From thought to action:

Evaluating the Role of Ruminative Thinking in

Legal, Illegal, and Violent Political Protest

Via System Justification

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Abstract

The present project focuses on 1) addressing dominant approaches to collective action and taxonomies of political protest, aiming to disentangle protest dimensions and explore retributive and moral imperative motivations to protest; and 2) examining ruminative thoughts as antecedents of protest. Studies were framed within system justification theory and the SIMCA. Protest was addressed through hypothetical scenarios, actions presented as real, and past behaviour. Studies included manipulations of protest legality and/or presenting multiple protest forms to participants. Appraisals of protest legitimacy, normativity, morality, disruptiveness, and aggressiveness were included in different studies, with findings supporting the need to separate dimensions in theory and research. Protest illegality indirectly deterred protest tendencies via appraisals of legitimacy, but not of normativity. It did not affect the perceived morality of protest, which did predict legal and illegal non-violent protest. Appraisals of aggressiveness negatively predicted violent protest independently of other appraisals, revealing a unique element in dimensions of aggressiveness and violence. Anger rumination predicted anger at politics, support for protestor violence, and the legitimisation and moralisation of violent protest. Political rumination positively predicted non-violent protest tendencies, past protesting, the moralisation of non-violent protest, and a broad range of emotions. It also negatively predicted system justification cross-sectionally and longitudinally and decreased it experimentally. System justification negatively predicted content-relevant perceptions of injustice and appraisals of protest acceptability (i.e. economic system justification delegitimising protest with an economic component). General system justification predicted higher expected group and protest efficacy–both utilitarian and retributive. Findings highlighted the influence of political and anger rumination on non-violent and violent protest respectively, expanded the system justification literature, and provided evidence for the effects of protest illegality on protest attitudes, tendencies, and support, and for the existence of retributive and moral imperative motivations to protest. Implications for academia, policymakers, and the police, are considered.

Chapter 1: Object of Research

1.1. Introduction

Research on political protest has grown over the years, becoming increasingly relevant to both the academic examination of social change and its real-life implementation (see van Stekelenburg, 2013). Over the last decade we have seen increasing international focus on protest actions across the world, ranging from the Arab Spring, to the UK riots in 2011, the occupy movement, and protests in Ferguson and Baltimore in the USA, that saw dramatic escalations of violence. Media focus on protest is mirrored by increased attention from the field of political psychology (van Stekelenburg, 2013), leading to a wealth of theory and empirical research that continues to develop. Throughout this thesis I connect views from philosophy, criminology, political psychology, legal psychology, and a forensic-psychological perspective in order to develop a clearer understanding of political protest in its different forms beyond more traditional conceptualisations. I further build on previous literature on predictors of political protest by evaluating the role of pervasive, repeated, and continuous thinking of a political nature –herein termed *political rumination*- in the context of system justification theory.

This project starts from the key assumption that it is essential for current research in protest to consider the on-going process of protest criminalisation in countries, such as Australia, the UK, the USA, or Canada (Gilmore, 2010; Jackson, 2013; Loadenthal, 2013; Monaghana & Walbyb, 2012). Protest criminalisation is a traditional response by those in power to depoliticise and delegitimise actions that challenge the system and the legitimacy of state power, through changes in legislation and increasingly authoritarian policing styles (El-Enany, 2015; Gilmore, 2010; Jackson, Monk, & Gilmore, 2016). The process of protest criminalisation has resulted in an increasing number of people being labelled as criminals, and subsequently being

arrested and imprisoned (Gilmore, 2010; cf., Jackson et al., 2016). It also has been

argued to erode people's rights (Jackson, 2013). Given the involvement of the law and

criminal justice system, it is necessary to consider criminological and forensic-

psychological perspectives, as well as views from psychology of law, in the study of

protest. Additionally, the field of forensic psychology has much to offer in terms of the

study of the escalation of violence in protest, policing actions against protestors, and

rioting.

      In real life, people can protest or challenge the status quo in a wide range of

ways (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Becker & Tausch, 2015; Livingstone & Leach, 2017;

Tausch et al., 2011; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990). This includes group actions,

such as a large-scale demonstration, as well as individual acts, like posting in social

media, or the creation of protest-related art by singers, filmmakers, or other artists.

Additionally, although protest is usually associated with anti-establishment views and

searching for change, collective action can be carried out in support of an established

system and can sometimes hinder social change (Gülsüm Acar & Reicher, 2017; Jost,

Becker, Osborne & Badaan, 2017; Osborne, Jost, Becker, Badaan & Sibley, 2019). An

example of collective action aimed at preventing change is the Afrikaneer movement in

South Africa, which resisted the end of apartheid (see Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

      Given the broad range of forms that protest can take, it is not surprising that

varying antecedents become relevant, depending on the type of protest at hand (see

Becker & Tausch, 2015; Jost et al., 2012; Tausch et al., 2011; Shuman, Cohen-Chen,

Hirsch-Hoefler & Halperin, 2016). As such, Wright and colleagues (1990) argued that

not considering differences across forms of political protest and collective action is an

important limitation to research in the field. Presenting the choice of participation in one

form of action, versus inaction, is bound to miss many of the intricacies inherent to how

dissent can be shown and how social change can be sought (see Piven & Cloward, 1991,

for a similar critique from a political perspective). The first step of this project is, therefore, to review and elaborate on different forms of protest, and proposed protest taxonomies. This review aims to develop an informed research approach, which accounts for the role of the law in protesting in a clearer manner than current dominant approaches and will guide the empirical studies addressed in later chapters.

1.1.1. Organisation of this Chapter

The present chapter reviews different taxonomies of protest, considering theoretical underpinnings, key assumptions in different approaches, limitations on which to build, and the discourse that has been constructed in research on protest within psychology. The chapter first addresses the definition and construct of collective action, elaborating on two key limitations –the potential overgrowth of the definition and its utilitarian nature– and proposing alternative views grounded in Kantian moral philosophy and retributive justice (Bierie, 2012; Jost & Kay, 2010; Kant, 2009, originally 1785; Murphy, 1994). Based on these considerations, I propose an alternative approach and definition of protest that will be followed throughout this project.

Given the importance of considering the predictors and outcomes of different forms of protest, I then address theoretical distinctions between normative and non-normative protest (Tausch et al., 2011). I focus on a taxonomy of normativity because of its dominant position in current research in psychology, as well as its continued development, and influence, over the last decades. I consider the overlap of dimensions of normativity and legality at a definitional level before considering research that portrays them as essentially different, and addressing real-life examples supporting this view. I, then, move on to review the overlap of normativity and violence across predominant discourse and operationalisations in quantitative research. I elaborate on problems within discourse in research and address tensions in empirical findings.

Following the in-depth analysis of the normative taxonomy of protest, I turn to other existing classifications of political actions. I specifically focus on taxonomies of conventional and non-conventional political engagement (Barnes et al., 1979; Milbrath, 1981), within-system and out-of-system political action (Sabucedo & Arce, 1991), activism versus radicalism (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009), constitutional versus extra-constitutional action (Hayes & McAllister, 2005), and disruptive and non-disruptive protest (Jost el al., 2012; Piven & Cloward, 1991). All different taxonomies match to some degree the classification of protest based on its normativity (as argued by Tausch et al., 2011), and therefore, share its limitations.

In the last section of the review I build on the literature to propose an alternative approach to research on the field. I argue for the importance of researching engagement in legal and illegal protest separately from other taxonomies, and through the proposed approach. I further suggest the relevance of this line of research not only in relation to protest intentions, or actual engagement in protest, but also in relation to the justification of police violence against protestors, as well as the support of proactive and reactive protestor violence or intentions to engage in it. I finish by providing a chapter by chapter overview of the full thesis.

1.2. Defining Dissent as Collective Action

A strong theoretical and research tradition in the field of psychology has approached the study of protest in terms of collective action (Becker & Tausch, 2015, Shuman et al., 2016; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004; Wright et al., 1990). Collective action was once defined as actions carried out with the aim of improving the conditions of one's in-group (Wright et al., 1990). Said actions could be carried out by groups (e.g., in a demonstration) or by individuals (e.g., signing a petition), but they were understood as occurring for the sake of the in-group. The

definition of collective action was later extended to account for solidarity actions in

support of another group (Becker, 2012; Saab, Tausch, Spears & Cheung, 2015;

Subašić, Reynolds & Turner, 2008; Subašić, Schmitt & Reynolds, 2011). This includes

actions taken by members of majority and powerful groups in European countries on

behalf of refugees, as well as collaborative actions, as in the case of white Americans

supporting the Black Lives Matter movement and protesting against violence and

racism directed at black people.

Solidarity collective action has been conceptualised by some researchers within

the framework of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) as

resulting from the emergence of a higher-order identity that includes both the in-group

and an out-group, and creates a feeling of unity (Subašić et al., 2008; Subašić et al.,

2011). By considering a more inclusive identity, the approach provides an explanation

for actions taken in solidarity regardless of perceived costs to the individual self-

interest.

Other researchers have focussed on the role of politicised identification with a

movement or organisation (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Stürmer & Simon, 2004a, 2004b).

Such identification results in the internalisation of political and ideological values and

can connect members of other groups with the plights of the disadvantaged, creating an

inner obligation to act (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Stürmer & Simon, 2004a). An

important implication of the approach is that what creates the imperative to act is the

internalisation of goals. Thus, somebody with an internalised set of values, such as

equality between genders, may engage in protest, even if they are not women, because

they identify as feminists. Politicised identification also provides an explanation for

individuals acting despite not labelling themselves as feminists –perhaps because of

lack of knowledge of what feminism is, or due to negative connotations associated to

the movement. What matters in this case is the identification with, and internalisation of, the values.

The expanding nature of the definition of collective action shows the malleability of the approach, the capability of social identity theory to address new considerations, and the willingness to reconsider established research and theoretical approaches by academics in order to better account for the realities we aim to study. The approach, however, still has some limitations worth noting.

1.2.1. Limitations of the Collective Action Approach: The Overgrowth of a Utilitarian Approach, versus the Moral Imperative and the Retributive Protest.

The first limitation to consider stems, ironically, from the very strengths that I have just addressed. That is, in the process of expanding the definition of collective action to fully account for a range of protest forms, it can lose much of its meaning and end up conceptually addressing all political action. For instance, Becker and Tausch (2015) defined collective action as "any action that promotes the interests of one's group or is conducted in political solidarity" (p. 45). Following this definition, collective action would include terrorist actions for the sake of a large in-group, voting in elections based on what will benefit one's family, and, potentially, any other form of political engagement that has beneficial implications for any group.

Similarly, through the extended notion of identification, collective action would include actions carried out on behalf of any human group, as well as actions for all humanity, for the well-being of non-human animals (e.g., vegan movements), against the perceived damage towards non-animal living beings (e.g. actions against deforestation by green activists), or even on behalf of the planet as a whole. As a result, in an extreme, most goal-oriented behaviour carried out by individuals or groups would be encompassed within collective action, and the term would lose its meaning.

The second limitation stems from the utilitarian conceptualisation of collective action. Whether collective actions are aimed towards achieving or preventing social change, and whether they have political goals, or identity consolidation goals, the actions themselves have been consistently defined as a means to an end (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Becker, 2012; de Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Saab et al., 2015; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašić et al., 2008; Tausch et al., 2011). The utilitarian approach to collective action is intuitively appealing, has had a strong influence in theoretical developments, and has been extensively supported by research on efficacy pathways to engagement in collective action (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Subašić et al., 2008; Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2004). In contrast, the potential for protest to be the goal in itself, or to serve other functions differing from achieving/preventing change or building support for a movement, has remained unaddressed.

Imagine a satirical representation that ridicules Donald Trump (the current US president) and is created by an artist as a form of protest against Mr Trump's discourse, prejudices, and policies. In the world of social media, such a representation could quickly spread among people who identify with the feelings and ideals of its creator; however, the motivations that each individual may have for sharing it would largely vary. Some people may share the satire to exercise pressure, or gather support and mobilise others in further protest against the president of the USA, with the ultimate intention of demanding his resignation. Others may share it while accepting that Donald Trump will not be removed from office until, perhaps, the next elections, but may still want to mobilise people to vote against him in the future. Alternatively, people may participate in the social protest against Trump because of frustration towards him and a desire to express their anger, or even aggress against him, in a socially accepted and legal manner. Similarly, people may desire some form of retribution and engage in the

protest because they view it as an available and legitimate form of punishment. Last, others may simply participate in this movement because resisting Trump's discourse and policies is perceived as the right thing to do, regardless of the outcome.

The resulting perceived social movement against Trump could be framed as a single form of collective action, but the motivations of its members would not necessarily fit the goal-oriented definition that is prevalent in the literature. In imposing a utilitarian definition to protest, researchers are bound to miss many of the intricacies that underlie socio-political protest. This can generate unclear findings that lead to misinterpretations, affect the development of research, and through it, can ultimately have real-life implications.

An alternative and non-utilitarian approach to protest by individuals or groups can be built upon a Kantian approach to morality. Within Kant's philosophy, the only thing that can be addressed as being good without qualification is "good will"; and this "good will", in turn, *is not judged based on its effects or capability to achieve an end* (Kant, 2009). Actions that are necessary in themselves, rather than being means towards an end, are represented as moral norms through categorical imperatives (Kant, 2009). From this perspective, one can expect people to protest, not because of the expected outcome, but because of the moral imperative to act against a perceived injustice. Protesting, thus, can be the goal itself, as well as a mean towards an end.

Kant's philosophy has had a great impact in modern western societies and is still present within penal approaches to retributive punishment (Duff & Garland, 1994; Murphy, 1994; Walker, 1991, 1994). Within said approaches, the purpose of punishment is not a utilitarian one (e.g., deterring future crime), but a way of providing "just deserts" (Bierie, 2012; Duff & Garland, 1994; Jost & Kay, 2010). Punishment is the goal. Retributive approaches to punishment still play an important part in penal policy even when alternative utilitarian approaches remain of relevance (Bierie, 2012;

Duff & Garland, 1994). We could expect a similar process in the context of protest.

Even if an important factor motivating protest is its capability to produce change,

protesting may also serve as a legitimate form of punishment that can be carried out by

social groups and even individuals. Thus, by combining utilitarian and retributive

perspectives we can better address the multifaceted motivations leading to protest.

       Given all factors addressed so far, it is appropriate to reconsider the approach to

the construct and definition of collective action, and perhaps even abandon it and focus

on a clearer construct of political protest. Of course, said construct could also

potentially develop and become increasingly inclusive to the point of encompassing all

political behaviour, so it should be clearly limited to address a specific set of behaviour.

For the purpose of this project, protesting will be defined as engaging in actions outside

structured and pre-set parliamentary and democratic participation, such as in elections

and referendums, that denounce and resist social or political issues perceived as unjust.

Protest is therefore seen both in a more concrete and delimited manner, not including all

political behaviour, as well as in broader terms that allow the consideration of non-

utilitarian motivations. This approach should lead to clearer findings that can be better

applied to the reality of protest.

1.3. Normative versus Non-normative Protest: Society, Law, and the Social Contract

      Even though the present chapter problematises the construct of collective action,

the value of research framed through it cannot be understated, both in terms of

informing our understanding of the antecedents of protest, and in terms of

differentiating between different protest actions. A key distinction in the literature on

collective action involves differentiating between normative and non-normative actions

depending on whether they adhere to social norms or not. That is, the overarching and

dominant norms in society and the structures of the system (Tausch et al., 2011; Wright

et al., 1990). Wright and colleagues (1990) argued that in real life people could chose to engage in a wide range of options, from inaction, to individual upwards mobility, normative collective action and, finally, non-normative collective action. According to them, engaging in different forms of protest has very different implications, and as research has continued to reveal, it is also related to different predictors (see Cichocka, Górska, Jost, Sutton, & Bilewicz, 2017; Jost et al., 2012; Shuman et al., 2016; Tausch et al., 2011).

Over the years, researchers have continued to distinguish between normative and non-normative forms of protest (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Jiménez-Moya, Spears, Rodríguez-Bailón & de Lemus, 2015; Louis, 2009; Piven & Cloward, 1991; Shuman et al., 2016; Shuman, Saguy, Halperin, & van Zomeren, 2017; Tausch et al., 2011; Teixeira, Spears, & Yzerbyt, 2017; Wright et al., 1990), yet the distinction is not as straightforward as it may appear. For instance, Simon and Klandermans (2001) note that power struggles, including acts of resistance and protest against a given system, involve questioning the legitimacy of the rules imposed by it. They further highlight that in the social context of power struggles, conflicting groups will aim for hegemony, claiming that their own position is the normative one. Therefore, not only do the norms of different groups vary, but alternative discourses aimed at obtaining the support of the general public can prevent either set of norms from becoming dominant in the wider society. Outside explicit focus on protest, research on norm-theory has revealed among other things, the mixed state of prevailing norms and lack of social consensus in relation to issues like immigration (see Esses, Dovidio, Jackson & Armstrong, 2001; Esses, Jackson & Armstrong, 1998; Fisher, Deason, Borgida, & Oyamot, 2011; Oyamot Borgida & Fisher, 2006; Pratto & Lemieux, 2001).

The context of multiple strikes occurring in the United Kingdom (UK) over the last few years provides another example of this point (BBCNews, 2016a: BBCNews,

2016b, Taylor, 2016; Telegraph Reporters, 2016; Travis, 2016). In the context of these power struggles, two alternative discourses have arisen: one by conservative government officials who portray strikes as being an unacceptable source of misery for the general population (see Mason, Sparrow, Syaland & Grierson, 2016), and another one, present in left-wing media outlets, which defends the right to strike as a human right that must not be violated and calls for Unions to defend it (see Becket, 2017; Ewing, 2010). At this point, the understanding of what is normative becomes increasingly ideological, and therefore, not applicable as a generalised phenomenon. Ultimately, concluding whether strike actions adhere to the overarching norms of society or not can become an impossible exercise.

In response to the debate on protest taxonomies (see Jost et al., 2012; Sabucedo & Arce, 1991), and the existence of different sets of values across groups, some authors have clarified their conceptualisation of normativity as relating to the norms of the social system, rather than those of specific groups (see Becker & Tauch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2011). Indeed, we can see an overlap between social normativity and system norms, and consequently legality, since early conceptualisation of protest normativity. Building on Martin (1986), Wright and colleagues (1990), addressed normative action as "[conforming] to the norms of the existing social system" (Wright et al., 1990; p. 995). In contrast, non-normative actions occur "outside the confines of the existing social rules and structure" (Wright et al., 1990; p. 995). Tausch and colleagues (2011) further built on these ideas and noted that examples of the rules of a social system include its laws and regulations.

Within this conceptualisation, the rules of a state (laws) and the norms held by the majority of people in a given society become inevitably mixed. As a result, discourse on normativity, and its operationalisations, have often addressed legal and illegal actions as symbolic of the rules of society (Shuman et al., 2016). A key

assumption is that the norms of a society (i.e., generalised norms held by most of the people) are reflected in the written law. Such an approach is not surprising, and reflects ideas of great influence in the creation of modern societies in terms of the law being a form of social contract (see Hobbes, 1968, originally 1651; Locke, 1970, originally 1686; Rousseau, 1978, originally 1775),

Proponents of social contract theories (Hobbes, 1968; Locke, 1970; Rousseau, 1978) argued that human beings are free entities who in a social context choose to create contracts with others. Said contracts involve the performance of civic duties and can only be legitimate if people entered them freely. More specifically, Rousseau (1978) elaborated the idea of a general will that reflected people's collective interest in the wellbeing of the group, beyond self-interest, and linked it to the basis of both law and society. Punishment, in turn, was seen to stem from the need to enforce compliance with this contract so long as people had freely accepted it and then broken it (Hobbes, 1968). An essential aspect of the social contract –and hence the law– can be further seen in ideas related to the need of majority votes to set up legislative institutions (Locke, 1970), and in the belief that people should vote on the enactment of legislation (Rousseau, 1978). Considering said views of society and the law as being built upon the beliefs and desires of the majority, together with portrayals of people freely agreeing to enter said contracts, it is easy to conceptualise the law as a representation of overarching and dominant social norms.

1.3.1. When Society and Law Disagree: Alternative Approaches

Despite the intuitive assumption that the law and social norms go hand in hand, this is not always the case. Indeed, within different areas of research, an explicit effort has been made into defining social norms as being independent of "any legal or social institution" (Sripada & Stich, 2006; p. 281). Similarly, academics in criminology have addressed for years how, in practise, the law, and social norms and social needs, do not

necessarily go hand in hand. The law is a social construct that continues developing through legislation and, thus, may reflect political interests (Croall, 2011). In the same way that governments are unlikely to criminalise their own activities (Croall, 2011; Green & Ward, 2004), legislators should be expected to pass laws that reflect their ideologies and protect the system in which they rule. Many academics have highlighted, for instance, the role of the state and law-makers in criminalising actions of the poor and the marginalised (Hallsworth & Stephenson, 2008; Reiman, 2008; Seal, 2008), while ignoring the crimes of the powerful and system-led harm (Green & Ward, 2004; Muncie, 2008; Roberts & McMahon, 2008, Seal, 2008).

One can easily see the differences between social and moral norms in comparison to the law in the cases of infidelity, alcohol consumption, and downloading movies illegally. Social and moral norms in most western industrialised countries condemn infidelity in romantic relationships; however, infidelity is not illegal. In contrast, although the legal drinking age in the USA is 21 years of age, the wider society may or may not frown upon a 20-year-old person having a beer. Something similar can be considered in terms of intellectual property and "piracy": streaming or downloading a movie illegally may be seen as a perfectly commonplace and acceptable action in many countries despite legislation against it (see Altschuller & Benbunan-Fich, 2009; Feldman & Nadler, 2006; Svensson & Larsson, 2009, 2012). Both dimensions inevitably overlap but should not be treated as being the same.

The distinction between the law and prevailing norms in a given society has been widely addressed in psychological, sociological, criminological, and legal theory and research. For instance, when addressing an immigration law (Senate Bill 1070) passed in Arizona, USA, Fisher and colleagues (2011) highlighted the controversy of the law, which was predicted to result in increased racial profiling and other constitutional violations, and had provoked strong reactions from the people. The law

could be seen to clash with traditional humanitarian-egalitarian values in the USA and had faced legal challenges even by police officers (see Escobar v. Brewer, 2010). In a completely different context, Svensson and Larsson (2012) studied changes in social norms before and after the implementation of copyright law and found that although self-reported file-sharing amongst Swedish internet users had decreased six months after the implementation of the law, social norms remained unaffected.

Theories on perceptions of culpability and the law (see Bicchieri, 2006; Elster, 1992; Finkel, 1995) have also considered potential conflicts between social norms – which Bicchieri (2006) addresses as embodying the values and collective desires of society– and the law. For instance, Finkel (2000) differentiated between two kinds of law: the law in the books, or black-letter law, and common-sense justice. The latter, he argued, reflected what ordinary people believe the law should be. Conversely, Garcia, Chen, and Gordon (2014) approached the distinction between the letter of the law and its spirit (i.e., what the law states versus its perceived intention), and noted the potential lack of consensus on the perceived intention behind specific laws, which can be viewed through and ideological prism. Such considerations of the law and perceptions of it highlight the degree to which the values of the people –and of society– and the law can differ.

Addressing the law and social norms as related but different dimensions allows the development of theory and empirical research on the effect that legislation and state institutions can have on shaping social norms, and vice-versa (Luís & Palma-Oliveira, 2016; Svensson & Larsson, 2012; Tankard & Paluck, 2016). Additionally, it has important implications given that legislating in conflict with social norms may result in the perceived unfair imposition of sanctions on innocent individuals (see Polinsky & Shavell, 2000) and in the loss of legitimacy by government (Feldman & Nadler, 2006). Finally, it has been argued that norms have a stronger influence on people's behaviour

than the law (Drobak, 2006; Ellickson, 1998), and that, when internalised, norms can

drive prosocial behaviour and collective action (Gavrilets & Richerson, 2017).

1.3.2. Protest, Social Norms, and the Law in Real Life

Strike actions in the UK provide a good context for considering the differences

between law and social norms in a practical setting. In a post-Thatcher Britain, the view

of strikes as a nuisance to society and breach of social norms (see Mason et al., 2016)

may have become internalised by most people, despite the country's legal framework

and having signed international treaties protecting the right to strike. On the other hand,

in a post-Franco Spain, which is signatory of many of the same treaties, like the

European Social Charter (Council of Europe, 1961, 2015), the historical struggles to

obtain the right to engage in industrial action may have precluded such a discourse from

becoming internalised by a majority of the people. As a result, two western European

nations might find themselves in completely different situations in terms of social

norms and to what degree they match the written law and governmental policies.

It is noteworthy that although we have seen numerous strike actions in the UK

among professionals in the railways system, post office, healthcare, and prison services,

among others (see BBCNews, 2016a: BBCNews, 2016b, Taylor, 2016; Telegraph

Reporters, 2016; Travis, 2016), responses at a legal level have differed. Strikes in

essential services, as in the case of medical junior doctors, have been allowed to occur –

even when being criticised– yet strikes by prison officers were prohibited by the High

Court (Travis, 2016). Whether we consider the Tory government's anti-strike discourse

to represent the social norms shared by the majority, or we believe that British social

norms would defend the right to strike and challenge the Government's view, the

system prohibiting some strikes and not others creates a problem if we see the norms of

the system and those of society as the same. Overall, social norms shared by the

majority of the population are unlikely to make nuanced distinctions between

professions in terms of their right to strike. Indeed, the Sun, a tabloid and one of the

most read sources of news in the UK (Ponsford, 2017), published an online article in

2016 under the title "Wrong side of the law? Why can't prison officers strike, and which

other professions have legal restrictions?" indicating the expectation that the general

population would not necessarily be knowledgeable about such issues (Lake, 2016).

Another example of differences between protest legality and normativity, can be

found in the implementation of the Spanish "Ley Orgánica de protección de la

seguridad ciudadana" (Ley Orgánica 4/2015, de 30 de marzo, de protección de la

seguridad ciudadana)—translated as Spanish Citizen Security Law in British media (see

Kassam, 2015a, 2015b). The law, also referred to as "gag-law", forbids the unauthorised

use of footage of the police that may put them or their families at risk (article 36).

Similarly, it classifies showing disrespect towards police officers as a minor infraction

(article 37). In practice, the enactment of the law has resulted in a woman being fined

for carrying a handbag with the acronym A.C.A.B—traditionally seen as standing for

"All Cops Are Bastards"— that was followed by the text "All Cats Are Beautiful"

(Sobot, 2016). In another case, a woman was fined for protesting by posting online a

picture of a police car parked in a disabled bay (Burgen, 2015). Such cases serve as

clear examples of non-violent and non-disruptive actions that most likely adhere to

overarching social norms, and yet, are punished by the law and state agents.

1.3.3. The Discursive Overlap of Law, Norms, and Violence

The overlap between social norms, law, and also violence, can be found

repetitively in both recent and older literature on non-normative protest (Becker &

Tausch, 2015; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2015, Shuman, et al., 2016; Wright et al., 1990). In

their paper on radical group behaviour, Tausch and colleagues (2011) explained that

"collective action can take many forms, ranging from relatively *moderate and*

nonviolent [assumed to be normative] actions such as taking part in peaceful

demonstrations, signing petitions, or participating in acts of civil disobedience, to more

radical forms such as *sabotage, violence, and terrorism* [logically assumed to be non-

normative]" (Tausch et al., 2011, p. 129, emphasis added). The authors further

highlighted the importance of their research for a *better understanding of extremism and*

terrorism, and informing "practitioners and policymakers concerned with steering

political action *away from violent confrontation*" (p. 130. emphasis added).

  In later work, Becker and Tausch (2015) used the terms "non-normative" and

"radical" interchangeably, and defined protest forms as "peaceful versus radical [i.e.

non-normative]" (p.63) when addressing Becker and colleagues' research (i.e., Becker,

Tausch, Spears & Christ, 2011). In doing so, they equate normativity to peaceful

actions, and non-normative to violent actions. Ironically, Becker and colleagues' (2011)

research stands out as an exception within the field in terms of disentangling through

their methodology the effects of an action being non-normative, and those of the form

and violence of the action. In other research, Jiménez-Moya and colleagues (2015)

similarly used terms of violent, extreme, radical, and non-normative collective action as

synonyms, highlighting that "extreme action… is not normative (neither in general, nor

according to the ingroup)" (p. 521).

  In terms of the overlap with legality, Tausch and colleagues (2011) highlighted

that protest at the time of data collection had taken both *legal –signing petitions or*

demonstrating– and *illegal forms –blocking university buildings, as well as violent*

actions. Similarly, Becker and Tausch (2015) stated that "*Non-normative actions* are

costly, given that they are *often illegal* and risky" (p. 62, emphasis added). The

assumptions of the law reflecting social values, and the discursive construction of non-

normative action as being radical and violent, blur the lines that separate the different

dimensions at play. In the end, the illegal becomes both violent and frowned upon by

the majority. In reality, this is not necessarily the case.

It is essential to highlight that, when addressing their measures of action tendencies in their first study, Tausch and colleagues (2011) differentiated between what they labelled normative actions (participating in plenaries, signing complaints, or demonstrating), violent non-normative actions (throwing bottles or stones and arson attacks), and non-violent non-normative actions (disruptive events or engaging in blockades). In doing so, they disentangled the different concepts to a certain degree and separated the constructs.

Similarly, Becker and Tausch (2015) clarified that *the same peaceful demonstration*, which can be "a *normative*, 'within-system' action in some contexts, can be clearly *non-normative and illegal* in others" (Becker & Tausch, 2015; p.77, emphasis added). At this point, Becker and Tausch clearly differentiated between normativity and violence, but continued to treat normativity and legality as being equivalent within countries. They further noted that it is "important to avoid distinguishing 'good' protesters from 'bad' radicals", which "happens quite often in real-life social movements and can lead to disidentification and the creation of subgroups" (p. 65). Becker and Tausch (2015) hence acknowledged the negative social implications of "radical protest" and addressed some of its problematic consequences. Despite points of clarification, the overall discourse in most research reviewed remains problematic. It ultimately confounds different dimensions and perpetuates views of non-normative protest, violence, illegality, and radicalism, as being inseparable from each other, thus reinforcing the assumption that an action cannot be illegal if it is peaceful and/or adheres to social norms.

Focus to this point has been largely directed at research by Becker, Spears, Tausch, and their colleagues (2011, 2015) due to being highly influential and representative of the field; however, similar approaches are common in social and political psychology. For instance, Shuman and colleagues (2016) stated that non-

normative action has traditionally been conceptualised and operationalised through the dimension of legality even though a normative action would entail anything that is accepted by the group. This discrepancy, however, was not the focus of their paper so the conceptualisation was simply accepted as general practise in the field. In addition, they operationalised normative actions as being peaceful (e.g. signing a petition or participating in demonstrations) whereas non-normative protest mostly involved engaging in violence (i.e. throwing rocks, clashing with the police, and attacking politicians or police). Other research by Cichocka and colleagues (2017) also included a differentiation between normative and non-normative protest in which the dimensions of violence and normativity became intertwined.

1.3.4. Untangling Theoretical Assumptions, Discursive Implications, and Empirical Tensions

The assumptions we make within frames of theory and research not only have an impact on academic discourse but, through it, can reinforce social views that underestimate the degree to which a system and its branches of power may fight to resist social change. In the process, we neglect to acknowledge that peaceful and normative actions can be illegal, and we may impose additional negative connotations on criminalised forms of dissent. By doing so, we, unintentionally, contribute to the creation of a dominant discourse that oversimplifies the relationship between the law and society, and the dynamics of resistance between the people and those in power.

Moreover, our assumptions of whether specific actions adhere to social norms, or not, may be bound by our own ideological views rather than by the actual perceived adherence to said norms by the general population or our participants. Ultimately, protest is likely to be among the social situations in which there are no clear and prevailing social norms (see Fisher et al., 2011). This can have an impact on our

interpretations and may result in our research missing key points or being unknowingly biased.

An example of how our conceptual assumptions might affect our interpretations can be found in Tausch and colleagues' (2011) findings linking anger and contempt to different forms of protest. As previously noted, Tausch and colleagues (2011) included a wide range of actions in their research from signing a complaint, to blockades, and even arson attacks. Principal components analysis revealed the existence of three factors, which they conceptualised as representing normative, non-normative and nonviolent, and non-normative and violent actions. Results revealed that perceived injustices predicted anger and contempt. Anger, in turn, predicted normative peaceful action tendencies, whereas contempt predicted violent non-normative tendencies.

Within their framework, results can be interpreted as supporting their hypotheses and revealing different emotional pathways to normative and non-normative action. That is, actions that fall outside of social norms are related to contempt instead of anger, whereas normative actions are only related to anger. The only finding that somehow contradicts a priori hypotheses involves the moderate non-normative action tendencies, which were predicted by similar pathways to normative actions rather than by contempt.

To address this slight inconsistency, Tausch and colleagues (2011) noted that in the context of the study –in which participants had been engaging in a range of protest actions– said actions might have been perceived as fairly legitimate and normative by participants. The authors interpreted them as belonging to a middle category that is less normative than peaceful demonstrations or signing complaints, but more normative than violent actions. This more nuanced interpretation of results probably draws a more accurate picture of normativity perceptions among the general population, as existing in a continuum, than portrayals of black and white categories. Interestingly, given that no middle-ground categories were included in their other studies, had they not included

them at this point, such a scaled and nuanced view of normativity may have never been explicitly considered in the paper.

Although Tausch and colleagues' (2011) interpretation is a plausible explanation for results, it clashes with their definition of normativity, which related to system norms rather than the norms of groups. In this context, perceptions of non-normative moderate actions as fairly normative are more likely to result from group normativity, or ideological perceptions of normativity, than from the law and system norms. After all, laws and system regulations were highly unlikely to have officially changed in the course of the actions. The fact that Tausch and colleagues (2011) had to resort to addressing normativity in a way that differed from their stated approach highlights the complexities of dealing with this construct. Moreover, their interpretation remains in tension with parallel research in which Becker and colleagues (2011) grouped actions like disrupting events and blocking university buildings together with violent actions based on participants' ratings of group normativity (both studies occurred in the same context and with researchers in common).

Considering findings by Becker and colleagues (2011), an alternative interpretation to Tausch and colleagues' findings becomes more plausible. It may be that what affected participants' responses in their study was not the perceived adherence to social norms of the different actions, but the perceived degree of aggression and violence. Blocking highways and university buildings is much more disruptive than signing a complaint, and thus, those actions may have been judged as being more aggressive and/or violent. Tausch and colleagues' (2011) findings could be interpreted as resulting from a perceived continuum of violence, rather than normativity, with arson attacks and throwing stones or bottles as the most extreme actions. Given that the second and third studies in their paper also compared violent and non-violent actions, rather than addressing normative and non-normative protest independently of violence,

concluding that non-normative protest relates to feelings of contempt may be erroneous. Similar considerations can be applied to findings by Cichocka and colleagues (2017) on the curvilinear relationship between system justification and non-normative action – where destroying state property may be seen as a violent action beyond normativity– or any other research that conflates non-normativity and violence.

Tensions on research methodology, results, and interpretations can also be found in Cheung, Sedikides, Wildschut, Tausch, and Ayanian's (2017) research. The authors found in their work that anger, and not contempt, predicted self-reported involvement in the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong. They interpreted their data as being in line with findings from Tausch and colleagues (2011), on anger predicting normative protest, because their measure included normative actions like hanging slogans. However, the measure also included involvement in occupations, which would be moderate/non-normative in Tausch's previous research. It must be noted that non-normative non-violent actions like occupations were indeed predicted by anger and not contempt in Tausch and colleagues' (2011) work. Nevertheless, Cheung and colleagues' (2017) findings and interpretations highlight tensions at definitional and operational levels across studies that build upon each other. Their findings also reinforce the alternative view that contempt is linked to the perceived violence of protest, rather than to its normativity. These cases serve as examples of the construction of a confusing discourse within the field and its potential negative implications when interpreting findings.

Some may point out that a distinction between normativity and violence is irrelevant since the more violent an action is, the less normative it will be perceived to be. Given the conceptual mix between normativity and violence, many may even see both interpretations as addressing the same issues but attaching different labels. However, findings seem to suggest that the variance explained by participants' perception of violence differs from the one explained by the perceived normativity (see

Becker et al., 2011). Violence elicits different emotions from those that stem from breaching norms (see Rozin, Lowery, Imada & Haidt, 1999), so endorsement of violent protest should also be predicted by different emotions independently of its adherence to social norms. Furthermore, perceived violence may relate more strongly to a dimension of perceived morality than to a construct of normativity (see Bicchieri, 2006, 2008; Dubreuil & Grégoire, 2013; Elster, 2007, 2009; Rozin et al., 1999, Turiel, 1983; for different taxonomies of norms).

Indeed, work by Saab, Spears, Tausch and Sasse (2016) approached the study of protest by grouping actions in terms of their aggressiveness instead of normativity. The authors even noted the potential separate influence of dimensions of perceived normativity and violence of protest when explaining why the item addressing an occupation might have cross-loaded on peaceful and violent factors (i.e. the action was peaceful, but less normative than others). However, no further mention of normativity was considered in terms of their results, and no control over the normative dimension was included. As a result, interpretations once again risked missing what it is exactly of the normative and violent dimensions that affected their outcome variables.

A specific experiment on protest stands out in terms of disentangling the overlap of violence and normativity (i.e. Becker et al., 2011). Becker and colleagues' research occurred in parallel to that of Tausch and colleagues (2011), and within the same context of student protest in Germany, yet they approached non-normativity and violence differently. The authors highlighted that "radical [i.e. violent] and non-normative action can be distinguished in principle" (Becker et al., 2011; p: 1110), and ensured through a manipulation (Study 2) that they addressed the interaction between the normativity and the violence of the action. Their results showed that imagined participation in aggressive actions lead to deidentification when the action was

presented as non-normative. That is, in the same violent protest, deidentification with the group resulted from not having the support of other members of the group.

It also stands out that Tausch and colleagues' (2011) and Becker and colleagues' (2011) work differed in their approach to normativity since, as previously noted, Tausch and colleagues linked normativity to the system and the law, yet Becker and colleagues focused on group norms. The fact that we can find studies defining normativity and addressing violence so differently, despite having authors in common, being set in the same context, and being published within the same year (see Becker & Tausch, 2015; Becker et al., 2011; and Tausch et al., 2011) highlights the complexity of a taxonomy of normativity, and how easily constructs can be confounded within research discourse.

1.4. Other Taxonomies and a History of Constructing the Acceptable

Although up to this point I have focused on the taxonomy of normative protest, most of the points raised about it can be applied to other classifications, such as those differentiating between conventional and non-conventional political engagement (Barnes et al., 1979; Milbrath, 1981), within-system and out-of-system political action (Sabucedo & Arce, 1991), activism versus radicalism (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009), constitutional versus extraconstitutional action (Hayes & McAllister, 2005), or disruptive and non-disruptive protest (Jost el al., 2012; Piven & Cloward, 1991). Exploring the evolution of terminology reveals a large overlap between taxonomies, which match normative considerations (Tausch et al., 2011), and could be summarised as attempting to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable political action.

Within the conventional and non-conventional classification (Barnes et al., 1979), actions as different as legal demonstrations, illegal boycotts, and personal violence were included in the same category, whereas conventional participation was limited to electoral processes. Similarly, Sabucedo and Arce's (1991) within-system and out-of-system taxonomy collapsed legalistic and violent dimensions. In their

classification, authorised demonstrations and strikes moved from non-conventional to within-system (becoming more acceptable), yet unauthorised strikes and demonstrations remained in the out-of-system (less acceptable) category together with blocking traffic, but also with armed violence.

Interestingly, Sabucedo and Arce (1991) noted that previous taxonomies implied "a generally negative assessment of less traditional activities" (p.94). Furthermore, they noted that a crude differentiation of political actions, as the one resulting from the conventional and non-conventional taxonomy, "is not adequate for any real understanding of the nuances and the distinctions between various categories of political involvement" (p.94). Sabucedo and Arce's (1991) work showed an interesting shift by moving certain political actions to a more acceptable or legitimate category, which may reflect changes in social norms across time or ideological differences between authors. Regardless, the resulting categories still failed to fully address the nuances of political engagement.

In more recent research, Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) differentiated between activism and radicalism in their scales but collapsed radicalism with illegal action, engagement in violence, and terrorism. Once again, activism (the acceptable) was peaceful and non-violent, whereas radicalism (the unacceptable) included readiness to participate in illegal or in violent actions. The Radicalism Intentions Scale (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009) includes support for an organization that *sometimes breaks the law*, and support for an organisation that *sometimes resorts to violence*. Thus, within their discourse and scale, supporting Martin Luther King's peaceful civil rights movement in the 50s –which broke the law on several occasions, with its members being imprisoned– is placed in the same category as radicalism in support for violent organisations.

The scale further includes items addressing willingness to engage in protest when thinking that it *might* turn violent, and willingness to attack police officers if one were to witness them beating members of one's group. They, therefore, conceptualised the willingness to attend a demonstration that *might* (not will) turn violent, and the willingness to engage in what could be seen as a form of self-defence, as radicalism, and confounded both with the willingness to proactively engage in planned violence, or the support of it. An individual may be willing to attend a protest despite believing that it might turn violent due to the actions of police officers or a radical vanguard, and still not support that violence. Moreover, distinguishing between willingness to engage in planned violence, and possible participation in the escalation of violence linked to in-situ aggressive behaviour, is essential when considering violent protest as they are likely to be linked to different variables (see Becker & Tausch, 2015). Such distinctions are missed by the scale.

The same blurring of lines can be found in the constitutional versus extraconstitutional distinction. Hayes and McAllister (2005) described the constitutional tradition as seeking change via "political parties competing in democratic elections, as well as through [unspecified forms of] pressure and interest group activity" (p. 606). Constitutional actions, they clarified, are *exclusive to established democracies*. In contrast, the extraconstitutional tradition included protest activity, which they linked to an implicit threat of force, or the use of armed force. Although their categorisation may be of great relevance for the context they addressed –a tradition of political engagement in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland– it remains too crude as a single form of categorisation of political activity.

The distinction between disruptive and non-disruptive actions (Jost et al., 2012; Piven & Cloward, 1991) faces similar problems. Disruptive actions disturb the social order, and include strikes, demonstrations, and occupations, whereas non-disruptive

actions would involve activities like signing a petition or writing to one's MP. Once again, the distinction may be confounded with the perception of violence and aggression in any given action. At this point, the reader may find such points exceedingly repetitive. Such repetition, however, should highlight the prevalence of said problems in the literature, which in turn warrants careful examination. Indeed, when considering protest disruptiveness, even in peaceful protest movements, an action like a blockade of parliament or cutting off traffic in a major city may be seen as a form of aggression due to the very disruption of social order that defines the categorisation. If so, one should consider whether research findings stem from the disruptiveness itself or from something unique to the perception of the action as being violent and/or aggressive.

The dimension of disruptiveness was also confounded with that of normativity in the work of Piven and Cloward (1991; also see Louis, 2009). Piven and Cloward (1991) defined protest as existing "'outside of normal politics' and 'against normal politics' in the sense that people break the rules defining permissible modes of political action" (p. 437). Thus, protest was implied to occur within the realm of disruption and outside assumed permissiveness. However, within contemporary settings, many nations ensure that disruptive protests like demonstrations are legal and permissible, and thus, part of "normal" politics, which prevents the strict application of their definition to many contexts. Within the same paragraph the authors further stated that "a riot is clearly not an electoral rally, and both the participants and the authorities know the difference" (p. 437). In a single paragraph they presented all protest as disruptive, collapsed dimensions of normativity and disruptiveness, and resorted to examples of violence to explain why, despite ambiguity in a construct of normativity, distinctions of normativity could still be drawn.

Disruptive and normative dimensions have a logical overlap with each other and with violence, and distinctions can be better seen as a representing a continuum rather

than categories. Signing a petition is bound to be perceived as being less disruptive than engaging in a sit-in in a park, occupying a central square in a main city, or blockading a building and stopping traffic around it. However, the last three actions are likely to be perceived as differing in degrees of disruptiveness as they would in degrees of aggression or normativity. Although the perceived disruptiveness of an action is likely to be more objective than an appraisal of its normativity, assumptions by researchers still have the potential to affect interpretations and result in a failure to address the nuances that underlie protest intentions or engagement.

As an example, we can see similarities in results by Jost and colleagues' (2012) and Tausch and colleagues' (2011) research. The former revealed that the pathway to protest intentions via anger was only present for non-disruptive actions. Similarly, Tausch and colleagues (2011) found that anger only predicted normative and moderate actions, whereas contempt predicted non-normative violent actions. Given the overlap between constructs, the findings can be seen to support each other, with anger predicting only normative/non-disruptive actions. However, in Jost and colleagues (2012) research, demonstrations, picket lines, and strikes, were grouped as being disruptive. Yet, in Tausch and colleagues' (2011) research, demonstrations were included within the most normative set of actions, together with signing up petitions.

Peaceful demonstrations were included, as a result, in a normative construct linked to anger within a research line but in a disruptive category unrelated to anger within the other. By adhering to a single classification of protest (which in fairness makes research less complicated and can result in simpler and more intuitive distinctions), researchers have missed that even if a demonstration is considered normative, it is still disruptive, just as an occupation can be seen as peaceful yet non-normative (see Saab et al., 2016). Similarly, although a demonstration may be

disruptive and could be classified together with blocking a building and stopping traffic, both actions will not be perceived as equally normative (Becker et al., 2011).

Once again, the overlap and blurring of dimensions occurs across definitional and operational levels. Such consistent repetition across approaches calls for a reconsideration of taxonomies. The same considerations applied by Becker and colleagues (2011) to normativity and aggression must be present in terms of other appraisals of protest. A more open approach to protest categories that moves away from the adherence to a single taxonomy may be essential to address the nuances that have eluded researchers since before the 1990s (Sabucedo & Arce, 1991).

1.5. Considering an Alternative Approach

The necessary next step within this project is to consider an alternative approach to the one currently followed in the field. Such an approach should build on the strength of previous research as well as account for its limitations. Indeed, the critical evaluation of different taxonomies of protest –whether based on normativity, disruptiveness, or any other classification– must not diminish their value in developing knowledge within psychology, or imply that past research is in any way irrelevant. Providing participants with more options than one specific form of action versus inaction (Wright et al., 1990) has undoubtedly enriched our methodologies, and forced us to face problems in our assumptions.

All research reviewed so far addressed reasonable constructs and has been supported by empirical data. Overall, researchers have continued to generate valuable knowledge on differences in the antecedents of protest, and has led to interesting developments in both theory and empirical research (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Becker et al., 2011; Cichocka et al., 2017; Jost et al., 2012; Saab et al., 2016; Tausch et al., 2011). While acknowledging the strengths of previous work, this review must reconsider predominant assumptions and approaches, and potentially erroneous interpretations,

which limit our understanding of protest. Based on this critique, I propose an alternative approach as a blueprint for the design of future studies within this project.

A key limitation in the empirical studies reviewed is the assumption that when researchers present protest actions to participants, these will be appraised in line with the researchers' conceptualisation. Nevertheless, little to no research ensures that protest actions are actually perceived by participants as claimed (Becker at al., 2011; Study 1), or that they are only appraised in relation to a single dimension (e.g. violence or normative) and not others. Precisely because it is necessary to study different predictors of protest intentions and engagement in actions *perceived* as non-normative, disruptive, and/or violent, it is also imperative to address the appraisal of the different actions. Even when addressing the exact same protest action, such as the occupation of a building, different dimensions will be at play (see Saab et al., 2016) and pathways to engagement and support for the action should be expected to differ.

When coming across a range of protest actions in real life, for instance, one person may appraise an occupation as non-normative and decide not to participate, while another also perceives it as non-normative and intends to participate nonetheless. A third person may be willing to participate because they believe the action to be normative despite how researchers would classify it. Additionally, these three individuals may be equally unwilling to engage in arson because it is seen as non-normative *and* violent by all. All instances may be predicted and explained by different variables.

Evaluating the immediate effects of manipulations and operationalisations, in terms of a range of appraisals is necessary for clear and correct interpretations of our findings (see Becker et al., 2011). For example, an intended manipulation of protest disruptiveness may involve presenting non-disruptive actions (e.g., signing a petition) to some participants and disruptive actions (e.g., joining a demonstration) to others. The

protest form may affect first the perceived disruptiveness of the action and, through it, impact the willingness to engage in it. It may additionally affect the perceived violence of the action, and/or its adherence to social norms, even though we interpret it in terms of disruptiveness, and through said appraisals have parallel effects on protest intentions. It could potentially even have a third causal pathway in the opposite direction through the perceived protest efficacy, as well as through anger (see Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Louis, 2009; Piven & Cloward, 1991). The perceptions of the action may also be affected by other variables, such as the ideology of the participant, or whether they see the system as being just and fair. This is particularly likely in perceptions of normativity since they are potentially more subjective.

In this example, if perceptions of normativity or disruptiveness of an action affected protest intentions above and beyond the protest form presented to participants, it would reveal the presence of other variables that remained unexplained by our manipulation but still affected the perceptions. Alternatively, should the protest form manipulation maintain a direct effect despite accounting for the perceived adherence to norms or disruptiveness, it would mean that there is something about the manipulation that we did not consider. Consequently, defining the manipulation as dealing with only disruptiveness or normativity, and looking directly at its effects on protest intentions, would provide a limited view of the processes involved, potentially leading to erroneous interpretations. In contrast, considering the manipulation and its immediate outcomes (i.e., perceptions of normativity, disruptiveness, violence, etc) allows to draw a clearer picture of the processes involved in the decision to protest.

Considering the perceptions of protest actions instead of classifying them based on predetermined dichotomies has the additional advantage of allowing the existence of middle points. Whereas a dichotomous distinction of protest actions may lose sight of the middle ground of a potential continuum –as described by Tausch and colleagues

(2011)– including scales or continuous responses measuring perceptions of normativity, disruptiveness, and other variables like morality and legitimacy, allows a better evaluation of an underlying continuum. Of course, measuring several perceptions of different actions becomes increasingly complicated and time-consuming within designs in which numerous protest actions are presented at the same time (e.g. Cichocka et al., 2017; Jost et al., 2012; Tausch et al., 2011), but it has been done successfully in the past in assessments of normativity (Becker et al., 2011).

Only by taking an inclusive approach to research, which addresses several dimensions of protest and acknowledges the distinctiveness of each one, can we elucidate the most eluding nuances of protest intentions and engagement, or the consequences of said engagement. Through this approach, we should be able to address all dimensions independently from each other, while acknowledging them as continuums, and ensuring that our participants appraise protest actions in the way that we claim. Sticking to a single taxonomy may, in contrast, lead us to interpreting our results incorrectly. The multidimensional approach to protest developed throughout this chapter underlies and guides this thesis and has been considered in the design of individual studies and the overall thesis, particularly when considering illegal protest.

1.5.1. Addressing Illegality in its Own Right

A classification of protest, which is present in official reports and has remained unaddressed in this review, involves distinguishing between 'organised declared' and 'non-declared' actions. For official bodies and institutions, such a distinction is essential due to its implications for police tactics during protest (O'Connor, 2009). Due to the lack of dialogue between protesters and the police, preparations and plans for a protest action become more difficult, and this, in turn, can result in the use of more restrictive police tactics (O'Connor, 2009). Official considerations on this point have led some academics to recognise shifts in protest policing that move away from repressive tactics

and instead favour communication (see Della Porta & Reiter, 1998; Gorringe & Rosie, 2008; Waddington & King, 2005). This analysis, however, has been criticised by other academics like Gilmore (2010), who questioned the veracity of said shift and provided examples of protest actions faced with large levels of police violence despite being organised and declared.

A more intuitive and potentially comprehensive approach to official and system-lead categorisations of actions involves the distinction between legal and illegal protest. Using the same example previously presented about strikes in the UK, we can see how organised and declared protest –as in the case of prison officers– can be prohibited by legislative, executive, or judicial powers. Given that Governments can be expected to legislate in defence of their own interests (Croall, 2011; Green & Ward, 2004), and considering the context of protest criminalisation in western industrialised countries (Gilmore, 2010; Jackson, 2013; Loadenthal, 2013; Monaghana & Walbyb, 2012), the study of engagement in legal and illegal protest is becoming of increasing importance. Additionally, peaceful actions (potentially seen as normative) can be criminalised when states become increasingly authoritarian and decreasingly democratic (as argued by Tausch et al., 2011). Therefore, the study of willingness to engage in illegal protest, independently from perceptions of normativity and violence, has important applications in cross-cultural research.

Following Simon and Klandermans' (2001) observations about the distinction between normative and non-normative protest, the government and the police can be seen not only as advantaged entities, but also as representatives and defenders of the very system that protestors challenge. Both in the case of the declared/undeclared (see Gilmore, 2010; O'Connor, 2009), and in the legal distinction, protest is categorised from the top and imposed on the bottom within the context of the power struggle. It should not be surprising, therefore, if legislation attempts to restrict protest or if

protestors refuse to adhere blindly to the written law. Depending on predominant views

at a given time and in a specific country, protestors can be labelled as valiant

revolutionaries fighting for freedom (as in many media depictions of the Arab Spring),

or as thugs and terrorists, even when engaging in the exact same actions in challenge of

the law. When addressing protest in terms of legality, it is therefore imperative not to

present engagement in an illegal action as having necessary negative connotations. As

Becker and Tausch (2015) state, we must be careful not to classify protestors in good

and bad categories. Similarly, it is essential to address engagement in illegal protest

without assuming its link to violence or breach of social norms.

Researching engagement in illegal protest allows distinguishing objective

dichotomous categories and conducting simpler manipulations. It also fits well within

the approach that I previously proposed. When researching protest intentions and

engagement in illegal protest, it is particularly important to measure not only our

outcome variables, but also the appraisals of legal and illegal actions themselves. An

illegal protest may not be seen as less normative than a legal one, or it may be judged as

less normative but not less moral. By considering the law in conjunction with its impact

on people's judgements of protest, we can examine protest intentions while avoiding the

overlap of different dimensions and reducing limitations in our assumptions.

