Please note that, in order to reduce the size of this file to below the maximum permitted, it has been necessary to remove many illustrations and the appendices. The text remains unaltered, but I apologise if the gaps left by the removal of the images make reading less easy.

KEIJO PRISONER OF WAR CAMP AND JAPANESE POW PROPAGANDA, 1942-1945

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INTRODUCTION

The Significance of Keijo Camp

My late father, Lieutenant George Baker of the 2nd Battalion, Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire) was a prisoner of the Japanese at Keijo (Seoul) camp in Chosen (Korea). In January 1944 he was found in possession of a hand-drawn map of the area. There had recently been an escape attempt at another camp, Jinsen, thirty miles away, and he was subjected to a series of interrogations. His diary records:

> Summoned to the office again expecting to be questioned about the map, that very tedious subject. Ushihara [camp interpreter] held in his hand a notebook, taken off me the first day in this camp, in which was an account, just begun, on the Malayan campaign. My heart sank rather when I remembered some of the uncomplimentary remarks I had made about 'our hosts'. Ushihara was affable. 'I have been making a translation of this for Colonel Noguchi' [commandant of POW camps in Korea]. 'Hell,' thought I. 'The devil you have'. Ushihara continues: 'and he finds it most interesting and wishes you to continue with your writing'. Then, fingering some maps I had made he said: 'He is interested in these also'. I was astonished and rather relieved. I said I could do what I could do, that it was old history by now and I would try to reconstruct the scenes again on paper. 'If there is anything you want just say so, any writing materials, or anything.' A short silence, then U. said carelessly: 'Oh by the way, don't bother about the other thing. I don't think anything is happening.' [….] I left the office with my notebook, reflecting that continuing with this Malayan battle record could do little harm and might indeed give some pleasure to old Col. Nog, who is not a bad old stick and quite kindly, tho' one of His Majesty's enemies. I had however an unpleasant feeling of blackmail.[1]

The diary entry illustrates how dissimilar to popular perceptions of Japanese POW camps some aspects of life at Keijo could be. Affability and kindliness were not qualities usually ascribed to the Japanese by their prisoners, and interrogations of captives suspected of planning to escape usually involved a considerable amount of violence.

[1]Privately held, G. S. Baker, *Diaries*, January 1944.

Conditions at Keijo were significantly better than those in most Japanese POW camps. The prisoners received Red Cross parcels and letters from home, and all ranks received a small amount of pay. They were permitted to keep diaries under the assurance that they could express themselves freely, and were allowed to buy the photographs which the guards occasionally took of them. The officers refused to work and acted instead as overseers of the Other Ranks' labour. An officer's life was mainly one of leisure, with the senior ranks having batmen at their disposal for menial tasks.

When Baker submitted his completed account of the Malayan Campaign he told Ushihara that he did so on condition that it would not be used for propaganda. He was assured that it was merely for Colonel Noguchi's personal interest. But Keijo in fact played a significant role in the manufacture of Japanese Prisoner of War propaganda, and it is highly unlikely that he was asked to write his account solely to satisfy the Colonel's curiosity. The disingenuous quality of the conversation sensed by Baker hints at the systematic manipulation of the camp for propaganda. The various writing activities that took place at the camp were a small part of a much larger propaganda function. That function is the subject of this dissertation.

Aspects of Keijo and its exploitation for propaganda have been discussed recently by the American historian, Sarah Kovner.[2] She builds on an earlier brief article by the Australian historians Fran de Groen and Helen Masterman-Smith to argue that the POW camps in Korea - Keijo, Jinsen and Konan - were purposely created to serve a propaganda function, and thus provide a unique opportunity to discern how the senior Japanese military and political leadership wished their treatment of its prisoners to be seen by the outside world.[3]

Given that this topic has been investigated so recently, it is necessary to justify a further study. Various reasons can be offered. Although the focus of this dissertation overlaps with Kovner's interest in Keijo, its scope is different. I focus on one camp and explore the propaganda process from its creation at Keijo to its dissemination and reception in Britain, whereas Kovner discusses all three Korean POW camps and considers the dynamics between the prisoners, guards and the local community. This dissertation also makes use of a great quantity of hitherto unexamined primary source material, much of it held in private hands, unavailable or unknown to Kovner and de Groen.

[2] Sarah Kovner, 'Allied POWs in Korea,' in Barak Kushner and Sherzod Muminov (eds.), *The Dismantling of Japan's Empire in East Asia: De-imperialization, Postwar Legitimation and Imperial Afterlife* (Routledge: Abingdon, 2017).

[3] Fran de Groen and Helen Masterman-Smith, 'Prisoners on Parade: Japan Party 'B'', *History Conference 2002: Remembering 1942*, Australian War Memorial, <www.awm.gov.au/ > [accessed 10 April 2018].

Kovner omits any discussion of the manipulation and deception which were the essence of the propaganda process and suggests that the prisoners' diaries corroborate the reports of the Red Cross inspector. This dissertation argues against this. Both Kovner and de Groen state that the regimes at the Korean camps were 'relatively benign'. Kovner also finds that, apart from insufficient clothing for the cold climate, conditions were 'adequate'. Although conditions were indeed better at Keijo than at most other camps, the sources I employ paint a far harsher picture of life. This is of more than local significance because Kovner uses her perception of adequate conditions to reach her main conclusion that 'when senior Japanese officials took an interest in Prisoners of War, their fate was not a cruel one'.[4] This dissertation argues the opposite.

My main argument is that Keijo played a more significant role in POW propaganda and in a greater variety of ways than has hitherto been recognised. For example, there has never been a detailed discussion of the photography at the camp, or any mention of the writing activities that took place. Letters and photographs from Keijo appeared in British newspapers and Red Cross journals, playing a significant part in shaping public perception of Far Eastern captivity.

Comparison of Keijo with other camps that served a propaganda function also enables us to discern a centralized co-ordination of various 'show camps' that has not previously been recognised. I argue that the Japanese Prisoner of War Information Office (Huryojohokyoku) orchestrated POW propaganda, and systematically manipulated the International Committee of the Red Cross (hereafter ICRC) as part of its overall strategy. In examining the role of the ICRC, I draw comparisons with the Theresienstadt deception and ask whether the organisation was at fault in acquiescing too easily in Japanese propaganda. I also suggest that the ICRC presence in Japan was permitted for propaganda rather than humanitarian reasons.

The final part of my discussion investigates the response to Japanese propaganda by the British government and public. Here I argue that Japanese POW propaganda succeeded in confusing the British government as to the ubiquity of Japanese maltreatment of its prisoners. The propaganda that emanated from just a handful of camps in Japan, Formosa, Korea and Manchuria led the British government into making a false distinction between camps in the southern, newly occupied territories, and those in the northern areas such as Korea, where it was wrongly believed conditions were significantly better.

Definition of Propaganda

[4] Kovner, 'Allied POWs in Korea', p.265.

David Welch has observed that propaganda is a 'portmanteau' word which has been assigned various definitions.[5] It is therefore useful at the outset to offer my own working definition. I follow the formulation offered by the theorists Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, who define propaganda as 'the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.'[6] My approach is also informed by the work of two leading scholars in this field, David Welch and the late Philip Taylor.

In particular, I follow Taylor's conceptualization of censorship and propaganda as 'two sides of the same coin', the coin being the manipulation of opinion.[7] As well as examining what the Japanese chose to say, it is important to consider what they chose *not* to say. For example, whilst the Japanese denounced the ill-treatment of its civilian internees in Allied hands to its domestic audience, it remained silent about Japanese Prisoners of War, unwilling to disclose that its soldiers had undergone the disgrace of capture. But at the same time it decried the maltreatment of its POWs to the Allies privately. Japan was also silent about its Indian POWs as this conflicted with its strategy of posing as India's friend and sponsor of independence.

David Welch's observation that contrast is one of propaganda's most common stylistic devices is particularly apposite in regard to Japanese wartime propaganda, where the technique is employed continuously.[8]As we shall see, the *bushido* qualities of the Japanese fighting man are contrasted with the un-warrior like spirit of the Allied serviceman, and the maltreatment of Axis POWs and Japanese civilian internees by the Allies is contrasted with the kind treatment of the Japanese towards Allied POWs.

Given the imprecise and evolving definitions of the term 'propaganda' in English, it follows that there is no exact equivalent in Japanese. Propaganda has a long history in Japan with a tradition of moral didacticism, exerted on the people by the ruling classes, dating back to the Edo period. From the 1880's, the Japanese government's campaigns to bring the people in line with government policy was defined by the term *kyoka*, which has been translated both as 'propaganda' and 'moral suasion'.[9] In the 1930s, the term *senden* came to be used. *Senden*

[5] David Welch (ed.), *Propaganda, Power and Persuasion*: *From World War I to Wikileaks* (London: I B Tauris, 2014), p.3.
[6] Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion,* Third Edition (London: Sage, 1999), p.6.
[7] Philip M. Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p.10.
[8] Welch, *Propaganda, Power and Persuasion*, p.37.
[9] The term is used for example by T. H. Havens in *Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War Two* (New York: Norton, 1978).

conveyed more the idea of a technological and scientifically based form of propaganda, rather than the older term which had its roots in Confucian morality. Like Germany, Japan had noted the success of British propaganda during the First World War and embarked on its own research. The early 1930s saw the large-scale translation of English and German propaganda texts as well as various research projects. As well as 'propaganda', *senden* can also simply mean 'advertising.' Wartime propaganda was expressed by the term *shisosen* or 'Thought War', a war without weapons. In my discussion I use the term 'propaganda' to match both Jowett and McDonnell's definition and the term *shisosen*. The two are compatible.

Figure 1: Map showing POW camp locations in Korea, from an American intelligence bulletin issued to its Pacific fleets: 'POW Encampments, CINPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin No. 113-45, June 1945'. Exact details were still unknown, and the map suggests two POW camps within the city of Keijo. Prisoners guilty of serious offences were sent to the city prison, where conditions were so poor that to be held there was tantamount to a death sentence. Keijo and Jinsen served propaganda functions, but Konan was created in 1943 to house labour for the nearby carbide factory and other local industry.

Historiography

There is a huge and ever-growing body of literature relating to incarceration during the Second World War.[10] If we view the historiography since 1945 as a whole, several significant features, relevant to this study, are observable. Richard Bessel has stated that during roughly the first twenty-five years after the war there was a reluctance in Europe to reflect on the violence that was committed on the continent rather than elsewhere.[11] If so, this may be offered as an explanation, alongside racial animus, for the tendency in early studies of Far Eastern captivity, such as Lord Russell's *The Knights of Bushido*, to view Japanese maltreatment of its captives as an expression of a peculiarly Japanese barbarity.[12] An awareness of the maltreatment of prisoners in the European theatre on the Eastern Front by both the Russian and German forces disabuses us of this notion. The survival rate in Japanese camps was in fact higher than

[10] For brief overviews, see S. P. Mackenzie, 'The Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War II,' in *The Journal of Modern History*, 66:3 (September 1999), pp.487-520; S. P. Mackenzie, 'Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees: The European and Mediterranean Theatres,' in L. E. Lee, (ed.), *World War II in Europe, Africa and the Americas, with General Sources: A Handbook of Literature and Research* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1997); S. P. MacKenzie,'Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees; The Asian and Pacific Theatres,' in L. E. Lee, (ed.), *World War II in Asia and the Pacific and the War's Aftermath, with General Themes: A Handbook of Literature and Research (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1998);*Bob Moore,'Prisoners of War in the Second World War: An Overview' in Bob Moore and Kent Fedorowich, *Prisoners of War and their Captors in World War II* (Oxford: Berg, 1996)

[11] Richard Bessel, *Violence: A Modern Obsession* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2008), p.78.

[12] Lord Russell, *The Knights of Bushido* (London: Cassell, 1959).

amongst Russian captives in German hands. If we extend the period under discussion back to the 1930s the maltreatment of POWs on both sides during the Spanish Civil War confirm that during the first half of the twentieth century Europe was the site of a huge number of atrocities committed on Prisoners of War.[13] Looking back further still to the First World War, Heather Jones' recent work on POW conditions illustrates that the starvation, malnutrition, physical abuse and squalid living conditions that were endured by Far Eastern Prisoners of War (hereafter FEPOWs) were also a more common feature of the POW experience on during the First World War than has previously been realized.[14] In their diaries, the prisoners at Keijo used the common perception of the relatively civilized treatment of Prisoners of War in the First World War mas a yardstick to measure Keijo against, but if we accept Jones' evidence, this perception was to a certain extent illusory.

The historiography of incarceration since 1945 also illustrates Bessel's central thesis: that there has been a growing revulsion towards violence but at the same time there is a 'modern obsession' with the subject. To illustrate this increased sensitivity, we can compare recent scholarly writings and public outcry concerning the maltreatment of captives held at Guantanamo Bay by America and the alleged maltreatment of Iraqi POWs at Abu Ghraib by British forces with the response to returned FEPOWs during the 1940s and 1950s, who were instructed to remain silent, and whose attempts to receive compensation remained unsatisfied until 2000.[15] Although there are of course other reasons to explain hostility to British and American military activities during this century, this increased concern about the fate of POWs nevertheless reflects a greater intolerance of the mistreatment of prisoners. It is worth noting these changing responses to the Prisoner of War issue, as it reminds us of the difficulty in analyzing and quantifying violence, and the impossibility of employing entirely objective criteria to measure human suffering. Our own perceptions are inevitably coloured by current ideologies and political beliefs.

