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On the Significance of Automaticity in Image-Making Practices

Automatic image-making techniques, or techniques that agents use to assist or replace some aspect of image-making, have been used since ancient times. Yet, there has been little philosophical discussion on this kind of image-making except in contemporary aesthetics, where discussions have largely centred around photography. This thesis aims to rectify this situation. To this end, I explore the philosophical implications of the historic and contemporary use of automatic image-making techniques, including drawing devices and printing technologies, that agents use to create images. I define two distinct kinds of automatic image-making techniques: those that are “external object dependent” and those that are “intentional object dependent”. The former have widely been conceived of as epistemically valuable, but not aesthetically valuable like the latter due to misconceptions about the nature of intentionality in art production. Consequently, I develop an original concept of “creative agency” to explain how agents employ external object dependent automatic techniques to produce particular aesthetic effects and modes of picturing. I elaborate on these findings and, by exploring hybrid art kinds, offer a classificatory framework to identify when it is aesthetically relevant to appreciate the use of automatic techniques in particular art practices. I consider whether viewers are changing any of their beliefs about art kinds in the digital age and what impact this has upon the kinds of epistemic value that viewers stand to gain from looking at images produced using automatic techniques. I examine how contextual factors in the digital age affect these and offer a set of criteria to determine when the beliefs formed about the representational contents of an image are warranted. I examine a related claim: images produced using external object dependent automatic techniques enable viewers to actually indirectly perceive the object. I reject this and construct a novel account of the “presence phenomenon” to explain the particular phenomenological responses that viewers may experience before such images. Altogether, this thesis provides a unified approach for explaining the aesthetic, epistemic, and phenomenological significance of images made using various automatic techniques.

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Abstract

This thesis is about the philosophical implications of the use of automatic techniques, such as drawing devices or photographic technologies, that agents use to create images. It seeks to demonstrate how the use of different automatic techniques affects the production and reception of images. In Chapter One, I examine different kinds of automatic image-making techniques and distinguish between those that are “external object dependent” and “intentional object dependent”. Given that this distinction has had a profound impact upon the way that certain works are viewed in an artistic setting, I explore the nature of artistic creativity and define what I term as “creative agency”, which I argue must be a form of diachronic agency in order to account for the variety of forms of image-making that are widely considered to result in works of art. I subsequently argue that the use of automatic image-making techniques does not restrict artists from fully exercising their creative agency. Following this, in Chapter Two, I examine the claims that have been made by sceptical “Orthodox Theorists” of photography and argue that artists are able to utilize external object dependent automatic image-making techniques to instantiate a kind of aesthetic representation of reality that is distinct from that which is generally instantiated by manographic, or even intentional object dependent automatic image-making techniques. Although sympathetic to the spirit of the “New Theory” of photography, in Chapter Three, I examine permissive versions of the New Theory, which I argue do not account for the fact that certain works are created and intended to be appreciated as “hybrids” of one art kind and another. I explore how artists hybridize different arts by using a mixture of automatic and manographic image-making techniques, as well as why artists conflate arts in this manner. I argue that Jerrold Levinson’s work on hybrid arts can account for the fact that certain art practices consist of creating works using, for example, both

painting and photography, and should subsequently be appreciated as a blend of these kinds in order to instantiate specific qualities, such as imaginativeness or truthfulness respectively, that enable viewers to access the meaning of the work. In Chapter Four, I then consider whether viewers are changing any of their beliefs about art kinds in the digital age and what impact this has upon the kinds of epistemic value that viewers stand to gain from looking at images that were made using automatic techniques. I argue that warranted beliefs about the representational contents of an image should be based upon contextual factors, as well as the aetiology of an image. In Chapter Five, I examine a different but related epistemic claim that has been made of images that are created by the use of external object dependent automatic techniques. I argue that Walton is incorrect to suggest that viewers actually indirectly perceive the subject of a transparent picture. Instead, I argue that due to their naturally-dependent origins and real-similarity relations, transparent pictures tend to function as forms of “perceptual evidence”. Building upon this idea, in Chapter Six, I construct a novel account of what I term the “presence phenomenon”, which is a particular phenomenology, whereby viewers feel that the subject of the work is present, that viewers tend to experience before images that function as forms of perceptual evidence. I argue that the presence phenomenon is an example of belief-discordant behaviour, which cannot be explained by imaginative engagement with the representation alone, and so I suggest that the subdoxastic state of alief accounts for the majority of cases of the presence phenomenon.

Key theorists discussed in this thesis are: Catharine Abell, Paloma Atencia-Linares, Dan Cavedon-Taylor, Jonathan Cohen and Aaron Meskin, Diarmuid Costello, Gregory Currie, Jonathan Friday, Berys Gaut, Tamar Gendler, Robert Hopkins, Jerrold Levinson, Dominic McIver Lopes, Patrick Maynard, Mikael Pettersson, Barbara Savedoff, Roger Scruton, Scott Walden, Kendall Walton, and Dawn Wilson.

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Introduction

Automatic image-making techniques, or techniques that agents use to assist or replace some aspect of image-making, have been used since ancient times. Different kinds of automatic techniques, from printing processes to drawing tools, optical devices, and photographic processes, have been used to create images for a variety of reasons including for the conveyance of knowledge and the creation of artworks. Automatic image-making techniques have been used widely and throughout the history of image production. Yet, there has been little philosophical discussion on this kind of image-making, except in contemporary aesthetics, where discussions have largely centred around photography. In this thesis, I therefore aim to rectify this situation and instigate a discussion centred around the philosophical issues, which are not only specific to photography, that arise from the use of automatic image-making techniques. Such issues include, the creative role of the agent who uses automatic image-making techniques; whether the kind of appreciative practices that surround works that are made using automatic techniques differ from the appreciative practices surrounding handmade, or “manugraphic” images; whether viewers experience a distinctive phenomenology when engaging with images that have been created using automatic techniques; what kind of beliefs viewers are warranted in forming about the representational contents of images that have been made using automatic image-making techniques and whether this differs from the beliefs that are formed as a result of viewing manugraphic works; and more. Given the scope of my investigation, I will not be able to go into great detail about each kind of automatic image-making technique, but I hope that I will at least provide the foundation for future explorations in these areas.

My focus will largely be on one subset of automatic image-making techniques; those that are “external object dependent”, rather than “intentional object dependent”. I introduce this distinction in Chapter One and as the following chapters will demonstrate, this distinction has had a profound impact upon the way that certain works are viewed in an artistic setting. External object dependent automatic image-making techniques entail that an external object was necessarily involved in the production of the image and that the image, at least during some stage of its creation, is counterfactually dependent upon the features of this object. In contrast, intentional object dependent automatic image-making techniques do not, of necessity, require an external object and are dependent instead upon the image-maker’s mental states. Consequently, in Chapter One, I examine the nature of artistic creativity and define what I term as “creative agency”, which I argue must be a form of diachronic agency in order to account for the variety of forms of image-making that are widely considered to result in works of art. Intentional control, in art production, has, I suggest, frequently been misunderstood as the performance of actions by an agent that successfully realize fully intended effects on the features of a work. This restrictive understanding of intentionality however, has been a detriment to understanding the ways that artists make use of external object dependent automatic processes in order to fulfil their artistic intentions, hence my permissive stance on what constitutes creative agency.

Following this, I examine how artists have utilized external object dependent automatic image-making techniques in order produce aesthetically significant representations of reality. I build on this work in Chapter Two, as I take on some of the claims that have been made by sceptical “Orthodox Theorists” of photography, that the medium, due to its naturally-dependent, automatic aetiology cannot function as a representational art form. I evaluate the basis of these claims, finding that, while external object dependent

automatic image-making techniques may not be able to instantiate certain qualities, such as fictionality, in the same way, or to the same extent, as manographic image-making techniques, artists are able to utilize naturally-dependent automatic image-making techniques to instantiate a kind of aesthetic representation that is distinctive from that which is typically instantiated by manographic, or even intentional object dependent automatic image-making techniques.¹ In order to demonstrate this point, I propose that photographers, like 17th century Dutch artists or 19th century British artists, typically create works in the “descriptive mode” and that such works engender aesthetic interest in the way that the artist has used reality to expressive ends. Despite this, I do concede that the sceptical theorists may have been correct to identify that certain kinds of artworks result from the combination of photographic and non-photographic arts. Moreover, I propose that recent developments in the New Theory of photography, have overlooked this kind of artistic practice.

While I remain sympathetic to the aims of the “New Theorists” of photography in my work, as like the New Theorists I propose that photographic means alone can be used to generate works of aesthetic significance, I suggest that permissive versions of the New Theory, do not account for the fact that certain works are created and intended to be appreciated as “hybrids” of one art kind and another. Consequently, in Chapter Three, I examine how artists hybridize different art kinds by using a mixture of automatic and manographic image-making techniques, as well as why artists conflate art kinds in this manner. Furthermore, I explore how the conflation of different image-making techniques and art kinds results in specific appreciative practices that rely on audiences’ beliefs and reactions to pre-existing art kinds, that are usually created by artists using certain kinds of image-making techniques. I use the principles of Levinson’s account to

¹ An early version of this argument can be found in Anscomb (2017).

build a classificatory framework that will enable viewers to distinguish between different kinds of arts that have evolved or involve, or are influenced, by other arts. This, I demonstrate, enables viewers to identify when the contribution of multiple arts to the production of a work is aesthetically salient and moreover when it is profitable to appreciate the use of automatic image-making techniques. Further to this, I demonstrate how this framework enables viewers to successfully accommodate new and evolving arts in the digital age and to establish when works are profitably appreciated as evolutions in existing practices and when works are profitably appreciated as entirely new arts or hybrid arts.

In relation to this, in Chapter Four, I consider whether viewers are changing any of their beliefs about art kinds in the digital age and what impact this has upon the kinds of epistemic value viewers stand to gain from looking at images that were made using automatic techniques. I start by considering whether images that were made using automatic techniques instantiate any specific epistemic properties that differ from works that were made using manographic techniques. I suggest that while automatic image-making techniques are better suited to function as consistent information channels than manographic image-making techniques, more generally, the epistemic properties of works that are made using automatic image-making techniques differ in degree, rather than kind from works that are made using manographic image-making techniques.

Warranted beliefs about the representational contents of an image, I suggest, should be based upon contextual factors, as well as the aetiology of an image. Although automatic image-making techniques may result in more accurate and reliable representations of a subject, this is not a necessary condition of works that are made using these kinds of techniques. Despite this, as I outline, many viewers hold beliefs that entail that they feel more warranted in forming beliefs, about the subject of a work, based on the contents of

a photograph, rather than other kinds of images. This situation is further complicated, I suggest, in the digital age, due to the unreliable digital platforms, that many photographs are now dispersed on. Consequently, I propose a set of negative criteria to test the reliability of an image, and so ascertain how warranted a viewer is in the beliefs that they form about a subject, as a result of viewing it through an image.²

Having established that viewers generally hold quite persistent beliefs about the veracity of photographic representation in particular, in Chapter Five, I examine a different, but related epistemic claim that has been made, about photographs, that I suggest can be used as the basis to account for some aspects of the phenomenology that is associated with viewing certain kinds of images that have been made using external object dependent automatic image-making techniques. In this chapter, I examine Walton's transparency account, in which he claims that viewers literally "see through" pictures that instantiate counterfactual dependence and real similarity relations to the external object. Although most theorists suggest that, in light of these necessary conditions for transparency, Walton places a "sharp-break" between photographs and other kinds of picture, I propose that, upon closer inspection, it becomes apparent that many works that are made using external object dependent automatic image-making techniques, also fulfil Walton's necessary conditions, and so also count as transparent. Walton claims that viewers of transparent pictures experience a twofold phenomenology, whereby they imaginatively directly perceive the subject of the work, while actually indirectly perceiving the subject of the work. In this chapter, I examine work from the philosophy of perception, from which I establish that Walton is incorrect to suggest that viewers actually indirectly perceive the subject of a transparent picture. Thus, the experience of seeing transparent pictures does not differ from ordinary cases of pictorial perception,

² An early version of this account can be found in Anscomb (2018).

which entails that when viewers look at a transparent picture, part of the content of the viewer's belief is that they are looking at an image. Nonetheless, viewers frequently do feel like they are in some kind of contact with the subject of transparent pictures, despite the fact that part of their pictorial experience is the representation of the fact that the external object is not spatially or temporally present to them. Thus, I propose that, what I term, the "presence phenomenon" is characterized by a belief-discordant experience, whereby the viewer feels that the object is present to them, through a transparent image, despite the fact that this is manifestly not true. I examine whether imagination could be responsible for this belief-discordancy, by examining Walton's account of imaginative seeing. However, I find that imagination, while a part of this experience, does not account for the fact that it is a belief-discordant one. Hence, in Chapter Six, I examine what cognitive mechanism causes this experience in order to construct a novel account of the presence phenomenon.

In Chapter Six, I elaborate on my conclusions from the previous chapter and I propose that the sense of contact, or feeling that the subject of the work is present, is something that is commonly experienced before works that tend to function as forms of perceptual evidence. Moreover, I suggest that the phenomenon can be traced at least as far back as very early Christendom to icons, which were thought to have been made with supernatural intervention that suppressed the role of the artist in order to allow the subject to manifest their own image. In more recent centuries, I suggest that this phenomenon has been most pronounced around photography. Despite the realist basis for associating certain kinds of works more closely with real objects, given the fact that the subjects of these works are manifestly unavailable for perceptual contact via the representation, I suggest a hybrid explanation for this phenomenon, based upon both realist and psychological factors. As I establish in the previous chapter, this cognitive

response to certain kinds of images cannot be due to imagination, moreover as I demonstrate in this chapter, it cannot be due to belief or desire. Instead, I suggest that the sub-doxastic state of alief provides the best explanation for the majority of instances of the presence phenomenon. As a result of examining this state and the role that it may play in the presence phenomenon, I conclude with a full characterization of the presence phenomenon, and related experiences, including the causes of these phenomena.

Chapter 1: Automaticity in Image-Making Practice

Throughout modern human history, agents have found methods to automatize the performance of individuals who have worked across a range of domains, including agricultural, architectural, and image-making practices. Automatization has entailed the use of technology and methods, which have both aided and supplemented human activities by, for example, making processes more efficient and yielding greater produce, but automatization has not always replaced human activities entirely.³ In discussions pertaining to image-making practice in art, automatic techniques have often been viewed negatively and it has been argued by historical and contemporary figures, including da Vinci (Kemp 1990, 163), Baudelaire (Gallsai 1981, 27), and Scruton (1981), that the use of automatic image-making techniques results in the “mindless” production of images, which subsequently reduces the value of the work as the product of a creative agent. In this chapter, I will address the nature of automaticity and creative agency in image-making practices and in particular, I will demonstrate that the use of automatic image-making techniques does not entail the “mindless” production of images. My focus in this chapter will be on examining the processes of image production, not the resultant images, which I will examine in later chapters.

In section i. I will define automaticity in image-making practice and I will distinguish between what I term “external object dependent” automatic techniques and “intentional object dependent” automatic techniques, which I will henceforth refer to as “e-dependent” and “i-dependent” automatic techniques respectively.⁴ I will be focusing on

³ Maynard for instance, has highlighted that: ‘Technologies are often presented as *laboursaving* devices...’ (2000, 75)

⁴ Note that these terms are not to be confused with the terms “natural dependence” and “intentional dependence” as used by Currie (1991, 24). Those terms are used by Currie to denote the distinction between counterfactual dependence of the features of an image on the features of an external object, that in the case of the former, is instantiated by processes that are

e-dependent automatic image-making techniques throughout this chapter, and in those that follow. To inform my discussion, I will frequently be drawing on debates about photography, which is one of the few image-making processes that can be fully automatic, as well as one of the few automatic image-making techniques that has been the subject of serious philosophical treatment. Two of the most disputed questions are whether the photographic process is naturally-dependent and whether it is belief-independent, as the answers to these questions, it has been supposed by philosophers, have some serious aesthetic, phenomenal, and epistemological implications, the first of which I will focus on in this chapter and the following two chapters. As such, in sections ii. and iii. of this chapter I will outline and assess the different sides of this philosophical debate. In section ii. I will examine the positions of the “Orthodox Theorists” of photography, who have argued that the process is necessarily naturally-dependent; the “Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists”, who have argued that the process is naturally-dependent for reasons determined by agents; and also, the “New Theorists” of photography, who have argued that natural counterfactual dependence is not what differentiates photography from other image-making processes. I will suggest that the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists have accurately described the nature of images that viewers typically appreciate as photographs, however I will also maintain that the New Theorists are correct to suggest that photographic means can be used to create a range of images that do not necessarily match this description. In section iii., I will examine belief-independency in image-making processes and I will distinguish between belief-independent feature-tracking and mark-making to argue that whilst external object dependent automatic image-making processes may instantiate belief-independency to a high degree, this is variable and contingent upon the techniques

independent of the beliefs of an agent, while in the latter case is mediated by the beliefs of an agent. I will discuss natural dependence, in particular, in greater detail later in this chapter.

being used. Natural-dependency and belief-independency are usually thought to preclude artistic expression however, and so in section iv. I will examine the role of creative agency in image-making practice. I will conclude that automaticity is compatible with the role of creative agency in image-making practice, provided that creative agency is taken to be a form of diachronic agency. As a result of which I will outline how artists have actively utilized automatic techniques, which instantiate natural-dependence and/or belief-independence, in their work to achieve their artistic intentions.

**i. External Object Dependent and Intentional Object Dependent
Automatic Techniques**

The automatization of a process is the replacement of, or assistance for, some aspect of human labour. A bicycle, for instance, assists the labour of the cyclist's lower limbs, and enables them to travel faster and further than would be possible, were they relying on their legs alone. The bicycle does not however, perform all of the work for the cyclist, as they still have to pedal and make key decisions about the direction and speed of travel. Whilst some of the cyclist's effort has been supplemented, making a journey by bicycle is still a process that requires agential input, albeit in a different form to that which may be required for walking or running. Likewise, in image-making practice, the use of automatic techniques still necessitates agential input, but this may be a different kind of input from that required by purely "manugraphic" processes.⁵ The position that I will defend, throughout this work, is that automaticity is used in image-making practice

⁵ "Manugraphic" is a term that refers to handmade processes including for example, drawing and painting (Friday 2002, 38)

to enhance, not replace, human abilities and performance. First, however, it is in order to clarify what constitutes an automatic image-making technique.

I propose that automatic techniques in image-making practice are those which aid or replace some aspect of the work that is constitutive of image-making. Specifically, then, automatic image-making techniques may be used to generate the visual features of an image and/or to transcribe the visual features of an object for reproduction in an image.⁶ As such, I propose that the following image-making processes are automatic: the registering of light on photosensitive supports, which the New Theorists have called the “photographic event” (Phillips 2009a, 10); the use of artificial perspective; the use of drawing instruments, such as a pantograph; the use of instructions to generate an image; the use of mapping methods including drawing either with a grid, which is called “squaring”, or from a projection using optical instruments, such as a camera obscura; and the use of processes including casting, and also pigment transfers. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but should serve to demonstrate that in common to all of these various automatic image-making techniques is that each can be used to aid or replace some aspect of the work that is integral to image-making. For instance, pigment transfers are used in printing to circumvent the need for an agent to repeat making marks, in order to ensure the predictable and reliable reproduction of images, while the use of optical and perspectival instruments help agents to make marks in an appropriate arrangement in order to generate an accurate visual representation of an object. Despite the range of different automatic image-making techniques, aside from photography, these techniques have rarely been discussed in a philosophical context however, as I

⁶ This characterization of automatic image-making processes is intended to accommodate conventionally held ideas about automatic image-making processes, including Lopes’ proposal that ‘An image made automatically is systematically selective.’ (Lopes 2016, 8) and Costello’s proposal that: ‘Automatism is [...] perhaps best understood as a way of standardizing, and thereby mechanizing out, individual control of the mapping process.’ (2017a, 41).

will demonstrate, this overlooks a significant component of both historical and contemporary image-making practice. In particular, there are many different ways that automatic image-making techniques are used in art practices, including drawing and painting systems, that are traditionally thought to be entirely manigraphic. Hence, in order to establish how widespread, the innovation and use of automatic image-making techniques has been, and also the different functions of automatic image-making techniques, I will briefly survey some of the key developments in the history of automatic image-making techniques.

Some of the earliest evidence, that is currently available, of human image-making activity shows that automatic techniques were in use at least 39,900 years ago.

Handprints were created by agents who blew pigments around their hands, which they had pressed against the cave walls in Sulawesi, Indonesia (Vergano 2014). This stencilling technique, aided the agent's ability to produce accurate markings on the wall by preserving the exact shape and size of the subject's appendage and significantly, created the impression of the subject's presence.⁷ There are many such reasons that explain why agents have found it desirable to replace or aid the work involved in image production. One particularly common reason is reproduction. Since the ancient world, humans have sought methods to reliably reproduce images, patterns, and words. For instance, the technique of stamping a seal is one that is thousands of years old, and such methods were frequently employed for the purposes of authentication or personalisation. Woodblock printing in China also dates back many thousands of years, however printing did not become common in Europe until the beginning of the 15th century, with the advent of the moveable type printing press. Etching also became increasingly common around this time in Europe, when paper became easier to source.

⁷ I will elaborate on the idea of presence in Chapters Five and Six.

This enabled agents to circulate material, including written texts and graphically produced images, widely.

The use of such automatic image-making techniques not only circumvented the need for agents to expend great time and effort in reproducing marks, but it also enabled agents to accurately reproduce the visual features of the original image, which is a demanding task for even the most adept draughtsman. Indeed, accuracy is another reason that accounts for why image-makers have frequently employed automatic techniques in image production. In the Renaissance, new ideas about modes of picturing were abundant, and, in particular, the development of new modes of geometrical perspective, which were devised through mathematical methods, saw agents using artificial perspective to create the illusion of spatial recession on a two-dimensional surface. The use of formulae to create pictures in perspective, entailed processes whereby an agent would draft a picture according to rules, rather than sketching by using purely manographic processes.⁸ During the Renaissance, the range of automatic image-making techniques was significantly increased. New perspective tools were developed, such as the bussola device (Kemp 1990, 170), the astrolabe (Kemp 1990, 169), the perspectograph, and the pantograph, and although they were not necessarily easy to use (Kemp 1990, 179), once mastered, such devices helped agents to produce extremely accurate visual records.⁹

⁸ In standard Western painting the rules, that were followed by agents, were usually for linear-perspective projection, the innovation of which is most closely associated with Brunelleschi and Alberti. This process sees agents ‘divide x coordinates and y coordinates by z coordinates to diminish shapes with their distance back from the picture plane.’ (Mitchell 1998, 126).

⁹ In particular, the perspectograph was the first machine ‘which has a genuine claim to provide an automated drawing system. It uses only one operation to make a direct transcription on the drawing surface of the object as it appears at the intersection.’ (Kemp 1990, 179) Although perspective tools had a clear use for scientific purposes, by improving the accuracy and reliability of the recording, it is worth noting that their role was not always so clear in artistic practice (Kemp 1990, 183).

These devices were largely usurped however, by the camera obscura.¹⁰ The camera obscura, which is a device that projects a light image of the objects before its aperture, is first mentioned in 1521 in Cesare Cesariano's annotations to Vitruvius' *Treatises on Architecture*.¹¹ In 1550, lenses were introduced to the device (Snyder 1980, 512), which meant that agents were able to focus the light images created by this device to the extent that they were able to trace over the projected image. Consequently, as soon as 1558 the 'first suggestion for a specifically pictorial use of the camera was published by Giovan Battista della Porta' (Snyder 1980, 513). The technology of the camera was developed over time and from the 17th century, in the Netherlands, mobile forms of camera obscura were available (Alpers 1983, 28). Many image-makers subsequently sought to picture the world in a new style of realism, by tracing over the projected image of the external object to accurately capture its forms and details.¹² This method enabled agents to abandon their pre-conceived ideas, about how to convey forms, and to record what they saw in correct proportions and perspective, rather than what they believed they saw.¹³ Working in this way from reality however, as I shall explain in what follows,

¹⁰ There was however, a brief resurgence after 1750 for 'linear perspective machines for the direct representation of natural form' (Kemp 1990, 186), such as the perspectival tripod by Charles Hayter, due to demand for cheap devices, that were relatively easy to use, by the growing middle classes (Kemp 1990, 186).

¹¹ The camera obscura, as Kemp has explained, is a device that 'is founded on the principle that rays of light from an object or scene will pass through a small aperture in such a way as to cross and re-emerge on the other side in a divergent configuration. If the divergent pattern is intercepted by a flat screen, a reversed and inverted image will be formed. For this image to become adequately visible, it is necessary that the screen be placed in a chamber in which the light levels are considerably lower than those around the object – hence the name camera obscura or 'dark chamber' (1990, 189).

¹² To clarify, the internal object is what a picture depicts, while the external object, if there is one 'is the independently existing object whose properties are causally responsible for the picture's surface being marked in the way it is.' (Abell 2010b, 83)

¹³ The camera obscura was frequently used to make sweeping panoramas and during the 18th century it was mostly used, at least in Britain, along with optical devices that were later developed, including the graphic telescope and camera lucida, to represent scenery and buildings (Kemp 1990, 198; 213). Thomas and (probably) Paul Sandby, 'who were officially employed as map-makers and providers of 'portraits' of locations for civil and military purposes' were particularly noteworthy users in this respect (Kemp 2006, 250-1). Kemp has highlighted that the use of such instruments would have been a source of pride for such image producers, given their 'mastery of optical imitation' (2006, 250).

frequently generated charges of “mindlessness” from artists such as da Vinci (Kemp 1990, 163) and Reynolds (Kemp 1990, 198).¹⁴


The advantages of both accuracy and reproduction were combined in the Physionotrace, a device which in some respects was a precursor to photography, in that both the generation and the reproduction of the image was automatic and moreover, the image, that was created, was based on an external object. The device was invented in 1786 by Gilles Louis Chrétien and combined what was, at the time, the available modes of ‘cheap and available portraiture’ – the cut-out silhouette and the engraving (Tagg 2002, 39). Seated in the contraption, customers would have their ‘profiles traced on glass by a stylus connected through a system of levers to an engraving tool which recorded movements of the stylus at a reduced scale on miniature copper plates.’ (Tagg 2002, 39) The subsequent image was easily reproducible by means of printing multiples from the copper plates and became popular as a form of image-making which recorded the exact features of the sitter. This popularity however, soon subsided with the invention of photography in the late 1830s.¹⁵

Henry Fox Talbot, the English inventor of photography was motivated to innovate the photographic process, after finding that his drawing skills were not improved with the use of a camera lucida. The camera lucida, which was invented in 1806 by the optician, physicist, chemist, and physiologist William Hyde Wollaston, was a significant improvement on the camera obscura as, not only was it more portable than the camera

¹⁴ Whilst Reynolds may have implicitly criticized Dutch Masters for their works that took on the appearance of images seen through the camera, Reynolds himself, owned a camera obscura, which, as Kemp has highlighted, in a busy studio served a valuable function as a subsidiary tool (1990, 198).

¹⁵ There are however, clear parallels between the technologies. Tagg has suggested that historical viewers of Physionotrace images saw these images ‘as the source of a truth not possessed by conventional images’ (2002, 2), which is a judgment that is frequently ascribed to photographs by both historic and contemporary viewers, as I shall outline in Chapter Four.


obscura, but it could be used in any light conditions. This was due to the fact that an agent was not tracing from a projected light image, as was the case with the camera obscura, but rather it was the illusion of seeing the image on the paper that an agent would trace from when using the camera lucida (Schaaf 1989, 11). Moreover, the camera lucida had prisms rather than curvilinear lenses, which the camera obscura was fitted with, and so the distortion of the image associated with the camera obscura did not occur in images made using a camera lucida (Schaaf 1989, 12). Despite this, the camera lucida could be very difficult to use, as Talbot discovered when he used the device to produce drawings of Italy, but achieved “lamentable results” (fig.1.).¹⁶ It still



(fig.1.) Henry Fox Talbot *View towards Lecco* 1833 (Accessed from: <https://www.pablogarcia.org/three-cameras-the-neolucida-interludes>)

¹⁶ As Schaaf has explained: ‘The device was a devilish frustration for anyone who lacked understanding of how to digest complex visual information for presentation in a two-dimensional medium.’ (1989, 7).

took a great deal of skill to transform the images seen through the camera lucida into a decent drawing, hence it was often found easier to use by those who were used to seeing the world through devices. For instance, Talbot's friend, Sir John Herschel, was used to looking through optical devices and was already an accomplished draughtsman. Consequently, he was able to utilise the camera lucida to adeptly produce accurate and comprehensive images (fig. 2).¹⁷



(fig. 2.) Sir John Herschel, *Interior of the Amphitheater Nimes, Sept. 21, 1850* (Accessed from: <https://www.pablogarcia.org/three-cameras-the-neolucida-interludes>)

The difficulty in translating the image seen through the camera lucida was avoided with the invention of photography in the early 19th century. Daguerre, Niépce, and Talbot were among the early pioneers of photography and once the light image seen in the camera obscura could be registered on a photosensitive surface, a whole host of different processes, that could preserve patterns of light, were developed. The first

¹⁷ Captain Basil Hall was also an advocate of the device (Schaaf 1989, 24-5) and probably because of his background, in the navy, would have been used to working with optical instruments.

photographs however, did require handiwork throughout their production (Maynard 2000, 67) and the Daugurreotype was not reproducible.¹⁸ Initially, this automatic image-making technique was only useful for the generation of images, however once Talbot patented the calotype process in 1841, the process also became an automatic method for the reproduction of these images, as the calotype process ‘was the first to generate a negative that could be used to produce an unlimited number of prints.’ (Fineman 2012, 3)¹⁹ Following these innovations, a myriad of automatic image-making techniques were developed including photo-gravure, screen printing, xerography, and more.²⁰

All of the aforementioned automatic techniques have aided, to varying degrees, the production of images, as these techniques have been created for specific purposes as required by agents.²¹ Snyder for instance, has pointed out that camera makers had to be informed of the specific needs of agents ‘before they could work out a design for a camera that would satisfy that need. The mechanism of the camera was thoroughly standardized to meet specific pictorial requirements.’ (1980, 513) Hence, automatic image-making techniques have been designed to complement, not completely replace the activities of agents.²² Skill and creativity is not necessarily removed from the

¹⁸ Despite this, as Daston has explained: ‘However arduous preparing the apparatus, composing the picture, operating the camera, and developing the image were, the process was [...] perceived as requiring negligible labour compared to the task of putting pencil to paper. This was why the image counted as “mechanical”.’ (2007, 137)

¹⁹ Despite this, it was still difficult to reproduce photographs on a large scale and as late as the 1880s, with the invention of half-tone technology, press reproductions of photographs were still made by hand engraving (Sandweiss 2007, 197).

²⁰ In particular, the invention of xerography, in the mid-1950s, meant that light and shade could be processed electronically as digital information. Specifically, a mechanical drum scanner constructed by Russell A. Kirsch and his colleagues at the National Bureau of Standards was used ‘to trace variations in intensity over the surfaces of photographs. They convert the resulting photomultiplier signals into arrays of 176 by 176 binary digits, feed them to a SEAC 1500-word memory computer, and program the SEAC to extract line drawings, count objects, recognize characters and produce oscilloscope displays.’ (Mitchell 1998, 3)

²¹ Moreover, as Costello has highlighted: ‘For something to count as “automatic” requires the mechanizing out of human (or animal) labour in the service of human ends.’ (2017a, 45)

²² As Snyder has pointed out in relation to photography: ‘To the extent that we believe cameras automatically give natural images, we have lost the sense of what these tools are and have forgotten that they are instruments at all.’ (1980, 510-11)

production of work that incorporates automatic techniques, rather the skillset that is used may be different or altered from that which is employed when agents work using strictly manigraphic means. For example, whilst prima facie the use of the camera lucida appears to allow agents to mindlessly trace over the image that is seen on the paper, in reality the camera lucida only replaces some of the detection of the object's features that agents do when transcribing the visual features of the object, not the process of making marks on a surface, as Talbot's experience with the camera lucida has demonstrated. Likewise, artificial perspective still requires calculation in order to materialize a coherent space on the support and even the process of translating a visual image using a grid still requires some degree of skill. What the foregoing should serve to demonstrate is that automatic image-making techniques do not necessarily remove the skills or intentional input of the agent from the process. Instead, automatic image-making techniques enable agents to achieve their pictorial aims more successfully.

There is however, an important distinction to be made among automatic image-making techniques. Some necessarily require an external object to produce work from and others do not, which is to say that some automatic image-making processes are, what I term, "external object dependent", while others are "intentional object dependent". As I noted in the introduction to this chapter, I will be referring to these as "e-dependent" and "i-dependent" automatic techniques respectively. More specifically, e-dependence entails that the visual features of the image are counterfactually dependent upon the features of the external object, whilst i-dependence entails that the visual features of the image are dependent upon an intentional object, as produced by the mental representation of the agent who is making the image, which may or may not be based upon a real object. Casting for instance, is e-dependent because without an external object to create an impression from, an agent could not generate the subsequent work,

and moreover had the shape and size of the external object been any different then so to would the shape and size of the resultant cast. Consequently, the process of casting is dependent on the external object, not the mental states of an agent as the process of, for example, artificial perspective is. This is due to the fact that such i-dependent automatic image-making techniques enable agents to create images that depict intentional, or non-existent objects using the rules of a mathematical system to generate plausibly realistic representations of space. This distinction need not be a strict divide and there are some processes that may instantiate degrees of e-dependence, or i-dependence, contingent upon the use of the process. For instance, squaring can be used to transfer a drawing which was made from an intentional object using purely manographic processes, or to transfer a drawing which was made from an external object through the use of a camera obscura. In general, however optical devices, such as the camera, tend to be e-dependent due to the nature of the projection of light. While it could be argued that the camera obscura may be used by an agent to reproduce a manographic work such as a painting (as seen in Vermeer's work for instance), the represented painting is itself an external object.

The distinction between e-dependent and i-dependent automatic image-making techniques has been the cause of great aesthetic controversy over the past centuries. In the 17th century, Italian artists for instance, criticized Dutch artists, for their reliance on the camera, or more specifically, for their transcription of external objects in their pictures. The Italians used automatic image-making techniques themselves, such as squaring, tracing, and spolvero to transfer designs from cartoons onto other surfaces, however the key difference was that these automatic techniques involved the transference of intentional objects, born of the artist's mind rather than what the artist

saw before them.²³ I will comprehensively address, and argue against, this aesthetic scepticism in the next chapter. Prior to this however, I will examine how philosophers have approached this kind of distinction by examining a well-worn debate that pertains to the nature of photography, which has been the target of the contemporary version of this aesthetic scepticism. This is a consequence of the Orthodox position whereby theorists, who support this position, maintain that photography, due to its e-dependent automatic nature, is necessarily naturally-dependent. This has allowed the Orthodox Theorists to claim that photography results in works of high epistemic value but low aesthetic value. In the following section I will examine the Orthodox Theory, the Second-Generation Orthodox Theory, and the New Theory of photography to ascertain the respects in which photography is naturally-dependent and what import this theorizing has about intentionality in relation to automatic image-making techniques, more generally.

ii. Photography and Natural-Dependency

There are many different and nuanced philosophical approaches to photography and in what follows I will focus on the premises of three broad distinctions among these approaches: the Orthodox Theory, which has been developed by theorists including Currie, Scruton, and Walton, and supported by theorists including Pettersson, and Mag Uidhir; the Second-Generation Orthodox Theory, which has been developed by

²³ Squaring was known as *grata*, and this technique was used by Raphael, Perino, Giulio Romano, Daniele da Volterra and Taddeo Zuccari, according to Armenini (Cerasuolo 2017, 167) Tracing was performed by Renaissance artists who used *carta lucida* or tracing paper (Cerasuolo 2017, 171). While *spolvero* involved pricking holes into a cartoon's surface and sprinkling charcoal dust over the top to result in a faint outline of the visual features of the image that was being transferred (Cerasuolo 2017, 168). In 1568, Vasari suggested a similar technique known as *calco*, which involved 'interposing between the prepared panel and the cartoon with the composition; another cartoon covered with black pigment on the side in contact with the *imprimitura*, and then tracing the drawing with an "iron, ivory or hard wood point, so that the cartoon is not damaged.'" (Cerasuolo 2017, 170)

theorists including Abell, and Hopkins, and supported by theorists including Cohen and Meskin (Costello 2017b, 451 n.3); and the New Theory, which has been developed by theorists including Atencia-Linares, Lopes, Wilson (né Phillips), and Maynard, and supported by theorists including Costello.²⁴ Although their accounts share key commonalities, each theorist within these categories has formulated their ideas differently to those in the same grouping. Resultantly my examination of these different theories will focus on the ideas of the central figures who have contributed to them and so my survey will be necessarily brief, but it will enable me to capture these different ideas about photography, and in particular, natural-dependency. I will elaborate on other aspects of these theorists' ideas about photography in the following chapters, but for now my focus will be largely restricted to natural-dependence and in the following section, belief-independency.²⁵ According to the Orthodox Theorists, both of these qualities inhibit intentional agency, however I will challenge this position in section iv.

Broadly speaking, the contemporary Orthodox Theorists have maintained that photography is a naturally-dependent causal mechanism, which entails that, according to the Orthodox Theorists, the resultant image which is of an external object, has been “objectively” formed by mechanisms that operate independently from the beliefs of the photographer.²⁶ In particular, Walton (1984) has argued that photography fosters

²⁴ Costello however, has been reticent to identify as a New Theorist, having stated that while he is sympathetic to the New Theory, it must meet several requirements before the New Theory can be considered as a genuine advance on the Orthodox Theory, including accounting for its aesthetic capacities in a way that does not compromise and render its epistemic capacities mysterious (2018, 231).

²⁵ The concept of belief-independency in relation to philosophical discussions about photography may be summarized as the following: ‘...a photograph turns out as it does, independently of what the photographer *thinks* that she sees through the viewfinder.’ (Pettersson 2017, 263)

²⁶ Pettersson has suggested that ‘most theorists of photography adhere to the causal version of photography theory’ and that ‘regardless of the intuitions of philosophers, much of our photographic practice seems to imply that we hold a causal theory.’ (2017, 260) This latter thought is one to which I will return to in Chapter Three.

counterfactual dependency and real similarity relations to the external object, which results in “transparent” representations whereby viewers really “see” the object of the photograph.²⁷ Relying on similar conditions but reaching a different conclusion, Currie (1999) has argued that photographs are “traces” of their external objects, which is a view that is also held by Pettersson.²⁸ By proposing that photographs are traces, Pettersson has maintained that an “ontological commitment” of photography is the fact that it refers to a subject that existed (2011a, 186). Scruton (1981) has similarly argued that photographs stand in a causal relation to their subjects, rather than an intentional relation which, Scruton has argued, entails that viewers are only interested in the external object, not the intentional processes, or thoughts of the maker, as viewers would be interested in when looking at a painting. Although these different versions of Orthodoxy stress certain features over others, in common to all is the premise that photography is a necessarily naturally-dependent, causal process. In particular, the emphasis on causality in each of these accounts reaffirms the Orthodox notion that photographs have a special relation to reality, as they come into being independently of the mental states of agents.

Yet, by defining photography in terms of a naturally-dependent, causal mechanism, it follows that, as Costello has highlighted, the paradigm examples of photography that this thesis implicates are: ‘time-lapse nature photography or speed cameras, of which it is literally true that the mechanism fires off automatically, irrespective of what anyone believes to be in front of the camera at the moment of exposure.’ (2012b, 106) But surely these kinds only account for a very small subset of photography? Consider the work of photographers such as Ansel Adams or Dorothea Lange, who carefully decide

²⁷ I will discuss Walton’s theory in depth in Chapter Five.

²⁸ Similarly, Sontag has stated that ‘a photograph is not an image (as a painting is an image), an interpretation of the real; it is also a trace, something directly stenciled off the real, like a footprint or a death mask.’ (2000, 154)

what to photograph and how to process their photographs in the darkroom. The more one looks at actual photographic practice, the more apparent it becomes that the Orthodox Theorists have failed to account for the fact that photography is a multi-stage process that has been designed by agents, to operate in accordance with their intentions, and not just a moment of exposure. Hence the ontology of photography that the Orthodox Theorists have proposed is not representative of the multifarious uses of the photographic medium and subsequent kinds of images that may result from the use of photographic technology.²⁹ The Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists however, have been more perceptive to this and have incorporated, into their theories, the fact that intentions are involved in photography. Specifically, Hopkins has argued that the causal relation, which he has proposed has been determined by the intentions of agents such as camera designers, between the external object and the photographic image offers viewers a “factive pictorial experience”, as: ‘Every stage must in some sense preserve information available at the previous stage, so that, if the later stage contains the information that *p*, so did the earlier stage’ (Hopkins 2012, 714) Likewise, Abell has proposed that all photographs have an external object, which the features of the photograph are counterfactually dependent on (2010b, 83), and that photographic mechanisms instantiate richness and reliability, largely due to the value that agents have found in using the process to harness these results (2010b). Furthermore, although there is some scope for the involvement of agent’s intentions in Abell and Hopkins’ respective accounts, this is still in a restrictive sense, as they have each proposed that if an agent intervenes with the effect of the photographic mechanism to the extent that they break the counterfactual dependence of the features of the photograph on the

²⁹ Realism had dominated for decades when Walton had been writing about photography and he has since acknowledged that his primary focus, in his discussion of transparent pictures, was the snapshot (2008, 104). Since that time however, photographers have become more experimental again. Resultantly, it is now more evident that the Orthodox approach does not account for photography as an extremely varied group of processes.

features of the object, then the result will not be purely photographic, or it will not be an instance of “authentic” photography (Abell 2010b, 84; Hopkins 2015, 332-3).

In sum, both the Orthodox and the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists have proposed that photography is a naturally-dependent process. Although the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists have granted greater scope for the involvement of the intentions of agents, this involvement is still restricted by the counterfactual dependence of the features of an image on the features of an external object, which the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists have proposed is fundamental to the photographic process. Moreover, by focusing on causality, the Orthodox Theorists have been able to maintain that photography is a belief-independent process. I have chosen to frame image-making processes, such as photography, as automatic techniques in this work to avoid precisely this result, as causality is a term that may also be used in relation to natural occurrences, whilst automaticity, which may entail causality, is strictly in service of human ends.³⁰ To this effect, the New Theorists have also chosen to frame photography, not as a causal mechanism but, in Maynard’s terms, as a family of technologies whereby ‘light is directed to make physical states that we call images’ (2000, 20).³¹ The roots of the New Theory can be traced to Maynard, who proposed that photographs are: ‘(1) surfaces that (2) have been marked – in this case by light.’ (2000, 22). And since Maynard, the idea of foregrounding the action of light to capture the nature of photography has been developed by the New Theorists, who have proposed

³⁰ Fineman for instance, has pointed out that: ‘Understood as natural phenomena rather than as human artifacts, photographs answered a cultural need for objective, visual representation that was not being met by pictures created by hand.’ (2012, 21) By contrast however, Costello has highlighted that ‘...because it is designed to replace human transcription, automatism always presupposes human ends.’ (Costello 2017a, 41)

³¹ Maynard (2000) was one of the first theorists to argue that photography is a family of technologies, that is used to produce images, and to extend the viewer’s powers of “depiction” and “detection”, which in turn enhances their powers of visual imagination and ability to acquire perceptual knowledge. I will discuss these issues in Chapter Five.

that the non-intentional core of photography should be shrunk to the registration of light on photosensitive surfaces, which they call the “photographic event” (Phillips 2009a, 10). According to the New Theorists, this is the only “fundamentally photographic” (Lopes 2016, 81), component of photography, but alone it is not sufficient for the creation of a photograph.³² This entails that other processes have to be used in order to materialize the photographic event and create a photograph. Consequently, the New Theorists have suggested that the term “photography” covers a range of differing processes, which at one end of the spectrum have the potential to be fully automated, as may be the case with polaroid snapshots, and at the other may involve highly intentional processes such as gum bichromate printing or digital manipulation.³³ According to the New Theory then, the stages that are required to generate a photographic image ‘may, but *need not*, be automated.’ (Costello 2018, 231) Moreover, the New Theorists have argued that it is the use of photographic technology, not natural-dependence or belief-independency, that demarcates photography from other pictorial media.

There have been multiple versions of the New Theory, some have been revisionist, such as Atencia-Linares’ account (2012), while others have been radical, such as Lopes’ account (2016). Atencia-Linares has explained that ‘the motivation behind the first wave of the New Theory was mainly to challenge the Orthodox view regarding what counts as a *photographic representation* or what counts as representing photographically or by *photographic means*.’ (2018, 218) To this end, Atencia-Linares (2012) has suggested that photographic processes involve the manipulation of light,

³² As Lopes has explained: ‘Automatic image-making is not the whole of photography; it is simply a step in the artist’s process.’ (2016, 10)

³³ As Costello has highlighted: ‘If a photographic event is necessary, but not sufficient, for the creation of a photograph, then all those subsequent stages of image processing - without which there could be no visible image – should in principle count as strictly photographic. If one cannot generate a photograph without the use of such means, they can hardly be regarded as incidental to “photography proper”.’ (2017a, 80) I will however, outline a way to set some boundaries for the photographic medium in Chapter Three.

while Wilson has stipulated that a photograph is ‘a visual image whose relevant causal history necessarily includes a photographic event.’ (Phillips 2009b, 336) In particular, Wilson has argued that whilst the photographic event may be mind-independent, the multi-stage practice of photography need not be (Phillips 2009a). Similarly, to Wilson and Atencia-Linares, Lopes has outlined four necessary stages of photography, which include: a pro-photographic scene, a dynamic light image of the pro-photographic scene, a photographic recording event, and a mark-making stage (2016, 79-80).³⁴ Lopes however, has created an account of photography that is more radical than Atencia-Linares’ and Wilson’s accounts, as Lopes has proposed that provided that input was taken from a photographic event, any kind of mark-making can contribute to a strictly photographic process, including painting and digital manipulation (2016, 97).³⁵ I will dwell on the aesthetic and epistemic implications of the distinction between revisionist and radical New Theory in the coming chapters, but for now, it is sufficed to say that a particular value of the New Theory is that there is no distinction between analogue and digital photography, as there is in the Orthodox Theory (Lopes 2016, 104).³⁶

Specifically, the Orthodox Theorists found that the potential to manipulate digital photographs, removed the process from its analogue counterpart. Savedoff for instance, declared that ‘the digital product of this new creative freedom [...] is no longer a photograph.’ (1997, 210) The New Theorists however, are absolved from these kinds of worries as, whilst digital photography differs from analogue photography in how the

³⁴ To clarify, a pro-photographic scene denotes the external objects that are involved in the photographic event while: ‘a dynamic light image of the pro-photographic scene [is what] is projected onto a photosensitive surface.’ (Lopes 2016, 80)

³⁵ Furthermore, Lopes has proposed that there are at least *Four Arts of Photography*, including what he has termed: classic photography, cast photography, lyric photography, and abstract photography (2016). I will discuss these different arts over the coming chapters.

³⁶ This is a result of the intentional control that digital photographers have over their images. Consequently, as Costello has highlighted, ‘Orthodoxy, but not the New Theory, *requires* there to be a difference of kind between analogue and digital.’ (2017a, 142).

data to create the image is stored and processed, the photographic event is still inherently the same. In relation to this, it should be noted that analogue photography covers a wide range of processes including plate photography and instant photography. Each of these types are different processes, as for instance, plate and polaroid photographs are unique and difficult to manipulate, while many other chemical forms of photography are easy to reproduce and manipulate during the negative to positive stage. In common to each of these analogue kinds however, is the fact that chemicals react to light, whereas in digital forms of photography, it is image sensors that react to light and store this information, recorded through electric charges, in binary code.³⁷

There are many important differences between the positions of the Orthodox Theorists, the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists, and the New Theorists. One of the most notable differences is that both the Orthodox Theorists and the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists maintain that photography is a kind of naturally-dependent process, whereby the features of a photograph are counterfactually dependent upon the features of an external object, whilst the New Theorists do not. The New Theorists have maintained this to different degrees however, which Costello has highlighted by noting that: ‘like Atencia-Linares, Dominic Lopes forgoes natural counterfactual dependency as a necessary condition of an image counting as photographic. Unlike Atencia-Linares, Lopes forgoes this in general and not only for the odd exception that proves the more general rule.’ (2017b, 444) This divergence has consequences that I shall not be able to fully explore until Chapter Three, however it is worth noting, for now, that Atencia-Linares is in this respect more closely aligned to some Second-Generation Orthodox

³⁷ Whilst the digital photographic process does not usually involve a negative-positive process, there are parallels that can be drawn between digital and chemical photographic processes, for instance compensating for over-or underexposure in the darkroom, or the digital removal of “red eye” (Costello 2017b, 442). Digital photography can also vary in degree of automaticity. Software settings can be altered in order that the camera does most processes automatically, or as with digital SLRs one can choose to make the settings completely manual.

Theorists. However, unlike the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists, and the Orthodox Theorists, Atencia-Linares (2012) has argued that photography is fictionally-competent and this is a position that is generally upheld by all the New Theorists.

Wilson for instance, has stated that: ‘Photo pictures do not have to have the photographed objects as their subject: in fact they do not have to have existent objects as their subject.’ (Phillips 2009a, 19) This is puzzling however, considering that by definition the photographic event itself cannot register light that does not exist. So how can photographs, which are created by photographic events, have non-existent objects as their subject? Notice that Wilson uses the term “photo picture” to describe photographs that may have non-existent subjects. Specifically, Wilson has proposed that there is a distinction between photo-images and photo pictures, the former of which stand in a specific relation to the photographed objects, while the latter ‘can have a subject, determined by the intentional states of the skilled photographer’ (Phillips 2009a, 19). All photographs, Wilson has suggested are photo-images, which are mind-independent, while some in addition are also photo pictures, which are mind-dependent, as the ‘properties of the photo-image supervene only on properties of the photographic process, [while] the properties of the photo picture also supervene on the intentions of the artist.’ (Phillips 2009a, 19)³⁸ What is key to take away from Wilson’s distinction, is that it is the performative aspect of creating a photograph that is where the relevant intentionality pertaining to the artistic content of photography is to be found, not in the technology itself. This, I suggest, is a point that can be extended to art-making more generally and in section iv. I will return to this idea to explore how agents exercise

³⁸ Wilson has additionally stated, in a footnote, that it may be the case that amateur photographers produce images rather than high-quality pictures as pictures cannot be accidental in any sense but rather must be the result of a skilled photographer (Phillips 2009, 19 n. 25). This however, does introduce the need to be very careful in defining the cut-off point between the amateur and skilled photographer.

intentionality in conjunction with e-dependent automatic image-making processes, which may appear to preclude intentionality.

As the foregoing demonstrates, contra the Orthodox Theorists, photographs are clearly in some sense, dependent upon intentions. It is in what sense that photographs are dependent upon intentions however, that is the key question. The Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists have suggested that photographs are typically created by agents to remain counterfactually dependent on an external object and to offer an accurate depiction of the features of an external object. Indeed, I propose, for reasons that will become fully apparent in Chapter Three, that artefacts which match this description are typically what viewers appreciate as photographs. Nonetheless, I concur with the New Theorists, that photography is distinguished from other image-making processes by harnessing the action of light, not qualities such as natural counterfactual dependency or belief-independency. First, consider the fact that other image-making processes also instantiate natural counterfactual dependency and belief-independency. For example, as I outlined in the previous section, the handprints created on the cave walls in Indonesia were counterfactually dependent upon the features of the participants hands, which were impressed on the wall with pigment so that the outlines created were established independently of how anyone conceived them to look. Second, note that there are plenty of examples whereby, using uniquely photographic means, photographers determine the nature of the visible features of an image to produce an alternative depiction of the external object. For instance, Berenice Abbott created her warped *Self-Portrait* (1930) by moving around an image of herself around whilst exposing it. While the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists may object that Abbott has created this image by flouting a norm of photography as it should be practiced, this I suggest serves to demonstrate the point that the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists have described

one particular kind of photographic practice, that is by no means exhaustive of the way that photographic technology can be used to create a photographic image. Hence, while e-dependent automatic image-making techniques may necessitate counterfactual dependence on an external object at some stage during the production of an image, such as the photographic event, it need not be prescriptive in every kind of practice which utilizes these techniques that, during all stages of production, image makers have to remain completely faithful to the appearance of the external object, as I shall elaborate in the next chapter.

Yet, given that e-dependent automatic image-making techniques necessitate the involvement of an external object during the production of the image, this does entail that e-dependent automatic image-making techniques tend to be bound to reality in a way that other kinds of image-making processes, including i-dependent automatic image-making techniques, are not. This I suggest, necessitates a different kind of creative act to generate images that, for instance, originate in a pro-photographic scene and a photographic event, but that may not necessarily resemble the appearance of this event or what preceded it. Moreover, this has a particular aesthetic significance, given that fictional or imaginary subjects are constituted from external objects that were involved in the photographic event. In particular, I suggest that, given the work of Wilson, images that are produced by e-dependent automatic image-making techniques may have two subjects, dependent upon the particular practice: the naturally-dependent subject, or the external object; and in some cases, an intentional subject, or an imaginary or fictional subject that is constituted from the naturally-dependent subject. Accordingly, given that photographic technologies can be used to different representational ends in different kinds of image-making practices, I propose that this entails that there need not necessarily be a strict divide between photography as a belief-

independent image-making process and other kinds of image-making processes as belief-dependent, as the Orthodox Theorists have generally maintained. As such, in the next section, I will examine belief-independency in order to establish how different image-making processes instantiate different degrees of belief-independency, and what impact this may have on the aesthetic standing of different works that have been made using automatic image-making techniques.

iii. Belief-Independency and Image-Making Processes

In image-making practices, belief-independency is established by processes, pertaining to feature-tracking and mark-making, that operate independently of an agent's cognition. Feature-tracking is a process in which the image-maker detects the object's visual features, for instance by observing the shape of the sitter's head, whilst mark-making refers to processes whereby an agent makes depictive marks on a support to convey the object's appearance by, for example, putting pencil to paper to make lines that correspond to the object's shape. Automatic image-making techniques enable image-makers to undertake processes that may instantiate varying degrees of belief-independent feature-tracking and/or belief-independent mark-making. For example, in etching and engraving, although the initial marks made on the matrix are belief-dependent, the subsequent print processes used to reproduce these marks are belief-independent, so when printed multiple times the same marks are reproduced in the finished prints, which entails that these printmaking processes, in their entirety, instantiate a relatively high degree of belief-independent mark-making. Other image-making processes however, such as photography for example, may be used to instantiate high degrees of belief-independent feature-tracking *and* mark-making. For instance, by using a trigger shutter and automated settings, no agent need be present for

a photographic image to be taken because by using photo-sensitive mechanisms in this way, the visual features of the external object are registered and a surface is marked accordingly without the involvement of any beliefs.³⁹ The idea however, that certain kinds of images can be made without the involvement of the mental states of an agent, has had some serious consequences for the aesthetic standing of images made using belief-independent image-making processes. The area in which this debate has received the most attention is in relation to photography, where dispute has generally been over belief-independent feature-tracking, and so in this section I will outline how the Orthodox Theorists, Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists, and the New Theorists have treated belief-independency in order to establish how different image-making processes instantiate different degrees of belief-independency and what the aesthetic significance of this may be.

As I highlighted in the previous section, the Orthodox Theorists, generally hold the position that photography is a naturally-dependent causal process. As such they have maintained that belief-independency is a necessary condition of photography.

Accordingly, the Orthodox Theorists have proposed that the creation of a photograph is independent of the mental states of the agent taking the photograph which, for these theorists, entails that only what is really before the camera can be recorded, regardless of what the photographer thinks is before the camera.⁴⁰ By contrast, Currie, has suggested that: ‘If the painter were having an hallucination, and so thinking there was a pink elephant in front of him, his painting would display a pink elephant, not the actual scene before his eyes.’ (1991, 24) As a result of maintaining that there is a contrast

³⁹ This being said, a human must however, have programmed the software or engineered the appropriate hardware, such as a trigger shutter, in order for this process to occur.

⁴⁰ A position, which is encapsulated in Currie’s statement, whereby: ‘Anything about the person’s appearance that the footprint or death mask manages to record is belief independent in the same way that the photograph is: what is recorded depends on the morphology of the foot or face; not on what someone thinks the morphology of the foot or face is.’ (1999, 287)

between photographs, which are produced by belief-independent processes, and paintings, which are produced by belief-dependent processes, the Orthodox Theorists have proposed that photography has high epistemic value, providing good visual evidence of how an object appeared but for just this reason some Orthodox Theorists, most notably Scruton, have argued that photography cannot be a representational form of art. In particular, Scruton has argued that because photographers do not have intentional control over every detail of the image to expressively convey their attitude about the subject, photographs are not representational works of art (1981, 593). This is a point however, that I will return to in the following section.

The Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists however, as I outlined in the previous section, have acknowledged the role of intentions in photography to a greater extent than the Orthodox Theorists. Yet, while the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists have maintained that photography is not necessarily a belief-independent process, as I outlined in the previous section, they have suggested that photographic equipment has been designed to ensure that the depictive content of a photograph is counterfactually dependent upon an external object. Consequently, the role of an agent in the photographic process can be reduced to being responsible for the chain of causal events that lead to the production of a photograph, where the content is determined by the features of an external object (Abell 2010b, 84; Hopkins 2015, 332-3). Hence, for the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists, the photographic process generally secures depiction by belief-independent feature-tracking (Costello 2017b, 444) and moreover, the process has been cultivated by agents in order to do so. As such, while the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists are more permissive than their intellectual predecessors, it is still the case that belief-independency is tightly bound with the concept of photography. The New Theorists however, have vastly different ideas about the role of

belief-independency in the photographic process. Wilson for instance, as I highlighted at the end of the previous section, has maintained that photo-images are “mind-independent” (Phillips 2009a, 14), but that photo pictures, which are also photo-images, ‘also supervene on the intentions of the artist’ (Phillips 2009a, 20) which entails that they are, additionally, “mind-dependent”. In a similar spirit, Costello has demonstrated that in certain cases, photographers can adjust the camera settings, such as focus and aperture, so that changes in a scene may not be perceptible in the photographic image, which entails that ‘*what* appears in the photograph – and not just *how* what appears – turns out to be intentionally-dependent on the photographer, at least in some cases.’ (2017a, 121). By highlighting the different ways in which an agent’s mental states may be involved in the photographic process, these New Theorists have tried to demonstrate that the Orthodox Theorists have misunderstood the nature of the photographic processes that results in photographs and that by extension, the Orthodox Theorists have overestimated the degree to which a photograph may instantiate belief-independent feature-tracking.

Lopes however, has taken an entirely different tactic to demonstrate how Orthodoxy has mischaracterized the ways in which an agent’s mental states may, or may not, be involved in image-making processes by demonstrating how manographic processes, such as drawing, imbricate photography and may also involve belief-independent feature-tracking.⁴¹ Lopes has proposed that this serves as a greater challenge to ‘the skeptic’s claim that photography is depiction by belief-independent feature-tracking’ (2016, 74), as even modifying the sceptics claims so that ‘acts of authorial agents must be intentional under every artistically relevant description’ (2016, 72) is too stringent.