1.5.2. Crime and Violence: Other Points of Interest

The implications of labelling a protest action as illegal are not limited to

expected effects on peaceful, normative, or non-disruptive protest. For instance, police

tactics on crowd control should be expected to differ when protest is not permitted by

the law, and may become increasingly coercive and potentially violent (O'Connor,

2009). Police actions, in turn, may trigger processes of escalation of violence in a

different way than if the protest was legal. Therefore, when studying the effects of

labelling protest as illegal the focus must go beyond considering protest intentions and

engagement, and address the justification of use of violence by the police and of possible responses to it.

Previous theory and research has highlighted the importance of intergroup dynamics and the potential role of police action in alienating communities, fostering radicalisation, and sparking violent responses against police repression in crowd settings (Blackwood, Hopkins & Reicher, 2016; Cronin & Reicher, 2006; Reicher, 2017; Reicher, Stott, Cronin & Adang, 2004; Stott & Reicher, 1988). As Tausch and colleagues note within their work (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2011), it is important to differentiate between different forms of violent engagement in protest, such as premeditated violence and spontaneous violence. It is similarly important to differentiate spontaneous violence in response to perceived, or actual, police aggression from violence predicted by shared emotions in terms of emotional effervescence, synchrony, or contagion. (Barsade, 2002; Bosse, Duell, Memon, Treur & van der Wal, 2015; Durkheim,1912; Hatfield, Cacioppo & Rapson, 1994; Páez, Rimé, Basabe, Wlodarczyk & Zumeta, 2015; Wang, Zhang, Lin, Zhao & Hu, 2016).

Given the interplay between police and protestors, it is also relevant to study the support for police and protestor violence. By examining different forms of violence (e.g., proactive, reactive), by different groups (i.e., police, protestors), and the support of it (e.g., by protestors, police, bystanders), we can properly understand the processes that motivate violence, in a context of protest criminalisation or outside of it, and we can inform relevant groups such as activists, the police, and policy makers.

Interestingly, Ayanian and Tausch's (2016) paper on the galvanising effect of government sanctions, via risk perceptions, on protest, can potentially be more informative for the study of illegal protest than research conflating social norms and law. Ayanian and Tausch (2016) found that perceived risks have parallel effects on future action intention through higher anger and identity consolidation efficacy. Applied

to the conceptualisation of contempt as "elicited when the reprehensible behaviour of another is perceived as stable and out of one's control" (Becker & Tausch, 2015; p. 48), sustained power struggles involving protest against any given system can be expected to result in contempt, as well as anger, which in turn predicts premeditated violent protest.

Only the assumption that repressive contexts exist solely outside western democracies (see Ayanian & Tausch, 2016) can prevent us from applying the same considerations to the UK, Spain, Canada, or the USA (among other countries). The degree of repression and opposition to protest in the UK cannot be compared to the repression suffered by activists in the context of the anti-coup actions in Egypt in 2013 (which Ayanian and Tausch studied). Nevertheless, legislation and repressive policing tactics are potentially among the strongest, and most used, tools for any government to protect their interests and resist challenges, whether in democracies or authoritarian regimes (Croall, 2011; El-Enany, 2015; Gilmore, 2010; Green & Ward, 2004).

As previously stated, legislation against protest should be expected to protect the system in which it is drafted. We should, therefore, expect that criminalisation of dissent does occur within democracies and will continue to do so, that resulting government sanctions can inflame feelings of anger and result in contempt in the long run, and that more repressive policing tactics during illegal protest actions may trigger processes of escalation of violence. All things considered, Ayanian and Tausch's (2016) research has important implications across cultures, including western democracies, and when addressing peaceful protest, as well as when considering premeditated violent protest or in-situ protest violence.

At different points of this project I will address the justification of police violence, which should be more prevalent in responses to illegal than legal actions, and the support and willingness to engage in a range of forms of violence by protestors. This includes violence in response to police attacks and premeditated violent protest.

Addressing peaceful protest, and different forms of violence, together with the impact of protest illegality, makes this a comprehensive project. This approach can help us understand different forms of protest engagement and the escalation of violence within existing processes of protest criminalisation.

1.6. Outline of Following Chapters

Jost and colleagues (2012) argued, in their paper on system justification and protest, that a multidisciplinary approach is essential for understanding the antecedents of protest and even revolutions. Chapter 1 has built up on their idea by reviewing literature in social and political psychology addressing protest, criminological literature on protest criminalisation and the criminal justice system, and philosophical, sociological, and political perspectives. Drawing from different fields will allow considering potential joint contributions to develop a more encompassing approach.

In Chapter 2, I will expand on this approach by reviewing the literature on anger, a key predictor of protest. I further build on psychological literature on emotions and aggression in order to propose the relevance of studying the role of rumination within the field of protest. The approach developed and the connection between all variables is considered within the framework of system justification theory. Last, I address findings from my MSc dissertation research, which served as a pilot for this project, and propose links between key variables.

Chapter 3 includes cross-sectional and longitudinal studies addressing the relationships between key variables. I focus on the predictive role of political rumination –that is, the continuous and repeated thinking about politics– on system justification and protest intentions, and of anger rumination on the justification of protestor violence and willingness to engage in it. Research in Chapter 3 further begins the exploration of protest appraisals through considerations of perceived protest legitimacy. Perceptions of legitimacy have underlying moral implications, are related to

obedience or disobedience to authority, and have been considered as essential to the support of protest by the general population (Kelman, 2001, Kelman & Hamilton, 1989, Passini & Morselli, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2015). An appraisal of legitimacy, thus, provides a good starting point for studying the impact of illegality on protest appraisals.

Chapter 4 expands on findings by using more ecologically valid measures of protest (Study 3), and by manipulating political rumination and evaluating its effects on system justification and emotions (Study 4). Direct pathways, and potential indirect effects, are considered for legal and illegal protest, and for the support for violent protest. The chapter, thus, focuses on examining causal relationships between the different variables addressed in Chapters 2 and 3, presents different pathways resulting from political rumination towards higher protest intentions and support for violent protest, and discusses the potential role of rumination in deterring protest tendencies.

Chapter 5 extends beyond the emotion pathway to protest and considers implications of rumination and system justification for perceived protest efficacy. Measures within Chapter 5 include both a utilitarian-focused measure of efficacy and a retributive-oriented measure. Additionally, Chapter 5 builds on previous studies by considering a range of appraisals beyond the perception of legitimacy. In Chapter 5 I study the unique contributions of perceptions of legitimacy, morality, normativity, disruptiveness, and aggressiveness, on protest support and willingness to engage in legal and illegal actions, as well as in violent protest.

The impact of protest illegality, by itself or as a moderator, and comparisons between legal and illegal protest tendencies, will be continuously considered throughout the thesis. A broad range of settings and methodological approaches are developed across studies to provide a comprehensive and rich analysis of the multiple avenues through which protest can occur. Overall findings will be considered in Chapter 6, in which I draw a set of conclusions linked to theoretical and practical implications.

All studies received ethical approval from the Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology at the University of Kent. To ensure that participants provided informed consent, written briefings with information about each study were included before any tasks were completed. Relevant information on confidentiality measures was also included in the briefings, and participants were reassured that their names would not be recorded and that any potential publications of the data would not allow identifying participants. My email address was included in all briefing and debriefing sheets (Appendices A & B). All participants confirmed that they understood the information provided to them, that they had the chance to ask questions to the researcher, that they understood their right to withdraw from the study, that they understood how their data would be treated, and that they consented to participate (Appendix C). Briefings and debriefings followed the same structure across studies. Only Study 3 included deception in the briefing (further addressed in Chapter 4).

To ensure anonymity, unique identification codes were used to identify participants' data without relying on records of their personal information or contact details (see Appendix D). Participants recruited via Prolific Academic used their Prolific ID, whereas participants who completed the studies face to face created their own identification codes. Thus, any participant who wished to withdraw from the study only needed to contact me and provide their code for the data to be identified and removed. Participants were given at least two weeks, since completing the study, to contact the researcher for the purpose of withdrawing their data (Appendices B & D). The debriefing further invited participants to contact me if they had any queries about the study. In case that any participant did not feel comfortable contacting me to address possible concerns, the email address of my supervisor, and the contact details of the ethics committee, were provided to them (Appendices A & C). No participant asked to

withdraw from any study, and, to my knowledge, no contact was made with my

supervisor or the ethics panel.

Chapter 2: Frame and Predictors

2.1. Introduction

Throughout Chapter 1, I have elaborated on different approaches to the study of protest, addressing definitions and taxonomies, as well as the predominant discourse and methodological approaches in research. I further addressed tensions and limitations in the literature, considering real-life scenarios, and proposed an alternative approach for this project. Lastly, I argued for the need to study illegal protesting, the justification of police violence, and the support and willingness to engage in violent protest, independently of an assumed adherence to established taxonomies. Chapter 1, therefore, involved setting up the objects of research, or key dependent variables within this project. Chapter 2, in turn, focuses on addressing key independent or predictor variables that will be considered in following chapters.

Although the focus throughout Chapter 1 was on setting up the groundwork for my conceptualisation of protest, different variables have continued to appear throughout the literature review as predictors, or causes, of different protest forms due to their relevance, and the prevalence of their study in the field. For instance, emotional variables (e.g., anger, contempt) have been noted as important predictors of normative and non-normative protest (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Becker & Tausch, 2015; Cheung et al., 2017; Tausch et al., 2011). Similarly, the psychological pathway to protesting through expectations of efficacy has repeatedly been of great relevance to our considerations (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2004). Indeed, as argued in Chapter 1, the notion of efficacy as an essential part of protest is a logical consequence of the definition of collective action and utilitarian perspectives of protest.

Chapter 1 may appear as particularly critical towards much of the literature reviewed. Yet, as previously noted, it is not intended to undervalue the contributions of

said research to the field. The wealth of literature on the parallel pathways of anger and efficacy to protest (e.g. Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2004) has been carefully, and successfully, developed over the years, enriching and shaping our understandings of protest. It has also been key to the development of this project, and thus, will be addressed before other relevant variables and theories are considered.

2.2. The Dynamic Dual Pathway to Collective Action

Social-scientific research in the 20th century saw the development and growth of theoretical work, which resulted in different, competing, and strong research approaches to protest. Relative deprivation theory (Runciman, 1966; Crosby, 1976; Folger, 1987; Walker & Smith, 2002), for instance, focused on the subjective experience of disadvantage as being unfair. Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) considered membership to social groups and the social identities linked to said membership. It proposed that challenges to the status quo through collective action result from differences in group status being perceived as illegitimate and unstable by disadvantaged group members.

Perspectives from intergroup emotion theory built up on appraisal theories of emotion (see Frijda, 1986) and social identity theory, by addressing group emotions, particularly anger, to explain protest (Smith, 1993). Last, resource mobilisation theory (Gamson, 1975; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978) saw protest in more rational terms. Later integrative work by Klandermans (1984, 1997) brought the role of the expected results of protesting, and whether collective action would be an effective path to goal attainment, into theoretical and research focus.

During the first decade of the 21st century, van Zomeren et al., (2004) drew from appraisal theories of emotion to integrate dominant perspectives in the field within a model with two distinct pathways to protest: an injustice/emotional pathway consistent

with emotion-focused coping which connected relative deprivation, social identity, and

intergroup emotion theories (Folger, 1987; Frijda, 1986; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and an

instrumental pathway mirroring problem-focused coping, which fit perspectives

addressing group efficacy and cost-benefit calculations (Klandermans., 1997; Simon et

al., 1998). Thus, distinct pathways of group-based anger and efficacy were found to

predict collective action tendencies. Further work bridged the gap between both

pathways by addressing the role of social identity, resulting in the Social Identity Model

of Collective Action (SIMCA: van Zomeren et al., 2008). In a later theoretical

endeavour, van Zomeren, Leach, and Spears (2012) transformed the model into a theory

of collective action that allowed addressing both its antecedents and its consequences.

Van Zomeren and colleagues' work has repeatedly provided evidence for the

importance of anger and perceived efficacy in protest, and has spearheaded work in the

field by numerous other researchers across time, cultures, and contexts (e.g. Ayanian &

Tausch, 2016; Cakal, Hewstone, Schwär & Heath, 2011; Odag, Ulug & Solak, 2016;

Tabri & Conway, 2011; Tausch et al., 2011; Wlodarczyk, Basabec, Páez & Zumeta,

2017). Of course, research on anger and efficacy pathways to protest existed prior to

van Zomeren and colleagues' work and has continued to develop since then, both within

their theoretical framework and outside of it. Within this project, I consider how

different theoretical perspectives in the literature, as well as my own study designs in

later chapters, contribute to the two pathways outlined by van Zomeren et al., (2004).

Within this chapter, as well as across Chapters 3 and 4 of the project, I will

mainly focus on literature on the emotional pathway of anger, and how my own studies

contribute to it. Chapter 5 will move beyond focus on a single pathway to address the

pathway of efficacy.

2.2.1. The Emotion Pathway and the Cornerstone of Anger

The role of anger and other related emotions (e.g., frustration, moral outrage) as precursors of participation in social movements and protest has been so extensively addressed in the literature to date that it almost feels moot to restate it (see for examples Barbalet, 1998; Goodwin et al., 2001; Gurr, 1970; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Jasper, 1998; Jost et al., 2012; Klandermans, van der Toorn, & van Stekelenburg, 2008; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006, 2007; Saab et al., 2015; Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2012). Anger is also almost omnipresent in descriptions of protest and collective action, even in academic portrayals of the Arab Spring (van Zomeren et al., 2012) or in the massive protests and escalation of violence that followed the gang-rape of a young woman in Delhi (Shukla, 2014).

Indeed, "as an action-oriented emotion about perceived injustice, anger represents a particularly potent form of emotion-focused approach coping with collective disadvantage that has an especially robust link to collective action" (van Zomeren et al., 2012; p. 181). Being action-oriented, anger is linked to a state of action readiness (see Fijda 1986; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). Furthermore, it has been conceptualised as an injustice-based emotion that amplifies social and moral concerns (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; van Zomeren et al., 2008) and can be seen as a proximal antecedent of protest that translates experienced grievances into action (Klandermans et al., 2008; Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2004; also see earlier work by Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Within the literature on collective action and the dynamic dual pathways theory, focus on the study of anger has been explicitly framed in group-based terms. Appraisals of injustice and the resulting emotions occur at a group level rather than an individual one. As van Zomeren and colleagues (2008) put it when addressing intergroup emotion theory:

"group-based appraisals or interpretations of an intergroup event (e.g., injustice) determine specific group-based emotions (e.g., anger or resentment) that, in turn, predict specific action tendencies (e.g., wanting to confront those responsible…)" (p. 508).

Group-based anger has been consistently found to predict protesting among the disadvantaged (Klandermans et al., 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2008), but has also been linked to feelings of responsibility for the actions of the in-group. Thus, group-based anger can motivate action against the in-group's advantage (Leach et al., 2006), as well as their transgressions (Iyer, et al., 2007). Researchers on moral outrage and solidarity collective action even have conceptualised moral outrage "as anger experienced regarding an injustice suffered by an outgroup" (Saab et al., 2015). Shifts in the target of the anger can also motivate members of an advantaged group to take political action against redress for the sake of the disadvantaged (also see Jost et al., 2017; Osborne et al., 2019).

2.2.2. Anger within this Project: Re-evaluating the Utilitarian Rage and Considering the Righteous Fury

An exploration of the literature on group-based anger reveals its raison d'être to be functional: the confrontation with parties responsible for existing disadvantage serves "to redress their [the disadvantaged group's] unfair deprivation" (van Zomeren et al., 2008, p.506). In later work (Becker and Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2015), researchers similarly presented anger as serving a constructive function; that is, "to correct wrongdoing and uphold accepted standards of behaviour" (Becker and Tausch, 2015, p. 47). Both within van Zomeren and colleagues' (2008) discourse, as in Becker and Tausch's (2015) functional approach to emotions, we can once again see the utilitarian conceptualisation of protest as a tool to achieve change: to redress deprivation and correct wrongdoings. However, an alternative view is also implied in considerations of the desire "to confront those responsible" and to "uphold accepted standards of

behaviour", which fits the retributive motivations to protest proposed in Chapter 1, or even a "lashing out" effect.

Indeed, van Zomeren and colleagues' work on moral convictions and their integration in the SIMCA (van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2011a, 2012; van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears & Bettache, 2011b) serves to elaborate on this point. Within their work, the authors not only acknowledged the need to consider the role of moral convictions in motivating protest, but linked them, as antecedents, to group-anger, group-efficacy, politicised identification, identification with the disadvantaged, and both collective action intentions as well as actual behaviour. Their work also provided support for the applicability of the SIMCA to protesting by both the advantaged and the disadvantaged (van Zomeren et al., 2011a, 2011b, 2012).

Despite the multiple valuable contributions of the authors' cited research, the conceptual details are what stands out as relevant for consideration at this juncture: van Zomeren and colleagues defined moral convictions as *absolute*, and highlighted that violations of said convictions result in intense anger at those who breach them and the intention "to punish and exclude them in order to defend one's conviction" (van Zomeren et al., 2011a, p.738). They further highlighted that "moral convictions legitimize and even necessitate action" (p. 738: for research informing their approach to morality see Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005; Tetlock, Kirstel, Elson, Green & Lerner., 2000; van Zomeren & Lodewijkx, 2005, 2009). In their discourse, the authors not only acknowledged the human desire to punish those who transgress moral norms –supporting retributive conceptualisations of protest– but they also addressed how morality can demand that action is taken against wrongdoing – supporting a potential moral imperative independent of other goals.

Additional support for this stance can be found in the research that informs van Zomeren and colleagues' approach. Skitka and Bauman (2008) stated that perceptions

of morality have a greater effect on action than strong but non-moral attitudes, highlighting that "the distinction between strong preferences and moral imperatives is an important but neglected one in attitude theory and research" (p.31). They further noted the strong emotional consequences of failing to engage in moral obligations and highlighted that moral judgement is based on "strong, intuitive, and visceral reactions" (p.36). Their claims fit previous findings revealing that moral mandates override procedural fairness considerations, making the achievement of outcomes perceived as "right" the only issue of relevance (Skitka & Houston, 2001). Additionally, Tetlock and colleagues (2000) linked moral outrage conceptually and empirically to anger, contempt, and disgust, as well as to the desire to punish both in terms of norm and metanorm enforcement (i.e. the desire to punish the transgressor as well as those who neglect to punish the deviant).

Findings on the SIMCA and dynamic dual pathways theory may also provide support for a view of retributive, and of moral imperative protest. I propose that the distinctiveness of emotional and instrumental pathways to protest, with anger connecting perceived injustices and action, at least partially reflects retributive, and moral imperative, motivations to protest. Should anger play a role in protest uniquely in terms of its usefulness to redress deprivation and correct wrongdoings, the emotion-focused coping pathway to collective action would have been more strongly linked, both theoretical and empirically, to the problem-focused coping pathway in early and later conceptualisations.

It is not my aim to reject the functionality of anger and other emotions, nor to deny their impact on people's motivations to protest. Instead, I wish to highlight additional potential roles that anger, and other emotions, may play in protesting but have remained neglected to date. Throughout this project, anger will be addressed as an emotion that, despite constructive functional purposes already considered in collective

action research, can also motivate retributive protest and fuel moral imperatives. Within

Chapter 5, I will also address the perceived morality of protest actions as an essential

appraisal to the decision to protest.

2.2.3. Beyond Anger: Reconsidering Research through a Retributive Dimension in

Violent Protest

In their research on protest non-normativity, Tausch and colleagues' (Tausch et

al., 2011; Becker & Tausch, 2015) associated contempt conceptually "with a lack of

reconciliation intentions, denial of respect, and moral exclusion" (Becker & Tausch,

2015, p.49), and connected both contempt and low group efficacy empirically with

violent non-normative action (Tausch et al., 2011). Although, they acknowledged the

strategic function of radical action, such a view creates some tension with their findings

on group efficacy. Their results, as well as their very definition of contempt, appear to

reflect a "make them pay" retributive mentality over a strategic approach.

In contrast, work by Becker and colleagues (2011) positively linked

participation in radical action and response efficacy –which relates to the perceived

efficacy of the action itself rather than the group– thus supporting a strategic pathway in

radicalism. Saab and colleagues (2016) similarly linked aggressive action to efficacy

perceptions, finding that the efficacy of peaceful protest negatively predicted aggressive

actions only when the latter was perceived as having low efficacy. Aggressive forms of

protest were more likely to be supported and adopted when peaceful action was seen as

ineffective, providing support for their "nothing to lose" hypothesis.

The two studies just addressed provided evidence of the functionality of non-

normative and aggressive protest but remain somewhat in tension with related findings

on contempt. Indeed, the desperation-led strategic aggression in Saab and colleagues'

(2016) research has little in common with the "lack of reconciliation intentions, denial

of respect, and moral exclusion" through which Tausch and colleagues (2011) defined

contempt. This tension may not have been considered by the authors or may explain why the emotion of contempt is not mentioned within Saab and colleagues' (2016) paper.

A view of strong emotional experiences, which are linked to moral judgement and the failure to fulfil moral obligations, and demand action as an imperative (Skitka & Bauman, 2008), together with an acknowledgement of the link between moral emotions like anger, disgust, and contempt, moral outrage, and the desire to punish (Tetlock et al., 2000) provides potential answers to these tensions. Within the injustice pathway there may be two emotional responses of relevance to a decision of protesting violently. The first involves a sense of desperation (described by Saab and colleagues in their nothing to lose hypothesis), which motivates engagement in any action that might bear fruits, no matter how unlikely. The second is the contempt that results from injustice appraisals, and probably also from perceived moral breaches, which motivates retributive action and justifies it as morally right. This view also fits with Skitka and colleagues' (2005) considerations on the dark side of moral mandates and their likely role in motivating extreme forms of violence, including terrorism, and justifying them as morally right.

2.3. Rumination

Although a wealth of literature has been developed addressing the relevance of anger to protesting, to date, rumination –which maintains and magnifies the experience of emotions– has remained largely unaddressed in the field (see Borders & Wiley, 2019, for recent research). Rumination is a mental process that involves continuous and repetitive thinking about a given topic (Martin & Tesser, 1996; Sukhodolsky, Golub & Cromwell, 2001). The experience of emotions tied to that topic, such as anger, is maintained in time and enhanced through the ruminative process (Bushman, Bonacci, Pedersen, Vasquez & Miller, 2005; Sukhodolsky et al., 2001), which makes it a relevant variable to consider within the field of protest.

Although different emotions can be linked to rumination, and may therefore have consequences in terms of socio-political action, anger rumination stands out in terms of relevance given the importance of anger within the field. Anger rumination, which can be conceptualised as provocation-focused thinking, involves pervasive and repeated thinking about anger-inducing topics (Bushman, et al., 2005; Sukhodolsky et al., 2001) and results in hostility and aggression (Anestis, Anestis, Selby & Joiner, 2009; Bushman et al., 2005; Vasquez et al., 2013). Such pervasive thinking involves – both at definitional and operationalisation levels– maintained focus on experiences of injustice, and thinking and fantasising of revenge, which results in the formation of negative schemas and cognitive distortions, and fuels violence (Barber, Maltby & Macaskill, 2005; Barnett, 2011; Sukhodolsky et al., 2001; Vasquez, Lickel & Hennigan, 2010; Wakeling & Barnett, 2011). It also maintains the experience of anger for much longer periods of time relative to no rumination. As a result, the motivation to retaliate is also prolonged (see Bushman et al., 2005).

Anger rumination is associated with reactive and anxious jealousy (Tandler, & Petersen, 2018), and predicts aggression against romantic partners (Pedersen et al., 2011; also see Ruddle, Pina & Vasquez, 2017). It is also associated with enhanced experience of provocations (Vasquez et al., 2013), leads to displaced aggression even after eight hours (Bushman, et al., 2005), and increases punishment when interacting with minor frustrations (Vasquez, Bartsch, Pedersen & Miller, 2007). Anger rumination inflames retaliation at individual and group-levels (e.g., in gang violence; Vasquez, Osman, & Wood, 2012; Vasquez et al., 2013) and has been associated with resentment and the formation of grudges (Vasquez et al., 2012).

Indeed, rumination has been linked to reduced forgiveness, stronger desire for revenge, increased anger, resentment and hostility, and lower empathy towards offenders (Berry, Worthington, O'Connor, Parrott & Wade, 2005; Burnette, Taylor,

Worthington & Forsyth, 2007; McCullough, Bellah, Kilpatrick & Johnson, 2001;

McCullough, Bono & Root., 2007; Paleari, Regalia & Finchman, 2009; Stoia-Caraballo

et al., 2008; Wade, Vogel, Liao, & Goldman, 2008). The motivation for revenge has

even been conceptualised as resulting from rumination (McCullough et al., 2001).

Ruminative thinking also contributes to grievance thinking, which is a risk factor for

recidivism among sexual offenders, due to the maintained focus on perceived injustice

and thoughts of retaliation that, in turn, lead to vengeful actions against the perceived

wrongdoer (Barnett, 2011; Wakeling & Barnett, 2011).

Recent research has continued to consider the role of rumination as a common

response to interpersonal offences. It has been associated with lower self-compassion

and forgiveness, as well as anger, aggression, and violence. Wu, Chi, Zeng, Lin and Du,

(2018) revealed that rumination connected self-compassion and the experience of anger,

which in turn was a negative proximal predictor of forgiveness, and Massa, Eckhardt,

Sprunger, Parrott and Subramani (2017) linked it, both directly and via interaction with

posttraumatic cognitions, to the feelings of anger and hostility that predicted intimate

partner aggression. Findings fit previous longitudinal research in which rumination was

found to predict anger and revenge motivation across time in cross-lagged designs

(McCullough et al. 2007), as well as evidence that it moderates the pathway from

cyberbullying victimisation to perpetration among men (Zsila, Urbán, Griffiths &

Demetrovics, 2018).

2.3.1. Rumination, Retribution, and the Moral Imperative Protest

In the same way that anger is an emotion strongly related to moral convictions,

which can be linked to imperative action and desire for retribution (Skitka & Bauman,

2008; Tetlock et al., 2000; van Zomeren et al., 2011a, 2011b, 2012), rumination about

experienced injustices is also linked to a dimension of morality. Across cross-sectional

and longitudinal studies with children and young teenagers, Bandura and colleagues

(Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, 1996; Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli & Regalia, 2001) conceptualised hostile rumination as a component of *aggression proneness* and linked it to moral disengagement (see Bandura 1986, 1999, 2001), as well as to aggressive and transgressive behaviour.

Later longitudinal work with late teenagers and young adults revealed that irritability and hostile rumination predicted each other across time, thus contributing to each other's development (Caprara et al., 2014). Hostile rumination was found to additionally foster moral disengagement across time and to act as a mediator between irritability and moral disengagement. Both rumination and moral disengagement predicted future engagement in aggression and violence across different points of a four-stage cross-lagged model.

The authors highlighted, in their theoretical considerations (Bandura et al., 1996; Caprara et al., 2014), the sense of self-righteousness that accompanies moral disengagement, driving thoughts of retaliation and the justification of one's behaviour, which enables people to "act on a social or moral imperative" (Bandura et al., 1996, p. 365). Caprara and colleagues (2014) further noted in their conclusion that "hostile rumination shows how hot anger may turn into cold feelings of hatred and hostility, leading to the pursuit of aggression and violence" (p. 80). Their words on moral disengagement, hostile rumination, and anger match to some degree my own arguments about retributive protesting and moral imperative protest. Moreover, the discourse also suggests potential connections between rumination and feelings of contempt as described by Tausch and colleagues (2011).

Much like Bandura and colleagues' conceptualisation of hostile rumination, anger rumination involves a proneness, or readiness, towards aggression. Together with findings linking anger rumination to enhanced experience of provocations (Vasquez et al., 2013), and displaced aggression (Bushman, et al., 2005), it points to the relevance of

anger rumination in inflaming retaliatory responses by protestors following police violence. Additionally, Caprara and colleagues' (2014) words on the cold hatred and hostility that result from repetitive cognitive focus on injustices and motivate violence, invite the consideration of researching anger rumination as an antecedent of contempt and proactive violent protest (see Tausch et al., 2011).

2.3.2. Political Rumination

Besides considering the potential roles played by anger rumination in violent responses by protestors to police aggression, and in promoting premeditated violent protest by fostering feelings of contempt and legitimising violence, this project will also address the impact that ruminative thinking focused on politics may have on protesting intentions. *Political rumination,* which I have defined as the pervasive and maintained thinking about political issues, may affect the development of ideas, attitudes, and affective responses targeted at the socio-political system and its structures. Due to having a more system-level focus, instead of solely an inter-personal one, attitudes and beliefs stemming from political rumination can be expected to have system-level outcomes and, thus, differ from the products of anger rumination (cf. Borders & Wiley, 2019). Political rumination should be, for instance, linked to the formation of grudges against the system, and heightened intentions to protest through non-violent means. It should also be linked to system-level emotions.

Theoretical work grounded on system justification theory has built upon considerations on individual and group-level emotions to address the experience of emotions at a system level and proposed their relevance for research and theory in social and political psychology (Solak, Jost, Sümer & Clore, 2012). The authors posited that emotions are inextricably embedded in social systems, their structures, and the social experiences we have of them and within them. They claimed that emotions can be elicited by the social system, as well as targeted at it. Thus, the emotions produced by

the system reflect our standing in its social order, reflect our perceptions of it, and affect action tendencies and actual behaviour directed at the system; whether to challenge it or defend it. Emotions directed at the system, in turn, include the "'Rage against the machine' (i.e., moral outrage directed at the government or institutions such as Capitalism or Communism)" (Solak et al., 2012, p. 680). Within this thesis I consider political rumination from a system justification perspective (Jost, Badaan, Goudarzi, Hoffarth & Mogami, 2018; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Solak et al., 2012; van der Toorn & Jost, 2014). That is, given that political rumination involves system-focused thinking, which can result in heightened system-targeted emotions and the formation of system-based attitudes, it should predict system-directed, rather than group-focused, action.

2.4. System Justification

System justification theory is guided by the view that explanations of social change and collective action within social identity theory fail to explain the acceptance and justification of unequal systems by low status groups. System justification theory proposes that people are motivated to see the overarching system on which they depend (for instance capitalism) as more just and fair that it actually is (Jost & Banaji, 1994, Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004). The justification of the system stems from epistemic, existential, and relational needs, and allows people to reduce social discord and cope with uncertainty, feelings of threat, and other negative emotional affect resulting from a hierarchical social order (Hennes, Nam, Stern, & Jost, 2012; Jost et al., 2008; Jost et al., 2004; Solak et al., 2012; van der Toorn & Jost, 2014). System justification, therefore, results in the legitimisation of authority and preservation of social structures and the status quo (Cichocka & Jost, 2014; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009; van der Toorn et al., 2015; van der Toorn, Tyler & Jost, 2010).

A key aspect of system justification theory is that the justification of the system perseveres even when it opposes self-interest and group-interest. System justification

has linked to the internalisation of inferiority and depressed entitlement by the disadvantaged, as well as to the legitimation of their powerlessness (Godfrey & Wolf, 2016; Henry & Saul, 2006; Jost et al., 2004; van der Toorn et al., 2015; van der Toorn & Jost, 2014; cf. Brandt, 2013). For instance, Sengupta, Osborne and Sibley (2015), found in a large-scale study in New Zealand, that Maori participants saw ethnic-based relationships as legitimate as did participants of European ancestry despite their unequal status. Pacific and Asian participants legitimised the system even more than the other two groups.

Through this tenet, system justification theory provides an explanation for the historical and pervasive support of right-wing parties among the working class (see Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2018). The point raised by the theory is "not that the working class [is] more conservative than the middle and upper classes; it [is] that -in an apparent violation of self-interest motivation- a substantial plurality of working class citizens [adopt] conservative attitudes" which reflect dominant capitalist values in the system and serve to protect it (Jost, 2017, p.73). Jost (2017) further highlighted that 43% of working class voters in the U.K. favoured the Conservative Party in 2017, and 22 million people with family incomes under people $50,000/year voted for Donald Trump in 2016, despite the conservative adherence to economic policies which favour the rich.

2.4.1. System Justification and Protest

The motivation to justify the system and the resulting tendency to defend it have obvious implications for socio-political protest. System justification has been found to reduce protest intentions and support for social change movements across different contexts and nations (Jost et al., 2012; also see Reynolds, Jones, O'Brien, & Subasic, 2013). Economic system justification positively predicted support for system supporting movements like the Tea Party in the USA, and negatively predicted support for relevant system-challenging movements like Occupy Wall Street (Hennes et al., 2012).

Similarly, gender-specific system justification partially mediated the relationship between benevolent sexism and support for feminist collective action among women (Becker & Wright, 2011). Manipulations of system justification have resulted in decreased anger (Jost et al., 2012) and moral outrage (Wakslak, Jost, Tyler & Chen, 2007) and, through them, reduced non-disruptive protest intentions against in-group disadvantage and the willingness to help the disadvantaged, respectively.

Jost and colleagues considered findings from previous research on the dampening effects of system justification on protest, as well key theoretical underpinnings to system justification, to build on van Zomeren and colleagues' SIMCA (Jost et al., 2017). In addition to the common inclusion of social identity, perceived injustices, group-based anger, and perceived efficacy, Jost and colleagues (2017) further included system-level anger, system justification, and the epistemic, existential and relational needs that underlie it. Moreover, their theoretical model accounts for action in favour of the system as well as protest against it.

Within their model, system justification is negatively associated with the perception of injustices and system-based anger. System-based anger, in turn, positively predicts system-challenging protest and negatively predicts system-supporting protest. In terms of group-based anger and efficacy, they positively predict both system challenging and system supporting protest. The authors clarified that the same high group anger and efficacy should lead people who identify with the disadvantaged towards system-challenging action when coupled with high system anger. In contrast, when co-occurring with low system-level anger, they would motivate the people who identify with advantaged groups to protest in defence of the status-quo (Jost el al., 2017).

As Jost and colleagues' (2017) model suggests, the implications of system justification are not limited to demotivating system-challenging protest but also involve

motivating action in support of it, including different forms of aggression. System

justification not only motivates defending and legitimising the system (see Jost et al.,

2010) but also increases derogation of those acting against the status quo (see Kay,

Gaucher et al., 2009). Research has shown that even among school-aged children, there

is a connection between system justification and believing that the government responds

to the needs of the people, and that political dissent should be suppressed (Henry &

Saul, 2006). Similarly, system justification has been experimentally linked to backlash

against system-challenging behaviour and ideology (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, &

Nauts, 2012; Yeung, Kay, & Peach, 2014).

Given that system justification is enhanced by perceived system threat (Jost et

al., 2004; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009), it is plausible that it will affect perceptions of, and

responses to, protest. I therefore extend on previous research by considering the

potential links between system justification and the endorsement of state violence

against protestors. More specifically, I expect that system justification will predict not

only lower protest intentions but also higher justification of police violence in "defence"

of the system.

2.4.2. Social and Moral Norms and the Motivation to Justify the System

In addition to the role of system justification in legitimising inequality,

defending social structures, and demotivating protest, it also has important implications

in terms of the social norms that permit or even necessitate behaviour (Jost, Sterling &

Langer, 2015). Jost and colleagues (2015) highlighted differences between descriptive

norms, or what people typically do, and injunctive norms, what they should or ought to

do (also see Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren, 1990). Injunctive norms, like moral

convictions (see van Zomeren et al., 2011a), demand what "ought to be" and what

"ought to be done" and consequently have a clear influence on human behaviour (Jost et

al., 2015). Descriptive norms, on the other hand, are argued to influence behaviour

through processes of imitation, learning, and social comparison. That is, through interpreting what is commonplace as implying a degree of wisdom in the action or a message that it is acceptable (Cialdini, 2007, Jost et al., 2015). Jost and colleagues (2015), pointed to the role of system justification in injuncting norms –that is, transforming the perception of "what is" onto "what ought to be".

In support of their theory, the authors draw from findings showing that Canadian participants in system enhancing conditions perceived descriptive norms in injunctive terms: information that portrayed unequal access to parliamentary positions became the norm in terms of what should happen (Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009). In their own words: "what is typically done is often approved" (Jost et al., 2015, p. 1289). The authors further argued that adherence to dominant norms in society –both descriptive and injunctive– serves the function of legitimising the system.

Jost and colleagues (2015) exemplify their point by arguing for the legitimising and enforcing effect that even small gestures –like removing one's hat at a baseball game and singing the anthem– can have. However, we can perhaps see their point more clearly when applied to well-known historical contexts; for instance, the racially segregated USA in which the civil rights movement was born. Within the segregated USA, following segregation laws, which later worked as descriptive norms, served to legitimise them and the system that created them. On the other hand, not following them, like in the cases of Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King, could delegitimise them. Thus, Jost and colleagues (2015) presented a picture of system justification both injuncting norms and being reinforced by them.

Jost and colleagues (2015), nevertheless, admit that not everyone perceives norms, or acts upon them, in the same way, and consider evidence suggesting that although the acceptance of what is commonplace can occur automatically, the "rejection of the status quo requires conscious effort" and focusing one's thoughts on existing

injustices (p. 1290; also see Laurin, Kay, Proudfoot, & Fitzsimons, 2013). Just as with the moralising effects of ruminative thinking, the link between system justification and morality is clear and provides common ground between rumination, emotion, and system justification.

2.5. Connecting System Justification, Anger, and Rumination

Throughout this chapter, I have elaborated on three key areas to this project: 1) the role of anger as a moral emotion that drives action against perceived injustice, 2) the importance of considering ruminative thinking in the field of protest, particularly in terms of political-focused thoughts, but also in the potential of anger rumination to foster violence in protest, and 3) the framework provided by system justification theory and its role in deterring system-challenging protest, and potentially fostering system-defensive violence. However, no clear picture of the connection between all variables has been presented yet.

The literature reviewed herein presents common ground between ruminative thinking and system justification in terms of anger and perceived injustices, with system justification minimising perceptions of injustice and dampening emotions (Jost et al, 2017), and rumination involving thoughts focused on injustices and increasing anger. The two can, therefore, be seen as acting in opposite directions. Additionally, Jost and colleagues' (2015) words on the importance of focusing one's attention on injustices in order to reject system norms invites the consideration of a potential causal relationship between rumination and system justifying beliefs. That is, the continued cognitive focus on political issues, including perceived injustices, can be expected to result in the rejection of system-supporting norms and the formation of attitudes against it.

Further support on this conceptual link between all areas stems from their overlap with norms and morality. Although the discourses on moral convictions and on moral disengagement are essentially different in terms of the positive and negative

connotations that each have (Bandura et al., 1996, 2001; Caprara et al., 2014; Skitka &

Bauman, 2008; Tetlock et al., 2000; van Zomeren et al., 2011a, 2011b, 2012), an

argument based on similarities can be drawn. In both cases, perceived injustices are

linked to emotions and moral appraisals, ultimately resulting in legitimised action. Said

action can have a utilitarian motivation or a retributive one, or can be a moral

imperative.

The same considerations apply to system justification's role in hindering the

perception of injustices, dampening affect, injuncting norms, and motivating action in

defence of the system or demotivating action against it (Jost et al., 2017; Jost et al.,

2014; Osborne et al., 2019). In all cases, action is linked to emotion and what can be

considered moral imperatives or mandates. Indeed, the same type of actions that

Bandura and colleagues (Bandura et al., 1996, Bandura et al., 2001) addressed as linked

to moral disengagement –such as terrorism (Rapoport & Alexander, 1982; Reich, 1990)

and crimes of obedience (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989)– are also framed in terms of

moral convictions by Skitka and colleagues (2005) when considering large-scale

international terrorism and ethnic cleansing. Similarly, those actions can be framed in

terms of system justification, system-level emotions, and injunctive norms when they

are in defence of, or fostered by, one's system (Jost et al., 2017; Jost et al., 2015).

Considering the realm of morality, findings on hostile rumination fostering

moral disengagement (Caprara et al., 2014) provide further support for a

conceptualisation of political rumination as an antecedent of system justifying beliefs.

Their findings suggest that the continuous focus on injustices moralises their experience

and allows future action to be framed as moral. Within the longitudinal research of

Caprara and colleagues (2014), the role of rumination in fostering moral disengagement

could be seen to occur in opposition of injunctive or descriptive dominant social norms.

Said norms, as Jost and colleagues (2015) argue, are inextricably linked to a system

justifying motivation, and are pervasive in society. Given findings revealing the

internalisation of system justifying tendencies among children as young as 5 years old

(Baron & Banaji 2009), injunctive and descriptive norms should be expected to act as a

baseline for children from a very young age and should be maintained due to system

justification. However, Caprara and colleagues' (2014) findings showed that they can be

displaced, if not changed, through the process of rumination.

    I, further, explore the link between system justification and political rumination

through system-level emotions. More specifically, through system justification theory's

notion of emotions targeted towards the overarching system (Solak et al., 2012). As

previously noted, given that people experience emotions towards a political system, we

should expect political rumination to have implications at a system level. Repeated and

continuous negative thoughts about politics can be expected to fuel displeasure with,

and even resentment towards, the political system. Thus, political rumination is

expected to be related to lower system justification, and higher anger and willingness to

protest, such that political rumination would predict protest intentions directly and via

mediated relationships.

    The literature addressed in this review suggests that rumination can result in the

formation of counter-normative values and attitudes in opposition to those related to

system justification. Although for many people, emotions and norms may be guided by

the system and a motivation to support it, ruminating about system issues and politics

should fuel opposing negative emotions, and drive the formation of attitudes against the

system despite a probable pre-existing motivation to defend it. Both the negative views

about the system and feelings of anger targeted at it should connect political rumination

and a range of outcomes including protest intentions and the justification of violence.

2.6. Thesis Overview and Aims

Chapter 1 focused on the critical discussion of strengths and limitations in theory and research on the field of protest. I considered definitions and taxonomies through which a wealth of knowledge has been constructed to this date, and elaborated an alternative approach aimed at disentangling confounded dimensions and further enriching our understanding of protest. Throughout Chapter 2, I have elaborated on key predictors of protest, and built on system justification theory to highlight the relevance of studying ruminative thinking in protest settings. Given the relationships of system justification and rumination with emotions, the project begins by considering both variables in relation to the emotion pathway of protest (Jost et al., 2017; Osborne et al., 2019; Saab et al., 2015; Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2004, 2008, 2012).

An initial study was carried out for my MSc dissertation and acted as pilot research for the thesis. The study included 170 university students in the UK as participants. They completed measures of political rumination, anger rumination, system justification, and political orientation, and then read information about a hypothetical protest action asking for free education in the UK. Half of the participants read an extra piece of information stating that the protest was illegal. Finally, participants responded to how legitimate they perceived the action to be, how willing they would be to protest, how justifiable they thought the use of violence by the police against protestors was, and how justifiable it would be for protestors to respond with violence should the police aggress against them first.

It was hypothesised that political rumination would predict protest tendencies above and beyond all other variables, and that its relationship with willingness to protest would be partially mediated by system justification. That is, the more that people ruminated about politics, the lower that their system justification beliefs would be, and the higher their protest intentions. It was further hypothesised that system justification

would positively predict the justification of police violence, and anger rumination

would be the strongest predictor of the justification of protestor reactive violence. The

higher the anger rumination, the more that participants were expected to justify reactive

violence. Regarding protest illegality, the illegal manipulation was expected to result in

lower perceived legitimacy of the action, which would in turn partially mediate its

deterring effect on willingness to protest.

Results revealed that, as hypothesised, political rumination predicted both

system justification (β = -.38, p < .001) and protest intentions (β = .34, p < .001)

independently of all other variables. However, system justification only marginally

predicted protest intentions (β = -.14, p = .093) and the justification of police violence

(β =.17, p = .074). Hypotheses were not supported either for anger rumination, which

failed to reach significance (β = .11, p = .174). Last, the illegality manipulation failed to

affect both the perceived legitimacy, $t(167)$ = -0.51, p = .609, and the protest intentions,

$t(168)$ = 1.08, p = .208. Results, thus, provided support for the study of political

rumination in relation to protest, but overall failed to support hypotheses.

Findings were believed to have been affected by having numerous international

students in the sample. International students should be expected to experience lower

system dependency and higher system escapability than British nationals (see Jost et al.,

2004; van der Toorn & Jost., 2014), which would explain the lack of strength in

findings linking system justification to protest intentions. A lack of attachment to the

British legal system could also provide an explanation for the null effects of the

illegality manipulation, both in relation to the perception of legitimacy of the action and

in relation to participants' willingness to protest. Limitations of the study also included

a small sample, the fact that anger at politics was not controlled for, and that only one

protest option was presented to participants, which also was hypothetical.

The first study of this project involved a replication of the pilot study with a larger sample of only British participants and a measure of anger at politics (Study 1a). A second wave of data collection with the same participants was carried out a year later for the longitudinal evaluation of the relationship between political rumination and system justification (Study 1b). Study 2 further built up on limitations by addressing willingness to protest in a range of actions, including violent protest, and past protest behaviour. Studies 1a, 1b and 2 are included in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, Studies 3 and 4 further develop the project by using more ecologically valid measures of protest intentions and experimentally linking political rumination to system justification as well as to anger at politics and other emotions. Chapter 5 extends the research scope by addressing efficacy, by controlling for a range of protest appraisals, and by addressing emotions of contempt and disgust. The aim is to elaborate a comprehensive model that informs legal and illegal protest, and violent actions. The model will include political rumination as a key variable of interest and will account for appraisals of protest, and retributive and moral imperative motivations to protest. Chapter 6 discusses the overall project, and its implications.

Chapter 3: Correlational Links (Studies 1a, 1b, & 2)

3.1. Introduction

Throughout Chapter 2 I have elaborated on well-established links between anger and protest (Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2004, 2008, 2012), between system justification and anger (Jost et al., 2012; Jost et al., 2017; Solak et al., 2012), and between ruminative thinking and anger (Massa et al., 2017; McCullough et al. 2007; Wu et al., 2018). In addition, I addressed previous pilot research showing that a construct of political rumination predicted both system justification and protest intentions. The study, however, revealed no effect of protest illegality on participants' protest tendencies, presumably due to characteristics of the sample. Moreover, the study did not include a covariate of anger at politics –which is a strong and relevant antecedent of protest– and precluded establishing causality due to being correlational and cross-sectional. Establishing a causal direction between political rumination and system justification is particularly important to this project and the hypothesised link between both variables.

Studies in Chapter 3 elaborate on the pilot study by replicating it while controlling for anger at politics, by establishing a longitudinal link between political rumination and system justification, and by considering the associations between the predictors and past protest behaviour as well as a range of protest actions. Moreover, Chapter 3 delves into the role of system justification as a predictor of support for police violence, and of anger rumination in the justification of protestor violence and willingness to engage in it. Last, it serves to build upon the political rumination measure and to examine its usefulness as a scale.

3.2. Study 1a

The aim of Study 1a was to address the limitations of the pilot work. A larger sample of only British participants was recruited and an additional measure of anger at

politics was included. Although previous theory and research suggests a path from

ruminative political thinking to protest intentions via anger, both the link between

rumination and anger (Massa et al., 2017; McCullough et al. 2007; Wu et al., 2018) and

between anger and protest intentions (Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2004,

2008, 2012) have already been extensively researched. Therefore, studying the negative

association between political rumination and system justification, while controlling for

anger at politics, was a more interesting first step of the project.

In Chapter 2, I conceptualised political rumination as having system-level

outcomes and predicted that it would result in the formation of negative attitudes

towards the system, as well as increased negative emotions aimed at it (see Solak et al.,

2012). However, there is no evidence or theoretical work that allows hypothesising a

clear order of effects. Established system justification approaches (Jost et al., 2012; Jost

et al., 2017; Solak et al., 2012) portray system justification as anteceding anger.

Political rumination may, therefore, first reduce the system justifying beliefs, which

would allow the increase of anger. Alternatively, the emotions that stem from political

rumination, such as anger, may affect the system justifying beliefs. That is, rather than

following a pathway from the system to the individual, effects may occur from the

individual towards the system (see Solak et al., 2012) due to the ruminative process.

Indeed, the emotional dimension of rumination is essential to its conceptualisation and

operationalisations (see Sukhodolsky et al., 2001). It is also plausible that the changes

co-occur. Given the different possibilities I decided to control for anger at politics when

considering the predictive validity of political rumination on system justification,

instead of assuming that changes in anger would occur at a later point in a conceptual

model.

In addition to the new measure of anger at politics, we further developed the

measure of political rumination, which previously focused only on the ruminative

thinking process without addressing emotions. Since ruminative thinking is associated with a range of emotions (Anestis et al., 2009; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Peled & Moretti, 2010) and research in political psychology has found that different emotions have different cognitive and behavioural outcomes (Brader & Marcus, 2013; Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Huddy, Sears & Levy, 2013), we expected that political rumination would be particularly relevant as a predictor of lower system justification and higher protest intentions when it taps into anger. This does not imply an expectation that rumination would affect anger prior to system justification within a causal model, although it may happen, but rather highlights that the ruminative focus on angry thoughts about politics needed to be considered. I therefore included an additional set of items to the measure specifically addressing ruminative thinking about politics in relation to feelings of anger.

Given the recruitment of a British sample, who should be more motivated to perceive the system as fair, system justification was hypothesised to predict protest intentions and justifications of police violence. I also hypothesised an indirect link from political rumination to both outcome variables via lower system justification. Given the moralising role of ruminative thinking for driving action (Bandura et al., 1996, 2001; Caprara et al., 2014), I explored the possibility that political rumination would predict protest intentions independently of system justification and anger at politics. Although anger rumination could be expected to predict protest intentions as well, it was not expected to occur when controlling for system justification and political rumination, both of which are more political measures. Anger rumination involves a readiness towards aggression (Bandura et al., 1996, 2001) and increases negative reactions to provocations, and aggression (Anestis et al., 2009; Bushman et al., 2005, Vasquez et al., 2007, 2013), so it was expected to predict the justification of violent responses to police aggressions.

Despite null results in the pilot research, I further hypothesised that the manipulation of illegality would reduce protest tendencies directly, through an interaction with system justification, and indirectly via reduced perceived legitimacy of the protest action. I additionally explored the possibility that it would moderate the relationship between system justification and the justification of police violence, and between anger rumination and the support for protestor violence. Differences in results were expected due to changes in the sample.

Study 1a Method

Design and Participants

Study 1a consisted of a cross-sectional design including political rumination, anger rumination, and system justification as predictors of protest intentions and the justification of violence by the police and by protestors. A between-subjects variable of legality with two levels (i.e., no legality information vs. illegal) was included through an experimental manipulation in the protest information presented to participants. Anger at politics and political orientation were included as controls.

Three hundred participants of British nationality, recruited through Prolific Academic, completed the online experiment. The only exclusion criteria set for their recruitment involved ensuring that they were over 18 years of age and British. Nine participants were excluded from the final sample due to errors in their age responses (reporting ages that were either too low or too high to be credible), leaving 291 participants (173 female, 116 male, and 3 who did not to state their gender). Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 67 years ($M = 34.18$, $SD = 11.08$). Participants were rewarded following Prolific Academic's guidelines.

Materials and Procedure

The study was completed online through Qualtrics. The first part of the study required participants to provide demographic information, including a measure of

political orientation, and to complete questionnaires for anger rumination, system

justification, political rumination, and anger at politics. Political orientation was

measured by a single item asking participants to place themselves on a scale from 1

(*extreme left*) to 6 (*extreme right*). All participants completed the questionnaires in the

same order to prevent priming effects of political measures when completing the anger

rumination scale.

The Anger Rumination Scale (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001) consists of 19 items

that participants rated on 1 (*almost never*) to 4 (*almost always*) scales based on how

well each statement reflected their experiences, $\alpha = .93$. Items in the scale measure the

tendency to ruminate about anger-inducing situations, for instance "I think about certain

events from a long time ago and they still make me angry". The full measure includes

four different sub-scales: *Angry Afterthoughts, Thoughts of Revenge, Angry Memories*,

and *Understanding of Causes*. High scores indicate high levels of rumination for all

statements.

The Economic System Justification Scale (Jost & Thompson, 2000) consists of

17 statements rated on scales from 1 (*disagree very strongly*) to 9 (*agree very strongly*),

$\alpha = .83$. The measure includes nine items with high scores reflecting high system

justification (e.g. "Economic positions are legitimate reflections of people's

achievements"), and eight reverse-coded items (e.g. "Economic differences in the

society reflect an illegitimate distribution of resources").

The political rumination measure (Appendix E) included 12 items adapted from

Sukhodolsky and colleagues' (2001) Anger Rumination Scale, specifically from the

subscales of *Angry Memories* (five items), *Understanding the Causes* (four items) and

Angry Afterthoughts (four items). Some of the items were changed without addressing

emotions; for instance, the statement "I keep thinking about events that angered me for

a long time" (*Angry Memories*) was changed into "I keep thinking about political events

a long time after they occurred". The other items continued to address political

rumination but focused on the experience of anger. For example, "Whenever I

experience anger at politicians, I keep thinking about it for a while". Like in the Anger

Rumination Scale, all items were rated on scales from 1 (*almost never*) to 4 (*almost*

always), and high scores corresponded to more tendency to ruminate, α = .93.

Maximum Likelihood extraction and Promax with Kaiser Normalisation rotation

revealed two factors accounting for 62.73% of the variance (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin

Measure of Sampling Adequacy, KMO = .94; factor correlation =.72). Factors were

assessed through the scree-plot, which revealed a strong first factor and a potential

weaker second factor. Factor 1 (explaining 55.36% of variance) included items linked to

emotions (e.g. "Whenever I experience anger at politicians, I keep thinking about it for

a while"), and Factor 2 (explaining 7.37% of the variance) was formed by non-

emotional items (e.g. "I ponder about political injustices").

Given the strong factor correlation, I computed scores reflecting both factors

separately, and a total composite including all items, in order to assess their

correlations. Both factorial scores were very strongly correlated to the single-factor

composite (emotional, $r = .89$, $p < .001$; and non-emotional, $r = .85$, $p < .001$).

