Name: David Stephen Harrison

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Introduction

This thesis will examine how the Foreign Office viewed the German colonial question during the early interwar period, 1919-1929. This is an important subject that requires a greater level of academic analysis than has previously been carried out. New evidence will be utilised to help fill in several key gaps in the existing literature.

Before comprehensively examining the existing literature, and the way this thesis will enrich the current historical understanding of the 1920s, it is essential to describe what the term German colonial question means. This is important as the definition of the German colonial question, and what it signified for the British Foreign Office changes, depending on which time period is being considered. At the turn of the twentieth century, Britain's concerns regarding German's colonial ambitions were similar to those regarding other imperial powers. The colonial question involved discussions within the British Government, revolving around which territories Germany owned and had plans to acquire. Most importantly, it considered how those colonial possessions influenced Britain's own empire and what steps the British wanted to take in response. However, after the First World War, Germany, as well as the Ottoman Empire and Austro-Hungarian Empire, forfeited its colonial possessions. This altered how the German colonial question was viewed by the British Government and the Foreign Office. The change in view was due to the Principle and Allied Powers, particularly the British Empire and the Third French Republic, having complete control over the destiny of Germany's territories in Africa and South East Asia. Consequently, the German colonial question then revolved around, how to deal with Germany's former colonies, and how to handle German ambitions to regain the status of an imperial power. This subject led to discussions within the British Government to decide the country's position and consequently triggered several negotiations with major powers. Now that this thesis has set out what is

indicated by the German colonial question it can turn to how its research expands on the existing literature, which will be explained in detail in the literature review.

This thesis discusses the Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question rather than that of the British Government, as primary sources on the subject are only recorded in detail in Foreign Office documents. Additionally, this is an area which has very little scholarly analysis. During the 1920s, the Foreign Office wrote a series of memorandums on the German colonial question, providing an in-depth history of this subject. The draft versions of the memorandum and discussions provide many numerical references to other original documents and discussions, aiding the location of primary material on this subject. Regrettably, the final version of the memorandum has not survived.

Unfortunately, other than the Foreign Office documentation, primary material is very limited. The Colonial Office and Dominion Office have few documents on the subject, and those that exist are mainly copies of information already included in the Foreign Office documents. The Cabinet Office documents include a number of additional memorandums on the German colonial question however, these lack critical context; there is no information on who wrote them and most importantly, there are no minutes or notes attached to them. Consequently, there is no way of identifying which officials or ministers knew about these documents, or how they viewed them, severely limiting their usefulness. The Treasury, Board of Trade and Prime Minister's Office have no surviving documents on this subject. Additionally, the private papers of the ministers and officials provide little extra information; most provide similar evidence to that found within the Foreign Office documentation. The evidence inside the Foreign Office documents regarding the subject, records the views of officials and ministers within the British Government and other nations. However, it is still primarily the British Foreign Office's view, which is the reason why this research investigates the Foreign Office regarding the German colonial question. A major advantage of using these resources,

is that the thesis can use the German colonial question as lens to study the Foreign Office, in terms of its administrative function and role within the wider British Government.

For the purpose of this introduction, and in relation to the German colonial question, it will be sufficient to briefly outline the three key topics of the thesis, whilst explaining their historical importance. The first, concerns the role the Foreign Office played in deciding Britain's foreign policy, 1919-1929. The second, considers the imperial ideology of the 1920s Foreign Office, and how it influenced decision making. The third, involves the organisation and operation of the German colonial campaign. Each of these topics will be discussed in turn starting with the role of the Foreign Office.

Examining how the Foreign Office handled the German colonial question provides an analysis of the role the department played in deciding Britain's foreign policy. In particular, it highlights when the department acted merely as an advisory body, providing information to the government on this subject when required, or when the department was able to dictate the country's foreign policy (alongside the level of opposition it received from other departments). The current research on the subject focuses heavily on the highest ranking governmental ministers (Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries), largely ignoring the Foreign Office's role in deciding Britain's foreign policy during the 1920s, leaving a gap in the existing literature. This thesis will rectify that omission, by bringing new evidence to light; evidence that highlights the important and previously largely ignored role played by the personnel in the Foreign Office, which will be discussed thoroughly in the literature review.

This study will demonstrate that the Foreign Office played an important role in the development of British foreign policy during the 1920s, especially, after the defeat of the Liberal-Conservative Coalition Government in 1922. During David Lloyd George's period as Prime Minister, 1916-1922, the Foreign Office only held influence over foreign policy as an

advisory body for the government, being one of many departments, which shared that responsibility. Once Lloyd George was no longer Prime Minister, the Foreign Office became the dominant department dealing with the German colonial question. It had the authority to promote its policies, despite opposition from other governmental departments and Cabinet Ministers. The implications of this change will be examined in detail within Chapter One.

The Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question reveals an additional aspect of analysis; the way the department itself was organised in the 1920s. By examining how information was circulated within the department and which individuals were actually making decisions, it is feasible to create a clearer picture of the structure of the Foreign Office, than was previously recognised. According to the evidence of this thesis, the Foreign Office had a very flexible command structure with little micromanagement from the higher ranks of the department. Most discussions and decisions concerning the German colonial question were made by middle ranking permanent officials who displayed a large amount of autonomy. Most middle ranking officials were divided into separate units (for example, the Central Department and the Western, General and League of Nations Department) overseeing several different nations. This structure encouraged a 'bottom up' approach to decision making, where all documents and messages were first given to the lower ranks in a department. If the information was considered to be of significance, it would be sent to the middle ranking members of the Foreign Office who ran the various departments, such as the previously mentioned Central Department and the Western General and League of Nations Department. It was at this stage, where the vast majority of the documented discussions involving the German colonial question took place. The officials had the autonomy to speak to their opposite representatives in other British governmental departments or foreign governments, regarding these issues. In most cases, it would then be the middle ranking members of the department who would make the final decisions. The senior ranking members

of the Foreign Office, only became involved in matters that the middle ranking permanent officials felt were of the highest importance, or if it was a personal 'pet' project of the Foreign Secretary. The role the permanent officials and the Foreign Office played in deciding British foreign policy, not only reveals who was actually making foreign policy decisions, but also allows a better understanding on how those decisions were actually made during the 1920s.

The second key topic of this thesis regards imperial ideology and its impact on international relations during the 1920s. Imperial ideology, and the way colonial ambitions and territories influenced relations between empires, is a very popular area of study for historians and research. Prominent examples cover everything from the classical and medieval versions of the Roman Empire to the 'Great Power' struggles of the nineteenth and twentieth century.[1] However, as the literature review later describes, the existing evidence regarding imperial ideologies and the impact on foreign relations in the 1920s is far from complete. The current research is dominated by several historical debates, but they leave areas of this subject with little attention. The Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question, during the 1920s, is the perfect lens to improve the existing literature. In the British Government, the Foreign Office was the main institution dealing with foreign policy, whilst also had substantial influence on imperial issues. Therefore, as the thesis demonstrates, this is an effective way of seeing how the colonial question impacted on the foreign policy of the largest empire in the 1920s. Importantly, this thesis gives greater clarity on the imperial ideology of the British Government, and whether it had changed following the First World War; a subject that will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two.

[1] A. J. Crozier, *Appeasement and Germany's last bid at Colonies* (Macmillan Press, London, 1988), Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers; economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000* (Fontana Press, London, 1989), Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire* (The Belknap Press of Havard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 2009).

The thesis will demonstrate that the First World War changed little regarding Britain's imperial ideology. The permanent officials within the Foreign Office continued to believe in a traditional version of imperialism, which favoured direct political and military control of territory, rather than considering economic concerns. This belief had a notable impact on Britain's foreign policy. For example, the Foreign Office wanted to increase the expanse of lands the British Empire possessed at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919. Once Britain gained new lands in the form of mandates, the Foreign Office would not tolerate any policy which involved giving up territory, no matter the size. The permanent officials within the Foreign Office were supported, with regards to this view, by the British Government and most of the other major powers of the 1920s. One of the most essential elements of this argument is that the Mandate System (the structure of governance for former German and Ottoman colonies[2]) did not represent a fundamental change in imperial ideology. Instead, the governments of Britain, France and Japan deliberately undermined the whole system to the point where a mandate of the 1920s was in practice identical to a colony of the 1820s. This is an argument which will be thoroughly analysed in Chapter Two.

Another example, which will be analysed in Chapter Three, regards the Locarno Pact and how imperial ideology influenced foreign relations between the European nations. As this research demonstrates, the Locarno Pact did not lead to any form of cooperation on colonial matters. Even if the treaty did lead to a few years of improved relations between the European nations on continental issues, its influence did not extend to imperial concerns. Germany did not give up on its colonial ambitions, while Britain and France remained determined to never relinquish their territory. It is through these fundamental arguments that this thesis will improve the historical understanding of imperial ideology in the 1920s.

[2] A detailed description of the Mandate System can be found in Chapter Two.

The third important topic of this research is an examination of the German colonial campaign through the lens of the British Foreign Office. It must be stated from the very start that the research for this thesis has been carried out using British archive material rather than German sources. Therefore, future research dedicated to this subject, which utilises German sources would be able to add further depth to this argument. It will be demonstrated clearly in the literature review, that the English speaking literature on this subject up until now, has been sparse. Most of the research on the Weimar Republic does not discuss Germany's colonial ambitions. The few studies that put forward arguments are disproven by this research. Therefore, there is scope for this thesis to improve the historical understanding of the organisation and operation of the German colonial campaign.

On the topic of the German colonial campaign, the first argument this thesis will demonstrate is that colonial issues received limited support from the general German population. Unquestionably, this does not mean that the German population had given up on their imperial ideology after the First World War. Instead, the economic and political crisis that crippled the Weimar Republic, was a more immediate concern to the average citizen. The main support for the campaign to regain a colonial role for Germany came from the country's elite. This included support from high ranking members of the German Government, most importantly, the Foreign Minister, Gustav Stresemann. The second argument related to the German colonial campaign which this thesis will establish, is that even though the German Government supported the campaign, it did not provide any form of leadership or strategic direction. The German colonial campaign was heavily decentralised, with various officials and citizens carrying out their own individual plans, without any clear guidance from the German Government. It was this decentralisation which eventually caused the German colonial campaign to fail. Had the German Government provided leadership, then it would have given the campaign two decisive advantages. First, centralised research could have

identified which strategies were the most attainable and second, the German Government could have examined and planned the best way to achieve success. With these two important advantages, members of the campaign could have been guided towards working together, offering a better chance of the campaign being successful. Instead, every member of the campaign had their own goals and methods based more on personal interests, rather than towards a centralised and unanimous strategic direction. Consequently, most of the members of the German colonial campaign wasted time on schemes which had little chance of success, while the ones which had the possibility of achieving their goals were left unsupported. Ultimately, as this thesis will examine in detail in Chapter Five, the German colonial campaign was an elite driven, decentralised movement, which had little chance of success.

As the introduction has revealed, there are three main topics of historical research which will be enriched by the study of the Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question. In order to best evaluate these three topics, the thesis will be divided up into five chapters. The first topic will be covered in a single chapter, Chapter One. It will examine the role of the Foreign Office in general, and the permanent officials in particular, when it came to deciding Britain's foreign policy. Its main focus, is the way the Foreign Office gained increasing influence over the empire's foreign policy after 1922. The second topic, regarding colonial ideology and its impact on foreign policy, will be spread over three chapters. Chapter Two, will analyse the main part of this subject and show that the First World War had little impact on imperial views, and that the Mandate System did not represent a fundamental change in colonial ideology. Chapter Three, will continue the discussion of colonialism by examining its impact on the relations between Britain and Germany. Particularly, it will demonstrate that the Locarno Pact, 1925, did not ensure an era of cooperation between the European Powers regarding imperial matters. Instead, colonial rivalries persisted and blocked any attempts of compromise involving imperial issues. Chapter Four, will provide greater context to the

arguments made in the previous two chapters regarding Foreign Office's imperial ideology and its impact on Anglo- German relations. Specifically, it will include a comparison between the views of the department between 1919 and 1929, on the importance of imperial concerns and relations with Germany, in juxtaposition with the Foreign Office of the Victorian, 1837-1901, and Edwardian, 1902-1914, eras. This comparison will demonstrate two essential facts; first, the Foreign Office of the 1920s considered colonial issues to be of significant importance, very similar to its Victorian predecessor. Such views signify that the Edwardian attitude of downplaying imperial concerns was short-lived. Second, the views of the Foreign Office towards Germany were closer to that of the Edwardian era, even if it was not as negative as during 1902-1914. Consequently, hostility towards Germany still undermined the two countries' relations, indicating that alliances of the Victorian era were not going to return in the 1920s. To complete the thesis, Chapter Five will discuss the final topic, the structure and the methods of the German colonial campaign. It will analyse the leadership and the ambitions of the campaign and prove that its decentralised nature and the lack of clear, unanimous objectives and leadership, prevented it from having any real chance of success.

Before examining the three main topics of this thesis, and the new evidence gained by this research, there is a need to examine how these topics fit into the existing historical literature. Therefore, the literature review will demonstrate how the new evidence uncovered by this research, rectifies several omissions in the historical understanding of international relations in the 1920s. Additionally, the literature review will demonstrate how the thesis contributes to several of the current debates in the historical community regarding this time period.

Literature Review

The 1920s, is one of the most crucial decades in modern history; a decade that witnessed the impact of the First World War, but had not yet felt the rise of the extremes of the 1930s. As its one hundredth anniversary approaches, historical research that enriches the current knowledge of the period is increasingly relevant. This thesis will focus on improving the understanding of the international and imperial aspects of British foreign policy in the 1920s. Even though there exists extensive literature covering this period, including British foreign policy and European colonial ambitions, there remains omissions in the research. Much of the current research is focused on key debates, which are important in order to improve the understanding of the 1920s. However, it leaves areas which have not been sufficiently researched until now. The three topics of the thesis discussed in the introduction will expand the existing literature in two important ways. First, this literature review will reveal where those gaps are in the existing research, and how this study will address these omissions. Second, it will demonstrate how the research for this thesis provides new evidence for several key historical debates.

The first topic of this thesis, regards the role of the Foreign Office in deciding British foreign policy, which directly addresses a major gap in the historical research. The existing literature focuses predominately on the political leaders, Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries, rather than the permanent officials within the British Government; for example, Permanent Under Secretaries and junior officials in the Foreign Office. Therefore, how the permanent officials in the Foreign Office influenced foreign policy between 1919 and 1929, has not been fully understood by the historical community. The research will correct this omission and supply new evidence to show the Foreign Offices increase in prominence during that period; before 1922, the Foreign Office was merely one of many departments influencing foreign policy, whilst after 1922, the Foreign Office became the dominant department for dealing

with international relations. This information not only fills a gap in the current knowledge, but also adds to the main historical debate regarding this topic. The debate in question is the nature of the relationship between Lloyd George and George Curzon, Foreign Secretary. This will be discussed in detail in the first section of the literature review.

The second topic of the thesis relates to the imperial ideology of the 1920s, and how it influenced foreign policy decision making. This joins two existing historical debates. The first is directly connected to the thesis, namely whether the First World War led to a fundamental change in imperial ideology.[1] The second debate is whether or not the Locarno Pact, 1925, can be used as a dividing line in history. However, more importantly than providing new evidence for these existing debates, this thesis fills in gaps in the existing literature regarding the importance of colonial concerns in the decision making regarding British foreign policy. This will be discussed in the second part of the literature review.

The third section of the literature review relates to the final topic of the thesis, the organisation and methods of the German colonial campaign. Unlike the colonial ambitions of both Imperial Germany and Nazi Germany, the imperial interests of the Weimar Republic have not been adequately researched in the English speaking literature until now. The research that does exist lacks detail and is often contradictory, leaving a clear gap, which this research will begin to fill, even if it does not use German sources. All three main topics will be discussed in turn starting with the role of the Foreign Office.

The role of the Foreign Office in deciding British Foreign Policy

The first topic that this thesis investigates, is the importance of the permanent officials in the Foreign Office in deciding Britain's foreign policy during the early interwar period, 1919-

[1] There is a view put forward by individuals including Erick Goldstein that imperial ideologies remained largely unchanged following the First World War. This is countered by Michael D. Callahan who argues that the Mandate System represented a fundamental shift in colonial views after 1920.

1929. This directly addresses one of the major gaps in the existing literature; the way Britain decided its foreign policy and the level of influence the Foreign Office had on that process during the 1920s, has not been researched sufficiently until now. In comparison, the role of the Foreign Office in the years leading up to the First World War until the year 1920, has received detailed examination from individuals including Zara S. Steiner, T. G. Otte and Eric Goldstein.[2]

Zara S. Steiner examined the role of the Foreign Office in deciding Britain's foreign policy from the end of the twentieth century to the start of the First World War.[3] She argued that between 1906 and 1914, the Foreign Office was at the height of its influence over British foreign policy.[4] She wrote, 'the Foreign Office did play a new role in the formulation of policy and enjoyed a prestige and a position of power which it was never to recapture.'[5] Steiner was less convinced regarding the role the permanent officials within the Foreign Office played in deciding foreign policy. She argued that by 1914, the permanent officials had gained far more influence than the previous generation of officials.[6] However, she then stated, 'effective power rested with the foreign secretary.'[7] She believed that permanent officials could only possess influence on foreign policy if they agreed with Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary 1905-1916.[8] Steiner thought that it was the power of the Foreign Secretary, which was the driving force behind the anti-German mind-set within the department, during

[2] [2] Z. S. Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970), T. G. Otte, *The Foreign Office Mind* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011), Erick Goldstein, *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991).
[3] Z. S. Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970), Zara Steiner in F.H. Hinsley, *British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey*, (Cambridge University Press 1977).
[4] Z. S. Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970) 209.
[5] Ibid 209.
[6] Ibid 209.
[7] Ibid 209.
[8] Ibid 209.

the decade before the First World War.[9] Steiner's research also indicated the importance of imperial concerns to the Foreign Office, stating that the department had a pre-occupation with colonial issues.[10]

Following on from Steiner, Otte also discussed the role of the Foreign Office in determining Britain's foreign policy. He argued that during the Victorian and Edwardian eras the Foreign Office was considered the chief of all offices.[11] He wrote that this, 'shielded [it] from…Treasury influence.'[12] However, when it came to the role of the permanent officials, Otte held a different view to Steiner. Otte believed that the permanent officials had a much greater influence over foreign policy. He wrote, '[s]enior diplomats were not merely clerical underlings or superannuated telegraph boys in gold lace.'[13] He went on to state, '[t]hey were counsellors, conscious of their duty to advise foreign secretaries and Cabinets, and confident in their ability to do so. And….they exercised considerable influence.'[14]

However, the role of the permanent officials and the Foreign Office in deciding British foreign policy was not the focus of Otte's research. Instead, he examined what he described as 'the Foreign Office mind', effectively the collective mind-set and ideology of the department. Otte believed that as officials in the Foreign Office came from a closed social elite; nobility who went to the same public schools and later universities,[15] this led them to have a similar mind-set. He stated, '[t]he social and educational background of Britain's diplomatic elite made for a relative uniformity of its outlook.'[16] Otte went into more detail

[9] Ibid 209.
[10] Zara Steiner in F.H. Hinsley, *British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey*, (Cambridge University Press 1977) 24.
[11] T. G. Otte, *The Foreign Office Mind* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 398.
[12] Ibid 398.
[13] Ibid 395.
[14] Ibid 395.
[15] Ibid 13.
[16] Ibid 17.

arguing that the official's schooling led them to value character rather than intelligence.[17] He wrote the 'Foreign Office mind', 'was based on a code of honour that was itself partly Christian and partly feudal, and that placed service before self-advancement.'[18]

It is important to note Otte believed that the Foreign Office's views on the world were not completely fixed, as different generations of officials held differing opinions on who were Britain's allies and enemies. There are four distinct generations listed in Otte's writings; early Victorians, high Victorians, Edwardians and post-Edwardians (although he does not give clear dates when each generation starts and ends). The early Victorians were heavily influenced by the events of the Crimean War, 1853-1856.[19] This meant that this generation was strongly anti-Russian, Otte described it as, '[p]rofound and ineradicable suspicions of Russia and Russian policy were a central part of the mental make-up of this generation.'[20] The mistrust of Russia led this generation of officials to be strong supporters of the Ottoman Empire as they saw this empire as a block to Russian expansion.[21] The high Victorians still mistrusted Russia, however, according to Otte 'they appreciated the chasm between Russia's ambitions and her limited capabilities.'[22] Instead, France was considered the main rival, while Germany was considered Britain's closest ally.[23] The Edwardians' views were the opposite of the high Victorians; fearing German colonial ambitions and seeing France as a useful ally to counter Germany.[24] The final generation, the post-Edwardians, were concerned about Russia's revival and Germany's continual weakness.[25] They wanted to distance Britain from France and rebuild the alliance with Germany, but the outbreak of the First World War ruined

[17] Ibid 10.
[18] Ibid 10.
[19] Ibid 405.
[20] Ibid 405.
[21] Ibid 405.
[22] Ibid 405.
[23] Ibid 406.
[24] Ibid 406.
[25] Ibid 406.

their plans.[26] Otte's research is invaluable to this thesis as it indicates the critical importance of the Foreign Office in deciding which nations were Britain's allies and enemies, based on the political climate of the era. It implies that understanding how the department viewed a certain subject, is critical in understanding Britain's foreign policy during the early interwar period. By extension, how imperial desires and ambitions changed the Foreign Office's views of other nations is of vital importance.

Goldstein continued the work of Steiner and Otte as far as the year 1920, by studying the permanent officials during the peace negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, which ended the First World War.[27] In many respects this thesis is a continuation of Goldstein's book, *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920*. Goldstein examined the role of the Foreign Office in shaping Britain's foreign policy and the importance of colonial issues in its policies. In this part of the literature review, the main focus will be on his views regarding the role of the Foreign Office. His arguments on the impact of imperialism on British foreign policy will be examined in detail later in the literature review. Goldstein argued that there were no 'neat' strategic decisions made by a single individual or one Cabinet policy.[28] Instead, many ministers, officials, officers and departments, discussed the issues and pushed forward their own policies and agendas. This in turn, had a major impact on the policies of the British Government during the negotiations. For example, when the government wanted to give the United States of America a mandate, no agreement could be reached over which territory to give to America as each department, most notably the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the War Office, blocked the choices of each other.[29] Another example was the British

[26] Ibid 406.
[27] Erick Goldstein, *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991).
[28] Ibid 286.
[29] Ibid 189.

Government making claim to an ever increasing amount of territory during the Paris Peace Conference, because each department argued the case for gaining a particular area of land.[30] (Both these examples will be discussed in detail in Chapter One). What Goldstein revealed with these examples, was that each department was able to influence British colonial policy. Subsequently, this meant that no single individual or department had control over British policy, during the Paris Peace Conference. Goldstein's research provided a greater understanding of the structure of the British Government, and how important the role of the Foreign Office was in the creation and the formulation of the country's foreign policy. However, he focused mainly on the higher ranks of government rather than departments like the Foreign Office. Therefore, there is room for this thesis to expand on his research, by looking at the lower ranking permanent officials and their determinate role on Britain's foreign policy making.

Steiner expanded her research into the Foreign Office in her article *The Foreign Office Reforms 1919-21*. This article is important to this thesis; not only is it one of the few pieces of existing literature on the structure of the Foreign Office, following the First World War, but it provides some interesting questions which this thesis will answer. The article focused on two major reforms which the Foreign Office attempted between 1919 and 1921. The first was to democratise the services of the Foreign Office, and the second was the transformation of the administrative side of the department. Both will be discussed in detail starting with the democratisation of the Foreign Office.

Steiner did not explain what the democratisation of the British Foreign Office would entail. Instead, the article focused on the argument that this effort was a complete failure. Steiner wrote, '[t]he wider and perhaps unrealistic hopes for the democratization of the foreign

[30] Ibid 190.

service were not fulfilled.'[31] She did not blame the officials within the Foreign Office for this failure. She stated, '[t]he slowness with which these changes were introduced was not due to any deliberate foot-dragging tactics by the senior members of the Foreign Office hierarchy.'[32] Instead, Steiner believed there were three reasons that combined together, led to the ultimate failure of these reforms. The first was that the planned reforms were excessively complex, which is demonstrated in Steiner's statement, 'the issues were exceedingly complex and some of the recommendations….were contradictory in aim or difficult to implement.'[33] The second was that the Foreign Office was primarily focused on other things including the Paris Peace Conference. She wrote, '[m]oreover, the officials were forced to consider the whole matter under the stress of the concluding years of the war and the first years of peace, when the Office, already undermanned was faced with an unprecedented increase in work load.'[34] The third and final reason was that there was no sustained outside pressure on the Foreign Office, to carry out those reforms. Steiner wrote, '[w]hat reform there was, came from within the Foreign Office, with only the Treasury, hardly the representative of radical interests, intervening from outside.'[35] As far as Steiner was concerned these three combined elements prevented the democratisation of the Foreign Office.

The only success of these reforms, according to Steiner, had been to slightly expand the number of non-Etonians within the Foreign Office. Between 1909 and 1914, 67 per cent of the permanent officials within the department had come from Eton, while between 1919 and 1929, that number fell to 24 per cent.[36] This indicates that the number of public and grammar

[31] Zara Steiner, The Foreign Office Reforms 1919-21, *The Historical Journal*, Volume 17, Issue 1 (March 1974) 131-156.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.

schooled individuals within the department had increased.[37] However, Steiner wanted to stress that even this success was extremely limited. She wrote, 'the Foreign Office elite was broadened within sharp limits.'[38] Steiner was pointing out that even though the number of Etonians within the department had decreased, it did little to change the overall ideology of the department. She stated, 'the Foreign Office remained a conservative institution both in its methods of operation and the kinds of men it attracted.'[39] This leaves an intriguing question regarding the ideology of the Foreign Office. If the democratisation of the department failed and the Foreign Office remained conservative minded, what other parts of the department's philosophy endured as well? This research can answer that question by looking at the imperial ideology of the Foreign Office, in a later section of the literature review.

The second reform that Steiner discussed involved the administration of the Foreign Office. Steiner argued that, '[t]he post-war Foreign Office which emerged after 1919, was physically and administratively very different from its pre-war predecessor.'[40] This was due to a major increase in the number of officials within the Foreign Office. Steiner wrote, '[t]he actual expansion in diplomatic staff was modest, from fifty-four in 1913-14 to seventy-five in 1921-22. But the overall number actually employed at the Foreign Office gives a much more accurate picture of the changed atmosphere within the department. In 1913-14 some 132 people were employed; by 1921 this had risen to 483.'[41] Steiner demonstrated that the cause for this increase of personnel was the ever increasing workload the Foreign Office had to deal with. She pointed to the number of papers circulated within the department as evidence for this.[42] In 1906, there were forty three thousand, two hundred and eight, which increased to

[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.

fifty eight thousand, seven hundred and nighty by 1913-1914.[43] It then exploded to one hundred and forty six thousand, eight hundred and forty six in 1921.[44] The increase in permanent officials changed the feel of the department for those who worked there. As Steiner wrote, '[t]he close-knit family feeling of the pre-war Foreign Office disappeared though the diplomatic establishment retained some of its pre-war personnel and character.'[45] She concluded with the statement '[t]he Foreign Office had entered the bureaucratic age.'[46]

Even though Steiner discussed the increase in personnel within the Foreign Office, she leaves an interesting question unanswered. Namely, how did this newly enlarged Foreign Office operate and how were decisions made? This is the gap discussed in this section of the literature review and an aspect the research will address directly.

Unfortunately, the research of Goldstein, Steiner and Otte only went as far as the Paris Peace Conference. This indicates that the role of the permanent officials at the Foreign Office in deciding Britain's policies during the 1920s, has not been fully explored in the existing literature. Research carried out on British politics, including foreign policy during this time period, has focused on the elected political leaders, the Prime Ministers and the Foreign Secretaries. The British Prime Ministers of the early interwar period were: David Lloyd George, 1916-1922, Andrew Bonar Law, 1922-1923, Ramsay MacDonald, 1924 and 1929-1931, and Stanley Baldwin, 1923-1924 and 1924-1929. From the general public's point of view, Prime Ministers as the leaders of the government, are the most well-known of the elected officials. Therefore, they have received more attention from historians compared to other public figures.[47] Other than the Prime Minister, the most powerful elected members of

[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] P. Rowland, *Lloyd George* (Barrie & Jenkins, London, 1975), C. Wrigley, *Lloyd George* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1992), R. Blake, *The Unknown Prime Minister: The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law 1858-1923* (Eyre &

the British Government with regards to foreign policy were the Foreign Secretaries. The Foreign Secretaries during the early interwar period were; Arthur James Balfour, 1916-1919, George Curzon, 1919-1924, Ramsay MacDonald, 1924, Austen Chamberlain, 1924-1929 and Arthur Henderson, 1929-1931. Undoubtedly, because of their influence in the Cabinet, the Foreign Secretaries have also received historical attention.[48] However, there appears to be more interest from historians in Lloyd George and Curzon than the later Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries; this is probably because they were in power during the Paris Peace Conference. Officially, Curzon did not technically become Foreign Secretary until October 1919. Instead, he served as Acting Foreign Secretary, and ran the department while Balfour attended the Paris Peace Conference with Lloyd George. Despite the research carried out on the Prime Ministers and the Foreign Secretaries of this time period, we still know little about how they interacted with their permanent officials between 1919 and 1929. Due to the focus of historical research on the highest ranks of government, the permanent officials have been condemned to relative obscurity, a matter that this thesis will rectify.

In order to fully comprehend the interwar period, it is of paramount importance to investigate two key components; first, the way permanent officials at the Foreign Office helped to shape British foreign policy and second, how the individual official's beliefs on certain subjects contributed to that policy. The permanent officials of the Foreign Office were the primary advisers for Foreign Secretaries and Prime Ministers, regarding most aspects of foreign policy. It was also the permanent officials in the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service, who carried out the foreign policy of the British Government. Unlike the elected head of the government, the permanent officials could remain in a position for a longer period of time and hence, provide continuity in foreign policy. Therefore, what the individual officials in the

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Spottiswoode, London, 1955), K. Middlemass & J. Barnes, *Baldwin: a bibliography* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1969).

[48] David Gilmour, *Curzon* (John Murray, London, 1994), David Dutton, *Austen Chamberlain: Gentleman in Politics* (Ross Anderson Publications, Bolton, 1985).

Foreign Office thought and believed, both in the higher and lower ranks, and their relationships with each other and the elected officials, are critically important. They will aid our understanding of why the British Government made the decisions that it did during the early interwar period.

There is a singular study, which provided details regarding the highest ranking permanent officials within the Foreign Office, the Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. This research was recorded by Keith Neilson and Otte in the book *The Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854-1946*. Unlike Otte's previous work, this was not an examination of the operation and mind-set of the Foreign Office. Instead, it was a list of mini-biographies, detailing the careers of all the individuals who held the rank of Permanent Under Secretary from 1854 to 1946[49] (the four individuals who held that rank during the time period covered in the thesis were: Charles Hardinge, 1916-1920, Eyre Crowe, 1920-1925, William Tyrrell, 1925-1928 and Ronald Lindsay, 1928-1930). This research could have contributed more extensively to this thesis, if it had included an in-depth investigation of each individual's role and views. Unfortunately, it only gave a brief overview of each Permanent Under Secretary. For example, when the book discussed Crowe's time as Foreign Secretary, it only stated basic information regarding his and the department's role, when forming decisions involving foreign policy. Neilson and Otte mentioned that, 'Crowe's influence on policy-making was profound but it was not uniformly so.'[50] They briefly analysed Crowe's relationship with the Foreign Secretaries he served; according to Neilson and Otte, whilst there was tension between Crowe and Curzon, MacDonald relied heavily on Crowe, and Chamberlain held a close relationship with Crowe.[51] The analysis was vague, when it discussed how the Permanent Under Secretary fitted into the structure of the Foreign Office,

[49] Keith Neilson and T.G. Otte, *The Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854-1946*, (Routledge, New York, 2009).
[50] Ibid 186.
[51] Ibid 175.

simply stating that Crowe listened to his subordinates. The work argued, 'He [Crowe] took their views seriously, provided they were expressed clearly and concisely.'[52] It is a similar situation when the book deliberated the views of the Permanent Under Secretaries. For example, they argued that Tyrrell always sided with the French over the Germans,[53] and that Lindsay held a mistrust towards the Americans.[54] The study provided no significant detail, signifying that this research on its own, failed to clarify the organisation and views of the permanent officials within the Foreign Office.

There have been limited attempts to expand the historical research of the Foreign Office beyond 1920, but they fall short of filling in the gaps in the existing literature. For example, Harold Nicolson, a permanent official at the Foreign Office himself, provided information regarding Curzon's time as Foreign Secretary.[55] However, Nicolson's book was not designed to provide a detailed account of the department's operation, instead, it mainly focused on restoring Curzon's reputation. It gave a clear and detailed account of Curzon as a person, arguing that even though Curzon's social skills lacked finesse, he was extremely intelligent and a largely successful Foreign Secretary. However, by focusing entirely on Curzon, Nicolson failed to give a more detailed account regarding how the permanent officials advised Curzon, and the degree of influence they had over foreign policy.

Another analysis on how the British Foreign Office operated was carried out by Sibyl Crowe and Edward Corp in a bibliography of Eyre Crowe called *Our Ablest Public Servant; Sir Eyre Crowe 1864-1925*. The work followed the life of Crowe, including how he rose up the ranks within the Foreign Office to become Permanent Under Secretary. It considered how the Foreign Office operated and indicated that the Permanent Under Secretary, was able to

[52] Ibid 175.
[53] Ibid 196.
[54] Ibid 206.
[55] H. Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925* (Constable & CO, London, 1934).

heavily influence British foreign policy by working as an advisor to the Foreign Secretary. Sibyl Crowe and Corp wrote, '[w]orking with and through them he was consequently able to play a role in the shaping and direction of British foreign policy between 1920 and 1925.'[56] However, Sibyl Crowe is a descendant of Eyre Crowe and as the title implies, the book comes across as biased. Crowe's appointment as Permanent Under Secretary was described as, 'a triumph for Curzon, a triumph for Crowe, and a triumph too for opinion in the Foreign Office.'[57] It continued, 'for it is probably true to say that there had never yet been, and perhaps never will be, a head of the office who was at once so profoundly respected and so deeply loved.'[58] When describing Crowe's performance as Permanent Under Secretary the book stated, '[n]o one since his time, it has been said, kept so tight a grip over the work of the whole office; and he has been described as the most efficient public servant which it ever produced.'[59] With these statements, it is clear the book is more interested in glorifying Crowe than conducting historical analysis of the British Foreign Office.

Another example is the work of John Connell.[60] He carried out a more generalised research into the makers of British foreign policy. However, he was far more concerned in analysing the policies of the Labour party during the interwar period, rather than detailing how the British Empire decided its foreign policy. It is also important to note that Connell's book is over half a century old. Since 1958, new archive material has been declassified, therefore up to date research on this subject is required, in order to analyse this recent information and enhance the understanding of the existing literature. This thesis will examine the Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question to help expand this knowledge. In

[56] Sibyl Crowe and Edward Corp, *Our Ablest Public Servant; Sir Eyre Crowe 1864-1925*, (Merlin Boos, Devon, 1993) 402.
[57] Ibid 399.
[58] Ibid 399.
[59] Ibid 399.
[60] J. Connell, *The Office: A study of British foreign policy and its Makers 1919-1951* (Allan Wingate, London, 1958).

particular, new evidence exposes how the department operated within the wider government, revealing the permanent officials' critical role in foreign policy decision making during the 1920s.

Based on the discussion above, the role of the permanent officials in the Foreign Office, in shaping the foreign policy of the British Empire in the 1920s, is yet to be fully examined by the existing literature. This study will fill in this major gap and reveal that the department and its officials were crucial in determining Britain's foreign policy. However, this is not the only way this research improves the current literature. Additionally, the role of the Foreign Office contributes new evidence to one of the major historical debates during that time, involving the relationship between Lloyd George and Curzon.

The traditionalists' view of this debate is that the two men had a strong dislike for each other and this led Lloyd George to marginalise the role of the Foreign Office. Supporters of this view include P. Rowland who argued that Lloyd George did not consider that he, personally, had any real need for a Foreign Secretary[61] and he had little time for the Foreign Office.[62] Towards Curzon, Rowland argued, Lloyd George 'took a malicious delight….in insulting, interrupting, ignoring and interfering,'[63] with him in the Cabinet. One such Cabinet exchange occurred on 8 of April 1920, when Lloyd George was arguing that the Ambassadors' Conference[64] in Paris was no longer serving any useful purpose. It, 'has an enormous amount of work to do,'[65] Curzon argued, 'and if you had to read as I have the reports of its work'[66]

[61] P. Rowland, *Lloyd George* (Barrie & Jenkins, London, 1975) 516.
[62] Ibid 515.
[63] Ibid 516.
[64] The Conference of Ambassadors of the Principled Allied and Associated Powers was the successor to the Supreme War Council, following the end of the First World War, as the international organisation and representation of the Entente. It was a gathering of Ambassadors from Britain, Italy and Japan to meet with representatives from France (the United States of America were only allowed to attend as observers). It was meant to enforce the peace treaties and mediate on territorial disputes within Europe. It became less active following the Locarno Treaties, 1925, and was formally disbanded in the early 1930s.
[65] P. Rowland, *Lloyd George* (Barrie & Jenkins, London, 1975) 516.
[66] Ibid 516.

Lloyd George interrupted stating, 'I have read every line of them…and that is why I remember them better than you or Eyre Crowe [Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs].'[67] Rowland's argument extended beyond Lloyd George as he believed that the hostility between them was mutual. He provided evidence of a letter between Curzon and his wife, Grace, which stated, 'I am getting very tired of working or trying to work with that man [Lloyd George]. He wants his….[Foreign Secretary] to be a valet almost a drudge and he has no regard for the conveniences or civilities of official life.'[68] It is this hostility that the traditionalists argue, led to the Foreign Office being marginalised.

Another supporter of the traditionalist view is Sibyl Crowe. She argued that Lloyd George 'bullied'[69] Curzon. Furthermore, she claimed that Lloyd George directly interfered with how the Foreign Office was operated. She stated that Lloyd George opposed Eyre Crowe's appointment as Permanent Under-Secretary, signifying that Curzon had to fight for it.[70] A more recent believer in this view is Alan Sharp who argued, 'Curzon's relationship with Lloyd George in particular was notorious and lived on in the institutional memory.'[71] Sharp was not convinced by arguments put forward by those who disagree with the traditionalists. He wrote, 'judgement by historians with their perspective and distance from events is certainly defensible but they are battling against a weight of contemporary opinion….ambassadors, ministers, officials, friendly and less friendly critics alike-all testified to their belief that the Foreign Office under Curzon, was not in proper control of British foreign policy.'[72]

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[67] Ibid 516.
[68] P. Rowland, *Lloyd George* (Barrie & Jenkins, London, 1975) 516.
[69] Sibyl Crowe and Edward Corp, Our Ablest Public Servant; Sir Eyre Crowe 1864-1925, (Merlin Boos, Devon, 1993) 399.
[70] Ibid 398.
[71] Alan Sharp, Adapting to a New World? British Foreign Policy in the 1920s, *Contemporary British History*, Volume 18, Issue 3, (January 2007), 74-86.
[72] Ibid.

Peter Yearwood is another who argued that Curzon and Lloyd George had a less than courteous relationship. Yearwood, however, came to this subject from a very different perspective. His article *A Genuine and Energetic League of Nations Policy: Lord Curzon and the New Diplomacy, 1918–1925,* was primarily focused on Curzon's beliefs regarding the League of Nations.[73] However, he mentioned, that once Lloyd George fell from power Curzon seized control over areas of policy he had been denied in the past.[74] Then, Yearwood stated, 'Curzon resolved not to allow any subsequent division of authority.'[75] This indicates that Curzon was not happy with the division of authority over foreign policy, which had existed under Lloyd George's leadership.

In opposition to the traditionalists are the revisionists who believe that Curzon and Lloyd George had a much better working relationship, with a division of responsibility between the two officials. One of the main revisionists is David Gilmour; he agreed with the traditionalists that Curzon and Lloyd George personally disliked each other. For instance, he pointed out that Curzon described Lloyd George as, 'the little man,'[76] believing him to be lazy[77] and referred to him as a 'Jingo'[78] which means warmonger. However, the main point of argument between the revisionists and the traditionalists, is that the former believe there was a mutual respect between them, leading both men to agree to a shared responsibility for foreign policy. In particular, Gilmour stated, 'Lloyd George….[dealt] with matters that interested him [Europe] and Curzon administering most of the others.'[79] He argued that Lloyd George held responsibility for European aspects of foreign policy allowing Curzon to focus on the rest of the world. Gilmour believed that, '[t]he divisions of labour, geographical and

[73] Peter Yearwood, A Genuine and Energetic League of Nations Policy: Lord Curzon and the New Diplomacy, 1918–1925, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Volume 21, Issue 2, (June 2010) 159-341.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] David Gilmour, *Curzon* (John Murray, London, 1994) 530.
[77] Ibid 506.
[78] Ibid 526.
[79] Ibid 502.

otherwise, between a Foreign Secretary with great Asian experience and a Prime Minister who had achieved the status of international statesman were not as unsatisfactory as is often supposed.'[80] The reason he advocated this was a good arrangement, was because the international situation following the First World War was so complex that no Foreign Secretary could have handled it alone.[81] Therefore, the revisionists agree with the traditionalists that the Foreign Office shared responsibility for foreign policy with individuals including Lloyd George. The difference is that the revisionists believe that this was an agreed division based on mutual respect rather than hostility.

The relationship between Curzon and Lloyd George is important to this thesis, even though the research does not provide any new direct evidence on the subject. This is because it is closely linked to one of the major topics of this research, namely, the role of the Foreign Office in forming British foreign policy during the 1920s. The evidence indicates that the Foreign Office's role changed dramatically depending on whether or not Lloyd George was the Prime Minister. While he was in office, the Foreign Office had influence over Britain's response to the German colonial question, but lacked any real control concerning international matters. After 1922, when Lloyd George fell from power, the department was able to direct the country's attitude towards foreign subjects. Therefore, the Foreign Office's temporary loss of control over Britain's response to the German colonial question demonstrates that Curzon lacked the authority over foreign policy when Lloyd George was in Downing Street, especially when compared to the situation under the later Conservative, Bonar Law and Baldwin, and Labour, MacDonald, Prime Ministers. The first part of the thesis contributes new evidence that clearly demonstrates the role of the Foreign Office throughout the early interwar period. Concurrently, it provides new information to an existing historical debate and fills a major gap in the existing literature.

[80] Ibid 513.
[81] Ibid 513.

Imperial Ideology

The second topic of the thesis examines the imperial ideology of the Foreign Office in the 1920s. This directly addresses another substantial gap in the current research. It explores, to what degree the colonial question impacted on the British Foreign Office's decision making in general, and regarding Germany in particular, between 1919 and 1929.

This subject is of significant importance, because even though the main era of imperial expansion ended before 1919, imperial concerns remained dominant during the interwar period. Britain held a globe-spanning empire and Germany still had ambitions to regain her lost colonies,[82] which she had forfeited under the Treaty of Versailles, 1919. The principal elements of the German colonial question in the early interwar period, are the colonial aspects of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, and the creation of the Mandate System, 1919-1921. The Paris Peace Conference has been well covered in the existing historical literature with the disarmament and reparations sections of the treaty receiving particular attention.[83] Even the colonial aspects of the Paris Peace Conference, including Britain's role in the negotiations, have received attention by historians.

The most significant piece of research as far as Britain's role in colonial negotiations is concerned, was carried out by Goldstein.[84] Goldstein argued that the British Government's preparation for the European settlement (including national borders and reparations) was,

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[82] K. D. Erdmann, *Gustav Stresemann: the Revision of Versailles and the Weimar Parliamentary System* (German Historical Institute, London, 1980) 16.

[83] M. Trachtenberg, *Reparation in World Politics: France and economic diplomacy, 1916-1923* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1980), G.C Fenwick, 'The Denunciation of the Disarmament Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles,' *The American Journal of International Law*, Volume 29, Issue 4, (1935), 675-678, M.R.D Foot, *British Foreign Policy since 1898* (Hutchinson's University Library, London, 1956), A. Sharp, *The Versailles Settlement: peacemaking after the First World War, 1919-1923* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008), B. Kent, *The Spoils of War: the politics, economics and diplomacy of reparations 1918-1932* (Clarendon, Oxford, 1989).

[84] Erick Goldstein, *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991).

'left to specialised departments, which were often handicapped by a lack of direction from the Cabinet.'[85] He claimed that this was not the case for the colonial aspects of the peace negotiations. The Cabinet Ministers provided active leadership to the colonial issues, leading to a more organised effort.[86] The reason why the Cabinet gave colonial issues the highest priority was because, '[t]he British Empire was a colonial empire….[therefore] success in the colonial negotiations was essential.'[87] Goldstein was in complete agreement with the government's priorities arguing, '[t]here is no reason to suggest why British policy should have been otherwise.'[88] One of the most important elements of Britain's colonial policy during the Paris Peace Conference, as highlighted by Goldstein, was to prevent France and the Kingdom of Italy replacing Germany as a threat to the British Empire. He wrote, '[t]he concern lay not so much in getting the colonies from Germany, which was assumed; rather, the worry was whether the French or the Italians might become the successors of the German Empire.'[89] He continued his argument by stating, '[n]o matter how close the Allies had been in Europe, competition for control of the colonial world was a different matter, one in which France, Great Britain, and Italy were more often in competition than agreement.'[90] Goldstein concluded his discussion on the British Government's colonial policy at the Paris Peace Conference by arguing how successful it was. He wrote, '[u]nlike any other major participant it achieved its key aims….Britain had not only achieved victory in war, but it won the peace as well.' [91] Goldstein's research clearly displays the importance of colonial issues to British Government's decision making during the Paris Peace Conference. There are, however, two vital missing elements within Goldstein's research that this thesis will bring to light. The first is that Goldstein's research focused at Cabinet level, with little discussion regarding the

[85] Ibid 150.
[86] Ibid 150.
[87] Ibid 150.
[88] Ibid 286.
[89] Ibid 183.
[90] Ibid 183.
[91] Ibid 286.

permanent officials at the Foreign Office. The second omission is that Goldstein's research ended in 1920, indicating that the main negotiations between the British Empire, the Third French Republic, the Japanese Empire and the Kingdom of Belgium over the creation of the Mandate System were absent. Therefore, there is room for this thesis to extend the research carried out by Goldstein, both by focusing on the role of the permanent officials and by expanding the time frame from 1920 to 1929.

Further evaluation of Britain's attitude towards the German colonial question was carried out in a journal article written by A. Edho Ekoko in 1979 entitled, *The British Attitude towards Germany's Colonial Irredentism in Africa in the Inter-War Years*. Unfortunately, the majority of the article focused on the late interwar period, 1933-1939. Ekoko wrote, '[w]hat can be said is that before 1933 the colonial issue did not strike any important chords in Anglo-German relations.'[92] Despite his focus mainly on Nazi Germany he did provide some useful information regarding the British attitude towards the German colonial question in the 1920s. For instance, he stated, 'a section of the German people, especially those who had personally suffered from the colonial loss, kept the issue alive by propaganda.'[93] This vaguely hinted that colonial issues were only important to a select group within German society without providing details on who they were. He also suggested that the British Government did not entirely believe that mandates were any different to colonies. He commented, '[t]he British government does not appear to have recognized the transitory nature of the mandates.'[94] He elaborated on his comment by writing, '[t]heir [British Government] policy was coloured by the underlying assumption that the African mandates, at least, were more or less colonies, subject only to the superficial supervisory role of the

[92] A. Edho Ekoko, The British Attitude towards Germany's Colonial Irredentism in Africa in the Inter-War Years, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Volume 14, Issue 2, (April 1979) 287-307.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Ibid.

League [of Nations] through the PMC [Permanent Mandate Commission].'[95] He concluded, '[t]hey regularly openly pledged that they did not intend to relinquish the territories.'[96] This was an important idea as it implied that the British Government did not consider mandates as anything different than colonies. Unfortunately, he did not go into any detail and only mentioned it in passing; unlike this thesis, which will go into greater detail on this subject in Chapter Two. However, the fact that Ekoko's research mainly focused on the years following 1933, suggests that Britain's reaction to the German colonial question, between 1920 and 1929, has not been fully examined until now.

Further research into Britain's views on the German colonial question was carried out by Wolfe W. Schmokel. However, his research is not compatible with the evidence discovered in this thesis. He argued that the British Government and people did not discuss or care about German colonial ambitions. He wrote, '[t]he German colonial agitation of the 1920s received little attention and caused few reactions of any kind in Great Britain.'[97] He went further and stated 'by no stretch of the imagination can we speak of a colonial discussion in Great Britain before the rise of Nazi Power.'[98] He believed that the only people who discussed the German colonial question in Britain during the 1920s were a few individuals, including Philip Snowden, a leading member of the Labour Party, who wanted to maintain peace in Europe by granting Germany a mandate.[99] However, he stated that they were an extreme minority. He wrote, '[a]ll these….were isolated voices.'[100] Schmokel's argument that there were no discussions regarding the German colonial question before the rise of Nazi Party, is not supported by other historians. It is certainly not supported by this thesis, which will show that

[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Wolfe W. Schmokel in Prosser Gifford, WM. Roger Louis, Alison Smith, *Britain and Germany in Africa; Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1967) 301.
[98] Ibid 305.
[99] Ibid 309.
[100] Ibid 305.

the German colonial question was discussed by the highest ranks within the British Government.

Another key aspect in understanding how colonial issues impacted on foreign relations during the 1920s, is the Mandate System. The Mandate System was a new creation designed after the First World War. It was formed to prevent the imperial powers of Britain, France and Japan from annexing former territory of the German and Ottoman Empires. Instead, the previously mentioned nations would govern mandated territories, with the League of Nations holding authority over the mandates. Understanding the imperial ideology of the officials who created this system, is critical to the understanding of how colonial issues impacted on foreign policy. There have been studies carried out on the creation and running of the Mandate System, however, the relevant research lacks certain historical aspects, which this thesis will attempt to rectify. Early research into the Mandate System was carried out by Quincy Wright[101] and by Campbell. L. Upthegrove.[102] Unfortunately, both these works were published before the declassification of relevant evidence, including Foreign Office documents, which greatly diminishes their academic potential. Wright's work was published in 1930, therefore he was unaware of the limitations of the League of Nations. Consequently, he overestimated the ability of the League of Nations to check the mandatory powers.[103] Upthegrove's work was published in 1954, and he argued that Britain and the League of Nations could have done more to appease Germany's desire for colonies.[104] However, his work focused only on governmental and institutional levels, with little discussion on what the

[101] Quincy Wright, *Mandates under the League of Nations* (The University of Chicago Chicago, 1930).
[102] Campbell. L. Upthegrove, *Empire by Mandate: a history of the relations of Great Britain with the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations* (Book Associates New York, 1954).
[103] Harold K. Jacobson, *Quincy Wright's Study of the Mandates System*, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 14, Issue 4, (December 1970), 499-503.
[104] Campbell. L. Upthegrove, *Empire by Mandate: a history of the relations of Great Britain with the Permanent Mandate Commission of the League of Nations*, Book Associates (New York, 1954) 167.

officials who created and ran the Mandate System believed. This is due to the fact that the relevant archival material had not been declassified in 1954.

More modern research, on the Mandate System, has been conducted by Susan Pedersen[105] and Michael D. Callahan[106] However, neither went into detail about the officials who created the system. Instead, they focused on their argument that the Mandate System represented a major change in imperial ideology; an argument not supported by the research of this thesis. Pedersen wrote a book entitled *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, in which she examined the influence of the League of Nations and the Permanent Mandate Commission (the organisation set up to monitor the Mandate System) on the empires of the 1920s. However, it was not a detailed analysis of the operations of both these institutions; it was rather an attempt to rehabilitate both the League of Nations and the Permanent Mandate Commission and to demonstrate their positive impact. With regard to the League of Nations she praised Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the League of Nations, for his organisational ability. She wrote, 'by the early 1920s Drummond had created something entirely new: a truly international bureaucracy, structured by function and not by nationality, loyal to an international charter, and capable of efficiently managing a complex programme.'[107] She then argued that the United Nations copied the organisation of the League of Nations in its creation.[108] With regard to the Mandate System she did not believe it could have any practical impact and its very existence accelerated the fall of colonialism. She wrote, '[p]ut bluntly, League oversight [through the Permanent Mandate Commission] could not force the mandatory powers to govern mandated territories differently; instead, it obliged

[105] Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015).
[106] Michael D. Callahan, *Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931* (Sussex Academic Press, Eastbourne, 1999).
[107] Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) 7.
[108] Ibid 7.

them to say they were governing them differently.'[109] She continued to state that '[t]he mandate system made imperial governance more burdensome and brought….statehood nearer.'[110] Callahan argued even stronger that the Mandate System represented a major shift in ideology within the imperial powers.[111] He commented, '[o]nce in place, the mandate system represented the changing character of post war European imperialism.'[112] The arguments of both Callahan and Pedersen are not supported by this thesis and neither provided detailed information about the role of the British Foreign Office in the creation of the Mandate System. Consequently, the formation of the Mandate System in general and the Foreign Office's role in particular, still remains an uncharted area that needs to be explored; an exploration that will occur in Chapter Two of this thesis.

