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**POLITICAL LEGITIMACY IN WESTERN EUROPE:
COMPARING PEOPLE'S EXPECTATIONS AND EVALUATIONS OF DEMOCRACY**

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Democratic legitimacy is sometimes measured by comparing what individuals expect of democracy with their evaluations of democratic performance. However, such composite measures hinder our understanding of whether any factors found to shape legitimacy do so through effects on expectations, through effects on evaluations or through effects on both. This article considers people's democratic expectations and evaluations separately. By modelling each – along with their combination in a measure of legitimacy – it identifies the factors that shape each outcome, and in particular whether any effects on legitimacy run through what people expect of democracy or through how they evaluate democratic performance. Models are run for four different dimensions of democracy to test whether the factors shaping people's attitudes vary between different aspects of the democratic system. The analysis is conducted using Wave 6 of the European Social Survey (2012-13) on populations across 16 west European countries. Analysis of individual country populations also enables us to identify whether the causes and mechanisms of democratic legitimacy vary between different national contexts.

Keywords: Democracy; Expectations; Evaluations; Legitimacy

The version of record of this manuscript has been published and is available at *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, December 2020, <http://www.tandfonline.com>, DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2020.1856121

Democratic legitimacy is a key factor in effective governance, capturing as it does the idea that citizens voluntarily accept governments and their rules. Legitimacy is generally held to comprise a judgement by citizens of state actors' right to make decisions, and about their duty to accept these rules (Weatherford 1992; Tyler 2006). Yet legitimacy is a tricky concept to measure. Recent studies have measured legitimacy as the combination of citizens' ideals of democracy and their evaluations of democratic practice. Operationalised thus, legitimacy comprises an individual's assessment of democratic performance adjusted by their expectation of what democracy should deliver; the more closely the former matches the latter, the higher the legitimacy (Weßels 2016; Thomassen and Van Ham 2018). Yet while this indicator of legitimacy is intuitive and has been widely used, it raises its own questions. In particular, measuring legitimacy as a combination of performance evaluations and expectations obscures the route through which any causal variable affects the outcome variable. Does the effect on legitimacy work through what people expect of democracy, through their evaluations of democratic performance, or through both routes?

It is important that analysts provide answers to these questions, and are thus equipped to identify not only the factors that shape levels of democratic legitimacy, but also the routes through which these factors operate. Policy-makers concerned about low rates of democratic legitimacy need to understand the routes through which legitimacy is shaped in order to devise appropriate policy interventions. In particular, policy-makers require help in understanding whether such interventions might best be targeted on stimulating democratic performance or on managing popular expectations of the system (OECD 2010).

This study explores the factors that shape feelings of democratic legitimacy and the routes through which these factors work. The study follows the approach taken by previous analyses (Weßels 2016) and measures legitimacy as a combination of people's expectations and evaluations of the democratic system. It seeks to explain legitimacy by reference to two broad sets of factors: considerations of gain and loss facing individuals under different democratic arrangements, and particular values and beliefs held by individuals. The analysis models the effects of each set of factors on legitimacy, and also on its specific constituents: people's expectations and evaluations of the democratic system. By disaggregating legitimacy into its constituent elements, and by modelling the effects of causal factors on each element separately as well as jointly, new light is shone not only on *which* factors shape legitimacy, but also *through which mechanisms or routes* these effects run.

The analysis is conducted on national populations across 16 west European countries. This comparative country-case approach enables us to identify whether the factors shaping legitimacy, and the routes through which the factors operate, are consistent or distinctive across national contexts. In addition, the study extends previous work exploring popular expectations and evaluations of the democratic system as a whole (Welzel and Alvarez 2014). The present analysis identifies people's attitudes towards specific aspects, or dimensions, of democracy, and can thus shed new light on whether the causes of, and routes to, legitimacy are generic to democracy as a whole or instead vary between different dimensions of the democratic system.

The routes to democratic legitimacy

Recent scholarship has examined in detail people's expectations and evaluations of democracy. Studies drawing on the European Social Survey in particular have mapped the distribution of such expectations and evaluations (Hernández 2016; Gómez and Palacios 2016), while also exploring their determinants. Ceka and Magalhães (2016) have explored the effects on people's democratic expectations of such factors as individual socio-economic status, age, ideological beliefs and levels of political trust, while Torcal and Trechsel (2016) have explored the effects on democratic evaluations of such factors as assessments of government performance, levels of political trust, feelings of discrimination and electoral 'winner' or 'loser' status. Yet as this list of factors suggests, while some explanatory variables are tested against people's expectations and evaluations of democracy, other factors are tested only against one. As a result, existing studies cannot establish whether people's expectations and evaluations of democracy arise from a similar or a distinctive set of factors.

Expectations and evaluations are sometimes combined to generate a measure of democratic legitimacy. This involves adjusting people's evaluations of democratic performance by their expectations of what democracy should deliver; the resulting difference between the two is taken to comprise legitimacy (Weßels, 2016). Armed with this measure, analysts can proceed to model the determinants of legitimacy. Thus, Markowski (2016) explores how far legitimacy is shaped by such individual-level factors as demographic characteristics, economic status, assessments of policy performance and levels of political trust. Yet while this sheds helpful light on the causes of legitimacy, the operationalisation of the dependent variable obscures our ability to identify the particular route through which these causal effects work. Analysts in psychology and marketing have pointed to problems in using composite (or 'difference') scores that relate people's desires or expectations of an outcome to their evaluations of the realisation of that outcome (Peter et al, 1993; Furr 2011). Among these problems are that any identified relationship between an independent variable (X) and a composite dependent variable (Y_1 - Y_2 ; comprising evaluations, Y_1 , and expectations, Y_2) is ambiguous about the nature of the relationships between X- Y_1 and X- Y_2 . Analysts cannot determine whether any relationship between an independent variable and the composite measure reflects an effect on the combined components of the composite measure or an effect on one of those components, and if the latter, on which component. For the current purposes, this means that while democratic legitimacy may be *conceptualised* in relational terms (ie. evaluations relative to expectations), problems arise when it comes to *analysing* the concept in these terms.

Thus, while recent studies have considerably enhanced our understanding of democratic legitimacy, they have also bequeathed some gaps. In particular, it remains unclear whether people's expectations and evaluations of democracy arise from a similar or distinctive set of factors. It is also unclear whether the factors shaping legitimacy – where this comprises a combination of expectations and evaluations – do so via effects on expectations, on evaluations, or on both. This article attempts to fill both these gaps in our understanding. It does so by disaggregating legitimacy into its component elements (expectations and evaluations), and then modelling these elements along with their compound form (legitimacy). This approach promises to provide a clearer picture of the factors associated

with both people's expectations and evaluations of the democratic system, and of the routes through which these factors work in shaping levels of democratic legitimacy.

Democracy can be considered as a singular system, but is usually analysed as a set of more or less distinctive practices or arrangements (Dahl, 1971). The European Social Survey module of questions on which the present analysis rests conceptualises democracy as comprising four different dimensions – electoral, liberal, social and direct – (Ferrín and Kriesi, 2016a), each of which is characterised by particular institutional features (Hernández 2016).¹ The distinctiveness of these dimensions is primarily conceptual rather than empirical, as empirical analyses find that people's expectations are broadly consistent across different dimensions of the democratic system (Kriesi et al 2016; Quaranta 2018a). People's evaluations of performance are similarly consistent across different dimensions of democracy (Kriesi and Saris 2016: 181; see also Quaranta 2018b). Indeed, previous studies have explored people's expectations and evaluations in relation to the democratic system as a whole (Welzel and Alvarez 2014). However, when expectations and evaluations are combined, the distribution of the resulting compound measure – or legitimacy – varies between different dimensions of the democratic system (Gómez and Palacios 2016; Weßels 2016). This suggests following the example of previous studies (Markowski, 2016) and analysing the determinants of legitimacy in relation to the four specific dimensions of democracy. The advantage of taking a disaggregated approach to democracy is that it allows us to explore whether the factors shaping legitimacy are distinctive to the electoral, liberal, social and direct aspects of the democratic system, or instead generic to democracy as a whole.

The sources of democratic legitimacy

This section lays out which factors are likely to shape people's perceptions of democratic legitimacy. It draws on existing studies (notably Ceka and Magalhães 2016, 2020; Markowski 2016; Torcal and Trechsel 2016), while also introducing factors not previously explored. As legitimacy is operationalised as a combination of what people expect of democracy and how they evaluate it, it is simpler to identify the factors anticipated to shape either expectations or evaluations, and from these to infer the likely effects on democratic legitimacy. The causal factors themselves fall into two broad groups. The first group involves considerations of gain and loss anticipated to arise under different democratic arrangements. The second group involves a set of values and beliefs likely to shape people's orientations towards different democratic arrangements.