The memory of war and imprisonment is of course never neutral and commemoration serves political ends.[16] This is particularly the case with Far Eastern incarceration. The differing national memories of the captive nations have been given separate chapters in Blackburn

[13] See Paul Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain* (London: Harper, 2013).
[14] Heather Jones, *Violence against Prisoners of War in the First World War: Britain, France and Germany, 1914-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

[15] See, for example, Phil Shiner, 'The Abject Failure of British Military Justice', *Criminal Justice Matters*, 74:1, 2010, pp.4-5. Former FEPOWs and FEPOW widows received £10,000 from Tony Blair's government.
[16] See, for example, T. G. Dawson and M. Roper (eds.), *Commemorating War: The Politics of Memory* (London: Routledge, 2006).

and Hack's *Forgotten Captives in Japanese-Occupied Asia*.[17] Joan Beaumont illustrates in particular how Far Eastern incarceration has been used to create the distinctively Australian quality of 'mateship', which has been added to the memories of Gallipoli as part of an 'ANZAC myth' to shape the nation's identity.[18] Australian POWs survived in greater numbers, according to the myth, because they had a greater sense of comradeship. In his survey of Far Eastern incarceration, Gavan Daws tells us that incarcerated Australians strove to create 'mini communities resembling welfare states' amongst their fellow countrymen, whilst the British captives remained divided by class distinctions.[19] The potency of this myth and pressure to conform to it can be gauged by the angry response to Peter Elphick's study of the Fall of Singapore, which discusses Australian deserters.[20]

It is perhaps surprising to note, given the enormous body of work on the subject, that there is a consensus amongst historians that the experiences of POWs are comparatively under-documented as a proportion of the even huger quantity of published material on the war itself. It is estimated that of the approximately eighty million combatants, over one third experienced captivity, and yet military histories, as Juliette Pattinson and others have observed, tend to end at the moment of capture.[21]

Certainly, if we narrow our perspective to the historiography of Far Eastern imprisonment during World War Two we can observe that the case for more investigation is a strong one. Karl Hack and Kevin Blackburn have complained that accounts of Far Eastern captivity have tended towards a 'dull homogeneity' focusing on the most extreme experiences, an observation borne out by recent popular histories such as history by Brian McArthur's *Surviving the Sword*.[22] There has also been a disproportionate focus on the camps on the Burma -Thailand railway in comparison to the equally appalling experiences of the prisoners who worked in the mines, factories and shipyards of Japan.

Figure 2: Japanese territories, 1942.

[17] Kevin Blackburn and Karl Hack, *Forgotten Captives in Japanese-Occupied Asia* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008).
[18] Joan Beaumont, 'Prisoners of War in Australian National Memory,' in Bob Moore and Barbara Hately-Broad (eds.), *Prisoners of War, Prisoners of Peace* (Oxford: Berg, 2005), pp.185-194.
[19] Gavan Daws, *Prisoners of the Japanese* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p.18.
[20] Peter Elphick, *The Pregnable Fortress: A Study in Deception, Discord and Desertion* (London: Coronet, 1995). The accounts given by the Keijo prisoners of their part in the Malayan campaign reveal how the Loyal battalion's left flank was exposed by the wholesale desertion of an Australian unit.
[21] Juliette Pattinson et al.,'Incarcerated Masculinities: Male POWs and the Second World War,' in *Journal of War and Culture Studies*, 7:3, August 2014, pp.179-190, (p.180).
[22]Hack and Blackburn, *Forgotten Captives*, p.15; Brian McArthur, *Surviving the Sword: Prisoners of the Japanese 1942-45* (London: Abacus, 2005).

In the popular imagination, the perception of Far Eastern imprisonment is narrower still and, particularly in Australia and this country, the Burma-Thailand railway has become emblematic of the entire history of Far Eastern incarceration, Moreover, as Sibylla Jane Flower has illustrated, many of the books and films which create and feed this memory, for example, *Bridge over the River Kwai* and *The Railway Man* are 'of little historical value'.[23] In his statistical history of Far Eastern captivity, Van Waterford has stated that every one of the approximately one thousand POW camps was unique.[24] Flower herself has written of the camps on the Burma-Thailand railway that conditions varied so much as to make generalization impossible. She also notes that no single comprehensive account of Far Eastern captivity has yet been written to explore this diversity.[25]

There is however a trend towards examining the varieties of experience. Robert Havers' reassessment of conditions at Changi camp, and Felicia Yap's comparative study of POW and civilian internee camps in British Asia might be added to Kovner's recent study of Korean camps as examples.[26] These supplement the valuable study by Flower on the camps on the Burma-Thailand railway, and Blackburn and Hack's collection of essays concentrating on what they refer to as the 'marginalised' categories of prisoners, such as women and children. [27]This dissertation might also be contextualized as part of this trend.

But an understanding of Japanese POW propaganda sheds light not just on Keijo but on all the camps visited by ICRC inspectors or Japanese photographers and reporters. Even if just for a brief moment, they too became propaganda camps. For example, an awareness of propaganda techniques might offer a possible solution to some of the 'disjunctures' and ambiguities which remain unresolved in Yap's` recent comparative study.[28] It might also problematise some of the conclusions she reaches.

In particular she raises the case of a Colonel Suga, Superintendent of Borneo POW and civilian internment camps. She states that his original conception of his role was as a civilising

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[23] Sibylla Jane Flower, 'Memory and The Prisoner of War Experience: United Kingdom,' in Blackburn and Hack, *Forgotten Captives,* pp.120-155, (p.135).
[24] Van Waterford, *Prisoners of the Japanese in World War Two: Statistical History, Personal Narratives and Memorials Concerning POWs in Camps and Hell Ships, Civilian Internees, Asian Slave Labourers and Others Captured in the Pacific Theatre* (North Carolina: McFarland & Co., 1994).
[25] Sibylla Jane Flower, 'Captors and Captives on the Burma-Thailand Railway,' in B. Moore and K. Fedorowich (eds.), *Prisoners of War and their Captors in World War Two* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
[26] Robert Havers: *Reassessing the Japanese Prisoner of War Experience: Changi Camp* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003); Felicia Yap, 'Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees of the Japanese in British Asia: The Similarities and Contrasts of Experience,' in *Journal of Contemporary History*, 47:2, April 2012, pp.317-346.
[27] B. Moore and K. Fedorowich, *Prisoners of War and their Captors in World War Two*.
[28] Yap, p.337.

and educative one and that he counselled his subordinates to get to know their charges well.[29] These good intentions, Yap argues, were borne out by the comparatively satisfactory conditions at Lintang camp (also known as Kuching), where he had his headquarters. But, as she herself notes, there is the problem of conditions at other camps under his jurisdiction, particularly Sandakan, where the treatment of prisoners was appalling. All the captives there, bar six escapees, died in terrible circumstances. or none at all. Yap conjectures that it is possible Suga was aware of his accountability for the deaths at Sandakan.[30] In fact, he was not only aware, but an instigator of the brutality at Sandakan.[31] The camp's existence was concealed from the outside world, unlike Kuching, which was open to reporters. If we observe that propaganda photographs were taken at Kuching and that letters from the prisoners reached Britain, another possible answer presents itself.[32] It may be that the better conditions were related to a propaganda function. We can also note that it was not unusual for camp commandants to propagandise both to their captives and their subordinates about their country's and their own beneficence. Colonel Noguchi did so at Keijo, and various Commandants at the Kinkaseki camp in Formosa used to offer their captives entirely insincere expressions of concern for their health, to give just two examples.[33]

Yap also draws attention to Japanese complaints about the 'extremely inhumane' conditions at an internment camp for Japanese civilians, Purana Qila, near Delhi.[34] She observes



BORNEO

Kuching Internment Camp. —.10.43

ALL well. No need to worry. Adequate food, tobacco. Good treatment. Vast vegetable garden, endless chess, bridge, etc., concerts, theatricals.

Figure 3 *Far East*, January 1945. One of several letters from Kuching published in the magazine, issued to families of FEPOWs. Its March 1945 issue informed readers that *all* Borneo POWs and internees were held at Kuching. See Figure 57 for other letters from the camp.

[29] Ibid., p.330.
[30] Ibid., p.345.
[31] See Christopher Dawson, *To Sandakan: The Diaries of Charlie Johnstone, Prisoner of War,1942-45* (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin,1995). Johnstone was held for a period at Sandakan and there are numerous references to Suga. He records: 'In his actions he was cold and ruthless – and cruel – as well as being a hypocrite and liar' (p.73). Of Suga's visits to Sandakan he notes: 'Everywhere he went with his armed bodyguards of thugs, men were slapped, kicked and beaten for nothing' (p.68).
[32] See Dawson, *To Sandakan*, p.91, for an account of staged propaganda photographs.
[33] See Jack Edwards and Jimmy Walter, *Banzai, You Bastards* (Hong Kong: Corporate Communication, 1989), p.104.
[34] Yap, p.327.

that the camp became a 'bone of contention' between the British and Japanese governments and led to reprisals on Allied POWs.[35] Again, it can be noted that Japanese propaganda strategy was to complain about Allied mistreatment of its internees as a smokescreen for its own abuses, and such complaints regularly appeared in *Japan Times* throughout the conflict. Yap cites the news agency *Domei* to substantiate her argument, without noting that it was under the control of the Japanese government and issued entirely fictitious propaganda on a daily basis.[36] Contemporary ICRC inspection reports and photographs, all depicting good conditions, support the argument that Japanese complaints were propaganda. This is not to deny that the British were guilty of mistreating Japanese internees but rather to suggest that the issue is possibly somewhat less clear-cut than Yap suggests.

Figure 4 V-PHIST-E-04272, Photothèque CICR. Purana Qila internment camp outside Delhi. The Japanese government protested angrily at the 'extremely inhumane' conditions here. The photograph above is one of several taken by ICRC inspectors. (No date is given).

In comparison to studies of British and Nazi propaganda in World War Two, Japanese propaganda has received comparatively little attention by anglophone scholars.[37] A brief but useful overview has been given by Philip Taylor in *Munitions of the Mind* , which pinpoints its

[35] Yap, p.331.

[36] For an account of *Domei* and its propaganda function, see Amaki Tomoko, *Soft Power of Japan's Total War State: The Board of Information and Domei News Agency in Foreign Policy, 1934-45* (Dordecht, Netherlands: Republic of Letters Publishing B V, 2009). See also T. H. Havens, *Valley of Darkness*, p.21.

[37] Barak Kushner makes the point in *The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda* (Hawaii: Hawaii University Press, 2007), p.7. For an overview of propaganda in World War Two, see Jo Fox, 'The Propaganda War,' in Evan Mawdsley (ed.), *The Cambridge History of The Second World War*, vol. 2, Michael Geyer and Adam Tooze (eds.), *Politics and Ideology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

failings.[38] Firstly, propaganda was predominantly based on lies, which, although effective during the early period of Japanese successes, became unsustainable as the tide of the war turned after the battle of Midway in May 1942. Secondly, there was no co-ordinating central authority comparable to Goebbel's Ministry of Propaganda, which led to confusing and sometimes contradictory messages. Japanese propaganda to the enemy was also damaged by its creators' imperfect grasp of English, and ignorance of Western life and attitudes. All these defects are evident in POW propaganda.

Although historians have in the main followed Taylor's assessment of Japanese propaganda as a failure, aspects of its internal propaganda were undoubtedly effective, as Taylor himself notes. Other historians have demonstrated the skill and artistry of Japanese wartime films, street theatre, and visual propaganda.[39] Taylor's predominantly negative summation of Japanese propaganda has however been challenged in an important work by Barak Kushner. *The Thought War* offers a reappraisal and argues that 'if Japanese propaganda was a failure it was at the least a successful failure.'[40] Kushner argues it mobilized and the population and sustained morale to an extent unobtainable in other totalitarian regimes, and also helped prepare it for defeat. His study illustrates how Japanese propaganda was multi vocal and multi-faceted, employing a variety of media and participants. As well as government propaganda, independent bodies such as advertising and record companies, as well as *rakugo* (comedians), story-tellers, Neighbourhood Assocations, participated in manufacturing what Ellul has termed 'horizontal propaganda', appearing to grow spontaneously from the people rather than being imposed from above.

But Kushner's survey does not aim to be a comprehensive one, and his most detailed and convincing analyses relate to internal propaganda. He offers little evidence to counter Susan Townshend's conclusion that a great deal of Japan's propaganda for its colonies was 'crass and insensitive'.[41] Japan presented itself as a bearer of progress, modernity and prosperity to other Asian territories. It cast itself as a liberator of the Asiatic people from white imperialism

[38] Philip M. Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind*, pp.238-241

[39] Sharlyn Orbaugh, *Propaganda Performed: Kamishibai in Japan's Fifteen Year War* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2015). The literal meaning of Kamishibai (紙芝居) is 'paper play'. At its most basic level, a performer would stand at a street corner with a set of drawings which would be shown in sequence to illustrate the story-teller's spoken narrative. The artistry of Japanese films and the subtlety of its propaganda are discussed by John Dower, 'Japanese Cinema Goes to War,' in *Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays*; (New York: New Press, 1993). The importance of photography in propaganda is investigated by David Earhart, *Certain Victory: Images of World War II in the Japanese Media* (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2008).

[40] Barak Kushner, *The Thought War*, p.9.

[41] Susan C. Townsend, 'Culture, Race and Power in Japan's Wartime Empire,' in Philip Towle et al. (eds.), *Japanese Prisoners of War* (London: Hambledon, 2000), p.186.

and stressed the cultural commonality of the Asiatic races, and the mutual benefit of the creation of a Greater Far Eastern co-prosperity sphere. But its actions were completely at odds with its propaganda. As Paul H. Kratoska and Ken'ichi Goto have observed, the Japanese received a cautious welcome when they first arrived at their newly-conquered territories, but due to their subsequent brutal and racist behavior, they left behind deep and lingering resentment and animosity.[42]

Japan's policy in its older colonies, Formosa and Korea, had been one of total assimilation (*dokuashugi*), which was premised on Japanese racial and cultural superiority. During the war Korea was stripped of its resources to aid the fight. The evidence of the Keijo diaries is of an utterly brutal and exploitative wartime regime. One of the Keijo diarists, Alan Toze, records a driver being beaten to death for not showing his pass.[43] An Australian captive, Arthur Kerr, describes the terrible conditions at a factory in Konan where he worked alongside local Korean labour. 'Mangled limbs and lost fingers' were a daily occurrence.[44] Outside the factory he witnessed railings and other metal objects being collected for the Japanese war effort, just one aspect of the denudation of the country's resources by the Japanese.

One of the most influential studies of Japanese propaganda appears in John Dower's *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*.[45] Dower analyses both American and Japanese propaganda to illustrate his thesis that racial hatred was the deep, underlying driver of the conflict. Historians have tended to discuss Japanese propaganda in these terms, exploring the dehumanising images of the enemy in Japanese propaganda, who is often depicted as a devil or sub-human. But David Earhart's useful study of visual propaganda shows how initially the enemy and POWs were presented in softer terms.[46] He identifies the Doolittle raids in April 1942 as a turning point in the depiction of the enemy.

The rhetoric and mythology of Japanese wartime propaganda are examined at length by Carol Gluck in *Modern Japan and its Myths*.[47] Gluck traces the history of internal propaganda back to the Meiji restoration in 1868, and links it to the process of remoulding and

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[42] Paul H. Kratoska and Ken'ichi Goto 'Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia, 1941-45,' in John W. Hall et al. (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 6, Peter Duus (ed.), *The Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.533. Japanese brutality and the failure of its colonial propaganda in the Philippines is discussed in M. C. Guerrero, 'La Propagande Japonaise aux Philippines (1942-45,)' in *Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, 22:86, April 1972*, pp.47-66.