⁴¹ It is worth noting that Lopes uses the term “drawing” to denote ‘richly embodied mark-making’ (2016, 84) and Lopes distinguishes this from other processes, such as throwing or spilling paint, as these bodily movements are ‘not ones that trace a path congruent with the resulting marks.’ (2016, 84)

This is because many artistically relevant features of paintings are unintended. For instance, accidental drips may occur during the process of painting that can become integral to the work. Moreover, this often key element of chance is not unique to artistic domains. For example, Watson and Crick did not intend to discover the structure of DNA, yet we credit them for this discovery given that their acts led to it (Lopes 2012, 862). Thus, following in the spirit of Anscombe and Davidson, Lopes has reasoned that ‘attributions of agency and intentionality perform different functions’ (2012, 860), which entails that: ‘attributions of agency typically have to do with crediting events to agents; attributions of intentions have to do with explaining acts as done for reasons.’ (2016, 70) Hence, Lopes has adduced that there are many non-intentional actions in art production that we can credit agents for, even in processes such as drawing, which are traditionally conceived of as being saturated with intentions (2016, 72-7). Subsequently, Lopes has proposed that drawing ‘is an operation that takes input in the form of visual experience or visual memory and organizes it to produce output by means of a manual motor sequence.’ (2016, 74-5)⁴² To this effect, Lopes has specified that drawing may involve using the concept of an object as guidance for how an agent moves their hand to mark a surface (2016, 75), or it may involve an agent looking at an external object and the surface that they are marking, and allowing the feedback from the appearance of the

⁴² Abell has argued that the Ebbinghaus illusion shows that Lopes is correct to propose that ‘the visual information that guides our motor actions may differ from that carried by conscious visual experience’ (2010b, 91). Whilst an agent’s conscious experience distorts the relative size of the disks, their motor actions reveal that they unconsciously represent the correct sizes. To this effect, Nanay has highlighted that dorsal, or motor guiding, vision is normally, if not necessarily unconscious (Nanay 2014, 186), which entails that agents may experience unexpected motor actions in response to the unconscious dorsal vision. Hence, as the dorsal stream, unlike the ventral, or classificatory, stream is not fooled by the illusion, an agent’s grip size remains accurate relative to the object (Nanay 2011, 465). Nevertheless, while an agent may be surprised to find that ‘the aperture produced between finger and thumb is perfectly suited to the actual sizes of the disks’ (Abell 2010b, 91), image-makers frequently have to use techniques, such as sighting and learning to see negative space, to emulate this effect.

surface to join with the appearance of the object to control the movement of their hand (2016, 76).⁴³

To demonstrate the latter notion of drawing, which involves belief-independent feature-tracking, Lopes has used the example of Galileo's drawings of the moon (fig. 3.). As it



(fig. 3.) Galileo Galilei *Drawings of the Moon* 1609 (Accessed from: <https://brunelleschi.imss.fi.it/galileopalazzostrozzi/object/GalileoGalileiDrawingsOfTheMoon.html>)

⁴³ The latter description is closer to what some theorists have described as a 'skilled unreflective action', or an action that will '(a) involve mastery of a given skill [...] and (b) unfold without the individual who performs them occurrently thinking about what she is doing.' (Brownstein 2013, 547).

was not known, at the beginning of the 17th century, that the moon had a rocky face, Lopes has argued that Galileo's act of drawing must have bypassed his conceptual cognition: 'Since Galileo presented his data as drawings, they must be a record of what he saw that was not "theory-laden" or influenced by what he believed he was looking at.' (2016, 77). Could it be that such an important discovery was made by belief-independent feature-tracking? There is evidence that suggests that this may not, in this particular instance, have been the case for, as Kemp has pointed out, Galileo's understanding of what he saw was 'founded on his understanding of the behaviour of shadow with respect to different angles of illumination on non-planar and curved surfaces.' (1990, 94) Therefore, whilst the drawings were an important aid, it seems unlikely that they were made by a high degree of belief-independent feature-tracking.⁴⁴ Moreover, there is strong evidence to suggest that most agents who are competent in drawing directly from visual data have to use techniques, such as sighting and measuring, that enable them to bypass their 'old habits of seeing', which typically entails that much of what is seen 'is changed, interpreted, or conceptualized in ways that depend on a person's training, mind-set, and past experiences.' (Edwards 2001, xxv-7)⁴⁵ Indeed, Lopes' other example, which he uses to demonstrate that drawing may involve a high degree of belief-independent feature-tracking, suggests that it is agents who have certain kinds of atypical cognitive processing who may find it easiest to harness this ability. Specifically, Lopes has outlined the case of Nadia, a low functioning autistic child, who could not classify and name objects (2016, 76), yet at the age of three was able to draw in perspective and depict her subjects in astonishing realism (2016, 74). In

⁴⁴ Furthermore, Edgerton has outlined how Thomas Harriot using a "perspective tube" had noticed the moon's "strange spottedness" (Edgerton 2009, 9-10) but did not possess the relevant knowledge to enable him to explain why the moon appeared this way, however as Edgerton has explained 'when Galileo also aimed his modified instrument at the moon, his unique drawing and teaching experience made it clear to him that Harriot's "strange spottedness" was really caused by dark shadows cast by protruding mountains on the moon's irregular surface.' (2009, 10)

⁴⁵ For a survey of techniques to this end, see Edwards (2001).

light of this, Lopes has proposed that: ‘When you draw, a concept of a feature may occur to you and it may play a part in what you do, but its occurrence is not essential to tracking the feature and it may play no part in your act of drawing.’ (2016, 76)

Lopes has used the distinction between belief-independent feature-tracking and mark-making to motivate the New Theorist’s argument that it is not belief-independency that demarcates the difference between drawing and photography, but rather the use of photographic technologies to mark surfaces (2016, 78).⁴⁶ This is a point that requires clarification however, for while it is generally the case that the Orthodox Theorists differentiate between photographic and other image-making processes by arguing that the former are belief-independent while the latter are not, Walton, who is an Orthodox Theorist, has suggested multiple ways in which an agent can harness automatic image-making processes to make images that are in Walton’s terms weakly “transparent”, or weakly naturally-dependent and belief-independent.⁴⁷ For instance, Walton has suggested that an agent can copy a photograph ‘conceivably without even recognizing what it is a photograph of, or painting over a photograph, matching the brightness of each spot of the original’ (1984, 267), which entails that certain automatic image-making processes, such as tracing, can instantiate a high degree of belief-independent feature-tracking.⁴⁸ Similarly, Walden has argued that certain technologies ‘tend to exclude the image-maker’s mentation’ such as the camera obscura (2016, 48). The

⁴⁶ As Costello has reaffirmed, for Lopes: ‘Belief-independent feature-tracking does not parse between photography and painting, but between the automatic and non-automatic processes to be found in both. What differentiates photography from painting is not belief-independent feature-tracking, but the fact that some images are made with photographic technologies and others are not.’ (2017a, 87)

⁴⁷ This is a view that has been shared by others, as for instance, Herschal’s drawings made by the camera lucida have been described as existing ‘somewhere between drawing and photography’ (Nash 1989).

⁴⁸ For example, to this effect, English surgeon William Cheselden made use of a camera obscura in the early 18th century to ‘bypass the problem of seeing and knowing, and representational habits’ that the draftsman he employed struggled with (Kemp 2006, 252).

element of the image-maker's mentation that is excluded in these cases is belief-dependent feature-tracking. Moreover, I propose that the process of tracing from a camera obscura projection typically instantiates a higher degree of belief-independent feature-tracking than that which is instantiated by purely manographic drawing processes, because if an agent is tracing from an image that is already two-dimensional then they need not additionally process the features of the three-dimensional object in order to transform it into a two-dimensional representation, as they would when making a freehand drawing.

Complete belief-dependency in any image-making process, Lopes has rightly argued, is an unrealistic expectation (2016, 72). This is a point that Lopes has used to maintain, contra sceptics such as Scruton, that manographic arts such as painting, are not completely dependent upon the intentions of the maker, as the sceptics have presupposed. However, while I remain sympathetic to this view, I suggest that purely manographic drawings made from memory or by looking at an object, usually exhibit higher degrees of belief-dependency than works that are made using other image-making processes. For instance, although Lopes has maintained that Galileo's discovery was made by belief-independent feature-tracking, evidence demonstrates that this was unlikely to be the case. This is important because it serves to show that a high degree of belief-independent feature-tracking in drawing is unusual for most agents. While Nadia's case clearly shows that drawings can be made by belief-dependent feature-tracking, it has been noted that the degree to which she was able to do so was exceptional (Lopes 2016, 75). For instance, a consequence of belief-independent feature-tracking is that an agent need not have processed the visual input in a manner which means that they can describe the visual properties of the subject that they are

drawing from.⁴⁹ Usually however, when agents make drawings, it is the case that if asked, they can describe the visual feature that they are inscribing on paper.⁵⁰ This is not to deny that belief-independent feature-tracking has played some part in their activity of drawing, but it is to suggest that concepts play a more central role in this kind of image-making than in automatic kinds of image-making. As such, I maintain that the use of automatic image-making techniques tends to instantiate higher degrees of belief-independency than purely manographic image-making techniques.

Nonetheless, as I have demonstrated in this chapter, there are many different ways that automatic techniques are used in art practices, including drawing and painting practices, that are traditionally thought to be entirely manographic. Moreover, as the debates on photography show, the production of images tends to consist of multiple, often distinct, stages of making whereby different image-making techniques may be used. Hence, different stages of image production may instantiate different degrees of natural-dependency and belief-independency. This then, entails that it is important to defend an account of art production that accommodates these variables, especially given the fact that different automatic image-making processes may be used to establish high degrees of belief-independency and natural-dependence. While these qualities have been conceived of by sceptical orthodox theorists as detrimental to the aesthetic potential of an image-making process, I will show that belief-independency and natural-dependency can be important qualities that artists make use of to fulfil their artistic intentions and by

⁴⁹ Furthermore, Cavendon-Taylor has argued that a consequence of Lopes' proposal is that agents non-attentively see the object they are drawing. Cavendon-Taylor has referred to this as *The Mere Experience View*, which is to say: 'S's beliefs about *o* do not play a necessary role in S's depicting *o*.' (2014, 36) Cavendon-Taylor has argued however, that: 'There can be no *Mere Experience View* unless seeing an object can be understood in a non-epistemic, non-belief involving way.' (2014, 45) Nonetheless, while seeing may be said to generally involve beliefs, as I will explain in Chapter Five, placing a doxastic requirement on seeing is problematic.

⁵⁰ As for instance, John Berger's description of making a life drawing demonstrates (Berger 2005).

extension, I will demonstrate that accounting for automatic image-making techniques is vital to properly appreciating certain artworks. Rather than using natural-dependency and belief-independency to indicate how aesthetically significant a work is, I will suggest that these factors instead should be taken to indicate what kind of aesthetic value an artwork instantiates.

iv. Creative Agency and Automaticity

The New Theorists have made valuable suggestions about the nature of intentionality in visual art in order to combat the restrictive view of sceptics, such as Scruton, who have argued that natural-dependency and belief-independency are incompatible with the production of representational works of art. Although I am sympathetic to the spirit of the New Theorist's arguments, I suggest that it is more profitable to construct a theory, whereby one is able to account for how agents produce artworks through non-intentional actions and processes. While Lopes has developed an account along these lines, by demonstrating that complete belief-dependency in any image-making practice is unrealistic, I intend to take this further in my account of intentionality in art production. Specifically, in this section I will construct an account of intentionality in art production that can accommodate the fact that artists have produced works by processes including the omission of action, actions performed by other agents, naturally-dependent processes, belief-independent processes, and automatism within art forms, including painting and printmaking, to manifest their intentions. While sceptics identify intentional control in art production with the performance of actions by an agent that manifest intended and successfully anticipated effects on a work's features (Abell 2015, 27), as I will demonstrate in this section, this conception of intentionality

in art production is incompatible with one of the most valued aspects of art production: creativity.

Creativity is an agential disposition that is valued across all artistic disciplines, hence I propose that the kind of intentional agency that should be the subject of attention in discussions pertaining to the role of agents in art production is a form of, what I will term, “creative agency”.⁵¹ Creativity is valued as such because creative agents tend to produce novel and valuable artistic products, and moreover; it is generally the case that creative agents, as shall I show, are responsible for the production of the salient artistic properties of a work and how these are manifested. Creativity however, as Gaut (2018) has highlighted, requires a necessary aspect of spontaneity, which entails that creative agency should be characterized as a form of diachronic agency (Bratman 2013, 50; Ferrero 2013, 90) in which an agent works with broad intentional goals (Costello 2017a, 60), in this case the content of which pertains to plans to produce a work with certain kinds of artistic properties or representational features, towards which they take an executive attitude. This entails a conception of intentionality in art production that is not only proximal, as the sceptics have suggested, but also distal. As such, in what follows, I will offer a full account of creative agency and I will provide examples to demonstrate why this is a successful strategy in accounting for intentional control in different kinds of art production. Although artistic intentions are of primary importance here, it should also be noted that this is not intended to diminish the formal qualities of a work or detract attention from the material product, but rather to help viewers to appreciate how the properties of a work are developed and manifested under the guidance of artistic

⁵¹ Gaut has proposed that ‘creativity, as an agential disposition, has instrumental value in massively increasing the rate and reliability of production of new and valuable things’ as well as final value because we admire agents with this disposition to produce those things (2018, 133).

vision.⁵² Specifically, I will show that agents use automatic image-making techniques in innovative ways that complement their ideas and/or manual skills.

First however, it is in order to clarify why sceptics identify intentional control, in art production, with the performance of actions by an agent that manifest intended and successfully anticipated effects on a work's features. Scruton has argued that painting is an independent representational art form because agents produce "aesthetically significant representations" (1981, 593) by acts of painting alone. Specifically, Scruton has argued that an ideal painting stands in an 'intentional relation to its subject because of a representational act, the artist's act...' (1981, 579). Painters, Scruton has argued, have control over every detail of their image and so he has proposed that: 'Art provides a medium transparent to human intention, a medium for which the question, Why? can be asked of every observable feature, even if it may sometimes prove impossible to answer.' (1981, 593) The same however, Scruton has argued, cannot be said of photography. While Scruton has acknowledged that 'there is, as a rule, an intentional act involved' (presumably that of taking the photograph, although Scruton does not specify), in the production of an "ideal" photograph, he has maintained that, as a causal process, 'this is not an essential part of the photographic relation' between the image and its subject (1981, 579).⁵³ Hence, for Scruton, ideal photographs maintain a causal

⁵² This approach, as I shall outline in the next chapter, is intended to align with an understanding of art as performance whereby 'the focus of our appreciation in our engagement with an artwork is *an artistic statement as articulated in an artistic medium realized in a vehicle.*' (Davies 2004, 60).

⁵³ In direct response to Scruton, Costello has argued that painting is both a causal and an intentional activity by highlighting that the transfer of paint from a brush to a canvas is a causal process, but one which theorists have no trouble thinking of as expressing a thought or intention (2017a, 60). Scruton may easily rebut this particular point however, by noting that without the necessary process of transferring paint from a brush to a canvas, there would be no painting, hence the intentional relation between the artist's intentions and the subject is a necessary one. The same does not hold for photography however, as there need not be an agent responsible for the triggering of a shutter and causing a photographic exposure, which is a necessary part of the photographic relation between the image and its subject.

relation to the external object, which entails that agents do not have sufficient intentional control over the details of a photograph to create an aesthetically significant representation solely through photographic means. For these reasons, Scruton has controversially maintained that photography is not an independent representational art form.⁵⁴ As Abell has highlighted however, ‘Scruton’s assumption that representational art forms must enable artists to express their thoughts about the things works of that form represent is contentious.’ (2015, 25) And indeed this aspect of Scruton’s argument is something that I will treat separately in the following chapter.

For now, however my attention shall be towards what constitutes intentional control for sceptics, given that Abell has suggested that Scruton’s:

...arguments seem equally compelling if one accepts only the weaker and more plausible assumption that representational art forms must enable artists to exercise their intentional control over the way in which objects are represented, and that independent representational art forms must provide artists with ways of intentionally controlling representational content independent of those provided by other art forms. (2015, 25)

Given this, what constitutes intentional control? Abell has suggested that:

⁵⁴ This sceptical argument has also had implications for other art forms that rely on automatic image-making techniques, such as printmaking. Abell for instance, has suggested that there is scepticism about the aesthetic significance of printmaking, given the idea that the techniques to produce the matrix are insufficiently different from drawing and painting and ‘the process by which prints are produced from these matrices might be considered too mechanical to contribute anything of artistic interest to the resultant prints.’ (2015, 23) While Abell has highlighted the ways in which many print processes, such as drypoint which produces burr, offer agents the opportunity to exercise intentional control by employing techniques and creating effects that are independent of drawing (2015, 28), she has maintained that in printmaking practices however, such as chromolithography and screenprinting, ‘printmakers lack intentional control over the representational and formal features of the prints that is independent of the intentional control exercised in the production of the painting or drawing to which they refer.’ (2015, 29) Which, she has proposed ‘is a result of genuine limitations on [a] printmaker’s ability intentionally to control the features of such prints.’ (2015, 30)

To have intentional control over a work's features, it seems both necessary and sufficient for an artist to be able successfully to anticipate the effect that his or her actions will have on those features: that is, to know what actions he or she must perform in order to produce a work with certain features, and to be able to perform those actions and thus produce a work with those features. (2015, 27)

This concept of intentional control then, entails that, (1) an agent must know exactly what they intend to achieve and how they will act to this end and (2) that they themselves must perform this action. Both (1) and (2), I suggest, are overly restrictive and preclude the opportunity for agents to act creatively, as I shall now explain. First, consider the fact that, as Gaut has highlighted, there is an a priori principle about creativity, which he has referred to as the *Ignorance Principle* (IP), according to which: 'If someone is creative in producing some item, she cannot know in advance of being creative precisely both the end at which she is aiming and the means to achieve it.' (2018, 134) Gaut has clarified that 'an agent must aim to produce a certain range of values, and must have some understanding of how to do so' (Gaut 2018, 132), but that in order to be creative, an agent must strike a balance between purposiveness and spontaneity.⁵⁵ This entails that, contra (1), in order to be creative an agent cannot know both exactly what they intend to achieve and how they will act to this end.

Second, (2) conforms to the Own Action Condition (OAC), whereby an agent intends *to do* what it takes for them to bring about the intention that they are trying to fulfil (Ferrero 2013, 70). Is the OAC an acceptable standard however, to uphold in relation to intentional processes that are used to produce artworks, even in an ideal form? There are

⁵⁵ Gaut is not the only theorist to have suggested this, as for instance, Hausman has also proposed that creative acts require spontaneity, in addition to directed control. (2009, 12).

a multitude of reasons to suggest that the OAC is not the standard upon which intentional control in the production of artworks should be based. Firstly, as I outlined in the previous section, not every action in the production of an artwork is completely intentional, given that belief-independency in the production of an artwork is variable and dependent upon the particular processes that the agent uses to manifest the work. Moreover, as Lopes has highlighted, even purely manographic processes may manifest some degree of belief-independency. Agents then, may perform unintentional actions that can result in features that are integral to an artwork. Secondly, the OAC is inconsistent with creativity, definitions of which, indicate that the production of states and artefacts, such as artworks, are goal-directed forms of activity, which coheres with the fact that, as I have outlined in this chapter, image production typically requires multiple stages of making, that may necessitate the use of different processes. While the OAC works well for describing individual or small series of intentional actions, it becomes deeply restrictive when applied to goal-directed agency (Ferrero 2013, 76). Hence, I propose that, contra the sceptics, intentional control in the production of artworks should not be identified with (1) or (2) but rather intentional control should be conceived of as goal-directed activity in the form of creative agency, which I will now provide a detailed account of.

The basis for my characterization of creative agency is Gaut's view that creativity is an agential disposition, which necessarily entails a spontaneous aspect. This necessary element of spontaneity Gaut has proposed is, in addition to the disposition to produce new and valuable products, a source of the value of creativity (Gaut 2018, 137).

Creative agents are thus, not only responsible for the features of a work, but also for

determining the most appropriate manner in which to manifest these features.⁵⁶ It is also worth noting that, given the IP, the creative agent(s) responsible for the artistic properties of a work and how these are manifested may not necessarily be the author of the work, although there is typically an overlap between these roles. Authors for instance, may know in advance what artistic features or representational properties the work will have and exactly how they will materialize these, which is problematic for creativity. Indeed, creative credit has often been conflated with authorship in philosophical discussions.⁵⁷ Yet, while it is important to determine the author of a work, this is not necessarily the same as identifying the creative agency behind the work.⁵⁸ Moreover, I propose it is good practice to identify creative agency in visual art production as creativity is a quality that contributes to the value that viewers find in artworks as the products of agents, and also there may, on occasion, be ethical dimensions that need to be addressed in a work, meaning that it is important to identify the agency, which may be difficult in collectively produced works for instance, that is responsible for the features of a work and the processes used to achieve these.

Given that creativity requires goals, knowledge about how to appropriately manifest these goals, and spontaneity, I propose to characterize creative agency in art production as a form of diachronic agency in which an agent works with broad intentional goals, in

⁵⁶ Lopes has stated that his ‘view is that artists’ intentions are relevant to what *artists* mean and to understanding what they mean, not to what their *works* mean or to understanding their works. What a picture means is what the artist means by making it only when her intention is *manifest* in an appropriate way – that is, through a picture that successfully implements her intentions.’ (2006, 159-160) This I suggest, is a view that would seem to support the account I am offering here.

⁵⁷ Mag Uidhir for example, has proposed that minimal authorship need not be linked to creative/non-creative distinctions, whilst Gaut and Livingston (2003) have (Mag Uidhir 2013, 85 n.12).

⁵⁸ To give a brief indication of what authorship generally entails, the authorial accounts of Gaut, Livingston and Mag Uidhir all rely on significant and/or direct contributions to the salient features of the work, be that the features that determine the art sortal in which the work is placed (Mag Uidhir 2013), the non-accidental contribution of significant artistic properties to the work (Gaut 1997), or the expressive utterance that is communicated through the work (Livingston 2005).

this case the content of which pertains to plans to produce a work with certain kinds of artistic properties or representational features, towards which they take an executive attitude.⁵⁹ More specifically, the content, of what I will term, “artistic intentions” contains delineative plans about what kind of artistic properties or representational features an agent is aiming to produce in addition to the most appropriate way to manifest these properties or features in a work (Livingston 2005, 43).⁶⁰ These goals and plans are however, subject to evaluation and modification given the practicalities and outcomes of different stages during the production of artworks (Livingston 2005, 8).⁶¹ Given that I am advocating an executive attitude towards the content of these intentions, the intentions can be proximal or distal (Ferrero 2013, 78-9), which entails that the realization of artistic intentions are not necessarily actions that an agent themselves has carried out, but rather the production of artefacts or states that an agent intends to achieve (Ferrero 2013, 71; Livingston 2005, 11). Some or all stages of production may involve an agent’s own actions but the entire realization of an intention need not be restricted by the OAC on this model. This entails that the artistic intention originates from an agent (Ferrero 2013, 77), or agents, and execution of these intentions proceeds from the agent(s), but may be achieved remotely in ways that include other agents, absence of the agent(s) during the making of the work, automatic techniques, belief-

⁵⁹ The sense in which, I am using the term “broad intentional goals” is sympathetic to the context in which it was originally used by Costello, who has proposed that ‘intentionality, in the sense of intentional action, is manifest in the way in which various causal processes can be harnessed for human ends’ (2017a, 60) and in order to distinguish between merely causal events and those used for human ends, Costello has added: ‘One simply needs a sufficiently broad description to show that the causal process in question falls under, or is done in the service of, the fulfilment of some broader intentional goal’ (2017a, 60).

⁶⁰ Livingston (2005) has argued that intentions are necessary to the making of art and that our evaluation of artworks should take the artist’s intentions into account. Similarly, to the account I am offering here, Livingston has explicated a view whereby intentions are a kind of propositional attitude, the content of the intention is a schematic *plan* to do something, whilst the attitude taken towards this is ‘an *executive* one’. (Livingston 2005, 7-8). Livingston however, has explicitly extended this to an account of authorship, which I will not be doing here.

⁶¹ Similarly, Hausman has proposed that the creative artist ‘constitutes his target as he discovers how to aim at it.’ (2009, 12).

independent processes, or the omission of antagonistic intervention (Ferrero 2013, 78).⁶²

Executive success could be achieved *by way of* (Ferrero 2013, 81), as for example, an agent could aim to make an image *by way of* painting, or *by way of* photography, however this is contingent depending on how specific the goal of the originating agent or agents is.⁶³ Artistic intentions may be quite vague such as “to capture the atmosphere of a crowd at a gathering by way of photography”, or more specific such as “to create an image of a still life scene by way of photography, to result in a shallow image of the stems of a bunch of flowers”. This entails that an agent is free to choose and guide the processes that most appropriately manifest their intentions. This type of agency coheres with Gaut’s creative disposition as it entails that an agent has, at least to begin with, the broad intention to produce a certain range of values and a schematic idea of how to do so (Gaut 2018, 132).⁶⁴ As an agent is not restricted to exercising their own intentional actions however, they can operate within a range of means that allow for unplanned or spontaneous events, which are then usually subject to refinement within the artist’s broader intentional scheme (Livingston 2005, 49). In sum, this characterization of creative agency provides opportunities for spontaneity and so enables agents, with the

⁶² For instance, John Cage’s artistic career was built upon an omission of action and Wolterstorff has proposed that: ‘Cage expressed his Buddhist convictions by adopting aleatory techniques in his music if Cage did have Buddhist convictions, if he did adopt aleatory techniques in his music, if those techniques are inherently fitting to his Buddhist convictions, and if he adopted those techniques because he wanted to do or produce something inherently fitting to his Buddhist convictions and believed that the use of aleatory techniques would satisfy this goal.’ (1980, 27)

⁶³ Ferrero has explained that: ‘There are cases where the recipe becomes part of the goal’, which can be expressed as: ‘I intend that: *g-by-way-of-r*.’ (2013, 85)

⁶⁴ Elsewhere, but similarly, Gaut has defended a teleological account of creativity, which consists in agents working with rough ideas, and refining them as they try out various options, or working with more defined goals, but being creative in finding the means to the specified ends (2009, 91).

disposition, to creatively produce new and valuable products that fulfil their artistic intentions.

Given the foregoing, it is key to note that creative agency is not necessarily the same as identifying technical agency. In particular, using the OAC, as a standard for the production of artworks, as Scruton has, does not accurately capture how both historic and contemporary artists have created artworks, as artists have frequently used automatic techniques and also the assistance of other agents to physically manifest their intentions.⁶⁵ For instance, in the Renaissance, workshops became studios ‘in which the master-artist employed apprentices [who worked] according to a given set of requirements.’ (Roberts 2007, 141) While in the 17th and 18th centuries when the demands of the commercial market placed increasing pressure on workshops, such as that of Rembrandt or Rubens, to produce works efficiently on a grand scale, the contributions of apprentices were encouraged in a redeveloped ‘apprentice-workshop system to *share* the effort of completing certain works on time’ (Roberts 2007, 141). Finally, the system, which has been dominant since the end of the 19th century, is an atelier system, whereby assistants work under the direction of a singly named artist, a contemporary example of which is Jeff Koons. In this system, the ‘collaborative nature of the studio production is largely hidden, diffused into technical support’ (Roberts 2007, 126). Hence, in order to locate where, in the art production process, creative

⁶⁵ It is not only philosophers, but also artists that are responsible for perpetuating the misleading idea that they created their work with genius alone. Michelangelo famously burnt the majority of his drawings shortly before his death in order to maintain the illusion that his genius was effortless (Bambach 1999, 22-3) even though there is evidence that he used automatic techniques including spolvero and working with the scalpel to help transfer his cartoons onto the monumental surfaces that he was painting (Bambach 1999, 354-6). Other artists also erased their transferred underdrawings and this became increasingly common by the mid-16th century when ‘the taste for the false paradox disguised in the critical notions of *facilità* and *difficoltà* – the task being difficult, but the manner of solving it appearing effortless – had at times become the only yardstick for measuring artistic excellence.’ (Bambach 1999, 356) Artists who used a camera lucida in the 19th century it seems often did the same: ‘there are clear signs that artists tried to conceal its use.’ (Schaff 1989, 26)

agency, and therefore artistic intentionality, finds its fullest expression, first it is necessary to ascertain what roles are required to produce a visual artwork. I propose that there are three different necessary roles that can be identified in the production of a visual artwork, which in my terms are: *executive agent*, *executive representational agent*, and *technical agent*.⁶⁶ Whilst one may conjecture, as conceptual artists such as Sol LeWitt do, that the execution of a work ‘is a perfunctory affair’ (Kieran 2004, 132) and so propose that the final role is not a necessary one in visual art production, in what follows I will only deal with works of art that have been materially realized.

Specifically, I propose that *executive agents* originate the idea for and guide the creation of the work.⁶⁷ The agent or agents that assume this role could also be thought of as producers (Buck 2012, 184). This role might be assumed by an individual or a body who commissions a work and may involve more practical aspects such as funding, determining the dimensions of the piece or more general organization (Nelson 2008, 20). However, patrons may be unable to imagine how to fulfil and accomplish their commission and so require an executive representational agent, or executive representational agents, to make such decisions (Nelson 2008, 18). *Executive representational agents* are responsible for the salient artistic properties or representational features that the work has, and in addition to this they also determine what processes are to be used to achieve these. Executive representational agents do not necessarily handle the physical materials themselves to materialize their intentions (Bacharach and Tollefsen 2011, 229). However, they should understand which

⁶⁶ There are, in addition, a number of other roles that may be important in the production of artworks, such as the role of providing feedback, which might be occupied by informed critics, collectors, dealers, and even models, however as these are not necessary roles for the production of an artwork I will reserve treatment about the creative potential of those who occupy roles such as this for another occasion.

⁶⁷ This definition is conjunctive because guiding the production of an artwork may involve playing a non-necessary role such as providing critical feedback on the work.

processes will most successfully realize their intentions, and how they can cause others to act in a manner that appropriately manifests their intentions. This role might be fulfilled by workshop leaders, such as for example Damien Hirst (Enhuber 2014, 14), and additionally may be thought of as a directorial role. Finally, *technical agents* act to materially realize the work. This role may be fulfilled by workshop assistants. Importantly, this technical role can be outsourced and the desired material results can sometimes be achieved through the use of automatic techniques.

These roles need not be sharply demarcated, dependent upon the nature of the works production, and frequently it is the case that an agent will assume all three necessary roles simultaneously. For example, a modernist painter (Roberts 2007, 145) may conceive of the idea for a painting, formulate the features of the work and how they may manifest these in the material product, as well as executing the task of painting in accordance with these intentions. However, as the foregoing shows, in some cases an agent will only assume one or two of these roles themselves in the production of an artwork. Does this then diminish their creative agency and is there a role in which creative agency finds its fullest expression in art production? Whilst executive agents may be responsible for the production of a new and valuable work; they are not however, usually responsible for determining how the artistic properties or representational features of the work are to be configured and realized through the appropriate processes.⁶⁸ Comparably, technical agents are not usually responsible for determining how the artistic properties or representational features of the work are to be configured and realized through the appropriate processes. As in the Renaissance workshop or atelier model for example, the technical agents in such working practices

⁶⁸ For an example of this, see Buck (2012, 201).

are akin to “fabricators”.⁶⁹ Specifically, provided that the leading agent(s) gives adequate instructions, the technical agent ‘*can* know in advance of fabricating it precisely both the end at which she is aiming and the means to achieve it’ (Gaut 2018, 135). For example, the assistants who painted Hirst’s spot paintings were given unambiguous instructions, to complete a largely mechanical task, with limited scope for altering the artistic properties of the work beyond Hirst’s specifications. The creative agency of the executive and technical agents is restricted because the salient content of the artistic intentions (be that the form of the artistic properties or the processes used to realize these) that the agent is working with has been, or will be, determined by other agents. Consequently, this largely precludes spontaneity for the executive and technical agents which, as I have outlined, is a necessary element of creativity.

The agents who usually determine the content of the artistic intentions, which the executive and technical agents work in accordance with, are the executive representational agents, who establish the form of the salient artistic properties or representational features of the artwork and in addition oversee the processes undertaken to realize these. Resultantly, these agents work with the relevant purposiveness and have a greater potential for spontaneity in this guiding role. It is thus, executive representational agency that I identify as the role in which creative agency finds its fullest expression in art production. Agents who occupy this role are usually identified by viewers as “Artists” and this correlation with creative agency demonstrates why viewers find those who occupy the role, of executive representational agent, as the most important figure(s) behind the formation of an artwork. In some art practices, such

⁶⁹ In the Renaissance, individuality became highly valued by patrons and creative credit was assigned solely to the master-artist, as Lamarque has highlighted: ‘Creativity is credited to the Master although the underlings bring the painting into existence.’ (2009, 108) This was largely due to the humanist concerns of the Renaissance, which saw an emphasis on the value of ‘*disegno*’ (Roberts 2007, 140).

as film, it is common to have multiple executive representational agents, such as editors, actors, and writers, who are creatively responsible for the salient artistic properties of the work. Additionally, in practices, such as film and music, executive and technical agents are frequently granted the autonomy to exercise their own creative agency and determine the form and/or materialization of some of the salient artistic properties or representational features of works. Consequently, such agents are often recognized for their creative input in the production of a work.⁷⁰ As I have highlighted, executive and technical agents involved in visual arts practices, such as painting and sculpture, are typically restricted in exercising their creative agency, however there are cases, as in the 17th and 18th century workshops for example, where these agents are granted the autonomy to determine the form and/or materialization of some of the salient artistic properties of the work. In such circumstances, I propose that the executive and technical agents are also to be accredited for their creative contributions to the production of a work.⁷¹

Importantly, those in the other roles may also provide the means for executive representational agents to undertake a greater range of creative processes and therefore potentially produce more novel and valuable products. Executive and technical agents may, for example, provide innovative solutions to accommodate the executive

⁷⁰ Consider for example, the fact that categories for awards, such as the Oscars, include sound editing and cinematography.

⁷¹ For example, in the work *Domain Field*, which was intended to ‘open up the body and disperse it into the surrounding space’ (Gormley 2007, 369), Gormley and his technical assistants took moulds of the bodies of volunteers, from which welders were instructed to use ‘seven lengths of stainless steel to form a random matrix of T pieces where at one end of the T was touching the skin or boundary of the body space. It was up to each one of them to use the lengths of steel as improvised notes, played within a score provided by the space of someone else’s life.’ (Gormley 2007, 369) The volunteers in this instance, whilst contributors to the work, did not do so creatively, the welders on the other hand, were responsible for determining the configuration of the lengths of steel, which in this instance were salient artistic properties of the works, based on their own artistic sensibilities, entailing that they were, in a sense, creative collaborators. Likewise, certain executive agents, such as the Third Earl of Shaftsbury who commissioned John Closterman to make a double portrait at the beginning of the eighteenth century, are also deserving of creative credit for the particulars of the design (Solkin 1993, 4).

representational agent's artistic intentions, which enhances the creative agency of an executive representational agent.⁷² Analogously, I propose that executive representational agents, who supplement or outsource the role of the technical agent to automatic techniques, such as casting or photography, frequently do so in order to enhance their creative agency and to successfully manifest and fulfil their artistic intentions. Moreover, while automatic techniques may be used to supplant some of the technical agency associated with image-production, this does not preclude executive representational agents from exercising their creative agency, which I have proposed, is where intentionality pertaining to artistic content is located and typically expressed from.

It should be clear by now that agents do not necessarily have to fulfil all three necessary roles in visual art production in order to create a novel and valuable artwork that is the result of the relevant intentional control, which I have proposed is creative agency. This entails that there is no basis for the sceptical view that the use of automatic techniques, such as photography, inhibit creativity and artistic representation. While art production has been identified with the realization of proximal intentions by sceptical theorists, this restrictive understanding of intentionality is, as the foregoing demonstrates, at odds with the nature of creativity and so, does not sufficiently account for the ways in which an agent may manifest their intentions in an artwork. Although the New Theorists have outlined how different photographic processes allow for greater intentional input, the approach that I have proposed, in this section, has the advantage of being able to account for the intentional nature of artworks, that have been made using automatic techniques which may be naturally-dependent and/or belief-independent, as the

⁷² An example of which, is the case of the print technician who worked with Rauschenberg to save his broken lithography stone and print the prize-winning *Accident* in 1963 (Brand 2015, 34).

products of creative agents. This is important to take into consideration because many image producers, who work with such methods capitalize on the qualities that come with these techniques in order to fulfil their artistic intentions, which I will now demonstrate by exploring examples of works made by artists using automatic techniques, which instantiate natural-dependence and/or belief-independence.

One of the leading proponents of automatism, in the history of art, were the Surrealists, who employed both e-dependent and i-dependent automatic techniques, that instantiated varying degrees of belief-independent feature-tracking, in order to pursue the movements principle artistic interest: the exploration of the unconscious. On occasion, the Surrealists pursued this interest collectively, for example, by producing “exquisite corpses”, in order to produce works that were drawn from the collective unconscious. Specifically, the exquisite corpse game involved passing around a piece of paper that was drawn on and folded by each participant to be passed on to, and repeated by, the next participant. The features of the drawings were dependent upon the intentions of each participant, however as the agents who were participating in the game did not know what had been drawn previously, or what would be drawn next, the resulting forms, which were collectively created by belief-independent feature-tracking, were “collagelike juxtapositions” (Laxton 2012b, 159). Although these drawings were created by using a process, of drawing and chance, that instantiated belief-independent feature-tracking, they were nonetheless the successful realization of a shared artistic intention to create fantastical forms that emerged from the collective unconscious. Likewise, works that were produced by the use of e-dependent automatic techniques, such as frottage, enabled Surrealist figures, such as Max Ernst to pursue their artistic intention to produce pictures that were made by “excluding all conscious mental guidance” (Jones 2012, 32). Frottage is a method of building up images, that instantiates

belief-independent feature-tracking, by rubbing graphite on paper over textured surfaces. In particular, Ernst used the process of making rubbings from external objects to guide the process of image production and produce images of intentional subjects that were drawn from the unconscious. Although the Surrealists did not start out with precise ideas about what shape the representational features of their artworks would take, they did begin with the intention to create forms that were not the product of conscious mental processes and they selected techniques that would accordingly enable them to manifest this aim.⁷³ Hence, while the Surrealists created works using automatic techniques that instantiated belief-independency, these images were still dependent upon the artistic intentions of executive representational agents.

Another important movement in the history of art, Photorealism, has seen executive representational agents including Gerhard Richter and Chuck Close use automatic image-making techniques, such as tracing and squaring, to instantiate high degrees of belief-independent feature-tracking. This is a quality that these artists have capitalized on to create representational works that fulfil their artistic intentions, which broadly speaking are to question the artist's role, as an author, and relation to their subject by exploring objectivity through the traditionally subjective medium of paint. Gerhard Richter for instance, has worked by tracing over projections of photographs (which Richter has used to function as representations of naturally-dependent subjects) to create his paintings, and in describing this process, he has effectively likened himself to a transcription machine.⁷⁴ The marks that have been made by Richter are however, intentional and so are a result of the artist's beliefs. It is this conflation of a high degree

⁷³ For more on artists who have utilized techniques that enabled them to produce works in this manner, see Turner (2011).

⁷⁴ For a description of this process, see Laxton (2012a, 787). While it could be conjectured that this process of transference precludes the opportunity for spontaneity, and so for creativity, it is important to remember that this is only one stage of the production of these works and that prior to this, the artist would have experimented with the composition of the work for instance.

of belief-independent feature-tracking and low degree of belief-independent mark-making that has enabled Photorealist artists, such as Richter, to pursue their interest in “objective” visual data through painting. In particular, Richter’s conceptually driven use of photographic imagery freed him from personal experience (Laxton 2012a, 776 n.2) and enabled him to manifest his intention to ‘render the author-function passive’ (Laxton 2012a, 795). Similarly, in his paintings, Chuck Close, who was influenced by conceptualism and minimalism, transferred “impersonal” visual data from the photographs of his subjects wearing neutral expressions in order to pursue his artistic intention of exploring forms rather than emotions.⁷⁵ In particular, Close’s choice, as an executive representational agent, to use the e-dependent automatic technique of photography and also, in this case, squaring, which instantiated a high degree of belief-independency, enabled him to manifest his intentions to render the forms of his subjects faces in his giant photorealistic paintings (Friedman 2005, 40).

While the Surrealists and the Photorealists frequently used automatic image-making techniques that instantiated belief-independent feature-tracking, some agents have chosen to use automatic image-making techniques that instantiate belief-independent mark-making in order to fulfil their artistic intentions. For instance, Pop artists, were particularly drawn to print-making processes that circumvented the artist’s hand, and used print processes to instantiate belief-independent mark-making, which enabled the artist to evade any emotional charge in the work and instead to challenge the traditional fine arts by meditating on the prevalence of commercial and popular culture in everyday

⁷⁵ Friedman has explained that: ‘The Conceptualists held that form could be generated by means of impersonal systems, as opposed to reliance on fugitive emotions.’ (Friedman 2005, 40). While another often-cited theory for Close’s dependence on photographic imagery is his prosopagnosia, which means that he can ‘recognize individual elements of a face, but not recognize whose face it is.’ (Stokes 2014, 285) Close can however, recognize faces he has painted (Stokes 2014, 285) and so it has been reasoned that one way to “fix” a face that he wanted to paint would be to have it before him in two-dimensional form.’ (Friedman 2005, 47)

life. For instance, much of Andy Warhol's artistic practice was premised on belief-independent copying processes as he explored the reproduction of images and cultural artefacts in his work.⁷⁶ This began with his blotted line drawings, such as *Bird on Branch of Leaves* (c.1957), which he made by drawing in pencil on water resistant or heavily saturated paper, after which he traced over the lines using drawing ink (Bastian 2002, 16). As the ink sat on the surface of the paper, Warhol was able to print his drawing by placing another piece of paper on top so that 'the resulting contour became the first 'original'; then absorbent watercolour paper would be laid on this to make a print of the original.' (Bastian 2002, 16). This process meant that, as an executive representational agent, Warhol was able to begin pursuing his artistic intention of giving precedence to the copy, rather than the original (Bastian 2002, 16).⁷⁷

Not all print-making processes however, exhibit this mixture of belief-dependency and belief-independency. In particular, some print-making processes instantiate high degrees of belief-independent feature-tracking and mark-making, such as screen-printing from photographs; a technique which Warhol started practicing in 1962, which as Bastian has highlighted, for Warhol functioned as the ultimate reproductive process that enabled him to fulfil his intention 'to depersonalize production: the print reflects the actual commensurability of the sheer facticity of the depicted object.' (2002, 27) While Warhol's intention was to reproduce cultural artefacts, other artists have used e-dependent print-making processes, that instantiate high degrees of belief-independent

⁷⁶ Like the Photorealists, Warhol also traced from projected images (Bastian 2002, 22) and this method enabled him to pursue his artistic intention of producing an anti-metaphorical style by reproducing his subjects without alteration, as his painting of a Coca-Cola bottle shows (Bastian 2002, 24)

⁷⁷ Warhol used many other belief-independent automatic techniques including the use of stamps, from which he could create a whole image, or denounce the authorial hand by building up an image consisting of the marks made from the stamps. For example, *Male Seated at Automat Counter* (1958) and *Matches* (c.1957). Bastian has explained that 'the use of the stamp facilitated additive procedures and series; paradigmatic first steps towards a later, advanced use of templates for an emotionally cleansed register of life.' (2002, 18)

feature-tracking and mark-making which circumvent the intervention of an agent to a degree that parallels many photographic processes, to fulfil their artistic intentions to meditate on the human experience of, and interaction with, nature and natural processes. For example, as an executive representational agent, Andy Goldsworthy chose to manifest his artistic intentions by selecting a technique that left some features of the work to be determined by nature. Specifically, Goldsworthy's naturally-dependent drawings were created by the earthy, sooty residue left from melting icicles and snowballs on the paper, forming patterns and rhythms that added 'an ironic narrative of environmental pollution by human agency into an elegant drawing not made by hand.' (Petherbridge 2010, 107). Using similar methods, nature prints are produced by using ink to impress natural objects on a surface and have been described by Cave as a '*mechanical* way of avoiding the need for an artist's eye, and mind, and hand, to process the image and flatten it.' (2010, 81). In her series of work *Transience*, Susan Aldworth's e-dependent nature prints were taken directly from slices of human brains in an almost entirely belief-independent process, that fulfilled her artistic objectives in virtue of this. Together with a master printer, or technical agent, executive representational agent Aldworth placed the brain slices on zinc etching plates, which when lifted left marks that 'could effectively 'draw' the brain by acting as a resist when the plate was placed in acid.' (Hartley 2016, 11) (fig. 4.) Aldworth did not interfere with many of these prints, allowing the viewer to experience what she has referred to as 'this mysterious territory where objective form (the brain) and subjective experience meet.' (Hartley 2016, 12) However, in some prints she wiped coloured ink over the surface of the plate by hand to suggest consciousness (Hartley 2016, 11). This entailed that the varying levels of belief-independency in these processes, corresponded to and embodied the subsequent meanings of Aldworth's works.



(fig. 4.) Susan Aldworth *Transience 6* 2013 (Accessed from: <https://susanaldworth.com/transience-2013/#jp-carousel-1690>)

Similarly, casting processes, which are naturally-dependent and instantiate high degrees of belief-independency, that like certain printing processes circumvent the intervention of an agent to a degree that parallels many photographic processes, have been used by contemporary artists, such as Rachel Whiteread, to manifest the intention to reveal the relationship between objective form and subjective experience. Specifically, Whiteread's practice consists of casting real objects in plaster, rubber, and resin (Bradley 1996, 8). This highly belief-independent process captures all the features of the objects from which it is taken, from sinks to library shelves (fig. 5.) to entire buildings to create 'something essentially uncanny, strange and unusual within the



(fig. 5.) Rachel Whiteread *Untitled (Book Corridors)* 1988 (Accessed from: <https://www.tate.org.uk/art/artists/rachel-whiteread-2319/five-things-know-rachel-whiteread>)

profound familiarity of the object it denotes' (Marí 1996, 64). Through her use of the naturally-dependent and belief-independent method of casting, executive representational agent, Whiteread has fulfilled her intention to provide viewers with a new experience of familiar objects and spaces by manifesting these objects and spaces in solid and tangible yet negative forms.⁷⁸

Along with print-making and casting processes, photographic technologies have also been utilized by executive representational agents to fulfil their artistic intentions. For instance, Lopes has highlighted that in one "art of photography", which he has referred

⁷⁸ Casting was historically practiced by artists such as Bernard Palissy, who interwove his natural casts with ceramic designs (Kemp 2006, 96-7). As 'prodigious skill and patience were required...' to create direct casts of animals and plants, these items 'became valued collectibles in the second half of the sixteenth century (Kemp 2006, 99).

to as “cast photography”, the limitation of agency ‘is embraced as a virtue’ (2016, 67). In this kind of photography, as epitomized in the work of Cindy Sherman, for instance, the object is depicted through belief-independent feature-tracking, but the photograph represents something that is not identical to what it depicts through belief-independent feature-tracking (Lopes 2016, 59). Moreover, Lopes has clarified that ‘while depiction by belief-independent feature-tracking may not be something [the photographer] does, the camera is not simply a short cut to depiction; it is a necessary ingredient in the thought that gets conveyed.’ (2016, 67) Furthermore, this quality has also been utilized by those working in another art of photography, such as Henri Cartier-Bresson, the “classic tradition”, where ‘revelation is unexpected, serendipitous, and hence unintended.’ (Lopes 2016, 68) In this art, photographic agency, Lopes has proposed, ‘is exercised in seeing photographically.’ (2016, 68) Likewise, artists including Ed Ruscha and Sophie Calle, have chosen, as executive representational agents, to utilize the photographic process at its most automatic in order to partially abdicate their control of the image-making process and, in their cases, let chance take over to fulfil their performative aims (Iversen 2009, 848). In particular, photography at its most automatic allows room for such chance, by instantiating belief-independent feature-tracking and mark-making to a high degree which is vital to the manifestation of the artistic intentions behind these “rule-governed performances” (Iversen 2009, 839). The ability, of photographic technology, to capture chance encounters has been utilized by different executive representational agents, for various purposes. For instance, Man Ray used a camera-less form of photography, photogrammetry, to create his “Rayographs” which, due to the nature of the process and his use of “developing-out” rather than “printing-out paper”, meant that the results of his arrangements in the dark room were largely unpredictable (Laxton 2009, 44), which enabled Man Ray to fulfil his artistic intention

to present real objects in an unfamiliar and abstract way.⁷⁹ Other executive representational agents, such as Michael Flomen, Ilan Wolff, and Susan Derges have used photographic contact printing processes to capitalize on the chance encounters between natural matter and photosensitive surfaces and to take ‘photography’s desire for the real to its literal extreme’ (Rexer 2009, 190). Flomen for instance, has placed sheets of photographic paper in natural settings such snowfields and streams ‘to register ‘the activity of light in relation to natural phenomena.’ (Rexer 2009, 190) Similarly, Susan Derges has submerged huge sheets of photosensitive paper underwater in rivers to create photographs by moonlight (fig. 6.) (Kemp 1997). Derges has utilized a range of photographic processes to create her work, from making use of carborundum powder and vibrations from sound on photographic paper. Wolff’s practice however, has seen him put materials such as dirt and heated metal directly on photographic paper, which has enabled him to explore the idea of ‘photography as a transmutation of energy into an object which is itself a record of that transmutation.’ (Rexer 2009, 191) The natural-dependence and high degree of belief-independence that the photographic medium can instantiate has enabled these artists to fulfil their artistic aims, which broadly equate to exploring the interaction of light and nature.

Similarly, using another direct photographic process, in 1999, Vera Lutter generated a series of pinhole photographs that she created by ‘using a room or shipping container as an enormous camera obscura, and the resulting images are only created in single copies that are inversed negative-positive.’ (Callahan 2012, 5) Lutter left these pinhole cameras in situ for several days in order to acquire the desired level of exposure, as well as to capture the changing scene. One of the resultant works (fig. 7.) features a translucent zeppelin, as for two of the four days that she recorded it, it was out being tested

⁷⁹ Dadists were particularly taken by this “automatic” way to create images (Laxton 2009, 28).



(fig. 6.) Susan Derges *Gibbous Moon Alder 2* 2009 (Accessed from: <https://www.artsy.net/artwork/susan-derges-gibbous-moon-alder-2>)

(Callahan 2012, 31). This was not an effect that Lutter had fully anticipated, yet fulfilled her intention to directly imprint her experience of the setting in flux onto the sheet of



(fig. 7.) Vera Lutter *Zeppelin, Friedrichshafen, I: August 10 - 13, 1999* (Accessed from: https://veralutter.net/works_transportation_15.php)

photosensitive paper.⁸⁰ Photographers, in particular, thanks to the flexibility and different variations of the process, are able to utilize a range of different degrees of belief-independency dependent upon their artistic aims and different approaches to depicting their subjects. For instance, realists, such as Robert Capa, have expressed the belief that their subjects should be depicted as they are and so these photographers have tried to avoid excessive reworking, or manipulation, of their photographic images, and have instead, in their work, presented an ‘arresting representation of visual experience.’ (Friday 2001, 360)⁸¹ Whilst pictorialists, such as Joel-Peter Witkin, have identified their aims with that of the painter, using reality as their pigment and brush to create anything from dream-like to hallucinatory images of the world, that are more potent for having

⁸⁰ In relation to the kind of agency that I have been discussing in this chapter, it is worth highlighting that Lutter has described herself as taking on the role of a choreographer in her practice (Crimp 2012).

⁸¹ Realists have included Lewis Hine, Dorothea Lange, and Robert Capa (Friday 2002, 117).

been constructed from it.⁸² The former tend to use photographic processes that instantiate high degrees of belief-independency, whilst the latter vary in accordance with how the agent chooses to reimagine and present the external object through different photographic means, more about which I will say in the next chapter.

The advantage of viewing the artist as a creative agent is that I can account for a variety of artistic practices and importantly, allow a place for artistically relevant non-intentional features in artworks. I have proposed that different automatic image-making processes manifest different kinds of counterfactual dependence and varying degrees of belief-independency however, I have demonstrated that none of these should be taken as an indicator of how aesthetically valuable the work is, but rather what kinds of aesthetic value such works can instantiate. This spectral approach reflects the varied approaches that artists take to representing their visions, and viewers, I maintain, will most profitably appreciate this by conceiving of the artist as a directorial figure. Moreover, the approach that I have developed here, accounts for the entirety of the image-making process, not simply the execution of it. This is important because, as Costello has noted, even permissive New Theorists tend to ‘assume that artistic intervention only occurs *downstream* of the photographic event’ (2017b, 450).⁸³ However, the idea of creative agency I have proposed here does account for artistic intervention that takes place upstream, as well as downstream, for as Singer has suggested ‘like the chisel or the brush, the camera must be *directed*’ (1977, 42) and as Kemp has proposed ‘from first to last, the process and design is dependent on our conceptions – their imaginative reach and their constraints.’ (2006, 321) While I have addressed how artists utilize automatic

⁸² Pictorialists have included Bill Brandt, Clarence Laughlin, and Cindy Sherman (Friday 2002, 114).

⁸³ Specifically, the New Theorists, Costello has argued, need to be able to account for what precedes the photographic event, such as previsualisation, rather than suggesting that photographs *originate* in photographic events (Costello 2018, 231).

techniques, which instantiate natural-dependence and/or belief-independence to achieve their artistic intentions, what I have yet to explore in detail however, is how these techniques are used in different modes of picturing. Arguably, one of the most powerful aspects of the sceptics' arguments is that e-dependent automatic image-making techniques cannot be used to produce representational artworks, however I shall use precisely this point to establish that agents are able to use these techniques to instantiate a kind of aesthetic representation that is distinctive from that which is typically instantiated by manugraphic, or even i-dependent automatic image-making techniques.

Chapter 2: Automaticity, Intentionality and the Representation of Reality

It has frequently been supposed throughout historic and contemporary art theory that there is a sharp distinction to be made between the representation of, what I described in the previous chapter as, naturally-dependent subjects and intentional subjects. This idea has found its strongest formulation in philosophical debates on photography. Sceptical theorists including Hopkins, Mag Uidhir, and Scruton have argued in various formulations that solely photographic means cannot be used to generate, in their terms, intentional or communicative representations. One of the biggest challenges in surmounting Hopkins', Mag Uidhir's, and Scruton's sceptical positions, is to show that photography, and by extension other kinds of e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, can be utilised independently of other artistic media to create representations of intentional subjects. This is a challenge that, in relation to photography, the New Theorists have risen to, by arguing that belief-independence is not a necessary condition of photography, but instead that the use of photographic technology is what demarcates photography from other media. Hence, as I outlined in the previous chapter, the New Theorists have argued that photography can be used for expressive purposes and that it is fictionally competent. However, as I also demonstrated in the previous chapter, the use of image-making processes that instantiate natural-dependency and belief-independency need not preclude artists from manifesting their artistic intentions. Given this, I shall take a different tactic, that has been used by Kivy (1997) in relation to musical arts, and I shall instead look at whether there are any forms of aesthetic representation that are distinctive of works that are created using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques.

In section i. I will examine Mag Uidhir's sceptical view that photography, as an e-dependent automatic image-making technique, is not substantively intention dependent as he has claimed that there need not be any agent that is directly responsible for the way in which a work is a photograph. In response to this scepticism, and in light of my work in the previous chapter, I will address the epistemic issue of how intentionality is located in works that have been made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, by utilizing some of the central principles of anti-empiricist approaches, whereby intentionality in art is understood and appreciated as performative. Following this, in section ii., I will examine the sceptical accounts of Scruton and Hopkins, who have argued that due to the natural-dependence of photography, the medium, when used on its own, cannot be an independent representational art in a communicative sense. I will suggest that these accounts inadvertently reveal the aesthetic significance of images that are made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques. In section iii. I will defend the sceptical notion that aesthetic interest in photographs is partly due to their relation to reality. I will concur that e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, such as photography, are not able to instantiate certain qualities, such as fictionality, in the same way, or to the same extent, as manographic image-making techniques. I will however, suggest that artists are able to utilize e-dependent automatic image-making techniques to instantiate a kind of aesthetic representation that is distinct from that which is typically instantiated by manographic, or even i-dependent automatic image-making techniques. Specifically, I will demonstrate that photographers, like 17th century Dutch artists or 19th century British artists, typically create works in the "descriptive mode" and that such works engender aesthetic interest in the way that the artist has used reality to expressive ends. While it is not prescriptive that e-dependent automatic image-making techniques need be utilized to this end, it is I suggest a particular aesthetic strength of these techniques. Hence, I will propose that photography

is especially well equipped to enable artists to create works in the “descriptive mode” and that generally, this is how artists intend viewers to appreciate photographic works. In section iv. however, I will further concede that the sceptical theorists may have been correct to identify that certain kinds of artworks result from the combination of photographic and non-photographic arts. Moreover, I will suggest that recent developments in the New Theory of photography, have overlooked this kind of artistic practice. Consequently, in the following chapter, I will explore when it is aesthetically relevant to identify, and to profitably appreciate, the contribution of, or conflation of different arts.

i. Automatism, Chance and Intentionality

In the previous chapter, I advocated that the relevant kind of intentionality to account for in art production should be thought of in terms of creative agency. There are however, some issues that remain to be addressed if this is to be a successful strategy. In particular, as Mag Uidhir (2013) has highlighted, photographic images can, albeit rarely, be created by natural processes, or more commonly, by accident. Given that such works need not necessarily have been formed as the direct result of intentional agency, creative or otherwise, how are viewers to locate and appreciate intentionality in photographic works and other kinds of works that are made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques? In this section, I will respond to this epistemic challenge by using the principles of anti-empiricist approaches to ascertain how artistic intentions are discovered when art production is understood and appreciated as performative.

A challenge to the position that I advanced in the previous chapter is accounting for the aesthetic value of a work that is produced using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, which may be perceptually identical to an object that is created accidentally by the same means. For instance, how are viewers to distinguish between a photograph taken by a creative agent, when a photograph with similar visual properties may accidentally be taken? Moreover, if, for example, an infant can accidentally take a photograph that has the same pleasing aesthetic qualities as a photograph taken by a professional then why do viewers tend to assign greater aesthetic value to the latter?⁸⁴ Mag Uidhir has taken such examples to argue that: ‘photography is not an art form because the sortal *photograph* is not substantively intention dependent (i.e. strongly author-relevant).’ (2013, 103) But what does Mag Uidhir mean by ‘substantively intention dependent’ and ‘strongly-author relevant’? Mag Uidhir has explained that the role of the author is to be responsible for the creation of a ‘successful art attempt’ (2013, 45-6), which entails there must an agent who is directly responsible for the manifestation of the work’s features that determine the sortal in which the work is placed. Furthermore, Mag Uidhir has specified that: ‘For *F* to be an art sortal, *F* must be strongly author-relevant (i.e., being an *F* must entail being an *F*-work).’ (2013, 101) So painting, according to Mag Uidhir, is an art sortal because the works that successfully satisfy the conditions for falling under this sortal, must have had an agent who was directly responsible for the way in which the work is a painting and furthermore, the ways in which items are paintings ‘are themselves ways in which those things are artworks.’ (2013, 102) Using this reasoning, Mag Uidhir has proposed that photography

⁸⁴ This does also beg the question – who is responsible for photographs taken by infants or animals? I suggest that whilst an animal or an infant may be the direct cause of an image, unless it can be shown that animals are able to conceptualize the activity of taking a photograph, or that a child is old enough to do so, then such works are not the result of intentional, never mind creative, agency. Given that such images cannot be evaluated as the result of intentional agency, I suggest that the photographs may only be valued as artworks on the basis of being involved in a selective act by a creative agent.

is not an art sortal because there need not necessarily be an agent, who is ‘directly responsible for the way in which that thing is a photograph’ (2013, 103). While Mag Uidhir’s reasoning here may be logical, there certainly do exist entities that are recognized as both artworks and photographs, so does Mag Uidhir deny that this kind of commonly recognized artefact holds the artistic status that viewers, artists, and curators have granted it? No, but Mag Uidhir has stipulated that such entities are not pure photographs. In order for a photograph to be an artwork, Mag Uidhir has argued, it must instead be photography-plus, that is containing some non-photographic, or extra-photographic, feature from an art sortal (Mag Uidhir 2013, 105).

By Mag Uidhir’s reasoning it would appear that not only photography, but other e-dependent automatic image-making techniques such as casting and pigment transfers, cannot alone be used to make works that belong to the art sortals sculpture and print respectively, as casts and pigment transfers can, and have, occurred accidentally. For instance, the haunting casts of the residents of Ancient Pompeii (fig. 8.) were created



(fig. 8.) *Plaster casts of the victims of the eruption can still be seen in Pompeii* 2018
(Accessed from: <https://www.thevintagenews.com/2018/08/16/pompeii-victims/>)

by a natural, albeit tragic occurrence. Thus, by Mag Uidhir's logic there has to be some non-casting feature present in order for a cast to be an artwork. However, as I outlined in the previous chapter, the works of Rachel Whiteread have readily been recognized by viewers, artists, and curators as belonging to the art sortal, sculpture, despite many of the works being constituted by casting processes alone. This then begs the question, has Mag Uidhir placed too heavy a burden on medium to distinguish between art and non-art sortals? Consider the fact that functional objects for instance, can be made by agents using processes and materials that are almost indistinguishable from those used in sculptural practice and can end up having sculptural qualities. Likewise, notice that the sortal drawing contains works that include sketches and pictures, as well as architectural plans and illustrations of biological specimens. These are but a handful of such examples that one could recruit to make the point that, while he has skillfully outlined the nature of intentionality in art production, Mag Uidhir has construed the nature of art sortals too broadly in his account, as it is not the case that every attempt to make work that satisfies the condition for belonging to an art sortal is an art attempt.⁸⁵ Given then, that sortals such as drawing and sculpture may contain works of art and non-art, and that the sortal photography may contain photo-images and photo pictures (Phillips 2009a), how are viewers to locate the relevant intentionality in such works that enable them to interpret and appreciate tokens of drawing, sculpture, and photography as artworks? To answer this question, I will examine anti-empiricist approaches to aesthetic appreciation, with a particular focus on cases of indiscernibility.

Although empiricism, which is the view that aesthetic value consists in the experience that a work affords, has long held sway in aesthetics, in recent years there has been

⁸⁵ As Costello has argued, 'there is no a priori correlation between a work's medium and its *capacity* to function as a vehicle of aesthetic value.' (2007, 12)

growing support, from figures including Kieran and Davies, for an anti-empiricist approach to aesthetic appreciation.⁸⁶ The particular attraction of this view is that it is able to account for the aesthetic value of contemporary artworks and the role that an artist has played in manifesting their work. Kieran for instance, has argued that unless one takes into account what an artist was striving to achieve in their work and ‘express in his artistic development, one will fail to understand and properly appreciate his art.’ (2004, 39) While, Davies has argued that ‘our interest when standing in front of a canvas, is not only in the perceptible properties of that canvas but also in how those properties result from the agency of a maker.’ (2004, 16) According to anti-empiricists, performance is a common factor among all kinds of art. This is not to say however, that all empiricists have ignored this facet of art production. Enlightened empiricists, such as Dutton have proposed that to fully understand and appreciate an artwork, viewers need to have an idea of what the artist has done ‘including some idea of the limitations, technical and conventional, within which he has worked.’ (Dutton 1979, 307)⁸⁷ Moreover, Dutton has argued that ‘all arts are performing.’ (1979, 304). He has highlighted that viewers however, tend to associate art forms like theatre and music with performance more than painting. Dutton has argued that this is because in the former ‘we are constantly conscious of human agency.’ (1979, 305) Unlike in the latter case where viewers see the results of a performance, which often took place a long time

⁸⁶ Kieran has highlighted the pervasiveness of empiricism by stating that: ‘From David Hume through to contemporary philosophers such as Malcolm Budd, the idea that artistic value can be wholly captured in terms of the experiences works afford is a common one.’ (2004, 21)

⁸⁷ Not everyone however, is convinced by this. For example, Goldman has defended the experiential account, arguing that ‘as an accomplishment of a particular artist, a work is of value mainly to the artist. The artist’s aim and point of view differs from those of his or her audience in the way that an athlete’s aim differs from that of a spectator of the sport.’ (Goldman 2006b, 341) This withstanding, it is common in sport to take into consideration the training of the athlete and how their performances compare, in order to appreciate their present performance. Likewise, whilst the audience may not necessarily identify their position with that of the artist, it is common practice to take into consideration how a work has been made and to locate this within an artist’s oeuvre, which would indicate that at least some aspect of the artist’s aim and point of view factor into the viewer’s appreciative activities.

ago. In these cases, however viewers are ‘no less confronted with the results of human agency.’ (Dutton 1979, 305) While enlightened empiricists do accommodate for the relevance of the intentions and agency of the artist, in appreciating an artwork, it is still the case that the material product and the experiences that are afforded from this are the primary focus of appreciation (Kieran 2004, 257 n.7.). There is however, I think good reason to support the approaches of anti-empiricists, who have proposed to ‘identify the artwork not with the product of the artist’s activity so viewed, but with the action-type enacted, or the token ‘doing’ performed by the artist.’ (Davies 2009b, 222) For instance, if an artist creates a work that successfully manifests their artistic vision but the work is destroyed in a fire before anybody can see it then, according to all forms of empiricism, given that nobody can experience the work, it ceases to be of aesthetic value. Kieran however, has defended the fact that: ‘If an artist creates a work which consists in the development of a unique style or which manifests individual artistic vision, then it constitutes an artistic achievement, and the work is of value, irrespective of whether anyone gets to see it or not.’ (2004, 28-9) This I think makes sense of the fact that few, I take it, would want to deny that lost artworks lack aesthetic value for example.

