



**CHANGING ATTITUDES TO
IMMIGRANTS' INCLUSION IN THE WELFARE STATE
IN NORWAY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM**

***A DELIBERATIVE APPROACH TO STUDYING ATTITUDE-FORMATION
THROUGH SOCIAL INTERACTIONS***

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DECLARATION

I, **Adrienn Győry**, declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own research. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm, that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Signed:

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Győry Adrienn', written in a cursive style.

Date: Canterbury, 30 January 2020

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ABSTRACT

Public polarization about the issue of immigration is a significant source of deepening divisions in society. To better understand public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state, this research takes a novel, qualitative approach to studying public attitudes through social interaction during democratic forums conducted in Norway and in the United Kingdom in 2015.

The research analyses people's understanding of the issue of immigration and how they articulate their attitudes and interact with others. It finds that attitudes to immigrants' inclusion involve diverse considerations and create ambivalence, as people have both positive and negative perceptions of immigration and immigrants. Furthermore, as people differentiate between immigrants, preferences for inclusion and exclusion vary depending on the group of immigrants. Changes in attitude can be identified considering the specific social contexts, needs, and interests related to the in-group, to the welfare state in the country of destination, and to the social situations that immigrants face. Therefore, this research stresses the dynamism of attitude-formation and argues that public attitudes to immigrants should not be simplified to one single attitude either 'for' or 'against' the inclusion of immigrants, as preferences range between pro-inclusive and pro-exclusive depending on the specific group of immigrants and the specific social context under consideration.

Furthermore, this research provides new evidence about how specific institutional features are discursively reproduced through interaction during debates. The research argues that especially differences in the institutional and social context explain the differences between the inclusive approach to immigration in the Norwegian and the restrictive approach to immigration in the British democratic forums. These findings draw attention to the power of the framing of issues in the wider public- and political discourse, and to the role of the homogeneity and heterogeneity of views. While a homogeneity of views and prevailing consensus within group discussions (and within the wider social context) can limit the scope of attitude-formation and restrict the reconsideration of stances for or against inclusion, a heterogeneity of views and competing preferences engender more comprehensive discussion that includes consideration of a wider range of aspects and measures concerning the inclusion of immigrants.

In analysing the dynamism of attitude-formation and the diversity of considerations behind public attitudes, the research makes significant theoretical and methodological contributions to the knowledge in the field of welfare attitudes. The research findings complement existing research into attitudes to immigrants' access to welfare provision, which predominantly relies on public opinion surveys. Furthermore, the research has important implications for future research and policy-making.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Public polarization on the issue of immigration is especially concerning as European populations are ageing. Considering the need for an active-age labour force for the maintenance of European welfare systems, the question is not about the need for a foreign labour force, but more about **how to manage immigration in the future**. The political salience of immigration is increasing, support for right-wing populist parties is on the rise, and negative tendencies, often expressed as welfare chauvinism is emerging across Europe (Akkerman, 2015; Alonso and Fonseca, 2012; Svallfors, 2012). Therefore, we **need to better understand public attitudes towards immigration**, we need to know more about people's considerations behind attitudes. **This research pioneers a specific methodology to improve our knowledge on and means to study public attitudes, which provides the basis to better understand and to better manage public concerns about immigration**. Accordingly, this research analyses public attitudes through social interaction during democratic forums conducted in Norway and in the United Kingdom in 2015. One of the most prominent benefits of conducting democratic forum is that it grants **high level of autonomy to participants to shape the discussions, to share their understanding of the issue**. Taking away the control from researchers, **democratic forums shed light on issues people perceive that might not have been considered by researchers so far**. Thus, giving rise to innovation and new approaches that can help to reduce tensions and facilitate inclusion of immigrants in the welfare states.

1.1 THE SOCIAL CONTEXT AND THE AIMS OF THE RESEARCH

European welfare states enjoy stable and relatively strong public support (Svallfors, 2012). However, the increasing pressures affecting welfare states raise questions about their long-term sustainability. An increasing number of researchers are pointing out the fact that the viability of welfare states will depend on the states' capacity to reconcile social and ethnic heterogeneity with popular support for the welfare state, emphasising inclusiveness, social cohesion, and the extension of social solidarity to immigrants (Banting and Kymlicka, 2017; Crepaz, 2008; Larsen, 2013; Taylor-Gooby, 2008). However, the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the consequent welfare retrenchments (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2017), and changes in mass migration, including the 2015 Refugee Crisis, have contributed to the intensification of public

concerns about immigration. Intergroup differentiation has become prevalent both in public and political discourse, which tends to deepen social divisions. Such divisions unfold not only in the relations between immigrants and nationals, but increase polarization within society itself. These trends significantly hinder the strengthening of social cohesion that could ensure the sustainability of welfare states.

Such trends throughout Europe calls for a more in-depth investigation of public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion. **Believing in the value and benefits of social inclusion, this research is devoted to examining public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state in order to better understand the conditions of immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state.** While previous research has examined the impact of immigration on welfare states with a focus on trust, social cohesion, and the institutional and political factors that enhance popular support for the welfare state (Banting, 1998; Taylor-Gooby, 2005; Goul Andersen, 2006; Soroka et al., 2006; Banting and Kymlicka, 2006; Crepaz, 2008), this research aims to take a step further and analyse the **dynamics of attitude-formation**. More specifically, it aims to contribute to the growing body of research by **examining the mechanisms underlying public preferences for the inclusion of immigrants in the welfare state**. Adopting a qualitative approach, the research aspires to analyse processes of differentiation between in-groups of nationals and out-groups of immigrants.

1.2 A UNIQUE RESEARCH APPROACH

The research analyses democratic forums conducted in the *Welfare State Futures – Our Children's Europe*¹ (WelfSOC) international research project. WelfSOC was the first international research effort to adopt democratic forums (DF) in the field of welfare attitude research. This deliberative method represents a genuinely different approach to the research of attitudes as it enables the **analysis of attitudes as articulated by participants through social interaction**. In contrast to public opinion surveys, which are most frequently used in attitudinal research (Ervasti et al., 2012; Sundberg and Taylor-Gooby, 2013), DF encourage participants to share their opinions, to justify their stances, and to discuss ambivalences and

¹ WelfSOC (2015-2018) aimed to analysing people's opinions, aspirations, and preferences for a future welfare state in 2040. It adopted a qualitative research design that included the use of democratic forums and focus groups. The research was conducted in Denmark, Germany, Norway, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom. Further information about the project is available at <http://blogs.kent.ac.uk/welfsoc/>

various aspects of the issues under examination. Thus, they offer the possibility to **examine the process through which attitudes are expressed, and to disentangle the reasons and justifications behind articulated attitudes.**

Within WelfSOC, the DFs involved two days of discussion about the future of welfare states in five European countries. However, the present research is restricted to a comparative analysis of DF discussions in Norway and in the United Kingdom. Through the analysis of DF discussions, the research aims to examine **(Research Question 1) how people's attitudes to the inclusion of immigrants emerge and evolve in the debates.** Applying discourse analytical methods, it intends to analyse **(RQ2) what considerations affect the way people discuss immigration, and what mechanisms shape people's attitudes toward inclusion and/or exclusion.** It is expected that through interaction and raising a diversity of views, arguments and interests, and taking into account different contexts and situations, the imaginary boundary between inclusion and exclusion will flexibly shift during the debates. Thus, at the heart of this research is to **identify such shifts in attitudes and examine the dynamics of attitude-formation.** Furthermore, it aims **to analyse (RQ3) when and under what circumstances do such effects and shifts occur in the DF discussions.**

Considering the challenges that increasing immigration and the wider scale social diversification of societies pose, the research assumes that the viability of welfare states will depend on states' capacities to reconcile social diversity with popular support for welfare states. This is the primary reason it aims to investigate what considerations enhance, or, on the contrary, undermine the development of a more inclusive welfare state. This consideration was taken into account in the selection of **Norway and the United Kingdom as case study countries.**² These two countries represent two different welfare regimes with differing public understandings of and attitudes towards welfare. Norway is a stable, social democratic welfare state with a high level of provision and a regulated labour market. The UK represents a liberal-leaning regime that offers a lower level of benefits and has an open, deregulated labour market. Furthermore, the DF discussions about immigration demonstrated distinctive approaches to the inclusion of immigrants. In the UK, participants were defensive and cautious about immigrants. In Norway, the debates concerned finding a suitable way of dealing with immigration and integrating immigrants for the benefit of the

² For a more elaborate justification of country choice, see Section 1.3.1

country.³ It was the latter distinction that influenced the choice of these two countries to examine *(RQ4) why people are more inclusive in one country than in the other*.

The DFs were conducted in October and November 2015, after the Refugee Crisis peaked in the summer of 2015, and prior to the campaign on the Brexit referendum in 2016 in the UK. These happenings genuinely affected the course of discussions and accentuated immigration-related issues. Therefore, the timing of the forums provided an outstanding opportunity to analyse attitude-formation in the polarized and heated social atmosphere that characterized the debates about the Refugee Crisis and the pre-Brexit period in the UK. The latter makes the cross-country comparison more challenging, but also more interesting, as there are profound differences with regard to how immigration is approached in the British and Norwegian discussions.

While the research aims to approach attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state in their complexity, it is essential to specify the scope of the research setting the key theoretical foundations on which this research draws, and to clarify the key terms used throughout the research.

1.3 THE SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH

The first step in delineating the scope and theoretical framework of this research is to define the understanding of public attitudes. In contrast to the traditional conceptualisation of public attitudes that are viewed as relatively fixed and stable evaluative responses to issues (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Wilson and Hodges, 1992), this research adheres to the social constructivist understanding of public attitudes. This conceives of **public attitudes as a set of considerations which are shaped by the social context, public discourses, and social interactions, with a stress on their fluidity and context-dependency** (Converse, 2006; Tourangeau et al., 2000; Wilson and Hodges, 1992).

Accordingly, **the first hypothesis** of this research is that **attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state change depending on the specific group of immigrants, and on the specific social aspects, contexts, and situations considered**. Therefore, this research argues that attitudes should not be reduced and simplified to binary terms such as 'in favour of' or 'against' the inclusion of immigrants. On the contrary, within the scope of this research,

³ The policy proposals formulated during the DFs are available in Table 1 – Appendix 1

attitudes are conceptualised to range along **an abstract continuum between inclusion and exclusion, along which they can shift depending on specific considerations**. This flexible and dynamic approach also allows us to identify ambivalences and contradictory claims behind articulated attitudes and to understand how such competing views are reconciled within groups.

Our **second hypothesis** concerns the **considerations⁴ that influence changes in preferences for inclusion and exclusion**. Acknowledging the intergroup context of immigration, this research argues that **the considerations behind attitudes are not only shaped by perceptions of immigrants** – i.e. in terms of differentiating specific groups of immigrants, assessing their achievements and efforts in the country of destination, etc. Instead, it claims that **perceptions of the in-group** – i.e. perceptions of the status of the in-group in society, perceptions about collective interests and societal aims, and perceptions about the role and functions of welfare state – **are equally important in shaping attitudes to immigrants' inclusion**. This hypothesis draws on **Social Identity Theory** (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel et al., 1971) that asserts that group membership influences individual identity and induces intergroup differentiation. Thus, it is argued that group membership and perceptions of the in-group set the benchmark and provide the lenses through which immigrants and their conduct are judged in the society. Considering such interactions related to perceptions of the in-group and the out-group, **within the scope of this research intergroup differentiation is understood as a means of accessing, analysing, and better understanding attitudes to immigrants' inclusion**.

To further narrow the scope of the analysis and to specify what is meant by the concept of inclusion in a welfare state, the research draws on **Welfare Deservingness Theory** (Van Oorschot, 2000, 2006; Van Oorschot et al., 2017). On the one hand, we may assume that people prefer to include immigrants whom they see as deserving. On the other hand, making a differentiation between 'deserving' and 'undeserving' welfare beneficiaries is a common and easily accessible means of justifying access to state support (Petersen et al., 2012). It was thus expected that deservingness judgements would naturally emerge in the discussions and provide authentic reasoning for or against the inclusion of immigrants. Therefore, **throughout the research, attitudes to immigrants' inclusion are approached through an analysis of perceptions of immigrants' deservingness based on the five deservingness**

⁴ Such considerations can be the perceived motivations of immigrants to migrate, immigrants' skills, reflections on discrimination of immigrants in the labour market, etc. For the in-depth analysis, see Chapter 5 and 6.

criteria (Cook, 1979; Swaan, 1988; Van Oorschot, 2000). The analysis of (in-group) perceptions of immigrants' deservingness is intended to investigate people's use and understanding of deservingness principles, which currently remains an under-researched area (Van Oorschot and Roosma, 2015). It is expected that both the understandings and the salience of particular deservingness criteria vary depending on specific groups of immigrants and specific social contexts. Therefore, the analysis provides a suitable means of testing our first hypothesis about the dynamism of attitude-formation. Furthermore, as deservingness judgements reflect the specific relation between the state and immigrants including the rights and duties of immigrants in the country of destination, the analysis allows us to test the second hypothesis about the role of and interactions between in-group and out-group perceptions.

Focusing on the interactions between the in-group and out-group perceptions leads to the **third hypothesis**: that **the institutional and social context affect in-group and out-group perceptions**. Building on the **dynamic institutionalist approach to the study of welfare attitudes** (Mau, 2003; Larsen, 2006, 2013; Sundberg, 2014), this research argues that the institutional and social context influences attitude-formation, and interactions between the institutional and social context are a significant driver of changing attitudes. Institutions provide a relatively stable framework, defining specific meanings and understandings of the world through sets of regulations and policies that are in line with and reinforce social values, norms, and expectations (March and Olsen, 2008). However, the salience of specific aspects of institutions – e.g. adherence to the principle of equal opportunities – can vary in the light of changing social contexts. For instance, in the context of the Refugee Crisis, the principle of equal opportunities might be overshadowed by preferences for security and control measures that are also embedded in institutions. This implies the need to analyse the specificity of the social context – including public and political discourses – as the social context is more prone to respond and to adjust to new developments and changing circumstances.

Taking an institutional approach, this research provides new evidence about how specific institutional features are discursively reproduced through interactions during the debates. There are distinct ways of thinking about immigration and welfare states, and the salience of these considerations can significantly vary (Kulin et al., 2016). Therefore, throughout the research particular attention is devoted to examining how perceived changes in the social context induce changes in attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state. Furthermore, this is the point at which the comparison of Norway and the UK becomes

relevant. The following section provides a review of the key differences and similarities between the two countries.

1.3.1 Country selection

Drawing on scholarship about welfare attitudes, the **differences in the Norwegian and British welfare systems were** one of the key arguments for the comparison of these two countries. While researchers are polarized about how to categorise the countries into specific regimes, there is consensus that support for equality, redistribution, and state intervention are most prominent in social democratic welfare states and weakest in liberal regimes (Svallfors, 2010). Studies of the relation between immigration and welfare states (Crepaz, 2008; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Swank and Betz, 2003), and studies focusing on welfare chauvinism (Crepaz and Damron, 2009; Mewes and Mau, 2013; Van Der Waal et al., 2013), highlighted the differences between comprehensive welfare states such as Norway, which are characterised by universal access to welfare provision, and liberal welfare states as the UK, with their higher share of means-tested benefits. Differences also concern how the labour market is organised and regulated, which together with welfare institutions might considerably affect perceptions of social inequalities in these two countries (Larsen, 2006). As perceptions of social inequalities and insecurities can be drivers of intergroup differentiation and anti-immigrant attitudes (Crepaz, 2008; Larsen, 2013), the way institutions address the issue of social insecurities is highly important. While perceptions of social inequalities might not be so important in relation to other dimensions of welfare attitudes, in relation to immigrants such perceptions tend to strengthen.

In relation to **the issue of immigration**, these two countries share certain features. The share of immigrants (foreign-born) in the population is similar, amounting to 14-15% (Eurostat). However, due to the difference in the size of the countries, there is a huge difference in the absolute number of immigrants. Consequently, it is crucial to find out more about (mis)perceptions concerning the proportion of immigrants in these two countries, which might have a significant effect on debates concerning immigrants (Van Der Waal et al., 2010; Mewes and Mau, 2013; Meuleman et al., 2018). Norway, as part of the European Economic Area, is subject to regulations concerning the free movement of people. Therefore, in both countries there is a dual system of immigration policies for EU (and EEA) citizens and non-EU nationals. However, from a historical perspective, post-colonial migration distinguishes the position of the UK concerning public reactions to immigration and contact with immigrants.

Right-wing populist parties are present in both countries and both parties use the issue of immigration for political mobilization –. However, there are significant differences in the right-wing populist party UKIP and the Progress Party in Norway. The parties were supported with 12.6% (2015) and 16.3% (2013) of all votes, respectively (Döring and Manow, 2019). While these electoral results are relatively similar, due to the differences in the electoral system there is a huge gap between these two parties in terms of the share of mandates and their role in national parliaments. Moreover, the Progress Party is a member of the Norwegian government.

During the DF discussions the issue of immigration was one of the top themes in both countries. However, the discussions revealed substantial differences. While in the UK the discussion concentrated on border controls, and the monitoring of immigrants entering the country was primarily associated with the exclusion of immigrants, in Norway debates focused on the need to integrate immigrants for the benefit of the country. This elemental difference encouraged us to examine the discourse that developed during DFs to scrutinise the contexts in which intergroup differentiation gains sense, attitudes to immigrants' inclusion or exclusion are articulated, and the mechanisms behind these attitudes can be better identified.

There exist a series of international comparative analyses that include these two countries both in relation to welfare attitudes and attitudes to immigration. However, as argued before, our knowledge about the dynamics of attitude-formation is under-researched. Therefore, the selection of these two countries produced a highly interesting comparison to test the above-described three hypotheses.

The former sections intended to define the scope of the research by elaborating on the three hypotheses and the four theories that create the foundations for the research. Social Constructivism is present as an overarching theory, affecting the essential understanding and approach to public attitudes as dynamic social concepts. Furthermore, the other three theories also draw on and employ the social constructivist approach. Both Social Identity Theory and Welfare Deservingness Theory provide the specific tools and framing along which the scope of the research was narrowed down and the conceptualisation of inclusion in welfare states was operationalized. Last, the institutionalist approach complements the research approach for explaining the similarities and differences identified in the Norwegian and British DF discussions both in terms of the content and process of attitude-formation. In

line with the described logic and motivation behind the research, the following section specifies the structure of the thesis.

1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The analysis of the considerations behind public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state and the dynamism of attitude-formation requires a step-by-step approach intended to gradually specify the research approach, and then present the research findings. Accordingly, the following **Chapter 2 reviews the academic literature** about the relation between immigration and welfare state support, and studies that specifically focus on attitudes to immigrants' access to welfare provision. Following up on the literature review, **Chapter 3 introduces the chosen methodological approach**. It intends to justify that the combination of DF and discourse analysis is suitable for answering the research questions. Throughout the research, particular attention is devoted to understanding the role of the institutional and social context in attitude-formation. Therefore, **Chapter 4 offers a comparative overview of the institutional and social context in Norway and in the UK**. Accordingly, Chapter 4 depicts trends in attitudes to immigration and immigrants' access to welfare provisions, elaborates on the development of immigration-, welfare-, and labour market policies, and the related public and political discourses. While the first part of the thesis captures the gradual development of the research approach, the second part of the thesis presents the research findings.

Within the research, attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state and the dynamism of attitude-formation are examined from four distinctive perspectives that are presented chapter-by-chapter. **Chapter 5 addresses what considerations affect attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state through an analysis of (in-group) perceptions of immigrants' welfare deservingness** (addressing [RQ2](#) and [RQ4](#)). The chapter proposes a new approach to explain the identified differences between Norwegian and British participants' understanding of deservingness criteria. Drawing on and deepening the findings of Chapter 5, **Chapter 6 analyses the practise of constructing the welfare deservingness of refugees and economic migrants** as the two most widely discussed groups of immigrants. While Chapter 5 elaborates on DF participants' use and understanding of deservingness criteria, Chapter 6 shows how the relevance and ranking of the five deservingness criteria change

depending on the specific group of immigrants, and on the time dimension (short- or long-term) considered by participants (addressing [RQ2](#) and [RQ4](#)).

Chapter 7 and 8 complement the findings of the content analysis presented in Chapter 5 and 6 by shifting attention to the process of attitude-formation. By analysing one Norwegian and one British case study, **Chapter 7 examines the process of attitude-formation in groups** analysing the interactions between participants, the role of group dynamics, and the potential effects of the homogeneity and heterogeneity of opinions in group discussions (addressing [RQ1](#), [RQ3](#) and [RQ4](#)). **Chapter 8 looks at the dynamism of attitude-formation from the perspective of individual participants.** To scrutinize the development of individual attitudes through interactions, Chapter 8 proposes a joint analysis of the narrative as well as pre- and post-deliberation survey⁵ responses of DF participants (addressing [RQ1](#), [RQ3](#) and [RQ4](#)). Accordingly, the chapter includes two Norwegian and two British case studies. **The thesis concludes with Chapter 9.** After a brief overview of the main research findings, the final chapter highlights the theoretical and methodological contributions of this research and delineates its policy implications.

The challenge of studying attitudes to such a polarizing issue as immigration is due to the complexity, multi-dimensionality, and context-dependency of attitudes. This research proposes a novel qualitative approach to the study of attitudes to immigrants' inclusion. The use of DF as method of data collection and discourse analysis as method of data analysis offers a new opportunity to analyse attitudes as they are shared by ordinary people, to learn about the considerations behind articulated attitudes, and to examine the dynamism of attitude-formation. Thus, the research aims to contribute to a better understanding of attitudes to immigrants' inclusion, and to increase understanding of the conditions of inclusion. It intends to complement the growing body of research that is based predominantly on international public opinion surveys. Recognizing the limits of this research means acknowledging that it cannot fully and comprehensively address the complexity, multi-dimensionality, and context-dependency of attitudes. However, it attempts to reveal how people debated immigration and shared their attitudes in Norwegian and British groups in the context of heightened debates about immigration following the peak of the 2015 Refugee Crisis and in pre-Brexit Britain. The research draws attention to the analysis of the dynamism of attitude-formation in order to reveal what makes a difference

⁵ As part of DF, participants were asked to fill out a survey before starting the discussions on Day 1 and after finishing the discussions on Day 2 – for further details see Section 3.3.1.5

and what changes attitudes to immigration. Thereby, revealing the potential drivers and barriers to creating a more inclusive welfare state. As a first step towards fulfilling these aims, the following chapter introduces theoretical discussions about immigration and welfare state support, and presents an overview of the key findings about attitudes to the inclusion of immigrants.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

The focal point of this thesis is analysing public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state. The long-term sustainability of welfare states requires a great amount of inclusivity (Banting and Kymlicka, 2017; Crepaz, 2008; Larsen, 2013; Taylor-Gooby, 2008). However, in contrast to the anticipated inclusion of immigrants, we have recently observed the deepening of social divisions fuelled by populist discourses and welfare chauvinism throughout Europe (Akkerman, 2015; Alonso and Fonseca, 2012; Svallfors, 2012). This contradiction and the need to better understand the conditions of inclusion inspired this research. Considering the complexity of the relation between immigration and the welfare state and the diversity of considerations behind public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion, the research draws on four main theories.

First and foremost, **Social Constructivism** creates the basic pillar of the research through its understanding of public attitudes as dynamic social concepts (Converse, 2006; Tourangeau et al., 2000; Wilson and Hodges, 1992). Abraham Tesser (1978: 297–298) argues that *“an attitude at a particular point in time is the result of a constructive process. ... there is not a single attitude toward and object but rather, any number of attitudes depending on the number of schemas available for thinking about the object”*. This definition captures the aim of this research: to study the constructive process as it happens through social interactions. The remaining three theories – namely, **Social Identity Theory** (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel et al., 1971), **Welfare Deservingness Theory** (Van Oorschot, 2000; Van Oorschot et al., 2017), and **Institutionalism** (Larsen, 2006; Mau, 2003; Sundberg, 2014) – guide the investigation of this constructive process by focusing on intergroup differentiation, perceptions of deservingness, and the specificities of the institutional and social contexts affecting attitude-formation. The four theories are closely intertwined and constitute a coherent approach. Social Constructivism and Social Identity Theory stress how social identities are formed, creating a basis for disentangling how welfare deservingness and immigrants' inclusion are understood, with attention to the importance of institutional contexts and to the variability between welfare states. The DFs provide a framework in which this constructive process of attitude-formation can unfold, enabling us to analyse how identities, attitudes, and criteria of inclusion are shaped and re-shaped through social interaction.

This chapter provides an overview of the key research findings in order to delineate and justify the theoretical approach of this research. As a starting point of this literature review,

research on relation between immigration and popular support for welfare state is revisited. Second, the expanding literature on welfare chauvinism is reviewed with particular attention to: 1) the impact of intergroup relations on perceptions of immigration, 2) perceptions of the welfare deservingness of immigrants, and 3) institutional approaches to the study of welfare attitudes.

2.1 WELFARE STATES AND THE RELEVANCE OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS

Immigration is often categorized as one of the complex and interrelated social processes – along with technological advancement and globalisation, the restructuring of the labour market and demographic changes, etc. – which are increasing the pressure on welfare states but also providing new opportunities (Emmenegger et al., 2012; Svallfors, 2012; Taylor-Gooby et al., 2017). Such processes challenge the social consensus and solidarity between the working and middle class on which European welfare states were built (Baldwin, 1990; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1983). They also give rise to new social divisions (Svallfors, 2012; Taylor-Gooby, 2008), which can be easily misused in political competition to increase the popularity of right-wing populist parties. While it is hard to separate the effects and changes these individual social processes bring about, immigration stands out as it confronts the nation-state conception that welfare states grant and restrict access to social rights based on national membership and a shared sense of national belonging (Bommes and Geddes, 2000; Wolfe and Klausen, 1997).

The development of welfare states has been part of nation-building efforts and the consolidation of nation-states (Clarke, 2005; Wimmer 1998 in Mau and Burkhardt, 2009). The gradual expansion of the social rights of citizens was frequently adopted to reduce social divisions in the population and to promote commonalities, collective aims, and entitlements (Tilly, 1994). Thus, welfare states have created a closed collective of individuals – an ‘in-group’ – which functions on the basis of a widely shared and institutionally-embedded consensus about citizenship and common good that promotes a certain way of life, social behaviour, and morals (Clarke, 2005; Mau, 2003; Wolfe and Klausen, 1997). Immigration challenges this situation, especially the collective boundaries of welfare states. This thesis is therefore specifically devoted **to exploring how flexible and permeable the boundaries between the in-group – i.e. citizens, members of the collective – and the out-group of immigrants are in the eyes of ordinary people.**

The social rights the welfare state provides to its members have become an integral part of in-group identity which can act to override individual interests, mitigate internal social divisions, and provide a firm basis for redistribution (Baldwin, 1990; Korpi, 1983). This nation-state conception of welfare states demonstrates the tenets of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel et al., 1971), which stresses how the identity of individuals is shaped by group membership, and how individuals adopt and adapt to group norms and values. However, we need to note that the understanding and the salience of group identification can greatly vary person-by-person, but also over time depending on the specific social contexts (Brown, 2020). Investigating what contexts trigger group identifications is relevant as group membership also gives rise to differentiation between the in-group – ‘us’ – and the out-group – ‘them’ (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1975). While this differentiation strengthens in-group identity and social cohesion within the in-group, it also reinforces divisions in relation to the out-group (Kramer and Brewer, 1984). It is especially this aspect – the analysis of social categorization and intergroup differentiation – that is the focus of this research. Through the lens of intergroup differentiation, the research aims to elaborate on how the in-group define themselves, and how such perceptions of the in-group – including perceptions of their own role within the welfare state, as well as the relationship between the individual and the state – emerge in characterisations of and expectations from immigrants. Throughout the thesis such characterisations and expectations, as shared by research participants, will be analysed to **identify the boundaries between preferences for the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants from the welfare state**. The key expectation is that **DF discussions can reveal how dynamically such boundaries can change depending on the specific social contexts and considerations**.

Many researchers treat nation-state conceptions unquestionable and unproblematic, and take for granted the existence of internal cohesion and unity within them (Sager, 2016). However, we are now witnessing a shift from citizenship-based eligibility to residence- and contribution-based social rights that is challenging the role and value of citizenship (Sainsbury, 2012). While some researchers argue that nation-states and national identity are essential for the sustainability of welfare states (Calhoun, 2002; Miller, 1995), others suggest that social cohesion should be extended beyond national identity in order to identify new platforms for cohesion that also permit the inclusion of immigrants (Banting and Kymlicka, 2017; Crepaz, 2008; Larsen, 2013; Taylor-Gooby, 2008). Issues regarding the compatibility of increasing immigration and the high level of support for the welfare state have heightened debate among scholars and given impetus to a new wave of welfare attitude research,

especially in relation to the future of European welfare states. The next section provides a review of the literature about the so-called 'progressive dilemma' (Goodhart, 2004; Koopmans, 2010).

2.2 THE PROGRESSIVE DILEMMA – DOES IMMIGRATION REDUCE PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE WELFARE STATE?

The key argument contained in the progressive dilemma is that increasing ethnic diversity – as a result of immigration – weakens social trust, which diminishes willingness to share solidarity and to redistribute resources to others with whom people do not identify or trust (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). Such negative effects were pinpointed by Freeman (1986) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004). Based on a study of fifty-four countries, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) find that ethnic heterogeneity negatively affects welfare state support, which is sensitive to the level of in-group solidarity. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) claim that it is primarily ethnic diversity and a lack of in-group solidarity that blocked the development of strong support for a generous welfare system in the US, compared to that of European welfare states. Based on the American experience, they warn that increasing immigration will endanger social solidarity in Europe, leading to declining support for welfare.

Talking about the effects of increasing ethnic diversity, it is worth to stress that the term ethnic diversity covers a heterogeneous group of people including members of autochthonous ethnic minorities, indigenous people, immigrants as well as immigrants' descendants (Castles and Schierup, 2010). The recently contested 'increasing ethnic diversity' concerns primarily the latter two categories. However, even within these two categories lies high level of heterogeneity. Diversity stems from the specific legal types of migrants distinguishing refugees, economic migrants, family migrants and international students. Evidence suggests that public conceptualisation of the specific groups of immigrants has relevant implications for formation of public opinion and attitudes towards immigrants and their inclusion (Blinder, 2015). However, research also shows that public perceptions are often based on distorted views of immigrants and misperceptions of the volume of specific groups of immigrants (Blinder, 2015; Blinder and Allen, 2016; Herda, 2010). The diversity within immigrant population further increases in relation to the second- or third-generation migrants, who have at least one migrant parent or grandparent and/or are coming from mixed marriages, which can entail acquisition of citizenship or dual citizenship at birth

having important implications on their legal and social status. Although the above described diversity reflects only on the legal status of migrants, it reveals crucial differences between (1) first generation (temporary or long-term) migrants and (2) second- and third-generation migrants. However, these two categories are often conflated in the literature, which points at the challenges of identification and definition of immigrants (Anderson and Blinder, 2019).⁶

While the challenges posed to European welfare states have not been undermined or underestimated, the claim that increasing ethnic diversity might change support for welfare states has been questioned by many researchers. Goul Andersen (2006) emphasizes the aspect of timing in developing welfare states. He argues that the European welfare systems developed and stabilized in ethnically homogenous societies.⁷ Established welfare institutions have become part of public norms and values and are considerably resistant to change. Goul Andersen (2006) therefore argues that while immigration might raise challenges, established welfare systems are able to mitigate the distributional conflict engendered by diversity. Banting (1998) also refers to the path-dependence of the gradual extension of social rights and entitlements in Europe, questioning whether people would accept a loss of rights. Furthermore, he argues that consensual policy-making also contributes to better reconciling ethnic diversity and welfare redistribution. Crepaz (2008) points at the differences between the institutions and the normative expectations of governments in Europe and the US, which he claims will lead to different strategies for coping with increasing diversity. Moreover, he argues that *“societies that developed welfare states before immigration occurred were able to build up a stock of trust with a capacity to reduce nativist resentment, thereby ensuring to continue viability of the welfare state”* (Crepaz, 2008: 251). He further states that the increase in anti-immigration attitudes in Europe needs to be taken into account in order to introduce policies to counter them, instead of building political rhetoric on them.

Taylor-Gooby (2005) disproves Alesina and Glaeser’s (2004) conclusions by reconstructing and analysing the same data-set. The author highlights that Alesina and Glaeser failed to

⁶ The critical review of the definition and public understanding of the term immigrant is addressed in Section 2.3.

⁷ While in most of European countries there has been high level of ethnic homogeneity, we need to note the existence of ethnic minorities in these countries, too. Furthermore, the development of welfare states and extension of citizens’ social rights also provided means to incorporate ethnic minorities, to unify the population and facilitate the nation-state conception (Castles and Schierup, 2010).

address the role of left-wing political parties in defending welfare policies that act to limit the negative impacts of immigration on popular support for welfare. Soroka, Banting and Johnston (2006), who study the effect of immigration on welfare spending, also observe the effects of left-wing parties in mitigating the impact of immigration. The authors find that in countries with considerable left-wing representation in government, welfare spending remained intact, while in other countries welfare spending tended to decrease when the share of the immigrant population increased.

A further difference is that commitment to welfare policies is shared by all parties across the political spectrum in Europe. Although, divisions between political party stances surface about the appropriate range, target population, and entitlement criteria for benefits and services (Kitschelt and McGann, 1997). Swank and Betz (2003) argue that comprehensive welfare systems themselves weaken the chance of diversity-based retrenchment by better addressing and reducing economic inequalities. Based on an analysis of national elections, the former claim that universal welfare states limit support for right-wing populist parties and motivations for welfare chauvinism. The same conclusions are drawn by Crepez and Damron (2009) who argue that a comprehensive welfare state can limit nativist opposition to immigrants by reducing the social gaps between nationals and immigrants.

Mau and Burkhardt (2009) examine the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on welfare state support. They find a weak effect on support for welfare redistribution. Furthermore, the authors find that these effects were mediated through GDP, the unemployment rate, and welfare regimes, among other factors. The authors also look at popular support for the inclusion of immigrants, where they also found a negative but weak association. However, it is important to stress that the negative effect was mitigated by the welfare regime typology and the presence of left-wing parties. Therefore, the researchers conclude that the role of institutional factors and the politics of interpretation are especially crucial in this respect.

Focusing on perceptions of competition in the labour market and perceptions of social insecurity, Finseraas (2008), Burgoon et al. (2012) as well as Brady and Finnigan (2014) find evidence for increasing support for the welfare state in the case of increasing immigration. While taking different approaches, all of these studies highlight individuals' interest in protecting themselves from social insecurities and supporting redistribution in occupational sectors more exposed to immigration (Burgoon et al., 2012) or in response to rapid flows of immigration (Brady and Finnigan, 2014). These findings show how the welfare state gains relevance as a response to increasing immigration. Emmenegger and Klemmensen (2013)

complements the central role of self-interest in attitude-formation by highlighting other forms of individual-level motivation driven by egalitarianism or humanitarianism. The authors argue that such motivations also shape attitudes towards immigration and support for redistribution.

Approaching the issue from the perspective of multiculturalism, Banting and Kymlicka (2006) argue that the trade-off between immigration and a generous welfare state tends to be exaggerated. According to them, there is no evidence that multicultural policies of immigrant integration lead to welfare retrenchment, nor that multicultural policies lead to the erosion of social solidarity (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006, 2017).

Considering the variability of immigrant populations within countries, there are new research initiatives that focus on the regional instead of the national level. Studies about Germany and Sweden show that a greater share of immigrants in regions have a negative effect on support for welfare programmes (Eger, 2010; Eger and Breznau, 2017). Stichnoth (2012) also finds that support for the unemployed decreases in regions where the share of foreigners among the unemployed is large. These findings reflect on a new aspect of the issue suggesting that further investigation of perceptions of immigration are needed to unravel the information that nationally aggregated data tend to hide.

In a recent article, Kulin et al. (2016) analyse attitudinal profiles, focusing on combinations of pro-/anti-welfare and pro-/anti-immigration attitudes, finding evidence for tension between pro-welfare and pro-immigration attitudes. However, they also point at the differences between and within countries and emphasise the need to acknowledge that people's understanding of social issues varies. This finding also strengthens previous arguments about the relevance of how institutions deal with social issues, and how such issues are framed in political and public discourse (Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Soroka et al., 2006). Therefore, even though there is no firm research evidence for the progressive dilemma and the threat to welfare support from immigration, the notion and the arguments can easily be kept alive in the political and public discourse, justifying the need to continue research into this phenomenon. These findings stressing the socially constructed character of framings and public understandings of issues encourage us to follow-up and take a social constructivist approach within the research. This applies to the theoretical understanding of public attitudes as social constructs that represent a particular set of considerations, including beliefs, feelings, and knowledge about issues (Tourangeau et al., 2000), which are influenced by the social context, public discourses, and social interaction (Converse, 2006;

Tourangeau et al., 2000; Wilson and Hodges, 1992). Adhering to the social constructivist tradition prompts us to focus more on the social and institutional contexts surrounding individuals, focusing on the power of the political framing of issues affecting attitude-formation (Larsen, 2013; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Sundberg, 2014).

In contrast to the above-mentioned studies that primarily used public opinion survey data, this research focuses on public attitudes as shared by ordinary people: participants of DF. Therefore, the analysis enables us to better understand people's perceptions of the tension between immigration and the welfare state, and the reasons behind such perceptions. Furthermore, the analysis of DFs allows us to elaborate on how the key features and elements of political and public discourse emerge and influence the discussions.

As this review shows, there is a wide variety of approaches to the study of the relation between immigration and the welfare state. Research has pointed at the complexity of the related relationships and highlighted various factors that can mitigate potentially negative effects of immigration. Moreover, we need to bear in mind that there is huge variation in how the related questions are operationalized, such as how researchers define and measure increases in ethnic heterogeneity, whether they measure impact on social spending or on welfare attitudes, whether they consider objective indicators of increases in immigration or perceptions of an increase in immigration, etc. (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). While there is no firm evidence for the negative effects of immigration on popular support for the welfare state in Europe, negative tendencies have been identified in relation to preferences for welfare chauvinism that restricts immigrants' access to welfare provision (Brady and Finnigan, 2014; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Van Der Waal et al., 2013), which can be understood as a response to the progressive dilemma.

While the term 'welfare chauvinism' refers to the exclusion of immigrants from accessing social rights and benefits, this research approaches the issue from the positive side, seeking to find out more about the conditions for immigrants' inclusion. Furthermore, a focus on inclusion is justified as international public opinion surveys show that only a small minority of Europeans would prefer the total exclusion of immigrants from the welfare state (Meuleman et al., 2018; Mewes and Mau, 2013; Van Der Waal et al., 2010). While there is some variation between specific preferences in European countries, a majority of respondents support conditional access to the welfare state, which also points at the need to better understand the conditions of inclusion. Therefore, we need to familiarize with the findings of previous research. However, before turning to the review of the literature on

welfare chauvinism, we first need to critically appraise who are the immigrants? This question is especially pressing as immigration is a cross-cutting social issue evoking perceptions of racial, ethnic, cultural and religious divisions, etc. (Song, 2018). This complexity challenges not only the scholars resulting in diversity of approaches to the study of immigration as described above, but also diversifies public understanding of immigration and people's vision of immigrants.

2.3 WHO ARE THE IMMIGRANTS?

Studies show that public attitudes to immigrants tend to vary depending on the particular characteristics of immigrants such as race, ethnicity or class (Blinder, 2015; Ford, 2011; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Considering the heterogeneity of immigrants, it is especially important to address who are the attitude objects – who are the immigrants? Public opinion surveys do not allow respondents to reflect on who they consider as immigrants when responding to survey questions (Hellwig and Sinno, 2017). It remains unclear whether respondents focus on legal or illegal migrants, do they consider the specific legal categories of migrants, male or female, skilled or unskilled, temporary migrants or migrants staying long-term in the country, whether respondents rely on their direct contact with immigrants or on other external sources. This section is intended to briefly review how immigrants are defined starting with the most frequent, nationally framed understandings, the shortcomings of these definitions in grasping the diversity of immigrants.

The terms immigration and immigrant raise ambiguity. Stressing the international mobility, the movement between states, both the process as well as immigrants (as subjects to this process) are defined in binary terms distinguishing citizens and migrants or insiders and outsiders taking for granted the nation-states framing (Wimmer and Schiller, 2003). Most scholarly work on immigration uses country of origin, country of birth or country of citizenship to identify and define immigrants (Anderson and Blinder, 2019). However, these definitions hide the high level of heterogeneity within the group of immigrants. Focusing strictly on citizenship or country of origin, we are unable to reflect on the differences between legal categories of immigrants and the differences between their entitlements deriving from their legal status (Anderson et al., 2018). Furthermore, it raises issues of objective and subjective identification of immigrants – i.e. who fulfils the formal criteria of being an immigrant and who is perceived to be an immigrant in the public. Citizenship or

origin in itself is unable to reveal the (actual or perceived) social status of immigrants in the country of destination. For instance, despite holding citizenship, second- and third-generation migrants are more likely to be considered as immigrants than certain migrants – such as highly educated, multilingual migrants, who are often invisible or perceived unproblematic by the public (Anderson et al., 2018; Will, 2019). Furthermore, definition of or considering somebody as an immigrant may entail further factors such length of stay in the country of destination, reasons for migration (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018), ethnic or religious identities (Hellwig and Sinno, 2017), perceptions of employability and work ethic (Bansak et al., 2016), etc. The factors considered influence the conception of immigrants, which can imply variation in attitudes to them and variation in preferences for their access to welfare benefits and services. **Acknowledgement of this variation justifies the need to take a more dynamic approach to the study of attitudes to immigrants' inclusion with particular focus on potential shifts between preferences for inclusion or exclusion based on the specific groups of immigrants and the specific characteristics of immigrants considered.**

Seeing the shortcomings of the formal – academic or institutionally set – definitions as well as the gap between these definitions and public conceptions of immigrants (Anderson et al., 2018; Blinder and Allen, 2016; Crawley and Skleparis, 2018), this thesis aims to shed more light on the later investigating what are those aspects and factors that affect ordinary people's vision of immigrants, how they perceive and define who they view as immigrants. In order to fulfil this ambition, particular attention is devoted to study social categorisation of immigrants during DF discussions and analyse whether and how people differentiate between specific groups of immigrants. Throughout the research, we do not expect that DF participants will come up with full-fledged definitions of immigrants or will fully comprehend immigration which cuts across contested issues and divisions based on race, ethnicity, social class, etc. However, we consider it important to study how people talk about immigration, what aspects do they consider relevant, what makes them uncertain about immigration and immigrants and more importantly, how the thus articulated conceptions of immigrants affect their preferences for inclusion of immigrants to the welfare state.

This section was intended to acknowledge and discuss the challenges of defining who immigrants are in academic and public discourse and to place our approach in this regard. Keeping in mind these critical appraisals, we now proceed to the review of the available literature on immigrants' access to welfare provision and gauging what the findings on welfare chauvinism reveal about the conditions of immigrants' inclusion. Throughout this

chapter the terms ‘welfare chauvinism’ and ‘public attitudes to immigrants’ access to welfare provision’ are used when discussing the literature, and reference to ‘attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion’ is used when describing the aims and ambitions of this research.

2.4 WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO IMMIGRANTS’ ACCESS TO WELFARE PROVISION?

The risk of growing welfare chauvinism is manifest both in the increasing political salience of the issue of immigration and also in the increase in support for right-wing populist, anti-immigrant political parties (Akkerman, 2015; Alonso and Fonseca, 2012; Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2016). Both of these phenomena stress the need to take the various manifestations of welfare chauvinism seriously and to focus more on the sources of such exclusionary preferences. The significance of the issue is proved by the expanding academic research on welfare chauvinism. This raises the question why and to whom does welfare chauvinism appeal, and under what conditions does it flourish? However, the related literature still tends to be limited – especially in comparison to the long-standing research into anti-immigrant attitudes. Research on welfare chauvinism primarily relies on international public opinion surveys (Ervasti et al., 2012; Sundberg and Taylor-Gooby, 2013) and the question specifically touching upon this issue was only introduced in 2008. Therefore, this chapter approaches the literature more broadly, drawing on research on welfare attitudes as well as on attitudes to immigration and immigrants. Considering the complexity, multi-dimensionality, and context-dependency of public attitudes, the subject has been approached from various perspectives, and both streams of literature offer important research findings about the potential mechanisms and factors that influence public attitudes to immigrants’ access to welfare provision.

Welfare chauvinism is most commonly defined as a preference for restricting the privilege of accessing welfare benefits and services to “our own” (Goul Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990: 212). Thus, supporting internal cohesion and strengthening the boundaries between the in-group and the out-group. Welfare chauvinism as an anti-immigrant, pro-welfare political agenda has become widely dispersed throughout Europe, sometimes in combination with anti-EU sentiments (Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2016). While the term welfare chauvinism can cover a wide variety of exclusionary measures that differ in quantity, restrictiveness, and the extent of target groups (specific groups of immigrants as debated in the previous section), its appeal and strength are well-demonstrated by the public discourse

in the UK centring on migrants' social rights which led to the Brexit referendum and vote to leave the EU in 2016 (Goodwin and Ford, 2017).

To better understand support for welfare chauvinism, we need to familiarize with the literature concerning what micro- and macro-level factors affect attitudes to immigrants' access to welfare benefits and services. The following sections explore the literature by first raising the question *which individuals* are most inclined to support welfare chauvinism, proceeding to the question *why* some people prefer to restrict immigrants' access to welfare provision. The literature that investigates the latter will be reviewed according to three key theoretical approaches to attitudes to immigration and attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state. These are: (1) Group Threat Theory, in conjunction with Social Identity Theory; (2) Welfare Deservingness Theory, and (3) the Institutional approach to the analysis of public attitudes. While the first theoretical approach has been influential in research into both attitudes to immigration and attitudes to immigrants' access to welfare, the latter two are more closely related and developed within welfare attitudes research.

2.4.1 Who supports welfare chauvinism?

Considering the fact that the most exclusivist forms of welfare chauvinism are preferred by only a minority of people (Van Der Waal et al., 2010; Mewes and Mau, 2012; Meuleman et al., 2018), researchers have been interested in identifying which individuals are more inclined towards the exclusion of immigrants. The findings reveal various social cleavages related to social status – with a focus on education, employment status, and the more encompassing category of social class (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Kitschelt and McGann, 1997; Mewes and Mau, 2012; Raijman et al., 2003; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Van Der Waal et al., 2010); along the urban-rural cleavage (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2013), and also based on age (Eger and Breznau, 2017; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Raijman et al., 2003). The diversity of these factors points at how the issue of immigration and immigrants' access to welfare requires a more complex and encompassing approach for understanding the drivers behind welfare chauvinism. Out of these cleavages, the most relevant and most widely studied is socio-economic status, with higher support for welfare chauvinism found among lower-educated, lower-skilled, and working class people who face greater insecurity in the labour market and who are themselves more reliant on welfare support (Scheve and

Slaughter, 2001; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Van Der Waal et al., 2010; Mewes and Mau, 2012).

Within the welfare attitudes literature, especially lower-educated, lower-skilled, working class individuals tend to be firm supporters of welfare state measures and egalitarianism (Korpi, 1983; Svallfors, 2012). Therefore, findings that such individuals are those most strongly inclined to exclusive preferences are puzzling and might seem contradictory especially from the perspective of sustaining popular support for welfare states. Eger and Breznau (2017) even argue that findings about welfare chauvinism coincide with research about anti-immigrant attitudes much more than with those about welfare attitudes. Therefore, they suggest that welfare chauvinism might be a symptom of anti-immigrant attitudes and a form of prejudice against immigrants. However, this difference can also be understood as a demonstration of the multi-dimensionality of welfare attitudes (Roosma et al., 2013) – acknowledging that there might be strong support for the goals and mission of the welfare state in general, but more critical and differing attitudes to specific issues such as immigrants' access to welfare.

This research agrees with the latter proposition, understanding welfare chauvinism and attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state as a form of welfare attitude. As this research is devoted to elaborate on the complexity, multi-dimensionality, and context-dependency of public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion, it takes a dynamic approach to the study of public attitudes, **arguing that attitudes to immigrants' inclusion should not be reduced to either pro-inclusion or pro-exclusion.** In contrast, it is expected that **public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion vary depending on specific considerations, specific groups of immigrants, and specific social contexts.** In other words, this means that while the studies mentioned above found evidence for higher support for welfare chauvinism and restrictive attitudes among lower-educated, working class people, this research argues that restrictive attitudes may be shared by non-working class people in relation to specific issues – e.g. refusal to provide any support to illegal migrants. Similarly, working class people might have more inclusive attitudes to involuntary migrants. With this approach **we can reflect not only on the changing and ambivalent character of attitudes, but also draw attention to the diversity within the immigrant population and the variability in their social contexts and situations which might change attitudes and the level of solidarity towards them.** Throughout the research, the identification and analysis of this dynamism of attitude-formation is in focus. However, in order to embrace the diversity of considerations behind attitudes to immigrants' inclusion, it is essential to draw on existing research. We are

particularly interested in mapping literature that investigates why people are more inclined to support welfare chauvinism.

2.4.2 Why do people support welfare chauvinism?

Group Threat Theory has been one of the most influential theories within the field of anti-immigrant attitudes – especially in the study of prejudices (for a review see Quillian, 2006). However, it has also been widely adopted within the literature on welfare chauvinism (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Van Der Waal et al., 2010; Mewes and Mau, 2012). Group Threat Theory, as introduced by Blumer (1958), stresses the perceptions of intergroup relations, and more specifically, collectively and historically developed perceptions of the positions of the in-group and the out-group. The central argument is that perceptions of group threat and seeing immigrants as competitors for resources increases the salience of group boundaries and gives rise to anti-immigrant attitudes and intergroup hostility (Blumer, 1958; Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 1995; Fetzer, 2000; Scheepers et al., 2002; Dancygier, 2010). Such feelings are expected to intensify in relation to perceptions of a growing immigrant population (Blalock, 1967; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Quillian, 1995), especially if immigrants hold similar social positions and become employed in the same sectors as members of the in-group (Coenders et al., 2009). As perceptions of group threat can mobilize anti-immigrant sentiments, they can also create significant barriers to the inclusion of immigrants. Thus, we need to look at the sources of these perceptions. The literature primarily distinguishes between the economic and cultural threats posed by immigrants (Semyonov et al., 2006; Sides and Citrin, 2007), as detailed in the following sections.

2.4.2.1 *Perceptions of economic threat*

The literature on attitudes toward immigration and immigrants elaborates on the various forms of economic threat that can influence people's attitudes, and highlights the variance in people's exposure to and (subjective) perceptions of threat. Scheve and Slaughter (2001), in focusing on preferences for immigration policies in the US, find that uneducated workers were more inclined to want to limit immigration due to changes in wage levels associated with immigrant involvement in the labour market. Gang et al. (2013) also evidence opposition to immigrants in the sectors in which people were most likely to compete for jobs

with immigrants. Fetzner (2000) highlights that the impact of socio-economic factors unfold through categories of occupations. Hanson (2005) and Mayda (2006) claim that attitudes are shaped especially by income. Escandell and Ceobanu (2009) and Malchow-Møller et al. (2009) show that opposition to, and prejudices against immigrants are greater among unemployed nationals. Fears of immigrants' misuse of the welfare system (Boeri, 2010) are of considerable concern, resulting in greater opposition towards low-skilled immigrants in manual jobs, and towards unemployed immigrants (Crepaz, 2008). While studies find no significant welfare gap between natives and immigrants in Europe (Boeri, 2010; Castronova et al., 2001; Corrigan, 2010), these perceptions and concerns are highly influential and easily manipulated in political and public discourse.

These findings illuminate the diversity of socio-economic factors and potential considerations that can emerge as relevant arguments in the DF discussions. Drawing on these findings, and on the scholarship on welfare attitudes, researchers have embarked on examining how these economic concerns and socio-economic vulnerabilities influence preferences for welfare chauvinism. Van der Waal et al. (2010) do not find evidence for the impact of a weak economic position on preferences for welfare chauvinism. In contrast, Mewes and Mau (2012) identify the impact of socio-economic factors, but also stress that this impact is significant only in the case of subjective indicators – namely, perceived material risk. In the case of objective indicators of socio-economic status such as income, Mewes and Mau (2012) reach the same conclusions as Van der Waal et al. (2010), highlighting the stronger effect of socio-cultural than socio-economic factors. Thus, Mewes and Mau (2012) draw attention to two important findings. First, that support for welfare chauvinism is driven by both cultural and economic concerns. Second, the relevance of subjective perceptions of socio-economic status, which can change more dynamically in response to economic and social developments. On the one hand, **these findings encourage us to explore in greater depth the interactions and potential linkages between economic and cultural concerns, which currently tend to be under-researched.** On the other hand, **emphasising perceptions underlines the need for a more qualitative approach to their study as they emerge through social interaction.** However, before elaborating on the research approach, we review the relevant literature on cultural or identity-related concerns.

2.4.2.2 *Perceptions of cultural threats*

Perceptions of cultural threats represent the second dimension raised by Group Threat Theory to explain the higher level of opposition to immigrants and immigrants' access to welfare among lower-educated, lower-skilled, and working class. The central argument is that people with lower socio-economic status rely more on group identity to have a positive self-image, triggers greater sensitivity to any threat to the position of the in-group (Tajfel, 1982). The perceived 'otherness' of immigrants is considered to have a damaging effect on dominant national culture, and challenges widely accepted values and social norms, the social order and way of life (Barry, 2002; McLaren and Johnson, 2007). Therefore, immigrants tend to be considered as risks to the cultural and social dominance of natives. The key motivation behind this perception is the need to maintain a positive group identity (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015).

Wright's research (2011) on national identity and immigration also demonstrates that people react to heightened flows of migrants by narrowing the boundaries of their national communities – finding clear tendencies towards exclusivity. Kymlicka (2015) also argues that cultural considerations tend to be more dominant. Moreover, he claims that perceptions of cultural risk trigger perceptions of economic threat. Ivarsflaten (2005), as well as Sides and Citrin (2007), argue that perceptions of cultural threats and a preference for cultural unity tend to have the strongest impact on opposition to immigrants.

Comparing ethnic, cultural, and civic conceptions of nationhood, Wright and Reeskens (2013) find tendencies towards exclusivity and welfare chauvinism in all three types of national identification. Wright and Reeskens (2013) show the relevance of culturally-informed symbolic boundaries and refute the expectation that civic or "thinner" conceptions of nation are more inclusive to immigrants. Using the 2008 ESS data on welfare chauvinism, Van der Waal et al. (2010) as well as Mewes and Mau (2012) tested the power of economic and cultural threats, as already mentioned. Van der Waal et al. (2010) examined three potential explanations – the effects of political competence, weak economic position, and cultural capital – for the higher level of support for welfare chauvinism among lower-educated people. However, their conclusions revealed that only the impact of education and cultural capital shape restrictive preferences. The authors argue that limited cultural capital induces an inclination to authoritarianism and greater exposure to cultural insecurity, which affects the perception of immigrants as a threat to the socio-cultural position of the in-group. Similarly, Mewes and Mau (2012) put emphasis on authoritarian values and conceive of

education as a predictor of authoritarianism, thereby confirming the findings of Van der Waal et al. (2010). In addition to these findings, Koning (2013) stresses the important role of political framing. He argues that even a low level of welfare dependence can be used and interpreted as a cultural threat, thus mobilizing welfare chauvinist measures, while a high level of welfare dependence may not mobilize welfare chauvinism if the former is not framed as a cultural threat. These conclusions are in line with Hopkins' (2010) arguments that perceptions of both economic and cultural threats intensify only if politicised at the local or national level. These findings draw attention again to social constructivism and the need to be vigilant to the influence of the public and political discourse surrounding this issue.⁸

So far, we have discussed the issues, factors, and perceptions that induce preferences for exclusion. However, it is essential to mention Contact Theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2000), which argues that an increase in the level of interaction between nationals and immigrants has a positive effect on the intergroup relations that shape attitudes toward immigrants. Laurence (2014) studies interethnic relations at a local level and finds that ties connecting individuals with different ethnic backgrounds improve perceptions of diversity and attitudes toward immigrants.

While in quantitative surveys it is difficult to test Contact Theory, Eger and Breznau's study (2017) provides interesting insight into how immigrants' entitlement to social rights is viewed at the regional level. The authors find that people in regions with a higher presence of immigrants are less opposed to granting them social rights. This finding suggests the positive implications of contact, but Eger and Breznau (2017) also point out the potential for the reverse explanation: that immigrants move to places where people are more inclusive. Mewes and Mau (2013) partially draw on Contact Theory when they examined the effects of globalization on preferences for welfare chauvinism. The authors differentiate societal and economic globalization, expecting the former to facilitate openness to immigrants through increasing connections to immigrants and expecting the latter to strengthen perceptions of group threat and competition. The findings show that neither form of globalization affects exclusionary preferences at the aggregate level. Focusing on specific socio-economic groups, the positive effect of societal globalization emerges only in relation to people with high socio-economic status, but only in countries with a low level of economic globalization. These inconclusive results reflect the complex interplay between the effects of contact and the perception of competition, which needs further elaboration.

⁸ The role of political and public debates is further discussed in Section 2.4.2.4

Cappelen and Peters (2018) compare the impact of Group Threat Theory and Contact Theory in relation to preferences for welfare chauvinism in relation to EU migrants and Eastern European migrants in particular. Focusing on EU migrants, Cappelen and Peters (2018) find evidence for the positive impact of contact and reduction in welfare chauvinism. However, the tendencies are reversed and preferences for welfare chauvinism increase in areas with a greater presence of Eastern Europeans. Considering that DFs were conducted in Birmingham (UK) and Oslo (NO) – two cities with a considerable EU and Non-EU migrant population, we can assume some contact between the in-group and immigrants. Furthermore, the groups include also participants with a minority ethnic or immigration background and the DFs offer participants the opportunity to elaborate on their lived experiences and contact with immigrants. Based on these aspects of the research, Contact Theory is taken into account during the analysis of the discussions. However, it does not play a central role in the theoretical framework as we lack the information, and the appropriate means, to control for the type, length, and quality of contact and relations participants have had. Therefore, while participants' references to contact with immigrants are taken seriously and inform the analysis, these findings are not interpreted through Contact Theory to avoid any misunderstanding.⁹

To sum up, studies about Group Threat Theory – i.e., a focus on economic and cultural threats – reveal the complexity of potential considerations behind preferences for welfare chauvinism and the wide variety of drivers of perceptions of group threat. While the literature is inclined to treat economic and cultural threats separately, and to compare which of them are more significant in anti-immigrant attitudes or in relation to welfare chauvinism, more recent studies have pointed out that both are important (Kymlicka, 2015; Mewes and Mau, 2012). However, **our knowledge is still limited about the interactions and linkages between perceptions of economic and cultural threat.** Therefore, throughout the research special attention is devoted to the economic and cultural framing of arguments for or against the inclusion of immigrants in the welfare state.

In line with the distinction between economic and cultural threats, the literature tends to stress the role of self-interest in relation to the perception of economic threat, and reflects on group interests in relation to the perception of cultural threat. Accordingly, the role of

⁹ While deliberative methods can provide the platform for researching Contact Theory, the research design needs to be adjusted to this purpose and facilitate the discussions to reveal such details. As the WelfSOC DFs had no such intentions and did not employ any specific arrangements, the use of Contact Theory could be easily misinterpreted and findings might not be solid enough.

Social Identity Theory is articulated only in relation to cultural threat (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010), arguing that individual identities and interests are shaped and filtered by group membership (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel et al., 1971). However, **this research argues that Social Identity Theory and group membership are relevant for the study of both economic and cultural threat perceptions – i.e. how people see the position of the in-group and how people see 'others'**. It is especially this collective aspect that is the focus of this research, which argues that attitudes to immigrants' inclusion are shaped both by perceptions of the in-group and by the perceptions of the out-group. In this respect, social categorization and intergroup differentiation play a crucial role in defining the boundaries between the in-group and the out-group (Turner, 1975; Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1982; Lamont and Molnár, 2002). These boundaries are important to protect the position of the in-group and to justify the exclusion of the out-group. **To better understand what facilitates or obstructs the inclusion of immigrants, we need to analyse how people conceptualize and draw such boundaries between the in-group and the out-group.** This is the point, where we expect that DFs will reveal variation in people's preferences for inclusion and exclusion. This research argues that through the process and social practise of intergroup differentiation, people express their conceptualisation of the in-group and the out-group. Furthermore, the perceptions of the in-group and out-group shape people's understanding of immigration and preferences for inclusion or exclusion. However, we need to be cautious regarding the analysis of intergroup differentiation as the weight and salience of such in-group and out-group perceptions can greatly vary person-by-person and case-by-case discussed during the DFs. The high level of variation can give rise to heterogeneity of views and to conflicting stances among participants, what needs to be reconciled during DFs. This is one of the key areas where DFs can contribute to our better understanding of attitude-formation and shifts in attitudes to inclusion of specific groups of immigrants.¹⁰

While we draw on Group Threat Theory, in the theoretical framework of this research the accent is put on Social Identity Theory which provides a more encompassing approach to the analysis of perceptions of immigrants. On the one hand, we consider it important to identify and analyse perceptions of group threats in the DFs to map barriers to inclusion. On the other hand, this research focuses on positive perceptions of immigrants that can facilitate the inclusion of immigrants. The analysis of both aspects – including an examination of the interplay between the economic and cultural framing of arguments – can reveal important

¹⁰ The role of heterogeneity/homogeneity of views in group discussions is elaborated in Section 3.3.3

findings about the in-group and how the perceptions of the in-group shape perceptions of the out-group.

This literature review started by raising the question who supports welfare chauvinism, and why. In line with the literature on anti-immigrant attitudes, research on welfare chauvinism stresses that lower-educated, low-skilled, and working class people tend to be the main supporters of the former. First, Group Threat Theory was explored as a potential rationale for preferences for welfare chauvinism. Keeping our focus on the role of intergroup relations, the following section reviews the theory of welfare deservingness. The finding that immigrants are perceived as the least deserving group of welfare beneficiaries (Van Oorschot, 2000, 2006) is understood by many researchers as a manifestation of welfare chauvinism that is fundamentally related to the boundaries between the in-group and out-group. Therefore, the following section focuses on studies about the welfare deservingness of immigrants, and elaborates why immigrants are seen as least deserving.

2.4.2.3 Perceptions of welfare deservingness

While according to Group Threat Theory preferences for the exclusion of immigrants from the welfare state are a response to perceptions of threat, perceptions of deservingness directly raise the question of inclusion or exclusion. Deservingness perceptions touch upon the relation between the state and the individual and establish the extent and conditions of collective obligations towards the individual. Who deserves the support of the welfare state? Who is worthy of accessing welfare benefits and services, and which ones? These questions may be extended to immigrants as a group of welfare beneficiaries. Findings show that immigrants are considered the least deserving group, ranking after elderly people, the sick and people with disabilities, and unemployed people (Van Oorschot, 2000, 2006, 2008). As a result, Welfare Deservingness Theory has inspired many researchers to study the potential mechanisms behind such preferences for the exclusion of immigrants. This section aims to review this specific stream of literature, first focusing on the understanding and conceptualization of welfare deservingness and deservingness criteria. Second, up-to-date research findings are appraised, highlighting the new approaches to the study of immigrants' deservingness and pointing at the remaining gaps in the research.

2.4.2.3.1 The understanding of welfare deservingness and the five deservingness criteria

Considerations of welfare deservingness, and whether beneficiaries deserve the support they receive are one of the most straightforward and automatic responses of individuals (Larsen, 2006; Petersen et al., 2012). Accordingly, the main tenet of welfare deservingness theory is the claim that public support for welfare benefits and services substantially depends on perceptions of the deservingness of the specific groups of welfare beneficiaries (Cook, 1979; Coughlin, 1980; Swaan, 1988; Van Oorschot, 2000; Van Oorschot et al., 2017). Petersen et al. (2010) argue that deservingness judgements function as cognitive categories that people can easily access and use in any situations. Thus, deservingness judgements – called “deservingness heuristics” by Petersen et al. (2010) – offer a shortcut to forming opinions. Therefore, an analysis of deservingness judgments and the perceptions on which they rely can represent a relevant tool for approaching attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion and to revealing how people view immigrants and their role in the country of destination.

Besides acknowledging the spontaneity, easy accessibility and understandability of deservingness judgements, we also need to reflect on the complexity of relations deservingness judgements embody. Willen (2012) understands deservingness judgements as highly relational, situational, and context-dependent. They are relational as deservingness judgements encompass not only the perceptions of people whose deservingness is assessed, but also the characteristics of the person making the judgement – the individual’s personal values and contact with the people in question (Willen, 2012). They are context-dependent as the political, economic, social, and cultural context considerably shape these considerations (Willen, 2012). Last, they are situational as deservingness claims can shift in the light of new information or changing circumstances (Willen, 2012). All these three aspects reveal important information about the reasons for such judgements – i.e. what social situations, what social contexts, what considerations and values make a difference in perceptions of deservingness. Deservingness judgements do not only reveal what is expected from the out-group, but also what is important for the in-group. Therefore, this research aims to exploit the spontaneity of deservingness judgements, expecting that participants will engage in these. Furthermore, it is expected that through the interactions between participants in DFs, the interplay between perceptions of the in-group and the out-group will emerge and reveal the thresholds of inclusion – defining what is perceived to make an immigrant worthy of receiving welfare support.

