How Member States Matter for the EU-NATO Interorganisational Relationship: A Typology

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'If we get the capabilities, NATO, along with the European Union, can do amazing things.'
Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General 1999-2003

'NATO and the EU make very poor friends. Even though the membership of both institutions is nearly identical (…), the two barely talk.'
Tomas Valasek, Ambassador of Slovakia to NATO, 2013-2017

'A Strong Europe provides a strong NATO.'
Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, 2014-present

Abstract

Cooperation in foreign, security and defence affairs has become an increasingly crucial topic with the growing number of crises and conflicts that the Euro-Atlantic community faces. Since their origins, the EU and NATO have gone through different phases of interactions, and recent events in their security environment on the Eastern and Southern borders have demanded greater collaboration. Their interactions and cooperation have experienced multiple challenges internally as well as externally. This dissertation analyses the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship and takes a special focus on the role of member states.

States pursue different goals and objectives, and thus takes a different position in international organisations as well as in interorganisational relationships. This research investigates the interactions between organisations in overlapping policy areas, and more specifically in the field of security and defence, by establishing the theoretical framework of interorganisational interaction. It argues that both member states and international organisations play decisive roles in shaping the preferences, designs and institutional settings of interorganisational relations, and seek to pursue their own interests through multiple channels and forums. Based on the findings and insights from the theoretical framework two typologies are developed: a typology of interorganisational interaction and a typology of member states' positions in interorganisational interaction. The typology of interorganisational interaction is based on a set of indicators that include the network density of international organisations, functional overlap, the level of formalisation, frequency, intensity, and membership overlap. The typology of member states consists of advocates, blockers, balancers and neutrals of interorganisational interaction. Both typologies help to explain and understand the diverging behaviours, strategies and positions of member states.

The theoretical framework with the typology of member states in interorganisational relations is applied to the analysis of the role of member states in the relationship between the EU and NATO. The empirical part analyses each type by considering and categorising all member states to illustrate their different contributions, interactions and approaches to shaping EU-NATO cooperation. This research takes a mixed methods approach by collecting data through the conduct of interviews with representatives from the EU, NATO and selected member states, the analysis of key national security and defence documents from member states, and the use of descriptive statistics which compile member states' contributions to EU-led and NATO-led military operations as well as their cooperation on the institutional and operational levels. With the development of the theoretical framework including the

indicators of interorganisational interaction and the typology of member states, and the findings from the empirical analysis, this inquiry enhances the scholarship of interorganisational relations. It adds a new angle by analysing the perspective of member states and further contributes to the empirical examination of the EU-NATO relationship in security and defence affairs.

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List of Abbreviations

AU	African Union
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CARD	Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
CDP	Capability Development Plan
CEU	Council of the European Union
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DCI	Defence Capability Initiative
DPC	Defence Planning Committee
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EATC	European Air Transport Command
EATF	European Air Transport Fleet
ECAP	European Capabilities Action Plan
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDF	European Defence Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUGS	European Union Global Security Strategy
EUISS	European Union Institute for Security Studies
FPA	Framework Participation Agreement
FNC	Framework Nation Concept
FYRoM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HR	High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NORDAC	Nordic Armaments Cooperation
NORDCAPS	Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support
NORDEFCO	Nordic Defence Cooperation
NORDSUP	Nordic Supportive Defence Structures
NORTART	Nordic Tactic Air Transport
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PSC	Political and Security Committee
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
TEU	Treaty on the European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Chapter 1 - Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Europe finds itself in the midst of simmering conflicts and crises in its near and wider neighbourhood. Increasing numbers of international actors have become involved in the crises that mark today's political stage. Since the end of the Second World War, an increasing number of international and regional organisations have been created. Organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisations for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as the European Union (EU) have done their stint to securing Europe and its borders from external aggression. Equally, other regions and continents have experienced the emergence of international organisations that have sought to establish peace and security. It would be ingenuous to believe that these organisations have the same share in this contribution, and that they have been able to knit closer ties. In Europe, the time period since the end of the Cold War has shown that the EU aims at becoming a global player in crisis management despite the presence of the military alliance formed by NATO.

The emergence and the development of European military capabilities and policies have triggered questions around why it has become necessary to create structures alongside the existence of NATO's already established military planning structures, and what will happen to the co-existence of similar security organisations in the same region — will they eventually cooperate or become rivals. In fact, not only do both organisations cover a similar geographical scope as well as overlapping memberships — twenty-two of NATO's twenty-eight member states belong to the European Union — but they also share common values and norms. In addition, they have a similar origin: the idea to formalise the relationship of states to prevent future conflicts in the aftermath of the Second World War and to deter new aggression.

The year 2016 has played a crucial part in the relationship between the EU and NATO. First, on 28 June 2016, Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), presented the EU Global Security Strategy (EUGS) at the EU Summit in Brussels (EU 2016a). Second, just a few weeks later, on 9 July 2016, the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of NATO adopted a joint declaration at the NATO Summit in Warsaw (NATO 2016a). In both documents, the strengthening of the EU-NATO relationship as well as

fostering European security have been reaffirmed. On paper, this special relationship received new contours and shapes; in practice, however, this has so far not been confirmed. While an official cooperation and partnership agreement has not been issued, informal ties and channels of cooperation between the organisations have become more popular (Græger 2016; Græger and Haugevik 2011).

The existing literature to analyse the phenomenon of the EU-NATO relationship is rooted in different sub-disciplines and theoretical as well as conceptual viewpoints. In more recent years, most of the European Studies literature has focused on the development of the EU as an international actor, on its civilian and military crisis management operations, i.e., the conduct, shortfalls and capabilities (Grevi et al. 2009; Nováky 2015). Scholars of International Security and International Relations have also focused on NATO's activities in the field of crisis and conflict management as well as on the conduct of military operations (Yost 2000). Much has also been contended about the parallel developments of the EU and NATO in terms of their security and defence structures as well as in regard to their approaches to crisis management (see, for example, Heise and Schmidt 2005; Major and Mölling 2009; Ojanen 2006; Schleich 2014; Touzovskaia 2006). In this regard, a particular group of scholars consisting of Rafael Biermann (2008a, 2009), Jolyon Howorth (2009, 2017, 2018; with John T.S. Keeler 2003), Martin Reichard (2006), and Johannes Varwick (2006) among others, increasingly focuses on the relationship between the EU and NATO. This particular relationship has been picked up again by a group of scholars who have presented their studies of EU-NATO cooperation in a 2017 special issue in *European Security*. These contributions focus on different conceptual and empirical aspects of this relationship including the role of practices and informal exchanges between the two organisations (Græger 2017; also see Græger 2016), their approaches to and relations with Russia (Duke and Gebhard 2017), the cooperation on defence industrial issues including capabilities development and interoperability (Fiott 2017a) and the interactions between the two organisations' key decision-making bodies in security and defence (Smith, Tomic and Gebhard 2017).

Existing studies acknowledge that international organisations, including their bureaucratic structures and secretariats play key roles, but so do member states. Nevertheless, 'theory-guided and IR-inspired studies on the role of member states in the IOR [interorganisational relations] life cycle are still rare' (Koops 2017: 198). As argued by neorealist scholars such as John Mearsheimer (1994), states represent the main actors in international relations and are

therefore substantive for the understanding and the analysis of world affairs. The question is why member states have so often been neglected from these scholarly works. This dissertation thus postulates that more emphasis should be put on the role of member states in interorganisational interactions.

In this context, this dissertation has overall two strands of objectives and rationales. One is addressed by theorising the interactions and relations between international organisations in the area of security and defence. The other is specifically addressed at the EU-NATO relationship and takes a closer look at why these two organisations have so far achieved little in translating their collaboration into official cooperation despite their ambitious postulations, and why these two organisations still fail to plan and conduct joint operations in the area of military crisis management. Furthermore, this dissertation considers the particular role that member states play and takes into account the motivational factors and institutional preferences of member states towards one security organisation over the other, and how member states can become key to solving challenges and problems in the EU-NATO relationship.

1.2 The Rationale: Research Questions and Assumptions

The purpose of this dissertation is thus twofold: The first is to follow the steps outlined by both Stefano Guzzini (2013) and Richard Swedberg (2012, 2016) to theorise the interorganisational relationship between the EU and NATO as well as the role of member states within this dyad. It will take into account pre-existing approaches and conceptualisations of key terminology, such as international organisations, cooperation, security, multilateralism, foreign and security policy orientation, member states and identity. Taking the analytical tool of theorising, the framework for this study shall also open up new avenues for scholars who struggle with the existing theories within the International Relations Scholarship.

The second purpose is that this dissertation seeks to contribute to the understanding of the concurrent evolutions of the security and defence instruments of the EU and the Atlantic Alliance as well as their approaches to interorganisational cooperation since the end of the Cold War. The time frame of interest for this study is therefore from the end of the Cold War in 1991 until the signing of the most recent Joint Declaration between the EU and NATO in

2016. While looking at this special interorganisational relationship, the role of member states will be the centre of attention. It aims to examine the means that member states have at their disposal to circumvent institutional and legal barriers to strengthen the interorganisational relationship. Doing so helps to test the theoretical framework of the role of member states in interorganisational interaction and delivers an attempt for future research to understand potential alternatives to the current state of affairs.

Since the EU and NATO share some vital similarities, such as a high degree of membership overlap, an overlap of their functions and policies in security and defence affairs, and complementary institutional structures, there are also other factors that trigger the decision of member states to launch a military crisis management operation either through the EU or NATO. While some states are outspoken supporters of the Atlantic Alliance – the so-called Atlanticists – others can be labelled as Europeanists, i.e., those favouring the EU's approach to crisis management (Cornish and Edwards 2001: 589). Yet, this categorisation does not ultimately explain what role states actually play in EU-NATO cooperation. The endeavour to examine the role of member states thus follows the main research question: *How do different national features shape member states' roles and positions in and their contributions to the interorganisational relationship between the EU and NATO?* In this context, national features refer to historical experiences, domestic particularities and restraints, geopolitical location and military capabilities.

Additionally, a set of sub-research questions will be asked and answered as part of this study. This inquiry seeks to answer the question *what is the current state of affairs in the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship?* to investigate and examine the overall evolution of the relationship between the EU and NATO and its current state of affairs to embed the position of member states therein. Given that states have varying perceptions, positions, ambitions and contributions to international organisations as well as differences in their networking with other states in the form of bilateral and minilateral relations, this research further addresses the question *how do states' use of minilateral and bilateral fora affect interorganisational relations, particularly the EU-NATO relationship?*

These questions inform the formulation of key assumptions which guide this research. It is suggested that member states need to receive more attention in the study of interorganisational interaction and specifically in the analysis of the relationship between the EU and NATO. States' bilateral and minilateral relations with other member states as well as inter-state tensions can strongly influence the developments and evolution of

interorganisational relations. Enhanced and deeper cooperation between these two international security organisations has been observable since the beginning of their rapprochement after the end of the Cold War. This has been an achievement primarily by their secretariats and individual key players, but also member states have actively contributed. These contributions, however, have been to diverging degrees. This follows the categorisation of member states according to their positions towards and roles in the EU-NATO relationship, which define and influence the future developments of interorganisational interaction. In this context, this research assumes that states' political strategies follow national interests and foreign and security policy orientations on the one hand, and the capabilities, structures, policy areas of activity and key strength in security and defence affairs of these international security organisations of which they are members on the other hand. Particularly those states with membership in all participating organisations of interorganisational relations, so-called multiple members, have the ability to influence interorganisational interaction because of their decision-making powers in both organisations and their ability to choose from a greater variety of political strategies.

By analysing the role of member states in interorganisational interaction more broadly and in the EU-NATO relationship more specifically, this dissertation seeks to enhance the scholarly work in these fields of study. In doing so, it adds the perspective of member states to the analysis of cooperation between these two organisations in security and defence, and thereby it provides a point of departure for research on mechanisms, triggers and key actors in interorganisational interaction.

1.3 Case Selection of Member States

Since this research postulates that member states play a central role in the interorganisational interactions between the EU and NATO, they therefore present the focal point in this analysis. This research is interested in investigating the positions that member states can take and how they can make use of these roles to shape the development of the EU-NATO relationship. This calls into question which member states will be particularly considered as cases for this analysis.

The EU consists of twenty-eight member states and so did NATO as of 2016. They have an overlap of a total of twenty-two member states. In addition, the EU maintains security

relations with non-EU NATO member states through Framework Participation Agreements (FPAs). These security agreements enable third states to participate in operations and missions under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Tardy 2014). Similarly, NATO maintains agreements with non-NATO EU partner countries through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, which is designed to maintain bilateral security cooperation between NATO and its partner countries, and also enables these states to participate in NATO-led operations (NATO 2016b). In this regard, Cyprus is the only state which is considered to be a truly single member state. It joined the European Union in 2004 but does neither have membership nor a formalised partnership with NATO, which has resorted to the so-called Cyprus issue between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey (see Acikmese and Triantaphyllou 2012). Table 1 provides an overview of all member states in the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship and indicates whether a state is either a full member in the EU and/or NATO or participates in the EU's FPA or NATO's PfP programme.

All of these thirty-four states will be considered as cases for the analysis of the role of member states in the EU-NATO relationship. The following chapter introduces and undertakes the process of theorising, and consequently, establishes a typology of member states in interorganisational interaction (chapter 2). In the empirical analysis, each member state is categorised according to the established types of member states. While every single member state is considered for the investigation, some individual states receive greater attention because of the availability of and access to information and data. It is acknowledged that more data is available for certain member states, such as bigger states with more military capabilities and resources including France, Germany and the United Kingdom, or specific groups of states such as the Baltics, Nordics, Central and Eastern European States and the Cyprus-Greece-Turkey triad, or small and militarily neutral member states. The analysis therefore shifts to these states to illustrate the extent to which they represent each type of member states in interorganisational interaction. For this process, especially primary sources in the form of national security and defence strategies have been helpful to categorise each member state according to the key characteristics and features that are developed in the theorising section.

Table 1 Membership Overlap in the EU-NATO Relationship

EU	NATO	Partner Countries FPA	Partner Countries PfP
	Albania	Albania	
Austria			Austria
Belgium	Belgium		
Bulgaria	Bulgaria		
	Canada	Canada	
Croatia	Croatia		
Cyprus*			
Czech Republic	Czech Republic		
Denmark	Denmark		
Estonia	Estonia		
Finland			Finland
France	France		
Germany	Germany		
Greece	Greece		
Hungary	Hungary		
	Iceland	Iceland	
Ireland			Ireland
Italy	Italy		
Latvia	Latvia		
Lithuania	Lithuania		
Luxembourg	Luxembourg		
Malta			Malta
The Netherlands	The Netherlands		
	Norway	Norway	
Poland	Poland		
Portugal	Portugal		
Romania	Romania		
Slovakia	Slovakia		
Slovenia	Slovenia		
Spain	Spain		
Sweden			Sweden
	Turkey	Turkey	
United Kingdom	United Kingdom		
	United States	United States	

**Cyprus is the only state that is considered to be a single member state because it is only member of the EU, and not of NATO.*

1.4 Research Design

This research is interested in the role of member states in the interorganisational relationship between the EU and NATO. It is an examination of the strategies, interests and preferences of member states in respect to their attitudes towards interorganisational interaction and how they seek to exert influence on their design, structures and formalisation in the field of security and defence. It applies both an inductive and a deductive approach to social inquiry (cf. Lamont 2015). The approach is inductive as it makes observations of the EU-NATO relationship based on the examination of secondary literature and security and defence strategy papers published by both organisations and their member states and translates these into theorising in International Relations Scholarship. With the help of these observations, theoretical propositions are generated, which identify and formulate key typologies for the study of member states in interorganisational interaction. These observations and the knowledge acquired from the national security and defence papers as well as the secondary literature allow to formulate tentative assumptions about member states' choices to act and behave and help to develop a theory of interorganisational interaction with an ensuing typology of member states. This will be done in the subsequent part inspired by the guide to theorising developed by Richard Swedberg (2012, 2016). In addition, this research is deductive to the extent that it uses the newly developed theoretical framework of interorganisational interaction and the typology of member states to examine assumptions about member states and their importance in shaping the interorganisational relationship between the EU and NATO. This theoretical framework is then empirically tested to verify the assumptions made in this dissertation.

Some epistemological and ontological considerations need to be made in the beginning. Ontologically, it follows the constructionist approach. According to objectivists, social phenomena are regarded as external factors which are outside the reach of influence. In contrast, constructionists challenge this assumption of the pre-given existence of objects and phenomena. They view knowledge as indeterminate (Lamont 2015). In this context, it is acknowledged that the preferences and attitudes of international organisations and member states are not pre-given and therefore prone to change and adaptation. In addition, as argued by Hollis and Smith (1996), epistemology matters as much as ontology. Knowing a researcher's approach to gaining knowledge and how acceptable knowledge should be regarded, can help to follow the research strategies and use of methodological tools in order to acquire this particular knowledge. Whereas a positivist approach claims to give

explanations of human behaviour by using methods of the natural sciences, an interpretivist approach enables the researcher to use the theories and methods to understand and interpret human behaviour and action (Hollis and Smith 1996; Lamont 2015; Scotland 2012). The understanding of certain actions, behaviours and viewpoints by member states is paramount for this research, and hence this research takes an interpretivist turn of social sciences. The interpretivist-constructionist view helps to further understand these actions and changes as well as the indeterminate nature of social phenomena.

One key element of this dissertation is the conduct of theorising, which follows the guide to theorising and generating new theoretical paradigms by Richard Swedberg (2012, 2016). Theorising, i.e., 'what you do to produce a theory' (Swedberg 2012: 2), is a core process to which all scholars of international politics are subject in their discovery and acquisition of new knowledge. The overall objective is to create and elaborate a new idea with the help of abduction as a means of inference. In this regard, the theorist stands in contrast to the practitioner: 'Being authorised to theorise world politics is something for which scholars have had to struggle by continuously challenging the allegedly superior knowledge of the practitioner' (Guzzini 2013: 522). The process of theorising is a vital process for the scholar because it is based on one's own ideas and one that signifies the ongoing development of a theoretical puzzle. Theorising encourages to take into account previously defined terms and conceptualisations, though one shall not just apply and reproduce the ideas and empirical works of others but rather to go beyond and work with them for one's own theorising process. This enables to dig deeper into one's research interest and to 'better understand of how a theory is put together' (Swedberg 2016: 6), which allows the researcher to understand the subject holistically. Moreover, applying someone else's theory to one's own findings and works, makes the theory 'exterior and alien to one's own thinking or, to put it differently, that it lacks a certain organic quality' (Swedberg 2012: 15-16).

A comparative case study design is further used in the empirical part of this dissertation to examine the role of member states in and their attitudes towards interorganisational relations. There is an ample number of understandings and formulations of what a case study entails. Gerring (2004: 341-342) defines a case study as 'an in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar's aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena'. While a single case study allows for the in-depth analysis of an outstanding member state, a comparative case study enables the research subject to take a closer look at several salient cases. It is, however, not necessarily limited to small-n studies

in which single units or cases are analysed. A case study can also comprise a large amount of cases – and member states – in order to identify and illustrate the broader phenomenon. These can then be examined and evaluated in either a qualitative or quantitative fashion. Here a case study design is applied that is extended to all member states in both the EU and NATO, which amounts to a total of thirty-four states[1]. The advantage of the case study approach is that it is 'of an explanatory nature' and enables to produce new hypotheses, whereby it focuses on generating new theories and theoretical concepts. In contrast, large-n studies rather seek to test newly generated hypotheses and theories (Gerring 2005, 2007; Lamont 2015). Through the development of a typology of member states in interorganisational interaction the entirety of member states of both the EU and NATO needs to be categorised and grouped accordingly. Comparing these types of member states allows not only to draw conclusions on their attitudes and strategies, but also to generate new assumptions and theories about the roles of states within interorganisational interaction.

Moreover, this dissertation seeks to analyse the EU-NATO relationship through the application of a multitude of research methods with the inclusion of qualitative and descriptive quantitative research methods. Both qualitative and quantitative research methods provide specific sets of data, both numerical and non-numerical, which are essential for the analysis of the role of member states in interorganisational interaction. Based on these two types of research methods, additional knowledge is gained through the process of triangulation. Triangulation refers to the use of two or more methods and sources of data for the inquiry of social phenomena, which coincides with the application of mixed research methods. This approach is used for cross-checking findings and to strengthen the credibility of the collected data (Lamont 2015). It also enhances the variety of findings and can motivate 'to think outside the box' (Mason 2006: 13). Thus, it is essential to utilise already existing findings as well as to collect new data. Qualitative and quantitative methods bring forward sets of advantages, but also weaknesses, and thus neither of them on their own allow to provide the full range of tools and instruments to gain new insights for the study of member states in interorganisational interaction. Some of these advantages include the 'heightened knowledge and validity' (Schoonenboom and Johnson 2017: 110) as well as 'specificity', 'transparency' and the ability to deal with large amounts of data and to make 'causal

[1] This includes the twenty-eight EU member states and the twenty-eight NATO member states. Montenegro has not been included since it officially joined the Atlantic Alliance on 5 June 2017, which is outside the time period of this research.

inferences about relationships among variables' (Lamont 2015: 99).

The adoption and use of descriptive quantitative research enable to identify quantifiable data on member states' contributions in absolute terms to international security organisations, such as financial resources, troops and military capabilities as well as the frequency of participation in crisis management operations. Relationships can then be established between these variables in order to examine so-called *what is* questions and to make predictive assumptions and claims (Lamont 2015). In addition, qualitative approaches help to make descriptive inferences about phenomena. These are based on the descriptions of observations, such as about the behaviour of states within international organisations and within interorganisational interaction, which will later enable to explain the causes, mechanisms and effects of states' actions and behaviour (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). The research scholarship in the field of foreign, security and defence affairs is a very sensitive area, however, which is often not quantifiable due to the inaccessibility and classification of data and information. The many tools and instruments used within qualitative methods focus on the spoken and written words that cannot be translated into numerical data. They allow to gain insights into the internal workings, negotiations and intentions of both international security organisations and their member states. This policy field raises specific challenges for the researchers and the use of qualitative methods, such as the conduct of interviews, helps to '[obtain] first-hand information to the extent that most of the time the researcher does not have any extensive access to the grey literature of internal documents he or she would need' (Deschaux-Beaume 2012: 102).

The overall aim of this research design based on the inductive and deductive approach is to generate and test new assumptions about the role of member states in interorganisational interaction between international organisations, and more specifically between the EU and NATO. The comparative case study design and the triangulation process with the use of the mixed research process help to acquire new data to formulate and test these new claims.

1.5 Categorisations and Typologies

In addition to the theorising process, which will receive greater attention in Chapter 2, the classification of interorganisational interactions, the establishment of a typology and the categorisation of member states into the newly developed typology on the role of member

states in interorganisational relations play essential parts in this dissertation. The development of typologies and the use of categorisation are analytical tools that enable and help to explain and predict certain phenomena in general, and the motives, behaviour and roles of member states in the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship in particular. Typologies can be defined as 'organised systems of types' (Collier, LaPorte and Seawright 2012: 217) and are referred to as classification which is defined as 'the ordering of entities into groups or classes on the basis of their similarity' (Bailey 1994: 1. Classification is furthermore 'both a process and an end result' (Bailey 1994: 2). Because of the advantages and usefulness of classifications, the development and application of typologies is a widely used analytical tool in the social sciences. They have not only been used and applied in quantitative methods, where variables are categorised into nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio scale variables, but also in qualitative research.

Authors working on and with typologies have identified distinctive types: conceptual typologies, descriptive and explanatory typologies, and multidimensional and unidimensional typologies (Bailey 1994; Collier, LaPorte and Seawright 2012). In addition, typologies can be distinguished from taxonomies. While typologies are based on ideal types, especially in the Weberian understanding of ideal types, taxonomies refer to classification based on 'empirically observable and measurable characteristics' (Smith 2002: 381). A note of caution needs to be added here. Max Weber describes the ideal type and at the same time formulates restrictions. First, the ideal type cannot be found empirically but is more a conceptual formulation and second, the ideal type is used to study and analyse the degree to which an empirical case or entity differs from the ideal type (Bailey 1994: 17). In this dissertation, the development and testing of a descriptive typology is pursued that allows to categorise member states based on their similar views on and positions within the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship. An ideal type is thus proposed but it is acknowledged that none of the member states will represent this ideal type but rather, the member states in each type share a set of features and characteristics.

Generally, Bailey (1994: 2) argues that 'almost anything is classified to some degree in everyday life', and typologies bring a set of advantages and benefits to the analysis in social sciences. The overall goal of typologies and classifications is to explain and predict. As expressed by the definition, typologies allow to identify specific patterns, such as patterns of behaviour and attitudes by states, and also allow to synthesise complex ideas and multiple strands of analysis into a simplified understanding of phenomena, which reduces the overall

complexity (Bailey 1995; Collier, LaPorte and Seawright 2012). The classification and categorisation into types based on similar criteria and characteristics increases the predictability of its entities due to the presumption of their characteristics, such as attitudes, opinions and patterns of behaviour. This enables to formulate responses and to make amendments and changes. In addition, the process of categorisation seeks to find in-group homogeneity while differentiating from other groups, which allows to compare different types more easily and helps to study and examine relationships within and among different types (Bailey 1994).

The analytical tool of typologies does not come without caveats, however. It is acknowledged that it is impossible to objectively classify and categorise entities into types due to scholars' different understandings, viewpoints and perceptions of the data as well as the subjective interpretation of the categorisation criteria (Bailey 1994; Smith 2002). The difficulty of selecting dimensions and criteria for the classification into typologies thus adds to the already existing complexity of social phenomena. In regard to the Weberian notion of ideal types, not every entity or case that needs to be put into a type fulfils the classification criteria to the fullest extent and no entity can in fact be considered to resemble the ideal type. It is therefore up to the discretion of the researcher to decide how to categorise the different types. While typologies have been accused of being rather static than dynamic (Bailey 1994), they are also never complete, perfect or permanent (Swedberg 2016), and the characteristics and criteria are not fixed. This leads to the problem of boundary cases or fluid cases, or what Rodt (2017: 139) identifies as 'swing states' in regard to classifying member states in the EU's security and defence policy. Boundary cases refer to those entities that adopt and fulfil characteristics with more than one type and such cases add to the complexity of typologies. Moreover, particularly conceptual typologies serve as descriptive tools and do not automatically allow for assessing and measuring. Collier, LaPorte and Seawright (2012: 226) therefore state that 'conceptual typologies do *not* thereby become explanatory typologies. Rather, they map out variation in the outcomes being explained and/or in the explanation of concern […]'.

In this dissertation, the development of a classification of interorganisational interactions and the development of a typology serve as meaningful analytical tools to analyse the role of member states in interorganisational relations and particularly EU-NATO cooperation while taking into account the caveats and shortcomings of categorisations and typologies. The typologies will be developed in conjunction with the process of theorising

interorganisational interaction in Chapter 2. The creation of the typology of member states in interorganisational interaction relies on a set of selection criteria including attitude towards interorganisational interaction and cooperation among international organisations (positive, negative, balanced, indifferent), level of active promotion of closer interorganisational cooperation (absent, low, medium, high), view on division of labour between the respective international organisations (positive, negative, balanced, indifferent), level of engagement in negotiations (absent, low, medium, high) and material contributions to the international organisations and their operations (absent, low, medium, high). This categorisation of member states into the typology of member states in interorganisational relations on the basis of these criteria rests on the analysis of primary sources and secondary data, as outlined in the subsequent section. In addition, the qualitative content analysis of primary documents on the basis of the appearance of keywords (see Chapter 1.6.1) has furthermore helped to categorise each state into the typology of member states in interorganisational interaction.

1.6 Data and Sources

Access to relevant data and sources goes in line with the epistemological and ontological approaches adopted in this dissertation. In this context, knowledge is viewed as indeterminate and one that can be acquired throughout the research process (Scotland 2012). Existing data and knowledge come in primary and secondary sources. With the help of the process of triangulation, the data has been acquired through different channels and from a wide range of sources. Triangulation has then helped to cross-check the validity of the collected primary and secondary data.

This research follows the analysis of both primary and secondary sources, whereas the former comes in two types. First, primary sources include official documents, statements and transcript of speeches by both the EU and NATO as well as member states' ministries and governments. Second, interviews have been conducted to collect additional data and insights into the workings of international organisations and national delegations, and to investigate member states' perspectives, attitudes and perceptions of the EU-NATO relationship. Further details on these sources and how the data has been collected is provided in the following subsection.

Secondary sources consist of journal articles and textbooks as well as publications by think tanks and research institutes. The latter has been particularly useful because of the recent political developments in the EU-NATO relationship. Policy papers, research reports and briefings from think tanks, such as Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, the Centre for European Reform, the European Union Institute for Security Studies, and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), are drafted and published in a timelier fashion than academic journal articles. Empirically, these secondary sources focus on the approaches, policies and positions of the member states and on descriptions of the emergence and evolutions of the interorganisational relationship between the EU and NATO. Generally, secondary literature provides additional information, in-depth knowledge and analyses of individual aspects. Even though one needs to be careful with secondary literature, especially because of its validity and credibility, these are taken into consideration in addition to the collection of primary data.

1.6.1 Official Documents and Content Analysis

Primary sources include official documents in two ways (see Appendix F for the overview of all official documents used for this dissertation). First, official documents are comprised of publications by the EU and NATO as well as declarations and agreements in which they agree on the framework of their relationship, such as strengthening cooperation in military crisis management. In this regard, three documents are most salient: the 2002 EU-NATO Declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy (EU 2002; NATO 2002), the 2003 EU-NATO Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus (EU 2003a) – also known as the Berlin Plus arrangements – and the 2016 Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO 2016a). Strategic concepts, security strategies and press releases from both the EU and NATO are also considered as well as other official documents, such as the 1998 Franco-British Saint-Malo Declaration (EUISS 2000). The most relevant official documents by the European Union include the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) (EU 2003b; EU 2016a), the various Framework Participation Agreements (FPAs) with partner countries and non-EU NATO member states, and the EU's directives and regulations. NATO's Strategic Concepts are the Alliance's most relevant documents in regard to their shared objectives and security outlooks (NATO 1991, 2010).

Second, national documents as well as press statements by EU and NATO member states, e.g., those produced by their Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs or national parliaments, are used in order to align their positions on the EU-NATO relationship and to cross-check these statements with the findings from the interviews with representatives from member states, the EU and the Atlantic Alliance. These national documents are particularly crucial to categorise each member state and to identify their orientations in foreign, security and defence affairs as they contain vital information on the member states' strategic cultures and security interests. The major caveat of these is that, although they are accessible online, they are often summaries in English and some primary documents are only available in the native language. It was sought to overcome these limitations with the help of interviews to gain insights and information from national representatives, which are explained in more detail below. Furthermore, transcripts of speeches by government representatives, such as ministers and head of states and governments, have been included in this research as additional sources to their national security and defence papers to examine and validate the implementation of their strategies in practice.

Document-based research and content analysis have been vital in the analysis of strategy papers, press statements and transcripts of speeches. They give insights into the working and functioning as well as into the negotiations and decision-making on particular issues. Content analysis refers to 'the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics' and it allows for the examination of a large amount of data (Neuendorf 2002: 1; also see Lamont 2015). For this research, the national security and defence strategies and white books of the member states have been considered. Member states produce new security and defence strategies, some more regularly while others introduce them only in response to changing security environments and emerging threats. The scope of this analysis is to investigate the foreign and security policy orientation of member states in regard to their memberships in the EU and NATO and their positions towards interorganisational cooperation between these two organisations. Derived from the knowledge that has been gained from the secondary literature, these national strategy papers have been searched based on a set of keywords, which include 'EU', 'NATO', 'EU-NATO', 'CSDP', 'CFSP', 'cooperation', 'collaboration', 'strategic partnership(s)', 'partner', 'interorganisational' (or, alternatively, 'inter-organisational'), 'PfP' (or 'Partnership for Peace'), 'FPA' (or 'Framework Participation Agreement'), 'crisis management', '(military) operations', 'security', and 'defence'. These keywords have been chosen according to their relevance for the overall research aim and in order to ascertain member states' positions in either the EU or NATO,

their interorganisational relationship and their overall foreign, security and defence policy orientation. In the search for these keywords it became evident that the term 'interorganisational' has so far received marginal attention, which was not surprising, however, due to the recent revitalisation of the EU-NATO cooperation and the fact that the majority of national security and defence concepts were published prior to this.

The use of official documents and the conduct of semi-structured interviews are commonly used methods within social sciences. They have proven to be particularly useful to acquire access to data that would have otherwise not be been accessible. Yet, a note of caution in regard to the use of official documents and the application of qualitative content analysis as a methodological approach needs to be added. While content analysis is useful to manage and examine a large amount of data, it is also a selective tool based on the researcher's subjective understandings and interpretations. Originally, content analysis has been used by quantitative researchers but has received greater attention by academics who apply qualitative methods. Since it has been a tool for researchers with a positivist viewpoint, interpretivists face different challenges, such as that the researcher gives meaning and interpretations to the data although some distance is required (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). This is particularly reflected in the approach to analysing the content. This means that the choice of keywords as outlined in Chapter 1.6.1 has been selected by the researcher herself based on a set of presumptions taken from the knowledge gained by the secondary literature. This can risk a certain bias towards the selection of keywords used to analyse the content, i.e., messages and meanings of the strategic security and defence papers by member states, the EU and NATO. Furthermore, researchers bring forward different meanings and interpretations which can lead to misunderstandings of the content and their messages (cf. Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Lamont 2015).

Another challenge or limitation of the examination of official documents is the issue of language. Some international organisations, and especially the European Union, are renowned for their own language and wording. The EU jargon is commonly known among European Union scholars, and also NATO maintains its own specific language addressed to those working in the field of security, defence and military affairs. Similarly, the language of the national security and defence strategies and documents of the member states all share a relatively similar use of words and language, which adds to the difficulty of categorising. Because none of the member states would state in their national security strategies that they disfavour EU-NATO cooperation, one needs to read between the lines, i.e., discourses,

speeches and behaviour needs to be taken into consideration to understand and interpret the meaning of these messages. Therefore, this research relies not only on the content analysis of official documents, but also on secondary literature and interviews.

1.6.2 Qualitative Interviews

For this dissertation, a total of twenty-eight face-to-face semi-structured interviews with national representatives from the member states and officials from the EU and NATO as well as three informative meetings with academics from the scholarly community in this research field were carried out during three research trips to Brussels in the time period of twelve months between February 2017 and February 2018. These interviews were conducted in the institutions of the European Union, primarily in the premises of the European External Action Service (EEAS), and at the Headquarters of NATO as well as in the embassies, permanent representations and delegations of the member states in Brussels. One interview was conducted in Berlin in August 2017 with two representatives in the Federal Ministry for Defence (BMVg) and one other additional interview with a NATO representative was held during a conference in Berlin in autumn 2017. The interviews were based on face-to-face meetings usually with one representative, however, in occasions also with an additional one or two officials from the member state delegations, for example one military and one civilian official (see Appendix A for the list of interviews).

The conduct of interviews is grounded in several sampling strategies, which include random and non-random sampling of interview partners (see Lynch 2013). This research method brings forward a set of advantages and disadvantages. For this particular research, non-random sampling was primarily applied because initial contacts had been made at various academic conferences and workshops as well as through the help of the doctoral supervisors, who presented themselves as very important sources for contacts. This was particularly useful for the so-called 'snowball sampling' (Lamont 2015: 147) as it helped to gain access to participants from both organisations and their member states, who would have otherwise not been accessible. It allowed to effectively receive an additional list of potential interview participants, and with the help of the previous interviewees, new interviews were more easily scheduled. In addition, once the list of contacts was exhausted, emails have been sent out to member states' delegations to NATO and permanent representations to the EU with requests for interviews the relevant desk officer or representative. Usually, the websites of

member states' representations and delegations offered organisational structures including the names and contact details of the officials in charge for foreign, security and defence affairs including CFSP, CSDP and NATO relations. This approach proved itself fruitful as additional interviews have been scheduled with individuals from several member state representations.

In particular the conduct of in-depth semi-structured interviews is among the most common methods in social science research. In this approach, interviews are 'usually organised around a set of predetermined open-ended questions' (DiCocco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006: 315). For this research, only semi-structured interviews have been conducted. The advantages are manifold. They offer higher flexibility compared to structured and standardised interviews and allow the researcher to be more reflexive and responsive to the statements and propositions. Moreover, they enable the researcher to go beyond a certain set of prepared questions and allow to dig deeper and thus stimulate the interviewee to reveal more information and insights, which one would usually not be able to do in a standardised interview or survey (Berg 2009; Mason 2006). This helps to collect rich and in-depth insights and allows to cross-check the findings from the primary sources and secondary literature. Qualitative interviews are generally a very useful tool for researchers in the defence sector. As noted by Deschaux-Beaume, they provide 'interesting access to military actors in a research context where secrecy and the very specific military language constitute an issue for the analyst' (2012: 103).

Conducting interviews of any type leads to numerous challenges when the military and defence sector are concerned. The two main issues are confidentiality and secrecy on the one hand, and the military language and discourse on the other (Deschaux-Beaume 2012). In response to these challenges, the qualitative interviews were conducted anonymously. The list of participating interviewees has been coded and encrypted so that the interviewees cannot be identified (for the list of the interviewees as references see Appendix A). In this way, the harm towards the actors in the field is reduced and this might even lead to the possibilities that interviewees are freer to talk and express themselves. Additional challenges include the identification of and the access to relevant actors in the EEAS and in NATO respectively, as well as in the Permanent Representations of the member states to both organisations. This problem was overcome by contacting academics located in Brussels and carrying out informative and exploratory interviews before the first round of in-depth semi-structured interviews was conducted. These exploratory interviews are helpful to set the first

foot into the network as these interviews usually include name-dropping and the start of the snowball effect leading to more contacts (Kapiszewski et al. 2015; Lynch 2013). In addition, one other potential challenge arises in regard to the effect of gender in this research field. While this point should not be emphasised too much, it is nevertheless important to note. As stated by Deschaux-Beaume (2012: 111), the special relationship between the researcher and the interviewee becomes 'more specific when one is a young woman investigating a mostly masculine environment'. For the researcher, gender was not perceived as a challenge, but its awareness has been helpful to prepare the field research and interviewing processes.

The conduct of interviews with representatives from the EU, NATO and the member states played an essential part in the acquisition of knowledge on member states' behaviours, perceptions and approaches to EU-NATO cooperation. They provided first-hand access to information and national policies which supplemented and partially verified the knowledge gained from the national security and defence papers as well as the strategic documents issued by the EU and the Atlantic Alliance. Particularly, the interviews allowed to dig deeper into member states' positions and roles within EU-NATO cooperation especially because the interviewees were asked to situate member states in the typology of member states in interorganisational relations as developed in Chapter 2. The combination of semi-structured interviews and content analysis of official documents in conjuncture with the examination of secondary literature allowed the triangulation and verification of data necessary for this research inquiry.

1.7 Chapter Outline

The following chapter, chapter 2, provides the theoretical foundation of this dissertation by theorising interorganisational interaction and the role of member states. It follows the guide to theorising by Richard Swedberg and builds upon the existing scholarly literature and theoretical debates on cooperation in international relations and among international organisations. It defines key concepts and terminology that help to further steer through the theorising process. The aim is to guide through the process of theorising to embed the phenomenon of interorganisational interaction into existing scholarly works and to establish a robust theoretical framework for the subsequent empirical analysis. With the help of the literature review of the existing theoretical and conceptual debates, chapter 2 then establishes a set of features of interorganisational interaction which then subsequently leads

to the development of the typology of member states in interorganisational interaction which presents the key element of this dissertation and poses the theoretical bedrock for the subsequent empirical chapters.

Chapter 3 examines the evolution of the relationship between the European Union and NATO starting from the end of the Cold War until the state of affairs in 2016. This chapter addresses the set of sub-questions by outlining the key historical events that have occurred between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance and reviews the scholarly debates which then leads to the thematic framework for the analysis of member states. Consequently, four key themes emerge from this examination: the formalisation and institutionalisation process, the issue of membership, military capabilities, and interoperability and division of labour. These four themes point out the importance of member states in the relationship between the EU and NATO, which is highlighted throughout the proceeding empirical chapters.

Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 present the empirical analyses of the four types of member states in the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship. These chapters address the main research question and examine the extent to which member states exert influence, behave and participate in the interactions between the EU and NATO. The focal point of these chapters is to illustrate each type of member state and to provide evidence for their actions, behaviours and approaches to interorganisational interaction in the security and defence realm. The aim is furthermore to compare these four types of member states and to examine the extent to which they contribute to the evolution of EU-NATO cooperation. Chapter 4 introduces the group of advocates of interorganisational interaction which contribute significantly to the advancement of this interorganisational relationship. The chapter gives insights into their behaviour and activities that enhance cooperation, which reveals their continuous efforts to promote this relationship. Chapter 5 examines how blockers hamper EU-NATO cooperation and illustrates exemplary actions through which they try to decelerate interorganisational interaction. Blockers play a crucial part and provide a reminder about the challenges posed my member states. Chapter 6 introduces the balancers of interorganisational interaction. It shows how these states seek to make a contribution to EU-NATO cooperation and how they mediate among their fellow member states. A central feature is their attempt to act as brokers in interorganisational interaction while having to meet numerous internal and external pressures. In the last empirical chapter, chapter 7, the group of neutrals receives greater attention. This chapter outlines their roles and positions,

and further demonstrates how these states, which usually have little influence, play their significant share in interorganisational interaction between the EU and NATO.

Chapter 8 then summarises and examines the findings. Based on the analysis it assesses how this research and its findings will impact the future development of the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship. The chapter concludes the main results by highlighting the significance of member states in interorganisational relationship and provides an outlook for future research in this field while considering the recent developments in the scholarship.

Chapter 2 - Theorising Interorganisational Interaction

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is guided by the question of how relations between international organisations are understood and explained from a theoretical point of view, and through which theoretical lenses the phenomenon of interorganisational interaction can be examined. It is guided by the process of theorising inspired by Richard Swedberg (2012, 2016) and Stefano Guzzini (2013). First, the phenomenon that is subject to the analysis of this study will be observed. This includes the observation of the emergence of international organisations and, more specifically, the emergence of interorganisational relations. This chapter then provides a theoretical discussion of existing approaches in order to develop the theoretical framework of interorganisational interaction. In this context, features of interorganisational interactions will be established that identify the occurrence of such phenomena. Subsequently, a typology of member states in interorganisational relations is developed, which guides the remainder of this dissertation.

Examining EU-NATO relations shows that most theoretical contributions are of a descriptive nature and that little attention has been paid to theoretical concepts that explain and help to understand cooperation between international organisations in security and defence. Different approaches to the study of international organisations and international institutions have been used and applied to examine interactions between organisations on the international level. These approaches include traditional theories of international relations and European integration as well as institutional theories, principal-agent models, socialisation theory, practice theory and ontological security. For example, in her work on EU-NATO cooperation, Hanna Ojanen (2006) applies supranationalism and intergovernmentalism to examine the models for European defence policy. Constructivism and sub-approaches such as concept of security community developed by Adler and Barnett (1998) has been used to study the Atlantic Alliance as a security community on the hand, but also to look at the EU and NATO in the Euro-Atlantic community of peace and security (also see Adler 2008; Greve 2018). Other constructivist scholars of international organisations, such as Barnett and Finnemore (1999, 2004), but also Bauer and Ege (2016), focus on the role and functioning of international bureaucracies and secretariats, and how these exercise autonomy over relations and interactions with external actors. Moreover, deriving from sociological, constructivist and organisational perspectives, academics such as Alastair Iain

Johnston (2001), Emanuel Adler and Patricia Greve (2009) and Nina Græger (2016, 2017) have made use of the approach of practice theory and the concept of socialisation to examine informal ways of cooperation, pragmatic interactions between organisations and the process of learning and social interactions. Such theoretical perspectives are particularly useful for looking beyond the formal and institutionalised forms of cooperation between different actors and allow to examine the actual interactions especially in the field of security and defence. These works contribute to the understanding of how interaction and exchanges occur on the practical and day-to-day basis especially in contexts where formalised cooperation faces unsurmountable obstacles. In this regard, Adler and Greve (2009) combine the concepts of balance of power and security communities, which have been used in the past to understand collaboration among states and the creation of organisations, and add studies of practices and discourse to analyse overlapping security governance structures in Europe. Building on this, Græger (2016, 2017) brings a new aspect to the debate by examining the everyday functioning of EU-NATO cooperation between their members of staff on the institutional dimension and between their troops on the ground in Kosovo. In some of these debates, the principal-agent model has appeared which accounts for the internal interactions and relations between states, institutions and bureaucracies within international organisations. It helps to unpack and examine at what levels cooperation between international organisations might occur (Schleich 2014).

In the context of this inquiry, it is not argued that these contributions do not make an essential contribution, from a theoretical point of view however, these scholars apply already existing theoretical frameworks and make them fit to their own purpose. Furthermore, while these theoretical approaches acknowledge that multiple actors interact with each other in international relations and in international organisations, the focus is either on the power relations between member states and international secretariats, e.g., the principal-agent model, or the analyses are directed at the contributions of actors at different levels of the international system (Koops 2017; Smith 2011). When both international organisations and member states are concerned, the applicability of these theoretical approaches is heavily limited and often does not account for the back and forth interactions between states and bureaucracies as well as between different international organisations in the same policy field. When reviewing the International Relations Theory literature as well as organisation theory, institutionalism and constructivist approaches in regard to international organisations, it becomes clear that the roles that member states can play remain open to debate and that a theoretical model needs to be developed. The theoretical framework in

this dissertation enhances the scholarship by providing an overview of the key features according to which interorganisational relationships can be analysed, and it also adds the viewpoint from member states as a new perspective to the analysis of interorganisational interaction, which has so far received little attention.

2.2. Theorising in International Relations Scholarship

The objective is to elaborate a conceptualisation of international organisations and develop an analytical framework of interorganisational relations derived from findings and insights from different theoretical approaches concerned with international organisations, and more specifically with the interorganisational relationship between the EU and NATO. The development of a genuine theoretical framework does not seek to generalise the relationship of international security organisations. Instead, as in the words of Robert O. Keohane, the aim here is that 'we must understand that we can aspire only to formulate conditional, context-specific generalisations rather than to discover universal laws' (1988: 379-380).

International Relations theorists find themselves in a paradoxical dilemma in which they receive criticism from both practitioners and empirical theorists alike (Guzzini 2013). This calls for a need to rethink International Relations Theory and shows a growing need to theorise phenomena in world politics. As Swedberg proposes in his contribution *Before Theory Comes Theorising or How to Make Social Science More Interesting* (2016), the process and activity of theorising needs to be learned and thus taught effectively. Swedberg (2012, 2016) also offers a guide to theorising in which he elaborates five steps in theorising: observation, naming the phenomena or concept, adding already existing concepts, categorisation and typology, and explanation. Guzzini (2013: 533-535) adds to the debate four modes of theorising — normative, meta-theoretical, ontological and empirical— which are all inherently connected. Swedberg's five steps as well as Guzzini's modes of theorising illustrate the guide for the theorising process on which this dissertation is based. This section therefore briefly describes these five steps to make sense of the proceeding subsections and the development of the theoretical framework of this dissertation.

The aim of the first step is to find something new by making observations in a particular field of interest. It should be very broad and can include any type of source. The important condition is not to reproduce someone else's findings and observations, but to 'go beyond

these and [to] try to locate *social facts*' (Swedberg 2016: 10) and to get closer to a phenomenon to acquire as much information as possible. In the second step, the observation receives a name or a label. This can either be a new name or a label that is associated with an already existing one. By calling the observed phenomenon not just a name but a concept, more emphasis is put on the process of theorising. Concepts build the foundation for theorising and its end product, i.e., theories, which provide the underlying tool to formulate arguments and hypotheses. In the third step, concepts are therefore at the centre of theorising because 'they are the words in which, but also for which, our theorising is done' (Guzzini 2013: 535). In this context, they are therefore an expansion of definitions. According to Berenskoetter (2017: 155), 'a concept is an abstract frame that helps generating knowledge about the world by organising, naming, and giving meaning to its features', and by giving names and meanings to a concept, one is able to control it.

Already existing concepts can be added to put the observed phenomenon and new concepts into context. This helps to further develop it into a particular direction. In the fourth step, a categorisation or typology can be devised. A typology serves the purpose to distinguish differences in phenomena which are otherwise grouped together under one comprehensive term. Such a typology also offers the understanding of the individual elements of the phenomena. The final step is concerned with explanation. In this stage, it is important to draw on logical reasoning, imagination and intuition as well as 'guessing, speculation and imagining something' (Swedberg 2016: 11). Through the explanation stage, the theorising process becomes a provisional theory or a prototype of a theory which can then be applied empirically. In the application phase, the newly developed theoretical concept can then also be adjusted, albeit not changed completely.

The following subsections follow the steps of theorising inspired by Richard Swedberg and Stefano Guzzini and review the theoretical literature on the study of international organisations and their interactions. Subsequently, the typology of the particular roles and positions that member states can claim in interorganisational relations will be developed, which provides the theoretical framework and conceptual centrepiece for the empirical analysis of this dissertation.

2.3 Observing the Interactions between International Security Organisations

Richard Swedberg (2012, 2016) tells us that the purpose of the first step of theorising, observation, is to find a new phenomenon, which needs to be broadly described. The observed phenomenon to be investigated in this thesis is the relationship between two or more international organisations that have some common features, such as issue areas, tasks and responsibilities, and membership as well as shared interests, rules and procedures. While it is essential not to reproduce someone else's work, it is nevertheless important to include an overview of the existing literature, which illustrates the current state of affairs as well as to delimit the new observation from previous findings.

During the early beginnings of the establishment of formal international organisations, such as the Concert of Europe in 1815 (Reinalda 2009), relations and interactions among them did not play an important role in world politics. The League of Nations was the first international organisation that recognised the significance of interacting with other organisations, such as with the International Labour Organisation after the end of the First World War. Since the end of the Second World War, the density of international organisations has increased tremendously (Alter and Meunier 2009). Hence, this also meant that a greater number of international actors were tasked with similar and even overlapping responsibilities.

The focus on international organisations and their interactions in international relations arose with the emergence of the research programme on international regimes and with the genesis of network analysis (Maoz 2012). International organisations and international regimes had already received attention in the fields of business administration, international economics and sociology (Schermerhorn Jr. 1975), but have been left aside in the International Relations literature until the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1982 special issue in *International Organisation*, the topic of international regimes shifted into the focal point of scholars such as Ernst B. Haas, Stephen D. Krasner, Robert O. Keohane and Oran R. Young (all published in 1982). Krasner's definition of international regimes has consequently been widely acknowledged. He defines them as 'implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations' (1982: 186). International regimes are further characterised as 'man-made' and 'social institutions' (Haas 1982: 210), which deal with immaterial and indirect processes. In contrast, international organisations consist not only of ideational and normative processes, but of 'brick and mortar' (Archer 2001: 2), i.e., material processes and physical presence. They also include an independent bureaucratic structure as well as some

autonomous decision-making power, which is distinct from their member states' decision-making powers (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004; also see Bauer and Ege 2016; Reinalda and Verbeek 1998).

Taking the research programme of international regimes as a point of departure helps to develop a theoretical framework for the analysis of interorganisational interaction. With the emergence of overlapping regimes, for example in the issue areas of environmental politics and international trade, the idea of regime complexes came about. Regime complex is defined as an 'array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue area' (Raustiala and Victor 2004: 279). It is further seen as 'the presence of nested, partially overlapping, and parallel international regimes that are not hierarchically ordered' (Alter and Meunier 2009: 13). These regime complexes also incorporate formal organisations and therefore entail relations between international organisations. Deriving from the institutional linkage literature as well as organisation theory literature, regime interaction can be observed (see Gehring and Oberthür 2004; Jönsson 2017; Lipson 2017). In regime theory, interaction is also referred to as interplay, and maintains a broader and vague understanding of the interaction between international regimes. It looks at how the rules and norms of overlapping international regimes, including their agreements, conventions and treaties, affect one another (Gehring and Oberthür 2009). The aim is to analyse how these overlaps translate into either cooperation or competition between international regimes. Further, it is generally argued that regimes that have a functional relation or similarity affect each other (Lipson 2017).

In the field of foreign, security and defence policy, a number of international security regimes and organisations exist. Moreover, such a regime complex and regime interaction, i.e., an overlap of international regimes and organisations can be observed. According to Jervis (1982: 360-362), specific conditions need to be met so that states create a security regime. These include the actors' willingness to establish a regime, the belief in mutual security and cooperation, the conviction that cooperation is more beneficial than expansion, and that individual pursuit of security is too costly. This debate is furthermore closely linked to network analysis, which is a technique and analytical tool to examine the linkages and connections between two or more units. The approach offers additional insights into the behaviour of the actors and units within the same network or within the same policy field, including their links, strategies and positioning as well as their behavioural expectations (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009; Maoz 2012).

While the theoretical underpinnings from the study of international regimes and regime complexes as well as the liberal and institutionalist understandings of international organisations pose helpful tools and conceptualisations for the study of interactions and cooperation between international organisations, they are not the only theoretical approaches applied in this field. International organisations, as mentioned above, can be defined as sets of rules, norms and principles that have a physical embodiment in the form of 'brick and mortar' including member states, their physical delegations, and international secretariats. Alternatively, from constructivist and sociological perspectives, international organisations and institutions have also been understood as arenas and forums, as actors in their own right and as social environments (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Johnston 2001; Reinalda and Verbeek 1998). In these approaches, organisations can act independently and autonomously from their member states by pursuing their own goals and policy objectives, whereby they can also influence and even trigger change in states' strategies and behaviour through the process of socialisation and learning towards cooperative action (cf. Johnston 2001).

Cooperation in security and defence in Europe has become an interesting as well as a highly relevant research topic, and has enjoyed high levels of scholarly attention, especially since the involvement of several international and national actors in the field (de Wijk 2004; Græger and Haugevik 2011; Howorth and Keeler 2003; Missiroli 2002; Winn 2003). Most contributions circulate around the dominant themes of rivalry and competition between two security organisations (Duke 2008; Ojanen 2006; Varwick 2006), the approaches to crisis management by the EU and NATO (Major and Mölling 2009; Schleich 2014) or the actors involved in EU-NATO cooperation, i.e., individuals, states, international staff and military actors (Koops 2017; Smith 2011). Other studies also take a closer look at the actual relationship between Europe and North America and between the EU and NATO (see, for example, Dorman and Kaufman 2011; Kagan 2003; Reichard 2006; Sloan 2003) or at the issue of practical cooperation in crisis management operations (Gebhard and Smith 2015; Michel 2007; Missiroli 2002; Schleich 2014). In addition, the increasing numbers of international organisations with functional overlaps and the condensed network of these organisations have triggered new research programmes. These imply studies and debates on the theoretical approaches to explaining the phenomena of organisational networks and fields, and the interaction of international organisations within the same issue area.

Both the EU and NATO emerged from the experience from the Second World War and are

products of the Cold War. Rising from the same origin – initiatives by France and the United Kingdom – these two organisations have taken different routes. Not only individually but also the relationship of both organisations has experienced lows and highs, in which they drew nearer but also dissociated from each other. Much has been contended about the parallel developments of the EU and NATO in terms of their security and defence structures as well as in regard to their approaches to crisis management. Whereas some scholars argue that competition between the two organisations has arisen, others assert that they are progressing towards a strategic partnership (Heise and Schmidt 2005; Touzovskaia 2006) as promulgated and reaffirmed in the EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy, which was agreed upon and signed on 16 December 2002 in Brussels (NATO 2002). These visions were again reaffirmed in the Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the NATO which was signed at the NATO Summit in Warsaw on 9 July 2016 (NATO 2016a).

For the purpose of theorising interorganisational relations in the area of security and defence, insights and assumptions from regime theory as well as from institutionalism and constructivism have been useful. The concepts of regime interaction and regime complexes provide starting points for theorising interorganisational interaction and analysing the relationship between the EU and NATO. The understanding of international organisations as actors in their own right and that both states and international organisations with their secretariats shape international politics provide relevant insights for theorising both interorganisational interaction and how member states shape these interactions. Yet, these existing theoretical approaches do not allow to fully study the mechanisms of cooperation and interactions between international organisations in security and defence affairs. They also do not include the numerous actors involved in the study of relations between international organisations because approaches such as regime theory assume that international organisations affect behaviour but does not make assumptions about how states are able to shape interactions between organisations. The next step focuses on this new phenomenon, i.e., the greater level of interactions and exchanges of international organisations and how they coexist as well as how they interact with each other. In the subsequent steps, the observed phenomenon is therefore subject to theorising interorganisational relations.