[43] Alan Toze, *Diaries*, p.45.

[44] Arthur Kerr, *Diaries*, January 1945.

[45] John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1986). See also Dower, *Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays*.

[46] David C. Earhart *Certain Victory: Images of World War II in the Japanese Media* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2008).

[47] Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the late Meiji Period* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

questioning its identity as it engaged with the West and modernity. The process was one not merely of conceiving an ideology but of inculcating it by the process of *kyoka*. Central to this was the idea of Japanese racial purity and superiority, which was anchored in its original descent from the gods.

A key part of this rhetoric was the concept of *bushido*. The most recent scholarly discussion of the concept by Oleg Benesch illustrates how a code which had formerly belonged to its warrior class was re-imagined to serve as a set of values for the entire Japanese people.[48] Benesch examines the problematic history and etymology of the concept. and dates the origins of its modern sense to the 1880s, tracing its evolution into a particularly severe, imperialistic form in the 1930s, mirroring government ideology.

Benesch also states that discussion of *bushido* is complicated by the fact that the Japanese use several other phrases as well as *bushido* (武士道) to discuss the concept as a whole.[49]It is therefore relevant to state that my discussion follows the conceptualization given by Inazo Inotobé in his key work, *Bushido, The Soul of Japan*, where he employs two phrases.[50] The masculine ferocity of *bushido* (武士道) is contrasted with the feminine quality of '*bushi no nasake'*(武士の情け), the tenderness or compassion of the warrior for the defeated. It was this feminine quality, according to Japanese propagandists, which characterized Japanese treatment of POWs.

The activities of the ICRC during this period in the Far East have not yet been fully explored; scholarly attention during this period has mainly been given to its controversial relationships with the Nazi regime and the Swiss government, and in particular its failure to speak out over the deportations to the death camps in Europe.[51] In her history of the ICRC, Caroline Moorehead provides considerable detail on the activities of the Japan delegation.[52] There is also the ICRC's own history of its activities, and André Durand's semi-official *From Sarajevo to Hiroshima*.[53] The memoirs of the last Japan delegate, Marcel Junod, offer descriptions of his camp inspections and how they were manipulated, and record his realisation,

[48] Oleg Benesch, *Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushido in Modern Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
[49] The three Japanese characters denote 'martial', 'person of importance' and 'path'.
[50] Inazo Nitobé, *Bushido: The Soul of Japan* (Philadelphia: Leeds & Biddle, 1900), pp.21-24.
[51] See, for example, Isabelle Vonèche Cardia, *Les Relations entre le Comité International de la Croix-Rouge et le Gouvernement Suisse, 1938-1945*. (Lausanne: SH SR, 2012).
[52] Caroline Moorehead, *Dunant's Dream: War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross* (London: Harper Collins, 1998); International Committee of the Red Cross, *Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on its Activities during the Second World War (September1, 1939 – June 30, 1947*) 2 vols. (Geneva: ICRC, 1948).
[53] André Durand, *From Sarajevo to Hiroshima: History of the International Committee of the Red Cross* (Geneva: Institut Henry Dunant, 1978).

after the war had ended, that the organisation had in fact been 'duped'.[54]

The most detailed account of the Japan delegation's work so far is given in an excellent Master's thesis by Christophe Laurent.[55] He demonstrates how the Japanese delegation were effectively blackmailed into accepting the Japanese terms on which they were obliged to operate. I discuss this in detail in chapter 1. Although he does not develop the argument, he concludes that the ICRC was manipulated by the Japanese to such a degree that the organisation was effectively 'integrated into Japan's war effort'. This discussion offers the detail to substantiate his observation.[56]

In chapter 3 I discuss the response to Japanese propaganda and the administrative mechanisms which existed in Britain to receive, analyse and disseminate this information. A significant part of this work was delegated to the British Red Cross and I have made use Hilary St George's authorised biography as well as the Red Cross's official account.[57] The deficiencies of government organisations in administrating these functions, and the consequent impact on families of POWs have been explored recently by Barbara Hately-Broad.[58] James Crossland has also analysed the sometimes complicated relationships that existed between the ICRC, the British Red Cross and the British government.[59]

Primary Sources

My limited knowledge of Japanese has meant that I have been unable to utilise Japanese sources to more than a very slight extent. Fortunately, many primary sources exist in translation. In particular, I have made use of documents relating to propaganda which appear in the transcriptions of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials.[60] Joyce Lebra has also translated and commented on key documents relating to the Greater East Asian co-prosperity sphere.[61] There are also anthologies of contemporary diaries, and an interesting collection of letters

[54] Marcel Junod, *Le Troisième Combattant*, (Lausanne : Payot, 1947). See pp.231-232 for the author's account of his realisation that the ICRC had been duped.
[55] Christophe Laurent, 'Les Obstacles Rencontrés par le C.I.C.R. dans son Activité en Extrême Orient (1941-1945)', Master's thesis, University of Lausanne, 2003.
[56] Ibid., p.103.
[57] P. Cambray and G. G. B. Briggs, *Red Cross and St. John: The Official Record of the War Organisation of the Humanitarian Services of the British Red Cross Society and Order of St. John of Jerusalem, 1939-1947* (London: Sumfield & Day, 1949).
[58] Barbara Hately-Broad, *War and Welfare*.
[59] James Crossland, *Britain and the International Committee of the Red Cross* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
[60] R. J. Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide (eds.), *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Complete Transcripts of the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Twenty-Two Volumes* (New York: Garland, 1981).
[61] Joyce Lebra (ed.), *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents* (Kuala Lumpa: Oxford University Press, 1975).

written to the Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun* in response to a request for readers' memories of the Second World War.[62]

It is fortunate that in order to communicate with its target audience, external Japanese propaganda had to be written in English. Peter O'Connor has edited two collections, each running to ten volumes, of English language propaganda from books and pamphlets, covering the period 1891-1941.[63] The selections illustrate how Japan's attempts to justify its colonial expansion, assert its equality with the West, and its pre-eminence in Asia were pursued continuously from the last decade of the nineteenth century.

My main Japanese primary sources for the war years are the digitized editions of the *Japan Times,* a daily English language newspaper which was produced for English-speaking citizens of its colonial territories but was also read by many in Japan.[64]As Sarah Kovner has observed it was a 'propaganda organ' for the Japanese government.[65] Many of its reports, originally issued by *Domei,* would have appeared in identical form in Japanese language newspapers. It has been less easy to locate other newspapers and periodicals in this country. The collections held at the School of Oriental and Asian Studies at London University (SOAS), for example, end in 1940 and resume after the war. David Earhart's *Certain Victory*, however, contains examples of POW propaganda photographs taken at Zentsuji camp, and a translation of a newspaper article on prisoners held there.[66]

Research into this topic is hindered by the wide-scale destruction of documents by the Japanese, including magazines and newspapers. On 20 August 1945 the Japanese Chief of the Prisoner of War Camps ordered that all documents relating to POW camps be obliterated. At Keijo, Captain John Jesson, a medical officer, noted in his diary that there were great 'conflagrations' as documents from the camp office were burned.[67] Nevertheless, one consequence of the camp's propaganda function has been the survival of a uniquely large quantity of primary source material from the camp to reconstruct Japanese propaganda activities.

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[62] Samuel Hideo Yamashita, *Leaves from an Autumn of Emergencies: Selections from the Wartime Diaries of Ordinary Japanese* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005); F. Gibney (ed.), Beth Cary (trans.), *Senso: The Japanese Remember the Pacific War*: *Letters to the Editor of the Asahi Shimbun* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2001).

[63] Peter O'Connor, (ed.), *Japanese Propaganda:* Selected Readings, Series 1: *Books,1872-1943,* 10 vols. (Folkestone, Kent: Global Oriental, 2005); Peter O'Connor, (ed.), *Japanese Propaganda: Selected Readings*, Series 2: *Pamphlets,1891-1939*, 10 vols., (Folkestone, Kent: Global Oriental, 2006).

[64] The *Japan Times* was renamed *The Japan Times and Advertiser* during the period 1940-43, then *Nippon Times* from 1943-56.

[65] Kovner, 'Allied Prisoners in Korea', p.232.

[66] David C. Earhart *Certain Victory: Images of World War II in the Japanese Media* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2008).

[67] John Jesson, *Journals*, August 1945.

Memoirs and sketches of Keijo began to be published immediately after the war ended. *Sketches of a P.O.W in Korea* by J D Wilkinson, a private in the Australian Imperial Forces (hereafter AIF) was published in 1946.[68] It reproduces his narrative drawings of the voyage to Korea and daily life at Keijo, Jinsen and Konan. The following year, two British artists, Alan Toze and Sergeant Stanley Strange, published *In Defence of Singapore*, a book of sketches with brief comments which again constitute a narrative of their life from the Malayan campaign.[69]

The senior British officer, Colonel Mordaunt William Elrington, published an account of captivity at Keijo which appeared between 1948 and 1952 in various issues of the Regimental magazine, *Lancashire Lad*.[70] In comparison to his account of his battalion's early incarceration at Changi, his discussion of Keijo is remarkably brief, which he explains on the grounds that it would have been painful both for him and for his readers to revive memories of the camp. Despite its brevity it contains a lot of significant information, including the Japanese intention, as the war neared its end, to kill all the officers in the Korean camps.[71] A later memoir by Lieutenant Tom Henling Wade, a professional journalist, was privately published in 1994.[72] It is a highly sanitized account of life in Changi, Keijo and Omori camp near Tokyo written for a popular audience. His suggestion that Fritz Paravicini, Head of the ICRC delegation in Japan, was corrupt, is discussed in chapter 1. A much more compelling account of captivity in Korea exists in the form of a recorded interview with a former prisoner, Captain Ivor Thomas, made in 1980. Thomas was held at both Jinsen and Keijo and summarises conditions at both as 'horrific', giving a far bleaker account of life at the camps than Kovner.[73] There are also recordings of interviews with three other Jinsen POWs, made in the early 1980s. [74]They all convey a sense of the painfulness of the memories which they are asked to revive and make Kovner's summation of the Korean camps as places where the prisoners 'could sit out the war in relative safety' seem possibly an overly positive one.

I have also made use of primary source material held at the Imperial War Museum, the Liddell Hart Collection at King's College London, the National Archives, The International

[68] J. D. Wilkinson, *Sketches of a P.O.W. in Korea* (Melbourne: unknown publisher, 1946).
[69] S. Strange and A. Toze, *In Defence of Singapore: A Series of Brief Sketches with Notes* (Preston: Snape & Co., 1947).
[70] M. W. Elrington, 'With 2nd Loyals in Captivity' *The Lancashire Lad: Journal of the Loyal Regiment*, September 1949, March 1950, June 1950, December 1950, June 1951, March 1952. de Groen and Kovner give Elrington the Christian name 'Michael'. This is incorrect.
[71] See March 1952 edition.
[72] Tom Henling Wade, *Prisoner of the Japanese: from Changi to Tokyo* (Ipswich: Kall-Kwik Printing, 1994)
[73] Imperial War Museum, Sound Archives (Oral History), 4630 Thomas, Ivor George, Interview, 5 August 1980.
[74] IWM Sound Archives (Oral History) 4986, Hanson, Douglas Parker; 6058, Roberts, Jack; 8302 Fraser, Daniel McClair.

Committee of the Red Cross archives in Geneva (mostly in French), the British Red Cross Archives in London and the Lancashire Infantry Museum in Preston. I have also used material held in private hands in this country, Australia and America. The written sources include diaries, letters, poems, short stories, and formal documents such as Courts of Enquiry held to investigate accidents and deaths at the camp, and a copy of the camp regulations.[75] I also make use of the records of Trial 181 at Yokohama in 1948, where Noguchi and eleven other camp officials from Korea were tried and convicted.[76]

Visual sources include over a hundred photographs of the camp. The prisoners drew portraits, cartoons, caricatures, sketches of their surroundings, portraits, flyers for their shows and birthday and Christmas cards for each other. I have also located reports and photographs of Keijo in the journal published by the ICRC: *Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge*, and in the British Red Cross magazines *Prisoner of War*, and its supplement *Far East* magazine, produced for the families of FEPOWs. In examining the reception of this propaganda by the British government, I have made use a variety of government documents held at the National Archives, including War Cabinet minutes, and Sir Harold Satow's report into the activities of the Foreign Office's Prisoner of War Department.

The diaries from Keijo are a unique resource. It was rare for men to keep diaries in Japanese POW camps: in many camps it was an offence punishable by death.[77] It was even rarer for Other Ranks to keep records as most, employed in heavy labour and under-fed, lacked the time, energy and materials. This study makes use of the very detailed accounts of three Other Ranks.

The principal constraint on the diarists was that the knowledge that their diaries might be read by the Japanese. Although the prisoners were given the assurance that they could write what they liked, they generally exercised prudence until after the Japanese capitulation. On 30 August 1945, Major Rigby wrote: 'The Japanese are behaving very well now, the little bastards. Up to now I have had to moderate my references to them in case this book fell into their hands. I hope to hear later of large numbers of executions and sentences for Japanese war criminals.'[78] My method in analysing the diaries has been to attempt to discern the extent to which form and function may have determined content. I have asked whom the diarist is addressing and how this might affect

[75] Examples of some of the verse written at the camp are reproduced at Appendix 3.
[76] Yokohama War Crimes Trials, Trial 181:Yuzuru Noguchi, Centre for War Studies, University of Marburg, Online Archives <http://www.online.uni-marburg.de/icwc/yokohama> [accessed 11 April 2018].
[77] The exception is Changi. But record keeping here was eventually forbidden in 1944. More than 50,000 prisoners passed through Changi, whereas there were at most 400 at Keijo. The Keijo diaries therefore enable a more complete reconstruction of camp life.
[78] Privately held, Conrad Rigby, *Diaries*, August 1945.

the subject matter. Were they, like many contemporary diarists, writing for their future selves or for posterity? In some cases the answer is straightforward. Lever's diaries are addressed to his wife, and Jesson's to his mother. In these cases I have considered whether they were therefore able to describe aspects of their existence which they may have felt awkward expressing to their male companion, or conversely whether their imagined audience acted as a censor to some of their darker thoughts and experiences.