The literature distinguishes five deservingness criteria (DC) that affect perceptions of deservingness. Drawing on and synthesising previous literature (Cook, 1979; Coughlin, 1980; Swaan, 1988), Wim van Oorschot (2000) specifies these as *Need*, *Control*, *Reciprocity*, *Attitude*, and *Identity*. All of these principles assess a particular aspect of individuals' conduct and behaviour. Moreover, group cues and public images of specific groups of beneficiaries are especially influential (Petersen et al., 2012; Larsen, 2006, 2013; Kootstra, 2016, 2017). Therefore, both perspectives about the individual and the group of welfare beneficiaries need to be considered in relation to all DC. The principle *Need* refers to the perception of the neediness of welfare beneficiaries, while the criterion *Control* refers to welfare beneficiaries' responsibility for and control over their neediness. The principle *Control* is considerably based on appraisals of whether individuals are making sufficient effort to secure their own welfare. This is best illustrated with the popular differentiation between being "lazy" and being "a victim of circumstances" (Larsen, 2006; Petersen et al., 2012).

The criterion *Reciprocity* encompasses considerations of past or future contributions of the individual. The greater the individual's past or prospective future contributions to the welfare system, the greater the justification for receiving state support. The criterion *Attitude* represents a more encompassing principle which expects compliance and gratefulness for the support the individual receives. Last, the principle *Identity* reflects on the phenomenon of the greater willingness of people to perceive deservingness if they can identify with the beneficiaries (Van Oorschot, 2000; Van Oorschot et al., 2017). In a broader understanding (within the in-group of nationals), this identification can mean sharing a common interest, a common past, or an expected forthcoming experience which can trigger greater solidarity with welfare beneficiaries – e.g. toward the elderly, or parents representing particular life stages. However, in relation to immigration, *Identity* is typically associated with national identity.

The attitude studies conducted by Van Oorschot (2006, 2008; 2017) suggest that these deservingness principles are universally applicable throughout the world. However, it is widely acknowledged that there might be great variability in relation to which DC, or which combination of criteria, are the most relevant for specific groups of beneficiaries (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2017, 2018; Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012). This also implies the need to critically reappraise the universal applicability of these principles and shed light on how

the deservingness of specific groups and subgroups of welfare beneficiaries¹¹ is constructed. Furthermore, it is important to stress that these five DC are deduced from the wider research on welfare states and welfare attitudes. **While they are based on empirical findings and have been operationalized and measured in public opinion surveys, our knowledge tends to be limited about people's understanding and use of deservingness principles** (Van Oorschot and Roosma, 2015). Moreover, the above-described definitions of these five principles are rather vague and require specification when talking about concrete groups of beneficiaries. This is especially the case with immigrants, who are the only group of beneficiaries to represent an out-group that falls outside the nationally-framed welfare community.

2.4.2.3.2 Studies about immigrants' deservingness

Focusing specifically on immigrants, Reeskens and Van Oorschot (2012) argue that immigrants are associated with deservingness primarily in relation to the principles of *Reciprocity*, *Identity*, and *Control*. First, considering *Reciprocity*, immigrants tend to make limited contributions to the welfare system, and future contributions cannot be foreseen partially due to their greater international mobility. Second, their deservingness is affected by the in-group seeing them as an out-group, which shows that the *Identity* principle is understood in terms of national identity. Third, in their case the principle of *Control* is interpreted as control over migration – i.e. taking responsibility for their choice to migrate. This means that perceptions of immigrants' deservingness decrease if their responsibility for migrating is seen as higher. However, the concrete mechanism that shapes perceptions of deservingness and ordinary people's understanding and use of these principles has not been scrutinized yet. Research into immigrants' deservingness has primarily focused on the individual- and the context-level effects.

Studies have thus far confirmed the effects of self-interest-driven considerations (Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012; Van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007), along with the effects of egalitarian values (Van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007), and redistribution preferences (Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012) on perceptions of the deservingness of immigrants. Focusing on redistribution effects, Reeskens and van Oorschot (2012) found a greater tendency to welfare chauvinism in liberal welfare systems in comparison to conservative or social

¹¹ The subgroups are meant to reflect on the heterogeneity within the five groups of welfare beneficiaries included in studies on welfare deservingness.

democratic welfare regimes.¹² Furthermore, findings disprove the expectation that a higher level of welfare spending or higher level of immigration necessarily reduces solidarity towards immigrants (Van Oorschot, 2008; Van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007). However, the mechanisms behind such patterns need to be further investigated. This is primarily due to the fact that the literature on welfare deservingness predominantly relies on international and national public opinion surveys (Van Oorschot and Roosma, 2015), which represent a strictly top-down approach. Public opinion surveys raise a limited number of questions that resemble researchers' interests and conceptions of social issues, and do not allow participants to elaborate the reasons for their answers (Goerres and Prinzen, 2012). In recognition of this gap in the literature, we can observe an increase in new approaches to the study of deservingness.

More recent studies have avoided comparing the deservingness of various welfare beneficiaries and focused more on the deservingness gap that unfolds in relation to immigrants (Kootstra, 2016, 2017; Reeskens and van der Meer, 2018). Using different survey experiments, both Kootstra (2016) and Reeskens and van der Meer (2018) found evidence for substantial double standards in the perceptions of deservingness of unemployed people from the in-group and the out-group (when distinguishing different regional and ethnic backgrounds). However, their findings diverge with regard to whether the deservingness gap can be reduced (yes: Kootstra, 2016; no: Reeskens and van der Meer, 2018). The issue of overcoming deservingness gap is especially relevant for our research as it indicates potential changes in perceptions of immigrants as more or less deserving. Moreover, these inconclusive findings about reducing the deservingness gap imply divisions about the possibility and conditions of immigrants' inclusion. It is expected that such divisions will emerge in the DFs, allowing us to analyse how such competing views are deliberated by participants, helping clarify the key conditions for inclusion.

Further developing the research on immigrants' deservingness, Kootstra (2017) identified differences between deservingness perceptions concerning various ethnic minorities and immigrants in the UK. She claims that considerations of the five DC matter more in relation to negatively perceived ethnic minority groups and immigrants than to positively perceived groups. While Kootstra (2017) finds the principles of *Attitude*, *Reciprocity*, and *Identity* to be most relevant, she also warns about overgeneralizing due to the limited number of

¹² The institutional line of reasoning concerning welfare chauvinism and the deservingness of immigrants is further discussed in Section 2.4.2.4.1

statements applicable to some of the criteria within the experiment. While these studies shed light on people's considerations behind deservingness judgements and reveal which principles are prioritised and make a difference, research experiments still reproduce the top-down approach and design of public opinion surveys. Therefore, the issues relating to peoples' understanding and use of these principles requires further investigation.

So far, there have been only a few studies about people's understanding and use of deservingness principles in relation to immigrants. Osipovic (2015) and Kremer (2016) conducted single-country studies with a focus on labour migrants' attitudes to the welfare state in the UK and in the Netherlands, respectively. Keeping our attention on the study of majority (in-group) welfare attitudes, two recent articles should be mentioned – both of which analysed focus groups conducted within the WelfSOC research project.¹³ Laenen et al. (2019) focus on the use of DC (in general), comparing Danish, German, and British focus groups as representatives of the three welfare regimes. The findings reveal the centrality of principles of *Reciprocity*, *Need*, and *Control* in all three countries. However, the authors also identify patterns of institutional differences, as greater emphasis was put on *Need* in the UK, and on *Reciprocity* in Germany. In Denmark, none of the principles stood out as intensively deployed by participants. In relation to *Reciprocity*, the researchers find a crucial difference between the responses of people who evaluated past contributions, and those who considered the future contributions of beneficiaries as reasons for deservingness. This differentiation is especially relevant for immigrants, whose perceived deservingness tends to decrease in the case of the former respondents, and increase in the case of the latter.

Nielsen et al. (2020) examine perceptions of immigrants' deservingness by analysing focus group discussions in four countries. Their findings show the use of all five deservingness principles, but put greater emphasis on *Reciprocity*, *Attitude*, *Need*, and *Control*. The authors also point at the different understandings of the specific principles, which are used in parallel in the discussions. Furthermore, they found that *Reciprocity* and *Attitude*; and *Need* and *Control* were closely linked in the arguments of focus group participants. These research findings shed new light not only on the different meanings people associate with deservingness principles and justifying deservingness of welfare beneficiaries, but also reveal the interplay of principles in perceptions of deservingness. This research aims to contribute to this stream of literature by going beyond the static picture of attitudes expressed in

¹³ WelfSOC involved conducting DF in 2015 and focus groups in 2016. However, this research uses only the DF data.

surveys in response to a pre-defined list of questions. It aims to further our knowledge and understanding of the key considerations behind immigrants' deservingness.

Moreover, recalling Willen's (2012) conceptions of deservingness as relational, context-dependent, and situational, this research intends to identify how deservingness judgements change in relation to different groups of immigrants, different social contexts and situations, and how the interplay between the in-group and out-group play out in justifications for or against immigrants' deservingness. Taking this dynamic approach is further underlined by the fact that studies have so far presented inconclusive findings about the variability in salience and importance of these deservingness principles. It is expected that perceptions of immigrants' deservingness will be constructed of different DC depending on the specific groups of immigrants and social contexts. Similarly, the importance of specific DC will also change depending on the specific social contexts and situations. It is especially these dynamically changing considerations that may shift preferences along the earlier described continuum of pro-inclusion and pro-exclusion attitudes.

This section has been devoted to reviewing the literature on welfare deservingness theory and its application to the study of attitudes to immigrants' access to welfare provisions. Each of the five DC reflect on specific considerations that can shape and inform attitudes to immigrants' inclusion. Furthermore, perceptions of welfare deservingness are considered to provide a useful means of analysing attitudes to immigrants' inclusion as deservingness judgements are easily accessible to people, and are widely deployed in public and political discourse to justify access to welfare benefits and services. Therefore, it is expected that participants will use deservingness judgements naturally in their arguments for or against immigrants' inclusion. As deservingness is used in public and political debates, this also raises the issue of how the social and institutional context shapes such perceptions of deservingness. This leads us to the third stream of literature which specifically focuses on the impact of institutions. The following section is devoted to a discussion of how the specificities of welfare regimes and the related policy designs influence preferences for welfare chauvinism.

2.4.2.4 *The institutionalist approach to the study of welfare attitudes*

The third major research approach to the study of restrictive preferences for immigrants' access to welfare provisions is represented by the institutionalist approach to welfare attitudes that stresses the impact of institutions in attitude-formation.

This literature review has stressed the high level of political salience of the issue of immigration as well as the role of political and public discourse in shaping public attitudes. Considering the heightened political debate on immigration in relation to the 2015 Refugee Crisis throughout Europe right before the conduct of the DF discussions, the analysis of the effects of political discourse (Zaller, 1992; Schmidt, 2002; Chilton, 2004; Leruth and Taylor-Gooby, 2019) emerges as a relevant and compelling approach to pursue in order to examine how the political discourse on the issue of immigration and immigrants' access to welfare benefits and services is reproduced in the DF.¹⁴ However, within this research institutionalism is chosen as a more comprehensive approach. Institutionalism incorporates and duly considers political discourse, but the analysis is not limited to this one aspect but being more vigilant how key institutional features are used and reproduced both in political and public discourse, how policies develop and respond to social changes and processes.

The thermostatic model of public opinion change (Soroka and Wlezien, 2009; Wlezien, 1995) is another popular theoretical approach in attitude research. The thermostat effect relies on the assumption that changes in the social and political contexts – e.g. perceptions of increase in social insecurity – can alter attitudes and policy preferences. Following up on the above example, studies show that an increase in the perception of social insecurity implies greater social solidarity and preference to spend more on social benefits (Baumberg Geiger, 2014). Thermostatic effects were evidenced also in relation to attitudes to immigration to explain the complex relations between public opinion and policy changes (Ford et al., 2015; Jennings, 2009). While these findings and the proven importance of changes in social and political context were duly taken into account, Institutionalism was seen as a more comprehensive theory, which builds on these fine details and is sensitive to changes in social and political contexts. All in all, for the purposes of this research, Institutionalism has been considered more suitable to grasp the complexity of interactions between political and public discourse

¹⁴ Within the WelfSOC project Leruth and Taylor-Gooby (2018) analysed the adoption of political parties' electoral programmes in the British DF discussions specifically focusing on preferences for restricting immigrants' access to welfare benefits and services.

and the diverse public reactions to social and policy developments within a particular institutional context.

The roots of the institutionalist approach within welfare attitudes research can be traced back to the tenets of historical neo-institutionalism (March and Olsen, 2008: 4) that views institutions as *“a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources”*. In this regard, Esping-Andersen’s (1990) major contribution in theorizing and categorising welfare regimes accents the role of welfare institutions, and the values, rules, and principles the three types of welfare regimes represent. The former has given impetus to research studies to find evidence how differences between welfare regimes emerge, and in which areas they are most salient. This chapter has already touched upon some key institutional arguments, first when discussing the effect of immigration on welfare state support (Goul Andersen, 2006; Banting, 1998; Crepaz, 2008; Taylor-Gooby, 2005; Soroka et al., 2006; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009). Second, institutional factors were briefly raised in the review of literature on perceptions of economic and cultural threats (Van Der Waal et al., 2010; Mewes and Mau, 2012; Koning, 2013). Third, the institutional approach has been influential in relation to perceptions of welfare deservingness (Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012; Van Oorschot, 2006). This section explores studies that raise institutional arguments. The review starts by presenting 1) literature that finds support for the impact of institutional factors, followed by 2) literature that introduces a more dynamic approach to the analysis of the role of institutions.

2.4.2.4.1 The impact of institutions on preferences for welfare chauvinism

Considering the categorisation of three welfare regimes, the identification of evidence for welfare-regime-specific patterns in relation to public support for the welfare state have tended to be inconclusive (for a review see Jaeger, 2009). However, in relation to the study of welfare chauvinism differences have emerged. Crepaz and Damron (2009) focus on the differentiation between selective and universal welfare states, finding that the latter are more likely to restrict the spread of welfare chauvinism. The authors argue that people in selective welfare systems – i.e. in liberal welfare regimes – are more susceptible to the discourse of targeted and differentiated approaches to beneficiaries, which induces greater inclination to increase the conditionality of immigrants’ access to welfare provisions. Mau and Burkhardt’s findings (2009) also suggest that the role of institutional factors and the politics of interpretations are especially crucial in relation to public support for the inclusion

of immigrants. From an examination of the effect of ethnic diversity on support for immigrants' access to welfare provision, the authors found a negative, but weak association. However, their findings also showed that the welfare regime typology and left-wing parties are important for reducing the effects of ethnic diversity. They also identified greater openness towards immigrants' access to welfare in social democratic welfare states.

Van der Waal et al. (2013) compare welfare chauvinism across the three welfare regimes. The authors conclude that welfare chauvinism is present in all of them, but to a different extent. Contrary to expectations, they identify two types of welfare chauvinism and state that liberal and conservative regimes are more inclined to welfare chauvinism than social democratic welfare states. Although their results also underline that greater selectivity regarding eligibility for benefits leads to higher welfare chauvinism, they could not find evidence that universal access to benefits is the reason for a lower level of welfare chauvinism in social democratic regimes. They do not find any effect of labour market trajectories or ethnic competition. However, they observe that a higher level of income inequality leads to a higher degree of welfare chauvinism. The authors conclude that policies and institutions aimed at reducing economic inequalities contribute to coping with welfare chauvinism.

Approaching the study of welfare chauvinism from the perspective of deservingness theory, Reeskens and Van Oorschot (2012) compare support for welfare chauvinism according to three welfare-regime-specific redistribution preferences – namely, need-, merit- and equality-based redistribution preferences. Their findings show that only needs-based redistribution preferences imply higher support for welfare chauvinism. The authors argue that with needs-based redistribution preferences the self-interest of the needy tend to dominate, which accents intergroup differentiations and the motivation for the in-group to keep limited resources for themselves. Merit- and equality-based redistribution preferences infer greater openness to granting immigrants access to the welfare state. Furthermore, Reeskens and Van Oorschot (2012) find that merit-based redistribution preferences are the most resistant to welfare chauvinism, stressing reciprocity as a condition of access to welfare.

The findings of the above-mentioned studies are coherent in that they point at the greater susceptibility of liberal welfare regimes to welfare chauvinism. This is underlined by the dimension of selectivity and universalism and redistribution preferences, as well as the level of income inequality. However, the mechanism by which these specific institutions affects

individual attitudes remains overshadowed, raising the questions how these institutional aspects affect individuals, and how the related contextual factors interact with individual-level factors and perceptions. To address some aspects of this question, Mau (2003, 2004) and Larsen (2006, 2007) have suggested taking a more dynamic institutionalist approach to the study of welfare attitudes.

2.4.2.4.2 Dynamic institutionalist approach

Both Mau (2003, 2004) and Larsen (2006, 2007) revisit the fundamental questions of why people support the welfare state, and how welfare institutions affect people's attitudes. Both authors challenge the popular theories and claims that individual self-interest and class interests underlie support for the welfare state. While searching for the answers what influences public attitudes and policy preferences, theories on self-interest and theories on class interests juxtapose the individual and collective social aspects. In contrast, Mau and Larsen show how self-interest and class interest are connected to and influenced by the institutional context. Their findings and arguments were key to give priority to the dynamic institutionalist approach in this research instead of analysing the effects of self-interests (Chong et al., 2001; Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Jæger, 2006; Svallfors, 2012), or the role of class interests (Kulin and Svallfors, 2013; Svallfors, 2006) in attitude-formation in relation to the issue immigration. As described later in Chapter 3, this does not mean the role of self-interest or collective interests is disregarded during the analysis, but they figure in the theoretical approach as conceived by Mau and Larsen as connected and shaped by the institutional context. None of their studies focus on immigration or immigrants' access to welfare provisions. However, their contributions and approach inform us about the role of welfare institutions in people's thinking.

To grasp the normative dimension of welfare states, Mau (2004: 58) acknowledges that *"social transactions are grounded upon a socially constituted and subjectively validated set of social norms and shared moral assumptions."* Elaborating on the moral dimension of the welfare states, the author highlights that welfare states 1) produce and validate specific conception of social justice, and 2) justify the common need for and commitment to *"the distribution of welfare burdens and benefits"* (Mau, 2003: 560). Through these moral assumptions and social norms, widely internalized by people, institutions construct what is socially appropriate and acceptable and define the norms of reciprocity; which according to Mau is the central social logic behind the popular support for welfare states. However,

institutions define not only norms but also collective interests, which shape people's understanding of issues and their interests. Acknowledging people's embeddedness in social ties and networks, Mau (2003) places individual attitudes and individual support for welfare policies into a more dynamic and complex context. He argues that people as "public spirited citizens" form welfare attitudes based on a combination of self-interest, collective interest, moral concern and moral judgements about what is appropriate and justified.

Similarly, Larsen (2006, 2007) understands individual attitudes as the attitudes of a more reflexive "political man" which are shaped by perceptions of reality. He argues that perceptions of reality are considerably influenced by welfare institutions and the way social issues are framed and interpreted in the welfare state. Both Mau's and Larsen's definitions extend the scope of considerations affecting attitude-formation and highlight the dynamic interplay between them, in which welfare institutions, the media, public and political discourses, and the specific framings of social issues play a crucial role. Sundberg (2014) also elaborates on the role of the institutional context on individual attitudes, arguing that individual attitudes adapt to changes in institutional and social contexts, which further increases the significance of political interpretations and framings and the potential shifts they can generate.

As immigrants are not genuinely part of the moral community of the welfare state – as described by Mau (2003) – the role of political framings and public discourse are even more relevant as these create and shape how immigrants fit into the common understanding of social justice and fairness in the welfare state, and how social norms and moral assumptions apply in relation to immigrants and their access to welfare. In other words, the narratives of what is appropriate for immigrants and what is expected from immigrants are continuously being shaped. Throughout the analysis of DFs, particular attention is devoted to identifying how social norms and values emerge and are reproduced in participants' arguments for or against the inclusion of immigrants. In this way we intend to scrutinize the role of institutions and the role of public and political discourse on attitudes to immigrants' inclusion.

Furthermore, drawing on the above-presented findings about the differences between welfare regimes' impact on support for welfare chauvinism, the comparison of the Norwegian and British discussions also allows us to analyse whether and how welfare-regime-specific characteristics unfold and shape the discussions. In this regard, Mau's (2003) findings about the welfare regime-specific norms of reciprocity, and Larsen's (2006, 2007)

findings concerning how welfare institutions affect the public perceptions of poor and unemployed people also inform our approach to the analysis of DFs.

2.5 THEORETICAL APPROACH

The academic literature on public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state reviewed above provided guidance and inspiration for defining the scope and theoretical approach of this research. Despite the growing literature on welfare attitudes that focuses specifically on immigrants, our knowledge tends to be limited concerning why and in what specific contexts people support an inclusive or exclusive approach to immigrants' access to welfare provisions. The reason for this gap is the dominance of a quantitative approach to the study of public attitudes that uses international public opinion surveys (Ervasti et al., 2012; Sundberg and Taylor-Gooby, 2013). These surveys provide important, internationally comparable data about people's preferences. However, among other factors the top-down approach and the strict design of the surveys do not allow us to study the reasons and considerations behind the responses or the attitudes which are expressed (Goerres and Prinzen, 2012). To address this gap and improve our understanding of public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state, this research takes a qualitative research approach.

Social Constructivism makes up the backbone of the research – starting with the social constructivist understanding of public attitudes, and affecting the remaining three theories (Social Identity Theory, Welfare Deservingness Theory, and Institutionalism) that are applied in this research. In contrast to the traditional view of attitudes as enduring and stable dispositions (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975), social constructivists argue that attitudes are shaped by the social and institutional context surrounding the individual, by public discourse and by social interactions (Converse, 2006; Tourangeau et al., 2000; Wilson and Hodges, 1992). Thus, attitudes are viewed as being substantially context-dependent and subject to change, which forms the key theoretical argument and contribution of this research. This understanding encourages us to study attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state through social interactions during DFs – to analyse how attitudes are shared, how attitudes develop and change. Accordingly, this research is committed to examining the specific contexts and circumstances in which attitudes shift towards more inclusive or more exclusive preferences.

Immigration is a complex and highly polarizing social issue, at the epicentre of which are intergroup relations. As welfare states are based on group membership, the issue of intergroup relations is even more salient when discussing immigrants' access to welfare provision. This is the reason that Social Identity Theory (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1975) is considered particularly relevant for this research. Furthermore, the key tenets of Social Identity Theory regarding the connections between perceptions of the in-group and perceptions of the out-group encouraged us to look at the practice of intergroup differentiation (differentiating "us" from "them") and to analyse attitudes to immigrants' inclusion through the intergroup differentiation raised by participants during the discussions.

Immigrants' access to welfare is often viewed as challenging the well-defined boundaries of the welfare state and implicitly raising the question of under what conditions should they be allowed to gain access to it. In other words, when and under what conditions should immigrants – or specific groups of immigrants – be included or excluded? This research intends to disentangle the specific arguments for or against inclusion, to elaborate on the processes of inclusion and exclusion as developed by the participants in order to illuminate what facilitates inclusion, and what considerations and concerns hinder it. Drawing on Group Threat Theory (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Quillian, 1995) the research distinguishes whether immigrants are perceived as threats, costs, as potential resources, benefits to the country under analysis. Furthermore, this research argues that these perceptions can co-exist and participants will differentiate and clarify which groups of immigrants are considered as costs or benefits moving along the mentioned abstract continuum of inclusion and exclusion. This way, we can better reveal how participants understand heterogeneity of immigrants, how participants characterise what they expect from immigrant and delineate how immigrants can move from one category to another – from being perceived negatively to positively.

To further specify the scope of this research, and particularly the term inclusion, the research draws on Welfare Deservingness Theory (Van Oorschot, 2000; Van Oorschot et al., 2017) and will analyse people's perceptions of immigrants' deservingness. First, deservingness judgements are easily accessible and used in many situations to form welfare-related opinions (Petersen et al., 2010). Therefore, it is expected that deservingness judgements will be widely used during the DF discussions. Second, as argued by Willen (2012), deservingness judgements are relational, situational, and context-dependent. Accordingly, within the discussions – when participants have time and might be specifically asked by others to elaborate on their views and preferences – it is expected that deservingness judgements will

shed more light on relational aspects both in terms of intergroup relations, and in terms of the desired relation between the state and individual immigrants. Moreover, deservingness judgments allow us to analyse the specific contexts and situations in which immigrants are perceived as deserving and worthy of inclusion, or perceived as undeserving and rejected. As participants interact and raise competing views, it will be important to scrutinize how boundaries of inclusion and exclusion shift during the discussions. Third, within this research particular attention is devoted to the analysis of how people understand and use the five deservingness principles (Van Oorschot, 2000), as this is still an under-researched area within the theory. While analysing how participants construct the welfare deservingness of immigrants, it is not only the use of the five criteria that will be scrutinized, but also the hierarchy and the specific relations and interplay between the five criteria.

The fourth theoretical pillar of the research is constituted by Institutionalism, or more specifically, by the dynamic institutionalist approach to the study of welfare attitudes (Mau, 2003, 2004; Larsen, 2006, 2007; Sundberg, 2014). In the dynamic institutionalist approach, people are conceived of as reflexive individuals embedded in a specific social and institutional context. This social and institutional embeddedness implies a particular vision of society and of social justice. Furthermore, it implies (tacit) knowledge of and adherence to social norms and values. Accordingly, attitudes are also understood to be shaped by the social and institutional context that includes the specific and more dynamically changing political framings of issues, and public discourses.

While theories on the impact of political discourses and thermostat effects on changes in public opinion were duly considered as useful theoretical approaches to the analysis, Institutionalism and more specifically the dynamic institutionalist approach offered a more comprehensive approach. It enables us to identify and analyse greater variation of patterns emerging in the DF discussions. It is believed that people's vision of society and understanding of social reality is highly influenced by the institutional context including the development of the political and public discourse, the diverse (individualised) perceptions of and direct or indirect experiences of the social and policy changes. As these influences are highly interactive, this research aims to approach them in their complexity. The effects of the social and institutional context are expected to emerge with regard to perceptions of immigrants' welfare deservingness and preferences for specific forms of inclusion or exclusion. Drawing on the comparative research on welfare states, attention to the institutional context is further justified for testing and elaborating on the similarities and

differences between the British and Norwegian DF discussions about immigration and immigrants' inclusion.

This chapter was devoted to reviewing the literature related to the study of immigration and the welfare state, and more specifically, the study of welfare chauvinism and attitudes to immigrants' access to welfare provision. The literature review has presented the diversity of approaches to the research on this issue, with particular attention to four theories which have inspired and influenced the thematic specification and theoretical and methodological approach applied in this research. Following the identification of the key gaps in the literature, and definition of the key objectives of this research, the next chapter is devoted to introduce the chosen methodology.

3 METHODOLOGY

Following the review of the academic literature and identification of under-researched areas in relation to public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state, this chapter presents the methodology applied in this research. Furthermore, it justifies why the use of **a combination of the methods of Discourse analysis (DA) and Democratic forums (DF) is suitable for addressing the research questions about the complexity of considerations behind attitudes to immigrants' inclusion, and the process of attitude-formation.** The methodological contribution this research aims to make is twofold. First, it applies these two methods to **extend our understanding of attitudes to immigrants' access to welfare and thus complements knowledge that has primarily been based on international public opinion surveys** (Sundberg and Taylor-Gooby, 2013). Second, as the application of these two methods has been rare in the field of welfare attitudes, it **critically assesses the applicability of these methods, reflecting on their strength and potential, as well as disadvantages.**

It is argued that public attitudes, especially attitudes to complex issues such as immigration and the welfare state, can be better examined through social interaction, as participants engage in deliberation during DFs. When participating in a discussion, people can express the opinion, values, and beliefs that underlie their attitudes, can elaborate on potential ambivalences or contradictory views, can contest others' opinions and to readdress their own. The deliberative method of DF was adopted to provide a structured framework for the development of a discussion about the future of welfare state, in which participants act as co-producers of knowledge. However, the core of the research is formed by DA as applied to the data thus gathered. The following section: 1) describes the research methodology, including the ontological and epistemological approaches that guide the research process; 2) justifies the choice of methods of data collection and data analysis; and 3) introduces the research design and the process of data analysis.

3.1 RESEARCH APPROACH

The theoretical understanding of public attitudes – as described in detail in Chapter 2 – essentially influenced the research approach and methodological planning. **Understanding attitudes as dynamic social concepts** (Converse, 2006; Tourangeau et al., 2000; Wilson and

Hodges, 1992), **the research follows a social constructivist approach**, which claims that social reality is always in the process of formation (Denzin and Lincoln, 2017). Social actors construct and re-construct the meaning of social reality, social practices, and attitudes through interaction (Bryman, 2015). Therefore, social constructivism suggests reflecting on and examining the social contexts – including norms, values, dominant interpretations, etc. – that influence how people share specific aspects of their identities and attitudes, how they speak about social issues. Emphasis is put on how reality is understood and interpreted by people, and on accepting that there are multiple ways of making sense of the world and that these interpretations may be modified as the social context changes (Denzin and Lincoln, 2017).

In line with this approach, the research does not intend to produce and describe a single, objective reality, but is rather designed to extend our knowledge about attitudes through an analysis of meanings and interpretations shared by the DF participants. To address the research questions, primarily discourse analytical methods are applied. DA is strongly linked to the social constructivist understanding of social issues and process. The bottom-up approach characteristic of DA represents an **exploratory analytical framework to reflect on how people understand and (re-)construct reality** (Taylor, 2013). According to discourse analysts, perceptions and interpretations of social reality are situationally embedded in discourses and always reflect a particular perspective; a set of values and interests (Taylor, 2013; Wodak et al., 2009). Meanings and framings of social issues change with the context in relation to what is being debated. In line with this constructivist approach, **the current research conceives that there is no clear demarcation between inclusion and exclusion, and that the boundaries between the inclusion and exclusion of immigrants move along an imaginary continuum; likewise, attitudes to inclusion depend on specificities (related to the visions of specific groups of immigrants) and contexts.**

Acknowledging the complexity, multi-dimensionality, and context dependency of attitudes, the research is ambitious in considering and dealing with a wide spectrum of variables and focusing on the interplay between various factors, contexts, and actors. Accordingly, the research adheres to qualitative research traditions utilizing the richness of discursive data. However, it does not follow a fully data-driven and inductive approach, but draws on some of the key principles of critical realism. In line with critical realism, the research **applies a theory-driven approach that incorporates an explicit acknowledgement of the fallibility of theory which permits a more flexible and experimental coding and analytical process** (Archer et al., 2016; Fletcher, 2017). In practice, this means that the first list of codes draws

on Social Identity Theory and Institutionalism, as outlined in Chapter 2. Moreover, a high level of flexibility was maintained during the coding and analysis to incorporate the details that unfolded during the DFs. Thus, the process of coding and analysis became a significant learning pathway which included familiarization with the discussions and the participants, and deepening the researcher's understanding of the discussions and the emerging attitudes. This step-by-step process enabled the gradual specification of the scope of the research devoting attention to emerging patterns. A good example of this is the identification of patterns regarding participants' use and understanding of deservingness criteria, which became a key pillar of the research (see Chapters 5 and 6).

3.2 APPROACHING THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES THROUGH DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

The current research understands attitudes as dynamic social concepts which are formed in, and in relation to, social contexts (Wilson and Hodges, 1992). The importance associated with attitudes may greatly vary; consequently, the strength of contextual effects and people's openness to considering others' views may also change depending on the issues (Howe and Krosnick, 2017). Welfare attitudes can involve uncertainty, ambiguity, and even contradictory claims (Roosma et al., 2013; Svallfors, 2010; Van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2012). Moreover, some issues are not considered by some people, who thus do not have any prior attitudes toward them. To better understand such specificities of welfare attitudes, we consider **discursive processes more suitable for encouraging people to elaborate on their opinions, views, and attitudes**. Furthermore, through the discursive processes we can also analyse the process of attitude-formation.

Gee (1992: 107) argues that *"Each Discourse involves ways of talking, acting, interacting, valuing, and believing, as well as the spaces and materials 'props' the group uses to carry out its social practices. Discourses integrate words, acts, values, beliefs, attitudes, social identities, as well as gestures, glances, body positions, and clothes."* Accordingly, discourses embrace a wide range of aspects, revealing often unspoken considerations and latent attitudes which help us better understand how people make sense of the world. DA was adopted to utilize and deal with the complexity of information discourses carry.

DA offers a wide range of methods such as critical discourse analysis, conversation analysis, and narrative analysis, just to name a few. The focus of DA can also vary from content analysis with its focus on the function of language in discourse, analysis of the process of discourse,

narrative analysis, etc. (Whetherel et al., 2001). This research aspires to take a pragmatic approach to DA and focuses specifically on the process of exchanges of opinions and interactions through which DF participants' stances about inclusion and exclusion develop. First, using DA the research aims to **identify and analyse the thematic and discursive patterns of DF discussions**. It intends to map how people talk about immigration and immigrants' access to the welfare state, focusing on key arguments, considerations, and the use of values, principles and interests. Second, the research aims to **analyse the dynamics of discussions and interactions to elaborate on the process of attitude-formation**.

As a second method, narrative analysis was considered to represent a micro-level approach in the research. The aim was to analyse narratives of participants with specific profiles for the whole period of the DFs. Accordingly, a pilot analysis was conducted. The essence of narrative analysis is to identify how participants' narratives develop with their adoption of different social identities within debates. In other words, how specific issues induce solidarity based on social status, gender, age, or national identification (Squire, 2005). In contrast to these expectations, the narratives of even the most active participants were not extensive enough for such an in-depth analysis. The pilot analysis showed that this approach did not work well in the context of group interactions. One of the potential reasons for the limited applicability of this specific method may have stemmed from the specific design of the WelfSOC.¹⁵ Presumably, the creation of smaller discussions groups and the incorporation of fewer discussion topics could have enhanced its applicability. Although the narrative analysis was not applied in this particular research, we argue that, with special arrangements for the design of DFs, the method could be utilized in the future. While the use of narrative analysis was thus eliminated, the aim of analysing the micro, individual level of attitude-formation was maintained and accomplished using the techniques of DA (see Chapter 8).

3.2.1 Three perspectives for examination

DA can help elaborate how attitudes toward the inclusion of immigrants are represented in DF discussions. The analysis focuses on three perspectives. First, discourse analytical tools enable us to identify thematic patterns in the debates and analyse what ideas, aspects, and issues are raised concerning immigration. It is expected that **attitude-formation shall be mobilized in light of new information, and convincing arguments** (Goodin and Niemeyer,

¹⁵ The research design is described in Section 3.3.1

2003; Luskin et al., 2002). Besides identifying the diversity of thoughts, it is important to **follow-up how and when such new ideas and opinions are shared by participants, and how they contextualize and justify their stances and preferences** (see Chapter 5 and 6). DA enables us to analyse what arguments make a difference in relation to the perception of immigrants, and what factors affect people's understanding and make them re-consider their standpoints. Particular attention is devoted to investigating how participants formulate their arguments, including how they distinguish what is acceptable and who deserves to be included. This way, the analysis aims to scrutinise the dynamics of attitude-formation.

Second, DA enables us to **analyse arguments according to types of considerations (economic/cultural), interests (individual/collective) and sources of knowledge, and the interplay of these in participants' contributions to the debate** (see Chapters 5 and 6). Focusing on the details of arguments and on the reactions they prompt, contributes to the analysis of the process of discussions. The **dynamics of the debate – in terms of agreements, disagreements, and contestations, etc.** – constitute the third perspective this research aims to investigate by employing DA. In this regard, the analysis of contested views enables us to identify what type of statements trigger disagreement, and to better understand why specific issues polarize participants, thereby leading to more inclusive or exclusive stances. Moreover, silence and "silent" agreement – i.e. issues and understandings which are not contested in the debates – also deserve attention, as these provide important information about what aspects are taken for granted (Kitzinger, 1994). In addition to agreements, disagreements, and contestations, attention is devoted to introducing new perspectives and new ideas concerning the topic under discussion, which also reveal the diversity and richness of discussions. **Focusing on the interactions between the participants, DA enables us to track the dynamism of the process of discussions, and to reflect on shifts in the debates and examine how interactions shape participants' attitudes** (see Chapters 7 and 8).

As both the welfare state and immigration are complex issues which can be approached from different perspectives – from abstract, normative aspects to practical considerations and lived experiences –, DA can make a valuable contribution by extending our knowledge about attitudes towards immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state, and on the conditions of reconciling immigration and welfare state support. On the one hand, DA helps with **exploring in which contexts intergroup differentiations are triggered and immigrants' access to the welfare state is thematized**. On the other hand, DA facilitates **reflection on the diversity of issues, and on complex, ambivalent and contradictory attitudes**. Therefore, we now turn to

a discussion of the DF, the method of data collection. The following section describes the research design used in WelfSOC and assesses its strengths and weaknesses.

3.3 DATA COLLECTION

The shift to a social understanding of attitudes gave rise to new approaches in attitudinal research which aim to capture attitudes in the process of formation through social interaction (Burchardt, 2014). This is how deliberation as a research tool entered the field of attitudinal research. Within this research, the minimalist definition of deliberation proposed by Bächtiger et al. (2018: 3) is applied, understanding deliberation as *“mutual communication that involves weighing and reflecting on preferences, values, and interests regarding matters of common concern [...] deliberation take place in contexts of equal recognition, respect, reciprocity, and sufficiently equal power for communicative influence to function.”*

This definition defines the subject of discussions as issues of common concern, but also foresees a heterogeneity of views and preferences being discussed in an open, respectful way. The origins of deliberative methods, including these fundamental principles of deliberation, reach back to the normative theory of deliberative democracy (Floridia, 2018). Proponents of deliberative democracy argue for the need to improve democratic decision-making and increase the legitimacy of representative democracy by organising deliberations prior to voting and to support the policy-making process (Dryzek, 2010; Goodin, 2008). The key rationale for deliberation is to engage citizens in public debates, to encourage them to think about social issues and consider different aspects, thus attaining a better understanding of issues that leads to an informed opinion (Chambers, 2003; Dryzek, 2010). While the act of decision-making is still reserved for the political elite, public deliberation encourages people to voice their opinions, interests, and preferences, thus informing policy-making (Chappell, 2012; Fishkin, 2011). It is argued that listening to people’s ideas and concerns leads to better and more legitimate policies (Goodin, 2008). Furthermore, Dryzek (2005) emphasises that deliberation can help to reduce differences through learning about others’ opinions and arguments. While in theory all the individuals concerned should have the chance to engage in deliberation, in practice there are crucial limitations to inclusivity. This is the main reason that deliberative initiatives have been restricted to local and regional-level initiatives (Elstub et al., 2016). However, even in such cases, inequality of access persists (Goodin, 2008).

In qualitative research – with special emphasis on attitudinal research – deliberation is conceived of as a process through which participants co-produce knowledge about a specific issue (Burchardt, 2014; Evans and Kotchetkova, 2009). Through the discussions, researchers can better access and explore how people perceive specific issues, examine what they consider as important and why they stand for specific ideas, views, and policies, etc. (Burchardt, 2014). Furthermore, social learning as a central feature of deliberation implies that participants are willing to re-consider their views in light of new information (Luskin et al., 2002; Goodin and Niemeyer, 2003) – especially in relation to issues about which they hold less firm views (Dryzek, 2010; Howe and Krosnick, 2017). Thus, changes in perceptions can be observed, enabling us to study the process of attitude-formation, too. In this regard, it is important to stress that – in contrast to other research projects that used deliberative methods –, **this research is not necessarily interested in investigating concrete changes in attitudes as a result of DF; instead, it focuses on the process of attitude-formation and shifts between pro-inclusive and pro-exclusive stances and attitudes during the discussions.**

To a certain extent, discussions attempt to reproduce the real-life situations and spontaneous human interactions through which attitudes are shaped. However, as social interactions and views that are shared tend to adjust to specific contexts, the research situation itself can considerably influence how people interact and articulate their attitudes (Burchardt, 2014; Evans and Kotchetkova, 2009). By giving voice to participants, DFs enable them to re-create the social realities and specificity of the social contexts through interaction, including how they frame issues and discuss arguments concerning issues of public concern (Elstub et al., 2016; Fishkin, 2018). These considerations were duly taken into when planning the DF in WelfSOC. The following section introduces the specificities of the research design and highlights the key methodological decisions that are critical to this research.

3.3.1 Democratic forums in Welfare State Futures – Our Children’s Europe research

The **Welfare State Futures – Our Children’s Europe (WelfSOC) research project** was designed to explore the views and priorities of ordinary citizens about the future of welfare states with a particular focus on the assumptions and values underlying these aspirations. It aimed to analyse how the changing social, political, and economic context of welfare policy interacts with people’s expectations and attitudes, and what cleavages and solidarities

emerge in welfare debates (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2018). The research design was formulated by the research consortium, which included distinguished social scientists from Denmark, Germany, Norway, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom. As I was not personally involved in the planning process, I fully rely on the methodological design developed by the consortium. However, this special “outsider” position enables me to identify the limitations of the research design and to critically assess how the research design helps to answer the research questions raised.

3.3.1.1 Selection of participants

The principles of the selection and recruitment of participants are one of the most debated issues relating to deliberative approaches. In practice, the number of participants can range from small groups – 10-12 members – to large groups of one thousand people. WelfSOC DFs involved 34-35 participants in each country. In Norway and in the UK, the recruitment process and the DF discussions were carried out by a private research company. In Norway, the capital Oslo was chosen as the location, while in the UK Birmingham was selected. The participants of WelfSOC DFs represented a **diverse group of people roughly representative of the national population** based on age, gender, education, marital and employment status, household income, ethnicity, and electoral preferences.¹⁶ Fishkin and Luskin (2005) argue that representative samples should attempt to reproduce the “real-world” distribution of public views and attitudes. A heterogeneity of groups is viewed as important for increasing the diversity of views and thus increasing the scope for accessing new information (Luskin et al., 2002, 2007).¹⁷ However, many researchers oppose this approach, claiming that it reinforces social inequalities and disregards the opinions of minority members (Wakeford et al., 2007). To mitigate this disadvantage, in WelfSOC the **over-sampling of specific minorities was applied in the break-out group sessions**, which constituted the major part of DFs.

As this research focuses on ordinary people’s attitudes towards the inclusion of immigrants, the use of a diverse, roughly representative sample is justified. However, considering the thematic focus of this research, the representation of people of a minority ethnicity and their views is particularly important as we expect that their perspective about the issue of immigration might enrich and broaden the scope of debates on immigration. Therefore, the

¹⁶ For further information on the distribution of the breakout groups and the socio-demographic characteristics of participants, please see Table 2 - Appendix 1.

¹⁷ The role of heterogeneity of views is further elaborated in Section 3.3.3

involvement of participants with minority/immigration background in the discussions received special attention during the analysis.

Considering the low overall number of participants, ensuring representativeness in relation to all eight characteristics represented a notable challenge. In this regard, the recruitment of participants with an ethnic/immigrant background may be perceived as demanding. However, in both countries the target share of participants in terms of ethnic minority/immigration background was met. Moreover, as shown in Table 1 in both countries participants with ethnic minority background were over-represented compared to the national population. While the extent of over-representation is smaller in Norway, in the British DF their share in the group reflected better the share of ethnic minority members in the locality of the DF, in Birmingham. However, this situation raises questions about the measurement and availability of data on ethnicity, too. The over-representation of participants with an ethnic minority background resulted in a greater level of participation in the discussions about immigration in the UK. However, this effect was strengthened by the fact that in one of the small groups the ethnic minority background was the guiding principle of over-sampling.

Table 1 – Detailed review of the representativeness of the British and Norwegian DF participants in relation to age, education, and ethnic minority background

		DF UK	UK	Birmingham	DF NO	NO	Oslo
Age	25-34	35%	14%	15%	31%	14%	21%
	45-54	23%	12%	15%	22%	14%	12%
Education	Upper secondary	55%	35%	47%	8%	41%	30%
	Tertiary, BA	35%	32%	38%	40%	23%	30%
	Tertiary, MA or above	0%	12%		46%	9%	19%
Ethnic minority background		41%	14%	47% (Non-White British, 2011)	21%	16%	32%
	Born in the country	23%	-	-	12%	3%	7%
	Foreign-born	18%	14%	22%	9%	13%	25%

Sources: UK - Eurostat 2015 (age, education, foreign-born population) and UK Census 2011 (Ethnic minority background); Norway - Statistics Norway 2015

Focusing on the remaining seven characteristics that guided the selection process, we should highlight age and education, in relation to which the final composition of the British and Norwegian group tended to diverge from the national population. As shown in Table 1, in both countries the age groups 25-34 and 45-54 were over-represented. However, focusing

on the discussions on immigration, participation in the discussions involved specific age-related differences only in Norway, because small groups were created by over-sampling participants based on age. More importantly, over-representation was identified in relation to level of education. In Norway, tertiary-educated participants, while in the UK participants with an upper-secondary education were overrepresented. The dominance of these groups of participants also emerged in the discussions on immigration, which reinforces the need to take this difference into account when interpreting the research findings.

As a last note about the selection of participants, we should highlight the effects of multiple identities. In this regard, O'Doherty and Davidson (2010) argue that during debates participants may switch their positions, thereby reflecting various identities depending on the issue, context, or interests. Therefore, even if people with specific socio-demographic characteristics are represented in DFs, this might not mean that they will contribute to the debate in that specific role. Therefore, especially in the case of participants with an ethnic minority/immigration background, it was considered important to focus on how they engage in the discussions about immigration, what aspects of their identities and attitudes they share, and whether they represent the minority opinion or remain silent in relation to divisive issues. As noted above, narrative analysis as a specific method was intended to scrutinize this particular issue. While the narrative analysis was not fully implemented, Chapter 8 addresses the related questions.

While the WelfSOC research design employed specific arrangements to recruit a diverse group of people to discuss the future of welfare states as well as to give voice to certain minorities, the critical question of inclusivity remains and forms the key limitation of this deliberative research method. Together with the high level of context-dependency of DF discussions, this limitation needs to be duly taken into account during the analysis. However, these limitations are to be considered together with the possibilities and prospects the method offers in attitude research complementing the findings of quantitative methods. The following sections focus especially on these aspects of the research design.

3.3.1.2 Duration of deliberation

Deliberations vary substantially in relation to the duration and timing of events (Burchardt, 2014). The main rationale of extending the timespan of deliberative events is to increase the quality of discussion. In WelfSOC, the DFs took place on **two days, with a two-week break**

between the two meetings. They were scheduled on Saturday, enabling people to participate. Participants who were invited were offered a generous financial incentive (in the UK, 150 GBP/day; in Norway appr. 850GBP/day) to increase the equal participation of people with various socio-economic statuses and to compensate for potential loss of free-time and income. The financial incentive may have encouraged attendance at the events – especially for low-income people. However, the incentive itself could not guarantee equal participation in the debates.¹⁸ Accordingly, we can observe considerable differences in the extent of engagement of participants during DFs.

In WelfSOC DFs, each day started and finished with a plenary session. In-between, discussions were conducted in three break-out groups.¹⁹ The research goals were particularly ambitious, as discussion of five topics was planned for both days, which meant that 25-30 minutes were available for each break-out session. Although the schedule allowed some flexibility, the agenda was quite tight. A setup including fewer than five topics but enabling more time for discussion about specific issues would have been an alternative strategy. Time pressure was especially clear on the second day when the participants had the special task of preparing three policy recommendations per topic. Availability of more time would have been especially important in relation to the discussions on complex social issues such as immigration. The key strength of the method is to encourage people to articulate and elaborate on their views and attitudes, to negotiate conflicting views. Therefore, the longer timeframe – what actually took place in some groups having longer sessions on immigration – would have been useful.

The overall longer duration of the discussions added significant value to the DF as participants had more time to process and think about the issues that were discussed on Day 1. Furthermore, on Day 2 participants were already familiar with the process of discussions and had got to know each other, which may have affected their engagement in the debates and how they articulated attitudes. The longer duration of DF also facilitated shifts in opinions and attitudes, allowing us to analyse the dynamics of attitude-formation. Therefore, it was considered worth comparing the discussions on Day 1 and Day 2 regarding how participants talked about immigration, justified their preferences for inclusion and/or

¹⁸ The issue of equal participation in deliberation and its implications is thoroughly studied by Gerber et al. 2014 and 2016.

¹⁹ Please see the detailed agenda Table 3 – Appendix 1.

exclusion, and whether they reacted differently to others' opinions. This topic is addressed in Chapters 7 and 8 in particular.

3.3.1.3 Moderation and facilitation of deliberation

The nature of moderation largely affects how deliberations are conducted. The role of moderators is significant as they define the framework of discussion and make participants adhere to the rules of deliberation, giving voice to each participant, and preventing any dismissive behaviour (Elstub, 2015). The purpose of the deliberation itself considerably determines the extent of facilitation. The purpose of WelfSOC DFs was rather exploratory, focusing on how people talk about certain social issues and the meanings attached to these issues, and was less concerned about reaching a consensus (Taylor-Gooby and Leruth, 2018). DFs followed a specific structure, which constituted of a learning phase on Day 1, and a deliberative phase on Day 2 (Taylor-Gooby and Leruth, 2018). Therefore, moderation inclined towards a "light-touch" approach, limiting moderators' influence in the discussion. This was especially the case in relation to the discussions on Day 1, which granted **extensive liberty to participants to raise issues they considered the most important for the future of welfare states**. Thus, a naïve discussion could develop without prior stimulus and letting topics emerge. In the UK, participants selected Immigration, Lack of money, Unemployment, Overcrowding/ageing population, and Lack of/access to education as topics for discussion. In Norway, the topics were Work/employment, Education, Financing, Health and Environment. However, we need to stress the specific timing of DFs, in the Fall of 2015 – following the peak of the Refugee Crisis, but before the Brexit referendum –, which may have influenced the choice of topics for Day 1 discussion.

Day 2 was more structured. It is widely argued that if the need to achieve a concrete outcome is specified, then participants are more motivated (Elstub, 2015). Elstub (2015) further argues that even in purely research-oriented deliberations, it is beneficial to embed discussions into a wider policy context. Accordingly, in WelfSOC a role-play was created in which participants were expected **to act as policy advisors and to discuss and agree on policy recommendations for the future government in 2040**. The main rationale was to make sure participants were forward-looking and discuss the future of welfare states. This way, the focus of discussions shifted from the identification of concerns to mapping the causes of problems and finding suitable measures for fixing them. On Day 2, the topics of the break-out group sessions were imposed by the research consortium. This was justified by the

priority of ensuring consistency and the cross-country comparability of results. The proposed topics – namely, income inequality, immigration, gender, intergenerational issues, and the labour market – coincided with the topics discussed on Day 1. The discussions often touched upon overlapping issues, which also reduced the demarcation of thematic areas and the potentially negative effects of imposed topics. Moderation was limited on Day 2, too. However, moderators were specifically asked to urge participants to discuss the possible (positive and negative) implications of the suggested policy recommendations. Each group was required to present their policy recommendations at the afternoon plenary session, which were then briefly discussed. A final vote was conducted to appraise overall support for these policy measures.

The proposed structure of DF seemed particularly useful in this research. On Day 1, discussions allowed participants to freely raise their concerns about welfare states, through which their understanding of the welfare state and immigration could be examined. The role-play on Day 2 proved useful for focusing the discussions. The task of formulating policy recommendations encouraged participants to articulate and reason their views and preferences regarding what is viewed as socially acceptable and desirable and what is not. This also helped us to analyse what types of arguments and information affect preferences for inclusion and exclusion. Moreover, we should note the differences between the quality of policy recommendations in relation to specific policy areas. For instance, it was apparent that participants were more creative in relation to the issue of an aging population than in relation to immigration, where familiarity with the issue was at a different level. Furthermore, uncertainty about the future implications of immigration also made it more complicated to relate to this topic. The latter aspect was explicitly communicated by Norwegian and British participants.

3.3.1.4 Provision of evidence

It is disputed whether it is beneficial to provide information and additional evidence during the course of deliberative processes. Some researchers claim that expert evidence is detrimental to the flow of discussion, especially as the means of presentation of evidence might differ from and interfere with the language used in the discussions (Burchardt, 2014; Gleason, 2011). In contrast, Neblo (2011) argues that the distribution of such information is natural in real-life public discourse. Within the WelfSOC project a mixed approach was applied. In the morning plenary session, facilitators presented the key characteristics of

welfare states in very general terms. While the information was minimal – not including any specific graphs or data –, it still might have had an effect on the following discussions. On Day 1, at the end of the afternoon plenary session, participants were asked what kind of information they would require for the second day of discussions. Tailored information packages were accordingly prepared for the next session and sent two days before the second meeting. The information package was also presented in the morning plenary session by the WelfSOC researchers.²⁰

As immigration was one of the areas in which evidence was demanded, the effects of the information packages represent an additional aspect for analysis concerning attitude-formation. Previous research found that deliberations have a transformative character and participants tend to re-consider their views in light of new information (Goodin and Niemeyer, 2003; Luskin et al., 2002). Moreover, literature shows that people tend to misjudge the size of the immigrant population (Blinder and Allen, 2016; Herda, 2010), and immigrants' share of welfare-use, and they overestimate the cost of benefits accessed by immigrants (Baumberg Geiger, 2016).²¹ Therefore, the information might have challenged unacknowledged biases and enriched the discussion (Mercier and Landemore, 2012). The provision of information enabled us to study how people treat factual information, and whether they recognise its validity.

During British and Norwegian the DFs we could observe different approaches and uses of the provided information. Within the discussions on immigration specifically, there were more direct references to the information packages in the UK. While the provided information raised important aspects in the debates and there were no issues with its understanding, in the British discussions the desired effects of statistical information to shake unacknowledged biases tended to be weak and as described in Chapter 7 highly dependent on the interactions within the group. While the validity of the data was explicitly questioned by only one British participant, the value of statistical information tended to be lower as it was often overruled by other (non-statistical) arguments. In future research, provision of information could be further developed by conducting experiments during the DFs testing provision of different information (in terms of thematic coverage and extensiveness) to the small groups and its effects on the group discussion.

²⁰ Please see the information packages in Appendix1.

²¹ Further details about misperceptions concerning immigration in the UK and Norway are discussed in Chapter 4.

3.3.1.5 *Pre- and post-deliberation surveys*


For many researchers, one of the most appreciated benefits of DFs – and deliberative methods in general – is collective learning and the transformation of views and attitudes through interaction (Dryzek, 2005; Fishkin, 2018; Luskin et al., 2002). In order to capture such potential changes, pre- and post-deliberation surveys are conducted, which can provide evidence about the potential changes the process of deliberation has made to individual participants' attitudes. Although the WelfSOC DFs were not designed to change participants' attitudes, a copy of the standardized 2008 ESS survey was used and filled out before the morning plenary session started on Day 1, and right after the concluding plenary session on Day 2. From a methodological point of view, these surveys enable us to reflect on how the initial positions indicated in the pre-deliberation survey were articulated through the discussion (what similarities and contradictions arose during the discussions). This also allowed us to examine in what respect deliberative processes can complement data collected in individual settings with the help of questionnaires. This particular issue is addressed in Chapter 8.

Furthermore, the use of the standardised ESS questionnaire allows us to test the representativeness of the sample by comparing the survey results to the findings of 2016 ESS. While the WelfSOC pre-deliberation survey included four immigration-related questions, only one question was part of the 2016 ESS survey. Figure 1 presents a comparison of DF participants' pre-deliberation attitudes (Fall of 2015) and the representative ESS findings (data collected in Summer 2016 – Spring 2017). In both countries the results of the DF pre-deliberation survey and the 2016 ESS survey are very similar, and only minor differences were found between attitudes. Additionally, it should be highlighted that in both countries there were many indecisive participants – six Norwegian participants who indicated “don't know” and four British participants who did not respond to the question.²² It is important to stress that this research was not specifically focused on examining the concrete changes in individual participants' attitudes, and shares scepticism about the chance of generating durable changes in attitudes after two days of discussion (for a recent review of attitude change see Albarracín and Shavitt, 2018). Instead, **this research examines the process of attitude-formation that DF discussions can trigger and initiate, thus the focus is on analysing how attitudes to immigrants' inclusion are shaped through social**

²² This issue and post-deliberation attitudes will be analysed in Chapter 7 and 8.

interactions, and under what conditions and in relation to which arguments and considerations do attitudes to immigrants' inclusion shift.

Figure 1 - Preferences for immigrants' access to welfare benefits and services - DF Before survey 2015, ESS 2016



Source: WelfSOC DF UK and WelfSOC DF NO (2015), ESS 2016

This section has described and evaluated the research design of WelfSOC DFs, which is followed by the review of the key strengths of DFs in comparison to other research methods used in attitudinal research.

3.3.2 The strengths of Democratic forums in comparison to other research methods

Openness, mutual respect, and social learning as the key principles of deliberation contribute to the creation of a **dynamic framework of discussions in which attitudes can unfold without raising direct questions regarding participants' stances about the inclusion of immigrants in the welfare state.** Utilizing group dynamics and interactions between participants, DFs are considered to be more suitable for the exploration and analysis of complex, value-laden issues (Fishkin, 2011). In this respect, the key strengths of DFs correspond to the weaknesses of public opinion surveys in which a structured format does not allow respondents to provide reasons for their responses. In contrast, DFs provide a more nuanced picture of attitudes towards issues (Fishkin, 2018). Through interaction, participants

can better describe what they understand by the term “welfare state”, and what they think about immigration and inclusion, who they consider as immigrants. Participants have more time to explain their stances from multiple perspectives, thus allowing the discussion of uncertainties, ambiguities, and conflicting views. **This interactive character makes DF especially attractive for attitudinal research in order to complement the findings of public opinion surveys, which is the most commonly used method to study attitudes.** From a methodological perspective, DFs resemble focus groups. However, it is particularly the time frame, the different levels of moderation, and the involvement of homogenous groups of participants in focus groups (Goerres and Prinzen, 2012; Wakeford et al., 2007) that mark the key differences that have implications for the potential to generate shifts in attitudes and offer the possibility to analyse attitude-formation.

Second, in an ideal scenario, deliberation involves **reasoned debate**, whereby people justify their stances and the force of better arguments affects the discussion (Bächtiger et al., 2018; Chambers, 2003; Fishkin and Luskin, 2005; Habermas, 1996; Mansbridge et al., 2010). However, in practice the nature of discussions can greatly vary and statements often do not reflect informed opinion (Rosenberg, 2014). People’s capacity to process information and express their views varies (Mendelberg, 2002). Similarly, reasoning can take different forms – ranging from references to norms and principles, value statements and personal stories, to concrete examples and comparisons – through which people try to justify their thinking to others (Young, 1996). **While the quality of data considerably depends on the information that is shared and the reasoning for this, how statements – even ones without real arguments – are formulated transmits information regarding the topic’s relevance for the participant and participant’s uncertainty or “non-attitude” toward the topic** (Kitzinger, 1994). In this respect, group interaction gains greater sense, as fellow participants may ask for details, follow-up or contest (vague) statements, thus exploring heterogeneous views and clarifying potential misunderstandings (Mansbridge et al., 2010). This also helps to deepen the discussion, to make people reflect on their views, and foster attitude-formation. This way, the analysis of the process of DF discussions can shed light on the mechanisms and dynamics of attitude-formation and shifts between preferences for the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants.

Third, in research methods that address respondents individually, respondents tend to focus on their own interests. This was demonstrated in Chapter 2, as self-interest has a dominant role in studies of welfare attitudes, attitudes to immigration and immigrants. In DFs **we can identify different tendencies, as group-based methods encourage people to talk about**

common goods, and to take into account the wider context and wider collective interests (Mansbridge et al., 2010). This might be especially the case in relation to debating immigration, which is usually reckoned to be a national issue that activates concerns about the collective instead of the individual (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Hatton, 2016). However, this does not mean that self-interest does not arise or matter in group discussions. Mansbridge et al. (2010) argue that self-interest is crucial to clarifying conflicting views. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that individuals are embedded in their family and social networks (Mau, 2003). Thus, self-interest should not be limited to concrete individuals as reflected in the demographic characteristics of survey respondents, but might be shaped by the interests, experiences, and perceptions of their connections, which can be better revealed during group discussions. While it is expected that debates about immigration rather draw on the collective dimension, the research examines how self-interest and wider social interests are formulated and how these interests interact, complement, or compete during deliberations.

Last, **the role of the researcher** in the implementation process also distinguishes DFs from other quantitative and qualitative research methods (Burchardt, 2014; Fishkin, 2018; Taylor-Gooby et al., 2018). An important added value of DFs is their facilitation of bottom-up discussions, letting participants express what they consider relevant. During the process of implementation, the researcher has no or only a limited opportunity to affect and interfere in the process of discussion, apart from by creating the research design (Burchardt, 2014). Participants interpret and contextualize issues, which in many cases can differ from academic conceptions (Fishkin, 2018; Taylor-Gooby et al., 2018). Thus, DFs **allow the researcher to distance from previous academic interpretations and focus on people's interpretations**. Thus, giving rise to innovation – exploring new ideas, which might not have been considered by researchers. At the same time, this also means a high level of dependence on the quality of debates. DFs are highly context-dependent so the quality of data that is gathered is affected by various conditions, ranging from the purpose of the research, the composition of the group of participants, formal and informal rules of interaction, the reproduction of power relations, etc. (Bryman, 2015; Burchardt, 2014; Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 2007; Luskin et al., 2007; Sunstein, 2002). The following section reflects on some of the critical issues, with particular attention to the potentially detrimental effects of group dynamics. It also points at how careful methodological planning can mitigate these potentially negative effects (Elstub, 2015).

3.3.3 Critical issues and limitations of democratic forums

While group dynamics can significantly foster diverse debates, they are also associated with disadvantages (Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 2007; Sunstein, 2002). Human interaction is adapted to social contexts and typically follows norms, habits, and assumptions associated with that specific context, which tend to reproduce social inequalities, involving giving voice to socially, culturally, and personally more dominant people and silencing others (Elstub, 2015; Forsyth, 2010; Young, 1996). This is one of the reasons why the selection of participants, addressing inequality in participation, and the quality of moderation require thorough methodological planning and consideration **to facilitate a diversity of considerations within discussions, thus increasing the quality of the discussions and the quality of the data to be analysed** (Mansbridge, 2010).

Considering the aims of deliberative methods in relation to improving people's understanding of social issues and to acquiring informed opinion, a heterogeneity of opinions is considered especially important for bringing different opinions and competing arguments to light that help participants re-consider their own positions (Goodin and Niemeyer, 2003; Luskin et al., 2002). While a heterogeneity of views represents the positive and desirable side of group dynamics, a high level of like-mindedness increases potentially negative implications. The dominance of a majority opinion and a high level of consensus within groups can hinder the articulation of minority views (Mercier and Landemore, 2012). A homogeneity of views can also hinder the contestation of public misperceptions, which are influential in relation to immigration (Blinder and Allen, 2016; Herda, 2010). Furthermore, it can lead to group polarization, understood as when participants *"move toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members' [participants'] pre-deliberation tendencies"* (Sunstein, 2002: 176).

Concerns about like-mindedness in group discussions is underlined by the findings from social psychology that group influence promotes the dominance of majority opinion (Forsyth, 2010). Group influence stems from both informational and normative influences. **Informational influences** refer to the tendency of people to compare their views with other participants' opinions. Especially in situations when people are uncertain or lack sufficient information about the topic of discussion, they tend to turn to others' opinions and arguments – using others' views to clarify, define, or confirm their own position(s) (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Festinger, 1954; Forsyth, 2010). A homogeneity of views can also be reinforced by **normative influences** as individuals are inclined to present themselves and

their opinions as being in line with social norms, standards, and conventions (Forsyth, 2010). Therefore, in the public sphere people might strategically position themselves as supportive of dominant opinions (Isenberg, 1986). Furthermore, the pressure for normative conformity can influence what attitudes are articulated and what attitudes are silenced in group discussion. ‘Spiral of silence’ theory also emphasises that people who hold unpopular views might be deterred from expressing them to avoid conflict within groups (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). Confirmation bias, the tendency to be more susceptible toward arguments that confirm an individual’s initial views, also bolsters the dominance of majority opinions and makes it more challenging to contest them publicly (Mercier and Landmore, 2012). Considering such risks of group dynamics, Sunstein (2002, 2009) argues that group polarization is likely to emerge in the absence of conflicting views when participants raise and consider only a limited “pool of arguments” and their ability to recognize and to deal with information biases is limited.