Importantly, the anti-empiricist approach has the advantage of accounting for the creativity, and therefore originality (Kieran 2004, 15), of the artist, which, as I outlined in the previous chapter is valued across all artistic disciplines. This entails that anti-empiricists can account for why originals are of greater aesthetic (and correspondingly economic) value than copies, forgeries, and pastiches, despite the fact that they may be perceptually indistinguishable and so according to empiricists able to offer comparable aesthetic experiences. Specifically, anti-empiricists have argued that an original work constitutes an artistic achievement, if the agent who is responsible for it has produced a new way of manifesting an individual or unique artistic vision (Kieran 2004, 19).

Copies and pastiches however, are derivative in this respect while, as Davies has argued, when a forgeries status is revealed ‘we can no longer appreciate it as before because it does not represent the achievement we took it to represent.’ (2004, 203)

Moreover, by taking the achievement of the artist into account, the anti-empiricists have also been able to account for why certain objects, such as the snow shovel that Duchamp exhibited in 1964, that may be indiscernible from other cultural artefacts and natural objects, are identified and appreciated as artworks. Given that viewers do not usually find the requisite qualities in snow shovels to warrant them the status of artworks, why would viewers be inclined to do so for Duchamp’s work *In Advance of a Broken Arm*? A supporter of anti-empiricism would answer to the effect that viewers identify Duchamp’s performance of exhibiting the snow shovel as the vehicle through which his artistic statement is articulated (Davies 2004, 196).

This argument also extends to cases of appropriation art, such as Sherri Levine’s photographs *After Walker Evans* (1981), which Levine created by photographing reproductions of Evans’ Depression-era photographs. Although Levine’s photographs are perceptually identical to Evans’, they are identified and appreciated as different artworks. This is because Levine’s performance of re-photographing Evans’ work has functioned as a vehicle which has enabled her to articulate an artistic statement which is different to that which may have been expressed through Evans’ original photographs. It is Levine’s gesture then, that constitutes her artistic achievement in this case, and not the representational features of the photograph. It could be objected however, that appreciating the performance of the artist would be to the detriment of the viewer’s experience, as it could be construed that this approach ignores the experiences afforded

from the material product.⁸⁸ However, as Davies has explained, for the performance view: ‘Appreciation, so conceived, can take place through the encounter with the artistic vehicle, given the knowledge of artistic medium and of other features of provenance that we bring to that encounter.’ (2004, 214) This approach then, flexibly accommodates the concerns of different arts, some of which may place great value on the artist’s role in materializing a physical product and its features, while others may place importance on the artist’s ‘expressive gesture’, rather than a material product (Kieran 2004, 32). This, I propose, gives rise to a more holistic appreciative experience and moreover, it accounts for all kinds of art from historic paintings and sculptures through to the output of contemporary artistic movements such as Arte Povera and the Art and Language movement.⁸⁹ Thus, aesthetic value, I suggest, is found in the performance of the artist as a creative agent, which entails that meaning and value is found in how the properties of a work, material or otherwise, are developed and manifested under the guidance of an artistic vision. Hence why greater aesthetic value is found in a photograph taken by an agent under the guidance of artistic intentions, rather than the perceptually indistinguishable one that was taken by accident because value is found in the creative achievement in the former case.

⁸⁸ Goldman for instance, who has characterized aesthetic experience as a fully absorbed experience that results from a ‘rich and intense mental experience imbued with meanings from all these faculties [perceptual, cognitive, affective, imaginative] operating in tandem and informing one another’ (Goldman 2006b, 334), has suggested that ‘aesthetic experience should be grounded in an acceptable interpretation of its object, and an acceptable interpretation is one that maximizes the value of the experience while being constrained by the objective or base properties of the object.’ (2006b, 341)

⁸⁹ Kieran has argued that the output of these movements may be ‘conceived of as attempts to make works where experience of the object is, if possible, beside the point.’ (2004, 32) He has added that: ‘Part of what is being drawn attention to is the underlying expressive gesture itself, via the presentation of the object, and it is towards the gesture itself, whether it’s funny, ironic, contemptuous or commentating on society and the art world, that our meditations are drawn in considering their value.’ (2004, 32)

How though, are audiences to locate the relevant artistic or representational features of the work and thus the performance of the artist? There are many strategies that viewers, critics, and theorists adopt to discern what an artist is representing in their work and as Kieran has highlighted there is no one feature that is always present, but there may be many different features like the title or the genre a work is in (Kieran 2004, 107). Furthermore, looking at the artist's oeuvre and direct authorial statements of intent may help to guide viewers in their interpretative and appreciative activities, especially in the case of contemporary art (Maes 2010). It can take time however, for audiences to become familiar with the conventions of new and evolving art practices, hence why Maynard has proposed that it can be challenging for audiences to locate intentionality in works that are made using relatively new techniques, such as photography (2000, 289). Despite this, Maynard has argued that time and experience enable an audience to discern the "intentional affordances" that are often missed during the early period in the history of an art practice (Maynard 2012, 740).⁹⁰ There are, I propose, a multitude of ways to identify objects, that may be constituted from e-dependent automatic image-making techniques and that may be indiscernible from other cultural artefacts or natural objects, as artefacts resulting from intentional, and specifically, creative agency. This withstanding, theorists such as Hopkins (2015), have argued that there are limitations as to how agents may use e-dependent automatic image-making techniques to convey their intentions to the audience. Consequently, in what follows, I will examine how agents utilize e-dependent automatic image-making techniques to expressive ends.

⁹⁰ As Maynard has explained: 'We cannot perceive something as skilfully or clumsily done unless we can identify the formative action as an intentional action: that is, known what was done in relation to what happened. The difficulty in identifying formative actions *as* actions in various kinds of photography is a main cause of misgivings regarding photography...' (2000, 289).

ii. Representational Communicative Art Forms

Both Scruton and Hopkins have argued that photography is not a representational art form because, by using strictly photographic processes, agents do not have sufficient control over the local details of the image to clearly convey their ideas about the subject independently of the object. It is important to highlight, that Hopkins nor Scruton denies that photographs can be artworks nor that photographs can be representational (note that this is different from “representational art form”). They have both acknowledged that photographs can present a point of view however, they have each maintained that this is only one part of the communicative process, which they have cast out in slightly different terms. For Scruton, the other part of the communicative process requires that the work create its own world through its narrative content. While Hopkins has clarified that a communicative representational art is one ‘that exploits the resources of representation to achieve artistically interesting communication of thought.’ (2015, 333) The conventions of the means of production Hopkins has argued, such as oil painting, need to be widely known in order to be communicative (2015, 335). Moreover, Hopkins has proposed that if viewers rely on background knowledge for an entire art form, rather than particular works, then it entails that ‘the art form’s own resources are not doing the communicative work.’ (2015, 337)⁹¹ In what follows I will examine the accounts of these theorists with a particular focus on what they each understand to constitute “strictly photographic means”. As I noted in the previous chapter, Scruton has argued that ideal photographs are purely causal, whilst ideal paintings are purely intentional,

⁹¹ It is also worth noting that Scruton has placed an even heavier burden on individual art works to convey the meaning of the work solely through the perceptible features of the work, as he has argued that the “inference” view of perception is incorrect (1981, 580). To which Davies, as a supporter of anti-empiricism, has responded: ‘the process of interpreting the expressive content of a *painting* is surely both perceptual *and* inferential, and requires that we relate observable details of the painting to a presumed history of making, in a given art-historical context, where manipulating pigment on canvas in a particular way can be taken to embody a particular way of thinking about the subject.’ (Davies 2009a, 353)

which entails that, for Scruton, the former kind of image is not ‘an interpretation of reality but [...] a presentation of how something looked.’ (1981, 588) Scruton himself has acknowledged that this approach does not necessarily reflect the reality of photography and painting (1981, 578) however, in discussing the ideal forms of these kinds, Scruton has been able to draw out what he believes to be the essential and distinctive qualities of a medium. Similarly, Hopkins has maintained that “authentic” photography is a form of causal, not intentional representation. In what follows, I will examine Hopkins and Scruton’s accounts, both of which I suggest inadvertently reveal the aesthetic significance of images that are made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques.

Hopkins has taken care to stress that he does not deny that photography can be artistically interesting, however he has caveated this by proposing that photography cannot be artistically interesting in one particular way, like painting can be, as a communicative representational art (2015, 330). Hopkins has proposed that there are four resources that agents may utilize to create a representation. The first of these resources are “content properties”, and due to the fact that there can be no pure content, Hopkins has called the second resource that delivers content “vehicle properties” (2015, 334). The third resource, which Hopkins has referred to as “interplay”, is the relation between content and vehicle properties, and the fourth resource is means of production (2015, 335). Representation, as Hopkins has proposed, is a means to communicative representational thought, and it is interplay, that is particularly effective at communicating thought, Hopkins has maintained, because by controlling vehicle properties independently of content, viewers will be able to ascertain what has been purposefully combined for representational communicative purposes (2015, 337-340). For instance, an agent may combine the arrangement of the words of a poem with the

content to produce interplay, as in the following example that Hopkins has given: ‘The sentences of a memoir capturing a child’s first faltering steps might lengthen with the forays they describe.’ (2015, 334) Thus, interplay in this example, is a representational resource, which can be utilized to communicate the progression of a child’s ability to walk independently. Hopkins has argued however, that this is a resource which photography ‘can tap only to a very limited degree’ (2015, 336), unlike painting however, which Hopkins has suggested exhibits all three of the following candidates for controlling the vehicle properties independently of the content: “content-determining properties”, such as lines that compose the picture; “local content-neutral properties”, such as the brush work; and “global content-neutral properties”, such as the size of the picture (2015, 337-8). It is the final candidate, Hopkins has suggested, for controlling vehicle properties that is independent of the content, which is within the authentic photographer’s control (2015, 338). Representational communicative arts, he has maintained, however exhibit all three methods of control. Hence photography, according to Hopkins, is not a communicative representational art.

Upon what grounds however, has Hopkins maintained that photographers are unable to control vehicle properties independently of content? Hopkins has proposed that authentic photography is constrained by its causal nature, which he has referred to as “imprinting” whereby: ‘some scene acts on some system in such a way that a picture is produced, where the content of the picture is determined, via a chain of mind-independent sufficient causes, by the nature of the scene.’ (2015, 331) Hopkins has not denied that imprinting is consistent with intervention but he has maintained that imprinting limits first-order control (2015, 333) as ‘intervention is limited to causing the causes to be as they are’ (2015, 331). Thus, agents are able to exert intentional control by for instance, deciding when to trigger the shutter, setting the length of exposure, and

aperture size, as in each of these cases Hopkins has proposed that ‘the photographer’s role might reduce to causing the underlying causal process to be as it is.’ (2015, 332) However, should agents intervene with the process by using methods, such as digital manipulation or photomontage, that are inconsistent with imprinting, then problems will arise, Hopkins has suggested, as viewers would have to be alert as to where the imprinting stops and the intervention of the artist begins (2015, 340).⁹² Thus, by maintaining that authentic photography is constrained by its causal nature, Hopkins has been able to claim that: ‘If the image is touched up in the darkroom or manipulated digitally in certain ways, or combined with others in photomontage, the resulting picture (at least as a whole) is not an imprint of the world.’ (2015, 332)⁹³ According to Hopkins, there are few vehicle properties in authentic photography which are local ‘and those there are display no variation independent of content.’ (2015, 339) Resultantly, Hopkins has maintained that photographs which are appreciated as communicative representational art are not instances of “authentic” photography.

Clearly, as the New Theory demonstrates, one need not hold such a conception of what constitutes “authentic” photography. Nonetheless, as I indicated in the previous chapter and as I shall explain in the next chapter, I think that Hopkins’ concept of “authentic” photography is more in alignment with how photography is generally appreciated by viewers. Should this raise significant concerns about the aesthetic potential of works that are made by e-dependent automatic techniques? No, I suggest, because this conclusion can be used to demonstrate that works which are made using e-dependent

⁹² Hopkins has added: ‘That control might lie at the shooting and processing end of the photographic process or at the printing and projecting end. If it lies at the former, the result will struggle to meet the demand for transparency. If [it] lies at the latter, we won’t have expanded authentic photography so much as supplemented it with a distinct art of printing or projecting.’ (2015, 340)

⁹³ Similarly, Scruton has proposed that if a photographer retouches some aspect of their photograph in post-production work, then they cease to practice photography and instead ‘become a painter’ (1981, 593-4).

automatic techniques tend to play to a different aesthetic strength and that recognizing this is key to the proper appreciation of works that are made using such techniques. Thus, I will not problematize Hopkins' account here, but instead, I will examine Scruton's conditions for representational art before examining what can be gleaned from these sceptical accounts. From this, I will build an account that details how agents utilize e-dependent automatic image-making techniques to create a different kind of aesthetically significant representation.

In *Photography and Representation*, Scruton made two claims pertaining to the kind of representation that photography was incapable of instantiating. First, he claimed that photography as a causal medium could not produce representations but instead pointed to the subject (1981, 589), which is a claim that Davies has termed Scruton's "not-PR" or "not Photographic Representation" argument (Davies 2009a, 342). Lopes has countered this argument by proposing that viewers take an aesthetic interest in photography as "a transparent medium" due to the way that they see the subject through the photographic medium, which face-to-face seeing cannot foster (Lopes 2003, 445). However, the not-PR argument was shown to be false by Scruton himself, when he acknowledged, towards the end of his paper, that photographs may 'be designed to show its subject in a particular light and from a particular point of view, and by so doing it may reveal things about it that we do not normally observe' (1981, 595). Scruton instead, claimed that there could be no photographic representational art, or the "not-PRA" argument (Davies 2009a, 342). Representational art, Scruton proposed, entailed that through the work 'the artist presents us with a way of seeing (and not just any way of thinking of) his subject' (Scruton 1981, 582), which requires that 'each and every feature of a painting can be both the upshot of an intentional act and at the same time the creation of an intentional object.' (Scruton 1981, 597) Consequently, Scruton has

maintained that ideal paintings do not necessarily have to represent an external object, as they stand in an intentional relation to the subject (1981, 578-9). Therefore, Scruton has argued that viewers are able to approach the subject of a representational work of art with a “contemplative” attitude (Scruton 1981, 585). This is because, Scruton has reasoned, paintings, unlike photographs, do not function as a surrogate for the represented object. Instead a representational work of art ‘is *itself* the object of interest and irreplaceable by the thing depicted’ (Scruton 1981, 586). It may be objected, that photographs such as Julia Margaret Cameron’s *The Passing of Arthur* (fig. 9.) do



(fig. 9.) Julia Margaret Cameron *The Passing of Arthur* 1875 (Accessed from: <http://www.getty.edu/art/collection/objects/58950/julia-margaret-cameron-the-passing-of-arthur-british-1875/>)

represent an intentional subject. However, while Cameron's photograph of the subject depicts a representation, Scruton has argued that this does not render such photographs themselves as representations.⁹⁴ Instead, Scruton has maintained that, due to its causal nature, photography serves as a non-essential mediator that can show the viewer representational acts (1981, 589). Consequently, according to Scruton, cases of what Lopes has called "cast photography", whereby a subject such as Cameron's King Arthur is represented through the medium of photography, are not aesthetically interesting as 'all that the photograph does is record the representation of S by O.'
(Lopes 2016, 60)

The real challenge then to Scruton's scepticism, Davies has argued, 'is to explain how the photographer can embody in her photograph not only her way of viewing the subject, but *that* this is her way of viewing the subject (2009a, 350). Both Davies and Friday (2002) have made style arguments, by proposing that viewers are able to see the agency of the photographer through their skills and selective judgement to frame, crop, and select how they wish their subject to be captured by the camera. All of which are decisions that have to be made in order to produce a photograph. Indeed, viewers can quickly become acquainted with photographic style by looking at the oeuvres of photographers such as Mapplethorpe or Cartier-Bresson.⁹⁵ As Davies has outlined, in Cartier-Bresson's work:

...the geometrical properties of the image immediately refer the viewer to the intentional agency of the photographer and to the expressive purposes that are manifest in the pictorial

⁹⁴ Likewise, Currie has argued that Cameron cannot 'represent-by-origin', intentional subjects such King Arthur or the May Queen, but that instead these figures are represented in Cameron's photographs by use. Conversely, a painting can represent these subjects by origin (Currie 2008, 273).

⁹⁵ As Maynard has pointed out photographers 'rarely make artistic impressions by single works.' (2012, 737)

composition. They indicate how the photographer intended the photograph to be viewed, the path that the eye is intended to follow, the way the subject is meant to be looked at. (2009a, 353)

Both painting and photography, Davies has maintained can be understood in terms of intentional activity and that ‘the noted difference pertains only to the ‘bare’ subject of the image, and not to the embodiment in the image of a thought about that subject.’ (2009a, 348)⁹⁶ This point concedes however, to Scruton’s argument that photographs necessarily represent external objects. It is also not a point that I will refute here. As I outlined in the previous chapter, the light image that is used to create the photograph is e-dependent and so to create an image by means of photographic events entails that an external object is necessarily involved in the production of the image. This however, I will explain in the next section, need not preclude the representation of an intentional subject. Like Davies, I maintain that a causal relation between the subject of the photograph and the image ‘does not entail that our interest in a photograph must be in its ‘bare’ subject.’ (Davies 2009a, 353) Unlike Davies, I will not try to maintain that this interest must be in communicative thought about the intentional subject. In order to demonstrate this however, I will need to take a brief historical detour.

iii. Automatism and the Representation of Reality

In what follows I will investigate the pre-photographic aesthetic scepticism towards automatic methods for creating images and also images of naturally-dependent subjects

⁹⁶ It is doubtful that Davies’ argument would satisfy Hopkins’ conditions (2015) however, but this need not impede the point that I shall make in relation to Davies’ account.

that were created in a highly realistic style.⁹⁷ As Kemp has highlighted, photography has suffered from similar criticism to earlier arts that made use of automatic techniques:

It is symptomatic of photography's place in this tradition that the responses to its invention and artistic potential should essentially be the same as those [...] with earlier systems of mechanical imitation. On the one hand there is delight and pride in the precision of the image; on the other there is distrust of its lack of humanity and ultimately, dismissed for its mindless lack of 'Art'. (1990, 220)

In order to establish the theoretical underpinnings of this scepticism, I will explore some of the most prominent sceptical views from historical figures including da Vinci, Hegel, and Baudelaire. This investigation will show that scepticism arose because verisimilitude and the use of e-dependent automatic image-making techniques were falsely thought to preclude the imaginative transformation of reality. Moreover, in some visual cultures, a hierarchy of subject matter placed greater value on the representation of historical, mythical, and biblical subjects, rather than the representation of everyday subjects including still life scenes, landscapes, and portraits. To demonstrate why the sceptical position is erroneous, I will examine a popular mode of representation in 16th and 17th century northern Europe, which Alpers has referred to as "descriptive" (1983) and I will also examine how this mode was revived in the naturalism of 19th century British art. I will outline why the descriptive mode and the representation of external objects could be considered properly artistic by those who adopted this way of picturing in order to convey visual experiences of naturally-dependent subjects, to express moral attitudes through the faithful representation of naturally-dependent subjects, and to

⁹⁷ It is important not to conflate automatism and realism. Costello for instance, has argued that 'automatism and realism are clearly independent: there are highly informative realist images (such as technical illustrations) rendered by hand, and automatic images that are so under- or over-exposed, blurred, or empty of incident (correctly exposed photographs of empty skies or clean sheets of paper) as to convey little or no information.' (2017a, 41)

imaginatively interpret reality. Furthermore, I shall argue that many photographers have created works to these expressive ends. While sceptics such as Scruton have maintained that the aesthetic goals of photographers such as Henri Cartier-Bresson and Diane Arbus, ‘presuppose that the photograph is transparent to its subject-matter’ (Scruton 2009, 451-2), I shall use this point to suggest that e-dependent automatic image-making techniques may be used to create a kind of aesthetic representation of reality that is distinct, but no less valuable, from that which is typically instantiated by manographic, or even i-dependent automatic image-making techniques.

Plato deeply disapproved of the imitative aims of artists (1997, 1199-1209) and this kind of aesthetic scepticism became increasingly prominent in Renaissance Italy due to the new artistic status of painting. What drove the transformation of this former craft into an art form was the humanist approach that came to characterize the ideals of the Renaissance. It was no longer enough to be a skilled manual worker, but intellect, imagination, and reason were also required to configure a work into an artwork.⁹⁸ Alberti proposed a hierarchy of subject matter in which historical, mythical, and biblical subjects were preeminent, due to the intellect required to interpret them and imaginatively compose a narrative, in pictorial form, based on them. The aim, of this mode of painting, was to create a work that visually approximated the world as God sees it (Koeppnick 2007, 9-10). Hence, to faithfully copy an existent subject without imaginatively transforming it, or to use an e-dependent automatic technique to create an image from life, was considered deeply unartistic by those working in Renaissance Italy. As da Vinci conjectured, the use of e-dependent automatic image-making

⁹⁸ From the early 15th century onwards “*invenzione*” was ‘at least for the West, the yardstick for measuring artistic creativity.’ (Bambach 1999, 82)

techniques, such as the glass or the veil, were thought to preclude skill and the intellectual and imaginative faculties that were considered key for proper artistry:

There are some who look at the things produced by nature through glass, or other surfaces or transparent veils. They trace outlines on the surface of the transparent medium ... But such an invention is to be condemned in those who do not know how to portray things without it, nor how to reason about nature with their minds ... They are always poor and mean in every invention and in the composition of narratives, which is the final aim of this science. (Da Vinci as quoted in Kemp 1990, 163)

As I outlined in the previous chapter however, i-dependent automatic image-making techniques were generally viewed more favourably by the Italians, as they enabled the representation of intentional subjects and still allowed room for the reasoned judgement of the artist's skilled eye.⁹⁹ Moreover, processes such as squaring and spolvero, which enabled the transference of designs and subsequent creation of modelli and cartoons, were considered valuable for aiding the process of creating a composition.¹⁰⁰ Such methods were not subject to aesthetic scepticism in Renaissance Italy because it was reasoned that copying, if transformative, could be a stage of the creative process (Cerasuolo 2017, 147).¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Palomino for instance, argued that tracing impeded the practice of drawing and advocated the use of the grid instead which was still thought to develop visual judgement and hand-eye coordination (Bambach 1999, 128).


¹⁰⁰ Cartoons were usually made to transfer the design onto the painting surface, but some cartoons were '...expressly made in order to delegate the execution of the painting from which then several replicas were made, such as the cartoon for Michelangelo's *Noli Me Tangere* and the *Venus and Love*' (Cerasuolo 2017, 169).

¹⁰¹ Armenini, for instance, defended the reuse of cartoons to be copied from: "I think that with skilled use, the work of others can be of profit, and without blame attached [...] as long as care is taken to introduce some changes and that these appear as if they were a product of their own imagination." (Cerasuolo 2017, 172) This for instance could be the turning a limb or changing drapery.

The hierarchy of subject matter, in many different visual cultures, for centuries after the Renaissance reflected the continued importance that was placed on the imaginative transformation of an intentional subject. In the 17th, 18th, and early 19th centuries for instance, portraiture and still life genres were considered inferior by many because they were considered imitative and therefore limited forms of representation. Still life painting for example, was seen as ‘a mimetic activity (*imitation*) and not an intellectual art based on ideas (*inventio*).’ (Sander 2008, 335)¹⁰² Moreover, this kind of representation entailed that rather than embodying a narrative that was intrinsic to the subject matter, the representational meaning was instead realized through the symbolism that was associated with the subject matter. The association of art with transformation did not dissipate in the 18th century, and it was conjectured that, in order to be considered representational, portraiture had to be transformative in some way.¹⁰³ As Brevern has highlighted, resemblance in portraiture since the Renaissance was not taken to be exactitude of the real, but the ‘*transformation of the real*.’ (Brevern 2013, 10) Despite this, sitters frequently demanded pictures that looked like them and so portrait painters generally did have to copy what was before them, hence the lower ranking of the portrait genre (Brevern 2013, 8). Contemporary thinkers thus found little artistic value in such faithfully rendered, highly realistic pictures. For example, in the 18th century, Hegel thought that the meticulous portraits of Balthasar Denner (fig.10.) comprised ‘a particularly daunting example of an overly exact style that, while representing every hair, every pore, and every wrinkle in a person’s face, failed

¹⁰² Sander has pointed out that Baroque theorists assigned further hierarchies, within the genre of still life, as: ‘They distinguished between the *trompe l’oeil* and paintings of live animals – which they conceded were more difficult – on the one hand, and depictions of motionless, minor things such as fruit, flowers, treasures, instruments, and musical instruments - which were considered simple – on the other.’ (2008, 335)

¹⁰³ In the 1760s, for instance, it was generally conceded that portraiture was essentially ‘mechanick’ as opposed to a liberal art, and a selfish genre which catered to the sitter’s personal vanity.’ (Solkin 1993, 180)



(fig. 10.) Balthasar Denner *Detail of Portrait of an Old Woman* 1720-1745 (Accessed from: <https://www.hermitagemuseum.org/>)

completely to represent the person.’ (Brevern 2013, 7) This disdain for exact likeness continued into the early 19th century when in 1804 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling ‘demanded that the portrait should not be the imitator, but the “translator” of nature.’ (Brevern 2013, 8) This attitude resurfaced when an exhibition of landscape pictures at the Salon of 1859 procured the criticism of Baudelaire, who wrote that copies do not produce art, but that ‘art must serve the imagination: a picture must be composed’ (Galassi 1981, 27-8).¹⁰⁴ In addition to this, the exhibition was the first Salon to include photographs, of which Baudelaire claimed that none could be art, as the medium did not

¹⁰⁴ Daston has pointed out that: ‘To “copy nature” was to forsake not only the imagination but also the individuality Baudelaire and other Romantic critics believed essential to great art...’ (2007, 131)

allow artists to compose their pictures and so ‘could never be a vehicle of the imagination’ (Galassi 1981, 28).

Contra Danto (1986), verisimilitude was clearly not the only central and progressive aim of visual art over these centuries, but also central to the development of visual arts was the imaginative transformation of the subject, ideally an intentional one, through the artist’s vision and their ability to represent and embody their ideas about this subject in an artwork. Not all visual cultures have shared these artistic aims however, as for instance Dutch artists in the 17th century have been described by Alpers as making “pictorial records or descriptions” (1983, 24), which can also be expressed as making artwork in the “descriptive mode”. Although largely dismissed by those working in southern Europe, who produced “narrative” pictures, at the time as unartistic, this mode of image-making has enjoyed multiple instantiations and increasing popularity over the centuries, having been practiced by artists including Caravaggio, Velásquez, Vermeer (fig. 11.), Courbet, and Manet (Alpers 1983, xxi).¹⁰⁵

Much of the divergence between the northern and southern schools of thought rested on disparate beliefs about the function of a picture and the pictorial positioning of the viewer in relation to this. In order to relay a narrative about an intentional subject to the viewer, the Italians created works in Albertian perspective whereby the picture was ‘a framed window to which we bring our eyes’ (Alpers 1983, 45). However, the 17th century Dutch found artistic value in representing the world as seen, rather than as preconceived, showing and reflecting reality, rather than telling stories. Hence, the emphasis for these artists was on, as Kepler at the time had discovered, the retinal

¹⁰⁵ For instance, Bernard Mandeville called for men to be judged by what they actually were and ‘condemned Italian art for misrepresenting the truth, for failing to measure up to the standards of honesty which the Dutch had shown that painting was capable of achieving.’ (Solkin 1993, 16)



(fig. 11.) Johannes Vermeer *The Art of Painting* 1668 (Accessed from: <https://www.khm.at/en/visit/collections/picture-gallery/selected-masterpieces/>)

image. For the Dutch then, who aimed to represent the experience of vision, this entailed that in their images: ‘the place of the eye with the frame and our location [is] left undefined.’ (Alpers 1983, 45)¹⁰⁶ Alpers has accordingly referred to narrative images as “Albertian” pictures and descriptive works as “Keplerian” pictures (Alpers 1983, 43-44). Furthermore, in order to produce Keplerian pictures, rather than composing a “perspectival” image (Alpers 1983, 32), those working in the descriptive mode purportedly used e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, such as optical devices, to represent a real scene in the world from an ‘uninterrupted field of potential

¹⁰⁶ This also entailed a difference in the use of perspective to make images. In contrast to those in the south working on “open windows” of monofocal perspective, those in north created images: ‘In Distance point construction [whereby] the picture takes the place of the eye itself – and leaves the frame and the viewer’s location rather undefined.’ (Koepnick 2007, 40)

pictures' (Galassi 1981, 16), much as photographers select what to capture from what is before them in the world.¹⁰⁷ Hence there are some clear parallels that can be drawn between this mode of picturing and many forms of photographic representation.¹⁰⁸

Friday has proposed that artists who created Keplerian pictures, which represented their visual experience of a naturally-dependent subject (2001, 355), created works that were representations of 'expressive perception' (2001, 359). Not all audiences however, found value in this form of representation.¹⁰⁹ This aesthetic scepticism was in part due to the fact that, as I have outlined, those in the south placed great emphasis on the value of imaginative transformation to produce an intentional subject, and also because many in the south took issue with the fact that artists in the north employed e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, such as optical devices, in order to produce their images. In particular, those in the south found that i-dependent automatic image-making techniques, such as the use of artificial perspective, were generally considered to be acceptable means to produce an Albertian picture. However, they considered the use of optical devices, such as the camera obscura, to be for those who were incapable of

¹⁰⁷ There is however, little in the way of evidence to state the point, that 17th century artists used optical devices, conclusively. There are however, anomalies in the way that such painters used to work, which would seem to support this theory. Caravaggio and Vermeer for instance, did not leave a single drawing and there are scarcely any underdrawings to be found on their canvases (Hockney 2006, 123; 147). Artists also seemed to be able to capture incredibly fleeting expressions. A contemporary criticism of Caravaggio's work was that he could not paint without any models, and this is certainly a parallel that we see in critics of photography as an art form (Hockney 2006, 49).

¹⁰⁸ Alpers has highlighted this link by noting that: 'Many characteristics of photographs – those very characteristics that make them so real – are common also to the northern descriptive mode: fragmentariness; arbitrary frames; the immediacy that the first practitioners expressed by claiming that the photograph gave Nature the power to reproduce herself directly unaided by man.' (1983, 43)

¹⁰⁹ As Reynolds stated for instance: 'The Italian attends only to the invariable, the great, and general ideas which are fixed and inherent in universal nature; the Dutch, on the contrary, to literal truth and a minute exactness in detail, as I may say, of Nature modified by accident. The attention to these petty peculiarities is the very cause of this naturalness so much admired in the Dutch pictures, which, if we suppose it to be a beauty, is certainly of a lower order, which ought to give place to a beauty of a superior kind, since one cannot be obtained by departing from the other.' (Solkin 1993, 254)

achieving the representation of pictorial space through the prescribed mathematical means (Alpers 1983, 32). Needless to say, this attitude was not shared in the north and this divergence in aesthetic attitude is rooted in social and cultural factors.¹¹⁰ As Kemp has pointed out ‘it is in such a context that the close use of a camera obscura by painters could become conceptually possible and could be regarded as relatively free from the stigmas of mindlessness or even of ‘cheating’’ (1990, 193). It should be apparent by this point however, that the charge of “mindlessness” is one that has survived through the ages and that a similar attitude has resurfaced in recent historical and contemporary scepticism.

What is not apparent however, is that artists who created descriptive pictures worked “mindlessly”. As Kemp has argued, the: ‘skill in constructing and using optical devices was highly valued in the periods with which we are dealing; and secondly that the use of a camera in no way prescribes the artistic choices to be made at each stage of the conception and making of a painting.’ (1990, 196) Similarly, the artist David Hockney has highlighted that while it may be the case that the optical images from which artists created their work may have influenced the appearance of the outcome as for instance, the introduction of strong chiaroscuro into paintings indicates strong light and shade which is necessary for optical projection (2006, 223), ‘optics do not make the marks; they cannot make paintings. Paintings and drawings are made by the hand.’ (2006, 17)¹¹¹ For example, it is now commonly held, among scholars, that Vermeer used e-dependent automatic techniques and devices such as the camera obscura to create his

¹¹⁰ It is telling, for example, to note that whilst other cultures enjoyed the use of the camera obscura to put on magic lantern shows and other forms of entertainment, the Dutch used them to present the world as it actually was (Alpers 1983, 13).

¹¹¹ Hockney has put forward the proposal, or the “Hockney-Falco” thesis, that from the 14th century artists used mirrors to project and trace images, and whilst there is no evidence to support this part of his thesis, he does discuss and assess the aesthetic impact of the less controversial claim that many artists used camera obscuras and camera lucidas to create their works.

work (Azab et al. 2014; Jelley 2013; Kemp 1990, 196; Steadman 2005; Sato 2010).¹¹²

This suggestion however, has not diminished the achievements of the artist, for it is clear that Vermeer's innovative use of technology and his ability to represent his perceptual experience, of seeing his subject through the lens, using paint is to be commended (Sato 2010, 107).¹¹³ Moreover, as Jelley has practically demonstrated: 'the only way to transfer and fix the images of arrested movement that we see in Vermeer's pictures would be by a slow, painstaking manual process.' (2013, 21).¹¹⁴

Whilst Vermeer created descriptive pictures that remained relatively faithful to the experience of the subject matter represented, it is by no means prescriptive that the use of e-dependent automatic image-making techniques to create descriptive works should necessarily result in images that completely reflect reality. In other manifestations of the descriptive mode, artists employed e-dependent automatic image-making techniques in

¹¹² Speculations that Vermeer used a camera obscura first appeared in an 1891 photography journal (Lefèvre 2007, 54) but the stumbling block for this thesis has been the lack of direct evidence; only the paintings themselves have served as any form of evidence. Steadman has proposed that Vermeer worked in a booth-type camera, whereby the back wall of the booth serves as a projection screen. In reconstructing the room, Steadman has argued that 'the paintings are the same size as the projected optical images because Vermeer has traced them.' (2005, 290) Not all agree however, that Vermeer would have been able to trace the entire image in one, but rather, 'his composition and approach to linear perspective could have been stimulated by [his] use of a small *camera obscura*.' (Azab et al. 2014)

¹¹³ Kemp for instance, has emphasized that the use of devices such as the camera obscura does not necessarily result in the production of a "mindless" or mechanical image, but necessitates a controlled series of aesthetic choices at every stage: 'That is why [Vermeer's] paintings, like great photographs, can be regarded as utilizing optical 'mechanics' for highly individualistic effects.' (1990, 196)

¹¹⁴ In her work, Jelley has explored how Vermeer may have used the tracings, which he created by using a camera obscura, to print on the canvas and create his paintings from. Using the camera obscura entails working in semi-darkness from an image that may also be upside down and inverted. Jelley has suggested that working in semi-darkness Vermeer could only have added colour to his paintings at later stages – something that scientific analysis of the different layers of his work supports and also a principle of painting which was generally advocated at that time. Hence, Jelley has speculated that Vermeer may have used a transfer technique that involved using paper saturated with oil. A tracing could then be turned the right way up and around and printed onto the canvas (2013, 25), which would then enable the artist to continue his work in the light directly facing his subject (2013, 25). This technique would leave no tangible evidence and Jelley has argued that 'the strength of this process lies in the fact it is incomplete, and that the painter's individuality and means of expression remain unfettered.' (2013, 43)

order to imaginatively interpret reality. For example, Canaletto used the camera obscura to faithfully trace buildings and scenes in cities, before stitching together impossible, but plausibly realistic viewpoints of cities such as Venice.¹¹⁵ For instance, in *Venice: The Rialto Bridge from the North* (fig. 12.), Canaletto moved the bridge to the left, in



(fig. 12.) Canaletto *Venice: The Rialto Bridge from the North* c.1726-27 (Accessed from: <https://www.rct.uk/collection/400668/the-rialto-bridge-from-the-north>)

order to show most of its width and he also turned the Palazzo by 90° to create a view of the bank of the canal (Royal Collection Trust). Indeed, many of Canaletto's famous views of Venice are falsified despite the fact that 'they seem to be true records' (Mitchell 1998, 188).¹¹⁶ In particular, the use of e-dependent automatic image-making techniques can enable image-makers who want to imaginatively interpret reality or convey visual experiences of naturally-dependent subjects, to achieve their pictorial aims more successfully.

¹¹⁵ Canaletto is possibly the most famous example of a painter who we have evidence to show used a camera obscura (Kemp 1990, 196).

¹¹⁶ As Mitchell has highlighted: '...scholars have shown that many of his views have no consistent coordinates in space and time and depict a Venice that never was.' (1998, 188)

In the mid-19th century in Britain, the descriptive mode was newly revived among contemporary artists and theorists. Ruskin, one of the most prominent art critics of the era, argued that all noble composition depends upon the ‘true perception of natural beauty’ which for Ruskin entailed that compositions had to be seen and seized, and that an artist should ‘never laboriously invent it.’ (1971, 210) Accordingly, Ruskin suggested that artists ‘have to show the individual character and liberty of the separate leaves, clouds, or rocks. And herein the great masters separate themselves finally from the inferior ones; for if the men of inferior genius ever express law at all, it is by the sacrifice of individuality.’ (1971, 116) Ruskin’s ideas on aesthetic matters were reflected in his attitude towards moral ones, and he explicitly extended his treatment of the former to the latter, arguing that ‘it would be a lamentable thing still, were it possible, to see a number of men so oppressed into assimilation as to have no more any individual hope or character...’ (1971, 117). Accordingly, Ruskin proposed that ‘it is only by the closest attention, and the most noble execution, that it is possible to express these varieties of individual character, on which all excellence of portraiture depends, whether of masses of mankind, or of groups of leaves.’ (1971-118-9) Although, as Ruskin admitted it was perhaps beyond the scope of artists to arrange compositions that represent every natural fact, he did however advocate that artists should also strive, in their work, to ‘give the impression of truth.’ (1971, 201-2)¹¹⁷ This was precisely the approach that artists correspondingly took and the most notable movement to uphold these standards, was that of the Pre-Raphaelites.

¹¹⁷ In light of this, Ruskin was thoroughly opposed to the use of certain automatic image-making techniques, such as the Claude glass, which was used in the 18th century as a popular device for darkening a scene in order to make the colours of a landscape appear more harmonious (Mitchell 1998, 94). Ruskin referred to the device as ‘one of the most pestilent inventions for falsifying Nature and degrading art which ever was put into an artist’s hand.’ (1971, 201-2) Ruskin has explained that he found the use of the Claude glass so reprehensible because rather than portraying the truth of nature, ‘the French landscape always gives me the idea of Nature seen carelessly in the dark mirror, and painted coarsely, but scientifically, through veil of its perversion.’ (1971, 202)

Although the Pre-Raphaelites did not use any automatic image-making techniques per se, ‘the stories about the Pre-Raphaelite artists insist that they were acting like photographic cameras, recording only what was there in physical substance before the eyes.’ (2007, 166) Rather than adopting e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, the Pre-Raphaelites sought to embody these processes of image-making through their own actions. As Pettejohn has highlighted: ‘The aim was to translate the eye’s perception to the canvas as directly as possible – with the minimum intervention of the brain. That meant sitting before the motif whenever paint was being applied to the canvas.’ (2007, 152) Further to this aim, the Pre-Raphaelites adopted a painterly technique that was employed by early Flemish oil painters – ‘the application of brightly coloured pigments stroke by individual stroke.’ (Pettejohn 2007, 145) This enabled the Pre-Raphaelites to, as Ruskin advocated, represent every particular and detail of the objects from which they were working. The visual effect is quite overwhelming as no one element of the composition is in greater detail than any other. Yet, despite the fact that the Pre-Raphaelites paintings do not visually resemble photographs, there is a ‘persistent habit of referring to Pre-Raphaelite art as ‘photographic.’ (2007, 166) This is most likely due to the fact that compositions, such as John Everett Millais’ *Portrait of John Ruskin* (1853-4), were designed to ‘prove to the spectator that the artist and sitter has ‘been there’...’ (Pettejohn 2007, 168). Pettejohn has argued that: ‘The comparison between Pre-Raphaelite art and photography holds because they share a distinctive approach to vision, not because they lack one.’ (2007, 136) Indeed, the various guises of the descriptive mode have, in more recent centuries, been successfully realized through the e-dependent automatic image-making technique, photography.

Although descriptive pictures are able to represent visual experiences and to meditate on the nature of perception, this mode of image-making, in all its various incarnations, is reliant on a naturally-dependent subject, in a way that narrative pictures, which communicate about an intentional subject, are not. However, this is only a negative thing if the narrative mode is held as the standard for all forms of picture-making.¹¹⁸ There is, I propose, a clear continuum between Hopkins' and Scruton's conceptions of representational art and the narrative mode. Much as the Renaissance Italians for instance, promoted the aesthetic value of compositions that instantiated the imaginative treatment of intentional subjects, Scruton has maintained: 'From the point of view of aesthetic interest, it is always irrelevant that there should be a particular object which is the object represented or, if there is such an object, that it should exist as portrayed' (1981, 591) and: 'The picture presents us not merely with the perception of a man but with a thought about him, a thought embodied in perceptual form.' (1981, 581) Hence, the recent historical and contemporary versions of the sceptical view are not vastly different to what preceded them. While Scruton, has taken the narrative picture to be the normative pictorial mode to create aesthetically interesting representations, Hopkins has highlighted that artforms, such as photography, instantiate a different kind of aesthetic interest (2015, 330). Given the fact that other pictorial modes, such as the descriptive mode, clearly exist and have been considered aesthetically valuable, it seems clear that aesthetic interest need not reduce to appreciating one specific kind of representational communicative act.

This has been the sentiment of many aestheticians over recent decades and there has been a marked shift from trying to find what different arts have in common to

¹¹⁸ As Snyder and Allen have outlined: 'Certainly "imaginary" scenes can be created by traditional art, but this does not mean that every painting, or even every good painting, is by definition totally divorced from "physical reality". Nor is it a fact that every photograph is inextricably mired in "the facts of the moment".' (1975, 163)

establishing the aesthetically significant respects in which they vary. Kivy for instance, dedicated his monograph, *Philosophies of the Arts*, to highlighting the pervasiveness of “wrong models” that threaten the proper appreciation of the different arts (1997, 29).

Specifically, and in relation to the normative persistence of holding the narrative picture as the aesthetically significant form of representation, Kivy argued that:

...the near hegemony of representation, or, to use Danto’s more inclusive concept, “aboutness”, as the defining theoretical concept has determined the ways we perceive, misperceive, or fail to perceive the individual arts in various pernicious ways. (1997, 53)¹¹⁹

In relation to this, Kieran has also provided support for the view that not all artmaking is centred around the Romantic ideal of the expression of artistic imagination (Kieran 2004, 33), stating that while:

Romanticism emphasized the creative role of the artist and demanded that art be the finest imaginative expression of the human mind. Taken as a view of what all art must be, or the doctrine that art should only be valued in such terms, it loses sight of much that we appreciate art for. (2004, 46)

From the foregoing, it should be clear that the narrative picture should not be the standard against which all visual artworks are judged against and that the expression of artistic imagination is not necessarily bound to a communicative act.¹²⁰ As such, while

¹¹⁹ Moreover, as Kivy has argued: ‘The notion that the mode of attention in which form and content, medium and message fuse is some special, favoured way of attending is just not in touch with reality.’ (1997, 110) As Kivy has highlighted, the viewer’s attention is not always focused on the medium and the message as one, but instead, their attention may flicker between the two (1997-110-1).

¹²⁰ As Kieran has suggested: ‘Actions we perform through which we intend to express our feelings, thoughts and attitudes need not have any communicative intent or thought for how others may respond. At least some works should be understood as the embodiment of just this kind of action.’ (2004, 35)

Hopkins has argued that photography cannot be used to communicative ends by employing the same representational means as paintings, even he has admitted that this does not necessarily preclude the use of photography alone to secure aesthetic interest. It is simply the case that photography and other forms of picture making that involve the use of e-dependent automatic image-making techniques frequently instantiate aesthetic interest in a different way to narrative picture making practices.

Scruton, I propose, is in some sense correct that part of the interest that is engendered in viewing a photograph is in the naturally-dependent subject, however I suggest that, as with other works made in the descriptive mode, it is the way that the naturally-dependent subject is presented to expressive effect, by a creative agent, which makes descriptive works aesthetically interesting representations.¹²¹ In fact, photography has been used very effectively to accentuate and distort reality to the end of expressive effects that can instantiate aesthetic interest in a photograph when, as Friday has proposed, ‘descriptions of the image employing the lexicon of critical metaphors and figurative language in general are the only means available to characterize interest in it.’ (Friday 2002, 101) Furthermore, this is a mode of representation that is distinctive of images that are created using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques. While one may conjecture here, that the Pre-Raphaelites, who sought to express moral attitudes through the faithful representation of naturally-dependent subjects, did not actually adopt e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, as I have characterized them, it is clear that many Pre-Raphaelite artists were highly dependent upon external objects in order to create their works. Thus, I maintain that the descriptive mode, while

¹²¹ As Singer has outlined, the cameras: ‘automatic function relies upon an intelligence beyond itself, a point of view that *tells* it how to perceive the world, a perspective that transforms reality by accentuating and even distorting its properties as required by the creative imagination.’ (1977, 42-3) Which Singer has suggested is the reason ‘why different photographers, using the same camera and stationed before the same reality, end up with different photographs.’ (1977, 43)

particularly suited to the use of e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, is not uniquely bound to the use of these techniques. Nonetheless, I do propose that typically the works of most aesthetic significance that have been made in the descriptive mode, have been made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques.

While I concur, with Scruton, that photographs necessarily represent external objects, what I propose that Scruton has neglected in his account is that photographs are not produced by a single snapshot at the moment of capture, but require processing in order to transform the photographic event into a photograph. While the light image is the cause of the photo-image, these are not the same thing, for as Wilson has argued, were an ideal photograph to stand in a merely causal relation to its subject it would be more akin to a tide-line on a beach (Phillips 2009b, 331).¹²² What the photograph primarily depicts then, may not always match the original referent and, as Wilson has highlighted, by specifying that a photograph shares a visual appearance with its object, Scruton ‘deliberately rules out of consideration the broader category of photographs whose appearance does not present immediately recognizable photographed objects’ (Phillips 2009b, 335), and in so doing, sets up a double standard between what can be represented in ideal painting and ideal photography, in particular with regards to fictive subjects (Phillips 2009b, 335). Wilson has instead proposed that the ‘appearance of the photograph does not lead the viewer to learn about the *appearance* of the photographic event’, but that instead, it allows viewers to learn about the photographic event. (Phillips

¹²² Costello and Wilson have argued that Scruton’s “ideal photograph” is actually just a light image which is ‘not to be confused with the photograph because, unlike a light image, a photograph does not remain counterfactually dependent on the scene it depicts.’ (Costello 2017a, 79) While I am sympathetic to this argument, I will however, argue in the following chapter that images made using photography, whose features do retain a high degree of visual similarity to the features of the external object, are typically what are appreciated as photographs.

2009b, 338)¹²³ From this, it follows that there can instead be many different photographs that are made based upon the same light image and ‘this is just one way in which photography’s representational qualities can be chosen and altered by the artist.’ (Kieran 2004, 10)¹²⁴ There are many different respects in which photography alone can be used to create aesthetically interesting works. I propose that agents typically use photographic technology as a means to create aesthetically interesting works that correspond to the various pictorial aims of historic agents who worked in the descriptive mode, including the aims to convey visual experiences of naturally-dependent subjects, to express moral attitudes through the faithful representation of naturally-dependent subjects, and to imaginatively interpret reality.

Thus, on some occasions, agents have used photographic techniques to convey their experience of a real subject, and to exaggerate or draw attention to the properties of the represented naturally-dependent subject. King for example, has highlighted that there are many photographic means that an agent may use to control how they represent their subject.¹²⁵ Looking at Ansel Adams’ practice he has proposed that ‘some photographs

¹²³ As Pettersson has pointed out: ‘photographs can present information about things of which they are not photographs. For instance, a cloud-like image in a photograph may present information about the fact (and, in some sense, even represent the fact) that light leaked into the camera, but without being a photograph of that fact.’ (2017, 266) Moreover, Charlesworth has conjectured that there is a second referent in photography, ‘an imaginary referent’ (2010, 141), which may bear no resemblance to the original, real referent (Charlesworth 2010, 143).

Consider, for example, photographs that are taken with unusually shaped lenses or using long exposures. In these cases, the viewer may struggle to see the original referent as depicted, but should still be able to detect and therefore imagine the original referent, which in these cases is, at the very minimum, light. For instance, the viewer can imagine a real horse in motion when they see the blurred photograph of one galloping, that was taken with a long exposure.

¹²⁴ Similarly, Wilson has proposed that the information which is registered during the photographic event, can be processed in a variety of ways that can lead to different images that ‘share in common a causal relation to one and the same photographic event.’ (Phillips 2009b, 339)

¹²⁵ King has also argued that Scruton’s account at best is applicable to photographs made as records and to one way of seeing photographs (1992, 258). He has cautiously noted however, that theorists must be careful in selecting examples to demonstrate that there are photographic ways to control the representation of a subject, as ‘some controls employed can pose a question about the nature of the result, namely, whether it remains a *photograph*.’ (1992, 261)

can be interesting in one way that paintings can be, namely, aesthetically interesting by virtue of the manner of representation.’ (1992, 264) Adams achieved this in multiple ways, including through the “Zone System”, a system of exposure which the photographer developed himself (King 1992, 263). Adams would “visualize” how he wanted the subject in the photograph to look prior to recording it photographically. This would then guide the exposure, development and printing of the photograph (King 1992, 263). For instance, Adams made use of a telephoto lens, orange filter, long development; and dodging and burning in the creation of *Moon and Half Dome* (1960) (King 1992, 264). Much as those working in the historic descriptive mode, could remain relatively faithful to the real states of affairs that they depicted yet draw out particular properties of the represented objects, certain photographic practices have enabled agents, such as Adams, to exaggerate and bring out the properties of, in this case, the moon and the landscape. Whilst it is frequently supposed that photographers are only capable of controlling global details in their work, Chadwick has pointed out that careful choices regarding depth of field, exposure, and lighting may enable photographers to ‘effectively remove fine detail from the resultant photograph,’ for example, in Bill Brandt’s *Nude* (1952) (Chadwick 2016, 107-8). In doing so, agents are able to focus on certain properties of the represented subject as is the case in Brandt’s photograph, in which the carefully composed forms of the face, arm, and breast of the nude figure are foregrounded.¹²⁶

¹²⁶ Chadwick has also maintained that a subject must exist in order to be captured photographically (2016, 109), and it is this, Chadwick has proposed that explains the aesthetic significance of photography and how it differs from representational painting. Specifically, Chadwick has argued that photographers are able, in effect, to have intentional control ‘over the *level of transparency* presented in the resultant photograph’ (2016, 110), which entails control over the ‘level of transparency in different parts of the same photograph, that makes representation in traditional artistic photography an *aesthetic* property, and furthermore, different from how it is in representational painting.’ (2016, 110) I will discuss transparency in Chapter Five.

On other occasions however, as I outlined in the previous chapter, agents have utilized e-dependent automatic image-making techniques to create the representation of an intentional subject from a naturally-dependent subject. While e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, such as photography, necessitate an external object this does not, I propose, prevent the representation of intentional, or fictional, subjects and states of affairs. Moreover, in such cases, the representation of an intentional subject is dependent upon the representation of a naturally-dependent subject and so, I propose that part of the fascination with such works is in how the artist has rendered an intentional subject from an external object.¹²⁷ Furthermore, there are multiple ways that this depictive dyad may manifest itself in an image. On occasion, as I discussed in relation to creative agency in the previous chapter, despite depicting by means of belief-independent feature-tracking, and as Lopes has highlighted in relation to works of cast photography, photographs may also have these two representational layers (2016, 59). In order to access the subject, Lopes has proposed that agents who make works in this art, ask their viewers ‘to undertake an appropriate act of looking’ (Lopes 2016, 63), as the photograph depictively expresses thought ‘even when it depicts only by belief-

¹²⁷ Other theorists have also made similar distinctions between naturally-dependent and intentional content. Currie, for instance, has argued that there is a distinction between ‘conceptual and nonconceptual content’ (1999, 290) and Abell (2010a) who, adopting a distinction that has been made by Lopes, has proposed that viewers can distinguish between primary and secondary subjects. Abell has used this distinction to argue that cinematic representation does involve primary depiction as ‘there are techniques that can directly affect the way the primary subjects of cinematic works are representational, without affecting the way in which their secondary subjects are represented.’ (2010a, 283) Such techniques may involve point-of-view shots (2010a, 284) or even editing the temporal sequence of the work (2010a, 286) – these techniques, she has proposed are uniquely bound in this way to the medium of cinema, a fact which she has argued is important because, as I have outlined, sceptics have argued that ‘independent representational art forms must provide artists with ways of intentionally controlling representational content independent of those provided by other art forms.’ (2015, 25) Although, I have demonstrated that this is an overly restrictive notion of intentional control, I do suggest that this account easily extends to photography and I propose that primary depiction in photography involves techniques such as long-exposure or solarization, which are uniquely bound to the medium of photography. For instance, by utilizing the photographic medium Berenice Abbott was able to create her warped self-portrait (1930) by moving the image around whilst exposing it, affecting the primary depiction of Abbott’s distorted self-image but not the secondary depiction of Abbott herself.

independent feature-tracking.’ (Lopes 2016, 64) However, on other occasions, photographers generate the intentional subject by means of photographic techniques that alter the appearance of the naturally-dependent subject. For instance, in order to represent Elton John’s eccentric persona and not simply his exterior appearance, Irving Penn used a long exposure to capture the movement of John in a still photograph (1997). This created a distortion of the features of the naturally-dependent subject that enabled Penn to fulfil his aim of representing the character of his sitter. Indeed, many photographers have challenged the assumption that photography must always reflect perceivable reality by using photographic techniques to create abstract images.¹²⁸

Countless photographers including Paul Strand, Man Ray, Walead Beshty, and Alvin Coburn have imaginatively reinterpreted reality by using novel photographic techniques to represent intentional subjects and states of affairs. For example, Coburn ‘shot what he called Vortographs (fig. 13.) through a system of mirrors and prisms, creating an effect like a kaleidoscope.’ (Rexer 2009, 57)¹²⁹ In doing so, Coburn created representations of intentional subjects in virtue of representing naturally-dependent subjects, which is, I suggest, what lends such works their aesthetic significance.

What I have shown in the foregoing, is that e-dependent automatic image-making techniques are used in certain image-making practices to create aesthetically interesting representations in the descriptive mode of picturing. The various pictorial aims of this particular mode of picturing include the conveyance of visual experiences of naturally-

¹²⁸ Gottfried Jäger and also Walead Beshty have advocated that the terms “concrete” or “constructive” photography should be used for abstract photography (Rexer 2009, 18).

¹²⁹ Another example of a technique to generate intentional appearances was a type of lens attachment called the “variable controllable distortograph”, which was patented in 1927 by the English photographer Herbert George Ponting. He described it as “a revolutionary optical system for photographing in caricature or distortion.” (Fineman 2012, 105)



(Fig. 13.) Alvin Coburn *Vortograph* 1916-7 (Accessed from: <https://www.moma.org/collection/works/83725>)

dependent subjects, the expression of moral attitudes through the faithful representation of naturally-dependent subjects, and the imaginative interpretation of reality to expressive ends. Moreover, this is a mode of picturing that is distinctive of images made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, due to the fact that works made in the descriptive mode necessarily represent external objects. While works that are made using manugraphic and i-dependent automatic image-making techniques can also represent external objects, they need not necessarily do so. Hence, the descriptive mode is a method of picturing that is particularly well-suited to works that are made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques. For this reason, I maintain that e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, such as photography, are not fictionally-competent in the same sense as manugraphic and i-dependent automatic

image-making techniques.¹³⁰ However, agents working in the descriptive mode can instead represent intentional subjects through the use of image-making techniques that alter the appearance of the naturally-dependent subject. In sum, while photographs are made with a higher degree of automaticity than most manugraphic images, this does not suppress the imaginative transformation of reality and intentional control of the photographer as has been supposed in much philosophical work on photography.

iv. Conflating External Object Dependent Automatic Techniques and Manugraphic Techniques to Aesthetic Ends

As I have outlined in this chapter, according to Hopkins, Mag Uidhir, and Scruton, using solely photographic means to create an image precludes the possibility of creating, in their respective terms, a communicative representational artwork, a substantively intention dependent artwork, and an aesthetically significant representation. In order to produce a communicative representational artwork, Hopkins has proposed that photographers have to resort to image-making techniques that are inconsistent with imprinting, such as digital manipulation, which will result in “inauthentic” photographs (2015, 340). Likewise, Mag Uidhir has proposed that in order to make a substantively intention dependent artwork, agents must combine some features from another art sortal with the photographic medium to produce works of “photography-plus” (Mag Uidhir 2013, 105). And similarly, Scruton has proposed that to create aesthetically significant representations, agents have to resort to adopting the ‘aims and methods of painting’ (1981, 578), which in turn results in the production of non-ideal photographs.¹³¹ In each of these cases, the sceptics have argued that the

¹³⁰ Likewise, Cavendon-Taylor has defended the fictional incompetence of photography and cinema by arguing that the camera itself cannot generate the representation of fiction (2010, 148).

¹³¹ As Costello has highlighted: ‘We can and often do, take such an interest in non-ideal cases,

viewer takes an aesthetic interest in the non-photographic medium. This I suggest, is wrong. In this chapter, I have demonstrated that viewers can and do take an aesthetic interest in photographs qua photographs, however there are some instances I propose, such as particular “inauthentic, non-ideal photography-plus” cases, where viewers actually take an aesthetic interest in the conflation of the different media that are constitutive of the artwork.

Scruton, for instance, proposed that artists such as Henry Peach Robinson, who used compositing techniques to create their works, essentially created paintings except for the fact that the work ‘employed photographic techniques in the derivation of its figures.’ (1981, 594) Importantly, Scruton conjectured, in parenthesis: ‘Of course the fact of their *being* photographs might be aesthetically important.’ (1981, 594) I suggest that in this case, Scruton is in fact correct to suggest that artists such as Robinson were adopting the ends and means of painting to create their works and that the fact that they used photographic techniques in order to do so is of aesthetic importance. Robinson for instance, advocated that photographers should take influence from the conventions of painting and intended viewers to appreciate his photographic composites in light of this (Harker 1989, 134; Talbot 2017, 158). Hence, as I shall explain in the next chapter, the aesthetic significance of Robinson’s work lies in the artist’s deliberate conflation of painting and photography. This point however, brings me to a worry about the New Theory. As I explained in the previous chapter, the New Theorists have significantly expanded the range of image-making processes that count as photographic and accordingly what counts as a photograph. This, I suggest, may make it significantly

and these comprise the vast majority of actual photographs, by Scruton’s own admission. The problem with the deflationary responses is that they unwittingly abet aesthetic skepticism about photography. Whatever enables us to take an aesthetic interest in the non-ideal cases, it cannot be the fact that they are photographs.’ (2017b, 440)

more difficult to discern when different media, or automatic and manographic techniques, have been combined to a specific end, in order to draw upon the particular qualities that are associated with certain media and arts, and should actually be appreciated in virtue of this.

As a radical New Theorist, Lopes, for instance, can accept photorealistic paintings as photographs or more specifically, photographs that have been made by painting (fig. 14.).¹³² Furthermore, Costello has suggested that a consequence of the kind of



(fig. 14.) Gerhard Richter *Self-portrait* 1996 (Accessed from: <https://www.gerhard-richter.com/en/art/paintings/photo-paintings/portraits-people-20/self-portrait-8184/?&categoryid=20&p=1&sp=1000000>)

¹³² As Costello has pointed out that ‘the fact that [the] Richter paintings originate in photographic events (they are painted from photographic sources), mean that the paintings count as photographs for Lopes.’ (2016, 144)

permissive New Theory that Lopes has proposed is that there are no constraints on the amount of processing that an image could be subjected to, provided that it originated in the photographic event.¹³³ For example, he has conjectured that: ‘a photograph of the Eiffel Tower may be manipulated to the point of resembling the Taj Mahal. But what could it mean to identify such an image as “a photograph of the Eiffel Tower”?’ (Costello 2017b, 446) Indeed, this would be problematic. However, this is not the issue that requires addressing, for Lopes’ account does not suffer from the problem that Costello has attributed to it, as Lopes has proposed an informational account, whereby: ‘A photograph is an image rendered by making marks *based on input* from a recording of information about a light image of a scene.’ [Emphasis mine] (2016, 87). In order to produce an image of the Taj Mahal from a photograph of the Eiffel Tower, one must manipulate the photograph to the extent that it becomes comprised of marks that have not taken input from a photographic event, hence the image does not actually constitute a photograph. Yet a problem does remain with radical New Theory. Specifically, in the case of photorealistic painting, which does require information from a photographic event, it is not clear why the photographic medium takes precedence when, as I outlined in the previous chapter, the practice is dependent upon combining different arts to new aesthetic ends. Consequently, in the following chapter I will explore when it is aesthetically relevant to identify, and to profitably appreciate the contribution of, or conflation of different arts.

