Caribbean after the Revolution. Having escaped first to Charleston and then to St. Augustine, Young finally made his way to Dominica. Despite being able to find a position in the in the service governor Sir John Orde, a long spate of bad health (due to a burst blood vessel in his chest), coupled with his failure to win any kind of compensation for his losses, had left Young fearing for his prospects there. Somewhat melodramatically, he declared that he was “in hourly expectation of his final dissolution and leaving behind him in a strange country a wife and a tender infant not a year old without any other provision but what may be afforded them by the humanity of this country.”³⁵¹

As Paul Pressly observed, Georgia and the Caribbean islands (especially Jamaica and the Bahamas) were similar in many ways.³⁵² They were plantation-based, export economies which were marked by the presence of large numbers of enslaved peoples. For these reasons, as Carole Watterson Troxler suggests, for many southern Loyalists who managed to keep hold of some of their human chattel property after the war, the

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Lieutenant-Colonel William Young memorial [undated], *Commission Records*, NA, AO 12/52, p.297.

³⁵² Pressly, *On the Rim of the Caribbean*, p.6.

Caribbean islands were naturally the most popular destination to which to flee.³⁵³ Indeed, many who went there were encouraged by glittering reports of the successes they could expect to flow their way there. In the Bahamas, for instance, many southern Loyalist planters went there hoping to establish themselves in the cotton trade. In order to achieve any kind of success though, exiles had to overcome several challenges. In 1786, for instance, Jamaica and parts of Dominica were battered by a series of hurricanes which decimated that year's crop and led to the death of approximately 15,000 enslaved peoples.³⁵⁴ The following year, a chenille and red bug infestation plagued the Bahamas, destroying 212 tons of long staple cotton planted there.³⁵⁵ It was, however, the ground itself, as well as the climate, which it seems most troubled the exiles, whether large slave-owners, smaller landholders, or export merchant traders. Writing in December 1785 to Anthony Stokes (their public agent in London and formerly Georgia's chief justice), Loyalist members of the Bahamian House of Assembly detailed their "mortification" at the "uncommon heats hitherto experienced in the culture of cotton [which] have not a little contributed to baffle the efforts of planters and so destroy a very promising appearance and expectation of the last year's crop."³⁵⁶ Broadly speaking, the Loyalist refugees would (on the backs of enslaved peoples) eventually come to enjoy a modicum of success in the Caribbean. Cotton exports from the Bahamas began to pick up between 1787 and 1788; the value and quantity of sugar outputs from Jamaica rose by 30 per cent over the same period; and even the timber trade – which exiles such as Daniel Manson, an artisan trader from Augusta who escaped to Jamaica

³⁵³ Troxler, *The Migration of Carolina and Georgia Loyalists to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick*, p.ii.

³⁵⁴ J.M. Parry, *A Short History of the West Indies*, Macmillan (1971), p.140.

³⁵⁵ Saunders, *Bahamian Loyalists*, pp.37-8.

³⁵⁶ Letter to Anthony Stokes, December 22nd, 1785, NA, AO 13/36c, p.1385.

after the peace, were involved in – burgeoned as shipbuilding activity surged.³⁵⁷ The initial delays they encountered, coupled with the lukewarm reception they received from older settlers, nonetheless worked to ferment acute feelings of alienation in the early years after the war which were manifest in the language of dislocation. Whereas in their schedules of loss they described their holdings in Georgia as rich and fruitful, the exiles' land in the Caribbean islands was, it seems, unfamiliar and simply “baffled” them.

Of all the regions Georgia Loyalist refugees fled to, though, the Canadian provinces must have appeared and felt the strangest to them. Frankly, no setting could have been further removed from their homes in colonial Georgia. Some initial reports from the region were very positive. One refugee writing in August 1783 described Nova Scotia as “an asylum of freedom and safety” full of the “necessary comforts of life, and the blessings of a happy government.”³⁵⁸ Such glittering reviews, however, appear to have been the exception rather than the rule in the accounts of Loyalist settlers there. Refugees more often documented the scarcity, cold, and general discomfort of life there. On their first arrival, new settlers noted the “lines of women ... sitting on the rocks of the shore, weeping at their altered condition.”³⁵⁹ They were, in a word, galled by the paper-thin promises of those who promoted Nova Scotia. One refugee scornfully observed that “We were taught to believe this place was not barren and foggy ... but we find it ten times worse ... only a few spots fit to cultivate, and the land is covered in a

³⁵⁷ See Craton, *A History of the Bahamas*; and Parry, *A Short History of the West Indies*.

³⁵⁸ J. Tomlinson Jr. to Joel Stone, August 18th, 1783, as quoted in *The Price of Loyalty*, p.400. The high-water mark of this positive image of Nova Scotia was reached with the publication of Hollingsworth's *The Present State of Nova Scotia* in 1786. To the author, Nova Scotia was the best colony in all of American, with fisheries and lumber enough to guarantee a bright future for settlers in Britain's trading empire. See S. Hollingsworth, *The Present State of Nova Scotia: with a Brief Account of Canada and the British Islands on the Coast of North America*, Edinburgh (1786).

³⁵⁹ John Inglis as quoted in Mackinnon, *This Unfriendly Soil*, p.37.

cold, spongy moss”.³⁶⁰ The land around Shelburne was thought to be especially poor, being “very rocky and full of stones”.³⁶¹ Good farming land was in incredibly short supply and the lack of fruitful conditions concentrated the minds of refugees there on subsistence only. There was but a slim chance of being able to supply any kind of local market (being primarily made up of individuals of limited means) or of producing enough to sustain any sort of export trade. For the small backcountry farmers who fled there – who were used to working in swamps rather than snow and whose fortunes had, for the most part, increased in colonial Georgia after mid-century – this was obviously profoundly unsettling.

Unlike their London or West Indian based compatriots, though, Georgia Loyalists exiled in the Canadian provinces did not describe their new surroundings directly as ‘strange’ in their petitions. Rather, they more commonly noted the wildness of their new locale. Having been “too obnoxious to the Rebels to have any reconciliation with that Republican body again” – serving under Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell as a German interpreter and local guide to British forces as well as a spy and militia captain commanding parties of raiding Loyalist gangs – Jacob Bühler fled from Ebenezer to New York following the fall of royal government in Georgia.³⁶² From there, along with his “poor sickly crippled wife”, he made his way to the supposed haven of Nova Scotia where he then lived “in a wilderness on new lands with little else”, far removed from his “former happy place of residence” having “received little or no reward” for his services.³⁶³ Thomas Manson painted an even bleaker picture of Nova Scotia. An émigré

³⁶⁰ Ibid., p.69.

³⁶¹ Ibid., p.39.

³⁶² Jacob Bühler memorial [undated], *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/138, p.141.

³⁶³ Ibid.

from Scotland, Thomas arrived in Georgia with his brother in early 1774 and settled in Augusta as a merchant. Having become an Ensign in the British army in 1781, Thomas retreated with his regiment to St. Augustine in the spring of 1783 and then headed to Halifax where he (along with his fellow refugees) hoped to receive “lands allowed by government as a reward for their faithful services.”³⁶⁴ Upon arriving there in November 1783, Thomas noted his and others’ disappointment as “lands were not surveyed nor grants to be obtained until the [next] summer”, describing his surroundings as “an uncultivated wilderness ... covered with snow ... without the necessary comforts of life.”³⁶⁵ Both Manson and Bühler echoed observations made by Sir James Wright. Writing to the commissioners as president of the board of Loyalist agents, Wright bluntly delineated how “upon the encouragement of the Commander in Chief at New York” many Loyalists went to Nova Scotia only to be “there employed in the arduous task of settling their families in a wilderness”.³⁶⁶

The motif of the wilderness was central to the history of colonial America. As Virginia Anderson, Peter Carroll, and Philip Greven have shown, it was a typical way for new settlers in America to describe the terrain there.³⁶⁷ To these early colonists, wilderness was associated with antediluvian notions of primitiveness and disorder. It was linked to and in many ways interchangeable with ideas of remoteness: from security and safety, from prosperity, and from civilisation (that is Christian civilisation) itself. It

³⁶⁴ Thomas Manson memorial, August 23rd, 1784, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 13/36b, p.634.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁶ Sir James Wright to the commissioners of the Loyalist claims, October 15th, 1783, NA, AO 13/35, p.508.

³⁶⁷ See Virginia DeJohn Anderson, *New England's Generation: The Great Migration and the Formation of Society and Culture in the Seventeenth Century*, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 1991), chapter 3; Philip Greven, *Four Generations: Population, Land, and Family in Colonial Andover Massachusetts*, Cornell University Press (New York, 1970), chapter 1:2; Peter N. Carroll, *Puritanism and the Wilderness: The Intellectual Significance of the New England Frontier 1629-1700* (New York, 1969), chapter 4.

encompassed that which imperial society in America was designed to overcome. It represented everything the British Empire was supposed not to be. Whilst admittedly there is no way to precisely discern why appellants who ran to Nova Scotia chose to describe their new environs as wildernesses rather than as strange places as their co-claimants elsewhere did (there was, as already noted, nothing in the board of agents' proscriptive literature which suggested they should use any such language) there is every reason to believe that the term wilderness was wittingly employed with its semantic baggage fully in mind. Although, therefore, they did not reference the strangeness or the foreignness of their new setting as straightforwardly as their counterparts exiled in London or the Caribbean islands did, Georgia Loyalist refugees in Nova Scotia plainly made linguistic choices in their petitions to the British government which gave voice to the exact same sense of isolation and disorientation. Observing their moss-strewn, rocky, and frigid horizon, they found themselves physically and imaginatively lost in the Empire which appeared nothing like that which they had left behind in colonial America. They were plainly a long way from the taskscapes in Georgia which had given them meaning in the Empire and made the Empire mean something to them. Simply, there could be no starker confirmation that the Empire as it was prior to 1775 – the Empire they grew to be loyal to – no longer existed, with all the troubling implications for their place within it and sense of belonging moving forward.

The language of dislocation should be understood against the backdrop of the exiles' displacement and their experiences of poor imperial administration after the war. Wherever they went, their resettlement was made all the harder as a consequence of the failure of British officials to accommodate them or somehow ease their re-adjustment. Their evacuation from America was shabbily organised, they were

inadequately provided for, and generally viewed as some kind of nuisance by local authorities. The Georgia exiles' broadly positive experience of royal government prior to the war was stark by comparison. As Neil Mackinnon has shown, nowhere was this more noticeable than in the Canadian territories. As more than 20,000 refugees poured into Nova Scotia, doubling the population there in the first year after the war, they found a province wholly unprepared to receive them. Indeed, as soon as governor Parr became aware of the coming deluge, he made the British government in London aware of the colony's lack of readiness and warned that the banished friends of government would be "for some time uncomfortable".³⁶⁸ Parr's prognosis, it seems, was largely accurate. In September 1783, for example, leading Loyalist subjects at Shelburne petitioned the British government for extra support. In it, the Loyalist bloc (mirroring the approach of individual memorialists to the Commission) emphasised their past services and simultaneously drew attention to the various problems they were encountering, underscoring the state of desperation and distress to which they had plunged.³⁶⁹ It was, however, the Parr administration's bungled land surveying operation and the failure to swiftly allocate plots which most perturbed the new arrivals and delayed their compaction. This displeasure was expressed by an anonymous Loyalist in the *Nova Scotia Journal* in February 1784. In it, a "well wisher to Nova Scotia" complained that since lands had not yet been properly granted, many Loyalists were unable to set about improving their situation.³⁷⁰ Faced with confusion, ineptness, and even in some cases outright apathy, displaced Loyalists' encounters with imperial authorities (not least of all the Commission itself which many believed had failed to inadequately provide for or

³⁶⁸ As quoted in Mackinnon, *This Unfriendly Soil*, p.12.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.27-8.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.103.

reward them) was, largely speaking, anything but reassuring. Rather, they served to inculcate and entrench general feelings of disarray and even otherness from imperial structures which Loyalist refugees palpably felt were failing them.

Crucially, the rhetoric of isolation and dislocation – of being indubitably out of place – should also be read in the context of the exiles' experience of the most thoroughly destabilising uncertainty imaginable. This uncertainty pertained most obviously to their subsistence. Tellingly, the language of dislocation appeared most prominently when their material prospects seemed bleakest. For Loyalists in Britain and the Canadian territories, this was in their earliest appeals, before their cases could be decided and before they received any kind of temporary provisions or managed to establish communal linkages. For Loyalists in the Caribbean islands – who, as noted, were generally wealthier planter sorts who had managed to retain some of their human chattel property – the language of dislocation was more prominent in their later appeals (primarily after 1786) after various natural disasters – from hurricanes to pest infestations – as well as a crippling trade embargo which prevented transactions with merchants in the New Republic on old imperial terms taking place, affected their holdings.³⁷¹

Importantly, the uncertainty and insecurity experienced by Georgia Loyalists after the peace, I argue, also pertained to their struggle to re-harmonise their persistent

³⁷¹ Published in July 1784, John Baker Holroyd, the 1st Earl of Sheffield's *Observations on the Commerce of the American States* expressed the idea that America was now a foreign power and thus existed outside the system of preferential imperial trade. Representatives for the Caribbean islands in London petitioned for the resumption of trade with American on old imperial terms, stating that "the commerce of America is, beyond all equivalent, more necessary to the British West Indies than that of the islands of America. Their concerns, however, were dismissed and supplies formerly obtained from the thirteen colonies now had to be purchased from Nova Scotia and Newfoundland at much higher prices and in smaller quantities. See John Baker Holroyd, the 1st Earl of Sheffield, *Observations on the Commerce of the American States*, London (1784); Parry, *A Short History of the West Indies*, p.140; Saunders, *Bahamian Loyalists*, p.37.

identification as subjects of the British Empire with their embodied sense of self and belonging in exile which remained pinned to their colonial American locale. Forcibly separated from their particular colonial taskscapes into which their reflexive conceptions of the transoceanic union were sedimented, Georgia Loyalist refugees looked out after the war onto an imperial terrain (geographic and imaginative) which they did not recognise. Wherever they ran to, the climate was different; the earth was different; the friendly interpersonal networks they relied on were no longer on hand. Except in the West Indies, of course, there were no plantations or fields of crops filled with large numbers of enslaved peoples. There was little to nothing which resembled the quotidian scene to which they attached so much value (emotional and monetary). Their whole imperial vista had been irrevocably altered. The language of dislocation that was so prevalent in their appeals, I would suggest, directly reflected the transitory moment in which these exiles found themselves as they sought to re-habituate themselves as imperial subjects at a time of profound upheaval. The language of dislocation was, I argue, the language of those battling to self-locate in chaotic circumstances and wrestling with the consequences of the loss of certain personal markers around which they had previously orientated their sense of imperial belonging.