In response to objections based on the **risks of group polarization**, deliberative research methods – including DF – have adopted specific arrangements to ensure that diverse and informed discussions occur. So far, studies found that representative sampling, the inclusion of diverse groups of people, the provision of balanced information, the availability of experts during discussions, and professional moderation, all contribute to the de-polarization of attitudes (Farrar et al., 2009; Goodin and Niemeyer, 2003; Himmelroos and Christensen, 2014; Luskin et al., 2007). These findings underline the benefits and significance of careful research design. This touches upon the **need to find the right balance between inclusivity and homogeneity** to ensure that participants feel secure and relaxed enough to share their views – including minority views – on the one hand; and to encourage a heterogeneity of opinions to increase the potential impact of forum discussions on participants’ opinion-formation.

The search for the right balance in WelfSOC is well-represented in the sampling method – the recruitment of a diverse group of people, but using the over-sampling technique for the creation of small discussion groups. While WelfSOC did not aim to change people’s attitudes, it was interested in the process of attitude-formation – what attitudes, preferences, and aspirations participants share, and how these positions emerge and develop through interaction. This interest in the process of attitude-formation further justifies the need to devote particular attention to the analysis of the impact of group dynamics on the development of discussions and more specifically to the examination of the homogeneity or heterogeneity of views that emerge in the discussion. This issue is especially important in

relation to such a complex and divisive issue as immigration and immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state, where both informational and normative influences can be strengthened and participants might be less open to changing their predispositions (Smets and Isernia, 2014).

The key limitations of DFs concern inclusivity, inequality in participation, a high level of context-dependency, and a high level of dependence on the quality of data – i.e. what is and how extensively is discussed in the debates. The previous sections were intended to critically assess these limitations, and to present what arrangements were put in place to mitigate them in WelfSOC. **While these limitations require thorough attention throughout the planning, execution and analysis of the debates, DFs do represent an alternative research method which can strongly complement research findings, especially in regard to the analysis of the process of attitude-formation.** The key added value is that DFs encourage bottom-up discussions and represent a more dynamic analytical framework to analyse attitudes through social interaction. Responding to the main weaknesses of survey methods, **DFs can complement the knowledge collected by public opinion polls** (Fishkin, 2018; Taylor-Gooby et al., 2018). Although small group discussions might not reveal major differences in attitudes toward immigration according to demographic and socio-economic characteristics, as the findings of quantitative surveys can do, it is expected that discussions reveal important patterns about the considerations that shape people's attitudes (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2018). Thus, DFs can **provide explanations for the findings of polls, identify relevant issues for inclusion in future polls, and can inform researchers about how to specify and refine how questions and responses are framed and worded in polls.**

Acknowledging the limitations and the great potential of DFs is also essential during the process of data analysis. Here, the task is to identify the means that can grasp the dynamism of interactions, the process of attitude-formation, and the complexity of arguments for or against the inclusion of immigrants. Additionally, we need to bear in mind and be vigilant to the above-described concerns about group dynamics. The following section presents the details of the process of data analysis and the specific measures that were taken to guarantee the quality of analysis.

3.4 PROCESS OF DATA ANALYSIS

3.4.1 The process of coding

As this research operates with a wide range of variables and a high level of context-dependency, it required a comprehensive coding scheme which was sensitive to the dynamism and nuances of attitude-formation. In contrast to an inductive, fully data-driven approach, the research draws on a critical realist approach. Accordingly, **data processing is theory-driven, but with the acknowledgement of the fallibility of theory. Thus, allowing for a high level of flexibility to permit the identification of new tendencies and discursive patterns emerging from the data** (Archer et al., 2016; Fletcher, 2017). Discourses might reveal often unspoken considerations, thoughts, and beliefs, which are poorly captured by other (non-discursive) methods (Kitzinger, 1994; Krzyzanowski, 2008; Taylor, 2013).

Coding of data supported the identification of key thematic and discursive patterns in DFs concerning attitudes to inclusion and exclusion. For the coding and analysis, **NVivo 11 software** was used. **The analysis of DF data was carried out in three stages**, devoting sufficient time for the coding. The first round of coding was intended to be the most comprehensive, with the widest focus on the details of the DF debates. Due to the extensive volume of discussions, after the assessment of the findings of the first round of coding the scope of the coding was narrowed down to the specific discussions on immigration. After each round, the coding scheme was revisited and the codes were refined as necessary. During the process, dozens of additional codes emerged, which were aimed at further specifying the emergent patterns. As the analysis advanced, the number of specific codes substantially increased. In both countries, two separate analyses were conducted and the comparative analysis commenced after the assessment of the second round of coding. The third round of coding served to double-check the coding and prepare for the analysis, the findings of which are presented in the following chapters.

Although the research only partially used the coding scheme developed within WelfSOC,²³ their availability and the coded transcripts provided a firm starting point for this research. All topics discussed (and coded) in DFs affected and complemented the discussions on immigration in many respects. However, as this research centres on how people understand immigration and how participants argue for or against inclusion, it was important to extend the WelfSOC codes drawing on the research findings reviewed in Chapter 2 and based on

²³ For the final coding scheme, see Table 4 – Appendix 1.

research findings on deliberation and deliberative methods described in earlier sections of this chapter. The extended coding scheme was constructed closely following the aims and methodological considerations and specificities of this particular piece of research (Creswell, 2015). Thus, **codes about rationale** were extended, differentiating **the source of knowledge** (such as rationality, emotions, sentiments, intuitions, etc.), and the **motivations and interests that were raised in the arguments** (self-interest and collective, societal interests); and last to identify whether the arguments are associated with **economic or cultural concerns**. In relation to the interests and motivations stressed in the arguments, it was considered important to observe if participants framed statements as individuals or as members of a larger collective. Therefore, individual and collective framing were added as child nodes under economic and cultural arguments.

Focusing on **intergroup differentiation**, specific codes were introduced to mark the perceptions and characteristics people attach to the in-group and out-group. In addition to **differentiation based on ethnicity/immigration status**, further cleavages were added focusing on: 1) age with respect to concerns about an aging population, and 2) socio-economic status, considering the perceptions of social inequalities. The initial reason for incorporating additional social cleavages was to compare the nature and dynamics of discussions that triggered interethnic differentiation and differentiation within the in-group. However, due to the wealth of data and findings on immigration specifically, we needed to be strict and narrow down the scope of the research. Therefore, after the first round of coding, the idea of comparing inclusion criteria in relation to different cleavages needed to be left behind to give priority to an in-depth analysis of perceptions of the welfare deservingness of immigrants and to the process of attitude-formation.²⁴

Last, to elaborate on the **interactions and dynamism of DF discussions**, specific codes were introduced. While the codes described so far served primarily the aims of content analysis, the discussion-dynamics codes were included to capture the process of discussions. In this respect, the findings of the German WelfSOC research team on changing preferences in relation to welfare redistribution in Germany (Zimmermann et al., 2018) provided substantial inspiration for this specific devotion to interactions within group discussions.

²⁴ The data was suitable for the comparison based on cleavages and in the future it would be worth undertaking a comparative analysis as it would offer another relevant perspective regarding how criteria for inclusion in the welfare state shift, and how the mechanisms behind preferences for inclusion/exclusion change concerning different groups of beneficiaries.

In addition to the identification and coding of agreements and disagreements as specific forms of interaction, it was considered relevant to track the diversity of views introduced in relation to the discussed issues. Therefore, the code **“New perspective”** was used to identify when participants introduced a new issue or a new argument to the debate. The novelty of the argument was broadly approached during the coding. It was used to refer to a new target group – e.g. shifting attention to another subgroup of immigrants, or to a new context such as stressing the living standards in the country of origin. The effects of “New perspective” as a form of interaction widely varied. It was often used to shift attention to a completely new (sub)topic, but it was also applied to deepen the discussion by mentioning further relevant considerations. Equally important was following up what arguments and stances were challenged or contested by other participants. Accordingly, **“Contestation”** code was used when participants raised questions for clarification or when they proposed specific counter-arguments. The role of “Contestation” as a form of interaction was especially important in relation to encouraging other participants to elaborate on their attitudes and preferences, but also to questioning previous arguments and to changing the focus of discussions.

During the actual process of coding, further codes were introduced such as **“Repetition, repeating an earlier raised new perspective”**. This specific code was added as a child node under “New perspective”. The rationale for adding this specific code was to study how specific arguments are raised again and again, and also to see if participants take up and use others’ arguments during the discussions. Furthermore, the repetition of arguments was also considered important as an indicator of the importance of the argument in relation to the given topic. The additional codes “Response to new perspective” and “Response to contestation” were introduced, too. However, the role of these as specific forms of interaction was rather insignificant. “Turning point” and “Interruption” were also considered important for indicating significant moments in discussions, and helped in the analysis of the process of attitude-formation (see Chapter 7 and Chapter 8).

3.4.2 The analysis of over forty hours of discussion

“Coding is the process of analysing qualitative text data by taking them apart to see what they yield before putting the data back together in a meaningful way”. Creswell’s (2015: 156) formulation grasps the dimensions of coding and analysis of data, starting with a very close scrutiny of references, statements, and reactions to these. Overall, the British and Norwegian DF discussions represent more than forty hours of discussion. The wealth of the data

required a comprehensive approach. Furthermore, as I did not participate nor observe the conduct of DFs, in-depth familiarization with the data was considered inevitable.

The coding process was closely intertwined with the process of analysis during the three stages. Coding in NVivo ensured easy access to summaries about the frequency and dominance of specific codes and, accordingly, specific understandings and framings in the discussions. On the one hand, this allowed the analysis of the overall use of these specific issues – captured by codes – on a one-by-one basis, devoting specific attention to the specificity of the context in which it was raised, the antecedents, and the reactions to the coded references. On the other hand, particular attention was devoted to treating the five discussions in all six break-out groups (three British and three Norwegian groups of 10-11 participants) as one unit in order to analyse the broader discursive context of the group discussion and the links that participants made. Therefore, **the process of analysis was an iterative one positioned between taking a close-up perspective about the use of specific codes, and a broader analysis that embedded references in their wider discursive context.**

This was followed by a comparative analysis of the three small groups in both British and Norwegian DFs. The aim was to find differences and similarities in how the participants of different small groups approach, discuss, and raise different or similar arguments and justifications concerning the same issues. Furthermore, it was considered important to identify what issues trigger more conflict, or, in contrast, uncontested agreement within the small groups and how participants react and deal with such conflicts or build on such consensus.

In the research, **multiple coding** was used, requiring the analysis of overlaps between the specific categories of codes – for instance, whether economic considerations were linked to specific groups of immigrants, or to specific subtopics of immigration such as immigration control in the UK. The findings about overlaps between specific framings also contributed to narrowing down the scope of the research and to concentrating more specifically on intergroup differentiations, the use of deservingness principles and group dynamics, and finally, on a comparison of emerging patterns in the British and Norwegian DFs. The results of the analysis created the core of the four analytical chapters. While Chapters 5 and 6 rely on the findings of the content analysis – focusing on the themes, arguments, and justifications that shaped discussions about immigrants' inclusion –, Chapters 7 and 8 focus on the details of the process of attitude-formation during the DFs.

Last, the analysis included the examination of emerging patterns related to participants' demographic and socio-economic characteristics, and based on their pre- and post-deliberation survey responses. This aspect of the analysis was primarily utilised in Chapter 8 focusing on individual attitude-formation.

As described above, the coding and analysis of the data involved a long journey of familiarizing with and exploring the British and Norwegian DF discussions and further specifying the codes to deepen understanding of the emerging patterns. As the coding process is based on a subjective assessment of the references and the discussions, **the three rounds of coding were justified as a critical approach for ensuring a high quality of analysis and minimising any misunderstandings or misinterpretation of data.** In relation to the analysis of the Norwegian discussion, special arrangements were made to check the authenticity of the English translation.

The process of coding and analysis became an important learning path. **As a result of the highly flexible and open research approach, numerous patterns emerged during the coding and analysis.** The emerging patterns confirmed initial expectations, but there were some issues – e.g. perceptions of trust – which were not as salient within the discussions either in Norway or in the UK as expected based on the available literature. Moreover, **the findings of the coding and analysis suggested plenty of new opportunities and directions within the research that significantly shaped the final structure of this thesis and the content of the following chapters.**

3.5 CONCLUSION

The novelty of this research stems from its unique methodological approach, which adheres to the social constructivist understanding of public attitudes (Converse, 2006; Tourangeau et al., 2000; Wilson and Hodges, 1992). Acknowledging the impact of public discourse, access to information, and social interaction on public attitudes, the research adopted a combination of the deliberative method of DFs and DA to examine public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion as such attitudes are articulated by ordinary people through social interaction. This chapter was devoted to describing and justifying the chosen research approach and presenting details about the data collection and data analysis.

DFs conducted in the WelfSOC research project granted a high level of autonomy to participants to shape discussions about the future of welfare states. Although DFs operate within a carefully designed research context, the discussions and participants' interactions can dynamically develop. This dynamically changing nature of discussions opens the space for exploring and examining attitude-formation through exchanges of views, contestations, justifications, and the reconciliation of conflicting opinions. DA as the method of data analysis was chosen for its capacity to embrace even the smallest details of this dynamism and the complexity of the discussions and the reasons behind participants' attitudes. This chapter was also written to reflect not only on the benefits and the potential of the use of these two methods, but also on the potential limitations, which required special attention throughout the analysis and interpretation of data. After describing the theoretical and the methodological approach, the following chapter focuses on providing an introduction to the two countries selected for the research. More precisely, it examines the development of immigration, welfare and labour market policies, and the key trends in attitudes to immigration and to immigrants' access to welfare benefits and services.

4 STANCES FOR INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION IN THE BRITISH AND NORWEGIAN INSTITUTIONS – A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Chapter 3 proposed a unique methodology for analysing public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion and emphasised the significant role of context in shaping public attitudes. Following-up on this central argument, this chapter analyses the institutional and social context in which the DFs took place in the autumn of 2015. This chapter compares the British and the Norwegian context to reveal the key similarities and differences between the countries that justify their selection as suitable and interesting for analysis.

As welfare states provide a means of reducing social divisions within the national population (Clarke, 2005; Tilly, 1994), the former have created a framework for and developed tools and practices of inclusion and exclusion. However, as much as the understanding of “common good” or social justice varies across welfare regimes (Mau, 2003; Wolfe and Klausen, 1997; Clarke, 2005), practices of inclusion and exclusion also vary country-by-country. Therefore, it is important to analyse how institutions define inclusion and exclusion and how the latter applies to immigrants specifically. As shown in Chapter 2, research findings stress the divide between social democratic and liberal welfare regimes, arguing that the former are more inclusive, while the latter represent a more selective approach to immigrants (Crepaz and Damron, 2009; Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012; Swank and Betz, 2003; Van Der Waal et al., 2013). Following Sainsbury (2012), this chapter extends the scope of institutions to immigration policies and labour market policies, in addition to welfare policies. This chapter argues that **despite the fact that inclusiveness in Norway and selectivity in the UK are important principles at the level of institutions, differentiation processes and balancing between inclusion and exclusion take place in all three policy areas, which closely interact with political and public discourses.**

As immigration cuts across various cleavages – like ethnicity, age, socio-economic status, etc. – the reasons for public polarization concerning the issue of immigration can be multiple and widely intertwined with social processes and socio-economic changes. Therefore, this chapter cannot provide an exhaustive review of differentiation processes, but focuses on the role of institutions in shaping social divisions. The scope of this chapter is limited to reviewing the period between 1998 and 2015, which captures the most recent significant wave of immigration in Norway and in the UK until the time of the DFs. During this period, post-2004 intra-EU labour mobility substantially changed the context of migration, which might have

fostered social categorisations. The first part of the chapter describes and compares trends in public opinions about immigration in light of the changes in the context of immigration in Norway and in the UK. It continues by investigating changes in immigration policies and the related public discourse. The second part of the chapter examines the institutional features of the social democratic and liberal welfare systems and the position of immigrants in welfare states. The last section analyses developments in labour market policies and its implications for immigrants.


4.1 THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF MIGRATION

The growth of an immigrant population and rapid inflows of immigrants have a considerable effect on perceptions of group threats and narrowing intergroup boundaries (Quillian, 1995; Wright, 2011). In this respect, the period between 1998 and 2015 was significant in both countries as **net migration doubled by 2015**, as depicted Figure 2 and Figure 3. The share of foreign-born people increased from 7.8% in 1998 to 13.5% – accounting for 8.7 million people – in 2015 in the UK. In Norway, the increase was even more significant, from 4.9% in 1998 to 14.4% – equivalent to 670 thousand people – in 2015.²⁵

The share of immigrants in the national population is very similar in the two countries and lower than in many other European countries (Eurostat, 2015). However, we should stress the **differences in the size of these two countries' national populations and immigrant populations, which may create different dynamics in terms of the public perceptions of immigration**. We should also consider the share of specific types of immigrants, which can also affect perceptions of immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Last, we need to highlight the **differences in the history of immigration between Norway and the UK as the latter is substantially affected by a legacy of post-colonial immigration** (Bloom and Tonkiss, 2013). While these differences are fundamental, focusing on the period from 1998 to 2015 we can identify common challenges and similar changes in the context of immigration.


²⁵ The Norwegian Statistics distinguish first-generation immigrants and persons born to two foreign-born parents. The data referred to above refer to first generation immigrants only.

Figure 2 - Immigration, emigration, and net migration in Norway (1980-2015)



Source: Statistics Norway

Figure 3 - Immigration, emigration, and net migration in the UK (1980-2015)




Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS)

First, considerable changes have occurred in the **ethnic composition of the population**, which reflect both the effect of natural changes and net international migration.²⁶ Census data in England and Wales show that the share of majority White British decreased to 80.5% in 2011 (ONS, 2013). As a result of the expansion of intra-EU migration, the largest increase in ethnic minority groups occurred in relation to the “Other White” category, which includes the majority of EU citizens. This increased by 1.1 million people to represent 4.4% of the total population in 2011. Indians (2.5%), Pakistanis (2%), and Black Africans (1.8%) followed as the

²⁶ For further details, see Figure 1 - Appendix 2

next most numerous ethnic minorities. Similarly, there were considerable changes in the composition of immigrants in Norway. Although migrants from non-European countries constituted almost half of the immigrant population, the share of Nordic country nationals dropped considerably from 20% to 10% as the inflow of Eastern European immigrants intensified. Poland was by far the largest country of origin in 2015 with 90 thousand migrants living in Norway. This was followed by Sweden (37 thousand), Lithuania (36 thousand) and Somalia (27 thousand).


Figure 4 - Share of immigrants in regions of Norway in 1998 and 2015



Source: Statistics Norway (1998, 2015)

Second, the increase in the number of immigrants also affected **the regional distribution of immigrants**. However, this did not change the dominance of the capitals – London and Oslo – as the key destinations for immigrants. In 2015, the share of foreign-born was 36.5% of the population in London, followed in terms of proportion of immigration by the regions closest to the capital: the South East with a share of 12.3%, and East with a share of 8.6% of the resident population (Kone, 2018). In Oslo, the share of foreign-born reached almost 25% in 2015, closely followed by the Drammen region with 20%, which is in the vicinity of the capital. If we focus on changes over time – comparing Figure 4 and Figure 5 – we can observe a more dramatic increase in the share of immigrants in resident populations in Norway, as in some regions the share of immigrants has almost tripled.

Figure 5 - Share of immigrants in regions of the UK in 2001 and 2015



Source: ONS, Local Area Migration Indicators, UK (2001 was the earliest year for which data were available in the UK)


Third, changes also occurred in relation to **the legal classification of immigration, which distinguishes labour, family, education, and asylum as reasons for migration.** Figure 6 and Figure 7 illustrate the significant differences between Norway and the UK. Focusing on changes over time, we see more extensive re-structuring in Norway. While refugee and family unification constituted the main reasons for migration in 1998, by 2015, due to the restrictive asylum policies and the liberalization of labour migration, labour became the key reason for migration. As Figure 6 shows, migration for education doubled in this period, but remained minor in comparison to other types. In contrast to this, in the UK education has played an important role, even out-numbering labour migration in the period between 2009 and 2012.

All three issues considered above contributed to changes in the context of immigration in Norway and in the UK. However, it is even more important **how the changes depicted in the data were perceived by individuals.** As raised in Chapter 2, the question remains who ordinary people view and perceive as immigrants. Studies show that visions of immigrants depend on wide variety of characteristics people take into account (or disregard) when formulating their opinions about immigrants (Bansak et al., 2016; Blinder and Allen, 2016; Ford, 2011). The heterogeneity of immigrants unfolds in respect to country of origin, reasons

for migration, length and permanency of stay in the country of destination, perceptions of racial, ethnic or religious differences as well as perceptions of immigrants' qualifications and employability, etc. Perceptions of any of these characteristics or combinations of these characteristics shape ordinary people's conceptions of immigrants and influence their understanding of immigration.


As noted by Anderson et al. (2018) migration tends to be associated with problematic mobility, which in itself calls for greater scrutiny of how people conceptualise immigrants, what considerations make a difference and how these conceptualisations affect public understanding of immigration. These are especially pressing questions as **public polarization and the political salience of the issue increased in both countries in the observed period** (Fangen and Vaage, 2018; Jennings, 2009). Furthermore, in the UK immigration was considered one of the top two national concerns after the early 2000s (Eurobarometer 2003-2015, Ipsos-MORI Issue Index, 2016), which may be due to the reaction to the influx of Central-European migrants after 2004 (Ford et al., 2015). However, specific events such as the terrorist attacks experienced in these two countries may also have shaped perceptions of immigration and visions of immigrants. In this regard, we should note the specificity of the 2012 terrorist attacks in Oslo, where the attacks were committed by an extreme right-wing advocate (Fangen and Vaage, 2018) in what was intended as a reaction to increasing immigration and to government policies.

Figure 6 - Immigration according to reason for migration in Norway (1998-2015)



Source: Statistics Norway (1990-2015)

Figure 7 - Immigration according to reason for migration in the UK (1998-2015)



Source: ONS (1998-2015)

Research shows that **public concerns can be greatly magnified by misperceptions**. Herda (2010) argues that people in all the 22 European countries included in his study over-estimated the size of the immigrant population. He found a greater gap – 15% – between the estimated and actual size of the immigrant population in the UK compared to the 5% gap in Norway. Among other factors, Herda (2010) associates the variability in the identified gaps with differences in economic inequality, the reading of politically biased newspapers, and contact with immigrants. In the UK, Duffy and Frere-Smith (2014) found that immigrants were thought to constitute 31% of the population, which is more than double the actual 13% measured in 2013. The same survey showed that respondents thought asylum-seekers made up 21% of the immigrant population, in contrast to the actual proportion of 4% (Duffy and Frere-Smith, 2014). These findings reflect how far public perceptions tend to stray from reality, further underlining the need to focus more on public (mis)perceptions when analysing public attitudes and to scrutinise how people talk about immigrants and immigration.

4.2 PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS

The previous section described the significant changes in the social context of immigration. However, the question remains how the Norwegian and British public perceived and responded to such changes. To elaborate on the development of public attitudes to

immigration and immigrants in the period between 1998 and 2015, seven questions from the European Social Survey are examined and the related tendencies in the two countries are compared. We need to stress again, that most of these survey questions do not specify who immigrants are singling out only one specificity (such as race, country of origin, etc.) or provide a very vague definition (see Figure 10) with an overall tendency to undermine the heterogeneity of immigrants as well as the wide variation in how immigrants are conceptualised by respondents.


Despite the above-described changes in the context of immigration, the findings of ESS in Norway show an overall positive shift in public attitudes towards immigration and immigrants between 2002 and 2015.²⁷ Comparison of the 2002 and 2014 data (see Figure 8) shows that **openness and willingness to permit immigrants to enter the country** increased, regardless of the distinctiveness of race or ethnicity or the socio-economic status of immigrants. While we can see specific changes in the hierarchy respondents create, opposition to people of a different race or ethnic background decreased. Concerning immigrants from poorer countries outside of Europe, almost 70% of respondents were more inclined to allow immigrants to come to Norway.

In contrast to these positive tendencies in Norway, the British data show stagnation and even deterioration in receptiveness. Openness towards permitting immigrants' entry into the UK is significantly lower than in Norway. While the race and ethnicity of immigrants does not seem to make a big difference in attitudes, the worse socio-economic status of non-European countries triggered greater opposition in 2014. These data indicate a more restrictive approach to immigration in the UK. Preferences for immigration control are even more powerfully articulated in national opinion polls. While we should note that the question in the British Social Attitudes survey asked about preferences for reducing immigration – instead of allowing in different groups of immigrants, as included in ESS – the finding that since the early 2000s almost 80% of respondents preferred a reduction in the number of immigrants indicates a firm consensus for restricting immigration into the UK.²⁸

²⁷ These questions about immigration were introduced in 2002. In the case of ESS and ISSP surveys, the year 2014 is used as the closest year to the DFs.

²⁸ See Figure 2 - Appendix 2


Figure 8 - Public preferences concerning entry of immigrants of different/same race and ethnic group, or from poorer countries outside Europe



Source: ESS 2002, 2014

Differences in British and Norwegian attitudes also emerge concerning the **assessment of the economic and cultural benefits of immigration**. As depicted in Figure 9, perceptions of immigration as good for the economy and of immigration as enriching cultural life increased in Norway, but the extent of the increase was not major. Additionally, we can note that there is greater division in relation to perceptions of immigrants' contribution to, or immigrants' use of, welfare provision. In 2014 relatively equal shares of people held positive, neutral, and negative views about the contributions of immigrants. The picture drawn by the British data is more complex. Perceptions about economic benefits improved and considerations that immigrants take out more than they contribute also decreased, which implies a positive change in terms of the inclusion of immigrants. However, we can also observe a higher level of polarization among British respondents in 2014, as the data indicate that individuals with positive, neutral, and negative attitudes on immigrants' contributions are almost equally represented. Furthermore, in relation to cultural considerations, a slightly negative change occurred.

Figure 9 - Public attitudes towards immigrants' contribution to cultural life, economy, and welfare system



Source: ESS 2002, 2014

Comparing these findings, the **issue of contributions to the welfare system** stands out, in relation to which both Norwegian and British respondents seem to be more critical. While concerning economic and cultural benefits Norwegian respondents have become more positive, in regard to welfare-related issues they are more divided, which are confirmed by and better demonstrated in national public opinion surveys in Norway.²⁹ Based on these ESS results, we can conclude that concerns about immigrants' welfare use are greater in the UK than in Norway.

In relation to public preferences for immigrants' access to welfare benefits and services,³⁰ the 2016 findings show a mixed picture in Norway, further refining the perceptions of the relation between immigration and welfare. In comparison to other countries, Figure 10 shows a relatively strong preference for immediate access or access after one year, regardless of work or contributions to the system (12.4% and 14.7%, respectively). Additionally, preferences are relatively supportive (34%) of the requirement to acquire citizenship. Comparison of the 2008 and 2016 data shows that only minor (1-3 percentage points) changes occurred.³¹ These findings also reflect that the public is more divided, and


²⁹ See Table 1 – Appendix 2.

³⁰ This specific question was raised only in 2008 and 2016. Therefore, here we use the 2016 data, the nearest year to the date of DFs.

³¹ See Table 2 – Appendix 2

preferences for a more restrictive approach have emerged requiring citizenship as a condition for accessing the same social rights as the in-group.

Figure 10 - International comparison of public attitudes towards immigrants' access to welfare benefits and services ("With regard to people who come to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?")



Source: ESS, 2016

The British data show very strong support for the principle of reciprocity. In 2016, 58.4% of respondents shared the view that immigrants should contribute for at least one year before accessing benefits – see

Figure 10. The extent of preferences for requiring at least a year of contribution in the UK is outstanding in European comparison. Furthermore, compared to preferences in 2008, we can see a 10% increase in the preference for one year's contribution at the expense of preferences for citizenship, which indicates a notable shift in attitudes. However, the response "at least a year" is vague about the preferred nature of restrictions and strength of welfare chauvinism in the country. In this respect, it is worth recalling responses to the 2013 BSA survey question "How soon, if at all, should they [immigrants working and paying taxes] be able to access the same welfare benefits as British citizens?" The results³² showed that respondents were divided about the length of the ideal contributory period, with roughly equal shares of respondents requiring at least a year (20-23%), at least three years (25%) or at least five years of contributions (22%). While these findings show that calls for at least one year of employment cover a relatively wide range of more inclusive and more exclusive

³² See Figure 3 – Appendix 2

preferences, it should be noted that, based on ESS, the UK is not one of the countries in the EU with the most restrictive preferences.

The review of the above survey results intended to briefly review the development of attitudes in the period between 1998 and 2015. Overall, we can identify more positive attitudes in Norway and a greater level of polarization and a tendency towards more restrictive attitudes in the UK. However, the issue of granting access to welfare provisions reveals some contradictory patterns as the UK seems to be more inclusive and Norway more exclusive. While these findings are significantly influenced by the survey methodology, they imply more complex considerations and a mix of pro-inclusive and pro-exclusive preferences. It is argued that institutions – related to immigration, welfare and labour market policies – include both inclusive and exclusive elements, which are applied to immigrant-related issues differently and with changing salience depending on the specific social context. The interplay of these specific aspects is further explored in the following sections by analysing policy legacies and policy changes in these three areas as well as the related political and public discourse.

4.3 POLICY LEGACIES

4.3.1 Immigration policies and integration

The development of immigration policies has led to various tensions in both countries. Perceptions of the need for a foreign labour force were counterbalanced by preferences for immigration control. The dilemmas involved in immigration control were closely intertwined with 1) fears about the challenges immigrants might pose in the labour market and the welfare state, 2) fears of deepening social conflict due to the different cultural and social backgrounds of immigrants and 3) the need to protect the interests of nationals (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012; Ford and Lymperopoulou, 2017). While the timing, extent, and historical reasons for immigration differ in Norway and the UK, these considerations were dominant in both countries when people sought to justify a halt to immigration (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012; Ford et al., 2015).

In the 2000s, these tensions reached a new level as the policy aim of regulating immigration and the aim of liberalizing the movement of a labour force needed to be reconciled (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012; Ford et al., 2015; Veggeland, 2016). Immigration was soon interpreted both as a problem and a solution to meeting labour shortages and to sustaining

the welfare state in light of an aging population. These tensions and conflicts of interest considerably influenced the way immigration and integration policies and the related discourse developed in Norway and in the UK. This section analyses these policy shifts and the related intergroup differentiation processes.

4.3.1.1 The legacies of immigration control in the British and Norwegian immigration systems

Considering the relatively long-term colonial history of migration in the UK, the public has largely accepted that some migration is beneficial. However, the pragmatism underlying public preferences for specific groups of immigrants has been coupled with preferences for keeping immigration under control. The development of British immigration policies show clear patterns of policy cycles as respective governments invested considerable effort in managing immigration in line with public preferences (Ford et al., 2015; Jennings, 2009). The settlement of co-nationals from Commonwealth countries, family reunification, and refugee rights were gradually restricted (Sainsbury, 2012). This responsiveness of governments and the perception of controlled immigration has prevailed in British society and thus created a legacy for demanding controlled immigration (Ford et al., 2015).

Similarly to the controlled immigration in the UK, a more exclusive immigration system was adopted in Norway. By the end of the 1980s, labour migration was restricted, and only Nordic nationals were allowed free movement (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012). As a result of these restrictions, refugee and family reunification became the dominant formal channels of immigration, which were perceived as a challenge to the welfare state (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012). Therefore, further restrictions were adopted concerning the requirement of attaining residence permits. The key argument behind these restrictions involved the state's capacity to manage immigration to ensure equal treatment and equal access to benefits and services (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012).

While we can identify specific parallels in the development of the Norwegian and British immigration policies, it is important to stress the difference in approaches to the integration of immigrants. In Norway there were efforts to integrate immigrants from the very beginning to prevent the emergence of a marginalised and segregated social group. Emphasis was put on labour market integration and language skills, which were considered a precondition for increasing understanding the functioning of the society and facilitating immigrants' adaptation to it (Veggeland, 2016). In the UK, instead of integration measures anti-

discrimination policies were enacted to reduce the social exclusion of ethnic minorities, including immigrants (Schierup et al., 2006). Although the UK is considered a multicultural society, it has not been free of inter-ethnic conflicts and racism, creating fertile ground for ethnic differentiation (Schierup et al., 2006).

4.3.1.2 The 1990s – steps towards more selective immigration policies

The 1990s brought a turning point in immigration policies in both countries. In Norway throughout the 1990s there were important economic, political, and social events – like the bank crisis, the referendum that rejected Norway’s accession to the EU, and the consequent discussions about the terms and conditions of cooperation with EU countries – that created the context in which questions concerning immigration emerged (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012). In the UK, the election of the New Labour government brought a new approach and a new discourse about immigration in light of the increase in economic growth, and need for a foreign labour force to improve the UK’s productivity and international competitiveness (Consterdine and Hampshire, 2014; Spencer, 2011). Furthermore, as a result of escalating political conflicts abroad in the late 1990s, both countries were faced an increase in the number of asylum-applications (see Figure 6 and Figure 7). These developments induced a series of changes in immigration policies. First, they led to a shift towards a more selective immigration policy in both countries that combined a more restrictive approach to asylum-seekers and the liberalization of labour migration. Second, EU free movement policies introduced a new phase of dualized immigration policies as EU and EEA nationals were subject to differentiated status.

4.3.1.3 The effects of 2004 EU enlargement on the development of immigration policies and the related discourse

While these two countries shared the challenges of increasing labour immigration, the British and Norwegian immigration systems substantially differed both in terms of the pace of accommodating labour migration, and in the volume of immigrants arriving to these two countries.

In the UK, the New Labour government engaged in the extensive liberalisation of immigration, launching specific schemes to attract high-skilled migrants and entrepreneurs and easing the process of acquiring a work permit (Consterdine and Hampshire, 2014;

Sainsbury, 2012). The government promoted the new policies as “managed migration” (Consterdine and Hampshire, 2014). The number of immigrants increased. However, as these new schemes were demand-driven, the state preserved the capacity to control who entered the country. Furthermore, the ability to regulate immigration was demonstrated in restrictions concerning asylum-seekers (Jennings, 2009). The perception of controlled immigration was exposed once the government decided not to impose any transitional labour market restrictions on citizens of Member States that had joined the EU in 2004 (A8 countries)³³ (Anderson, 2017).

The volume of EU migration was significantly underestimated by the government. While estimations predicted 5 – 13 000 migrants per year, more than 290 000 migrants arrived in the UK between May 2004 and September 2005 (OECD, 2009). Although the booming British economy absorbed the increase in the inflow of migrants, A8 nationals were overrepresented in low-skilled jobs (Fernández-Reino and Rienzo, 2017). Therefore, public perceptions of EU migration tended to change. Before 2004, EU migrants were largely employed in professional, high-skilled jobs. While the public viewed their contributions as significant and their integration as unproblematic, the contribution of low-skilled migrants was less clear-cut; consequently, A8 migrants were less favoured (Anderson, 2017). Moreover, as EU citizens they were entitled to welfare support after one year of employment (Ruhs, 2015; Sainsbury, 2012). Although previous research found limited evidence for the detrimental impact of EU immigration (Dustmann et al., 2003; Dustmann and Frattini, 2014; Manacorda et al., 2012)³⁴, public concern about immigration rose and intensified fears about the potential abuse of the welfare system (Ford et al., 2015).

The government misjudged the strength of differences in values and failed to pay attention to the economic, social, and cultural impact of mass immigration on society (Spencer, 2011). It was especially working class people who perceived that they were receiving a limited share of the benefits of economic growth and that it was “others” – bankers, employers, and immigrants – who were enjoying its advantages (Finch and Goodhart, 2010). Consequently, the New Labour government faced increasing public anxiety about immigration, which was reinforced by criticism from the opposition and media. The key cornerstone of the debate in the media framed the uncontrolled inflow of migrants as imposing excessive pressure on

³³ On the occasion of EU enlargement, old Member States had the opportunity to limit freedom of movement. In 2004, only three countries – Sweden, Ireland, and the UK – opened their borders to A8 migrants.

³⁴ For further elaboration of these findings, see Section 1.3.2.2.2 and Section 1.3.3.3

nationals' employment prospects and increasing pressure on housing, education, and healthcare services (Balch and Balabanova, 2016).

The introduction of a five-tier, point-based system (adopted in 2006 and implemented from 2008) intended to moderate public concerns about immigration (Finch and Goodhart, 2010). Furthermore, in the following round of enlargement the UK imposed restrictions on the movement of Romanian and Bulgarian nationals (A2 countries) who could enter the country through the points-based system (Ruhs, 2015). However, it could not restore the perception of controlled migration.

After 2010, the Coalition government extended control mechanisms through a process of stricter selection and monitoring. However, these initiatives primarily affected non-EU migrants.³⁵ The Coalition government was unable to fulfil its promises to restrict immigration (Morris, 2018), what further increased disillusionment with the mainstream political parties. This benefited mostly the United Kingdom Independence Party as its popularity increased and the party gained ownership of the issue (Dennison and Goodwin, 2015). The fact that the Prime Minister, David Cameron, committed the government to holding a referendum on EU membership – an idea previously publicly advocated only by UKIP – confirmed the latter party's influence and ability to set the agenda without being present in Parliament³⁶ (Goodwin and Ford, 2017).

In Norway, two discourses had emerged in relation to immigration by the end of the 1990s (Fangen and Mohn, 2016). One involved approaching the issue from a moral perspective, viewing refugees as the most deserving group of immigrants. The other discourse stressed the economic benefits of labour migration – favouring an expansion of labour migration and the considering refugees and asylum-seekers as a burden on the state. The policy changes in the 2000s largely followed the latter approach in Norway – leading to the liberalization of labour migration and restrictions on refugee entry to the country, as in case of the UK. The “unified refugee policy” that was adopted was underlined by a new understanding of the responsibility for refugees through their limited protection until they could return to their country of origin (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012). In contrast, labour migration was publicly embraced and labour migration rapidly increased after 2003 (see Figure 6). Following the 2004 EU enlargement, Norway was the top destination for immigrants,

³⁵ For a detailed review of post-2010 policy changes, see Shutes, 2016 and Morris, 2018.

³⁶ Due to the majoritarian electoral system, UKIP attained its first and only one parliamentary seat in the 2015 Parliamentary Elections.

attracting more than half of all EU migrants who moved to Nordic countries (Dølvik and Eldring, 2008). Although Norway introduced transitional arrangements, these were relaxed, allowing migrants six months to find employment, and granting permits to stay for those who were in full-time employment (Dølvik and Eldring, 2008). In contrast to the free movement policies within the Nordic countries, the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargement posed a new challenge, as migrants generally came from poorer countries with lower living and working standards, which raised the issue of wage competition and social dumping (Friberg and Eldring, 2013).³⁷

Recognition of the failure of integration policies in the 1990s led to the reformulation of integration policies. The Introduction Act aimed to encourage the activation and social participation of immigrants, including labour and family migrants, except for EU and EEA citizens (Breidahl, 2017). As part of the Introduction Act (2003, 2005), a more comprehensive Introduction programme was adopted to foster the employment of immigrants and promote their acquisition of language skills. Attendance at the Introduction programme was linked to a flat-rate introduction benefit to motivate participation. Furthermore, later attendance in the Introduction programme was defined as a precondition of attaining residency permit. The Introduction programme is a clear example of an increase in the obligations and duties of immigrants towards the state (Breidahl, 2017). While such integration programmes are often claimed to be key instruments of inclusion, they have exclusionary elements, too. Integration programmes serve as a means of screening those immigrants who are liable to integrate and provide an opportunity for the government to manifest its ability to control borders, and to communicate towards immigrants the priority of maintaining cultural cohesion and national identity (Goodman, 2011).

Corresponding to these policy changes, the issues of immigration and integration also emerged in the public discourse. The focus of the discourse shifted to the recognition of diversity and enhancing individual freedoms. Additionally, there were increasing expectations that immigrants should adapt to society, with stress on the existence of rules and values that should be respected (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012). Therefore, in Norway we can observe a specific form of dual approach – i.e. efforts to construct a new and more inclusive sense of national identity, but also efforts to shape immigrant groups and make them adapt to Norwegian norms and the Norwegian way of life (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012). This duality can be found in public attitudes, too. In terms of preferences for

³⁷ For further details, see Section 1.3.3.2

immigrants' access to social benefits and services, we can identify the emergence of both more inclusive attitudes – i.e. support for immediate access to social rights – and a more exclusive approach – the requirement of citizenship – as preconditions for accessing social rights (see Figure 9).

The discourse on immigration was greatly fuelled by the right-wing populist Norwegian Progress Party (FrP), which together with the Conservative Party formed a coalition government in the past two parliamentary elections. FrP is the only political party in Norway which openly uses the threat of Islamization, a clash of cultures, and the negative effects of cultural diversification as core arguments for restrictive immigration policies, which are then further linked to negative economic impacts and presenting immigrants as a burden on Norwegian taxpayers (Fangen and Vaage, 2018). Being in the government, FrP's public stances on immigration became more moderate. Still, the restrictions that have been introduced since 2013 prove the success of the party in shaping immigration policies. Cultural threats and fears about the sustainability of the Norwegian welfare state are sufficient reasons to keep intergroup differentiations alive in the political and public discourse.

This section has reviewed the key social and political changes in relation to immigration policies in Norway and UK which affected the development of public perceptions about immigration and the inclusion of immigrants in the period between 1998 and 2015. In the UK, the rapid increase in immigration and related more inclusive but unpopular policy changes strengthened the narrative of a lack of control and fostered the politicization of the issue of immigration. In Norway, we can observe notable dualities in the means of regulating and debating immigration. While in the 2000s there was a considerable change in policies stressing commitment to the integration of immigrants, this change was also driven by concerns about the cultural divisions between immigrants and Norwegian nationals. Therefore, both in political and public debates, differentiation processes along cultural and ethnic lines became dominant. As concerns about the welfare state are central to public perceptions of immigration, the following section focuses on the British and Norwegian welfare systems and approaches differentiation processes in the field of welfare policies.

4.3.2 Welfare policies

The British and the Norwegian welfare states represent two different welfare regimes. As differences in institutional characteristics affect inclusion in the welfare state, this section provides an analysis of processes of inclusion and exclusion as these are shaped and reproduced by the British and Norwegian welfare states. First, key institutional characteristics are reviewed, stressing the potential impact of institutions on intergroup differentiation. Second, immigrants' social rights and access to social benefits are examined.

4.3.2.1 *Welfare-regime characteristics*

The Norwegian tax-financed welfare state is based on a combination of full employment and extensive redistribution through active social and economic policies (Halvorsen et al., 2016). An emphasis on labour market participation and achieving a high level of productivity ensure the financial viability of social democratic welfare systems (Dølvik et al., 2015). Therefore, the functioning of the former system assumes a two-way, reciprocal process of "rights" and "duties". Accordingly, the social value of work and expectation to contribute are strong in Norwegian society. In return, the state provides extensive social protection and moderates the social insecurity that affects people's lives and society by reducing inequalities, striving to equalize life chances, providing high level employment protection, and offering help in the form of benefits and services by extensive risk-pooling (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Halvorsen et al., 2016).

Within the British welfare state, employment plays a central role, too. However, the logic justifying this centrality is different due to the claim that only employment can ensure a decent living for members of society. Consequently, the welfare state is supposed to focus on needs which are not met by the labour market and to support those people who are not able to work (Dwyer, 2000). Welfare policies shift the focus to market forces – keeping taxes low, allowing people the freedom to organize their lives, fostering greater individual responsibility with limited state intervention and extending reliance on private provision (Dwyer, 2000; Taylor-Gooby et al., 2017). The UK has developed the most deregulated labour market in Europe and has increasingly shifted towards implementing a targeted system of means-tested social provision (Taylor-Gooby, 2008).

This situation is fundamentally different to the Norwegian welfare state, where access to benefits is universal, while in the UK there is a largely tax-financed residual welfare system


that grants universal access to major social services – such as healthcare, education, etc. – and non-contributory, means-tested benefits based on specific requirements of neediness (Esping-Andersen, 1990). However, the question remains how these differences affect perceptions of and preferences for immigrants’ inclusion.

4.3.2.1.1 The role of universal vs. selective welfare systems in intergroup differentiation processes

Focusing on how universal and selective welfare systems affect processes of intergroup differentiation, research highlights the inclusivity of universal social democratic countries and the higher exposure to differentiation in selective welfare systems (Crepaz and Damron, 2009; Larsen, 2006; Van Der Waal et al., 2013). As argued by Rothstein (1998), the more selective the welfare system, the more it draws attention to the “otherness” of the needy. Larsen (2006) argues that a higher level of social inequality reinforces perceptions of a lifestyle divide between the most vulnerable and the majority of citizens, who may view the poor as deviant and not deserving of access welfare benefits. Furthermore, while universal access limits, selectivity and means-testing fosters the stigmatization of welfare recipients (Larsen, 2006). While these studies focus on welfare beneficiaries within the in-group of nationals, emerging internal tensions and patterns of opposition are easily re-produced to the out-group of immigrants.

As shown in Figure 11, differences between the two countries are indicated by the level of income inequality, which is the highest in the UK among Western European countries. In contrast, Norway’s achievements at reducing social inequalities are outstanding in European comparison (Dølvik et al., 2015). Figure 12 also depicts considerable differences concerning poverty and social exclusion in these two countries. Both sets of data underline that, in relation to income inequality and economic conditions, the Norwegian welfare state performs better, which implies that the in-group is less exposed socially and economically. Therefore, perceptions of intergroup competition and seeing immigrants as a threat (Blumer, 1958; Scheepers et al., 2002; Semyonov et al., 2006) might be less and openness toward the inclusion of immigrants higher, as suggested in the positive trends related to public attitudes about immigration (see Figure 9).


Figure 11 - Level of income inequality in EU Member States and Norway in 2015³⁸



Source: Eurostat, 2015

In contrast, in the UK both a higher level of income inequality and poverty – as shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12 – indicate greater exposure to perceptions of intergroup competition and consequently to preferences for restricting immigrants’ access to welfare provision (Crepaz and Damron, 2009). Recalling the development of public attitudes to immigration (Figure 9), and the strong preference for immigration control, also indicates such tendencies.

Figure 12 - Population at risk of poverty, in low work intensity households and materially deprived household in EU Member States and Norway, 2015




Source: Eurostat, 2015

³⁸ Figure 4 – Appendix 2 presents data on income inequality in all EU Member States

4.3.2.1.2 Social protection expenditure

As perceptions of competition intensify under perceptions of scarcity (Coenders et al., 2009; Dancygier, 2010; Semyonov et al., 2006), it is considered relevant to review the extent of social protection expenditure and the generosity of welfare systems.³⁹ Both Norway's and the UK's expenditure on social protection accounted for 27% of GDP in 2015, which is in line with the EU average (Eurostat). However, focusing on expenditure per inhabitant (in EUR), Figure 13 shows a huge gap between the two countries. In Norway, the volume of expenditure per inhabitant considerably surpassed the EU average. Moreover, in terms of trends Norwegian expenditure continuously increased, while in the UK the trends are less progressive, showing weaker commitment to redistribution.

Figure 13 - Social protection expenditure per inhabitant (in EUR at constant 2010 prices), 1998-2015




Source: Eurostat, 2015

Furthermore, using the Social Welfare Generosity Index (Scruggs, 2014), Figure 14 shows an increase in the generosity of social benefits in Norway in contrast to other Nordic and Western European countries. The main reason Norway was able to increase the generosity of benefits is the fact that the country has not faced major internal or external pressures for retrenchment (Halvorsen et al., 2016; Sørvoll, 2015). This marks another distinguishing

³⁹ Although people's perceptions of the generosity of the welfare system may differ from the objective indicators used in academic research.

feature in comparison to the British case, as in the British welfare state the shift to neo-liberalism has fostered and justified periods of welfare retrenchment (Taylor-Gooby, 2016).

Figure 14 - Welfare Generosity Index based on sickness benefits, unemployment benefits, and old-age pensions



Source: Scruggs, Lyle, Detlef Jahn and Kati Kuitto (2014). *Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset 2, Version 2014-03*, University of Connecticut and University of Greifswald, in Dølvik et al. (2015)

In Norway, the stability and prosperity of the national economy – primarily due to oil production – have secured firm support for social protection both financially and politically (Dølvik et al., 2015). On the one hand, this long-term stability strengthens perceptions of social safety and might reduce public perceptions of threat. On the other hand, awareness of the generosity of the welfare systems and the financial costs of maintaining it might also increase public concern about the misuse of the welfare state, thus leading to a mixture of positive or negative effects on perceptions of immigrants’ inclusion.

In contrast to this, in the UK financial and political support for social protection is more fragile and exposed to changes in the national economy (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2017). Considering the past decade, some of the harshest austerity measures were adopted by the Coalition government (Dwyer and Wright, 2014; Taylor-Gooby, 2016). In comparison to the stability in Norway, these developments in the British welfare state decreased perceptions of social security, especially at the bottom of society (Dwyer and Wright, 2014; McEnhill and Taylor-Gooby, 2018) and contributed to the politicisation of immigration. Furthermore, the discourse on austerity policies legitimised restriction as a solution to the needs of British society. These phenomena contributed to an increase in intergroup differentiation that protects the in-group, and preferences for restrictive measures towards the out-group.

4.3.2.1.3 Collective vs. individual responsibilities

The tendency towards individualization in the UK points at the contrast between these welfare regimes, stressing individual and collective responsibilities. As summarized by Svallfors (2010: 246), *“while targeted systems tend to demand of citizens that welfare recipients should be docile and grateful and do their best to move away from their current ‘needy’ status, a universal system gives rise to questions about how the larger collectivity is able to solve its problems of security and sustenance.”* In this respect, Mijs et al. (2016) argue that especially processes of individualization and neo-liberal policies strengthen intergroup boundaries. The authors claim that the economic competition inherent to neoliberalism fosters differentiation processes that protect the privileges of the in-group. Moreover, the individualization of risk implies greater acceptance of inequalities in society and a stronger tendency to disregard the impact of structural issues. Therefore, shifting the responsibility for inequalities to individuals further reduces the collective responsibility and solidarity required to support people in vulnerable situations in the UK.

The popular discourse on welfare dependency draws on these notions in the UK. The political elite – regardless of political orientation – have presented welfare dependency as a by-product of welfare provision, discouraging people from seeking employment and locking in poverty, inter-generational worklessness, and other anti-social behaviour (Jensen and Tyler, 2015; Wiggan, 2012). The welfare dependency discourse draws attention to perceptions of benefit fraud and portrays welfare recipients as abusers of the system (Jensen and Tyler, 2015; Wiggan, 2012). While the discourse on welfare dependency considerably relies on misperceptions and misunderstandings about the British welfare system⁴⁰ (Baumberg Geiger, 2016), it creates clear patterns and practices of differentiation which are largely reproduced in the discourse on immigrants that portrays the latter as abusers of and burdens on the welfare state (Balch and Balabanova, 2016; Hoops et al., 2016; KhosraviNik, 2010).

While the sections so far reviewed the key institutional factors of the Norwegian and British welfare state and stressed their potential implications for increasing or decreasing intergroup differentiation, the following sections elaborate on immigrants’ social rights and positions within the welfare states.

⁴⁰ Baumberg (2016) finds evidence for people’s misperceptions and limited understanding of the British welfare system. For instance, 61% of respondents tended to overestimate the level of fraud; and 91% overestimated the share of expenditure on unemployment benefits.

4.3.2.2 *Immigrants' entitlements in the Norwegian and British welfare states*

Changes in immigration policies – described in Section 4.3.1 – were supplemented by differentiated access to employment and social rights which functioned as additional control mechanisms for regulating immigration in both countries. The issue of granting access to welfare provision creates a dilemma between 1) granting access and promoting the integration of immigrants by reducing inequalities in access to employment and welfare benefits, and 2) restricting entitlements to those who have already contributed to the functioning of the system (Spencer 2011). In this regard, we can observe differences in the way the Norwegian and British welfare states responded to the increase in immigration.

4.3.2.2.1 Immigrants and the Norwegian welfare state


Past policy changes in Norway marked a shift towards prioritising the integration of immigrants. These changes were considerably driven by concerns about immigrants' lower living standards being a potential reason for deepening social inequalities and the marginalization of the latter (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012). In line with overall trends in welfare policies, activation measures were implemented in the form of the earlier mentioned Introduction programme, and the Qualification programme.⁴¹ Both programmes were designed to increase the employability of long-term welfare recipients (Gubrium and Fernandes Guilherme, 2014).

Despite these targeted measures, studies show that immigrants are more exposed to economic deprivation and their access to and long-term dependence on specific welfare benefits are higher (Sørvoll, 2015). As Figure 15 shows, the risk of poverty affects 20% of foreign nationals, indicating a 9% difference in comparison to Norwegians. While the risk of poverty is only slightly higher for EU nationals, non-EU nationals are twice as likely to face social exclusion as the Norwegian-born. In public perceptions, the reasons for such inequalities are associated with the lower level of employment of immigrants and are thus interpreted as a problem of cultural differences and a lack of integration and adaptation to the Norwegian way of life (Friberg and Midtbøen, 2018). However, it is important to highlight that working immigrants tend to be concentrated in lower-paid and temporary jobs (Dølvik et al., 2015). Furthermore, the high living standard in Norway is ensured by the dual-earner

⁴¹ The programme is available to a wider group of beneficiaries, but immigrants constituted 40% of all programme participants in 2010 (Naper 2010 in Gubrium and Fernandes 2014).

family model, which less frequently occurs in families of immigrants (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012; Dølvik et al., 2015).

Figure 15 - Individuals at risk of poverty or social exclusion by broad classification of country of birth (population aged 18 and over), 2015



Source: Eurostat, 2015

Underlining the findings on exposure to poverty, data show that immigrants' income lags behind the national median income significantly, leading to a 30% difference between non-EU immigrants and Norwegian nationals.⁴² We see similar trends with regard to the composition of income.⁴³ While the occupational income of immigrants from EU and other Western countries exceeds that of the majority population, immigrants from Asia and Africa face more difficulties and show greater dependence on social transfers. Analysis of income from specific types of social benefits reveals the differences in the needs of specific groups of immigrants.⁴⁴ While nationals from old EU Member States increasingly draw on old-age pensions, A8 and A2 nationals draw more on sickness benefits and family support. In relation to non-EU nationals, a more diverse picture emerges due to their long-term residence in Norway and more variable demographic characteristics. Considering these specificities, the data show a higher level of use of social assistance, disability pensions, and work assessment allowances, and participation in the Introductory programme.

While these data inform us about the differences between specific groups of immigrants and their access to welfare provisions, it is questionable whether and how such information

⁴² See Table 3 - Appendix 2

⁴³ See Figure 5 - Appendix 2

⁴⁴ See Table 4 - Appendix 2

reaches the public. In this regard, it is important to recall the case of disability pensions in Norway. The take-up rates of disability pensions among non-European immigrants increased in the 2000s. Bratsberg et al. (2010), who studied the causes of this phenomenon, pointed at a complex interplay of social and institutional factors. In the 2000s, disability pensioners could access supplementary benefits if they had a dependent spouse and a number of children in the household. Consequently, the disability benefit, together with the supplementary benefit, often exceeded the typical income of low-wage earners. While Bratsberg et al. (2010) highlighted the imperfections and shortcomings of institutions that failed to incentivise return to work, in the public debate this situation was framed as an issue of the non-conformity of non-Western immigrants and reinforced perceptions of immigrants' misuse of the welfare state.

Concerns about misuse of welfare benefits also increased after 2004. In relation to A10 migrants, the issue of the exportation of benefits was raised. However, a recent study finds that the exportation of benefits involves a very small share (2%) of the state's total social expenditure (Hatland 2015 in Sørvoll, 2015), and is primarily attributable to Norwegian pensioners living abroad. While this finding reveals that concerns about the exportation of benefits are exaggerated, in the public discourse this issue remains influential in shaping public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion.

4.3.2.2.2 Immigrants and the British welfare state

In comparison to Norway, where specific integration measures were adopted to reduce the inequalities between immigrants and Norwegians, in the UK there have been tendencies towards restricting immigrants' access to welfare provisions. Correspondingly, immigrants' access to social benefits was gradually curtailed for non-EU migrants by the mid-1990s. With the adoption of the 'no-recourse-to-public-funds' rule, access to benefits became conditional on the acquirement of a residence permit with varying criteria for length of uninterrupted stay depending on the specific entry category (Sainsbury, 2012). Despite such restrictions, critical stances persisted in public discourse that demanded the prioritisation of nationals in relation to specific benefits such as social housing (Ruhs, 2015).

The issue of accessing non-contributory benefits became especially salient concerning A8 migrants' social rights. As Eastern Europeans were coming from economically less advanced countries, public concerns about their motivations were central in public debates. Although

one full year of legal employment was a prerequisite for becoming eligible to claim benefits, A8 migrants were accused of misusing the latter (Ruhs, 2015).

In contrast to these assumptions, research has found that both EU and non-EU migrants are less likely to rely on social benefits (Dustmann and Frattini, 2014). Moreover, Dustmann and Frattini (2014) show that immigrants' tax contributions were higher than the public spending on benefits and services acquired by immigrants between 2001 and 2011. Focusing on EU migrants, contributions exceeded £20 million (£15 million from EU15 and £5 million from A10 migrants). Data from 2014 from the Department of Work and Pension also confirm that EU and non-EU migrants are underrepresented in relation to the uptake of all working-age benefits.⁴⁵ Focusing specifically on young EU migrants, Spreckelsen and Seeleib-Kaiser (2016) find a high employment rate and a low probability of receipt of Jobseekers Allowance. Focusing on tax credit claims, the key provision for people with a low-income, Vargas-Silva (2019) found based on an analysis of LFS data that non-UK migrants were more likely to receive (15%) tax credits than UK nationals (11%). However, data also show that the vast majority of EU nationals who were claiming tax credits stayed in the country for more than four years – i.e. had contributed before accessing tax credits. Furthermore, instead of finding evidence for excessive reliance on social benefits and services, qualitative research findings pointed at how uncertain and unaware EU migrants are of their social rights (Ehata and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2017).

Although the currently available evidence invalidates the key assumptions of the public discourse, as Figure 9 shows more people think that immigrants take out more than they contribute to the welfare system. Furthermore, Duffy and Frere-Smith (2014) identified significant misperceptions related to immigrants' access to social benefits. 45% of respondents estimated that more than 300 000 migrants were receiving unemployment benefit, while the real figure was roughly 60 000. According to respondents' average estimations 38% of immigrants were claiming unemployment benefits, while the real number was only 10%. Such misperceptions were reinforced by the media (Balch and Balabanova, 2016; Hoops et al., 2016) and by political parties (Cappelen and Peters, 2018). Similarly to Norway, concerns about the exportation of benefits by EU migrants heightened. The issue of claiming child benefits for children living outside UK was especially controversial and contributed to the adoption of restrictions in relation to unemployment, housing and child benefits in 2014 (Ruhs, 2015).

⁴⁵ See Tables 5-6 – Appendix 2

The balance between employment and welfare redistribution is crucial in both welfare states and in the public perceptions of immigration. While the current section touched on the interactions between the labour market and welfare policies several times, the following section intends to scrutinize the development of labour market policies affecting perceptions of immigration and intergroup differentiation.

4.3.3 Labour market policies

Within the institutional comparison of Norway and the UK, the regulated and unregulated labour market represent another distinction. Unregulated labour markets offer relatively easy access to the labour market, resembling an inclusive approach. However, the limited level of job protection creates greater exposure to social insecurity, especially for low-skilled jobs, and gives rise to mechanisms of exclusion, which are further aggravated by public opposition to low-skilled migrants (Ruhs, 2015). In contrast to this, regulated labour markets offer a high level of employment protection both in terms of wages and working conditions. However, the higher price of labour implies stricter preconditions for entering the labour market, which creates exclusory mechanisms in relation to low-skilled immigrants (Halvorsen et al., 2016; Veggeland, 2016). This section elaborates more on such specificities related to regulated and unregulated labour markets and their impact on intergroup differentiation.

4.3.3.1 *Transformation of the labour market and society*

As in any other European country, the shift to a post-industrial society, technological development, globalisation, increasing international labour mobility, and an aging population affected the restructuring of the Norwegian and the British labour market (Emmenegger et al., 2012). However, these two welfare states responded and dealt with these issues differently. Norway has one of the most regulated labour markets in Europe, in which employees' rights are safeguarded by the wide network of trade unions and tripartite negotiations (Dølvik et al., 2015). The system of compressed wages is designed to ensure sufficient income for all occupations and contributes to maintaining a relatively low level of income inequality in the country (see Figure 11). In the late 1990s, Norway's need for foreign labour force was publicly acknowledged (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012). While earlier, women represented the key "new human resource", now immigrants are seen as a means of meeting labour market needs. In light of an aging population, immigration is also

considered as a way of attracting an economically active population to sustain the welfare state, which encourages a more positive approach to the former.

The deregulated British labour market stands out in Europe. The limited state interference with the free operation of markets substantially contributed to the relatively stable and high level of employment (Emmenegger et al., 2012). However, as highlighted by Iversen and Wren (1998), job growth is achieved at the expenses of increasing inequality in the labour market, along with limited social security and protection for employees and a lower level of productivity. The shift to a post-industrial economy contributed to an increase in the gap between the highly skilled in protected jobs, and the low-skilled in precarious jobs (Emmenegger et al., 2012). Employment in the growing service sector is more exposed to the dynamics of global market competition, offering limited social security, especially for the low-skilled. The weakening position of trade unions also fostered decline in job protection (Taylor-Gooby, 2016). Recently, the UK has one of the weakest job protection legislation in Europe (OECD, 2013).⁴⁶

As a result of these changes in the British labour market, the social security that full-time employment was supposed to ensure deteriorated. The higher risk of the labour market exploitation of low-skilled workers, the relatively high incidence of low-paying jobs, poor job quality and the limited prospects of mobility (Machin, 2011; Yoon and Chung, 2016) considerably affect perceptions of social insecurity. This labour market context in which flexibility, risks, and precariousness are typical elements of working life make people more sensitive to competition for jobs and induce intergroup differentiation.

4.3.3.2 The position of immigrants in the Norwegian and British labour market

In the UK, five million foreign-born people were active in the labour market in 2015, constituting 16% of the national labour force. In comparison with 1998, the share of foreign workers has doubled. In Norway, similarly, foreigners constituted more than 15% of the labour force in 2015. In European comparison, both countries have stable and high level of employment.⁴⁷ Mean hourly earnings are higher than the EU15 average in both countries.⁴⁸ Furthermore, in Norway, the first decile of earnings is twice as high as the EU15 average, creating a significant pull factor for immigrants. While in the UK the wage levels are not as

⁴⁶ See Table 7 - Appendix 2

⁴⁷ See Figure 6 – Appendix 2


⁴⁸ See Table 8 – Appendix 2

generous as in Norway, the relative ease of entry to the labour market and familiarity with the language are important factors in attracting immigrants (Anderson, 2017).

Looking at the employment rate of immigrants, we can identify a gap between non-Western (non-EU) immigrants and the national population in Norway and in the UK, which has not considerably decreased in either country. However, to better understand the position of immigrants in these labour markets, it is important to review in which sectors immigrants obtain employment.

In the UK, the composition of the labour force changed during the observed period, which brought the expansion of high-skilled jobs and a decline in low-skilled occupations (Migration Advisory Committee, 2014). The participation of immigrants in both high-skilled and low-skilled jobs increased at a similar pace and in 2013 immigrants in high-skilled jobs outnumbered low-skilled migrants.⁴⁹ However, focusing on the specific regions of origin, A8 and A2 migrants stand out as the only group for which participation in low-skilled sectors was significantly greater than for high-skilled employees; it is the former group that became the target of the public anxiety about immigration.


Figure 16 - Employment rates by country of birth: People aged 20+ (Norway)



Source: Statistics Norway, 2015

⁴⁹ See Table 9 - Appendix 2

Figure 17 Employment rates by country of birth: People aged 16 - 64



Source: Labour Force Survey - Office for National Statistics

In comparison to British employees, A8 and A2 migrants are younger, better educated, and more likely to be employed (Ruhs, 2015). However, newly arriving migrants are more willing to accept jobs under their actual level of qualification⁵⁰ (Dustmann and Frattini, 2014), to work for lower wages, and are more flexible in terms of working conditions and working hours (Ruhs, 2015). Therefore, besides perceptions of competition and wage depression, low-paid workers' contributions are less and they are more exposed to social insecurity, which implies a stronger demand for welfare support triggering perceptions of misuse of welfare benefits.

Similarly, to the situation in the UK, the composition of the labour force changed in Norway, too. The high level of social mobility within Norwegian society contributed to a decline in interest in typical working class jobs (Friberg and Midtbøen, 2018). Thus, the need for labour force has been largely met by immigrants, especially in sectors which do not require a high level of competence or language skills (Dølvik et al., 2015; Friberg and Midtbøen, 2018). In Norway the share of immigrants is much higher in low-skilled and lower paid jobs along with the proportion of immigrants that have temporary contracts or who are employed by agencies specializing in temporary work (Dølvik et al., 2015). Thus, the segmentation of the Norwegian labour market is increasing (Friberg and Midtbøen, 2018).