The impact of colonial matters on foreign policy not only fills in a gap in the current research, it also provides new evidence for two major debates in existing literature. The first historical debate revolves around historiographers' attempts to establish if the Locarno Pact represents a fundamental shift in foreign relations (details on this can be found in Chapter Three). Historians are fond of dividing up history into separate eras and time periods for various reasons, including explaining events or providing arbitrary cut- off dates, and the Locarno Pact is used as one of those boundaries. In this case, having such a boundary is meant to represent an era of cooperation and peace between 1925 and 1929, something referred to as the 'spirit of Locarno'. The main intention is to separate the 1920s, from the more tense and aggressive atmosphere of the 1930s and 1940s. As with most divisions, a boundary becomes a major historical debate, due to the fact that there is no consensus when any particular era should be.

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[109] Ibid 4.
[110] Ibid 13.
[111] Brian Digre, Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa 1914-1931 (Book Review), *The International Journal of Africa: Historical Studies*, Volume 34, Issue 1, (January 2001), 216-218.
[112] Michael D. Callahan, *Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931* (Sussex Academic Press Eastbourne, 1999) 188.

The historical debate seeks to provide a decisive answer to whether the Locarno era is a genuine dividing line within twentieth century history, or if it is an arbitrary date which has no real significance. Goldstein argued that the Locarno Pact represented a major change in imperial ideology; therefore, using it as a dividing line is justified. He wrote '[t]he year 1925 dawned in Europe with a palpable atmosphere of fear hanging over the continent, but it would end with a feeling of euphoria that came to be called the spirit of Locarno.'[113] He continued to state that the optimism brought on by the Locarno Pact was justified.[114] He concluded with the comment, 'in the glittering room at Locarno in which a new spirit emerged in European relations.'[115] It is clear that Goldstein believed Europe entered a more optimistic and cooperative era in foreign relations with the Locarno Pact. This spirit of cooperation made the time period distinct compared to the more combative atmosphere of the 1930s. However, this is not a universally accepted opinion.

Historians including Jon Jacobson have argued that there was no real difference in European diplomacy during the Locarno era, from the time periods that followed or preceded it. Therefore, using it as a dividing line in human history is completely pointless. Jacobson pointed out that there was no more cooperation between the major European powers in the mid-1920s, than there were in the 1900s or 1930s. He wrote, 'natural enemies did not become natural allies….fundamental rivalries and antagonisms persisted through the Locarno era.'[116] He furthered his argument by stating, '[t]he objectives of German, French, and British policy did not change after 1925, they remained much what they had been.'[117] Jacobson's belief was that the basic strategic situation in Europe remained unchanged throughout the first few decades of the twentieth century. Therefore, the policies of the individual nations and empires

[113] Erik Goldstein, *The First World War Peace Settlements 1919-1925* (Routledge, New York, 2002) 87.
[114] Ibid 90.
[115] Ibid 91.
[116] Jon Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-1929* (Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 1972) 372.
[117] Ibid 373.

stayed unaffected as well. He went further and claimed that the relationship between Chamberlain, Stresemann and Aristide Briand, the French Foreign Minister, was not as supportive as usually believed either. He wrote, 'the history of Locarno diplomacy is largely the story of conflict of the opposing policies of Stresemann and Briand.'[118] He also mentioned that Chamberlain could never be the neutral negotiator he desired to be because he was too pro-French and anti-German.[119] He argued that the only real assistance the three Foreign Ministers provided to one another was not to humiliate any of the others or give them trouble in their domestic politics. He claimed, '[t]here was among them a brotherhood of foreign ministers; they frequently appealed to each other for this or that concession; otherwise, they and their governments would fall from power.'[120] However, Jacobson pointed out that this limited assistance did not impact on the mutual distrust and rivalries between the nations. He concluded by stating that it would be wrong to blame the Wall Street Crash for the end of the friendly relations between the European nations, as he commented, '[r]elations were strained long before October 1929.'[121] Therefore, Jacobson argued that there was not a greater level of cooperation and compromise in European geo-politics between 1925 and 1929, in comparison with either the decades preceding or following it. Consequently, having the Locarno Pact as a dividing line in history is not an effective boundary.

The debate over the importance of the Locarno Pact does not directly influence this thesis, due to the fact that colonial issues were not significant during the negotiations at Locarno. However, there is still new evidence that the thesis can provide for this debate. It will reveal that even if the European powers were willing to collaborate and come to a consensus over issues impacting on the European continent, the spirit of cooperation and unity did not extend into colonial matters. There is no indication that Britain and the other empires were willing to

[118] Ibid 379.
[119] Ibid 378.
[120] Ibid 385.
[121] Ibid 386.

compromise on colonial matters. On the contrary, they guarded their sphere of influence with determination, as this thesis will demonstrate in Chapter Four.

The second historical debate under investigation is whether the First World War caused a noteworthy evolution in imperial ideology. This is a fundamental part of this thesis and as such it will be analysed comprehensively in Chapter Two. For this literature review, it will be sufficient to state overall there is a general historical argument that the concept of empire had begun to change following 1919. For Callahan, the Mandate System was the representation of that change as it challenged the right of European powers to annex African territory as they wished. He wrote, '[o]nce in place, the mandate system represented the changing character of post war European imperialism.'[122] He believed this argument for two main reasons.

First, the system's very creation revealed that the imperial ideology of the European powers had changed. He claimed, '[d]espite flaws, mandates contributed to an evolution in the culture of colonialism that affected not only the vast diplomatic and colonial bureaucracies of both Britain and France, but Europeans and Africans within all the mandated territories as well.'[123] He then stated, '[t]he impact of the mandates system on the ideology of imperialism among Europeans was….penetrating and extensive.'[124] Callahan believed that the British in particular supported this change in imperial ideology, arguing that the country, 'could only gain by taking the spirit of the mandate system seriously.'[125] He supposed that the only real European opposition to the new imperial ideology, provided by the Mandate System, came from France.[126] The second reason was his belief that the Permanent Mandates Commission would allow the League of Nations to have practical control over the mandates and prevent

[122] Michael D. Callahan, *Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931* (Sussex Academic Press Eastbourne, 1999) 188.
[123] Ibid 188.
[124] Ibid 189.
[125] Ibid 190.
[126] Ibid 190.

Britain, France and Japan turning them into more traditional colonies.[127] He argued, '[t]he leading members of the Permanent Mandates Commission….created a network of political alliances that gave the PMC a great deal of informal power to advance what it considered was progressive change and practical administration in Africa.'[128] He continued to state, '[i]n this way, the mandate system not only symbolized the internationalization and reformation of European imperialism, but gradually played a transforming role in its operation.'[129] He provided examples of the commission's success, including preventing the British creating an East African Dominion and allowing German citizens to return to their former colonies. These examples led Callahan to conclude that, '[s]uch results demonstrated how mandates restricted imperial power and inspired more internationally-oriented colonial practices.'[130] Callahan's belief that the Permanent Mandates Commission had a practical impact on the running of the Mandate System is supported by contemporaries, including Quincy Wright. Wright was convinced of the League of Nation's ability to check the power of the mandate colonial administrator,[131] thereby, contributing to a shift in imperial ideology.

A further supporter of the idea that the Mandate System represented a fundamental change in colonial movements was Pedersen. However, her argument was more complicated than that of Callahan, in that the change it brought was not designed by the individuals behind the system. She saw the German involvement on the Permanent Mandates Commission, after 1926, as having a decisive impact. Pedersen argued that before 1926, the Mandate System was just a continuation of the European colonialism. She believed that as the Americans were not able to provide effective oversight of the creation of the system, the imperial powers were

[127] The Permanent Mandates Commission was established on 1 December 1920 and was an international body made up of both nations which received mandates and nations which did not. The commission was meant to oversee the running of the mandates and advise the League of Nations on the subject.
[128] Michael D. Callahan, *Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931* (Sussex Academic Press Eastbourne, 1999) 188.
[129] Ibid 188.
[130] Ibid 189.
[131] Harold K. Jacobson, *Quincy Wright's Study of the Mandates System*, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 14, Issue 4, (December 1970), 499-503.

able to design it to further their colonial ambitions.[132] What cemented Pedersen's idea that the imperial powers, mainly Britain and France,[133] were undermining the Mandate System, was that they were aiming to make the Permanent Mandates Commission powerless. First of all, according to Pedersen, they were sluggish in creating the commission; she wrote, 'those ostensible "mandatories" had proven reluctant to negotiate the terms of their rule and quite uninterested in establishing the oversight apparatus at all.'[134] Furthermore, the imperial powers made sure that the members of the commission were not going to challenge the mandatory powers right to rule their mandates as they saw fit. She stated, '[a]ll but one hailed from states with colonial empires and four from powers ruling territories the Commission was to oversee.'[135] She went further, 'while all were appointed as 'independent experts' ostensibly for their 'personal qualities' and not representatives of their states, most had close ties to, or were even under direct instructions from, their governments.'[136] As far as Pedersen was concerned, by sabotaging the Permanent Mandates Commission, the mandates were effectively turned into colonies. She wrote, 'Mandatory oversight was supposed to make imperial rule more humane and therefore more legitimate; it was to 'uplift' backwards populations and- so its more idealistic supporters hoped-even to prepare them for self-rule.'[137] She then stated that '[i]t did not do these things.'[138] She concluded, 'mandated territories were not better governed than colonies….in some cases were governed more oppressively; claims by population under League oversight for political rights were more often met with repression than conciliation.'[139] It was this control over the Mandate System

[132] Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) 2.
[133] Ibid 12.
[134] Ibid 2.
[135] Ibid 2.
[136] Ibid 2.
[137] Ibid 4.
[138] Ibid 4.
[139] Ibid 4.

which was the main reason she described the League of Nations as the, 'League of Empires.'[140]

Therefore, even though Pedersen actually supported those who argued that the Mandate System did not change imperialism before 1926, she believed German entry to the Permanent Mandates Commission changed everything. She argued that once Germany became a member of the commission the mandatory powers could no longer rule their mandate unchallenged. She wrote, '[o]ne might say that the Germans seized the role the Americas had abdicated….Germany was determined that if she could not regain her colonies, she could at least fight to realize those 1919 promises of international control, open economic access, and a roadmap towards independence.'[141] She argued Germany was motivated not out of any anti-colonial attitude but rather out of self-interest. She stated, '[b]y supporting the principle of self-determination, in other words, rather than simply claiming a share of the colonial pie, Germany could regain its influence over its lost colonies.'[142] Even if Germany could not regain influence in its old colonies it could diminish the loss; '[i]f the benefits of territorial control were limited, Germany's disadvantage would diminish.'[143] The reason why Pedersen believed that German actions were so important was that they forced the mandatory powers to take the commission seriously. In doing so, it undermined the whole concept of imperialism representing a fundamental change. She wrote, '[p]ut bluntly, League oversight [through the Permanent Mandate Commission] could not force the mandatory powers to govern mandated territories differently; instead, it obliged them to say they were governing them differently.'[144] She continued to state that '[t]he mandate system made imperial

[140] Ibid 403.
[141] Ibid 12.
[142] Ibid 197.
[143] Ibid 198.
[144] Ibid 4.

governance more burdensome and brought….statehood nearer.'[145] Therefore, her argument was that the Mandate System did represent a major change, even if the original designers of the system did not wish it to be.

While individuals including Pedersen, Wright and Callahan argued that imperial ideology had changed following the First World War, their views were challenged by other historians including John W Young and John Darwin. Young claimed that there was no shift within British imperial ideology following 1918. He commented that, 'there is little to suggest that the management of Imperial policy was informed by novel conceptions of imperial rule, still less by any loss of confidence in the future of the British world system.'[146] He continued to write, '[d]espite the Great War, the British were determined to shore up the Empire, rebuilding their investments in Latin America, China and elsewhere, and outclass their Imperial competitors.'[147] He concluded with the statement, '[t]hey [the British] retained their ambition and, compared to all the other Great Powers, remained both strong and successful.'[148] Young argued that the British were just as determined to defend their colonial power after the First World War as they had previously, hence that there was no fundamental change in imperial ideology within Britain, during the early interwar period.

Young's arguments were supported by Darwin who claimed, '[c]onventional as it is to see the First World War as a great watershed in British imperial history, separating the era of strength and success from the age of decline and dissolution, it remains difficult to show conclusively that the disintegration of the imperial system had become inevitable before the second World War.'[149] He continued to state that the British Government, 'periodically

[145] Ibid 13.
[146] John W Young, *Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century* (Arnold, London, 1997) 81.
[147] Ibid 81.
[148] Ibid 81.
[149] John Darwin, Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy between the Wars, *Historical Journal*, Volume, 23, Issue 3 (September 1980), 657-679.

repressed its recalcitrant subjects with a vigour and efficiency that would have impressed Lord Kitchener.'[150] Similar to Young, Darwin argued that the British were determined to defend their colonial possessions in the 1920s, which contradicts the idea that there was a change in imperial ideology during this time period.

This controversial debate regarding imperial ideology following the First World War is a fundamental part of this thesis and it will be analysed in Chapter Two, with new evidence adding to the discussion. Ultimately, it will prove that there was no significant change in imperial ideology in the 1920s, as compared to the decades preceding the First World War. Hence, the thesis will challenge Pedersen, Wright and Callahan's arguments directly by demonstrating that, from a practical viewpoint, a mandate of the 1920s, was no different to a colony of the 1820s. It will also extend the arguments voiced by Young and Darwin, to show how committed Britain and the rest of Europe were to defend their colonial interests.

This section of the literature review has demonstrated how the research of this thesis, improves the existing historical knowledge regarding the imperial ideology of the permanent officials at the Foreign Office. It fills in a major omission in the current literature, around the importance of colonial issues in deciding Britain's foreign policy, and it also provides new evidence for two significant historical debates. First is the debate over whether or not the Locarno Pact can be used as a dividing line in international history. This thesis will show that the Treaties of Locarno, 1925, did not lead to any greater cooperation regarding imperial matters compared to the preceding and following years. The second debate is whether the Mandate System represents a fundamental change in imperial ideology. This thesis will demonstrate that in practical terms a mandate of the 1920s, was no different to a colony of the 1820s.

[150] Ibid.

The organisation and methods of the German colonial campaign

The third topic of the thesis is a discussion involving the organisation and methods of the German colonial campaign during the 1920s. To reiterate what was stated in the introduction; this research is based on evidence from the British Archives. Future research based on German archive documents would provide more information on this subject. As this thesis will demonstrate, the current English speaking literature on this topic is sparse. Most research on German colonial ambitions focuses on Imperial and Nazi Germany, thereby ignoring the Weimar Republic. Whenever the existing literature discusses the German colonial campaign, it lacks details and is contradictory to the evidence provided by this research (a subject discussed in detail later in the literature review). It would be pure speculation to state why the existing literature does not analyse in detail the German colonial campaign during the 1920s. It could be due to the fact that ultimately the campaign achieved little of significance and that this led historians to ignore it. Another reason could be that colonial ambitions fit easier into the narratives regarding Imperial and Nazi Germany, than they do for the Weimar Republic. In the end, what matters is that the existing literature has little information on this subject, so that there is room for this thesis to expand the historical knowledge in this area, albeit it uses British sources rather than German.

Much of the research into Germany during the Weimar era tends to ignore colonial issues. Historians such as Henry Ashby Turner, John Hiden and F.L. Carsten[151] completed research into the Weimar Republic, providing information regarding Germany's foreign policy. However, they did not mention how the colonial question impacted on German foreign policy. Most of the existing literature on Germany during the Weimar Republic follows the same theme, of analysing Germany's domestic disputes. When German foreign policy is

[151] H. A. Turner, *Stresemann: and the Politics of the Weimar Republic* (Greenwood Press, Westport, 1963), J. Hiden, *Germany and Europe 1919-1939* (Longman, London, 1977), F.L. Carsten, *Britain and the Weimar Republic: the British documents* (Batsford Academic and Educational Ltd, London, 1984).

discussed, it refers mainly to Europe, and then only on matters such as the Locarno Treaties, disarmament and reparations.[152] Fortunately, these studies provided details regarding the interests of Gustav Stresemann, the German Foreign Minister 1923-1929, in regaining former German colonies.[153] Stresemann was in control of German foreign policy, so what he believed and thought was of great importance. However, this evidence provided little information regarding how the Germans intended to regain their position as a colonial power.

Marshall. M. Lee and Wolfgang Michalka's book, *German Foreign Policy 1917-1933; Continuity or Break,* did not discuss or analyse how colonial ambitions impacted on German foreign policy in detail, instead, the book focused on two main arguments. First that German foreign policy between 1917 and 1933, continued to operate with the same objectives and used the same methods,[154] and second, that Germany had to choose between siding with the Soviets or the Americans. Other nations were not even discussed and the British were hardly mentioned. The French were only brought up as an obstacle stating France 'restrict Germany's freedom to explore, the American and Soviet options to the fullest.'[155] These examples show that much of the current research does not analyse how colonial issues impacted on German foreign policy during the early interwar period.

When the existing literature investigates Germany's colonial ambitions and how this influenced the country's foreign policy, it tends to focus on Imperial or Nazi Germany rather than the Weimar era. One of the best examples of this is the research carried out in Helmuth Stoecker's *German Imperialism in Africa; From the Beginning until the Second World War*. Within this book there was a chapter written by Adolf Rüger regarding the colonial ambitions

[152] J. Hiden, *Germany and Europe 1919-1939* (Longman, London, 1977).
[153] F.L. Carsten, *Britain and the Weimar Republic: the British documents* (Batsford Academic and Educational Ltd, London, 1984) 177, J. Hiden, *Germany and Europe 1919-1939* (Longman, London, 1977) 56.
[154] Marshall. M. Lee, Wolfgang Michalka, *German Foreign Policy 1917-1933; Continuity or Break*, (Berg Publishers, Leamington Spa, 1987) 153.
[155] Ibid 8.

of the Weimar Republic, which will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter Five. For this literature review it will be sufficient to state his belief that there was a centralised and organised German colonial campaign[156], an opinion not supported by this thesis. Unfortunately, the Weimar Republic time period was not the focus of this book. There was only one chapter regarding this subject limited to only forty pages. This was in comparison to two chapters given to Nazi Germany consisting of eighty two pages while Imperial Germany received nine chapters and two hundred and eighty two pages. More importantly, there was little information regarding how colonial ambitions impacted on German foreign policy and even less on how it influenced Anglo-German relations during the Weimar period. Chamberlain was only mentioned once in the entire book while other important British leaders, during the 1920s, including Curzon, Baldwin and MacDonald were not mentioned at all.

Another example of historical research into German colonial ambitions, focusing on time periods other than the Weimar era, is the work by Andrew J. Crozier. His main book, *Appeasement and Germany's last bid at Colonies,* provided great detail about the importance of imperial interests in German foreign policy decision making during the interwar period. However, Crozier's research started in 1933, missing all the years between the end of the First World War and the rise of Nazi Germany.[157] He covered the 1920s, in a single journal article entitled, *The Colonial Question in Stresemann's Locarno Policy*, which tried to link German colonial interests and ambitions to the Locarno negotiations. Unfortunately, it lacked the detail and quality of the previously mentioned book. In the article, Crozier argued strongly that Stresemann attempted to regain a colonial role for Germany, stating, 'it would appear that Stresemann was perhaps even more conscientious than his predecessors in

[156] Adolf Rüger in, Edited by Helmuth Stoecker, Translated by Bernd Zöllner, *German Imperialism in Africa; From the Beginning until the Second World War*, (C. Hurst & Company, London, 1986) 314.
[157] A. J. Crozier, *Appeasement and Germany's last bid at Colonies* (Macmillan Press, London, 1988).

maintaining the colonial claim advanced by all Weimar Government.'[158] He then claimed, 'Stresemann was….prepared to further Germany's claim to colonies in a practical manner whenever the opportunity presented itself.'[159] Furthermore, Crozier's analysis of the British reaction to German colonial ambitions pointed to the British Government having a high level of hostility towards the idea of Germany regaining one of its former colonies. He wrote, 'the attitude of the British Government towards colonial revision throughout the 1920's was one of firm opposition.'[160] Both of these arguments are supported by the research of this thesis.

However, there are concerns with Crozier's research, especially when it comes to linking the German colonial ambitions to the Locarno negotiations. The title *The Colonial Question in Stresemann's Locarno Policy,* signifies that the article would show that Stresemann had a colonial strategy during the negotiations. However, the article did not identify this. Instead, the article discussed Stresemann's, and the German Government's, colonial ambitions throughout the 1920s, with the Locarno Pact barely mentioned. Crozier's attempts to link the two subjects were weak at best. For instance, Crozier wrote 'Stresemann, colonial revision manifestly figured as part of the anticipated Ruckwirkungen of the Locarno Pact, whether he raised the matter formally during the negotiations or not.'[161] Crozier argued that Stresemann had a vague hope that the Locarno Pact would bring Germany closer to regaining a colony, but at the same time he was not confident that Stresemann even brought up the colonial question during the negotiations. A vague hope of Stresemann's, is not a convincing argument that he had a deliberate colonial policy at the Locarno negotiations. Crozier puts even more doubt to the link between Stresemann's colonial ambitions and the Locarno negotiations when he wrote, 'the notion, frequently repeated in error, that Germany's claims

[158] A.J. Crozier, The Colonial Question in Stresemann's Locarno Policy, *The International History Review*, Volume 4, Issue 1, (1982) 37-54.
[159] Ibid.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Ibid.

to a colonial mandate was verbally recognised at Locarno should be dispelled once and for all.'[162] The lack of a proper link between the two subjects reveals that Crozier wanted to write an article about Stresemann's and the German Government's colonial ambitions during the 1920s. This was the clear focus of the article. The Locarno Pact aspect of the article seems to have been added later, probably to give it a better chance of being published.

Another of Crozier's major arguments was equally problematic. He believed that had the British Government been more willing to compromise, regarding the German colonial question, it would have minimised the increase in tension between the two nations during the 1930s. He wrote, 'a firm policy towards Germany on the part of the British Government combined with fair concessions might have brought Germany into satisfactory permanent treaty relations with the rest of Europe.'[163] The section regarding, 'firm policy towards Germany,' did not mean standing strong against Germany; it actually referred to Crozier's belief that Britain should have had a committed policy towards Germany. Crozier provided no evidence on how Britain being more open to German colonial ambitions would have led to a more friendly relationship between Germany and the rest of Europe; neither did he provide any details on how any government of the British Empire could have accepted such a compromise. Even Crozier admitted that his view was 'pure speculation.'[164] This indicates Crozier's research cannot be considered an adequate analysis of the colonial ambitions of the Weimar Republic.

As with Crozier's article, other research into German colonial ambitions during the 1920s, also lack key details. One of the more recent attempts was from Sean Andrew Wempe. He tried to give the German perspective regarding how the German colonial question influenced relations between European nations, during the 1920s. Particularly, he argued that pressure

[162] Ibid.
[163] Ibid.
[164] Ibid.

caused by German colonial societies and lobbyists forced colonial issues to be discussed at the Locarno negotiations,[165] 1925, even though it was not originally on the agenda. He wrote, '[t]he matter of Germany's colonial claims and that nation's demands for a role in the new League of Nations Mandates System…[is] wonderfully illustrates how the global public sphere forced the discussion of off-program topics at Locarno.'[166] His main argument was that German colonial societies and lobbyists were able to gather enough public pressure to force the diplomats at Locarno to discuss the subject. He stated, '[t]he court of public opinion in the nations of the major players weighed heavily on each delegate.'[167] He elaborated further, '[t]here were more 'representatives' making their voices heard than the iconographic photographs suggest…public opinion took its place at the bargaining table, causing disruptions and forcing compromises.'[168] He concluded, '[rumours] spread by lobbies and press wars between competing interests forced debate on issues at Locarno that were not originally on the agenda.'[169]

This thesis supports Wempe's argument that the German colonial campaign had an impact on relations between the European nations. However, this research does not share Wempe's opinion that colonial issues played a major role at the Locarno negotiations, a subject that will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three. For this literature review, it will be sufficient to affirm that the permanent officials in the British Foreign Office clearly stated in a memorandum that colonial issues were not brought up by the German Government at Locarno.[170] Furthermore, Wempe did not provide adequate evidence to support his argument about public pressure forcing the German colonial question to be discussed during the

[165] A series of negotiations between Britain, France and Germany held at Locarno, Switzerland, with the goal of improving relations in Europe. It will be discussed in greater detail later in the thesis.
[166] Sean Andrew Wempe, Peripheral Players? German Colonial Interests, The Press, and the Spirit of Locarno, *International History Review*, Volume 40, Issue 1, (March 2017) 177-205.
[167] Ibid.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Ibid.
[170] Memorandum on German Colonies, 11 February 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C1733/539/18.

Locarno negotiations. Instead, his research focused primarily on a discussion of the three largest German colonial societies, the German Colonial Society (*Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*), the Women's League (*Frauenbund*) and the Imperial Working Group on the Colonies (*Kolonial Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft*).[171] He went into detail about their history and how they operated which did provide some useful historical insights. Wempe indicated that the two most important individuals to this movement were Heinrich Schnee, former Governor of German East Africa, and Theodor Seitz, former Governor of German South West Africa. He described Schnee, 'as the most persistent propagandist calling for German colonial restitution'[172] and Seitz as, 'the colonial lobby's nervous system.'[173] Unfortunately, this information did not define how colonial subjects were forced onto the agenda at Locarno. Wempe mentioned that German colonial efforts, 'backfired when public opinion from the former Allied Powers and their affiliates was antagonized by Colonial German demands.'[174] Thus, making it more difficult to discover when colonial societies and lobbyists forced the German colonial question to be discussed at the Locarno negotiations.

The discussion of colonial subjects at the Locarno negotiations is not the only point of difference between this thesis and Wempe's research. Wempe mentioned in passing that '[a]lthough he was willing to grant Germany a Mandate, Chamberlain could not afford to appear…inclined towards German colonial restitution.'[175] If this statement was accurate, it would indicate that Chamberlain had a completely different personality to that revealed in the Foreign Office documents. Every time Chamberlain wrote in the Foreign Office documents, he showed a determination to never allow Germany to regain a colony or mandate. While evidence of this will be shown later in the thesis, for this literature review it will be sufficient

[171] Sean Andrew Wempe, Peripheral Players? German Colonial Interests, The Press, and the Spirit of Locarno, *International History Review*, Volume 40, Issue 1, (March 2017) 177-205.
[172] Ibid.
[173] Ibid.
[174] Ibid.
[175] Ibid.

to give the following representative example. In May 1925, Chamberlain sent a message to the British Embassy in Berlin in which he wanted to undisputedly clarify his and the government's position on the German colonial question. He wrote, 'His Majesty's Government cannot contemplate for a moment the possibility of returning to Germany now or any time her former colonial possessions, or any part of them.'[176] Unfortunately, it is difficult to discover where Wempe gained the view that Chamberlain supported the idea of giving Germany a mandate, as he provided no evidence to authenticate his statement. This signifies that Wempe's research on its own cannot adequately assess the German colonial question during the 1920s.

Another example of the existing literature not providing adequate detail regarding the colonial ambitions of the Weimar Republic can be observed in the research of Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann. He indicated that colonial ambitions were concentrated around a close circle of people rather than having mass appeal. He wrote, '[d]espite great effort on behalf of the colonial movement, it failed to win a mass basis, but it was successful in lobbying parliamentarians who, in turn, were elected to committees of the colonial movement from 1920 onwards.'[177] He agreed with most other historians, that Stresemann was one of the leading figures behind the German colonial movement. He stated, 'Foreign Minister Stresemann, a keen supporter of the colonial idea, tried his utmost to promote the case of colonial revisionism on the diplomatic stage.'[178] However, he did not go into great detail regarding the German colonial movement. Instead, his main argument was that the colonial ambitions of the Weimar Republic enabled the rise of Nazi Germany possible, as it normalised the concept of aggressive imperial expansion. He wrote, '[i]t was not the nature of

[176] Message from Austen Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon, 21 May 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C6145/2994/18.
[177] Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann in Wolfgand J. Mommsen and Jurgen Osterhammel, *Imperialism and After; Continuities and Discontinuities*, (The German Historical Institute, London, 1986) 95.
[178] Ibid 98.

a radical alternative which made this type of imperialism acceptable to many Germans; in fact it was its affinity to the various expansionist ambitions during the Weimar Republic.'[179]

Strandmann provided a brief discussion regarding how the British viewed the German colonial question. He claimed, 'in London, colonial revisionism was, as far as can be seen, not properly analysed and the link to other revisionist issues was not understood.'[180] Strandmann argued that the British Government failed to see that German colonial ambitions were not a separate issue. Instead, they saw them as part of the general movement in Germany to rewrite the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. He believed this was a mistake, as any German Government was bound to bring up the issue of regaining a colony due to internal pressure within the country. He went further, arguing that the refusal of the British and French to compromise on the German colonial question increased the domestic problems within Germany. He wrote, '[i]t was not clear in London or Paris that every German Government was bound to support colonial revisionism and instead of realising the complexity of the problem in German domestic politics and its inherent dangers, the repented revisionist demands were turned down.'[181] However, this is only a brief description which requires a more detailed examination, a matter that this thesis will rectify in Chapter Five.

Another attempt to research the colonial ambitions of the Weimar Republic was carried out by Wolfe W. Schmokel. Unfortunately, his research was equally problematic. He wrote two pieces of work; the first was a book entitled *Dream of Empire: German Colonialism, 1919-1945*, written in 1964. The second work was written in 1967 and it was a chapter in a book named *Britain and Germany in Africa; Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, by Prosser Gifford, WM. Roger Louis and Alison Smith. These two pieces of research were only three years apart but they completely contradicted each other. In his book (*Dream of Empire:*

[179] Ibid 114.
[180] Ibid 98.
[181] Ibid.

German Colonialism, 1919-1945), Schmokel argued that there were few discussions in Germany, in the 1920s, concerning colonial subjects.[182] He claimed that this issue was only debated twice by the elite in the Reichstag. The first debate was when Germany entered the League of Nations, as there seemed to be a slight possibility of Germany gaining a mandate.[183] The second was when Britain was discussing plans to create an East African Dominion. This would have combined the mandate of Tanganyika with Britain's colonies, including Kenya, into a single administrative area. However, this was controversial, as the mandate would have become a permanent addition to the British Empire. He then argued that it was not only the elite within Germany who were not interested in colonial issues, but the general population also lacked interest. He wrote, '[i]f the Reichstag didn't take much interest in the colonial problem, the people at large took even less.'[184] The 1920s was clearly not the focus of this book as it covered that period in the first sixteen pages; instead, he focused mainly on the interests and ambitions of Nazi Germany. However, in his chapter in *Britain and Germany in Africa; Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, Schmokel stated that almost all of the political parties within Germany supported the idea of regaining a colonial role. He wrote, '[t]he governments of the Weimar Republic….steadfastly….maintained an interest in Germany's former possessions, and a claim that Germany had a right to return to at least some of them someday, perhaps in the role of mandatory power.'[185] He argued that '[o]nly the communists were solidly opposed to colonialism in any forms.'[186] This was the complete opposite to his views only three years previously. It could be a simple case of someone changing their mind. However, three years is a short time to have a complete change of view,

[182] Wolfe W. Schmokel, *Dream of Empire: German Colonialism, 1919-1945*, (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1964) 14.
[183] Ibid 14.
[184] Ibid 15.
[185] Wolfe W. Schmokel in Prosser Gifford, WM. Roger Louis, Alison Smith, *Britain and Germany in Africa; Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1967) 301.
[186] Ibid 303.

considering the amount of time it takes to carry out academic research. Either way, the contradictory nature of Schmokel's work limits the value of his research.

Another problem with the existing literature on this subject is that some of the historians have, rather, controversial opinions. For example, Jonathan Wright in his bibliography of Stresemann argued that Stresemann was not interested in regaining a colonial role for Germany. He stated, 'as Stresemann's priority became more firmly one of peace, so the revisionist goals which were in conflict with this priority were gradually postponed to an increasingly remote future. That was clearly true of [union with] Austria and colonies.'[187] He elaborated on his argument by writing, 'Stresemann became increasingly doubtful about whether union with Austria or regaining colonies were even desirable.'[188] Wright's opinion was rather unique with little support from the rest of the existing literature. This thesis will show that the evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of those who argue Stresemann believed in regaining a colony for Germany.

Contemporary studies into German colonial ambitions are equally of limited value, as they did not have access to all the available evidence and also tend to have a political motive. The best example of this was written by Heinrich Schnee, former Governor of German East Africa, entitled *German Colonization Past and Future: The Truth About the German Colonies*. His work is of little academic value; Schnee was a leading member of the German campaign to regain a colonial role for his nation (a matter which will be developed in detail within the thesis) and as such, his work was a piece of propaganda with little interest in academic study. He had two main arguments; the first was that Germany's former colonies were in a worse state under the Mandate System than they had been under German rule. He

[187] Jonathan Wright, *Gustav Stresemann: Weimar's greatest statesmen*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) 356.
[188] Ibid 356.

wrote that the lands and its people, 'are still far behind our standard.'[189] He went further claiming 'the administration of the mandates has not been able even to preserve the work or maintain the standards which Germany had created, much less improve upon them.'[190] His second argument was that taking Germany's colonies away was a morally unjustifiable act. He concluded his work with the comment '[s]urely it is abundantly evident that a great indefensible wrong has been committed against the German people in robbing them of their colonial possessions.'[191] This book can be useful as it gives an insight into Schnee's thinking and an example of what methods the German colonial campaign used to turn public opinion on their side. However, as an academic analysis of how German colonial ambitions impacted on its foreign policy, it is of limited value.

Consequently, there is a gap in the existing literature regarding the organisation and methods of the German colonial campaign. This thesis will directly address this omission by demonstrating that even though the German Government supported the campaign, it did not provide effective leadership. Instead, it was a heavily decentralised movement with many different objectives and methods. It will also show that it was this decentralisation which ultimately caused the campaign to fail.

Conclusion

In a final analysis, this thesis will continue the works of Steiner, Otte and Goldstein in two particular ways. First, it will reveal the role of the Foreign Office in deciding British foreign policy. Second, it will demonstrate the continuation of the traditional version of imperialism and its impact on decision making. It will also add a third aspect, independent of the research of the three previously mentioned historians; the organisation and method of the German

[189] Heinrich Schnee, *German Colonization Past and Future: The Truth About the German Colonies* (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1926) 161.
[190] Ibid 174.
[191] Ibid 174.

colonial campaign. By continuing their work, the research in this thesis will expand the historical literature, not only by rectifying several omissions, but also by providing new evidence to several historical debates regarding the period 1919 to 1929.

The first topic of the thesis revolves around the role of the permanent officials and the Foreign Office in shaping Britain's foreign policy, which directly addresses a gap in the existing literature. Unlike the years leading to the First World War, the role of the Foreign Office between 1919 and 1929 has not been adequately researched until now. The current research focuses on the political leaders of the 1920s, without evaluating their relationship with their officials. This thesis will show that the permanent officials were given a large amount of autonomy and that after 1922, the Foreign Office regained its control over foreign policy. As well as filling a gap in the historical knowledge regarding this topic, this research will also add new evidence to an existing debate. The relationship between Lloyd George and Curzon has been a controversial subject, due to two conflicting views. One view includes those who believe that the relationship between the two was entirely hostile, while others believe the two men respected each other and shared responsibility for foreign affairs. A close examination of the Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question reveals the impact of Lloyd George's relationship with Curzon. While Lloyd George was in office, the Foreign Office held a diminished position; it was one of several governmental departments attempting to influence British foreign policy. Once Lloyd George fell from power, the Foreign Office was able to regain its position as the dominant department regarding foreign policy.

The second topic of the thesis argues that traditional views on imperialism continued into the 1920s, and were largely unchanged by the First World War. This again fills a major omission in the existing literature, as the importance of colonial concerns in the decision making on British foreign policy, has not been fully evaluated until now. It will also provide new

information towards two existing historical debates. The first concerns whether or not the Locarno Pact represents a dividing line in the history of European relations. This study reveals that the Locarno Treaties did not lead to any cooperation on colonial issues; hence, it should not be considered as a historical boundary. The second debate regards imperial ideology. Research for this thesis will directly challenge the idea that the Mandate System represented a major change in colonial attitudes, and support those who argue that the First World War did not lead to a decline in imperial ideology.

The third topic of the thesis evaluates the organisation and methods of the German colonial campaign. It will demonstrate that the decentralised nature of the campaign caused its efforts to fail, directly addressing another major omission in the historical literature. Even though, the colonial ambitions of both Imperial Germany and Nazi Germany have been well researched, the same cannot be said of the colonial ambitions of Weimar Germany. Previous research on this subject often lacks detail and is contradictory, an issue that will be rectified through the academic research of this thesis.

Chapter One

The role of the permanent officials and the Foreign Office when dealing with the German colonial question

The Foreign Office in the 1920s, had the same remit as the modern equivalent of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a branch of the Civil Service, responsible for advising the British Government on foreign policy and world affairs. During the interwar period, the Foreign Office had the extra responsibility for much of Britain's intelligence networks, including the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS).[1] It was also the Foreign Office, alongside the Diplomatic Service, which instigated Britain's foreign policy. The level of influence the Foreign Office had over British foreign policy varied throughout its history; from simply having an advisory role to absolute authority. Therefore, research into British foreign policy during any time period, needs to analyse the role and level of influence of the Foreign Office, in order to fully understand how British foreign policy was created.

Academic research has investigated the operation and role of the Foreign Office for most of its history, particularly before the First World War. Steiner and Otte both studied the department before 1914.[2] Their work was continued into the First World War by Warman[3] and during the Paris Peace Conference by Goldstein.[4] However, the role and level of influence the Foreign Office possessed, during the early interwar period, has not received historical analysis in as greater depth as other time periods. As the British Foreign Office

[1] John. R Ferris, Far Too Dangerous a Gamble? British Intelligence and Policy during the Chanak Crisis, September-October 1922, *Diplomacy and Statecraft,* Volume 14, Issue 2, (June 2003) 136-184.
[2] Z. S. Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970), T. G. Otte, *The Foreign Office Mind* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011).
[3] R. W. Warman, *The Foreign Office, 1916-1918: A Study of Its Role and Functions* (Garland, New York, 1986).
[4] Erick Goldstein, *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991).

remained one of the crucial departments, when deciding the foreign policy of the world's most dominant empire following the First World War, it is important to continue their work and fill in the gaps of academic research through the analysis of new evidence.

The department's reaction to the German colonial question is a perfect lens to examine the role of the Foreign Office. One of the reasons for this is because the German colonial question was a subject that permeated throughout the entire Foreign Office. It included discussions in most of the different departments within the Foreign Office, with everyone taking part; from the lowest ranking members all the way up to the Foreign Secretary. Examining this particular issue will demonstrate how decisions were made by the Foreign Office in the 1920s, and indicate who was making them. Another reason why an investigation into the German colonial question is a perfect way to analyse the role of the Foreign Office in deciding Britain's foreign policy, is because it is not an issue which the department could handle alone. As it was a colonial matter, the Foreign Office had to deal with other governmental departments, most notably the Colonial Office. It therefore reveals, how the Foreign Office interacted with other departments and, fundamentally, how much influence the Foreign Office had over them. Particularly, it demonstrates when the Foreign Office could secure acceptance of its policies, or when other departments could veto Foreign Office's decisions. Consequently, this is an effective way to analyse the role of the Foreign Office in deciding foreign policy for the British Empire, 1919-1929.

How the Foreign Office operated regarding the German colonial question

The permanent officials' approach to the German colonial question at the Foreign Office, uncovers much about how it was organised internally. A hasty examination of how the Foreign Office was organised, would leave an impression that the department had a rigid hierarchy with a fixed chain of command. However, the department's reaction to the German

colonial question reveals that it had a much greater level of flexibility, allowing the lower ranking permanent officials to use their initiative. More importantly, the way the department circulated information indicated that it had closer to a 'bottom up' rather than a 'top down' structure. This section will demonstrate how the structure operated and will argue, that the permanent officials were given the independence to act on their own initiative, with little micro-management from the Foreign Secretary.

The Foreign Office during the early interwar period had a set hierarchical structure (Appendix provides more details regarding the structure of the Foreign Office by listing the most important members dealing with the German colonial question). At the head of the Foreign Office was the political leadership in the form of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.[5] These individuals were appointed by the Prime Minister and were often a high ranking member of the governing political party or coalition, usually, but not universally, an elected Member of Parliament. Other political representatives included the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Additional Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who were usually middle ranking Members of Parliament of the governing party. These final two positions carried little authority and do not appear in the Foreign Office documents regarding the German colonial question.

The permanent officials ran the department and were the heart of the Foreign Office. They were under the overall authority of the Permanent Under Secretary of State,[6] who was part of the Civil Service and the administrative head of the department. The hierarchical structure continued with individuals and ranks who had varying degrees of authority, including the

[5] In the time period covered in this thesis they are Arthur James Balfour, December 1916-October 1919, Lord George Curzon, October 1919-Janurary 1924, Ramsay MacDonald, January 1924-November 1924, Austen Chamberlain, November 1924-June 1929 and Arthur Henderson, June 1929-August 1930.
[6] The individuals who held that rank during this time period were Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, June 1916-November 1920, Sir Eyre Crowe, November 1920-May 1925, Sir William Tyrrell, May 1925-June 1928 and Sir Ronald Lindsay, June 1928-Januray 1930.

Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Assistant Under Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs (which included Legal Advisers) and Private Secretaries.

Most permanent officials in the Foreign Office were allocated to various departments, responsible for different parts of the world. Each department had a list of nations it was responsible for, which would include receiving information concerning those nations and advising on how to carry out British foreign policy, with regard to those countries. An example of how responsibility was allocated is revealed in the Foreign Office Lists for 1926, where the Central Department had responsibility for Germany, Republic of Austria, Republic of Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia (Czechoslovakia), Jugo-Slavia (Kingdom of Yugoslavia), Kingdom of Romania, Kingdom of Bulgaria and Kingdom of Greece. It was in these departments that most decisions regarding the German colonial question and other international issues took place. Each department was led by a Superintending Assistant Secretary, later renamed simply as head of department, with several supporting clerks. However, in the 1920s, there were no separate departments for international bodies, such as the League of Nations. Instead, the responsibility for issues regarding the League of Nations was placed in the Western Department, which became the Western, General and League of Nations Department. It was only in the 1930s that a separate League of Nations department was created.

The Foreign Office had a hierarchical structure which would normally indicate a fixed chain of command. However, the organisational system was more flexible. For example, a department could utilise specialists within the Foreign Office, such as legal advisors, to provide extra information on a given subject. For instance, in December 1920, Herbert Malkin, Assistant Legal Adviser, supported the Central Department in writing a reply to a parliamentary question, regarding whether the League of Nations could alter British Mandate

Treaties (a subject discussed in detail in Chapter Two).[7] Another instance would be when departments' responsibilities overlapped. In those circumstances, it was common to find individuals of one Foreign Office department writing minutes on files meant for a different department. For example, when the Foreign Office was concerned regarding the repercussions of Germany joining the League of Nations, minutes from Charles Orde[8] and Ronald Campbell,[9] from the Western, General and League of Nations Department, are found on documents meant for the Central Department. This indicates that individuals were taking part in discussions when required, which were not necessarily part of their departmental remit, therefore, the hierarchical structure was not set in stone.

The most significant evidence indicating that that the Foreign Office did not have a fixed chain of command is seen in how information was circulated through the department. Rigid hierarchies are common within civilian, government and military institutions and they tend to be 'top down' organisations. An effective example would be an army, where everyone has a rank and a specific role to play, orders are given from the top and are expected to be obeyed and followed through down the line. Lower ranks can show little initiative, as it is generally assumed that the higher ranks know more about the 'bigger picture.' The Foreign Office was different; it had a system closer to a 'bottom up' structure. Most documents and messages received by the department were seen by the lower ranks first. These lower ranking officials would then decide if the information was important enough to be passed up the chain of command. If the officials did not consider it essential, then they would sign the document to indicate that they had read it, maybe leave a comment and then file it.[10] If the information

[7] Minute by Malkin, 3 December 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C14052/154/18.
[8] Minute written by Orde, 14 October 1924, TNA/FO371/9821/C15519/2072/18.
[9] Minute written by Campbell, 14 October 1924, TNA/FO371/9821/C15519/2072/18.
[10] Signature of Bennet, undated but within October 1922, TNA/FO371/7523/C14809/338/18.

was considered significant, it would be circulated to the middle ranks, who would then have a more detailed discussion[11] and decide whether to pass it up the chain of command.

The way information was circulated through the Foreign Office allowed a great deal of room for initiative from the permanent officials. The system in theory would allow the permanent officials, on purpose to keep back information from the Foreign Secretary, though it would be difficult to prove. Most of the discussions on the German colonial question were with middle and high ranking permanent officials. In these discussions, it was common for permanent officials to communicate with their opposite representatives in other government departments,[12] or in other countries and international organisations.[13] For example, John Troutbeck of the Central Department, held talks with members of both the Dominion Office and Board of Trade, during the creation of a memorandum involving the German colonial question.[14] In another instance, Sydney Waterlow of the Central Department contacted the French Ambassador, Charles de Beaupoil, to discuss how Britain and France should handle the League of Nations during the process to create the Mandate Treaties.[15] These communications were often accomplished without the knowledge or guidance of the Foreign Secretary. Effectively, the Foreign Secretary did not micromanage the department, allowing the permanent officials to take the lead in colonial discussions.

The roles of both the Foreign Secretary and the Permanent Under Secretary within the Foreign Office, were the fundamental reason that the permanent officials had such a high

[11] Minute written by Lampson, 1 January 1926, TNA/FO371/10756/C16526/2994/18, Minute written by Huxley, 31December 1925, TNA/FO371/10756/C16526/2994/18.
[12] Message from O. Niemeyer to M.W. Lampson, 3 August 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C8728/539/18, Minute by Wigram, 7 August 1920, TNA/FO371/4766/C3049/154/18, Letter from C.W Dixon to J.M. Troutbeck, 8 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4366/539/18.
[13] Message from S.P. Waterlow to Monsieur Le Comte de Saint Aulaire, 18 April 1921, TNA/FO371/5852/C7507/11/18, Letter from W. Tyrrell to Baron F. de Ropp, 16 November 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C15381/2994/18, Message from H.G (Drummond) to E.D (Cadogan), 12 November 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10779/59/98.
[14] Letter from C.W Dixon to J.M. Troutbeck, 8 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4366/539/18, Letter from J.M. Troutbeck to J.J. Wills, 23 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4366/539/18.
[15] Message from S.P. Waterlow to Monsieur Le Comte de Saint Aulaire, 18 April 1921, TNA/FO371/5852/C7507/11/18.

level of freedom and influence. Foreign Secretaries held an important position, as they were the main driving force ensuring that the Foreign Office policy was accepted within the Government. For instance, it was Chamberlain who ensured that the department's view of vetoing German representation from the Permanent Mandates Commission was accepted as policy for the British Empire at the Imperial Conference (semi-regular meeting of all major governmental and administrative officials within the British Empire) of 1926.[16] Within the department, the Foreign Secretary had the power to overrule permanent officials and advisors. Chamberlain would dismiss the views of the British Ambassador in Berlin, as much as Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary December 1905-December 1916, had done before the First World War[17] (a subject which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four). However, the Foreign Secretary did not become involved in the majority of issues and subjects that the Foreign Office dealt with. In fact, the Foreign Secretaries would only discuss issues they believed to be of great importance[18] or related to their personal 'pet' projects, such as Curzon's interest with the Kingdom of Persia.[19] The day to day running of the Foreign Office was under the remit of the Permanent Under Secretary and all permanent officials were answerable to him. However, they were not interested in controlling the actions of the other permanent officials. For example, whenever the Permanent Under Secretary tried to promote a particular policy or view point, there was no guarantee that the other officials would comply. An example of this will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter Two, when

[16] Minute by Cadogan, 28 October 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10170/59/98.
[17] Message from Austen Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon, 21 May 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C6145/2994/18, Sir Edward Grey's reply to a letter from Sir F. Lascelles, 28 May 1906, TNA/FO 371/78/18131.
[18] Minute by Chamberlain, 19 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4596/539/18.
[19] G.H Bennett, *British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period, 1919-24* (St. Martin's Press, Basingstoke, 1995) 189, Message from Curzon of Kedleston to Lord D'Abernon, 23 November 1921, TNA/FO371/6417/E12608/76/34.

William Tyrrell, Permanent Under Secretary, tried to voice support for Frederick de Ropp's policies, but the rest of the department dismissed his opinion.[20]

An excellent example of how the Foreign Office operated in the 1920s, comes from the department's creation of the memorandums regarding the German colonial question. These memorandums started as a list of documents detailing the history of the German colonial question. Over time, they transformed into the department's main effort to persuade the Imperial Conference of 1926, to support the Foreign Office's policy on this subject. The Foreign Office's interactions with other governmental departments and the department's ideology were revealed through these documents, and will be discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter Two. The importance for this section of the chapter is what the information reveals regarding how the Foreign Office made decisions.

The concept for the memorandums originated within the Central Department. Troutbeck, in January 1926, argued that, '[t]he German Government have for some time been threatening to raise the question of the German colonies and Germany's right to mandates. It may therefore be useful to have a paper in print giving the history of the question since the Peace Conference.'[21] He created the first memorandum on this subject, titled *German Colonies.*[22] Troutbeck then took his document to James Headlam-Morley, Historic Advisor, and Cecil Hurst, Legal Advisor, who helped him create an updated version of the memorandum titled *Memorandum on the German Colonies*.[23] The new version had changed from a simple record stating German attempts to regain a colonial role following 1919, to a policy document, designed to provide the best legal and practical arguments against Germany regaining a

[20] Minute written by Huxley, 23 November 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C14881/2994/18. Minute written by Lampson, 25 November 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C14881/2994/18.
[21] Minute written by J.M. Troutbeck, 20 January 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C746/539/18.
[22] Document called German Colonies, undated, TNA/FO371/11303/C746/539/18.
[23] Memorandum titled *Memorandum on the German Colonies*, 11 February 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C1733/539/18, Minute written by J.M. Troutbeck, 12 February 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C1733/539/18.

former colony. It was at this stage, that these documents were passed up to the higher ranks of the Foreign Office.

By June 1926, both Miles Lampson, head of the Central Department, and Tyrrell had seen the documents. They were highly supportive of the memorandums, but felt that they could be enhanced by comments from other government departments. Lampson wrote, 'an excellent paper. But it would certainly have additional force if it had the….[support] of the Colonial Office….[and] Treasury behind it.'[24] While Tyrrell stated, '[w]e are most indebted to Mr Troutbeck for a very clear statement of the case against the German Colonial claim….it would certainly be strengthened by Colonial Office and Treasury Endorsement.'[25] This led Lampson and Orme Sargent (Sargent became head of the Central Department in 1926, but it is unclear if he had been promoted by this point) to hold discussions with the Colonial Office, Dominion Office and Treasury on this subject.[26] Chamberlain was the last person to join the discussions regarding the creation of the memorandums on the German colonial question. What's more, he did not give many instructions to his permanent officials on what should be written. Instead, he gave support for their creation and wanted them ready to be utilised at the Imperial Conference later in the year.[27]

The creation of the memorandums on the German colonial question provide an effective demonstration of the decision making process within the Foreign Office. As with most Foreign Office discussions, the pathway began with the low and mid ranking permanent officials in a department, in this case the Central Department. It was Troutbeck who came up with the idea, acting on his own initiative. Information was then passed up the department to

[24] Minute by M.W. Lampson, 23 June 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7329/539/18.
[25] Minute by William Tyrrell, 24 June 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7329/539/18.
[26] Message from O. Niemeyer to Miles W. Lampson, 3 August 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C8728/539/18, Draft message to Treasury, Colonial Office and Dominion Office by Orme Sargent, 30 June 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7329/539/18.
[27] Minute by Chamberlain, 26 June 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7329/539/18, Minute by Troutbeck, 22 June 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7329/539/18.

the historic and legal advisors, proceeding to the head of the Central Department and Permanent Under Secretary. Chamberlain only became involved later, and even then, he allowed his officials to make most of the decisions. When it was decided to discuss the subject with other governmental departments, the permanent officials did not require the Foreign Secretary to give them permission; they acted on their own authority. This is a clear demonstration of the Foreign Office's 'bottom up' structure.

In conclusion, this section of the chapter has revealed that the Foreign Office did not have a rigid hierarchical structure between 1919 and 1929. Unlike most hierarchical organisations, the Foreign Office had a 'bottom up' not a 'top down' structure. As such, any given information was passed up the chain of command depending on whether the permanent officials believed the information to be significant. This system of minimum centralised control allowed for more initiative to be shown from the permanent officials, in both deciding policy and communicating with their opposite representatives in other governmental departments. Neither the Foreign Secretary nor the Permanent Under Secretary, were interested in controlling the actions of all the permanent officials and, therefore, this flexibility was able to flourish.

The role of the Foreign Office in deciding Britain's policies towards the German colonial question

In theory, the British Government was a cabinet collective responsibility system, in which Cabinet Ministers debated and discussed issues, both domestic and international. These discussions could include other ministers and departments not directly involved with the subject. However, these debates were confidential, as all ministers had to agree with the Prime Minister in public, enabling the government to show a united front to the population; even if there had been serious disagreements in private. At the same time, this show of unity

ordained that if the Prime Minister lost a vote of no confidence, then all Cabinet Ministers must resign as well. With regards to foreign policy, a cabinet collective responsibility system ensured that neither the Foreign Secretary nor the Foreign Office could control foreign policy, as all decisions were required to be agreed within the Cabinet. Such a system is very different when compared to other governmental systems, for instance absolute monarchies, which have a more fixed chain of command. Despite the fact that a cabinet collective responsibility system is arguably fairer, it is also time-consuming and can lead to stalemates when everyone vetoes each other's ideas.

