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Title:

The Psychology of Euroscepticism and Brexit Preferences: The Role of Social Attitudes and Implications for National Identification

Abstract:

Discussions about supporting vs. rejecting European supranational governance (i.e., Euroscepticism) have been dominating national conversations for several years in Europe. Although political scientists have written extensively about Euroscepticism, surprisingly little is known about citizens' attitudes towards the general political principles of supranational governance (i.e., supranationalism) that underpin institutions such as the European Union (EU). Addressing this gap, this thesis focusses on the psychology of supranationalism and the psychological implications of events such as Brexit. Specifically, this thesis investigated the psychological factors that relate to opposition to supranational governance, and how it contributes to Euroscepticism and Brexit preferences. Furthermore, this thesis investigated how the unprecedented rejection of European supranational governance (i.e., Brexit) related to British voters' national identities. Chapter 2 reports two cross-sectional studies conducted in the UK that introduced a novel measure of supranationalism and established its psychometric properties and ideological correlates (right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation). Furthermore, supranationalism significantly predicted voters' EU attitudes and Brexit preferences, while controlling for established factors such as national identification and immigration concerns. A third study, reported in chapter 3, replicated these results with samples from the UK, Germany, and Belgium, and showed that supranationalism is relevant to Euroscepticism in- and outside of the UK. Chapter 4 turns attention to the implications of Euroscepticism in the UK and investigated the impact of two anti-EU elections on voters' national identities in three longitudinal studies. Specifically, Studies 4 and 5 showed that electoral losers dis-identified and became more estranged from their country after Brexit in 2016. Study 6 replicated these findings during the Brexit-election in 2019, and further showed that the looming threat of Brexit and voters' inability to influence the political course, were key factors explaining dis-identification and estrangement effects which were stronger among political liberals across all three studies. Overall, this thesis illustrates how Euroscepticism draws on right-wing social attitudes and represents a particular challenge to people on the political left.

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November, 2020

School of Psychology

**The Psychology of Euroscepticism and Brexit Preferences: The Role of Social Attitudes  
and Implications for National Identification**

Linus Peitz

School of Psychology, University of Kent

Word count: 30,869

November, 2020

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Kent for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy in Psychology. Funded by the School of Psychology, University of Kent.

**Declaration**

The research reported in this thesis is my own work, except for where indicated. Data for Study 1 was collected and submitted as part of my MSc thesis in Political Psychology at the University of Kent.

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### Abstract

Discussions about supporting vs. rejecting European supranational governance (i.e., Euroscepticism) have been dominating national conversations for several years in Europe. Although political scientists have written extensively about Euroscepticism, surprisingly little is known about citizens' attitudes towards the general political principles of supranational governance (i.e., supranationalism) that underpin institutions such as the European Union (EU). Addressing this gap, this thesis focusses on the *psychology* of supranationalism and the psychological implications of events such as Brexit. Specifically, this thesis investigated the psychological factors that relate to opposition to supranational governance, and how it contributes to Euroscepticism and Brexit preferences. Furthermore, this thesis investigated how the unprecedented rejection of European supranational governance (i.e., Brexit) related to British voters' national identities. Chapter 2 reports two cross-sectional studies conducted in the UK that introduced a novel measure of supranationalism and established its psychometric properties and ideological correlates (right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation). Furthermore, supranationalism significantly predicted voters' EU attitudes and Brexit preferences, while controlling for established factors such as national identification and immigration concerns. A third study, reported in chapter 3, replicated these results with samples from the UK, Germany, and Belgium, and showed that supranationalism is relevant to Euroscepticism in- and outside of the UK. Chapter 4 turns attention to the implications of Euroscepticism in the UK and investigated the impact of two anti-EU elections on voters' national identities in three longitudinal studies. Specifically, Studies 4 and 5 showed that electoral losers dis-identified and became more estranged from their country after Brexit in 2016. Study 6 replicated these findings during the Brexit-election in 2019, and further showed that the looming threat of Brexit and voters' inability to influence the political course, were

key factors explaining dis-identification and estrangement effects which were stronger among political liberals across all three studies. Overall, this thesis illustrates how Euroscepticism draws on right-wing social attitudes and represents a particular challenge to people on the political left.

## **Chapter 1: The Political Psychology of Supranationalism**

Post World War II (WWII), a number of international political institutions started to emerge aiming to provide stability to war-torn societies and to ensure that countries can rely on basic rules when interacting on the global stage (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). Since then, supranational governance, a form of governance above the nation state, and its ability to co-exist along sovereign nation states have primarily been analysed through the lens of international relations and political theory (for examples see Calhoun, 2007; Eriksen & Fossum, 2000). The European Union (EU), which can be considered as the most advanced supranational institution of its kind to date, has been the focus of research in the quest to understand citizens' perception of supranational government. As opposition to the EU (namely Euroscepticism) became a serious obstacle to further integrative steps in the 1990s, economic, political and sociological approaches have provided a number of theories why citizens began to turn their backs on European supranational governance. It has been suggested that people consider their personal (e.g., economic) costs under supranational governance (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993), that they simply repeat the opinions of trusted Eurosceptic elites (Franklin et al., 1995), or that they fear a loss of national identity (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). However, to date, no research has considered citizens' attitudes towards supranationalism itself.

This thesis addresses national citizens' perceptions of supranational government principles. It answers questions whether ordinary people hold meaningful preferences for their country's engagement in supranational politics, on the origins of such preferences, and what a rejection of such political engagement means for their feelings of national belonging. More specifically, I examined whether and to what extent ideological predispositions relate to peoples' views on supranational principles, and how this contributes to their relationship with a specific supranational institution such as the EU. Furthermore, I capture the reaction of

British citizens to their decision to withdraw completely from involvement in European supranational governance and how this, in turn, affects their national identities.

In chapter 1, the nature and growth of supranationalism is outlined, principally referring to the emergence and development of the EU. Corresponding changes in public opinion and the appearance of Euroscepticism are also discussed. Furthermore, drawing on political science literature on Euroscepticism, and social-psychological theories on social values, I analyse how attitudes towards supranational governance relate to peoples' basic predispositions to favour authority and social hierarchies. This approach allowed me to introduce and test a novel supranationalism measure in models explaining EU attitudes, in the United Kingdom (UK) (chapter 2) and in different European national samples (chapter 3). In chapter 4, I examine the impact of rejecting supranationalism in the context of the British referendum and Brexit (chapter 4), with a particular focus on polarised experiences of electoral winners and losers and negative implications for national cohesion and group relations. Finally, I summarise the findings (chapter 5) and discuss the implications of a link between political ideology and supranationalism, and the potential impact on winner-loser gaps in the aftermath of elections.

### **1.1 The Political Psychology of Supranationalism**

In this section, I discuss the emergence of international government structures, and introduce and define the concept of supranationalism. After that, I provide an overview of the development of supranational governance in Europe and corresponding changes in public opinion on the European Union. I will review the dominant theories to explain mass-level opposition to European integration (Euroscepticism), and why attitudes towards supranationalism itself cannot be ignored.

### 1.1.1 Global Demand for International Government Structures

Global crises reveal that people's lives can abruptly change even in the absence of economic or military conflicts. If there was ever any doubt whether the lives of citizens across the planet are tied together in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the global coronavirus pandemic serves as a forceful reminder of the interconnectedness of local, national, and international society. Within 2 months, a viral outbreak at a wet market in Wuhan, China, evolved from a regional, to a national, and then to a global health crisis (Park et al., 2020; Sohrabi et al., 2020). What started as a health crisis is now standing on the verge of a global economic crisis (Fornaro & Wolf, 2020). The coronavirus pandemic has received much of our attention, yet one could point to a number of humanitarian, economic, environmental and security challenges to illustrate how policy decisions of any kind can commonly transcend national borders and jurisdictions. For example, energy consumption and policy connect the fate of people both in the short (e.g., promoting biofuels can inflate crop prizes in poor regions of the world, Tenenbaum, 2008) and long term (e.g., traditional energy sources contribute to global warming; Lesk et al., 2016; Lucas et al, 2007; Schiermeier, 2011; Yu et al., 2020). Foreign military interventions can fuel international and domestic terrorism (Eland, 1998; Williams, 2008). Malpractice among credit lenders in some parts of the world can collapse the world economy (Rose & Spiegel, 2010).

It is clear that the increase in complex and multifaceted challenges is reflected both in increased levels of globalisation (Figge & Martens, 2014; Potrafke, 2015), and in the increased number of international organisations and institutions established to deal with the volume and by-products of global exchange (Keohane, 2002). Political elites are well aware of the challenges in a globalised world, and almost all countries and governments, regardless of their ideological convictions, recognise that these challenges require collaborative efforts (Keohane, 2002).

Indeed, over the last century, an infrastructure of international organisations has emerged, reflecting the ambitions of national representatives to collaborate with each other and to address problems that affect multiple countries. The majority of such political efforts take the voluntary form of international collaboration, where countries come together on issues of common interest, and negotiate with each other to establish a common policy or agreement. Such collaboration can emerge between a small number of countries on specific policy issues or can involve a global community that seeks to establish rules on vast and complex issues. Examples are the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) that establishes rules for free trade between the North American countries, or the Paris Climate Agreement that has been signed by more than 190 countries, pledging to reduce carbon emission and mitigate global warming effects (UNFCCC, 2020). However, this form of cooperation has been criticised for some notable shortcomings.

First, the negotiation process is shaped by each state's respective preferences, as well as their relative power and status (Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998), meaning that less powerful or prosperous countries might struggle to achieve advantageous outcomes. Second, there is no independent enforcement mechanism, which means that compliance with rules and policies is monitored and enacted by the respective countries themselves, and this has the potential to undermine the value of agreements (e.g., Gale, 2013). With regard to these two shortcomings, António Guterres, secretary general of the United Nations (2020), pointed out that this political infrastructure and approach to problem solving is fragile and institutions are ill-equipped. Speaking specifically about the issue of the global covid-19 pandemic, he argued that the crisis threatens to widen the gap between more and less affluent countries, and advocates to give smaller nations a stronger voice and have countries engage with each other on equal footing at the global stage. Specifically, he called for a restructuring of power relations in international institutions, such as the United Nations security council or the



World Bank, to assure that countries regardless of their status can partake in global solutions via a recognised political infrastructure. In other words, he postulated that global problems require global solutions. This in turn requires global political infrastructure, beyond the bargaining of rich and poor states, recognising and organising responsibilities between countries at a level above the nation state. That is supranationalism. This form of international politics refers to a level of governance *above* (*Latin; supra*) the nation state that goes beyond bilateral agreements between countries. According to Sweet and Sandholtz (1998):

A 'supranational' mode of governance is one in which centralized governmental structures (those organizations constituted at the supranational level possess jurisdiction over specific policy domains within the territory comprised by the member-states. In exercising that jurisdiction, supranational organizations are capable of constraining the behavior of all actors, including the member-states, within those domains (p8).

Thus, supranationalism requires "the delegation of political authority from representative organs to non-majoritarian institutions, which are neither directly elected by the people, nor directly managed by elected [national] politicians" (Tallberg, 2002, p. 23). The delegation of control "takes inter-state relations beyond cooperation into integration and involves some loss of national sovereignty" (Nugent, 2010, p. 428), which means that states might be compelled to act against their individual preferences. This differentiates supranationalism from the aforementioned voluntary forms of international collaboration (inter-governmentalism).

According to Simon and Valasek (2017), independent nation-states are enticed to join supranational institutions based on the promise of reciprocal benefits of joint projects that would otherwise be unavailable and by the fact that compliance to agreed-upon rules are enforced by an independent institution. The earliest attempts at establishing such institutions

date back to the post-WWI era and the League of Nations, an organisation aimed to foster world peace, as countries sought to address global and regional crises and provide stability beyond the capacity of individual nation states. Likewise, after WWII, institutions with similar ambitions emerged including the Bretton Woods system, the predecessor of the World Bank, which provided the first global monetary exchange system (Bordo, 1993; Dooley et al., 2004), or the United Nations. However, most institutions never developed the independent characteristics that would enable them to truly constrain the actions of individual member countries and they largely relied upon the voluntary compliance of their members (e.g., Bilder, 1982; Kelsen, 1945), and supranational projects have remained limited in scope (Kahler & Lake, 2009; Sanchez, 2017).

One supranational project however stands out, and that is the European Union (EU). The EU is undoubtedly the most successful attempt at establishing supranational governance to date and is commonly used as a benchmark to evaluate supranational policies, institutions (Cuyvers, 2002; Ginbar, 2010; Klynn, 2012), as well as citizens' trust in such projects (Koh, 2017). The EU was founded after WWII to ensure peace and prosperity in Europe via a system of economic interdependence between neighbour states. Unlike the abovementioned projects however, the EU developed capacities beyond its initial prospect as an economic project and now plays a role for almost every public policy domain in its respective member states. Having established such a meaningful role for national citizens, the EU provides the most suitable context to investigate how people experience and evaluate advanced supranationalism.

### **1.1.2 Distinguishing Supranationalism from Federalism and Cosmopolitanism**

Before providing details on the development of citizen attitudes towards European supranationalism, it is important to clarify the distinction between supranationalism and two related concepts, namely federalism and cosmopolitanism.

Describing supranationalism as a multi-level governance system automatically draws comparisons to federalism. In fact, many of the world's largest countries and a number of European countries have federal systems, including the United States, Russia, India, Germany, and Belgium. Similar to supranationalism, federalism is a system of governance in which power is constitutionally "divided between central decision-making institutions on the one hand and regional decision-making institutions on the other" (Nugent, 2010, p. 424). However, an important practical distinction between the two forms of governance is that while federal states have the constitutional status of statehood, which grants them legitimacy to use force in order to constrain behaviour of citizens, supranational government lacks this legitimacy and it remains contested if it can acquire such legitimacy as it expands (e.g., Moravcsik, 2001; Von Hagen & Eichengreen, 1996).

Furthermore, there is a theory-based distinction whether the division of sovereignty in federalism reflects the same type of multi-level governance as supranationalism (consisting of subnational, national, and supranational levels of government; Hooghe & Marks, 2001; 2009b). National political systems under supranational institutions are naturally diverse, whereas regional federal units commonly share a highly similar political system. The latter reflects perhaps the most obvious difference, which according to Sweet and Sandholtz (1998) is that the concept of federalism has historically not included an international component. Thus, in order to examine attitudes towards a government structure with a clear international scope, supranationalism is more suitable than referring to global or international federalism. Studying lay-attitudes towards supranationalism, instead of federalism can also help to avoid confounding national experiences, as the description of an international federal system might be interpreted differently from nationals with, (e.g., Belgium, Germany) and without (UK) personal experiences of national federal governance structures.

The second concept of relevance is cosmopolitanism. Unlike, supranationalism and federalism, cosmopolitanism does not refer to a political structure, but refers to individuals' support for- and identification with- a global society. This concept goes back as far as ancient Greece, where philosophers argued that humans do not solely belong to a polis (state) but also the cosmos (world) and share responsibilities with a world community (see Held, 2002). According to a modern theoretical framework by Held (2010), the basic principles of cosmopolitanism are a) recognition of every individual as an autonomous moral agent, deserving of equal dignity and treatment, b) consensual and collective decision making among these agents to develop cosmopolitan forms of governance which c) prioritize the conservation of resource.

Held argued that cosmopolitan values are already reflected in international treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in regional human rights agreements, providing a common structure of rights (e.g., liberty of conscience, thought, speech and press, freedom of movement, or seek asylum from persecution). Cosmopolitan egalitarianism has also found its way into the language of international law, under which all individuals are recognized. Yet, the reflection of cosmopolitan values in organised government structures, and even the abovementioned achievements are commonly seen as by-products of expanding international institutions, rather than the outcome of cosmopolitan values expressed and agreed upon by citizens of the world. Thus, it is difficult to gauge whether and to what extent citizens' cosmopolitan attitudes would translate into support for specific government structures. This is also reflected in the way cosmopolitanism is commonly measured as a feeling of closeness or proximity to people at different territorial levels (e.g., local, national, European; see Pichler, 2009) or as a measure of openness to foreign people and cultures (e.g., see Saran & Kalliny, 2012), with no indication of a desire to support or work towards a cosmopolitan government structure.

Therefore, I would argue that people's attitudes towards the politics behind specific supranational projects need to be investigated with reference to the international nature of the concept and the tangible structures that are associated with this concept instead of appropriating a related national concept (i.e., federalism), or than referring to undefined concepts (i.e., cosmopolitanism). In the absence of supranationalism as a psychological concept, a novel measure of supranationalism was designed and tested in chapters 2 and 3.

## **1.2 Supranationalism in Europe**

This section provides an overview of how European supranationalism and the corresponding public opinion developed over time. A review of the interdisciplinary literature explaining opposition to further integration (Euroscepticism) is provided, and discrepancies in our understanding of elite and lay motivations to reject the EU are discussed.

### **1.2.1 The Emergence of the European Union and Euroscepticism**

The European Union was initially conceived as an economic project aimed to foster prosperity and peace among war-torn countries in Europe. It began with the treaty of Paris in 1951, signed by Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands and it came into force in 1952 establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The aim of the ECSE was to regulate the market for the resources most vital to rebuild Europe after WW2. In 1957 the treaty of Rome was signed, which further established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), expanding economic cooperation among member countries beyond coal and steel, and for an unlimited period of time. In 1967, both the ECSC and Euratom were merged into the EEC. In 1987, the Single European Act (SEA) aimed to establish a European single market by the end of 1992, granting more powers to the European institutions (e.g., the European parliament and the council of ministers). Six more countries had joined the project (Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, and Spain). In 1991, public support for the European

project reached its highest level, as two thirds of European citizens evaluated membership as a good rather than a bad thing for their country according to the Eurobarometer survey (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993).

In the early 90s, the members of the EEC signed the Maastricht treaty (1992), which is the official founding document of the European Union (EU) as we know it today. At this time, a number of meaningful changes occurred. For instance, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was established (1991), which started a decade long process to introduce the joined currency, the Euro, in 1999. The treaty also added more powers to its institutions in a number of sensitive policy areas including foreign policy, security and defence, and asylum and immigration. The transfer of authority to the supranational level on many of these domains was initially resisted by some member states, though subsequent treaties (i.e., Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, Treaty of Nice 2001) contained amendments that substantially strengthened the supranational institutions of the EU. Crucially, beyond its impact on policy, the EU also began to monitor member country's household deficits, which was a requirement for the integration of the monetary union, thus indirectly influencing and restricting country's spending policies (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007).

Another key step of integration was meant to be taken in 2004, when all member states signed a treaty, which would replace all existing treaties with a single European constitution. This would make the charter of fundamental rights legal and expand qualified majority voting (requiring a 55% majority of council, or 72% when the council acts on its own initiative) on policy issues that previously required unanimity. However, the ratification process was abruptly abandoned after citizens in France and the Netherlands rejected the constitution via referendums, dealing a substantial blow to further integration plans.

The timespan since the Maastricht treaty in 1992 is widely considered as a turning point in public opinion on the EU, as it never reached its popularity from the early 90s'.

Different theories as to why this was the case are discussed in the following section. It is important to note here that the founding of the EU essentially transformed the European project from an exclusively economic enterprise to a political union, expanding its influence in countless policy domains and expanding from 15 to 25 member countries (Bickerton et al., 2015). The change in citizens' attitudes towards the European project has been characterised by Hooghe and Marks (2009a) as a shift 'from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus'. According to these authors, before the Maastricht treaty, the EU functioned mainly as a trade facilitator and was only relevant to a limited number of international and national actors (i.e., parties/ representatives), and thus of limited interest to the general public. However, as supranational politics expanded beyond its original role and started to influence public policy of major importance to national politics and discourse (i.e., fiscal budgets, immigration etc.), it entered the domestic political arena. Having to engage and compete with existing policy strategies politicised the policies pursued by the EU, and it became more reliant on national parties and citizens, and their individual and group preferences.

### **1.2.2 Sources of Euroscepticism: Economic, Cultural and Political Factors**

Explanations of mass-level Euroscepticism have examined economic, social-cultural and political factors, which have been investigated among political elites (political parties) and the general public.

**Economic factors.** Given that the EEC/EU was originally conceived as an economic project the initial explanations for Euroscepticism focused on economic reasoning. Political parties among both ends of the political spectrum have taken issue with how the EU influences the economy and workers in Europe. Studies of party manifestos have shown that left-wing parties mobilise against European integration because they see it as a vehicle of market liberalisation and removal of trade-barriers between countries which would threaten the welfare state (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012; Van Elsas et al., 2016) Right-wing parties, on

the other hand, oppose European integration for its attempts to over-regulate industries (De Vries & Edwards, 2009; Hobolt & De Vries, 2016; Hooghe & Marks, 2001).

Economic rationales were also the first approach to explain Euroscepticism among national citizens. After all, the European project was defined by its early focus on market liberalisation, reducing trade barriers between member states, with its proclaimed goal to increase welfare and standards of living among European citizens (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007). Drawing on utilitarian theories of political behaviour, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) proposed that citizens evaluate European integration based on its costs and benefits. Citizens' preferences to support or oppose integration reflected their personal economic interests. Thus, people with more human capital (i.e., more resources and higher levels of education) would benefit from integration processes and should support it. There was substantial support for this hypothesis, as Gabel and Whitten (1997) showed that demographic factors indicating economic potential, such as income, education, and occupation strongly correlated with support for European integration. Those who were most likely to benefit from economic integration showed the strongest support for integration (Gabel, 1998a, 1998b). However, when support for integration decreased significantly in the 1990s despite stable economic conditions, it became apparent that there was more to citizens' EU attitudes than plain utilitarianism.

**Social/Cultural Factors.** With the structural changes to the EU in the early 1990s, as the EU expanded its influence towards social policy domains, researchers recognised that a multi-dimensional approach to Euroscepticism was more appropriate. Eurosceptic parties could also be identified along a social- as well as an economic left-right ideological dimension. Social-cultural concerns of political left-wing parties have focused on military and foreign policy perspectives advanced by the European Union (e.g., Svensson, 1996). Parties of the political right are taking issue with the free movement of workers, which they



describe as a threat to ethnic and cultural homogeneity (Hooghe et al., 2002). A longitudinal study by Prosser (2016) showed that placement on the social dimension had become more informative for a party's integration stance than its placement on the economic dimension.

Similarly, McLaren (2002) pointed out that national citizens also evaluate European integration not just in terms of its potential threat to their economic interests, but also as a threat to their nation-state and its integrity. National integrity could be perceived to be undermined either directly or indirectly by European institutions, because they replace national government functions and because the increased exchange of goods, services and people leads to higher rates of immigration. As territorial group membership provides an important source for people's feelings of belonging, those who are strongly attached to their national group would be more likely to reject European integration. Support for this explanation of Euroscepticism has come from studies that showed that feelings of national pride as well as attachment to one's region or country predicted lower support for EU membership across 15 EU countries (Carey, 2002). Also, European citizens who categorise themselves as nationals of their country only, as opposed to nationals of both their country and Europe, or European only, showed less support for European integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2004). They tended to be more strongly opposed to integration of various policy domains (e.g., defence, currency, immigration, education, health & social welfare etc.), have more negative attitudes to European institutions, and were less likely to think they personally benefitted from EU membership (McLaren, 2007a). Furthermore, fear of foreign cultures (McLaren, 2002) and fear over loss of identity and culture (Carey, 2002) predicted stronger Euroscepticism.

**Political Factors.** Lastly, Euroscepticism among political parties can reflect concerns over the political concept of European integration. Political scientists distinguish between soft and hard Euroscepticism (Taggart & Szczesniak, 2002). Soft Euroscepticism is defined as

opposition to specific integration steps in one or more policy areas (either economic or social) and reflects concerns that the trajectory of European integration is conflicting with national interests. For example, soft Eurosceptic parties in Greece always supported EU membership, but opposed joining into an economic and monetary union (Verney et al., 2013). Hard Euroscepticism on the other hand, is defined as principled opposition to any form of European integration, and parties in this category commonly express their desire to roll back previous integrative steps and/or withdraw from EU membership. Hard Eurosceptic parties essentially reject supranationalism itself, rather than specific instances of supranational integration, and exist at both extreme (left-right) ends of the ideological spectrum (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002). That does not mean hard Euroscepticism is unrelated to policy concerns. As Nicoli (2017) pointed out, Hard-Eurosceptic parties benefited from increased mistrust towards the EU during the financial crises between 2008 and 2015 and made their case against supranational governance by pointing to specific (economic) policy failures of the EU.

While party positions on supranationalism are well established, we know little to nothing about how national citizens evaluate this issue. Common reasons cited why this phenomenon has been ignored as a contributing factor for voters' Euroscepticism is that they are too busy and do not engage with this topic enough to form opinions (Anderson, 1998). Indeed, low levels of knowledge about the EU have been shown to correlate with citizens' unwillingness to answer questions about EU politics (Mößner, 2009; Rohrschneider, 2002) and from an early stage, political scientists focused on alternative indicators. Inglehart (1970) showed that attitudes towards the EEC correlate with citizen's levels of cognitive mobilisation, meaning their "capacity to receive and interpret messages relating to a remote political community" (p. 47), without which they could not familiarise themselves with European institutions and would remain fearful and opposed. Indeed, several studies have

shown a negative relationship between levels of cognitive mobilisation (operationalised as higher levels of education) and Euroscepticism (e.g., Hakhverdian et al., 2013), though questions over the direct causal link between the two variables remain (Kunst et al., 2020). In line with this argument, Anderson (1998) suggested that in the absence of opinions on abstract political matters, such as European integration, citizens use mental shortcuts and adopt viewpoints from various sources (proxies), such as domestic politics or the news media. There is also evidence that attitudes expressed during a referendum on European integration correlated strongly with attitudes towards the government in power at the time (Franklin et al., 1994; 1995). Other studies have shown that media coverage on the EU can influence whether citizens vote for Eurosceptic parties (Van Spanje & de Vreese, 2014), or whether they support or oppose EU enlargement (Azrout et al., 2012), especially among those with less political knowledge (Schuck & De Vreese, 2006).

Taken together, research has considered socio-economic and cultural factors among both political elites and the general public, but evaluations of the basic political concept underlying European integration have only been examined for political parties. To date citizens' attitudes towards the politics behind the EU itself (supranationalism) have been ignored. The next section challenges some of the underlying presumptions that led to this topic being neglected.

### **1.2.5 The Role of Citizen Attitudes on Supranationalism**

While it is plausible that most average European citizens do not have deep-seated opinions on specific supranational structures, I would expect that centuries of EU membership, lived experiences, and socialisation within a European supranational system have resulted in some form of basic preference over the principles of supranational governance. For example, citizens with low levels of EU knowledge might be reluctant to weigh in on the question whether more powers should be granted to the European Council of

Ministers but might still have preferences whether to delegate more authority to external actors or maintain political power at the national level. Indeed, de Wilde and colleagues (2010) found that voters who supported Eurosceptic parties in the 2009 European Parliament election were more likely to justify their vote via general rather than specific statements (e.g., against the principle of integration). Furthermore, it has been argued that voters adopt pro- and anti-European stances of parties that they vote for in national elections (Hellström, 2008; Steenbergen et al., 2007), so it follows that they would also adopt messages of principled opposition to supranationalism.

Crucially, such preferences over supranationalism do not have to be at the forefront of voters' minds in order to be relevant. While voter turnout for European parliamentary elections was below 50% on average across all European countries all but once in the last 26 years (Europarl, 2020), turnout for the 26 EU-relevant referendums held across Europe since 1972 has been much higher (>65%), and that is important. Referendums ask citizens more general questions about the EU, most often, they ask for support to delegate more power to EU institutions and they have become vital to take major integrative steps. Thus, voters express their opinions about the EU particularly during political events (i.e., referendums) when basic principles of supranational governance, such as delegation of power, are particularly salient (Gallagher, 1996). Therefore, it is particularly important to investigate how voters evaluate supranationalism.