⁵⁰ One-third of the British workforce are overqualified for the jobs they are doing, which is the highest rate in the EU (Cedefop, 2015)

Public concerns have intensified in relation to migrants employed in low-skilled sectors in Norway. The low-skilled sectors offer the lowest average wages, and these are the sectors in which the role of trade unions weakened the most and coverage of collective agreements declined in the past decade (Dølvik et al., 2015). These findings reflect the vulnerability of immigrants, even in the highly regulated Norwegian labour market. Although coordinated wage setting aims to reduce precariousness, it is argued that it creates specific exclusion mechanisms for low-skilled people due to the existence of high entry-level wages (Halvorsen et al., 2016; Veggeland, 2016). On the one hand, in this system a low-skilled labour force is expensive – especially in international comparison – which means that employers expect skills, experience and high productivity. However, for immigrants, language barriers and issues with supplying formal proof of qualifications might be problematic (Veggeland, 2016). As a result of these developments, issues of social dumping and the potential impact of low-wage competition on wage policies are at the centre of public discourse as representing a risk to the maintenance of the comprehensive Norwegian welfare state (Friberg and Eldring, 2013).

4.3.3.3 The effects of immigration on the labour market participation of the majority

While studies analysing the overall impact of the increase in immigration on the labour market find limited evidence of a negative effect in both countries (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2009), research examining the effect on nationals' labour market participation find negative effects among low-skilled nationals who compete for the same jobs. In the UK, Dustmann et al. (2005) identified a minor negative effect on UK nationals with an intermediate-level education. The recent research of the Migration Advisory Committee (2014) emphasised the relevance of economic downturns and found a specifically negative impact for non-EU immigration on unemployment in the period between 1995 and 2010. However, in relation to EU immigration, such a negative impact was not statistically significant.

Most studies that focused on examining the impact of immigration on changes in average wages found no or a relatively small effect on average wages (Bratsberg et al., 2013; Dustmann and Frattini, 2014; Manacorda et al., 2012; Reed and Latorre, 2009). In both countries, such effects were more likely to occur in low-skilled sectors, but the impact was small (Bratsberg et al., 2013, 2013). However, Bratsberg et al. (2013) stress that these effects are more significant for immigrants as the employment of immigrants is rather

complementary to the employment of nationals. These findings are in line with the conclusions of Manacorda et al. (2012) in the UK, who argue that new migrants tend to substitute resident immigrants in workplaces. Therefore, the related impacts are stronger for immigrants than for UK nationals.

As presented above, research into the impact of immigration tends to be inconclusive. Moreover, there seems to be agreement that there is no or only a very limited negative effect on the employment of nationals or on average wages. Despite this, concerns about and opposition to immigration remain prevalent in the public discourse in both countries. In the UK, the deregulated labour market contributed to the dualization of the labour market, putting low-skilled workers in disadvantaged positions, thereby increasing perceptions of competition and perceptions of the intergroup as a threat – especially as the recent influx of A8 and A2 immigrants typically enter these sectors. In relation to the regulated Norwegian labour market, we have already flagged up the adverse effect of wage-setting mechanisms and the deepening segmentation of the labour market which shape specific practices of exclusion and contribute to the vulnerability of immigrants in the Norwegian labour market. The interactions between labour market institutions and welfare institutions represent an important element in the debates in both countries, as labour market exclusion triggers greater use of welfare support. This creates a vicious circle that challenges the expected balance between high labour market participation and contributions on the one hand, and access to welfare benefits and services on the other.

4.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter was devoted to examining the key changes in the institutional and social context in Norway and in the UK, which could affect tendencies for intergroup differentiation and accentuate processes of inclusion or exclusion of immigrants. Both countries experienced considerable change in the context of immigration due to external pressures and internal policy changes. It is important to stress the complex interactions between immigration, welfare, and labour market policies, which in both countries complemented efforts to restrict or to liberalize immigration. In relation to immigration policies, Norway and the UK share legacies of immigration control, which started to transform in the late 1990s and the 2000s when both countries introduced more selective immigration systems. In addition to these measures, Norway placed greater emphasis on the integration of immigrants. However, these efforts were largely intended to foster immigrants' adaptation to Norwegian

society to protect the in-group and reduce social inequalities – threats to the Norwegian welfare system.

In the UK, the liberalization of labour migration and granting immediate access to A8 migrants to the British labour market triggered substantial tension which reinforced preferences for the exclusion of immigrants. These preferences have thematized British immigration policy and public discourse since then. Furthermore, the analysis showed that that British welfare institutions, the way the British welfare state shifted to a more selective, means-tested benefit system and the increasing individualisation of risks also underlined differentiation processes and justified the perceived need to control immigration and to curtail immigrants' social rights. In contrast to this, the Norwegian universal welfare system, the low level of income inequality, and stable financial and institutional support for redistribution offers a good starting point for the inclusion of immigrants. Moreover, this chapter pointed at the high level of polarization based on cultural considerations (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012), which can strengthen intergroup differentiation and shape public attitudes towards exclusive stances.

This chapter revealed that both the British and the Norwegian institutions include inclusive and exclusive elements, and thus represent particularly interesting cases for an analysis of how these institutional features, processes of inclusion and exclusion, and the described themes of public discourse emerge and develop in the DF discussions. The next chapter focuses in particular on the differentiation of deserving and undeserving immigrants in order to better understand what the key conditions of the inclusion of immigrants are in the Norwegian and British welfare states.

5 HOW ARE PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE WELFARE DESERVINGNESS OF IMMIGRANTS SHAPED?

The British and the Norwegian DF discussions took two distinctive directions – the former representing a more exclusive approach to immigration, and the latter a more inclusive one. While the policy proposals reflect these general approaches, the small group discussions reveal much more diversity and shifts between preferences for inclusion and exclusion in both countries. The current chapter intends to approach attitudes to immigrants' inclusion through an **analysis of perceptions of immigrants' welfare deservingness that sheds light on the diversity of considerations behind changing preferences for immigrants' inclusion in or exclusion from the welfare state** (related to [RQ2](#) and [RQ4](#)).

Welfare deservingness is often characterized as consideration of “who should get what, and why?” and “who is worthy of receiving help?” (Van Oorschot, 2000). In political and public discourse, deservingness is used (1) as a tool to differentiate between “deserving” and “undeserving” beneficiaries, and (2) to establish and justify the extent of collective obligations and responsibilities towards others. As immigrants are considered the least deserving group throughout Europe (Van Oorschot, 2006, 2008; Van Oorschot et al., 2017), **this chapter aims to examine the considerations that affect (in-group) perceptions of immigrants' deservingness, and also preferences concerning the share of collective and individual responsibilities.**

Chapter 2 introduced the five deservingness criteria – namely, ***Reciprocity, Control, Need, Attitude, and Identity*** (Cook, 1979; Swaan, 1988; Van Oorschot, 2000). Scholars consider these five principles as key determinants when assessing welfare deservingness. Furthermore, Petersen et al. (2012) argue that these principles tend to work as “deservingness heuristics” – i.e. as cognitive categories that people can easily access and use in any situation. As the vast majority of the research on welfare deservingness relies on survey methods, our knowledge is limited concerning how these deservingness criteria (DC) are employed by ordinary people. This is the area, where this research and this chapter aims to contribute through the analysis of DF discussions on immigration.

To provide more details on the character of discussions on immigration, we should stress again that participants, their understanding of immigration and visions of immigrants shape the development of discussions. This also implies certain precaution as we cannot and should

not expect participants to be experts on immigration policy, to comprehend the complexity of the issue, to know the eligibility criteria or the extent of entitlements related to specific legal categories of immigrants. Their references may not rely on verified information about immigrants. However, their references and interactions are important to analyse in order to better understand what considerations dominate people's perceptions of immigrants. This is the reason why welfare deservingness is especially relevant and useful to analyse what character and qualities do people associate with immigrants, under what conditions do they see them as deserving and worthy to be included. Each of the five DC highlight a specific behaviour, personal qualities and efforts that make welfare beneficiaries more or less deservingness. This chapter aims to find out how these DC are understood, used and framed in relation to immigrants and their inclusion.

In an individual setup (e.g. being a respondent in a survey) it might be less likely that individuals reflect on the complexity of the issue or on the heterogeneity of the immigrant population based on legal categories, country of origin, skill-level, length of stay or immigrants' achievements in the country of destination, etc.⁵¹ In contrast to the individual setup, it is expected that in a group discussion, interactions encourage participants to consider numerous perspectives on the issue, to differentiate between the groups of immigrants and consider the particular circumstances and motivations of refugees, economic migrants or family migrants that can make a difference in perceptions of immigrants' deservingness. Seeing and acknowledging the heterogeneity of immigrants is considered particularly important to have a more diversified view of immigration and distinguish the benefits and the potential costs of immigration, which can unfold in shifts between preferences for inclusion and exclusion. It is expected, that interactions will reveal in what respect do people perceive the heterogeneity of immigrants. Accordingly, we aim to examine what characteristics and qualities do DF participants consider or disregard, what perceptions and misperceptions dominate their visions of (deserving/undeserving) immigrants.

Each of the five DC raise different aspects of deservingness and stress different qualities of immigrants as welfare beneficiaries. The emergence of DC in the debates may be identified by analysing DF participants' expectations about immigrants' life and conduct in the country of destination, their preferences regarding when and under what conditions immigrants

⁵¹ The analysis of how DF participants differentiated between specific groups of immigrants is elaborated in Chapter 6.

should get access to welfare benefits and services. The analysis of DF shows the application of all five DC in both countries. **In terms of the frequency and salience of raising specific criteria, we find very similar patterns in the discussions, but there are significant differences in how these criteria are understood and used by DF participants depending on the specific social context, and on the specific group of immigrants.**

Taking an institutional approach to the analysis, this chapter argues that **the differences in the use and understanding of the five DC can be traced back to the institutional differences between the British and the Norwegian welfare states.** First, the in-group's perceptions of their own collective needs are essentially shaped by the norms, values, ideals, and understanding of the role of the welfare state and the relationship between the individual and the collective within that welfare state. Such in-group perceptions are embodied in the country-specific and institutionally embedded visions of "Good Citizens". Second, the in-group's expectations of immigrants also replicate these values and collective aims, setting high standards for immigrants to achieve, reflected in visions of "Good Immigrants". In order to disentangle these interactions between in-group and out-group perceptions this chapter develops the "Good Citizen – Good Immigrant" Model to analyse how country-specific values and understandings of the welfare state are transformed into expectations towards immigrants and to highlight which areas are viewed as most important for their inclusion. The "Good Citizen – Good Immigrants" Model relies on the analysis of political discourses, which raises the relevance of applying political discourse analysis as a theory (Chilton, 2004; Zaller, 1992). However, this research chose Institutionalism as a more comprehensive theory. Besides the aim of analysing the role of political discourses, it intends to investigate how discourses use, reproduce and strengthen the significance of these social values, norms and expectations dominating visions of Good Citizen and as shown below the vision of Good Immigrants.

The first part of this chapter describes the use of DC during the DF discussions. The chapter continues with a more detailed analysis of various understandings of the DC. To approach the analysis, visions of "good citizens" are first presented in both countries, which are then used to analyse perceptions of in-group needs, and expectations about immigrants.

5.1 THE USE OF DESERVINGNESS CRITERIA – THE DOMINANCE OF *RECIPROCITY* AND *ATTITUDE*

Welfare deservingness theory specifies five DC, thereby reflecting on various aspects of the deservingness of welfare beneficiaries. However, as described in Chapter 2 the literature provides relatively vague definitions of *Reciprocity*, *Control*, *Need*, *Attitude*, and *Identity*, and we need to investigate how these criteria are used and understood by individuals and how these criteria relate to each other in relation to immigrants' deservingness. Through an analysis of DF discussions, we can identify the emergence of all these principles in participants' arguments. As these arguments were not raised in response to specific questions about welfare deservingness, the use of these principles helps to define cases and contexts in which DC are seen as important by the participants. While participants do refer to and describe these principles, they do not name them as DC. These are interpreted as DC by the author. For the purpose of clarity, the presented citations – in this and the next chapter – always highlight the identification of principles within the statements.

Table 2 - The use of deservingness criteria in the British and Norwegian DF discussions on immigration

	Participant (No.)	References (No.)	Sentences (No.)	Overlap with Reciprocity	Overlap with Control	Overlap with Need	Overlap with Attitude	Overlap with Identity
UNITED KINGDOM								
Reciprocity	26	122	244	-	14	33	90	8
Control	15	45	94	14	-	9	33	1
Need	23	86	191	33	9	61 ⁵²	43	11
Attitude	30	249	443	90	33	43	-	24
Identity	16	34	87	8	1	11	24	-
NORWAY								
Reciprocity	24	79	347	-	10	30	69	3
Control	14	43	179	10	-	8	25	3
Need	25	76	375	30	8	57 ⁵³	43	6
Attitude	31	222	709	69	25	43	-	9
Identity	14	19	79	3	3	6	9	-

Note: The table shows the number of references to the five DC coded, the number of participants using the specific deservingness criterion, the number of sentences in references to the DC and the number of references using combinations of DC in DF discussions on immigration

⁵² No. of references to *In-group needs*. The role of *In-group needs* is discussed in Section 5.3

⁵³ No. of references to *In-group needs*.


As Table 2 depicts, all DC are raised in both countries. Whether we look at the number of participants who refer to the specific DC, at the total number of references, or the number of sentences, we can clearly see that the shares for specific DC are very similar in the two countries under analysis. The criteria *Attitude* (75% of all references made in the UK and 79% in Norway) and *Reciprocity* (38% in the UK and 29% in Norway) tended to dominate the discussions. The *Need* principle (26% in the UK and 27% in Norway) received a little less attention in terms of frequency. The least mentioned out of the five were the *Control* (14% in the UK and 15% in Norway) and *Identity* principles (10% in the UK and 7% in Norway).⁵⁴

These findings indicate very similar patterns in terms of the salience of DC. However, **the analysis found substantial differences in the understanding and use of these criteria during the discussions.** These differences are related to the different approach to immigration and different policy measures that are proposed. One area where we can see similarity in relation to DC is in how these criteria are linked together and often overlap. Although Table 2 depicts these overlaps, Diagram 1 better illustrates the dominance of specific criteria within debates about immigration, which is indicated by the size of the circles. Furthermore, Diagram 1 highlights the links and the parallel use of these criteria in relation to perceptions of welfare deservingness. These overlaps also stress that the same context and the same expectations are approached and judged using different perspectives of deservingness. The following section briefly reviews the definitions of DC and contrasts them with the meanings and understandings of DC that emerged in the discussions.

The principle *Attitude* reflects greater willingness to see somebody as deserving if that person shows compliance and conformity with the standards of the majority society. While in the literature *Attitude* has not been considered among the most relevant principles, in the DF discussions references to *Attitude* dominate and are articulated by the vast majority of participants. This high salience suggests that expectations about compliant behaviour are linked to various facets of life and are not articulated only in relation to perceptions about access to and use of welfare benefits and services. One key area to which *Attitude* is strongly related is labour market engagement. This may explain the high level of overlap with the use of *Reciprocity*.

⁵⁴ Percentages reflect the share of specific DC in the discussions. However, due to the high number of references where parallel use of DC was identified, these percentages exceed 100%. There was a total of 329 references to DC in the British discussion, and 280 references in the Norwegian discussions.

Diagram 1 - Visualisation of the dominance of deservingness criteria used in the DF discussion in relation to each other



The literature considers *Reciprocity* to be the most important criterion in relation to immigrants (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2018; Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012; Van Oorschot, 2008). *Reciprocity* reflects on past and future contributions as forms of justification for deservingness. In DF discussions *Reciprocity* is linked to employment and payment of taxes, thus to earning entitlement to social rights. However, the discussions reveal that not only the economic but also social aspects of contributing to society are seen as important in both countries. Furthermore, in many cases *Reciprocity* emerges in the discussions as a reflection on two-way processes and expectations of mutuality between the in-group and the out-group.

The principle *Need* is usually considered in relation to perceptions of immigrants' neediness. The literature does not mention it as being among the most relevant DC in relation to immigrants' deservingness (Kootstra, 2017; Reeskens and van der Meer, 2018; Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012; Van Oorschot, 2008). However, based on the findings of the analysis the principle of *Need* should be interpreted in relation to the in-group, too. The DFs reveal that perceptions of *In-group needs* influence perceptions about immigrants' deservingness. *In-group needs* usually refer to the interests of the state and of society. They also encompass

references to the institutional and financial capacities of the state. In the discussions, *In-group needs* tend to function as limits, within which the welfare deservingness of immigrants is considered. As indicated in Table 2, references to *Need* are predominantly associated with the in-group (more than 70% of references to *Needs* in both countries), which also shows the importance of *In-group needs*, and the limited concern about immigrants' needs.

Previous research interpreted the principle of *Control* as responsibility over neediness mostly in relation to immigrants' decision to migrate (Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012; Van Oorschot, 2008). In practice, this means that people see immigrants as less deserving if they are believed to be in control of their migration. This idea finds support in the DF discussions. However, another aspect of *Control* was raised – immigrants' control over their situation and control over their contribution to the society. On the one hand, such perceptions emerge in relation to immigrants' long-term stay in the country of destination. On the other hand, expectations about immigrants being in control of their situation significantly depend on the socially accepted relationship and share of responsibilities between individuals and the collective.

Last, the literature treats the principle of *Identity* as the most exclusivist criteria (Kootstra, 2016, 2017; Reeskens and van der Meer, 2018). While in relation to the other four principles immigrants themselves can make efforts to improve their deservingness, in relation to *Identity* it is difficult to bridge the gap between the in-group and the out-group. Identity was the least used DC in the discussions. Moreover, it was not only raised in relation to nationality or citizenship – to reflect on cultural and ethnic differences, as the literature suggests –, and was not used necessarily in an exclusivist manner as something that could not be acquired by immigrants.

This brief review of DC intended to provide extended definitions of DC in light of the DF discussions. The more elaborate analysis which follows is designed to highlight how the understanding and framing of these criteria emerge in relation to the specific social contexts, and what explains the differences between the described content of DC. As argued earlier in Chapter 2, deservingness judgements are embedded in a relational, situational, and context-dependent environment (Willen, 2012). Therefore, understanding intergroup differentiation is especially important for better understanding attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state. It is not sufficient to analyse only the perceptions of the out-group. Equally important are the perceptions of the in-group towards itself because these are presumed to function as the basis for comparison; as the ideal to which immigrants are expected to grow.

Therefore, before turning to an analysis of deservingness principles, it is important to first present the in-group visions of “good citizens” in the two welfare states and through these depictions proceed to a more detailed analysis of the expectations through which the related DC emerge in the debates.

5.2 COUNTRY-SPECIFIC VISIONS OF “GOOD CITIZENS”

Deservingness theory is closely linked to intergroup relations and intergroup differentiations. In general, all DC are aimed at screening immigrants’ behaviour and actions as individuals. However, we cannot ignore the role of the in-group and the power of institutions, values, and social norms in shaping what is considered “good enough” or “deserving”. Focusing specifically on intergroup differentiation based on ethnicity/immigration status, 273 references to out-group characterisation were identified and coded in the Norwegian DF and 247 in the British. References to in-group characterisations were much less frequently made – 81 references in the Norwegian and 55 references in the British discussions. The findings showed that DF participants did not explicitly exemplify and contrast the conduct of the in-group and the out-group, as it was initially expected. Nonetheless, **in a more implicit and subtle way intergroup differentiations did unfold in the discussions, in which we could identify how preconceptions about “good citizens”, the endorsement of social values, and collective social aims influenced expectations about immigrants.**

Van Oorschot (2006) also suggests that deservingness judgements are part of the welfare culture and can work as survival or protection mechanisms against “others” who do not conform, or who are suspected of being a burden on the welfare state within the in-group (e.g. the unemployed) or the out-group (such as immigrants). Previous research found evidence for differences in perceptions of welfare deservingness between welfare regimes – primarily between liberal regimes on the one hand, and social-democratic and conservative regimes on the other (Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012). Drawing on these findings, this chapter argues that the effects of cultural and institutional contexts need to be duly taken into account, thus the following sections reflect on these aspects and describe how they unfold in intergroup differentiations and perceptions of welfare deservingness.

5.2.1 “A good Norwegian citizen” – emphasis on responsibility towards society

In the Nordic welfare model, employment plays a central role, as embedded in the Lutheran values that have affected the way Nordic welfare states developed (Kuhnle and Hort, 2004). Employment is not only considered a way of expressing individual growth in terms of personal development and financial security, but also as a duty towards society. The Nordic welfare states, including the Norwegian welfare state, offer extensive social rights and a high level of social security to all based on egalitarian values (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Pedersen and Kuhnle, 2017). As the state is the key provider of welfare support, there is acknowledgement that the system is financially and institutionally viable only if people are committed to contributing to it an adequate amount that the state can then manage and redistribute. This logic certainly implies a specific relationship between the individual and the collective, in which collective interests tend to outweigh individual interests – or, better put, individual interests are framed in the light of the collective interests, values, and social objectives of welfare state projects. Therefore, “good Norwegian citizens” endorse the responsibility to be economically active. Accordingly, they not only strive to secure a livelihood for themselves (and their families), but also contribute to the functioning of the welfare state and the production of the common good.

The achievements of Nordic countries in relation to the low level of income inequality, and reducing gender inequality, also strengthen the role of redistribution, equality, and inclusiveness as part of the welfare culture and welfare identity (Pedersen and Kuhnle, 2017). In addition to participation in working life, participation in society is viewed as important. Therefore, “a good Norwegian citizen” appreciates the comprehensive welfare state, the benefits and high living standards it provides, and is therefore motivated to contribute to it by participating in working life and in society. These social values and expectations delineating the visions of “good citizens” emerge throughout the DF discussions on various welfare issues (Chung et al., 2018; Schøyen and Hvinden, 2018).

5.2.2 “A good British citizen” – the notion of working for a better life

Similarly, in the British discourse engagement in employment is considered the most important feature of a good citizen. However, the relevance of employment has a more individualistic framing. In this understanding, work is the key source of income and the key source of social security of the individual. Labour market participation is perceived as the way to succeed, to improve one’s life. In this respect, hard work and individual effort to

progress and achieve are acknowledged and praised in British society (Evans and Tilley, 2017). In relation to the state and society, employment implies making tax payments that contribute to the functioning of the state. Employment is also expected to create financial independence from the state, and consequently to reduce the responsibility of the latter. For the working of a liberal-leaning welfare state, financially independent citizens who are considered responsible, who have control over their life, who contribute to the functioning of the state and the national economy, and who are expected to make less demands on welfare support represent ideal citizens (Dwyer, 2000; McEnhill and Taylor-Gooby, 2018).

Stressing the value of freedom to organize one's own life and greater individual responsibility with limited state intervention certainly shifts the focus to self-interest. The collective interests related to redistribution are limited to helping people in need, which means targeted support for the vulnerable (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The centrality of individual responsibility and preferences for targeted support was clearly articulated throughout the DF discussions (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2018; Taylor-Gooby and Leruth, 2018) and gave greater scope for differentiations in the debates – arguing who should and should not get support.

5.2.3 Welfare regimes reflected in visions of “good citizens”

Comparison of the visions of “good citizens” in Norway and in the United Kingdom indicates that welfare regimes tend to essentially shape expectations about citizens behaviours within their borders. As argued in details in Chapter 3, welfare institutions define the role of individuals within society, but also the relations between the individual/citizen and the state. In Norway, there is a strong commitment to contribute and to support collective interests such as maintaining a comprehensive welfare system, and achieving equality and social inclusion through redistribution. In contrast, in the UK the values of individualism, freedom of choice, and a strong belief in the free market are the dominant features of the welfare regime. In this case, self-interests seem to prevail and achieving social well-being is expected from individuals. However, Mijs et al. (2016) argue that increasing levels of individualism strengthen the symbolic boundaries between the in-group and the out-group and weaken the sense of community, which might be a relevant distinction between the approaches to immigration in Norway and the UK. The following sections investigate the details of the use of specific DC. As much as the key characteristics of the welfare regimes are reflected in the visions of “good citizens”, we expect similar impacts in relation to the use and specific meanings attached to DC. The following analysis starts with a review of *In-group needs*,

wherein perceptions of the relationship between the state, the in-group, and immigrants affect what is expected from immigrants.

5.3 PERCEPTION OF *IN-GROUP NEEDS* – DEFINING THE LIMITS OF IMMIGRANTS' WELFARE DESERVINGNESS

One of the main findings of this research is that **the principle of *Need* not only relates to the neediness of the out-group, but also to perceptions about *In-group needs***. Perceived *In-group needs* and interests reflect concrete social aims that DF participants see as important and expect migrants to contribute to achieving. Thus, perceived *In-group needs* provide an important framework within which expectations towards immigrants are defined. Participants use them to strengthen their arguments and justify their preferences for inclusion or exclusion, depending on which is seen as more suitable for meeting these in-group needs.

The analysis also found that perceived *In-group needs* were more promptly presented and defended by participants in both countries, as shown in Table 2. In the UK, 71% (61 references) and in Norway 75% (57 references) of all references to the principle of *Need* concerned the in-group rather than the out-group. Perceptions of *In-group needs* primarily pertained to macro-level factors such as the level of unemployment, labour market needs and skills shortages in the economy, as well as available state capacity – both financially and institutionally. Previous research tended to include these macro-level factors as contextual elements that influence the development of trends in attitudes and explain differences between various countries. However, our research results suggest including and considering the perceptions of *In-group needs* as part of the deservingness model.

It is highly important to stress the subjectivity of participants' perceptions about these needs, which are not underpinned by concrete facts or statistics: they rather reflect participants' views about the state of the country, economy or society, and perceptions of the challenges it faces. As emphasised in the literature on welfare state support and immigration, the political framing of these issues is especially crucial in relation to public perceptions about whether immigrants are seen as people who can help to resolve these issues, or as people who are likely to aggravate them (Koning, 2013; Larsen, 2014; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Soroka et al., 2016). In this respect, we can identify differences between the UK and Norway

which are related to the interplay of institutional context and individual attitudes (Sundberg, 2014).⁵⁵

5.3.1 The perceived need for immigrants

During the discussions participants primarily focused on the need for a labour force and to making up skills shortages, in relation to which they accepted and expected the help of immigrants. In the British discussions, attracting foreign businesses and investment was also mentioned as a need in terms of strengthening the economy. In Norway, the need to counter the effects of an aging population was raised, referring to the need to have a sufficiently large active labour force, and to guaranteeing the availability of benefits and services for elderly people:

33: *“With the so-called elderly boom that we talked about, we need immigrants NEED. It can be very positive and dealt with very correctly.”(NO)*⁵⁶

On the one hand, this means that immigrants were seen as contributors; part of the economically active population in Norway. On the other hand, they were also seen as producers of welfare, acknowledging the need for more care workers. Despite the awareness of the issue of an aging population, the British DF participants rather shared their fears about overpopulation due to immigration and argued for the need to control and better regulate immigration.⁵⁷

The above-mentioned economic and labour market needs served as rational justifications in favour of immigration and set the key expectations towards immigrants. As with all of the challenges related to the economy and sustainability of the welfare system, this expectation primarily referred to employment and tax contributions. In the discussions, it also meant a higher level of willingness to include skilled and working immigrants. In this regard we can identify some differentiation between immigrants based on their employability and their ability to contribute. An awareness of and wish to promote these *In-group needs* were seen as the guiding principles of proposals for a selective immigration system in the UK:

44: *“Points system, I've put down as the rationale as it must be incomers must bring something to the system, can't just keep take, take, take, ATTITUDE, RECIPROCITY there will be a lack of housing and space, so we*

⁵⁵ Specificities of the institutional and social context in Norway and in the UK are elaborated in Chapter 4.

⁵⁶ The parts of quoted statements highlighted in grey were coded and interpreted as references to specific DC.

⁵⁷ This specific aspect is addressed in more detail in Chapter 7 – Section 7.2

need to minimise it_{NEED}. [...] There will be more ultimately more skilled people in the UK, leading to higher earners and more tax being paid into the system_{ATTITUDE, RECIPROCITY} per the people that are here, do you know what I mean, there will be less unemployed_{ATTITUDE} hopefully allowing us to offer more skills to companies that might come here_{NEED}.” (UK)

The vast majority of participants viewed controlled immigration and letting in only those immigrants who qualify and meet these needs as the way forward for the UK. Participants stressed the need for skilled and high-skilled migrants and almost ignored the need for a low-skilled labour force.⁵⁸ This highlights **the selectivity of participants in terms of their perceptions of the country’s needs** – not considering the high level of reliance of the country’s economy on a foreign labour force in low-skilled jobs (Afonso, Devitt 2016). Therefore, the positive framing of immigration was restricted to skilled immigrants in the UK. Low-skilled migrants – primarily nationals of new EU Member States – were usually presented in a negative light as problematic immigrants, mirroring the public and political discourse in the UK.⁵⁹

Although in Norway the proposal for a more selective immigration system that focused on high-skilled immigrants was voted down, the need for a labour force considerably shaped the discussions:

22: “Yes. We need manpower_{NEED} in 2040 and ahead. Then we have to invest. We have to use the resources coming to the country_{NEED, RECIPROCITY}. Make sure they are a resource and not a cost_{RECIPROCITY, NEED}. That is an expense we have to take.” (NO)

These *In-group needs* were often framed within the broader aim of making immigration benefit the respective country. In the Norwegian discussion, the maximization of benefits of immigration was based on a preference for viewing immigrants as bringing resources to the country. This is also the reason why participants supported integration and were willing to invest in it – to further increase these benefits. In the UK, we can see a more selective approach involving viewing primarily skilled and high-skilled people as a resource for the country. Low-skilled people are rather seen as a threat, whose migration needs to be controlled. Thus, in Norway we can observe greater openness towards the inclusion of immigrants, while in the UK selective inclusion prevails, which is seen as being a suitable approach for fulfilling these *In-group needs*. This difference resembles some of the

⁵⁸ The need for a low-skilled labour force was acknowledged when discussing the lack of interest of English people in taking low-paid jobs.

⁵⁹ For further information on the representation of post-2004 EU migration in the British media see Chapter 4 Section 4.3.1.3

institutional features of the welfare states – a higher level of inclusiveness in social-democratic regimes, and higher level of selectivity in liberal welfare regimes.

5.3.2 State capacities – limits on the need for immigrants

The perceived concerns about state capacity that entered the discussions form the second category of *In-group needs*. Such concerns were primarily related to the capacity to accept and accommodate refugees, the capacity to integrate immigrants, and the need to cope with competition in the labour market. The framing and weight of these concerns about capacity varied between the two countries, but awareness of limited capacity drove participants to spell out and agree on priorities. This also informs us about how perceptions of different forms of scarcity shape attitudes to immigrants and how these capacity issues are used to justify placing limits on immigrants' deservingness and their access to welfare.

In the British discussion, these priorities targeted primarily the in-group – for example, concerning protecting their opportunities and dealing with internal social issues (such as homelessness) instead of supporting immigrants' well-being. In this regard, we can identify how participants delineated circles of solidarity along which the *Identity* principle emerged in the debates. Such preferences were underlined by perceptions of increasing population growth due to immigration, resulting in greater competition especially in terms of employment:

40: *"But immigration could be simply because we have that fear of like others coming and taking over our [unclear]Over our space and the opportunities that we possibly could have had IDENTITY, (IN-GROUP) NEED. So, something that, like you know educating ourselves or trying to work ourselves, and the next minute someone else comes in and that's it, they've taken your job opportunity because they're a bit more skilled IDENTITY, ATTITUDE, you know you've been studying for four years and hoping to get that right sort of position but someone with more experience comes along and takes IDENTITY..." (UK)*

Capacity issues were articulated in relation to housing and education, but mostly in relation to the National Health Services (NHS). Participants were particularly critical about free access to NHS, which is one of the few universally accessible provisions of the British welfare system and is considered one of the greatest achievements of the British welfare state. Therefore, perceptions that the NHS is underfinanced and struggling with capacity issues were very strong. Furthermore, these issues were primarily associated with an increase in demand for healthcare services by immigrants. One of the groups even proposed restricting free access to the NHS for a period of two years for Non-EU migrants. Another group suggested

introducing extra tax payments for newly arriving immigrants which could cover the cost of infrastructural developments, including extending the capacity of hospitals.

In contrast to these preferences for restrictions, Norwegian participants put emphasis on integration and capacity building. Accordingly, limits were envisioned based on the state's capacity to integrate immigrants, which also included their social support, as stressed by Participant 5 in relation to refugees:

5: *"The first thing I write is how many? I think that the government should decide on how many they can take NEED. We should help and we should welcome. The people who come here should be treated right. Some demands have to be made, some clear rules of how things work here ATTITUDE. What happens to them when they come here? People have expectations, which opportunities they get to adapt to society. Some things should be clear: how things happen, what is expected of those who come here RECIPROCITY, ATTITUDE."* (NO)

Participants discussed the considerable (but not specified) costs of integration, but they still viewed integration as worth investing in, especially when taking a long-term perspective. They seemed confident that Norway had the resources to allocate money for this purpose, which signals a lack of a perception of scarcity. At the same time, willingness to invest in integration also implied stricter demands for returns on this investment:

22: *"We must demand more from the money we spend NEED. If we don't get anything in return for it RECIPROCITY, I believe we are spending it somewhat wildly and uninhibitedly. Kind of firing with a shotgun."* (NO)

Reflecting on potential issues with the financial sustainability of the welfare system,⁶⁰ there were also suggestions that immigrants' welfare entitlement should depend on the ability of the state to finance a comprehensive welfare state. This implies a potential shift towards the approach described in the case of the British discussions – i.e. drawing boundaries between the in-group and out-group and making access to welfare provision more restrictive.

The perceived needs of the in-group and perceptions of limited capacity set the framework within which immigrants' welfare deservingness and eligibility for welfare were judged. This finding draws on the relevance of perceptions of scarcity, which can be considerably influenced by the way the welfare state is organized, and how social issues are communicated and dealt with (Larsen, 2006). The differences between the social democratic and liberal-leaning welfare systems in terms of universal vs. means-tested benefits,

⁶⁰ During the DF discussions participants also discussed the probability of a financial crisis hitting Norway in the case of a decline in oil production, or for other reasons, and sought to agree on strategies for dealing with such a situation, how to revitalize the Norwegian economy, etc. These discussions were not related to immigration, but reveal that there is awareness about the limits of Norway's favourable financial situation.

differences in the level of welfare benefits, and differences in the public discourse concerning social issues can explain the greater exposure to scarcity and the stronger inclination to restrictive measures in the British welfare system. At the same time, the stable financial background of Norway cannot be ignored when discussing (the lack of) scarcity perceptions.

Perceived *In-group needs* are thus argued to define the limits of perceptions of deservingness. The following section explores what the content and understanding of other DC is, what the key expectations from immigrants are, and what makes an immigrant “good” and “deserving”.

5.4 VISIONS OF “GOOD”, “DESERVING” IMMIGRANTS

Assessments of welfare deservingness involve perceptions of immigrants in various areas of life. Through expectations about and requirements for immigrants, participants also delineate visions of “good” and “bad” immigrants – the positive and negative attitudes DF participants hold in relation to immigrants. Focusing on three aspects of life, this section explores the understanding of specific DC, and investigates how the latter are linked.

5.4.1 Employment and the ability to contribute

Labour market engagement was the ultimate expectation for immigrants. Formal employment and the ability to contribute were certainly key criteria for complying with expectations concerning *Reciprocity*. However, requirements for reciprocity and requirements for employment were usually also framed as the principle of *Attitude* – as compliance with the rules and duties in the society and country of destination. This also explains the high level of overlap between *Reciprocity* and *Attitude* presented in Table 2. In the UK, 74% of all 122 references to *Reciprocity* were identified as *Attitude*. In Norway, where references to *Reciprocity* in general were less frequent, 87% of all 77 references to *Reciprocity* were coded as *Attitude*, too.

Respondents desired that immigrants should start working and contributing to the running of the state as soon as possible. On the one hand, employment is seen as the most direct way to contribute. The basic understanding is that if immigrants find employment, they can produce something, pay into the system, and enrich the country through their work and skills. Following this line of thought, further factors enter the debate in the form of the

consideration of immigrants' skills, employability, work experience and work ethic, to name a few elements that focus specifically on the individual level.

The discussions stress the relevance of *Reciprocity*, involving going beyond the mere consideration of past and future contributions, and pointing at the social dimension of employment and contributions. In the British discussions, employment was largely treated as an individual choice, and the argument was made that anyone – even those without skills – could find work if they wanted to. In the case of unemployment, participants expected immigrants (and then generalized this to all welfare beneficiaries) to contribute in the form of voluntary work. As articulated by Participant 89 in the citation below, voluntary work is seen as a sign of making an effort to give something back to the community, which shows the relevance of the social element of contribution:

"89 And also with the two year you've got to be showing that you're going to contribute RECIPROCITY whether you do voluntary. I work full-time and I've been doing voluntary for 17 years ATTITUDE and it's just giving back something to the community RECIPROCITY, ATTITUDE. Now I'm looking at people can't just be sitting there not doing nothing ATTITUDE. Voluntary work, do some voluntary work." (UK)

In Norway, unemployment was perceived as disrespect for the "rights-and-duties" principle. While participants did not argue for limitations on immigrants' social rights, there was a clear expectation that immigrants should start working and fulfil such duties, as stressed by Participant 1:

1: "If we want them because of manpower NEED, then they have to work ATTITUDE, RECIPROCITY. Not just sit back and enjoy the benefits, they have to get out in the labour market ATTITUDE, RECIPROCITY." (NO)

Moreover, in the Norwegian discussions employment and the workplace environment were considered a key arena for integration, getting in touch with Norwegians, and learning about the Norwegian way of life. Understanding Norwegian society and the way it works was considered to be key to integration, to adapting and complying with rules and principles, and being motivated to take part in it. Therefore, non-employment tended to be associated with isolation from the majority society.⁶¹

The principle of *Control* was also raised in relation to the question of whether immigrants have control over their employment and contributions. In the British discussions, becoming

⁶¹ This aspect emerged more explicitly in the discussions involving the non-employment of immigrant women – for further details see Section 5.4.3

employed was considered the responsibility of the individual, and, accordingly, immigrants were viewed as being in control of their employment, regardless of skill level:

69: "Circumstances will dictate how an individual, how much they can contribute to society but the bottom line is everybody can contribute to society if they worked or wanted RECIPROCITY, ATTITUDE, CONTROL and as long as they understand that ATTITUDE and they provide people those opportunities, there shouldn't be any reason why people can't earn their benefit. CONTROL" (UK)

Being in control was considered a minimum requirement, and not something that would positively affect the deservingness of immigrants. In this regard, we can identify a different approach in the Norwegian discussions in which participants openly talked about the difficulties immigrants face in securing their own income from formal employment due to discrimination on the labour market:

11: "Also a problem that if Norwegian workers see a foreign name, chances to get a job are smaller compared to a Norwegian name CONTROL. something to think about." (NO)

This acknowledgement of issues in the hiring process also meant acknowledging immigrants' lack of control over their labour market situation that could lead to demands for welfare support even if they were looking for a job. According to this understanding, it is not only the individual who is expected to contribute and reciprocate, but integration is rather considered a two-way process. This also means that the *In-group needs* to get involved in reducing the barriers that affect immigrants' ability to contribute.

The understanding of the *Control* principle strongly manifests the institutional divide between the role of individual and collective responsibility in Norway and the UK. This divide is further reinforced if we analyse the principle of *Attitude*. The discussions reveal that, perceptions about and the recognition of immigrants' contributions do not only depend on the ability to contribute but also on efforts to contribute.

5.4.2 Immigrants' efforts to contribute

Perceptions about immigrants' efforts to contribute positively affect assessments of their deservingness in general. In this respect, there are certain distinctions concerning in which areas participants expect immigrants to make an effort. In the British discussions, the strong work ethic of immigrants was clearly considered an important asset, as emphasised by Participant 83:

83: "So that's why I agree with the whole Australian ethos is about you come in, you've got that strong work ethic and then you're going to boost the economy, bring some really valuable skills into that country and hopefully that will pass down the line to the next generations RECIPROCITY, ATTITUDE. For me it's about having containment, control, regulations and all of those things need to be put in" (UK)

Hard work and willingness to work long hours and to work at low-paid jobs that English people were not interested in were appreciated and used in the debate in calls for greater recognition of immigrants' contributions:

89: "That's a good point there because [unclear] Britain also send the people to come here to help build the country and a lot of immigrants do contribute but it's the same all round really RECIPROCITY, ATTITUDE, it's not being highlighted properly because even in the NHS a lot of people are immigrant working RECIPROCITY, ATTITUDE, a lot of the jobs in this country as you rightfully say, a lot of people pick and choose what job they want ATTITUDE." (UK)

In this particular case we can observe how perceptions of the in-group or acknowledgement of the in-group's fault or unfavourable behaviour stress the value and the benefit of having the out-group. While these positive acknowledgements are weighted and counterbalanced with other concerns about immigration, a strong work ethic, hard work, and a willingness to work one's way up the ladder are definitely values the in-group appreciates and associates with the image of "good immigrants".

In Norway, the requirement of making an effort to contribute did not emerge in the form of a call for a good work ethic, but in expectations that immigrants should learn the language and participate in society. These expectations were framed in cultural terms, as stressed by Participant 28:

28: "when you immigrate to something, you chose that culture that you immigrate to CONTROL. I believe the essence is to begin with language. Teaching language in order to teach culture. ATTITUDE Experience that this is related to both rights and duties ATTITUDE. When you enter a society you get some rights, but you get duties too RECIPROCITY. We have to make sure that they understand what that implies and that it is followed through ATTITUDE. For example get a job, learn the language, achieve to enjoy ATTITUDE. My first specific advice is the language. Intensify and provide that language teaching as soon as possible to ensure the cultural teaching." (NO)

Labour market engagement was considered an essential element as well as a means of understanding Norwegian society and Norwegian culture. Participants argued for the need to acquire language skills as this was seen as one of the key barriers to finding a job and to becoming more involved in society. The discussions illustrate the interlocking relationship between employment, language, and social participation that is considered important for becoming integrated and committed to contributing to the functioning of society.

In the British discussions, culturally framed expectations are much less salient. While the requirement to speak the language is mentioned, it is not framed as a strict condition of obtaining employment, which might be due to the status of English as a world language. Engagement in social life was not commonly raised in the debates. This may be due to the fact that the latter is seen as part of individuals' freedom to decide. As noted, efforts to contribute in the form of a strong work ethic and hard work also stress the moral character of the individual. In Norway, expectations concerning employment and contributing were embedded in a wider cultural and social context aimed at maintaining the strength of community and reducing social division.

5.4.3 Earning entitlement to welfare provision

Another aspect of life which is duly considered regarding immigrants is assessing their conduct in times of need and vulnerability. This shifts the focus to the use of welfare benefits and services. In this respect, "good immigrants" are envisioned as immigrants who earn their benefits – by contributing first, and also being self-sufficient most of the time. They do not use welfare to further their own personal interests. Perceptions of immigrants' welfare use are intertwined with expectations of *Reciprocity* and *Attitude*, and perceptions of immigrants' *Needs*.

In general, neediness was usually linked to a lack of paid employment, when the welfare state is supposed to help out. This welfare support takes different forms and dimensions in the UK and Norway, but in both DFs it was accepted that unemployment involving losing a job for various reasons can occur to anyone. Despite this acknowledgement, perceptions of immigrants' neediness were rarely raised. In each country there were only 25 and 19 references in the British and Norwegian discussions respectively, which touched upon immigrants' needs. This means that only small proportion of references to *Need* focused on out-group needs. Furthermore, we also observed that the vast majority of references were associated with refugees' needs and vulnerability. These numbers clearly show very limited interest in immigrants' needs – especially economic migrants' needs.⁶²

This lack of interest can be explained by highlighting expectations about the self-sufficiency of immigrants. Self-sufficiency was described as having one's own income, being able to take care of oneself (and dependent family members, if any), and being financially independent

⁶² The differences between the welfare deservingness of refugees and economic migrants are elaborated in Chapter 6.

from the state. In both countries this was raised as a form of fulfilling *Reciprocity*, and was rationally framed as reducing the state's responsibilities and expenses related to immigrants. In the British discussions, self-sufficiency also meant that immigrants should be able to cope with unexpected situations – the loss of a job, the need for healthcare treatment – on their own without expecting state support. Emphasis on self-sufficiency was often associated with the aim of preventing welfare dependence among immigrants. In the Norwegian discussions, self-sufficiency was also linked to unproblematic immigrants. In one of the small groups, the need for self-sufficiency was raised in relation to highly skilled economic migrants and then generalized to all economic migrants as a condition for remaining in the country:

8: *"I think the request should be for the whole world. If you come from Africa, but support yourself and have a nice job RECIPROCIITY, I feel it is weird to throw them out. If they pay tax, work RECIPROCIITY, have a social life ATTITUDE."* (NO)

It is important to stress that in relation to economic migrants we also see an inclination towards individualism and increasing individual responsibility in the Norwegian discussions. This is especially the case in the context of international labour mobility, freedom of movement, and uncertainty about immigrants' long-term presence in the country. We observed how the acknowledgement of global trends and pressures shifted preferences towards more individualism, instead of a higher level of adaptation.⁶³

Due to the high level of sensitivity about perceptions of misuse of the welfare state, participants in both countries stressed that immigrants need to contribute first – i.e., they expected immigrants to earn their benefits:

11: *"You have to perform before you can enjoy the benefits ATTITUDE, RECIPROCIITY. And contribute to get the goods ATTITUDE, RECIPROCIITY."* (NO)

84: *"For me you've got to put two years' worth of money into the system before you can take anything out or x amount of years RECIPROCIITY."* (UK)

In both countries at least two years were mentioned as the minimum requirement. However, no clear arguments were presented to explain why exactly this period of contribution should be covered, and not more or less. Furthermore, the use of welfare support was seen legitimate and acceptable if taken temporarily, or for a defined period of time. In the British discussions, perceptions about a lack of effort seeking new employment were immediately linked to the broader debate on welfare dependency. Shifting the responsibility onto the

⁶³ For further details about how such shifts between preferences occurred, please see Chapter 7.

individual participants also questioned the moral character of those who would choose to live on benefits. This difference was pointed out by Participant 68:

68: "I think if you're working for, you know, your own [unclear], for a better life, I think it's totally different from people ATTITUDE, not just immigrants but, you know, people in general IDENTITY. Sponging off the system and being lazy ATTITUDE." (UK)

In the Norwegian discussions, a lack of employment was understood rather as a reluctance to adapt to the Norwegian way of life. Therefore, it was framed as an issue of cultural difference. Accordingly, immigrants' welfare deservingness was linked to the *Identity* principle. The latter emerged in relation to immigrant families and immigrant women's lack of employment and lack of social involvement. Tensions arose between acknowledging the freedom of individuals to decide about private matters – such as the management of family life – and demands for labour market participation and the maintenance of a high level of gender equality:

10: "I also agree that immigration is a very important resource for our country NEED. The challenge is perhaps the Asian and African immigrants with little participation in working life. It has to do with cultural differences, and I think we need to be harsher in respect of Norway being a country where both men and women work IDENTITY, NEED. [...] I have interviewed immigrant women myself to get them apprenticeships and possibility for a long-term job. Then many of them say "No, I can't wear trousers because I wear a long dress". Then I have made adjustments as to how people can do things, but many say no, culturally IDENTITY, ATTITUDE. I think Norway has to be harsher in those cases. You have to work, and actually say yes to what is offered to you. Sort of a request for activity for immigrants ATTITUDE, RECIPROCALITY." (NO)

In both countries we can identify concerns about immigrants' use of welfare, but anxiety about welfare dependence was more dominant in the British discussion, as also reflected in policy proposals for limiting access to welfare benefits for a period of at least two years. The fact that discussions about immigrants' welfare use shifted several times to a broader and more general discussion about welfare dependence and unemployment indicates the impact of the salient public discourse on welfare dependence and the "undeserving unemployed". As highlighted in the literature, such social divisions tend to be reinforced by a liberal welfare state organized on the basis of need (Dwyer, 2000; Larsen, 2006; Sainsbury, 2012). The provision of means-tested benefits is associated with the higher risk of stigmatization (Jensen and Tyler, 2015). As described in Chapter 4, a high level of selectivity and a high level of income inequality, strengthen differentiation processes and exclusivist public discourses, which also affect opposition to granting immigrants access to welfare (Crepaz and Damron, 2009; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2013; Van Der Waal et al., 2013).

The analysis finds that perceptions of *In-group needs*, and especially perceptions of scarcity, significantly underlie preferences for a more restrictive and selective approach to immigration. The restrictive approach is also mirrored in perceptions of immigrants' welfare deservingness. Expectations of *Attitude* and *Reciprocity* dominate the debates. Participants are less perceptive concerning the *Neediness* or lack of *Control* of immigrants over their situation in the UK, thereby shifting the responsibility to the individual.

In the Norwegian discussions, concerns about immigrants' welfare use were associated with the perception that, for immigrants, access to welfare benefits means disincentivising entry to the labour market. Non-employment was considered a crucial issue, affecting the functioning of the welfare state and increasing social inequality in the country. The Norwegian DF reveal that participants tend to frame this issue as a problem of cultural differences. Therefore, it is not surprising why language, an understanding of Norwegian society and culture, as well as demands for social participation are so closely intertwined with expectations of *Reciprocity* and *Attitude*. Despite perceptions of the exploitation of the welfare system in the form of exportation of benefits or the accumulation of various benefits, none of the Norwegian breakout groups proposed restrictions on accessing welfare benefits. All groups focused on integration as a way of addressing the issue of immigration and to a certain extent, teaching immigrants to understand and comply with the collective responsibility associated with the welfare system. In this respect, the role of the in-group is also recognized – the need to change majority attitudes and reduce discrimination. Still, as in the case of the British discussion, we see limited interest in or awareness of the *Needs* of immigrants. Therefore, immigrants' welfare deservingness is largely determined through the interplay of *In-group needs* and expectations related to *Reciprocity* and *Attitude*.

5.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter examined the use of deservingness criteria in the DF discussions. Each of the five deservingness criteria – *Attitude*, *Reciprocity*, *Need*, *Control*, and *Identity* – reflect on a different aspect of welfare deservingness. Analysis of the DF discussions revealed that, in terms of the salience of the specific DC, very similar patterns emerge, stressing the dominance of *Attitude* and *Reciprocity*. However, the particular understandings of these DC are considerably different in the British and the Norwegian discussions. Therefore, this chapter aimed to analyse these differences. Moreover, the analysis shed light on how these

DC relate to each other and interact. The overlapping and parallel use of the criteria indicate that in relation to the same issue, various aspects of deservingness are considered and linked together.

One of the key findings of the analysis is that the principle of *Need* is not only applied in relation to immigrants' neediness. The analysis revealed that perceived *In-group needs* affect the perceptions of immigrants' welfare deservingness. Moreover, *In-group needs* play a much more dominant role in the discussions and set the framework within which immigrants' deservingness is assessed. We can identify, that the dominance of expectations related to *Attitude* and *Reciprocity* are formulated to address the perceived *In-group needs*.

The analysis found evidence that distinctions in the country-specific visions of "good citizens" in Norway and in the UK – each stressing specific values, norms, and social expectations – resonated in relation to perceptions of immigrants' welfare deservingness and shaped the in-group's expectations of immigrants. The analysis provided further evidence how key institutional features – such as the role and understanding of employment and contribution, the relations between the individual and the collective, the structure and aims of the welfare state, and the related values – were discursively reproduced and how they affected discussions about immigrants' welfare deservingness and the thresholds of inclusion.

While this chapter focused on the use of deservingness principles in the DF debates, the next chapter analyses how perceptions of welfare deservingness change depending on the specific group of immigrants. Chapter 6 is devoted to scrutinizing how DF participants construct the deservingness of refugees and economic migrants, and how they define a hierarchy between DC in relation to these two groups of immigrants.

6 THE COLLECTIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WELFARE DESERVINGNESS OF IMMIGRANTS

The previous chapter focused on the analysis of different understandings of the welfare deservingness principles as articulated by DF participants in Norway and in the UK. In this chapter, the scope shifts from meanings to the social practice of how people construct the welfare deservingness of immigrants through their interactions with each other. This chapter aims to examine **what considerations and principles are seen as more or less important when assessing immigrants' welfare deservingness** (related to [RQ2](#) and [RQ4](#)). The focus is on the results of these discussions co-created by DF participants.

As raised earlier, DF participants might not formulate concrete definitions of who they consider as immigrants. They might not know exactly the formal eligibility criteria of family migration or attaining refugee status, the criteria of acquiring long-term residency or citizenship. However, through their interactions participants do delineate what are those aspects and principles that they view relevant in relation to immigrants. Their perceptions might not reflect the statistics on immigration or the available research evidence, still these perceptions, concerns, judgements and uncertainties are real to those participants and often taken-for-granted for many other people. That is the reason we need to focus on and examine these perceptions (and misperceptions) to better understand how people think and talk about such social issues, on what pieces of information and considerations they rely when forming their opinions.

The emergence of various considerations and perspectives in the DF discussions evidence that people do differentiate between immigrants along numerous and often cross-cutting dimensions, which affect also perceptions of immigrants' welfare deservingness and preferences for in/exclusion. These dimensions are not limited to country of origin, motivations for migration or specific legal categories of immigrants, but considering also the legitimacy of moving to another country, the choice of the country of destination or the moral character of persons, etc. To elaborate more on this aspect, this chapter deepens the analysis of public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state by comparing the perceptions of welfare deservingness of refugees and economic migrants (including EU and non-EU nationals) as two specific subgroups of immigrants. However, as the analysis will show DF participants delineated lines of division not only between these two groups, but within the group of refugees and the group of economic migrants, too.

Refugees and economic migrants tended to dominate the discussions on immigration in both countries. The dominance of these two groups of immigrants can be associated with the strong contextual effects on discussions. The preoccupation with the issue of refugees and economic migrants resonates with the public discourse following the 2015 Refugee crisis and broader concerns about the increasing mobility of the labour force in Europe and worldwide. In addition to these two groups, family migration was raised as an issue in Norway. However, the related discussions were not as significant and comprehensive as in the case of refugees and economic migrants. Furthermore, family migration was not discussed by the British groups and the topic thus would not qualify for comparative analysis. While we cannot be certain why, one of the explanations for the lack of debate about family migration in the UK is that the perceptions of losing control over EU nationals' free movement was so salient in the public and political debates that it overshadowed other concerns about immigration. Taking into account these considerations, this chapter focuses only on refugees and economic migrants. It aims to contribute to the scholarship on welfare deservingness, and more broadly to the scholarship on attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state, by elaborating on the dynamism of attitude-formation and the changing perceptions of welfare deservingness in relation to the specific groups of immigrants and specific social contexts debated.

Although welfare deservingness claims are usually located in the realm of moral values and moral assumptions (Willen, 2012), this research is not restricted to the **moral framing of deservingness** and remains open to exploring **a more practical approach to the topic of the deservingness of immigrants**. In contrast to the moral conception of deservingness, practical understanding does not necessarily condition perceptions of deservingness on the needs and vulnerability of immigrants, but focuses more on acknowledging individual immigrants' achievements and outcomes (Feather, 1999). People are more likely to positively evaluate those achievements that conform to the in-group's internalized vision of "good citizens" and which meet the in-group's perceived needs of the country and society. **The DFs reveal that participants used different framings of welfare deservingness in relation to these two groups**. While **refugees' deservingness** is substantially influenced by **a moral desire to promote solidarity**, **economic migrants' deservingness** is approached much more practically, with a stress on **the need for conformity with the needs of the country of destination**. Second, the chapter aims to **elaborate on the hierarchy that exists between deservingness principles**. Scrutinizing the differences in the ranking of DC in relation to these

two groups of immigrants enables us to analyse the key considerations and concerns that shape attitudes to refugees' and economic migrants' inclusion in the welfare state.

Throughout the chapter it is argued that **the application of DC differs in relation to specific groups of immigrants, also affecting the way their welfare deservingness is constructed. Consequently, the ranking of principles in terms of importance, weight, and impact on perceptions of welfare deservingness also varies.** Focusing on DC, the analysis finds that the moral framing of deservingness judgements primarily relies on the *Control* and *Need* principles. However, the discussions about refugees also reveal the limits of moral obligations and the shift towards a more practical approach in relation to refugees, too. The practical approach – primarily applied to economic migrants – unfolds in consideration of *Reciprocity* and *Attitude* and stressing the need for conformity with the *In-group needs* as key factors in the perception of welfare deservingness. **The analysis of this notable shift – emerging both in relation to refugees and economic migrants – sheds new light on the considerations shaping attitudes towards immigrants' access to welfare.** Furthermore, it **highlights the significance of the expected interactions and relation between individual immigrants and the in-group** represented by the state and the (majority) society. The analysis also identifies the dynamism and changing character of (in-group) expectations of immigrants in relation to specific groups of immigrants, specific circumstances, etc. which provide further information about how visions of 'good' and 'bad' immigrants are constructed.

6.1 REFUGEES AS PEOPLE IN CRISIS

The DFs were conducted shortly after the peak of the 2015 Refugee crisis. The disputes concerning whether to welcome or refuse refugees were high on the political agenda and public discourse at a national and European level. The DF discussions reveal that refugee-related issues, including their inclusion and welfare deservingness, are not seen in black and white. Accordingly, ambivalence frequently emerges – balancing between a desire to recognize the neediness of refugees and concerns about the exploitation of the refugee system and the welfare system. In this regard, there is a strong divide in terms of the dimension of time – i.e. in **how participants view and reason about refugees' deservingness at the time of arrival (Stage 1), and how participants evaluate refugees' deservingness and their role in society in the longer term (Stage 2).** This difference of attitudes related to

specific time periods enables us to track which considerations count, which DC play a central role in the short-term dimension, and how these criteria fade when evaluated using a long-term perspective. In the first period of time – i.e., at the time of arrival, refugees are at the centre of attention. Refugees' *Neediness*, their lack of *Control over migration*, and the moral obligations towards them are contrasted with *in-group capacities* for accommodating refugees. In the second period of time – i.e., when taking the long-term perspective – *In-group needs* and interests are in focus. Therefore, expectations related to *Reciprocity*, *Attitudes*, and *Identity* are of greater significance in the debates. Accordingly, refugees are expected to adapt in order to be seen as more deserving. In the discussions, we cannot identify a strictly defined threshold between the initial short-term and long-term dimension. **Still, differentiating these two periods can help us to better understand how the moral justifications for refugees' welfare deservingness transform into more practical expectations about refugees in a long-term perspective.**

The discussion about refugees and the desired approaches to them varied significantly between the British and the Norwegian debates. A fundamental difference between the UK and Norway arose in terms of how participants viewed refugees. In the UK, refugees were often seen as a cost, a burden the country needed to shoulder, while in Norway a more optimistic approach prevailed, with refugees being seen as a resource, as labour force the country needed. In line with this conception, discussions examined how to facilitate refugees' integration and the utilization of their resources and skills. Therefore, Norwegian participants were more open to providing targeted services for refugees – for example, language courses – to facilitate refugees' integration, while in the UK the need for such measures was not raised at all.

Despite these differences, there were also some similarities. First, in both countries there were suspicions about the exploitation of the refugee system. Therefore, the legitimacy of and reasons for asylum-seeking were taken seriously, and the return of asylum-seekers was supported in both countries. Similarly, the return of recognized refugees was considered desirable once the main reason for migration had ceased – i.e. when safety was restored in the country of origin. Both of these examples show participants' concerns about the misuse of the refugee system and the weakening of moral justification for the accommodation of refugees. Study of these considerations – highlighting both the practical aspects that stress the usefulness of refugees, and moral reasoning focusing on refugees' neediness – help us understand the application of various DC. The following sections elaborate on the

construction of refugees' welfare deservingness in relation to the two aforementioned periods of time.

6.1.1 Stage 1 – Solidarity with refugees at the time of arrival

At the initial stage of arrival and application for refugee status, participants stress the principle of *Control*. Lack of control over the violent circumstances in the country of origin was the main justification participants employed to recognize the neediness of asylum-seekers and refugees. The acknowledgement of this neediness – primarily understood as the need for a safe place to live – positively affects the welfare deservingness of refugees. The centrality of the *Control* principle is proved by considerations that any doubt about the control refugees have over their situation in the country of origin, or control over their migration, or any doubt about the legitimacy of requesting asylum, reduces perceptions of welfare deservingness. Both in the British and the Norwegian discussions participants clearly differentiate between legitimate asylum-seekers who deserve help, and asylum-seekers who cheat the system by pretending to be in need of protection. DF participants argue that the latter have economic motivations, and their migration is not undertaken to save their lives. Accordingly, they are often called “economic refugees” in both countries, as described in the following citations:

45: “Yeah - there are two differences, the people who are trying to get away from war *CONTROL* and then you've got the economic refugees who haven't really got a reason for leaving where they live except they want to get some more money *CONTROL, ATTITUDE*.” (UK)

25: “The other thing is refugees, the ones who flee from something, war, hunger, catastrophe *CONTROL, NEED* or quite frankly fortune hunters who seek a better life for themselves *ATTITUDE*. Quite a few of them too.” (NO)

While legitimate refugees enjoyed a higher level of informal solidarity, participants tended to call for the deportation of “economic refugees”. In the British discussions, participants questioned the motivation of legitimate asylum-seekers, suggesting that access to welfare benefits affects asylum-seekers' choice of destination country:

“I said earlier they should be travelling to bordering countries, not countries that are going to give them better benefits like Germany or the UK *ATTITUDE*.” (UK, Participant not identified)

Such perceptions, and the difficulty of checking who refugees are, shifted the discussions to seeking other ways of fulfilling moral obligations towards refugees than accepting refugees in the country of destination. This acknowledgement of moral obligations but also distancing

from the need to accommodate refugees reveals how welfare deservingness and solidarity with refugees gradually decreased in the British discussions.

In both countries, participants emphasised the need to return refugees if safety is restored in the country of origin. In this case, neediness and thus the welfare deservingness of refugees diminishes; this points to the desire to offer only temporary help. However, in relation to welfare deservingness, not only individual, micro-level factors are taken into account. As described in [Chapter 5](#), in-group capacities – or more precisely, the limits of these – affect perceptions of refugees' welfare deservingness. This was especially the case in the British discussions, where refugees' neediness was contrasted with that of vulnerable groups within the in-group, and internal social issues:

68: "I mean it's good having... you know, helping say Syrian peoples, I still think you need to help your own as well... IDENTITY [...] I understand the moral issues, I do understand moral issues and I know there's a lot help with needs out there NEED but I do think charity starts at home and look after your own first that's, you know, this country IDENTITY. I'm not saying just the English person or a Jamaican person or Asian person, I'm not saying that, I'm saying try and sort out what's here now and store what you've got left or what you can do to help others NEED, IDENTITY." (UK)


This specific case pinpoints how in-group capacity needs were combined with the *Identity* principle to limit the responsibilities of the state to providing help for only a limited period of time. In the Norwegian discussions, participants also raised concerns about the number of refugees arriving in the country. The questions what was manageable (how many refugees), and how the cost of accommodating refugees would affect the financing of the welfare state were raised, but these considerations did not lead to preferences for restricting the state's responsibility for supporting refugees.

While discussions about refugees touched upon other DC, these gained relevance during participants' consideration of the second stage, reflecting on the long-term perspective. For instance, the *Identity* principle – stressing refugees' cultural distinctiveness – was rarely considered. When cultural differences were discussed, even in Norway, this aspect was brought up more in regard to the second stage, as discussed in more detail in the following section. We could even argue that the acknowledgement of moral obligations towards refugees seemed to override considerations related to *Identity* and cultural differences.

In Chapter 5, which analysed the use of specific DC, the principles of *Attitude* and *Reciprocity* were found to be the most dominant concerning immigrants in general. However, once we reduce the scope to discussions about refugees, and especially to the period of arrival (Stage 1), the analysis reveals **the dominance of moral considerations and justifications in the**

construction of the welfare deservingness of refugees. Accordingly, the importance associated with specific DC becomes significantly realigned. In line with the findings above, Diagram 2 visualizes **the centrality of the Control and Need principle at the first stage of arrival.** The diagram also highlights the relationship between these two principles (that the neediness of refugees is acknowledged if refugees are seen to lack control over their migration). However, if refugees are perceived to have control over their migration, or are seen as being able to influence their choice of destination country, the legitimacy of seeking asylum in the country of destination is perceived to malign their moral character; consequently, perceptions of welfare deservingness decrease, too. Last, the diagram also presents the counter-balancing role of in-group capacities as justification for reducing the welfare deservingness of refugees.

Diagram 2 - Construction of the welfare deservingness of refugees



Notes: the diagram illustrates the importance of specific DC, the relations between the DC and their effect on increasing or decreasing perceptions of welfare deservingness.

The analysis has shown how perceptions of the welfare deservingness of refugees change in light of new information and considerations. This section examined shifts related to the perceptions of neediness (non-neediness). The following section moves to an analysis of the second stage, arguing that as the time refugees spend in the country of destination passes, considerations affecting refugees' deservingness are also reformulated.