¹³³ Without belief-independency, Costello has questioned: ‘What is to stop the photographer from applying one image-rendering process after another to an image that, because it originated in a photographic event, continues to count not only as a photograph but perhaps also as a photograph of what was before the camera?’ (2017b, 446)

Chapter 3: Automaticity and the Appreciation of Hybrid Arts



(fig. 15.) Gerhard Richter *Betty* 1988 (Accessed from: <https://www.gerhard-richter.com/en/art/paintings/photo-paintings/children-52/betty-7668/?&referer=search-art&title=betty&p=1&sp=32>)

Gerhard Richter created the work *Betty* (1988) (fig. 15.), by projecting a photograph of the artist's daughter, taken ten years earlier, onto a canvas and painting over this projection in oils. Can *Betty* plausibly be identified and adequately appreciated as a photograph? In accordance with the permissive claims of New Theorist, Lopes, the answer is yes, given that the mark-making processes used to produce the image took input from a photographic event which, for the New Theorists, is the only fundamentally photographic element of photography. A particular benefit of the New

Theory is that a greater range of mark-making activities are accounted for as photographic, which entails that a greater range of works count as photographs than have been permitted by the Orthodox Theorists and the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists. There are some worries I have however, about accepting certain works, such as *Betty*, as photographs. First, it appears that the photographic aspect of such works is given precedence over the other media that also contribute to the production of the work. This is problematic, given that the spirit of the New Theory is to adequately characterize how artists make use of particular media, in this case photography, to fulfil their intentions and produce works of art.¹³⁴ Second, it is not clear, that the permissive claims of New Theorists, such as Lopes, will be of benefit to viewers, for instance how will a viewer profit from appreciating *Betty* as a photograph? As a result of these concerns, in this chapter, I will use the principles behind Jerrold Levinson's account of hybrid art forms to put pressure on the New Theorists' permissive claims and to build a classificatory framework that will enable viewers to distinguish between different kinds of arts that have evolved or involve, or are influenced by other arts. This, I suggest, will enable viewers to establish when it is aesthetically relevant to identify, and to profitably appreciate the contribution of, or conflation of arts. Moreover, by facilitating the viewer's appreciation of the contribution of, or conflation of, arts in different works, my account will also enable viewers to ascertain when the use of automatic image-making techniques or manugraphic image-making techniques is relevant to the appreciation of an artwork.

In section i. I will examine the different strands of the New Theory, by focusing on the revisionist accounts of Atencia-Linares, and Wilson; and the radical account of Lopes. I

¹³⁴ Both Costello (2017a) and Lopes (2016), have placed emphasis on the artistic potential of photography in their respective work, and as Atencia-Linares has highlighted, the title of Lopes' book *Four Arts of Photography*, suggests that 'one of the aims, if not the main aim of Lopes' book is to account for various ways in which photography may become art.' (2018, 218)

will outline the different claims of each of these theorists as to what processes constitute photographic means, with a particular focus on Lopes. I will highlight certain works that, as a consequence of their claims, the New Theorists are able to accept as photographs, before explaining how certain cases may prove problematic to the spirit of the New Theory. In section ii. I will examine the role of medium in art production and appreciation in order to ascertain when it is appropriate to acknowledge the contribution of other media as distinct from the photographic process. Lopes himself has proposed a medium-centred appreciative account, which I will focus on to inform my investigation. In doing so, I will demonstrate that identifying and appreciating certain works, such as *Betty*, as ‘photographs completed by painting’ (Lopes 2016, 90) or ‘paintings and photographs’ (Lopes 2018, 228) is inadequate. To provide a solution to this I will use the principles behind Levinson’s account of hybrid arts to demonstrate that such works plausibly belong to hybrid arts and are profitably appreciated as a hybridization of arts, such as photography and painting in the case of *Betty*. Following this, in section iii., I will draw upon Levinson’s account to build a classificatory framework that will enable viewers to distinguish between different arts that have evolved or involve, or are influenced by other arts. This, I will demonstrate, shall enable viewers to identify when the contribution of multiple arts to the production of a work is aesthetically salient and moreover when it is profitable to appreciate the use of automatic image-making techniques. In section iv. I will highlight how new and unfamiliar digital technology can cause difficulties in making these distinctions, which has led to uncertainty about the identity of certain digital works. Consequently, I will apply the classificatory framework, that I develop in this chapter, to examples of such cases to demonstrate how to appropriately identify and profitably appreciate the following: new digital hybrid arts that involve photography; digital arts that are influenced by photography and; arts and hybrid arts, involving photography, that pre-exist the digital age, but that have evolved

to incorporate digital technology. Finally, in light of the classificatory framework that I will develop in this chapter, I will conclude that the New Theorists may wish to revise some of their permissive claims in order to avoid mischaracterizing and inadequately appreciating certain kinds of works as photographs.

i. The New Theorists' Permissive Claims

The New Theorists, as I highlighted at the end of the previous chapter, are able to accept a wider range of works as photographs, than either the Orthodox Theorists or the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists. Significantly, they have proposed that the non-intentional element of photography should be shrunk to the photographic event which, they have argued, is the only fundamentally photographic component of photography. This alone however, is not sufficient for the creation of a photograph, and so consequently other processes have to be used in order to materialize the photographic event and create a photograph. As I have highlighted in Chapter One, Wilson and Atencia-Linares are both generally restrictive, while Lopes is permissive, about which processes can be used to create a photograph. Resultantly more works count as photographs for Lopes, than for Wilson and Atencia-Linares, as I will now outline in detail.

The photographic medium, for Wilson, consists of objects and light sources. Wilson has proposed that photographs are necessarily the products of photographic processes, which requires that there be:

i) proximity between photographed objects and a photo-sensitive object, ii) a photographic event and iii) the production of a photograph or photo-object. (Phillips 2009a, 11)

As I outlined in Chapter One, Wilson has remarked that all photographs are mind-independent “photo-images”. Wilson has specified that photo-images result from natural processes, for example sun-bleached patterns on wooden surfaces, that are harnessed by human design to create photo-objects that display complex photo-images (Phillips 2009a, 12). However, Wilson has proposed that some photographs, in addition, are also mind-dependent “photo pictures”, whereby through skill and imagination, photographers control the photographic process to create a picture which supervenes on their intentions. Furthermore, as I outlined in the previous chapter, Wilson has accounted for the photographic representation of fiction by proposing that the appearance of a photograph enables viewers to learn about the photographic event, but that this need not necessarily correspond to the appearance of this event and the objects that are involved in it (Phillips 2009b, 338). While Wilson’s account does not appear to permit anything radically different from what may normally be considered a photograph, there are some exceptions. For instance, Heather Ackroyd and Dan Harvey’s *Green brick, green back* (2004) (fig. 16.), was produced by exposing negative photographic images on a growing wall of seedling grass, resulting in walls of grass that displayed patterns corresponding to those in the negative image (Rice Gallery).¹³⁵ The process adhered to all of Wilson’s stipulated steps and furthermore, was the result of the artists’ intentions, meaning that the resultant grass was a photo picture.

In a similar spirit to Wilson, Atencia-Linares has maintained that strictly photographic means consists of the following:

¹³⁵ It should be noted that this was not any ordinary form of grass: ‘Genetics researchers developed a grass that keeps its green colour longer, allowing the artists to maintain the visibility of the image over a longer period of time as the grass dries.’ (Ritchin 2010, 8)



(fig. 16.) Heather Ackroyd and Dan Harvey *Green brick, green back* 2004 (Accessed from: <http://www.ricegallery.org/ackroyd-harvey>)

Any action or technique performed or taking place during the production of an image, including the stages of transduction [transforming the latent image from the photographic event into the visible, patent image] and storing [fixing the pattern created by the patent image], that consists solely in the exploitation, manipulation, or control of the incidence of light on, and its interaction with, a photosensitive material. (2012, 22)¹³⁶

¹³⁶ It is also worth highlighting that in its present form, Atencia-Linares applies her account largely to analogue forms of photography as she has maintained that it is more difficult to discuss digital manipulation because it frequently conflates post-production processes and also uses means other than recording and projection of light (2012, 22). For instance, adjusting the contrast in Photoshop is a parallel process to controlling the amount of developer and exposure time or contrast in the analogue method however, one can do this at any point in the process, after for instance retouching some of the image, which might count as an instance of post-production.

Costello however, has argued that by foregrounding the action of light to determine what constitutes photographic means, Atencia-Linares has failed to recognize that a whole host of processes also take place in the darkroom, ‘including not only the manipulation of light, but control of chemical reactions through the use of accelerants, inhibiting agents, and temperature’ (Costello 2017a, 85-6), which are integral to the production of a photograph. Yet, Atencia-Linares’ account is not as arbitrary as Costello has suggested that it is. As Atencia-Linares has later clarified, in response to Costello’s claims, there is no reason why such processes could not count as photographic means on her account, as the use of masking agent, for instance, ‘could be described as a process that controls *the interaction* – or the effect – of light with the photosensitive material *during the process of transduction.*’ (2018, 220)¹³⁷ Hence, for Atencia-Linares, photographic means may include actions or techniques such as the use of a flashlight to draw on a photosensitive surface, given that this is a form of drawing, that plays a ‘role in the manipulation or interaction of light with photosensitive material.’ (2018, 220) To this effect, other photographic means include the use of a template to selectively mask parts of the image and multiple exposures. Consequently, to use the example that Atencia-Linares has given, Wanda Wulz’s *Io + Gatto* (1932) (fig. 17.), which sees the photographer’s face combined with a cat’s, was created through strictly photographic means as two negatives were superimposed on one sheet of photographic paper (Fineman 2012, 161-165). Other composites could also be made by strictly photographic means, in accordance with Atencia-Linares’ account, provided that no physical cutting of the photographic elements occurs. Notice however, that the word photograph has yet to be mentioned in relation to Atencia-Linare’s account. This is because, as I indicated in Chapter One, she has proposed that ‘one of the marks of the

¹³⁷ Atencia-Linares has noted that there is a long history within analogue photography whereby editing and working on prints is an integral part of the photographic process (2012, 21).



(fig. 17.) Wanda Wulz *Io + Gatto* 1932 (Accessed from: <https://www.moma.org/interactives/objectphoto/artists/24577.html>)

New theory is to put emphasis on *the photographic process* rather than on finding a *definition of what a photograph is.*' (2018, 217) Hence Atencia-Linares has argued that her account was descriptive, not prescriptive as: 'describing what counts as (representing by) *photographic means* is a separate and different issue from proposing what counts as a photograph. There is no implication from one thing to the other.' (2018, 221-2) Despite this caveat, Atencia-Linares has defended the notion that images such as *Io + Gatto* are photographs and should be appreciated as such (2012, 22-3).¹³⁸ Moreover, while Atencia-Linares has argued that to evaluate *Io + Gatto* 'as a painting

¹³⁸ Not all theorists have been sympathetic to this argument. Pettersson for instance, given his premise that photographs are traces, has proposed that *Io + Gatto* may depict Wulz as a catwoman but it is not a photograph of a catwoman 'as there simply is no catwoman that could *cause* the image and on which the image could depend.' (2017, 264)

would be to miss the whole point of the picture' (2012, 23), as I highlighted at the end of the previous chapter, historically artists who created photographic composites took influence from the conventions of painting, and intended their viewers to appreciate the works in light of this.¹³⁹ Thus, although it would clearly be incorrect to appreciate works such as *Io + Gatto* as paintings, would it be beneficial for viewers to appreciate such works as products of a photographic and painting practice? Before answering this question, first I will examine some of the works that radical New Theorists have categorized as photographs.

In turning the question away from “what is photography”, back to “what is a photograph”, Atencia-Linares has argued that radical New Theorists, who have responded to the latter question, have ‘straitjacketed necessary and sufficient conditions [which] is more a regress than a progress.’ (2018, 223) Regardless of whether this methodology is less progressive than the radical New Theorists had hoped, Atencia-Linares is correct in identifying that radical New Theorists such as Lopes have been very forthcoming about what a photograph is. In particular, Lopes has proposed that:

A photograph is an image output by a mark-making process taking input from an electro-chemical event that records information from a light image of a pro-photographic scene. (2016, 81)

Importantly, this permissive definition allows Lopes to maintain that mark-making processes including drawing, painting, or manipulation in the darkroom or on Photoshop, provided that input was taken from a photographic event, can contribute to a

¹³⁹ Indeed, Atencia-Linares has acknowledged that Wulz worked in a tradition that is descended from that of pictorialist photographers such as Henry Peach Robinson (2012, 29 n.20). However, Atencia-Linares has not discussed the relation between the photographic practices developed by these artists and painting.

strictly photographic process (2016, 97).¹⁴⁰ In accordance then, with Lopes' permissive account, a significantly greater range of works count as photographs, including digitally processed works, such as Loretta Lux's images of children, for example *The Dove* (2008) (fig. 18.), which she created by combining photographs and paintings using digital editing processes, and also works such as those in Helena Almeida's series *Study for Inner Improvement* (1977) (fig. 19.), in which the artist painted over the top of photographs of herself in a rich blue pigment to create narratives by seemingly interacting with the paint (2016, 91). The most radical admission however, by Lopes is the proposal that works, such as Richter's *Betty* count as photographs under his brand of New Theory.¹⁴¹ Given that the information from a photographic recording guided Richter's bodily movement to mark a surface, Lopes can accept Richter's work as 'both a photograph and a drawing' (2016, 85). Lopes has accordingly described the nature of this kind of work in various terms, for instance, on one occasion Lopes has remarked that *Betty* is 'literally a photograph - one completed by painting.' (2016, 90) Yet, on another, more recent, occasion Lopes has referred to Richter's work as "photorealistic painting", which Lopes has proposed entails that the work should be appreciated as 'paintings and photographs – as painted marks capturing information from a photographic event.' (2018, 228) It would, I think, be remiss to appreciate Richter's work solely as a photograph and, as I have just outlined, this does not seem to be the approach that Lopes recommends either. However, of the other ways in which Lopes

¹⁴⁰ Lopes has suggested that the beauty of the proposal is that 'any mark-making process counts as photographic as long as it stands in the right relation to a photographic event.' (2018, 228)

¹⁴¹ Lopes' admission that *Betty* counts as a photograph has attracted a lot of attention from aestheticians. Abell, for instance, has highlighted that the permissiveness of Lopes' view 'seems to be borne out by his subsequent discussion of Richter's *Betty* and his claim that it is a genuine photograph.' (2018, 212) While Atencia-Linares has proposed that photorealistic paintings, are better appreciated as paintings and that the 'radical new theory conceives of as photographs things that clearly fall, and are better appreciated in, other categories.' (2018, 224)



(fig. 18.) Loretta Lux *The Dove* 2008 (Accessed from: <https://www.torchgallery.com/loretta-lux/the-dove.html>)



(fig. 19.) Helena Almeida *Study for Inner Improvement* 1977 (Accessed from: <https://www.anothermag.com/art-photography/2924/helena-almeida-study-for-inner-improvement>)

refers to the work, I suggest that there is one way in particular that is to be preferred.¹⁴²

Consider the first option, that *Betty* is literally a photograph that has been completed by painting. This could easily be read as giving precedence to the photographic aspect of the work over the other medium, painting, that has also contributed to the production of the work. Yet, such works are usually categorized as paintings by professional bodies and viewers alike. Could it be that painting is only a contributing factor to the production of such works? I suggest that this option is problematic, but that the second option however, whereby works such as *Betty* are referred to as photorealistic paintings does foreground the fact that the work is a combination of both painting and photography, and that both of these media have made important contributions to the identity of the work. This, I suggest, captures the idea that, as I outlined at the end of the previous chapter, sometimes artists choose to combine the qualities and practices that come from other media, to specific aesthetic ends which, in order to understand and appreciate the work, requires acknowledging the fact that distinct media have been purposefully combined. For instance, as I outlined in Chapter One, artists such as Richter frequently choose to conflate painting and photographic practice in order to bring out the tension between automatic and manographic image-making processes and in doing so, to explore the role of the artist as an author. Moreover, given that Lopes defends a medium-centred appreciative approach, there is, I suggest, good reason for

¹⁴² Other theorists, such as Costello, have suggested that a possible approach to make Lopes' view more intuitive is that an image with photographic origins that has not preserved the information from the photographic event, such as a photograph that has been painted over, should not count as a photograph but that 'its photographic origins continue to bear, by virtue of its title, on its appreciation as a painting nonetheless.' (Costello 2017b, 447) This however, as Costello admits does not create the radical New Theory that Lopes seeks. Abell however, has proposed Costello's suggestion, that the 'photographic origins continue to bear, by virtue of its title, on its appreciation as a painting' (Costello 2017b, 447) should be endorsed, as it allows the New Theorists to accommodate abstract photography and precludes the possibility that other counterintuitive examples may be counted as photographs (Abell 2018, 213). In what follows, in a similar spirit to Costello and Abell's proposals, I make my own alternative suggestion as to how such works may be most profitably appreciated.

him to prefer this particular approach to identifying the work. This being said, as I shall demonstrate in the following section, there are compelling arguments to motivate the conclusion that works such as *Betty* should be recognized, not only as photorealistic paintings, but as belonging to a hybrid art, which is a notion that Lopes does not appear to have embraced (2016, 96-7). Moreover, I propose that this strategy can be extended to provide a principled basis to determine when a work is no longer adequately categorized as a photograph, as radical New Theory may otherwise allow. Given this, I will examine the role of medium in art production and appreciation in order to ascertain when it is appropriate to acknowledge the contribution of other media as distinct from the photographic process.

ii. Medium-Centred Appreciation

There are many philosophers, including Davies (2005), Gaut (2010), and Lopes (2014), who defend the view that artists (at least partly) achieve their objectives by working in accordance with practices that are specific to certain media and that this fact should be taken into account in order to adequately appreciate artworks.¹⁴³ It should be noted that each of these theorists has used the term “medium” to refer not only to materials, such as oil paint or graphite pencil, but also to methods that govern the use of materials, such as painting or drawing.¹⁴⁴ Lopes has used the terms “resource” and “technique” respectively, the former of which includes not only material stuff, but also symbolic resources or events (2014, 138-9).¹⁴⁵ Some methods can be carried out using different

¹⁴³ Moreover, this approach reflects actual critical practice. Art critics, for instance, make frequent reference to the fact that artists face certain challenges and restrictions within the medium that they choose to work in (Davies 2005, 187).

¹⁴⁴ Smith, who has defended a medium-involving account of appreciation has similarly stated that ‘medium’ refers both to material substance and process (2006, 142).

¹⁴⁵ Gaut has similarly suggested that ‘one should allow that some material is not physical, but symbolic, made of signs – lexical signs in the case of literature or numerically constituted bitmaps in the case of the digital image.’ (2010, 289)

materials, for example painting can be done by using watercolours on textured paper, or by using paint and wet plaster on a ceiling. Likewise, some materials can be used in culmination with a range of methods, for example canvas can be stretched over a frame and painted on, or it can be cut and stitched together to make a bag. Given my focus in this chapter, I will primarily examine Lopes' medium-centred appreciation account in order to ascertain when it is appropriate to acknowledge the distinct contribution of other media and why Lopes, given his medium-centred appreciation account, may profit from recognizing certain works as hybrids.

In *Beyond Art*, Lopes argued that a theory of art is mistaken and that really a theory of individual arts, such as painting or music, is needed to account for what makes certain entities *artworks*. Specifically, his account amounts to the following:

x is a work of K , where K is an art = x is a work in medium profile M , where M is an appreciative kind, and x is a product of M -centred appreciative practice P ... (2014, 153)

Medium then, is an important factor that contributes to a work's status as belonging to a certain art however, in contrast to the accounts of the sceptical theorists that I have examined in the previous chapters, Lopes has stressed that each art does not have a unique medium but rather that each art is individuated partly by its *medium profile* (which is a non-empty set of media), and that arts with different profiles may share some media in common (2014, 139-140). Top-down and bottom-up strategies, Lopes has recommended, can be coordinated to help develop theories of the arts, as 'the goodness properties of an art's media partly determine the goodness properties of the art itself.' (2014, 142) Different goodness properties can parse between different appreciative kinds, including arts and non-arts, which entails that media do not distinguish between works of art and non-art, but rather 'the fact that they are products

of different practices.’ (Lopes 2014, 148) Hence, it is not simply the development of new materials and methods that can lead to the formation of new arts, but rather it is the development of new practices that can give rise to new arts.¹⁴⁶ In particular, Lopes has remarked that ‘most if not all of the arts are appreciative practices with implicit constitutive rules.’ (2014, 149) For example, in *Four Arts of Photography*, Lopes identified that there are many arts of photography including classic photography, cast photography, lyric photography, and abstract photography. However, in addition to sharing a medium profile, as I highlighted in Chapter One, both classic and cast photography share the norm of depicting by belief-independent feature-tracking. Nonetheless, this norm is utilized and appreciated to different ends in these practices and so the classic and cast traditions represent different arts. In relation to this, it is worth highlighting that classic and cast photography, in addition to being arguably some of the oldest photographic practices, are the most typical kinds of photography, as practiced more broadly. Hence, many of the defining features of photographs, such as the depiction of one spatio-temporal scene and not depicting fictional entities are derived from the norms that govern these practices. Nonetheless, lyric and abstract photography are practices that now receive a lot of attention in contemporary art.

Lopes has proposed that works of lyric photography, such as *Betty*, are made in: ‘a practice whose defining norms are to make photographs that thematize processes of image-production and then to appreciate them with this goal in mind.’ (2016, 99)¹⁴⁷ A

¹⁴⁶ For example, Gaut has argued there are robust grounds to claim that the introduction of digital cinema is a new art because the new means, including Computer Generated Imagery (CGI), that are used to create films carry new conventions that are capable of producing films which realize qualities, that would not have been possible to achieve using analogue media (2010, 305-6).

¹⁴⁷ Moreover, lyric photographs play – ‘with the qualities of the light image and the rich potentiality of mark-making...’ (Lopes 2016, 87). It is worth noting that Lopes has pointed out that *Betty* is ‘not a paradigm of lyric photography in the book’ but that instead it is photographers including Mosse, Yass, and Ruff who motivate the central premise of the New Theorist’s proposal (2018, 228).

medium-centred appreciative practice then, will have norms that refer to the medium of the appreciative kind, which Lopes has specified may involve being true to the item, or true to the kind. Specifically, artistic appreciations may go astray, Lopes has conjectured, unless they conform to one of two general norms:

A practice, *P*, is *M*-centred either (1) if it is a constitutive norm of *P* not to appreciate a work as a work in *M* unless the work is a work in *M*, or (2) if it is a constitutive norm of *P* not to appreciate a work as a work in *M* if that appreciation counterfactually depends on any belief that is inconsistent with the truth about what it is to be a work in *M*. (2014, 159)

Only one of these norms need be satisfied, yet the appreciation of a work may still be adequate. For example, as Lopes has remarked, ‘some art practices involve the deliberate yet adequate appreciation of non-*Ks* as *Ks*’, as in the case of landscape architecture where it is standard to appreciate some landscapes as paintings (2014, 157). Whilst other art practices may involve the deliberate, yet adequate appreciation ‘of *Ks* against the background of a misunderstanding about the nature of *Ks*’ (Lopes 2014, 158), an example of which Lopes gives is Savedoff’s claim that viewers have misplaced confidence in the veracity of photographs. Specifically, Savedoff has argued that viewers:

...do experience photographs differently from paintings and that the critical demands of the two media diverge [...] Whether it is warranted or not, we tend to see photographs as objective records of the world, and this tendency has a far-reaching influence on interpretation and evaluation. (2000, 49)

Accordingly, Lopes has suggested that viewers profit from appreciating photographs in this way and so rather than revise any beliefs about photographs, viewers instead violate

the second norm (2014, 158). Here it is worth noting, that while some of the norms, of practices, that govern the typical use of the photographic medium would seem to be in accordance with Savedoff's conjecture about objectivity, such as the depiction of one spatio-temporal scene and not depicting fictional entities, it is still not the case that these defining features of photographs guarantee objectivity or truthfulness.

Moreover, photography, by Lopes' theory, may not be the only kind that is adequately appreciated by violating the second appreciative norm. As I outlined in Chapter One, Lopes has emphasized that drawing and photography are not mutually exclusive kinds (2016, 85), by proposing that drawing imbricates photography, as drawing can also instantiate belief-independent feature-tracking. It would appear however, that the appreciative practices of drawing and other manugraphic arts do not reflect the concept that drawing can instantiate belief-independent feature-tracking, given for instance, the work of Walden (2012), and Cohen and Meskin (2008), who have outlined the divide in viewer's beliefs between the mental involvement of agents in drawing and photographic practices.¹⁴⁸ Moreover, as I discussed in Chapter One, there are many different ways that automatic techniques are used in art practices, including drawing and painting practices, that are traditionally thought to be entirely manugraphic. A consequence of the use of certain kinds of automatic techniques is that many drawings, and other works that are categorized as manugraphs, are created by some degree of belief-independent feature-tracking. Given however, that drawing and painting practices are generally conceived of as manugraphic, and so intention dependent with respect to both feature-tracking and mark-making, it would appear that such works are adequately appreciated by flouting the second norm, much as photographs are adequately appreciated by flouting the second norm. Moreover, if misconceptions about the nature of art kinds,

¹⁴⁸ More about which I will say in the following chapter.

such as photography and drawing, are as widespread as theorists, including Savedoff, Walden, and Cohen and Meskin, have suggested then it seems that frequently, it is the first norm that is required to be satisfied for the adequate appreciation of artworks.¹⁴⁹

This, I suggest, is also true of works such as *Betty*, which are made using both photographic and painting processes to the effect that they are profitably appreciated by flouting the second norm. Specifically, given the nature of the production of this work, which involved belief-independent feature-tracking, to appreciate the work as a painting, as Atencia-Linares has suggested (2018, 223), would entail that the second norm is flouted, which in turn would require viewers to be true to the item in order to adequately appreciate *Betty*. Likewise, to appreciate *Betty*, as a photograph, would require viewers to be true to the item, given that viewers generally have misplaced confidence in the veracity of photographs and so flout the second norm. Before elaborating on how the first norm is satisfied for the adequate appreciation of *Betty*, and works like it, I will further explain why is profitable for viewers to appreciate *Betty* against a background of misunderstandings about both painting and photography as individual arts.

Atencia-Linares has argued that, although works, such as *Betty*, do meet Lopes' criteria for what counts as a photograph:

...in the vast majority of the cases (i) their authors are willing to call their pictures paintings, (ii) the critical practices consider them as belonging to a subcategory or a style of painting and [iii]

¹⁴⁹ It is also worth noting that artists are generally quite perceptive of viewers' misconceptions of the nature of art kinds and that they frequently capitalize on certain, inaccurate preconceptions that viewers hold, as I will explain later on in this chapter.

it makes much sense – in these cases – to appreciate them as paintings than as photographs.
(2018, 223)

However, it is not clear that appreciating the works as paintings only, will be profitable for viewers, given that works such as *Betty* are the result of a particular painting and photography-centred practice that has been developed by Richter and others.¹⁵⁰ This well-established practice, which I discussed in Chapter One, is identified by artists, critics, and viewers as “photorealistic painting”. As I explained in the previous section, in his most recent work on the topic, Lopes himself has suggested that photorealist paintings, which are made by meticulously copying snapshots, should be appreciated as paintings and photographs (2018, 228). Lopes has argued that: ‘After all, we fail to appreciate them as photorealistic until we take account of their snapshot origins. The norms of the practice of photorealism give the photographic process appreciative relevance.’ (2018, 228) Given the foregoing, this is a point that is well taken and indeed, Lopes has taken great care to contrast photorealistic painting practice ‘with the practice of a painter like Cézanne, who used photographs as painting aids’, because it is clear in such cases, as Lopes has explained, that ‘no norms of Cézanne’s practice give the photographic process appreciative relevance.’ (2018, 228) Those who practice photorealistic painting however, as I explained in Chapter One, tend to make works that question the role of authorship and the distinction between objective and subjective image-making methods.¹⁵¹ In particular, artists, such as Richter, have capitalized on the common, but misinformed idea that photography constitutes an objective medium, while painting represents a subjective medium to create a tension between the two arts in the works. In order to access the meaning of these works then, photorealistic

¹⁵⁰ Richter himself refers to these works as “Photo paintings”.

¹⁵¹ Lopes has suggested that, to this end: ‘Richter paints to make photographs because there is a mode of painting that cancels the conventions of the traditional, thought-saturated practice of painting and repels the urgings of personal experience.’ (2016, 91)

paintings, are profitably appreciated with these common misconceptions, that respectively flout the second norm, in mind.

Moreover, photorealism is not the only practice in which artists have capitalized on the background of misunderstandings about the nature of particular arts, in service of their creative ends. Almeida for instance, in her series *Study for Inner Improvement* took advantage of the fact that performance art is generally conceived of as being a live event in order to make a point about the position of women in art. Specifically, in order to explore ‘the conflicting roles of woman as artist and model, subject and object’ (Mahon 2009, 13), Almeida created a series of works in which she purposefully mixed the flat, high contrast photographic document that depicted her performing actions and the tactile, expressive gestures of the paint to both enhance and cover the performative aspect of her work (Mahon 2009; Sardo 2015, 59-60).¹⁵² Specifically, by capitalizing on the fact that performance is typically conceived of as a live event, Almeida demonstrated, in her painted photographs, how women have historically been restricted to performing as objects. The foregoing entails then, that the works are profitably appreciated by flouting the second norm. Furthermore, many of the other artists who created the works that I highlighted in the last section, have specified that they were flouting some kind of appreciative norm in order to achieve their artistic intentions. For instance, by utilizing the beliefs that viewers have about the divide between the representation of particulars and types in photography and painting respectively, Lux created works, by digitally combining paintings and photographs, which took on the uncanny appearance of both painting and photography in order to create “a reality that differs from what I find in memory and imagination” (Stoll 2004, 70). Hence, the

¹⁵² Almeida herself stated that photographs as the documents of performances were most influential on her practice (Mahon 2009, 19).

meaning of these works are realized by the artist's decision to take advantage of misconceptions about the nature of photography, which is associated with memory and particulars, and painting, which is associated with imagination and types. Thus, it is profitable to appreciate these works, by flouting the second norm.

This then, gives us the theoretical tools to reconsider the identity of *Betty* and other works like it. As I have explained, given that works such as *Betty* are profitably appreciated by flouting the second norm, it follows that in order to adequately appreciate *Betty*, viewers need to meet the first norm, being true to the item. Is the first norm met then, by appreciating *Betty* as a painting or as a photograph? It does not seem so in either case, for the following reason: that the creation of these works necessitates both photography and painting (Meisel 1989, 13). While radical New Theorists such as Lopes can in principle accept these works as photographs because 'painting, drawing, and print-making can be stages in genuinely photographic processes' (Lopes 2016, 97), consider the fact that photographs can be created without any painting processes whatsoever. Painting can certainly contribute to a genuinely photographic process however, it is not necessary to paint in order to make a photograph. Conversely, note that it is not necessary to work from an electro-chemical event in order to create a painting. Hence, the medium profile for *Betty* necessarily includes both photography and painting, which is not the case for either of these arts individually. While Lopes has proposed that '[New theory] explains how photorealism is not ordinary painting: photorealistic paintings are essentially products of photographic processes' (2018, 228), I propose that these photorealistic works are essentially products of both photographic and painting processes and so, are most profitably appreciated as hybrids of photography and painting. Hence, in order to satisfy the first norm, the works should

not be appreciated as works of photography or as works painting, but as works of, what I propose is, a hybrid art: photorealistic painting.

Lopes himself has proposed that many of the photographs that he discusses in *Four Arts of Photography* are hybrids, in that they contain properties from each of the four arts of photography (2016, 35). Moreover, he has explained that taking the strategy, as he did in *Four Arts of Photography*, of isolating these arts enables theorists to ‘identify hybrid cases as hybrids’ and to ‘pinpoint how ingredients drawn from different arts contribute to the overall flavour of the masala.’ (2016, 35) However, while Lopes has proposed that the ‘four arts combine with each other to serve up many more arts’ (2016, 127) it is not clear that Lopes has suggested that works such as *Betty* should be appreciated as hybrids. I am certainly not the first, to suggest that such works may be hybrids and as Lopes has highlighted, lyric photographs have been described as ‘hybrids of photography and some other art’ (Lopes 2016, 96) by those who maintain that the essence of photography is belief-independent feature-tracking, entailing that ‘Richter’s photo-paintings and Almeida’s documentations are hybrids of photography and painting.’ (Lopes 2016, 96). Although I am sympathetic to the spirit of New Theory, I propose that there are reasons to suggest why it is not necessarily belief-independent feature-tracking that is what makes such works hybrids.

As I have argued, the medium profile for *Betty*, and works like it, necessitates both photography and painting, which is not the case for either of these arts individually. Moreover, artists, such as Richter, have, in creating works such as *Betty*, challenged one of the norms of photography, whereby photo-objects are produced by processes that involve light and photographic technologies, by using the materials and techniques of painting to create an entire photo-object. Additionally, in doing so, this has challenged

one of the norms of painting which typically does not see artists working entirely in accordance with the output of electro-chemical events in order to produce paintings. By combining photography and painting in this way, I suggest that the essence of these works lies in the fact that they function as objects that frustrate identifying the works as either paintings or photographs. It could be argued that proposing to identify these works as hybrids is merely a terminological distinction however, if the foregoing is correct then it would follow that it is inadequate to appreciate *Betty* and works like it as a photograph completed by painting or as a photograph and a painting. Consider the following analogy to further demonstrate why identifying such works as hybrids, rather than paintings and photographs is a more suitable approach: the spork is a form of cutlery that takes on the functionality of both a fork and a spoon. The goodness properties of the spork are derived from its joint spoon and fork heritage, and moreover the defining features of the fork are challenged by the defining features of the spoon and vice versa. It would not only be highly counter-intuitive to identify the spork as a spoon completed by a fork, but also wrong as this may imply that the goodness properties of the fork kind are not as relevant as the goodness properties of the spoon kind in appreciating the kind spork, which they clearly are, given that both kinds are necessary for the creation of the features specific to the spork. Likewise, it would be incorrect to identify the spork as a spoon and a fork, given that the appreciation of the goodness properties of the spork differs from the appreciation of the goodness properties of a spoon or a fork. Although it can be helpful to compare the goodness properties of the spork to the goodness properties of the spoon and the fork, the appreciation of the goodness properties in the spork differs from the appreciation of the goodness properties in either of the individual kinds, spoon and fork. Moreover, although the spoon and the fork may share some features, such as a handle in common, given that one of the defining features of the

spoon, its rounded edge, has been challenged by one the defining features of the fork, its prongs, it makes far more sense to identify the object as a hybrid of the two.

Analogously, it would be wrong to identify a photorealistic painting as a photograph completed by painting because the goodness properties of a photorealistic painting are derived from its joint painterly and photographic heritage. It would also be wrong to identify a photorealistic painting as a photograph and a painting because this fails to capture the development of the practices and properties that are specific to the kind photorealistic painting. Whilst the viewer's understanding of the work may be aided by comparing a photorealistic painting to a painting and a photograph, adequate appreciation of the kind is dependent on appreciating the goodness properties within the context of a practice that is specific to photorealistic painting. Furthermore, although painting and photography may share some features such as, according to Lopes, belief-independent feature-tracking, given that one of the defining features of a photograph, the typically almost imperceptible feature that upon close inspection may reveal film grain or pixels for instance, has been challenged by one the defining features of painting, painterly feature, it makes far more sense to identify the object as a hybrid of the two. Likewise, in the case of Almeida's works in the series *Study for Inner Improvement*, the defining feature of a performance, the live event, has been challenged by one of the defining features of a photograph, the static nature of the image. Moreover, in this case, the defining features of the performance and the photograph, have also been challenged by one of the defining features of painting, painterly feature. While Lopes has acknowledged that: 'Almeida is working within a performance tradition' and that rather than serving as mere documents of her performance, the works are used to actively 'explore the idea of identifying a performance with an image or series of studies' (2016, 91), he has also maintained the claim that, Almeida's works in

this series are photographs, or more specifically, photographs made partly by drawing (2016, 91). This is because, according to Lopes: ‘it is only the photograph of Almeida painting blue paint onto the silver halide print that represents the identification of making with the product made.’ (2016, 91) Yet, I propose that it is of greater profit to identify and appreciate the works as hybrids, which is not ‘to refuse the proposition that the silver halide print overpainted in blue is the outcome of a single act of making a photograph partly by drawing’ (Lopes 2016, 91) but rather to recognize that, in her work, Almeida combined performance with photography and painting in order to produce works that challenged one of the defining norms of performance art in order to manifest the meaning of the work.¹⁵³ Hence, I propose that ‘Richter’s photo-paintings and Almeida’s documentations are hybrids of photography and painting’ (Lopes 2016, 96), not in virtue of belief-independent feature-tracking, but as a consequence of the fact that these works have medium profiles and appreciative practices that differ from any of the arts that are combined individually. I suggest then, that the appreciation of works, such as photorealistic paintings, involves appreciating the work as a combination of K_a and K_b , which amounts to appreciating the work as K_c , not K_{ab} , or as the product of a hybrid art kind.¹⁵⁴

Hence, unlike other arts, photorealistic paintings and other such kinds do not question the art of photography from within the art itself. For instance, in *Beyond Art*, Lopes suggested that certain “hard cases”, or cases whereby a work does not seem to belong to

¹⁵³ Mahon has also identified these works as hybrid: ‘The liveliness of performance gives way to a new, hybrid, liveness of form: far from a document, the spectator finds him or herself before a new visual exercise which defies any privileging of the real.’ (2009, 11)

¹⁵⁴ Carroll has described the combination of ‘two or more heretofore distinct styles or genres’ as hybridization (2003, 222), and the importation of ‘strategies, aims, and values from one artistic tradition (not necessarily of one’s own culture) into another’ as “artistic interanimation” (2003, 223). Although I am using the term hybridization in relation to medium-centred practices, it is worth noting that Carroll has suggested that strategies, that involve hybridization, are used by artists for creative inspiration, as well as to rejuvenate their traditions (2003, 223).

any art kind, such as John Cage's *4'33"* do in fact belong to a familiar art. In this specific case, despite not fitting our concept of music, Cage's *4'33"* "questions the art of music from the inside" and in doing so, Lopes proposed, 'compels us to seek a better theory of music' (2014, 192). In *Four Arts of Photography*, Lopes has taken a similar strategy with *Betty* and other works that are not traditionally identified as photographs. Using the challenges that such works present to the sceptic's argument (2016, 20), he has built an inclusive theory of photography and comprehensive accounts of the different arts of photography. There is no doubt that in some respects works, such as *Betty*, are created to question the arts of photography, however it is not clear, as I have explained, that they do so "from the inside" as Lopes may be willing to grant that they are. As I have highlighted and as Lopes has emphasized, *Betty* was created by painting on a support in accordance with an existing photographic image. Is this comparable to the strategies of artists such as Cage who question arts from within? In *4'33"* the musician does not play their instrument, in order to magnify the incidental sounds of the room. Not playing an instrument however, is a technique that is employed routinely in music, for instance to add dramatic pauses; in this case what differed was the duration and isolation of this technique. Hence, no resources or techniques from other arts were involved in this case, and so, while an extremely unusual case, the work did indeed question music from within. This is not the case with works such as *Betty* however, as I have demonstrated in this section that the first norm, being true to the item, is not met for the adequate appreciation of such work as a photograph nor as a painting. Instead, artists who create works, such as *Betty*, question the arts of photography and painting from within a different kind of art, photorealistic painting. Moreover, in these cases, the purposeful combination of different media and practices is intended to be perceived by viewers.

As I highlighted earlier in this section, there are certain norm of practices that govern the use of the photographic medium, which have entailed that a static image, typically almost imperceptible facture, the depiction of one spatio-temporal scene, and not depicting fictional entities have come to be defining features of photographs. However, here I would like to stress that not meeting a norm of photographic practice, does not in itself entail hybridity. For instance, photographs that are made using a long-exposure may depict a spatio-temporal scene as it appears over several hours, and hence does not depict any one spatio-temporal scene. Rather, I propose that what constitutes a hybrid, is when these defining features of the art are challenged by other arts (Levinson 1990, 33). For instance, by digitally combining paintings that she had made with photographs that she had taken, Lux created hybrid works that enabled her to depict types, rather than particulars, by utilizing painting to challenge one of the defining features of photography. While there is nothing to stop drawing and painting from constituting genuinely photographic means, I propose frequently it is the case, that when the resources and techniques of drawing and painting are used in the creation of works that involve photographic events, it is for the purpose of conflating different image-making practices to specific aesthetic ends, which for instance may require the viewer to note the distinction between the manugraphic and automatic processes that are (albeit falsely) believed to be exclusive to painting and photographic processes respectively. Thus, I propose that it is important to carefully determine what item a work is if it is profitably appreciated by flouting the second norm given that, as I have demonstrated in this section, the meaning of a work may have been realized within and thus profitably appreciated as a work that belongs to another, but related, kind of art. Furthermore, I encourage Lopes to continue identifying works, such as *Betty*, as photorealistic paintings, rather than photographs completed by painting, but I also suggest that there are compelling reasons to identify photorealistic painting as a hybrid art. This approach,

I propose, not only correctly captures the identity of works such as *Betty*, but is, as I have demonstrated, also the most profitable way to appreciate such works.

The foregoing should not be taken to deny that artists can make use of the photographic medium in a variety of ways and to a number of different ends. Moreover, some of the norms of photographic practices that I have outlined, should not be taken as an ontology for photographs, as I propose that these artefacts are incredibly more varied than such norms suggest, but as a guide to indicate what kinds of features have come to define photography, as broadly construed, and how these may be modified by combining photography and other arts. Lopes has remarked that disagreement does not surround whether lyric photographs are works of art, but rather ‘whether they are hybrids that do not inherit their art genes from their photographic lineage, or whether they are purebred photographic art.’ (2016, 98) The aim here is not to deny that photography is a properly artistic practice, which is a view that I have defended in the previous chapters. In the case of many lyric photographs however, I propose that the art lies in the conflation of different kinds that leads to goodness properties and appreciative practices that differ from those in the individual arts that are combined, and that these can only be adequately appreciated by identifying such works as hybrids. As such, in the next section I will examine in depth how to identify when the contribution of multiple arts to the production of a work is aesthetically salient, which will entail exploring in greater depth what a hybrid art amounts to, and what impact this may have on the identity and appreciation of certain works that, according to the New Theorists’ claims, are photographs.

iii. What are Hybrid Art Kinds?

There are hybrids of course, of course, like hand painted photographs, where testimony and trace are literally superposed. (Currie 1999, 287)

Photomontages are collages made with photographs, and collages are plausibly regarded as a ‘hybrid’ art form, comprising elements of photographic and handmade methods of picture making. (Cavedon-Taylor 2013, 288)

Walton’s commitment to natural counterfactual dependency has consequences very similar to Scruton’s commitment to causality when it comes to combination prints or digital montages. Because both take photography to depend, as a matter of definition on its sources, such images may at best be understood as hybrid or special cases [...] They may be pictures comprised of photographic parts, but they cannot be photographs simpliciter. Again, not so according to new theory. (Costello 2017b, 450)

Hybrid arts have frequently been mentioned in philosophical discussion surrounding photography, however this is not something that any theorist has ever treated in great depth. I will attempt to remedy this by using Jerrold Levinson’s detailed framework for “hybrid art forms” (1990, 26-36), which I will henceforth refer to as hybrid art kinds in accordance with Lopes’ account of individual art kinds, to build a classificatory framework that will enable viewers to distinguish between different kinds of arts that have evolved or involve, or are influenced by other arts.¹⁵⁵ This, I will demonstrate, shall enable viewers to identify when the contribution of multiple arts to the production of a work is aesthetically salient and moreover when it profitable to appreciate the use of automatic image-making techniques. In doing so, I will primarily focus on applying

¹⁵⁵ It should be noted that the change from art forms to art kinds does not make any difference to the salient details of Levinson’s account.

this classificatory framework to cases of photography as the issue of identification and appreciation is so contentious in relation to works made using this medium.

Levinson has proposed that ‘an art form is a hybrid one in virtue of its development and origin, in virtue of its emergence out of a field of previously existing artistic activities and concerns, two or more of which it in some sense combines.’ (1990, 27) Levinson has also specified that pre-existing artistic media can contribute to the status of an art as a hybrid one, however Levinson has specified, in a similar spirit to Davies, Gaut, and Lopes, that “medium” entails ‘a developed way of using given materials or dimensions, with certain entrenched properties, practices, and possibilities.’ (1990, 29) To this effect, Levinson has identified multiple ways in which arts may be hybridized, three of which he has discussed in his account: juxtaposition, fusion, and transformation; and he has also distinguished between two sorts of overall effects that hybrid artworks achieve – “integrative” and “disintegrative” (1990, 35). Fusion and transformation hybrids usually instantiate integrative effects, as the different arts that form the hybrid artwork, in these categories, become indistinguishable, creating a richness and complexity that head towards a new common end. While juxtaposition hybrids usually instantiate disintegrative effects as the different arts that constitute the hybrid artwork, in this category, are discernible from one another leading to a lack of cohesion that is necessary for the aesthetic significance of the work as a hybrid. More specifically, hybrid art kinds in the juxtaposition category contain works which have elements from different art practices that are present in the juxtaposition hybrid in their original form, hence why the different arts in this kind of hybrid may be analysed independently from one and other. Whilst they tend towards a disintegrative effect, the whole is the focus of the work rather than the sum parts taken individually (Levinson 1990, 31). Examples of

hybrid arts in this type include collage, and also “Combines” that were initially created in 1954 by Rauschenberg (fig. 20.), and later by Jasper Johns and Louise Nevelson.



(fig. 20.) Robert Rauschenberg *Untitled* 1954 (Accessed from: <https://www.rauschenbergfoundation.org/art/series/combine>)

In this particular hybrid kind, arts are juxtaposed, including sculpture and painting (Schimmel 2005, 211), to elevate the status of the ordinary objects that the artists incorporated into the works.


By contrast, in Levinson’s fusion and transformation categories, it is usually the case that the different arts form an integrative effect so that ‘some *essential*, or *defining*

feature of one or both arts is challenged, modified, or withdrawn' (1990, 33). In the case of hybrid art kinds in the fusion category:

...the objects or products of two (or more) arts are brought together in such a way that the individual components to some extent lose their original identities and are present in the hybrid in a form that is significantly different from that assumed in the pure state. (Levinson 1990, 31)

Examples of such hybrid art kinds include stop-motion animation, opera, and concrete poetry. Concrete poetry for instance, conflates visual art and poetry to convey and realize metaphorical and textual meaning through the arrangement of words (Meyer 2017). Levinson has claimed that while works in the transformation category are closer to those in the fusion, they differ in that the 'arts combined do not contribute to the result in roughly the same degree.' (1990, 32) He has used the example of kinetic sculpture (fig. 21.) to illustrate this, and suggested that 'the result could not reasonably be called an instance of dance, even in the extended sense – though of course it might be so *metaphorically*.' (Levinson 1990, 33) In this case then, Levinson has proposed that sculpture has been transformed by dance.

Before going any further, I will first suggest some amendments to these categories as, given that Levinson stated that the different arts that are hybridized in the transformation category do not contribute to the same degree, *prima facie* it seems that Levinson expected that the arts combined in the other categories contribute in equal measure. This idea however, is not persuasive, given that for example, a large painting may juxtapose a small section of collage work, as in many works of cubism (Ades 1986, 12). Resultantly, I suggest that in all hybrid categories the contribution of different arts is variable and that works may be hybrids to different degrees, dependent upon the nature of the artwork and the aims of the creative agent. Following this, as the



(fig. 21.) Alexander Calder *Antennae with Red and Blue Dots*, c1953 (Accessed from: <https://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/calder-antennae-with-red-and-blue-dots-t00541>)

premise for Levinson's transformation category was based on the variability of the degree of contribution from different media, I suggest that the third category contains cases in which one or more, of the central practices of one art have been altered by the incorporation of a central practice (or practices) from another art. To clarify and demonstrate what this entails, I will use the example of an art which in the 19th century was referred to as "composition photography" or "combination printing" by Henry Peach Robinson (Talbot 2017, 144).

Composition photography is an early form of composite photography. It was an art that was frequently practiced by pictorialist photographers who sought to blur the boundaries of photographic and painting practice.¹⁵⁶ In 1869 Robinson published

¹⁵⁶ Other methods that pictorialists employed to this end included gum bichromate printing. Pictorialism, as Lopes has highlighted, accepted the proposition that photography was an

Pictorial Effect in Photography in which he encouraged his readers to study paintings ‘in terms of picture construction, light and shade, emphasis, focus and perspective rendition’ (Harker 1989, 134).¹⁵⁷ Robinson strongly advocated that photographers take influence from the conventions of painting. Resultantly, and not without controversy, Robinson created many combination prints, such as *Sleep* (1867) (fig. 22.), by



(fig. 22.) Henry Peach Robinson *Sleep* 1867 (Accessed from: <http://www.betterphotography.in/perspectives/great-masters/henry-peach-robinson-the-pictorialist/25794/>)

combining multiple negatives to create one final composite image that reflected many different photographic events, constructing the image in a way that reflected the construction of the composition of a painting. The results idealized and imaginatively reinterpreted reality, which was a consequence of adopting the principles of painting to

objective medium and so in order to secure the artistic status of the photographs that they produced, pictorialists ‘promoted the art of photography as a hybrid of the newly invented techniques of photography mixed with techniques taken from painting.’ (2016, 11)

¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, in *Pictorial Effect in Photography*, Robinson proposed that whilst art photography should not represent figments of pure fantasy, it should, if it creates an illusion be a convincing one (Fineman 2012, 25).

transform one of the norms of photographic practice, which entailed exposing just one negative to yield an image of one spatiotemporal scene. Hence, taking into consideration the norms that standardly govern the use of the photographic medium is key to appreciating works of composite photography, but so too is the deliberate disruption of these norms, which is achieved by incorporating painterly practices that result in a new kind of practice with different goodness properties and appreciative standards to its forebears.

As I outlined at the end of the previous chapter, in his sceptical account, Scruton proposed that artists such as Robinson, who use montage techniques do not create photographs. Scruton has argued that a work such as *Sleep*, ‘is, to all intents and purposes, a painting, except that it happens to have employed photographic techniques in the derivation of its figures.’ (1981, 594) To which he added, in parenthesis: ‘Of course the fact of their *being* photographs might be aesthetically important.’ (1981, 594) While, as I outlined in the previous chapter, Scruton has attracted a lot of criticism for being so restrictive about what does, and what does not count as a photograph, I maintain that in this case Scruton is correct to suggest that artists, such as Robinson, actively adopted the strategies of painters to compose their montages. Furthermore, appreciating Robinson’s work in this way is not only adequate, but undoubtedly enhances the viewer’s appreciation of the work, as for example, whilst critics often objected to visible signs of Robinson’s process, such as shadows that were not quite right, ‘Robinson expected viewers to take his labour-intensive procedures into account when they looked at his pictures’ (Talbot 2017, 158).¹⁵⁸ This then, is an example in

¹⁵⁸ Robinson was under the impression that viewers would understand that what they were looking at was a ‘crafted artefact rather than an unmediated print of whatever had lain before the camera’s lens – and that they would be willing to suspend their disbelief for the sake for art.’ (Fineman 2012, 27)

which one art kind, photography, has been transformed under the influence of practices and qualities from another, painting.

I believe that treating transformation hybrids this way preserves Levinson's initial aim but articulates it more clearly and without the stipulation that the other hybrid categories be an equal mix of different arts. My amendment to several of the principles behind Levinson's account does not however, entail any salient changes to the distinction that Levinson made between transformation hybrids and cases where one art has influenced another. In the case of transformation hybrids, though I have stipulated the conditions for this type of hybrid differently to Levinson, I suggest it must still be the case, as Levinson proposed, that 'some *essential* or *defining* feature' of the art is 'challenged' (1990, 33). As I outlined in the case of composite photography, the defining feature of photography that is challenged, by adopting painterly techniques, is the depiction of one spatiotemporal scene. Some photographic practices however, have been influenced by painting, but not actually transformed by it. Take the case of Jeff Wall's photographs *Picture for Women* (1979) (fig. 23.) and *The Storyteller* (1986) that respectively echo the compositions of Manet's paintings, *A Bar at the Folies-Bergères* (1881-2) (fig. 24.) (Campany 2011, 5) and *Déjeuner sur l'herbe* (1863). Given the foregoing, Wall's works may seem like plausible candidates as transformation hybrids however, have any of the essential or defining features of photography been challenged in these cases?¹⁵⁹ The answer is no, because although Wall staged his photographs for picturesque or dramatic effects, his pictures were otherwise taken according to the norms of photographic practice.¹⁶⁰ Wall's works were designed to be hung on a wall, as paintings usually are,

¹⁵⁹ It is worth noting that these works were made before Wall began experimenting with composite photography, more about which will be said later in this section.

¹⁶⁰ A comparable example is Cindy Sherman's photographic practice, which sees her take influence from the qualities of other arts such as film and performance, as for example in her *Untitled Film* series (1977-80). In her early 1990s series of *History Portraits* she took influence



(fig. 23.) Jeff Wall *Picture for Women* 1979 (Accessed from: <https://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-modern/exhibition/jeff-wall/jeff-wall-room-guide/jeff-wall-room-guide-room-1>)



(fig. 24.) Édouard Manet *A Bar at the Folies-Bergère* 1881-2 (Accessed from: <https://courtauld.ac.uk/gallery/collection/impressionism-post-impressionism/edouard-manet-a-bar-at-the-folies-bergere>)

from classic paintings and created photographs based upon paintings using body paint and prostheses.

but the hang of a photograph however, certainly does not constitute one of its essential or defining features. Instead, Wall's photography has been influenced by painting, specifically in this case the mode of picturing known as *tableau*, which was reinvigorated by Manet in his 19th century paintings. Taking painting practice into account in this case, will be of some benefit to appreciating Wall's pictorial aims however, it is not necessary to take into account the ways that Wall has deviated from photographic practice because rather than challenging any of the essential or defining features of photography, Wall instead adapted photographic practice in order to reflect a particular mode of picturing that is associated with painting.¹⁶¹ Hence, it is beneficial for appreciative practice to distinguish between works that belong to a particular hybrid kind and works in which the practices of one art have been adapted in order that the resulting work reflects the properties of another art.

It is also worth noting that photography has greatly influenced painting practices, for instance, Bourriaud has suggested that while artists such as Monet and Degas displayed a *photographic way of thinking* (2002, 67), they did not actually employ photographic means to make their paintings.¹⁶² Indeed, none of the essential or defining features of painting were challenged in these cases. With the invention of new image-making techniques, such as photography, Bourriaud has argued that 'the most fruitful thinking [...] came from artists who, far from giving up on their critical consciousness, worked on the basis of the possibilities offered by new tools, but without representing them as *techniques*.' (2002, 67) With the invention of photography, many artists took influence from the qualities of images that were made using photographic techniques, without actually using these techniques themselves, to create new kinds of pictorial

¹⁶¹ In his later practice however, Wall also began to hybridize photography and painting, by making composite photographs such *A Sudden Gust of Wind (after Hokusai)* (1993).

¹⁶² Bourriaud has referred to this phenomenon as the "Law of Relocation" (2002).

representation.¹⁶³ This has been demonstrated for example, by the changing depiction of movement in painting after the advent of photography. Photographic technology was able to capture a scene in an instant, and as a result of looking at photographs of animals in motion, many artists realized that they had been incorrectly representing animal movement such as racing horses (Kemp 2006, 304) and so took influence from photographic practice to inform the appearance of their work. It was never, however a defining or essential feature of painting to accurately convey motion, and likewise, it is not an essential or defining feature of painting that the entire subject need be depicted in sharp definition, hence why this is a case of influence rather than hybridization.

Similarly, photographic blur is not an essential element of photography, as all one needs is a sufficiently small aperture setting to capture the entire pro-photographic scene in focus.¹⁶⁴ Thus, another interesting case of photography influencing other arts, is the depiction of photographic blur in manugraphic works, such as Arturo Cuenca's *Cira, sus partes en mi paisaje* (1976) (fig. 25.). Cuenca depicted photographic blur in his painting to signal exterior reality however, the placement of the blur, in this work, additionally signalled loss of mental clarity.

As it is beneficial for appreciative practice to identify whether a work belongs to a particular hybrid kind, or whether a work was created in one art that has been influenced by another art, it is also beneficial to identify whether a work belongs to an evolved version of a pre-existent art. For instance, the advent of digital photography did not signal an entirely new art, a hybrid art, or even a practice that was influenced by

¹⁶³ Polte has similarly made the case that 'photography stimulated the different genres of art and helped them sharpen awareness of their own possibilities.' (2006, 146)

¹⁶⁴ As Fineman has explained: 'It was not until the late 1880s that blurriness formally entered art photography's visual lexicon' as Peter Henry 'Emerson advocated the use of selective focus to mitigate the harsh mechanical clarity of the camera image. In an artistic photograph, he explained, the main point of interest should be relatively sharp, but everything else should appear slightly blurred – an adjustment he believed mimicked the natural imperfections of human vision.' (2012, 81)



(fig. 25.) Arturo Cuenca *Cira, sus partes en mi paisaje* 1976 (Accessed from: <http://www.bellasartes.co.cu/obra/arturo-cuenca-cirasus-partes-en-mi-paisaje-1976>)

other arts. Digital photography instead, represented an evolution of photography because the practice, of organizing, recording, and reproducing corresponding patterns of light from a subject through the use of photo-sensitive mechanisms to create an image, was fundamentally the same as in analogue practice.¹⁶⁵ What differed between analogue and digital processes was the digitalization of the materials and methods that are used in accordance with photographic practice. For instance, in analogue photography, the silver halides are held in place during the development stages by a binder, most commonly gelatine, which together forms an emulsion. Once the emulsion is exposed to controlled light, the halides are transformed and the result is the latent

¹⁶⁵ In addition to this, both analogue and digital photographic processes create effects that are largely global and uniform and are either chromatic or greyscale, depending on whether any information from the light regarding hue is preserved.

image. The remaining silver halide crystals which are not developed are removed, which then fixes the image. This initially creates a negative image and the process is then repeated in order to create a positive image. In the digital process however, it is image sensors, rather than silver halides that react to light, creating an electric charge which is stored as a set of digital instructions in binary code which, when processed by software, produces an image consisting of pixels which are stepped in order that they appear as a smooth tonal image. Although the materials and methods used in analogue and digital photographic processes may differ, resulting in the alteration of some of the defining features of photographs, such as the constitution of the image through pixels rather than film grain for instance, this represents an evolution of this defining feature, given that the facture of the photographs surface was created using photographic technology and that it is still largely imperceptible. Hence, digital photography represents a development of photography rather than a new art. Furthermore, it is only on certain occasions that the alteration of the defining features, such as the appearance of pixels rather than film grain, are aesthetically salient, as for instance in Thomas Ruff's *jpegs* (2007) series, and to be accounted for in order to adequately appreciate certain works of photography. Digital photography then, represents a development of photography rather than a new art, and only on occasion will the digital nature of the medium need to be taken into consideration in order to adequately appreciate the work.

Likewise, consider the cases of Vermeer and Canaletto, who, as I explained in the previous chapter, combined automatic and manugraphic image-making techniques to make their paintings. Despite the fact that the initial stages of the painting may have been guided by the use of an optical device, which projected light images onto a surface, the works are still paintings. This is because, despite the use of a projected light image, no practices that involved photosensitive materials and no photographic events

contributed to the creation of the works. Instead, Vermeer and Canaletto's work represented a new practice of picturing from within an evolving art, because the essential features of painting were not challenged in this instance, and nor were the features of another art used to transform or alter the practice of painting. The use of the lens-based device in this case, instead introduced another way of picturing into Vermeer and Canaletto's painterly practices, which as I outlined in the previous chapter, was the descriptive mode.

With this then, the classificatory framework, for distinguishing between different types of arts that have evolved, or involve, or are influenced by other arts, is in place. I propose that evolving arts are those in which some aspect of a pre-existent practice is developed or expanded on, while the essential or defining features of the art are retained, by incorporating newly developed materials and/or techniques. I propose that arts that are influenced by other arts, are those in which the practices of an art are adapted so that the resultant works reflect the properties of other arts. And finally, I propose that hybrid arts are those in which the essential or defining features of an art (or multiple arts) have been juxtaposed or challenged with or by other arts. It could be conjectured however, that it is not necessary to actively recognize hybrid art kinds as "hybrid" because other arts, such as opera, are no longer routinely appreciated as "hybrid" art kinds, despite combining media and practices, for example from musical and theatrical arts. Why then might it be profitable to recognize and appreciate particular works, that according to the New Theorists' claims are photographs, as "hybrids"? Here Levinson supplies the response, as he proposed that:

The important distinction seems to be between arts whose antecedents are still evident to them, and appropriately taken into account in critical response, and those whose artistic predecessors, if there any, have long since receded from the appreciative or interpretative picture. (1990, 30)

Arts that hybridize photography, which is a relatively new kind, especially in its digital incarnation, do usually have their antecedents still evident to them hence why it is still debated what kinds they actually belong to and so, consequently I suggest that hybridity should be taken in account when appreciating such kinds.