Overall, I would argue that approaches that focus on voters' experiences of personal costs and benefits, fears of national identity loss, and their level of education undoubtedly contribute to our understanding of Euroscepticism but tell us little about citizens' evaluations of the ideas underpinning European governance (i.e., supranationalism). There is evidence that general preferences towards basic principles of European politics are expressed by Eurosceptic voters (de Wilde et al., 2010), but no social-psychological research has explored

them in detail as of yet. Therefore, a key research aim of this thesis is to answer the following questions: Do people have coherent preferences towards basic principles of supranational governance? Do these attitudes play a meaningful role for their broader EU attitudes, over and above established factors, such as concerns over immigration, levels of education or national attachment? In chapters 2 and 3, the first step was to answer these questions, using a novel measure of supranationalism. This measure has been integrated into models of EU attitudes that account for relevant established factors, to test if opposition to supranationalism contributes to Euroscepticism at the individual level as it does at the party-level.

### **1.3 Right-Wing Ideology and Supranationalism**

The next step is to establish the social-psychological origins of supranationalism preferences. In this section, I provide an overview of the theorised link between citizens' supranationalism and their ideological predispositions. Drawing on evidence of the association between right-wing ideology and principle-based opposition to European integration at the party level (Hard Euroscepticism), I theorize how the basic principles of supranational governance would relate to ideology-based preferences for authoritarian social structures and hierarchical group relations, conceptualised as Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance orientation (SDO).

#### **1.3.1 The Mobilizing Potential of the Eurosceptic (Hard) Right**

The initial evidence to consider for the ideological correlates of supranationalism has come from political science research of party-level Euroscepticism. While it is true that Euroscepticism has consistently been found at both ends of the ideological spectrum, there has been a notable shift in the distribution of left and right-wing Euroscepticism over the past 50 years. A look at electoral success of Eurosceptic parties shows that there were initially more left-wing than right-wing parties represented in this category, but since the 1990s, right wing Eurosceptic parties have become the dominant force in the European parliament (von

Sydow, 2013). Among those, parties that are considered hard Eurosceptic or else parties that oppose supranationalism as a principle appear to be the driving forces behind constitutive Euroscepticism in their respective national electoral arenas as well. A snapshot from the 2014 European Elections shows that the number of seats held by soft Eurosceptic parties in the EU-parliament was almost equally distributed between left (49 seats) and right (54 seats) parties, whereas left-wing hard Eurosceptics had control of 2 seats, and right-wing hard Eurosceptics held 55 seats (Treib, 2014). Analyses of the mobilising potential of Eurosceptic parties (i.e., their prospects of electoral success) showed not only that radical right-wing parties were particularly successful at addressing fears among ‘globalisation losers’ (Kriesi, 2008), but also that such parties successfully campaigned on constitutive (i.e., hard) Eurosceptic issues in domestic political arenas (Dolezal & Hellström, 2016; Hutter et al., 2016).

This ideological shift within the Eurosceptic movement was also observed among European citizens. Van Elsas and van der Brug (2015) showed that the relationship between European citizens’ political ideology and their perception of threats relevant to Eurosceptics (e.g., the loss of national identity, the loss of social security, etc.) has shifted from a linear relationship in the 1970s, when left-wing Euroscepticism was far more prevalent, to a u-shaped curvilinear relationship by 2010, as the prevalence of right-wing Euroscepticism steadily increased. Evidence as to what draws voters to such parties has been provided by Werts et al. (2013) who found that higher levels of ‘concerns that European Unification had gone too far’ uniquely contributed to the likelihood to vote for a radical right-wing party, beyond factors such as perceived ethnic threat or political distrust.

Taken together, right-wing parties represent the strongest Eurosceptic movement, compared to their centrist and left-wing counterparts. The literature suggests that support for these parties is a function of “classic” right-wing concerns related to ethnocentrism and

immigration, but also by opposition to European integration. In addition, I would argue that over and above those concerns, voters who support Eurosceptic movements do so because they share an ideology-based dislike for supranational principles of governance.

### **1.3.2 Ideology and Supranationalism: A Psychological Perspective**

Why do some people feel attracted to anti-integration messages of political parties? What connects right-wing ideology to supranationalism? According to social psychology scholars (see Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002) socio-ideological attitudes can be differentiated into two dimensions, a social-cultural dimension, typically indicated by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA, Altemeyer, 1981; 1998), and an economic-hierarchical dimension, typically indicated by social dominance orientation (SDO, Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

RWA reflects preferences for traditional values and submission to local authority structures that can preserve cultural norms (Altemeyer, 1981; 1998). It also expresses underlying motivations of maintaining order and social cohesion and is rooted in the belief that the world is a dangerous place (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Perry et al., 2013; Van Hiel et al., 2007). Furthermore, RWA has been linked to support for a variety of policies aimed to promote social cohesion, such as strict immigration rules (Craig & Richeson, 2014), immigrant deportation (Skitka et al., 2006), stop-and-frisk (Saunders et al., 2016) or more religious education (Perry & Sibley, 2013). On the other hand, SDO reflects preferences for group-based dominance and hierarchical intergroup relations (Ho et al., 2012; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), driven by competitive power motivations and desires for superiority of one group over other groups (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Perry et al., 2013; Van Hiel et al., 2007). It has also been linked to support for policies that reaffirm group differences in society, such as flat income tax (Perry & Sibley, 2013), support for university admission limits (Gutierrez,

2018), and opposition to affirmative action policies (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Pratto et al., 1994).

Both predispositions (RWA & SDO) and their underlying motivations stand in contrast to principles of supranational governance. Indeed, supranational governance involves the transfer of power from the national to the supranational level, leading to increased dependence on foreign political partners and increased social and cultural exchange. Given that they favour local ingroup authority structures to provide order and security, people high in RWA should hold negative attitudes towards international institutions that reduce national control over decisions and resources. Furthermore, increasing supranational integration to accommodate increased rates of transnational exchange requires a willingness to cooperate with other national and international actors as well as high levels of openness to change. However, right-wing authoritarians are typically more resistant to change (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Van Hiel et al., 2007) and show higher levels of perceived external threats, such as threats coming from governments of other countries (Onraet et al., 2013; 2014).

Supranational governance also emphasizes transnational collaboration at a single (supranational) level, bypassing national rules regarding legal procedures and socio-economic status. This requires members to acknowledge regulations under the jurisdiction of an external institution, under which all members gain equal status. This collaborative focus reflects a perspective on European supranationalism, where supranational regulatory capacities are used to redistribute human and social capital and promote solidarity among members (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). This goal goes against the competitive motivations among high SDO individuals to maintain group dominance between groups and nations (Kteily et al., 2012; Pratto et al., 1994).

On this basis, I expected that individuals higher on RWA and individuals higher on SDO would be more likely to dislike features of supranationalism and, in turn, be less likely



to support European integration. In chapters 2 and 3, I will test whether both RWA and SDO predict lower levels of supranationalism. Furthermore, I tested whether this proposed relationship could explain voters' levels of Euroscepticism even after controlling for established effects of right-wing ideology, concerns over immigration (e.g., Tillman, 2013) or stronger national attachment (McLaren, 2002; 2007b).

#### **1.4 Rejecting Supranationalism and its Consequences**

Establishing the psychological construct of supranationalism and its ideological correlates helps us to understand how people form EU-attitudes, but it also reinforces the focus in the literature on understanding Eurosceptics. In order to give a more holistic picture of citizens' relationships with supranational governance, it is also important to capture what happens when Euroscepticism leads to the rejection of supranationalism and how citizens react to this. The UK's vote to leave the EU in 2016 was the first instance where citizens of a member country conclusively rejected supranational politics indefinitely. Thus, Brexit provides us with a unique opportunity to examine the impact of such a decision on experiences of both opponents and supporters of the EU.

##### **1.4.1 Electoral Defeat and its Impact on Voters**

It is known that election outcomes impact electoral winners and losers differently. Such *winner-loser gaps* (Blais & Gelineau, 2007) commonly reflect positive reactions among winners, who become more satisfied with democracy (Curini et al., 2012; 2014) and negative reactions among losers, who perceive politics as more corrupt (Anderson & Guillory, 1997). Importantly, recent studies suggest that such effects are not symmetrical. Indeed, electoral losers' negative reactions are stronger, both in terms of magnitude and longitude, compared to winners' positive reactions. For instance, Hansen and colleagues (2019) showed that Danish electoral losers' satisfaction with democracy was still negatively affected three years after experiencing political defeat. Furthermore, the magnitude of negative experiences

surrounding electoral defeat depends on the political system within which they occur and specific circumstances of election outcomes. Anderson and Guillory (1997) found that dissatisfaction with democracy among electoral losers was stronger in majoritarian systems, compared to consensus or proportional political systems. They argued that this reflects the voters' understanding of how the political system treats their dissenting preferences (i.e., that their preferences are more likely to be ignored in a majoritarian than a consensus system, making their loss greater). Others have shown that the margin of victory can impact the magnitude of winner-loser gaps. Noteworthy, Howell and Justwan (2013) found that narrow victories and defeats elicit the strongest positive and negative reactions respectively. Another factor that influences the severity of loser-effects is whether voters previously supported winning or losing campaigns. Multiple studies have shown that switching from the winning to the losing side amplifies the negative experiences (e.g., Craig et al., 2006; Hansen et al., 2019). This has been speculated to reflect human's basic aversion to losing, in this case political control, and negativity-bias, as people consider negative events more meaningful due to their potential importance for future events.

While the literature on loser-effects is primarily interested in attitudes towards the political system, from a social-psychological perspective I am interested in the impact political defeat can have on social relations among voters. Psychological research on this topic so far is scarce and has focused primarily on the impact of electoral defeat on partisan group-identity. Wann et al. (1995) found that participants who supported the unsuccessful Republican Bush/Quayle ticket in 1994 decreased their public affiliation and displayed voting-badges less frequently than supporters of the winning democrat ticket. Similarly, Boen et al. (2002) found a significant correlation between Flemish voters' display of posters and the relative success of the respective political party in that region. Most recently, Jenkins (2018) found in Twitter communications during the immediate aftermath of the US election

in 2016 that Clinton supporters publicly distanced themselves from the unsuccessful candidate and campaign.

Drawing on social identity theory (SIT), a certain amount of volatility in people's group attachment is to be expected. According to Tajfel and Turner (1986), a person's association with other individuals and social groups plays an important role for their self-image. It can shape their behaviours, attitudes, and expectations towards others, both inside and outside of their groups. Given that individuals are inherently motivated to view their groups favourably, they constantly evaluate their status to ensure that they contribute to a positive self-image (Hogg, 2016). Thus, support for a political campaign and a partisan identity can become more or less favourable during an election, and depending on election performance it is reasonable, to dis-identify as an identity management strategy. However, while there is plenty of evidence that such a strategy is feasible for partisan identities (Wann et al., 1995) and small social groups (Ditrich et al., 2017; Ellemers, 1993), this phenomenon has not been investigated in the context of how citizens identify with their country.

Citizens' sense of national identification is of particular interest for a number of reasons. Tajfel (1960) noted that national identities are relevant social identities for young children and can shape individuals' perception and behaviour to an extent that would be considered "extreme" for other social groups, such as the willingness to self-sacrifice. National identities contribute to an individual's sense of belonging and equip them with a point of reference when interacting with people around the world (Mummendey et al., 2001). Unlike most social identities, national identities are also somewhat immutable, as they are tied to citizenship and generally difficult to attain or change, hence why it might seem unintuitive or implausible for individuals to deny their affiliation or forfeit membership. Indeed, changes in individuals' sense of national attachment have so far only been observed

under extreme circumstances, such as national tragedies and acts of terrorism (Coryn et al., 2004).

Political elections are relevant for people's national identities in two ways. Candidates and parties present their vision for the country as well as their priorities and solutions, and individual voters can express their preferences by lending their support. At the same time, the election allows voters also to monitor their fellow group-members' preferences and behaviour. The results of an election can then be interpreted as the contemporary priorities of the national group, and voters learn whether their electoral preferences reflect a majority or minority position. From this perspective, each election has the potential to alter the overall image of the group, as well as individuals' position within the group. Change in group contexts requires individuals to engage in maintenance strategies to minimize any potential negative impact on their personal identity (Blanz et al., 1998). The most common strategy is to either increase or decrease the identification with one's group, though the extent to which this occurs depends on the circumstances of the group change (e.g., Ethier & Deaux, 1994).

#### **1.4.2 The Impact of Brexit on British Society**

When analysing the specific electoral events that led to Brexit--the initial referendum in 2016 and the general election in 2019--both the circumstances of the vote and the content of the campaigns are relevant for understanding potential winner-loser gaps in voters' experiences and feelings of national belonging.

With regard to the electoral circumstances, the initial vote took the form of a national referendum, with a binary choice to "*Remain a member of the European Union*" or "*Leave the European Union*". Such a winner-takes-all design reflects the type of majoritarian systems that is known to elicit stronger negative responses by voters because their preferences are disregarded in the wake of the vote (Anderson & Guillory, 1997).

Furthermore, the legitimacy of the referendum was always open to criticism, as the British

government was not legally obliged to implement the result but had promised to do so when the vote was announced. This uncertainty is due to the fact that constitutional practice for referendums in the UK has evolved based on precedent rather than formal rules, and according to Balsom (1996) it remains unclear under which circumstances referendums are deemed necessary or appropriate in the United Kingdom. This lack of clarity whether or when a popular vote can and should resolve a political issue in a representative democracy means that the process itself can be perceived as un-democratic, which makes voters more likely to question the result and react with anger (Esaiasson, 2011). Thus, the conditions under which Brexit was initially decided on made strong negative experiences among electoral losers likely.

Regarding the content, both the Leave and the Remain campaign attempted to link their referendum cause to voters' identities. According to the Remain campaign, EU membership had made Britain more prosperous and the country was heading towards 'a brighter future in Europe'. The Leave campaign on the other hand claimed that Britain was currently worse-off, and its prosperity and prestige could only be restored by returning to its independent, pre-EU membership status, by controlling policies about immigration and trade (Voteleave, 2019). In addition, the campaigns' key promises, to shield citizens against economic risks (Remain) or to regain control over laws and immigration (Leave), addressed different priorities and preferences within the electorate. As hypothesised in chapters 2 & 3, perception of immigrants as a threat and mistrust towards supranational politics, both of which were highly salient topics of the Leave campaign, are associated with basic right-wing ideological preferences for group hierarchy and local authority. On the other hand, concerns over economic stability and the associated risks of leaving the EU, were much more important for people who support Remain (Clarke et al., 2017). Data shows that voters strongly identified with the positions of their respective campaign and still do (Curtice, 2018;

2019a; 2020). Thus, a referendum on preferences for involvement in supranational politics involved questions about salient group characteristics, and social and economic priorities.

Taken together, the magnitude of the policy decision, the fundamentally different ideological preferences attached to support and opposition for supranational governance, and the procedure itself provided the ideal conditions for a strong winner loser gap with direct relevance to voters shared national identity. In chapter 4, I investigated the impact of Brexit, with a particular focus on the electoral losers and their national identities as the UK underwent this major change.

### **1.5 Outline of the Following Chapters**

Chapter 2 introduces supranationalism as a psychological construct and a novel scale to measure it. The research conducted examines its ideological correlates and implications for EU attitudes and Brexit preferences with two studies in the United Kingdom, addressing three research aims. First, I designed and established a novel measure of supranationalism and examined its psychometric properties with two samples from the UK. Second, the predictors of supranationalism were examined, focusing on the roles of RWA and SDO, while controlling for established factors such as national identification (Studies 1 and 2) and economic conservatism (Study 2). Third, I investigated whether supranationalism could predict the relationship between right-wing ideology (RWA & SDO) and British voters' EU attitudes and Brexit preferences while controlling for established factors of Euroscepticism, such as immigration concerns or national identification.

Chapter 3 expands on the national context in which supranationalism is investigated. In Study 3, I further examined the concept validity of supranationalism, its psychometric properties and predictive value in a cross-country context with samples from three different countries (UK, Germany, and Belgium). A series of multigroup confirmatory factor analyses were conducted to test for measurement invariance between national groups, aiming to

establish whether the new concept can be captured outside of the UK. After that, similarities and differences in the ideological correlates and predictive value of supranationalism were tested between the national groups, via the same model of EU attitudes used in Studies 1 & 2.

Chapter 4 focuses on the implications of Brexit and examines the impact of the decision to leave the EU on the British electorate as a whole, and in particular on voters' sense of shared national identity and social cohesion. Based on a number of longitudinal studies at two key Brexit votes, I tested the effects of electoral defeat on national belonging and group cohesion (Studies 4-6), as well as the role of threat and external efficacy in the dis-identification process (Study 6).

Chapter 5 summarises the findings of chapters 2-4 and discusses implications, limitations, and future avenues of research for the concept of supranationalism and consequences of electoral defeat on social cohesion.

## **Chapter 2: The Psychology of Supranationalism and its implications for EU attitudes and Brexit preferences<sup>1</sup>**

### **2.1 Introduction**

“...and if we vote leave and take back control, I believe that his Thursday can be our country's independence day.” (Boris Johnson, Member of Parliament for the Conservative Party, 2016)

In his final public call to vote *Leave* in the British EU referendum, Boris Johnson, prominent Brexit campaigner, stated that a vote to leave would be a vote for democracy. He further emphasised the importance of British identity, control over British borders, economic prosperity, and national sovereignty. A few days later a majority of UK citizens, be it a small one (52%), voted for independence from the European Union (EU) (BBC, 2016a).

Empirical research has confirmed the key roles of exclusive national identities and anti-immigrant attitudes in explaining voters' opposition to EU membership (e.g., Clarke et al., 2017; Hobolt & De Vries, 2016; McLaren, 2007a). Remarkably, research in this area has rarely considered people's general attitudes towards the political concept behind the European project, termed supranationalism. At a psychological level, supranationalism can be defined as a broad attitude toward an arrangement in which several state governments have transferred authority over certain policy domains to a centralised institution, possessing jurisdiction over agreed domains for all nations involved (Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998). The typical aim of supranational institutions is to generate reciprocal benefits from joint projects and address shared issues more effectively (Simon & Valasek, 2017; Tallberg, 2002). Besides

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the European Union, widely known examples of supranational institutions include the United Nation (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Europe has witnessed a number of political parties, such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP), the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, and the National Front in France, who oppose any further European integration, and even seek to denounce membership (De Vries & Edwards, 2009). These parties do not merely reject EU policies, but rather reject the principle of supranationalism altogether (Hutter et al., 2016; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002), which stands in stark contrast to the EU's statutory aim towards an ever-closer union and vision of a social democratic Europe (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). The success of those Eurosceptic actors, and the simultaneously heightened demand for global governance structures, emphasizes the need to investigate (anti-)supranationalism at the individual level, including its psychological underpinnings and its implications.

The current research addresses this gap by investigating supranationalism and its effects on Euroscepticism in the UK context. While popular attitudes to supranationalism are of relevance, and likely inform people's attitudes to international institutions across a range of countries, we attempted for the first time to assess its nature and importance in the context of one country. Britain is particularly relevant due to its people's longstanding equivocation over membership of the EU, and their eventual decision in favour of leaving that international organisation.

### **The Psychology of Supranationalism**

Supranationalism, as discussed by political scientists, reflects an individual's attitudes towards the core aspects of supranational governance (Nugent, 2010; Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998; Tallberg, 2002). That is a) willingness to participate in supranational projects, b) belief in the proposed problem-solving capacity of supranational governance, c) commitment to

binding international rules outside of national control, d) aspirations for the role of supranational institutions in the future.

The aspect of *participation* refers to the willingness to engage in and commit to supranational institutions and projects and indicates individuals' basic approval (or disapproval) of involvement at this governance level. Belief in the proposed *problem-solving capacity* of supranational governance denotes whether or not citizens trust the notion that a centralised institution can address and solve transnational or global issues more effectively than individual states, which is the primary purpose of such a commitment (Tallberg, 2002). The aspect of *commitment to binding rules* refers to the core mechanism of supranational governance on which its superior effectiveness is based. Citizens can agree or disagree with the principle that institutions outside of national control can create new laws or rules for all parties involved (Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998). The last aspect, *future aspirations for supranational governance*, reflects the extent to which individuals think that supranational institutions should have a bigger impact on global politics. Whether people would like to see supranational governance expanded or not is similar to attitudes towards widening and deepening integration processes, which is a key construct in contemporary European integration research (Tillman, 2013).

Importantly, the concept of supranationalism does not merely reflect the opposite pole of supportive attitudes towards national governance, nor can it be inferred from reversing individual's identification with the national ingroup. Supranationalism captures attitudes towards aspects of transnational cooperation and organisation that are unique to this level of governance and go beyond attitudes towards the nation state. Despite the extensive discussions on supranationalism in recent political debates and theorising, to date no published research has investigated people's attitudes towards the fundamental principles underpinning supranational governance. A scale measuring supranationalism is thus lacking.

The only attempt that we are aware of comes from Coromina and Saris (2012), who aimed to explore supranationalism by asking respondents about their preferences for either national or European jurisdiction over specific policy domains. Although valuable, this approach is not only limited by an exclusively European conceptualisation of supranationalism, but it also conflates attitudes towards specific policy domains (e.g., agriculture, welfare) with attitudes towards the principles of supranational governance. The first aim of the present research was therefore to introduce a newly developed supranationalism scale tapping into the core aspects of supranationalism, capable of allowing us to explore its role in predicting attitudes towards the EU.

### **The Ideological Underpinnings of Supranationalism and Euroscepticism**

Scholars (see Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002) differentiate between two socio-ideological attitude dimensions, a social-cultural dimension, often indicated by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981; 1998), and an economic-hierarchical dimension, typically indicated by social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). RWA reflects preferences for traditional values and submission to local authority structures that can preserve cultural norms (Altemeyer, 1981; 1998). RWA expresses underlying motivations of maintaining order and social cohesion and relates to the belief that the world is a dangerous place (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Perry et al., 2013; Van Hiel et al., 2007). SDO reflects preferences for group-based dominance and hierarchical intergroup relations (Ho et al., 2012; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), driven by competitive power motivations and desires for superiority of one group over other groups (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Perry et al., 2013; Van Hiel et al., 2007). It has a strong negative association with support for international harmony, and predicts support for war (Heaven et al., 2006; Kteily et al., 2012).

Both predispositions and their underlying motivations stand in contrast to principles of supranational governance. Indeed, supranational governance involves the transfer of power from the national to the supranational level, leading to increased dependence on foreign political partners and increased social and cultural exchange. Given that they rely on local ingroup authority structures to provide order and security, people high in RWA should hold negative attitudes towards international institutions that reduce national control over decisions and resources. Furthermore, increasing supranational integration to accommodate increased rates of transnational exchange requires a willingness to cooperate with other national and international actors, as well as high levels of openness to change. However, right-wing authoritarians are typically more resistant to change (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Van Hiel et al., 2007) and show higher levels of perceived external threats, such as threats coming from governments of other countries (Onraet et al., 2013; 2014).

Supranational governance also emphasizes transnational collaboration at a single (supranational) level, bypassing national discrepancies regarding legal procedures and socio-economic status. This requires members to acknowledge regulations under the jurisdiction of an external institution, under which all members gain equal status. This collaborative focus reflects a perspective on European supranationalism, where supranational regulatory capacities are used to redistribute human and social capital and promote solidarity among members (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). This goal goes against the competitive motivations among high SDO individuals to maintain group dominance between groups and nations (Kteily et al., 2012; Pratto et al., 1994).

Supranational integration used to be promoted and championed in the UK based on economic conservative values in support of a competitive neoliberal project, where supranational institutions were seen as aids in abolishing barriers to trade and promoting economic competition between countries (Pinder & Usherwood, 2013). Economic

conservatism reflects preferences for a limited role of government in business and opposition to interference with free market processes and is strongly correlated with SDO, with both being indicators of the economic-hierarchical ideology dimension (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002). Hence, we would expect SDO and economic conservatism to have similar relations with supranationalism. Yet, whereas SDO focuses on group-based competition and intergroup hierarchies, economic conservatism emphasizes free market competition without a focus on intergroup relations. Therefore, their association with supranationalism might not completely overlap.

Taken together, given that supranational governance involves some sharing of authority, engaging in increased social-cultural exchange, and collaborating in reciprocal projects with foreign partners, individuals high on RWA and SDO will, in theory, be more strongly opposed to supranational institutions. Furthermore, within the European context, this should be reflected in more negative attitudes towards the EU.

Prior research has already shown that RWA and SDO are associated with anti-EU attitudes and stronger support for Brexit (e.g., Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Tillman, 2013), while others emphasised the role of exclusive national identities or perceived immigrant threat (e.g., Meleady et al., 2017; Swami et al., 2017). More specifically, European citizens who hold strong and exclusive national identities are more likely to reject European integration, because they are unable to embrace a shared European identity and perceive free movement of people as threatening their national, cultural and economic interests (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Hobolt & De Vries, 2016; McLaren, 2007b).

Critically, however, supranationalism is related to, but not the same as national identification and outgroup threat. Hence, we expected that supranationalism would predict EU attitudes, over and above national identification and immigrant threat. Furthermore, we expected that opposition to supranationalism would help to account for the negative

associations of RWA and SDO with attitudes towards the EU, over and above specific concerns regarding immigration typically also associated with RWA and SDO (Asbrock & Kauff, 2015; Hodson & Dhont, 2015; Meeusen & Dhont, 2015; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008).

## **2.2 Overview of the Present Studies and Hypotheses**

The aim of the current research is threefold. First, we design a new measure of supranationalism and test its psychometric qualities on two samples from the UK. Second, we investigate the predictors of supranationalism, specifically focusing on the role of RWA and SDO, while simultaneously controlling for national identification (Studies 1 and 2) and economic conservatism (Study 2). Third, we examine the role of supranationalism in shaping British people's attitudes towards the EU and the Brexit negotiations. More specifically, we test whether opposition to supranationalism explains the relations between right-wing ideological attitudes (RWA and SDO) and anti-EU views over and above people's national identity and negative perceptions of immigration.

## **2.3 Study 1: Method**

### **Participants**

The sample for the current study was collected in December 2016, six months after the Brexit vote, and consisted of 336 British adults who were recruited via the online platform Prolific Academic (69% females;  $M_{age} = 37.50$ ,  $SD_{age} = 12.00$ ). All participants took part after they had given written informed consent and received compensation for their time. This study was approved by Kent School Research Ethics Committee.

### **Measures**

Participants completed measures of RWA, SDO, national identification, supranationalism, immigrant threat, and EU attitudes. All measures were scored on a 7-point scale (1 = *Strongly Agree*, 7 = *Strongly Disagree*), unless specified otherwise.

### ***Supranationalism.***

We developed a new scale consisting of eight items to measure supranationalism. Participants were first presented with a brief text that explained the concept of supranational governance and the different forms this can take (e.g., trade agreements, or political and military unions). We also provided participants with a few well-known examples of supranational institutions (e.g., the UN, WTO) to help them understand what type of organisations were typical of supranational governance. We then presented participants with a pair of statements – one positively worded and one negatively worded – to test attitudes towards particular aspects of supranationalism that we considered central to the concept. The statements tapped the aspects of *participation* (e.g., “Being part of a supranational institution like the UN is a good thing for a nation”), *problem-solving capacity* (e.g., “Supranational institutions are more likely to solve global issues better than nationally elected governments”), *adherence to common rules* (e.g., “We achieve more at the international level of all states follow global rules rather than do whatever each likes”), and *future aspirations* (e.g., “Supranational institutions should be granted more powers in the future so that they can have a greater impact on global issues”).

After recoding the negatively worded items, we investigated the psychometric qualities of the scale. All items were positively inter-correlated with an average inter-item correlation of  $r = .47$  (ranging from  $r = .26$  to  $r = .65$ , all  $ps < .001$ ; for full results of inter-item and corrected total-item correlations see Appendix A Table A2.1). The scale yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .88, demonstrating that the scale had high internal consistency.