6.1.2 Stage 2 – Increasing demands for activity

While Stage 1 reflected the discussions at the time of asylum-seekers' arrival in the country of destination, Stage 2 focused more on refugees' lives in the country of destination. The related discussions raised predominantly practical instead of moral considerations concerning asylum-seekers' welfare deservingness. As there were clear differences between the countries in terms of the comprehensiveness of discussions about refugees, the analysis of considerations related to Stage 2 primarily relies on the Norwegian discussions. The integration of refugees was one of the key topics in Norway, with a clear preference for seeing refugees as resources for the country; this also contributed to the more detailed discussion about the lives of refugees in the country. In the British discussions, a more restrictive approach emerged that focused on controlling refugees who enter the country, and a tendency to see refugees as a burden. Therefore, discussions concerned more how to stop refugees coming, or the need to return them to the country of origin, instead of focusing on their lives and integration in the UK.

In both countries the risk of refugees becoming dependent on welfare was duly considered. As highlighted, the willingness to provide support for refugees was seen as temporary. This means that their stay in the country of destination may be terminated if the reasons for migration ceased. However, as no one can predict when a conflict may end in the country of origin, agreement about the need to provide temporary help can be also understood within the country of destination. The Norwegian discussions showed a willingness to provide help in the initial phase with housing, finding employment, and language courses. However, participants also articulated the requirement of certain returns in the long term, in line with the "rights-and-duties" principle, which constitutes one of the main pillars of Norwegian welfare society and one of the key criteria for being seen as a "good citizen".⁶⁴ Stressing such returns is how the principle of *Reciprocity* and *Attitude* becomes more important at the second stage in terms of assessing refugees' welfare deservingness. The principle of *Control* shifts from perceptions of refugees' control over migration to control over their situation and livelihood in the country of destination. However, the weight of the principle of *Control* is much less than in the first stage, as indicated in Diagram 2. Perceptions of immigrants having control over their situation feed into expectations of *Reciprocity* and *Attitude*. Both in the British and the Norwegian discussions there was a clear consensus on the need to obtain employment.

⁶⁴ For further details on visions of 'good citizens' see Section 5.2

In the Norwegian discussions we can observe a more comprehensive approach to refugees that acknowledges certain institutional barriers they might face and the extra help they might need to be able to utilize their skills. These barriers are associated with the lengthy process of recognizing refugee status, and with the shortcomings of the system of allocating refugees throughout the country – especially in municipalities with limited job opportunities. Two out of the three groups in Norway recommended issuing temporary work permits already during the process of recognizing refugee status, and employing refugees as soon as possible:

11: *“Today it takes years to find out, for asylum seekers to find out if they can stay here, they aren’t given the opportunity to get a job CONTROL.” (NO)*

19: *“We have to improve our asylum policy. People are stuck waiting in the system for 25 years without getting a residence permit or work permit CONTROL, and that costs us money RECIPROcity. They don’t work, they are stuck CONTROL, ATTITUDE, RECIPROcity. They have nothing to do ATTITUDE. We have to improve the policy there NEED. I don’t know.” (NO)*

Furthermore, issues with the recognition of qualifications are raised, stressing the need to map immigrants’ skills and understand how these can be used in the labour market. These issues were seen as barring refugees from having *Control over their situation* and increasing their welfare demands.

31: *“I agree on using the resources when they get here NEED, RECIPROcity. Find out which competence they have, how to use it the best way and put them to work NEED, RECIPROcity.” (NO)*

The recognition of refugees’ limited responsibility for such difficulties also increased their welfare deservingness. In the British discussions, the responsibility was fully shifted onto individuals, with limited or no interest in the needs or difficulties of refugees in the labour market or in society in general. This marks an important institutional difference between the Norwegian and British welfare system which (respectively) stress collective/individual responsibility, as described in [Chapter 4](#) and analysed in [Chapter 5](#).

In Norway, another aspect of the neediness of refugees was identified. Norwegian participants were in favour of providing psychological care for traumatized refugees as a preventive measure. Interestingly, participants associated potentially violent acts with the external circumstances of refugees and difficulty adapting to a completely new, peaceful environment in Norway, as articulated by Participant 15:

15: *“If you are brought up on violence and war and know nothing else, then it can be easier to turn to violence yourself even though you are living in peaceful surroundings ATTITUDE. Quite simply treatment of trauma and experienced violence NEED is important. Especially when we see that the immigrants are*

people who fled for their lives, fled from war and violence. ... Yes. People who have experienced war have a hard time finding their place in the Norwegian society ATTITUDE, IDENTITY. *A greater feeling of being homeless which could lead to radicalizing.”* (NO)

In this particular case, the principle of *Control* is raised in relation to the situation in the country of origin, where refugees' lack of control over migration is used as a justification for the welfare deservingness of refugees. Here the neediness of refugees was also seen as a result of violent circumstances in the country of origin, outside of their control. This was perceived as increasing refugees' deservingness in connection with the receipt of special services. In the British discussions, the radicalization of refugees was raised as well, but early employment was proposed as a preventative solution.

In terms of the principle of *Attitude*, in Norway there were clear demands for learning the language, and learning about the Norwegian state and society. Thus, the expectations very much resemble the expectations associated with economic migrants. However, the key difference is that in relation to refugees it is seen as the responsibility of the state to facilitate refugees' integration and ensure their access to support services. The understanding of the responsibility of the state is underlined by the perceptions of cultural differences between nationals and refugees. Therefore, the *Identity* principle enters the debate about deservingness. An awareness of cultural differences functions in the debates as reason for integration, with the argument that there is a greater need for the integration of refugees. The agenda behind integration is to reduce the effects of cultural differences on Norway, and make refugees respect and adapt to the country through their involvement:

9: *“I think that language and culture should be included in the same, not necessarily be two separate things. I experience that many see it as forced Norwegian courses is because we don't respect the culture they come from, but it is important to focus on the fact that to partake in society, they have to learn something about how things are here even if they speak English* ATTITUDE, IDENTITY. *It is about focusing on making them see the importance of that. Not everyone sees the upside by taking these classes* ATTITUDE, IDENTITY.” (NO)

Support for integration also emerges in the debates as regards preventing deepening of the gap between immigrants and the majority. A belief in social inclusion and a commitment to reducing inequalities are profoundly embedded in the vision of 'good citizens' in Norway, and actually developing this kind of commitment to these social aims is expected from refugees through the process of integration. As participation in the labour market and society is seen as essential for integration, perceptions of non-compliance with these expectations have detrimental effects on the welfare deservingness of refugees.

In the British discussion, the issue of refugees is approached rather along the line of how to better control it and how to limit the responsibilities of the state in terms of accepting and accommodating refugees. Participants said that refugees should be employed to prove they were not coming to the country because of welfare benefits. Moreover, fulfilment of the expectations of working and contributing was understood to be the responsibility of the individual, which is a major difference between the approach and understanding of the UK and Norway as regards the share of responsibilities of the state and refugees. While there were no specific proposals concerning how to limit refugees' access to welfare in the British discussions, there was a clear preference for stopping offering any incentives that would attract more refugees to the country.

In relation to the first stage, the analysis found that in-group capacity shaped and set limits on the perceptions of the welfare deservingness of refugees. In contrast, at the second stage it was *In-group needs* that influenced expectations towards refugees. Compliance with these expectations has a positive impact on the perceptions of refugees' welfare deservingness, as also presented in Diagram 2.

6.1.3 Changing perceptions of the welfare deservingness of refugees

While in the DFs we can identify only the aforementioned two dimensions of time, we can assume that the third dimension would be the stage of acquiring citizenship in the country and becoming a formally equal citizen. However, the conditions of acquiring citizenship were only superficially discussed. Therefore, the analysis is restricted to the former two dimensions of time. **Distinguishing the two stages allows us to study the ambivalent attitudes towards refugees.** On the one hand, **at the time of arrival (Stage 1) participants tended to share solidarity with refugees.** It was acknowledged that they have no control over their living conditions and have no other choice but to leave their country and seek protection elsewhere. On the other hand, **participants also shared concerns about the exploitation of asylum policy.** Fears of refugees **becoming dependent on welfare benefits,** or the cost of their accommodation, were used to justify a preference for offering only temporary help and supporting the return of refugees once safety was restored in the countries of origin.

The discussion about refugees also changed when participants discussed what should be demanded of refugees, and how to facilitate their integration into working life, and into

society. **In this second dimension, we can identify a shift towards more practical considerations and expectations linked to *Reciprocity* and *Attitude*.** Although these expectations resemble the expectations of economic immigrants, **a key difference remains: stressing the responsibility of the state to support refugees' integration.** This notion of differentiated treatment was explicitly shared in Norway, while in the British discussion it was present more implicitly and subtly in that no restrictions were specifically proposed for refugees. This differentiated treatment may be associated with the acknowledgement of the legal status of refugees in the country, but also with moral considerations and assumptions in relation to refugees. While a practical approach prevails in discussions about refugees' long-term stay in the country of destination, we can identify interactions between the moral and practical approach to the issue of refugees.


The analysis of discussions shows how the specific ranking and hierarchy of DC is shaped according to these two dimensions of time. Additionally, **along the moral and practical framing of arguments and justifications we can also identify a social hierarchy of refugees,** as presented in Diagram 3. As shown in the analysis, recognition of neediness linked to perceptions of *Control* is at the heart of the morally framed assessments and justifications that emerge at Stage 1. In this respect, we can observe a shift during the discussions along a spectrum of perceptions from needy to non-needy refugees, the latter who are seen as people who exploit the welfare system. Such shifts also indicate considerations of the limits of neediness (horizontal axis). Along the practical framing of considerations participants distinguish refugees based on their usefulness for the country, stressing the needs of the country and in-group (vertical axis). Accordingly, we can distinguish four groups of refugees:

1. Needy and needed, useful for the country of destination
2. Needy but not needed, not useful for the country of destination
3. Useful but not needy, exploiting the welfare system
4. Not useful, and exploiting the welfare system

At the first stage, moral justifications – perceptions of neediness – tend to override perceptions of usefulness. However, as the discussions develop, we find evidence of how perceptions of neediness and moral justifications change with the time immigrants spend in the country. A desire for the restoration of safety in the immigrants' country of origin is the most clear-cut example of how the moral justification for solidarity diminishes and refugees' welfare deservingness declines, unless they are seen as useful to the country of destination.

Thus, the accent shifts more to practical reasoning (Stage 2). In terms of perceptions of usefulness, we see different patterns in the two countries. Changing perceptions of usefulness are subject to the compliance of refugees with perceived *In-group needs* and expectations about *Reciprocity* and *Attitude*. While in Norway both the state and the majority society take responsibility for enhancing the usefulness of refugees, in the UK this kind of achievement is considered to be solely up to refugees themselves.

Diagram 3 - Hierarchy of refugees, distinguishing four groups of refugees based on moral and practical assessments of welfare deservingness



Note: the colour of the circles that represent the specific group of refugees represents the dominance of moral (purple) or practical (blue) framing of arguments in relation to welfare deservingness.

In relation to both neediness and usefulness, perceptions change only in one direction. Shifts from needy to not needy unfold once moral justifications weaken and the initial reasons for neediness at the time of arrival cease to exist, or perceptions of refugees having *Control* over their situation in the country of destination replace perceptions of their *Control* over migration. The shift from non-useful to useful happens if refugees become economically active, their qualifications are recognized, or they receive the necessary training to allow

them to utilize their skills. To a certain extent, usefulness can also be understood as a measure of refugees' adaptation to the country of destination in terms of the acquisition of new skills in the country of destination.

Focusing on the group of refugees, **the analysis found that, with time, the framing of arguments for the welfare deservingness of refugees shifts from moral to more practical understandings.** Accordingly, **the ranking and importance of specific DC is realigned, shifting attention from *Control and Need to Reciprocity and Attitude*.** This shift to a more practical approach involves a certain similarity with the discussions on economic migrants, which stress a merely practical approach – avoiding moral considerations. The following sections elaborate on what stances shaped the discussions on economic migrants, and what factors affected perceptions of their welfare deservingness.

6.2 ECONOMIC MIGRANTS

The term 'economic migrant' usually refers to the legal category of immigrants who enter a foreign country with the primary purpose of working. However, the purpose of performing economic activity itself does not create a clear division between specific categories of immigrants, as the latter goal might be shared as much among refugees and family migrants as among economic migrants.⁶⁵ Therefore, first, it is important to clarify how economic migrants⁶⁶ were conceptualised in the DF discussions.

In the discussions – in both countries – economic migrants are simply called 'immigrants', and the adjectives 'economic' or 'labour' are rarely applied. Still, immigrants' economic motivations are clearly articulated by the DF participants. The perceived economic motivation for migration forms the key distinction between refugees and economic migrants. **In the case of economic migrants, the free choice of immigration was taken for granted.** This was seen as justified especially in relation to EU migrants due to freedom-of-movement regulations. The possibility that migration might not involve a free and informed decision but a chance to break out of economic deprivation in the country of origin was not considered in any of the breakout group discussions. Therefore, economic migrants were

⁶⁵ International students stand out as their labour market activities might be limited due to their student status. However, this group was not at the centre of discussions in either country.

⁶⁶ Throughout the thesis the term "economic migrants" is used to make a clear distinction between specific groups of immigrants.

perceived to be in control of their migration and their choice of destination. This perception substantially shaped the discussions. Furthermore, it provided the ground for more confined considerations about economic migrants' welfare deservingness, focusing on contributions and performance as the basis of practical, instead of morally driven assessments.

As described in Chapter 5, due to perceptions of (in-group) needs for a foreign labour force, economic migration was at the centre of discussions in the Norwegian and the British DFs. However, the debate was more intense in the UK considering the salience of issues concerning EU migration in the 2015 parliamentary elections (that took place five months before the DF), and the prospects of the Brexit referendum. In line with the trends in public discourse, the British discussions reveal a restrictive approach focused on a regulated and selective immigration system:

90: "I think the biggest issue is actually with the EU nationals because there is no limits, no control or nothing. They can just come and do whatever they want to ATTITUDE so maybe just put more focus on the actual EU nationals, check who is working, who's not working, how long have they been unemployed, whether they are actually coming here for work or whatever they're coming ATTITUDE" (UK)

45 "I would suggest that we go along the same lines as Canada and Australia and be very, very selective as to who comes into the country and because of that we've got to come out of the EU." (UK)

In both countries expectations of *Reciprocity* and *Attitude* prevailed. Primarily, these two principles influenced deservingness assessments, completely overshadowing perceptions of economic migrants' *Needs*. Principles of *Control* and *Identity* tended to feed into and strengthen expectations related to employment. The following sections aim to detail how DF participants constructed the deservingness of economic migrants, and how *Reciprocity* and *Attitude* become the most relevant principles in terms of shaping perceptions of economic migrants' deservingness.

6.2.1 Perceptions of economic migrants' control over their migration

The perception that economic migration is based on an informed and free choice considerably influenced participants' views about economic migrants' welfare deservingness. This implied that migrants were seen as fully in *Control* of their migration. Accordingly, a similarly high level of responsibility and independence was expected from them during their stay in the country of destination. In the British discussions, such expectations unfolded in the form of preferences for obtaining jobs in advance of actual

migration, but also for securing the finances required to survive the period immediately after arriving in the country of destination.

According to participants, economic migrants' perceptions that the country of destination is a rich country and offers welfare benefits and services constituted relevant factors that are considered in advance, as also implied by Participant 80 and Participant 23:

80: "My issue is if those benefits weren't there, you haven't got benefits in Australia you haven't got many there, if those benefits wasn't there how many people would actually flood to the country." ATTITUDE, CONTROL. (UK)


23: "Fair enough that the labour immigrants come here to work, but don't come with an agenda. Work for two years, and then maybe you go on maternal leave, then you can actually go for two years on unemployment benefit and then again report sick." ATTITUDE. (NO)

Such stances were also underlined by reflecting on the gap in the living standards between countries of origin and destination. Furthermore, the differences in the value of social benefits, and individual interests were also mentioned as push factors for migrating to these countries, as Participant 69 stresses:

69: "there shouldn't be any incentive in that sense to come into this county because you'll have people who come over from countries that are significantly, you know, worse off than we are because we're a developed society, because it's a lot of money and they send that money back." (UK)

Based on these considerations, economic migrants' control over migration was taken for granted, thereby affecting perceptions of a low level of deservingness. Accordingly, *Control over migration* as a DC has a special place in Diagram 4, which visualises how the welfare deservingness of economic migrants is constructed. Perceptions of economic migrants' *Control over migration* also served as justification for decreasing the state's responsibility for supporting them in both countries. Thus, it shifted the focus to the economic migrant's individual responsibility, their achievements, and performance in the country as a way of increasing their welfare deservingness.

Diagram 4 - Construction of the welfare deservingness of economic migrants



Notes: the diagram illustrates the importance of specific DC, the relations between the DC and their effect on increasing or decreasing perceptions of welfare deservingness.

6.2.2 Perceptions of economic migrants' misuse of the welfare system

Perceptions of economic migrants' misuse of the welfare system considerably affected willingness to share welfare with them. Furthermore, it strengthened the preference for demanding that they earn their entitlement to welfare benefits. In both countries, perceptions of the intentional use of welfare benefits and services were seen as highly problematic. The perceived intentionality was clearly associated with economic migrants' control over their lives and the choice of using and enjoying the benefits offered by the welfare state:

23: "I'm not saying that everyone, but many labour immigrants come in here and work, but some come here and work for two years, report sick or do something else, and then they have free-of-charge benefit from NAV [Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration] for another two years. ATTITUDE, CONTROL" (NO)

"88 Well some people just come for the Health Service, they come over here for twelve months because they know there's a problem and they'll get seen to straight away ATTITUDE, CONTROL where in the US you know or whatever you have to pay" (UK)

In the British discussions, immigrants' access to welfare benefits and services was almost taken for granted, but after the proposed two years of contribution participants also claimed they would prefer if economic migrants were followed-up and deported if they had been economically inactive in the long term:

64: *“The security system doesn’t necessarily have to be a separate system. If they are not violent or they contribute to the country, and they are unemployed, they are going to be, well they should be actively searching for work^{ATTITUDE}. If they, then that could tied in with their, like....Job Seekers and, you know, if you’ve been out of work for a year and a half and you not contributing then are there grounds to send them back and say^{ATTITUDE, RECIPROCITY}, look it hasn't worked.” (UK)*

This stance – shared by other participants as well – stipulates the relevance of the economic benefits migrants bring to the country and the unacceptability of long-term unemployment, which in the eyes of participants meant taking from the welfare state instead of contributing to it. In Norway, the focus was primarily on the exploitation of cash benefits. In relation to EU migrants, participants were concerned about remitting cash benefits abroad. It was considered unfair to enjoy the generosity of welfare benefits in the countries of origin, where living standards are much lower compared to Norway. Furthermore, especially in relation to family policies and parental leave schemes, cash benefits were viewed as a disincentive to work and integrate:

11: *“Important to make demands for Norwegian participation in working life^{ATTITUDE}. Remove benefits that allow people to stay at home^{ATTITUDE}, for example cash benefit. Reversed intuitive for integration....” (NO)*

In this understanding, cash benefits were seen not only as hindering economic migrants from contributing to the welfare state, but also as drivers of separation, creating parallel societies and increasing social inequalities by discouraging social participation. While in relation to in-group members Norwegian participants were not suspicious about the exploitation of cash benefits, they stated that they would prefer to offer more services to migrants instead of cash benefits. This preference also shows that in the Norwegian discussions the desire was not necessarily to limit migrants’ access to these benefits and services, but rather to limit the perceived exploitation of them, and to reduce barriers to integration.

In addition to concerns about cash benefits, the British participants articulated issues related to social services. In this respect, the topic of the National Health Service (NHS) triggered disputes, and participants recommended restricting free access to NHS for non-Western migrants. The recommendations were seen as necessary for saving money to better cope with capacity issues and to invest more into more relevant sectors:

40: *“The NHS is one area that we are saying that we spend a lot of money on, so I mean in this case with non EU nationals, you know, it's fair enough that they don't have access to the NHS. If that's something that we are having an issue of doing cuts and jobs and all sorts are in place and education is something that we really want to, you know, develop and examine^{NEED}, but it's a bit unfair for non EU nationals to come in and, sort of, take advantage of that.^{ATTITUDE}”*

Further capacity issues were identified in relation to education and housing, leading to arguments about overcrowding⁶⁷ in the UK. As these capacity issues were associated with immigration, perceptions of a lack of capacity were used as arguments for restricting economic migrants' access to services. Despite the fact that British participants tended to acknowledge the contributions and hard work of economic migrants within the NHS specifically, this did not change their preferences for limiting economic migrants' access to services. This discrepancy also reflects on the uneven approach and differing weights associated with the perceptions of contributions of economic migrants, and perceptions about the exploitation of the welfare system.

Debates about the misuse of the welfare system and the perceived imbalances between migrants' contributions and take-up of benefits justified the more stringent expectations about the need for greater individual responsibility for earning access to welfare through employment and contributions. While, in relation to refugees, willingness to share solidarity with them was initially stronger during the first stage (at the time of their arrival), for economic migrants it was especially during the initial phase when their deservingness was questioned. For the latter it takes longer to prove their abilities, their contributions, to earn entitlement to social benefits, and it is only through such achievements that are they seen as more deserving. Thus, in the initial period participants argued for a higher level of self-sufficiency. However, economic migrants' self-sufficiency was not stressed only as an expectation in relation to enhancing *Reciprocity*, but also as part of compliant behaviour in both countries. In this regard, we encounter substantial differences between the British and Norwegian expectations related to *Attitude*, which also had some implications in connection with perceptions of economic migrants' welfare deservingness.

6.2.3 Requirements for self-sufficiency and the role of the *Control* principle

In the British discussions, self-sufficiency was understood mostly in economic terms as financial independence from the state and its support, which meant that obtaining employment and working hard were the key expectations economic migrants needed to fulfil to be perceived as more deserving and earn access to benefits. Furthermore, expectations of being in control of their own (social) situation in the country of destination – the second

⁶⁷ The expression 'overcrowding' was used by participants in reference to population growth and consequently increasing demands for social and healthcare services.

aspect of the *Control* principle – also tended to feed into requirements related to the *Attitude* principle. As highlighted in Chapter 5, this perception of *Control* reflected on DF participants' preferences that economic migrants should take responsibility for their own choices and for their life in the country of destination. As visualized in Diagram 4, discussions reveal that perceptions of economic migrants being in control of their own lives, affects and increases perceptions of their welfare deservingness through the recognition of a compliant *Attitude*. Recalling the description of 'good citizens' from the previous chapter, we can identify the reproduction of these patterns in relation to economic migrants.

In comparison to the British discussions, where the economic framing of self-sufficiency prevailed, in the Norwegian discussions the centrality of employment and the requirement that migrants have their own income were complemented with certain cultural expectations. As part of self-sufficiency, economic migrants were supposed to be able to communicate and to participate in society. In contrast to the case with refugees, economic migrants' eligibility for free Norwegian language courses was disputed. Most participants expected economic migrants to integrate on their own without the state's support. In this regard, the role of employment and the workplace was strengthened as an environment for supporting integration and learning and practising the Norwegian language, coming into contact with Norwegians, and participating more broadly in society.

While Norwegian participants expected economic migrants to adapt to the Norwegian way of life, responsibility was not fully shifted onto the individuals, as was the case in the British discussions. Discrimination in the labour market – particularly in the hiring process – emerged in the discussion as a key barrier to economic migrants' labour market activities, being outside their responsibility as stressed by Participant 23:

23: *"One thinks immigration and that the problem is the immigrants. But we also have to think about how we receive them* RECIPROCITY. *Give them the opportunity to work. There is racism in Norway, but luckily not so much compared to other countries. If an immigrant wants to apply for a job, he actually has to be given the opportunity to work too, if not we will only face even more prejudice, that foreigners don't work* ATTITUDE. *It isn't easy to start working if you can't get a job.* CONTROL *Many people try. One thing is the challenges when the immigrants come here, another is the challenge of what people think of them too.* RECIPROCITY *One has to be alert about that too."* (NO)

The Norwegian participants critically reflected on racism and negative attitudes to immigrants in the majority society and among employers. In this regard, the stories of immigrants' changing their names to Norwegian ones were seen as especially convincing

with regard to the claim that the majority society also needs to change and become more open to diversity, securing equal opportunities for all:

14: "We are in need of a change in attitude in Norway, because we are a bunch of bloody racists, sorry for saying, but it doesn't matter whether you are from the east or west of Europe, if you are African or American; we are racists regardless, and we have to stop it. We need an attitude changing campaign amongst employers to get people understand that it isn't always that Norwegian guy with a bachelor's degree that is the best person for the job IDENTITY, CONTROL. Because the kitchen is full of people with a doctor's degree doing dishes, and that is awfully sad. Resources we actually need in the working life IDENTITY, NEED." (NO)

Through such considerations, participants acknowledged that immigrants' *Control* over their situation is limited by external factors such as negative majority attitudes and discrimination. Thus, the Norwegian discussions reveal a distinctive approach to the *Control* principle which affects perceptions of economic migrants' welfare deservingness positively: namely, responsibility for non-employment or under-employment is not blamed on immigrants.

6.2.4 Perceptions of intergroup differences and the impact of the principle of *Identity*

Both the inclusion of cultural expectations and awareness of the limits of individual responsibility in the Norwegian discussions suggest the importance of taking into account the potential effects of intergroup relations and interactions on the perceptions of the welfare deservingness of economic migrants. In this respect, the *Identity* principle is an important means of fostering social inclusion or strengthening group boundaries. In Welfare Deservingness Theory, we tend to assume the centrality of national identity. However, acknowledging the multiplicity of identities we expect that the principle of *Identity* can emerge in various ways in the discussions, which should be examined.

Strong collective identity can be identified in the Norwegian DF discussions, with ethnic and civic elements. The emphasis on language, Norwegian culture, social values and principles, as well as the Norwegian lifestyle represent what makes Norwegians different from others (in-group identity). However, instead of exclusion and strengthening group boundaries, participants raised the requirements of better understanding Norwegian society and the functioning of the state as a means of integration. This suggests that the former is seen as something acquirable through learning and social participation. These expectations are both related to principle of *Identity* and *Attitude*. Considerations of cultural differences affect perceptions of welfare deservingness through compliance with these requirements. The

general understanding was that, through the process of learning about and experiencing how Norwegian society functions, economic migrants would also better understand their role and duties in the country of destination, and would be more motivated to comply with their collective responsibilities towards society. As described in Chapter 5, such collective responsibilities primarily touched upon respect for the “rights-and-duties” principle and promoting a fair balance between contributing and accessing welfare benefits. Participating fully in such a system of collective responsibility was understood as being a way to reduce potential misuse of the welfare system, which tended to be linked to cultural differences between migrants and the majority society. Cultural differences were primarily stressed in relation to non-Western migrants and especially to immigrant women and families. Therefore, the discussion of cultural differences often blurred the boundaries between economic and family migration and shifted the debate towards immigrant families and their life in the country of destination.

In contrast to the Norwegian discussions, British participants did not raise cultural considerations in relation to immigration in general, nor to economic migrants specifically. Moreover, the discussions show that collective identification is not fixed on citizenship or ethnic identity. The division between working people and unemployed people living off benefits seemed to be much more relevant in the eyes of British participants. The centrality of this differentiation provides evidence for the effects of the salient public discourse on welfare dependency and the “undeserving unemployed” in the UK (Larsen 2006, 2013; Jensen and Tyler; 2015).⁶⁸ This approach also points at the greater relevance awarded to individual character and individual performance instead of a more collective understanding. However, even working migrants were seen as sources or reasons for tension due to perceptions of competition for the same opportunities and concerns about the social mobility of in-group members. These fears served as justification for prioritising the in-group, as shared by Participant 40:

40: *“It’s an issue because it’s probably restricting our British citizens from having access to you know, like education, to job opportunities IDENTITY. It’s simply because, you know we have Europeans and other people from around the world coming in and it’s restricting and taking all the opportunities that we could possibly have. IDENTITY ... It’s a problem because it’s like, you know, we’re trying to build up on our lifestyle and our career IDENTITY. [...]”*

And concentrate on the British citizens because they are your main priorities. [...] They should be prioritised only so that their skills are developed and that’s what we should do, the government should be looking after our people first. IDENTITY” (UK)

⁶⁸ For further details on the public discourse on welfare dependency in the UK see [Chapter 4 – Section 4.3.2.1.3](#)

At the same time, all British breakout groups critically raised the question whether competition occurs if economic migrants do the jobs that English people are not willing to take. Participants recognized the hard work of economic migrants but they also appreciated the indispensable work of migrants in the healthcare sector.

80: *"If we look back all those years immigration started purely because the people of England were too lazy to get off their bums and go and work IDENTITY we had to employ [unclear] to come into the country to do the job."*

88: *"A lot of my friends are Polish and to be fair they work really hard, they will do the hours, they will do the jobs ATTITUDE but we won't, we go we're not doing that..." (UK)*

Despite calling for greater recognition of such accomplishments, these arguments were not fully translated when discussing migrants' access to welfare benefits and services and did not affect preferences for a more restrictive approach. As mentioned earlier, this also signals that concerns about welfare dependency tend to be stronger than the recognition of hard work and the strong work ethic of some economic migrants. This also meant that it was more challenging to argue against such claims or to convince others about their misperceptions of the share of immigrants in the country, about the negative effects of the mediatization of certain welfare scandals, or the volume of benefit fraud. Such counter-arguments usually went unheard, and had a limited effect in terms of altering the discussion.⁶⁹ These counter-arguments were not supported by facts, but even when underpinned by statistics (as part of the information packages participants received before Day 2), these were often questioned during the debates.

Comparing the British and Norwegian discussions, we can identify two very different forms of use of the *Identity* principle. In line with the institutional differences examined in Chapter 5, the British DF participants stressed and encouraged individual responsibility, while the Norwegian DF participants put emphasis on compliance with the principle of collective responsibility. However, both approaches were aimed at the same goal – a high level of employment and contributions from immigrants.

⁶⁹ Chapter 7 is devoted to an analysis of the process of attitude-formation within the groups, focusing on the effects of group dynamics on the development of the discussion.

6.2.5 The role of *In-group needs* in relation to economic migrants' welfare deservingness

The previous sections reflected on the key considerations in the discussions which show the role of perceived *In-group needs* in framing and shaping perceptions of economic migrants' welfare deservingness. The analysis of expectations of economic migrants revealed in both countries that the principles of *Reciprocity* and *Attitude* dominated stressing the need for labour force and addressing skills shortages in these countries. In relation to these *In-group needs*, discussions about the welfare deservingness of economic migrants are framed in practical terms (what they can offer, how they can benefit the country of destination). The comparison in Diagram 2 of refugees' welfare deservingness and Diagram 4 of economic migrants' deservingness shows that, in contrast to the situation with refugees, economic migrants' needs do not affect perceptions of welfare deservingness. Actually, economic migrants' needs are raised only occasionally – e.g. in relation to facilitating recognition of qualifications acquired abroad, which emerged as an issue in both countries. Even in such cases, the identified needs were related to facilitating their labour market activities – i.e. to meeting *In-group needs*, and were less about economic migrants' need for support.

The vulnerability of economic migrants was not considered. This also underlines the issue that **it is primarily *In-group needs* that define who is seen as deserving**. In both countries the role of employment and contributions – as expectations related to *Reciprocity* and *Attitude* – was central to the discussions. While principles of *Control* and *Identity* also shaped perceptions of economic migrants' welfare deservingness, these considerations fed into expectations related to the principle of *Attitude*. Thus, their effect was conditional on economic migrants' conformity with and adaptation to these attitudes. In contrast to the situation with refugees, **moral considerations or perceptions of neediness were almost fully disregarded in relation to economic migrants**.

6.3 COMPARISON OF THE DEBATES ABOUT REFUGEES' AND ECONOMIC MIGRANTS' WELFARE DESERVINGNESS

Throughout the analysis, particular attention was devoted to identifying and highlighting the different considerations, different social contexts, and different applications of DC, which together shaped the collective construction of the welfare deservingness of refugees and economic migrants as two specific groups of immigrants. The following two sections are designed to reflect on these findings in a comparative manner, drawing conclusions both in

relation to differences between refugees and economic migrants, as well as in relation to the country-specific differences that unfolded in the discussions on immigration.

6.3.1 Differences between refugees and economic migrants

In relation to refugees, we can first identify a morally driven approach to welfare deservingness, in which perceptions of lack of *Control over migration* from the country of origin and perceptions of neediness prevail. However, an important finding is how fragile these perceptions of neediness are, particularly in light of participants' concerns about the abuse of asylum policies and welfare systems. Such concerns gradually shifted participants' focus from a moral to a more practical approach to refugees' welfare deservingness. This shift is also demonstrated by preferences for providing temporary support to refugees. To better understand this shift from moral to practical framing, it is important to distinguish between the initial period – the time of the arrival of refugees –, and a second, longer period, which allows refugees within the country of destination to be seen from a longer-term perspective. Accordingly, as visualised in Diagram 2, refugees' welfare deservingness in Stage 1 is underlined by moral considerations that overshadow assessments of refugees' practical contributions. It is especially these practical considerations shaped by *In-group needs* and an assessment of who is useful to the country and to society that increased in Stage 2. Participants started raising expectations linked to *Reciprocity* and *Attitude*, with refugees accordingly needing to fulfil the requirements of employment and adaptation to the majority society to be seen as deserving.

In contrast to refugees, for economic migrants it was especially with regard to the initial phase when DF participants tended to deny, or did not really consider, the welfare deservingness of economic migrants. This stance was primarily reasoned by the perception that economic migrants have full *Control over their migration* and their migration occurs due to free choice. This perception also implies taking greater individual responsibility for their lives in the country of destination. Participants require a high level of self-sufficiency, especially in the initial period, and economic migrants can gradually earn welfare deservingness through their achievements – through their employment and contributions, and their adaptation to the country of destination. However, any perceptions of misuse of the welfare system considerably counteracted recognition of economic migrants' deservingness. The practical framing of welfare deservingness and the dominant role of *Reciprocity* and *Attitude* pervaded the discussions and, as depicted in Diagram 4, principles

of *Control* and *Identity* fed into and strengthened expectations related to the expected behaviour and attitude.

6.3.2 Differences between the Norwegian and British discussions and conceptions

The analysis found considerable differences with regard to how refugees and economic migrants are treated in the Norwegian and British discussions. Throughout the chapter it has been argued that the differences between the formulation of specific expectations can be traced back to institutional factors that influence how DF participants aim to meet perceived *In-group needs*. Furthermore, the articulated expectations are also shaped by the visions of 'good citizens' and, accordingly, visions of 'good immigrants'. However, in terms of perceived *In-group needs*, British and Norwegian participants stressed employment as a key criterion. The analysis finds that employment in itself is not only construed as an economically framed expectation of *Reciprocity*, but also as social expectation related to *Attitude*. A key difference between the two countries was that in Norway cultural expectations were also raised. Cultural expectations were used to justify improving refugees' and immigrants' understanding and commitment to collective responsibilities towards the state and society. This aspect reveals a further difference in relation to how expectations about refugees and economic migrants are framed in terms of individual and/or state responsibility. Strong collective responsibility as a part of Norwegian welfare identity – and a key pillar of the vision of 'good citizens' – is reflected in the expectation that refugees and economic migrants should comply with the "rights-and-duties" principle and commit to and fulfil collective responsibilities towards society and state. Second, the impact of this strong collective responsibility is also revealed in the view that the responsibility of finding work and integrating should not be shifted completely to immigrants, but the state and majority society should take part in facilitating the process. The preferred share of responsibilities between these three actors – individual immigrants, the state, majority society – tend to vary according to specific groups of immigrants. The state's responsibility is seen as greater in relation to refugees, while in the case of economic migrants it is primarily the individual who is supposed to take action.

In contrast to the Norwegian discussions, in the UK it was predominantly individual immigrants who were expected to take responsibility and to secure their livelihood in the country of destination. In accordance with the visions of 'good citizens', it was hard-work, individual effort, and achievements that was expected from immigrants. Complying with the

ideals of liberal-leaning welfare states, participants argued for reducing the state's responsibilities towards immigrants – including refugees – and favoured more restrictive measures in relation to economic migrants' access to welfare. Therefore, in the UK we can see a more individualised approach to immigrants' welfare deservingness and, to certain extent, a lower level of solidarity with both refugees and economic migrants.

6.4 CONCLUSION

Discussions about immigration in the British and Norwegian DFs reveal the dominance of *Reciprocity* and *Attitude* as the two most important principles through which welfare deservingness of immigrants is thematised. This chapter shed more light on how the salience of these two principles changes in relation to the diversity of immigrants, as well as the variety of situations and circumstances that are considered. Focusing on the social practise of constructing the welfare deservingness of refugees and economic migrants, **the analysis found evidence that different approaches and different (moral and practical) framings of welfare deservingness emerge depending on the specific groups of immigrants. Accordingly, the role and importance of specific deservingness criteria tends to change, too. These findings point at the potential pitfall of treating immigrants as a homogeneous group when assessing the welfare deservingness of immigrants.** This also confirms the need to distinguish between specific groups of immigrants, as in this regard different considerations and different social contexts and situations are taken into account.

The second key contribution of this chapter is that the **analysis reveals and evidence the dynamism of attitude-formation – the changes in perceptions of welfare deservingness not only in relation to the specific groups of immigrants, but also how these perceptions shift in relation to different time dimensions.** Despite the substantial differences in the way refugees and economic migrants are treated in the two countries under study, the DF discussions reveal the relevance of the time dimension: namely, how the welfare deservingness of refugees and economic migrants is viewed from a short- and long-term perspective. Moreover, the chapter also describes how perceptions of in-group needs, as well as visions of 'good citizens', provide the lenses through which the welfare deservingness of refugees and economic migrants is assessed.

Besides revealing the differences in the approach to welfare deservingness of these two groups of immigrants, this chapter also shed light on the dynamism of attitude-formation,

and on how perceptions of welfare deservingness change in the light of new information and new considerations. The next chapter is devoted to examining these changes, but from the perspective of the process of the discussions.

7 WHY DO INTERACTIONS MATTER IN ATTITUDE RESEARCH?

The previous chapter examined the social practise of how people delineate the welfare deservingness of immigrants and found considerable differences in how the deservingness of refugees and economic migrants is assessed. Moreover, the analysis revealed that perceptions of refugees' and economic migrants' welfare deservingness tend to change in light of new information, and how emerging ambivalence shapes the discussion about immigration. Identifying such shifts in attitudes raises the question how such dynamism in attitude-formation unfolds in the discussions. How do interactions between participants shape attitudes? Furthermore, the British DF ended with a vote in favour of restrictive measures towards immigrants, while the Norwegian sessions ended in inclusive policy proposals. This difference encourages us to scrutinize the process of attitude-formation to better understand what mechanisms explain such differences in respect of the direction and outcome of the discussions. Therefore, this chapter intends **to analyse the process of attitude-formation within groups, with particular attention to the processes of interaction between participants**. More precisely, this chapter examines: how participants raise new perspectives and shift the focus of discussions; how they raise questions and respond to them; how they respond to and engage with other participants' claims; and **how such interactions – that together form a reasoned debate, a deliberation – led to agreement about policy proposals on the second day of the DFs**.

Although deliberation aims to involve informed and informative, balanced and comprehensive discussion (Fishkin and Luskin, 2005), research shows that **the outcome of and impact of discussions on attitudes can vary depending on the nature of the deliberations**. As highlighted in Chapter 3, the composition of groups, participants' predispositions, together with the homogeneity and heterogeneity of arguments shared within groups can affect the direction and outcome of discussions (Grönlund et al., 2015; Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 2007; Luskin et al., 2007; Smets and Isernia, 2014; Sunstein, 2002). Following up on these claims, this chapter aims to complement the findings of the previous chapters by focusing on the processes of deliberation within the small groups in order to **reveal the details of how the break-out groups reached agreement about restrictive or inclusive policy proposals in the British and Norwegian DF discussions, respectively (addressing RQ4)**. Second, it elaborates on the impact of interactions on attitude-formation within the groups (related to RQ3).

While the previous chapters examined how the institutional and social context shape the discussions thematically – i.e. what issues and expectations participants perceive as important –, this chapter argues that **the institutional and social context also influence the development and the outcomes of discussions** – i.e. how the group agrees on policy proposals. The chapter draws on the findings of Sunstein (2002, 2009) and Kitzinger (1994), who stress the **relevance of distinguishing between 1) deliberation within a like-minded group that builds on and reinforces similar opinions and preferences; and 2) deliberation in a group of people that share and negotiate conflicting views**. As within the DF discussions differences emerged between the British and Norwegian groups specifically, the central argument of this chapter is that the institutional and social context had a substantial impact on the nature of the deliberations. Consequently, the impact of the interactions also varied in terms of attitude-formation in the British discussions, where there was a prevailing preference for restrictive approaches, and in the Norwegian discussions, where participants reconciled competing preferences for inclusion and exclusion. The analysis finds that the most widely used **forms of interaction – such as sharing new perspectives, contestations, or repeating arguments – often serve different functions and have different meanings in deliberation aimed at reinforcing a predefined consensus than in deliberation involving conflicting views**. To analyse these differences in the development of discussions and differences in the process of attitude-formation, this chapter presents two case studies – one British and one Norwegian discussion about immigration. The comparative analysis aims to contribute both to the field of welfare-attitude research, and to research on deliberative methods, by showing the importance of analysing the process of deliberation and examining the implications of such differences for the process of attitude-formation within groups.

7.1 THE RELEVANCE OF DELIBERATION

Deliberative methods are designed to generate shifts in attitude as a result of deliberation. This chapter does not focus on examining concrete changes in individual participants' attitudes, but is rather interested in investigating the process of attitude-formation within groups as a whole, and elucidating how attitudes to immigrants' inclusion are shaped through social interaction. Chapter 3 already raised that DFs are based on the assumption that social interaction is crucial both to encouraging individuals to articulate and justify their opinions and attitudes, and to fostering access to new information through learning about others' attitudes and arguments about topics under discussion (Chappell, 2012). Following

Karpowitz and Mendelberg (2007), this chapter is committed to examining attitude-formation through the process of interaction, duly taking into account group-level processes and social dynamics within groups which can shape the direction and the outcome of such deliberation.

The formulation of policy proposals on the second day of the DFs can be understood as the articulation of the group's (deliberated) attitude to immigration and preferences for immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state.⁷⁰ Within the analysis, agreement about policy proposals is treated as the outcome of deliberation. Therefore, the analysis of the process of attitude-formation within the group relies on an examination of the process of interaction through which participants reach agreement about policy proposals. The scope of the analysis is restricted to attitude-formation in relation to inclusive and/or exclusive preferences. During the analysis, we focus on key moments and shifts in the discussions that affected and contributed to the agreement about policy proposals. Along with the examination of such shifts, the analysis aims to reflect on the role of social dynamics in shaping the discussion and attitudes within the group.

7.1.1 Why are social dynamics important for understanding the process of attitude-formation?

The critical role of social dynamics and the relevance of homogeneity or heterogeneity of views in group discussion has been already elaborated in Chapter 3 focusing on the methodology of this research. Social psychology literature shows that people's engagement and interactions in group discussions can be considerably affected by group influence (Forsyth, 2010). Both informational (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Festinger, 1954) and normative influences (Forsyth, 2010; Isenberg, 1986; Noelle-Neumann, 1993) can foster and reinforce the dominance of majority opinions, which strongly act against articulation of and considerations of minority, competing views. Thus, reducing also the scope for potential attitude-formation. These risks are advanced by Sunstein (2002, 2009) drawing attention to group polarization as a negative effect of group dynamics on attitude-formation.

Sunstein (2002, 2009) argues that **like-mindedness and the overwhelming dominance of a majority opinion lead to group polarization**, which means that the opinions of participants become more extreme than their predispositions. According to Sunstein (2002), group

⁷⁰ Table 1 – Appendix 1 presents the list of policy recommendations formulated in the British and Norwegian DFs.

polarization is likely to emerge in the absence of conflicting views when participants raise and consider only a limited pool of arguments and their ability to recognize and to deal with information biases is limited. He argues that, in contrast, individuals in mixed groups in which heterogeneous opinions are articulated have greater scope for re-consideration of their own stances and potential shifts in attitudes. Thus, Sunstein's (2002, 2009) findings stress that the composition of groups in terms of the homogeneity and heterogeneity of opinions has a crucial impact on the process and outcome of deliberation, and also on attitude-formation.

The risk of group polarization is particularly important to consider in the autumn of 2015 following the peak of the Refugee crisis, and amidst the contested public discourse on immigration and the overpoliticisation of the issue it induced throughout Europe. In this heightened social context, it is even more important to analyse how deliberations developed, to identify the emergence of majority opinions and disentangle how participants react to and critically engage with such dominant views. Chapter 4 elaborated on the key tendencies in public discourse on immigration and immigrants' access to welfare provision and revealed the existence of public misperceptions. Therefore, it is of particular importance to analyse whether participants were able to reflect on information biases and distorted portrayals of immigrants during the DF discussion, and, if so, under which conditions this happened.

As highlighted by Sunstein (2002) and by deliberative researchers (Dryzek, 2005; Fishkin, 2011; Luskin et al., 2007; Mansbridge, 2010) **heterogeneity of views is key to minimise the potential negative effects of group dynamics**. Therefore, deliberative methods, including DF, adopted specific arrangements to promote diverse and informed discussions. So far, studies confirmed that representative sampling, the inclusion of diverse groups of people, professional moderation, the provision of balanced information and the availability of experts during discussions can effectively reduce risks of group polarization (Farrar et al., 2009; Grönlund et al., 2015; Himmelroos and Christensen, 2014; Luskin et al., 2007). However, Smets and Insernia (2014) found that impact of participants' predispositions on attitude-formation tends to vary depending on the specific issue. The authors found that participants' predispositions tend to be much stronger concerning controversial issues such as immigration. **Drawing on these findings and considering the contested nature of the issue of immigration at the time of conducting the DFs, this chapter analyses the process of deliberation focusing on the effects of homogeneity and heterogeneity of views in the DF discussion about immigration.**


Focusing on interactions in group discussions, Kitzinger (1994) distinguishes between complementary and argumentative interaction. The author argues that **complementary interaction builds on similarity and shared identity, along with shared preferences within groups**. Although individuals raise various views and opinions, these function primarily to complement, specify, and underline shared preferences. In contrast, **argumentative interaction is based on emerging differences and the competing views of participants**. Thus, interactions serve the purpose of convincing other participants, and reconciling participants' conflicting views. As argued by Kitzinger (1994), the analysis of both types of interaction enriches our understanding of attitude-formation. However, these two types of interaction induce different forms of discussion, which affects the process of attitude-formation, too. Adhering to Kitzinger (1994), this chapter argues that both types of discussions are relevant for welfare attitude research, but it is important to stress these differences and to analyse what circumstances contribute to these differences in the direction and outcome of discussions.

7.1.2 Interactions within DF discussions

Analysis of the process of attitude-formation was carried out through the examination of interactions within DF discussions – distinguishing between 'agreement' and 'disagreement', 'New perspective', 'Contestation', and 'Repetition of previously raised new perspective' as the specific forms of interaction.⁷¹ The initial expectation was that attitude-formation would be significantly influenced by the use of specific forms of interaction – e.g. frequent use of contestations or disagreements would induce greater shifts in the discussion. However, the analysis of interactions revealed that group processes within the discussions tended to be dominant and the functions of specific forms of interactions and their impact on attitude-formation tended to vary depending on the nature of discussions. In other words, it is argued that the functions and impact of specific forms of interaction differed in the case of the complementary interactions characteristic of the British discussions, and the argumentative interactions characteristic of the Norwegian discussions (Kitzinger, 1994).

⁷¹ For a more detailed description of these specific codes, please see [Chapter 3 - Section 3.4.1](#).

Figure 18 - Share of different forms of interaction in discussion about immigration



Notes: The chart illustrates the number of references to Immigration according to the specific forms of interaction coded. As whole references were coded, there may be overlaps in coding if within one reference different forms of interactions were identified.

As depicted in Figure 18, discussion about immigration (including the debates on Day 1 and Day 2) in Norway and in the UK display very similar patterns in terms of the use of specific forms of interaction. The debates about immigration show the important role of ‘New perspective’ (41% and 36% of all references to immigration in the British and Norwegian discussions, respectively), suggesting that participants raised and exchanged various views and information on immigration. The dominant role of ‘Contestation’ (23% and 22% of all references to immigration in the British and Norwegian discussions, respectively) also underlines the fact that participants did challenge and question each other, thus contributing to the diversity of views discussed during the debates. The frequent use of ‘Repeating’ (19% and 24% of all references to immigration in the British and Norwegian discussions, respectively) shows that participants tended to return to previously shared views and raise the same arguments. While the findings presented in Figure 18 imply that both the British and the Norwegian discussions involved the same process of raising and considering various perspectives, **the analysis finds substantial differences in terms of how the specific forms of interaction influenced the development of discussions and what meanings and functions these specific forms of interaction took within the DF debates.** This means that, for instance, repetition served a different function in a context where the homogeneity of views as repeating previously raised arguments further strengthened the overwhelming consensus. In contrast, repetition might not have been as effective at shaping attitudes in a context of competing views.

The main line of division between the interactions in the British and Norwegian debates relates to the level of homogeneity or heterogeneity of articulated views and preferences in the groups. In line with Kitzinger's (1994) distinction, **in the British discussions emerged a very firm overall preference for controlling immigration and restricting immigrants' access to welfare.** As a result of the emerging consensus the British interactions fulfilled primarily complementary functions. **While interactions raised new arguments and new perspectives about the issue of immigration, these interactions complemented, underlined, and reinforced earlier established preferences for restrictive measures.** In contrast, **in Norway we can observe a more contested debate about immigration** in which the scope of discussions was not restricted to one specific approach. Thus, in the Norwegian debates we can identify argumentative interaction with greater shifts between inclusive and exclusive measures.

In line with these differences between the use of complementary and argumentative interaction, we can identify distinctive effects on the process of discussions and on attitude-formation in the British and Norwegian DFs. To elaborate on the process of discussions and attitude-formation, two case studies were selected for the purpose of elucidating deliberation about one Norwegian and one British policy proposal for immigration. Both case studies focus on policy proposals that were unanimously supported by all participants in the Afternoon Plenary Session. The unanimous support is important as it signals the collective recognition of the significance of the specific issue and the proposed measure across all breakout groups.

7.1.3 The relevance of the institutional and social context

Both case studies selected for analysis focus on discussions touching upon expectations related to the deservingness principles of *Reciprocity* and *Attitude* as key constituents of the visions of 'good immigrants'. Chapter 5 elaborated on the differences in the understanding of these deservingness principles in these two countries and how these perceptions are shaped by the institutional and social context. As discussions about two unanimously supported policy proposals were selected for the case studies, these differences in understanding are relevant for the current analysis as well. However, this chapter argues that the effects of the institutional and social context are not limited to shaping the DF discussions thematically through agenda-setting, perceptions of the salience of the issue, or conceptualisations of 'good citizens'. **The analysis finds that the institutional and social**

context influenced the development of the discussions, too. Considering the relevance of the pressure to conform in small group discussions, the institutional and social context can considerably shape group norms in relation to how immigration is talked about, what is considered a socially acceptable attitude to immigration, and what the desirable measures are for dealing with immigration. Through such influences the institutional and the social context can set the framework for the discussion, implying that specific opinions and reasoning are correct and socially acceptable (Forsyth, 2010). Accordingly, **it is argued that liberal-leaning welfare institutions that emphasise individualism and a higher level of selectivity of welfare provision, together with the salient public discourse on welfare dependency and immigration, pre-determined the restrictive and selective perceptions about immigrants' access to welfare benefits and services that emerged in the debates.** Furthermore, the recent changes in immigration policies designed to limit non-EU immigration (as adopted by the Coalition Government)⁷² also reinforced restrictive measures as an unquestionable preference in all three British groups. **In Norway, the social democratic welfare system which stresses universalism, a strong sense of collectivity as an ideal, and, accordingly, the shared responsibilities of the state, society, and the individual, and the centrality of the value of (and efforts to) reduce social inequalities drove participants in the discussions to consider more pro-active, inclusive measures for enhancing the integration of immigrants.** However, perceptions of the growing immigrant population in Oslo, where the DF took place, an awareness of cultural differences and a strong nationally framed welfare identity, also pushed the discussions towards more protective measures and preferences for defining requirements for adapting to Norwegian society.

Taking into account these institutional features, it is not surprising that in the UK the introduction of a selective immigration system and in Norway a proposal for language and employment requirements gained the support of all participants. Therefore, this chapter investigates the Norwegian Red Group's discussion on language and employment requirements and the British Orange Group's discussion about a selective immigration system. The Norwegian case study was chosen to analyse how the group coped with the reconciliation of clashing views about the visions of 'good immigrants'. The British case study represents a discussion in which there was an overwhelming consensus about the preferred approach from the beginning to the end of the debate, but interactions between participants were key to clarifying concerns and to specifying and justifying their preferences and

⁷² The recent policy developments are described in [Chapter 4 – Section 4.3.1.3](#)

priorities. The following sections are devoted to an analysis of the interactions to scrutinize the role and impact of interactions on attitude-formation.

7.2 CASE STUDY 1: EXPECTATIONS OF *RECIPROCITY AND ATTITUDE* AND *IN-GROUP NEEDS* – A DISCUSSION OF PREFERENCES FOR CONTROLLED IMMIGRATION IN THE BRITISH DF

Concerns about losing control over immigration and preferences for a restrictive approach to immigration widely resonated in the British DF discussions across all three breakout groups. As the issue was discussed on Day 1, participants were already familiar with the topic and a more focused discussion could develop on Day 2. Moreover, the issue was debated in the Day 1 Afternoon Plenary Session, thus further strengthening the overall consensus about the need for restrictions which might have contributed to the homogeneity of opinions within the groups, including the Orange group.

This case study aims to investigate the process of discussions of the Orange group – especially focusing on the sections when participants deliberated about immigration control immigration and agreed on the following policy proposal:

“Cap immigration, set a kind of points system, as such, of who you want in the country. And then to review that, if they're in this country bringing a skill, if they're unemployed for a long period of time, reviewing that in the unemployment stage. The rationale is to bring in skill sets and to bring in skilled workers, and to review their influence on the country that's actually affecting the income to the country.”

The cited policy proposal clearly defines controlled immigration, which is constituted of the phase of selection and review, stressing the country's sovereignty to decide who is needed. As participants discuss the key principles for selection, they also delineate the criteria for inclusion, reconciling *In-group needs*, and expectations of *Reciprocity* and *Attitude*.

7.2.1 The process of discussions leading to the formulation of the policy proposal

The deliberation represents a complex picture of how and why British participants prefer a more regulated immigration system. During the debate, economic arguments dominated the discussion and restrictive measures were supported to reduce the cost of immigration, a situation which can be associated with the heightened public discourse on immigration and

immigrants' misuse of welfare benefits.⁷³ Due to the high level of homogeneity of opinions in the group, there were no significant turning points in the discussion. This homogeneity of views also emerged in the survey conducted before the start of the DF discussions. Seven out of 11 participants stated that immigrants should work and pay taxes for at least one year before accessing benefits,⁷⁴ raising concerns about potential group polarization according to Sunstein's (2002) findings.

Throughout the analysis, specific attention is devoted to examining interactions between participants that generate shifts in the discussion. The analysed debate includes 127 references and is divided into four sections, which are investigated one-by-one highlighting some of the key features of how participants interacted. For each section, the flow of discussions is illustrated, showing all the references made by the participants during the discussion analysed in the case study. The visualisation (see Diagram 5) indicates the specific forms of interaction, and the reaction it triggered (written in the arrows that connect the references). Furthermore, the illustrations show whether the reference makes a stand for inclusive or restrictive preferences and the shifts between inclusive and exclusive stances. Last, the illustrations also indicate the specific deservingness criteria specified by participants as a condition of inclusion or exclusion.

7.2.1.1 Section 1: Need for immigration control – the limited role of disagreement

Early in the debate, the group arrived at the assumption that there is a need to cut down on immigration and the group started to elaborate on why the immigration control and assessment of immigrants is needed. As the discussion developed, the group considered various perspectives and differentiated between working and non-working migrants as well as people in crisis and migrants who misuse the benefit system. Still, most of the arguments were ultimately raised as justification for controlling immigration and assessing immigrants, thereby prioritizing *In-group needs*.

As depicted in Diagram 5, participants focused on restrictive stances, with preferences for inclusion emerging only in relation to refugees. However, the discussion soon shifted back to

⁷³ The key trends in public discourse on immigration and welfare use are scrutinized in Chapter 4 – Section 4.3.1.3 and 4.3.2.1.3

⁷⁴ Out of the remaining four participants, two did not answer the question, one participant stated a preference for requiring one year with or without employment and one participant preferred not to permit access to welfare benefits at all.

more restrictive preferences. Disagreements and counter-arguments were not effective to change the overall path of the discussions.

At the early stage of the debate, disagreement emerged. However, as the following quoted section of the discussion shows, the reaction to it completely annulled the impact of the disagreement.

Quotation 1 – Orange group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 5)

	P90: People are coming in and the UK has open doors for everybody, whoever wants to come here they just come in and that's about it. EU national [Inaudible] the majority of people coming here [inaudible] how many...
	P84: Well, no, it's only a third. It's a third. I was surprised by that because I thought it would be higher than that but in the EU itself it's a third of immigrants are from the EU and they're coming here to work.
	P90: But how many of them are actually working? That's the question.
	P84: I mean, for me the big thing with that is if you haven't worked in England for two, three, five years you're not entitled to any benefits from the UK.
	P90: It is in place but the government is not actually following those rules because whoever is coming to the UK as an international has three months to get work. If you're inactive within three months you should leave the country.

Participant 84's disagreement is significant, as using the previously provided information package⁷⁵ he corrected a very common misperception about the share of EU immigrants in the UK.⁷⁶ While this correction opened the possibility to reflect on such misperceptions, Participant 90's reaction shifted the attention, stressing employment and implicitly raising the issue of immigrants' unemployment. Participant 84's response confirms the common understanding of such implicit reference and perceptions about the issue of unemployed immigrants as he argued for conditional access to welfare. The discussion continued with participants elaborating on the reasons for immigration control, including the governments' inactivity regarding the enforcement of rules.

⁷⁵ Before Day 2, participants received an information package that included statistics about key social issues. Details on the provision of information packages is elaborated in [Chapter 3 – Section 3.3.1.4](#). The information package provided to British participants is available in Appendix 1

⁷⁶ Misperceptions concerning immigration in the UK are discussed in [Chapter 4 – Section 4.1](#)

Diagram 5 - Visualisation of the process of discussion - UK, Orange Group - Section 1.1






Diagram 6 - Visualisation of the process of discussion - UK, Orange Group - Section 1.2



As the discussion developed, the common understanding and vision of ‘good immigrants’ as contributing and working immigrants was further strengthened. Participant 89’s statement on the need to differentiate refugees – “people in crisis” – from immigrants misusing the welfare system brought about a change in the debate, as Quotation 2 and Diagram 6 show.

Quotation 2 – Orange group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 6)

	P89: But it’s two different immigration system if you look at it because you have people who are running from torture and killing. Then you have people just coming because of the easy life and [inaudible] the benefits. So the government need to look at the people in crisis what are we doing to help them? How are we going to help them? How are we going to help them when they come and then help them to go back and live decent lives...?
	P90: They’re in crisis. It’s not the usual...
	P89: Yes, I know that’s what I’m trying to say there’s two immigration. That’s the crisis thing but the people who are just coming over because they can come because they can go to the doctor now, they can get this, they can get that, that’s the bit... [Inaudible] you do assessment so we’ve got 10,000 people coming over in the next two years, three years, do assessment, assess these people. What are their skills, [inaudible]? Who is good for the country, who’s not good because [voices overlapping]. You’ve got to assess people.
	P90: And that’s the [inaudible] how to help you? UK is trying to help you thinking, how am I going to help you, but these people [inaudible]. If you’re coming over [inaudible] horrible situation and we should help these people but in ten years’ time these people will be here sitting on their arses, my apologies for that, and then she’s going to claim the benefits because this is how [inaudible] how to provide you. No, you’re coming over, you assess and whether you are actually a refugee what is the chance of you returning to your country or not and if you stay [inaudible] so they can bring profit to the country.

Participant 89 and Participant 90 articulated ambivalent attitudes – both sharing support for and concern about refugees. However, both ended up by arguing for the need for assessments and prioritising in-group needs in the selection process. Thus, their stances further deepened the **economic approach to immigrants and stressed the limits to moral and humanitarian reasons for helping.**

As shown in both quotations, participants often employed differentiations which allowed them to reflect not only on why immigrants should be excluded, but also what qualifies immigrants for inclusion. Thus, such **differentiations provided a means of articulating ambivalences and reflecting on the complexity of the issue**, which could have widened the pool of arguments within the debates. However, the effect of these arguments was dependent on other participants’ reactions – i.e. how other participants responded to and engaged with these claims (Goodin, 2000). The fact that these reactions usually followed-up on negative phenomena reinforced the homogeneity within the group and thus step-by-step validated the consensus about the need to control immigration.

7.2.1.2 Section 2: agreement about capping immigration

Section 2 opened with the Moderator’s question about the issue of ageing population. However, the discussion revealed that concerns about population growth outweighed concerns about an ageing population. This indicates that within this group the argument that immigrants – as members of an active labour force (and as care-providers) – can help to reduce the negative effects of an ageing population was not considered at all. On the contrary, immigration was perceived as a threat. Therefore, participants proposed and debated the need to introduce an immigration cap, which also meant that the discussion focused on restrictive measures, as depicted in Diagram 1. As captured in Quotation 3, the perception of immigration as a threat was further strengthened in light of the uncertainty about how immigration would develop and how the population would grow. This uncertainty also increased the perceptions of participants about losing control over immigration and justified the need for capping immigration.

Quotation 3 – Orange group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 7)

	P84: We said 10 million today but I saw a report two days ago that said it was going to be 20 million. So 85 million people will be here by 2040.
	P89: They project ten million and then they said they’re extending it just in case they have babies, they bring in extra family, so it’s 20 million.
	P83: But it’s getting so out of control. This is where they need to have a cap on the population. There has to be a general idea in terms of what is our population figure? What can be sustained and how do we sustain that? So there has to be a cap in place.
	P84: You can’t have an open borders policy which we have got within the EU and then cap it. You can’t. You can’t have both.

The contestations of participants highlighted the formal barriers to proposed policy, such as Participant 84 stressing the incompatibility of EU free-movement regulations and an immigration cap (raised twice in Section 2). However, none of the contestations opposed the proposal for capping immigration. Therefore, the group’s support for restrictions was not challenged. The absence of counter-arguments and the missed opportunity to discuss the more positive side of immigration – e.g. how immigrants could help the country to deal with the challenges of an aging population – reveals the one-dimensionality of the discussion. Furthermore, it underlines Sunstein’s (2002) claim that homogeneity within groups makes it difficult to identify and challenge potential biases in opinions.

Diagram 7 - Visualisation of the process of discussion - UK, Orange Group - Section 2.1







Diagram 8 - Visualisation of the process of discussion - UK, Orange Group - Section 2.2

INCLUSIVE STANCES AND PREFERENCES



RESTRICTIVE STANCES AND PREFERENCES

LEGEND:



7.2.1.3 Section 3: Immigration cap and gaining control over immigration

Following up on the proposed immigration cap, participants raised the need to differentiate between specific groups of immigrants. Quotation 4 shows the role of contestations and the role of using examples in facilitating the discussion and requiring participants to specify their views and preferences.


Quotation 4 – Orange group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 9)

	M: So in terms of policy in 2040 we want to cap net migration per year.
	P84: I think there's two things. I think it's EU and non-EU, I think.
	P89: That's what I'm saying, the refugees and EU people because it's going to be a problem somewhere along the line.
	M: What about the people who are non-EU that aren't refugees? So like nurses from the Philippines?
	P84: Well, that's massive issue, isn't it?
	P85: You can't...
	P90: For immigration this is quite strict they go through various assessments, they need to provide various documentation. I think the biggest issue is actually with the EU nationals because there is no limits, no control or nothing. They can just come and do whatever they want to so maybe just put more focus on the actual EU nationals, check who is working, who's not working, how long have they been unemployed, whether they are actually coming here for work or whatever they're coming [voices overlapping].
	P88: They need to have a job ready for them when they come here and that is possible.
	P90: That could be or give them a limit like if [inaudible].
	P88: If you got rid everybody from the Philippines there would be nobody in the hospitals, would there?