2.4 Naming the Phenomenon: Interorganisational Interaction

It is not only the relationship between the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance that has received different labels, but also the phenomenon itself, i.e., the relationship between international security organisations in general, has been named differently. In the step of naming the phenomenon, labels are identified to describe the relations between international organisations. Identifying previously used names helps to formulate a concrete label that is applicable to the EU-NATO relationship.

Deriving from both network analysis and the study of international organisations, i.e., the emergence, growth and increasing density of international organisations in an issue-specific network, Christer Jönsson (1986) gives the observed phenomenon the name 'interorganisational theory'. He discusses the issue of the interrelations of international organisations and thereby takes a closer look at the networks in which these interact. He then calls this observation 'interorganisational relations'. Daniel W. Lang (2002) as a scholar of organisation management labels the relationship between organisations and institutions 'inter-institutional cooperation'. In this case, the focus is on different forms of cooperation ranging from informal and loose cooperation to the merging of such bodies. In the attempt to develop a theoretical and conceptual framework, Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür examine 'interinstitutional interaction' (2004, 2009; also see Gehring and Faude 2014). Though, they rather consider international regimes and institutions, such as environmental regimes, than international organisations whose integration and institutionalisation is more advanced. When seeking to explain the relations between international institutions and international organisations, both Howard Loewen (2006) and Stefan Jungcurt (2006) use the term 'interplay between international institutions'. The term interplay, however, refers solely to 'situations when the development, operation, effectiveness or broad consequences of one institution are significantly affected by the rules and programs of another' (Loewen 2006: 11), which does not include the possibility of collaboration and cooperation of the respective institutions.

When it comes to the actual exchange, cooperation and interplay of international organisations, Joachim Koops (2007, 2012a) and Rafael Biermann (2008a, 2009) label the observation 'interorganisationalism'. Biermann (2008a) goes even a step further by referring specifically the EU-NATO relationship to 'interorganisational networking' because of the efforts of both organisations to create a wider group or system in which the organisations are increasingly interconnected. More broadly, the relationship between the European

Union and NATO has received different labels and names. While scholars such as Andrew M. Dorman and Joyce P. Kaufman (2011) as well as Stanley R. Sloan (2003) refer to 'transatlantic relations', others label it directly the 'EU-NATO relationship' (Reichard 2006). The latter is the focus of attention here because it deals specifically with the relationship between the two particular organisations in the Euro-Atlantic space, i.e., with the interorganisational relationship between the EU and NATO.

Naming the relationship between international security organisations is not an easy task. As illustrated above, there is no commonly agreed label. For the proceeding analysis and the development of the theoretical framework, the label of *interorganisational interaction* or alternatively *interorganisational relations* and *interorganisational cooperation* are used interchangeably. This allows to point out the relations between international security organisations and particularly the relationship between the EU and NATO. The reason behind this label is based on two justifications. First, the term international interaction comprises the overall phenomenon of the connection of two or more international organisations as well as the way these actors regard and relate to each other as well as behave and exert influence towards each other. *Interorganisational* implies that at least two international organisations are involved which share numerous points of contact and connections between each other. *Interaction* refers to the reciprocal actions and exchanges of, for example, ideas, initiatives, and information as well as reciprocal influence whereby both organisations shape and affect the activities of the other organisation. The connections and interchanges are thus not single-sided activities, but rather triggered by both or all actors involved. While the relationship between international actors can refer to 'interplay' (Loewen 2006; Jungcurt 2006), 'cooperation' (Lang 2002), or 'interlinkages' (Biermann et al. 2009), the term interaction is more comprehensive because it encompasses the overall organisational setting and the whole architecture of the web of international security organisations. In addition, even though the interactions, exchanges and connections are located primarily on the interorganisational level, the notion of interorganisational interaction therefore includes that influences can also be exerted by actors within one of the organisations, such as the secretariats, agencies or institutions, e.g., the EU institutions and NATO departments as well as by member states and key individual figures. This allows the term to be more comprehensive and describes the phenomenon more holistically as it addresses and comprises the multiple actors involved.

2.5 Conceptualisation of Key Terminology

Concepts are generally vital in the International Relations Scholarship because they 'provide analysts with an understanding of what is "out there" and in doing so help to grasp relevant phenomena by naming and giving meaning to its features' (Berenskoetter 2017: 152). As outlined above, *interorganisational interaction* refers to the reciprocal actions and influences between international organisations that share functional overlaps. The overall concept of interorganisational interaction is composed of fundamental components which, for the greater understanding of the framework, need to be conceptualised. Key terms that receive further conceptualisation in this section include international organisations, security cooperation, networks of international actors, multilateralism and foreign and security policy orientation. In all of these concepts it becomes evident that member states play a central role.

2.5.1 International Organisations

In the scholarly literature, the terms international institutions and international organisations as well as international regimes have been widely applied and discussed. Yet, no commonly agreed definition of *international organisation* exists due to the different theoretical perspectives from various disciplines in which organisations are analysed, such as international relations, organisation studies and sociology (Johnston 2001; Karns et al. 2015; Peters 2012; Simmons and Martin 2012). As Gehring and Oberthür (2004) argue, the distinction between institutions, organisations and regimes are less clear in practice than in theory. For the purpose of this dissertation, the terms institutions and organisations share the same aims and characteristics and are therefore used under the term of organisation for reasons of simplicity.

Different understandings of and approaches to the study of international organisations exist. From an institutionalist perspective, organisations 'imply an integrating and structuring of activities directed toward goal accomplishment' (Bedeian 1984: 2) and therefore actors, such as states, form organisations because they share the same overarching goal which they assume to achieve in cooperation due to the decreased transaction costs for the individual actors. Furthermore, Levy et al. (1995: 274) define the characteristics of organisations as 'consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas'. Hence, international organisations are

governing entities formed of several nation states, which share common norms and values, and act under similar procedures. Such organisations are created to reduce the costs to achieve specific goals in defined political domains and regulate state relations in world politics. A governing body as a central part of the organisation as well as sets of rules to regulate procedures and interactions are further established to coordinate the activities and policies of the members.

Definitions and conceptualisations of international organisations in International Relations Scholarship often refer to Krasner's definition of international regimes. He defines them as 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations' (Krasner 1983: 1, cited in Katzenstein et al. 1988: 662). According to this understanding, an international organisation is conceptualised as an overarching system based on multiple actors and entities, which encompasses a set of rules, norms, values, practices and procedures that enable the members to act through the international organisation. Though, neorealist scholars such as Mearsheimer perceive international institutions from a different viewpoint. He understands them to help realise powerful states' interests and preferences in the international system. More precisely, he argues that states create and act through international institutions to 'maintain their share of world power' (1994-95: 13). Another view of international organisations is to understand them as social actors. Constructivists such as Jeffrey Checkel (2005) and Alastair Iain Johnston (2001) see the potential of international organisations to act as enablers for socialisation among member states, i.e., the process of learning and internalising rules, norms and procedures that can create a common or collective identity.

According to Krasner's definition, an international organisation has limited autonomy to develop further and to take actions and decisions on behalf of its members. It includes bureaucratic structures, such as sub-institutions and agencies, which deal with specific, commonly agreed issues and policy areas within a defined functional and geographical scope. Consequently, international organisations comprise specific characteristics and features, which have an impact on their relations and interactions with other actors. Major components of international organisations are their member states and international bureaucracies (Biermann 2017). As Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 16) argue, international organisations 'are constituted as bureaucracies, and that bureaucratic character profoundly shapes the way they behave'. Bureaucracies are regarded as 'the collection of rules that

define complex social tasks and establish a division of labour to accomplish them' (2004: 18). The secretariats of international bureaucracies are comprised of members of staff that bring information, knowledge, expertise and skills to the bureaucratic structures that organise and regulate international politics and which also shape the behaviour of states and actors. They contribute to developing a distinctive bureaucratic culture of international organisations that rest on shared discourses, symbols and values for staff which help to generate a certain group identity guiding their action and that they adopt a certain type of collective identity. This relates to the agency-structure debate within the study of international organisations and the extent to which international organisations have acquired their own identity, loyalty and spectrum of legal capacity (Wendt 1987, 1994). This is linked to the aspect that international organisations are perceived to possess some autonomy over the direction of their policies and actions, which leads to the premise that international organisations are 'partially independent actors' (Faude 2015: 296). Particularly constructivist scholars emphasise the bureaucratic dimension of international organisations, how they regulate world politics and inter-state relations, the bureaucratic power that international organisations can exercise and the extent to which international secretariats can exercise authority and autonomy apart from their member states. Accordingly, interorganisational relations would not only be triggered by member states but could also be the result of the actions of international bureaucracies (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004; Bauer and Eger 2016). Additionally, the bureaucratic structures and decision-making procedures of an international organisation can be characterised as intergovernmental or supranational. Intergovernmental refers to the sovereignty of member states whereby national political elites make decisions within an international organisation, which is done in the Council of the European Union and the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Supranational, in contrast, refers to creating central institutions within an international organisation that make decisions on behalf of its member states (Ojanen 2006).

Moreover, while an international organisation is of international nature, meaning that interactions, such as incentives, initiatives, projects and programmes, occur between states, the term ultimately comprises sub-categories such as regional organisations. Regional organisations are confined to an identified geographical region which can be an entire continent, for example the African Union (AU) and the European Union, or a specific region such as the transatlantic region, for example NATO, and the Middle East and North Africa, for example in the form of the Arab League (Abass 2004). An *international security organisation* is comprised of these sets of rules, norms, values and procedures and maintains

such a bureaucratic system, but refers to those international organisations that have a particular focus on security and defence issues. Such organisations do not necessarily have a primary emphasis on security and defence matters, rather they play – or aim to play – an essential part in world politics by actively maintaining security through prevention, conflict resolution and crisis management. This special form of international organisation shares the features that were outlined above. Existing international security organisations on the European continent, for instance, include the EU, the OSCE and NATO.

2.5.2 Security Cooperation

The main feature of international security organisations is *security cooperation*. Cooperation of actors, be it states, international organisations or non-state actors, has been widely researched in economics, sociology and international relations. Particularly from the viewpoint of rational choice theorists, the issue of cooperation has been vigorously examined. From a pessimist point of view, Hobbes (1651) argues that individuals are selfish, follow their own interests and mistrust others, and they are thus not very likely to cooperate unless a central authority dictates them to cooperate. History has however disclosed that states are able to collaborate under certain circumstances, also in the field of security and defence.

A rather simple definition of cooperation is the working together of two or more actors who share the same end goal. According to Axelrod's understanding of cooperation theory, it implies that individuals collaborate in order to 'pursue their self-interests without the aid of a central authority to force them to cooperate with each other' (2006: 6). Müller refers to a definition of security cooperation in which he defines it as 'relying on other states for national survival' (2012: 607). Hence, security cooperation among individual states 'occurs when states adjust their foreign policy and defence behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others' (Jones 2007: 8). Cooperation can then be formalised through agreements and treaties of the participating actors. The processes of institutionalisation and socialisation, i.e., the increased social interaction of actors, promote the persistence of cooperation (Duffield 2013). In this context, Alyson J.K. Bailes and Andrew Cottey (2006) identify four different models of security cooperation: alliances, collective security, security regimes and security communities. The cooperation of states in the field of security and

defence has triggered the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance in 1949 and of the European Union with its Common Security and Defence Policy in 1992.

Looking through the lens of interorganisational interaction, security cooperation is conceptualised in a more grassroots fashion with a wider scope. It refers to the collaboration of two or more international actors in the field of security and defence in which the participating actors exchange necessary information, tools, and capabilities in order to confront shared security threats. These international actors can be embodied by states as well as international organisations and each of these maintain multiple cooperation frameworks. Because of the increasing linkages among states and international organisations, there is a higher density of international actors involved which form a dynamic network.

2.5.3 Networks of International Actors

Such networks depict the relationships between international (security) organisations while also considering individual actors such as member states. This approach to the understanding of international organisations emerges from network analysis, which focuses on the links between organisations and individuals. *Networks* in general terms are defined as 'sets of relations that form structures, which in turn may constrain and enable agents' and as 'sets of ties between any set or sets of nodes' (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009: 560, 562). Based on these definitions, networks consist of nodes which imply any actors, such as states, institutions or international organisations, within these networks, as well as of ties which illustrate connections or relationships between nodes. They can be composed of dyads, in the case of relations between two states or two organisations, triads as well as of a greater number of participating international organisations and individual states. General characteristics and basic elements of networks include the interdependence among the nodes and units in a given network, and that the links between them serve specific functions. There is constant interaction not only between the units and nodes but also between the agent and structure (Maoz 2012).

The most striking feature of networks is that the members of a network are 'bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and service' (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). Webs of international sets of rules, and thus of international

organisations, in the same or in similar policy domains have emerged due to the increased density of international bureaucracies. The cumulating number of international organisations within the same policy area, such as in security policy, environmental policy or trade policy, can be seen in such networks. Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier (2009) have coined this observation 'international regime complexity'. Christer Jönsson (1986) and Rafael Biermann (2008a) also call this phenomenon 'interorganisational systems' and 'interorganisational networks' respectively. These complexes or networks are defined as a web of 'nested, partially over-lapping, and parallel international [organisations] that are not hierarchically ordered' (Alter and Meunier 2009: 13). Such interorganisational networks comprise 'all of the organisations linked by a specific type of relation and is constructed by finding the ties between all the organisations' (Aldrich 1979: 281).

Networks follow specific purposes. First, they link international actors that have common values, rules and responsibilities. Second, networks enhance and facilitate interactions and dialogue between their nodes due to the increasing links among actors and because they enable access to important resources. The more links exist, the less likely it is that conflicts occur between the nodes (Dorussen and Ward 2008, Keck and Sikkink 1999). Therefore, networks serve as a 'mode of organisation that facilitates collective action and cooperation, exercises influence, or serves as a means of international governance' (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009: 560). Actors set up networks based on shared understandings of norms, rules, and purposes as well as overlaps of policy domains. In this sense, networks 'reflect and promote similarity of interest and mutual understanding' (Dorussen and Ward 2008: 192).

A similar approach to the analysis of the agglomeration of international organisations is the study of organisational fields. These are defined as 'a community of organisations that partakes of a common meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside of the field' (Scott 1994: 207-208). An actor needs to have appropriate and favoured features to become member in an organisational field (Wooten and Sacco 2017), i.e., a certain degree of homogeneity among members within a field must already exist. The existence of such organisational fields, for example the field of international security organisations, requires overlaps and similarities of structures and bureaucracies to facilitate exchanges, interaction and cooperation. In addition, organisational fields are influenced by their members and, vice versa, members are influenced by those organisational fields in which they partake (DiMaggio 1988; Wooten and Sacco 2017). Furthermore, members of an organisational field share a common and collective

goal. This could include, for instance, regional security, stability, peace and security cooperation.

Positioning and membership both in international organisations and in networks are additional central features of network analysis. It is important for nodes to position themselves in networks to receive access to crucial resources, such as information, and to have direct interactions and exchanges with other important nodes. Positioning is also a way of expressing power, i.e., power in the sense of possessing capabilities and resources. For this reason, 'organisations constantly seek to enhance their own positions within a network, resulting in rivalry for interorganisational power and centrality within a network' (Koops 2012a: 79). Joint memberships of states in various international organisations that exist in the same network is another form of power because joint memberships have the advantage of fostering linkages and exchanges. Moreover, both positioning and membership can influence the transformation of networks, for example, from informal to more formal networks (Dorussen and Ward 2008; Hafner-Burton et al. 2009). Both elements are important to explain organisational adaptation and change because group socialisation, which occurs through interactions with other nodes, can affect change within other nodes. The idea of networks and organisational fields can be transferred to interorganisational interaction in the sense that numerous international organisations with a degree of domain similarity, i.e., an overlap of policy areas, co-exist in a network in which they and their member states need to position themselves. The consideration of networks of international actors overall helps to position member states and also international organisations within the same policy area which allows to examine their linkages. Their interactions give furthermore new meanings to other relevant concepts including the notion of multilateralism.

2.5.4 Multilateralism

In having a new understanding of international organisations as well as of security cooperation and international networks, the notion of *multilateralism* is also shaped by these new observations. Thus, it receives two concurrent meanings. Multilateralism is regarded as a special form of diplomacy and security cooperation taking place between different actors. In a multilateral framework, at least three actors must be involved. In the traditional sense, it is understood as 'the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more

states' (Keohane 1990: 731). Multilateralism as a general concept thus implies the dialogue, coordination of activities or exchanges of more than two actors. According to John Gerard Ruggie (1992: 567), the factor that makes multilateralism distinctive from other forms of coordination and cooperation is 'that it does so on the basis of certain principles of ordering relations among those states'. The coordination of national activities and policies, however, does not ultimately imply cooperation of these actors but nevertheless expects communication and the sharing of information to a certain degree. Concurrently to the emergence and increase of international organisations since the end of the Second World War, multilateral frameworks have generally increased (Keohane 1990; Ruggie 1992).

Taking this definition to the interorganisational level, the notion of multilateralism is advanced to include a broader spectrum of actors, i.e., states and international organisations including their bureaucracies. Hence, it is regarded as the coordination of foreign, security and defence policy of international actors, either international organisations or states or both, that share functional overlaps, such as the EU and NATO. Both organisations operate in multilateral frameworks when conducting military crisis management operations, and both invite third states to participate in their crisis management activities. This allows for understanding the cooperation of international security organisations as a special form of multilateralism because of the multiple actors that are involved. In the context of EU-NATO cooperation and the invitation to third states to participate in their military operations, one can therefore understand this cooperation framework as *maxilateralism* in which states cooperate and, at the same time, international organisations interact and cooperate with each other. Moreover, in contrast to the cooperation among states through multilateral framework, this kind of cooperation includes not only the coordination of foreign, security and defence strategies of states, but also the coordination of those policies and strategies of international organisations among themselves and with those of their member states.

2.5.5 Foreign and Security Policy Orientation

In the analysis of states' rationales, preferences and behaviour in foreign, security and defence affairs, the debate around foreign and security policy orientation has emerged with regard to the concept of strategic culture. Foreign and security policy orientation is understood in the context of EU-NATO cooperation while considering their member states' specific characteristics, norms, histories, operational experiences and national caveats. It

further refers to an actor's system of beliefs, norms and values in conjunction with its own specific experiences, i.e., historical events as well as experiences in military deployment and operations. These factors form an actor's very own foreign and security policy orientation, which then shapes its policy preferences in foreign, security and defence affairs (cf. Aras and Gorener 2010). Moreover, members states in the EU and NATO have often been categorised into the camp of Atlanticists, those preferring a NATO-led approach to crisis management and security issues, or the camp of Europeanists, those in favour of EU response to crises and conflicts (Cornish and Edwards 2001). One can further distinguish between states with tendency of military engagement in contrast to those states that seek to avoid or are restricted in the use of force. Both distinctions become rather problematic for the analysis of the role of member states and how they exert influence on EU-NATO cooperation because of its one-dimensional categorisation. As the subsequent categorisation and investigation will show, more factors than the preference for either the EU or NATO shape a state's foreign and security policy orientation.

The concept of foreign and security policy orientation is related to the notion of strategic culture, which emerged from the 'dichotomy between the demands of policy and the dictates of the battlefield' (Klein 1991: 6). It generally entails both political and operational elements that define a county's approach to security and defence affairs. The strategic culture concept moved to the centre of attention particularly in the 1970s with the so-called first generation of scholarship led by Collin Gray and has been a contested concept ever since. Scholars of the second and even more so of the third generation, such as Alastair Iain Johnston, have countered the first generation's understandings. According to Gray (1999: 51), strategic culture is comprised of 'socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits [...], and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience'. Strategic behaviour is thus not only formed by attitudes, habits and ideational factors but also by geography, military history and operational experience, technological advancement in warfare and a state's international relationships (Bloomfield 2012; Lord 1985). While the second generation's main argument on strategic culture is based on the distinction between the declared policy and the actual rationales and aims of a state, it takes a narrow focus on a state's national character and identity (Biehl et al. 2013; Lock 2010). However, it has not received much attention in comparison to the third-generation scholarship which has been led by Alastair Ian Johnston.

Johnston takes a positivist approach to the understanding of strategic culture in which he understands it as an independent variable explaining states' foreign, security and defence policy actions and strategic behaviour. In this view, the term encompasses a broader approach to culture by referring to military culture and history, organizational culture and political-military culture. He defines strategic culture as 'an integrated "system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs […]' and further assumes that it is 'an ideational milieu which limits behavioural choices' (Johnston 1995: 46). Hence, it is not only rooted in historical experiences and strategic preferences but seen as the result of recent practices and experiences that shape a state's strategic culture. The third-generation scholarship and particularly Johnston have been criticised for the positivist approach counter-arguing that culture is not falsifiable as well as for the 'too-much-continuity problem', i.e., if strategic cultures changes it would do so very slowly (Bloomfield 2012: 444).

The debate on strategic culture by the different generations of scholarship is especially helpful for the conceptualisation of foreign and security policy orientation of states as well as the strategic orientations of the EU and NATO's security and defence policies. Derived from the debates on strategic culture, it is acknowledged that states have their own distinct foreign and security policy orientation and that international security organisations have developed their own foreign, security and defence policies. A state's foreign and security policy orientation is consequently shaped by its worldview, interests, ideologies, historical experiences and their domestic politics. External factors such as a state's geographical location[2] and the strategic environment, i.e., the existing security challenges and threats, play additional roles for states to make choices about their behaviour and responses that shape a state's foreign and security policy orientation.

These policies and orientations are written down in official documents in the form of white papers or national security and defence strategies (see Appendix F). NATO has introduced regular strategic concepts since its creation, and most notably, it has issued new strategic concepts in the context of its post-Cold War transformation. These strategic documents summarise the challenges and threats to NATO and present its responses (see NATO 1991,

[2] See, for example, the special issue by Brommesson (2018a) and other scholars which explores the notion of on Nordicness in the foreign and security policies of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

2010). Similarly, with the development of CFSP and CSDP, the European Union followed suit by launching the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 and the subsequent EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016, which outline a list of risks and threat to Europe and how it seeks to approach them (EU 2003, 2016). The debate on the EU's strategic culture has been particularly contested and has been hotly debated during the development of its foreign, security and defence policies (Cornish and Edwards 2001; Matlary 2006; Zyla 2011). In contrast to national white papers and strategies, however, the security strategies by the EU and NATO 'can both be conceptualised as outcomes of the bargaining and negotiation processes of nationally held strategic beliefs, values, norms and ideas of security' (Zyla 2011: 672). This refers to the understanding that the EU and NATO's foreign, security and defence strategies and policies are the result of their member states' agreed commonalities and the lowest common denominator of their preferences, strategies and threat perceptions.

For the analysis of the role of member states in interorganisational relations and how they shape EU-NATO cooperation, the notion of foreign and security policy orientation helps to locate and categorise states in the developed typology and to understand their positions and preferences concerning the EU-NATO interorganisational relations.

2.6 Theorising Interorganisational Interaction

Theorising and developing a theoretical framework to explain the interactions and relations between international organisations is the aim of this section. It draws on findings from already existing theoretical approaches and concepts derived from the study of international organisations and theories of International Relations Scholarship in addition to organisation theory. A theoretical framework that has so far received little attention by scholars interested in the analysis of international security organisations is the conceptual framework of interorganisational interaction developed by Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür (2004, 2009; also see Gehring and Faude 2014). While Gehring and Oberthür originally analyse *interinstitutional interaction*, the concept here is applied to the study of international security organisations and therefore the term *interorganisational interaction* is primarily used. Most scholars in the field of international organisations focus on the emergence, structure, maintenance, and effectiveness of international organisations (Loewen 2006). The conceptual framework of interorganisational interaction offers the novel ability, which other theoretical approaches often lack, to explain the interactions of international organisations.

Generally, interorganisational interaction focuses on the emergence of separate institutions and organisations in the international governance structure that are tasked with similar political, functional and geographical scopes. Relationships and interactions, including collaboration and cooperation as well as competition and rivalry between actors such as states, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, and between two or more international organisations, have been analysed from several analytical approaches. These include, for example, organisation theory, game theory, principal-agent theory, bureaucratic approaches, resource dependence theory, organisational-sociological approaches and network analysis (Faude 2015; Franke 2017). The concept takes assumptions from other theoretical perspectives in International Relations Scholarship, such as liberalism and constructivism, as well as assumptions from sociology and economics. For example, it is embedded in the liberal school of thought, and particularly neoliberal institutionalism, which examines the formation and maintenance of international organisations. The theoretical framework of interorganisational interaction also identifies an interdependent structure of the international system which enhances cooperation among actors, e.g., states and international organisations. Rooted in these viewpoints, both states and international organisations are key actors. States, on the one hand, are member states in organisations and can therefore exert influence on the formation, design, structure and level of formalisation of the organisation. International organisations, on the other hand, also play a vital role because it is assumed that they receive a high amount of autonomy from their respective member states, which enables them to act independently and to develop their own dynamics, procedures and capabilities to act (Guzzini 2013; Hopf 1998).

Gehring and Oberthür initially applied their framework to the study of interactions between global environmental organisations and regimes, but they state that the conceptual framework can also be used to examine the interorganisational interactions between other international organisations and institutions, such as in the field of crisis management of, for example, the AU, EU, UN and NATO. Furthermore, this concept has received more attention with the increasing density of international security organisations and alliances. Since the end of the Second World War, numerous security organisations and alliances have been created in Europe. Since the end of World War Two, the number of international organisations worldwide has increased from about one hundred in the mid-1940s to three hundred in 1990 (Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke 2004). The most enduring ones are the Council of Europe, the OSCE, NATO as well as the EU and previously the Western European Union (WEU). Nevertheless, due to the issue-specific overlap, the concept needs a ‘careful

consideration of the different nature of complexes made up of transnational or operational institutions' (Gehring and Faude 2014: 494).

The theoretical framework of interorganisational interaction helps to understand interactions between organisations as well as to examine an organisation's causal influence on other organisations in the same policy area. Simply described, interorganisational interaction occurs 'if one institution (the source institution) affects the development or performance of another institution (the target institution)' (Gehring and Oberthür 2009: 127). Loewen takes this definition one step further. Accordingly, '[i]nstitutional interplay refers to situations when the development, operation, effectiveness or broad consequences of one institution are significantly affected by the rules and programmes of another' (Loewen 2006: 11). In addition, Koops defines interorganisational relations as 'links, relationships and modes of interaction between two or more international organisations' (2012a: 72). Consequently, it is assumed that the interaction between two organisations can take different forms including exchanges of information and material resources, coordination of activities and the establishment of structured relationships. According to these definitions, interorganisational interaction can also go a step further in which one organisation can influence and shape the other's policies, procedures and institutions, and thereby one organisation is in a learning process and gets socialised. While learning is defined as a 'change in the cognitive structures of actors' and the change of their beliefs, procedures and structures, socialisation is a type of learning. It refers to a 'process by which social interaction leads novices to endorse "expected ways of thinking, feeling and acting"' (Johnston 2001: 494) as well as to a process of 'adaptation of certain rules of behaviour, "ways of doing things", stemming from interaction with members of the same group' (Juncos and Pomorska 2006: 3). Socialisation and learning among member states and thus among international organisations are likely to occur with increased interactions. Though, learning can be prevented by communication problems, lack of implementation due to shortage of resources and the frequent rotation of staff whereby the learned processes get lost.

Moreover, the theoretical approach draws onto findings from network analysis which investigates the connections and interplays of actors within a network in a certain policy domain. These networks of interconnected international organisations develop further with the emergence of increasing functional overlap as well as when interests, norms and rules become more homogenous. Functional overlap refers to the overlap of regulatory jurisdiction, tasks, geographical scope and membership (Gehring and Oberthür 2009). On the

interorganisational level, this means that international organisations maintain similar or even the same functions, such as acting as security providers or crisis management actors, they have a similar geographical scope, include a high amount of overlapping member states, and possess similar decision-making procedures as well as similar or compatible organisational structures. Functional overlap can either be unintentional or deliberate. Either the bureaucracies of the concerned international organisations or their member states can take action to promote and facilitate the overlap of tasks, geographical scope and membership.

Interorganisational interaction can generally occur on several levels. While Kenneth Waltz (1959) distinguishes between three levels of analysis – individual level, state level and the international system level – in his analysis of the causes of conflicts in international relations, Koops (2017) applies this framework to the phenomenon of interorganisational relations. Interorganisational interaction is a complex phenomenon. When analysing relationships between international organisations, scholars have increasingly used a multilevel approach to describe, examine and explain the interactions on different levels. The *international system level* takes into account the neorealist assumptions which addresses the anarchic nature of the international system, which allows war to occur. The structure of the international system and the changes and developments thereof lead to opportunities, which can either enable or constrain state actions (Waltz 1959). This structure of the international system allows interorganisational interaction to take place, i.e., the prevailing international order can either facilitate or impede cooperation of international actors.

The state level, which is called the *member state level* in this context, is about the behaviour of states within the international system. According to the (neo-)realist viewpoint, states play the central role in international politics and thus play a significant part in shaping relations between international organisations (Waltz 1959). States possess the ability to initiate, trigger, hinder or even prevent cooperation with other states on the one hand, and between organisations on the other hand. It is important to consider the extent to which member states can influence the emergence as well as the design of interorganisational interaction. However, while member states can lead negotiations between international organisations and maintain the necessary resources and means to approve or obstruct interorganisational relationships as well as the facilities to move these relationships forward to deeper cooperation, member states also have to face certain limitations. A lack of coherence among national institutions and ministries on the national level has been recorded. They also encounter the problem of imperfect knowledge and information which leads to

uncoordinated policies and different approaches within a state. Rivalries among member states in different international organisations can then also prevent interorganisational relations (Biermann 2008b; Koops 2017).

On the *individual level*, the focus is shifted towards the role of individual decision-makers and the relations between key figures such as executive heads and liaison officers. Similar to states, individuals can initiate and foster cooperation, but might also be the reason for rivalries between actors. As stated by Koops (2007: 27), the 'facilitation of greater interaction and socialisation between key leaders and boundary-role occupants of international organisations is as important as greater interorganisational interaction on the ground in the form of joint training exercises and desk-to-desk dialogues'. Boundary-role occupants are those individuals that connect international organisations and thereby play the role of bridges or linkages within multilateral settings (Jönsson 1986). Even though executive heads, such as the NATO Secretary General and the EU's High Representative, can be drivers as well as obstacles in deepening interorganisational interaction, interpersonal relations matter on all levels of the organisational hierarchy. In cases of well-working interpersonal relations, the emergence of interpersonal trust can transform into interorganisational trust. To acquire more interorganisational trust, Koops suggests that the frequent rotation of personnel, and especially of key leaders in liaison offices or interorganisational units, leads to an 'alumni effect' (2017: 23), which can enhance mutual understanding and increase the enthusiasm for cooperation.

As regards interorganisational interaction, a multilevel approach is required to holistically analyse interorganisational relations. Therefore, Koops (2007, 2017; also see Biermann 2017) introduces two additional levels: the bureaucratic level and the inter-secretariat (inter-institutional) level. In line with Barnett and Finnemore's findings (2004), the *bureaucratic level* refers to administrative structures within international organisations, where the majority of decisions are taken and the day-to-day management occurs. On this level, liaison units, permanent committees and formal cooperation channels can be established. In addition, 'identities, loyalties and an organisational culture of bureaucracies can also influence a secretariat or subunit's behaviour and approach towards interorganisational cooperation' (Koops 2017: 205). Some international organisations have even developed similarly or at least with compatible administrative structures to facilitate collaboration, cooperation and exchanges.

The *inter-secretariat level*, or inter-institutional level, includes jointly created cooperation

channels, such as working groups and steering committees that are in charge of the formal cooperation between two or more organisations. Secretariats and institutions within organisations have to update each other frequently through the joint cooperation channels to maintain and nurture efficient interorganisational interaction. Besides formal channels, informal cooperation plays a crucial role, especially in cases of organisational incompatibility or other institutional and legal barriers (Smith 2011), such as the issue of limited sharing of classified information and intelligence. When looking at the inter-secretariat level, certain institutional aspects need to be taken into account, such as formal agreements and declarations, the existence of liaison offices, regular meetings between secretariats, and the particular arrangements of working groups and steering committees. In addition, the formalisation and institutionalisation processes that occur through the exchanges at the inter-secretariat level need to be considered (Koops 2017).

An important aspect of cooperation on any of these levels of interorganisational interaction is the role of autonomy. As the conceptualisation of international organisations has indicated, the constructivist understanding highlights that organisations possess their own autonomy, albeit limited and dependent on the delegation of autonomy by states and the degree of their expertise (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Reinalda and Verbeek 1998). When cooperating with others, an organisation has to give up autonomy, especially decision-making autonomy and authority, for example, over its resources and tasks (Biermann 2008b, 2015, Koops 2012a). However, despite the loss of autonomy and authority, organisations enter into interorganisational relations with others on the premise of certain motives. Such motives for international organisations to cooperate with other organisations, either formally or informally, and either ad hoc and short-term or long-term vary from autonomy concerns to relative gains and from functional overlap to resource dependence. Haugevik (2007) distinguishes between material and ideational motives. While organisational survival, neutralising competition and resource dependence are understood as material motives, ideational motives include legitimisation, shared values and organisational learning. Emerging from resource dependence theory, an incentive for organisations to give up autonomy, and authority to a certain extent, to cooperate with other organisations is to make use of the cooperation partner's vital resources that the organisation itself might lack (cf. Biermann and Harnisch 2017). These resources can include military assets and capabilities as well as planning and operational structures. Organisations might seek cooperation to survive and remain relevant on the international level. Cooperation facilitates the usage of resources that enable organisational survival, i.e., cooperation leads to the exchange and sharing of

essential resources. Another reason to enter interorganisational cooperation is the search for greater legitimacy of actions. This is usually the case when cooperating with the UN because it authorises and thus legitimises crisis management operations through the mandate of the UN Security Council. In the case of EU operations, however, a UN mandate is not necessarily required in case of consensus of the host country (Haugevik 2007). Concerning the EU and NATO, autonomy concerns have shaped their interaction in particular with reference to the loss of autonomy with an increasing overlap of responsibilities and the decision-making over the use of the alliance's military capabilities (Biermann 2015).

As argued by Gehring and Oberthür (2009) as well as by Biermann (2008b), in particular functional overlap triggers interorganisational relations due to the already existing links and connections of international organisations. According to Faude (2015: 297), 'functional overlap occurs an overlap between two or more international organisations in terms of membership and contextual governance areas exists'[3]. Important similarities and overlaps include, for example, geography, membership, responsibilities, and organisational structures. States, international organisations and any other actors involved in interorganisational interaction can trigger functional overlap, which can take place either intended or unintended. Deriving from a sociological viewpoint on interorganisational interactions, 'the more organisations learn from each other and the more similar they tend to become, the easier their cooperation will become' (Koops 2007: 22). Those organisations that favour fostered exchanges and cooperation with other international organisations are more inclined to functional overlap. Furthermore, functional overlap allows for actors, especially states, to make use of specific 'cross-institutional political strategies', such as 'chessboard politics' including forum shopping and regime-shifting (Alter and Meunier 2009: 16).

Within interorganisational interactions, organisations can take specific positions and roles, which can further promote stronger cooperation and intensify functional overlaps. Christer Jönsson (1986) and Patrick Doreian and Kayo Fujimoto (2004) focus on linking-pin organisations in interorganisational networks. These are defined as those organisations 'that have extensive and overlapping ties to different parts of the network' (Aldrich and Whetten 1981: 390) and therefore, they take an 'integrative role in interorganisational networks'

[3] Translation by the author; original quote: 'Ein funktionaler Überlappungsbereich internationaler Organisationen liegt dann vor, wenn zwischen zwei oder mehr IOs Überschneidungen hinsichtlich der Mitgliedschaft und der inhaltlichen Regelungsbereiche vorliegen.'

(Doreian and Fujimoto 2004: 46). Linking-pin organisations or linking-pin actors serve as communication points between organisations and actors within interorganisational networks. This notion is transferable to the idea of boundary-role occupants which connect two or more organisations in a given policy area.

Gehring and Faude (2014; Faude 2015) argue that interorganisational interaction creates opportunities for organisational adaptation and organisational change, whilst Biermann (2009) also refers to organisational transformation. Both member states and organisations, due to their own dynamics and autonomy, can exercise influence on organisational adaptation. Organisational adaptation implies that the governance activities of both organisations gradually become accommodated and adapted to the respective other. Organisational adaptation leads to diverging outcomes depending on the power distributions and relations among the organisations in the structural network. Power distribution can either be symmetric or asymmetric. In this context, power of an organisation denotes 'its ability to retain, or expand, its capability to pursue its policies within the area of functional overlap' (Gehring and Faude 2014: 479). Under an asymmetric power distribution, a so-called 'sectoral specialisation' (Gehring and Faude 2014: 479) of the organisations is most likely to occur because the weaker organisations have to withdraw their governance activities from the concerned policy domain. In case of a symmetric power distribution, the organisations have to coordinate their governance activities in the particular policy area. Herein, multiple members, i.e., those states that are members in more than one international organisation within the same interorganisational network, play a crucial role as they have to negotiate the institutional arrangements within both organisations to avoid conflicts and malfunctions of the regulatory bodies. Under symmetric power distribution, co-governance and a division of labour are more likely to occur than role specification of either organisation. More specifically, organisational adaptation 'under symmetrical power relations is likely to produce institutionalised schemes of permanent co-governance instead of clear-cut sectoral separation' (Gehring and Faude 2014: 481).

In accordance with these findings, Gehring and Faude observe that organisational adaptation 'gives rise to an institutionalised division of labour among the elemental institutions of an institutional complex' (2014: 482). In his analysis, Faude (2015: 304-305) defines interorganisational division of labour as

> a set of rules, which defines the tasks and responsibilities of competing organisations within a wider system of interorganisational coordination or cooperation. This set of

> rules includes generalised expectations about how each organisation should perform their tasks within the area of functional overlap. It therefore serves as a mechanism for containing interorganisational competition and dissolving opportunities for forum shopping in areas of functional overlap.[4]

This division of labour results in deeper cooperation of the organisations in which they become so-called 'interlocking institutions' (Biermann 2009; Gehring and Faude 2014; Schleich 2014). This is especially the case when a high level of functional overlap between the organisations involved is recorded. It needs to be noted that a division of labour should not be taken for granted because it is not automatically triggered by functional overlap, but it can emerge from complimentary organisational adaptation processes. In order to occur and be used effectively, the respective international organisations need to agree upon their specific division of labour and the allocation of the responsibilities, tasks and governance areas for each actor (Faude 2015).

Theorising interorganisational interaction is based on the assumptions and premises from a wide spectrum of theoretical approaches and viewpoints, which range from traditional international relations theories such as liberalism and constructivism to interdisciplinary approaches such as organisation theory, sociological-institutional viewpoints and economic theory. While interorganisational interaction has been broadly conceptualised as the relations, connections and interactions between two or more international organisations, the theoretical framework encompasses more detailed elements which provide its core assumptions, including the notion of autonomy, functional overlap, organisational adaptation and interorganisational division of labour. These core elements provide the basis for the features of interorganisational interaction as outlined in the following subsection.

2.7 Features of Interorganisational Interaction

As pointed out by Swedberg, typologies help to give observed phenomena not only a name but also facilitate the process to 'build out a theory' (2012: 24). Different types and categories

[4] Translation by the author; original quote: 'Bei einer inter-organisationalen Arbeitsteilung handelt es sich um einen Regelsatz, der die Aufgaben der konkurrierenden Organisationen innerhalb eines breiteren Systems inter-organisationaler Koordination oder Kooperation definiert. Dieser Regelsatz beinhaltet generalisierte Erwartungen darüber, wie die einzelnen Organisationen ihre Aufgaben im funktionalen Überlappungsbereich ausüben sollen. Er fungiert daher als Mechanismus zur Eindämmung inter-organisationalen Wettbewerbs und zur Schließung von Möglichkeiten zu Forum-Shopping in funktionalen Überlappungsbereichen.'

within a typology help to differentiate certain facts, characteristics and elements. The focal point here is to develop a typology, or rather a set of features and criteria, of interorganisational interaction which includes the varying degrees of cooperation and interactions of international security organisations. While theories and typologies of relationships and interplays already exist on the state level, these can contribute to creating a typology on the organisational level (Loewen 2006). The typology shares the assumption that there is a source organisation and a target organisation, whereby the source organisation can become the target organisation and the target organisation can transform into the source organisation due to reciprocity effects. It is also assumed that interorganisational interaction leads to either synergy effects or competition among international organisations (Biermann 2008b; Gehring and Oberthür 2009; Loewen 2006).

Even though no coherent theoretical approach to interorganisational interaction exists, several categorisations and approaches to typologies have already been developed. Gehring and Oberthür propose a typology composed of seven dimensions: functional interdependence, interaction and/or membership overlap, intentionality of action, ability to influence another organisation, quality of effect, response, and policy domains. This attempt to develop a typology helps to understand the process of interactions of international organisations and how it affects organisational adaptation and change. However, it does not provide much detail about the extent and type of interactions. In this regard, Young (1999) distinguishes between functional interplay and political interplay. Functional interplay occurs when at least two organisations deal with the same issue or problem and when these organisations are geophysically or socioeconomically linked. This is closely related to what Gehring and Oberthür (2004, 2009) call, functional overlap. Political interplay implies an intentional interplay, i.e., created on purpose by the concerned organisations in order to set up links in pursuit of specific goals, which can either be collective or individual.

Loewen (2006) adds to this categorisation two additional types: horizontal interplay and vertical interplay. While horizontal interplay takes place on the same level of similar types of organisations including interactions on the interregional level, such as the interplay between the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), vertical interplay is based on 'cross-scale interactions' (Loewen 2006: 2) between international organisations with different types of international organisations, such as the EU and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

Biermann (2008a, 2015) distinguishes first between three categories of cooperation –

information sharing, coordination of policies, and joint actions and decision-making – and then between different intensity levels of interorganisational interaction – absent, minimal, moderate and strong. Drawing on these, Koops (2012a, 2017) looks at the levels on which interorganisational interaction can occur. Apart from the organisational and bureaucratic levels, i.e., between the secretariats and bureaucratic institutions of organisations, interorganisational interactions also take place on the individual (or personal), member state and international system level. In addition, he characterises the forms of cooperation and relationships between organisations. They can be ad hoc and short-term, or formalised, structured and long-term.

Acknowledging already existing categorisations and typologies of cooperation as well as interorganisational relations and interaction, this inquiry proposes a set of features of interorganisational interactions, which contributes to the understanding of how international organisations interact. In the current literature on interorganisational relations some features have been identified and worked with, yet this has primarily occurred in a fragmented way. This typology takes into consideration some of these existing features, especially from Gehring and Oberthür (2002b, 2009), Biermann (2008a, 2008b), and Koops (2007, 2012a, 2017). It furthermore integrates some of the existing characteristics from these scholars and elaborates them further while adding new elements based on the review of the literature and the observation stage of the theorising process. Accordingly, the typology of interorganisational interaction employed in this dissertation is based on six features: density of the network of international security organisations, functional overlap, formalisation, frequency of interactions, intensity, and membership overlap. Table 2 shows an overview with the description of these features.

Based on this set of features and indicators, the interorganisational relationship of two particular international organisations within the same network can be identified and analysed. These features help to explain the relationship, including its emergence and maintenance, and how the organisations' interactions affect their respective internal and bureaucratic structures. In the later stages of this dissertation, these dimensions are applied to the EU-NATO relationship. The application enables the characterisation of their relationship and how each organisation influences the respective other in its role as an international security organisation in the realm of security and defence (see, for example, Koops 2012b). In addition, the elaboration of the features and indicators of interorganisational interaction enables the development of the typology of member states

in the proceeding step.

Table 2 Features of Interorganisational Interaction

Features	**Description**
Density of Network	Density illustrates the number of international organisations in a network of organisations, i.e., in the network of international security organisations. It is assumed that the more links exist in a network, the less conflicts occur (Dorussen and Ward 2008; Keck and Sikkink 1998).
Functional Overlap	Functional overlap indicates the overlap of policy areas that are covered by the international organisations in the same network. The more functional overlaps exist, the more links exist and thus the more dialogue and exchanges take place. This dimension also includes geographical scope, i.e., the geographical area covered by an international organisation in regard to both membership and activity. Functional overlap can be triggered intentionally or it can occur unintendedly (Faude 2015).
Formalisation	This is similar to the level of institutionalisation. It includes how formal or informal relationships of organisations are. Formal agreements, such as declarations, contracts or pacts, are indicators of high level of formalisation. Ad hoc cooperation without agreements as the foundation are considered as low level of formalisation.
Frequency of Interactions	Frequency indicates the amount of interactions and interplays of international organisations. Interactions therefore include formal and informal exchanges, formal and informal meetings as well as joint actions. It is suggested that the higher the level of formalisation, the higher the frequency of interactions. Two or more international organisations that maintain an active interplay may even set up formal arenas for interactions such as joint councils.
Intensity	According to Biermann (2015), four levels of intensity of interorganisational interactions can be distinguished: (1) absent, (2) minimal, (3) moderate, and (4) strong. This dimensions therefore encompasses the dimensions of frequency and formalisation and adds the character and form (i.e., ad hoc, short-term, structured, long-term, etc.) of interaction.
Membership Overlap	This shows the amount of states that are members in more than one international security organisations. It is assumed that membership

	affects organisational adaptation and enhances cooperation and interactions.

2.8 The Role of Member States

Member states play vital roles in shaping institutional design and the interactions between organisations. However, research on the actual role of individual member states within the construct of an interorganisational interaction is shallow. Rather little attention has so far been paid to membership and positioning within international organisations in regard to relations with other organisations. Member states, especially those that enjoy membership in multiple international organisations, have the abilities to use international organisations for their national purposes, but they can exert influence on the organisational processes and structures of such organisations as well as of interorganisational relations. Generally, member states have the ability to shape interorganisational relations through different channels and on numerous levels while they also have the capacity to behave differently in the respective organisations. In areas of high politics in international relations, Koops (2017: 198-199) identifies the following responsibilities, powers and duties of member states: approval for negotiations, approval for the formation of contractual relationships between organisations and subunits, providing key resources, veto power which allows states to obstruct deeper cooperation, facilitating interorganisational coherence, and facilitating cooperation across organisations in order to limit duplication. This range of identified tasks and responsibilities of member states in international organisations has triggered the question of the role of member states in interorganisational interaction. Based on the above conceptualisations, it is acknowledged that member states alongside international bureaucracies of organisations, have preferences derived from their foreign and security policy orientation, histories, domestic politics, resources and capabilities, and delegate certain autonomy to international organisations. It is hence argued that member states play a central role as they have a variety of political strategies at their disposal and can take different positions in interorganisational interaction, which requires further conceptualisation.

Magliveras (2011) refers to two types of membership. Original membership implies those

states that take the initiative to create an international organisation and who have the right over the determination and nature of the newly created organisation. Subsequent members are those states that join the international organisation at a later stage and their membership is granted based on the discretion of original members and depending on the organisation's admission clauses. In their framework, Gehring and Oberthür (2009) distinguish two categories of member states: multiple members and single members. This framework provides a crucial foundation for developing a typology of the role of member states in international organisations, which helps to identify what specific role member states can play in the relationship of two or more international organisations in the same issue area.

Single members are those states which are members in only one organisation and who might not be directly affected from functional overlap of organisations. Furthermore, single members do not have the ability to exert influence immediately as they are not involved in the decision-making process of those organisations of which they are not member. While it is assumed that states that join several international organisations in the same issue area have numerous advantages, single member states can also influence interorganisational cooperation. For example, single members can use the strategy of hostage taking. This occurs when single member states 'use their membership to obstruct the relationship between both institutions, holding them hostage in pursuit of national interests', which has happened in the cases of Turkey in NATO and Cyprus in the EU (Hofmann 2009: 46).

Multiple members, in contrast, are those states that are members of two or more international organisations and those who enjoy the advantage of being able to choose one organisation over another. Gehring and Oberthür claim that multiple members can 'transmit influence from one institution to another' (2009: 150) and moreover, they play key roles in exerting influence on both organisations as well as their interactions with each other. Hence, multiple members can create functional overlap on purpose to establish an organisation 'to challenge the regulatory dominance of an existing one (…), or if they seek to shift regulatory activities from one to another [organisation]' (Gehring/Faude 2014: 474). Even though these states have the ability to shape and influence an organisation's direction, multiple member states might also have a clear preference for one organisation over another. Hence, multiple member states can trigger regime shift, i.e., the change of organisational structures (Gehring and Faude 2014; Alter and Meunier 2009), as well as take blocking and obstructive roles by using the strategy of turf battles. When using this strategy, multiple members 'advocate policies that shape the capability and mandate of one institution – often at the expense of

the other' (Hofmann 2009: 47). For example, in the EU-NATO relationship, those states who clearly prefer the EU are called Europeanists, and those states in preference of NATO are called Atlanticists.

Among the most prominent and widely applied strategies by multiple member states is forum-shopping. It belongs to the category of 'cross-institutional political strategies' (Alter and Meunier 2009: 16). By the term forum-shopping it is understood that a member state can choose one organisation over another to put a particular issue on the agenda because it is convinced that it will receive more gains in this particular organisation than in the other one (Gehring and Oberthür 2009). Due to the increasing density of international organisations within a network, the likelihood for states to select the appropriate governance structures and international organisations according to their interests has increased significantly and has enabled states to make use of forum-shopping for frequently (Alter and Meunier 2009; Drezner 2009; Hofmann 2018). Yet, forum-shopping can also be considered as a new form of free-riding because it increasingly allows multiple member states to pursue national interests, instead of collective goods, which causes greater fragmentation and less optimal results for the international organisation and the other member states (Faude 2015).

In regard to both the European Union and NATO, states of both categories can be easily identified. Cyprus is the only state that is member of the EU but not of NATO or its PfP programme. Those non-EU NATO member states maintain relations through FPAs, and some EU member states did not join NATO as full members but have joined the PfP programme. These are Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden. NATO treats PfP states as a special category of membership. By taking part in the PfP these states can join military operations under the Alliance's framework and are granted access to essential classified information and intelligence, but they do not have the ability to directly influence NATO's policies (NATO 2016b).

In addition to the strategies of hostage-taking, regime shift and forum-shopping, another option for both single and multiple member states is brokering. This means that member states 'do not necessarily appreciate both IOs [international organisations] in equal terms, but they want them to work according to their mandates' and often mediate among the organisations (Hofmann 2018: 5). Overall, both single and multiple members have a variety of strategies at their disposal and can make use of them depending on their preferences, resources and the international context. However, single member states can only draw on hostage-taking, obstruction and brokering, whereas multiple members can also apply the

strategies of forum-shopping and regime shift.

Moreover, states can take different roles within international organisations as well as within networks of international organisations, such as the role of linking-pin actors, which are actors that link sub-networks with larger interorganisational networks. In this position, they can enable the exchange of information, trigger regime shift and can increase functional overlap (Doreian and Fujimoto 2004). States have furthermore the capability to delegate authority to international organisations so that these fulfil their mandates and tasks to take decision and to pursue more interactive engagement with other actors and organisations on states' behalves. Moreover, member states can take particular positions in interorganisational interaction. They cannot only be classified as single or multiple members, but, more importantly, they can also take different roles. Member states can thus be categorised as: (1) advocates of interorganisational cooperation, or (2) blockers of interorganisational cooperation, (3) balancers of interorganisational cooperation, or (4) neutrals of interorganisational cooperation (see Table 3 for an overview). These four roles provide the basis of the typology of member states in interorganisational interaction.

Advocates are those member states that are multiple members and account for those states that prefer a functioning and effective relationship between international organisations in overlapping policy domains. These states promote cooperation among international organisations in the same network by creating ties either through the benefit of their own multiple membership or through functional overlap, i.e., activities such as exchanges and joint actions in the same issue area. They can also play the role of bridging two or more international organisations due to their embeddedness in international networks and the maintenance of bilateral and minilateral relations. Among multiple member states, it is significant to identify the most powerful member states or leading governments in interorganisational interaction. Koops calls the most powerful member states the 'interorganisational hegemon' (2017: 201), which seek to influence the relationships between two or more international organisations. In addition, these states have the ability to influence policies, preferences and interests of international organisations and can therefore serve as vital contact points in interorganisational relations.

In contrast, *blockers* of interorganisational interaction do not favour cooperation of international organisations because of particular national interests and therefore block or veto efforts to strengthening interorganisational relations. This role can be taken by both single and multiple member states. Blockers are especially interested in obstructing

interorganisational interaction by making use of strategies such as hostage taking and turf battles (Hofmann 2009). For example, Turkey and Cyprus block each other's memberships in the respective other organisation and thereby also block EU-NATO cooperation in military crisis management to a certain extent. France also serves as a case example because of its disintegration from NATO's military command structure and its role as main driver of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy.

Balancers of interorganisational cooperation are those member states that attempt to find not only a balance in their own practices and policies concerning their choice of international organisation for their action. They also seek to balance between international organisations internally within the organisations and among other members. Balancers try to find an equilibrium between participating international organisations in the same network and thus seek to moderate and mediate between them. These states have no explicit preference for one over the other organisation. Instead, they acknowledge and value the benefits of each international organisation and aim to make full use of each organisation's own strength. These member states are therefore in favour of co-governance of international organisations in which a division of labour between them is regulated.

Neutrals are neither active, or even proactive, nor obstructive in interorganisational interaction. These states are neutral and sometimes even disengaged because of particular national interests or national constraints, such as in regard to the use of force. Neutrals can be either single or multiple member states, but it is suggested that single members are more likely to take this role in order to facilitate cooperation without their own involvement. These states should however not be confused with those neutral states such as Austria, Finland, or Sweden, which are militarily neutral states in general and whose neutrality primarily refers to military non-alignment.

As outlined in the introductory chapter on typologies, categorisation is not a straightforward process. The categorisation of member states in the typology of member states in interorganisational interaction rests upon a set of selection criteria, as established and described in chapter 1.5. This list of selection criteria includes the attitude towards interorganisational interaction and cooperation among international organisations (positive, negative, balanced, indifferent), the level of active promotion of closer interorganisational cooperation (absent, low, medium, high), states' view on division of labour that varies between negative to positive and also includes the option of specific which will be elaborated in the empirical chapters, the level of engagement in negotiations (absent, low, medium,

high) and material contributions to the international organisations and their operations (absent, low, medium, high). In this regard, it is acknowledged that the domestic politics, resources and capabilities, foreign and security policy orientation and historical experiences, including operational experiences and legal caveats, are relevant to identify and categorise a state along either advocates, blockers, balancers or neutrals of interorganisational interaction.

During the process of locating member states based on the examination of their national strategic security and defence documents, a change of wording and emphasis has helped to identify their association with one of the types. Comparing these national documents over time, a shift of attention has become evident for some member states, for instance, a shift of focus on one organisation to two organisations in the same policy area with the recognition of their equal importance. Such developments and shifts occur on the domestic level. While foreign and security policy orientations do not change abruptly, the domestic political context can change, such as the shaping and formation of interests and the diverging preferences of political parties, which can heavily influence states' attitudes, practices and behaviour (Putnam 1988). For example, in her analysis of the relevance of party preferences and France's relationship with NATO, Hofmann (2017) finds that French political parties have diverging views on the Atlantic Alliance and its value for the country's security and defence, and therefore have different preferences for the transformation of NATO depending on their policy preference. Consequently, member states' interests and preferences concerning the forums and institutions used for activities and policy-shaping depend on the interactions and position of decision-making power on the domestic level. The formation and shaping of member states' interests and preferences for the design, framework and intensity of interorganisational interaction is furthermore closely linked to the debate of identity of member states as well as of international organisations, which is explored in the following subsection.

Over the time of their memberships, states can therefore be located into at least one type of member state in interorganisational interaction. States have the capacity to shift and move between types and could therefore be located into more than one of the types based on how they match the characteristics of each type. However, some states present themselves as boundary cases or cases similar to what Rodt identifies as 'swing states' (2017: 139-140). This means that they are more fluid, i.e., they demonstrate characteristics of more than one type, and cannot be immediately grouped into one of the above types. With the help of the review

of official documents by the member states, the analysis of the interviews and the examination of the secondary data, each member state will be categorised into one type according to how they score and meet the set of criteria.