I begin by considering which of these factors are likely to shape people's expectations of democracy. The first set of factors is based on considerations of gain and loss from the

¹ The *electoral* dimension of democracy concerns the functioning of the electoral process, and includes such features as free and fair elections and government accountability. The *liberal* dimension concerns personal liberties and constraints on the state, and includes such features as equality before the law and the protection of individual rights. The *social* dimension concerns the provision by the state of basic economic goods, and includes such features as government reduction of inequality. The *direct* dimension concerns the direct participation of citizens in policy decisions, and is based on the presence of popular referendums. For further details, see Table 2 and Hernández (2016).

existing democratic order and from alternative democratic orders. These considerations suggest that individuals will desire or expect features of democracy that benefit them, and resist features of democracy that undermine their position. Such considerations are likely to arise in relation to individuals' economic status. People in high socio-economic groups are likely to look favourably on arrangements that have delivered material benefits to them, and thus to support or express a desire for electoral and liberal processes that conserve the existing democratic order. Conversely, people in lower socio-economic groups who have benefitted less from these arrangements are more likely to oppose the status quo and to express desires for alternative democratic arrangements (see also Ceka and Magalhães 2016, 2020).² Yet when it comes to the social dimension of democracy – involving redistribution of wealth from rich to poor – the relationship should be reversed, with higher desires or expectations among people in low socio-economic groups and lower desires among their richer counterparts.³ Considerations of gain and loss are also likely to arise in relation to individuals' civic status, particularly whether they feel discriminated against. Individuals that feel discriminated against are likely to fall within minority groups and might thus be anticipated to desire democratic arrangements that protect them from majority incursion, notably liberal or rights-enhancing arrangements. By the same logic, such individuals should be less favourable towards direct forms of democracy such as referendums, since these enhance majority voice over minority preferences.⁴

The second set of factors suggests that popular expectations of democracy will be shaped by individuals' values and beliefs. One relevant value is ideology. People holding left-wing values tend to favour redistributive economic activity by the state, along with direct citizen participation in decision-making (Ceka and Magalhães 2016). Left-wing individuals should therefore manifest higher expectations of the social and direct dimensions of democracy than their right-wing counterparts. Another relevant value is liberalism. People espousing liberal values favour political arrangements that protect individual freedoms. We should therefore anticipate that people holding such values will hold higher expectations of the liberal dimension of democracy. Yet because liberals are concerned to protect the rights of minority groups, we might also anticipate them to hold lower expectations of the direct dimension.⁵

The impact of values on democratic expectations might also be manifested in people's demographic characteristics. In particular, people of different ages are likely to hold different values, and hence are likely to expect different qualities from the democratic system. In particular, recent age cohorts are likely to hold more 'postmaterialist' orientations

² This argument extends the hypothesised relationship between individuals' economic status and their preferences over democracy or autocracy (Boix, 2003), by suggesting that economic status will also shape individual preferences over alternative forms of democratic regime.

³ These relationships might be subject to moderation by country or contextual-level conditions. I consider such moderating effects in the results section.

⁴ In certain circumstances, referendums can enhance rather than reduce minority rights, particularly where citizens can initiate referendums (Lijphart, 2012: 219-223). I address this point further in the results section.

⁵ Individuals feeling discriminated against and liberals are thus anticipated to manifest similar expectations of democracy. In the case of discriminated individuals, however, these expectations rest on considerations of gain and loss, while in the case of liberals, expectations rest on particular values.

than older cohorts, and are thus likely to favour opportunities for self-expression and the protection of individual rights (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, chapter 4). Older cohorts, socialised in a period before the postmaterial shift of the 1970s, are more likely to favour representative political arrangements (Franklin and Riera 2016). Although the equation of generational replacement and postmaterial change has been widely challenged (Abramson, 2011), the thesis that recent cohorts hold different democratic values – in particular more participatory norms and attachments to individual rights – to their predecessors has received some empirical validation (Dalton et al, 2001; Welzel, 2011: 96-99). I follow this thesis, anticipating that younger age cohorts will hold higher expectations of the direct and liberal dimensions of democracy, with older age cohorts favouring the electoral dimension.⁶

Values shaping people's expectations of democracy might also be reflected in their educational status. Previous studies have identified more extensive democratic demands among highly-educated individuals than among less educated ones (Kotzian 2011; Quaranta 2018a). People with higher-level cognitive resources have been shown to particularly favour direct citizen participation in politics (Bowler et al 2007) and to manifest greater tolerance towards minority groups (Bobo and Licari 1989). I therefore anticipate that education will be positively related to individuals' expectations, particularly on the direct and liberal dimensions of democracy.

I now turn to consider the factors likely to shape how people evaluate democratic performance. As with expectations, I assume that performance evaluations will reflect individual considerations of gain and loss. People in high socio-economic groups who have benefitted from electoral and liberal arrangements are likely to evaluate performance on these dimensions in positive terms. By contrast, people in low socio-economic groups are likely to be more critical of democratic performance, particularly when it comes to the system's social provision. On a similar logic, individuals feeling discriminated against might feel more imperilled by existing democratic arrangements than their majority counterparts, and might thus be more likely to mark down performance, particularly on the liberal dimension (Torcal and Trechsel 2016).⁷ People who 'lose' at elections and people holding extreme ideological views – who tend to enjoy weaker political representation than electoral winners and ideological moderates – might be expected to evaluate democratic performance negatively, particularly on its electoral dimension (Anderson et al 2005; Torcal and Trechsel 2016). Similarly, people who judge government policy delivery in negative terms might be anticipated to evaluate democratic performance more harshly than people who are positive about policy outcomes (Torcal and Trechsel 2016). Finally, people with low trust in political actors and institutions might be anticipated to evaluate democratic performance negatively (Torcal and Treschel 2016). At the same time, low trust should not also shape what people

⁶ The cross-sectional data used here does not permit a distinction between cohort and ageing effects. Note also that any association between age cohort and democratic attitudes may arise from factors other than socialisation effects. For example, older people may be more risk-averse, and as a result more resistant to changes in the democratic status quo (Ahlfeldt et al, 2018).

⁷ Individuals perceiving discrimination might be particularly prone to negative evaluations where individual rights are weakly protected (as in majoritarian systems) relative to where individual rights are strongly protected (as in consensus systems). These contextual effects are considered in the results section.

expect of the democratic system, with the possible exception of expectations on the direct dimension, since previous studies have shown people with low levels of political trust to be particularly supportive of the use of referendums (Ceka and Magalhães 2016; Seyd et al 2018).

Summarising, there are two sets of factors – reflecting considerations of gain and loss, and individual values and orientations – which are anticipated to shape what people expect of democracy and how they evaluate democratic performance. These can be used to extrapolate likely effects on democratic legitimacy (Table 1). These effects assume that factors anticipated to raise people’s expectations of democracy are thereby likely to depress levels of legitimacy, unless offset via the stimulation of positive evaluations of democratic performance. Note that some factors are anticipated to shape democratic legitimacy via effects on both expectations and performance evaluations, while other factors are anticipated to shape legitimacy only through one of these routes. Thus, even at the conceptual level, there is some variation in the routes by which a putative set of factors is anticipated to shape democratic legitimacy. Observe, too, that most of the anticipated effects apply to specific dimensions of the democratic system, rather than to the democratic system as a whole.

TABLE 1

Data and methods

Data were drawn from a module of questions on attitudes to democracy fielded on Round 6 of the European Social Survey.⁸ Expectations of democracy were measured by survey questions asking respondents what importance they attached to a particular feature of democracy, with answers recorded on a 0 (not at all important) to 10 (extremely important) scale. Evaluations of democratic performance were measured by questions that asked respondents whether they judged each feature to apply in their country, with answers recorded on a 0 (does not apply at all) to 10 (applies completely) scale. The democratic characteristics drawn on in this analysis are shown in Table 2. The second column lists the specific features covered by the survey questions. These features capture much of democracy’s substantive meaning, as can be seen in the fact that the features extend across four key dimensions of democracy, listed in the first column.

TABLE 2

The dependent variables in the analysis comprise separate measures of democratic expectations, evaluations and legitimacy. Legitimacy is measured in the form $L_i = (P_i - E_i)$, where L denotes legitimacy, P denotes performance evaluations and E denotes expectations, for each i feature of democracy. Positive values equate to high legitimacy ($E < P$) and negative scores to low legitimacy ($E > P$). Expectations, evaluations and legitimacy are each measured in relation to the four core dimensions of democracy. For each dimension, additive scales were formed from the survey items tapping each of the features identified in the second

⁸ Fieldwork was conducted face-to-face between September 2012-June 2013. The samples drew on a probability design, and ranged from 752 (Iceland) to 2,958 respondents (Germany); response rates varied between 77.1 per cent (Portugal) and 33.8 per cent (Germany) (European Social Survey 2016).

column of Table 2 (the survey measures are listed in Appendix 1). The ‘electoral’ dimension comprises an additive scale of responses to four institutional features, the ‘liberal’ dimension a scale of responses to five features, the ‘social’ dimension a scale of responses to two features and the ‘direct’ dimension a single indicator relating to the use of referendums.⁹

Round 6 of the ESS covered 29 countries across western and eastern Europe. National populations within these two blocs have been shown to manifest quite different levels of democratic legitimacy, with rates significantly lower in most east European countries than in west European ones (Weßels 2016, 246). Moreover, the factors associated with democratic legitimacy appear to differ between populations in the two blocs. In particular, evaluations of economic performance have been found to exert stronger effects on democratic attitudes among populations in east European countries than in their west European counterparts (Markowski, 2016). Yet little scholarly attention has hitherto been paid to whether the impact of these factors on democratic attitudes varies between national populations within western Europe. Although these populations manifest fairly consistent and high levels of democratic legitimacy (Weßels 2016, 246), there is some variation between these populations, particularly when it comes to those countries hardest hit by the 2008 financial crash whose populations – particularly in Italy, Portugal and Spain – manifest lower rates of democratic legitimacy than the west European average (Weßels 2016, 246). It is therefore worth extending existing studies by exploring whether the individual-level determinants of democratic legitimacy vary between populations across western Europe, and if so whether these variations correspond to particular differences in economic or institutional arrangements between these countries.