Specifically, given the classificatory framework I have provided, I propose that the following should be identified and appreciated as hybrid art kinds: light drawing and composite photography, which are transformation hybrids; photorealistic painting, certain kinds of luminography such as photogenics, and cliché verre, which are fusion hybrids; overpainted photographs, which can be fusion or juxtaposition hybrids; and photomontages, which are juxtaposition hybrids. Given his radical approach, Lopes can identify and appreciate all these kinds as photographs whilst, even given her revisionist approach, Atencia-Linares can count light photographs, composite photographs, and photogenic works as photographs. However, I propose that by using my classificatory framework, I am able to more successfully account for the identity of these works and how they may be most profitably appreciated. Moreover, this framework provides the tools to take a more nuanced approach to evaluating when it is relevant to appreciate the use of automatic image-making techniques or manigraphic image-making techniques. While the list of hybrid art kinds that I have noted above is not an exhaustive list, it does serve to indicate how nuanced the conflation of different photographic media and practices may be.¹⁶⁶ Although I will not be able to outline each hybrid art in great detail,

¹⁶⁶ There are plausibly many more specific hybrid arts that involve particular photographic technologies, for example polaroid photography may be quite uniquely hybridized with other arts such as painting and sculpture, as in the case of the SX-70 print, which has “a commonality with painting and sculpture” due to the fact that the ‘dyes take up to 48 hours to harden completely, during which time the image emulsion can be scratched, dented or otherwise doctored’ (Buse, 2007, 41). Lucas Samaras for example, has created many hybrid works by manipulating polaroid prints in this way. Another hybrid kind that involves particular photographic technologies, is the chemigram, which involves the manipulation of photographic


I will offer some key, but brief examples to demonstrate the general premise of each kind that I have just identified and why they are profitably appreciated as a hybrid art.

Light drawing is a transformation hybrid art, as the practice of drawing is used to alter one of the central norms that governs photographic practice, whereby fictional entities are not depicted by photographic means. Some of the most famous examples of light drawings were produced in 1949 by Gjon Mili and Picasso (fig. 26.), and these were created by Mili's use of two cameras and long exposures to capture Picasso's transient "drawings" of a centaur, which he made by drawing in the air using strobe lights.¹⁶⁷ In order to profitably appreciate light drawings, such as those made by Mili and Picasso, it is important for viewers to be attentive to the ways in which manugraphic image-making processes have transformed e-dependent automatic image-making practice, and produced photographic depictions of a fictional entity. This is not however, the only manugraphic art to have transformed photography.

There is a long history of artists producing composite photographs, starting with Robinson, as I highlighted earlier in this section, and also Oscar Rejlander. In this kind, broadly speaking, photographic practice is transformed by painting practice, in order to produce imaginative and idealized interpretations of reality. Although, viewers may appreciate the photographic elements of works of composite photography as accurate or truthful, the reconfiguration of these photographic elements is something that is most profitably appreciated as an imaginative reconfiguration of reality. As Savedoff has highlighted, the power of photography is its perceived 'special connection with reality

chemicals and painterly materials to produce an image. Pierre Cordier invented this practice in 1956 (1982, 262) and clearly views this as a hybrid practice: 'Photographers feel that I imitate painters and painters cast me as a photographer. Luckily, more and more, the borderlines between different artistic disciplines are being crossed.' (1982, 267)

¹⁶⁷ Pettersson for instance, has proposed that 'this is not a photograph of a centaur; at most it is a picture, produced by photographic means, resembling a photograph of a centaur.' (2017, 257)



(fig. 26.) Gjon Mili *Pablo Picasso Draws with Light* 1949 (Accessed from: <https://time.com/3746330/behind-the-picture-picasso-draws-with-light/>)

and an independence of the photographer's intentions' (2000, 84) which, according to Savedoff entails that photographs verify the existence of the subject in a way that painting never can. Moreover, Savedoff has argued that the viewer's faith in the documentary character of photography is 'transferred to the way that things appear in a photograph' (2000, 88) hence why photographic distortion can be so unsettling. She has suggested however, that the use of double exposure can prevent viewers 'from reading a photograph as a record of the world.' (Savedoff 2000 118) Thus, in utilizing photographic techniques such as double exposure in order to create composite photographs, artists are able to manipulate the responses of viewers in order to set up a

contradiction between what they feel entitled to believe as a result of viewing what appears to be a photograph and what the image appears to depict. For example, in her composite photograph, *Io + Gatto*, Wulz has been able to realize a new dream-like reality where feline and female human form one impossible whole, which Fineman has described as a ‘potent visual metaphor for the fluidity of feminine identity’ (2012, 161). In order to create the depiction of this impossible being, Wulz flouted the norms that govern photographic practice and created a composite photograph to create an imaginary subject that is presented in a medium that is typically appreciated as a means to verify the appearance of an external object.

In the cases of light drawings and composite photographs, some of the central practices of photography have been altered by the incorporation of a central practice (or practices) from another art, such as drawing or painting. The next hybrid arts that I will be examining however, are cases of fusion hybridity whereby the media and practices of photography and other arts are fused together to assume an entirely new combined identity. For instance, since the mid-twentieth century, artists have been producing photorealistic paintings, such as *Betty*. This fusion hybrid art has been practiced by a number of artists, including Chuck Close and Ben Schonebeck, who reacted to the monocular vision and focal qualities of images made using a lens, that became deeply engrained in the viewer’s everyday experience largely due to the prevalence of photographic technology used by the media, including in newspapers and on television (Meisel 1989, 21). The artists who have partaken in this practice have used different automatic techniques to transfer photographic imagery onto their supports. I have already described one of the most common techniques that is employed by Richter – tracing from a projected photograph. The conflation between photographic and painterly practice is heightened in another such technique which ‘involves developing the image


on a photo-sensitized canvas or paper' (Meisel 1989, 14-5) and then painting over the top of the black and white exposure.¹⁶⁸ Another common technique is squaring, which is used by Chuck Close (figs. 27. & 28.), who does not hide this technique in his work and often leaves traces of the grids he uses on his works, as Friedman has explained: 'The effects of Process art, with its emphasis on evidence of the artist's journey, are still to be found in a Close portrait.' (2005, 40) Indeed, this influence on Close's practice emphasizes the amalgamation of automatic and manographic techniques in this hybrid art. Moreover, as I highlighted in Chapter One, Close's use of automatic techniques including photography and squaring, enabled him to manifest his intentions to explore forms rather than emotions in his photorealistic paintings. Hence, it is relevant in such cases to appreciate the artist's use of automatic image-making techniques, and moreover, how these have been conflated in photorealistic paintings with traditionally manographic image-making techniques to capitalize on the distinction between what are conceived to be subjective and objective forms of image-making.

Furthermore, the conflation of manographic and automatic image-making techniques is practiced in other hybrid arts to different aesthetic ends. For instance, in photogenic works, manographic drawing techniques are combined with photographic processes in order to produce abstract images that muse on the nature of light. In the mid-20th century, photogenics was a term that was coined by Lotte Jacobi who, along with others who practiced this art, would produce abstract images by 'drawing with a light pen or

¹⁶⁸ Artists who have employed this process include Guy Johnson and Paul Staiger (Meisel 1989, 14).



(fig. 27.) Chuck Close Marquette for *Self Portrait* (Accessed from: <http://chuckclose.com/>)



(fig. 28.) Chuck Close *Big Self Portrait* 1968 (Accessed from: <http://chuckclose.com/>)

candle' on photosensitive paper (Warner- Marien 2012, 140-1) (fig. 29.).¹⁶⁹ In this



(fig. 29.) Lotte Jacobi *Silver Lining* 1950 (Accessed from: <https://www.icp.org/browse/archive/constituents/lotte-jacobi?all/all/all/all/0>)

practice then, artists would challenge one of the defining features of photography, the depiction of one spatio-temporal scene as captured in one photographic exposure, with one of the defining features of drawing, the depiction of a subject by the use of line. As Jacobi for example, would draw on the photosensitive surface whilst simultaneously registering light on it, this is a practice that instantiates a high degree of fusion hybridity between drawing and photography. Another art that combines photography with manographic arts is cliché verre, which is an art that originated in the 19th century. Works of cliché verre are created by drawing, etching or painting on transparent

¹⁶⁹ Lopes has referred to Lotte Jacobi's images as photograms (2016, 115), which in a sense is correct, however this does not adequately bring focus to the aesthetically significant fact that the images were created by mixing drawing and photogrammetric practices to result in the art of luminography. Works of luminography are, as Lopes himself has defined 'objectless photographs that foreground light as an element of the photographic process' (2016, 123).

surfaces and then contact printing them, or directly exposing them, on photosensitive surfaces, thereby conflating imaginative manual mark-making techniques with photographic practice. Specifically, this practice has frequently been used by artists to challenge one of the defining features of photography and depict fictional entities, as well as to challenge one of the defining features of the drawn or painterly facture that drawings and paintings usually exhibit. In particular, by combining manual mark-making techniques with photographic practice, artists are able to give an uncanny photographic appearance to the subjectively depicted forms that are commonly created in this practice. For example, Frederick Sommer's *Paracelsus* (1957) (fig. 30.) was




(fig. 30.) Frederick Sommer *Paracelsus* 1957 (Accessed from: http://www.vam.ac.uk/__data/assets/image/0015/233340/2006AC9589_sommer_paracelsus.jpg)

created by the application of semi-transparent paint onto cellophane which was exposed on a photosensitive surface (Davis et al., 2005, 229) in order to capture the texture of

the paint and create the form, in this case, of a sculptured torso. Moreover, the uncanny effects of such works are largely due to the widespread beliefs that viewers have formed about the veracity of photography.

In relation to the pervasiveness of these beliefs, contemporary artist Jane Dixon, in her series *Evidence of Doubt* (2011-13) (fig. 31.), has produced cliché verres that, according



(fig. 31.) Jane Dixon *Evidence of Doubt* 2011-13 (Accessed from: <http://www.janedixon.net/evidence.html>)

to my classificatory framework, are cliché verres that have been influenced by photogrammetry. The works were made in accordance with the norms of cliché verre practice, however in her work, Dixon adapted this practice to produce images of imaginary biological specimens, that took on the appearance of photograms to challenge viewers' preconceptions of the evidential nature of works that are produced in accordance with photogrammetric practice. To produce photograms, objects are placed on photosensitive surfaces that are exposed to light, recording the exact size and shape, and a few details of the object (which only occurs when the objects have transparent or opaque elements). Dixon however, undermined 'the evidential nature of photograms by replacing real specimens with drawings' (Hartley 2016, 9), which she created by using graphite on textured transparent polyester film to replicate the appearance of biological

specimens or organic forms, which she then exposed on a photosensitive surface.¹⁷⁰ Hence, in order to access the meaning of the work, it is key for viewers to appreciate Dixon's conflation of manographic and automatic image-making techniques to create images that took on the appearance of photograms. Moreover, given that Dixon's process did not involve placing real objects on the photosensitive surface, but instead drawings that were made to imitate, albeit uncannily, the appearance of real specimens, Dixon's cliché verre works were influenced by photogrammetry but not actually hybridized with it. Thus, these works are profitably appreciated as cliché verres that take on the appearance of being photograms in order to challenge the viewer's beliefs about the evidential nature of photogrammetry.

Like cliché verre, overpainted photographs have existed alongside photographic practice for the majority of its history, and have come in a variety of forms. Some kinds of overpainted photographs are created to form an integrative effect and so fall into the fusion category, for example some of Erwin Blumenfeld's photographic works were airbrushed in order to single out and idealize the salient features of the images.¹⁷¹ Likewise, in Pierre et Gilles' practice, photographs taken by Gilles were enlarged and meticulously painted over by Pierre to result in an integrated whole that, by combining e-dependent automatic image-making techniques and manographic image-making techniques, idealize the naturally-dependent subject (Turner 1994, 53-4) (fig. 32.).

¹⁷⁰ Hartley for instance, has remarked that 'it is the evidential nature of their medium that informs our initial reaction', however 'the subjects are not tied to what exists or is real, except our subverted assumptions.' (2016, 9).

¹⁷¹ For instance, Erwin Blumenfeld created the January 1st 1950 *Vogue* cover: 'Through a combination of bright studio lighting and airbrushing on the print, Blumenfeld distilled the model Jean Patchett's face to its graphic essentials – eye, brow, lips, and beauty mark [after which heavily saturated colour was added] – producing a glamorous abstraction onto which the reader is invited to project his or her own fantasies and desires.' (Fineman 2012, 152-5) And historically, there have been hand-coloured photographs such as William Notman's *Skating Carnival, Victoria Rink, Montreal, QC* (1870) which 'could be mistaken for an oil painting, [which amplified] the stylistic similarity of Notman's work to popular Victorian crowd paintings such as William Powell Frith's *Derby Day...*' (Fineman 2012, 54).



(fig. 32.) Pierre et Gilles *La Voyante* 1991 (Accessed from: Turner 1994, 55)

Some overpainted photographs however, are juxtaposition hybrids, as in the overpainted photographs of Richter, and Sigmar Polke. Broadly speaking, these artists overlaid photographs with gestural and abstract painterly interruptions, creating a disintegrative effect that was crucial to the meaning of the hybrid works. Richter for instance, painted over 10 x 15cm commercial photographs (mostly using plastic doctor blades and palette knives as in his painting practice) to address the ‘state of tension between the “two realities” (Gerhard Richter) in photography and painting’ (Heinzelmann 2008, 7) (fig. 33.).¹⁷² In these works, by using the manigraphic process of painting to create non-representational marks on the surface of the image, Richter drew out the tensions between automaticity and agency (Laxton 2012a, 778), and in doing so challenged the

¹⁷² Richter’s juxtapositions grew out of experimentation with landscape and abstract painting, first entering his oeuvre in 1989 (Heinzelmann 2008, 87).



(fig. 33.) Gerhard Richter *5.3.89* 1989 (Accessed from: <https://www.gerhard-richter.com/en/art/overpainted-photographs/rural-landscapes-75/5389-14308/?&categoryid=75&p=1&sp=32>)

common perception of photography as an automatic and predictable/reliable method of creating images (Guillermet, 2016). In particular, Richter has been able to connote rather than simply denote with these painterly interventions (Hustvedt 2008, 75) and the painted section frequently changes the viewer's relation to the subjects of the photographs.¹⁷³ There is clear evidence that these works are meant to be appreciated as juxtapositions of different media which create a disintegrative effect, as Scheende has argued that: 'If the two planes and media, if the contradictions came to form a unity, then these oil-on-photograph works would have failed in their purpose...' (2008, 196). Similarly, photomontages are created to instantiate a disintegrative effect, as this hybrid art, practiced by artists such as John Hartfield, George Grosz, Johannes Baader, and Hannah Höch, involves the combination of photography and collage to rearrange

¹⁷³ 'The painted gestures [...] generate a host of meaningful associations that play with or against the image that lies beneath them – curtains, veils, walls, waves...' (Hustvedt 2008, 74-5).

images and parts of reality into a new, turbulent whole.¹⁷⁴ As Ades has explained: ‘The Berlin Dadists used the photograph as a ready-made image, pasting it together with cuttings from newspapers and magazines, lettering and drawing to form a chaotic, explosive image, a provocative dismembering of reality.’ (Ades 1986, 12-3) In particular, the ‘juxtaposition of the human and the mechanical’ was a recurrent theme in early photomontages (Ades 1986, 36) and photomontages were frequently created to construct politically charged narratives.

In most of these kinds, it is possible for the audience to discern, by the act of looking alone, that photography and another medium have been combined to make the work, however there are some cases where it can be significantly more difficult to determine the aetiology of the image by looking alone, and in turn to adequately appreciate the work. For instance, in contemporary digital practice, the constructed nature of the photographic imagery, in composite photographs, is able to go undetected by viewers.¹⁷⁵ It may be the case then, that viewers are justified in appreciating these composite photographs as photographs. If, however, this were the case then why would figures, such as Jeff Wall or Andreas Gursky (fig. 34.), who create seamless composite photographs by using digital technology, make no secret about the constructed nature of their images? The answer is that viewers are invited to appreciate the constructed nature

¹⁷⁴ The term “photomontage” originated just after the first world war from the Berlin Dadists (Ades 1986, 12), who initially used the term photomontage in opposition to collage, however, there are some disagreements over what constitutes photomontage (Ades 1986, 15). Some take it to be something that only takes place in the darkroom (e.g. William Rubin who argued the Dada creations were actually photo-collages), whilst others have argued that it needn’t necessarily be a montage of photographs (e.g. Sergei Tretyakov) (Ades 1986, 15-16). Others such as Bear (2017) take it to be a practice that originated in the 19th century. Ades has argued that a work is a photomontage ‘when the imagery is predominantly photographic, whether collaged or re-photographed, rather than according to the technique.’ (Ades 1986, 17) which seems broadly correct.

¹⁷⁵ As Batchen has highlighted, photographers have always been able to intervene in the creation of a photograph, however ‘the thing about computers is that they let an operator do all these same things, but much more easily and in a less detectable way.’ (1994, 48)



(fig. 34.) Andreas Gursky *99 Cent* 1999 (Accessed from: <https://www.thebroad.org/art/andreas-gursky/99-cent>)

of the photographic imagery.¹⁷⁶ Consequently, it is not only appropriate and encouraged by the artists, but also profitable to appreciate works that are made in accordance with this practice, as belonging to the hybrid art kind of composite photography. Such works do however, raise some new questions. Are these digital composite photographs a new hybrid art?¹⁷⁷ Maynard has remarked that ‘as image-taking systems are further joined to digital processing systems – including image-generating ones – hybrid forms will appear’ (2000, 17).¹⁷⁸ However, is this necessarily the case? Using the classificatory framework that I have developed in this chapter, I will now direct my attention to issues of identification and appreciation in the digital age.

¹⁷⁶ Gursky, for instance, has taken advantage of high resolution, large image size, and digital manipulation to create the multi-layered experience of the macrostructure and microstructure for viewers of his work (Nanay 2012).

¹⁷⁷ It is important to remember, as Lopes has highlighted, that digital art is not ‘a single, new art form’ (2010, 17). Moreover, Lopes has distinguished between computer art and digital art, and he has argued that the former is distinguishable by being an interactive art form run on a computer (2010, 27).

¹⁷⁸ In addition, Maynard later stated that ‘what seems significant about the digitalization, here as elsewhere, is its amplification of those powers of hybridization, once all the information is translated into its controllable common currency.’ (2012, 745)

iv. Issues of Identification and Appreciation in the Digital Age

While it may be tempting to assert that there are an increasing number of new arts and hybrid arts in the digital age, it seems that many digital arts and hybrid arts however, are continuations and evolutions of pre-existing arts (Skopik 2003, 271) and hybrid arts.¹⁷⁹ For instance, many digital works are created in existing arts using digitalized versions of the materials and techniques that are used in accordance with pre-existing practices. David Hockney's "iPad drawings" for instance, do not represent a new digital art, but rather represent an evolved, digital version of pre-existent drawing practice, given that the essential and defining features of the art have been retained, but enhanced with digitalized materials and techniques.¹⁸⁰ Likewise, many of the practices in the hybrid arts, that I identified in the previous section, have continued and evolved to encompass digitalized versions of the materials and methods that constitute the media profile of the arts that are hybridized. For instance, the digital composite photographs of Wall and Gursky, have been made in accordance with the norms of the pre-existent art of

¹⁷⁹ In particular, Skopik has argued that there are two types of digital images, the 'seamlessly manipulated photo-like' image and the 'collage aesthetic' photograph (2003, 266). The latter, he has argued are nothing new – 'we need to acknowledge that collage as a structural synthetic technique is, after about ninety years of exploration, a thoroughly familiar visual strategy in other two-dimensional media.' (2003, 266) Furthermore, Skopik has argued that the plausibly fantastical image has simply arrived too late in the day to be truly revolutionary, stating that this is what 'Ernst would have used had it been available.' (2003, 269) Similarly, Costello has argued 'the widespread use of digital montage by Gregory Crewdson, Andreas Gursky, and Jeff Wall, among others, is in this respect not as novel as is often suggested.' (2017a, 99 n.39)

¹⁸⁰ In digital drawing for instance the mouse or stylus has replaced the pencil and the screen has replaced the paper (Krčma, 2010). Whilst certain features like the ability to erase elements of the drawing, or pixels and characters on the screen, is consistent with standard drawing practices, Krčma has observed that erasure in traditional drawing practice is not so easily removed as in digital practice. The paper unlike the screen product, will usually bear witness to its historical production– this being precisely a function that artists such as Kentridge draw on in the creation of their analogue hybrid art works. Despite this, although the features of digitalized art forms are evolving, they largely retain the traditions and conventions that predate them.

composite photography but have been made and enhanced with the use of digitalized versions of the materials and techniques that are used in accordance with this practice.

This is also demonstrated in the work of Lux, who as I highlighted earlier in this chapter, has created digital overpainted photographs. In light of the classificatory framework that I have developed, I suggest that, like the works of Pierre et Gilles, Lux's digital overpainted photographs fall into the fusion category. To create her digital works, Lux photographed her subjects, which were usually children, and then proceeded to digitally erase the background and substitute in one which consisted of her own painting or photographs that had been retouched to appear more painterly. She also altered the photographs of the children in ever so subtle ways to create what she described as "imaginary portraits" (Stoll 2004, 70). In her pictures, as I outlined in section ii., she attempted to create "a reality that differs from what I find in memory and imagination" (Stoll 2004, 70) and by conflating photography, which is associated with memory and the real, with painting, which is associated with the imaginary, she has been able to create this vision. Moreover, the conflation and subsequent homogenization of the different arts in Lux's work has aided her intention to represent and explore the qualities that children in general possess, such as awkwardness or distance, rather than the portrayal of a particular child (Hart 2005, 16). Furthermore, by using photo-editing software, Lux has been able to conflate the production and post-production stages of photography to create a synthesized whole that would not be nearly so well integrated by using analogue methods.¹⁸¹ In Lux's work it becomes difficult to estimate where one

¹⁸¹ Although some digital production and post-production techniques go beyond what was possible using analogue methods, such as the ability to isolate layers and undo actions, very frequently these are used in accordance with existing practices, such as drawing, painting, and collage, as was the case in analogue editing that involved the use of paint and scalpels for instance. Indeed, parallels between image processing software such as Photoshop and the practice of painting were drawn very quickly after its release. However, the tools in Photoshop may be operated with significantly more ease and precision than their analogue forebears, hence

medium ends and the other begins, further distorting the nature of reality in her work, Lux therefore uses digital technology to enhance the meaning of her work and so taking this factor into account can certainly aid the viewer's appreciation of Lux's work, however the practices that she combines are not in themselves new as there is a long historic practice of literally painting over photographs (Warner Marien 2012, 39) and so consequently Lux's work does not represent a new hybrid art.

Although Lux's digital overpainted photographs do not belong to a new hybrid art, some new digital technology has led to uncertainty about the identity of the resultant works. For instance, the ground-breaking "Light Field Camera" (LFC) was released in 2012 by Lytro. The camera worked by capturing the direction of light as it hit the image sensor and from this, the light field was then reconstructed by the software. This technology allowed viewers of LFC-images to refocus images after they had been taken and in addition to this, the technology also made it possible for viewers to change the viewing angle of LFC-images. Although New Theorists, such as Lopes, can accept LFC-images as photographs, given that they originate in a photographic event, which is output in digital mark-making processes to make an image, some theorists however, have questioned the photographic status of these images. Benovsky, for example, has argued that LFC-images are not photographs. This is due to his view that photographs not only have depictive powers, but also narrative powers, given the necessary decisions that photographers make regarding framing, aperture, shutter speed, and focal length which, he has argued, enables photographers to manipulate and manage the attention of viewers to convey messages (2014, 730). As a consequence of this view, Benovsky has concluded that LFC-images are not photographs, but digital sculptures, because the

the digital artist has an almost limitless range of control over the image, the biggest restriction it would seem, is their imagination (Dawber, 2005).

images are not static, as photographs usually are, which means that the viewer's attention is not directed by the photographer, but rather the viewer dynamically engages with the image, as they do when engaging with works of sculpture (2014, 731).


Although artists may have to consider the third dimension when making images using a light field camera and whilst viewers may interact with LFC-images in a similar manner as they do when engaging with sculptural works, given that digital photographic technology is used to generate the images, is it appropriate to identify them as digital sculptures and to appreciate them as such? As LFC-images incorporate both photographic and sculptural practices, I propose that they are most appropriately identified and adequately appreciated as belonging to a new hybrid art, that may be called "light field photography", given that one of the defining features of a photograph, the static nature of the image, has been challenged by one of the defining features of sculpture, the dynamic nature of the viewer's interaction with the work. Specifically, then, sculpture has transformed digital photographic practice, which I suggest alters, rather than diminishes the narrative capacities of these images, as a necessary decision still needs to be made by a photographer about what section of the world they wish to bracket off and create an image from for the attention of the viewer. Granted, focus and aperture are no longer completely under the control of the photographer however, photographers can instead compose their images, taking into consideration the fact that different aspects of the image will reveal different messages, when focused upon, much like in sculptural practice. Sadly, Lytro no longer support the LFC-image viewing platforms and although the practice was short-lived, Apple have recently announced developments for their iPhone cameras and software, which enables users to alter the depth of field of images after they have been taken. Moreover, many commentators have remarked that this kind of development looks to set the standard for the industry

(Conditt 2018). The issue of appropriate identification and appreciation of digital arts that involve photography is then I suggest particularly pressing at this point in time.

Light field photography is a new hybrid art in virtue of the fact that digital photographic technology has enabled agents to join two pre-existent arts, photography and sculpture, in a new practice, that would not previously have been possible to realize. In light of this, other new hybrid practices have been developed using techniques that, prior to the digital age, would not have been possible. For example, Richard Kolker, uses computer generated imagery (CGI) to create three-dimensional objects and scenes, which he then “photographs” using a virtual camera, that ‘follows the same rules as the real one: film size, aperture, shutter speed.’ (Soutter 2013, 107) (fig. 35.) Given however, that no actual photographic event takes place, the works most plausibly belong in a hybrid art that may be called “virtual photography” in which digital imaging techniques are used to render virtual objects and scenes and to simulate the resources and methods of actual photographic practice. In this case then, photographic practice has transformed digital imaging practice. Similarly, Thomas Ruff’s “photograms” (fig. 36.) are hybrids of photography and three-dimensional digital studio technology, in which Ruff created objects before rendering the object’s shadows using light-simulating software (Reader 2013). As in Kolker’s case, given that no actual photographic event takes place, the photograms are most appropriately identified as belonging to the hybrid art of virtual photography, or perhaps “virtual photogrammetry” in Ruff’s case.



(fig. 35.) Richard Kolker *Cotan #2* 2014 (Accessed from: <https://www.richardkolker.com/after-juan-sanchez-cotan/2018/4/18/cotan-2>)



(fig. 36.) Thomas Ruff *r.phg.s.03_I* 2014 (Accessed from: <http://www.artnet.com/artists/thomas-ruff/rphgs03i-a-e1E3IxNIsUbRrOFxA-jMZw2>)

Not all works that meditate on the theme of photography, digital or analogue, belong to hybrid arts however, and as I highlighted earlier in the chapter, it is important to distinguish between arts that are influenced by other arts, and arts that are actually hybridized with other arts. For example, Stan Douglas has created his *DCTs*, or “Discrete Cosine Transforms” (fig. 37.) by “reverse engineering” the digital



(fig. 37.) Stan Douglas *N99N* 2016 (Accessed from: <https://www.victoria-miro.com/news/967>)

photographic process (Smith 2018, 88). More specifically, influenced by the fact that digital cameras transform light into code, which is then turned into an image, Douglas created software and hardware that allowed him to produce a code for an image, which he created by entering data for frequencies of amplitude and colour, that was then printed on stretched and gessoed canvas. Douglas has said that his process is based on JPEG compression and that he is ‘manipulating the kinds of harmonic interactions that

essentially undergird all digital images.’ (Smith 2018, 88) Given that Douglas is harnessing digital imaging technology to create images that are in some sense created in accordance with digital photographic practice, it could be asserted that these works may plausibly be identified as transformation hybrids however, JPEG compression is not an essential or defining feature of digital photography. Moreover, Douglas is not combining two existent arts, but developing a new art which he has designed to break the rules of realism in photography and encourage viewers to ‘look at images as objects that are in front of them’ (Smith 2018, 91) by creating images that have no referent other than the data that was entered, in this case, by an agent, rather than data derived from light waves and input via photosensitive mechanisms. Whilst Douglas’ work is clearly influenced by digital photography, Douglas has not actually hybridized two arts to make these works. It is however, I suggest, going to be profitable for viewers to take into consideration how the nature of digital photographic image processing and storage, influenced the development of Douglas’ practice.

There are some works however, that have a more uncertain status. For example, “Computational Photography” comprises processes such as HDR, or High Dynamic Range imaging, which entails that the ‘camera takes multiple pictures at different exposure levels and seamlessly stitches them together to produce a composite image that retains optimal detail in both the brightest and the dimmest areas.’ (Fineman 2012, 203) Photographic composites, as I highlighted earlier, are frequently created by incorporating painterly practices into photography, and indeed in the mid-19th century Gustave le Gray combined negatives of the sea and sky to create composites that harmoniously captured the best light and detail of each (Fineman 2012, 211). However, the HDR process does not seem to be closely aligned with this kind of practice, as the aim in HDR imaging is not to compose an image, as one creates the composition for a

painting, but rather to create an image in which all the photographed subjects are clearly visible. Although it has been a norm of photographic practices up until recently to capture one spatiotemporal scene in one photographic exposure, HDR is now a standard shooting mode on most smartphones and given the proliferation of photographs that are taken using these devices, it may become a norm of photography to create composites that reflect different photographic events but that capture a scene, literally in its best light. Given the nature of this practice however, it does not seem appropriate to deem it a hybrid one, as unlike in other kinds of photographic composite imaging, the techniques and practices do not involve the interpenetration of techniques and practices from other arts such as painting. Hence, viewers will not profit from appreciating these works as hybrids of painting and photography, or as photography that has been influenced by the properties of paintings. Instead, HDR imaging may simply reflect an evolution of photographic practice.

It is important for viewers to distinguish between digital arts that are a continuation and evolution of existing photographic arts, digital arts that are influenced by photographic technology, and digital arts that hybridize photography with other kinds. I have highlighted how some artists who create works that belong to established hybrid arts, such as overpainted photographs, make use of digital technology in ways that enhance the meaning of the work and I have explained why this is beneficial to factor into the appreciation of the work. I have also identified hybrid arts, including virtual photography and light field photography, that are new in virtue of the digital technology that is used to create the works. As with other new and developing arts, at present these hybrid arts tend to be transformations, however this is likely to change as digital arts develop in the future. What I have established here then, is a framework that will enable

viewers to appropriately identify and adequately appreciate these future developments in the digital arts.

Returning however, to what originally prompted this discussion, what impact should the foregoing have on the New Theory? I suggest that the New Theorists should reconsider some of their permissive claims, by taking into consideration the conventions surrounding photography and other arts, in order to avoid failing to correctly identify and adequately appreciate certain kinds of works including light drawings, composite photographs, photorealistic paintings, photogenic works, photomontages, cliché verres, overpainted photographs, LFC-images, and virtual photographs. This is not to take a purist stance but to remember that there are some fundamental differences in the practices of photography and painting for instance. And to reiterate a point from the last chapter, this is not to say that one medium is intrinsically more aesthetically interesting than the other. The act however, of combining different media and image-making processes is inherently interesting and will naturally affect the meaning and appreciation of a work. As I have demonstrated in this chapter, the contribution of, or conflation of arts is aesthetically relevant in a variety of different practices and furthermore, the combination of automatic and manigraphic image-making techniques is often constitutive of the work's meaning.

There is more to be said about the conventions surrounding different kinds of images, and this will form the basis of the next part of my investigation into automatic image-making techniques. In the next chapter I will turn my attention towards other kinds of engagement that viewers have with images made using automatic techniques, starting with issues of epistemic warrant. Although the convention of appreciating photography as truthful or accurate within an artistic context is profitable for viewers, it is not clear

that such beliefs are helpful for viewers who hope to gain factual visual information from photographs. Consequently, in the next chapter I will examine in greater depth what kinds of epistemic value viewers stand to gain from looking at images that were made using automatic techniques. Given that this issue is further complicated in the digital age due the new and largely unregulated platforms and channels through which images can be distributed and shared, I will also establish how viewers may ascertain whether or not they are warranted in the beliefs that they form from looking at images in the digital age.

Chapter 4: Automaticity and Epistemic Warrant in the Digital Age

Knowledge comes in many forms. Propositional knowledge pertains to knowing facts, practical knowledge relates to knowing how to act and live in the world, and situated or experiential knowledge pertains to human experience (Maes 2017, 218-9). Throughout its history, photography has frequently been called an “objective” medium, which is to say that it has been thought of by viewers and philosophers alike as a way of conferring visual information that is not distorted by the human hand or intervention of the mind.¹⁸² Non-intervention is not however, identical to objectivity, moreover the intervention of the hand and mind of an agent can, provided that they are subject to certain rules and guidelines, which I will refer to as “warrant conditions”, enhance the propositional information giving capacities of images and help to convey the visual facts of a subject through the representational contents of the image. Automatic image-making techniques are better suited to reliably and accurately preserving visual information, as they provide more consistent information channels than manographic techniques. However, the context and dissemination of an image should also be considered when ascertaining how warranted one is in forming beliefs about the representational contents of an image given that images, which are made using automatic techniques, may provide different kinds of epistemic value, including propositional knowledge and situated knowledge.

Yet, viewers generally hold a disposition towards photographs that enable them to automatically feel warranted in the beliefs that they form about the representational contents of a photograph, despite the fact that many photographs do not convey

¹⁸² As Daston has highlighted, it was the process rather than the final product that was central to the idea of objectivity: ‘Non-intervention – not verisimilitude – lay at the heart of mechanical objectivity...’ (2007, 187).

propositional information alone. While, as I outlined in the previous chapter, this is profitable within artistic contexts, this is not the case in epistemic contexts. Hence, given the persistent beliefs and habits that viewers have formed in response to this particular kind of image, I will primarily direct my attention towards image-making practices that involve photography in this chapter. To account for the different kinds of representational contents that photographs may contain, and the different kinds of knowledge that can be formed from these I will draw upon a distinction that I used in Chapters One and Two, between the representation of naturally-dependent subjects, common to all photographs and images that are made using e-dependent automatic techniques, and the representation of intentional subjects, which are comprised of naturally-dependent subjects. As I shall outline, viewers can struggle to discern the different kinds of knowledge that they stand to gain from photographs, given that the representation of intentional subjects entails the representation of naturally-dependent subjects. Moreover, as I shall explain, viewers have been slow to adapt to the use of digital technology in photographic practices. In particular, viewers can struggle to ascertain how the operations of developing photographic technologies may be performed in accordance with existing warrant conditions (both official and implicit) in certain domains. This situation, I suggest, is further complicated as there are fewer warrant conditions in place to ensure the regulated dissemination of images on digital platforms. Under what circumstances then are viewers warranted in forming beliefs about the representational contents of a photograph and other kinds of images? To address this question, I will propose a set of negative criteria that can be used to test the reliability of an image, as a source of knowledge. In this chapter then, I will ascertain what kinds of knowledge images, that are made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, have to offer and how viewers can access this epistemic value.

In section i. I will investigate how the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists and the New Theorists have approached, and conceived of, the epistemic value of photography, given their differing ideas about the automaticity of the practice. Following this, in section ii. I will explain why automatic image-making techniques are frequently used in knowledge-oriented practices, as automatic techniques are well suited to providing consistent information channels. I will also explore how, provided that they are subject to warrant conditions, the intervention of hand and mind is consistent with the objective production of images that convey facts about the subject. In section iii. I will outline and explain why viewers may fail to recognize that images besides photographs convey propositional information, and that in turn, photographs convey different kinds of knowledge that, without adequate signalling, entails that viewers are not always warranted in the beliefs they form about the representational contents of a photograph. In section iv. I will explain how photographs can convey different kinds of knowledge by returning to a distinction that I made in Chapters One and Two, between the representation of naturally-dependent subjects and the representation of intentional subjects, and I will highlight how viewers may fail to discern this difference, a problem which in section v. I will show has continued in the digital age. Further to this, I will propose that post-photographic concerns are misplaced in targeting post-production processes, but rather should be directed towards the unregulated dissemination of images on digital platforms. Resultantly, I will provide a set of negative criteria to test the reliability of an image in the digital age, as a source of knowledge.

i. Orthodoxy, New Theory, and Epistemic Value

Photography, as a naturally-dependent, belief-independent automatic image-making process, has frequently been identified as an objective method for making images due to

the supposed non-intervention of agents during the production of photographs.¹⁸³ This way of producing photographs however, as I outlined in Chapter One, only accounts for certain subsets of photographs, such as photographs that are taken by an automatic triggering mechanism or polaroid photographs.¹⁸⁴ The Orthodox Theorists have, however in various formulations, defended accounts which see this kind of non-interventive making as a necessary premise of photography. Occasions on which the agent intervenes in the photographic process, the Orthodox Theorists have reasoned, entail that the result cannot be purely photographic. Photographs, then according to Orthodox Theorists, such as Currie (1999) and Scruton (1981), are the result of an objective recording process, and this, along with other conditions including real similarity relations, underpins the unique epistemic value that they argue is inherent to photography, which other kinds, such as painting, tend not to have or at least not to such a high degree.¹⁸⁵ It is also, as I have explained in previous chapters, for this reason that Scruton has maintained that photographic processes alone cannot be used to create an aesthetically significant representation. I have argued against this restrictive Orthodoxy in previous chapters, by pointing out that belief-independency cannot be instantiated in photography to the extent that the Orthodox Theorists have suggested, otherwise the result would not be the artefact that a photograph clearly is. Consequently, in this chapter, I will bypass a review of traditional Orthodox approaches to the epistemic value of photography and I will instead, in what follows, focus more closely on the

¹⁸³ Daguerre used the word “objectif” to describe his camera’s lens and this idea of objectivity has haunted the camera since (Rogers 2013, 16).

¹⁸⁴ It is however, a common misconception that polaroid photography was always as simple as clicking a button, in reality it wasn’t until 1972 and the development of SX-70 technology that truly instant photographs were produced (Buse 2007, 40). Prior to this the camera operator would have to carefully and skilfully pull the print manually from the camera and peel it apart (Buse 2007, 33). It was however, also around 1972 that the Polaroid began to be used in artistic ways (Buse 2007, 40-1) reflecting the automaticity and commerciality of image-making at the time.

¹⁸⁵ Currie for instance, has argued that photographs are epistemically valuable because ‘a photograph is a *trace* of its subject’ (1999, 286) He has contrasted this with painting, which he argues ‘is *testimony* of it.’ (1999, 286).

approaches of the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists and the New Theorists to this topic.

The Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists, like the Orthodox Theorists, have maintained that photographs reliably convey factual information about the visual appearance of an external object, however they have additionally emphasized that certain manographs may also be of high epistemic value. Abell, for instance, has argued that non-photographic images can be just as valuable as photographs but she has suggested that they provide viewers with different kinds of knowledge as, for example, non-photographs may depict salient features and not just particulars (2010b, 82).

Moreover, as I outlined in Chapter One, the Second-Generation Orthodox theorists have embraced the role of intentions in photography to a greater degree than their theoretical predecessors. Hopkins for instance, has proposed that, while it is the ‘causal relation between photograph and object photographed’ (2009, 72) that sets the standard of correctness for photographs, it is intentions that are responsible for setting this standard, because ‘the camera’s designer intended that we see in the photographs whatever is causally responsible for those surfaces being marked as they are’ (Hopkins 2009, 72).

Furthermore, Hopkins has maintained that the relevant causal relations are ‘exploited by someone who intends that whatever is the cause in the relevant chain be visible in whatever is the effect.’ (2009, 73) Consequently, Hopkins has argued that traditional photography is designed to instantiate “factive pictorial experience” (2012, 711) by preserving information from the previous stages and by sticking to accepted norms, such as particular levels of contrast in an image. This experience, Hopkins has argued, also accounts for the distinctive phenomenology that is associated with looking at photographs (2012, 722), because viewers recognize that products of such a

photographic system are ‘guaranteed to show the world how it is (or was)’ and also offer a ‘distinctive route to knowledge’ (2012, 721).

In a similar spirit to Hopkins, Abell has argued that in order to provide ‘compelling evidence of an object’s existence, and of its possessing certain features’, a picture must have been produced by a reliable process (2010b, 85). Abell has acknowledged that photography need not necessarily result in reliable, quick, and rich depictions of external objects but, similarly to Hopkins, she has argued that it tends to do so due to the standardization of photographic functions, which have been instantiated as a result of the value that agents find in this richness (2010b, 98). Moreover, Abell has proposed that: ‘This standardization is enabled by the fact that photographic processes are largely mechanical.’ (2010b, 98) Although Abell has admitted that not all photographic development is mechanized, she has suggested that: ‘the extent to which photographic processes standardly function to produce accurate pictures makes them considerably more reliable than non-photographic processes.’ (2010b, 100) Like Hopkins, Abell has confirmed that photographers intentions may additionally play a role in the photographic process, for instance in framing and darkroom techniques however, as I outlined in Chapter One, she has proposed that: ‘photographer’s intentions can sever the counterfactual dependence of features of the photograph on features of its external object only by overriding the effect of the photographic mechanism, and producing a picture that is not purely photographic.’ (2010b, 84) Similarly, but perhaps more stringently, as I outlined in Chapter Two, Hopkins has proposed that there is only a very narrow sense in which the intentions of the agent can intervene in the process and result in a purely photographic product. Resultantly, the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists have maintained that photographs are unable to misrepresent particulars

(Hopkins 2009, 74) and that “pure” or “authentic” photography is generally of high and reliable epistemic value.

The New Theorists however, as I have explained in previous chapters, have proposed that intentions play a greater role in the photographic process than the Orthodox or Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists have allowed for. Thus far, Lopes is the only theorist to have comprehensively accounted for the epistemic value of photographs from the position of the New Theory (Costello 2017b, 448). Like the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists, Lopes has proposed that there are certain standards of correctness which, dependent upon the domain within which the image is produced, govern the process and ensure reliable, epistemically valuable results. Lopes differs from the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists however, by proposing that it is belief-independent feature-tracking, not causality, that is epistemically virtuous. This is a quality that “standard photography” sustains, but standard photography is neither exhaustive of photography nor is belief-independent feature-tracking unique to photography (Lopes 2016, 112). Images that deserve the viewers trust in the factual content, Lopes has recommended, are typically ‘products of practices that exploit belief-independent feature-tracking by carefully controlling the conditions in which they are made.’ (2016, 111) Consequently, Lopes has proposed that it is social practices that maintain belief-independent feature-tracking, which is not, as Lopes has highlighted, a necessary or sufficient condition to determine whether an image is a photograph. Hence, Lopes has proposed that: ‘The improved normative claim is that images made by belief-independent feature-tracking have an epistemic virtue not possessed by other images.’ (2016, 112)

As different social practices determine different standards of correctness, it follows that epistemic value is contingent, as Lopes proposed: ‘any image type used to perform an imaging task should be informative, where what counts as informativeness depends on the task at hand.’ (Lopes 2009, 17) To this effect, Lopes has highlighted that there are many other knowledge-oriented image-making domains that are not photographic, but that are subject to stringent rules (2016, 112), or what I shall refer to as “warrant conditions”, in order to convey knowledge for specific purposes. One such domain is archaeological lithic drawing, in which warrant conditions are followed ‘to isolate features of artifacts as intentionally made’ (Lopes 2009, 13).¹⁸⁶ This entails that the illustrator is visually selective but still able to depict particulars rather than types. Traditionally, according to the Galison-Topper hypothesis, drawing in the service of science and research has been used to represent types ‘which relies on the judgment and knowledge of the scientist’ (Lopes 2009, 15-16) rather than particulars, which ‘must be represented objectively’ (Lopes 2009, 16).¹⁸⁷ This however is an unnecessarily strict divide and one that does not speak to actual image-making practice. Lopes has demonstrated this by showing that the epistemic virtue of works, such as lithic illustrations, are that ‘by expressing a reading, they aid us to see what would otherwise be missed, but they convey enough additional information in a format that allows us to recognize alternative readings.’ (2009, 22) Such images have the advantage of being interpreted and rendered by an expert and similarly, Moser has highlighted how the use of pictorial convention for illustrating antiquities in the early 18th century enabled new recognition of object types. This mode of selective and interpretative illustration has been described as “scientific realism”.¹⁸⁸ While this may appear to preclude objectivity,

¹⁸⁶ Such as lighting the artefact from a certain angle, making it 1:1 scale and using certain marks to convey different textures (Lopes 2009, 12).

¹⁸⁷ As Moser has outlined, early ‘naturalists moved away from the detailed representation of individual plants to the idealized portrayal of generic “types,” which involved depicting the roots, leaves, flowers, and fruit of a plant all in a single image.’ (2014, 63)

¹⁸⁸ As described by Brian Ogilvie (Moser 2014, 62).

it is not the case that illustrators take on imaginative liberties to present the depicted objects.¹⁸⁹ Instead, such drawings are used to make inferences about the depicted subjects in a strictly scientific method, which involves seeking out the most plausible hypothesis to explain the facts of the object.¹⁹⁰

Hence, as Lopes has highlighted, interpretative manigraphic methods in image-making practice do not preclude the possibility of obtaining reliable visual data. Indeed, as Costello has emphasized: ‘It is because these conditions can be closely monitored by skilled technicians that image manipulation in these domains will often enhance, rather than undermine, an image’s epistemic value...’ (Costello 2017b, 448). While this may be the case, it is not the case, as Costello has claimed that: ‘were orthodoxy true, one would expect *any* intervention in the information channel between input and output to compromise an image’s value and reliability as a source of information. Yet under laboratory conditions the reverse is often true.’ (Costello 2017b, 448) This is not an accurate representation of the Orthodox and, especially, the Second-Generation Orthodox position. The Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists do not deny that other image-making processes, which involve the intervention of an agent, can be epistemically valuable and preserve visual facts about their subjects. Rather, these theorists have proposed that if an agent intervenes to break the counterfactual dependence of the photograph on an external object then the result will not be purely photographic. Hence, while these works may be epistemically valuable, they are not epistemically valuable in virtue of being photographic. This however, as Lopes has

¹⁸⁹ For example, Leonhart Fuchs wrote in 1542 “we have not allowed the craftsmen so to indulge their whims as to cause the drawing not to correspond accurately to the truth.” (Moser 2014, 75 n.43)

¹⁹⁰ For instance, as Moser has highlighted, for the avid collector of antiquities and scientific specimens, Cassiano dal Pozzo, drawings of antiquities ‘were a starting point rather than an end point, providing the antiquarian community with the necessary “equipment” for identifying patterns in classes of objects.’ (Moser 2014, 76)

demonstrated, need not be problematic, given that epistemic value is largely contingent upon social practices that maintain belief-independent feature-tracking, hence these works can still be of epistemic value despite not being purely photographic. However, given that belief-independent feature-tracking can be sustained, albeit to relatively low degrees, in manugraphic practices, is there anything else about automatic image-making techniques that explains why they tend to be used in epistemic practices?

ii. Automatic Image-Making Techniques and Epistemic Value

In this section, I shall demonstrate that automatic image-making techniques tend to function particularly well as consistent information channels for preserving information, whereas purely manugraphic processes are typically inconsistent information channels and so are much less likely to result in the same level of reliability and accuracy. This proposal should not be taken to suggest however, that it is necessary to instantiate a high degree of belief-independence at every stage of an image-making process in order to convey accurate facts about an object and its visual appearance. Accordingly, in what follows, I will demonstrate that the intervention of an agent is not only compatible with the reliable conveyance of visual information but that such intervention can, on occasion, improve the preservation of, and access to, this information. Hence, I propose that what warrants the belief that an image-making process is objective is the adherence to warrant conditions as well as consistent information channels (Abell 2018; Walden 2005). My position is sympathetic to both the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists and the New Theorists, as I propose that e-dependent automatic image-making processes enable agents to more effectively maintain consistent information channels, which, if, subject to warrant conditions can reliably convey propositional information through the image's representational contents about an external object. Furthermore, I

maintain that this is not a necessary function of photography, but a task that it is well suited to performing.

The fact that scientific images, which are created using automatic image-making techniques, are frequently subject to local and global manipulations, by scientists, in order to transmit facts will serve to highlight one of the key points of this chapter; that the intervention of agents in image-making processes is compatible with the resultant products serving as sources of factual visual information about a subject. For example, to create images of nebulas (fig. 38.), scientists use RAW images taken through a range of filters, and combine them with observations and measurements of objects and scenes that humans are not able to perceive (Mitchell 1998, 119) to create compound images, which may be considered fictive were it not for the testimony of scientists that the images accurately reflect the facts of these objects. Global values, such as contrast are adjusted in these images, and in addition local features, such as the colour of particular features, are also adjusted, which is designed to help viewers visually access the information from the image. This is often an arbitrary decision that heightens not only epistemic value, but also aesthetic value.¹⁹¹ What is clear is that, in some instances, photographic images, that have been subject to local manipulation, have far greater epistemic worth than if they were left unaltered. The trust and value that viewers find in these images, is clearly highly dependent upon the context in which they are used and, as Savedoff has pointed out, scientific photographs can be divorced from their authority

¹⁹¹ This is a point that has been emphasized by several theorists, including Chadwick, who has suggested that: 'For aesthetic effects the colours in some of these photographs are represented arbitrarily and, in many cases, data from wavelengths beyond the visible range are assimilated.' (2016, 105) And also Wilder, who has highlighted that: 'Analogies between astronomical images and master paintings have brought the process of designing digital images to the fore. The problem is that colour is so subjective.' (2009, 73)



(fig. 38.) NASA *View of the Crab Nebula 2017*¹⁹² (Accessed from: <https://www.nasa.gov/image-feature/new-view-of-the-crab-nebula/>)

if placed in other contexts.¹⁹³ Importantly, viewers trust images that are presented in a scientific context, unless there are reasons to suggest that they should doubt the representational contents of the image. Moreover, scientists do not conceal the techniques that they employ in order to create images. Similarly, in other knowledge-oriented image-making practices such as medical or archaeological illustration, agents will fully disclose what processes they have used to create their images, having been subject to strict warrant conditions that try to reduce the distortion or loss of visual data.

¹⁹² Furthermore, this image is accompanied by the caption: ‘This composite image of the Crab Nebula, a supernova remnant, was assembled by combining data from five telescopes spanning nearly the entire breadth of the electromagnetic spectrum...’ (Loff 2017).

¹⁹³ The viewer’s faith, Savedoff has argued, in the veridicality of the image, is preserved by their faith in the aim of the search for truth in science (2008, 133).

If, however, all one requires are warrant conditions to determine whether an image will contain factual visual information, then why do image-makers so frequently use automatic image-making techniques, such as photography to create images to convey this information? Part of the answer lies in the fact that automatic image-making processes are well suited to function as consistent information channels, which entails that, provided the image maker uses them to this effect, automatic techniques tend to reliably preserve and convey visual information. To elaborate on this further, here I turn to Walden, who has provided some illuminating comments regarding the nature of channel conditions, in terms which were first laid out by Dretske. Walden has distinguished between two types of information channel degradation – consistent and inconsistent degradation (2005, 268-9). As mental states can degrade information channels, the former type, consistent degradation, is typically associated with automatic image-making processes such as photography or casting. Consistent degradation entails secondary mental state involvement and so generally relates to choices that have global effects on the image that lie outside of the mapping process, such as the decision to use black and white film (Walden 2005, 269), or to add a pigment to a casting resin. For instance, a viewer may not be warranted in the beliefs that they form about the chromatic properties of the representational features of a photograph that was produced by a salt printing process.¹⁹⁴ Yet as this reddish brown tint is the result of secondary mental state involvement, viewers will be warranted in the beliefs they form regarding the spatial arrangement, and relative contrast and brightness of the objects depicted in

¹⁹⁴ In relation to this point, representing colour faithfully has been historically problematic in photography and the chromatic properties of historic photographs were frequently the result of largely arbitrary choices made by a technician. As time and technology progressed however, colour became subject to more consistent channel conditions, as Snyder and Allen have noted that ‘professional photographers include the standard Kodak Colourguide in their pictures to aid printers in reproducing colour.’ (1975, 162 n.18) For more about the development of colour in photography, see Coe (1978).

the photograph (provided that these have not been altered) (Walden 2005, 271).¹⁹⁵ In contrast to this, inconsistent degradation however, entails primary mental state involvement (2005, 267) and so generally relates to choices pertaining to local features of the image, such as the decision to retouch a blemish or the decision to paint a cast by hand. This kind of information channel degradation is typically associated with manographic processes and entails that it is difficult to ascertain whether equivocation is present in the resultant image (Walden 2005, 269).¹⁹⁶ Scientists however, frequently have to manipulate the local features of images in order to emphasize particular features that may be difficult to see or may be extremely poor in quality due to the distance that they have to be transmitted for instance. Yet, as the example of the Crab Nebula image demonstrates (fig. 38), scientists typically disclose what image-making processes they have used, and will alter the image in accordance with warrant conditions, in order to provide assurance that their interference with the local features of the image have been in service of enhancing the information conveying capacities of the image.

As a result of the fact that automatic image-making techniques may be employed to efficiently maintain consistent information channels, many image-makers within epistemic domains have utilized such techniques to the end of preserving and relaying visual information. In some cases, image-makers employed automatic techniques at just one stage in the creation of an image, such as tracing an outline, while in other cases,

¹⁹⁵ Pettersson has argued that ‘relatively *dense*’ (2011a, 191) counterfactual dependence supplies the reason why photographs are so epistemically valuable. Despite this, photographs can still occlude or distort visual information, for instance some photographs are monochromatic or blurry. Pettersson has suggested however, like Walden, that ‘the lack of dependence can in these cases be rather easily read off the image itself (together with some knowledge of the photographic process and the fact that the world is rarely a monochromatic blur)’ (2011a, 191). This being unlike in manographic images, as ‘there is rarely any sign in the image itself as to where and to what extent this impoverished dependence occurs.’ (Pettersson 2011a, 191)

¹⁹⁶ Walden does not state this prescriptively however, and has proposed that: ‘Many photographs have been formed in non-objective ways, and there are imaginable examples of handmade images that are objective.’ (2005, 264)

automatic techniques were employed at every stage possible, from tracing the outline of an object, to the transference of the tracing, and finally, to printing this in reproductions. For example, medical illustrators often employed the use of automatic image-making techniques, such as tracing, in order to faithfully record the appearance and document the workings of the body.¹⁹⁷ This was a practice that continued long after the invention of photography, largely due to the initial technical limitations of the medium, but also because it was easier to single out the salient details of the subject by using automatic image-making techniques, such as tracing.¹⁹⁸ In the late 19th century, with the advent of improved photographic technology, many social institutions began to implement photography as a means to preserve and communicate propositional information. In order to maintain and establish objectivity however, the use of photography was subject to stringent warrant conditions that extended from scientific practices, such as medicine or archaeology, through to judicial systems. For instance, the practice of photogrammetry consists in photographing objects or landscapes from regulated viewpoints (Wilder 2009, 38) and was, and still is, used extensively in the realms of archaeology, aerial surveying, and geology (Wilder 2009, 41). As Snyder and Allen have outlined: ‘Even when a scientist uses “conventional” kinds of photography, he is likely to rely on the inclusion of stopwatches or yardsticks or reference patches in the image, rather than on the photographic process pure and simple, to produce pictures

¹⁹⁷ One such example of which is the following: ‘In his 1901 magnum opus, an atlas of medical surgical diagnostics, Ponfick reassured the reader that his strict rules had limited his artist’s actions. He had recorded outlines of organs on a plate of milk glass mounted over the body, then transferred the image from glass to transparent paper; from the transparent paper, he had inscribed the image onto paper destined for the full watercolour painting. Whilst this series of putatively homomorphic action is by no means fully mechanical (hands-free), at every stage possible the pathologist sought all the automatism that he could implement.’ (Daston 2007, 147)

¹⁹⁸ For example, it was found that the collotype process, which ‘involved direct printing from a gelatin-coated plate after exposure to light under a photographic negative’ (Kemp 2006, 279) could not deliver the same degree of definition as achieved in hand-drawn lithographs. This was so ‘even with such extensive manipulation and the added enhancement of colour, the clarity of detail still fails to rival representations by specialist artists.’ (Kemp 2006, 279) Kemp has highlighted however, that the perceived natural-dependence of photography entailed that for users ‘of early photography in science, the virtue was that he could claim to be showing the real thing’ (2006, 279), which is an idea that I will discuss in the next chapter.

which are a reliable guide to the truth.’ (1975, 162) Resultantly, images that are made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, such as photographs, can serve as sources of factual visual information but this is generally when a “stringent scientific method” has been employed (Wilder 2009, 83) in order to actively maintain consistent channel conditions.

It is particularly interesting to note that an illicit shift was made in the 19th century. As an automatic method for capturing images, photography was initially praised for its ability to unselectively capture detail, however this position was subtly adjusted over time to the claim that photography produced objective images (Daston 2007, 130-1).¹⁹⁹

Whilst e-dependent automatic image-making processes, such as photography, may be well suited to produce images that relay propositional information, this is by no means a default outcome of these processes, but one that has, as the Second-Generation Orthodox Theorists have proposed, been cultivated by agents. Indeed, initially after the invention of photography ‘not all objective images were photographs; nor were all photographs considered *ipso facto* objective.’ (Daston 2007, 125) In the early days of photography, the technology was not sufficiently developed for it to be a particularly consistent information channel. It was especially difficult for instance, to capture entire scenes in one shot due to the length of exposure times.²⁰⁰ Clouds and figures in cityscapes for example, could not be captured due to the long exposure required to capture the image, and so some photographers, as I outlined in the previous chapter,

¹⁹⁹ This shift has been outlined by Daston: ‘The capacity to freeze detail with negligible labour remained a lauded feature of nineteenth century photography for scientific illustration [...] Very soon, however, another argument was advanced in favour of photography as a distinctly *scientific* medium. The automatism of the photographic process promised images free of human interpretation – *objective* images, as they came to be called.’ (2007, 130-1)

²⁰⁰ The usefulness of photography in an epistemic sense was initially quite limited and it was only once the length of exposure times were sufficiently decreased that photography was able to capture scenes in motion and preserve images of scenes that happened in the blink of an eye. For this reason, Keller has noted that unlike artists, the photographer Roger Fenton could not record any of the actual battle during the Crimean War (2010).

created photographic composites to compensate for the loss of visual information, while others retouched photographs to this end. For instance, the images in Artaria's series of aquatints *Vues d'Italie d'après le daguerréotype* (1840-47) were made from tracing over a daguerreotype, and transferring this to a copper plate, when a skilled artist would add in the missing clouds and figures, as well as colour to the image, which 'offered tourists a more faithful souvenir than traditional prints, since it was made directly from a photograph, and thus, from reality.' (Metropolitan Museum of Art 2018) The close connection of photography to reality is an idea that proved to be endemic to how the medium is perceived, as I will discuss in what follows. However, what I wish to emphasize here, is that the process of reiterating the photograph, in the form of the aquatint, was subject to relatively consistent channel conditions that resulted from the automatic image-making techniques; tracing and pigment transfer.

From the foregoing, it should be clear that the objective conveyance of visual information results from the adherence to warrant conditions that govern an image-maker's activities, however this can be greatly enhanced by the use of automatic techniques, which provide more consistent channels to reliably convey this information. Hence, I propose that there is a realist basis for forming warranted beliefs about the representational contents of an image that has been made using automatic techniques in accordance with warrant conditions. Despite this, it is not clear that viewer's beliefs always reflect the fact that certain kinds of images such as drawings, which as I highlighted in the previous chapter are traditionally conceived of as highly belief-dependent manigraphic kinds, may reliably convey propositional information from which viewers can form warranted beliefs about the representational contents of the image. Moreover, as I highlighted in the previous chapter, viewers tend to grant photographs an epistemic status, which is not necessarily justified in the case of every

particular photograph. Unless, there is strong evidence of manipulation, Savedoff has argued, viewers generally assume that they are dealing with “straight” photographs (1997, 209). Furthermore, as Cavedon-Taylor has highlighted, positive reasons for assent to the representational contents of photographs are rarely available to viewers, yet viewers tend to assent to the content of their ‘pictorial experiences before photographs by default’ (2015, 77). To explain why viewers typically automatically assent to the contents of their pictorial experiences before photographs, and by extension to the representational contents of photographs themselves, in the next section I will examine the beliefs that viewers form and hold about different image-making processes and kinds.

iii. Epistemic Status

In this section I will examine why viewers typically assent to the representational contents of photographs in order to establish, in the next section, how the beliefs of viewers diverge from what they are actually warranted in forming beliefs about. From this I will ascertain what can be done to ground the production of warranted beliefs, formed about the representational contents of an image, in good epistemic practice. Despite the fact that there have been many high-profile cases to indicate otherwise, the epistemic status of photography as a reliable, objective medium has been surprisingly persistent. Within three decades of the invention of photography, high-profile court cases were proving that the technology did not guarantee results that would accurately represent the external object. In particular, audiences’ tendencies to believe in the reality of what the photograph depicted were played upon in the second half of the 19th century when ‘photographic images that featured a superimposed element were at times believed to be real manifestations of the existence of spirits and ghosts’ (Natale 2012,

126).²⁰¹ Natale has pointed out that whilst this “reality” was frequently revealed to be a photographic trick, within spiritualist fields, such as the American Spiritualist movement started in 1862 by William H. Mumler, this practice did not actually start to decline in popularity until the mid-20th century (Natale 2012, 129). This is in spite of the Mumler trial of 1869, whereby the photographer was tried for swindling by having purported to have photographically recorded spirits (fig. 39.), during which nine



(fig. 39.) William H. Mumler *Mary Todd Lincoln* c.1870 (Accessed from: <https://www.newyorker.com/culture/photo-booth/photographer-who-claimed-to-capture-abraham-lincoln-ghost>)

²⁰¹ Interestingly, audiences tended to latch on to the idea of the supernatural, even when there was not the suggestion that what they were witnessing was a mystical event, as in the case of the magic lantern show in April 1882 at Neumeyer Hall London in which photographic superimpositions were projected, as a result of which ‘many of the public claimed to have seen visions of spirits or to have felt the presence of them.’ (Natale 2012, 139)

different techniques for producing this illusion were described by photographers over the course of the trial. Despite this however, ‘people testified to having received genuine psychic portraits of dead relatives and friends’ (Rexer 2009, 53) as a result of which, Mumler was acquitted. Although this trial, and others like it, did induce a more general scepticism in public opinion on photographic “truth” (Fineman 2012, 24), the epistemic status of photography as an objective or truthful image-making process is still strong. Yet this status does not accord with the fact that on many occasions viewers are not actually warranted in the beliefs that they form about the representational contents of photographs.