Both the use of differentiation and the use of examples prompted participants to specify why people are more concerned about EU migration than about non-EU migration. Clarifying these differences helped participants to define how to gain control over immigration. As shown in Diagram 9, participants again stressed employment and *In-group needs* (for a skilled labour force) as the key criteria qualifying immigrants for inclusion. However, **the focus of the discussion shifted from annual reviews and limits on who should enter the country to the need to monitor EU migrants living in the country to check whether they fulfil expectations.**

In Section 3 it was rather the Moderator who raised questions and tried to confront participants. However, these contestations were not effective enough to change the focus of discussion away from prevailing preferences for immigration control. Therefore, as the discussion developed, the high level of cohesion and shared thinking within the group was further enhanced.

Diagram 9 – Visualisation of discussion about immigration - UK, Orange Group - Section 3



7.2.1.4 Section 4: The benefits of immigration

In the second half of the discussion, the Moderator once again raised the issue of an ageing population, specifying the need for a larger active-age labour force and trying to challenge what implications the proposed immigration cap might have.

Quotation 5 – Orange group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 10)

	M: [...] So we've got a very small gap here which is people 59, 16 of working age. So if you're going to have loads and loads of old people, a shrinking gap here of people that naturally pay tax to support them how is capping immigration...I know they're coming to jobs where there are jobs but if you've got lots of people coming in perhaps not for a specific job but they might come, they might set up a shop. They might hire three people. They might create more employment. What is capping it going to do in terms of restricting that? Is that going to create a problem?
	P89: No, but why you're capping it? You're capping it to [inaudible]. So every time you cap it if you have 10,000 people, [inaudible]. You've got to find a way to, it's turning a wheel around. So it's like us sitting there and not moving. It's moving so 5,000 people who don't do anything.
	M: So with this policy and the cap how often should that be reviewed? That should form part of the policy.
	P89: Yearly.
	P85: [Inaudible].
	P89: Yearly will do.
	P87: The more people you have in the country, they need to eat. They need to have...they need clothes. They need education of course and they will need somewhere to live therefore will that not benefit the building trade, the food suppliers whatever, all that. They create a need for more of all of that.
	P84: I think none of us have got an argument with the fact that if somebody comes into England or Great Britain or whatever and starts work, pays their taxes, pays their dues, shops in England, buys a house, rents a house, we haven't got a problem with that. What we've got a problem with is...
	P85: Freeloaders.
	P84: ...people coming and...
	P85: Not contributing.
	P84: ...absolutely so if they contribute welcome them in. I mean to us we've always had that policy in England where we've let x amount of people in to do x. As long as they're working and contributing to the society they're living in.

The Moderator's emphasis on different forms of immigrants' economic activities and contributions gave rise to considerations about the positive side of immigration. First, Participant 87 elaborated on positive economic effects. Participant 84, in cooperation with Participant 85, contrasted economically active immigrants with "freeloaders". This differentiation between 'good' and 'bad' immigrants reinforced the economically framed conditions of inclusion and the individual's role in terms of their contribution to the economy in various forms. Furthermore, it underlined the consensus about the need for selective

Diagram 10 - Visualisation of discussion about immigration - UK, Orange Group - Section 4.1






Diagram 11 - Visualisation of discussion about immigration - UK, Orange Group - Section 4.2



measures that would allow in only those migrants who contribute, and to be stricter towards less economically promising migrants.

This very strong economic understanding of immigration is further reflected in the responses to the Moderator’s question on the earlier raised costs of immigration. These primarily concerned the need to develop the infrastructure to meet the increased demand for services. Quotation 6 show how **perceptions of limited capacities are used to justify the need for the immigration cap and adjusting immigration cap to the state’s capacities to provide the required services.**

Quotation 6 - Orange group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (See the highlighted section in Diagram 11)

	M: So in terms of the government policy what should they do? Twenty-forty, we’ve got 74 million people what should the...?
	P80: Well, that’s where they need to look at how many they’re letting in to how much they’re going to have to...
	From now.
	P80: If they say we’re going to bring 20 people in you’ve got to build something. So those 20 people are already going to cost us x amount of money because we need to school them so they need to look at their costs against what they’re letting in as well.
	P84: The big problem is that we need to spend money today that we’re not going to recoup...

As depicted in Diagram 10, we can identify a change in the discussion, whereby participants extended their understanding of ‘good immigrants’. However, even these more positive and inclusive arguments tended to be limited to a discussion of economic benefits. This economic framing of the issue shows the limits of the discussion in the Orange group and the minimization of social and cultural aspects. The salience of economic considerations may also reflect the normative influences that led to the perception that only economic arguments are socially acceptable to be raised in the debate.

To sum up, attitudes and opinions articulated throughout the debate show a high level of consistency within the group. There were no clashes of views or significant turning points in the discussion. **This cohesion allowed the participants to elaborate why they wanted to restrict immigrants and how they wanted to achieve this.** However, **it also limited the discussion to one dimension; namely, to restrictive and selective policies.** As shown in the analysis, there were various opportunities to consider other features of and other approaches to immigration. Nonetheless, the discussion always returned to justifying the need for controlling immigration. Therefore, the scope of attitude-formation tended to be limited and raised the risks of group polarization. Sometimes, the Moderator took on the

role of sharing dissenting views by adding in questions about the aging population or Non-European, non-refugee migrants such as Filipino nurses. While this questioning tended to lie outside the remit of the rather passive role of a typical moderator, it can be understood as the Moderator's attempt to give voice to dissenting views. Moreover, we must acknowledge that the Moderator's questions helped to deepen the discussions and clarify the group's preferences.

We cannot ignore the relevance of the pressure for conformity within the small group discussions: the fact that only those participants became engaged in the discussion who tended to agree with the consensus. In the Orange group the involvement of participants tended to vary greatly. Four participants (Participant 81, Participant 82, Participant 86 and Participant 87) made less than five references during the debate. These four participants were the least active in the DF overall. While these participants' silence needs to be taken into account, only in the case of Participant 87 do we suspect the participant of having dissenting views, but feeling deterred from articulating them in the group. Participant 87 made only one pro-immigration reference in the discussion under analysis, which was shared after the Moderator's attempt to direct the discussion to the more positive side of immigration.

The Orange group's debate shows the dominance of economic considerations. The reasons and justification for introducing the immigration cap and the annual review system relied almost exclusively on economic considerations. While participants stressed what kind of achievements and behaviour they expected from immigrants, there was complete silence about whether 'good immigrants' are or should be integrated into society, whether the state should facilitate integration (as something that can increase the overall benefits of immigration to the country). Only restrictions were considered in order to maximise the benefits of immigration and allowing only resourceful migrants to enter and stay in the UK. While participants shared different views and often ambivalent positions about immigration, in relation to policy preferences there seemed to be a pre-existing consensus. Considering the salience of the issue of immigration in the public discourse, the political framing of the latest immigration policy changes (since 2010), the institutional features of the liberal-leaning welfare state towards individualism and the selective approaches, the acceptance of social inequality within society – these social influences underline a consensus towards restrictive policy preferences. The fact that this consensus emerged in all three breakout group discussions further strengthens the assumption that the institutional and social context substantially shaped the process of discussions, and consequently, attitude-

formation. While in the British debates, measures facilitating inclusion that would support immigrants to become ‘good immigrants’ were not considered, integration was much more at the centre of the Norwegian discussion, as the following case study shows.

7.3 CASE STUDY 2: EXPECTATIONS ABOUT *RECIPROCITY* AND *ATTITUDE* – DISCUSSION OF LANGUAGE SKILLS AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE NORWEGIAN DF

In contrast with the predominance of economic arguments in the British discussion, the Norwegian participants shared both culturally and economically framed expectations about immigrants. In terms of learning the Norwegian language and obtaining a better understanding of Norwegian culture and society was a topic of all breakout groups and the latter achievements were deemed important characteristics of ‘good immigrants’. Furthermore, policy recommendations about language learning and cultural integration were unanimously supported by all participants in the Afternoon Plenary Session. The Red Group discussed language requirements the most extensively. Therefore, this case study analyses their discussion and the process leading to the formulation of this policy proposal:

“Linguistic and cultural integration of immigrants through mandatory Norwegian language courses, requirements for work and self-sufficiency for economic migrants”.

The wording of the policy proposal itself indicates some of the key points of the analysis of welfare deservingness – specifically, expectations related to *Reciprocity* and *Attitude*.

7.3.1 The process of discussions leading to the formulation of the policy proposal

In the Red Group, discussion about the relation between language skills and employment was only briefly debated on Day 1. In contrast to the British case study, where a firm consensus about the policy preferences was present from the beginning, the Red Group had a more contested debate concerning expectations about immigrants. Thus, agreement about policy proposals was reached through deliberation about participants’ competing views and priorities. The competing views primarily concerned finding the right balance between economic and cultural requirements for inclusion. Therefore, the debate included several turning points during which participants needed to negotiate their positions about conditions of inclusion and exclusion. In comparison to the British case study, the heterogeneity of opinions in the Norwegian debate created greater scope for attitude-formation.

The heterogeneity of opinions among the participants is also underlined by the results of the pre-deliberation survey. Out of ten participants, four participants preferred the condition of at least one year of employment and tax payments, while two participants required citizenship, and two participants preferred immediate access to welfare benefits and services. The remaining two participants chose the “Don’t know” response. Through the deliberation, the shifts and turning points in the discussion reveal **how ambivalence and divisions emerged about the criteria of inclusion/exclusion**. The analysed debate is formed of 75 references and is divided into five sections, which will be examined one-by-one.

7.3.1.1 Section 1 – agreement about the centrality of language learning

From the beginning of the debate, language and culture were specified as among the priorities in relation to immigration. These preferences are in line with Norwegian immigration policies that put an emphasis on activation and integration programmes, including long-term language courses.⁷⁷ Throughout the debate, language comprehension was considered both as a means for inclusion and for exclusion.

Participant 9 was the first to take a very explicit stance, arguing why the requirement of learning the Norwegian language is more important and why language courses should precede any offer of economic support to immigrants.

Quotation 7 – Red group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 12)

	M: Should there be different demands like you say? Benefits like teaching when talking about foreign workers or refugees?
	P9: We do have restrictions with for example work assessment allowance. Very specific though. But I think we should make more restrictions for the immigrants too. More than today. Maybe work assessment allowance is a bad example, but request that they go to Norwegian classes for example. The first thing you encounter when you come here is how things are, and if you aren't prepared in any way, it is of little help that you get money to get started, when you have no idea of how society works to make use of those means.
	Language and culture first.
	P9: I think so.
	<i>More people agreeing.</i>

Participant 9's argument is based on **contrasting immigrants' need for economic support and need for learning the language and learning about the culture of the majority society**. The argument convinced the group and thus broad agreement unfolded about the centrality

⁷⁷ For further details, please see [Chapter 4 – Section 4.3.1](#)

of language and culture, as indicated in Diagram 12. This agreement defined the ground for a deeper discussion about language and culture.

7.3.1.2 Section 2 - The challenge of defining the threshold of language requirements

In line with the preliminary consensus, Section 2 further elaborates on **the relevance of Norwegian language skills regarding the conceptualisation of ‘good immigrants’**. Although Participant 1 attempted to shift the discussion to economic considerations, this suggestion was declined by Participant 11. Instead, Participant 11 formulated a restrictive suggestion (see Diagram 13) to require immigrants to pass a language exam as a condition of inclusion. However, this triggered objections within the group as Quotation 8 shows.

Quotation 8 – Red group, Day 2 – discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 13)

	M: Many of you have mentioned request for activity. Should this be included under language and culture, or is it a new bullet point?
	P11: New bullet point. It doesn't make sense otherwise. Mandatory Norwegian course, passed within a year or something.
	P5: It has to be clear enough and be determined. That you have to pass.
	P8: But I don't like deporting people just because they failed Norwegian class.
	<i>Laughter.</i>
	P1: But be able to show that you have attended and participated and know something.
	P11: There is a difference between refugees and economic immigrants, though.
	P8: If there is a difference, then I completely agree.
	M: Do we make different demands here now, for the different immigrants?
	P1: If you are to live in Norway, you have to know some Norwegian no matter where you come from.
	P11: Legally there is a difference between residence permit and work permit in the country, to become a Norwegian citizen.
	P1: I don't think it should be a difference in language demand in those points. Even if you stay in Norway for a longer period of time, I think you should know some Norwegian.
	P8: And what do we do with them if they don't? Send them back to death?
	P1: No, but I think they should prove that they have attended Norwegian classes and know a little at least, even if it isn't perfect.
	P8: But what if they don't?
	P9: I agree with you, but at the same time I believe everyone can learn something at some level. The hard part is deciding what counts as passed. That is the actual discussion.

Quotation 8 demonstrates the central role of contestations (see Participant 8's references) and the responses given to them in pushing the discussion further. As participants continued elaborating on the specificities of the requirements, they framed their arguments in a more practical manner – focusing on the length of stay, and on decreasing the requirements to the

minimum level of language comprehension. This shows that participants used more practical and simple arguments to convince others. Still, within the discussion tension arose about the potential consequences of non-compliance, primarily for refugees.

In Section 2, competing views unfolded regarding the required level of language comprehension. Counter-arguments relied primarily on warnings about the potential consequences of non-compliance. Through these differences in opinions, participants faced the challenge and potential limits of defining an appropriate level of language comprehension as key criteria for inclusion, which may have contributed to the shift in the debate to economic considerations.

7.3.1.3 Section 3 - Shift from cultural to economic considerations

The third part of the discussion was marked by the first key turning point in the discussion, which reflected on the clash between two visions of ‘good immigrants’ – good immigrants as defined in cultural terms, and good immigrants conceived in economic terms. Therefore, this section focuses on the interactions that led to the turning point and how the group reacted and dealt with the disagreement.

Quotation 9 – Red group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 14)

	P6: At the same time there are many jobs in which you don't have to communicate in Norwegian. IT and such, should they also learn Norwegian?
	P1: You still live in Norway and go shopping in a Norwegian shop, then you should know how to say "I would like two plastic bags, please"
	P6: You can say it in English.
	P1: Yes, but this is Norway, right.
	P6: But are you going to throw them out?
	P9: My point is not that you say "Hello, good bye", but to learn the language is an important part of the culture, and kind of the same if you speak Norwegian, English, Urdu to be here.

As depicted in Quotation 9, Participant 6 contested the issue of language requirements by drawing attention to jobs that do not demand Norwegian language skills, bringing considerations about immigrants' employment back into the discussion. While the former's question extended the practical approach to language as means of communication, it triggered nationally framed responses from other participants. Diagram 14 illustrates how these interactions – contestations and specifications – triggered shifts between more inclusive and more restrictive stances.

Diagram 12 - Illustration of discussion about immigration – NO, Red Group, Section 1






Diagram 13 - Visualization of discussion about immigration – NO, Red Group, Section 2



LEGEND:






Diagram 14 – Visualization of discussion about immigration – NO, Red Group, Section 3



Building on and showing support for such claims, Participant 11 repeated his earlier suggestion of requiring economic migrants to pass a language test. However, Participant 11's rather radical proposal induced disagreement and led to the first turning point in the discussion:

Quotation 10 - Red group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 14)

	P11: I am willing to go as far as to say that if you are an economic immigrant, but fail the test, you can't be here.
	P10: I am against that actually. If you are an engineer from the US and come to Norway to work, and you communicate just fine in English. I mean, English is taking over more and more. English will take over in the end. I don't think they should be punished for not learning Norwegian because they offer new knowledge to our society.
	P11: But we are talking about something else. About economic immigrants who have as purpose to settle down and work in the country, not temporary labour-... a difference between temporary and to work in a country.
	10: Now I follow.
	P5: If you come here and have decided to stay here, I think that has to be a condition.
	P11: If you are a citizen of the EU the only demand is that you have to be able to support yourself.
	P8: I think the request should be for the whole world. If you come from Africa, but support yourself and have a nice job, I feel it is weird to throw them out. If they pay tax, work, have a social life.
	M: Regardless of the time limit?
	P8: The problem is those who come here and just enjoy the benefits without contributing. That problem need be stopped. I don't see any problem with those who contribute, but don't speak Norwegian.

Through the last couple of interactions that included contestations, disagreement, and new perspectives, the discussion about language requirements completely turned around and economic considerations – skills, knowledge and expertise, employment and contribution – prevailed as conditions of inclusion as shown in Diagram 13. With the example of a US engineer, Participant 10 clearly distinguished his stance that involved **prioritising economic considerations and in-group needs (for highly skilled people) – thereby taking an economic approach to the vision of 'good immigrants'**. In response, Participant 11 tried to clarify his suggestion, stressing long-term stay and the aim of settling down in the country, but then **raised the criteria of self-sufficiency**. In response, Participant 8 proposed to extend this criterion to all economic migrants. The comparison of non-contributing migrants and contributing migrants who do not speak Norwegian turned the focus of the discussion from cultural concerns about non-comprehension of the Norwegian language to the problem of non-contribution.

7.3.1.4 Section 4 – Focus on the employment of immigrants and on the connection between language and employment

In Section 4 the discussion turned to concerns about non-contribution and welfare use, shifting the focus to expectations about employment. The analysis elaborates how language requirements re-emerge, revealing another point of connection between employment and language skills.


First, focusing on the issue of the non-contribution of immigrants – specifically asylum-seekers and refugees in this specific case, the debate shifts to the conditions of accessing welfare benefits without making a contribution. As shown below, language skills were raised again as a prerequisite for accessing welfare benefits and framed as means of restricting immigrants’ access to welfare. However, reading Quotation 11, we can observe another example of competing views. While Participant 10 thought the requirement of language skills would delay the labour market involvement of refugees. Participant 11 argued that language is the foundation of finding employment, shedding light on the perceived link between language and employment.

Quotation 11 - Red group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 15)

	M: Do you think that they have to attend this course first, and then they get their residence permit, or that it is withdrawn if you aren’t good enough or fail to pass a test?
	<i>Laughter.</i>
	P1: I guess to pass the test to get the permit, if not it’s a little backwards.
	P10: Then we will have even more asylum seekers waiting for even longer in the reception centres, I believe. If everyone has to... they can’t start anything unless they have passed the Norwegian course.
	P11: That is a problem today too. Many of those who sit there don’t have a need for asylum, no need to stay in Norway. Then you can regard them as economic immigrants instead. Should they be allowed to stay?
	P10: Then we need more trips, like Norway has done the last years. That if you are not from Eritrea, Somalia, Syria you are sent back.
	P11: But earlier we talked about how we need that manpower, that we want them.
	P10: Yes, then they have to be forced to work.
	P1: If we want them because of manpower, then they have to work. Not just sit back and enjoy the benefits, they have to get out in the labour market.
	P11: we talked about how language is the foundation for what you need to get out in the labour market.
	M: How do we make that more specific? Everyone doesn’t have to agree. Can we narrow it down a little?
	P11: If we say mandatory Norwegian course for everyone, but for economic immigrants we say it is an obvious condition that they pass a test. Most people want them out working, if not we want to send them back.

Diagram 15 - Visualization of discussion about immigration – NO, Red group, Section 4

INCLUSIVE STANCES AND PREFERENCES



RESTRICTIVE STANCES AND PREFERENCES





Diagram 16 - Visualization of discussion about immigration – NO, Red group, Section 5



The discussion shifted towards considerations on in-group needs for foreign labour force, which enhanced an emerging consensus about the expectation that immigrants (including refugees) should obtain employment as soon as possible, and employment should be the key criteria for staying in the country. Raising the connection between language skills and employment, Participant 11 repeated his initial suggestion, but he framed the need for passing the language exam as a means to getting employed in the Norwegian labour market. This time the proposal was not explicitly contested by others and the discussion continued on immigrant's access to welfare benefits, which is not included in this analysis.

7.3.1.5 Section 5 – Agreement about the criteria of self-sufficiency for economic migrants

The analysis was resumed once the Moderator asked participants to formulate the final policy proposal. Taking the initiative, Participant 11 once again repeated his suggestion. However, this triggered opposition in the group.

Quotation 12 - Red group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 16)

	M: We also have to give reasons for this. It is supposed to be written as a claim or a statement, ideally as a sentence.
	P11: But for non-refugees, then. For immigrants, not temporary work in Norway. They have to pass a Norwegian course and participate in the working life.
	P6: The unemployed? As long as they have a job and pay tax.
	P8: Shouldn't we set work as number one? Instead of cultural integration?
	P11: If you want asylum, the way it is today, the asylum seekers are entitled to those rights whether they work or not. It is the others we want to make demands for per today. We agree that economic immigrants have to speak Norwegian and partake in the working life.
	P8: I don't think they have to speak Norwegian, but if the group thinks so, okay.
	<i>Laughter.</i>
	P10: I agree with you, though.
	P1: Norwegian or English if you are supposed to stay here for a long time.
	P11: I think we should go for partaking in working life.
	P8: The language will come naturally after a while.

As shown in Diagram 16 and Quotation 12, change was brought about by Participant 8's disagreement. **Articulation of his passive acceptance became a new turning point in the discussion as Participant 10 and Participant 1 supported him.** Participant 11 accepted this turn in the discussion and proposed (once again) to include employment as the only requirement for economic migrants. While the discussion continued with specifying what qualifies as employment, this part of the final policy proposal was not challenged again in the discussion and therefore the analysis of the discussion ends at this point.

To conclude, the discussion reveals frequent movements between inclusive and restrictive measures, also reflecting the heterogeneity of views within the Red group. As participants explored the potential boundaries of inclusion, clashing views about the visions of 'good immigrants' emerged. While for some participants compliance with economic and social expectations – employment, contribution, social life – fulfilled the vision of 'good immigrants' and comprised sufficient reason for inclusion, others preferred cultural integration, including command of the Norwegian language. The fact that primarily economic arguments prevailed over cultural ones in the final formulation of the policy proposal should be interpreted within the context of such competing visions of 'good immigrants'. Taking into account these differences, economic arguments – framed as expectations of *Reciprocity*, *Attitude* and also as *In-group needs* – were more convincing to the group, as there was overwhelming agreement that economic migrants need to work. Accordingly, unemployment and non-contribution were accepted as potential reasons for deportation. This conclusion was not contested by any participant. In contrast, the group could not agree on language requirements for economic migrants.

To interpret the results of deliberation, the composition of the group needs to be considered. The Red Group included primarily younger participants (under 35 years old), which could have influenced the prioritization of economic considerations over cultural arguments. The younger generation, especially those who are better educated and situated in the area of the capital, tend to have more experience of working in multilingual workplaces, and different perceptions about the dynamic increase in the number of immigrants in the broader area of Oslo. These circumstances might have influenced their preferences regarding immigrants and their language skills. In terms of participation in the discussion, only two participants made less than five references during the debate.

While in the Norwegian case study the dynamics of the discussion were enhanced by the emerging gaps between participants' opinions and preferences concerning the thresholds of inclusion and exclusion, in the British discussion we can observe a high level of cohesion in terms of policy priorities. The following comparative analysis elaborates on how these differences can alter the impact of interactions on attitude-formation at the group level.

7.4 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS – THE IMPACT OF INTERACTIONS ON ATTITUDE-FORMATION

7.4.1 Dynamism of attitude-formation

Both case studies involved detailed analyses of the process of discussions leading to an agreement about the policy proposal. Throughout the analysis, particular attention was devoted to the key moments and arguments that pushed the discussions further, shifting the focus of the discussions and affecting attitude-formation. The case studies showed and underlined the dynamism of attitude-formation through social interactions. While in the British discussion the shifts along the inclusion and exclusion dimension were more moderate and remained within the scope of economic considerations on immigration, in the Norwegian discussion these movements towards inclusion and exclusion were more extensive and influenced by both cultural and economic arguments. The analysis also found that such differences in the dynamism of attitude-formation considerably depended on the homogeneity or heterogeneity of views in relation to preferred approaches to immigration. Focusing on this distinction, the following sections elaborate on the impact of homogeneity and heterogeneity of views on attitude-formation in groups.

7.4.1.1 The impact of homogeneity

Due to the strength of the consensus about the need for restrictive preferences in the British discussion, informational and normative influences pushed the discussions in one specific direction, which also limited the scope of attitude-formation. While participants did approach immigration from various perspectives – identifying the key issues, raising the role of the government, considering the needs and capacities of the country to receive immigrants, elaborating on the differences between EU and Non-EU migration – all these arguments were raised to justify restrictive policy measures. None of the participants tried to question the need for restrictions and the Moderator's attempts to raise another perspective also failed to change the direction of the discussion.

Placing the Orange group's discussion into the wider institutional and social context reveals that such informational and normative influences were not activated within the Orange group only. As described in Chapter 4, in the post-2004 period the public discourse in the UK became particularly polarized about the advantages and disadvantages of immigration, inclining towards a negative portrayal of immigrants and the issues they are associated with.

While perceptions of issues – concerning social inequalities, the quality of public services, and labour market issues – were real, these were not genuinely caused by immigration (Alfano et al., 2016).⁷⁸ However, in the public discourse immigrants have become scapegoats for these social issues. The way political parties approached and framed the issue and the policy changes they proposed also legitimized the need for restricting immigration as a solution to the issues raised. Therefore, the public discourse, the political framing⁷⁹, and recent policy changes⁸⁰ strengthened such public perceptions and preferences as being the right ones. Furthermore, individualism and selectivity as the key characteristics of the liberal-leaning welfare state also enhanced such restrictive discourse. While deliberations offer the possibility to raise other approaches, challenging the dominant public discourse would have required the greater representation of people with firm pro-immigration attitudes who could have introduced other perspectives about the issue and policy priorities. In the absence of such arguments, majority opinion prevailed and potentially silenced the few participants who did not necessarily share the former opinions. Thus, the discussion of the Orange group was limited to one dimension.

7.4.1.2 The impact of heterogeneity

In contrast to the British case study, the Norwegian Red group's debate on immigration demonstrated different group dynamics. While at the beginning there was overall agreement about the need to integrate immigrants and the importance of language, as the discussion developed a conflict unfolded about the desired strictness of language requirements. Therefore, participants needed to reconcile economic and cultural expectations about immigrants. Through the exchanges of arguments calling for more inclusive or more exclusive measures, the scope of informational influences was extended as participants familiarized with other perspectives about the issue. Participants specified, re-considered and made concessions as a result of the objections raised therein. As a result, in the end a minority opinion was able to change the outcome of the deliberation.

⁷⁸ For further information about the development of immigration policies and the relation of public discourse to immigration in the UK, see Chapter 4.

⁷⁹ Parliamentary Elections were held in May 2015 – few months before the DF. Immigration was a dominant issue of the electoral campaign (Leruth and Taylor-Gooby, 2019).

⁸⁰ Recall the Coalition Government's pledges and measures restricting non-EU migration described in Chapter 4 – Section 4.3.1.3

The benefits of a heterogeneity of opinions are also revealed in the dynamism of shifts between inclusive and exclusive preferences. However, it is important to understand what enhanced this heterogeneity. First, the composition of the group is relevant. The Red group was a mixed group of people in terms of initial attitudes to immigrants, as presented in the pre-deliberation survey. Moreover, the Red group was constituted of younger participants, which could also have affected the group norms in terms of their willingness to sharing their own stances and openness to other's opinions. Both of these factors could have enhanced the heterogeneity of opinions. In addition to this, this chapter also argues that this heterogeneity was facilitated by the Norwegian institutional and social context.

The Norwegian DF discussions show that perceptions of the issue of immigration are driven by multiple – often intertwined – considerations which also emerge in preferences for more inclusive and more exclusive measures. Preferences for the inclusion and integration of immigrants are in line with the universalism principle of the Nordic welfare states, complying with the widely understood value of a high level of social equality within the country and acknowledging the need for an active labour force to maintain the generous welfare state. At the same time, perceptions of cultural differences between the majority society and the immigrants raised concerns about the potential issues immigration can cause if immigrants are not integrated. This tension, stemming from the institutional and social context, underlines the emergence of ambivalences, conflicting views, and more significant shifts between inclusive and exclusive stances.

These findings support previous research (Grönlund et al., 2015; Luskin et al., 2007; Sunstein, 2002, 2009) that **confirmed the relevance of the composition of groups and the significance of the emerging homogeneity or heterogeneity of views within groups in relation to attitude-formation**. Furthermore, **the case studies provide evidence for the impact of institutional and social context on the development of the discussions**. As the next step in the comparative analysis, the following section elaborates on how the specific forms of interaction influenced attitude-formation.

7.4.2 The impact of interactions

Drawing on the findings presented about the impact of a homogeneity and heterogeneity of opinions, we now focus on the meanings and roles specific forms of interaction – such as new perspectives, contestations, agreements and disagreements – can have in such discussions.

Examining how the specific forms of interaction shape attitudes, both case studies show the **significance of contestations and new perspectives**. Focusing on the concrete effects on attitude-formation, these two types of interaction cannot be separated because the effect of any argument or question that is articulated during a discussion depends on the reaction it triggers (Goodin, 2000). The discussions studied above deepened as a result of the combinations of contestations and the specifications that questions prompted. Through these interactions, attitudes to immigrants' inclusion were better articulated. New pieces of information, the clarification of stances, and reformulation of policy suggestions helped to elaborate on attitudes and to shape the final policy proposal. Moreover, comparison of the two case studies sheds light on the variability in the function and effect of these interactions on the development of the discussions. In the case of the Norwegian debate, in the context of competing views these exchanges initiated a negotiation process in the group that affected preferences about the thresholds of inclusion and exclusion. In contrast, in the British discussions these interactions rather served to complement and reinforce participants' views without participants needing to convince each other, and without triggering shifts in attitudes at the group level.

In both case studies, occasions of **disagreement** were rare. Dissenting views were usually formulated as contestations or reflections on a new perspective. Therefore, pronounced disagreements tended to mark the development of discussions and affected the group's preferences. However, we can observe that the effect of disagreements was more significant in the Norwegian discussion. The reason for this difference might be linked to the nature of the disagreements. In the British discussions, all disagreements relied on formal objections based on external sources of information. For instance, disagreements signalling the incompatibility of EU open border policies and an immigration cap were not presented as personal convictions but rather as a formal argument against the proposal. In contrast, in the Norwegian case study disagreements involved personal arguments against proposals, which might have been more powerful in making other participants to consider them. Thus, in the Norwegian discussions, disagreements were key to shaping the final policy proposal.

Repeating as a form of interaction was also significant, especially in terms of signalling the importance of issues, justifications or objections to certain preferences. Repetition can function as expressing agreement if it involves repeating other participants' thoughts or suggestions. Repeating the same arguments can especially influence uncertain or uninformed participants, generating a so-called "illusion of truth" (Chong and Druckman, 2013). In the British discussions, repetitions further increased the common understanding of

the issue of immigration and strengthened consensus about the policy proposal. In contrast, in the Norwegian case study, other patterns emerged. Repeating arguments and questions formed an important part of the negotiation process and exploring participants' visions and preferences, as in the case of the British case study. However, approaching the topic from the perspective of the impact of repetition on agreements about the final policy proposal, the repetition of Participant 11's suggestion was not effective at convincing the group. On the contrary, it divided the group and contributed to shifting the discussion to other considerations and priorities.

From the perspective of the impact of interactions on attitude-formation, the analysis highlighted **the joint effect of contestations and new perspectives as specific forms of interaction**. Furthermore, through the comparison of the British and Norwegian case studies it elaborated on **the differences in the function and effect of specific forms of interaction depending on the homogeneity or heterogeneity of views within the group**.

7.4.3 Polarization and de-polarization effects

So far, the findings of the chapter underline Sunstein's (2002, 2009) argument about the importance of the heterogeneity of views in relation to the nature of deliberations and to the scope of attitude-formation this can trigger. However, based on Sunstein's findings one more question remains to be asked: Did the British case study lead to group polarization, and did the Norwegian case study lead to de-polarization? To answer these questions, first we need to look at the specificities of the research design and the composition of the group. Second, we investigate (de-)polarization effects using the pre- and post-deliberation surveys to find out whether participants' preferences shifted to more or less extreme positions.

7.4.3.1 *Research design and composition of the groups*

Both discussions shared the research design and thus also the special arrangements aimed at facilitating a comprehensive, and diverse debate. As described in Chapter 3, the special arrangements included a representative sampling method, the over-representation of specific minorities in breakout groups, the provision of information in the form of information packages, the availability of social policy experts during the discussions, and the professional moderation of discussions. The actual outcome of sampling and division into

breakout groups and the moderation of the group discussions could have created differences in the actual conduct of debates, but these are factors which cannot be strictly controlled.

Previous research highlighted the relevance of the composition of groups in terms of participants' initial positions about specific issues (Grönlund et al., 2015). As WelfSOC DFs were initiated to discuss a wide array of welfare topics, the possibility of screening specific attitudinal positions – in our case, pro- or anti-immigration attitudes – was out of question. The sampling and division of participants into breakout groups considered only the key socio-demographic characteristics of participants. Therefore, within the DF there was no intention to affect group composition – the potential homogeneity or heterogeneity of opinion – based on participants' dispositions. This meant that the emerging homogeneity or heterogeneity of views was incidental. Therefore, while the DF included specific arrangements to enhance diverse debates, participants' dispositions were not controlled within the groups, allowing for the homogeneity or heterogeneity of views within the group to potentially change when discussing different issues. As the issue of immigration was highly salient when the DFs were conducted, the benefit of this arrangement was that we could analyse how powerful the mainstream discourses were in the given context.

7.4.3.2 Group polarization or de-polarization

Based on the differences identified between the two case studies, it is assumed that attitudes de-polarize in the Norwegian group, while attitudes in the British group tended to polarize. As noted, in the Norwegian group there was a relatively high level of heterogeneity in terms of participants' dispositions to the timing of immigrants' access to welfare benefits and services. Heterogeneity of views was characteristic of the group's discussion about immigration. As expected, the post-deliberation survey showed changes in participants' attitudes. While this research does not assume that such changes are constant, the changes do provide evidence that is of use in examining whether deliberations had polarization or de-polarization effects. Table 3 shows that, among the Red group, attitudes to immigrants substantially homogenized and shifted to a moderate position of requesting at least one-year of employment as a precondition for accessing social benefits. This outcome supports the findings of previous studies that deliberation in heterogeneous groups leads to the de-polarization of attitudes (Himmelroos and Christensen, 2014; Luskin et al., 2007). However, we need to note that this effect applies to the whole process of deliberation, and is not limited to the discussion analysed within this case study.

In contrast to the Norwegian case study, the British discussion raised concerns of group polarization. The homogeneity of the group was demonstrated throughout the discussion. Moreover, the pre-deliberation survey also showed that seven out of eleven participants shared the same preference. However, this in itself would not necessarily lead to group polarization unless participants shifted to extreme standpoints. Looking at the results of the post-deliberation survey presented in Table 3, we observe mixed results. On the one hand, there was a slight homogenization effect as the number of participants preferring one year of employment increased to eight. On the other hand, we can identify a shift towards more extreme positions as the number of participants who evinced a preference for refusing to ever grant immigrants access to benefits and services also increased from one to three.

Table 3 - Results of Before and After Survey, Norway, Red group and UK, Orange group

When should immigrants obtain rights to social benefits/ services?	Immediately on arrival	After a year, whether or not they have worked	After working and paying taxes for at least a year	Once they have become citizens	They should never get the same rights	Don't know
NO Red group - Before	3	0	4	2	0	3 ⁸¹
NO Red group - After	1	1	7	1	0	0
UK Orange group - Before	0	1	7	0	1	2
UK Orange group - After	0	0	8	0	3	0

Focusing on the shifts towards the most extreme survey response, we confirm the group polarization effects of the deliberations. However, if we focus on the dominant preferences, the tendencies are unchanged. The interpretation of these findings is especially challenging as the most dominant preference of requiring one year of employment represents a moderate position among the survey responses. However, the analysis revealed a much more restrictive approach. This suggests that the survey questions are not suitable for use in reflecting on more complex standpoints that would allow participants to indicate their restrictive preferences. A second explanation is that pressures for group conformism are greater during the discussion, but the impact on individual attitudes is lower (Forsyth, 2010; Isenberg, 1986). As both of these possibilities have significant implications for attitude

⁸¹ One participant from the Red group did not attend the DF on Day 2, who chose the “Don’t know” answer in the pre-deliberative survey.

research, the next chapter is devoted to exploring the process of attitude-formation at the level of individuals to reveal whether the attitudes expressed in the discussions are in line with the attitudes presented in surveys.

7.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter extended the scope of the analysis of attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in welfare states by stressing the relevance of examining the process of deliberation – how the group reaches agreement about policy proposals by the end of the DF. Firstly, this chapter argued that the research should not be limited to content analysis, but should investigate the process of the interactions through which participants share their attitudes and preferences. Secondly, to analyse the role and impact of interactions on attitude-formation, two case studies were presented. The analysis found substantial differences between how the discussions developed in the British and the Norwegian breakout groups. **In the UK, the consensus about the need for restrictive measures emerged early on in the debate, and it dominated the whole discussion.** As a result, the discussion concerned why these restrictions are seen as necessary and how to restrict immigrants' access to the welfare state. Therefore, participants' interactions were complementary, without questioning the need for restrictions. **In Norway, we can observe a greater diversity of preferences, creating a broader framework for debate about competing approaches to immigration.**

While both processes of discussion are driven by the same forms of interaction – contestation, new perspective, repetition, etc. – their impact on attitude-formation is significantly different. In the British discussion attitude-formation unfolds through the process of deploying arguments that underline the consensus. In the Norwegian discussion, attitude-formation emerges through the reconciliation of competing preferences. Although both processes generate precious information about attitude-formation, these differences need to be considered as **interactions take on different meanings and have different functions in the discussion depending on the homogeneity/heterogeneity of views.** Accordingly, specific forms of interaction have different impacts on attitudes in the group.

The findings of the analysis confirm previous research about the relevance of the composition of groups and the emerging homogeneity and heterogeneity of views within groups (Grönlund et al., 2015; Luskin et al., 2007; Smets and Isernia, 2014; Sunstein, 2002). However, the analysis also reveals that **despite the specific research design that was**

intended to facilitate the diversity of opinion in DFs, other factors influenced the direction and the outcome of discussions. This chapter found evidence for the impact of institutional and social context on the way the discussions developed. To be more specific, the analysis found that the high level of homogeneity within the British Orange group and the preference for restrictions was affected by the dominant negative public discourse about immigration. Furthermore, the institutional context – including immigration and welfare policies – enhanced a selective approach, further strengthening preferences for restriction as the correct response to the perceived issues. In contrast, competing views and preferences for inclusion and exclusion in the Norwegian discussions can be associated with the institutional and social context that enhanced both the value of and preference for social inclusion, and a preference for exclusion considering the greater awareness of the cultural differences between immigrants and natives.

The effects of polarization and de-polarization were analysed using the results of pre- and post-deliberation surveys. **While examination of the Norwegian case study confirmed the de-polarization of group participants' attitudes, the British case study showed inconclusive findings whether participants' attitudes shifted to a more extreme position.** To better elaborate on the effect of deliberation on individual attitudes, the following chapter analyses the process of individual attitude-formation.

8 THE DYNAMISM OF ATTITUDE-FORMATION AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL

In this chapter, the focus of the analysis remains on the dynamism of attitude-formation. Chapter 7 focused on the dynamism of attitude-formation within groups. It elaborated on the impact of the emerging homogeneity and heterogeneity of views within groups, and on the impact of the institutional and social context on the development and outcome of discussions. Furthermore, it aimed to analyse concerns of group polarization. However, the findings about group polarization tended to be inconclusive – especially in relation to the British discussion. As the emergence and the extent of group polarization is measured by analysing shifts in individuals' attitudes towards more extreme positions (Sunstein, 2002), the focus of this chapter shifts from group-level processes to the development of individual attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state. It is expected that **deliberation and interactions have a different impact on 1) groups – on the overall development of the discussions (Chapter 7); and on 2) individual participants and their attitudes**. Therefore, this chapter intends to **analyse how participants articulated their attitudes and how their attitudes changed as a result of deliberation** (related to *RQ3*).

Although there is an expanding literature on deliberation that specifically looks at the drivers of changes in attitudes (Barabas, 2004; Farrar et al., 2009; Gerber et al., 2014; Luskin et al., 2007), so far little attention has been devoted to the analysis of individuals' narratives. This also implies that deliberative researchers tended to disregard the role of coherent, ambivalent, and contradictory attitudes and the potential differences in how these specific types of attitudes develop during discussions and how these attitudes are reflected in post-deliberation surveys. While deliberation enables participants to elaborate on the complexity of attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in welfare states, including ambivalences and contradictory claims, pre- and post-deliberation surveys offer limited opportunity to express such complexity. **The analysis finds that, especially in the case of participants with ambivalent attitudes, shifts in attitudes emerge in the discussions, but these shifts tend to disappear in the survey responses**. This discrepancy raises the question what causes this lack of visible changes in survey responses. Addressing this question is important, as it has implications for evaluating the effects of deliberation. Similarly, it has implications for the study of group polarization, as the lack of visible changes in attitudes can also distort findings about group polarization.

In line with previous research, we argue that group conformism in public discussions can result in differences between publicly and privately shared attitudes (Fishkin, 2018; Luskin et al., 2007). However, this chapter argues that the latter is not only caused by group conformism. We also need to consider whether the pre- and post-deliberation surveys are appropriate for measuring shifts in attitudes which may be more subtle and nuanced than survey responses can capture. This consideration is particularly crucial in relation to participants with ambivalent attitudes, as the latter share both arguments for and against the inclusion of immigrants in the debates. Moreover, locating their ambivalent attitudes using a standardized questionnaire might be more challenging. To address both the impact of group conformism and the critical assessment of post-deliberation surveys, this chapter takes a more comprehensive approach to analysing shifts in attitudes examining shifts in attitudes not only in terms of changes between pre- and post-deliberation survey responses. **Using four case studies, it complements the survey findings with an analysis of participants' narratives about immigration during the two days of discussion.**

Acknowledging that the analysis of narratives and identification of coherent, ambivalent, and contradictory attitudes is possible only in the case of more active and talkative participants, this chapter examines the narratives of the two most active and most influential participants in the discussions of the Norwegian Red group and the British Orange group (analysed in Chapter 7). Thus, the selection of four participants was based on the (greatest) number of contributions made to the debate on immigration on Day 2. A further criterion was that the selected participants should have had significant impact on the development of discussions examined in Chapter 7.

While the previous chapter investigated how the selected participants' claims and interactions affected the outcome of discussions on immigration, this chapter **analyses their overall narrative about the issue of immigration** to reveal **how their individual attitudes tended to shift during the deliberation**. The key ambition of this chapter is thus to contribute to attitudinal research by 1) shedding light on the processes of individual attitude-formation through the analysis of individuals' narrative during the DF, and 2) examining how the specific types of attitudes were translated into the attitudes we see in the post-deliberation surveys.

8.1 WHAT KIND OF CHANGES IN ATTITUDES CAN BE EXPECTED IN DF?

One of the key distinguishing features of deliberative methods is the social learning effect of deliberation and a belief in the transformative nature of deliberation (Dryzek, 2005; Fishkin, 2018; Luskin et al., 2002). Accordingly, the effects of deliberation were primarily measured in terms of changes in attitudes. Participants of DFs are expected to have more informed and enlightened attitudes as a result of reasoned debates, due to their accessing new knowledge and considering a variety of arguments (Goodin and Niemeyer, 2003; Luskin et al., 2002). In line with such expectations for attitude change, scholarly preoccupation with the analysis of changes in attitudes increased, exploiting before- and after-surveys to find evidence of change. While preliminary studies tended to focus on and analyse net aggregate shifts in before- and post-deliberation attitudes, it has recently been more widely acknowledged that not only concrete changes in attitudes prove the success of deliberation (Barabas, 2004). Fishkin (2018) himself claims that the effects of deliberation should not be reduced to specific changes in attitudes as there might be great variability in how deliberation influences individual considerations.

Following Zaller and Feldman (1992), Barabas (2004) argues that survey responses can be understood as distributions of opinions which are underlined by specific considerations. Deliberation, access to new information and arguments raised for and against issues and policies affect the pool of available considerations. Thus, deliberations can help individuals to better locate their attitudes on the scale of available survey responses. *“The central idea is that pre-deliberative opinions blend with new information obtained via deliberation (or for that matter from any other message generating process) to determine the post-deliberative opinions jointly”* (Barabas, 2004: 689). Barabas (2004) calls this process “opinion updating” and argues that it can both lead to changes in attitudes and also to confirmation and the strengthening of individuals’ initial positions without any visible change in attitude.

Drawing on these claims, this chapter aims to elaborate on the underlying process of attitude-formation by focusing on both changed and updated attitudes. Considering both the attitudes articulated in the DF discussions and attitudes presented in pre- and post-deliberation surveys, this chapter distinguishes three types of post-deliberative attitudes:

1. **Changed attitude** – convincing arguments leading to change in attitude; the expectation is that attitude change can be followed up both in individual narratives and post-deliberation surveys.

2. **No change, but updated attitude** – initial position confirmed (Barabas, 2004), both pro- and counterarguments are equally convincing, thus individuals decide to stick to their initial position (Gerber et al., 2014); it is thus expected that individuals' narratives will underline the updated attitude presented in the post-deliberation survey.
3. **Change in attitude in survey, but no change in attitude in the narrative** – the change presented in post-deliberation surveys can be interpreted as clarification of individual positions on the scale of available survey responses (Barabas, 2004) – it is expected that individuals' narratives will be coherent with their post-deliberative survey response.

All three types of post-deliberative attitudes adhere to the theoretical ideal that deliberation leads to more enlightened and informed preferences. All three types draw on previous research findings about the power of reason (Farrar et al., 2009; Gerber et al., 2014; Himmelroos and Christensen, 2014) and on the relevance of participants' predispositions (Barabas, 2004; Gerber et al., 2014; Smets and Isernia, 2014). The last two types of post-deliberation attitude point out discrepancies between participants' narratives and the attitudes presented in the surveys, implying certain inconsistencies. This chapter is dedicated to exploring the process of attitude-formation, relying on both the narratives and on the pre- and post-deliberation surveys to elaborate on these inconsistencies. The focus is restricted to the potential impact of group conformism in group discussion, which is often considered to cause differences between publicly and privately shared attitudes (Luskin et al., 2007). Second, these gaps also raise the need to critically assess whether surveys can appropriately measure shifts in attitudes (Rosenberg, 2014).

While the previous chapters have discussed that some of the considerations induced ambivalence and contradictions in the debates, this chapter aims to disentangle how coherent, ambivalent, and contradictory attitudes emerge at the level of individual attitudes. This issue is especially pressing as surveys typically treat all attitudes the same way (Goerres and Prinzen, 2012), while people with ambivalent attitudes in particular might face challenges in locating their position in surveys.

8.2 DIFFERENTIATING COHERENT, AMBIVALENT, AND CONTRADICTIONARY ATTITUDES

The social constructivist concept of attitudes encourages us to acknowledge the variety of considerations that underline attitudes including the ambivalent and contradictory stances behind public attitudes, which tend to be hidden in survey-based research (Goerres and Prinzen, 2012). Within the scope of this chapter, coherent, ambivalent, and contradictory attitudes are conceived solely in relation to participants' pro- and anti-immigration attitudes, with a high level of dynamism expected with regard to pro-inclusion and pro-exclusion preferences between these two poles. As attitudes to immigrants' inclusion are articulated in relation to multiple dimensions, coherent, ambivalent, and contradictory attitudes is studied primarily in relation to subdimensions – like references to selective immigration system, integration, refugees, economic migrants, etc – see Table 2 and 4 – Appendix 3. Focusing on subdimensions is seen as justified as we can observe a high level of selectivity and variability as to which dimensions participants consider relevant. Joining in the discussion about specific sub-issues and sharing views and arguments can also be understood as a sign of importance for participants.

Coherent attitudes are understood as involving a consistent pro-immigration or anti-immigration narrative in terms of raising various features and dimensions of the issue. The identification of coherent attitudes does not rule out the possibility of attitudes changing in the post-deliberation survey, as raised in Section 8.1.

In terms of ambivalent attitudes, the research adheres to a definition by Wegener and colleagues (1995: 460): namely, *“the extent to which one’s reactions to an attitude object are evaluatively mixed in that both positive (favourable) and negative (unfavourable) elements are included.”* Although ambivalent attitudes are often conceived as weak attitudes, research findings show that an openness towards competing arguments, increased information processing, and a higher level of differentiation between stronger and weaker arguments make ambivalent attitudes strong and more stable (Jonas et al., 1997). Moreover, Maio and Haddock (2004) find that, especially concerning controversial issues, ambivalent attitudes make people seem more knowledgeable and fairer, which can also strengthen their position within the group.

As presented in Table 2 and 4 – Appendix 3 there were only few participants whose narratives about immigration revealed contradictory attitudes. It is important to note that within the discussions these participants were not explicitly confronted with their

contradictory stances and claims. Due to the low number of occurrences, the following analysis does not include any contributions from participants with contradictory attitudes.

As the identification of coherent, ambivalent, and contradictory attitudes is only possible by analysing participants' engagement in the discussion and narratives about immigration, four case studies were selected to examine shifts in attitudes and preferences for the inclusion of immigrants. However, the analysis of individual narratives has certain limitations. One of them is that only active participants' narratives are extensive enough to provide sufficient data to qualify for the analysis. Therefore, drawing on the case studies presented in Chapter 7, and utilizing readers' familiarity with the discussions, the two most active and most influential participants were selected for this analysis. Along these criteria, Participant 8 and Participant 11 were selected from the Norwegian Red group and Participant 84 and Participant 90 were selected from the British Orange group. From these four participants, Participant 8 articulated a coherent pro-immigration attitude, while the remaining three participants shared ambivalent attitudes towards the inclusion of immigrants. Interestingly, a change in attitudes as represented in pre- and post-deliberation surveys was identified only in the case of Participant 8. The other three participants did not change their preferences in the post-deliberation survey.

Focusing on the group of participants with ambivalent attitudes, we can observe a weaker tendency towards a change in attitudes, as supported by the post-deliberation surveys. As shown in Table 1 – Appendix 3, in the Norwegian DF nine participants articulated ambivalent attitudes towards the inclusion of immigrants. From these participants, four changed their attitudes in the post-deliberation survey. However, two of the participants changed their opinion from a “Don't know” answer, which supports the claim that deliberation informs and reduces the uncertainties of participants. In the British discussions, eight participants were identified as sharing ambivalent attitudes – see Table 3 – Appendix 3. Among British participants with ambivalent attitudes only two participants changed their attitude in the post-deliberation survey. Here, one of them changed from a “No answer”. These patterns draw our attention to differences in the process of attitude-formation of participants with ambivalent and coherent attitudes. Moreover, focusing specifically on participants with ambivalent attitudes, it also raises the question **what explains the lack of a shift in attitude in the pre- and post-deliberation surveys. This chapter argues that both group conformism as well as the limitations of the survey method contribute to such discrepancies.**

To analyse the potential effects of group conformism during the process of attitude-formation, this chapter proposes specific measures. Throughout the chapter, particular attention is devoted to examining 1) the occurrence and use of majority opinion; 2) counter-arguments to majority opinion; 3) the acceptance of others' arguments; 4) the uptake of others' arguments, and 5) changes in views and arguments during the two days of discussion.⁸² Using these indicators, individuals' positions about the emerging majority opinion are examined and their engagement with majority opinion is assessed to reveal whether they contributed to the homogeneity or heterogeneity of views within the group discussion.

While the WelfSOC pre- and post-deliberation survey included three questions about immigration,⁸³ only one question directly touched upon individuals' preferences for immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state. Therefore, shifts in attitudes is analysed based on responses to the question "*With regard to people who come to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?*" This question measures preferences for inclusion on a five-point scale. Responses range from the preference for granting immediate access to social rights as the most inclusive, and never granting social rights to immigrants as the most exclusive option, and in a broad understanding represent the different principles of conditional access to welfare provisions.

The following four case studies are included to help examine the processes of attitude-formation of three participants with ambivalent attitudes and one participant with a coherent attitude. The latter case forms an important part of the analysis as it draws attention to another way how the exclusive use of pre- and post-deliberation surveys can distort findings about the effect of deliberations.

⁸² Definition of these principles was partly inspired by the indicators of quality of discussion in Gerber et al. 2016.

⁸³ Please see Table 1 and 3 – Appendix 3 for further details on survey questions and responses.

8.3 CASE STUDIES

8.3.1 The narrative of a coherent pro-immigration attitude – Participant 8

In the discussion by the Norwegian Red group, Participant 8⁸⁴ played a crucial role as he stood up for his dissenting views twice, as presented in Chapter 7. Following his intervening questions, the initial proposal of requiring immigrants to pass a Norwegian language exam was first detailed, and later substantially reformulated. However, in this chapter the focus is not on how his contributions affected the development of the discussion. The following analysis intends to analyse how Participant 8's attitudes were articulated through his contributions to the debates and compared to the attitudes presented in the pre- and post-deliberation surveys. Throughout the discussion, his views reflected **a coherent pro-immigration attitude, which relied on future-oriented considerations and on the conviction that immigrants will be both economically and socially needed in the country** considering the challenges of an aging population. Participant 8 argued for open border policies and saw the benefits of the international mobility of resourceful migrants.

During the discussions, the issue of deportation particularly engaged him in the discussion. First, he entered the conversation on policy proposals by raising questions and arguing for a differentiated approach to the potential deportation of refugees (due to failed language exams) considering the life-threatening circumstances in the country of origin. While he acknowledged the importance of language learning, during the discussion he took a more inclusive stance by emphasising economic activity and contributions as key criteria for staying in the country for all immigrants, regardless of the place of origin.

The same rationale emerged when participants discussed the lengthy process of recognizing refugee status and expressed their discontent that asylum-seekers are not allowed to work. In accordance with other participants, Participant 8 condemned the inactivity of asylum-seekers. This emphasis on economic activities considerably explains why Participant 8 views access to welfare benefits without contributing as the biggest issue. While he articulated a preference for stopping immigrants' access to welfare without contributing, he did not make any suggestions about how to deal with this issue. His conviction about the value of employment was further elaborated in a reference when he described the global humanitarian benefits of employing immigrants.

⁸⁴ Participant 8 – Male, Age 25-34, Student, Education – Tertiary (Masters), Household income – 4th decile, Political affiliation Christian Democratic.

8.3.1.1 *Challenging the emerging majority opinion*

The analysis of Participant 8's contributions to the debate on immigration – constituting 24 references of varying length – shows a coherent pro-immigration attitude. Table 4 summarizes Participant 8's engagement in the discussions concerning the key indicators for tracing the effects of group conformism. Within the discussions, he respected others' arguments and sometimes took up and agreed with the argumentation of other participants. However, considering his overall participation we can observe that he was more likely to enter the discussions to challenge the developing majority opinion in the areas he viewed as most important – such as preventing the deportation of refugees, and promoting the economic activities of immigrants (seven occasions). **While he showed a willingness to reach a consensus about policy proposals, he expressed his disagreement, what indicates the strength of his own beliefs.** Based on these findings, we conclude that group conformism had no impact on Participant 8.

Table 4 - Assessment of Participant 8's participation in the discussions

	Participant 8 - D2
Occurrence and use of majority opinion	3
Counter-argument to majority opinion	7
Accepting others' arguments	4
Uptake of others' arguments	2
Change in views, arguments	0
Raising a specific immigration issue	3

8.3.1.2 *Discrepancy between Participant 8's narrative and post-deliberation survey response*

Based on his participation in the discussion, we cannot identify any shift in Participant 8's opinions and attitudes to immigrants' inclusion. However, this finding contrasts with the change in his post-deliberation survey response to the question about immigrants' inclusion. Participant 8 was one of the few participants who preferred to grant immigrants immediate access to welfare benefits and services in the pre-deliberation survey, which position can be associated with his open border priorities. However, this preference may be less consistent with his discontent with migrants who do not contribute but enjoy welfare benefits. In the post-deliberation survey, he shifted to the requirement of one year, but without the requirement of work, which on the scale of survey responses represented a slightly more restrictive preference – also slightly reducing the inconsistency between his views in the debates and in the survey. This shift in preferences resembles the third type of post-

deliberation attitude – as defined in Section 8.1 – showing no change in attitudes in the discussion, but clarifying his position in the post-deliberation survey, which better matched his narrative in the debate. On the one hand, this shift in preferences underlines the strength of deliberation in terms of clarifying the participant’s position on the scale of inclusive and exclusive preferences. On the other hand, it points at the difficulties survey respondents face when asked to choose the survey response that is most applicable to them, and how they weigh various standpoints and considerations to come to a conclusion that corresponds to the criteria presented in the pre-defined survey responses.

Although the question on immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state is primarily considered here, it is worth checking Participant 8’s responses to the other two immigration-related questions. In line with his pro-immigration stances, he indicated that immigrants contribute more than they received (on the related 0-10 scale, he chose 01 in the pre-deliberation survey and 02 in the post-deliberation survey). In relation to the survey question concerning whether welfare benefits attract migrants to Norway, Participant 8 first took a neutral – neither agree nor disagree – position, and then in the post-deliberation survey disagreed with this proposition, which also supports his pro-immigration narrative.

To conclude, the analysis of Participant 8’s narrative and survey responses shows that **deliberation helps participants to clarify their own position in relation to the survey questions**. In this particular case, we can observe that the **change in attitudes presented in the post-deliberation surveys is not the result of changing opinions about the conditions of inclusion of immigrants, as during the discussion Participant 8 presented a coherent attitude, not adjusting to emerging, more restrictive majority opinions and preferences**. This highlights that even people with coherent and unchanging attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion to the welfare state face difficulties choosing the most applicable answer in a survey situation.

8.3.2 The narrative of complex and diverse considerations and ambivalent attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion – Participant 11

Participant 11⁸⁵ was the most dominant and most active member of the Norwegian Red Group, not only in relation to immigration, but overall to all topics discussed during the two days. Due to his intensive involvement in the debates (a total of 70 references to

⁸⁵ Participant 11 – Male, Age 25-34, Working full-time, Education – Tertiary (Masters), Household income – 8th decile, Political affiliation – Conservative.

immigration), we have access to a more nuanced description of his opinions and attitudes. Throughout the debate, his contributions reflected a complex approach to social issues. He brought important arguments into the discussions, but he also adopted a consensus-seeking attitude to reach agreement. Therefore, we can identify **fluctuations in his views and emerging ambivalence both in terms of inclusive and exclusive stances, and in relation to the use of economic and cultural reasoning.**

Within the debates on immigration he took clear stances on immigrants' employment, the role of education for enhancing immigrants' labour market integration, access to welfare, integration and language and how these all are interlinked together. For instance, concerning income inequality, he elaborated on the negative effects of having immigrants employed in low-paid sectors also associated with greater need for welfare support. Therefore, he emphasized the role of education and re-training to prevent the deepening of the gap between nationals and immigrants.

In line with these positions, he emphasised immigrants' labour market integration. He reflected on cases in which immigrants refuse employment opportunities due to cultural reasons. However, he also showed awareness of employers' discriminative practices – not giving a chance to people with foreign names. In the discussion he became the key advocate for strict language requirements as demonstrated in Chapter 7. Through the interactions and other participants' objections, he clarified the differences between refugees and economic migrants in terms of free access to language courses (for refugees, but not for economic migrants), and regarding the consequences of non-compliance. Although he accepted dissenting views and his suggestion was re-formulated, he kept restating the relevance of language, which shows the importance he associated with language. While he mainly framed his preferences for defining language requirements in relation to employment, later he revealed that these are also linked to concerns about immigrants not adapting to Norwegian society.

Regarding perceptions of cultural differences, he held several ambivalent positions, backing measures to support immigrants' integration – e.g. in relation to housing policies he was in favour of settling immigrants in areas where the highest-income, predominantly Norwegian, population lives. At the same time, he was critical of the low level of female employment, blaming cultural differences for this. He claimed that access to welfare benefits has a particularly negative effect on immigrant women's employment, which leads to delays in the integration of immigrant children as they do not attend childcare facilities. Therefore, he

argued for eliminating cash benefits that discourage employment, even if this requires that Norwegians lose access to them.

Underlining his emphasis on employment, he agreed with the suggestion of enhancing asylum-seekers' opportunity to obtain employment during the process of the evaluation of their applications. Furthermore, acknowledging that not all asylum-seekers are eligible for international protection, he raised whether non-eligible asylum-seekers should be admitted as economic migrants, arguing that there is need for manpower in Norway.

8.3.2.1 Articulation of ambivalence increases the tendency to group conformism during the discussions

As the above analysis shows, Participant 11 presented himself as a person who is aware of social issues and is able to distinguish various aspects – both positive and negative – of social issues and how they relate to each other. Accordingly, in his stances we can identify ambivalence. On the one hand, he supported immigration to address labour market needs and supported immigrants' integration. On the other hand, he was also concerned about the potentially negative effects of immigration through increasing inequality in Norway. In his statements he often referred implicitly and explicitly to the need to maintain the status quo and to use integration to prevent any increase in social inequality. However, he also proposed exclusive measures for making immigrants adapt to Norwegian society and thus maintain the status quo. Therefore, in his narrative we can often identify the balancing and bringing in of different perspectives. However, the question remains, how were his contributions influenced by the group?

As shown in Table 5, on Day 1 Participant 11 entered the discussion primarily by raising counter-arguments against the developing majority opinion on immigration. In comparison, on Day 2, devoted to formulating policy proposals, his participation changed. While counter-arguments remained dominant in his contributions, he also supported and argued for the majority opinion. He also tried to push the discussions toward more restrictive preferences, as we can recall from Chapter 7. Despite this, he respected other participants' disagreements and counterarguments and was willing to elaborate his proposals or to make concessions. In his contributions on Day 2 we can identify certain shifts in preferences. However, **focusing on his overall narrative, it is questionable whether these shifts were fully due to persuasion or rather signs of group conformism.** On the one hand, he himself articulated ambivalent positions, which enabled him to be more flexible throughout the discussions. On the other

hand, the fact that he kept returning to the same issues and raising new arguments in favour of them indicates that these shifts were rather aimed at reconciling differing views and facilitating consensus in the group. Therefore, we conclude that **group conformism impacted the way he articulated his attitudes. The shifts in opinion were less significant, especially if we take into account his ambivalent positions and structured, complex considerations about immigration.**

Table 5 - Assessment of Participant 11's participation in the discussions

	Participant 11 - D1	Participant 11 - D2
Occurrence and use of majority opinion	0	4
Counter-argument to majority opinion	3	5
Accepting others' arguments	2	5
Uptake of others' arguments	1	8
Change in views, arguments	0	3
Raising a specific immigration issue	1	7

8.3.2.2 Updating attitudes – deliberation strengthening initial positions

Participant 11 articulated a largely pro-immigration attitude, but with restrictive preferences. Comparison of his stances to the attitudes presented in the surveys shows that his reasoning represents the second type of post-deliberation attitude defined in Section 8.1: an updated attitude. **The effect of deliberation emerged more in the form of confirming and strengthening his initial attitude.** Considering the wide-ranging arguments he raised both for and against the inclusion of immigrants, it might not be surprising that he chose the requirement of citizenship in both the pre- and post-deliberation survey. On the one hand, this choice is inconsistent with the views presented in the debates, where he argued for the requirement of one-year of employment before accessing benefits, but granting immediate access to some benefits to refugees. On the other hand, in more broadly interpreting the survey question, the preferences for citizenship, the second most restrictive measure among the five available options can be understood as a choice which resembled his preference for requiring immigrants to learn the Norwegian language and adapt to the Norwegian way of life. Thus, emphasising the more restrictive stances that he articulated on Day 2.

While his attitudes to immigrants' inclusion did not change, regarding the question whether immigrants are net contributors to the welfare system his survey responses changed from rather neutral (choosing 6 on a scale of 0-10) to a more positive (choosing 3) seeing immigrants more as contributors. Although on Day 2 Participant 11 articulated certain restrictive preferences regarding immigrant families and women's access to benefits, his

overall narrative with both inclusive and exclusive stances counterbalances such restrictive proposals and justifies his post-deliberation response – updating rather than changing attitudes. Concerning the question whether welfare benefits encourage immigration to the country, he agreed/strongly agreed.

To sum up, his contribution to the debates shows that his attitudes to immigration are based on various perceptions and considerations and, accordingly, his views tended to shift in the discussions. On the one hand, these **shifts can be understood as attempts to balance the various aspects that were required to be taken into account**. On the other hand, especially in the Day 2 discussions, we can identify **the impact of group conformism in the shifts in his views and preferences**. While **his ambivalent positions unfold in the discussion, they are not revealed in the survey situation**. Participant 11's pre- and post-deliberation survey responses are largely consistent with the key arguments in his narrative and can be understood as a position of reconciliation towards the inclusion of immigrants.

8.3.3 The narrative of an ambivalent attitude centred on the expectation of employment and contribution – Participant 84

During the two days of discussion, Participant 84⁸⁶ was the most active participant within the British Orange group. His overall participation in the debates shows ambivalent attitudes. The most salient threshold of inclusion for him was the requirement of employment and contributions.

On Day 1 he joined the discussion about refugees, elaborating on the security issues involved with receiving refugees whose background is difficult to check. Focusing on security aspects, he stressed the difference between migration within the EU and the issue of refugees, but called for monitoring both types of immigration. In relation to economic migrants, he joined the discussion as other participants complained about the misuse of welfare benefits and raised the need to develop the skills of nationals instead of bringing in a foreign labour force. Participant 84 was the first to present another perspective that recognized the strong work ethic of Polish and Romanian migrants in comparison to British nationals. However, he also raised the issue of small income difference between working for minimum wage and taking up welfare benefits as a driver of the limited willingness of nationals to take low-paid jobs.