Considering the strong correlations between the factors, and between both composites

and the single measure, I decided to employ the single composite (KMO = .94, 54.81%

of variance explained, all $\lambda > .58$; see 3.8. for a review of the measure).

A final measure, consisting of five items addressing anger at politics and seven

filler items focusing on emotions of sadness and happiness, was also included. Items,

for example "Politics makes me angry", were rated on 1 (*Completely Disagree*) to 4

(*Completely Agree*) scales, with high scores representing more anger at politics, α = .84

(Appendix F). All items were created using previous research on protest as a guideline.

They addressed feeling angry, displeased, frustrated, furious, and irritated (see Mackie

et al., 2000; Tausch et al., 2011; Van Zomeren et al., 2004, 2008). Exploratory Factor

Analysis (EFA) based on scree-plot criteria and following Maximum Likelihood

extraction and Promax with Kaiser Normalisation rotation, revealed a single factor

underlying the five items of anger at politics (KMO = .84, 53.06% of variance

explained, all $\lambda > .62$).

In order to ensure that there was no factorial overlap between the measure of

anger at politics, and the measures of political rumination and anger rumination, a final

EFA with Maximum Likelihood extraction and Promax with Kaiser Normalisation

rotation was carried out. The scree-plot revealed three strong factors: Factor 1 included

all items in the anger rumination scale (all $\lambda > .53$, except for item 13, $\lambda = .43$) and

accounted for 26.44% of the variance; Factor 2 underlay all items of political

rumination (all $\lambda > .55$), accounting for 17.38% of the variance; and Factor 3

encompassed the items of anger at politics (all $\lambda > .65$), explaining 5.74% of the

variance explained (KMO = .91).

Following the scales, participants read a short text about a hypothetical protest

asking for free education in the UK, which involved a peaceful, week-long occupation

of parliament square. Half of the participants read an addendum stating that the protest

was illegal, and the other half read no information concerning the legality of the action

(Appendices G & H). Participants were then asked to respond to four questions: "How

legitimate do you think this protest would be?" on a scale from 1 (*Extremely

Illegitimate*) to 6 (*Extremely Legitimate*), "How willing would you be to participate in

this protest action?" from 1(*Extremely Unwilling*) to 6 (*Extremely Willing*), and "How

justifiable would the use of violence by the police, against protesters, be in your

opinion?" and "Should the police use force against protestors gathered for the

occupation, how justifiable do you think it would be for protestors to respond with

violence against the police?" on scales from 1(*Extremely Unjustifiable*) to 6 (*Extremely Justifiable*).

Study 1a Results and Discussion

Means, standard deviations and correlations were calculated for all variables of interest, as well as age (Table 3.1). As expected, results revealed negative correlations between political rumination and system justification, as well as political orientation. Political rumination correlated positively with anger rumination, anger at politics, perceived legitimacy of the protest action, and protest intentions. System justification correlated negatively with anger at politics, perceived legitimacy of protest, and willingness to protest, and positively with political orientation and justification of police violence. Anger at politics correlated with every variable except for age. It correlated positively with anger rumination, perceived legitimacy of protest, protest intentions, and the justification of protestor violence. It also correlated negatively with political orientation and support for police violence. Anger rumination had significant and positive relationship with the justification of protestor violence.

Multiple Regressions

Three hierarchical regressions were carried out to evaluate the predictive validity of all predictors, and relevant interactions, on the outcome variables (Table 3.2). Political rumination, system justification, anger rumination, political orientation, anger at politics, and the manipulation of illegality were included in the first step for all criterion variables. The interaction between illegality and system justification was included in the second step of the models for protest intentions and the justification of police violence. Since anger rumination was hypothesised to be the strongest predictor of protestor violence, I further included its interaction with illegality in the second step of the model on protestor violence for exploratory purposes. All continuous predictors were mean centred, and the experimental conditions were coded as -1 and 1.

Table 3.1.

Means (SDs), and Intercorrelations for Key Variables and Age (Study 1a)

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Political Rumination	r	1									
2. System Justification	r	-.37***	1								
3. Anger at Politics	r	.39***	-.39***	1							
4. Anger Rumination	r	.19**	.08	.23***	1						
5.Political Orientation	r	-.25***	.59***	-.30***	.05	1					
6. Perceived Legitimacy	r	.15*	-.29***	.21***	.02	-.16**	1				
7.Protest intentions	r	.30***	-.41***	.36***	.03	-.31***	.45***	1			
8. Justification of Police Violence	r	-.08	.29***	-.15**	.07	.11†	-.18**	-.12*	1		
9. Justification of Protestor Violence	r	.10†	-.09	.12*	.16**	-.11†	.03	.14*	.17**	1	
10. Age	r	-.05	-.03	-.08	-.19**	.02	.08	-.03	-.10†	-.11†	1
M		2.01	4.31	2.74	2.20	3.08	4.28	3.08	1.80	2.25	34.18
(SD)		(0.62)	(1.08)	(0.66)	(0.55)	(0.96)	(1.13)	(1.31)	(1.07)	(1.26)	(11.08)

Note. $^\dagger p < .10.$ $^* p < .05.$ $^{**} p < .01.$ $^{***} p < .001.$

Table 3.2.

Multiple Regressions Including Interactions With Illegality on Protest Intentions, Justification of Police Violence, And Justification of Protestor Violence (Study 1a)

Predictor	Model 1: Protest Intentions		Model 2: Justification of Police Violence		Model 3: Justification of Protestor Violence	
	β	t	β	t	β	t
	$R^2 = .23^{***}$		$R^2 = .10^{***}$		$R^2 = .05^{*}$	
Political Rumination	$.11^{\dagger}$	1.89	.04	0.57	.03	0.40
System Justification	$-.25^{**}$	-3.48	$.32^{***}$	4.21	-.03	-0.32
Anger Rumination	-.009	-0.17	.06	1.07	$.16^{*}$	2.51
Political Orientation	-.07	-1.12	-.09	-1.31	-.09	-1.27
Anger Politics	$.20^{**}$	3.23	-.08	-1.26	.03	0.52
Illegality	.006	0.12	.05	0.92	-.03	-0.46
	R^2 change = .002		R^2 change < .001		R^2 change =.004	
Illegality X System Justification	.04	0.83	.02	0.28	-	-
Illegality X Anger Rumination	-	-	-	-	.07	1.13

Note. N = 291

$^{\dagger}p < .10.$ $^{*}p < .05.$ $^{**}p < .01.$ $^{***}p < .001$

Results revealed that only system justification and anger at politics predicted participants' willingness to protest significantly, with political rumination remaining as a marginal predictor ($p = .059$). Regarding the measures on violence, system justification was the only significant predictor of the justification of police violence, whereas only anger rumination predicted participants' justification of protestor violence. The manipulation of illegality did not affect any of the outcomes either by itself or in interaction with system justification or anger rumination.

Findings provided support for hypotheses on the predictive value of system justification not only on protest intentions but also on the justification of police violence. Results also provided partial support on the role of political rumination above and beyond potential mediation pathways through system justification and anger at politics. The hypothesis on anger rumination as a predictor of the justification of protestor reactive violence was also supported by the data. However, no established hypotheses or exploratory questions on the direct influence of illegality were supported.

Indirect Effects

Given results on system justification as a predictor of protest intentions and the justification of police violence, and the significant negative correlation between political rumination and system justification, indirect effects analyses were carried out using PROCESS (Hayes, 2012). Political rumination was included as the independent variable, and system justification as the mediator. Anger at politics, anger rumination, and political orientation were included as covariates to ensure that the associations remained significant above and beyond all related variables. Given that no significant effects were found on illegality and its interactions on the outcome variables, and that the manipulation was not relevant for the measurement of system justification, illegality was not included in the model.

Bootstrapping analyses with 5,000 resamples and 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals revealed significant indirect effects of political rumination on protest intentions (Figure 3.1). Higher scores of political rumination predicted higher willingness to protest, via lower system justification: unstandardized $B = .10$ [0.04, 0.21], $BootSE = .04$.

Figure 3.1. Indirect effects model conducted in PROCESS of political rumination on willingness to protest via system justification (Study 1a). Numerical values show unstandardised regression weights. Solid lines represent significant paths on bootstrapping analysis on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. Dash lines represent non-significant relationships: $p > .05$. The curved path represents the total effect, whereas the straight one represents the direct effect.

Note. $^{†}p < .10$. $^{*}p < .05$. $^{**}p < .01$. $^{***}p < .001$.

Although there were no total or direct associations between political rumination and the justification of police violence, a negative indirect effect was found with high political rumination predicting lower system justification, and through it, higher justification of police violence positively; $B = -.11$ [-0.20, -0.05], *BootSE* = .04 (Figure 3.2). Surprisingly, anger rumination also predicted system justification, although in the opposite direction of political rumination and anger at politics, suggesting a suppression effect. Results supported the hypothesised relationship between political rumination and system justification, with system justification connecting it to higher protest intentions and lower justification of police violence.

Figure 3.2. Indirect effects model conducted in PROCESS of political rumination on justification of police violence via system justification (Study 1a). Numerical values show unstandardised regression weights. Solid lines represent significant paths on bootstrapping analysis on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. Dash lines represent non-significant relationships: $p > .05$. The curved path represents the total effect, whereas the straight one represents the direct effect.

Note. $^{\dagger}p < .10.$ $^{*}p < .05.$ $^{**}p < .01.$ $^{***}p < .001.$

Indirect Effects of Protest Illegality on Willingness to Protest.

In order to see if the illegality of the protest action had an indirect effect –via

perceived legitimacy– on willingness to protest, means and standard deviations were

calculated for both dependent variables across levels of the manipulation (Table 3.3). T-

tests were calculated so that the significance of differences could be assessed.

Table 3.3.

Descriptive Statistics of Willingness to Protest and Perception of Legitimacy across

Protest Illegality (Study 1a)

		Perception Legitimacy	Willingness to Protest
Legal	*M*	4.44	3.04
	SD	1.10	1.29
	N	141	141
Illegal	*M*	4.13	3.11
	SD	1.13	1.32
	N	150	150

The analyses of differences between the means revealed no effect of protest

illegality on protest tendencies, $t(289) = -0.46$, $p = .645$. Results on perception of

legitimacy, however, revealed that participants in the illegal condition perceived the

protest action as less legitimate than participants in the legal condition, $t(289) = 2.34$, p

$= .020$. Since there were both a significant effect of illegality on perceived legitimacy of

the protest action, and a significant correlation between perceived legitimacy and

willingness to protest ($r = .45$, $p < .001$), an indirect effect model was conducted using

PROCESS (Hayes, 2012) to assess the potential significance of the indirect path (see

Figure 3.3). The model, with 5000 bootstrap resamples and 95% confidence intervals,

controlled for all variables of interest considered in the previous models on willingness

to protest: system justification, political rumination, political orientation, and anger at

politics. A significant indirect effect was found, $B = -.07$ $[-0.14, -0.02]$, *BootSE* $= .03$.

Results on the indirect path between illegality and protest intentions revealed that even though protest illegality can play a part in deterring protest, it may be insufficient on its own. Indeed, system justification also predicted negatively the perceived legitimacy of the action (β = -.28, p < .001), and despite significant correlations between perceived legitimacy and other covariates, anger at politics and political orientation, the whole model only predicted 12% of its variance. The variable of perceived legitimacy should, therefore, not be seen simply as a manipulation check, but as a variable of interest, as discussed in Chapter 1.

Figure 3.3. Indirect effects model conducted in PROCESS of protest illegality on willingness to protest via perception of legitimacy (Study 1a). Numerical values show unstandardised regression weights. Solid lines represent significant paths on bootstrapping analysis on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. Dash lines represent non-significant relationships: p > .05. The curved path represents the total effect, whereas the straight one represents the Direct Effect.
Note. $^\dagger p$ < .10. $^* p$ < .05. $^{**} p$ < .01. $^{***} p$ < .001.

Results of Study 1 provided full or partial support for all hypotheses. Participants who scored higher in system justification were less willing to engage in protest and justified more the use of violence by the police. Additionally, the higher the reported political rumination, the lower that participants justified the system, and the more they were willing to protest. The link between political rumination and protest

intentions remained marginally significant even when considering it together with

system justification and anger at politics, the latter of which also predicted higher

willingness to protest. Results further provided support for the hypothesised link

between anger rumination and participants' justification of reactive violence by

protestors against the police. Finally, results suggested that by labelling an action as

illegal, its perceived legitimacy can be reduced, and through it, protest intentions can be

deterred.

The findings of the studies, however, did not support the expected direct effect

of illegality on protest tendencies, nor its interaction with system justification. The lack

of direct impact of illegality on willingness to protest could be due to the use of a

hypothetical protest. Other outcomes of protest illegality besides perceptions of

legitimacy, such as the threat of punishment due to breaking the law, should be

expected to be much less impactful when speaking in hypothetical terms.

3.3. Study 1b: Longitudinal Follow-Up

Study 1a provided support for a conceptualisation of political rumination as a

predictor of system justification. It additionally served to extend research on system

justification as a motivating factor in the defence of the system (see Henry & Saul,

2006; Jost et al., 2017; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009) by linking it to the justification of

police violence against protestors. Furthermore, Study 1a provided support for studying

anger rumination as an antecedent of the support for violence in protest.

System justification has been conceptually and empirically associated to the

defence of the system throughout the years (Jost & Banaji, 1994; van der Toorn & Jost,

2014), and anger rumination has been consistently linked to different forms of

aggression (Anestis et al., 2009; Bushman et al., 2005; Vasquez et al., 2013). However,

the hypothesised role of political rumination as an antecedent of system justification is a

novel contribution of this project to the field. Indeed, an alternative model with system

justification anteceding rumination could be proposed as an alternative. The cross-sectional and correlational design of Study 1a prevents making any inferences of causality, so Study 1b was designed to further elaborate on the relationship between political rumination and system justification longitudinally, and thus, test both models.

Participants recruited from Prolific Academic for Study 1a completed a second wave of measures for all predictor variables. Study 1a took place during the UK Brexit campaign, and Study 1b approximately a year later. After a period of such political intensity, I hypothesised that political rumination at Time 1 would predict system justification at Time 2 negatively, even when controlling for all other variables.

Study 1b Method

Design and Participants

Study 1b employed a longitudinal design for cross-lagged analyses. All participants who had completed the first wave of data collection were invited for the second wave through Prolific Academic. Only their reported ID was necessary to contact them through the site. A total of 137 participants (90 female, 46 male, and 1 who did not state their gender) out of the 291 from Study 1a (47.08%) completed the second wave of data collection. Participants were rewarded with £0.50 in line with Prolific Academic guidelines.

Materials and Procedure

As in the previous studies, data collection was carried out through Qualtrics. Participants completed the same measures of anger rumination, system justification, political rumination, political orientation, and anger at politics used in the first wave of data collection. It is worth noting that the correlation between the measures of each sub-scale of political rumination (cognitive and emotional) with the total measure was even stronger than in the first wave (cognitive-total, $r = .88$, p <.001; emotional-total, $r = .95$,

$p < .001$). No measures were taken of protest related variables since the goal of the study was to clarify the relationship between the predictors.

Study 1b Results and Discussion

Means, standard deviations and inter-correlations for all continuous variables can be found in Table 3.4. Several correlations in Study 1b increased in strength and significance compared to Study 1a. Apparent differences in the relationships between variables may have resulted from the high political activity in the UK. Despite changes, political rumination continued to correlate with system justification, as well as with anger at politics and political orientation, at both times and across time.

Longitudinal Path Model

A fully saturated cross-lagged model between all variables at Time 1 (T1) and Time 2 (T2) was tested in Mplus v8 (Muthén & Muthén, 2017; Figure 3.4). The model showed that high scores in political rumination at T1 predicted low scores in system justification at T2 ($B = -.28$, $SE = .09$, $\beta = -.14$, $p = .003$), but system justification at T1 did not predict political rumination at T2 ($B = -.02$, $SE = .04$, $\beta = -.03$, $p = .710$). System justification, however, predicted political orientation ($B = .17$, $SE = .06$, $\beta = .19$, $p = .009$) and was predicted by it ($B = -.11$, $SE = .05$, $\beta = -.17$, $p = .042$) longitudinally, showing that both variables contributed to changes in each other. Additionally, political orientation was associated with anger at politics ($B = -.11$, $SE = .05$, $\beta = -.17$, $p = .042$) across time. In regard to anger rumination, it only predicted, and was predicted by, itself across time ($B = .70$, $SE = .06$, $\beta = .73$, $p < .001$).

Interestingly, the cross-lagged path analysis did not find longitudinal relationships between either political rumination or system justification, and anger at politics. The focus of the study was not to evaluate the longitudinal relationships of anger at politics, yet the findings must be addressed due to its relevance as a proximal predictor of different forms of protest (see Tausch et al., 2011). Results contradicted

Table 3.4.

Means (SDs) and Intercorrelations for Political Rumination, System Justification, Anger Rumination, Political Orientation, and Anger at Politics at Time 1 and Time 2 (Study 1b)

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Political Rumination T1	r	1									
2. Political Rumination T2	r	$.70^{***}$	1								
3. System Justification T1	r	$-.41^{***}$	$-.34^{***}$	1							
4. System Justification T2	r	$-.49^{***}$	$-.50^{***}$	$.85^{***}$	1						
5. Anger Rumination T1	r	.14	.07	.06	.06	1					
6. Anger Rumination T2	r	.09	$.15^{\dagger}$	.04	.04	$.72^{***}$	1				
7. Political Orientation T1	r	$-.37^{***}$	$-.31^{***}$	$.59^{***}$	$.66^{***}$	.003	.02	1			
8. Political Orientation T2	r	$-.35^{***}$	$-.40^{***}$	$.61^{***}$	$.62^{***}$	.05	.03	$.76^{***}$	1		
9. Anger at Politics T1	r	$.40^{***}$	$.32^{***}$	$-.47^{***}$	$-.44^{***}$	.13	.08	$-.36^{***}$	$-.40^{***}$	1	
10. Anger at Politics T2	r	$.27^{**}$	$.43^{***}$	$-.34^{***}$	$-.45^{***}$	$.17^{*}$	$.16^{\dagger}$	$-.36^{***}$	$-.40^{***}$	$.62^{***}$	1
M		2.05	2.10	4.24	4.16	2.14	2.10	3.02	2.90	2.76	2.80
(SD)		(0.60)	(0.59)	(1.13)	(1.17)	(0.56)	(0.54)	(0.96)	(0.97)	(0.63)	(0.62)

Note. $^{\dagger}p < .10.$ $^{*}p < .05.$ $^{**}p < .01.$ $^{***}p < .001$

Figure 3.4. Cross-Lagged model carried out in Mplus (Study 1b). Numerical values show standardised regression weights for the full model. Solid lines represent significant paths. Dash lines represent non-significant relationships: *p* > .10.

Note. †*p* < .10. **p* < .05. ***p* < .01. ****p* < .001.

established literature on both system justification and rumination (e.g. Jost et al., 2017;

Massa et al., 2017; Solak et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2018).

Findings may stem from the post-Brexit context in which the study took part,

with support for, or opposition to, the decision of the UK leaving the EU explaining

changes in anger. Political orientation was the only significant predictor of anger at

politics, beyond itself, across time. Since the Brexit campaign was linked to right-wing

ideology, results provided some support for this interpretation. However, no measure

was taken of support for Brexit, so its influence could not be considered either by itself

or through interactions with political rumination and system justification.

Despite unexpected results for anger at politics, Study 1b showed that political

rumination longitudinally predicted system justification, but not the reverse. Findings,

thus, supported the hypothesised relationship between both variables. Although the

correlational methodology used in the present studies precludes fully establishing

causality, an important step was taken in Study 1b due to its longitudinal design.

3.4. Reviewing the Measure of Political Rumination

Studies 1a and 1b focused largely on the relationship between political

rumination and system justification, as well as protest intentions. Additionally,

throughout Chapter 2, I elaborated on the connection between ruminative thinking and

emotions (Bushman et al., 2005; Sukhodolsky et al., 2001). That connection was

assumed within the design and analytic strategy in Studies 1a and 1b. The use of single

composites that include different sub-scales or facets is common in research on

rumination, as well as other constructs like narcissism. However, it is important to

review how the scale has worked across studies before moving forward.

Political Rumination Measure in Study 1a

Political Rumination EFA

The EFA in study 1a revealed a first strong factor of political rumination linked to emotions, followed by a second, weaker, factor that addressed the maintained and repetitive cognitive focus on political issues (Figure 3.5). Factor loadings for Factors 1 and 2, as well as for a single factor solution, KMO values and cumulative variance explained, are shown in Table 3.5.

Factor loadings in the two-factor solution revealed problematic cross-loading on Item 5 "I keep thinking about political events a long time after they occurred" (λ difference < .10). There was also some cross-loading in Items 4 "When I get angry about politics, I turn this matter over and over again in my mind", and 11 "When the government makes a decision with which I disagree, I keep wondering why this should have happened" (λ differences < .30). However, as long as differences in factor loadings were greater than .20, the items were not considered sufficiently problematic to warrant their deletion. Last, the highest factor loading on Items 5 and 11 did not reach a cut-point of .50. Said items showed no problems on the single factor solution (all λ >.55).

Figure 3.5. Political rumination scree-plot (Study 1a). Maximum likelihood extraction and Promax with Kaiser normalisation rotation.

Table 3.5.

Factor Loadings of all Political Rumination Items, Cumulative Variance Explained, and KMO (Study 1a)

Items	Factor Loadings λ		
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Single Factor
1. I ruminate about political issues.	-.08	.92	.76
2. I think about the reasons behind political decisions	-.13	.96	.74
3. I ponder about political injustices	.04	.75	.72
4. When I get angry about politics, I turn this matter over and over again in my mind	.56	.33	.84
5. I keep thinking about political events a long time after they occurred	.38	.46	.78
6. Memories of political events that annoy me bother me for a while	.59	.24	.77
7. I analyse political events	.09	.70	.72
8. I have had times when I could not stop being preoccupied with a particular political issue	.68	.17	.78
9. Memories of political annoyances and aggravations often pop into my mind before I fall asleep	.86	-.21	.59
10. I think about political events from a long time ago and they still make me angry	.88	-.06	.75
11. When the government makes a decision with which I disagree, I keep wondering why this should have happened	.47	.22	.65
12. Whenever I experience anger at politicians, I keep thinking about it for a while	.79	.02	.76
Cumulative Variance Explained	53.36	62.72	54.81
KMO		.94	

Given the strong correlation between both factors (.72), the strong correlations between composites of the two factors and a general score (both >.85), and the good value of KMO (.94), I decided to use the full measure instead of two separate scores. Results showing that all factor loadings in the single solution were above .55, the avoidance of problems resulting from cross-loading of items, and the security of avoiding any potential multicollinearity issues further supported the decision. Ultimately, the single measure was deemed to be sufficiently representative of both subscales and a-priori hypotheses had been set considering a single composite.

Multi-measure EFA

An additional EFA was carried out in Study 1a to ensure that there was no overlap between items of political rumination, and those of anger rumination and anger at politics. All items for the three measures were included in the analysis. The scree-plot revealed a strong three-factor structure[1] (Figure 3.6) with all items in the political rumination scale loading onto a single factor. Items of the anger rumination and anger at politics measures also loaded onto a single factor each with no overlap among measures (Tables 3.6 & 3.7). Results supported the use of a single measure of political rumination when considering the items of other scales on the study.

Comparison with Validated Measures.

Additional EFAs were carried out with the validated measures of Anger Rumination and System Justification. Both measures are often used as single composites despite underlying factors. The analyses followed Maximum Likelihood extraction and Promax with Kaiser Normalisation rotation. Scree plot evaluation on anger rumination revealed a strong single factor followed by up to 4 much weaker

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[1] Even in potential four to seven-factor solutions, political rumination items load onto the same factor except for item 9 "Memories of political annoyances and aggravations often pop up into my mind before I fall asleep" which cross-loads between two factors (λ = .39 on Factor 2 vs. λ = .52 on Factor 4 in the four-factor solution; λ = .46 on Factor 2 vs. λ = .48 on Factor 5 in the seven-factor solution).

factors (Figure 3.7). A single factor solution –which would match the scree-plot and the use of a single measure– showed one factor loading under .55 (compared the political rumination single measure, with all λ > .55). It accounted for 43.29% of the variance (compared to the 54.81% of the political rumination single factor composite).

Figure 3.6. Scree-plot for items of anger rumination, political rumination, and anger at politics (Study 1a). Maximum likelihood extraction and Promax with Kaiser normalisation rotation.

The four factor solution –as suggested by the official subscales in the measure– revealed problematic cross-loading for several items: Item 14 loaded on all factors (Factor 1 λ = .11, Factor 2 λ = .21, Factor 3 λ = .23, and Factor 4 λ = .29); Item 17 cross-loaded on Factor 1 (λ = 0.39) and Factor 4 (λ = 0.25), Item 10 on Factor 1(λ = .35), and Factor 2 (λ = .34); and Item 8 on Factor 2 (λ = .38), and Factor 4 (λ = .26). The total variance explained was 55.44% (only 0.63% greater than the variance explained by the single-factor political rumination measure). Last, the correlation between factors ranged between .45 (between Factors 3 and 4) and .74 (between Factors 1 and 2) with only the strongest correlation surpassing the two-factor correlation in the measure of Political Rumination. The stronger factor correlations in the political rumination measure together with the higher factor loadings in its single composite (compared to anger rumination) provided further support for its valid use as a single score.

Table 3.6.

Factor Loadings for Items of Anger Rumination, Political Rumination, and Anger at Politics, Cumulative Variance Explained, and KMO (Study 1a, Items 1 to 19)

Items	Factor Loadings λ		
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
1. I keep thinking about events that angered me for a long time.	*.79*	-.08	-.001
2. I think about certain events from a long time ago and they still make me angry.	*.74*	-.008	.02
3. I re-enact the anger episode in my mind after it has happened.	*.73*	.02	.03
4. When something makes me angry, I turn this matter over and over again in my mind.	*.73*	-.12	.12
5. I ponder about the injustices that have been done to me.	*.72*	-.04	-.03
6. Whenever I experience anger, I keep thinking about it for a while.	*.71*	-.09	.03
7. I ruminate about my past anger experiences.	*.69*	.02	.01
8. After an argument is over, I keep fighting with this person in my imagination.	*.69*	-.08	-.03
9. Memories of even minor annoyances bother me for a while.	*.68*	.03	-.05
10. I feel angry about certain things in my life.	*.68*	.03	-.01
11. I have had times when I could not stop being preoccupied with a particular conflict.	*.68*	-.04	-.02
12. Memories of being aggravated pop up into my mind before I fall asleep.	*.66*	.08	-.003
13. I have long living fantasies of revenge after the conflict is over.	*.66*	.08	-.10
14. When someone provokes me, I keep wondering why this should have happened to me.	*.62*	.009	.03
15. When someone makes me angry I can't stop thinking about how to get back at this person.	*.57*	.04	-.09
16. I think about the reasons people treat me badly.	*.56*	.12	<.001
17. I have difficulty forgiving people who have hurt me.	*.54*	-.13	.05
18. I analyse events that make me angry.	*.53*	.08	.08
19. I have had dreams and fantasies of violent nature.	*.43*	.19	-.13
Cumulative Variance Explained	26.44	43.82	49.55
KMO		.91	

Table 3.7.

Factor Loadings for Items of Anger Rumination, Political Rumination, and Anger at Politics, Cumulative Variance Explained, and KMO (Study 1a, Items 20 to 37)

Items	Factor Loadings λ		
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
20. I keep thinking about political events a long time after they occurred.	.03	.86	-.18
21. When I get angry about politics, I turn this matter over and over again in my mind.	.05	.82	.02
23. I ruminate about political issues.	-.12	.79	-.009
24. I analyse political events	-.04	.79	-.12
25. I think about the reasons behind political decisions.	-.09	.79	-.07
26. I have had times when I could not stop being preoccupied with a particular political issue.	-.02	.78	.02
27. Memories of political events that annoy me bother me for a while.	.06	.75	.02
28. I think about political events from a long time ago and they still make me angry.	.06	.72	.03
29. I ponder about political injustices.	-.07	.69	.10
30. Whenever I experience anger at politicians, I keep thinking about it for a while.	.08	.65	.21
31. Memories of political annoyances and aggravations often pop into my mind before I fall asleep.	.13	.57	-.01
32. When the government makes a decision with which I disagree, I keep wondering why this should have happened.	.01	.56	.19
33. I feel irritated because of politicians.	-.09	.06	.79
34. Politics makes me angry.	.05	.05	.73
35. Politics are displeasing.	-.07	-.12	.71
36. The political process makes me feel frustrated.	-.01	.04	.71
37. Politics in this country make me furious.	.06	.03	.68
Cumulative Variance Explained	26.44	43.82	49.55
KMO		.91	

Figure 3.7. Scree-plot of Anger Rumination (Study 1a). Maximum Likelihood extraction and Promax with Kaiser Normalisation rotation

The scree-plot for System Justification revealed at least 3 clear factors underlying the measure (Figure 3.8). A theoretical single factor solution –matching the common use of a single score– explained 31.19% of the variance and had several factor loadings below .55 (whilst all λ > .55 for political rumination). A potential two factor solution grouped items based on whether they were reverse coded or not. It explained 38.90% of the variance and still had items within both factors with λ > .55 (factor correlation = -.63). The three-factor solution –being the closest to the scree-plot– explained 45.49% of the variance. Its factor correlations were all lower that in the measure of political rumination (all < +/− .65) and all factors included at least one item with a factor loading under .55. Results further supported the use of political rumination as a single score in comparison to validated and commonly used measures.

Interestingly, the system justification measure –which is conceptualised as a single measure– revealed several underlying factors whereas the anger rumination measure –which has four validated sub-scales– showed a strong one-factor solution. Results showed that the underlying factors in the political rumination measure, and the

factor loadings on the single score composite, matched or surpassed those from the two

validated scales. It also did not fall behind in terms of variance explained even when

used as a single score. The single factor solution of political rumination can, therefore,

be considered a robust measure despite its two-factor structure.

Figure 3.8. Scree-plot of Economic System Justification (Study 1a). Maximum
Likelihood extraction and Promax with Kaiser Normalisation rotation.

Validity as a variable within the study: Correlations.

I further conducted a set of analyses with the single measure of political

rumination and the two separate sub-scale scores in order to compare them. The single

score included the 12 items since there were no problems in the factor loadings, but

items 5 and 11 were excluded from the two factor composites. Correlations between the

two factor measures and other variables of interest (Table 3.8) showed the largest

discrepancy in their relationship with anger rumination, where the emotional measure of

political rumination correlated positively with anger rumination, but the cognitive

oriented measure did not. All other relationships were significant, and in the same

direction for both sub-scales. The single factor composite correlated significantly and in

the same direction as the strongest of the two separate measures.

Table 3.8.

Correlations Between Different Composites of Political Rumination with System Justification, Anger at Politics, Anger Rumination, Political Orientation, and Protest Intentions (Study 1a)

	System Justification	Anger at Politics	Anger Rumination	Political Orientation	Protest Intentions
Political Rumination Total	-.37***	.39***	.19**	-.25***	.30***
Emotional Political Rumination	-.32***	.41***	.24***	-.25***	.28***
Cognitive Political Rumination	-.38***	.27***	.05	-.19**	.27***

Note. $^{†}p < .10.$ $^{*}p < .05.$ $^{**}p < .01.$ $^{***}p < .001.$

Analyses to evaluate the differences between the dependent correlations were further completed. The correlations between each variable of interest and the total score of political rumination were compared to their correlations with the strongest of the two-factor measures. No comparison was made for the relationships with political orientation since both coefficients were of -.25. The relationship between the single composite of political rumination and system justification was not significantly different from the one between system justification and cognitive political rumination ($t = 0.34$, $df = 288$, $p = .737$). The differences between correlations including political rumination as a single score, compared to the emotional subscale, and anger at politics ($t = -0.79$, $df = 288$, $p = .428$) and protest intentions ($t = 0.76$, $df = 288$, $p = .449$) were also non-significant. A marginally significant difference was found on the relationships between the emotion factor of political rumination and anger rumination, when compared to the total score ($t = -1.87$, $df = 288$, $p = .063$). Nevertheless, a significant relationship in the same direction existed in both cases. Correlations for the total score of political

rumination were, thus, statistically comparable to the strongest correlated measure out of the two sub-scales across all measures except for anger rumination.

Validity as a variable within the study: Regressions.

Multiple regressions were calculated with political rumination predicting system justification, and anger at politics. Two models were created for each outcome, one with the single measure, and another which included both sub-scale scores (Table 3.9). Through these analyses I further explored whether maintained and repetitive thinking was sufficient to reduce system justification above and beyond an emotional dimension of political rumination. On the other hand, it was expected that the emotional measure would predict anger at politics above and beyond the purely cognitive one.

Although within studies 1a and 1b there was no explicit focus on studying political rumination as a predictor of anger at politics, the predictive validity of political rumination on anger at politics is an essential part of the construct. Multiple regression models predicting anger at politics included system justification as a covariate together with political orientation and anger rumination. Conversely, models on system justification included anger at politics as a covariate.

Results showed that the non-emotional subscale of political rumination predicted lower system justification, whereas the emotional one was not significant. Conversely, the emotion subscale positively predicted anger at politics independently of the cognitive measure, which in turn was a non-significant predictor. Analyses of differences of β revealed that there was no significant difference between the coefficients of the cognitive and full measures when predicting system justification ($z = .37, p = .712$). No difference was found either between the emotional measure and the single score as predictors of anger at politics ($z = .38, p = .701$).[2]

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[2] The models for the full measure were the same as previously reported. However, to ensure that the same number of predictors was included in the models compared, those with the subscale scores

Table 3.9.

Multiple Regressions With Separate Political Rumination Scores on System

Justification, and Anger at Politics (Study 1a)

Predictor	Model 1: System Justification		Model 2: Anger at Politics	
	β	t	β	t
Single Measure				
	$R^2 = .45***$		$R^2 = .27***$	
Total Political Rumination	-.20***	-4.15	.23***	4.06
System Justification			-.27***	-4.15
Anger at Politics	-.21***	-4.15		
Anger Rumination	.14**	3.12	.21***	4.05
Political Orientation	.47***	10.07	-.09	-1.42
Separate Measures				
	$R^2 = .47***$		$R^2 = .28***$	
Emotional Political Rumination	.006	0.10	.27***	4.05
Cognitive Political Rumination	-.24***	-4.41	-.03	-0.42
System Justification			-.29***	-4.37
Anger Politics	-.22***	-4.37		
Anger Rumination	.12*	2.53	.19***	3.63
Political Orientation	.48***	10.31	-.07	-1.13

Note. N = 291

$^{\dagger}p < .10.$ $^{*}p < .05.$ $^{**}p < .01.$ $^{***}p < .001$

As in the correlations previously addressed, the single measure of political

rumination predicted both outcomes comparably to the best predictor of the two

subscales. Results, thus, showed that even if the measure is composed of two sub-scales,

a single factor composite provides a robust measure to consider as predictor of our

variables of interest.

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included only one of them (the cognitive measure predicting system justification, β = -.24; and the emotional measure predicting anger at politics, β = .26).

Political Rumination Measure in Study 1b

Political Rumination Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)

A CFA for a two-factor solution was carried out in Study 1b and was compared to the single factor solution. Given cross-loading of items 5 and 11, both items were excluded from the analysis of both measures. The analysis once again confirmed a two-factor solution, with scores of Chi-square, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), CFI, TLI, and Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), being better for the two-factor solution (Table 3.10). The χ^2 difference 81.97 (1) was significant ($p < .001$). Results validated the two-factor structure of the measure when considered on its own. Factor loadings of the two-factor solution, the single factor without items 5 and 11, and the single factor including all items can be seen in Table 3.11 (all $\lambda > .50$).

Table 3.10.

Model Fit Indices for Single and Two-factor Solutions of Political Rumination (Study 1b)

	χ^2 (*df*)	RMSEA	CFI	TLI	SRMR
Single factor	125.27 (35)	0.14	0.89	0.86	0.62
Two-factor	43.30 (34)	0.04	0.99	0.99	0.03

Validity as a variable within the study: Correlations.

Inspection of correlations at the time of the second wave of data collection revealed, once again, that the most relevant point of divergence between the two subscales lied in their relationships with anger rumination. Tests of differences between the dependent correlations revealed no significant differences between the associations of the total measure, and the cognitive sub-scale, with system justification ($t = 0.56$, $df = 134$, $p = .579$) and with political orientation ($t = 0.52$, $df = 134$, $p = .606$). A significant

Table 3.11.

Factor Loadings Across Two-Factor Solution, Shortened Single Factor, and Full Single Factor (Study 1b)

Items	Factor Loadings λ			
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Single Factor Short Scale	Single Factor Full Scale
1. I ruminate about political issues.		.81	.72	.71
2. I think about the reasons behind political decisions		.83	.73	.72
3. I ponder about political injustices		.77	.72	.68
4. When I get angry about politics, I turn this matter over and over again in my mind	.79		.77	.77
5. I keep thinking about political events a long time after they occurred				.83
6. Memories of political events that annoy me bother me for a while	.76		.75	.78
7. I analyse political events		.84	.78	.76
8. I have had times when I could not stop being preoccupied with a particular political issue	.84		.81	.81
9. Memories of political annoyances and aggravations often pop into my mind before I fall asleep	.58		.54	.55
10. I think about political events from a long time ago and they still make me angry	.81		.79	.79
11. When the government makes a decision with which I disagree, I keep wondering why this should have happened				.71
12. Whenever I experience anger at politicians, I keep thinking about it for a while	.76		. 73	.75

difference was revealed when looking at the correlations between anger rumination and

the single score of political rumination when compared to the emotional subscale ($t = -$

4.40, $df = 134$, $p < .001$). Correlations with anger at politics were equal for the total

score and the emotion score so the test of differences was not necessary. Across most

measures, the full composite of political rumination correlated comparatively to the best

correlate among the two subscales (Table 3.12).

Table 3.12.

Correlations Between Composites of Political Rumination with System Justification,

Anger at Politics, Anger Rumination, and Political Orientation (Study 1b)

	System Justification	Anger at Politics	Anger Rumination	Political Orientation
Political Rumination Total	-.50***	.43***	.15†	-.40***
Emotional Political Rumination	-.43***	.43***	.26**	-.37***
Cognitive Political Rumination	-.52***	.35***	-.06	-.38**

Validity as a variable within the study: Cross-lagged model.

To ensure that the cross-lagged model reported in Study 1b did not predict anger

at politics across time due to the use of a single measure, the initial model was

compared to a set of new models. One cross-lagged model was created with composites

from both subscales instead of the single measure, a second one was created only with

the score for the emotion subscale, and a third one with the purely cognitive one. When

the model included both measures, neither the emotional composite ($β = -.08$, $SE =$

0.06, $p = .206$), nor the cognitive one ($β = -.08$, $SE = 0.06$, $p = .190$) predicted system

justification across time. Neither variable predicted anger at politics at T2 either

(emotional $β = -.05$, $SE = 0.10$, $p = .581$; cognitive $β = .02$, $SE = 0.09$, $p = .816$). The

pathways for all other variables remained the same in terms of significance when

compared to the model with the single measure.

Both the emotion subscale of political rumination (β = -.12, *SE* = 0.05, *p* =.010),

and the purely cognitive score (β = -.12, *SE* = 0.05, *p* =.009) predicted system

justification across time when only one of them was included within the model. Neither

subscale predicted anger at politics (emotional β = -.04, *SE* = 0.08, *p* = .603; cognitive β

= -.01, *SE* = 0.07, *p* =.894) nor was predicted by system justification across time

(emotion, β = -.001, *SE* = 0.08, *p* =.873; cognitive, β = -.08, *SE* = 0.08, *p* =.360). All

other pathways remained equally significant across models. Results revealed that

previous findings were not a result of using a single score of political rumination, and

that longitudinal findings were comparable when using a single score, or the separate

subscale measures so long as they were not both included in the same model.

Collinearity Review

Previous analyses revealing that the separate subscales of rumination take up the

variance explained by each other on system justification –despite being significant

predictors when considered separately– demands an exploration of multicollinearity.

Thus, multiple regressions with the subscale scores of political rumination were

conducted on system justification. The variables at T1 –using the full sample from

Study 1a– revealed no problematic collinearity coefficients (VIF = 1.59, Tolerance =

.63; see Field, 2014). Neither did they show problematic collinearity at T2 (VIF= 1.95,

Tolerance = .51). Even when including both measures of political rumination at T1 and

T2, predicting system justification at T2, while controlling for system justification at

T1, coefficients remained within acceptable values (emotion subscale T1, VIF= 3.06,

Tolerance = .33; cognitive subscale, T1 VIF= 3.33, Tolerance = .30; emotion subscale

T2 VIF= 3.33, Tolerance = .30; cognitive subscale T2 VIF= 3.66, Tolerance = .27). All

VIF values remained below 10, and Tolerance never dropped below .20 (see Field, 2014).

Interestingly, when the single score of political rumination was included in analyses, all collinearity statistics became problematic. The collinearity coefficients became unacceptable for the single measure (T1 VIF= 19.31, Tolerance= .05; T2 VIF= 87.18, Tolerance = .01), and problematic for the separate subscales (emotion subscale T1 VIF= 8.35, Tolerance = .12; T2 VIF= 39.03, Tolerance = .03; and cognitive subscale T1 VIF= 6.28, Tolerance = .16; and T2 VIF= 17.53, Tolerance = .06). Results when accounting for all measures as predictors of system justification across time were the most problematic: single measure (T1 VIF= 86.70, Tolerance = .01; T2 VIF = 90.17, Tolerance = .01), emotion measure (T1 VIF= 40.15, Tolerance = .03; T2 VIF= 42.34, Tolerance = .02), and cognitive score (T1 VIF= 18.76, Tolerance = .05; T2 VIF= 18.96, Tolerance = .05).

It is not necessarily surprising that including the single score in the regression models together with the two subscales would reveal multicollinearity issues. After all, they all belong to the same measure. What is interesting is that collinearity coefficients shifted substantially when accounting for the full measure even though they had not changed to a problematic level when the subscales were included at both points in time. That is, using the whole measure together with the separate ones created a larger multicollinearity problem than using the same measures at different points in time.

To further explore multicollinearity in the measure, I conducted a regression model with the anger rumination score and its thoughts of revenge subscale as predictors of protestor violence with the Study 1a data. Unlike with political rumination, using the full measure and one of its subscales together did not shift collinearity values to a problematic point (VIF = 2.51; Tolerance = .40).

Overall Review

Although no large problems of collinearity were revealed when including the scores of both subscales of political rumination in either study, multicollinearity between the full score and the separate measures was larger than that of anger rumination and one of its subscales. This is not surprising given the larger factor loadings and factor correlation in the political rumination measure, and the larger variance explained by its factors when compared to the validated anger rumination scale.

Moreover, findings across Studies 1a and 1b were comparable regardless of the use of the single score or two separate values. At T1, the single score of political rumination worked similarly as a predictor of anger at politics as the emotion subscale. It was also comparable to the cognitive subscale when predicting system justification. Results in the cross-lagged longitudinal analysis were also comparable when including the single score, or when using any of the two subscales. All of them predicted system justification, neither was predicted by it, and neither predicted anger at politics. Additionally, problems arouse in the longitudinal analysis when measures of both subscales were included at the same time.

The fact that neither subscale predicted anger at politics across time, yet both predicted system justification equally well, considered together with problems of including both measures in the same model, suggests that the overlap between both factors may have increased over time. Within the context of post-Brexit UK, it is certainly plausible that ruminative thinking about political issues became increasingly linked to emotions over time.

Although the measure created for the assessment of political rumination has not been fully validated, the analyses carried out provided support for its stability as a two-factor scale as well as for its usefulness as a single measure. Findings also provide

evidence of its convergent validity. Based on results, and in order to avoid potential problems of overlapping variance in future studies, the single score will continue to be used throughout the rest of the thesis.

3.5. Study 2

Studies 1a and 1b served to confirm the hypothesised relationship between political rumination and system justification. Statistical analyses in Study 1a further revealed the indirect pathways from political rumination to protest intentions and the justification of police violence via system justification. Study 1a also showed the deterring indirect effect of a protest action being labelled as illegal on protest tendencies, via decreased perceived legitimacy. Last, anger rumination was linked to the support of reactive violence against the police following a police aggression.

In Study 2, I built up on previous findings by evaluating the established indirect effect of political rumination on protesting intentions when multiple protest actions are made available for participants (see Jost et al., 2012; Tausch et al., 2011). Considering multiple actions not only can be seen as more ecologically valid (Wright et al., 1990; also see Tausch et al., 2011), but also allows presenting a range of actions from normative and non-disruptive, to disruptive, and even violent (Jost et al., 2012; Tausch et al., 2011). It also facilitates the inclusion of the same action as legal compared to illegal.

In addition to extending the range of protest actions presented to participants, I considered actual engagement in past protest. Furthermore, a different and more general measure of system justification (Kay & Jost, 2003) was used in Study 2. The study also extended previous findings on anger rumination by considering its connection to proactive violent protest tendencies.

Study 2 was part of a larger project, with data collection being carried out for several different studies. Due to the inclusion of other studies, and to reduce the time of

completion, the number of scales and items used was reduced. The most essential scales to this section of the project, political rumination and system justification, were fully included. For anger rumination, however, only the *Angry Memories sub-scale* (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001) was used. This specific subscale includes the item stating, "I ruminate about my past anger experiences", and those that load with it, so it was judged to be the closest to the overall concept of anger rumination.

No measures of political orientation and anger at politics were included in the questionnaire. Instead, I considered the roles of self-esteem and narcissism in the models previously addressed. The study, thus, examined political rumination together with individual differences associated with self-evaluation. The dependent variables included willingness to participate in protest actions, as well as measures of past protest participation (i.e. whether participants had signed petitions or demonstrated in the past, without specifying the purpose of the action).

Ruminative thinking has been studied previously in connection to self-directed emotional and cognitive variables, such as self-compassion (Tandler & Petersen, 2018; Wu et al., 2018), moral self-sanctions (Bandura et al., 1996, 2001), self-criticism and contempt (Kramera & Pascual-Leonec, 2016), and self-esteem (Turner & White, 2016). More specifically, Turner and White (2016) found that anger rumination was inversely related to global self-esteem, and positively associated with contingent self-esteem. Moreover, they found that anger rumination interacted with global self-esteem and gender to predict both proactive and reactive aggression.

Rumination has also been linked to narcissism in previous research. Much like rumination (McCullough et al., 2001; McCullough et al. 2007; Sukhodolsky et al., 2001; Wu et al., 2018), narcissism has been conceptualised as opposing processes of forgiveness and fostering desires for revenge, which has been supported by empirical research (Eaton, Struthers, & Santelli, 2006; Emmons, 2000; Fatfouta, Gerlach,

Schröder-Abé & Merkl, 2015). Moreover, the rivalry dimension of narcissism has been associated with increased state rumination and anger, as well as decreased empathy; all three variables mediated its relationship with revenge motivations against transgressions (Fatfouta et al., 2015).

Both variables are also connected in terms of aggression, with angry rumination mediating the relationship between narcissistic vulnerability and reactive and displaced forms of aggression (Krizan & Johar, 2015). Narcissism has been associated with self-reported and peer-reported forms of aggression (Barry, Lui & Anderson, 2017), and motivated unprovoked aggression (Reidy, Foster & Zeichner, 2010). Additionally, the positive association between narcissism and aggression has been found to be strengthened when accounting for the variance explained by self-esteem (Locke 2009).

Narcissism and self-esteem also have important political outcomes. Research by Dhont, Cichocka and Makwana (2017) showed that narcissistic self-evaluation was linked to right wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation. Through them, it was indirectly and positively associated with prejudice. Results were consistent even when controlling for psychopathy, Machiavellianism, the Big Five dimensions of personality, and collective narcissism. In studies in Poland and the USA, it was further revealed that self-esteem positively predicted support for democracy, whereas narcissism negatively predicted it (Marchlewska, Castellanos, Lewczuk, Kofta & Cichocka, 2018).

Despite an overlap between ruminative thinking and narcissism and self-esteem, I expected the hypothesised relationship between political rumination and system justification, and the resulting mediation on protest intentions, to be replicated in Study 2. Given that system justification demotivates action against the system but fosters action in its defence (Jost et al., 2017; Osborne et al., 2019), and that measures of past protest did not specify whether action was taken in favour of the system or against it,

system justification was not hypothesised to predict past protest behaviour. Moreover, because feelings of anger were not controlled in this study, direct effects of political rumination were expected to remain on non-violent protest intentions and past protest behaviour despite controlling for other variables. No direct association was hypothesised on willingness to protest violently given its association with contempt rather than anger (Tausch et al., 2011) and a lack of evidence linking political rumination to contempt at this point in the project.

Previous research connecting ruminative thinking and both narcissism and self-esteem (Krizan & Johar, 2015; Fatfouta et al., 2015; Turner & White, 2016), the links of all variables with aggression, and findings on the suppression effects of narcissism and self-esteem when predicting aggression (Locke 2009) suggest the need to control for both variables when researching the links between anger rumination and support for, or intentions to engage in, violent protest. Given that anger rumination predicts aggression independently of the other two measures (Krizan & Johar, 2015; Turner & White, 2016), it was hypothesised that anger rumination would predict violent protest tendencies despite the new covariates.

Study 2 Method

Design and Participants

Study 2 employed a cross-sectional correlational design. Political rumination, anger rumination and system justification, as well as self-esteem and narcissism, were included as predictors of protest tendencies and past engagement in protest. A sample of 184 British participants were recruited through Prolific academic and rewarded following its guidelines. Out of the 184, four participants did not complete the study, and 15 failed an attention check at the end, so data was analysed for a total sample of 165 (123 female and 42 male). The ages of participants ranged from 18 to 73 years old

($M = 36.84$, $SD = 12.11$). One participant did not report their age, and another one reported it as 334, which was interpreted as a typo and corrected to 34.

Materials and Procedure

The study was completed online via Qualtrics. Participants completed the *Angry Memories* subscale of anger rumination (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001). The subscale is formed by 5 items, such as "I ruminate about my past anger experiences" and "I ponder about the injustices that have been done to me", and was deemed to be the most representative of the whole construct. Like in previous studies, items were rated in on 1 (*almost never*) to 4 (*almost always*) scales, $\alpha = .92$.

The same scale from Studies 1a and 1b was used to measure political rumination. The CFA provided support once again for a two-factor solution. Model fit indices for the two-factor solution (which excluded items 5 and 11 due to previous cross-loading) remained within good or acceptable ranges except for the Chi-square (Table 3.13). The Chi-square difference between the single factor and two factor solutions was once again significant $\chi^2 (1) = 33.14$, $p < .001$.

Interestingly, the single factor solution improved on CFI, TLI and SRMR now falling within acceptable or good range under those criteria. Similarly, fit indices for the two-factor solution worsened from previous studies in chi-square and RMSEA. Changes in results may be partially driven by an increased factor correlation. Study 2 took place within 9 months of Study 1b and may have been affected by an increased overlap of rumination dimensions, with political rumination becoming increasingly driven by emotion in the post-Brexit UK. Following the steps of previous studies, a single composite was calculated for political rumination, including items 5 and 11, $\alpha = .94$. Model fit indices of all analyses are included in Table 3.13. Once again, all factor loadings were larger than .50.

Table 3.13.

Model Fit Indices for Single and Two-factor Solutions of Political Rumination (Study 2)

	χ^2 (*df*)	RMSEA	CFI	TLI	SRMR
Single factor Short Scale	115.96 (35)	0.12	0.93	0.91	0.05
Two-factor Solution	82.82 (34)	0.09	0.96	0.94	0.04
Single Factor Long Scale	164.14 (54)	0.11	0.92	0.91	0.05

System justification was assessed through a more general measure than in previous studies, the system justification scale (Kay & Jost, 2003). The measure includes eight items rated from 1 (*disagree very strongly*) to 9 (*agree very strongly*). Examples of items include "British society needs to be radically restructured" (reverse-scored), and "In general, the British political system operates as it should", α = .80.

The Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire (Back, Küfner, Dufner, Gerlach, Rauthmann & Denissen, 2013) was used to measure narcissism. Participants were asked to respond in 6-point agreement scales to 18 items. The full measure is formed by eight facets, which in turn underlie two scales. The *Admiration* scale includes facets of *Grandiosity, Uniqueness*, and *Charmingness*. Example items of each facet include "I am great", "I show others how special I am", and "Mostly, I am very adept at dealing with other people". The *Rivalry* scale includes the facets of *Devaluation*, *Supremacy*, and *Aggressiveness* with items like "Most people are somehow losers", "I enjoy it when another person is inferior to me", and "I often get annoyed when I am criticized". Composite scores were created for both *Admiration* α = .86, and *Rivalry* scales α = .80.

Self-esteem was measured through the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). The scale includes 10 statements rated on 7-point scales ranging

from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Examples of items include "On the whole, I am satisfied with myself" and "I feel I do not have much to be proud of" (reverse coded), α = .92.

Following the completion of all scales, participants were asked to respond to whether they had, or had not, signed a petition for political reasons, and participated in demonstrations, over the previous two years. The petition was included as a normative and non-disruptive action, and the demonstration as a normative disruptive action. Participation in more "radical" disruptive actions like blockades and occupations was not included due to the small likelihood that participants would have taken part (see Becker et al., 2011; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). No information on past violent participation in protest was included for ethical reasons.

Participants were then asked for information on whether they voted for Brexit or not (*leave*/*remain*/*I cast a blank vote or spoiled the ballot* /*I did not vote*), and were asked, in hindsight, to rate whether they thought that leaving the EU was right or wrong 1 (*definitely right*) to 4 (*definitely wrong*). Participants who responded that it was right, or definitely right, were then directed to a section where they were asked to imagine a scenario in which during the following months the Government reversed its decision. Those who reported that leaving the EU was wrong or definitely wrong were asked to imagine the opposite scenario, in which the Government decided to continue with the process of leaving the EU (Appendix I). In both cases, the Government's decision was presented as occurring despite knowledge of its detrimental consequences. This was not treated as a manipulation, but rather to ensure that all participants were exposed to a scenario that presented a political situation with which they disagreed.