After deciding to leave America, Loyalist exiles who approached the Commission in search of aid were faced with an existential question: what to write and how to write it? Their testimonies were the key to unlocking the Commission's doors and to accessing the compensation they desired. Their memorials were their subjective narratives of their wartime and postwar trials: little fictions of their experiences during the

Revolutionary epoch. In conjunction with their schedules of loss, they were submitted to the authorities in London and presented as arguments for their right to restitution. Given the natural limit on what they could put down, the Commission's strict parameters, and the officials' miserly approach, the language choices made by claimants and the import they gave to certain words and terms were of the greatest significance to them. Previous scholarship on the subject of Loyalist rhetoric has overwhelmingly focussed on a small cabal of 'big figure' writers such as Joseph Galloway, Charles Inglis, or Jonathan Boucher. These studies have called attention to what might be thought of as the ideological core of high loyalism in America. My work in this chapter is intended to supplement the existing scholarship in this regard. By considering the language of the claims as Loyalist rhetoric and drawing on a wider constituency of principally non-elite (or, at least, chiefly less vocal) actors, broad trends in the Loyalist outlook may be identified and older assertions either secured or refocussed.

The claims of Georgia Loyalists exiles were largely defined by two multi-layered and, in many ways, countervailing languages. The first was the language of dependency. Comprising affirmations of suffering and helplessness in some way, the language of dependency was, it appears, mapped against pronouncements made by the Loyalist agents' in their campaigning literature. It was demonstrably intended to foster a sympathetic understanding between the petitioners and their readers, and spoke directly to the notion of the Lockean bidirectional compact between the state and the subject. In so doing, they essentially attested to their lingering attachment to the idea of the transoceanic family bound by common and universally understood rights and responsibilities. At the same time, however, Georgia Loyalist exiles across the diaspora attested to sensations of dislocation which they experienced in their new environs

through the language of dislocation. By referring to themselves as strangers in their new communities – or by stating that their postwar settings appeared as strange, baffling, or as a totally unfamiliar wilderness to them – Georgia Loyalists gave voice to quiescent feelings of isolation, disorientation, and detachment which had risen within them as displaced persons lacking a basic sense of rootedness in a world they did not fully recognise or yet understand their new place in.

Unlike the language of dependence, the language of dislocation does not seem to have been part of any sort of overarching argument or rhetorical strategy. Rather, it appears as an authentically reactive rhetorical mode adopted by individuals battling to come to terms with a postwar climate which, despite their expectations, felt at times as if it was filled with the same kind of tumult and acerbity which largely defined the Revolution for them. They were personal reflections that are key to understanding and tracking the basis of the Loyalist claimants' sense of place and belonging after the war. Of course, as numerous historians of the diaspora have shown – including Keith Mason, Maya Jasanoff, and Carole Watterson Troxler – refugees of the American Revolution were, with time, able to recraft spaces for themselves in the postwar imperial landscape, forming what Keith Mason referred to as the “fascinating vanguard” of the British Empire into the nineteenth century.³⁷² In their memorials, though, the Georgia Loyalist exiles testified to the fact that this transition was not easy and their continued attachment to the idea of the transoceanic family was never guaranteed. As they attested to sensations of dislocation in the British Empire after the Revolution, I argue that they reaffirmed the essential distinctiveness and provinciality of their identities and

³⁷² Mason, “Loyalism in British North America in the Age of Revolution c.1775-1812”, p.173.

the importance of the taskscapes which had defined their imperial vistas, around which quotidian routines were performed, to their self-location as colonial Americans and Loyalists.

“Good and Peaceable Citizens”: the reintegration of the Georgia Loyalists, 1782-90

In chapters two and three of this thesis, I sought to question the ways Georgia Loyalist refugees presented themselves and their stories to imperial authorities in Westminster and consider the implications for their identity as subjects of the British Empire. Through a close analysis of the material and rhetorical dimensions of their appeals – the sequestered or destroyed possessions which were privileged in their schedules of loss as well as the ‘languages’ that were foregrounded in their personal testimonies – I endeavoured to evince the enduring essentiality of Georgia’s distinctive locale to their sense of self and belonging in exile. This group quintessence, I argue, was reflectively forced to the surface amidst the upheaval and disarray caused by their displacement as individuals imaginatively clinging to the sites which had previously anchored their embodied, provincialised identities as colonial Americans. My work in these chapters is situated within a larger and still growing body of scholarship attending to the experiences and perceptions of banished American Tories across the diaspora. Taken in concert, the studies of Wallace Brown, Mary-Beth Norton, Carole Watterson Troxler, and Maya Jasanoff have gradually come to dominate the literature on the Loyalists. They show that whilst they may have faced many challenges resettling in their new environs after the war, they were at times remarkably resourceful, resilient, and anything but the myopic victims of change they were surrounded by.³⁷³

³⁷³ Brown, *The King’s Friends*; Norton, *The British Americans*; Troxler, *The Migration of Carolina and Georgia Loyalists to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick*; Jasanoff, *Liberty’s Exiles*.

Whilst such studies have been necessary and salutary, the predominating concern for the histories of those who left America after the peace does not reflect the weight of numbers. The United States' Census Bureau records state that the population at 1780 was approximately 2,800,000 and the general view amongst most scholars is that on the eve of the Revolution 2,500,000 peoples resided in the American colonies.³⁷⁴ Using the 1775 figure as baseline, if 30 per cent of Americans were Loyalists (as John Adams famously suggested) there should be a total of 750,000 individuals who counted as friends of government at the outbreak of the War of Independence. Even if the more conservative estimate of 20 per cent of the sum population is utilised, as proposed by Paul H. Smith, the overall number of Loyalists in 1775 would still amount to around 500,000.³⁷⁵ Of these, according to Jasanoff (who built on the work of the early twentieth century historians Alexander C. Flick and Claude Halstead Van Tyne), about 60,000 emigrated after the war.³⁷⁶ Whilst, as Philip Ranlet has pointed out, these figures are problematic – not least because they are primarily based on sketchy numbers compiled by British quartermasters who stood to profit from the acquisition of excess provisions for the exiles as they departed America – because they really are all that exists, it is somewhat impracticable not to refer to them.³⁷⁷ But even accounting for the fact that this figure may be bloated as a result of the activities of light-fingered British officials, it is evident that the overwhelming majority of Loyalists actually remained in

³⁷⁴ Mason, "Loyalism in British North America in the Age of Revolution c.1775-1812", p.169.

³⁷⁵ Smith, "The American Loyalists: Notes on their Organisational and Numerical Strength", *WMQ*, vol.25:2 (1968), pp.259-77.

³⁷⁶ Alexander C. Flick, *Loyalism in New York During the American Revolution*, Columbia University Press (New York, 1901), p.277; Claude Halstead van Tyne, *The Loyalists in the American Revolution*, The Macmillan Company (New York, 1902), p.ix; Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles*, Appendix: "Measuring the Exodus", pp.351-8.

³⁷⁷ See Phillip Ranlet, "How Many American Loyalists Left the United States?", *Historian*, vol.76:2 (2014), pp.278-307.

the New Republic postwar. Indeed, for every Loyalist who departed the colonies, at least seven stayed in their homes in America to restart their lives there (with the number more likely being closer to ten). This reality underscores a gaping hole in the historiography. A full appreciation of the Loyalists' experiences after the war requires attention be given to those who worked to accommodate themselves to the new regime and reintegrate back into American society. Given the size of the Tory population in Georgia prior to the war – which was, according to Brown, proportionally larger than anywhere else in America – such attention must necessarily be granted to reintegrating Loyalists there as a priority.³⁷⁸

There are a number of reasons for this gap in the literature. Because of the nature of the conflict itself, marked by high levels of intimidation and harassment, many of the Revolution's 'losers' naturally felt compelled to disguise their past and chose not to advertise their struggles. They thus avoided noting down or publishing any of their thoughts on the conflict and its effects which may have formed the primary basis for future scholars to retell their stories. It is also likely that given the longstanding patriotic emphasis on the Revolution as a narrative of the triumph of virtue over a depraved tyranny, subsequent historians (especially immediately after the war) did not look terribly hard to uncover the experiences of individuals who fought against the independence project but nevertheless chose to stay in America after the peace. Where they did, it was only to note their marginal or villainous status. Their very presence was problematic to the founding national schema, consciously constructed by Whiggish historians such as David Ramsay and Mary Otis Warren, which asserted that sentiment

³⁷⁸ Brown, *The King's Friends*, p.253.

in America moved unanimously against British rule and its supporters.³⁷⁹ Indeed, only a select band of historians in a limited range of works have sought in any way to do this. Looking at Connecticut and Massachusetts respectively, Oscar Zeichner and David E. Maas separately set out a mixed picture for Loyalists who sought to re-establish themselves there.³⁸⁰ They show that whilst certain returnees were indeed subject to various forms of persecution resembling wartime precedents – including legislative sanctions as well as extra-legal harassment – others, especially those in occupations which were seen as useful to the state, were afforded the space to resettle relatively quietly. Judith van Buskirk both confirms and complicates this tableau with her study of revolutionary and post-revolutionary New York.³⁸¹ By showing that allegiances there were often blurry at best during the war – with financial, political, and filial concerns often overlapping and creating contradictions – Buskirk sets the basis for a more nuanced understanding of the reasons some Loyalists were able to return that goes beyond the somewhat top-down analysis of Zeichner and Maas. Given the difficulty of defining the boundaries of loyalty, Buskirk demonstrates how ordinary individuals on opposite sides of the revolutionary divide, who at times went to great lengths to show generosity to each other even during the war, were keen to forget the past after the peace. They thought, she argued, that this was the most prudent way of securing the most prosperous future possible for all. Rebecca Brannon has lately built on Buskirk's

³⁷⁹ See Ramsay, *The History of the American Revolution: Volume II*; Mercy Otis Warren, *History of the Rise, Progress, and Termination of the American Revolution*; Billias, "The First Un-Americans", *Perspectives on Early American History*, pp.282-324; Messer "From a Revolutionary History to a History of Revolution", pp.205-33.

³⁸⁰ Oscar Zeichner, "The Loyalist Problem in New York after the Revolution", *New York History*, vol.21:3 (1940), pp.284-302; and "The Rehabilitation of Loyalists in Connecticut", *New England Quarterly*, vol.11:2 (1938), pp.308-330; David E. Maas, *The Return of the Massachusetts Loyalists*, Ph.D. thesis (University of Wisconsin, 1972).

³⁸¹ Buskirk, *Generous Enemies*.

work with a close, systematic analysis of the social and political mechanics of Loyalist reintegration in South Carolina. In *From Revolution to Reunion* (2016), Brannon not only sets-out the ways the state's leaders sought to reincorporate the 'disaffected' as quickly as possible (culminating in the legislature's approval of what was in effect a clemency Act in 1784) but also the strategies Loyalists developed themselves in order to convince their would-be fellow citizens to embrace "the redemption of forgetting" and to "let painful memories die with the revolutionary generation".³⁸² Indeed, South Carolina's many links with and similarities to my own region of focus – not to mention the porousness of the backcountry border with Georgia during the war – naturally raises potentially revealing questions regarding the extent to which patterns of Loyalist rehabilitation in Georgia emulated those in the older Lowcountry province.

In 1990, John Shy questioned how a national polity so successful and relatively peaceful could emerge in America after a war so full of bad behaviours in which roughly one-fifth of the population was actively treasonous (meaning they fought for the British crown).³⁸³ Since then, scholars (with the exception of Brannon) have worked to unriddle this quandary principally by exploring how Patriots made room to reabsorb and quieten Loyalists in the New Republic. There remains scope, however, to reflect on and analyse the ways former friends of government made themselves 'reincorporateable' and subsequently helped to shape America's social reconstruction after the war. Indeed, the degree to which the reality of post-Revolutionary America breaks with conventional

³⁸² Rebecca Brannon, *From Revolution to Reunion: The Reintegration of South Carolina Loyalists*, University of South Carolina Press (Columbia, 2016), p.34. See also Brannon, *Reconciling the Revolution: Resolving Conflict and Rebuilding Community in the Wake of the Civil War in South Carolina 1775-1860*, Ph.D. thesis (university of Michigan, 2007).

³⁸³ John W. Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence*, University of Michigan Press (Ann Arbor, 1990), p.17.

assumptions regarding internecine conflicts and their aftermath, I would suggest, anticipates the need for such an approach. These conventional assumptions, I argue, are overturned most thoroughly by Georgia's postwar narrative. The contest in Georgia was singularly brutal and disordered (especially in the backcountry); authority was more unstable there than anywhere else on the continent; the divide was sharp; and existences were precarious. What is more, Whiggish Georgians, unlike their compatriots elsewhere in the New Republic, lived postwar with the emotional legacy of occupation. They witnessed first-hand the revivification of royal rule in their region and watched as their Tory adversaries read poems, attended plays, and made toasts which celebrated the imperial connection (embodied by the king) and damned the independence project. This schema should have fermented a cocktail of vitriol and vengefulness too potent to conceivably allow the Revolution's 'losers' to re-enter society after the peace. In short, if hopeful Loyalist reintegrators were to be met with a uniformly harsh stance anywhere, I would suggest that it would be in Georgia. Contrary to these expectations, though, Loyalists in Georgia were, in more cases than not, able to remain in the state and successfully reintegrate themselves. In this final chapter, therefore, I work to unpack the ways indicted Loyalists who remained in Georgia after the peace attempted to manage their wartime legacies and presented their actions during the conflict to their Whig neighbours after the peace in a way which would be acceptable to their one-time enemies. I examine how erstwhile Tories there sought to navigate the political and legislative terrain as set out by the new Patriot authorities and went about securing their re-entry into American society. Using the petitions of the King's once loyal subjects in Georgia who appealed to be allowed to become citizens of the state after the war, I tell the story of how they pivoted (seemingly very abruptly) from their former fealty to

Britain and pressed their case for clemency. In so doing, I elucidate the influence of one-time friends of government in Georgia over questions of citizenship in the embryonic Republic and consider the consequences regarding the basis of their sense self and belonging.