Table 3 Typology of the Role of Member States in Interorganisational Interaction

Type of member state	**Description**
Advocate	In favour of interorganisational interactions; promotes cooperation and interplay with other organisations in a network through membership or functional overlap; most likely to be a multiple member.
Blocker	Not in favour of interorganisational interactions; makes use of veto rights to prevent deeper cooperation; takes this position based on particular national interests or conflicts with other organisations in the network; can be single or multiple member.
Balancer	No explicit preference for a particular international organisation but attempts to balance between them; seeks equilibrium between organisations and acknowledges the strengths of each in order to achieve a division of labour.
Neutral	Neither advocates nor blocks interorganisational interactions; takes this position based on particular national interests or restraints; can be either a multiple or single member state.

2.9 Identity of Member States and International Organisations

When dealing with membership in international organisations, the notion of identity – of member states on the one hand, and of international organisations on the other – needs to be considered. Not only states, but also international organisations develop and possess their own identity (Poopuu 2015). Moreover, this theoretical framework postulates that both member states and international organisations even preserve multiple identities. In the study of how international organisations interact with and relate to each other and of how member states are able to influence this interorganisational interaction, identity plays an essential role in understanding the motivations, interests and objectives of the actors concerned.

While some theoretical approaches take different perspectives and views, others neglect the whole issue of identity. This draws on their view on states and international organisations in the international system. In particular rationalist and constructivist accounts differ explicitly in their understandings and usage of identity in their approaches to international relations. Rationalist approaches, including neorealism and neoliberalism, do not put great emphasis on identity. Their main focus is rather on the notion of power, especially material power such as military capabilities, which shape states' interests and behaviour. They assume that actors have 'only one meaningful identity' (Hopf 1998: 175) instead of multiple and context-dependent identities. In this regard, identity is not modifiable and instead, it is seen as given which cannot be changed. The constructivist view, in contrast, takes a different stand on identity. It sees identity as modifiable and adaptive depending on the historical, social or political context. Identities, as well as narratives, are in a continuous and dynamic process of change (Flockhart 2015; Guzzini 2003).

The theoretical framework of interorganisational interaction treats both international organisations and member states as equal actors in the network of international actors, and argues that their interests, interactions and behaviour are shaped and influenced by their self-perception as well as by their positioning within existing networks. In this context, the view on identity is borrowed from constructivism. Alexander Wendt argues in his seminal essay *Collective identity formation and the international state* (1994) that not only states but also international actors, such as regimes, institutions and organisations, possess their own identities. Among ideas and interaction, identity plays an important part in the understanding of international politics because they construct actors' interests and goals (Guzzini 2003; Hopf 1998). Wendt (1999) further proposes and develops four categories of identity: personal/corporate, type, role, and collective identity. Personal refers to states' identity and corporate to those of international organisations. Their identities are 'constituted by the self-organising, homeostatic structures that make actors distinct entities' (1999: 224). Type identity refers to a group of actors that share some characteristics that make up their identity. These characteristics and features might include language, skills, experience, and knowledge among others. This assumption relates to the understanding by Cooper and Brubaker who posit that identity serves as a 'collective phenomenon' which 'denotes a fundamental and consequential *sameness* among members of a group or category' (2000: 7). Role identity implies the existence of the Other. Identity helps to formulate an actor's beliefs as well as behaviour by distinguishing between the Self and Other. Through the existence of the Other, actors take specific roles accompanied by their self-perception and distinction

from the Other. Hence, identities are based on 'sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others' (Wendt 1994: 385). However, it is important to note that the study of identity by constructivists such as Alexander Wendt and the understanding of roles by role theorists are not identical, but also not mutually exclusive. Role theorists view roles as 'social positions' (Harnisch 2011: 8) which are determined by the expectations of the Self and of the Other, and primarily focus on a single actor within an organised group. Lastly, collective identity goes in line with identification and 'takes the relationship between Self and Other to its logical conclusion' (Wendt 1999: 229), whereby it combines role identities and type identities.

Actors construct their identity by making a distinction between Self and Other through telling and acting their identity (Poopuu 2015). National identities as well as those of international organisations have been formed over the course of time through the historical, cultural, social and political experiences that states make. States represent their view on the international security environment in their national security and defence strategies. But also international organisations are able to tell and act their identities. For example, NATO has published numerous Strategic Concepts in which it presents its perceived security challenges, but in which it also delimits its partners from the Others. Over the years, NATO's identity has changed and adapted to the new security environments especially after its identity crisis that was triggered by the end of the Cold War and the diminishing of the Other, i.e., the Soviet Union (Flockhart 2015). In addition, the practice of member states in NATO to second staff from their defence and foreign affairs ministries to posts within the Atlantic Alliance further allows for shaping its identity. This contributes to the learning and socialisation process of member states' foreign and security policy orientation and the alignment with NATO's objectives, responsibilities and mandates. In reverse, such a learning process also takes place when the seconded staff return to their national ministries. On a similar note, the EU has presented and vocalised its security identity through the introduction of its CSDP and the issuance of the ESS and EUGS. Poopuu (2015) even argues that the CSDP identity is a tool intended rather for the EU's self-representation than for others such as local actors and governments. Moreover, as argued by Hopf (1998: 174), identities are important to consider because they 'ensure at least some minimal level of predictability and order'. With the distinction between the Self and the Other, actors receive certain characteristics that differ from those of other actors. Hence, an actor knows that what the Other is not (cf. Wendt 1994). In this regard, 'a world without identities is a world of chaos, a world of pervasive and irremediable uncertainty' (Hopf 1998: 175-176).

Within the typology of member states in interorganisational interaction, therefore, each member state as well as the international organisations possess their own distinctive identities. A state's foreign and security policy orientation is influenced by its national identity, which further rests on the country's historical experiences, legal and constitutional frameworks, geopolitical location and resources and capabilities. The states that are located in one of the four types share certain characteristics which ultimately leads to possessing elements of shared identity. States from each category distinguish themselves from the others by formulating common positions, attitudes and policy preferences. Thus, member states from each type have a collective identity. In addition, the international organisations of which they are members also acquire their identities, which overlaps with those of their member states. Taking into account the notion of identity, and that both states and organisations have their own identities developed through their self-perception and the distinction from the Other helps to locate each of the states to a type of member state in interorganisational interaction and enables to identify their specific shared features and characteristics.

2.10 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed theoretical approaches to the study of international organisations and, more specifically, of interorganisational interaction, including institutionalist and constructivist viewpoints. Through the application of Swedberg's guide to theorising and the examination of different approaches, the theoretical framework of interorganisational interaction has been developed. Its core characteristic is its ability to generalise the relations and interactions between international organisations in the international system. As elaborated in this chapter, the main features and indicators of interorganisational interaction include the density of network, functional overlap, formalisation, frequency of interactions, intensity, and membership overlap (see Table 2). According to these features, different constellations of interorganisational relations can occur.

In the subsequent sections, a greater emphasis was put on member states and their role in interorganisational interaction. While it can be distinguished between single and multiple members as well as between original and subsequent members, this chapter has introduced a new typology of member states. States take specific positions to influence, support or obstruct relations between international organisations. Consequently, the newly developed typology consists of four types of member states, namely advocates, blockers, balancers, and

neutrals of interorganisational interaction (see Table 3). Member states have the ability to influence the intensity, functional overlaps and frequency of the external relations of international organisations including their relationships with those organisations in the same network. They can draw on a range of political strategies to shape interorganisational interaction, such as brokering, forum-shopping and regime-shifting as well as hostage taking and turf battles. Taking into consideration of states' foreign and security policy orientation and the notion of identity, member states can be categorised according to the typology on the basis of their national security policies, positions towards the particular international organisations and security identities, which translate into their policy preferences, attitudes and behaviour vis-à-vis interorganisational interaction. Both the theoretical framework of interorganisational interaction and the typology of member states are applied to the EU-NATO relationship to examine how member states shape interorganisational interaction based on their national features.

Chapter 3 - The EU-NATO Interorganisational Relationship

3.1 Introduction

The relationship between the EU and NATO has experienced many highs and lows since the beginning of their interactions. While it has seen a constant progress, it has also sensed periods of stagnation. Both Howorth (2009) and Flockhart (2014) even claim that their relationship was not only unsatisfactory but also dysfunctional. Hence, 'the political relationship between NATO and the EU requires careful thought and management' (Moens 2003: 32). Their relationship has been summarised by Flockhart (2014: 75) in the following:

> In a nutshell, the EU-NATO relationship has been summarised as a relationship that has developed from parallel but separate existences during the Cold War, to intense interinstitutional rivalry during the 1990s, to a "strategic partnership" defined by the EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy in 2002, but ending as a "frozen conflict" following the admission of Cyprus to the EU in 2004.

With the most recent events – especially the signing of the Joint Declaration by the President of the European Commission, the President of the European Council and the General Secretary of NATO in July 2016 and the subsequent Implementation Plan introduced in December 2016 – and newly shared security threats and challenges from their Eastern and Southern borders, this relationship has experienced a revival and has opened up a new era for cooperation. These events gave the relationship not only a new direction but also a new momentum in scholarly attention. In the scholarly community, the EU-NATO relationship has received a wide interest since the end of the Cold War. Yet, these contributions have primarily, and even sometimes exclusively, focused on the exchanges and interactions on the institutional level between the secretariats and key personalities of both organisations, or they have provided historical overviews on how the relationship emerged and developed over time. What has been missing, however, is the perspective of member states and how these have made contributions to the highs and lows of EU-NATO cooperation.

To fully grasp the historical and institutional developments as well as to locate the role of member states in the EU-NATO relationship, this chapter outlines and examine the state of affairs of the relationship between the EU and NATO. By doing so, it follows a thematic structure, which is based on previous works on both organisations individually as well as on the EU-NATO cooperation literature. For example, in the works of Messervy-Whiting (2005), Duke (2008) and Reichard (2006), one of the key issues is the historical development of the

relations between the EU and NATO as well as the slow process of formalising the interactions towards the institutionalisation of their cooperation. Scholars such as Larrabee (2004), Major and Mölling (2009), Gebhard and Smith (2011), Whitman (2004), Sperling (2004) and Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2014) focus on the operational and practical dimension, i.e., the interactions and cooperation in peacekeeping and crisis management operations, as well as on the division of labour and the issue of capabilities in their research of EU-NATO cooperation. Another strand of research, which includes the works by Schleich (2014) as well as Acikmese and Triantaphyllou (2012), Duke (2008) and Smith (2011) take into consideration the issue of particular member states and how they disrupt the cooperation between the EU and NATO. While doing so, certain member states have been shifted to the centre of attention, such as Cyprus, Turkey and France.

For the examination and state of the art of EU-NATO cooperation beginning with the end of the Cold War until 2016, this chapter illustrates their interorganisational relationship by looking at the institutional and legal framework, the issue of membership overlap, the capabilities gap as well as interoperability and division of labour. While some of these themes have helped to guide previous academic contributions and have allowed to provide insights into the obstacles and opportunities for this relationship to develop, these have not yet been combined in order to analyse the EU-NATO relationship with a special attention to member states (see also Græger and Haugevik 2011; Howorth and Keeler 2003; Missiroli 20002; Reichard 2006; Sloan 2003). In each theme the relevance of member states will be explained. They highlight that member states are the driving forces of the EU-NATO relationship but also demonstrate the obstacles for enhancing cooperation between the two organisations. These four themes serve additionally as the guiding line for the empirical analysis of the four categories as outlined in the typology of member states and based on the criteria for categorising member states into this typology (see Chapters 1 and 2).

This chapter first starts with a synopsis of the historical development of the relations between the EU and NATO from its early beginnings until the most recent developments in 2016. The historical overview provides an essential foundation for the analysis of their relationship based on the four themes. In the second section, the institutional and legal framework of their cooperation is illustrated. Starting from informal exchanges the relationship has developed towards a more formalised framework including established institutional structures. The third section deals with the issue of membership and analyses obstacles created by member states both deliberately and undeliberately. The impact of the

capabilities gap for their cooperation is examined in the fourth section. It further includes the gap of military assets and capabilities as well as the gaps in other areas of the institutional structure of both organisations. This leads to the issues of interoperability and division of labour between NATO and the EU, which are analysed in the fifth section. Lastly, the final section summarises how these four factors have impacted the EU-NATO relationship as a whole and provides a forward-looking view on the subsequent empirical analysis of advocates, blockers, balancers and neutrals of interorganisational interaction.

3.2 Institutional and Legal Framework: Towards Institutionalisation and Formalisation

With the end of the Cold War in 1989, the security environment in Europe underwent a drastic change. After the establishment of the European Union with the Treaty on European Union in 1992, its member states decided not only to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but also to bring the issue of security and defence back on the agenda. This affected the relationship between international security organisations in Europe due to the functional overlap that was triggered. The main question for both the EU and NATO concerned their positions in the new security architecture as well as their relationship with each other. Their member states maintained diverging viewpoints, however. For example, France initially prioritised the Union and its integration project in particular because of its own disintegration from NATO's military command structures. The UK, in contrast, set EU-NATO cooperation as a condition for the development of the EU's foreign, security and defence policy (Bozo 2016; O'Donnell 2011). Subsequently, both organisations worked towards establishing relationships formally and informally since the early 1990s.

The route towards formalising the EU-NATO relationship has overcome institutional and legal hurdles, which need further description and explanation in order to understand the current state of affairs. In this regard, some major milestones serve as guidance, starting from the first informal meetings in the 1990s, the first formal meeting between the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC), via the Berlin Plus arrangements and Security of Information Agreement in the early 2000s until the signing of the Joint Declaration by the President of the European Commission, the President of the European Council and the Secretary General of NATO in July 2016. With each arrangement,

agreement and declaration the relationship took another step towards formalising cooperation.

3.2.1 From Informal to Formal Cooperation

The EU-NATO relationship originates in informal meetings, which took first place in 1997 between then NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, European Commission Jacques Santer and Commissioner Hans van den Broek (Reichard 2006). With the appointment of Javier Solana as Secretary General of the Council of the EU and the Union's first High Representative in June 1999 and former British Defence Secretary George Robertson as NATO Secretary General in the same year, informal talks were continued during lunch meetings. This helped to further advance the EU-NATO cooperation informally and to pave the way for a closer relationship. Both took a very proactive approach in both EU-NATO cooperation and crisis management. Their personal relationship as well as their common interest in finding a joint approach to solving the Balkan conflicts, which were simmering at the Euro-Atlantic's border, have created a window of opportunity for 'some kind of EU-NATO institutional connection' (Reichard 2006: 123). Especially Javier Solana and George Robertson, as well as former US ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow, envisaged a permanent institutionalisation between the two organisations in the future (de Wijk 2004; Reichard 2006; Vershbow 1999). In fact, according to a NATO official, the best period of cooperation between the EU and NATO occurred during the 'Solana-Robertson connection' as it was the first time that organisations, instead of states, undertook joint efforts to solve a conflict. They were more interested in solving the issue than in the bureaucracy in Brussels (NATO Official 3).

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, informal meetings and exchanges therefore took place between the EU and NATO on all levels[5]. The first informal meeting between the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was held on 19 September 2000, which subsequently led to a routine of three meetings per year. Informal exchanges also occurred between the Head of the Interim Military Staff on the EU side and the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) on the NATO side since March 2000 (Messervy-Whiting 2005). Such exchanges then triggered meetings at lower levels, for example, at the ministerial level in May 2001, and between the organisation's military

[5] For an overview of formal and informal meetings between 2001 and 2009 see Table 1 in Smith 2011.

committees in the same year. Throughout their relationship, the meetings between the PSC and NAC 'became the key meeting format in all important areas of cooperation' (Reichard 2006: 126). Once both organisations became more familiar with their counterpart and had the chance to build up trust, got to know each other's procedures and modalities as well as internalised a routine of exchanges, relations started to become more formal (EU Official 1). This is illustrated by the step-by-step rapprochement through several arrangements, agreements and declarations, which show that both organisations and their interorganisational cooperation has moved 'from a parallel to a more integrated relationship' (Schleich 2014: 187).

The only proof of the formalisation of relations and the scope of cooperation and consultation is an exchange of letters between then NATO Secretary General Robertson and the Swedish EU Presidency in January 2001. Since this is not a legal document, legalisation of any cooperation arrangements required further formalisation of the relationship[6]. This began with the some of the first official meetings between the EU and NATO. The first ministerial meeting between the EU and NATO took place on 31 May 2001, which was followed by the first formal PSC-NAC meeting in June 2001, in which the foreign ministers discussed common concerns in the Western Balkans (NATO 2001). Henceforth, meetings between the PSC and NAC became the format for formal meetings to discuss particularly important areas of interorganisational cooperation, albeit these did not occur very often. Consultations and sharing of positions on security issues among the two organisations were initially the prime objectives of these meetings. Yet, with the on-going crises in the Balkans and the initiatives in both organisations to launch crisis management operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM) meetings between the PSC and NAC became more frequent and intense in crisis situations (Heise and Schmidt 2005). Such modalities for mutual consultations and for cooperation based on the principles of partnership and equality were then enshrined in the EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy in 2002.

With the signing of the 2016 Joint Declaration and the introduction of the subsequent Implementation Plan, the two organisations agreed on modalities for meetings between the PSC and NAC. Accordingly, the new package includes regular meetings based on at least one

[6] According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations, an international agreement needs to be ratified and implemented in order to become legalised. In addition, only states possess treaty-making power, which would mean for the EU-NATO relationship that a legally binding agreement would have to be done by EU member states and NATO member states. Further information on the legalisation of international agreements between international organisations can be found in UN 1986.

formal meeting and two informal meetings per year, as well as regular invitations of the EU High Representative to NATO Defence Ministers meetings and of the NATO Secretary General to the EU Defence Ministers meetings (CEU 2016; EU Official 1).

One further important aspect in the institutionalisation and formalisation of the EU-NATO relationship is the establishment of permanent liaison arrangements. Generally, liaison officers serve as points of contact to ensure frequent exchanges and meetings as well as coordination, and to provide mutual benefit for both organisations. The NATO Permanent Liaison Team at the EU Military Staff was launched in 2005 and the EU Cell at SHAPE was created in 2006. Establishing the EU Cell at SHAPE turned out to be problematic because some EU member states, such as France, demanded an independent headquarters for EU-led operations, which was in return obstructed by other member states, most importantly by the UK (Reichard 2006). The establishment of both liaison offices has so far showed fruitful signs for closer cooperation. Since reaching functionality, 'everything is done in liaison of both organisations and their member states' (EU Official 3), which also led to the fact that 'to almost every policy within NATO there is nowadays an EU angle' (NATO Official 1).

3.2.2 Security of Information

One of the most contested issues in the EU-NATO relationship has been, and still is, the security of classified information and finding arrangements on sharing such information. The different, but parallel, classification systems in NATO and the EU has posed a challenge, which needed to be overcome. In NATO, on the one hand, the rules on security of information date back to the document C-M(55)15(Final) from the 1950s, which was revised and adopted in 2002 and then referred to as C-M(2002)49[7] (Reichard 2006). These contain a classification system for sensible information based on four levels: Cosmic Top Secret (unauthorised disclosure would lead to grave damage to NATO), NATO Secret (unauthorised disclosure would cause serious damage to NATO), NATO Confidential (unauthorised disclosure would cause damages to NATO interests), and NATO Restricted (unauthorised disclosure would lead to disadvantages to NATO interests). It has an additional classification labelled "Atomal" in which it distinguishes between Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data, and NATO further distinguishes between classified and unclassified documents. The EU, on the other

[7] Both documents are not open to the public.

hand, maintains a slightly different classification system. This originates back to the initial reluctance of member states to share information with third parties, which was then repealed by the principle of transparency of the Commission and the Council (Reichard 2006). Due to the different proceedings and regulations among the EU institutions there is no EU-wide classification system. Concerning the exchange of classified information in the context of the CSDP, framework participation agreements between the EU and third states include the handling of classified information related to the CSDP operation and mission. The highest classification level for civilian missions is labelled 'Restreint UE/EU Restricted' and 'Confidentiel UE/Confidential EU' for military operations (CEU 2014: Annex VI; also see EU 2011).

The different classification systems and, more specifically, the lack of a Union-wide classification system in the EU triggered concerns among NATO member states to share information with the EU and its member states. In this regard, it became evident

> that full and effective consultation and cooperation may require access to EU and NATO classified information and material, as well as the exchange of classified information and related material between the EU and NATO; Conscious that such access to and exchange of classified information and related material requires appropriate security measures (EU 2003c; also see Schilde 2015: 173).

Establishing a mechanism for the exchange of classified information – an important factor for cooperation in security and defence including crisis management operations – requires a formal agreement between the two organisations. At the Santa Maria da Feira European Council meeting in June 2000, the ministers agreed on a proposal to establish four working groups with NATO, among them one working group to deal with issues of security and information sharing (EU 2000; Messervy-Whiting 2005; Moens 2003). This triggered the Interim Security Arrangements on the security of information between NATO and the General Secretariat of the EU Council on 26 July 2000.

With the breakthrough year of 2003, the two organisations signed the Security of Information Agreement on 14 March 2003, which replaces the agreement from 2000. This enabled the EU and NATO to fully and effectively consult each other and cooperate. It further allows them to access classified information as well as related material that is exchanged between the two organisations provided that the receiving organisation only makes use of it for the specific purpose set out by the originator and 'shall protect and safeguard the classified information or material according to the provisions set out in its own security regulations for

information or material holding an equivalent security classification' (EU 2003c: Article 4b; also see Reichard 2006). However, the Security of Information Agreement does not create a common classification system that could be used by both organisations to exchange classified information.

Facilitating the exchange of information between the two organisations was also a key aspect of the Joint Declaration and Implementation Plan from 2016. Therefore, and in order to achieve improvements in the information exchange, cooperation on strategic communication and situational awareness have been established between the EU and NATO. This includes intensified communication between NATO's Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and the Strategic Communications division with the European External Action Service (CEU 2016; NATO 2016a).

3.2.3 Legal Framework: Agreements, Arrangements and Declarations

In 1996, the North Atlantic Council decided in the Berlin Accords to develop the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), which further allowed the WEU to make use of NATO's military assets and capabilities for WEU-led crisis management operations (NATO 1996). This was a vital step in formalising and institutionalising the relations between NATO and the WEU. Although this did not automatically translate into formalising EU-NATO relations, the Western European Union played an important part. It served as 'middle-man' between NATO and the EU, and as a bridge in particular through the declaration with the EU, in which the latter was permitted to draw on the WEU's resources (Bailes and Messervy-Whiting 2011: 32; EU 1997; Moens 2003).

Since the beginnings of their informal cooperation, the aim was to formalise and institutionalise their relationship. This facilitates and brings about routine in their cooperation on both the institutional level and the operational level in situations of conducting crisis management operations in the same theatre. One of the first steps towards formalising the EU-NATO relationship was the signing of the EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy on 16 December 2002. It showed an important step not only for the EU to achieve its capability goals as set out its Headline Goals, but also for the EU-NATO relationship as a whole (NATO 2002). According to this declaration, their cooperation is based on the principles of partnership, mutual consultation, equality, respect

for each other's member states, and development of military capabilities for the benefit of both organisations. It further deals with the issue of involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within the EU's security and defence policy framework. The 2002 Declaration labels the EU-NATO relationship as a "strategic partnership", which gives it an even greater importance, but also enough 'room for manoeuvre and flexibility' for both organisations (Touzovskaia 2006). However, some member states were not pleased with the wide scope of cooperation as they feared that NATO might be able to restrict the EU in the pursuit of its security and defence policy (NATO Official 2).

In the following year, both organisations focused on the capability improvement for crisis management operations. In this regard, the EU and NATO eventually agreed on the so-called Berlin Plus arrangements in 2003, which is a classified document and thus not available to the public. Both the Security of Information Agreement and the establishment of the EU-NATO Capability Group played important parts in finalising these arrangements. In fact, the discussions and negotiations leading to these arrangements made reference to the already existing Berlin Accord arrangements between NATO and the Western European Union from 1996 as well as to the EU's and WEU's crisis management capacities and responsibilities as outlined in the Petersberg Tasks (NATO 1996; also see WEU 1992). More serious discussions then began at the Washington summit of the Alliance in 1999 where NATO member states agreed on provisions for making NATO military assets and capabilities available for EU-led operations (NATO 1999). The Berlin Plus arrangements were perceived as a major breakthrough by the public as well as a 'landmark' for EU-NATO relations as they outline the principles for practical cooperation (CEU 2003; Ojanen 2006; Reichard 2004, 2006). As it had already outlined in the 1999 Helsinki Presidency Conclusions, the EU desires to conduct military crisis management operations 'where NATO as a whole does not get engaged' (EU 1999). However, it did not have adequate capabilities to do so. The arrangements under Berlin Plus therefore serve as a crucial step for the EU to conduct autonomous military operations in its near proximity. Accordingly, the main arrangements are the following (CEU 2003; Reichard 2004):

- the EU is permitted to have access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations,
- NATO military assets and capabilities are available for EU-led military crisis management operations,
- terms of reference for using NATO's DSACEUR for commanding EU-led operations,

- the establishment of consultation mechanisms between the EU and NATO before crisis management operations, and
- setting up arrangements for the coherent and mutually reinforcing development of capability requirements common to both the EU and NATO.

From the Alliance's perspective, these arrangements are a good way for 'tying the EU closer to NATO' (Ojanen 2006: 69) whereby the EU's autonomy could be restricted. Another important issue was the inclusion of NATO member states in EU-led military operations, which was emphasised by several NATO allies, most importantly by Norway and Turkey (Tofte 2003). While this package of arrangements was regarded as a breakthrough, it nevertheless had some shortcomings and critical issues, which were not immediately addressed. The EU and NATO had different interpretations of the arrangements and different understandings over their depth and substance. This was especially the case in terms of shaping and participating in the decision-making processes on both sides (Varwick 2006). In addition, since the agreement on Berlin Plus, there were only two EU-led military crisis management operations in which the Union drew on NATO military assets and capabilities under Berlin Plus: Operation Concordia in FYRoM in 2003 and Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina which is on-going since 2004. In both operations, it is said that both organisations cooperated and collaborated well, which was particularly facilitated by the Berlin Plus arrangements (Haugevik 2007; Mace 2004). Yet, due to continuing problems among certain member states in both organisations, the EU and NATO have not launched any other military crisis management operations under Berlin Plus. This has led critical voices to argue that Berlin Plus is outdated and not suitable anymore for the current state of affairs of the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship (Kammel and Zyla 2011; Smith 2011).

With the signing of the Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on 8 July 2016 another milestone in the EU-NATO relationship was reached. The EU and NATO have agreed to cooperate more closely in seven areas: countering hybrid threats, operational cooperation including maritime issues, cyber security and defence, defence capabilities, defence industry and research, exercises, and defence and security capacity-building (EU 2016b; NATO 2016a). This Joint Declaration is even considered to be a new breakthrough (EU Official 2), but it is also important to consider that it was 'not fully revolutionary' because the effects and impact on the practical cooperation are not yet measurable (NATO Official 2). Overall, since the Joint Declaration, the atmosphere between

the staff members of both organisations has improved, more frequent exchanges – sometimes even on a weekly basis – are occurring, and both sides have finally agreed on guidelines to set up the procedures and structures for the future of their relationship (EU Official 1; NATO Official 1, 3).

3.2.4 On Practical Cooperation

The so-called 'alumni-effect' has played an important role in liaising with each other's staff members (Koops 2007, 2017; Messervy-Whiting 2005). When an officer from one organisation takes a new position in the other organisation, he or she brings working culture, knowledge and expertise from the previous occupation as well as from the procedures and structures from the previous organisation with her. The effect is the constant import of working culture, knowledge and procedures as well as the awareness of the need to cooperate.

However, despite the efforts on the institutional and staff-to-staff levels as well as on the operational level, as demonstrated in FYRoM and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the period of EU-NATO relations between 2004 and 2014/2015 was labelled as 'frozen conflict' and 'the end of the honeymoon' (Flockhart 2014: 75, 84; also see Acikmese and Triantaphyllou 2012: 564; Hofmann and Reynolds 2007: 2). Both organisations have realised and acknowledged the mutual benefits of their relationship, but they were not able to overcome intervening political obstacles (Smith 2011). First, national interests have obstructed to push closer EU-NATO cooperation forward. While some states prefer closer cooperation, others perceive a threat to the EU's autonomy due to the dominance of NATO. Second, cooperation in the field depends on military actors. However, these are guided by the principles given by policy-makers. If the latter are not able to agree on the legal and institutional framework for cooperation, the former cannot act. In this regard, Smith (2011: 244) discusses the issue of the 'participation problem'. Accordingly, most of the exchanges occur on the international staff-to-staff level through the office of the DSACEUR where 'the "real business" of EU-NATO cooperation is being sustained, especially with regard to facilitating informal cooperation for non-Berlin Plus operations where both organisations are deployed' (Smith 2011: 245). Thus, most information exchanges still occur through informal channels on the lowest level of cooperation between the two organisations (Duke 2008).

Lastly, the institutional nature of the EU-NATO relationship has furthermore led to a deadlock. Gebhard and Smith (2015: 113) claim that the lack of closer EU-NATO cooperation is grounded in the 'problem of institutional incompatibility', i.e., actors within NATO are not sure of their counterparts in the EU security and defence structure and who to address in particular circumstances. Despite the similar structures, communication between the respective organisations has also not been labelled as successful. Consequently, EU-NATO relations are faced with the absence of arrangements regarding communication, cooperation and command (Gebhard and Smith 2015; Smith 2011).

3.3 The Issue of Membership

According to Marsh and Rees (2012: 55) there are three main reasons for the problematic relationship between the EU and NATO. Besides the transatlantic relations between the EU and the United States and the lack of consensus about the roles of each organisation, the 'overlapping but differentiated membership' poses tensions for closer cooperation. Reichard (2006: 6) confirms this by observing that a 'constant feature of the EU-NATO relationship which complicates its analysis is that the membership of the two organisations largely overlaps'. Member states' behaviour varies in each organisation, they pursue their own interests and make use of their membership in different ways. Traditionally, some member states, and above all the UK, see NATO as the main forum for collective defence and crisis management and regard the EU as an economic power instead of a security and military actor. Over time, however, member states' views have altered. For instance, while national policies prevailed in the early stages of institutionalisation of the EU's security and defence policy, the developments since the launch of the CSDP have indicated a profound change. This was reflected in the institutionalisation of security and defence policies as well as in the evolution of the strategic cultures of both organisations (Cornish and Edwards 2001; Juncos 2017).

Figure 1 The EU and NATO Membership Overlap



In total, twenty-two states of the EU's twenty-eight and NATO's twenty-eight members are among the multiple members in the EU-NATO relationship (Figure 1). This means that they possess membership in both organisations and thus, are part of the organisations' decision-making processes. Already in one of the earliest works on interorganisational relations, scholars and policy-makers were interested in the effects of membership overlap (cf. Smithers 1979). Member states have numerous strategies at their disposal. For example, they can choose to contribute actively and push for closer cooperation. In contrast, they are also able to obstruct and block interorganisational interaction. Forum-shopping is a common approach by member states. This means that they can take preference for and deliberately choose a particular international organisation as the forum to realise their national interests and objectives (Gehring and Oberthür 2009). Hofmann (2009) has furthermore identified three major strategies: hostage taking, turf battles and muddling through (see Chapter 2). Member states have made use of one of these strategies in several occasions. One example

is Turkey's extensive use of hostage taking when it comes to fostering closer cooperation by blocking the accession of Cyprus to NATO (Acikmese and Triantaphyllou 2012). France's decisions and actions in the EU and NATO is another popular example. Because of its support for European autonomy in defence and security, other member states have viewed this as a way of hostage taking in NATO, i.e. a form of obstructing reforms in order to allow the EU to take on certain responsibilities and tasks (NATO Official 2).

Disagreements among the member states on the appropriate approach to crisis management, over the design of the EU-NATO relationship as well as the level of institutionalisation and formalisation of this cooperation have hampered the progress of convergence (see, for example, Manners and Whitman 2001; Marsh and Rees 2012; Schleich 2014; Varwick and Koops 2009; Winn 2003). In this regard, member states have been categorised either in the camp of Atlanticists, e.g., the Netherlands, Spain and the UK, or in the camp of Europeanists, e.g., Belgium and France (Flockhart 2014; Gebhard and Smith 2015; Larrabee 2004). The traditional tensions between France and the United Kingdom have been perceived as an obstacle. Both are among the militarily powerful states in Europe, in possession of nuclear weapons, but their views diverged over the purpose of NATO and CSDP. Yet, with the Saint-Malo Declaration in 1998 and the bilateral defence cooperation through the Lancaster House Treaties in 2010, their tensions have become a minor issue for fostering the EU-NATO relationship (EUISS 2000; Ostermann 2015). First, France agreed to the British demand that EU will be able to further develop its security and defence policy and its military capabilities under the condition of closer EU-NATO cooperation. Second, with enhanced bilateral defence cooperation through the Lancaster House Treaties, France and the UK build the core of European security for both the EU and the Atlantic Alliance.

In addition to the membership overlap and the divergences among member states based on their national preferences and interests as well as their strategies in pursing these, there are three salient issues, which highlight how member states can – either deliberately or unintentionally – influence the EU-NATO relationship. These three issues are the role of groups of interest, states' "schizophrenic" behaviour, and inter-state conflicts. Derived from the theoretical framework and the typology of member states in interorganisational interaction (Chapter 2), it is suggested that states maintain bilateral and minilateral connections with other members within international organisations. It is furthermore assumed that these bilateral and minilateral connections lead to networks of like-minded states and allow to form coalitions to promote, or delay and oppose, ideas, initiatives and

policy items. On the basis of the primary data acquired through the interviews, it has also become evident that some member states stand out in their behaviour and present "special" cases. In particular, some states are sought to act in a way that is often difficult to read and understand by their peers from other member states (cf. EU Official 1), which needs to receive further investigation to understand how states shape the EU-NATO relationship. Lastly, as commonly referred to and studied in the existing works on EU-NATO cooperation, it has become evident that inter-state tensions and conflicts among particular members of the two organisations has been an increasingly dominant factor and specifically an obstacle to furthering cooperation legally and practically (see, for example, Acikmese and Triantaphyllou 2012; Bilgin 2003; Duke 2008; Smith 2011). Taking into consideration that the three aspects of membership in both organisations – groups of interest, states' "schizophrenic" behaviour and inter-state tensions – have been crystallised, they guide this examination on member states in the EU-NATO relationship.

3.3.1 Groups of Interest

Throughout the evolution of the EU and NATO themselves on the one hand and their interorganisational relations on the other hand, so-called groups of interest – sometimes also referred to as coalition groups – within both organisations have emerged. These groups consist of member states that are like-minded and closely aligned in terms of their security and defence policies as well as their strategic interests. Especially within Europe a trend towards minilateralism in defence cooperation has been recognised. In comparison to multilateral frameworks such as the EU and NATO, which member states often see as lacking the appropriate efficiency and effectiveness due to the slow progress in developing new initiatives and taking decisions on new proposals, minilateral cooperation has also become a helpful approach for member states to realise new ideas. Minilateral cooperation is comprised of two or more states, which share a common goal and aim, and can be operated within multilateral frameworks (Pannier 2015). Within both the EU and NATO minilateral cooperation has taken the form of groups of interests or coalition groups. In these groups of interests, member states have the chance to identify other states as coalition partners which share similar ideas, threats and positions. In some cases, these states are located in the same region, for example the Nordics, Central and Eastern Europe or Southern Europe. The regional divide particularly between the South and the East often illustrates a problem of convergence in both organisations. While the Baltics and other Central and Eastern European

member states put a greater emphasis on deterrence and defence, Southern European states focus on counter-terrorism and maritime security in the Mediterranean Sea (British Official 1).

In the EU-NATO relationship, there are certain groups of interest that are most prominent. The "friends of Europe" within NATO is a group comprised of Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States (Cypriot Official 2; NATO Official 3). Except for the US, these states are all multiple members and among those with the biggest share of the defence budget in the EU. In addition, they all put an emphasis on the EU-NATO cooperation, though from different perspectives and with different objectives in mind. The "quint" is a group of five member states in NATO – France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the US – that meets regularly prior to meetings of the NAC or of the Military Committee (MC) (German Official 2). During these meetings, the Military Representatives and other staff members of each ally discuss their positions on a crisis or conflict, or any other crucial topic, in an informal way. This forum serves to exchange views and strategies and helps to formulate a common position in order to form a coalition in the decision-making process. The "Big Three", which consists of France, Germany and the UK, is another known group in both the EU and NATO. Despite the divergences of historical experiences, a policy convergence in some areas of security and defence and in their approaches to the use of military force has been recorded. Therefore, trilateral cooperation is regarded as vital for advancing defence in Europe (Pannier and Schmitt 2014). These three countries are not only the major economic powers in Europe, but they also possess the highest military expenditures and even account for 63% of the EU's overall defence budget (EDA 2016). The Visegrad Group is another prominent group among member states, which often meets informally as well as formally to discuss issues of security, defence and foreign policy. It is a political alliance of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. In fact, this group collaborates on a more formalised manner than the other groups of interests. All four states sought simultaneous accession to both the EU and NATO and see membership as well as EU-NATO cooperation crucial for their own security and defence and for the realisation of their national interests (Törő 2011).

3.3.2 States' "Schizophrenic" Behaviour

Member states pursue specific interest with their membership in international organisations such as the EU and NATO. Due to the functional overlap and domain similarity, i.e., the overlap or similarity of policy domains in which organisations have competences (Biermann and Koops 2017; Gehring and Oberthür 2009), member states have to take important decisions about which organisations should receive the responsibility to deal with a specific issue, task or policy area. As in some cases it has been observed that certain member states act in "schizophrenia" (EU Official 1). This means that a member state expresses its opinion on an issue positively in one organisation, but negatively on the same issue in another organisation. A prime example of this is the behaviour of the French foreign minister during the negotiations on the EU takeover of NATO's operations in the Western Balkans, notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. According to NATO Official 2, the French representative emphasised the French support for a takeover in EU negotiations in the PSC, but the French representative in the NAC expressed concerns about the EU's readiness, hence showing scepticism and disagreement over a potential takeover.

Another illustrative example is the case of Turkey in terms of discussing closer EU-NATO cooperation. In NATO negotiations it has voiced assent to a closer relationship with the Union, but it has vetoed the accession of Cyprus to the Atlantic Alliance or NATO's Partnership for Peace programme, which would be fundamental to overcome many obstacles in the EU-NATO relationship (EU Official 3; NATO Official 2). This schizophrenia of member states is not uncommon and has been observed at numerous occasions. This political schizophrenia serves to play off NATO and the EU against each other in order to obstruct further progress in their cooperation. This behaviour, however, is to a certain extent dependent on what representative of a member state sits at the negotiation and decision-making table. Whereas some Military Representatives and ambassadors to the NAC and the PSC receive a joint instruction from their Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other member states either receive separate instructions and guidance or make decisions within their national delegations to the respective organisations.

3.3.3 Inter-State Conflicts and the Cyprus Issue

Another obstacle, and sometimes even a deadlock, for deepening the EU-NATO relationship is the issue of disputes between individual member states as well as the issue of discrimination of non-members. Most notably the still unresolved disputes between Cyprus, Turkey and Greece – and the so-called *Cyprus issue* – pose a major problem to EU-NATO cooperation in security and defence (see, for example, Acikmese and Triantaphyllou 2012; Duke 2008; Græger and Haugevik 2011; Marsh and Rees 2012; Smith 2011; Tofte 2003). Historically, the conflict between Greece and Turkey dates back to before either organisation was founded (see Cemp 1980 for a detailed description of the dispute). Both Greece and Turkey became NATO members in 1952, and Greece later joined the EU in 1981. Even though the three guarantors of Cyprus – Greece, Turkey and the UK – are all alliance members, the country rejected NATO membership and instead opted for the Non-Alignment Movement (Ker-Lindsay 2010). With the invasion of the Turkish army on the Cypriot island in 1974 and the Turkish non-recognition of Cyprus as a sovereign state, the dispute between the three countries culminated. The developments have since affected the cooperation between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance.

The EU-NATO relationship was regarded as moderate until Cyprus became a member state of the EU in the 2004 enlargement round (cf. Biermann 2015). This event changed the cooperation dynamics. In a nutshell, the unresolved Cyprus-Greece-Turkey dispute and Cyprus' EU membership caused obstacles for the EU-NATO relationship in multiple dimensions. First, the 2002 Security of Information Agreement only includes the exchange of classified information between the two organisations and all the member states as long as a bilateral agreement on information sharing exists for non-members. In the drafting of this agreement, Turkish representatives took careful accounts of the correct wording in case of potential EU membership of Cyprus to make sure that it would not be included in an exchange of classified information (NATO Official 2). NATO's PfP programme and the EU's FPA account for such bilateral security of information agreements. Yet, such an agreement does not exist between NATO and Cyprus due to Turkey's veto (Acikmese and Triantaphyllou 2012). Due to this restriction, formal exchanges on the PSC and NAC level can therefore only occur on the issues of Operation Concordia in FYRoM and Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the provisions of the Berlin Plus arrangements. In cases of formal negotiations on issues not related to Berlin Plus, Cyprus shall not participate. In order to improve the situation and to make progress, the PSC and NAC increasingly meet in informal

settings (Cypriot Official 2; EU Official 1). As suggested by scholars such as Smith (2011), a possible solution to overcome the problem of information security would be the reunification of the Republic of Cyprus and Northern Cyprus, and the subsequent accession to NATO's PfP programme, and concurrently Turkey's accession to the European Union. Due to the still unresolved dispute over the island – and a solution to this is still not in sight (Cypriot Official 1; Cypriot Official 2) – the likelihood of closer EU-NATO cooperation is entrapped in the double veto of these two countries.

While the Cyprus issue used to be *the issue* to obstruct greater cooperation between the EU and NATO, other disagreements between member states have been widely neglected, but which also play a crucial role. Deriving from this, the tensions between Turkey and the EU pose another challenge. Negotiations on Turkey's possible accession to the EU began formally in 2005, but were halted in 2006 due to the lacking progress on the Turkish side as well as because it did not implement the Additional Protocol of the Customs Union, which includes the access for Cypriots aircrafts and ships to Turkish ports (Acikmese and Triantaphyllou 2012). Especially in light of the EU's rejection of membership and the suspensions of negotiations the tensions have arisen between Turkey and the EU (EU Official 4). Furthermore, the country felt discriminated due to its non-participation in CSDP affairs and therefore demanded involvement in the EU decision-making process concerning the Union's security and defence policy and CSDP matters related to Berlin Plus (Tofte 2003).

3.4 The Capabilities Gap

Robert Kagan's infamous distinction that 'Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus' (2003: 3) has translated into the debate on the power and capabilities gap between America[8] and Europe, and between NATO and the European Union. He refers to Mars as being the more powerful and Venus the weaker actor. In contrast, Flockhart (2011) used the wordplay of Tarzan and Jane to attribute the hard power approach to crisis management to the EU and the soft power approach to NATO. This has matched the initial purpose of NATO and the EU – the Atlantic Alliance as the military alliance in Europe, and the Union as the economic actor on the continent (Coonen 2006; Reichard 2006). Yet, the EU's objective to become a security actor, which is capable of conducting autonomous military crisis

[8] When analysing the capabilities gap, NATO and the US are often used interchangeably because of the large contribution of the US to NATO's military capabilities.

management operations had experienced backlashes because of its inadequate capabilities. The former Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens therefore called the EU 'an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm' in a statement in 1991 (Whitney 1991). This issue is an underlying problem within both organisations and in the EU-NATO relationship.

The capabilities gap between the EU and NATO became evident first in the Balkan wars in the 1990s, especially in Kosovo, where the EU's common foreign, security and defence policy tools and instruments were not operable as planned and where NATO eventually conducted an intervention, and then again in the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s, where the EU was mandated to establish sustainable civil police and law enforcement structures through its civilian mission EUPOL Afghanistan (Sperling 2004; Yost 2003). Bialos (2005: 55) points out three main reasons for the primacy of American military power and the weak European capabilities: money, institutional resistance, and the lack of political will. Cultural and historical perspectives of member states can be considered as additional explanatory factors. Throughout their cooperation efforts the capabilities gap is not the only recognisable gap. In fact, the 'capabilities gap should be defined as an aggregate of many gaps' (Yost 2003: 83). Sperling (2004) identifies a total of seven gaps between Europe and North America – sovereignty gap, leadership gap, input-output gap, investment gap, procurement gap, technology gap, and spectrum gap – to which the interoperability gap can be added. All of these gaps relate to one of the issues of the capabilities gap, which were addressed by several scholars (Bialos 2005; Coonen 2006; Fiott 2017b; Græger and Haugevik 2011; Muratore 2010; Reichard 2006; Schmidt 2006; Whitman 2004; Yost 2003).

The EU-NATO Capability Group was established, which followed the proposal from the EU's Feira Summit in 2000. This Capability Group was set up to coordinate their capabilities as well as their efforts to improve these through the EU Headline Goals and NATO's Defence Capability Initiative (DCI). This was crucial to avoid 'unnecessary duplication', which was requested by the United States (Albright 1998). It was supposed to serve as the 'linchpin of coordination' between them, but its abilities were constrained due to the political differences of the EU and NATO as well as their member states (Marsh and Rees 2012: 55). Therefore, the EU-NATO Capability Group conducted mainly cross-briefings in order to keep each side updated about armament and capability improvements. Due to the political differences, however, this group did not meet for over fifteen months, between February 2016 and June 2017 (French Official 1).

3.4.1 Sovereignty Gap and Leadership Gap

First, the sovereignty gap refers to the intergovernmental nature of the European Union decision-making process related to security and defence issues as well as within the Atlantic Alliance decision-making process. This includes decisions on procurement and addresses the fragmentation of Europe's defence industry (Coonen 2006; Sperling 2004). While the US has to comply with a single standard and works with its national defence contractor, European states seek to maintain sovereignty over their national defence industry. This means that the US makes use of a single type of armoured tanks, but Europeans are faced with a diversity of armoured vehicles. Sovereignty over the defence industry has therefore illustrated a practical problem in military operations. However, this issue is not only an intra-EU problem, but also an issue that has hampered the interoperability within NATO (German Official 2).

The leadership gap is based on the problem that the EU faces a leadership problem in comparison to NATO. France, Germany and the UK present the three major powers within the Union, but none of them takes over the leadership in security and defence issues, and none would be able to do so on its own. This has cultural as well as structural reasons. While France would seek to do so, it is constrained by lacking capabilities as well a declining defence budget (French Official 2), Germany remains reluctant to take responsibility and leadership due to its 'mentality of caution, restraint, and reserve in foreign and security policy' (Hyde-Price 2014: 601). From the early beginnings of CSDP, the UK has been sceptical and cautious, because it views rather NATO than the EU as the cornerstone for its security and defence (Biscop 2012). On the other side, the US is claimed to be the leader in NATO. However, the increasing American inability to lead effectively because of the diverging interests between the American and European member states in NATO on the one hand, and between NATO and the EU on the other (Reichard 2006; Sperling 2004).

3.4.2 Gaps in Input-Output, Investment, Procurement and Technology

The input-output gap, investment gap, procurement gap and technology gap are interconnected. All of them refer to the imbalance of defence spending and the subsequent dichotomy of the actual military capabilities of the two organisations. This relates to financing defence capabilities and the issue of burden sharing. Investments and procurements are vital elements to remain powerful and to conduct military crisis management operations, from

low- to high-intensity warfare. Between the EU and NATO there is a 'deep transatlantic divide' over the levels of force capability despite the increasing defence budgets among European states (Bialos 2005; Kagan 2003; Mattelaer 2016; Norheim-Martinsen 2013). The origin of this divide lies in the Cold War. While Europe was occupied with restoring peace and stability on the continent in the aftermath of the Second World War, the United States and NATO were engaged in actual combat situations worldwide. North America was driven by the revolution in military affairs, but European states had to set their focus on modernising and revamping their national forces in order to meet the requirements of the emerging security environment (Sperling 2004). In this regard, NATO and the US have invested more in advancing defence technologies as well as in research and development. In 2016, the US defence expenditure for equipment accounted for 25% and 36% for personnel. In contrast, the Big Three in the EU spent about 45% to 50% of their defence budgets on personnel, which has limited their expenditures for other capabilities, such as procurement, technologies and logistics. The share of defence expenditure for equipment accounted for 23-24% for the UK and France respectively, and only 13% for Germany (EDA 206; NATO 2017; see Appendices C and D). This highlights not only the differences between North America and Europe, but also between the major powers in NATO and the European Union. Yet, the United States as well as France, Germany and the United Kingdom are among those fifteen countries with the highest military expenditures worldwide (SIPRI 2017).

3.4.3 Military Expenditure and Defence Budgets

While NATO's overall defence budget has amounted to $889 billion (approx. €786 billion) in 2016, the EU's budget only accounted for €205 billion in the same year (EDA 2016; NATO 2017a). European defence budgets have been in decline since the global financial and economic crisis but saw an increase after the onset of the Ukraine crisis in 2014 (Schilde 2017; SIPRI 2017). Although the EU and NATO have an overlap of twenty-two states, which pay financial contributions to both organisations, there is a financial imbalance. As illustrated by Figures 2 and 3 (also see Appendices C and D), member states differ in their national contributions to both organisations. With the idea of burden sharing and common funding also new problematic issues arose. The issues of financial contributions and burden sharing in line with the allocation of resources have been a long-lasting dispute among member states (Nováky 2016). Among the reasons are the diverging security interests and the different threat perceptions by member states as well as the commitments to other

international cooperation and alliance efforts (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014). Although all member states enjoy the security and defence provided through both organisations, those with higher contributions accuse other member states of free-riding. For example, some Central and Eastern European member states as well as Germany have been claimed as such free-riders in NATO because they do not meet the targets and, in the case of Germany, it does not contribute as much as it would be capable of in comparison to its economic power (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014). Since the global financial crisis in 2008, defence budgets have been cut by European governments (SIPRI 2017), but with NATO's target of 2% of GDP member states are urged to contribute more to the Atlantic Alliance. In fact, an increase in military expenditure has been recorded since this pledge and has also been expected for 2017 and beyond (NATO 2017a; also see Appendices C and D). Especially the United States are concerned about decreasing defence budgets because 'Europe's undersupply of military security' can undermine NATO's accountability and capability to act not only in collective defence but also in military crisis management operations (Sperling 2004: 453; also see Mattelaer 2016). Due to the troubles of funding for CSDP operations, the EU set up the Athena mechanism in 2004. The main principle for funding CSDP operations is thus "costs lie where they fall", i.e., one part is financed by member states and the other part through the common costs. Athena is an intergovernmental mechanism to coordinate and finance the common costs and the funding comes from the member states based on their Gross National Income (Nováky 2016).

Figure 2 Defence Expenditure of EU Member States as a Share of GDP and Overall Government Expenditure



Data shown for 2005-2015 in %. Source: EDA 2016

Figure 3 Defence Expenditure of NATO Member States as a Share of GDP



Data shown for 2016 in %. Source: NATO 2017a. Note: Iceland does not have any armed forces and Montenegro is excluded because it only joined NATO in 2017.

However, in contrast to some NATO member states, the majority of European armies face dual obligations in light of advancing and funding their capabilities. They have to meet the demands by NATO's 1999 Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and the subsequent 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment as well as targets set out in the EU's Military Headline Goals in 2003 and 2010, and the Capabilities Development Plan introduced by the European Defence Agency (EDA) (Sperling 2004; Yost 2003). This therefore reflects 'a three-way stretch' between the EU, NATO and national obligations, which explains the shortfalls of European military assets and capabilities (Sperling 2004: 457). Most member states argue that they only have a single set of forces at their disposal and that these need to be distributed and committed to either EU or NATO crisis management operations in a calculated and cautious manner (British Official 1; German Officials 2).

In order to improve their military capabilities on the one hand, and the effectiveness of their responses to international crises on the other, both the EU and NATO have developed initiatives to make their instruments more capable of acting. The overall idea is the concept of pooling and sharing of defence capabilities (Biscop and Coelmont 2011; Faleg and Giovanni 2012; Mölling 2012; Overhage 2013). The concept is not new and states in both organisations have been pooling and sharing capabilities through bilateral and minilateral frameworks, which has previously led to role specialisations of some member states. Yet, they have only done it on a case-by-case cooperation on the tactical level (Biscop and Coelmont 2011). Each organisation has therefore set up frameworks for a coherent and unitary pooling and sharing approach – the EU created the EDA and NATO introduced the concept of Smart Defence. One of the main responsibilities of the EDA is to coordinate the required capabilities to maintain, and even increase, the level of ambition of the EU's force capability. It supports the development of defence capabilities and military cooperation among member states. In this regard, it also strengthens the European defence industry for research and development (CEU 2004, 2011, 2015). In addition, the introduction of the Ghent Framework in 2010 enabled the member states to gradually collaborate and cooperate in the areas of communication, logistics, medical, training and transport (Faleg and Giovannini 2012). NATO's concept of Smart Defence pursues a similar goal. It serves as an incentive for member states to work together on the generation of capabilities in a cooperative framework. It seeks to make the acquisition of such capabilities more effective and cost-efficient with the view on the most important capabilities needed for NATO (NATO 2017a, 2017b).

Moreover, both organisations have introduced concepts and initiatives to transform parts of their troops into more capable, reactive and preventive forces. The initiatives of the EU Battlegroups (EUBG) and NATO Response Force (NRF) were launched in the early 2000s but were already planned and prepared in the 1990s. Already in 1995, within the EU the idea of European Rapid Response Forces (ERRF) came about in the shadow of the Balkan wars and as a response to the evident capabilities shortfalls. At the Franco-British summit in 2003, both states agreed on the urgent need for a functional rapid response force (Barcikowska 2013; Chappell 2009; Kaitera and Ben-Ali 2008; Major and Mölling 2011). However, the ERRF faced many shortcomings, which became evident during Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and subsequently, the initiative of the EUBG derived from these shortcomings. The EU Battlegroup as a unit of the EU's rapid response instrument is aimed at 'the minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations' (CEU and EUMC 2006

quoted in Major and Mölling 2011: 10). Prior to this and in light of the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, former Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld approached NATO allies with the proposal of creating a rapid response force of the Atlantic Alliance. Its main purpose is 'to be an agile military weapon against asymmetric threats', which deals with rapid high-intensity interventions (Reichard 2006: 232). Moreover, the NRF was created to meet all types of missions and operations conducted by the Atlantic Alliance and to work in close cooperation with US forces in crisis situations (Kaitera and Ben-Ali 2008; Ringsmose and Rynning 2017). Even though member states had different perceptions on both the EUBG and the NRF, and some even showed an unwillingness to deploy rapid response forces, for example in connection to Germany's general reluctance to make use of force (Chappell 2009), all agreed on the necessity of complementarity between both concepts. In fact, both France and the UK sought to make the EU Battlegroup concept a priority so that it could make a contribution to NATO's rapid response force (Barcikowska 2013). Thereby both member states aimed at ensuring the compatibility of the EU Battlegroups and the NATO Response Force.

3.5 Interoperability and Division of Labour

As pointed out by Bialos (2005), Coonen (2006) and Sperling (2004), the many gaps between NATO and the EU have a negative impact on their interoperability. Not only is the capabilities gap widening, but also interoperability poses a continuous challenge and problem for their cooperation in military crisis management operations. The disagreement and debates about division of labour correspond with this gap and lead to the unanswered question of what capabilities need to be acquired and how they are most effectively employed in a coherent and compatible way.