The cabinet collective responsibility system was supposed to move the British Government away from its authoritarian past. However, theory and practice are often at odds, and many parts of that authoritarian past still lingered. For instance, historians including B.J.C McKercher and Young argued that before the First World War, foreign policy was dominated by the Foreign Secretaries and the Foreign Office.[28] This is particularly true during Grey's time as Foreign Secretary. Grey and his Foreign Office played a critical role in ending Britain's alliance with the Germanic nations (Kingdom of Prussia, Kingdom of Hanover and Austrian Empire and after 1866, the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire), which had existed for centuries.[29] It was replaced by an alliance with Britain's traditional enemy, France, now a Republic following the fall of the Second French Empire, and the Russian Empire.[30] The alliance was carried out despite strong opposition from individuals such as Lloyd George,[31] who was then the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Foreign Office's

[28] John W Young, *Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century* (Arnold, London, 1997) 72, Dockrill Michael and McKercher Brian (edi*), Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1960* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996) 80.
[29] Michael Stürmer, *The German Empire 1871-1919* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2000) 65, Message from Mr Gosselin to Foreign Office, 25 November 1895, TNA/FO64/1351/278.
[30] John Charmley, *Splendid Isolation? Britain and the Balance of Power 1874-1914* (Hodder & Stoughton 1999) 399, Sir Edward Grey's reply to a letter from Sir F. Lascelles, 28 May 1906, TNA/FO 371/78/18131, Message from Sir N. O. Conor to Sir Edward Grey, 30 April 1906, TNA/FO 371/108/14565.
[31] John Charmley, *Splendid Isolation? Britain and the Balance of Power 1874-1914* (Hodder & Stoughton 1999) 400.

ability to pass an agreement despite opposition meant that foreign policy had not been completely incorporated into the cabinet collective responsibility system by 1914. It is, therefore, important to analyse the Foreign Office's role and level of influence after 1918, in order to examine whether it remained in a dominant position, or if foreign policy had become part of the cabinet collective responsibility system.

As mentioned previously, the German colonial question is the perfect aspect to analyse the role of the Foreign Office. This is because it is a subject that required the Foreign Office to work with the rest of the government, allowing an examination of its level of influence, when compared to other governmental departments. This chapter will reveal in the following section that the role of the Foreign Office in deciding Britain's foreign policy varied greatly between the government of Lloyd George, 1916-1922, and the governments of his successors, 1922-1929. During the time Lloyd George was Prime Minister the Foreign Office lost influence, meaning the cabinet collective responsibility system towards foreign policy became a reality. This allowed many ministers and departments to promote their individual views and policies. However, once Lloyd George was no longer Prime Minister, the government reverted back to its more traditional arrangements, with the Foreign Office again dominating the decision making on foreign policy. The changing role and influence of the Foreign Office had a major impact on British foreign policy between 1919 and 1929, and this will be discussed in the detailed examination of both the Lloyd George era (1919- 1922) and that of his successors (1922- 1929).

The Lloyd George era, 1919-1922

Lloyd George became Prime Minister in December 1916, during the height of the First World War. However, due to the war, his impact on foreign policy was not fully realised until 1919. Lloyd George wanted to play an active role at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, and in

affairs on the European continent. Even though involvement in international affairs was within the right of the Prime Minister, usually it was not acted upon. For instance, during the Congress of Vienna, the peace negotiations which followed Napoleon's defeat in 1814 and 1815, Robert Jenkinson, the Prime Minister of the time, did not take an active part. Instead, Britain was represented by Arthur Wellesley, British Field Marshal, Robert Stewart, Foreign Secretary, and Richard Trench, President of the Board of Trade. Lloyd George's desire to participate in the peace negotiations and European foreign relations caused a fundamental shift in the role of the Foreign Office within British foreign policy decision making. In essence, he prevented the department from dominating foreign policy, allowing a practical version of the cabinet collective responsibility system to form.

Before going into detail regarding the evidence of the formation of a collective responsibility system and how this impacted on Britain's foreign policy, it is necessary to outline the relationship between Lloyd George and Curzon. A discussion on the role of the Foreign Office inevitably, would have to consider how the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister interacted during their common service. Furthermore, most of the historiography regarding the operation of the British Government between 1919 and 1922 revolves around this subject. As mentioned in the literature review, historians are split over how to classify the relationship between Curzon and Lloyd George. The traditionalist view is that the two men had a strong dislike for each other, which led Lloyd George to marginalise the Foreign Office. This interpretation is supported by historians including Rowland.[32] The revisionists, for example Gilmour,[33] on the other hand, argue that both men had a grudging respect for each other. This implies that despite any antipathy, there was a division of responsibility between them, with Lloyd George taking the lead on foreign policy towards Europe and at the Paris Peace Conference, while Curzon was responsible for matters relevant to the rest of the world.

[32] P. Rowland, *Lloyd George* (Barrie & Jenkins, London, 1975) 516.
[33] David Gilmour, *Curzon* (John Murray, London, 1994) 502.

As far as this thesis is concerned, it makes little difference which side of the argument is correct, because whether Lloyd George marginalised Curzon or they agreed on a power sharing agreement, the result remains the same. For either way, the Foreign Office did not have the ability to dominate foreign policy as it had enjoyed before 1914. This loss of influence was noticed by several individuals within or closely connected to the Foreign Office. For example Crowe in August 1919, complained that the Foreign Office was being left out of the colonial negotiations within the newly formed Permanent Mandates Commission. He wrote, '[they do] nothing to keep us informed beyond occasional communications of old papers.'[34] Nicolson also commented that Lloyd George had taken away some of the decision making opportunities from the Foreign Office.[35] Another example is from the former Foreign Secretary, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, who stated that there should be 'rather more FO and rather less PM in the salad.'[36] This leads to two very important questions, namely; what was the new role of the Foreign Office while Lloyd George was Prime Minister and how did this impact on British foreign policy? The next section of this chapter will use the Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question to answer these two questions starting with the new role of the department.

The first question regards the role of the Foreign Office during the Lloyd George government. As part of the cabinet collective responsibility system, the Foreign Office would still have had considerable influence on British foreign policy, but it would not be alone in making decisions. It was just one of many institutions, which included the Board of Trade,[37] the War Office,[38] the Colonial Office[39] and the Dominion Governments.[40] They all advised

[34] Minute written by Crowe on a letter from P.H. View, 14 August 1919, TNA/FO608/152/509/1/2/16204.
[35] Nicolson Harold, *Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925* (Constable & CO, London, 1934) 60.
[36] David Gilmour, *Curzon* (John Murray, London, 1994) 535.
[37] Minute by Waterlow, 19 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4767/C11644/154/18.
[38] Message from the Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 17 January 1921, TNA/FO371/5940/C1256/115/18.

and tried to form Britain's decisions, involving the German colonial question between 1919 and 1922. The Foreign Office had mixed success in carving out a role for itself within the cabinet collective responsibility system. On the positive side, it played a major part in Britain's negotiations on mandates and controlled much of Britain's foreign policy outside of Europe, when referring to colonial interests. It also provided advice and experts for several of Britain's delegations. However, there were also major areas of the negotiations, particularly during the Paris Peace Conference, where the Foreign Office was bypassed completely.

The Foreign Office was still able to continue with its less important traditional roles, including advising the British Cabinet on how to answer parliamentary questions regarding foreign policy. For instance, in response to a question by William Ormsby-Gore, Member of Parliament for Stafford, on 22 July 1920, Lloyd George's reply was written word for word by the Central Department.[41] On another occasion during the same month, Lloyd George's response to a question regarding the submission of the Mandate Treaties again, was deliberately chosen by the Foreign Office.[42]

More importantly, there were several areas where the Foreign Office was able to play an active role during the early interwar period; most notably throughout the negotiations between the imperial powers regarding the Mandate Treaties during 1920-1921.[43] One such example includes the way the British dealt with Japanese opposition to 'C' Mandates (a detailed description of different type of mandates is carried out in Chapter Two). In the

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[39] Message from Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 27 September 1920, TNA/FO371/4767/C7391/154/18, Minute by Malkin, 8 October 1920, TNA/FO371/4767/C8136/154/18, Message from H.J. Read to Under Secretary of State, 8 October 1920, TNA/FO371/4767/C8276/154/18.

[40] Telegram from Governor General of Commonwealth of Australia to Secretary of State for Colonies, 15 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4767/C11633/154/18.

[41] Draft author is unknown but was signed off by Crowe, 21 July 1920, TNA/FO371/4766/C2130/154/18.

[42] Copy of Parliamentary Question, undated, TNA/FO371/4766/C2407/154/18.

[43] The Paris Peace Conference and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles had decided that former German colonies should be divided amongst the victorious imperial powers as mandates. However, there remained several important issues to be discussed regarding creation of the mandate treaties; including the terms of the mandate treaties, border disputes between the mandates, deportation of German citizens and how to handle German opposition. These questions would be decided within direct negotiations between the imperial powers.

Pacific, former German colonies were turned into 'C' Mandates, where the Mandatory Power had almost unlimited control over the mandate and their citizens were given preferential treatment. The Japanese Government wanted to make modifications to the draft Mandate Treaties for 'C' Mandates, which would give Japanese citizens in southern 'C' Mandates 'national treatment or most favoured-nation treatment.' [44] In effect, giving Japanese subjects the same status as subjects of the British Empire. Curzon and the Foreign Office, supported by the Colonial Office and the Government of Australia, prevented the Japanese from gaining those concessions in the 'C' Mandate Treaties.[45]

The negotiations with Japan over 'C' Mandates was not the only time the Foreign Office played an active role in the negotiations over the Mandate Treaties. The department was involved in talks with the French over 'B' Mandates. The handover, controlling the various zones for Togoland and Cameroon did not go completely smoothly. There were many delays as communication systems and roads needed to be constructed.[46] It required several talks and negotiations between the Foreign Office and various French representatives to complete.[47] This led to various permanent officials expressing their frustration with the French Government. For example, Ralph Wigram, from the Central Department, wrote, '[t]he French are very tiresome about this, and they will not find the Colonial Office at all

[44] Message from Earl Curzon to Sir C. Eliot, 7 July 1920, TNA/FO371/4766/C1037/154/18.
[45] Message from Earl Curzon to Sir C. Eliot, 7 July 1920, TNA/FO371/4766/C1037/154/18, Message from Eric Phipps to the Security of State for Colonial Affairs, 12th October 1920, TNA/FO371/4767/C8508/154/18, Telegram from Governor General of Commonwealth of Australia to Secretary of State for Colonies, 15 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4767/C11633/154/18, Minute by Crowe, 20 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4767/C11633/154/18.
[46] Message from H.J. Read to Under Secretary of State, 17 August 1920, TNA/FO371/4766/C4045/154/18.
[47] Message from French Embassy in London to Foreign Office, 18 August 1920, TNA/FO371/4766/C4278/154/18, Message from Earl Curzon to Monsieur de Fleuriau, 26 August 1920, TNA/FO371/4766/C4876/154/18, Message from Eric Phipps to Monsieur Cambon, 25 September 1920, TNA/FO371/4767/C6935/154/18.

accommodating.'[48] Communications between Britain and France over the mandate handover was an area where the Foreign Office could potentially provide essential services.

There are further examples where the Foreign Office played a key part in producing Britain's strategy when dealing with the Mandate Treaty negotiations. The evidence for this lies within a memorandum dated 20 July 1920, written by Cecil Hurst of the Central Department.[49] The memorandum indicates that the permanent officials at the Foreign Office were deliberately holding up negotiations with France regarding the Mandate Treaties, which allowed them to raise extra African troops in 'B' mandated territories. The Foreign Office did this not because they had a problem with France raising troops in 'B' Mandates. In fact, it was due to a matter of timing, as they wanted to hold off the signing of 'B' Mandates until they could simultaneously sign off the 'C' Mandates. As the memorandum stated, '[i]t would not be safe to settle and sign the 'B' Mandates and let the 'C' Mandates wait, because France, having obtained the mandates in which she is interested, might then turn round and support Japan.'[50] The Foreign Office also did not want the Dominion Governments, who were mainly attaining 'C' Mandates, to believe the British Government was deserting them.[51] This once again demonstrates that the Foreign Office had influence over British foreign policy.

Other than the Mandate Treaty negotiations, an area within the German colonial question where the Foreign Office played a major role was where issues did not directly impact on Europe or the Paris Peace Conference. The best example of this comes from the Foreign Office's handling of German action in Persia. During September 1921, the permanent officials in the Eastern Department were discussing the banning of 72 German nationals (who during the First World War had tried to undermine British influence in Persia) from entering

[48] Minute by Wigram, 9 September 1920, TNA/FO371/4767/C5827/154/18.
[49] Memorandum titled *B and C Mandates, Memorandum on the present position by Sir C. Hurst*, 20 July 1920, TNA/FO371/4767/C10428/154/18.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.

Persia.[52] These discussions ended with Charles Tufton, Superintending Assistant Secretary of the Central Department, sending a dispatch to Edgar Vincent, referred to as Lord D'Abernon while he was British Ambassador to Germany, with instructions laid out by Crowe to ban those individuals.[53] There is no evidence that the Prime Minister, or anyone else outside the Foreign Office, was consulted before the decision was made.

A further example that the Foreign Office was acting on its own initiative, when dealing with German colonial ambitions towards Persia, comes from Curzon's hard-line stance towards the German Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran in November 1921.[54] The permanent officials of the Foreign Office had become deeply concerned about the actions of the German Chargé d'Affaires, as they believed he was undermining Britain in the country. [55] Curzon carried out a hard-line policy towards this issue, instructing D'Abernon to make sure the Germans were aware that if, 'such actions continue, His Majesty's Government may have to reconsider their whole attitude towards Germany.'[56] This resulted in two reactions; first, Joseph Wirth, German Chancellor, promised to make an immediate enquiry and recall the German Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran if required. Second, the Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran sent a message stating, 'I assure you on my oath of office that I have not encouraged the Persian Government in any measures detrimental to British interests.'[57] The banning of German individuals and the affair with the German Chargé d'Affaires in Persia indicate that the Foreign Office acquired more independence to make decisions, when dealing with countries not within the European continent.

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[52] Minute by Waterlow, 2 September 1921, TNA/FO371/5974/C17374/416/18, Minute by Lindsay, 3 September 1921, TNA/FO371/5974/C17374/416/18, Minute by Crowe, 5 September 1921, TNA/FO371/5974/C17374/416/18, Minute by Oliphant, 7 September 1921, TNA/FO371/5974/C17374/416/18.
[53] Message from Charles Tufton to Lord D'Abernon, 22 September 1921, TNA/FO371/5974/C17374/416/18.
[54] The real name of the German Chargé d'Affaires is not recorded in the documents.
[55] Annexed note written by Crowe, 17 November 1921, TNA/FO371/6417/E12608/76/34.
[56] Message from Curzon of Kedleston to Lord D'Abernon, 23 November 1921, TNA/FO371/6417/E12608/76/34.
[57] Message from Joseph Addison to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 9 December 1921, TNA/FO371/6418/E13677/76/34.

The final area where the Foreign Office showed its influence was in providing vital information and expertise to several British delegations, including at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. As mentioned previously, Lloyd George played an active role during the negotiations and, by extension, the Foreign Office's role had become more limited. However, the Foreign Office was represented and provided its expertise when required. The Foreign Secretary during 1919, was Balfour and he accompanied Lloyd George to Paris during the peace conference. Balfour played an active part in negotiations; for instance, he held talks with Georges Clemenceau, the Prime Minister of France, over the right of France to use native troops from mandated territory, to defend France.[58] Balfour was not the only member of the Foreign Office to have played an active role during those negotiations. Hurst was well informed as he would often have talks with leading foreign officials, including Louis Henry Simon, the French Minister for Colonies. These included discussions about the French Government's position concerning mandates, after which he would update Balfour.[59] The Foreign Office certainly played a role in Britain's decision making process regarding the German colonial question.

Conversely, there were areas where the Foreign Office policies were vetoed or bypassed altogether. For instance, the role of the Foreign Office was more restrained during the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, and during the Mandate Treaty negotiation in Geneva, 1920 to 1921, compared to previous historical events. Usually negotiations between the British Government and other nations would be carried out through the professional diplomats of the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service. However, as the British Government was well represented at the Paris Peace Conference and within Balfour's Geneva delegation, the Foreign Office was not required to partake in its usual intermediary role. Under normal circumstances, if a governmental department or a Dominion Government wanted to raise a

[58] Minute by Hurst, 23 July 1919, TNA/FO608/152/509/1/1/15892.
[59] Minute by Hurst, 11 August 1919, TNA/FO608/152/509/1/2/16204.

subject with another nation, while the British Empire was in negotiations, they would first contact the Foreign Office, who would represent them as part of the delegation. The Foreign Office would then decide how best to raise the subject during the negotiations. In spite of normal procedures, this process was neglected during the Paris Peace Conference as the Dominion Governments and most governmental departments already had representatives present. As a consequence, they could raise the subject directly with the target nation without informing the Foreign Office. For example, during the colonial negotiations within the Paris Peace Conference, Simon and the British Minister for Colonial Affairs, Alfred Milner, would often communicate directly with each other,[60] without the Foreign Office acting as liaison between the two officials. Instead, the Foreign Office played an advisory role, with the permanent officials at the Foreign Office keeping the Colonial Office informed of relevant information or providing an expert opinion when required.[61] The Australian Government also chose to go through the Colonial Office rather than the Foreign Office, when it decided to raise concerns regarding the draft Mandate Treaties for Germany's Pacific colonies.[62] It was also the Colonial Office who reassured Australia of the British Empire's position regarding those Mandate Treaties.[63] On the whole, it was not just in the negotiations between the French and British Colonial Ministers where it appeared that the Foreign Office was being bypassed. The general agreement regarding the allocation of former German colonies was made in a private meeting between Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States of America, and Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, the Prime Minister of Italy. The Foreign Office was simply informed about the conclusion of this

[60] Telegram from M.H. Simon to Lord Milner, 4 August 1919, TNA/FO608/152/509/1/1/17580.
[61] Minute by Hurst, 11 August 1919, TNA/FO608/152/509/1/1/17580, Minute by Crowe, 11 August 1919, TNA/FO608/152/509/1/1/17580.
[62] Telegram from Governor General of Commonwealth of Australia to Secretary of State for Colonies,13 September 1919, TNA/FO608/152/509/1/1/13973.
[63] Telegram from Secretary of State for Colonies to Governor General of Commonwealth of Australia, 20 September 1919, TNA/FO608/152/509/1/1/13973.

meeting after the event.[64] It is clear that during the Paris Peace Conference the Foreign Office was not required by governmental departments, Dominion Governments or the Prime Minister to talk to their opposite representatives. In essence, this indicates that the Foreign Office's role and influence was diminished to an advisory position.

It is clear that the Foreign Office had influence on certain areas of Britain's decision making, regarding the German colonial question, but its function had been greatly reduced in other areas. So, what does this reveal about the role the department played between 1919 and 1922, within the wider government? The answer is relatively simple; having influence in some areas and not others was common during that time period, due to the fact that there were several governmental departments in the same position. Effectively, the Foreign Office carried some influence, but it was only one of many that attempted to influence foreign policy. The broad selection of institutions having a role in the decision making process, is clear evidence of a cabinet collective responsibility system.

Britain operating within a cabinet collective responsibility system had a major impact on how Britain decided its foreign policy. Instead of having one individual or department forming the decisions, all Cabinet Ministers, and their respective ministries, would debate, vote on various issues and even overrule each other on any given subject. In the British Government during the 1920s, not only would there be Cabinet Ministers attempting to voice their opinions, but also there would be colonial administrations and Dominion Governments, all trying to influence decisions. This led to many different opinions trying to control foreign policy, which in turn had a major impact on Britain's response to the German colonial question. It signified that policy was not based on cold hard analysis of the strategic situation but on loose compromises, which had to be accepted by every Cabinet Minister.

[64] Cypher Telegram to Lord Curzon from Mr Balfour, 7 May 1919, TNA/FO608/152/509/1/1/9423.

An effective example involves the discussions within the government, when deciding whether or not to offer the United States a former German or Ottoman colony. There was a belief within the British Government, that if the United States was given a colony, it would stop their opposition to European colonialism.[65] However, as every Minister could argue against, or even block, any given territory being handed over to the United States, this system made it impossible for the government to decide on which lands to offer them.

The debates within the government, regarding this subject, began in July 1919, when the Foreign Office held discussions around offering Constantinople or another major part of the Ottoman Empire to the United States.[66] This idea was completely rejected by Lloyd George, who was determined before the Paris Peace Conference to prevent a non-European state, such as the United States, from holding any European territory.[67] Instead, Lloyd George suggested Palestine as an alternative mandate for the United States of America[68] but this idea was in turn rejected by Curzon.[69]

Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for War, also voiced his opinion on the debate regarding whether to give the United States a former German or Ottoman colony. He opposed any suggestion that would give the United States land connected to the Mediterranean. He feared that access to the Mediterranean would encourage the United States to become a naval power.[70] 'Churchill and the Admiralty both preferred to see the United States in East Africa, where the British Empire already had more territory than it had the capacity to develop.'[71]

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[65] Erick Goldstein, *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) 184.
[66] Minute written by Vansittart, 7 July 1919, TNA/FO608/133/385/1/16/14397.
[67] Erick Goldstein, *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) 189.
[68] Ibid 189.
[69] Ibid 189.
[70] Ibid 189.
[71] Ibid 189.

This however, was rejected by both Lloyd George[72] and the British Dominion of the Union of South Africa,[73] who believed that any territories now occupied by troops from the British Empire were effectively annexed and, 'there could be no question as to their fate.'[74] In this way, the British Government rejected every possible colony, ending up with no suitable colony to offer the United States. Whether or not the United States would have actually accepted a colony is debatable, though not relevant to this thesis. What is important is that these discussions clearly demonstrated how the cabinet collective responsibility system impacted on decision making. The Cabinet had to come up with a compromise and when it failed, the country was left without a policy.

The cabinet collective responsibility system also influenced which territories the British claimed during the Paris Peace Conference, as each governmental department and Dominion Government was able to state a case for any former Ottoman or German colony being incorporated into the British Empire. This resulted in the British Empire claiming more and more territory, which led to the rather comical comment made by Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India, who stated, 'it would be very satisfactory if we could find some convincing argument for not annexing all the territories in the world.'[75]

A final example of the cabinet collective responsibility system impacting on British foreign policy, involves the Cabinet decisions regarding Persia and Russia between 1919 and 1922. This reveals much about British decision making at that time. In 1919, Churchill, was determined that Britain play a bigger role in the Russian Civil War, to implement what was necessary to destroy the Bolshevik regime.[76] On the other hand, Curzon was opposed to this

[72] Ibid`187.
[73] Telegram from Governor General of Union of South Africa to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 January 1919, TNA/FO608/148/481/1/1/1895.
[74] Erick Goldstein, *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991)187.
[75] Ibid 190.
[76] David Gilmour, *Curzon* (John Murray, London, 1994) 514.

policy, and this was one of the reasons why the Cabinet did not support Churchill.[77] Curzon held a strong determination to secure British influence in Persia through financial support and ground troops.[78] This was strongly opposed by Churchill, who was upset due to Curzon's opposition to his policy of aiding the anti-Bolshevik forces during the Russian civil war.[79] In retaliation, Churchill won over the support of the rest of the Cabinet and obstructed Curzon's plans for Persia. These events reveal that during this time period, Britain's foreign policy was based more on the egos and rivalries of the Cabinet Ministers, rather than a consistent, unanimous and well-thought-out strategic plan.

The very last element which needs to be discussed in this section, involves the relationship between the Foreign Office and other governmental departments. This element is of paramount importance because it reveals that the strained relationship between Cabinet Ministers and the loss of Foreign Office's influence, did not lead to more difficult relations with other departments. On the German colonial question, the Foreign Office continued to foster positive and cooperative relations with other departments, delegations and governments, within the wider British Empire, most notably with the Colonial Office and Balfour's delegation in Geneva.

The close collaboration between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office is most evident within the administrative system of the formation of the Mandate System. This comprised of preparing the German colonies for British rule[80], involving their assets and bureaucracy. Close cooperation embodied several policies, including the deportation of Germans from the

[77] Ibid 514.
[78] Ibid 517.
[79] Ibid 517.
[80] Message from H.J. Read to Under Secretary of State, 17 August 1920, TNA/FO371/4766/C4045/154/18.

British mandates and the liquidation of German assets.[81] In both cases, the Foreign Office provided advice and liaison work for the Colonial Office.

It was decided, by the British Government, that German citizens still living in German colonies about to become British mandates should be deported. Furthermore, all German assets within the territory should be seized and sold by the British Government during the liquidation process. These events were a purely colonial administration matter and therefore the Colonial Office was the primary department dealing with the issue. The Foreign Office, however, cooperated with the Colonial Office throughout the whole process. It was the Foreign Office who informed individuals, and foreign and British companies, how to purchase German assets and how to buy land within the new mandates.[82] At the instruction of the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office also made it clear to anyone interested in former German assets that 'no purchases by a neutral [citizen from a nation not involved in the First World War] from the former German owner would be recognised by His Majesty's Government.'[83]

The collaboration between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office was close during the deportation of German citizens from British mandates. The Colonial Office was ultimately in charge of the deportation. However, the Foreign Office had a role to play in dealing with Friedrich Sthamer, the German Ambassador to London. Sthamer was continually concerned about the treatment of the German deportees and would make frequent requests for updates

[81] Translation of a message from Friedrich Sthamer to Foreign Office, 16 July 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C1750/29/18, Message from H.J. Read to Under Secretary of State, 30 June 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C29/29/18, Communication from the Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 17 January 1921, TNA/FO371/5940/C1256/115/18.
[82] Message from Colville Barclay to Earl Curzon of Kedleston, 23 December 1920, TNA/FO371/5940/C115/115/18, Telegram from Lord Kilmarnock to Foreign Office, 10 January 1921, TNA/FO371/5994/C821/821/18.
[83] Communication from the Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 17 January 1921, TNA/FO371/5940/C1256/115/18.

on the deportation.[84] The Foreign Office acted as liaison between the Colonial Office and Sthamer,[85] in order to allow this process to be as smooth as possible. The Foreign Office also ensured that the German deportees obtained permission to travel through certain countries.[86] This cooperation meant that the deportation was completed successfully, with the only exception being a minor diplomatic incident when the deportees arrived in the Kingdom of the Netherlands; an event that will be discussed later within this chapter.

The second area that reveals the close cooperation of the Foreign Office with other governmental departments relates to the negotiations at Geneva. The main negotiations regarding the creation of the Mandate System occurred in Geneva between 1920-1921, with delegations of the imperial powers, including Britain, France and Japan. Britain was represented by Balfour's[87] delegation, with the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office attending in an advisory capacity. Throughout the negotiations Balfour asked Maurice Hankey, Cabinet Secretary, for as much information as possible on the subject as he was, 'anxious to put all the pressure….[he] can on the French and Japanese as to B. and C. Mandates'[88]

In response to his request, the Foreign Office gathered information for the Balfour delegation. It was the permanent officials at the Foreign Office who discovered that France still opposed the creation of the Mandate System,[89] and then forwarded this information to Geneva through

[84] Translation of a message from Friedrich Sthamer to Foreign Office, 16 July 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C1750/29/18, Message from H.J. Read to Under Secretary of State, 30 June 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C29/29/18.
[85] Message from H.J. Read to Under Secretary of State, 3 August 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C3001/29/18, Message from Eric Phipps to Under Secretary of State for Colonial Office, 23 September 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C6739/29/18, Translation of message from Friedrich Sthamer, to Foreign Office, 25 September 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C7383/29/18, Message from H.J. Read to Under Secretary of State, 30 September 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C7614/29/18, Message from G. Grindle to Under Secretary of State, 4 October 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C7948/29/18.
[86] Message from Mr Woodhouse at Geneva to Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 9 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C11230/29/18.
[87] Balfour had stopped being part of the Foreign Office in October 1919.
[88] Telegram from Mr Balfour to Sir Maurice Hankey, 25 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12161/154/18.
[89] Document handed by Berthelot to Curzon, 8 July 1920, TNA/FO371/4766/C2368/154/18.

the Colonial Office.[90] The Foreign Office then worked with the Colonial Office to provide the delegation with the best advice on how to modify the Mandate Treaties, which would ensure agreement by the French Government. At first, the Foreign Office thought that turning some of Germany's African colonies into 'C' Mandates with a provision for commercial equality would solve the issue.[91] In discussions with the Colonial Office, it was discovered that this would lead to problems with the Japanese Government[92] and therefore, the two departments advised Balfour's delegation to create a modified 'B' Mandate instead.[93] This process reveals the level of cooperation the Foreign Office had with other departments within the British Government to keep Balfour's delegation as well informed as possible.

The above evidence demonstrates there was a good level of collaboration between the Foreign Office and other governmental departments, particularly with the Colonial Office and Balfour's delegation in Geneva. However, this cooperation was not without its problems; occasionally there was friction between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office regarding certain subjects. An effective example was the small diplomatic incident which followed the deportation of the German citizens from former German colonies in Africa. Most Germans were being transported back to Germany on SS. *Kigoma*, except for a small group sent on another ship because of a smallpox outbreak.[94] As the SS. *Kigoma* approached Rotterdam, the final destination for the Germans, before being handed over to German authorities, the Colonial Office instructed the Foreign Office to have Britain's representatives in the

[90] Message from Eric Phipps to the Under Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, 11 August 1920, TNA/FO371/4766/C2368/154/18.
[91] Minute by Malkin on the French Ambassador's note, 23 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12031/154/18, Minute by Crowe, 23 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12031/154/18.
[92] Message from Colonial Office to Under Secretary of State, 26 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12353/154/18.
[93] Telegram from Foreign Office to Sir Lambert, 29 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12471/154/18, Minute by Waterlow, 25 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12161/154/18, Minute by Crowe, 25 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12161/154/18.
[94] Message from Governor of Tanganyika Territory to Secretary of State for Colonies, 15 September 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C9007/29/18.

Netherlands board the ship and demand the deportees pay for the cost of their deportation. [95] This resulted in Vice-Consul Muller, the British representative in Rotterdam, boarding the ship and attempting to gain payment from German citizens[96] who had already had their assets taken from them in Africa. Consequently, this led to a German Government protest and demand for compensation.[97] The Foreign Office was not pleased with the Colonial Office's handling of the event, particularly as it caused a diplomatic incident. An example of this displeasure is a minute from the Central Department stating, '[t]he Colonial Office seems to me to have muddled this.'[98] Fortunately, the diplomatic incident, regarding the SS. *Kigoma*, did not lead to any serious arguments between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office.

Conversely, the Colonial Office on occasions became frustrated with the Foreign Office. For instance, Leo Amery, Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs and Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, wrote in his diary on January 1919, 'that the chaos in the Foreign Office is now indescribable.[99] However, these frustrations between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office were the exception, and were greatly outweighed by the many occasions the departments worked collaboratively. Overall, the Foreign Office held good relations with the Colonial Office and other governmental departments when dealing with the German colonial question between 1919 and 1922.

In conclusion, this thesis has demonstrated that Lloyd George's desire to play an active role at the Paris Peace Conference and in European foreign policy lessened the Foreign Office's influence and control at that time. Therefore, in the first few years following the end of the First World War, 1919-1922, the Foreign Office did not have the ability to control foreign

[95] Message from H.J. Read to Under Secretary of State, 9 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C10777/29/18.
[96] Translation of a message from Friedrich Sthamer to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 22 January 1921, TNA/FO371/5885/C1842/82/18.
[97] Translation of a message from German Embassy in London to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 4 February 1921, TNA/FO371/5885/C2801/82/18.
[98] Minute by Brooks, 19 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C11576/29/18.
[99] John Barnes and David Nicholson (editors), Introduction by Julian Amery, *The Leo Amery Diaries; Volume one 1896-1929*, (Hutchinson, London, 1980) 249.

policy decisions as it had, before 1914. Instead, it was one of many departments and Dominion Governments that all voiced an opinion on foreign affairs. The department could still influence aspects of foreign policy outside of Europe and provide information and advice to Britain's delegations, at the Paris Peace Conference and Geneva. However, the Foreign Office had no more authority than other governmental departments, including the Board of Trade, the War Office and the Colonial Office. This indicates that Britain was closer to a more traditional cabinet collective responsibility system than it had been in the past.

This system had a considerable impact on how Britain conducted its foreign policy. Strategic concerns became less important in deciding policy, as it became a matter of trying to form compromises, on which all Cabinet Ministers could agree. These compromises were often hard to achieve, when each minister would oppose and veto the views of the others. This struggle was particularly evident when deciding which colony to give to the United States, as every option was dismissed by one department or another, leading to no colony being offered. A similar situation occurred when it came to decide which colonial territories should be claimed by the British Empire. With every governmental department, colonial administration and the Dominion Governments all pushing for different lands to be annexed, this led to Britain claiming more and more territory. Another effective example of how a cabinet collective responsibility system impacted on foreign policy revolved around plans for Russia and Persia. Churchill wanted Britain to become a bigger player in the Russian Civil War. However, this strategy was opposed by Curzon. In retaliation Churchill then opposed Curzon's plan to preserve British influence over Persia. This incidences prove that between 1919 and 1922, British foreign policy decision making had more to do with the egos and rivalries within the Cabinet, rather than any well thought out strategic plan.

Post Lloyd George Era, 1923-1929

This section will assess the role the Foreign Office played in deciding Britain's policy towards the German colonial question during the years 1923-1929. The events under investigation follow Lloyd George's fall from power in October 1922, resulting from his failed policy in Turkey culminating in the Chanak Crisis.[100] Historians such as Gilmour[101] and Dilks[102] have argued that Lloyd George's replacements as Prime Minister gave the Foreign Office a greater level of influence. In Bonar Law and Baldwin's case they were less interested in foreign policy, allowing their Foreign Secretaries more independence in international matters, including the European continent and the wider world. MacDonald in his first term held both the position of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, giving the permanent officials at the Foreign Office direct access to him. This allowed the department to have a greater level of influence as it could advise the Prime Minister directly.

The department's handling of the German colonial question, during 1923-1929, reveals that the previously mentioned historians were correct. However, they may have underestimated the level of influence the Foreign Office had gained. This thesis indicates that instead of only being one of several departments dealing with the German colonial question, the Foreign Office had become the dominant department. This demonstrates that the Foreign Office had begun to regain the position it had held during the Victorian and Edwardian eras. There are several indicators of the department's new found influence and each will be discussed in turn. First, the Foreign Office had the ability to dismiss and overrule opposition to their policies from other governmental departments. Second, the Foreign Office was the governmental department which received and analysed intelligence reports regarding the German colonial

[100] The Chanak Crisis was a political and military standoff between Lloyd George and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, leader of the Grand National Assembly, over control of the Dardanelles and Constantinople.
[101] David Gilmour, *Curzon* (John Murray, London, 1994) 592.
[102] D. Dilks in B.J.C McKercher and D.J Mass (edt), *Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy 1895-1939* (The University of Alberta Press, Alberta, 1984) 188.

question. Third, the Foreign Office officials could take action using their own initiative, without consulting the Prime Minister at that time, or other governmental departments. These three factors demonstrate the increasing influence the Foreign Office possessed, after Lloyd George was no longer Prime Minister. Additionally, this section will show that despite the department's increasing power, the good level of cooperation that existed between the Foreign Office and the other governmental departments concerning colonial matters, continued as it had during the previous years.

The first piece of evidence that the Foreign Office had gained influence after Lloyd George was no longer Prime Minister comes from its dominant position when dealing with other governmental departments regarding the German colonial question. Between 1919 and 1922, the Foreign Office had been one of several governmental departments within the cabinet collective responsibility system. Each department was competing for control and in many cases, could attempt to block each other's policies. By 1923, the level of influence had completely changed; the Foreign Office succeeded in securing the acceptance of its policies regarding the German colonial question, despite opposition from other governmental departments. Two effective examples demonstrate that influence. First was the Treasury's opposition to the Foreign Office's memorandum for the Imperial Conference of 1926. Second was the Colonial Office and the Dominion Office's opposition to Foreign Office policy regarding the Permanent Mandates Commission.

The first main piece of evidence comes from the memorandum written by the Foreign Office for the Imperial Conference in 1926. In the memorandum there was a warning referring to the seriousness of the German colonial campaign. The Treasury believed that the German colonial campaign was not a serious issue and that the Foreign Office was overreacting. This is clearly indicated in a letter from Otto Niemeyer, from the Treasury, to Lampson, dated 3

August 1926. [103] Niemeyer wrote, '[m]y belief….is that there is not much fire behind this smoke. I wonder if you are not fanning the feeble flame by taking it too seriously…[you] seem to me over-coloured and likely to excite rather than allay trouble.'[104] The Central Department completely dismissed the Treasury's comments. Troutbeck, later wrote, 'there seems no reason for toning them [the arguments] down.'[105] The rest of the Foreign Office agreed with the Central Department and continued with their policy of circulating their memorandum to the Imperial Conference. The memorandum had the following argument, 'the recovery of colonies has become the object of a vigorous propaganda campaign in Germany with which the German Government openly shows their sympathy….The campaign shows no sign of abating.'[106] The department's willingness to ignore the concerns of a major department such as the Treasury and to continue with its policies is a clear demonstration that the Foreign Office had regained much of its former influence.

The Foreign Office's dismissal of the concerns of the Treasury is not the only time the Foreign Office showed their ability to bypass opposition from other governmental departments. Further evidence can be seen in the fact that Chamberlain was able to get his, and the Foreign Office's policies, accepted despite objections from Cabinet Ministers. A successful example comes from the Foreign Office's opposition to Germany gaining a representative on the Permanent Mandates Commission, during 1926. The reason why the Foreign Office was so opposed to Germany joining that particular commission will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two. For the purposes of this chapter, it will be sufficient to say that the Foreign Office feared Germany would use membership of the

[103] Message from O. Niemeyer to M.W. Lampson, 3 August 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C8728/539/18.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Minute by Troutbeck 1926, 30th August 1926, TNA/FO371/11304/C9656/539/18.
[106] Memorandum respecting the German Claim for a Colonial Mandate, 14th September 1926, TNA/FO371/11304/C9656/539/18.

Permanent Mandates Commission to secure a mandate of its own.[107] Chamberlain wanted the representatives of the British Empire in the League of Nations to oppose German entry to the Permanent Mandates Commission, during the Imperial Conference of 1926. However, the Colonial Office did not have the same fear, in fact the department favoured Germany joining the commission.[108] The reason why the Colonial Office supported German membership is voiced best by Amery. He gave three reasons for his views; first he stated, '[a]s a critic of mandate administration Germany is likely to be less dangerous if represented on the Commission than if excluded from all participation.'[109] Second, he believed that the, 'Commission compromises among its members Nationals of the four other countries which have permanent seats on the Council of the League and it would be invidious to deny similar representation to Germany.'[110] Third, Amery argued, 'I assume that Lindequist [who he thought the German member would be] who is I presume the ex-Colonial Secretary is person of moderate views. If so, the present time may be opportune for his appointment since a future German Government might make a less acceptable selection.'[111]

This implies that the Colonial Office and Foreign Office were in direct opposition during the Imperial Conference of 1926. Amery wanted the conference to confirm the Colonial Office's policy regarding German membership of the Permanent Mandates Commission. For that purpose, the Colonial Office circulated a memorandum, entitled *Questions connected with the work of the Permanent Mandate Commission of the League of Nations*, to the Imperial Conference in order to argue its case.[112] Despite Amery's efforts, Chamberlain was able to force through the Foreign Office's policy regardless of the strong opposition. On 27 October

[107] Minutes by Hurst, 2 December 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C15503/2994/18.
[108] Minute by T.K. Lloyd, 22 September 1925, TNA/CO323/965/16, C.W. Dixon telegram to H.F. Batterbee, 22 September 1926, TNA/CO323/965/16.
[109] Telegram from Mr Amery to Lord Cecil, 27 September 1926, TNA/FO371/11876/W9166/56/98.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Colonial Office memorandum titled *Questions connected with the work of the Permanent Mandate Commission of the League of Nations*, October 1926, TNA/CO323/965/16.

1926, a meeting took place in the Foreign Office, as part of the Imperial Conference, which included Chamberlain and the premiers of Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand. During this meeting it was agreed that representatives of the British Empire in the League of Nations would oppose German entry into the Permanent Mandates Commission.[113]

Chamberlain was never in doubt regarding his ability, to ensure his policy was accepted at the Imperial Conference, even with Colonial Office's opposition. This is revealed in the Foreign Office documents recording the creation of the memorandum on the German colonial question discussed earlier. Before the Foreign Office circulated its memorandum at the Imperial Conference, the department contacted other government departments, including the Colonial Office and Treasury, to see if they would support its arguments. However, Chamberlain wanted his officials to make clear to those other governmental departments, that even if they opposed the arguments within the memorandum the Foreign Office would carry out its policy regardless. Chamberlain wrote, 'I should be glad of D.O. [Dominion Office] C.O. [Colonial Office] and Treasury concurrence, but I reserve my own right to circulate the memo [at the Imperial Conference] should that concurrence by any chance be refused.'[114] This demonstrates that Chamberlain, even before the Imperial Conference, was confident that opposition from other governmental departments would not prevent the Foreign Office carrying out its chosen polices.

Chamberlain's ability to push through his plan in 1926, despite resistance from within the Cabinet, is in complete contrast to what occurred to Curzon's Persian policy. Before 1923, the Foreign Office could not get its policies accepted if there was opposition within the Cabinet. By 1926, this was no longer the case, as the Foreign Office had the influence to push beyond such disagreement. This is a clear demonstration that the cabinet collective

[113] Minute by Cadogan, 28 October 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10170/59/98.
[114] Minute by Austen Chamberlain, 26 June 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7329/539/18

responsibility system which had been prevalent during Lloyd George's term as Prime Minister had faded. In fact, the Foreign Office was once again becoming the dominant department when dealing with foreign policy just as it had been before 1914.

Another part of the Foreign Office's growing influence, if not dominance, regarding the German colonial question, was that the department was able to decide which other governmental departments learnt about an issue. A good example of this comes from February 1929, during the controversy over the Hilton Young Commission regarding the creation of a British East African Dominion (this will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two).[115] The Foreign Office had learnt through Horace Rumbold, British Ambassador to Berlin from 1928 to 1933, of German opposition to the commission and Stresemann's request for more information on the subject.[116] There were discussions within the Central Department between Charles Howard Smith and Sargent, over whether the Colonial Office should be informed.[117] The decision was eventually made to update the Colonial Office.[118] However, this does not diminish the evidence that it was the Foreign Office's decision, whether or not information should be given to other governmental departments regarding the German colonial question.

This policy of ignoring opposition and deciding which information should be sent to other governmental departments appeared to work well for the Foreign Office. It was evident during 1929, when aspects of the German colonial question were discussed at Cabinet

[115] Hilton Young Commission was a commission into the management of British African colonies and mandates. The main proposal was to create a new East African Dominion by combining the British mandate of Tanganyika with Britain's colonies including Kenya. Germany strongly opposed the create of an East African Dominion as it would mean Tanganyika being permanently annexed by the British Empire.

[116] Message from Sir H. Rumbold, to Foreign Office, 4 February 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C969/43/18.

[117] Minute by Smith, 5 February 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C969/43/18, Minute by Sargent, 5 February 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C969/43/18.

[118] Message from C.H. Smith to Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, 7 February 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C969/43/18.

level.[119] In that year, there is no evidence that the Prime Minister or other Cabinet Ministers attempted to change the Foreign Office's policy. The Cabinet seemed in agreement with the policies and actions of the Foreign Office, allowing the personnel the independence to carry them out as the department saw fit.[120]

The second piece of evidence that indicates the Foreign Office had significant influence after 1922, was that the department received and analysed intelligence reports regarding the German colonial question. The Foreign Office received many secret reports regarding this issue from their informants and spies throughout the early interwar period. [121] These included reports from informants providing detailed information on the opinions of key members of the German Foreign Office. For example, the Foreign Office received various secret reports regarding German ambitions towards Angola.[122] This subject will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two. For the purposes of this chapter it will be sufficient to state that several members of the German Foreign Ministry, *Auswärtiges Amt*, believed Germany could use their opposition to the creation of a British East African Dominion as leverage for Britain to support Germany gaining Angola as a mandate. The Foreign Office received these reports, and the permanent officials in the department analysed them and decided whether any action was necessary.[123] With regard to the intelligence reports involving German desires towards Angola, Sargent analysed the information and concluded that the British did not need to act upon it.[124] Sargent believed that Germany's plan would fail, as the country had no way of forming high level opposition which could be considered a serious threat, to Britain's

[119] Minute by Lindsay, 26 March 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2284/43/18.
[120] Minute by Chamberlain, 26 March 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2284/43/18.
[121] Secret Report titled The German Colonial Question, 26 July 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C6076/43/18.
[122] Secret Report on German Colonial Policy, 30 March 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18, Secret report, 16 March 1927, TNA/FO371/12150/C2706/2706/18, Secret Report, 15 August 1928, TNA/FO371/12908/C6534/1069/18.
[123] Message from R.C. Lindsay to Howard Smith, 1 May 1928, TNA/FO371/12908/C3407/1069/18, Minute by Troutbeck, 17 March 1927, TNA/FO371/12150/C2706/2706/18.
[124] Minute by Sargent, 16 April 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18.

position in the East African Dominion.[125] Without that leverage there would be no reason for Britain to humour German desires on Angola.[126] With the assurance that these secret documents required no further action, the reports were not circulated up the chain of command, in accordance with the Foreign Office's standard procedure. Of course, other governmental departments would see some of these intelligence reports,[127] but it was the Foreign Office who was primarily responsible for analysing and distributing the information provided by Britain's intelligence network.[128] This meant that Britain's reaction to intelligence reports was dictated by the Foreign Office's views and beliefs on each subject.

The third and arguably most important evidence that the Foreign Office had gained significant influence was the ability of the department to carry out independent actions. Gilmour[129] and Dilks[130] argued that the Prime Ministers following 1922, allowed the Foreign Office to develop the foreign policy it desired. Curzon certainly believed that he had greater autonomy after 1922. When referring to the Imperial Conference of 1923, he said Baldwin, 'never opens his mouth and leaves the entire lead to me.'[131] Curzon would continue to write that Baldwin was doing nothing to interfere with foreign policy; when discussing negotiations with the French, Curzon stated that Baldwin had no more influence than his own 'butler.'[132] Curzon revelled in his new position remarking to his wife, Grace, 'I have suddenly been discovered at the age of 63. I was discovered when I was Viceroy of India from [age] 39 to 46. Then I was forgotten, traduced, buried, ignored. Now I have been dug up and people

[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.
[128] There is a need for a more focused research carried out on Britain's intelligence services during the early interwar period to discover how important it was in the decisions of the government.
[129] David Gilmour, *Curzon* (John Murray, London, 1994) 592.
[130] D. Dilks in B.J.C McKercher and D.J Mass (edt), *Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy 1895-1939* (The University of Alberta Press, Alberta, 1984) 188.
[131] Ibid 592.
[132] Ibid 592.

seem to find life and even merit in the corpse.'[133] Such a statement endorses the argument that the Foreign Office regained its former position, which had been weakened during Lloyd George's term as Prime Minister.

The Foreign Office's handling of the German colonial question supports Gilmour's, Dilks' and Curzon's interpretation that the Prime Ministers that came to power after October 1922, offered the department a much greater level of autonomy. There are no Foreign Office documents (recorded in The National Archives) which refer to the Prime Ministers voicing their opinions on this subject. The Foreign Office personnel neither consulted with them nor asked their permission; the department seems to have acted on its own initiative. However, the Prime Ministers could have talked directly with the Foreign Secretary or Foreign Office officials' informally. These discussions would not necessarily have been recorded in Foreign Office documents. If this was the case, there would have been the occasional mention by the permanent officials of the need to gain the Prime Minister's approval on the subject. There is no mention of this in any document regarding the German colonial question from 1923-1929.

An example of the Foreign Office not asking for the Prime Minister's permission and carrying out independent action comes from March 1923, involving an American professor. The Western, General and League of Nations Department became concerned regarding the actions of a German citizen named Herr R. Hauptmann[134] and Professor David Jordan from Stanford University. The Western, General and League of Nations Department received information from the Colonial Office, informing them that Hauptmann had been debating the case for the return of German colonies.[135] Hauptmann debated through a German propaganda leaflet entitled, *The German Colonies under the Mandates*, which had been given to many

[133] D. Gilmour, *Curzon* (John Murray, London, 1994) 558.
[134] His full name is not recorded.
[135] Message from G. Grindle to Under Secretary of State, 7 March 1923, TNA/FO371/9440/W1788/1788/98, Draft message from G. Grindle to Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 5 March 1923, TNA/CO323/916/8500.

members of the American elite. This propaganda leaflet had been able to gain some academic support from professors including Jordan. The British Colonial Office and the Foreign Office took this seriously. Gerald Villiers, Head of the Western, General and League of Nations Department, went as far as to request, 'discreet enquiries regarding the activities of Jordan.'[136] Those enquiries were carried out and completed by April 1923.[137] The enquiry into Jordan went into great detail, not just about his views but also who he socialised with, the list of places he had been and even what he did on holiday.[138] The enquiry concluded, '[w]hile admittedly pro-Japanese, he is not considered by his intimate friends to be pro-German, but the more casual observers credit him with German sympathies mainly because of his Pacifist utterances.'[139] The investigation into Jordan was eventually dropped when it became clear he was no threat to British interests. A permanent official (whose signature on the minute is unclear) simply commented, '[h]e doesn't sound very formidable.'[140]

In the wider historical context, the investigation into Jordan is not particularly important but it does show the ability of the permanent officials at the Foreign Office to take independent action. The Western, General and League of Nations Department set out to investigate, if not effectively spy on, an American professor. This happened immediately after they discovered what they considered to be, evidence that he was supporting German propaganda for the return of German colonies. There is no recorded conversation by the permanent officials ascertaining the Prime Minister's, or any other governmental departments', permission for the investigation. There is not even a recorded discussion to show they might have had an opinion on the subject. Instead, Villiers ordered the investigation on his own initiative[141] and

[136] Message from G.H. Villiers to Sir Auckland G. Geddes, 12 March 1923, TNA/FO371/9440/W1788/1788/98.
[137] Message from Sir A. Geddes to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 25 April 1923, TNA/FO371/9440/W3549/1788/98.
[138] Ibid.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Minute by signature unclear, 8 May 1923, TNA/FO371/9440/W3549/1788/98.
[141] Message from G.H. Villiers to Sir Auckland G. Geddes, 12 March 1923, TNA/FO371/9440/W1788/1788/98.

the report was handed back to the Foreign Office.[142] Nobody outside the Foreign Office appears to have been informed that any of these actions had taken place. This is a clear example of the Foreign Office personnel having the ability to act on their own authority during this time period.

There is further evidence that the Foreign Office could carry out its policies independently, with limited interference from the rest of the British Government. The main discussions, regarding German colonial ambitions outside of Europe and areas directly administered by the British Empire, took place within the Foreign Office. An example of this involves German activities in the Republic of China. The Foreign Office's response to German actions in China is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two. For the purposes of this chapter it will be sufficient to state that the department became concerned regarding the increase of German trade in China and the high number of military advisers in the country.[143] It was the permanent officials in the Far Eastern Department, who examined whether intervention was likely to succeed and what was the most appropriate course of action.[144] Similar discussions occurred when dealing with German action in Egypt[145] and Angola[146]. In each case, it was the permanent officials who decided Britain's course of action, with limited, if any input, from other governmental departments or the Prime Ministers.

Other governmental departments were well aware of the Foreign Office's independence, and were not always happy about it. Amery used to complain bitterly in his diaries about Curzon

[142] Message from Sir A. Geddes to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 25 April 1923, TNA/FO371/9440/W3549/1788/98.
[143] Message from Acting Consul-General Garstin to Austen Chamberlin, 6 April 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F1699/467/10, Minute by Toller, 21 January 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F467/467/10, Report written by Aiers, 5 February 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F1699/467/10, Message Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 24 May 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F2660/467/10.
[144] Minute by W.S. Toller, 21st January 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F467/467/10,Minute by E.H. Carr, 31st May 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F2660/467/10, Minute by C.E. Minns, 13th June 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F2873/467/10.
[145] Summary of a communication to D'Abernon referred to as .NO. 115, 23 December 1922, TNA/FO371/7740/E14384/1/16.
[146] Minute by Sargent, 17 April 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18, Minute by Villiers, 25 April 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18, Minute by Huxley , 10 May 1928, TNA/FO371/12908/C3407/1069/18.

after 1922, not informing the rest of the British Government what he was doing. For instance, he wrote a diary entry dated 19 October 1923, in which he described how angry he was because Curzon had invited the Americans to a conference on German reparations, without informing the Imperial Conference.[147]

This research clearly indicates that during the post-Lloyd George era, the Foreign Office had regained much of the influence it had previously lost. However, it is also important to note, that even though the Foreign Office did not necessarily require the Colonial Office's or the Dominion Office's assistance for its policies, it would often try to gain their support.[148] This demonstrates that even though the Foreign Office had regained its former pre-Lloyd George era position, it did not mean the end of the effective level of cooperation the department had formed with other governmental institutions. In fact, the harmonious collaboration with the Colonial Office[149] and the Dominions Office[150] is particularly evident and distinctly demonstrated when the department dealt with the German colonial question.