For all the reasons I have noted, Whiggish citizens in the newly independent state had every reason to reject the whole idea of granting clemency to those who had ostensibly set their face against American liberties. In fact, they had every motivation to vigorously drive friends of government from their property for good and, as a result of the lack of protections accorded to the Loyalists in the terms of the Paris peace treaty, there was almost no impediment against them doing so. Yet, what emerged in Georgia was a broadly open reintegration settlement which involved collaboration between erstwhile Loyalists, the communities they wished to resettle into, and the new state government, and saw the vast majority of the Revolution's opponents duly rehabilitated as citizens in the New Republic. This rehabilitation typically occurred in a somewhat prosaic fashion. First, an individual was officially attainted; they were then banished and their property confiscated; that individual would then petition the legislature to reconsider their punishment; and it was then for the state authorities to decide whether they would dilute their sanction to some form of amercement or strike it down altogether. These proceedings were driven ultimately by the Loyalists themselves with successful appellants nearly always seeking and winning the support of their fellow inhabitants who signalled their assent by way of supporting memorial. In so doing, attainted Loyalists seeking clemency after the war affirmed the paramount importance of Georgia's locale to their sense of self and belonging by turning to local networks which had sustained and moored them prior to and during the Revolution to facilitate their

appeals. To put it another way, just as their Loyalist identity was built locally – shaped in accordance with immediate circumstances and orientated around a distinctly provincialised set of thought materials – it was dissolved at the local level too. In the process, I argue, erstwhile Tories in Georgia helped to foster an understanding of citizenship there that was localised, democratic, and volitional – demanding the declared will of an indicted Loyalist who wished to stay in America as well as the consent of the communities which would take them in – which would define individuals' relationship to each other and the state in the New Republic. Although, as Erik Mathisen amongst others points out, the basis of these relationships would continue to be remade nationally throughout the Antebellum and Civil War periods, the reintegration of the Loyalists in Georgia, I argue, helped to establish the lived norms of what it was to be an American in the new nation immediately after the peace.³⁸⁴ Far from being part of the marginalia as passive victims or simple observers of change, the Georgia Loyalists became central to the reconstruction of the state after the war and to the development of a distinctly American civic culture there which was the Revolution's culmination.

Before turning to the ways Loyalists in Georgia worked to bring about their reintegration for themselves, it is worth exploring the particular context which framed their reabsorption back into Georgian society. Former Tories hoping to be granted clemency for their actions and allegiances during the Revolution were not, after all, reintegrating into a power vacuum. Although, as I will outline later in this chapter, the

³⁸⁴ See Erik Mathisen, *The Loyal Republic: Traitors, Slaves, and the Remaking of the of Citizenship in Civil War America*, University of North Carolina Press (Chapel Hill, 2018), especially chapter 3.

Loyalists would finally do the meaningful work of reintegration for themselves, immediately after the peace their destinies in America were, at least in part, subject to the urges and dictates of their possibly vengeful revolutionary opponents (in particular the men who signed the laws effecting their place in society). Erstwhile Loyalists in Georgia were, in short, acting within a social and political terrain which was controlled and shaped by their recent adversaries. In order to fully appreciate how the Revolution's 'losers' in Georgia were able to journey from the status of indicted enemies of American liberty to trusted citizens, it is necessary to examine this terrain and unpack the new state authorities' official posture toward those who had sided with the crown and fought against independence.

Whig efforts to punish Loyalists in Georgia began on September 16th, 1777, with "An Act for the Expulsion of Internal Enemies from the State". The act called for all white males over the age of twenty-one to sign an oath of allegiance and produce two "undoubted friends of American independence" as witnesses to testify to their loyalty to the rebel state before a twelve-person committee. If said demands were not met, the defendant would have to leave their home within forty days and half of their property (both real and personal) would be seized. If such persons were to return to the state and be found at arms against Patriot forces, they would be put to death. This was succeeded in March the following year when 177 men were attainted for treason. Five commissioners were elected in each county to oversee the confiscation of their property and they were banished from the state on pain of imprisonment and death. In line with the Revolution's internal logic, power was moved downward and given to the communities themselves to pursue the Revolution's disaffected. Those with knowledge of the immediate landscape were trusted to decide exactly how to execute these

punishments. This was an example of official local autonomy and self-regulation at work that went hand-in-hand with extra-legal forms of harassment to ostracise suspected enemies and drive them out of the community.

The British reconquest of the state in the winter of 1778-9 temporarily prevented the full implementation of these measures. But the restoration of Whig government in the backcountry from June 1781 prompted a renewal of their efforts to appropriate the Loyalists' property. Four months prior to General Charles Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown, the Rebels' victory at Augusta marked the effective end of British power in the Lower South. The war had ravaged the people and the landscape. Accounts of British atrocities during the conflict were a litany. One French observer noted that the progress of Loyalist and British troops in the southern theatre had been "marked by fire, devastation, and outrages of every kind".³⁸⁵ Significantly, though historians have struggled to account for this, there was no guarantee at the time that such violence was anywhere near an end. To contemporary observers, it was inconceivable that after six years of war, Britain would not attempt to relaunch its campaign to subdue the rebellious colonies back to obedience. Such a policy was, of course, actively urged by the crown's supporters in Georgia and elsewhere across the colonies. A few months after Rebel troops led by Elijah Clarke achieved their famous victory at Augusta, for instance, Sir James Wright appealed to officials in Westminster to relaunch the southern campaign by sending "800 foot and 150 horse" to the colony, declaring that "with this force I think rebellion cannot rear its head in Georgia again and the inhabitants will begin to turn their thoughts to industry and the province will soon resettle and flourish

³⁸⁵ As quoted from Piecuch, *Three Peoples, One King*, p.3.

again”.³⁸⁶ Independence supporters in an out of government were, at this juncture, understandably in no mood to behave with generosity toward the crown’s supporters. They were anxious. They were fearful. Their tempers were still hot. It was against this backdrop that on May 4th, 1782, two months prior to the British evacuation of Savannah, the rebel legislature at Augusta passed an enlarged Confiscation and Banishment Act. The purpose of the Act was to reinforce the penalties of the 1778 law and extend them to cover individuals held responsible for the “murder, rapine, and devastation” witnessed during the British occupation of the state.³⁸⁷ In all, 279 individuals were declared guilty of treason. They were banished forever and required to leave the state within sixty days. They also suffered the loss of all of their property, including debts owed to them as of April 1775. The House of Assembly appointed thirteen commissioners to administer the law. Their duties were to advertise and supervise the sale of this property and to report on their progress every two months.

Georgia’s Confiscation and Banishment Act was broadly in-keeping with similar measures passed against the Loyalists in other states, including both of the Carolinas, New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.³⁸⁸ There were both emotional and practical reasons to pursue the Revolution’s disaffected in this way. In the first instance, as the conflict was drawing to a close, such measures enjoyed popular support. In October 1782, for instance, inhabitants of Chatham County declared their “enormous grievance” against “any person or persons who shall be detected harbouring or encouraging to remain in this state any person or persons who is or are banished in this or any other of

³⁸⁶ Sir James Wright to the 1st Viscount Sackville, George Germain, Secretary of State for the colonies, February 15th, 1782, *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society*, vol.3, p.368.

³⁸⁷ The text of the Confiscation and Banishment Act 1782 is in *The Revolutionary Records of the State of Georgia*, ed. Allen D. Candler, Atlanta (1908), vol. 1, pp.373-97.

³⁸⁸ Brannon, *From Revolution to Reunion*, p.36.

the United States.”³⁸⁹ Many Georgian Patriots had lived under enemy rule for more than two years and suffered through an especially brutalising war. Demands from certain quarters to treat the Loyalists harshly constituted a form of vengeful catharsis driven by the idea that the Revolution’s ‘wrongdoers’ should face consequences for their actions.

Members of the recently reconstituted Whig legislature were keenly sensitive to the need to be seen to respond positively to such demands for two reasons. Firstly, in the chaotic and uncertain environment of mid-1782, the restoration of order was a primary concern. The question of how best to deal with Loyalists threatened to unleash a new wave of mob justice if left unregulated. That the legislature understood this and recognised the dangers it posed is revealed by the wording of the Confiscation and Banishment Act itself. It stated that the “peace and safety” of the state required that “*proper examples be made of such atrocious offenders*”.³⁹⁰ The Act, in other words, brought the problem of Loyalist justice ‘indoors’ and demonstrated that the state was capable of wielding an instrument of vengeance. Lawmakers also knew (having just fought a war that was essentially in favour of the idea of popular sovereignty) that nothing made politics more disposable or irrelevant quicker than the failure of leaders to acknowledge and act on the desires of their constituents. The draft text of the Paris peace negotiations (published in November 1782) offered nothing stronger than a Congressional ‘recommendation’ to the states to treat the Loyalists with equity and understanding. So non-existent were any kind of concrete protections for the Loyalists – which, as stated at multiple points in this thesis, were also absent from the final treaty signed on September 3rd the following year – that it is frankly difficult to avoid the

³⁸⁹ *Gazette of the State of Georgia* (Savannah), October 16th, 1782.

³⁹⁰ See the text of the Confiscation and Banishment Act 1782 in *Revolutionary Records*, vol. 1, pp.373-97.

conclusion that Congress endorsed the idea of that the states could, if they chose to, enact reprisals against friends of government. If Whig legislators in Georgia, whose authority was by no means secured, were to unilaterally strictly implement Congress' half-hearted recommendation in contradiction with the state and the national mood, they risked alienating those whose approval they needed to authenticate and undergird their power. By introducing an act to banish the Loyalists and sequester their property, the new Patriot authorities moved, in effect, to shore-up confidence in their administration.

Most obviously, though, the confiscated property of banished persons potentially provided a much-needed boon to the state's exhausted public finances after the peace. Indeed, as Robert Lambert demonstrated in an influential article published in 1963, between June and October 1782 sales of property once belonging to indicted Loyalists (which were primarily made-up from large plantations in Chatham County) yielded an income of £344,980.³⁹¹ Georgia officials used these funds for every conceivable purpose during the 1780s. Capital raised from the sales of confiscated property helped to pay-off war debts and debts incurred during the period of transition to peace. It was also used to grant estates to war heroes – Major-General Nathaniel Greene, for instance, was granted former royal Lieutenant-Governor John Graham's Mulberry Grove plantation on the Savannah River – as well as to construct public buildings such as a meeting place for the Executive Council.³⁹² Most frequently, though,

³⁹¹ This sum of total sales for 1782 was compiled from figures in Candler ed., *Revolutionary Records*, vol. 1, pp.414-607. See Lambert, "The Confiscation of Loyalist Property in Georgia 1782-1786", pp.83-4.

³⁹² *The Revolutionary Records of the state of Georgia*, vol.2, ed., Candler, Atlanta (1908), p.412, p.529, pp.542-3, pp.569-70; vol.3, p.265, p.304. See Lambert, "The Confiscation of Loyalist Property in Georgia 1782-1786", p.86.

it was used to pay for the “immediate exigencies” of government.³⁹³ It helped to pay for the salaries of the governor and members of the Assembly. It also covered the travel expenses of the state’s delegates to the Confederation Congress as well as the commissioners to treat with neighbouring Native American tribes.³⁹⁴ When it was neither feasible nor politically practicable to levy taxes on a worn-out populace, this regulated form of war booty appeared to provide a ready-made solution to the problem of paying for some of the cost of reconstruction.

There was, in other words, every motivation to vigorously go-after the Loyalists in Georgia. Pursuing Tories was politically and financially expedient, it enjoyed popular support, and was seemingly in line with the radical logic of the national campaign for independence. Official sanctions against the Revolution’s disaffected in Georgia, however, were not as harsh as they appeared. The mood-music of the Confiscation and Banishment Act may have sounded tough, but the reality was not quite so severe. It was in many respects an incomplete, even illusive bill – a subtle piece of legislative chicanery – so porous and leaky as to give the impression that it was constructed to be open to evasion. Rather than outright revenge, the 1782 act signalled the Whig authorities’ intent to pursue a limited form of revolutionary justice which was conceived in order to allow as many Loyalists to remain in the state and quietly reintegrate themselves back into society unhindered as tolerable.

If the intent of the Confiscation and Banishment Act was to treat loyalism as a crime in and of itself, it did so exceptionally sparingly. Only a small number of persons

³⁹³ *Ibid.*, p.86.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

ever found themselves scrutinised, exiled, or forced to pay any type of reparation for their wartime allegiances. There were, of course, those who pushed for a stricter, more exclusionary policy. In November, members of the Richmond county Grand Jury, for example, appealed to governor John Martin to broaden the 1782 bill, declaring their “very great grievance” that a number of suspected Tories had not been attainted in the law.³⁹⁵ These individuals represented a body of opinion in Georgia and elsewhere across the colonies which argued for mass requitals over moderation. The members of the Richmond county Grand Jury (doubtlessly along with many others) viewed the continued presence of these Tories as a threat to the state’s hard-won security and independence. They demanded that the authorities expel individuals they viewed as a kind of invidious fifth column who would, given the chance, jeopardise the happiness and prosperity of the New Republic. In practice, though, only 279 individuals were ever indicted by the Patriot legislature in Georgia for treason against American liberties. This list overwhelmingly comprised the tip of the Loyalist spear in the state. They were primarily elite men who had either taken a commission in the British army or held a position in the British occupational government (or sometimes both). The names of these men amount to a ‘who’s-who’ of the royal cause in Georgia: Governor Sir James Wright, Lieutenant-Governor John Graham, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Brown and so on. Outside of these elite circles, though, it appears that most royal supporters were able to dodge the legislative bullet. By definition, these individuals escaped recognition in the historical record. They were ordinary men and women (whose number may be in the thousands) who had sided with Britain in some way during the war but had managed

³⁹⁵ *Gazette of the State of Georgia*, November 20th, 1782.

to do so quietly enough to remain comparatively anonymous. They were consequently able to slip back into the general population when defeat came. The intent of the 1782 Acts was thus plainly not to punish all Loyalists. Nor was it to treat the category of loyalism as a crime in and of itself. Had this been the case, there would have been no need to go through the unnecessary bureaucratic rigmarole of naming specific culprits. Instead, state authorities were discriminatory, identifying and pursuing only the biggest and loudest offenders whilst casually ignoring the rest.

There were several factors pushing this targeted approach in Georgia. To begin, there was the nature of the war there. As I have described at multiple points throughout this thesis, the conflict in Georgia was predatory and self-perpetuating (especially in the backcountry). Inhabitants were plagued by the constant threat of raiding banditti gangs led by the likes of the Rebel militia captain James McKay and the notorious professional plunderer Daniel McGirth. Indeed, the type of war conducted there, to quote one Loyalist observer, was one in which it was thought that “every man is a soldier.”³⁹⁶ It was, though, precisely the high levels of savageness and chaos which scarred the state during the war which, I argue, made adopting an unvaryingly vindictive posture toward the Loyalists as a group after the peace undesirable. Joseph Clay – a Savannah merchant, a Patriot, and commissioner of confiscated estates – openly doubted the wisdom of an overtly punitive stance. He believed that it would result in the fostering of bitterness that would hinder reconstruction.³⁹⁷ Having lived through a bloody and predatory

³⁹⁶ Quote taken from Robert M. Weir, “The Violent Spirit: The Re-Establishment of Order, and the Continuity of Leadership in Post-Revolutionary South Carolina”, in *An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry during the American Revolution*, ed. Ronald Hoffman et al, University of Virginia Press (Charlottesville, 1985), p.74.