The epistemic status of photography as an objective and reliable medium for gaining warranted beliefs from, has been established largely as the result of the beliefs of viewers. These beliefs will have been formed by the viewer’s past experiences and what they have learnt (Quine 1970, 55). On occasion, viewers may not know the evidence for their beliefs, not that is to say that the relevant observations have not been made, but they have not been consciously registered (Quine 1970, 60). According to Quine, assessing beliefs is best done by assessing several combinations and when a set of beliefs is incompatible, agents have a choice about which belief they can reject in order to restore consistency in their beliefs (1970, 8). Following this concept of belief formation, it is reasonable to suggest that viewers form aetiological beliefs from a very young age when they are taught how to engage with different image-making techniques. Children regularly paint from a very young age and, in an era where photography has become ubiquitous, they also take photographs very early on, but importantly, children are less likely to engage in photographic practices that involve primary mental state involvement, such as digital manipulation of the local features of an image. Indeed, Walden has stated that: ‘Children witness the dramatically different processes that lead

to the formation of handmade images and photographic ones' (2005, 272) and that by observing such differences between making a painting and taking a photograph, beliefs will form with the requisite contents – 'these beliefs will then become operative – silently but importantly – on future encounters with images.' (Walden 2005, 272) When these fully formed beliefs materialize later in life, as Quine has stated, these origins are often unknown as they are formed over time in conjunction with a variety of other beliefs.

Although viewers generally hold a distinction between the epistemic value of photographs and the epistemic value of works made using other processes, it is not obvious that there are good reasons for maintaining this distinction. While automatic image-making techniques may tend to function as consistent information channels, this does not entail that manographic images cannot also provide factual visual information. Despite this, epistemic status appears to be largely fixed in the minds of viewers. For instance, while automatic image-making techniques, including tracing or squaring, may function as consistent information channels through which propositional information can be reliably relayed, viewers are unlikely to be able to appreciate this fact if these techniques are used to produce works that are generally categorized as manographic, such as paintings. This then entails that viewers may form beliefs about the representational contents of the image that are not necessarily appropriate if they view such works under the concept, or type, "painting", which frequently fails to provide accurate visual and spatial information. In particular, the application of concepts can preclude the formation of correct beliefs, and this is a result of incorrect training.

Cohen and Meskin (2008) have also recognised that the epistemic status of media, such as photography, is contingent upon the background beliefs of viewers, given that, as

they have highlighted, the epistemic advantage of photography is not unique to this kind.²⁰² Specifically, the pair have proposed that photographs are epistemically valuable as sources of v-information, or visual information, rather than egocentric spatial information, which I will say more about in the following chapter. However, the pair have noted that there are a few token manigraphic images that also supply v-information including veridical portrait paintings and ornithological illustrations but, as I have just outlined, most viewers fail to recognize these manigraphic tokens as purveying this kind of information due to the fact that they belong to a type which is not typically associated with such information carrying qualities (Cohen and Meskin 2004, 205).²⁰³ While Cohen and Meskin have correctly identified the phenomenon, whereby viewers create an artificial distinction between the epistemic value of photographs and other image kinds, they have not provided any sufficient viewer-independent reasons that may underpin this distinction which, I propose, does in some respects have a realist basis. In particular, Cohen and Meskin have chosen to reject identifying automaticity as a realist factor that contributes to this phenomenon because they favour the view that mentation is just as involved in photography as it is in painting (Walden 2012, 144). This is a view, which I fully support however, I maintain that it is important to distinguish between the different kinds of mental involvement that might occur in different kinds of image-making processes.

Walden has developed an account, in which he has provided such an ontic explanation for the epistemic status that viewers associate with photography and why viewers tend

²⁰² Cohen and Meskin have clarified that their aim in their work was ‘not an attempt to say that this epistemic status is (always) deserved or justified.’ (2008, 77)

²⁰³ Cohen and Meskin has clarified however, that within certain knowledge-oriented contexts, it is likely that manigraphic tokens, such as ornithological illustrations, are categorized as a type, separate from drawing, that do supply v-information and are accordingly recognized as carrying the appropriate degree of evidentiary weight (2004, 206). The vast majority of paintings and other handmade media, they have argued however, fail to supply either v-information or e-information (2008).

to *feel* warranted in the beliefs that they form as a result of looking at photographs and not images made using other media. As I have just highlighted, Cohen and Meskin provide a cognitive explanation for this, proposing that viewers believe that photographs function as sources of v-information.²⁰⁴ However, they have failed to provide an ontic explanation to account for this belief.²⁰⁵ Walden has argued, contra Cohen and Meskin, that the “mechanistic” nature of the photographic process can account for the epistemic value that viewers tend to associate with photographs as this, he has argued, renders the process an objective one (2012, 144). Walden has included in his ontic explanation two further elements: proto-beliefs, known in folk psychology as “appearances”, or states that are candidates to become full-fledged beliefs and so do not perform functional roles, and also high-level regularity, or ‘an idea that emerges from reflections on our interactions with technologies whose mechanisms we do not understand’ (2012, 145). As a result of which he has proposed the following ontic assertions:

- O1: proto-beliefs induced in the minds of viewers of objectively formed pictures are frequently true
and
O2: proto-beliefs induced in the minds of viewers of non-objectively formed pictures are frequently false. (2012, 145)

²⁰⁴ Walden has argued however, that it is improbable that ‘viewers believe that the type of photographs is one whose members carry v-information’ (2012, 142).

²⁰⁵ Walden has explained that the ontic aspect is ‘developing an understanding of the objects or processes that persons value’ (2012, 142), whilst the cognitive explanation is ‘developing an understanding of the beliefs that those persons develop about the ontic matters, and how those beliefs interact with desires to yield the value assigned to the objects and processes.’ (2012, 142) An example of this in a standard case would be agents valuing diamonds more than cubic zirconia due to the ontic belief that cubic zirconia is not as hard as diamond and will therefore scratch unlike diamond. A non-standard or error-theoretic (Walden 2012, 143) case may be of practicing human sacrifice for the Gods, which are formed on unfounded ontic beliefs.

Walden has tied this ontic component together with his central cognitive assertions to propose that:

C1: viewers believe that proto-beliefs induced in their minds by looking at objectively formed pictures are frequently true

and

C2: viewers believe that proto-beliefs induced in their minds by looking at non-objectively formed pictures are frequently false (2012, 146)

In sum then, according to Walden, when viewers encounter photographs they establish the belief that the image has been objectively formed and so in conjunction with C1, the viewer infers (usually unconsciously) that: ‘the proto-beliefs engendered by looking at the picture are likely true, whereupon she elevates them to the status of full-fledged beliefs.’ (2012, 147) This inferential pattern constitutes warrant for the beliefs that viewers form about the visible features of the scene depicted in a photograph (Walden 2012, 147). Hence, viewers typically find photographs more epistemically valuable due to the confidence they feel in the beliefs that they form by looking at this kind of image, given that they generally tend to yield more true beliefs than handmade images.

Whilst I disagree with Walden that it is the automatic nature of the photographic process alone that can render it an “objective” one, it does seem that viewers have subsumed this, or similar contents, into their beliefs to the extent that they do not generally choose whether they withhold assent to the contents of the photographic image. As Cavendon-Taylor has outlined, viewers typically only withhold assent, from the contents of photographs, if they ‘possess reasons *against* thinking the photograph creditworthy.’ (2013, 294) Cavendon-Taylor has also argued that there are realist reasons that explain why photography may be epistemically distinctive to manographic

processes, given that photographs, unlike paintings, can be created without the attention of an agent (2009, 234) and, as Cavedon-Taylor has argued, the term ‘to photograph’ is a ‘factive verb’ (2013, 288). This entails that manographic works unlike photographs, are sources of testimonial knowledge, Cavedon-Taylor has suggested, as they disseminate already known truths (Cavedon-Taylor 2013, 287-90). Contrarily, photographs are sources of perceptually based knowledge, which entails that viewers assent to the contents of photographs, in a manner that is ‘spontaneous, uncritical and unmediated by inference.’ (Cavedon-Taylor 2013, 294) Viewers then, acquire beliefs that rise to the standard of knowledge about the subjects depicted in photographs and so, photographs generate knowledge (Cavedon-Taylor 2013, 294). This being said, while photographs can be used as sources of perceptual knowledge, on occasion viewers may have to infer the content if, for instance, it is particularly unusual (Cavedon-Taylor 2013, 292).²⁰⁶

Indeed, perhaps one of the greatest epistemic advantages of automatic image-making processes is that agents may create visual information about a subject for which they hold no conceptual knowledge, due to the fact that automatic image-making techniques can typically instantiate belief-independent feature-tracking and/or mark making to a greater degree than purely manographic processes, as I outlined in Chapter One. Certain forms of photography, can instantiate belief-independency in both respects and to a very high degree and, as I shall outline in the next chapter, many photographs can be used as such for their evidentiary value. This withstanding, while e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, such as photography, may be used to produce images that instantiate particular epistemic virtues, such as functioning as sources of perceptual

²⁰⁶ Cavedon-Taylor has also noted that the boundary between perceptual and inferentially-based knowledge is highly variable (2013, 290) however, he has maintained that whilst viewers may sometimes acquire inferential knowledge from photographs this should not be taken as an indication that ‘photographically based knowledge is inferential in nature’ (2013, 292).

knowledge, it is not necessarily the case that viewers are more warranted in the beliefs that they form from looking at photographs rather than manugraphic works. Rather, viewers are *more likely* to be warranted in the beliefs that they form as a result of looking at photographs rather than manugraphic works. This is to say, that despite the fact that it may be easier to ascertain secondary mental state involvement, given that viewers tend to assent to the content of their “pictorial experiences before photographs by default”, viewers may fail to detect any signs of primary mental state involvement if the amended content retains the phenomenal appearance of being produced by photographic means. Frequently, as in the context of science for instance, primary mental state involvement is highlighted and the viewer is assured that the image was produced in accordance with warrant conditions. However, viewers are not always provided with such clear contextual information that indicates what beliefs viewers are warranted in forming about the representational contents of a photograph. This entails that viewers may not be warranted in certain beliefs that they form about the representational contents or moreover, viewers who are unaware that a photograph has been produced using inconsistent information channels, may feel warranted but form false beliefs about the representational contents of a photograph.

This is problematic however, given that, in proposing an amendment to Lopes’ epistemic account, to accommodate for the varying degree of epistemic value that is associated with different photographic processes, Abell has proposed that viewers value photographs that carry information about the pro-photographic scenes, which were involved in their production, in depictive form and that viewers value ‘photographs that carry information about the pro-photographic scenes involved in their production through communication channels that *we recognize* as being effective at carrying such

information.’ (2018, 215)²⁰⁷ This certainly helps to explain why particular photographic practices have epistemic import. However, the problem, I suggest, is that, as I have just highlighted, viewers do not always recognize which channels are and which are not actually effective at carrying such information.²⁰⁸ Hence viewers may assign certain kinds of photographs with an epistemic value that, in token cases may not be warranted and conversely viewers may fail to recognize the epistemic value that other kinds of images may convey and moreover, this may be further complicated in the digital age with the advent of new photographic processes. Lopes has added that Abell’s approach spells out the details of this amendment in a promising direction (2018, 229) as it provides the basis for a better and more permissive account that undercuts the need for belief-independent feature-tracking and instead focuses on how ‘some photographic practices comprise norms that govern how photographic equipment is designed, manufactured, and then used to serve any of our epistemic needs.’ (2018, 229) While this may be true, more I suggest needs to be done, for the sake of good epistemic practice, to ground the production of warranted beliefs, formed about the representational contents of an image. To this end then, I shall proceed in what follows.

²⁰⁷ Abell has proposed that, given Lopes’ endorsement of Dretske’s notion of information carrying, Lopes’ account should be modified to include the stipulation that: ‘a photograph is an image output by a mark-making process that carries information from an electro-chemical event that records information from a light image of a pro-photographic scene and *does so through a communication channel of a type that is effective at carrying such information*’ [Emphasis mine] (Abell 2018, 214). Abell has included the social norms in order to avoid falling back on belief-independency, which Abell has argued would preclude the New Theorists from accounting for forms such as abstract photography.

²⁰⁸ Specifically, Abell has suggested that: ‘The type to which [a communication channel] most saliently belongs affects how effective we take it to be and thus the epistemic import we attribute to it.’ (2018, 215)

iv. The Representation of Naturally-Dependent and Intentional Subjects

Although viewers tend to assent to the general content of a photographic image, given that it is possible to manipulate the local features of photographic images so that the amended content retains the phenomenal appearance of being produced by photographic means, there may be elements of an image that viewers are not warranted in forming beliefs from. Hence, epistemic warrant may operate at different levels within the same image. Typically, in epistemically oriented domains, as I outlined in section ii., any manipulation of global and local features will be altered in accordance with warrant conditions and clearly signalled to the viewer. However, given that images and photographs are frequently produced and circulated outside of knowledge-oriented environments it can be difficult, for viewers, to determine what representational content of the image they may form warranted beliefs from. To ascertain then, in what respects warranted beliefs about the representational contents of an image may be formed, and in relation to this, what kinds of epistemic value a viewer may access in an image, I will return to a distinction that I made in Chapters One and Two, to account for the fact that images, such as photographs, that are made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, have a naturally-dependent subject and may in addition have an intentional subject.

Within an epistemic context, I propose that typically, representations of naturally-dependent subjects record the visual appearance of an external object in order to preserve and present factual visual information, from which propositional knowledge about the presented object can be generated, while representations of intentional subjects may additionally be used for the purpose of depicting fictional subjects, presenting visual information whilst offering an explanation or perspective about the

object, or conveying situated knowledge.²⁰⁹ Moreover, as I highlighted in Chapters One and Two, the latter kind of representation entails the former, but not vice versa. An example that very clearly illustrates the distinction between the photographic representation of naturally-dependent and intentional subjects, is Gijon Mili's photograph of Picasso "drawing" a centaur using light (1949) (fig. 26.). The photograph represents the naturally-dependent subjects, Picasso, the room, the pottery in the background, and the small electric light, but also represents the intentional subject, the fictional centaur, which was created by Picasso's act of drawing in the air with the small electric light and captured by Mili's two cameras and use of long exposure. Warranted beliefs about the representational contents of a photograph can be formed from both of these types of representation, for example by looking at the Mili photograph, viewers can form warranted beliefs about the appearance of Picasso's face, the pottery, and the shape of the room he was in when the depicted event took place. Viewers would not be warranted however, in forming the belief that the centaur really existed, but would be warranted in believing that Picasso had moved a small electric light in such a way as to create the outline of an imaginary centaur. Although it is obvious in this example, that the intentional subject was not veridical, in many cases this is harder to detect. In what follows, I will explore the implications of this depictive dyad for viewers, examining in particular what kinds of epistemic value they are able gain from these different modes of picturing.

Numerous photographs that are used in advertisements are subject to production and post-production processing in order to make the intentional subject, the product, seem appealing and effective, and so convince viewers that it is worth purchasing.²¹⁰ It is rare

²⁰⁹ This could also be expressed in the words of John Fiske, who wrote that "denotation is what is photographed; connotation is how it is photographed." (Callahan 2012, 11)

²¹⁰ As Ritchin has noted of photography: 'its perceived credibility has also been purposefully misused to manipulate the public since the medium's inception for political and commercial

however, for viewers to be adequately informed about when photographs have been subject to such processing in this domain and the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) frequently receive complaints about photographs being used in advertisements that are deceptive for this reason. For instance, a 2009 advert for Olay eye cream (fig. 40.) received over 700 complaints for using a photograph that, due to extensive



(fig. 40.) Olay Advert 2009 (Accessed from: <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2009/dec/16/twiggys-olay-ad-banned-airbrushing>)

post-production work, presented a misleading representation of the efficacy of the product on a woman of the model's age. This particular case led a Scottish MP to campaign for a symbol that would indicate whether images had been altered and to what extent (Cockcroft 2009). Despite this, the ASA ruled that the whilst the image was misleading it was not socially irresponsible (Cockcroft 2009). Another noteworthy example of photographs used in advertisements that prompted public outcry, were the 2003 adverts for the charity Barnardos, which featured photographs that appeared to

goals.' (Ritchin 2010, 19) And Fineman has likewise stated that: 'The suasive power of photography – its capacity to elicit a reflexive suspension of disbelief even in the face of strong counterevidence – has made the camera an incomparable tool for advertising.' (2012, 150-151)

show babies in distressing situations of poverty, which prompted over 466 complaints to the ASA. Ash has explained that

...many viewers took issue with the Barnardos's ads because of their seeming exploitation of the "real" babies in the images (the models), and this reaction was surprisingly strong despite the artificiality and digital manipulation of the photographs. (Levin 2009, 331)

Certainly, there are many kinds of photographic manipulation that do not provoke outrage, such as the use of an Instagram filter, however in other contexts, photographic manipulations can provoke strong reactions, given that manipulation may be used to deceptive ends.²¹¹ For instance, Atencia-Linares has noted that manipulations in photography, when presented in certain contexts, are usually considered a defect unless presented as fictional (2012, 28). Despite this, the examples of the advertisements demonstrate that, even though photographs may be used in a context that is widely known to be non-neutral about what is being communicated, it is frequently the case that viewers cannot help but feel that photographs accurately reflect reality, or at least should accurately reflect reality. Clearly in the case of the eye cream advert, the manipulation of the photograph was to a misleading end, however can this also be said of the Barnardos advert? While the naturally-dependent subjects in these photographs were not victims of the kind of abuse that was depicted in the photographs, the intentional subjects, the real victims, tragically did suffer from such abuse. Hence the photographs were not misleading in the sense that the intentional subjects, which were the focus of the images, conveyed situated knowledge.

²¹¹ Moreover, deceptive manipulations, which have evaded notice, have frequently had big repercussions in political spheres: 'The falsification of photographs was notoriously widespread in the Soviet Union, but it was hardly unique to that country or that political system. The temptation to "rectify" photographic documents had proved irresistible to modern demagogues of all stripes, from Adolf Hitler to Mao Zedong to Joseph McCarthy.' (Fineman 2012, 91)

As I highlighted in relation to the Mili photograph, factual visual information can be communicated through either of these types of representation however, given that the representation of an intentional subject, which is constituted from a naturally-dependent subject, can additionally convey nonfactual subjects and states of affairs, clear signalling must be given by image producers and publishers to indicate deviations from fact or standard photographic practice.²¹² There are undoubtedly some contexts in which viewers will withhold their assent to the photographic contents, such as in the context of a satirical magazine or, as Bátori has proposed, fashion photographs which are commonly known to be manipulated (2015, 76), however viewers typically feel justified in forming beliefs about the representational contents of images that appear to have been made in a photographic, and therefore “objective”, medium. Hence, as Mitchell has explained: ‘if this suspension of the rules is not clearly signalled with sufficient clarity, or if it is deliberately fudged, then we may justifiably feel deceived – that fiction has slipped into falsehood.’ (1998, 219) Moreover, sufficient clarity entails ensuring that viewers will understand the import of the manipulation that has been performed, as for instance:

A 1950 composite of the former leader of the U.S. Communist Party, Earl Browder, meeting with Senator Millard E. Tydings of Maryland, circulated by the staff of the virulently anti-communist senator Joseph McCarthy, is thought to have been not only a factor contributing to Tyding’s unsuccessful bid for reelection (he lost by 40,000 votes) but a warning to other politicians not to tangle with McCarthy. (Ritchin 2010, 37)

²¹² Currie for instance, has proposed that ‘if a documentary is misleading, it is not intrinsically misleading.’ (Currie, 1999, 288) Documentary as a category Currie has shown, and as I maintain here, actually contains a lot of cases whereby there is a mix of documentary and non-documentary elements (1999, 286), and this is acceptable so long as convention is followed, that the viewer is made aware that what they are looking at is intended to be a particular viewpoint or narrative that is presented or a fictional representation.

This was despite the fact that it was indicated that the photograph had been subject to manipulation, however as Ritchin has explained: ‘Even though it was labelled a photo-composite, few readers understood the term.’ (2010, 37) While it was indicated that this photograph represented an intentional subject, by combining different naturally-dependent subjects, it was not made sufficiently clear to avoid being deceptive.

Pogliano has argued, within a journalistic context the ‘generic trust in the medium of photography [is] thanks to the apparent invisibility of its manipulative aspects.’ (2015, 553)²¹³

Furthermore, there are certain kinds of manipulation that viewers may struggle to account for without sufficiently clear signalling. As Bátori has suggested that in the case of erasing someone from a photograph for instance:

...our default interpretation does not (cannot) take this type of manipulation into account, even if we know about the possibility of such manipulations. In this case we have no choice but to proceed with the default interpretation, but that will result in deception. (2015, 76)

While deception is a negative thing for epistemic practice, in the realm of art many photographers have capitalized on this response, the viewer’s assent to the contents of photographs, as in the case of tableaux or staged documentary.²¹⁴ Moreover, frequently these photographs are used to convey situated knowledge through an artistic form and as long as this is clearly signalled to the viewer then they will offer what Kermode calls their “conditional assent” (Soutter 2013, 58). If, however it turns out that some aspect of

²¹³ In her study, Pogliano has found that ‘that citizen photographs are generally held to be worthy of equal or greater trust than the images produced by professional photojournalism’ (2015, 555), largely because they appear to be snapshots and so it is thought that they are less likely to have been somewhat staged or interfered with (2015, 559).

²¹⁴ For example, as in the work of An-My Lê, who reconstructs her memories of war-torn Vietnam.

the purported events portrayed is non-fictional, or vice versa in the case of non-fiction works, then viewers are likely to feel that they have been deceived.²¹⁵ That viewers can be deceived however, confirms that photography is capable of representing its subjects accurately (Gunning 2004, 42) and as cases of staged documentary show, or manipulated photographs, it is the association of which with reality that contributes to the viewer's reactions.


Extrinsic factors then, such as the outlet in which the photograph is released or the caption that accompanies the photograph, are also important to take into consideration in order to ascertain what representational content viewers are warranted in forming beliefs about.²¹⁶ Some photographs may even be misleading for reasons that are largely extrinsic to the representational contents of the photograph itself. For example, in the photograph *Migrant Mother* (1936) (fig. 41.) by Dorothea Lange, the naturally-dependent subject, Florence, is represented quite accurately in terms of the relative spatial locations, facial expressions and clothing of Florence and three of her children.²¹⁷ The intentional subject of “the deserving poor” however, as represented by an anonymous family that, in Lange's full caption for the photograph, included a father who was identified by the photographer as Californian, does not accurately reflect the situation of the individuals depicted (Sandweiss 2007, 194-6), as the identities and stories of the individuals pictured are subsumed into an overarching cultural comment (Ritchin 2010, 150).²¹⁸ Photographs are frequently taken by viewers to objectively

²¹⁵ For instance, as Soutter points out, readers tend to react negatively when it is found out that autobiographies contain fictional aspects (2013, 58).

²¹⁶ As Ritchin has confirmed: ‘A documentary photograph has always required contextualization to evoke its intended meanings. This usually comes from a caption, a voice-over, a headline, an accompanying article, as well as the context derived from where it is shown or published.’ (2010, 72)

²¹⁷ The photograph was however, subject to some alteration as, on the tent pole, at the bottom right hand corner of the image there is a semi-transparent thumb.

²¹⁸ As Ritchin has highlighted: ‘the subject of the photograph is often voiceless, unable to contest his or her depiction. Often the photographer barely knows the person, yet the image



(fig. 41.) Dorothea Lange *Migrant Mother, Nipomo, California* 1936 (Accessed from: https://www.moma.org/learn/moma_learning/dorothea-lange-migrant-mother-nipomo-california-1936/)

present the subject and while Lange's photograph does accurately represent the naturally-dependent subject, taking extrinsic factors into account, such as the caption, may mean that viewers are not warranted in forming certain beliefs about the naturally-dependent subject.²¹⁹ Intentional subjects are often represented in order to communicate situated knowledge, which may potentially mislead the viewer about the naturally-

could be used to define the person or to represent a certain theme.' (Ritchin 2010, 150) While Sandweiss has noted that 'the personal narratives of the picture's subjects can disrupt the powerful cultural stories that adhere to the image in its multiple iterations' (2007, 196).

²¹⁹ For more about the significance of the caption in the *Migrant Mother* case, see Sandweiss (2007, 194-6).

dependent subject of a photograph if there is not adequate signalling provided for the viewer that what they are looking at is intended to be a particular idea or experience that is presented. Consequently, I propose that epistemic warrant should rest on the regulated processing *and* dissemination of the image. There are many photographs that are created and disseminated without regulation and may not be reliable sources of knowledge as a result. Conversely there are many fields where works that are produced by a combination of manographic and automatic processes, or even works made entirely by manual means, are highly reliable sources of knowledge, due to the rigorous management of their creation and dispersal. Viewers however, frequently fail to recognize this (Cohen and Meskin 2008). Nevertheless, the digital or post-photographic age has given viewers a chance to reassess their beliefs and so I shall now turn my attention towards issues pertaining to epistemic warrant in the digital age.

v. Epistemic Warrant in the Digital Age

I have outlined that viewers are not always warranted in the beliefs that they form about the representational contents of photographs, seemingly having subsumed the popular saying “the camera does not lie” into their beliefs.²²⁰ Despite the fact that the digital age has been referred to as the “post-photographic” age by theorists including Mitchell (1998) and Savedoff (2008), who have argued that the digital post-production of photographs endangers the epistemic standing of the medium, it appears that there has been little change to the epistemic status of photography in the digital age. While digital technology means image-makers may access editing tools and manipulate photographs with ease and precision, in what follows, I will propose that the real post-photographic

²²⁰ As Kemp has concurred: ‘Even in the age of digital manipulation, this popular reaction to photographically-generated images dies hard.’ (2006, 245)

issue is not that of post-production, but the digital dispersal of photographs, given that in the digital age there are fewer warrant conditions in place to ensure the regulated dissemination of images on digital platforms. Under what circumstances then are viewers warranted in forming beliefs about the representational contents of photographs? To address this question, I will propose a set of negative criteria to test the reliability of an image, as a source of knowledge, and in so doing offer an account of epistemic warrant in the digital age. While, given the context of the discussion in this chapter, I will tailor these criteria to photographs, as I will demonstrate, the criteria can easily be adapted to account for the reliability of other kinds of images.

Theorists, including Mitchell (1998), Richin (2010), and Savedoff (2008), have expressed pessimism about the epistemic prospects for photography in the digital age. Savedoff has argued that ‘the notion of a special authority now seems chained to the photography of the past, as digital tools move contemporary photography closer to the subjectivity of drawing and painting.’ (2008, 111) Similarly, Mitchell has concluded that digital imaging practices are destabilizing the entire photographic tradition and all the conventions that go along with this (1998). Hopkins meanwhile, has asserted that *prima facie* there is no reason why digital photography cannot be an information preserving system (2012, 722) but it is notably susceptible to manipulation, given the increased ease, accessibility, and precision of digital manipulation. In cases where manipulation has occurred, Hopkins has argued that digital photography may not count as factive or may ‘prevent our *recognizing* such experience as factive (even though it is).’ (2012, 723) Likewise, Abell has maintained that digital manipulation does not necessarily diminish the epistemic value that photographic pictures generally possess, but that it can affect the epistemic value of particular photographs (2010b, 101). She has proposed that whilst techniques which allow for systematic alteration, such as the

adjustment of colour, can make photographic misrepresentation easier than it used to be, the counterfactual dependence of the features of the photograph on the features of its external object is preserved (Abell 2010b, 101). This being said, Abell has suggested that this reduces ‘the reliability of digital photographic processes and the [epistemic value] of the photographs produced by them’ (2010b, 101). In other cases, however whereby digital photographs are retouched pixel-by-pixel, Abell has argued that the result ceases to be a purely photographic picture as the counterfactual dependence on the object is severed and so the photograph misrepresents the particulars of the external object (2010b, 101).

Despite these concerns, evidence shows that viewers are generally confident in the reliability of digital photographic products. Whether consciously or not, many viewers display behaviour that indicates that they still view photography as an objective medium (Levin 2009, 331). Walden has described this phenomenon as the digital photography paradox, whereby such images should undermine the viewer’s confidence in photographs yet do not actually seem to have.²²¹ Likewise, Polte has argued that despite many theorists and practitioners proclaiming that photography has come to an end, ‘the medium is alive and well, including the popular idea of a “true” representation of reality.’ (2006, 145)²²² This has been confirmed by research, as for example, Pogliano’s study reported ‘that the general level of audience trust of news photographs has held up well in spite of the digital revolution.’ (2015, 558) One reason for this is that many of the “post-photographic” concerns, that have been expressed by theorists, are not

²²¹ One reason he has cited for this is the public dismissal of photo-journalists, such as Brian Walski, who have been found out as manipulating their images (Walden 2008, 109).

²²² Similarly, Lopes has observed that: ‘Despite all the fretting about the danger of digital technology to photography’s epistemic credentials, there has been no catastrophe’, which Lopes has argued is due to the fact that penalties are still in place within certain image-making domains that place restrictions on doctoring depending upon the nature of the practice (2016, 110).

concerns that are specific to the digital age. It is worth noting for example, that whilst Savedoff has claimed that manipulation is standard in digital photographic practice (1997, 211), this is not necessarily a new phenomenon for photography and nor, as I have outlined in this chapter, does manipulation necessarily preclude a photograph from conveying propositional information or other kinds of knowledge.

Although many viewers and theorists took the February 1982 *National Geographic* cover, on which the Pyramids of Giza were digitally shifted closer together, to be a ‘symbol of photography’s waning credibility’ (Fineman 2012, 38), it is a myth that analogue photographs were rarely manipulated. The first intentional photographic manipulation is thought to have been performed by Calvert Richard Jones around 1846, when he blotted out one figure in a group of monks from a negative (Fineman 2012, 3-4) and from as early as the 1850s, as I highlighted in the previous chapter, Oscar Gustave Rejlander and Henry Peach Robinson started ‘printing several negatives onto a single sheet of photosensitized paper’ (Bear 2010, 93 n.3) to create composite positive images. By paying close attention, the photographer would soften or vignette the edges of the different negatives in order that they would blend together to produce a more natural looking image (Mitchell 1998, 164). As soon as this practice was developed, a whole host of bizarre Victorian photographic “trick” studios were set up, creating anything from “headless” photographs to “spirit” photographs (fig. 39.) where one could purportedly be photographed with a ghostly apparition (Fineman 2012, 117). The manipulation of images was not however, just restricted to photographs created for aesthetic, playful, or mystical purposes as for example Nadar, reportedly employed “six retouchers of negatives: and three artists for retouching the positive prints” (Mitchell 1998, 183), which is a strong indication that retouching would have been an important element in the production of portrait photographs in this 19th century photographic

studio.²²³ Nadar however, was not unique in this as ‘retouching was widely practiced, especially by commercial portrait photographers whose livelihood depended on their wiliness to flatter their clients.’ (Fineman 2012, 63)²²⁴ Even photographic purists in the 20th century, such as Paul Strand and, as I outlined in Chapter Two, Ansel Adams, would alter their photographs for, as Fineman has explained: ‘in practice there has always been a roster of permissible kinds of image manipulation’ (2012, 34).²²⁵ Moreover, retouching was often necessary in order to create a realistic appearance of the subject in photographs (Fineman 2012, 9) and as I have outlined in this chapter, manipulation can enhance the capacity of photographs to convey factual information about their subjects.²²⁶

As Maynard has observed ‘...the digital worry is about too much agency. This paradox should motivate us to consider what kinds of agency we value, and for what.’ (2010, 33)

It was certainly not the case that all those who were working with analogue photography would manipulate their negatives or retouch their positives, but likewise, contrary to the assertions of theorists, such as Savedoff, not all digital photographers manipulate their images. Morris for instance, has suggested that while it is good that

²²³ Fineman has explained that: ‘From the 1850s on, retouching – a term that encompassed various kinds of image manipulation, from the hand colouring of prints with paint or dye to the altering of negatives with chalk or graphite – has been the most obsessively talked-about taboo in photography, at once widely condemned and commonly practiced.’ (2012, 61)

²²⁴ Furthermore, in large group portraits at the time, it was common to construct the image ‘posing the figures separately and adding them to the composition one at a time.’ (Fineman 2012, 51) George Washington Wilson’s *Aberdeen Portraits No. 1*. (1857) is the first known group portrait produced by additive means, whereby: ‘Wilson cut out and pasted a selection of portrait heads in a tight oval, placing the largest and most important figures in the center; then he rephotographed the collage.’ (Fineman 2012, 51)

²²⁵ Permissible kinds of image manipulation have included ‘choosing particular film, lenses, lighting, filters, and photographic paper of different textures and tones to achieve desired effects as well as burning and dodging in the darkroom to adjust shadows and highlights.’ (Fineman 2012, 34)

²²⁶ Interestingly, retouching was often necessary as a result of the speed of transmitting photographs. ‘The launch in the 1930s of photographic wire services, which enabled the near-instantaneous transmission of images via telephone lines, made prepress retouching all the more necessary.’ – images needed to be retouched in order that they ‘would reproduce legibly on the printed page.’ (Fineman 2012, 140-1)

viewers may be more aware of the manipulation of photographs, it is also important for viewers to remember that ‘not every photograph has been tampered with.’ (2011, 45-46)

The potential to manipulate photographs has almost always been possible, what has changed, I suggest, is cultural and photographic movements and styles, and moreover increased public awareness and first-hand experience of editing photographs. What has not sufficiently changed however, I suggest, is awareness of how different developing photographic technologies operate and how these operations may be performed in accordance with existing warrant conditions (both official and implicit) in certain domains. Rather than positing the difference between analogue and digital photography to lie in epistemic status it is more fitting, as I highlighted in the previous chapter, to consider this as an evolution of a pre-existing set of technologies and practices.²²⁷ The development then, of digital photography may entail some differences in creative activity and potential output but in general, digital photography has retained the majority of features that were also present in analogue forms of photography.²²⁸ For instance, in Photoshop 1.0, which was released in 1990, Fineman has highlighted that some of the tools:

...were directly analogous to predigital darkroom techniques such as cropping, burning and dodging, and colour-balance adjustment; others, including plug-ins designed to ripple, whirl, pinch, or otherwise distort images, were closer to the visual universe of film special effects. (2012, 42)

²²⁷ As Maynard has highlighted, the development of digital technology simply reiterates the fact that photography is a name which covers not just one process, but ‘an ever-developing family of technologies.’ (2010, 29)

²²⁸ As Fineman has pointed out: ‘Nearly every kind of manipulation we now associate with Photoshop was also part of photography’s predigital repertoire, from slimming waistlines and smoothing away wrinkles to adding people to (or removing them from) pictures, changing backgrounds, and fabricating events that never actually took place.’ (Fineman 2012, 5) Theorists such as Steele and Jolly, however have argued that: ‘computers are also capable of generating previously impossible forms of display on the screen or as prints: using software, similar images can be combined, stitched together in panoramas...’ (2011, 466).

These latter effects, though difficult to achieve using analogue means, as I demonstrated at the end of section iii. in Chapter Two, were possible with the use of lens attachments and long exposures for instance. However, some particularly notable differences between the activities of the analogue photographer and the digital photographer is the ability to create layers, morph photographs, save different adjustments and variations, as well as “undo” any alterations made (Fineman 2012, 201).²²⁹ Moreover some digital shooting formats are dependent upon these kinds of editing to create a visible image, which in accordance with what I discussed in the previous chapter, entails that viewers may be uncertain about what kind the resultant images belong to, which in this context may entail that viewers are unsure about when they are warranted in the beliefs that they form about the representational contents of an image.

The advent of the RAW shooting format has for example, created many problems as the RAW file, just like a negative, cannot be printed without first being edited and so the output does not match the original RAW image (Solaroli 2015, 522), which in turn has made it difficult to determine whether a photograph has been excessively post-produced in relation to conventional warrant conditions. For instance, ‘in 2009 [...] Danish photojournalist Klavs Bo Christensen was excluded from the “Picture of the Year” contest in Denmark because the juries, comparing the “final” photos with their raw files, argued that the colours had been excessively post-processed.’ (Solaroli 2015, 525) HDR, which I discussed in the previous chapter, has also produced problems in determining whether a photograph has been overly post-processed. For example, in 2013 Swedish photojournalist Paul Hansen won World Press Photo of the Year, for a photograph of the funeral procession of two children killed in Gaza, however this

²²⁹ These features were introduced in 1994 with the advent of Photoshop 3.0. (Fineman 2012, 189).

decision was challenged by Neal Krawetz, who argued that it was not a single photograph, but an HDR composite (Solaroli 2015, 525). Experts in forensic analysis found no evidence of significant photo manipulating or compositing and the Chair of the US National Press Photographers Association's Ethics and Standards committee confirmed:

In this day and age, the public has a perception of what makes an honest photograph. True, this is in many ways just a convention. But there is a general understanding of what makes an honest photograph and HDR and other new techniques are not a part of this perception, at least not yet. (Solaroli 2015, 526)

Although I have proposed, in the previous chapter, how to determine what kind the images that are produced by these technologies belong to and when it is appropriate to appreciate the digital nature of the technology, as the Hansen case demonstrates there is further work to be done to aid the viewer's awareness of how the operations of developing photographic technologies may be performed in accordance with existing warrant conditions (both official and implicit) in certain domains. This is a matter, I suggest, that cannot be settled without appealing to the context in which an image is distributed in order to ascertain the reliability of an image and what in turn, the viewer is warranted in believing as a result of looking at an image produced by digital photographic means. Consequently, I will construct a series of negative criteria that can be used to test the reliability of an image as a source of information. Specifically, these criteria will pertain to the integrity of the image itself, and whether the image has been distributed in a responsible and reliable manner that does not mislead the viewer about the kind of information presented in the representational contents of the image. Using this kind of criteria, I propose, may help viewers to identify and infer any anomalies and thus evaluate how warranted they are in the beliefs that they form from viewing an

image. Given the level of uncertainty about evolving digital photographic processes in particular, I will tailor the criteria to photographs, however as I will demonstrate, these can easily be adapted to account for the reliability of other kinds of images. In order then, to establish the content of this criteria, I will examine how warrant conditions are established and upheld in different domains.

While there are few established standards to determine what constitutes acceptable manipulation within fields such as fashion photography, in fields such as photojournalism and wildlife photography however, ‘the prohibition of manipulation (of pictorial content) and staging is well known.’ (Bátori 2016, 82) Generally, there are more warrant conditions for the production and dissemination of images, within scientific, documentary, and photojournalist domains. Within photojournalism for instance, typical practices of increasing contrast or brightness are considered acceptable, while ‘additions or deletions to the subject matter of the original image’ (Solaroli 2015, 520) are considered to be unacceptable. These were the standards that were upheld before the advent of digital photography and despite the differences in techniques, the guide for retouching in the digital age within a journalistic context is often referred to as the “darkroom principle” (Solaroli 2015, 519). When these standards are not upheld there are consequences, which usually take the form of public exposure and backlash, when it is found out that a purportedly neutral visual report is in fact misrepresenting the actual state of affairs.²³⁰ The fact that entities such as the Society of Professional Journalists (2014) and the National Union of Journalists (2011) promote journalistic codes of ethics which specify that information should be “accurate” and “differentiate between fact and opinion” strongly supports the thesis that journalistic photography

²³⁰As Pogliano has highlighted: ‘In the cases where a manipulation is the subject of public criticism, the situation goes from rituals in news production to public rituals of reparation, which serve to maintain the journalistic ideal of objectivity.’ (2015, 554)

should follow conventions to maintain impartiality and to not diverge from reporting the actual state of affairs. This does not however, necessarily makes things easier for the viewer as ‘while many publications, particularly newspapers, have recently adopted more stringent policies concerning the digital manipulation of photographs, the reader usually has no simple way to understand what these standards are, even in the responsible press.’ (Ritchin 2010, 64) Hence while viewers may be provided with assurances that warrant conditions have been observed, this is still not adequate to provide reassurance that an image is a reliable source of knowledge, given that the information about these warrant conditions is not sufficiently clear. This is problematic as without a clear indication of what warrant conditions are followed within particular practices, viewers cannot test whether an image upholds certain values, after the fact of its having been made.

In order to ascertain whether an image has been made and distributed in accordance with warrant conditions, viewers need to have clear idea of what these conditions are. Hence, sufficiently clear warrant conditions, I propose are important for both the creation of an image and also the distribution of an image, as these enable viewers to determine what beliefs they are warranted in forming about the representational contents of an image. This has been demonstrated in legal domains, where photographs are routinely treated with scepticism. Moreover, photographs that are used as evidence in courtrooms, for instance, are generally considered to be: ‘explanatory tools, not as proof in and of themselves.’ (Carter 2010, 44) There is a long history of the incorporation of photographs as evidence in legal contexts and in Paris this began as early as 1841, when ‘police included daguerreotypes of criminals in their files’ (Carter 2010, 26). By the late 1850s in the US, and the early 1860s in the UK, photographs were starting to be incorporated as evidence in courtrooms (Carter 2010, 26-7). Carter

has explained that this use of photographs began due to the belief that ‘as a truthful representation of the world, the photograph, unlike witnesses, would not confuse facts.’ (2010, 32) In the 1880s however, courts became sceptical about using photographs as primary evidence due to an increasing awareness of photographic manipulation (Carter 2010, 36). To circumvent this concern, ‘some corroborating testimony’ was required to vindicate the evidential status of photographs in legal proceedings (Carter, 2010, 36). This entailed:

...witnesses’ oral testimony to provide them with meaning. This meaning is contested upon cross-examination or through the submission of different photographs and other expert witnesses’ testimony. It is then left to the jury to make a determination about the value of evidence based on the conflicting narratives provided. (Carter 2010, 44)

This standard was set in place by the US, UK, and Canada during the last two decades of the 19th century (Carter 2010, 38). Carter however, has argued that courts have been slow to react to the digitalization of the medium, but he has conceded that few adjustments have been needed to amend the standards already in place (2010, 41). For example, photographs that are knowingly enhanced are admissible in American Courts ‘provided they are properly admitted as part of testimony by an expert who is knowledgeable about the process used, and who can testify to the operations of the computer and the software.’ (Carter 2010, 43) Such warrant conditions, that can be tested, after the fact, have entailed that digital photographs may be used to form warranted beliefs about the representational contents of a photograph.

This has been demonstrated by the Abu Ghraib case, which involved digital photographs taken as amateur visual records by military personnel involved in the practices shown. Moreover, it was one of the first cases to show that digital photographs

are still considered to be epistemically valuable by authority figures and other viewers. By contrast, the unprecedented release of silver-based photographs by the Daily Mirror on May 1st 2004 purporting to show British soldiers torturing detainees, were widely dismissed by experts and journalists as being faked (Gunthert 2008, 106). What is key to note in the Abu Ghraib case, is not only that the digital photographs functioned as representations of naturally-dependent subjects, but also that the context of their dissemination enabled viewers to form warranted beliefs that what they were shown in the photographs was an accurate reflection of the situation:

Correlated with testimony enabling the identification of the photographers, the date and the conditions in which they were taken, the images had the status of evidence, explicitly referred to by the prosecution as proof of the charges. The cornerstone of the photographs' credibility, the criminal case also provided the conditions of their transmission to the press. (Gunthert 2008, 107)

Conversely, the editor of the Daily Mirror was fired for failing to ensure that the images depicting British soldiers had been verified as accurately representing the event that was purported to have taken place. Warrant conditions are supposed to be followed by such outlets and there are consequences for those who do not follow them. This situation however, has changed in recent years.

The problem, I propose that faces contemporary viewers of photographs is not post-production, but the fact that images released on digital platforms, such as social media outlets, are not subject to warrant conditions that determine the circumstances of their distribution and so can present viewers with misleading or misguided "facts".²³¹

²³¹ For an example of the variation in content dependent upon the context of a works release, see Prosser (2005, 133).

Amateur, private, and non-professional photographs have been used for journalistic and other knowledge-oriented purposes for a long time (Solaroli 2015, 518); however, the social media channels in which these are now distributed are simply not as reliable as professional outlets, including news sources, that will (or are supposed to) cross-check sources in order to ascertain the veridicality of what is being shown and reported.

Information can now be shared in seconds, which is both an advantage and disadvantage as for example, whilst photographs of current and developing events can be shared with the world instantly this can come at the price of sharing the most appropriate image, or giving a photograph an accurate caption or frame (Morris 2011, 193; Ritchin 2010, 86).²³² While these issues existed prior to digitalization, as is evident in the *Migrant Mother* case, misunderstandings or miscommunications are more likely to occur in the digital age, even in professional circles, given how little time photographers have to edit their photographs and “to digest what had happened” before immediately sending their photographs off for publication (Ritchin 2010, 86).²³³ Under what circumstances then, are viewers warranted in forming beliefs about the representational contents of a photograph? To address this question, I propose that the following negative criteria can be used to test the reliability of a photograph as a source of knowledge.²³⁴

²³² In an interview with Morris, for instance, photographer Ben Curtis has stated: ‘In an ideal world, you have lots of time to go and [find information about the subject to include in the caption]. We’re an up-to-the-minute news agency; you’ve got to go and file those pictures. Sometimes it’d be nice to go back tomorrow and track this person down and interview them and get their story and provide the context for it. And maybe if I were working for a weekly magazine, I’d have more of an ability to do that. So you make these compromises.’ (Morris 2011, 193)

²³³ This being said, there are certain advantages that come with quickly processing photographs, as Warburton has noted: ‘A short gap between taking and printing a photojournalistic image reduced the chances of photographers forgetting the circumstances of the photograph by the time they came to print it; insisting on the photographer printing his or her own negatives eliminated misleading interpretations of the negative’s apparent content.’ (1997, 131)

²³⁴ Morris has outlined four criteria that have been used on the internet for determining inauthenticity in photography: 1) digitally altering photographs after the photograph has been taken; 2) photographing staged events as if they were real events; 3) staging scenes or moving objects and then photographing them; and 4) providing false or misleading captions (2011,

Image Integrity:

- The subject exists or existed at the time the photograph was purported to have been taken, or appropriate signalling is provided to indicate that the photograph is nonfactual i.e. if the photograph shows a person known to have been deceased for five years but was purportedly taken last year and there is no indication that it is fictional, it is not a reliable source of knowledge
- The scene or event depicted is within the realms of plausibility, or appropriate signalling is provided to indicate that the photograph is nonfactual i.e. if the photograph shows a person present at an event that occurred before they were born and there is no indication that it is fictional, it is not a reliable source of knowledge
- The physics of the scene the photograph depicts is accurate, or appropriate signalling is provided to indicate that the photograph is nonfactual i.e. if the background features of the photograph show a slight curve and a very slim celebrity there is a strong chance that the photograph has been digitally altered to enhance their figure and if there is no indication that any such processing has occurred, it is not a reliable source of knowledge

Image Authenticity:

- The photograph is presented in a trustworthy context i.e. if the photograph is presented in a fashion advert or certain magazines there is a strong likelihood that it has been retouched without indicating that this has occurred and so it is not a reliable source of knowledge
- Supporting text should verify what is depicted in the photograph i.e. if there is a caption with the photograph, this should cohere with the facts of the depicted

214). The criteria I propose here, however, significantly expand on this, in particular with respect to the image authenticity category that I have proposed.

subject, or adequately indicate that it is nonfactual, otherwise it is not a reliable source of knowledge²³⁵

- There is sufficient supporting data to verify the photographed event i.e. if the photographed event does not appear to have any other reliable witnesses, or if there is no other documentation that the photographed event occurred then there are reasons to doubt that the photograph is a reliable source of knowledge
- The original source of the image can be traced i.e. if the photograph appears in the media or on the internet it should be possible to trace this back to the source where it first originated from, which should be verifiably trustworthy, otherwise it is not a reliable source of knowledge
- The conditions of release have been respected i.e. if the photograph has been released by a specific person, or party, under certain conditions then the distribution of the photograph should reflect these, otherwise there are reasons to doubt that it is a reliable source of knowledge

This list is not exhaustive, but provides the basis for establishing the reliability of a photograph as a source of knowledge. If the majority of these conditions are met then it is likely that the photograph is a reliable source of knowledge. Whilst some of these conditions may be necessary, certainly none are sufficient for forming warranted beliefs about the representational contents of a photograph. There is nothing inherently wrong in not meeting any of the aforementioned conditions, particularly with respect to the integrity criteria. If, however, such conditions are not met and a photograph is released without the appropriate signalling and presented as a representation of a naturally-dependent subject, then this is an act of deception and viewers may not be warranted in

²³⁵ As Mitchell has outlined, John G. Bennett has concluded that ‘the label is analogous to a name, that the picture is analogous to a predicate, and that combining the label and the predicate gives something which can be seen as true or false, like a sentence.’ (1998, 192)

the beliefs they form as a result of looking at the photograph or moreover, viewers, unaware of this deception may feel warranted but form false beliefs about the representational contents of the photograph. Using this kind of criteria may help viewers to identify and infer any anomalies and thus evaluate how warranted they are in the beliefs that they form from viewing a photograph and, if the criteria are adapted, other kinds of images. For instance, the second Image Integrity criterion can be adjusted as follows: ‘The scene or event depicted is within the realms of plausibility, or appropriate signalling is provided to indicate that the image is nonfactual i.e. if the image shows a person present at an event that occurred before they were born and there is no indication that it is fictional, it is not a reliable source of knowledge’.

Given however, that ‘humans are unreliable in identifying fake images’ (Korus 2017, 1) why may it be a good idea to advocate the use of testing criteria rather than automatic detection methods? Broadly speaking, there are currently four automatic approaches to detecting image forgery: a) digital signatures, which are metadata, b) authentication watermarks, which are embedded directly in the image content, c) forensic analysis, which examines whether the physics of what the image depicts is accurate, for instance by determining whether figures have been removed or inserted by examining the lighting of the image, and d) phylogeny reconstruction, which aims to recover the editing history of the image (Korus 2017). Each of these methods are vulnerable however. Digital signatures may be invalidated after ‘mild’ post-processing or image compression (Korus 2017, 4). Embedding watermarks can lead to a degradation of the image quality and can also have limited effectiveness in work flows where images can be ‘pro-actively protected’ (Korus 2017, 5). Forensic traces are easily falsified and may also exhibit limited robustness due to compression or global post-processing (Korus 2017, 16), whilst image phylogeny does not answer questions regarding image integrity,

which ensures ‘that the content represented by the images is the same as at the time of its acquisition’ (Korus 2017, 2). Furthermore, advances in photographic technologies may require entirely new approaches to determining the authenticity of an image. Given that automatic methods to determine the authenticity of an image are still quite limited and not always widely available, it is good epistemic practice to have some guidelines that can be used to test the reliability of an image. Using these criteria may not yield specific answers, such as exactly what part of an image may have been subject to modification and what kind of modification this may be, but the proposed criteria can at least provide the basis for a viewer to know when to exercise caution.

As I have demonstrated in this chapter, automatic image-making techniques do have certain epistemic advantages as for example, provided that they are used to this end, they very effectively maintain consistent information channels. While images that are made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, such as photographs, may appear to provide viewers with grounds to assume that the resultant images convey factual information about the naturally-dependent subject, as I have also demonstrated in this chapter, and those that have preceded it, there is nothing in principle to preclude image-makers from misleadingly representing the naturally-dependent subject, or to represent an intentional subject, which is constituted from the naturally-dependent subject. In order then, to navigate the complex field of epistemic value in relation to images that are made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, viewers need to exercise caution and carefully ascertain whether an image has been produced and distributed in accordance with warrant conditions, in order to determine when they may be warranted in the beliefs that they form about the representational content of an

image. It is difficult to reconcile the fact that reporting is done by humans.²³⁶ In order to impart the significance of an image and why it is worth showing, an act of communication must occur. As Mitchell has stated, if viewers insist on truthfulness from a photograph then they need to ensure that confirmation can be produced that a standard procedure was followed (1998, 30). This withstanding, it is also clear that viewers have persistent beliefs and habits that they have formed in response to photographs. In relation to this, in the next chapter I will examine another epistemic claim that has been made, about photographs in particular, that I suggest can be used as the basis to account for some aspects of the phenomenology that is associated with viewing certain kinds of images that have been made using e-dependent automatic image-making processes.

²³⁶ Photographer W. Eugene Smith, for instance, as quoted by Soutter, conjectured: ‘Up to and including the instant of exposure, the photographer is working in an undeniably subjective way. By his choice of technical approach (which is a tool of emotional control), by his selection of the subject matter to be held within the confines of his negative area, and by his decision as to the exact, climatic instant of exposure, he is blending the variables of interpretation into an emotional whole which will be a basis for the formation of opinions by the viewing public.’ (Soutter 2013, 53)

Chapter 5: Automaticity and the Perceptual Experience of Images

In the previous chapter, I explored what kinds of knowledge viewers stand to gain from the representational contents of images that have been created using e-dependent automatic techniques, such as photography. As I outlined, despite the fact that not all photographs are reliable sources of propositional information, viewers typically automatically assent to the representational contents of photographs. In this chapter, I will examine a different, but related epistemic claim that I suggest can be used as the basis to account for some aspects of the phenomenology that is associated with viewing certain kinds of images that have been made using e-dependent automatic image-making processes. This claim has been made by the Orthodox Theorist, Walton, who has proposed that photographs, unlike manigraphic works, are transparent pictures that put viewers in perceptual contact with the subject. More specifically and used in this sense, transparency is the notion that when a viewer experiences a certain kind of picture, they “see through” it and perceptually experience the content of the picture.²³⁷ Walton has specified that this experience is twofold, consisting in both the indirect perception of the external object through the photograph, and the fictive direct perception of the external object. Costello has described Walton as a “nonskeptical” Orthodox Theorist (2017b, 440) as Walton, in his transparency account, has explained how ‘photography is both an aid to vision *and* a means of making pictures’ by describing photography in terms of the interaction of ‘a “mandate to imagine” with an extension of our natural powers of visual detection.’ (Costello 2017b, 449) Moreover, Costello has noted that the ‘marginalization of Walton remains a blind spot in recent debate.’ (2018, 231) Does Walton hold the key then, to account for both the epistemic

²³⁷ The term transparency is also used in theories of depiction to refer to the experience of seeing depicted objects as overlapping, however this phenomenon will not be the one I focus on in this chapter.

and aesthetic capacities of photography? In this chapter, I will establish that Walton's epistemic claims cannot be substantiated, however while Walton's account cannot speak for both the epistemic and aesthetic capacities of photography, it can, I propose, be adapted to provide the foundations for an account to explain why viewers may feel like they are in some kind of perceptual contact with the objects of images, which have been made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, that fulfil the conditions for transparency.

In section i., I will examine the nature of transparent pictures, suggesting that, contrary to most interpretations of his account, Walton's conditions for what constitutes a transparent picture result in a theory that admits degrees of transparency, given my account of automatic image-making techniques. Having established what counts as a transparent picture, in section ii. I will assess whether Walton has appropriately categorized transparent pictures within a perceptual framework. In particular, I will address whether transparent pictures convey egocentric information, which is widely considered to be a necessary condition for object perception, both direct and indirect. Given that photographs, and other transparent pictures, are unable to satisfy this condition, I will instead suggest that transparent pictures form a unique kind of "perceptual evidence". There is evidence to suggest that viewers also hold a similar conception that transparent images function in this way. Moreover, there also seems to be a particular phenomenology associated with viewing such kinds of images, which I will term the "presence phenomenon." Consequently, I will instead explore the claim that viewers frequently *feel* like they are in some form of perceptual contact with the subject of a transparent picture. Given then, that one aspect of Walton's twofold experience is incorrectly characterized, in section iii. I will examine whether there is any particular respect of the pictorial experience of transparent pictures that triggers this

phenomenology. As one aspect of Walton's twofold account is incorrect, I will argue that the experience of seeing transparent pictures does not differ from ordinary cases of pictorial perception. Hence, when viewers look at a transparent picture, part of the content of the viewer's belief is that they are looking at an image, which entails the representation of the fact that the external object is not spatially or temporally present to them. Thus, I will propose that the presence phenomenon is characterized by a belief-discordant experience, whereby the viewer feels that the object is present to them through a transparent image, despite the fact that this is manifestly not true. I will then examine whether imagination could be responsible for this belief-discordancy, by examining Walton's account of imaginative seeing. However, I will find that imagination, while a part of this experience, does not account for the fact that it is a belief-discordant one. Hence, in the following chapter, I will examine what cognitive mechanism causes this experience in order to construct a novel account of the presence phenomenon.

i. Transparent Pictures

Walton has proposed that transparent pictures are necessarily created by belief-independent methods that instantiate counterfactual dependency and real similarity relations to the object. Walton has specified that both of these conditions, i) natural counterfactual dependency and ii) real similarity, must be met for viewers to literally see, or to be in perceptual contact with the external object of the image.²³⁸ Although

²³⁸ Although Walton has maintained that seeing-through furnishes contact, not necessarily knowledge (1997, 72), seeing-through can, he has acknowledged be a valuable epistemic tool that enables viewers to gain perceptual knowledge about objects that they would not have been otherwise able to access (1990, 331). For example, photographs, in particular, are able to show viewers the appearance of objects in ways that they could never be perceptually experienced. For instance, from the end of the 19th century photography has been "freezing" scenes that would usually be experienced by an agent in motion (Kemp 2006, 301). This kind of representation has been referred to by Kemp as 'the first major adjunct to the act of seeing that

transparency may imply a loss of awareness of the picture, Walton's account actually describes a dual experience of both the picture and the external object. To this effect, Walton has stated that:

A photograph may allow us actually to see what could not be seen otherwise – the position at a given moment of the galloping horse's four hooves, for instance. But it may also be fictional that we see this when observe the photograph. (Walton 1990, 330)

Thus, Walton's account trades on a twofold experience, whereby viewers indirectly perceive the object of the transparent picture, while they fictively directly perceive the object of the transparent picture.²³⁹ Moreover, by using transparent pictures, viewers are able to see what would otherwise be impossible to actually directly see.²⁴⁰ Some kinds of pictures may meet the first condition, but fail to meet the second and so will not instantiate perceptual contact. To use the example that Walton has provided, a machine may transcribe an exact description of whatever is before it (1984, 270) and so meet the first condition however, viewers will be unable to use the appropriate perceptual facilities to gain information about the subject and so do not see through this kind of work.²⁴¹ Likewise, some works may meet only the second condition and so fail to

was wholly specific to photography' (2006, 301). Walton has also emphasized that photographs allow viewers to see into the past, however Benovsky has stressed that photographs are *images* of the past (2011, 391).

²³⁹ As Costello and Phillips have highlighted, it is the '*interaction between* actual, if indirect, seeing, and direct, but imagined, seeing – only the latter of which photography shares with other forms of depiction on Walton's account – that marks photography and film out...' (2009, 7).

²⁴⁰ In time-lapse photography for instance, images are captured that do not reflect any one spatio-temporal configuration, thus while such visual arrangements are impossible to actually see, viewers are able to see them through transparent pictures. Similarly, Perini has highlighted that photographs can visually misrepresent perceptual experiences of the external object, as for example in the case of a horse-race photo-finish image: 'Treated as a depiction, it is largely inaccurate: there was no moment in time in which the horses were in those relative spatial positions and configurations.' (2012, 153) In such cases however, Perini has suggested, viewers frequently employ resources other than depiction to comprehend the image's contents.

²⁴¹ Walton has suggested that 'investigating things by examining pictures of them (either photographs or drawings) is strikingly analogous to investigating them by looking at them directly...' (1984, 270), which is a sentiment that has been echoed by other theorists. For

sustain transparency because the viewer cannot perceive an external object. For example, a painting may display a high degree of accuracy in the depiction of the subject, however if it was created by purely manographic means then, according to Walton, the viewer's visual experience will depend on the beliefs of the maker (1984, 270). Resultantly, such a picture will fail to meet the first condition and viewers will not sustain perceptual contact with the subject. Such pictures, Walton has proposed, are "opaque", rather than transparent (1984, 267).

In relation to this last point, Walton has proposed that photographs generally meet both conditions and that there is a "sharp-break" between photographs and other kinds of pictures in this respect (1984, 253).²⁴² Most theorists, who have critically engaged with Walton's transparency account, have maintained that Walton suggested that there is a difference in kind, rather than degree between photographs and other kinds of pictures.²⁴³ Moreover, some theorists have suggested that this distinction exists, but is contingent on the beliefs of the viewer with respect to what kinds of information they believe certain kinds of pictures to convey.²⁴⁴ Walton himself has not however, maintained this distinction to the extent that most theorists have found him to, as Walton claimed that transparency can be a matter of degree, in some instances, and that some pictures may be transparent in certain respects, but opaque in others (1984, 267). For instance, some photographs may present viewers with subjects that are distorted, blurry, or out of focus and so may not be transparent to a high degree, while 'most

instance, 'Eco concedes that "iconic signs reproduce some of the conditions of perception, correlated with normal perceptive codes"' (Callahan 2012, 17). Whilst Montfaucon explicated the value of images as opposed to verbal descriptions as follows: "No Narrative, however plain and full, can teach us what one Glance of the Eye will; Images copied from Monuments produce the same Effect almost, as being upon the very spot." (Moser 2014, 85)

²⁴² More specifically, Walton has proposed that: 'Objects cause their photographs and the visual experiences of viewers mechanically; so we see the objects through the photographs.' (1984, 261)

²⁴³ See for example, Currie (1991) and Benovsky (2014).