Both organisations face the problem of burden sharing and the acquisition of adequate, modern and functional capabilities and technologies in addition to the challenge of interoperability. The interoperability gap was identified as the most crucial and the most hampering one in the EU-NATO relationship (Bialos 2005; Coonen 2006; Sperling 2004; Yost 2003). As in the words of Bialos, 'the "interoperability gap" is in some sense becoming more significant than the "capabilities gap"' (2005: 57). This is the case because interoperability is required in the areas of communication systems, command, information systems, network structures and logistics. In order for the EU and NATO to be engaged effectively in the same

crisis and to conduct joint efforts, it is inevitably crucial to maintain interoperable forces and capabilities. However, the example of their military crisis management operations in the Western Balkans during the 1990s and early 2000s reveal an obstinate problem. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO launched the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) to stabilise the region and maintain peace in the country as well as to deter any hostilities that could undermine these peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts (NATO 2005). Due to the improvement of the security situation, the European Union successfully took over the operation – labelled Operation Althea – and transformed it into a civil-military operation within its comprehensive approach framework (Nováky 2015; Rodt and Wolff 2012). In Kosovo, a similar takeover was anticipated but has so far not been realised. Although the lessons learned from their shared experience in both FYRoM and Bosnia and Herzegovina were useful, both organisations face problems of only minimal interoperability to make the takeover a success. In the negotiations, some areas of missing interoperability have been identified, such as the different practices among staff members as well as the lacking capabilities of the EU to conduct medium-range intensity warfare. During these cases, the EU especially lacked enabling capabilities, for instance the availability and readiness of deployable forces (Larrabee 2004; Norheim-Martinsen 2013; Sperling 2004). In addition, Gebhard and Smith (2015: 114) point out that a missing interorganisational arrangement concerning communication, command and control has remained a problem during the naval anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden, which were launched in 2008.

Furthermore, both organisations have come to realise that neither is able to conduct crisis management operations in a holistic fashion without cooperating on the institutional and operational level. Interoperability is essential to achieve this, however. Internally, NATO has submitted a guide for interoperability in joint operations in which it has developed standardisation policies and practices (NATO 2006). The EU constantly improves its internal interoperability through several mechanisms that coordinate the activities of its instruments and tools, such as the Civil-Military Coordination and the consultation and exchange procedures of the EU institutions, i.e., EEAS, European Commission and the Council. It has thereby internalised a ‘culture of coordination’ within its own structures (Siedschlag and Eder 2006: 64). On the interorganisational level, such a framework does not yet exist. The lack of interoperability has already become a challenge in the area of classified information. Due to their different classification systems as well as perceptions and views on handling classified documents (see Reichard 2006), even information with regards to Berlin Plus are not easily

shared among both organisations and their member states (NATO Official 3). A standardised classification system would therefore add to the interoperability of the two organisations. In a similar vein, a more harmonised process of procurement as well as research and development would furthermore constitute an important contribution to a higher level of interoperability and might even reduce the capabilities gap between the EU and NATO.

The division of labour and tasks has been proposed to reduce the capabilities and interoperability gaps. The lack of division of labour has been labelled as the 'spectrum gap' by Sperling (2004: 463f.), and has troubled academics and policy-makers alike since the beginnings of interorganisational cooperation (Hagmann 2002; Heise and Schmidt 2005; Ojanen 2006; Schleich 2014; Schmidt 2006; Varwick 2006; Whitman 2004). In interorganisational interaction a balanced distribution of power, and thus a balanced distribution of capabilities, leads to institutional co-governance, i.e., the co-existence of governance structures, and ultimately leads to a division of labour (Gehring and Faude 2014). The EU-NATO relationship is a specific case. During the Cold War, each organisation had their own specific tasks and responsibilities: NATO was in charge of collective defence and the EU was primarily responsible for economic, social and political integration. As a result of adaptation and the new orientation of both organisations with the end of the Cold War, they sought new tasks and responsibilities. Initially, a division of labour was not desired by neither the EU nor NATO. Instead, both organisations aim at complementarity in crisis management (Biermann 2008a; Reichard 2006; Whitman 2004).

A particular division of labour and tasks has been pictured by some scholars. For example, Varwick claims that there is already an outline of division labour in which NATO 'would be responsible for the conduct of more robust combat missions where US participation is necessary, while the EU would mainly undertake peace-keeping operations' (2006: 15). Heise and Schmidt (2005) argue that the lack of military capabilities in the EU, the lack of civilian capabilities in NATO, and the differences in their approaches to crisis management call for both complementarity and a division of labour. Both organisations need to make use of their own and each other's strengths. Without a clear task-related and functional division of labour, both organisations run the risk of duplicating important capabilities and to come into rivalry over these resources from their member states (Biermann 2008b). During the wars in the Western Balkans, such a division of tasks was clearer because the EU's tools and instruments within its CSDP framework were not fully developed. In the case of the crisis management operations in FYRoM, Operation Harvest conducted by NATO served as the

security provider and the EU's Operation Concordia concentrated primarily on economic assistance (Mace 2004). Thus, Sperling (2004) and Major (2015) argue for a division of labour, where 'NATO can cover military aspects, but the EU is in the best position to take on civilian issues' (Major 2015: 10). Yet, with the changing nature of warfare, from traditional towards non-traditional and modern warfare, such as hybrid warfare and cyber-attacks, such a division is not obvious. This is also due to the various capabilities, which both organisations have acquired and specialised in.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter provided an in-depth analysis of the changing relationship between NATO and the European Union since the beginnings of their cooperation. Overall, the EU-NATO relationship has moved from non-cooperation during the Cold War towards structured interactions between members of staff, liaison officers and the external representatives of each organisation, such as the NATO Secretary General and the EU High Representative. Recently, it has moved towards more intensified interactions and frequent exchanges, and even to greater formalisation and institutionalisation of their relationship in the form of the 2016 Joint Declaration. This chapter pointed out the obstacles and challenges as well as the opportunities for progressing their interaction further towards a relationship of equals and a strategic partnership. A thematic structure based on the analysis of the institutional and legal framework, the issue of membership, the capabilities gap, and interoperability and division of labour has enabled to identify these obstacles and opportunities.

On their way towards formalising their relationship, the EU and NATO have signed significant agreements and declarations. The Security of Information Agreement and the Berlin Plus arrangements from 2003 alongside the Joint Declaration from 2016 represent the most important declarations and agreements and provide the basis of this relationship. Deriving from the recognition that cooperation is essential, they built up working groups and mechanisms, such as the EU-NATO Capabilities Group and the permanent liaison offices, to enhance exchanges and to foster cooperation. Not only in the process of formalisation but also in the practical cooperation between the EU and NATO member states play an important part. Some even act in a "schizophrenic" way, which distracts from their national direction and deludes member states and organisations alike. National policies and preferences therefore illustrate an obstacle to strengthening the EU-NATO relationship. Within and

between the organisations, patterns of groups of interest have been identified. Inter-state disagreements and the formulation of common positions of such groups are factors that can lead to the support or obstruction of strengthening the EU-NATO relationship. Another obstacle is highlighted by the capabilities gap between the EU and NATO, as well as the asymmetry between Europe and North America. The capability gap goes beyond the actual numbers of troops and military capabilities, and includes gaps in technological development, investment and procurement as well as sovereignty and leadership. Both organisations face similar problems of burden sharing and acquiring adequate military capabilities. They employ different targets and mechanisms to gather the necessary capabilities for crisis management operations. Whereas a NATO primacy has often been observed which would have the potential to undermine the EU's effort in security and defence (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014; Reichard 2006), the development of CSDP and the engagement in crisis management operations by the EU has, in contrast, concerned alliance members due to the potentially negative impact on NATO's efforts. The capability gap has led to the lack of interoperability especially between European and US forces. While mechanisms that tackle the internal gaps in interoperability have been established within both organisations, such efforts are still missing on the interorganisational level. Division of labour has been suggested by academics and policy-makers alike but has been faced with resistance. Rather, it would be more important to make use of each other's strength and to create a framework for cooperation in military crisis management operations.

In all four themes, member states play a driving force. It is thus significant to analyse the instruments, abilities and policies at their disposal as well as their strategies towards the EU-NATO relationship. Member states act differently towards each of the four themes. The following chapters explore in-depth the four types of member states developed and outlined in chapter 2 – advocates, blockers, balancers and neutrals – in order to illustrate and highlight the actual challenges and opportunities for the two organisations to cooperate more closely in practical terms and on the institutional level.

Chapter 4 – Advocates of Interorganisational Interaction

4.1 Introduction

As states take different positions in interorganisational interactions, and more specifically in the EU-NATO relationship, advocates play a key role in promoting closer cooperation and more frequent and intensified interactions. This chapter provides an analysis of the group of advocates as a whole and as one type of member states in the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship. It also examines some member states from this group in more depth to illustrate how and to what extent advocates are able to engage in and promote the relationship between the EU and NATO in practice.

States in this group serve as promoters and drivers of cooperation between organisations and are enthusiastic about becoming more engaged. The majority of member states in the EU and NATO is generally in favour of some kind of cooperation and maintaining a good relationship with the respective other organisation. This was highlighted in the most recent developments and the process leading to the 2016 Joint Declaration between the Presidents of the EU and the NATO Secretary General (EU Official 2). Advocates stand out especially due to their proactive and supportive behaviour, which requires a more in-depth analysis. In addition, member states' affiliation with the group of advocates is shaped by their domestic politics, i.e., the extent to which political parties on the domestic level support interorganisational cooperation, view each organisation and how changes in government influence the country's foreign and security policy orientation. The possibility and ability of member states to shift between types of membership in interorganisational interaction (cf. Rodt 2017) has therefore been acknowledged in the categorisation of member states in this type. In particular, moments of external rupture and changes in domestic politics trigger states to swing and shift.

Through the examination of national security strategies and defence papers, member states have been located to the group of advocates based on their supportive attitude towards EU-NATO cooperation. Based on the criteria for categorising states in the development typology of member states in interorganisational interaction, advocates generally score high in most criteria. This means that advocates demonstrate positive attitudes towards interorganisational cooperation, have a rather positive view on division of labour, show higher levels of promotion and higher level of engagement in negotiations and make

significant contributions of troops and resources in relation to their individual positioning and their individual resources in total. Subsequently, the following states can be considered as advocates: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. While all of these states are located in the group of advocates, some have been more engaged and active in supporting EU-NATO cooperation than others, and therefore receive greater attention throughout this chapter.

Advocates share a certain set of specific characteristics, which enable them to drive the efforts towards closer cooperation even further. These characteristics and features are derived from their scores and how they meet the selection criteria of the typology. Yet, these characteristics and the peculiarity in each member state varies in the degree of actively promoting EU-NATO cooperation due to the diverging national interests and preferences. It is thus important to note that some of the member states within this group have not necessarily belonged to this group from the beginning of the EU-NATO relationship and with their accession to these organisations. It is overall assumed that advocates of the interorganisational relationship between the EU and NATO are very active members in both organisations and have sufficient or even outstanding military resources, which they can use to convince and persuade other member states to follow their approach. It is furthermore presumed that they are eager to support each organisation's strengths in security and defence affairs, seek to facilitate further cooperation, and that they follow a defined strategy for the future of the EU-NATO relationship.

First, the shared characteristics are outlined and, based on the description from the development of the typology in chapter 2, their attributes are described with more details. Second, the type of advocates is examined in relation to the four themes presented in the previous chapter, i.e. how advocates act and behave in the development of institutionalising EU-NATO cooperation, how they affect membership, how they behave towards the capabilities gap, and their positions towards interoperability and division of labour.

4.2 Characteristics and Features of Advocates

Those member states that can be categorised as advocates of interorganisational interaction share a common set of characteristics and features, which require further exploration and

explanation (see Table 4). States express and illustrate these characteristics to varying degrees and for diverging reasons, including national interests and preferences, historical pathways or bilateral relations and partnerships. As outlined in the theoretical framework, the overall aim, which is generally shared by all the member states of this type, is the facilitation of interorganisational relations and, more specifically, the enhancement and strengthening of the EU-NATO relationship. They take different approaches to express their position in the EU-NATO relationship and to advocate further cooperation. This section explores these shared characteristics and features, and analyses advocates' behaviour, activities and contributions in greater detail.

In response to the type of membership as outlined by Gehring and Oberthür (2009) the group of advocates of interorganisational interaction include both multiple and single member states. Yet, multiple members are more likely to play a proactive role in supporting closer cooperation and enhanced interaction because their multiple membership status within the same network allows them to effectively promote interorganisational cooperation equally in both organisations. Bilateral relations between advocates and other member states have significant relevance because through these ties advocates are able to persuade other states, in particular those usually aligned with advocates in other policy areas. For example, if something is at stake in another policy field or issue area, enthusiasts of interorganisational relations can then use this in order to influence the voting behaviour and to form coalition groups among member states. This approach is known to be a common practice among member states in negotiations and decision-making scenarios, especially in the last stages of finding agreements (UK Official 2).

Single member states among the group of advocates are also able to take over positions as drivers. However, single member states as advocates need to have bilateral agreements and partnerships with the respective other organisation either through NATO's PfP programme or the with the EU through an FPA. Single members have made wide use of both programmes and agreements to avoid isolation and, instead, to strengthen closer EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management.

In the context of membership, advocates belong to both old and new member states, and to both original states and subsequent states (cf. Magliveras 2011). Although original member states were involved in the creation of the two organisations, it does not necessarily mean that they are enthusiastic about EU-NATO cooperation since the original purpose, when the two organisations were established, differed from what they have evolved into over the past

decades. They nevertheless see benefits from enhanced cooperation and a closer relationship to economise their military assets and capabilities as well as other relevant resources. In addition, for many – both old and new – member states cooperation between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance seems 'natural' given by the high level of membership overlap (British Officials 2; Romanian Official 1). For new member states, especially Central and Eastern European states, one of the main objectives after gaining independence from the Soviet Union was to join the EU and NATO. Therefore, they took part in and contributed to EU and NATO operations even prior to their accessions, and were already much in favour of closer cooperation to make use of their single set of forces more effectively and efficiently. Despite their more Atlanticists foreign and security policy orientation, the choice between the EU, NATO and the partnership with the US has been actively avoided to prevent any duplication (Pomorska 2017; also see Weiss 2015).

Moreover, a shared recognition among advocates is the need for actively promoting the EU-NATO relationship among other member states, especially those with less optimistic outlooks. One way of doing so is in consultations and minilateral negotiations with other states. Some of the advocates are more involved in these activities, especially those with more resources and capabilities. This can also be done through the maintenance of a wide network of partnerships and good relations with the majority of members in both organisations. In this regard, advocates take the position of boundary-role actors, which means that they have close and overlapping ties with other states which enables organisations and other states to connect (Jönsson 1986). Another way to show their enthusiasm of this relationship and to push for the deepening of cooperation is through conditionality. As pointed out by one national representative, they make use of their resources to persuade other states and to promise them advantages in other policy domains (British Officials 2).

Table 4 Overview of Advocates' Characteristics

Shared characteristics by balancers	**Neutrals and their membership**	**Contributions to the capabilities debate**	**View on interoperability and division of labour**

• active participation in the formalisation process of cooperation • key actors and drivers in this process • maintains close cooperation with other member states in both organisations	• well-networked and maintenance of minilateral frameworks • represented in many groups within and between both organisation • overall good relations with all member states • if making trouble then not decisive • cooperation with member states outside the interorganisational relationship	• possess vital resources and military capabilities • engaged in capability development projects in both organisations • aim at convincing other member states to improve and develop military capabilities • seek to avoid (unnecessary) duplication • higher military expenditure and defence budget	• promote and actively engage in achieving interoperability among all states and organisations • internal and external consultations on interoperability • favour division of labour to support each organisation's strengths • prefer a division of labour to avoid duplication and overlap of activities

These characteristics and features are presented throughout this chapter in accordance with the four themes as outlined in the previous chapter. While some drivers of this relationship are "silent followers", i.e., they align with some of the bigger, older and more powerful and resourceful member states, such as the UK and the US, others are more proactive and thereby play a more significant role, which will receive greater attention in this analysis. Examples of how some more proactive member states behave within the institutionalisation process, maintain relations with other states in both organisations, and how they contribute to closing the capabilities gap and increasing interoperability serve to illustrate the active engagement of advocates for closer EU-NATO cooperation.

4.3 Promoting a Legal and Institutional Framework for the EU-NATO Relationship

The role of advocates in the development of the legal framework and the institutionalisation of the EU-NATO relationship is highlighted by their active, and moreover their proactive, participation and engagement. For these states the formalisation of interorganisational relations is relevant for setting the framework as well as for defining the boundaries of and opportunities for areas of cooperation. Member states in the group of advocates have sought to actively promote the formalisation of the EU-NATO relationship in different ways. In this regard, some of these states can be grouped according to their national interests and actions, and according to their status as old or new member state. In particular, the UK, the US and the Central European and Baltic states are exemplary cases of advocating the establishment of a legal and institutional framework.

In the discussions among states and debates among policy-makers on developing a European military capacity and a European security and defence policy it has often been stressed that the United Kingdom concentrated rather on the acquisition of military capabilities instead of institutional structures, which has been frequently emphasised by France (British Officials 2; French Official 2). Britain was initially reluctant towards the creation of CSDP in the debates resulting in the Treaty of Maastricht, and also opposed the creation of new institutional structures due to the existing ones in NATO. Yet, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s the UK played a fundamental role not only in contributing towards developing the structures of the European security and defence policy but, more importantly, in shaping the institutional design of the EU-NATO relationship. From the early stages, it advocated for formal contacts between the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. It acted as a watchdog to ensure the avoidance of any duplication and competition on the one hand, and to guarantee complementarity with NATO's command and institutional structures on the other hand. For example, it promoted the idea of establishing and strengthening the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), which the UK regarded as a NATO project, while it also vocalised its favour for developing stronger European military capabilities in general during the mid-1990s (Giegerich 2007; Howorth 2000; Rees 1996). According to one NATO official, in bilateral talks between the UK and France, the former even agreed to lift its veto on the merger of the WEU with the EU to secure NATO's relevance and to trigger exchanges between the two organisations (NATO Official 2). This illustrates the British belief in pragmatism concerning security and defence organisations in Europe, which means that the UK sees pragmatic

solutions especially to economic constraints and restraints in personnel (Cornish 2013; Ostermann 2015).

Moreover, the British-Franco Summit in Saint-Malo in December 1998 marks a significant milestone for the EU-NATO relationship. In fact, the summit was initiated by then Prime Minister Tony Blair, under whose government a shift towards European integration in security and defence was recorded. The two countries discussed the idea to create a European capability for autonomous action and to improve its readiness to be able to respond to international crises as well as to strengthen the transatlantic link. Yet, they had different objectives, because, 'whereas Britain saw capability development as a means to strengthen the transatlantic relationship; France perceived it as a means to strengthen the EU as a foreign and security policy actor' (Simón 2017: 71). Blair further emphasised that the EU would take on the role of security actor, but the defence dimension would remain solely in NATO's realm (Biscop 1999; Dryburgh 2010; Dyson 2011; Miskimmon 2004). In order to find an agreement, the UK set the conditionality that the EU would be able to acquire autonomous military capabilities and develop a security and defence policy, albeit limited to crisis management and the Petersberg Tasks, and only in respect to close cooperation and consultation with NATO. The UK thereby sought to trigger reforms and to increase the military capabilities among member states in order to support NATO as well as the EU (O'Donnell 2011). As a consequence of the Saint-Malo summit and the subsequent declaration, EU member states furthered the development of the European security and defence policy at the European Council meetings in Cologne and Helsinki in 1999 and at the same time, the EU High Representative and the NATO Secretary General began to meet informally and more periodically.

In addition, Britain eventually accepted the institutional developments as well as the inclusion of a defence dimension within CSDP. This highlighted the change in the domestic policy of the UK and shows how it has 'swung back and forth between more or less pro-EU positions' (Rodt 2017: 139). On the other side, it was also active in defining the ESDI within the Atlantic Alliance. It originally perceived the ESDI to be an opportunity to strengthen the military capabilities among other European member states and due to its long-lasting special relationship with the United States, it acted as 'interlocutor' between Europe and North America (Rees 1996: 232).

British officials under the Blair government were heavily involved in the procedures that resulted in the agreement on the Berlin Plus arrangements between the EU and the Alliance.

They vocalised their concerns as well as the opportunities of cooperation on military capabilities. Eventually, they were able to convince the Turkish officials to agree to the arrangements, who were initially opposed to such arrangements on sharing NATO's military assets and capabilities. British officials held bilateral negotiations with Turkey as well as with both organisations in order to overcome any oppositions and disagreements, which allowed the signing of the agreement of the Berlin Plus arrangements (Missiroli 2002). Similarly, in the same year, the UK was able to broker a compromise between NATO and the EU – more specifically with those states that participated in the so-called Chocolate Summit in Tervuren, i.e., Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg – which later led to the establishment of the permanent EU liaison cells at NATO's SHAPE and in the EU Military Staff (Duke 2008). The UK has therefore provoked an important step towards the establishment of formal relations between the EU and NATO. It played a significant part particularly in the early beginnings in enabling the institutionalisation and formalisation of the EU-NATO relationship while – based on its pragmatic approach – more actively promoting the necessity for cooperation among member states in both arenas.

Among the advocates is also the United States, a close partner of the UK in security and defence affairs. Although it has shown initial signs of scepticism towards the project of developing a European security and defence policy with the capacity to carry out autonomous actions, it has nevertheless been a contributor to the formalisation process. It welcomed the decisions taken at the Franco-British Saint-Malo Summit as it also saw it as an enhancement of European capabilities to support and strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, it was much in favour of the development of a European self-responsibility in the security and defence realm, and thus actively supported the ESDI under the Clinton Administration. As a condition from the point of view of the US government, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) would have to be tight closely to NATO (Hunter 2002; Larrabee 2004; Touzovskaia 2006). In addition, in her renowned speech at the North Atlantic Council on 8 December 1998, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright confirmed the US government's support, and stated in a subsequent article in the *Financial Times* that the ESDI provides an initiative for better burden sharing because it 'allows there to be a partnership that does not in any way undercut NATO' (Albright 1998). But she also set out three conditions, which became known as the "three Ds": no decoupling, no duplication and no discrimination. Accordingly, 'any initiative must avoid pre-empting Alliance decision-making by delinking ESDI from NATO, avoid duplicating existing efforts, and avoid discrimination against non-EU members' (Albright cited in Hunter 2002: 33-34). Under these conditions,

which were reassured by the United Kingdom throughout the development process of European capabilities and capacity, the US finally gave the 'political green light' (Howorth 2000: 380) and actively supported and promoted the necessity of a close relationship as it saw a clear benefit for the Atlantic Alliance.

Although the Central and Eastern European states as well as the three Baltic states joined both the EU and NATO once the two organisations had already begun to cooperate and institutionalise their relations, they have evolved as advocates of this interorganisational relationship. After the end of the Cold War, countries of the former Soviet Union sought to join the EU, the WEU and NATO, and subsequently, debates on how to harmonise the accessions and enlargement processes within these organisations arose (Flockhart 1996). The Central and Eastern European countries and the Baltics applied for membership with similar intentions. All of them wanted to become part of the club and gain greater stability and prosperity as well as security vis-à-vis Russia. Relating thereto, this group among the advocates also belongs to the camp of Atlanticist, i.e., those supporting and favouring any actions for collective defence through NATO (Pomorska 2017; Tromer 2006). Sometimes this group of states is also referred to as 'New Atlanticists' or 'New Europe' (Šešelgytė 2013: 225). Their Atlanticist tradition, including the strong partnership with the US as one of their most important allies, has long been emphasised in their national security and defence strategies (Czech Republic 2012; Latvia 2008; Poland 2007). In the more recent national security and defence strategies and updated national defence reviews, the EU did not only receive more attention in regard to security and crisis management, but also the cooperation between the EU and NATO has become an increasingly important factor (see, for example, Czech Republic 2015; Poland 2014, 2017; Slovenia 2016). As stated by one Romanian official, both the EU and NATO are key for its national security and it thus does not come to a surprise that 'there is a natural need to have the EU and NATO work together and to synchronise' (Romanian Official 1). The importance and need for their cooperation have also been confirmed by officials from Poland and the Czech Republic (Polish Official 1; Czech Official 1).

All of the Central and Eastern European and Baltic countries avoided having to make a decision between the EU and the Alliance and therefore opted for preferring the formalisation of the relationship. Some countries saw that an 'increased overlapping membership would facilitate both cooperation and convergence' (Missiroli 2004: 130-131), which would enable them to become members in both organisations without discriminating the other. Hence, especially the Baltics states 'see their main function as ensuring

coordination between the [CSDP] and NATO' (Tromer 2006: 364; also see Tiilikainen 2006). In particular the new member states put an emphasis on achieving complementarity, maintaining sustainable cooperation and the prevention of any duplication of both command structures and capabilities (Abukevicius 2015; Jankowski 2015; Kiukucans 2015; Pomorska 2017; Šešelgytė 2013).

Moreover, some have even proven to be more proactive in advocating the institutionalisation of structures to enhance further EU-NATO cooperation. For example, after joining NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004, the Czech Republic was not exactly sure what to do with its membership (Weiss 2015) but it was supportive of any developments within both organisations. It was initially not among the active contributors to shaping and influencing the development of the European security and defence policy. However, with the recognition of the need for EU-NATO cooperation, the Czech Republic has more recently served among the drivers of EU initiatives, such as the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) as it regards significant contributions to NATO and thus to strengthening Euro-Atlantic security and defence. As expressed by one national representative, the country even claims that 'the closer the cooperation, the better' (Czech Official 1), which includes the formalisation of their relationship to set the specific framework for cooperation.

While France has been also a promoter of creating a formalised link between the EU and NATO throughout the 1990s, it cannot be truly characterised as an advocate, and can thus be labelled as a state that has swung from advocates to blockers of interorganisational interaction (cf. Rodt 2017). France has a substantial share in driving the cooperation efforts forward because it respected NATO's autonomy and structures while it pushed for greater EU autonomous military capacity. It also agreed to the UK's proposal of applying the Alliance's planning and command structures to the European security and defence capability and capacity. It has gradually become acclimatised to closer EU-NATO cooperation and eventually decided to reintegrate into the Alliance's military command structures in 2009 under Nicolas Sarkozy (Howorth 2000; Perruche 2014). However, due to France's shifting positions and traditionally less enthusiastic attitude towards NATO and the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship as a whole in addition to its long-term ambitions of developing a EU autonomous military capacity and capability, it cannot be regarded as an advocate and, instead, is categorised as a blocker (see chapter 5).

Advocates have played, to varying degrees, very significant roles in promoting actively the benefits and advantages of EU-NATO cooperation. The UK is one of the most salient countries in this group, which has been constantly promoting the relationship by making the formalisation and institutionalisation a condition for deepening the European security and defence policy, and thereby triggered additional avenues and efforts. Despite occasional less-supportive behaviour towards CSDP, it has consistently contributed to the formalisation and institutionalisation of the EU-NATO relationship. In the early stages, the US has also been an active driver by giving the 'political green light' (Howorth 2000: 380). In contrast, some member states that have been categorised as blockers present themselves as less salient cases, for example Albania, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Hungary, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania and Slovenia. This is based on the assumption that these states do not necessarily possess the resources and capacities as well as high levels of influence to shape interorganisational cooperation in negotiations and debates. Analysing the states within the group of advocates shows that they can be both single and multiple as well as original and subsequent member states, and that each has a particular share in the formalisation process of the EU-NATO relationship. In the next section, the use and perception of their membership in both organisations receives closer examination in order to highlight their supportive and enthusiastic position.

4.4. The Issue of Membership

In terms of states' behaviour vis-à-vis membership, the group of advocates is not a very homogenous group. As mentioned above, they can be both multiple and single member states, old and new member states, as well as small and large member states. Due to the overall membership overlap of twenty-two states, advocates are likely to be multiple members, which enables them to promote the EU-NATO relationship equally and more proactively among other states in both organisations. Concerning their relations with other members, advocates of interorganisational interaction are generally well connected and part of minilateral security and defence cooperation within and outside the frameworks of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. As outlined in chapter 2, the membership and the subsequent positioning of states within an international organisation is highly significant for gaining access to vital resources and being able to participate in decision-making and thus exerting influence on relevant decisions concerning the organisations' external relations (Dorussen and Ward 2008). Therefore, advocates make use of their joint and overlapping

memberships, alongside the possession of other important resources, to manage a vast range of social connections, and are incorporated in a number of groups of interests and lead these groups of like-minded states. Yet, while some drivers are deeply embedded in international organisations and in international networks with other actors, such as third states, non-governmental organisations and international organisations, other advocates maintain less bilateral and minilateral connections.

In the course of developing the European foreign, security and defence policy and European military capabilities, members have often taken sides in either the Atlanticist camp or the Europeanist camp. The latter is a group of states that plead for the idea of developing autonomous European military capabilities independent from the Atlantic Alliance. In contrast, the group of Atlanticists seeks future engagement of NATO and the United States in European security and see the Atlantic Alliance as the cornerstone of their security and defence. They are not in favour of developing autonomous European capabilities and structures unless these support, and do not undermine, the Atlantic Alliance (Larrabee 2004; Stahl et al. 2004). The majority of advocates can be categorised in the camp of Atlanticists because they rely on NATO for national and European defence, aim to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance, and favour US presence in Europe (Estonia 2011; Poland 2014; UK 2010a). More importantly, they do not fundamentally oppose the development of European military capabilities as they regard them as an added value to NATO.

The UK is an example of an old, big and multiple member state, which is well connected and makes use of its ample linkages to actively promote not only its national interests but also its position on the EU-NATO relationship. The country has been furthermore labelled as an Atlanticist, and, moreover, as the leader of the Atlanticist camp in the European security and defence policy (Dunne 2004; Howorth 2000). It maintains one of the most extensive networks of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral connections. Accordingly, Bailes (1995: 85-86) characterises the philosophy of the British defence policy as 'active, global, multinational and intergovernmental'. The UK is not only member of key international and regional organisations, such as the EU, NATO, OSCE, the Council of Europe as well as its permanent seat in the UNSC, but it can also draw on its long list of bilateral cooperation partners with key strategic states in the transatlantic space. Among these, however, only some countries qualify as 'worthy partners' (O'Donnell 211: 425). Its key partners include France, Germany, Turkey, Estonia, Denmark and Norway alongside the United States (UK 2003, 2010a).

In addition to its contributions to civil and military operations under the frameworks of the EU and NATO, it also participates in coalitions of the willing with its security and defence cooperation partners. This shows that the UK has become 'a "networked" foreign policy actor' (Whitman 2016: 44), and it has also been labelled as a 'globally significant player' (Whitman and Tonra 2017: 43) since it has evolved as a country with a 'sense of responsibility for international security policy' (Cornish 2013: 371). Drawing on its 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, bilateral and minilateral cooperation receive significant relevance in its foreign, security and defence policy: 'building new models of practical bilateral cooperation with those countries whose defence and security posture is closest to our own or with whom we cooperate in multinational operations (UK 2010a: 59). The UK sees these bilateral and minilateral relations as advantageous for its own position because they enable the UK to shape its cooperation partners' view on the EU-NATO relationship. This became evident in the developments leading to the Saint-Malo Agreement in 1998 as well as in the process resulting in the 2003 Berlin Plus arrangements. While it has used its membership in multiple forums and organisations to apply the strategy of forum-shopping, the United Kingdom has made use of these social networks to persuade and convince other member states of the importance of EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management and in security and defence (Rodt 2017).

Within the EU-NATO membership overlap, the UK thus plays a significant part in building the bridge between the two organisations and their members as well as between Europe and North America in converging security and defence interests. It does so through participating in minilateral groups with key partners. Whereas multilateral frameworks, i.e., the EU and NATO as a whole, have their advantages, the UK has been frustrated by the lack of efficiency. Britain is aligned with the so-called Friends of Europe within the Atlantic Alliance, which consists of France, Germany, the US, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Spain and also Slovakia, which recently joined this group of interest (NATO Official 1). These like-minded member states see a clear advantage in strengthening the European pillar in NATO. Along with Germany, France, Italy and the US, the UK regularly meets as the so-called "Quint" to consult on security issues. These meetings take place in an informal setting among the Military Representatives specifically before official meetings of the Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council (German Officials 2). Although the UK, France and Germany pursue divergent security and defence policies and strategies, possess different military assets and capabilities, and take different positions on the EU-NATO relationship, they form the "Big Three". These

three states contribute the largest financial share for military operations under CSDP and they are perceived as the most influential EU member states in security and defence.

Besides the minilateral formats, the UK builds upon its extensive bilateral connections. The most prominent bilateral relationship is the special partnership with the United States. Both countries have shared values of liberal democracy and free-market capitalism, and maintain close economic, political and social links. In addition, they are both founding members of NATO and possess permanent seats in the UNSC. In the US' perspective, the UK is a key ally in European geopolitics and in the European integration process, because as mediator and bridge between Europe and the US, 'the UK has played a central part both in US engagement in Europe's geopolitics and in the development of the EU' (Oliver and Williams 2016: 553). The UK and the US have aligned parts of their policies in security and defence, which is reflected in their joint efforts and engagements in military crisis management operations, e.g., in Afghanistan and Iraq, despite subsequently hitting rock bottom in their special relationship. They maintain close cooperation in the military domain, including intelligence and information sharing, increasing interoperability and on nuclear weapons. Their bilateral cooperation in information sharing has been of significance in the development of the EU-NATO Security of Information Agreement, because due to their already established practices, the two countries were able to facilitate and support the negotiations between the EU and NATO, and promoted the advantages as well as the necessity of such an agreement. British efforts and approaches to European integration have also been in favour of the US' policies, including the UK's promotion of acquiring military capabilities among its European partners (Marsh 2012; Oliver and Williams 2016). The UK-US special relationship is highly relevant and significant for the EU-NATO relationship as both countries seek to motivate NATO and EU allies to increase their defence spending for maintaining peace and security in Europe and beyond the Euro-Atlantic borders, both countries make the biggest contributions coming from either side of the Atlantic, and because both acknowledge that Europe would not be able to manage peace, security and stability in Europe and on European borders without US military capabilities through NATO (UK Official 1).

The UK's second most important bilateral security and defence cooperation in Europe is the one with France. Traditionally, however, Britain and France represent the two camps within European security and defence in which the UK leads the camp of Atlanticists and France heads the camp of Europeanists. Although the two countries pursue diverging strategic goals concerning international security and prefer different international organisations for their

actions – NATO is seen as the UK's cornerstone of security and takes a pre-eminent position in its strategic culture (British Official 1), and France has always favoured the EU and developing autonomous European military capabilities (French Official 2) – the two countries have converged their policies and attitudes towards the EU and NATO over time. Their relationship is based on a series of agreements as well as shared positions in security and defence. They have overlapping perceptions of their international status, have similar conceptions of their national interests and emphasise their willingness to make use of force for interventions. With the increased institutionalisation of their defence cooperation through the Saint-Malo Agreement in 1998 and the Lancaster House Treaties in 2010 (UK 2010b), their policy preferences have gradually converged in two ways. Firstly, France has aligned with the UK's attitude towards international security organisations and subsequently re-integrated into NATO's military command structures in 2009, and secondly, both countries have converged concerning their defence instruments and means primarily due to their overlapping ambitions and their similar experiences in military operations (Ostermann 2015; Pannier 2017; Pannier and Schmitt 2014). The Franco-British security and defence cooperation has therefore enabled the UK to promote its view on international security organisations and on the EU-NATO relationship among French policy-makers, and successfully convinced its strategic partner to accept and follow its policy preferences. Their bilateral agreements have concurrently strengthened EU-NATO cooperation in military crisis management because of the development of defence capabilities, the convergence of ambitions and the increased interoperability of armed forces.

Drawing on its wide network of bilateral relationships and its embeddedness in multilateral security cooperation frameworks inside and outside NATO and the EU, the UK plays an important role in advocating their approaches to security and defence as well as their cooperation efforts in the area of crisis management. Thus, Britain acts as a boundary-role actor (cf. Jönsson 1987), i.e., it connects states and international actors albeit their diverging policy preferences. Other advocates claim similar positions, yet not as strong as the UK. One example is the group of Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Despite their slightly varying attitudes towards NATO and the EU, the three Baltics form a group of like-minded states concerning their view on the EU-NATO relationship. Their primary reason for membership in both NATO and the EU was to avoid the historical events of the twentieth century and to avoid isolation in the post-Cold War era as well as to find a source of power to counter Russia. They see NATO as the cornerstone for their territorial defence and the security of their sovereignty when backed by the United States (Estonia; Latvia 2008;

Lithuania 2017). In fact, they perceive themselves as 'Atlanticists from within' the CSDP (Tromer 2006: 364). The EU, in contrast, is regarded as an important actor for soft security issues, including economic and environmental security. In order to avoid any duplications, the advocates from the Baltics seek to ensure close coordination between the EU and NATO (Salu and Männik 2013; Rikveilis 2013; Šešelgytė 2013).

Although the Baltics only joined both organisations in 2004, they have built up an extensive network of connections with other member states. Most notably, they connect the Central and Eastern European countries with the Nordics and other states in the Baltic Sea region, such as Germany. While most of the military cooperation between the Baltics and Nordics take place through NATO, they have been invited to participate in the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), which focuses on the harmonisation of security and defence policies as well as on the development of defence capabilities (Bajarūnas 2014; Tromer 2006; von Voss et al. 2013). Because of their multiple memberships, which is not the case among the Nordic countries, the Baltics are able to promote their positions and viewpoints of EU-NATO cooperation inside these two organisations as well as through their relations outside these frameworks. Concerning the EU-NATO relationship, the Nordics take diverging positions, but through interactions with the Baltics they have become increasingly supportive of the interorganisational cooperation between the Union and the Atlantic Alliance (Herolf 2006; Tiilikainen 2006; Tromer 2006). In a similar context, the Baltics are also well connected with Central and Eastern European countries based on their shared historical experiences and their geographical proximity to Russia, which has been a common security concern to all states in Eastern Europe. In addition, they seek to increase interactions with old and Western European member states, such as Germany and the Netherlands. This has been highlighted through their participation in and contribution to EU Battlegroups and NATO Response Force, in which, for example, Lithuania has participated in both rapid response forces with some of the Nordic countries, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and the UK (EEAS 2015). As small and new members, they prefer to collaborate with old members in rapid response forces in order to increase the level of interoperability with important actors and to converge their security interests.

The embeddedness in multiple international security organisations, including the EU and NATO, active membership based on participation and contributions, as well as maintaining links and relations with international actors and states inside and outside the EU-NATO cooperation framework is a fundamental characteristic of advocates of interorganisational

interaction. They pursue a networked foreign policy in which they seek to create new linkages and increase connections especially within groups of interest with like-minded countries, which allow them to act as boundary-role actors. Accordingly, advocates score high in engaging with other member states which allows them to demonstrate their positive attitude and actively promote interorganisational cooperation between the EU and NATO. The United Kingdom illustrates a prime example because of its characterisation as 'a "networked" foreign policy actor' with a very extensive diplomatic service (Whitman 2016: 44; Whitman and Tonra 2017). It maintains bilateral and minilateral defence cooperation with key states such France and the United States as well as with regional groups of interest including the Baltics and Central and Eastern European countries within both the EU and NATO. Being interlinked, embedded and active members make advocates reliant partners and member states in both organisations.

4.5 Advocates and the Capabilities Gaps

The group of advocates has recognised the gaps between the EU and NATO, which they seek to close through multiple channels and actions. These gaps include a sovereignty gap and leadership gap as well as gaps in military capabilities, which include shortfalls in investment, procurement and technology (Sperling 2004; Yost 2000). A balanced and complementary relationship is comprehended to be more beneficial than one-sided efforts and asymmetric interdependence. Advocates have grouped together to elaborate ways to develop and improve their military capabilities more effectively and efficiently. Like all member states, advocates face pressures from lacking capabilities and reduced numbers of armed forces, which are double-hatted due to states' multiple memberships, as well as from low levels of interoperability especially among European states. This has gained even more relevance in the course of overall declining defence budgets. Since the group of advocates is not a homogenous group in terms of foreign and security policy orientation, political and historical constraints to the use of force, which also condition the procurement of military assets and capabilities, pose additional challenges to overcoming the capabilities gap between the Union and the Atlantic Alliance. Nevertheless, none of the member states in the group of advocates faces heavy national constraints on the use of force, e.g., limitations based on their constitutions, and these states have a tendency of lenient attitudes towards the use of force in peacekeeping, interventions and crisis management operations. This means that these

states have demonstrated their preferences for engagement through active participation in military campaigns through multilateral forums such as NATO and the EU.

While NATO has a clearly defined leader within the Alliance – the United States – the EU lacks clear leadership. The possession and development of vital military capabilities and civilian resources gives states certain reputation and authority. Accompanied with experiences in the conduct of crisis management operations and out-of-area deployments, such powerful states have also a more forceful voice. Through its possession of military power as well as its historical record of military interventions and deployments worldwide, the United States has gained reputation among its European allies. Many Central and Eastern European and Baltic states as well as the Netherlands state that their relationship with the US is of great relevance for their national security through NATO. Hence, they rely on their American partner and aim to keep it interested in European security (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014; Noll and Moelker 2013; Tromer 2006). Yet, recently the US has been faced with resistance from its allies and because of the changes on its domestic level, it showed signs of lacking abilities to effectively take the lead within NATO. The EU, in contrast, faces a leadership problem since there is not a single member state that is able to take the lead in CFSP and CSDP. Within the EU there is an emphasis on the equality of its member states but, as stated by a Czech Official, 'all are equal but some are more equal' in the context of the EU's foreign, security and defence policy (Czech Official 1). Therefore, France, Germany and the UK have formed an 'informal EU foreign policy *directoire*' (Whitman and Tonra 2017: 42). Whereas the UK would have had leadership potential due to its military resources, track record of deployments and its widely connected diplomatic service, it abandoned its leadership role in CFSP and CSDP (Biscop 2012).

Concomitant with the leadership gap is the sovereignty gap. In this regard, however, the EU and NATO face similar problems and have so far not found solutions to resolving this issue. Although advocates generally seek to drive EU-NATO cooperation forward, there is nevertheless a caveat. The majority among this group prefers intergovernmental decision-making structures in security and defence policy, which provides more autonomy for member states and allows them to pursue their national foreign and security interests (British Official 1). Similarly, European states prefer to acquire their military capabilities from their national defence industry, which complicates the interoperability of armed forces. In order to overcome this problem, member states have launched bilateral and minilateral

initiatives for the joint procurement of armament and other capabilities (Keohane 2002; von Voss et al. 2013).

Figure 4 Defence Expenditure of Advocates as a Share of GDP



Data shown for 2016 in %. Source: NATO 2017a

Member states in the group of advocates belong to those countries with the highest military expenditures and increased investments in acquiring and developing military capabilities. At the 2002 Prague Summit, the Alliance has set itself the defence spending target of 2% of GDP, within which 20% of the total spending shall be allocated to equipment, investment and research and development. Only a handful of states has so far met this target. As shown in Figure 4, those NATO member states that met the target of 2% of GDP in 2016 belong to the group of advocates, i.e., the United States, Poland, United Kingdom and Estonia. Other states among the advocates have also increased their military expenditures including new member states who had to catch up with some of the older ones since gaining membership, such as Romania (1.44%) and Croatia (1.38%) (NATO 2017a; see Appendices C and D). Since all of the top five states, except for the United States, are multiple members they also contribute a big

share of their military expenditure to the EU and CSDP. For example, the military contribution of the UK amounts to 20.8% of the EU's overall military expenditure (SIPRI 2015). In 2012, it was also the only EU member state that met the capability objectives of the EDA because it was able to make significant improvements and procurements (Biscop 2012).

With their accession to the EU and NATO, and in regard to the changing security environment in the post-Cold War era, particularly small and new member states have modernised and reformed their capabilities and armed forces in shifting towards role specialisation. Most of their armed forces were not able to interoperate with other armed forces. These had previously put an emphasis on territorial defence, which was not required ensuing their memberships in international security organisations and subsequently, some of these small member states focused on the specialisation of their armed forces. For example, Hungary has focused on engineering squads, Romania has specialised in mountain light infantry, and the Czech Republic has concentrated on developing nuclear, biological and chemical decontamination units. The Baltics, in turn, had to develop new armed forces almost from scratch (Missiroli 2004). Multiple and original members record a greater variety of assets and capabilities, which gives them a higher level of authority among member states. Their armed forces have been reformed towards more flexibility, endurance, and sustainability with the ability to conduct expeditionary operations (UK 2003). In addition to their higher levels of military expenditure, the United Kingdom and the United States, alongside France, are the only nuclear powers in the Euro-Atlantic community. This military power – the possession of crucial resources including military and civilian assets, equipment and capabilities, and a high number of armed forces – allows advocates to influence the EU-NATO relationship because they are able to allocate certain resources to either or both organisations according to their preferences and the needs for operations. They can also make use of this military power to set certain conditions vis-à-vis other member states in order to convince and persuade them for a benefit in other policy areas (British Officials 2).

Another divide that has been identified in the EU-NATO relationship concerns the development and procurement of vital capabilities. This goes hand in hand with the problem of resource allocation to EU-led and NATO-led military operations, which all member states face because they only have a single set of forces at their disposal, which is commonly emphasised especially by small member states (Czech Official 1; Romanian Official 1; Slovak Official 1). In light of declining defence budgets and this allocation problem, multinational and interorganisational capability procurement projects have become increasingly

important. Both organisations have launched programmes and initiatives to improve and acquire capabilities, such as NATO's DCI and Smart Defence as well as the EU's launch of the EDA to coordinate and promote defence industry collaborations and to stimulate research and development. In 2009, in the course of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU also initiated PESCO which was eventually launched it in November 2017. It is an initiative through which EU member states plan to deepen defence cooperation and to combine capability acquisition through clusters of states. Both organisations, with the DCI and Smart Defence as well as the EDA, emphasise the importance of complementarity of their capability initiatives and projects to increase further efficiency and interoperability (EU 2003b; NATO 2010).

However, the actual procurement of military capabilities is the responsibility of member states. To resolve capabilities shortages, advocates of EU-NATO cooperation, in particular, have been actively engaged in cooperative efforts and projects to develop crucial military capabilities for crisis management. The benefits of joint procurement projects as well as pooling and sharing are primarily economic but also political. They allow greater economies of scale which, in turn, lead to considerable efficiency and savings as well as the ability to invest more in more advanced capabilities and weapon systems, and increases the interoperability of international organisations and states in operations. Another advantage is of political nature because joint procurements stimulate the convergence of priorities and security threats, and thus facilitate a common response to such threats (Keohane 2002; von Voss et al. 2013). Some member states, notably the UK, are active in bargaining for and promoting greater burden sharing and capability improvements among European partners (O'Donnell 2011). Among advocates it is furthermore commonly agreed that in the development of structures and capabilities any duplication between the EU and NATO need to be avoided (British Officials 2; Czech Official 1; Romanian Official 1; Slovak Official 1). Instead, both organisations should make use of their capabilities to orchestrate their responses and approaches to shared security threats, e.g., hybrid warfare (Jankowski 2015; Keohane 2002).

Examples of minilateral armaments cooperation and joint procurement initiatives include the cooperation among the Visegrad countries, which seek to acquire capabilities together and who form an EU Battlegroup in order to improve their interoperability within as well as outside this group (Törő 2011). NORDEFCO and the BENELUX group, which consists of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, illustrate other examples. NORDEFCO has also invited the Baltics to participate in its procurement activities to address shortages in their

military capabilities. The Nordic states have been cooperating on defence capabilities even before states like Finland and Sweden joined the EU, and have a successful record of joint efforts, such as in tactical air transport and the set-up of joint a command and control system. Some of the Nordics and Baltics have also formed EU Battlegroups and cooperate within NATO's Response Force. Similarly, the BENELUX countries have especially concentrated on launching joint procurements in the area of naval capabilities as well as air policing. Yet, most of these occur on a case-by-case basis, and further formalisation would enhance joint procurements and increased interoperability (von Voss et al. 2013).

Lastly, drawing on their military resources and capabilities, advocates regularly participate in and contribute to EU-led and NATO-led military crisis management operations. In fact, some of the states in this group of advocates have the highest share of contributions to EU and NATO military operations. As shown in Appendix B, most of the advocates are frequent participants and have made major contributions to operations. Among these states are the United Kingdom as one of the most prominent advocates as well as other promoters such as Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United States, although the latter has not participated in any of the EU operations. States from the Baltics and Central and Eastern Europe have also participated in military operations especially in the Western Balkans (Operation Concordia in FYRoM, SFOR and Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and KFOR in Kosovo) as well as in operations abroad, such as the EU Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the International Security Assistant Force (ISAF) and its successor Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan (Appendix B; also see Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014; Grevi et al. 2009). Moreover, in the case of the naval operations conducted by both the EU and NATO in the Gulf of Aden, the United Kingdom has played a key part. It has provided the operational headquarters in Northwood for both naval operations – EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, ongoing since 2008, and NATO Operation Ocean Shield (2009-2016). A shared operational headquarters allows for smoother communication and exchange of information between the organisations involved, as well as the divergence of policy approaches and the efficient use of member states' capabilities. Moreover, providing the operational headquarters has allowed the UK to play a contributing act towards EU-NATO cooperation as it consented to the launch of EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta albeit its initial reservations (Gebhard and Smith 2015).

This section has illustrated that member states belonging to the type of advocates of interorganisational interaction make efficient use of their military resources and capabilities

to promote the relationship between the EU and NATO. Advocates partake actively in minilateral frameworks to develop more advanced military capabilities to counteract new capabilities shortages. Furthermore, due to their high levels of military expenditure and through the acquisition and possession of significant capabilities they can maintain a powerful voice in the EU-NATO relationship because they can direct these towards either or both organisations by participating and contributing to their military operations.

4.6 View on Interoperability and Division of Labour

The issues of interoperability and division of labour are closely linked to the capability gaps; they are in fact mutually interlinked. As drivers of the EU-NATO relationship, advocates aim to increase efficiency and improve interoperability among member states of both organisations and are therefore in favour of defence standardisation. Interoperability is especially crucial in the areas of communication systems, command, information systems and sharing of intelligence, network structures, and logistics (Bialos 2005; Hunter 2002; Sperling 2004; von Voss et al. 2013). While interoperability did not pose a drastic problem to NATO and the EU during the Balkan wars due to a more clearly defined division of responsibilities, internally both organisations have struggled with it especially in the conduct of military crisis management operations. For example, Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF in Afghanistan highlighted the limits of interoperability between US and European armed forces (Binnendijk and Braw 2017). With the introduction of joint capability development programmes in both the EU and NATO, they seek to enhance interoperability based on the harmonisation of capabilities and through the conduct of parallel and coordinated trainings and exercises, such as the Combined Training Initiative in NATO. This is, however, only achievable with certain contributions by member states.

According to their national security and defence strategies, the UK and the Baltics aim to improve interoperability of their armed forces and weaponry with other EU and NATO partners, and especially with the United States. In its 2010 National Security Strategy and 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the UK stresses the importance of interoperability especially in terms of information sharing and logistics with its key allies, the US, France and Germany (UK 2010a, 2015). Through its bilateral cooperation with France based on the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties it ensures further interoperability, for instance, through the development of a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) and the joint usage

of its aircraft carrier in addition to cooperation in satellite communications, cyber security, unmanned air systems, and research and technology (UK 2010b). Even beyond the NATO framework, the UK has been cooperating with the US on information and intelligence sharing, which further enhances interoperability due to increased shared awareness. The continuation and added value for the interoperability between the EU and NATO has been frequently emphasised (UK 2015). The several groups of interest in the EU-NATO relationship, such as the Baltic, Nordic and Visegrad countries, follow this example by conducting joint exercises and through their capability development projects (Törő 2011; Tromer 2006). The continuous search for opportunities to achieve greater interoperability on the member state level indicates advocates' engagement in extending the efficiency between the EU and NATO to avoid the duplication of capabilities and efforts.

Similar to the aspect of interoperability, division of labour has received increased attention with closer cooperation between the EU and NATO. While their responsibilities and tasks were clearly defined during the Cold War – NATO represented the defence alliance in charge of collective defence and territorial security and the EU was regarded as a political project responsible for economic and political integration – this has changed with the new security environment. Advocates believe that a division of labour between the two organisations leads to more consultations on the one hand and reduces the capabilities and interoperability gaps on the other hand. With a clear mandate and a well-defined set of tasks and responsibilities, each organisation can develop and acquire the required capabilities. Moreover, member states acknowledge that there will always be overlaps and duplications to a certain extent, but additional duplication should be avoided through a defined and negotiated division of tasks (Estonian Official 1; Polish Official 1; Romanian Official 1).

These states therefore have a common view on division of labour. Member states from the Baltics and Central and Eastern Europe see the EU and NATO as two different organisations that serve 'two parallel and complementary but essentially distinct goals' (Missiroli 2004: 132). They pursue the division of hard and soft security, and because of their close relations with the US and their interest in keeping the US involved in European security, they underline the importance of NATO's contribution to their territorial defence, especially vis-à-vis the underlying threat coming from the Eastern border. Yet, the line of division is ambiguous and blurred. As stated by a Polish official, there is 'no division of labour in geographical terms', but there is automatically a division of labour concerning their mandates and responsibilities due to the availability of military capabilities (Polish Official 1). Furthermore, there is no

division of tasks based on the intensity of conflicts since, for example, the EU-led operation EUTM Mali has an intensity level compared to NATO-led operations. But, nevertheless, the Atlantic Alliance is and remains in charge of collective defence whereas the EU should, in contrast, focus on military training and executive operations such as the ones in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Mali (Czech Official 1). Advocates promote this view in the debates and negotiations preceding the launch of new operations or the extension of ongoing civilian and military operations. For example, as mentioned by one British official, if a crisis emerges and states within groups of interests agree that action needs to be taken, at first, partners in NATO are consulted. They exchange their views and discuss whether the issue concerns one of NATO's core tasks, and in a second stage, they consider whether and how the EU would be able to contribute (British Official 1). Consequently, states such as the UK alongside Estonia, Poland and the Czech Republic first look at options within NATO and concomitantly take into account the EU's capabilities and strengths. This allows for a division of labour in which both organisations can act according to their strengths and core tasks while they seek to ensure complementarity at the same time. Through this approach advocates also avoid the risk of competition between the EU and NATO, and instead, contribute to their cooperation and strengthening their relationship in crisis management.

While advocates acknowledge the challenge of interoperability of armed forces which both the EU and NATO face, they seek to overcome it by facilitating better communication and exchanges. By coupling up with other member states for joint exercises as well as by partaking in similar state constellations for EUBG and NRF, as was shown by the example of Lithuania and the Netherlands, they contribute to a higher degree of interoperability among member states. Moreover, it is commonly agreed among states within the group of advocates that a division of labour is logical to make full use of the capabilities, policies and practices of each organisation. Nevertheless, there is no clearly defined division of functions or geographical scope, which leads advocates to make use of their armed forces and contribute to EU and NATO military crisis management operations on case-by-case decisions to support each organisation's advantages and strengths.

4.7 Conclusion

Advocates of the interorganisational relationship between the EU and NATO form a group that seeks closer cooperation and enhanced interactions in the areas of crisis management,

security and defence. They are generally characterised as proactive and supportive member states, which are embedded in the structures of both organisations and that contribute vital military and civilian resources. Advocates share a set of characteristics in accordance with the four themes outlined in the previous chapter, which distinguish them from the other types of interorganisational interaction.

They have played an active role in the formalisation and institutionalisation process of EU-NATO cooperation. Especially the UK is a salient case because it has contributed to developing the European security and defence policies, and a military capacity through conditionality as well as its networked foreign policy approach. Alongside the UK, the Central and Eastern Europeans states as well as the Baltics serve as crucial actors that connect member states within and between international organisations, and through their embeddedness and their numerous links they seek to convince others of their positions as drivers. With the help of vital military resources – such as the nuclear power of both the UK and the US – as well as their higher defence budgets, advocates can make use of their military power in order to influence and direct the EU-NATO relationship by allocating calculatedly these resources. Advocates' shared awareness of the necessity for enhanced interoperability and their common idea on a division of labour allows them to act unitedly by promoting and disseminate this view outside their group of interest towards more sceptical member states. They do so in negotiations within both the EU and NATO while acting as a majority coalition group.

Although advocates do not always behave homogenously in regard to these four themes, they overall drive the EU-NATO cooperation forward by making use of their resources, initiatives and ideas, and seek to persuade their fellow member states to follow suit. They see more benefits than costs in the EU-NATO relationship which helps them to economise their military resources, increase their security, and pursue their national security and defence interests more effectively. Advocates constantly interact with members of the other types of interorganisational interactions and sometimes come into conflict with other member states' national interests concerning the development of the EU-NATO relationship.