³⁹⁷ Joseph Clay to Henry Laurens, 15th March 1784, in *Letters of Joseph Clay: Merchant of Savannah 1776-93*, Georgia Historical Society Collections, Savannah (1913), vol.8, pp.205-6. Clay’s concerns were echoed

conflict in Georgia, Clay plainly feared the potential consequences of awakening a violent spirit of resistance to Whiggish authority amongst a large proportion of the population. He and others were deeply concerned that if they acted too punitively against all those with Tory sympathies, they risked creating a groundswell of ill-feeling amongst the Patriot regime's less committed supporters (of which, given the size of the state's Tory population prior to the war, there were undoubtedly a sizeable number). Such fears were especially salient in the summer of 1782. Whilst Americans across the continent were celebrating the likely prospect of independence, there were many who were simultaneously blanching at the fear that Britain would send another force to try and reconquer them. Patriot Georgians, of course, had already witnessed the revival of British dominion in their region during the war. Inhabitants there were intimately familiar with the repercussions that would have accompanied a reinvasion by the crown's forces and (perhaps to a greater extent than citizens in any of the other former colonies) alert to the need to take whatever measures necessary to ward off this possibility. Under these circumstances, the logic of only targeting the crown's biggest and loudest supporters was irrepressible. Simply, they would have comprised the corpus of the Loyalist leadership in the event of a British revival. By primarily going-after elite individuals, the new state authorities in Georgia made clear that their aim was not to punish the loyalism of *all* those who supported the crown's cause in some way. It was, rather, to counter two specific threats: a British resurgence in the region and the disorder that was bound to follow. In a plantation society with a sizable enslaved black population (with more and more inhabitants leaving for other shores fearing possible

by Arthur Middleton, a South Carolina delegate to the Continental Congress. Middleton cautioned policymakers to "beware of encouraging a spirit of a different kind and of converting them into a band of robbers egg'd on by avaricious views". See Weir, *An Uncivil War*, p.75.

reprisals at the hands of vitriolic Patriots) the appeals of order and security carried particular resonance in Georgia.³⁹⁸ For lawmakers, their concern to forestall the breakdown of social order (amongst its white population) outweighed any desire they had to enact wholesale retributive justice.

Not only was a uniformly harsh and far-reaching policy toward the Loyalists not desirable, it was also not practicable. The reason for this was, again, closely tied to the state's disordered wartime schema. In mid-1776, Congress took steps to turn mere disaffection into legally defined treason. The principle behind the treason law – passed on June 24th, a mere six months after the Tory Act in which Congress offered its opinion that “unworthy Americans” ought to be “kept in safe custody or bound with sufficient sureties to their good behaviour” – rested on the idea that inhabitants who resided in a state and received the protection of that state's laws (whether they agreed with them or not) owed the presiding authority there their fealty. This notion formed the basis of the general revolutionary position on allegiance. Ostensibly, it broke with the English legal understanding of allegiance which defined fealty to the state (in the form of the King) as natural and perpetual since the early-seventeenth century.³⁹⁹ This ‘break’, however, was not as clear cut as some contemporaries and modern historians have imagined. Congress' treason law and England's seventeenth century treason law were similar in one fundamental respect: both essentially assumed that once allegiance was owed – whether by election, residence, conquest, or birth – it could not then be reneged

³⁹⁸ On the eve of the Revolution, according to Sir James Wright, the population of Georgia was approximately 33,000 of which roughly 15,000 were black enslaved peoples. In Savannah, according to Paul Pressly, the population comprised 821 enslaved black people out of a total of 1,996 individuals. See Pressly, *On the Rim of the Caribbean*, p.71; Hall, *Land and Allegiance*, p.13.

³⁹⁹ For the best account of the development of the British colonial legal understanding of citizenship and theories of allegiance see James H. Kettner, *The Development of American Citizenship 1608-1870*, University of North Carolina Press (Chapel Hill, 1978), chapter 3.

upon. The only meaningful difference was that where the English tradition supposed that fealty to the state and the King came *before* the decision to create a society of laws, Congress' law presumed that allegiance *followed* the creation of a government with mutual obligations. In Georgia, though, Congress' definition of treason was impossible to uphold. The contract invoked by Congress was only binding if there existed a stable government capable of commanding fealty in return for protection.⁴⁰⁰ In Georgia, it was questionable whether any such government existed during the War of Independence. Many previously observant Whigs signed oaths to protect themselves at the expense of their patriotism after the winter of 1778-9, as many Tories had done when the colony fell to the revolutionaries in February 1776. The waters of allegiance were muddied yet further from the period between June 1781 and the summer of 1782 when the state essentially functioned under two competing governments. In this environment, it was incredibly difficult to pinpoint which behaviours constituted 'real' loyalism or to lay definitively the charge of treason at the door of all supposed Tories *en masse*. Such questions plainly vexed Patriot authorities in the execution of the 1782 legislation. The Executive Council, for instance, regularly delayed the sale of confiscated property pending clarification of the status of the attainted individual.⁴⁰¹ In the end, Georgia lawmakers balanced the desire for retributive justice with the recognition of the sheer impracticality of prosecuting large numbers of the Revolution's disaffected by focussing

⁴⁰⁰ This argument was forwarded postwar by Pennsylvania's Chief Justice Thomas McKean who stated that Congress' 'agreement' in the revolutionary treason law was only binding if there was a government which was able to uphold its side of the bargain. See James H. Kettner, "The Development of American Citizenship in the Revolutionary Era: The Idea of Volitional Allegiance", *American Journal of Legal History*, vol.208 (1974), pp.226-7.

⁴⁰¹ *Revolutionary Records*, vol.2, pp.549-55.

their attention on a select number of individuals whose actions were beyond contention whilst allowing for a wide-open space for the rest to slip back into society unnoticed.

The 1782 Confiscation and Banishment Act was complex and multi-layered. It was not, despite outward appearances, a purely anti-Tory piece of legislation. Were this so, there would have seemed little reason not to include as many accused and known Tories as possible and reap the benefits from their sequestered holdings. Instead, the new Whig authorities in Georgia singled-out just 279 Loyalist totems for symbolic revolutionary justice, effectively allowing the great majority of the King's formerly faithful subjects there to escape into the state's vast and unpopulated spaces to quietly resettle back into American society. Scarred by the savageness of the conflict, in favour of sweeping and potentially embittering requitals, the new regime after the war adopted a moderate approach by attempting to balance the very human wish to see retribution enacted – making it clear that the Revolution's enemies could not simply walk back from the fray untouched – with mercy as a way to hopefully foster a more stable and peaceable society which, I argue, was their primary concern as the fighting drew to a close.

As open as the Confiscation and Banishment Act was, though, it was clear that the law could not be enforced in any meaningful way without doing some kind of damage to Georgia's already frayed social fabric. Even when applied with forbearance, it appeared threatening to mutual feelings of respect amongst the state's inhabitants, to filial connections, friendships, and to practical considerations of postwar regeneration. Lawmakers were sensitive to this. John Wreat – Georgia's state auditor

throughout the 1780s – signalled as much when he declared that he would “forgive everyone now the war is at an end” in the interest of reconstruction.⁴⁰² Wereat’s sentiments were echoed by Aedenus Burke, South Carolina’s Attorney General. Writing as “Cassius” to “The Freemen of South Carolina”, Burke argued for the necessity of some law or process “to bury into oblivion past transactions” for the restoration of tranquillity and the promotion of a prosperous and stable society.⁴⁰³ In Georgia, such steps were taken almost immediately after the British evacuation of Savannah in July 1782. After that point, the state authorities began unpicking their previous work in favour of an expressly pro-reintegration program. From thereon, all legislation which was introduced relating to the Loyalists was designed with the intention of eventually returning them to the rights and protections of citizenship.

This process began in Georgia with the passage of the first Amercement Act on August 5th, 1782 (a mere three months after the Confiscation and Banishment Act was put into effect). The act indicted those who had “since the taking of the town of Savannah ... taken protection from some one or other of his Britannick majesty’s officers”.⁴⁰⁴ Once again, legislators acted cautiously by naming just ninety-eight individuals in the bill. Crucially, though, in contrast to the Confiscation and Banishment Act, the amercement law recognised formally different degrees of Tory culpability and split the indicted persons into three classes. The first class consisted of fifteen individuals who were compelled to pay within three months cash amounting to 12 per cent of the total value of their property; the second class was made-up of twenty-two individuals

⁴⁰² Quote taken from an undated petition on behalf of Thomas Young, Keith M. Reed Collection, MS 3705, Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library (University of Georgia, Athens).

⁴⁰³ Quote taken from Weir, *An Uncivil War*, p.85.

⁴⁰⁴ *The Revolutionary Records of the State of Georgia*, ed., Candler, Savannah (1908), vol.3, p.176

who were obliged to hand-over 8 per cent of the value of their property; and the third class comprised sixty-two individuals who were ordered to serve as troops in the Patriot militia under Major James Habersham or find a substitute. This list was later added to on February 21st, 1785, with the passage of a second Amercement Act. Sixteen more Tories were commanded to pay the state cash to the value of 12 per cent of their total property. Amerced persons were not entitled to vote in elections or serve “in any place of honour, trust, or profit” until they had “complied with the purport of this resolution”.⁴⁰⁵ In other words, once their obligations under the Act had been met, they were to be considered citizens with the return of full civil rights. The amercement bills thus offered the promise of official redemption for contrite friends of government and provided a legal framework against which they could plot a route back to citizenship in the New Republic once they had fulfilled the required conditions.

The purpose of the amerancements laws, I argue, was three-fold. Firstly (and most obviously), it was a means to waive the confiscation and banishment of certain Tories in exchange for a portion of their property, granting the state a more secure source of income. It was apparent even as early as 1783 that confiscation was not the financial panacea it was hope it could be. The state simply could not sell their newly acquired wares. Many of the same lots appeared multiple times in advertisements – suggesting a lack of interest – and the House of Assembly even postponed sales between January and February 1783 in order to review its operations in response to poor returns.⁴⁰⁶ Allowing individuals to keep a large share of their property which was proving difficult to sell in any case in return for a path back to citizenship was an convenient way for the state

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, vol.1, p.614; vol.3, p.179.

⁴⁰⁶ Lambert, “The Confiscation of Loyalist Property in Georgia 1782-1786”, pp.83-5

authorities to secure some kind of public revenue whilst demonstrating to the wider citizenry that former misdemeanours would not go totally unpunished and ensuring that indicted persons were invested in the communities they wished to reside in. The idea that something was better than nothing and that those with a stake in the community were less likely to jeopardise the peace of society were thus made fundamental to the internal logic of amercement and, by extension, to reintegration.

Amercement was also a way of refilling the ranks of the depleted state militia. Just under two-thirds of all amerced individuals were designated in the third class of Loyalists who were commanded to serve in the Georgia First Battalion for the period of two years (or find a substitute) rather than hand-over some of their property. These individuals were by and large less incorrigible, less well-off Tories. They were primarily small-to-middling merchants and artisans like James Martin, a baker from Savannah. Appropriating a portion of their limited worth would, by definition, be of limited value to the state. With the spectre of a British reinvasion swirling around the former colonies, these individuals were primarily valued for their physical presence. Given their previous allegiances, it is probable that they were not yet viewed as a collection of reliable, on-hand recruits who could be trusted to stand firm in the event Britain relaunched its campaign to subdue America. Their enlistment appears, therefore, to have been less precautionary or logistical than nominal. Even in their admittedly small numbers, the amerced recruits functioned to bolster the impression that the state's borders remained physically manned (despite the obvious depletions) and that any threats to its territorial integrity from within as well as without would be repelled. In so doing, they served effectively as expedient mascots of sorts which demonstrated the new Patriot

authorities' ability to fulfil their duty to defend its citizens in return for which they could justly demand their allegiance.

The third and, in many ways, the most significant function of the amercement laws was symbolic. As open as the Confiscation and Banishment Act was, its essential surface feature was still to holdout symbols for punishment. With amercement, the inverse was true: symbols were held out not for punishment, but for naturalisation. Where confiscation and banishment allowed the majority of Loyalists to surreptitiously reintegrate, now the overt policy of the new regime was to create an open path to citizenship for indicted individuals. Even some of those on the original punitive bill appeared on later amercement lists. In all, sixty-six individuals were 'upgraded' in this way. The implication was obvious: if it was possible for these individuals to be reincorporated into American society, it was theoretically possible for all. This was, simply, a subtle re-setting of the culture of Loyalist reintegration from passive, unofficial acceptance to formal (if conditional) encouragement. This re-setting did two things. To begin with, it directly contravened Congress' 1776 treason law which (as I explained) defined allegiance as immutable and static. The amercement acts explicitly recognised that fealty was a decision made by individuals which could be changed according to circumstances. In other words, they facilitated the transition of those who wished to renounce the allegiances they were born to in favour of American citizenship. In so doing, the amercement laws also accorded a degree of agency to former Loyalists by offering them a route to citizenship which required their express participation. Amerced individuals needed to actively demonstrate their will to become citizens. They did this, most obviously, by submitting to the terms of their amercement: by financially or physically investing in the state as mandated by the authorities. This requirement

opened space for erstwhile Tories to shape the trajectory of their reintegration. In essence, it presented them with a choice when otherwise they did not have one and made that choice the foundation stone upon which their path to citizenship was constructed.