²⁴⁴ See for example, Cohen and Meskin (2004).

photographic constructions [such as composite photographs] are transparent in some of their parts or in certain respects.” (Walton 1984, 269)²⁴⁵

Moreover, as I outlined in Chapter One, Walton has claimed that some other kinds of pictures may be weakly transparent, including those that have been created using automatic techniques, such as drawings that are created by tracing from photographs or over windows. In addition to this, Walton has suggested that ‘one might use a directional light meter and fill in the squares of a grid with shades of grey corresponding to the readings it gives of the various parts of a scene’ (1984, 267) and he also conjectured that ‘doodles done automatically, while the doodler’s mind is on other things’ are probably transparent (1984, 267). Walton’s “sharp-break” is then, I suggest, not quite as sharp as he himself at times appears to suggest (1984, 253) and as other theorists have generally maintained that he has suggested. This more inclusive reading suggests that other kinds of pictures may also count as transparent, although perhaps to a lesser degree than most photographs. For example, pictures that are created using automatic image-making techniques including drawing from a photograph using the method of squaring, and as I outlined in Chapter One; images that are created by tracing from a projected image, using either a camera obscura, a camera lucida, or a projected photographic image, may all count as transparent to some degree. All of these techniques instantiate some degree of belief-independent counterfactual dependence on an external object, as well as real similarity relations, provided that the image-maker remains faithful to the appearance of the subject as they draw and do not, for example,

²⁴⁵ In response to Walton, Lopes has pointed out that many photographs are made with intervention and so: ‘our impression of seeing-through a picture should, on this view, be weakened by the suspicion that it has been touched up.’ (2006, 182) Walton however, would likely respond that such works are weakly transparent, as he has maintained that while not all photographs are transparent or perfectly transparent: ‘We *do* see through photographs. Not perfectly.’ (1986, 807)

as Chuck Close has in his later work, use such techniques to create images that upon closer inspection reveal themselves to consist of abstract forms.

Lopes has gone further than this and has proposed that all kinds of images, including those made by purely manographic means, may be transparent. He has suggested that Walton's transparency account is too restrictive with regard to the type of experience that viewers undergo in front of pictures and so to rectify this, he has proposed that, as I outlined in Chapter One, drawing is an automatic action and so can, in some sense, be both belief-independent and counterfactually dependent.²⁴⁶ As a consequence of this, Lopes has suggested that manographic images, like photographs, can convey information that is not reliant on conceptual, and therefore belief-dependent, processes and so should also be considered transparent, which he has characterized in the following way:

In sum, we see things through pictures because the conditions under which they represent parallel the condition under which we experience the objects of visual perception. In particular, pictures are transparent because they are caused by, counterfactually dependent upon, and second-order isomorphic with properties of their subjects that are constitutive of the visual sense modality. (2006, 192)²⁴⁷

Walton himself, however has suggested that mindlessly-made doodles may be transparent, and while Lopes may be correct to suggest that a greater number of manographic pictures count as transparent, I will maintain here, as I did in Chapter One,

²⁴⁶ Specifically, Lopes has proposed that frequently drawing is applied recognition: 'In order to draw, you are required only to make marks that are recognizably of the object whose appearance is guiding your drawing movements.' (Lopes 2006, 184)

²⁴⁷ To clarify, Lopes has defined second-order isomorphic properties as follows: 'correspondences need not be, and usually are not, one-to-one. Combinations of design features may correspond holistically with pictorial properties, and not vice versa.' (2006, 188-9)

that drawing does not typically instantiate belief-independency to a high degree, unless performed with automatic techniques. Pictures made by purely manugraphic means typically instantiate natural counterfactual dependence and real similarity relations to a lower degree than pictures made using automatic techniques and so I suggest that manugraphic works tend to be weakly transparent, if at all. I shall therefore restrict my focus in the remainder of this chapter to pictures that are transparent to a high degree, or have been made using automatic techniques, such as tracing and photographic events. Moreover, as I shall demonstrate, the particular phenomenological experiences that works made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques instantiate are more profitably accounted for by adapting Walton's transparency account, rather than Lopes' transparency account.

ii. Perception

Walton's transparency account has been subject to widespread criticism. In particular, critics have objected to Walton's proposal that viewers literally "see" the subject of a transparent picture. Walton's account however, was one of theory construction rather than "conceptual" or "linguistic" analysis as he has stated in later work (Walton 2008, 111) and so his intention was not to use the term "see" in the sense of the ordinary English use of the word, but rather to examine the viewer's perceptual experience of the contents of a photograph.²⁴⁸ Despite this, many of his statements are reliant upon common understandings of the terms "seeing" and "perceiving". For example, there are indications in *Transparent Pictures* that Walton sympathizes with a representationalist approach to perception, whereby agents perceive by seeing-through sense data, as Walton argued that just as sense data does not block an agent's view of the world

²⁴⁸ Walton has restated this point in several other publications (1986, 805; 2007, 156).

neither does a photograph (1984, 253).²⁴⁹ Moreover, as I outlined in the previous section, Walton based his account of the twofold experience of transparent pictures on a distinction between direct and indirect perception, which is a conventional distinction, that is compatible with a common understanding of perception.²⁵⁰ In this section then, I will assess whether Walton has appropriately categorized transparent pictures within a perceptual framework.

In the previous section, I outlined that for Walton both conditions of i) natural counterfactual dependency and ii) real similarity, must be met for viewers to literally see, or to be in perceptual contact with the subject of the image. Currie however, has argued that i) is not necessary (1991). To demonstrate this, he has re-examined the case of “Blind Helen”, an example used by Walton to demonstrate that i) is necessary (1984, 265). In this example, Helen’s neurosurgeon hooks her brain up to a computer, ‘which gives her visual experiences that match the scene before her eyes.’ (Currie 1991, 24) Helen’s “sight” however is controlled by the neurosurgeon operating the computer and so according to Walton, Helen only ‘*seems* to be seeing’, as really it is the doctor who sees for her and any differences in the doctor’s beliefs will make a difference in her visual experiences (1984, 265). According to Currie however, this is an ‘odd kind of seeing, but still a case of seeing as long as the surgeon’s vigilance ensures counterfactual dependence between Helen’s visual experience and the scene before her eyes.’ (1991, 24) To strengthen this reply and factor out issues arising relating to maintaining the correct degree of counterfactual dependence, Currie has used a

²⁴⁹ Friday has suggested that direct realists hold an advantage over representationalists, as they are able to resist the “slippery slope” and deny that viewers really see through photographs (1996, 37). Friday has proposed to treat photographs as a case of “regarding-as” which is ‘to say that a photograph is transparent is to characterize the attitude we have to the causally produced picture we see.’ (1996, 40) This an approach that, as will become apparent over the course of the chapter, I will favour.

²⁵⁰ Although this distinction may not always be made using the terms direct and indirect perception.

Malebranche inspired example, whereby God, in his benevolence, mediates between the scene and an agent's visual experience to maintain counterfactual dependence.²⁵¹

Walton has responded to this point by highlighting that Currie's examples are also unusual uses of the term "seeing" and that moreover, in the Malebranchian case, the figure that guides the seeing is more akin to a force of nature than a 'human intentional agent' (2008, 132 n.47a). Currie has additionally argued however, that i) and ii) are not jointly sufficient for perceptual access. For example, mercury thermometers are naturally counterfactually dependent and preserve real similarity relations, yet agents do not perceive heat through this mode of, what Currie has called, representation (1991, 25). Currie has suggested that representations provide viewers with 'information about things without giving us perceptual access to them.' (1991, 25) To see if this counter-example goes through however, consider the following example. A digital photograph need not be output as an image due to the fact that it is stored in binary code, which may be output for instance, sonically, rather than visually. Indeed, if the digital photograph is output in a sonic format, then it will in the same sense, as the thermometer does, preserve real similarity relations. But would we be willing to grant that the musical output of a digital photograph does preserve real similarity relations? The answer, contra Currie, is no, given that, as I outlined in the previous section, Walton has suggested in his account, that information about the objects of transparent works are preserved in order that they may be accessed through the appropriate perceptual sense.²⁵²

²⁵¹ This is an example, that Lopes has also similarly used to demonstrate that manographic image-making techniques can result in transparency (2006, 183).

²⁵² It is worth remembering, as Kulvicki has highlighted, that some kinds of images 'systematically share some qualities with what they represent, but they also fail to do so in key respects' (2014, 146) as is the case of fMRI images, which Kulvicki suggests fall under a class of non-pictorial images that are mimetic but not transparent (2014, 146). The advantage however, of such images, according to Kulvicki, is that they 'allow us to apply our resources for perceptually investigating things to that which we cannot ordinarily see.' (2014, 150)

Currie has not only suggested however, that mercury thermometers are representations. He has also proposed that both photographs and paintings are representations, although Currie has specified that photographs are instances of natural, or causal representation, whereas paintings are instances of intentional representation (1991, 24-5).²⁵³ According to Currie, both kinds of representation give the viewer information about their subjects without providing perceptual access to them, yet they differ in that the former kind is naturally-dependent, while the latter is intentionally-dependent. Walton however, does not deny that photographs, and other transparent pictures, are also representations and has advocated that transparent pictures can be artworks and also that transparency is compatible with representation (1997, 68).²⁵⁴ This is due to the fact that Walton used the term, representation, to account for the kind of entity, including depictions, ‘whose function is to serve as a prop in reasonably rich and vivid perceptual games of make-believe.’ (1990, 296)²⁵⁵ In *Transparent Pictures*, Walton has stated that ‘we can be aware, even vividly aware, of both the medium and the maker without either blocking our view of the object.’ (1984, 262) Similarly, I have advocated throughout this work, that photographs may be representations of naturally-dependent subjects and intentional subjects.

In particular, Walton has placed transparent representations in a category of perceptual aids, that include mirrors and telescopes, and he has suggested that ‘*this* mediation is a

²⁵³ In this context, these terms are used to denote that the contents of intentional representations are subject to change as a result of the image maker’s beliefs, that may be mistaken, whereas in the case of natural, or causal, representations the image will reflect whatever was before, in this case, the camera irrespective of what the image-maker believed.

²⁵⁴ Walton has emphasized that the difference that he posits between photographs and manographic works ‘is entirely compatible with the fact that photographs, like paintings, result from human activity and reflect the picture maker’s interests, intentions, beliefs etc.’ (1997, 68)

²⁵⁵ However, as Lopes has shown, Currie’s understanding of representation is in close alignment with the Scrutonian sense (Lopes 2003, 441) whereby non-representation results in transparency.

means of *maintaining* contact.’ (1984, 273)²⁵⁶ Currie however, as will become clear in what follows, has not differentiated finely enough between cases of “ordinary seeing” and seeing via the use of visual aids. Specifically, there are some key distinctions between direct and indirect perception, which corresponds respectively to “ordinary seeing” and seeing via the use of visual aids, in Currie’s terminology. Direct perception entails that nothing has mediated an agent’s view of the scene before them, unlike in instances of indirect perception whereby rays of lights are first reflected off another surface, such as a mirror, before meeting an agent’s eyes. A further consequence of the distinction between direct and indirect perception is that when directly perceiving an object, agents will typically have some sense of the objects spatial positioning in relation to them, however this is not necessarily the case when agents perceive objects through the use of visual aids. Hence, when indirectly perceiving an object, viewers may not be able to ascertain where exactly an object is in relation to them. Before assessing how transparent pictures fare in relation to this distinction, it is first worth outlining that there are several reasons as to why it is good practice to maintain this general distinction between the conveyance of egocentric information in cases of direct perception and indirect perception.

Currie has argued that seeing is perspectival and that from this, it follows that egocentric information is necessary for an agent to see (1991, 26). Thus, Currie has proposed that in order to see, an agent must be able to orient themselves spatially to the object of their perception (1991, 26). In response to this however, Walton has pointed out that Currie would be forced to deny that an agent sees a carnation in an array of mirrors due to the lack of clear spatial positioning (Walton 2008, 129-130). Cohen and

²⁵⁶ Walton has also included, in the category of indirect perception, seeing-through television hookups, footprints, and death masks. He described the class of these cases as “natural kinds” (1986, 805).

Meskin, who together have argued that Currie holds too strong a requirement on object seeing by involving doxastic attitudes, have tried to counter Walton's reply and his argument more generally, by basing their own theory on Dretske's understanding of 'information-carrying as a kind of (objective) probabilistic, counterfactual-supporting connection between independent variables.' (2004, 200) This then, entails that the truth of the objective probabilistic link between two independent variables 'is independent of anyone's doxastic attitudes about the two.' (2004, 201) Hence, Cohen and Meskin have suggested that object seeing is a kind of objective probabilistic counterfactual relation whereby 'x sees y through a visual process z only if z carries information about the egocentric location of y with respect to x.' (2004, 201) However, as Nanay has pointed out 'the problem is that the necessary condition they propose is not even satisfied by some perceptual episodes of healthy adult humans' (2010, 467) as for example, humans are notoriously bad at distance perception and seeing in low light. Agents then, can see, but not necessarily see *where* something is, which is to say that agents may not necessarily gain egocentric knowledge of an object's spatial location from perceptual experiences (Walton 2008, 129).²⁵⁷ In relation to this sentiment, Nanay has suggested a weaker, but more palatable condition for object perception that makes sense of Walton's mirror example and does not lead to the counterintuitive examples that Currie and, Cohen and Meskin's accounts suffer from. Influenced by Lewis and Noë's accounts of embodied perception, Nanay has put forward the case that rather than be able to locate objects in egocentric space (Nanay 2010, 466), a necessary condition of object perception is that if one were to move, then the perceived object would change

²⁵⁷ Friday has also pointed out that whilst sight evolved for the reason of acquiring knowledge, it does not necessarily follow that this will be the only way in which agents utilize this function (Friday 1996, 34). Additionally, Walton has highlighted that an agent's ability to see objects that are far away is useful to their everyday survival, however this also entails perceiving entities such as stars, which is of no obvious epistemic advantage to an agent's survival (2008, 129).

continuously whilst one does so (Nanay 2010, 468).²⁵⁸ This condition, then focuses on egocentric information as broadly construed, rather than the narrow construal of egocentric location as is found in Currie and, Cohen and Meskin's accounts of object perception.²⁵⁹

Although this condition coheres with Walton's views on object seeing more generally, it fails to be satisfied in the case of photographs. Specifically, although the object on which the photograph is presented will change if the viewer moves, the photographic image itself will not (2010, 473). This is different for mirrors and telescopes however, as if the viewer moves, or moves the position of the visual aid, then the perceived object will change continuously as the viewer moves. Nanay has expressed doubts however, that this extends to the use of devices such as CCTV cameras. He has used the example of seeing oneself and an apple on CCTV to question whether this can be deemed as a form of egocentric information as it is not localized in egocentric space (Nanay 2011, 469 n.9). Although the case, of seeing oneself and an object on CCTV, may seem counterintuitive to class as an instance of object perception, given that the information is relayed to the viewer in real time, if the viewer moves then the object will change in relation to them and so, this may count as a borderline case of genuine, albeit indirect, object perception. Another borderline case has been offered by Asis, who has argued that photographs may be useful visual prostheses as for example, an agent may take photographs using a flash to help guide themselves around a pitch-black room (2008,

²⁵⁸ Nanay does note however, that this necessary condition does not rule out that the possibility that viewers literally see what is represented by sculptures or three-dimensional photographs (2010, 474-5). One possible line of reply is that generally in such cases, the constituent materials and makeup of the represented objects are significantly different from the sculpture or three-dimensional photograph. Hence what viewers literally see are representations, not the actual objects such entities represent, which is to say that the representational object itself changes, not the represented subject.

²⁵⁹ Furthermore, Nanay has suggested that this condition is what makes genuine perception unique as for example, hallucination does not satisfy this condition, despite its indistinguishability from percepts (2010, 469).

13). If this example goes through then it may show that photographs do provide egocentric information. However, entities and objects may move or be moved between the agent taking the photographs and so, while the photographs may help to guide the agent, viewing them, I propose, does not count as an instance of object perception. Instead, as I shall elaborate later in this section, transparent pictures, such as photographs, more plausibly serve as forms of “perceptual evidence”. I maintain then, that generally transparent pictures do not satisfy Nanay’s weak necessary condition for object perception, but more plausibly, and as suggested by Cohen and Meskin, remain spatially agnostic, functioning as rich, but spatially undemanding, sources of visual information (2004, 204).²⁶⁰

Nanay’s condition for object seeing and, Cohen and Meskin’s suggestion that transparent representations function as rich, but spatially undemanding, sources of visual information has also been formulated in Matthen’s work. In particular, Matthen’s account of pictorial experience provides empirical reasons as to why transparent representations do not foster indirect perceptual contact, as Walton has suggested that they do. Moreover, Matthen has explained what accounts for the experience of feeling in the presence of an object, which I suggest, is an important phenomenological feature of the transparency account to explain. Matthen has shown that an agent’s visual subsystems work together in order to give them both an “agent-centred” and “scene-centred” experience that enables an agent to both navigate and catalogue their way through the world (2005, 299).²⁶¹ Ventral visual data is responsible for the visual capacity of sensory classification, and so Matthen has referred to this as “descriptive

²⁶⁰ Similarly, Wiesing has concurred, that the perception of images is a unique form of perception that is undemanding, given that the agent is not physically involved in what is perceived (2011, 238).

²⁶¹ For more on the role of perceptual subsystems see for example, the relationalist accounts of Eilan (2011) and Cavedon-Taylor (2015a); the neuroscientific account of De Ridder, Vanneste, and Freeman (2014); and the cognitive scientific account Pearson and Westbrook (2015).

vision” (2005, 296), while the dorsal stream is responsible for motion-guiding actions and performs independently of the classificatory part of vision in a direct and unconscious manner, providing what Matthen has called “motion-guiding vision” (Matthen 2005, 297). Importantly, motion-guiding vision accounts for egocentric seeing and entails that as an agent moves, their spatial relationships change with the objects of the visual field. This kind of vision, accounts for agent-centred representations whereby agents perceive objects in relation to their person (Matthen 2005, 299). While descriptive vision accounts for scene-centred representations of the world which entails that an agent perceives objects in relation to one another (Matthen 2005, 300). Together, descriptive vision and motion-guiding vision account for a feeling of “presence” (Matthen 2005, 301). This feeling of presence distinguishes actual perception of a real scene from dreaming of, or imagining, one (Matthen 2005, 305) and importantly, it can be fostered by seeing-through visual aids, such as mirrors.

Perceptual experiences then, are not only perspectival, but also dynamic.²⁶² Taking into consideration the lack of physical interaction that agents are able to foster with the objects of transparent representations, further evidence is generated to suggest that viewers do not perceive the external objects of transparent representations in the indirect manner that Walton has proposed. Moreover, Matthen has shown that there is evidence to suggest that the agent’s subsystems operate differently when perceiving images and when perceiving objects that are available for direct or indirect perception. According to Matthen, the act of viewing any kind of picture segregates an agent’s visual subsystems, which entails that their descriptive vision is engaged, whilst their motion-guiding vision is not, hence viewers are able to learn about the visual properties

²⁶² For more on the dynamic nature of perception see, for example, Noë (2009) and Roberts (2010).

of objects by looking at pictures of them (2005, 306-13).²⁶³ Consequently, ‘... a picture *can* put you in visual states recognizably like those caused by the real thing’ (Matthen 2005, 307) however, this is a descriptive state, not a dorsal phenomenon as the perceptual experience of the subject of a picture, or an imagined subject, lacks the agent-centred representation that is vital to sustaining a feeling of presence.²⁶⁴ As Cohen and Meskin have similarly advocated in their account (2008, 78), viewers can use this descriptive experience to learn about things that they may encounter in the real world, for instance by using a photograph to identify someone that they have never met before.²⁶⁵ Similarly, Walden has suggested that an agent’s visual systems, when confronted with the surface marks of a picture will treat them in many ways just as though the depicted object were before them. As a result, Walden has suggested that ‘this similarity of operation includes acts of perceptual belief formation’ (2008, 98), which entails that images can increase what agents can form perceptual beliefs about.²⁶⁶ Like Matthen, and Cohen and Meskin however, Walden has carefully caveated this point however, by noting that it is visual properties that perceptual beliefs can be formed about, not spatial properties. Hence, using images, such as transparent pictures, to engage descriptive vision alone may be beneficial for the kind of epistemic purposes that I discussed in the previous chapter, but this should not to be mistaken for actual

²⁶³ The experience of looking at a portrait of someone for instance, in some respects can resemble the experience viewers would have had if they experienced the subject directly and moreover: ‘the three-dimensional features of the face are portrayed by creating visual cues in the two-dimensional surface of the picture that mimic three-dimensionality.’ (Matthen 2005, 308)

²⁶⁴ Although, as Matthen has pointed out, a perceptual state and an episodic memory of that perceptual state may have the same content, ‘they have different ways of presenting this content – they have different *characters*.’ (2005, 319)

²⁶⁵ Likewise, Lopes has suggested that agents engage with pictures using their recognition abilities and that pictures can also endow them with recognition abilities (2006, 151).

²⁶⁶ It should be noted here that Walden has additionally suggested that the aetiology of a photograph is irrelevant to experiences of contact, but not to the beliefs that viewers form about the warrant, or lack of warrant, for the perceptual beliefs that they form as a result of looking at pictures (2016, 47). I will reserve my treatment of this proposal for the following chapter, for reasons that will become clear.

perception as agents lack the necessary agent-centred visual representation of the external object.

As the foregoing demonstrates, perceptual contact is highly dependent upon an experience of presence that is only possible when an agent's dorsal systems are confronted with an actual object. It is however, possible to engage an agent's dorsal systems even when the perception is indirect, such as when agents use visual aids, including telescopes and mirrors. As I have outlined, Walton placed transparent pictures in this category, however this placement is, I suggest, misguided as the external objects of transparent pictures, do not engage an agent's dorsal systems. Instead transparent images provide descriptive visual information which is responsible for epistemic contributions to an agent's classificatory scheme. However, as the accounts of Matthen, Cohen and Meskin, and Walden have shown, this fact alone does not make transparent pictures unique among pictorial forms of representation. Given that one aspect then, of Walton's twofold experience of seeing-through is incorrect and moreover, that transparent pictures do not appear to be distinctive in their ability to engage descriptive vision alone, is there anything distinctive about transparent pictures?

To consider this, let's return to Walton's two conditions for transparency. Transparent images are those that sustain: i) natural counterfactual dependency and ii) real similarity. Although I have demonstrated that it is not possible to maintain perceptual contact with the subject of an image, transparent or otherwise, on the basis of these conditions, images that fulfil these conditions do, I suggest, instantiate distinctive effects from other forms of representation in virtue of their being made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques. Consider the fact that works, which are made using only manographic and i-dependent automatic image-making techniques,

need not necessarily represent any external object. It is entirely possible to render, in paint for example, a strikingly lifelike, but entirely fictitious portrait or to draw, according to the rules of linear perspective, an accurate representation of a fictional building. Conversely, in order to make a nature print, or a cast, an external object must not only exist, but must necessarily be part of the image-making process. Thus, I propose that images, which are made using only manographic and i-dependent automatic image-making techniques, are agnostic regarding the existence of the subject.²⁶⁷ Images that are made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques however, necessarily involve existent, external objects in their production. This fact alone however, is not particularly remarkable. What does make this fact significant, I suggest, is when, in accordance with Walton's conditions for transparency, external objects have necessarily been involved in the production of an image and when the image faithfully reflects this fact by accurately depicting the visual features of the external object. This I suggest, entails that the image serves as a reliable form of "perceptual evidence", by which I mean that the image is a testament to the fact that the subject existed in close proximity to the production of the image and appeared in a particular way.²⁶⁸

Although agents may not receive the same rays of light from a transparent representation as they would from viewing the object itself, they do receive similar

²⁶⁷ This is to say, as Pettersson has stated it, that there is no ontological commitment that the subject of a manographic work exists (2011a, 186). This is not to deny that manographic works can, and frequently do, have existent subjects, however this is not a necessary aspect of this kind of image production.

²⁶⁸ The term "perceptual evidence" was used by Friday (2002, 49), in relation to the idea that photographic representation is distinctive as photographs are "iconically indexical" which is to say that an image points to its cause whilst also resembling it (Friday 2002, 49). The way in which I have used the term "perceptual evidence" here however, points to a broader category of works that have automatic aetiologies and fulfil the conditions for transparency.

patterns of light.²⁶⁹ While casts and nature prints may capture the imprinted features of the external object in detail, it is arguably in certain photographs, which function as transparent representations, that the greatest degree of visual similarity is fostered between the image and the object. In particular, viewers have an especially dense visual connection to the external object when they view photographs which function as transparent representations given that, as Friday has pointed out, photography and human optics work on very similar principles (2002, 44). Transparent images then, are a *re*-presentation of the rays of light that may have otherwise been reflected off the object and into an agent's eyes and further to this, the nature of their production serves as evidence for the existence of the object. What this amounts to, I suggest, is that images which satisfy the criteria for transparency are not a source, but a resource of perception.²⁷⁰ Hence in Friday's words, these images offer the viewer 'something *akin* to perceptual experience of what they depict.' (2002, 49)

Moreover, particularly in the case of photographs, for instance, it could be that viewers perceive that they are close to, or connected in some way, with the object of the work, due to the general understanding among viewers that the photographic process, at some stage, necessitates the external object being before a photosensitive surface. In support of this idea, here I turn to Quine, who has suggested that:

Our present observations of the records gives us indirect knowledge of the past events recorded there, thanks to our knowledge of the forces and mechanisms that would have gone into

²⁶⁹ Simply sharing a similar structure however, is not enough to claim to be perceiving one and the same thing. For example, as Currie highlighted, perceiving one identical twin one does not entail perceiving the other, as sharing the same genetic pattern does not mean that the twins are the same entity (1991, 26).

²⁷⁰ Wilson for example, has demonstrated that photographs can extend a viewer's understanding of the visual world by enabling viewers to see images of things that would otherwise be impossible for them to experience, such as a self-portrait with one's eyes closed (2012).

producing the records. A preserved photograph of an event would be indirect evidence in the same way. (1970, 20)

Testimony, Quine has argued, is used as evidence by agents, in language, based upon the fact that the speaker has had the ‘stimulation appropriate for its utterance’ (1970, 33). Analogously, devices can serve as an extension of an agent’s senses. Although testimony and vicarious observation are more likely to be fallible when an agent uses transparent representations, such as a photograph, to make causally connected observations (1970, 34), this idea does capture something distinctive about the phenomenology of photography. Barthes for instance, in the opening to his influential work, *Camera Lucida*, wrote that upon seeing a photograph, taken in 1852, of Napoleon’s youngest brother Jerome he realized ‘with an amazement I have not been able to lessen since: “I am looking at the eyes that looked at the Emperor.”’ (2000, 3) However, this statement is somewhat puzzling considering that Barthes was not looking at the actual eyes of a person who had looked at Napoleon. Rather, Barthes was looking at an image that faithfully preserved Jerome’s appearance and necessitated Jerome’s involvement in its production, but did not actually manifest him in the image itself.

It is entirely plausible that Barthes was speaking metaphorically here and that he did not actually think that Jerome was somehow present in the image. However, would it really be that unusual for an agent to behave as though the object is somehow present in a transparent image? Consider a case, that Gendler has suggested, whereby an agent is hesitant to throw a dart at a photograph of their baby (2010, 274). As Gendler has highlighted, agents may be hesitant to throw a dart at a photograph of a loved one, despite the certainty that no harm will come to the loved one as a result of doing so (2010, 286). While Walton would presumably argue that this is because viewers actually are in some form of perceptual contact with the external object through a transparent

image, given that transparent images do not engage motion-guiding vision, this is clearly not the case. Consequently, I will instead defend the claim that viewers frequently *feel* like they are in some form of perceptual contact with the subject of a transparent representation, which is an experience that I will refer to as the “presence phenomenon”, in light of the fact that Prosser has suggested that ‘we treat photographs as if they had a kind of presence’ (2005, 1).²⁷¹ As this cannot be an instance of actual perception, in what follows I will examine what cognitive mechanism could be responsible for this perceptual-like experience of the object, as seen through a transparent representation, and whether this is something that Walton’s theory can account for.

iii. The Perceptual and Phenomenological Experience of Transparent Pictures

As I outlined in section i., Walton proposed that transparency entails a twofold experience, whereby through the transparent picture viewers indirectly but actually see the external object while they directly, but fictively perceive the external object. However, as I established in the previous section, seeing-through transparent representations does not constitute an instance of indirect perception, hence Walton’s characterization of one aspect of the experience of seeing-through is incorrect. Yet, while viewers do not actually see through photographs, as I outlined in the previous section, viewers frequently exhibit feelings and behaviours that indicate that they do feel that the external object is somehow present. Thus, in what follows I propose to adapt Walton’s transparency account to provide the basis for an explanation of the phenomenological experience, of the presence of the external object, that viewing

²⁷¹ I will however, use the terms “contact” and “presence” interchangeably.

transparent pictures frequently engenders. In this section then, I will examine whether there is any aspect in particular of the pictorial experience of transparent pictures that triggers this phenomenology, such as an awareness of the image's aetiology, and whether the other aspect of Walton's theory, fictive direct seeing or "imagining seeing" (1990, 351), can account for the cognitive mechanisms that are responsible for the presence phenomenon.

As I established in the previous section, one aspect of Walton's twofold phenomenology is false. This entails that the experience of a transparent picture cannot be one of seeing-through, but rather an ordinary pictorial experience of "seeing-in", which is a theory of depiction that was developed by Wollheim (1980, 210-224). Moreover, Walton has proposed that his account of imagining seeing is consistent with and enhances seeing-in (2002, 28; 2008, 155).²⁷² Seeing-in, like imagination, differs from everyday face-to-face seeing (Wollheim 1980, 214).²⁷³ Wollheim has described the viewer's awareness of the picture's surface as being the "configurational" aspect, whilst their experience of discerning the depicted object is the "recognitional" aspect (1987, 73). Essentially, to see a picture as a picture, viewers need to see the depicted object in the design of the picture (Wollheim 1980, 212-3). Specifically, the twofoldness of seeing-in accounts for the difference between seeing-in pictures and

²⁷² Specifically, Walton has suggested that his account of imagining seeing makes sense of the fact that Wollheim 'wants to insist on the fact that the viewer enjoys a *genuine* visual experience, which grounds the visual nature of depiction, not just an imaginary or make-believe one' (2002, 28). Thus, Walton has explained that, for example, in experiencing a picture of a fire engine: 'the experience is a perception of the pictorial surface imagined to be a perception of a fire engine.' (2008, 155) This suggestion however, has not been uncontroversial (Nanay 2004). Yet I will not problematize Walton's proposal here, as this does not change the fact that in imagining the experience of the perception of the pictorial surface to be a perception of the depicted object, the content of the viewer's experience pertains to the fact that they are experiencing a picture of the object, not the object itself.

²⁷³ For example, Bradley has noted that 'objects and scenes in pictures possess inflected properties, while objects and scenes seen face-to-face could not be seen to have those properties' (2014, 413). Similarly, Cavedon-Taylor has suggested that 'twofold seeing-in doubles with seeing design properties and in that respect, it is phenomenally distinguishable from face-to-face seeing.' (2012b 275)

ordinary seeing (Lopes 2003, 222). Although seeing-in is not unique to pictures as viewers can see-in with different stimuli, such as puddles or as da Vinci famously advocated stains on walls (Turner 2011), pictures are notable for instantiating this twofold phenomenology as Kulvicki has explained that pictures ‘amount to an exploitation and fostering of this interesting perceptual activity.’ (2009, 387) Many philosophers support and have developed different variations of twofold accounts of depiction however, it is broadly agreed that seeing-in is a simultaneous experience of the design and the depicted object whereby design and depicted object cannot be pulled apart.²⁷⁴

Empirical evidence also supports the twofold account of depiction. As I highlighted in the previous section, together the ventral and dorsal systems operate in face-to-face seeing to attribute properties to the perceived object (Nanay 2011, 477) but come apart when agents perceive pictures as ‘the ventral subsystem attributes properties to the depicted scene whereas the dorsal subsystem attributes properties to the surface of the pictures.’ (Nanay 2011, 466)²⁷⁵ As a consequence of the fact that agents do not dorsally represent the features of a depicted object, agents ‘don’t and can’t perform actions on depicted objects.’ (Nanay 2014, 189) Usually the experience of pictures involves a simultaneous awareness of surface and content, but the notable exception to this is trompe l’oeil works. Nanay however, has made the case that when agents are deceived by trompe l’oeil paintings they dorsally as well as ventrally represent the depicted object and so, viewers think that they are perceiving a real object, rather than a picture

²⁷⁴ Other philosophers to have developed twofold accounts of depiction include for example, Lopes (2006) and Newall (2015).

²⁷⁵ Nanay has suggested that this also accounts for the fact that viewers do not see objects in surfaces, they perceive dorsally, as distorted even if a picture is viewed at an oblique angle (2011, 476). If, however, viewers do not directly perceive a surface, or see it from very far away, as distance may also preclude the dorsal representation of objects (Nanay 2014, 188), they will see it as distorted should they look at it from another angle as in the case of photographs of paintings (Nanay 2011, 476).

(Nanay 2014, 193). Viewers become aware of this deception, once they dorsally represent the surface of the trompe l'oeil painting. In relation to this phenomenon, Newall has provided a contextual explanation for an analogous case by highlighting that colour photographs can preclude visual awareness of the picture surface by having imperceptible feature to ordinary vision. Newall has proposed however, that viewers are not deceived by such works because of the format, the usually flat manufactured surfaces, that they find them in (2015, 144). In general then, proponents of the seeing-in account of depiction recommend that simultaneous attention, or simultaneous (conscious or unconscious) representation (Nanay 2014, 192), of both the surface and the content of a picture is required in order to see a picture as a picture. What import then, does the foregoing have for transparent pictures?

In order to see a picture as a picture, viewers need to see the features of the object in the features of the picture surface hence it follows that part of the content of the viewer's belief, that they are looking at a photograph, is the representation of the fact that the external object is not spatially or temporally present to them. Moreover, if viewers do hold a conception of transparent pictures as forms of perceptual evidence, then part of the content of their belief, that modulates their responses to transparent pictures, is that while the external object was involved in the production of the image, it is no longer spatially or temporally present. Yet viewers display behaviours that indicate that they do feel that they are in the presence of the external object when viewing these kinds of images. Hence, given the nature of picture perception, this suggests that the viewer's experience is one of belief-discordancy, whereby the viewer feels or behaves in a way that contradicts their occurrent beliefs. For example, as Gendler has outlined, although when walking on the glass platform over the Grand Canyon, an agent believes that they are safe, they may still experience fear, trembling and in some cases, may hold on to the

sides of the platform (2010, 640). Similarly, although an agent believes that the external object is absent from a transparent picture, they may still feel as though the object is somehow present. Given then, that transparent pictures do not sustain seeing-through, but instead sustain the kind of seeing that is common to all kinds of pictures, I propose that it is a belief-discordant experience that characterizes the phenomenology of feeling a sense of perceptual contact that Walton discusses in *Transparent Pictures*. But what could give rise to this belief-discordancy?

Currie and Ichino have made the case that imagining provides a good explanation for belief-discordant behaviour (2012). For instance, they have suggested that in the case of a sports fan, who watches televised re-runs of a match, their belief-discordant behaviour of loudly encouraging their favourite player is due to their vividly imagining themselves to be at the match (2012, 793). Moreover, as I explained at the beginning of this chapter, the other aspect of Walton's twofold experience of seeing-through, was that the viewer fictively directly perceives the subject of the transparent picture. This aspect, of what Walton has referred to as "imagining seeing" (1990, 351), is not something that he developed specifically for his account of seeing-through transparent pictures, but instead he has suggested that imaginative seeing pertains to experiences of art and everyday life. Representational arts, including painting, photography, and literature, are particularly special however, as Walton has outlined, because they are specifically designed to be props which evoke a certain kind of imaginative engagement (1990, 68-9), having been made with the participation of the appreciator in mind. In particular, the viewer's engagement with representational artworks can further increase the similarity between the imaginative experience and the actual experience of seeing. Given the foregoing, could the other aspect of Walton's theory of seeing-through, imagining seeing, account for the viewer's belief-discordant experience that characterizes the

phenomenology of the presence phenomenon? To ascertain whether this may be the case, first I will examine Walton's account of imagining seeing and then I will consider whether this may plausibly account for the belief-discordant nature of the presence phenomenon.

When viewing pictures, as opposed to reading descriptions, Walton has proposed that perceptual experiences are inseparably intertwined with imaginings to the extent that: 'The seeing and the imagining are [...] integrated into a single complex phenomenological whole.' (Walton 1990, 295)²⁷⁶ This is largely due to the fact that a viewer's interactions with a picture mimic those that occur when they encounter the subject in real life, which is a phenomenon that Kulvicki has referred to as "Waltonian mimicry" (2014, 83).²⁷⁷ Walton has suggested that inspecting a picture recalls perceptual experience due to the order in which observers acquire information (1990, 305), and also in light of the fact that the experience can be continuous, as in actual seeing (1990, 308). Furthermore, as with actual seeing, imagining seeing can be spontaneous and non-inferential (Walton 1990, 217).²⁷⁸ This experiential form of imagining then, shares characteristics of actual perceptual experiences, coheres with the quasi-perceptual phenomenology of viewing photographs that Cavendon-Taylor has described (2013; 2015b) and moreover, the extent to which a picture mimics a viewer's interaction with the depicted subject will correspond to the extent that the picture is

²⁷⁶ Likewise, O'Shaughnessy has argued that this amounts to 'one complex phenomenon' (2000, 347), which he has proposed belongs to the type 'seeing' rather than 'imagining', which he has described: 'as *imaginative seeing* rather than as *visual imagining*.' (2000, 347)

²⁷⁷ Similarly, Lopes has proposed 'that identifying what a picture represents exploits perceptual recognition skills. In particular, viewers interpret pictures by recognizing their subjects in the aspects they present.' (2006, 144)

²⁷⁸ Walton has clarified that imagining can be a spontaneous or a deliberate act, but spontaneous imaginative acts are more likely to be highly vivid and realistic, and generally 'more like actually perceiving or otherwise interacting with the real world.' (1990, 14) Maynard has suggested that this adds value to a viewer's experience of a picture: 'Since pictorial depiction consists in imagining seeing, it is all the more effective when that imagining is *vivid*.' (2000, 130)

found to be realistic (Kulvicki 2014, 117), hence why transparent pictures in particular, which can instantiate high degrees of similarity to the appearance of the subject, can seem very realistic.

Imagining seeing then, is a kind of perceptual imagining, experiences of which Currie and Ravenscroft have highlighted are ‘similar, phenomenologically and chronometrically, to perceptions, share resources with perceptual systems, and suffer similar patterns of disorder’ (2002, 100). Imagining seeing is not necessarily a phenomenon however, that adults are actively aware of as they experience it, because rather than the physical participation of childhood make-believe, adults tend to participate in their own imaginings mostly at a psychological level.²⁷⁹ Perceptual imaginings however, can be very much like actual perception. Yet, if the content of the imaginative experience is the same as the content that the viewer is looking at, then how does this experience differ from face-to-face seeing? Hopkins has similarly questioned how this experience differs from face-to-face seeing, by conjecturing that ‘if the two elements are to be integrated, they presumably must be transformed in the process. If not, the resulting experience must be composite as the experience of the [object] was, and as seeing-in is not.’ (2009, 21) Hopkins has additionally noted that this objection is dependent upon whether it is taken to be that Walton describes the activity as visualizing (2009, 21). Walton himself has maintained that a viewer experiencing a depiction is having a *genuine* visual experience, one that differs not just in degree, but in kind from face-to-face seeing, because imagining seeing is not merely the visualization of the visual content that is seen by the viewer, but involves the viewer imagining themselves to be seeing the depicted object. Thus, Walton has claimed that

²⁷⁹ To this effect, Currie and Ravenscroft have distinguished between imagining, which they suggest is a purely mental state that is very ‘intimately connected with subpersonal processes’ (2002, 33), and pretending, which is more akin to the kind of activity that children undertake, whereby ‘one pretends to do something by actually doing something else’ (2002, 32).

‘understanding the recognitional aspect to involve imagining seeing makes sense of the claim that it is both analogous to and incommensurate with face-to-face seeing.’

(Walton 2002, 30) In order to explain this reflexive aspect of the viewer’s imaginative experience, Walton has appealed to make-believe.

In order to generate the feeling of what it would be like to perceive and interact with the subject, Walton has proposed that make-believe typically has a kind of dual perspective, the experience of which leads appreciators to ‘participate in their games and observe them.’ (1990, 49) As Walton has explained:

Participants in games of make-believe are thus props, objects, and imaginers all three, intimately combined in one neat package. They prescribe imaginings – imaginings that are about themselves by virtue of the fact that they themselves do the prescribing – and it is to themselves that they issue the prescriptions. (1990, 212)

According to Walton then, imaginings are essentially perspectival. Similarly, Maynard has suggested that viewers use depictions as reflexive props and, like Walton, has suggested that ‘when we look at a picture depictively – for example, at a photographic picture of something – we imagine something of our own actual looking...’ (Maynard 2000, 109). Hence, it is not just the external object that determines the content of the viewer’s experience of a transparent picture for instance, but it is also the viewer’s imaginative faculties that determine the content of this experience. This may also explain why a viewer for example, imagines the subject of a transparent representation in colour, if it is depicted in monotone, or why they imagine seeing occluded parts of the transparent picture.²⁸⁰ Moreover, it is likely that viewers are aware of the similarities

²⁸⁰ For more on the role of imagination in the viewer’s experience of the presence of occluded parts of a picture, see Pettersson (2011b).

and differences in appearance between transparent pictures and their objects, and that this additionally enables viewers to distinguish between their experience of the content of the transparent representation and their experience of the object that is represented. O'Shaughnessy for instance, has noted that while viewers of photographs may be aware of similarities between the appearance of the photograph and the external object, due to a '*projective relation* to the visible elements of the imagined object' (O'Shaughnessy 2000, 347), they are also aware of the differences, such as the lack of a third dimension or colour.²⁸¹ As a consequence of the awareness of these differences, O'Shaughnessy has proposed that viewers fail to generate the belief that they are really in the presence of the photographed object, resulting in an 'unreal' perception of such an object.' (2000, 349) The experience of the external object through this kind of representation may then generate the feeling of what it would be like to perceptually experience the object without actually perceiving the object itself.

There is strong empirical evidence to suggest that imagining triggers similar neural patterns to those that are experienced when agents do encounter the objects of their imagination in actuality. The fusiform gyrus for example, is activated when agents see real faces and also when agents imagine faces (Goldman 2006a, 43). This type of imaginative activity can be caused by will, but regardless of how it is started, the imagination can generate a state that resembles not only the content of a counterpart perceptual state but also the kind of state, such a visual kind of state (Goldman 2006a, 47). Essentially, the imagining state uses many of the same neural circuits that are activated during a genuine perceptual experience (Goldman 2006a, 48) which is due to

²⁸¹ Despite his different approach to the perceptual aspect of the experience of photographs, O'Shaughnessy, like Walton, has suggested that when viewers experience transparent pictures, and in particular O'Shaughnessy has focused on photographs, they undergo 'perceptual experiences in which the imagination openly assists in generating the internal object of the perceptual experience.' (2000, 347)

the fact that, as Schroeder and Matheson have stated, ‘there is no distinct anatomical region of the brain used for representing the merely imaginary.’ (2006a, 28) As a consequence of imaginings sharing neural similarities with percepts, imaginings may produce in the agent ‘some of the same downstream consequences’ (Goldman 2006a, 48), such as certain affective states, hence why for example, seeing portraits may produce states in agents that are similar to when they directly or indirectly perceive a person. As Schroeder and Matheson have explained:

...when the neurons making up the capacity to represent that *p* (whether in sensory or more cognitive mode) fire, tokening a representation, they also send neural signals down to the brain’s ‘emotional centers’, causing responses that are ultimately experienced as the strong feelings that ideas can evoke in us, whether believed or imagined. (2006, 32)

Furthermore, Schroeder and Matheson have proposed that feelings, unlike action, tend to be more ‘powerfully influenced by representation without regard to belief’ (2006, 33). This, they suggest, may explain why the fear of the agent who is walking over a glass floor at a great height has a greater impact than the belief that they are safe (2006, 33). Given the neural similarity that these theorists are proposing between belief and imagination, how do agents distinguish between imagined feelings and actual feelings? Similarly, as I have outlined earlier in this section, agents, they suggest, represent the fictional nature of their feelings source by for example, reading about events in what looks like a novel (Schroeder and Matheson 2006, 34).²⁸² Moreover, an agent’s sensory representations of their actual surrounding may conflict with their imaginary representations such as, for example, the smell of popcorn that is inconsistent with the

²⁸² Schroeder and Matheson have clarified that ‘although fictional and otherwise imaginary stimuli have many of the same effects as ‘real’ stimuli do, they obviously do not have all the same effects, or else people would leap onto stages in order to prevent murders, and so on.’ (2006, 29)

smell that would be expected from the events shown in the movie (Schroeder and Matheson 2006, 35).

There is a lot of evidence then, to suggest that imagination may account for the presence phenomenon. However, it is not clear that imagination can account for the kind of belief-discordancy that characterizes the presence phenomenon. Is there anything contradictory for example, in imagining that one is in a hot country, while sensing and also believing that one is really in England in the winter? Again, consider the case of the agent who is hesitant to throw a dart at a photograph of a loved one. Is there anything contradictory in the agent believing that their loved one will come to no harm as a result of this action, but imagining that they will? Downstream, the agent may experience similar affective consequences to those that they may experience in the real scenario, however the agent who imagines that their loved one will come to harm, as a result of having a dart thrown at a photograph of their beloved, can exercise conscious will over their imagining given that, although imaginings may arise spontaneously they can be consciously controlled.²⁸³ Agents, such as those in the dart throwing case, who experience the presence phenomenon, however do not seem to be able to consciously control their experiences. Moreover, such experiences may be the result of a disposition to respond to particular stimuli in a certain way, whereas imaginings tend to be occurrent. Imagination, as I will explain in the next chapter, is on occasion responsible for some aspect of the phenomenal character of the presence phenomena. However, imagination cannot be used to provide an explanation for the cause of the presence phenomenon as it fails to explain the belief-discordancy, which is a key aspect of the presence phenomenon.

²⁸³ As Nichols has explained: 'the inputs to the imagination are at the whim of intention' (2006, 8-9).

In this chapter, I have demonstrated that appealing to notions of actual seeing and imagining seeing does not capture why transparent pictures are distinctive from other kinds of picture. In the previous section however, I argued that there is a realist basis for the claim that transparent pictures are distinctive, from works that are made using only manographic and i-dependent automatic image-making techniques, as articles of perceptual evidence. While this fact alone does not account for the presence phenomenon, whereby viewers frequently *feel* like they are in some form of perceptual contact with the subject of a transparent representation, it does, I suggest, serve to underpin the viewers psychological response to works of perceptual evidence, that they perceive as such. Specifically, the psychological contact that viewers form with the subjects of transparent representations can, I suggest, lead to belief-discordant behaviour whereby viewers, such as Barthes, find themselves feeling and in some respects behaving as though they are in the presence of the subject when this is patently untrue given that, as I have ascertained in this chapter, Walton's transparent pictures, while functioning as perceptual evidence, do not in virtue of this fact sustain an experience of seeing that is different from the experience of seeing any other kind of picture. Thus, in looking at transparent pictures, viewers are still looking at an image, which is not to be confused with perceptually experiencing the object either directly or indirectly. When a photographic image is enlarged for instance, it is reduced to either a blur of film grain or pixels, and this is not what it is to have a direct, transactional relation to the object when it is in one's immediate and present vicinity. In order to explain what causes this belief-discordancy, in the next chapter I will examine the cognitive states of the viewer in greater depth and construct a comprehensive account of the presence phenomenon.

Chapter 6: Automaticity and the Presence Phenomenon

In the previous chapter, I established that viewers are prone to sustaining a strong, but fictional sense of perceptual contact with the objects of transparent representations. In this chapter I will continue to explore the nature and cause of this experience, which I have referred to as the “presence phenomenon”. This sense of contact, or feeling that the object of the work is present, is something that is commonly experienced, by viewers before works that have been created using e-dependent automatic techniques that, for reasons I stated in the previous chapter, tend to function as forms of perceptual evidence. This feeling, that the subject of the work is present, is not a form of deception for, as I outlined in the previous chapter, viewers are aware that they are looking at an image, which they know not to be the actual object that is represented. Yet viewers frequently treat transparent pictures, such as photographs, as though the external object is really manifest in its image. Moreover, as I shall elaborate in this chapter, this is a phenomenon that has an ancient history and has been described by a range of different cultures. One such example of which, are early Christian “cult” images, which were believed to have been made with supernatural intervention that suppressed the role of the artist in order to enable the holy subject to manifest their own image. In more recent centuries, as many theorists have noted, this phenomenon has been most pronounced around photography. Given the proclivity of viewers to treat certain kinds of images as though the object were really present, I maintain that the presence phenomenon is typically an example of belief-discordant behaviour. This kind of behaviour, for reasons that I explained in the previous chapter, cannot be explained alone by imaginative engagement with the representational work. Instead, I will suggest that in the majority of cases, the sub-doxastic state of alief accounts for the presence phenomenon and other experiences that are related to this phenomenon, which I will discuss in this chapter.

Finally, I will explain why works that function as perceptual evidence are distinctive as the kind of image that most frequently, and in the greatest magnitude, cause the presence phenomenon. Thus, I will offer a hybrid account of the presence phenomenon as an experience that occurs for both realist and psychological reasons.

In section i. I will examine the history of the presence phenomenon from its early manifestation in cult images through to contemporary photography. I will sample the work of a range of theorists who have written on photography to establish a comprehensive phenomenological characterization of the experience under discussion. In particular, I will return to Walton's writings on contact and in section ii. I will examine the "jolt", that Walton described in his work on transparency, in detail in order to gain a clearer sense of how the presence phenomenon may manifest itself in viewers and what psychological mechanisms may be responsible for this. As a result of this examination, I will elaborate on the fact that the presence phenomenon, and other related experiences that are caused by the jolt, have a quasi-perceptual, belief-discordant nature. In section iii. I will investigate which psychological state is the primary cause of the presence phenomenon and the experiences that arise as a result of the jolt. As I established in the previous chapter this cannot be due to imagination and moreover, as I shall demonstrate in this chapter, it cannot be due to belief or desire. Instead, I will suggest that the sub-doxastic state of alief provides the best explanation for the majority of instances of the presence phenomenon. As a result of examining this state and the role that it plays in the presence phenomenon, I will conclude in section iv. with a full characterization of the presence phenomenon, and related experiences, including the causes of these phenomena. Moreover, I will also elaborate on why works of perceptual evidence frequently prompt this phenomenon.

i. The Historical Roots of the Presence Phenomena and Walton's Jolt

The presence phenomenon, as I have used the term, refers to the experience a viewer may have whereby they feel in contact with, or the presence of, the subject of a transparent representation, despite the fact that the actual object is not present in the viewer's spatio-temporal vicinity. There are two ways that the presence phenomenon manifests itself in agents. On the one hand, agents experience a sense of the ongoing presence of the object of a transparent representation. For example, one bereaved parent, who participated in Blood and Cacciatone's study on perinatal death and postmortem photography, stated that photographs of their deceased son enabled the parent "to be with him and honour him since I cannot do so physically." (2014, 230) In this case, the parent used the photograph as a means to experience a continuous feeling of the presence of their son, as Blood and Cacciatone have suggested that in this context 'photographs provide assurance that the subject represented was "real"' (2014, 225). On the other hand, however the presence phenomenon manifests itself in agents as a sudden awareness of the presence of the object of a transparent representation. This is demonstrated in the following passage from Sartre's novel *Nausea*. The central character, Antoine Roquentin, overcome with an existential crisis, listens to some jazz music being played on a gramophone in a café. Roquentin narrates the scene, writing in his diary:

The voice, deep and husky, suddenly appears and the world vanishes, the world of existences. A woman of flesh had that voice, she sang in front of a record, in her best dress and they recorded her voice [...] she existed like me [...] The spinning record exists, the air struck by the vibrating record exists, the voice which made an impression on the record existed. (Sartre 2000, 149)

In this case, upon imagining the way that the record was made, Roquentin experiences a newfound awareness of the causally connected presence of the singer whose voice was recorded on the record that he now listens to, much like Barthes and the photograph of Jerome (2000, 3) as I discussed in the previous chapter. In common to both of these experiences, is an awareness that the aetiologies of the representations entailed that the works were created using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques (i.e. photographic and phonographic events) that necessarily involved the existent, external objects in their production. It is clear, I think, that the presence phenomenon is not unique to images but, given my focus in this work, I will only discuss this phenomenon in relation to pictorial representations.

Returning to images then, Sontag has suggested that photography is unique in its ability to make a subject present because ‘photography has powers that no other image-system has ever enjoyed because, unlike the earlier ones, it is *not* dependent on an image maker.’ (2000, 158) Given my account of automatic image-making techniques however, I suggest that, contra Sontag, photography is not particularly unique in this respect.²⁸⁴ Moreover, in historic image cultures, kinds, such as early Christian “cult” images, that were thought to have been made by automatic, albeit supernatural, methods were also experienced by viewers as instantiating the presence of the subject. Although supernatural, or miraculous, methods of image-making may be stretching my use of the term “automatic”, the comparison is intended to highlight the way that viewers understood these works to have been made and the particular qualities that they associated with this, including real similarity and (super)natural-dependency, which are also associated with certain automatic image-making techniques and kinds of images

²⁸⁴ As I outlined in Chapter One for example, some historic casting and printing processes have been used to make images that circumvent the intervention of an agent to a degree that parallels many photographic processes.

that I have described throughout this work. Specifically, two kinds of image-making methods were thought to instantiate these qualities in cult images, that were the subject of worship from very early on in Christendom. Such images were thought to have been made either by *archeiropoieto* means, which denotes that the works were “not made by hand” (Belting 1994, 49), or with the assistance of the holy subject that was depicted by the artist.²⁸⁵ The former, *archeiropoieto*, means resulted in one kind of cult image that included “unpainted images” or imprints of the divine figure on cloth, which were said to be either ‘of heavenly origin or produced by mechanical impression during the lifetime of the model.’ (Belting 1994, 49)²⁸⁶ Consequently, these were considered to be particularly authentic images.²⁸⁷ The latter kind of image-making method however, resulted in icons of the Virgin that were made by human agents, but with the assistance of the heavenly sitter. The origins of this kind of cult image can be traced back to the myth that Mary had sat for St. Luke the Evangelist to make a portrait during her lifetime. This narrative was later embellished with the addition that ‘the Virgin herself was made to finish the painting, or a miracle by the Holy Spirit occurred to grant still greater authenticity for the portrait.’ (Belting 1994, 49) Resultantly, whether made by *archeiropoieto* means or with the assistance of the divine, such portraits were treated and respected as though they were the actual person (Belting 1994, 4). Moreover, given the way that these images had been created, viewers believed, as Belting has outlined,

²⁸⁵ Belting himself has even suggested an analogy between the kind of natural-dependency that is supposed to be exhibited by the Christian cult images and photographs: ‘The intervention of a painter in such a case was deemed something of an intrusion; a painter could not be expected to reproduce the model authentically. Only if one was sure that the painter had recorded the actual living model with the accuracy we today tend to attribute to a photograph...could one verify the authenticity of the results.’ (Belting 1994, 4)

²⁸⁶ To this effect, Belting has added that ‘the *achiropiite* was an agent of authenticity independent of the talents of a painter.’ (1994, 208)

²⁸⁷ The term “authentic” was not however, always associated with such images, as Belting has noted that ‘in the West, the concept of authenticity was initially restricted to relics and their origin from the actual body of the saint. Later on, it was transferred to images, which were treated as relics and distinguished from mere replicas or copies as originals with a history of their own.’ (1994, 304)

‘the image *was* the person it represented, at least that person’s active, miracle-working presence, as the relics of saints had previously been.’ (1994, 47)²⁸⁸

The intervention of the human agent was repressed not only in the production of cult images, but also during the subsequent reproduction of the images where ‘priority was given not to [...] the artist’s invention but to the utmost verisimilitude’ (Belting 1994, 53). This was to ensure that authentic contact was sustained between each image, and therefore the original body (Belting 1994, 53). The later works ‘became a retrospective proof of the first image’s origin’ (Belting 1994, 53) as in the case for example, of replicas of ‘the cloth image, or *Mandylion* of King Abgar’ (Belting 1994, 209), which corresponded to the appearance of the imprinted face and hair on a cloth in order to ‘offer visible proof of the way in which the original was produced’ (Belting 1994, 210).²⁸⁹ It was important that artists exactly repeated such images, which were considered to be the authentic form of a holy figure, as these images made ‘the claim of reality for whatever it is represented’ (Belting 1994, 155), unlike symbols which were considered to be transient and culture dependent. Maynard has highlighted that the suppression of the human agent’s involvement was not restricted to the reproduction of images, as other kinds of relics were also reproduced by *archeiropoieta* means, which included the production of surface transfers by making rubbings from the relic. As a consequence of creating images using such techniques, the manifestation quality of the original relic could be passed on to the image that was created from it as ‘byproducts of relics (*brandea*) – perhaps things that had contacted them or were associated with them in various ways – then acquired some of the function of the originals.’ (Maynard 2000,

²⁸⁸ I will expand on the significance of this point in section iii.

²⁸⁹ According to Belting ‘the replica was a witness of the original and aroused the same hopes as the latter’ (1994, 441).

239)²⁹⁰ There are, I suggest, some clear parallels between cult images and photographs, given that both are (or at least are supposed to be) produced and reproduced using e-dependent automatic techniques. Moreover, both cult images and photographs depict (or at least are supposed to) their naturally-dependent subjects, which in both cases are frequently considered to be the cause of their own images.²⁹¹ Indeed, many contemporary viewers now treat photographs, particularly of loved ones, in ways that are not dissimilar to the manner in which historic viewers would treat cult images and relics.²⁹²

I am certainly not the first however, to suggest this parallel. Both Freeland and Maynard have also compared photographs to cult images, suggesting that in common to both these kinds are the manifestation function of the image and the sense of contact that is sustained, by the viewer, with the subject.²⁹³ Freeland however, has extended this

²⁹⁰ This concept of reproduction is perhaps an interesting contrast to Benjamin's claims made in the early 20th century that: '...what shrinks in an age where the work of art can be reproduced by technological means is its aura.' (2008, 7)

²⁹¹ In addition to photographs and Christian cloth images, Currie and Abell have noted that viewers seem to have a special affectation for other kinds of images and objects such as fossils and death masks. They have observed that 'contact with them seems next best to contact with the objects from which they derive' (Currie and Abell 1999, 430) and that in particular, it is the means of reproduction of the original subject, specifically the use of naturally-dependent methods, that gives the items their significance in this respect. They have suggested that if naturally-dependent methods have been used to reproduce an item 'then we claim that work-status is transferred from one to the other' however, in contrast to the early Christians they propose that if 'the copy was testimony - being, say, the product of a superbly skillful draftsman - we would be much less inclined to think that the result inherits work-status.' (Currie and Abell 1999, 431)

²⁹² Sontag has also compared photographs to relics, having suggested that 'a photograph of Shakespeare would be like having a nail from the true cross.' (2000, 154)

²⁹³ Freeland has argued that like icons, photographs seem to make the person present as photographs preserve the appearance of the subject and they are venerated as a manifestation of the subject, which has been caused in such a way as to reduce the role of human mentation (2008, 58-64). Maynard has suggested that many viewers of photographs do not always recognize this manifestation however, as 'the western tradition [...] in pursuing its projects of vivid sensory imagining, stumbled upon a mechanism of manifestation or contact but, given its historic habits of thought, was not well able to recognize it for what it was.' (Maynard 2000, 247) Additionally, Maynard has emphasized that photographs *can*, not *must*, support the manifestation function (2000, 247).

comparison beyond images that have been made using automatic techniques, as she has argued that:

...beliefs in photographs' status as a means of direct contact with a depicted person are grounded less in any convictions about their special epistemic status than in attitudes and emotions that both reflect and continue traditional historical practices of making and using portraits as guarantees of presence. (2008, 69)

Freeland has suggested then, that portraiture more generally has a manifestation function, which is thought 'to have originated from the desire to preserve the likenesses of the dead and to facilitate contact with them' (2008, 55). Freeland has proposed that photography continues this tradition, by also sustaining practices in which the image is assigned a substitutive function. It is however, important to emphasize that whilst such pictures are often attributed a substitutive status, this is not coextensive with saying that they are the real subject, as Lopes has noted, 'praying *before* a statue is not the same as praying *to* a statue.' (2006, 80)²⁹⁴ Portraits and other kinds of substitutive representational works are used to generate a sense of contact with the subject *in* and *through* the representation.²⁹⁵

Cult images for instance, were revered, prayed before, and treated with respect.

Likewise, as Freeland has highlighted, photographs are treated in ways 'that reveal love, respect, and even veneration' (2008, 62) and Lopes has questioned: 'who cannot confess to touching or addressing words to a photograph of an absent beloved as if he or

²⁹⁴ Although the beliefs of viewers of Christian cult images can get more complicated, as I shall explain in section iii.