Table 1

Diarist	**Period at Keijo recorded in diary**	**Location**	**Approximate length (words)**
Lieutenant George Baker	Sep 43 -Sep 45	Privately held	10,000
Captain John Jesson	Sep 42- Sep 45	Privately held	20,000
Private Arthur Kerr, AIF	Sep 42-Nov 43	Privately held	3,000
Capt. John Lever	Sep 42- Sep 45	Lancashire Infantry Museum	15,000
Major Conrad Rigby	Sep 42-Sep 45	Privately held	3,000
Lance-bombardier Alan Toze	Sep 42-June 44	Imperial War Museum	30,000
Private Eric Wallwork	Sep 42-Nov 43	'Bolton Remembers the War' (website)	4,000

I have also attempted to discern what impulses led the diarist to write. Keeping a diary provided escape and a form of consolation. It could serve an assimilative or performative function as the writer tried to make sense of his experiences and construct a new identity as a prisoner. It could aid his survival. For these reasons, the prisoner may have excluded the most harrowing experiences or most negative thoughts.

All the diaries carry a sense of making the best of their experience. They also reflect the characteristic modes of expression of their time. Most noticeably, they tend to understatement, and use humour to mediate their experiences. The various artworks and forms of imaginative literature written at the camp provided other means of expression. For example, Baker wrote a short story containing a lurid description of a hospital ward, with its smell of gangrene and putrefying flesh.[79] Nothing comparable appears in his diaries, suggesting that he found it easier to express himself in a form which distanced himself from the experience. Likewise the anonymous poem *War*, written at Keijo, expresses a sense of horror to a far greater degree than any of the diaries.[80] As the examples of prisoner sketches reproduced at

[79] Privately held, G. S. Baker Archive.
[80] See *War*, reproduced at Appendix 3.

Appendix 6 illustrate, other art forms allowed the prisoners to express themselves more eloquently than in writing.[81]

Personal Testimony

My initial interest in Keijo, of course, derived from my father. But like most other former prisoners he hardly ever spoke of his experiences – indeed, he never once spoke of Changi or his voyage to Korea on the 'Hellship' *Fukkai Maru* - and what little he did say was mostly understated or even recalled in comical terms, as when he described to me the seaweed which was sometimes served as breakfast. However, he also once told me that he had not expected to survive. Recalling the Japanese intention to kill the prisoners as Russian forces advanced into Korea, he remarked 'we were all very worried', as if amused by the recollection. Nevertheless, my brother and I formed the impression that it had been a terrible experience, too terrible to discuss. He kept various photographs which he had pasted into the family album, reproduced at the end of this chapter, but he was unwilling to discuss them.

Some years after my father's death, my mother told me of two memories which continued to trouble him over a decade after his release: helping hold a man down whilst he had a limb amputated without anaesthesia, and of lying in a hospital bed listening to a friend's delirious cries as he died of meningitis, again without any relief from anaesthesia. I also remember her commenting that a disproportionately large number of the men at the camp died during the 1950s, including my father's close friend, Captain Peter Cazalet. Speaking to the daughter of an Australian POW, Lieutenant Lesley Fraser, who had died in that decade, I discovered that this belief also existed amongst Australian families.[82]This transmitted memory obviously informs my perception of the camp. Above all my discussion is based on a strong consciousness of suffering and blighted lives. I have attempted however to avoid personal bias in my discussion. The distinguished historian Sheila Fitzpatrick's recent work on her late husband's wartime experiences illustrates that a personal connection can be of benefit rather than a hindrance when writing history.[83]

A family connection has been useful in making contact and talking with other relations of Keijo prisoners, who have all been very generous in sharing their family archives.[84] The topics of intergenerational memories and of how captivity subsequently affects family life are

[81] For a discussion on POW creativity, see G. Carr and H. Mytum (eds.), *Cultural Heritage and Prisoners of War: Creativity behind Barbed Wire* (London: Routledge, 2009).
[82] Merrie Bott, daughter of Lieutenant Fraser, exchanged emails with me in January 2016.
[83] Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Mischka's War* (London: IB Tauris, 2017).
[84] I have also met Alison Jesson, daughter of Captain John Jesson; Helen Sherpa, granddaughter of Major Conrad Rigby and have exchanged emails with Johnny Howard, son of Captain Jack McNaughton, and Phil Karshis, a friend and former colleague of Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier) Elrington during his second career as Headmaster of a private school in New Mexico.

ones that have recently attracted scholarly attention, and indeed the memories of three children of Australian POWs at Keijo appear in a book edited by the daughter of Captain Wilfred Fawcett, senior Australian officer at Keijo.[85] Although I draw on the book for evidence of Keijo, these issues themselves are outside the scope of this discussion.

In summary, this case study of Keijo draws on a large number of hitherto unexamined primary sources and offers a new understanding of conditions at the camp and how they were manipulated. It also offers insights into Japanese POW propaganda which have broader applicability. In particular, it invites re-consideration of the respective roles of the ICRC and the Huryojohokyoku.

Figure 5: Private Collection, Richard Baker. Officers, Keijo camp, Christmas Day, 1942. Back row, left to right: Captain Procter, Lieutenant Hill, Lieutenant Baker. Captain Lever is seated immediately in front of Baker

Figure 6: Private collection, Richard Baker. Making bread at Keijo.

[85] Carolyn Newman, *Legacies of our Fathers*: *World War Two Prisoners of the Japanese - their Sons and Daughters Tell their Stories* (Sydney: Hachette, 2006).

Figure 7: Private Collection, Richard Baker. Christmas lunch, 1943. Lieutenant Baker is looking at the camera, his close friend Padre Peter Cazalet to his right.

CHAPTER 1

Keijo in Context: Japanese POW Propaganda in World War Two

To understand Keijo's significance, it is first necessary to view it within the broader context of Japanese POW propaganda during World War Two. This chapter identifies key Japanese POW propaganda themes and the various purposes they served. The propaganda varied according to the target audience, whether domestic, foreign or colonial, and although there was considerable overlap, there were also differences which, as we shall see, contained a fundamental contradiction. Keijo was exploited in a variety of ways to serve as propaganda but its chief significance lay in projecting a benign image of Far Eastern captivity.

Keijo's exploitation for this purpose, described in detail in chapter 2, formed a significant part of a strategy of deception conducted by the Huryojohokyoku upon the ICRC delegates. This bureau permitted the ICRC representatives to inspect only a very small number of unrepresentative camps. There was careful preparation at the camps before the visits, and stage-managed inspections resulted in the delegates reporting a far more positive impression of conditions than the reality. The false impression was reinforced by propaganda photographs and

film reels which the Huryojohokyoku forwarded to the delegates. I focus in particular on the manipulation of the ICRC by the Huryojohokyoku, as this is where Keijo's role was most significant, and is an area which is not properly understood. My investigation suggests that the ICRC's limited presence in Japanese territories was permitted for propaganda rather than humanitarian reasons.

POW propaganda: strategies and goals

Barak Kushner has suggested that all Japanese wartime propaganda can be subsumed under one key objective, to 'unite the home front with the battlefront'.[86] As was the case with any belligerent nation in the twentieth century, it was necessary to mobilise the entire population in support of the war. Kushner's observation is supported by a policy document issued by the Army Information Board in 1943 for the benefit of the media. Entitled 'Precautionary Matters Concerning Censorship of News of Prisoners of War', it states that, for the domestic audience, the principle aim of any reporting should be to 'raise the fighting spirit of the people'.[87]

The document offers several suggestions about how this could be done. Reports of Japanese martial prowess from the mouths of the prisoners were encouraged; and indeed these were a feature of radio and print propaganda throughout the war. As soon as the prisoners bound for Keijo disembarked at Fusan they were met by reporters eager to hear details of Japanese military superiority during the fighting in Malaya.[88] Once they had arrived at Keijo, they were again interviewed by reporters anxious to hear about Japanese fighting skills. Eighteen months later, one of the instructions in a questionnaire given to all prisoners in Korea was 'to list things admired about the Japanese army'.[89]

The document also forbade reports of prisoners 'being too well or too harshly treated'. As the Japanese people experienced steadily increasing privations, earlier reports of prisoners leading leisure-filled lives, even playing water polo at Singapore, were replaced with accounts of disciplined lives with an even balance of work and recreation.[90] News of harsh treatment or the usual methods of interrogation was forbidden on the grounds that it would provide 'evil propaganda for our enemies'.

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[86] Kushner, *The Thought War*, p.10.

[87] 'Precautionary Matters Concerning Censorship of News of Prisoners of War', reproduced in R.J. Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide (eds.), *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Complete Transcripts of the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Twenty-Two Volumes* (hereafter *IMTFE*), vol. 6 (New York: Garland,1981) pp.11412-15.

[88] See Eric Wallwork *Diaries*, September 1942, accessed at <www.boltonswar.org.uk>

[89] The questionnaire is reproduced at Appendix 1 and discussed in Chapter 2.

[90] Compare for example, *Nippon Times*, 20 February 1942, report headed '40,000 British prisoners take life easy: play guitar, sing and swim at Shonanto' with a report published on 3 May 1943 stating that prisoners were leading 'disciplined lives'

Much POW propaganda, whether directed internally or externally, made reference to the ideology of *bushido*. The Japanese could not claim physical, technological or intellectual superiority over their enemies, nor could they match the enemy in terms of manpower and resources, but propaganda asserted the Japanese soldier's superior moral qualities and *damashii yamato,* its unique fighting spirit.[91] It was anchored in a mythical past, and the Yamato race's divine origins. It manifested itself through *bushido*. Japan also possessed a unique *kokutai* - usually translated as 'polity'- which reflected the *bushido* principles of loyalty and patriotism, placing the nation before the individual, in contrast to the selfish individualism of the democratic system.

The problematic nature of *bushido*'s history and etymology has been referred to in the introduction. The most recent scholarly study of *bushido* by Oleg Benesch illustrates not merely that the concept has continued to evolve during the twentieth century, with a particularly severe form, 'Imperial *bushido'*, becoming prominent in the 1930s and 1940s, but that during the period under discussion several types of *bushido* discourse existed concurrently.[92] However, we can say that a contemporary Japanese audience would have understood that the term encompassed the qualities of loyalty to one's comrades and country, self-sacrifice, pitilessness in battle, a refusal to undergo the disgrace of surrender, and a severely austere manner of life.

POWs are presented as the exact antithesis of this *bushido* ideal. Propaganda constantly emphasised the terrible shame the prisoners had brought on themselves, their families, and their countries, by surrendering.[93] Lacking Japan's *kokutai*, the POW selfishly put his family before his nation: he was luxury-loving (seen as an effeminate quality in Japanese propaganda), materialistic, and in awe of the Japanese soldier. Although Benesch has suggested that *bushido* was often employed to dehumanise the enemy, POWs are depicted with all-too-human failings.[94] in the pages of *Nippon Times* they are feckless, unconcerned, even blasé, as in the following typical report:

> Apart from the kindness of the Japanese authorities the thing which interested and at the same time baffled him [the reporter] the most was the nonchalant

[91] Yamato damashii, i.e., the national 'Yamato spirit'. Yamato was the mythical ancient home of the Japanese.
[92] Oleg Benesch, *Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushido in Modern Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
[93] Kushner, *The Thought War*, p.23.
[94] Benesch, *Inventing the Way of the Samurai*, p.200.

> happy-go-lucky devil-may-care attitude of these enemy soldiers who are actually proud of being prisoners. He was also appalled their lack of real comradeship and patriotism.[95]

Lack of comradeship was often cast in terms of resentment between different nationalities, mirroring a greater disunity between the Allied powers. Australians, for example, were offended by British snobbery and haughtiness, whilst Americans were unpopular with other prisoners on account of their materialism.[96] The different nationalities were also assigned other particular failings: Americans were sentimental as well as money-minded, the British were decadent and luxury-loving, while the Australians were 'drunkards'.[97]

The kindness of the Japanese authorities referred to in the first report was as another aspect of *bushido*. As mentioned in the introduction, '*bushido* generosity' was a key theme of all Japan's POW propaganda.[98] POW propaganda for both internal and external audiences cast Japanese treatment of its prisoners in these terms. For the domestic audience, the kind treatment the Japanese gave its prisoners was often contrasted with the maltreatment suffered by Axis prisoners and civilian internees in the hands of the Allies. As Ellul has observed, the enemy does not accuse you of just anything, but of the very act it intends to commit itself.[99] In reality, it was the *bushido* precept that to surrender was a mortal shame that coloured Japanese treatment of POWs.

Although Keijo was used primarily to demonstrate *bushi no nasake* to the world, its prisoners were also exploited to show the Korean population the shamelessness and lack of spirit which characterised the enemy soldier. Like other FEPOWs, they were located in a particular part of Japan's empire in order to demonstrate Japanese superiority to the local population. In April 1942 at a conference in Tokyo, Prime Minister Hideki Tojo had decreed: 'Prisoner of War camps will be established not only in the south, but also in Japan, Korea, Manchuria and China. We will act so to create in the peoples of East Asia, who have for so many years been resigned to being no match for the white races, a feeling of trust towards Japan.'[100]

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[95] *Japan Times*, 17 March 1943.
[96] See, for example, 'Anzac, Indian and British Prisoners Form Own Cliques, Displaying Mutual Contempt', *Nippon Times*, 21 February 1942 or 'Mutual Antagonism is Displayed by Anglo-American War Prisoners', *Nippon Times*, 18 May 1943
[97] See *Nippon Times*, 21 February 1942.
[98] See, for example, 'Foe's Charges on Prisoners without Basis: Code of Japanese Bushido rigidly Differentiates between War Activities and Human Morality' *Nippon Times*, 11 February 1943.
[99] Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1966) p58.
[100] Quoted by Yoichi Kibata in 'Japanese Treatment of British Prisoners of War: The Historical Context' in Philip Towle, Margaret Kosuge and Yoichi Kibata, (eds.), *Japanese Prisoners of War* (London and New York: Hambledon and London, 2000).

Even before this announcement, Keijo's existence had been envisaged for this purpose. In February 1942, General Seishiro Itagaki, Commander of the Korean Army, had written to the Japanese War Ministry requesting permission to have prisoners sent to Korea 'to stamp out respect and admiration of the Korean people for the Britain and America and to create confidence in a Japanese victory'.[101] In fulfilment of this plan, Japan party 'B', numbering approximately a thousand men, arrived in Korea from Singapore in September 1942.[102]

But the policy, as it played out across Japan's territories, was one of demonstrating Japanese superiority by the prisoners' public humiliation. Korea's significance here, according to Lord Russell, lay in the fact that it was the first place where the policy was enacted, in the form of a victory march, and its perceived success was a spur to similar events in other cities across Japan's empire.[103] The prisoners were marched around the streets of Fusan immediately after their disembarkation, and the next day they were paraded in front of the local population at Keijo.

Nearly all the men were suffering from diarrhoea and beriberi following their journey from Singapore, crammed into the four small cargo holds of the steamer *Fukkai Maru*, where conditions, in one prisoner's account, 'were unfit for animals, let alone human beings'.[104] Several collapsed during the marches and sixteen of the party were to die over the next few weeks. The march was photographed, filmed, and reported in Korean national media.