An example of this collaboration comes from how the governmental departments handled the German propaganda campaign. As the German colonial campaign increased its activities during 1923-1926, the Foreign Office became increasingly aware of a concerted propaganda effort. The purpose of this was to persuade public opinion in Germany and globally of the need for Germany to regain a colonial role (a subject discussed in more detail in Chapters Two, Four and Five). As a response there was a growing need for Britain to develop a counter narrative with two focal purposes. The first purpose was to oppose German arguments regarding their need for new colonies, and the second, to ensure no one was under any illusion that Britain would relinquish her mandates. To create this counter narrative the

[147] John Barnes and David Nicholson (editors), Introduction by Julian Amery, *The Leo Amery Diaries; Volume one 1896-1929*, (Hutchinson, London, 1980) 350.
[148] Minute by Sargent, 5 February 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C969/43/18.
[149] Message from G. Gaddes to Under Secretary of State, 24 March 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C4238/2994/18.
[150] Letter from C.W.Dixon to J.M. Troutbeck, 8 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4366/539/18.

Colonial Office would provide information and evidence,[151] which the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service could use to argue against those who supported the German propaganda campaign.[152] The Foreign Office was thankful for the support the Colonial Office provided, including giving Amery much of the credit for silencing the German colonial propaganda campaign.[153]

Further evidence of the Foreign Office cooperating with the Colonial Office, as well as the Dominion Office, comes from 1926, when they had to deal with Germany gaining a representative on the Permanent Mandates Commission. Despite the efforts of the British Government, Germany was given a seat on the commission. In response, the Foreign Office and the Dominion Office worked together in an attempt to handle the selection process.[154] For instance, once Germany had selected Ludwig Kastl, former head of the Financial Division in German South West Africa, as its representative the Colonial Office would report to the Foreign Office important information involving his actions during commission meetings.[155] In this way, the three departments strove to make sure Germany did not challenge Britain's mandates through the Permanent Mandates Commission.

The close collaboration between the departments did not eliminate occasional friction regarding certain subjects. Tyrrell, for instance, wrote '[t]he ways of the Colonial Office are beyond me'[156] and Chamberlain wrote, '[t]he D.O. [Dominion Office] never acts till the last

[151] Message from G. Gaddes to Under Secretary of State, 24 March 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C4238/2994/18, Memorandum called M*emorandum respecting Germany and her Colonies before the War*, 24 March 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C4238/2994/18.
[152] Message from G. Gaddes to Under Secretary of State, 24 March 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C4238/2994/18, Minute by Huxley , 25 March 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C4238/2994/18, Minute by Lampson, 27 March 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C4238/2994/18.
[153] Minute by Huxley, 19 June 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7069/539/18, Minute by Troutbeck , 3 July 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7422/539/18.
[154] Message from C.W. Dixon to A. Cadogan, 18 August 1927, TNA/FO371/12681/W8028/333/98, Minute written by Villiers, 25 August 1927, TNA/FO371/12681/W8028/333/98, Minute written by Chamberlain, 25 August 1927, TNA/FO371/12681/W8028/333/98.
[155] Report written by Lloyd, 19 November 1927, TNA/FO371/12681/W11640/333/98.
[156] Minute by Tyrrell, 6 July 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C8864/2994/18.

moment.'[157] Likewise, Amery would also, at times, criticise the Foreign Office and its Foreign Secretary. For instance, he mentioned in a diary entry, dated 30 October 1923, '[t]he trouble with Curzon is that his policy is purely static and argumentative and does not attempt to deal with the development of live forces.'[158] Overall, however, there was a good level of collaboration between the three departments, the Colonial Office, the Dominion Office and the Foreign Office, at least as far as the German colonial question was concerned. They all agreed on the significance of dealing effectively with the subject.[159] The beliefs of the Foreign Office and Colonial Office regarding colonial issues will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two.

This section of the chapter has assessed the role the Foreign Office played in deciding Britain's foreign policy, between the years 1923 and 1929, by analysing the department's reaction to the German colonial question. This research is in line with the existing historical literature argued by Gilmour and Dilks. With new evidence, this thesis endorses the argument that Lloyd George's successors as Prime Ministers were less interested in foreign policy, allowing their Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Office officials to obtain a greater level of autonomy.

There are several clear indicators of the department's new found influence regarding this issue. First, the Foreign Office had the authority to dismiss opposition to its policies from other governmental departments. Second, the Foreign Office was the governmental department which received and analysed intelligence reports regarding the German colonial question and distributed this information. Third, the Foreign Office could take action on its own authority without consulting the Prime Minister at that time, or other governmental

[157] Minute by Chamberlain, 22 October 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10170/59/98.
[158] John Barnes and David Nicholson (editors), Introduction by Julian Amery, *The Leo Amery Diaries; Volume one 1896-1929*, (Hutchinson, London, 1980) 353.
[159] Minute by Troutbeck, 1 September 1926, TNA/FO371/11304/C9246/539/18, Minute by Troutbeck 1926, 30 August 1926, TNA/FO371/11304/C9656/539/18.

departments. These three factors indicate that the Foreign Office had gained a large amount of influence following the downfall of Lloyd George.

The degree of influence the Foreign Office held over Britain's decision making towards the German colonial question between 1923 and 1929, is greater than what is considered normal in a cabinet collective responsibility system. The Foreign Office did not have to rely on support from other departments to carry out its policies. In fact, the officials would often dismiss any views which disagreed with their ideas. The Foreign Office also frequently acted on its own initiative with no discussion or recorded attempt to gain approval from the Prime Minister. The department's handling of the German colonial question signifies that the existing literature was correct when stating that the level of influence the Foreign Office possessed increased after Lloyd George was no longer Prime Minister. The Foreign Office was no longer acting as a single member of a cabinet collective responsibility system, instead, it was acting within a system closer to that utilised during the Victorian and Edwardian eras.

The Foreign Office became the dominant department within the British Government when dealing with the German colonial question. However, there was still a high level of cooperation between the Foreign Office, the Dominion Office and the Colonial Office on this subject. This is clearly indicated when the three departments were creating a counter narrative to the German colonial propaganda campaign. However, this does not mean that the Foreign Office did not show its frustration with the other governmental departments from time to time and vice versa.

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the role of the Foreign Office when dealing with the German colonial question, during the early interwar period between 1919 and1929. This is an important issue as it reveals two important aspects regarding the role of the Foreign Office.

First, it uncovers how the Foreign Office itself was structured and how the individual permanent officials operated within the department. Second, it indicates the fluctuating level of influence the department held within the British Government, throughout the early interwar period. This close examination improves the historical understanding of the British Government within a time period which up until now has received little historical attention.

The first aspect that this thesis presents revolves around how the Foreign Office itself operated and how its chain of command worked. On the surface, the structure of the Foreign Office would indicate that it had a rigid command hierarchy; at the top of the chain of command was the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and below that the Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Most of the permanent officials were divided up into departments, with clear areas of the world that they were responsible for, each with their own head of department. However, the Foreign Office's handling of the German colonial question discloses that its structure was far more flexible. Unlike most hierarchical institutions, the Foreign Office had more of a 'bottom up' system rather than 'top down.' The lowest ranking officials would receive the documents and messages connected to foreign matters, such as communications from embassies and decide whether it was worth circulating this information up the chain of command. In this way, the highest ranks only discussed the most important issues or topics that the lower ranking officials thought they ought to examine. This enabled the permanent officials to operate independently according to their judgement and views. They also had the freedom to communicate with their opposite representatives in other governmental departments using their own initiative. There was little micromanagement from the Foreign Secretary or Permanent Under Secretary. Therefore, the Foreign Office had a very flexible chain of command, which allowed a great deal of initiative to be shown by the lower ranks in juxtaposition to most hierarchical institutions, such as armies.

The second aspect identified in this thesis, examined the role of the department within the wider British Government. This chapter has shown that there was a major difference in the level of influence the Foreign Office held, depending on whether it was before or after Lloyd George was Prime Minister. Lloyd George wanted to play an active role in the Paris Peace Conference and in foreign policy towards Europe, leading to a decline in the Foreign Office's influence. The department retained the ability to advise the government on critical areas of the German colonial question. However, the Foreign Office was just one of many institutions with that role, including the Board of Trade, the War Office, the Colonial Office and the Dominion Governments.

This meant that between 1919 and 1922, the British Government had a functioning cabinet collective responsibility system, that played a major role in the way the British Government handled aspects of the German colonial question. For example, each department and Dominion Government could argue a case for the British Empire gaining a former German or Ottoman colony. As a result, Britain claimed more and more territory during the Paris Peace Conference. The cabinet collective responsibility system impacted even further on the government's overall decision making, when Cabinet Ministers blocked each other's views, leading to British policies formed on compromises and egos rather than strategic concerns. An exemplary case would be when Churchill helped block Curzon's Persian policy as revenge for Curzon preventing Britain being drawn into the Russian Civil War on the side of the anti-Bolsheviks.

The Foreign Office had a dramatic increase in its level of influence after Lloyd George resigned from his Prime Minister duties in October 1922. Due to the fact that the three Prime Ministers who replaced Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Baldwin and MacDonald, allowed their Foreign Secretaries a greater degree of independence. Such authority enabled the department's officials to act on their own initiative, without recorded consultations with the

Prime Minister or other governmental departments. More importantly, the Foreign Office had the authority to dismiss opposition from other governmental departments, when dealing with the German colonial question. The department also analysed information from Britain's intelligence network, deciding what action should be taken and who should be informed. The Foreign Office carried far more influence over the German colonial question than you would expect within a cabinet collective responsibility system. Unlike, during the Lloyd George era, the Foreign Office, between 1923 and 1929, held a position of influence closer to the role it had before 1914, when the department effectively controlled Britain's foreign policy. However, this increase in the Foreign Office's influence did not harm the close collaboration the Foreign Office held with other governmental departments.

Chapter Two

Traditional Views on Empire

On the 11 November 1918, Germany signed the armistice that formally acknowledged the defeat of the Central Powers and brought an end to the First World War. The permanent officials at the Foreign Office quickly recognized Britain's strong position following the decisive victory. Nicolson, a British diplomat who served in a junior capacity during the Paris Peace Conference, later wrote, '[i]t must be admitted that in those concluding weeks of 1918 the British Empire had cause for confidence.'[1] Nicolson expanded his thoughts, stating his belief that; '[t]he German fleet and armies were no longer a menace; already, and without opposition, the Allied forces had consolidated their bridge-head across the Rhine.'[2] He went further claiming that 'The Austro-Hungarian Empire had split into its component parts, and all that remained of that once formidable factor were two small republics: isolated, famished and disarmed.'[3] Nicolson's confidence in the British position was evident in his following statement; 'Bulgaria was no more than a corridor for the passage of our troops….The Ottoman Empire lay at our feet dismembered and impotent, its capital and Caliph at the mercy of our guns.'[4] Nicolson also displayed a supreme confidence in the position of the British Empire; '[t]he command of the seas was ours in undisputed possession; the German colonies had been occupied; all vital communications, all strategical points, were under our control….Triumphant in Europe and in Africa, we held the keys of Asia in our grasp.'[5] Nicolson concluded that, 'No victory has ever been so wide, so overwhelming, so unquestioned. We possessed physical supremacy such as had never been known since the

[1] Harold Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925*, (Constable & CO, London, 1934) 5.
[2] Ibid 3.
[3] Ibid 3.
[4] Ibid 3.
[5] Ibid 3.

days of Hadrian or Alexander. We seemed to be master of the world.'[6] Nicolson's confidence was representative of that displayed by the political leadership of the Foreign Office. On the 18 November 1918, Curzon stated the following in the House of Lords; '[t]he British flag has never flown over a more powerful or a more united empire.....Never did our voice count for more in the councils of nations; or in determining the future destinies of mankind.'[7]

The triumphant and imperialist pride in Curzon's and Nicolson's tone is demonstrative of a general character and attitude within the Foreign Office, and it is important to understand the traditional version of imperialism demonstrated by these statements. Domination of the seas, direct control of territory and the naked pursuit of hegemonic power all represent a traditionalist view of imperialism. Nicolson even compared the British Empire to the great Hellenic and Roman empires of antiquity, such views of empire would be those advocated during the Victorian or even the Georgian period. This traditionalist approach to imperialism suggests that Britain's imperial ideology had remained fundamentally the same after 1918, despite the First World War.

However, the view that Britain's imperial ideology had changed little in the years following the First World War is not one accepted by all historians. Callahan and Wright,[8] have long argued that the First World War was a watershed moment in European imperialism. Such historians argued, that there was a decline in support for imperialism across the continent and that there was a major ideological change within developed countries, including Britain. Callahan, Wright and Pedersen used the Mandate System as the evidence that there was a

[6] Ibid 4.
[7] Ibid 2.
[8] Brian Digre, Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa 1914-1931 (Book Review), *The International Journal of Africa: Historical Studies*, Volume 34, Issue 1, (January 2001), 216-218, Harold K. Jacobson, *Quincy Wright's Study of the Mandates System*, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 14, Issue 4, (December 1970), 499-503.

change in imperial ideology.[9] Their view, however, is challenged by Goldstein, Young and Darwin who argued Britain's faith in imperial ideology remained resolute, continuing to believe in the traditional interpretation of empires.[10]

This chapter will examine the reaction of the Foreign Office when dealing with the German colonial question, in order to further explore the debate. How the officials discussed the subject and the decisions they made will reveal much about their ideology. It will show that there was no change in the imperial ideology within the department, throughout the early interwar period (1919-1929). The permanent officials at the Foreign Office maintained the same conceptual view of empire as their Victorian predecessors; namely that empires involved direct control of territory and military domination (the views of the Victorians are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four). The department largely adhered to a traditional doctrine of imperialism. It was generally dismissive of viewpoints which prioritized economic dominance and political influence over direct territorial control and military supremacy.

Three key areas will be investigated involving the Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question to ascertain Britain's unchanging imperial ideology. The first regards the creation of the Mandate System as a successful attempt by the imperial powers to remove the authority of the League of Nations over the mandates. The second explores the department's determination to protect Britain's rule over her mandates and sphere of influence. The third is that the Foreign Office was uninterested in other forms of imperialism. These key areas will be examined in detail in order to argue the case that Britain did not change its imperial

[9] Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) 13, Michael D. Callahan, *Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931* (Sussex Academic Press Eastbourne, 1999) 188.

[10] J. W. Young, *Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century* (Arnold, London, 1997), J. Darwin, Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy between the Wars, *Historical Journal*, Volume. 23, Issue 3 (September 1980), 657-679, Erick Goldstein, *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) 150.

ideology. There will also be a fourth section, intended to widen the analysis and demonstrate that the Foreign Office was not alone in maintaining traditional views on imperialism, with the governments within the British Empire and most other European powers holding the same view.

The Foreign Office and the creation of the Mandate System

The traditional view alleged that the creation of the League of Nations was a move towards the internationalisation of foreign relations and that by extension, the Mandate System represented a fundamental change in imperial ideology. Instead of the victorious imperial powers dividing up the colonies of the Central Powers amongst themselves, those colonies would be given over to the authority of the League of Nations. The victors would play a reduced role, theoretically a temporary administrator.

As mentioned in the literature review, this was the core view put forward by Callahan, Wright and Pedersen. They argued that the Mandate System represented the changing nature of European imperialism.[11] This was due to the mandatory powers having to accept the authority of the League of Nations. Callahan believed, that the Permanent Mandates Commission allowed the League of Nations to have practical control over the mandates, preventing Britain, France and Japan turning them into more traditional colonies.[12] He provided examples of the commission's success, including preventing the British creating an East African Dominion and allowing German citizens to return to their former colonies. Callahan used these examples to conclude that, '[s]uch results demonstrated how mandates

[11] Michael D. Callahan, *Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931* (Sussex Academic Press, Eastbourne, 1999) 188, Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) 13.

[12] The Permanent Mandates Commission was established on 1 December 1920 and was an international body made up of both nations which received mandates and nations which did not. The commission was meant to oversee the running of the mandates and advise the League of Nations on the subject.

restricted imperial power and inspired more internationally-oriented colonial practices.'[13] Callahan's belief that the Permanent Mandates Commission could have a practical impact on running the Mandate System is supported by Wright who was convinced of the League of Nation's ability to check the mandatory powers.[14]

As explained in the literature review, Pedersen held a slightly different view to that expressed by Callahan. She believed the Mandate System was originally designed to be little more than an illusion, with mandates to be treated the same as any colony. The Permanent Mandates Commission had very little impact on the rule of the mandatory powers.[15] However, she believed that German entry into the commission, in 1926, completely changed the balance of power within the institution. Instead of it being controlled by the mandatory powers, Germany was able to challenge their authority over mandated territory.[16] She admitted that this would have limited influence on the ground. However, it forced the mandatory powers to at least pretend that they treated their mandated territories differently from their colonial lands.[17] This pretence undermined the right of empires to rule over their territories in whatever way they desired. Therefore, the Mandate System ended up forcing a change in imperial ideology, even if that was not the intention of its creators.

It is clear that Callahan, Wright and Pedersen strongly believed that the Mandate System represented a fundamental change in imperial ideology. However, this chapter challenges their views and demonstrates that the Mandate System represented no change in imperial beliefs, and that the League of Nations (through the Permanent Mandates Commission) held no practical authority over the mandates.

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[13] Michael D. Callahan, *Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931* (Sussex Academic Press, Eastbourne, 1999)189.
[14] Harold K. Jacobson, *Quincy Wright's Study of the Mandates System*, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 14, Issue 4, (December 1970), 499-503.
[15] Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) 12.
[16] Ibid 12.
[17] Ibid 4.

The Mandate System had been strongly advocated by the President of the United States of America, Woodrow Wilson,[18]during the Paris Peace Conference. Wilson wished to prevent the victorious Allies in general, but particularly the imperial powers, from annexing former German and Ottoman territory. There were three types of mandates: 'A', 'B' and 'C', all of whom were under the ultimate authority of the League of Nations. 'A' Mandates[19] were former Ottoman colonies in the Middle East assigned to France and Britain. Many of the 'A' Mandates were territories meant for Greece and Italy, but were ultimately retained by the newly created Republic of Turkey, following the Treaty of Lausanne, 1924. These mandates were meant to be largely self-governing territories with only minimum presence from the Mandatory Power.

'B' Mandates[20] were former German colonies in Africa allotted to France, Britain, Britain's Dominions, and Belgium. In 'B' Mandates the Mandatory Power administered the territory, but with protection for both the rights of native populations and the rights of other nations to trade inside the mandate.

'C' Mandates[21] were former German colonies in the Pacific and South West Africa; those in the northern hemisphere of the Pacific were given to Japan and those in the southern hemisphere and South West Africa were given to Britain and her Dominions. 'C' Mandates granted greater administrative control to the Mandatory Power than 'A' and 'B' Mandates.

A brief examination of the Mandate System seems to provide merit to the arguments put forward by Pedersen, Wright and Callahan. As the system, in theory, was a step away from colonisation, the imperial powers would have to accept that the League of Nations held

[18] Memorandum titled *Memorandum on the German Colonies*, 11 February 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C1733/539/18.
[19] There were three 'A' mandates; Syria was given to France while Britain received Palestine and Mesopotamia.
[20] There were 6 'B' mandates; Ruanda-Urundi went to Belgium, Britain received Tanganyika, British Cameroon and British Togoland. France got French Cameroon and French Togoland.
[21] There were 5 'C' mandates; Australia administrated New Guinea and Nauru, New Zealand administrated Samoa, South West Africa was administrated by South Africa and Japan received South Pacific Mandate.

ultimate authority over the mandates, rather than the administrating power. This represents a theoretical departure from the imperial ideology of the Victorian age. Prior to the twentieth century, there was generally very little challenge to the conventional wisdom that European powers had the right to seize unclaimed territory deemed to be uncivilized.

This chapter will show, however, that the long-established view regarding this subject is inaccurate. The Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question reveals that the department viewed Britain's new mandates as permanent additions to the British Empire. It will also show that the League of Nations was regarded as just another tool to advocate Britain's interests and ambitions. Therefore, the League of Nations and the Mandate System did not represent a change in imperial ideology. First, high ranking officials within the Foreign Office, from the start were sceptical of Wilson's ideas, regarding the Mandate System. This led the department to not only reject the authority of the League of Nations over mandates, but actively strive to minimise its role, by effectively turning the newly acquired mandates into colonies. Second, the Foreign Office naturally assumed other governments would have a similar policy in regards to the League of Nations, using it as a means of pursuing their imperial ambitions. This is indicated by the Foreign Office's fear that Germany would use the Permanent Mandates Commission to gain a mandate for itself. Both of these issues will be analysed in turn, beginning with the Foreign Office's views towards the creation of the Mandate System.

The two individuals who led the Foreign Office while the Mandate System was created, were Balfour and Curzon and both men voiced strong opposition to Wilson's ideas for the Mandate System. In 27 January 1919, Balfour sent a message to the Foreign Office informing the department that he had held a meeting with Wilson, during the Paris Peace Conference,

specifying his views on Wilson's ideas for the Mandate System.[22] Balfour was extremely negative in this message. First, he talked about Wilson's idea that the League of Nations should provide money to help develop the mandated territories. Balfour was not impressed by this idea, he wrote, 'I can hardly conceive a more difficult machine to work.'[23] Balfour also disagreed with the notion that the League of Nations should pay for the defence of the mandates. He said, 'I think the impossibility of such a plan will, on reflection, appear so obvious that I will not at the present stage waste time on superfluous demonstrations.'[24] The concept Balfour strongly opposed, was the idea that the Mandatory Power would not gain the rights to administrate the land permanently. Wilson wanted the native population to have the ability to change which empire governed them, if they felt they were being treated unfairly. Balfour believed this would lead to instability when he stated, '[a] moveable Mandatory might thus supply a perpetual incentive to agitation and intrigue.'[25] Balfour then went into detail about how non-permanent mandates would lead to future conflicts.[26] This document clearly indicates that Balfour was not a supporter of the Mandate System as designed by Wilson.

Balfour's scepticism for the Mandate System was matched by Curzon. On 5 December 1917, Curzon wrote a memorandum entitled, *German and Turkish Territories Captured in the War*.[27] In this memorandum, Curzon voiced strong opposition to the Mandate System, arguing that Britain should annex as many of the former German and Ottoman territories as possible, to provide greater security for Britain's empire and improve global stability.[28] In 1917, the Mandate System was a very new concept and had yet to receive its name; Curzon

[22] Message written by Balfour, 27 January 1919, TNA/FO608/242/1634/1/1/1154.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Memorandum written by Curzon, 5 December 1917, TBL/MSS/EUR/F/122/1831.
[28] Ibid.

refers to it as the internationalisation of territory.[29] Even though it was still early in the process, Curzon was aware that the internationalisation of territory meant that instead of Britain directly annexing former German and Ottoman lands, the territories would be overseen by a new international council or body.[30] Curzon believed that this would cause chaos. He wrote, 'I tremble at the contrast that will be presented between the areas that are ruled by a single Government, and the suggested muddle of conflicting interests and ambitions.'[31] He expanded his argument further when he stated, 'an international administration [of these territories] would….only be a nursery of international quarrel, and the prelude to greater disaster.'[32] Evidently, both Curzon and Balfour held strong misgivings regarding the Mandate System, as originally intended by Wilson.

Curzon and Balfour's views on the Mandate System were supported within the wider Foreign Office. This support is demonstrated in a minute created within the Foreign Office to advise Britain's delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, dated 27 February 1919. This minute argued, that enabling the League of Nations through the Permanent Mandates Commission to overrule the nations who administered the mandates, would make those lands unmanageable. It stated, '[t]he task of administrating Mesopotamia is going to be difficult enough in the new conditions. If, above the Arab Government or the advisors of the Mandatory Power, there is going to be a super Government….with powers not only of revision but of initiation, administration will be impossible.'[33] Additionally, the minute criticised another core principle of the Mandate System; that of preparing the native population to govern themselves without the oversight of an imperial power. The minute stated, 'in countries where we are letting….indigenous govern, in the hope that they will learn to govern, this mechanism is not

[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Minute by unknown, 27 February 1919, TNA/FO608/240/1614/3/3/2885.

only unnecessary but impracticable how should we have got on in Egypt or India….[with] such a system?'[34] The minute concluded with a recommendation to the British delegation, that the powers of the Permanent Mandates Commission should be greatly limited to areas that will not severally influence the governance of the mandated territories. It recommended, 'I suggest that the powers of the commission [Permanent Mandate Commission]….be strictly limited to matters of common interest, such as arms, slaves….[and] liquor traffics.'[35] This recommendation demonstrates that Balfour's and Curzon's opposition to Wilson's ideas for the Mandate System were not lone voices within the Foreign Office.

As Curzon and Balfour did not support the concept of the Mandate System, the Foreign Office did not recognise the authority of the League of Nations over former German and Ottoman lands. Instead, it regarded the mandates as permanent additions to the British Empire. This attitude revealed itself in two ways, first by ignoring any requests from the League of Nations and second, by resisting attempts from the Assembly or Council of the League of Nations to draft the Mandate Treaties.[36] Later in the chapter, the thesis will also demonstrate that it was not only the Foreign Office who aimed to restrict the authority of the League of Nations; the wider governments of Britain, France and Japan also supported this objective. Therefore, in practice, any real authority the League of Nations had over the mandates proved little more than an illusion.

The first indicator that the Foreign Office did not recognise the authority of the League of Nations is that the department actively ignored the League of Nations' requests and complaints regarding the Mandate System. By the middle of 1920, the League of Nations was

[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] The League of Nations had two major chambers, the Council and the Assembly. Membership of the Council was reserved for Great Powers, meaning the imperial powers of Britain, France and Japan could control most of its activities and make sure it did not threaten their interests. The Assembly was different, its membership was open to all the nations of the League of Nations; meaning the level of control the imperial powers could hold over it was greatly reduced.

becoming increasingly frustrated due to the lack of progress regarding the development of the Mandate Treaties. This is communicated by a number of messages and complaints sent to Britain from the League of Nations.

For instance, on 5 August 1920,[37] Quinones de Leon, President of the Council of the League of Nations, was frustrated about the constant delays in the process for creating the Mandate Treaties. He wrote, '[y]ou [British Government] will argue that the Treaty of Versailles having how been in force since the 10th January, 1920, [six month before this message was written] it is much to be desired that the application of the Mandatory….should be further delayed.'[38] Another example is a memorandum written by Eric Drummond, the Secretary General of the League of Nations, in July 1920.[39] Drummond threatened that the League of Nations would create its own treaties if the Principal Allied and Associated Powers failed do so.[40] Drummond sent a second complaint, this time addressed directly to Lloyd George, when he received no response to his memorandum from the British Government.[41]

The Foreign Office seems to have largely ignored these messages. During any discussions regarding this issue no formal minutes were written by the permanent officials. A few documents reference requests by the League of Nations, but they only do so in order to assess which pieces of information should or should not be shared. One such example of this limited information exchange concerns Herbert Malkin, Assistant Legal Adviser, when discussing the boundaries for 'B' and 'C' Mandates. Malkin advised that the only information regarding boundaries between the British and French zones of Togoland and Cameroon should be provided to the League of Nations, because they had already been decided in the previous

[37] Message from Quinones de Leon to Foreign Office, 5 August 1920, TNA/FO371/4767/C8136/154/18.
[38] Ibid.
[39]The memorandum written by the Secretary General is undated, however, there is a stamp which reveals that the Foreign Office received it on the 14 July 1920.
[40] Memorandum by the Secretary General of the League of Nations, undated, TNA/FO371/4766/C1300/154/18.
[41] Telegram from Drummond to Lloyd George, 1 December 1920, TNA/CAB24/116/12.

year. Malkin further wished to only pass on the information with the consent of the French Government.[42] What this example demonstrates is that the permanent officials at the Foreign Office only wished to grant the League of Nations a minimal amount of information. The threat from Drummond suggesting that the League of Nations would write the Mandate Treaties seems to have been entirely dismissed by the Foreign Office, as there is no evidence it was ever mentioned or discussed by any rank of officials.

Another piece of evidence indicating that the Foreign Office did not recognise the authority of the League of Nations was its determination to minimise the role of the Council and Assembly during the formation of the Mandate Treaties. The Council and the Assembly were intended to check and approve Mandate Treaties, to ensure that ultimate authority lay with the League of Nations, and not the governing powers. According to a memorandum by Drummond on 10 January 1920, it was decided that it was the, 'right and duty of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to select the Mandatory Power who should exercise authority on behalf of the League [of Nations] and to define the frontiers of the areas for which each of these Powers should be responsible.'[43] This implied that the Great Powers, especially Britain, France and Japan, decided which nation received a particular mandate and the allotted nation then wrote their own Mandate Treaty. This made a certain amount of sense as those colonial powers already had troops in the respective territories, making it more difficult for another country to receive that particular mandate. More importantly, these empires were the only ones with the officials and experts in significant numbers to write the treaties. However, it had one major drawback; it allowed the nations receiving the mandates to write Mandate Treaties which gave themselves, and not the League of Nations, ultimate authority over the mandate.

[42] Minute by Malkin, 8 October 1920, TNA/FO371/4767/C8136/154/18.
[43] Memorandum by the Secretary General of the League of Nations, undated, TNA/FO371/4766/C1300/154/18.

The Council and the Assembly were supposed to review the Mandate Treaties before they were ratified, but the Foreign Office was determined to deny those two institutions any chance to check the Mandate Treaties. Curzon led this desire within the Foreign Office. This desire is demonstrated within communications between the Foreign Office and Colonial Office on the subject. Unfortunately, most of these messages no longer survive, however, one remaining document reveals Curzon's views on this subject. In a message from the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office dated 1 April 1921, the Colonial Office voices its relief that Curzon will support its view that the League of Nations should not be allowed to make changes to the Mandate Treaties. The message states, 'the Secretary of State [for Colonial Affairs] concurs with the views expressed in your letter….He regards it as important not to concede to the Council of the League of Nations any right of revision of the draft mandate [treaties]….and is glad to see….that Earl Curzon of Kedleston is prepared to uphold this view.'[44] Curzon was supported by most, if not the entire department, on this issue. For instance, Malkin, in response to the League of Nations proposing a list of changes to 'B' Mandate Treaties in May 1925, argued that there was no reason why Britain should accept changes to British Mandate Treaties when the French would not. He wrote, 'there is no use inserting [changes]….in our mandate [treaties] if it is not put into theirs [French treaties].'[45] Charles Tufton, the Superintending Assistant Secretary of the Central European Department, held a similar opinion to that of Malkin. In a message to the Colonial Office, dated 3 June 1921, Tufton wrote, '[i]t would be useless to insert any such clause [a proposed change] in the British mandate [treaties] alone.[46] This statement reveals that Tufron, like Malkin, believed that there was no reason for Britain to accept alterations proposed by the League of Nations if the French would not. Other permanent officials within the Foreign Office also

[44] Message from H.J. Read to Under Secretary of State, 1 April 1921, TNA/FO371/5852/C6691/11/18.
[45] Minute by Malkin, 25 May 1921, TNA/FO371/5852/C10341/11/18.
[46] Message from Charles Tufton to the Secretary of the Cabinet, 3 June 1921, TNA/FO371/5852/C10341/11/18.

demonstrated the same belief that Britain should not allow the League of Nations to alter the Mandate Treaties in any meaningful way. Waterlow, argued, '[t]his administration….is far from conceding to the Council a general right of revision….a right, which His Majesty's Government would agree, should not be admitted.'[47] (For information on how the previously mentioned individuals fit into the department's structure view Appendix). There is no evidence that there were any opposing opinions within the department on this subject. The unity of the department on this issue clearly demonstrates that the Foreign Office did not recognise the authority of the League of Nations regarding mandated territories.

The commitment of the department to this view is demonstrated in November 1920, when the German Government made an official complaint to the League of Nations regarding the treatment of their former colonies within the Mandate System (a topic discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five).[48] One of their arguments was that the nations who were creating the Mandate System were deliberately writing Mandate Treaties, which gave the imperial powers authority over mandates and not the League of Nations. The response of the permanent officials at the Foreign Office to this memorandum, gave an insight into their thinking regarding the creation of the Mandate System. Waterlow, wrote, 'these contentions are in the main well-founded and cannot, I think, in fairness be denied….only on such conditions that it was possible to introduce the mandatory system at all.'[49] Waterlow was admitting that as far as the Foreign Office was concerned, the whole point of the Mandate System was that mandates were little more than colonies, with an illusion of the League of Nations' authority. None of the Principal Allied Powers would have agreed to anything different.

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[47] Message from S.P. Waterlow to Monsieur Le Comte de Saint Aulaire, 18 April 1921, TNA/FO371/5852/C7507/11/18.

[48] League of Nations document titled *The Responsibility of the League under Article 22 of the Covenant*, 22 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12585/154/18, Copy of the German Memorandum, 8 December 1920, TNA/CAB24/116/61

[49] Minute by Waterlow, 2 December 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12585/154/18.

The Foreign Office's desire to prevent the League of Nations redrafting the Mandate Treaties never met with much resistance. The Council, which only had representatives from the Great Powers, was dominated by Britain, France and Japan and therefore, would not mount any serious opposition. In theory, the Assembly should have posed a more serious threat, as it had members from every country within the League of Nations and therefore, the Great Powers control over it was much weaker than in the Council. Many of the individuals, including Simons,[50] put their faith in the Assembly to ensure that the Mandate Treaties imposed authority of the mandates to the League of Nations. However, even this institution failed to provide significant opposition, as any changes to the Mandate Treaties would require unanimous support from the members of the Assembly, enabling countries including Britain to easily veto any proposed changes.[51] With both the Assembly and the Council unable to change the Mandate Treaties, the mandatory powers were free to create treaties which gave themselves and not the League of Nations authority over the mandates.

If further evidence is required regarding the League of Nations' inability to prevent the imperial powers from writing Mandate Treaties which favoured themselves, then it is provided by how the draft treaties regarding 'A' Mandates were handled. The 'A' Mandates were meant to be almost independent regions, with the Mandatory Power providing an advisory and assisting role. When the British and French revealed their draft treaties for 'A' Mandates, the members of the Mandates Section of the Secretariat were, 'staggered by their terms.'[52] As far as the members were concerned, '[t]he terms of the Mandates are equivalent in their view not to "administration advice and assistance" but to control by the Mandatory

[50] League of Nations document titled *The Responsibility of the League under Article 22 of the Covenant*, 22 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12585/154/18.
[51] Minute by Malkin, 3 December 1920, FO371/4768/C14052/154/18.
[52] Memorandum titled, *Present Position on Mandates*, 10 December 1920, FO371/4768/C13748/154/18.

[Britain and France].'[53] Unfortunately, for the League of Nations, it had no pathway to change the treaties.

The refusal of the permanent officials at the Foreign Office, to recognise the League of Nations' authority over the mandates and the international institution's inability to change the Mandate Treaties, contradicts the arguments of Callahan. However, Callahan and Pedersen still have one other major argument in support of the idea that the Mandate System represented a change in imperial ideology. They believed that the Permanent Mandates Commission had a practical impact on the administration of the mandated territories, preventing them from becoming any other type of colonial land. This belief is also challenged by the research carried out for this thesis. This section of the chapter will show that as the Council and the Assembly could not rewrite the Mandate Treaties, the Permanent Mandates Commission could not influence how the mandates were governed.

The Permanent Mandates Commission struggled for influence from its conception, as the Mandate Treaties had given the nation administrating the mandate, authority over the territory not the commission. However, Callahan provided two examples of the commission being able to influence the administrating power into making a decision it would not have usually made. His first example referred to German citizens being allowed to return to their former colonies. However, the Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question reveals that this was not a victory for the commission; it was rather due to negotiations between Britain and Germany. As discussed in Chapter One, Britain had expelled German citizens from British mandates in 1920.[54] Throughout the early 1920s, the Germans would attempt to regain some form of presence in their colonies, but not use the Permanent

[53] Ibid.
[54] Message from Mr Woodhouse at Geneva to Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 9 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C11230/29/18.

Mandates Commission to achieve their objective.[55] Instead, actions were carried out by individual officials or citizens, most notably Ropp,[56] with little success (this will be explained in detail in Chapter Five). German citizens were only granted access to their former colonies due to the negotiations involving the Anglo-German Commercial Treaty. Originally, the treaty itself had little to do with the colonies and was intended to be a way of easing trade between Britain and Germany. However, in 1925, the German Government on a semi-official basis,[57] informed the Foreign Office that the treaty would struggle to be ratified in the Reichstag, 'their complaint was that His Majesty's Government had not applied the treaty to colonies and mandated territories without further formality and that German nationals were still excluded from certain mandated territories.'[58] After much negotiation, the treaty was eventually applied to Britain's colonies and mandates and most restrictions on Germany within the mandates were lifted. The Anglo-German Commercial Treaty was passed in the Reichstag in September 1925.[59] Therefore, it was the representatives of Britain and Germany negotiating with each other directly, which brought about the return of German citizens to their former colonies. The Permanent Mandates Commission had little, if any, influence on this issue.

Callahan's second example revolved around his belief that the Permanent Mandates Commission was able to block Britain merging her mandate of Tanganyika, with her other East African colonies, including Kenya, to form an East African Dominion. The British Government set up the Hilton Young Commission to examine the administration of British territory in East Africa and to forward advice on improvements. One of the possibilities the Hilton Young Commission examined was the creation of this new dominion. It was a

[55] Report written by Lloyd, 19 November 1927, TNA/FO371/12681/W11640/333/98.
[56] Letter from F. de Ropp to William Tyrrell, 15 November 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C15381/2994/18.
[57] Memorandum on German Colonies, 11 February 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C1733/539/18.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.

controversial subject, generating hostility within certain circles of the German elite. For many in Germany, the mandates were trusteeships which would eventually be returned to Germany.[60] An East African Dominion, however, would permanently incorporate the mandate into the British Empire, causing opposition from within the German elite, including Stresemann[61] and Heinrich Schnee, former Governor of German East Africa.[62] There were plans within the German *Auswärtiges Amt* to cause problems inside the League of Nations, to prevent Britain creating the East African Dominion.[63] It is important to note that the informant who passed on this intelligence information, did not state whether it was the Permanent Mandates Commission being used or other institutions within the League of Nations. The permanent officials at the Foreign Office, including Sargent[64] and Michael Huxley,[65] of the Central Department, were confident that the League of Nations could not be used to prevent the creation of the dominion. The Foreign Office's confidence was supported by Article 11 of the Mandate Treaties, which states that the Mandatory Power must inform the League of Nations of their proposals for the mandated territory, one year after they have carried out the said proposal.[66] In other words, the British could create their East African Dominion and then inform the League of Nations a year after its creation; when it would be too late for the League of Nations to object. However, in the end, the Hilton Young Commission recommended closer administration links between the mandate of Tanganyika with Britain's colonies, and did not support the creation of the new dominion. The Permanent Mandates Commission had played no role in that decision and, had the East African

[60] Message from R.C. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 6 February 1928, TNA/FO371/2907/C1069/1069/18.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Message from R.C. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 6 February 1928, TNA/FO371/2907/C1069/1069/18, Message R.C. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 15 February 1928,TNA/FO371/12907/C1275/1069/18.
[63] Secret Report on German Colonial Policy, 30 March 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18.
[64] Minute by Sargent, 17 April 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18.
[65] Minute by Huxley, 10 May 1928, TNA/FO371/12908/C3407/1069/18.
[66] Ibid.

Dominion been recommended, Article 11 of the Mandate Treaty would have prevented the Permanent Mandates Commission from blocking its formation.

This section of the chapter has revealed that Callahan was incorrect to argue that the Permanent Mandates Commission, provided a pivotal role for German citizens returning to former German colonies or prevented the creation of an East African Dominion. Likewise, the research for this thesis undermines the arguments provided by Pedersen. As discussed previously, Pedersen believed that Germany used the Permanent Mandates Commission to challenge the mandatory powers, forcing them to take the commission seriously.[67] However, the Foreign Office documents reveal a completely different story.

Kastl became the German member of the Commission during the fifth meeting of the forty sixth session of the Council of the League of Nations, 9 September 1927,[68] and instead of challenging the mandatory powers, he supported them. This is demonstrated in a communication from the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office, dated 19 November 1927, which stated '[e]veryone to whom I spoke on the subject agreed that Dr Kastl was, from the point of view of the mandatory powers, an excellent selection. He was in every way helpful to the British Accredited Representatives.'[69] After this report, the Foreign Office had no serious discussions regarding Germany's membership of the Permanent Mandates Commission. That is hugely important, because if Pedersen was correct and the German representative was regularly putting pressure on the mandatory powers through the commission, there would be Foreign Office documents regarding this issue. It would have been the Foreign Office's job to handle concerns regarding a German member on the Permanent Mandates Commission. There would have been discussions within the Foreign

[67] Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) 12.
[68] Extract of a minute of fifth meeting of the forty sixth session of the Council of the League of Nations, 9 September 1929, TNA/FO371/12681/W8720/333/98.
[69] Report written by J.L.K. Lloyd, 19 November 1927, TNA/FO371/12681/W11640/333/98.

Office regarding what damage could be caused by this situation and how to handle it. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four, the Foreign Office would often overreact to minor German errors in the League of Nations, including trivial matters such as using old German names when referring to British mandates.[70] The lack of Foreign Office documents regarding a 'troublesome' German representative is major evidence against Pedersen's arguments.

Before Germany joined the commission, the Foreign Office had been concerned regarding that issue, but for a completely different reason. The Foreign Office believed Germany would use the Permanent Mandates Commission to promote a mandate for itself. This is the last subject that requires analysis, before this thesis can categorically state that the commission could not have any practical influence on the running of the Mandate System. The reason for this is the fact that the Foreign Office's fears could be viewed as evidence that the commission did have power over the Mandate System. The reason why that is not the case can only be gained by closer examination of the subject.

The belief that Germany would use the Permanent Mandates Commission to gain a mandate was almost universally supported within the Foreign Office during 1925 and 1926. It was endorsed within the Central Department by John Perowne and Troutbeck.[71] Equally it was advocated within the Western, General and League of Nations department by individuals including Villiers, the Superintending Assistant Secretary,[72] Campbell[73] and specialists such as Hurst.[74] This belief was upheld in the very highest ranks of the Foreign Office, with Chamberlain[75] a committed supporter. Chamberlain would fight successfully to have opposition to German representation on the Permanent Mandates Commission accepted as

[70] Message from Charles Howard Smith to C.W. Dixon, 3 January 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C43/43/18.
[71] Minute written by Troutbeck, 25 November 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10779/59/98, Minute written by Perowne, 3 March 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C2994/2994/18.
[72] Message from G.H. Villiers to Sir Ronald Lindsay, 30 November 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10779/59/98.
[73] Minute written by Campbell, 23 September 1926, TNA/FO371/11876/W9037/56/98.
[74] Minute by Hurst, 2 December 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C15503/2994/18.
[75] Minute written by Chamberlain, 19 October 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10169/59/98.

policy for the British Empire at the Imperial Conference of 1926, despite disagreement from the Colonial Office and the Dominion Office.[76]

The reason why the officials at the Foreign Office were greatly concerned regarding German representation on the Permanent Mandates Commission during 1925 and 1926 is conveniently recorded in a minute written by Hurst, dated 2 December 1925. He wrote, '[t]here is no provision in the Covenant of the League which authorises the Council to subject to mandate territory other than ex-German and ex-Turkish possessions.'[77] The minute continued, 'Article 22, which is the only article in the Covenant dealing with mandates, is limited to colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which formally governed them.'[78] This implied that if any new mandates came into existence, new treaties would have to be created to cover them. The fear was that if Germany was part of the League of Nations, particularly the Permanent Mandates Commission, it, 'would be in a position to exercise her influence in the League to secure any such mandates for herself.'[79] The document stated two methods by which a new mandate might be created. The first was if a governing power was unable to maintain civil order in a colony, requiring another Mandatory Power to take over. The listed hypothetical example was if a Portuguese colony descended into anarchy and needed another nation-state to restore order.[80] The second method was if an existing Mandatory Power relinquished that mandate, requiring another Mandatory Power to take over governance.[81] It was the fear within the Foreign Office that Germany could cite either of these two methods to establish her own mandate, which led to them opposing German representation on the Permanent Mandates

[76] Telegram from Mr Amery to Lord Cecil, 27 September 1926, TNA/FO371/11876/W9166/56/98, Minute by Cadogan, 28 October 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10170/59/98.
[77] Minute by Hurst, 2 December 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C15503/2994/18.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.

Commission. In the end, Kastl, the German representative on the Permanent Mandates Commission, did not use the institution to push for a German mandate and as mentioned previously was very cooperative with the British.

Even though the fears within the Foreign Office towards a German member on the commission proved to be unfounded, that anxiety between 1925 and 1926, regarding this subject was genuine. However, this concern is not applicable to argue that the Permanent Mandates Commission or the League of Nations could impact on the administration of the mandated territory. This is because the Foreign Office did not fear Germany would use the commission to confiscate one of Britain's mandates, which would indicate some form of the League of Nations authority over the Mandate System. Instead, it was a concern that the commission could be used to gain new territories beyond the existing mandates, effectively using it as a tool for imperial ambitions. The fact that the Foreign Office saw the Permanent Mandates Commission as a tool for imperial ambitions, with the expectation that other nations would attempt to gain more colonial territory, is in itself an indication that imperial ideology had changed little since 1914.

In conclusion, this section of the chapter has revealed that Wright, Callahan and Pedersen were wrong to argue that the Mandate System represented a fundamental change in imperial ideology. The Foreign Office never accepted the League of Nations authority over the mandates. Instead, the department prevented the Assembly and Council of the League of Nations from making any changes to the Mandate Treaties, which handed all the influence to the imperial powers. Callahan's argument that the Permanent Mandates Commission could have a practical impact on the administration of the mandates has also proved inaccurate. The commission's role was negligible regarding the return of German citizens to former German colonies, as this was gained through direct negotiations between Britain and Germany. Additionally, the commission had little impact on whether or not the British created an East

African Dominion, as Article 11 of the Mandate Treaties allowed the British to create the new dominion and inform the League of Nations a year after its formation. This would have been too late for any opposition to be organised. The only fear that the Foreign Office possessed regarding the Permanent Mandates Commission, was that other nations would use it to forward their own imperial ambitions. This implied that on a legal document a mandate was something new, but from a practical point of view a mandate of the 1920s, was no different to a colony of the 1820s.

Determination to defend British rule over the Mandates and Sphere of Influence

The last section of the chapter analysed the arguments put forward by Callahan, Wright and Pedersen that the Mandate System represented a change in imperial ideology. Now the chapter will turn to the other side of the debate. Goldstein, Young and Darwin have argued that Britain's imperial policy after 1918, still revolved around securing colonies and defending the country's imperial interests, just as it had before 1914. Goldstein believed that securing Britain's imperial interests was of the highest priority during the Paris Peace Conference[82] and that, '[t]here is no reason to suggest why British policy should have been otherwise.'[83] Young commented that there was no loss of confidence in empire and imperial ideology within Britain.[84] Finally, Darwin argued that even though it is traditional to view the First World War as a great turning point in imperial history, there is little evidence of a decline in the support for empires in Europe before the Second World War.[85] These three historians argued that Britain believed in the importance of the empire and was determined to defend every inch of territory.

[82] Erik Goldstein, *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) 150.
[83] Ibid 286.
[84] John W Young, *Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century* (Arnold, London, 1997) 81.
[85] Darwin John, Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy between the Wars, *Historical Journal*, Volume. 23, Issue 3 (September, 1980), 657-679.

The Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question provides further evidence to reinforce the claims of Goldstein, Young and Darwin. The Foreign Office and the wider British Government had expanded the British Empire during the Paris Peace Conference. The department would continue to develop policies of imperial expansion; an example is Curzon's desire to bring Persia into the imperial fold.[86] Furthermore, the permanent officials at the Foreign Office continued to believe, after the First World War, that Britain's empire was a positive feature and populations around the world would want to join. For instance, Gerald Spicer, Senior Clerk and Superintending Under Secretary of the Russian Department, wrote, 'I fear we cannot hope to take into the British sphere all the people in the world who would doubtless like to enter it.'[87] Spicer was generally concerned that when the mandates were officially taken over by their respective powers, people in French controlled mandates would leave in large numbers and try to enter British colonies or mandates. He stated, '[i]t is to be hoped that the inhabitants of the Cameroon will not carry out their threat of leaving en masse for Nigeria in the probable event of the management of the creator part of that country being….[given] to the French.'[88] More importantly throughout the 1920s, the department was determined to keep the new lands gained through the Mandate System. This resolve to never relinquish British territory is further evidence that imperial attitudes within the department had not changed following the First World War.

This attitude is seen within all ranks of the department. The Central European Department, later renamed the Central Department, was the main department which dealt with issues regarding the German colonial question. It was highly vocal in defending Britain's imperial interests. One of the most outspoken members of the Central Department on this issue was Huxley. He described the idea of Germany regaining one of their former colonies as, 'talking

[86] G.H Bennett, *British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period, 1919-24* (St. Martin's Press, Basingstoke, 1995) 189.
[87] Minute by Gerald Spicer, 29 January 1919, TNA/FO608/215/9/1/1/955.
[88] Minute by Gerald Spicer, 20 January 1919, TNA/FO608/215/719/1/1/290

rubbish,'[89] and continually voiced opinions against a return of those colonies, chastising anyone who disagreed.[90] Huxley however, was not alone in this view; most, if not all, of the Central Department shared that view. Perowne for instance wrote, 'return to Germany of her overseas possessions. There can surely be no idea of this.'[91] The two heads of the Central Department, Sargent and Lampson, supported their subordinates in their determination to never relinquish territory. Lampson's opinion is demonstrated in January 1926, at the time he vented his frustration when individuals in the French Parliament had stated that Britain might return a mandate to Germany. Lampson believed there could not be, 'even any doubt about our attitude on this subject.'[92] Sargent's determination to never hand over territory is revealed in April 1928, when he supported the Colonial Office argument that British rule in East Africa should never appear weak to deter German ambitions there.[93]

The Central Department was well supported in its determination to prevent any challenge to Britain's mandates or sphere of influence. The members of the Western, General and League of Nations Department had a similar mind-set. Campbell voiced strong opposition to Germany gaining a seat on the Permanent Mandate Commission (a possible first step for Germany regaining a colony in the form of a mandate). He wrote: '[i]f the Germans have no mandate….it would be absurd that they should be represented on the [Permanent] Mandate Commission.'[94] Ivone Kirkpatrick agreed, stating, '[t]he Germans are greatly mistaken if they think that membership of the Commission is a step towards getting a mandate.'[95] The head of the department, Villiers, was equally opposed to Britain giving back territory and even went

[89] Minute by Huxley, 16 October 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C12672/2994/18.
[90] Minute written by Huxley, 8 May 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C6145/2994/18, Minute by Huxley, 8 June 1926,TNA/FO371/11303/C6291/539/18, Minute by Huxley, 6 August 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C8671/539/18.
[91] Minute by Perowne, 21 February 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C1275/1069/18.
[92] Minute written by Lampson, 1 January 1926, TNA/FO371/10756/C16526/2994/18.
[93] Minute by Sargent, 17 April 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18.
[94] Minute written by Campbell, 14 October 1924, TNA/FO371/9821/C15519/2072/18.
[95] Ibid.

as far as ordering "discreet investigations" into an American professor just in case he supported the German campaign.[96]

It was a similar state of affairs within the Eastern Department, which strongly opposed German interference in Persia. George Churchill believed that German actions were, 'rather suspicious.'[97] While Lancelot Oliphant went as far as refusing a German request to set up a German school in Tehran.[98] Even permanent officials within the Foreign Office, who were not part of any particular department, shared their colleagues' commitment to defending British imperial interests. As mentioned in Chapter One, Headlam-Morley and Hurst, respectively Historical and Legal Advisors, played a major role in the creation of the memorandum regarding the German colonial question. It was designed to persuade the Imperial Conference to support the Foreign Office's opposition to Germany joining the Permanent Mandates Commission.[99]

The determination within the lower and mid ranks of the Foreign Office to defend Britain's imperial interests was supported by the very highest positions in the department. The Permanent Under Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs during this time period were Hardinge, Crowe, Tyrrell and Lindsay and they voiced their determination not to surrender any of Britain's mandates or sphere of influence. When responding to reports that the German Colonial Congress had argued the case for Germany to regain her lost colonies, in an attempt to pressure the German Government, Crowe completely dismissed their view as 'Incorrigibly Foolish.'[100] Tyrrell had a slightly more complicated history when it comes to this subject. This is because for a brief period, he fell under the influence of Frederick de

[96] Message from G.H. Villiers to Sir Auckland G. Geddes, 12 March 1923, TNA/FO371/9440/W1788/1788/98.
[97] Minute by Sir George Percy Churchill, 8th August 1923, TNA/FO371/9046/E8017/2745/34.
[98] Minute wrote by Oliphant, undated, TNA/FO371/9046/E2745/2745/34, Minute wrote by Oliphant, 22 March 1923, TNA/FO371/9046/E3033/2745/34.
[99] Document called German Colonies, undated but in 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C746/539/18, Minute by Troutbeck, 15 February 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C1733/539/18.
[100] Minute written by Crowe, 30 September 1924, TNA/FO371/9845/C15131/10167/18.