The analysis of the group of advocates has furthermore shown that these member states therein have evolved over time and naturally show signs and characteristics which are shared by states in one of the other four types of membership. No rupture moments, i.e., abrupt changes of their behaviour, policies and interactions, towards both organisations and the EU-NATO relationship as a whole have occurred which would have shifted their position towards

another type of membership in interorganisational interaction. This has been the case with member states belonging to other types, which will receive more illustration in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 5 – Blockers of Interorganisational Interaction

5.1 Introduction

Among the main obstacles for the EU-NATO relationship is the political blockage enacted by particular member states. While states in the group of blockers of interorganisational interaction are not *per se* blockers of EU-NATO cooperation as a whole, and neither would they admit to actively block further enhancement and interactions, they nevertheless undertake actions that has stalled the relationship. Blockers, in this context, therefore do not serve as blockers as such, but rather as those states inhibiting the process of closer cooperation. The majority of member states within this group do not automatically veto any further improvements or enhancements once the topic is on the agenda, neither do they obstruct any cooperative efforts during crisis management operations. Yet, there are certain signs which assume that they feel being left out of the EU-NATO relationship, which triggers their frequent oppositions and hampering behaviour. Their reasons and rationales for obstructing the EU-NATO relationship are determined by their national interests, strategic cultures and perceptions of each organisation as well as of their cooperation, and vary over time. Their attitude towards and preference for interorganisational interaction are found in their national security and defence documents, which were the tool to identify and categorise member states in the group of blockers. Overall, in addition to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey also France and Ireland – the latter only to some extent – can be considered as blockers of interorganisational interaction. Among these states there is a greater fluctuation of who can be assigned to this group. Because some of their strategies and actions have also benefitted EU-NATO cooperation, it is thus acknowledged that some of these member states are not essentially fully-fledged blockers but can also be occasionally considered as boundary cases.

What makes these states to be recognised as blockers of interorganisational interaction is the extent to which they meet the selection criteria for the categorisation in the typology of member states in interorganisational interaction. Overall, blockers have less positive, and sometimes even rather negative, attitudes towards closer cooperation between the EU and NATO. They therefore actively seek to obstruct the enhancement of interorganisational interaction and even though they aim to be engaged in the negotiations, this is addressed at slowing down closer cooperation according to their own interests and benefits. The key purpose of their contributions to military operations and the provision of resources to the

international organisations is thus to increase their influence in negotiations to realise their own preferences in regard to the extent of interorganisational cooperation.

The group of blockers is a heterogeneous group of member states. This chapter therefore depicts their behaviour as well as their interactions within and positions towards the four themes outlined in chapter 3: institutional and legal framework, issue of membership, capabilities gaps, and interoperability and division of labour. It first provides an overview of the main characteristics shared by all member states in this category, and points out where and to what extent they differ vis-à-vis their orientation towards the interorganisational relationship between the EU and NATO. Subsequently, the attitudes and positioning of blockers as well as their contribution to the institutional evolution is described. This is then followed by an examination of their membership in both the EU and NATO, including their partnerships and minilateral frameworks, as well as their approaches to the capabilities gap, interoperability and division of labour between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance.

5.2 Shared Characteristics of Blockers

Member states within the group of blockers of interorganisational interactions share a common set of characteristics, which have changed and altered over time and with the course of the development of EU-NATO cooperation. Whereas identifying the shared characteristics of advocates was rather straightforward, the outlook for blockers is more complex due to the different natures of their positions towards the relationship. Therefore, this section only focuses on the more general shared features.

The group of blockers of interorganisational cooperation includes both single member states and multiple member states as well as original and subsequent members (cf. Gehring and Oberthür 2009; Magliveras 2011). Each state in the group of blockers differs however in the nature of its membership. For example, while France is considered to be a big and original member state, which has regained its status among other powerful states such as the UK and the US (Bozo 2016), Greece and Ireland are small states, and Cyprus can even be considered as a 'micro state' (Dobrescu 2017: 83). While member states generally pursue specific objectives in organisations, blockers seek to make maximum benefits of their membership. This means their behaviour is very interest-driven based on national advantages. Yet, some blockers also experience the disadvantages of lacking membership in the respective other

organisation (Tofte 2003). Hence, not only their positioning within both the EU and NATO matters, but also their membership in general, and the perception thereof, contributes to their behaviour towards their cooperation. This results in their use of specific strategies such as hostage taking, turf battles and forum-shopping (Hofmann 2009). Such strategies are applied especially in times when essential issues are at stake, including the launch of military operations, the deployment of troops, and the cooperation with other international actors, or enlargement towards new member states and the widening of responsibilities and policy areas.

Multiple member states have the ability to influence the EU and NATO on different levels and to varying extents. With the possession of both memberships they are involved in both decision-making procedures, in which they can express their concerns and oppositions, and staff positions within both organisations. In a similar vein to advocates, blockers with multiple memberships seek to maintain a wide network of bilateral and minilateral relations within and between the two organisations to promote their views and initiatives (Pannier and Schmitt 2014). Single member states, in contrast, want to become multiple members by accessing the respective other organisation, or seek to take advantage of their position by hostage taking. They can exploit their situation to obstruct closer EU-NATO cooperation by making their own gains through the realisation of their national interests, such as better conditions and positioning of their own membership (Hofmann 2009, 2018).

Furthermore, while blockers have been engaged in the institutionalisation process of the EU-NATO cooperation, albeit with concessions and compromises, they also have certain military and strategic resources at their disposal. These include the possession of vital and inevitable military capabilities such as nuclear weapons (France), high level of defence expenditure (France, Greece, Turkey) or a well-trained and specialised armed forces (France, Turkey) (NATO 2017a; The Military Balance 2017). In addition, their geographical location in the Euro-Atlantic space can be of detrimental value and strategic importance. Such is the case for Cyprus, Greece and Turkey with their location in the Mediterranean Sea region and their proximity to the Middle and Near East, Central Asia and the Black Sea region. These are areas which have recently received increased significance and attention for the security and strategic activities of both the EU and NATO (Economides 2013; Müftüler-Baç 2000; Samokhvalov 2013). France's relations with its former African colonies can further be seen as a strategic asset due to the country's overseas engagements, which have resulted in the development of well-equipped and well-trained expeditionary armed forces. Yet, these

relations also represent new challenges, growing threats and rising instabilities (Charbonneau 2008).

Lastly, it needs to be noted that the extent to which these member states have obstructed the enhancement of the EU-NATO relationship has changed over time and can be described as peaks and troughs. This means that at times blockers do not necessarily hamper or obstruct progress, however, their continuous actions, behaviour and policies inside and outside the EU-NATO framework have not always been beneficial and contributory. Such changes and the undulated, shifting positioning has been observed with regard to changing political parties in power and subsequent shifts in their national foreign, security and defence policy orientations (Hofmann 2017) as well as with regard to blockers' bilateral and minilateral relations with other states, especially other member states in the EU and NATO. Domestic politics and relationships have therefore shaped their attitudes and behaviour towards interorganisational cooperation between these two organisations.

The main characteristics and features are presented throughout this chapter with regard to the four themes (see chapter 3), but they receive diverging attention depending on the member state in discussion. Moreover, due to their different attitudes and reasons, this chapter is structured not only according to the four themes but also, in a secondary step, based on the member states themselves. This allows a comprehensive and holistic analysis of blockers' preferences and reasons to obstruct the EU-NATO relationship.

Table 5 Overview of Blockers' Characteristics

Shared characteristics by balancers	**Neutrals and their membership**	**Contributions to the capabilities debate**	**View on interoperability and division of labour**
• make use of their veto right in decisions on formalisation and institutionalisation • not much in favour of strengthening cooperation • agreement on interorganisational	• among the "troublemakers" • might have inter-state clashes and disagreements with other member states • act in a "schizophrenic" way in discussions	• possess vital resources and military capabilities • use of resources and capabilities for bargaining and	• not much engagement in improving interoperability • not in favour of division of labour • seek to strengthen their preferred organisation

cooperation depends on issue area, scope and geographical location • raise concerns about formalising interorganisational relations	• ambivalent relations with organisations and other members • might maintain cooperation with member states outside the interorganisational relationship	threatening veto • pursuit of different capability development programmes in each organisation • want to use capabilities primarily for one organisation • higher military expenditure and defence budget	• interoperability only needed in cases of clear absence of required capabilities and resources

5.3 Obstacles to the Institutionalisation Process

An important factor that slows down and complicates interorganisational relations is the formalisation and institutionalisation process. With the help of their membership status, most blockers also have the right and power to veto further progress whenever it is in line with their national interests and policy preferences. Both the EU and NATO maintain intergovernmental structures and decision-making procedures on security and defence issues, which allow every single member state to express their concerns and opposition by making use of their veto right (Sperling 2004). In the course of the EU-NATO relationship since the early 1990s, this has occurred several times. The different approaches and ways taken by France, on the one side, and by the triangle consisting of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, on the other, need to be distinguished. In contrast, Ireland plays a very marginal role in the formalisation process.

5.3.1 France: Trapped between Promotion and Obstruction

As a founding member of both the Atlantic Alliance and the EU, France has sought to realise its strategy of detaching European security and defence from US dominance and dependence from the early beginnings. It has furthermore played an instrumental role in the development and institutional evolution of both organisations separately. For example, in collaboration with the UK, France was involved in creating NATO's integrated military structures. Two of its key politicians, the diplomat Jean Monnet and former Foreign Affairs minister Robert Schuman, are considered to be the founding fathers of the European Community, who were among the main drivers of the European integration project (Bozo 2014, 2016). Since the end of the Second World War, France pursued four fundamental objectives, which have often put strains on the EU-NATO relationship: (1) its desire for French and European *grandeur*, i.e., military autonomy and independence, (2) national ownership, military sovereignty and especially the national control over its *force de frappe* (nuclear warfare), (3) regaining and maintaining its status as a great power among the UK, the US and the Soviet Union (and then the Russian Federation), and (4) the rebalancing of US dominance in the international system and the establishment of a multipolar world order (France 2008, 2013; also see Irondelle and Mérand 2010; Pannier 2017; Simón 2017; Treacher 2011).

Similar to other member states, France seeks to translate its objectives into reality, and thereby pursues different political strategies and interests in each organisation. It generally sees both the EU and NATO as tools to regain its power status and political rank on the international level and aspires to rebalance the international order especially in regard to US involvement and predominance on the European continent (Hofmann and Kempin 2008; Perruche 2014). Since the founding of the Atlantic Alliance, France has had a troublesome relationship with NATO due to its dissatisfaction with a US-dominated alliance and with a NATO-dominated Europe (Bozo 2016; Ratti 2014). It therefore aims to realise a European security and defence capacity to create a counterweight which would allow greater autonomy for Europe. The new international security environment after the end of the Cold War triggered a rethinking of the French attitude towards NATO as well as the European integration project. It was faced with the choice between the creation of a European pillar within NATO, which later became known as the ESDI, and the development of an autonomous European defence policy in the form of CSDP (Boyer 1993; Bozo 2016; Irondelle and Mérand 2010).

Throughout the 1990s, the Atlantic Alliance underwent its own transformation process and France had to decide whether it desires to be part of it or whether it prefers to remain outside the defence framework. During the same time, conflicts in the Western Balkans simmered which was of great concern especially for European states. While French policy-makers initially hoped for a European solution to this European conflict, they soon had to realise that the EU's capabilities and capacity was not advanced enough, which led to France's first disappointment with the European integration project. Subsequently, France saw the need to move closer to the idea of ESDI and also accepted the need to collaborate with NATO and its allies despite the scepticism vocalised by former French President François Mitterrand. This can be regarded as the French pragmatic step to remain a powerful player through approaching NATO (Bozo 2016; Hofmann and Kempin 2008; Pannier 2017; Rieker 2013). What French armed forces and policy-makers had to realise, however, was the lack of appropriate communication and interoperability with those of other NATO member states, and that there was no formal framework to collaborate. Hence, the process of formalising and institutionalising EU-NATO cooperation also posed a problem in itself.

Under the Socialist President François Mitterrand, France focused more on the European integration project, but when the Republican Jacques Chirac assumed office in 1995, the rapprochement with NATO as well as the relations between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance moved to the centre of attention. Although Chirac announced the continuation of the Gaullist tradition of autonomy, independence and sovereignty, and emphasised the establishment of "European power" (Bozo 2016: 151), relations with the US, the UK as well as with NATO improved fundamentally. This was vital for triggering the 1998 Saint-Malo summit. British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac signalled an important step towards the creation of a European security and defence capacity as well as strengthening relations between both organisations (Bozo 2016; Simón 2017). However, even though France seemed to be in favour of normalising relations with NATO and enhancing the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship, particularly because it suggested the creation of joint committees (Flockhart 2014), French officials opposed proposals by US Defence Secretary Cohen in 2000. These proposals anticipated a 'reciprocal NATO-EU defence planning process' which sought to foster closer cooperation (Ratti 2014: 371).

Further negotiations between the EU and NATO over formalising their relations began in September 2000 between the joint meeting of the NAC and the interim PSC, and were concluded with the signing of the 2002 EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and

Defence Policy. Throughout the negotiations, several member states wanted to make changes and modifications, especially to the wording. Among these were notably France alongside Greece and Turkey. France was not very pleased with the wide scope of cooperation that the two organisations agreed upon in the first draft, because it feared that NATO would again take the dominant position and thereby restrict the further development of CSDP. The main objective of French policy-makers was to 'protect the EU from being eaten by NATO' (NATO Official 2). This shows that despite the rapprochement with NATO, France maintained its original scepticism and caution about strengthening EU-NATO cooperation which has been indicated throughout the negotiation process. In the wake of the 2003 Berlin Plus arrangements between the Union and the Atlantic Alliance, France further defended its position by disagreeing on wordings of the arrangements and by opposing NATO's predominance in European security. Among the reasons were the disagreements between France and the US over the 2003 intervention in Iraq, and the French initiative of establishing autonomous European headquarters as discussed at the so-called Chocolate Summit in Tervuren in the same year (Flockhart 2014; Ratti 2014).

Furthermore, it only wanted to enhance cooperation if it proves to be truly necessary, depending on the international and European security environment. Whereas some member states prefer EU-NATO cooperation and the EU's referral to NATO's military assets as normal practice, France takes a more cautious approach and sees it rather as an exception (French Official 2; NATO Official 2). Therefore, the country originally perceived the agreement on Berlin Plus arrangements as a downgrade of the capacities and capabilities of CSDP and thus a strengthening primarily of NATO. Yet, it did not veto the arrangements because it then saw it as a pragmatic step towards enhancing the EU's role as an international security provider because of the widening of the toolbox for crisis management operations. With these arrangements France also accepted the need for NATO's military assets and capabilities and desired to exert influence from within, which later triggered its reintegration into the alliances' integrated military structures in 2009 (Ratti 2014; Rieker 2013). Nevertheless, France envisaged the development of independent and autonomous European defence and security capacity to reduce the level of dependence on the US as much as possible.

France has taken its individual route in shaping the formalisation and institutionalisation process of the EU-NATO relationship, which has been influenced by its national interests and policy preferences. It is known for its drive towards a European security and defence policy which is much in favour of French strategies and security culture. While the country has

challenged and questioned the need for institutionalising EU-NATO cooperation, it has shown two faces: its supportive role and its ability, albeit limited, to obstruct the process. It is not the only member state that has not been continuously in favour since the tensions among Cyprus, Greece and Turkey have posed a profound challenge and obstacle for the relationship between the EU and NATO.

5.3.2 Formalisation in Light of the Cyprus-Greece-Turkey Triad

The EU-NATO relationship and particularly its formalisation and institutionalisation process have been profoundly hallmarked by the tensions between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Among these three states only Greece is a multiple member state as it joined NATO in 1952 and the EU in 1981. Turkey joined NATO in the same year and gained official EU candidate status in 2005 but had already been an associate member state of WEU since 1992. Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 but has not formalised relations with the Atlantic Alliance. Although both Greece and Turkey cannot be labelled as original members (cf. Magliveras 2011), they are seen as old members which have been involved in the institutional evolutions of these organisations and have therefore been able to exert influence on the early formalisation of the EU-NATO relationship. With the Cypriote accession to the EU, relations and policy preferences have changed, and tensions have increased. This ultimately affected the proceedings of institutionalising EU-NATO cooperation. This section first outlines the problem pose by the Cyprus-Greece-Turkey triad, and then examines how their strained relations impact EU-NATO cooperation, especially in regard to the Berlin Plus arrangements and the Security of Information Agreement.

Greek-Turkish relations have seen many phases and due to their conflictual neighbourhood, i.e., the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea as well as their proximity to the Middle East, both countries have struggled for regional influence. Albeit their deep differences and their perennial disputes[9], both have pursued parallel objectives. The Turkish invasion of the Cypriot island in 1974 has not only spurred new tensions between the two countries but also affected their behaviour in international organisations and the dynamics in interorganisational interactions (Binder 2012; Larrabee 2012). The so-called Cyprus issue has been labelled as the biggest and most difficult political obstacle for the EU-NATO relationship,

[9] For a detailed description and overview of the Greek-Turkish conflict see, for example, Cemp 1980.

and especially for advancing the formalisation and institutionalisation process (EU Officials 3, 4; NATO Officials 1, 2).

In the early phases of rapprochement, neither Greece nor Turkey has actively opposed the furthering of EU-NATO cooperation or any cooperative efforts triggered by member states. Both of them see the importance of their memberships because they perceive both the EU and NATO as essential international platforms to counter-balance each other (Tsakonas and Tournikiotis 2003; Tsakonas 2008). Especially with the improvement of their bilateral relationship in 1999, which was triggered by the events after the Ocalan affair and the so-called "earthquake diplomacy" between their governments (Larrabee 2012: 473), Greece lifted its veto on Turkey's bid for accession to the EU and even strongly supported its candidacy. It saw a Europeanised Turkey beneficial for its own security interests and likewise, Turkey perceived EU membership as a further achievement towards acquiring a Western identity (Bilgin 2003; Larrabee 2012; Nestoras 2015; Tsakonas and Tournikiotis 2003). This had a positive effect on the EU-NATO relationship because in the course of improving the Greek-Turkish relationship and particularly the lift of Greece's veto, a hurdle was minimised, which allowed to establish meetings between bodies of the two organisations.

Despite the evolving relations between Greece and Turkey, new obstacles had to be overcome. Turkey's exclusion from and Cyprus' inclusion on the enlargement agenda at the 1997 Luxembourg Summit of the European Council reflected Turkey's behaviour vis-à-vis the EU-NATO relationship, especially because the country had already been an associate member of the WEU since 1992 (Ulusoy 2016). In the negotiations of the Berlin Plus arrangements Turkey put a lot of emphasis on the wording of the arrangements. Within NATO, Turkey also pushed to clarify the role of non-EU NATO members and therefore promoted the inclusion of NATO's right of first refusal (Acikmese and Triantaphyllou 2012). In fact, the country proofed to be a troublemaker and a stumbling block, because it once again felt marginalised and it threatened to use its veto power in case it would not receive any reassurances and concessions (German Official 1). When the agreement between the EU and NATO was drafted, Cyprus had not been a member of the EU, although it had gone through the accession process. Due to this fact, in the document of the Berlin Plus arrangements it therefore says 'as things stand at present', which means that the agreements made between the EU and NATO count for the state of affairs in 2003, i.e., before Cyprus's EU accession (NATO Official 2). With the changed circumstances in 2004, however, these are not valid anymore as they were originally agreed upon. In this context, Turkey actively tried to 'push

Cyprus out of the game and initiated conditions on the NATO side' by using and promoting this particular wording (NATO Official 2). Furthermore, in regard to Cyprus' planned accession to the EU and 'in order to further assuage Turkish security concerns, the island nation would not take part in EU-led military operations using NATO assets once it had become a member of the EU' (Reichard 2006: 287). This would reassure Turkey and give it the opportunity to participate and contribute, although it also demanded to have decision-making power concerning EU-led operations under Berlin Plus.

The negotiations on the Interim Security Arrangements and the subsequent Security of Information Agreement between the EU and NATO proceeded in a similar way. Turkey as well as other member states from both organisations such as the US, were cautious about setting up arrangements for the exchange of classified information and intelligence. The EU did not possess any internal regulations concerning the management and exchange of information prior to the development of its CSDP, whereas NATO has a long tradition of maintaining a security of its information and intelligence (Reichard 2006). In addition to this cautiousness, Turkey among others sought to limit the access to classified information and intelligence to some states. Consequently, in the Security of Information Agreement it states that 'classified information (…) may be disclosed or released to states which are members of NATO, and to other States which are members of the EU and have subscribed to the "Partnership for Peace" framework document and, in that context, have a valid security agreement with NATO (…)' (EU 2003c: Art.5). This was specifically targeted at Cyprus in the context of the country's accession to the EU (NATO Officials 2, 4).

The political tensions and disputes among the Cyprus-Greece-Turkey triad have profoundly impacted the developments of the EU-NATO relationship including the formalisation and institutionalisation process. Particularly Cyprus' accession to the EU in 2004 has complicated procedures and limited the full access to military capabilities and classified information. Due to the Berlin Plus arrangements and the 2003 Security of Information Agreement, a 'participation problem' has emerged (Biermann 2015: 53; Hanbay 2011) in which, on the one hand, Turkey does not participate in the EU's decision-making on EU-led operations with the use of NATO's military assets and capabilities, and on the other hand, Cyprus cannot participate in military operations under Berlin Plus. In addition, Cyprus cannot access NATO's classified information based on the limitations for non-NATO partner states as set out in the Security of Information Agreement. These double deadlocks have illustrated one of the major obstacles to the enhancement of the institutional framework of the EU-NATO relationship.

5.4 Making Use of their Membership

Membership in international organisations is vital for states to realise their national interests, to coordinate action and to shape policy preferences as well as for the benefits of collective action and the reduction of transaction costs. In contrast, membership can also produce competition and tensions among member states over, for example, resources, the level of influence they can exert on the policy outcomes and institutional developments, and over filling key positions within the structure of international organisations (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Keohane and Martin 1995). Organisations often serve different purposes for individual member states, which also depends on the organisation's functions and mandates. The high degree of functional overlap in the interorganisational relationship between the EU and NATO in the area of security and defence has triggered states to reformulate their objectives. In this case, member states might enter into a conflict of interest vis-à-vis the respective organisations, which leads to unpredictable behaviour. Consequently, the behaviour of some member states in this relationship has been characterised as 'schizophrenic' and 'paranoid' (EU Official 1; EU Official 4; NATO Official 2).

Blockers are among the "troublemakers" in terms of their membership, because they have a record of conflictual bilateral and multilateral relations with other member states. Such conflicts and tensions have an overall impact on the relationship and the cooperative efforts between the EU and NATO. States can apply different strategies to achieve their objectives, including forum-shopping, hostage taking and turf battles. Especially forum-shopping and hostage taking are among the most common strategies used by member states in the relationship between the EU and NATO (Faude 2015; Hofmann 2009). In addition to blockers' memberships within the two organisations and their relationships with other member states, this section also explores more in-depth the "schizophrenic" behaviour of members in the group of blockers as well as the Cyprus issue, illustrating one example of inter-state tensions and the application of hostage taking among member states.

When representatives from the EU and NATO as well as from member states' delegations have been asked about what countries are most troublesome concerning the EU-NATO relationship, the two most common answers were France and Turkey in addition to the problematic triad between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. According to German officials, especially Turkey has been labelled as the prime 'troublemaker' of this relationship (German

Officials 2). Many states feel frustrated by this problem and solving the conflict between the three states has further been named as the major hurdle to improving EU-NATO cooperation (British Officials 2; Czech Official 1; Italian Official 1; NATO Officials 4; Polish Official 1; Slovak Official 1). Yet, according to a Cypriot official, the conflict has been increasingly perceived as an 'alibi' for other member states to slow down cooperation efforts (Cypriot official 2). This has been confirmed by an EU Official who stated that 'the political obstacle goes beyond the Cyprus issue' (EU Official 4). This leads to the assumption that, while the Cyprus issue does indeed present a significant obstacle to enhancing cooperation, it is not the only one. Hence, two British officials as well as a representative from Cyprus mentioned France as a blocker because of its 'limited angle' on interorganisational security and defence cooperation (British Officials 2; Cypriot Official 1). This narrow view indicates France's preference for the EU over NATO in security and defence, which embodies a challenge for closer cooperation.

France preserves a strong network of bilateral relationships and counts Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States as its most important partners in security and defence (France 2013). It is part of numerous informal minilateral networks including the Big Three with Germany and the UK, the Quint which also includes Italy and the US, and the Friends of Europe among NATO allies. Over the course of time, France has had a special relationship with the Atlantic Alliance, which experienced de Gaulle's decision to withdraw from the alliance's military command structures in 1966 after disagreements with the UK and the US over the Suez crisis, and its gradual rapprochement resulting in its reintegration under Sarkozy in 2009 (Cizel and von Hlatky 2014; Fortmann et al. 2010; Pesme 2010; Rieker 2013). As a low-level supporter of NATO from the beginning, France was especially dissatisfied with the US' dominance in NATO as well as NATO's prevalence in Europe, which triggered its pursuit of a European defence capability (Bozo 2016). Despite its withdrawal, France remained a formal member and thus kept its decision-making power in the NAC. While it was outside the alliance's military command structures France sought to develop a European defence capacity and capability under the EU's umbrella in the 1990s and thereby obstructed the enhancement of cooperation. With its reintegration it turned tables and actually contributed to closer cooperation between the two organisations. Nevertheless, it was able to express its views and preferences, and exert influence over NATO's course of action in security and defence.

This behaviour of the French government, as well as of the other blockers, had at times led to confusion among European and transatlantic partners. This assumes that the conduct of

member states in this group is less predictable and unreliable, although their intentions and policy preferences are generally known among member states and international secretariats in both organisations. As a consequence, this behaviour has been characterised as 'schizophrenic' by EU staff members and repeatedly also by a NATO representative especially in regard to France and Turkey's behaviour during negotiations and decision-making procedures (EU Official 1; EU Official 4; NATO Official 2). In this sense, the term "schizophrenic" is used to describe how a state would promote a specific initiative or project, including capabilities development, training and interoperability plans in one organisation that would be beneficial and contributory to both EU and NATO, but in the respective other organisation it would obstruct further developments of these initiatives and projects.

A concrete example for this is the positioning and behaviour of France in both the EU and NATO, which was put forward by one EU Official. He observed that in one week, in one of the meetings of the European Union to plan a potential takeover from NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), the French EU representative announced to withdraw the Gendarmerie Force. In the following week, however, the French defence minister claimed in a NATO meeting that the EU would not meet its commitments and would not be able to come up to its expectations (EU Official 1). It is assumed that, on the one hand, France seeks to act through the EU and CSDP in terms of military and civilian crisis management, peacekeeping and post-conflict activities, and thus wants to strengthen European autonomy and the EU's defence capabilities. And on the other hand, it desires to increase its global influence, and in this context, 'to restore French influence within the Alliance' (Cizel and von Hlatky 2014: 355). Multiple members, who have recorded this particular French position, were left confused and without a clear standpoint, which complicated negotiations as well as reliance on the French decision-makers. Subsequently, some member states, as stated by two British officials as well as a Romanian representative, perceive the French "exceptionalism" as an underlying ambivalence as well as a grand pursuit of the country's national interests (British Officials 2; Romanian Official 1).

The French focus on strategic autonomy as well as national ownership and sovereignty of its *force de frappe* has become obstructive and has led to the indecisiveness between the pursuit of its national objectives, pushing for the development of the EU as a security actor through enhancing its CSDP and favouring NATO over the EU due to its feeling of frustration with its fellow EU member states and their lack of capabilities, commitment and willingness (Bozo 2016; Muniz 2013; Pannier 2017). Yet, one NATO staff member observed that, despite

the rapprochement with NATO and improved relations with the US, French policy-makers are still paranoid about being 'patronised' by both the US and NATO, which they aim to counter by all means (NATO Official 2). Although the French return under former president Nicolas Sarkozy did not come as a surprise (Bozo 2014; Fortmann et al. 2010; Muniz 2013a), it was nevertheless seen by some European partners as proof of the French ambivalence and it was even perceived as a potential 'death knell' for CSDP (Irondelle and Mérand 2010). Therefore, this behaviour has left European states in a state of limbo because France's behaviour has become increasingly unpredictable as well as contradictory. These cases indicate the "schizophrenic" as well as unpredictable behaviour of French representatives in the negotiation and decision-making forums of the EU and NATO as well as the state's shifting preferences and positions between the two organisations and towards their cooperation efforts. Member states' "schizophrenic" behaviour consequently refers to the gap between rhetoric and action, as well as to the different narratives deployed in international forums. As highlighted by the example of the behaviour of French representatives, member states may express their preferences for policies and action, but might employ practices and approaches which contradicts their initially vocalised preferences. In this context, Turkey represents another example of member states' "schizophrenic" behaviour, which is primarily connected to the Cyprus issue and its bilateral relationship with the EU.

The conflicting triangular relationship and the ensuing Cyprus conflict has caused a double veto concerning membership in the EU and NATO, which has ultimately impacted the development of the EU-NATO relationship. The initial conflict between Greece and Turkey did not pose an insurmountable challenge for either the EU or NATO, but this changed with the enlargement process after the end of the Cold War. The situation of the double veto emerged when Turkey was denied candidate status in the EU in the 1990s because of the Greek veto. Turkey had already applied for membership in the European Economic Community in the late 1980s and had become an associate member of the WEU in 1992. It then sought to fully integrate into the EU through membership, but Greece initially obstructed this enterprise. With Cyprus' accession and the on-going territorial dispute over the Cypriot island with Turkey, an additional veto player emerged to block Turkey's bid for EU membership (Ker-Lindsay 2007; Larrabee 2012; Tsakonas 2003). On the other side, while both Greece and Turkey became NATO allies jointly in 1952, the latter would veto Cyprus' bid for NATO accession, including participation in the PfP programme. This did not only affect Cyprus itself but also the provisions of the institutionalisation process and the practical

efforts of EU-NATO cooperation (Coskun 2013; Ker-Lindsay 2010; Samokhvalow 2013; Ulusoy 2016).

Moreover, this double veto has caused a 'participation problem' (Biermann 2015: 53) for the EU-NATO relationship because of the lack of a formal security or partnership agreement between Cyprus and the Atlantic Alliance. As a consequence, Cyprus cannot be involved in any negotiations in which sensitive information and operational issues are discussed, for example on operations under the Berlin Plus framework. The country is thus excluded from this aspect of EU-NATO cooperation (Cypriot Officials 1 and 2; NATO Official 2). The second element of this participation problem is the intricate relationship between the EU and Turkey. Although Turkey had already been a WEU member state, it was not included in the EU's CSDP and felt discriminated as a non-EU European NATO member state (Dedeoğlu 2017; Hanbay 2011). Non-EU European NATO allies, including Norway and Turkey, have been particularly suspicious about the EU's plan to develop the European security and defence policy, and autonomous military capabilities. In the negotiations between the EU and NATO over the Berlin Plus arrangements, Turkey was concerned that the EU would use NATO's military assets and capabilities against a NATO member, i.e., against itself, and therefore strongly sought to be involved in the EU decision-making process on CSDP, which it had been denied however (Tofte 2003). In recent years, and especially under the Turkish government led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as Prime Minister (2003-2014) and as President (since 2014), the relations between Turkey and the EU have experienced more frequent ruptures and periods of ups and downs leading to a gridlock of the accession process (Dedeoğlu 2017). Differences over human rights, the rule of law and democratic institutions as well as the diverging foreign and security policy orientations of both actors have furthermore shaped their bilateral relations but also Turkey's attitude towards the EU-NATO relationship. The decreasing ability to shape the EU's decisions in foreign, security and defence affairs, and particularly the dwindling possibility to become a full member, triggered a disconnect between Turkey and its Western partners, which is also perceived among other member states as obstructive behaviour towards the EU-NATO relationship (NATO Officials 4).

The complex and difficult relationship between Turkey and the EU relates to the benefits and challenges for a potential Turkish accession. Turkey would bring three distinct advantages for CSDP: (1) it has well-trained armed forces and possesses the second largest military capabilities in NATO, (2) it is a long-standing ally in NATO which would further contribute to interoperability, improved coordination and closer cooperation between the two

organisations, and (3) its geostrategic location between Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Black Sea as well its relations with neighbouring states (Bilgin 2003; Müftüler-Baç 2003; Tangör 2012; Turkey 2011a, 2011b). In contrast, with the Turkish accession to the EU also new tensions and sensitive issues would be added to the Union's agenda. Especially its proximity to conflictual regions, its poor record of democracy and human rights, and the ongoing territorial dispute with Cyprus constitute the main problems and challenges (Müftüler-Baç 2000). Hence, the EU set conditions which, in case of fulfilment, would allow to open new chapters in the accession process and would allow Turkey to eventually join the Union and become integrated into its security and defence dimension. These conditions include the establishment of amicable relations with both Cyprus and Greece, and other EU member states including Austria and Germany, as well as solving ongoing territorial disputes. In line with this, the country received candidate status in 2005 and both parties signed an agreement which allows Turkey to participate in CSDP operations albeit without any decision-making powers (Tsakonas 2008; Müftüler-Baç 2003). Yet, the negotiations with Cyprus have so far not resulted in outcomes that would resolve the dispute or allow EU-NATO cooperation to progress further.

Ireland's obstructive behaviour is set in contrast to both France and the Cyprus-Greece-Turkey triad. As a military neutral country it has a strong preference for the peaceful settlement of international tensions and disputes, and therefore puts greater emphasis on a non-military approach to crisis management. Despite its membership in the EU, it is outspokenly in favour of international peacekeeping by the UN (Keohane 2013). Ireland shows characteristics of a blocker of interorganisational interaction due to its own exceptionalism, which has occasionally caused the slowing down the progress of EU-NATO cooperation. While it is not against EU-NATO cooperation as a whole, it is wary towards closer defence cooperation in general. The "Irish exceptionalism" is constituted of its geo-strategic location in the EU's periphery, the absence of a clear external security and defence strategy as well as the marginal level of defence expenditure in addition to the constitutional constraints on international military engagements and the strong adherence to international law (Keohane 2013; Tonra 2012). Because the EU needs to take into consideration its member states' preferences and interests when negotiating with the Alliance, Irish' constraints add to the slow progress of cooperation efforts. For example, one representative noticed that 'Ireland is also generally sceptical about EU-NATO cooperation' (Estonian Official 1), which has been perceived as hampering by other member states. Moreover, although Ireland is declared to be militarily neutral it cannot be said to be neutral concerning the EU-

NATO relationship. A Slovak representative has therefore understood Ireland's scepticism as 'a move towards Cyprus and Turkey', meaning it took over a hesitant and less supportive position (Slovak Official 1). In addition, Ireland's full membership in NATO is based on the condition of its relations with the United Kingdom. The country has in fact demanded that the Alliance should get involved in solving the Northern Ireland conflict and the end of partition so that it would be able to join fully. This did not occur, however, and therefore, initiatives proposed by the UK in regard to NATO and the EU-NATO relationship are perceived with caution (Cottey 2018). This shows that states' feelings of scepticism and restraint can lead to obstructive behaviour for enhancing cooperative efforts.

Overall, bilateral and multilateral relationships play an important part in explaining the behaviour and preferences towards the EU-NATO relationship by those member states belonging to the group of blockers. These ties are significant in promoting ideas and interests vis-à-vis other member states as well as institutional decision-making bodies. Three particular relationships are important to consider, which have negatively impacted the development and enhancement of closer cooperation: Franco-NATO relations, EU-Turkey relations as well as the triad between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Each of these countries pursues their own interests in the international organisations concerned and seeks to influence their policies for their own benefits. While France has demonstrated the willingness to adapt its position towards and perceptions of NATO, the picture looks differently concerning Turkey and Cyprus. The double veto and ensuing participation problem still dictate the relationship between the EU and NATO, and frequently cause tensions and challenges which need to be overcome. Ireland presents an exceptional case because its reserved attitude towards defence cooperation and military operations, which has also contributed to slowing down closer interorganisational cooperation.

5.5 Blockers and the Capabilities Debate

Some states in the group of blockers have, similarly to advocates, significant military capabilities and resources which are relevant for the EU-NATO relationship. They also acknowledge the existing capabilities gap in addition to the leadership gap which influence the future developments of the relationship (Sperling 2004). However, blockers also play an important part in contributing to these gaps due the selective use of their national assets and capabilities as well as their participation in and contribution to EU-led and NATO-led military

crisis management operations. This relates to their perception of membership in the respective organisations and on their views and national interest concerning how they want their preferred organisation to respond to international crisis situations. While France seems to take a staunch position on preserving military independence and autonomy over its nuclear weapons, Greece prefers to contribute its capabilities to the EU in order to exert influence vis-à-vis Turkey, and Turkey itself is among NATO's biggest military powers whose resources would also benefit EU-led operations (Bilgin 2003; Bozo 2016; Dobrescu 2017; Nestoras 2015). Ireland, on the other hand, demands UN authorisation for military operations conducted by the EU and NATO and its military neutrality disallows the country from participation in territorial defence engagement, which is among NATO's core tasks (Cottey 2018). This section examines how blockers make use of their military capabilities to shape the EU-NATO relationship and thereby how they contribute to the existing capabilities gap.

Within the group of blockers, France, Greece and Turkey are among those states which possess well-trained armed forces, a high degree of advanced and sophisticated military capabilities, and a long record of operational experience. All of the blockers have, however, reduced their defence budgets due to the economic and financial constraints succeeding the 2008 financial and economic crisis, albeit to a limited extent. As Figure 5 shows, France, Greece and Turkey nevertheless belong to those countries within NATO which meet, or are close to reach, the target of 2% of GDP for its military expenditure, or those who are in the close vicinity of this target (EDA 2016; NATO 2017a; SIPRI 2017).

In regard to the defence budgets of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey it needs to be noted that one of their main drivers for maintaining high levels of military expenditure relates to the Cyprus issue and the remaining threat perception of one another. In the case of Greece, for example, it is interesting to note that it preserves a high level of defence spending in comparison to other European states despite the implications of the 2008 economic and financial crisis on its economy and also in spite of a rather limited record of contributions to EU and NATO military operations. Although perceived threats from Turkey can no longer be counted as a justification, both its participation and contributions in multilateral crisis management operations and frameworks are only marginal (Dempsey 2012; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014). In contrast, Ireland's military expenditure is generally kept low at 0.3% of its GDP, which reflects its overall positioning on security and defence issues, i.e., military neutrality and the emphasis on international law and the peaceful settlement of conflicts (Keohane 2013;

Sweeney 2016). This has been perceived as an additional hindrance to EU-NATO cooperation by representatives from the organisations (NATO Official 5).

Figure 5 Defence Expenditure of Blockers as a Share of GDP



Data shown for 2016 in %. Source: EDA 2016; NATO 2017a; SIPRI 2017

France, alongside the United Kingdom and Germany, is considered to be one of the main leaders in Europe in terms of developing and contributing to European security and defence capabilities and particularly to CSDP. Due to its exclusion from NATO's integrated military structures and its interest in promoting an autonomous European capacity to develop the EU as a security actor, it has continuously promoted the importance of backing up CSDP with sufficient and adequate military assets and capabilities. Since de Gaulle's presidency and throughout the second half of the 20th century, it has advocated a *Europe de la défense* encompassing European autonomous decision-making over security and defence matters and the acquisition of military capabilities by EU member states (French Officials 1, 2). But France has also been in a constant struggle with its fellow member states in the EU to acquire and develop more advanced and sophisticated military capabilities. Like most other European states, its military expenditure has recorded decreases over the last decade and more evidently since the 2008 economic and financial crisis. Although it promotes European autonomous capabilities and further enhancement of CSDP, it has become increasingly frustrated with its European partners, mostly with those states that actually possess the financial resources to procure more capabilities and to contribute more to EU-led military

operations under CSDP, such as Germany. The country's ambitions and views on the acquisition of military assets and capabilities do not match other member states' ambitions and financial resources, which poses an additional obstacle to improving cooperation among EU members, but also among NATO allies, as well as on the interorganisational level between the EU and NATO (Cizel and von Hlatky 2014; Irondelle and Mérand 2010; Muniz 2013a).

To overcome the lacking capabilities, France has been involved in bilateral and multilateral initiatives and cooperative frameworks to procure joint capabilities with the UK based on the 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration and the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties as well as with the so-called Weimar Triangle, i.e., in cooperation with Germany and Poland (France 2012; UK 2010b; also see Pannier and Schmitt 2014; von Voss et al. 2013). Through these cooperative frameworks the country does not only seek to acquire new capabilities more cost efficiently, but it also desires to tie other member states to the development of European defence capabilities and to commit to CSDP as well as to take the lead in European security and defence. In this context it is therefore interesting to state that 'France bears by far the heaviest CSDP-specific defence burden relative to "average benefits received", whereas the remaining large countries all contribute less than their "fair" share of troops given the average benefits received' (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014: 96). But, although France has always pushed for and promoted an increase of contributions to the CSDP among its allies and partners, its own contributions of military force to NATO surmount the ones to EU-led operations. This raises questions about France's actual preferences and intentions behind its own participation and contributions as well as about its pragmatic approach to security and crisis management as a whole (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014; Irondelle and Mérand 2010).

Since its reintegration into NATO's military command structures in 2009, France has sought to further enhance its leadership role by maintaining closer links to its allies and most importantly to the UK and the US alongside Germany in the EU (Andréani 2002; Pannier 2017; Perruche 2014). With its possession of nuclear weapons, and thus being among the two European nuclear powers alongside the United Kingdom, France has the potential to overcome the EU's leadership gap, and is able to contribute to reducing the capabilities gap. Yet, due to the persistence on the autonomy and independence of its *force de frappe* it has also posed an obstacle especially in terms of cooperation with other European partners as well as within the EU and NATO, which ultimately affected their cooperation. By advancing the idea of autonomous European defence capabilities, it neglects the interests and objectives of other member states and also of the two organisations themselves. This has led

to tensions among states, which also had consequences on the interorganisational level. Concurrently, closer EU-NATO cooperation would not be possible without France and its military capabilities and resources (German Officials 2; Romanian Official 1).

In a similar vein, Turkey is able to use its military capabilities as a leverage for its political interests. More importantly, its geostrategic location in addition to its bilateral relations are of significance for both the EU and NATO. For example, it 'serves as a buffer between Europe, the West and the Middle East' (NATO Officials 4) which is especially crucial for the conduct of military and civilian crisis management operations and the establishment of bases for operational activities in the proximity of conflictual areas. It is tasked to secure NATO's southern flank and the Aegean Sea alongside Greece. Because of the transformation of its armed forces it has not only become one of the most powerful allies in the region but also one that seeks a comprehensive approach to crisis management by combining civilian and military components (Turkey 2011b). Turkey seeks to play an increasingly influential role in the Aegean Sea and the Middle East as well as within NATO. Therefore, it makes use of its capabilities and resources to receive more power by influencing the Alliance's decisions (Oğuzlu 2013). As it was observable in the case of Cyprus' bid for participating in NATO's PfP programme, the country successfully mobilised its capabilities and resources to express its concerns and opposing views, which was translated into a veto. Yet, the military coup in July 2016 had negative impacts on the structure and composition of Turkey's military and armed forces, because of the detainment of over 80,000 state employees and the reduction of serving officers by 10% (The Military Balance 2017; also NATO Officials 4). The actual implications and effects on Turkey's capacity to influence will have to be seen however. Since it is among the largest military forces and actively contributes to the security of the Atlantic Alliance through participations in its operations, NATO was not keen to open negotiations talks with the Republic of Cyprus because it did not desire to become involved in neither the Cyprus conflict nor in the Greek-Turkish dispute (Tsakonas 2008).

The possession and use of particular defence capabilities, such as nuclear weapons in the case of France, as well as additional assets, Turkey's geostrategic location for example, have proven to be useful for blockers to influence the EU-NATO relationship according to their national preferences and interests. This has often times led to slowing down further progress, but also to the obstruction of new incentives and cooperation efforts. Most striking is the continuous impact of the Cyprus issue on the relationship, which has resulted in a state of hostage taking in both organisations. As the following section explores, blockers share

particular views on operational engagement and cooperation between the EU and NATO and showcase a long record of operational experience. They increasingly participate in multilateral military operations, in which they continue to pursue their national interests.

5.6 Interoperability and Division of Labour

Both interoperability and division of labour are key factors where the preferences of blockers become visible, especially in regard to cooperation between the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance in the operational dimension. Although blockers seek to make their armed forces and military capabilities more efficient and sustainable, their contributions to improving interoperability and their attitude towards division of labour represent additional obstacles. A higher degree of participation and contribution to operations allows member states to have greater influence on and involvement in the planning process of operations. Member states' contributions to interoperability also shape their view on the preferred division of labour and the allocation of responsibilities. This section therefore examines their contributions to closing the interoperability gap between the EU and NATO, and the extent to which blockers participate in EU-led and NATO-led operations as well as how they promote their preferred view of a division of labour between the two organisations.

Member states in the group of blockers share particular aspects on their perception of and view on interoperability between the EU and NATO (see Table 5). They do agree on the necessity of interoperability for effective operational cooperation and seek to increase the effectiveness and performance of their own armed forces through possibilities of collaboration, cooperation and coordination, thus through interoperability. Yet, national interests prevail and internal obstacles have also proven to be challenges for achieving higher levels of interoperability. The notion of complementarity is a component of interoperability but also linked to blockers' view on and understanding of division of labour between the two organisations. There is, however, a divergence between single members and multiple members. While single members evidently favour the organisation in which they have membership, multiple members take preference for one over the other, and therefore they provide more support and resource to the institutional and capability developments of their preferred organisation. The behaviours of France, Greece and Turkey are the most illustrative examples to demonstrate how blockers engage in the division of labour debate and contribute to interoperability.

Under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, interoperability was one of the main drivers for re-joining NATO's integrated military command structures (Irondelle and Mérand 2010). Despite France's exclusion it participated in the Alliance's military operations albeit to a limited extent due to the emergence of operational obstacles. During the Balkan wars in the 1990s, i.e., in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and FYRoM, the French government as well as its armed forces were increasingly confronted with the lack of coordination and cooperation capacities with their NATO allies, which hampered both their diplomatic and military effectiveness and capabilities. The response from the newly created European Union was marginal because of the lack of resources, the shortage of capabilities and operational inexperience of the then twelve member states. In addition, despite the drive for European defence autonomy, France realised the significance of NATO and the importance of collaboration including interoperability. These problems had not been solved in such a short period of time and therefore re-occurred during the NATO-led ISAF operation in Afghanistan in the early 2000s (EU Official 1).

For France, problems have been recorded within NATO as well as within the EU, but also between EU and NATO when both organisations conducted military operations in the same theatre (Bialos 2005; Sperling 2004). On the European level, it therefore seeks to increase interoperability through the joint procurement of defence capabilities, such as with the United Kingdom through the help of the Lancaster House Treaties as well as with Germany and Poland through the Weimar Triangle initiatives and projects. On the interorganisational level, parallel and coordinated trainings and military exercises between the EU and NATO have also been promoted by France (French Official 2), and thus a supportive view of higher levels of interoperability can be identified. Simultaneously, however, it has tried to maintain and even improve its own military and political rank in both organisations as well as globally. In this respect, interoperability is regarded as a goal as long as France can exert influence and is able to strengthen its own voice therein (Irondelle and Schmitt 2013; Simón 2017). Moreover, in the context of interoperability, the 2013 French White Paper on Security and Defence (France 2013) nevertheless emphasises the preservation of sovereignty as well as the wish and ability to act independently and in any framework desired by any state. This clearly shows that France pursues two parallel objectives. On the one hand, it desires more efficient coordination and practices of interoperability and, on the other hand, the country favours strong European defence capacities in which it plays the dominant role.

One way of influencing the process of interoperability as well as the EU-NATO relationship overall is through the participation in and contributions to military crisis management operations. Member states' contributions to EU-led missions and operations are generally marginal compared to the ones to NATO operations and even to UN missions. Some states are nevertheless eager to make the highest contributions to CSDP operations to pursue certain national objectives and strategic goals. Both France and Greece have participated in and contributed to all EU-led military operations under the framework of CSDP since the launch of the EU's first deployment in EUFOR Operation Concordia in 2003, though to varying degrees and with diverging intentions.

France has been the initiator of the majority of CSDP military operations, especially of those conducted on the African continent such as Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, EUFOR DR Congo, EUFOR Chad/CAR in Chad and the Central African Republic, EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mali. It has furthermore acted as framework nation and provided the operational headquarters, e.g., in EUFOR Operation Artemis and EUFOR Chad/CAR (Grevi et al. 2009; see Appendix B). Despite its withdrawal from the Alliance's integrated military command structures, it nevertheless participated in NATO-led operations during the 1990s and early 2000s, for example in SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo, Operation Essential Harvest as well as subsequent military operations in FYRoM, ISAF in Afghanistan, Operation Unified Protector in Libya and Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean Sea. In the case of initiating the no-fly zone in Libya, France was even one of the lead nations alongside the UK (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014; Appendix B). France's eagerness to launch and conduct EU operations highlights its preference for EU over NATO in crisis management as it seeks to increase the EU's role as an international security actor. Particularly concerning crises in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa, France's national interests are at stake and consequently it aims to get increasingly involved (Gegout 2009). This further shows France's view on division of labour between the EU and NATO. According to a French official, the EU is 'more capable and suitable due to its existing policies and funds' (French Official 2) which leads to the assumption that France favours EU over NATO for the conduct of crisis management operations. Additionally, it does not want NATO to get involved in areas such as capability and capacity building because this is part of the EU's territory, and only wants the two to cooperate in those areas where it is regarded to be fruitful and necessary because of lacking capabilities on the EU's side (French Officials 1, 2).

In the case of Greece, the participation in CSDP and NATO operations serves a specific national objective. Although Greece has so far been engaged in every EU-led and NATO-led operation and despite being among those states with the highest military expenditure, Dempsey (2012) notes that 'its participation has been negligible' and therefore, 'it is not using its soldiers to boost either EU or NATO operations' and nor does it enhance EU-NATO cooperation. Since its accession to both organisations, it has contributed to operations such as in KFOR, ISAF and Operation Ocean Shield as well as in EU-led operations in the Western Balkans (Concordia, Althea) and in Africa (Artemis, DR Congo, Chad/CAR, Atalanta and Mali). Yet, the Hellenic Republic has neither taken over as framework nor as lead nation, and instead, it has deployed only marginal numbers of troops, assets and capabilities (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014; Grevi et al. 2009). It becomes evident that Greece's rationale behind participating in EU-led operations is to secure its own position in the EU vis-à-vis Turkey. Within NATO its participation needs to be understood in parallel to Turkey's participation and contributions (Tsakonas and Tournikiotis 2003; Appendix B). Consequently, it does not see a strict division of labour as vital, but rather takes preference for the EU for its national security interests because developing the EU as a strong actor in security and defence and in crisis management helps Greece to realise its own interests.

Turkey shares some of Greece's viewpoints as well as the French approach to interoperability between the EU and NATO. In the early stages of CSDP and in the beginning of EU-NATO relations, cooperation was seen as part of the country's strategy to join the Union (NATO Officials 4). Hence, it saw interoperability as a necessity for functional cooperation in military operations, especially in cases of overlapping tasks and engagements in the same geographical location such as the Western Balkans. Turkey still sought EU accession with full integration and involvement in CSDP operations and decision-making procedures. Not only cooperation but also interoperability was the only option for the two organisations to collaborate more effectively and efficiently (Bilgin 2003). With its military assets, its position within NATO and its geographical location it wishes to contribute to both organisation's success in operations as well as to their interoperability. Interoperability especially between Europe, NATO and the US is not only vital for the EU-NATO relationship but also internally for the Atlantic Alliance, which simultaneously needs to be improved due to the internal force imbalance. Yet, diplomatic relations, including bilateral tensions and disagreements, in addition to political and military imbalances are more powerful in shaping institutional, political and operational compatibility and interoperability (Çağlar and Akdemir 2017). Moreover, as outlined in the previous subsections, the triangular conflict between Cyprus,

Greece and Turkey poses an additional obstacle to achieving interoperability and compatibility between the EU and NATO. Added barriers and challenges include the communication problem, the search for circumventing the disclosure of information problem, and the particularities of cooperation inside and outside the Berlin Plus framework (Acikmese and Triantaphyllou 2012). Especially these limitations to cooperation hinder further enhancement of interoperability between the EU and NATO.

Blockers take a specific position on the notions of interoperability and division of labour. They prefer one organisation over the other and seek to further develop its capabilities whereby they create new challenges for interoperability and future cooperation between the EU and NATO.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the positions, policies and attitudes of blockers of interorganisational interaction. In regard to the EU-NATO relationship, they play a particular part since they frequently pose new obstacles and challenges to improving this relationship. While blockers cannot be labelled as those who completely obstruct or oppose this interorganisational cooperation, these states interrupt its enhancement intentionally as well as unintentionally through their rhetoric and behaviour. The Cyprus issues still illustrates a critical juncture but cannot be counted as the only obstacle to enhancing EU-NATO cooperation.

Blockers as a whole can be labelled as the "troublemakers" within the EU, NATO and their interorganisational relationship. Although they do not always act homogeneously, they share certain notions and views on the EU-NATO relationship. They have engaged in the formalisation and institutionalisation process albeit not as intense as, for example, advocates. Their input and contributions as well as their agreement to formalising are the result of a series of compromises and concessions. Therefore, some achievements of the EU-NATO relationship can be considered as the lowest common denominator based on the demands, expectations and policies of member states on both sides. In addition to bilateral and minilateral tensions, other factors determine their positions which include the strategic interests of France, Greece and Turkey, including their positioning of themselves in the respective organisations as well as within the interorganisational relationship, and the use of

their capabilities to pursue national objectives. States in the group of blockers have overall made use of political strategies, especially of hostage-taking and turf battles, i.e., in terms of blocking each other's accession in the case of Cyprus and Turkey or when negotiating over the deployment of troops and the distribution of military capabilities for crisis management operations.

The attitude and behaviour of France is most prominent among the blockers. It has shifted its positions over time from a strong stance on European autonomous defence capacity and capabilities to a rapprochement with NATO leading to its reintegration, and from constituting to a major challenge for EU-NATO cooperation to a facilitator albeit with reservations and still obstructing elements. In a similar vein, the triad of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey remains a hurdle and only its solution can bring positive implications for interorganisational interactions. Overall, these states have impeded efforts to institutionalise and enhance but have never fully opposed the EU-NATO relationship.

Chapter 6 – Balancers of Interorganisational Interaction

6.1 Introduction

The primary objective, which determines membership in the group of balancers of interorganisational interaction, is to strike the balance between the EU and NATO, and between the other types of member states, i.e., advocates, blockers and neutrals. Member states in this group bring forward a broad set of skills and tools, which they frequently apply in order to balance between the different positions within the EU-NATO relationship. Some of these states are said to have no concrete strategy in their foreign, security and defence policy, therefore they float with the current and act responsively instead of proactively (Dyson 2014; Muniz 2013b). Their strategy is precisely to serve as a balancing act between the Europeanist and Atlanticist camps, and to mitigate between the security needs of the North and the South as well as the East and the West of the EU and NATO's geographical membership scope. Balancers take more flexible and adjustable positions because they are in favour of the cooperation efforts between the EU and NATO as a whole, but might also seek to slow down specific initiatives and projects. Their overall objective, however, is different from those of advocates, blockers and neutrals since they aim to create an equilibrium of the diverse range of positions and viewpoints. Some balancers are more vocal and outspoken about their positions whereas others silently follow like-minded states. Through the examination of national security and defence strategy papers, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain have been identified as the states that form the group of balancers of interorganisational interaction.

These four states that form the group of balancers take a more nuanced approach in comparison to advocates and blockers. While their attitude towards EU-NATO cooperation is generally positive, they show traces of medium to low levels of active promotion of enhanced cooperation and their level of engagement in negotiations is consequently medium as well. This is further related to their mediocre contributions and possession of resources allocated to both organisations based on the limited availability and national constraints. Deriving from their mid-range scores of the selection criteria of the typology of member states, balancers take the middle way epitomising the mediators in interorganisational relations.

The following analysis shows how the member states in this group seek to balance and mitigate among the divergences on and in the EU-NATO relationship and how they simultaneously pursue their own interests and objectives. The overview of their shared characteristics and features provides the foundation for the subsequent subsections, which is then followed by the analysis of balancers' involvement in the institutionalisation process of EU-NATO cooperation, and how they perceive and make use of their own memberships as well as the extent to which they apply political strategies. The subsections on their military capabilities and their contributions to EU-led and NATO-led military operations as well as their view on interoperability and division of labour is then concluded by outlining balancers' positioning in the EU-NATO relationship.