Next, we entered the eight items in a factor analysis using maximum likelihood analysis with oblique rotation. The analysis showed two highly correlated factors ( $r = .62$ ) (see Appendix A Table A2.2 for full results of factor analyses) explaining a total of 57.43% of the variance. The content of the items did not differ between the two dimensions. Rather, the first factor included all positively worded items, whereas the second factor included all

negatively worded items. The high correlation between the two factors and the fact that items of two factors only differed because of the wording and not in terms of item content support the idea that attitudes towards levels of governance are distributed on a single dimension (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). Thus, we averaged all items into a single score of supranationalism, with higher scores indicating more positive attitudes towards supranational governance. The good psychometric properties of the new scale confirmed the successful development of a supranationalism scale, meeting our first research aim.

### ***Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)***

RWA was measured using a shortened 9-item version of Duckitt et al.'s scale (2010, based on Altemeyer, 1981; see also Dhont et al., 2016). Sample items are: "Our country will be great if we show respect for authority and obey our leaders" and "Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn". Negatively worded items were recoded, and all items were averaged so that higher scores reflected stronger Right-Wing Authoritarianism. The scale reliability was good, with a Cronbach's alpha of .88.

### ***Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)***

We measured SDO using 8 items of the short SDO<sub>7</sub>-scale by Ho et al. (2015). Sample items are: "It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others" and "Group equality should not be our primary goal". Negatively worded items were recoded, and all items were averaged so that higher scores reflected a greater social dominance orientation. With a Cronbach's alpha of .90, the scale showed a good internal reliability.

### ***National identification***

Levels of national identification were measured with 5 items (based on Leach et al., 2008), including statements such as: "The fact that I am British is an important part of my identity" and "I am glad to be British". Item scores were averaged with higher scores indicating higher levels of national identification (Cronbach's alpha was .96).



### *EU Attitudes*

To measure attitudes towards the EU participants had to indicate how they “feel generally towards the European Union” (1 = *Very Negative*, 7 = *Very Positive*). Higher scores indicate more positive attitudes towards the EU.

### *Immigrant Threat*

We measured the extent to which participants perceive immigrants as a threat towards the British society and the British economy using the following two items: “Immigrants are posing a threat to the economic and political system of the UK” and “The presence of immigrants is problematic for our cultural norms and values in the UK” (based on Stephan & Renfro, 2002; see also Onraet et al., 2013). Item scores were averaged with higher scores indicating higher levels of perceive immigrant threat, and the Cronbach’s alpha showed that the scale was reliable, .89.

## **2.4 Study 1: Results**

### **Correlations**

Means and standard deviations for all measures are presented in Table 2.1, along with zero-order correlations. As expected, supranationalism was significantly negatively correlated with RWA, SDO, and national identification<sup>2</sup>. Supranationalism was also positively correlated with EU attitudes, whereas all other variables were negatively associated with EU attitudes.

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<sup>2</sup> Confirmatory factor analysis with oblique rotation confirmed that items indicating supranationalism, immigrant threat and national identification load on distinct factors without significant cross-loadings (see appendix A2.4).

Table 2.1

*Means, Standard Deviations and Zero Order Correlations between Variables in Study 1*

	M (SD)	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
1. RWA	3.57 (1.13)	.47***	-.47***	.45***	.54***	-.50***
2. SDO	2.84 (1.16)	-	-.28***	.28***	.50***	-.32***
3. Supranationalism	4.48 (1.10)		-	-.29***	-.54***	.61***
4. National Identification	4.87 (1.48)			-	.38***	-.32***
5. Immigrant Threat	3.45 (1.83)				-	-.63***
6. EU Attitudes	4.57 (1.97)					-

*Note.* \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

### Model Test

To investigate the associations between the variables, we conducted structural equation modelling (SEM) with observed variables in Mplus (version 8, Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017). We focused in particular on the simultaneous associations of RWA and SDO with attitudes towards the EU, and whether supranationalism would account for these associations, in addition to immigrant threat. We included national identification and demographic variables (age and gender) as controls<sup>3</sup>. All predictors were allowed to co-vary, as were the residual terms of immigrant threat and supranationalism<sup>4</sup>. The results of this model are presented in Figure 2.1, which shows significant standardized estimates only (full model results are presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3).

The model shows, first, that supranationalism is negatively predicted by RWA, but not by SDO or national identification (see Table 2.2). Furthermore, positive attitudes towards

<sup>3</sup> Model tests with personal and household income as additional control variables revealed highly similar results (see appendix A2.7 & A2.8).

<sup>4</sup> The model was fully saturated ( $df = 0$ ).

supranational governance significantly predicted more positive EU attitudes. In other words, this effect remained even when all the other factors are included in the model (see Table 2.3).

Estimating the indirect associations of RWA with EU attitudes revealed that RWA was significantly indirectly associated with less positive EU attitudes through lower levels of supranationalism (standardized estimate =  $-.09$ ,  $CI_{95}$   $[-.145, -.040]$ ,  $p = .001$ ), in addition to the indirect effect through immigrant threat (standardized estimate =  $-.11$ ,  $CI_{95}$   $[-.169, -.052]$ ,  $p < .001$ ) (see Appendix A2.3 for full results of indirect associations).

Table 2.2

*Results (Standardised Estimates) of Study 1 for the Associations of RWA and SDO Predicting Supranationalism and Immigrant Threat, Controlling for National Identification and Demographic Variables*

	Supranationalism		Immigrant Threat	
	$\beta$ [ $CI_{95}$ ]	$p$	$\beta$ [ $CI_{95}$ ]	$p$
RWA	-.35 [-.471, -.220]	<.001	.29 [.156, .416]	<.001
SDO	-.07 [-.181, .040]	.211	.32 [.196, .436]	<.001
National Identification	-.10 [-.209, .014]	.070	.14 [.032, .241]	.010
Age	-.12 [-.216, -.013]	.026	.13 [.037, .214]	.005
Gender	.05 [-.049, .142]	.339	-.02 [-.106, .062]	.612
Education	.16 [.055, .265]	.003	-.12 [-.213, -.023]	.015


*Note.* Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female), Education (1 = GCSE, 2 = A-Levels, 3 = BSc/Ba, 4 = MSc/Ma, 5 =PhD).

Table 2.3

*Results (Standardised Estimates) of Study 1 Showing the Effects of Supranationalism on Attitudes Towards the EU over and above the Effects of Ideological, Intergroup, Identity-based, and Demographic Variables*

	EU Attitudes	
	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>
Supranationalism	.23 [.188, .333]	<.001
RWA	-.23 [-.338, -.116]	<.001
SDO	.05 [-.053, .152]	.347
National Identification	.06 [-.043, .156]	.264
Immigrant Threat	-.34 [-.456, -.221]	<.001
Age	-.11 [-.189, -.028]	.008
Gender	.05 [-.033, .132]	.237
Education	.08 [.000, .162]	.050

*Note.* Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female), Education (1 = GCSE, 2 = A-Levels, 3 = BSc/Ba, 4 = MSc/Ma, 5 = PhD).

**Figure 2.1***The Effects of Ideology on EU Attitudes in Study 1*

*Note.* Associations (standardised estimates) of RWA, SDO with EU-attitudes via Immigrant-threat and supranationalism, controlling for national identification, age, and gender (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3 for full results). \* $p < .05$ . \*\*  $p < .01$ . \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

### **2.5 Study 1: Discussion**

Overall, the results of Study 1 demonstrated that the supranationalism scale proved to have good psychometric properties. As hypothesised, both RWA and SDO were negatively related to supranationalism, although when both predictors were simultaneously entered into the model, only RWA remained as a significant predictor of supranational attitudes. Finally, the results demonstrated that besides concerns about mass migration, principled opposition to supranational governance plays a critical role in anti-EU sentiment and helps to explain why right-wing adherents show stronger anti-EU sentiments.

### **2.6 Study 2**

The aim of Study 2 was to further increase confidence in the reliability and validity of the supranationalism scale by establishing its psychometric quality and predictive power among a second sample. We also further examined its relations with people's RWA and SDO orientations, and also included a measure of economic conservatism to test that associations between RWA and SDO and EU attitudes were not driven by economic conservatism. Furthermore, in order to gain a better understanding of the role of supranationalism for people's attitudes on current European supranational politics, we examined people's opinion about the objectives they think the British government should prioritise during the Brexit negotiations. We designed survey items that tap into these objectives, drawing on the priorities for the negotiations recently identified by the British Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Brown & Waitzman, 2016). These priorities included regaining national jurisdiction over domains such as border control and laws, and continued cooperation with the other EU members on issues such as safety and trade.

We expected that supranationalism would predict more positive attitudes towards cooperative goals and more negative attitudes towards control-related goals. Furthermore, we hypothesised that these post-Brexit preferences would also be related to people's RWA and

SDO orientations. In particular, we theorised that RWA would be of particular relevance in predicting preferences towards regaining national jurisdiction, while SDO was expected to show a stronger association with preferences towards inter-state cooperation.

## 2.7 Study 2: Method

### Participants

The sample for this study was collected in November 2017, four months into the first round of Brexit negotiations between the UK and the EU, and one and a half years after the EU referendum. The sample consisted of 400 British adults who were recruited via the online platform Prolific Academic (73% females;  $M_{\text{age}} = 38.59$ ,  $SD_{\text{age}} = 11.58$ ). All participants took part after they had given written informed consent and received compensation for their time. This study was approved by Kent School Research Ethics Committee.

### Measures

Participants completed the same measures of RWA (Cronbach's  $\alpha = .85$ ), SDO (Cronbach's  $\alpha = .87$ ), and immigrant threat (Cronbach's  $\alpha = .94$ ) as in Study 1. All measures were scored on a 7-point scale (1 = *Strongly Agree*, 7 = *Strongly Disagree*), unless specified otherwise.

### *National Identification*

We used the same measure of national identification as in Study 1 (Leach et al., 2008), but changed the phrasing from "British" to "English". By measuring a narrower (more exclusive) scope of national identification, the association between national identification and EU attitudes might become more pronounced than in Study 1. The Cronbach's  $\alpha$  in this study was .94.

### *Supranationalism*

We used the new supranationalism scale, but in this study, we provided participants with a slightly more detailed description of the concept of supranationalism. The satisfactory

psychometric quality of the scale was also confirmed in this sample. More specifically, the items were highly intercorrelated with an average inter-item correlation of  $r = .49$  (ranging from  $r = .26$  to  $r = .66$ ,  $p < .001$ , for full results of inter-item and corrected total-item correlations see Appendix A Table A2.1), and a Cronbach's alpha of .88. Again, factor analysis using maximum likelihood analysis with oblique rotation revealed two strongly correlated factors ( $r = .63$ ) that distinguished between the positively and negatively worded items (for full results of factor analysis see Appendix A Table A2.2). Hence, the items were averaged into a single measure of supranationalism.

### ***EU Attitudes***

Rather than relying on a single item measure of attitudes towards the EU as in Study 1, we used 12 items (Boomgarden et al., 2011) measuring different aspects of EU attitudes including negative affect (e.g., "The European Union poses a threat to British identity and culture"), EU identification (e.g., "The fact that I am a European citizen is an important part of my identity"), performance (e.g., "The European Union is wasting a lot of tax money"), and idealism (e.g., "The European Union fosters the preservation of the environment"). After recoding negatively worded items, item scores were averaged with higher scores indicating more positive EU attitudes. Factor analysis indicated a unidimensional scale, with a Cronbach's alpha of .96.

### ***Economic conservatism***

We used 5 items to measure the concept of economic conservatism (De Witte, 1990; see also Cornelis & van Hiel, 2006). Example items are: "The wealthy have an unfair advantage in our society" (reverse coded), and "The government should take actions to decrease income differences" (reverse coded). After recoding negatively worded items, item scores were averaged with higher scores indicating more conservative economic attitudes (Cronbach's alpha was .83).



### *Post-Brexit Preferences*

The following five items were used to measure post-Brexit preferences by asking participants how important they thought it was to achieve the following issues during the Brexit negotiations: “Bringing back control of our laws to Parliament”, “Bringing back control of decisions over immigration to the UK”, “Maintaining the strong security cooperation we have with the EU”, “Establishing the freest possible market in goods and services with the EU and the rest of the world”, and “Securing rights of UK citizens living abroad in the EU, and EU citizens living in the UK”. Participants had to rate the importance of each goal on a 5-point scale (*1 = Not important at all; 5 = Extremely important*). Factor analysis revealed two distinct factors, which distinguished the issues of “prioritising control” in terms of laws and immigration and “prioritising cooperation” in terms of security, trade and citizen rights. We averaged these items into measures of “prioritising control” (Cronbach’s alpha = .89) and “prioritising cooperation” (Cronbach’s alpha = .77).

## **2.8 Study 2: Results**

### **Correlations**

Means and standard deviations for all measures are presented in Table 2.4, along with zero-order correlations. The pattern of correlations was similar to that in Study 1 (Table 2.1). As expected, supranationalism was negatively correlated with RWA, SDO, national identification, and economic conservatism. Furthermore, supranationalism was positively related to EU attitudes<sup>5</sup> and prioritising cooperation, whereas negative relations were found with prioritising control.

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<sup>5</sup> Confirmatory factor analyses with oblique rotation showed that items indicating supranationalism load on distinct factors from items capturing EU attitudes, as well as other relevant control variables (see appendices A2.5 & A2.6).

Table 2.4

*Means, Standard Deviations and Zero-order Correlations Between Variables in Study 2*

	M (SD)	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
1. RWA	3.57 (1.13)	.45***	.36***	-.45***	.45***	.50***	-.42***	.61***	-.18***
2. SDO	2.84 (1.16)	-	.55***	-.38***	.23***	.33***	-.35***	.38***	-.25***
3. Economic Conservatism	2.78 (1.21)		-	-.26***	.21***	.14**	-.19***	.21***	-.14**
4. Supranationalism	4.48 (1.10)			-	-.28***	-.51***	.64***	-.60***	.40***
5. National Identification	4.87 (1.48)				-	.37***	-.24***	.46***	-.01
6. Immigrant Threat	3.45 (1.83)					-	-.65***	.71***	-.27***
7. EU-Attitudes	4.57 (1.97)						-	-.71***	.39***
8. Brexit-Control	3.46 (1.23)							-	-.16**
9. Brexit-Cooperation	3.95 (0.82)								-

Note. \* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

### Model Test

We tested the same associations as in Study 1, but also included the two Brexit preference measures as additional criterion variables. The residual terms of all criterion variables were allowed to covary<sup>6</sup>. With regard to the predictors of supranationalism, the results showed that higher levels of RWA and SDO significantly predicted lower supranationalism levels (Figure 2.2, Table 2.5), whereas economic conservatism and national identification did not significantly predict supranationalism<sup>7</sup>.

The model also showed that, supranationalism positively predicted EU attitudes and prioritising cooperation after Brexit, and negatively predicted prioritising control after Brexit. Critically, these effects of supranationalism remained over and above the variance explained by all other factors in the model (Table 2.6).

Estimating the indirect associations of RWA and SDO with EU attitudes further revealed, in line with our hypotheses, that both predictor variables were significantly indirectly related to EU attitudes via supranationalism, over and above the indirect associations through immigrant threat (see Table 2.7).

Similar patterns of indirect associations were observed for Brexit priority preferences (Table 2.7). Both RWA and SDO were indirectly positively associated with Brexit preferences of control, and indirectly negatively associated with cooperation priorities, via supranationalism. However, it should be noted that, while RWA had a significant total effect on people's preferences towards control, the total effect of RWA on preferences over cooperation was not significant. RWA was also directly positively related to prioritising regaining national control, while SDO was directly negatively related to prioritising the continuation of cooperation with the EU.

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<sup>6</sup> The model was fully saturated ( $df = 0$ ).

<sup>7</sup> Model tests with personal and household income as additional control variables showed highly similar results (see Appendix A Tables A2.9-A2.12).

Table 2.5

*Results (Standardised Estimates) of Study 2 for the Associations of RWA and SDO Predicting Supranationalism and Immigrant Threat, Controlling for National Identification, Economic Conservatism, and Demographic Variables*

	Supranationalism		Immigrant Threat	
	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>
RWA	-.27 [-.388, -.113]	<.001	.30 [.344, .779]	<.001
SDO	-.21 [-.317, -.097]	<.001	.19 [.152, .583]	.001
National Identification	-.08 [-.174, .018]	.145	.17 [.082, .417]	.003
Economic Conservatism	-.03 [-.111, .062]	.580	-.12 [-.346, -.019]	.026
Age	-.03 [-.010, .004]	.420	.05 [-.005, .022]	.210
Gender	.11 [.034, .491]	.029	-.06 [-.655, .091]	.137
Education	.18 [.087, .294]	<.001	-.24 [-.640, -.301]	<.001

*Note.* Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female), Education (1 = GCSE, 2 = A-Levels, 3 = BSc/Ba, 4 = MSc/Ma, 5 = PhD).

Table 2.6

*Results (Standardised Estimates) of Study 2) Showing the Effects of Supranationalism on Attitudes Towards the EU and post-Brexit Preferences, over and above the Effects of Ideological, Intergroup, Identity-based, and Demographic Variables*

	EU Attitudes		Brexit Cooperation		Brexit Control	
	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>
Supranationalism	.39 [.421, .627]	<.001	.33 [.152, .374]	<.001	-.24 [-.373, -.198]	<.001
RWA	-.03 [-.165, .084]	.530	.04 [-.083, .141]	.598	.22 [.162, .351]	<.001
SDO	-.03 [-.165, .078]	.477	-.13 [-.202, -.006]	.042	.05 [-.038, .151]	.231
National Identification	.07 [-.018, .162]	.118	.15 [.024, .176]	.011	.13 [.058, .203]	.001
Immigrant Threat	-.41 [-.353, -.219]	<.001	-.12 [-.105, .008]	.086	.39 [.193, .304]	<.001
Economic Conservatism	-.03 [-.134, .073]	.566	-.01 [-.087, .067]	.816	-.04 [-.113, .041]	.371
Age	-.17 [-.028, -.012]	.037	.05 [-.003, .010]	.338	.07 [.001, .014]	.037
Gender	.11 [.093, .554]	.005	.02 [-.152, .211]	.753	-.02 [-.207, .117]	.590
Education	.01 [-.093, .111]	.886	.08[-.022, .143]	.155	-.03[-.114, .053]	.470

*Note.* Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female), Education (1 = GCSE, 2 = A-Levels, 3 = BSc/Ba, 4 = MSc/Ma, 5 = PhD).


Table 2.7

*Results of Effect Decomposition Analyses (standardized estimates) for the Associations of RWA and SDO with EU attitudes and Post-Brexit Preferences, Controlling for National Identification, Economic Conservatism, and Demographics in Study 2*

	EU Attitudes		Brexit Control		Brexit Cooperation	
	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>
Total effect for RWA	-.26 [-.386, -.130]	<.001	.40 [.299, .503]	<.001	-.08 [-.242, .076]	.307
Direct effect for RWA	-.03 [-.127, .065]	.530	.22 [.140, .298]	<.001	.04 [-.104, .180]	.598
Total indirect effect for RWA	-.23 [-.311, -.144]	<.001	.18 [.116, .247]	<.001	-.13 [-.183, -.059]	<.001
Indirect effect via Supranationalism	-.10 [-.163, -.045]	.001	.06 [.027, .099]	.001	-.09 [-.143, -.029]	.003
Indirect effect via Immigrant Threat	-.12 [-.175, -.071]	<.001	.12 [.067, .171]	<.001	-.04 [-.077, .007]	.099
Total effect for SDO	-.19 [-.309, -.077]	.001	.18 [.081, .265]	<.001	-.22 [-.337, -.094]	.001
Direct effect for SDO	-.03 [-.124, .078]	.477	.05 [-.030, .126]	.231	-.13 [-.246, -.005]	.042
Total indirect effect for SDO	-.16 [-.237, -.083]	<.001	.13 [.062, .187]	<.001	-.09 [-.142, -.038]	.001
Indirect effect via Supranationalism	-.08 [-.127, -.036]	<.001	.05 [.018, .081]	.002	-.07 [-.113, -.023]	.004
Indirect effect via Immigrant Threat	-.08 [-.129, -.026]	.003	.08 [.028, .123]	.002	-.02 [-.052, .008]	.145

**Figure 2.2**

*The Effects of Ideology on EU Attitudes and Brexit Preferences in Study 2*



*Note.* Associations (standardized estimates) of RWA, SDO with EU attitudes and Brexit-priorities via Immigrant-threat and supranationalism.

Dashed lines depict the effects of national identification (control variable). Other control variables included in the model were economic conservatism, age, gender, and education (see Tables 2.5 and 2.6 for full results).  $*p < .05$ .  $**p < .01$ .  $***p < .001$ .

### **2.9 Study 2: Discussion**

Overall, Study 2 largely replicated the results of Study 1 and established that the supranationalism scale is a reliable and valid measure of attitudes towards supranational governance. We found people's socio-ideological orientations to be predictors of supranationalism, notably RWA (studies 1 and 2) and also SDO (Study 2). Once these variables are included in the models, economic conservatism and national identification did not provide any additional value in predicting supranationalism. Furthermore, the findings indicated that issues of national control are predominantly associated with authoritarian predispositions, whereas issues of international cooperation are more strongly (negatively) related to dominance strivings and desires for social hierarchies.

### **2.10 General Discussion: Chapter 2**

The current research investigated, for the first time, supranationalism as a psychological construct, its ideological correlates, and its role in predicting Euroscepticism. I demonstrated that supranationalism can be reliably measured with a newly developed scale, which consistently predicted more favourable attitudes towards the EU, even while controlling for a range of variables tapping ideological, intergroup, and identity-based variables. This supports the hypothesis that Euroscepticism in Britain is not only associated with attitudes towards specific factors identified in previous research, namely immigration and national identity (e.g., Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Hobolt & De Vries, 2016), but it also relates to people's views towards the general principles of supranational governance. I should note here that the findings of Study 1 and 2 are in line with the recent analysis conducted by Clarke et al. (2017), which showed that popular support for Brexit was substantially driven by concerns about Britain's sovereignty under EU membership, quite apart from concerns about immigration.

Our findings also showed that supranationalism levels have implications for participants' preferences about how Britain should continue its relations with the EU after



Brexit. Those in favour of supranational governance, found it more important to continue cooperative relations with the EU, while those more strongly opposing supranational governance found it more important to regain control over legislative processes. In sum, our findings inform public debate and add to the growing body of literature on Euroscepticism by showing the role that is played by supranationalism.

When it comes to the predictors of supranationalism, the studies showed a clear role for right-wing authoritarianism. This finding supports the idea that supranational governance is intrinsically unattractive for authoritarians, given that a core feature of supranationalism is the transfer of authority and a reduction of control over local institutions and decision-making processes. The findings also align with recent work that showed that authoritarian attitudes manifest themselves in nationalist and anti-globalist positions (Scotto et al., 2018).

Social dominance orientation was negatively associated with supranationalism in both studies (high SDO = low supranationalism). Yet, when tested simultaneously, SDO only predicted supranationalism and EU attitudes in Study 2. A possible explanation for this difference could be the shift in public and media discourse during data collection of Study 2. The UK was four months into Brexit negotiations and the competing interests between the UK and the EU were highly salient. This may have activated the competitive motivations underlying SDO (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Perry et al., 2013; Van Hiel et al., 2007) which would be related to stronger opposition to both supranationalism and the EU among those high in SDO.

The absence of any effect of economic conservatism support the idea that attitudes towards the EU in Britain, and particularly views on Brexit were dominated by social-cultural, rather than economic values (Clarke et al., 2017). Furthermore, although national identification was also negatively associated with supranationalism, it did not predict supranationalism when controlling for RWA and SDO in both studies. This is consistent with

our rationale to introduce a measure of supranationalism because attitudes towards transnational governance cannot be inferred by merely reversing national identity scores.

### **Conclusion**

The first two studies extend prior research by establishing a valid measure of supranationalism and reveals the important, yet previously underexplored, role of principled opposition to supranational governance for understanding attitudes towards international organisations such as the EU. Supranationalism plays a meaningful part in Euroscepticism and post-Brexit preferences, and is related to broader authoritarian and anti-egalitarian ideological attitudes. This represents the first step in establishing supranationalism as a relevant factor in a context where its principles were highly salient for peoples' evaluations of the European Union. This raises the question whether the concept and underlying psychological mechanism can be found in other national contexts. That is examined in chapter 3.

### **Chapter 3: The Ideological Correlates of Supranationalism and EU Attitudes Across Countries**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

Studies 1 and 2 revealed that Supranationalism is an important factor connecting right-wing ideology and EU attitudes among British citizens. Ever since Britain joined the EEC in 1973, its history of resistance to European political unification beyond matters of trade (Pinder & Usherwood, 2013) rendered it probable that British citizens would consider principles of supranationalism relevant when they think about the EU. However, as pointed out in chapter 1, the link between right-wing ideology and hard Euroscepticism, reflected in efforts to reverse integration or leave the union, is by no means unique to the United Kingdom. Hard Eurosceptic parties can be found across different countries (e.g., Rooduijn et al., 2019). Thus, the second aim of my research was to examine the generalisability of the findings and test the hypotheses of studies 1 and 2 with samples from different European countries. Specifically, the current chapter aims to answer the following questions: Can the new measure of supranationalism reliably capture preferences on engagement in supranational politics? Can opposition to supranationalism explain the relations between right-wing ideological attitudes (RWA and SDO) and anti-EU views over and above people's national identity and negative perceptions of immigration?

Providing an answer to these questions can give us a unique insight on whether aversion to supranational principles as a component of (right-wing) Euroscepticism is a uniquely British phenomenon or applies to a variety of European national contexts. If the latter were the case, it would increase the confidence in the veracity of our theorized explanation of Euroscepticism, and complement the prevailing explanations of Euroscepticism (e.g., utilitarian, identity), which do not account for citizens' attitudes towards the European political system itself. To my knowledge, the attitudes towards

supranationalism have not yet been investigated in this form in any European country.

### **Supranationalism and Euroscepticism in Germany and Belgium**

With resource constraints to the number of countries that could be investigated as part of this project, it was decided to examine two countries hosting relatively strong and weak Eurosceptic political parties respectively; Germany and Belgium (Ro. Germany does not have a long history of mainstream Euroscepticism, but the main Eurosceptic party in Germany, *Alternative für Deutschland (AFD)* (alternative for Germany), has become increasingly popular in the last years. The party was initially founded as an anti-European currency party, exclusively focused on reversing the monetary union integration. Not long after its founding the party was taken over by more nationalist populist figures, and now focuses on topics such as immigration, opposition to the establishment and European integration (Arzheimer, 2015; Reher, 2017). Although the party has never been involved in government, it received 13% of the vote in the 2017 federal election in Germany and 11% in the 2019 European parliament elections, and consistently polls as a major opposition party in national polls (Tagesspiegel, 2018; Wahlrecht, 2020). Similar to Germany, Belgium also does not have a pronounced Eurosceptic history. The main Eurosceptic party in Belgium is *Vlaams Belang* (Flemish Interest), a nationalist separatist party from the Dutch-speaking Flemish region in Belgium. Although they enjoyed notable successes in recent domestic elections, their stance on Europe carries little weight in a predominantly pro-European country according to Brack and Hoon (2017).

The known predictors of Euroscepticism among citizens in Germany and Belgium seem to be highly similar to the factors investigated in studies 1 and 2. For example, Kuhn (2012) found that right-wing ideology and low education increased levels of Euroscepticism in Germany, whereas support for immigration decreased Euroscepticism. Similarly, Abts et al. (2009) found that Euroscepticism in Belgium was predicted by cost-benefit calculations

(citizens who did not believe they benefitted from EU membership), distrust in EU citizens and institutions, as well as national identification. Furthermore, predictors of support for Eurosceptic parties in both Germany and Belgium include established factors, such as right-wing ideology, concerns over immigration and national identification (McDonnell & Werner, 2019). Thus, it can be argued that the model of EU attitudes tested in chapter 1 contains relevant factors for EU attitudes among British as well as Belgian and German nationals.