Following the imagined scenario, participants were asked to rate their willingness to engage in 10 different protest actions. Actions ranged from signing a petition to physically assaulting the people responsible for the situation. The action of

"participating in a demonstration" was presented explicitly both as being legal in one item, and as being illegal in another (Appendix I).

After completing all measures and the task, participants provided demographic information, and responded to a final item asking them about the content of the scenario they had been asked to imagine (Brexit continues/Brexit is cancelled). The last item served as an attention check.

EFA on Protest Tendencies

An EFA with principal axis extraction and promax rotation was carried out on the protest intentions measures (KMO = .82). Three clear factors were identified via scree-plot criteria; together they explained 73.89% of the variance. The first factor included disruptive forms of protest: disturbing events (e.g. via pickets) $\lambda = 1.00$, participating in blockades of streets $\lambda = .98$, participating in occupations of squares $\lambda = .82$, taking part in a demonstration (even if it is illegal) $\lambda = .67$, and participating in legal demonstrations $\lambda = .53$. The second factor was formed by violent actions: physically attacking the people responsible for the situation $\lambda = .99$, using violence against police officers $\lambda = .98$, and damaging the property of people responsible for the events $\lambda = .66$. The third factor was formed by normative and non-disruptive actions: signing a petition $\lambda = .78$, and posting comments on social media $\lambda = 70$.

Engagement in legal and illegal protest loaded onto the same factor, together with other disruptive actions. However, the willingness to demonstrate legally also cross-loaded on Factor 3 ($\lambda = .40$). The cross-loading of this item is not surprising and is reminiscent of cross-loading in the item addressing an occupation in Saab and colleagues' (2016) research. In the same way that the occupation in their study may have been seen by participants as peaceful yet non-normative, the legal demonstration presented in this study appears to have been perceived by participants as normative yet disruptive. Composite measures were created for normative protest $\alpha = .70$, disruptive

protest α =.93, and violent actions α = .89. Due to cross-loading, the legal demonstration measure was studied on its own.

Study 2 Results and Discussion

Frequencies of the dichotomous variables of past protest behaviour were calculated: signing a petition (Yes = 121, No = 44) and participating in a demonstration (Yes = 14, No = 151). Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations between all other variables were calculated and included in Table 3.14. As expected, political rumination correlated negatively with system justification and positively with anger rumination and rivalry, replicating previous findings. It also correlated positively with disagreement with Brexit, willingness to demonstrate legally, and normative and disruptive protest readiness.

System justification correlated with all measures of protest negatively. Anger rumination correlated positively with rivalry, and negatively with system justification and self-esteem. Surprisingly, it was not a significant correlate of violent protest intentions. Regarding the new measures, rivalry was found to correlate positively with admiration, and self-esteem correlated positively with admiration and system justification. Self-esteem also correlated negatively with disruptive protest readiness. Last, disagreement with Brexit correlated positively with willingness to demonstrate legally.

Multiple Regressions

A multiple regression with political rumination, anger rumination, rivalry, admiration, self-esteem, and disagreement with Brexit on system justification provided further support for the role of political rumination as a predictor of lower system justification ($\beta = -.32$, $p < .001$). The only other significant predictor was self-esteem ($\beta = .24$, $p = .012$). Four more multiple regression models were then calculated with the

Table 3.14.

Means (Standard Deviations) and Intercorrelations of all variables of interest (Study 2)

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Political Rumination	*r*	1										
2. System Justification	*r*	-.34***	1									
3. Anger Rumination	*r*	.34***	-.19*	1								
4. Rivalry	*r*	.25**	-.03	.45***	1							
5. Admiration	*r*	.13†	.20*	.08	.34***	1						
6. Self-esteem	*r*	-.11	.33***	-.35***	-.12	.50***	1					
7. Legal Demonstration	*r*	.40***	-.40***	.07	.01	-.06	-.13	1				
8. Normative Protest	*r*	.37***	-.31***	.14†	-.03	-.06	-.10	.62***	1			
9. Disruptive Protest	*r*	.29***	-.40***	.10	.04	-.09	-.24**	.75***	.51***	1		
10. Violent Protest	*r*	-.03	-.16*	.03	.15†	.11	.02	.19*	.09	.36***	1	
11. Disagreement with Brexit	*r*	.31***	-.13	.07	.12	-.004	-.10	.17*	.12	.02	-.11	1
M		1.97	4.15	2.23	1.92	2.60	4.51	2.24	2.92	1.68	1.12	2.87
(SD)		(0.66)	(1.29)	(0.76)	(0.71)	(0.90)	(1.40)	(1.09)	(0.92)	(0.80)	(0.36)	(1.05)

Note. †$p < .10$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$

same predictors as before, plus system justification, on the four measures of protest

intentions (see Table 3.15).

Political rumination positively predicted willingness to engage in legal

demonstrations, normative protest, and disruptive protest. In addition, high scores of

system justification predicted lower scores on all forms of protest. No other variable

was found to predict any of the outcomes, although the marginal significance of self-

esteem predicting lower disruptive intentions, and of rivalry predicting violent protest,

suggested the potential relevance of those variables.

Results on willingness to protest non-violently replicated previous findings and

invited additional analyses of indirect effects. The lack of significant results on violent

protest intentions, beyond the deterring effect of system justification, was particularly

surprising given the inclusion of several predictors of aggression. Although the null

effects may have resulted from the unwillingness of participants to admit that they

would engage in violent actions, it is important to remember that similar materials have

been successfully used in previous research on the field (e.g. Tausch et al., 2011).

The lack of predictive validity of anger rumination may have partially resulted

from the selection of *angry memories* as the only subscale included in the study.

Although the measure is representative of anger rumination as an overall construct, the

exclusion of other subscales may have taken away an essential part of the relationship

between the measure and aggression. The variance missed due to the exclusion of the

thoughts of revenge subscale was likely relevant in driving the null results, particularly

if violent protest is driven by retributive or vengeful motivations.

Indirect Effects

Four indirect effects models with 5000 bootstrap resamples and 95% confidence

intervals were carried out on all measures of willingness to protest using PROCESS

(Hayes, 2012). All models included political rumination as the independent variable,

Table 3.15.

Multiple Regression Models Across Different Forms of Protest (Study 2)

Predictor	Model 1: Legal Demonstration		Model 2: Normative Protest		Model 3: Disruptive Protest		Model 4: Violent Protest	
	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t
	$R^2 = .25^{***}$		$R^2 = .19^{***}$		$R^2 = 21^{***}$		$R^2 = .09^{*}$	
Political Rumination	.34***	4.11	.32***	3.77	.23**	2.72	-.11	-1.21
System Justification	-.29***	-3.70	-.19*	-2.35	-.30***	-3.77	-.24***	-2.82
Anger Rumination	-.09	-1.04	.06	0.62	-.08	-0.94	-.05	-0.49
Rivalry	-.04	-0.49	-.13	-1.44	-.003	-0.04	.17†	1.83
Admiration	-.02	-0.21	-.04	-0.38	.03	0.32	.10	0.98
Self-esteem	-.02	-0.18	.02	0.20	-.17†	-1.73	.03	0.30
Disagreement with Brexit	.03	0.45	.007	0.09	-.10	-1.27	-.12	-1.43

Note. $N = 165$

†$p < .10$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$

system justification as a mediator, and anger rumination, rivalry, admiration, self-esteem, and support for Brexit as covariates (Figure 3.9). Political rumination had significant indirect effects via system justification on willingness to engage in legal demonstrations ($B = .15$ [0.07, 0.29], *BootSE* = .05), normative protest ($B = .09$ [0 .02, 0.19], *BootSE* = .04), disruptive protest ($B = .12$ [0.05, 0.23], *BootSE* = .04), and violent protest ($B = .04$ [0.001, 0.12], *BootSE* = .03).

The relationship between political rumination and normative and disruptive protest, including legal demonstrations, was partially mediated by system justification. Given that anger at politics was not included as a control within this study, it is not surprising that direct effects of political rumination remained significant across several

models. Moreover, political rumination was connected to violent protesting via system justification. The lack of total and direct effects suggested that the relationship between political rumination and violent protesting is more tangential, as with protest illegality and protest intentions in Study 1a.

Binary Logistic Regression on Past Protest Behaviour

Having established the direct and indirect pathways between political rumination and a broad range of protest intentions, I turned my attention towards addressing the relationships between political rumination and past protest behaviour. Two binary logistic regression models were conducted to evaluate the same variables previously considered –except Brexit disagreement– as predictors of the dichotomous measures of past engagement in signing petitions (as a normative non-disruptive action) and demonstrating (as a normative disruptive action).

Brexit support/disagreement was not added to the models because participants had been asked to respond to the item in hindsight, based on their beliefs at the time of completing the study rather than at the time of the referendum, or even as recently as one month before the study took place. Additionally, there was no control over the goals of the past protest actions. A participant who disagreed with Brexit at the time of the study (but had agreed throughout the previous year) may have protested in favour of Brexit but would be classified as disagreeing with it. Similarly, two participants at the opposite ends of the agreement scale might have protested equally to defend their beliefs, one in favour of Brexit and the other against it. Moreover, some participants may have protested about issues unrelated to Brexit. In any of these examples, no matter how likely or unlikely one finds them to be, the measures used would not allow us to pinpoint important differences. To avoid potential erroneous assumptions and interpretations, the measure of agreement with Brexit was dropped when addressing past behaviour.

Figure 3.9. Indirect effects models conducted in PROCESS of political rumination on willingness to protest via system justification (Study 2).

Numerical values represent unstandardised regression weights. Solid lines represent significant paths on bootstrapping analysis with 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. Dash lines represent non-significant relationships: $p > .05$. Curved paths represent the total effects, whereas the straight ones represent the direct effects. *Note*. $^{\dagger}p < .10$. $^{*}p < .05$. $^{**}p < .01$. $^{***}p < .001$.

The logistic regression model with all variables on signing a petition was not significant (Nagelkerke $R^2 = .06$, $\chi^2 = 6.49$, $p = .371$), revealing that the model did not significantly add to the baseline (Table 3.16). However, political rumination was found to significantly predict past behaviour of signing a petition, Odds ratio Exp(B) = 1.90, $p = .041$. An increase of one point on political rumination was associated with 1.90 times increase in the odds of having signed a petition in the past two years. No other variables significantly predicted the outcome, diluting the strength of the full model and, thus, explaining the lack of significant results at a block level. Results offered some support for the link between political rumination and past normative non-disruptive protest. Given that system justification did not predict the outcome, indirect effects were not calculated.

The analysis on past participation in demonstrations found the complete model to significantly add to the baseline, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .20$, $\chi^2 = 14.96$, $p = .021$ (Table 3.16). Political rumination predicted the outcome variable, Odds ratio Exp(B) = 4.04, $p = .021$, with a one point difference in political rumination scores being associated with a 4.04 times increase in the odds of having participated in a demonstration in the previous two years. Admiration was a marginal predictor ($p = .083$), yet no other variable predicted the criterion. Once again, no indirect effects analyses were completed due to the lack of an association between system justification and past engagement in demonstrations.

Taken together, findings across Study 2 provided further support for the relevance of political rumination on protesting by replicating previous findings across a range of protest actions, and further linking it directly to increased likelihood of past engagement in disruptive and non-disruptive protest. Findings on the negative association between political rumination and system justification were also replicated using a different measure of system justification, which partially mediated the positive

relationship between political rumination and non-violent protest. Study 2 further

revealed an indirect connection between political rumination and violent protest, via

system justification, despite the lack of total and direct effects, mimicking previous

results on the support of police violence (Study 1a).

Table 3.16.

Logistic Regression Models on Past Protest Behaviour (Study 2)

Predictor	Model 1: Signing a Petition		Model 2: Participation in a Demonstration	
	Nagelkerke $R^2 = .06$ $\chi^2 = 6.49$		Nagelkerke $R^2 = .20*$ $\chi^2 = 14.96$	
	B	Odds ratio Exp(B)	*B*	Odds ratio Exp(B)
Political Rumination	.64*	1.90*	1.40*	4.04*
System Justification	-.10	0.90	-0.15	0.87
Anger Rumination	-.002	1.00	-0.17	0.85
Rivalry	-.12	0.69	-0.75	0.48
Admiration	-.001	1.00	0.72[†]	2.05[†]
Self-esteem	.11	1.11	0.61	1.06

Note. [†]$p < .10$. [*]$p < .05$. [**]$p < .01$. [***]$p < .001$.

Findings pointed towards the complexity of interpreting willingness to engage in

illegal protest simply in terms of a dimension of normativity. Willingness to participate

in illegal and legal demonstrations loaded onto the same factor. Other variables in the

same factor included forms of protest that would likely be seen as normative, yet

disruptive, and which are often legal (e.g., disturbing events via pickets, which is

commonplace and accepted during strikes), as well as disruptive actions that would be

seen as less normative and more aggressive, and would be less likely to be legal (e.g.,

blockading streets). Although the willingness to demonstrate legally cross-loaded on the normative and non-disruptive factor, findings still highlighted the inadequacy of classifying protest through a single taxonomy that collapses different dimensions.

Findings for violent protest tendencies did not support the hypothesis. They also opposed established research linking anger rumination to hostility and aggression (e.g. Anestis, et al., 2009; Bushman et al., 2005: Turner & White, 2016). However, it may be that anger rumination is more related to reactive violence than proactive violence when considering a political arena. The fact that other variables relevant to revenge thinking and aggression, like narcissistic rivalry and self-esteem (Fatfouta et al., 2015; Turner & White, 2016) were also not linked to violent protest intentions provides some support for this interpretation. Results from Study 2 appear to fit conceptualisations of radical, and even violent protest, as desperate, yet strategic (Becker et al., 2011; Saab et al., 2016), rather than as retributive actions, or violence associated to a lack of respect for the out-group and the lack of desire for reconciliation inherent to contempt (Tausch et al., 2011).

3.6. General Discussion

As the first empirical chapter in this thesis, Chapter 3 has served to lay the foundations of the project. Political rumination has been associated cross-sectionally with different measures of system justification (Studies 1a & 2), and increases in political rumination have been shown to predict decreases in system justification longitudinally (Study 1b). Across studies, political rumination has also been linked directly, and via mediations, to protest tendencies across a range of actions, as well as to past protest behaviour. Moreover, the measure has been reviewed and was found to be robust in its links to key variables and its predictive validity. Variations in fit indices were likely to reflect changes in the political context of the UK, which further showed the usefulness of the measure. Results, thus, supported the conceptualisation of political

rumination developed in Chapter 2 with repetitive thinking focused on political issues being associated to lower system justification, increased anger, and higher protest outcomes.

Chapter 3 has also initiated the study of the role of anger rumination in protest violence. So far, anger rumination has been associated with the justification of violence against the police following police aggressions (Study 1a). Moreover, although it was found to positively predict system justification cross-sectionally in Study 1a, and correlated with political rumination and system justification in Study 2, it did not predict longitudinally any variable with a political component in Study 1b. Anger rumination was also not associated with the willingness to engage in violent protest in Study 2.

Given that anger rumination is a variable linked to general aggression (Anestis et al., 2009; Bushman et al., 2005; Vasquez et al., 2013), results could be interpreted as supporting its conceptualisation as detached from a political dimension, with violent protest being strategic rather than stemming from aggressive tendencies or serving vengeful purposes (Becker et al., 2011; Saab et al., 2016). Nevertheless, results may be partially driven by the paradigm used (i.e. an imagined scenario) and could be expected to differ in real-life situations. The hypothesised link between anger rumination and contempt (Chapter 2), its link with the moralisation of violence (Bandura et al., 1996; Caprara et al., 2014), and the potential subsequent violent protest tendencies are addressed in future studies (see Chapter 5).

Regarding the third key research line within this project, the study of protest illegality, Chapter 3 has shown that simply presenting an action as illegal was not sufficient to deter willingness to participate. Nevertheless, it did decrease its perceived legitimacy, which was in turn a significant predictor of protest intentions (Study 1a). So far, protest illegality seems to play a part in protest deterrence, but only indirectly. The

findings of Study 2 further served to highlight the need for studying legality and normativity as separate dimensions. Engaging in illegal demonstrations loaded onto the same factor as legal ones, together with other actions that differed in their degree of adherence to social norms and the law.

Although Chapter 3 provides a good foundation for the development of the project, its research still has some limitations. Results linking political rumination to system justification, anger at politics, and protest, have continued to be correlational. Additionally, although the pathway from rumination to protest via feelings of anger has been suggested, and supported in the review of the measure of political rumination, it has not been explicitly studied. Both points will be further addressed in Chapter 4. Another key limitation from Chapter 3 involves the use of hypothetical protest actions. Although past protest behaviour has been linked to political rumination in Study 2, all studies considering illegality presented participants with hypothetical scenarios. Knowing that the protest action presented is not real can be expected to decrease the potential effects of labels of illegality, particularly in terms of fear of punishment.

Chapter 4: Experimental Effects (Studies 3 & 4)

4.1. Introduction

Chapter 4 builds on previous studies through controlled laboratory experiments. Study 3 focuses on the pathway from system justification to protest intentions, and the previously predicted interaction with protest illegality. It also expands on findings on the indirect effect between protest illegality and protest tendencies via decreased perceived legitimacy of the action. Further, Study 3 elaborates on previous findings on protest illegality by addressing protest intentions when the legal/illegal action presented to participants was seen as real. Thus, Study 3 builds upon limitations from previous studies related to the use of hypothetical protest scenarios.

Study 4, on the other hand, builds upon previous findings of political rumination. Although political rumination has been linked to lower system justification cross-sectionally and longitudinally, the correlational nature of the data prevents fully establishing causality. In addition, although the link between political rumination and anger at politics or political events has been mentioned, so far it has not been the focus of the research conducted. Thus, Study 4 involves a manipulation of political rumination and assesses its effects on system justification and anger. Last, Study 4 evaluates other emotional outcomes of rumination, such as sadness and anxiety, and explores potential pathways of protest deterrence through them.

4.2. Study 3

Study 3 addresses limitations of previous studies involving the use of hypothetical protest actions. Studying intentions to participate in a real protest action is more ecologically valid, however, it is particularly essential when considering the effects of illegalising protest since part of its deterring effect could be expected to occur via fear of punishment. Study 3, therefore, included the use of leaflets that were presented to participants as addressing a real protest. Participants not only rated their

willingness to engage in the action in a scale, but were also offered the possibility to write their email addresses on a sheet of paper so that the protest organisers could get in touch with them to make arrangements for attending the protest as a group.

The use of protest materials presented as real and the inclusion of a dichotomous measure, based on whether participants provided their email address or not, served the purpose of enhancing the ecological validity of results. Although neither measure entails protesting behaviour, the email response requires participants to take an active step closer towards protesting (see Klandermans, 1997; Van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009).

The study further builds upon findings in Study 1a on perceived legitimacy of protest as a connection between protest illegality and protest intentions. Results of Study 1a revealed a pathway of deterrence for protest illegality via legitimacy while showing that it was not enough deterrence by itself. Protest illegality did not affect protest tendencies directly and the perceived legitimacy of the action was also predicted by control variables, such as system justification. In Study 3, I examine the effects of protest illegality, a manipulation of system justification, and the interaction between both variables, on the perceived legitimacy of protest and the intention to engage in it.

Building on previous findings, the perceived legitimacy of the protest action was expected to be affected by both system justification and protest illegality. An interaction was also expected, with the illegality of the action making those in the high system justification condition see the protest as even less legitimate. Given that system justification motivates the defence of the system and its justification, the label of illegality should be accepted to a larger degree by system justifiers, and its delegitimising effect should increase. Additionally, and given the use of more ecologically valid dependent variables, both system justification and protest illegality were expected to deter protest intentions in the ratings as well as the email measure. An indirect effect of the independent variables on protest intentions, via perceived

legitimacy, was expected to occur, with direct effects of protest illegality remaining due to not controlling for fear of punishment.

Study 3 Method

Design and Participants

The present study consisted of a 2 (System justification: High vs Low) X 2 (Protest legality: Legal vs Illegal) between-subjects experimental design. System justification was manipulated through exposure to complementary stereotype texts adapted from those used by Jost et al., (2012). Once again, illegality was manipulated through changes in the information presented to participants about the protest action.

The sample included 188 participants (131 female, 56 male, and one who did not report their gender), from 42 different nations. The study was advertised in the Research Participation Scheme (RPS) at the University of Kent, with further participants being approached by the main investigator and recruited in person. International students were included in the study due to the difficulty of gathering a full sample of British participants. Participants received course credits in exchange for participating, and a chocolate bar was offered to those who did not need more credits for the year. Most participants were British ($n = 96$, 51.10%), followed by Greek ($n = 7$, 3.70%). Ages ranged from 18 to 65 years old ($M = 21.86$, $SD = 5.02$). The sample reported identifying as slightly left-leaning in terms of political orientation, the Median being 3, in a 1 (*Extreme Left*) to 7 (*Extreme Right*) scale.

Materials and Procedure

The experiment was presented to participants as a pilot study addressing perceptions and judgements of other people, and was fully completed on paper. Participants were provided with complementary (i.e. poor but happy and poor and unhappy) stereotype texts on paper, based on Kay and Jost's (2003) materials, which were later used by Jost and colleagues (2012) to manipulate system justification in

research on protest. Participants were asked to read the text, which presented a poor individual who was described as being either happy or unhappy:

> Tom is from a large English city. He is married and has two children, he has brown hair, and is 5 feet 11 inches. Tom liked to play football as a child and still closely follows the matches of his local team. Tom *is not particularly happy with most aspects of his life* [enjoys almost all aspects of his life] *and* [but] because of his low salary he has trouble getting the bills paid and keeping food on the table. In June, Tom will be turning 41.

After reading the text, participants were asked to rate the character, Tom, in terms of how likely or unlikely they thought it was that he was arrogant, funny, generous, content, socially competent, likeable, honest, and modest. Ratings were carried out on 1 to 9 scales in paper. Like in Jost and colleagues' (2012) research, the "poor but happy/poor and unhappy" exemplar was used due to being better for manipulating levels of system justification among left-wing people (see Kay, Czapliński, & Jost, 2009). Given that participant recruitment took place in a faculty of social sciences, political ideology was expected to be skewed towards the left. Following the rating task, participants were told that the experiment was over. However, I told them that I was working with a group of activists on a parallel project and I had been asked to gather information on student views about a protest they were organising in London against austerity measures and cutbacks in the UK.

While I collected the debriefing materials, I gave participants a leaflet with information about the protest and asked them to read it. The content of the leaflet was manipulated so that half of the participants read a slightly longer version that stated that

Government officials and the Metropolitan Police had released a statement labelling the

protest as illegal, but the promoters of the protest would exercise their democratic right

to protest and continue with the protest as planned (Appendices J & K). Information

concerning the view of protesting as a democratic right was not included in previous

studies but was deemed necessary for the leaflet to be realistic given that the illegality

of the action was being addressed in it. Participants then rated in 7-point scales how

legitimate they believed the protest action was (from *Extremely Illegitimate* to

Extremely Legitimate), and how likely they would be to participate (from *Extremely*

Unwilling to *Extremely Willing*).

Last, participants were told that the organisers of the protest were arranging to

rent a bus, so that all protestors could travel together to London, and were offered the

possibility of adding their email address to a list. That way they could be contacted and

provided information about the trip. Rather than recording the actual email addresses

provided by participants, I simply noted whether they provided an email address or not.

The list of emails was shredded following data collection. The dichotomous email

measure was included as a second measure of protest intentions that was more

ecologically valid. All participants completed the study individually and were fully

debriefed, both verbally and in writing, after the second part. The deception included in

the study was disclosed in the debrief (Appendix L), and participants were reminded of

their right to withdraw from the study in order to ensure consent.

Study 3 Results and Discussion

Scale Measures

Means and standard deviations for perceived legitimacy of the action and

willingness to protest, as measured by the scale, were computed (see Table 4.1). A first

2 (Legal/Illegal) x 2 (High/Low system justification) between subjects factorial GLM

was conducted for perceptions of legitimacy of the protest action. The analysis revealed

a significant main effect of the manipulation of system justification, $F(1,184) = 5.72$, p =.018, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. Participants in the high system justification condition ($M = 5.11$, $SD =$ 1.36) perceived the protest action as less legitimate than participants in the low system justification condition ($M = 5.58$, $SD = 1.36$). Although no effect of illegality was found for perceived legitimacy, $F(1,184) = 0.36$, $p = .547$, $\eta_p^2 = .002$, a marginally significant interaction effect was found, $F(1,184) = 3.18$, $p = .076$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$. Analysis of simple effects showed that illegality did not affect the perceived legitimacy of the action among participants in the low system justification condition, $F(1,184) = .70$, $p = .404$, $\eta_p^2 =$ .004, but it did increase the perceived legitimacy marginally in the high system justification condition, $F(1,184) = 2.85$, $p = .093$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$.

Table 4.1.

Means (SDs) of Key Variables Across Conditions of Legality and System Justification (Study 3)

	Perceived Legitimacy		Protest Intentions	
	Legal	Illegal	Legal	Illegal
Low System Justification	5.70 (1.37)	5.47 (1.37)	4.21 (1.92)	4.13 (1.45)
High System Justification	4.88 (1.38)	5.35 (1.23)	3.69 (1.56)	3.70 (1.63)

Results supported the hypothesised main effect of system justification but not the main effect of illegality. Additionally, although there was a marginal interaction, it affected protest tendencies in the opposite direction from what was expected. That is, participants in the high system justification condition perceived the illegal action as more legitimate than the legal one, instead of perceiving it as less legitimate. Although the finding is only marginal, it should still be considered as opposing the established hypothesis.

A second 2x2 factorial GLM with the same independent variables was conducted on participants' protest intentions. A main effect of system justification was

found once again, $F(1,184) = 3.95$, $p = .048$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$, with participants in the high

system justification condition ($M = 3.69$, $SD = 1.59$) being less willing to protest than

participants in the low system justification condition ($M = 4.17$, $SD = 1.70$). No main

effect of illegality, $F(1,184) = 0.03$, $p = .873$, $\eta_p^2 < .001$, and no interaction effect, F

$(1,184) = 0.04$, $p = .847$, $\eta_p^2 < .001$, were found. Results once again supported the

hypothesised effect of system justification, but not the effect of illegality.

Given that the interaction effect between system justification and illegality on

perceived legitimacy was only marginal, and indirect effects would not be found within

95% confidence intervals, the mediation model was calculated without the inclusion of

illegality as a moderator. The mediation analysis of system justification on protest

intentions via perceived legitimacy of the action was carried out in PROCESS (Hayes,

2012) with 5000 bootstrapped resamples and 95% confidence intervals (Figure 4.1).

Results showed that the relationship between the manipulation of system justification

and protest intentions was fully mediated by perceived legitimacy of the action ($B = -.13$

$[-0.25, -0.03]$, *BootSE* $= .06$).

Findings qualified the deterrent effect of system justification on protest

intentions as fully occurring through the reduced perceived legitimacy of the action.

Although protest illegality had no direct effect on either perception of legitimacy or

willingness to protest, its marginal interaction with system justification on perceived

legitimacy suggested a potential effect of illegality in opposition to the hypotheses and

other results. That is, that despite a general tendency of system justification to reduce

perceived legitimacy of protest, and through it, deter protest, when protest is illegalised,

this effect can be reversed, and high system justifiers may actually perceive the action

as more legitimate instead.

Figure 4.1. Indirect effects model conducted in PROCESS of system justification on protest intentions via perceived legitimacy (Study 3). Numerical values show unstandardised regression weights. Solid lines represent significant paths on bootstrapping analysis on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. Dash lines represent non-significant relationships: $p > .05$. The curved path represents the total effect, whereas the straight one represents the direct effect.

Note. $^{†}p < .10.$ $^{*}p < .05.$ $^{**}p < .01.$ $^{***}p < .001.$

This surprising and apparently contradicting effect may be explained within this study by the inclusion of information in the illegal leaflet stating that the protest would continue due to being a democratic right. System justification has been highlighted in the past as involving the belief that things are alright, but also the belief that should they not be, the system would be responsive and solve the issues that arise (see Cichocka et al., 2017). Within this study I may have found that for some people in the enhanced system justification condition, the illegality of the protest was seen as a failure to respond to a problematic situation, or perhaps even an attack on core democratic values. Thus, despite a general tendency in line with the hypotheses on system justification, an opposing interaction effect was possible although marginal.

Email Measure

A hierarchical logistic regression model was carried out on the email measure with system justification and illegality as predictors in Step 1, the interaction between both variables in Step 2, and the perceived legitimacy of the action in Step 3. Conditions in both manipulated variables were coded as 1 and -1. Results revealed a marginal effect of system justification, $B = -.30$, Odds ratio Exp(B) $= .74$, $p = .062$, with increases in system justification being associated to 0.74 times decrease in the odds of providing the email address. No effects were found for illegality, $B = .01$, Odds ratio Exp(B) $= 1.01$, $p = .936$, or the interaction, $B = -.09$, Odds ratio Exp(B) $= .92$, $p = .586$. Once again, the significant effect of system justification disappeared, $B = -.24$, Odds ratio Exp(B) $= .78$, $p = .134$, when the perceived legitimacy was included in the model, $B = .25$, Odds ratio Exp(B) $= .1.29$, $p = .049$. A one-point increase in perceived legitimacy was associated with 1.29 times increase in the likelihood of providing the email address.

Findings on the email variable supported the hypothesised role of system justification in reducing willingness to protest, but not the expected deterrent effects of protest illegalisation. Additionally, the link between system justification and the protest variable became non-significant when the perception of legitimacy of the action was included in the model. It is important to note that the strength of predictors in protest should be expected to decrease the closer that outcome measures are to actual engagement in protest (see van Zomeren et al., 2008). Therefore, the decrease in strength and significance of the predictors on the email outcome, compared to previous analyses, suggests that the measure tapped closer to actual behaviour than previous ones. This makes the lack of significant findings of illegality even more noteworthy and surprising.

It also must be noted that the lack of effects of protest illegality on the perceived legitimacy of the action and the scale measure of protest intentions may be partially due

to the inclusion of international students in the sample. A lack of attachment to the

British system may have decreased to some degree the effects of illegality on

delegitimising the action. This interpretation would explain differences in results

between Study 1a and Study 3 and fits previous findings during the pilot MSc study

addressed in Chapter 2. However, the manipulation of illegality did show marginal

effects on perceived legitimacy through its interaction with system justification.

Furthermore, deterrent effects should have still been found in the email measure for

international and British participants alike even if only due to fear of punishment[3]. A

potential explanation for the lack of effects on that variable may be the expectation of

potential negative consequences of participating in protest even when the action was not

highlighted as illegal.

4.3. Study 4

Study 3 focused on the effects of protest illegality and elaborated on findings of

perceived legitimacy of protest as a proximal predictor of protest engagement by using

more ecologically valid materials. It also provided additional support for the study of

system justification as a causal predictor of protest appraisals and protest intentions.

Study 4, on the other hand, focuses on the effects of ruminating about politics through

controlled laboratory experiments, which enable establishing causality.

Chapter 3 established political rumination as a predictor of lower system

justification both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. It has also been implied to fuel

anger at politics. Study 4 takes a step forward by addressing the effects of an

experimental manipulation of rumination. Previous research has successfully induced a

state of rumination, which resulted in increased aggression eight hours after a

provocation (Bushman et al., 2005). Study 4 involved the use of a similar manipulation

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[3] Indeed, post-hoc analyses selecting only British participants (n = 96) failed to reveal significant effects on perceived legitimacy, protest intentions, and the email measure.

in which participants had to think continuously and repetitively about a political topic

with which they disagreed in order to examine its effects on system justification and a

range of emotional outcomes (see recent work by Borders & Wiley, 2019, for a

comparable procedure).

It is essential to highlight that although the focus on rumination within this

project has been placed on anger, ruminative thinking can be associated with a broad

range of emotions. A wealth of literature has addressed its links with sadness, shame,

anxiety, and fear (Cheung, Gilbert, & Irons, 2004; Cox, Enns & Taylor, 2001;

McCullough, Orsulak, Brandon, & Akers, 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Peled &

Moretti, 2010; Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters & Arntz, 2008; Wade et al., 2008;

Worthington & Wade 1999). Moreover, ruminative thinking has been found to be

linked to psychological disorders, such as PTSD and depression (Nolen-Hoeksema,

Larson & Grayson, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Roelofs et al., 2008;

Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000; Takano & Tanno, 2009; Treynor, Gonzalez

& Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Last, within clinical settings and in the study of depression,

it has been linked to distorted cognitions, such as decreased motivation and poor

autobiographical memory, and to personality traits like neuroticism (Jones, Papadakis,

Hogan & Strauman, 2009; Raes et al., 2006: Roelofs et al., 2008; Teasdale & Green,

2004).

Ruminative thinking may, therefore, have a range of effects on protesting

through its interplay with different emotions, and its impact on different cognitions.

That is, depending on the emotions to which it is linked, attitudes towards political

events and behavioural outcomes may differ. Research on rumination and depression,

for example, suggests potential pathways of protest demotivation when rumination is

linked to other emotions than anger. Within Study 4, I considered different emotional

outcomes that are likely to be affected by the manipulation of rumination in order to explore potential protest-deterring pathways.

As in previous studies, I examined the effects of protest illegality on willingness to protest. Prior studies focused on confirming specific hypotheses on the effects of illegality by itself, or in interaction with system justification, but not through other potential interactions. Given the lack of significant findings, I took a more exploratory stance in Study 4 and addressed the main effects of illegality, and its interactions with system justification and with all emotions that stemmed from the task. In addition, instead of presenting a protest action as illegal in one condition, and with no information on its legality on the other, I explicitly presented actions as either legal or illegal depending on the condition.

Last, previous findings linking system justification to the justification of police violence against peaceful protestors (Study 1a) and the deterred willingness to engage in violent protest (Study 3) have revealed an indirect link between political rumination and attitudes towards violence. In this study I extended on those findings by addressing a measure of general support for protest violence.

I hypothesised that the induced ruminative state would result in increased anger and decreased system justification, which would predict higher protest intentions independently of protest illegality. I also explored possible pathways of protest demotivation via feelings of sadness and anxiety. Additional exploratory aims included assessing whether the explicit mention of protest actions as legal in comparison to illegal served to bring out the effects of protest illegality that had so far eluded the project. The effects of illegality were considered both by addressing its effect on its own, and by evaluating its interactions with all other variables considered in the model. Furthermore, I predicted that system justification, but not anger (see Tausch et al.,

2011), would predict lower support for violent protest, with rumination being unrelated to it unless connected via system justification.

Study 4 Method

Design and Participants

The experiment followed a 2 (rumination, distraction) x 2 (legal, illegal) between-subjects design. It allowed studying the effects of rumination on system justification and emotions towards politics and to construct a model including rumination and measures of system justification and emotions, with illegality as a moderator, as predictors of protest intentions. Attitudes towards violent protesting were considered separately since they were not expected to be affected by the manipulation of legality. A final sample of 154 university students (127 female and 27 male), completed the experiment in exchange for course credits. All participants were recruited through the RPS at the University of Kent.

Most participants were British ($n = 120$, 77.90%), followed by Greek ($n = 5$, 3.20%). Once again, non-British participants were included in the sample due to the difficulty of gathering sufficient British students. Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 29 years of age ($M = 19.25$, $SD = 1.51$). Self-reported political orientation was slightly skewed towards the left with a median of 3.33, a minimum score of 1 and a maximum of 5.67 measured from 1 (*extreme left*) to 7 (*extreme right*). The initial sample included 161 participants, but seven were excluded from the study due to not following the instructions in the rumination task (e.g. wrote about Donald Trump as a British political issue with which they disagreed).

Materials and Procedure

Participants completed the full study using pen and paper. The experimenters randomly allocated them to the different conditions and provided them with materials in small packs as the study advanced. Participants first completed a section of

demographic information, which included three items asking participants to rate how they would describe their political attitudes and beliefs in general, in terms of economic issues, and in terms of social issues (1= *extreme left,* to 7 = *extreme right*).

Participants were subsequently asked to think about a political issue with which they disagreed and was relevant to them, and to write two sentences about the topic. For the sake of control, a maximum time of 2 minutes was provided so that participants had time to think of a topic but did not spend too long thinking about it. Participants in the rumination condition then elaborated on the political topic they had addressed through four other writing tasks, each lasting five minutes, for a total of 20 minutes. They were asked to write about their general thoughts and feelings towards the political issue they had chosen, to write about past interactions with people who disagreed with them on that issue, to elaborate on the current state of affairs and how politicians were mishandling or had mishandled things, and to list the ways in which that political issue affected them or people that they knew. The experimenters highlighted in the third section that it was not necessary for participants to display in-depth knowledge of current events in parliament but could simply write about their perceptions of what was occurring.

Participants in the distraction condition were asked to complete a series of tasks presented as an exploration of memory. The tasks involved describing the layout of their houses, the layout of a friend's house, and the layout of the lab room they had crossed to reach the cubicle where they were completing the study. Asking participants to describe the layouts of geographical areas as a method of distraction has been used for control purposes in previous research (e.g., Bushman et al, 2005). Last, they were asked to draw a floor plan of their house.

Each task was timed for five minutes, with the researcher bringing the next one whenever the time ran out. The manipulation was designed so that participants in the

rumination condition would have to think repetitively for 20 minutes about a specific

political topic with which they disagreed and that was relevant to them, whereas those

in the distraction condition would still choose a topic that they cared about but would be

prevented from engaging in pervasive and repetitive thinking.

Participants were then asked to indicate how they were feeling at that moment in

time towards the political issue they had chosen at the start of the study. The measure

consisted of a list of emotions: sad, down, upset and depressed to measure sadness (α =

.89), angry, annoyed, and frustrated for anger (α = .87), afraid, anxious, nervous, and

worried for anxiety (α = .91), and content, happy, and pleased for happiness (α = .84).

Emotions were rated on 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*extremely*) scales. An EFA based on scree-

plot criteria, with Maximum Likelihood extraction and Promax rotation revealed four

factors accounting for 71.11% of the variance (KMO = .86). All items loaded on the

relevant factors above .50 except for feelings of frustration (λ = .42). The item was,

nevertheless, included in the composite for theoretical reasons and due to matching

operationalisations in past research (see Tausch et al., 2011).

Participants were also asked to complete the PANAS (Watson, Clark &

Tellegen, 1988) indicating how they were feeling *as a result of the task*. That is, how

the task made them feel. The PANAS included a list of 20 words representing positive

and negative affective states (e.g. interested, distressed, alert, determined, jittery, and

hostile), which were rated on 1 (*very slightly or not at all*) to 5 (*extremely*) scales.

Scores were used to compute two separate composites for positive (α = .85) and

negative affect (α = .88). The PANAS was included so that we could distinguish

emotions directed at the political topic from general affect resulting from the tasks.

After completing the measures of emotions, participants completed Kay and

Jost's (2003) system justification scale, which included eight items rated on scales from

1 (*disagree very strongly*) to 9 (*agree very strongly*), α = .79. Examples of items include

"In general, the British political system operates as it should", and "British society needs to be radically restructured" (reverse-scored). Kay and Jost's (2003) scale was chosen because it has been previously used in research with manipulations of system justification (see Jost et al., 2012). It is also a more general measure of system justification compared to the economic scale, and thus, more appropriate given that there was no control over the topics selected by participants.

The system justification scale was followed by a measure of protest tendencies in which participants rated on 7-point scales how much they disagreed or agreed that they would participate in protest actions against the topic they had thought about at the beginning of the study. Three items were presented to them addressing disruptive forms of protest (see Jost et al., 2012): a demonstration, an occupation, and a blockade of parliament. All actions were presented as non-violent, but for half of the participants the actions were also presented as legal, whereas for the other half, the actions were stated to be illegal. By getting participants to choose themselves which political topic was addressed by the protest I expected results to at least partially mitigate the association between political orientation and protest tendencies.

Last, participants completed a questionnaire with nine statements addressing attitudes towards protest on agreement scales (1 = *Disagree very strongly*, to 9 = *Agree very strongly*). The study focused on three items involving the justification of protestor violence ("It is justifiable to protest in violent ways when the government is doing unjust things", "Sometimes the only way to achieve political change is through violence", and "Protesting violently is another legitimate tool to use for those who strongly disagree with the status-quo": α = .82). Since factor analysis cannot be carried out on only three items, the EFA, with unweighted least squares and promax rotation, was run on the three protest items and the three items addressing protest violence. The scree-plot revealed two clear factors explaining 68.49% of the variance (KMO = .75).

The three protest items loaded on Factor 1 (all $\lambda > .70$) and the three items on protest violence on Factor 2 (all $\lambda > .70$).

Study 4 Results and Discussion

Intercorrelations between all variables were computed (Table 4.2). System justification correlated negatively with anger, anxiety, negative affect, protest tendencies, and support for violent protesting. Feelings of anger correlated positively with sadness, anxiety, positive and negative affect, and protest tendencies. Anger was also negatively associated with feelings of happiness and political orientation. Political sadness and anxiety correlated positively with each other, and with both affect measures and protest intentions. They also correlated negatively with happiness and political orientation. Happiness correlated negatively with negative affect, which in turn correlated negatively with political orientation, and positively with support for violent protesting. Positive affect was positively linked to protest intentions. A positive association was found between protest intentions and support for violent protesting. The positive relationships between positive affect and political anger, sadness, and anxiety, may result from the PANAS measuring emotions about the task rather than the political scenario.

Descriptive statistics were also calculated for system justification and all emotion measures across conditions of rumination, and for protest intentions and support for violent protest across both rumination and legality conditions (Table 4.3). Although the support for violence was not expected to be affected by the manipulation of legality, differences were considered to control for potential priming effects.

The first steps to the analytic strategy involved assessing the effect of rumination on all outcomes. A between-subjects multivariate GLM was calculated to address its effects on system justification, all emotion variables, protest intentions, and support of violent protesting. Multivariate analysis was used since all variables were

Table 4.2.

Intercorrelations Between Key Variables (Study 4)

		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
1. System Justification	*r*	1									
2. Anger	*r*	-.25**	1								
3. Sadness	*r*	-.16†	.60***	1							
4. Anxiety	*r*	-.16*	.62***	.62***	1						
5. Happiness	*r*	.14†	-.34***	-.23**	-.26**	1					
6. Positive Affect	*r*	-.02	.30***	.17*	.22**	-.02	1				
7. Negative Affect	*r*	-.25**	.40***	.54***	.50***	-.19*	.12	1			
8. Political Orientation	*r*	.11	-.23**	-.20*	-.19*	.09	.02	-.16*	1		
9. Protest Intentions	*r*	-.35***	.37***	.24**	.24**	-.15†	.25**	.13	-.13	1	
10. Violence Support	*r*	-.26**	.08	.05	.15†	-.04	.05	.17*	.008	.25**	1

Note. †*p* < .10. **p* < .05. ***p* < .01. ****p* < .001

Table 4.3.

Means (SDs) of Key Variables Across Manipulations (Study 4)

		Rumination	Distraction
System Justification		4.07 (0.97)	4.50 (1.25)
Anger		4.86 (1.24)	3.63 (1.44)
Sadness		3.17 (1.34)	2.24 (1.15)
Anxiety		3.98 (1.43)	2.97 (1.46)
Happiness		2.30 (1.12)	2.43 (1.20)
Positive Affect		2.49 (0.64)	2.46 (0.81)
Negative Affect		1.90 (0.74)	1.24 (0.31)
Protest Intentions	Legal	4.07 (1.73)	4.18 (1.89)
	Illegal	3.17 (1.77)	3.23 (1.60)
Violence Support	Legal	2.92 (1.49)	2.84 (1.46)
	Illegal	2.91 (1.24)	2.63 (1.51)

expected to correlate (see Solak et al., 2012). The multivariate test was significant, $F (9, 143) = 9.30$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .37$. Tests of between subjects effects showed that people in the rumination condition reported significantly lower levels of system justification, $F (1, 151) = 5.44$, $p = .021$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, and higher anger, $F (1, 151) = 31.60$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .17$, sadness, $F (1, 151) = 20.40$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .12$, and anxiety, $F (1, 151) = 19.04$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .11$, directed at the political issue they had thought of

Significant effects were also found for Negative Affect, $F (1, 151) = 51.14$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .25$, with people in the rumination condition experiencing more negative affect attributed to the task. No effects were found on feelings of happiness, $F (1, 151) = 0.49$, $p = .485$, $\eta_p^2 = .003$, or positive affect, $F (1, 151) = 0.04$, $p = .846$, $\eta_p^2 < .001$.

Interestingly, no effects were found either on protest tendencies, $F(1, 151) = 0.09$, $p = .766$, $\eta_p^2 = .001$, and support for violence, $F(1, 151) = 0.65$, $p = .422$, $\eta_p^2 = .004$.

In the next step of the analyses I regressed protest intentions and the support for violent protest onto two hierarchical models (Table 4.4). Rumination, system justification, all political emotion variables, both scores of PANAS for the sake of control, political orientation, and illegality were included in Step 1. The interaction between rumination and illegality was included in Step 2 for exploratory purposes, and the interaction between illegality and system justification for the purpose of comparison with previous studies. A three-way interaction was not considered given that system justification was conceptualised as a mediator. Scale measures were mean-centred and conditions in the manipulations coded as 1 and -1.

System justification and anger at the political situation predicted protest intentions significantly, with participants being less willing to protest the more they justified the system and being more willing to protest the angrier they felt. Feelings of sadness, anxiety, and happiness did not predict protest intentions. Additionally, neither positive nor negative affect, nor the political orientation, significantly predicted the outcome. Although the manipulation of illegality did predict lower protest intentions, its interaction with system justification was non-significant. The manipulation of political rumination was found to predict lower protest intentions independently of all other variables but not in interaction with legality. Regarding the model on the support of violent protest, only system justification predicted the outcome, as originally hypothesised.

The hierarchical regressions supported the hypothesised pathways from system justification and anger to protest intentions. Moreover, although no significant relationships were found in the exploration of the predictive value of emotions of sadness and anxiety, the remaining association between the political rumination

manipulation and protest intentions, once system justification and anger were controlled, was found to be negative. Although not accounted within the emotional pathways considered, the suggested suppression results provide support for a potential deterring effect of rumination on protest. Once the enhanced feelings of anger and the reduced system justification were considered, the remaining effects of the manipulation may reveal feelings of helplessness or reflect a process of offloading. Unlike in previous studies, protest illegality directly predicted willingness to protest, although its interaction with system justification was once again non-significant.

Table 4.4.

Hierarchical Regressions on Protest Intentions and Support for Violence (Study 4)

Predictor	Model 1: Protest Intentions		Model 2: Support for Violence	
	β	t	β	t
	$R^2 = .35$***		$R^2 = .10$	
Rumination	-.25**	-2.97	-.04	-0.42
System Justification	-.27***	-3.77	-.24**	-2.87
Anger	.33**	3.22	-.05	-0.39
Sadness	.13	1.34	-.13	-1.07
Anxiety	-.04	-0.42	.18	1.53
Happiness	-.01	-0.17	.01	0.16
Positive Affect	.12†	1.66	.03	0.33
Negative Affect	-.02	-0.17	.14	1.26
Political Orientation	-.03	-0.48	.05	0.58
Illegality	-.27***	-3.79	.005	0.07
	R^2 change = .003		R^2 change = .001	
System Justification X Illegality	.02	0.31	-.01	-0.16
Rumination X Illegality	-.05	-0.74	.03	0.32

Note. N = 154

†$p < .10$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$

Results further showed that political orientation did not correlate with, or predict, protest intentions, revealing that the task served to tap onto protest intentions beyond a distinction based on right-left ideological identification. The inclusion of the PANAS measures further serves to indicate that the relationship between anger and protest intentions resulted from feelings directed at the political situation rather than from affect attributed to the task. Taken together, results provide support for the established hypotheses and respond to exploratory questions.

The second hierarchical model on support of violent protesting revealed that only system justification predicted the outcome variable. Results fit previous findings that linked political rumination to violence support and violent protest intentions only via system justification. As expected, and in line with previous research by Tausch et al., (2011), feelings of anger did not predict support for violent protesting. The regression model further confirmed that the manipulation of legality did not influence the posterior measurement of violence support. The subsequent indirect effects model on violent protest support was carried out separately from the model accounting for legality conditions.

Indirect Effects Models

Having confirmed the effects of the rumination manipulation on system justification and anger at the political issue, a moderated mediation model was carried out to assess indirect effects and interactions with illegality on protest tendencies (PROCESS: Hayes, 2012). Rumination was included as a starting point, system justification and political anger, sadness, and anxiety, were included as mediators, and protest intentions as the only outcome (5000 bootstrapped resamples and 95% confidence intervals). Protest illegality was set as a moderator for all paths between the mediators and the outcome for exploratory purposes. Control measures were not included since effects had been confirmed in regression analysis. Pathways of sadness

and anxiety were still included due to being central to the aims of the study. No causal

order was modelled between system justification and emotions because it could not be

confirmed whether cognitions or emotions were affected first by the manipulation

(Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2. Indirect effects model conducted in PROCESS of rumination on protest

intentions via system justification and emotions towards politics (Study 4). Numerical

values show unstandardised regression weights. Solid lines represent significant paths

on bootstrapping analysis on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. Dash lines

represent non-significant relationships: $p > .05$.

Note. $^{\dagger}p < .10.$ $^{*}p < .05.$ $^{**}p < .01.$ $^{***}p < .001.$

Results showed no effects of the moderator on any path (Table 4.5). Significant

indirect effects of rumination on protest intentions via anger (Legal, $B = .33$ [.09, .63],

BootSE = .13; Illegal, $B = .25$ [.04, .55], *BootSE* = .13) and system justification (Legal,

$B = .10$ [.02, .27], *BootSE* = .06; Illegal, $B = .09$ [.008, .23], *BootSE* = .06) were found

at both levels of the moderator. Indirect effects through sadness (Legal, $B = .15$ [-.03, .42], $BootSE = .12$; Illegal, $B = .03$ [-.14, .21], $BootSE = .09$) and anxiety (Legal, $B = .-.05$ [-.23, .10], $BootSE = .08$; Illegal, $B = -.005$ [-.17, .20], $BootSE = .09$) were non-significant. Direct effects of rumination were also significant in legal and illegal conditions (Legal, $B = -.44$, $p = .018$; Illegal, $B = -.49$, $p = .016$). Thus, although rumination had no total effect on protest intentions ($B = .04$, $p = .771$), pathways of protest motivation were revealed via decreased system justification and increased anger, and a direct pathway of demotivation appeared after controlling for the mediators. The effect of protest illegality disappeared once the variance of all interactions was considered in the model.

Table 4.5.

Indices of Moderated Mediation for Each Mediation Path (Study 4)

Mediator	*B*	CI (LL/UL)	*BootSE*
System Justification	-.01	-.15/.08	.05
Anger	-.08	-.41/.26	.17
Sadness	-.12	-.45/.12	.14
Anxiety	-.05	-.17/.33	.12

An additional indirect effects model with 5000 bootstrapped resamples (95% confidence intervals) was completed using PROCESS (Hayes, 2012). The manipulation of rumination was placed as the independent variable, system justification as a mediator, and support for violent protest as the outcome (Figure 4.3). Since the emotion measures were not significant in the hierarchical regression, they were not included in the model. Results revealed an indirect effect with rumination decreasing system justification, and system justification predicting lower support for protest violence ($B = .07$ [0.12, 0.17], $BootSE = .04$). As in previous studies, political rumination affected a violent dimension of protest only via system justification.

Taken together, results supported the conceptualisation of rumination about politics as a causal antecedent of lower system justification and increased anger, which in turn lead to increased protest intentions. Additionally, although emotions of sadness and anxiety resulting from the ruminative task did not predict lower protest intentions, the study revealed a demotivating pathway from rumination to protest intentions. Findings remained stable across legal and illegal actions, but protest illegality had a deterring effect when considered on its own. Results on the support for violent protest fit all predictions, with system justification predicting lower support of violence and connecting political rumination to it indirectly. Additionally, and in line with previous research findings (Tausch et al., 2011), anger was not found to predict supporting attitudes towards violent protest. Findings of Study 4, thus, supported key hypotheses and provided responses to exploratory questions.

Figure 4.3. Indirect effects model conducted in PROCESS of rumination on support for protest violence via system justification (Study 4). Numerical values show unstandardised regression weights. Solid lines represent significant paths on bootstrapping analysis on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. Dash lines represent non-significant relationships: $p > .05$. The curved path represents the total effect, whereas the straight one represents the direct effect.

Note. $^{\dagger}p < .10$. $^{*}p < .05$. $^{**}p < .01$. $^{***}p < .001$.

4.4. General Discussion

Studies in Chapter 4 were designed to address causal relationships among the variables examined via correlational designs in previous studies. Results of Study 3 supported the hypothesised role of system justification in deterring protest intentions and participation, while using more ecologically valid materials. Study 4 further served to causally link political rumination to reduced system justification and increased anger, through which it was found to indirectly enhance protest intentions. Indirect effects of rumination through system justification on support for violence were further established in Study 4.

Findings on a protest demotivating path from rumination were found to exist beyond the emotion outcomes considered. Results may be explained by effects of rumination outside of the emotion pathway to protest. Given the links between rumination and depression (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Peled & Moretti, 2010), it is plausible that the induced state of rumination generated feelings of helplessness, reducing perceptions of efficacy. It may also be that what remained from the task of repetitive and continuous thinking about politics, after controlling for anger and system justification, revealed processes of cognitive reappraisal, of offloading, or even cost-benefit considerations of becoming involved in the situation.

Regarding the effects of illegality, the manipulation failed to reduce perceptions of legitimacy and protest intentions in Study 3. The lack of effects on legitimacy may be explained by the presence of international students in the sample, and by the inclusion of a statement framing the protest as a democratic right in the leaflet presented to participants. However, Study 4 found a direct effect of protest illegality on willingness to protest despite the presence of international students in the sample. This suggests that even if the effects of illegality on perceptions of legitimacy are affected by attachment

to, or dependency on, the nation and its socio-political system, the legality of an action can still affect protest intentions (potentially due to fear of punishment).