The reported remarks of the onlookers reflect the themes we have discussed: the unwarrior-like quality of the soldiers, manifested in what one onlooker purportedly described as the 'disgraceful indifference' to their capture and their 'lack of patriotism'. Their 'frail and unsteady' appearance also served to enhance confidence in Japanese martial supremacy. The comments appear in a memorandum sent by the Chief of Staff in Korea to various recipients in Japan entitled 'Reactions amongst the General Public following internment of British prisoners'.[105] Historians of this topic, including Russell, have accepted this document as reportage, however biased, but it should be noted that it was dated 12 August 1942, and was received in several locations in Japan during that month, yet the prisoners did not arrive in Korea until 21

[101] 'Report Regarding Plans for the Internment of POWs in Korea' from Commander in Chief of the Korean Army, Seishiro Itagaki to Minister of War, Hideki Tojo, 23 March 1942, in Pritchard and Zaide (eds.), *IMTFE* vol. 6, pp.14512-13.
[102] There were no Americans at Keijo until 1945, but all *Japan Times* references to the camp state their presence. The party consisted almost entirely of British servicemen, with a small Australian contingent. Most of the prisoners were from 2nd Battalion, Loyal Regiment, a regular battalion that had been stationed in Singapore since 1939. Kovner is incorrect in stating that there were a large number of senior officers in the party.
[103] Lord Russell *The Knights of Bushido*, p.77.
[104] A. F. Douglas Allison, 'The Voyage of the *Fukkai Maru'*, *Blackwood's Magazine*, February 1946, p.137.
[105] 'Reactions amongst the General Public following Internment of British Prisoners', in Pritchard and Zaide, (eds.), *IMTFE* vol.6, pp.14535-39.

September.[106] These remarks are therefore invented, and can be viewed as evidence of propaganda aims rather than actual responses.[107]

Victory marches were merely a small element in this policy of humiliation. In Rangoon, for example, prisoners were publicly degraded by being made to clean gutters with their hands, sweep the streets and empty dustbins. In Hong Kong, prisoners were made to pull rickshaws.[108] It is impossible, due to lack of documentary evidence, to define the extent of this policy or its exact nature. A recently published work on this topic by Japanese historian Aiko Utsumi suggests that the starvation and general maltreatment of prisoners stemmed, at least in part, from the policy.[109]

In an article on Canadian POWs, Hamish Ion illustrates the pervasiveness of deliberate humiliation of POWs, but also states, somewhat puzzlingly, that there was no overall policy of ill-treatment.[110] It remains an area in need of further investigation, but it illustrates an aspect of Japan's propaganda campaigns mentioned in the introduction: that they were sometimes contradictory. Japanese subjects could read newspaper accounts of Japanese kindness, but also see the public degradation of these prisoners. There was a contradiction at the very heart of its POW propaganda policies.

Figure 8: Australian War Memorial 041096: Disembarkation from *Fukkai Maru* at Fusan

Figure 9: Australian War Memorial 041102: Victory Parade, Fusan.

[106] Russell states that the prisoners arrived in August, but the prisoners' diaries give a date of 21 September for their arrival. De Groen and Kovner do not address the discrepancy.
[107]Oral accounts of the parade are given by Douglas Hanson, (IWM (Sound) 4986) and Daniel Fraser (IWM (Sound) 8302). Their testimony suggests that the Koreans lining the street were 'cowed' by the Japanese and not overly interested in the spectacle. Roberts formed the impression that the spectators had been coerced into attending.
[108] For details of Hong Kong, see Philip Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the Japanese Occupation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).
[109] See Aiko Utsumi, 'Japan's World War II POW Policy: Indifference and Irresponsibility', *Asia-Pacific Journal*, 3:5 (2005), https://apjjf.org/-Utsumi-Aiko/article.html> [accessed 4 April 2018].
[110] Hamish Ion, '"Much ado about Too Few": Aspects of the Treatment of Canadian and Commonwealth POWs and Civilian Internees in Metropolitan Japan, 1941-1945', *Defence Studies*, 6:3 (2006).

Figure 10: AWM 041104

Propaganda for the Allies

The prisoners' humiliation was for the benefit of audiences in Japan and its territories only. The Allied and neutral countries were presented with a consistent message: prisoners were treated with '*bushido* generosity'. In February 1942, the Japanese had responded to a request from the ICRC to clarify its stance regarding POWs with the following statement: 'Since the Japanese government has not ratified the Geneva convention it is therefore not bound by the said convention. Nevertheless, in so far as possible, it intends to apply this convention *mutatis mutandis* to all prisoners of war.' Although it had no intention of doing so, it maintained this fiction unvaryingly and in the face of seemingly irrefutable evidence to the contrary throughout the conflict.

We can see a continuity in this fiction of '*bushido* generosity'. Japan was anxious to cast itself in a good light to the rest of the world. From the Meiji period onwards, it had pursued acceptance as an equal by the West, despite the slights and rebuffs it received.[111] Even during the 1930s, when it had become increasingly resentful and suspicious of the West, it was sensitive to foreign criticism. In 1934, Japan had been a generous host of an ICRC international conference, paying lip-service to its principles whilst at the same time acting in a spirit entirely contrary to them in its prosecution of undeclared war in China. The pretence of a generous nation who treated its prisoners kindly was also employed as part of a broader

[111] Japanese writings in English in pursuit of this aim can are reproduced in O'Connor, *Japanese Propaganda: Selected Readings,* Series 1 & 2.

policy of inducing war-weariness in the enemy. Propaganda broadcasts from Batavia to Australia were punctuated by unscheduled messages from POWs who praised both the fighting abilities of the Japanese, and their kindness to prisoners.[112] Propaganda to American troops in the Pacific theatre contained similar themes.

POW propaganda's most specific task, however, was to rebut the claims of mistreatment made the Allied governments. The Japanese responded to such claims in a variety of ways. Newspaper articles referred back to the First World War and dismissed British accusations as 'the old story' of fabricated accounts of atrocities; they also reminded their readers of Japan's exemplary treatment of POWs during that conflict.[113] The Japanese government responded by outright denial, by counter-accusations, or by silence. It also invented narratives to explain the most notorious incidents, such as the Bataan Death March and the sinking of the *Lisbon Maru*. In the latter case, a British protest made through the Protecting Power, that the Japanese had locked prisoners into the holds of the sinking ship, and then shot at those who managed to break out, were countered by reports in *Nippon Times* lauding the heroism of the Japanese sailors who had risked their lives to come to the drowning prisoners' aid.[114] But the main element of its counter-propaganda was to manipulate the Red Cross into publishing accounts and photographs of satisfactory conditions in the POW camps. To substantiate this claim of manipulation, it is necessary to examine the relationship between the Huryojohokyoku and the ICRC.

The Huryojohokyoku and the ICRC

The Huryojohokyoku (Prisoner of War Information Office) was ostensibly created to satisfy Article 77 of the 1929 Geneva convention. Its function, as formulated by the Convention, was to operate as an independent body, receiving and supplying POW information. It was also responsible, with the Japanese postal service, for co-ordinating prisoner mail. At the same time, another ostensibly separate organisation, the POW Management Office, responsible for camp administration, discipline and prisoner transfers, which had been created during the First World War, was revived.[115]

[112] Australian Intelligence officers monitored these broadcasts and came to the conclusion that their aim was to induce 'war-weariness'. See A. J. Sweeting, 'Prisoners of the Japanese' in Lionel Wigmore, *Australia in the War of 1939-45*, vol. 4, *The Japanese Thrust* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957) pp.168-170.
[113] See 'The Old Story', *Nippon Times, 3 February 1942.*
[114] The fullest account of the incident is given in Tony Banham, *The Sinking of the 'Lisbon Maru'* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006).
[115] The organisation's name is given various translations: it is sometimes referred to as the POW Administration Office, or POW Control Office.

Although most historians have discussed the two bodies as separate entities, it is reasonable to query this. In an article on Japan's POW policy, Aiko Atsumi gives an organisational chart representing the two as entirely distinct units with separate reporting lines.[116] But there is evidence to suggest that David Bergamini's identification of the Management Office as a *subsidiary* of the Hurjohokyoku is closer to the truth.[117] After the war, the ICRC discovered that the organisations operated from the same building. Both reported directly to the War Ministry; both were headed by a General Uemura, and both shared the same personnel. This is significant on several counts. At the least, such an arrangement would undoubtedly have facilitated the manipulation of camp visits and the flow of propaganda to and from the Army Ministry's Information bureau, which briefed journalists. It also calls into question the view offered by Hamish Ion and others, that the Huryojohokyoku's tardiness in supplying POW details was due, at least in part, to understaffing and the lack of available information.[118] However, the POW management board was able to co-ordinate the transfer of many thousands of prisoners across its territories to locations where their skills matched particular labour requirements, which suggests that a great deal of information was in fact readily available. Sibylla Jane Flower's view that POW information was deliberately withheld matches the evidence.[119] Her observation that, at least until 1944, the Huryojohokyoku kept detailed records is confirmed by evidence of the thousands of POW records taken from the Japanese at the capitulation and now held at the National Archives.[120] An example is reproduced below at Figure 11.

It was the Huryojohokyoku whom the Far East delegates of the ICRC approached for POW information and permission to visit camps.[121] But from the beginning of the conflict until the Japanese capitulation, many constraints were placed on the ICRC's work. The southern,

[116] Aiko Utsumi, trans. Gavan McCormack, 'Prisoners of War in the Pacific War: Japan's Policy' in Gavan McCormack and Hank Nelson, *The Burma-Thailand Railway* (Thailand: Silkworm books, 1993), p.70, Figure 8.1.
[117] David Bergamini, *Japan's Imperial Conspiracy* (London: Panther 1971), p.261.
[118] Hamish Ion, '"Much ado about Too Few".
[119] Sybilla Jane Flower, 'British Policy Makers and the Prisoner-of-War issue: Perceptions and Responses,'in Ian Gow and Yoichi Hirama with John Chapman (eds.), *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000: Vol. 3: The Military Dimension* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) pp. 232-24.
[120] TNA WO/345
[121] Ion states that the Japan approached the POW Management Board, but Paravicini's communications with Geneva mention approaching the Huryojohokyoku. However, as I have suggested, the distinction may be redundant.



Figure 11: TNA WO/345, Lieutenant Baker's details, held by the Japanese. His occupation is correctly given as 'student at London University'.

newly-occupied territories which held nearly ninety percent of the Allied prisoners, were forbidden to the ICRC on the ground that they were war zones. The ICRC was also severely limited in its number of accredited delegates. In comparison to the thirty delegates allowed in Germany, only three delegations were initially accredited in Japanese territories, based in Hong Kong, Japan and Shanghai. The ICRC was fortunate in that it could call upon the services of Dr Fritz Paravicini, a society doctor living in Tokyo who had acted in the same role during the First World War. Following its usual procedure, the ICRC sought the Swiss consul's advice for the names of suitable Swiss nationals to take on the other positions. `Eventually Eduoard Egle, a director of a firm of importers and exporters, assumed the role of delegate in Shanghai, and Rudolf Zindel, an employee of a trading company, Arnold & Co, in China for the previous twenty years, took the position in Hong Kong.[122]

The ICRC appointed delegates in other areas, but the Japanese refused to recognise them. These unofficial delegates in the newly occupied territories attempted to help the POWs in an unofficial or clandestine capacity, but they ran very great risks. The delegate in Borneo, Dr Matthaeus Fischer, a doctor and missionary, was beheaded on trumped up

[122] Following Paravicini's death in January 1944, Angst acted as temporary Head of the delegation, before Marcel Junod was accredited as Head in January 1945.

charges of espionage.[123] Even the official delegates were regarded with suspicion and hostility.

As far as the ICRC was concerned, it was an endlessly frustrating relationship. In its account of its activities during The Second World War, it complained: 'From the outset the bureau was very unwilling to co-operate with the delegation. Personal visits were discountenanced: the delegates were even asked to deal with all questions only by correspondence'.[124] It summarises its dealings by concluding: 'Over the period it issued the least possible information concerning PW'. On 12 January 1943 Paravicini wrote to Geneva: 'If I look back on the first year of my activity I am most disappointed with the results; no delegate in the South, no Red Cross ships admitted, enquiries, correspondence, lists, distribution etc. very unsatisfactory.' The situation did not improve. In December 1943, shortly before his death, Paravicini summed up his dealings with the bureau in a telegraph to Geneva: 'have sent Huryojohokyoku by cable or letter several thousand enquiries on missing or unidentified pows- so far, very few answers received'.[125] The unrelieved obstructiveness of the Huryojohokyoku raises the question of why the Japanese allowed the ICRC any presence whatsoever. After all, like Russia, it was not bound by the Geneva convention, and it could have followed Russia's example in refusing the organisation admission to its country. The answer lies in Japan's sensitivity to world opinion rather than any humanitarian motive. In the broadest sense, the Japan delegation could be said to have served a propaganda purpose, its mere presence illustrating Japanese adherence to western notions of humanitarianism. But it also unwittingly served far more specific functions as a conduit of Japanese POW propaganda.

ICRC Camp Inspections

Paravicini's area of inspection encompassed Formosa, Korea, Manchuria and mainland Japan. Of the 102 camps known to exist in this region, the delegation was allowed to visit just 42. It was the Huryojohokyoku who decided when and where inspections could be made, and they sent the inspectors to those locations which at that particular moment could best be manipulated to offer an impression of humanity to the inspectors. Only a handful of

[123] Other unofficial delegates included H. M. Schweitzer in Singapore, Werner Salzmann in Bangkok, a Mr Weidman in Batavia and a Mr Surbek in Sumatra. All took great risks. For a recent study of the work of Werner Salzmann, offering interesting new details, see Elena Bosch, 'The Role of Red Cross Aid in the Prisoners of War Camps on the Siam-Burma Railway' *British Empire at War Research Group*, Article 2, 2012 <https://britishempireatwar.org/research-paprs>[Accessed 26 March 2018].

[124] International Committee of the Red Cross, *Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on its Activities during the Second World* War, 3 vols. (Geneva: ICRC, 1948), vol.2, pp.123-126.

[125] Cited in Christophe Laurent, 'Les Obstacles Rencontrés', p.31.

camps received three annual visits: Mukden in Manchuria, Zentsuji on the Japanese mainland, and Jinsen and Keijo in Korea.[126] The camps in Formosa where senior officers were held were also used for propaganda, and received two visits. By contrast we can note that other camps in Formosa, where prisoners worked in mines and lived in terrible conditions, received none.[127] After the Japanese surrender, Paravicini's successor, Marcel Junod, realised the organisation had been duped.[128] Conditions at many of the camps the inspectors visited, he wrote, had been faked, and there were other camps in Japan whose existence had been kept entirely hidden from the Red Cross. This was undoubtedly a propaganda success on the part of the Huryojohokyoku.