### **Measurement Invariance and Supranationalism**

In order to test the main hypotheses and whether supranationalism adds explanatory value to EU attitude models similar to the UK, it was necessary to empirically evaluate the extent to which the new supranationalism scale captures the same construct across different national groups (Chen, 2008). Establishing measurement invariance is crucial before comparing model results between different countries. Despite the simplicity of the supranationalism scale content, and the geographical similarity between the samples under investigation in this study, measurement invariance should not be presumed, particularly when establishing a new measure.

For example, it is possible that evaluations of supranational principles reflect unique national experiences, as in the abovementioned argument that supranationalism should be strongly expressed in the UK because of its anti-EU integration history. Similar arguments could also be made for Germany and Belgium. Historically, European supranationalism was founded in direct response to Germany's role in World War II and to confine German expansion ambitions by a system of economic interdependence (Pinder & Usherwood, 2013). Today, Germany finds itself as the focal point of European political decision making. Belgium, like Germany, is a founding member of the EEC, but rather than being confined, involvement in supranational politics has arguably stabilised the country against both external and internal (separatist) pressures (Deschouwer & Van Assche, 2008). Today, Belgium hosts

the headquarters of the EU, as well as NATO, in Brussels. Such different experiences could be reflected in different average levels of support for supranationalism, but also could also lead to different interpretations of the content of the scale and render the concept incomparable across countries. This is why invariance between groups needed to be demonstrated before further comparisons could take place.

### **3.2 Overview of the Present Study and Hypotheses**

The first aim of this study was to establish measurement invariance of the novel supranationalism scale across national samples, by replicating the findings from studies 1 and 2 with another sample from the UK and compare the results with samples from Germany and Belgium. The second aim was to test and replicate the model of EU attitudes from studies 1 and 2, and test the ideological correlates-, and predictive role of supranationalism in all three countries. Specifically, I tested whether opposition to supranationalism explains the relations between right-wing ideological attitudes (RWA and SDO) and Euroscepticism over and above people's national identity and negative perceptions of immigration among all three national samples.

### **3.3 Study 3: Method**

#### **Participants**

A total of 974 participants were recruited via social media (Facebook) and the crowdsourcing platform Prolific. After excluding incomplete responses, the final sample consisted of 946 participants, containing 349 British nationals, 435 German nationals, and 162 Belgian nationals<sup>8</sup> ( $M_{age} = 34.08$ ,  $SD_{age} = 14.32$ , 42.2% female). All participants took part after they had given written informed consent. Participants who were recruited via Prolific received compensation for their time. This study was approved by Kent School Research Ethics Committee.

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<sup>8</sup> Dutch speaking Belgian nationals were recruited from the region of Flanders

## Measures

Participants completed measures of supranationalism, EU attitudes, national identity, immigrant threat, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). A subset of British participants completed only the supranationalism measure, thus, model tests for ideological correlates and the predictive validity of supranationalism were conducted with a reduced sample of  $N = 724$ . All measures were scored on a 7-point scale ( $1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree$ ), unless specified otherwise. Instruments were translated from English to Dutch and German and proofread by multiple native speakers to ensure concept validity<sup>9</sup>. Internal scale reliability scores (Cronbach's alpha) are presented in Table 3.1.

### *Supranationalism*

We used the supranationalism scale developed in chapter 2 (Peitz et al., 2018) to measure general attitudes towards supranational politics and mechanisms. Sample items include “Being part of a supranational institution is generally a good thing for a nation” and “Supranational institutions should be granted more powers in the future so that they can have a greater impact on global issues”. Items were highly inter-correlated with mean inter-item correlations of  $r = .50$  (UK sample),  $r = .42$  (GER sample) and  $r = .49$  (BE sample) (for complete inter-item and item total correlations see Appendix B Table B3.1) and the scale showed high internal reliability for each respective sub-sample (see Table 3.1).

### *EU Attitudes*

A shortened 11-item version of Boomgarden et al.'s (2011) EU attitude measure was used. Sample items include “The European Union functions well as it is”, or “I feel threatened by the European Union”. Negatively worded items were recoded, and item scores were averaged so that higher scores indicated more positive EU attitudes.

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<sup>9</sup> Validated scales for the measures of RWA and national identity were used for the German sample

### ***National Identification***

To capture participants' national identity, we used the 14-item measure of in-group identification developed by Leach et al. (2008) for the British and Belgian survey. Sample items include "I feel a bond with [In-group]", and "Being [In-group] gives me a good feeling". For the German survey, we used Roth and Mazziotta's (2015) 15-item adapted and validated German version of this measure, which included three items that did not correspond with Leach et al.'s final scale. In our final analyses, we used the 12-items that overlapped between the two versions.

### ***Immigrant Threat***

We measured the extent to which participants perceive immigrants as a threat towards their society and their economy using the following two items: "Immigrants are posing a threat to the economic and political system of [name of country]" and "The presence of immigrants is problematic for our cultural norms and values in [name of country]" (based on Stephan & Renfro, 2002; see also Onraet et al., 2013). Item scores were averaged with higher scores indicating higher levels of perceive immigrant threat.

### ***Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)***

RWA was measured using a shortened 9-item version of Duckitt et al.'s scale (2010, based on Altemeyer, 1981; see also Dhont et al., 2016) for the British and Belgian samples, and the 9-item KSA-3 authoritarianism scale by Beierlein et al. (2014; based on Funke, 2005) for the German survey. Both scales contain items that capture the three sub-dimensions of authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission and conventionalism. Sample items are: "Strong, tough government will harm not help our country" (authoritarian aggression), "The 'old-fashioned ways' and 'old-fashioned values' still show the best way to live" (conventionalism), and "Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn" (authoritarian submission). Negatively worded items were recoded,



and all items were averaged so that higher scores reflected stronger Right-Wing Authoritarianism.

***Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)***

We measured SDO using 8 items of the short SDO7-scale by Ho et al. (2015). Sample items are: “It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others” and “Group equality should not be our primary goal’. Negatively worded items were recoded, and all items were averaged so that higher scores reflected a greater social dominance orientation.

Table 3.1

*Means, Standard Deviations, Cronbach Alphas (in Parentheses) and Zero-order Correlations Between Variables in Study 3*

	Variable	M	(SD)	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	
UK	1. Supranationalism	5.38	1.16	(.89)	.83***	-.58***	-.40***	-.37***	-.70***	.13	.03	.24**	
	2. EU Attitudes	5.62	1.45		(.96)	-.54***	-.34***	-.36***	-.80***	.16	.01	.20*	
	3. RWA	3.01	1.00			(.82)	.62***	.33***	.57***	.17	.01	-.19*	
	4. SDO	2.29	0.84				(.78)	.22*	.43***	-.04	-.19*	.05	
	5. National Identity	3.72	1.30					(.95)	.43***	-.06	-.04	-.06	
	6. Immigrant Threat	2.09	1.47						(.91)	.03	-.00	-.28**	
	7. Age	52.47	14.50								-.19*	-.18*	
	8. Gender												.07
	9. Education	3.17	0.91										
GER	1. Supranationalism	5.11	0.94	(.85)	.59***	-.35***	-.42***	-.16**	-.45***	-.12*	-.04	.08	
	2. EU Attitudes	5.03	0.87		(.89)	-.23***	-.35***	.08	-.45***	-.08	-.09	.15**	
	3. RWA	3.31	1.07			(.77)	.59***	.49***	.60***	.06	.05	-.04	
	4. SDO	2.62	1.00				(.82)	.30***	.56***	.08	.15**	.04	
	5. National Identity	4.42	1.23					(.90)	.39***	.06	.07	.08	
	6. Immigrant Threat	2.67	1.60						(.88)	.18***	.03	-.05	
	7. Age	29.06	11.02								.15**	.11*	
	8. Gender												.13**
	9. Education	3.82	1.05										
BE	1. Supranationalism	5.30	1.02	(.88)	.62***	-.58***	-.56***	.17*	-.53***	-.01	.21**	.13	
	2. EU Attitudes	4.99	0.92		(.87)	-.39***	-.44***	.32***	-.43***	.01	.05	.03	
	3. RWA	3.17	1.01			(.78)	.61***	.08	.59***	.15	-.19*	-.10	
	4. SDO	2.31	0.97				(.81)	-.05	.63***	.02	-.18*	-.09	
	5. National Identity	4.28	1.07					(.92)	-.16*	.10	-.09	-.01	
	6. Immigrant Threat	3.11	1.89						(.91)	.09	-.27**	.01	
	7. Age	27.52	9.21								.05	.30***	
	8. Gender												-.01
	9. Education	3.04	0.84										

Note. UK  $n = 128$ , GER  $n = 434$ , BE  $n = 162$ .

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

### 3.4 Study 3: Results

#### Measurement Invariance Across Countries

Analysis of measurement invariance of the supranationalism scale across national groups was conducted using multigroup confirmatory factor analysis with the 8 items that the 2-factor model indicated in studies 1 and 2 as the baseline model. As shown in Table 3.2, the configural invariance model showed a good model fit to the data, denoting that the factor structure of the latent construct ‘supranationalism’ was similar across national groups. The fit indices of the metric model (M2), where all factor loadings were constrained to be equal across groups, also indicated a good fit and was not significantly worse compared to the configural model fit (M1) according to conventional criteria to evaluate model fit (e.g., Putnick & Bornstein, 2016). Thus, metric invariance was supported, indicating that factor loadings were similar across national groups. In the last step and test for scalar invariance, all intercepts were constrained to be equal across groups, suggesting that mean levels of ‘supranationalism’ were similar across groups. The scalar model (M3) showed acceptable model fit, though the RMSEA was above the cut-off point for good fit ( $< 0.08$ ), and the changes in the chi-square and CFI values provided no evidence for scalar invariance (Chen, 2007).

As we expected citizens from different national backgrounds to evaluate aspects (items) of supranationalism differently, scalar invariance was not anticipated. Furthermore, since the aim of the research was to examine the correlational relations of supranationalism rather than mean levels between groups, metric invariance was sufficient to go ahead and test for the ideological correlates and predictive value of supranationalism in our model of EU attitudes (Bialosiewicz et al., 2013).

Table 3.2

*Measurement Invariance Test for Supranationalism Scale Across National Groups in Study 3*

	$X^2$ ( <i>df</i> )	CFI	RMSEA (90%CI)	SRMR	Model comp	$\Delta X^2$	$\Delta CFI$	$\Delta RMSEA$	$\Delta SRMR$	Decision
M1: Configural Invariance	157.07 (57) ***	.956	.075 (.061-.089)	.039	--	--	--	--	--	--
M2: Metric Invariance	173.03 (69) ***	.954	.069 (.056-.082)	.059	M1	16.08 (12)	.002	.006	.020	Accept
M3: Scalar Invariance	275.24 (81) ***	.914	.087 (.076-.099)	.064	M2	111.25 (12) ***	.040	.018	.005	Reject

*Note.*  $N = 946$ , Group UK  $n = 349$ , Group GER  $n = 435$ , Group BE  $n = 162$ .

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

## Correlations

As expected, supranationalism was negatively correlated with right-wing ideology (RWA & SDO) and positively with favourable EU attitudes (Table 3.1). These associations were consistent and comparable across all national groups, which supports the idea that supranationalism plays an important role in the relationship between ideology and Euroscepticism. Furthermore, we found that supranationalism was consistently linked to lower levels of perceived immigrant threat in all three countries, while its association with participants' levels of national identity was negative among British and Germans, but positive for Belgians.

## Model Test

To investigate the associations between the variables and compare them across groups, we conducted multigroup structural equation modelling (SEM) with observed variables in Mplus (version 8, Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017). We tested the simultaneous associations of RWA and SDO with attitudes towards the EU, and whether supranationalism would account for these associations, in addition to immigrant threat. As in the previous studies, we included national identification and demographic variables (age and gender) as controls. All predictors were allowed to co-vary, as were the residual terms of immigrant threat and supranationalism<sup>10</sup>. The results of this model are presented in Figure 3.1, which only shows significant standardized estimates (full model results are presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4).

The model shows that among British citizens supranationalism was significantly predicted by RWA, but not SDO, whereas both dimensions of right-wing ideology were significant predictors of supranationalism in the other two groups. SDO was the strongest predictor in the German sample and RWA is the key predictor among Belgian participants.

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<sup>10</sup> The model was fully saturated ( $df = 0$ ).

Wald chi-square tests of parameter equalities revealed that the effect of RWA on supranationalism was significantly stronger in the British and Belgian sample compared to the German sample (UK vs GER,  $\chi^2 = -.41$ ,  $p = .002$ ; BE vs GER,  $\chi^2 = .28$ ,  $p = .003$ ), whereas there were no significant differences between the paths of SDO and supranationalism.

Importantly, higher levels of supranationalism predicted EU attitudes across all groups while controlling for other factors. Estimating the indirect associations of RWA and SDO with EU attitudes further revealed that right-wing ideology was significantly indirectly associated with less positive EU attitudes through lower levels of supranationalism, in addition to the indirect effect through immigrant threat (Table 3.5).

There were also some differences between the groups. The full mediation model shows that in the British group, stronger national identification predicted significantly lower levels of supranationalism and higher levels of perceived immigrant threat. For the German group, national identification predicted more immigrant threat, but there was no significant effect on supranationalism. Lastly, among Belgians, national identification predicted both more support for supranationalism and lower perceived immigrant threat. The strengths of individual paths were compared using the Wald chi-square test of parameter equalities. The effects of national identification on supranationalism were significantly different between all samples (UK vs GER  $\chi^2 = -.17$ ,  $p = .026$ ; UK vs BE  $\chi^2 = -.35$ ,  $p < .001$ ; GER vs BE  $\chi^2 = -.18$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

Furthermore, for both the German and Belgian group, higher levels of national identification were directly associated with more positive EU attitudes. This suggests that the role of national identification is sensitive to the national context, in contrast to the consistent effects of ideology. Lastly, although immigrant threat was negatively correlated with EU attitudes in all groups, this path was no longer significant in the Belgian group when accounting for all other factors.

With regards to the demographic control variables, it has to be noted that the UK sample was significantly older than both the German and Belgian sample (Table 3.1) and that age played a significantly different role for supranationalism attitudes between British and German respondents (Wald qui-square = .03,  $p < .001$ ).

Table 3.3

*Results (Standardised Estimates) of Study 3 for the Associations of RWA and SDO with Supranationalism and Immigrant Threat, Controlling for National Identification and Demographic Variables*

	UK				GER				BE			
	Supranationalism		Immigrant Threat		Supranationalism		Immigrant Threat		Supranationalism		Immigrant Threat	
	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>
RWA	-.47 [-.665, -.268]	<.001	.24 [.081, .445]	.023	-.15 [-.265, -.039]	.008	.35 [.254, .437]	<.001	-.41 [-.549, -.264]	<.001	.33 [.198, .470]	<.001
SDO	-.09 [-.281, .101]	.353	.27 [.081, .468]	.005	-.33 [-.434, -.232]	<.001	.32 [.237, .407]	<.001	-.28 [-.422, -.136]	<.001	.40 [.273, .534]	<.001
National Identification	-.18 [-.318, -.034]	.015	.30 [.155, .435]	<.001	.01 [-.084, .110]	.791	.12 [.039, .199]	.003	.20 [.086, .316]	.001	-.18 [-.291, -.075]	.001
Age	.23 [.086, .373]	.002	.00 [-.148, .146]	.991	-.10 [-.182, -.012]	.026	.14 [.067, .209]	<.001	.01 [-.114, .133]	.517	.04 [-.078, .156]	.517
Gender	.04 [-.107, .180]	.616	.08 [-.070, .222]	.305	.02 [-.066, .107]	.639	-.05 [-.124, .020]	.155	.10 [-.023, .213]	.114	-.15 [-.258, -.035]	.010
Education	.19 [.050, .330]	.008	-.24 [-.382, -.098]	.001	.10 [.010, .181]	.028	-.06 [-.134, .008]	.082	.07 [-.053, .190]	.266	.08 [-.040, .190]	.201



Table 3.4

*Results (Standardised Estimates) of Study 3 Showing the Effects of Supranationalism on Attitudes Towards the EU, with Controls for Ideological, Intergroup, Identity-based, and Demographic Variables*

	UK		GER		BE	
	EU Attitudes		EU Attitudes		EU Attitudes	
	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>
RWA	-.11 [-.250, .025]	.109	.04 [-.060, .136]	.444	-.04 [-.203, .132]	.676
SDO	.13 [-.002, .256]	.054	-.07 [-.162, .023]	.140	-.10 [-.266, .060]	.215
Supranationalism	.48 [.360, .604]	<.001	.47 [.396, .543]	<.001	.50 [.353, .644]	<.001
Immigrant Threat	-.50 [-.627, -.379]	<.001	-.33 [-.421, -.232]	<.001	-.07 [-.235, .096]	.408
National Identification	.06 [-.030, .155]	.186	.28 [.198, .357]	<.001	.21 [.087, .330]	.001
Age	.14 [.034, .236]	.009	.03 [-.043, .099]	.436	.03 [-.097, .155]	.648
Gender	.05 [-.048, .143]	.332	-.09 [-.161, -.020]	.012	-.08 [-.203, .044]	.207
Education	-.06 [-.156, .039]	.236	.09 [.016, .156]	.016	-.07 [-.193, .057]	.288


Table 3.5

*Results of Effect Decomposition Analyses (Standardized Estimates) for the Associations of RWA and SDO with EU Attitudes, Controlling for National Identification, and Demographics in Study 3*

	UK		GER		BE	
	EU Attitudes		EU Attitudes		EU Attitudes	
	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>
Total effect for RWA	-.46 [-.670, -.246]	<.001	-.15 [-.260, -.032]	.012	-.26 [-.425, -.098]	.002
Direct effect for RWA	-.11 [-.250, .025]	.109	.04 [-.060, .136]	.444	-.04 [-.203, .132]	.676
Total indirect effect for RWA	-.35 [-.522, -.169]	<.001	-.18 [-.258, -.111]	<.001	-.23 [-.332, -.120]	<.001
Indirect effect via Supranationalism	-.23 [-.337, -.113]	<.001	-.07 [-.126, -.017]	.010	-.20 [-.296, -.108]	<.001
Indirect effect via Immigrant Threat	-.12 [-.226, -.015]	.026	-.11 [-.157, -.068]	<.001	-.02 [-.080, .033]	.415
Total effect for SDO	-.05 [-.262, .153]	.607	-.33 [-.433, -.229]	<.001	-.27 [-.430, -.111]	.001
Direct effect for SDO	.13 [-.002, .256]	.054	-.07 [-.162, .023]	.140	-.10 [-.266, .060]	.215
Total indirect effect for SDO	-.18 [-.351, -.012]	.035	-.26 [-.329, -.194]	<.001	-.17 [-.270, -.064]	.002
Indirect effect via Supranationalism	-.04 [-.136, .049]	.358	-.16 [-.210, -.103]	<.001	-.14 [-.221, -.057]	.001
Indirect effect via Immigrant Threat	-.14 [-.243, -.033]	.010	-.11 [-.146, -.064]	<.001	.03 [-.096, .039]	.412

**Figure 3.1**

*The Effects of Ideology on EU Attitudes in Study 3*



*Note.* Associations (standardised estimates) of RWA, SDO with EU-attitudes via Immigrant-threat and Supranationalism, controlling for national identification, age, and gender (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4 for full results). \* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

### 3.5 Study 3: Discussion

The present research revealed some important similarities in the psychological underpinnings-, and the predictive value of supranationalism for EU attitudes across different European samples. First, we were able to establish measurement invariance for the supranationalism scale, extending the initial research findings presented in chapter 2 and proving that supranationalism can be reliably captured in different European national contexts.

Second, we successfully replicated the link between right-wing ideology and supranationalism, as RWA and SDO consistently predicted less support for supranational governance. This finding is in line with the assumption that right-wing ideologies predispose individuals to prioritise in-group security and status, sometimes at the expense of peaceful collaboration (e.g., Heaven et al., 2006; Kteily et al., 2012).

Third, we also replicated the finding that supranationalism explained a significant share of the variance in Euroscepticism when controlling for other established factors such as national identification and perceptions of immigrant threat (e.g., Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Hobolt & De Vries, 2016). This adds to a growing body of literature that suggests that supranationalism itself plays an increasingly important role for citizens when they evaluate the EU, even in countries that are historically not opposed to the European project (e.g., Brack & Hoon, 2017).

Furthermore, this study also revealed some interesting differences between countries. With regards to the ideological correlates of supranationalism RWA was the key predictor in both the British and Belgian sample when controlling for all other factors. For the German sample, ideological preferences over group hierarchies (SDO) was the dominant predictor of less support for supranationalism. Such different patterns could suggest that evaluations of supranational governance depend on different ideological priorities in different national

context. For example, supranationalism could primarily reflect concerns over control and authority in the UK and Belgium, but concerns over a clear hierarchy among Germans, and a mixture of both for Belgians. Future studies will have to address whether distinct (ideological) rationales to oppose supranationalism can be attributed to different national samples, and whether they contribute to different expressions of Euroscepticism.

Another difference between the national groups was that for the Belgian sample, supranationalism and national identification predicted EU attitudes in the final model but this was not the case for immigrant threat. This is surprising at first glance, given that concern over immigration has previously been linked with voting for Eurosceptic parties in European elections in Belgium (McDonnell & Werner, 2019) and considering the strong negative correlation between immigrant threat and EU attitudes in our Belgian sample. However, Brack and Hoon (2017) showed that, after controlling for other relevant factors, voting for Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 European Parliament elections in Belgium was primarily dominated by voters' attitudes toward Europe itself.

Our results indicate that the role of national identification for attitudes towards supranational governance is ambiguous. In studies 1 and 2, national identity was unrelated to supranationalism when controlling for ideological predispositions. In study 3, national identification predicted less support for supranationalism in the UK, but more support among Belgians and was not a significant predictor for supranationalism among German participants. This suggests that feelings of national belonging can influence how people evaluate principles of supranational politics. However, the fact that both positive and negative associations were captured does support the idea that (lower) levels of supranationalism cannot simply be inferred from (higher) levels of national identification. Instead, Study 3 suggests a more complex relationship wherein participants' construction of their national identity can include self-categorisation components that reflect either pro- or anti-

supranational group characteristics (i.e., being British means being independent of supranational governance). Nevertheless, ideology was the key predictor throughout all studies and samples, which supports the hypothesis that evaluations of supranationalism are related to ideological preferences first and foremost.

### **Conclusion**

Overall, this study further establishes supranationalism as a valid and meaningful concept in the relationship between ideology and EU attitudes, even in countries with less influential Eurosceptic movements than the UK, such as Germany and Belgium. Our model adds further support to the idea that right-wing Euroscepticism relates to negative evaluations of supranational principles, which are associated with tendencies to rely on authoritarian social structures and hierarchical group relations, as well as strong national identification and concerns over immigration. Considering these characteristics, support for Eurosceptic parties on the political right has been closely monitored over the past decade (De Vries, 2018; Henley, 2020; Scutt, 2016) and Eurosceptic successes are commonly framed as troublesome for the EU (Boffey, 2017; Rohac, 2015). Arguably, they are even more relevant to the citizens of affected countries, precisely because their social values on supranationalism, immigration and national identity are implied. This is examined in chapter 4.

#### **Chapter 4: The Implications of Brexit Preferences for National Identification**

The results of studies 1-3 provide clear evidence that Brexit preferences (chapter 2) and negative EU attitudes (chapters 2 & 3) in the UK reflect deep-seated value orientations for local authority structures and hierarchical group relations in society. Indeed, throughout the electoral events that resulted in Brexit support for either side reflected contrasting values, preferences and priorities (e.g., Clarke et al., 2017). In contrast, the purpose of a referendum, both politically and legally, was to establish a national consensus on the matter of EU membership. Chapter 1 outlines the reasons why this constellation provided the ideal conditions for strong and divergent effects on citizens' sense of national identity, and chapter 4 examines how exactly voting for or against EU membership relates to British citizens' group relations.

##### **4.1 Introduction**

Elections are sometimes described as “a battle for the soul of a nation” to emphasise the importance of a political choice, indicative of the core values and policy priorities of a country and its citizens (BBC, 2016b; Biden, 2017). Yet, being on the losing side of high-stake electoral battles can undermine voters' support for democracy, satisfaction with the political system or legitimisation of new government (Hansen et al., 2019). Such winner-loser gaps in voter experiences are more pronounced in majoritarian rather than proportional election systems (Anderson & Guillory, 1997) and when electoral losers previously supported winning campaigns (Craig et al., 2006). Put more simply, the more there is to lose, the stronger voters' reactions are going to be.

Enter David Cameron and his referendum on EU membership in the UK in 2016, where the British public was made to decide on a consequential public policy via a simple majority vote. The eventual victory of a Eurosceptic movement, which had previously not attracted much support at the ballot box, reflected an unprecedented deviation from political

and social norms and divided a nation long after the Brexit vote, until the battle was ultimately won by the pro-Brexit conservative government in the general election of 2019. Meanwhile, new divisions emerged among political elites, between new pro- and anti-Brexit alliances (Ford & Goodwin, 2017; Goodwin & Heath, 2017; Wincott, 2017), and between leave and remain voters evidenced by less pro-social (i.e., helping) behaviour (Murray et al., 2017) and increased prejudice towards each other (Hobolt et al., 2020).

Yet to date, no empirical research has thoroughly examined the divisive effect of an event such as Brexit on voters' perceptions of what many had declared to be on the ballot; their country's values and identities. The studies in this chapter capture for the first time how the British public, and particularly those who "lost the battle for the soul of Britain", experienced the referendum in 2016 and the general election in 2019. Reports from some recent polls showed higher levels of hostility and resentment between voter groups and a strong sense of dissatisfaction among Remain voters (e.g., Bruter, 2019; YouGov, 2019). But can the negative impact of electoral defeat extend beyond mere dissatisfaction, to potentially undermining citizens' general sense of identification with one's country and disrupting the very fabric of society? If politicians and policy makers are to rely on citizens' vote for important decisions, a greater understanding of the potential widespread and disruptive implications of such events is of critical importance.

To date, no empirical research has systematically examined the effect of high-stake referenda or elections on voters' national identification and their general attachment to society, impacting on societal cohesion. Using longitudinal survey data, the present research program examined the impact of Brexit on people's feelings of national identification before and after ballots were cast and we provide insights into the psychological factors involved in the weakening of identification.



### **Group Values and Identities**

To understand why electoral defeat might have had such a stark impact in this context, we draw on social psychological theory, which suggests that shared norms and values are the basis of every social group, as they provide people with a sense of identity and shape their behaviours, attitudes and expectations towards others both inside and outside their respective groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Hogg, 2016; Huddy, 2001). In order to draw on positive group identities, including national identities, members make favourable comparisons against other groups or against another point in time (Mummendey, Klink & Brown, 2001; Sani & Reicher, 1998).

In the run-up to the EU-referendum in the UK for example, both the Leave and the Remain campaign used temporal comparisons to link their political cause to a positive national identity. According to the Remain-campaign, EU membership has made Britain more prosperous and the country was heading towards an even brighter future as a member of the EU. The Leave-campaign on the other hand claimed that Britain was in decline and its prosperity and prestige could only be restored by returning to its independent, pre-EU membership status, by taking back control over immigration and trade policies (Voteleave, 2019). Furthermore, the campaigns' key promises, to shield citizens against economic risks (Remain) or to regain control over laws and immigration (Leave), also addressed different policy priorities and ideological preferences within the electorate. As shown in chapters 2 and 3, stronger perceptions of immigrant threat and greater distrust in supranational politics is associated with stronger Eurosceptic attitudes and support for Leave (Peitz et al., 2018). On the other hand, those who were most concerned about economic stability and the associated risks of leaving the EU, were much more likely to support Remain (Clarke et al., 2017).