6.2 Shared Characteristics of Balancers

The key features that are shared by all states in the group of balancers are categorised along the lines of the type of their membership, their capabilities and their strategic cultures. Throughout their actions and behaviours, this group of member states pursues the overall aim of balancing other member states' positions and especially among those who traditionally belong to either the Atlanticist or Europeanist camp, and seek to mitigate among states with conflicting positions and preferences particularly in the context of deepening interorganisational cooperation in security, defence and military crisis management. Consequently, alternative labels for balancers, or at least for some specific members in this group, have been used in the scholarly literature such as '*Mittellage*'[10] – or 'middle ground' (Simón 2017; Zimmer 1997), 'balancing act' and 'third way' (Faleg 2013) as well as 'mediator' (Algieri 2011; Zyla 2011). Despite their general support of the EU-NATO relationship, these member states are nevertheless considered as balancers because, what generally unites them, is the pursuit of a balanced approach to EU-NATO cooperation. All of these group members, however, depict the following characteristics to varying levels and at different points in time. In comparison to the other types of member states in interorganisational

[10] The term 'Mittellage' shall not be confused with the negative connotation that circulated during the Bismarckian era, in which Germany's central European location and surrounding by five major powers was perceived as a geopolitical threat, which it sought to counter by a semi-hegemonic strategy. The categorisation and characterisation of Germany as a balancer of interorganisational interaction shall furthermore not be confused with, and shall therefore be delimited from Bismarck's balance of power politics.

interaction, balancers are more homogenous due to their commonalities and shared positions as demonstrated in this analysis.

Concerning their membership, balancers are multiple member states and are deeply rooted in the institutional structures of both the EU and NATO (Gehring and Oberthür 2009). It is in fact recognised that multiple membership is a prerequisite to be categorised as a balancer in interorganisational interaction. Only in the case of multiple membership with the ensuing ability to influence in decision-making processes, the capability to shape policy outcomes, institutional structures and making decisions over military deployments, a balancer would be able to exert influence in both organisations equally and can then be recognised as a viable and competent player among member states. Single member states lack the required access to important decision-making forums in order to actually make an impact in both organisations and on the interorganisational level.

The time of gaining membership, i.e., either as original and founding member or as a subsequent and new addition, is not necessarily decisive (cf. Magliveras 2011). Yet, in order to be able to serve as a balancer from an early stage, an early accession to an international organisation before the start of interactions with other organisations is helpful. Balancers then have the ability to mitigate and balance from the earliest moment possible to avoid any competition or rivalry among organisations in the same policy field. Out of the four states in this group only Italy is among the founding members of both organisations and can therefore be considered the only original and old member state in this group. Germany is among the creators of the EU and Portugal of the Atlantic Alliance, but have equally joined the respective other organisation at a later point in time – West Germany joined NATO in 1955 which was followed by the inclusion of the Federal Republic in 1990, and Portugal joined the EU in 1986. Spain, on the other hand, is a subsequent member state because it joined both organisations in the 1980s after its transition to a liberal democracy, and it only received full membership in NATO in 1995 as a result from the 1986 referendum under a government led by the Spanish Socialist Workers Party.

A shared characteristic of balancers is their Atlanticist orientation in security and defence although this has been disputed in the case of Germany, which has often been claimed to belong to the Europeanist camp (Miskimmon 2001). While this Atlanticist trace in their strategic culture refers primarily to their standpoint on defence policy, it does not ultimately reflect their attitude towards the EU-NATO relationship and the way they perceive their own memberships. Portugal is the most salient example of balancers with an Atlanticist outlook.

Due to its geostrategic location on the Atlantic and its long relationship with the US, it has maintained a focus on the Atlantic region for security and defence (Ferreira-Pereira 2007a, 2007b; Robinson 2016). Similarly, Spain and Italy have Atlanticist traits in their strategic cultures and both prefer to make use of NATO's capabilities and functions for military crisis management operations of high intensity (Portugal 2015; Spain 2013). In the case of Germany, however, there is an ambiguity whether it can be regarded as Atlanticist or Europeanist. While the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs traditionally maintains a European orientation and stresses the importance of developing a European defence capacity, the Federal Ministry of Defence has a tendency towards a preference for the conduct of military operations through NATO (German Officials 3).

Balancers have specific constraints in terms of their defence budgets and sizes of their armed forces. Most notably, their shared historical experience as former autocratic and fascist regimes have significantly contributed to their middle power status[11] as well as to their overall positioning within both the EU and NATO. All four states have a historical record of dictatorship in the twentieth century: Germany under the Nazi Regime (1933-1945), Italy under Mussolini and the era of Italian Fascism (1922-1943), Portugal during the Second Republic or also known as *Estada Novo* (1933-1974), and Spain under Franco's dictatorship (1939-1975). This historical experience has strongly shaped balancers' strategic cultures, which leads to the assumption that these events have been imprinting and characterising to the extent that these member states do not risk in any way to return to these ideologies or their former positions. For example, two of Germany's guiding principles are "never again" and "never alone", and Spain is still hesitant towards greater involvement which is shown by its late full membership in the alliance (Coates 2000; Iso-Markku 2016; Marrone and Di Camillo 2013; Wurzer 2013). Their middle power status paired with the constraints in their strategic cultures based on their historical experiences has induced the view of these states as 'soft powers' and 'civilian powers' (Faleg 2013; Maull 2006; Muniz 2013b).

In addition to their membership and their label as balancers, these states consequently share the status of 'middle powers' (Dobrescu 2017; Junk and Daase 2013; Marrone and Di Camillo 2013). This refers to the level of their military capabilities and resources as well as their global involvement in security and defence matters. In this context, some of the states in this group

[11] In this case "middle power" status refers to balancer's military capabilities in relation to their positioning within NATO and the EU, i.e., their location in the centred in terms of their possession of military assets and capabilities available to EU-led and NATO-led military operations and the level of their military expenditures.

are furthermore labelled as 'laggards', such is the case specifically with Germany, but also occasionally with Italy, Portugal and Spain (Mejía 2017; Rodt 2017; Wagner 2005). As outlined by one NATO official, these four states are not among those with the most outstanding contributions to military operations or do not launch any missions themselves. But they are constantly and continuously involved in improving interorganisational relations through participation in initiatives, negotiations, trainings and other projects (NATO Official 5). Instead of providing the leadership in military capabilities, balancers are thus rather active in the institutionalisation of interorganisational relations as well as in the conceptual and structural developments to combat limited resources and counteract domestic constraints and can overall rather be characterised as reactive than proactive (Kempin 2015).

States in the group of balancers of interorganisational interaction are perceived to be more homogeneous in comparison to advocates or blockers, though they also show differences regarding the extent of these common characteristics and their attitudes towards and position in security and defence matters in the EU and NATO frameworks. For example, while Germany is considered as the European economic power, the other three have suffered heavily from the 2008 economic and financial crisis. In contrast, although Germany has the economic strength and the industrial base to acquire and develop more sophisticated weaponry and capabilities, which is not the case of the other balancers, it shows less willingness than Italy, Portugal and Spain to increase its defence spending (Hyde-Price 2015; Sabatino 2017). All states in the group of balancers have thus often been accused as laggards in the context of Euro-Atlantic security and defence. Furthermore, these four members depict some level of variation in the four dimensions of institutionalisation of EU-NATO cooperation (see Table 6), i.e., membership, military capabilities, and interoperability and division of labour which will be revealed in the following subsections.

Table 6 Overview of Balancers' Characteristics

Shared characteristics by balancers	**Features vis-à-vis membership**	**Contributions to the capabilities debate**	**View on interoperability and division of labour**
• labelled as 'mediators', 'balancing act' and 'middle ground'	• multiple members • can be both original and	• seek to fill capability gaps equally • involved in capability	• promote interoperability actively • favour division of labour

• in favour of interorganisational cooperation • mediate and negotiate among states and organisations alike • balance the institutionalisation process but do not seek a rapid advancement to accommodate the preferences of others • Atlanticist orientation to diverging degrees	subsequent members • generally active in negotiations and in small group activities • favour contact and dialogue partner for other members • maintain good relations will all member states from both organisations • use of diplomacy and negotiations to mediate in inter-member states disagreements	development initiatives in both organisations but not very proactive • balance efforts and capabilities • not among those member states with high military budgets • identified as middle powers in both the EU and NATO • labelled as "laggards" • limitations on the use of force	where the strengths of both organisations are highlighted and effectively used • want that division of labour and interoperability benefit both organisations equally

6.3 Contributions to the Institutionalisation of EU-NATO Cooperation

This section examines the role of balancers in the institutionalisation process of the EU-NATO relationship. It traces the historical milestones and focuses especially on the main agreements signed by the two organisations, i.e., the 2002 Joint Declaration including the Security of Information Agreement and the 2003 Berlin Plus arrangements as well as the 2016 Joint Declaration. Balancers are generally in favour of formalising and institutionalising the cooperative efforts between the Union and the Atlantic Alliance. The main reason for this preference is rooted in their historical experience as former unilaterally driven and isolated actors and as authoritative regimes in the twentieth century. The foreign, security and defence policies of all four member states emphasise heavily the significance of

multilateralism and especially of intergovernmental organisations through which they seek to take joint actions with their partners and allies. Accordingly, the national security and defence strategies of balancers state that multilateralism is vital for responding effectively to contemporary threats and security risks (Germany 2006, 2016; Portugal2015; Spain 2013). Moreover, their close attachments to multilateralism and international organisations allow these middle powers to upload their own national interests and preferences to the intergovernmental level, which gives them a more vocal and influential position among more powerful member states. A higher degree of institutionalisation of interorganisational interaction, and more specifically of EU-NATO cooperation, therefore fosters multilateralism even further and provides balancers greater leverage on security and defence matters.

Since balancers are not at the forefront in terms of creating obstacles or initiating arrangements like France and the United Kingdom, they seek to be part of the negotiation processes in which they are able to make use of their ability as balancing acts. None of the balancers therefore belongs to these fringe groups or troublemakers in regard to either European strategic autonomy, NATO's dominance or interorganisational cooperation. Instead, balancers engage in mediation among member states who create tensions and pose new challenges. Balancers can additionally be regarded as silent followers or 'support states' (Rodt 2017: 141-142) as well as 'bystanders' (Overhaus 2004: 555) among the member states in both organisations. Because of the lack of high level and sophisticated initiatives on the institutional level, with the exception of Germany's idea of the framework nation concept within NATO, especially the behaviour of Southern European states among the balancers has been perceived as rather 'lazy' and 'free-riding' (NATO Official 5).

The behaviour and bargaining positions of Italy and Germany represent the most salient examples. Italy has engaged in negotiating and balancing between France, as the leader of the Europeanist camp, and the UK, as the head of the Atlanticist camp, in the debate on European security and defence capacities and capabilities. It has made use of its own military capabilities to gain leverage in these negotiations. For example, it followed the UK and deployed troops to Iraq under the coalition of the willing in 2003 as well as strengthened its commitment in Afghanistan in 2003, while at the same time, it supported the launch of the EU's first autonomous military operation labelled Artemis in the DRC. This shows its balancing approach by not only supporting and contributing to operations on both sides, but also by engaging in the negotiations of their launches and designs. It supported and contributed equally to the initiatives to launch military operations by both France and the UK. The country

was especially keen to avoid the "either or" debate and it therefore served as 'a diplomatic and political balancing act' which sought 'to find a "third way, or mediation between the French vision (…) and the UK's pro-Atlantic stance (…)' (Faleg 2013: 64). One Italian representative consequently observed that in the past and primarily during the late 1990s as well as in recent occasions, Italy 'does not align with or refer to other bigger states' such as France, the UK or the US (Italian Official 1) and alternatively locates itself in the middle ground while negotiating with both sides equally.

Comparatively, Germany takes increasingly the route of mediating especially between France and the United Kingdom as well as the US. It was stuck between France's preference for European defence autonomy and ESDI, and Britain's perseverance of NATO's primacy. It saw this divide problematic in regard to the interventions in the Balkans and the debates circulating the prime actor to intervene and to become involved. From the early stages of cooperative efforts, Germany has been interested in 'reinforcing cooperation between NATO and the European Union' (Overhaus 2004: 556) and formalising their relations especially since Britain as well as Greece and Turkey had agreed to further advancements. Therefore, Germany itself saw the development of ESDI as the best option to please its Western partner France while ultimately keeping the UK interested because NATO would remain a significant player, and also to provide viable options to non-EU NATO member states such as Turkey. Furthermore, throughout the formalisation process, the country demanded for higher levels of transparency and complementarity among all actors involved, i.e., international secretariats and member states alike (Meiers 2001). This allowed to have equal information about the negotiations and to find common ground for consultations between the two organisations.

Another exemplary behaviour of Germany is its bargaining activity between its most important allies, France and the US. Under the chancellorship of Helmut Kohl as well as under Klaus Kinkel as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Volker Rühe as Minister of Defence during the 1990s, it was made clear that there is and has to be compatibility between the EU, ESDI and NATO integrity. The government also sought to actively pursue to mitigate between France and the US due to their strong bilateral relationship and the significance of these two states for European and international security (Rees 1996). To proactively mediate and mitigate, Kinkel took the route of bilateral partnerships to promote this approach. For instance, in 1998, Klaus Kinkel and his French counterpart Hubert Védrine drafted a joint call for

complementarity between Europe and America specifically in regard to their transatlantic relations including the area of security and defence (Germany 1998).

Equally, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the country's own reunification, Germany used the momentum to realise a new form of *Ostpolitik* which was addressed at integrating Central and Eastern European states into the western security and defence system including the structures of NATO and the EU, as well as to maintain stable relations with Russia. In addition, to pay justice to its 'culture of compromise' and 'tradition of corporatism' (Wurzer 2013: 35), the government was furthermore involved in talks with its counterparts from its NATO allies to convince them of the compatibility and complementarity of the EU, the WEU and the Alliance as well as of the necessity and the advantages of closer cooperation between these actors. This emphasis has been fruitful for the advancement of the institutionalisation process because it reduced the level of mistrust among member states in the two organisations and especially France and the US. Germany sought to use its own Presidency in the WEU to connect the EU and NATO. For example, in his speech at the 1997 Autumn Summit of the WEU in Paris, Klaus Kinkel (1997) re-emphasised that 'the WEU plays an increasing role as joint between the European Union and NATO'. With this behaviour and these relationships, the country overall aims 'to strike the right balance' (Simón 2017: 76). This demonstrates Germany's balancing act between France, the US and the Central and Eastern European states on EU-NATO cooperation and that it has sought to engage on all sides to advance the formalisation process.

One way of vocalising and realising a state's policy preferences is the use of the Presidency in the European Union. By adding EU-NATO cooperation on the agenda, balancers – similar to other types of member states of interorganisational interaction – have successfully made use of their EU Presidencies for the advancement and deepening of EU-NATO cooperation on the one hand, and to find the middle ground among all member states on the other hand. Three major milestones have been achieved in which the EU Presidencies of states within the group of balancers were decisive. First, after having hold the 1996 NATO ministerial meeting, where alliance partners in joint action with members of the WEU agreed upon the use of the Alliance's military assets for WEU-led crisis management operations (NATO 1996; Reichard 2006), Germany was once again host to a crucial meeting by the EU heads of states and governments. At the 1999 European Council meeting in Cologne, it was agreed to advance European defence and crisis management capabilities, which were to be beneficial for both the EU and NATO, which would ultimately increase the interoperability between them. The

outcomes of the European Council Conclusions reinforced the key elements of the recently signed Saint-Malo Declaration between France and the EU and contributed further by agreeing on the capability development as well as on 'the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency' between the two security organisations (European Council 1999).

Second, at the 2000 European Council meeting in Santa Maria da Feira under the Portuguese Presidency, the EU member states decided upon the establishment of ad hoc joint EU-NATO working groups to deepen cooperation on the security issues, capabilities goals, modalities for the EU's access to the Alliance's assets and capabilities, and mechanisms for permanent consultations (European Council 2000). There are two important factors to note in terms of the Portuguese EU Presidency in 2000. The first factor is that the country held the Presidency in the WEU at the time in which it emphasised the integration of the WEU into the EU's structures. The second one is that Portugal continuously reminded the EU community of its close ties to other Atlantic states. In these debates, the Portuguese geographical location and its initial Atlanticist foreign policy orientation were crucial to maintain the link between EU and NATO (de Melo Palma 2009; Robinson 2016). During both Presidencies, Germany and Portugal were decisive in preparing the meetings and the drafting the conclusions, which were filtered according to both country's policy preferences as well as the common view of all member states on is interorganisational cooperation. Furthermore, these decisions taken at both European Council meetings eventually led to the formulation of the Berlin Plus arrangements, which proved to be a major advancement of the EU-NATO relationship.

Finally, during the Portuguese EU Presidency in 2007 another milestone was achieved, which served to be beneficial and contributory to this interorganisational cooperation. The EU member states agreed on a set of initiatives for improving European military capabilities and structures including the EDF, MPCC and PESCO. These initiatives were only brought into being in 2017 but are sought to bring an additional input and added-value to EU-NATO relations, which remains to be seen, however (cf. Biscop 2017; also see Chapter 8).

The contributions of balancers of interorganisational interaction to the institutionalisation of the EU-NATO relationship has demonstrated to be very specific for this group of member states. They fall short on major initiatives but have made use of their bilateral relations as well as their EU Presidencies to facilitate the formalisation of interorganisational cooperation. This illustrates their approach to finding the middle ground between the organisations and member states alike to balance any counterweights.

6.4 Foreign Policy Orientations, National Assets and the Use of Membership

This subsection explores the specific assets and caveats of membership of balancers, how well they are networked and embedded in bilateral, minilateral and multilateral cooperation, and the extent to which they perceive and use their membership to mitigate among other member states and between the EU and NATO. While states usually make use of their membership in multiple organisations to reduce transaction costs, coordinate their activities and policies and to realise their national interests (see Abbott and Snidal 1998), additionally, balancers show signs of equalising their national interests with those of the respective organisations. For example, Germany 'has continued to wrap its domestic and foreign policy within the EU mantle' (Mattox 2011: 122) and has heavily internalised collective security as well as the European foreign, security and defence policy in its domestic context. Although membership in international security organisations is regarded as a legitimising factor for their external action and relations, their strategic cultures are deeply embedded in multilateral forums as well as close-knit bilateral and minilateral cooperation frameworks (Barbé and Mestres 2007; Baumann and Hellmann 2001; Cardoso Reis 2013; Faleg 2015). Balancers have each a specific set of characteristics and assets, which are beneficial for serving and acting as balancers, and which will be outline in this subsection to analyse the use and perception of their memberships (see Table 6). Since each balancer has its own assets and caveats, this subsection looks at each state individually but will establish a red thread to demonstrate their commonality.

Germany has long been claimed to be the 'civilian power' in Europe (Maull 2006) and has imposed itself constitutional and legal limitations concerning the use of military force. Until the court ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court of 12 July 1994 (Deutscher Bundestag 2016), Germany was prohibited from participating in and contributing to military operations excluding humanitarian missions. Yet, the nature of the German Bundeswehr as a so-called *Parlamentsarmee* ("parliamentary army"), which requires the approval of the Bundestag for each mandate and deployment, has resulted in special rules of engagement for the armed forces based on the 2004 Parliamentary Participation Act. This has significant effects on its engagement in military operations as well as on its foreign policy orientation. There are traces of an 'anti-militarism' (Baumann and Hellmann 2001: 63; Iso-Markku 2016: 51) and a 'mentality of caution, restraint, and reserve' in its strategic culture (Hyde-Price 2015: 601), which have often times hampered Germany's activism and engagement in security and

defence. The perception of the country's restraint as a decelerating factor has been especially emphasised, for example, by one EU official and also confirmed by a Romanian official. Both claimed that the progress in European defence is slowed down by the country's dilemma between its economic growth, and thus the potential for increased defence investments, and the anti-militarism and restrained attitude towards the use of force (EU Official 4; Romanian Official 1). One high-ranked German official even acknowledged this impact and admitted that the country eventually needs to give up its initial misgivings in the security and defence realm (German Official 1). The traditional rivalry between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as their different viewpoints have proven to be additional obstacles, which have suspended Germany's efforts in security and defence cooperation (Dyson 2014; Hyde-Price 2015).

The German position therefore poses a specific caveat but in order to compensate for this behaviour, it makes strategic use of its additional assets. Its central geographical location – the so-called *Mittellage* – has long been a burden for its external relations and so has its critical size in terms of its physical and economic sizes (Fröhlich 2011; Zimmer 1997). It is caught, not only geographically but also politically, between the East and West as well as between the North and South. Nevertheless, it has made use of this location for the purpose of mitigating among member states and international secretariats due to its wide network of bilateral and minilateral relationships. This central position is well suited for its role as mediator and balancer because it has always needed to maintain peaceful and stable relations with all of its nine neighbouring countries. This position has often been labelled as *Strommitte* ('mid-stream') by several German representatives (German Officials 2), which implies its central location as well as the notion of going with the current. It thus counts France and Poland as well as the US as its most important partners in foreign policy, security and defence (Germany 2016). The tensions between Paris and Washington needed to be specifically eased through Germany as a mediator. It has an interest in both the transatlantic view and the Gaullist perspective on European security and defence, and seeks to keep stable and good relations with both partners. Because it does not desire to disappoint any of its partners and allies, it usually approaches them informally before decision-makings in order to negotiate a common ground as well as a compromise (Kaim and Niedermeier 2011; Meiers 2001; Zyla 2012). This approach is translated to the level of the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship because Germany prefers a common approach as well as collaboration and cooperation among all partners in terms of EU-NATO cooperation.

As a member of the Quint and the Friends of Europe alongside its most valued partners, it also maintains close ties with Italy and the UK. Within these small interest groups, German representatives occasionally invite representatives of other EU and NATO member states to so-called *Kaffeerunden* ('coffee rounds' or 'coffee meetings') in order to informally discuss and negotiate further developments and initiatives. In these minilateral negotiation groups, Germany has taken over the position as broker especially between Eastern European and Atlanticist demands as well as between France, on the one side, and the US and Britain, on the other. For example, during the first stages of initiating and launching a military operation, Germany would first invite its close partners in both the EU and NATO to these *Kaffeerunden* to discuss their preferences and strategic choices for action. Before the issue comes to the decision-making table, the country seeks to find ways to harmonise diverging interests and opinions. According to one German official, the national representative then evaluates the options and seeks to express compromises to comfort its close partners but also to find a way to harmonise and use of the strengths and capabilities of both organisations (German Officials 2). Such meetings have therefore proven to be vital, above all, in regard to enhancing EU-NATO cooperation and circumventing political tensions among states.

Moreover, Germany increasingly constitutes the first point of contact in consultations for several member states when new ideas or initiatives are introduced and when crucial items are put on the agenda. Particularly small and medium-sized member states in both organisations increasingly seek to consult and negotiate with Germany as it was confirmed by a Dutch as well as a high-ranked Slovak representative (Dutch Official 1; Slovak Official 1). Furthermore, despite Estonia's Atlanticist foreign and security policy orientation and its advocative position on EU-NATO cooperation, it 'recently looks more often at (…) Germany for actions' (Estonian Official 1). This demonstrates that Germany has not only become a more important player in security and defence matters, but also that its skills as broker and mediator between the different states and actors involved in EU-NATO cooperation is highly in demand. It shows that its central position as balancer has received wide-spread acceptance, which allows Germany to further pursue the key features of this role.

Among the balancers, Spain would be considered as the newest multiple member states. It joined both organisations after having transformed into a liberal democracy in 1975 with the end of the Franco era. Yet, due to the outcome of the referendum on NATO membership in 1986, which left it outside the integrated military command structures, it did not fully join the alliance until 1996. In this situation it was able to participate in working groups and

committees, however it was not involved in the military structures of the Atlantic Alliance (Arteaga 2013; Serra 1988). Over the past two decades, Spain has increasingly perceived its full memberships in both EU and NATO as essential for its foreign, security and defence policy, and therefore 'it feels like a valued partner' in both organisations. This value in membership is further demonstrated by its emphasis on solidarity and loyalty (Muniz 2013b: 90). One of Spain's key asset cannot be counted in material terms or in light of its network of bilateral and minilateral relationships. Instead, its former Minister for Foreign Affairs Javier Solana (1992-1995) was first seconded as NATO Secretary General (1995-1999) and then as the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (1999-2009). For the Spanish policy direction, Solana has therefore played a crucial part and contributed to the country's positioning as balancer between the EU and NATO (Coates 2000).

As a middle power in security and defence Spain is nevertheless regarded among the bigger players in the EU, yet because of its peripheral geographical location it is situated among the second-tier member states within NATO (Muniz 2013b). Its geographical position bordering the Mediterranean Sea and caught between France and Portugal makes it a vulnerable state to security threats from the South. Its peripheral place therefore leads to close bilateral cooperation with its neighbours and other Euro-Mediterranean states, but it also considers the US among its most important allies in defence issues. The country highly values its bilateral ties as it pursues to strengthen these in order to become a more influential actor on the international stage and especially in international forums (Arteaga 2013; Barbé and Mestres 2007; Spain 2013).

Both Spain and Portugal make use of their geographical location between the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean to their advantage in order to maintain relations with key strategic partners. Through this position they have direct links to their most important allies, the United States, as well as other powerful defence actors such as France and the United Kingdom. As Atlantic states they can thus serve as bridges between the European and American continents, which help them to balance between the differing security interests (Cardoso Reis 2013; Ferreira-Pereira 2007b). In the case of Portugal, the country also seeks to act as a broker and mediator within the EU. It pursues to achieve the middle ground between the Big Three and particularly between France and Germany. It aims to use this geostrategic position, which makes it also vulnerable to new threats, to avoid any marginalisation in the EU-NATO relationship by attaching to bigger member states, such as Germany and Italy, and to mediate among them, i.e., between the US and Europe. Examples

include the debates on procurement. Portugal prefers to purchase and develop new capabilities through either EU or NATO partners, especially the US. In one occasion, Portugal opted for German and Dutch submarines, but also acquired new missiles from its American partner through the NATO procurement process (Branco 2015; de Melo Palma 2009; Robinson 2016). Consequently, Portugal tried to support both the EU and NATO and their member states' defence industries by procuring important capabilities through both organisations.

While Germany, Portugal and Spain seek close alignments through strong bilateral and minilateral partnerships with other EU and NATO member states, Italy prefers to maintain relations equally with all allies and partners and does not seek to engage in such informal minilateral cooperative frameworks. It recognises the need to maintain good relations with the other Mediterranean states as well as the countries in the Balkans due to the shared neighbourhood, thus also shared security concerns, and occasionally sides with Spain as its partner in Mediterranean security affairs. Italy further allows itself to enter an asymmetric relationship with the United States due to its own middle power status (Marrone and Di Camillo 2013; Schumacher et al. 2016). The country is considered to be part of the Friends of Europe group within NATO, which counts those allies that promote European security and defence interests within the Atlantic Alliance and, in the case of Italy, it serves to be part of the club. Yet, there is no definite close partnership comparable with those between France and Germany or between the UK and the US. Therefore, as emphasised by one Italian representative, 'at the European level both in the EU and NATO, Italy does not align with or refer to other bigger states'. He added that in general, 'coalition groups should not be based on regional constituency because this would damage the cohesion within both the EU and NATO' (Italian Official 1). The Italian government has a 'double loyalty to the EU and the United States and firm respect for multilateralism' but often times perceives itself of second-class status within NATO (Cladi and Webber 2011: 208). Therefore, it seeks to be engaged in initiatives and projects as much as possible and pursues to maintain good relations with all member states equally. The primary purpose is the aim to avoid 'the feeling of frustration that arises whenever Rome is left out' especially from negotiations among the bigger and more powerful member states (Faleg 2013: 49). This enables the country to act as a balancer and broker due to its balanced approach towards bilateral and minilateral relations. Italy's foreign, security and defence policy is heavily influenced by its domestic political situation and societal context, which is comparable to the case of Germany. Domestic politics particularly shape the country's membership in both the EU and NATO, which has caused

'wavering alignments' with defence partners (Andreatta 2008: 169). According to Cladi and Webber (2011: 206), these 'blurred lines' have led to lower levels of reliability among its partners in the past, which ultimately forces the government to stay involved as much as feasible.

Overall, balancers are deeply rooted in multilateralism due to their shared historical experiences and lessons learned, and because they seek to avoid any marginalisation in the EU-NATO relationship. The preference for multilateralism is evident across all political parties which have formed the governments in these member states, which indicates the fundamental importance of cooperation on both the member state and the international secretariat levels. They are in general embedded in bilateral and minilateral partnerships and connected with other member states. However, Germany is the only outstanding member in this group which is well networked and which emerges as the first point of contact for states in both the EU and NATO. Albeit to varying degrees, the countries in this group have an Atlanticist orientation in defence issues, but do support the development of CSDP and, more specifically, the enhancement of EU-NATO cooperation in this policy field. All balancers can be furthermore considered to be peaceful and rather proactive in regard to mediating in inter-state tensions. Instead of getting engaged in such disputes, balancers seek to mitigate between other member states and between both organisations to avoid divergences and the risk of fragmentation in the European security architecture.

6.5 Balancers' Contributions to the Capabilities Debate

States in the group of balancers have their own share in the capabilities debate in both the EU and NATO and in their cooperation. Most of these states have often be accused of their lack of capabilities commitment and their low level of investments. Yet, some of these balancers also introduced new initiatives through which they have seeded valuable ideas for fruitful initiatives to overcome burden sharing obstacles since the beginning of the peace dividend. These views and behaviours have been specifically shaped by these member states' historical experiences, public debates and domestic politics, and the subsequent cautious perspective on the use of force. This subsection explores the position of balancers in the leadership and sovereignty gaps, and their input to the development of military capabilities for the benefit of both organisations. It also looks at the state of affairs of their armed forces and military budgets to examine their contributions.

As Sperling (2004) and Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2014) outline, there are several gaps between Europe and North America as well as between the EU and NATO, which heavily influence their cooperation in security and defence. The leadership gap is significant in this debate as it indicates the areas in which the EU and CSDP are lacking behind, but also highlights potential avenues for cooperation. In regard to European security, defence and crisis management, balancers have limited potential to contribute to the leadership gap. Only Germany – alongside France and the UK – 'could make a plausible claim to defence leadership in Europe' (Sperling 2004: 460). External calls and pressures especially from its European partners have become louder, which demand Germany to take the leadership role (Helwig 2016; Iso-Markku 2016). However, the country has frequently been labelled as the 'reluctant hegemon' (Patterson 2011 cited in Junk and Daase 2013: 140) due to its normative foreign policy and morally oriented approach based on humanitarian and moral principles, which in fact disallows the country to take over leadership. Hyde-Price (2015) portrays Germany as a 'sleep-walking giant' because it fails to live up to the expectations brought forward by its partners and allies, and to the responsibilities of a major power in Europe. The sense of resolve and restraint accompanied by the missing 'proper institutionalised inter-ministerial "whole of government" approach' dominate the internal debate and thus hamper it to invest more in the defence realm and to take leadership (Hyde-Price 2015: 607). Former Federal President Joachim Gauck (2014) and Minister of Defence Ursula von der Leyen (2014) showed signs of a growing sense of responsibility and leadership in security and defence at the 2014 Munich Security Conference. They also raised the point that Germany will need to do more to realise its position in the European security and defence realm, but these promises and hopes have not yet materialised. In his speech, Joachim Gauck (2014) stated that

> Germany has long since demonstrated that it acts in an internationally responsible way. But it could – building on its experience in safeguarding human rights and the rule of law – take more resolute steps to preserve and help shape the order based on the European Union, NATO and the United Nations. At the same time, Germany must also be ready to do more to guarantee the security that others have provided it with for decades.

The German government has so far put forward the idea of the framework nation concept in NATO and, in collaboration with Sweden, the pooling and sharing idea in the EU. To fully develop and consolidate its own position in the European security and defence *directoire* alongside France and the UK, these ideas would require the German government and policy-makers to become accustomed to the leadership role (Glatz and Zapfe 2017). On the institutional level, however, Germany finds itself in a leadership trap. As one high-ranked

official noted, 'other member states tender Germany this leadership role', which is especially the case for small members, yet the country has not asked for such a role (German Official 1, 2). He further observed that the country 'gets pushed to realise this leadership role in CFSP and CSDP', but in the internal debate policy-makers are not convinced that Germany will eventually fulfil these expectations. Against the hopes expressed by its partners, however, Germany is not willing to take over this role, but it is rather satisfied with its part in the European *directoire* (Meiers 2001). The external pressures by its allies and partners to take over leadership collides with Germany's key principle of restraint and anti-militarism which therefore explain the country's reticent attitude towards leadership in security and defence.

In contrast, neither Italy, Portugal or Spain have the resources, capabilities or potential to fill the current leadership gap in the EU and do not seek to take a lead in the EU-NATO relationship overall. They perceive themselves as second-class and middle powers in regard to security and defence issues (Cladi and Webber 2011; Dobrescu 2017; Muniz 2013b) and therefore do not make any claims to the leadership position in the EU, NATO or in their interorganisational relationship as well as in the military capabilities debate. This is further illustrated by the actual lack of new initiatives that could improve capabilities and defence cooperation by these three balancers. While Germany has introduced the framework nation concept, the other three states have 'no political courage' to come up with their own projects and initiatives but have expressed their support for Germany's idea (NATO Official 5). Moreover, there are no signs that any of these countries will become more proactive and eager to trigger new projects to develop and create more advanced and efficient military capabilities.

In the debates on military expenditure, defence investments and capabilities for collective defence and crisis management, most of the balancers have been accused of being 'laggards' and 'free-riders' (Barbé and Mestres 2007; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014; Hyde-Price 2015; Schumacher et al. 2016; Serra 1988). Spain, for example, lags behind similarly sized and similarly placed member states such as Canada, Italy and Poland in terms of its military budget. The Portuguese armed forces still suffer from the consequences of the financial and economic crisis. Both Italy and Germany went through a phase of ample restructuring of their armed forces as well as their military bureaucracies to meet the new challenges, but still remain far from expectations and the political rhetoric of their governments. Hence, the German Bundeswehr has been labelled as a 'paper army' (De Hoop Scheffer 2016) due to the dire state of its equipment and level of training for high intensity military crisis management

and collective defence scenarios. To be capable to participate in EU-led and NATO-led military operations on the one side, and to contribute to the enhancement of the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship on the other side, balancers need to improve and update their militaries so that they can actually have an impact.

Members in the group of balancers are consequently among those states with lower or mid-range military budgets and expenditures on procurement, technologies and Research & Development. As shown in Figure 6, Italy records the highest military budget among balancers with 1.7% of its GDP. Portugal ranks second with 1.5% of GDP, while both Germany (1.2%) and Spain (1.2%) make up the most salient laggards (NATO 2017a; SIPRI 2017). The governments of these states have declared their commitment to the defence pledge of meeting 2% of GDP by 2024 as it was agreed among NATO partners at the 2014 Wales Summit. It remains questionable whether these pledges and political rhetoric will translate into reality on time. Comparing their defence expenditures to the share of government spending, for example, these four states show a constant spending, in which they are also located in the centre of the spectrum. However, as stressed by one Italian representative, NATO's 2% target is an 'over-simplification' and 'just a bar for all states', but does not reflect the real capabilities and commitments of member states. He further claimed that, while some members might meet this target, not all of their defence expenditure is for the benefit of either the EU or NATO, and therefore rather meaningless for improving the EU-NATO relationship if the capabilities are used solely for national defence purposes (Italian Official 1).

Furthermore, at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, allies also agreed to spend at least 20% of their total military expenditures on equipment including Research and Development by 2024, if they are not already meeting this target (NATO 2014). However, according to the data provided by NATO (2017a) and shown in Figure 7, only Italy and Spain have moved closer to this target with 20.94% and 19.31% respectively, and Portugal is situated at the rear end with 10.31%. While Germany is again lagging behind with a share of 13.75% of its total military expenditure spent on equipment, it spends relatively less on personnel and more on the modernisation of infrastructure compared to the other states in this group.

Figure 6 Defence Expenditure of Balancers as a Share of GDP



Data shown for 2016 in %. Source: EDA 2016; NATO 2017a; SIPRI 2017

Figure 7 Distribution of Military Expenditure by Equipment, Personnel, Infrastructure and Other Costs (Share of Total Military Expenditure)



Data shown for 2016 in %. Source: NATO 2017a

The level of defence spending signals balancer's middle power status in regard to EU-NATO cooperation. Despite their commitments and recent increases of their military expenditures after the agreement to the alliance's 2% pledge, it becomes evident that balancers have the tendency to focus rather on institutional capacities than on military hardware. In this regard, balancers have been frequently characterised as free-riders with a low defence budget which is lower than their financial capabilities. This is particularly targeted at both Italy and

Germany, whereas the latter's status as economic giant should translate into higher expenditure on security and defence (Hyde-Price 2015; Muniz 2013b; Schumacher et al. 2016). Moreover, due to their relatively low military expenditures balancers cannot make use of military power to exert influence, which is the case, for instance, with France as blocker and the UK as advocate respectively. For both organisations, it can be claimed that the more military power a member state possesses, the more influence it can exert in the area of security and defence. With their middle power status, however, states in the group of balancers cannot achieve this level of influence. As an alternative, they have to make use of their negotiation and mediation skills instead of their level of ambition and capabilities.

Since the beginning of the peace dividend, increasing financial constraints and decreasing military expenditures of member states, new initiatives and incentives had to be created to maintain the level of ambition and capabilities and to meet the challenges of the new international security environment. All of these states take part in institution-wide defence procurement initiatives, such as DCI in NATO and those projects put forward by the EDA including the Capability Development Plan. Moreover, similar to the other types of member states in interorganisational interaction, balancers have either joined or established minilateral cooperation frameworks to approach the military capabilities gaps.

Germany has been the most active member state as it maintains bilateral cooperation with France as its most important partner as well as its other neighbouring countries Poland and the Netherlands. In collaboration with both France and Poland it makes up the Weimar Triangle, in which they seek to jointly develop military capabilities as well as trigger new ideas, such as the reform of the EU Battlegroups concept. Italy and Spain were invited to join these three states and to enter into the so-called Weimar Plus cooperative framework. For example, in their Declaration on European Defence, they agreed to strengthen efforts on capabilities, including air-to-air refuelling, and to work on the European Air Transport Command (EATC) (France 2012). The latter was finally established in Zaragoza, Spain in 2017 which hosts the European Air Transport Fleet (EATF) (EUISS 2018). As emphasised by one NATO representative, neither Portugal nor Spain have indicated to trigger any joint efforts concerning the modernisation or procurement of their armed forces and capabilities. Therefore, no new initiatives or ideas should be expected to be vocalised any time soon from these states (NATO Official 5). Italy, in slight contrast, is very eager to join the Franco-German core group on capabilities procurement within the EU and also seeks to increase its standing within NATO. It has therefore started to manage the logistic support-ship procurement

programme and the multipurpose patrol vessel procurement programme called *Pattugliatori Polivalenti d'Altura* (Gilli et al. 2015). This indicates its first efforts of launching cooperation frameworks in the area of military capability procurement as well as its willingness for expanding these initiatives.

The contributions by balancers to filling the gaps between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance, particularly the leadership gap and military capabilities gap, has had limited potential and success. While neither Italy nor Portugal or Spain assert a claim to leadership, Germany is the only state among the balancers that experiences external pressures by its partners and allies to take more responsibilities in security and defence, and thus to claim a leadership role. The country's culture of restraint and especially the anti-militarist attitude of the public disallow Germany to actually take up this position. In the debate on military capabilities, all balancers participate in institutionalised procurement initiatives by the EU and NATO, yet again, only Germany maintains a wide network of bilateral and minilateral cooperative frameworks to further develop and acquire more advanced defence technologies and equipment. These projects and initiatives are aimed at improving the military capabilities available to both organisations in order to avoid any rivalry and competition over resources. Their limited willingness and capabilities are further reflected by their low military budgets and rather high expenditures on personnel. Balancer's overall contributions overall signal willingness albeit their limited resources to close the gaps between the EU and NATO in a fashion that is beneficial to both and in which these states can further pursue their balancing act.

6.6 View on Division of Labour and Interoperability

The perception of division of tasks and responsibilities between the Union and the Atlantic Alliance varies among balancers, albeit they share a common ground. While they agree that a certain division of labour is beneficial for increasing the level of interoperability among member states as well as between the EU and NATO, the specifics diverge over the allocated responsibilities and activities. Member states in general and balancers in particular acknowledge that with increased functional overlap between organisations competition over resources can emergence but also a specialisation process can be triggered (Faude 2015). This section examines balancers' views on division of labour and interoperability between the two organisations as well as their contributions to EU-led and NATO-led operations and shows how these three issues are interconnected.

According to balancers, a division of labour between the EU and NATO overall 'makes sense' because it allows for the efficient use of scarce resources, and particularly it sustains the capabilities of every member state's single set of forces (German Officials 3). The armed forces and military assets of European states suffer from severe austerity measures and defence cuts. The increasing functional overlap between the EU and NATO since the end of the Cold War has initially been perceived as problematic by some member states, such as Spain, and a division of labour therefore presents a possible solution to avoiding duplication and competition over vital resources and military capabilities (Fojón et al. 2015). In line with the argument brought forward by Faude (2015) as well as Gehring and Oberthür (2009) that functional overlap triggers organisational adaptation and specialisation processes of both organisations, balancers emphasise the need to make use of each organisations' key strengths. Hence, governments are required to manage their armies more efficiently and sustainably, in which a division of tasks becomes a useful approach.

Both the EU and NATO have different and very specific toolboxes at their disposal. Although member states carry the ownership of the required capabilities, they provide them for the use in military crisis management operations for both organisations. Members in the group of balancers emphasise, for example in the case of Germany, that states should not pose themselves the "either or" question, but rather the question of how both organisations can be useful and how the strengths and toolboxes of each organisation can contribute to the efficient resolution of crises and conflicts (Tettweiler 2015: 36). Consequently, balancers generally agree that the EU and NATO offer these specific toolboxes with unique added values, and that it depends on the type of crisis and conflict to take the decision which organisation is better suited, how mechanisms can be established to better coordinate the efforts and how both organisations are best equipped to cooperate on the operational-strategic level. Balancers further share the opinion that NATO is best equipped for robust military crisis management operations and out-of-area engagements which require high-intensity responses. In contrast, these states are also often in favour of the EU because it offers a much broader toolbox, which includes diplomatic, economic, political, and military tools and instruments, and has proven to be more successful when undertaking a comprehensive approach based on a civil-military engagement (Robinson 2016; Wurzer 2013; Zyla 2012).

While balancers find a division of labour between the EU and NATO meaningful to a certain extent, it has been stressed by German and Italian representatives that there is a pressing

need to create more synergies and complementarity through cooperation and coordination of efforts (German Officials 3, Italian Official 1). An illustrative example which was mentioned by these representatives were the military operations in Afghanistan, where the EU only conducted a civilian mission as well as in the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa. For instance, the EU's training missions are perceived as a great asset to NATO's robustness and military capabilities and are therefore seen as significant in the field. Since neither organisation has a complete toolbox for responding effectively and efficiently to international crises, interorganisational interaction is thus inevitable. A division of tasks and responsibilities also helps balancers to serve as mediators and brokers in the process of planning military crisis management operations. As multiple members they are able to influence and raise their voices in both the PSC and the NAC while at the same time, they have the knowledge of each organisation's mandates for conducting military operations. Accordingly, they engage in the discussions among other states to ensure that a division of labour will be negotiated, in which they make use of their bilateral and minilateral relations and networks. They position themselves between both organisations with the aim to achieve complementarity and cooperation and to avoid any competition over resources (Faleg 2013). One current example is the Ukraine crisis, which started in 2014 and involves the EU, NATO and their member states as well as other actors including Russia and the OSCE. Germany, alongside France, has emerged as a key negotiator between Ukraine and Russia, but it has also signalled that a concerted approach by the EU and NATO in addition to the OSCE's efforts is required to resolve the on-going crisis. It seeks to make use of the EU's broad toolbox, particularly the diplomatic instruments as well as of NATO's deterrence strategy and capabilities (Hanns Seidel Stiftung 2015). This highlights the German culture of restraint, on the one hand, as it does not ultimately favour a purely military solution to the crisis, and its balancing act between the EU and NATO, and how it prefers a division of labour between the two organisations on the other hand.

There are, however, also diverging voices among balancers on the scope of division of labour. None of these states favours a strict division based on a functional and/or geographical scope between the EU and NATO (Faleg 2013; Tettweiler 2015). One Italian representative even expressed his personal view on this matter and mentioned that 'a division of labour between the EU and NATO is not good in the future' because it risks to counter attempts to achieve coherence. But he also stated that synergies of their activities and efforts are necessary (Italian Official 1). Moreover, while some German representatives agreed that a division of tasks on the operational level is meaningful, it would be vital to take these decisions on a

case-by-case basis and that such a division highly depends the phase of the operation (German Officials 2). One example is the engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where NATO was in charge of the initial entry operation, which includes a rapid response to a crisis, and where the EU took over the operation and was responsible for the conduct of a stabilisation operation. Yet, some of their German colleagues also admitted that different views on division of labour circulate among those civil servants in Berlin and the civilian and military staff at the EU and NATO permanent representations in Brussels (German Officials 2, 3). This highlights not only the difficulty of finding common grounds among member states on this issue, but also that a strictly defined division of labour between the EU and NATO is not necessarily beneficial for the conduct of military crisis management operations in shared geographical areas and operational theatres.

A division of labour between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance has further implications on their interoperability as well as on member states' participation in and contributions to their military operations. States in the group of balancers have been active in participating in EU-led and NATO-led military operations. To date, Italy has contributed to all operations, and each of the other states has participated in the majority of operations, considering some exceptions in the cases of Germany (all CSDP operations; all NATO operations excluding Operation Unified Protector in Libya), Portugal (all EU operations but Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina; all NATO operations excluding Operation Unified Protector) and Spain (all CSDP operations excluding Operation Althea; all NATO operations) (see Appendix B). Although balancers have been participative in almost all military operations, their contributions have been low which has been explained based on their limited resources and national constraints (Fröhlich 2011; Robinson 2016; Zyla 2012).

In addition, the motivations for participation in collective military operations under either the EU or NATO frameworks vary among balancers. One of the prime reasons for Spain, for instance, to participate is its commitment to these organisations, its solidarity and also the result of a compromise among its partners (Muniz 2013b). In the case of Germany, its main reason to participate equally in international frameworks is its view on creating a balance among its allies and partners, and thus to please its closest partners in security and defence, France and the United States. In addition, in some of the operational areas it has specific economic interests, which enables Germany to legitimise its participation to its own public and justifies its preference for a comprehensive and coordinated approach by both the EU and NATO (Baumann and Hellmann 2001; Junk and Daase 2013; Wurzer 2013). Moreover,

both Germany and Italy seek to participate tantamount in EU and NATO operations in order to strike a balance in their international engagement. However, this is not reflected in their contributions to operations since NATO missions still receive a higher share of assets and capabilities from these member states (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014). This further illustrates their political willingness not only to participate in EU-led and NATO-led military operations as well as their commitment to multilateral frameworks, but also indicates their balancing approach to EU-NATO cooperation and interoperability on the operational level.

Balancers have overall specific views on division of labour between the Union and the Atlantic Alliance. While they do not seek to pursue a clearly defined division of tasks and responsibilities, they see the advantages of having such a division on a case-by-case basis, which would allow for a sustainable and more efficient management of their limited resources. They agree on the benefits of the strengths of each organisation, which also triggers the necessity for the EU and NATO to cooperate on both the institutional and the operational levels. Through their active participation in military operations, balancers aim to maintain a balanced approach and seek to increase their interoperability between both organisations.

6.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, the attitudes and role of balancers have been explored by focusing on their involvement in the EU-NATO relationship as well as their contributions to cooperation. Although the group of balancers of interorganisational interaction seems to be more homogenous than the other types of member states, there are nevertheless some degrees of variation in their engagement on the institutionalisation of cooperation as well as their views on how cooperation between the EU and NATO should work and should be designed.

The main aim of balancers is to mediate and mitigate among their fellow member states as well as between the EU and NATO themselves. By doing so, they have also been labelled as brokers and mediators, and primarily present the middle ground in this interorganisational relationship. Overall, balancers have not been very engaged in setting up this special partnership in comparison to both advocates and blockers. However, as brokers and mediators, they fill a crucial position which helps to enhance cooperation and enables the two organisations to find common grounds. Due to their historical experiences and shared

past of transforming from authoritative regimes and dictatorships to liberal democracies throughout the twentieth century, balancers' attitude towards military engagement is limited and constrained on the domestic context. In fact, these experiences have a crucial impact on their foreign and security policy orientation and their perceptions of membership in the EU and NATO. Therefore, their involvement with these organisations and their network of bilateral and minilateral relationships with fellow member states is of high importance, which further contributes to their ability to act as mediators and brokers. Although their contributions of financial means and capabilities to military operations is limited due to these constraints, balancers aim to achieve a division of labour between the EU and NATO to make use of each organisation's key strengths to resolve international crises and conflicts.

Chapter 7 – Neutrals of Interorganisational Interaction

7.1 Introduction

Neutrals of interorganisational interaction represent a particular group of member states in the relationship between the EU and NATO, and the final group of member states in this analysis. States in this group share some characteristics and attitudes of advocates, blockers and balancers, and therefore, neutrals in this context can be perceived as advocates or as blockers due to their political and geostrategic position as well as their status as single members. They take a specific position and approach towards the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship. Neutrals should not be confused with militarily neutral states *per se* although the majority of these states have either been or are still considered to be militarily neutral or non-aligned states in the Euro-Atlantic security area. As neutrals in interorganisational interaction these states pursue specific security and defence interests and objectives in regard to EU-NATO cooperation, although these are relatively limited for some neutrals in comparison to the other types of member states due to their non-alignment status. They also make only selected use of specific strategies because of their limited resources (Wivel 2005).

In regard to the selection criteria set out for categorising states into the typology of member states in interorganisational interaction, neutrals demonstrate less clear views regarding interorganisational cooperation. Neutrals have an overall positive attitude towards closer cooperation and interorganisational interaction in the sense that they would not want to be any obstacles. Yet, they show lower levels of active promotion and lower levels of engagement in negotiations and involvement in inter-state tensions of other member states, which makes them look rather indifferent towards interorganisational cooperation. Moreover, because of their already limited resources and narrow capacities, neutrals make comparatively low contributions to the international organisations and their operations. This means that neutrals do not have many capacities and resources to actively promote interorganisational cooperation and therefore stand on the sidelines. A key factor for neutrals is also the role of domestic politics and their general attitudes in regard to their foreign and security policy orientation in terms of cooperation in security and defence. Deriving from the extent to which neutrals meet these selection criteria, it also becomes evident that neutrals can often be labelled as boundary cases since they neither actively

obstruct or advocate closer EU-NATO cooperation, but nevertheless do not take a strong position or engage proactively to enhance this relationship.

Based on the examination and the findings from national security and defence strategies, the group of neutrals of interorganisational interaction is formed of Austria, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Malta and Sweden. The states in the group of neutrals are characterised primarily by their lack of engagement in interorganisational interaction and thus, their impartial position on EU-NATO cooperation, i.e., not taking sides with either advocates or blockers in their behaviour towards interorganisational interaction. Their ability to act in security and defence is generally limited due to their geographical and political positions as well as their resources and restricted contributions to interorganisational interaction, which has shaped their overall position. Their role has nevertheless proven to be vital because of their flexibility and adaptability to new security environments and political situations.

It needs to be acknowledged that the existing literature takes a narrow approach to the military non-alignment and neutrality status of neutrals in international security organisations, and focuses primarily on Finland and Sweden. Yet, this literature provides valuable insights that help to further examine the role of these states in interorganisational interaction and above all, in the EU-NATO relationship. The following analysis therefore illustrates the role of neutrals and more specifically, how they have exerted influence on the evolution of EU-NATO cooperation in security and defence. This chapter is organised according to the four themes previously outlined: at first, the common features and shared characteristics of those member states in this group are identified and explained, which is followed by the examination of their positions on the formalisation of EU-NATO cooperation and the perception and use of their own memberships as well as their contributions to the military capabilities debate and their views on both interoperability and division of labour between the two organisations.

7.2 Shared Characteristics of Neutrals

Member states belonging to the group of neutrals in interorganisational interaction share specific characteristics and pursue common goals, though their attributes in the form of resources, foreign and security policy orientation and type of membership varies greatly among neutrals. These commonalities provide the foundation for the subsequent analysis

and allow to further understand their behaviour in the EU-NATO relationship (see Table 7). While these characteristic traits are shared within the group of neutrals, these states also demonstrate some overlaps with advocates, blockers and balancers. The commonality of certain characteristics has emerged from similar historical experiences, political viewpoints and domestic attitudes, such as the general preference for civilian and non-violent means of conflict management and the use of small state strategy, which will be elaborated further throughout this subsection. Each state adds individual features and the extent to which they fulfil the shared characteristics varies according to theme and issue area.

Neutrals of interorganisational interaction consists of those states with single membership status as they are only member of either the EU or NATO. In this context, both Malta and Denmark represent special cases, which will be further explored in the following subsections. All of the non-NATO EU member states participate in the PfP programme, which allows them to participate in collective security activities and NATO-led military operations. Similarly, all of the non-EU NATO members have an FPA with the EU. Based on these agreements they are able to contribute to and participate in EU civilian and military crisis management operations (NATO 2016b; Tardy 2014). According to Gehring and Faude (2014), single membership means that their ability to influence decisions and shape policies including interorganisational interaction is limited because they do not have a voice, and thus no decision-making power, in the international organisations of which they are not a full member. In addition, the group of neutrals encompasses both original members, e.g., Iceland and Demark are founding nations of the alliance, and subsequent members, whereby Malta is the latest addition to this group (cf. Magliveras 2011).

The states in this group also share the status as small or even micro states. Whereas Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden are regarded as small states, Iceland and Malta are considered to be micro states due to their size in population, economic strength and military power (Dobrescu 2017; Setälä 2005; Wivel 2005). Moreover, with the exception of Austria, all of the neutrals are located on the geographical periphery of the Euro-Atlantic security space. The four Nordics in this group – Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden – make up the northern borders and are located on the coastal borders to the East. They thus face challenges such as maritime security in addition to those on the Eastern border with Russia, which is still perceived to be one of their security concerns, especially for Finland (Finland 2013). Malta, on the other hand, is located in the Mediterranean Sea and is thereby also concerned with maritime security as it presents the South Eastern border in Europe (Malta 2017). In addition

to the geographical periphery, these member states present the political periphery in both the EU and NATO. These states show variance concerning their ability to shape and influence political decisions and policies. While Denmark has demonstrated that it seeks closer ties with some of the powerful allies in NATO to play a more active role as a small member state, specifically the US and the UK, which pictures the country as less neutral concerning interorganisational relations, other states in the group of neutrals of interorganisational interaction often remain on the sidelines. As small and peripheral states they face specific challenges and have different threat perceptions, which diverge from those of middle-sized and larger member states. In regard to their politically peripheral location, which is linked to their status as small states, none of the neutrals has much policy-shaping power in the PSC as well as not much leverage in the NAC. Their low level of resources and military power, and in the case of Iceland even the non-existence of permanent armed forces, impedes neutrals in exerting influence on the policies, proposals and interests which compete with those of bigger and more powerful members (Cottey 2013; Molis 2006; Setälä 2005; Wivel 2005). Consequently, they find it difficult to shape and influence the policy orientation of international organisations including the interorganisational relationship between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance.

Neutrals' historical record of neutrality and military non-alignment, especially during World War Two and the Cold War, is a key element that delimits them from those belonging to the other types of member states of interorganisational interaction. This status has received a variety of labels and descriptions. Denmark was labelled a neutral country in the beginning of the Second World War which it chose due to its geographical location neighbouring the Third Reich and its links to the UK. Yet, it was then under German occupation. This status has also affected Iceland's status as it was a sovereign kingdom in a personal union with Denmark in the first half of the twentieth century (Petersen 1990). Both Finland and Sweden call themselves "military non-aligned" while Austria is characterised as "non-allied". For some neutrals this neutrality is thus deeply rooted in their national approaches to security and defence as well as enshrined in their constitutions. For example, according to Austria's agreement with the former Soviet Union from 1955, it has committed itself to a policy of neutrality and therefore would not join a military alliance. This is similar for Finland and Sweden, although they keep the option open to join the Atlantic Alliance and would make a decision based on the public opinion and the developments of the international security environment (Ilves 2018; Möttölä 2001; Nilsson and Larsbrink 2013; Österreichisches Bundeskanzleramt 1955; Salonius-Pasternak 2018).