A key methodological difference between Study 4 and previous studies is that instead of presenting an action as illegal and the other with no legality information, the legal status of the action was explicitly stated in the legal condition. Differences in results could be interpreted to suggest that rather than illegality deterring protest it is the explicit legality of an action what increases protest intentions. It is plausible that participants might expect potential conflict with the police if they protest, and this expectation may be reduced by framing the protest as legal rather than increased through labels of illegality.

Taken together, studies in Chapter 4 provided important support through the replication of previous findings on rumination, system justification, protest intentions and attitudes towards violent protest. They also responded to exploratory questions on the effects of attaching legal and illegal labels to protest actions. Moreover, results pointed to the potential relevance of rumination on the efficacy pathway to protest. The scope of the project is therefore extended in Chapter 5 through the consideration of efficacy. Chapter 5 will further build upon previous findings by considering a range of appraisals beyond the perception of legitimacy in order to provide further responses on the effects of protest legality and illegality.

Chapter 5: Efficacy and Dual Pathways (Studies 5 & 6)

5.1. Introduction

Chapters 3 and 4 showed that rumination is a relevant variable to protesting through its role in decreasing system justification and increasing anger. Additionally, the research supported the role of system justification in delegitimasing protest against the system, and predicting low support for protest violence and high support for police violence against protestors. Furthermore, anger rumination predicted the justification of reactive violence by protestors following police aggressions, but not the willingness to engage proactively in violent protest.

All findings have been considered across legal and illegal protest, with protest illegality serving to reduce perceptions of legitimacy only in studies with a full sample of British participants. Additionally, a deterrent effect of illegality was found in Study 4, although when considered with previous studies, findings appeared to be driven by noting the legality of the action rather than its illegality. Nevertheless, the models considered so far have not been found to interact with conditions of legality.

The present chapter will focus, through Studies 5 and 6, on two key points that have been left unanswered. The first point was already discussed in depth in Chapter 1. Previous studies in this project have served to highlight the relevance of accounting for the perceived legitimacy of a protest action as a proximal antecedent of protest intentions and engagement. That is, beyond the relevance of the anger that drives an action, or its expected efficacy, it is essential to consider how that action is perceived in terms of being rightful or legitimate. Indeed, as argued in Chapter 1, appraisals of acceptability of protest are implied in the distinction between actions based on normativity or violence (e.g. Becker et al., 2011; Saab et al., 2016; Tausch et al., 2011). However, so far, studies in this project have only taken the perception of legitimacy into

account. The studies discussed in this chapter involve the measurement of a broad range of appraisals of protest rather than a single one.

The second key point stems from Study 4, which points at the potential of political rumination in demotivating protest. Study 4 did not reveal a path of protest demotivation via emotional outcomes of the ruminative process, but it did provide support for the existence of those pathways. Just as the motivating pathway of political rumination has been framed as occurring in part through the creation of attitudes against the system, its demotivating effects may result from its link to perceptions of efficacy.

The links between rumination and depression run deep at multiple levels, including theoretical considerations, empirical findings, and even the measurement of rumination (e.g. Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema & Murrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008, Treynor et al., 2003). At a conceptual level, rumination has been argued to impair problem solving by fostering feelings of hopelessness and making people fixate on their problems and emotions, and on barriers to solutions, which prevents them from acting (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). The overlap between depression and ruminative thinking linked to sadness has been so prevalent that the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) was reconceptualised due to including items that were too close in content to measurements of depression (see Treynor et al., 2003).

It is likely that the manipulation of rumination from Study 4 fostered feelings of political disillusionment, demotivation, and helplessness, which would explain the negative pathway that remained between it and protest intentions after controlling for changes in system justification and anger. It is also possible that such feelings and related attitudes may be more prevalent in people with a tendency to ruminate. Thus, efficacy-related outcomes need to be examined within this project.

Theory and research on system justification also point towards the relevance of extending this project beyond the emotional pathway of protesting and into the pathway of efficacy. In their work, Cichocka and colleagues (2017) revealed a negative quadratic relationship between system justification and normative political engagement, including the intention to vote, protest intentions, and actual protest behaviour. Their findings showed that although lower system justification increased protest participation, effects were reversed at the extreme, therefore suggesting the potential for political disengagement among people with extremely low levels of system justification.

The authors framed their research and results in terms of perceived political efficacy and system confidence, which should account for the belief that the system will respond positively to one's attempts to change it. That is, system justification should not only be seen in terms of a motivation to believe that "everything is alright", but also that "should something not be alright, the system will respond and fix it". Within their conceptualisation, Cichocka and colleagues (2017) pointed towards the positive association between system justification and perceived efficacy, which should result in a potential protest-promoting pathway.

Indeed, in other research, Osborne, Yogeeswaran and Sibley (2015) revealed the significant association between system justification and appraisals of efficacy, with efficacy positively predicting system justification. An alternative pathway in which system justification predicts efficacy was not considered in Jost and colleagues (2017) model but was added in recent work by Osborne and colleagues (2019; cf. Osborne et al., 2015). Given consistent indirect effects of political rumination via system justification in previous chapters, considering the outcomes of system justification in relation to perceived efficacy provides a strong starting point.

Extending the project to account for a pathway of efficacy also has important implications for the consideration of legal and illegal protesting, as well as protest

violence. Although different forms of efficacy have been linked to non-violent protest actions on behalf of one's group or in solidarity in similar ways (e.g. Tausch et al., 2011, Saab et al., 2015), their connections to violent, or illegal protest are more complicated. Feelings of group efficacy –that is the feelings that one's group can produce change– have been shown to be negatively related to violent protest (Tausch et al., 2011), yet the expected efficacy of a radical actions has been positively associated with engagement in it (Becker at al., 2011). Additionally, perceived efficacy of both peaceful and aggressive actions can interact to predict support for, and intention to participate in, aggressive protest (Saab et al., 2016).

Research on risk perception within repressive political settings has also shown the potential of repressive policies for enhancing perceptions of efficacy and intentions to engage in future protest (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016). The researchers framed their findings within the framework developed by Opp and Roehl (1990), who highlighted how even though repression can deter protest due to perceived costs, its effects can be reversed so that it actually galvanises mobilisation and increases incentives for protesting. Opp and Roehl (1990) linked this reversal process to the perceived illegitimacy of repressive measures, thereby highlighting how governmental decisions can go against established social norms. Ayanian and Tasuch's (2016) and Opp and Roehl's (1990) work have important implications for this project given that the law is an essential tool for governments to repress action against them, and labelling protest actions as illegal may increase perceptions of efficacy and foster protest.

A similar argument can be raised regarding disruptive protest. Rule-breaking, disruptive action, for instance, has been argued to be more effective than alternative forms of protest (Piven & Cloward, 1991). Indeed, within the massive strike actions in higher education in the UK over the last few years, many academics may have found

themselves discussing whether achieving key goals was possible without disturbing the students' education.

My own email communications with lecturers and seminar leaders have highlighted key issues, such as the fact that "for maximum impact of strike action on the institution, the union policy is to not give notice/warning of disrupted activities" (L. Ewing, personal communication, February 12, 2020). Similarly, the idea that "the intention is not to mess the students around" and the acknowledgement that "they [the students] are entitled to be frustrated and annoyed" can be found in connection to the suggestion that "it would be great if that negative energy could be channelled towards the University Administration team and the Vice Chancellor - the more emails they get, the more motivated they will be to help end the strike" (L. Ewing, personal communication, February 12, 2020).

This example illustrates how the need for disruption is linked to the undesired but necessary frustration of students affected by the strike and their subsequent communications with the institution. The possibility of success becomes intricately tied to the degree of disruptiveness. Considerations like these are likely familiar to anyone who has participated in similar disruptive protest actions, whether in higher education or other settings. Thus, both protest disruptiveness and protest illegality have the potential to enhance perceptions of efficacy, so the exploration of their roles within this pathway is merited.

Study 5 addresses the effects of the form (sit-in in a park vs. occupation of parliament square) and legal status (legal vs. illegal) of a protest on perceptions of its legitimacy, normativity, disruptiveness, morality, and efficacy. Additionally, links these new considerations to the previous studies through system justification, which has been consistently associated to perceptions of legitimacy throughout this project, and can be expected to be linked to perceptions of efficacy (see Osborne et al., 2019; Osborne et

al., 2015). Study 6 builds up on Study 5 by addressing a broader range of actions, including violent ones, and including political and anger rumination, and their emotional outcomes, in order to create a more comprehensive model.

5.2. Study 5

Study 5 was largely designed to provide a more in-depth understanding of results on protest illegality. So far, studies in the project have shown the potential that protest illegality has to delegitimise action, yet illegality has mostly predicted protest outcomes indirectly. Methodological changes in Study 4, and the subsequent results, suggested that rather than illegality, it might be the label of an action as legal what makes the difference. Additionally, the potential interaction between the legal status of an action and its form has remained unaddressed. Last, the focus on perceptions of legitimacy of the action and neglect of other forms of appraisal might lead to confounds in previous studies. Therefore, Study 5 aims to answer four main questions: is the perceived legitimacy of an action the only appraisal that protest legality affects? Is the perceived legitimacy what best predicts protest intentions? Are there opposing effects stemming from illegality? And what role is played by the form of protest, on its own and through interactions with system justification and legality, in affecting said appraisals and protest outcomes?

Most of the appraisals selected were based on literature reviewed throughout Chapters 1 and 2. The perception of normativity was included to account for theory and research on social norms and protest normativity (e.g. Tausch et al., 2011; Wright et al, 1990), and the perception of disruptiveness was included to separate the dimension of normativity from the construct of disruptiveness as addressed by Jost and colleagues (2012). Theoretical and empirical work by van Zomeren and colleagues (2011a, 2011b, 2012), together with considerations of moral outrage in relation to protest (Saab et al., 2015), the work by Bandura and colleagues (1996, 2001) linking moral disengagement

to a sense of righteousness and to rumination, and theory on system justification and injunctive norms (Jost et al., 2015) further informed the study and highlighted the importance of addressing the perceived morality of a protest action. As addressed in Chapter 1, perceptions of morality provide a cornerstone in the conceptualisation of rumination in relation to anger and system justification, the three central variables addressed as predictors in this thesis.

The perception of legitimacy was maintained following previous studies within this project that highlighted its relevance. Previous research and theory have highlighted perceptions of legitimacy as essential in judging the claims of authorities and following their orders (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989) and have linked them to obedience and disobedience, as well as to support for protest (Passini & Morselli, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2015). Legitimacy is, therefore, a variable of great relevance to the effects of labels of legality and illegality and must remain in this project and be considered together with other forms of appraisal.

In order to avoid conflict with perceptions of violence, Study 5 focuses solely on peaceful actions. Focus on willingness to engage in violent actions and an extra measure for the appraisal of aggressiveness are included in Study 6. In addition to studying participants' willingness to engage in protest, Study 5 considers a further measure of support for the protest action. Given that the life expectancy and relevance of protest is strongly linked to the support that they receive from the population (Passini & Morselli, 2013, 2015), considering both participants' willingness to protest and their support for the action allows to broaden the scope of this study. The construct of legitimacy has already been framed as particularly important when it comes to protest support, but the present research will allow evaluating its unique contribution independently of other related appraisals and its role in connecting protest illegality and protest support.

As previously discussed, work on perceptions of efficacy provides a further connecting point between rumination, system justification, and protest dimensions of legality and disruptiveness. Additionally, addressing perceptions of efficacy allows the extension of this project to explore alternative effects of system justification and rumination that remain unexplained in this project, namely the role of system justification in motivating protest, and that of rumination in deterring it, via perceptions of efficacy. Last, although considerations of efficacy usually focus on the efficacy of protest in achieving change, and strengthening the protest movement by reaffirming identity of the group and gaining support (see Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Saab et al., 2015), they can also address retributive-guided protest.

Beyond the effects of protest form and legality, Study 5 bridges new considerations and previous findings on political rumination and system justification. Given the importance of using appropriate measures of system justification when addressing its effects (see Jost 2017; Sengupta et al., 2015), this study used two different measures to assess on one hand its connections to appraisals of the rightfulness or acceptability of the action, and on the other, its connection to perceptions of efficacy. The economic system justification measure (Jost & Thompson, 2000) was used in connection to appraisals of rightfulness given that the protest presented to participants focused on economic issues and allocation of state funds to big companies. The more general measure of system justification (Kay & Jost, 2003) was used to address its association with perceptions of efficacy.

Economic system justification was hypothesised to predict lower perceptions of legitimacy, normativity, and morality of the protest action. That is, given the focus of the measure on the justification of the economic system, it should be linked to the denial of a problem, and to the defence of the economic system through delegitimating the protest actions that challenge it. On the other hand, the general measure of system

justification was expected to predict higher perceptions of efficacy of the protest. Indeed, past research has already linked system justification to lower perceptions of corruption and to higher institutional trust (Tan, Liu, Huang, Zheng & Liang, 2016) as well as to higher efficacy (Cichocka & Jost, 2014; Cichocka et al., 2017; Osborne, et al., 2015).

As a more objective appraisal of protest, perceived disruptiveness was not expected to be predicted by either measure of system justification. Instead, it was expected to be affected by the manipulation of the form of protest, with the occupation being perceived as more disruptive than the sit-in in a park. The occupation was also expected to increase perceptions of efficacy but was not expected to affect perceptions of normativity or of morality, given that they are considered more subjective and affected by ideology. Similarly, like in previous studies, protest illegality was expected to affect perceptions of legitimacy, but not perceptions of disruptiveness, normativity, or morality. It was also expected to increase perceptions of efficacy. At an exploratory level, the interactions of both measures of system justification with protest form and legality were considered as predictors of all protest appraisals. Three-way interactions on protest outcomes were further explored with no specific hypotheses underlying the analyses.

Regarding protest tendencies and support, the perceived legitimacy of protest was expected to predict both outcome variables positively. The same was expected for perceived morality, in support for a moral imperative motive for protesting. That is, protesting and support for protest actions should not only be predicted by the action being seen as legitimate, but by the action being perceived as morally right. The study further explored the predictive validity of appraisals of normativity and disruptiveness. Perceptions of both retributive and utilitarian efficacy were expected to predict protest intentions and support positively, in line with utilitarian and retributive motivations for

protesting. However, given that they are both measures of efficacy, they were expected to correlate strongly so the shared explained variance could potentially lead to neither variable being significant. Hypotheses on their role were therefore tentative.

Study 5 Method

Design and Participants

Study 5 was a 2 (legal vs. illegal) x 2 (sit-in vs. occupation) between-subjects online experiment. The protest presented to participants was manipulated both in terms of its legality and its form. Participants either read about a legal or an illegal protest action, which involved either a sit-in in a park, or an occupation of parliament square and blockade of parliament. The effects of both manipulations on perceptions of disruptiveness and normativity, as well as on perceptions of legitimacy, morality, and efficacy of the action were considered. Measures of protest intentions and protest support were also included as dependent variables. Two-hundred British participants (115 female, 85 male) were recruited for the experiment via Prolific Academic, and received £0.90 as compensation for their time. Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 65 years old ($M = 37.22$, $SD = 11.16$).

Materials and Procedure

Study 5 was completed online through a Qualtrics questionnaire. Participants provided demographic information and completed measures of political orientation and system justification. The political orientation measure included three items in which participants placed themselves in 1 (*extreme left*) to 7 (*extreme right*) scales regarding their political orientation in general, in terms of economic issues, and in terms of social issues. Kay and Jost's (2003) scale was included to measure general system justification ($\alpha = .88$), and Jost and Thompson's (2000) scale to assess economic system justification ($\alpha = .90$). Items were rated on 9-point agreement scales (e.g., "In general, you find

society to be fair" for the general measure, and "Social class differences reflect

differences in the natural order of things" for the economic scale).

Participants were subsequently asked to read a vignette and imagine themselves

as its protagonist (Appendix M). The vignette described a day in the participant's life. It

started when they came across a political scandal during the morning, which involved

the government favouring powerful business in contracts and over-paying them over the

years. This had resulted in companies overcharging the state by billions of pounds,

leaving no money for important services in multiple communities, including the

participant's community. The vignette continued to describe the day as the participant

found out more about the scandal and discussed the situation with friends and co-

workers, finding it intolerable. Last, the vignette presented information about either a

sit-in in a park, or an occupation of parliament square and blockade of parliament. Each

form of protest was presented as either being legal or illegal. Regardless of the form and

legality of the action, the vignette claimed that the protest was peaceful and finished by

stating that "you feel that your voice should be heard on this issue, so you decide to

participate in it"

Following the imagined task, participants were asked to complete a measure of

protest tendencies (i.e. "How likely would you be to protest in this situation?" rated

from 1, *I would definitely not protest,* to 5, *I would protest for sure*). The task and

measure were influenced by work in forensic psychological research using proclivity

measures, which use motor imagery to trigger the connections between attitudes and the

intention to act (see Alleyne, Tilston, Parfitt & Butcher, 2015).

Next, participants responded to three 5-point agreement scales (from 1, *Strongly*

Disagree, to 5, *Strongly Agree*) addressing their belief that the public should protest (i.e.

"Members of the public should protest against this case"), and the efficacy of the action

(i.e. "This protest action would lead the government to make the responsible parties

accountable for their actions" and "This protest action would lead the government to make changes in the established contracts with these businesses"). The efficacy measures accounted for a retributive view of efficacy focused on punishment of those responsible for the situation and a utilitarian form focused on changing the situation. Participants finished by rating how legitimate, moral, normative, and disruptive they believed that the protest action was on 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*extremely*) scales.

Study 5 Results and Discussion

Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations can be found in Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics of all appraisals, protest tendencies, and protest support across conditions of legality and protest form are included in Table 5.2. Both system justification measures correlated very strongly and positively with each other. They also correlated positively with political orientation and perceived retributive efficacy, and negatively with the perceived legitimacy and morality of the protest, protest tendencies, and protest support.

As expected, general system justification also correlated positively with utilitarian efficacy, whereas economic system justification was only a marginal correlate. The measure of general system justification tended to correlate more strongly with measures of efficacy whereas the economic measure tended to correlate more strongly with perceptions of legitimacy and morality, as well as with the protest outcomes. Political orientation was also negatively related to perceptions of legitimacy and morality, as well as to protest tendencies and support.

Regarding the protest appraisals, perceived legitimacy correlated positively with perceived normativity and morality, and negatively with perceived disruptiveness. Perceived normativity correlated positively with perceived morality and utilitarian efficacy but was not related to the perception of disruptiveness. The perception of morality was related negatively to perceived disruptiveness and positively to perceived utilitarian efficacy. The two measures of efficacy correlated very strongly and positively

Table 5.1.

Means (SDs), and Intercorrelations for Key Variables (Study 5)

	M (SD)		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.
1. General System Justification	4.44 (1.38)	*r*	1										
2. Economic System Justification	4.15 (1.19)	*r*	.65***	1									
3. Political Orientation	3.34 (1.36)	*r*	.44***	.69***	1								
4. Legitimacy	3.92 (1.13)	*r*	-.20**	-.40***	-.31***	1							
5. Normativity	3.11 (0.98)	*r*	.008	-.06	-.04	.24**	1						
6. Disruptiveness	2.33 (1.02)	*r*	.05	.11	.02	-.24**	-.09	1					
7. Morality	4.21 (0.94)	*r*	-.26***	-.39***	-.29***	.68***	.38***	-.28***	1				
8. Utilitarian Efficacy	2.92 (1.15)	*r*	.20**	.13†	.04	-.002	.16*	.08	.18**	1			
9. Retributive Efficacy	2.82 (1.18)	*r*	.21**	.16*	-.004	.007	.12†	.11	.10	.81***	1		
10. Protest Tendencies	2.89 (1.28)	*r*	-.16*	-.33***	-.34***	.44***	.19*	-.22**	.51***	.24**	.27***	1	
11. Support for Protest	4.34 (0.89)	*r*	-.32***	-.44***	-.33***	.53***	.33***	-.25***	.67***	.18*	.17*	.59***	1

Note. †$p < .10$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

in line with expectations. Protest tendencies and support for protest were also strongly

and positively related to each other. Both protest measures correlated positively with

perceptions of legitimacy, normativity, morality, and utilitarian and retributive

efficacies. They also had negative relationships with perceived disruptiveness.

Table 5.2.

Means (SDs) of Protest Appraisals, Protest Tendencies, and Protest Support Across
Manipulations (Study 5)

		Sit-in	Occupation
Legitimacy	Legal	4.05 (1.10)	4.20 (0.88)
	Illegal	3.60 (1.42)	3.70 (1.07)
Normativity	Legal	3.16 (1.01)	3.14 (1.00)
	Illegal	3.00 (1.05)	3.11 (0.88)
Disruptiveness	Legal	1.96 (0.88)	2.64 (1.07)
	Illegal	2.14 (1.08)	2.57 (0.89)
Morality	Legal	4.22 (0.94)	4.34 (0.75)
	Illegal	4.09 (1.15)	4.13 (.93)
Utilitarian Efficacy	Legal	2.64 (1.13)	2.91 (1.05)
	Illegal	2.88 (1.22)	3.28 (1.17)
Retributive Efficacy	Legal	2.53 (1.09)	2.95 (1.09)
	Illegal	2.86 (1.37)	2.98 (1.16)
Protest Tendencies	Legal	2.89 (1.33)	3.18 (1.24)
	Illegal	2.67 (1.36)	2.74 (1.16)
Support for Protest	Legal	4.31 (0.94)	4.43 (0.74)
	Illegal	4.33 (0.99)	4.28 (0.91)

General Linear Model.

The analytic strategy for this study followed similar steps as that in Study 4. The

first step involved completing a 2 (Sit-in, Occupation) X 2 (Legal, Illegal) multivariate

GLM on all appraisals of protest and protest outcomes. The multivariate results were

significant both for form of the action, $F (8, 189) = 2.89$, $p = .005$, $\eta_p^2 = .11$, and its

legality, $F (8, 189) = 2.17$, $p = .032$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$. The analysis revealed no differences in

perceptions of legitimacy, $F(1, 196) = 0.54$, $p = .464$, $\eta_p^2 = .003$, normativity, $F(1,$

$196) = 0.10$, $p = .755$, $\eta_p^2 < .001$, morality, $F(1, 196) = 0.35$, $p = .554$, $\eta_p^2 = .002$, or

retributive efficacy, $F(1, 196) = 2.60$, $p = .109$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$, as a result of the form of

protest presented to participants.

However, participants exposed to the sit-in scenario perceived the action to be

less disruptive, $F(1, 196) = 15.60$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$ (sit-in $M = 2.04$, $SD = 0.97$;

occupation $M = 2.61$, $SD = 0.99$), and less likely to result in changes in future contracts,

that is, less efficacious in utilitarian terms, $F(1, 196) = 4.33$, $p = .039$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$ (sit-in

$M = 2.74$, $SD = 1.17$; occupation $M = 3.08$, $SD = 1.11$). The manipulation had no impact

on protest tendencies $F(1, 196) = 0.95$, $p = .332$, $\eta_p^2 = .005$, or protest support $F(1,$

$196) = 0.09$, $p = .764$, $\eta_p^2 < .001$.

The between-subjects tests further revealed a significant main effect of legality

on perception of legitimacy, $F(1, 196) = 8.97$, $p = .003$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, and a marginal effect

on utilitarian efficacy, $F(1, 196) = 3.67$, $p = .057$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$. Participants in the legal

condition saw the action as more legitimate (Legal $M = 4.13$, $SD = 0.99$; Illegal $M =$

3.65, $SD = 1.24$), but less likely to lead to changes in the establishment of future

contracts (Legal $M = 2.77$, $SD = 1.09$; Illegal $M = 3.09$, $SD = 1.20$). No effects were

found on perceptions of normativity, $F(1, 196) = 0.50$, $p = .482$, $\eta_p^2 = .003$,

disruptiveness, $F(1, 196) = 0.12$, $p = .726$, $\eta_p^2 = .001$, morality, $F(1, 196) = 1.56$, $p =$

$.213$, $\eta_p^2 = .008$, or retributive efficacy, $F(1, 196) = 1.20$, $p = .275$, $\eta_p^2 = .006$.

Participants stated that they were more likely to participate in the legal protest, $F(1,$

$196) = 3.27$, $p = .072$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$ (Legal $M = 3.04$, $SD = 1.29$; Illegal $M = 2.71$, $SD =$

1.25), but illegality had no impact on the belief that other people should protest, $F(1,$

$196) = 0.26$, $p = .611$, $\eta_p^2 = .001$. No interaction effects were found either in the

multivariate test, $F(1, 196) = 1.04$, $p = .399$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$, or in the between-subjects tests

(see Table 5.3).

Results on the form of the action supported the view that a dimension of disruptiveness is more objective than one of normativity. As argued in Chapter 1, social and moral norms are subjective and likely to be affected by individual differences in ideology, which presents a problem when using a taxonomy of normativity to classify protest. Findings on the expected higher efficacy of the more disruptive action also supported established hypotheses and previous literature (Piven & Cloward, 1991), although only in utilitarian terms.

Table 5.3.

Form X Legality Interaction on Appraisals of Protest and Protest Outcomes (Study 5)

	Mean Square	*df*	*F*	*p*	η_p^2
Legitimacy	0.03	1, 196	0.03	.873	< .001
Normativity	0.21	1, 196	0.21	.645	.001
Disruptiveness	0.79	1, 196	0.82	.366	.004
Morality	0.09	1, 196	0.10	.755	.001
Utilitarian Efficacy	0.19	1, 196	0.15	.701	.001
Retributive Efficacy	1.12	1, 196	0.82	.367	.004
Protest Tendencies	0.61	1, 196	0.38	.539	.002
Protest Support	0.33	1, 196	0.41	.523	.002

Results further parallel previous findings in this project showing the effects of legality on the perception of legitimacy of protest. They also provided partial support for the view that state action aimed to deter dissent can increase perceptions of efficacy (see Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Opp & Roehl, 1990). On the other hand, the lack of

effects of form and legality on perceived retributive efficacy suggests the existence of differences between it and utilitarian efficacy, despite their strong correlation.

As expected, no effects of illegality were found on perceptions of disruptiveness, normativity, or morality, which supports theoretical considerations addressed at the start of the thesis, and the view of the law and social and moral norms as being separate. Nevertheless, as in the previous study, Illegality/Legality affected protest tendencies so an evaluation of indirect paths through mediating appraisals was merited.

Hierarchical regression models on protest appraisals

A series of hierarchical multiple regressions were carried out next to assess the predictive validity of system justification measures and their potential interactions with protest form and legality, on each appraisal. Both measures of system justification, political orientation, form of protest, and protest legality were included in Step 1. Interactions were modelled in Step 2 for the two system justification measures to explore if the hypothesised links were qualified by protest form or illegality (Table 5.4). Scale measures were mean centred and manipulation conditions were coded as 1 and -1.

Indices of collinearity remained within an acceptable range despite the overlap between predictors (general system justification, VIF =1.72, Tolerance = 0.58; economic system justification, VIF = 2.64, Tolerance = 0.38; political orientation, VIF = 1.90, Tolerance = 0.53). VIF remained below 10 in all cases, with the average not being "substantially greater than 1" (Field, 2014; p. 325). Tolerance was also above .20 for all variables.

Results confirmed the predicted negative links of economic system justification with perceived legitimacy and morality of the protest but not the hypothesised relationship between economic system justification and perceived normativity. Indeed, normativity appraisals were not predicted by any variable in the first step. A non-hypothesised marginal association was found between economic system justification

Table 5.4.

Multiple Regressions Including Interactions on Appraisals of Protest (Study 5)

Predictor	Model 1: Legitimacy		Model 2: Normativity		Model 3: Disruptiveness		Model 4: Morality		Model 5: Utilitarian Efficacy		Model 6: Retributive Efficacy	
	β	t	β	t	β	t	B	t	β	t	β	t
	$R^2 = .20^{***}$		$R^2 = .01$		$R^2 = .10^{**}$		$R^2 = .16^{***}$		$R^2 = .08^{**}$		$R^2 = .09^{**}$	
General System Justification	.14	1.61	.09	0.94	-.02	-0.25	-.01	-0.12	.19*	2.08	.19*	2.09
Economic System Justification	-.45***	-4.31	-.12	-1.04	.21†	1.88	-.36**	-3.32	.07	0.63	.18	1.65
Political Orientation	-.03	-0.33	.01	0.12	-.13	-1.33	-.04	-0.42	-.11	-1.18	-.23*	-2.38
Form	.05	0.85	.02	0.30	.28**	4.14	.04	0.62	.16*	2.25	.14*	1.99
Legality	-.17**	-2.64	-.05	-0.70	.02	0.32	-.04	-0.60	.12†	1.66	.06	0.90
	R^2 change .01		R^2 change = .02		R^2 change .02		R^2 change = .02		R^2 change = .08**		R^2 change = .03	
General System Justification X Illegality	.11	1.28	-.04	-0.44	-.06	-0.65	.11	1.33	-.16†	-1.81	-.11	-1.21
General System Justification X Form	-.09	-1.02	.17†	1.82	.006	0.07	<.001	0.001	-.009	-0.11	-.07	-0.82
Economic System Justification X Illegality	-.04	-0.43	.11	1.14	-.09	-0.97	-.04	-0.46	.08	0-87	.05	0.51
Economic System Justification X Form	.07	0.86	-.09	-0.93	.003	0.03	.13	1.46	.25**	2.82	.19	2.07

Note. N = 200

$^{\dagger}p < .10.$ $^{*}p < .05.$ $^{**}p < .01.$ $^{***}p < .001$

and appraisals of disruptiveness. No results of economic system justification predicting

measures of protest acceptability were qualified by interactions with the manipulations.

Last, as expected, general system justification did not predict any appraisal of protest

acceptability (i.e. legitimacy, normativity, disruptiveness, and morality). A marginal

interaction was found, nonetheless, between general system justification and protest

form on perceived normativity despite the lack of main effects.

Regarding the variables of efficacy, as hypothesised, general system justification

significantly predicted higher perceived efficacy both in utilitarian and retributive terms,

whereas the economic measure did not (cf., Osborne et al., 2015). The relationship

between general system justification and utilitarian efficacy was qualified by a marginal

interaction with protest legality, but its relationship with retributive efficacy was not.

Interestingly, once the variance explained by ideological variables was controlled, the

form of the protest was found to predict perceived retributive efficacy in line with the

hypothesis (which had not been supported by the GLM). Last, economic system

justification was found to interact with the protest form on utilitarian efficacy.

The moderated effect on utilitarian efficacy was calculated via PROCESS

(Hayes, 2012) for exploratory purposes. The model included the general measure of

system justification, political orientation, and protest legality as covariates. The

significant interaction effect ($B = .25$, $SE = .07$, $p < .001$) revealed that the form of the

protest affected utilitarian efficacy perceptions only among participants who scored

higher on system justification (+1SD, $B = .47$, $SE = .11$, $p < .001$), but not among those

who scored lower on system justification (-1SD, $B = -.11$, $SE = .11$, $p = .307$). That is,

relative to participants who scored low on economic system justification, those who

scored high perceived the occupation as having more utilitarian efficacy than the sit-in

(Figure 5.1)[4].

Figure 5.1. Interaction effects calculated in PROCESS between protest form and

economic system justification on perceived utilitarian efficacy (Study 5).

Hierarchical Regression Models on Protest Outcomes.

      Two additional hierarchical multiple regression models were carried out on

protest tendencies and protest support. I modelled both measures of system justification,

political orientation, and the two manipulations in Step 1, followed by the appraisals of

the protest action in Step 2. I further included the two-way interactions between protest

form, illegality, and both measures of system justification in Step 3. The three-way

interactions between form, legality, and each measure of system justification were

included in Step 4 to ensure that all relevant variance was accounted by the perceptions

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[4] If evaluated with protest form as a moderator, both the significant interaction of the economic measure and the marginal one of the general measure reveal that the positive associations between system justification measures and utilitarian efficacy only occur when the protest action is sufficiently disruptive (I refer to the occupation as more disruptive, rather than less normative, now that findings support the link between protest form and disruptiveness but not normativity).

of the action (Table 5.5). All coefficients of multicollinearity were checked at Step 4 (which included all variables) and revealed no multicollinearity according to Field's (2014) guidelines (all VIF < 4 and all Tolerance > .30).

Economic system justification negatively predicted protest tendencies. Moreover, once its variance was controlled, the negative association between general system justification and protest intentions became non-significant. Indeed, it even changed direction, possibly due to its association with perceived protest efficacy. Both measures of system justification became non-significant predictors once the appraisals of protest were included in Step 2.

Among all protest appraisals, only the perceived disruptiveness, morality, and retributive efficacy predicted protest tendencies. The more disruptive that participants rated the action to be, the less likely they thought they would be to protest. Conversely, the more moral that they perceived the action to be, and the more they believed it would result in responsible parties being made accountable, the higher their protest tendencies. No interactions were found independently of the appraisals of protest. Among the initial predictors, only political orientation remained a marginally significant predictor of the criterion after controlling for the appraisals of the action ($\beta = -.15$, $p = .060$).

Regarding protest support, only economic system justification predicted it at Step 1; the more that participants justified the economic system, the less that they thought that people should protest. Among all protest appraisals, only the perceived morality significantly predicted protest support, with participants supporting more the action the higher its rated morality. Ratings of legitimacy, normativity, and retributive efficacy marginally predicted the criterion. Once again, no interactions were revealed. Interestingly, although economic system justification stopped being significant after the appraisals of the protest action were accounted for, the general measure became a stronger predictor, yet only marginally significant ($\beta = -.13$, $p = .061$).

Table 5.5.

Hierarchical Regressions on Protest Tendencies and Protest Support (Study 5)

Predictor	Model 1: Protest Tendencies		Model 2: Protest Support	
	β	t	β	t
	$R^2 = .15^{***}$		$R^2 = .20^{***}$	
General System Justification	.11	1.24	-.07	-0.84
Economic System Justification	-.24*	-2.25	-.35***	-3.30
Political Orientation	-.21*	-2.28	-.07	-0.78
Protest Form	.08	1.20	.02	0.32
Protest Legality	-.08	-1.23	.03	0.38
	R^2 change = .24***		R^2 change = .34***	
Legitimacy	.10	1.22	.13†	1.84
Normativity	-.01	-0.22	.11†	1.94
Disruptiveness	-.14*	-2.20	-.09	-1.57
Morality	.31**	3.43	.41***	5.33
Utilitarian Efficacy	-.02	-1.71	-.009	-0.10
Retributive Efficacy	.27**	2.69	.17†	1.95
	R^2 change = .001		R^2 change = .008	
General System Justification X Illegality	-.005	-0.07	-.04	-0.66
General System Justification X Form	-.02	-0.26	-.08	-1.22
Economic System Justification X Illegality	.03	0.33	-.03	-0.44
Economic System Justification X Form	-.001	-0.008	.05	0.66
Legality X Form	-.02	-0.37	-.02	-0.33
	R^2 change = .002		R^2 change = .002	
General System Justification X Form X Legality	-.01	-0.16	-.06	-0.82
Economic System Justification X Form X Legality	.06	0.70	.04	0.60

Note. N = 200

†*p* < .10. **p* < .05. ***p* < .01. ****p* < .001

Findings provided support for most predictions, excluding the hypothesised relationship between economic system justification and protest normativity. The exploration of the potential link between protest illegality and efficacy also revealed no effects, but the evaluation of disruptiveness revealed an association with protest tendencies. The surprising lack of predictive validity of utilitarian efficacy on both outcomes probably resulted from the large overlap between both measures of efficacy.

Full Model

A full model was created in Mplus v8 (Muthén & Muthén, 2017: Figure 5.2). All hypothesised pathways were included within the model. Due to the exploratory study of perceived normativity, and results of the regression models showing that it was not associated significantly with any of the potential predictors and outcomes, the measure was not included in the model. Perceived legitimacy, on the other hand, was maintained in the model despite regression results due to prior findings within this project and the fact that its role had been actively hypothesised. Similarly, both measures of efficacy were included in the model. There is strong evidence in the literature for the relevance of efficacy in utilitarian terms and, although tentative, a-priori hypotheses were established for its association with both protest outcomes. I included the two measures of system justification, and both manipulations as predictors, appraisals as mediators, and protest tendencies and support as outcomes.

Economic system justification was modelled as a predictor of legitimacy and morality in line with the hypothesised pathways. General system justification, on the other hand, was set as a predictor of both measures of efficacy. Protest form was modelled predicting both efficacy measures and perceived disruptiveness, whereas illegality was modelled to predict perceived legitimacy. Perceived legitimacy, perceived morality, and both measures of efficacy were included as predictors of the two

outcomes. Perceived disruptiveness was only modelled as a predictor of protest

tendencies. The model was set as involving full mediations.

Appraisals of protest acceptability (i.e. morality, legitimacy, and disruptiveness)

were correlated with each other based on the general overlap between dimensions in the

literature and correlational findings within this study. Appraisals of efficacy were also

allowed to correlate. Regarding the predictors, both measures of system justification

were correlated in the model. The manipulations were set as uncorrelated to each other,

and to system justification, given that allocation to conditions was random (Figure 5.2).

The full model accounted for 32% of the variance of protest tendencies and 46%

of the variance of protest support (both $p < .001$), model fit indices, reached acceptable

standards: χ^2 (32) = 71.37, p<.001, RMSEA = .08, CFI = .94, TLI = .91, SRMR = .07.

A stronger model fit could have been reached by removing utilitarian efficacy, which

had been shown to not predict the outcome variables in prior regression models, or by

collapsing both efficacy measures.

As in previous studies, results revealed a significant deterrent path from

illegality to perceived legitimacy. The form of protest positively predicted perceptions

of disruptiveness and both forms of efficacy. Economic system justification negatively

predicted perceptions of morality and legitimacy, whereas general system justification

predicted higher scores in both measures of efficacy. Results, therefore, supported

hypotheses on the appraisal measures.

Regarding the outcome variables, perceived legitimacy negatively predicted

protest tendencies, and protest support (marginally). Perceived morality of the action

predicted both outcomes positively and strongly. The model further showed that

expected retributive efficacy significantly predicted higher protest tendencies but not

support for protest. Differences in the predictive value of retributive efficacy suggest

that it was a stronger motivator for the desire to take action oneself, rather than form a

more general support of the action. Additionally, as in previous regression analyses,

utilitarian efficacy did not predict either outcome variable. Thus, findings supported the

existence of a retributive dimension to protest, particularly in the intention to protest.

Figure 5.2. Path analysis conducted in Mplus on protest tendencies and protest support
(Study 5). Numerical values show standardised regression weights. Solid lines represent
significant paths on bootstrapping analysis on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals.
Dash lines represent non-significant relationships: p > .05.
Note. †p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

It is also worth noting that although perceived legitimacy was not a significant

predictor in the regression models, which included illegality as a predictor of the

outcomes, once relationships were modelled as full mediations, its predictive validity

increased and reached significance. This is likely to have resulted from its shared

variance with illegality. Findings in previous studies showed a link between legitimacy

and protest intentions independently of the manipulation. The fact that those results

were not replicated is probably due to perceptions of morality being included in the

model. Perceived morality was the strongest predictor of protest intentions as well as

protest support. Additionally, the construct of legitimacy has a strong overlap with

morality both in theory and empirically. Indeed, both measures were strongly correlated

in this study. Findings suggest that despite the relevance of appraisals of legitimacy for

protesting, it was the unique contribution of perceptions of morality –which were

unaffected by the legality of an action– that most strongly predicted both protest

tendencies and protest support.

Significant indirect effects were found for several variables in the model.

General system justification predicted protest tendencies via higher perceptions of

retributive efficacy ($B = .06$, $SE = .03$, $p = .044$). Economic system justification, in

contrast, significantly predicted deterred protest intentions via lower perceived

legitimacy ($B = -.07$, $SE = .04$, $p = .048$), and both outcomes via lower perceived

morality (protest tendencies, $B = -.14$, $SE = .04$, $p < .001$; protest support, $B = -.15$, $SE =$

$.04$, $p < .001$). Regarding the manipulations, no significant indirect effects were found

for protest illegality, even via perceived legitimacy despite significant paths from

illegality to legitimacy and from legitimacy to protest tendencies (protest tendencies, B

$= -.06$, $SE = .04$, $p = .105$; protest support $B = -.04$, $SE = .02$, $p = .088$).

All indirect effects for protest form were non-significant despite significant

paths from the manipulation to retributive efficacy and from it to protest tendencies.

This is not necessarily surprising given that the strongest effect for protest form was

shown on utilitarian efficacy, and it was retributive efficacy what better predicted

protest intentions. Indeed, in the initial GLM, the form of the action was not shown to

affect retributive protest –the path only became significant once system justification was

added in the regression models. The role of protest form in moderating the relationship

between economic system justification and perceived utilitarian efficacy –as well as the

general measure at a marginal level– was likely irrelevant for considerations of indirect effects as well given the lack of relationship between utilitarian efficacy and the outcome variables. Research in which retributive and utilitarian measures of efficacy are collapsed into a single score is likely to find stronger pathways from the form of the protest to protest tendencies and support. Nevertheless, for the sake of this study, which aimed to address the unique contribution of retributive efficacy, both measures had to remain separate.

Taken together, results supported most hypotheses. Economic and general measures of system justification were found to predict different appraisals of protest, with the economic measure predicting lower perceptions of morality, and legitimacy, and the general score positively predicting both measures of efficacy. Indirect effects were found for both variables (cf., Osborne et al., 2019; Osborne et al., 2015). Findings also provided evidence for the moral drive of protesting above and beyond expected efficacy, and for the existence of retributive motivations to protest.

Last, results served to better understand the lack of effects of illegality across different studies in this project. That is, although the legality of an action can reduce its perceived legitimacy, it does not appear to affect its perceived morality, which in turn appears to be the strongest predictor of protest intentions and support. Indeed, when controlling for morality, there was no significant indirect effect of illegality via legitimacy.

5.3. Study 6

Study 6 constitutes the final study within this project and aims to build on previous findings and expand on questions that remain unanswered to develop a more comprehensive model in line with the SIMCA (van Zomeren et al., 2008). As in Study 5, I considered different measures of system justification as predictors of a range of appraisals of protest. I also included measures of political and anger rumination, and of

emotions (i.e., anger, contempt, and disgust). As in Study 2, rather than presenting a

single scenario to participants, I presented them with a range of actions, including

peaceful and violent actions, as well as legal and illegal protest. Each action was rated

based on its perceived morality, legitimacy, disruptiveness, normativity, and

aggressiveness. In order to better fit the SIMCA and its extensions (Tausch et al., 2011;

van Zomeren et al., 2008), I further examined the perceived injustice of the political

scenario. Last, I included measures of group efficacy, as well as ratings of retributive

and utilitarian efficacy for each action.

The inclusion of political rumination is essential at this point in order to evaluate

its fit within the model, particularly via perceptions of efficacy, beyond its negative

relationship with system justification. The manipulation of rumination in Study 4

revealed a protest demotivating effect once the outcomes of increased anger and

reduced system justification had been controlled. I hypothesised that findings might

have resulted from a depressing effect of rumination (see Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1999;

Nolen-Hoeksema & Murrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, et al., 2008, Treynor et al.,

2003). Indeed, even anger rumination has been linked longitudinally to the Behavioral

Inhibition System and partially mediated its relationships with anxiety and depression

(Izadpanah, Schumacher & Barnow, 2017). It is therefore plausible that the measure of

political rumination will predict lower perceived group and action efficacy.

The inclusion of the anger rumination measure also allowed exploring its

potential links to feelings of contempt. The relationship between the two variables has

already been suggested within this project, particularly in relation to the cold feelings of

hostility that Caprara and colleagues (2014) conceptually link to the pervasive thinking

about injustice. The association is also suggested by previous research on rumination

linking repetitive self-directed thinking to self-contempt (Kramera & Pascual-Leonec,

2016). Contempt is fuelled by sustained anger experiences that failed to change

reprehensible behaviour in the other (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Fischer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016). It is, therefore, reasonable, that the maintained focus on angering experiences and injustices, and the reduced forgiveness (e.g., Wu et al., 2018) associated with anger rumination, will predict feelings of contempt.

Additionally, in Study 6 I extend previous research linking contempt to non-normative violent protesting (Tausch et al., 2011) by controlling for feelings of disgust. Although both contempt and disgust are discreet emotions, each with their unique qualities and functions (Fischer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016; Giner-Sorolla, Kupfer & Sabo, 2018), the overlap between both, as well as their overlap with anger, cannot be ignored. Indeed, contempt has been argued to be intrinsically linked to disgust, being conceptualised as a mixture between anger and disgust (Prinz, 2007; TenHouten, 2007). It has also been found to be indistinguishable from disgust in empirical research (Gutierrez, Giner-Sorolla & Vasiljevic, 2012).

Strong correlations between anger and disgust can be found consistently in the literature as well (Izard, Libero, Putnam & Haynes, 1993; Zelenski & Larsen, 2000), and have at points been so strong that researchers decided not to treat them as separate (Sabo & Giner-Sorolla, 2017, Study 2). Yet, the overlap between both emotions does not prevent them from contributing to moral judgements independently from each other (for a review see Giner-Sorolla et al., 2018). Methodological work has also been developed to pry apart the two emotions (Crispim, Giner-Sorolla, & Salerno, 2017, cited in Giner-Sorolla et al., 2018; Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013).

In Study 6, I used grids based on the one developed by Salerno and Peter-Hagene, (2013) to measure anger, contempt, and disgust. Tausch and colleagues (2011) found that contempt predicted violent protest while controlling for anger. However, if contempt is a mixture of anger and disgust, their findings could be interpreted as revealing the predictive validity of disgust rather than of contempt (i.e., what is left of

contempt after controlling for anger may be disgust). Using a measure that helps participants to think of the different emotions orthogonally, rather than in parallel (Crispim et al., 2017, cited in Giner-Sorolla et al., 2018; Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013), reduces the correlations between them, and should allow examining the unique contribution of each emotion.

As in Study 5, retributive and utilitarian forms of efficacy were considered as predictors within the efficacy pathway to protest. A new addition to this study involved considering feelings of group efficacy as well. Prior research has addressed the pathway of efficacy in different ways, examining group efficacy (Tausch et al., 2011), response efficacy (Becker et al., 2011), political efficacy, and identity consolidation efficacy (Saab et al., 2015). The use of different measures has resulted in diverging findings, with group efficacy being negatively associated with violent protest tendencies and support (Tausch, 2011), and response efficacy (which reflects the efficacy of the action in achieving its goal) being positively associated with support for violent action (Becker et al., 2011). Given the differences in findings and the likely association between both constructs of efficacy, it is important to consider both measures within the same study.

The inclusion of more than one measure of efficacy in a single study is not new. Saab and colleagues (2015), for instance, included both political efficacy and identity consolidation efficacy in their research (i.e., the efficacy of a protest movement in producing social change, and its efficacy in consolidating the identity of its members, increasing solidarity, and gaining outside support). The different forms of efficacy were placed at different points in the model, with identity consolidation efficacy predicting political efficacy. Similarly, group efficacy and the retributive and utilitarian forms of action efficacy were hypothesised to be of influence at different stages. More specifically, feelings of group efficacy (being more general) were conceptualised as preceding the perceptions of efficacy of the actions (which are more specific). Both

group efficacy and action efficacies were expected to be positively predicted by general system justifying beliefs in line with Study 5.

Taken together, the aims of this final study included placing political and anger rumination in the frame of the SIMCA. It also expands on previous findings linking contempt to violent protest tendencies by exploring its contribution above and beyond both disgust and anger. The study also examines differences in previous findings on efficacy as an antecedent of violent protest while controlling for a broad range of protest appraisals. Additionally, as in Study 5, measures of general and economic system justification were included in order to address the different pathways related to each measure, building on Cichocka and Colleagues' (2017), Jost and colleagues' (2017) and Osborne and colleagues (2015) work.

Study 6 Method

Design and Participants

Study 6 followed a cross-sectional, correlational design. A sample of 401 (261 female, 136 male, and 4 who did not report their gender) British participants was recruited via Prolific Academic. Participants ages ranged from 18 to 73 years old ($M = 35.41$, $SD = 12.42$). Participants received £1.75 in exchange for their participation. An additional 49 participants were removed from the study due to failing attention checks.

Materials and Procedure

Participants completed the study online via Qualtrics. They first completed demographic information and the same three-item measure of political orientation from Studies 4 and 5 ($\alpha = .94$). Participants subsequently completed the measures on general system justification (Kay & Jost, 2003: $\alpha = .86$), economic system justification (Jost & Thompson, 2000: $\alpha = .88$), political rumination (as in studies 1a, 1b, and 2: $\alpha = .95$) and anger rumination (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001: $\alpha = .95$) described in previous studies. A small change was included in the measures of rumination, which were rated in 5-point

scales instead of 4-point scales to provide a middle point. All measures were presented

randomly. Participants then read a version of the political scenario used in Study 5, with

no information about protest actions (Appendix N). The scenario, once again, asked

them to imagine themselves in a situation in which a political scandal of corruption

unfolds.

Next, participants completed a series of measures on their emotions towards the

scenario. They were based on Salerno and Peter-Hagene's (2013) measure (see Figure

5.3), which consisted of a 5X5 grid, with anger being placed along the Y axis (low

anger on the bottom and high anger on the top), and disgust on the X axis (low disgust

on the left and high disgust on the right). The instructions highlighted that the scenario

could make participants "feel high in both, low in both, or high in one and not the other"

and were asked to select a cell within the grid. In addition to the anger/disgust grid, an

additional two grids were created. One included feelings of anger on the vertical axis

and feelings of contempt on the horizontal one, whereas the other included feelings of

contempt vertically, and of disgust horizontally. Thus, two measures were obtained, via

use of grids, for anger, two for disgust, and two for contempt.

		Not at all Disgusted	Somewhat Disgusted	Disgusted	Very Disgusted	Extremely Disgusted
ANGER ↑	Extremely Angry	5-1	5-2	5-3	5-4	5-5
	Very Angry	4-1	4-2	4-3	4-4	4-5
	Angry	3-1	3-2	3-3	3-4	3-5
	Somewhat Angry	2-1	2-2	2-3	2-4	2-5
	Not at all Angry	1-1	1-2	1-3	1-4	1-5
		Not at all Disgusted	Somewhat Disgusted	Disgusted	Very Disgusted	Extremely Disgusted
		DISGUST →				

Figure 5.3. Example of emotion grid measure for anger and disgust (Study 6; from

Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013).

In order to make a composite with three measures for each emotion, a final measure was included, with the three emotions being presented in parallel. Participants responded on one to five scales with higher scores indicating stronger feelings of anger, disgust, and contempt. Participants were once again reminded that they could feel high on all, low on all, or high in some but not others. Presentation of the grids was randomised but the measure with the three emotions was always presented last. That way it was ensured that participants had already engaged in thinking about the emotions orthogonally before completing it.

Following the measures of emotions, participants were presented an open question asking them to write for one minute about their feelings towards the political situation presented to them. The content was expected to be biased due to priming resulting from the previous measures and, thus, was only used to ensure that they had paid attention to the text. Measures of perceived injustice, group efficacy, and protest tendencies were presented next. Participants finished by completing the measures of appraisals of the different protest actions.

Emotion measures. An EFA with Maximum Likelihood extraction and Promax with Kaiser Normalisation rotation was carried out on the emotion measures. I included the items from the matrices as well as the measures in which the three emotions were presented in parallel. The scree-plot revealed a clear three-factor structure. Factor 1 included all anger items ($\lambda > .90$), Factor 2 included the measures of contempt (loadings $\lambda > .80$) and Factor 3 included the measures of disgust ($\lambda > .65$). Factor correlations ranged from .43 (between anger and contempt factors) and .55 (between anger and disgust). Together, they explained 83.84% of the variance (KMO = .80).

The final set of measures –in which the three emotions were presented in parallel– was included after all grids with the expectation that participants would be primed by the prior orthogonal separation. A series of correlations were conducted to

ensure that the separation between dimensions had worked as expected. First, I

calculated the correlations between the emotions presented in each grid and compared

them to the responses obtained from the parallel measure. Anger and disgust correlated

less strongly in the grid ($r = .43, p < .001$) than when all emotions were presented

together ($r = .60, p < .001$) (test of differences between correlations, $z = -3.16, p =$

.002). The magnitude of the correlation between anger and contempt was also weaker in

the matrix ($r = .34, p < .001$) than when presented in parallel ($r = .40, p < .001$), but the

difference was not significant (test of differences, $z = -0.95, p = .343$). Last, contempt's

correlation with disgust was significantly weaker ($z = -2.53, p = .012$) in the matrix

measure ($r = .36, p < .001$) than in the parallel scale ($r = .51, p < .001$).

For the second step, I created composites for each emotion using only the grids,

as well as using the three scores. I then compared the correlations between emotions for

the grid and the three-item scores. Correlations between anger and contempt showed no

difference when using the full measure ($r = .41, p < .001$) or only the grid-based

composite ($r = .41, p < .001$), and the difference in the correlations between disgust and

contempt did not reach significance ($z = 0.70, p = .483$) when comparing the grid

composite ($r = .44, p < .001$) and the three-item measure ($r = .48, p < .001$). However,

correlations between anger and disgust were significantly different ($z = 2.05, p = .040$)

from each other (grid composite, $r = .45, p < .001$; all items, $r = 56, p < .001$).

There were significant differences in correlations between anger and disgust and

between disgust and contempt when the items in the grid were compared to the parallel

measures. Moreover, the three-score composites of anger and disgust correlated more

strongly than the matrix-based composites. Although the parallel measures were

completed after the grids –and participants were expected to think of the emotions

orthogonally– they showed an increased overlap between measures. Given the aim of

separating the emotions as much as possible, I decided to use the composite scores

which included only the grid measures despite the three factor structure found when analysing all items (anger, $\alpha = .96$; disgust, $\alpha = .92$; contempt, $\alpha = .88$).

Perceived injustice. Participants were asked to rate a series of statements about the political scenario in 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly Agree*) scales. The items included: "The corruption presented is unfair towards the people", "The scenario presents a socially unjust situation", "The allocation of contracts in the scenario is not legitimate", "The actions by the Government are justified" (reverse coded), "The actions carried out by the Government are immoral", "The political scenario is intolerable", and "The Government's actions should be illegal".