Gavan Daws' summary of the ways in which camp inspections were customarily manipulated is borne out by the memoirs of FEPOWS and by the diarists at Keijo.[129] In all cases, prisoners were given increased rations of special food on the day of the visit. Sometimes, as at Formosa, they had enjoyed increased rations for weeks in advance, only to suffer a commensurate reduction after the inspection.[130] To satisfy the provision of the Convention that prisoners should benefit from a canteen, goods were brought into the camp to stock a sometimes newly created 'canteen', then removed afterwards. The camps were tidied up, 'as if expecting a visit from the emperor' in the words of a prisoner at Jinsen, and sometimes, even new clothes were issued.[131] Very often, issues of Red Cross parcels or mail occurred just before the inspection, or on the day itself.

Under the provisions of the Geneva Convention, the inspectors' visit included independent conversations with 'men of confidence' chosen by the prisoners. But these conversations were always conducted in the presence of Japanese officers.[132]

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[126] For an account of Mukden and ICRC inspections see Linda Goetz Holmes, *Guests of the Emperor: The Secret History of Japan's Mukden POW Camp*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012), pp.67-82. The author summarises life in Mukden as 'a living hell'. She identifies Mukden as a show camp and gives a great deal of valuable information about ICRC inspections, but is not correct in suggesting that Mukden was the sole camp to receive three inspections.

[127] The inspectors were unaware of the very existence of Kinkaseki and Taihoku camps. See Norman Cliff's *Captive in Formosa* (Rochford: Rochford Press, 1993) for an account of the terrible conditions at Taihoku.

[128] Marcel Junod, *Le Troisième Combattant*, p.243.

[129] Gavan Daws, *Prisoners of the Japanese* (New York: Simon and Schuster,1994), pp.273-274.

[130] A senior American Officer held in Formosa, General Lewis Beebe, recorded in his diary: 'We had an inspection on November 8 [1944]. Prior to the inspection we had been receiving about all the rice we could eat, and the soup was also nourishing, but following the inspection there was a cut in food for some reason.' Lewis Beebe, John M Beebe (ed.), *Prisoner of the Rising Sun: The Lost Diary of Brig. Gen. Lewis Beebe* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006) p.54.

[131] IWM, (Sound) 463, Ivor George Thomas, Interview.

[132] Daniel Fraser gives an oral account of the first Red Cross inspection at Jinsen, describing the thoroughness of the preparations for the visit, the larger meals on the day of the visit, and the shield of Japanese officers surrounding the inspectors, blocking prisoners' access to them. (IWM, (Sound), 8302.)

The prisoners were told beforehand what they could or could not say, and were punished if they did not adhere to their instructions. The entire visit lasted no more than two hours, the first of which was generally occupied by an interview with the camp commandant. These usually consisted of propaganda: an example of such a meeting is given in Junod's memoirs, where he recalls Colonel Matsuda, commandant of Mukden camp, praising the camp facilities.[133] Commandants frequently refused to answer questions on the grounds that they lacked the authority to do so. Any mention of the Geneva convention might result in the inspection being terminated immediately.

The inspection of the camp was limited to areas selected by the Commandant. Those prisoners bearing conspicuous marks of illness or maltreatment remained out of sight. Sometimes the inspectors were unable to see any prisoners at all, as at Mukden, where Junod was informed that they were out on a work party and thus unavailable for inspection. Prisoners' accounts speak of smiling inspectors being rushed through living quarters, seemingly looking neither left nor right, unobservant of the details before them.[134] Unaware of the constraints the inspectors operated under, the prisoners' perception was that they were overly friendly with the Japanese. According to Henling Wade, when news of Paravicini's death was announced at Omiro camp, the prisoners cheered.[135]

Athough conditions at these camps were by no means uniform - one of the inspectors to Keijo remarked that it was the best camp he had yet visited - the similarities in the manner in which they were manipulated proves a centralised co-ordination.[136] If we narrow the analysis to those few camps which received more than one visit, we can observe other shared features and greater evidence of deliberate deception. The camps which received three inspections - Keijo, Zentsuji, and Mukden - were also filmed and photographed. The largest collection of propaganda photographs comes from Keijo, but propaganda photographs were also taken at Zentsuji and Mukden, and at the Formosa camps. (See Figures 14 to 18 below).

These were also the camps which received the greatest number of Red Cross parcels. By the middle of 1944, the prisoners at Zentsuji had received nine parcels each; at Keijo the prisoners had received seven parcels per person and additional bulk supplies. Meg Parkes has estimated that, on average, prisoners in the northern areas received three parcels each during

[133] Junod, *Le Troisième Combattant*, p.238.
[134] Lever *Diaries*, November 1943. See also Holmes, *Guests of the Emperor*, p.73.
[135] Henling Wade, *Prisoner of the Japanese*, p.49.
[136] See Toze, *Diaries*, December 1942.

captivity, and those in the southern areas half a parcel per person, although many camps received none whatsoever.[137]

These were also the camps which received the most correspondence, and where prisoners had greatest opportunity to write home. At Keijo, Captain Jesson received some fifty postcards and letters, vastly more than the average in other camps. That the camps which received the most mail and Red Parcels also received the most inspections and were used for filming and photography is not a coincidence. It would have required considerable pre-planning and organisation on the part of the Huryojohokyoku. Both Mukden and Keijo were also visited by senior Propaganda Officers at the time of the inspections, suggesting that these camps held a particular importance.

Manipulation did not end on the day of the visit. When the inspectors came to write the reports, there was considerable pressure placed on them to avoid criticism. It was part of an effective system of blackmail which has been lucidly outlined by Christophe Laurent.[138] The Japanese reacted badly to less than positive remarks. As Paravicini wrote to Geneva, 'the mildest criticisms are met with expressions of outraged hurt. We cannot afford in any way to offend these most sensitive of people. To do so would run the risk of being expelled from Japan completely'.[139] Junod records how the commandant at Mukden camp warned him that 'the whole future of the Red Cross in Japan depends on your attitude today'.[140]

As Laurent has observed, the blackmail was effective because the Japanese also gave good reasons for the ICRC to wish to remain.[141] Proposals for visits or setting up supply channels were rarely refused outright. The Huryojohokyoku always held out the possibility of these schemes being enacted at an unspecified date in the future. There is no doubt that Paravicini believed that patience and perseverance would eventually yield results; he saw this procrastination as a typically Japanese characteristic. He wrote to Geneva assuring them that although 'the Rising Sun only lets fruit ripen very slowly' progress was being made.[142] The slow, incremental approach he was willing to adopt was entirely in keeping with his organisation's *modus operandi*.

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[137] Meg Parkes and Geoff Gill, *Captive Memories: Starvation, Disease, Survival: Far East POWs and Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine* (Lancaster: Palatine, 2015), p.35.

[138] Laurent, 'Les Obstacles Rencontrés' pp.67-69.

[139] ACICR G 8/76 IV, Letter from Paravicini to Geneva, January 1943.

[140] Junod, *Le Troisième Combattant*, p.228.

[141] Laurent, 'Les Obstacles Rencontrés' pp.81-83.

[142] On 15 January 1943 he wrote to Geneva: 'mais le soleil levant ne laisse murir les fruits que très lentement.' On 12 March 1943 he reiterated his point, employing the same image : 'Les choses murissent avec une lenteur désespérante sous le soleil levant et on croit souvent battre l'eau. On avance quand même.' ACICR G8/76 III, Correspondance, jan-mars 1943.

Once the reports were written, they were censored by the Japanese. As Laurent has also found, it is difficult to determine exactly how and where this censorship was performed. Nevertheless, there is abundant evidence that the reports were doctored to create a better impression.[143] The ICRC's report on its activities during the Second World War observed:

> The Committee's correspondence, too, either by letter or by telegram, was subject to censorship under conditions which severely hampered it. Thus in March 1944, a telegram from a delegate giving an account of his visit to the PW camp Fukishima, was considerably amended by the Military Authorities, who were unwilling that the delegate should report the unsatisfactory details that he had noted concerning the rations, sanitary conditions, and discipline of the Allied soldiers detained in the camp.[144]

Evidence of doctoring can be found in the Geneva archives. For example, there is a letter from Inspector Egle in Hong Kong to Paravicini which begins with the news that he has 'casually overheard a conversation' between German soldiers in a bar discussing the bravery displayed by the Japanese in their efforts to save drowning POWs from the torpedoed *Lisbon Maru*.[145] As we have seen, this was the official Japanese story created in response to a protest by the British government, and the purported conversation is entirely implausible.

Once the ICRC headquarters had received the reports, summaries of them were published in their journals. In due course, the Japan delegation came to read them, and to realise that that, somewhere along the line, their reports had been distorted. In February 1944, the Japan delegation sent a telegram to Geneva to express their concern:

> perturbed at finding *primo* considerable discrepancies some instances complete reversal facts *tertio* omission significant points *quarto* generally too favourable and not always accurate interpretation when comparing our original camp reports with your monthly review.[146]

By publishing summaries of inspection reports, as well as photographs, including eight from Keijo, the ICRC had provided useful propaganda material for the Japanese, who could now add the considerable weight of the ICRC's moral authority to their rebuttals. Following Eden's disclosures of Japanese atrocities to the House of Commons in January 1944, *Nippon*

[143] 'Il m'est difficile de percevoir à quel point la correspondance entre la délégation du Japon et la siège de l'institution était contrôlée: néanmoins il est certain qu'une partie le fut au moins occasionnellement.' Laurent, 'Les Obstacles Rencontrés', p.43.
[144] *Report of the International Committee of the Red* Cross, vol.3, pp.454-455.
[145] The letter is reproduced at Appendix 2.
[146] ACICR G8/76 VII Télégrammes reçus, jan-avril, 1944.

Times used the imprimatur of the Red Cross to dismiss his claims. Under the heading 'Kind treatment given to Prisoners', visits to the camps in Manchuria and Korea were offered as impartial evidence:

> Speaking of the war prisoners' camps in Chosen which he visited on November 15, Mr. Pestalozzi [ICRC inspector] testified that 'the general condition is quite pleasant', that the camp prisoners are carrying on well, and that all facilities are efficiently organised…These unbiased reports are attracting keen interest as a powerful refutation of the unfounded charges the British and American governments have been heaping on Japan regarding treatment of POWs.[147]

A few days later, Pestalozzi's 1943 report from Korea was again referred to, this time to rebut accusations made by Senator Breckinbridge Long in the US House of Representatives. Under the subheading 'Red Cross backs Japan' readers were informed:

> At a press conference for foreign correspondents, Sadao Iguchi, a spokesman for the Board of Information states that 'Long's claims appear to be a continuation of the enemy's atrocity campaign which is wilfully fabricated propaganda. At a recent visit to Keijo camp, Max Pestalozzi found about one hundred Americans and British POW's and 10 Australians, all of them in good physical condition. The buildings in which they are housed are well-heated, the supply of clothing excellent and the quality of food satisfactory. The camp has facilities for out-door exercise, a library and necessary medical and dental equipment and services. The prisoners here keep their own truck gardens [*sic*] and raise poultry and rabbits. Officers are at liberty to work or not, but to the rank and file work is obligatory although they are given preferences for their labour. [148]

Censored copies of *Nippon Times* were supplied to Keijo, mainly for use as toilet paper, and the article was read by Baker a month after it appeared. His infuriated response offers evidence of the various embellishments added by the Japanese:

> There are no Americans in the camp. Good physical conditions cannot apply to any. Supply of clothing grossly overrated. What facilities have we for outdoor exercise on that miserably small yard? What are the indoor recreations? A library gives a very false picture. A limited number of books are fortnightly circulated through squad rooms. One man keeps rabbits! There are no poultry kept by any

[147] See *Nippon Times*, 8 February 1944, article headlined 'Japan's treatment of captives praised: International Red Cross finds reports submitted by delegates refute Foe's lies.'
[148] *Nippon Times,*14 February,1944.

members of the camp! Officers are compelled to go out on working parties! This is the grossly deliberate deception the J.'s delight in! [149]

Filming and Photography

More propaganda photographs appear to have been taken at Keijo than anywhere else, with the possible exception of Zentsuji. Although the variety of subject matter of the Keijo images is unique, we can place Keijo within a broader context to discern distinct patterns. As we have seen, It was those camps which were inspected most that were also photographed the most. Apart from Keijo, approximately a dozen or so photographs survive from Mukden, and approximately ninety from Zentsuji, although most of these are group photographs. There are also photographs from those Formosan camps which received two inspections. These would have been particularly useful for propaganda, as it was here that the most senior officers were held until their transfer to Mukden in 1945. Images of Lieutenant-General Percival, and General Wainwright, respective commanders of the British and American forces, appeared in Japanese newspapers, as seen in Figures 14 and 15.

Testimony from prisoners in Formosa confirm how other scenes were deliberately faked. The images of Formosa published in the British Red Cross magazine *Far East*, reproduced below at Figure 16, were all stage-managed.[150] The livestock in the photographs were introduced into the camp shortly before the inspector's arrival, and removed again immediately afterwards. The bottles on the table seen in the photograph at bottom left were for display only: the POWs were forbidden to drink from them. Even the cars, suggestive of modern and abundant resources, were not quite what they seemed. To inspector Angst's irritation, his vehicle refused to start, and the prisoners seen saluting him in the photograph later had to push it down the road.

As well as using these three show camps for photography, the Japanese also took mocked-up photographs at various locations to refute specific Allied accusations. In Borneo, a search was made for the least emaciated prisoners at Kuching, who were then photographed at a local swimming pool. Another was covered in white bandages to illustrate the camp's medical facilities. There are also a very small number of photographs from other camps where positive events, particularly Christmas celebrations, could be exploited. But the chief source of propaganda photographs for an international audience was Keijo, and the first images of Far Eastern captivity seen by the British public were of this camp.

[149] G S Baker, *Diaries*, June,1943.
[150] *Far East*, January1945.

Figure 12: AWM 041210. Inspector Angst visiting the prison 'farm' in Formosa, 1944. As well as cattle and pigs, it boasted a flock of geese, evidence of considerable planning and preparation.