The amercement acts were followed by a number of special laws passed by the Georgia House of Assembly between 1785 and 1805. These laws incrementally removed individuals and groups from confiscation and amercement; permitted others to return to the state (but not reclaim their property); and in a few cases struck names off punitive lists altogether without any conditions attached. Indeed, several names which appear in the confiscation and amercement lists also crop-up in later special laws often without the terms of their naturalisation having been completed. William Stephens, for example, was readmitted to the full rights of citizenship and his property returned by special Act passed a mere six months after he had been amerced at 8 per cent.⁴⁰⁷ Smith Clarendon – amerced at 8 per cent of his property – Thomas Johnston, Thomas Polhill, and George Basil Spencer – all amerced at 12 per cent of their property – and James Douglass, James Thompson, John Hammet, and James Weatherford – all commanded to serve in the Georgia battalion – were also swiftly readmitted to full citizenship in early 1784 after swearing an oath of allegiance to the state without any evidence that they had fulfilled the terms of their amercement.⁴⁰⁸ Their cases demonstrate just how temporary amercement conditions sometimes were and how achievable the promise of and official rapprochement often was. Of course, this rapprochement was never guaranteed. Nor

⁴⁰⁷ *Revolutionary Records*, vol.1, pp.610-11

⁴⁰⁸ For the 1784 oath of allegiance text see the Telamon-Cuyler Collection, MS 1170, Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library (University of Georgia, Athens).

was the progression toward citizenship for these indicted Tories unambiguously uphill. Amercement, though it initiated a journey to official reintegration, went hand-in-hand with the inhibition of certain rights, including exclusion from the franchise and certain professions. The result was, in effect, to create a second class of citizenship for the period that the amercement was in effect. The official approach to the naturalisation of Loyalists in Georgia was thus cautious. Yet, the state authorities after the war set a broad legislative path which – for reasons relating to the promotion of harmony, the potential threat to the state’s territorial integrity, and lawmakers’ concern to bolster their base of popular support – was geared primarily toward the reabsorption of former Loyalists. Importantly, in the transition from confiscation and banishment to amercement, authorities in Georgia lent credence to a fundamental principle: namely, that for full citizenship to be granted, individuals needed to give action to their desire to be naturalised. This process began *officially* with amercement but would be fulfilled on the ground by the Loyalists themselves and the communities they sought to settle into.

Almost as soon as the ink was dry on legislation regarding the Tory population in Georgia, Loyalists there set about casting around for better options. They realised very quickly that it was worth making every effort for themselves to secure a peaceful and prosperous future in America. To that end, one-time Loyalists in Georgia petitioned the Assembly to request that the sanctions placed on them be overturned entirely and they be admitted to the full rights and protections of citizenship. Their appeals had two grounds. Firstly, they declared that their allegiances during the War of Independence were not the product of a free choice. They were, rather, the result of some kind of

malignant compulsion, be it sickness or the threat of mortal peril. As such, so their implied logic went, the punishments that were meted out against them were unjustified and illegitimate. More importantly, though, erstwhile Tories substantiated their appeals for clemency and citizenship by claiming they enjoyed the support of their fellow inhabitants. These individuals thus demonstrated how they had laid the groundwork for their own full reintegration by seeking and winning the consent of members of the communities they desired to be absorbed into. In so doing, Georgia Loyalists who sought to remain in the state after the peace did three things. To begin with, after a protracted and disorientating conflict, they affirmed the essentiality of their provincial locale and the importance of familiar networks there to their anchored sense of belonging by dissolving their loyalism at the local level (just as it was built at the local level). In so doing, they demonstrated that their identification as subjects of the British Empire was always elastic, conditioned by their particular regional experiences, and ultimately dissolvable. At the same time, by building their case for clemency from the ground-up – by re-rooting themselves in local, tangible communities which appeared marked by contrast with the fanciful associations they imaginatively forged around monarchalist displays and discourses during the war – Georgia Loyalists made themselves central to the genesis of a distinctly Americanised civic culture and understanding of citizenship in the state. This understanding of citizenship, I argue, was based on ideas of consent, choice, trust, and local autonomy – as well as the obligation of individuals to uphold the standards of the collective – which were finally cemented at the heart of the 1790 Naturalisation Act and (as Mathisen implies) left their mark upon the national

consciousness throughout the early-nineteenth century into Antebellum and Civil War periods.⁴⁰⁹

The immediate environment in Georgia after the war was marked by an element of suspicion. Time and time again, the fear of transients, aliens, and newcomers reared its head. One wartime measure passed on August 5th, 1782, required that emigres from other states produce a certificate from a circuit or county court judge where they last resided verifying “his or their state of attachment to the liberties or independence of the United States of America, and also of his honesty, probity, and industry.”⁴¹⁰ Such concerns went undiluted by the end of the armed conflict. On October 31st, 1783, for example, Wilkes County’s Grand Jury declared their concern for “the number of people coming into this state without recommendation from whence they came” and their desire to see established “a patrol on the road leading from Augusta to Savannah, whereby skulking plundering parties from Florida have an opportunity of robbing and plundering people on the road, very detrimental to the trade and commerce of the state”.⁴¹¹ The atmosphere of the state was also marked by an element of caprice. At the same time that legislators began to open-up pathways to citizenship for Loyalists, there were those who, as I have already pointed out, continued to call for a more draconian stance. On August 19th, 1783, for instance, Georgia’s Attorney General Samuel Stirk advised the House of Assembly and Governor Lyman Hall to pursue a “strict execution” of the Confiscation and Banishment Act contrary to the approach they appeared to be pursuing. This climate had a number of causes, not least, I suspect, the desire of those

⁴⁰⁹ Mathisen, *The Loyal Republic*, introduction.

⁴¹⁰ *Revolutionary Records*, vol.3, p.186.

⁴¹¹ *Gazette of the State of Georgia*, October 31st, 1783.

in an out of power to repossess the holdings of the Revolution's disaffected and take advantage of the opportunities such confiscations offered. It was also, I would suggest, the result of the legacy of Georgia's scarring wartime experiences, most notably the memory of raiding banditti gangs who terrorised the state during the conflict via the East Florida and South Carolina borders. This environment was, needless to say, difficult for former Loyalists to negotiate. Simply, they needed to win over these suspicious and still vengeful quarters if they were to secure their *full* reintegration and claim their place amongst the ranks of American citizens.

They did this, in the first instance, by trying to shape a public culture in Georgia which suited their ends. As the armed conflict drew to a close, Loyalists sought to facilitate their re-acceptance from the wider community by framing the public discussion surrounding the problem of their reconciliation on their terms. As Timothy Barnes and Robert Calhoon have shown, newspapers were the primary vehicle they used to do this.⁴¹² After the evacuation of Savannah and Charleston, humbled Tories in the press unashamedly adopted the tone of the 'trimmer' (meaning one who adopts their views to match prevailing trends for personal advancement).⁴¹³ They appealed nakedly to the Patriot view of their wartime allegiances by attempting to explain away their loyalism as a practical response to the British threat. They argued that the reconquest of most of the Lower South by the crown's forces between 1778 and 1781 had left them with no other choice than to side with the royalists.⁴¹⁴ In other words, they tried to excuse their loyalism as merely an expedient cloak donned out of sheer

⁴¹² See Calhoon and Barnes, "Loyalist Discourse and the Moderation of the American Revolution", *Tory Insurgents*, pp.160-204.

⁴¹³ *Ibid.*, pp.192-3.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.193.

necessity. Their purpose was to suggest that all things being equal – were they *free* to choose their allegiances unimpeded by considerations regarding the safety of their property and person – they would have supported the independence cause. This was, in essence, an attempt to show that they were in line with a fundamental aspect of Patriot thought: namely, that loyalism was a shallow and corrupt form of allegiance which compared poorly with the purity and authenticity of the true Patriot position. This played directly to what Gordon Wood referred to as ‘the Whig science of politics’ (the confident belief that political behaviour could be understood by the careful discernment of virtue and corruption).⁴¹⁵ If Whigs were to reject uniformly this stance, they risked undermining part of their own rationale regarding the recent struggle. It also worked to assuage Whig fears concerning the scale of the Loyalist peril, intellectually limiting the scope and depth of enemy sentiment whilst presenting themselves as essentially unthreatening to the new polity. Their intent was to draw themselves emotionally and imaginatively closer to ordinary independence supporters – showing how they shared their habits of thought – thereby marginalising more radical opinion against them. The central idea was to justify their re-acceptance back into society by emphasising their commonality with other Americans and to massage into the public consciousness their conversance with the expectations of their would-be ‘new’ communities and with the republican principles which underpinned them.

For Georgia’s indicted Tories, the effort to nurture a general feeling in the state that was geared toward their collective reintegration was an important first step. The exculpations of humbled Loyalists in the press worked to set the broad intellectual

⁴¹⁵ Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic*, p.606; Calhoun and Barnes, “The Reintegration of the Loyalists and the Disaffected”, *Tory Insurgents*, p.356.

current flowing in their favour. But for those named in the 1782 Acts, more work was yet required. For if all that was needed for these Loyalists to be welcomed back into American society was the creation of a principally amenable civic mood achieved through public works, then it might be expected that the Georgian authorities would have passed some kind of sweeping legislation granting universal clemency as had been done in South Carolina in 1784.⁴¹⁶ But they did not. Ultimately, these Georgia Loyalists were indicted as individuals and they would need to secure their reintegration as individuals. The way then went about doing this was to petition the new Patriot legislature to be returned to citizenship. Indeed, the vast majority of those proscribed in the 1782 laws did exactly this almost as soon as they came into effect. In all, fully 244 out of 343 (or approximately 71 per cent) indicted individuals submitted petitions, of which 193 (or approximately 79 per cent) were successful and readmitted as citizens of the state. These successful petitions are worth studying because at the end of a bloody and embittering civil conflict, the idea that the Revolution's 'losers' might be granted clemency and citizenship was so overwhelmingly unlikely. What these petitions reveal is nothing less than the fullest expression of the basis of the Loyalists' complete reintegration and the embryonic formation of an American idea of citizenship which was rooted in local communities.

To begin, though, a word on why a petition was the best way for an individual Loyalist to press their case. These petitions were simultaneously private and public records. They were private in the sense that they pertained to an individual's personal experiences. But in submitting their appeals, indicted Loyalists knew that they would be

⁴¹⁶ See Brannon, *From Revolution to Reunion*, p.88.

read out-loud in the Assembly, referred to special committees, and their merits openly debated.⁴¹⁷ They were, therefore, also very much public files: formal written accounts of the Loyalists' submission to Patriot authority. As with the appeals of Loyalist refugees pleading for compensation from the British government, these petitions for clemency were, in essence, personal fiction tales constructed with the readers' gaze firmly in mind. Their primary purpose was to move readers to empathise with their position and to affect the return of their full political rights based on the acceptance of their good character and the establishment of their fitness to receive the benefits those rights endowed them with.

To these ends, hopeful Tory reintegrators were first and foremost required to offer exculpatory arguments minimising their public actions as Loyalists during the war. They strove to present their outward allegiances as simply a face they put on because they had no realistic alternative (especially during the period of British occupation in the state). They thus forwarded practical explanations which rationalised their wartime adherence to the crown's cause. A few individuals, for example, stressed how they had been unfit to take a stand against British forces as a result of some kind of personal incapacity. Some declared that they had been too ill and were thus unable to put up any kind of resistance to the enemies of American liberty. Appealing on behalf of his brother John (whose land was confiscated and who was banished in 1782), William Fox stated that he had only outwardly sided with the British because he had "been long in a bad state of health" and was thus unable to take any action against them.⁴¹⁸ Others,

⁴¹⁷ Ibid., pp.63-6.

⁴¹⁸ William Fox to John Houston, April 16th, 1784, *Telamon-Cuyler Collection*, Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library (University of Georgia, Athens).

however, sought to excuse their behaviour by alluding to their limited ability to fully comprehend the issues at stake or understand traditionally elite dominated questions of political culture which were thrust upon ordinary actors in the midst of an all-consuming civil conflict. William McKinney, for instance, offered an apology for signing a British oath and stated that he had only done so because he was “following the example of those more informed in public affairs”.⁴¹⁹ Appealing for a portion of her deceased husband’s property, Mary McDaniel claimed that he had only joined the British forces at Savannah in 1781 “through surprise”, hinting at some form of temporary misjudgement or gullibility.⁴²⁰ Eleanor Mackey – wife of James, a cooper who worked in both South Carolina and Georgia prior to the Revolution – likewise emphasised her spouse’s cerebral shortcomings and sought his official pardon on the basis that he had essentially been tricked into siding with Britain. Whilst she glowingly characterised her husband as a “quiet, industrious, inoffensive man”, Eleanor also apologetically declared that “if he had incautiously made himself in any degree conspicuous for an adherence and attachment to the British government, it was because his simplicity and timidity made him a miserable dupe to the suggestions and persuasions of more artful and designing men.”⁴²¹

These types of exculpatory assertions functioned, in effect, as *mea culpas* infused with a tone of remorse and regret. They were, in essence, admissions of some kind of personal inadequacy – be it physical or intellectual – without which, it was

⁴¹⁹ William McKinney petition for John McDaniel, February 22nd, 1783, as quoted in *Journal of the House of Representatives 1783-4*, eds., Theodora J. Thompson and Rosa S. Lumpkin, University of South Carolina Press (Chapel Hill, 1977), p.177.

⁴²⁰ Mary McDaniel petition, January 1784, in *British Georgia: The Aftermath*, ed. Mary Warren, Athens (2015).

⁴²¹ Eleanor Mackey petition for James Mackey, January 29th, 1784, *Journal of the House of Representatives*, p.387.

implied, they would have been able to choose the side they wished to join. Their inclusion in these Loyalists' petitions for clemency signalled a general approach which was markedly different from that adopted by Loyalist refugees who petitioned the British government after the war for consideration in the form of compensation. Taking their lead from the board of agents in London, the Tory exiles appealing to the Loyalist Claims Commission did so asserting (whether implicitly or explicitly) that their outstanding service demanded special recognition. In other words, they held themselves out to be exceptional subjects within the imperial family: self-sacrificing and sturdy as well as morally and intellectually upright. They were, at all times, strident in the defence of their right to restitution and unabashed by their failings during the War of Independence (which, they maintained, were a consequence of Britain's failure to properly support them in any case). Loyalists petitioning for citizenship in Georgia were, by contrast, overtly contrite. They humbled themselves in their appeals by confessing to some kind of essential weakness which compelled them to take sides against the independence project. Adopting this stance was not without its risks. Those who did walked a fine line between abasing themselves just enough to inspire a degree of empathy amongst those who decided on their petitions and convincing Georgia's Whigs that they had turned away from their former fealties, whilst still presenting themselves as worthy of the mantle of Republican citizenship which imagined individuals capable of independent judgement with both the means and the will to defend their position at *all* times. But, whilst it might seem as if Loyalist petitioners would have been better served to portray themselves as not lacking in the virtues which would have made them good candidates for the rigours of Republican citizenship, some form of apologia (however veiled) was essential. Common justice demands that offenders admit their mistakes and

take steps to right them. These indicted Tories were doing exactly that. Their exculpations were, at their heart, admissions of fault which worked as shows of their civic regeneration and the reform of their political character. They were thus what William Reddy would refer to as past-tense emotional claims which indicated to readers that the individual seeking clemency had moved on from their former state of being and was ready to pass into another.⁴²² James Mackey (husband of the aforementioned Eleanor) sought to demonstrate this explicitly. Mackey professed that he had only signed a British oath during the Revolution because he was “totally ignorant” of its nature and content. He went on to say, though, that he had “always behaved himself as a good and peaceable citizen” and was “truly and unfeignedly sorry for the error he had committed.”⁴²³ By acknowledging their previous offences and personal shortcomings, and by requesting forgiveness for them, Mackey and other one-time Tories like him gestured toward the future. By acknowledging that they had been ignorant, they implied that they were no longer so (an ignorant person, after all, would not know they are ignorant). As such, they endeavoured to convince Georgia’s lawmakers that their past actions, however justified, were not important compared to how they intended to conduct themselves moving forward (an intent which was evidenced by the dint of submitting a petition denoting their will to fulfil the obligations of citizenship in the new republic).