The sample drawn on for analysis thus comprises populations across western Europe, located in 16 countries: Belgium, BE; Cyprus, CY; Denmark, DK; Finland, FI; France, FR; Germany, GE; Iceland, IC; Ireland, IR; Italy, IT; Netherlands, NE; Norway, NO; Portugal, PO; Spain, SP; Sweden, SWE; Switzerland, SWI; and the United Kingdom, UK.¹⁰ Across these 16 countries and for the sample as a whole (WEU), the distribution of democratic expectations, evaluations and legitimacy for each of the four dimensions of democracy is shown in Figure 1. People’s expectations of democracy are consistently high across countries. There is more variation between countries when it comes to people’s evaluations of democracy. In turn, these variations drive country differences in the legitimacy accorded to each dimension of the democratic system (see also Kriesi et al 2016; Gómez and Palacios 2016). I explore the factors explaining variations in democratic attitudes among individuals by pooling data across the 16 countries. To take account of the hierarchical nature of the data – with individuals being clustered within countries – and to control for any unobserved country heterogeneity, the pooled sample models include country fixed-effects (Allison,

⁹ The four scales were selected on the basis of conceptual, not necessarily empirical, distinctiveness. As already noted, prior empirical analysis shows that people’s expectations and evaluations overlap considerably across different dimensions of the democratic system (Kriesi et al 2016; Kriesi and Saris 2016).

¹⁰ Austria, Greece and Luxembourg could not be included as they were not covered by the 2012-13 ESS.

2009; Möhring, 2012; Huang, 2016).¹¹ Alongside this, and to test for any variations in individual-level relationships between countries (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016), I replicate the pooled models with 16 separate models on individual national populations.

FIGURE 1

The factors anticipated to shape people's democratic attitudes are measured as follows. Economic status is measured by reported household income. Civic status is measured by a survey item asking respondents whether they feel part of a group that is discriminated against.¹² Electoral status is measured by whether a respondent reported voting in the previous election for a party that subsequently was included in government (winner) or not (loser).¹³ Policy performance is measured by a summed scale of responses to separate survey items tapping satisfaction with the economy, the state of education and the state of the health service. Ideology is measured by respondents' self-defined position on a left-right scale, with extremists captured by the introduction of a squared term. Political trust is measured by a summed scale of responses to separate survey items tapping trust in five institutions. Liberal values are measured by a survey item asking respondents whether they believe gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish (with agreement denoting liberal values). Codings and summary statistics for each of these measures can be found in Appendix 3. Since the dependent variables approximate interval-level measures, model parameters are estimated using ordinary least squares regression.¹⁴

Results

Effects on democratic legitimacy: sources and routes

I begin with the results from the pooled sample, which enable me to test average effects across countries. Full results from the models are shown in Appendix 4, while a graphic presentation of the key findings appears in Figure 2. I start by considering what the results tell us about the determinants of democratic legitimacy, before moving on to consider the routes – involving expectations and/or evaluations – that these effects take.

Democratic legitimacy appears, as hypothesised, to be partly shaped by considerations of gain and loss. Thus, individuals in high economic groups accord greater legitimacy to the social dimension of democracy than do individuals in low economic groups. Individuals

¹¹ Due to the inclusion of country fixed-effects, no weights are applied to the data (although weighting the data by post-stratification and population size factors produces substantially similar results to those reported).

¹² Civic status could also be measured through an indicator of minority ethnic group membership. However, this indicator produced few significant associations with people's democratic attitudes. Hence these attitudes appear to be shaped more by feelings of discrimination than by membership of a minority group.

¹³ To avoid losing cases, this variable includes as a separate category people who did not vote. Limiting the construction of electoral winners and losers to people who reported voting does not substantially alter the results reported here (see Appendix 2).

¹⁴ As the models already include terms for age, education and income group, no additional control variables were entered.

perceiving discrimination, individuals holding extreme ideological positions, people judging policy performance in negative terms and people lacking trust in political actors also manifest lower rates of legitimacy, across different dimensions of the democratic system.¹⁵ Legitimacy is also shaped by people's values and beliefs. As anticipated, individuals holding liberal values mark down legitimacy on the liberal dimension of democracy. Highly-educated individuals accord lower legitimacy to the liberal and direct dimensions of the democratic system, while people manifesting left-wing ideological beliefs mark down democratic legitimacy on the social dimension.

FIGURE 2

These results are all broadly in line with the anticipated effects. However, other results do not comport quite as closely with the hypotheses. Thus, economic status was anticipated to be associated with higher levels of legitimacy on the electoral and liberal dimensions of democracy, principally through wealthier individuals' positive evaluations of performance on these dimensions. On both dimensions, however, high economic status is associated with lower legitimacy, since wealthier individuals' hold higher expectations on these dimensions which are not matched by positive performance evaluations. Note also that economic status does not strongly shape people's evaluations of democratic performance on the social dimension. The lower legitimacy accorded by poorer individuals to the social dimension of democracy does not arise because they see the system as failing to perform, but, again, because this group holds higher expectations of what democracy should deliver. However, the opposite causal effect arises when it comes to the impact of education on the legitimacy of the direct dimension of democracy. Here, lower rates of legitimacy among educated individuals were anticipated to reflect higher expectations, which is not the case. Instead, education is associated with poorer evaluations of performance, and it is this factor which accounts for the lower rates of legitimacy on the direct dimension. Moreover, while the effects on legitimacy of discrimination, ideological extremism and liberal values were anticipated to affect particular dimensions of the democratic system, their negative effects run rather wider than this. Thus, while ideological extremists accord less legitimacy to the electoral dimension of democracy, as anticipated, they also accord less legitimacy to the other – liberal, social and direct – dimensions. The same is the case for individuals feeling discriminated against and those holding liberal values, who not only manifest lower legitimacy scores on the liberal dimension of democracy but on the other dimensions of the democratic system, too.

In sum, while the results of the pooled models confirm several of the anticipated associations, they also point to a rather broader set of effects. In particular, some factors shape people's attitudes not only on the anticipated dimension of democracy, but more broadly across different dimensions of the democratic system (a point examined further

¹⁵ The association of trust and legitimacy is not tautologous, as legitimacy comprises democratic expectations and evaluations which themselves – as explained earlier – may plausibly be associated with trust.

shortly). Moreover, the influence of some factors does not operate via the anticipated expectations or evaluations route, but via a different route.¹⁶

What do the findings tell us about those routes? In some cases, the impact on legitimacy arises through effects both on what people expect of democracy and on how they evaluate democratic performance. Thus, as anticipated, the lower legitimacy accorded by discriminated-against individuals to the liberal dimension of democracy reflects a combination of high expectations on this dimension and low evaluations of performance. Somewhat less anticipated, we see that among people judging policy performance negatively and among people holding liberal values, low levels of democratic legitimacy on the social and direct dimensions reflect both low performance evaluations and high expectations (liberals were anticipated to hold lower expectations of direct democracy than non-liberals; in fact, their expectations are higher¹⁷).

Yet aside from such examples where democratic legitimacy is shaped by effects on both people's expectations and their evaluations, the results show legitimacy to arise primarily through one or other route. Thus, among wealthy individuals, lower legitimacy on the electoral and liberal dimensions of democracy, and higher legitimacy on the social dimension, primarily reflects expectations rather than performance evaluations. The same is true of educated individuals, for whom the lower legitimacy accorded to the electoral and liberal dimensions of democracy principally reflects high expectations rather than poor performance evaluations. However, among electoral losers, people who distrust politicians and people who evaluate government policy performance in negative terms, the influence on legitimacy arises primarily through lower evaluations of democratic performance. In the case of distrust, the only dimension on which lower legitimacy reflects higher expectations is – as anticipated – the direct democratic one. Finally, while age only shapes legitimacy on two dimensions of the democratic system, note that these effects arise through slightly different routes. In the case of social democracy, legitimacy is lower among older cohorts than among younger ones because older people expect more of democracy on this dimension and also mark down its performance. In the case of electoral democracy, lower legitimacy among older cohorts arises solely from the higher expectations on this dimension among older people relative to their younger counterparts.

Overall, then, while the factors shaping democratic legitimacy sometimes run both through what people expect of democracy and through their evaluations of its performance, more often their effects on legitimacy run through one or other of these routes.

¹⁶ I took two additional steps to validate the robustness of the results. First, I employed two alternative measures of the dependent variable: factor scores in place of additive scales and a weighted measure of legitimacy ($L_i = [P_i - E_i] * E / 100$) (see Weßels, 2016: 240-41) in place of the unadjusted measure ($L_i = [P_i - E_i]$). Second, I included as a control variable in the model self-reported religiosity. The results using these alternative measures and additional control variable are almost identical to those reported here (for details, see Appendices 5-7).

¹⁷ This suggests that liberals see devices like referendums as enhancing individual and group voice. However, there is no greater effect of this in countries – notably Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland – that allow citizens a role in staging referendums (see Appendix 8). Nor do individuals perceiving discrimination in these countries hold particularly high expectations of referendums.

Variations on different dimensions of democracy and among different populations

Having established the principal sources of democratic legitimacy, and the principal routes through which these sources run, I now consider variation in these effects between different dimensions of the democratic system and between different countries.

As is clear from Figure 2, some factors influence legitimacy primarily on particular dimensions of democracy. Thus, economic status and age have different effects on the legitimacy accorded to different democratic dimensions. High-income individuals accord less legitimacy to the electoral, liberal and direct dimensions of democracy, but more legitimacy to the social dimension, relative to their low-income counterparts. The elderly accord lower legitimacy particularly to the social dimension, and also to the electoral dimension, than the young but not to the liberal and direct dimensions. People's ideological beliefs are also associated with legitimacy only on some dimensions of democracy: people holding left-wing values accord less legitimacy on the social dimension and more legitimacy on the direct dimension. Yet ideology is not associated with legitimacy on the electoral or liberal dimensions.