Although both campaigns associated a positive national identity with their preferred outcome, evidence shows that stronger national identification predicted voting Leave (Hobolt, 2016; Macdougall et al., 2020). European identification on the other hand was associated with voting Remain (Macdougall et al., 2020), though given that few people identify as European in the UK (Ormston, 2015), the more central national identity was clearly associated with Leave and Brexit. The design of the referendum, establishing a national consensus via a simple majority, meant that the winners' priorities would be enshrined in public policy and the losers' priorities would indefinitely be labelled as a minority position. Thus, the winning side's characteristics would become salient and the normative characteristics more strongly identified as typical British characteristics whereas the electoral losers would have to adapt or reject the majority norms (e.g., see Louis et al., 2012).

Taken together, the referendum on involvement in supranational politics revealed stark contrasts between voters' values and motivations to support or oppose EU membership. An electoral competition also became a competition for normative national identity, and Britishness was most strongly associated with a vote to Leave. During the first vote on this issue, the 2016 referendum, this ultimately meant that a sizable portion (48.1%) of the British electorate found their political priorities largely disregarded in the upcoming changes their country would go through and having to adapt to a new Brexit British identity. At the time of the 2019 general election, a Brexit deal had been negotiated but was stuck in parliament, as the small majority of the incumbent Conservative government failed to ratify the agreement. Prime minister Boris Johnson called a general election to "get Brexit done" and ask the electorate for a clear majority for his Brexit agreement. Voters again had the choice to support Johnson's Brexit or opposition parties that promised to hold a second referendum. Although three years had passed since the initial vote, public support for either side remained

remarkably stable (Curtice, 2019a; WhatUKthinksEU, 2020), which suggests that little had changed in terms of voter priorities and (national) group values.

Thus, capturing voters' Brexit preferences and their levels of national identification at both events provides a unique opportunity to examine how citizens reacted when a majority of their national group supported a policy based on unshared values and priorities, which would subsequently become attached to their shared national identity.

### **Group Change and Identity Management Strategies**

When groups change, either due to internal or external events, members will evaluate how the change reflects on the group and themselves, and then engage in identity maintenance strategies to minimize any negative impact on their personal identity (Blanz et al., 1998; Packer, 2008). A key predictor determining whether people dis-identify in this context is the perception of group threat. However, according to Greenaway and Cruwys (2019), people engage in different identity management strategies depending on the source of the perceived threat. While inter-group threat (e.g., external conflict/criticism) tends to increase group identification and solidarity among members, intra-group threat on the other hand can undermine group cohesion, especially when the source of the threat cannot be expelled from the group. In the context of the UK and Brexit, I would argue that the majority vote for Brexit was perceived as a threat by electoral losers, both for their values as an open society and pragmatic priority of economic stability, which were key pro-EU arguments during both election events (Corbyn, 2019; Stone, 2016). Furthermore, the support for Brexit remained stable over time, with no indication that the threat could be expelled by popular demand. I would also argue that those who perceive higher levels of threat from Brexit would be more likely to distance themselves from the origin of the threat, from leave voters as well as their national group, which has been redefined in terms of the values that Brexit represent.

A second psychological factor we expected to contribute to dis-identification in an electoral context is political efficacy or political power. Electoral defeat results in a significant loss of (political) influence and has electoral losers on the outside looking in during a fundamental group decision, especially when a vote determines an outcome indefinitely. Once an issue is “off the table”, the losing side has limited incentives to participate or further engage in the process. The more central the issue is to voters’ understanding of their group identity, the more should a loss of efficacy be associated with detachment from the group.

To summarise, perceived threat of an event caused and supported by a majority of in-group members should motivate citizens to engage in social distancing and dis-identify and become estranged from their national group and its values. At the same time, the perception to have no control over this process and lacking the efficacy to prevent group change (i.e., becoming a non-EU country), should undermine identification with their country. Thus, these processes provide the link between electoral defeat and dis-identification and estrangement effects among British voters, particularly those for whom the threat and lack of efficacy to stop a Brexit associated with right-wing social values is most relevant (i.e., political liberals).

### **Ideology and Group Identification**

We suspected that the extent to which electoral defeat (the perception of threat and loss of efficacy) would be associated with dis-identification will depend on voters’ political ideology. Theoretical and empirical evidence associates political ideology with baseline levels of group identification and in-group loyalty. Political conservatives show stronger national identification and higher levels of nationalism (e.g., Jost et al., 2003; Napier & Jost, 2008). Political liberals on the other hand tend to score lower on national identification and generally have more flexible identities. This flexibility has been argued to reflect liberals’ susceptibility to contextual factors, such as perceived threat, which led to the *reactive-*

*liberals-hypothesis* (Nail et al., 2009; van der Toorn et al., 2014; Van de Vyver, et al., 2016). Indeed, experimental evidence showed that liberals, but not conservatives, shift in their attitudes towards their group when exposed to an external threat manipulation, such as group criticism. Van der Toorn and colleagues (2014) argued that external threat activates system justification motivations and compels liberals to defend their group from the impact of external threat. Motivated to preserve the social relations and structures provided by the national group against unfair criticism or other threat, individuals will defend it and thus associate more closely (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004). However, I suggest that when the source of the threat is internal, those motivations would not be activated and instead, those with lower levels of system justification and group identification (political liberals) would be less likely to justify and tolerate their groups' transgression, relating to stronger dis-identification and estrangement from the national group.

Voters' political ideology should also relate to their perceptions of political efficacy and reflect the direction of the transition of power in an election. In the context of this research, the anti-immigration aspect of the Leave campaign and a Brexit withdrawal negotiated by an incumbent conservative government should be associated with a lack of political efficacy among more politically liberal voters, and thus contribute to stronger dis-identification and stronger estrangement.

#### **4.2 Overview of the Present Studies and Hypotheses**

The aim of the current research was twofold. We wanted to provide a first empirical account of the impact the political events between 2016 to 2019 have had on national group relations in the UK. A number of hypothesis were made about electoral losers. Electoral losers included voters who supported unsuccessful campaigns in 2016 (voted Remain Vs Leave) and 2019 (voted for a party that backed a second referendum, such as Labour or Liberal Democrats). Specifically, it was hypothesised that electoral losers (vs winners) would

1) dis-identify from their national group (i.e., show lower levels of national identification after vs before the election)

2a) feel more estranged from their political outgroup (i.e., perceived themselves as more dissimilar to people who voted to Leave after vs before the election, Study 4)

2b) feel more estranged from society (i.e., show higher levels of societal estrangement after vs before the election, Studies 5 & 6)

The second aim of the research was to test the role of perceived group threat and political efficacy in the dis-identification and estrangement process. Specifically, we hypothesise that

3a) the relationship between electoral defeat (vs win) and dis-identification/estrangement would be partially explained (i.e., mediated) by electoral losers' perception of threat. Electoral losers would have higher levels of perceived threat of Brexit, which in turn would predict stronger dis-identification and estrangement (Study 6).

3b) the relationship between electoral defeat (vs win) and dis-identification/estrangement would be partially explained (i.e., mediated) by electoral losers' lower perception of political efficacy. Electoral defeat would predict lower political efficacy, which in turn would predict stronger dis-identification and estrangement (Study 6)

4a) the effects of dis-identification and estrangement (Studies 4-6) would be stronger (i.e., moderated) the more politically liberal voters are

4b) the effects of perceived threat and political efficacy (Study 6) will be stronger (i.e., moderated) the more politically liberal voters are

5) there would be no-dis-identification effects among electoral winners (Studies 4-6)

### 4.3 Study 4

This study focused on the initial reaction to the 2016 referendum. Drawing on representative longitudinal data allowed to examine the effects of electoral defeat among the general population and establish winner-loser gaps in the experiences of Remain and Leave voters as Brexit unfolded.

#### 4.4 Study 4: Method

##### Participants

We drew on secondary data from the British Election Study (Fieldhouse et al., 2020), using its nationally representative panel data from England, and specifically the data from English nationals who participated in waves 7 (collected between 14th April 2016 and 4th May 2016) to 10 (collected 24th November 2016 and 12th December), which we refer to as time points pre-vote -2, pre-vote -1, post-vote 1, post-vote 2 in our study. After excluding ‘don’t-know’ and missing responses from the sample ( $N = 11,207$ ) we ended up with a final sample of  $N = 10,408$  participants (51.5% females;  $M_{age} = 51.51$ ,  $SD_{age} = 15.11$ , 53.6% Leave voters). We did not include data from Scotland, Northern-Ireland, and Wales. This decision was made to ensure that results can be compared with study 5 for which we only had the resources to collect data from one region.

##### Measures

To test our hypotheses, we selected measures of national identification, perceived group similarity, political ideology and Brexit vote. Means, standard deviations and correlations between all variables can be found in Appendix C Table C4.1.

##### *National identification*

English and British national identification were measured with single items. Participants indicated their Britishness and Englishness on 7-point scales to ( $1 = \text{minimum score}$ ,  $7 = \text{maximum score}$ ).

### ***Perceived Political Ingroup and Outgroup Similarity***

Participants indicated how much they have in common with a number of different groups including “People who want to leave the EU” and “People who want to remain in the EU” ( $0 = \text{Nothing in common}$ ,  $10 = \text{A great deal in common}$ ). Scores on perceived similarity with “people who want to leave the EU” were coded such that higher scores reflected higher perceived ingroup for Leave voters yet higher outgroup similarity for Remain voters, while higher scores on perceived similarity with “people who want to remain in the EU” reflected higher perceived ingroup similarity for Remain voters yet higher outgroup similarity for Leave voters.

### ***Political Ideology***

Participants indicated their political ideology on a scale from left (0) to right (10).

### ***EU referendum vote***

Participants indicated how they voted in the EU referendum immediately after the vote at time 3 (BES wave 9). Participants who indicated that they did not vote or responded ‘don’t know’ were excluded from our analyses as we focus only on Remain and Leave voters only ( $0 = \text{Leave the EU}$ ,  $1 = \text{Remain in the EU}$ ).

## **4.5 Study 4: Results**

### **Mean Scores Between Groups**

As expected, there were significant differences in voter experiences before and after the Brexit vote. There was a significant difference in voters’ political ideology, as Remain voters were unsurprisingly more liberal ( $M = 4.18$ ,  $SD = 2.18$ ) than Leave voters ( $M = 6.05$ ,  $SD = 2.15$ ). Most importantly, levels of national identification remained stable among electoral winners (Leave voters), whereas there was significant fluctuation among electoral losers (Remain voters) (Figure 4.1). The most notable change can be seen among electoral losers immediately after the ballots were cast, which provides clear evidence that voters



evaluated the referendum outcome as relevant and detrimental to their national identity (Table 4.1). Remain voters identified less with their national group after the referendum compared to before, and the effect was particularly strong for their English identity.

Furthermore, perceptions of voter in- and out-groups became significantly more polarised after Brexit among Remain voters. Specifically, Remain voters indicated they had more in common with other remain voters, and less in common with leave voters after the referendum, compared to the levels of perceived similarity before the referendum. Interestingly, Leave voters felt that they had more in common with remain voters after (vs. before) the referendum, though this perception of common ground did not last until the follow-up. Five months after the referendum, perceived out-group similarity dropped below pre-vote levels for Leave voters (Figure 4.1).

**Figure 4.1**

*Mean levels of National Identification and Perceived In-/Outgroup Similarity in Study 4*




Table 4.1

*Repeated Measure ANOVA Results of Study 4*

Variable	Effect	F	<i>p</i>	Contrasts	F	<i>p</i>
British Identity	Vote	227.43	<.001			
	Time	127.59	<.001			
	Vote*time	9.99	<.001	-2 vs -1	6.08	.014
				-1 vs 1	26.11	<.001
			1 vs 2	0.62	.430	
English Identity	Vote	1533.85	<.001			
	Time	150.94	<.001			
	Vote*time	100.52	<.001	-2 vs -1	1.98	.159
				-1 vs 1	202.76	<.001
1 vs 2				36.74	<.001	
Ingroup Similarity	Vote	92.45	<.001			
	Time	287.12	<.001			
	Vote*time	93.36	<.001	-2 vs -1	3.69	.055
				-1 vs 1	221.98	<.001
1 vs 2				19.65	<.001	
Outgroup Similarity	Vote	64.61	<.001			
	Time	143.95	<.001			
	Vote*time	252.67	<.001	-2 vs -1	0.12	.730
				-1 vs 1	530.65	<.001
1 vs 2				110.84	<.001	

### **Moderation**

We further analysed the role of political ideology in the relationship between voters' referendum vote and their identity and perceived similarity scores in the crucial pre-vote/post-vote timespan. We computed simple difference scores ( $y_2 - y_1$ ) and tested path models with Mplus (version 8, Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017), using a robust maximum likelihood estimation. We first tested for the main effects of referendum vote and political ideology on identity and similarity difference scores, controlling for the baseline levels of identity and perceived similarity as well as demographics. In a second model we entered the interaction term between referendum vote and ideology<sup>11</sup>. Results showed a significant interaction between ideology and referendum vote (Table 4.2). Dis-identification and perceived ingroup/outgroup polarisation were significantly stronger among Remain voters with more politically liberal ideology (Figure 4.2).

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<sup>11</sup> Both models were fully saturated ( $df = 0$ )

Table 4.2

*Standardised Main and Interaction Effects of Referendum Vote and Political Ideology on Identity- and Perceived Similarity Change Scores*


	British Identity change	English identity change	Perceived Out- group similarity change	Perceived In- group similarity change
Model 1				
Vote	-.06***	-.18***	-.22***	.11***
Ideology	-.04**	-.06***	-.02*	-.03*
DV Pre- vote -1	.32***	.26***	.47***	.58***
Age	-.05***	.07***	-.004	-.04***
Gender	-.03***	-.03**	-.004	-.05***
Education	-.02	-.05***	-.005	.01
Model 2				
Vote	-.10***	-.25***	-.30***	.24***
Ideology	-.06***	-.09***	-.06**	.03*
Vote * Ideology	.05	.09**	.10**	-.16***
DV Pre- vote -1	.32***	.26***	.47***	.59***
Age	-.05***	-.07***	-.004	-.04***
Gender	-.03**	-.03**	.004	-.05***
Education	-.02	.05***	.003	.02

*Note.* Vote (0 = Leave, 1 = Remain). Change scores = 'Post-vote 1' - 'pre-vote -1'. Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female), Education (1 = GCSE, 2 = A-Levels, 3 = BSc/Ba, 4 = MSc/Ma, 5 = PhD).

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

**Figure 4.2**

*The Effects of Electoral Defeat on Identity- and Perceived In-/Outgroup Similarity Change in Study 4*



*Note.* Model shows unstandardized conditional effects -1SD/+1SD of political ideology on the relationship between referendum vote and change scores (standard errors in parentheses). \* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

#### 4.6 Study 4: Discussion

Drawing on representative samples of English voters we were able to confirm our hypotheses 1, 2 and 4 on the impact of the EU referendum on electoral losers. While we observed fluctuation in social identities within both groups, as expected, Brexit had a stronger (negative) impact on Remain voters shared national identities, particularly their English identity (H1). The immediate dis-identification coincided with perceptions to have more in common with fellow Remainers and less with the winning majority, as the election made group differences salient immediately for electoral losers, but not winners (H2a, H5). These negative effects on voter group relations were consistently moderated by citizens' ideology, as among electoral losers, more politically liberal voters experienced stronger dis-identification and perceived group polarisation, compared to more politically conservative ones (H4a).

Differences between Remain and Leave voters' national identification were particularly clear for their English identities, which could reflect an asymmetrical association of group identities and responsibility for the referendum result. English voters represented 84% of the British electorate, had the highest voter turnout (73%), and voted in favour of Brexit by a margin of +5.8% and 1.9 million votes, whereas the rest of the UK voted by a margin of +10.5% (0.7 million votes) to remain (EU referendum results, 2016). There is indeed some anecdotal evidence for this assignment of responsibility to English voters in particular in instances where media- and political elites have attributed Brexit to English stubbornness and characterised Leave-voters as 'Little Englanders' (for examples see Greer, 2018; Hawkes, 2019; Smyth, 2017). Thus, for Remain voters it was perhaps more important to distance themselves from their least desirable superordinate (English) identity, which should be further monitored in future studies.

### 4.7 Study 5

While the nature of the representative samples in Study 4 allowed us to draw inferences about the general population, one drawback of using secondary data is the reliance on single item proxy measures. Thus, for study 5 we recruited British citizens for a three-wave longitudinal study before and after the 2016 referendum, using established multi-item measures of national identity and political ideology, and also a direct measure of societal estrangement. The aim was to replicate the findings of Study 4 and increase our confidence in the validity of the psychological constructs of interest.

### 4.8 Study 5: Method

#### Participants

Data for this study was collected three months before (March 14<sup>th</sup> – 15<sup>th</sup>) and immediately after the EU referendum (June 28<sup>th</sup> – July 8<sup>th</sup>), as well as at a follow-up six months later (December 15<sup>th</sup> – January 2<sup>nd</sup>). Initially, 595 English citizens were recruited via the online crowdsourcing platform Prolific Academic (62% females;  $M_{age} = 38,00$   $SD_{age} = 14.86$ , 60% Remain voters). Due to dropout after wave 1 (29%) and wave 2 (22%) and excluding 28 participants who indicated that they did not vote in the referendum, the final sample of participants who completed all three waves was 305, (69.8% females;  $M_{age} = 36.82$ ,  $SD_{age} = 11.27$ , 65.6% Remain voters).

#### Measures

Participants completed measures of national identification, societal estrangement, political ideology and Brexit vote. All measures were scored on a 7-point scale (1 = *Strongly Disagree*, 7 = *Strongly Agree*), unless specified otherwise. Means, standard deviations and Cronbach's alphas of all variables are provided in the supplementary materials (see Appendix Table C4.2).

### ***National Identification***

Levels of national identification were measured with five items (based on Leach et al., 2008), including statements such as: “The fact that I am British is an important part of my identity” and “I am glad to be British”. Item scores were averaged with higher scores indicating higher levels of societal estrangement.

### ***Societal Estrangement***

To capture a detachment component of the dis-identification process we measured participants’ levels of societal estrangement. This measure consists of four items (based on an adapted version of Pattyn et al., 2012), including statements such as: “When I think about British society, I consider myself an outsider” and “I do not feel involved in society at all.” Item scores were averaged with higher scores indicating higher levels of national identification.

### ***Political Ideology***

Participants’ political ideology was measured with 3 items. People were asked to describe their political attitudes and beliefs in general, in terms of economic issues and in terms of social issues on a 7-point scale ( $1 = \text{very left-wing}$ ,  $7 = \text{very right-wing}$ ). Item scores were averaged with higher scores indicating more conservative political ideology.

### ***Brexit vote***

Participants indicated how they had voted in the EU-referendum on Thursday 23<sup>rd</sup> of June 2016 ( $0 = \text{Leave}$ ,  $1 = \text{Remain}$ ).

## **4.9 Study 5: Results**

### **Mean Scores Between Voter Groups**

Similar to Study 4, Remain voters indicated more liberal political ideology ( $M = 3.05$ ,  $SD = 1.26$ ) than Leave voters ( $M = 3.96$ ,  $SD = 1.14$ ). There were again significant differences in voter reactions to the referendum vote. Whereas there was no change in national



identification among electoral winners (Leave voters), electoral losers (Remain voters) dis-identified significantly immediately after the vote, which coincided with an increase of societal estrangement (Figure 4.3). Although both national identification and societal estrangement scores recovered at the follow-up, the contrast is strongest for the pre/post vote timespan (Table 4.3).

**Figure 4.3**

*Mean Levels of National Identification and Societal Estrangement in Study 5*




Table 4.3

*Repeated Measures ANOVA Results of Study 5*

Variable	Effect	F	p	Contrasts	F	p
British Identity	Vote	25.78	<.001			
	Time	29.41	<.001			
	Vote*time	25.86	<.001	-1 vs 1	44.39	<.001
				1 vs 2	10.16	.002
Societal Estrangement	Vote	9.94	.002			
	Time	2.91	.055			
	Vote*time	2.54	.080	-1 vs 1	5.16	.024
				1 vs 2	2.61	.107

### Moderation

As for study 4, we tested for the role of political ideology in the relationship between voters' referendum vote and their identity and estrangement change scores in the crucial pre-vote/post-vote timespan with latent variables in Mplus<sup>12</sup> (version 8, Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017), using a robust maximum likelihood estimation. We first tested a model examining the relationship of referendum vote and political ideology with latent identity and estrangement change scores (see Appendix Figure C4.6 for full model). The model showed acceptable fit,  $\chi^2(262) = 832.02$   $p < .001$ ,  $RMSEA = .060$  (95% confidence interval [CI] = .056, .065,  $CFI = .93$ ,  $SRMR = .062$ ). In a second model we entered the interaction term between referendum vote and ideology<sup>13</sup> (see Appendix C4.7 for full model). Results showed a significant interaction between ideology and referendum vote (Table 4.4). Ideology had an effect on estrangement change but not on dis-identification, and there was no significant interaction between referendum vote and ideology. Looking at the trends of the conditional effects of ideology, very liberal Remain voters (i.e.,  $-1SD$  Political ideology) show slightly stronger dis-identification, whereas moderate Remain voters (i.e.,  $+1SD$  Political ideology) experienced slightly less estrangement increase (Figure 4.4).

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<sup>12</sup> Longitudinal measurement invariance CFA using maximum likelihood estimation indicated acceptable fit for metric invariance models of both societal estrangement and national identification measures (see appendix C4.3).

<sup>13</sup> Mplus does not provide fit indices for models with latent interaction terms.

Table 4.4

*Standardised Main and Interaction Effects of Referendum Vote and Political Ideology on Identity Change and Estrangement Change Scores, Controlling for Demographics*


	British Identity change	Societal Estrangement change
Model 1		
Vote	-.36***	.14*
Ideology	.08	-.19**
Gender	.03	-.01
Age	.01	-.14*
Ethnicity	.003	.04
Model 2		
Vote	-.40***	.10
Ideology	-.02	-.27*
Vote * Ideology	.08	.09
Gender	.05	.01
Age	-.02	-.12
Ethnicity	.002	.03

*Note.* Vote (0=Leave, 1= Remain). Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female). Ethnicity (1= White, 0 = non-white).

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

**Figure 4.4**

*The Effects of Electoral Defeat on National Identity and Societal Estrangement Change in Study 5*



*Note.* Model shows unstandardized conditional effects -1SD/+1SD of political ideology on the relationship between referendum vote and change scores. (standard errors in parentheses).  $*p < .05$ .  $**p < .01$ .  $***p < .001$ .

#### 4.10 Study 5: Discussion

Although study 5 provides some mixed evidence for our hypotheses, the results confirm the asymmetrical negative impact of Brexit on voters, as Remainers dis-identified (H1) and became more estranged from their national group (H2b) whereas these effects were not observed among Leave voters (H5). With regards to the role of political ideology for group identification there was only weak evidence that liberal ideology increased dis-identification effects.

#### 4.11 Study 6

The purpose of study 6 was to capture dis-identification effects in a different election context, informed by the same political event. British citizens took part in another 3-wave longitudinal study before and after the 2019 UK general election. In addition to the effects of (liberal) ideology on group identification, we tested potential mediating factors that could further explain asymmetrical loser-effects, perceived threat and political efficacy.

We know that threat plays a crucial role for changes in group identification, and, if originating from an intra-group source, can undermine group cohesion and drive members away. Brexit dominated the public and political discourse in the 2019 general election, and voters faced a choice between supporting a quick withdrawal from the EU, or holding another referendum (Curtice, 2019b). Another defeat for pro-EU party supporters would render Brexit inevitable, and should, for those who see Brexit as a threat, relate to dis-identification. Electoral defeat would also result in a significant loss of (political) influence and has electoral losers on the outside looking in during a fundamental group decision. We hypothesise that the powerlessness to address group change would be associated with detachment from society and feelings of estrangement.

#### 4.12 Study 6: Method

##### Participants

700 English nationals (50.5% Remain voters, 67% female,  $M_{age} = 37.46$   $SD_{age} = 12.02$ ) were recruited 4 months before (August 20<sup>th</sup>), 1 months before (November 4<sup>th</sup> – 10<sup>th</sup>) and immediately after the general election on December 12<sup>th</sup>, 2019 (December 13<sup>th</sup> – 21<sup>st</sup>). Due to drop-out rates of 16% and 12% respectively, the final sample of participants who completed all three waves comprised of  $N = 519$  (48% Remain voters, 67% female,  $M_{age} = 39.30$ ,  $SD_{age} = 12.28$ ).

##### Measures

Participants completed measures of national identification, societal estrangement, political ideology, perceived Brexit-threat, political efficacy, and GE vote. All measures were scored on a 7-point scale (1 = *Strongly Disagree*, 7 = *Strongly Agree*), unless specified otherwise. Means, standard deviations and Cronbach's alphas of all variables are provided in the supplementary materials (see Appendix Table C4.4).

##### *National Identification*

Levels of British and English national identification were measured with the same 5 items (based on Leach et al., 2008) as in Study 5. Item scores were averaged with higher scores indicating higher levels of national identification.

##### *Societal Estrangement*

Societal estrangement was captured using five items (based on an adapted version of Pattyn et al., 2012), including statements such as: "When I think about British society, I consider myself an outsider" and "I do not feel involved in society at all." Item scores were averaged with higher scores indicating higher levels of national identification.

##### *Political Ideology*

Participants' political ideology was measured with 3 items. People were asked to describe their political attitudes and beliefs in general, in terms of economic issues and in terms of social issues on a 7-point scale (*1 = very left-wing, 7 = very right-wing*). Item scores were averaged with higher scores indicating more conservative political ideology.

### ***Brexit Threat***

Perceived threat was investigated with direct reference to the source (Brexit), and to what extent it is perceived as threatening to the individual and their relevant immediate (family) and extended (community, country) groups view (based on Huddy et al., 2007). We used four items and asked participants whether they perceived Brexit as a threat to themselves, their family, community, and country. Answers were scored on a 5-point scale (*1 = definitely not, 5 = definitely yes*). Items were averaged with higher scores indicating higher levels of perceived threat of Brexit.

### ***Political Efficacy***

We captured participants' levels of political efficacy with the following two items: "Public officials in the UK do not care much about what people like me think" and "The British Government does not pay attention to what the people think when they decide what to do" (based on de Moor, 2016). Both statements were reverse coded, and scores were averaged with higher scores indicating higher levels of political efficacy.

### ***General Election Vote***

We assessed whether participants had voted for a winning or losing party in the 2019 general election. Participants indicated which party they had voted for and the answers were coded according to support for electoral winners and losers. Parties that formed a government, supported the governing party by standing aside or gained seats compared to the previous election were coded as winners (0) and other parties as losers (1). For example, a vote for the Conservatives was scored 0, and votes for Labour was 1. Votes for the two

relevant single-issue (Brexit) parties, UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) and the Brexit Party, were also coded as successful due to their leaderships' tactical decision to aid the Conservatives and not stand candidates against them. Our final sample contained 207 electoral winners, and 260 electoral losers.

### 4.13 Study 6: Results

**Mean scores between groups.** With regard to voter group differences, electoral losers indicated more liberal political ideology ( $M = 2.67$ ,  $SD = 1.22$ ) than electoral winners ( $M = 4.53$ ,  $SD = 1.09$ ). There is a clear pattern over time as identities remain stable among electoral winners, whereas mean levels of national identity decrease, and levels of societal estrangement increased among losers after the election (Figure 4.5). As in the previous studies, the most notable change can be seen among electoral losers immediately after the ballots were cast (Table 4.5).