More commonly, though, compunctious Georgia Tories tried to excuse their loyalty by arguing that they only sided with the crown’s cause in order protect their families or so they could perform some type of service to their fellow inhabitants. These

⁴²² Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling*, p.105.

⁴²³ James Mackey petition, January 23rd, 1783, *ibid.*, p.25.

petitioners also portrayed themselves as victims of circumstances which obliged them to publicly embrace the party it was most useful for them to support. Crucially, though, they packaged their capitulation to the British as a posture adopted in the defence of others. Amos Whitehead was one such petitioner. During the spring of 1782, Whitehead had been held by Patriot forces at Ebenezer as a prisoner of war. His confinement appears to have resulted from his refusal to march with the local Whig militia as well as some prior service he had rendered to British troops. Whitehead was later amerced at 12 per cent, but he petitioned the Assembly for his removal from the list in January 1783, stating that “he had no design of joining the enemy” until the lives of his family were threatened.⁴²⁴ Thomas Elfe likewise stated that he had only signed a British oath because his family had been threatened and the had otherwise always “behaved as a peaceable citizen.”⁴²⁵ Alexander Rose – a small merchant from Chatham county – admitted to having accepted the crown’s protection but contended that he had only did so in order to support his large distressed family, adding that he had never been “friendly to the British in either actions or converse” and always “assisted the Americans whenever he could”.⁴²⁶ James Gordon – a backcountry trader from Wilkes county – protested that his actions during the war were motivated by his desire to prevent further miseries from befalling members of his community who had suffered under the British occupation. Having been attainted for accepting a commission as a captain in the local royalist militia, Gordon asserted that he had only done so “with a view to act with lenity” and resigned in August 1781 (two months after Rebel forces assumed control in the

⁴²⁴ *Revolutionary Records*, vol.3, p.210, p.213, p.295, p.371.

⁴²⁵ Thomas Elfe petition, January 27th, 1783, *Journal of the House of Representatives*, pp.46-7.

⁴²⁶ Alexander Rose petition, January 22nd, 1783, *Ibid.*, p.15.

backcountry) because he could no longer be useful to his friends in that role.⁴²⁷ These appellants sought not merely to excuse their loyalism but to justify it as an expedient public front which allowed them to fulfil the manly duty of care they owed to their dependents and neighbours. They were not, so they implied, motivated by selfish impulses. Rather, they sought to portray themselves as having been impelled to act in a certain way as a result of their keen sense of responsibility to others. As with those who emphasised their personal frailties, though, these Tory petitioners for Patriot clemency walked a fine line. Even though they presented their public loyalism as being tinged with a particular brand of virtuous masculine compassion untainted by self-interest – the same brand of compassion, it is worth noting, they charged Patriots as lacking during the war – they risked throwing into question whether or not they could be trusted as citizens by underscoring the fact that their public face did not necessarily reflect their private inclinations and that their true allegiances could be hushed by the brutal calculus of utility (whether in relation to others or, possibly, themselves).

Regardless of the precise mode they adopted, all Loyalists seeking clemency and citizenship worked to shape the reality of their wartime actions in way that might be acceptable to Whiggish eyes. They did not, of course, deny culpability altogether. They were, after all, still admitting to the fact that they had outwardly sided with the crown in some way. But they worked hard to stress the widely understood practical perils many Georgians had found themselves in during the British occupation as the reasons for their actions. They thus avoided expressly any suggestion of there being any ideological slant to their loyalism whatsoever. Certainly, it would not have aided their cause to show

⁴²⁷ James Gordon petition, January 25th, 1783, *ibid.*, p.39.

themselves as still clinging in any way to Tory ideas at the same time they sought clemency and citizenship from the new Whig authorities. But by giving plausible excuses for their behaviour, these individuals demonstrated how their loyalism had not been compelled primarily by ideological arguments or concerns. It was always contingent on a particular set of localised circumstances and parochial experiences.

In the end, though, excuses for past behaviour – necessary as they were – were not always sufficient in and of themselves. Ultimately, indicted Loyalists in Georgia needed to show they were rooted in local networks which could vouch for them if they were to be successful. Winning and demonstrating that they had the trust and support of the community on the ground was essential in order to secure clemency and full legal reintegration. The community effectively acted as guarantors for the petitioner's good character and were the final arbiters of their fitness to ascend to the status of citizen. Gaining this endorsement was, no doubt, an arduous and humbling process involving the re-establishing of trusting relationships person to person. For obvious reasons, this hard task could only be achieved in any meaningful and sincere way face-to-face. As such, these exchanges do not directly enter the historical record. That such interactions took place, though, is evidenced by the dozens of ordinary Georgians who were moved to sign supporting statements for the return of individuals' property and citizenship rights. As with the legislators who devised and designed the 1782 laws, these ordinary inhabitants likely had reason enough to treat the Loyalists as a group with more than a degree of coarseness. But not only did they choose not to do this, they actively facilitated a broadly generous settlement in Georgia for convicted Tories. That they were able to harness this kind of support, I argue, stands as proof of the efforts made by indicted Tories in Georgia to propagate and root themselves in local conjunctive

assemblages which helped them to collapse their identities as Loyalists and expedited their formal re-admittance to citizenship.

Some individuals were able to secure the backing they required by dint of their filial connections. Their complete fall from grace was prevented by what Buskirk refers to as “the web of the family”.⁴²⁸ Levi Sheftall was one such Loyalist in Georgia. Levi’s brother Mordecai had sided with the revolutionaries early in the conflict and although Levi had served on a small number of parochial committees with his sibling, he tended to view independence with scepticism.⁴²⁹ Following Mordecai’s arrest after the siege of Savannah, Levi supported his entire family from Charleston and later Virginia. Having heard from his wife in Savannah of her dire financial situation as well as the tragic death of his son, however, Levi decided to return to Georgia and signed a British oath in return for his family’s protection.⁴³⁰ For this reason, Levi was confiscated and banished in 1782. Upon his return to Savannah, Mordecai immediately began a campaign to clear his brother’s name. Mordecai, who was well regarded as a committed and brave Patriot, submitted several letters to the legislature on his brother’s behalf with some supporting affidavits from sundry citizens attesting to Levi’s good character. Mordecai’s efforts were eventually successful, allowing Levi to return to the state as an amerced Tory in February 1785 with his full citizenship restored on February 10th, 1787. Revolutionary fealties had divided communities, friendships, and not least of all families too. Indeed, two of Georgia’s more notable Loyalist statesmen, James Habersham and Sir Patrick

⁴²⁸ van Buskirk, *Generous Enemies*, chapter 2.

⁴²⁹ John McKay Sheftall, “The Sheftalls of Savannah: Colonial Leaders and the Founding Fathers of Georgia Judaism” in *Jews of the South: Selected Essays from the Southern Jewish Historical Society*, Mercer University Press (Macon, 1984), p.73.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid*, p.75.

Houston, both had sons who sided with the Patriot cause.⁴³¹ In the trial between public and private affections, however, personal connections often took precedence. Cases like Levi Sheftall's, where a well thought of Patriot worked to win clemency for an attainted family member, were evidence of the existence of personal ties that no civil conflict or revolution could break. At the end of an intense and souring war, which had left individuals exhausted on both sides of the divide, falling back on connections which had been forged over a lifetime (none of which, for obvious reasons, were deeper than the bond of the family) made complete sense. Family members were ready-made vouchers for attainted individuals' good characters and acted as ideal bridges back to the communities they wished to join. They worked, in essence, as social chaperones, supporting former Loyalist family members as they went about the day-to-day business of re-familiarising themselves with their fellow inhabitants and beginning their lives afresh as former imperial subjects in the newly independent American republic.

More commonly, though, erstwhile Tories demonstrated that they enjoyed the support of their neighbours because they had performed some type of service to the community during the war. In the muddied waters of revolutionary allegiances in Georgia, concerns of outward political affiliation were occasionally ignored by certain Loyalists who reached across the wartime divide (presumably at great personal risk) to support their Whig neighbours in the stresses of the conflict. Despite differing "in his political opinion from his fellow citizens", Alexander Inglis' request for the return of his civil and property rights was supported by sundry inhabitants of Chatham county who submitted a petition on his behalf describing how he had "always assisted as much as

⁴³¹ See Frank Lambert, "Father Against Son and Son Against Father: The Habershams of Georgia and the American Revolution", *GHQ*, vol.84:1 (2000), pp.1-28.

was in his power those under British persecution” and “on many occasions been friendly and serviceable to several citizens of the state while still in the power of the enemy.”⁴³² Inglis’ case admittedly took a long time to settle. He was eventually restored to citizenship by special resolution of the Assembly on December 10th, 1790, but died a little under four months later on March 31st, 1791, following a duel.⁴³³ After his death, though, the state authorities reaffirmed their decision to recognise formally the good standing Inglis was held in by his fellow citizens by investing certain property in his children as if he “had not been named or included in the acts of confiscation.”⁴³⁴

Thomas Young was another Loyalist who was able to call on the support of Whig citizens whom he had aided during the war. In early 1783, a group of thirty-two rebel soldiers and citizens forwarded a petition to the Assembly requesting that Young’s name be stricken from the state’s list of confiscated and banished Tories. Amongst the signees were such notable Patriots as Lachlan McIntosh junior, Raymond Demere, Seth John Cuthbert, and John Wereat. In it, they expressed their gratitude for the kindness he had shown them whilst they were prisoners of war at Sunbury as well as for the “acts of friendship [they] received in their hours of adversity”. They additionally described how Young had helped affect the exchange of Raymond Demere and others during the battle of the Rice Boats on March 2nd, 1776, as well as how he had assisted those whose rice had been taken by the British navy gain compensation for their losses.⁴³⁵ On February 21st, 1785, Young (who simultaneously appealed to the Loyalist Claims Commission for

⁴³² Mary Inglis petition for Alexander Inglis, February 12th, 1783 and Sundry inhabitants of Chatham county petition in support of Alexander Inglis, February 20th, 1783, *Journal of the House of Representatives*, p.127 and p.164.

⁴³³ Reported in the *Georgia Gazette*, April 2nd, 1791.

⁴³⁴ *Revolutionary Records*, vol.1, pp.624-5.

⁴³⁵ See Robert S. Davis, *Georgia Citizens and Soldiers During the American Revolution*, Southern Historical Press (South Carolina, 1783), pp.81-2.

remuneration amounting to £19,590) was taken off the confiscation and banishment list. Instead, he was amerced at 12 per cent of his property and prevented from voting or holding office in Georgia for fourteen years. Even these restrictions, though, did not last and were completely overturned by the Assembly a little under two years later on February 10th, 1787, when he was granted full citizenship.⁴³⁶

Local vouchers for Thomas Gibbons were, perhaps, more vociferous than any other group of citizens supporting the clemency of an attainted Tory. Gibbons, a lawyer, was confiscated and banished in 1782, but later amerced at 12 per cent and prevented from practicing law for fourteen years. This punishment, though, was overturned officially by August 2nd, 1786, and his full citizenship was restored by February the following year. This was, it seems, in no small part due to affidavits of ordinary Georgians attached to his petition attesting to his “humanity to the distressed citizens of the state whilst in the power of Britain”.⁴³⁷ One such supporter was Thomas Mills, a Savannah merchant who had supported independence. In his accompanying memorial, Mills stated that he had known Gibbons since 1775 and testified that Gibbons had “held no civil commission under the British government, or military, nor did he do any act prejudicial to the American cause”. Crucially, Mills added that Gibbons had “acted friendly to all classes of men that were distressed under British authority for their attachment to the American cause” and that he was “the only attorney at the bar who would act for persons then arrested for their attachment to America”.⁴³⁸ Mills’ endorsement was followed by that of Paul Porcher, a wealthy planter of Black Swamp

⁴³⁶ Davis, *Georgia Citizens and Soldiers*, pp.81-2.

⁴³⁷ *Revolutionary Records*, vol.3, p.217

⁴³⁸ Thomas Mills affidavit sworn before Samuel Stirk, 9th August 1782, in *British Georgia: The Aftermath*, ed. Mary Warren, Athens (2015).

(South Carolina) who had also supported independence. In his memorial, Porcher described how he had been taken as a prisoner by the British in July 1781 and confined for four days in Savannah. Porcher noted in particular “the rigorous mode of persecution which was then adopted by the British government to all those who were friends to the American cause”.⁴³⁹ By the exertions of Gibbons, however, Porcher was released on parole and allowed to return to his plantation. Porcher went onto to claim how he had been “induced to offer Mr. Gibbons ... a very large sum of money as a fee” but that Gibbons had declined his offer and “willingly stepped forth as a friend”.⁴⁴⁰ These were the best kind of character witnesses imaginable. They reaffirmed the difficult circumstances *all* Georgians were operating in and portrayed Gibbons not as a grasping or opportunistic British lackey, but as a principled and upright individual who had even forgone the chance of material gain in service to his fellow inhabitants. This, simply, amounted to an authentication of Gibbons’ honour and the esteem in which he was held by others (both fundamental qualifications for citizenship). Honour, as Joanna Freeman has shown, was integral to the eighteenth century mindset. It formed not only part of an individual’s self-conception, but also how that person was viewed by others.⁴⁴¹ Most Loyalists had thrown their honourable status into question in the eyes of their Patriot neighbours by choosing the losing side. Testimonies like Mills’ and Porcher’s (as well as those forwarded by sundry citizens on behalf of Inglis and Young) helped reassure Patriot authorities of the petitioner’s continuous good standing in the eyes of the wider community and the trust that community had in their suitability for citizenship.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴¹ Joanna Freeman, “Duelling in Politics: Reinterpreting the Burr-Hamilton Duel”, *WMQ*, vol.53:2 (1996), pp.295-6

There was, of course, always a chance of complications. A petitioner's case could be equally endangered by a negative character witness. Consider the case of Dr. Donald McLeod, a Savannah physician who was dispossessed and banished in 1782. By the end of July 1782, McLeod's case reached a crescendo. McLeod's appeal to the assembly to be readmitted to citizenship was met with counter petitions by sundry inhabitants of Chatham county arguing that he should not be granted absolution. They charged McLeod with a number of crimes against toward Americans whilst on board prison ships in the Savannah river. Specifically, they claimed he had "mixed fine, broken, or pulverised glass in a parcel of medicines ... for the use of said persons."⁴⁴² But, as McLeod's case makes plain, even such bad testimonies could be overcome (in part if not in full) if a corresponding set of vouchers came forward affirming the appellant's essential moral uprightness. Although no fewer than four prominent Patriots (including Mordecai Sheftall) gave a negative reference for McLeod, nine others presented memorials "setting forth Dr. McLeod's humanity and attention to the sick, wounded, and distressed American prisoners and families" and testifying to "his general good character in the town of Savannah".⁴⁴³ Edward Davis, a member of the Patriot House of Assembly, set forth in an affidavit that "during his confinement on board one of the prison ships, he never heard anything of the charges against Dr. McLeod".⁴⁴⁴ James White, a soldier in the Continental line, voiced his gratitude for "the Doctor's care of, attention, and humanity to himself and another soldier when prisoners, having not only recovered them from dangerous and grievous wounds, but also clothed them from their

⁴⁴² *Revolutionary Records*, vol.3, p.400.