The effects of other factors are more general, however, extending across different dimensions of democracy. People holding extreme policy views not only deem the electoral dimension as less legitimate than do policy moderates; they also mark down the liberal, social and direct dimensions. The same is true of individuals perceiving discrimination and people holding liberal values. Even though liberal values are measured through an indicator tapping attitudes to civic and political rights ("gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish"), liberals manifest lower levels of legitimacy not only on the liberal dimension of the democratic system but also on its electoral, social and direct dimensions. Negative policy evaluations and low political trust also affect legitimacy across the different dimensions of democracy (confirming similar findings in Torcal and Trechsel 2016). In sum, while the determinants of legitimacy are sometimes specific to particular dimensions of democracy, more often their effects generalise across the democratic system as a whole.

To identify any significant variations in the causes of legitimacy between countries, I fitted the model used for the pooled sample to each of the 16 countries in separate models (the results of which are summarised in Appendix 8). Given the smaller sample sizes in these models, fewer factors achieve a statistically significant association with legitimacy than in the pooled sample. Equally unsurprisingly, across the 16 cases there is some variation in the relationship of these factors with legitimacy. Yet there is no clear pattern to these variations, which are thus more idiosyncratic than systematic. In the main, the effects on legitimacy identified across countries also hold within countries; there is little evidence of substantial and systematic between-unit variation in these effects. Hence, in spite of the fact that the sampled countries manifest rather different rates of democratic legitimacy – particularly in the cases of Italy, Portugal and Spain – the individual-level relationships with legitimacy are found to be broadly consistent across populations.

Comparison between cases also enables us to identify – although not to formally test – any effects arising from the different contextual and institutional conditions presented by the sample countries. First, we might anticipate people in low socio-economic groups to mark down performance on the social dimension of democracy particularly in countries with weak social security nets and redistributive regimes. The same might be anticipated in countries affected most by the 2008 financial crash. Yet the results across the 16 countries show that the only cases in which poorer individuals mark down performance on the social dimension of democracy are Belgium and Switzerland; otherwise, there is no tendency for evaluations of social democracy to be shaped by individuals' socio-economic position (for similar results, see Markowski 2016, 269-73). Second, we might anticipate individuals perceiving discrimination and people professing liberal values to evaluate performance on the liberal dimension of democracy more positively in countries whose political arrangements enshrine the protection of individual rights. Yet among liberals, positive performance evaluations are recorded not only in consensual political regimes (such as Finland and Germany) but also in majoritarian ones (such as Britain, France and Ireland). Among discriminated-against individuals, only in Spain is performance on the liberal dimension of democracy judged particularly critically. Third, we might anticipate differences in performance evaluations on the electoral dimension of democracy between electoral winners and losers located in either consensual or majoritarian systems. Yet two of the three countries in which electoral losers evaluate democratic performance on this dimension significantly more negatively than do winners are the Netherlands and Germany, normally considered exemplars of the consensus model.

Conclusion

The tricky issue of empirically measuring legitimacy has recently been addressed by studies that compare citizens' desired or idealised version of democracy with the form of democracy they think is delivered. This approach can usefully be employed to map the distribution of legitimacy across different countries and dimensions of democracy (Weßels 2016), although its use in identifying the causes of legitimacy is more problematic. In particular, operationalising legitimacy as a compound of expectations and evaluations obscures whether the effects of potential explanatory variables run through what people expect of democracy, through their evaluations of its performance, or through both. By disaggregating legitimacy into its component elements, the present study has introduced new light into a previous 'black box', by identifying the specific routes taken by various explanatory factors in shaping legitimacy.

The results show that, in the main, the effects of these factors work through shaping either what people expect of democracy or how they evaluate democratic performance. Some factors (such as individuals' socio-economic position and education levels) affect legitimacy primarily through their effects on people's democratic expectations, while the effects of other factors (such as low political trust) work primarily through people's democratic evaluations. The path to legitimacy thus takes a specific route, not a general one. In turn, this complicates policy-makers' task. Any policy interventions designed to boost legitimacy must seemingly take into account the different routes to legitimacy taken by individuals' demographic characteristics and attitudes. There is no 'one size fits all' solution – focused either on managing citizens' expectations of democracy or on stimulating their evaluations

of democratic performance – to the problem of low legitimacy among western Europe's citizens.

Rather more homogeneity is apparent when it comes to the determinants of legitimacy across different dimensions of democracy, and across different national contexts. The results show that some factors affect legitimacy differentially on individual dimensions of the democratic system. Thus, for example, compared to their low-income counterparts, affluent individuals tend to accord less legitimacy to the electoral, liberal and direct dimensions of the democratic system, but more legitimacy to its social dimension. Yet the effects of other factors are more general. Individuals perceiving discrimination and people holding liberal values, for example, manifest lower rates of legitimacy not only on the liberal dimension of democracy, but on other aspects of the political system, too. Thus, many of the factors considered here affect legitimacy across, rather than between, different dimensions of democracy. For analysts, this suggests that popular opinion may reasonably be studied at the level of the democratic system as a whole, although such a generalised approach may sometimes fail to reflect variations in people's attitudes towards different dimensions of that system.

The findings presented here also provide some support for using a common framework to study democratic attitudes among west European citizens. In decomposing cross-country effects to the national level, this study identified some variation between countries in the individual-level associations with legitimacy. Yet the results highlighted rather more consistency in those relationships across national contexts, a point that is often assumed in comparative studies, but which has been empirically examined and validated here.

Debate will continue over the optimal approach to measuring democratic legitimacy. Notwithstanding claims that legitimacy should be measured primarily by reference to 'macro-level' features of the state (Weatherford 1992), analysts will continue to gauge legitimacy by reference to citizens' attitudes. In this context, there are significant benefits to be had in operationalising legitimacy by reference to citizens' expectations and evaluations of democracy. Yet these need to be analysed separately, as well as in combined form. Only by doing so will analysts be able to identify the particular routes through which democratic legitimacy is shaped, and thereby to achieve a fuller understanding of its nature and causes.

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TABLE 1: Anticipated effects on expectations, evaluations and legitimacy of democracy

Factor	Effect on expectations	Effect on evaluations	Effect on legitimacy
Gain and loss			
Economic status	Higher among rich on liberal and electoral dimensions. Higher among poor on social dimension.	Higher among rich on liberal and electoral dimensions. Lower among poor on social dimension.	Lower among poor on social dimension.
Feeling discrimination	Higher on liberal dimension. Lower on direct dimension.	Lower on liberal dimension.	Lower on liberal dimension.
Electoral status	-	Lower among electoral losers on electoral dimension.	Lower among electoral losers on electoral dimension.
Policy performance	-	Lower among people judging policy performance negatively.	Lower among people judging policy performance negatively
Ideology: extremism	-	Lower among policy extremists on electoral dimension.	Lower among policy extremists on electoral dimension
Political trust	Higher among low trusters on direct dimension.	Lower among low trusters.	Lower on direct dimension.
Values and beliefs			
Left-right ideology	Higher among left-wing on social and direct dimensions	-	Lower among left-wing on social and direct dimensions.
Liberal values	Higher on liberal dimension. Lower on direct dimension.	-	Lower on liberal dimension. Higher on direct dimension.
Socialisation	Higher among younger age cohorts on direct and liberal dimensions. Higher among older age cohorts on electoral dimension.	-	Lower among young on direct and liberal dimensions. Lower among elderly on electoral dimension.
Education	Higher among educated on liberal and direct dimensions.	-	Lower among educated on liberal and direct dimensions

TABLE 2: Indicators of democratic attitudes

Dimension	Feature of democracy
Electoral	Free and fair national elections Political parties offer clear alternatives Governments are punished when they have done a bad job Government explains its decisions to voters
Liberal	Opposition parties are free to criticise the government Media are free to criticise the government Media provide citizens with reliable information Rights of minority groups are protected Courts treat everyone the same
Social	Government protects citizens against poverty Government reduces differences in income levels
Direct	Citizens have say on policy issues via referendums

Source: European Social Survey 6 (2012)

Figure 1: Distribution of expectations, evaluations and legitimacy across four dimensions of democracy







Figure 2: Plot of effects, pooled sample for (a) Electoral dimension




(b) Liberal dimension



(c) Social dimension



(d) Direct dimension



Note: Figures shows point estimates and 95% confidence intervals derived from regression models in Appendix 4. Reference categories: * Low income ** Age 18-25 *** Low education

**POLITICAL LEGITIMACY IN WESTERN EUROPE:
COMPARING PEOPLE’S EXPECTATIONS AND EVALUATIONS OF DEMOCRACY**

Appendices

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Appendix 1: Survey measures of democratic expectations and evaluations

Expectations are measured through the question “How important do you think it is for democracy in general that?”

Evaluations are measured through the question “To what extent do you think each of the following statements applies in [country]...?”