Previous research has used items addressing unfairness, legitimacy, justifiability, and immorality to create composite measures of injustice appraisals (Saab et al., 2015; Tausch et al., 2011). However, this project addresses differences between dimensions of legitimacy, morality, and normativity among others, so I carried out an EFA to evaluate whether the items indeed loaded onto a single factor. The analysis was carried out on scree-plot criteria, with Unweighted Least Squares extraction and Promax with Kaiser Normalisation rotation. It revealed a single factor including all items (KMO = .90, 49.09% of variance explained). One item, "The allocation of contracts in the scenario is not legitimate", had a factor loading of .44 and was excluded from the composite measure. The reverse coded item, "The actions by the government are justified", loaded negatively ($\lambda = -.52$). All other items had factor loadings above .70 ($\alpha = .86$).

Group Efficacy. Given that the scenario did not portray any specific group as affected by the scandal, the measure of group efficacy addressed "the British people". It included four items rated in 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly Agree*) scales: "I think that the British people can put a stop to political corruption", "I think that British people can successfully defend their rights against situations like this one", "The people in Britain are strong as a group and can have a lot of influence", and "The British people

have the power to demand accountability among politicians". The EFA, based on scree-plot evaluation, with Maximum Likelihood extraction and Promax with Kaiser Normalisation rotation, revealed a single factor explaining 71.46% of the variance (KMO = .84). All items showed good factor loadings ($\lambda > .75$; $\alpha = .91$).

Protest Tendencies. Participants read that at the end of the day they came across a series of protest actions against the political situation presented to them (Appendix N, Part 2). They were then asked to rate how likely they would be to participate in a list of 18 protest actions. The protest actions included peaceful as well as violent, and legal and illegal, acts. Only the most normative and non-disruptive actions (i.e. signing a petition, posting on social media, and distributing flyers) and actions that were obviously violent and illegal (i.e., damaging the property of people responsible for the events, using violence against police officers, and physically attacking the people responsible for the situation) were presented with no mention of their legality or violence. All actions were rated in 7-point scales, with higher scores indicating higher likelihood of engaging in the action. The protest actions were presented in a random order for each participant.

An EFA was carried out with Unweighted Least Squares extraction and Promax with Kaiser Normalisation rotation, and the number of factors extracted was decided based on scree-plot criteria. The analysis revealed two strong underlying factors followed by a third weaker factor. The three-factor solution explained 67.55% of the variance (KMO = .93). An initial factor was found including most legal actions, a second factor included all illegal protest, and the third factor included all forms of violence (Table 5.6).

Unlike in previous research (e.g., Tausch et al., 2011), in which protest actions loaded onto different factors based on their form, in this study they loaded on factors mostly based on their legality and violence. Thus, participation in legal demonstrations

Table 5.6.

Factor Loadings for Protest Intentions (Study 6)

Items	Factor 1 (λ)	Factor 2 (λ)	Factor 3 (λ)
5. Participating in a *peaceful* and *legal* sit-in in a park	*.86*	.09	-.02
4. Participating in a *peaceful* and *legal* demonstration	*.83*	.12	.01
6. Participating in a *peaceful* and *legal* occupation of squares	*.75*	.19	-.02
3. Distributing flyers with information about the scandal	*.68*	.07	.09
1. Signing a petition	*. 67*	-.17	-.03
2. Posting comments on social media	*.61*	-.16	.04
11. Disturbing events (e.g. via pickets) *even if it is illegal*	-.21	*.95*	.10
13. Participating in a blockade of a street *even if it is illegal*	-.16	*.93*	.09
7. Taking part in a *peaceful* demonstration *(even if it is illegal)*	.08	*.85*	-.07
9. Taking part in a *peaceful* occupation of squares *(even if it is illegal)*	.11	*.83*	-.03
8. Taking part in a *peaceful* sit-in in a park *(even if it is illegal)*	.16	*.82*	-.08
10. Disturbing events as long as it is *not illegal*	.31	*.56*	.002
12. Participating in a blockade of a street as long as it is *not illegal* (e.g. via pickets)	*.42*	*.47*	.03
15. Participating in a *violent* occupation of squares	.005	.004	*.90*
18. Physically attacking the people responsible for the situation	.10	-.16	*.87*
14. Participating in a *violent* demonstration	-.06	.15	*.76*
17. Using violence against police officers	-.02	.03	*.74*
16. Damaging the property of people responsible for the events	.04	.06	*.69*

and in occupations of squares loaded on Factor 1 with signing a petition or distributing flyers. Similarly, all illegal but non-violent behaviour loaded on Factor 2, and all violent protest on Factor 3. However, participation in a legal blockade cross-loaded on the first (legal) and second (illegal) factors (λ difference = .05) indicating that the factor structure reflected other dimensions beyond legality (e.g. disruptiveness, normativity). Legally disturbing events approached cross loading on Factors 1 and 2, but the factor loading difference remained above .20, loading more strongly on Factor 2 together with all illegal actions despite being legal.

Appraisals of Protest. Participants rated the same list of protest actions based on how Legitimate (1, *Extremely Illegitimate,* to 7, *Extremely Legitimate*), Normative (1, *Completely Opposite to Social Norms,* to 7, *Completely in line with Social Norms*), Moral (1, *Extremely Immoral*, to 7, *Extremely Moral*), Disruptive (1, *Not Disruptive at all*, to 7, *Extremely Disruptive*), and Aggressive (1, *Not Aggressive at all*, to 7, *Extremely Aggressive*) the actions were. Measures of perceptions of protest, and the items within each measure were presented in a random order. Participants then rated the degree to which they agreed that each action would lead to the responsible parties being made accountable, and to what degree they agreed that they would lead to changes in the contracts established with big businesses (1, *Strongly disagree*, to 9, *Strongly agree*). The two measures of efficacy were also presented randomly.

Within previous research, some authors have created composites of the dependent variable and then used the same structure to create scores for its antecedents. For instance, Becker and colleagues (2011) identified the factorial structure of collective action through EFA and then created composites of efficacy for moderate and radical action following the same structure. Nevertheless, a big component of this thesis has been to highlight the complexity of appraisals of protest. That is, that they will be judged differently in terms of their legitimacy, normativity, disruptiveness and so on

(e.g. a demonstration being normative yet disruptive). As mentioned in Chapter 1, this can result in the same action loading on different factors with varying items. To ensure that all items included in the appraisal measures were grouped on the correct composites, a range of analyses were carried out.

Responses of participants for the rated legitimacy of the protest actions were modelled in a single CFA with the same structure as suggested by the protest intentions. That is, Factor 1 included all legal actions, Factor 2 encompassed all illegal but peaceful actions with some disruptive but legal forms of protest, and Factor 3 included all violent actions. One item had been removed due to cross-loading and was therefore not included. Model indices fell below acceptable criteria with the analysis suggesting that Item 10 (legally disrupting events) cross-loaded on the pre-set Factor 2 as well as Factor 1, Item 1 (signing a petition) cross-loaded on Factors 1 and 3 (likely serving as a reverse-coded item for the violent actions), and Item 11 (disturbing events illegally) cross-loaded on the pre-set Factor 2 and on the factor underlying violent protest. The three items were excluded from the measure and the CFA was repeated, revealing acceptable to good model fit indices.

Ratings of perceived morality of the remaining actions were then analysed on the same structure. After that, the factor structure was repeated for assessments of violence, followed by normativity, disruptiveness, utilitarian efficacy, and retributive efficacy. Whenever the item for an action did not fit the factor structure due to cross-loading, or had a factor loading lower than .50, it was removed from subsequent analyses. Thus, Item 2 (posting comments on social media) was removed due to low factor loading when analysing ratings of aggressiveness ($\lambda = .40$), and Items 3 (distributing flyers; $\lambda < .50$) and 13 (participating in an illegal blockade; which cross-loaded on Factors 2 and 3) were removed when applying the factor structure to

perceived disruptiveness. The factor structure underlying the remaining 11 items remained stable for the measures of efficacy.

The final set of actions was then tested for each measure separately. The three-factor structure (legal, illegal, and violent) was applied to each appraisal (i.e. three factors underlying the perceptions of legitimacy, three underlying those of morality, and so on) and to protest tendencies. Having confirmed the stability of all model fits, a CFA was conducted with all items to ensure that there was no problematic overlap among the different dimensions (see Table 5.7). Model fit indices were good or acceptable in all analyses and all factor loadings were above .60 (see Table 5.8. for Cronbach's Alpha values).

Table 5.7.

Model Fit Indices of the Final set of Actions for Each Separate Measure, and With Measures Analysed at the Same Time (Study 6)

	χ^2 (*df*)	RMSEA	CFI	TLI	SRMR
Protest Tendencies	169.24 (41)	.09	.97	.96	.03
Legitimacy	100.59 (41)	.06	.98	.97	.03
Morality	68.41(41)	.04	.99	.99	.02
Aggressiveness	93.56 (41)	.06	.98	.97	.04
Normativity	106.66 (41)	.06	.98	.97	.03
Disruptiveness	124.69 (41)	.07	.97	.96	.03
Retributive Efficacy	195.04 (41)	.10	.97	.96	.03
Utilitarian Efficacy	229.24 (41)	.11	.96	.95	.03
All Measures	6284.045 (3464)	.05	.91	.91	.04

Table 5.8.

Cronbach's Alpha for all Protest Measures (Study 6)

		α
Protest Tendencies	Legal	.95
	Illegal	.95
	Violent	.89
Legitimacy	Legal	.92
	Illegal	.92
	Violent	.89
Morality	Legal	.90
	Illegal	.92
	Violent	.89
Violence	Legal	.85
	Illegal	.82
	Violent	.88
Normativity	Legal	.89
	Illegal	.87
	Violent	.92
Disruptiveness	Legal	.86
	Illegal	.85
	Violent	.88
Retributive Efficacy	Legal	.95
	Illegal	.93
	Violent	.97
Utilitarian Efficacy	Legal	.94
	Illegal	.93
	Violent	.96

Before continuing to the results, it is imperative to highlight that the items for seven of the eighteen actions presented to participants had to be removed from the final composites. This is unlikely to result from the items lacking validity, but rather reflects the complexity of grouping actions based on pre-set taxonomies (also see Study 2). Protest tendencies for a legal blockade cross-loaded on "legal" and "illegal" factors

likely due to being legal but highly disruptive. Similarly, participation in an illegal

blockade cross-loaded between illegal and violent factors underlying disruptiveness,

and disturbing events illegally cross-loaded on Factors 2 and 3 when assessing ratings

of legitimacy. In these cases, the label of illegality may have been enough to push the

highly disruptive actions towards the "less acceptable" Factor 3. Items 2 and 3 were

also removed for appraisals of aggressiveness and disruptiveness respectively. This is

not surprising since distributing flyers, for instance, is hardly as disruptive as

demonstrating or occupying squares (regardless of legality).

Had the factorial evaluation started with the appraisals of disruptiveness, Items 1

to 3 would have likely been separated from Items 4 to 6 to form a different factor.

Similarly, if starting with the ratings of morality or legitimacy, Items 10 to 13 might

have been separated into a separate factor from Factor 2. In the end, some items may not

have been removed at later stages due to the structure being sufficiently good and the

final set of items and composites could have differed for each case. Given that this

project studies protest engagement, intentions, and tendencies as outcomes, using the

outcome's factor structure as the starting point is hardly an incorrect approach (as in

Becker et al., 2011). However, it is necessary to highlight that the process followed and

the chosen starting point were likely to have had some impact on later results.

Study 6 Results and Discussion

Given the large number of variables included in the study, in initial analyses,

measures were divided for each pathway in the SIMCA (van Zomeren et al., 2008). The

appraisal of injustice and the measures of emotions were placed within the emotion-

based path. The measure of group efficacy, and perceptions of efficacy of the actions –

both utilitarian and retributive– were placed within the second pathway. Even though

perceived disruptiveness did not correlate with efficacy measures in Study 5, it was

affected together with them by the manipulation of protest form. Indeed, the argument

for the exploration of the effects of protest form was based on an implied link between

disruptiveness and efficacy. Perceived disruptiveness of each action was, therefore,

included in analyses of the efficacy pathway. Analyses on the appraisals of acceptability

of protest were considered within both pathways. Measures of political rumination,

anger rumination, system justification, and political orientation, as well as the protest

outcomes, were included in all analyses.

Emotion Pathway Correlations

Correlations for variables in the emotion pathway of protest revealed that

political rumination was significantly associated with all variables (Table 5.9). Higher

rumination about politics was related to higher anger rumination and the three emotion

measures. It correlated negatively with both measures of system justification, and

positively with perceived injustice and all protest tendencies. Findings fit previous

studies and the hypothesised connexion between political rumination and protest. Anger

rumination correlated with anger, but not with contempt or disgust, contradicting

considerations of its potential association with contempt. It also correlated negatively

with general system justification and positively with violent protest tendencies.

The general measure of system justification correlated significantly with all

variables except for contempt (marginal and weak negative relationship). The economic

measure correlated with all variables except for violent protest tendencies. The two

measures correlated strongly and positively with each other and with political

orientation. All other associations were negative; the more that participants justified the

economic system, the lower their perceptions of injustice, their emotions, and their

protest tendencies.

Table 5.9.

Means (SDs), Sample Size, and Intercorrelations on Emotion Pathway (Study 6)

		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.
1. Political Rumination	r	1											
2. Anger Rumination	r	.29***	1										
3. System Justification	r	-.27***	-.24***	1									
4. Economic System Justification	r	-.33***	-.03	.55***	1								
5. Political Orientation	r	-.22***	-.006	.36***	.59***	1							
6. Injustice	r	.16**	.08	-.24***	-.32***	-.20***	1						
7. Anger	r	.29***	.28***	-.23***	-.19***	-.07	.45***	1					
8. Contempt	r	.21***	.02	-.09†	-.11*	-.05	.43***	.41***	1				
9. Disgust	r	.15**	-.004	-.18***	-.21***	-.15**	.52***	.45***	.44***	1			
10. Legal Protest	r	.35***	.05	-.12*	-.32***	-.31***	.18***	.24***	.09	.19***	1		
11. Illegal Protest	r	.35***	.08	-.15**	-.30***	-.25***	.16**	.25***	.13	.14**	.78***	1	
12. Violent Protest	r	.18***	.15**	-.14**	-.06	-.04	-.06	.10*	-.007	-.06	.25***	.37***	1
Mean (*SD*)		2.40 (0.83)	2.63 (0.83)	4.16 (1.31)	4.17 (1.10)	3.37 (1.24)	6.14 (0.82)	3.64 (1.08)	3.59 (1.17)	3.92 (1.14)	3.97 (2.10)	3.00 (1.91)	1.27 (0.70)
N		401	401	401	401	401	401	377	376	373	401	401	401

Note. †$p < .10$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Perceived injustice, a key variable in the injustice/emotion path (e.g. Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2008), had strong positive links with all emotions. Moreover, the more that participants perceived the situation as unjust, the more they thought they would participate in both legal and illegal protest actions, but not violent ones. In a similar pattern, emotions of anger and disgust were significantly and positively associated with legal and illegal protest tendencies but their links with violent tendencies were weak or non-significant. Surprisingly, contempt was not related to either illegal or violent protest tendencies, contradicting expected results and findings in previous research (Tausch et al., 2011).

Efficacy pathway correlations

Correlations for the variables in the efficacy pathway can be found in Table 5.10. To avoid displaying redundant information, and to reduce the size of the table, variables included in Table 5.9 were only added to the rows of the table. Political rumination did not correlate significantly with any measure of efficacy, and anger rumination only correlated with the expected utilitarian efficacy of legal protest. Political orientation was not related to any efficacy measure either.

As predicted, and in line with Study 5, the general measure of system justification correlated positively with group efficacy as well as with the efficacy measures of legal and illegal protest. However, it was not related to violent protest efficacies. Conversely, economic system justification did not correlate with any form of efficacy. Findings replicated those of the previous study, in which economic system justification was conceptually and empirically linked to perceptions of legitimacy and morality –both appraisals being more closely connected to emotions and perceived injustice than to efficacy– whereas the general score was connected to efficacy.

Table 5.10.
Means (SDs) and Intercorrelations on Efficacy Pathway (Study 6)

		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
1. Group Efficacy	r	1									
2. Retributive Legal	r	.27***	1								
3. Retributive Illegal	r	.24***	.79***	1							
4. Retributive Violent	r	.08	-.006	.28***	1						
5. Utilitarian Legal	r	.35***	.64***	.52***	.03	1					
6. Utilitarian Illegal	r	.32***	.54***	.63***	.18**	.84***	1				
7. Utilitarian Violent	r	.15**	.05	.21***	.47***	.08	.29***	1			
8. Disruptive Legal	r	.02	< .001	.02	.003	-.09†	-.06	-.06	1		
9. Disruptive Illegal	r	.03	.05	.01	-.015	.007	-.03	-.04	.72***	1	
10. Disruptive Violent	r	.01	.04	-.004	.006	.02	-.05	-.04	.06	.20***	1
11. Legal Protest	r	.13**	.13**	.12*	.02	.17**	.15**	-.03	-.11*	-.10*	-.04
12. Illegal Protest	r	.15**	.10*	.14**	.09	.11*	.16**	.04	-.03	-.12*	-.13*
13. Violent Protest	r	.13**	.03	.05	.12*	<.001	.06	.15**	.02	.001	-.17**
14. Political Rumination	r	.03	.05	.04	-.04	-.002	.004	-.02	-.11*	-.09†	-.05
15. Anger Rumination	r	-.04	-.04	-.009	.09†	-.11*	-.09†	.09†	.03	.02	.01
16. System Justification	r	.27***	.27***	.22***	<.001	.21***	.21***	.02	.08	.07	.07
17. Economic System Justification	r	.03	.06	.04	.07	.03	.03	.08	.08	.13*	.08
18. Political Orientation	r	-.04	-.003	-.03	-.02	-.04	-.03	.07	.08	.08	.02
Mean (SD)		4.37 (1.53)	4.42 (2.18)	4.27 (2.01)	3.68 (2.71)	4.44 (2.09)	4.14 (1.97)	2.91 (2.15)	2.98 (1.42)	3.52 (1.44)	6.33 (1.03)

Note. N = 401

$^\dagger p < .10$. $^* p < .05$. $^{**} p < .01$. $^{***} p < .001$.

Also in line with expectations, results revealed that the higher the rated group efficacy, the higher the expected efficacy of legal and illegal actions. It was also positively related to the utilitarian efficacy of violent protest actions but not to its retributive rating. Group efficacy further correlated with protest tendencies across all actions. Each form of protest was also positively related to its rated retributive and utilitarian efficacies. The higher the efficacy expected from any protest action, the greater its protest tendencies.

Regarding the intercorrelations among the measures of protest efficacy, the strongest correlations for both utilitarian and retributive efficacies were found between legal and illegal actions. Additionally, the expected efficacy of violent actions did not correlate with that of legal protest –either in terms of retributive or utilitarian efficacy– but it was positively associated with the efficacy of illegal actions. Similarly, the two forms of efficacy correlated with each other strongly for each type of protest. Further associations were found between retributive efficacy of legal protest and the utilitarian efficacy of illegal protest, as well as between the retributive efficacy of illegal actions and the utilitarian efficacy of legal ones.

No relationships were found between perceived disruptiveness and any of the efficacy measures. Additionally, only the disruptiveness of the legal action was weakly related to political rumination and not to anger rumination. It also did not correlate with any measure of system justification or with political orientation, but it was associated with legal protest tendencies. The perceived disruptiveness of the illegal action only correlated with economic system justification and with the tendency to protest illegally.

The disruptiveness of violent protest correlated with neither the rumination, nor the system justification and political orientation variables but once again correlated negatively with the willingness to engage in violent protest. Relationships were found, nonetheless, among the measures of disruptiveness themselves. The perceived

disruption of legal protest was very strongly related to that of illegal protest, and the
latter corelated with the disruptiveness of violent actions. Results fit findings of the
previous study, with the perception of disruptiveness remaining unrelated to most
variables but related to protest outcomes. Results opposed any expectations of a link
between the measures of perceived disruption and those of efficacy but supported the
view of protest disruptiveness as an objective form of appraisal.

Correlations between appraisals of acceptability of protest

A final set of intercorrelations was calculated for appraisals of legitimacy,
morality, aggressiveness, normativity, and disruptiveness. Perceived disruptiveness was
included as an appraisal of protest acceptability for consistency with Study 5.
Correlations with measures of rumination, system justification, political orientation, and
protest tendencies, as well as with perceived injustice and the three emotions are
included in Table 5.11. Intercorrelations among all appraisals of protest acceptability
can be found in Table 5.12, whereas their correlations with variables in the efficacy
pathway are included in Table 5.13. Table 5.14 displays intercorrelations between
variables of efficacy, emotions, and perceived injustice. Some variables are shown only
in rows or columns to avoid redundant reporting of data.

Political rumination correlated with all appraisals of legitimacy and morality but
not with appraisals of aggressiveness or normativity (Table 5.11). The more that
participants ruminated about politics, the more legitimate and moral that they found all
protest, including explicitly violent actions. On the other hand, anger rumination was
positively associated with perceived morality of illegal protest and to the perceived
legitimacy and morality of violent protest. Moreover, the more that participants reported
ruminating angrily, the less aggressive they perceived the most extreme –and explicitly
violent– actions to be.

Both measures of system justification were negatively related to all appraisals of legitimacy and morality, and positively associated with the perceived aggressiveness of legal and illegal protest (see Table 5.11). The economic measure was also linked to ratings of normativity for legal and illegal protest. The more that participants justified the system, the less legitimate and moral they rated all protest, and the more aggressive they perceived it to be –except for explicitly violent actions. Moreover, the more just that participants rated the economic system to be, the less normative they found both legal and illegal protest. Measures of legitimacy, morality, and normativity were conceptually and empirically linked to economic system justification in Study 5 and were expected to correlate with perceptions of injustice and emotions in this study.

Ratings of legitimacy and morality were also positively associated with perceived injustice across legal and illegal protest. The higher that participants rated the injustice, the more legitimate and moral they found the legal and illegal actions. They also correlated positively with all emotions; only the perceived legitimacy of illegal protest was unrelated to disgust, being negatively related to contempt instead (see Table 5.11). Furthermore, the higher the rated injustice, anger, and contempt, the lower the perceived aggressiveness of legal and illegal protest. Neither the perceived injustice nor the emotion measures correlated significantly with ratings of disruptiveness.

Like in Study 5, the strongest relationships for protest outcomes were found between perceived morality of legal and illegal protest and the willingness to participate in said actions. Perceived morality also correlated strongly with violent protest tendencies, but perceived legitimacy was its strongest correlate. Perceptions of legitimacy for legal and illegal protest were also strongly related to the respective outcomes. The appraisal of aggressiveness of protest was most strongly related to protest tendencies for illegal and violent actions. Last, the more that participants saw an action as adhering to social norms, the more willing they were to engage in it.

Table 5.11.

Means (SDs) of Protest Appraisals, and Intercorrelations With the Emotion Pathway to Protest (Study 6)

		Legitimate			Moral			Aggressive			Normative			Disruptive	
		Legal	Illegal	Violent	Legal	Illegal	Violent	Legal	Illegal	Violent	Legal	Illegal	Violent	Legal	Illegal	Violent
Political Rumination	r	.19***	.20***	.11*	.28***	.23***	.15**	-.06	-.08	-.09†	.08	.07	.02	-.11*	-.09†	-.05
Anger Rumination	r	-.05	.10†	.19***	-.02	.12*	.19***	.05	-.02	-.12*	-.05	.05	.09†	.03	.02	.01
General System Justification	r	-.15**	-.19***	-.10*	-.16**	-.22***	-.21***	.13*	.14**	.04	-.05	-.10†	-.06	.08	.07	.06
Economic System Justification	r	-.33***	-.33***	-.10*	-.34***	-.36***	-.18***	.17**	.26***	-.01	-.22***	-.20***	.07	.08	.13*	.08
Political Orientation	r	-.24***	-.25**	-.02	-.25***	-.28***	-.05	.14**	.19***	-.006	-.17**	-.21***	.06	.08	.08	.02
Injustice	r	.35***	.19***	-.07	.41***	.23***	.02	-.13*	-.17**	.20***	.25***	.10*	-.18***	.006	-.01	.09†
Anger	r	.18***	.18**	-.02	.31***	.26***	.10†	-.13*	-.13*	-.02	.09†	.12*	-.05	-.06	-.09	.006
Contempt	r	.30***	.24***	-.05	.34***	.23***	.08	-.14**	-.16**	.03	.21***	.14**	-.03	-.07	-.11	-.01
Disgust	r	.21***	.07	-.13*	.27***	.16***	-.05	-.06	-.04	.11	.16**	.08	-.07	.005	-.05	.01
Legal Protest	r	.37***	.28***	.03	.43***	.36***	.06	-.17**	-.18***	-.002	.32***	.30***	-.04	-.11*	-.10*	-.04
Illegal Protest	r	.29***	.45***	.15**	.36***	.48***	.21***	-.11*	-.25***	-.12*	.29***	.39***	.03	-.03	-.12*	-.13*
Violent Protest	r	.05	.20***	.48***	.05	.20***	.47***	.07	-.02	-.39***	.04	.18***	.32***	.02	.001	-.17**
Mean (SD)		5.84 (1.33)	4.23 (1.76)	1.50 (1.00)	5.78 (1.28)	4.53 (1.65)	1.41 (0.85)	1.56 (0.89)	2.08 (1.10)	6.56 (0.81)	5.40 (1.34)	4.23 (1.47)	1.68 (1.07)	2.98 (1.42)	3.52 (1.44)	6.33 (1.03)

Note. $N = 401$

†$p < .10$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Table 5.12.

Intercorrelations Between Appraisals of Protest Acceptability (Study 6)

		Legitimate			Moral			Aggressive			Normative		
		Legal	Illegal	Violent	Legal	Illegal	Violent	Legal	Illegal	Violent	Legal	Illegal	Violent
Legitimate Legal Actions	r	1											
Legitimate Illegal Actions	r	.46***	1										
Legitimate Violent Actions	r	-.13**	.22***	1									
Moral Legal Actions	r	.65***	.38***	-.11*	1								
Moral Illegal Actions	r	.40***	.68***	.15**	.53***	1							
Moral Violent Actions	r	.05	.27***	.68***	.05	.27***	1						
Aggressive Legal Actions	r	-.34***	-.22***	.07	-.40***	-.28***	-.002	1					
Aggressive Illegal Actions	r	-.29***	-.42***	-.05	-.33***	-.47***	-.10*	.63***	1				
Aggressive Violent Actions	r	.13*	-.10†	-.39***	.16**	-.08	-.42***	-.05	.05	1			
Normative Legal Actions	r	.55***	.37***	-.04	.56***	.39***	.05	-.26***	-.17**	.11*	1		
Normative Illegal Actions	r	.35***	.59***	.10†	.37***	.61***	.18***	-.17**	-.36***	-.11*	.58***	1	
Normative Violent Actions	r	-.07	.11*	.41***	-.09†	.05	.27***	.06	-.01	-.36***	-.03	.21***	1
Disruptive Legal Actions	r	-.21***	-.15**	-.02	-.21***	-.13*	-.008	.40***	.29***	.05	-.16**	-.09†	-.02
Disruptive Illegal Actions	r	-.20***	-.27***	-.05	-.19***	-.29***	-.05	.29***	.44***	.12*	-.11*	-.23***	-.06
Disruptive Violent Actions	r	-.02	-.16**	-.25***	.02	-.12*	-.26***	-.05	.09†	.40***	-.02	-.16**	-.25***

Note. N = 401

†$p < .10$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$

Table 5.13.

Intercorrelations Between Appraisals of Protest Acceptability and Efficacy Measures (Study 6)

		Legitimate			Moral			Aggressive			Normative		
		Legal	Illegal	Violent	Legal	Illegal	Violent	Legal	Illegal	Violent	Legal	Illegal	Violent
Group Efficacy	r	.08	.05	.02	.03	.08	.04	-.003	-.03	-.04	.05	.07	.03
Retributive Efficacy Legal	r	.04	-.02	-.08	.02	< .001	-.10*	.03	.08	.04	.12*	.007	-.09†
Retributive Efficacy Illegal	r	.05	.10*	-.06	.01	.08	-.08	-.004	-.006	-.04	.06	.08	-.04
Retributive Efficacy Violent	r	<.001	.09†	.13*	-.09†	.02	.05	.07	.03	-.09†	-.08	.06	.13*
Utilitarian Efficacy Legal	r	.14**	.02	-.11*	.12*	.08	-.12*	-.06	.01	.02	.19***	.07	-.08
Utilitarian Efficacy Illegal	r	.13*	.13*	-.02	.11*	.15**	-.07	-.06	-.06	-.08	.18***	.16**	-.008
Utilitarian Efficacy Violent	r	-.003	.11*	.26***	-.06	-.007	.16**	-.02	-.03	-.21***	-.02	.05	.23***

Note. N = 401

†*p* < .10. *p* < .05. **p* < .01. ***p* < .001.

Results among the different appraisals mirrored findings in Study 5. Perceived legitimacy of legal protest correlated positively and strongly with ratings for the same action across morality and normativity, and negatively with ratings of aggressiveness and disruptiveness. The same pattern was shown for illegal and violent actions. Similar findings were revealed for morality; the more moral each action was rated, the more normative, and the less aggressive and disruptive that it was rated to be (see Table 5.12., for comparable trends between aggressiveness, normativity, and disruptiveness ratings). Positive relationships between ratings of legal and illegal protest were stable across appraisals. Results in the same direction were found among correlations between illegal and violent protest for legitimacy, morality, and normativity, but not for ratings of aggressiveness.

Strong relationships were also shown between different appraisals across actions. The perceived legitimacy of legal protest correlated positively with the rated morality of the illegal actions, and the legitimacy of the illegal protest with the morality of the legal one. The same pattern occurred between ratings of normativity for legal protest and ratings of legitimacy and morality for illegal actions. Similarly, the morality of legal actions correlated negatively with the aggressiveness of illegal protest –and the morality of illegal protest, with the assessed aggressiveness of the legal action. Moreover, the greater the rating of legitimacy for illegal protest, the greater the moral rating of violent protest. Results highlighted the strong relationships between the different forms of appraisal not only when rating the same actions but also across forms of protest (see Table 5.12).

Correlations for measures of efficacy showed that group efficacy was not related to any of the appraisals of acceptability of protest (Table 5.13). Acceptability appraisals for each action correlated with the respective measures of utilitarian efficacy but not with those of retributive efficacy. That is, the more that participants believed that an

action was legitimate, moral, or normative, the more they believed it would be

efficacious in utilitarian terms. Findings replicated those of Study 5, in which utilitarian

efficacy correlated with perceptions of normativity and morality of protest but

retributive efficacy did not.

Table 5.14.

Intercorrelation Between Efficacy Measures, Injustice, and Emotions (Study 6)

		Injustice	Anger	Contempt	Disgust
Group Efficacy	*r*	-.008	.03	-.05	-.03
Retributive Efficacy Legal	*r*	-.08	-.12*	-.13*	-.12*
Retributive Efficacy Illegal	*r*	-.07	-.05	-.07	-.09†
Retributive Efficacy Violent	*r*	.001	.06	-.05	-.01
Utilitarian Efficacy Legal	*r*	-.02	-.05	-.06	.03
Utilitarian Efficacy Illegal	*r*	-.02	-.004	.01	.02
Utilitarian Efficacy Violent	*r*	-.09†	-.03	-.08	-.12*

Note. $N = 401$

$^{\dagger}p < .10.$ $^{*}p < .05.$ $^{**}p < .01.$ $^{***}p < .001.$

Among the appraisals of aggressiveness, an association with utilitarian efficacy

was found for violent protest but not for legal and illegal actions. The more aggressive

that the most extreme actions were rated to be, the less they were expected to result in

changes in government contracts. The utilitarian efficacy of violent actions further

correlated negatively with disgust. When it came to retributive efficacy, the higher the

reported anger, contempt, and disgust, the lower the belief that legal action would result

in the parties responsible for the scandal being made accountable. Perceived injustice for the situation did not correlate with any of the efficacy variables (see Table 5.14).

Emotion pathway Multiple regressions

> **Preliminary analyses.** Given the large number of variables in Study 6, and to narrow down its focus, no hypotheses were made on the impact of appraisals across action forms. Thus, as in Study 5, I addressed the associations within each specific form of protest: appraisals of the legal action predicting that specific outcome and no others, appraisals of the illegal action predicting only illegal action, and the appraisals of the violent action predicting only violent protest. Nevertheless, associations across forms were found in the correlation analyses (e.g. perceived legitimacy of legal protest was related to illegal tendencies).

> Addressing perceptions of protest across different actions is not novel. Becker and colleagues (2011) revealed, in an experiment involving imagined scenarios, the interaction between perceived support for protest (high vs. low) and protest form (three actions increasingly disruptive and violent, plus a control) on identification with the broader in-group across time. Similarly, Saab and colleagues (2016) studied the interaction between expected efficacies of aggressive and peaceful action on violent protest tendencies and support.

> To ensure that potential associations were addressed at least in an exploratory manner, an initial set of regressions was conducted including all relevant variables in the emotion pathway at Step 1, and all appraisals at Step 2. Table 5.15, thus, displays the equivalent results of later regression models at the fifth step, with all appraisals included. The analytic strategy allowed addressing findings suggested by the correlations in a transparent manner and informed the researcher on what variables among the appraisals predicted the outcomes above and beyond all others. No interactions were included in order to not divert further the focus of the study.

Given the exploratory nature of the study of appraisals in Study 5, I deemed

necessary to confirm the consistency of null findings for disruptiveness and normativity

before excluding them from later models. Additionally, both variables have been

conceptualised as appraisals of protest permissibility throughout this thesis. Therefore,

they were included in the regressions for the sake of control, and the decision of

removing or keeping them in later analyses was informed by the results. Neither

measure was expected to predict the outcomes.

Table 5.15.

Hierarchical Regressions With Appraisals of Protest Acceptability Predicting the Three Protest Tendencies (Study 6)

Predictor		Model 1: Legal Protest Tendencies		Model 2: Illegal Protest Tendencies		Model 3: Violent Protest Tendencies	
		β	t	β	t	β	t
		R^2 change = .11***		R^2 change = .18***		R^2 change = .29***	
Legitimate	Legal	.15*	2.26	.01	0.19	.12†	1.90
	Illegal	-.04	-0.57	.18**	2.65	-.02	-0.25
	Violent	.10	1.56	.07	1.13	.26***	3.92
Moral	Legal	.16*	2.31	.10	1.37	.05	0.71
	Illegal	.08	1.10	.13†	1.78	.07	1.03
	Violent	-.08	-1.18	.003	0.05	.17*	2.58
Aggressive	Legal	.006	0.10	.07	1.13	.08	1.26
	Illegal	.007	0.10	-.08	-1.13	.02	0.24
	Violent	-.03	-0.52	-.07	-1.14	-.20***	-3.74
Normative	Legal	.05	0.68	.07	0.99	-.005	-0.08
	Illegal	.11	1.58	.10	1.35	.04	0.58
	Violent	-.05	-1.06	-.06	-1.16	.09†	1.78
Disruptive	Legal	-.03	-0.36	.08	1.09	.02	0.28
	Illegal	.05	0.71	.01	0.15	.06	0.80
	Violent	-.01	-0.23	-.01	-0.30	.05	0.99

Note. N = 401

$^\dagger p < .10.$ $^* p < .05.$ $^{**} p < .01.$ $^{***} p < .001.$

Results supported previous findings. Perceived legitimacy significantly predicted all action-relevant outcomes. That is, perceived legitimacy of the legal action predicted legal protest tendencies, but the legitimacy of the illegal and violent actions did not. Similarly, among all legitimacy appraisals, only that of the illegal action predicted illegal protest tendencies, and only the legitimacy of violent protest predicted the corresponding outcome.

Similarly, ratings of morality for legal and violent protest positively predicted the respective actions. The perceived morality of illegal protest only marginally predicted the outcome but remained the strongest predictor among appraisals of morality. This result may contradict findings of Study 5, where the perceived morality was the strongest predictor of protest independently of the manipulation of legality. The conflicting findings, however, may have resulted from including the perceived morality of the legal action as a predictor. In Study 5, participants only rated the action presented in their condition. Furthermore, in Study 5 no significant differences were found in ratings of morality across conditions of legality, but a significant main effect was found on the appraisals of legitimacy. Thus, a greater overlap should be expected across legal and illegal ratings specifically for morality.

Further supporting previous findings, none of the appraisals of normativity or disruptiveness predicted any of the outcome variables. The lack of significant results reinforced the view of the two dimensions as potentially useful for classifying protest while not being necessarily influential in the decision of protesting. Therefore, both appraisals were excluded from the following analyses in the emotion pathway.

Last, ratings of perceived aggressiveness for violent protest significantly predicted its tendencies above and beyond all other appraisals. Ratings of aggressiveness of the legal and illegal actions did not predict any outcome despite significant correlation results. Findings were not surprising despite the exploratory

inclusion of the variable. The legal and illegal actions were both non-violent and, thus, their ratings on a dimension of aggressiveness were likely irrelevant predictors when controlling for other appraisals. The appraisal of aggressiveness significantly deterring the most extreme actions, despite removing its shared variance with morality and legitimacy, may result from perceptions of risk or fear of punishment remaining independently of controls. These variables were not included in the current study so a significant path could have remained.

Among the other variables included in the model, only political rumination (legal, $\beta = .23$, $p < .001$; illegal $\beta = .22$, $p < .001$), political orientation (legal, $\beta = -.14$, $p = .012$), and emotion measures, significantly predicted protest tendencies independently of the appraisals. Anger predicted legal ($\beta = .14$, $p = .013$) and illegal ($\beta = .14$, $p = .014$) protest tendencies, and contempt negatively predicted legal ($\beta = -.15$, $p = .006$) protest. Marginally significant predictors included general system justification on legal protest ($\beta = .10$, $p = .082$), contempt on illegal protest ($\beta = -.09$, $p = .074$), and political rumination ($\beta = .09$, $p = .089$), economic system justification ($\beta = .12$, p $= .076$), and anger ($\beta = .11$, $p = .053$), on violent actions. The emotion of disgust did not predict any outcome.

Main analyses on protest outcomes. Three hierarchical regression models were created to evaluate the predictive validity of the different variables on each protest outcome across steps. In the first step, protest tendencies were regressed on political rumination and anger rumination, with political orientation as a control. The two measures of system justification were included in the second step (Steps 1 to 3, Table 5.16; Steps 4 & 5, Table 5.17).

The perceived injustice at the scenario was modelled in the third step, the three emotions were added on the fourth block, and appraisals of protest acceptability were included last. Perceived legitimacy, morality, and aggressiveness were modelled for the

corresponding outcomes but not the others (i.e., appraisals of legal actions in the model

addressing legal actions, appraisals of illegal actions in the second model, etc).

Perceived morality and legitimacy were expected to be related to moral emotions (like

anger and disgust) since the protest actions were presented as a response towards

injustice. However, emotions towards the scenario were rated prior to participants being

exposed to the actions available. Thus, although the emotions may have influenced the

following appraisals, the opposite was implausible within the study. Perceived

disruptiveness and normativity were not included due to consistent null findings.

Collinearity values remained within acceptable criteria in line with Field (2014: all VIF

< 2.5 and Tolerance > .45).

Analyses once again confirmed the relevance of political rumination as a

predictor of protest. The more that participants ruminated about politics, the higher their

protest tendencies across all steps and for all outcomes. Conversely, anger rumination

predicted violent tendencies positively, whereas political orientation predicted both

legal and illegal protest tendencies negatively (see Table 5.16). Results at the second

step further confirmed hypotheses and previous findings within this project. Economic

system justification significantly and negatively predicted legal and illegal protest

tendencies, whereas the general measure predicted legal protest tendencies positively.

Findings replicated those of Study 5, with general system justification predicting legal

protest tendencies positively (presumably due to its link to the efficacy route) whereas

the economic measure predicted them negatively (hypothesised to occur via associations

with perceived injustice, emotions, and appraisals of the action). Indeed, although the

general measure remained a significant predictor across the model, the economic one

lost strength as a predictor until becoming non-significant.

Table 5.16.

Hierarchical Regressions on Protest Tendencies (Study 6, Steps 1, 2 & 3)

Predictor	Model 1: Legal Protest Tendencies		Model 2: Illegal Protest Tendencies		Model 3: Violent Protest Tendencies	
	β	t	β	t	β	t
	$R^2 = .18$***		$R^2 = .15$***		$R^2 = .04$**	
Political Rumination	.31***	6.15	.31***	5.98	.14**	2.61
Anger Rumination	-.05	-0.90	-.01	-0.27	.11*	2.02
Political Orientation	-.24***	-5.05	-.18***	-3.58	-.009	-0.17
	R^2 change = .02*		R^2 change = .02*		R^2 change = .007	
Political Rumination	.29***	5.52	.28***	5.22	.14*	2.46
Anger Rumination	-.02	-0.29	.005	0.11	.09	1.57
Political Orientation	-.18**	-3.14	-.10	-1.60	<.001	-0.006
General System Justification	.12*	2.03	.06	1.01	-.10	-1.62
Economic System Justification	-.19**	-2.78	-.19**	-2.75	.05	0.64
	R^2 change = .006		R^2 change = .003		R^2 change = .01*	
Political Rumination	.28***	5.48	.28***	5.18	.14*	2.53
Anger Rumination	-.02	-0.36	.003	0.06	.09†	1.66
Political Orientation	-.18**	-3.13	-.09	-1.58	-.002	-0.03
General System Justification	.12*	2.13	.06	1.08	-.11†	-1.75
Economic System Justification	-.17*	-2.43	-.17*	-2.49	.02	0.25
Perceived Injustice	.08	1.60	.05	1.07	-.11*	-2.02

Note. $N = 401$

†$p < .10.$ *$p < .05.$ **$p < .01.$ ***$p < .001.$

Table 5.17.

Hierarchical Regressions on Protest Tendencies (Study 6, Steps 4 &5)

Predictor	Model 1: Legal Protest Tendencies		Model 2: Illegal Protest Tendencies		Model 3: Violent Protest Tendencies	
	β	t	β	t	β	t
	R^2 change = .03*		R^2 change = .02*		R^2 change = .01	
Political Rumination	.27***	5.05	.25***	4.53	.13*	2.26
Anger Rumination	-.05	-0.94	-.03	-0.55	.06	1.09
Political Orientation	-.19***	-3.31	-.11†	-1.86	-.02	-0.23
General System Justification	.14*	2.25	.08	1.30	-.11†	-1.71
Economic System Justification	-.16*	-2.39	-.17*	-2.49	.02	0.30
Perceived Injustice	.01	0.22	-.02	-0.24	-.11†	-1.67
Anger	.17**	2.88	.18**	2.94	.12†	1.87
Contempt	-.09	1.56	.001	0.02	-.003	-0.04
Disgust	.07	1.18	-.007	-0.12	-.10	-1.48
	R^2 change =.09***		R^2 change =.15***		R^2 change = .25***	
Political Rumination	.22***	4.32	.23***	4.61	.10*	2.03
Anger Rumination	-.01	-0.23	-.06	-1.22	-.03	-0.55
Political Orientation	-.16**	-2.99	-.06	-1.09	-.04	-0.77
General System Justification	.12*	2.10	.06	1.13	-.07	-1.22
Economic System Justification	-.09	-1.32	-.05	-0.76	.10	1.50
Perceived Injustice	-.07	-1.26	-.03	-0.51	-.03	-0.57
Anger	.14*	2.55	.13*	2.35	.11†	1.93
Contempt	-.15*	-2.84	-.09	-1.64	-.04	-0.80
Disgust	.08	1.43	.04	0.70	-.02	-0.44
Legitimacy	.16**	2.67	.23***	3.87	.25***	4.14
Morality	.23***	3.62	.23***	3.65	.20**	3.24
Aggressiveness	.008	0.16	-.01	-0.25	-.19***	-3.72

Note. N = 401

†$p < .10$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Since the general measure of system justification was hypothesised to have a protest promoting effect because of its relationship with system trust, null findings on illegal actions were not surprising. Similarly, given that violent protest goes directly against the system, its predictive role would be expected to disappear, if not be reversed. Surprisingly, neither the general nor the economic measure negatively predicted violent protest tendencies. This might be explained by shared variance between both variables, but it must be noted that only the general measure was negatively related to the outcome during correlational analyses. Thus, the missing association for general system justification was more likely to result from shared variance with other variables like political rumination or political orientation.

Further challenging results involved the measure of perceived injustice failing to predict legal and illegal protest tendencies, and predicting violent tendencies negatively in Block 3. Findings opposed the hypotheses, as well as prior theory and research (Jost et al., 2017; Saab et al., 2015; Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Results for the legal and illegal outcomes may be explained by the shared variance among multiple variables, particularly due to the inclusion of two measures of system justification, political rumination, and political orientation (all of which were related to perceived injustice). The negative association with violent protest revealed a potential suppression effect. The variance explained by perceived injustice after accounting for rumination, the justification of the system across two measures, and political orientation, may very well reflect a rejection of harm. That is, once the political-ideological variance was removed, the remaining association between both variables could have reflected an evaluation of the harm they cause and a rejection of violence.

Results for the different emotions (see Table 5.17) supported the hypothesised role of anger as a predictor of legal and illegal protest, even independently of other related emotions, in line with previous research (see Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Cheung

et al., 2017; Tausch et al., 2011). The exploration of the predictive role of contempt on

violent protest while controlling for disgust provided initial evidence of a potential

problematic overlap between the variables. It may be that, within previous work (see

Becker & Tausch, 2015), the variance explained by contempt after controlling for anger

was the variance that it shares with disgust.

Last, appraisals of legitimacy and morality significantly and positively predicted

all protest tendencies (Table 5.17). Results followed the same trend as those previously

reported with all appraisals. Only the changes in strength of perceived morality on the

illegal outcome resulted in changes in significance (all appraisals, $\beta = .13$, $p = .076$;

only matching appraisals, $\beta = .23$, $p < .001$). The shift fit considerations regarding the

shared variance between assessments of morality of legal and illegal actions reducing

their predictive strength in prior results. Results, hence, allowed to confirm the stability

of previous findings (Study 5) on the appraisal of morality as an important predictor of

legal and illegal protest tendencies.

Changes among predictors in the last step of the model –compared to the one

with all appraisals– resulted in small variations in strength, some of which also resulted

in changes in significance. For the sake of transparency, marginal and significant

predictors at the last step of the models were compiled in Table 5.18. No changes were

as large as those found for the appraised morality of the illegal action, and none were

deemed problematic.

Next, a series of regressions were calculated for each of the steps. Two models

were computed including ruminative measures and political orientation on each system

justification measure (Table 5.19), a hierarchical model including all variables of

rumination and system justification, plus political orientation on perceived injustice,

three models with all prior variables on the three emotions (Table 5.20), and all

variables, including emotions, predicting each appraisal of legitimacy and morality

(Tables 5.21 & 5.22). Since appraisals of aggressiveness of legal and illegal protest were non-significant predictors, and in order to enhance conciseness and clarity, models predicting them were not created. Only the appraisal of aggressiveness for the violent action was considered as an outcome (Model 13, Table 5.23).

Table 5.18.

Standardised Coefficients of Marginal and Significant Predictors at the Last Step of all Models (Study 6)

Predictor	Model 1: Legal Protest Tendencies		Model 2: Illegal Protest Tendencies		Model 3: Violent Protest Tendencies	
	First Model	Final Model	First Model	Final Model	First Model	Final Model
	β		β		β	
Political Rumination	.23***	.22***	.22***	.23***	.09†	.10*
Political Orientation	-.14*	-.16*	-	-	-	-
General System Justification	.10†	.12*	-	-	-	-
Economic System Justification	-	-	-	-	.12†	.10
Anger	.14*	.14*	.14*	.13*	.11†	.11†
Contempt	-.15*	-.15*	-.09†	-.09	-	-

Note. N = 401

$^\dagger p < .10.$ $^* p < .05.$ $^{**} p < .01.$ $^{***} p < .001.$

In line with prior research, political rumination negatively predicted both measures of system justification. Moreover, the more that participants reported ruminating about politics, the greater their feelings of anger, contempt, and disgust, and the more legitimate and moral that they rated legal and illegal actions to be. In line with Study 4, findings highlighted the importance of ruminating about politics as a predictor

of emotions beyond anger. They further suggested potential indirect paths of rumination

via appraisals of protest.

Anger rumination predicted general system justification negatively, anger

positively, and the appraisals of legitimacy and morality of violent protest positively. A

link was, therefore, suggested between anger rumination and violent protest via altered

perceptions of violent acts, despite not being linked to contempt. Higher feelings of

contempt predicted higher perceived legitimacy and morality of legal and illegal protest,

but not of violent actions. Given that contempt also did not predict violent protest

tendencies, even if a path from anger rumination to contempt had been found, it would

not have been indirectly related to measures of violent protest through it.

Table 5.19.

Multiple Regressions on System Justification Measures (Study 6)

Predictor	Model 1: General System Justification		Model 2: Economic System Justification	
	β	t	β	t
	$R^2 = .20$***		$R^2 = .40$***	
Political Rumination	-.14**	-2.85	-.22***	-5.26
Anger Rumination	-.19***	-4.09	.04	.347
Political Orientation	.33***	7.15	.54***	13.56

Note. $N = 401$

†$p < .10$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$

The angrier that participants felt towards the political scenario, the more moral

they rated the protest to be in both legal and illegal forms. Last, disgust predicted

negatively the perceived legitimacy of the illegal action, and the perceived morality of

the violent one. The emotion of anger, therefore, provided a potential link between both

forms of rumination and protest tendencies in line with findings from Study 4. On the

other hand, the unexpected findings for disgust revealed an unconsidered possible

deterring indirect path for political rumination.

Table 5.20.

Hierarchical Regressions on Perceived Injustice and Emotions (Study 6)

Predictors	Model 3: Injustice		Model 4: Anger		Model 5: Contempt		Model 6: Disgust	
	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t
	$R^2 = .06$***		$R^2 = .13$***		$R^2 = .05$**		$R^2 = .04$**	
Political Rumination	.10†	1.94	.22***	4.31	.22***	4.07	.14*	2.52
Anger Rumination	.05	0.96	.21***	4.17	-.05	-0.87	-.05	-0.85
Political Orientation	-.18***	-3.56	-.01	-0.28	< .001	-0.002	-.12*	-2.36
	R^2 change = .06***		R^2 change = .02**		R^2 change = .003		R^2 change = .02*	
Political Rumination	.03	0.64	.19**	3.47	.21***	3.65	.10†	1.81
Anger Rumination	.05	0.88	.20***	3.78	-.05	-0.92	-.06	-1.12
Political Orientation	-.01	-0.20	.08	1.40	.04	0.61	-.04	-0.56
General System Justification	-.07	-1.24	-.11†	-1.77	-.03	-0.49	-.10	-1.63
Economic System Justification	-.26***	-3.87	-.12†	-1.67	-.05	-0.72	-.10	-1.39
			R^2 change = .15***		R^2 change = .17***		R^2 change = .22***	
Political Rumination			.17***	3.52	.19***	3.72	.09†	1.73
Anger Rumination			.18***	3.76	-.07	-1.39	-.08†	-1.75
Political Orientation			.09	1.63	.04	0.76	-.03	-0.53
General System Justification			-.08	-1.39	.001	0.02	-.07	-1.20
Economic System Justification			-.008	-0.12	.06	0.91	.03	0.49
Perceived Injustice			.41***	8.80	.43***	8.82	.50***	10.67

Note. $N = 401$.

$^\dagger p < .10$. $^* p < .05$. $^{**} p < .01$. $^{***} p < .001$

Table 5.21.

Hierarchical Regressions on Appraisals of Protest Legitimacy and Morality (Study 6, Steps 1 & 2)

Predictor	Models 7-9: Perceived Legitimacy						Models 10-12: Perceived Morality					
	Legal		Illegal		Violent		Legal		Illegal		Violent	
	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t
	$R^2 = .08^{***}$		$R^2 = .09^{***}$		$R^2 = .04^{**}$		$R^2 = .12^{***}$		$R^2 = .12^{***}$		$R^2 = .05^{**}$	
Political Rumination	$.17^{**}$	3.15	$.13^*$	2.50	.06	1.03	$.27^{***}$	5.08	.15**	2.91	$.10^{\dagger}$	1.85
Anger Rumination	$-.10^{\dagger}$	-1.83	.06	1.07	.17**	3.24	$-.10^{\dagger}$	-1.97	.08	1.50	$.16^{**}$	2.93
Political Orientation	$-.20^{***}$	-3.94	$-.22^{***}$	-4.19	-.008	-0.15	$-.19^{***}$	-3.73	$-.25^{***}$	-4.90	-.03	-0.58
	R^2 change $= .04^{***}$		R^2 change $= .04^{***}$		R^2 change $= .009$		R^2 change $= .04^{**}$		R^2 change $=.04^{***}$		R^2 change $= .03^{**}$	
Political Rumination	$.11^*$	2.06	.08	1.43	.03	0.52	$.22^{***}$	4.04	$.10^{\dagger}$	1.78	.05	0.95
Anger Rumination	-.07	-1.46	.07	1.38	.18**	3.19	-.08	-1.61	$.09^{\dagger}$	1.76	$.14^*$	2.56
Political Orientation	-.06	-1.01	-.08	-1.23	.06	0.92	-.06	-1.01	$-.10^{\dagger}$	-1.73	.09	1.40
General System Justification	.04	0.68	.03	0.53	-.008	-0.13	.04	0.63	.02	0.33	$-.12^{\dagger}$	-1.91
Economic System Justification	$-.28^{***}$	-4.05	$-.28^{***}$	-3.96	-.12	-1.61	$-.26^{***}$	-3.72	$-.28^{***}$	-4.03	$-.14^*$	-2.01

Note. N = 401.