**Figure 4.5**

*Mean Levels of National Identification and Societal Estrangement in Study 6*






Table 4.5

*Repeated Measure ANOVA Results of Study 6*

Variable	Effect	F	<i>p</i>	Contrasts	F	<i>p</i>
British Identity	Vote	120.60	<.001			
	Time	25.53	<.001			
	Vote*time	21.08	<.001	-2 vs -1	0.01	.912
				-1 vs 1	29.59	<.001
English Identity	Vote	136.69	<.001			
	Time	16.54	<.001			
	Vote*time	16.54	<.001	-2 vs -1	0.21	.649
				-1 vs 1	25.51	<.001
Societal Estrangement	Vote	63.69	<.001			
	Time	0.40	.671			
	Vote*time	41.32	<.001	-2 vs -1	0.37	.546
				-1 vs 1	64.96	<.001

**Model Test**

As for study 5, we tested for the role of political ideology in the relationship between voters' election vote and their identity and estrangement change scores in the crucial pre-vote/post-vote timespan with latent variables in Mplus<sup>14</sup> (version 8, Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017), using a robust maximum likelihood estimation. We first tested the same model as in Study 5, examining the relationship of election vote and political ideology with latent English identity, British identity and estrangement change scores. The model showed acceptable fit,

<sup>14</sup> Longitudinal measurement invariance CFA using maximum likelihood estimation indicated acceptable fit for metric invariance models of both societal estrangement and national identification measures (see appendix C4.5)

$\chi^2(608) = 2131.37, p < .001, RMSEA = .060$  (95% confidence interval [CI] = .057, .063,  $CFI = .91, SRMR = .074$ ). In a second model we entered the interaction term between referendum vote and ideology. This time there were interaction effects for election vote and ideology for both national dis-identification and feelings of estrangement (Table 4.6). The conditional effects of election defeat on dis-identification show that only electoral losers who considered themselves very liberal (i.e.,  $-1SD$  Political ideology) dis-identified as British and English (Figure 4.6). There was no significant interaction for ideology and estrangement change, though the trend shows that among electoral losers, stronger liberals were more severely affected than moderate liberals (i.e.,  $+1SD$  Political ideology).

Table 4.6

*Regression Analysis of Main and Interaction Effects in Study 6*


	English Identity Change	British Identity Change	Societal Estrangement Change	
Model 1	General Election Vote	-.13*	-.17*	.32***
	Ideology	.17**	.14*	-.12
	Gender	.09	.09*	-.07
	Education	-.08	-.06	.01
	Age	.07	.08	-.11*
	Model 2	General Election Vote	-.15*	-.18**
Ideology		-.03	.01	-.04
General Election Vote * Ideology		.19**	.13*	-.10
Gender		.09	.12*	.004
Education		-.07	-.02	.06
Age		.05	.12*	-.04

*Note.* General election vote (0=Win, 1=Loss). Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female), Education (1 = GCSE, 2 = A-Levels, 3 = BSc/Ba, 4 = MSc/Ma, 5 = PhD).

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

**Figure 4.6**

*The Effects of Electoral Defeat on National Identity and Societal Estrangement Change in Study 6*




*Note.* Model shows unstandardized conditional effects -1SD/+1SD of political ideology on the relationship between general election vote and change scores (standard errors in parentheses). \* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

### **Moderated Mediation**

We added perceived threat and political efficacy to the model to test their hypothesised role as mediators between electoral defeat and dis-identification and estrangement. We first tested a model examining the relationship of election vote and political ideology with latent English identity, British identity, and estrangement change scores, mediated by perceived threat and political efficacy (See Appendix C4.8 for full model). The model showed acceptable fit,  $\chi^2(811) = 3146.65$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $RMSEA = .064$  (95% confidence interval [CI] = .062, .067,  $CFI = .91$ ,  $SRMR = .069$ ). In a second model we entered the interaction term between referendum vote and ideology (see Appendix C4.9 for full model). The analysis revealed significant interaction effects between participants' GE vote and political ideology. Among electoral losers, the perception of Brexit threat significantly predicted dis-identification and estrangement, but only for those with more liberal ideology and not for more politically conservative voters (Figure 4.7, Table 4.7). The same pattern held true for the other indirect path. Lower levels of political efficacy were associated with stronger estrangement change among more liberal participants, but not among more conservative voters.

**Figure 4.7**

*The Effects of Electoral Defeat on National Identity and Societal Estrangement Change via Perceived Threat and Political Efficacy*



*Note.* Model shows unstandardized conditional effects -1SD/+1SD of political ideology on the relationship between referendum vote and change scores via perceived threat and political efficacy (standard errors in parentheses). \* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table 4.7

*Conditional Indirect and Total Effects of GE Vote on Change Scores Through the Mediators (Perceived Threat & Political Efficacy) at  $M \pm 1SD$  Values of the Moderator (Political Ideology)*

Dependent variable	Mediator	Ideology	Indirect Effect	SE	Total Effect	SE
English Identity Change	Perceived threat	-1 <i>SD</i>	-0.14**	0.05	-0.20*	0.08
		+1 <i>SD</i>	-0.03	0.06	-0.09	0.11
	Political efficacy	-1 <i>SD</i>	-0.04	0.03	-0.09	0.10
		+1 <i>SD</i>	-0.03	0.03	-0.09	0.10
British Identity Change	Perceived threat	-1 <i>SD</i>	-0.14**	0.04	-0.14	0.08
		+1 <i>SD</i>	-0.03	0.06	-0.02	0.10
	Political Efficacy	-1 <i>SD</i>	-0.04	0.02	-0.03	0.09
		+1 <i>SD</i>	-0.03	0.03	-0.02	0.09
Societal Estrangement change	Perceived threat	-1 <i>SD</i>	0.13**	0.05	.30**	0.10
		+1 <i>SD</i>	0.03	0.05	0.19	0.12
	Political Efficacy	-1 <i>SD</i>	0.15*	0.06	0.32**	0.12
		+1 <i>SD</i>	0.12	0.11	0.29	0.15

Note. \* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

#### 4.14 Study 6: Discussion

We successfully replicated the findings of Study 4 and found that the dis-identification effect among electoral losers was amplified by liberal political ideology. We were also able to shine light on the processes underlying this mechanism. Participants who considered the group's decision to go ahead with Brexit as threatening tried to distance

themselves from this decision and the group itself, as threat consistently predicted change in identity and estrangement levels. As Brexit is perceived by many to reflect and be fuelled by right-wing political preferences (i.e., strict immigration control), it is unsurprising that liberals were more susceptible to this type of threat. Electoral defeat also predicted low political efficacy, which in turn predicted stronger estrangement. However, there was no significant difference for this effect between political liberals and conservatives, as the loss of political representation at the highest level for the foreseeable future would arguably affect voters of either aisle. Nevertheless, stronger estrangement played an important role for the overall effect of dis-identification.

#### **4.15 General Discussion: Chapter 4**

Overall, studies 4-6 provide some important insights as to the consequences of electoral defeat in the context of Brexit. Brexit had a significant immediate impact on levels of national identification among those who ‘lost the battle for the soul of the nation’ in 2016, who subsequently felt estranged from fellow citizens who voted differently (Study 4) and society as a whole (Study 5). The same phenomenon occurred after the general election in 2019, when supporters of parties that advocated for a second referendum suffered a crushing defeat (Study 6).

Our findings highlight that citizens monitor and evaluate the electorate’s choices as relevant for their national group image and dissociate if they perceive things to change for the worse (Becker & Tausch, 2014; Sani, 2008). Such changes in national identification are particularly meaningful considering that feelings of national belonging uniquely contribute to a persons’ self-image as early as childhood, comparable only to influences of one’s family according to Tajfel (1960). Writing about the willingness to self-sacrifice for a group, Tajfel noted that:



There are two [groups] only which seem able to claim as much, independently of what they stand for, whether they are right or wrong; simply, it seems, because they exist, and because we are part of them – our family and our country. Why? Possibly because if either of them is destroyed the whole structure of our life is liable to collapse. (p. 846)

Previously, dis-identification processes had only been observed among smaller partisan or social groups (Ditrich et al., 2017; Ellemers, 1993, Wann et al., 1995). Thus, capturing national dis-identification reflects on the significance of Brexit for the British people and the decision to reject engagement in supranational politics.

Study 6 also provides crucial evidence for the psychological mechanism underlying the dis-identification process, as electoral defeat was linked to low political efficacy and perceived threat of the election's consequences. The impact of political efficacy, or rather the lack thereof, intuitively contributes to voters' estrangement from their group as they are excluded from important decision-making processes. The perception of threat was key to both dis-identification and estrangement effects, showing that the anticipated consequences (e.g., group change due to Brexit) motivate members to seek social distance to a central group identity (Greenaway & Cruwys, 2019).

The finding that (liberal) ideology significantly amplified dis-identification effects in studies 4 and 6, supports the hypothesis that political liberals are more susceptible to threat and less likely to endure their association with an undesirable national group image. It is noteworthy that the effects hold in a model that takes into account voting behaviour, which is itself associated with political ideology (i.e., Remain voters are more likely to be liberals). Among voters who tend to be liberal on average, it is the most liberal ones who show the strongest reactions, which supports the idea that the effect of ideology on identity is general. However, the possibility of an extremism effect cannot be ruled out yet. Van Prooijen et al.

(2015) showed that people at the ideological extremes, both left-wing and right-wing, show stronger negative emotions about politics than moderates. Therefore, an alternative interpretation of our results is that the ideological environment of Brexit (e.g., a rejection of liberal values on immigration and supranationalism), triggered stronger reactions for whom the event is most threatening (i.e., extreme liberals). Only future research can answer whether, or to what extent ideological asymmetries for dis-identification effects are uniquely associated to liberal ideology or ideological extremes.

Future research also needs to clarify whether the factors relevant for dis-identification are also relevant for other identity management strategies, such as schisms (exiting a group) (Sani, 2008; Dietrich & Sassenberg, 2016) or engagement in collective action (Klandermans, 2002; 2014). Some have suggested that polarizing elections could fan the support for separatist movements, or even motivate people to migrate (Motyl, 2014; Wagoner & Barreto, 2019), though the psychological factors shaping such intentions remain unclear and evidence for migration in the wake of national elections is scarce. A more common strategy to address group change is to engage in collective action. There were indeed protest marches in London in the weeks following the Brexit vote (Vulliamy, 2016) and numerous petitions to stop, delay or revoke Brexit garnered millions of signatures (UK Parliament, 2019). There is some evidence that different ideologies can contribute to support or opposition of collective action (e.g., Hennes et al., 2012; Jost et al., 2017), though this has not been studied in the context of electoral winner loser gaps.

### **Conclusion**

Overall, our findings suggest that the decision by the British public to reject European supranationalism was harmful to the social fabric of the United Kingdom. Repeated defeat at the ballot box over the most consequential political decision in recent decades made voters feel powerless, afraid, and ultimately less British and more estranged from society, particularly those who consider themselves politically liberal. Brexit has not only created new

partisan divides (Hobolt et al., 2020), but also undermines existing social bonds, as supporters of supranational politics in Britain both are left out of the European Union and feeling detached from their nation.

## **Chapter 5: Discussion**

### **5.1 Introduction**

This thesis has investigated the psychological processes involved in shaping Euroscepticism and Brexit preferences, as well as the implications of Brexit for voters' national identification. This was investigated with six studies (including over 13,000 participants in total), conducted in three countries, with nationally representative and convenience samples, using both cross-sectional and longitudinal methods. In particular, this thesis produced evidence that right-wing ideology predisposes national citizens to oppose supranationalism, which in turn contributes to stronger Euroscepticism, over and above concerns about immigration or national identity. Furthermore, this thesis highlights the implications of Brexit preferences on winner-loser gaps in the UK, showing the negative effects of electoral defeat on voters' national identification in post-Brexit Britain.

### **5.2 Summary of Chapters 1-4**

Chapter 1 introduced the concept of supranationalism and laid out the importance of understanding opposition to supranational governance in the context of global demand for international cooperation and more specifically, in the context of rising opposition to the European Union (EU), the flagship supranational project. To date, theoretical and empirical approaches attempting to explain Euroscepticism had ignored lay attitudes towards the supranational principles embodied in the EU. However, drawing on evidence that principled opposition to integration motivates Hard-Eurosceptic political parties was theorised as a link between right-wing ideology and Euroscepticism among national citizens. In addition to understanding the ideological roots of supranationalism and Euroscepticism (analysed in chapters 2-3), another focus of this thesis was to capture the consequences of the rejection of European supranationalism in the UK (explored in chapter 4). Anticipating strong asymmetrical reactions among electoral winners and losers of the Brexit referendum, the

research question here focused on the potential negative implications of Brexit on voters' national identification.

Chapter 2 addressed two research aims, to establish a new measure of supranationalism attitudes and examine its ideological correlates and role for EU attitudes. The results of two cross-sectional studies from the UK confirmed the sound psychometric properties of the supranationalism scale. It was demonstrated how supranationalism correlates with RWA and SDO, as preferences for authoritarian and hierarchical social structures predispose individuals to reject supranational principles of delegating power and adhering to egalitarian political structures. It was also shown that supranationalism mediates the relationship between ideology and EU attitudes, after controlling for perceived immigrant threat, national identification, and demographic factors. Thus, chapter 2 provided the first evidence that citizens hold meaningful attitudes towards supranational governance, and that such attitudes draw on right-wing ideological predispositions and contribute to stronger Euroscepticism, at least in a British context.

In Chapter 3, the aim was to expand on chapter 2, and further validate the new scale by testing for measurement invariance with different national samples and compare the psychological factors shaping supranationalism across the United Kingdom, Germany, and Belgium. Drawing on cross-sectional data from these three countries, metric invariance between national groups was established, showing attitudes towards supranational principles load onto the same specified latent factor structure for the English, German, and Dutch scale. Study 3 also replicated the negative association between right-wing ideology (RWA & SDO) and supranationalism, as well as the role of supranationalism as a mediator of the link between ideology and EU attitudes over and above other relevant factors. Interestingly, national identification played a different role for supranationalism in each group, suggesting that evaluations of supranationalism, to an extent, are sensitive to national context. Overall,

the findings in chapter 3 provided supportive evidence for the hypothesis that the lack of support for supranationalism is a key factor to right-wing Euroscepticism, and crucially, is not unique to the British context, but that this link can be found elsewhere (i.e., among German and Belgian samples).

Chapter 4 shifted the focus from the roots of Euroscepticism and Brexit preferences to the implications of Brexit on social relations and national identification in the United Kingdom. Three longitudinal studies captured voters' levels of national identification and societal estrangement during the 2016 referendum and the 2019 general election. All studies confirmed the hypothesised national dis-identification and estrangement effects among electoral losers, extending previous research that has shown such effects for partisan-group identities (e.g., Ditrich et al., 2017; Ellemers, 1993, Wann et al., 1995). Studies 4 and 6 also provided evidence that negative loser-effects were stronger among more liberal voters, for whom the anti-liberal group change that Brexit reflects was more relevant. Study 6 provided some support for this idea, as the link between electoral defeat and dis-identification and estrangement was explained by higher levels of perceived Brexit threat and lower levels of political efficacy. The mediation effects via perceived threat, and (to an extent) via political efficacy were moderated by voters' ideology, as effects were stronger among liberal voters. Taken together, chapter 4 revealed, for the first time, the negative implications of Brexit on Britain's shared national identity. Among electoral losers, more liberal voters detached more strongly from their country and felt particularly estranged, which can be explained by their fear of Brexit and lack of political power to counter Brexit developments.

### **5.3 Theoretical & Practical Implications**

- 1) National citizens, both in- and outside of the UK meaningfully vary in their preferences for or opposition to supranational principles which are associated with

right-wing ideological attitudes about authoritarian and hierarchical social structures.

Despite early claims that citizens' attitudes concerning complex issues, such as European politics do not reflect meaningful opinions based on high levels of knowledge (e.g., Inglehart, 1970), it was shown that preferences towards basic principles of supranational governance can be captured and distinguished from EU attitudes (chapters 2 & 3). This suggests that national citizens in Europe (i.e., UK, Germany, Belgium) have engaged with the concept to a degree that renders it relevant 70 years after supranational government was first introduced in Europe. With regard to factors that are associated with supranationalism, Studies 1, 2 and 3 showed that right-wing ideological preferences for authority and social hierarchy are key predictors of greater opposition to supranationalism. The consistent negative relationship of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social dominance orientation (SDO) with supranationalism fits with previous research that has shown RWA and SDO to be associated with less support for international harmony, and more support for military conflicts (Heaven et al., 2006; Kteily et al., 2012). Those who see the world as a dangerous and competitive place do not appear to buy into the problem-solving capacity of supranational politics and prefer an international order dominated by the nation state. Importantly, there is clear evidence that such preferences cannot simply be deduced from high levels of national identification. This finding provides more indirect evidence for Duckitt and Sibley's dual process model (2010) wherein competitive and dangerous worldviews undermine support for supranationalism and reinforce support for nationalism. Questions as to whether RWA and SDO contribute equally to anti-supranationalism, whether one dimension is more dominant, or whether potential differences depend on national context cannot be concluded based on the samples available here. Past research has shown that RWA and SDO sometimes predict separate preferences on related topics (e.g., see Thomsen et al.,

2008; Milojevic et al., 2014) and future research needs to clarify whether concerns over the loss of authority (related to RWA) vs concerns over group hierarchy (related to SDO) inform opposition to different aspects of supranationalism, and European integration.

There are also broader implications that can be drawn from the association of right-wing ideology and supranationalism. An ideology-based rejection of supranationalism spells trouble for those who were optimistic that globalisation would automatically lead to a post-national global society and who would point at Europe as a sign of things to come (Habermas, 1999). Ever-closer European integration was theorised by some to provide the institutional framework by which a European society would evolve, eventually encompassing and potentially replacing national society (Calhoun, 2007). The emergence of Euroscepticism and ultimately Brexit put this idea on indefinite hold, and the findings presented in chapter 3 would suggest that supranationalism lacks support elsewhere, too, and that obstacles to European or global society can be found outside of the United Kingdom as well. This fits with observations that national populism enjoys increasing support across Europe and the US (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018), precisely when international solutions appear the logical conclusion to contemporary challenges (e.g., global migration, finance, or health). According to Calhoun (2007) “globalization fuels resurgence in nationalism among people who feel threatened or anxious as much as it drives efforts to transcend nationalism in new structures of political-legal organization or thinking about transnational connections” (p. 171). This line of work is the first of its kind to address both phenomena in context of each other and suggests that supranational politics are certainly contested in Europe.

- 2) Supranationalism plays an important role in explaining (i.e., mediating) the association between right-wing ideology and Euroscepticism, beyond established factors such as perceived immigrant threat, national identification, and demographics.



The robust negative relationship between right-wing ideology and supranationalism throughout studies 1-3 appears to confirm at the individual level what political scientists have shown at the party-level (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002). Opposition to supranational integration in principle is a phenomenon among right-wing political parties, but also among right-wing adherents in the general population in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Belgium. Whether these findings have unearthed something like Hard-Euroscepticism (i.e., opposition to any type of European integration), among citizens is discussed in the Limitations & Future Research section. Regardless, the fact that supranationalism contributes to Euroscepticism in a country where EU membership was publicly contested (i.e., the UK) (Studies 1, 2 & 3) as well as in countries where this salient context was missing (i.e., Belgium, Germany, Study 3), reflects a mobilizing opportunity for right-wing Eurosceptic parties compared to their left-wing counterparts (e.g., Kriesi, 2008). Not only are more right-wing citizens attracted to party's stances on policy issues (e.g., anti-immigration), but they are also more likely to buy into constitutive anti-EU arguments based on their dislike for supranationalism itself (see Dolezal & Hellström, 2016; Hutter et al., 2016).

- 3) Voters' Brexit preferences resulted in asymmetrical winner-loser gaps during the 2016 EU referendum and the 2019 general election, where electoral losers dis-identified and became more estranged from their national group.

National identities are social identities after all, and despite their unique role for individuals' sense of belonging, group members will adjust their identification once the group's image changes or becomes less desirable. Previous research has shown such effects only for small social groups (e.g., Ditrich et al., 2017; Ellemers, 1993; Wann et al., 1995), and changes in national identification in response to individual events has only ever been observed after major events (e.g., Coryn et al., 2004). Providing evidence that electoral losers have distanced themselves from their country is not only testimony to the significance that

Brexit has had for the British public, but also shows that election outcomes are not just relevant for feelings towards the political system (e.g., satisfaction with democracy), but also for voters' social shared social identities.

National dis-identification and estrangement effects also have practical implications for the decision-making process by which political leaders call referendums. Consider Gallagher's (1996) conclusion following the analyses of referendums in 12 major European countries:

“It makes sense to put to a referendum issues that cut across, rather than correspond to, the lines of the party system. The referendum is least useful if applied to an issue that runs along the lines of a major cleavage in society” (p.245).

For Gallagher, who assumed major partisan cleavages would correspond to major ideological cleavages, these two pieces of advice were complementary. However, by applying his conclusion to Brexit, one might think the referendum made sense, and yet might not have been useful after all. The EU referendum indeed drew support from across partisan lines, as two thirds of Conservative voters and one third of Labour voters broke with the official party position (to support Remain) and voted for Brexit (BBC, 2019a). At the same time, this thesis and others provide evidence that the referendum unearthed an ideological cleavage that split the country down the middle (Hobolt et al., 2020). Beyond the immediate political and economic consequences of Brexit, many of which likely remain unclear, the findings of chapter 4 imply that Britain's new image as a nation that prioritises independence over international integration and immigration over economic stability has alienated approximately half its population. Evoking unity and internal cohesion as important factors to “unlock” the potential and focus on post-Brexit priorities as the UK leadership has done (BBC, 2019b), could prove difficult in the wake of such as polarising and divisive event.

Thus, when employing a political device to manufacture national consent politicians ought to consider both partisan and ideological cleavages relevant to their referendum carefully.

### **5.5 Limitations and Future Research**

Before closing, some limitations of the current findings should be mentioned. First, the correlational nature of studies 1-3 does not allow to make inferences about the causal direction of the effects, and reverse-causality cannot be ruled out. The dual-process model suggests a causal impact of personality and basic worldviews on ideological attitudes and political attitudes and behaviours. It was argued that worldviews inform how people want to structure society, in this case the cooperation of nation-states, and that this translates into attitudes towards specific supranational institutions such as the EU. However, it is also possible that participants hold pre-existing attitudes towards the EU and related relevant issues, such as immigration, which lead them to form opinions about supranationalism. Future studies examining the relationship between supranationalism and EU attitudes over time could support the theoretical argument made in this thesis (e.g., Leszensky & Wolbring, 2019). Additionally, studies on populations without salient experiences with specific supranational institutions (e.g., outside the EU context) could prove useful to address this issue. If one can show that supranationalism relates to opinions on a range of supranational projects (e.g., WHO, Paris Climate Agreement, UN, etc.) when salient reference points are not available, this would increase the confidence in the mechanisms proposed in this thesis.

Furthermore, the findings presented here ought to be interpreted in the national context from which the samples are drawn. That means interpretations are limited to the British, German, and Belgian context and broader conclusion to a central/ northern European context. Indeed, the Euroscepticism literature differentiates between Central, Southern- and Eastern-Europe as regions with distinct political and historic backgrounds. Regional differences in levels of Euroscepticism show that countries from Southern Europe are

generally less Eurosceptic (Llamazares & Gramacho, 2007) than countries from Eastern Europe, in particular post-communist countries (Jerez-Mir et al., 2009; Taggart & Sczerbiak, 2004), though attitudes within the regions are also not homogenous (e.g., Clements et al., 2014; Jerez-Mir et al., 2009; Teperoglou & Blechior, 2020). None of these differences have been researched in the context of citizens' support for supranationalism, and there are a number of interesting questions that can be posed for nationals of either region. For example, one could investigate whether citizens in post-communist countries, where national governments were controlled by a supreme soviet government, evaluate principles of supranationalism, such as the delegation of power, differently to citizens who only experienced liberal democracies. Another possible research line could investigate whether or to what extent supranationalism is relevant in southern Europe, where there is more support for left-wing Eurosceptic parties than in the north. Historically, southern countries supported the EU in principle, but after the financial crisis of 2008 Euroscepticism rose even among traditionally pro-EU countries (Verney, 2011), and it would be important to test if such experiences led to more critical views of supranational governance, even among left-wing Eurosceptics. Left-wing Eurosceptic parties do generally support the principles of supranational governance, but whether this is true for their supporters needs to be investigated.

In order to establish whether and to what extent EU attitudes can be compared between parties and voters in terms of hard or soft Euroscepticism, supranationalism also needs to be investigated further in terms of its qualitative inferences. Do low and high levels of supranationalism translate into soft and hard Eurosceptic stances among citizens? Drawing on work that opposition to supranationalism is a key indicator of Hard-Euroscepticism at the party level (Taggart & Sczerbiak, 2002), chapters 2 and 3 could suggest that the indirect link between RWA and SDO with EU attitudes via supranationalism reflects hard Euroscepticism

at the individual level. However, the use of a continuous measure of EU attitudes only allows for the inference that less support for supranationalism contributes to stronger Euroscepticism. Whether this really reflects a qualitatively different form of Euroscepticism, would require measurements of EU attitudes that can capture and differentiate between soft- and hard Eurosceptic attitudes. One way to address this issue would be to administer separate measures of Euroscepticism that capture both soft- and Hard-Eurosceptic priorities e.g., reform European institutions (soft) vs abolish European institutions (hard), such as the monetary union.

Another important question that was not addressed here, but ought to be answered by future research concerns the link between national identification and supranationalism. The findings presented in chapters 2 and 3 provide mixed results as to whether national identification relates positively, negatively or at all to supranationalism. Differences between countries might very well reflect different and unique national experiences and backgrounds, and associations between national identities and European identities can be found across Europe (e.g., Westle & Bruchheim, 2016). However, a promising approach to further explore the role of social identity in this line of research may be to investigate different forms of national identification, such as national collective narcissism. National collective narcissism captures inflated views of one's country, wherein individuals believe that their country deserves special treatment (Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), whereas supranational governance entails that rules and regulations apply to all member states equally. Collective narcissism has been found to predict support for Brexit (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017), which would imply a negative relationship with supranationalism, although this link could depend on the specific national context. Cislak and colleagues (2020) showed that the relationship between collective narcissism and support for leaving the EU among Polish citizens was mediated by biased cost-benefit perceptions of EU membership. Participants

with higher levels of collective narcissism were more likely to perceive EU membership as disadvantageous, which in turn predicted intentions to support leaving the EU. This would suggest that collective narcissists interpret supranationalism as counteractive to their quest for special treatment, though this might depend on the specific national context. National collective narcissists from lower status countries might interpret representation at the supranational level as a boost for their country's underappreciated status. The associations with supranationalism have yet to be investigated in future work.

There are also two important questions raised by the results of chapter 4 regarding the generalisability and longevity of the observed effects. While it is tempting to compare the impact of Brexit on British voters to other (similar) events elsewhere in the world, it is difficult to gauge to what extent these effects are generalizable or unique to Brexit. As pointed out in chapters 1 and 4, the design, content and outcome of the EU referendum was the epitome of an electoral event bound to elicit strong reactions by the electorate. In order to find out whether dis-identification and estrangement generally occur in response to such events, one has to investigate similar elections in different contexts with the same research questions, though this could prove difficult. There were some striking similarities of Brexit to the 2016 US presidential election of Donald Trump, where voters bought into a promise to return a nation to past greatness (Make America great again), and which elicited public displays of social distancing among liberal voters who considered the result outside of acceptable group norms (e.g., Ramswell, 2017; Jenkins, 2018; Lieven, 2016; Healy & Peters, 2016; PewResearch, 2016). This could connect the phenomenon of dis-identification in response to electoral defeat with the recent rise of nationalist-populist movements. Thus, it will be important to monitor if significant shifts in domestic political landscapes, be it as the result of direct democratic initiatives or high stakes general elections (e.g., threatening dramatic changes in public policy or constitutional law) generally lead to polarized group

relations and dis-identification among politically liberal or conservative voters. In the absence of opportunities to study the phenomenon along real-world events, experimental methods could attempt to replicate the psychological mechanisms involved in the dis-identification and estrangement effects observed in chapter 4. Past research has shown that identity management strategies can be tested in experimental settings (e.g., Nail et al., 2009). It might be possible to test these effects and explore under which conditions individuals dis-identify from national groups, and whether additional psychological factors aside from threat and efficacy play a role, such as other negative emotions.