⁸⁶ Participant 84 – Male, Age 45-54, Working full-time, Education – Upper secondary, Household income – 8th decile, Political affiliation – Conservative.

On Day 2, Participant 84 took on the role of note-taker, which meant that he more frequently raised questions regarding the direction of the discussion and summarized the groups' decisions about proposals. However, besides these references he also took an active part in the discussion primarily in relation to the requirements of employment and conditions of contributing before accessing welfare benefits. At the beginning of the discussion Participant 84, using the data included in the information package,⁸⁷ admitted that he also thought that the share of EU migrants was greater than in reality, and that EU migrants come to the UK to work. As a response to Participant 90's question whether all of them work, Participant 84 shifted the debate to immigrants' access to welfare benefits, arguing that two, three, or five years of employment should be required before accessing benefits. While he echoed this preference several times in the debate, the fact that he mentioned different periods signalled his indecisiveness, and neither did he provide further arguments for any specific period. In his later references he tended to use "at least two years" or "two to five years". Later, he also mentioned direct payments into the system worth two years of contributions as another form of potential contribution. This suggestion further proves the centrality of financial considerations and in-group interests behind his preference. He expected the government to keep control over welfare recipients, including immigrants, and to take measures and enforce deportation of immigrants in the case of non-compliance. During the debate Participant 84 also reflected on the migrants' perspective, arguing that from their point of view it is a rational choice to be unemployed in a country with higher living standards. While he clearly indicated his disagreement with such conduct, he highlighted the financial considerations and the self-interest involved in accessing a higher level of benefits than in the country of origin, and the informed choice of migrants to move to another country.

Agreeing with other participants, he also perceived an increase in capacity-related challenges in the areas of education, housing, and healthcare due to immigration. He claimed that this needs to be tackled by the state rejecting and not trusting the market to take care of such important services. He also found it problematic that investment in the development of infrastructure needs to be made now suspecting that related benefits would not return in the future.

⁸⁷ For more information on information packages provided before Day 2 of DF, please see Chapter 3 – Section 3.3.1.4.

During the discussion about an immigration cap, Participant 84 repeated the need to differentiate between EU and Non-EU migration several times. Furthermore, he stressed the incompatibility of an immigration cap and EU open border policies. However, he did not elaborate on these stances, nor make any suggestions about how to reconcile the proposed immigration cap with free movement regulations within the EU. He only argued for selecting the skilled migrants needed for the country. Later in the debate he further detailed who is needed and who may be accepted in the country – expecting migrants to work, pay taxes, pay rent, or buy a house, and purchase goods. Moreover, he emphasised the need for a labour force as the key rationale behind allowing people to come to the UK.

8.3.3.1 *Tendencies to group conformism, but no significant shift in attitudes*

Analysis of Participant 84’s engagement in the discussion shows that on both days he articulated his attitude to immigrants in reaction to other participants’ stances by contesting or raising a new perspective on the issue. He rarely raised new agenda for the discussion.

Table 6 - Assessment of Participant 84’s participation in the discussions

	Participant 84 - D1	Participant 84 - D2
Occurrence and use of majority opinion	1	5
Counter-argument to majority opinion	2	6
Accepting others’ arguments	0	1
Uptake of others’ arguments	1	2
Change in views, arguments	0	1
Raising a specific immigration issue	0	0

Comparing his participation on Day 1 and Day 2, Table 6 shows that Participant 84 took both sides – conforming with the majority opinion, but also articulating arguments against it. Although he raised counter-arguments, his narrative reveals that his arguments were often formal and lacked concrete justifications or alternative suggestions, which could have weakened their persuasive power. The only change in his views may be associated with the information provided in the information package regarding the share of EU migrants. While this change is related to the DF, it is not a result of interaction with other participants. **Although we can identify tendencies towards group conformism, these do not seem to have been strong enough to induce changes in Participant 84’s views or attitude.**

8.3.3.2 Updating attitudes - strengthened initial positions in the post-deliberation survey, and evidence for group conformism

The way Participant 84 participated in the discussions, and the views he shared, are consistent in relation to attitudes to working and contributing migrants. Throughout the debate he primarily employed economic arguments and in-group interests to support his preferences for an immigration cap and conditions for accessing welfare benefits. This consistency is valid regarding his survey responses, where he indicated a requirement of at least one year of contribution as a condition for accessing the same rights as British citizens.

Similarly, no change can be identified in relation to the other two immigration-related survey questions. It is worth to note, that in relation to the question about immigrants' contribution, he thought immigrants receive more (choosing 9 on a 0-10 scale), which explains why he insisted on the requirement of at least two years contribution to the welfare state. However, within the discussions he does not elaborate on this view explicitly.

To sum up, Participant 84 did not hold a clear pro-immigration attitude in the debates, but pointed out other aspects of immigration several times. The main ambivalence in his attitudes is based on the differentiation between contributing and non-contributing migrants, which he aimed to reconcile by imposing stricter conditions related to the requirement of contributing to earn access to welfare benefits and services. **Based on the analysis of Participant 84's narrative, and his pre- and post-deliberation responses, we can conclude that the deliberation strengthened, but did not change Participant 84's attitudes.**

8.3.4 The narrative of an ambivalent attitude and positioning between in-group and out-group identities – Participant 90

Participant 90⁸⁸ played a very specific role in the British Orange group as she was the only participant with a migration-related background, which fact also emerged in the discussions. Furthermore, in comparison to other topics, she was more active in the discussions about immigration on both days. Within the debates she represented both in-group and out-group identities and views, which makes her case particularly relevant for analysis. Throughout the debate she argued for a restrictive approach towards immigration control and immigrants' access to welfare benefits, but ambivalences often emerged as she discussed these issues.

⁸⁸ Participant 90 – Female, Age 25-34, Working full-time, Education – Upper Secondary, Household income – 5th decile, Migration background – moved to the UK 6-10 years ago, Political affiliation – Labour.

She joined the discussion about immigration on the first day by arguing that issues with immigration stem from the government's misconduct and lack of control over immigration. However, she also shared her perception that the issue of immigrants' access to welfare benefits triggers discontent in majority society. Therefore, she called for more regulations and the requirement that immigrants contribute before accessing welfare benefits and the NHS specifically. When the group discussed the contributions of migrants, reflecting on the hard work and strong work ethic of Polish migrants, as stated by Participant 88, and contrasted this with the attitude of the in-group, Participant 90 revealed her Polish identity. She shared her experience of working long hours for low wages and not receiving any benefits as she did not qualify for them. Furthermore, she stated that she does not consider it fair that it is especially people on benefits (within the in-group) that accuse Polish people of taking their jobs. In reaction to her statement, Participant 81 clarified the difference between working migrants and migrants coming to take benefits. Others also confirmed their acceptance of contributing migrants, and Participant 90 stressed her condemnation of migrants who come only because of benefits. However, later in the discussion she raised the fact that the issue is the responsibility of the government, and individuals should not be blamed if the authorities allow them to enter.

On Day 2 she took a much harsher position in the debates, in favour of strict immigration control especially in relation to EU migrants. Despite the fact that she is an EU migrant, she claimed that EU migration is out of control in contrast to Non-EU migration, which is based on more regulated procedures. According to her, the key differentiation is between working and inactive migrants. Although there are regulations that should ensure that inactive (EU) migrants leave the country, these are not enforced by the government. Thus, she emphasised again the responsibility of the government, but also admitted the difficulty of tracking inactive migrants. Throughout the debate she supported the proposal of an immigration cap and also suggested monitoring immigrants' economic activities in the country and defining clear criteria for staying in the country. She claimed that long-term unemployed migrants (four-five years) should be deported. As a reaction to other participants' concerns about the costs of infrastructure development, she suggested increasing the tax payments of newly arriving immigrants, which should also be paid by migrants who claim welfare benefits. She defended her suggestion by claiming she would not mind paying more tax if that guaranteed her stay in the country.

Ambivalence also emerged concerning her stance on refugees. She recognized the neediness of refugees and was willing to provide help. However, taking a long-term perspective she

shared her concern that refugees become dependent on welfare benefits. Therefore, she argued for closely monitoring who is really eligible for asylum, and who could be returned. Furthermore, she stated that if refugees stay in the country then they should be expected to be of financial benefit – taking a clear stand on protecting in-group interests.

8.3.4.1 Ambivalent attitudes with clear evidence for group conformism on Day 2

Comparison of Participant 90's engagement in the discussions on Day 1 and Day 2 reveals crucial differences. While on Day 1 she tended to be the voice of the minority opinion, bringing in the perspective and experiences of working immigrants, on Day 2 she became the main advocate of the majority opinion, calling for restrictions. This change in roles is indicated in Table 7. On Day 1, Participant 90 equally supported the majority opinion and challenged it. Thus, sharing both the in-group (the British majority) and out-group (immigrant minority) perspectives on immigration. However, on Day 2 we can identify a substantial decline in counter-arguments against majority opinions and she almost completely abandoned her reflections from the immigrants' perspective. This change indicates **the effects of group conformism, which may have been strengthened due to the immigration background of Participant 90 and her intention of proving her place in British society as a working and contributing 'good immigrant'.**

Group conformism also influenced how she articulated her ambivalent positions. Although on Day 2, Participant 90 kept articulating and revealing ambivalence by elaborating on different aspects of immigration, this occurred less frequently than on Day 1. This shift is also indicated in the changes in her views and arguments on Day 2, as shown in Table 7.

Table 7 - Assessment of Participant 90's participation in the discussions

	Participant 90 - D1	Participant 90 - D2
Occurrence and use of majority opinion	5	8
Counter-argument to majority opinion	5	1
Accepting others' arguments	0	1
Uptake of others' arguments	1	2
Change in views, arguments	0	2
Raising a specific immigration issue	3	2

8.3.4.2 Discrepancy between Participant 90's narrative and the post-deliberation survey responses

Within the debates, Participant 90 articulated rather restrictive attitudes to immigration. However, the way she articulated her views about immigration revealed ambivalence. She stressed the positive side of immigration in relation to working immigrants, defining a clear threshold for inclusion depending on the contribution of immigrants. This is consistent with her preference in the pre- and post-deliberation survey (requiring at least one year of employment and contribution). However, **this lack of change in attitude contrasts with expectations based on her narrative, as on Day 2 she became one of the participants with the most restrictive preferences.** Therefore, it is challenging to interpret her attitudes in the post-deliberation survey. First, we can argue that the former proposals, even if more restrictive, still rest on the principles of requiring employment and contributions. Furthermore, employment and making a contribution were the most salient issues she discussed during the debate. This interpretation would justify **her choice in the post-deliberation survey as a sign of a strengthened attitude.** However, this unchanged choice also implies an inability to reflect on ambivalences clearly articulated in the debates. Second, we can argue that the **shifts towards a more restrictive attitude were more likely to be the result of a higher level of group conformism on Day 2, not a result of changes in attitude** as her focus remained on the same issues.

Considering her view on the question whether availability of welfare benefits attract migrants to the country did not change. However, concerning the question about the contribution of immigrants, her position shifted to more restrictive stances seeing immigrants as receiving more benefits than they contribute (shifting from scoring 6 to 8 on the 0-10 scale), which underlines the effect of group conformism in relation to the most salient issue within the debates triggering restrictive proposals. Thus, lending support to the findings of Chapter 7 about the potential polarization effects of homogeneity of views in groups.

8.4 THE ADDED VALUE OF ANALYSING INDIVIDUAL NARRATIVES AND SURVEY RESPONSES TOGETHER

Each case study demonstrated a particular narrative and a particular understanding of the issue of immigration, through which we could observe how the selected individuals articulated their views and attitudes. Some of the participants participated more extensively, bringing more wide-reaching considerations and arguments to the debates (as Participant 11), while others were more selective about which aspects of their attitudes they wanted to share with the group, and elaborated on two or three specific aspects in the debates.

Focusing on the process of attitude-formation, we can observe that **the group and the interactions influenced both when and how individual participants engaged in the discussion** (whether they joined the discussion to support or challenge the arguments and proposals shared therein) and in relation to which (sub)issue. However, shifts in individual attitudes often did not correspond to the changes in the group discussion. In other words, **the key moments in the development of the discussion – as examined in Chapter 7 – did not necessarily have the same effect on individuals resulting shifts in individual attitudes.** This was revealed in the narrative of Participant 84 with regard to the share of EU nationals among migrants, which was important for Participant 84 personally, but did not gain relevance in the group discussion.⁸⁹ Another example is the shift from language requirements to economic conditions for staying in the country in the Norwegian Red group, such as when Participant 11's proposal was challenged and reformulated. While Participant 11 accepted and agreed with the shift towards applying economic conditions, his later references revealed that he preferred to incorporate the learning of the Norwegian language into the proposals. Such differences in the impact of specific interactions on the group and on individuals imply the relevance of the dynamics between the group and the individuals (Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 2007). This shows, that the reconciliation of varying views involves different processes at the level of the group, and at the level of the individual.

Second, the case studies identified certain discrepancies between the attitudes presented in the discussions and the attitudes presented in the pre- and post-deliberation surveys. Accordingly, the case studies aimed to scrutinize the reasons for these discrepancies, focusing both on the role of group conformism and on an assessment of the appropriateness

⁸⁹ Limited reactions to statistical data can be due to personal beliefs and distrust in this form of information. In other British discussion groups, some participants openly stated that they did not trust statistics.

of the survey method for revealing shifts in attitudes. Furthermore, the analysis found that these discrepancies tended to differ in the case of participants with ambivalent and coherent attitudes. The case studies showed that group conformism tended to be more influential in relation to participants with ambivalent attitudes. The complementary analysis of narratives and post-deliberation attitudes revealed that issues regarding the use of surveys emerged with participants with both ambivalent and coherent attitudes. The following sections address these differences between ambivalent and coherent attitudes and the effects of deliberation on individual attitude-formation.

8.4.1 Studying the effects of deliberation on public attitudes

The broader analysis of coherent, ambivalent, and contradictory attitudes showed that it was especially participants with ambivalent attitudes who were less likely to change their attitudes in the post-deliberation surveys – see Table 1-4 – Appendix 3. Three out of four case studies focused on the process of attitude-formation of participants with ambivalent attitudes, finding varying levels of group conformism in the DF discussions, and evidence for the limitations of surveys with regard to people with ambivalent attitudes.

8.4.1.1 *Ambivalent attitudes and group conformism*

Focusing on participants with ambivalent attitudes, the narratives of Participant 11, Participant 84 and Participant 90 indicate greater fluctuation between pro-inclusion and pro-exclusion stances. However, the analysis also shows the broader tendency for deliberations to strengthen initial attitudes. To disentangle the reasons for this phenomenon of updating but not changing of attitudes, the case studies looked at the effects of group conformism, assessing the consistency of individual narratives about immigration and their survey responses.

The case studies show that participants with ambivalent attitudes were more liable to group conformism. First, at the individual level, by **having both positive and negative stances about immigration, the former tended to be more flexible in embracing the direction the group preferred.** Second, in sharing both positive and negative considerations in relation to immigration, **participants with ambivalent attitudes are also more dependent on how other participants react to this articulated ambivalence. The feedback (or lack of reaction) of other participants can essentially inform individuals about the level of openness toward**

other, competing opinions within the group. The analysis of Participant 90's attitudes reveals that group conformism greatly influenced her engagement in the discussion abandoning reflections on minority opinions on Day 2. Furthermore, in relation to one of the survey questions her response shifts to more restrictive preferences.

These findings indicate that **group conformism emerged in different forms and to a varying extent in the discussions.** Both the use of the specific indicators of engagement with majority opinions (see Table 4-7) and the comparison of post-deliberation attitudes with the participants' narratives captured different forms of group conformism during the deliberation. In the case of Participant 11 in the Norwegian Red group, group conformism unfolded in Participant 11's narrative as he tended to use and support the majority opinion more, while counter-arguments decreased when comparing his participation on the first and second day. As described above, the highest level of group conformism was identified in relation to Participant 90. While on Day 1 she articulated minority views several times in the discussion, on Day 2 she advocated for the majority – restrictive – opinion. While her narrative clearly raises polarization effects – as discussed in Chapter 7; shift towards more restrictive stances in her survey responses occurred only in relation to the question on immigrants' contribution, which was the most salient issue within the Orange group suggesting also stronger effects of group conformism.

These findings show that **group conformism acted to shape how people articulated their attitudes.** However, this chapter also argues that group conformism alone cannot explain the discrepancies between the shifts in attitudes in the narrative and the lack of changes in the pre- and post-deliberation surveys. It is argued that this lack of change post-deliberation attitudes – in relation to the central question about conditions of immigrants' inclusion in welfare state – is also caused by difficulty to reflecting on ambivalent positions that demand reconciliation of participants' views.

8.4.1.2 Ambivalent attitudes and the challenges of responding to survey questions

One of the main critiques of public opinion surveys is that they involve the use of a rigid framework for measuring attitudes to a limited number of questions (Goerres and Prinzen, 2012). Thus, what is captured in surveys is a more static picture of attitudes which does not enable participants to reflect on their understanding of the issue, or reveal ambivalent attitudes (Goerres and Prinzen, 2012). In a survey situation a participant is required to choose

only one answer – i.e. to reduce their position on an issue to a single response. As the case studies show, participants with ambivalent attitudes face a greater challenge reconciling their pro-inclusion and pro-exclusion preferences.

This reconciliation or weighing of own views can activate various strategies for locating respondents' positions within the available options. The case studies attempted to elaborate on the potential strategies based on the narratives of participants considering the high level of salience of particular issues, strong support for certain principles of inclusion (or exclusion), and the relative pro-inclusion – pro-exclusion stance represented on the scale of options. Furthermore, the literature assumes that people with ambivalent attitudes are more inclined to choose a moderate position (Goerres and Prinzen, 2012; Klopfer and Madden, 1980). This was the case of Participant 84 and Participant 90, but Table 3 – Appendix 3 shows that in the UK out of the eight participants with ambivalent attitudes seven selected the median position in the post-deliberation survey. In Norway, similarly, seven out of nine participants with an ambivalent attitude chose the median response. Therefore, the question arises: if surveys require participants to reconcile and reduce their views to one statement, are they an appropriate means of measuring shifts in attitudes and assessing the effects of deliberations? The relevance of this question is also stressed by the case study that focused on a participant with coherent pro-immigration attitudes, for whom discrepancies also emerged.

8.4.1.3 Coherent attitudes and the challenge of responding to post-deliberation surveys

In contrast to the situation with participants with ambivalent attitudes, we cannot identify clear patterns of changing or updating attitudes among participants with coherent attitudes. As shown in Table 1 and 3 – Appendix 3, in both countries almost an equal number of participants changed and updated their attitudes as a result of deliberation. However, the case study that focused on the attitude-formation of Participant 8 highlights the tendency for discrepancies to emerge between the narrative and the post-deliberation survey responses. Participant 8 shared very coherent pro-immigration attitudes without any substantial shifts during the discussion. However, in the post-deliberation survey he changed his response, which based on his narrative rather reflects the difficulty of choosing the right response without relevant reference points in the pre-deliberation survey. While this proves the relevance of deliberations for clarifying participants' opinions about issue, it distorts the findings on the effect of deliberation signalling a change in attitude even if individuals did

not change their positions about the issue. This finding points at the shortcomings of solely using pre- and post-deliberation surveys and highlights the need for the joint analysis of narratives and survey responses to improve how we measure the effects of deliberation.

8.4.2 The benefits of using joint analysis

Earlier studies questioned the impact of deliberation on attitude changes (Mackie, 2006; Mutz, 2008; Thompson, 2008), and the use of mean scores of opinion changes as evidence (Himmelroos and Christensen, 2014), but it has rarely been examined whether pre- and post-deliberation surveys are appropriate ways of measuring shifts in attitudes. The analysed case studies revealed certain inconsistencies between participants' narratives and attitudes as expressed in the surveys. Besides the effects of group conformism, the analysis found that the identified discrepancies may be associated with participants' difficulties positioning their attitudes on the scale of available survey responses.

Analysis of the DF discussions and processes of individual attitude-formation highlights the limitations of the pre- and post-deliberation surveys. First, the survey questions do not allow participants to distinguish between specific groups of immigrants, and we lack any information about how the former envision immigrants when they respond (Tourangeau et al., 2000). However, the discussions showed this was a highly relevant issue in terms of defining how to approach the inclusion of immigrants (we could identify considerable shifts in attitudes relative to the specific groups of immigrants). Second, surveys do not permit the articulation of the ambivalences and contradictions behind attitudes to immigrants' inclusion (Goerres and Prinzen, 2012). In the discussions, both of these aspects – differentiations and ambivalence – were important in generating shifts in attitudes and affecting the development of discussions. Furthermore, in surveys we do not know what considerations the survey questions activate or what the respondent's reasons are for choosing a position or a preference in relation to the survey question (Goerres and Prinzen, 2012; Tourangeau et al., 2000). These concerns can be mitigated if we analyse participants' narratives as well as pre- and post-deliberation survey responses. While we cannot be certain about the exact reasons for choosing one response or the other, the narratives can reveal the details and complex considerations behind attitudes. Such joint analysis can better assess the effects of

deliberation on individual attitudes – i.e. whether it led to change in attitudes, the clarification of attitudes, or the strengthening of initial attitudes.⁹⁰

Joint analysis is also useful for improving the analysis of group polarization or de-polarization as a result of deliberations. The identified discrepancies between the narratives and the pre- and post-deliberation attitudes point at issues that could genuinely distort findings about group polarization if we were to base the analysis exclusively on a comparison of pre- and post-deliberation surveys. The seeming reluctance to change attitudes in the case of participants with ambivalent attitudes, and inclinations towards the median position, can significantly mask group polarization effects. However, the case study of Participant 8 also shows that although the participant did not change his attitude, he contributed to the de-polarization of attitudes in the Norwegian Red group. As deliberative methods involve a limited number of participants, even such small details can affect the results of analysis on group polarization. Therefore, devoting attention to such discrepancies may be the first step to developing a better approach to studying group polarization.

8.5 CONCLUSION

The main contribution of this analysis was the examination of the process of individual attitude-formation. Furthermore, the analysis revealed the complexity and diversity of considerations which underline the shifts between inclusive and restrictive preferences. Accordingly, this chapter argued that both individual narratives and the pre- and post-deliberation survey results need to be considered in order to identify shifts in participants' attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state. The analysis of individual attitude-formation was based on four case studies and **showed that the interactions between participants substantially influenced the way participants shared their attitudes.** The impact of interactions tended to be different on individual attitude-formation than on attitude-formation within the group. **The analysis also found that the identified shifts in the narratives often did not correspond to the changes (or lack thereof) in the post-deliberation surveys. This chapter has argued that both group conformism and the limitations of surveys contributed to these discrepancies.**

⁹⁰ Within WelfSOC there were no follow-up surveys after the DFs, so we cannot assess the durability of these effects.

In distinguishing coherent, ambivalent, and contradictory attitudes, the analysis found that participants with ambivalent attitudes were most affected. On the one hand, they were more exposed to the effects of group conformism. On the other hand, the analysis also elaborated on the difficulty of choosing one single survey response and reducing the ambivalent attitudes, diverse considerations and arguments the participants raised in the discussions to one position on the scale of available – often vague – survey responses. However, such difficulties also emerged in the case study of the participant with a coherent attitude, for whom we could observe a change in attitude in the post-deliberation survey, but no shifts in his narrative. While this finding confirms the positive effect of deliberations in terms of how deliberation can help participants to clarify their attitudes, the identified discrepancies reveal that findings can be potentially distorted when exclusively using pre- and post-deliberation surveys to analyse the effects of deliberation.

Although this analysis focused on a limited number of case studies, the findings provide important evidence of the need to complement the findings of pre- and post-deliberation surveys with the analysis of individual narratives. During the deliberations, participants expressed the complex considerations underlying their attitudes, which revealed shifts between preferences for the inclusion and exclusion of immigrants. These shifts can be clearly identified in their narratives, but tend to be hidden in participants' survey responses. The joint analysis allowed us to critically reflect on the impact of group conformism in the discussions and on the limitations of surveys in terms of revealing shifts in attitudes. On the one hand, the analysis of narratives and reflections on the diversity of arguments behind attitudes mitigates the limitations of the surveys related to their very structured framework. On the other hand, surveys can be useful for revealing the impacts of group conformism. As pointed out, the analysis of both of these forms of expressing attitudes is relevant to improving the evaluation of the effects of deliberation, and that of group polarization in group discussions.

9 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

9.1 THE AIMS AND SCOPE OF THIS RESEARCH

This thesis was dedicated to analysing public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state in Norway and the United Kingdom. Taking a novel approach – using a combination of the deliberative method of democratic forums (DF) and discourse analysis –, the research was designed to **study public attitudes through social interactions, and to scrutinize the dynamism of attitude-formation**. The analysis of DF discussions and interactions between participants enabled us to investigate not only the question what considerations affect attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state, but also how these considerations and conditions of access to welfare tended to change depending on the specific groups of immigrants, the specific contexts, and social situations. This concluding chapter reviews the findings of this research, highlighting the key theoretical and methodological contributions it brought to the study of welfare attitudes, and elaborating on the implications for future research.

First, in contrast to the most widely used methods of public opinion surveys, the DFs enabled participants to debate various aspects of immigration. Being able to observe and analyse how participants understand, approach, and link various aspects of immigration and the welfare state (that they are members of) revealed that attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state did change in the course of discussion. The findings suggest that we should not simplify the issue of immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state as one single attitude – either 'for' or 'against' the inclusion of immigrants (en masse). On the contrary, confirming Hypothesis No. 1, the research found that **attitudes to immigrants' inclusion involve various considerations and create ambivalence, as people share both positive and negative perceptions of immigration and immigrants**. Furthermore, **people do differentiate between immigrants**, thus preferences for inclusion and exclusion also vary depending on the specific groups of immigrants. **Changes in attitudes can be identified considering the specific social contexts, which may be related to the in-group, to the welfare state in the country of destination, and to the social contexts and social situations that immigrants face**. Throughout the thesis, this variance has been conceptualised as **an abstract continuum between inclusion and exclusion, along which public preferences can shift** – from being strictly against illegal immigrants or illegitimate asylum-seekers, being more open to

supporting legitimate refugees, or having a preference for stricter requirements towards economic migrants before granting them access to welfare provisions. However, as the research shows, differentiations and the specification of the conditionality of accessing welfare benefits and services do not stop at this broad level. DF participants debated and argued about their expectations of immigrants, which highlights one of the added values of DFs – that they grant a high level of autonomy to participants to elaborate on their opinions, experiences, attitudes, and preferences.

This leads to our second key finding: that **these movements along the inclusion-exclusion continuum differed between Norway and the United Kingdom**, confirming Hypothesis No. 3. While we can identify similarities between the two countries in terms of the specific policy areas and the key guiding principles of inclusion or exclusion (such as the requirements of contributions to the welfare state), the DF discussions unveiled crucial differences in understandings of the issue of immigration and the approaches proposed for specific groups of immigrants. Furthermore, confirming Hypothesis No. 2, the thesis found evidence that **these differences can be traced back to the country-specific institutional and social context, which unfold both in perceptions of the in-group** – i.e. what the needs and interests of the country of destination are – **and in perceptions of the out-group** – i.e. what the expectations towards immigrants are.

The four main ambitions of this research were **1) to analyse how people talk about immigration and what considerations affect their attitudes to immigrants' inclusion** (addressing Research Question 1 and 2); **2) to capture and analyse the dynamism of attitude-formation** (Research Question 4), and 3) to compare public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the two case-study countries, including finding out more about **why there was a more inclusive approach in Norway and a more exclusive approach in the UK** (Research Question 3). Understanding the latter is considered particularly important for informing us about the opportunities for facilitating social inclusion in public debates in the future. Last, the thesis aimed **4) to assess the applicability of DF and discourse analysis for the study of welfare attitudes**. In order to address these aims, content analysis of the DF discussions was conducted. Furthermore, **the findings of the content analysis were complemented by an analysis of the process of attitude-formation**. The research approached the investigation of public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion and the investigation of the dynamism of attitude-formation from four (interrelated) perspectives, which were presented in the four analytical chapters of this thesis:

- 1) Drawing on Welfare Deservingness Theory, **Chapter 5 analysed attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state through DF participants' perceptions of immigrants' welfare deservingness** elaborating on the diversity of considerations behind attitudes to immigrants' inclusion.
- 2) Deepening the analysis of attitudes to immigrants' inclusion, **Chapter 6 focused on the social practise of constructing welfare deservingness differentiating conditions of inclusion for refugees and economic migrants.**
- 3) Complementing the findings of the content analysis, **Chapter 7 scrutinized the process of attitude-formation within the groups based on one Norwegian and one British case study** with particular attention to interactions between participants and to the effects of group dynamics.
- 4) Keeping focus on the analysis of the process of attitude-formation, **Chapter 8 looked at the dynamism of attitude-formation from the perspective of individuals** by analysing the narratives and pre- and post-deliberation survey responses of two Norwegian and two British DF participants.

As the research addresses a complex issue, this complexity is also reflected in the theoretical framework. Therefore, it is important to review the theoretical foundations of the research in order to facilitate discussion of the research findings and the contributions of the research to the broader field of attitude research.

9.2 THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

As this research embarked on studying the diversity of considerations behind public attitudes and the dynamism of attitude-formation, it drew on four theories which formed the key pillars of the research approach. First, the fundamentals of this research were established on the **social constructivist understanding of public attitudes**. Accordingly, public attitudes were considered dynamic social concepts which are shaped by the institutional and social context and public discourse, and by social interaction (Converse, 2006; Tourangeau et al., 2000; Wilson and Hodges, 1992). In line with this understanding, it was argued that public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state are not static but fluid and dynamically developing. Deliberative methods such as DFs also adhere to the social constructivist understanding of public attitudes. Furthermore, DFs enable us to study attitudes through

social interactions. Thus, the method facilitates an analysis of the impact of the wider social context on public attitudes and how attitudes can vary in relation to different social contexts.

Second, the topic of immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state involves intergroup relations. Therefore, the research builds on **Social Identity Theory** (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel et al., 1971) which claims that individual identity is shaped by group membership and gives rise to differentiations between the in-group – “us” – and the out-group – “them” (Tajfel et al. 1971; Turner 1975; Brewer 1979). Within the scope of this research intergroup differentiations were chosen as a means of analysing attitudes to immigrants' inclusion arguing that understanding both the perceptions of the in-group and perceptions of the out-group are necessary to comprehend attitudes to immigrants' inclusion.

Third, to narrow the scope of the research, the research drew on **Welfare Deservingness Theory** (Van Oorschot, 2000; Van Oorschot et al., 2017) based on the assumption that people are more willing to include those whom they perceive as deserving. In line with Welfare Deservingness Theory, attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state were analysed through participants' (in-group) perceptions of immigrants' welfare deservingness (out-group). Perceptions of welfare deservingness inherently involved considerations about the preferred relations between immigrants and the state, and about the preferred role of immigrants within the country of destination. This leads us to the **Dynamic institutionalist approach to the study of welfare attitudes** (Mau, 2003; Larsen, 2006, 2013; Sundberg, 2014) and to an analysis of how the institutional and the social context shape attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state. Furthermore, the institutionalist approach gained particular significance in explaining the differences between the discussions about immigration in the Norwegian and the British DFs.

These four theories were highly influential in developing the scope of the research. The application of these four theoretical approaches describes the complexity of the research approach and the ambitions of the research in terms of its contribution to the knowledge. The following sections discuss the research findings.

9.3 DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

Focusing on the central argument of this thesis about dynamically changing attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state, the following sections elaborate on the evidence that supports this finding and disentangle how this dynamism of attitude-formation emerged in the discussions.

9.3.1 The effect of perceptions of the in-group

One of the foremost findings of the research is that the considerations that affect attitudes to immigrants' inclusion are not restricted to perceptions about immigrants (out-group) in the country of destination. The discussions about immigration showed that perceptions about the in-group are equally important. Chapter 5, focusing on perceptions of immigrants' welfare deservingness, elaborated on **the interplay between perceptions of the in-group and perceptions of the out-group**. By introducing the 'Good Citizen – Good Immigrant' Model, the analysis found evidence for how internalized country- and welfare-state-specific visions of 'good citizens' shaped expectations about immigrants and thus visions of 'good immigrants'.

Focusing specifically on considerations affecting attitudes to immigrants' inclusion, the analysis revealed that of the five deservingness criteria – namely *Reciprocity*, *Attitude*, *Control*, *Need*, and *Identity* (Cook, 1979; Swaan, 1988; Van Oorschot, 2000) the principle of *Reciprocity* and *Attitude* dominated the debates. The frequent emergence of these two principles (often used in parallel) indicates the **significance of considerations about contributions to the welfare state (*Reciprocity*) and expectations about adapting to the rules and interests of the country of destination (*Attitude*)**. The latter included the expectation that immigrants would not intentionally misuse the welfare system. However, if we look at the expectations linked to these deservingness principles, we can observe how the perceptions of the in-group influence what is required from immigrants. In the UK, the emphasis was put on different forms of economic contributions (associated with the principle of *Reciprocity*) and on the individual's responsibility to be active in the labour market, thereby earning entitlement to welfare benefits, and to be financially independent from the state (*Attitude*). Perceptions of hard-work and a strong work ethic (*Attitude*) were also considered as characteristics of 'good immigrants'. These expectations played a crucial role in justifying restrictive measures and a selective immigration system that favours skilled

immigrants who make limited demands for state support. In Norway, in addition to the desired economic contributions, participants also raised cultural expectations – concerning learning the language, learning about Norwegian society, and participating in society (*Attitude*). The latter expectations were justified as a means of integrating immigrants and making them understand and become committed to fulfilling the collective responsibility towards state and society.

The differences between the understandings of these principles follow the key institutional differences between the British liberal-leaning and the Norwegian social democratic welfare system. These considerations reveal how these institutions become internalized in individuals and naturally emerge in the debates and in participants' justifications for the inclusion or exclusion of (certain groups of) immigrants. However, not only does the institutional context have framing effects: the social context in the country, perceptions about social issues and the related public and political discourse also influenced how the issue of immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state was approached and discussed. We should stress here that the institutional and social context are highly intertwined, as perceptions about social issues and the related public discourse draw on and amplify institutional effects. To put it simply, **the institutional context** tends to provide the **lenses through which people view society, its aims and values, and tends to be more stable and long-lasting**, while **the social context moderates the salience of perceptions about the issues, needs, and interests of society**, and can be **more dynamic and more responsive to recent social, political, and economic developments**.

The role of in-group perceptions was further strengthened as the analysis found that participants were less perceptive of immigrants' neediness. In contrast, immigrants' welfare deservingness was much more affected by **perceptions of the (in-group's) country's needs and interests as well as the country's financial and institutional capacities** in both countries. For instance, perceptions about the need for a foreign labour force and the need to counter the challenges of ageing population (raised only in Norway) were important justifications for immigration and seeing immigrants as bringing benefits to the country. However, perceptions of limited institutional and financial capacities activated restriction mechanisms. This counterbalancing role of perceived institutional and financial capacities also points at the dynamism of attitude-formation with regard to how needs for immigration can be refined as participants engage in further consideration.

Based on these findings about the perceptions of the in-group, it was argued that articulated ***In-group needs and interests functioned as a framework within which immigrants' welfare deservingness was considered, with the expectation that immigrants should meet these needs and contribute to attaining the desired social aims.*** Furthermore, Chapter 6 elaborated on how the expectations linked to *In-group needs* changed depending on the specific group of immigrants, and how the fulfilment of these *In-group needs* could shift perceptions of immigrants' deservingness and thus trigger movements along the aforementioned imaginary continuum between preferences for inclusion and exclusion. In line with this, the next section addresses the perceptions of the out-group.

9.3.2 The effect of perceptions of the out-group

Chapter 6 analysed the social practise of constructing the welfare deservingness of refugees and economic migrants. Thus, the research aspired to **draw attention to the diversity of the immigrant population** and argued for the need to stop treating immigrants as one homogeneous group. It was considered important to examine how participants approached immigrants – whether they treat them as one group. The discussions showed that the latter did further differentiate. However, the boundaries of the specific subgroups tended to be blurred in some cases. Besides the differences in how people assess and frame the specific situation and the deservingness of these groups, the analysis revealed ambivalences and shifts in preferences regarding the specific groups of immigrants. Such differentiation within the specific groups of immigrants provides further evidence for the dynamism of attitude-formation and shifts in preferences for inclusion or exclusion.

Focusing on the practise of constructing welfare deservingness, the analysis found substantial differences in the importance awarded the five deservingness criteria in relation to refugees and economic migrants. With regard to refugees, moral considerations related to the principles of *Need* and *Control* were most relevant. **Perceptions of refugees' lack of control over their migration, and over their situation in the country of origin (*Control*) was the basis of recognizing their neediness and deservingness.** However, the analysis found that such moral judgements tended to be very fragile and any perceptions of cheating the refugee system or misusing the welfare system reduced solidarity with refugees. Thus, any indication of the control of immigrants – such as the choice of the destination country – were treated with suspicion in both countries and in most cases such perceptions implied a preference for exclusion and deportation.

The discussions on refugees in both countries gave rise to the articulation of ambivalence – as participants perceived it important to help refugees in a crisis situation, but shared concerns about the capacity of the state to accommodate them. Such ambivalences intensified once participants started to discuss the long-term stay of refugees in the country of destination, which stresses **the centrality of the time dimension and the temporariness of solidarity with refugees**. Shifting from a short-term perspective related to the arrival of refugees in the country of destination to a long-term perspective, we can observe how the argumentation changed. The moral framing of deservingness shifted to more practical considerations. **When taking the long-term perspective, the assessment of refugees' and economic migrants' deservingness converged, and practical considerations and compliance with *In-group needs* superseded moral considerations**. Thus, principles of *Reciprocity, Attitude, and Identity* prevailed and considerations about contributions and adaptation to the rules and values of the country of destination were seen as more relevant. The example of refugees provides evidence for changing attitudes that relate to considerations and perceptions of refugees' lack of control over their migration and perceptions, and the emergence of stricter, more practical expectations when a long-term perspective is employed.

In contrast to the situation with refugees, moral justifications were not raised in relation to economic migrants' welfare deservingness, which fact is closely linked to the widely shared perception in both countries that **economic migrants have full control over their migration and their movement to the country of destination occurs out of free choice (*Control*)**. This perception basically rules out any considerations of economic migrants' neediness and justifies limiting state responsibility for their welfare and social security. This was especially the case in the British debates, in which participants required full financial independence and self-sufficiency in the first two years (at most) to earn entitlement to social rights (*Reciprocity, Attitude*). Preferences for self-sufficiency were seen as important in Norway, too. However, in Norway self-sufficiency was interpreted more broadly, including the requirement of participating in society (*Reciprocity, Attitude*). Furthermore, responsibility over labour market engagement was not fully shifted to the individual, as all three Norwegian groups critically reflected on discrimination in the labour market (*Control*). This also indicates recognition of collective responsibilities – the sharing of responsibility for the facilitation of immigrants' integration between the state, majority society, and the individual.

Both the British and the Norwegian debates revealed that economic migrants' contributions, and adaptation to the rules and values of the country of destination, increased perceptions

of economic migrants' deservingness and thus preferences for inclusion in the welfare state. However, **perceptions of misuse of the benefit system had particularly detrimental effects.** Perceptions of the intentional use of welfare benefits, long-term unemployment, and remitting benefits were seen as the biggest issues. Comparison of the two countries shows that these concerns were more salient in the British discussion, as all three small groups proposed policy recommendations for limiting immigrants' access to welfare benefits and services. The British discussions show that perceptions of the misuse of the welfare system and welfare dependency had greater weight in the discussions than the perceived benefits of immigration, immigrants' hard-work, or a strong work ethic. This imbalance also emerged in perceptions of immigrants – both refugees and economic migrants – as representing a cost to the state, explaining the overwhelming support for restrictive policy recommendations. In contrast to this, in Norway we can identify a preference for seeing immigrants – both refugees and economic migrants – as resources for the country. Considering the need for a labour force, especially in light of the challenges of an ageing population, integration was proposed as being able to moderate perceived cultural differences and prevent a potential increase in inequality. Thus, perceived concerns about the misuse of welfare were addressed by a desire for facilitating integration and reducing labour market discrimination.

Focusing both on the policy proposals and on the justifications for immigration reveals further evidence about the significant interplay between in-group and out-group perceptions. The findings presented so far focused on the content of the debates. However, understanding the attitudes evinced in social interaction called for the analysis of the process of interaction to reveal how the latter affected attitude-formation and led to the final policy proposals.

9.3.3 Processes of attitude-formation within the group

Within the discussions, interactions between participants embodied the dynamism of attitude-formation. Therefore, Chapter 7 shed light on the process of interactions and on the impact of interactions on shifts in attitudes within the group that led to the final policy proposals deliberated by the group. Focusing on attitude-formation within the group, the analysis highlighted **the relevance of distinguishing the homogeneity and heterogeneity of views within the groups.** It was argued that it is important to reflect on how agreement about restrictive or inclusive policy proposals was reached, as **the process of discussion has implications for the scope of attitude-formation.** Furthermore, the analysis showed that

homogeneity and heterogeneity of views influenced the meanings and functions of specific forms of interaction. For instance, introducing a new perspective in a discussion with an overwhelming consensus further underlined the majority opinion, but in a discussion with competing views it broadened the scope of discussions by leading to the consideration of other options or minority opinions. In terms of focusing on the homogeneity and heterogeneity of opinions in group discussions, the analysis found substantial differences between the British and the Norwegian case studies.

The British case study – examining the Orange group’s discussion about immigration on the second day of DF – exhibited a high level of homogeneity of views. Accordingly, the agreement on policy proposals relied on a widely shared consensus about the need for immigration control in the UK. Although the Orange group approached the issue from various perspectives – discussing the role of the government, differentiating between EU and non-EU citizens, elaborating on the needs and capacities of the country to welcome immigrants, etc. – most of the arguments reinforced the consensus about the need for immigration control. **While the interactions shed light on the various considerations and reasons behind restrictive preferences, the former all strengthened the majority opinion and tended to discourage articulation of dissenting views and preferences.** Therefore, interactions between participants were rather **complementary**. This also implied the more **limited scope for attitude-formation, and raised the risk of group polarization** – i.e. a shift towards more extreme preferences than the participants’ initial preferences (Sunstein, 2002).

In the Norwegian case study – based on Red group’s discussion about immigration on the second day of the DF – agreement about policy proposals was reached through a more contested debate which required the **reconciliation of conflicting views and differing preferences for the inclusion of immigrants**. The heterogeneity of views facilitated considerable shifts in the discussions and also shifts between preferences for inclusion and exclusion. The process of reconciliation required participants to convince each other. Therefore, **the interactions between participants had an argumentative character**, thus **creating greater scope for attitude-formation** and encouraging other participants to reconsider their own preferences in light of the new arguments.

Although deliberative methods – including DF – employ a specific research design to facilitate greater heterogeneity of views and the de-polarization of views as a result of deliberation (Fishkin, 2011; Luskin et al., 2007; Mansbridge, 2010), Chapter 7 argued that other factors can shape the direction and the outcome of such discussions. The **findings provide evidence**

for the impact of the institutional and social context on the process of interactions. Accordingly, it was argued that the overwhelming consensus for restrictive measures in the British discussion reflected the key institutions – both welfare and immigration policies – as well as the particular social context (including the political and public discourse) in 2015. Both individualism and means-testing, two crucial features of the British welfare state, encourage selectivity and conditionality (Dwyer, 2000; Larsen, 2006; Sainsbury, 2012). Furthermore, a selective immigration system has been in force in relation to non-EU nationals, and restrictive measures were adopted after 2010 (Anderson, 2017). The public and the political discourse advanced immigration control and restrictions as the correct response to the challenges experienced in the UK. **The joint effect of the institutional and the social context contributed to the framing of discussions on immigration and made a restrictive approach unquestionable within the British discussion, leading to the significant homogeneity of views.** Findings about group polarization effects in the Orange group were mixed. We cannot clearly identify a shift towards more extreme preferences. Still, the discussions revealed the strength of the majority opinion about the need for immigration control, despite the fact that the British discussions (during the two days) also touched upon the benefits of immigration and recognized the contributions of immigrants to the country.

In Norway, the policy proposals were more inclusive. However, it is important to stress that **the discussions considered both preferences for inclusion and exclusion, as the Norwegian case study showed.** This duality can be identified in the Norwegian institutional and social context. On the one hand, the Norwegian welfare state, in promoting the principles of universalism and egalitarianism, supports the reduction of social inequalities (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Pedersen and Kuhnle, 2017). This feature was considered important in the DF discussions in relation to immigrants, too. Furthermore, due to the strong sense of collectivity, individuals are seen within (networks of) broader society, which helps with critical reflection not only on immigrants' individual responsibility towards society, but also on the responsibility of society towards immigrants. This understanding fostered support for inclusive measures to enhance individual opportunities to work and contribute. On the other hand, the strong sense of collectivity, and the fact that welfare identity is an integral part of Norwegian identity (Pedersen and Kuhnle, 2017), may also activate preferences for social closure. This understanding also emerged in the form of discussions about cultural differences and putting emphasis on adapting to Norwegian rules and values, and to the Norwegian way of life. The tension between preferences for inclusion and exclusion gave rise to ambivalences and conflicting views, as shown in the case study. The discussion of the Red

Group led to convergence between participants' attitudes, thereby confirming depolarization effects.

Chapter 7 focused on the process of attitude-formation within the groups, which also meant that the effect of each statement and argument was dependent on the reaction to it (Goodin, 2000). Entering into interactions empowered participants to reinforce social norms and social expectations, which could have then unfolded in terms of an increase in openness, and greater consideration of every – popular and less popular – opinion. However, it also enabled participants to abandon and not listen to certain unpopular views and instead shift the discussion to other ideas and thoughts. We cannot determine whether the latter occurred consciously or subconsciously in the discussions, but it affected how discussions developed and the process of attitude-formation within the groups. However, at the individual level such silenced arguments can make a difference and induce re-consideration. This is why Chapter 8 was designed to examine the processes of individual attitude-formation and to uncover the differences in the effect of interactions at the level of the group and the level of the individual.

9.3.4 Processes of attitude-formation at the individual level

Chapter 8 used both the narrative of selected participants as well as their pre- and post-deliberation survey responses to elaborate on the process of attitude-formation and on the impact of deliberations on the process of attitude-formation. This joint analysis enabled us to identify shifts in individuals' attitudes to the inclusion of immigrants in the welfare state, but also to better understand the attitudes presented in the post-deliberation survey.

Within the research, the effects of deliberation on public attitudes were understood in terms of changes in attitudes and the updating of attitudes (i.e. confirming pre-deliberation attitudes) as a result of deliberation (Barabas, 2004). An important element of the analysis was that it distinguished between the narratives of participants with ambivalent and coherent attitudes. Following this approach, the analysis found that **participants with ambivalent attitudes were more inclined to update attitudes instead of changing them.** The narratives exhibited shifts in preferences for the inclusion and exclusion of immigrants depending on various considerations, providing further evidence for the central argument of the thesis about the existence of changing, dynamic attitudes to immigrants' inclusion. However, most often these shifts between preferences for inclusion and exclusion left no

mark on participants' post-deliberative survey responses. This finding raises the question what explains the discrepancy between the narratives and the post-deliberation survey attitudes.

The analysis found that **participants with ambivalent attitudes were subjected to group conformism to a greater extent, as the former – in sharing both positive and negative perceptions – could be induced to support the majority opinion more easily.** Evidence for the effects of group conformism emerged both in the narratives and during the comparison of attitudes presented in the discussions and in survey responses. In this respect, the analysis of Participant 90's attitude-formation provides an interesting case as the effects of group conformism strengthened on Day 2, when discussing policy proposals. As a result, Participant 90 shifted toward majority opinion in her narrative on Day 2. Moreover, in relation to one of the three survey questions she shifted towards more restrictive stances, which underlines the concerns about group polarization raised in Chapter 7.

Chapter 8 argued that group conformism alone does not explain the identified discrepancy and lack of change in post-deliberation surveys. It proposed an alternative explanation – namely, that participants are challenged to match their ambivalent attitudes to one of the five potential responses to the survey question about immigrants' inclusion, which might have discouraged them from changing their attitudes in the post-deliberation survey. Therefore, **particular attention was devoted to examining various strategies for identifying the most suitable survey response in light of the attitudes and arguments shared during the discussions.** These strategies related to the choice of a middle position in relation to the most salient issues participants discussed throughout the two days of discussion, or the individuals' choice of a middle position between the most inclusive and most exclusive attitudes in the survey. Locating their own position in the range of survey responses also raised challenges for participants with coherent attitudes. The case of Participant 8 also shows that although the former had a coherent attitude to immigrants' inclusion which did not change during the discussions, he changed his position in the post-deliberation survey.

Based on the case studies, Chapter 8 pointed out that **both group conformism and the limitations of the pre- and post-deliberation surveys have significant implications for the assessment of the effects of deliberation. These implications may be especially important for the evaluation of group polarization.** Both group conformism and the limitations of surveys in terms of capturing more nuanced shifts in attitudes can distort findings about group polarization if the related analysis is based on a comparison of pre- and post-

deliberative surveys only. Therefore, Chapter 8 argued for the joint analysis of narratives and pre- and post-deliberation survey responses, which together can reveal not only the impact of group conformism, but also important information that helps better understand participants' survey responses and improves the study of group polarization.

The past sections reviewed the key empirical findings of the research, primarily focusing on the evidence for the dynamism of attitude-formation and the diversity of considerations underlying public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state. Drawing on these findings, the following section points out the key theoretical contributions to Welfare Deservingness Theory and Institutionalism – more precisely the Dynamic institutionalist approach to the study of welfare attitudes.

9.4 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

As described above, the research draws on four theoretical foundations: namely, Social Constructivism, Social Identity Theory, Welfare Deservingness Theory, and Institutionalism. While all four theories were influential in the research, Social Identity Theory and intergroup differentiation were used mostly as a means of approaching the analysis of attitudes. Furthermore, the social constructivist approach had significant bearing on the whole research process, including the methodology, and the remaining two theories. Therefore, the findings related to Social Constructivism are appraised together with contributions to Welfare Deservingness Theory and Institutionalism.

9.4.1 Welfare Deservingness Theory

So far, literature on welfare deservingness has relied on quantitative research methods – primarily international public opinion surveys, and more recently, survey experiments (Van Oorschot et al., 2017). Therefore, our knowledge tends to be limited about people's use and understanding of the five deservingness principles, and about the hierarchy of these principles. This is the area in which this research aimed to contribute. Before turning to the concrete contributions, it is important to stress that within the scope of this research only the welfare deservingness of immigrants was analysed and comparison to other welfare beneficiaries' deservingness was not raised.

Focusing first on the use of the five welfare deservingness principles, this research confirms the universal applicability of these five criteria as all of them emerged in the discussions on immigration in both countries. However, the research also found that **the understanding of these five criteria tended to differ in these two countries. Thereby, also shedding light on the impact of institutions on conceptualisation and the use of the criteria in the discussions on immigration.** Furthermore, through the analysis of the specific understandings of these principles we could further specify the definitions of deservingness criteria. On the one hand, the analysis of the discussions revealed that deservingness criteria were used in a broader sense not restricted to immigrants' access to welfare benefits and services. For instance, in the literature the principle of *Attitude* tended to be defined as compliance with the expected behaviour and being thankful for benefits received (Van Oorschot, 2000; Van Oorschot et al., 2017). In contrast, in the discussions participants also expected immigrants' compliance in terms of participation in the labour market and in society.

While neediness is considered to be at the heart of deservingness judgements in general, it was an important finding that **perceptions of immigrants' neediness tended to be limited.** In this regard, the finding that ***In-group needs* were more influential with regard to perceptions of immigrants' deservingness** was crucial. Based on this finding, *In-group needs* were incorporated into the deservingness model as a subcategory of the *Need* principle. From the perspective of Welfare Deservingness Theory, it is thus considered particularly important to examine and test whether *In-group needs* also play such an important role in relation to other groups of welfare beneficiaries – such as retired, disabled, or unemployed people. While the DF discussions provide relevant data for analysing it, this objective was outside the scope of this particular research effort.

Findings about the ranking and relations between these specific deservingness criteria also enhanced our understanding of how the deservingness of immigrants is assessed and which principles are considered important and why. Furthermore, revealing the linkages between the specific principles (for instance, between *Reciprocity* and *Attitude*) and the overlapping use of these principles also provided new information about how the same context and same requirements are approached from various perspectives of deservingness (represented by the specific deservingness criteria).

The analysis of the practise of construction of the welfare deservingness of refugees and economic migrants shed light on the dynamism involved in how perceptions of deservingness change depending on the specific group of beneficiaries. Furthermore,

Chapter 6 also **elaborated on changes in the framing of deservingness depending on the specific group of immigrants and on the time dimension**. Distinguishing between the moral and practical framing of deservingness revealed differences in the hierarchy of deservingness principles. **Moral framing mobilized perceptions of *Control* and *Need*, while practical framing stressed achievements related to *Reciprocity* and *Attitude***. These findings raise a question for future research: whether moral and practical framing of deservingness is applied to other groups of beneficiaries, and whether we can observe any shifts from one type of framing to another.

Last, the analysis of DFs provided new evidence for the institutional approach to welfare deservingness (Larsen, 2006, 2013; Mewes and Mau, 2013; Van Der Waal et al., 2013), arguing that welfare institutions influence perceptions of welfare deservingness, and justifications for providing state support to specific groups of welfare beneficiaries. This leads us to the contributions of this research to knowledge about Institutionalism.

9.4.2 Dynamic institutionalist approach to the study of welfare attitudes

Within the broader institutional approach to the study of welfare attitudes, this research primarily draws on and provides new evidence about the Dynamic institutionalist approach to welfare attitudes represented by Mau (2003) and Larsen (2006, 2013). Inspired by Sundberg's (2014) finding that public attitudes adapt to changes in institutions and to changes in social context, this research was intended to scrutinize the dynamic interplay between public attitudes and the institutional and social context. It focused on whether and how institutional and social context emerges in the DF discussions and how this influences public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state.

Within the DFs, **institutional patterns unfolded very clearly as participants started to debate the future of the welfare state in the UK and Norway**. However, it was considered important to analyse how and in relation to which social issues or policies these patterns emerged. Within this research, the institutional context was understood in terms of immigration, welfare, and labour market policies. Following Sainsbury (2012), it was argued that understanding the issue of immigration, and specifically immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state, requires the analysis of these three policy areas at least. In this respect, Chapter 4 found that both Norway and the UK have inclusive and exclusive elements regarding immigrants in their institutional system, which further increased the relevance of

the analysis in terms of the need to scrutinise which aspects are seen as more important by participants. Norway has an inclusive welfare system based on universalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Pedersen and Kuhnle, 2017). However, there is a very strong sense of collectivity and welfare identity is an inherent part of the Norwegian identity (Pedersen and Kuhnle, 2017), which tends to counterbalance the inclusivity of welfare institutions. The labour market is highly regulated and more rigid towards foreigners, especially towards low-skilled migrants (Halvorsen et al., 2016; Veggeland, 2016). In terms of immigration policies there is a differentiated system that offers more privileged treatment for EU and EEA citizens and stricter rules for Non-EU, Non-EEA nationals (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012).

The liberal-leaning British welfare system is considered to be more exclusive. Individualism – the key value and feature of liberal welfare regimes – suggests lower expectations for the individual towards society, but it also means limited interference and support from the state (Dwyer, 2000; Larsen, 2006; Sainsbury, 2012). While an open and less regulated labour market is more welcoming towards immigrants, the state has fewer responsibilities in terms of reducing the potential disadvantages created by the free labour market. As in Norway, immigration policies are differentiated, with a highly selective immigration system for Non-EU nationals and free movement of EU nationals. The duality in the Norwegian and British system can also facilitate the dynamism of attitude-formation as the importance of specific institutional aspects can change depending on the specific groups of immigrants and on the specific social contexts considered. While institutions are relatively stable and path-dependent, the discourse and the framing of policies are more flexible to adapt to new social contexts and new social challenges.

These institutional features prominently emerged and shaped participants' understanding of the issue of immigration and differences regarding how Norwegian and British participants perceived immigrants as "resources" or "costs" for the country. However, it should be stressed that **the discussions also pointed at some misperceptions regarding the welfare state**. Such misperceptions emerged in relation to the perceived generosity of the British welfare state and about immigrants' access to welfare benefits and services. Participants' argumentation showed that the considerations and concerns that influenced participants' understanding of the issue of immigration were not devoid of the institutional and social context. We can very precisely identify how key public discourses and the framing of the respective policies are reproduced in the debates, confirming previous research findings (Larsen, 2014; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Soroka et al., 2016). The above-mentioned misperceptions about the welfare state also demonstrate the shortcomings of public and

political debates that often reproduce and misuse these misperceptions for their own political or economic interests. Focusing on Norway, an awareness of cultural differences between Norwegians and immigrants played a distinctive role in the Norwegian discussions and followed the centrality of language courses in Norwegian integration policies (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012; Veggeland, 2016).

The analysis of perceptions of welfare deservingness of immigrants presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 revealed very accurately the influence of institutional and social context on the understanding of the five deservingness principles, and on how participants formulated their expectations towards immigrants. From the perspective of actual preferences for the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants, the analysis showed that perceptions of social inequalities and concerns about the increasing gap between the majority and immigrants were important determinants of Norwegian participants' support for integration measures and reducing inequalities. In contrast, in the British debates perceptions of social inequalities triggered preferences for prioritising the in-group. Together with scarcity perceptions, they were the key drivers behind a desire for more restrictive measures. These two distinctive approaches to social inequalities highlight the differences between the expected role of individuals within society and the share of responsibilities between the individuals and the state. Throughout the analysis, the differences between individualism in the UK and the strong sense of collective responsibilities in Norway emerged very promptly. This difference was particularly notable in relation to the understanding and use of the principles of *Control*, (in-group) *Need* and *Attitude*.

Another important finding and contribution to the study of Institutionalism is that the influence of the institutional and social context emerged not only thematically, but also shaped the development and the process of discussions. Social expectations, social norms, and values also frame what issues and what measures are socially acceptable for debate. In this regard, the effect of the social context and the power of public and political discourse was found to be especially relevant. This feature was particularly notable in the British discussions. The overwhelming support for immigration control and concerns about immigrants' misuse of the benefit system and the related costs for the state were rarely challenged. This finding also showcases participants' misconceptions about immigration and immigrants' access to and use of welfare benefits (Duffy and Frere-Smith, 2014; Baumberg Geiger, 2016). While it was expected that such misconceptions could be dealt with in the course of DF, the analysis found evidence of how dissenting views were silenced, especially on the second day of the DFs when participants formulated the concrete policy

recommendations for the future government. This also revealed that institutional effects were important not only thematically, but also in relation to the process of discussions.

Focusing specifically on the process of attitude-formation and on the relevance of distinguishing the homogeneity and heterogeneity of views in groups, this research found that the institutional and social context can facilitate or constrain the emergence of dissenting views in the discussions. Chapter 7 found that the institutional and social context considerably define social desirability effects, shaping socially acceptable views and preferences. In the discussions this meant that the heterogeneity of views on immigration in the Norwegian Red group was facilitated by the institutional and social context that involved both support for and concerns about immigration. In contrast, in the British Orange group both the institutional and social context influenced the discussion about restrictions as viable measures for controlling immigration. Thus, this research adds one more factor to consider when assessing the process of discussions and the effects of deliberations.

Based on these findings, the thesis argued that institutional differences and the specificities of the social contexts shaped how immigration was discussed in Norway and in the UK, indicating their importance as drivers of attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state. Consequently, differences in the institutional and social context are claimed to explain the more inclusive approach in Norway and more restrictive approach and more restrictive policy recommendations in the UK.

While this research chose Institutionalism, the findings evidence the crucial role of political discourse in shaping public attitudes. Furthermore, they indicate the need to continue and deepen research on political discourses and to better address how these discourses are internalised and used by ordinary people in future research projects. In this respect deliberative methods provide important resources.

9.5 METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

The novelty of this research rests upon the research approach and the unique combination of DF and discourse analysis. Considering that research on welfare attitudes significantly relies on international public opinion surveys (Ervasti et al., 2012; Sundberg and Taylor-Gooby, 2013), there is an increasing need for more qualitative research that elaborates on the reasons for and mechanisms behind attitudes, as well as on the dynamism of attitude-

formation (Svallfors, 2012). Therefore, one of the key ambitions of this research was to assess the applicability of the deliberative method of DF for the study of welfare attitudes, and more specifically for the study of a complex issue such as immigration. As the research design of DFs includes standardized questionnaires for measuring pre- and post-deliberation attitudes, it also offers the possibility to scrutinise how deliberations and the discourse analysis of deliberation can complement and enrich our knowledge about public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state.

The most important distinguishing feature of DF is that it grants participants a high level of autonomy to shape discussions. Accordingly, the researchers' role and influence change and are limited, especially in comparison to other quantitative and qualitative methods. Thus, a bottom-up discussion could develop without specific questions being raised. This itself reveals the explorative character of the research: namely, analysing how people talk about and understand the welfare state and the issues of immigration.

This explorative approach to data collection and to data analysis, allowed us to examine the issue of immigration as it emerged in the DF debates. The discussions developed and deepened as participants raised new arguments and new aspects of the issue, asked for clarifications, challenged each other and expressed their agreement or disagreement. Through these interactions, participants not only accessed new information but were confronted, too. They needed to react to others' arguments, to defend their positions, to reflect on and re-consider some of their thoughts. Focusing on the discussions, **the key added value and contribution of the DF is that the discussions were able to reproduce the institutional and social context through the participants' interactions, arguments, and justifications.** Despite the different composition of the three small groups in Norway and in the UK, overlaps emerged in terms of the key aspects, considerations, and policy proposals that were raised. Numerous personal stories and very specific arguments enriched the debates, and there were differences in the amount of detail included in statements and justifications, but the perceptions and approaches, as well as the guiding principles resembled country- and welfare-state-specific institutional features and corresponded to the wider public and political discourse. Although DFs in WelfSOC involved only a limited number of participants, the fact that the deliberations reproduced the institutional and social context increases the validity of the research and suggests the provision of valuable contributions to the field of welfare attitudes research.

The high level of autonomy of participants enabled us to scrutinize how people conceptualize immigrants, how they understand the issue of immigration (its benefits and disadvantages), and what the problems are that they want to tackle concerning immigration. The analysis of deliberation thus represents an important means of **examining the complexity and multi-dimensionality of considerations behind attitudes, and the context-dependency of attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state**. In a survey situation the researcher cannot control who respondents have in mind when responding to questions about immigration and immigrants' access to welfare benefits (Goerres and Prinzen, 2012). Throughout the research it was deemed important to examine **how people perceive and categorize immigrants**. An important example is how Norwegian and British participants distinguished "economic refugees" as a specific sub-group, referring to illegitimate refugees who have an economic motivation for migration rather than a desire to escape life-threatening conditions in the country of origin. Moreover, the tendency to refer to economic migrants as "immigrants" in general was another important finding which can inform researchers and survey designers when they raise questions about immigration and immigrants. Furthermore, **participants' characterizations of immigrants ("good" and "bad"; "deserving" and "undeserving") shed new light on attitudes to immigrants' inclusion and changing preferences for inclusion, representing a new perspective about attitudes that complements the rather static view of attitudes in surveys**.

The structure of the DF encouraged participants to elaborate on their stances and to justify their preferences through interacting with and considering others' views and arguments. Thereby, creating **a dynamic and interactive framework for discussions and facilitating the contextualisation of the articulated attitudes**. As shown in Chapter 8, participants' narratives and engagement in the discussions revealed further details about participants' attitudes and **elaborated on ambivalences in attitudes**. Furthermore, DF discussions enabled the analysis of the process of attitude-formation – how participants articulated their attitudes, which aspects of their attitudes were shared in the group, and how their attitudes shifted between preferences for inclusion and exclusion depending on the specific contexts. Therefore, **the opportunity to analyse the dynamism of attitude-formation** is a significant added value of DFs to the study of welfare attitudes.

The longer duration of DFs, and the specific design of the discussions on Day 1 and Day 2, also enabled participants to learn about various perspectives on immigration and to reflect on the complexity of immigration-related issues. **Setting up a role-play involving participants acting as policy advisors and formulating policy recommendations was an**

effective tool for focusing the discussion on the desirable approach to dealing with immigration. The findings stressed the relevance of distinguishing the homogeneity and heterogeneity of views that emerged in the discussions when analysing the process of attitude-formation. The overwhelming consensus about policy recommendations in the British DF had a different impact on the development of the discussion, and created limited scope for attitude-formation compared to the case of the Norwegian discussions, which included competing views. While the preferences articulated in the British discussions corresponded to the overall public and political discourse and captured a particular social context, this consensus was so unquestionable that it prevented participants from considering other approaches to immigration. Comparing the discussions on Day 1 and Day 2, we can observe that **the issue of controlling immigration was already dominant on the first day, but there were more counter-arguments and a greater openness to seeing the benefits of immigration too. This finding reveals another layer of the context-dependency of attitudes, or more precisely, the context-dependency of attitude-formation.** In this specific case, changes were generated as the context of the discussion changed, and participants needed to agree on policy proposals and solutions for the identified issues.