Ropp, and actually supported Germany regaining some form of colonial role (this will be discussed later in the chapter). Once that action had been rejected by the Foreign Office, Tyrrell fully supported the opposition to Germany regaining a colony. He wrote to Robert Crewe-Milnes, British Ambassador to Paris, to remind the French of Britain's policy of never giving back to Germany one of her mandates. [101] Lindsay, like his colleagues in the Eastern Department, was concerned regarding Germany gaining a presence in Persia when we wrote, '[this] may turn into something serious in years to come.'[102]

The views of the Permanent Under Secretaries were more than matched by the Foreign Secretaries, most notably Curzon and Chamberlain. As already mentioned, Curzon demonstrated ambitions towards Persia and he was not tolerant of Germany interfering within the country. In response to reports that the German Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran opposed British interests in the kingdom, Curzon sent a rather hostile message to D'Abernon, informing the ambassador that he must stress to the German Government that, '[should] such actions continue, His Majesty's Government may have to reconsider their whole attitude towards Germany.'[103] Chamberlain was even more antagonistic to Germany regaining a colonial role than Curzon. He argued, 'His Majesty's Government cannot contemplate for a moment the possibility of returning to Germany now or any time her former colonial possessions, or any part of them.' [104] Therefore, there was a consistent determination within all ranks of the Foreign Office to defend Britain's control over its mandated territories.

Of course, inside a department with as many individuals as the Foreign Office, there could never be complete uniformity when it comes to opinions and beliefs and on this issue, as with many others, there were differing opinions. However, on this subject there was no civilised

[101] Letter from William Tyrrell to Lord Crewe, 8 January 1926, TNA/FO371/10756/C16526/2994/18.
[102] Minute by Ronald C. Lindsay, 8th August 1923, TNA/FO371/9046/E8017/2745/34.
[103] Message from Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord D'Abernon, 23rd November 1921, TNA/FO371/6417/E12608/76/34.
[104] Message from Austen Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon, 21st May 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C6145/2994/18.

debate or discussion. Anyone who voiced an opinion in favour of relinquishing British territory, however minor the loss, was immediately rejected and ridiculed to the extent that most in the department would be reluctant to voice such an opinion.

The first example of the Foreign Office dismissing views which supported Britain handing over territory comes from none other than the head of the department, the Permanent Under Secretary. Tyrrell briefly around November 1925, fell under the influence of Ropp (Ropp's role in the German colonial campaign will be discussed in Chapter Five). He even sent a letter to Samuel Wilson of the Colonial Office to see how far the Colonial Office was willing to support Ropp's desire for Germany to regain a colonial role.[105] Tyrrell's actions were met with a firm rejection by the permanent officials in the Central Department. Huxley stated that, 'whatever impression the Baron may have gathered of the attitude of the Colonial Office, the last thing they wish is to encourage the German side to continue.'[106] Lampson went further writing 'he [Ropp] should receive no encouragement whatsoever.'[107] After this rejection, Tyrrell largely gave up on his support for Ropp; he never brought up the subject again, and followed the department's traditional view. It was clear that the permanent officials at the Foreign Office were not willing to accept any suggestion of Britain giving up territory, even if it came from their own Permanent Under Secretary. If the permanent officials in the department were willing to block the views of someone of a high rank, it then becomes plausible that anyone in the lower ranks would not have dared to challenge the established view on this subject.

A further example, of the Foreign Office rejecting ideas which differed from the established view of defending Britain's territories, was the strong, bordering on hostile, reaction of the

[105] Letter from William Tyrrell to Sir Samuel H. Wilson, 30th November 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C14881/2994/18.
[106] Minutes written by Michael Heathorn Huxley , 23rd November 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C14881/2994/18.
[107] Minutes written by Miles Wedderburn Lampson, 25th November 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C14881/2994/18.

department to D'Abernon. He was not selected to the Ambassadorial post by the Foreign Office, as for most Ambassadors, but was instead chosen by Lloyd George. This meant he was often not respected by the wider Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service. This lack of respect is clearly demonstrated when he started to voice support for Britain returning her mandates to Germany.

The first instance of D'Abernon trying to persuade the Foreign Office of the wisdom of giving up territory came in June 1924. D'Abernon was not acting alone as he was supported by Joseph Addison, the highest ranking official at the British Embassy in Berlin. They wrote to MacDonald that, '[f]rom the point of view of relations between England and Germany, and more particularly of English influence on German policy, it always appeared to me that German oversea colonies and oversea interests….really increase for her the importance of friendship with England.'[108] The reason given was, 'that any German oversea possessions would be largely under the control of England's sea-power, and would increase the desire of Germany to remain on good terms with us.'[109] The document then stated that, '[s]o long as there is no idea of a revival of the German navy, I should regard the establishment of German colonies as a guarantee of good behaviour and as a favourable element in the general political position.'[110] At the time these views were ridiculed by Crowe, who commented, '[i]t is altogether absurd for D' Abernon to entertain…. [these] ideas. I hope he keeps them to himself.'[111]

D'Abernon was undeterred by the dismissal of his views in 1924, and tried again on 7 May 1925.[112] He was probably taking advantage of the fact that Tyrrell had recently replaced Crowe as the Permanent Under Secretary of State, and that Chamberlain had only just

[108] Message from Lord D'Abernon to Mr MacDonald, 26 June 1924, TNA/FO371/9845/C10167/10167/18.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Minute written by Crowe, 27 June 1924, TNA/FO371/9845/C10167/10167/18.
[112] Message from Lord D'Abernon to Austen Chamberlain, 7 May 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C6145/2994/18.

become Foreign Secretary. D'Abernon's argument was very similar to the one used in 1924, but this time he also added that the colonial possessions which Britain had gained from Germany, 'prove their insignificant actual value to-day.'[113] He claimed that as the colonial possessions gained from Germany were of so little value, keeping them was not worth the expense and giving them back to Germany would not provide Germany with a major advantage. Unfortunately for D'Abernon, his views were once again received in a very negative way by the permanent officials at the Foreign Office. Huxley led the criticism of D'Abernon's arguments, when we wrote, 'he [D' Abernon] [is] entitled to his opinion, but if he thinks that he is….[expressing] an axiom of British policy, that is, as would be, a dangerous misconception.'[114] Lampson agreed with Huxley that they should leave D'Abernon with no illusions that his views were shared by the permanent officials at the Foreign Office.[115]

The real hostility however, came from Chamberlain who sent a reply to D'Abernon with the statement, 'I do not know whether it was your Lordship's intention to raise one of the most controversial questions which existed in the past between this country and Germany, but, the question being raised….I think it necessary to acquaint you with the views of His Majesty's Government…for fear of any misapprehension arising in the mind of the German Government.'[116] Chamberlain went on to state that, 'His Majesty's Government cannot contemplate for a moment the possibility of returning to Germany now or any time her former colonial possessions, or any part of them.'[117] Then he gave clear instructions to D'Abernon that if, '[s]uch an agitation is a bad accompaniment of the past discussion, and your Lordship should not hesitate to let the views of His Majesty's Government on the

[113] Ibid.
[114] Minute written by Huxley, 8 May 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C6145/2994/18.
[115] Minute written Lampson, 15 May 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C6145/2994/18.
[116] Message from Austen Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon, 21 May 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C6145/2994/18.
[117] Ibid.

subject be known in unequivocal language to those whom they may concern.'[118] The hostility Chamberlain showed towards D'Abernon following the latter's support for Germany regaining a colonial role continued throughout D'Abernon's tenure as British Ambassador to Berlin. There are several examples of Chamberlain voicing his frustration at D'Abernon regarding this subject, during 1926.[119] However, an effective example arose in January 1926, when he complained that, 'I wish that there were some indication that Lord D'A[bernon] remembered his instructions not to allow anyone to be under the impression that….[we are] going to surrender our mandates to Germany.'[120] This statement reveals Chamberlain's frustration with D'Abernon and his belief that he was not carrying out his instructions to prevent people in Germany from believing Britain would return mandate territory. Chamberlain either thought that D'Abernon was not capable of carrying out that order or was deliberately ignoring them.

What makes the dismissal of D'Abernon's views so illuminating is not just the fact that his ideas were rejected, but the tone and language used in the process. Crowe wrote that his opinions were absurd and should be kept to himself, while Chamberlain talked as if D'Abernon could not follow simple instructions and needed reminders about the details of British foreign policy. This is not the language of individuals partaking in a civilised discussion regarding policy with a respected Ambassador. Instead, it is as if they are talking down to a child whose views are beyond contempt. The lack of respect given to D'Abernon would certainly have put other individuals off from voicing a similar opinion. Risking their views being received in the same way, would certainly have damaged any future promotional chances. With few individuals willing to voice contradictory opinions, the Foreign Office remained committed to defending every inch of British territory.

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[118] Ibid.
[119] Message from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon, 24 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4596/539/18.
[120] Minute written by Chamberlain, 1 February 1926, TNA/FO371/11248/C1154/6/18.

The conviction within the Foreign Office that Britain should never surrender any part of the British Empire, had a major impact on the actions of the department. Within British Government, the Foreign Office dismissed any arguments forwarded by individuals who believed in relinquishing aspects of the British Empire, and pushed back against those policies. For instance, Philip Snowden, a prominent Labour politician who would become Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1929, wrote an article in *The Nation,* in July 1926, advocating that Germany should have a colony, now a British mandate, restored to her.[121] This argument was ridiculed in the Central Department with Huxley writing, 'Mr Snowden's heart is probably in the right place, but it may well be doubted whether his head….is as happily situated.'[122] Ridiculing the opinion of a member of the House of Commons was one thing, but the Foreign Office would do the same to Cabinet Ministers. In June 1926, Huxley stated, 'Chancellor of the Exchequer [Winston Churchill]….said that in his opinion Germany ought to have colonies because they were "a hostage to Sea Power".'[123] Churchill's argument was that if Germany gained a colony, the country would be vulnerable to British naval power and would therefore be forced to have good relations with Britain. This argument was completely dismissed by Huxley[124] and Tyrrell.[125] The latter, also sent a news article to Churchill to enlighten him on why his views were incorrect.[126] In this way, the Foreign Office prevented any real political movement developing within Britain, which would risk returning any mandates to Germany.

The Foreign Office's determination to defend Britain's imperial interests also had an impact on how the department reacted to German actions outside of Europe. The Foreign Office was

[121] Message from British Library of Information in New York to Foreign Office, 23 July 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C8671/539/18.
[122] Minute by Huxley, 6 August 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C8671/539/18.
[123] Minute by Huxley , 8 June 1926,TNA/FO371/11303/C6291/539/18.
[124] Ibid.
[125] Minute by Tyrrell, 11 June 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C6291/539/18.
[126] Minute by Tyrrell, 11 June 1926,TNA/FO371/11303/C6291/539/18, Message from British Library of Information in New York, 22 May 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C6291/539/18, Letter from N. Bland to P.J. Grigg, 12 June 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C6291/539/18.

committed to never giving Germany back any of its former colonies. It held this view from when the department dismissed Germany as a possible Mandatory Power[127] in 1920,[128] to the controversy regarding the actions of Herr von Kühlmann[129] in 1929[130] (Kühlmann's actions will be describe in detail in Chapter Four). As part of this determination, the Foreign Office developed several schemes and plans to counter any attempt by Germany to strive for a return of their colonies. This included regularly informing foreign governments that Britain would never give up any mandate.[131] Another method involved working closely with the Colonial Office and the Dominion Office, in an attempt to create a counter-narrative to the German propaganda campaign.[132] One of the more extreme methods was spying on foreign citizens they believed to be supportive of the previously mentioned campaign; most notably an American professor called Jordan.[133] One of the more ingenious schemes was to use Italy's desire for a mandate to block Germany. Italy was one of the Allied Powers not to receive a mandate during the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, causing resentment within the Italian Government.[134] Italy would never tolerate Germany gaining a mandate before Italy was given one. Therefore, the Foreign Office planned to use Italy to block Germany, if the latter brought

[127] Walter Simons, German Foreign Minister, sent an official complaint to the League of Nations from his government about the way in which the former German colonies were being divided up by the imperial powers. Within the complaint was an argument for Germany to be given back a former colony as a mandate. This was completely dismissed by the Foreign Office.

[128] League of Nations document titled *The Responsibility of the League under Article 22 of the Covenant*, 22 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12585/154/18, Minute by Waterlow, 2 December 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12585/154/18, Minute by Crowe, 2 December 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12585/154/18.

[129] Kühlmann used his position as an unofficial observer during the meetings of the Reparations Experts Committee to try and gain support for Germany regaining a colony. This should have been a minor event as he was acting on his own without support from his government. However, the Foreign Office turned it into a major controversy with discussions on the subject being discussed within Cabinet.

[130] Minute by Perowne, 26 March 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2284/43/18, Message from Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 4 April 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2541/43/18, Minute by Chamberlain, 26 March 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2284/43/18.

[131] Message from Austen Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon, 21 May 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C6145/2994/18, Message from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon, 24 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4596/539/18, Letter from W Tyrrell to the Marquess of Crewe, 8 January 1926, TNA/FO371/10756/C16526/2994/18.

[132] Message from G. Gaddes to Under Secretary of State, 24 March 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C4238/2994/18, Minute by Lampson, 27 March 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C4238/2994/18.

[133] Message from G.H. Villiers to Sir Auckland G. Geddes, 12 March 1923, TNA/FO371/9440/W1788/1788/98, Message from Sir A. Geddes to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 25 April 1923, TNA/FO371/9440/W3549/1788/98.

[134] Message from Marquees of Crewe to Austen Chamberlain, 30 November 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C15301/2994/18.

up the question of mandates.[135] These actions represent a clear determination on behalf of the Foreign Office to prevent Germany regaining any of her former colonies.

The permanent officials in the Foreign Office were not just hostile to any German attempt to regain her lost colonies, but were equally antagonistic to Germany gaining authority in Britain's sphere of influence, including within Persia and China. The Germans could never, even if they had wanted to, challenge Britain's dominant position within Persia. However, the Foreign Office reacted strongly against even the slightest provocation, probably because Persia was of special interest to the Foreign Office during Curzon's time as Foreign Secretary, 1919-1924.[136] In September 1921, the Foreign Office wanted to ban seventy-three Germans from entering Persia. This decision was made even more drastic as the department decided to ban these individuals in response to a German offer of friendship. D' Abernon in a message, dated 31 August 1921, informed the Foreign Office that he had held a conversation with Friedrich Rosen, German Foreign Minister from May 1921 to October 1921, during which Rosen stated, 'essential object of German policy was to establish relations of confidence with England and he would not allow any other consideration to interfere with this.'[137] Waterlow advised that while Germany had a pro-British Foreign Minister, it would be an opportune time to expel those on what he described as the 'black list.'[138] He was supported by Lindsay, Oliphant and Crowe. [139] The Foreign Office also refused to allow a German school to be reopened in Tehran[140] during 1923. Curzon even threatened 'to

[135] Minute written by Huxley, 30 November 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C15301/2994/18.
[136] G.H Bennett, *British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period, 1919-24* (St. Martin's Press, Basingstoke, 1995) 189.
[137] Dispatch from Lord D' Abernon to Foreign Office, 31 August 1921, TNA/FO371/5974/C17374/416/18.
[138] Minute by Waterlow, 2 September 1921, TNA/FO371/5974/C17374/416/18.
[139], Minute by Lindsay, 3 September 1921, TNA/FO371/5974/C17374/416/18,Minute by Oliphant, 7 September 1921, TNA/FO371/5974/C17374/416/18, Minute by Crowe, 16 September 1921, TNA/FO371/5974/C17374/416/18.
[140] Telegram from Sir P. Loraine to Foreign Office, 13 March 1923, TNA/FO371/9046/E2745/2745/34, Telegram from Foreign Office to Sir P. Loraine, 17 March 1923, TNA/FO371/9046/E2745/2745/34, Telegram from Sir P. Loraine to Foreign Office, 20 March 1923, TNA/FO371/9046/E3033/2745/34, Telegram from Foreign Office to Sir P. Loraine, 26 March 1923, TNA/FO371/9046/E3033/2745/34, Message from Sir P.

reconsider their whole attitude towards Germany'[141] in response to the German Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran interfering with contract prospects of British oil companies in Persia in November 1921. This clearly demonstrates the Foreign Office's determination to defend every part of Britain's sphere of influence. Despite the fact that Germany could have never threatened Britain's position in Persia, the department still prevented them from having a role in the kingdom.

The Foreign Office acted similarly when dealing with a situation in China. Throughout 1929, the Foreign Office received reports regarding increases in German trade[142] and the arrival of German military advisers in China.[143] German activity within China was usually reported to the Far Eastern Department from Britain's intelligence network and other forms of secret sources.[144] The permanent officials in the Foreign Office were greatly concerned regarding this increase of German influence in China.[145] This led to Francis Aveling, a member of the British Diplomatic Service in Peking, to form an official protest regarding German activities to Herr von Erdmannsdorff, the German Chargé d'Affaires.[146] The Foreign Office's hostility towards the German activity led Erdmannsdorff to deny any wrong doing on behalf of the German Government. He claimed that these actions in China were carried out by individual

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Loraine to Foreign Office, 29 March 1923, TNA/FO371/9046/E4714/2745/34, Message from Sir P. Loraine to Foreign Office, 12 May 1923, TNA/FO371/9046/E6344/2745/34,Message from Lancelot Oliphant to J. Addison, 22 June 1923, TNA/FO371/9046/E6344/2745/34, Message from D'Abernon to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 3 August 1923, TNA/FO371/9046/E8017/2745/34, Minute wrote by Churchill, 14 March 1923, TNA/FO371/9046/E2745/2745/34, Minute wrote by Churchill, 21 March 1923, TNA/FO371/9046/E3033/2745/34, Minute wrote by Oliphant, undated, TNA/FO371/9046/E2745/2745/34, Minute wrote by Oliphant, 22 March 1923, TNA/FO371/9046/E3033/2745/34.

[141] Message from Curzon of Kedleston to Lord D'Abernon, 23 November 1921, TNA/FO371/6417/E12608/76/34.

[142] Message from Acting Consul-General Garstin to Austen Chamberlin, 6 April 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F1699/467/10.

[143] Minute by Toller, 21 January 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F467/467/10, Report written by Aiers, 5 February 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F1699/467/10, Message Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 24 May 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F2660/467/10.

[144] Minute by Toller, 21 January 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F467/467/10.

[145] Minute by Carr, 31 May 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F2660/467/10.

[146] Confidential Memorandum by Aveling, 5 April 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F2873/467/10.

Germans acting on their own initiative.[147] This was met with a great deal of suspicion in the Far Eastern Department.[148] The Foreign Office's mistrust towards German actions in China, combined with the department's hostility towards German interference in Persia, demonstrate that the permanent officials within the Foreign Office were determined to defend Britain's sphere of influence.

This section of the chapter has clearly shown that the Foreign Office of the early interwar period was just as opposed to the concept of surrendering territory, as during the Victorian and Edwardian eras. However, before moving on to the conclusion of this section, it is important to define clearly the Foreign Office's mind-set during this time in regards to Germany's colonial ambitions. The previous evidence of the Foreign Office's determination to defend Britain's colonial territories could be misinterpreted as demonstrating that the department wanted to prevent Germany regaining its position as a colonial power. Therefore, the final piece of evidence provided for this section of the chapter will show that the Foreign Office's opposition was not due to an ideological objection towards Germany regaining its status as an imperial power. Instead, it was due to a desire to defend the British Empire. The Foreign Office's belief in the concept of empires allowed it to accept other nations trying to create empires, as long as those empires did not threaten Britain's imperial interests.

The Foreign Office held a more relaxed attitude towards Germany regaining a form of imperial role, if Britain's interests were not directly threatened. This is validated by the department's reaction to German ambitions towards Angola. The Foreign Office received reports throughout the 1920s, that Germany possessed desires to rebuild her colonial empire within that part of Africa. The Foreign Office received intelligence reports that leading German officials were discussing the possibility of the Portuguese colony of Angola

[147] Ibid.
[148] Minute by C.E. Minns, 13 June 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F2873/467/10.

becoming a German mandate.[149] The German plan was to use the threat of opposition to the creation of a British East African Dominion as leverage, in order to gain Britain's support for Angola becoming a German mandate.[150] However, even though the Foreign Office was aware of German imperial ambitions towards Angola, the department did not react with the same level of hostility that it did towards any German ambitions which directly impacted on British colonies. In regards to Angola, the department was split, with Villiers actually supporting Germany gaining Angola. He wrote, '[i]t would be to the great good of the whole world if Germany could….[gain] Angola.'[151] While others, including Lindsay, did not see Germany gaining Angola as a major concern, he stated, 'I do not see why we should exert ourselves more than we have to in order to keep the Germans out of Angola.'[152] Only the most anti-German members of the Foreign Office, including Sargent[153] and Chamberlain[154] opposed Germany gaining Angola. That Angola was a Portuguese colony and the Portuguese Republic being an ally of Britain may have also influenced their thinking. The reaction of the Foreign Office to German ambitions towards Angola signifies that the motivation to block German colonial ambitions was not driven by any ideological opposition to Germany regaining its status as an imperial power. Instead, the department was driven by a desire to defend Britain's imperial interests, and when these were not directly threatened, the Foreign Office's objection to German requests became less extreme.

In conclusion, this section of the chapter has shown that the culture of the Foreign Office was to defend every inch of the British Empire; the concept of surrendering territories was not a subject the permanent officials would entertain. The department was unified in preventing any German attempt to regain a mandate or gain a foothold within Britain's sphere of

[149] Secret Report on German Colonial Policy, 30 March 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Minute by Villiers, 25 April 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18.
[152] Message from R.C. Lindsay to Howard Smith, 1 May 1928, TNA/FO371/12908/C3407/1069/18.
[153] Minute by Sargent, 11 May 1928, TNA/FO371/12908/C3407/1069/18.
[154] Ibid.

influence. If officials, regardless if they were a low ranking member or in a high position such as an Ambassador or Permanent Under Secretary, voiced a contradictory opinion, they were ridiculed and had their ideas rejected. This reaction implied that few people would have voiced opposing viewpoints and therefore, the department remained committed to defending every inch of British territory. This attitude had a considerable impact on the policies of the Foreign Office, leading them to dismiss any arguments made within the British Government that Britain should give up territory. The mind-set also influenced how the Foreign Office responded to German actions outside of Europe. The department was hostile to any interference within Britain's sphere of influence no matter how minor the transgression. The Foreign Office's determination to defend Britain's colonial interests is further evidence that imperial ideology had changed little following the First World War.

The Foreign Office's lack of interest in other forms of Imperialism

This chapter has argued the case that there was no fundamental change within the ideology of the Foreign Office towards the concept of empires following the First World War. It has shown that the Mandate System, which was created to enable a major shift in policy, was completely overridden by the imperial powers. Therefore, this represented no change in imperial ideology. It has also indicated that the Foreign Office of the 1920s, was just as opposed to the concept of yielding territory as the department during the Victorian and Edwardian eras. There is, however, one last piece of evidence to consider, in order to confirm that the department kept its traditional view on imperialism after the First World War, and that is the lack of interest in other forms of imperialism.

The views of the Foreign Office towards imperialism and empires were similar to most European and non-European empires throughout history. The mind-set of personnel revolved around colonies and direct military and political control over territory. Securing trade routes

and economic resources were of course important to these empires, but they would attempt to gain them through colonies. There are, however, other versions of imperialism which gain influence through economic power, either through trade or investment. It could be argued, to a certain extent, that the modern United States of America and the historical Serene Republic of Venice used this version of imperialism. However, there is little evidence that the British Foreign Office would accept these views of imperialism. This is revealed in the department's reaction to German influence in China, and German trade in the Persian Gulf and South America.

Earlier in this chapter, it was argued that the Foreign Office reacted with a great level of hostility towards Germany, attempting to gain political and military influence in the Middle East. If the Foreign Office believed in the economic version of imperialism, there would have been the same reaction to Germany building up their trading presence in the area. This, however, was not the case; the officials demonstrated less concern in regard to German trade in the region. The Foreign Office kept regular reports on German activities regarding trade with countries such as the Kingdom of Egypt[155] and Persia,[156] but they took no action to interfere with that trade. When documents arrived at the department, regarding this issue, the permanent officials barely discussed the subject, leaving few, if any, minutes on the relevant documents.

The relaxed attitude of the Foreign Office towards German trade in the Persian Gulf, as a single example, does not prove that the department did not focus on the economic versions of imperialism. There could be several different reasons why the Foreign Office demonstrated less concern regarding German trade in the region, including complete confidence in their own trading dominance. There is evidence to support this view. During May 1924, in

[155] Message from L.B.S. Larkins to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 11 December 1923, TNA/FO371/10029/E122/122/16.
[156] Message from R.H. Hadon to Foreign Office, 18 January 1924, TNA/FO371/10151/E1687/1687/34.

response to German and American shipping companies trying to compete with British companies in Persia, George Churchill, Eastern Department, stated that Britain's, 'competitors in the Persian Gulf have….a long road to travel before they can get abreast of us.'[157] If this was the only piece of evidence available, it could be dismissed by arguing that the Foreign Office's lack of concern regarding German actions in the Persian Gulf was due to overconfidence. However, there is further evidence of the Foreign Office's lack of interest in non-colonial versions of imperialism.

This further piece of evidence regards the Foreign Office's reaction to German ambitions in South America. The Foreign Office received several reports of the growing influence of Germany, both politically and economically, within South America.[158] It was argued that Germany was trying to replace its lost colonial territories in Africa and the West Pacific with new trade and influence in South America.[159] This was carried out through economic actions such as trade, but also through political influence, migration and military advisers.[160] Britain did have economic interests in South America and a certain amount of political influence on the continent. However, the Foreign Office seemed less concerned about protecting it, even though their position on the continent was less secure than in the Persian Gulf. Most reports regarding German actions within South America were not considered important by the permanent officials at the Foreign Office. This is indicated by the fact that when reports did arrive on this subject, the lower ranks would just sign to say they had read them but little else.[161] Even though the German presence in South America was greater than in other parts of the world and Britain's weaker, the Foreign Office seemed unconcerned.

[157] Minute by Churchill, 4 May 1924, TNA/FO371/10151/ E3892/1687/34.
[158] Dispatch from Lord D' Abernon to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 9 August 1921, TNA/FO371/5974/C10299/416/18.
[159] Ibid.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Signatures attached to document, 13 August 1921, TNA/FO371/5974/C10299/416/18.

The evidence indicating unconcerned Foreign Office officials, regarding the German presence in South America is supported by the existing literature. Goldstein revealed that during the preparations for the Paris Peace Conference, the British Government spent little time on Latin America. Gilmour argued that Curzon had no interest in South America and considered their countries, 'undistinguished and undistinguishable, even in their vices.'[162] This was very different to the Americans who spent a lot of time preparing for issues regarding that continent.[163] Taken on its own it could be argued that this merely is an indication of the Foreign Office's general lack of interest in South America. However, when analysed with other evidence, it is far more likely that the Foreign Office was not as concerned about protecting economic assets as they were with the defence of areas they militarily or politically controlled. Considering political or military control more important than economic influence is a major indication that the Foreign Office held a traditional view of imperialism.

Another aspect of the Foreign Office's reports regarding German activity in South America which is of interest, is how the department referred to German population centres. There was a growing German migrant community in South America, which had existed long before the First World War. Over time, the Germans had developed communities supported by German traders and advisers; economic, political and military. These population centres increased German presence in South America, but the communities lacked any governmental and administrative oversight from Germany. Therefore, they were still under the sovereignty of the host South American nation. However, whenever the Foreign Office or Diplomatic Service referred to these communities, they called them colonies even though they were not.

[162] David Gilmour, *Curzon* (John Murray, London, 1994) 513.
[163] Erik Goldstein, *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) 186.

There are references to the German colony in Southern Chile,[164] with further documents referring to the German colony of Santiago[165] and the German colony in the Valdivia district;[166] both these named sites are within Chile. There is also reference to a German colony in Bolivia.[167] These references are important, as labelling these population centres colonies rather than German communities, indicates that the Foreign Office saw the world through a colonialist lens, confirming that views had changed little following the First World War.

The final and most important piece of evidence indicating that the Foreign Office held a traditional view on empires, regards the department's reaction to growing German influence and trade in China. In the decades before the First World War, the Chinese had suffered several major military defeats at the hands of various imperial powers.[168] This led to several one-sided treaties which provided the imperial powers with special trading and political rights in key territories and ports in China.[169] These treaties were a source of great resentment within the Chinese population. Following the war, Germany lost this special status within China as punishment for defeat in the First World War. However by 1929, the Foreign Office received reports regarding increases in German trade[170] and the arrival of German military advisers in China.[171] A report from Lampson now British Minister in Peking, commented on the possibility that the loss of Germany's special treaty status, actually allowed Germany to

[164] Message from Mr Bateman to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 22 November 1922, TNA/FO371/8699/C1918/203/18.
[165] Message from Mr Bateman to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 5 October 1922, TNA/FO371/7539/C15787/752/18.
[166] Ibid.
[167] Message from Mr Huckin to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 30 January 1923, TNA/FO371/8699/C4605/203/18.
[168] These defeats included the First Opium War, 1839-1842, the Second Opium War, 1856-1860, and the Boxer Rebellions, 1899-1901.
[169] Message from Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 24 May 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F2581/467/10.
[170] Message from Acting Consul-General Garstin to Austen Chamberlin, 6 April 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F1699/467/10.
[171] Minute by Toller, 21 January 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F467/467/10, Report written by Aiers, 5 February 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F1699/467/10, Message Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 24 May 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F2660/467/10.

increase trade with China, as it permitted them to win over Chinese public support.[172] Several of the permanent officials actually supported this idea, including Frank Ashton-Gwatkin of the Eastern Department.[173]

It would have made sense, when the officials voiced their opinions that Germany had actually benefitted from losing its special status treaty, that discussions would have followed concerning Britain also giving up those rights. However, there is no evidence to indicate that there were any discussions or arguments offered from any rank of officials, suggesting that if Germany could prosper from losing its previous treaty rights in China, then Britain might also benefit. Even Ashton-Gwatkin did not discuss the subject. This reveals much about the Foreign Office's ideology. It demonstrates that the department was determined to defend Britain's position, regardless of whether the situation was providing a positive or negative economic consequence. It also reveals much about the priorities of the department. The permanent officials decided to ignore possible economic benefits in favour of direct political and military control. In other words, the Foreign Office was sticking to its traditional view on empires.

In conclusion, this section of the chapter has provided further evidence that the ideology of the Foreign Office had not changed following the end of the First World War. It has shown that the department was committed to the traditional view on empires, focusing on political and military control of colonies to gain economic assets. The department was less concerned with other forms of imperialism, including the use of economic dominance to gain political influence in other countries. The evidence for this comes in several forms; the first regards German trade in the Persian Gulf. When Germany tried to gain a small political or military

[172] Message from Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 24 May 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F2581/467/10.
[173] Minute by Ashton-Gwatkin, 23 April 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F1699/467/10.

influence in Persia the department responded with a high level of hostility. However, when Germany began to increase trade in the Persian Gulf, the Foreign Office was less concerned.

The second piece of evidence refers to German ambitions in South America. German population centres were always referred to as colonies by the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service, clearly indicating that the people who worked inside those departments saw the world through a colonialist lens. More interestingly, Britain had economic interests in South America but the Foreign Office did not seem to be overly concerned regarding German influence on the continent. Certainly, the department did not react with the same rigour to defend economic assets in South America, as it did with more traditional colonies in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.

The last and most important evidence comes from the reaction of the Foreign Office to growing German trade in China. Following the First World War, Germany was stripped of its special treaty rights in China, but instead of German trade declining, it actually increased. This was due to the fact that the Chinese population detested the treaty rights, so Germany operating without them, actually won support from the local population. Several individuals within the Foreign Office, including Ashton-Gwatkin, recognised the gains Germany had made following the loss of its treaty rights. However, there were no discussions involving Britain giving up treaty rights, indicating that the permanent officials at the Foreign Office were determined to defend Britain's political and military control over a region, even at the cost of economic benefits. This implies that the department had kept its traditional views on empires following the end of the First World War.

Support for Foreign Office imperial ideology in other governmental departments and other national governments

This chapter has revealed that the ideology of the Foreign Office on empires had changed little following the First World War. This evidence is a complete contradiction to historians such as Callahan, Pedersen and Wright who argued that the Great War represented a watershed in imperial ideology. The final section of this chapter will examine this historical argument further, indicating that imperialism remained the dominant political ideology within the British Government and other Great Powers. This view has a strong level of support from several historians, including Young and Goldstein, who argued that imperialism remained a dominant ideology within the British Government.[174] Darwin believed that there was no decline in imperial ideology in Europe after the First World War.[175] Even though this argument is already a well-researched topic, the Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question still provides fresh evidence to authenticate the arguments of Goldstein, Young and Darwin.

With regard to imperial ideology, the Foreign Office was not alone within the British Government and wider empire in preserving its traditional view on imperialism. Most of Britain's institutions and leaders voiced strong support for the concept of colonialism and protecting both Britain's territories and sphere of influence. The Colonial Office held many similar views to the Foreign Office regarding this subject. This is particularly true during Amery's time as Colonial Secretary, November 1924-June 1929. Amery was just as committed to keep the mandates under British rule as any Foreign Secretary. At dinners in 1925 and 1926, Amery made it clear that Britain would never return a mandate to

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[174] Erick Goldstein, *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) 150.
[175] John Darwin, Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy between the Wars, *Historical Journal*, Volume. 23, Issue. 3 (September 1980), 657-679.

Germany.[176] Amery's views received a large amount of support from the Foreign Office. Huxley wrote, 'these statements of Mr Amery's ought to be a good dose of cold water for the German colonial propagandists.'[177] Troutbeck was similarly pleased with Amery when he stated, 'Mr Amery's speech has raised a storm.'[178]

Amery may have been the most vocal Colonial Secretary in supporting imperial ideology but he was by no means original; his predecessor Winston Churchill was a big supporter of the Foreign Office's attempts to remove any League of Nations authority over the mandates. This is indicated in a message from the Colonial Office to the Cabinet Office, in 25 May 1921. It stated, 'Churchill….does not desire that the British Members on the Council of the League of Nations should be instructed to press for the adoption of any of the amendments [to the Mandate Treaties].'[179] In general, the Colonial Office held very similar views on imperialism to the Foreign Office. For example, the department strongly advocated that British rule in East Africa should never appear weak.[180] Their similar views led to close cooperation between the two departments on many issues, especially regarding the German colonial question and most notably when opposing the German colonial propaganda campaign[181] (as discussed in detail in Chapter One).

Imperialism as an ideology was alive and well within both the Foreign Office and Colonial Office, but it was also common within the governmental structure of the British Empire. The Dominion Governments were completely convinced of the positive impact of imperialism. Australia, New Zealand and South Africa all received mandates to administer and believed, like the Foreign Office, that the British Empire and not the League of Nations should hold

[176] Minute by Huxley, 19 June 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7069/539/18, no author given, A United East Africa; Mr. Amery on Recent Progress, *The Times*, 12 June 1926.
[177] Minute by Michael Heathorn Huxley , 19 June 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7069/539/18.
[178] Minute by John Monro Troutbeck , 3 July 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7422/539/18.
[179] Copy of a message from the Colonial Office to Cabinet Office, 25 May 1921, TNA/FO371/5852/C11108/11/18.
[180] Minute by Sargent, 17 April 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18.
[181] Message from G. Gaddes to Under Secretary of State, 24 March 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C4238/2994/18.

ultimate authority over these territories. For instance, Henry Forster, the Governor General of the Commonwealth of Australia, stated, '[t]he Assembly of the League [of Nations]….has neither the authority nor right to modify mandates in any way and Commonwealth Government hopes this view will be most strongly supported by Empire [British and Dominion] delegates.'[182] Equally similar to the Foreign Office, the Dominion Governments considered the mandates as permanent additions to the British Empire and were determined never to return them to Germany. For instance, Sydney Buxton, Governor General of South Africa, sent a telegram to the Colonial Office, dated 28 January 1919, stating his view that, 'under no circumstances whatever should the territories known as German East Africa and German South West Africa be returned to Germany….That the territory known as German South West Africa should in future form portion of Union of South Africa.'[183]

Even Lloyd George, a man who had many disagreements with the Foreign Office between 1919 and 1922, shared the department's views on imperialism. Most notably, he supported the view that the imperial powers and not the League of Nations should hold the authority over the mandates. This is indicated when John Rees, the Conservative Member of Parliament for Nottingham East, asked a Parliamentary Question which stated, '[d]o the Great Powers submit mandates to the League of Nations? Is submission the real attitude?'[184] Lloyd George responded, 'The Great Powers are on the League of Nations, and they are only submitting to themselves.'[185] What Lloyd George pointed out was that even though the Great Powers, Britain, France and Japan, were submitting authority of their mandates to the League of Nations, they were the ones controlling the League of Nations. Therefore, the Great Powers were handing authority from themselves back to themselves.

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[182] Telegram from Governor General of Commonwealth of Australia to Secretary of State for Colonies, 15 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4767/C11633/154/18.
[183] Telegram from Governor General of the Union of South Africa to Secretary State for Colonies, 28 January 1919, TNA/FO608/148/481/1/1/1895.
[184] Parliamentary Question Cutting, undated, TNA/FO371/4766/C2407/154/18.
[185] Ibid.

There is overwhelming evidence that imperial ideology remained a leading mind-set within the British Government and that those views had changed little since 1914. This can be extended to the wider world to demonstrate that imperialism remained dominant between 1919 and 1929. Darwin voiced this argument strongly, by pointing out that during the years following the end of the First World War if a nation was able to escape the control of one imperial power it would end up falling under another one.[186] Darwin's research is extensive and provides a convincing argument, supporting the continuation of imperial ideology. However, it can be further supported from the new evidence provided by this thesis.

For example, Darwin argued that France continued to show vigour and combativeness in its support of imperial ideology and this was demonstrated in Morocco and Syria.[187] The research into the Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question provides new evidence to reinforce Darwin's claim that France continued to possess a strong commitment to the concept of empire. For example, this research demonstrates that the French Government, like the British, was completely opposed to yielding any of its mandates. For instance, Léon Perrier, French Minister for the Colonies October 1925, stated, 'the Government had never entertained for a moment any idea of selling one of the Colonies, and that it was quite impossible to contemplate any such proposal.'[188] Importantly, this research reveals that France was even more determined than the British Foreign Office to drive out the League of Nations from any part of the Mandate System. The French Government was still thinking of turning France's share of Togoland and Cameroon into colonies, rather than mandates, as late as July 1920. This is demonstrated when Philippe Berthelot, Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attempted to bring up the subject during the gathering of the

[186] John Darwin, Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy between the Wars, *Historical Journal*, Volume. 23, Issue 3 (September 1980), 657-679.
[187] Ibid.
[188] Message from Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlin, 21 December 1925, TNA/FO371/10756/C16692/2994/18.

Supreme War Council at the Spa Conference July 1920.[189] Another example comes from April 1921, when the French Government questioned whether there was any need to give the Council of the League of Nations a chance to review the Mandate Treaties.

As mentioned previously, the British Foreign Office did not believe that the League of Nations should have authority over mandated territory. The department actively prevented the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations from having any meaningful role over the creation of the Mandate Treaties. However, the department still sought to continue the façade that the League of Nations approved the Mandate Treaties. The French Government desired to take the next step and deny the League of Nations even the right to look at the Mandate Treaties and give its stamp of approval. This is revealed in a message from Waterlow to de Beaupoil dated 18 April 1921. The message stated, 'as regards the first point raised in this memorandum [a previous message sent from the French Ambassador to the British Foreign Office]-His Majesty's Government find it difficult to modify the opinion already conveyed to Your Excellency.'[190] It then went on to describe the previously mentioned response mentioning, '[t]he Terms of Article 22 of the Covenant [the article of the covenant of the League of Nations with created the Mandate System] are indeed on this point obscure and, literally interpreted, might in the event of the principal allied powers having agreed among themselves as to the mandates [treaties], justify the powers not submitting the mandates [treaties] to the Council of the League at all. The allied powers, however, have decided not to stand upon the letter of Article 22, but to act according to its spirit and have accordingly submitted draft mandates [treaties] of approval to the Council of the League.'[191] What the message from Waterlow demonstrated was that the French Ambassador had previously

[189] Document from Philippe Berthelot to Curzon, 8 July 1920, TNA/FO371/4766/C2368/154/18, Message from Eric Phipps to the Under Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, 11 August 1920, TNA/FO371/4766/C2368/154/18.
[190] Message from S.P. Waterlow to Monsieur Le Comte de Saint Aulaire, 18 April 1921, TNA/FO371/5852/C7507/11/18.
[191] Ibid.

contacted the British Foreign Office, giving his government's view that the Council of the League of Nations should not even be allowed to view the Mandate Treaties, arguing that Article 22 did not prevent them from doing this. It also confirmed that the British Foreign Office rejected this plan, believing it went too far. Unfortunately, it did not provide a reason why both governments thought the way they did, as governmental minutes and other messages on this subject do not survive. However, it did clearly show that the French Government was even more committed than the British Government to eliminate the role of the League of Nations in the Mandate System.

Alongside Britain and France, Belgium also opposed the League of Nations modifying the Mandate Treaties. The view of the Belgium Government on this subject is recorded in a minute by Villiers, dated 6 December 1920. Villiers stated that the official position of the Belgium Government was that, 'the Council [of the League of Nations] had theoretically an incontestable right to take cognisance of the absence of any Convention such as was referred to by the Covenant, and itself to regulate the degree of authority or administration of the mandatory party, it would not be opportune to exercise this right.'[192] This demonstrated that Belgium, similar to France and Britain, did not believe the League of Nations should have any influence over the mandated territories; an indication that there was little change in imperial ideology.

Darwin also pointed out that other Great Powers showed little sign of moving away from imperial ideology. With regard to Germany he wrote, '[i]n Germany, if the flesh was temporarily weak, the imperialist spirit was more than willing.'[193] This is strongly supported in this chapter's research. Many individuals within the German elite, including the President

[192] Minute by Villiers, 6 December 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C14052/154/18.
[193] John Darwin, Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy between the Wars, *Historical Journal*, Volume. 23, Issue 3 (September 1980), 657-679.

of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht, [194] Minister for the Interior, Wilhelm Külz,[195] and Stresemann,[196] supported campaigns and schemes to regain their former colonies. Darwin argued that Italy and Japan actually became more imperialistic after the First World War.[197] With regards to Italy, there are multiple examples of the country's conquests. For instance, the annexation of the Empire of Ethiopia in 1935, and several other attempts to make further conquests during the Second World War, including an unsuccessful invasion of Greece in 1941. While for Japan there were the conquests of Manchuria in 1931, on mainland China in 1937, and in South East Asia, 1941. The research for this thesis provides further evidence for Darwin's arguments, revealing that both Italy and Japan tried to use the Mandate System to fulfil their imperial ambitions. As mentioned previously, Italy wanted to gain a mandate of their own and Japan wanted to rewrite 'C' Mandates to gain a trading advantage by giving Japanese citizens the same status as British citizens in mandates owned by the British Empire.[198]

Darwin provided other examples of imperial powers demonstrating no sign of relinquishing their imperial ideology. He argued that the Soviet Union was no less imperialistic than the old Russian Empire[199] and wrote, '[i]n the colonial empires of the [Kingdom of the] Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal, the principle of metropolitan control was applied with as much

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[194] Message from Lord D'Abernon to Mr MacDonald, 26 June 1924, TNA/FO371/9845/C10167/10167/18, Correspondent [name not recorded], The Lost German Colonies; Campaign for a Mandate, *The Times*, 6 October 1925, Correspondent [name not recorded] German Colonial Policy; The Chartered Company System, *The Times*, 26 March 1926.

[195] Message from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon, 24 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4596/539/18, Correspondent [no name given] German Claim to Colonies; A "War Quilt" Question, *The Times*, 13 April 1926.

[196] F.L. Carsten, *Britain and the Weimar Republic: the British documents*, (Batsford Academic and Educational Ltd, London, 1984) 177, J. Hiden, *Germany and Europe 1919-1939*, (Longman, London, 1977) 56, Translation of a speech made at the German Colonial Congress, 17th September 1924, TNA/FO371/9845/C15131/10167/18.

[197] John Darwin, Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy between the Wars, *Historical Journal*, Volume. 23, Issue 3 (September 1980), 657-679.

[198] Message from Marquees of Crewe to Austen Chamberlain, 30 November 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C15301/2994/18, Message from Earl Curzon to Sir C. Eliot, 7 July 1920, 7 July 1920, TNA/FO371/4766/C1037/154/18.

[199] John Darwin, Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy between the Wars, *Historical Journal*, Volume. 23, Issue 3 (September 1980), 657-679.

determination after 1918 as before 1914.'[200] Even though these latter examples cannot directly be influenced by the Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question, they are still important in proving there was no decline in colonial ideology throughout the world.

In conclusion, there is overwhelming evidence that imperial ideology remained dominant within most Great Powers following 1918. In the British Empire, the Foreign Office was supported by most governmental departments and the Dominion Governments in its imperial ideology. Outside of Britain, the world's empires, France, Italy, Japan, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Portugal showed no sign of losing faith in imperial ideology. They all, at a minimum, were determined to keep the territories they owned or to actively explore a policy of imperial expansion.

Conclusion

This chapter entered the debate over whether or not the First World War represented a major watershed on views towards empires. Historians including Callahan, Wright and Pedersen have argued the case that 1918, represented the start of a decline in support for traditional views on imperialism, with the Mandate System being the cornerstone of this shift in imperial ideology. However, others including Goldstein, Young and Darwin have argued the opposite, stating that Britain and most of the Great Powers were just as committed to the concept of imperialism in 1919, as they had been in 1914. This chapter has used new evidence, provided by the examination of the reaction of the Foreign Office to the German colonial question to join the debate. With new evidence this thesis has revealed that there was little change in imperial ideology following the end of the First World War.

First, the chapter analysed the main arguments of Callahan, Wright and Pedersen by examining the Mandate System. These historians argued that the Mandate System placed the

[200]Ibid.

League of Nations in ultimate authority over the mandates, relegating the imperial powers to an administrative role, which represented a shift in imperial ideology. The Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question undermines this argument. It indicates that the Foreign Office, successfully removed any form of authority from the League of Nations, through the creation of the Mandate Treaties. In this endeavour the department was supported by other governmental departments, the Dominion Governments and the governments of France and Japan. Therefore, any authority of the League of Nations to hold the imperial powers to account was removed and Britain, France, Belgium and Japan could rule over their mandates in any way they desired. This reveals that the differences between a mandate and other territories only existed in legal documents, while in practice, a mandate of the 1920s was identical to a colony of the 1820s.

Further proof that the imperial ideology within the Foreign Office had changed little following the First World War was revealed through the department's opposition. The evidence reveals that the permanent officials within the Foreign Office, were just as opposed to the concept of surrendering territory as their predecessors, during the Victorian and Edwardian eras. The reason why a department which included many individuals and differing ranks could maintain a single view on this subject, was due to opposing ideas being swiftly dismissed. Even personnel in high positions within the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service including Tyrrell and D'Abernon, who argued that Britain should relinquish territory, had their views completely dismissed by the department. In D'Abernon's case, his views were not just rejected, he was treated with disrespect and even ridiculed. If high ranking members of the department could be treated in such a way, this deterred lower ranking individuals challenging the established view on empires. The department would also dismiss any opposing voices from the government, including Snowden, a prominent Labour Member

of Parliament and Winston Churchill, Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, who argued for Britain to yield territory.

The Foreign Office's continued commitment to the traditional concept of empires impacted on the department's policies, especially as the department would not tolerate any interference within Britain's sphere of influence, no matter how minor. This traditional view of imperialism refers to political and military domination of territories as the primary concept of imperialism, with economic assets gained and protected through colonies. However, there are other views on imperialism which argue that economic dominance can lead to political influence within a country. The Foreign Office never accepted the economic centric version of imperialism; it always saw political and military dominance as a higher priority than economic interests. Evidence of the thesis has demonstrated this clearly, through the differing levels of concern the Foreign Office asserted towards German actions across the world. The department did not react with the same level of hostility towards Germany, challenging British economic assets in the Persian Gulf and South America, as it had shown to German interference in areas under direct British political and military control. More importantly, the Foreign Office chose to sacrifice possible economic benefits in China in order to preserve political and military dominance in the country.

Lastly, the investigation of the German colonial question goes beyond revealing that the Foreign Office exhibited no change in imperial ideology following the end of the First World War. It also expands the arguments of Goldstein, Young and Darwin, to argue that there was no change of views within the wider British Government and other imperial powers. The Foreign Office's determination to defend Britain's colonial possessions and remove the authority of the League of Nations from the Mandate System, was fully supported by the Colonial Office, the Dominion Office, Lloyd George and the Dominion Governments. France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal remained just as committed to defend their

colonial interests as the British. Whereas countries including Germany, Japan, Italy and the Soviet Union remained just as determined to expand their borders or rebuild their empires as they had before 1914. The evidence is overwhelming; imperialism remained the dominant ideology during the early interwar period, 1919-1929, and had changed little from before the First World War. It would take the destruction of the Second World War to break the dominance of this philosophy.

Chapter Three

How the German colonial question fits into Anglo-German relations and the Locarno Pact

The previous chapter discussed the Foreign Office's views on the German colonial question and what close examination of the subject reveals about the department's imperial ideology. This chapter will analyse how the German colonial question fitted into the wider relationship between Britain and Germany from 1919 to 1929. Historians such as Sharp, have argued that British policy towards Germany in the 1920s, was driven by a desire to rebuild good relations between the two nations. He wrote, 'it was….Germany, and Britain needed to establish a working relationship with it, partly to re-establish trade links, partly to create an effective barrier to Bolshevism, and partly (though less readily admitted in public) to act as a counter to a France perceived to be over-dominant on the continent.'[1] Keith Sahler went further, arguing that there was close cooperation between the foreign ministries of both Britain and Germany. He stated, '[d]uring the interwar period….statesman in Britain and Germany worked for revision of the Treaty of Versailles. No Department worked harder for the peaceful restoration of Germany's legitimate rights than the respective Foreign Offices of the two nations.'[2] He extended this view by stating, 'by the time Gustav Stresemann came to power Germany had moved to a point where arguments for a fair and just treatment were heard with ever more sympathetic ears in London.'[3] However, the German colonial question reveals that Anglo-German relations were far more complex than suggested by Sahler and Sharp.

This chapter is not designed to be a complete rebuttal of historians, such as Sahler and Sharp, who have argued that there was a great deal of cooperation between Britain and Germany

[1] Alan Sharp, Adapting to a New World? British Foreign Policy in the 1920s, *Contemporary British History*, Volume 18, Issue 3, (January 2007), 74-86.
[2] Keith B Sahler, *Reappraising Anglo-German Diplomatic Relations*, 1919-1939, Central Michigan University, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2008.
[3] Ibid.

regarding European issues. As the primary focus of this thesis regards colonial issues, the research did not examine European matters in any great detail. However, the way the British Foreign Office dealt with the German colonial question reveals that the department continued to be distrustful of German actions. In fact, this mistrust of Germany within the department, increased rather than decreased throughout the 1920s, as the Foreign Office had no interest in compromising on colonial issues. This ratifies that any cooperation which was achieved by Britain and Germany on European issues did not spread to imperial concerns. Consequently, this influences how the Locarno Treaties should be viewed, when it comes to analysing their impact on European relations.

The Locarno Pact is meant to represent a time of cooperation and compromise amongst European nations between 1925 and 1929; often referred to as the 'spirit of Locarno.' This separated it from the eras of conflict and rivalry between European powers before 1914, and during the 1930s and 1940s. However, as discussed in the literature review, historians including Jacobson, have argued that the Locarno Pact should not be treated as a dividing line, as there were little differences in European relations before and after the treaties.[4] This research provides new evidence to this debate in support of Jacobson's argument. It will demonstrate that even if there was a greater level of cooperation concerning European matters during the Locarno era, 1925-1929, it did not extend to colonial matters. The European empires were no more willing to cooperate or even compromise on imperial concerns after the Locarno Pact, as they were before the treaties were signed.

The chapter will be split into two distinct parts. The first section will examine what the Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question reveals regarding Anglo-German relations. It will demonstrate the department's lingering mistrust towards Germany and its

[4] Jon Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-1929* (Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 1972) 372.

inability to compromise on colonial issues. The second section will examine the debate regarding the Locarno Pact and the new evidence that this research can provide to enhance it. Both these sections will expand the historical knowledge regarding Anglo-German relations between 1919 and 1929.

Anglo-German Relations

The Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question reveals that Anglo-German relations, between 1919 and 1929, were more complex than Sharp and Sahler indicated. This section of the chapter will demonstrate that there was a lingering mistrust towards Germany within the department, which primarily revealed itself when the institution dealt with imperial issues. This is not a huge surprise, as Britain and Germany had just finished fighting a major war against each other. The larger revelation is that the mistrust did not decrease during the 1920s. Instead, it actually increased once Chamberlain became Foreign Secretary in November 1924. Additionally, the thesis will uncover that the Foreign Office's unwillingness to compromise or work with the Germans on colonial issues influenced other areas of Anglo-German relations.

The distrust for Germany, particularly on colonial issues, was present within the Foreign Office between 1919 and November 1924. This is demonstrated in two ways; first, through the comments and language used by the highest ranking members of the department. Second, in the way the Foreign Office and Colonial Office treated German citizens when they were deported from British mandates. However, the antagonism was much milder that it would become once Chamberlain became Foreign Secretary.

The anti-German leaning between 1919 and November 1924, regarding colonial issues is shown in the comments and language of the Foreign Office's two highest ranking members.