With these states' accession to either the EU or NATO, traditionally militarily neutral countries have taken positions on the politico-military spectrum and adapted their approach to neutrality. Joining one of these organisations sparked domestic debates about the continuation and validity of their military neutrality and special status, particularly in Austria, Finland and Iceland (Bailes and Rafnsson 2012; Gärtner 2018; Müller and Maurer 2016). Their position as either militarily neutral, non-aligned or non-allied states has also influenced their characterisation as neutral in terms of the EU-NATO relationship since they have not positioned themselves in the advocacy camp but have also not vetoed any efforts to deepen this relationship. This approach is translated from their general hesitance towards the use of force and their preference for peacekeeping and civilian crisis management. This group of member states is not labelled as neutrals due to their viewpoint on security and defence in general and their alignment status. Instead, these states possess a particular attitude towards interorganisational interaction and more specifically towards EU-NATO cooperation in the area of security and defence. Since their accessions to either the EU or NATO, or both organisations in the case of Denmark, they have been increasingly engaged in the organisations' security and defence policies and activities including crisis management and peacekeeping operations. As a consequence, Gebhard (2013: 280), Manners and Whitman (2001), Möttölä (2001) and Forsberg and Vaahtoranta (2000, 2001) have called them 'post-neutrals', which demonstrates their move away from full military neutrality and the turn towards greater engagement internationally as well as towards adapted versions of neutrality, such as 'engaged neutrality' in the case of Austria and their increased interactions with the Atlantic Alliance on the basis of cooperative security and crisis management (Gärtner 2018; Petersson 2018).

One aspect needs to receive special attention when dealing with neutrals of interorganisational interaction. Member states in this group have a higher tendency of shifting and being boundary cases. For example, one could expect other member states, such as Albania, Croatia, Ireland and Norway, to be categorised in this group because they share some of these characteristics defining states in the group of neutrals, e.g., small states with limited military capabilities and resources, less proactive towards promoting closer EU-NATO cooperation and lower levels of active engagement in negotiations. Yet, at is has been indicated by representatives from NATO and some member states, countries like Albania, Croatia and also Norway often attach themselves to one of the advocates – mainly the UK and the US – to support their perspective on interorganisational cooperation (Cypriote Officials 2; Italian Official 1; NATO Official 5).

Neutrals' position on and within EU-NATO cooperation has therefore emerged from a variety of factors, which will be explored subsequently. Overall, neutrals share the status as single member states, but they include states from both original members and subsequent members, i.e., those who are among the founding members of either the EU or NATO and those who joined at a later stage even when the two organisations have already started their cooperative endeavour. Their position within the relationship between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance is strongly influenced by their general attitude towards military alignment and their traditional neutrality. Although they are labelled as neutrals, the states in this group make a significant contribution to this special relationship as well as to crisis management as a whole.

Table 7 Overview of Neutrals' Characteristics

Shared characteristics by balancers	**Neutrals and their membership**	**Contributions to the capabilities debate**	**View on interoperability and division of labour**
• generally positive towards EU-NATO cooperation • small or even micro states • military neutrality or non-alignment or non-allied since the end of Second World War • labelled as 'post-neutrals' due to increased engagement	• single members with partnership agreements • maintenance of bilateral and minilateral security and defence cooperation incl. security guarantees outside EU or NATO • limited trigger for trouble	• low level of military budgets and scarce resources • low contributions to military operations • neutral EU non-NATO states participate in EUBG • neutral NATO non-EU states participate in NRF	• preference for complementarity • in favour of close coordination and exchanges in operations • in favour of division of labour to avoid exclusion • see high level of interoperability as vital for their own security and defence

7.3 Neutrals' Involvement in the Institutionalisation Process

Their overall neutrality in military affairs has a significant impact on neutrals' involvement, and it is therefore relevant to consider the specific characteristics of neutrals and of these individual member states in order to examine their engagement. This section specifically focuses on the development of institutionalising the EU-NATO relationship from the 2002 Joint Declaration on ESDP and the 2003 Berlin Plus arrangements to the 2016 Joint Declaration. It can be argued that neutrals are generally in favour of the formalisation and institutionalisation of interorganisational interaction due to their own absence in one of the respective organisations, yet their own contributions are rather little because of their overall low profile in both organisations and in the area of security and defence.

Neutrals are closely attached to and have a clear preference for multilateralism and intergovernmental platforms. According to the national security and defence strategies of Iceland and Sweden, for example, these states take a rules-based and comprehensive approach to security and defence and seek to engage and take action primarily through multilateral organisations (Iceland n.a.; Sweden 2017). Both membership and participation in multilateral organisations such as the EU and NATO provide a greater voice for neutral states, not only because of their attitude towards military action but also due to their status as small and micro states. It is suggested that multilateral organisations allow these states to forge small coalition groups and establish minilateral partnerships with those that share common security threats to upload their interests to the international level. These organisations further help to overcome weaknesses and vulnerabilities for small and micro states (Molis 2006; Wivel 2005). This preference for multilateralism can be translated into the preference for institutionalising interorganisational interaction, which represents a specific form of multilateralism, or even *maxilateralism*. From the perspective of the group of neutrals and as stated, for example, in the Finnish Security and Defence Policy and the Austrian White Book of Defence, these states acknowledge the lack of decision-making power due to their single membership. Hence, formalised EU-NATO cooperation would help to overcome their lack of multiple membership and would allow them to compensate for their low level of influence (Austria 2010; Finland 2013). Consequently, due to their vulnerabilities and weaknesses emerging from their small state status and their outspoken preference for multilateral action, neutrals are located among those member states that prefer and even rely on deepened and formalised interorganisational relations.

One key element, which is also a requirement for the institutionalisation of the EU-NATO relationship, would be the complementarity between the organisations. States in the group of neutrals emphasise the need for a higher degree of complementarity as well as the equality among the organisations and their member states with the increase of institutionalised relationships. This viewpoint is rooted in their status as single member states. Accordingly, neutrals seek to benefit from enhanced interorganisational interaction and try to avoid any inequality vis-à-vis multiple member states (Bergquist et al. 2016). They therefore express a general support of the institutionalisation process and desire formalised structures and procedures for the cooperation between the EU and NATO.

In regard to formalising the EU-NATO relationship, neutrals such as Sweden and Finland have introduced a limited number of initiatives and ideas to enhance the formalisation process and improve this special relationship. Some of these initiatives are of value and relevance for both organisations as well as their relationship because they seek to increase cooperation among their member states. For example, during its EU Presidency, Sweden, was involved in the exchange of letters with then NATO Secretary General George Robertson in 2001. This was directed at formulating provisions for the framework of EU-NATO meetings which later provided the foundation for the future formalisation of their cooperation (Reichard 2006). In addition, Finland initiated the Northern Dimension in 1999, which is a non-security and non-defence related instrument of cooperation between the European Union, Iceland, Norway and Russia. Although it primarily addresses issues such as transportation, health, and environment, it also strengthens practical cooperation and the exchange between the EU, its member states and third states such as Iceland and Norway, which are both members of NATO. In fact, the initiative has also indirectly enhanced the level of trust among these actors and the ability of both Finland and Sweden – the latter joined and strongly supported Finland in this endeavour – to exert some influence in the area of the EU's foreign, security and defence policy (Arter 2000; Haukkala 2003).

Another example of a neutral's effort to bring forward ideas that would be indirectly beneficial for further institutionalising EU-NATO cooperation is the creation of the Salzburg Forum by Austria in 2003. It is composed of Austria alongside Central and Eastern European states including Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The Salzburg Forum is a minilateral security partnership that also enhances exchange, cooperation and trust among its participants. While its main focus is on internal and European-level security, it helps to formulate common interests and preferences, which

can be translated to the international as well as to the interorganisational levels (Gebhard 2013; Müller and Maurer 2016). Both the Northern Dimension Initiative by Finland and the Salzburg Forum by Austria foster cooperation among states which are either single or multiple members and help to formalise minilateral partnerships. Although these initiatives are targeted at areas outside security and defence, they nevertheless contribute to fostering cooperation and exchanges, which are beneficial for translating these efforts into formalising and strengthening the EU-NATO relationship. This demonstrates that neutrals make indirect contributions to interorganisational cooperation although rather unintentionally.

Their general lack of engagement in the development and shaping of either NATO's or the EU's security and defence structures, including provisions for cooperation with other international actors, is comparable to and derives from their general low profile in influencing the formalisation of the relationship between the Union and the Atlantic Alliance. Although neutrals are in favour of institutionalised interorganisational relations, their actual contributions are kept to the minimum. This means that they participate in negotiations and the decision-making processes on establishing and strengthening partnerships with other international actors. However, no notable efforts or involvements have been recorded, neither in the literature nor in conversations with representatives from member states, the EU or NATO. Instead, one NATO official observed that especially smaller and medium-sized member states have 'no political courage' and lack ideas and initiatives in order to contribute to the EU-NATO relationship, including its formalisation process (NATO Official 5). Moreover, it has been noted that member states in the group of neutrals, such as Austria and Malta, prefer not to become more involved than necessary in the affairs and external relations of international organisations (Gebhard 2013; Pace 2013). This suggests that neutrals generally seek to remain on the sidelines and prefer to observe rather than to become deeply involved in shaping and formalising interorganisational interaction.

Neutrals thus play a minor role in the institutionalisation and formalisation processes of the relationship between the EU and NATO. Due to their limited capabilities and resources they perceive themselves as unable to provide significant contributions to this debate. This has been illustrated by the lack of ideas and direct incentives which help to improve not only the relationship as a whole, but which also provide little to facilitate the formalisation process. Moreover, neutrals generally have low profiles in security and defence as well as within international organisations, which has further led to low levels of political courage and little preference for becoming engaged in shaping interorganisational cooperation.

7.4 Foreign Policy Orientations and Their Membership Status

The status of neutrals as single members in the EU-NATO relationship and their nature as small states in general have significant implications on their overall membership in the respective international organisations as well as in interorganisational cooperation. Both factors spur the establishment of and accession to minilateral cooperative endeavours, yet their contributions to these have been recorded as low and restricted. The examination of the motivations and embeddedness of neutrals in bilateral and minilateral cooperation frameworks inside and outside EU-NATO relations is an essential aspect that shapes their positions. Each state in the group of neutrals brings forward a certain approach to EU-NATO cooperation as well as an individual foreign and security policy orientation, which includes caveats concerning their memberships. This section examines these particularities and caveats of specific member states, especially Denmark and Malta who show a record of opt-outs and withdrawals, which have particular consequences for their memberships. It further takes into consideration the national foreign and security policy orientations to assess how neutrals use their own membership to exert influence on this interorganisational relationship. This analysis helps to understand and explain the nature of their behaviour and viewpoints.

7.4.1 Issue of Membership

Single member states are involved in the decision-making process of only one organisation and are therefore not directly affected by functional overlap due to the lack of full integration in the other organisation, and thus the inability to do forum-shopping (Gehring and Faude 2014). Thus, they naturally prefer to act multilaterally through the particular organisation of which they are member and in which they can influence the design, preparation and conduct of military crisis management operations. Single membership restricts their ability to make use of a variety of strategies as outlined by Alter and Meunier (2009: 16), such as 'chessboard politics' as well as forum-shopping and regime-shifting. As identified by Hofmann (2009: 46; 2018), single member states occasionally make use of the strategy of hostage-taking, which means that 'members of just one institution can use their membership to obstruct the relationship between both institutions, holding them hostage in pursuit of narrow interests'

which allows them to exert influence in another organisation where they are not members. Concerning neutrals of interorganisational interaction, this has rarely happened.

Two examples where member states have applied political strategies for their own interests, however, is the case relating to Denmark's opt-out of the military dimension of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy and Malta's bilateral relationship with NATO (Larsen 2008; Olsen and Pilegaard 2005; Pace 2013). When EU member states initiated the idea of a European defence capacity, Denmark was not the only country faced with the option to support it while being a member of NATO. It nevertheless chose the turf battle approach by opting-out of defence affairs and thereby opted for one organisation at the potential expenses of the other (cf. Hofmann 2009). Malta's relations with NATO have experienced ups and downs, which include the participation, withdrawal and re-entering the PfP programme, which made the island state a less reliable partner as well as a possible blocker similarly to Cyprus. Yet, membership in only one of the organisations means limited capacities to influence the overall decision-making because lobbying for one's own preferences becomes restricted. With the help of bilateral relations in the respective other organisation, such as NATO's PfP programme and the EU's Framework Participation Agreements, this dilemma can be overcome. While neutrals are regarded as single member states, they nevertheless maintain close cooperation with the other organisation and their member states.

Each state is charged with specific national caveats and characteristics that shape their foreign and security policy orientation. The commonality among members in the group of neutrals is their general attitude towards the use of force and the historical record of neutrality and/or non-alignment. National limitations and caveats act as restrictions to states' memberships in international forums and sometimes lead to opt-out and specific agreements, such as Denmark's CSDP opt-out. The case of Denmark, which receives further attention below, is not the only one, however. Malta represents another interesting example. It joined NATO's PfP programme in 1995 but withdrew shortly afterwards in 1996 while it concurrently froze the membership negotiations with the EU under its labour government (Pace 2013). Malta then re-accessed the PfP programme in 2008 after it had already gained full EU membership in 2004, in which it did not negotiate any opt-outs from CFSP or CSDP despite its constitutional neutrality. Furthermore, since joining both the EU and PfP it even sought closer defence cooperation, and thereby confirmed that cooperation either with NATO or between the EU and NATO would indeed not clash with its own neutrality (Fiott 2015; Times of Malta 2017). Although Malta represents a positive example in which a neutral

state does not prevent any further efforts towards enhanced EU-NATO cooperation due to its specific national position, it has also not made any contributions. In addition, during the time in which it was only an EU member without any cooperation agreement with NATO, it did in fact pose a hurdle and had been perceived as an obstacle similarly to Cyprus because of the implications for cooperation under the Berlin Plus arrangements (Pace 2013).

In comparison to other neutral and non-aligned states, Finland alongside Denmark and Sweden, demonstrates a case of a less pacifist country among these neutrals. It maintains conscription, is highly committed to peace operations under the condition of a UN mandate, and the defence of its national territory continues to play a vital part of its nationhood and attitude towards security and defence (Forsberg 2018; Seppo and Forsberg 2013). Its non-alignment is rooted in its historical experience with the former Soviet Union, which disallowed it to join the Atlantic Alliance but did not prevent its accession to the EU in 1995. These conditions as well as the non-alignment status were also set upon Austria, which have since been deeply embedded in its foreign and security policy orientation. Although this position does not directly cause any problems for EU-NATO cooperation on the institutional or operational levels, neither Austria nor Finland seeks to make major contributions to closer cooperation (Kammel 2013; Müller and Maurer 2016; Ojanen 2007, 2008).

Iceland represents an outlier in the group of neutrals of the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship. It epitomises the only state which does not possess standing armed forces, and which remains outside armaments collaborations and cooperation efforts. Even though it gained observer status in the WEU it decided to remain outside the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) and continued to do so when the WEU was integrated into the EU and when the EDA was established. This fact gives it a special status as well as marginal leverage in negotiations and decision-making due to its little resources and thus its negligible contributions and over-reliance on NATO as well as close partners such as the United States (Bailes and Thorhallsson 2006). Moreover, Iceland is considered as a third state and has an FPA with the EU. Yet, in case of a possible accession to the EU, it would seek to negotiate a defence opt-out similar to that of Denmark (Bailes and Rafnsson 2012). This indicates that Iceland keeps some scepticism as well as constraints towards CSDP and the EU's military dimension. But that it also shows tendencies of non-interference in this aspect as it would not veto any advancements and developments within CSDP either.

The decision to join NATO's PfP programme has been a pragmatic one for most EU non-NATO member states in the group of neutrals, which ultimately allows them not only to access vital

information and to participate in joint meetings and activities, but also equips them with a voice in the interorganisational interaction between the EU and NATO. While Austria and Malta have expressed that joining NATO as full members is not likely, Finland and Sweden both keep this option open (Cottey 2013; Nilsson and Larsbrink 2013; Tiilikainen 2006). Individual characteristics and reservations need to be taken into consideration to examine the attitude and efforts of neutrals of interorganisational interaction. Some of them have the ability to pose additional obstacles, whereas others only prevent the specific state from further involvement in the EU-NATO cooperation. Nevertheless, the most present and dominant national caveat is the case of the defence opt-out by Denmark that needs to receive greater attention, which is further analysed in the following subsection.

7.4.2 Danish EU and NATO Memberships and the CSDP Opt-Out

Denmark possesses a special status among the neutrals of the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship, which makes it a special among the neutrals of interorganisational interaction. Even though it is considered to be a single member state, Denmark is in fact a multiple member albeit not in regard to the military aspect of CSDP. It is among the founding members of NATO and joined the EU in 1973 alongside its close ally, the United Kingdom. From the early stages of negotiations on the development of a European autonomous defence capacity the country resided with the UK's sceptical view. Domestically, there have also been divisions over Denmark's membership in the European Community, and when the topic of developing CFSP and CSDP emerged it has expressed its deep concerns over the risk of duplicating NATO's efforts (Petersen 1990). Danish scepticism and reluctance towards CFSP and CSDP do therefore not come as a big surprise. However, its specific position, i.e., as a de facto multiple member but a single member in foreign, security and defence affairs, as well as its diverging attitude towards the use of force in comparison to other states in the group of neutrals, Denmark can also be considered as a 'swing state' (Rodt 2017) or boundary case in terms of the categorisation of states into the typology.

In 1991, a referendum was held on the accession to the European Union. The Danish population initially vetoed the accession to the Union and specifically the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. Negotiations between Denmark and the EU resulted in four opt-outs of

which one was especially devoted to the EU's aim of developing its own defence policy and capability. According to Wivel (2014), neutrality had already lost its significance with gaining NATO membership although the country is nevertheless highly committed to international cooperation and multilateralism, but both the public and the political elite perceived that European security and order would be achieved best through the Atlantic Alliance and US presence. These opt-outs then came into force through the Edinburgh Agreement (European Council 1992). Accordingly, Denmark does not participate in or contribute to the planning and conduct of any EU-led military operations. Furthermore, it does not participate in the development or acquisition of military armaments and capabilities and did not join the European Defence Agency. In return, it would also not block or prevent any efforts for closer cooperation among other EU member states (Olsen 2007; Olsen and Pilegaard 2005; Rynning 2013).

The defence opt-out has been interpreted and applied differently by the various Danish governments succeeding the Edinburgh Agreement. Since the provisions of the agreement are broad and do not mention any precise restrictions, the country's permitted participation has been widened over time and Denmark has shifted from the traditional 'adaptive foreign policy' to a more proactive approach in European foreign and security policy (Haukkala et al. 2017: 26; Pedersen 2006). From 1992 until 2007, it has applied the defence opt-out nine times, which were primarily addressed at the soft end of the Petersberg Tasks as well as in the run-up of the Council meetings in both Helsinki in 1999 and Lisbon in 2000, which were significant for the further development of CSDP (Olsen 2007; Olsen and Pilegaard 2005). This CSDP opt-out was primarily regarded as symbolic until 2003 because of the lacking content and capabilities of CSDP. However, with closer cooperation among EU member states and the strengthening of both CFSP and CSDP, Denmark has realised this shortfall. Therefore, several attempts by Danish prime ministers, such as Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Lars Løkke Rasmussen, have been made to carry out a new referendum with the aim to abolish the defence opt-out and fully integrate into CSDP, which have so far failed (Miles 2014). The opt-out has been perceived as a barrier especially for Danish foreign, security and defence policy, and its activism and internationalism (Herolf 2006; Rynning and Rahbek-Clemmensen 2015). As stated in its national security and defence strategy, Denmark strives to increase its active engagement and international involvement to achieve peace and security worldwide as well as to maintain a high level of interoperability with its European and transatlantic partners (Denmark 2017, 2018). Only through the active participation in and contribution to CSDP and EU-led operations, it would be able to increase its influence and raise its voice internationally.

Interestingly, according to one EU Official, this defence opt-out is not seen as a barrier or obstacle on the organisational level since it has been a deliberate choice by the Danish public which could be reversed (EU Official 2). This would allow future Danish participation in CSDP if the issue is back on the agenda and needs re-negotiation.

Both the political elite and the Danish public view their memberships in the EU and NATO differently and with diverging intentions, which has impacted the country's policies towards the two organisations and their interaction. According to the 2000 Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey on European Defence, Denmark was the only country in which NATO is the first choice with 40% over the EU with 27% (European Commission 2000). In this context, Danish EU membership is set in contrast to its NATO membership and its general foreign, security and defence policy. Accordingly, 'Denmark's approach to the EU's security and defence policy remained one of foot-dragging' (Wivel 2014: 80). As it has been identified, its lack of participation in CSDP paired with its general Euroscepticism has led to lugging activism. Its involvement in NATO, however, has experienced some noteworthy developments. During the Cold War, Denmark has been labelled by Wivel (2014: 80) as a 'repressed' Atlanticist and characterised as a reluctant ally that fell short of incentives and activism. Its level of ambition within and approach to the Alliance has evolved over time, and its position has even shifted from a 'mainstream' Atlanticist to a 'super Atlanticist' and 'impeccable ally' (Ringsmose and Rynning 2008; Wivel 2014: 80-81). Its new activism and Atlanticist orientation have not been translated into involvement in the EU-NATO relationship and on the contrary, it has remained largely on the sidelines.

Because of its de facto multiple membership, the defence opt-out and its strong attachment to transatlantic security, Denmark could be considered as a boundary case because it generally expresses a preference for interorganisational cooperation and stronger ties between the EU and NATO, which are seen as important and essential for its national security. Furthermore, it seeks to maintain American presence in Europe and European security through NATO, while it aims to contribute to the EU's preventive action and civilian efforts to crisis management at the same time (Denmark 2018). Denmark's opt-out from the EU's security and defence policy and from cooperation on defence industry and armaments development has therefore posed challenges for the country in regard to the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship. For example, when the EU took over the military command and deployed troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina under Operation Althea, Denmark had to withdraw its troops which were previously under NATO command (Olsen and Pilegaard

2005). While the Danish armed forces were integrated into the already existing command structures on the ground and the troops from its European partners and allies stayed in the theatre, it was the only country that was technically forced to withdraw its troops due to the defence opt-out and the missing arrangements with the EU. This created a gap in the operation because of the omission of troops and resources. Moreover, the Danish representative is not able to attend or participate in any EU decision-making related to defence matters, which prevents complete knowledge in this policy field. Lastly, although the country is a general supporter of closer EU-NATO cooperation particularly in terms of dividing tasks and reducing extra costs for individual member states, the defence opt-out excludes Denmark from active participation and contribution to this interorganisational cooperation (Larsen 2008; Olsen 2007). The opt-out therefore does not allow it to exert influence which similarly-sized multiple member states do possess, which reduces Denmark's international influence as a whole and also affects its general position in both the EU and NATO. The opt-out from CSDP is therefore understood not only as a barrier to its foreign, security and defence policy, but also to its ability to influence political decisions and to take the lead in minilateral cooperation frameworks.

7.4.3 Participation in Coalition Groups and Minilateral Cooperation

States frequently engage in minilateral cooperation and enter coalition groups to strengthen their influence and positions as well as to formulate common concerns and preferences. Some member states are more active in this context and seek to overcome the dilemmas of multilateral cooperation in international organisations. Neutrals of interorganisational interaction make no exception and are engaged in coalition groups and maintain close relationships with individual member states in both the EU and NATO to increase their own influence in the area of foreign, security and defence affairs. In comparison to the other types of member states, neutrals seem overall less active, and especially less proactive, in terms of bilateral and minilateral relationships. Although all neutrals are somewhat involved in coalition groups and minilateral frameworks, the most prominent is the defence cooperation among the Nordic member states, which needs further analysis to assess its contribution to the EU-NATO relationship.

One of the most well-known minilateral cooperation frameworks within the Euro-Atlantic space is the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), which represents one part of the

overall cooperative endeavours of the Nordic states – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Nordic cooperation in general has been recorded since the end of World War Two and even aimed towards a common Nordic identity based on these countries' feeling of and attachment to "Nordicness" albeit to varying degrees (see, for example, Brommesson 2018a; Ojanen and Raunio 2018; Thorhallsson 2018). NORDEFCO was created in 2009 as a merger of previous frameworks and defence structures[12], and seeks to strengthen the defence cooperation among the participating states. It further provides incentives for synergies and armaments collaboration to thwart shortcomings, lacking resources and decreasing budget cuts. With the strengthening of cooperation through the EU and NATO, NORDEFCO received little attention, which was also caused by the differing memberships of the Nordic states. Moreover, both Denmark and Iceland have frequently been regarded as outliers because of their peculiarities, i.e., Denmark's CSDP opt-out and Iceland's non-existing armed forces (Forsberg 2013; von Voss et al. 2013). Yet, regional and minilateral defence cooperation through NORDEFCO, particularly in addition to other cooperation frameworks such as the Nordic Council, 'has been progressively seen as an asset to the enlarged EU and NATO' since the influence of the Nordic states through either organisation is limited, and for some states such as Sweden, it sometimes even represents the preference over either the EU or NATO (Joel and Iso-Markku 2013: 2). Renewed and enhanced cooperation has been recorded again since the 2010s with the Swedish idea of a Nordic Defence Pact as well as with the signing of the Nordic Declaration on Solidarity in 2011, which is rooted in the shared new security concerns in Northern and Eastern Europe.

NORDEFCO highlights an exemplary case of minilateral cooperation which contributes to the EU-NATO relationship. It consists of single and multiple member states as well as of both militarily neutral and militarily aligned states. The framework helps to formulate collective security and defence interests and preferences and enables closer cooperation among individual states. For example, members in NORDEFCO form the Nordic EU Battlegroup and undertake joint exercises and industrial collaboration to pool and share relevant military capabilities, which has also led to a positive impact on joint acquisition and procurement for both the Union and the Atlantic Alliance.

While NORDEFCO is not only a well-known but also a well-functioning minilateral cooperation framework among the Nordics, these Nordic states as well as the other members

[12] Nordic Armaments Cooperation (NORDAC), Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) and Nordic Supportive Defence Structures (NORDSUP)

in the group of neutrals occasionally participate in *ad hoc* coalition groups, such as with the US as a close ally specifically for Denmark and Iceland, but also with Germany and the UK. None of these bilateral partnerships are highly formalised and serve specific purposes, meaning the forming of coalitions depends highly on the issue on the agenda. It can overall be summarised that neutrals are not very active in a lot of coalition groups and minilateral cooperation frameworks, and often join on case-by-case basis to exert influence and realise their own security and defence interests. Although NORDEFCO represents an example of a minilateral framework that serves closer interorganisational cooperation, it has a very regional focus.

7.5 Contributions to the Military Capabilities Debate

The military capabilities gap as well as gaps in leadership, technology and investment have been identified as the most pressing ones in the EU-NATO relationship. Contributions and military expenditures are voluntary and are made by member states on the basis of their political willingness and their ability to develop and acquire new weaponry and defence systems (cf. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014; Fiott 2017b; Sperling 2004). As single members, neutrals of interorganisational interaction are not hampered by the double obligations set by NATO's DCI and the EU's Headline Goals, and they therefore have a lower risk of duplication. Meeting one of these capability targets and obligations is nevertheless difficult, and in some states that have a military neutrality status even controversial. This section examines neutrals' contributions to the military capabilities debate between the EU and NATO and identifies the position of the states in the group of neutrals to examine the impact this has on the relationship between the two organisations. It takes into consideration the possession of military capabilities and additional assets as well as the level of ambition, military expenditures and the willingness to engage in military crisis management operations.

As small states with historical records of or continued status as militarily neutral and non-aligned, members in the group of neutrals are highly aware of their limited resources and less advanced military capabilities. They therefore prefer multilateral endeavours and seek to couple up with bigger and more powerful states to benefit from those assets and capabilities, and to reduce their own vulnerability (Molis 2006; Wivel 2005). Moreover, this awareness is also highlighted in the debate on the leadership gap between the EU and NATO. There are some variances regarding the level of resources and military capabilities among

the neutrals of interorganisational relations, however. For example, Denmark has a long track record in military engagement because it does not share the status of military neutrality or non-alignment, and pursues a more active foreign and security policy. In addition, its Atlanticist orientation and bilateral ties with the US facilitate the advancement of its military capabilities (cf. Denmark 2018). Further, although Sweden seeks to take a leading role in the EU Battlegroups, for instance, it is the lead nation in the Nordic Battlegroup, it is conscious about its own interests which do not include the leadership position in European security and defence including CSDP (Haukkala et al. 2017). This means that none of these states has the ambition or desire to fill this gap and to take over the leadership in the Union, therefore no major contributions can be recorded.

Figure 8 Defence Expenditure of Neutrals as a Share of GDP



Data shown for 2016 in %. Source: EDA 2016; Eurostat 2018; NATO 2017a; SIPRI 2017.

As shown in Figure 8, the military expenditures of neutrals do not meet – and are not even close to – NATO's target of 2% of GDP. In 2017, Finland was the country with the highest military budget among the neutrals whereas Iceland takes an exceptional position because it does not possess a standing army and therefore does not record any military expenditures. The defence budgets of neutrals overall vary between 0.6% of GDP in the case of Malta and 1.4% of GDP for Finland (Eurostat 2018; NATO 2017a; SIPRI 2017). This locates them at the

lower end of both EU and NATO member states' military budgets, makes them highly vulnerable and gives them little leverage in negotiations with their peers. With regard to developments in international and European security, it is interesting to note that especially Northern European – in addition to Eastern European – countries have increased their military budgets. One of the reasons has been the on-going crisis in Ukraine as well as the conflict with Russia, which is still perceived as threatening to national security by some particular member states (Jedlaucnik 2015). In addition, the distribution of their military expenditures is still highly concentrated on costs for personnel. For example, while Finland follows the rule of thumb of thirds, i.e., one third goes to each personnel, supplies and procurement, Denmark allocates almost half of its defence budget to personnel costs and with 12.10% to equipment it does not meet NATO's target of 20% (NATO 2017a; Seppo and Forsberg 2013; also see Appendices C and D). Despite the military neutrality and non-alignment of the majority of states in the group of neutrals, their defence budgets and distribution of military expenditures are nevertheless guided by either NATO or the EU's principles and targets, and states in this group seek to meet these mostly for reasons of European and international solidarity and commitment to shared principles.

Neutrals have often been denounced as 'free-riders' because of their low military expenditures and overall defence budgets in comparison to other European partners and allies (NATO Official 5). In the debates on burden-sharing in NATO, for example, member states' military budget is the main metric to measure their contributions to the military capabilities debate and part of burden-sharing within the alliance. Quite frequently however, the contributions and capabilities in actual terms, such as their indirect contributions in the form of training facilities and joined exercises as well as efforts in crisis management and peace operations including civilian capabilities and humanitarian aid, have not been considered (see Mattelaer 2016). Small and micro states, including the neutrals, possess some vital and important resources and assets. With the defence transformation after the Cold War and the development of the EU's foreign, security and defence policies and capacities, states have increasingly transformed and specialised their armed forces. Some of the neutrals therefore seek to fill niche capabilities and resources. The example of Malta shows that the country has little resources but nevertheless vital ones to offer for both the EU and in circumstances also for NATO. Although its overall defence budget only amounts to 0.6% of its GDP, Malta maintains a key geostrategic position in the Mediterranean Sea with close proximity to North Africa. As Fiott (2015: 94) notes, 'its neutrality and geography appear to move in different directions', but both formulate its foreign and security policy orientation

and define its assets especially in crisis management situations. For instance, in spite of its general reluctance to make use of force, it offers a specialisation in nautical and maritime security. During the Libyan crisis it was hit severely by impacts and it thus responded by contributing financially as well as making use of its special crisis operations command centre and maritime security expertise to allow NATO to conduct Operation Unified Protector and the EU to exercise its border assistance mission EUBAM Libya (Fiott 2015; Pace 2013; Vella 2015). This indicates not only Malta's willingness to be active, albeit to a limited extent, but also demonstrates that it actually possesses vital resources which is can use to contribute to both the EU and even indirectly to NATO.

Most of neutrals' have specialised primarily in the civilian dimension of CSDP or in the comprehensive approach by both the EU and NATO, which takes a civil-military approach to crisis management operations. This is above all the preference and focus by militarily neutral, post-neutral or non-aligned states, including Austria, Finland, Iceland, Malta and Sweden (Finland 2013; Iceland n.a.; Malta 2017; Sweden 2017). Austria additionally strives to focus on prevention and specifically on creating a comprehensive security precaution (*umfassende Sicherheitsvorsorge)* (Austria 2010; Kammel 2013). Denmark, in contrast, has sought to focus on and specialise in anti-terror capabilities which has been emphasised in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks as well as its participation in ISAF Afghanistan and the US-led coalition of the willing in Iraq (Denmark 2016; Rynning 2013).

Finland and Sweden are prime examples that show a specialisation in and preference for civil-military approaches to international crises. For the deployment of troops to crisis situations both countries first require the legitimacy through a mandate by the UNSC, and then discuss civilian solutions and options before taking the decision to deploy troops to either EU-led or NATO-led military operations (Ruffa 2013; Seppo and Forsberg 2013). Deriving from their historical experiences and neutrality status, they pursue a traditional view on defence and see self-defence more vital for their own national security than for the solidarity and defence of other states. Foremost Sweden might possess a 'solid military capacity' (Tiilikainen 2006: 54) but sees itself primarily as the guard of norms, values as well as international law. Within international organisations and specifically as members of the EU and the PfP programme, both Finland and Sweden make major contributions to the development of civilian instruments and mechanisms. For instance, Finland introduced the idea of the Northern Dimension which was launched and joined by Sweden in 2000. The two countries jointly introduced initiatives to strengthen the EU's civilian capabilities and promoted the idea to

include the Petersberg Tasks concerning international crisis management in the Amsterdam Treaty (Forsberg and Vaahtoranta 2001; Möttölä 2001). This shows that, while neutrals might have smaller defence budgets and lower levels of willingness to use force, they hold other key assets and capabilities, which are required for the conduct of crisis management operations. Because of their preference for multilateral action, both the EU and the Atlantic Alliance are able to draw on these assets and niche capabilities.

The Nordic countries have furthermore collaborated in the development and procurement of military capabilities, and especially through the NORDEFCO framework. They have cooperated to create formal structures of coordination already when they established NORDAC, which was later integrated into NORDEFCO. Within these formal structures they have primarily cooperated on logistical coordination for crisis management operations through the Nordic Logistic Concept and in the field of air transport through the Nordic Tactical Air Transport (NORTART). The Nordic states additionally aim to set up joint command and control systems in order to pool and share their expertise, capabilities and resources to overcome shortages and meet needs in this field. Yet, also the cooperation and coordination among the Nordic countries on capabilities development and acquisition has proven to be difficult. The projects on the Standard Helicopter Programme and the Viking submarine are the most illustrative examples that highlight the diverging interests and preferences among these states (Jokela and Iso-Markku 2013; von Voss et al. 2013). In contrast to the defence industrial collaboration among the Nordic states, Austria or Malta's participation in such cooperative frameworks is rather shallow. This is explained on the basis of their neutrality and the continuity of the strong embeddedness of pacifism and this neutrality in their security and defence policies, which ultimately affects their willingness to advance their military assets and capabilities.

Overall, the states in the group of neutrals maintain lower levels of military expenditures and thereby place themselves at the lower end of the military capabilities spectrum in both the EU and NATO. Against this backdrop, they also express lower levels of political willingness to advance their existing military capabilities and to acquire new ones, which is based on their foreign and security policy orientation and their overall reluctance towards the use of force. Neutrals nevertheless fill important niches especially in terms of their contributions to civilian capabilities for crisis management operations. In addition, they provide well-functioning defence industrial cooperation and collaborations, in particular through NORDEFCO, to overcome financial constraints and lacking resources. While they might be single member

states and it might seem that they contribute only one-sidedly to the interorganisational relationship between the EU and NATO, their niche capabilities and assets are key to joint responses to international crises and to enhance practical cooperation.

7.6 View on Division of Labour and Interoperability

Member states in the group of neutrals of interorganisational interaction share a high number of views on the EU-NATO relationship, such as the necessity and benefits of cooperation, and make similar contributions to the functioning of this interorganisational relationship. In terms of their perspective on division of labour, divergences have been recorded especially between those states that are more open to multiple membership and those who rule out joining the Atlantic Alliance, i.e., Austria and Malta. This section focuses on the perspectives of neutrals on the division of labour and their contribution to closing the interoperability gap between the EU and NATO. It further examines the neutrals' participation in and contributions to EU-led and NATO-led operation.

The view on division of labour among neutrals varies and both Austria and Malta take a more distant perspective. Due to their general reluctance towards the use of force to respond to international crises, they are sceptical about NATO-led military crisis management operations overall. Thus, they have a clear preference for the EU's toolbox which includes diplomatic, economic and political instruments and which, in the view of Austria and Malta, has a more effective outcome than the approach taken by NATO (Kammel 2013; Pace 2013). Nevertheless, Austria does favour strong cooperation and collaboration between the EU and NATO in crisis management, especially if the use of force is inevitable. In that respect, it would favour the use of the EU's toolbox and civil-military approach in conjuncture with the use of NATO's military capabilities in order to support equally the core strengths and abilities of both organisations (Austria 2010).

In comparison, Denmark pursues its own view on the issue of division of labour between the Union and the Atlantic Alliance, which should be clearly defined, particularly because of its defence opt-out. Accordingly, it favours NATO as well as operations supported and led by the United States for the hard end of the security spectrum and for the conduct of military operations, while it prefers the EU to take over the civilian dimension (Denmark 2016). Consequently, it takes a pragmatic approach to division of labour. For Denmark, 'division of

labour means that NATO should be supported in questions of hard security and the EU in questions of soft security' (Rynning 2013: 92). In addition, the Danish public does not support EU autonomy in hard security and defence matters, but it also does not promote NATO's engagement in the Union's expertise and key areas in crisis management. Denmark's opt-out of CSDP is, however, the most decisive factor for its viewpoint on division of tasks and responsibility. A clearly defined division of labour allows the country's full participation in NATO-led operations as well as in EU-led civilian missions, and this provides Denmark a greater extent to exert influence in both organisations.

In the cases of Iceland and Sweden there are some overlaps with the Danish perspective albeit for different reasons. Iceland shares some of these views since it has joined the Atlanticist camp and prefers NATO action over the EU. It thus also values the EU's broad toolbox due to the organisation's main advantages and key strengths (Bailes and Rafnsson 2012). Sweden, on the other hand, prefers this particular division of labour because it initially did not fully support the development of the EU's security and defence policy and overall prefers taking action through the UN or Nordic cooperation. Based on the Atlanticist traits in its foreign and security policy orientation as well as the shifts in European and international security as well as its defence transformation, Sweden prefers the EU to focus on the civilian dimension of security and NATO to deal with aspects of hard security. This also explains its activism on strengthening the Union's civilian capabilities for crisis management (Raik 2018; Ruffa 2013). Although there is a high level of convergence and similarity between Finland and Sweden, the former maintains a different perspective on division of labour between the EU and NATO. It sees the use and engagement of both EU and NATO capabilities in the same theatre as 'natural', however only 'whenever appropriate' (Hopia 2008: 42). These different views among neutrals on the division of tasks and responsibilities between the two organisations in international crisis management, as well as the overall diverging perceptions and viewpoints among all member states, remains a critical aspect for practical interorganisational cooperation.

Neutrals' perspective on division of labour has further implications on the interoperability between the two organisations. Their overall view has been reflected in their participation in and contributions to EU-led and NATO-led military operations (see Appendix B). To date, Denmark is the only state among the neutrals that has participated and contributed to all NATO-led operations but because of its CSDP opt-out it has not been part of any EU-led military operations. Although it could technically contribute to CSDP operations, this would

imply to join the EU's defence policy, but this is not likely due to the failed attempts to reverse this opt-out (Miles 2014). In contrast, Austria has participated primarily in EU-led operations where its troops were deployed to the Western Balkans, which also reflects its overall focus on the neighbourhood. For Austria, a dilemma has emerged which is composed of the EU's increased engagement in Africa, which is not among the country's main interests. Moreover, its low contributions and only frequent participation highlight Austria's overall inactivity in the practical side of crisis management (Kammel 2013; Müller and Maurer 2016). Finland, Iceland and Sweden are cases that indicate that single members are active in the conduct of military operations of both the EU and NATO. In fact, from the early beginnings of their memberships, these three states have been increasingly participatory albeit with varying motivations. While Sweden seeks to increase its overall influence globally, both Finland and Iceland strive for growing peace and stability in Europe's neighbourhood and in geographical areas of interest (Finland 2013; Iceland n.a.). This further shows that none of these states is averse to closer cooperation and more frequent interactions with the respective organisation of which they are not full members. Participating almost equally in both organisations' military operations contributes to their interoperability and enables these states not only to gain a voice among other member states but also to express their security threats and interests. Apart from Iceland, Malta is the overall outsider in terms of participation in military operations. So far it has only deployed troops to EUNAVFOR Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden, and its total number of deployed troops in 2010 amount to 0.83% of its overall troop contingent (Pace 2013: 247). Malta generally faces the dilemma between constitutional neutrality and participation as well as pressures from other European states to become more active in CSDP (Fiott 2015).

Overall, the contributions by states in the groups of neutrals can be located in the middle to lower end across all member states in the EU and NATO. This shows their general reluctance towards the use of force on the one hand, and their limited military capabilities and the focus on civilian solutions on the other hand. This further pushes these states to the sidelines in practical cooperation between the EU and NATO, which is in line by and large with the efforts, viewpoints and foreign and security policy orientations of the members in the group of neutrals.

7.7 Conclusion

This chapter provided an analysis of the attitudes of and contributions by neutrals of interorganisational interaction. It explored their involvement in the formalisation process of the EU-NATO relationship and examined how they perceive and use their membership, foreign and security policy orientation and national caveats, which have further implications for the military capabilities debate and the scope of division of labour between the two organisations.

Neutrals have been characterised as member states with low profiles in the area of security and defence and particularly in regard to the EU-NATO relationship, who bring forward particular national caveats. One of these is their historical record or the continuation of military neutrality and non-alignment. Most of the states in the group of neutrals still maintain a high level of reluctance to make use of force and to deploy their troops to international crises overseas. Due to the embeddedness of multilateralism in their action, there are signs of greater willingness to act through either the EU or NATO especially in terms of civil-military approaches to conflict management. Moreover, it also explains their overall positive attitude towards closer cooperation between the two organisations. Their low profiles in pair with their limited military capabilities and military neutrality or non-alignment status does not allow neutrals to make major contributions to enhance this interorganisational relationship. In this regard, Denmark presents a special case as an outlier and a boundary case because it does not share military neutrality or non-alignment with the other states in this group. Additionally, it shows comparatively more enthusiasm and activism towards security and defence. Lacking effort to initiate projects and to develop new ideas by all states in the group of neutrals restricts their activism and therefore, neutrals remain overall on the sidelines of the EU-NATO relationship, but nevertheless possess flexible positions and are open to adapt to new circumstances if required.

Chapter 8 – Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

The overall aim of this research was to investigate how member states shape and contribute to interorganisational interaction between international security organisations. This dissertation has thus accounted for the interorganisational relationship between the European Union and NATO and has examined the role of their member states. It took a new perspective and captured how member states contribute to and shape EU-NATO cooperation. This analysis has thereby enhanced the current scholarship of the EU-NATO relationship and the study of interorganisational interaction by adding the member state perspective to the already existing analyses of the historical developments and institutional processes. The focus was first set upon theorising the position and roles of member states in interorganisational interaction, which was based on the current state of the art of interorganisationalism and organisation studies literature in conjuncture with insights from traditional international relations theories. According to Richard Swedberg's guide to theorising (2012, 2016), the proposed five steps include observation, naming the phenomenon, development of (hybrid) concepts, creation of a typology or analogy, and examination, which has guided the theorising process of this inquiry. The main research question that guided the development of the typology and the empirical analysis is the following: *How do different national features shape member states' roles and positions in and their contributions to the interorganisational relationship between the EU and NATO?* It was supported by additional sub-questions that address the current state of affairs of EU-NATO cooperation and how member states make use of their minilateral and bilateral relations to shape interorganisational cooperation.

In the first part, a set of features of interorganisational interaction was established and then the process of theorising the role of member states resulted in a typology which has identified four types of member states consisting of advocates, blockers, balancers and neutrals of interorganisational interaction. Both typologies provided the theoretical and conceptual framework for the subsequent analysis of the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship and the examination of the four types of member states including their attitudes, positions and contributions to this special relationship. It has been assumed that every single state can be categorised along the lines of the newly developed typology while it was also acknowledged that this categorisation is not fixed, which means that states' positions can

change over time and so can their affiliation with the types. In the second part, each type of member states was examined in more depth, with a particular focus on selected member states for each type, to understand and explain their diverging attitudes and behaviours towards EU-NATO cooperation in the area of security and defence. To do so, a multitude of research methods has been applied. The analysis of official documents such as member states' national security and defence strategies, the European Security Strategy, NATO's Strategic Concepts and agreements between the Union and the Atlantic Alliance ranging from the 2002 Joint Declaration on ESDP to the 2003 Berlin Plus arrangements and the Security of Information Agreement and to the 2016 Joint Declaration have been vital sources (see Appendix F) in addition to the conduct of semi-structured interviews with officials and representatives from both organisations and member states' permanent representations.

This chapter summarises the main theoretical and empirical findings of this dissertation and considers the assumptions made in the introductory chapter. This concluding chapter is divided into three sections. First, it summarises the findings of both the theorising process with the resulting typology of member states of interorganisational interaction and the empirical test of this typology. Second, the summary of the empirical part leads to the reflection on the role of member states and the change and continuity of their positions. This then aims to generalise the role of member states in interorganisational interaction beyond the EU-NATO relationship. Third, it presents the implications of this analysis for the cooperation between the EU and NATO based upon this new empirical data. This then gives new insights into the future development of their relationship and allows for an outlook for future research in this scholarship.

8.2 Summary of Theoretical Findings and Contributions

In this thesis, the focus was set on two elements: the theoretical foundations and the theorising of member states in interorganisational interaction on the hand, and the empirical test of this theoretical framework on the other. The theoretical study and debate on interorganisational interaction is a newly emerging approach in the International Relations Scholarship that incorporates a diverse range of theoretical debates, paradigms and viewpoints. This approach has its roots in the study of regime complexes (Raustiala and Victor 2004; also see Alter and Raustiala 2018), neoliberalism (Keohane 1982, Krasner 1982), organisational theory, interorganisationalism and interinstitutionalism (Franke 2017;

Gehring and Oberthür 2004, 2009; Jönsson 1986, 1993; Lipson 2017) and also takes into account network analysis (Dorussen and Ward 2008; Hafner-Burton et al. 2009; Maoz 2012). It has furthermore reflected on the constructivist literature and the aspects of international organisations as social actors and socialisation and learning within and between organisations (Checkel 2005; Johnston 2001; Juncos and Pomorska 2006), the focus on practical cooperation (Græger 2016, 2017), the role of international bureaucracies and the notion of autonomy of international organisations (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004; Bauer and Ege 2016; Reinalda and Verbeek 1998). With the help of these previous theoretical contributions and the seminal compilation of studies on practical interorganisational relations by Rafael Biermann and Joachim A. Koops (2017), key features of interorganisational interaction have been identified and defined. These features include the density of network in which the international organisations are located, functional overlap, the level of formalisation of their relations, the frequency of interactions, the level of intensity ranging from absent to minimal, to moderate and to strong, and membership overlap (see Table 2). Deriving from these features, key themes have been distilled which then help to examine the extent of interorganisational interaction and the engagement of member states therein. The key themes consist of the formalisation and institutionalisation process, the use and perception of membership of states, division of labour and interoperability between the participating international organisations, and the aspect of military capabilities that help to analyse the intensity of exchange and interaction depending on the policy field in which the two organisations are active and overlap. The use and measurement of these features and key themes allow to identify interorganisational interaction and to depict a particular interorganisational relationship between actors in a chosen policy area. In the field of security and defence, the evolving relationship between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance has proven to be a viable example.

The establishment of the typology of interorganisational interaction has brought forward a set of strengths and weaknesses which need to be considered and further elaborated. The typology combines different strands of the literature such as organisation theory, sociological approaches and institutionalism as well as approaches to interorganisationalism. The phenomenon of interorganisational interaction has been observed in these disciplines and combining them has been a novel approach. Its application creates a comprehensive overview of what constitutes the relationships and interactions between international organisations and how newly emerging cooperative frameworks of organisations can be characterised. Yet, it is also acknowledged that this typology and the features of

interorganisational interaction developed and explored in this dissertation still show some shortcomings. Although it combines different theoretical and conceptual approaches, its application needs to be undertaken more rigorously throughout the different disciplines and each field will need to contribute to the further elaboration of the key features of interorganisational interaction. Furthermore, the current typology lacks methodological guidance in order to assess the intensity, frequency and level of formalisation. For example, it does not yet enable to identify when an interorganisational relationship counts as, for example, moderate or strong. Methodological and analytical tools will need to be developed and tested that identify the threshold levels, which was however not the objective of this dissertation.

What has been striking is that the role of member states in interorganisational interaction has often been overlooked and that member states represent a crucial aspect which has so far received little attention in both theoretical and empirical debates. The focus in current studies has shifted towards the inclusion of and emphasis on international bureaucracies and secretariats as well as staff-to-staff cooperation (Biermann and Koops 2017; Græger 2016). Yet, states are the foundational building blocks of which international organisations are constituted and they are key providers of resources to international secretariats. The success and failure as well as the political directions of international organisations are therefore influenced by member states (Archer 2001). Because of this scarcity of theoretical debates on member states in interorganisational interaction, this research draws on findings from studies on states in international organisations. Accordingly, member states are characterised as either original and old or subsequent and new members (Magliveras 2011) and as either multiple members or single members (Gehring and Faude 2014). In case of intergovernmental decision-making, as it is the case in the EU and NATO in the realm of security and defence affairs, the distinction between single and multiple member states is specifically crucial because of the restricted capacity to influence of those states which hold single membership status.

Taking these previous studies and insights from theoretical contributions as a point of departure, this research was interested in examining the role of member states in interorganisational relations and particularly how states shape the interorganisational relationship between the European Union and NATO. Drawing on the features of interorganisational interaction outlined in the first part of the theoretical chapter as well as on the characteristics of member states in international organisations, the theorising process

induced a typology of member states in interorganisational interaction. This typology consists of four types: advocates, blockers, balancers and neutrals (see Table 3).

Each type of member states is attached to certain sets of characteristics that describe the attitudes, positions and viewpoints of member states, which help to understand and predict their behaviour towards future endeavours in interorganisational relationships between organisations of which they are members. A key distinguishing factor is a state's approach to foreign and security policy as well as its political orientation in security and defence, which allows to categorise member states into one of these types. Member states have been categorised into the typology based on a set of selection criteria, which include states' attitudes towards interorganisational interaction and cooperation among international organisations (positive, negative, balanced, indifferent), level of active promotion of closer interorganisational cooperation (absent, low, medium, high), view on division of labour between the respective international organisations (positive, negative, balanced, indifferent), level of engagement in negotiations (absent, low, medium, high) and material contributions to the international organisations and their operations (absent, low, medium, high). The consideration of states' distinctive characteristics and foreign and security policy orientation helps to further identify relationships between member states and the respective international organisations as well as between member states and interorganisational relationships. Moreover, these provide the basis to make predictions in the future about the positioning of a specific member state, which is particularly significant when a new policy or initiative is introduced. The ability to foresight potential outcomes because of the location of states in the typology can lead to the naming of states that might seek to hamper the aspired process. Through the typology similarities and differences can be pointed out, which then enable to formulate new policy ideas and initiatives to the extent that they would receive greater acceptance among all member states.

The theoretical framework and especially the typology of member states in interorganisational interaction, however, also recognise the fact that states are not fixed to one of these types and that change and shifts are possible albeit not frequently. These cases can be labelled as 'swing states' (Rodt 2017) or boundary states. The limitations of the typology of member states is therefore that not every member state fits directly into one of the types and cannot be clearly categorised but rather shift across types, which complicates the overall categorisation of states as well as the predictions of member states' responses to the introduction of new initiatives if their categorisation is not clear due to shifts and changes

on the domestic level. While this research focuses on the analysis and the application of the typology of member states of the EU-NATO relationship, the aim of the typology is also to become a general analytical framework to examine the role of member states in interorganisational interaction outside this particular relationship. The application requires that cooperating international organisations include exchanges and interactions at the member state level in order to account for member states' influence on interorganisational relations and the position therein. This means that the typology of member states is limited to those interorganisational relationship that take place not only on the institutional level but that are more comprehensive and meet higher scores in the typology of interorganisational interaction, such as intensity, formality and membership overlap.

In addition, the use of typologies and classification is generally difficult where the categorisation relies on information, data and knowledge acquired through third parties, e.g., through the conduct of interviews and the examination of secondary literature, in a field that deals with sensitive topics and where the access to participants with this knowledge is limited. The analysis of national security and defence strategies has been useful since these provide sources to carve out states' orientations towards the EU and NATO and have also revealed national restraints, attitudes and positions. However, the language of these documents has shown similarities and that particular wordings and phrasings are common in official documents. This has added to the difficulty of categorisation because they had to be examined with consideration of the findings from the interviews and the secondary literature. Concerning the specific categorisation of EU and NATO member states into this typology, the adaptability and changing nature of states' foreign and security policy orientations, domestic politics as well as the occurrence of external shocks have posed challenges to clearly identify and categorise a state according into the types of member states in interorganisational interaction. Especially boundary cases, who represent key characteristics of more than one type, have been difficult to label and therefore, references to how they also show features other than their located type have been made throughout the thesis to demonstrate that they have either held diverging positions on particular issues or have shared attitudes and behaviour with another type. These challenges and the general limitations of the use of typologies as set out in the introductory chapter have been taken into account when creating the typology of member states in the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship, which led to several attempts of redefining the final categorisation of all member states throughout the research process.

The theorising of the role of member states in interorganisational interaction and the development of the typology has overall led to the characterisation of each type. Member states that belong to the group of *advocates* are prominent for promoting interorganisational interaction among other states and in international forums, i.e., in negotiations with fellow member states when the topic of cooperation and collaboration with other international security organisations is put on the agenda. They are active participants in the formalisation of interorganisational relations and belong to many minilateral cooperative frameworks. Advocates make use of their embeddedness in external networks and coalition groups to promote their views on interorganisational interaction. Division of labour plays a crucial part for advocates since they promote a more clearly defined division of tasks in order to make efficient use of member states' resources and to avoid competition and duplication.

Both the theorising of *blockers* and the theoretical findings have led to the description of this group of states as "troublemakers" in interorganisational interaction. Based on their experiences and foreign and security policy orientation, these states seek to slow down the formalisation process. Although they are embedded in minilateral networks, it is widely perceived by other members that these states produce obstacles to interorganisational relations. Blockers subsequently make use of political strategies such as hostage taking in which they use their own membership against another potential member, and thereby also obstruct the division of labour between participating international organisations (see Alter and Meunier 2009; Hofmann 2009, 2018).

The third type is represented by *balancers* of interorganisational interaction. States in this group share the approach of balancing between the organisations, between other types of member states such as advocates and blockers, and between any other dividing lines that emerge in interorganisational relations. While they are generally active and supportive of interorganisational interaction, their main aim is to mitigate and broker between states and organisations. This becomes most salient in negotiations and bargaining situations. Balancers also take a particular viewpoint on division of labour between the participating organisations in which the strengths and capabilities of each is primarily supported and in which the emphasis is put on complementarity among international organisations.