While the paragraphs above intended to highlight how and why DF can contribute to the study of welfare attitudes, we need to duly acknowledge its limitations, too. As discussed in Chapter 3, one of the foremost limitations of the method is that it involved only a limited number of participants. DFs put particular emphasis on the selection of participants to create a diverse group which roughly represents the national population. Within WelfSOC the selection of participants was based on age, gender, education, marital and employment status, household income, ethnicity, and electoral preferences. We hereby admit that the small number of participants (34-35 participants/country) makes it especially challenging to create a group that is representative of all these characteristics. Therefore, as part of the research the representation of specific social groups and their participation in the discussions on immigration was checked.

Based on the findings, age, education, and ethnic minority background needs to be highlighted, where certain level of divergence was observed compared to the national population. As described in details in Chapter 3, over-representation of the age groups 25-34 and 44-54 years old was present in both countries. Based on the level of education, in Norway tertiary-educated participants, while in the UK participants who completed upper-secondary education were overrepresented. The dominance of these two education-specific groups of participants also emerged in the discussions on immigration, further increasing the

need to take this difference into account. Last, the share of participants with an ethnic minority background was slightly higher in Norway, while in the UK case-study overrepresentation of participants was more significant. As described in Chapter 3 the composition of the British group of participants reflected more the share of ethnic minority members in Birmingham, the locality of the DF. These divergences need to be duly taken into account. However, the overall findings of the research and the similarities found across small group discussions (per country) encourage us to highlight the ability of deliberations to recreate the specific institutional and social context. As mentioned earlier, despite the differences in the composition of breakout groups, the discussions raised similar perceptions of and approaches to immigrants, and similar conditions of inclusion, which resembled the country- and welfare-state-specific institutional and social context. Thus, the deliberations offer rich data about how the key characteristics of institutions and the specific features of the social context is discursively reproduced by participants. Accordingly, deliberations in DF represent an important opportunity for further research into public attitudes. However, successfully exploiting them also requires a high level of awareness of the context-dependency of attitudes and attentiveness to the specificities of the context in which the DF discussions are conducted (Strandberg et al., 2019).

Second, the essence of DF is the collective creation of knowledge through social interactions between participants. However, this also implies that group dynamics affect discussions. Group dynamics can significantly contribute to the discussions, but involve certain risks, as discussed in Chapter 7. In this regard, the composition of the group, the participation of group members, the dominance of certain participants, and the quality of moderation are crucial factors which can highly influence the quality of discussions. This is why it was seen as particularly important to devote special attention to the analysis of the process of attitude-formation in addition to the content analysis presented in the first part of the thesis. As stated in Chapter 7, both the emerging homogeneity and heterogeneity of views raise important insights that enrich our understanding of attitude-formation. However, we should stress these differences to provide a precise interpretation of the data and the processes involved in the discussions.

Although the research design of the DFs conducted in WelfSOC was carefully planned and involved special measures for mitigating the potential limitations of the method, it could not control all of them. The limitations elaborated above need to be duly taken into account as much as the contributions of the analysis of the DFs. We acknowledge that the analysis of discussions and interactions between participants can broaden our knowledge about **1)**

people's understanding of complex social issues such as immigration, 2) the key considerations and reasons behind public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state, and 3) the dynamism of attitude-formation. These findings and contributions lend empirical support to the applicability of, and the need for more deliberative research in the field of welfare attitudes. Therefore, let us review the key lessons learnt and formulate some recommendations for future deliberative research ventures.

9.5.1 Recommendations for future deliberative researchers

Deliberative research is highly dependent on the quality of the data – what participants share and how they interact with each other – which is one of the key limitations of this research method. Therefore, our recommendations concern primarily on how to enhance high quality and reasoned debates. Firstly, **the structure and time-management of discussions** is crucial. The aim to let participants discuss various welfare topics – not limiting the scope of WelfSOC research to one particular issue – was important and useful to analyse the development of different dynamics of attitude-formation, the different levels of understanding of specific welfare issues and how participants drew and perceived the linkages between various issues. However, proposing five topics per day seemed to be too ambitious, restricting the available time for discussion. Time-pressure was especially evident in the case of complex issues such as immigration, where deliberation can uncover the most and enable us to better understand how people formulate and reason their opinions, attitudes and preferences for or against inclusion of immigrants. In order to enhance more in-depth discussions, we would **recommend to choose less (not more than three) topics per day and extend the available time-frame for one topic to one hour at least.**

Secondly, the structuring of Day 1 – focusing on identification of current issues – and Day 2 – focusing on the future – was crucial to facilitate a quality and diverse discussion. The role-play on Day 2 was especially important to encourage participants to concentrate more on how to solve the issues identified earlier, what also enabled participants to take a different approach to the same issue – revealing further standpoints, ambiguity or uncertainty related to specific aspects of the issue. Depending on the specific aims, **researchers employing deliberative methods, should definitely consider what type of role-plays (policy-related or other forms of decision-making situations) could enhance the discussions the most.** In addition to role-plays, the use of experiments could be considered and tested in order to further specify which contexts, which individual characteristics make a difference in relation

to preferences for inclusion or exclusion of immigrants. Experiments could entail provision of different information (statistical data) in terms of thematic coverage – e.g. data labour market participation of immigrants or educational level of immigrants – and more detailed data – e.g. more information the profile of immigrants accessing specific welfare benefits such as family status, length of stay in the country, etc. Thus, the experiments could add a further layer and deepen the discussions.

Thirdly, the quality of discussions also depends on **the critical question of inclusivity**. As the aim is to encourage diversity of opinions, selection of participants and the composition of the small discussion groups is pivotal. The combined use of (relatively) representative sample and overrepresentation of specific minorities in small groups worked well in WelfSOC. While the topic of the DF should be kept broad – facilitating participants’ freedom to express what they deem relevant, the choice of principles of oversampling in small groups allows researchers to delineate the scope of the research by enhancing the voice of specific minorities within group discussions. While oversampling of certain minorities proved useful in WelfSOC, we also need to note that the specificities of the oversampled minorities – e.g. the group of self-employed – emerged in the discussions with varying strengths, being more salient and relevant in relation to some topics while less in relation to other. Due to the limited number of participants, **research teams should prioritise certain (three or four) demographic characteristics that should be strictly kept during the selection process** and leave greater flexibility in relation to the rest of the demographic characteristics. Enhancing heterogeneity of opinions cannot be controlled by the selection of participants only, the development of the discussion – including what information, what opinions are shared – highly depends on the group dynamics (as shown in Chapter 7). In this respect, **the provision of information is especially crucial and should form a key element in the research design**.

Our last recommendation concerns **the use of pre- and post-deliberation surveys**, which provide an important insight into the analysis of attitude-formation during the DF. While in WelfSOC post-deliberation survey was conducted at the end of Day 2 discussions, it would have been particularly interesting to repeat the survey few weeks or months after the discussions. In future research it would be useful to **extend the scope of post-deliberation surveys in order to examine and learn more about the effects of discussions on attitude-formation in a longer time span**. Although deliberative methods require careful methodological planning, these bottom-up discussions can contribute to the better understanding of ideas, perceptions and mechanisms behind welfare attitudes and can reveal ordinary people’s thinking about the welfare state and welfare beneficiaries. These

contributions make this method worth to apply and to further develop within the field of welfare attitudes research.

9.6 WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM DEMOCRATIC FORUMS?

The main motivation for conducting this research was to better understand what the conditions are for creating more inclusive welfare states that go beyond the ties of nationhood and which are able to mitigate social divisions between nationals and immigrants. That is the reason the research investigated processes of inclusion and exclusion. However, the contributions of the research are not restricted to a better understanding of attitude-formation; the benefits of the deliberations also need to be considered. **In an era of increasing populism, when a decline in the ability to listen to each other and to differing arguments is occurring (Bächtiger et al., 2018), the need for deliberation is greater, especially in relation to complex and divisive issues such as immigration and immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state.** Therefore, following the presentation of the key findings of the research, these findings are now considered from the perspective of implications for policy-making, and for future research.

9.6.1 Policy implications

The key tenet of deliberative democracy is that policy-making should not be restricted to the political elite, and that ordinary people should be more involved (Dryzek, 2005; Goodin, 2008). One of the very first challenges for proponents of deliberative democracy was to overcome the critique that ordinary people are not informed or competent enough to participate in deliberation and influence policy-making (Rosenberg, 2014; Sanders, 1997). It is a valid and important question what information people access based on which they form their opinions and attitudes. In this regard, deliberative methods, including DFs, provide a reasonable platform for sharing and elaborating on the views of the public, which enables researchers and also policy-makers to comprehend what people know and how they perceive and understand the issues under discussion. Furthermore, DFs are designed to improve knowledge both as a result of interactions between participants, and by distributing evidence-based knowledge (Mansbridge, 2010; Fishkin, 2011; Bächtiger et al., 2018).

In this regard, WelfSOC DFs and in particular **discussions about immigration, shed light on and inform policy-makers about people's conceptions and misconceptions of immigration, and how people distinguish specific groups of immigrants and how they view immigrants' duties and rights in the country of destination.** In the UK, misconceptions emerged both in terms of the size of the immigrant population, but more importantly about immigrants' excessive access to welfare benefits and services. The latter misconception was further reinforced by misperceptions about the generosity of welfare benefits. While unemployment benefits were considered as one of the key instruments of misusing the British benefit system, participants did not reflect on in-work benefits such as tax credits, in relation to which immigrants are slightly over-represented (Vargas-Silva, 2019) and which indicate the motivation of the latter to work, and the disadvantaged position of immigrants on the labour market. Considering that economic contributions were viewed as the key criteria for inclusion in the welfare state, **the need to educate people about the reality of immigration and to encourage people to discuss these issues is clear.** In Norway, misconceptions emerged concerning the length of the process of assessing eligibility for asylum. In all three groups this issue was flagged as a priority that needed change. Participants considered this period to be a waste of time and a waste of applicants' skills and resources. Here we see the need to share more information about asylum-seekers' stays in reception centres, and about opportunities for the employment of asylum-seekers.

In relation to misconceptions, it is important to again stress the finding about **the relevance of an emerging consensus or competing views and, accordingly, the composition of the groups and the openness of discussions. Discussions in which competing views were aired proved to be efficient at mitigating and critically reflecting on some of the emerging misconceptions** – e.g. in relation to immigrant women's access to welfare benefits, or linking the unemployment and underemployment of immigrants to discrimination on the labour market. In contrast, discussions in which there was an overwhelming consensus tended to be mired in misconceptions, and discouraged participants with conflicting views from opposing these arguments. First, this finding stresses the benefits and the need for a high level of diversity of views within groups in order to facilitate the exchange of information and consideration of various perspectives about the issue. Second, **the discussions on the second day show that the main issue is not the competence of individuals to contribute to the discussions, or to propose policy recommendations, limitation rather emerges in form of the group dynamics that can reduce the scope of potential measures and solutions.** Therefore, special attention needs to be devoted to analysing group dynamics and to

improving the arrangements that minimise their negative consequences and guarantee a high level of autonomy for participants in terms of shaping the discussions.

The findings about the substantial impact of the institutional and social context also point to important lessons for policy-makers. First, **the significance of the framing of the issue of immigration should be stressed – i.e. whether immigrants are viewed as a cost or benefit in political and public discourses.** The British and the Norwegian debates showed how this very basic framing had significant implications for the development of discussions and especially on the scope of policy preferences debated. The analysis found evidence for the impact of both institutional and social context. However, the thesis argued that welfare institutions have both inclusive and exclusive elements, and it is rather up to the more dynamically changing social context to define and shape what the desirable approach to immigration and to the specific groups of immigrants is. The DFs highlighted the power of public and political discourse to facilitate a more complex and comprehensive understanding of the issue of immigration considering both positive and negative aspects.

Focusing specifically on the conditions of inclusion, labour market engagement was considered to be the most important issue in both countries. Therefore, **in order to enhance the inclusion of immigrants, governments and policy-makers should focus on how to facilitate the employment of immigrants** through reducing discrimination in the labour market and supporting recognition of qualifications acquired abroad, by providing language courses, requalification courses or other active labour market programmes. All these measures and services for supporting the employment of immigrants could increase the value of immigrants and their skills for countries of destination, which in the debates were articulated as the most convincing argument in favour of immigration and the inclusion of immigrants in the welfare state. In this respect, **it is crucial to inform (in-group) people about the employment- and other related contributions of immigrants to the welfare system, to tackle key misperceptions, and to present a more balanced picture of immigrants.**

In view of growing social divisions, there is an immense need to conduct more public debates. Based on our experiences with DFs (and the positive feedback of the participants), we are convinced about the benefits of holding public debates on socially relevant and complex issues. First, it is important to **help people access more information that goes beyond their own (selected and often closed) communities and sources of information, and to familiarize them with multiple aspects of issues and thus help them to attain a more informed opinion.** Organizing DFs or similar public debates is a non-intrusive way of

distributing information about the reality of immigration, including its benefits as well as costs and potential consequences, and connecting people with various backgrounds and views. Second, DFs can help to give voice to ordinary people. **Governments should devote more attention to people and consult them more, especially in relation to difficult and polarizing social issues.** Third, accessing and evaluating people's experiences, perceptions and preferences can provide precious information about what is seen as acceptable or unacceptable in relation to immigration, and what the state's responsibilities are towards immigrants. Thus, **DFs can inform policy-makers at various levels of governance about what the most crucial concerns are that need to be tackled to reduce opposition to immigrants and how to better communicate about immigration.**

From the perspective of future research, deliberative methods as DFs and the high level of autonomy of participants to shape discussions are essential to improving the measurement of attitudes. On the one hand, **these discussions can substantially complement the findings of public opinion surveys.** On the other hand, **the discussions can also help researchers to refine public opinion surveys** – i.e. how questions and answers are formulated – and **to better accommodate the diversity of considerations behind attitudes.**

9.7 CLOSING REMARKS

This thesis was committed to analysing public attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state. Such analysis and better understanding of the conditions of inclusion of immigrants was viewed as important for enhancing the creation of more inclusive welfare states, which are able to reconcile social and ethnic heterogeneity with popular support for latter stressing inclusiveness, social cohesion, and the extension of social solidarity to immigrants. **The research found that attitudes to immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state changed depending on the specific group of immigrants, and the specific social contexts and circumstances under consideration. This changing nature of attitudes suggests opportunity and greater scope for inclusion.** Acknowledging the power of the institutional and social context, the power of framing, and the identification of key concerns and the resolution of the latter are among the first steps towards the greater inclusion of immigrants. People need to talk more about the benefits and costs of inclusive policies, as well as about the consequences of the growing social divisions and tensions which pose the greatest threat to popular support for and the sustainability of welfare states.

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APPENDIX 1 – SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE RESEARCH DESIGN OF DEMOCRATIC FORUMS

Table 1 – Review of policy proposals formulated by British and Norwegian Democratic Forum participants at the Final Plenary Session on Day 2

POLICY PROPOSALS IN RELATION TO IMMIGRATION IN THE BRITISH DF	POLICY PROPOSALS IN RELATION TO IMMIGRATION IN THE NORWEGIAN DF
Introducing an immigration cap based on immigrants' skill-level	Offering intensified training in language, culture and laws and regulations
Restricting access to free healthcare services in the first two years – the costs of healthcare should be covered by the employer or the individual	Issuing temporary residence permits and work permits (to get immigrants faster into the labour market)
Restricting access to welfare benefits – entitlement for welfare benefits is conditional on at least two years (two to five years) of employment	Supporting long-term job creation for those with permanent residence
Introducing an ID card system that allows to track use of healthcare services and ensures the costs of services are paid	Immigrants to assume greater personal responsibility for own integration
Introducing a point-based system considering immigrants' skill-level, language comprehension, health condition, criminal history and requirement of having a job offer and depositing certain amount of money to cover initial costs of staying in the country.	Introducing a selective labour immigration system, as Australia and Canada
Creation of a more robust return system for immigrants – deportation of criminals.	Starting campaigns aimed at employers to hire immigrants
Introducing an immigration cap – setting a point-based system based on skill-level and introducing a long-term follow-up of immigrants and their influence on the country	Enhancing linguistic and cultural integration of immigrants through mandatory Norwegian language courses, requirements for work and self-sufficiency for economic migrants

Introducing an immigration cap – setting a point-based system based on skill-level and introducing a long-term follow-up of immigrants and their influence on the country	Issuing work permit from day one
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Table 8 – The socio-demographic characteristics of the Participants in the Democratic Forums

Participant No.	References Total	Vote for party in next election	Gender	Age	Highest level of education	Work status	Household's total net income, all sources	Ethnic minority
NORWAY: RED GROUP - YOUNG (under 35 years) overrepresented in the group								
1	221	Labour	Female	Under 24	Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent level (3 years or less)	In full-time education	No answer	No
2	166	Labour	Female	25-34	Tertiary, Masters or equivalent level, or above	In full-time education	M - 4th decile	No
3	2	Conservative Party	Female	25-34	Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working full time	No answer	No answer
4	18	Red Party	Female	25-34	Tertiary, Masters or equivalent level, or above	Working full time	F - 5th decile	No
5	69	Labour	Female	35-44	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Working full time	C - 3rd decile	Yes

6	41	Labour	Female	35-44	Tertiary, Masters or equivalent level, or above	Working part time	C - 3rd decile	Yes
7	21	Conservative Party	Male	Under 24	Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working part time	R - 2nd decile	No
8	119	Christian Democrats	Male	25-34	Tertiary, Masters or equivalent level, or above	In full-time education	M - 4th decile	No
9	131	Conservative Party	Male	25-34	Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working full time	H - 10th decile	No
10	150	Liberal Party	Male	25-34	Tertiary, Masters or equivalent level, or above	In full-time education	S - 6th decile	No
11	391	Conservative Party	Male	25-34	Tertiary, Masters or equivalent level, or above	Working full time	P - 8th decile	No
NORWAY: BLUE GROUP - MIDDLE-AGED (35-54 years) participants overrepresented in the group)								
12	137	Labour	Female	25-34	Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working part time	R - 2nd decile	Yes
13	28	Socialist Left	Female	25-34	Tertiary, Masters or equivalent level, or above	In full-time education	M - 4th decile	No
14	252	Conservative Party	Female	45-54	Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working full time	P - 8th decile	No
15	84	Centre Party	Female	35-44	Tertiary, Masters or equivalent level, or above	Permanently sick or disabled	R - 2nd decile	No

16	41	Labour	Female	45-54	Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working part time	P - 8th decile	No
17	42	Liberal Party	Male	Under 24	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	In full-time education	J - 1st decile	Yes
18	48	Labour	Male	25-34	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Working full time	R - 2nd decile	Yes
19	46	Conservative Party	Female	35-44	Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Stay at home to look after house/ family	S - 6th decile	Yes
20	89	Labour	Female	45-54	Tertiary, Masters or equivalent level, or above	Working full time	H - 10th decile	No
21	150	Conservative Party	Male	45-54	Tertiary, Masters or equivalent level, or above	Working full time	H - 10th decile	No
22	164	Conservative Party	Male	55-64	Tertiary, Masters or equivalent level, or above	Working full time	D - 9th decile	No
NORWAY: GREEN GROUP – OLD-AGED (over 55 years) people overrepresented in the group								
23	68	Labour	Male	Under 24	Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working full time	P - 8th decile	Yes
24	142	Conservative Party	Male	25-34	Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent level (3 years or less)	In full-time education	R - 2nd decile	No

25	112	Progress Party	Male	35-44	Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working part time	S - 6th decile	No
26	22	Conservative Party	Female	45-54	Tertiary, Masters or equivalent level, or above	Permanently sick or disabled	F - 5th decile	No
27	71	Red Party	Female	35-44	Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Unemployed, looking for job	C - 3rd decile	No
28	31	Labour	Female	45-54	Tertiary, Masters or equivalent level, or above	Working full time	H - 10th decile	No
29	49	Labour	Female	45-54	Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working full time	M - 4th decile	No
30	106	Labour	Female	65+	Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Retired	D - 9th decile	No
31	50	Socialist Left	Female	65+	Tertiary, Masters or equivalent level, or above	Retired	S - 6th decile	No
32	22	Labour	Male	55-64	Primary or less	Permanently sick or disabled	R - 2nd decile	No
33	103	Labour	Male	65+	Tertiary, Masters or equivalent level, or above	Retired	K - 7th decile	No
34	0	Conservative Party	Male	65+	Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Retired	P - 8th decile	No

Participant number	References Total	Vote for party in next election	Gender	Age	Highest level of education	Work status	Household's total net income, all sources	Ethnic minority
UNITED KINGDOM: GREEN GROUP – UNEMPLOYED people overrepresented in the group								
40	163	No Answer	Female	25-34	Tertiary, Bachelor's or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working full time	M - 4th decile	Yes
41	190	No Answer	Female	45-54	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Working part time	S - 6th decile	No
42	3	Labour	Female	25-34	Lower secondary education completed (ISCED 2)	Stay at home to look after house/ family	R - 2nd decile	Yes
43	33	Labour	Male	Under 24	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	In full-time education	K - 7th decile	No
44	483	Conservative	Female	35-44	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Working part time	D - 9th decile	No
45	347	Don't Know	Female	65+	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Retired	M - 4th decile	No
46	255	Don't Know	Male	35-44	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Working full time	M - 4th decile	No
47	173	Don't Know	Female	65+	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Retired	J - 1st decile	No

48	130	Labour	Male	45-54	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Permanently sick or disabled	C - 3rd decile	Yes
49	86	Labour	Female	45-54	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Working part time	J - 1st decile	Yes
51	138	UKIP	Female	Under 24	Lower secondary education completed (ISCED 2)	Stay at home to look after house/ family	S - 6th decile	No
UNITED KINGDOM: YELLOW GROUP – ETHNICITY (participants with ethnic minority background overrepresented in the group)								
60	45	Don't Know	Male	25-34	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Working full time	J - 1st decile	Yes
61	47	Lib Dems	Male	25-34	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Working full time	M - 4th decile	Yes
62	43	Labour	Male	25-34	Tertiary, Bachelor's or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working full time	D - 9th decile	Yes
63	115	Conservative	Female	Under 24	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	In full-time education	Unassigned	No
64	129	Lib Dems	Male	25-34	Tertiary, Bachelor's or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working full time	P - 8th decile	No
65	34	Don't Know	Female	Under 24	Tertiary, Bachelor's or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working full time	P - 8th decile	Yes

66	164	Labour	Male	45-54	Tertiary, Bachelor's or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working full time	H - 10th decile	Yes
67	304	Labour	Male	25-34	Tertiary, Bachelor's or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working full time	P - 8th decile	No
68	267	Labour	Female	35-44	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Working part time	F - 5th decile	Yes
69	293	Labour	Male	25-34	Tertiary, Bachelor's or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working full time	D - 9th decile	No
70	43	Lib Dems	Male	55-64	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Working full time	D - 9th decile	Yes
71	27	Don't Know	Female	25-34	Tertiary, Bachelor's or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working full time	P - 8th decile	Yes
UNITED KINGDOM: ORANGE GROUP - SELF-EMPLOYED participants overrepresented in the group								
80	228	Conservative	Female	45-54	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Working part time	R - 2nd decile	No
81	33	Don't Know	Female	Under 24	Tertiary, Bachelor's or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working full time	D - 9th decile	No
82	31	Conservative	Female	35-44	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Working full time	H - 10th decile	No
83	72	Don't Know	Female	45-54	Tertiary, Bachelor's or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working part time	S - 6th decile	No

84	294	Conservative	Male	45-54	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Working full time	P - 8th decile	No
85	77	Conservative	Male	65+	Lower secondary education completed (ISCED 2)	Retired	J - 1st decile	No
86	78	UKIP	Male	25-34	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Working full time	D - 9th decile	No
87	57	Conservative	Female	65+	Tertiary, Bachelor's or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Retired	S - 6th decile	No
88	166	Don't Know	Male	25-34	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Working full time	H - 10th decile	Yes
89	195	Labour	Male	45-54	Tertiary, Bachelor's or equivalent level (3 years or less)	Working full time	K - 7th decile	No
90	96	Labour	Female	25-34	Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)	Working full time	F - 5th decile	Yes

Table 9 – The Agenda of the WelfSOC Democratic Forums

DEMOCRATIC FORUM DAY 1		DEMOCRATIC FORUM DAY 2	
Time	Content	Time	Content
9.00-9.30	FIRST ROUND OF QUESTIONNAIRE		
9.30-10.15	PLENARY – WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION	9.00-10.30	PLENARY – PRESENTATION OF STIMULUS + Q&A WITH EXPERTS
9.30-9.45	Welcome and introduction (15 minutes)	9.00-9.15	Welcome + “ice-breaking” discussion
9.45-10.15	“What is welfare policy?” (30 minutes)	9.15-9.45	Stimulus presentation
10.15-10.30	Break	9.45-10.15	Q&A session with experts
10.30-11.00	Presentation of the five themes (lead facilitator)	10.15-10.30	Break
11.00-15.30	BREAKOUT SESSIONS	10.30-10.45	BREAKOUT SESSIONS – ROLE PLAY
11.00-12.00	Explaining breakout sessions (5 minutes) First breakout session (25 minutes) Break (5 minutes) Second breakout session (25 minutes)	10.45-12.15	Explaining breakout sessions (5 minutes) First breakout session (25 minutes) Break (5 minutes) Second breakout session (25 minutes) Break (5 minutes) Third breakout session (25 minutes)
12.00-12.45	LUNCH	12.15-13.00	LUNCH
12.45-14.25	Third breakout session (25 minutes) Break (5 minutes) Fourth breakout session (25 minutes) Break (5 minutes) Fifth breakout session (25 minutes) Break (15 minutes)	13.00-14.00	Fourth breakout session (25 minutes) Break (5 minutes) Fifth breakout session (25 minutes) Break (5 minutes)
14.25-17.00	PLENARY SESSION – FINDINGS AND PREPARATION FOR THE STIMULUS	14.00-16.30	PLENARY SESSION – Q&A, PRESENTATION OF PRIORITIES AND VOTE
14.25-16.30	Presentation of breakout discussions 14.25-14.45: issue 1 (5-10 min presentation by rapporteurs, followed by a 10-15 min whole-group discussion) 14.45-15.05: issue 2	14.00-14.30	Plenary Q&A session between participants and experts (i.e. research team members), in order to discuss/clarify any issues raised during breakout sessions

	15.05-15.25: issue 3 15.25-15.40: Break 15.40-16.00: issue 4 16.00-16.20: issue 5 16.20-16.30: Break		
		14.30-14.45	Opening the “box for thoughts” and discussing any issues that have not been raised before the vote takes place
16.30-17.00	Open session	14.45-16.15	Presentation of priorities and vote 14.45-15.00: Income inequality 15.00-15.15: Immigration 15.15-15.30: Gender 15.30-15.45: Break 15.45-16.00: Intergenerational issues 16.00-16.15: Labour Market 16.15-16.30: Any other issues
		16.30-17.00	SECOND ROUND OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Excerpts of the Information Package provided to the Participants of Democratic Forums in the UK – including only the section on immigration



2. Immigration


What is the foreign-born proportion of the UK population?

Around 13% of the UK population are born abroad. Most of these foreign citizens are born in Poland, India and Ireland.² In total, around 5% of the UK population are born in other European Union countries.

The UK’s migrant population is concentrated in London. Around 37% of people living in the UK who were born abroad live in the capital city. Similarly, around 37% of people living in London were born outside the UK, compared with 13% for the UK as a whole.

How did net migration evolve over the past decades?

Table 6. Evolution of net migration in the United Kingdom, 1970-2014



Source: Long-term International Migration - International Passenger Survey (IPS), Office for National Statistics

² Source: University of Oxford Migration Observatory.



- *Between 1970 and the early 1990s, the level of immigration in the UK was relatively stable;*
- *Between 1995 and 2004, the gap between immigration and emigration increased;*
- *Between 2004 and 2013, the levels of immigration and emigration remained stable and even decreased in 2012;*
- *In 2014, net migration reached its highest level.*

Net migration is the number of people moving to live in a particular country (immigration) minus the number of people moving out of that country to live elsewhere (emigration).

If more people are arriving than leaving, net migration is a positive number, which means net immigration. If more people are leaving than arriving, net migration is a negative number, which means net emigration. Since the mid-1990s, there has been an increasing level of net immigration in the United Kingdom, as the above graph shows.


It is important to recognise that net migration does not by itself indicate the full extent of population change. It is only a part of the picture. If immigration and emigration are roughly equal, net migration will be low irrespective of how many people arrive and leave.

In 2014, 636,000 people (+84,000 compared to 2013) came to live in the United Kingdom, while 307,000 (-9,000) people left the country. As such, the level of net immigration in 2014 was 329,000 (+ 94,000). This is the highest level of net immigration ever recorded in the United Kingdom.



How many immigrants come from other European Union countries?

Table 7. Evolution of net migration by citizenship in the United Kingdom, 1975-2015



Source: Long-term International Migration, Office for National Statistics

- *Most immigrants come from non-EU countries;*
- *The level of EU immigration has been on the rise since 2012 and now the numbers from EU and non-EU countries are nearly equal*


In 2013, 14% of people migrating to the UK were British nationals, 38% were nationals of other EU countries, and 47% were nationals of non-EU countries.

Net migration of EU citizens was 183,000 in 2014 (+53,000 compared to 2013), the highest level ever recorded. Non-EU net migration has also increased to 196,000 in 2014 (+39,000), but remains lower than in 2004, when it reached more than 250,000. Since 1975, there have been more British nationals leaving the United Kingdom than entering it.



Why do people migrate to the United Kingdom?

Table 8. Long-Term International Migration estimates of immigration to the UK, by main reason for migration



Source: Long-term International Migration, Office for National Statistics

- The main reason for immigration is to work in the UK
- The next most important reason is to study

Since 2012, work has been the main reason for migrants to come and live in the United Kingdom. Study was the most common main reason for immigration during the period 2009-12, and the reduction in the number of people migrating to the UK to study since then reflects a reduction in the number of student visas issued to students from outside the European Economic Area³ and Switzerland.

Of those whose main reason for migration was work-related, the majority (59%) were EU citizens; whereas of those whose main reason for migration was study, the majority (72%) were non-EU citizens. Changes in flows of people migrating for these reasons are affected by the differing rights of EU and non-EU citizens to migrate to the UK and by the impact of government policy.

³ Countries from the European Economic Area include all European Union member states, as well as Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.



Can immigrants claim benefits?

The rules are complicated. Most non-EU nationals who are subject to immigration control are not allowed access to “public funds” (such as jobseekers’ allowance or tax credits), although they can use public services like the NHS and education.

EU citizens who are working have similar access to the benefits as UK citizens. For jobseekers or people not working, the rules for determining eligibility can be complex and vary depending on the type of benefit in question.

The government has introduced various restrictions on European Economic Area (EEA) citizens’ access to benefits. Their impacts on total welfare spending are hard to quantify but are not likely to be large.

Foreign born people are less likely to be receiving key Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) out-of-work benefits than the UK born, but more likely to be receiving tax credits.

It is unclear whether current or proposed welfare restrictions would reduce future immigration.

Do foreigners use the NHS?

‘Deliberate’ use of the NHS —use by those who come here specifically to receive free treatment or who come for other reasons but take advantage of the system when they’re here— is hard to quantify. It is thought to be very roughly between £110 million and £280 million a year.

‘Normal’ use of the NHS —by foreign visitors who have ended up being treated while in England— is estimated to cost about £1.8 billion a year.

The majority of these costs aren’t currently charged for. Only about £500 million is thought to be recoverable or chargeable at the moment.

The cost of the NHS is about £138 billion, so use by foreigners accounts for about one and a half per cent of NHS spending. British people use health services in other countries some of which is free.



Is immigration likely to increase in the future?

It is difficult to predict how migration flows are going to evolve in the future, as there are many factors that can influence this including government policies, geopolitical changes and job creation/opportunities. Recent attempts to predict the evolution of net migration in the United Kingdom did not reflect the current reality. For instance, the Office for National Statistics predicted higher levels of emigration and lower levels of immigration in the United Kingdom.

Excerpts of the Information Package provided to the Participants of Democratic Forums in Norway – including only the section on immigration (in Norwegian)



INNVANDRERE

ARBEID

- Et flertall av voksne innvandrere er i jobb.
- Det er stort mangfold blant innvandrere. Enkelte grupper er spesielt utsatte og har høyere arbeidsledighet og lavere sysselsetting, mens andre har høyere sysselsetting enn majoritetsbefolkningen.

Sysselsatte i alt og sysselsatte innvandrere etter verdensregion. Absolutte tall og i prosent av personer 15-74 år i hver gruppe. 4. kvartal

	2014		Endring siste tolv måneder	
	Absolutte tall	Prosent	2013 - 2014	
			Absolutte tall	Prosentpoeng
Hele befolkningen	2650000	68.5	31000	-0.1
Befolkningen eksklusive innvandrere	2268175	69.4	7587	-0.1
Innvandrere i alt	381825	63.4	23413	0.3
Norden	48791	76	967	-0.3
Vest-Europa utenom Norden og Tyrkia	43182	70.6	1792	-0.1
EU-land i Øst-Europa	113330	73.2	10484	0.3
Øst-Europa utenfor EU	31778	63.7	1701	0.9
Nord-Amerika og Oseania	6763	66	142	0
Asia	96464	56	5296	0.8
Afrika	29289	42	2496	0.1
Sør- og Mellom-Amerika	12228	62.6	535	-0.5

Kilde: Statistisk Sentralbyrå

Innvandrerbefolkningen med bakgrunn fra Asia og Afrika har en lavere **sysselsettingsgrad** enn andre innvandrergrupper. Dette kan delvis forklares med at disse gruppene har et større innslag av flyktninger med kort botid i Norge. Med lengre botid øker sjansen for sysselsetting, men forskjellene mellom gruppene utjevnes likevel ikke helt over tid.

Sysselsettingen er høyere blant norskfødte personer med innvandrerforeldre enn for innvandrere.



**Registrert helt arbeidsledige, etter innvandringsbakgrunn og verdensregion.
 Absolutte tall og i prosent av arbeidsstyrken i hver gruppe**

	2. kvartal 2015		Endring siste tolv måneder	
	Absolutte tall	Prosent	2. kvartal 2014 - 2. kvartal 2015	Prosentpoeng
Registrerte helt arbeidsledige i alt	74994	2.7	2501	0.1
Befolkningen eksklusive innvandrere ¹	45709	2	1164	0
Innvandrere i alt	29285	7.1	1337	0.1
Norden	1532	3	155	0.3
Vest-Europa ellers	1674	3.7	222	0.4
EU-land i Øst-Europa	10594	8.6	1471	0.9
Øst-Europa ellers	2344	6.7	-11	-0.2
Nord-Amerika og Oseania	222	3.3	18	0.2
Asia ²	7821	7.6	-408	-0.6
Afrika	4128	11.8	-198	-1.5
Sør-og Mellom-Amerika	970	7.3	88	0.5

¹Inkl. ikke- bosatte.

²Tyrkia er inkludert.


Kilde: Statistisk Sentralbyrå



KRIMINALITET OG STRAFF

- De fleste straffede er personer uten innvandringsbakgrunn, men man kan snakke om en overrepresentasjon i kriminalstatistikken for enkelte grupper.
- Kriminalitet er sterkt knyttet til alder og kjønn.
- Noen innvandrergupper med en høy andel unge menn er overrepresentert i kriminalstatistikken.

Figur 4.1. Straffede, etter innvandringskategori og alder. 2008. Per 1 000 innbyggere



Kilde: Straffereaksjoner. Statistisk sentralbyrå

På samme måte som for integrering på arbeidsmarkedet, er det stor variasjon mellom ulike grupper innvandrere.

Variasjon i **alders- og kjønns sammensetning** er med på å forklare hvorfor innvandrere fra enkelte opprinnelsesland er overrepresenterte i kriminalstatistikken.

Det kan se ut som det er en sammenheng mellom overrepresentasjon i kriminalstatistikken og **kort botid**.



Straffereaksjoner, etter innvandrerkategori, alder og type reaksjon. 2008. Antall og prosent

	I alt	15-17 år	18-20 år	21-24 år	25-29 år	30- år	I alt	15-17 år	18-20 år	21-24 år	25-29 år	30- år	
<i>Abslutte tall</i>						<i>Prosent</i>							
	I alt												
Totalt	73 589	5271	11 043	11 733	9861	36 681	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Forelegg og bot	53 040	3 375	8 163	7 671	7 008	26 823	72	64	74	71	71	73	
Ubetinget fengsel	9 136	116	1 202	1 503	1 485	4 830	12	2	11	14	15	13	
Betinget fengsel	6 904	541	1 044	1 009	880	3 430	9	10	9	9	9	9	
Påtaleunntatelse	1 669	812	158	94	99	506	2	15	1	1	1	1	
Samfunnsstraff	2 840	427	476	456	389	1 092	4	8	4	4	4	3	
	Øvrig befolkning												
Totalt	62 752	4 520	9 770	9 065	8 095	31 302	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Forelegg og bot	45 306	2 982	7 232	6 481	5 729	22 882	72	66	74	71	71	73	
Ubetinget fengsel	7 718	92	1 048	1 271	1 230	4 077	12	2	11	14	15	13	
Betinget fengsel	5 940	461	946	845	729	2 959	10	10	10	9	9	9	
Påtaleunntatelse	1 348	657	134	75	73	409	2	15	1	1	1	1	
Samfunnsstraff	2 440	328	410	393	334	975	4	7	4	4	4	3	
	Innvandrere												
Totalt	9 810	512	999	1 441	1 586	5 272	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Forelegg og bot	7 049	275	716	1 027	1 161	3 870	72	54	72	71	73	73	
Ubetinget fengsel	1 307	21	127	206	219	734	13	4	13	14	14	14	
Betinget fengsel	883	59	84	140	136	464	9	12	8	10	9	9	
Påtaleunntatelse	248	96	19	15	24	94	3	19	2	1	2	2	
Samfunnsstraff	323	61	53	53	46	110	3	12	5	4	3	2	
	Norskfødte med innvandrerforeldre												
Totalt	1 027	239	274	227	180	107	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Forelegg og bot	685	118	215	163	118	71	67	49	78	72	66	66	
Ubetinget fengsel	111	3	27	26	36	19	11		10	11	20	18	
								Antall 1					
Betinget fengsel	81	21	14	24	15	7	8	9	5	11	8	7	
Påtaleunntatelse	73	59	5	4			7	25	2	2	:	:	
Samfunnsstraff	77	36	13	10	9	7	7	16	5	4	5	7	

Kilde: Straffereaksjoner. Statistisk Sentralbyrå; Skardhamar, Thorsen og Henriksen (2011).

VI ØNSKER DERE EN GOD DISKUSJON!

Mer informasjon

Dersom du ønsker mer informasjon om prosjektet «Welfare State Futures: Our Children's Europe» og vil følge med på hvordan det går videre, inviterer vi deg til å besøke prosjektets internasjonale hjemmeside: www.welfsoc.eu. Du finner oss også på twitter @WelfSoc.


Table 10 – The final coding scheme used for the analysis of DF discussions in Norway and in the UK

Category of code	Code (Node in Nvivo)	Child-node
Type of Argument		
	Beliefs	
	Claims for social change	
	Emotional arguments	
	Moral arguments	
	Norms	
	Opinion	
	Personal arguments	
	Rational arguments	
	Principles	
		Affordability
		Equality - equal treatment
		Fairness
		Solidarity
		Transparency
		DC - Need
		DC - Control
		DC - Attitude
		DC - Reciprocity
	Values	
Differentiation		
	Characteristics (In-group) - age cleavage	
	Characteristics (In-group) - nationality cleavage	
	Characteristics (In-group) - social status cleavage	
	Characteristics (Out-group) - age cleavage	
		characteristics - out-group - old-age
		characteristics - out-group - youth
	Characteristics (Out-group) - nationality cleavage	
	Characteristics (Out-group) - social status cleavage	
		characteristics - out-group - poor
		characteristics - out-group - rich
Discussion Dynamics		
	Agreement	
		Reasoned
		Unreasoned
	Contestation	
	Disagreement	
		Reasoned
		Unreasoned
	Interruption	
	New perspective	
		Repeating, re-opening a previously mentioned new perspective
	Response to contestation	
	Response to new perspective	
	Turning point	
Interests and Considerations		
	Collective interest	

	Cultural considerations	
		Collective framing
		Individual framing
	Demographic risk	
	Economic considerations	
		Collective framing
		Individual framing
	Individual, self-interest	
Framing of issues		
	Prioritisation (x over y)	
	Problem	
	Solution (or its refusal)	
Rationale (developed in WelfSOC)		
	Economic impact	
	Societal impact negative	
	Societal impact positive	
Themes (developed in WelfSOC – only the theme of Immigration was extended)		
	Childcare and parenting	
	Disability	
	Education	
	Funding and or financing priority	
	Gender	
	Healthcare	
	Housing	
	Immigration	
		Border control, monitoring
		Economic migrants
		Integration and inclusion
		Overcrowding
		Refugees
	Income inequality	
	Intergenerational issues	
	Population ageing	
	Labour market	
	Old-age pensions	
	Other - various	
	Social safety net	
	Taxation	
	Unemployment	
	Welfare state financing	


APPENDIX 2 – SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS – INCLUDING FIGURES AND TABLES – COMPLEMENTING CHAPTER 4

Figure 1 - Annual population change 1992-2015



Source: Office for National Statistics

Figure 2 - Public preferences for increasing or decreasing the number of immigrants (1995, 2003, 2008, 2011, 2013)



Source: BSA


Table 11 - Changes in public attitudes towards immigrants in Norway (2002-2015)

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Most immigrants make an important contribution to Norwegian working life														
Strongly agree (per cent)	18	21	21	24	26	31	33	26	31	29	32	29	32	30
Agree on the whole (per cent)	48	45	47	45	46	41	42	45	47	45	48	43	45	42
Neither agree nor disagree (per cent)	12	9	10	10	10	16	15	15	8	11	9	13	10	15
Disagree on the whole (per cent)	14	18	15	13	12	8	7	9	10	10	8	10	9	7
Strongly disagree (per cent)	5	6	6	5	5	3	2	4	3	3	3	4	3	3
Don't know (per cent)	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
Most immigrants abuse the system of social benefits														
Strongly agree (per cent)	14	14	13	12	12	11	8	9	10	10	8	11	8	8
Agree on the whole (per cent)	27	25	27	25	24	20	19	20	21	25	24	21	21	17
Neither agree nor disagree (per cent)	14	10	12	10	13	21	19	19	12	14	14	14	13	18
Disagree on the whole (per cent)	30	33	31	30	33	27	32	34	35	32	34	33	33	32
Strongly disagree (per cent)	13	15	15	20	16	18	19	17	19	16	16	17	21	20
Don't know (per cent)	2	2	2	4	2	3	3	2	4	2	3	3	3	5
Most immigrants enrich the cultural life in Norway														
Strongly agree (per cent)	24	31	27	36	31	32	33	32	34	35	34	32	36	36
Agree on the whole (per cent)	39	39	39	35	37	35	38	38	38	39	39	37	33	35
Neither agree nor disagree (per cent)	12	9	10	8	11	14	12	14	9	9	9	12	12	12
Disagree on the whole (per cent)	14	13	14	11	13	11	10	10	10	11	10	13	13	8
Strongly disagree (per cent)	8	7	8	8	7	7	5	4	5	4	5	4	5	6
Don't know (per cent)	2	1	1	3	1	1	2	1	3	2	3	2	2	2
Most immigrants are a cause of insecurity in society														
Strongly agree (per cent)	17	17	14	13	14	11	12	10	11	11	10	11	9	7

Agree on the whole (per cent)	28	28	27	27	27	23	21	23	25	24	23	24	19	19
Neither agree nor disagree (per cent)	13	10	10	10	13	19	18	15	8	11	12	12	10	15
Disagree on the whole (per cent)	25	28	31	26	28	27	29	33	33	29	31	30	31	30
Strongly disagree (per cent)	16	17	16	23	18	19	20	19	21	23	23	22	29	27
Don't know (per cent)	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	2
All immigrants in Norway should have the same opportunities to have a job as Norwegians														
Strongly agree (per cent)	60	61	64	69	62	68	70	67	66	67	63	62	67	66
Agree on the whole (per cent)	26	22	23	21	24	22	20	22	22	21	23	24	20	21
Neither agree nor disagree (per cent)	4	3	3	3	4	5	5	4	3	3	4	3	4	5
Disagree on the whole (per cent)	6	8	6	4	6	3	4	4	5	5	6	7	6	5
Strongly disagree (per cent)	4	4	4	3	4	2	2	2	3	3	3	4	2	3
Don't know (per cent)	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1

Source: Norway Statistics, 2002-2015

Figure 3 - Public preferences on immigrants' access to welfare benefits, 2013




Source: BSA, 2013

Table 2 - Comparison of results on attitudes to immigrants' access to the same social rights as citizens in 2008 and 2016

	Great Britain	Norway
(1) Immediately on arrival 2008	6.10%	13.40%
(1) Immediately on arrival 2016	4.80%	12.40%
Change	-1.30%	-1.00%
(2) After a year, whether or not have worked 2008	5.40%	12.90%
(2) After a year, whether or not have worked 2016	7.90%	14.70%
Change	2.50%	1.80%
(3) After worked and paid taxes at least a year 2008	48.00%	34.50%
(3) After worked and paid taxes at least a year 2016	58.70%	37.20%
Change	10.70%	2.70%
(4) Once they have become a citizen 2008	32.10%	37.30%
(4) Once they have become a citizen 2016	21.80%	34.00%
Change	-10.30%	-3.30%
(5) They should never get the same rights 2008	8.50%	2.00%
(5) They should never get the same rights 2016	6.70%	1.70%
Change	-1.80%	-0.30%

Source: ESS 2008 and 2016

Figure 4 - The level of income inequality in EU member states and Norway in 2015




Source: Eurostat, 2015

Table 3 - Immigrants' after-tax income per consumption unit, 2015

	Index (the whole population = 100) (%)	Median EU-scale (NOK)
Population in total	100	356600
Immigrants, total	77	274800
Western countries and EU countries⁹¹	84	300900
Non-Western, Non-EU countries⁹²	70	250200

Source: Statistics Norway, 2015

Figure 5 - Immigrant households' income composition (per cent), by main source of income, country background, contents and year, 2015



Source: Statistics Norway, 2015

⁹¹ The EU/EEA, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand

⁹² Asia, Africa, Latin America, Oceania except Australia and New Zealand, and Europe except the EU/EEA

Table 4 Social transfers to immigrant households' income (per cent), 2015

	Old-age pensions	Disability pensions	Work assessment allowance	Sickness benefits	Family support	Introductory programme	Social assistance, total	Other transfers
Population in total	10	4	2	2	1	0	0	7
Western countries and EU countries⁹³	3	1	1	2	1	0	0	6
Denmark	11	2	1	2	1	0	0	8
United Kingdom	6	1	1	1	1	0	0	6
Sweden	4	1	2	2	1	0	0	6
Germany	4	1	1	2	1	0	0	5
Lithuania	0	0	1	2	2	0	0	6
Poland	1	0	1	3	2	0	0	6
Non-Western, Non-EU countries⁹⁴	2	4	4	3	2	2	5	8
Afghanistan	1	2	4	3	3	4	8	10
Eritrea	1	1	2	1	3	16	14	10
Iraq	1	7	8	4	4	1	9	9
Iran	1	6	5	3	1	1	3	6
Somalia	1	2	4	2	6	9	20	13

Source: Statistics Norway, 2015

⁹³ The EU/EEA, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand

⁹⁴ Asia, Africa, Latin America, Oceania except Australia and New Zealand, and Europe except the EU/EEA

Table 5 - DWP working age benefit claimants by world area of origin

Thousands and percent

World Area of Origin	Feb 2008		Feb 2009		Feb 2010		Feb 2011		Feb 2012		Feb 2013		Feb 2014		Feb 2015	
	number	% of total	number	% of total	number	% of total	number	% of total	number	% of total	number	% of total	number	% of total	number	% of total
All	5,174.88	100	5,802.48	100	5,917.56	100	5,765.34	100	5,881.70	100	5,695.39	100	5,309.58	100	5,129.52	100
UK	4,886.17	94.4	5,472.74	94.3	5,560.72	94.0	5,394.31	93.6	5,474.79	93.1	5,298.23	93.0	4,914.16	92.6	4,758.30	92.8
non-UK and unknown - total	288.72	5.6	329.75	5.7	356.84	6.0	371.02	6.4	406.90	6.9	397.16	7.0	395.42	7.4	371.22	7.2
of whom:																
European Union (not UK)	65.09	1.3	84.08	1.4	89.89	1.5	91.31	1.6	116.52	2.0	121.28	2.1	130.99	2.5	113.96	2.2
<i>EU excl. Accession Countries</i>	<i>52.48</i>	<i>1.0</i>	<i>60.41</i>	<i>1.0</i>	<i>63.67</i>	<i>1.1</i>	<i>62.57</i>	<i>1.1</i>	<i>66.80</i>	<i>1.1</i>	<i>62.33</i>	<i>1.1</i>	<i>63.72</i>	<i>1.2</i>	<i>55.33</i>	<i>1.1</i>
<i>EU Accession Countries</i>	<i>12.61</i>	<i>0.2</i>	<i>23.67</i>	<i>0.4</i>	<i>26.22</i>	<i>0.4</i>	<i>28.74</i>	<i>0.5</i>	<i>49.72</i>	<i>0.8</i>	<i>58.95</i>	<i>1.0</i>	<i>67.27</i>	<i>1.3</i>	<i>58.63</i>	<i>1.1</i>

Source: Department of Work and Pension

Table 6 - DWP working age claimants by client group and world area of origin, 2015

Thousands and percent

World Area of Origin	Total		Key out-of-work benefits		Jobseeker's Allowance		Employment and Support Allowance and incapacity benefits		Lone Parent		Other Income Related	
	number	% of total	number	% of total	number	% of total	number	% of total	number	% of total	number	% of total
All	5129.52	100	3883.54	100	785.62	100	2533.22	100	448.11	100	116.59	100
UK	4758.3	92.8	3596.3	92.6	692.34	88.1	2383.35	94.1	412.61	92.1	107.96	92.6
non-UK and unknown - total	371.22	7.2	287.3	7.4	93.28	11.9	149.87	5.9	35.5	7.9	8.63	7.4
of whom:												
European Union (not UK)	113.96	2.2	91.7	2.4	38.02	4.8	44.22	1.7	7.61	1.7	1.87	1.6
<i>EU excl. Accession Countries</i>	55.33	1.1	45.0	1.2	16.02	2.0	24.5	1.0	3.36	0.7	1.11	1.0
<i>EU Accession Countries</i>	58.63	1.1	46.7	1.2	22	2.8	19.72	0.8	4.25	0.9	0.76	0.7
Other non-UK												
<i>Europe - non-EU</i>	17.85	0.3	14.2	0.4	2.57	0.3	9.51	0.4	1.76	0.4	0.35	0.3
<i>Africa</i>	85.98	1.7	72.6	1.9	24.49	3.1	31.34	1.2	14.81	3.3	1.98	1.7
<i>Asia and Middle East</i>	125.58	2.4	87.3	2.2	22.88	2.9	52.29	2.1	8.85	2.0	3.29	2.8
<i>The Americas</i>	16.72	0.3	13.0	0.3	3.74	0.5	6.85	0.3	2.17	0.5	0.28	0.2
<i>Australasia and Oceania</i>	1.86	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.35	0.0	0.77	0.0	0.09	0.0	0.04	0.0
<i>Others and Unknown</i>	9.29	0.2	7.1	0.2	1.23	0.2	4.89	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.82	0.7


Source: Department of Work and Pension

Table 7 – OECD Employment protection indicators in OECD countries, 2013

The OECD indicators				
Scale from 0 (least restrictions) to 6 (most restrictions), last year available				
	Protection of permanent workers against individual and collective dismissals	Protection of permanent workers against (individual) dismissal	Specific requirements for collective dismissal	Regulation on temporary forms of employment
OECD countries				
United Kingdom	1.59	1.18	2.63	0.54
Estonia	2.07	1.74	2.88	3.04
Ireland	2.07	1.50	3.50	1.21
Hungary	2.07	1.45	3.63	2.00
Finland	2.17	2.38	1.63	1.88
Slovak Republic	2.26	1.81	3.38	2.42
Norway	2.31	2.23	2.50	3.42
Denmark	2.32	2.10	2.88	1.79
Spain	2.36	1.95	3.38	3.17
Slovenia	2.39	1.99	3.38	2.13
Poland	2.39	2.20	2.88	2.33
Greece	2.41	2.07	3.25	2.92
Austria	2.44	2.12	3.25	2.17
Sweden	2.52	2.52	2.50	1.17
Czech Republic	2.66	2.87	2.13	2.13
Portugal	2.69	3.01	1.88	2.33
Luxembourg	2.74	2.28	3.88	3.83
France	2.82	2.60	3.38	3.75
Germany	2.84	2.53	3.63	1.75
Italy	2.89	2.55	3.75	2.71
Netherlands	2.94	2.84	3.19	1.17
Belgium	2.99	2.14	5.13	2.42

Source: OECD/IAB Employment Protection Database, 2013

Figure 6 Employment rate, rate of active population (15-64 years) - annual data



Source: Eurostat, 1998-2015

Table 8 - Hourly earnings in EUR in EU15 and EU10 countries and in Norway compared, 2014

	Mean earnings in euro		First decile earnings in euro	
	EUR	% of EU15	EUR	% of EU15
Norway	30.8	173%	19.27	200%
Denmark	27.61	155%	17.1	178%
Finland	19.61	110%	12.35	128%
Sweden	20.64	116%	14.07	146%
Belgium	19.9	112%	12.75	133%
Germany	17.78	100%	7.98	83%
France	17.4	98%	9.93	103%
Luxembourg	22.94	129%	11.67	121%
Netherlands	17.89	101%	9.2	96%
Austria	15.93	90%	8.31	86%
United Kingdom	18.76	105%	8.53	89%
Bulgaria	2.34	13%	1	10%
Czechia	5.38	30%	2.53	26%
Estonia	5.78	32%	2.5	26%
Latvia	4.41	25%	1.93	20%
Lithuania	3.91	22%	1.7	18%
Hungary	4.64	26%	2.2	23%
Poland	5.66	32%	2.25	23%
Romania	2.79	16%	1.1	11%
Slovenia	8.84	50%	4.45	46%
Slovakia	5.33	30%	2.47	26%
EU15	17.8	100%	9.62	100%
EU28	15.23	86%	3.83	40%

Source: Eurostat, 2014

Table 9 - Working age population and total employment of individuals aged 16-64, 2013

Region	Working age population (000s)	Total employment (000s)	% all employed	High-skill employment (000s)	% all high skill employment	Low-skill employment (000s)	% all low skill employment
EU*	1,040	770	3	480	3	290	2
EU8 & EU2	1,080	840	3	270	2	580	4
Non-EU	4,190	2,610	9	1,430	9	1,190	9
UK	33,910	24,300	85	13,440	86	10,860	84
All	40,220	28,530	100	15,620	100	12,910	100

Source: Labour Force Survey in MAC 2014

APPENDIX 3 – SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS COMPLEMENTING CHAPTER 8

Table 1 – Pre- and post-deliberation survey responses of Norwegian DF participants concerning the three immigration-related questions (identification of Coherent/Ambivalent/Contradictory attitudes are detailed in Table 2 below)

Participant No.	References to immigr. No.	<i>When do you think immigrants should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens?¹</i>		<i>Do you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in [country] encourage people from other countries to come and live here?²</i>		<i>Do you think people who come to live in [country] receive more than they contribute or contribute more than they receive?³</i>		Attitudes: Coherent/Ambivalent/Contradictory	Change/Update ⁴
		Before	After	Before	After	Before	After		
Part. 1	27	1 year		Agree strongly	Agree	Receive	Middle	Coherent	update
Part. 2	19	Don't know	1 year	Agree	Agree strongly	Don't know	Receive	Coherent	change
Part. 6	18	1 year		Agree strongly		Middle		Coherent	update
Part. 8	24	Immediately	1 year - whether or not have worked	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Contribute		Coherent	change
Part. 9	29	Don't know	1 year	Agree strongly		Middle	Contribute	Ambivalent	change
Part. 10	14	1 year		Agree		Middle		Ambivalent	update
Part. 11	70	Citizen		Agree	Agree strongly	Middle	Contribute	Ambivalent	update
Part. 12	31	Immediately	1 year	Disagree strongly		Contribute		Contradictory	change

Part. 14	34	Citizen	1 year	Don't know		Don't know		Coherent	change
Part. 19	13	Citizen	1 year	Agree strongly		Middle	Receive	Ambivalent	change
Part. 21	28	Citizen		Agree strongly	Agree	Receive		Ambivalent	update
Part. 22	12	1 year		Agree	Agree strongly	Contribute		Contradictory	update
Part. 23	27	1 year		Disagree	Agree	Contribute	Middle	Ambivalent	update
Part. 24	30	Citizen	1 year	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Middle		Ambivalent	change
Part. 25	23	1 year		Agree		Receive	Middle	Ambivalent	update
Part. 29	14	1 year - with or without work	1 year	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Middle		Coherent	change
Part. 30	15	Don't know	1 year	Neither agree nor disagree		Don't know		Ambivalent	change
Part. 33	24	1 year		Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Contribute		Coherent	update

Notes:

¹ Answers to Question 1: Immediately on arrival - "Immediately"; After living in [country] for a year, whether or not they have worked – "1 year - with or without work"; Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year – "1 year"; Once they have become a [country] citizen – "Citizen"; They should never get the same rights – "Never"; Don't know/No answer

² Answers to Question 2: Agree strongly; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Disagree strongly; Don't know

³ Answers to Question 3 are on a scale of 0-10: From 0 to 3 – Contribute; From 4 to 6 – Middle; From 7 to 10 – Receive

⁴ Change or update in attitudes is based on the comparison of answers to Question 1 – as the only question on immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state

Table 12 – Identification of Coherent/Ambivalent/Contradictory attitudes among Norwegian DF participants in relation to specific sub-issues raised during the DF discussions

Participant No.	References to immigr. No.	Attitudes	Change/update	Refugees	Econ. Migrants	Immigr. women	Border Control	Integration	Access to Welf. benefits	Need for immigration Benefits for the country	Issues that make immigration problematic
Part. 1	27	Coherent	update	-				+ - -	-	+ -	-
Part. 2	19	Coherent	change	+				+++	+++ -		
Part. 6	18	Coherent	update		+	+ -		++	-		+
Part. 8	24	Coherent	change	++ -	++				- +	+	
Part. 9	29	Ambivalent	change					++++	-		+ - -
Part. 10	14	Ambivalent	update	- -	++	-		++		+	
Part. 11	70	Ambivalent	update	- +	- - +	- -		- + + - +	+ - -	++	++
Part. 12	31	Contradictory	change	+	+		+ - + *	++		+	
Part. 14	34	Coherent	change	+			+	+++			+++
Part. 19	13	Ambivalent	change	- + +		+ -					-
Part. 21	28	Ambivalent	update	+ -	-		- - -	++			- -
Part. 22	12	Contradictory	update			- +		- + *		+++	-
Part. 23	27	Ambivalent	update	+	- +			+ - + -	- +		++
Part. 24	30	Ambivalent	change					+	+ - -		++
Part. 25	23	Ambivalent	update	+ - -	+			++	- -		-
Part. 29	14	Coherent	change					+++++	+		+
Part. 30	15	Ambivalent	change	+++					- - - -		
Part. 33	24	Coherent	update	+ -		+		+	- -	++	

Note: “+” means a pro-immigration (inclusive) reference; “-“ means anti-immigration stances (exclusive) reference; * means contradictory reference

Table 3 – Pre- and post-deliberation survey responses of UK DF participants concerning the three immigration-related questions (identification of Coherent/Ambivalent/Contradictory attitudes are detailed in Table 2 below)

Participant No.	References to immigr. No.	<i>When do you think immigrants should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens?¹</i>		<i>Do you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in [country] encourage people from other countries to come and live here?²</i>		<i>Do you think people who come to live in [country] receive more than they contribute or contribute more than they receive?³</i>		Attitudes: Coherent/Ambivalent/Contradictory	Change/Update ⁴
		Before	After	Before	After	Before	After		
Part. 40	46	Citizen		Agree strongly	Agree	Receive	Contribute	Coherent	update
Part. 41	27	1 year		Disagree	Disagree strongly	Contribute		Coherent	update
Part. 44	101	1 year		Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Contribute		Contradictory	update
Part. 45	65	No answer	Citizen	Agree strongly		Receive		Coherent	change
Part. 46	26	Never		Agree strongly		Receive		Coherent	update
Part. 47	42	1 year		Agree strongly		Contribute	Receive	Coherent	update
Part. 48	17	1 year		No answer	Disagree	Contribute	Middle	Ambivalent	update
Part. 49	15	Immediately	Citizen	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Contribute	Middle	Coherent	change
Part. 51	35	1 year		Agree strongly		Contribute		Coherent	update
Part. 63	14	1 year		Agree strongly		Middle		Ambivalent	update
Part. 64	10	1 year		Agree		Middle	Contribute	Coherent	update
Part. 66	28	1 year		Neither agree nor disagree		Middle		Ambivalent	update

Part. 67	24	Citizen	1 year	Agree	Agree strongly	Neither agree nor disagree	Receive	Ambivalent	change
Part. 68	17	Citizen	Never	Disagree strongly		Receive	Contribute	Coherent	change
Part. 69	25	Citizen		Agree strongly	Agree	Contribute	Receive	Contradictory	update
Part. 80	23	1 year	Never	Agree strongly		Contribute	Receive	Coherent	change
Part. 83	14	No answer	1 year	Agree strongly		Contribute	Receive	Coherent	change
Part. 84	34	1 year		Agree	Agree strongly	Receive		Ambivalent	update
Part. 88	19	No answer	Never	Disagree strongly	Agree strongly	Receive	Middle	Ambivalent	change
Part. 89	23	1 year		Neither agree nor disagree	No answer	Middle	Receive	Ambivalent	update
Part. 90	30	1 year		Agree		Middle	Receive	Ambivalent	update

Notes:

¹ Answers to Question 1: Immediately on arrival - "Immediately"; After living in [country] for a year, whether or not they have worked – "1 year - with or without work"; Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year – "1 year"; Once they have become a [country] citizen – "Citizen"; They should never get the same rights – "Never"; Don't know/No answer

² Answers to Question 2: Agree strongly; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Disagree strongly; Don't know

³ Answers to Question 3 are on a scale of 0-10: From 0 to 3 – Contribute; From 4 to 6 – Middle; From 7 to 10 – Receive

⁴ Change or update in attitudes is based on the comparison of answers to Question 1 – as the only question on immigrants' inclusion in the welfare state

Table 4 – Identification of Coherent/Ambivalent/Contradictory attitudes among UK DF participants in relation to specific sub-issues raised during the DF discussions

Participant No.	References to immigr. No.	Attitudes	Change/update	Refugees	Econ. Migrants	Border Control	Access to Welf. benefits	Need for immigration Benefits for the country	Issues that make immigration problematic
Part. 40	46	Coherent	update						
Part. 41	27	Coherent	update		+	- +	--		--
Part. 44	101	Contradictory	update	+ - - *	+ + - *	---	- + *	+	-
Part. 45	65	Coherent	change	--- + + -	+	--	-		-
Part. 46	26	Coherent	update	-	+	--			-
Part. 47	42	Coherent	update	-	+	---	--		
Part. 48	17	Ambivalent	update			--	+		+
Part. 49	15	Coherent	change	+ -		-	+		-
Part. 51	35	Coherent	update	--	- +	--	+		--
Part. 63	14	Ambivalent	update	+ -			-	+	
Part. 64	10	Coherent	update			++	- +		
Part. 66	28	Ambivalent	update	+	-	- + +	---	++	+
Part. 67	24	Ambivalent	change	-		+ + - -	--	+	--
Part. 68	17	Coherent	change	+ - -		-	--	+	-
Part. 69	25	Contradictory	update	--		+ - * + -	---		--
Part. 80	23	Coherent	change	-	+	--	-----		-
Part. 83	14	Coherent	change			++			-
Part. 84	34	Ambivalent	update	--	++	--	-- +	+	+ -
Part. 88	19	Ambivalent	change		+ - +	-	-		
Part. 89	23	Ambivalent	update	+ -		-	+ -	+	-
Part. 90	30	Ambivalent	update	- + -	- + + -	- - + -	+ - -		-

Note: "+" means a pro-immigration (inclusive) reference; "-" means anti-immigration stances (exclusive) reference; * means contradictory reference