As mentioned in Chapter Two, Curzon was hostile to German interference in Persia.[5] However, that nation was of significant interest to him,[6] indicating he would have a strong reaction to German action in Persia. He was determined to defend Britain's position in the country. The main individual who voiced the strongest distain for German colonial action, before 1924, was Crowe, Curzon's Permanent Under Secretary of State. Crowe had always had a strong mistrust for Germany, as early as March 1905, he had been predicting an imminent German war on France. This is demonstrated in a memorandum Crowe wrote, on 29 March 1905, which argued 'Germany has, after careful deliberation, come to the conclusion that the moment has come for a complete change of direction in her foreign policy.'[7] He then went on to state that as far as the German Government was concerned, 'war with France creates no terrors.'[8] The First World War did little to change Crowe's opinion on Germany. For example, when referring to German actions in Persia he stated, '[y]et here is the German delegation at Tehran, that old nest of the most pernicious anti-British intrigue, actively engaged in underhand measures.'[9] The language used by Crowe reveals a strong underlying dislike for Germany, demonstrating that hostility towards Germany still lingered on following the end of the First World War.

The main piece of evidence of an anti-German leaning within the department, between 1919 and 1924, comes from the deportation of German citizens from British mandates. This is revealed in the communications between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office regarding this subject. In June 1920, there were still German citizens living within former German colonies that were shortly to become British mandates. The British Government

[5] Message from Curzon of Kedleston to Lord D'Abernon, 23 November 1921, TNA/FO371/6417/E12608/76/34.
[6] G.H Bennett, *British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period, 1919-24*, (St. Martin's Press, Basingstoke, 1995) 189.
[7] Memorandum written by Crowe, 29 March 1905, TNA/FO800/12.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Annexed note written by Crowe, 17 November 1921, TNA/FO371/6417/E12608/76/34.

made the decision to deport them and then to refuse access to the territory for German citizens in the future. The Colonial Office organised the deportation on the ground. Whereas, the Foreign Office was given the job of ensuring that the German deportees obtained permission to travel through certain countries[10] and to keep the German authorities informed.[11] Throughout the deportation process the two British departments acted unnecessarily callously towards the German citizens. For example, in the Tanganyika Territory, they stripped them of their assets,[12] and then marched them to Dar es Salaam to be deported on the British ship, SS. *Kigoma*.[13] When a small group of deportees were infected by smallpox they did not want them on a British ship, so they placed them on a Portuguese cargo ship.[14] At least the smallpox victims were allowed to travel through the Suez Canal, while those on the SS. *Kigoma* were sent around the Cape of Good Hope, adding time to their journey. Then when the ship approached its final destination, Rotterdam, the decision was made to charge the deportees for the privilege of being deported.[15] The whole affair regarding the deportation of German citizens demonstrates that the Foreign Office did not consider these individuals as having the same status as British citizens. Instead, they treated them in the same way they would have treated any defeated nation or tribe. This is a far cry from when the Victorians considered the Germans to be their blood relatives.[16] (Evidence of the latter statement will be revealed and discussed in Chapter Four.)

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[10] Message from Mr Woodhouse at Geneva to Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 9 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C11230/29/18.
[11] Translation of a message from Friedrich Sthamer to Foreign Office, 16 July 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C1750/29/18, Message from Eric Phipps to Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 23rd September 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C6739/29/18, Translation of message from Friedrich Sthamer, to Foreign Office, 25 September 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C7383/29/18, Message from H.J. Read to Under Secretary of State, 30 September 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C7614/29/18, Message from G. Grindle to Under Secretary of State, 4 October 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C7948/29/18.
[12] Message from Governor-General at Rotterdam to Earl Curzon of Kedleston, 15 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C11576/29/18.
[13] Message from H.J. Read to Under Secretary of State, 3 August 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C3001/29/18.
[14] Message from Governor of Tanganyika Territory to Secretary of State for Colonies, 15 September 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C9007/29/18.
[15] Message from H.J. Read to Under Secretary of State, 9 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4736/C10777/29/18.
[16] Message from Mr Gosselin to Foreign Office, 25 November 1895, TNA/FO64/1351/278.

Chamberlain's arrival at the Foreign Office increased the mistrust towards Germany within the department. This is not a new idea as Jacobson pointed out, Chamberlain could never have a neutral opinion on disputes between European nations as he was pro-French and anti-German.[17] Chamberlain once publicly admitted that he loved France as a man loves a beautiful woman.[18] This means that in any clash between the two countries, Chamberlain would instinctively favour the French. This strong French bias is clearly demonstrated in the letters Chamberlain wrote to his sisters Hilda and Ida Chamberlain. In his letters, Austen Chamberlain was very proud of improving relations between Britain and France. He wrote to Ida, 17 May 1925, '[o]ur relations with France are better than at any time since the War.'[19] He praised the French Foreign Minister Briand often. For example, on 20 October 1925, he wrote to Hilda, 'Briand was charming as ever.'[20] Chamberlain was also impressed by Briand's ability in negotiations. In a letter to Ida, dated 31 October 1925, he discussed events during talks between the British, the Germans and the French. He commented, '[y]ou will have gathered from the papers that the German Government played the fool at the last moment by handing to the various Allies a very contentious declaration.'[21] He applauded Briand's response by stating that, 'Briand, however, showed his usual good-sense and moderation and refused to ally himself to be deflected from the path which he had marked out.'[22] Chamberlain held a clear bias towards France in general and towards Briand in particular.

Chamberlain's favourable views of the French were mirrored by his distrust for the Germans, which was also illustrated in his letters to his sisters. For instance, in the letter to Hilda, 20

[17] Ibid.
[18] Eric Sutton, *Gustav Stresemann, Diaries, Letters and Papers*, Volume II, (Macmillan and Co, London, 1937) 3.
[19] Robert C. Self, *The Austen Chamberlain Diary Letter; The correspondence of Sir Austen Chamberlain with his Sisters Hilda and Ida, 1916-1937*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995) 276.
[20] Ibid 279.
[21] Ibid 280.
[22] Ibid 280.

October 1925, he stated, '[t]hey [the Germans] & the Poles are the restless element in Europe north of the Balkans.'[23] He went further in a letter to Ida, 31 October 1925, in which he showed his frustration of the Germans during the Locarno negotiations writing, 'the German Government was a most difficult Government to help and had the French shown as little wisdom and generosity as the Berlin Cabinet there would have been no prospect of a pact at all.'[24] Chamberlain was clearly upset with the German Government at this time as he commented in the same letter, 'I gave the German Ambassador a piece of my mind.'[25] One of the things Chamberlain was most annoyed about the German foreign policy was that it was often dictated by domestic politics. He explained, to Ida, in 7 November 1925, 'Germany troubles me….why can't other nations keep foreign affairs outside of & above domestic party politics?'[26]

Chamberlain's letters to his sisters are not the only evidence for his anti-German attitude. Further confirmation is found in the way he treated individuals with different opinions on Germany. Those who were suspicious of German motivations or held anti-German views were met with praise. A good example of this is when Brigadier General Page Croft, Conservative Member of Parliament, sent a message to the Foreign Office which voiced a concern about German colonial ambitions. Chamberlain wrote positive recommendations regarding Croft, stating his views did his, 'perspicuity credit.'[27] While at the same time he was hostile toward anyone trying to advocate policies which could be considered pro-German. This is shown in his responses to D'Abernon[28] (discussed in previous chapters).

[23] Ibid 279.
[24] Ibid 280.
[25] Ibid 280.
[26] Ibid 282.
[27] Copy of a Letter from Austen Chamberlain to Sir H. Page Croft, 6 July 1925, TNA/FO371/10758/C8771/8771/18.
[28] Message from Austen Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon, 21 May 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C6145/2994/18, Minute written by Chamberlain, 1 February 1926, TNA/FO371/11248/C1154/6/18.

If one piece of evidence represents the Foreign Office's views on Germany during the early interwar period, then it is a telegram from the Foreign Office to D'Abernon dated April 1926. The telegram does not have a signature, however, the way it is written and the anti-German sentiment strongly indicates that Chamberlain was the author. What is significant is that this telegram creates a small window into the thinking of the department during this time. The telegram started by discussing German relations with Poland and stated, 'Germany first frightens Poland and then gets frightened by her….German hostility (and worse contempt for the Poles and all things Polish) is never concealed and breeds resentment and fear.'[29] Next, the telegram discussed the relations between Germany and France. It argued, 'Briand has several times spoken with great courage and generosity. I have seen nothing comparable in the speeches of the German leaders and their constantly growing demands….do not encourage concessions.'[30] The telegram then moved onto the German colonial question. It started with the statement, '[w]e ourselves [Foreign Office] cannot view without concern the renewed agitation about mandates for which the President of the Reichsbank appears mainly responsible.'[31] Then it continued to argue, '[y]ou [D'Abernon] should repeat to Foreign Minister [Stresemann] that there can be no abandonment of any British mandate and that the agitation can only embarrass our new and more friendly relations with Germany.'[32] The telegram concluded, '[u]nless the German government can give clear evidence that they are as ready to give as to receive and that they recognise that the whole basis of the Locarno policy was maturity I shall despair of obtaining further concessions to them. They make things too difficult for those who desire to help them in this country and still more in France.'[33] The telegram revealed a department that believed countries such as Britain, France and Poland were being constructive in trying to smooth over relations with Germany, and that

[29] Copy of telegram from Foreign Office to Lord D'Abernon, 12 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4531/539/18.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.

they were being frustrated or undermined by Germany. This indicated that there was a belief, that Germany was in the wrong and an unwillingness, to give the country the benefit of the doubt.

As discussed in Chapters One and Two, Chamberlain's mistrust towards Germany regularly revealed itself when he dealt with the German colonial question. He personally led the Foreign Office's effort of opposing German membership onto the Permanent Mandates Commission to become accepted as British policy.[34] He also wanted to make it absolutely clear to the German Government that Britain would never hand one of her mandates back to Germany.[35] Chamberlain was not alone in mistrusting Germany during his time in office. For instance, Sargent would oppose any attempt by Germany to regain a colonial role, no matter where in the world the Germans were interested.[36] However, it was Chamberlain who was the real driving force behind the distrust towards Germany between 1924 and 1929.

Studying how the Foreign Office reacted to the German colonial question not only demonstrates the department's distrust of Germany, it also reveals that colonial issues could have a wider impact on Anglo-German relations. The level of importance the British Foreign Office considered imperial concerns to be is a topic that will be discussed in Chapter Four. For this chapter, it will be sufficient to establish that colonial issues did have a wider impact. Several cases of this have already been mentioned in the thesis. For instance, when the Foreign Office tried to prevent Germany gaining membership into a major part of the League of Nations (the Permanent Mandates Commission) as the department feared Germany would use it to push forward her colonial ambitions.[37] A further example regards the Anglo-German Commercial Treaty. As discussed in Chapter Two, the Reichstag became hesitant to ratify the

[34] Minute by Cadogan, 28 October 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10170/59/98.
[35] Message from Austen Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon, 21 May 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C6145/2994/18.
[36] Minute by Sargent, 11 May 1928, TNA/FO371/12908/C3407/1069/18.
[37] Minute by Hurst, 2 December 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C15503/2994/18.

Anglo-German Commercial Treaty, in 1925, because it did not include the right for Germans to trade in British mandates. [38] The Reichstag only agreed to sign the treaty due to a further agreement made between Britain and Germany, that the former would remove trade restrictions within British imperial territories.[39] The fact that an important trade deal could be put in jeopardy by a colonial dispute is a clear demonstration that imperial issues had a wider impact on relations between the two nations.

The Foreign Office's unwillingness to compromise on colonial issues also had a negative impact on the German Foreign Ministry and its personnel. An effective example of this comes from Stresemann, in a diary entry dated December 1925, when he wrote, 'Chamberlain's wholly negative attitude on the Colonial question….was very unpleasant and painful.'[40] Holding such a negative view on a subject which Stresemann clearly felt strongly about was always going to sour relations, even if it did not lead to any policy changes.

This chapter has shown that colonial issues impacted on wider Anglo-German relations. However, this assessment should not be taken too far as imperial concerns were never going to fundamentally undermine cooperation between the two powers regarding European matters. The existence of the Locarno Treaties demonstrates that Britain and Germany had the potential to cooperate and compromise on European issues, even if the same cannot be said regarding colonial matters. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office's mistrust towards Germany and lack of compromise on colonial issues prove that Anglo-German relations were more complex during the 1920s than previously indicated by Sahler and Sharp.

[38] Memorandum on German Colonies, 11 February 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C1733/539/18.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Eric Sutton, *Gustav Stresemann, Diaries, Letters and Papers*, Volume II, (Macmillan and Co, London, 1937) 237.

The Spirit of Locarno

It might seem an odd choice to discuss the Locarno Pact in a thesis focusing on colonial issues, as those treaties had little relevance to imperial matters. However, the Foreign Office's distrust towards Germany and lack of cooperation on colonial matters have an impact on how the Locarno Treaties are viewed; specifically, whether or not the Locarno Pact represented a major shift in European relations and therefore, if it can be considered a dividing line in European history.

The negotiations in Locarno, in 1925, were a series of talks between delegates from Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and the Republic of Poland to improve relations and stability in Western Europe. Those negotiations resulted in the creation of four treaties, which collectively are referred to the Locarno Pact. [41] The four treaties were:

1) A treaty of mutual guarantee of the Franco-German and Belgian-German frontiers, with Britain and Italy as guarantors.
2) German-Belgian and German-French arbitration treaties.
3) German-Czechoslovak and German-Polish arbitration treaties.
4) Treaties of mutual assistance in the event of German aggression between France and Poland and between France and Czechoslovakia.

Neither of these four treaties had any colonial aspects, instead, they only referred to continental European matters. Therefore, the German colonial question was not an important part of the Locarno negotiations. In a Foreign Office memorandum concerning the German colonial question it stated that, '[i]n the negotiations leading up to the Security Pact [term for the Locarno treaties] the question of mandates was never raised by the German Government

[41] Erik Goldstein, *The First World War Peace Settlements 1919-1925* (Routledge, New York, 2002) 88.

at all….at Locarno.'[42] Foreign Office officials were present at the Locarno negotiations and they have no reason to be misleading in this memorandum. Therefore, it is safe to assume the German colonial question was not discussed during these negotiations. In fact, this thesis' literature review went into detail explaining why Crozier's article, *The Colonial Question in Stresemann's Locarno Policy*, which tried to link the German colonial question to the Locarno Pact is fundamentally flawed. However, even though the German colonial question was not linked directly into the negotiations at Locarno, the research for this thesis does provide new evidence to the debate regarding the 'spirit of Locarno'.

As mentioned in the literature review, the debate revolves around whether or not it is justifiable to consider the Locarno Pact as a dividing line in the history of the twentieth century. Historians are fond of separating history into different time periods and eras. Some boundaries between eras are based on major events which cause a fundamental change. For instance, the rise of Gaius Octavius as Augustus in 27 BCE brought about the final collapse of the crumbling proto-democratic Roman Republic and replaced it with the Absolute Monarchy of the Roman Empire. Another example would be the French (1789) and Russian (1917) revolutions causing major wars and changes to the geo-politics of Europe. However, most boundaries are arbitrary dates based on the individual opinions of each historian. An illustration of this would be 476 CE as the divide between the Roman Empire and Byzantine Empire. The divide is meaningless as the fall of the Western Roman Empire did not impact on the Eastern Roman Empire in any serious way. Zeno was emperor both before and after this event and the Roman Empire itself remained in place from 27 BCE to 1453 CE. Therefore, not all eras, which separate different parts of history, are based on significant reasons and are merely time periods chosen at the whims of historians. Similarly, historians

[42] Memorandum on German Colonies, 11 February 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C1733/539/18.

have differing opinions on whether the Locarno Pact is another arbitrary boundary or if it had real significance, and hence could be used as a historical dividing line.

The Locarno Pact is seen by many historians, including Goldstein, as the defining moment of the 1920s. For Goldstein, the agreements at Locarno brought an era of cooperation between the European powers.[43] This unity is distinct in juxtaposition of the mistrust, rivalry and aggression of European foreign policy in the years 1900-1914, and during the 1930s and 1940s. However, this is not a view shared by everyone. Jacobson argued that there was no change in European relations following the Locarno Pact.[44] He stated that the strategic situation was no different in the 1920s, and therefore all the nations continued to pursue the same aims.[45] Consequently, there is historical disagreement over whether or not the Locarno Pact represented a new era in European geo-politics.

This thesis provides three pieces of evidence which support the idea that the Locarno Pact should not be used as a dividing line in European history. The first revolves around the very concept of the 'spirit of Locarno.' Locarno was meant to start an era of cooperation and compromise within European relations. However, the Locarno era dates from 1925 to 1929, which is when the Foreign Office was under the control of Chamberlain. As discussed earlier in the chapter, Chamberlain was more hostile towards Germany than his predecessors, Curzon and MacDonald. This contradicts the ideals of the Locarno Pact, which emphasised greater respect and cooperation.

The second piece of evidence that this thesis adds to the existing literature regarding the Locarno era, is the lack of cooperation regarding colonial issues. Even if there was a greater level of cooperation and compromise regarding issues on the European continent, there is no

[43] Erik Goldstein, *The First World War Peace Settlements 1919-1925* (Routledge, New York, 2002) 91.
[44] Jon Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-1929* (Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 1972) 372.
[45] Ibid 372.

evidence of this when it comes to imperial matters. As discussed in Chapter Two, the British Foreign Office was not interested in improving relations with Germany by negotiating on colonial concerns. In 1926, the year after the signing of the Locarno treaties, the department was committed to preventing German imperial ambitions if they impacted on the British sphere of influence. For instance, the Foreign Office was strongly opposed to Germany becoming a member on the Permanent Mandates Commission.[46] As mentioned previously, it was feared that Germany could use representation on that particular commission to gain a mandate.[47] This led the Foreign Office to ensure that the British representatives at the League of Nations opposed German representation.[48] The next example of the lack of compromise, on imperial matters, comes from the Imperial Conference of 1926. Several memorandums were created regarding the German colonial question, for the purpose of circulating them to the Dominion Governments before the conference. [49] They were designed to argue the case that Germany was taking seriously its campaign to regain its colonies and how best to prevent that.[50] A final example would be Chamberlain sending a message to D'Abernon to make sure he reminded the German Government that Britain would never surrender any of its mandates.[51] These three examples, all within twelve months of the signing of the Locarno Treaties, reveal that the Foreign Office was not willing to compromise on imperial issues. Therefore, any goodwill and cooperation achieved in European relations due to the Locarno Pact did not encourage or enable compromise regarding colonial concerns.

[46] Minute written by Troutbeck, 25 November 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10779/59/98, Minute written by Perownne, 3 March 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C2994/2994/18, Message from G.H. Villiers to Sir Ronald Lindsay, 30 November 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10779/59/98.
[47] Minute by Hurst, 2 December 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C15503/2994/18.
[48] Minute by Cadogan, 28 October 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10170/59/98.
[49] Memorandum resecting the German Claim for a Colonial Mandate, 14 September 1926, TNA/FO371/11304/C9656/539/18, Colonial Office memorandum titled *Questions connected with the work of the Permanent Mandate Commission of the League of Nations*, October 1926, TNA/CO323/965/16.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Message from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon, 24 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4596/539/18.

The third reason why this research can extend the existing literature on the Locarno era is that it reinforces one of the arguments made by Jacobson. He argued that negotiations between the European powers, after the Locarno Pact, were dominated by mistrust and misunderstandings. [52] This argument is supported by this research, as the only time the Locarno negotiations directly involved colonial issues, was in a misunderstanding from a speech by Hans Luther, German Chancellor. In November 1925, Luther spoke in the Reichstag about the Locarno negotiations. The *Times* mistranslated the speech and reported that Luther had said, '[a]t Locarno the assurances had been secured….that her (Germany) right to colonial mandates should not only be recognised but should be given practical effect.'[53] Had this report been accurate it would signify that during the Locarno negotiations, Germany had been promised a mandate territory. This caused a strong reaction within the Foreign Office; in the memorandum on the German colonial question, it was written, '[i]t was impossible to let this go unchallenged.'[54] The department informed the German Embassy in London that 'Luther had given quite a false impression of what actually took place at Locarno.'[55] This story then started to spread with discussions in Parliament[56] and more importantly being brought up by other governments. Italy, in particular, was angry about the suggestion that Germany could be given a mandate before them.[57] The French Government supported the British Government's view that Luther was wrong to voice the idea that the Locarno negotiations had led to an agreement for Germany to gain a mandate.[58] This diplomatic incident disappeared very quickly once the German Government reassured the

[52] Jon Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-1929* (Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 1972) 385.
[53] Memorandum on German Colonies, 11 February 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C1733/539/18.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Parliamentary Question by Captain Walter Shaw, 18 March 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C3663/539/18.
[57] Message from Marquees of Crewe to Austen Chamberlain, 30 November 1920, TNA/FO371/10755/C15301/2994/18.
[58] Ibid.

other European powers that *The Times* had mistranslated Luther's speech.[59] However, even though it was only a brief diplomatic incident, it is an exemplary case of Jacobson's belief that the negotiations between the European powers were dominated by mistrust and misunderstandings during the Locarno era.[60] The fallout from Luther's speech supports this argument. *The Times* mistranslating a speech by Luther is obviously an example of a misunderstanding. More importantly, it reveals the suspicious nature between the European nations from 1925 to 1929. The British Foreign Office did not try to verify the newspaper's translation before turning it into a diplomatic issue. They assumed that it was correct, as did the Italians, revealing that they expected the German Chancellor to misrepresent the Locarno negotiations, so that Germany could push forward its colonial ambitions. It indicates a clear lack of trust between the European nations, demonstrating that the Locarno era was not a golden age of cooperation in foreign relations.

Therefore, this section of the chapter has provided three pieces of evidence contradicting the notion that the Locarno Pact brought an era of cooperation in European geo-politics. The first is that the hostility within the Foreign Office towards Germany increased rather than decreased once Chamberlain became Foreign Secretary. This was followed by the revelation that even if there was greater compromise in European matters, it was not extended to colonial concerns. Finally, the diplomatic incident following the *Times* mistranslation of a speech by Luther supports Jacobson's argument that misunderstandings were common between 1925 and 1929. This leads to an overall conclusion, that those who believed that the Locarno Pact did not represent a change in European geo-politics, including Jacobson, are correct.

[59] Memorandum on German Colonies, 11 February 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C1733/539/18.
[60] Ibid 385.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed how the Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question provides new evidence regarding the historical understanding of Anglo-German relations during the 1920s. This is an important topic because it reveals that relations between Britain and Germany were more complex than indicated by Sharp and Sahler, and highlights how the influence of the Locarno Pact could be interpreted.

With regard to Anglo-German relations, the Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question demonstrates that there was a lingering mistrust of Germany within the department, following the First World War. More importantly, it establishes that this distrust actually increased rather than decreased during the decade, particularly once Chamberlain became Foreign Secretary in November 1924. This cynicism towards Germany is revealed in the comments and actions of key individuals within the department, most notably Crowe, Sargent and Chamberlain. However, Chamberlain was the strongest driving force behind the Foreign Office's view on Germany. He dismissed anyone who voiced pro-German sentiments while praising those who voiced suspicions towards German objectives.

This mistrust for German intentions is illustrated in the department's handling of the German colonial question. The Foreign Office had no interest in compromising on colonial matters. However, this lack of cooperation on imperial concerns was never going to completely undermine the working relationship between Britain and Germany, regarding European issues. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office's determination to prevent Germany any opportunity to regain one of its former colonies, did have consequences for wider Anglo-German relations. It led the department to try to prevent Germany gaining membership to a major commission in the League of Nations; the Permanent Mandates Commission. More importantly, it jeopardised a major trade deal between the two powers and caused distress to

major members of the German Government, most notably Stresemann. This indicates that Anglo-German relations during the 1920s were more complex than how it was described by Sharp and Sahler.

The new evidence gained by this thesis also adds to the debate, regarding how the Locarno Pact should be viewed regarding its influence on European relations. The Locarno Pact has been considered by some historians including Goldstein, as a defining moment of the early interwar period, representing the cooperation and compromise of the 1920s. Therefore, justifiably, it is used as a dividing line in European relations. However, individuals such as Jacobson have argued that the Locarno Pact did not lead to an era of greater cooperation between European relations. Therefore, its use as a dividing line is meaningless. This chapter has revealed further evidence in support of Jacobson's view.

First, distrust of Germany increased within the Foreign Office during the years following the Locarno Pact. Second, even if there was greater collaboration regarding European concerns due to the Locarno Pact, this did not spread to colonial matters. The third piece of evidence which this thesis provides regarding the historical understanding of the Locarno Pact again ties into the arguments made by Jacobson. He believed that misunderstandings were a common aspect of the Locarno era. This belief is supported by the mistranslation of a speech by Luther in the *Times*, which led to a diplomatic incident. Neither the British Foreign Office nor the Italian Government verified the news article; they assumed the speech's translation was correct, revealing the mistrust and rivalry within that era. These pieces of evidence may be non-revolutionary and relatively small in scale, due to the fact that the Locarno Pact did not directly link into colonial concerns. Nevertheless, they show that this research adds to the most heavily studied era of the early interwar period by presenting new evidence regarding the geo- politics at a colonial level.

Chapter Four

Comparing the Foreign Office of the early interwar period with its predecessors

The previous two chapters of this thesis have discussed the British Foreign Office and examined its imperial ideology and its views on Germany during the early interwar period. Chapter Two revealed that the Foreign Office continued to hold a traditional version of imperialism, while Chapter Three demonstrated that colonial concerns impacted on other areas of Anglo-German relations. This chapter will enhance those arguments by providing two critical perspectives. The first is an examination, of the overall level of importance the Foreign Office gave to imperial issues, to discover if the Great War caused a change in its priorities. Second is an in depth investigation of the department's mistrust towards Germany to discover if the First World War had permanently reinforced hostility between Britain and Germany. An effective way of analysing these two critical pieces of information is to compare the Foreign Office during the early interwar period with its predecessors during the Victorian era, 1837-1901, and the Edwardian era, 1901-1914.[1]

The reason why the Victorian and Edwardian eras were chosen for this comparison, is because the Foreign Office of both time periods had radically different views, when it came to the importance of colonial concerns and forming relations with Germany. The Victorians viewed imperial interests as its highest priority, with Britain's foreign policy focused on efforts to defend and expand the empire. Meanwhile, the Edwardians relegated colonial matters in favour of European concerns. This sharp contrast is a perfect lens to examine the Foreign Office of the 1920s, as comparing the department with the extremes of its predecessors, provides a greater perspective to its views on imperial ideology. It is a similar

[1] There is no consensus about the exact dates and names for the eras that divide British history. For the purposes of this chapter the Victorian era is being used to represent all the years of Queen Victoria's reign. While the Edwardian era is being used to represent not just the reign of Edward VII, which ended in 1910, but also the following years before the First World War. This is because there was little culture or political change between 1910 and 1914.

situation when examining the Victorian and Edwardian views on Germany. The Victorians were affable towards Germany favouring close alliances, while the Edwardians held far more negative views. It is these opposing opinions that create an effective comparison with the views of the 1920s Foreign Office.

The comparison between the early interwar Foreign Office and its predecessors demonstrates that the department of the 1920s, had its own distinct mind-set. It does not follow on neatly from its pre-1914 roots, instead, in many ways, its mind-set is a combination of Victorian and Edwardian ideologies but always with its own twist. This is highlighted when analysing the level of importance with which the Foreign Office viewed imperial concerns at any one time. The permanent officials in the early interwar Foreign Office, considered colonial issues to be of greater importance than their Edwardian predecessors. This is significant as it proves imperial interests rose in importance following the Paris Peace Conference, providing further evidence that the First World War had not undermined the belief in imperialism. However, it is important to note that the officials in the Foreign Office of the 1920s, did not go as far as their Victorian counterparts and consider colonial matters to be the overwhelming priority. Of equal importance, is the revelation regarding the early interwar Foreign Office's views on Germany. As mentioned previously, there was a lingering cynicism of Germany within the department, following the First World War. However, it was nowhere near the level of hostility that the Edwardian Foreign Office viewed the Germans; meaning that the First World War had not cemented an antagonistic view of Germany, within the mind-set of the Foreign Office. Therefore, overtime there was a chance that this mistrust could decline. Nevertheless, the lingering cynicism within the early interwar Foreign Office indicates that there was no prospect of the alliances between Britain and Germany during the Victorian era, appearing again in the 1920s.

It is essential to note that with departments the size of the Foreign Office, there could not always be uniformity on issues as important as these. There would always be individuals who held a view contrary to the rest of the department. Likewise, there would be events which would lead the department to temporarily change its view. However, as mentioned in Chapter Two, the Foreign Office would often disregard opinions which differed from their established view, particularly on colonial matters. Therefore, the department would end up with a uniformity of opinion, at least in public. Although the outliers will be mentioned, the main focus of this chapter is on the general consensus and not individual permanent official's private opinion.

In order to effectively compare the early interwar Foreign Office with the department during the Victorian and Edwardian eras, this chapter will first examine the importance of colonial issues within the Foreign Office, showing how the significance of imperial matters changed over time. Second, it will discuss the Foreign Office's views on Germany, including an evaluation of whether the hostility of war had lingered into 1919-1929.

Importance of colonial issues

The reaction of the Foreign Office to the German colonial question, reveals the level of priority with which the department considered colonial concerns. This in turn provides the first comparison between the interwar Foreign Office and its counterparts, during the Victorian and Edwardian eras. However, before examining this in detail, there is a requirement to clarify how the research of this thesis judged the level of significance the Foreign Office gave this subject, as it is not an exact science. Unfortunately, the permanent officials did not produce documents where they set out their priorities, or left a convenient list of topics in order of importance. Instead, the only way to analyse how significant a particular topic was to the Foreign Office, is to examine several factors. These include how often the

topic was discussed, whether it was discussed by the highest ranks of the Foreign Office or only the lower ranks, and how often the Foreign Office discussed the issue with other governmental departments. In this way, the chapter will reveal that there was a great level of fluctuation regarding the importance of this subject within the Foreign Office, between 1919 and 1929. The subject altered from being a highly important issue one year, to being a low priority the next, only to increase in importance once more. This indicates that the Foreign Office of the 1920s, considered imperial concerns to be a greater issue than that of their Edwardian counterpart, which aligns them more closely with the Victorians. However, it must be noted that the early interwar Foreign Office did not go to the extent of the Victorians, when colonial issues were the top priority of the department.

This section of the chapter will indicate that there were several years in which colonial issues were of significant importance, most notably the German colonial question. The first time was during the Paris Peace Conference and the negotiations over the Mandate Treaties, 1919-1921, followed by the second, during the height of the German colonial propaganda campaign, 1925-1926. The third time occurred between 1928 and 1929, due to several controversial issues taking place during those years. These concerns regarded Britain's East African Dominion, German ambitions towards Angola and the actions of Kühlmann, an unofficial advisor for the German representatives at the Reparations Experts Committee. Each of these examples will be discussed in detail.

The first case of colonial issues increasing in significance to the Foreign Office was during the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, and the negotiations over the Mandate Treaties, 1920-1921. The Paris Peace Conference was a hugely busy time for the British Government with many important issues to be deliberated. This included, but not limited to, the borders of Europe and the subject of reparations. Historians, including Goldstein, have argued that colonial matters would have been one of the higher priority issues. He wrote, '[t]he British

Empire was a colonial empire….success in the colonial negotiations was essential.'[2] He continued to argue that gaining colonial territories and protecting the empire 'was a British war aim of the first rank.'[3] Goldstein was not alone in this argument, as Victor Rothwell wrote, '[a]lways one comes to the point that British foreign policy in the era of the First World War was truly concerned with the interests of the British Empire.'[4] The reason why historians have seen colonial matters as a major British war aim, is because it was one of the few areas in which Britain could directly benefit from the First World War. Britain was not going to be granted lands on the European continent and any reparations it received would be modest in comparison to France. Therefore, the only new lands and resources Britain could gain from the war would have to come from the German and Ottoman colonies.

The Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question provides further evidence to support the arguments of Goldstein and Rothwell. The Foreign Office between 1919 and 1921, saw the German colonial question as a priority subject. This is indicated by the volume of documents recording conversations between permanent officials on this issue, stored in The National Archives. Within the documents are a variety of subjects, from administering the handover between British and French Cameroon and Togoland,[5] to the negotiations on the Mandate Treaties.[6] Significantly, it was not just the lower ranking permanent officials in the various departments discussing these issues. The very highest ranking permanent officials, including Crowe,[7] and the political head of the Foreign Office, Curzon,[8] would regularly join

[2] Erik Goldstein, *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) 150.
[3] Ibid 183.
[4] Ibid 286.
[5] Message from H.J. Read to Under Secretary of State, 17 August 1920, TNA/FO371/4766/C4045/154/18.
[6] Telegram from Foreign Office to Sir Lambert, 29 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12471/154/18, Minute by Waterlow, 25 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12161/154/18, Minute by Crowe, 25 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12161/154/18.
[7] Minute by Crowe, 23 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12031/154/18, Minute by Crowe, 25 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12161/154/18, Minute by Crowe, 10 May 1921, TNA/FO371/5852/C9377/11/18, Minute by Crowe, 15 June 1921, TNA/FO371/5852/C12280/11/18.

the conversations. The most important evidence comes from deliberations on this topic between Government Departments. There are a large number of communications between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office,[9] but the Board of Trade,[10] the Cabinet Office[11] and the Dominion Governments[12] would also take part in the discussions and decision making process regarding the German colonial question. Only an issue which was considered highly important would have received this much attention within the British Government.

The second example occurred between 1925 and 1926, when the German colonial propaganda campaign reached its zenith (a detailed analysis of the propaganda campaign will be carried out in Chapter Five). The propaganda campaign slowly built up over several years.[13] However, by 1925 and 1926, it had become a pivotal issue.[14] It was often discussed by the permanent officials in the Foreign Office,[15] including within the very highest ranks, with Chamberlain often joining in the dialogue.[16] More notably, the individuals within the Foreign Office felt under pressure by this issue. For example, Huxley wrote, 'steady campaign….on the subject of the lost colonies which has been gathering weight in Germany for the last two years and has received anything but discouragement in official quarters.' [17] He continued to state, '[t]he Germans are engaged in "trying it on" and….[sending] out feelers in

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[8] Minute by Curzon, 5 December 1920, THA/FO371/4768/C14052/154/18, Message from Earl Curzon to Sir C. Eliot, 7 July 1920, 7 July 1920, TNA/FO371/4766/C1037/154/18.
[9] Message from Colonial Office to Under Secretary of State, 27 July 1920, TNA/FO371/4766/C2384/154/18, Message from Colonial Office to Under Secretary of State, 26 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12353/154/18.
[10] Minute by Waterlow, 19 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4767/C11644/154/18.
[11] Message from Cabinet Office to Foreign Office, 30 May 1921, TNA/FO371/5852/C12495/11/18.
[12] Telegram from Governor General of Commonwealth of Australia to Secretary of State for Colonies, 15 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4767/C11633/154/18.
[13] Message from G.H. Villiers to Sir Auckland G. Geddes, 12 March 1923, TNA/FO371/9440/W1788/1788/98, Minute written by Rondall, 1 August 1923, TNA/FO371/9440/W6029/1788/98, Memorandum on German Colonies, 11 February 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C1733/539/18, Message from W.H. Clive to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 17 June 1924, TNA/FO371/9799/C10005/668/18.
[14] Message from Lord Kilmarnock to Austen Chamberlain, 6 May 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C6232/2994/18.
[15] Minute by Huxley, 15 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4596/539/18, Minute by Lampson, 17 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4596/539/18.
[16] Minute by Chamberlain, 19 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4596/539/18, Message from Austen Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon, 21 May 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C6145/2994/18.
[17] Minute by Huxley, 15 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4596/539/18.

this as in many other directions. Until those feelers come into contact with some strong resistance….they will no doubt continue to extend.'[18] Lampson agreed that there had been no decrease in the German campaign, 'on the contrary it shows signs of distinctly increasing.'[19] The Foreign Office felt the subject to be of such standing that the department wrote a memorandum providing a detailed history of the German colonial campaign, dated 14 September 1926.[20] That memorandum had a strong message, 'the recovery of colonies has become the object of a vigorous propaganda campaign in Germany with which the German Government openly show….sympathy, in spite of the warnings conveyed from time to time by His Majesty's Government. The campaign shows no sign of abating.'[21]

The pressure only increased during 1925, as many European Governments began discussing the ramifications of the German colonial question, including the French Parliament,[22] the Italian Government[23] and the Polish Government.[24] Then in 1926, many important members of the German Government, including Stresemann,[25] Schacht[26] and Külz,[27] all gave public support for the German colonial propaganda campaign. The involvement of the German elite and foreign governments forced the British Foreign Office to elevate the German colonial question on the department's list of priorities.

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[18] Ibid.
[19] Minute by Lampson, 17 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4596/539/18.
[20] Memorandum titled *Memorandum respecting the German Claim for a Colonial Mandate*, 14 September 1926, TNA/FO371/11304/C9656/539/18.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Message from Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlin, 21 December 1925, TNA/FO371/10756/C16692/2994/18.
[23] Report of a conversation between Willian Tyrrell and Italian Ambassador, 1 December 1925, TNA/FO371/10756/C15510/2994/18.
[24] Minutes of a conversation with M. Morawsky written by Bentinck , 14 October 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C13633/2994/18, Minutes written by Huxley , 27 October 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C13633/2994/18.
[25] Message from Mr Ingram to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 6 September 1926, TNA/FO371/11281/C9916/234/18.
[26] Message from D'Abernon to Sir W.G. Tyrrell, 23 January 1926, TNA/FO371/11248/C1154/6/18, Correspondent [name not recorded] German Colonial Policy; The Chartered Company System, *The Times*, 26 March 1926.
[27] Telegram from Mr Ingram to Foreign Office, 14 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4596/539/18, Correspondent [no name given] German Claim to Colonies; A "War Quilt" Question, *The Times*, 13 April 1926.

The third and final time the Foreign Office believed that the German colonial question was a major issue was during 1928 and 1929. There were three different controversial concerns which caused this issue to rise to prominence. First, was the German opposition to the creation of an East African Dominion, second, was Germany's ambition towards Angola and third, were the actions of Kühlmann. These concerns led to a slow increase in the importance of the German colonial question during this time. Concerns regarding these issues, which had been deliberated regularly by the lower to mid ranking personnel of the Foreign Office, were now elevated and discussed at Cabinet level.

The reason why there was controversy over an East African Dominion, was due to a German belief, that since the loss of colonies during the Paris Peace Conference, the mandates were trusteeships which would eventually be returned to Germany.[28] When rumours reached Germany regarding the Hilton Young Commission, there was a strong response within certain circles, due to acknowledgement that a possible recommendation could create a new East African Dominion. As a result, Britain could merge her colonies in East Africa, including Kenya and the mandate of Tanganyika Territory. Such a recommendation would imply that Britain intended to permanently incorporate the mandate into the British Empire, an action opposed by anyone in Germany who wanted Tanganyika returned to Germany.

The controversy regarding the East African Dominion led directly to anxiety within the Foreign Office regarding German ambitions towards Angola. The subject was discussed in detail in Chapter Two. Therefore, for this chapter will be sufficient to outline the following; on 30 March 1928, the Central Department received a secret report which referred to information passed on by a 'trustworthy informant.'[29] The report indicated that the informant

[28] Message from R.C. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 6 February 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C1069/1069/18.
[29] Message from C. Howard Smith to Sir R. Lindsay, 25 April 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18. The identity of the informant and his/her exact mission is unknown.

had held conversations with two German 'officials,'[30] whose names and ranks are blanked out on the document. These officials did not know that their conversations with the informant would be passed onto the British Foreign Office.[31] Both of the German officials revealed a plan to use their country's opposition to a British East African Dominion to gain a mandate.[32] The plan was rather complex, but in simple terms, it was to offer Britain a deal; Germany would drop her opposition to the new Dominion and in return Britain would support Germany gain a mandate over one or more of Portugal's colonies, most notably Angola.[33]

In both of these cases, various discussions occurred within the departments of the Foreign Office, particularly in the Central Department and the Western, General and League of Nations Department. These discussions are indicated in two ways; the first, by the volume of comments written within the department. There were no less than twelve different Foreign Office documents, dated between February 1928 and February 1929, covering conversations regarding either German opposition to the East African Dominion or Germany's ambitions towards Angola.[34] The second way involved the department's attempts to find out as much information as possible, regarding German hostility to the East African Dominion and their ambitions in Angola. Requests were sent to the British Embassy in Berlin[35] and further investigations were carried out by informants.[36] However, even though the discussions may have been many, they remained firmly at a departmental level, mostly within the Central Department and the Western, General and League of Nations Department, and did not

[30] Secret Report on German Colonial Policy, 30 March 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] TNA/FO371/12907/C1069/1069/18, TNA/FO371/12907/C1275/1069/18, TNA/FO371/12907/C1940/1069/18, TNA/FO371/12907/C2825/1069/18, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18, TNA/FO371/12908/C3407/1069/18, TNA/FO371/12908/C3474/1069/18, TNA/FO371/12908/C6111/1069/18, TNA/FO371/12908/C6534/1069/18, TNA/FO371/12908/C3407/1069/18, TNA/FO371/13615/C51/43/18, TNA/FO371/13615/C920/43/18, TNA/FO371/13615/C969/43/18.
[35] Message from C. Howard Smith to Sir R. Lindsay, 25 April 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18, Message from R.C. Lindsay to Howard Smith, 1 May 1928, TNA/FO371/12908/C3407/1069/18.
[36] Secret Report, 15 August 1928, TNA/FO371/12908/C6534/1069/18.

include the highest ranking personnel. This indicates that these issues had increased the level of priority of the German colonial question within the Foreign Office, but it falls far short of where it had been in 1926.

It was the actions of Kühlmann, during 1929, which brought the German colonial question back to prominence within the Foreign Office. This is surprising, as he was only a low ranking official, who used his position to partake in conversations with representatives from the British and French Governments; his intention was to argue that relations with Germany could only be improved if Germany regained its African Empire.[37] Kühlmann carried out his actions without the support or knowledge of his own government.[38] Even so, it became a major incident within the Foreign Office, causing a rise in hostility within the department, including condemnation from Perowne and Sargent. Perowne wrote a minute where he stated, '[t]here can surely be no question of H.M. Government being a party to any of this.' [39] Sargent went further when he described it as an, 'impertinent attempt at blackmail.'[40]

What made this controversial issue different to the previous examples, regarding the East African Dominion and Angola, was that the discussions went higher than the lower ranks of the Foreign Office. The Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lindsay,[41] and Chamberlain[42] both took part in deciding Britain's response to the actions of Kühlmann. As a result, the highest ranks of the department were involved and more importantly, the matter proceeded beyond the Foreign Office and was discussed at Cabinet level. This is demonstrated in a minute by Chamberlain when he informed the Foreign Office, '[he]

[37] Minute by John Victor Perowne, 26 March 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2284/43/18.
[38] Message from Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 4 April 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2541/43/18.
[39] Minute by Perowne, 26 March 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2284/43/18.
[40] Minute by Sargent, 26 March 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2284/43/18.
[41] Minute by Lindsay, 26 March 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2284/43/18.
[42] Minute by Chamberlain, 26 March 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2284/43/18.

entirely agrees [with the department's opposition to Kühlmann] and so does the Cabinet.[43] The Cabinet had clearly discussed the subject earlier and through Chamberlain, informed the Foreign Office that ministers agreed with its policy. This case demonstrates that the issue had forced the German colonial question up the Foreign Office's priority list, closer to the level of interest it received in 1926.

This section of the chapter has shown that during several key years, the German colonial question was of critical importance to the Foreign Office. However, there were also years in which the subject was less of a concern to the department, but even then it was still an issue which would never quite leave the mind-set of the Foreign Office. Twice during the early interwar period the German colonial question became a much lower priority subject. The first instance was during 1922, when there were few discussions regarding the German colonial question. That year was dominated by the Chanak Crisis and the subsequent downfall of the Lloyd George Government, hence, European and domestic matters increased in significance. In that troubled year, it is likely that the Foreign Office was simply forced to focus its attentions elsewhere, rather than on the German colonial question. The second instance was during the final months of 1926 and the beginning of 1927, when there was a rapid decline in importance of the colonial question to most Germans. There could have been several reasons for this; most notably, more pressing concerns within Germany during that time. These anxieties included: the fallout from the French withdrawal from the Ruhr a few months before, Wilhelm Marx, German Chancellor, trying to hold his government together, occupation of the Rhineland and Germany entering the League of Nations. However, as discussed in Chapter Two, the Foreign Office was completely convinced that it was because the British Government stood up to German colonial ambitions, giving much of the credit to

[43] Ibid.

the speeches of Amery, the Minister for Colonial Affairs and the Minister for Dominion Affairs.[44]

Consequently, there was a great deal of fluctuation in the importance of the German colonial question during the early interwar period. However, even in the years when the subject dipped in the list of priorities within the Foreign Office, it was an issue which would never leave the mind-set of the department. Even in 1923 and 1927, when the department believed that this issue had a lower priority, the permanent officials did not let it rest. There was always a reason for this topic to be discussed again, whether this was by carrying out investigations into an American professor[45] or gaining intelligence on the views of the officials within the *Auswärtiges Amt*. The latter was a response to a report from Rumbold, regarding a comment from Stresemann, it stated, 'he was being pressed by all sides for the information as to the bearing of Hilton Young report on the status of mandated territory of former German East Africa.'[46] The permanent officials at the Foreign Office then turned to their informants to gain an insight into the level of interest in Germany on this subject. The investigation culminated in a secret report, titled *The German Colonial Question*, dated 26 July 1929, which first revealed the plan for Germany to gain Angola, as discussed earlier in the chapter.[47] Such an incidence demonstrates, that even during times when the German colonial question was not a high priority within the Foreign Office, the permanent officials would still use Britain's intelligence networks to oversee the subject.

Other important examples of the Foreign Office's inability to disregard the German colonial question, was when the personnel turned minor events into major issues. Two significant

[44] Minute by Huxley, 19 June 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7069/539/18, Minute by Troutbeck , 3 July 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7422/539/18, no author given, A United East Africa; Mr. Amery on Recent Progress, *The Times*, 12 June 1926.
[45] Message from G.H. Villiers to Sir Auckland G. Geddes, 12 March 1923, TNA/FO371/9440/W1788/1788/98.
[46] Message from Horace Rumbold, to Foreign Office, 4th February 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C969/43/18.
[47] Secret Report titled *The German Colonial Question*, 26 July 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C6076/43/18.

cases involved the actions of Kühlmann and the controversy regarding the use of former German colonial names, when referring to British mandates in official German documents. As mentioned previously, Kühlmann was a low ranking official acting without the support of his own government. Hence, this incident should not have been a major issue and certainly not discussed by the highest ranks of the Foreign Office and the Cabinet. Another effective example regards the use of German colonial names, within German documents given to the League of Nations. Dr Teubert,[48] the German representative on the Committee for the Unification of Transport Statistics of the League of Nations, circulated a memorandum which referred to British mandates by former German colonial names.[49] This was a minor discretion by a low ranking official in an unimportant part of the League of Nations; it could have been ignored or quietly dealt with by communicating with Teubert. However, the permanent officials reacted with hostility. Howard Smith wrote that the German use of old colonial names when referring to British mandates, 'should not be allowed to stand.'[50] Similar statements were made by Christopher Warner, of the Central Department[51] and Percy Koppel, one of the Councillors at the Foreign Office.[52] In response, the Foreign Office cooperated with the French Government[53] to investigate Teubert's actions within the League of Nations[54] leading eventually to an official protest to the German Government.[55]

Both Kühlmann's actions and the use of former German colonial names for British mandates in German documents were trivial matters. However, the permanent officials at the Foreign Office found it impossible to let these events pass unchallenged, so they decided to turn them

[48] His full name is not recorded.
[49] Message from C. Howard Smith to C.W. Dixon, 3 January 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C43/43/18.
[50] Message from Charles Howard Smith to C.W. Dixon, 3 January 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C43/43/18.
[51] Minute by Christopher Frederick Ashton Warner, 19 February 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C1250/43/18.
[52] Minute by Percy Alexander Koppel, 20 February 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C1250/43/18.
[53] Message from French Foreign Ministry to British Foreign Office, 9 January 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C273/43/18.
[54] Message from E.J. Elliot to C. Howard Smith, 14 February 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C1250/43/18.
[55] Draft message to Sir R. Rumbold, undated, TNA/FO371/13615/C4972/43/18.

into issues far bigger than they should have been. Only a subject that was of fundamental importance to the permanent officials at the Foreign Office, would have ingrained itself into their mind-set in such a way, which made these overreactions possible.

This section of the chapter has proved that colonial issues were important to the early interwar Foreign Office. However, it should not be taken to the extreme and claim that it was the highest priority for the department. As discussed in Chapter Three, the way the Foreign Office reacted to the German colonial question impacted on other areas of Anglo-German relations, but only to a limited extent. For instance, in 1925, the Germans felt that they were not getting fair access to their former colonies. This issue became the 'principal stumbling-block'[56] to the Reichstag passing the Anglo-German Commercial Treaty. Other instances include the Foreign Office's attempt to block Germany gaining membership to the Permanent Mandates Commission, within the League of Nations[57] and Stresemann's frustration with Chamberlain's refusal to cooperate on colonial issues.[58] However, these are only isolated cases. The Foreign Office was never going to completely undermine its relationship with Germany, particularly on European issues, because of disagreements on colonial concerns. Therefore, imperial issues were important to the early interwar Foreign Office, but they were not the department's overwhelming priority.

In order to provide a more informed context to how the early interwar Foreign Office viewed the importance of colonial issues, it will be compared to how its predecessors viewed the same subject. This is an effective way of analysing the Foreign Office of the 1920s, because it reveals that imperial issues actually increased in importance to the department following the First World War. Had this comparison not been made, such critical perspective would

[56] Minute by Huxley, 17 March 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C3825/2994/18.
[57] Minute written by Troutbeck, 25 November 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10779/59/98, Minute written by Perownne, 3 March 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C2994/2994/18, Message from G.H. Villiers to Sir Ronald Lindsay, 30 November 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10779/59/98.
[58] Eric Sutton, *Gustav Stresemann, Diaries, Letters and Papers*, Volume II, (Macmillan and Co, London, 1937) 237.

have been missed. Evidence demonstrates that analysing colonial issues during the early interwar period, indicate that the Foreign Office was closer to its Victorian counterpart rather than the department of the Edwardian era.

The Foreign Office, and the wider British Government, were heavily focused on growing and protecting the empire during the Victorian era. This can be seen in the rapid growth in imperial territory between 1830 and 1901, and the government's desire to crush all opposition to British rule. Whether that opposition be from the Zulu Empire, 1879, Indian rebels, 1857-1859 or the independent Boer States, 1899-1902. Steiner argued that the individuals in the Foreign Office at this time had a pre-occupation with imperial issues and problems.[59]

The Edwardian Foreign Office however, held a different view, as the department relegated imperial issues to a secondary priority. The permanent officials at the department kept track of German activities outside Europe,[60] but unlike the Victorians, they saw them from a negative viewpoint[61] (as will be discussed in detail later in this chapter). However, as historians including Steiner[62] and Muriel E. Chamberlain[63] have indicated, colonial issues were not the reason for rising tensions and eventual war between Britain and Germany from 1902 until 1914. This is not to argue that the Edwardians did not care for colonial matters; they just felt other issues were more crucial.

One issue which the Edwardians considered to be of the highest priority was the naval arms race between the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet. It was this particular issue which led to the rise in tension between the two nations. Kaiser Wilhelm II may have

[59] Zara Steiner in F.H. Hinsley, *British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey*, (Cambridge University Press 1977) 24.
[60] Sir N. O. Conor to Sir Edward Grey, 30 April 1906, TNA/FO371/108/14565, Unknown to Foreign Office, 3 May 1906, TNA/FO371/11/541/15013.
[61] Sir Evelyn Baring to Foreign Office, 12 March 1906, TNA/FO372/59/8560.
[62] Zara Steiner in F.H. Hinsley, *British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey*, (Cambridge University Press 1977) 24.
[63] Muriel E. Chamberlain, *Pax Britannica: British Foreign Policy 1789-1914*, (Longman 1988) 179.

built his navy with the hope of creating a stronger alliance with Britain.[64] However, it angered the British Government.[65] No department saw the increase in the German navy as a threat to Britain more than the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service.[66] Once the naval arms race ended in 1912, Anglo-German relations greatly improved.[67] Therefore, it can be argued that the naval arms race rather than colonial issues brought about the rise in tension between the two empires.

As far as the declaration of war in 1914 was concerned, colonial matters had even less of an impact. Grey's rejection of the German offer for British neutrality[68] only mentioned colonial matters in passing and did not mention naval matters at all.[69] The reply regarded European concerns, the neutrality of Belgium and the British fear that Germany could defeat France and therefore remove her as a Great Power.[70] Similarly, the British Declaration of War did not mention colonial matters. Instead, the reason it gave for the declaration of war was the failure of the German Government to reply to an 'assurance respecting the neutrality of Belgium.'[71] The British rejection of neutrality and the declaration of war barely mentioned colonial matters, indicating that the subject was a lower priority for the Edwardian Foreign Office when compared to continental European concerns.

Therefore, the Victorians viewed colonial matters as one of its highest priorities, while the Edwardians regarded it as a much lower concern. A comparison between the 1920s, Foreign

[64] Robert K. Massie, *Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany and the Winning of the Great War at Sea*, (Jonathan Cape 2004) 10.
[65] Robert K. Massie, *Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany and the Winning of the Great War at Sea*, (Jonathan Cape 2004), 10, F.H. Hinsley, *British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey*, (Cambridge University Press 1977), 314.
[66] Mr Fairfax Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey, 10 June 1907, TNA/FO371/260/19056.
[67] Unknown to Foreign Office, 7 January 1914, TNA/FO371/1985/776, Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain made the Modern World*, (Penguin Books 2004) 298.
[68] The German offered the British a deal in which Britain remained neutral and the Germany would promise to keep Netherlands neutrality, respect integrity of Belgium after the war is over and would not take European territory from France but made no such promise about non-European territory. This deal was sent to Britain on the 29th July 1914.
[69] Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, 30 July 1914, TNA/FO371/2159/30342.
[70] Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, 30 July 1914, TNA/FO371/2159/30342.
[71] Sir Edward Grey to German Embassy 4 August 1914, TNA/FO371/2161/30342.