Neutrals of interorganisational interaction represent the fourth type of member states which is comprised of states that take a neutral standpoint on interactions and cooperation between international organisations. These states stand out in the sense that they do not take a strong position similar to advocates or blockers. Moreover, neutrals also do not have

the capabilities to take the role of negotiators and balancers. Because of their status as single member states and due to national constraints, these states recognise their limited abilities to shape interorganisational interaction, and therefore they make limited contributions and remain primarily outside of the main activities. This position, however, also induces their dependence on interorganisational cooperation in order to make use of the joint resources and strengths.

Theorising interorganisational interaction as a whole and the development of the typology of member states have resulted in the assumption that when two – or more – international organisations decide to cooperate in a particular policy field, member states play an essential role in the design, intensity and practical functioning of their interactions. Considering the theoretical debates on state behaviour in international organisations, it is acknowledged that member states' preference for and attitudes towards interorganisational cooperation between particular international security organisations is determined by their view on the organisations' purposes, their national interests, foreign and security policy orientation and historical experiences. Their positions are not fixed and their affiliations can change over time through the occurrence of external and internal events, such as the onset of new conflicts and crises, the change in government, as well as through the socialisation with other member states within participating international security organisations. This typology of member states of interorganisational interaction has consequently been tested empirically to assess its applicability and to examine how member states are able to shape interorganisational interaction

8.3 Summary and Discussion of Empirical Findings

The research question of this dissertation was addressed to examine the role of member states particularly in the interorganisational relationship between the European Union and NATO. In order to respond to this research question, the sub-question *what is the current state of affairs in the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship?* has sought to examine the developments of this particular interorganisational relationship. This study has been embedded in the wider literature on the EU-NATO relationship starting from the end of the Cold War and reaching until the signing of the Joint Declaration in July 2016. Unlike previous scholarly works, this dissertation has established a thematic overview of the EU-NATO relationship. Drawing on previous studies in conjuncture with the theorisation and key

features of interorganisational interaction (see Table 2), four key themes have been identified: institutional and legal framework, issue of membership, capabilities gap, and interoperability and division of labour.

The institutionalisation of the relations between the EU and NATO has evolved over time. While their interactions were almost non-existent during the Cold War due to the limited functional overlap, this changed with the end of the East-West conflict and the subsequent new security environment and global order. Informal meetings occurred at the early stages between the military staff of the EU and NATO as well as between the Secretary General and High Representative of either side which created a viable format for future meetings and exchanges (Messervy-Whiting 2005). Although both organisations achieved the formulation and signing of important and unique agreements since the beginnings of their cooperation, including the EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy, the Security of Information Agreement and the Berlin Plus arrangements, particular obstacles disallowed the deeper institutionalisation of their interactions.

The analysis of the EU-NATO relationship has revealed that member states pose a main constrain to deepening interorganisational cooperation. The Cyprus issue and the still ongoing tensions between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey evidently represent one of the biggest challenges and the prime obstacle to formalising EU-NATO cooperation. However, this research has shown that the Cyprus issue is not the only challenge that the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship faces but also other individual member states and their bilateral disputes as well as national perceptions of this special partnership have hampered further formalisation in the past. The most relevant ones to note here are France's withdrawal from NATO's military command structures and its fear of US dominance in Europe and the strong stance on military neutrality and the disengagement with military alliances such as NATO by Ireland, for example. But also states who are overall supportive of EU-NATO interorganisational cooperation, such as the UK, have occasionally hampered the EU to acquire military defence structures and capabilities, and thus have automatically created an asymmetric relationship which made achieving cooperation at eye level more difficult. The membership overlap and the tensions among some member states have furthermore affected the subsequent themes for the EU-NATO relationship.

Several gaps between the EU and NATO have been identified, including the capabilities gap, leadership gap, investment and procurement gap, technology gap and interoperability gap (Bialos 2005; Sperling 2004). It has been observed that such gaps between the two

organisations have resulted in an uneven and asymmetric relationship in which member states assume that NATO is the more capable and powerful organisation in terms of security, defence and crisis management. The EU, in contrast, is often seen as the weaker partner due to the lack of vital military capabilities, which are primarily provided by the United States within the Atlantic Alliance. Yet, it has also been found that the EU possesses a much broader and even oftentimes more useful toolbox than NATO which allows the Union to be the first choice in terms of engagements in crisis management for some multiple member states. These gaps and the asymmetry in their relations has caused member states to pursue a specific division of labour albeit one in which interoperability is warranted. It has become evident that states would decide upon such a division of tasks and responsibilities on a case-by-case basis depending on the type of security threat and crisis. So far, there is no clearly defined division of labour between the EU and NATO, which provides greater freedom for both organisations to develop their own capabilities, instruments and policies, but which also enables them to create incentives to achieve interoperability and to close some of the gaps in their relationship.

The empirical research process was structured within the boundaries of the theoretical and analytical framework and the analysis was thus guided by the four themes. The application to the EU-NATO relationship in security and defence has then indicated that member states have the ability to influence and shape their relations. Alongside the international secretariats of both organisations and individuals in key positions such as the Secretary General and High Representative, member states are essential actors in directing future cooperation. These findings and analyses have then guided the empirical analysis of member states' and roles and positions in interorganisational interaction according to the four types of member states developed in the theoretical framework. Theorising the role of member states and applying the typology of member states of interorganisational interaction has resulted in the categorisation of each state into one of the four types as seen in Table 8. While it is evident that the EU-NATO relationship is progressing since all member states agree that interactions between the two organisations are useful and necessary to meet today's multiple security challenges, the attitudes and positions on the depth and width vary among member states. For each type of member states in the EU-NATO relationship specific insights and findings have been made and the following subsections summarise and conclude the main findings from the empirical analysis of the role of member states.

Overall, the study of the role of member states in the relationship between the EU and NATO has overall shown that states take a decisive position in shaping in interorganisational interaction not only because of the need of their agreement but, more importantly, because of their diverging preferences, rationales and attitudes which shape the outcome of cooperation between organisations. Member states influence and thus shape, either by obstructing, advocating or balancing, the interactions and level of cooperation among international organisations in the same policy field. Specifically in the case of the EU-NATO relationship, this research has highlighted the need to consider national characteristics and features, including historical and operational experiences, possession of capabilities, legal constraints and foreign and security orientation, as well as their attitudes and approaches which contribute to the design, formalisation and framework of interaction of interorganisational cooperation.

Table 8 Allocation of States in the Typology of Member States of Interorganisational Interaction

Type of member states of interorganisational interaction	**Member States**
Advocates	Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, the United States
Blockers	Cyprus, France, Greece, Ireland, Turkey
Balancers	Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain
Neutrals	Austria, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Malta, Sweden

8.3.1 Advocates

The states in the group of advocates of interorganisational interaction play an active role in promoting cooperation between NATO and the EU. As drivers and promoters of EU-NATO relations they are actively involved in all dimensions of the four themes. One key element of advocates is that they make use of their status as multiple members to promote this special

relationship equally in both organisations. The empirical findings have shown that the majority of states in both organisations is generally supportive of their relationship and closer cooperation in the future (see Table 8). According to the insights from the conducted interviews, the general perception is positive and some of the national representatives have indicated that further progress is feasible and aspired. These states have engaged intensively in the formalisation and institutionalisation process, and have frequently voiced their advocative view on the EU-NATO relationship to persuade other member states to join them. Advocates' embeddedness in minilateral networks and coalition groups as well as the maintenance and strengthening of bilateral partnerships has enabled advocates to convince less enthusiastic members to pose little to no obstacles to further cooperation and exchanges.

Among the most active advocates are the United Kingdom and the Baltics as well as some of the Central and Eastern European states. Britain's bilateral relations with France as its most valued European partner and the special relationship with the US as its most important transatlantic ally have proven to be vital for initiating and enhancing EU-NATO cooperation. Examples of the UK's conducive behaviour include the signing of the Franco-British Saint Malo Agreement in 1998, the individual efforts by former Secretary General George Roberts and the provision of operational headquarters in Norwood to both the EU naval operation EUFOR Atalanta and NATO Operation Ocean Shield. The three Baltic states have made impeccable contributions to the promotion of enhanced interorganisational cooperation which is remarkable considering their status as small states and their limited resources and capabilities.

The analysis of advocates of interorganisational interaction has highlighted that the motives and strategic interests behind the support for enhanced EU-NATO cooperation vary across states in this group. While especially some of the smaller states, such as the Baltics and Eastern European countries, are still seeking to find and fostering their place in both organisations after having joined as subsequent members, the UK, for example, sees this relationship as a necessary and inevitable one to increase its own influence in international politics. Albeit the divergences in the depth of activism, all states in the group of advocates have made integral contributions to supporting EU-NATO cooperation which have enabled these efforts overall.

8.3.2 Blockers

States belonging to the group of blockers – Cyprus, France, Greece, Ireland and Turkey – have been labelled as "troublemakers" because their external actions, attitudes and particularly "schizophrenic" behaviour have posed major obstacles to formalising and enhancing the relations between the EU and NATO. These states do not completely obstruct any interaction between the two organisations but derived from their national interests and frictions with other member states, their behaviour has hampered relevant and necessary developments. The conflict between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey has been pointed out as the main problem for the institutionalisation process. Unless this issue gets resolved and either side stops blocking the other from joining and/or fully participating in the respective other organisation, this issue will also pose the major blockage in the future. All of the states in the group of blockers show signs of involvement in all four themes of the EU-NATO relationship but, as highlighted by representatives of member states from the other types, this has been perceived negatively because of the slowing down effect.

Accordingly, blockers are very selective in the use and provision of their military capabilities when it comes to crisis management operations in which both the EU and NATO seek to cooperate. This is furthermore complicated by the nature of the Berlin Plus arrangements, which provide the practical dimension of cooperation and allow the EU to make use of NATO's military assets and capabilities for EU-led operations. However, one element of these arrangements is the EU-NATO Security of Information Agreement in which Turkey blocks Cyprus from joining the arrangements, and in return, Cyprus has impeded deeper Turkish engagement in European security and defence policies and structures (Acikmese and Triantaphyllou 2012). France, on the other hand, seeks to strengthen the EU's military and crisis management capacities and therefore focuses on the allocation of its resources towards the EU's engagement while it has limited its contributions to NATO operations. Its outspoken opposition and fear of US dominance in both Europe and NATO caused the French location in the Europeanist camp and its drive for European autonomy. As the analysis has shown, this position has ultimately impacted the EU-NATO relationship to the extent that France, in addition to the other states in this group, is rather sceptical and cautious about advancing and enhancing this interorganisational relationship. It was overall concluded that blockers do not strongly oppose any cooperative efforts, but instead, that they seek to slow down the progress and are heavily attached to national interests and strategic choices.

8.3.3 Balancers

In regard to EU-NATO cooperation, the group of balancers consists of countries such as Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain. As it is evident from the typology of member states of interorganisational interaction and the theorisation of balancers, these states balance and mediate among the different groups and camps, e.g. advocates and blockers. Applied to the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship, these members are active in negotiations and in coalition groups in order to mitigate tensions not only between those who promote and those who block further cooperation, but also between Atlanticists and Europeanists. One of the main common features is the shared historical past as former authoritarian regimes and dictatorships in the twentieth century, which has heavily influenced and shaped the approach to security and defence of states in the group of balancers. Particularly Germany and Italy – based on their central geographical location in Europe, their status as multiple members, their preference for the comprehensive approach to crisis management rooted in their foreign and security policy orientation, and their middle power status – possess the toolbox and interest to mediate among their fellow member states equally in both organisations. As the empirical examination has shown, these countries are frequently perceived as balancers by other members in either the EU or NATO. Especially Germany's ability to negotiate with some of the more powerful states as well as the maintenance of valuable bilateral and minilateral relationships has earned the country to be a vital state in this interorganisational relationship. Germany has become the first point of contact for many small-sized members because it provides a platform that is used to balance among all states in both organisations.

The role of balancers has received increased attention whenever a sign of asymmetry and imbalance between the EU and NATO has been visible, which called for brokers and mediators to rebalance the relationship. These states have therefore been mostly active in negotiations and consultations between either side and among other member states. While balancers are actively engaged in negotiations and in the institutional developments of external relationships of their organisations, they have comparatively little to contribute in terms of defence spending, military capabilities and additional resources. Balancers face high degree of national constraints, either due to their historical past or because of financial reasons, in order to increase their contributions. Consequently, it has been found that they seek to emphasise the comprehensive approach to become actively involved in enhancing

further EU-NATO cooperation in which both organisations have their fair share of engagement.

8.3.4 Neutrals

The last type of member states to be analysed was the group of neutrals of interorganisational interaction. As outlined in the typology, their shared characteristics include a minimal degree of engagement in interactions and exchanges between the EU and NATO as well as the neutral viewpoint of their relationship. This group is comprised of especially small states which are located on the geographical periphery of both organisations, who have neither the ability nor the willingness to actively promote, block or balance interorganisational cooperation. In addition, the members in this group maintain a single membership status albeit with partnership agreements with the respective other organisation. This group, however, includes both original and new member states, and each brings forward a specific set of attitudes and approaches to EU-NATO cooperation. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Malta and Sweden have all been identified as primarily neutrals. The outlier in this group is Denmark because it factually has a multiple membership status but due to its opt-out of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, it is constrained in the defence activities of one organisation, which makes it thus a *de facto* single member state.

A common element, which goes in line with their neutral and rather impassive attitudes towards interorganisational interaction, is their historical record or still on-going military neutrality and non-alignment. It therefore does not come as a surprise that these states prefer civilian approaches and seek to engage in the softer spectrum of security and defence tasks. This has caused national constraints on joining a military alliance such as NATO on the one hand, yet none of these states seeks to disrupt or obstruct further cooperation with the EU on the other hand. Neutrals therefore remain silent and prefer to stay out of tensions with other member states. According to the typology, it was assumed that neutrals do not possess many outstanding resources and military capabilities. As was shown by the analysis of the empirical data, countries such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden seek to increase their military expenditures and have recently made greater contributions to crisis management operations as well as to developing joint capabilities, such as some of the Finnish-Swedish initiatives and states' specialisation in civil-military responses to international crises. Despite

the positioning on the sidelines, neutrals are of vital importance for the EU-NATO relationship because they provide niche capabilities which help to improve the comprehensive approach in which both organisations can operate with their expertise and strengths.

8.5 Implications for the EU-NATO Interorganisational Relationship

This inquiry overall argued that member states play an essential role in the evolution of the interorganisational relationship between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance because they seek to find their own place at the decision-making table within either organisation and are driven by specific interests and caveats. The scholarly publications and studies so far have centred their examinations around the interactions on the international bureaucracy and secretariat levels and primarily focused on the analysis of practical cooperation in crisis management operations (see Duke 2008; Gebhard and Smith 2015; Nováky 2015; Smith 2011; Whitman 2004) or on the institutional dimension and staff-to-staff cooperation (see Reichard 2006; Touzovskaia 2006; Varwick and Koops 2009). The rationale of this research was to analyse the approaches, attitudes and behaviour of member states towards EU-NATO cooperation on the hand, and to examine the implications for the future development of this special relationship on the other hand. The question that has emerged from this analysis concerns the usefulness of the typology of member states in interorganisational interaction for the relationship between the EU and NATO.

Analysing the role of member states in the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship, and thereby considering their foreign and security policy orientation, minilateral and bilateral relations, and policy preferences within these two organisations, has allowed to collect insights into individual member states' motives, rationales and perceptions. This explains, for example, why the United Kingdom has eventually agreed to the development of the EU's military structures and capabilities and to create CSDP alongside CFSP, because it would not only have some degree of influence on the policy designs, but it would also be linked closely to NATO's activities and policies. In this regard, advocating for deeper EU-NATO cooperation would only make sense for Britain to retain its influence globally and in European security. The analysis has shown that variances and discrepancies among members exist. Investigating the positions of individual member states and categorising them into four types has thus enabled to identify national caveats and preferences which would provide the necessary information and knowledge for drafting new initiatives in the future. Knowing a state's

position helps to predict its responses and reactions to such new initiatives, and would furthermore enable to formulate the future direction of EU-NATO cooperation to incorporate these caveats to avoid another 'frozen conflict' between the two organisations. In addition, it has been found that the Cyprus issue and the dispute between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey is not the only blockage that needs to overcome, albeit it is the most intractable and a deeply anchored one. With the involvement of member states in the negotiations, every single state is a potential veto player. Any bilateral tensions and discrepancies can impact the EU-NATO relationship, as was shown by the most recent example of Austro-Turkish relations.

While it has been acknowledged that domestic politics can affect a country's foreign, security and defence policies, and thus also its attitude towards interorganisational cooperation between international security organisations, member states have the potential to shift from one type to another. Members are thus not fixed to a single type. Yet, based on their foreign and security policy orientation and their approaches to security and defence, member states are likely to stay attached to one particular category. Knowing a state's position, and thus its affiliation with the type of member state in interorganisational interaction, increases the predictability of this state's response and reaction to policy incentives and to initiatives that aim to enhance EU-NATO cooperation.

This overall helps to move towards more effective EU-NATO cooperation on both the institutional and operational levels (cf. Aghniashvili 2016). Effective cooperation relies on the contributions and support of member states. The typology and the categorisation of each member state provides room for further incentives to allow EU-NATO cooperation to progress and develop in a way that pleases all member states. The advantages are manifold. First, this would overcome and avoid fragmentation and friction among member states in regard to shared strategic views on EU-NATO cooperation and combined responses to international crises. Moreover, this will also lead to greater effectiveness particularly in terms of practical cooperation. In the context of crisis response and crisis management, considering member states' positions in the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship allows the creation of mechanisms to respond especially to hybrid conflicts that require the toolboxes of both organisations. For example, the conflict in Ukraine including the dispute with Russia as well as the subsequent involvement by international security organisations, including the EU and NATO, has highlighted the necessity of a concerted approach to crisis management which includes civilian and military components that are coordinated effectively (Mälksoo 2018; Pindják 2014).

With the help of the analysis of member states in regard to their approaches to and positions in the interorganisational relationship between the EU and NATO and the subsequent typology of member states has therefore added a new angle on analysing this special relationship. It has further allowed to make future predictions on the evolution of interorganisational interaction and provided an analytical framework as well as a foundation for forthcoming investigations of the EU-NATO relationship. Since the time period of this research was set for 1991-2016, questions have arisen on the recent events and developments, however. The following subsection thus takes a look at these events and considers the outlook for future research.

8.5.1 EU-NATO Cooperation in 2016 and Beyond

When the Secretary General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg, the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker and the President of the European Council Donald Tusk signed the Joint Declaration on 8 July 2016 at NATO's Warsaw Summit (NATO 2016a), a major milestone was reached for EU-NATO cooperation. It was hailed as a success by representatives from both organisations (EU Official 2; NATO Official 1) as well as the academic community and the media (see, for example, Dempsey 2016; Raik and Järvenpää 2017). Since this pivotal event, further progress not only in the EU-NATO relationship has been recorded, but also the EU has taken up its promises to realise the many points on its defence bucket list and to improve its military structures. In addition, events within member states as well as on the international level have shown their effects on EU-NATO cooperation which requires further elaboration.

The 2016 Joint Declaration has been regarded as the revitalisation of this interorganisational relationship. In the follow-up, both organisations agreed on the Implementation Plan on 6 December 2016 which sets out the practical realisation of their cooperation efforts. Their cooperation has accordingly shifted towards seven areas: (1) countering hybrid threats, (2) operational cooperating including on maritime issues, (3) cyber security and defence, (4) defence capabilities, (5) defence industry and research, (6) exercises, and (7) defence and security capacity-building (CEU 2016). Within these areas of cooperation, forty-two concrete actions have been agreed upon which shall be implemented and realised, and which are monitored through frequent progress reports every six months. To ensure further advances and to create new incentives for cooperation, the Council of the EU and the NAC have agreed

on additional thirty-four actions in December 2017 (NATO 2018a). In respect to these reports, progress in all areas of cooperation have been observed, yet, both organisations acknowledge that most proposals and actions have a long-term perspective which require continuous efforts as well as the need to increase and intensify cooperation between the EU and NATO on both institutional and operational levels.

On the EU side, new developments have been achieved to foster its security and defence policy and capacity. Just a few weeks before the signing of the Joint Declaration, the Union and its member states adopted the EUGS on 28 June 2016. Therein it is restated that the EU desires to deepen the partnership with NATO and that working closely is a vital part to contributing to Europe's security. At the same time, it seeks to act autonomously and therefore wishes to devise and strengthen its autonomy while concurrently acting in cooperation with NATO (EU 2016a). As already outlined in the Lisbon Treaty, and thus even in advance to both the EUGS and the Joint Declaration, the EU planned to create new tools and mechanisms which were eventually introduced in 2017, such as the European Defence Fund, the Military Planning and Conduct Capacity, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and eventually Permanent Structured Cooperation. Particularly the establishment of the latter has led to criticism in regard to the future of EU-NATO cooperation due to the renewed idea of a European army as well as the risk of duplication. However, such concerns were annihilated by the EU's High Representative Federica Mogherini who emphasised that these mechanisms are to be complementary to NATO and will serve to enhance the EU's capability to make cooperation with the Alliance more effective and fruitful (EEAS 2018a).

Although these achievements sound prosperous and promising, new challenges and obstacles have emerged for the EU-NATO relationship. New bilateral disputes among member states, such as the tensions between Austria and Turkey as well as the latter's relations with both Germany and the Netherlands, have disallowed a new stimulus and have even posed new obstacles that need to be considered in implementing the proposals (NATO Official 1). The so-called Brexit, the election of Donald Trump and new types of external security threats coming from both the East and the South will have additional influences on the future of the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship.

The decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union from 24 June 2016 has been recognised as an additional challenge. With Britain's withdrawal, the largest military power will leave the EU which can create new asymmetries, especially within the military capabilities dimension, between the two organisations. The Franco-British axis has

traditionally been the foundation of European security and CSDP. Since the EU already faces a leadership gap in comparison to NATO, a new run on the UK's position is possible and other member states might seek to fill this gap. Potential candidates are not only Germany with its level of capabilities and resources as well as outreach, but also Italy and Poland are the next in line as the most powerful states in Europe (cf. Bond 2016). On the other hand, Brexit has also been identified as a potential enabler for EU-NATO cooperation in the future. The UK's limited resources would result in the increase of its full commitment in and contributions to NATO (Martill and Sus 2018; von Voss and Schütz 2018). Labelled as an advocate of interorganisational interaction, it is suggested that the country will still pursue to realise this role in the future and that it will strengthen its position as a bridge through its expansive bilateral and minilateral security relations. Even though negotiations on the future relationship between the EU and the UK, including in the area of foreign, security and defence affairs are still on-going and a deal has not yet been struck, it has been crystallised that Britain will seek a close tie with its European partners and the Union as a whole (see Martill and Sus 2018; Whitman 2016).

Another internal challenge to EU-NATO cooperation is presented by the election of Donald Trump as US president in 2016 and his 'distaste for these institutions' (Walt 2018). Since his inauguration he has claimed that 'NATO is obsolete' and that the European allies in NATO are all free-riders, whereby the United States have been perceived a less reliable and more complicated partner not only for other alliance members but also for the EU-NATO relationship as a whole (Howorth 2018). In addition, external risks and security challenges coming from the South, such as the refugee flows coming via the Mediterranean Sea and the perceived threat of terrorism, and the East, including the on-going conflict between Ukraine and Russia, as well as the increased threats by cyber-attacks, hybrid warfare, and organised crime demand for closer EU-NATO cooperation but also face both organisations with the question of how to respond effectively and in a concerted fashion (EUGS 2016; also see Mälksoo 2018; Raik and Järvenpää 2017). This also calls for future investigations on how, on the one hand, both organisations will provide a framework and room for coordinated efforts and, on the other hand, how member states will contribute to enable and guarantee interorganisational cooperation.

8.6 The Roles of Member States beyond EU-NATO Cooperation: Applicability and Generalisation

The greater aim of theorising member states in interorganisational interaction and the development of the typology of member states and the conceptualisation of interorganisational interaction as a whole was to create an analytical framework that contributes more broadly to the study of the relations and interactions between international organisations. Cooperation and interaction between the EU and NATO and the role of member states therein is only one, albeit a very illustrative one, which has been empirically examined in this research. The findings and conceptualisations, and more importantly the typology, seek to be applicable to studies of interorganisational interaction beyond the EU-NATO relationship as well as beyond the area of foreign, security and defence policy. Yet, it is overall acknowledged that only a few examples exist in which the criteria of all six features of interorganisational interaction (density of network, functional overlap, formalisation, frequency, intensity and membership overlap) are met.

In the area of foreign, security and defence affairs, a multitude of studies has already been conducted on interorganisational relations. Examples that have received particular attention and interest are the relations between the EU and the UN, and the former's relations with other regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (see, for example, Charbonneau 2009; Laatikainen and Smith 2006; Novotny and Portela 2012; Rodt and Martyns Okeke 2013). The EU is not the only organisation that is active in triggering and maintaining interorganisational relations. The UN is another particular example and in the area of peacekeeping and security is has a long record of cooperating with international organisations, including the AU, ASEAN, ECOWAS and NATO, because of its reliance on regional organisations, their expertise and resources. Beyond this policy field, interorganisational interaction is most prominent in the areas of environmental policy and climate change, energy policy, and international trade (see, for example, Biedenkopf 2017; Franke and Koch 2013; van de Graaf 2017). The theoretical framework of interorganisational interaction has thus been used to examine the relationships between and among international organisations in a variety of fields.

Regarding the applicability of role of member states, however, research has not only been limited but also the number of cases only account to a few. The analysis of the role of member states and the examination whether particular member states are responsible for promoting

or obstructing the interorganisational interaction between selected international organisations, advocates and 'linking pin' actors (Jönsson 1986) as well as blockers to explain potential the slowing down factors, need to be identified. This would consequently require a membership overlap to a higher degree between the participating organisations. Without membership overlap a state considered to be the advocate would find it difficult to promote interorganisational interaction equally among participating organisations if it does not possess influence in decision-making and policy-shaping abilities. The notion of membership overlap is thus a highly explanatory factor. Moreover, a degree of institutional compatibility is necessary so that advocates, blockers, balancers and neutrals have the ability to exert influences and to shape interorganisational interaction. One example where a high degree of membership overlap and some institutional compatibility, albeit limited, are provided would be mostly when the UN cooperates and interacts with regional organisations. Yet, the main actor on the UN side is the United Nations Secretariat and cooperation takes primarily place on the ambassadorial level. This means that the main representatives from the organisations meet to negotiate and agree on the terms of cooperation, and therefore exclude member states.

8.7 Outlook and Future Research

On the basis of this research it can overall be concluded that member states play a crucial part generally in interorganisational interaction and, more specifically, in shaping the relationship between the European Union and NATO. The findings of this dissertation can guide two strands of future research; the first relates to the EU-NATO cooperation and the second is founded on the applicability of the typology of member states.

The argumentation and examination of this dissertation have found that there is a greater need for the consideration and inclusion of the role of member states in the analysis of the interactions between international organisations as well as member states' important contributions to and influence on the EU-NATO relationship. Future research of the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship will therefore need to take into account more intensively the influence by domestic politics on member states' positions within these international security organisations as well as the shift of governments including the foreign policy approaches of incumbent political leaders. Particularly the issue of Brexit and the future relationship between the EU with the UK will need to receive greater attention when

analysing EU-NATO cooperation, not only on the institutional level but even more importantly on the operational level since the UK is still hosting the EU's operational headquarters for EUFOR Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden. The uncertainty of the negotiations between the UK and the EU as well as the unstable commitment of the United States towards NATO and collective security more generally among its allies will have an impact on the future direction of the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship.

Most recent academic works have therefore re-considered the importance of specific member states, and the current debates have especially focused on the developments in and the roles of the United Kingdom and the United States (see, for example, von Voss and Schütz 2018). With the findings presented in this dissertation, the future research in the scholarship can consider the changes on the domestic level to make predictions about the likely effects and implications on the EU-NATO relationship. Yet, at the current stage, also more progress and improvements on the institutional and interorganisational levels are required. While scholars interested in EU-NATO cooperation have also shifted their focus towards developments within the organisations in the field of security and defence, special attention has been given to the elaboration of CSDP and the launch of the EU's new instruments of CARD, MPCC and PESCO. It will be interesting to examine the impact of such new tools and mechanisms on the EU-NATO relationship and whether they will lead to greater European autonomy in security and defence, or whether they will allow the two organisations to collaborate and cooperate more closely.

An additional factor that will need to be included in future research is the role and influence of external actors, including individual states, other international and regional organisations, and non-governmental actors involved in the area of security and defence. Individual actors and key states such as Russia as the Eastern neighbour for both organisations as well as the United Nations, the African Union and the OSCE will have an interest in the development of the EU-NATO relationship and thus need to receive greater attention in this research field. The revival and intensification of the interactions between the EU and NATO have emerged with the onset of the Ukraine crisis and the conflict with Russia in 2014. Russia has therefore been seen as one of the triggers for the most recent developments and enhancements of EU-NATO cooperation. Therefore, Russia cannot be excluded from European security issues and in fact, it plays a significant role by representing one part of the European security triangle. Russia's new foreign policy direction will therefore need to be considered in the future analysis of this special relationship.

Likewise, the crises on Europe's southern borders and particularly in the Mediterranean Sea do not only affect the EU and NATO, but have also expedited the interests of other international actors in the region such as the African Union. In the past, primarily the EU, but also NATO such as in the Gulf of Aden, has been an active security actor in Africa. Yet, the AU has also seen the strengthening the of its own peace and security architecture. Consequently, depending on future crises situations that require the military and civilian involvement of external actors, both the EU and the Atlantic Alliance will need to reconsider their interorganisational relations with the AU. Future research will thus need to include not only the influences from within, i.e., from member states and the institutions themselves, but also from the outside in the context of external actors' influence and contributions to the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship.

Avenues for future research and cases to apply the typology of interorganisational interaction could further be broadened and extended to the relations of the EU and NATO with other international and regional organisations, including the AU and the UN. Moreover, the typology of member states will also need to be applied to cases outside the spheres of the EU and NATO, which could, for example, include the UN's relations with regional organisations and, additionally, to regional relationships such AU-ECOWAS cooperation as well as to relations between the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League, cooperation between the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and any interaction between international organisations that include all of the features of interorganisational relations as outlined in this thesis.

Overall, both the typology and features of interorganisational interaction and the typology of member states are applicable to relations between international organisations beyond EU-NATO cooperation, albeit limited since all criteria and features need to be met, with a particular emphasis on the membership dimension. By developing an overview of the features of interorganisational interaction and the typology of member states, this research has enhanced the scholarship of EU-NATO cooperation. In doing so, it has further contributed to the analysis of interorganisational interaction by establishing a conceptual and analytical tool that allows for future studies of interaction between international organisations beyond the EU-NATO relationship.

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Appendix A: List of Interviews

Title	Description	Date	Location
EU Official 1	EU Official at European External Action Service	14 March 2017	Brussels, Belgium
EU Official 2	EU Official at European External Action Service	22 March 2017	Brussels, Belgium
NATO Official 1	NATO Official at NATO HQ	29 March 2017	Brussels, Belgium
EU Official 3	EU Official at European External Action Service	3 April 2017	Brussels, Belgium
NATO Official 2	NATO Official at NATO HQ	13 April 2017	Brussels, Belgium
Cypriote Official 1	Official at the Cyprus Permanent Representation to the EU	26 April 2017	Brussels, Belgium
French Official 1	Official at the French Delegation to NATO	6 June 2017	Brussels, Belgium
EU Official 4	EU Official at European External Action Service	9 June 2017	Brussels, Belgium
Cypriote Officials 2	Two Officials at the Cyprus Permanent Representation to the EU	9 June 2017	Brussels, Belgium
French Official 2	Official at the French Permanent Representation to the EU	12 June 2017	Brussels, Belgium
German Official 1	Official at the German Permanent Representation to the EU	13 June 2017	Brussels, Belgium
NATO Official 3	NATO Official at NATO HQ	26 June 2017	Brussels, Belgium
German Officials 2	Three Officials at the German Delegation to NATO	28 June 2017	Brussels, Belgium
NATO Officials 4	Two former NATO Officials	20 July 2017	Brussels, Belgium
British Official 1	Official at the British Delegation to NATO	20 July 2017	Brussels, Belgium
German Officials 3	Two Officials at the Federal Ministry of Defence Germany	9 August 2017	Berlin, Germany
Romanian Official 1	Official at the Romanian Delegation to NATO	24 October 2017	Brussels, Belgium
British Officials 2	Two Officials at the British Permanent Representation to the EU	24 October 2017	Brussels, Belgium
Czech Official 1	Official at the Czech Permanent Representation to the EU	25 October 2017	Brussels, Belgium
Slovak Official 1	Official at the Slovak Permanent Representation to the EU	25 October 2017	Brussels, Belgium

Polish Official 1	Official at the Polish Permanent Representation to the EU	26 October 2017	Brussels, Belgium
NATO Official 5	NATO Official at NATO HQ	12 November 2017	Berlin, Germany
Estonian Official 1	Official at the Estonian Permanent Representation to the EU	12 February 2018	Brussels, Belgium
Dutch Official 1	Official at the Dutch Permanent Representation to the EU	13 February 2018	Brussels, Belgium
Italian Official 1	Official at the Italian Delegation to NATO	13 February 2018	Brussels, Belgium
Czech Official 2	Official at the Czech Delegation to NATO	15 February 2018	Brussels, Belgium
Czech Official 3	Official at the Czech Delegation to NATO	15 February 2018	Brussels, Belgium
Estonian Official 2	Official at the Estonian Delegation to NATO	16 February 2018	Brussels, Belgium

Appendix B: Overview of Member States' Participation and Contributions to EU-led and NATO-led Military Operations

Member State	CSDP Operations 2009-2016	NATO Operations 2009-2016
Albania	Althea, EUFOR Tchad RCA	SFOR, KFOR, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Resolute Support
Austria	Concordia, Artemis, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA	SFOR, KFOR, ISAF, Resolute Support
Belgium	Concordia, Artemis, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, Atalanta	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, ISAF, Enduring Freedom HOA, Ocean Shield, Unified Protector, Resolute Support
Bulgaria	Concordia, Artemis, Althea, Atalanta, EUFOR Tchad RCA	SFOR, KFOR, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Unified Protector, Resolute Support
Canada	Concordia, Artemis	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Endouring Freedom HOA, Ocean Shield, Unified Protector
Croatia	EUFOR Tchad RCA, Atalanta	KFOR, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Resolute Support
Cyprus	Artemis, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, Atalanta	-
Czech Republic	Concordia, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA	SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, ISAF, Resolute Support
Denmark	-	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Enduring Freedom HOA, Ocean Shield,

		Unified Protector, Resolute Support
Estonia	Concordia, Artemis, Althea, Atalanta, EUFOR RCA	SFOR, KFOR, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Resolute Support
Finland	Concordia, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, EUFOR RCA, Atalanta	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, ISAF, Resolute Support
France	Artemis, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, EUFOR RCA, Atalanta	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, ISAF, Enduring Freedom HOA, Unified Protector
Germany	Concordia, Artemis, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, Atalanta	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Enduring Freedom HOA, Ocean Shield, Resolute Support
Greece	Concordia, Artemis, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, Atalanta	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Enduring Freedom HAO, Ocean Shield, Unified Protector, Resolute Support
Hungary	Concordia, Artemis, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, Atalanta	SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, ISAF, Resolute Support
Iceland	Concordia	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, ISAF, Resolute Support
Ireland	Artemis, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, Atalanta	SFOR, KFOR, ISAF, Resolute Support
Italy	Concordia, Artemis, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, Atalanta	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Enduring Freedom HOA, Ocean Shield, Unified Protector, Resolute Support
Latvia	Concordia, Althea, EUFOR RCA	SFOR, KFOR, ISAF, Resolute Support

Lithuania	Concordia, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA	SFOR, KFOR, ISAF, Resolute Support
Luxembourg	Concordia, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, Atalanta	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, ISAF, Resolute Support
Malta	Atalanta	(Unified Protector)
Netherlands	Concordia, Artemis, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, EUFOR RCA, Atalanta	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, ISAF, Enduring Freedom HAO, Ocean Shield, Unified Protector, Resolute Support
Norway	Concordia, Atalanta	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Ocean Shield, Unified Protector, Resolute Support
Poland	Concordia, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, EUFOR RCA , Atalanta	SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Resolute Support
Portugal	Concordia, Artemis, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, EUFOR RCA , Atalanta	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Enduring Freedom HOA, Ocean Shield, Resolute Support
Romania	Concordia, Artemis, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, EUFOR RCA, Atalanta	SFOR, KFOR, ISAF, Unified Protetor, Resolute Support
Slovakia	Concordia, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA	SFOR, KFOR, ISAF, Resolute Support
Slovenia	Concordia, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, Atalanta	SFOR, KFOR, ISAF, Resolute Support
Spain	Concordia, Artemis, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, EUFOR RCA , Atalanta	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Enduring Freedom HOA, Ocean Shield, Unified Protector, Resolute Suppor

Sweden	Concordia, Artemis, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, Atalanta	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, ISAF, Unified Protector, Resolute Support
Turkey	Concordia, Althea, EUFOR DRC	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Enduring Freedom HOA, Ocean Shield, Unified Protector, Resolute Suppor
United Kingdom	Concordia, Artemis, Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad RCA, Atalanta	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Enduring Freedom HOA, Ocean Shield, Unified Protector, Resolute Support
United States	-	Joint Endeavour, SFOR, KFOR, Allied Harmony, Active Endeavour, ISAF, Enduring Freedom HOA, Ocean Shield, Unified Protector, Resolute Support
Number of Operations	**7**	**10**

Source: EEAS 2018b; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014; Grevi et al. 2009; NATO 2018b

Appendix C: Distribution of Defence Expenditures by NATO Member States

Defence Expenditures by NATO Member States: Distribution of Defence Expenditures by Category in 2009-2016 (NATO 2017a)

	2013	2014	2015	2016e
Equipment (a)				
Albania	16.29	16.65	8.92	8.01
Belgium	2.82	3.52	3.42	4.65
Bulgaria *	4.52	1.03	3.47	12.55
Canada	11.16	13.03	13.06	18.06
Croatia	10.72	7.35	10.58	7.37
Czech Republic	9.49	6.53	11.75	7.23
Denmark	11.26	10.99	11.50	12.41
Estonia	14.48	22.15	13.94	13.50
France	28.56	24.74	25.03	24.48
Germany	12.74	12.94	11.93	12.21
Greece	12.06	8.17	12.77	14.91
Hungary	11.08	7.76	8.17	13.00
Italy	12.51	10.92	9.72	20.24
Latvia	12.09	7.55	13.60	17.86
Lithuania	9.23	14.06	21.55	27.65
Luxembourg	14.57	22.61	33.33	27.24
Netherlands	12.57	10.68	11.16	14.14
Norway	18.89	21.17	22.48	25.08
Poland	13.90	18.84	33.06	25.79
Portugal	8.65	8.43	8.73	9.43
Romania	10.71	15.77	19.65	20.40
Slovak Republic	7.39	11.12	18.28	15.30
Slovenia	1.27	0.66	1.86	1.03
Spain	12.37	13.49	14.82	15.23
Turkey	26.89	25.08	25.13	22.35
United Kingdom	21.89	22.82	21.75	22.56
United States	25.83	25.97	25.41	25.03
Personnel (b)				
Albania	75.25	68.05	78.15	67.33
Belgium	77.06	77.84	78.16	77.10
Bulgaria *	65.37	72.84	73.66	64.31
Canada	52.44	50.90	47.21	45.81
Croatia	68.06	69.25	63.64	68.49
Czech Republic	62.03	61.40	55.25	58.47
Denmark	51.74	51.27	52.01	50.28
Estonia	39.83	38.62	39.05	38.19
France	49.23	48.53	47.79	47.87
Germany	49.86	50.67	49.86	48.35
Greece	74.56	77.18	70.04	69.93
Hungary	48.96	49.77	48.27	50.21
Italy	75.00	76.41	77.55	69.15

Latvia	52.98	52.97	50.06	44.88
Lithuania	66.53	57.53	48.49	46.08
Luxembourg	51.10	49.31	42.77	43.69
Netherlands	58.53	56.50	55.51	51.77
Norway	41.02	39.36	38.71	36.31
Poland	57.70	51.45	41.96	46.82
Portugal	79.85	81.27	82.07	77.98
Romania	78.99	71.15	63.30	64.33
Slovak Republic	70.14	69.14	56.24	58.65
Slovenia	80.52	82.31	82.22	75.93
Spain	68.25	67.34	65.18	64.02
Turkey	54.58	56.88	56.82	58.73
United Kingdom	37.85	36.59	36.80	34.79
United States	34.38	35.45	36.64	36.68

Infrastructure (c)

Albania	1.17	0.86	1.40	1.84
Belgium	2.21	1.81	0.93	0.95
Bulgaria *	0.47	0.63	1.27	0.57
Canada	4.12	3.81	5.68	5.24
Croatia	1.21	1.63	2.62	2.02
Czech Republic	2.72	2.34	3.32	2.90
Denmark	1.16	0.97	1.09	2.13
Estonia	11.54	8.20	8.34	11.21
France	2.30	2.33	2.80	2.70
Germany	3.55	3.75	3.60	3.39
Greece	0.63	1.10	0.77	0.49
Hungary	2.32	1.07	0.64	2.27
Italy	1.57	1.40	1.30	1.04
Latvia	6.26	8.89	6.64	10.02
Lithuania	2.04	2.17	2.16	5.78
Luxembourg	11.81	10.26	7.79	11.81
Netherlands	2.74	4.77	3.19	3.90
Norway	5.64	6.00	5.60	7.57
Poland	5.62	5.47	4.74	5.17
Portugal	0.04	0.11	0.25	0.06
Romania	1.16	1.09	1.27	2.81
Slovak Republic	0.29	0.57	1.99	3.75
Slovenia	1.33	0.65	0.61	1.15
Spain	0.67	0.66	0.97	1.02
Turkey	2.72	2.77	2.56	2.54
United Kingdom	2.04	1.95	1.63	1.99
United States	2.08	1.71	1.45	1.43

Other (d)

Albania	7.30	14.44	11.53	22.82
Belgium	17.91	16.83	17.49	17.31
Bulgaria *	29.64	25.51	21.60	22.56
Canada	32.28	32.26	34.05	30.89
Croatia	20.01	21.78	23.16	22.13
Czech Republic	25.75	29.73	29.67	31.40
Denmark	35.84	36.78	35.40	35.19

Estonia	34.14	31.03	38.67	37.10
France	19.91	24.40	24.37	24.96
Germany	33.84	32.63	34.61	36.05
Greece	12.75	13.55	16.42	14.67
Hungary	37.64	41.40	42.91	34.52
Italy	10.93	11.27	11.42	9.56
Latvia	28.68	30.59	29.69	27.24
Lithuania	22.20	26.24	27.79	20.49
Luxembourg	22.52	17.82	16.11	17.25
Netherlands	26.16	28.05	30.14	30.20
Norway	34.45	33.46	33.21	31.05
Poland	22.78	24.24	20.24	22.22
Portugal	11.46	10.19	8.95	12.53
Romania	9.13	11.98	15.78	12.45
Slovak Republic	22.19	19.16	23.49	22.31
Slovenia	16.88	16.38	15.31	21.90
Spain	18.71	18.50	19.03	19.72
Turkey	15.80	15.27	15.49	16.38
United Kingdom	38.22	38.63	39.82	40.66
United States	37.72	36.87	36.51	36.86

* Defence expenditure does not include pensions.

(a) Equipment expenditure includes major equipment expenditure and R&D devoted to major equipment.

(b) Personnel expenditure includes military and civilian expenditure and pensions.

(c) Infrastructure expenditure includes NATO common infrastructure and national military construction.

(d) Other expenditure includes operations and maintenance expenditure, other R&D expenditure and expenditure not allocated among above-mentioned categories.

Appendix D: Defence Expenditures of EU and NATO Member States[13]

Member Sate	Share of GDP (%)	Equip-ment (%)	Personnel (%)	Infrastruc-ture (%)
Albania	1.2	8.01	67.33	1.84
Austria	0.7	N/A	N/A	N/A
Belgium	0.9	4.65	77.10	0.95
Bulgaria	1.5	12.55	64.31	0.57
Canada	1.0	18.06	45.81	5.24
Croatia	1.4	7.37	68.49	2.02
Cyprus	1.8	N/A	N/A	N/A
Czech Republic	1.0	7.23	58.47	2.90
Denmark	1.2	12.41	50.28	2.13
Estonia	2.1	13.50	38.19	11.21
Finland	1.4	N/A	N/A	N/A
France	2.3	24.48	47.87	2.70
Germany	1.2	12.21	48.35	3.39
Greece	2.6	14.91	69.93	0.49
Hungary	1.0	13.00	50.21	2.27
Iceland[14]	0.00	N/A	N/A	N/A
Ireland	0.3	N/A	N/A	N/A
Italy	1.5	20.24	69.15	1.04
Latvia	1.5	17.86	44.88	10.02
Lithuania	1.5	27.65	46.08	5.78
Luxembourg	0.5	27.24	43.69	11.81
Malta	0.6	N/A	N/A	N/A
Montenegro	1.6	N/A	N/A	N/A
Netherlands	1.2	14.14	51.77	3.90
Norway	1.6	25.08	36.31	7.57
Poland	2.0	25.79	46.82	5.17
Portugal	1.8	9.43	77.98	0.06
Romania	1.5	20.40	64.33	2.81
Slovakia	1.1	15.30	58.65	3.75
Slovenia	1.0	1.03	75.93	1.15
Spain	1.2	15.23	64.02	1.02
Sweden	1.0	N/A	N/A	N/A
Turkey	2.0	22.35	58.73	2.54
United Kingdom	1.9	22.56	34.79	1.99

[13] EDA 2016; NATO 2017a; SIPRI 2017

[14] Iceland does not possess any armed forces.

United States	3.3	25.03	36.68	1.43

Appendix E: List of Interview Questions

- What is your position in the EU / in NATO / in the Permanent Representation to the EU or NATO?
- What is your main portfolio, i.e. your responsibilities and tasks?
- In what way is your unit within the EU / NATO preoccupied with issues dealing with the EU-NATO interorganisational relationship?
- To what extent do you deal with partnerships of your country with the institutions and bodies of the EU and NATO working in the area of security and defence, military operations, and/or crisis management?
- Could you please describe and explain your country's strategic goals concerning the EU and NATO in security and defence issues?
- How are resources for military crisis management allocated in your country between EU-led and NATO-led operations? Who and based on what factors decides to provide assets and capabilities to either EU-led or NATO-led operations?
- What has been and is your country's position towards (closer) EU-NATO cooperation?
- What is your perception of the effectiveness of the cooperation between the EU and NATO?
- What are the remaining obstacles and problems (politically and/or militarily) for closer EU-NATO cooperation?
- Where would you locate your country in the EU-NATO relationship (advocate, blocker, neutral, balancer)?
- To what extent is your country's Ministry of Defence and/or Ministry of Foreign Affairs involved in communicating interests and preferences, which your country's Permanent Representation (to EU and NATO) will then present and defend in negotiations with other member states as well as with the EU and NATO?
- How do you perceive the willingness of member states to work closely with EU and/or NATO?
- What coalition groups in the negotiations does your country belong to? Who are your most important cooperation and alliance partners?
- How do you see the future development of the EU-NATO relationship?

Appendix F: List of Official Documents and Strategic Security and Defence Papers

Member state/international organisation	Year of publication	Title of document	Source
European Union	2003	A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy	European Council
European Union	2016	Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Strategy	European External Action Service
European Union / NATO	2016	Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation	NATO
NATO	1949	The North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty)	NATO
NATO	1991	The Alliance's New Strategic Concept	NATO
NATO	1999	The Alliance's Strategic Concept	NATO
NATO	2010	Active Engagement, Modern Defence – Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of NATO	NATO

NATO	2014	The Wales Declaration on the Transatlantic Bond	NATO
Albania	2004	National Security Strategy	Government of the Republic of Albania
Albania	2012	Military Review	The Centre for Defence Analyses (CDA) of the Albanian Training and Doctrine Command
Austria	2004	Weissbuch 2004: Analyse, Bilanz, Perspektiven	Ministry of Defence
Austria	2008	Weissbuch 2008	Ministry of Defence and Sport
Austria	2010	Weissbuch 2010	Ministry of Defence and Sport
Austria	2012	Weissbuch 2012	Ministry of Defence and Sport
Belgium	2000	The Modernisation Plan 2000-2015 of the Belgian Armed Forces	Government of Belgium
Belgium	2016	The Strategic Vision for Defence	Ministry of Defence
Bulgaria	2002	White Paper on Defence	Ministry of Defence
Bulgaria	2010	White Paper on Defence and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria	Ministry of National Defence
Canada	2008	Canada First: Defence Strategy	Ministry of National Defence
Canada	2017	Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canday's Defence Policy	Ministry of National Defence

Croatia		2005	Strategic Defence Review	Ministry of Defence
Croatia		2017	National Security Strategy	Ministry of Defence
Cyprus	n.a.		Defence Policy	Online/Website of the Ministry of Defence
Czech Republic		1997	National Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic	Ministry of Defence
Czech Republic		2008	The Military Strategy of the Czech Republic	Ministry of Defence
Czech Republic		2012	The Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic: A Responsible State and a Responsible Ally	Ministry of Defence
Czech Republic		2015	Security Strategy of the Czech Republic	Government of the Czech Republic
Denmark		2009	Danish Defence Agreement 2010-2014	Danish Government
Denmark		2016	Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change: A Review of Denmark's Foreign and Security Policy	Danish Government
Denmark		2017	A Strong Defence of Denmark: Proposal for new defence agreement 2018-2023	Ministry of Defence (Forsvarsministeret)
Denmark		2018	Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2019-2020	Danish Government

Denmark	2018	Defence Agreement 2018-2023	Ministry of Defence (Forsvarsministeret)
Estonia	2004	National Security Concept	Government of Estonia
Estonia	2010	National Security Concept	Government of Estonia and Riigikogu (Parliament)
Estonia	2011	National Defence Staretgy of Estonia	Ministry of Defence
Finland	2001	Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001: Report by the Government to Parliament	Government of Finland
Finland	2004	Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004	Prime Minister's Office
Finland	2010	Security Strategy for Society	Ministry of Defence
Finland	2012	Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012	Prime Minister's Office
France	1994	White Paper on Defence	Ministry of Defence
France	2008	The White Paper on Defence and National Security	Ministry of Defence
France	2012	Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers and Ministers of Defence of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain; Paris November 2012	Diplomatie.gouv.fr

France	2013	The White Paper on Defence and National Security: Twelve key points	Ministry of Defence
France	2017	Strategic Review of Defence and National Security: Key Points	Ministry of Defence
Germany	1998	Gemeinsame deutsch-französische Positionen zu aktuellen Themen der Europapolitik	Government of the Federal Republic of Germany
Germany	2003	Defence Policy Guidelines	Ministry of Defence
Germany	2006	White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr	Ministry of Defence
Germany	2016	White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr	Ministry of Defence
Germany	2016	Verfassungsrechtliche Grundlage für Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: Überlegungen zur Änderung der verfassungsrechtlichen Praxis	German Parliament
Greece	1997	White Paper for the Armed Forces	Hellenic Ministry of Defence
Greece	2007	Greek Security Policy in the 21st Century	Thanos Dokos (ed.), Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy

Hungary		2004	The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary	Government of the Republic of Hungary
Hungary		2012	Hungary's National Security Strategy	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Iceland	n.a.		Ministry of Foreign Affairs: National Security	Iceland Government Offices; Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Iceland		2015	Parliamentary Resolution on a National Security Policy for Iceland	Icelandic Parliament
ireland		2007	The White Paper on Defence: Review of Implementation	Department of Defence
Ireland		2015	White Paper on Defence	Department of Defence
Ireland		2016	Strategy Statement 2016-2019	Department of Defence
Italy		2005	The Chiet of the Italian Defence Staff Strategic Concept	Mnistry of Defence
Italy		2015	White Paper for International Security and Defence	Ministry of Defence
Latvia		2005	The National Security Concept	Ministry of Defence
Latvia		2008	The State Defence Concept	Ministry of Defence
Latvia		2015	The National Security Concept	Ministry of Defence
Latvia		2016	The National Defence Concept	Ministry of Defence
Lithuania		2002	National Security Strategy	Ministry of National Defence

Lithuania	2002	White Paper: Lithuanian Defence Policy	Ministry of National Defence
Lithuania	2017	National Security Strategy	Ministry of National Defence
Lithuania	2017	White Paper: Lithuanian Defence Policy	Ministry of National Defence
Luxembourg	2017	Luxembourg Defence Guidelines for 2025 and Beyond	Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
Malta	2017	The Armed Forces of Malta: Strategy Paper 2016-2026 - Press Brief	Armed Forces of Malta, Ministry for Home Affairs and National Security
The Netherlands	2000	Summary of the Defence White Paper	Ministry of Defence
The Netherlands	2005	Netherlands Defence Doctrine	Ministry of Defence
The Netherlands	2013	The Dutch Defence Doctrine	Ministry of Defence
The Netherlands	2018	Defence White Paper: Investigating in our people, capabilities and visibility	Ministry of Defence
Norway	2004	Strategic Defence Concept	Ministry of Defence
Norway	2006	Norwegian Defence	Ministry of Defence
Norway	2008	Norwegian Defence	Ministry of Defence
Norway	2013	Norwegian Defence	Ministry of Defence
Poland	2003	National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland	Ministry of National Defence
Poland	2007	National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland	Ministry of National Defence

Poland	2014	National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland	Ministry of National Defence
Poland	2017	The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland	Ministry of National Defence
Poland	2017	Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017-2021	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Portugal	2015	White Paper for International Security and Defence	Ministry of Defence
Romania	2005	National Security Strategy	Ministry of National Defence
Romania	2005	Military Strategy	Ministry of National Defence
Romania	2006	Foreign Relations and National Security	Romanian Embassy in Belgium
Romania	2007	National Security Strategy	Ministry of National Defence
Romania	2015	National Security Strategy 2015-2019	Ministry of National Defence
Romania	2016	The Military Strategy of Romania	Ministry of National Defence
Romania	2017	EU-NATO: Strategic Partnership	Romanian Delegation to NATO
Slovakia	2001	Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic	Ministry of Defence
Slovakia	2001	Defence Strategy	Ministry of Defence
Slovakia	2005	The Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic	Ministry of National Defence
Slovakia	2005	Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Slovakia	2005	Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic	Ministry of National Defence
Slovakia	2017	Draft Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic	Unofficial document provided by Slovak Permanent Delegation to the EU
Slovenia	2004	Strategiy Defence Review: Comprehensive Summary	Ministry of Defence
Slovenia	2010	Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia	Ministry of Defence
Spain	2000	Defence White Paper	Ministry of Defence
Spain	2012	National Defence Directive 2012: For a Necessary and Responsible Defence	Presidencia del Gobierno (Prime Minister)
Spain	2013	The National Security Strategy: Sharing a Common Project	Presidencia del Gobierno (Prime Minister)
Sweden	1999	Sweden's Security in the 21st Century	Björn von Sydow, Ministry of Defence
Sweden	2004	Our Future Defence: The focus of Swedish defence policy 2005-2007	Ministry of Defence
Sweden	2015	Sweden's Defence Policy 2016-2020	Ministry of Defence
Turkey	2000	Defence White Paper	Ministry of Defence
Turkey	2007	Defence White Paper	Ministry of Defence

United Kingdom	1998	Strategic Defence Review	House of Commons Defence Committee, Parliament
United Kingdom	2003	Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper	Ministry of Defence
United Kingdom	2008	The future of NATO and European Defence, Ninth Report of Session 2007-08	House of Commons Defence Committee, Parliament
United Kingdom	2010	A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy	HM Government, Prime Minister of the UK
United Kingdom	2015	National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom	HM Government, Prime Minister of the UK
United Kingdom	2017	The United Kingdom's exit from and new partnership with the European Union	HM Government, Prime Minister of the UK
United States	1988	National Security Strategy of the United States	President of the United States
United States	1990	National Security Strategy of the United States	President of the United States
United States	1994	National Security Strategy of the United States	President of the United States

United States	2000	National Security Strategy of the United States	President of the United States
United States	2006	National Security Strategy of the United States	President of the United States
United States	2010	National Security Strategy of the United States	President of the United States
United States	2015	National Security Strategy of the United States	President of the United States
United States	2017	National Security Strategy of the United States	President of the United States