$^{\dagger}p < .10$. $^*p < .05$. $^{**}p < .01$. $^{***}p < .001$

Table 5.22.

Hierarchical Regressions on Appraisals of Protest Legitimacy and Morality (Study 6, Steps 3 & 4)

Predictor	Models 7-9: Legitimacy						Models 10-12: Morality					
	Legal		Illegal		Violent		Legal		Illegal		Violent	
	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t
	R^2 change = .07***		R^2 change = .006		R^2 change = .02*		R^2 change = .10***		R^2 change = .01*		R^2 change = .004	
Political Rumination	.10†	1.97	.08	1.38	.03	0.61	.21***	4.07	.09†	1.72	.06	0.99
Anger Rumination	-.09†	-1.75	.07	1.31	.18**	3.32	-.10*	-2.01	.09†	1.67	.14**	2.35
Political Orientation	-.06	-0.99	-.07	-1.21	.06	0.90	-.06	-1.00	-.10†	-1.71	.09	1.39
General System Justification	.06	1.04	.04	0.64	-.02	-0.28	.06	1.10	.03	0.48	-.12*	-1.98
Economic System Justification	-.21***	-3.09	-.26***	-3.69	-.15*	-2.07	-.17*	-2.56	-.25***	-3.54	-.16*	2.21
Perceived Injustice	.27***	5.41	.08	1.62	-.14*	-2.51	.33***	6.91	.12*	2.30	-.06	-1.20
	R^2 change = .03*		R^2 change = .05***		R^2 change = .01		R^2 change = .03**		R^2 change = .03**		R^2 change = .02†	
Political Rumination	.07	1.33	.03	.062	.05	0.82	.16**	3.09	.04	0.82	.04	0.69
Anger Rumination	-.08	-1.49	.06	1.15	.18**	3.18	-.11*	-2.23	.07	1.29	.13*	2.35
Political Orientation	-.07	-1.15	-.09	-1.56	.06	0.89	-.08	-1.34	-.12*	-2.08	.07	1.19
General System Justification	.06	1.01	.03	0.56	-.03	-0.46	.07	1.25	.04	0.61	-.13*	-2.09
Economic System Justification	-.22***	-3.28	-.27***	-3.79	-.15*	-2.04	-.18**	-2.73	-.25***	-3.68	-.16*	-2.25
Perceived Injustice	.21***	3.56	.04	0.57	-.07	-2.04	.23***	4.00	.02	0.34	-.06	-0.88
Anger	-.005	-0.09	.06	1.03	-.04	-0.60	.12*	2.11	.14*	2.31	.04	0.57
Contempt	.19**	3.33	.22***	3.92	.02	0.31	.16**	2.96	.14*	2.56	.12†	1.95
Disgust	-.03	-0.50	-.15*	-2.42	-.12†	-1.92	-.03	-0.47	-.05	-0.75	-.15*	-2.30

Note. $N = 401$ except for anger, 377; contempt, 376; and disgust, 373.

†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table 5.23.

Hierarchical Regressions on Appraisals of Protest Aggressiveness (Study 6)

Predictor	Model 13: Aggressiveness	
	β	t
$R^2 = .02^\dagger$		
Political Rumination	-.06	-1.07
Anger Rumination	$-.10^\dagger$	-1.89
Political Orientation	-.02	-0.38
R^2 change = .001		
Political Rumination	-.07	-1.17
Anger Rumination	$-.10^\dagger$	-1.70
Political Orientation	-.001	-0.01
General System Justification	.03	0.39
Economic System Justification	-.05	-0.68
R^2 change = .05***		
Political Rumination	-.08	-1.33
Anger Rumination	$-.11^\dagger$	-1.93
Political Orientation	.002	0.03
General System Justification	.04	0.66
Economic System Justification	.01	0.14
Perceived Injustice	.23***	4.28
R^2 change = .008		
Political Rumination	-.06	-0.94
Anger Rumination	-.09	-1.61
Political Orientation	.01	0.21
General System Justification	.04	0.62
Economic System Justification	.01	0.16
Perceived Injustice	.26***	4.00
Anger	-.08	-1.25
Contempt	-.06	-0.99
Disgust	.06	0.85

Note. $N = 401$, except for anger, 377; contempt, 376; and disgust, 373.

$\dagger p < .10$, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Further surprising results involved the null findings for both measures of system justification on the emotion variables. Like in the earlier regression on violent protest, findings may result from the inclusion of both measures of system justification. In contrast, economic system justification negatively predicted the perceived injustice in line with the established hypotheses and theoretical work by Jost and colleagues (2017). Moreover, the more that participants justified the economic system, the less legitimate and moral that they found legal and illegal protest to be. Last, economic system justification negatively predicted the appraised morality of the violent actions.

Regarding perceived injustice, it was the strongest predictor for all emotions. It also predicted positively the legitimacy and morality of legal action and the perceived morality of the illegal one. Higher perceived injustice further predicted lower perceived legitimacy and higher rated aggressiveness of violent protest. Together, results suggested multiple protest-promoting paths from perceived injustice to legal and illegal action despite null direct results. Findings on appraisals of violent protest provided potential explanations for the negative association between perceived injustice and violent protest tendencies in earlier regressions.

Efficacy Pathway Multiple Regressions

Preliminary analyses. In order to address potential cross-action predictors among efficacy measures on protest tendencies, an initial set of regressions was completed. Political rumination, anger rumination, political orientation, both measures of system justification, and group efficacy were included in Step 1. All protest efficacy scores were included in Step 2 (Table 5.24). Unlike for the emotion pathway, prior research has specifically addressed the interaction between perceptions of moderate and aggressive efficacy on violent protest tendencies (Saab et al., 2016). Hence, variables were mean-centred, and that specific interaction was included in the last step of the model. No other interactions were addressed to narrow down the scope of the analyses.

Results in the first model showed that no efficacy measures predicted legal protest tendencies. Prior correlational analyses had revealed consistent relationships between each form of efficacy and the related protest form, so the null findings likely resulted from the proverbial throwing of the baby with the bath water due to the inclusion of all measures of efficacy as predictors. Alternatively, it may be that group efficacy's explained variance made the two action-focused measures redundant. Neither group efficacy nor cross-action appraisals of retributive and utilitarian efficacy were included in Study 5.

In the second model, with illegal action as the outcome, the only significant predictor was the perceived utilitarian efficacy of that specific action. Neither the utilitarian efficacies of legal and violent protest, nor the retributive measures, predicted illegal protest tendencies. Results differed from Study 5 where only retributive efficacy predicted protest tendencies. On the other hand, they followed the same trend as those of appraisals of protest acceptability. The relevant appraisal predicted illegal protest with no appraisals predicting it across action form.

The final model, on violent action, showed the opposite trend. That is, the relevant appraisals (i.e. efficacy ratings for violent protest) did not predict protest tendencies whereas the rated utilitarian efficacy of the legal action was a significant negative predictor. Results may be seen to replicate prior findings by Saab and colleagues (2016) where the expected efficacy of peaceful action predicted lower violent tendencies through interactions. However, in the current analyses, only legal efficacy predicted violent tendencies –whereas in Saab and colleagues (2016) research it was the opposite– and no interaction was found ($\beta = -.02$, $p = .674$).

Despite the unexpected null findings for efficacy of violent action, it must be noted that the utilitarian efficacy of legal protest was far from significance when looking at its relationship with violent protest tendencies ($r < .001$). It only showed a

negative association when controlling for other variables. The opposite happened to the

utilitarian violent efficacy, which stopped predicting violent tendencies when analyses

included controls ($r = .15$, $p = .002$). Thus, potential deterring effects of the appraisal of

moderate protest efficacy on violent actions remained highly dependent on other related

variables as shown on Saab and colleagues (2016) research.

Table 5.24.

Hierarchical Regressions of all Efficacy Appraisals on Protest Tendencies (Study 6)

Predictor		Model 1: Legal Protest Tendencies		Model 2: Illegal Protest Tendencies		Model 3: Violent Protest Tendencies	
		β	t	β	t	β	t
		R^2 change = .02		R^2 change = .03[†]		R^2 change = .03[†]	
Retributive Efficacy	Legal	.06	0.62	.05	0.54	.16	1.61
	Illegal	-.05	-0.51	-.009	-0.09	-.13	-1.25
	Violent	.06	1.08	.09	1.52	.08	1.39
Utilitarian Efficacy	Legal	.07	0.66	-.12	-1.19	-.22*	-1.99
	Illegal	.07	0.71	.21*	1.99	.19[†]	1.75
	Violent	-.06	-1.09	-.04	-0.74	.07	1.13

Note. N = 401

†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001

Next, hierarchical models were computed to address the different predictors step

by step. The links between political rumination, as well as political orientation and

system justification, and all protest tendencies have already been addressed so they were

all included together in the same step. Group efficacy was included in Step 2, and

ratings for efficacy of the relevant action on Step 3. Thus, the analyses followed the

same general structure as models in Study 5 and analyses on the emotion pathway

within the current study. Results in Table 5.25 start at Step 2 to avoid redundant

reporting.

Conceptualisations of protest disruptiveness throughout this chapter have assumed a connection to efficacy, with efficacy of the action being associated to the disruption produced. Similarly, conceptualisations of violent protest as strategic (e.g. Saab et al., 2016; Tausch et al., 2011) require the action to be perceived as violent or aggressive for its violent efficacy to exist. Furthermore, there may be the expectation that the action will be effective precisely because of being violent. This line of thinking is particularly likely within scenarios where moderate action is seen as ineffective whereas aggressive action is seen as efficacious (see Saab et al., 2016). The exact same rationale can be applied to other appraisals; the action may be rated as effective because of its assessment as legitimate or morally right.

Appraisals of legitimacy, morality, and disruptiveness of the corresponding action were therefore included in the fourth step of all models. The appraisal of protest aggressiveness was further included in the model on violent protest (Table 5.26). Although conceptually considered prior to the appraisals of utilitarian and retributive efficacy, the order of inclusion of variables allowed evaluating the predictive validity of efficacy measures prior to addressing the influence of appraisals of acceptability of protest and potential changes in efficacy results.

Political rumination predicted all protest tendencies positively above and beyond all other variables, with the only standardised coefficient falling below .20 in the last step being the one on violent protest. General system justification –which significantly and positively predicted legal protest tendencies in injustice/emotion models– stopped being a significant predictor once measures of efficacy were included. Moreover, it became a negative predictor of violent protest despite null results on the emotion pathway. Results supported the conceptualisation of general system justification as being closely connected to efficacy considerations and system trust.

Table 5.25.

Hierarchical Regressions on Protest Outcomes Across Stages (Study 6, Steps 1 & 2)

Predictor	Model 1: Legal Protest Tendencies		Model 2: Illegal Protest Tendencies		Model 3: Violent Protest Tendencies	
	β	t	β	t	β	t
	R^2 total = .21***		R^2 total = .19***		R^2 total = .08***	
	R^2 change = .008*		R^2 change = .02**		R^2 change = .03**	
Political Rumination	.28***	5.61	.27***	5.26	.13*	2.36
Anger Rumination	-.02	-0.37	.001	0.02	.08	1.55
Political Orientation	-.17**	-3.08	-.08	-1.41	.02	0.29
General System Justification	.08	1.35	.003	0.05	-.17**	-2.70
Economic System Justification	-.18**	-2.72	-.18**	-2.63	.07	0.95
Group Efficacy	.10*	2.04	.14**	2.98	.17**	3.38
	R^2 change = .02*		R^2 change = .02*		R^2 change = .02*	
Political Rumination	.27***	5.51	.26***	5.17	.14**	2.52
Anger Rumination	-.009	-0.18	.004	0.08	.07	1.26
Political Orientation	-.16**	-2.94	-.07	-1.24	.02	0.28
General System Justification	.05	0.91	-.03	-0.44	-.16*	-2.54
Economic System Justification	-.17**	-2.69	-.17*	-2.59	.05	0.74
Group Efficacy	.06	1.15	.11*	2.18	.15**	2.91
Retributive Efficacy	.02	0.34	.05	0.87	.06	1.17
Utilitarian Efficacy	.12*	2.06	.10†	1.70	.10†	1.71

Note. $N = 401$

$\dagger$p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001

Table 5.26.

Hierarchical Regressions on Protest Outcomes Including Appraisals of Acceptability (Study 6, Step 3)

Predictor	Model 1: Legal Protest Tendencies		Model 2: Illegal Protest Tendencies		Model 3: Violent Protest Tendencies	
	β	*t*	β	*t*	β	*t*
	R^2 change =.08***		R^2 change = .14***		R^2 change = .24***	
Political Rumination	.21***	4.38	.23***	4.91	.10*	2.20
Anger Rumination	.01	0.31	-.04	-0.83	-.01	-0.30
Political Orientation	-.15**	-2.76	-.04	-0.70	-.009	-0.17
General System Justification	.05	0.81	-.01	-0.25	-.13*	-2.30
Economic System Justification	-.08	-1.32	-.05	-0.82	.10†	1.68
Group Efficacy	.06	1.21	.09*	2.02	.14**	3.08
Retributive Efficacy	.05	0.87	.05	0.94	.07	1.46
Utilitarian Efficacy	.06	1.11	.03	0.62	-.04	-0.83
Legitimacy	.11†	1.97	.21***	3.72	.26***	4.38
Morality	.23***	3.98	.25***	4.18	.19**	3.25
Aggressiveness	-	-	-	-	-.20***	-4.11
Disruptiveness	.007	.16	.03	0.77	.03	0.59

Note. N = 401

†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001

Economic system justification negatively predicted legal and illegal protest tendencies in line with results for the emotion pathway. However, it became non-significant once the appraisals of protest acceptability were included in the models. Results support its link to the specific scandal presented to participants –in this case an

economic scandal– as well as to the denial of an economic injustice, and a deterrent effect linked to appraisals of protest. All collinearity values remained within acceptable standards (Field, 2014; VIF < 2.5, Tolerance > .45).

Feelings of group efficacy not only predicted all outcomes when included in the model, but also remained significant on illegal and violent protest at all stages. Conversely, appraisals of efficacy of the actions were found to be weaker and less stable predictors. Perceived utilitarian efficacy predicted the legal action significantly but only marginally predicted illegal and violent protest. In all models it became non-significant once appraisals of protest acceptability were included. Ratings of retributive efficacy did not predict any outcome at any point. Null findings on protest efficacy once controlling for protest acceptability support a view of protest as a goal in itself that is linked to assessments of righteousness rather than as a means to an end.

Like on the emotion pathway, the following analyses involved regressing the mediators across steps. First, group efficacy was regressed on rumination measures and political orientation (Step 1) and on system justification measures (Step 2). Next, retributive and utilitarian efficacy measures were regressed on rumination and political orientation in Step 1, on system justification measures in Step 2 (Table 5.27), and on group efficacy in Step 3 (Table 5.28). An additional step was modelled to explore the appraisals of protest acceptability as predictors of protest efficacy measures (Table 5.29).

Political rumination did not predict any measure of efficacy in Step 1, opposing considerations of its potential protest-deterrent effect through low efficacy. It is plausible that the deterrent effect from Study 4 resulted from the state of political rumination induced by the manipulation while not appearing at a trait level. Alternatively, the manipulation of rumination in Study 4 –being based on anger rumination experimental procedures– may have produced effects linked to ruminating

about politics consistent with the general scale of anger rumination. Indeed, anger rumination negatively predicted the utilitarian efficacy of legal protest significantly and that of illegal protest marginally.

Results supported the hypothesised predictive path for general system justification on group efficacy, as well as on retributive and utilitarian measures for legal and illegal protest. The variance explained by general system justification on protest efficacy remained significant, independently of group efficacy and measures of protest acceptability (Table 5.29). Group efficacy also predicted legal and illegal appraisals of protest efficacy positively. It further predicted the utilitarian efficacy of violent protest. Like for the general measure of system justification, its predictive value remained independently of appraisals of protest acceptability.

Last, none of the appraisals of protest acceptability predicted the legal or illegal forms of efficacy. The perceived morality of the illegal action only had a marginal association with utilitarian efficacy. In contrast, the perceived legitimacy of the violent action predicted its retributive and utilitarian efficacies. Similarly, perceived aggressiveness of the violent action predicted violent utilitarian efficacy negatively. That is, the less legitimate and the more aggressive that violent protest was rated to be, the lower the perceived retributive and utilitarian efficacy.

Taken together, results supported the hypothesised link between protest efficacy and both system confidence and feelings of group efficacy, beyond appraisals of protest righteousness. Ratings of legitimacy, however, were relevant to assessments of efficacy for violent protest. Previous regressions also showed that perceived injustice predicted the appraised legitimacy of violent protest negatively. They suggested a protest-promoting pathway of injustice perceptions for non-violent protest tendencies and a protest-deterring pathway for violent action. Current results suggest that the violence-deterring path may have been further connected to considerations of efficacy, whereas

Table 5.27.

Hierarchical Regressions on Group and Protest Efficacies (Study 6, Steps 1 & 2)

Predictor	Model 1: Group Efficacy		Models 2 - 4: Retributive Efficacy						Models 5 - 7: Utilitarian Efficacy					
			Legal		Illegal		Violent		Legal		Illegal		Violent	
	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t
	$R^2 = .004$		$R^2 = .006$		$R^2 = .002$		$R^2 = .01$		$R^2 = .02$		$R^2 = .009$		$R^2 = .02$	
Political Rumination	.04	0.73	.08	1.39	.04	0.73	-.08	-1.49	.03	0.47	.03	0.49	-.04	-0.73
Anger Rumination	-.05	-0.94	-.06	-1.12	-.02	-0.40	.11*	2.18	-.12*	-2.30	-.10†	-1.82	.10†	1.95
Political Orientation	-.03	-0.63	.01	0.27	-.02	-0.36	-.03	-0.64	-.04	-0.69	-.02	-0.45	.07	1.28
	R^2 change = .11***		R^2 change = .10***		R^2 change = .07***		R^2 change = .008		R^2 change = .05***		R^2 change = .05***		R^2 change = .001	
Political Rumination	.07	1.32	.11*	2.09	.07	1.34	-.06	-1.01	.05	0.93	.05	0.96	-.03	-0.53
Anger Rumination	.03	0.61	.02	0.29	.04	0.80	.10†	1.94	-.07	-1.25	-.04	-0.76	.10†	1.84
Political Orientation	-.10†	-1.75	-.07	-1.22	-.10	-1.59	-.09	-1.48	-.10	-1.57	-.08	-1.39	.04	0.67
General System Justification	.40***	6.74	.37***	6.23	.32***	5.22	-.03	-.41	.27***	4.49	.28***	4.54	-.004	-0.6
Economic System Justification	-.11	-1.62	-.07	-0.97	-.05	-0.71	.12†	1.74	-.06	-0.79	-.05	-0.78	.05	0.64

Note. N = 401

$^\dagger p < .10.$ $^* p < .05.$ $^{**} p < .01.$ $^{***} p < .001$

Table 5.28.

Hierarchical Regressions on Protest Efficacies (Study 6, Step 3)

Predictor	Models 2 - 4: Retributive Efficacy						Models 5 - 7: Utilitarian Efficacy					
	Legal		Illegal		Violent		Legal		Illegal		Violent	
	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t
	R^2 change = .03***		R^2 change = .03**		R^2 change = .008†		R^2 change = .08***		R^2 change = .06***		R^2 change = .03**	
Political Rumination	.10†	1.88	.06	1.13	-.06	-1.14	.03	0.57	.03	0.64	-.04	-0.76
Anger Rumination	.009	0.18	.04	0.70	.10†	1.89	-.08	-1.49	-.05	-0.95	.09†	1.76
Political Orientation	-.05	-0.91	-.08	-1.31	-.08	-1.32	-.06	-1.11	-.06	-0.96	.06	0.97
General System Justification	.30***	4.83	.25***	3.92	-.06	-0.98	.15*	2.50	.17**	2.72	-.07	-1.14
Economic System Justification	-.05	-0.69	-.03	-0.44	.14†	1.89	-.02	-0.33	-.03	-0.37	.07	0.91
Group Efficacy	.18***	3.60	.17**	3.42	.10†	1.84	.30***	6.05	.27***	5.36	.18**	3.36

Note. $N = 401$

†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001

Table 5.29.

Hierarchical Regressions on Protest Efficacies (Study 6, Step 4)

Predictors	Models 8 - 10: Retributive Efficacy						Models 11 - 13: Utilitarian Efficacy					
	Legal		Illegal		Violent		Legal		Illegal		Violent	
	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t	β	t
	R^2 change = .001		R^2 change = .01		R^2 change = .02†		R^2 change = .02*		R^2 change = .03*		R^2 change = .08***	
Political Rumination	.10†	1.79	.05	0.99	-.07	-1.20	.001	0.02	.02	0.35	-.05	-1.01
Anger Rumination	.01	0.22	.03	0.50	.08	1.40	-.06	-1.17	-.07	-1.27	.04	0.82
Political Orientation	-.05	-0.88	-.07	-1.16	-.08	-1.33	-.05	-0.93	-.04	-0.69	.05	0.88
General System Justification	.30***	4.81	.25***	3.92	-.07	-1.12	.15*	2.53	.17**	2.77	-.07	-1.16
Economic System Justification	-.04	-0.57	<.001	-0.001	.14†	1.89	.02	0.22	.03	0.37	.07	1.104
Group Efficacy	.18***	3.53	.17**	3.24	.10†	1.83	.29***	5.97	.25***	5.09	.17**	3.27
Legitimacy	.04	0.58	.10	1.59	.17*	2.48	.08	1.32	.08	1.14	.25***	3.73
Morality	-.01	-0.18	.02	0.27	-.09	-1.26	.06	0.90	.12†	1.80	-.06	-0.86
Violence	-	-	-	-	-.07	-1.13	-	-	-	-	-.15**	-2.62
Disruptiveness	-.004	-0.09	.03	0.61	.04	0.75	-.07	-1.45	.01	0.22	.06	1.06

Note. $N = 401$

†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001

the protest-promoting path was unrelated. In contrast, group efficacy predicted all forms of protest in the same direction.

The significant association between legitimacy of violent protest, but not its morality, and efficacy of violent protest encourages further considerations. Study 4 revealed that ratings of legitimacy were affected by protest legality while assessments of morality were not, suggesting a view of legitimacy as more closely related to the law and system values, and morality to more individual ones. Similar considerations were addressed in earlier analyses in the current study regarding the predictive role of morality on illegal protest and the variance shared by morality ratings across actions. Considerations of legitimacy being closer to norms of the system, government, and law, would also explain why the rated legitimacy of violent protest predicted its efficacy and the morality did not.

Another point to highlight involves earlier findings revealing that when controlling for all appraisals of efficacy, the utilitarian efficacy of the legal protest predicted violent protest tendencies, whereas efficacy of violent protest was a non-significant predictor. Together, findings invite considerations of the potential role of the legitimacy of legal protest in predicting the efficacy of violent action.

Last, results on ratings of disruptiveness continued to reveal its lack of predictive power across different pathways and supported its removal from the following analyses. Nevertheless, results for disruptiveness may have been linked to the specific scenario and forms of protest presented to participants. Its predictive value within a strike setting may show very different results.

Full model

Model Construction. A single model including both emotion and efficacy pathways was created in Mplus v8 (Muthén & Muthén, 2017). The model including both utilitarian and retributive efficacy failed to reach acceptable standards of model fit,

so separate sets of analyses were completed: one with the retributive measure, another with the utilitarian efficacy score, and a final model with a composite created from both measures (Table 5.30; composite legal efficacy, $M = 4.43$, $SD = 1.93$; composite illegal efficacy $M = 4.20$, $SD = 1.80$; composite violent efficacy $M = 3.29$, $SD = 2.09$). All models followed the exact same structure, as no differences had been hypothesised for each specific form of efficacy. Fit indices were comparable across models, and the same variance for each protest action was explained across all of them (legal, $R^2 = .28$, $p < .001$; illegal, $R^2 = .28$, $p < .001$; Violent, $R^2 = .30$, $p < .001$). Further analyses reported within figures focus on the composite measure since it included both forms of efficacy. However, differences between paths for each model are addressed in-text.

Table 5.30.

Model Fit Indices for all Models (Study 6)

	χ^2 (*df*)	RMSEA	CFI	TLI	SRMR
Separate Measures	505.58 (164)	.07	.92	.85	.07
Retributive Efficacy	249.01 (116)	.05	.96	.92	.05
Utilitarian Efficacy	252.16 (116)	.05	.96	.92	.05
Composite Measure	249.18 (116)	.05	.96	.92	.05

Political rumination was set predicting both system justification measures as a starting point of the injustice/emotion and efficacy pathways and in line with hypotheses. Anger rumination was also set as their predictor, and political orientation was included as a control across all steps of the model. The economic measure of system justification was modelled to predict perceived injustice, which in turn was set to predict anger, contempt, and disgust in line with Jost and colleagues (2017) work. Political rumination was set to predict perceived injustice and all emotions. Anger rumination was also modelled to predict anger, contempt and disgust. Despite

regression findings showing the lack of a relationship between anger rumination and contempt, their association had been hypothesised. It was also linked to disgust to ensure consistency on all emotions.

The appraisals of legitimacy and morality for all outcomes, as well as the perceived aggressiveness of the most extreme actions, were regressed on perceived injustice and all emotions. They were further regressed on economic system justification, in line with Study 5. Appraisals of non-violent protest were also regressed on political rumination, whereas appraisals of violent action were regressed on anger rumination. The model, therefore, allowed addressing a pathway where protest appraisals were preceded by emotions, as well as a pathway that bypassed emotions and linked appraisals directly to prior variables in the model.

Similarly, all protest outcomes were regressed on all emotion measures (in line with Tausch et al., 2011), as well as on their matching appraisals of morality and legitimacy. The appraisal of aggressiveness was also included as a predictor for violent protest. Given that the study of rumination is the central aspect of this project, political rumination and anger rumination were set to predict non-violent and violent protest forms respectively. The model, thus, included pathways via appraisals, pathways via emotions bypassing the appraisals, and direct paths to the core rumination measures.

The general measure of system justification was modelled predicting group efficacy. Political rumination was also included predicting group efficacy following a-priori hypotheses despite previous regression results. Group efficacy and system justification were included as predictors of action efficacy, so both the pathway based on group efficacy and another related to system confidence were considered. Additionally, the efficacy of each action was regressed on its matching appraisal of legitimacy to control for the possibility of protest efficacy depending on its rated legitimacy.

As previously argued, appraisals of legitimacy of moderate action may be highly relevant to efficacy considerations of violent protest. Indeed, prior regression analyses revealed that it predicted violent protest tendencies when other appraisals were included as covariates. Hence, violent efficacy was also regressed on the perceived legitimacy of moderate protest.

Last, all protest outcomes were regressed on their respective forms of efficacy, with violent protest being also regressed on the efficacy of moderate protest. Previous exploratory work revealed the association between the expected utilitarian efficacy of moderate protest and protest tendencies for violent actions. Its inclusion in the model allowed evaluating its predictive role within a less saturated model. Together, the inclusion of legal protest efficacy on violent action tendencies, and of legal protest legitimacy on violent action efficacy, extended prior research on the field (Saab et al., 2016). Although a single model was computed, figures were split according to each outcome to enhance legibility (Figures 5.4 to 5.6). Only significant paths are included to reduce saturation of the figures.

Theoretical considerations across Chapter 1 were centred on the complexity of protest taxonomies and the large overlap between them. Moreover, conceptual focus and empirical findings in this project have consistently highlighted the association between appraisals of protest across different dimensions. Therefore, ratings of protest morality and legitimacy were correlated for each action (e.g., legitimacy of legal protest with morality of legal protest). Additionally, correlations were modelled for each specific appraisal across actions (e.g. legitimacy of legal, with illegal and violent actions). Ratings of protest efficacy were also correlated in the model (i.e., efficacy of legal action correlating with the efficacies of illegal and violent protest). No cross-action correlations between different appraisals were modelled (e.g. legitimacy of legal with morality of illegal) to ensure that the model was as parsimonious as conceptually

possible. Political and anger rumination were set to correlate with each other, and so were the two measures of system justification.

Model results. In line with core hypotheses of the project, high political rumination predicted low system justification across both measures. Moreover, political rumination predicted legal and illegal protest tendencies independently of all other predictors. Anger rumination predicted the general measure of system justification, but not the economic one or the violent protest tendencies. Political rumination also marginally predicted group efficacy, but not the perceived injustice of the scenario presented to participants.

Further supporting hypotheses, higher political rumination predicted higher ratings for all emotions. Among appraisals of protest acceptability, political rumination only predicted the perceived morality of legal protest. In contrast, anger rumination only predicted the emotion of anger but directly and positively predicted the appraisals of both legitimacy and morality of violent protest. No direct associations were found for violent protest's rated aggressiveness.

Findings, thus, indicated that most pathways for political rumination on injunctive norms happened through potential indirect effects via system justification and emotions. Alternatively, anger rumination had more direct associations with protest appraisals. Results followed the trends of the regression analyses and fit considerations of anger rumination in relation to moral disengagement (see Bandura et al., 1996, 2001). They also reinforced a view of appraisals of aggressiveness in violent protest as fairly objective and directly unrelated to ideological variables and rumination.

Replicating findings from Study 5, the economic measure of system justification negatively predicted all appraisals of legitimacy and morality (Figures 5.4, legal; 5.5, illegal; and 5.6, violent), and the perceived injustice of the scenario. Findings supported the established hypotheses, and considerations by Jost and colleagues (2017).

Conversely, the perceived injustice only positively predicted the legitimacy and morality of the legal action, but not for illegal and violent protest. As in previous regression analyses, it further predicted the ratings of aggressiveness of violent protest, which was not predicted by any other variable in the model.

Economic system justification being the only predictor of the assessed legitimacy and morality of illegal protest (with their associations to perceived injustice having disappeared) can be interpreted in terms of its role in norm injunctification (see Jost et al., 2015) and suggested its potential to overpower other relevant variables and deter protest that is opposed by the system through multiple paths.

Ratings of legitimacy and morality of legal and illegal actions significantly predicted the corresponding outcomes, replicating results of Study 5. Violent protest tendencies were predicted by the corresponding legitimacy and the rated aggressiveness of the action. Despite revealing a considerably strong association, the perceived morality only marginally predicted violent tendencies ($\beta = .20$, $SE = .11$, $p = .067$). Several indirect pathways to protest became apparent through considerations of justice but independently of emotions. They will be addressed before evaluating pathways including emotions.

Righteousness beyond emotion. Indirect associations were found between political rumination and legal protest via appraised morality ($B = .05$, $SE = .02$, $p =.029$). Furthermore, it positively predicted legal protest tendencies via system justification and perceptions of legitimacy ($B = .02$, $SE = .01$, $p =.047$) and morality ($B = .012$, $SE = .006$, $p =.049$). It also predicted illegal protest tendencies (via system justification and legitimacy, $B = .03$, $SE = .01$, $p =.015$; via system justification and morality, $B = .02$, $SE = .007$, $p =.033$).

Although the reported paths adhered to injunctive norms via appraisals of protest righteousness, they were all independent of emotions and of the perceived injustice of

the scenario presented. Findings fit hypotheses and supported the proposed view of

political protest (both legal and illegal) as a goal, rather than a tool, associated with

appraisals of the action being legitimate or moral, and independently of all other

variables. Said appraisals were in turn negatively related to system justification, and

positively linked to political rumination, thus revealing a political-ideological

component.

Further mediation chains bypassing emotions involved perceptions of injustice.

Said paths, however, were only apparent in legal protest. Appraisals of legitimacy and

morality connected perceived injustice and legal protest tendencies. With system

justification as an antecedent of injustice appraisals and political rumination predicting

it, the full indirect paths were evaluated. The pathways were significant and marginal

via ratings of legitimacy and morality respectively (via legitimacy, $B = .005$, $SE = .002$,

$p = .041$; via morality, $B = .005$, $SE = .003$, $p = .055$). Findings thus revealed paths in

which legal protest was appraised as a legitimate or moral action in connection to

perceived injustices but still independently of any emotions. As previously noted,

system justification appeared to overpower the associations of perceived injustice for

illegal protest, deterring opposition to the system through actions that it condemns

Regarding violent protest, three indirect paths were evaluated. The first one

revolved around the deterring effect of system justification on violent protest and its

support, and the resulting indirect association between violent protest and political

rumination found in previous studies (e.g. Study 2). The second extended on this and

involved the post-hoc exploration of the deterring path suggested for perceived injustice

in earlier regression analyses. Last, indirect paths for anger rumination via

legitimisation and moralisation of violence were assessed to build on prior results

connecting it to reactive but not proactive violence in protest (i.e. Studies 1 & 2) and

connect the project to prior research (Caprara et al., 2014).

Figure 5.4. Full path analysis conducted in Mplus on legal protest tendencies (Study 6). Numerical values show standardised regression weights. Solid lines represent significant paths on bootstrapping analysis on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. Dash lines represent marginally significant paths: *p* < .10. Only significant and marginal paths are displayed in the figure.

Note. Economic System Justification (ESJ), General System Justification (SJ). †*p* < .10. **p* < .05. ***p* < .01. ****p* < .001.

Figure 5.5. Full path analysis conducted in Mplus on illegal protest tendencies (Study 6). Numerical values show standardised regression weights.

Solid lines represent significant paths on bootstrapping analysis on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. Dash lines represent marginally significant

paths: $p < .10$. Only significant and marginal paths are displayed in the figure.

Note. Economic System Justification (ESJ), General System Justification (SJ). $^{†}p < .10$. $^{*}p < .05$. $^{**}p < .01$. $^{***}p < .001$.

No indirect paths where found from political rumination, or economic system justification on violent protest tendencies independently of emotions despite significant paths from economic system justification to the appraisal of legitimacy of violent protest and from this to violent protest tendencies. Similarly, although perceived injustice was connected to the assessment of aggressiveness of extreme protest, and this was subsequently associated to violent tendencies, no significant indirect path was revealed. Results for anger rumination revealed a marginal indirect association with violent protest tendencies via their appraised legitimacy ($B = .038$, $SE = .02$, p $= .055$) but not through their morality.

Findings supported initial conceptualisations of political rumination being linked to non-violent protest but not violent action. Indeed, control over an increased number of variables appears to have reduced indirect effects via system justification to non-significance (in contrast, see Studies 2 & 4). Results further built on the complex relationship between anger rumination and protest violence. Like in previous studies, direct and indirect associations with proactive violent tendencies, independently of emotions, remained marginal at best. However, its link with the moralisation and legitimisation of violent protest was supported in line with the literature (Bandura et al., 1996, 2001; Caprara et al., 2014).

Emotion-centred paths. The model allowed the exploration of four alternative paths depending on whether the antecedent of the emotion was injustice or rumination, and whether the emotion directly predicted protest tendencies or their appraisals. The first pathway involved the direct association between emotions and protest, with ruminative measures as antecedents. It was fully independent from system justification, appraisals of injustice, or the acceptability of the different actions. It could be seen as a predisposition to act independently from considerations of justice or righteousness.

Figure 5.6. Full path analysis conducted in Mplus on violent protest tendencies (Study 6). Numerical values show standardised regression weights.

Solid lines represent significant paths on bootstrapping analysis on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. Dash lines represent marginally significant

paths: $p < .10$. Only significant and marginal paths are displayed in the figure.

Note. Economic System Justification (ESJ), General System Justification (SJ). $^{†}p < .10$. $^{*}p < .05$. $^{**}p < .01$. $^{***}p < .001$.

The second path remained independent from system justification and perceived injustice but was connected to the appraisals of protest permissibility. It informed of potential indirect pathways where rumination predicted different emotions, and these linked it to protest appraisals. That is, the action would be seen as appropriate or inappropriate not because of the injustice it responded to but due to the emotions that preceded it, which are conceptually heightened and maintained by ruminative thinking (Bushman et al., 2005; McCullough, Bono et al., 2007).

In the third and fourth pathways, emotions were directly anteceded by perceptions of injustice instead of ruminative thinking. Perceived injustice is theoretically deterred by system justification, which is proposed to be negatively associated with political rumination within this project. Therefore, the role of rumination was moved further away from the different emotions. Within this approach, two alternatives existed depending on the direct outcomes of the emotions.

The third pathway, which most closely resembled van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) SIMCA model included emotions as direct predictors of protest outcomes. The fourth pathway expanded on this by including protest appraisals as potential mediators between emotion and action. Thus, the third pathway could be conceptually interpreted as moral emotions directly driving action due to an injustice, whereas the fourth one saw the moral emotions that result from the injustice as informing the appraisals of each action. Each path allowed addressing different hypotheses and research questions.

Within the current model, anger predicted legal and illegal protest in line with Tausch and colleagues' (2011) work –in which it predicted both normative and non-normative but peaceful protest. It also marginally predicted violent tendencies. Anger was close to significantly linking political rumination and legal ($B = .06$, $SE = .03$, $p = .050$), and illegal protest ($B = .05$, $SE = .026$, $p = .050$), and significantly connected anger rumination to both outcomes (legal, $B = .07$, $SE = .03$, p $= .035$; illegal, $B = .057$,

SE = .026, p = .028). Results did not reveal an indirect association between political rumination and violent action via anger, but the emotion provided a marginal link for anger rumination (*B* = .016, *SE* = .009, *p* =.069).

Neither contempt nor disgust were predicted by anger rumination so indirect effects were only possible for political rumination. In contrast with previous research, contempt only predicted legal protest tendencies, but did so in a deterring form. Like anger, it marginally linked political rumination to legal protest (*B* = -.05, *SE* = .029, *p* = .077). Although the indirect association was marginal, and farther from significance, results provided an alternative interpretation for findings in Study 4, in which the political rumination manipulation had a deterring effect on protest tendencies when controlling for system justification and anger.

The effect had been hypothesised to be linked to efficacy but might have resulted from a connection to contempt instead. Indeed, current results on contempt fit with an understanding of it in connection to lack of reconciliation intentions and the disengagement with the target of contempt (Becker & Tausch, 2015). Although it did not predict legal and peaceful action negatively in prior research (Cheung et al., 2017; Tausch et al., 2011), it is plausible that once controlling for the influence of other variables, like appraisals of protest acceptability, the remaining variance explained by contempt was connected to a lack of desire for engaging in forms of protest accepted by the system and its law.

The last emotion explored, disgust, was not directly connected to any protest outcome so it could not provide indirect associations in line with the first explored path. Results differed from those for other emotions and could be argued to support the study of contempt and not disgust when researching protest. Even if both emotions explained the same variance on violent protest tendencies, contempt still predicted protest outcomes independently of disgust whereas the opposite did not occur.

Informing the second explored pathway, in which emotions were predicted directly by rumination but appraisals were considered before the protest outcomes, results showed that anger only predicted the morality of the illegal action. Through it, high political rumination was associated with higher ratings of morality of illegal protest (B = .05, SE = .02, p =.033). Nevertheless, the indirect association became marginal when extended to the protest outcome (B = .008, SE = .005, p =.092). The indirect path from anger rumination was not significant.

In comparison, contempt positively predicted ratings of legitimacy and morality of legal and illegal protest, as well as the morality of violent protest (Figures 5.4 & 5.5). Through them, it was positively associated with legal protest (via legitimacy, B = .05, SE = .02, p =.019; via morality, B = .05, SE = .02, p =.025). Additionally, the perceived legitimacy of the illegal action, but not its morality, indirectly connected it to illegal protest tendencies (B = .08, SE = .03, p =.002). No indirect association was revealed on violent protest.

Contempt, thus, provided an alternative protest-supporting pathway for political rumination as a predictor of the legitimacy and morality of moderate protest (legitimacy, B = .06, SE = .02, p =.019; morality, B = .05, SE = .02, p =.035). However, indirect paths to legal protest tendencies remained at a marginal level (legitimacy, B = .013, SE = .007, p =.069; morality, B = .011, SE = .006, p =.086) as in the first pathway. Contempt also linked political rumination and ratings of legitimacy of illegal protest, which, in turn, connected it to illegal protest tendencies (B = .02, SE = .009, p =.029). Last, it marginally linked political rumination and the assessed morality of violent protest (B = .023, SE = .012, p =.068) without reaching the protest outcome.

Regarding disgust, it negatively predicted the legitimacy of the illegal action significantly and was indirectly associated with illegal protest tendencies through it (B = -.06, SE = .02, p =.021). The indirect path was not significant once extended to political

rumination. Disgust was also marginally associated with the morality of the violent action, but the path failed to reach protest tendencies.

The third pathway, with perceived injustice as antecedent of emotion, but independently from appraisals of protest, precluded the evaluation of anger rumination due to its non-significant relationship with economic system justification. The model showed that anger partially mediated the association between perceived injustice and legal protest ($B = .14$, $SE = .06$, $p =.021$). The indirect pathway remained significant when economic system justification was added preceding the ratings of injustice ($B = -.031$, $SE = .015$, $p =.044$), but was only marginally significant when considering political rumination as a starting point ($B = .009$, $SE = .005$, $p =.066$).

Results followed the same trend for illegal protest. An indirect pathway was revealed starting on economic system justification and connected to protest tendencies via perceived injustice and anger ($B = -.03$, $SE = .01$, $p =.043$), but once political rumination was considered as a starting point, significance fell to marginal levels ($B = .008$, $SE = .004$, $p =.063$). Regarding violent protest tendencies, both the indirect path from injustice to protest via anger ($B = .03$, $SE = .018$, $p =.060$), and the one including system justification ($B = -.008$, $SE = .004$, $p =.086$) were significant at a marginal level, whereas the path starting on political rumination was non-significant.

Like in the first pathway, given that contempt was only directly associated with legal protest, it could only be considered for that outcome. Contempt linked perceived injustice and legal protest ($B = -.12$, $SE = .057$, $p =.033$) revealing a negative pathway. The pathway fell to a marginally significant strength when economic system justification was included as a predictor of injustice ($B = .027$, $SE = .014$, $p =.052$), and remained marginal with political rumination as the starting point ($B = -.008$, $SE = .004$, $p =.072$). Once again, indirect associations via the emotion reached injustice but not

political rumination. Regarding disgust, like in the first pathway, its lack of direct relationship with all outcomes precluded addressing it in the third pathway.

With anger only predicting the appraised morality of illegal action and the latter being only marginally connected to illegal protest tendencies, the fourth pathway via anger and appraisals on illegal protest was not found. Like in the second pathway, political rumination was significantly associated with the rated morality of illegal action via anger. However, the chain of mediations also included economic system justification, and perceived injustice preceding anger ($B = .008$, $SE = .004$, $p = .043$). The full path was barely marginal for protest tendencies ($B = .001$, $SE = .001$, $p = .099$).

As noted when considering the second pathway, contempt was indirectly linked to legal protest tendencies through appraisals of morality and legitimacy, and to illegal protest via appraisals of its legitimacy. Thus, the fourth pathway revealed indirect chains on legal protest via appraisals of legitimacy, including perceived injustice and economic system justification ($B = -.007$, $SE = .003$, $p = .034$). In line with results for the second pathway, the indirect pathway became marginal once political rumination was included ($B = .002$, $SE = .001$, $p = .058$). When evaluating the path via perceived morality of the legal action, a significant association was found from perceived injustice ($B = .03$, $SE = .01$, $p = .031$). The pathway became marginal when system justification was included predicting injustice ($B = -.006$, $SE = .003$, $p = .054$) and remained marginal with political rumination as the starting point ($B = .002$, $SE = .001$, $p = .066$).

Also like in the second pathway, a long chain of indirect effects was found for illegal protest via contempt and its perceived legitimacy. The indirect association remained significant from political rumination and across system justification, perceived injustice, contempt, and the perceived legitimacy of illegal protest ($B = .003$, $SE = .001$, $p = .032$). With disgust being disconnected from appraisals of legal protest and being only marginally associated with those of violent action, no connections could

be established with said outcomes indirectly. Nevertheless, like in the second path, a similar chain to that of contempt was shown for disgust via perceived legitimacy of illegal protest. Economic system justification indirectly predicted illegal tendencies across perceived injustice, disgust, and the assessment of legitimacy ($B = .009$, $SE = .004$, $p = .043$). Given that disgust negatively predicted the perceived legitimacy of illegal protest, indirect paths through it opposed other findings in direction. That is, the perceived injustice predicted lower protest tendencies, whereas economic system justification predicted them positively. The indirect association became marginal once political rumination was included ($B = -.002$, $SE = .001$, $p = .063$).

Overall, results replicated prior findings on the indirect links between both forms of rumination and legal and illegal protest via anger, and further clarified the links of anger rumination with legitimising and moralising violence. They also successfully linked contempt to legal protest in a deterring manner, which suggested a rejection of system-permitted protest, and to illegal protest via its appraisal of legitimacy in a protest promoting form. Results highlighted the greater strength of indirect associations for ruminative measures when anger directly antecedes protest tendencies (comparing Paths 1 and 2), and when ruminative measures directly antecede the emotions (comparing Paths 1 and 3). Results on disgust's association with illegal protest through its legitimacy invite future research into studying the specific variance that each emotion explains on protest-related outcomes (Paths 2 and 4).

Findings of Path 3 fit conceptualisations of van Zomeren and colleagues (2008, 2012), and of Jost and colleagues (2017), on injustice, anger, and system justification, for both legal and illegal protest. SIMCA models were further extended through findings on contempt's positive association with legal protest tendencies (Path 3) and its indirect associations with both legal and illegal actions (Path 4: Becker & Tausch, 2015; Jost et al., 2017; Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2008, 2012). Results also

replicated previous and consistent findings within this project on the similar patterns for legal and illegal protest, but not violence, with system justification and enhanced emotions as predictors. Only considerations of contempt in relation to anger rumination and violent protest failed to meet expectations (see Figures 5.7 to 5.9, for significant, non-significant, and marginal paths with no coefficients).

Efficacy pathway. Results supported the connections between political rumination and general system justification. They further replicated findings of Study 5 showing that general system justification predicted expectations of protest efficacy for legal and illegal protest. The model further expanded on the last study by linking general system justification to group efficacy positively, supporting considerations of system justification fostering system trust and expectations of efficacy. Group efficacy predicted the expected efficacy of all protest actions positively. Evidence also provided some support for the concept of protest being perceived to be efficacious because of being legitimate, with all forms of legitimacy predicting the corresponding forms of efficacy. However, regression findings linking the legitimacy of legal protest to assessments of efficacy for violent action were not replicated.

Measures of protest efficacy predicted legal and illegal protest tendencies in line with hypotheses and previous research (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Becker & Tausch, 2015; Becker et al., 2011; Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2012). Nevertheless, protest efficacy of violent action did not predict violent protest tendencies, opposing research by Saab and colleagues (2016) but matching earlier regression models. The expected efficacy of legal action only marginally predicted the violent outcome. Results for the efficacy on violent tendencies, thus, only partially supported hypotheses and prior research.

Figure 5.7. Full path analysis on legal protest tendencies (Study 6). Solid lines represent significant paths on bootstrapping analysis on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. Dash lines represent marginally significant paths: *p* < .10. Dotted lines represent non-significant paths: p > .10. No coefficients are reported (see Figures 5.4., to 5.6 for standardised coefficients). *Note*. Economic System Justification (ESJ), General System Justification (SJ).

Figure 5.8. Full path analysis on illegal protest tendencies (Study 6). Solid lines represent significant paths on bootstrapping analysis on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. Dash lines represent marginally significant paths: $p < .10$. Dotted lines represent non-significant paths: $p > .10$. No coefficients are reported (see Figures 5.4., to 5.6 for standardised coefficients). *Note*. Economic System Justification (ESJ), General System Justification (SJ).

Figure 5.9. Full path analysis on violent protest tendencies (Study 6). Solid lines represent significant paths on bootstrapping analysis on 95% bias-

corrected confidence intervals. Dash lines represent marginally significant paths: *p* < .10. Dotted lines represent non-significant paths: p > .10. No

coefficients are reported (see Figures 5.4., to 5.6 for standardised coefficients). *Note*. Economic System Justification (ESJ), General System

Justification (SJ).

No indirect effects were found for either measure of rumination on the protest outcomes via efficacy. However, an indirect path was found for group efficacy via protest efficacy on legal protest ($B = .04$, $SE = .018$, $p = .029$). The path became marginal when extended to general system justification ($B = .02$, $SE = .01$, $p = .052$). The indirect pathway from system justification to legal protest via protest efficacy and bypassing group efficacy was also marginally significant ($B = .04$, $SE = .02$, $p = .054$).

Indirect pathways on illegal protest via protest efficacy were marginally significant both when group efficacy and when general system justification directly predicted protest efficacy (group efficacy, $B = .03$, $SE = .016$, $p = .074$; system justification, $B = .03$, $SE = .017$, $p = .058$). Neither measure was indirectly associated with violent protest. Taken together, results revealed the decreasing strength of pathways through protest efficacy as protest moved towards less permissible forms. Given the conceptualised influence of system trust on the efficacy of protest actions, results are hardly surprising.

It must further be noted that group efficacy positively predicted both illegal and violent protest tendencies in earlier regression models, even when controlling for all variables in the efficacy path, as well as appraisal of legitimacy and morality of the actions. The pathways were not included in the model because a-priori hypotheses established an expected mediated path in which group efficacy and system justification led to efficacy for each specific action and this, in turn, predicted the outcomes. Results, however, suggested that such mediated paths may be applicable only to legal forms of protest; whereas those opposed by legislation, and those that are explicitly violent, could depend more strongly on feelings of group efficacy. In such cases, indirect pathways from system justification via group efficacy are likely to be found.

Among all perceptions of legitimacy, only that of illegal protest marginally predicted the protest outcome via action efficacy ($B = .02$, $SE = .01$, $p = .069$). All other indirect paths were non-significant. Thus, after multiple analyses, it could be concluded that although some influence of protest legitimacy should be expected on appraisals of efficacy, its influence was better conceptualised through the injustice pathway than across paths.

Differences between pathways for utilitarian and retributive measures of efficacy need to be noted at this point. When using the retributive measure, general system justification was the strongest predictor of legal (group efficacy, $\beta = .19$, $SE = .05$, $p < .001$; system justification, $\beta = .26$, $SE = .05$, $p < .001$), and illegal efficacy (group efficacy, $\beta = .17$ $SE = .05$, $p = .001$; system justification, $\beta = .23$, $SE = .06$, $p < .001$). In contrast, group efficacy was the strongest predictor of legal and illegal utilitarian measures (legal, group efficacy, $\beta = .29$, $SE = .05$, $p < .001$; system justification, $\beta = .17$, $SE = .06$, $p = .004$; illegal, group efficacy, $\beta = .26$, $SE = .05$, $p < .001$, system justification, $\beta = .19$, $SE = .06$, $p = .001$). Neither group efficacy nor general system justification predicted retributive efficacy for violent protest, but group efficacy predicted the utilitarian efficacy of violent protest ($\beta = .16$, $SE = .05$, $p = .002$). Result trends suggested a greater importance of system trust for retributive considerations of efficacy, and a greater influence of feelings of group efficacy for utilitarian considerations.

Further differences involved the exploration of legitimacy as a predictor of protest efficacy. Results were significant for utilitarian efficacy of legal ($\beta = .08$, $SE = .03$, $p = .008$), illegal ($\beta = .14$, $SE = .03$, $p < .001$), and violent protest ($\beta = .20$, $SE = .06$, $p = .001$). Conversely, although the rated legitimacy of illegal ($\beta = .12$, $SE = .04$, $p = .001$) and violent protest ($\beta = .15$, $SE = .05$, $p = .004$) predicted retributive efficacy, the legitimacy of legal

protest did not predict it (β = .05, *SE* = .03, *p* = .147). Neither measure of efficacy of

violent action was predicted by the legitimacy of legal protest.

Regarding the protest outcomes, both utilitarian (β = .11, *SE* = .05, *p* = .016) and

retributive measures (β = .09, *SE* = .045, *p* = .049) predicted legal protest tendencies. The

utilitarian measure also predicted the illegal action (β = .09, *SE* = .04, *p* = .042), but the

retributive measure only marginally predicted it (β = .086, *SE* = .045, *p* = .057). Neither

form of expected efficacy of violent protest predicted the willingness to engage in it.

Nevertheless, the retributive efficacy of legal action marginally predicted violent protest (β

= .07, SE = .04, p = .057), whereas the utilitarian measure did not.

When looking at results of the composite, it becomes apparent that the strengths of

both measures were reflected on results. Like the utilitarian measure –consistently shown to

be the strongest predictor of both forms in earlier regressions– the composite predicted

illegal and violent protest tendencies. The composite also revealed a path from perceived

legitimacy of the legal action to its expected efficacy unlike the retributive measure. Last,

although marginal, the path from rated legal efficacy to violent protest tendencies was

common for the retributive and composite measures.

5.4. General Discussion

Studies in the current chapter took an important step in expanding core

considerations of the project to account for efficacy pathways and frame this research in the

context of the SIMCA. Study 5 served to establish the relevance of retributive motivations

associated to protest efficacy and participation. Study 6 showed, in contrast, that utilitarian

efficacy was a stronger predictor of protest across regression analyses but also suggested

the relevance of including a retributive dimension to composites of protest efficacy in the

later model. Both studies also provided evidence for the hypothesised association between

the general measure of system justification and considerations of efficacy in line with

Cichocka et al. (2017), with Study 6 further confirming the association between political

rumination and general system justification.

The core hypothesis of political rumination acting as a deterrent of protest efficacy

independently from system justification, as established in Study 4, was not confirmed in the

present chapter. It is possible that the protest-deterring path resulted from the state of

rumination while not being present for rumination as a trait. Given that anger rumination

did predict utilitarian efficacy measures negatively, it is also possible that the task in Study

4 elicited responses from participants that were better reflected by the anger rumination

scale despite the specific focus of the task on thinking about politics.

In the exploration of the potential view of protest being rated as efficacious as a

result of being righteous, Study 6 served to clarify the importance of appraisals of

legitimacy, specifically, as predictors of protest efficacy. Findings also fit analyses of Study

5 revealing that protest illegality affected appraisals of legitimacy but not of morality,

highlighting a link between legitimacy and law in line with the literature (see Kelman &

Hamilton, 1989; Passini & Morselli, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2015). The association

between system confidence and protest efficacy, together with that of legitimacy and law

explains results of the exploration. However, results showed that appraisals of legitimacy

were not indirectly associated with protest tendencies via efficacy considerations. Given the

consistent direct associations between legitimacy and protest tendencies across studies and

analyses, findings suggested a better conceptualisation of the measures as related but

separate in line with prior research on the SIMCA (e.g. Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et

al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2008).