Electoral dimension

National elections are free and fair

Different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another

Governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job

Government explains its decisions to voters

Liberal dimension

Opposition parties are free to criticise the government

The media are free to criticise the government

The media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government

The rights of minority groups are protected

The courts treat everyone the same

Social dimension

The government protects all citizens against poverty

The government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels

Direct dimension

Citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums

Appendix 2: Regression models (see Appendix 4), voters only

(a) Democratic expectations

	Electoral		Liberal		Social		Direct	
Gain and loss								
Socio-economic status (income: low)								
Medium	0.15	(.02)**	0.15	(.02)**	0.00	(.03)	0.05	(.04)
High	0.18	(.03)**	0.28	(.03)**	-0.39	(.04)**	-0.22	(.05)**
Feel discriminated against	0.22	(.04)**	0.21	(.04)**	0.12	(.05)*	0.13	(.06)*
Electoral loser	0.03	(.02)	0.11	(.02)*	0.04	(.03)	0.10	(.03)**
Negative policy evaluations	0.01	(.01)	-0.01	(.01)	0.05	(.01)**	0.04	(.01)**
Ideological extremist	0.01	(.00)**	0.01	(.00)**	0.01	(.00)**	0.02	(.00)**
Low political trust	-0.03	(.01)**	-0.06	(.01)**	-0.02	(.01)*	0.08	(.01)**
Values and beliefs								
Left-wing ideology	-0.10	(.01)**	-0.05	(.01)**	0.04	(.02)*	-0.16	(.02)**
Liberal values	0.16	(.01)**	0.24	(.01)**	0.14	(.01)**	0.10	(.02)**
Age group (<25 years)								
26-35	0.03	(.04)	0.10	(.04)*	0.13	(.06)*	0.01	(.07)
36-45	0.17	(.04)**	0.25	(.04)**	0.32	(.06)**	0.05	(.07)
46-55	0.29	(.04)**	0.35	(.04)**	0.47	(.06)**	0.10	(.07)
56-65	0.38	(.04)**	0.43	(.05)**	0.58	(.06)**	0.06	(.07)
>65	0.39	(.04)**	0.38	(.04)**	0.55	(.06)**	-0.04	(.07)
Age finished education (ref: <16 years)								
16-18 years	0.22	(.03)**	0.24	(.03)**	0.05	(.04)	0.10	(.04)*
>19 years	0.30	(.02)**	0.49	(.03)**	-0.18	(.03)**	-0.18	(.04)**
Constant	7.55	(.08)**	7.05	(.09)**	6.53	(.12)**	7.52	(.14)**
F	54.44		107.83		77.20		46.03	
Prob > F	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
R ²	0.09		0.17		0.12		0.08	
N (unweighted)	17,227		17,290		17,394		17,417	

(b) Democratic evaluations

	Electoral		Liberal		Social		Direct	
Gain and loss								
Socio-economic status (income: low)								
Medium	0.09	(.03)**	0.14	(.03)**	0.11	(.04)**	-0.09	(.06)
High	0.03	(.03)	0.20	(.03)**	0.08	(.05)	-0.38	(.07)**
Feel discriminated against	-0.28	(.05)**	-0.24	(.04)**	-0.35	(.07)**	-0.48	(.09)**
Electoral loser	-0.08	(.02)**	0.01	(.02)	-0.16	(.03)**	-0.04	(.04)
Negative policy evaluations	-0.17	(.01)**	-0.14	(.01)**	-0.28	(.01)**	-0.16	(.02)**
Ideological extremist	0.01	(.00)**	0.00	(.00)	-0.00	(.00)	-0.00	(.00)
Low political trust	-0.28	(.01)**	-0.24	(.01)**	-0.32	(.01)**	-0.24	(.01)**
Values and beliefs								
Left-wing ideology	-0.10	(.02)**	-0.04	(.02)**	-0.07	(.02)**	-0.04	(.03)
Liberal values	0.01	(.01)	0.08	(.01)**	-0.09	(.02)**	-0.10	(.02)**
Age group (<25 years)								
26-35	0.01	(.05)	0.17	(.05)**	-0.17	(.07)*	0.09	(.10)
36-45	0.13	(.05)**	0.27	(.05)**	-0.16	(.07)*	0.22	(.10)*
46-55	0.28	(.05)**	0.41	(.05)**	-0.18	(.07)**	0.17	(.09)
56-65	0.36	(.05)**	0.44	(.05)**	-0.13	(.07)	0.24	(.10)**
>65	0.52	(.05)**	0.46	(.05)**	-0.05	(.07)	0.38	(.10)**
Age finished education (ref: <16 years)								
16-18 years	0.03	(.03)	0.08	(.03)*	-0.05	(.05)	-0.15	(.06)*
>19 years	-0.06	(.03)*	0.08	(.03)**	-0.13	(.04)**	-0.61	(.06)**
Constant	9.01	(.11)**	8.53	(.10)**	9.40	(.15)**	8.45	(.20)**
F	297.22		300.22		252.31		174.41	
Prob > F	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
R ²	0.36		0.36		0.32		0.24	
N (unweighted)	17,101		16,876		17,325		17,316	

(c) Democratic legitimacy

	Electoral		Liberal		Social		Direct	
Gain and loss								
Socio-economic status (income: low)								
Medium	-0.07	(.03)*	0.01	(.03)	0.10	(.05)	-0.13	(.06)*
High	-0.14	(.04)**	-0.08	(.04)*	0.46	(.06)**	-0.17	(.07)*
Feel discriminated against	-0.49	(.05)**	-0.46	(.05)**	-0.47	(.08)**	-0.62	(.10)**
Electoral loser	-0.11	(.03)**	-0.10	(.02)**	-0.20	(.04)**	-0.16	(.05)**
Negative policy evaluations	-0.18	(.01)**	-0.13	(.01)**	-0.33	(.02)**	-0.20	(.02)**
Ideological extremist	-0.00	(.00)	-0.01	(.00)**	-0.01	(.00)**	-0.02	(.00)**
Low political trust	-0.24	(.01)**	-0.18	(.01)**	-0.31	(.01)**	-0.32	(.02)**
Values and beliefs								
Left-wing ideology	-0.01	(.02)	0.01	(.02)	-0.12	(.03)**	0.12	(.04)**
Liberal values	-0.16	(.01)**	-0.17	(.01)**	-0.23	(.02)**	-0.20	(.03)**
Age group (<25 years)								
26-35	-0.02	(.06)	0.08	(.05)	-0.29	(.09)**	0.08	(.11)
36-45	-0.03	(.06)	0.04	(.05)	-0.47	(.09)**	0.18	(.10)
46-55	-0.00	(.06)	0.07	(.05)	-0.63	(.09)**	0.08	(.10)
56-65	-0.02	(.06)	0.02	(.05)	-0.70	(.09)**	0.20	(.10)
>65	0.13	(.06)*	0.10	(.05)	-0.58	(.09)**	0.44	(.10)**
Age finished education (ref: <16 years)								
16-18 years	-0.19	(.04)**	-0.16	(.03)**	-0.11	(.06)**	-0.23	(.07)**
>19 years	-0.37	(.03)**	-0.42	(.03)**	0.06	(.05)	-0.41	(.06)**
Constant	1.59	(.12)**	1.48	(.11)**	2.89	(.19)**	0.91	(.22)**
F	288.93		231.74		274.16		153.10	
Prob > F	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
R ²	0.35		0.31		0.34		0.22	
N (unweighted)	16,877		16,721		17,199		17,218	

Figures show unstandardized regression coefficients and associated standard errors. Reference categories for categorical variables appear in brackets. Country fixed-effects are included in the model, but results are not shown.

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, two-tailed. Source: *European Social Survey 2012*

Appendix 3: Core variables – coding and descriptive statistics (pooled sample)

Factor	Variable	Coding/range	Mean	SD	Weighted N
Dependent variables					
(a) Expectations					
Electoral	4 items] see Table 2	0=low, 10=high	8.51	1.30	27,652
Liberal	5 items]	0=low, 10=high	8.54	1.44	27,854
Social	2 items]	0=low, 10=high	8.30	1.77	28,382
Direct	1 item]	0=low, 10=high	8.17	1.99	28,339
(b) Evaluations					
Electoral	4 items] see Table 2	0=low, 10=high	6.36	1.88	26,905
Liberal	5 items]	0=low, 10=high	6.90	1.77	26,671
Social	2 items]	0=low, 10=high	4.87	2.53	27,936
Direct	1 item]	0=low, 10=high	5.41	3.13	27,894
(c) Legitimacy					
Electoral	Evaluations minus	-10=low, 5.75=high	-2.13	2.08	26,320
Liberal	expectations.	-10=low, 6.2=high	-1.64	1.82	26,235
Social		-10=low, 9.5=high	-3.43	3.19	27,621
Direct		-10=low, 10=high	-2.75	3.38	27,587
Independent variables					
Socio-economic status	Estimated annual household income	1=deciles 1-3 (low) 2=deciles 4-7 (med) 3=deciles 8-10 (high) 4=DK/not available*			29,233
Political status	Are you a member of a group discriminated against?	0=no, 1=yes	0.05	0.22	29,024
Ideology	Left-right scale**	0=right, 10=left	4.90	2.06	29,233
Extreme ideology	Left-right scale squared	0=right, 100=left	28.28	21.62	29,233
Liberal values	Gay men/lesbians free to lead life as they wish	1=strongly disagree 5=strongly agree	4.15	0.98	28,726
Socialisation	Age group	1=15-25 2=26-35 3=36-45 4=46-55 5=56-65 6=above 65			29,178
Education	Years of FT education completed	1=<16 years 2=17-18 years 3=>18 years			29,013
Electoral winner or loser	Reported vote at previous election	0=voted governing party 1=voted opposition party			26,340

Policy performance	Summed scale of dissatisfaction with economy, health and education	2=did not vote/not eligible to vote* 1=high satisfaction 11=low satisfaction	5.50	1.91	27,941
Trust	Summed scale of trust in five institutions: parliament, the legal system, the police, politicians and political parties.	0=high trust 10=low trust	5.14	2.02	28,004

* Included to avoid loss of cases, but results not shown.