Lastly, additional longitudinal research is needed to examine the long-term effects of events such as Brexit. Our research here shows the negative immediate impact on group relations, and divisions between Remain and Leave voters have the potential to turn into hostility (Hobolt et al., 2020). But how long will this inter-group conflict continue once Brexit comes into effect in 2021? An optimist could point to the facts that a) the decision to Brexit is resolved and b) support for either campaign cut through established partisan lines, meaning that there will be plenty of contact between members of each group, which are both factors that should reduce hostility and prejudice (e.g., Barlow et al., 2009; 2012; Paolini et al., 2010). Furthermore, as the UK adapts to its new non-EU status, the focus on political and economic challenges might shift to the external “opponents”, which would draw group members closer and perhaps unite them against foreign threats (Greenaway & Cruwys, 2009). However, there is still the potential for more domestic fallout from the Brexit vote, as Scotland, which voted overwhelmingly to remain, has shown renewed interest in independence (Bennhold, 2017; Curtice, 2020; Greene et al., 2018). The potential economic fallout of Brexit could also reignite assignment of blame from Remain voters and reinforce hostility. Whatever the future holds for the United Kingdom, it will be important to monitor

the cracks that emerged in the social fabric, and whether they can heal or have long lasting negative effects.

## **5.6 Conclusion**

Taken together, the research presented here suggests that there is more to preferences over supranationalism and EU membership than previously thought. Opposition to the EU and its political principles reflect important ideological predispositions and citizens' priorities how to run and organise society, on top of voters' immigration concerns, national identities and socio-economic status. The fact that supranationalism is relevant for Euroscepticism, not only in the UK, but also other countries can help explain why Eurosceptic parties, especially right-wing parties, have been on the rise across Europe, as they appeal to various voter preferences. This is not only bad news for the EU, but also reflects a major challenge for European countries. Voters' reactions to Brexit indicate that decision over involvement in the European project can elicit stark, contrasting visions for a country's future, even among people who are least likely to consider themselves European. Thus, the choice whether or not to embrace supranationalism can have consequences beyond the political and economic welfare of a nation.



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## APPENDIX A: Chapter 2 Supplementary

Table A2.1

*Zero-order Inter-item Correlations and Corrected Item-total Correlations of Supranationalism Items in Study 1 and Study 2*

	Study 1								Study 2							
	Zero-order Correlations							Item total correlation	Zero-order Correlations							Item total correlation
	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.		2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	
1. Engaging in supranational politics is generally a good thing for a nation. (Participation +)	.61	.42	.57	.58	.26	.44	.37	.62	.62	.44	.62	.66	.34	.65	.48	.73
2. Every nation is best off acting independently on the global stage, without commitment to supranational institutions. (Participation -)	-	.63	.54	.48	.41	.47	.55	.72	-	.49	.51	.47	.49	.43	.65	.70
3. National governments should never give up authority to supranational institutions on important global issues. (Purpose -)		-	.47	.41	.57	.52	.65	.73		-	.37	.35	.53	.41	.50	.59
4. Supranational institutions are more likely to solve global issues better than nationally elected governments. (Purpose +)			-	.60	.32	.53	.38	.65			-	.64	.32	.61	.45	.67
5. We achieve more at the international level if all states follow global rules rather than do whatever each likes. (Binding Rules +)				-	.27	.44	.36	.59				-	.26	.61	.41	.64
6. Every nationally elected government should decide independently which rules and standards their citizens must abide by. (Binding Rules -)					-	.40	.56	.54					-	.33	.57	.54
7. Supranational institutions should play a bigger role on the global political stage in the future. (Future Status +)						-	.42	.62						-	.42	.65
8. We should keep political power at the national level and nations should decide on global issues independently. (Future Status -)							-	.65							-	.67

*Note.* Three items were slightly rephrased in Study 2 to reflect more nuanced statements.

In Study 1, item 1 read 'Being part of a supranational institution is a good thing for a nation', Item 2 'Every nation is best off acting independently without interference from supranational institutions.' and Item 7 'Supranational institutions should be granted more powers in the future so that they can have greater impact on global issues.'

Table A2.2

*Factor Loadings and Communalities for Factor Analyses with Oblique Rotation of Supranationalism Items in Study 1 and Study 2*

	Factors		Communalities
	1	2	
Study 1			
Item 1 (Participation +)	<b>.81</b>	.05	.61
Item 5 (Binding Rules +)	<b>.77</b>	.05	.55
Item 4 (Purpose +)	<b>.75</b>	-.03	.59
Item 2 (Participation -)	<b>.49</b>	<b>-.37</b>	.61
Item 7 (Future Status +)	<b>.43</b>	-.30	.43
Item 8 (Future Status -)	.03	<b>-.77</b>	.61
Item 3 (Purpose -)	.12	<b>-.77</b>	.72
Item 6 (Binding Rules -)	-.08	<b>-.74</b>	.49
Study 2			
Item 5 (Binding Rules +)	<b>.86</b>	-.08	.66
Item 1 (Participation +)	<b>.76</b>	.11	.70
Item 7 (Future Status +)	<b>.76</b>	.02	.59
Item 4 (Purpose +)	<b>.75</b>	.05	.60
Item 6 (Binding Rules -)	-.12	<b>.80</b>	.52
Item 8 (Future Status -)	.06	<b>.77</b>	.65
Item 2 (Participation -)	.26	<b>.60</b>	.44
Item 3 (Purpose -)	.11	<b>.60</b>	.61

*Note.* Factor loadings > |.30| in boldface

Table A2.3

*Full Results of Mediation Analysis (Standardized Estimates) for the Associations of RWA, SDO with EU Attitudes via Immigrant Threat and Supranationalism, Controlling for National Identity, Age and Gender in Study 1*

	EU Attitudes	
	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>
Total effect for RWA	-.44 [-.551, -.334]	<.001
Direct effect for RWA	-.24 [-.350, -.130]	<.001
Total indirect effect for RWA	-.20 [-.277, -.128]	<.001
Indirect effect via Supranationalism	-.09 [-.145, -.040]	.001
Indirect effect via Immigrant threat	-.11 [-.169, -.052]	<.001
Total effect for SDO	-.07 [-.182, .042]	.219
Direct effect for SDO	.06 [-.047, .158]	.294
Total indirect effect for SDO	-.13 [-.194, -.056]	<.001
Indirect effect via Supranationalism	-.02 [-.044, .012]	.271
Indirect effect via Immigrant threat	-.11 [-.167, -.051]	<.001

Table A2.4

*Results of Factor Analysis with Oblique Rotation for Supranationalism, National Identification, and Immigrant Threat Items in Study 1*

Scale	Item	Factors		
		1	2	3
Supranationalism (Participation -)	Every nation is best off acting independently, without interference from supranational institutions.	<b>-.78</b>	-.01	-.01
Supranationalism (Participation +)	Being part of a supranational institution like the UN is a good thing for a nation.	<b>-.77</b>	.11	.06
Supranationalism (Problem-solving Capacity +)	Supranational institutions are more likely to solve global issues better than nationally elected governments.	<b>-.75</b>	.08	-.01
Supranationalism (Binding Rules +)	We achieve more at the international level if all states follow global rules rather than do whatever each likes.	<b>-.67</b>	.09	-.03
Supranationalism (Supranational Desire +)	Supranational institutions should be granted more powers in the future so that they can have a greater impact on global issues.	<b>-.66</b>	-.07	.03
Supranationalism (Problem-solving Capacity -)	National governments should never give up authority to supranational institutions on important global issues	<b>-.65</b>	-.13	-.12
Supranationalism (Supranational Desire -)	We should keep political power at the national level and nations should decide on global issues independently	<b>-.57</b>	-.15	-.08
Supranationalism (Binding Rules -)	Every nationally elected government should decide independently which rules and standards their citizens must abide by.	<b>-.41</b>	<b>-.31</b>	-.11
National Identity	I feel committed to the British people.	.06	<b>.95</b>	-.05
National Identity	Being British gives me a good feeling.	-.03	<b>.93</b>	.02
National Identity	I feel solidarity with the British people	.07	<b>.91</b>	-.03
National Identity	I am glad to be British.	-.04	<b>.88</b>	.04
National Identity	The fact that I am British is an important part of my identity.	-.09	<b>.85</b>	.03
Immigrant Threat	The presence of immigrants is problematic for our cultural norms and values in England	-.06	-.02	<b>1.00</b>
Immigrant Threat	Immigrants are posing a threat to the economic and political system of England	.08	-.02	<b>.78</b>

*Note.* Factor loadings > |.30| in boldface

Table A2.5

*Results of Factor Analysis with Oblique Rotation of EU Attitudes and Supranationalism Items in Study 2*

Scale	Items	Factors	
		1	2
EU_06	The European Union functions well as it is.	<b>.91</b>	-.14
EU_08	I trust the European Parliament.	<b>.90</b>	-.03
EU_05	I feel solidarity with the European people.	<b>.90</b>	-.11
EU_04	The fact that I am a European citizen is an important part of my identity.	<b>.88</b>	-.13
EU_03	Being European citizen gives me a good feeling.	<b>.83</b>	-.01
EU_07	The European Union is wasting a lot of tax money.	<b>.72</b>	.04
EU_12	The United Kingdom has benefited from being a member of the European Union.	<b>.69</b>	.22
EU_02	The European Union poses a threat to British identity and culture.	<b>.69</b>	.20
EU_11	The European Union reflects a model of international cooperation and peace that should be used in other parts of the world.	<b>.69</b>	.21
EU_09	The European Union fosters peace and stability.	<b>.67</b>	.24
EU_10	The European Union fosters the preservation of the environment.	<b>.64</b>	.20
EU_01	I feel threatened by the European Union.	<b>.58</b>	.23
Supranat_01	Engaging in supranational politics is generally a good thing for a nation.	-.07	<b>.84</b>
Supranat_05	We achieve more at the international level if all states follow global rules rather than do whatever each likes.	-.05	<b>.76</b>
Supranat_02	Every nation is best off acting independently on the global stage, without commitment to supranational institutions.	.00	<b>.76</b>
Supranat_04	Supranational institutions are more likely to solve global issues better than nationally elected governments.	-.02	<b>.75</b>
Supranat_08	We should keep political power at the national level and nations should decide on global issues independently.	.05	<b>.66</b>
Supranat_07	Supranational institutions should play a bigger role on the global political stage in the future.	.10	<b>.65</b>
Supranat_03	National governments should never give up authority to supranational institutions on important global issues.	.19	<b>.49</b>
Supranat_06	Every nationally elected government should decide independently which rules and standards their citizens must abide by.	.24	<b>.40</b>

*Note.* Factor loadings > |.30| in boldface

Table A2.6

*Results of Factor Analyses with Oblique Rotation for Supranationalism, National Identification, and Immigrant Threat Items in Study 2*

Scale	Item	Factors		
		1	2	3
Supranationalism (Participation +)	Engaging in supranational politics is generally a good thing for a nation.	<b>.83</b>	.12	-.05
Supranationalism (Problem-solving Capacity +)	Supranational institutions are more likely to solve global issues better than nationally elected governments.	<b>.81</b>	.01	.09
Supranationalism (Binding Rules +)	We achieve more at the international level if all states follow global rules rather than do whatever each likes.	<b>.79</b>	.04	.08
Supranationalism (Supranational Desire +)	Supranational institutions should play a bigger role on the global political stage in the future.	<b>.79</b>	.02	.09
Supranationalism (Participation -)	Every nation is best off acting independently on the global stage, without commitment to supranational institutions.	<b>.63</b>	-.07	-.15
Supranationalism (Supranational Desire -)	We should keep political power at the national level and nations should decide on global issues independently.	<b>.56</b>	-.08	-.17
Supranationalism (Problem-solving Capacity -)	National governments should never give up authority to supranational institutions on important issues.	<b>.43</b>	-.13	-.25
Supranationalism (Binding Rules -)	Every nationally elected government should decide independently which rules and standards their citizens must abide by.	<b>.38</b>	-.18	-.19
National Identity	Being English gives me a good feeling.	-.01	<b>.93</b>	-.09
National Identity	I feel committed to the English people.	.07	<b>.90</b>	.03
National Identity	I feel solidarity with the English people.	.01	<b>.88</b>	.00
National Identity	I am glad to be English.	-.02	<b>.86</b>	-.07
National Identity	The fact that I am English is an important part of my identity	-.02	<b>.78</b>	.11
Immigrant Threat	The presence of immigrants is problematic for our cultural norms and values in England.	-.01	-.01	<b>.92</b>
Immigrant Threat	Immigrants are posing a threat to the economic and political system of England.	-.01	-.01	<b>.92</b>

*Note.* Factor loadings > |.30| in boldface

Table A2.7

*Results (Standardised Estimates) of Study 1 Showing the Effects of Supranationalism on EU Attitudes Over and Above the Effects of Ideological, Intergroup, Identity-based, and Demographic Variables, including Income*

	EU Attitudes		EU Attitudes	
	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>
Supranationalism	.23 [.188, .333]	<.001	.22 [.116, .331]	<.001
RWA	-.23 [-.338, -.116]	<.001	-.23 [-.344, -.120]	<.001
SDO	.05 [-.053, .152]	.347	.03 [-.075, .131]	.592
National Identification	.06 [-.043, .156]	.264	.03 [-.065, .134]	.498
Immigrant Threat	-.34 [-.456, -.221]	<.001	-.32 [-.441, -.204]	<.001
Age	-.11 [-.189, -.028]	.008	-.13 [-.209, -.049]	.002
Gender	.05 [-.033, .132]	.237	.08 [-.008, .164]	.074
Education	.08 [.000, .162]	.050	.02 [-.075, .112]	.700
Personal Income			.13 [.016, .248]	.025
Household Income			.05 [-.078, .176]	.451

*Note:* Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female), Education (1 = GCSE, 2 = A-Levels, 3 = BSc/Ba, 4 = MSc/Ma, 5 = PhD).



Table A2.8

*Results (Standardised Estimates) of Study 1 Showing the Effects of RWA and SDO Towards Supranationalism when Controlling for Identity-based, and Demographic variables, including Income*

	Supranationalism			
	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>
RWA	-.35 [-.471, -.220]	<.001	-.34 [-.468, -.214]	<.001
SDO	-.07 [-.181, .040]	.221	-.08 [-.190, .034]	.173
National Identification	-.10 [-.209, .014]	.070	-.11 [-.225, .008]	.068
Age	-.12 [-.216, -.013]	.026	-.11 [-.214, -.006]	.038
Gender	.05 [-.049, .142]	.339	.04 [-.061, .142]	.436
Education	.16 [.055, .265]	.003	.14 [.022, .263]	.021
Personal Income			-.03 [-.167, .118]	.734
Household Income			.09 [-.052, .230]	.763

*Note.* Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female), Education (1 = GCSE, 2 = A-Levels, 3 = BSc/Ba, 4 = MSc/Ma, 5 = PhD).

Table A2.9

*Results (Standardised Estimates) of Study 2 Showing the Effects of Supranationalism on EU Attitudes over and above the Effects of Ideological, Intergroup, Identity-based, and Demographic Variables, including Income*

	EU Attitudes		EU Attitudes	
	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>
Supranationalism	.39 [.421, .627]	<.001	.40 [.316, .413]	<.001
RWA	-.03 [-.165, .084]	.530	-.03 [-.130, .062]	.488
SDO	-.03 [-.165, .078]	.477	-.04 [-.128, .055]	.438
National Identification	.07 [-.018, .162]	.118	.07 [-.015, .156]	.105
Immigrant Threat	-.41 [-.353, -.219]	<.001	-.41 [-.498, -.314]	<.001
Economic Conservatism	-.03 [-.134, .073]	.566	-.03 [-.124, .065]	.539
Age	-.17 [-.028, -.012]	.037	-.17 [-.238, -.104]	<.001
Gender	.11 [.093, .554]	.005	.12 [.046, .201]	.002
Education	.01 [-.093, .111]	.886	.00 [-.063, .060]	.963
Personal Income			.06 [-.015, .138]	.120
Household Income			-.03 [-.104, .052]	.512

*Note.* Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female), Education (1 = GCSE, 2 = A-Levels, 3 = BSc/Ba, 4 = MSc/Ma, 5 = PhD).

Table A2.10

*Results (Standardised Estimates) of Study 2 Showing the Effects of Supranationalism on EU Attitudes over and above the Effects of Ideological, Intergroup, Identity-based, and Demographic variables, including Income*

	Brexit Cooperation		Brexit Cooperation	
	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>
Supranationalism	.33 [.152, .374]	<.001	.32 [.188, .458]	<.001
RWA	.04 [-.083, .141]	.598	.03 [-.109, .172]	.663
SDO	-.13 [-.202, -.006]	.042	-.12 [-.243, -.006]	.040
National Identification	.15 [.024, .176]	.011	.15 [.035, .264]	.010
Immigrant Threat	-.12 [-.105, .008]	.086	-.13 [-.256, .005]	.060
Economic Conservatism	-.01 [-.087, .067]	.816	-.02 [-.139, .093]	.700
Age	.05 [-.003, .010]	.338	.04 [-.051, .132]	.383
Gender	.02 [-.152, .211]	.753	.02 [-.084, .119]	.763
Education	.08[-.022, .143]	.155	.04 [-.054, .130]	.415
Personal Income			.02 [-.098, .128]	.792
Household Income			.03 [-.084, .142]	.617

*Note:* Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female), Education (1 = GCSE, 2 = A-Levels, 3 = BSc/Ba, 4 = MSc/Ma, 5 = PhD).

Table A2.11

*Results (Standardised Estimates) of Study 2 Showing the Effects of Supranationalism on Brexit-Control Preferences over and above the Effects of Ideological, Intergroup, Identity-based, and Demographic Variables, including Income*

	Brexit Control		Brexit Control	
	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>
Supranationalism	-.24 [-.373, -.198]	<.001	-.24 [-.314, -.168]	<.001
RWA	.22 [.162, .351]	<.001	.23 [.146, .303]	<.001
SDO	.05 [-.038, .151]	.231	.05 [-.032, .123]	.250
National Identification	.13 [.058, .203]	.001	.13 [.061, .204]	<.001
Immigrant Threat	.39 [.193, .304]	<.001	.40 [.317, .484]	<.001
Economic Conservatism	-.04 [-.113, .041]	.371	-.04 [-.113, .043]	.381
Age	.07 [.001, .014]	.037	.07 [.005, .137]	.035
Gender	-.02 [-.207, .117]	.590	-.02 [-.082, .045]	.567
Education	-.03 [-.114, .053]	.470	.01 [-.061, .071]	.881
Personal Income			-.01 [-.085, .060]	.737
Household Income			.01 [-.076, .086]	.904

*Note.* Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female), Education (1 = GCSE, 2 = A-Levels, 3 = BSc/Ba, 4 = MSc/Ma, 5 = PhD).

Table A2.12

*Results (Standardised Estimates) of Study 2 Showing the Effects of RWA and SDO Towards Supranationalism when Controlling for Identity-based, and Demographic variables, including Income*

	Supranationalism		Supranationalism	
	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>	$\beta$ [CI <sub>95</sub> ]	<i>p</i>
RWA	-.27 [-.388, -.113]	<.001	-.27 [-.406, -.137]	<.001
SDO	-.21 [-.317, -.097]	<.001	-.22 [-.322, -.108]	<.001
National Identification	-.08 [-.174, .018]	.145	-.09 [-.188, .008]	.073
Economic Conservatism	-.03 [-.111, .062]	.580	-.07 [-.173, .040]	.222
Age	-.03 [-.010, .004]	.420	-.04 [-.122, .042]	.341
Gender	.11 [.034, .491]	.029	.10 [-.003, .203]	.056
Education	.18 [.087, .294]	<.001	.10 [.000, .194]	.049
Personal Income			-.02 [-.130, .088]	.705
Household Income			.18 [.084, .276]	<.001

*Note:* Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female), Education (1 = GCSE, 2 = A-Levels, 3 = BSc/Ba, 4 = MSc/Ma, 5 = PhD).



## APPENDIX C: Chapter 4 Supplementary

Table C4.1

*Means, Standard Deviations and Zero-order Correlations Between Variables in Study 4*

	M (SD)	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.	20.	21.	
1. UK ID -2	5.87 (1.38)	.73*	.68*	.69*	.39*	.32*	.31*	.31*	.04	.04*	.05*	.06*	.08*	.07*	.12*	.09*	-.13*	.18*	.18*	.05*	-.09*	
2. UK ID -1	5.80 (1.40)		.73*	.72*	.29*	.36*	.29*	.29*	.02	.04*	.05*	.05*	.08*	.07*	.12*	.08*	-.11*	.17*	.17*	.06*	-.09*	
3. UK ID 1	5.66 (1.51)			.71*	.29*	.30*	.38*	.30*	.02	.03	.06*	.06*	.09*	.09*	.16*	.11*	-.14*	.18*	.17*	.06*	-.08*	
4. UK ID 2	5.79 (1.45)				.31*	.31*	.31*	.39*	.02	.03	.04*	.07*	.10*	.10*	.15*	.10*	-.14*	.20*	.20*	.05*	-.08*	
5. EN ID -2	5.90 (1.58)					.83*	.81*	.81*	.08*	.08*	.05*	.06*	.03	.04*	.15*	.09*	-.31*	.30*	.20*	.06*	-.22*	
6. EN ID -1	5.86 (1.61)						.84*	.82*	.07*	.08*	.04*	.06*	.03	.05*	.15*	.10*	-.32*	.31*	.21*	.04*	-.22*	
7. EN ID 1	5.72 (1.73)							.83*	.06*	.07*	.03	.05*	.04*	.06*	.19*	.11*	-.37*	.33*	.23*	.04*	-.23*	
8. EN ID 2	5.80 (1.67)								.07*	.07*	.04*	.06*	.05*	.06*	.17*	.10*	-.35*	.32*	.24*	.04*	-.23*	
9. In-Sim -2	7.10 (2.17)									.48*	.35*	.34*	-.31*	-.23*	-.12*	-.17*	-.14*	.09*	.07*	.02	-.04*	
10. In-Sim -1	7.27 (2.14)										.41*	.37*	-.25*	-.30*	-.13*	-.17*	-.16*	.07*	.10*	.06*	-.08*	
11. In-Sim 1	7.64 (2.06)											.44*	-.19*	-.20*	-.21*	-.21*	.02	.03	.08*	.08*	-.04*	
12. In-Sim 2	7.78 (2.16)												-.21*	-.23*	-.17*	-.36*	-.04	.03	.13*	.06*	-.05*	
13. Out-Sim -2	3.80 (2.45)													.53*	.40*	.42*	.05*	.07*	-.07*	-.02	.07*	
14. Out-Sim -1	3.86 (2.50)														.45*	.45*	.04*	.07*	-.07*	-.01	.08*	
15. Out-Sim 1	3.71 (2.75)															.52*	-.23	.17*	.03	.00	-.04*	
16. Out-Sim 2	3.29 (2.68)																-.12*	.10*	-.16*	-.02	.00	
17. Brexit																		-.40*	-.20*	.00	.23*	
18. Ideo	5.14 (2.36)																			.16*	-.06*	-.10*
19. Age	51.51 (15.11)																				-.03	-.21*
20. Gender																						-.02
21. Edu	11.92 (5.30)																					

*Note.* UK ID = British Identity, EN ID= English Identity, In-Sim = Perceived Ingroup Similarity, Out-sim = Perceived Outgroup Similarity, Ideo = Political Ideology, Edu = Education. Referendum vote (0=Leave, 1= Remain), Ideology (1=very liberal, 7=very conservative), Gender (1=male, 2= Female), Education (1=no formal qualification, 18 = Other technical, professional or higher qualification).

\* $p < .001$ .

Table C4.2

*Means, Standard Deviations, Cronbach Alphas (in Parentheses) and Zero-order Correlations Between Variables in Study 5*

	M (SD)	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
1. UK ID pre-vote -1	4.97 (1.40)	(.94)	-.69**	.76**	-.62**	-.62**	-.55**	.27**	-.15**	.13*	.01
2. UK ID post-vote 1	4.39 (1.66)		(.96)	.78**	-.49**	-.67**	-.55**	.36**	-.39**	.18**	.05
3. UK ID post-vote 2	4.89 (1.48)			(.96)	-.62**	-.65**	-.67**	.34**	-.29**	.17**	.07
4. Estrangement pre-vote-1	3.26 (1.30)				(.79)	.72**	.68**	-.25**	.11*	-.13**	-.05
5. Estrangement post-vote1	3.39 (1.37)					(.83)	.71**	-.32**	.21**	-.21**	-.05
6. Estrangement post-vote2	3.31 (1.31)						(.82)	-.26**	.15*	-.22**	-.09
7. Ideology pre-vote -1	3.40 (1.20)							(.91)	-.36**	.16**	-.03
8. Referendum Vote									-	-.26**	-.02
9. Age	38.00 (14.86)									-	.17**
10. Gender											-

*Note.* Referendum Vote was indicated at post-vote 1, (0= Leave, 1 = Remain), Ideology (1= very left wing, 7 = very right-wing), Gender (1 = Male, 2= Female).

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .



Table C4.3

*Longitudinal Measurement Invariance for Dependent Variables Before and After the Vote in Study 5*

		X <sup>2</sup> (df)	CFI	RMSEA (90%CI)	SRMR	Model comp	ΔX <sup>2</sup>	ΔCFI	ΔRMSEA	ΔSRMR	Decision
British Identity	M1: Configural Invariance	290.55 (29) ***	.925	.122 (.110-.135)	.035	--	--	--	--	--	--
	M2: Metric Invariance	355.20 (34) ***	.908	.125	.046	M1	64.65 (5) ***	.017	.003	.011	Reject
	M2a: Partial* Metric Invariance	329.73 (33) ***	.915	.122	.042	M1	39.18 (4) ***	.010	.000	.007	Accept
	M3: Scalar Invariance	421.64 (37) ***	.892	.130	.055	M2b	91.91 (4) ***	.016	.005	.013	Reject
Societal Estrangement	M1: Configural Invariance	36.07 (15) **	.985	.048 (.028-.069)	.031	--	--	--	--	--	--
	M2: Metric Invariance	40.46 (19) **	.985	.043 (.025-.062)	.039	M1	4.39 (4)	.000	.005	.008	Accept
	M3: Scalar Invariance	65.94 (23) ***	.969	.056 (.040-.072)	.040	M2	25.48 (4) ***	.016	.013	.001	Accept

Note. \* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

British Identity Partial Metric Invariance: Loading of item 1 at 'pre-vote -1' was freed based on modification indices.