Indeed, results of both studies in this chapter supported the use of legitimacy across this project as a relevant appraisal of protest connected to its legality. Not only did ratings of legitimacy significantly predict protest tendencies in Studies 5 and 6, but they were also affected by the manipulation of legality in Study 5, while ratings of morality were not. Moreover, appraised legitimacy was a better predictor of illegal and violent protest in Study 6 than morality. Although Study 5 suggested the greater relevance of ratings of morality and Study 6 that of legitimacy as predictors of protest outcomes, results consistently supported hypotheses on the importance of both variables.

Both studies also showed that neither appraisals of normativity nor disruptiveness were relevant predictors of protest intentions independently of other forms of protest acceptability. Findings may have been affected by the specific scenario presented to participants and could be different in other settings but suggest that, outside of specific forms of protest (e.g. strikes), considerations of disruptiveness and normativity can be problematic despite their usefulness for classifying protest. Indeed, results and factor analyses have shown repeatedly the large overlap of protest dimensions, as well as the differences between them, in support of core hypotheses and theoretical considerations developed throughout the thesis.

Findings also connected appraisals of protest acceptability to the injustice-emotion pathway of the SIMCA. Economic system justification was connected to protest acceptability in Study 5, and was further set within the path of injustice in Study 6, in line with hypotheses. Also supporting all prior studies, it was negatively associated with political rumination. Results on emotions and protest appraisals, on protest intentions, both when bypassing each other, as well as when connected, served to further frame the project within the SIMCA. They also supported the view of a moral imperative motivation of

protest in which tendencies result from the judgement of protest as righteous independently

of emotions and efficacy. It is worth noting that within said pathways, the rated morality

consistently connected protest outcomes with its antecedents for both legal and illegal

protest tendencies. Results on injustice and emotion, like those on efficacy, further served

to elaborate on theoretical models addressed by Jost and colleagues (2017) and expand on

the multiple ways in which system justification can deter, but at times also promote,

protest.

Findings did contradict the established hypotheses and prior research (see Becker &

Tausch, 2015) on the direct link between contempt and violent protest but revealed protest-

promoting indirect effects on legal and illegal protest, as well as protest-deterring direct

paths on legal protest. Findings can be interpreted in line with the lack of reconciliation

intentions associated with contempt as stated by Becker and Tausch (2015). Similarly, no

support was found for the predicted link between anger rumination and contempt –although

political rumination did significantly predict all emotions. Nevertheless, Study 6 served to

confirm the hypothesised role of anger rumination on moralising and legitimising violent

protest (also see Bandura et al., 1996, 2001; Caprara et al., 2014).

Given the hostility and cold hatred that Caprara and colleagues (2014) highlight as a

part of ruminative thinking, the findings also provided a further potential interpretation for

deterring effects of rumination found in Study 4. That is, just as contempt was shown to

directly predict lower legal protest tendencies, it is plausible that strong feelings akin to

contempt or to hatred resulted from the rumination manipulation in Study 4, deterring

protest tendencies.

Last, unexpected findings on violent protest further invite future research. The

perceived violence of extreme protest negatively predicted the willingness to engage in it

beyond assessments of morality and legitimacy. Results may be explained by shared

variance with perceptions of risk but suggested the usefulness of future research. Moreover,

the perceived injustice resulting from the scenario positively predicted ratings of

aggressiveness further highlighting the importance of future research on such ratings and

their potential connections to the evaluation and rejection of harm. Similarly, results on the

deterring path for disgust on illegal protest, invite the exploration of a variety of emotions

in relation to protest when controlling for their shared variance.

Chapter 6: Thesis Discussion

6.1. Return to Chapter 1

Within Chapter 1, focus was placed on evaluating theoretical approaches to the study of protest. I highlighted problems in the overlap of dimensions of normativity, disruptiveness, violence, and legality in dominant research and across available taxonomies of protest (see Becker & Tausch, 2015; Hayes & McAllister, 2005; Jost el al., 2012; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009; Sabucedo & Arce, 1991; Shuman et al., 2016; Wright et al., 1990). I argued for the importance of assessing participants' actual perceptions of protest across different dimensions to disentangle the effects of legality, normativity, and violence among other variables. I also noted the need to research the effects of protest illegality independently from its assumed adherence to social norms.

Studies throughout the thesis have addressed my theoretical considerations through carefully designed methodologies; each study building on prior findings and addressing their limitations. Thus, in Study 1a, participants rated their willingness to participate in a hypothetical non-violent protest that was presented as illegal or with no mention of its legality. They also rated the legitimacy of the action. Study 3 developed the manipulation to address a protest presented as real. It also included a second, more ecologically valid, measure of protest intentions by asking participants to provide their email addresses if they were interested in joining the protest. Study 4 explicitly labelled protest as legal or illegal instead of only addressing its legality in the illegal condition. Moreover, participants themselves chose a political issue with which they disagreed, and the protest actions were directed at it instead of the researcher imposing a topic to protest.

In Study 5, participants were provided information on protest actions labelled as legal or illegal across an additional manipulation of protest form (sit-in vs. occupation).

Protest tendencies and support measures followed an imagined scenario involving a

political scandal in which the government favoured powerful businesses in contracts and

over-paid them over the years. The study further built on previous ones by including a

range of appraisals of protest beyond its legitimacy. Participants rated the protest presented

in terms of its legitimacy, morality, normativity, disruptiveness, and utilitarian and

retributive forms of efficacy.

Protest illegality was also addressed when presenting participants with a range of

actions (see Cichocka et al., 2017; Jost et al., 2012; Tausch et al., 2011). In Study 2,

participants rated their willingness to participate in different protest actions including

demonstrations, explicitly stated as legal and illegal, and non-disruptive and violent protest.

Likewise, Study 6 included a list of 18 protest actions following the same imagined

scenario used for Study 5. In line with Study 2, actions included legal and illegal protest as

well as violent actions and normative non-disruptive ones. Participants provided ratings on

the same protest appraisals included in Study 5, plus perceived aggressiveness.

6.1.1. Problematising Taxonomies and Researching Protest Illegality in its own right

Findings throughout the project have consistently supported the problematisation of

confounding legality and normativity, normativity and violence, or any other dimensions of

protest. Study 1 revealed the lack of direct effect of protest illegality on protest intentions.

Instead, it affected the perceived legitimacy of the action, which indirectly associated

protest illegality with non-violent protest intentions. That is, illegal protest was seen as less

legitimate, and low scores of legitimacy predicted lower protest tendencies. Null direct

effects on protest intentions were replicated in Study 3 with more ecologically valid

measures.

Exploratory factor analyses in Study 2 revealed that, when addressing multiple

forms of protest, legal and illegal tendencies to demonstrate loaded on the same factor with

other disruptive forms of protest –including normative and frequently legal actions, like

joining a picket, as well as less normative actions that are more likely to be illegal, such as

blockading streets. The legal demonstration cross-loaded on the non-disruptive factor

together with actions like posting comments on social media. Results suggested the

associations between the item and appraisals of normativity and/or legitimacy, linked to its

legal status, as well as of disruptiveness, likely connected to its form.

Study 4 further built on findings by revealing a main effect of legality on protest

tendencies, with participants being more willing to participate in the explicitly labelled

legal action. The effect was replicated in Study 5, which showed that protest legality

affected appraisals of its legitimacy (replicating earlier studies) and protest tendencies, but

did not affect perceptions of normativity, morality, or disruptiveness. The lack of effect on

normativity provides strong support for the critique of dominant assumptions in the

literature that confound law and social norms (see Becker & Tausch, 2015; Shuman et al.,

2016). However, no indirect effect was found for protest legality via perceived legitimacy

despite significant direct paths. The missing indirect effect likely resulted from the

inclusion of ratings of morality of the actions, which were the strongest predictor for both

protest tendencies and support.

Conversely, the manipulation of the form of protest affected perceptions of

disruptiveness and of utilitarian efficacy, but not protest tendencies or the other appraisals.

The occupation was seen as more disruptive and likely result in changes in how the

government would establish future contracts. Findings of Study 5 help understand the

cross-loading in Study 2, supporting the interpretation that the item's form (demonstration)

pushed it to load with other disruptive protest, whereas its legality (legal) was likely

associated with considerations of legitimacy and pushed it towards the most moderate

factor. Findings and interpretations are also applicable to similar cross-loadings in

published research (e.g. Saab et al., 2016).

Study 6 also revealed problematic cross-loadings of items across ratings of protest

tendencies and of different appraisals (morality, legitimacy, etc). Indeed, seven items had

to be withdrawn from the final composites to ensure that they adhered to underlying

factors. Results resembled earlier analyses for Study 2. Study 6 also replicated findings on

the relevance of perceptions of legitimacy and morality as predictors of protest tendencies,

as well as null-results for normativity and disruptiveness. Trends for legal and illegal

protest remained similar overall, but the appraisal of legitimacy, compared to morality, was

a stronger predictor of illegal protest, helping establish numerous indirect associations.

Findings adhere to a view of legitimacy appraisals being more closely linked to the legality

of protest and the norms of the system, than ratings of morality. Nevertheless, ratings of

legitimacy were also associated with individual values and ideology.

Further differences between legal and illegal protest were displayed at earlier points

in the model. Specifically, perceived injustice following the imagined scenario predicted

the appraisals of legal but not illegal protest. When appraising illegal actions, the variance

explained by economic system justification on protest appraisals appeared to overpower the

influence of perceived injustice.

Overall, the project successfully provided empirical support for theoretical

considerations in Chapter 1. Interrelationships among different appraisals of protest were

consistently shown, and the problematic side of adhering to pre-set taxonomies was

highlighted. Moreover, the unique contribution of specific appraisals of protest

acceptability (i.e., legitimacy and morality) independently of all others, and null results for

appraisals commonly considered in the literature (i.e., normativity and disruptiveness) calls

for a reconsideration of dominant research approaches. Findings from Studies 5 and 6 also

revealed the feasibility of controlling for different appraisals within the SIMCA even when

including numerous protest actions. Results in Study 6 further call for caution in the

common practise of presenting multiple actions to participants, creating composites based

on exploratory factor analyses, and assuming their adherence to taxonomies. Indeed, the

protest actions included, and the specific measure for which factors are analysed (e.g.

protest tendencies compared to protest disruptiveness) can affect the final composites and

subsequent interpretations of findings. Thus, evidence calls for more nuanced approaches

to the study of protest.

In addition, the studies highlighted the importance of researching protest illegality

independently from considerations of normativity or disruptiveness. It may be tempting to

downplay the effects of protest illegality due to its general lack of direct effects, with

protest being labelled as legal seemingly promoting participation instead of its illegality

deterring it. However, protest illegality affected ratings of protest legitimacy and, through

them, protest tendencies. Furthermore, shifts in pathways among the predictors of protest

tendencies were revealed in the final study. Findings reinforced the proposed need to

consider the effects of protest illegality in present societies, including democratic countries,

and the ways in which protest criminalisation can indirectly or subtly deter dissent. Such

considerations are particularly relevant when considering norm injunctification and the role

of system justifying beliefs in turning "what is" into "what ought to be" (Jost et al., 2015;

also see Jackson et al., 2016).

The most direct implications of findings relate to the sector of academia. As argued in Chapter 1, assumptions in theory and research, and the discourse we construct, can reinforce social views that downplay the multiple ways through which a state can resist social change (see Jackson et al., 2016). Even a democratic one. Caution is particularly relevant in order to avoid contributing to the delegitimisation of forms of dissent that fall outside the law. Implications, however, are not limited to academia.

Although the effects of labelling an action as illegal must not be understated, its power to deter protest also should not be overestimated. Moral values appear to be unaffected by protest illegality and can at times overpower considerations of legitimacy (Study 5). This was particularly the case when addressing support for protest instead of the willingness to engage in it. Given that legislation against social norms can result in the loss of legitimacy by the government (see Feldman & Nadler, 2006; Polinsky & Shavell, 2000), findings on the non-significant associations between perceived legitimacy and protest support highlight the potential for tactics of criminalisation to backfire. Indeed, resistance against laws that clash with democratic, humanitarian, or egalitarian values of society (see Fisher et al., 2011) can be expected to fuel dissent, and illegalising protest can backfire and promote it even among people who see the system as just (see Study 3).

6.1.2. Disentanglement of Violence

Chapter 1 highlighted the importance of separating dimensions of aggressiveness and violence from those of normativity and disruptiveness. In Chapter 2, I elaborated on the potential role of anger rumination in promoting proactive and reactive protest violence and of system justification in promoting violence by state agents. Methodological considerations across the project, thus, aimed to separate a dimension of violence/aggressiveness from those of normativity, disruptiveness, and illegality. Measures

of endorsement of violence included the justification of police violence against protestors (Study 1a), and of reactive violence by protestors (Study 1a), support for violent protest (Study 4), and proactive violent protest tendencies (Studies 2 & 6). At all stages, findings accounted for the potential overlap with legality, as well as other protest dimensions like disruptiveness and normativity.

As in prior research (e.g., Cichocka et al., 2017; Tausch et al., 2011), violent protest was overall predicted by different variables than non-violent action. However, system justification was a key common negative predictor for violent and non-violent protest tendencies (Studies 1a, 2, & 6). It also negatively predicted the support for non-violent and violent protest (Studies 1, 4, & 5), and positively predicted support for violence by the police in defence of the system (Study 1a). All findings are consistent with the literature on system justification (Cichocka et al., 2017; Jost et al., 2017; Osborne et al., 2019).

An essential difference in pathways leading to violent compared to non-violent protest was the relevance of ratings of aggressiveness as predictors of violent tendencies, but not non-violent ones, above and beyond appraisals of morality and legitimacy (Study 6). Additionally, anger rumination predicted the justification of reactive violence (Study 1a) but not proactive aggression (Studies 2 & 6, also see Study 4). It is not clear why it would be related to reactive aggression when participants were thinking of protest issues as opposed to being in a situation when they were provoked. However, findings could be linked to priming of aggression and retaliation, or to the moralisation of violence. Indeed, despite a lack of direct associations with proactive violence, its hypothesised role in legitimising and moralising proactive violent protest was supported in Study 6 in line with hypotheses and prior research (Bandura et al., 1996, 2001; Caprara et al., 2014).

Conversely, political rumination did not predict reactive violence (Study 1a), and only predicted proactive violent protest tendencies and its support via system justification (Study 2, Study 4). It also did not predict the moralisation and legitimisation of violence directly (Study 6). Nevertheless, it positively predicted non-violent protest tendencies consistently (Study 1a, Study 2, Study 4, Study 6), as well as the moralisation of legal non-violent protest (Study 6).

Taken together, results highlighted the importance of separating dimensions of aggressiveness and violence from those of normativity, disruptiveness, and even legitimacy and morality, in theory and research. Such a distinction is essential for the clear understanding of the constructs that we address but also has important implications in terms of the discourse that we construct. Moreover, the strong and consistent support for the proposed role of anger rumination in moralising violence, enhancing aggression, and justifying violent responses to perceived provocations (Anestis et al., 2009; Bandura et al., 1996, 2001; Bushman et al., 2005; Caprara et al., 2014; Vasquez et al., 2013) encourages the development of new research. Such research should not be limited to protestors and could be fruitful for the police when recruiting police participants.

Implications apply further to police-work. Differences between predictors of violent and non-violent protest (even when it is illegal) encouraged disentangling the understanding of "radicalism" in terms of both "law-breaking" and "violently protesting" (e.g. Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Considered together with work on the potential for police action to alienate communities, foster radicalisation, and fuel crowd violence (Blackwood et al., 2016; Cronin & Reicher, 2006; Reicher, 2017; Reicher et al., 2004), findings invite caution in using restrictive or aggressive police tactics (O'Connor, 2009) against illegal protest. As argued in the prior section, this is particularly important given

the lack of effects of illegality, via legitimacy, on protest support, which strongly suggest

potential public backlash against police action.

6.1.3. Retributive motivations and the moral Imperative to Protest

In Chapter 1 I further highlighted the limitations stemming from utilitarian views of

collective action (see Becker & Tausch, 2015, Shuman et al., 2016; Simon & Klandermans,

2001; Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2008) and drew from moral philosophy and

views of retributive justice to propose the existence of retributive motivations to protest and

a view of protest as a goal rather than a means to an end (Bierie, 2012; Kant, 2009;

Murphy, 1994). In Chapter 2, I further elaborated on consistent arguments in the literature

around punitive motivations for protest stemming from moral values and linked to anger

(see van Zomeren et al., 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2011a), which provided theoretical

support for my proposals. Evaluating those views in as careful detail as the assessment of

protest taxonomies, and separation of dimensions, was not possible in only six studies but

empirical evidence was provided supporting my theoretical considerations.

The inclusion of utilitarian and retributive forms of protest efficacy in Studies 5 and

6 served to provide support for the existence of retributive motivations. Both forms of

efficacy were strongly related, but each uniquely contributed to different analyses –and to

the composite measure used in the final model in Study 6. Retributive efficacy

significantly predicted protest tendencies in Study 5, whereas utilitarian efficacy did not.

The utilitarian measure was a better predictor across analyses in Study 6, but differences in

trends among their predictors were revealed, and only the retributive measure of efficacy

predicted violent protest.

It is worth noting that final analyses in Study 6 controlled for a broad range of

emotions, and even earlier regressions controlled for the influence of political rumination

and anger rumination, as well as group efficacy (which analyses in Study 5 did not).

Retributive motivations to protest are mostly implied in the literature within the emotion

path of protest (Becker & Tausch, 2015; van Zomeren et al., 2008; see also Tetlock et al.,

2000). Controlling for anger rumination and political rumination may have led to

differences in results when comparing Studies 5 and 6. Both variables were linked to anger

throughout this project, they were both linked to considerations of morality, and are

conceptualised as driving action against perceived offences (Barber et al., 2005; Barnett,

2011; Bushman et al., 2005; Vasquez et al., 2010; Wakeling & Barnett, 2011). Anger

rumination specifically involves revenge fantasies and is linked to retaliation (Bushman et

al., 2005; Sukhodolsky et al., 2001).

Results, thus, fit a conceptualisation in which protest serves to redress unfair

deprivation and correct wrongdoings (Becker & Tausch, 2015; van Zomeren et al., 2008)

but can also serve the goal of confronting and punishing the responsible parties (see van

Zomeren et al., 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2011a). Findings also supported views of violent

protest as strategic (as argued following Study 2; also see Saab et al., 2016) while

suggesting alternative pathways involving anger rumination, the emotions it heightens, and

its role in moralising violence (Study 6). All results provided support for the existence of a

retributive motivation connected to thoughts of revenge and the desire to make those

perceived as responsible for the protesters' grievances pay (see Saab et al., 2016; Tausch et

al., 2011).

Of course, findings remain limited in scope and have focused solely on retributive

motivations that remained connected to the system and its structures. Measures in Studies

5 and 6 still depended on system confidence given that punishment was framed as resulting

from the protest but being carried out by the Government. Further research into protest that

serves as punishment (as suggested in Chapter 1) can further elucidate the role of retributive motivations to protest. Addressing the overlap between emotions, morality, and the desire to punish wrongdoers has the potential to further enrich our understanding of protest and its many complexities. Thus, the thesis succeeded in supporting the proposed call for reconceptualising protest beyond a utilitarian approach to include other motivations and goals. It also encourages future research aimed at disentangling the overlap between variables and clarifying the processes that underpin retributive motivations to protest.

Findings also supported the possibility of protest being a goal rather than means to an end. In Studies 5 and 6, appraisals of protest as being morally right consistently predicted legal and illegal protest tendencies, as well as support for protest (Study 5), independently of considerations of legitimacy (which are strongly tied to system norms), other appraisals (like normativity and disruptiveness), and expected efficacy. As shown in Study 6, assessments of protest morality can be anteceded by emotions, in line with a righteous fury, but can also result from perceptions of injustice, independently from emotions, or be preceded directly by political-ideological variables. Null findings on efficacy paths further invite the development of research on protest that looks beyond expected outcomes to account for moral imperative motivations.

Nevertheless, as previously argued, implications are not limited to the development of future theory and research. Results showing that protesting, and its support, were driven by moral values, independently of expected outcomes, and could overpower the deterring effect of protest illegality have important implications for policymakers and the police. Ultimately, legislation and policing against dominant moral values in society, or in specific communities, can be expected to result in the alienation of large sectors of society, the loss of legitimacy by state agents, and the escalation of violence.

6.2. Onwards to Chapter 2: Thesis Frame and Predictors

Throughout Chapter 2 I elaborated on the project by addressing key predictors and the conceptual links among them, and with protest. Beyond addressing emotion and morality as motivators of protest in line with retributive and moral imperative proposals, goals were established for assessing the role of ruminative thinking in enhancing emotion, moralising action, and promoting non-violent and violent protest. All aims and considerations were framed within system justification theory.

6.2.1. Rumination and System Justification

Once again, methodological approaches were carefully designed for the assessment of predictors in the project. Study 1a correlationally linked rumination and system justification to violent and non-violent protest outcomes. Study 1b provided longitudinal support for the proposed causal association between political rumination and system justification, and Study 4 further revealed through an experimental manipulation the effects of ruminating about politics in decreasing system justification beliefs and increasing anger at politics, among other emotions. Likewise, Study 3 replicated prior research (Jost et al., 2012; see also Kay & Jost, 2003) by showing the impact of manipulating system justification on protest tendencies. It also built on the literature by linking it to decreases in the perceived legitimacy of protest.

In addition to longitudinal and experimental considerations, political rumination was linked to different measures of system justification (economic: Study 1a, Study 1b; general: Study 2, Study 4). Both measures of system justification were in turn associated with lower protest tendencies across initial studies. Yet, when considered together, different pathways were revealed in line with predictions and expanding on the literature (e.g. Cichocka et al., 2017; Jost et al., 2017; Osborne et al., 2019). A protest-deterring path

was revealed for the topic-matching measure (i.e., economic system justification) via appraisals of protest, perceived injustice, and emotions (Studies 5 &6). In contrast, the general measure was found to positively predict group efficacy and protest efficacy in a protest-promoting path conceptually associated with system trust (see Cichocka et al., 2017, cf. Osborne et al., 2015). Thus, the causal relationship between political rumination and system justification was strongly established, with the latter being connected to protest in multiple ways.

Evidence on the reduction of system-justifying beliefs as a result of focusing cognitively on system injustices builds on previous work (see Jost et al., 2015), but findings should not be interpreted as indicating that political rumination can reduce the motivation to justify the system. What they reveal is that it can play a part in reducing the system justifying beliefs that result from said motivation. Further research is necessary to assess whether rumination can also potentially affect the motivational process that underlies system justification. Thus, findings encourage further research on the outcomes of political rumination, and on the potential effects of need for cognition, on system justification and protest.

6.2.2. Proximal predictors

Appraisals of legitimacy and morality of protest, and measures of emotions, were essential mediators between predictors and outcomes. As previously noted, perceived legitimacy became increasingly relevant as a predictor of protest appraisals, compared to morality, as actions became less permissible (first through labels of illegality, and then due to violence; see Study 6). Key differences specifically involved the increasing influence of economic system justification and decreasing influence of perceived injustice on perceived legitimacy. However, views on both the legitimacy and morality of protest connected

political rumination and system justification to legal and illegal protest. Appraisals of legitimacy and morality were also a cornerstone in considerations for the influence of anger rumination on promoting proactive violence.

Likewise, anger served to connect political and anger rumination, perceived injustice, and economic system justification, with non-violent protest tendencies (Studies 4 & 6). Conversely, contempt served as a direct deterring link on legal protest tendencies. It was also associated in a protest-promoting manner with appraisals of morality and legitimacy of legal and illegal protest and through them with protest tendencies (Study 6). Last, although it did not directly predict violent protest in line with hypotheses and prior research (see Becker & Tausch, 2015), contempt positively predicted the appraised morality of violent action. Results supported its hypothesised role in motivating and justifying action as morally right (as established in Chapter 2), providing some support for its association with violent protest (see Becker & Tausch, 2015).

Another non-confirmed hypothesis in the project involved the association between anger rumination and contempt. The association was hypothesised in relation to the view of contempt as resulting from continuous reprehensible behaviour outside one's control, and its connections to lack of reconciliation intentions, and moral exclusion (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2011). Said considerations showed similarities with theoretical and empirical work on anger rumination and its role in maintaining cognitive focus on injustice, enhancing anger and hostility, fostering the formation of resentment and grudges, and leading to moral disengagement (Anestis et al., 2009; Barnett, 2011; Bushman et al., 2005; Caprara et al.,2014 ; Vasquez et al., 2010, 2012, 2013; Wakeling & Barnett, 2011). It is, therefore, worth noting that although anger rumination did not predict feelings of contempt at the political scenario in Study 6, political rumination did.

A core point for the proposal of political rumination as a relevant predictor of political emotions and system justification involved its hypothesised influence in the "development of ideas, attitudes, and affective responses targeted at the socio-political system and its structures" (Chapter 2, p. 55) which, in turn, should have system-focused outcomes. In contrast, anger rumination was conceptualised as a more general predictor of aggression proneness and moral disengagement. Thus, although against predictions, it is not surprising that political rumination specifically predicted contempt directed at politics whereas anger rumination predicted the moralisation of violence directly.

The final point considered throughout the thesis that cannot be fully explained involves the deterring effect of rumination on protest shown in Study 4. Multiple hypotheses have been considered to explain results, including that decreases in efficacy appeared following a ruminative state but were not present at trait level, the possibility that the manipulation resulted in an outcome better represented by the measure of anger rumination, and the fact that the manipulation would be expected to have generated feelings of contempt, which were not controlled for and were later shown to have a protest-deterring association. It may even be that once its effects on anger and system justification were controlled for, the remaining effects of the manipulation revealed processes of offloading, cognitive reappraisals, or even cost-benefit calculations. Hence, future research is encouraged to better understand findings and address the potential depressing role of ruminative thinking about politics (see Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema & Murrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Treynor et al., 2003).

Overall findings, nevertheless, may exemplify instances of rumination having positive social outcomes. Researchers have largely addressed rumination as a maladaptive form of self-reflection that leads to psychological and behavioural problems (Nolen-

Hoeksema et al., 2008; cf., Allen & Leach, 2018). In contrast, acceptance has been

conceptualised as liberating individuals from fighting against what cannot be changed

(McCracken, 1995) and being negatively related to psychological problems like depression

(Costa, Marôco, Pinto-Gouveira & Ferreira, 2016; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).

Rumination can be seen as occurring in opposition to acceptance; both variables being

inversely related to each other (see van der Kaap-Deeder et al., 2016).

Yet, although rumination often produces negative outcomes and acceptance positive

ones, the reverse may be true in certain contexts. For instance, the acceptance of the

negative situations that led to historical events, such as the American and French

Revolutions, or the end of South African apartheid, would likely have diminished

democratic processes. Conversely, if rumination was relevant in fuelling and/or triggering

such events, it could have positive socio-historical consequences (see Allen & Leach,

2018). This topic should be explored in future research to examine the roles played by

acceptance, rumination, and other forms of reflection within the socio-political arena.

6.3. Project Limitations

6.3.1. Methodological considerations and the WEIRD population.

Despite caution in the design of studies, two key limitations must be addressed

involving methodological points. First, research in this thesis has focussed entirely on the

socio-political context of the United Kingdom, with effort being made to specifically

recruit British participants. This was a conscious choice in order to address the importance

of researching state-action aimed at deterring protest (i.e., illegalising actions) in

democratic societies, which also allowed to use available resources in an efficient manner.

Psychological literature on protest has already considered the role of authoritarian regimes

in repressing protest (e.g., Ayanian & Tausch, 2016; Tausch et al., 2011) and has addressed

violent protest in the context of long-lasting conflicts in non-WEIRD settings (e.g., Saab et al., 2016; Tausch et al., 2011). Yet dominant work in psychology has neglected to address the multiple ways in which democratic states can repress protest (see El-Enany, 2015; Gilmore, 2010; Green & Ward, 2004; Jackson, 2013; Jackson et al., 2016).

The present project, thus, aimed from the start to consider a WEIRD population and context to expand on the literature. Nevertheless, findings must be considered with caution and should not be expected to be applicable in other socio-political and cultural settings. As noted in Chapter 1, repression and opposition to protest in the UK cannot, and should not, be compared to the context studied by Ayanian and Tausch (2016; the anti-coup actions in Egypt in 2013). Similarly, nothing to lose hypotheses in line with Saab and colleagues' (2016) research should be expected to differ when addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (as they do in their second study) from when focussing in the UK (even though they did address a British setting in their first study). Even within the UK, findings can be expected to differ in alternative protest settings like strikes.

The second methodological limitation involves the use of non-real protest scenarios. The impact of this limitation has been reduced through the inclusion of past protest behaviour (Study 2) and more ecologically valid measures together with a small degree of deception (Study 3). Measures of protest tendencies also have focused on topics that were relevant at the time of data collection and were chosen by participants themselves (Study 4). Last, using imagined scenarios like in Studies 5 and 6 is a frequent practise in crime proclivity research in forensic psychology (see Alleyne, Gannon, Ó Ciardha, & Wood, 2014; Alleyne et al., 2015), which is also present in protest research (Becker et al., 2011, Study 2).

Imagined scenarios are particularly useful when addressing criminal behaviour, since actual engagement and/or the willingness to disclose it can be low in the general population (see Becker et al., 2011, Study 1; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009), and ethical considerations can preclude researchers from asking participants to disclose criminal acts (as in Study 2). Thus, the use of imagined scenarios in the current project allowed evaluating violent and illegal attitudes and beliefs while avoiding problematic limitations. Indeed, the scenario used in Studies 5 and 6 was greatly influenced by meetings of the Centre of Research and Education in Forensic Psychology (CORE-FP) at the University of Kent, with established researchers, such as Alleyne, Gannon, Ó Ciardha, and Wood providing invaluable input.

The impact of limitations in the thesis was minimised throughout the project and should not be expected to substantially affect findings. It must be acknowledged, nonetheless, and findings should be interpreted as encouraging further research and inviting replications. As with any other research project, it is important for its studies to be replicated in alternative settings, with different populations, and with a broader range of measures.

6.3.2. Pre-registration, Transparency, and Standing of the Researcher.

Another limitation of this project is that none of its studies were pre-registered, which can be seen to affect transparency. In order to minimise potential problems stemming from the lack of pre-registration, I have made an effort to honestly and transparently report exploratory analyses (e.g., regressions completed prior to full models), and post-hoc interpretations of data (e.g., the predictable association between political rumination, instead of anger rumination, and contempt which had been missed a priori) throughout the thesis. I have also maintained hypothesised pathways in final models even

when they had been revealed to not be significant in prior regressions, and included an

evaluation of the measure of political rumination to inform the reader of the process

involved in understanding how it functions and the reasons why I used it as a single

composite. Indeed, I have preferred to over-report than under-report at every step of the

project. Thus, although the lack of pre-registration deserves to be acknowledged, steps

have been consistently taken to ensure transparency in the project.

As academics in the field of psychology, we are familiar with the problems

stemming from biases (e.g., confirmation and hindsight biases) and from the human

tendency to find patterns in what is random (see Munafò et al., 2017). Similarly, scientific

training ensures awareness of the importance of minimising subjectivity, and objectively

reporting data, to avoid erroneous conclusions and to build a valid body of knowledge.

Nevertheless, evidence has continued to mount over the years evidencing our incapability,

as human researchers, to be fully objective. Furthermore, practises like p-hacking, the

existing conflicting interests in academia, and the competitive publication industry, have

been problematised across research fields (Munafò et al., 2017).

Like in most research in quantitative psychology, multiple measures have been

taken to reduce potential biases and enhance objectivity in this project. A core line of

actions has involved maximising the benefits of collaborative research, with external views

and interdisciplinary considerations being actively sought to enrich the project (see Jost el

al., 2012; Munafò et al., 2017). The influence of thesis supervisors has been consciously

evaluated to consider alternative views to my own; hypotheses, tasks, and analyses have

been discussed with other academics in the political psychology laboratory and the CORE-

FP at the University of Kent; and studies have been informed by multiple fields including

criminology, forensic psychology, and philosophy. Together with the clear and transparent

reporting of data, measures are expected to make this thesis as objective and honest as possible.

All being said, a final point of relevance to this project involves the practise of reflexivity. Reflexivity is a common practise in qualitative research, which involves self-directed critical thinking and addresses researcher subjectivity (Lazard & McAvoy, 2020; Rodríguez-Dorans, 2018). Although uncommon in quantitative methodologies and positivist approaches, reflexivity has been argued to be essential for ensuring validity in qualitative and quantitative research alike (Finlay, 1998). Thus, despite measures taken to enhance objectivity and ensure the transparent reporting of data, the acknowledgement that perfect objectivity is likely outside the capabilities of human researchers demands addressing my own subjectivity and ideological standing to ensure research validity.

A key aspect of my standing and experience is my own tendency to ruminate. Indeed, I would be an outlier in my own research, consistently scoring two standard deviations above the mean score of political rumination and one standard deviation above for anger rumination. Similarly, I score on the far left in the political orientation measures used in this thesis and would be an outlier in all system justification scales used (with few participants revealing greater system-challenging beliefs than my own). Thus, the reader will probably not be surprised to learn that I have a past as an activist, or that I ideologically reject protest criminalisation.

It was not until meeting Martijn van Zomeren, due to a workshop on theory building at the University of Kent, that I realised that my approach to the study of protest, my choice to research system justification theory, and the proposed link between it and political rumination were all influenced by my personal experiences. System justification theory grabbed my attention since reading it for the first time. It provided explanations for

political and ideological issues that I had struggled to understand throughout my youth (e.g.

the support of right-wing policies by the working class) and resonated with a history of

anecdotal evidence linked to political conversations with friends and family.

In contrast, my first encounters with social identity theory and collective action

failed to resonate with my past. I had protested racism while being white, protested sexism

while being a man, protested homophobia while being straight, and protested cutbacks to

public education while studying in a private school. I also did not identify as an activist

and rarely protested expecting change to occur. Thus, original work on the SIMCA, and

other research on the field, did not speak to my experiences, which ultimately fostered

critical thinking and a motivation to research protest differently. I had already run four

studies when I realised that my understanding of the moral imperative to protest was tied to

my own values and experiences.

Similarly, I noticed that my hypotheses on political rumination decreasing system

justification beliefs also stemmed from my experiences. I ruminated since I was a child,

even when I believed that the world and society were perfect. Rumination and critical

thinking, reflection and brooding, had been parts of me throughout my life. My propensity

for critique and tendency to focus consistently and repetitively on political injustices has

probably affected my emotions towards politics, my ideology, my beliefs about the system,

my actions as a protestor, and, eventually, influenced the variables I chose to study and the

hypotheses I set.

Of course, my ideology has also been informed by the research I have carried out in

my academic life. From my undergraduate studies in psychology and criminology, to my

master's in forensic psychology, and the many readings completed throughout my PhD,

academia has consistently informed my views on the world, on politics, and on justice.

Similarly, my choice to study psychology was likely fostered by preceding values, which were in turn shaped through earlier learning. The dynamic and complex interplay between beliefs and academia makes addressing what came first, or will come last, an impossible exercise. Nevertheless, acknowledging and stating my subjectivities, ideology, and reflections is a necessary exercise so that academics can engage in an informed critique of my work, challenge my proposals like I have challenged those of others, and build on my work by replicating it or addressing its flaws.

6.4. Review and Conclusions

The project developed in this thesis resulted from years of research, deep critical thinking, imagined discussions with academics as I read their work, real conversations with theorists and empirical researchers, and a lifetime of experiences. Through it, I have challenged dominant views on protest in the field of psychology, addressed a broad range of questions, built on the literature on protest, rumination, and system justification, and invited future research to expand or challenge my own considerations. In the end, most hypotheses were supported, and plausible explanations were provided for those that were not. Thus, the project takes important steps towards a more comprehensive understanding of protest.

Overall, the thesis has supported the need to consider different dimensions of protest carefully, acknowledging their overlap while researching the unique contribution of each. Results have consistently revealed the indirect and subtle effects of labelling a protest action as illegal, highlighting the complexities of power struggles and the ways in which the system can repress dissent. Theoretical critique and findings also caution against collapsing violence, law, and social norms when addressing protest. Academic discourse that confounds said dimensions risks reinforcing negative connotations on specific forms of

protest and underestimating the nuances of what we aim to understand. Furthermore,

findings caution against political reliance on legislation and policing against non-violent

protest.

Support has also been provided for views of a moral imperative to protest against

injustice, and for retributive expectations linked to efficacy. Thus, findings invite future

considerations that look beyond the already established motivation to protest as a means

towards achieving or preventing change. The project also contributes to the literature by

linking anger rumination to reactive violence and the moralisation of violent protest. More

importantly, it reveals the unique contribution of ruminating about politics on different

protest antecedents, like emotions towards politics and system justification beliefs, and on

protest outcomes including past protest behaviour (also see recent work by Borders &

Wiley, 2019).

The project builds on system justification theory and the SIMCA by linking system

justification to the support of police violence and revealing its parallel pathways on protest.

It has been shown to deter protest against the system via low perceived injustice and

emotions, and to promote it via enhanced expectations of efficacy. Moreover, although the

underlying motivation to justify the system was not addressed within the project, actual

system justifying beliefs were shown to be reduced by political ruminations. Thus, the

effects of cognitive focus in developing system-challenging attitudes was supported. Last,

results highlight the relevance of ruminative thinking in enhancing emotions at politics and

moralising and legitimising action.

Limitations of the project should not be underestimated but also should not be

expected to have strongly affected results. The multiple methodological considerations

addressed throughout this chapter, and the actions carried out to reduce biases, can be

expected to enhance the validity of findings. Transparency in the reporting of data and interpretations, and reflexions on my own standing, subjectivities, and values, serve as final precautions to ensure validity.

This project, like all before it, remains in the hands of the scientific community. Only other researchers can fully challenge the theoretical and empirical work carried out within it by adding their own views to my own. Only they can replicate or disprove my findings while being free of vested interest. Only through the collaborative work of the scientific community can truly valid and comprehensive knowledge be developed. In the end, the greatest contributions of this project lie on the future research that it informs and motivates.

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Appendix A (Example of Briefing Sheet)

Who is Organising This Study?

This research is organised by the Psychology Department of the University of Kent. The researcher is Alvaro Rodriguez, a PhD Student. The research supervisor is Eduardo Vasquez.

What Are the Aims of the Study?

This study aims to research participants' perceptions of protest by considering a political situation and a range of protest actions.

Who Can Take Part?

British and over 18 years of age.

Who Can Not Take Part?

Non-british or under 18 years of age. There will be no other exclusion criteria.

What Happens to the Information I Provide?

Participation in this study guarantees confidentiality of the information you provide in line with the UK Data Protection Act 1998. Only researchers involved in the study and, if required, the body funding this research will be authorised to access the data. We will not ask you to write your name on the study materials. Instead we will ask you to create a unique participant identification number. The data collected for this study will be used for a student project. Once the data is analysed a report of the findings may be submitted for publication. Only broad trends will be reported and it will not be possible to identify any individuals. A summary of the results will be available from the researcher on request.

Contact for Further Information
If you require any further information or have any queries about this study please contact the researcher:
Alvaro Rodriguez
email: air5@kent.ac.uk

Or the research supervisor:
Dr Eduardo Vasquez
Tel: 01227 827611
e-mail: E.Vasquez@kent.ac.uk
Address: Psychology Department, Keynes College, University of Kent, CT2 7NP
If you wish to withdraw your data from this study, please contact the Researcher. You can also contact the School of Psychology Office on:
Tel: 01227 823699

If you have any serious concerns about the ethical conduct of this study, please inform the Chair of the Psychology Research Ethics Panel (via the School of Psychology Office) in writing, providing a detailed account of your concern.

Appendix B (Example of Debriefing Sheet)

Do the Right Thing! An Evaluation of the Interaction between Disruptiveness of Protest and Criminalisation on Perceptions of Normativity, Morality and Legitimacy of a Protest Action

Thank you for taking part in this study. Please find further information on the study and contact details of the researcher in this page.

In the present study we aim to evaluate differences in people's perceptions of protest depending on whether the protest actions presented to them were more or less disruptive, and whether they were legal or illegal. Half of the participants read a version of a less disruptive protest action, **a peaceful sit-in in a park**, and the other half read about a more disruptive action, **a peaceful occupation of parliament square and blockade of parliament**. Within each group, half of the participants read about the protest action being **legal**, whereas the other half read that the protest was **illegal**. Measures were taken of participants' willingness to participate in the protest action as well as of their perceptions of how effective, moral, legitimate and normative the action was. The findings are expected to help us better understand how peoples' perceptions of protest change across different forms of protest, and how these perceptions relate to the decision to participate in the action or not.

Please contact the researcher should you have any queries about the study or if you would like to ask further questions. You can also contact the researcher if you wish for your data to be withdrawn. However, this needs to be requested within two weeks of completing each part of the study, as data analysis is scheduled to follow at that point. You do not need to give any reason for your withdrawal, but you will need to provide your participant code.

Researcher contact details:
Alvaro Rodriguez
Air5@kent.ac.uk

Once again, we would like to thank you for your valuable contribution to this research. Your participation is greatly appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

Alvaro Rodriguez

Appendix C: Consent Form

Please read the following statements and, if you agree, please **tick 'yes'** to confirm your agreement.

I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet provided. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, contact the researcher with any questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.
○ Yes

I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason.
○ Yes

I understand that my data will be treated confidentially and any publication resulting from this work will report only data that does not identify me.
○ Yes

I freely agree to participate in this study.
○ Yes

If you would like a copy of this consent form to keep, please ask the researcher. If you have any complaints or concerns about this research, you can direct these, in writing, to the Chair of the Psychology Research Ethics Committee by email at: psychethics@kent.ac.uk. Alternatively, you can contact us by post at: Ethics Committee Chair, School of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NP.

Appendix D: Instructions for the Collection of Unique Identification Codes

For Prolific Academic participants:

Your Prolific ID will be used to identify your data and if you chose to withdraw from the study after completing it. If you wish to withdraw your data, please contact the researcher on **air5@kent.ac.uk** with your Prolific ID **BEFORE Monday 30th July**, as your data will be used in data analysis after this date.

Prolific ID:

For participants completing the study in person:

Please create a unique code for your responses by writing the first three letters of your mother's maiden name followed by the last two digits of your phone number. For example, if your mother's maiden name is Smith and your phone number ends in 82, your code would be 'smi82'.

Your identification code will be used to identify your data across stages of the study and if you chose to withdraw from the research after completing the study. If you wish to withdraw your data, please contact the Psychology Department on 01227 823961 or the researcher *with your unique identification code* **WITHIN two weeks of participating in the study** *as your data will be used in data analysis after this date.*

Appendix E: Political Rumination Measure

Please respond to each statement by rating it on a 1 to 4 scale from 1 = "almost never" to 4 = "almost always" in terms of how well it corresponds to your beliefs about yourself.

1 - I ruminate about political issues.

2 - I think about the reasons behind political decisions.

3 - I ponder about political injustices.

4 - When I get angry about politics, I turn this matter over and over again in my mind

5 - I keep thinking about political events a long time after they occurred.

6 - Memories of political events that annoy me bother me for a while

7 - I analyse political events.

8 - I have had times when I could not stop being preoccupied with a particular political issue.

9-Memories of political annoyances and aggravations often pop into my mind before I fall asleep.

10 - I think about political events from a long time ago and they still make me angry.

11 - When the government makes a decision with which I disagree, I keep wondering why this should have happened.

12-Whenever I experience anger at politicians, I keep thinking about it for a while.

Appendix F: Emotions at Politics

Please select an option to indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements (1 = "completely disagree" to 4 = "completely agree"):

I feel content about the political process	Filler Item
Politics makes me angry	Anger at Politics
Politics are depressing	Filler Item
The political process makes me feel frustrated	Anger at Politics
I feel unhappy about politics	Filler Item
Politics in this country makes me furious	Anger at Politics
I feel pleased with politicians	Filler Item
Politics make me happy	Filler Item
Political events sadden me	Filler Item
Politics are displeasing	Anger at Politics
I feel irritated because of politicians	Anger at Politics
Politics make me feel sorrow	Filler Item

Appendix G: Protest Text (Study 1a, Legal Condition)

Fight for Education!

Students and education professionals across the world have fought and won their battles against privatisation and gained the right to free education. From Fight for Education! We call all students, education professionals, their representatives, and unions, as well as activist groups and members of the community to unite and take direct action towards transforming the education system.

Results of the national elections held in 2015 place education services in danger and mean that we will be facing further cutbacks in education and increases in tuition fees. As the first year of Tory government approaches its end, we must continue to stand and not only state that we will not accept further cutbacks, but also send a clear and loud message to the Government that we will not stop until every person in the UK is given the right to access education at all levels for free. True equality cannot exist otherwise!

We will occupy Parliament Square for a full week starting on the 2nd of May to remind the new Government that education is a right and not a privilege. There will also be other occupations at squares in all major cities across the country. Throughout the week a series of talks, workshops, discussions, and meetings for the organisation of further action will be held for anyone who wishes to attend. Every person and organisation is welcome to join the occupation regardless of their ideology; if you want to fight against austerity and the privatisation of education you are welcome to join us and Fight for Education!

Appendix H: Protest Text (Study 1a, Illegal Condition)

Fight for Education!

Students and education professionals across the world have fought and won their battles against privatisation and gained the right to free education. From Fight for Education! We call all students, education professionals, their representatives, and unions, as well as activist groups and members of the community to unite and take direct action towards transforming the education system.

Results of the national elections held in 2015 place education services in danger and mean that we will be facing further cutbacks in education and increases in tuition fees. As the first year of Tory government approaches its end, we must continue to stand and not only state that we will not accept further cutbacks, but also send a clear and loud message to the Government that we will not stop until every person in the UK is given the right to access education at all levels for free. True equality cannot exist otherwise!

We will occupy Parliament Square for a full week starting on the 2nd of May to remind the new Government that education is a right and not a privilege. There will also be other occupations at squares in all major cities across the country. Throughout the week a series of talks, workshops, discussions, and meetings for the organisation of further action will be held for anyone who wishes to attend. Every person and organisation is welcome to join the occupation regardless of their ideology; if you want to fight against austerity and the privatisation of education you are welcome to join us and Fight for Education!

News article section on the Fight for Education! Protest and occupation of Parliament Square:

"Government officials have stated that the organisation *Fight for Education!* lacks the relevant permissions for the organised protest and that the occupation of Parliament Square would be an illegal action. A Metropolitan Police spoke-person has confirmed that the police will be present at the site and actions will be taken against any protesters."

Appendix I: Materials (Study 2)

Imagined Scenario

For participants who responded that it is wrong for the UK to leave the EU:

Please imagine the scenario in which during the following months the Government decides to continue with the process of leaving the EU despite knowing that it will have detrimental consequences for the UK.

For participants who responded that it is right for the UK to leave the EU:

Please imagine that during the following months the Government decides to take back the decision of leaving the EU despite the results of the referendum. Going back on the decision to leave is likely to have detrimental consequences for the UK.

Protest Tendencies

If the situation you have imagined were to occur, how willing would you be to engage in the following actions against the government's decision?
Signing a petition

Posting comments on social media

Participating in legal demonstrations

Participating in occupations of squares

Disturbing events (e.g. via pickets)

Participating in a blockade of a street

Taking part in a demonstration (even if it is illegal)

Damaging the property of people responsible for the events

Using violence against police officers

Physically attacking the people responsible for the situation

Appendix J: Protest Leaflet (Study 3, Legal Condition)

Stop Austerity! Take *Action NOW*!

Join ***Action NOW*** in the fight against austerity and the
current culture of cutbacks and privatisation.

In the last few months we have seen how the government axes grants for poor students and NHS bursaries while pushing forward new housing bills, which will affect numerous families, with little to no scrutiny. We are seeing how an unfair pay gap continues to increase in our country, with top executives making more money, in as little as 22 hours, than the average British worker in a full year. Similarly, big businesses continue to avoid and evade paying taxes while many underprivileged people are denied the economic support that they need.

Action NOW will march peacefully from King's Cross to the Houses of Parliament on Saturday the 25th of June (2pm starting time). The demonstration will be followed by an occupation of Parliament Square that will continue throughout the night and all Sunday.

As our junior doctors are pushed into their first strike in decades, our students have to pay increasing fees for education, and benefits continue to get cut, we need to stand together against austerity.

Join us in the fight for a fairer economy...

Join us in the fight against tax evasion...

Join us to demand better jobs and conditions of employment...

Fight with us to ensure that everyone has a house in which to live, and access to healthcare and education.

Join us! Fight with us! Take *Action NOW*!

Appendix K: Protest Leaflet (Study 3, Legal Condition)

Stop Austerity! Take *Action NOW*!

Join **Action NOW** in the fight against austerity and the
current culture of cutbacks and privatisation.

In the last few months we have seen how the government axes grants for poor students and NHS bursaries while pushing forward new housing bills, which will affect numerous families, with little to no scrutiny. We are seeing how an unfair pay gap continues to increase in our country, with top executives making more money, in as little as 22 hours, than the average British worker in a full year. Similarly, big businesses continue to avoid and evade paying taxes while many underprivileged people are denied the economic support that they need.

Action NOW will march peacefully from King's Cross to the Houses of Parliament on Saturday the 25th of June (2pm starting time). The demonstration will be followed by an occupation of Parliament Square that will continue throughout the night and all Sunday.

Government officials and the Metropolitan Police have released a statement labelling our protest as illegal. We will, however, exercise our democratic right to protest and continue with the protest as planned.

As our junior doctors are pushed into their first strike in decades, our students have to pay increasing fees for education, and benefits continue to get cut, we need to stand together against austerity.

Join us in the fight for a fairer economy...

Join us in the fight against tax evasion...

Join us to demand better jobs and conditions of employment...

Fight with us to ensure that everyone has a house in which to live, and access to healthcare and education.

Join us! Fight with us! Take *Action NOW*!

Appendix L: Debriefing (Study 3)
To Act or Not to Act: The Impact of System Justification and Criminalisation of Dissent on Perceptions and Intentions of Protest

Thank you for taking part in this study. Please find further information on the study and contact details of the researcher in this page.

The aim of the study is to research the effects of system justification and protest criminalisation on perception of the legitimacy of a made-up protest movement and participants' willingness to participate in it. The study expands on research linking system justification –people's bias towards seeing the system as more just than it is- to reduced intentions to protest by addressing it together with a manipulation of the legality of the protest action. Protest criminalisation was manipulated by presenting additional information to half of the participants labelling the action as illegal. In order to manipulate system justification, participants were presented a vignette about a fictional character which has been shown, in previous research, to affect people's bias towards justifying the system.

Self-reported responses of perception of legitimacy of protest and willingness to participate were recorder as dependent variables. Additionally, participants were told that if they wanted to participate in the protest they could provide their email address to receive further information. The protest action presented, however, was not real and the email addresses will not be used for any purposes. Only the fact of whether participants provided their contact information was recorded.

The deception in the experiment was deemed necessary as it disguises the manipulation of system justification; allowing a better exploration its effects. The same form of deception has already been used in related research (see Kay & Jost, 2003) in order to hide the link between the IVs and DV. Lastly, presenting the information about the protest movement as separate from the study was considered necessary for participants to perceive the protest as real and provide more valid responses.

Please contact the researcher should you have any queries about the study or if you would like to ask further questions. You can also contact the researcher if you wish for your data to be withdrawn. However, this needs to be requested within two weeks of completing the study, as data analysis is scheduled to follow at that point. You do not need to give any reason for your withdrawal, but you will need to provide your participant code.

Researcher contact details: Alvaro Rodriguez – email: Air5@kent.ac.uk

Once again, I would like to thank you for your valuable contribution to this research. Your participation is greatly appreciated.

Yours sincerely,
Alvaro Rodriguez

Appendix M: Imagined Scenario (Study 5)

Please imagine yourself as the protagonist in the following scenario and respond to the following questions on a 5-point Likert-type scale.

Imagine that one morning you go online to read some news articles and come across a big government corruption scandal. You learn that former governments have favoured specific powerful businesses for contracts over the years. The government and the taxpayers have been overcharged by billions of pounds by these businesses. As a direct result, many communities, including yours, have been left with no money for important services, and taxes need to be increased. As more details are discovered about the scandal, you learn that the businesses involved will keep their contracts and charge the same amount of money as before, so the situation will be allowed to continue without any changes. It becomes clear this problem has been going on for over a decade, but nobody will be held accountable. Throughout the day, you talk about the news with several co-workers and friends. You are tired of politicians doing whatever they want without consequences and you find the situation intolerable. At night you come across information on a protest action addressing the situation: a **peaceful sit-in in a park / a peaceful occupation of parliament square and blockade of parliament**. The protest action has been declared **legal by the police and / illegal by the police bu**t you feel that your voice should be heard on this issue, so you decide to participate in it

Appendix N: Imagined Scenario (Study 6)

Please imagine yourself as the protagonist in the following scenario and respond to the following questions.

Imagine that one morning you go online to read some news articles and come across a big government corruption scandal. You learn that former governments have favoured specific powerful businesses for contracts **over the years**. The government and the taxpayers have been overcharged by billions of pounds by these businesses. As a direct result, many communities, including yours, have been left with no money for important services, and taxes need to be increased. As more details are discovered about the scandal, you learn that the businesses involved will keep their contracts and charge the same amount of money as before, so the situation will be allowed to continue without any changes. It becomes clear **this problem has been going on for over a decade**, but nobody will be held accountable. Throughout the day, you talk about the news with several co-workers and friends. You are fed up politicians doing whatever they want without consequences.

Part 2 (Following Emotion and Group Efficacy Measures)

After spending the day discussing the corruption scandal with friends and family, you return home. At night you come across information on a series of protests addressing the situation.