It is less easy to investigate the filming. Aiko Utsumi mentions that four propaganda films were made, three of them at the show camps Mukden, Zentsuji and Keijo.[151] Unfortunately, no copies of these three films appears to have survived, and apart from Atsumi's very brief reference, virtually nothing in English has been written on them in English or French, as far as I am aware. All that appears to exist of filming at Zentsuji is the photograph reproduced at Figure 18 below. We see the POWs being given cigarettes and tangerines, which were immediately retrieved once the prisoners were out of camera shot. We know also that the film *Huryo Chosen ni kita* (The prisoners who came to Korea) was shot at Keijo and Jinsen. No copy of the film appears to have survived, but details of it are reconstructed using contemporary diary accounts in the next chapter.

The one film that has survived, *Calling Australia,* is untypical in that a considerable number of prisoners and internees were forced on pain of starvation into taking speaking roles. Filmed in Java, the prisoners appear to live a holiday camp existence, playing cricket, swimming, and relaxing in bars where they could eat steak and listen to the radio. Its purpose was both to illustrate *bushido* generosity and to soften up Australia for invasion. In the event,

it was never released.[152] However, several stills of the film were published by the ICRC's *Review*. The example reproduced in Figure 20, purportedly a camp cookhouse, is in fact the kitchen of the *Hotel des Indes*, a luxury establishment taken by the Japanese as their headquarters in Batavia.[153]

It is possible to establish a direct link between the Huryojohokyoku and these propaganda images. Letters enclosed with the photographs sent by the Japan delegation to Geneva indicate that they had been forwarded by the bureau. Further confirmation is provided by the

[151] Aiko Utsumi 'Prisoners of War in the Pacific War: Japan's Policy' in Gavan McCormack and Hank Nelson, *The Burma-Thailand Railway*

[152] In 1946 the Dutch East Indies Information Bureau made the film *Nippon Presents*, contrasting *Calling Australia* with the reality of incarceration. It features interviews with the prisoners who were coerced into taking part. Both films were the subject of a documentary, *Prisoners of Propaganda*, broadcast on Australian television in 1987. A DVD of the documentary was issued in 2010 by Umbrella Entertainment.

[153] See Russell, *The Knights of Bushido, p.12.*

ICRC's acknowledgement of the Huryojohoku's permission to publish, which accompanies eight photographs of Keijo reproduced in the April 1943 edition of the organisation's *Review*.

Figure 13: ICRC Revue, April 1943. Methodist, Anglican and Shinto priests officiated at the filmed ceremony at Keijo.

Figure 14: *Nippon Times*, 15 May 1943. Report on ICRC activities and photograph of Percival.

Figure 15: Nippon Times 15 May 1943

Figure 16: *Far East*, January 1945.

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Figure 17: AWM: P04017.064**,** Group photograph, Zentsuji. Conditions at the camp deteriorated, and prisoners began to die of starvation in 1945.

Figure 18: Filming at Zentsuji. Reproduced from website, <http://www.us-japandialogueonpows/> [accessed 7 March 2018]


1. Service religieux

2. Funérailles de prisonniers de guerre

[1] Hors-texte publiés avec l'autorisation du «Bureau de renseignements sur les prisonniers de guerre» (Huryojohokyoku).

Figure 19: ICRC *Review* April 1943: see bottom of page for Huryojohokyoku authorisation

Figure 20: ICRC *Review* January 1944, captioned 'Cuisine du Camp', but in fact the kitchen of the *Hotel des Indes*, Batavia.

The activities of the Japan Delegation

If we look at what the Japan delegation achieved, measured against the magnitude of suffering endured by the captives in the Far East, the results seem negligible. The other side of the equation is that, thanks to systematic manipulation, the ICRC gave a false picture of Far Eastern captivity in its journals, which provided useful propaganda for the Japanese. I discuss Geneva's response in Chapter 3, but here I raise the question of whether any blame can be apportioned to the Japan delegation and its representatives. The motivation of some of the organisation's representatives in Europe is, after all, the subject of continuing debate: Marc Roussel's inspection of Theresienstadt remains a highly controversial topic, as does the relationship of the organisation's deputy, Carl Burckhardt, with the Nazi party.[154] Certainly, the prisoners in the Far East wondered at the motives of the inspectors, and a suspicious attitude has remained in the popular memory. Writing in 1994, Henling Wade recalled Paravicini's first visit to Keijo.

> What sort of a man, we wondered, was this Dr. Paravicini, who could be satisfied with a fourteen-minute visit to a camp he had travelled over 400 miles to see, and where he had not spoken to a single prisoner or heard one single complaint or request? We were bitterly disappointed in him.[155]

[154] See Gerald Steinacher, *Humanitarians at War: The Red Cross in the Shadow of the Holocaust* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). The ICRC headquarters' response to Japanese manipulation is discussed in chapter 3.

[155] In fact, Paravicini spoke to at least two senior officers, Colonels Elrington and Cardew.

> When I moved to Tokyo in November 1943 I heard that Dr. Paravicini had behaved much the same in every camp he visited in Japan and that no improvements had followed his visits. I learnt that he had lived 30 years in Japan, was married to a Japanese and that his business depended upon Japanese goodwill. How could such a man negotiate with the Japanese with any degree of integrity? As far as any of us could see, he achieved nothing during his appointment as senior International Red Cross delegate in Japan […]
>
> If I may address the International Red Cross, I entreat then to take great care in the selection of their crucial representatives and to be extremely wary of choosing a man whose wife is a national of the country in which he is working or who is in any way so vulnerable.[156]

Even the late Roger Mansell, whose website has become the main online database for FE-POW researchers, wrote 'the Red Cross, as represented by a Swiss/Italian, was EX-TREMELY partial toward Japan.'[157]

But there are no grounds for doubting Paravicini's integrity. The American government was initially nonplussed at how little he had achieved, and even initiated an investigation into him by the OSS (Office of Strategic Studies, forerunner to the CIA). But once they had been briefed by the ICRC headquarters they, like the British government, accepted that Paravicini and his colleagues were doing all that was possible given the constraints they operated under. What no-one was aware of however was that the seventy-year-old Paravicini was seriously ill. He neglected his illness and hid it from his colleagues.[158] By June 1943 he was bed-ridden, dying in January 1944. If his successor appeared more of a 'live wire' to the prisoners, this may be explained by Paravicini's failing health.[159]

Nevertheless, as we have seen, Paravicini and his assistant Max Pestalozzi were well aware that the Japanese distorted their reports. On 12 May 1943 Paravicini wrote to Geneva: 'our reports accentuate the good side of things somewhat and I believe that helps the prisoners and internees in enemy hands to an extent, even though they don't like to read in the local press, which creates propaganda out of them, that we have described the camps as earthly paradises.'[160]

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[156] Henling Wade, *Prisoner of the Japanese*, p.48.

[157] *Center for Research: Allied POWS Under the Japanese*, mansell.com. Mansell's comments are quoted on the website < www.us-japandialogueonpows.org> on its page of photographs relating to Zentsuji.

[158] See letter from Swiss Minister in Tokyo to Geneva, ACICR G8/76 VI, 23 March1944.

[159] See Toze, *Diaries*, November 1943. Wade also writes that the prisoners were more impressed by Max Pestalozzi's inspection visit in 1943 than Paravicini's the preceding year.

[160] Nos rapports accentuent en général plutôt les bonnes côtes et je crois cela aide plutôt aux prisonniers et internes en mains adverses, malgré qu'ils n'aiment pas lire dans la presse locale qui fait la propagande, que nous ayons décrites les camps comme des paradis terrestres. ACICR G7/76 VI, Letter from Paravicini to ICRC, May 1943.

Can we criticise Paravicini for emphasising the good points of what he saw in his reports, and for acquiescing in Japanese exploitation? In fact, Paravicini's actions were typical of his organisation. He was a pragmatist: his job was to get aid to men who were desperately in need of it, and he was willing to compromise the principles of impartiality and neutrality to achieve this, whether through emphasising the good side of things in reports, or by remaining silent in the face of exploitation by a belligerent party. It should be remembered that although the three underlying principles of the ICRC are impartiality, neutrality and humanity, the first two can be, in some circumstances, instrumental values in service of the fulfilment of the third.

Summary

In this chapter I have outlined the various intentions of Japanese POW propaganda, whether directed internally or externally, and have suggested that even though this propaganda contained contradictions, it was nevertheless more carefully planned and co-ordinated than has hitherto been recognised. I have also suggested that the key mechanism of its external propaganda was the manipulation of the Red Cross by the Huryojohokyoku. I have also illustrated the similarities in the manipulation of the show camps, and that the propaganda manufactured at Keijo, discussed in detail in the next chapter, fits within the broader context of Japanese strategies.

Figure 21 ACICR G 8/76 V, Paravicini at work, unknown location, 1943.

Chapter 2

The Manipulation of Keijo Camp

This chapter is divided into two sections: in the first I establish what conditions were actually like at Keijo; in the second, I examine the ways in which they were manipulated to present a positive impression to the outside world. As I have stated in the introduction, the hitherto unexamined primary sources employed in this study suggest a harsher picture than the one given by de Groen and Kovner. This is of more than simply local significance because it challenges Kovner's broader claim that 'the history of the POW camps in Korea indicates that when senior Japanese leadership took an interest in the fate of Allied POWs, policy was not one of deliberate cruelty.'[161]

Camp Conditions

i) Infrastructure and amenities

Shortly after the Japanese capitulation, Keijo was investigated by an American intelligence unit as part of a general survey of Japanese POW camps.[162] Their report is particularly useful in that it evaluates Keijo in comparative terms. The prisoners' experience at Korea did not appear to the investigators to be unusually good, and they summarised conditions as 'fair'.[163] The report gives a comprehensive description of infrastructure and amenities which is corroborated by the accounts in the Keijo diaries.

> Heating was satisfactory between December and March, but in early and late winter there was no heat [...] The lighting in the room were [sic] poor. All windows were glassed and of the shuttered type. In the summer the ventilation was almost non-existent and in winter the inside temperature was often below zero at night. No beds were available and the prisoners slept on straw mattresses. Cells used for punishment were 8 feet by 10 feet, with no windows and a small door […] The hospital consisted of a small hut. In the winter the temperature would often be at freezing point and many cases of illnesses [sic] were concealed and nursed in the barracks as conditions were more favourable than in the hospital. [...] There were two Japanese-type lavatories with twelve cubicles in each. There were also a sufficient number of the standing-up type cubicles, but the drainage was very poor.[164]

[161] de Groen, Masterman-Smith, 'Prisoners on Parade: Japan Party "B"'; Kovner, 'Allied POWs in Korea', p.67.
[162] J. Norwood, E. Shek, *Camps in Areas Other Than the Four Principal Islands of Japan*, Liaison and Research Branch, American Prisoner of War Information Bureau,1946.
[163] The authors use the term in the sense of 'not bad' rather than 'equitable'.
[164] Norwood and Shek, *Camps in Areas Other Than the Four Principal Islands of Japan*, p.39.

Figure 22 A. Toze, S. Strange, *In Defence of Singapore: A Series of Brief Drawings with Notes* (Preston: Snape & Co.,1947), Plate XIV



Figure 23: J. Wilkinson, *Sketches of a P.O.W. in Korea* (Melbourne: unknown publisher,1946, p.26.

In winter the pipes often froze, and the washrooms would become, in Toze's words, 'a quagmire of excreta and filth'.[165] In general, sanitary conditions were, in Baker's words, 'foully

[165] Toze, *Diaries*, p.62.

disgusting beyond description'.[166] The conditions were unhygienic in all areas. Elrington's first impression of the camp was of a 'fly-blown, poxy dust heap in the midstof a filthy, evil-smelling slum area'.[167] He was soon to discover that the living quarters were lice-ridden and verminous; on occasion the camp would be invaded by swarms of fleas.[168] The flies that infested the camp in the warmer months spread disease, including an outbreak of dysentery in 1945.[169]



Figure 24: Lancashire Infantry Museum, Harry Kingsley Collection, (Hereafter LIM HKC) 846/2.1.87, Major Grubb in the cookhouse, inviting the flies to 'Come and get it!

Toze's diary vividly evokes the discomfort of day-to-day living, as in the following complaint:

> I am heartily sick of this place[…]the stinking benjos, the dusty, draughty, crowded, humanity-reeking squad rooms, the mess and muck and poverty, and extreme stinginess of everything Asiatic, of burning my fingers every meal time on the ridiculous aluminium eating utensils, of having to eat stew with a fork; of travelling down to drain off rice water two or three times a night[…]of our humourless jabbering custodians, their scruffiness, their face-slapping, empty

[166] Baker, *Diaries*, June 1943.
[167] M.W. Elrington, 'With 2nd Loyals in Captivity', *The Lancashire Lad: The Journal of The Loyal Regiment*, March 1952.
[168] Toze records a friend counting thirty-five fleas on himself, to his amusement. Descriptions of vermin and lice are usually light-hearted. *Diaries*, p.79
[169] See Lever, *Diaries*, May1945.

> promises, pilfering of Red Cross stuff, etc., etc., ad lib, of my scruffy, lousy old clothes […] of the soul-wrenching contrast of eating one of the 'meals' then immediately afterwards reading one of the books in which an English meal is described.[170]

Cold was one of the worst aspects of the prisoners' ordeal, with the cold period lasting for four and a half months of the year. Temperatures could drop to minus twenty-eight degrees centigrade. On 18 November 1943, Toze wrote:

> The Siberian wind of unbelievable coldness is whistling through the ill-fitting doors and windows, penetrating our clothes - our very flesh - as tho' it was not there. Another twelve months of this life under summer or autumnal conditions would be bearable, but, God in Heaven! How we fear and loathe the winter here.[171]

ii) Diet

The diet at Keijo was inadequate, both in quantity and in nutritional content. On 1 January 1944, Senior Medical officer Rigby recorded in his diary: 'I am very tired of living on the border line of starvation, after nearly two years of it'.[172] There were periods when the diet was supplemented by Red Cross parcels, and the prisoners were able to gain a little weight. But the diaries also record three periods when death by malnutrition was a real possibility.[173] On 6 April 1944 Toze recorded: 'Our doctors are very worried over weight loss: say we are near borderline of decline: say that unless something turns up in the food line there will be many deaths this summer'.[174] Food was a constant obsession: Rigby kept a record of every meal he ate at the camp, Wallwork wrote poems on remembered meals, and all the diaries contain long lists of the contents of the Red Cross parcels.[175] Toze recorded that he was perpetually weak and tired from hunger, unsurprising since, as Lever wrote in March 1944, their daily diet provided only 1800 calories.[176] Most health organizations suggest that a diet of 2400 calories per day is necessary for an adult male.