** Those answering 'don't know' were coded to the mid-point of the scale, to avoid losing cases.

Appendix 4: Regression models predicting democratic expectations, evaluations and legitimacy, pooled sample across 16 west European countries

(a) Democratic expectations

	Electoral		Liberal		Social		Direct	
Gain and loss								
Socio-economic status (income: low)								
Medium	0.14	(.02)**	0.12	(.02)**	0.00	(.03)	0.06	(.03)
High	0.19	(.03)**	0.26	(.03)**	-0.37	(.03)**	-0.19	(.04)**
Feel discriminated against	0.28	(.03)**	0.29	(.03)**	0.19	(.04)**	0.18	(.05)**
Electoral loser	0.03	(.02)	0.11	(.02)*	0.04	(.03)	0.12	(.03)*
Negative policy evaluations	0.00	(.01)	-0.01	(.01)	0.04	(.01)**	0.03	(.01)**
Ideological extremist	0.01	(.00)**	0.01	(.00)**	0.01	(.00)**	0.01	(.00)**
Low political trust	-0.03	(.01)**	-0.06	(.01)**	-0.01	(.01)	0.06	(.01)**
Values and beliefs								
Left-wing ideology	-0.09	(.01)**	-0.05	(.01)**	0.05	(.02)*	-0.14	(.02)**
Liberal values	0.16	(.01)**	0.23	(.01)**	0.14	(.01)**	0.10	(.01)**
Age group (<25 years)								
26-35	0.10	(.03)**	0.22	(.03)**	0.13	(.04)**	0.07	(.05)
36-45	0.19	(.03)**	0.33	(.03)**	0.26	(.04)**	0.08	(.05)
46-55	0.29	(.03)**	0.42	(.03)**	0.38	(.04)**	0.12	(.05)*
56-65	0.40	(.03)**	0.50	(.03)**	0.51	(.04)**	0.10	(.05)*
>65	0.39	(.03)**	0.45	(.03)**	0.45	(.04)**	0.01	(.05)
Age finished education (ref: <16 years)								
16-18 years	0.23	(.02)**	0.27	(.02)**	0.08	(.03)*	0.16	(.04)**
>19 years	0.34	(.02)**	0.53	(.02)**	-0.13	(.03)**	-0.08	(.03)*
Constant	7.48	(.07)**	6.89	(.08)**	6.62	(.10)**	7.39	(.12)**
F	77.58		136.79		83.90		48.96	
Prob > F	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
R ²	0.10		0.16		0.11		0.06	

N (unweighted)	23,282		23,381		23,630		23,623	
(b) Democratic evaluations								
	Electoral		Liberal		Social		Direct	
Gain and loss								
Socio-economic status (income: low)								
Medium	0.10	(.03)**	0.13	(.02)**	0.10	(.04)**	-0.09	(.05)
High	0.06	(.03)*	0.19	(.03)**	0.08	(.04)	-0.37	(.06)**
Feel discriminated against								
Electoral loser	-0.23	(.04)**	-0.19	(.04)**	-0.35	(.05)**	-0.45	(.07)**
Negative policy evaluations	-0.07	(.02)**	0.01	(.02)	-0.15	(.03)**	-0.03	(.04)
Ideological extremist	-0.17	(.01)**	-0.14	(.01)**	-0.28	(.01)**	-0.17	(.01)**
Low political trust	0.01	(.00)**	0.00	(.00)	-0.00	(.00)	-0.00	(.00)
	-0.29	(.01)**	-0.24	(.01)**	-0.33	(.01)**	-0.26	(.01)**
Values and beliefs								
Left-wing ideology	-0.09	(.02)**	-0.04	(.02)*	-0.07	(.02)**	-0.04	(.03)
Liberal values	-0.01	(.01)	0.07	(.01)**	-0.10	(.02)**	-0.10	(.02)**
Age group (<25 years)								
26-35	-0.03	(.04)	0.22	(.04)**	-0.20	(.05)**	-0.04	(.07)
36-45	0.07	(.04)	0.34	(.04)**	-0.20	(.05)**	0.06	(.07)
46-55	0.20	(.04)**	0.45	(.04)**	-0.20	(.05)**	0.02	(.07)
56-65	0.29	(.04)**	0.50	(.04)**	-0.16	(.05)**	0.14	(.07)*
>65	0.42	(.04)**	0.51	(.04)**	-0.10	(.05)*	0.19	(.07)*
Age finished education (ref: <16 years)								
16-18 years	0.02	(.03)	0.11	(.03)**	-0.05	(.04)	-0.12	(.05)**
>19 years	-0.06	(.03)*	0.11	(.02)**	-0.12	(.04)**	-0.58	(.05)**
Constant	9.10	(.09)**	8.44	(.09)**	9.47	(.12)**	8.83	(.16)**
F	387.92		371.11		347.43		232.64	
Prob > F	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
R ²	0.36		0.35		0.33		0.25	

N (unweighted)	22,856		22,711		23,442		23,408	
(c) Democratic legitimacy								
	Electoral		Liberal		Social		Direct	
Gain and loss								
Socio-economic status (income: low)								
Medium	-0.05	(.03)	0.01	(.03)	0.11	(.04)*	-0.14	(.05)**
High	-0.13	(.03)**	-0.07	(.03)*	0.45	(.05)**	-0.18	(.06)**
Feel discriminated against								
Electoral loser	-0.49	(.05)**	-0.48	(.04)**	-0.53	(.07)**	-0.63	(.08)**
Negative policy evaluations	-0.11	(.03)**	-0.10	(.02)**	-0.20	(.04)**	-0.16	(.05)**
Ideological extremist	-0.18	(.01)**	-0.13	(.01)**	-0.32	(.01)**	-0.21	(.02)**
Low political trust	-0.00	(.00)*	-0.01	(.00)**	-0.01	(.00)**	-0.02	(.00)**
	-0.25	(.01)**	-0.18	(.01)**	-0.31	(.01)**	-0.33	(.01)**
Values and beliefs								
Left-wing ideology	0.01	(.02)	0.01	(.02)	-0.12	(.03)**	0.11	(.03)**
Liberal values	-0.17	(.01)**	-0.16	(.01)**	-0.24	(.02)**	-0.21	(.02)**
Age group (<25 years)								
26-35	-0.11	(.04)**	0.01	(.04)	-0.34	(.07)**	-0.12	(.08)
36-45	-0.11	(.04)*	0.01	(.04)	-0.47	(.07)**	-0.02	(.08)
46-55	-0.09	(.04)*	0.03	(.04)	-0.58	(.07)**	-0.10	(.07)
56-65	-0.11	(.04)**	0.00	(.04)	-0.68	(.07)**	0.04	(.08)
>65	0.04	(.04)	0.06	(.04)	-0.55	(.07)**	0.18	(.08)*
Age finished education (ref: <16 years)								
16-18 years	-0.21	(.03)**	-0.16	(.03)**	-0.13	(.05)**	-0.27	(.06)**
>19 years	-0.40	(.03)**	-0.42	(.03)**	0.02	(.04)	-0.48	(.05)**
Constant	1.63	(.10)**	1.56	(.09)**	2.86	(.16)**	1.46	(.18)**
F	364.77		288.28		357.09		202.04	
Prob > F	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
R ²	0.35		0.30		0.34		0.22	

N (unweighted)	22,506	22,440	23,253	23,237
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Figures show unstandardized regression coefficients and associated standard errors. Reference categories for categorical variables appear in brackets. Country fixed-effects are included in the model, but results are not shown.

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, two-tailed. Source: *European Social Survey 2012*

Appendix 5: Regression models (Appendix 4) with alternative specifications of the dependent variable – factor scores

(a) Democratic expectations

	Electoral		Liberal		Social		Direct
Gain and loss							
Socio-economic status (income: low)							
Medium	0.09	(.01)**	0.08	(.01)**	0.00	(.01)	Not applicable
High	0.12	(.02)**	0.17	(.02)**	-0.15	(.01)**	
Feel discriminated against	0.17	(.02)**	0.18	(.02)**	0.08	(.02)**	
Electoral loser	0.02	(.01)	0.07	(.01)*	0.02	(.01)	
Negative policy evaluations	0.00	(.00)	-0.01	(.00)	0.02	(.00)**	
Ideological extremist	0.01	(.00)**	0.01	(.00)**	0.00	(.00)**	
Low political trust	-0.02	(.00)**	-0.03	(.00)**	-0.01	(.00)	
Values and beliefs							
Left-wing ideology	-0.06	(.01)**	-0.03	(.01)**	0.02	(.01)*	
Liberal values	0.10	(.01)**	0.14	(.01)**	0.06	(.01)**	
Age group (<25 years)							
26-35	0.05	(.02)**	0.14	(.02)**	0.05	(.02)**	
36-45	0.10	(.02)**	0.21	(.02)**	0.11	(.02)**	
46-55	0.16	(.02)**	0.27	(.02)**	0.16	(.02)**	
56-65	0.23	(.02)**	0.31	(.02)**	0.21	(.02)**	
>65	0.22	(.02)**	0.28	(.02)**	0.19	(.02)**	
Age finished education (ref: <16 years)							
16-18 years	0.15	(.01)**	0.17	(.02)**	0.04	(.01)**	
>19 years	0.22	(.01)**	0.34	(.01)**	-0.05	(.01)**	
Constant	-0.64	(.04)**	-1.06	(.05)**	-0.70	(.04)**	
F	80.43		135.78		80.32		
Prob > F	0.000		0.000		0.000		
R ²	0.10		0.16		0.10		