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.401

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

nakedness at his own expense”.⁴⁴⁵ Weighing up the arguments, the Assembly committee decided in favour of McLeod and declared him “worthy to be admitted a citizen of this state”.⁴⁴⁶

There was not a single recorded case of an attainted Loyalist in Georgia who was able to call on the support of their fellow inhabitants in this way whose appeal for clemency was not finally accepted by the state authorities. Cases did at times take a while to decide and certain individuals (such as Alexander Inglis) were left in a kind of civil purgatory for a number of years whilst waiting for a decision to be reached. With the aid of their neighbours who petitioned on their behalf, though, they were finally readmitted as citizens of the state with their full civil and property rights restored. They thus collapsed their identities as Loyalists in the same place that they were incubated and shaped: at the local, quotidian level. By affixing themselves to local networks – by looking to them in order to re-secure a stable and legal sense belonging and place – these hopeful reintegrators, I argue, evinced a quintessentially provincial orientation which overrode any previously held political allegiance. Throughout the revolutionary epoch, this orientation was made palpable by Georgia Loyalists in several ways, at different times, and in various places. It was brought to light by monarchalist displays and discourses during the war which imaginatively evoked an idealised provincial age in which they were confident. This space in time (embodied by the king) formed part of their founding group mythology and pinned the construction of their identities as Loyalists at war firmly to region. It was also laid bare in the memorials and schedules of loss forwarded by Loyalist refugees to the British government as part of their quest for

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.402

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.402-3

compensation. In these appeals, Loyalist exiles from Georgia admitted to sensations of dislocation in their new environs and reaffirmed the essentiality of their Georgian taskscapes to their sense of self and place in exile. For those that stayed in Georgia following the British evacuation though – after a prolonged and at times bewildering contest there when the pull of normality was strong – this orientation drove them to local, conjunctive assemblages which had been useful to them prior to and during the Revolution. In short, after the upheaval of the war, they looked to the immediate and the local for fixity and the sense of surety that came with it, doing what was necessary (and perhaps natural) to arrive at a situation where they could re-settle into the workaday, parochial rhythms which were disrupted by the Revolution.

Crucially, the importance of local vouchers to the success of an attainted person's appeal shows how access to the benefits of citizenship in Georgia after the war was an active process requiring continuous effort to nourish and maintain. It was dependent on the norms of face-to-face, interpersonal exchanges and founded on the principles of choice, consent, trust, and local autonomy. By choosing to re-enter American society, convicted Tories signalled their approval of its pre-existing expectations as well as their learned subjection to the will of the majority and subsequent introjection of the standards of the wider community. Members of the community, in turn, consented to the Loyalists' reabsorption on the basis that they had been able to earn their trust – by dint of personal connections, time spent in those communities, or some type of service given – and could be relied upon to uphold and promote the values and norms of the collective. As a result, citizenship in Georgia after the Revolution came to be bounded by a series of mutually reinforcing obligations between persons which coagulated to encompass something like what Gillian Brown

refers to as the Lockean legacy at the heart of Early American society and culture.⁴⁴⁷ It was defined, ultimately, by individuals' relationships and responsibilities to each other which were freely entered into and fastened over time.⁴⁴⁸

In the final analysis, although the reintegration of indicted Tories in Georgia was confirmed officially by the state authorities, it was nursed and cemented in the everyday realm by ordinary interactions – in taverns, on street corners, in businesses, and in homes – between individuals who intended to join a community and the members of that community who consented to adopt them. The supporting memorials of established citizens endorsing an attainted Loyalist's case for clemency demonstrated how the reintegration of the Revolution's disaffected in Georgia was largely a matter of the state authorities recognising *de jure* what had already happened *de facto*. This was citizenship built from the ground-up, beginning with the approval of ordinary inhabitants and culminating with legislators acknowledging this status law. This fact was most clearly expressed in the case of Simon Munro's petition. A several times attainted Loyalist – who at the same time as appealing to the Assembly for citizenship was also petitioning the British government for restitution – eventually had his confiscation and banishment repealed by special act on February 13th, 1786. The reason the Assembly gave for the annulment of his sanction was that they were “ever willing to comply with

⁴⁴⁷ Gillian Brown, *The Consent of the Governed: The Lockean Legacy in Early American Culture*, Harvard University Press (Boston, 2001), p.9. See also Gustafson, “Morality and Citizenship in the Early Republic”, *American Literary Review*, vol.15:1 (2003), pp.172-87. See also John Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693).

⁴⁴⁸ This ethos was echoed on the national stage throughout the 1780s and was, in many respects, eventually codified in Congress' first Federal Nationalisation Law (1790). By mandating that applicants be obliged to reside in the United States for a minimum of two years before they could be naturalised as citizens (at least one of which had to be in the state they wished to permanently reside in) national lawmakers made plain their assumption that the exercise of civil rights in the New Republic required individuals be trusted by the communities they desired to settle in and were *au courant* with their expectations. See Kettner, *The Development of American Citizenship*, pp.214-36.

the wishes of their constituents".⁴⁴⁹ Such sentiments were echoed by the Assembly when they pronounced on the case of Thomas Young. Declaring his removal from the confiscation and banishment list in exchange for amercement at 8 per cent of his property, lawmakers acknowledged that they had reduced Young's sanction "in consideration of the petition of a number of the Whig citizens of Liberty county".⁴⁵⁰ Indeed, the Assembly more often than not cited their reason for overturning the sanctions placed on an attainted Tory was their desire to reflect the wishes of the 'respectable citizens' who had made their convictions known through the presentation of affidavits. As cases like Munro's and Young's make clear, the formal reintegration of the King's once loyal subjects in Georgia was often a matter of the authorities simply applying a rubber-stamp to decisions which had already taken place in the locality. This was not merely consistent with revolutionary principles and practices, but was, in many ways, their ultimate fulfilment. The Revolution, as Kenneth Owen points out, was not a movement in favour of a particular form of government but in favour of popular sovereignty and the idea that political authority was derived from the consent of the people.⁴⁵¹ Independence did not simply mean separation from Britain, but the ability of individuals and communities to self-regulate. The process of Loyalist reintegration in Georgia, I argue, represented the fullest expression of these ideals. It was defined by communities organising in favour of a desired end which they then expected the authorities to implement on the basis they were representative of the constituents they served. This signified a clear-cut rejection of the idea that allegiance and citizenship were

⁴⁴⁹ Robert and George Watkins, *1799 Watkins Digest of Statutes*, R. Atkin (Savannah, 1800), p.619.

⁴⁵⁰ *Journal of the Georgia House of Assembly* (July 25th, 1783), ed. Allen D. Candler, The Franklin Turner Company (Atlanta, 1908), p.373.

⁴⁵¹ Kenneth Owen, *Political Community in Revolutionary Pennsylvania 1774-1800*, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2018), p.52.

things which could be compelled from the top-down. This was, distilled, the basis of what James Kettner viewed as a truly volitional form of citizenship and was, I contend, the logical conclusion of the Revolution's foundational *raison d'être*: specifically, that politics drew their legitimacy not from authority but from the primacy of popular power at the heart of which were the twin pillars of individual liberty and communal consent.⁴⁵²

The environment in Georgia after the war presented a plethora of challenges to hopeful Loyalist reintegrators. Georgia's wartime experience had left the landscape and people there scarred and wearied. There was every reason for erstwhile Tories to suspect they would be met with uniform retribution for the crime of having fought against the society they were now seeking to become a part of. But rather than prompting a harsh policy, Georgia's particular experience of the revolutionary conflict made reconciliation not only desirable, but a practical necessity also. Georgia's late arrival in the conflict, the depravity witnessed by members of both sides when the war did come, the constant threat of raiding parties to persons and property, and the British reconquest in the winter of 1778 followed by the Whig resurgence in the summer of 1781, combined to sufficiently cloud individuals' revolutionary allegiances and render the wholesale punishment of the Loyalists impossible. As a result, the state's Whig authorities set a legislative path which attempted to strike a balance between limited forms of revolutionary justice and reconciliation. They saved what fire they had primarily for members of the Loyalist elite. The banishment of these men was motivated chiefly by practical rather than ideological impulses. Given the difficulty in defining exactly what

⁴⁵² See Kettner, "The Development of American Citizenship in the Revolutionary Era", pp.208-42.

constituted treasonous behaviour in a state where the law and government had broken nearly beyond existence down during the war, these individuals represented the most obvious targets for lawmakers to pursue. Because they more often than not were officials in the occupational government, or accepted a commission in the British army, they were most clearly guilty. Consequently, they served as useful totems for symbolic punishment which enabled lawmakers to demonstrate to their supporters that they were not completely turning a blind eye to the supposed crimes of the Tories without resorting to treating the category of loyalism as a crime in and of itself. In the summer of 1782, with the spectre of a British reinvasion still looming large, they also represented a unique threat as potential leaders of that campaign which needed to be countered.

For the republican project to take hold and work in Georgia, though, the state needed people. Already sparsely inhabited prior to the War of Independence, the mortal toll of the fighting coupled with the exodus of fearful Tories after the peace combined to further deplete the state's population. Just a few months after the Confiscation and Banishment Act was passed, therefore, legislators adopted a new policy which was designed with the express intention of opening up the prospect of a return to citizenship for convicted Loyalists. The system of amercement which was established late in the summer of 1782 created a route for individuals who sought to remain in the state to reclaim officially their place in Georgian society with temporary conditions attached. Whether motivated by the prospect of economic gain, or a genuine concern to correct the perceived injustices of the confiscation and banishment laws, or a sense that punitive legislation of any kind delayed the state's progress toward peace and prosperity, the amercement acts laid out an official framework for the reintegration of

attainted Tories which required they actively demonstrate their commitment to the communities they wished to resettle into.

In the end, though, the real work of reintegration was done by the Loyalists themselves. Amercement and ultimate clemency required the active participation of the indicted persons. Unlike in South Carolina, for instance, there was no mass clemency bill passed by the authorities in Georgia. To be readmitted as a citizen of the state in Georgia, individuals needed to set about securing their reabsorption into society for themselves. To these ends, one-time Tories who petitioned the Assembly for citizenship first sought to explain away their wartime loyalism and turn it into something that was unthreatening to Whiggish eyes. They thus packaged their former allegiances as a transitory guise pragmatically embraced in order to navigate the practical perils accompanying the hostilities which touched the lives of all Georgians at some point during conflict. Perhaps more importantly, though, Georgia's attainted Loyalists worked to secure their re-admittance to the rights and protections of citizenship by appealing directly to the communities they wished to resettle into. In other words, they sought to dissolve their identities as Loyalists in the same realm they in which they had been cultured: the local realm. Although not recognised directly in the historical record, that former Tories worked to win the approval of their fellow inhabitants – which doubtlessly comprised some type of face-to-face recantation – was evidenced by the supporting memorials which established citizens forwarded as part of their case for clemency. These memorials made the principles of choice, consent, trust, and local autonomy central to the Loyalists' naturalisation and, by extension, broadly defined citizenship in Georgia after the war. By recognising formally that individuals had met the bar for citizenship set by their neighbours, lawmakers simply gave a green light to decisions

which had already taken place on the ground. The reintegration of Loyalists in Georgia thus served to reinforce the radical revolutionary idea that power resided with communities and that institutions alone could not govern polities. In so doing, the reintegration of the Loyalists in Georgia helped fill the empty space identified by John Murrin between the 'roof' of the early republic (meaning the constitutions) and the floor. It helped to pour meaning into popular conceptions of citizenship in the newly republican state and made it elastic enough to accommodate people from different backgrounds so long as they could be counted upon to uphold and promote the interests of the collective: an embryo of a distinct civic culture and understanding of what it was to be an American in Georgia after the Revolution.⁴⁵³

⁴⁵³ See John M. Murrin, "A Roof Without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity", in *Beyond Confederation: Origins of the American Constitution and American National Identity*, ed. Richard Beeman, University of North Carolina Press (Chapel Hill, 1987), pp.333-48.

Conclusion

In late 1763, Dr. Andrew Johnston moved from his home in Scotland and settled in Georgia. He arrived, along with countless other new emigres, to find a colony that was booming after the signing of the Treaty of Augusta. Land which was forcibly ceded from the Creek nation opened-up miles of plots along the province's fertile coastal plain. The population – whilst still small and thinly scattered by comparison with both of the Carolinas – was growing as a result of inward migration. The number of trades and consumers were subsequently snowballing and the quantity and value of exports (most notably rice, indigo, and deerskins) was increasing seemingly by the day.⁴⁵⁴ After a slow start during the first two decades of its colonial life – during which time the province was largely dependent on largesse from the British parliament – Georgia was transformed under royal rule from a somewhat impoverished backwater to a major port province in the Atlantic trading network.⁴⁵⁵ The imperial connection had, it seemed, worked broadly well for Georgia. Even the imposition of centralising trade legislation by the British parliament – most notably the Sugar Act passed April 5th, 1764 – had by and large not affected the colony's professionals, merchants, artisans, and planters (or, at least, it did not affect them to the same extent as their compatriots in the northern and middle colonies).⁴⁵⁶ Amid these favourable conditions, Johnston had been able to establish himself “in a very lucrative practice of physician surgeon and apothecary at

⁴⁵⁴ Pressley, *On the Rim of the Caribbean*, p.155, p.169; Morgan, “The Organisation of the Colonial Rice Trade”, pp.433-52; McCusker and Menard, *The Economy of British America 1607-1789*, pp.18-34; Hall, *Land and Allegiance*, introduction.