Office and its predecessors is very revealing. The early interwar Foreign Office may not have considered colonial issues as an overwhelming priority, but its mind-set was much closer to that of the Victorian department than the Edwardian. The early interwar Foreign Office generally viewed colonial matters to be significant, even if its exact priority fluctuated regularly. Through this comparison it is clear that the Edwardian mind-set of being less concerned regarding imperial issues was short-lived, as imperial matters increased in significance following the First World War. Additionally, such comparison serves as further evidence to one of the main arguments of this thesis, that the First World War did little to undermine the traditional view of imperialism. In fact, this critical piece of information could be easily overlooked if the early interwar Foreign Office had been only viewed in isolation.

The views of the Foreign Office on Germany

This section of the chapter will compare the early interwar Foreign Office's views on Germany, with the views of its predecessors in the Victorian and Edwardian eras. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the permanent officials and political leaders of the Foreign Office between 1919 and 1929, had a lingering anti-German stance. In this respect, their views were the complete opposite to their Victorian counterparts and similar to the Edwardians, even if they were not as extreme as the latter. This comparison is paramount, as it shows that the First World War had not quite cemented a hostile view on Germany, but the mistrust between the two countries remained. However, it also reveals that the cooperation and alliances between the kingdoms and empires of the British Isles and Germanic territories which had existed for 400 years were not going to return in the 1920s.

Ever since King Henry VIII of England joined forces with the Holy Roman Empire during the Italian Wars, 1494-1559, the English and later the British had continuous friendly relations with many of the Germanic states and empires, until the start of the twentieth

century. The Victorians continued this policy, when Imperial Germany established itself after the Austro-Prussian War, 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871. There was a committed friendship between the two empires[72] which Michael Stürmer described as, 'the silent alliance between Britain and Germany.'[73] Jean Stengers wrote, '[a]t some time….Britain and Germany felt very close and acted in close cooperation.'[74] Stenger's main example of the cooperation is that the two countries planned to divide up the Portuguese African Empire amongst them. She claimed, '[w]hen they negotiated on the possible partition of the Portuguese colonies, Britain and Germany certainly considered themselves two highly civilized nations who had to provide for what might happen to a much less civilized and capable one.'[75] She described this as, 'evidence, in an indirect way, of mutual esteem.'[76]

The Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service during the Victorian era showed a strong cultural affiliation with the Germans, describing them as Britain's 'blood relative.'[77] This positive outlook led them to view German actions in a very different way to that of the early interwar and Edwardian periods. For instance, during the Victorian era the department kept regular checks on the colonial actions and ambitions of Imperial Germany.[78] However, the Victorians saw German colonial power as something positive. Their view was that as Britain's ally grew in power, this would in turn increase British influence. For instance, when Germany, in 1874, gained further influence and trade treaty rights in Persia, the Foreign Office believed that this would help Britain gain further economic assets in the country.[79] That kind of attitude led to a close cooperation between the British Empire and German

[72] Muriel E. Chamberlain, *Pax Britannica: British Foreign Policy 1789-1914*, (Longman 1988) 124
[73] Michael Stürmer, *The German Empire 1871-1919*, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 2000) 65
[74] Jean Stengers in Prosser Gifford, WM. Roger Louis, Alison Smith, *Britain and Germany in Africa; Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1967) 345
[75] Ibid 345.
[76] Ibid 345.
[77] Message from Mr Gosselin to Foreign Office, 25 November 1895, TNA/FO64/1351/278.
[78] Foreign Office to L.E.O Russell, 5 December 1874, TNA/FO64/800/261, Lord Ampthuill to Foreign Office, 28 March 1883, TNA/FO64/1031/37, Sir E. Malet to Foreign Office, 14 May 1885, TNA/FO64/1086/17, Sir E. Malet to Foreign Office, 16 May 1885, TNA/FO64/1086/19.
[79] Message from India Office to Foreign Office, 6 October 1874, TNA/FO64/1874/809.

Empire on colonial matters, including the signing of the Anglo-German Agreement relating to Africa and Helgoland in July 1890, and Britain offering to send warships to protect German subjects in Chile in 1891.[80]

This view point of seeing a growing German power as a positive aspect, or at the very least not a concern, continued into continental European matters. The Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871, witnessed the destruction of the Second French Empire (which was replaced by the Third French Republic), the bombardment of Paris and the German army asserting itself as the dominant military force on the continent. The British Foreign Office's reaction to the war in 1870, was completely different to that of 1914. The department lacked the same level of anxiety towards a German military victory. There were some minor concerns regarding the security of Belgium,[81] but once it became clear that the Prussian monarchy had no interest in annexing parts of Belgium, the British Government was satisfied.[82] The Foreign Office's attitude signifies that it was more willing to give Berlin a free hand in Europe in 1870, than it was in 1914.

The department's attitude did not mean that between 1870 and 1901, there was only friendship between the British and German Empires. Occasionally, there were frictions between the two nations. One of the most prominent examples was during the Second Boer War, 1899-1902, when Germany offered limited political support and small arms to the Boer Republics. However, these periods of friction never had a realistic chance of turning into open conflict between Britain and Germany. The periods of hostility between the two countries before the death of Queen Victoria, were always fleeting, and friendly relations would quickly re-establish themselves.

[80] Message from Count Metteinich to Foreign Office, 29 January 1891, TNA/FO64/1262/49.
[81] Foreign Office to Lord A Loftus, 6th August 1870, TNA/FO64/682/82.
[82] Ibid

Instead of viewing Germany as a threat, the Victorian Foreign Office and wider British Government viewed France and the Russian Empire as the main threat to British colonial interests.[83] This had been the British Governments' attitude for centuries and, therefore, it made good strategic sense to ally with the Germanic kingdoms and empires to fight against France and Russia. These were the strategies their predecessors had used in the Spanish War of Succession, 1702-1715, and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1792-1815. There were only two instances when large numbers of British and Germanic troops would be on opposing sides. The first was when the Germanic kingdoms became puppet states of the French, for instance, in the Confederation of the Rhine, 1806-1813. The second was when German States were divided and fought each other, for example, during the War of Austrian Succession, 1740-1748. Even during these two occasions the British always supported the dominant German powers: Austria and Prussia in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and the Hapsburg Monarchy during the War of Austrian Succession. The continuation of this policy is demonstrated in March 1896, when the Kaiser came to visit the British Embassy in Berlin in the middle of the night. He sought to warn the British Government that German intelligence had learnt that Russia and France were planning an attack on the British Empire.[84] The Kaiser conveyed his assurances that if France and Russia attacked, Germany and Austria-Hungary would go to war to protect Britain.[85] This incident verifies the general friendship and alliance between the British and Germans in order to fight their mutual enemies, the French and Russians, in the decades leading up to the twentieth century.

The pro-German stance was not shared by the Foreign Office of the Edwardian era, at least not after December 1905, once Grey became Foreign Secretary. This is evident in how the department reacted to individual permanent officials and dignitaries, who voiced a pro or

[83] Muriel E. Chamberlain, *Pax Britannica: British Foreign Policy 1789-1914*, (Longman 1988) 123.
[84] Message from Sir J. Lascelles to Foreign Office, 4 March 1896, TNA/FO64/1376/59.
[85] Ibid.

anti-German view. Those who worded their reports to describe German actions in a negative light received praise from the higher ranks in the Foreign Office. For instance, in June 1907, Fairfax Cartwright, British Minister for Bavaria and Württemberg, sent a report to the Foreign Office, which argued that the building up of the German navy was designed for a war against Britain.[86] All the responses from within the department to Cartwright's message recorded in the minutes are positive, including the statement, 'what a powerful thinker he is.'[87] However, those who tried to defend German actions and argued that Germany did not want war with Britain, received the opposite reaction, often their comments were dismissed or ridiculed. Grey, in particular, was quick to dismiss any pro-German opinions within the department. For example, Frank Lascelles, British Ambassador in Berlin 1895-1908, tried desperately to inform Grey that, '[t]he Emperor [Kaiser Wilhelm II] certainly desired friendship with England.'[88] Grey ridiculed Lascelles's opinion and described it as, 'an act of unreality.'[89] To have an individual as high in the Diplomatic Service as an ambassador, having his opinion dismissed in such a way by Grey would have impacted on the rest of the Foreign Office. It certainly, would have made many of the permanent officials, particularly those in junior ranks, reluctant to voice pro-German opinions. A similar situation, when the interwar Foreign Office dealt with decisions regarding Germany regaining its former colonies, is mentioned in Chapter Two. Where opinions did not fit into the department's consensus they were rejected, limiting debate on the subject. In this way, the Foreign Office remained committed to an anti-German stance, between 1906 and 1913, even if a few individuals did not share that view.

[86] Message from Mr Fairfax Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey, 10 June 1907, TNA/FO371/260/19056.
[87] Minutes to the message Mr Fairfax Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey, 10 June 1907, TNA/FO371/260/19056.
[88] Message from Sir F. Lascelles to Foreign Office, 28 May 1906, TNA/FO371/78/18131.
[89] Sir Edward Grey's response to the message from Sir F. Lascelles to Foreign Office, 28 May 1906, TNA/FO371/78/18131.

It is therefore, ironic that the only time the Foreign Office held a pro-German position during Grey's time as Foreign Secretary was in the first few months of 1914. Grey attempted to rectify relations with the German Government in the final months before the First World War, and relations between the two countries improved. Lloyd George,[90] Churchill[91] and the Austrian Parliament[92] all noticed this progress in relations. The Kaiser had even invited members of the British Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service to attend a celebration for the birthday of King George V, an event which had not happened since the Victorian era.[93] There was also a British naval squadron in Kiel on a goodwill visit to Germany on 28 June 1914, the day when Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was assassinated. Unfortunately, the events of June and July 1914, undid all the efforts to improve the relationship between the two empires. This brief period of pro-German attitude within the Foreign Office did not prevent the department from supporting war in July 1914, nor did it diminish an anti-German stance which had existed for almost a decade.

Therefore, there is a clear difference between the pro-German Victorians and the anti-German Edwardians. Comparing the early interwar Foreign Office to these predecessors, reveals that the anti-German mind-set unsurprisingly lingered into the interwar period. However, it was much milder than the pre-1914 era, indicating that the First World War did not reinforce a fundamentally negative view on Germany. The exact details of the Foreign Office's views on Germany were demonstrated in detail within Chapter Three. For the purpose of this chapter it will be adequate to state that there were several influential officials who held negative views on Germany, including Crowe,[94] Sargent[95] and Austen

[90] Unknown to Foreign Office, 7 January 1914, TNA/FO371/1985/776.
[91] Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain made the Modern World*, (Penguin Books 2004) 298.
[92] Message from R.L. Craige to Foreign Office, 13 July 1914, TNA/FO371/1991/31719.
[93] Message from Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, 8 June 1914, TNA/FO371/1990/25529.
[94] Annexed note written by Crowe, 17 November 1921, TNA/FO371/6417/E12608/76/34.
[95] Message from Austen Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon, 21 May 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C6145/2994/18, Minute written by Austen Chamberlain, 1 February 1926, TNA/FO371/11248/C1154/6/18.

Chamberlain,[96] This led the department, particularly after 1924, to mistrust the Germans and to support France and Poland in disputes with Germany.[97] Furthermore, the department held strong opposition to any attempts made by Germany to regain any of her former colonies.

Therefore, there was an anti-German leaning within the Foreign Office, particularly when Chamberlain was Foreign Secretary. However, it would be inaccurate to put this on a par with the Edwardian era. Most individuals within the Foreign Office, between 1919 and 1929, opposed German colonial ambitions out of a desire to defend British interests, not through an underlying hostility towards Germany. As Chapter Two proved, the department was united in its determination to prevent Germany interfering with Britain's mandates or sphere of influence. However, this determination did not apply to German colonial ambitions if it did not directly threaten British interests. For example, both Villiers and Lindsay were unconcerned with Germany gaining Angola as a mandate. [98] Therefore, Chamberlain's Foreign Office held some hostility towards Germany, but it was not as extreme as when Grey was Foreign Secretary.

A final reason why the mistrust towards Germany was much milder in the early interwar period, in comparison to the Edwardian era, was due to the absence of the threat of war. As discussed in Chapter Three, Crowe had talked about the possibility of a war with Germany as early as 1905.[99] However, there was no belief within the early interwar Foreign Office that Germany would attempt a military confrontation with Britain, either then or in the near future. Neither Crowe, nor any other individual within the department brought up the possibility. The Foreign Office might become concerned at Germany trying to gain influence in countries Britain considered within its sphere of influence, but it never accused the

[96] Minute by Sargent, 11 May 1928, TNA/FO371/12908/C3407/1069/18.
[97] Copy of telegram from Foreign Office to Lord D'Abernon, 12 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4531/539/18.
[98] Minute by Villiers, 25 April 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18, Message from R.C. Lindsay to Howard Smith, 1 May 1928, TNA/FO371/12908/C3407/1069/18.
[99] Memorandum written by Crowe, 29 March 1905, TNA/FO800/12.

Germans of trying to position themselves in an advantageous place for a future war. This indicates that the fear of war which existed during the time of the Edwardian Foreign Office[100] simply did not exist between 1919 and 1929.

In summary, the contrast between the Foreign Offices of the Victorian, Edwardian and early interwar period is very revealing. The early interwar Foreign Office was not as hostile towards Germany as the Edwardians, but was certainly not pro-German similar to the Victorians. The differences in attitudes indicate that the anti-German mind-set had declined, but still existed during the 1920s. Like the Edwardians, Chamberlain's Foreign Office promoted the views of those with mistrust towards Germany and dismissed those individuals considered to be too pro-German. However, most of the hostility to German colonial ambitions within the interwar Foreign Office was motivated from a desire to protect British interests rather than a negative view of Germany, especially as there was no fear of a future war between the two countries. Nevertheless, the presence of individuals such as Chamberlain and Sargent in the Foreign Office made it a certainty that the pro-German views of the Victorians would not return in the 1920s.

Conclusion

This chapter provides a comparison between the early interwar Foreign Office, with its counterparts during the Victorian and Edwardian eras. The comparison is important because the views of officials within the Victorian and Edwardian Foreign Offices were very different. The Victorians considered colonial issues to be of the highest priority and had a strong pro-German mind-set. Conversely, the Edwardians minimised the significance of imperial matters, in favour of European concerns, and were hostile towards Germany. By

[100] Message from Mr Fairfax Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey, 10 June 1907, TNA/FO371/260/19056, Minutes to the message Mr Fairfax Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey, 10 June 1907, TNA/FO371/260/19056.

comparing the early interwar Foreign Office to its counterparts in the two proceeding eras, the thesis provides critical context that would otherwise have been missed.

With regard to the priority of colonial matters, the interwar Foreign Office was much closer to its Victorian counterpart than the Edwardian department. The significance of colonial matters fluctuated between 1919 and 1929, but overall it was an issue the permanent officials took seriously. There were a large number of discussions within the department, mainly in the Central and the Western, General and League of Nations Departments, which included many of the middle ranking members of the institution. More importantly, these discussions often encompassed the very highest members of the department, including the Foreign Secretaries and the Permanent Under Secretaries. Only an issue which the Foreign Office considered to be of great importance would receive this level of recorded attention. Therefore, even if the 1920s Foreign Office, did not apply the same extreme intentions or priorities on colonial issues as their Victorian predecessors, the department still considered the subject to be significant. Revealing the early interwar Foreign Office's mind-set provides essential information regarding the history of imperial ideology. It indicates that the Edwardian era's loss of interest in colonial concerns was short-lived and that the First World War, did little to undermine imperialism as an ideology in Britain.

The second comparison explored the Foreign Office's views on Germany. The Victorians viewed Germany in a positive light and favoured alliances with them, while the Edwardians viewed the country with suspicion and hostility. Undoubtedly, this did not mean that the Victorians always supported the Germans, for instance, there were disagreements over the Boer Wars, and, of course, not every Edwardian disliked Germany. However, overall the Victorians and Edwardians had holistically differing views on the relationship between the British and German Empires, shaped by the geo-politics of each era. The early interwar Foreign Office in this regard was much closer to the Edwardian mind-set but not to the same

extreme degree. There was residual hostility within the department, lingering on from before the First World War. Such hostility was magnified by individuals like Sargent and Chamberlain who had a greater distrust of German intentions, regardless of whether it was over colonial concerns or events such as border disputes with Poland. The general view within the department was to oppose German colonial ambitions, similar to the Edwardian view. However, unlike the Edwardians, this was not due to a broad disapproval of German imperial desires, instead, it was a desire to protect the British Empire. When German ambitions did not directly impact on Britain, the response from the Foreign Office was milder and some even believed it to be positive.

Hostility towards Germany was present within the mind-set of the permanent Foreign Office officials after the First World War, but it was not as extreme as that of their Edwardian counterparts. This indicates that the Great War did not cement an excessive anti-German feeling within the department, signifying that the hatred of the war could fade over time. However, the close friendship and respect which the Victorians shared with Germany, was not going to return in the 1920s.

Chapter Five

German attempts to regain a colonial role

The preceding four chapters were devoted to analysing the first two topics of the thesis, namely; the role of the Foreign Office in deciding Britain's foreign policy, along with the department's imperial ideology and its impact on Anglo-German relations. This final chapter will discuss the third topic, which is a comprehensive examination of the German colonial campaign, detailing how the campaign was organised, who were its leading supporters and why it was ultimately unsuccessful. Even though the research for this thesis is entirely focused on British Government sources rather than German documentation, it can still greatly improve the historical understanding of this subject.

The literature review explained why the existing literature fails to adequately analyse the German colonial campaign. For the purpose of this chapter it will be sufficient to give a brief description of this gap in current historical research. Existing studies on the foreign policy of the Weimar Republic, including the works of Turner, Hiden, Carsten, Lee and Michalka, do not mention how imperial interests and ambitions impacted on German policy.[1] Instead, they focused mainly on European concerns with a special interest on the Locarno Treaty and disarmament. At the same time, individuals, including Stoecker and Crozier, who completed general research involving German colonial ambitions, focused on Imperial and Nazi Germany providing only a brief outline of the Weimar period.[2] There are few historians who have researched the imperial interests of the Weimar Republic in any detail. Unfortunately,

[1] H. A. Turner, *Stresemann: and the Politics of the Weimar Republic,* (Greenwood Press, Westport, 1963), J. Hiden, *Germany and Europe 1919-1939,* (Longman, London, 1977), F.L. Carsten, *Britain and the Weimar Republic: the British documents*, (Batsford Academic and Educational Ltd, London, 1984), Marshall. M. Lee, Wolfgang Michalka, *German Foreign Policy 1917-1933; Continuity or Break*, (Berg Publishers, Leamington Spa, 1987).

[2] A. J. Crozier, *Appeasement and Germany's last bid at Colonies* (Macmillan Press, London, 1988), Edited by Helmuth Stoecker, Translated by Bernd Zöllner, *German Imperialism in Africa; From the Beginning until the Second World War*, (C. Hurst & Company, London, 1986).

their work has limitations. For example, Wempe's work is undermined by his unsuccessful attempt to link German colonial ambitions to the Locarno negotiations.[3] Another instance would be the two pieces of research completed by Schmokel (discussed in the literature review), which completely contradict each other.[4]

Rüger's research into the colonial ambitions of the Weimar Republic was equally problematic. He provided a detailed account of the organisation and leadership of the German colonial campaign between 1918 and 1933. However, his arguments are contradicted by the evidence uncovered in this research. He gave an impression of a well-coordinated campaign, centrally controlled by the German Foreign Ministry. Rüger described how the German Foreign Ministry provided support for the colonial campaign and stated, 'the propaganda campaign [was] financed primarily by the [German] Foreign Office.'[5] He then went further saying that the Colonial Department of the German Foreign Ministry coordinated and planned the colonial campaign. His argument was that, 'it involved detailed planning for a long-term strategy and for tactical moves by both the government and private bodies.'[6] He believed Stresemann was one of the leading individuals behind this organisation. Therefore, he claimed, '[u]ntil the early years of Nazi rule this took place according to the "Colonial Policy Guidelines" submitted by the Colonial Department of the Foreign Office on 10 November 1924 after consultation with interested business circles, politicians, ideologists and propagandists and subsequently endorsed by Stresemann.'[7] Rüger argued that this level of coordination allowed the colonial campaign to be relatively effective. His view was, '[i]n

[3] Sean Andrew Wempe, Peripheral Players? German Colonial Interests, The Press, and the Spirit of Locarno, *International History Review*, Volume 40, Issue 1, (March 2017) 177-205.
[4] Wolfe W. Schmokel, *Dream of Empire: German Colonialism, 1919-1945*, (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1964) 14, Wolfe W. Schmokel in Prosser Gifford, WM. Roger Louis, Alison Smith, *Britain and Germany in Africa; Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1967) 301.
[5] Adolf Rüger in, Edited by Helmuth Stoecker, Translated by Bernd Zöllner, *German Imperialism in Africa; From the Beginning until the Second World War*, (C. Hurst & Company, London, 1986) 313.
[6] Ibid 314.
[7] Ibid 314.

putting these plans into effect the Colonial Department made sure that all interested groups and institutions were cooperating in an organized fashion.'[8] In order to prove his point, Rüger mentioned two achievements of the German colonial campaign. The first was the productive effort by the Committee on Colonial Economic Affairs to support German economic presence in former colonies.[9] Second, he recorded the successful attempts of the German financial banks to influence the government of South Africa.[10]

However, Rüger's arguments are not supported by this thesis. His belief that the German colonial campaign was well organised, under the overall leadership of the German Government is unrealistic. The evidence uncovered by this research demonstrates that the German Government, even though it was highly supportive of the colonial movement, provided very little in terms of leadership to the campaign. Instead, the colonial movement was decentralised, with various individuals working independently on their own strategies and objectives, and little cooperation between them. Furthermore, Rüger's opinion that the German colonial campaign was successful is an over optimistic assessment. Certainly gaining economic access to Germany's former colonies and South Africa was an achievement. However, it was nowhere near what the campaign set out to gain. At the absolute minimum, the members of the campaign wanted large scale settlement of German citizens in other nation's colonies. However, what they really wanted was Germany to be granted a colony or a mandate.

Existing English speaking studies have not previously analysed the German colonial campaign during the 1920s, to any satisfactory degree. Consequently, there is an opportunity for this thesis to provide new insights into the subject. The first aspect that the new research provides, regards which sections of German society were most interested in recovering a

[8] Ibid 315.
[9] Ibid 310.
[10] Ibid 311.

colonial role. The evidence demonstrates that it was the German elite rather than the general public who held the strongest desire to regain a colony. The second aspect is the detailed account of the decentralised nature of the campaign, which leads directly into an analysis on why the structure of the German colonial campaign ultimately caused it to fail. These two pieces of research will improve the historical knowledge of the interwar period, by presenting a view into the imperial mind-set and colonial ambitions of the Weimar Republic.

Before continuing, it is vital to note that the British Foreign Office would not have had a complete picture regarding the opinions of the German public. The department could attain sufficient information from its embassy staff and its intelligence network, to gain a reasonable amount of knowledge regarding which issues the German public considered important. However, it would have lacked the ability to correctly judge all the details regarding the priorities of the German general population. Furthermore, the Foreign Office occasionally misjudged the intentions of the German Government. For example, as mentioned previously, between 1925 and 1926, the department was universally opposed to a German representative on the Permanent Mandates Commission,[11] as officials believed Germany would use its membership to claim a mandate of its own. Chamberlain argued successfully to have this view accepted as the policy for the British Empire, despite strong opposition from the Colonial Office and the Dominion Office.[12] In fact, this belief within the department proved to be incorrect. When Germany gained representation on the commission, [13] it did not utilise its membership to endorse its own mandate. Instead, the German

[11] Minutes by Hurst, 2 December 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C15503/2994/18, Minute written by Perowne, 3 March 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C2994/2994/18, Minutes written by Troutbeck, 25 November 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10779/59/98, Message from G.H. Villiers to Sir Ronald Lindsay, 30 November 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10779/59/98, Minute written by Campbell, 23 September 1926, TNA/FO371/11876/W9037/56/98, Minutes by Hurst, 2 December 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C15503/2994/18, Minutes written by Chamberlain, 19 October 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10169/59/98.
[12] Telegram from Mr Amery to Lord Cecil, 27 September 1926, TNA/FO371/11876/W9166/56/98, Minute by Cadogan, 28 October 1926, TNA/FO371/11877/W10170/59/98.
[13] Report written by Newlands, 1 December 1927, TNA/FO371/12681/W11640/333/98, Report written by Lloyd, 19 November 1927, TNA/FO371/12681/W11640/333/98, Minute written by Kirkpatrick, 15 December

representative, Kastl, was often an ally of British representatives on the commission.[14] Therefore, the Foreign Office was more likely to be correct regarding the general picture rather than the exact details. Even though this thesis utilises only British resources, it can still provide illuminating evidence on the support within Germany regarding colonial issues. Future research dedicated to this subject that includes German sources would be able to add even more depth to this argument, complementing this thesis.

Support within Germany for colonial issues

The first section of this chapter will examine which sections of German society were the most interested in Germany regaining its status as a colonial power. Unlike the modern world where opinion poll data is used to provide detailed reports on the popularity of a given subject, the early twentieth century relied on less scientific methods. The Foreign Office trusted its officials within their embassy in Germany to know and report on the extent to which the German population supported colonial issues. Those officials based their analysis on how frequently and to what length the subject was discussed in newspapers and official circles, combined with 'gut instinct'. Despite the primitive nature of the Foreign Office's reports on the popularity or unpopularity of the colonial issue, they still provide an enlightening insight into the views of the German public. Further evidence can be added by a modern historian using historical documents that highlight which individuals supported German colonial ambitions. The combination of historical analysis and historical reports create a clear and rounded picture on which sections of German society were most interested in gaining a new colony or regaining old colonies.

1927, TNA/FO371/12681/W11640/333/98, Minute written by Chamberlain, 20 December 1927, TNA/FO371/12681/W11640/333/98.

[14] Report written by Newlands, 1 December 1927, TNA/FO371/12681/W11640/333/98.

In this manner, this section of the chapter will reveal that the main support for the resurrection of the German colonial empire, originated from the elite establishment of Germany. Popularity for colonial issues within the wider population throughout the early interwar period mainly centred in several key circles. These included the colonial societies and the military veterans. Outside these groups, colonial matters were often a low priority and only considered when there were no other concerns impacting on the country.

Evidence for the German elite supporting their country regaining its status as a colonial power is relatively easy to establish. The German Government, for instance, officially raised the subject of colonies several times during the early interwar period. In 1920, Simons, the German Foreign Minister, June 1920-May 1921, gave an official protest to the League of Nations regarding the distribution of their former colonies.[15] The Germans argued that the mandatory powers, including Britain, France and Japan, were overruling the authority of the League of Nations regarding the Mandate System, implying they were effectively annexing Germany's former colonies.[16] The German Government argued that the League of Nations had to be responsible for allocating the mandates and Germany should be considered as a mandatory power.[17] The colonial question was raised again in 1924, by the German Government as preparations and negotiations were being formed for Germany to enter the League of Nations. The German Government sent a message to all nations within the Council of the League of Nations stating that Germany should be given the right to take part in the Mandate System.[18] The reason given was that it was unfair to exclude any advanced nation with colonial experience from taking part in the system.[19] In both 1920 and 1924, Britain and

[15] League of Nations document titled *The Responsibility of the League under Article 22 of the Covenant*, 22 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12585/154/18.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Memorandum title *Memorandum on the German colonies*, 20 August 1926, TNA/FO371/11304/C9246/539/18.
[19] Ibid.

the other mandatory powers rejected Germany's arguments and, from a practical view point, the German Government gained nothing from official action. Even though these attempts were unsuccessful, the German Government felt the issue was important enough to raise it officially. This is clear evidence that colonial issues were important to the German establishment.

The official comments made in 1920 and 1924 were not the only unambiguous evidence indicating that the German Government supported regaining the country's position as a colonial power. Further confirmation comes from the number of prominent individuals within the government who supported efforts to restore a colony. The highest ranking member of the government who showed public support for imperial concerns was Stresemann, the Foreign Minister. Throughout the early interwar period he made a concerted effort to increase public approval for regaining lost colonies, including relevant speeches at Colonial Congresses.[20] He left the British Government with no illusion regarding his intentions towards the German colonial question. For example, he told Rumbold, that, 'he did not wish it to be supposed that he was reconciled for ever to the loss of German colonial empire.'[21] Stresemann was supported within the government by other ministers who shared his beliefs and ambitions. These like-minded individuals included Külz,[22] Heinrich Held,[23] the Minister President of Bavaria and Johannes Bell,[24] the Minister for Justice. It was not just the political leadership of the German Government who continued to advocate German colonial ambitions. There was also support relating to imperial interests within the German civil service, particularly from the *Auswärtiges Amt*, the German Foreign Ministry. Evidence from British intelligence

[20] Translation of a speech made at the German Colonial Congress, 17 September 1924, TNA/FO371/9845/C15131/10167/18.
[21] Message from Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 4 April 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2541/43/18.
[22] Message from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon, 24 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4596/539/18.
[23] Message from British Consulate General at Munich to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 12 March 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C3825/2994/18.
[24] Message from British Embassy in Berlin to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 8 March 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C1940/1069/18.

reports indicated that German officials within the Foreign Ministry advocated Germany gaining a mandate over Angola (which was discussed in previous chapters).[25] Consequently, there was a strong faction within the German Government that supported the country regaining a colonial role.

Outside the German Government, there was more support for imperial issues within the wider German elite, especially from those individuals who were once members of Germany's colonial administrations. For instance, Theodor Seitz, the former Governor of German South West Africa, became president of the German Colonial Society, which was a society devoted to keeping Germany's imperial ambitions alive in one form or another.[26] Another example of a previous governor continuing to support Germany regaining its former colonies was Schnee, the former Governor of German East Africa. He never renounced his belief that this former colony should be returned to Germany. In fact, he even went to the extent to describe it as, 'matters of life and death,'[27] Schnee became a leading opponent against Britain creating an East African Dominion, as this would have led to his former colony becoming a permanent addition to the British Empire.[28] Another member of the German establishment with similar views was Schacht.[29] He believed that overseas territory was vital for domestic stability as it would allow a destination for German migrants,[30] which would remove 'discontented elements such as retired officers and young men who, under the old régime, would have sought a military career.'[31] Notably, one of the most active individuals who

[25] Secret Report on German Colonial Policy, 30 March 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18.
[26] Message from Ormsby-Gore to Sir W. Tyrrell, 21 June 1927, TNA/FO371/12146/C5411/1323/18.
[27] T.R. Ybarra, Germany Wants Lost Colonies; Lands Taken by the Peace Treaty are Called an Economic Necessity to the Reich-Views of a Former African Governor, *New York Times*, 25 March 1928.
[28] Minute by Perowne, 21 February 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C1275/1069/18, Message from R.C. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 6 February 1928, TNA/FO371/2907/C1069/1069/18, Message R.C. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 15 February 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C1275/1069/18.
[29] Message from D'Abernon to Sir W.G. Tyrrell, 23 January 1926, TNA/FO371/11248/C1154/6/18.
[30] Message from Lord D'Abernon to Mr MacDonald, 26 June 1924, TNA/FO371/9845/C10167/10167/18.
[31] Ibid.

attempted to gain a colonial role for Germany was Ropp.[32] This former German agent's actions following the First World War[33] will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter. For this section it will be adequate to state that he played an active part in German attempts to regain a colonial role, including holding various discussions with high ranking members of the British Government.[34] The wider German elite kept German imperial ambitions alive. However, this subject lacked the same appeal within the general German population.

As mentioned previously, figuring out the popularity of a subject within a historical population is far from an exact science. However, the evidence gathered by the Foreign Office, combined with historical analysis reveals that for most of the early interwar period, colonial issues were not a major concern for the general German population. Only between 1925 and 1926 could an argument be made that this subject gained some public support (which will be discussed later in the chapter). Nevertheless, even during those years, it is unlikely that it was the highest priority issue for much of the populace. This implies that for the average German citizen the loss of the country's colonies was not a cause of great resentment as it was for the establishment.

Tracking the support for colonial issues within the German public using evidence gathered by the Foreign Office is difficult between 1919 and 1924. The main reason being that, there are no surviving records within the Foreign Office documents, which reveal information regarding the popularity of this issue within the German population during those years. It is impossible to know for certain, but it is likely the department never requested nor created any such documents between 1919 and 1924. This is due to a conviction within the Foreign Office during those years, that Germany was a defeated nation and its opinion on colonial issues was not important. For instance, when the German Government officially protested to

[32] Memorandum on Baron Frederick de Ropp, 19 March 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C2144/1069/18.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Letter from F. de Ropp to William Tyrrell, 15 November 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C15381/2994/18.

the League of Nations regarding the allocation of their former colonies during 1920, Crowe effectively dismissed it as an irrelevance.[35] This attitude meant that the Foreign Office would not believe it had a need to gather information regarding the views of the German public on colonial issues.

The lack of surviving evidence makes it difficult, but not impossible to analyse the popularity of this subject during those years. Evidence can be ascertained by examining the years 1927-1929, and then compare with information from the 1919-1924 time period. A close investigation of German domestic matters during these periods, can shed light on how the population prioritised international matters and more specifically, on the level of importance they gave to colonial issues. The British Foreign Office received a substantial number of reports regarding the popularity of regaining overseas territories within the German population, between the second half of 1926 and 1929. All of them described a sharp decline in support for regaining a colony. For instance, D'Abernon sent a message to the Foreign Office in August 1926, stating that the Berlin journalistic press were no longer taking much notice of the Colonial Congress in Hamburg.[36] D'Abernon's opinion that approval for this subject was in decline was also shared by Lindsay, who succeeded him as the British Ambassador to Germany. Lindsay sent a message to the Foreign Office in February 1928, writing that colonial issues were, 'obscured for the great public by questions of closer and more immediate import.'[37] It only continued to be important within 'narrow circles'[38] of Germany. Lindsay argued that for much of the German population imperial matters lost their significance in the face of more important issues occurring within Germany itself (these issues are discussed later in this chapter). Rumbold agreed with Lindsay believing colonial

[35] Minute by Crowe, 2 December 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12585/154/18.
[36] Message from British Embassy in Berlin to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 9 August 1926, TNA/FO371/11304/C8997/539/18.
[37] Message R.C. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 15 February 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C1275/1069/18.
[38] Ibid.

matters in Germany had, 'little popular support' because other issues were more important.[39] It was not just the Ambassadors who reported this decline in public support for regaining a colony. Other members of the embassy staff, including Nicolson, reported similar information.[40] What makes Nicolson's account so important is that it refers to the formation of the British East African Dominion. In previous chapters, it was stated that the German elite opposed Britain creating an East African Dominion, as it would have meant the permanent annexation of the mandate of Tanganyika. Nicolson wrote that the protests against the creation of an East African Dominion, 'does not appear to have stimulated the German public to any very lively interest.'[41] Clear evidence has been identified, that even when the German elite were considering colonial issues to be of substantial importance, their view was not shared by the general population.

The reports received by the Foreign Office regarding the decline in public support for imperial concerns are likely to be accurate given the fact that there are other pieces of evidence that showcase the same observation. First of all, several key members within the campaign for Germany to regain a colonial role also noticed this weakening in support. Both Seitz and Ropp believed that colonial matters had 'fallen behind,' within the public's priorities, due to concerns regarding Poland and the Rhineland.[42] In response to public opinion, they moderated their objectives, so instead of requiring Germany to gain a colony or mandate they sought to send settlers and establish communities within other empires' territories.[43] The leaders of the German colonial campaign talked openly with the Foreign Office officials stating that the public had turned against them, which vindicates the department's reports. An additional piece of evidence is the fact that by 1929, the, 'Reichstag

[39] Message by Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 15 February 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C1216/43/18.
[40] Message from British Embassy in Berlin to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 8 March 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C1940/1069/18.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Message from Ormsby-Gore to Sir W. Tyrrell, 21 June 1927, TNA/FO371/12146/C5411/1323/18.
[43] Ibid.

would not support any attempt to pursue an active colonial policy.'[44] If the Reichstag did not support the regaining of colonies this signals two important things. First, the representatives in the German Parliament were not under public pressure to bring up the issue and second, the elite were not united in regaining colonies, at least in 1929. With senior members of the colonial campaign moderating their objectives, and the Reichstag not fully supporting the regaining of colonies, it is clear evidence that only a few select circles within Germany considered colonial issues to be a priority.

In order to fully comprehend the comparison with the years 1919-1924, it is important to know, that the Foreign Office's documents do not only record that colonial issues were not a priority for the average German citizen between 1927 and 1929. Additionally, they provide a reason why the population's interest shifted, which significantly was not due to the German population giving up their imperial ideology. In fact, the wars of conquest and annexation of large amounts of territory in the late 1930s and early 1940s had wide public approval, revealing that this ideology remained dominant within the German mind-set. From 1927 to 1929, the average German citizen had more important issues within their daily lives to worry about, therefore any anxieties regarding territorial expansion was not their primary concern. This is revealed within reports from both Lindsay and Rumbold. Lindsay believed that the German public still possessed a 'strong'[45] desire for colonies that would reawaken in the future but only after current problems facing Germany had passed.[46] Rumbold went into greater detail writing, 'it must be remembered that the desire for colonies is deep-rooted in the German people.'[47] He elaborated saying, '[the] seed of colonial desire….[was not dead it was] lying dormant in an unfavourable soil.'[48] He concluded by stating that, '[i]f all the

[44] Message by Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 15 February 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C1216/43/18.
[45] Message from R.C. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 3 May 1928, TNA/FO371/12908/C3474/1069/18.
[46] Message R.C. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 15 February 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C1275/1069/18.
[47] Message by Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 15 February 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C1216/43/18.
[48] Ibid.

circumstances were again to become favourable he would be a brave man who would deny that this vigorous and progressive people would not again want colonies- and better colonies too- with something of that old blind and aggressive determination.'[49] The problems which Germany faced, between 1927 and 1929, were substantial. The economy was recovering, at least before the Wall Street Crash in October 1929, but it was still far from secure. Domestic politics were still uncertain as Marx tried to hold his government together.[50] In terms of foreign policy, the border disputes with Poland, Germany joining the League of Nations and relations with other European powers were all major concerns during that period. With these issues causing real worries for the German population, it is clear that Lindsay and Rumbold were correct to believe that the population was too distracted on social and economic concerns to focus on regaining colonies between 1927 and 1929.[51]

The fact that the German population was focused on other priorities between 1927 and 1929, neglecting colonial issues, is important, as it can be compared to the situation in Germany during the period 1919-1924. The country was in a far worse state economically and politically between 1919 and 1924, than at the end of the 1920s. Germany during the first few years following the end of the First World War was on the verge of collapse. The political scene was in chaos, with revolution attempts and the rise of separatist movements. Governments fell in quick succession, with nine different chancellors in the first five years of the Weimar Republic.[52] There was hyperinflation in the economy, the Rhineland was

[49] Ibid.
[50] Marx's second term lasted 2 years and 26 days making it the second longest term in the Weimar Republic which is an indication about how unstable the governments were between 1919 and 1933.
[51] It is important to note that this was not a few shared by most within the Foreign Office. Instead the permanent officials were convinced it was the British Government's opposition to Germany getting one of its former colonies which caused the Germans to lose interest in colonial ambitions. Minute by Huxley, 11 June 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7296/539/18, Minute by Troutbeck, 3 July 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7422/539/18 Minute by Howard Smith, 9 August 1927, TNA/FO371/12146/C6108/1323/18.
[52] Friedrich Ebert (November 1918-February 1919) Philipp Scheidemann (February 1919-June 1919) Gustav Bauer (June 1919-March 1920) Hermann Müller (March 1920-June 1920) Constantin Fehrenbach (June 1920-May 1921) Joseph Wirth (May 1921-November 1922) Wilhelm Cuno (November 1922-August 1923) Gustav Stresemann (August 1923-November 1923) Wilhelm Marx (November 1923-January 1925).

occupied by allied troops, and French and Belgian troops had invaded the Ruhr. It would, therefore, be completely illogical for the German population to consider regaining colonies as a higher priority during all the crises of the early 1920s, than during the less troubled years at the end of the decade.

It is only during 1925, and the first few months of 1926, that the Foreign Office documents indicate that the German population considered colonialism a primary issue. However, it is still unlikely that many more German citizens sought to focus on regaining a colony in 1925 and 1926, than any other year in the early interwar period. What is certain is that the Foreign Office reported a strong increase in the support for colonial issues within Germany during these two years. More specifically, the Foreign Office received several reports regarding the German Colonial Society trying to drive up public support for the issue in 1925. For example, British representatives in Munich reported major meetings of the Colonial Society within the city, during both March and June.[53] The latter date also included several public marches and speeches from Held and Prince Rupprecht, a leading member of the former Bavarian royal family.[54] The Colonial Society was not acting on its own; there was also an intense German colonial propaganda campaign, in both 1925 and 1926,[55] which was supported by the German elite (this campaign will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter). The department concluded that the Germans had recovered from the shock of losing the war and this had turned into a desire to regain colonies in order to resolve the country's economic problems.[56] By September 1926, the Foreign Office had become convinced that the Germans considered regaining a colonial role as a priority issue, leading the department to write a memorandum on the subject, which was circulated to the Dominion governments during the Imperial

[53] Message from British Consulate General at Munich to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 12 March 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C3825/2994/18, Message from H. Gaisford to Austen Chamberlain, 10 June 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C8113/2994/18.
[54] Message from H. Gaisford to Austen Chamberlain, 10 June 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C8113/2994/18.
[55] Memorandum on the German Colonial Question, 11 February 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C1733/539/18.
[56] Memorandum on the German Colonial Question, 20 August 1926, TNA/FO371/11304/C9246/539/18.

Conference of 1926.[57] A simple examination of this information would lead to an argument that the Foreign Office documents indicate a major increase in the support for colonies within the German population. However, a more detailed analysis reveals that this was not accurate.

It is easy to justify that the Foreign Office was correct in thinking colonial matters had become significant within the German elite. However, it is much more difficult to say the same regarding the overall German population. The reason is that Foreign Office reports indicating increased support of colonies within Germany, focused more on the country's establishment rather than its general populace. A representative case would be the *Memorandum respecting the German Claim for a Colonial Mandate*, written in 1926. This memorandum discussed the increase in the support for colonies within Germany.[58] However, this support was only linked to the German Government. The memorandum rarely discussed the general German public and mainly argued that '[t]he average German is probably convinced that England, if she did not engineer the war, at least welcomed it as a means of depriving Germany of her colonies.'[59] The few documents which discuss some form of support within the general population for colonial issues indicate two groups who voiced the most support. The first were the military veterans and the second were the members of the Colonial Society;[60] the Colonial Society had 80,000 members[61] and the military veterans would number in the millions. They both represent a substantial number of individuals, even though not all of them would support regaining colonies. Yet these numbers would not put them in a majority of the German population, particularly, when other major groups,

[57] Memorandum respecting the German Claim for a Colonial Mandate, 14 September 1926, TNA/FO371/11304/C9656/539/18.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Message from British Consulate General at Munich to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 12 March 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C3825/2994/18, Message from Consul-General Bentinck to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 15 November 1924, TNA/FO371/9799/C17668/668/18.
[61] Message from Ormsby-Gore to Sir W. Tyrrell, 21 June 1927, TNA/FO371/12146/C5411/1323/18.

including the socialists, opposed Germany regaining a colony.[62] Even though more people may have supported this subject between 1925 and 1926 than before or after these years, there is little reason to suppose that the increase would be significant. Particularly when the news was dominated by events of greater importance such as the Locarno Treaty in 1925, Germany joining the League of Nations in 1926, and the Rhineland Occupation from 1918 to1930. Therefore, even when the elite were highly interested in colonial issues between 1925 and 1926, their interest was not mirrored by the general German population.

In conclusion, the German elite were the main section of German society who were most interested in colonial matters during the early interwar period, rather than the German populace. There was a substantial faction within the German Government who aspired for the nation to regain its status as a colonial power. Members of that bloc included Stresemann, Külz, Held, Bell and members of the *Auswärtiges Amt*. They were also supported by other members of the German elite, including former governors of German colonies such as Seitz and Schnee, as well as, the President of the Reichsbank, Schacht. However, the establishment's desire for a colonial role was not an issue which was shared by the rest of the German public. During the early interwar period, average citizens were facing severe domestic issues that held a higher priority in their daily life compared to colonial matters. These included general political and economic instability, as well as particular issues regarding the Locarno Treaty, joining the League of Nations and the invasion of the Ruhr. In these circumstances it was difficult for other, non-domestic issues to gain much attention from the general public. Even in 1925 and 1926, when the Foreign Office reported an increase in support for colonial concerns, it only involved two sections of the German population, the military veterans and the members of the Colonial Society. Although both of these groups included a substantial number of people, they were still far from a majority. It is

[62] Message from Viscount D'Abernon to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 28 May 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7069/539/18.

essential to emphasise that the lack of public support for colonial issues during the early interwar period does not imply that the population had lost its imperialistic mind-set. On the contrary, most German citizens supported the wars of conquest of the 1930s and early 1940s. Instead, it was the instability of the 1920s, which meant other issues took priority over imperialism in the mind of the average German citizen between 1919 and 1929.

The nature of Germany's colonial campaign

This chapter has demonstrated that the German elite wanted to regain their country's position as a colonial power. However, they failed to achieve this goal during the 1920s. The existing English speaking literature records few facts that reveal, why the agenda of the German elite failed to be successful during that period. This section will correct this omission by providing an in-depth analysis on how the Germans conducted their colonial campaign. In particular, it will focus on how it was organised, what it hoped to achieve and most importantly why the campaign failed. This evidence will reveal that its main weakness was its lack of leadership and guidance. The German Government supported the colonial campaign, but failed to provide the necessary leadership to give it any chance of success. As a result, it became a highly decentralised campaign, with many different schemes and objectives carried out by individual officials and citizens. Even though some of these schemes, particularly the colonial propaganda campaign, raised the profile of the issue and created some political pressure, the lack of governmental coordination and strategy sealed the campaign's fate and therefore, any success would have been limited.

The decentralised nature of the German colonial campaign is clearly evident by the lack of an overall strategist and no agreed single policy. Instead, there were various independent strategies, including attempts to persuade the League of Nations to nominate Germany as one

of the nations to be granted a mandate.[63] Other schemes involved Germany gaining a mandate over the Portuguese colony of Angola,[64] and greater efforts were made to increase German trade and influence in South America[65] and China.[66] All of these plans had their own instigators. For instance, it was lone German officials within the *Auswärtiges Amt*, who came up with the idea of turning Angola into a German mandate (a plan described thoroughly in the previous chapters). [67] Another instigator was Kühlmann, who, acting on his own, attempted to use his committee to find support for Germany to gain a mandate.[68] However, the higher ranks of the German Government did not provide leadership to their officials' schemes. In Kühlmann's case, Stresemann went as far as renouncing him and sent a message to the Foreign Office where he asked, 'whether….[the British Foreign Office] really suppose that, if the German Government wished to raise the question of the partial restoration of their former colonies in Africa, they would do so through the intermediary of an entirely unofficial person.'[69] Instead, the German Government devised its own plans. For instance, Simons made an effort to convince the League of Nations to consider Germany for mandate administration.[70] As all of these different schemes had their own promoters, it substantially limited the amount of cooperation that could exist between them.

Even the German colonial propaganda campaign, which was the most successful aspect of Germany trying to regain her position as a colonial power, lacked centralised leadership. The

[63] League of Nations document titled *The Responsibility of the League under Article 22 of the Covenant*, 22 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12585/154/18.
[64] Secret Report on German Colonial Policy, 30th March 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18.
[65] Dispatch from Lord D' Abernon to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 9 August 1921, TNA/FO371/5974/C10299/416/18.
[66] Minute by Strang, 22 January 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F467/467/10, Report written by Aiers, 5 February 1929, TNA/FO371/13936/F1699/467/10.
[67] Secret Report on German Colonial Policy, 30 March 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18.
[68] Letter from Herr von Kühlmann to Sir W. Tyrrell, 19 March 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2359/43/18.
[69] Message from Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 4 April 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2541/43/18.
[70] League of Nations document titled *The Responsibility of the League under Article 22 of the Covenant*, 22 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12585/154/18.

campaign began in 1920,[71] and continued throughout the early interwar period. It reached its zenith during the middle of 1926,[72] followed by a sharp loss of momentum.[73] The German colonial propaganda campaign comprised of articles within the German media,[74] public events including rallies and protests,[75] gatherings most notably within the Colonial Congresses,[76] and the printing of literature.[77] All of these were designed to drive public opinion and put pressure on governments opposed to Germany regaining a colonial role. The scheme received regular support from the elite and government within Germany.[78] However, the German Government provided little in terms of leadership or direct coordination for the movement. Instead, it offered indirect support for reasons that will be discussed below.

Without the German Government providing leadership, it was left to charismatic individuals to drive forward the German colonial propaganda campaign. There were several such leaders, including Schnee.[79] However, by far the most important German citizen within the German colonial propaganda campaign was Ropp. Ropp's significance is demonstrated by the fact that the British Foreign Office took the time to create a memorandum on him, where they recorded details of his entire life and actions.[80] Ropp had been a German agent during the First World War, which led to him being banned from all ports controlled by the British

[71] Message from George C. Foster to Foreign Office, 15 July 1920, TNA/FO395/334/P751/751/150.
[72] Memorandum respecting the German Claim for a Colonial Mandate, 14 September 1926, TNA/FO371/11304/C9656/539/18.
[73] Minute by Huxley, 19 June 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7069/539/18, Minute by Troutbeck, 3 July 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C7422/539/18.
[74] Report by Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 24 February 1928, TNA/FO371/12900/C1473/763/18.
[75] Message from British Embassy in Berlin to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 8 March 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C1940/1069/18.
[76] Translation of a speech made at the German Colonial Congress, 17 September 1924, TNA/FO371/9845/C15131/10167/18.
[77] Communication from G. Gaddes to Under Secretary of State, 7 March 1923, TNA/FO371/9440/W1788/1788/98.
[78] Message from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord D'Abernon, 24 April 1926, TNA/FO371/11303/C4596/539/18.
[79] Minute by Perowne, 21 February 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C1275/1069/18, Message from R.C. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 6 February 1928, TNA/FO371/2907/C1069/1069/18, Message R.C. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 15 February 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C1275/1069/18.
[80] Memorandum on Baron Frederick de Ropp, 19 March 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C2144/1069/18.

Empire.[81] He only gained access to Britain following the peace settlement, when he lost no time in creating an impressive list of contacts. He held talks with the Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, Tyrrell,[82]and the Under Secretary of the Colonial Office, Ormsby-Gore.[83] He also took part in meetings with Cabinet Ministers, including Amery[84] who was Secretary of State for Colonies, members of the East African Commission[85] and a selection of Members of Parliament.[86] However, without concentration of the German colonial campaign on a singular effort, there were limits to what any individual could potentially achieve. Even a well-connected individual such as Ropp struggled, particularly when taking into consideration the extent of the Foreign Office's[87] and the Colonial Office's[88] opposition to his plans (Foreign Office opposition to Ropp was discussed in detail within Chapter Two).

The fact that the German colonial movement had a large number of individuals operating independently with their own schemes, signifies that the German colonial campaign lacked centralised leadership. This raises an interesting question; why did the German Government not take control and provide organised, centralised leadership? As mentioned previously, there was a powerful faction within the German Government which supported Germany regaining a colonial role. It would have made sense if this faction had helped plan and coordinate the campaign, thereby giving the scheme effective leadership and the best opportunity to succeed. However, the German Government largely offered aid from the side lines, expecting individual members of the campaign to carry out much of the work. The

[81] Ibid.
[82] Letter from F. de Ropp to William Tyrrell, 15 November 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C15381/2994/18.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Letter from Page Croft to Austen Chamberlain, 26 June 1925, TNA/FO371/10758/C8771/8771/18, Letter from F. de Ropp to William Tyrrell, 15 November 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C15381/2994/18.
[87] Minutes written by Huxley, 23 November 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C14881/2994/18, Minutes written by Lampson, 25 November 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C14881/2994/18, Copy of a Letter from Austen Chamberlain to Sir H. Page Croft, 6 July 1925, TNA/FO371/10758/C8771/8771/18.
[88] Message from S.H. Wilson to Tyrrell, 18 November 1925, TNA/FO371/10755/C14842/2994/18.

reason for this was the general instability of the government during the Weimar Republic. German Ministers who supported Germany regaining its position as a colonial power, such as Külz, were not in their posts long enough to make a huge difference and create an impact on the campaign (Külz was in office little more than a year, from January 1926 to February 1927). At the same time, German officials who were in governmental positions for long periods of time, such as Held, lacked the power and influence to take up a leadership position. The only individual who kept his position long term and had the authority to take up a leadership role, and, therefore, would have been able to lead the campaign to regain Germany's former colonies, was Stresemann. However, he did not believe the 1920's was the appropriate time to promote Germany's agenda to regain its position as a colonial power. This view was revealed in a recorded conversation between Stresemann and Rumbold. The report stated, '[h]e [Stresemann] did not think the moment [was] opportune for raising the question of a possible modification of the arrangements with regard to the former German colonies'[89] but wanted to stress that, 'he did not wish it to be supposed that he was reconciled for ever to the loss of German colonial empire.'[90] Therefore, with the only man able to provide control and coordination not believing the time was right, the movement was left leaderless.