N (unweighted)	23,282		23,381		23,630		
(b) Democratic evaluations							
	Electoral		Liberal		Social		Direct
Gain and loss							
Socio-economic status (income: low)							
Medium	0.04	(.01)**	0.07	(.01)**	0.04	(.01)**	Not applicable
High	0.02	(.01)	0.11	(.02)**	0.03	(.01)	
Feel discriminated against	-0.10	(.02)**	-0.07	(.02)**	-0.12	(.02)**	
Electoral loser	-0.03	(.01)**	0.01	(.01)	-0.05	(.01)**	
Negative policy evaluations	-0.08	(.00)**	-0.07	(.00)**	-0.09	(.00)**	
Ideological extremist	0.00	(.00)**	0.00	(.00)*	-0.00	(.00)	
Low political trust	-0.13	(.00)**	-0.11	(.00)**	-0.11	(.00)**	
Values and beliefs							
Left-wing ideology	-0.04	(.01)**	-0.03	(.01)**	-0.02	(.01)**	
Liberal values	-0.01	(.00)	0.04	(.01)**	-0.03	(.01)**	
Age group (<25 years)							
26-35	-0.02	(.02)	0.12	(.02)**	-0.07	(.02)**	
36-45	0.02	(.02)	0.19	(.02)**	-0.07	(.02)**	
46-55	0.08	(.02)**	0.26	(.02)**	-0.07	(.02)**	
56-65	0.11	(.02)**	0.29	(.02)**	-0.06	(.02)**	
>65	0.17	(.02)**	0.30	(.02)**	-0.04	(.02)*	
Age finished education (ref: <16 years)							
16-18 years	0.00	(.01)	0.07	(.01)**	-0.02	(.01)	
>19 years	-0.04	(.01)*	0.08	(.01)**	-0.04	(.01)**	
Constant	1.25	(.04)**	0.59	(.04)**	1.55	(.04)**	
F	390.90		314.72		347.10		
Prob > F	0.000		0.000		0.000		
R ²	0.36		0.31		0.33		

N (unweighted)	22,856		22,711		23,442		
(c) Democratic legitimacy							
	Electoral		Liberal		Social		Direct
Gain and loss							
Socio-economic status (income: low)							
Medium	-0.02	(.01)	0.01	(.01)	0.03	(.01)*	Not applicable
High	-0.05	(.01)**	-0.03	(.01)	0.12	(.01)**	
Feel discriminated against	-0.19	(.02)**	-0.21	(.02)**	-0.14	(.02)**	
Electoral loser	-0.05	(.01)**	-0.05	(.01)**	-0.05	(.01)**	
Negative policy evaluations	-0.07	(.00)**	-0.06	(.00)**	-0.08	(.00)**	
Ideological extremist	-0.00	(.00)*	-0.00	(.00)**	-0.00	(.00)**	
Low political trust	-0.10	(.00)**	-0.08	(.00)**	-0.08	(.00)**	
Values and beliefs							
Left-wing ideology	0.00	(.01)	0.00	(.00)	-0.03	(.00)**	
Liberal values	-0.07	(.00)**	-0.07	(.01)**	-0.06	(.01)**	
Age group (<25 years)							
26-35	-0.05	(.02)**	0.00	(.02)	-0.09	(.02)**	
36-45	-0.04	(.02)*	0.00	(.02)	-0.12	(.02)**	
46-55	-0.03	(.02)*	0.01	(.02)	-0.15	(.02)**	
56-65	-0.04	(.02)*	0.00	(.02)	-0.18	(.02)**	
>65	0.02	(.04)	0.03	(.02)	-0.14	(.02)**	
Age finished education (ref: <16 years)							
16-18 years	-0.09	(.01)**	-0.07	(.01)**	-0.04	(.01)**	
>19 years	-0.15	(.01)**	-0.20	(.01)**	0.01	(.01)	
Constant	1.50	(.04)**	1.44	(.04)**	1.66	(.04)**	
F	375.36		259.97		356.91		
Prob > F	0.000		0.000		0.000		
R ²	0.36		0.28		0.34		

N (unweighted)	22,506	22,440	23,253
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Notes: As Appendix 4.

Appendix 6: Regression models (Appendix 4) with alternative specifications of the dependent variable – weighted legitimacy measure

Democratic legitimacy

	Electoral		Liberal		Social		Direct	
Gain and loss								
Socio-economic status (income: low)								
Medium	-0.03	(.03)	0.02	(.02)	0.12	(.04)**	-0.10	(.05)*
High	-0.11	(.03)**	-0.07	(.03)*	0.41	(.05)**	-0.11	(.06)
Feel discriminated against	-0.48	(.04)**	-0.48	(.04)**	-0.56	(.06)**	-0.63	(.07)**
Electoral loser	-0.11	(.02)**	-0.09	(.02)**	-0.21	(.04)**	-0.15	(.04)**
Negative policy evaluations	-0.17	(.01)**	-0.13	(.01)**	-0.31	(.01)**	-0.20	(.01)**
Ideological extremist	-0.01	(.00)*	-0.01	(.00)**	-0.01	(.00)**	-0.02	(.00)**
Low political trust	-0.24	(.01)**	-0.19	(.01)**	-0.30	(.01)**	-0.31	(.01)**
Values and beliefs								
Left-wing ideology	0.03	(.02)	0.04	(.01)**	-0.03	(.03)	0.15	(.03)**
Liberal values	-0.17	(.01)**	-0.15	(.01)**	-0.24	(.02)**	-0.18	(.02)**
Age group (<25 years)								
26-35	-0.12	(.04)**	0.02	(.04)	-0.29	(.06)**	-0.13	(.07)
36-45	-0.12	(.04)**	0.02	(.04)	-0.40	(.06)**	-0.03	(.07)
46-55	-0.10	(.04)**	0.05	(.04)	-0.51	(.06)**	-0.09	(.07)
56-65	-0.14	(.04)**	0.03	(.04)	-0.62	(.06)**	0.02	(.07)
>65	0.00	(.04)	0.09	(.04)*	-0.48	(.06)**	0.17	(.08)*
Age finished education (ref: <16 years)								
16-18 years	-0.21	(.03)**	-0.15	(.03)**	-0.13	(.04)**	-0.26	(.05)**
>19 years	-0.38	(.03)**	-0.41	(.02)**	-0.02	(.04)	-0.41	(.05)**
Constant	1.53	(.09)**	1.32	(.08)**	2.56	(.14)**	1.30	(.16)**
F	384.31		328.31		367.45		202.04	
Prob > F	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
R ²	0.36		0.33		0.34		0.22	

N (unweighted)	22,506	22,440	23,253	23,237
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Notes: As Appendix 4

Appendix 7: Regression models predicting democratic expectations, evaluations and legitimacy, pooled sample across 16 west European countries (including religiosity)

(a) Democratic expectations

	Electoral		Liberal		Social		Direct	
Gain and loss								
Socio-economic status (income: low)								
Medium	0.15	(.02)**	0.12	(.02)**	0.01	(.03)	0.06	(.03)
High	0.19	(.02)**	0.26	(.03)**	-0.36	(.03)**	-0.18	(.04)**
Feel discriminated against	0.27	(.03)**	0.29	(.03)**	0.17	(.04)**	0.17	(.05)**
Electoral loser	0.03	(.02)	0.11	(.02)*	0.04	(.03)	0.12	(.03)*
Negative policy evaluations	0.00	(.01)	-0.01	(.01)*	0.04	(.01)**	0.03	(.01)**
Ideological extremist	0.01	(.00)**	0.01	(.00)**	0.01	(.00)**	0.02	(.00)**
Low political trust	-0.03	(.01)**	-0.06	(.01)**	-0.01	(.01)	0.07	(.01)**
Religious	0.01	(.00)**	-0.01	(.00)	0.03	(.00)**	0.02	(.00)**
Values and beliefs								
Left-wing ideology	-0.09	(.01)**	-0.05	(.01)**	0.05	(.02)**	-0.14	(.02)**
Liberal values	0.16	(.01)**	0.23	(.01)**	0.15	(.01)**	0.12	(.01)**
Age group (<25 years)								
26-35	0.09	(.03)**	0.22	(.03)**	0.13	(.04)**	0.07	(.05)
36-45	0.18	(.03)**	0.34	(.03)**	0.24	(.04)**	0.07	(.05)
46-55	0.28	(.03)**	0.42	(.03)**	0.35	(.04)**	0.10	(.05)*
56-65	0.39	(.03)**	0.50	(.03)**	0.48	(.04)**	0.08	(.05)
>65	0.37	(.03)**	0.46	(.03)**	0.41	(.04)**	-0.02	(.05)
Age finished education (ref: <16 years)								
16-18 years	0.23	(.02)**	0.27	(.02)**	0.09	(.03)*	0.17	(.04)**
>19 years	0.34	(.02)**	0.53	(.02)**	-0.13	(.03)**	-0.08	(.03)*
Constant	7.39	(.08)**	6.93	(.08)**	6.37	(.10)**	7.21	(.12)**
F	75.72		132.88		83.42		48.07	
Prob > F	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	