²⁹⁵ For example, 'the novelist E.M. Forster placed a photograph of his mother by the porthole of his cabin when his ship was passing through the Suez Canal, thereby activating the photograph's ability to enable subjects to be somewhere other than where they are.' (Smith 2011, 124)

she were present in the picture?’ (2006, 79)²⁹⁶ Photographs are used to remember loved ones at funerals; agents carry photographs of loved ones around with them; and moreover, agents may find it uncomfortable to damage or destroy photographs of loved ones, despite the common knowledge of the fact that photographs are easily reproducible and that in damaging or destroying a photograph, no harm will actually come to the viewer’s loved one.²⁹⁷ Furthermore, the context in which a photograph is viewed can seemingly affect the level and sense of contact that the viewer forms with subject, which reinforces the idea that the presence phenomenon is largely psychological. For instance, Barthes stated ‘I need to be alone with the photographs I am looking at.’ (2000, 97) In order to experience a sense of contact with the subject, some viewers require privacy, while others experience the presence phenomenon in a ceremonial setting. Moreover, the presence phenomenon is more likely to be experienced by viewers who are familiar with, or have formed a relationship with, the subject of a portrait. This may be a spiritual relationship, as in the case of cult images, or a personal relationship, as in the case of a photograph of a loved one.²⁹⁸

Could it be the case then, that the presence phenomenon is simply the result of engaging with certain kinds of images, that may have emotional significance, in ways that are intended to manifest or sustain contact with the subject? Given that this function is frequently associated with portraiture, tokens of which may not have been made using automatic image-making techniques, Freeland is clearly correct to suggest that a sense of contact is not restricted to the experience of works with an automatic aetiology.

²⁹⁶ Lopes has highlighted that the substitutive function may be revealed by the behaviour of the beholder, but he has added that this function is one that may be ascribed to any kind of picture: ‘The truth is that we cannot tell a substitutive picture simply by its style of representation. Any picture may be a substitute.’ (2006, 79)

²⁹⁷ Richter for instance, has declared that “snapshots are like little devotional pictures” (Heinzelmann 2008, 82).

²⁹⁸ Noë, for instance, has suggested that viewers ‘*regard* a picture *as* the one who is depicted. That is why it need not be superstitious to kiss the photograph of a loved one.’ (2012, 104)

However, using a picture as a substitute indicates that there is likely to be a high degree of deliberate and controlled choice in doing so, yet the presence phenomenon is not subject to conscious will. Moreover, the most notable cases of the presence phenomenon, and reports of the most insuppressible and strongest sense of contact with the object, are those in which the representation has the dual function of both sustaining the presence of the object and also serving as evidence of the object's existence by having being generated using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques. The presence phenomenon that is experienced by viewers before works of, what I have termed, "perceptual evidence" that instantiate this dual function is then I suggest, sustained by both psychological and realist factors.²⁹⁹ Given the distinction between works of perceptual evidence which, in this context, have the dual function of both sustaining the presence of the object and also serving as evidence of the object's existence; and works that simply serve a substitutive function, I will focus on the former type of images for the remainder of this investigation. Historic *archeioipoieto* images are one such type of image that sustain, or at least were thought by historic viewers to sustain, this dual function.³⁰⁰ Given contemporary uses of images however, it seems that this dual function is now most commonly associated with photographs, as the following excerpts demonstrate:

- a) Only a photographic lens can give us the kind of image of the object that is capable of satisfying the deep need man has to substitute for it something more than a mere approximation... (Bazin 1967, 14)³⁰¹

²⁹⁹ Sontag for instance, has proposed that 'our irrepressible feeling that the photographic process is something magical has a genuine basis.' (2000, 155)

³⁰⁰ Belting has also suggested, in relation to cult images, that 'the portrait, too, derives power from its claim to historicity, from the existence of a historical person.' (1994, 10)

³⁰¹ It is worth noting that Bazin (1967) was a forerunner of the Orthodox position, as he characterized photography as a causal artefact or an identity-substitute, by proposing that through photography the object is *represented*.

- b) [A photograph] is a means by which the subject manifests itself to us. Furthermore, in photographs the manifestation is at the same time the descriptive image. We get not only description *with* manifestation but description *by* manifestation. That makes the description seem authoritative, no matter how distorted, torn, out of focus... (Maynard 1983, 157)
- c) A photograph is both a pseudo-presence and a token of absence. (Sontag 2000, 16)
- d) A photograph's *punctum* is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me.) (Barthes 2000, 27)
- e) Suppose we see Chuck Close's superrealist *Self-Portrait* thinking it is a photograph and later learn that it is a painting. The discovery jolts us [...] We feel somehow less "in contact with" Close when we learn that the portrayal of him is not photographic. (Walton 1984, 255)

The central claims of a), b) and also c) correlate to the first way in which the presence phenomenon may manifest itself in agents, whereby agents experience a sense of the ongoing presence of the object of a transparent picture. While d) corresponds to the second way in which the presence phenomenon may manifest itself in agents, as a sudden awareness of the presence of the object of the transparent picture.³⁰² In the case

³⁰² Overcome with grief for his recently deceased mother Barthes rejected the structuralist approach which characterized his career and focused upon the effect that individual photographs can instantiate in the viewer, by distinguishing between the "studium" and the "punctum" of the photograph. The former, he suggested, is common to all photographs, as it is the cultural system of reference and betrays the intentions of the artist. The latter however, breaks the studium, prompting affective responses that are deeply personal to the individual. The punctum is only possessed by a few photographs, and it is frequently found in a detail. Contrary to the studium, 'the reading of the *punctum* [...] is at once brief and active' (Barthes 2000, 49). Barthes has described his own experience of the punctum at length. He stated that he first encountered the punctum when looking through a box of photographs of his, then, recently deceased mother.

of e) however, the agent experiences the ongoing presence of Close in his self-portrait (fig. 28.), but then experiences a disruption to this experience and consequently undergoes an extinguishment of the feeling of Close's presence.

As I explained in the previous chapter, Walton has proposed that transparent representations put viewers in perceptual contact with the subject of the representation (1984). In addition to this, he suggested that some manographic representations, such as Close's painted self-portrait, may take on the appearance of being photographic.³⁰³ For reasons that I have outlined in the previous chapter, Walton has clarified that a similar appearance to the subject, or in the Close case a photograph, alone is not enough to sustain genuine contact. Resultantly, Walton has postulated that viewers may, as in the case that he described in e), suffer from illusions that they are in contact with the subject of such works. The "jolt" then, occurs when viewers realize that they have misattributed the nature of the work and are not actually "seeing" Close.³⁰⁴ In order to demonstrate that imaginative experiences, like perceptual awareness, are transparent and non-committal (2010, 177), Dorsch has outlined a similar experience to Walton's jolt, which results in another outcome that Walton also suggested may arise in the Close case. In Dorsch's example, an agent sees a perfect wax replica of a friend from a distance. As a result of this visual experience, the agent forms the respective belief that their friend is

Upon coming across the "Winter Gardens" photograph (Barthes 2000, 67-71), he was struck by the punctum and felt the essence of his mother in the photograph.

³⁰³ Walton does admit in a footnote however, that this is not the best example to illustrate the "jolt", as 'Close made many of his works by projecting a photograph on the canvas and painting over it. If this is how his *Self-Portrait* was executed, its opacity may be questionable.' (1984, 276 n.29) Given the way that the portrait was made, I suggest that it certainly is "transparent" and probably to quite a high degree. Moreover, I have argued, in Chapter Three, that Close's photorealistic paintings are hybrids of photography and painting, however I will ignore that here and treat the case as Walton intended it to function.

³⁰⁴ Friday has written in relation to this, that the perceptual appearance of photorealist pictures and paintings made from projections 'so closely resemble photographs that a viewer might easily adopt an attitude of transparency towards them.' (2002, 61-62) Unlike Walton, he states that this attitude is contingent and 'potentially unstable' (2002, 62).

present in their environment. When the agent moves closer and recognizes that what they initially perceived to be their friend is actually a wax figure, Dorsch has suggested that the agent's experience alters substantially, as they become committed to accepting that the figure before them is a wax replica (2010, 177-8). As a result of this, Dorsch has proposed that 'although we continue to enjoy some kind of awareness of our friend, our experience has stopped being non-neutral about his presence.' (2010, 178) The friend has therefore stopped being presented as though actually before the agent, but is nonetheless present in their experience. Comparatively, Walton has suggested that in the Close case, 'even after this realization it may well continue to *seem* to us as though we are really seeing the person (with photographic assistance), if the picture continues to look to us to be a photograph.' (1984, 255)

As a result of the jolt then, viewers may either feel no sense of contact with the object, or feel a lingering sense of contact with the object, despite the viewer's knowledge that the object is not present in the way they had initially thought the object to be. The jolt itself, as Dorsch's example demonstrates, does not appear to be specific to cases involving images made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques. Of course, this point could also be used to argue that this additionally demonstrates that the presence phenomenon is not at all specific to cases that involve works which have been produced by e-dependent automatic image-making techniques in the way that I have suggested. However, note that in this case, the agent initially perceives the wax figure to be their friend. Hence, 'in the grip of its illusionary effect' (Dorsch 2010, 177), they are initially deceived by the wax figure, which is not the case for viewers of transparent representations, who do not mistake the representation for the object. Returning to the initial point then, the jolt may occur when viewers engage with any kind of image, it may be the inverse of the Close example, or viewers may be surprised to discover that

what they took to be a marble carving is actually a painted cast. The jolt does however, lead to experiences that are, I propose, a direct result of the presence phenomenon. Hence, an explanation for the presence phenomenon must also provide an explanation for the different experiences that the jolt may subsequently lead to.

ii. Theorizing About the Presence Phenomenon and the Jolt

The jolt is a phenomenon that has also been explored by Cavendon-Taylor (2015b), Walden (2016), and Pettersson (2011a), who have each maintained, albeit differently to Walton, that the jolt is a real phenomenon. Some aestheticians however, including Gaut (2008, 384) and Lopes (2006, 182) have argued, for vastly different reasons, that a transformation in the viewer's attitude seems implausible. Broadly speaking, Gaut has proposed that all pictures are opaque, while Lopes has maintained that all pictures may be transparent, hence for these theorists, there is no basis upon which to claim that a viewer's attitude could be transformed upon finding that an image does, or does not sustain: i) natural counterfactual dependency and ii) real similarity to the external object. Although, throughout this work, I have argued for a more nuanced approach to the categorization of images based upon their aetiology, it is the fact that there is genuine disagreement over whether this phenomenon exists, I suggest, that serves to demonstrate that the jolt is a contingent phenomenon that is dependent upon the viewer's attitude towards different kinds of image-making practices. Hence, Walton has, I propose, captured a genuine array of experiences in his account, that some readers are likely to be familiar with. Although Walton has characterized the phenomenology of the *feeling* of contact, the jolt, and the possible experiences that may arise as a result of this, correctly, he has however, wrongly attributed the cause of these experiences to transparency. Specifically, in his account, Walton has purported to provide a realist

explanation for transparency, having suggested that there is a distinction between transparent and opaque pictures, and that the jolt occurs if viewers suffer from the illusion that an opaque picture is a transparent picture. Given however, that Walton has postulated that there is a sharp-break between these kinds, an agent should not at any point feel a sense of contact with the subject of an opaque picture (Cavedon-Taylor 2015b, 85), besides the fact that, as I highlighted at the end of the previous section, viewers who experience the presence phenomenon do not suffer from an illusion.³⁰⁵ Consequently, Walton's account of this experience must also rely on a psychological sense of contact, as it is upon learning that a work is an opaque picture rather than a transparent picture, for instance by reading the accompanying text panel, that informs the viewer of their perceptual misattribution and triggers their change in attitude.³⁰⁶ This suggests then, that the trigger for such a phenomenal experience is the viewer learning that a work has subverted their expectations and has an aetiology towards which, the viewer may hold an altogether different attitude towards. Moreover, the fact that some theorists, such as Gaut and Lopes, purport that the jolt does not occur, while others, such as Cavedon-Taylor, Walden, and Pettersson, have maintained that it does, reinforces the idea that the presence phenomenon, the jolt and other related experiences, are at least partly contingent upon the attitudes that individual viewers hold towards different kinds of images.

³⁰⁵ Savedoff has however, suggested that 'photo-realist paintings are paintings of photographs, they make us think of photographs, but they are not easily confused with photographs.' (2000, 111) This may true for some viewers, but others it seems, such as Walton, may initially misperceive a photorealistic painting as a photograph.

³⁰⁶ In order to combat this difficulty, Freeland has argued that 'transparency is literal, but contact is fictional.' (2008, 67) Furthermore, Freeland has suggested that it is contact, rather than transparency that supports games of make-believe or emotional involvement (2008, 67). While this may seem like a plausible suggestion, given my work in the previous chapter, I suggest that make-believe cannot be the sole cause of this phenomenon, nor as my work in this chapter has shown, emotional involvement.

Despite the flaws in Walton's argument, his account can however, as I outlined in the previous chapter, be fruitfully adapted to explain why certain kinds of images in particular enable viewers to sustain a strong, but fictional sense of contact with the subject. Images that sustain real similarity relations to the subject and that are made using e-dependent automatic techniques function as articles of perceptual evidence, hence why viewing certain kinds of images may be analogous to the visual experience that a viewer is likely to undergo if they actually encounter the real object, that was necessarily involved in the production of this kind of image. In addition to these realist factors, there are also however, clearly psychological factors that are responsible for the presence phenomenon, given that the experience of the presence phenomenon appears to be contingent upon the viewer's distinct engagement with the work. In this section then, I shall start considering how the viewer's psychological makeup contributes to the presence phenomenon, the jolt, and the other experiences that may result from this. In order to ascertain the nature of the viewer's cognitive states as they undergo these experiences, I will begin by examining the accounts of Pettersson, Walden, and Cavendon-Taylor, who have each proposed that the cognitive states of the viewer are responsible for the photographic phenomenology that Walton has described. Although each of these theorists have made a valuable contribution towards understanding the cognitive states that may be responsible for this phenomenology, I will demonstrate that none of these theorists can individually provide a satisfactory account, which resolves all of the different aspects of the presence phenomenon, the jolt, and other related experiences. Hence, by critically examining these theorists' ideas about what kind of cognitive states are responsible for the presence phenomenon, the jolt, and other related experiences, I will ascertain how best to account for the cognitive element that is responsible for each of these different experiences and I will construct my own account accordingly.

Pettersson has suggested that these experiences occur *depending* on what viewers believe about the images that they look at and such beliefs, he has proposed, may be grounded in factors that differ from those that Walton has suggested. Pettersson has referred to the feeling of closeness that viewers may form with the subjects of photographs as “proximity”, an account of which he has suggested should ‘pay due respect to what viewers actually believe’, given that, as he has proposed, ‘it is the occurrence of beliefs with a certain type of content that produces the sense of closeness’ (2011a, 187). Like other theorists, Pettersson has argued that it is unlikely that viewers believe themselves to be literally seeing the object of a photograph, as Walton has proposed. Instead Pettersson has proposed three elements that individually suffice to explain proximity, but together provide a stronger sense of this phenomenon: i) photographs are traces ii) they typically allow greater epistemic access than other types of image and iii) they are typically *depictive traces* in that they depict what they are photographs of (2011a, 191). Pettersson has proposed that looking at photographs typically involves appreciating all three of these elements (2011a, 193), or more precisely it involves beliefs pertaining to the first two elements and pictorial experience in relation to the third element (2011a, 195 n.35). Moreover, Pettersson has tentatively suggested that the jolt may occur due to the discovery that an image does not instantiate the first two of these elements, as the viewer had believed it to (2011a, 193), which may result in a change of the viewers experience of the image, whereby the proximity aspect may vanish (2011a, 187).³⁰⁷ Although Pettersson has been sensitive to the different magnitudes of contact that a viewer may feel with the subject of a photograph, his account cannot, I suggest, be used to provide a full explanation for the presence

³⁰⁷ Pettersson has additionally suggested that viewers may undergo more jolts as the manipulation of photographs may increase in the digital age (2011a, 193).

phenomenon, the jolt, and other related experiences. While Pettersson has offered explanations for the sense of contact that viewers may feel with the subject of a photograph, the jolt, and the extinguishment of this sense of contact, by appealing to the beliefs of viewers to explain these phenomena, Pettersson cannot extend this strategy to account for the “lingering sense of contact” that the viewer may feel with the subject, as described by Walton and Dorsch. For instance, if the beliefs of the viewer are solely responsible for the phenomenology under discussion, then why would a viewer continue to feel in contact with Close, despite the fact that the viewer now believes that they are not viewing an image that is a trace, nor an image that allows greater epistemic access than other types of image? Thus, any adequate account of the presence phenomenon, the jolt, and other related experiences must appeal more broadly to the viewer’s cognitive states as they undergo pictorial experiences.

Cavedon-Taylor has attempted to do precisely this in order to account for the shift in attitude that viewers experience, as in the Close case for example. In particular, Cavedon-Taylor has distanced himself from realist approaches, such as Walton’s transparency account; folk-psychological approaches, such as Pettersson’s depictive traces account; and hybrid approaches, such as for example, Hopkins’ factive pictorial experience account.³⁰⁸ Cavedon-Taylor has instead taken a fourth approach and although his account does share some features with folk-psychological accounts, rather than referencing ‘the *content* of viewers’ *background* beliefs about the [...] medium’, Cavedon-Taylor instead has referenced ‘*etiological* facts about viewer’s beliefs’ (2015b, 74). Hence, Cavedon-Taylor has proposed that the experience of the jolt is contingent upon the viewer’s *response* to their own ‘pictorial experience, rather than to

³⁰⁸ Realist approaches appeal to viewer-independent factors, folk-psychological approaches appeal to the viewer’s conceptions of the medium, while hybrid approaches appeal to a mixture of both, in order to explain photographic phenomenology (Cavedon-Taylor 2015b, 73).

the pictorial experience itself' (2015b, 82), or to the viewer's cognitive phenomenology. Moreover, Cavedon-Taylor's account of pictorial experience is grounded in a cognitive phenomenology that is typical of, rather than a necessary element of photography. Specifically, as I outlined in Chapter Four, when viewing photographs, Cavedon-Taylor has suggested that agents experience a quasi-perceptual phenomenology because they tend to assent to the contents of photographs rather than the contents of manographic works (2015b, 78). This experience is quasi-perceptual because when agents view photographs, Cavedon-Taylor has suggested that the occurrent beliefs, formed about objects 'on the basis of pictorially experiencing those objects in photographs, are also arrived at in a spontaneous manner, unmediated by inference.' (2015b, 79) The jolt then, Cavedon-Taylor has proposed, occurs as a result of a shift in the viewer's doxastic attitudes upon learning about the genuine identity of the work. This entails that the viewer's doxastic attitude changes upon realizing that Close's self-portrait is a painting because rather than assenting to the pictorial contents, the viewer instead withholds belief (Cavedon-Taylor 2015b, 86).

A particular benefit of Cavedon-Taylor's account is that by appealing to the viewer's cognitive phenomenology he is able explain why, as I outlined in Chapter Four, viewers typically automatically assent to the representational content of photographs, despite the fact that not every photograph is a reliable source of propositional information. This I suggest is relevant to the phenomenology of the viewer's experience of contact because it indicates that viewers immediately perceive the type that an image belongs to and that, in turn, cognitive responses that are associated with this kind manifest themselves non-inferentially, which further indicates that the kind of state that is responsible for the presence phenomenon is not one that is subject to conscious control. However, it is not clear that the cognitive phenomenology account fully accommodates for the fact that, as

Walton has described, viewers may undergo different kinds of cognitive experiences after a jolt. Like Pettersson, Cavedon-Taylor has not extended his theory to account for the “lingering sense of contact”, or in the terms used in Cavedon-Taylor’s account, a continued feeling of warrant in the beliefs that the viewer has formed about the appearance of the subject. As I have discussed in relation to this kind of case, despite the fact that the viewer’s beliefs are adjusted to account for the kind of image that is before them, they still cannot help but adopt an attitude towards the picture that they associate with the kind of image that they had initially perceived the picture to be. Yet it is not clear that the cognitive phenomenology account can be used to explain this particular phenomenological response to the jolt, due to the fact that Cavedon-Taylor has specified that, in his account, he has followed orthodoxy in ‘treating the withholding of belief as a doxastic attitude, distinct from merely lack of belief combined with lack of disbelief.’ (2015b, 86 n. 30) This is problematic because, as the cases of lingering feelings demonstrate, it appears that viewers do not always simply withhold belief from the pictorial contents, but instead viewers hold the belief that the external object is absent from the image, yet continue to feel that the external object is somehow present. Thus, an adequate account of the presence phenomenon, the jolt, and other related experiences must be able to accommodate for the conflicting mental states that a viewer can undergo during pictorial experiences.

Walden however, has accommodated for such conflicting states in his two-factor appreciation account, and like Cavedon-Taylor, he has also proposed that the jolt arises as a result of changes in the viewer’s cognitive phenomenology. Specifically, Walden has suggested that the jolt occurs due to the discovery that the image does not have the aetiological origins that the viewer initially perceived it to have. Following this discovery, Walden has proposed that viewers may experience a “lingering dissonance”

between their ‘tendency to assign a high degree of warrant to beliefs formed on the basis of what appears to be a photograph, on the one hand, and the need to refrain from doing so as a result of the surprising discovery on the other.’ (2016, 48) In his account, Walden has argued that the aetiology of an image is relevant to the beliefs that viewer’s form about the warrant, or lack of warrant, they ascribe to perceptual beliefs formed about the visible appearance of the subject of an image (2016, 47), but irrelevant to experiences of contact, which he nonetheless has proposed are veridical.³⁰⁹ To account for a sense of contact, Walden has instead offered a deflationary understanding of contact, or proximity, whereby rather than the aetiological origins of an image, Walden has suggested ‘the viewer’s experience of a sense of contact is keyed instead to the character of the marked surface and associated proximal stimuli only, and not to how those marks came to be arranged.’ (2016, 40-1) Hence, as these marks do not change a sense of contact remains intact, even when the viewer discovers that the picture they were looking at belongs to a different kind. It is only, Walden has argued, because images that have been produced by naturally-dependent means can be used to easily and efficiently produce images that have a high degree of similarity to the object, that the correlation between natural-dependence and the contact phenomenon exists (2016, 41). Walden has illustrated his point by recounting that upon reading Hockney’s *Secret Knowledge*, in which Hockney proposed that many historic images were made using optical devices, Walden did not experience any subsequent change in his experience of contact with the subjects of works that had purportedly been made using such methods, as Walton may suggest should happen.³¹⁰ As I have outlined, Walden has maintained that viewers may still experience a jolt, but that this is due to the viewer suddenly

³⁰⁹ Walden has also rejected Walton’s notion that viewers experience an illusion when they experience a sense of contact with a painting, such as Close’s (2016, 37). As I outlined in the previous section, the presence phenomenon is not due to an illusion as viewers of transparent representations do not mistake the representation for the object itself.

³¹⁰ See Chapter Two for more about the content of Hockney’s book.

assigning less warrant to the perceptual beliefs that they formed about the visible properties of the subject of the work (2016, 47) on the basis of discovering that the image has different aetiological origins, not a changing sense of contact.

I concur with Walden that it cannot be the case that viewers suffer from an illusion when they experience a sense of contact (2016, 37), but as Walden has highlighted, it is puzzling to think that the viewer may experience a changing sense of contact with the subject, given that the marked surface and proximal stimuli do not change. Yet, what Walden has perhaps neglected is the fact that the perceptual stimuli, while unchanging itself, may be experienced differently depending upon how the viewer inspects the picture and what they may or may not be attentive to during their viewing of the image. For instance, upon discovering that the Close self-portrait was actually a painting, rather than a photograph, when a viewer inspects the picture closer they likely notice facture that they associate with painting and, for reasons that I have outlined in the previous chapters, therefore not with the actual object, which then extinguishes their sense of Close's presence. Consequently, the viewer ceases to feel or behave as though the object were really present, which Walden would not be able to explain, given that he has proposed that a sense of contact remains unaffected by the jolt. Conversely, viewers may not notice any painterly facture, given the thin layers of paint that Close applied to the support, or viewers may remain at a distance from the work and so continue to feel that the subject is present in some way. In all of these scenarios, the marked surface and proximal stimulus remain consistent, however the viewer experiences these elements differently depending on their viewing position or attention to the marked surface, and thus the viewer experiences different outputs in affect and behaviour, which Walden's two-factor approach cannot account for. If the foregoing is right, then it seems that the aetiology of an image, contra Walden, does account for the sense of contact that viewers

may form in relation to the object of a picture and, like Pettersson, I suggest that the viewer's sense of contact with the object may be subject to change with the occurrence of the jolt.

All things considered, I propose that the presence phenomenon, the jolt, and the experiences that are related to this, are dependent upon the psychological makeup of the individual and their proclivity to associate certain kinds of images with certain properties. In common among Cavedon-Taylor, Pettersson, and Walden's accounts, is the idea that the jolt occurs as a result of the viewer discovering that the image has aetiological origins that are different to those that the viewer initially perceived them to be and towards which, they may hold different attitudes. The jolt itself, as a cognitive shift, may occur, as Walden and Cavedon-Taylor have suggested, due to a changing sense of warrant in the beliefs that have been formed about the subject on the basis of viewing it through a certain kind of image.³¹¹ Given that, as I outlined at the end of the previous section, the jolt is not specific to the phenomena under discussion here, I will maintain that the jolt itself should not be limited to the presence phenomenon. I do suggest however, that the jolt, or more specifically the viewer's updated mental impression of the work, may trigger a change in the viewer's mental states and attitudes towards the image. Moreover, as I ascertained when discussing Cavedon-Taylor's account, the phenomenology in question is quasi-perceptual, and so these mental responses manifest themselves non-inferentially and hence, in a manner that is beyond the conscious control of the viewer. Typically, when the jolt occurs the viewer's beliefs adjust to account for the kind of image that is before them, however this may not always be reflected by the viewer's feelings and behaviour towards the picture, given that, as I

³¹¹ Savedoff has also suggested that viewers reactions to different kinds of images, such as paintings and photographs, rests 'on our disparate beliefs about the genesis of each image' (2000, 110).

demonstrated while discussing Walden's account, the viewer's sense of contact, and not only warrant, is subject to change with the jolt. Specifically, when the viewer's sense of contact does not accord with the beliefs that they hold, this is a case of belief-discordancy, whereby the viewer feels or behaves in a way that contradicts their occurrent beliefs. This then, is neither a case of withholding belief, nor lack of belief combined with lack of disbelief. For instance, after learning that the Close portrait is actually a painting, the viewer's beliefs update to adjust for the fact that they now know themselves to be looking at a painting and not a photograph, part of the content of which, is the representation of the fact that Close is not spatially or temporally present to the viewer. The viewer experiences a changing sense of warrant, given that they hold a different attitude towards the veracity of tokens of the type painting. Despite the fact that the viewer assigns less warrant to the beliefs that they formed about Close's facial features on the basis of looking at them in the picture, they continue to feel that Close is still present in some way because they have not noticed any painterly facture or have remained at a distance from the image. While the viewer may not experience a change in the perceptual stimuli, it is still not the case that they are withholding belief about the status of Close in relation to the image. The viewer believes that Close is manifestly absent, yet they continue to feel, in a way that contradicts their occurrent beliefs about Close's absence, that Close is somehow present in the image. Thus, having now established the nature of the viewer's cognitive states as they undergo these experiences, in the next section I will investigate what kind of mental state is responsible for the quasi-perceptual, belief-discordant nature of the presence phenomenon and other experiences, including a sense of lingering contact.

iii. What Mental State is Responsible for the Presence Phenomenon and the Jolt?

In this section, I will examine what mental state most plausibly accounts for the quasi-perceptual, belief-discordant nature of the presence phenomenon and other related experiences. Appealing to beliefs alone I suggest, will not hold the answer, for beliefs are too sensitive to reality (Gendler 2010, 267; Albahari 2014) to account for various feelings of contact that characterize the presence phenomenon and other related experiences. Furthermore, these phenomena may actively conflict with the desires of the viewer as for example, an agent may wish to eat a slice of cake onto which has been printed a photograph of a loved one. Yet, the agent may feel uneasy about doing so, as they may feel that the loved one is somehow manifested in their own image.³¹² For instance, as I outlined in the previous chapter, an agent may be hesitant to throw a dart at a photograph of their baby, despite the certainty that no harm will come to the baby as a result of doing so (Gendler 2010, 274). Belief and desire then, cannot account for these experiences. Furthermore, as I explained in the previous chapter, imagination is also not a plausible candidate for explaining the belief-discordant nature of the presence phenomenon and other related experiences that may arise after a jolt. Hence, I will turn my attention to sub-doxastic states to find an explanation for the phenomena under discussion here. In particular, I will examine whether the sub-doxastic state of alief may be more up to the task at hand.³¹³ Gendler has proposed that alief provides an explanation for belief-discordant behaviour, as aliefs actively conflict with beliefs and

³¹² Such belief-discordant examples also extend to extremely realistic, but gorily rendered cakes. See for example, Cocozza (2017).

³¹³ There are, at present, several other kinds of sub-doxastic states that have been described by Bayne and Hattiangadi (2013) as “bedfellows of belief”, including “fuzzy beliefs” and, “bigmation” and “besire”. There is however, significantly more literature on alief, which has been adopted and developed by multiple theorists, hence my decision to focus on this particular state.

desires to produce inconsistent feelings within the agent, unlike the classic cognitivist picture, which Gendler has suggested is insufficiently sensitive to the differences between belief, imagination, habit, and instinct (2010, 287).³¹⁴ Furthermore, Gendler has proposed that aliefs are not consciously controllable and that aliefs are immediate and non-inferential in character.³¹⁵ Alief then, fits the phenomenal and functional description of the kind of state that may be responsible for the presence phenomenon and other related experiences that may arise after the jolt.³¹⁶ In what follows, I will elaborate on the nature of alief and consider whether this state is able to adequately account for the range of experiences that are associated with the presence phenomenon.

Alief is a primitive state, not an attitude (Gendler 2010, 268), that is prior to belief and desire, and may be occurrent or dispositional (2010, 263).³¹⁷ Alief is distinct from belief and imagining as it not a propositional state nor is it reality sensitive as belief is, or like imagination ‘explicitly reality insensitive.’ (Gendler 2010, 267) Aliefs are typically: associative, automatic, arational, action-generating, and affect-laden (2010, 288), hence the term ‘*alief*’. Aliefs may be activated by features of the agent’s internal or ambient environment (Gendler 2010, 255) that trigger an associative chain of responses, which the agent may or may not be consciously aware of, to apparent actual stimuli that may

³¹⁴ Gendler has argued that it is crucial to have an intermediate category between intentional behaviours which result from belief and desire, and reflex behaviours (2012, 800). She has stated that ‘what it is to say that it is useful to have a notion of alief *is* to say that habit plays a much larger role in our lives than we are (pre-reflectively) inclined to admit.’ (2012, 806) Gendler has qualified this point however, by noting that this is “habit” in a special sense of the term (2012, 807).

³¹⁵ Haug has highlighted that inferential isolation of alief indicates that ‘they are components of modular systems (e.g. pain, hormonal, etc.) whose processing does not have significant informational connections to other subsystems.’ (2011, 694)

³¹⁶ Gendler herself, has suggested that without the notion of a state, such as alief, theorists would lack explanation for certain evaluations, including ‘*why* it might seem disrespectful to treat an image of someone in a way that we would not want to treat the person herself, even though she is obviously distinct from the image.’ (2010, 285)

³¹⁷ Gendler has added to this point that ‘speaking loosely – we typically have multiple aliefs which may be triggered by a given stimulus. Which one is activated on a particular occasion will depend on context.’ (2012, 804)

occur ‘regardless of the attitude one bears to the content activating association.’

(Gendler 2010, 270) Gendler has suggested that there are three stages to this associative chain: Representation, Affect, and Behaviour (R-A-B). Although aliefs themselves, are not propositional, the representation of the object or situation may be propositional or non-propositional, conceptual or non-conceptual (2010, 263).³¹⁸ Furthermore, as the representational content is processed in a shallow way, it need not necessarily translate into actual behaviour (2012, 800), hence alief may also be described as quasi-intentional action. Essentially, the behaviour that may be output from an alief need not actually be performed, however, it is more likely to be performed (Gendler 2010, 264). The agent with the dart then, may believe that no harm will come to their baby by throwing a dart at a photograph of them, however given the visual-motor input associated with throwing a dart at a representation of a loved one, they may alieve the following all at once:

“harmful action directed at beloved, dangerous and ill-advised, don’t throw” (Gendler 2010, 262). While paradigmatic instances of alief involve this four-place relation (i.e. an agent alieves R-A-B), Gendler has specified that there may be cases where ‘the salient content falls primarily in only one or two of these domains’ (2010, 290).

How then do these associative chains form? Gendler has proposed that some aliefs are innate, having been formed as a result of evolution, while other aliefs are formed by

³¹⁸ Some theorists, such as Mandelbaum (2013), have suggested that aliefs must contain propositional content, as otherwise it remains unclear how an alief, as a purely associative chain, binds to certain objects. To illustrate this, Mandelbaum has used the example of an agent not washing an item of clothing that was worn by a celebrity, “as it will eliminate the celebrity’s essence from the material”, in this case Mandelbaum has maintained that the propositional state, that the item contains the essence of the celebrity, is inferentially promiscuous as it interacts with other knowledge stores, specifically in this case ‘the belief that washing things takes away scents and germs.’ (2013, 207) In such cases, Mandelbaum has suggested that the propositional state is truth evaluable, and so it is unclear how alief, in the deflated form that Mandelbaum has described, differs from other psychological states (2013, 207). Bayne and Hattiangadi however, have countered the argument that aliefs are inferentially promiscuous by pointing out, as Gendler has, that ‘even though the representational component of an alief might have propositional content, the alief as a whole will not have purely propositional content.’ (2013, 142 n.11)

habit (Gendler 2010, 300). Hence agents are not at liberty ‘to generate such patterns of association merely at will.’ (2010, 271) Consequently, as aliefs are not subject to conscious will, they can take a long time to change. Examples of grief illustrate this as, for instance one can still think that a deceased loved one will be sitting in their usual chair, only to find by surprise that it is unoccupied, and it can take a long time to adjust to these changes.³¹⁹ Two strategies however, may effect a change in an agent’s aliefs including the ‘cultivation of alternative habits through deliberate rehearsal’ (Gendler 2010, 285) and the ‘refocusing of attention through directed imagination’ (Gendler 2010, 285). On some occasions, aliefs may be belief-concordant, while on others they may be belief-discordant. In the former case, as the content of the alief and the belief coincide, it is difficult to distinguish between belief-mandated behaviour and alief-mandated behaviour (Gendler 2012, 806). To illustrate belief-discordant behaviour caused by alief, Gendler has used the example, that I mentioned in the previous chapter, of the agent who is fearful of walking over the glass platform above the Grand Canyon. Gendler has proposed that in this case, the agent believes that they are safe to walk on this structure, however they also alieve that such a height is dangerous and they experience fear, trembling and may hold on to the sides of the walkway. The agent’s alief is neither deliberate nor self-controlled, but it activates motor routines associated with fear and hesitation, which compete with the motor routines that are activated by the agent’s ‘explicit intention to walk across the surface that she believes to be solid.’ (2010, 261) Although belief-discordant aliefs are usually disruptive and unwelcome by the agent, Gendler has pointed out that sometimes this discord is welcome and exploited, for instance in the cases of reading, theatre, rollercoasters, and daydreaming,

³¹⁹ This is an example that, as Gendler has highlighted, can be traced back to Hume (2010, 310 n.25).

whereby associative chains are exploited in order to add to the richness of human life (2010, 303).

Other theorists have also started to utilize alief as an explanation for certain phenomena including Leddington, who has used alief to explain the experience of magic, which he has suggested ‘essentially involves a *belief-discordant alief* that an impossible event is happening’ (2016, 258), and also Haug (2011), who has used alief to explain the “placebo effect” in medical cases. Additionally, Haug has cited empirical evidence to support his proposal that a mental state, such as alief, may be responsible for the placebo phenomenon:

As several imagining studies have shown [...] during the production of placebo responses both affective areas (e.g., anterior cingulate cortex and amygdala) and modulatory or representational areas (e.g., the dorsal prefrontal cortex and lateral orbitofrontal cortex) of the brain are activated. (2011, 694)

Haug has confirmed that ‘this is exactly what should be expected if a state that has content with representational, affective, and behavioural/physiological components, like alief, is involved in the placebo response.’ (2011, 694) Despite some evidence to suggest that aliefs may be a unitary mental state, some theorists have questioned whether alief comprises an additional mental state.³²⁰ In relation to this, it is worth highlighting that alief may not be the sole cause of belief-discordant behaviour. As I highlighted in the previous chapter, Currie and Ichino have argued that imagining

³²⁰ For theorists who have queried whether alief is an additional mental state and have offered their own explanations for this kind of mental state, see for example, Currie and Ichino (2012); Doggett (2012); Hubbs (2013); Kwong (2012); and Mandelbaum (2013). For theorists who have defended alief as some kind of unified state and offered their own developments on the nature of this mental state, see Albahari (2014); Brownstein and Madva (2012); Haug (2011); and Kriegel (2011).

provides a good explanation for belief-discordant behaviour (2012). As I explained in the previous chapter however, it is difficult to see how imagining on its own accounts for the kinds of cases under discussion here, given that for instance, the presence phenomenon is plausibly the result of a disposition to respond to certain stimuli in a particular way but imaginings tend to be occurrent, and also an agent can consciously cease an imagining, even if it begins involuntarily.

Yet, as Gendler herself has stated, vivid imagining, false belief, and hypocrisy may result in belief-discordant behavioural tendencies, however she has emphasized that none of this precludes behavioural responses from being due to belief-discordant alief (2010, 291). Gendler has suggested for example, that vivid imagining may activate the relevant habitual propensities (2010, 291), but she has specified that this must be involuntary imagining, as deliberate imagining represents, rather than manifests the content in question. This is to say that the agent who deliberately imagines can easily decouple their imaginative beliefs and desires from their real counterparts (2010, 299). Gendler has proposed that involuntary imagining however, which is prompted by an external stimulus, may play an important role in some cases of alief when the imagining violates a norm of this activity. Usually, imagination is governed by quarantining, which entails that the imaginative content does not seep into the agent's actual beliefs and desires. However, Gendler has suggested that in some cases 'imagination gives rise to behaviour via alief' as the process of imagining activates 'a subject's innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way' (2010, 299) given that, aliefs can be activated in response to apparent actual stimuli, whether perceptual, or imagined. Moreover, I suspect that behaviour, in the form of a propensity to act in a certain way, is not the only output of alief. I additionally suggest that imaginings may constitute another output of this state. For instance, an agent looking at

a photograph knows that their loved one is not really with them, however they could believe that their loved one is present and subsequently imagine having conversations with them.

Gendler herself has acknowledged that she may have overstretched or miscategorized some of the behaviours that can be attributed to alief, however she has taken a welcome step forward in understanding some of our more mysterious cognitive traits. Other theorists have also recognized this and have continued to develop an account of this state and when it is appropriate to describe discordancy cases as having been caused by alief. For instance, Albahari has provided a nuanced approach to assessing whether discordant behaviour is down to alief, by proposing that an analysis of discordant behaviour should be grounded in contextual factors. To ground this analysis, Albahari has based his account on Schwitzgebel's summary (2010) of the various directions that philosophers have taken in order to understand belief:

- (1) The pro-judgement view – S believes that P and fails to believe not-P
- (2) The anti-judgement view – S fails to believe that P but believes not-P
- (3) The shifting view – S shifts between believing P and not-P
- (4) The contradictory belief view – S believes both P and not-P
- (5) The in-between view - S neither believes P nor not-P (Albahari 2014, 702)

To which, Albahari has added (6) “the contextual view” or “contextual analysis”, which specifies that ‘depending on the discordancy case at hand, any of (1)-(5) may offer a correct explanation of S's doxastic stance in relation to P and not-P.’ (2014, 703)

Albahari holds a “disjunctive”, and therefore permissive criterion of belief ascription, by maintaining that satisfying either judgment-based or action-based criteria will suffice for believing P (2014, 703). The judgement-based view, which is held by Gendler

(Albahari 2014, 705), ascribes belief to agents if and only if they non-defectively endorse a proposition, which entails that agents conform to the norms of rationality, which may include truth-tracking and norms pertaining to inference (Albahari 2014, 706). While the action-based view ‘ascribes belief to a subject solely on the basis of distinctive patterns of behaviour and affective responses.’ (Albahari 2014, 706) Consequently, in cases where either the judgement or action-based criteria fail to be satisfied then disjunctive view supporters need to look for contextual analysis (Albahari 2014, 707). Why however, is the disjunctive view preferable to a conjunctive view? Defenders of a conjunctive view opt for (5) to explain discordancy cases when neither judgement or action-based criteria alone are enough to determine whether the ascription of belief to a subject is correct (Albahari 2014, 707). However, given that an agent who has a phobia of walking over the glass platform may sincerely and non-defectively endorse the proposition that it is safe to walk over the platform, it seems inconsistent to maintain that this is simply a case of in-between beliefs (Albahari 2014, 708). The action-based view suffers from similar issues, as some supporters of this view recommend (4) for cases such as the hesitant agent on the glass platform, however as Albahari has highlighted, it is difficult to establish whether supporters of the action-based criteria are warranted in treating unendorsed “not-p-ish” strains of emotion and behaviour as doxastic (Albahari 2014, 709). Consequently, the disjunctive, judgement-based view is more successful at correctly diagnosing the doxastic status of an agent and identifying the nature of unendorsed reactions, such as reticence to walk over the glass platform.

Gendler has generally, using the unifying explanation of alief, explained discordancy cases by (1) (Albahari 2014, 702) and in doing so, Albahari has suggested that ‘Gendler cites the compatibility of alief with standard action-based views.’ (2014, 709)

Contextually this is not always applicable however, as Albahari has demonstrated that in the case of the agent who is trying to walk on the glass platform, ‘patterns in their emotion imply belief to be present in the case of the phobic (meriting a contradictory belief analysis) and absent in the case of the hesitant skywalker (meriting a pro-judgement analysis).’ (2014, 703) Moreover, some cases of belief-discordancy, may be due to defective cognition, which would entail a belief-like state (Albahari 2014, 713). Under what circumstances then, is it possible to attribute a discordancy case to alief? Given that alief *modulates* behaviour, rather than determines it, Albahari has suggested that theorists can be confident that discordancy cases can be attributed to alief when a pattern of discordant behaviour and emotion does not conform to action-based criteria (2014, 716). Using these criteria then, will help to ascertain whether alief may be responsible for the presence phenomenon, and other related experiences that may arise after a jolt, which should, given the foregoing, conform to the pro-judgement analysis.

The presence phenomenon, as I have described it, is a state whereby the viewer believes that the external object is absent from the image, yet the viewer feels and behaves as though the external object is present to them through the image, or that they are in contact with the external object. Consider then, which of the following is most applicable to this experience:

- (1) S believes that the external object is absent from the image and fails to believe the external object is not absent from the image
- (2) S fails to believe that the external object is absent from the image but believes the external object is not absent from the image
- (3) S shifts between believing the external object is absent from the image and the external object is not absent from the image

(4) S believes both the external object is absent from the image and the external object is not absent from the image

(5) S neither believes the external object is absent from the image nor the external object is not absent from the image

Few viewers, I have suggested, believe that the external object is present to them when they look at a photograph or any other kind of image, which rules out (2), (3), and (4). Moreover, part of the content of the viewer's belief that they are looking at a photograph is, as I suggested in the previous chapter, the representation of the fact that the external object is not spatially or temporally present to them, but was in order for the photograph to be taken, hence (5) will also not be applicable in the case of the presence phenomenon. Given this, I think it is clear that (1) is the most satisfactory analysis of this experience. As this is the pro-judgement analysis, it seems fitting to generally attribute the discordancy of the presence phenomenon to alief. There is however, a potential objection to this. What of the cases of devout Christians before cult images? Surely, given their belief in the miraculous nature of the divine, they must experience something that is more akin to that described by (4), the contradictory belief view? This is where contextual analysis is particularly helpful. Some viewers before the cult images experience something more like (1), while others experience something more akin to (4). In some cases, for viewers before Christian cult images, I suggest that the presence phenomenon is a result of alief, in others however, it may instead be due to a complicated set of beliefs whereby a disposition to believe in the manifestation of the divine conflicts with the belief that the viewer is also looking at a picture, which does not usually manifest the external object. The exact cause of such discordancy, is contingent and will reflect the cognitive states and attitudes of the individual, hence why it is so difficult to characterize the presence phenomenon and its exact causes.

More generally however, I maintain, that the presence phenomenon is frequently attributable to belief-discordant aliefs, which can be verified by the contextual view.

Can alief also account for the other experiences that may arise after the jolt? In some cases, as I have outlined, the viewer may experience a sense of lingering contact with, or awareness of, the subject. Returning to the Chuck Close case, once the viewer has experienced the jolt, they form the belief that they are looking at a photorealistic painting. Different viewers may have different beliefs about how photorealistic paintings are made and some may be aware that the external object is necessarily involved in the production of the image to produce a photorealistic painting, other viewers however, may not possess this knowledge. In either case, part of the content of the belief about a photorealistic painting is the representation of the fact that the external object is not spatially or temporally present to the viewer through the image. However, given the perceptual similarity between the appearance of Close, a photograph of Close, and the photorealistic painting of Close (fig. 27.; fig. 28.), the apparent actual stimuli, including the surface of the image and the visual features that resemble Close, may continue to trigger an associative chain that represents the external object, hence why some viewers continue to feel that Close is in some way present.³²¹ This case also merits a pro-judgement analysis, as the viewer believes that Close is absent from the image and fails to believe Close is not absent from the image, and so resultantly, the agent's behaviour can be confidently attributed to alief. Why then, in other cases do viewers experience an extinguishment of this sense of contact? As I suggested in the previous section, when viewers experience the jolt, as a result of

³²¹ This lingering sense of contact, I suggest, may be thought of in terms of the following case that Gendler has outlined: '*Misleading perceptual stimulus*: I don't believe that I am in situation S (indeed: I believe that I am not in situation S). And I have no independent desire to behave in the ways that I typically do in situation S. Nonetheless, I (feel a propensity to) act in ways that I typically do in situation S. This is because I am experiencing an S-typical R, which activates a locally inflexible R-A-B structure.' (Gendler 2012, 804)

realizing that they had misattributed the perceptual stimulus as a different kind of picture, they are likely to inspect the picture closer and notice features that they associate with painting and therefore not with the actual subject. Hence, as the apparent actual stimulus changes, the viewer's aliefs also change. Consequently, I propose that the viewer forms the belief-concordant alief that the external object is absent. Having now established then, that the mental state of alief is responsible for the majority of instances of the presence phenomenon and the related experiences, I will offer a full characterization of these phenomena and their causes.

iv. The Presence Phenomenon

What I will not be able to offer here is a set of necessary or sufficient conditions for the presence phenomenon. Its puzzling nature reinforces the idea that it is generally caused by a sub-doxastic state that operates at an arational level. It is however, possible to observe some common characteristics, triggers of, and responses to, the phenomenon, and so what I will be able to offer is a characterization of the presence phenomenon and the associated experiences that arise after a jolt. First, it is worth noting that although in contemporary society pictures that are, or take on a similar appearance to, photographs, may create a strong sense of contact, this phenomenon is not unique to photographs. Second, and in relation to this previous point, the presence phenomenon is very much contingent on the viewer and their particular beliefs and attitudes that they may hold towards different kinds of images. Third, it is worth highlighting that as it is the beliefs and aliefs that a viewer holds about the image kind and the subject matter that determines whether or not they experience the presence phenomenon and other related experiences, the presence phenomenon plausibly has a realist basis, as well as a psychological one. Fourth, as I highlighted in section i., there are two types of

experiences that may comprise the initial presence phenomenon, one of which, an ongoing sense of the subject's presence, may have a subtle phenomenology, while the other has a more pronounced phenomenology, as Barthes described in the case of the "punctum". Finally, there are artists who may induce such phenomenal experiences in order to add to the aesthetic experiences of their work. Each of these points are worth expanding on and so I will now address each in turn.

Pictures that take on the appearance of photographs typically create a stronger sense of presence in contemporary culture however, such phenomenal experiences do not occur every time viewers encounter a photograph. Moreover, other images that have been created using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, such as casts and nature prints, as works of perceptual evidence are also likely to trigger the presence phenomenon.³²² Some agents however, may experience a sense of contact with the subjects of manographic works, but this is dependent upon the habits and propensities that the viewer has in relation to these image kinds and their subjects. In relation to the representational subject, it is also worth highlighting that cases of the presence phenomenon are most frequently reported in relation to portraiture.³²³ In section i., I highlighted that, as works that function as perceptual evidence, photographs are often used as items to remember loved ones, who are spatially or temporally remote. This, I suggest, is because these images enable viewers to feel close to their loved ones, as aliefs are activated that include the representation of the loved one and the feelings for the loved one that are associated with them. Hence, the consequent output in behaviour reflects the kinds of behaviours that an agent would perform when really in the presence

³²² For instance, Currie has stated that: 'Possessing a photograph, death mask, or footprint of someone seems to put me in a relation to that person that a handmade image never can.' (1999, 289)

³²³ A fact that is especially apparent in Barthes' *Camera Lucida*, which as Iversen has pointed out 'is dominated by the genre of portrait photography in which the question of presence/absence of the represented subject is most insistent.' (1994, 456)

of the loved one. Essentially, an alief is formed that the viewer is really in the presence of the subject. This alief may then form a discord with the belief that the viewer is in fact looking at the subject through a photograph, or another kind of representation, and cause the kinds of belief-discordant behaviours that I discussed in section i., including for example, taking care of photographs as agents may find it uncomfortable to damage or destroy photographs of loved ones. Habits and propensities develop differently in each individual however, hence why the presence phenomenon is contingent and unique to each agent. Accordingly, some agents experience a sense of contact with the subject of a portrait painting who they recognize to be a real historic sitter, while some agents experience a sense of contact with the subjects of edited photographs and indeed, if a photograph of a person has been retouched then it seems that most viewers, if they have the propensity to do so, still experience a sense of contact with the object as the picture may still resemble the object enough in order for the viewer to associate the apparent actual stimuli with the object. In relation to the contingency of the phenomena, some viewers never undergo the presence phenomenon, and the other related experiences, at all. For instance, agents whose jobs involve photo editing may not experience the presence phenomena as a consequence of their everyday interaction with the medium, which involves manipulating photographs. Resultantly, these agents' habits and responses to photographs may be different from that of the general populace. For most viewers however, their responses to photographs have been seemingly slow to change despite, as I outlined in Chapter Four, post-photographic claims, made by some theorists, that the unique qualities of photography are changing in the digital age, and this is something that alief can account for.

As I have outlined, aliefs are formed by evolution and habit so how may evolution or habit instill in agents, certain responses to, for example, photographs? There are, I

suggest several potential explanations, which reflects the multiplicity of aliefs that an agent may form (Gendler 2012, 804). For instance, the similarity in appearance that photographs, in particular, instantiate to the external object may cause viewers to represent the object and so generate the associated feelings and behaviours with that object, despite the fact that the external object is absent. If aliefs are components of modular systems then it is reasonable to suggest that photographs and other kinds of images that instantiate real similarity relations to the subject, prompt viewers to react at some level, through habit and association, as though the external object were really present. Photographs, for instance, can capture expressions and features of an external object that will only occur in the blink of an eye but which can be unique to an individual, hence if a viewer sees this in a photograph then their hormonal output is likely to be similar to when the viewer sees the object in actuality. Furthermore, through habit, viewers come to associate photographs with naturally-dependent origins. For instance, viewers who sit for photographs or who take photographs may form the representation that a photograph of an object entails that the object was, at some point, really present before a camera. Viewers then come to associate photographs with a kind of causal connection to the object, given that the naturally-dependent subject is necessarily involved in the recording event, and so through this associative habit will react to photographs with representational content along the lines of: “external object present before and captured by the camera”. Hence why some viewers experience an extinguishment in their sense of contact with *Close* as a result of the jolt, if they then re-examine the painting and actually see the very thin layers of paint, from which they form the new representation of a painting, which does not have content pertaining to the necessary involvement of the external object in the production of the image. Given that, as Gendler has stated, agents typically have multiple aliefs activated simultaneously, it is likely that viewers react to both the appearance of the external object and the

aetiology of the image when they experience the presence phenomena. Moreover, when these different factors are brought together in an image, they meet the criteria for transparency, or as I have suggested, articles of perceptual evidence. The fact that images, which function as forms of perceptual evidence, are most likely to trigger the presence phenomenon and also the sustain the strongest sense of contact with the subject, I propose, indicates that there is, in part, a realist explanation for the presence phenomena.

It is more difficult to characterize the presence phenomenon, the jolt, and other associated experiences in terms of behaviour, as unlike the agent on the platform, the viewer of a transparent picture does not tend to exhibit obvious actions.

Phenomenologically however, viewers may be aware of a feeling of contact that is of a greater magnitude or persistence than is typical to experience in relation to an object. As I outlined in section i., there are two ways in which the presence phenomenon manifests itself in agents. In the first instance, agents experience a sense of the ongoing presence of the object of a transparent picture, while in other cases the presence phenomenon manifests itself in agents as a sudden awareness of being in the presence of the object of the transparent picture. In the first case then, the presence phenomenon is not typically particularly pronounced, but instead has a subtly modulating effect upon a viewer's interaction with an image that cannot be consciously silenced. To illustrate this phenomenology, I will draw upon personal experience. When viewing a series of pictures in the *Double Take: drawing and photography* exhibition (2017) at the Photographer's Gallery in London I could not alter the feeling that I was looking at a series of photographs rather than a series of drawings by Paul Chiappe (fig. 42.). I believed that the pictures were created by the artist using a pencil, having read the text



(fig. 42.) Paul Chiappe *Series 2012 (1 of 8)* 2012 (Accessed from: <http://paulchiappe.com/>)

panel that informed me so, but from the way in which Chiappe had rendered the drawings to so closely resemble photographs, in terms of the size, tone, and blur, of the image, I could not help but feel that I was looking at a class photograph that contained real, particular schoolchildren, rather than a drawing of some general, school age children. I found it incredibly difficult to see them as anything other than photographs of a real class of schoolchildren and this is something that alief can account for.

In the second case however, as of Barthes' *punctum*, I suggest that the presence phenomenon is caused by a jolt, in which the attitude of the viewer shifts and their representation of the work and the subject changes. For instance, when looking at photographs of his mother, Barthes initially displayed belief-concordant behaviour as he both believed and alieved that his mother was absent from the photographs and so failed to feel any sense of her presence. He was afflicted however, upon seeing the "Winter

Gardens” photograph whereby it struck him that his mother existed as a child before the camera, which was captured in this image, triggering a change in Barthes’ representation of the work and the subject (2000, 67-71). Rather than simply representing the photograph, Barthes imaginatively represented the moment at which the photograph was taken (2000, 67-69) and it is this that formed the representation of his mother that triggered the alief that caused Barthes’ feeling of her presence. While Barthes believed himself to be looking at a photographic representation, as a result of the imaginative experience that this triggered, he also alieved that he was in the presence of his mother. The fact that, for Barthes, this experience only occurred with one photograph out of a large number further indicates that such strong and explicitly manifest feelings of contact are relatively rare. Moreover, the presence phenomenon is often deeply personal and depending on the subject matter, the affectivity of the experience will vary.

The fact that cognitive associations with different image kinds tend to trigger certain phenomenological experiences has been utilized and exploited by artists throughout history in order to add an extra dimension to the viewer’s aesthetic experience. Artists have often created works that look as though they have been gestated in another medium in order to prompt the viewer to experience a jolt and question some of their underlying assumptions they brought to the image. Consider for instance, Jane Dixon’s “photograms”, which I discussed in Chapter Three, or more generally works of *trompe l’oeil*.³²⁴ In contemporary art, jolt experiences frequently occur when viewers engage

³²⁴ Not however, that this kind of sensory engagement has always been applauded. Plato famously deplored the imitative aims of artists, stating: ‘it is because they exploit this weakness in our nature that *trompe l’oeil* painting, conjuring, and other forms of trickery have powers that are little short of magical.’ (1997, 1207 602d) Indeed, there is a real sensory trickery that occurs in the case of *trompe l’oeil* painting as, according to Nanay, the experience of *trompe l’oeil* paintings entails a tension between the viewer’s dorsal representation of the subject and their dorsal representation of the picture surface, and this tension is particularly pronounced when viewers realize that they are looking at a painting, rather than the actual subject (2014, 193-4).

with drawings and paintings that are created to emulate the appearance of photographs and vice versa. This is because, as Savedoff has suggested:

...we readily think of paintings as constructions, we see the equivalences and transformations they show as products of the artist's imagination. On the other hand, because we tend to think of photographs as objective records of the world, the phenomena they show, no matter how surprising or disturbing, are not as easily dismissed as imaginative fictions. (2000, 82)

Furthermore, Savedoff has described an alief-like experience whereby viewers may 'know that what the photograph seems to show is not real, but we may see it as real, and that is what makes the photograph so disturbing.' (Savedoff 2000, 88) In relation to the difficulty that viewers may experience in trying to dismiss photographic works as "imaginative fictions", it is a relief, for example, to discover that what initially appears to be a baby in one of the photographs (fig. 43.) from Jorge Luis Rodríguez's *Juegos Macaabros [Macabre Games]* series (2013) is actually a dismembered doll and not an actual infant, yet it can prove alarmingly difficult, perhaps due to the positioning of the doll's limbs, to see the "baby" as anything other than a real human infant. Alief however, provides an explanation as to why it is so difficult to change this uncomfortable reaction to the photograph. Moreover, the photographer has deliberately composed the photograph in order to trigger this effect in the viewer and in doing so, has enabled viewers to experience the contradiction, suggested by the title of the series, between games and the macabre.

There are genuine reasons, namely as articles of perceptual evidence – a conception which I outlined in the previous chapter - as to why viewers may consider photographs



(fig. 43.) Jorge Luis Rodríguez *Juegos Macaabros* 2013 (Accessed from: Fototeca de Cuba)

and other kinds of “transparent pictures” valuable in a way that is distinct from manographic works. Hence, if some pictures have the same phenomenal appearance as photographs and are placed within a context where viewers expect to see photographic content, then viewers are likely to misperceive the work and potentially experience the presence phenomenon, the jolt, and other related experiences. Given that the physicality of photographs, which were once typically small, glossy, paper objects, has changed in the digital age so that photographs tend to be digitalized images, which may be printed on any kind of material, contemporary viewers are, I suggest, more likely to misperceive what type an image belongs to and potentially experience more jolts, particularly if they still assign a greater degree of warrant to beliefs formed on the basis of viewing subjects through photographs. Moreover, should viewers begin to change their attitudes towards different kinds of images in the digital age, given that the presence phenomenon is typically a case of alief, this reaction to is likely to be slow to change. In sum, the account of the presence phenomenon presented here is a hybrid one, based upon realist and psychological factors. The presence phenomenon is an instance

of belief-discordant behaviour whereby the viewer feels a sense of contact with, or the presence of, the external object despite the knowledge that the external object is absent from the image. Whilst the account outlined in this chapter does not explain every type of presence phenomenon or go into great depth for each kind of image and the idiosyncrasies that may be experienced with each type, hopefully it advances the explanation of the presence phenomenon in a way that will allow future explorations into this topic to pin down this elusive phenomenon based on studies in cognitive science and philosophy.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I have established how the use of automatic image-making techniques affects both the creation and the reception of the works that have been created using these techniques. Taken together, the arguments that I have presented provide an important contribution to the understanding of several philosophical issues that have remained under-examined in relation to an important and widely used set of image-making techniques. First, I have developed a nuanced account of the role of creativity in art production and demonstrated a way to distinguish between the varied roles that agents may take during art production and why viewers, philosophers, and artists tend to value one of these roles, the role of the executive representational agent, in particular. I have demonstrated how the use of automatic image-making techniques does not restrict artists from fully exercising their creative agency but it is clear, I think that the implications of this account extend beyond automaticity and may provide a solution to understanding how creative agency operates in collaborative and collective artistic endeavours. Moreover, the issue of ‘individuating photographs by means of photographic events’ remains challenging for the New Theorists (Costello 2017b, 445) and is not something that I have been able to address in this work. However, a possible line for future exploration in this topic would be to examine how the artistic intentions of the creative agent may be used to determine the ‘relevant set of events that individuates any given photograph’ (Costello 2017b 445) and furthermore, this may also help to ascertain when photographic prints that are produced posthumously (Costello 2017b, 445) for instance, are genuine instances of particular photographic works. Second, I have developed an original and pragmatic set of strategies to account for the changing nature of images, that are made using automatic image-making techniques, in the digital age, from both an aesthetic and epistemic standpoint. I have

developed provisions to profitably appreciate new and developing arts in the digital age, as well as provided a set of criteria for viewers to establish how warranted they are in forming beliefs about the representational contents of an image that they have seen on a digital platform. Finally, I have provided an original account of a distinctive phenomenology that viewers tend to experience before works that have been made using e-dependent automatic image-making techniques, which function as articles of perceptual evidence. This account of the presence phenomenon, I hope, will shed some light on one of the more mysterious and elusive experiences that viewers undergo before pictures. While I have primarily directed my attention towards e-dependent automatic image-making techniques in this thesis there is, I propose, much more ink to be spilt about the particularities of different kinds of image-making techniques. In particular, although I have said relatively little about i-dependent automatic image-making techniques, I believe that future exploration in this area would undoubtedly reveal more about art, and image-making practices more generally, and so would be a worthwhile avenue for future research in relation to what I have achieved in this thesis.

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