⁴⁵⁵ See Taylor, “Colonising Georgia 1732-1752: A Statistical Note”, pp.119-27

⁴⁵⁶ Sabine, *The American Loyalists*, pp.49-51.

Augusta”.⁴⁵⁷ Given his prospects (which seemed to be flourishing with the colony’s) it was perhaps to be expected that he would possess some kind of Tory or pro-British sympathies. Georgia’s persistent upward trajectory under royal rule after mid-century had created for him and others a fertile environment to establish roots in and grow. He was, it seems, a contented colonial American.

When the chance came, Johnston took up the fight with the royal forces. Having been attainted by the rebel legislature in 1776 as one of forty-three individuals who were designated to be “dangerous to American liberty”, Johnston managed to remain in the state to witness its recapture by British forces under General Sir Archibald Campbell during the winter of 1778-9. From that point on, Johnston took an active part in the crown’s cause. In his various appeals for compensation to the Loyalist Claims Commission after the war – submitted through his attorney in London, James Jackson – Johnston noted down his many invaluable services to British forces during the conflict.⁴⁵⁸ Serving under Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Brown (the “King’s Ranger”) at Augusta during the summer of 1781, Johnston described how he had attended Lieutenant Alexander McRae of the British legion. He had, he claimed, cured him of a gunshot wound “with a fracture of the shoulder and the bone much shattered” which would have otherwise proved fatal. He also described how he had “attended as physician and surgeon Lieutenant-Colonel [Isaac] Allen’s New Jersey Volunteers, and also the Royal Militia doing duty at Augusta”, supplying them “with all the medicines and necessaries” to effect their recovery.⁴⁵⁹ Johnston went on to state how upon the surrender of the

⁴⁵⁷ James Jackson forwarding the memorial of Dr. Andrew Johnston, February 3rd, 1789, *American Loyalist Claims Commission Records*, The National Archives (Kew), Audit Office papers AO 13/6, p.19.

⁴⁵⁸ Johnston’s appeal was for the loss of land, furniture, and medical supplies to the value of approximately £600.

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

town “after a brave defense for upward of eleven weeks” he had been “taken prisoner with the rest of the garrison”. Whilst incarcerated, his house was also set afire by Whig fighters “with all his stock in trade, medicines, household goods, and furniture ... immediately consumed.”⁴⁶⁰ Johnston’s petition was supported by Brown, who declared that he had “acquitted himself on all occasions as a faithful and loyal subject” and given “readily and cheerfully his assistance to all the sick and wounded of Colonel Archibald Campbell’s army at Augusta, and on two subsequent occasions ... at a very considerable expense to himself and to the great prejudice of his fortune.”⁴⁶¹

When defeat became inevitable (a little more than a year after he took part in the “brave defense” of Augusta) Johnston, like his fellow friends of government, was left with a decision to make. Rather than flee to some other undetermined part of the king’s dominion, as many Loyalists did, Johnston stayed in Georgia after the British evacuation of Savannah on July 11th, 1782. In a supporting memorial for Johnston’s appeal to the British authorities, former royal governor Sir James Wright made clear his belief that Johnston’s decision to remain in the New Republic (which it appeared was hampering his suit for restitution) “must have proceeded from necessity, not choice.”⁴⁶² There was, it seems, no other way to explain why an individual he had “always considered ... as a loyal subject” chose to stay in America after the peace rather than run and continue to live under the protection of the British government elsewhere. Johnston’s flight, Wright rationalised, must have been forcibly impeded in some way.⁴⁶³ Yet, Johnston’s decision

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁶¹ Certificate from Thomas Brown, late Lieutenant-Colonel of the King’s Rangers and Superintendent of Indian Affairs, in support of the petition of Dr. Andrew Johnston, December 21st, 1787, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 12/71, pp.159-60.

⁴⁶² Certificate from Sir James Wright, late Governor of the Province of Georgia, in support of the petition of Dr. Andrew Johnston, March 22nd, 1784, *ibid.*, p.159.

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

to remain in Georgia was, it appears, very much his choice. For at the same time as he was appealing for restitution from the British state as a subject of the Empire – his first submission to officials in London was dated March 20th, 1784 – Johnston was also petitioning the Georgia Commons House of Assembly to be readmitted as a citizen of the state. Having been named in the Confiscation and Banishment Act passed on May 4th, 1782, Johnston set about attempting to overturn his punishment and reintegrate into American society from as early as July that year. Given the multiple indictments against his name for having resisted the independence project, his chances of success appeared ostensibly thin. His case, though, was supported by “sundry ladies of Augusta” who forwarded a memorial on his behalf in recognition of the care he had given to American soldiers and refugees taken hostage by British forces at Augusta.⁴⁶⁴ Johnston was eventually successful and on February 21st, 1785, he was granted his citizenship after being amerced at just 1 per cent of his property.⁴⁶⁵

For too long, the stories of friends of government like Dr. Johnston were absent from the histories of the Revolution. These are complicated stories of resilient individuals who found themselves caught in the middle of the fracturing of the British Empire as the local and the imperial were, in many ways, pitted against each other. Johnston could not have been farther away from the nationalistic, Paineite caricature of the Loyalist subject which was echoed by post-revolutionary writers such as Mary Otis Warren and David Ramsay.⁴⁶⁶ He was not in any way an ‘elite’ Tory. He was neither

⁴⁶⁴ *Journal of the House of Assembly* (July 25th, 1783), p.367; Dr. Andrew Johnston memorial, March 20th, 1784, *Commission Records*, NA, AO 12/71, p.157.

⁴⁶⁵ *Revolutionary Records*, vol. 1, p.613.

⁴⁶⁶ See George A. Billias, “The First Un-Americans”, *Perspectives on Early American History*, pp.282-324; Cheng, “American Historical Writers and the Loyalists 1788-1856”, pp.491-519.

servile nor slavish. He evidently was not a coward. And (if only to the wounded on both sides he attended to who might have otherwise died) he was anything but marginal. Given that after the peace he sought citizenship in the New Republic as well as compensation from the British government – he was, as it were, facing both ways in search of the best possible settlement for himself – perhaps he did, at certain times, act out of self-interest. But having come through a bloody and unforgiving war – in which, according to the testimonies of the “King’s Ranger” Brown as well as the ladies of Augusta, he had risked his fortune, his liberty, and likely his life attending to combatants on both sides of the Revolutionary divide – the charge of self-interest, it seems to me, is no charge at all. Crucially, he does not appear to have been a complacent or inevitable Anglophile either. Had this been the case, it stands to reason that he would have rejected the republican project outright after the peace and left Georgia in order to continue to live under British rule elsewhere (as Wright implied in his testimonial). But he did not. He stayed in Georgia – in his familiar taskscape – seeking to collapse his previous affiliation and be absorbed into the New Republic as a citizen with the aid of his fellow inhabitants. His journey from loyal subject of the British Empire to trusted citizen of the United States makes plain the fact that the architecture of an individual’s identity as a Loyalist was the product of myriad human choices made in response to particular challenges – imaginative as well as physical – that they were confronted with during and after the Revolution. These challenges involved the need to ensure their physical safety and material well-being as well as to achieve some semblance of fixity amidst the most uncomfortable and overwhelming change imaginable. In the process of facing these challenges – which were comprised of a series of social deaths and rebirths as individuals grappled with the dilemma of whether to dampen, intensify, or reject their

attachment to the British Empire altogether – they contended with a range of troubling existential questions regarding their sense of self, place, and belonging as they found themselves caught in the middle of the imperial schism as slightly awkward actors who at times appeared strangely close but irritatingly distant from both their American and British counterparts. It has been the purpose of this thesis to unpack the stories of actors like Johnston and consider the ways individuals in Georgia who pledged their allegiance to Britain during the War of Independence responded to the various challenges they were faced with. In so doing, I have sought to examine the basis of their identities, sense of belonging, and self-understanding as they were articulated by them (implicitly and explicitly) at various points between 1779 and 1790.

Across this thesis, I have argued for the need for a study of the Loyalists which foregrounds the importance of locale. This line has been driven chiefly by the presupposition that where experiences and circumstances differed, the architecture of individuals' identities, allegiances, and sense of belonging would differ too. This assumption is informed by the critical commentaries of Tim Edensor, John Hutchinson, and Michael Billig who perceive individuals' identities broadly as creative personalities which are shaped by unspectacular but familiar ways of doing things in particular places at particular times.⁴⁶⁷ My intention in calling for this approach has not been to undermine or reject the work of historians who, especially over the last forty or so years, have steadily moved the scholarly pin on the Loyalists. Rather, it has been to build on their labours and add much needed layers to the centre they established. By unpacking the ways friends of government from distinct regions navigated the revolutionary

⁴⁶⁷ Edensor, *National Identity*; John Hutchinson, *Modern Nationalism*, Harper Collins (London, 1994); Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, Sage (London, 1995).

epoch's choppy waters – attending to the ways they spoke to typologies of identity and belonging – nuances in the Loyalists' group character may be pinpointed and older orthodoxies refocussed. In so doing, I argue that it becomes possible to recognise and evaluate the ways individuals scaled their identities as Loyalists in line with local rhythms. Accounting for these locally scaled models, I argue, is necessary in order to fully appreciate the American Loyalists' broad tessellation.

The study of the Georgia Loyalists is essential to this task. Frankly, it could not be fulfilled in any meaningful way without foregrounding their experiences and perceptions. Georgia's distinctive locale and particular history make it an indispensable test arena for an analysis of Loyalist identity and its links to region. Georgia stands out for its late 'founding' as a colony; for its broadly positive experience under royal government after mid-century; and for its large Tory population prior to the War of Independence comparative to the other provinces. It is also distinguished for being the focal point of Britain's campaign to re-subdue the continent from the bottom-up after the summer of 1778 and the only part of America where royal rule was re-established formally during the Revolution. As such, Tories there were accorded the space, time, and institutional support they required to give action and voice to their identities as Loyalists at war. Inevitably, therefore, how these individuals reacted to the ebb and flow of the war and its aftermath – how they articulated and gave body to their particular sense of self and belonging – pushes the historiographical envelope regarding the study of the Loyalists and loyalism in America.

Throughout this thesis, I have argued that as they faced their various moments of crisis and opportunity, Georgia Loyalists (sometime implicitly and sometime explicitly)

affirmed an embedded attachment to their distinctive colonial locale. This attachment, I contend, evinced a quintessentially provincialised personal core around which their embodied, reflexive sense of self and belonging was orientated. This basic provinciality was multi-layered and communicated in several ways, with changing circumstances modulating its particular thrust. During the war, it simmered within their monarchalist displays and discourses which overlaid earlier colonial practices and evoked an idealised age under royal rule. This age was part of a story they told themselves over and over again in the midst of the revolutionary struggle. This story was the story of their particular regional experience which functioned as the basis for their foundational group mythology as well as a prism through which they could comprehend events and locate themselves in the middle of a brutalising conflict. Rather than bridging any kind of gap with their fellow subjects elsewhere across the British Empire (especially in the metropole), by symbolically elevating the figure of the king in the way they did, the Georgia Loyalists pinned their identities against their regional experience. They subsequently reflexively reinforced their group distinctiveness and distance from other members of the imperial family. For those who fled the colony after the evacuation of Savannah, a sense of provincial distinctiveness permeated their appeals to the British government for compensation for their losses and services during the war. Having been tantalised with the prospect of the revivification of royal rule in their region only a few years beforehand, these individuals faced the unenviable task of having to start their lives over again as former colonial Americans in unfamiliar settings. In their appeals, Loyalist petitioners from Georgia gave voice to sensations of disorientation and unrootedness in these new environs and, through a set of emotionally freighted assets which connoted familiarity and prosperousness, testified to the essentiality of their

colonial experiences and American taskscapes to their habituated sense of self and place in exile. And for hopeful Tory reintegrators who remained in Georgia after the peace, it urged their recourse to familiar local networks after a protracted and bewildering civil conflict. By setting out to win the endorsement of their communities – a process dependent on the norms of face-to-face interpersonal exchanges and workaday interactions – erstwhile Tories toiled to dissolve their Loyalist identities in the same place they were nurtured and given shape: in the local realm. By implication, they made it clear that their sense of belonging was pinned to place and this (in the remainers' case at least) ultimately overrode any previously outward affiliation. In the process, crucially, Tory reintegrators helped to foster an understanding of citizenship in Georgia that was volitional, democratic, and localised: an office which was built from the ground-up, requiring the declared will of an indicted Loyalist who wished to stay in the state as well as the consent of the communities which would take them in.

By tying loyalism in Georgia to locale, I have sought to emphasise its basic parochialism as a quotidian identity which was reflexively and unreflexively realised from a variety of locally sourced thought materials. These thought materials encompassed local histories, experiences, networks, sights, and sounds which individuals interacted with and related to in a dynamic process of meaning-making and self-location necessitated by the Revolution and the loss of the personal label 'colonial American'. The identity of the Georgia Loyalists was, in other words, a dynamic modality – a site of dialogue and creativity, of exchange and displacement – which was shaped by the particular context it was produced in. It was not a natural, or even, or static ideological disposition. It was, rather, a localised posture which could be hardened, dampened, or dissolved altogether according to circumstance. I see my conclusions as

a critically meaningful place from which to begin to re-examine the nature of imperial attachments in the revolutionary epoch. They shun the stereotypical model which assumes a top-down and hegemonic orientation and move beyond issues of pure politics or governance to look at reciprocities and peculiarities of habit, culture, sentiment, and outlook. They are, in essence, a call to reconsider the basis upon which the analysis of transatlantic affiliations has traditionally operated – that is to say with a predominant focus on high cultures at the expense of the vernacular, existential elements which make up the majority of individuals' experiences and form the basis of their quotidian mores – and to reframe the discussion with a concern for local inflections as the starting point for any study. Careful scrutiny of local imperatives evinces the weight of contingency, unforeseen consequences, and variation to the tenor and trajectory of imperial identities. This is, I argue, a compelling point of departure not least because, amongst other things, it helps to clean-up seemingly irreconcilable contradictions and embedded tensions inherent in the Loyalist condition (including, ultimately, the decision of some who remained in America after the peace to dissolve their loyalism). It also helps to explain why individuals who had fought to keep imperial sovereignty in one setting rubbed against it so awkwardly in others, and functions as a reason (one of many) for the failure of authorities in London to mobilise sentiment in their favour during the War of Independence as they expected they could. Perhaps most strikingly, though, it predicts the continued importance of the sizable Loyalist populations dispersed across the Atlantic world – whether as successful assimilators and civil renovators or as the wideners (if not the introducers) of communal splits – to the development of the societies they settled into, their legacy still felt and contested and debated today.

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