Table C4.4

*Means, Standard Deviations, Cronbach Alphas (in Parentheses) and Zero-order Correlations Between Variables in Study 6*

	M (SD)	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.
1. UK ID -2	5.04 (1.36)	(.95)	.81***	.78***	.88***	.76***	.72***	-.43***	-.43***	-.52***	-.26***	-.38***	.41***	-.39***	.21***	-.05	-.12**
2. UK ID -1	5.01 (1.36)		(.95)	.79***	.75***	.87***	.73***	-.42***	-.43***	-.52***	-.26***	-.36***	.40***	-.40***	.19***	-.11**	-.17***
3. UK ID 1	4.77 (1.55)			(.95)	.73***	.75***	.89***	-.45***	-.42***	-.66***	-.33***	-.52***	.50***	-.50***	.24***	-.06	-.19***
4. EN ID -2	4.95 (1.48)				(.96)	.84***	.80***	-.36***	-.37***	-.47***	-.27***	-.46***	.43***	-.44***	.22***	-.05	-.15***
5. EN ID -1	4.96 (1.50)					(.96)	.83***	-.38***	-.38***	-.48***	-.27***	-.42***	.44***	-.43***	.24***	-.09*	-.17***
6. EN ID 1	4.75 (1.70)						(.97)	-.37***	-.37***	-.57***	-.33***	-.55***	.54***	-.51***	.26***	-.06	-.20***
7. Estr -2	3.98 (1.13)							(.78)	.67***	.67***	.43***	.29***	-.24***	.24***	-.11**	-.05	-.02
8. Estr -1	3.98 (1.10)								(.76)	.66***	.42***	.22***	-.24***	.22***	-.17***	-.03	-.02
9. Estr 1	4.04 (1.27)									(.82)	.55***	.47***	-.41***	.47***	-.26***	.00	.07
10. Efficacy 1	5.22 (1.44)										(.88)	.32***	-.33***	.47***	-.14***	.04	-.05
11. Threat 1	2.87 (1.36)											(.96)	-.52***	.70***	-.28***	.10*	.14**
12. Ideology	3.43 (1.37)												(.95)	-.68***	.19***	-.12**	-.10**
13. GE vote														-	-.27***	.11*	.08
14. Age	37.46 (12.02)															-.08*	-.06
15. Gender																	.04
16. Education	2.73 (1.19)																

*Note.* UK ID = British Identity, EN ID = English Identity, Estr = Societal Estrangement.

GE Vote was indicated at post-vote 1 (0= Winner, 1 = Loser), Ideology (1= very left wing, 7 = very right-wing), Gender (1 = Male, 2= Female), Education (1=GCSE, 2=A-Levels, 3=BSc/Ba, 4=MSc/Ma, 5=PhD).

\*p < .05. \*\* p < .01. \*\*\* p < .001.

Table C4.5

*Longitudinal Measurement Invariance Test for Dependent Variables Before and After the Vote in Study 6*

		X <sup>2</sup> (df)	CFI	RMSEA (90%CI)	SRMR	Model comp	ΔX <sup>2</sup>	ΔCFI	ΔRMSEA	ΔSRMR	Decision
English Identity	M1: Configural Invariance	104.73 (29) ***	.980	.067 (.053-.081)	.016	--	--	--	--	--	--
	M2: Metric Invariance	138.75 (34) ***	.972	.072 (.060-.085)	.083	M1	34.02 (5) ***	.008	.005	.063	Reject
	M2a: Partial* Metric Invariance	124.63 (33) ***	.975	.069 (.056-.082)	.067	M1	19.90 (4) ***	.005	.002	.051	Accept
	M3: Scalar Invariance	155.96 (36) ***	.968	.074 (.062-.086)	.090	M2a	31.33 (3) ***	.007	.005	.023	Reject
British Identity	M1: Configural Invariance	163.78 (29) ***	.961	.089 (.076-.102)	.032	--	--	--	--	--	--
	M2: Metric Invariance	196.83 (34) ***	.952	.090 (.078-.103)	.099	M1	33.05 (4) ***	.009	.001	.067	Reject
	M2a: Partial* Metric Invariance	174.86 (32) ***	.958	.087 (.075-.100)	.069	M1	11.08 (3) **	.003	.002	.037	Accept
	M3: Scalar Invariance	207.47 (35) ***	.950	.092 (.080-.104)	.091	M2b	33.61 (3) ***	.011	.003	.059	Reject
Societal Estrangement	M1: Configural Invariance	117.75 (29) ***	.950	.072 (.059-.086)	.054	--	--	--	--	--	--
	M2: Metric Invariance	134.70 (34) ***	.943	.071 (.059-.084)	.071	M1	16.95 (5) ***	.007	.001	.017	Accept
	M3: Scalar Invariance	144.29 (39) ***	.940	.068 (.056-.080)	.070	M2	9.59 (5)	.003	.003	.001	Accept


*Note.* English Identity Partial Metric Invariance: Loadings of items 1 and 3 at 'pre-vote -1' were freed based on modification indices.

British Identity Partial Metric Invariance: Loading of item 1 at 'pre-vote -1' was freed based on modification indices.

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Figure C4.6


*Model Testing the Main Effects of Electoral Defeat and Political Ideology on Identity and Estrangement Change Scores*



*Note.* Additional demographic control variables were omitted for visual clarity

Figure C4.7


*Model Testing the Main-, and Interaction Effects of Electoral Defeat and Political Ideology on Identity and Estrangement Change Scores*



*Note.* Additional demographic control variables were omitted for visual clarity

Figure C4.8


*Mediation Model Testing the Effect of Electoral Defeat on Identity, and Estrangement Change Scores via Perceived Threat and Political Efficacy*



*Note.* The model tested in study 6 contained two identity change scores (English & British). The second change score, as well as additional demographic control variables were omitted for visual clarity

Figure C4.9

*Moderated Mediation Model Testing the Effect of Electoral Defeat on Identity-/Estrangement Change Scores via Perceived Threat and Political Efficacy*



Note. The model tested in study 6 contained two identity change scores (English & British). The second change score, as well as the separate indicators of political efficacy (4) and perceived threat (2), and additional demographic control variables were omitted for visual clarity.

**APPENDIX D: Materials and Measures****Study 1****Supranationalism**

Please read the following abstract about Supranationalism and then rate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements:

A supranational institution is a union of several nations, to which members (the countries) delegate authority on certain policy domains, in order to solve complex political issues more effectively. Such institutions can be equipped with powers to enforce laws and regulations that every member country has to abide by. The United Nations (UN) would be an example of such an institution.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements: (1 = *Strongly Disagree* to 7 = *Strongly Agree*).

1. Being part of a supranational institution like the UN is a good thing for a nation.
2. Every nation is best off acting independently, without interference from supranational institutions.
3. National governments should never give up authority to supranational institutions on important global issues
4. Supranational institutions are more likely to solve global issues better than nationally elected governments.
5. We achieve more at the international level if all states follow global rules rather than do whatever each likes.
6. Every nationally elected government should decide independently which rules and standards their citizens must abide by.
7. Supranational institutions should be granted more powers in the future so that they can have a greater impact on global issues.



8. We should keep political power at the national level and nations should decide on global issues independently

### **National Identity British**

1. I am glad to be British.
2. Being British gives me a good feeling.
3. I feel solidarity with the British people.
4. I feel committed to the British people.
5. The fact that I am British is an important part of my identity.

### **EU Attitudes**

Indicate how you feel generally towards the European Union:

Negative	<input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/>	Positive
----------	---	----------

### **Perceived Immigrant Threat**

1. Immigrants are posing a threat to the economic and political system of the UK.
2. The presence of immigrants is problematic for our cultural norms and values in the UK.

### **Right-Wing Authoritarianism**

1. It's great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority.
2. What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity.
3. Students at high schools and at university must be encouraged to challenge, criticize, and confront established authorities.
4. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
5. The "old-fashioned ways" and "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live.
6. This country will flourish if young people stop experimenting with drugs, alcohol, and sex, and pay more attention to family values.
7. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse.
8. Strong, tough government will harm not help our country.

9. The facts on crime and the recent public disorders show we have to crack down harder on troublemakers, if we are going preserve law and order.

### **Social Dominance Orientation**

1. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom.
2. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
3. No one group should dominate in society.
4. Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top.
5. Group equality should not be our primary goal.
6. It is unjust to try to make groups equal.
7. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
8. We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed.

## Study 2

### Supranationalism

Please read the following abstract about supranationalism and then rate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements:

Supranationalism refers to a concept of legally binding political cooperation between nations. National representatives negotiate agreements on political issues when pursuing shared objectives in a centralised manner promises to be more effective than dealing with the bureaucratic and legal boundaries of individual nation-states. This can take the form of trade-agreements, or political and military unions.

Therefore, supranationalism requires the acknowledgement of an external and independent institution. Those supranational institutions are equipped with jurisdiction over agreed-upon policy-domains and rules, as well as powers to enforce those rules, above and beyond national institutions.

A few examples of supranational institutions are:

- the United Nations (UN)



- the World Trade Organisation (WTO)



- NATO



1. Engaging in supranational politics is generally a good thing for a nation.
2. Every nation is best off acting independently on the global stage, without commitment to supranational institutions.
3. National governments should never give up authority to supranational institutions on important global issues.
4. Supranational institutions are more likely to solve global issues better than nationally elected governments.
5. We achieve more at the international level if all states follow global rules rather than do whatever each likes.
6. Every nationally elected government should decide independently which rules and standards their citizens must abide by.
7. Supranational institutions should play a bigger role on the global political stage in the future.
8. We should keep political power at the national level and nations should decide on global issues independently.

### **National Identity English**

1. I am glad to be English.
2. Being English gives me a good feeling.
3. I feel solidarity with the English people.
4. I feel committed to the English people.
5. The fact that I am English is an important part of my identity.

### **EU Attitudes**

1. I feel threatened by the European Union.
2. The European Union poses a threat to British identity and culture.
3. Being European citizen gives me a good feeling.
4. The fact that I am a European citizen is an important part of my identity.

5. I feel solidarity with the European people.
6. The European Union functions well as it is.
7. The European Union is wasting a lot of tax money.
8. I trust the European Parliament.
9. The European Union fosters peace and stability.
10. The European Union fosters the preservation of the environment.
11. The European Union reflects a model of international cooperation and peace that should be used in other parts of the world.
12. The United Kingdom has benefited from being a member of the European Union.

### **Perceived Immigrant Threat**

1. Immigrants are posing a threat to the economic and political system of England.
2. The presence of immigrants is problematic for our cultural norms and values in England.

### **Right-Wing Authoritarianism**

1. It's great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority.
2. What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity.
3. Students at high schools and at university must be encouraged to challenge, criticize, and confront established authorities.
4. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
5. The "old-fashioned ways" and "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live.
6. This country will flourish if young people stop experimenting with drugs, alcohol, and sex, and pay more attention to family values.
7. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse.
8. Strong, tough government will harm not help our country.
9. The facts on crime and the recent public disorders show we have to crack down harder on troublemakers, if we are going preserve law and order.

### **Social Dominance Orientation**

1. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom.
2. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
3. No one group should dominate in society.
4. Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top.
5. Group equality should not be our primary goal.
6. It is unjust to try to make groups equal.
7. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
8. We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed.

### **Economic Conservatism**

1. The wealthy have an unfair advantage in our society.
2. Taxes on high incomes should be increased.
3. Labor unions are a huge benefit to workers.
4. Big businesses enrich themselves at the expense of the workers.
5. The government should take actions to decrease income differences.

### **Attitudes towards supranational projects**

Please indicate how you generally feel towards a number of supranational projects.

(1=extremely negative, 10= extremely positive)

1. The Paris Climate Agreement
2. UN (United Nations)
3. WTO (World Trade Organisation)
4. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation)
5. EU (European Union)

### Study 3 (English Survey)

#### Supranationalism

Please read the following abstract about Supranationalism and then rate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements:

Supranationalism refers to a concept of legally binding political cooperation between nations. In this form of cooperation, national representatives negotiate agreements on political issues when pursuing shared objectives. This can take the form of trade-agreements, or political and military unions. Therefore, supranationalism requires institutions making decisions over certain policy-domains and laws and have the power to enforce these, independent from national institutions.

A few examples of supranational institutions are:

- the United Nations (UN)
  - the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
  - NATO
1. Engaging in supranational politics is generally a good thing for a nation.
  2. Every nation is best off acting independently on the global stage, without commitment to supranational institutions.
  3. National governments should never give up authority to supranational institutions on important global issues.
  4. Supranational institutions are more likely to solve global issues better than nationally elected governments.
  5. We achieve more at the international level if all states follow global rules rather than do whatever each likes.
  6. Every nationally elected government should decide independently which rules and standards their citizens must abide by.

7. Supranational institutions should play a bigger role on the global political stage in the future.
8. We should keep political power at the national level and nations should decide on global issues independently.

**National Identity English**

1. I feel a bond with the English people.
2. I feel solidarity with the English people.
3. I feel committed to the English people.
4. I am glad to be English.
5. I think that English people have a lot to be proud of.
6. It is pleasant to be English.
7. Being English gives me a good feeling.
8. I often think about the fact that I am English.
9. The fact that I am English is an important part of my Identity.
10. Being English is an important part of how I see myself.
11. I have a lot in common with the average English person.
12. I am similar to the average English person.
13. English people have a lot in common with each other.
14. English people are very similar to each other.

**National Identity British**

1. I feel a bond with the English people.
2. I feel solidarity with the English people.
3. I feel committed to the English people.
4. I am glad to be English.
5. I think that English people have a lot to be proud of.
6. It is pleasant to be English.



7. Being English gives me a good feeling.
8. I often think about the fact that I am English.
9. The fact that I am English is an important part of my Identity.
10. Being English is an important part of how I see myself.
11. I have a lot in common with the average English person.
12. I am similar to the average English person.
13. English people have a lot in common with each other.
14. English people are very similar to each other.

### **EU Attitudes**

1. I feel threatened by the European Union.
2. The European Union poses a threat to British identity and culture.
3. Being European citizen gives me a good feeling.
4. The fact that I am a European citizen is an important part of my identity.
5. I feel solidarity with the European people.
6. The European Union functions well as it is.
7. The European Union is wasting a lot of tax money.
8. I trust the European Parliament.
9. The European Union fosters peace and stability.
10. The European Union fosters the preservation of the environment.
11. The European Union reflects a model of international cooperation and peace that should be used in other parts of the world.
12. The United Kingdom has benefited from being a member of the European Union.

### **Perceived Immigrant Threat**

1. Immigrants are posing a threat to the economic and political system of the UK.
2. The presence of immigrants is problematic for our cultural norms and values in the UK.

### **Right-Wing Authoritarianism**

1. It's great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority.
2. What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity.
3. Students at high schools and at university must be encouraged to challenge, criticize, and confront established authorities.
4. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
5. The "old-fashioned ways" and "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live.
6. This country will flourish if young people stop experimenting with drugs, alcohol, and sex, and pay more attention to family values.
7. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse.
8. Strong, tough government will harm not help our country.
9. The facts on crime and the recent public disorders show we have to crack down harder on troublemakers, if we are going preserve law and order.

### **Social Dominance Orientation**

1. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom.
2. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
3. No one group should dominate in society.
4. Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top.
5. Group equality should not be our primary goal.
6. It is unjust to try to make groups equal.
7. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
8. We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed.

### Study 3 (German survey)

#### Supranationalism

Unter dem Prinzip der Supranationalität versteht man verbindliche Kooperation zwischen Nationalstaaten. Dabei beschließen gewählte Vertreter verschiedener Länder Abkommen zu Themen bei denen sie gemeinsame Interessen verfolgen. Solche supranationalen Projekte können die Form von Handelsabkommen und politischen oder militärischen Vereinigungen annehmen. Darüberhinaus setzen supranationale Abkommen voraus das es Institutionen gibt, die Entscheidungen zu vereinbarten Regeln und Gesetzen durchzusetzen, unabhängig von nationalen Institutionen.

Beispiele supranationaler Institutionen sind:

- Die Vereinten Nationen (UN)
- Die Welthandelsorganisation (WTO)
- Die NATO

1. Sich an supranationaler Politik zu beteiligen ist grundsätzlich gut für ein Land.
2. Es ist besser für Länder, wenn sie unabhängig und ohne Verpflichtungen gegenüber supranationalen Institutionen in der globalen Politik auftreten.
3. Nationale Regierungen sollten bezüglich internationaler Angelegenheiten niemals Befugnisse an supranationale Institutionen abtreten.
4. Supranationale Institutionen können globale Probleme besser lösen als nationale Regierungen.
5. Wir können auf der internationalen Ebene mehr erreichen, wenn alle Länder internationale Regeln befolgen, anstatt zu tun was sie möchten.
6. National gewählte Regierungen sollten eigenständig entscheiden, welche Regeln und Standards ihre Bürger folgen sollen.
7. Supranationale Institutionen sollten in Zukunft eine bedeutendere Rolle in der internationalen Politik einnehmen.

8. Wir sollten politische Macht auf der nationalen Ebene belassen und Nationen sollten zu internationalen Angelegenheiten eigenständig Entscheidungen treffen.

### **National Identity**

1. Ich denke oft an die Tatsache, dass ich deutsch bin.
2. Die Tatsache, dass ich ein Deutscher bin, ist ein wichtiger Teil meiner Identität.
3. Deutsch zu sein ist ein wichtiger Teil dessen, wie ich mich selbst sehe.
4. Ich fühle mich mit Deutschen verbunden.
5. Ich empfinde Solidarität mit Deutschen.
6. Ich fühle mich in das, was Deutsche betrifft, involviert.
7. Ich bin froh, dass ich deutsch bin.
8. Ich finde es angenehm, deutsch zu sein.
9. Es gibt mir ein gutes Gefühl, deutsch zu sein.
10. Ich habe viele Gemeinsamkeiten mit einer/m typischen Deutschen. (
11. Ich ähnele einer/m typischen Deutschen sehr.
12. Ich bin ein/e typische/r Deutscher.
13. Deutsche haben viele Gemeinsamkeiten miteinander.
14. Deutsche ähneln sich einander sehr.
15. Deutsche teilen viele gemeinsame Eigenschaften.

### **EU Attitudes**

1. Ich fühle mich von der Europäischen Union bedroht.
2. Die Europäischen Union bedroht die deutsche Kultur und Identität.
3. Europäer zu sein gibt mir ein gutes Gefühl.
4. Die Tatsache, dass ich Europäer bin ist ein wichtiger Teil meiner Identität.
5. Ich empfinde Solidarität mit anderen Europäern.
6. Die Europäische Union funktioniert gut so wie sie ist.
7. Die Europäische Union verschwendet viel Geld.

8. Die Europäische Union fördert Frieden und Stabilität.
9. Die Europäische Union fördert den Naturschutz.
10. Die Europäische Union stellt ein Modell internationalen Kooperation und Frieden dar, dass so auch in anderen Teilen der Welt angewendet werden sollte.
11. Deutschland profitiert davon, ein Mitglied der Europäischen Union zu sein.

### **Perceived Immigrant Threat**

1. Immigranten bedrohen die Wirtschaft und das politische System Deutschlands.
2. Immigranten sind ein Problem für unsere kulturellen Normen und Werte in Deutschland.

### **Right-Wing Authoritarianism**

1. Gegen Außenseiter und Nichtstuer sollte in der Gesellschaft mit aller Härte vorgegangen werden.
2. Unruhestifter sollten deutlich zu spüren bekommen, dass sie in der Gesellschaft unerwünscht sind.
3. Gesellschaftliche Regeln sollten ohne Mitleid durchgesetzt werden.
4. Wir brauchen starke Führungspersonen, damit wir in der Gesellschaft sicher leben können.
5. Menschen sollten wichtige Entscheidungen in der Gesellschaft Führungspersonen überlassen.
6. Wir sollten dankbar sein für führende Köpfe, die uns genau sagen, was wir tun können.
7. Traditionen sollten unbedingt gepflegt und aufrechterhalten werden.
8. Bewährte Verhaltensweisen sollten nicht in Frage gestellt werden.
9. Es ist immer das Beste Dinge in der üblichen Art und Weise zu machen.

### **Social Dominance Orientation**

1. Eine ideale Gesellschaft setzt voraus, dass gewisse Gruppen an der Spitze und andere am Rande der Gesellschaft stehen.
2. Manche Gruppen von Menschen sind anderen Gruppen unterlegen.

3. Keine einzelne Gruppe sollte in der Gesellschaft dominieren.
4. Gruppen am Rande der Gesellschaft verdienen die gleiche Behandlung, wie die an der Spitze.
5. Die Gleichstellung von Gruppen sollte nicht unser oberstes Ziel sein.
6. Es ist ungerecht zu versuchen Gruppen gleichzustellen.
7. Wir sollten tun was wir können, um die Bedingungen von verschiedenen Gruppen anzugleichen.
8. Wir sollten darauf hinarbeiten allen Gruppen gleiche Erfolgchancen zu geben.

### Study 3 (Dutch Survey)

#### Supranationalism

Supranationalisme verwijst naar de idee van een politieke samenwerking tussen landen die wettelijk geregeld is. In deze vorm van samenwerking onderhandelen vertegenwoordigers van de betrokken landen akkoorden over politieke zaken bij het nastreven van gemeenschappelijke doelen. Dit kan de vorm krijgen van handelsovereenkomsten of politieke en militaire organisaties. Daardoor vergt supranationalisme de erkenning van een extern instituut die beslissingen nemen over bepaalde beleidsdomeinen en wetten. Deze instituten hebben de macht om deze regels ook af te dwingen, onafhankelijk van de nationale instituten

Enkele voorbeelden van supranationale instituten zijn:

- De Verenigde Naties
  - De Wereld Handels Organisatie
  - NAVO
1. Over het algemeen, is deelnemen aan supranationale politiek een goede zaak voor een land.
  2. Elk land is beter af met onafhankelijk te handelen op het internationale niveau, zonder toewijding aan supranationale instituten.
  3. Nationale regeringen zouden nooit hun zeggenschap moeten opgeven aan supranationale instituten als het over belangrijke internationale zaken gaat.
  4. Supranationale instituten hebben een grotere kans om globale problemen op te lossen dan regeringen verkozen op nationaal niveau.
  5. We bereiken meer op het internationale niveau wanneer alle landen de internationale regels volgen dan wanneer ze allemaal doen wat ze willen.
  6. Iedere regering verkozen op nationaal niveau zou onafhankelijk moeten beslissen welke regels en waarden hun inwoners moeten gehoorzamen.

7. Supranationale instituten zouden in de toekomst een grotere rol moeten spelen op het internationale politieke toneel.
8. We moeten de politieke macht op het nationale niveau houden en naties zouden onafhankelijk moeten beslissen over internationale zaken.

### **National Identity**

1. Ik voel een band met het Belgische volk.
2. Ik voel solidariteit tegenover de Belgen.
3. I voel me toegewijd aan het Belgische volk.
4. Ik ben blij dat ik Belg ben.
5. Ik denk dat de Belgen veel hebben om trots op te zijn.
6. Het is prettig om Belg te zijn.
7. Belg zijn geeft me een goed gevoel.
8. Ik denk vaak aan het feit dat ik Belg ben.
9. Het feit dat ik Belg ben, is een belangrijk deel van mijn identiteit.
10. Belg zijn is een belangrijk deel van hoe ik mezelf zie.
11. Ik heb veel gemeenschappelijk met de gemiddelde Belg.
12. Ik ben gelijkaardig aan de gemiddelde Belg.
13. Belgen hebben veel gemeenschappelijk met elkaar.
14. Belgen zijn heel gelijkaardig aan elkaar.

### **EU Attitudes**

1. Ik voel me bedreigd door de Europese Unie.
2. De Europese Unie vormt een bedreiging voor de Belgische identiteit en cultuur.
3. Europeaan zijn geeft me een goed gevoel.
4. Het feit dat ik een Europeaan ben, is een belangrijk deel van mijn identiteit.
5. Ik voel solidariteit tegenover het Europese volk.
6. De Europese Unie functioneert goed zoals het is.



7. De Europese Unie verspilt heel wat belastingsgeld.
8. Ik vertrouw het Europese Parlement.
9. De Europese Unie bevordert de vrede en stabiliteit.
10. De Europese Unie bevordert het behoud van de natuur.
11. De Europese Unie weerspiegelt een model van internationale samenwerking en vrede dat gebruikt zou moeten worden in andere delen van de wereld.
12. België heeft voordeel gehaald door lid te zijn van de Europese Unie.

### **Perceived Immigrant Threat**

1. Immigranten vormen een bedreiging voor het economische en politieke systeem van België.
2. De aanwezigheid van immigranten is een probleem voor onze culturele normen en waarden in België.

### **Right-Wing Authoritarianism**

1. Het is fantastisch dat veel jonge mensen tegenwoordig bereid zijn om niet te luisteren naar de autoriteiten.
2. Wat ons land het meest nodig heeft, is discipline, waarbij iedereen onze leiders in eenheid volgt.
3. Studenten op middelbare scholen en universiteiten moeten worden aangemoedigd om de gevestigde autoriteiten uit te dagen, te bekritisieren en te confronteren.
4. Gehoorzaamheid en respect voor het gezag zijn de belangrijkste deugden die kinderen moeten leren.
5. De 'ouderwetse manieren' en 'ouderwetse waarden' tonen nog steeds de beste manier van leven.
6. Dit land zal floreren als jongeren stoppen met experimenteren met drugs, alcohol en seks, en meer aandacht besteden aan gezinswaarden.
7. Er is niets mis met seks (geslachtsgemeenschap) voor het huwelijk.

8. Een sterke, onverbiddelijke regering zal ons land schaden.
9. De feiten over criminaliteit en de recente publieke wanorde laten zien dat we harder moeten optreden tegen onruststokers, willen we de wet en orde blijven handhaven.

### **Social Dominance Orientation**

1. Een ideale samenleving vereist dat sommige groepen hoger aangeschreven staan dan andere.
2. Sommige groepen van mensen zijn gewoonweg inferieur aan andere groepen.
3. Geen enkele groep zou onze maatschappij mogen domineren.
4. Groepen die onderaan de sociale ladder staan hebben evenveel rechten als groepen die bovenaan staan.
5. Gelijkheid tussen groepen moet niet ons primaire doel zijn.
6. Het is onrechtvaardig om groepen gelijkwaardig te maken.
7. We moeten doen wat we kunnen om de leefomstandigheden voor verschillende groepen gelijk te maken.
8. Leden van alle groepen zouden een gelijke kans op succes in het leven moeten krijgen.

**Study 4 (British Election Study)**

The Combined Waves Internet Panel Codebook can be found here:

<https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/>

**National Identity (National Identities)**

Where would you place yourself on these scales? (1=minimum, 7=maximum)

1. Britishness
2. Englishness

**Perceived Similarity (Social Identity Global)**

How much do you have in common with the following groups (apart from what they think about Europe)? (0=Nothing in common, 10=A great deal in common)

1. People who want to leave the EU
2. People who want to remain in the EU

**Political Ideology (lr)**

In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place the following parties on this scale?

1. 0=Left, 10=Right

## Study 5

### **Societal Estrangement**

1. When I think about the British society, I consider myself an outsider.
2. I feel myself part of society.
3. I do not feel involved in society at all.
4. In society, power is exercised and maintained in small backrooms, resulting in people like me being excluded.

### **National Identity British**

1. I am glad to be British.
2. Being British gives me a good feeling.
3. I feel solidarity with the British people.
4. I feel committed to the British people.
5. The fact that I am British is an important part of my identity.

### **Political Ideology**

1. In terms of economic issues, how would you describe your political attitudes and beliefs?
2. In terms of social issues, how would you describe your political attitudes and beliefs?
3. In general, how would you describe your political attitudes and beliefs?

**Study 6****National Identity English**

1. I am glad to be English.
2. Being English gives me a good feeling.
3. I feel solidarity with the English people.
4. I feel committed to the English people.
5. The fact that I am English is an important part of my identity.

**National Identity British**

1. I am glad to be British.
2. Being British gives me a good feeling.
3. I feel solidarity with the British people.
4. I feel committed to the British people.
5. The fact that I am British is an important part of my identity.

**Societal Estrangement**

1. When I think about the British society, I consider myself an outsider.
2. I feel myself part of society.
3. I do not feel involved in society at all.
4. In society, power is exercised and maintained in small backrooms, resulting in people like me being excluded.
5. Recent decisions of the British society have changed the true meaning of being British.

**Political Ideology**

1. In terms of economic issues, how would you describe your political attitudes and beliefs?
2. In terms of social issues, how would you describe your political attitudes and beliefs?
3. In general, how would you describe your political attitudes and beliefs?

**Political Efficacy**

1. Public officials in the UK do not care much about what people like me think.

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2. The British Government does not pay attention to what the people think when they decide what to do.

### **Brexit Threat**

Do you perceive Brexit as a threat...

1. to you personally?
2. to your family?
3. to your community?
4. to your country?