R ²	0.10		0.16		0.11		0.06	
N (unweighted)	23,244		23,342		23,590		23,580	
(b) Democratic evaluations								
	Electoral		Liberal		Social		Direct	
Gain and loss								
Socio-economic status (income: low)								
Medium	0.10	(.03)**	0.13	(.02)**	0.11	(.04)**	-0.07	(.05)
High	0.07	(.03)*	0.19	(.03)**	0.09	(.04)*	-0.35	(.06)**
Feel discriminated against	-0.24	(.04)**	-0.19	(.04)**	-0.37	(.05)**	-0.49	(.07)**
Electoral loser	-0.07	(.02)**	0.01	(.02)	-0.15	(.03)**	-0.03	(.04)
Negative policy evaluations	-0.17	(.01)**	-0.14	(.01)**	-0.28	(.01)**	-0.16	(.01)**
Ideological extremist	0.01	(.00)**	0.00	(.00)	-0.00	(.00)	-0.00	(.00)
Low political trust	-0.28	(.01)**	-0.24	(.01)**	-0.32	(.01)**	-0.25	(.01)**
Religious	0.02	(.00)**	-0.00	(.00)	0.02	(.00)**	0.05	(.01)**
Values and beliefs								
Left-wing ideology	-0.09	(.02)**	-0.04	(.02)*	-0.07	(.02)**	-0.04	(.03)
Liberal values	0.00	(.01)	0.07	(.01)**	-0.09	(.02)**	-0.08	(.02)**
Age group (<25 years)								
26-35	-0.04	(.04)	0.22	(.04)**	-0.21	(.05)**	-0.05	(.07)
36-45	0.05	(.04)	0.34	(.04)**	-0.22	(.05)**	0.03	(.07)
46-55	0.18	(.04)**	0.45	(.04)**	-0.22	(.05)**	-0.02	(.07)
56-65	0.26	(.04)**	0.49	(.04)**	-0.19	(.05)**	0.09	(.07)
>65	0.39	(.04)**	0.52	(.04)**	-0.14	(.05)**	0.12	(.07)
Age finished education (ref: <16 years)								
16-18 years	0.03	(.03)	0.11	(.03)**	-0.04	(.04)	-0.11	(.05)**
>19 years	-0.04	(.03)*	0.11	(.02)**	-0.11	(.04)**	-0.57	(.05)**
Constant	8.94	(.09)**	8.46	(.09)**	9.28	(.13)**	8.44	(.17)**
F	377.37		359.45		338.12		227.58	

Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R ²	0.36	0.35	0.33	0.25
N (unweighted)	22,817	22,677	23,403	23,367

(c) Democratic legitimacy

	Electoral		Liberal		Social		Direct	
Gain and loss								
Socio-economic status (income: low)								
Medium	-0.05	(.03)	0.01	(.03)	0.10	(.04)*	-0.13	(.05)**
High	-0.13	(.03)**	-0.07	(.03)*	0.45	(.05)**	-0.18	(.06)**
Feel discriminated against	-0.50	(.05)**	-0.49	(.04)**	-0.53	(.07)**	-0.66	(.08)**
Electoral loser	-0.11	(.03)**	-0.10	(.02)**	-0.20	(.04)**	-0.16	(.05)**
Negative policy evaluations	-0.18	(.01)**	-0.13	(.01)**	-0.32	(.01)**	-0.20	(.02)**
Ideological extremist	-0.00	(.00)*	-0.01	(.00)**	-0.01	(.00)**	-0.02	(.00)**
Low political trust	-0.25	(.01)**	-0.18	(.01)**	-0.32	(.01)**	-0.32	(.01)**
Religious	0.01	(.00)**	0.00	(.00)	-0.01	(.00)	0.03	(.01)**
Values and beliefs								
Left-wing ideology	0.00	(.02)	0.01	(.02)	-0.12	(.03)**	0.10	(.03)**
Liberal values	-0.16	(.01)**	-0.16	(.01)**	-0.25	(.02)**	-0.19	(.02)**
Age group (<25 years)								
26-35	-0.12	(.04)**	0.00	(.04)	-0.34	(.07)**	-0.13	(.08)
36-45	-0.11	(.04)**	0.01	(.04)	-0.46	(.07)**	-0.03	(.08)
46-55	-0.10	(.04)*	0.02	(.04)	-0.57	(.07)**	-0.13	(.07)
56-65	-0.13	(.04)**	-0.00	(.04)	-0.67	(.07)**	0.00	(.08)
>65	0.02	(.04)	0.05	(.04)	-0.54	(.07)**	0.14	(.08)
Age finished education (ref: <16 years)								
16-18 years	-0.21	(.03)**	-0.16	(.03)**	-0.13	(.05)**	-0.26	(.06)**
>19 years	-0.39	(.03)**	-0.42	(.03)**	0.02	(.04)	-0.47	(.05)**
Constant	1.55	(.11)**	1.54	(.10)**	2.92	(.16)**	1.25	(.19)**

F	353.69	278.99	346.12	196.30
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R ²	0.35	0.30	0.34	0.22
N (unweighted)	22,471	22,409	23,216	23,196

Appendix 8: Summary of regression models predicting democratic expectations, evaluations and legitimacy, 16 west European countries

(a) Electoral democracy

	Bel			Cyp			Den			Fin			Fra			Ger			Ice			Ire								
	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L						
Gain and loss																														
Socio-economic status (income: low)																														
Medium				+								+				+							+	+						
High										+	+	-										+								
Feel discriminated against	+	-				-	-				+	-	+	-	+	-														
Electoral loser																-	-													
Negative policy evaluations	-	-	-				-	-				-	-				-	-				-	-							
Ideological extremist	+																		+	+	+									
Low political trust	-	-	-				-	-	-				-	-	-				-	-				-	-					
Values and beliefs																														
Left-wing ideology	-																		-	-	-				-	-				
Liberal values	+	-				-				+	-	+	+				-	+	-	+	-	+	-				-			
Age group (<25 years)																														
26-35										+				-				+				+								
36-45							+	+							+															
46-55	+	-				+	+							+				+												
56-65	+						+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+			
>65							+	+				+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+				
Age finished education (<16 years)																														
16+18 years	+									+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+				
>19 years	+	-				-	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+				
N (weighted; range across models)	1653-			632-			1390-			1843-			1719-			2322-			551-			1979-								
	1685			680			1422			1864			1737			2418			583			2053								

Gain and loss								
Socio-economic status (income: low)								
Medium		+	+			+	+	
High	+	+	+		+	+	-	+
Feel discriminated against	+		-		+	-	+	-
Electoral loser	+						+	
Negative policy evaluations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ideological extremist	+		-	+				+
Low political trust	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Values and beliefs								
Left-wing ideology			+					-
Liberal values	+	-	+	-	+	+	-	+
Age group (<25 years)								
26-35	+			+		+		
36-45	+	+	+		+	+		+
46-55	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
56-65	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
>65	+	+		+	+		+	+
Age finished education (<16 years)								
16+18 years	+			+	-	+	-	+
>19 years	+	+	-	-	+	-	+	-
N (weighted; range across models)	1640-1673	632-680	1364-1421	1825-1851	1715-1745	2324-2432	563-606	1985-2079

	Ita	Neth	Nor	Por	Spa	Swe	Swi	UK
	E P L	E P L	E P L	E P L	E P L	E P L	E P L	E P L
Gain and loss								
Socio-economic status (income: low)								
Medium								+
High		+	+	+	+		+	+
Feel discriminated against	-		-	+	-	+	+	-

Electoral loser		+	-	-	+	-		+	-	-		+	+	
Negative policy evaluations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ideological extremist	+	+					+	-				+		+
Low political trust	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Values and beliefs														
Left-wing ideology	-	-					-	+						-
Liberal values	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+
Age group (<25 years)														
26-35				+	+					+	+			
36-45		+		+	+			+		+	+	+		+
46-55	+	+	+	+	+			+	+	+	+	+	+	
56-65	+	+	+	-	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	-	+
>65	+	+		+	+			+	+	+	+			+
Age finished education (<16 years)														
16+18 years	+	+					+	+		+	-	+		
>19 years	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+		+	-	+	-	+
N (weighted; range across models)	558- 584	1556- 1604	1493- 1510	1263- 1384	1446- 1499	1500- 1581	1051- 1127	1639- 1718						

(c) Social democracy

	Bel			Cyp			Den			Fin			Fra			Ger			Ice			Ire		
	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L
Gain and loss																								
Socio-economic status (income: low)																								
Medium	-		+																-	+	+	+		
High	-	+	+					+					-			-	+		-		+			
Feel discriminated against	+		-													-	-		+		-			
Electoral loser																+	-	-						
Negative policy evaluations	-	-														-	-		-	-		+		-

Ideological extremist	+	-		+	-	-		+			+	+
Low political trust	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Values and beliefs												
Left-wing ideology			-			+				+	-	-
Liberal values	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	+		-	-	-
Age group (<25 years)												
26-35						+	-	-			+	
36-45				+	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	
46-55	+	+		-	-	+	-	+	-	-	+	-
56-65	+			+	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	+
>65				+	-	+	-	+	-	-	+	-
Age finished education (<16 years)												
16+18 years	+			-		+				-		
>19 years		-		-	+				-	-		
N (weighted; range across models)	1683- 1701	677- 703	1390- 1420	1855- 1875	1745- 1755	2417- 2448	591- 603	2076- 2105				

	Ita			Neth			Nor			Por			Spa			Swe			Swi			UK					
	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L	E	P	L
Gain and loss																											
Socio-economic status (income: low)																											
Medium													-	-					-	+	+						
High	-		+		+		-		+										-	+	+						
Feel discriminated against																						-					
Electoral loser				-	-								-	-		+											
Negative policy evaluations	-	-		-	-		-	-		+	-	-	-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-	
Ideological extremist										+												-	-				
Low political trust	-	-		-	-		-	-		+	-	-	-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-	
Values and beliefs																											
Left-wing ideology										-																	
Liberal values							-			+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-			+					

16+18 years		+	-					
>19 years				-	-		-	-
N (weighted; range across models)	584- 600	1579- 1602	1502- 1519	1310- 1371	1465- 1507	1577- 1598	1140- 1152	1721- 1771

Notes:
 E=Expectations; P=Performance evaluations; L=Legitimacy.
 + Positive effect - Negative effect (p≤0.05; two-tailed test).
 Full results are available at: [URL withheld to maintain author anonymity]