This chapter has highlighted that the lack of leadership was the main reason why the German colonial campaign failed. The following section will now go into more detail on this subject and reveal why the campaign was hindered by the absence of a clear strategic direction. There are two reasons why the absence of centralised control prevented the campaign reaching its full potential. First, there was no overall strategic plan; not having centralised leadership caused different agendas to be pursued, with little research and analysis into which was most likely to succeed. Second, the lack of universal direction meant that there was little

[89] Message from Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 4 April 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2541/43/18.
[90] Ibid.

cooperation in how the individual strategies were implemented. Consequently, the various plans contradicted and undermined each other. Both of these reasons will be discussed in detail, starting with the lack of an overall strategic objective.

The lack of leadership thwarted the German colonial campaign due to the absence of uniformity in the aims of the various instigators. Despite the main objective of the campaign aspiring for Germany to regain a colonial role, there were considerable differences between what each individual aimed to achieve. Some members were highly ambitious, wanting major pieces of territory to be given or returned to Germany. For instance, Simons tried to persuade the League of Nations to consider Germany when allocating the mandates.[91] While the officials in the *Auswärtiges Amt* aimed to gain control of Angola.[92] Other schemes within the German colonial campaign had more modest goals. For example, Seitz and Ropp wanted permission to send citizens to settle within British territories,[93] allowing Germany to participate in the colonial system but not on the scale of gaining a full colony. Therefore, there were a wide range of goals within the German colonial campaign, which were dependent on individual's personal ambitions and views.

The leaderless campaign meant that little research and analysis was conducted by its members regarding which aims had the best chance of success, and, therefore, should be prioritised. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the British Foreign Office held fewer objections to Germany gaining a colony or mandate if it did not involve Britain giving up territory. The department also expressed minimal concern regarding the potential economic competition from Germany in places such as the Persian Gulf, as long as British military and political control were left unchallenged. Therefore, the campaign for Germany to regain some form of

[91] League of Nations document titled *The Responsibility of the League under Article 22 of the Covenant*, 22 November 1920, TNA/FO371/4768/C12585/154/18.
[92] Secret Report on German Colonial Policy, 30th March 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C3223/1069/18.
[93] Message from Ormsby-Gore to Sir W. Tyrrell, 21 June 1927, TNA/FO371/12146/C5411/1323/18.

colonial role had a better chance to succeed, if the main focus did not belong within Britain's sphere of influence. Whilst there was no guarantee of success, as countries such as France and Italy might still have objected, there was a higher chance to prevail. The German Government through its embassies and intelligence networks had the ability to find out which objectives could give the colonial campaign better odds in regaining a colony. It could have used this information to set appropriate, common targets, which would have enabled individuals within the campaign to work together. In reality though, all members of the various campaigns devised their own objectives, based more on personal preference rather than strategic thought. For example, when one of these plans aimed to gain an area out of Britain's sphere of influence, such as Angola, it was not supported by any of the other strategies, limiting its chance of success. One of the major weaknesses of not having a form of centralised leadership, was the lack of strategic direction and shared focus, regarding the aims the different campaigns hoped to achieve.

The second reason why the absence of leadership hindered the German colonial campaign is connected to the tactics used within the different schemes. Each member of the campaign had their own strategy to achieve their personal objectives. Without some form of central control, not only did these plans not complement each other, but many even disrupted other schemes. For example, many of the tactics used by the colonial campaign angered the British Foreign Office, undermining any effort which relied on good relations with the British Government. A good illustration of a member of the colonial campaign using tactics which displeased the British was Kühlmann. He used his position as an unofficial advisor, for the German representatives at the Reparations Experts Committee to seek support for Germany gaining a mandate.[94] However, the tactic he used was to imply, that friendly relations with Germany

[94] Letter from Herr von Kühlmann to Sir W. Tyrrell, 19 March 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2359/43/18.

could only be gained by allowing Germany to regain its position as a colonial power.[95] This angered the permanent officials at the Foreign Office with Sargent describing it as 'blackmail.'[96] A similar response was given by Perowne,[97] Lindsay[98] and Chamberlain.[99] Tactics which angered the British, whether intentional or not, undermined efforts by individuals, like Ropp, who relied on gaining British trust and support for their colonial policies.[100] Having separate German colonial schemes undermined by the tactics of others is clear evidence of how the lack of cooperation meant the campaign was always likely to fail.

In conclusion, this section of the chapter has analysed the German colonial campaign, examining its structure and the main reasons it was ultimately unsuccessful. The campaign was decentralised in nature with many different schemes, each with their own leaders and different objectives. Overall, there was little cooperation between the different groups of the campaign. Even though key members of the German Government throughout the early interwar period supported many of these plans, they provided no leadership or coordination. The only member of the German Government who held his position long enough, with the authority to support it, and who could potentially have taken a leadership role, was Stresemann. However, he did not believe the 1920s, was the right time to restore Germany as an imperial power. Instead, it was left to individual officials and citizens to act on their own authority, to drive these schemes and campaigns forward. The lack of centralised oversight is what ultimately caused the failure of the campaign. It meant that research was not carried out into which objectives had the best chance of success. Instead, each member came up with their own aims based on personal preferences. On the occasions where a plan did not involve removing territories from a major power, hence, offering a better chance of achieving its

[95] Ibid.
[96] Minute by Sargent, 26 March 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2284/43/18.
[97] Minute by Perowne, 26 March 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2284/43/18.
[98] Minute by Lindsay, 26 March 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2284/43/18.
[99] Minute by Chamberlain, 26 March 1929, TNA/FO371/13615/C2284/43/18.
[100] Memorandum on Baron Frederick de Ropp, 19 March 1928, TNA/FO371/12907/C2144/1069/18.

objective, it was left unsupported. Another major weakness resulting from the absence of leadership was that the tactics used, often undermined the plans of other individuals within the movement. Several members of the German colonial campaign used strategies which angered the British Foreign Office, unintentionally ruining any scheme which relied on British support. Therefore, the German colonial campaign was a decentralised movement and this major weakness prevented any real chance of Germany reclaiming a colonial role in the 1920's.

Conclusion

This chapter has used evidence from the Foreign Office documents to examine the German colonial campaign. Its main goal was to rectify a gap in the existing English speaking historical literature, which up until now has been vague and contradictory. However, an in-depth examination of German documents would reveal additional information. This research provides illuminating evidence that can complement and extend existing studies. For instance, it reveals that the main section of German society which was most interested in the country regaining a colonial role was the elite. Another major piece of evidence is that the German campaign was a decentralised movement and its lack of overall leadership was the main reason it failed to regain a significant colonial role.

The first major contribution of this chapter's research, is that it improves the historical understanding of colonial desires in Germany during the early interwar period. Particularly, it uncovers which section of German society was most interested in the subject. The German elite viewed regaining a colonial role as a high priority. This included a substantial faction within the government represented by Stresemann, Külz, Held, Bell and members of the *Auswärtiges Amt*. Outside the government there was further support within the wider elite, from individuals such as Seitz, Schnee, Ropp and Schacht for regaining a colony or a

mandate. However, the establishment's view that retrieving a colony was a priority was not shared by most of the German population. This is particularly evident between 1927 and 1929, when the Foreign Office documents recorded a marked decrease in public support for this issue. This decrease was not due to any loss of support for imperialistic ideology within the population. Instead, it was due to a variety of issues including Marx trying to hold his government together, Germany joining the League of Nations, border disputes with Poland and relations with other European powers, which had a greater impact on the average citizen. It was a similar situation during the years 1919-1924. The political and economic climate in Germany during those years was worse than that between 1927 and 1929; there had been revolution attempts, growth of separatist movements, political instability, hyperinflation, the Rhineland was occupied by allied troops and the French and Belgian forces had invaded the Ruhr. Therefore, it would be highly unlikely that the German population would be more interested in colonial issues given the chaos in the years following the First World War, than in the relative stability of the last years of the decade. Only in 1925 and 1926, is there evidence that the German population was taking colonial issues seriously. This is due to a belief within the Foreign Office that there had been a major increase in support for this subject. However, this rise in support was only in specific sections of the German population, including the military veterans and members of the Colonial Society. Even though there were certainly a significant number of individuals within these groups, they were unlikely to be anything close to a majority. This is particularly true when another large group, the socialists, was opposed to regaining a colony. Therefore, throughout the early interwar period, the German elite were the main section of German society most interested in regaining a colonial role, while this ambition was not equally held by the general German population.

The second reason why this research improves the historical knowledge of colonial issues within the early interwar period is because it reveals how the overall German colonial

campaign was structured and explains the reasons for its failure. This campaign was a decentralised movement with no overall leadership. The main piece of evidence for this is the existence of many different schemes within the campaign, each with its own leaders and main objectives. For instance, it was the German officials within the *Auswärtiges Amt*, who hoped to use opposition to Britain creating an East African Dominion as leverage to support Angola becoming a German mandate. Meanwhile, Simons wanted the League of Nations to consider Germany as a possible candidate, when allocating the mandates in 1920. There was no coordination or cooperation between any of these plans, revealing a lack of overall leadership and direction. The main reason for this was because most members of the German Government, who supported the campaign, lacked the authority or were not in their positions long enough to provide effective leadership. The only man capable of taking over the campaign was Stresemann. However, he believed the 1920s, was not the correct moment to attempt this project. Without government leadership it was left to charismatic individuals, including Ropp, to move the movement forward.

Without effective leadership the campaign was almost certain to fail. The first consequence of having no centralised control was that little research was carried out to discover which objectives were most likely to be successful. The British Foreign Office was less hostile to German attempts to regain a colonial role or position on the world stage, which did not threaten Britain's political or military control. Centralised leadership may have discovered this information and directed the aims of the different schemes accordingly. However, without clear strategic direction, each plan had its own objectives based on the preferences of each instigator, rather than on any strategic thinking. A secondary consequence of the absence of leadership that hindered the German colonial campaign was that different strategies undermined the plans and success of others. Several schemes within the campaign used tactics which angered the British Government. These tactics diminished any chance of

success for individuals like Ropp who relied on gaining British support. Therefore, the lack of strategic leadership thwarted the efforts of the German colonial campaign making it likely, if not certain, to fail.

Final Conclusion

This thesis has extensively analysed how the British Foreign Office viewed the German colonial question during the early interwar period between 1919 and 1929. This was an important subject to investigate, as it allowed an analysis of topics which have previously received little academic attention from historians. In addition, it provided new evidence strengthening certain arguments, which already exist within wider debates regarding international relations during the 1920s.

The reason why this thesis concentrated on the Foreign Office, rather than the wider British Government, was due to the availability of surviving documents. The Foreign Office evidence provided a wealth of information, with memorandums on the German colonial question which presented an effective timeline for events on this subject. Importantly, it provided links to a large number of documents which offered detailed information concerning how the officials' viewed the subject from 1919 to 1929. In comparison, the archives of other governmental departments regarding this subject were of limited value. The Colonial Office, Cabinet Office and Dominion Office had few surviving documents, which were either copies of those found within the Foreign Office or they lacked critical context. The Treasury, Board of Trade and Prime Minister's Office had no remaining papers on the subject. However, researching this issue using primarily Foreign Office material provided an intriguing perspective. This new primary evidence from the National Archives offered an effective opportunity to analyse the role of the Foreign Office in Britain's decision making process during the early interwar period, which was an area that has not previously been researched sufficiently.

An analysis of how much influence the Foreign Office possessed over British foreign policy was not the only omission in the existing literature rectified by this thesis. It also provided

greater context by examining the extent that imperial ambitions influenced British foreign policy and Anglo-German relations. Additionally, the thesis scrutinised the organisation and methods of the German colonial campaign; a subject largely ignored by existing English speaking academic studies. Of equal importance to filling in gaps in the current historical knowledge, the research into the Foreign Office's response to the German colonial question provided new evidence to complement several historical debates. These included the relationship between Lloyd George and Curzon, whether or not the Mandate System represented a major shift in imperial ideology, and if it was justified to use the Locarno Pact as a dividing line in European history. By correcting the omissions in the existing literature and providing new evidence to historical debates, the thesis enhanced the understanding of imperial and international history of the 1920s.

The role of the permanent officials and the Foreign Office when dealing with the German colonial question

The first topic discussed within the thesis was dedicated to the operating structure of the Foreign Office, and how the department fitted into the British Government's decision making process during the early interwar period. Unlike the elected heads of the government, the permanent officials at the Foreign Office between 1919 and 1929, had not previously received a great deal of attention from historians. Particularly, their role in shaping British foreign policy had not been sufficiently researched. Analysing the Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question was an effective way to correct this omission in the existing academic studies for two important reasons. First, the German colonial question was a subject discussed within many different spheres of the department, from the very lowest ranks to the highest. Therefore, it revealed how information was circulated through the Foreign Office and how the department made its decisions. The second reason why the German colonial question was an effective lens to view the Foreign Office was because it was not purely a

foreign policy issue. The subject contained colonial elements; therefore, the Foreign Office had to deal with other governmental departments, including the Colonial Office and Dominion Office. This allowed an analysis of how the Foreign Office interacted with other governmental departments and the balance of power between them. By extension, such analysis provided new evidence which revealed the impact of the relationship between Lloyd George and Curzon on the department's role in deciding foreign policy. These crucial aspects increased the historical knowledge of how the world's largest empire decided its foreign policy during the early interwar period.

The first revelation gained through the analysis of the Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question regards the structure of the department. A brief examination of the Foreign Office would provide a misleading belief that the department had a rigid command hierarchy. At the top of the pyramid was the Foreign Secretary followed by the Permanent Under Secretary. Most other officials were divided up as clerks in separate departments, including the Central Department and the Far Eastern Department. Each department had a defined list of countries it was responsible for, and the clerks were answerable to the head of department, who in turn was answerable to the Permanent Under Secretary. However, the Foreign Office's handling of the German colonial question revealed that instead of a rigid centralised hierarchical structure, the department exhibited a much greater level of flexibility towards its lower ranking officials than the one which appears on paper.

The permanent officials had a broad degree of autonomy, with little micromanagement from the higher ranks of the Foreign Office. Officials inside the Central Department and the Western, General and League of Nations Departments, frequently communicated with their opposite representatives in other governmental departments, including the Colonial Office, and even with foreign governments. Those officials benefited from having the freedom to carry out such actions on their own initiative, without having to consult the Permanent Under

Secretary or the Foreign Secretary. The reason for this flexibility originated from the very nature of the department's structure, as unlike other hierarchical based organisations, it was a 'bottom up' rather than a 'top down' structure. A 'top down' structure, for example an army, receives orders from the top with the lower ranks carrying out the tasks delegated to them, with only a limited degree of independence. The 'bottom up' organisation of the Foreign Office was very different. All documents and messages were first given to the lowest ranking personnel, who decided if the information was significant enough to be passed up the chain of command. In this way, the highest ranking officials only saw and discussed the most important issues or topics, which the lower ranking personnel believed were worthy of their attention. Therefore it is evident that, in general, the Foreign Secretary left the operation of the department to his officials, granting them the freedom and independence to operate on their own, in the best interests of the department.

The second aspect, revealed by this research, revolved around the extent the Foreign Office impacted decisively on British foreign policy decision making, and how this fluctuated over time. Chapter One documented a major difference in the level of influence the department held over foreign policy, when comparing the eras before and after Lloyd George fell from power in 1922. Before 1922, the British Government operated in a way much closer to a traditional cabinet collective responsibility system. In this system, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Office and other institutions, including the Board of Trade, the War Office, the Colonial Office and the Dominion Governments all had influence on the foreign policy decision making process. This shared jurisdiction and accountability had a major impact on British policy; one representative example can be found during the Paris Peace Conference. During the negotiations, each department and Dominion Government was able to argue a case for the British Empire gaining a former German or Ottoman colony, directly leading to Britain claiming more and more territory. Having a cabinet collective responsibility system

also meant that policy was influenced by the ability of the Cabinet to compromise. Strategies could be dictated by the egos and opinions of individual ministers. For example, Curzon obstructed Churchill's policy of supporting the anti- Bolshevik forces during the Russian civil war. In response, Churchill blocked Curzon's policies in Persia. The conclusive factor that held together the entire system is the close cooperation between the Foreign Office and other governmental departments, most notably the Colonial Office.

In October 1922, Lloyd George fell from power following the Chanak Crisis. The new political climate had a dramatic impact on the role of the Foreign Office in British foreign policy decision making. The changes were directly linked to the new heads of the government. The two Conservative Prime Ministers who replaced Lloyd George, Bonar Law and Baldwin, were less interested in foreign affairs, allowing their Foreign Secretaries a greater degree of independence. The third person to replace Lloyd George was Labour's MacDonald. He held both the position of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, in his first term, giving the permanent officials at the Foreign Office direct access to him. Bonar Law, Baldwin and MacDonald allowed the Foreign Office to gain a dominant position in influencing foreign policy.

There are three, clear pieces of evidence revealed by this research, which highlight the department's new found dominance. First, the Foreign Office had the ability to dismiss and overrule opposition to its policies from other governmental departments. An example of this is when the Treasury believed that the Foreign Office was overreacting to the German colonial propaganda campaign in 1926, and the Foreign Office completely ignored the Treasury's views on this issue. Another notable example is Chamberlain's actions at the Imperial Conference of 1926. He managed to ensure his policy of opposing German representation on the Permanent Mandates Commission was accepted as British policy, despite opposition from both the Colonial Office and the Dominion Office. The second

indication of how the Foreign Office became more influential after 1922 was the way the department utilised intelligence reports. At that time, it was the department which received and analysed intelligence reports regarding the German colonial question. It held the responsibility and authority to decide which pieces of information were given to other departments. The third and final piece of evidence that the Foreign Office possessed a significant level of influence over foreign policy after 1922, was the department's ability to take action on its own authority without consulting the Prime Minister's Office or other governmental departments. An example of this newly acquired independence, was when the department ordered an investigation into an American professor without consulting anyone outside the Foreign Office. There was little recorded evidence indicating that the Prime Ministers influenced Foreign Office decisions between 1923 and 1929. Curzon even went as far as saying that one of the Prime Ministers, Baldwin, had no more influence on what he was doing than his own butler. An important aspect that remained from the Lloyd George era after 1922, was the close collaboration between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office. The role the permanent officials and the Foreign Office played in deciding British foreign policy, not only revealed who was actually making foreign policy decisions, but also allowed a better understanding on how those decisions were actually made during the 1920s.

Imperial ideology and its impact on Anglo-German relations

The second major topic discussed within the thesis analysed the imperial ideology of the Foreign Office, and the way its view impacted on British foreign policy and Anglo-German relations during the early interwar period. This subject was spread over three chapters, with each discussing a different argument. The first regarded the philosophy of the Foreign Office and how little impact the First World War had on its imperial ideology. The second demonstrated that relations between Britain and Germany were complex during the 1920s, especially as the cooperation concerning European matters was contrasted by the British

policy of no compromise regarding colonial concerns. The third provided greater context to the previous two aspects by comparing the early interwar Foreign Office with its predecessors of the Victorian and Edwardian eras. Particularly, it focused on the departments' view of Germany and the significance of colonial matters. These three aspects combined, improved the historical understanding of imperial ideology during the 1920s.

Examining the Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question was an effective way of analysing its imperial ideology. The department dealt directly with colonial issues, therefore, all the comments the officials recorded and the decisions they made revealed much about their general views on colonialism. A major revelation uncovered by studying the Foreign Office's imperial ideology during the 1920s, was how little views had changed following the First World War. The Foreign Office continued to use a traditional version of imperialism, which valued political and military control rather than economic power, viewing the world through a colonial lens. The lack of change in imperial ideology was not just within the British Foreign Office; it was similar in the wider British Government and for other imperial powers as well.

The view that imperial ideology had changed little following the First World War directly challenged the views of Callahan and Pedersen. They believed that the very existence of the Mandate System represented a shift in imperial ideology.[1] In almost every historical war in the past, the lands and colonies of the defeated 'sides' were divided up between the victorious powers. However, the Mandate System was designed to be different; instead of former German and Ottoman lands being seized by Britain, France, Belgium and Japan they were given over to the authority of the League of Nations. This institution then decided who administrated these territories in its name. The nation which received the mandates had strict

[1] Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) 7, Michael D. Callahan, *Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931* (Sussex Academic Press Eastbourne, 1999) 188.

rules imposed on them, which varied on whether it was an 'A', 'B' or 'C' Mandate. Those rules specified how each nation could administer their appointed territories, while the Permanent Mandates Commission was designed to make sure those rules were obeyed. According to Callahan, the very creation of this system meant there had been a fundamental shift in imperial ideology.[2] However, this argument could only work if the Mandate System had the ability to prevent the mandatory powers ruling their new lands in any way they desired.

This research demonstrated that the Mandate System did not represent a fundamental change in imperial ideology. The imperial powers ensured nobody could prevent them from managing their mandates in the same way as they managed their colonies. The authority of the League of Nations over the mandates existed only on paper. In reality, the British Foreign Office continually undermined the League of Nations' authority by ignoring its requests. Furthermore, Britain, France, Belgium and Japan deliberately wrote Mandate Treaties, which granted power to the empire that administrated a territory to decide its fate, and not the League of Nations. In these actions, the Foreign Office was supported by other British governmental departments and the Dominion Governments. The League of Nations was aware that the imperial powers were undermining its authority, but it was powerless to prevent it. This effectively meant that in reality a mandate was a colony in everything but the name.

A mandate of the 1920s, being effectively the same as a colony of the 1820s, was not the only evidence provided in this research that there had not been a shift in imperial ideology following 1919. The department was just as committed to preserve the British Empire during the early interwar period, as it had been before the First World War. Consequently, the

[2] Michael D. Callahan, *Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931* (Sussex Academic Press Eastbourne, 1999) 188.

Foreign Office was completely opposed to the concept of relinquishing British territory. Anytime an individual brought up the subject the idea was dismissed, if not completely ridiculed. The thesis validated this argument in Chapter Two, through the department's reaction to Snowden's and Churchill's comments on this subject. The department would not accept the idea of surrendering territory, even if the suggestion came from the head of the department such as Tyrrell. The officials would become extremely hostile if an individual continued to state opposing views. Effective examples can be seen when D'Abernon voiced opposing opinions in 1924 and 1925; in both instances he was met with a high level of hostility. That antagonism, from individuals such as Chamberlain, remained towards him throughout his time as British Ambassador to Berlin.

Further evidence of the unchanging nature of imperialistic ideology within the Foreign Office, was found in its continued belief in the traditional version of empires. The traditional view, is that political and military domination of land and territories are the primary concepts of imperialism; economic assets are important but they are gained and protected through colonies. Other views on imperialism, which revolve around the argument that economic dominance can lead to political influence within a country, were never accepted by the Foreign Office. This research has established that the department would never tolerate German interference, no matter how minor, in Britain's sphere of influence. This was demonstrated in the department's opposition to German actions in Persia. However, the Foreign Office was less concerned with Germany challenging British economic assets in the Persian Gulf and South America. Further evidence which revealed that the Foreign Office prioritised political and military power over economic assets was found in the case of China, when the department maintained Britain's political and military dominance in the country, to the sacrifice of possible economic benefits. The evidence gathered for this thesis clearly

demonstrated that the Foreign Office's imperial ideology had changed little between 1914 and 1919.

The research of this thesis into the German colonial question revealed that the Foreign Office had not changed its imperial ideology following the end of the First World War. Additionally, it broadened the argument by providing evidence that there was no change within the thinking of the wider British Government and other imperial powers. As mentioned previously, the Foreign Office's desire to remove the authority of the League of Nations from the Mandate System was extensively supported. Furthermore, countries, including France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal, remained just as committed to defend their colonial interests as Britain. At the same time, countries including Germany, Japan, Italy and the Soviet Union remained equally determined to expand their borders or to rebuild their empires. The evidence was therefore, overwhelming; imperialism remained the dominant ideology during the early interwar period, and that ideology had changed little from that before 1914.

After the thesis had demonstrated that the Foreign Office continued to hold a traditional view on empires, the next step was to analyse its impact on the wider Anglo-German relations. The way the Foreign Office handled the German colonial question revealed that the relations between the two nations during the early interwar period were more complex than previously thought. Historians, including Sharp and Sahler, discussed how the British and German governments were able to cooperate on European issues.[3] However, the research for this thesis demonstrated that this cooperation did not extend to colonial issues, and that a lingering mistrust of Germany remained prevalent within the Foreign Office. This revelation

[3] Alan Sharp, Contemporary British History, *Adapting to a New World? British Foreign Policy in the 1920s*, Volume 18, Issue 3, (January 2004), p74-86, Keith B Sahler, *Reappraising Anglo-German Diplomatic Relations*, 1919-1939, Central Michigan University, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2008.

by extension impacted on how the Locarno Pact should be viewed, in terms of its influence on European relations.

The lingering mistrust of Germany revealed itself when the Foreign Office dealt with the German colonial question. The Foreign Office had absolutely no intention of compromising when it came to the possibility of relinquishing British territory. Consequently, Anglo-German cooperation on colonial issues was not possible to the same extent, as it was towards European issues. More importantly, this research revealed that colonial issues could impact on wider Anglo-German relations. A major trade deal between Britain and Germany, the Anglo-German Commercial Treaty, 1925, was placed in jeopardy because members of the Reichstag were displeased when originally the treaty did not allow Germany economic access to British colonies and mandates. Furthermore, the mistrust towards German colonial ambitions influenced the British Foreign Office's attempt to prevent Germany gaining membership to a major commission within the League of Nations, namely the Permanent Mandates Commission. However, this should not be taken to the extreme, as the lack of cooperation on colonial issues was never going to fundamentally undermine Anglo-German relations on European concerns. Nevertheless, it demonstrated that relations between Britain and Germany during the 1920s were more complex than Sharp and Sahler indicated.

The reports and minutes of the permanent officials indicated a clear distrust for German intentions concerning colonial matters. This is not surprising, considering Britain and Germany had just fought a major war on opposing sides. However, what is of interest is that the mistrust did not fade as the 1920s progressed. Instead, it increased largely due to Chamberlain, who became the main driving force behind this mind-set within the Foreign Office. Cynicism towards Germany was present within the department before November 1924, voiced most notably by Crowe. However, it was milder and unlikely to greatly damage Anglo-German cooperation. Chamberlain, on the other hand, was far more interested in

building strong relations with France and he did not trust the Germans. Therefore, Chamberlain praised individuals who voiced concerns regarding German actions, while those who tried to argue the merits of such activities were met with distain, including British Ambassadors. This prevented any junior officials from voicing differing opinions on this subject, which reinforced a mistrust of Germany within the mind-set of the department.

The mistrust of Germany within the Foreign Office combined with the department's refusal to compromise on colonial issues, provided new evidence for the historical debate regarding how the Locarno Pact is viewed and its impact on European relations. The Locarno Pact, signed in 1925, was supposed to bring an era of cooperation and compromise into European geo-politics, and is used by many historians, including Goldstein, as a dividing line in twentieth century history.[4] However, Jacobson argued that there was no improvement in European relations following the signing of the Locarno Treaties, therefore, using it as a historic boundary would be meaningless.[5] The Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question provided new evidence regarding Anglo-German relations which supported Jacobson's arguments. It demonstrated that even if the Locarno Pact improved European relations involving European issues, it did not spread to colonial concerns. Furthermore, the presence of Chamberlain at the Foreign Office led to an increase in mistrust towards Germany within the department. Therefore, the years after the signing of the Locarno Treaties were not an era of complete cooperation and compromise.

[4] Erik Goldstein, *The First World War Peace Settlements 1919-1925* (Routledge, New York, 2002) 91.
[5] Jon Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-1929* (Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 1972) 372.

Comparing the early interwar Foreign Office, with its predecessors in the Victorian and Edwardian eras

This thesis has demonstrated that the Foreign Office continued to possess a traditional view of empires and those opinions impacted on wider Anglo-German relations. However, to fully understand how much of an impact these views had, a greater context was required. An effective way of doing this, was by comparing the views of the early interwar Foreign Office, with those of its predecessors in the Victorian, 1837-1901 and Edwardian, 1902-1914, eras. The Victorian and Edwardian eras are suitable for this comparison as the Foreign Office personnel of each period, viewed Germany and perceived the significance of colonial issues differently.

Overall, the Foreign Office considered colonial matters to be an important issue during the early interwar period, as revealed by the department's reaction to the German colonial question. Three times between 1919 and 1929, this issue rose to a high level of significance. The first time was during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, and throughout the negotiations regarding the Mandate Treaties during 1920-1921. The second time was between 1925 and 1926, when the German colonial propaganda campaign reached its zenith. The third and final time was during 1928 and 1929, due to German opposition to the creation of a British East African Dominion, German ambitions towards Angola and the actions of Kühlmann.

A major piece of evidence provided by this research, that confirmed the early interwar Foreign Office viewed colonial issues as a priority, was through the large number of discussions held within the department during the 1920s. These discussions included the lower and middle ranking members in the Foreign Office's departments. More significantly, at certain times, it included the very highest ranking members of the department, such as the

Foreign Secretaries and the Permanent Under Secretaries. It even widened the communication to involve the Prime Minister and other governmental departments. Only an issue that the Foreign Office considered to be of high importance would have received this level of attention, both within the department and the wider British Government.

However, the early interwar Foreign Office did not go to the extreme and consider imperial concerns as its overriding priority. There were times when the German colonial question lost much of its significance for the Foreign Office. This decline in interest was most notable during 1922, when the British Government was forced to focus on the Chanak Crisis and during the final months of 1926, when the department became convinced that the German colonial campaign had lost its momentum. German colonial issues never completely left the minds of the permanent officials; they kept finding reasons to discuss them. Nevertheless, that does not take away from the fact that it was a subject that would fluctuate in significance. Most importantly, even though colonial issues influenced wider Anglo-German relations, they were never going to completely undermine the cooperation that existed between the two nations concerning European issues. Consequently, colonial issues were considered significant to the Foreign Office during the 1920s, but they were not an overwhelming priority.

The Victorians considered imperial matters to be of the highest priority, with most of their actions and ideologies revolving around this aspect. The Edwardians on the other hand, considered it to be of less significance and focused more on issues concerning the European continent. Such a comparison revealed substantial and meaningful information involving the history of imperial ideology. It indicated that the view of the early interwar Foreign Office was closer to its Victorian predecessor, even if it did not take the issue to the same extreme extent. Therefore, the Edwardian era's loss of interest in colonial concerns was short-lived,

indicating that the First World War did little to undermine imperialism as an ideology in Britain.

The second comparison between the early interwar Foreign Office and its predecessors investigated the department's relations with Germany. This was an important comparison because it demonstrated that even though there was a lingering mistrust towards Germany within the Foreign Office during the 1920s, it was mild compared to the hostility felt by the department during the Edwardian era. The Victorians viewed Germany in a positive light, including their colonial ambitions, and favoured alliances between the two counties. On the other hand, the Edwardians viewed the country with suspicion and hostility, even within the colonial arena. The early interwar Foreign Office continued that hostility towards Germany, though in a much milder form. This residual hostility became prominent between 1919 and 1929, when the permanent officials believed British interests were threatened. A select number of individuals, such as Sargent and Chamberlain, held a negative view of Germany, whether the matter referred to the colonial question or other issues. With regards to colonial ambitions there was indeed a general view that German aspirations had a negative influence on Britain. However, when it was clear that a particular German objective would not impact on Britain's interest, for example German desires on Angola, the Foreign Office's hostility towards that ambition declined. Paradoxically, in some cases, a few officials within the department even went to the extent of supporting such German, non-threatening ambitions.

Clearly defining the Foreign Office's anti- German attitude, developed the historical understanding of the interwar period. It exposed that hostility towards Germany certainly continued after the First World War, but it was not as extreme as it had been in the Edwardian era, particularly between 1906 and 1913. This indicated that the Great War did not create an extreme anti-German feeling within the department, implying that over time the hatred of the war could eventually fade. However, the close friendship and mutual respect

which the Victorians had formed with Germany, a relationship which had existed for centuries, had ended and did not return in the 1920s.

These arguments regarding the Foreign Office's colonial ideology greatly enhanced the historical understanding of the 1920s. They demonstrated that the traditional interpretations of imperialism remained dominant within the British Government and other imperial powers. This was particularly true for the British Foreign Office which also started to consider colonial concerns with a greater degree of importance, after the Edwardian era. The Foreign Office's colonial ideology together with the departments lingering mistrust for Germany led to the department strongly opposing German colonial ambitions. However, all of this must be kept within context. The Foreign Office of the 1920s, certainly considered colonial issues to be more important than its Edwardian predecessor. However, it did not consider it to be the overwhelming priority as the Victorians had. It is also true that the Foreign Office distrusted German intentions, particularly on colonial issues. Nevertheless, it would be an exaggeration to say that the 1920s Foreign Office, held the same negative feelings towards Germany as the Edwardians had possessed.

The German colonial campaign

The final topic analysed in this thesis regards the way the German colonial campaign was organised and implemented between 1919 and 1929. The research utilised new evidence from British primary sources. However, a dedicated piece of research based on German sources would provide even more information on this subject. The thesis revealed which sections of German society were most supportive and interested in the country regaining a colonial role. Additionally, it provided details regarding how the campaign was organised and ultimately, why it was unsuccessful.

The first piece of evidence revealed that it was the German elite rather than the general German population, who were interested in regaining the country's former status as a colonial power. The support within the German elite for the colonial campaign was widespread and included several key members of the German Government, most notably Stresemann, Schacht, Külz and officials in the *Auswärtiges Amt*. Those individuals were supported by other members of the wider German establishment, including Ropp and Seitz. However, the elite's enthusiasm for regaining a colony was not shared by the general German public. During the 1920s, Germany had numerous serious problems, including political instability, a struggling economy, a significant amount of territory under foreign occupation and border disputes with neighbouring states. For the general German population these issues took prominence over colonial matters. However, this lack of interest did not mean that imperialism as an ideology was in decline for the average German citizen. The population's support for the wars of conquest during the 1930s and 1940s, showed that an imperial mind-set still persisted inside Germany. It was the fact that other issues had a more substantial influence on the daily life of the average citizen during the 1920s, which prevented the German populace from concentrating on colonial expansion.

The second piece of information this research offered regards the decentralised nature of the German colonial campaign. This movement within Germany had neither strong leadership nor a single strategic policy. Instead, there were many different schemes, all with their own objectives and leaders, with little cooperation between them. The reason why the campaign lacked centralised control, was because the members of the German Government who supported the movement, either lacked the authority or were not in their positions long enough to take an active leadership role. The only individual who could have taken over and potentially led the campaign was Stresemann. However, he did not believe the 1920s, was the

opportune moment to promote the colonial question leaving the campaign leaderless, without a uniformed strategic plan or clearly defined aims.

In essence, the lack of centralised leadership, preordained that the German colonial campaign was never going to succeed, or at least the chances of success were particularly low. The absence of direction meant there was no concentrated research or organised effort to identify which objectives had the highest probability of success. Instead, leaders of each campaign formed their own aims based on personal preferences, rather than a cohesive and unanimous strategic plan. This caused some schemes to waste their efforts on objectives which could never be realised, for instance, any strategy which required a major power to surrender territory. Strategies which did have potential, especially those which did not impact on the major powers, were left unsupported. In fact, many of the tactics indirectly harmed the efforts of others. For example, the actions of Kühlmann angered the Foreign Office which hindered efforts by individuals, like Ropp, who needed to gain British support in order to succeed. The lack of united objectives and inconsistent strategies were both caused by the absence of leadership, which thwarted the German colonial campaign.

Future Research

The Foreign Office's reaction to the German colonial question between 1919 and 1929, provided new and illuminating evidence to the understanding of the interwar period. It rectified several gaps in the existing historical literature, by demonstrating how the Foreign Office operated within the British Government, and how colonial issues influenced Britain's foreign policy. It presented new evidence to several existing debates, providing proof that imperial ideology changed little following the First World War and that the Locarno Pact, did not result in an era of cooperation and compromise in European geo-politics. However, there are topics that for various reasons could not be placed in this thesis, which could potentially

further increase our understanding of international history. This section of the thesis will provide a brief discussion on those topics.

The first topic which could be researched further is a simple time extension of this thesis into the late interwar period. The Wall Street Crash and the rise of Adolf Hitler are subjects which have attracted a great deal of prior research. However, how these events impacted on the British Foreign Office's views on the German colonial question have received little historical attention. The absence of space or time to include those events into the scope of this research could be an opportunity for a future work to add significant value to the wider historical context.

The second topic for future investigation could revolve around the importance of the intelligence agencies, and how they influenced the decision making process within the Foreign Office. This thesis reported several times that the Foreign Office relied upon and utilised intelligence agencies and informants, to gain information on the German colonial question. However, it was not the focal purpose of this thesis to analyse how intelligence was gained by the Foreign Office, and how it fitted into the decision making process regarding foreign policy. This is a subject which would be useful to the wider understanding of British foreign policy in the interwar period, but would require a more focused and dedicated piece of research.

The third topic for future analysis is the way the Foreign Office viewed the League of Nations. This thesis has shown that the Foreign Office never supported the League of Nations' authority over mandates, but it did not cover how the department felt generally about the League. Further research would allow another important aspect of the ideology of the Foreign Office to be analysed.

The fourth topic which could expand the knowledge of British foreign policy during the interwar period is the way the Foreign Office viewed the colonial question in relation to other countries. This thesis has shown that the colonial question influenced how the Foreign Office viewed Germany. It is quite possible that colonial issues would have influenced their views on other countries, including France, Italy and Japan. It would be of historical interest to analyse the way colonial concerns impacted on the department's views of other world powers.

The fifth and final topic has been hinted at several times during the thesis; it is an examination of the German colonial campaign using German sources. This thesis revealed important information regarding the organisation and tactics of the German colonial campaign from British sources. However, a dedicated piece of research focusing entirely on the German colonial campaign and using German sources would enhance the findings of this thesis.

It is the hope of this thesis that the study of how colonial issues impact on relations between nations will be discussed in greater detail in the future.

Appendix

Officials in the Foreign Office, 1919-1930

This appendix will provide a reference for the key officials within the Foreign Office discussed in the thesis. This will make it easy to work out what rank any individual processed during the years this thesis covered. It provides the names of all the high ranking members of the department (from Foreign Secretary to Assistant Under Secretary) regardless of their involvement in the German colonial question. It also includes the legal advisors even though they are middle ranks as they often appear in documents discussing this subject. Finally, it will list all the members of the Central and Western Departments as they were the two most important departments in handling this issue.

1919

Highest ranking officials from Foreign Secretary to Assistant Under Secretary (including Legal Advisors)

Arthur James Balfour (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Earl Curzon of Kedleston (Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Lord Harding of Penshurst (Permanent Under Secretary of State)

Sir Eyre Crowe (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Sir Ronald W. Graham, (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Sir William George Tyrrell (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Cecil Harmsworth (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State and Minister in charge of the Blockade)

Sir Arthur Steel Maitland (Additional Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

John Anthony Cecil Tilley (Acting Under Secretary of State)

Victor A.H. Wellesley (Controller of Commercial and Consular Affairs)

Charles Hubert Montgomery (Acting Chief Clerk)

Cecil James Barrington Hurst (Legal Advisor)

Herbert William Malkin (Assistant Legal Advisor)

No Central or Western Department recorded in the Foreign Office Lists in 1919

1920

Highest ranking officials from Foreign Secretary to Assistant Under Secretary (including Legal Advisors)

Earl Curzon (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Lord Harding of Penshurst (Permanent Under Secretary of State)

Sir Eyre Crowe (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Cecil Harmsworth (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Frederick George Kellaway (Additional Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Sir William George Tyrrell (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Sir John Anthony Cecil Tilley (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Gerald Sydney Spicer (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Victor A.A.H. Wellesley (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Rowland Arthur Charles Sperling (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Eric Clare Edmund Phipps (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Charles Hubert Montgomery (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Charles Henry Tufton (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

John Duncun Gregory (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Cecil James Barrington Hurst (Legal Advisor)

Herbert William Malkin (Assistant Legal Advisor)

Montague Shearman (Assistant Legal Advisor)

Central European and Persia Department

E.C.E. Phipps (Superintending Assistant Secretary)

L. Oliphant (Clerk)

A.M.G. Cadogan (Clerk)

S.P. Waterlow (Clerk)

F.E.F. Adam (Clerk)

A. Leeper (Clerk)

R.F. Wigram (Clerk)

G.P. Churchill (Clerk)

W.V. Cooper (Clerk)

Western, General and League of Nations Department

C.H. Tufton (Superintending Assistant Secretary)

G.H. Villiers

O.G. Sargent

W.M. Codrington

J. Balfour

F.A. Rissik

1921

Highest ranking officials from Foreign Secretary to Assistant Under Secretary (including Legal Advisors)

Earl Curzon of Kedleston (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Sir Eyre A. Crowe (Permanent Under Secretary of State)

Sir William G. Tyrrell (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Cecil Harmsworth (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Frederick George Kellaway (Additional Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Ronald C. Lindsay (Principal Assistant Secretary)

Gerald Sydney Spicer (Assistant Secretaries)

Victor A.A.H. Wellesley (Assistant Secretaries)

Rowland Arthur Charles Sperling (Assistant Secretaries)

Charles Hubert Montgomery (Chief Clerk)

Charles Henry Tufton (Assistant Secretaries)

John Duncan Gregory (Assistant Secretaries)

Robert Gilbert Vansittart (Assistant Secretaries)

Gerald Hyde Villiers (Assistant Secretaries)

Sir Cecil James Barrington Hurst (Legal Adviser)

Herbert William Malkin (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Montague Shearman (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Central European Department

C.H. Tufton (Superintending Assistant Secretary)

S.P. Waterlow (Clerk)

A.M.G. Cadogan (Clerk)

H.G. Nocolson (Clerk)

H.W. Brooks (Clerk)

R.F. Wigram (Clerk)

J.M. Troutbeck (Clerk)

H.A.C. Williams (Clerk)

Western, General and League of Nations Department

G.H. Villiers (Superintending Assistant Secretary)

O.G. Sargent (Clerk)

R.H. Campbeli (Clerk)

W.M. Codrington (Clerk)

J. Balfour (Clerk)

I.A. Kirkpatrick (Clerk)

N.M. Butler (Clerk)

A.W. Lidderdale (Clerk)

1922

Highest ranking officials from Foreign Secretary to Assistant Under Secretary (including Legal Advisors)

Earl Curzon of Kedleston (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Sir Eyre A. Crowe (Permanent Under Secretary of State)

Sir William G. Tyrrell (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Cecil Harmsworth (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Sir Philip Lloyd-Greame (Additional Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Ronald C. Lindsay (Principal Assistant Secretary)

Gerald Sydney Spicer (Assistant Secretaries)

Victor A.A.H. Wellesley (Assistant Secretaries)

Rowland Arthur Charles Sperling (Assistant Secretaries)

Charles Hubert Montgomery (Chief Clerk)

Charles Henry Tufton (Assistant Secretaries)

John Duncan Gregory (Assistant Secretaries)

Robert Gilbert Vansittart (Assistant Secretaries)

Gerald Hyde Villiers (Assistant Secretaries)

Sir Cecil James Barrington Hurst (Legal Adviser)

Herbert William Malkin (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Montague Shearman (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Central European Department

C.H. Tufton (Superintending Assistant Secretary)

S.P. Waterlow (Clerk)

A.M.G Cadogan (Clerk)

H.G. Nicolson (Clerk)

H.W. Brooks (Clerk)

B.H. Barber (Clerk)

R.F. Wigram (Clerk)

C.W.E. Cradock-Hartopp (Clerk)

J.M. Troutbeck (Clerk)

Western, General and League of Nations Department

G.H. Villiers (Superintending Assistant Secretary)

O.G. Sargent (Clerk)

R.H. Campbell (Clerk)

N.H.H. Charles (Clerk)

I.A. Kirkpatrick (Clerk)

N.M. Butler (Clerk)

1923

Highest ranking officials from Foreign Secretary to Assistant Under Secretary (including Legal Advisors)

Earl Curzon of Kedleston (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Sir Eyre A. Crowe (Permanent Under Secretary of State)

Ronald McNeill (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Sir William Joynson-Hicks, (Additional Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Sir William G. Tyrrell (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Ronald C. Lindsay (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Charles Hubert Montgomery (Chief Clerk)

Sir Cecil James Barrington Hurst (Legal Adviser)

Herbert William Malkin (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Montague Shearman (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Central Department

M.W. Lampson (Head of Department)

A.M.G. Cadogan (Clerk)

H.G. Nicolson (Clerk)

R.F. Wigram (Clerk)

J.L. Dodds (Clerk)

N.M. Butler (Clerk)

J.M. Troutbeck (Clerk)

J.C. Sterndale Bennet (Clerk)

Western, General and League of Nations Department

G.H. Villiers (Head of Department)

R.H. Campbell (Clerk)

C.W. Orde (Clerk)

N.H.H. Charles (Clerk)

T.A.Shone (Clerk)

I.A. Kirkpatrick (Clerk)

1924

Highest ranking officials from Foreign Secretary to Assistant Under Secretary (including Legal Advisors)

Earl Curzon of Kedleston (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Sir Eyre A. Crowe (Permanent Under Secretary of State)

Ronald McNeill (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Sir William G. Tyrrell (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Ronald C. Lindsay (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Charles Hubert Montgomery (Chief Clerk)

Sir Cecil James Barrington Hurst (Legal Adviser)

Herbert William Malkin (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Montague Shearman (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Central Department

M.W. Lampson (Head of Department)

W.H.M. Selby (Clerk)

H.G. Nicolson (Clerk)

R.F. Wigram (Clerk)

C.W. Baxter (Clerk)

A.F. Aveling (Clerk)

N.M. Butler (Clerk)

J.H. Le Rougetel (Clerk)

J.M. Troutbeck (Clerk)

J.C. Sterndale Bennet (Clerk)

Western, General and League of Nations Department

G.H. Villiers (Head of Department)

R.H. Campbell (Clerk)

C.W. Orde (Clerk)

T.A. Shone (Clerk)

I.A. Kirkpatrick (Clerk)

W.E. Houston-Boswall (Clerk)

1925

Highest ranking officials from Foreign Secretary to Assistant Under Secretary (including Legal Advisors)

Sir Austen Chamberlain (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Sir Eyre A. Crowe (Permanent Under Secretary of State)

Ronald McNeill (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Arthur Michael Samuel (Additional Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Sir William G. Tyrrell (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Victor A.A.H. Wellesley (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Charles Hubert Montgomery (Chief Clerk)

Sir Cecil James Barrington Hurst (Legal Adviser)

Herbert William Malkin (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Montague Shearman (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Central Department

M.W. Lampson (Head of Department)

H.G. Nicolson (Clerk)

C. Howard Smith (Clerk)

C.W. Baxter (Clerk)

C.H. Bateman (Clerk)

A.F. Aveling (Clerk)

J.M. Troutbeck (Clerk)

J.C. Sterndale Bennet (Clerk)

J.V. Perowne (Clerk)

Sir Adrian Baillie Bart (Clerk)

J.H.F. Mc Ewen (Clerk)

Western, General and League of Nations

G.H. Villiers (Head of Department)

R.H. Campbell (Clerk)

C.W. Orde (Clerk)

T.A. Shone (Clerk)

I.A. Kirkpatrick (Clerk)

W.E. Houston-Boswall (Clerk)

1926

Highest ranking officials from Foreign Secretary to Assistant Under Secretary (including Legal Advisors)

Sir Austen Chamberlain (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Sir William G. Tyrrell (Permanent Under Secretary of State)

Godfrey Tennyson Lampson Locker-Lampson (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Arthur Michael Samuel (Additional Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Victor A.A.H. Wellesley (Deputy Under Secretary of State)

Charles Hubert Montgomery (Chief Clerk)

John Duncan Greggory (Assistant Under Secretaries of State)

Sir Cecil James Barrington Hurst (Legal Adviser)

Herbert William Malkin (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Montague Shearman (Assistant Legal Adviser)

William Eric Beckett (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Central Department

M.W. Lampson (Head of Department)

O.G. Sargent (Clerk)

C. Howard Smith (Clerk)

O.C. Harvey (Clerk)

C.W. Baxter (Clerk)

C.H. Bateman (Clerk)

A.F. Aveling (Clerk)

J.M. Troutbeck (Clerk)

J.C. Sterndale Bennett (Clerk)

J.V. Perowne (Clerk)

M.H. Huxley (Clerk)

Western, General and League of Nations Department

G.H. Villiers (Head of Department)

R.H. Campbell (Clerk)

C.W. Orde (Clerk)

T.A. Shone (Clerk)

I.A. Kirkpatrick (Clerk)

1927

Highest ranking officials from Foreign Secretary to Assistant Under Secretary (including Legal Advisors)

Sir Austen Chamberlain (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Sir William G. Tyrrell (Permanent Under Secretary of State)

Godfrey Tennyson Lampson Locker-Lampson (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Arthur Michael Samuel (Additional Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Victor A.A.H. Wellesley (Deputy Under Secretary of State)

Charles Hubert Montgomery (Chief Clerk)

John Duncan Greggory (Assistant Under Secretaries of State)

Sir Cecil James Barrington Hurst (Legal Adviser)

Herbert William Malkin (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Montague Shearman (Assistant Legal Adviser)

William Eric Beckett (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Central Department

O.G. Sargent (Head of Department)

C. Howard Smith (Clerk)

O.C. Harvey (Clerk)

C.H. Bateman (Clerk)

A.F. Aveling (Clerk)

J.M. Troutbeck (Clerk)

J.V. Perowne (Clerk)

M.H. Huxley (Clerk)

Western, General and League of Nations Department

G.H. Villiers (Head of Department)

R.H. Campbell (Clerk)

J.H. Leche (Clerk)

T.A. Shone (Clerk)

I.A. Kirkpatrick (Clerk)

P.M. Broadmead (Clerk)

1928

Highest ranking officials from Foreign Secretary to Assistant Under Secretary (including Legal Advisors)

Sir Austen Chamberlain (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Sir William G. Tyrrell (Permanent Under Secretary of State)

Godfrey Tennyson Lampson Locker-Lampson (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Douglas Hewett Hacking (Additional Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Victor A.A.H. Wellesley (Deputy Under Secretary of State)

Charles Hubert Montgomery (Chief Clerk)

John Duncan Greggory (Assistant Under Secretaries of State)

Sir Cecil James Barrington Hurst (Legal Adviser)

Herbert William Malkin (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Montague Shearman (Assistant Legal Adviser)

William Eric Beckett (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Central Department

O.G. Sargent (Head of Department)

C. Howard Smith (Clerk)

O.C. Harvey (Clerk)

C.H. Bateman (Clerk)

J.V. Perowne (Clerk)

W.H.B. Mack (Clerk)

M.H. Huxley (Clerk)

E.E. Crowe (Clerk)

Western, General and League of Nations Department

G.H. Villiers (Head of Department)

R.H. Campbell (Clerk)

I.A. Kirkpatrick (Clerk)

P.M. Broadmead (Clerk)

K.T. Gurney (Clerk)

1929

Highest ranking officials from Foreign Secretary to Assistant Under Secretary (including Legal Advisors)

Sir Austen Chamberlain (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Sir R.C. Lindsay (Permanent Under Secretary of State)

Godfrey Tennyson Lampson Locker-Lampson (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Douglas Hewett Hacking (Additional Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Victor A.A.H. Wellesley (Deputy Under Secretary of State)

Charles Hubert Montgomery (Chief Clerk)

Lancelot Oliphant (Acting Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Sir Cecil James Barrington Hurst (Legal Adviser)

Herbert William Malkin (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Montague Shearman (Assistant Legal Adviser)

William Eric Beckett (Assistant Legal Adviser)

Central Department

O.G. Sargent (Head of Department)

C. Howard Smith (Clerk)

O.C. Harvey (Clerk)

C.H. Bateman (Clerk)

C.F.A. Warner (Clerk)

J.V. Perowne (Clerk)

M.H. Huxley (Clerk)

E.E. Crowe (Clerk)

Western Department

R.H. Campbell (Head of Department)

A.W.A. Leeper (Clerk)

I.A. Kirkpatrick (Clerk)

P.M. Boardmead (Clerk)

K.T. Gurney (Clerk)

F.R. Hoyer Millar (Clerk)

1930

Highest ranking officials from Foreign Secretary to Assistant Under Secretary (including Legal Advisors)

Arthur Henderson (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

Sir R.C. Lindsay (Permanent Under Secretary of State)

Hugh Dalton (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

George Masterman Gillett (Additional Parliamentary Under Secretary of State)

Victor A.A.H. Wellesley (Deputy Under Secretary of State)

Charles Hubert Montgomery (Chief Clerk)

Lancelot Oliphant (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

George Augustus Mounsey (Assistant Under Secretary of State)

Herbert William Malkin (Legal Adviser)

William Eric Beckett (Second Legal Adviser)

Gerald Grey Fitzmaurice (Third Legal Adviser)

Central Department

O.G. Sargent (Head of Department)

O.St.C. O'Malley

J. Balfour

E.H. Carr

E.E. Crowe

D.L. Busk

League of Nations and Western Department

C. Howard-Smith (Head of Department)

A.W.A. Leeper

I.A. Kirkpatrick

K.T. Gurney

F.R. Hoyer Millar

W.I. Mallet

E.L.A. Robertson-Fullarton

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