Many accounts of Far Eastern incarceration mention the difficulties the prisoners had in adapting to a diet consisting mainly of rice. The Keijo diaries complain not just of the monotony of a rice diet but of the repellent quality of other staple foods, such as seaweed. Baker

[170] Toze *Diaries*, p.30.
[171] Ibid., p.46.
[172] Rigby, *Diaries*, February 1944.
[173] November 1942, April 1944, Spring 1945. During the first month at Keijo, the prisoners lost an average of half a stone each. On arrival at Keijo, the men had already lost an average of two stones since the capitulation.
[174] Toze, *Diaries*, p.77.
[175] See Appendix 3 for two of Wallwork's verses.
[176] Lever, *Diaries*, March 1944. At one point, in February1945, it dropped to 1500 calories.

notes on one occasion that, hungry though he was, he could not bring himself to eat the seaweed served as breakfast.[177]

iii) Health

There was constant sickness at the camp caused by malnutrition, inadequate protection from the cold and the unhygienic living conditions. The maladies were the common ones of Far Eastern captivity: malaria, dysentery, diphtheria, beriberi, and those prevalent in camps in colder climates: pleurisy, bronchitis and pneumonia. Although on a smaller scale than elsewhere, there were also serious workplace injuries resulting in permanent disablement and death.[178] For example, Private Harry Kingsley lost his leg after it was crushed in an earthfall during excavations.[179] Some of the less serious complaints were a continuous presence in each prisoner's life throughout his time at Keijo. Toze, like many others, suffered unremittingly from diarrhoea for the entire period of captivity. Most of the men suffered from worm infestations, and all of them from diseases caused by vitamin deficiencies, which in more severe form caused temporary blindness and permanent damage to the heart.[180]

Medical provision was needlessly inadequate. One of the charges made against the Keijo defendants at the Yokohama War Crimes Tribunal was that they 'deliberately and unnecessarily' withheld available medical supplies, including those received from the Red Cross. A senior officer, Colonel Cardew, testified at the Yokohama War Crimes trial that during the first year at the camp he constantly made requests on behalf of the men for available medicine, which were invariably denied.[181]

The sick were sometimes compelled to work, and those that came to the hospital to report sick ran the risk of being physically assaulted by medical orderly, Taksumi Ushihara.[182] For a brief period at Keijo all form of medical treatment whatsoever was denied to officers. Although treatment for more serious cases was available at a civilian hospital, it was described by the AIF prisoner, Private Kerr, as 'butchery'.[183] In Harry Kingsley's case, it seems likely that had he received proper treatment at the time, it would not have been necessary to amputate his leg after the initial operation. Kerr records: 'Kingsley's pelvis arranged without Thomas

[177] Baker, *Diaries*, August 1944.
[178] See Appendix 5 for lists of serious injuries and deaths at Keijo.
[179] National Archives, WO/361/1208, Far East: Korea; Loyal Regiment; Court of Enquiry held at Keijo POW Camp.
[180] Lever describes men 'crippled' by beriberi, *Diaries*, January 1945.
[181] Yokohama War Crimes Trials, 'Trial No.181, Yuzure Noguchi.'
[182] Ibid. Ushihara combined his role as medical orderly with the position of camp interpreter.
[183] Kerr, *Diaries*, January 1945.

splint, and apparently without anything else; leg is about 2" shorter than other, and sciatic nerve is gone. Foot is raised for walking by means of string in hand.'[184]

Among the prisoners was a dentist, Captain Charles Mummery, but he was not permitted any dental instruments and appears to have used kitchen and carpentry implements, as seen in the cartoon at Figure 25 below.

Figure 25: LIM, HKC, 846/2.1.87. Captain Mummery, camp dentist.

iv) Captor and Captive

A feature of memoirs of captivity in the Far East is that they invariably mention instances of kindness and generosity by individual guards. It is not a picture of unrelieved brutality. Such was the case at Keijo, but the picture is complicated by its propaganda function. It is simple to identify the bullies amongst the guards – Corporal Takuma, and Captain Terada, for example – but less easy to discern genuine, rather than manipulative, friendliness. In Lever's words, there were 'one of two of the Japs you could mistake for gentlemen if you were prepared to overlook a few things'.[185] Baker formed a friendship with one of the guards, 'Prof' Ukai, a former University lecturer, and they even corresponded after the war. However, the one surviving letter from Ukai, ostensibly to congratulate Baker on passing Foreign Office exams, makes reference to Noguchi's forthcoming trial, and suggests Baker may wish to write a helpful reference on his behalf. It is impossible to be sure that the friendship was entirely disinterested.[186]

As we have seen in the introduction, Baker described Noguchi as a 'kindly' man, and there is no doubt that he had a humane side: for example, when prisoners were killed in a work accident on 13 November 1942, he appeared genuinely shocked. The benign persona he projected to the prisoners at his home camp did not, as in Colonel Suga's case in Borneo, conceal a brutal, sadistic reality. Nevertheless, he permitted continuous, gratuitous maltreatment under his command, and there is ample proof of the calculating quality of his apparent mildness.

Both the characterisation of the relationship between Elrington and Noguchi, given by Toze in his 1990 introduction to his diaries, and Kovner's interpretation of it, are at odds with Elrington's own account, published in1952. Toze appears entirely unaware of any manipulative element to Noguchi's behaviour, and suggests that Elrington and Noguchi enjoyed a relatively

[184] Ibid., p.48.
[185] Lever, *Diaries*, March 1944.
[186] Letter in possession of Nicholas Baker. Baker passed the Foreign Office exams but was ultimately rejected as a security risk. It was felt that he might have been 'turned' by the Japanese during captivity.

amicable relationship, with Noguchi occasionally inviting the senior POW officer over for a chat and cup of tea. The reality was very different. Elrington met Noguchi privately on no more than seven occasions over the three years at Keijo, and each time it was at Elrington's request, to plead for better conditions. It was at one such meeting, in 1945, that Noguchi informed him, now that Japanese defeat appeared inevitable, of his intention to have him, and all the other officers in the Korean camps, put to death. Kovner's statement that the commandant seemed a mild man in Elrington's eyes is, I suggest, a misreading of Toze's introduction, where he states that it was a perception held by the men, rather than Colonel Elrington.[187]

In fact, Elrington's assessment of the captor-captive relationship was that it was entirely governed by the *bushido* precept that to allow oneself to be captured was utterly contemptible: 'We were in their eyes less than dust […] We poor, inferior Westerners deserved no pity, no consideration, no rice. Yet such was the benevolent spirit of *bushido*, that a yellow hand, often a cruel yellow hand, was held out to the White Captives'.[188]

The most obvious manifestation of this cruelty was the violence committed on the prisoners at the camp. Kovner argues that brutality was not systemic at the Korean camps but rather the spontaneous actions of a few individuals. Fraser, a prisoner at Konan, remembered otherwise. In an interview in 1984 he recalled that captives ran the risk of being assaulted simply for looking at a guard. According to his recollection, a favourite 'prank' of the guards was to knock prisoners into the 'open sewer' which served as a latrine.[189] Violence was also a daily occurrence at Keijo and Elrington writes of officers, not just Other Ranks, suffering 'spilt teeth, black eyes and broken noses' as part of their lives.[190] One of the main perpetrators was the adjutant, Captain Terada, who encouraged his subordinates to strike the prisoners on the slightest pretext.[191] Private beatings from Terada could last for up to two hours. Both publicly and privately, prisoners were struck with a variety of implements, including swords, and if the force of the blows knocked them over, they could be kicked or spat on. Baker's diary contains a characteristically angry account of a Corporal Takuma delivering six blows to a prisoner's face with a soup ladle fashioned from a piece of wood a with a tin can attached to its end, with protruding metal screws.[192] There were sometimes group beatings: on one occa-

[187] IWM 1133, Toze Collection, Introduction to Diaries.
[188] Elrington, 'With 2nd Loyals in Captivity', *Lancashire Lad*, March 1952.
[189] IWM (Sound) 8302, Fraser.
[190] Elrington, 'With 2nd Loyals in Captivity, *Lancashire Lad*, March 1952.
[191] Many examples of Terada's brutality were presented at the Yokohama War Crimes Trials. (Marburg Archives, Trial 181, Noguchi).
[192] Baker, *Diaries*, September 1944.

sion a work party comprising twenty prisoners was slapped and kicked for failing to understand an instruction. The diaries also record that prisoners were made to strike each other around the face. In its summary of conditions at Keijo, the American intelligence report highlighted the frequency of 'slappings' as a particular feature of the camp.

Figure 26: AWM, 04102. Captain Terada leads the prisoners into Keijo camp for the first time.

Work parties were sent out from the camp when there was sometimes no work to do; prisoners spent many hours standing in the snow, inadequately clothed. Reasonable requests were needlessly turned down: for example, the prisoners' pleas to be allowed to wash vegetables to reduce the risk of worm infestations were refused.

The diaries collectively illustrate that the needless, petty restrictions placed on the prisoners' lives were a source of constant and increasing frustration. They were denied available medical supplies, their Red Cross supplies were pilfered; when letters from home or relief supplies arrived at the camp, the prisoners had to wait many weeks before the Japanese released them; the concerts, art exhibitions and talks which gave interest to the prisoners' lives during their first months at Keijo were soon entirely forbidden, apart from the annual Christmas concert.[193]

Reviewing his three years at Jinsen and Keijo, Captain Ivor Thomas summed up conditions at the camps in one word: 'horrific'. John Jesson's summary of his imprisonment, written in August 1945 provides more detail:

> To have been insulted, humiliated, struck, starved, robbed, taunted, and deprived of every reasonable amenity for over forty months is almost unforgettable for any normal man […] When the perpetrators of this treatment happen to be a race of despicable, arrogant, untrustworthy, mean, cruel little savages, the sense of outrage is considerably aggravated.[194]

Nevertheless, conditions were indeed better than at most camps. In 1943, Eric Wallwork was transferred to a camp in Japan and wrote in his diary: 'We used to grumble at the one we left in Korea, but that was like a holiday camp in comparison with this one.'[195] But this is more a measure of how appalling conditions were elsewhere rather than an indication of satisfactory

[193] See J. Wilkinson, *Sketches of a P.O.W. in Korea*, p.34, for an account.
[194] Jesson, *Journals*, August 1945.
[195] Wallwork, *Diaries*, November 1943.

conditions at Keijo. In his study of POW artists from Lancashire, Stephen Bull makes a brief but well-judged summary:

> Despite its hardships this had a reputation as one of the better places to be, particularly when set against the horrors of Thailand and Burma. Nevertheless, the distinction was at best comparative […] and as early as October 1942 weight loss and malnutrition were significant problems.[196]

He is echoing Elrington's opinion, given forty years earlier: 'By comparison with the horror stories of the Siamese railway prison camps, ours is almost colourless. And yet we were not without our share of trouble'.[197]

Men returned from Keijo with mental and physical scars that lasted the rest of their lives. Elrington's lungs were permanently damaged, whilst others suffered from the long-term effects of malnutrition, and in particular, cardiovascular damage from beriberi.[198] Of the Australians, Sergeant Stan de Groen suffered from depression, alcoholism and anxiety for the rest of his life; Carolyn Newman has recorded that her father, Captain Wilf Fawcett, who died tragically in an accident a few years after release, returned from Keijo 'completely changed'.[199]

If we finish this first section by returning to Kovner's argument that 'when senior Japanese leadership took an interest in the fate of Allied POWs, policy was not one of deliberate cruelty,' we can see that there is evidence to challenge it.[200] In particular, the decision to kill the officers came from senior leadership.[201] Both Elrington and Baker believed that their lives were saved by the dropping of the second atomic bomb.[202] Had the Russian advance reached Keijo before the second atomic bomb was

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[196] Stephen Bull, *'Nor Iron Bars': Lancashire Artists in Captivity 1942-1945* (Lancashire: Lancashire County Council, 2005), p.49.

[197] Elrington, 'With 2nd Loyals in Captivity', *Lancashire Lad*, March 1952.

[198] Elrington later emigrated to the warmer climate of New Mexico due to his condition. The long-term health effects of Far Eastern incarceration are still by no means fully understood. For research into British FEPOWs' health, see Parkes and Gill, *Captive Memories*; Geoff Gill and D. R. Bell, 'Strongyloides Stercoralis Infection in Former Far East Prisoners of War,' in *British Medical Journal*, 2:6190, 8 September 1979, pp.572-574; Gill and Bell, 'Persisting Nutritional Neuropathy amongst Former War Prisoners,' in *Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry* 45(10) October 1982, pp.861-865; R. N. Sutton, 'Neurological Disease in Former Far-East Prisoners of War,' in *Lancet*, August 1980 2: 8188, pp.263-4; D. Robson et al., 'Consequences of Captivity: Health Effects of Far East Imprisonment in World War II,' in *QJM: An International Journal of Medicine*, 102:2, 1 February 2009, pp.87–96

[199] See Carolyn Newman, *Legacies of our Fathers*, pp.120-137

[200] Sarah Kovner, 'Allied POWs in Korea,' p.269.

[201] Ivor Thomas also recalls that the prisoners' footwear was confiscated to prevent escape attempts.

[202] See Elrington,'With 2nd Loyals in Captivity', *Lancashire Lad*, March 1952. My father mentioned to me that he believed that he owed his life to the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Toze, who had been relocated to a camp on the Japanese mainland, was an eye-witness to the second nuclear explosion. On 9

dropped on Nagasaki, they would have been shot dead. At a lesser level of cruelty, the policy of public humiliation was also decided at the highest level, as we have discussed in the previous chapter.

Kovner's argument hinges on her assertion that conditions did not deteriorate after the camp's propaganda function ceased in 1943, but rather the humane practices and precedents that governed the earlier propaganda regime were so well-established that they continued until the capitulation. However, the source she employs as evidence that Keijo's propaganda function ended in 1943 - the policy document entitled 'Precautionary measures regarding the reporting of Prisoners of War', discussed in the previous chapter - relates only to *domestic* propaganda. Furthermore, my reading of the document is that it proscribes the idyllic holiday-camp style reporting of 1942, with prisoners relaxing on the beaches of Singapore and playing water-polo, rather than the less exaggerated fictions which continued to appear throughout the war for both internal and external audiences. Most of the propaganda photographs of Keijo were taken in 1944, and the 1944 Red Cross inspection was manipulated with as much care as in previous years.

There are numerous factors to explain better conditions at Keijo. As the camp had been created to serve a propaganda rather than an economic purpose, there was no urgent labour function, a significant factor in mortality rates. Prisoners mainly worked at a warehouse and a railway yard, loading and unpacking supplies for the army. Yap, like others, has also suggested that 'prisoners' agency' was a significant factor in determining conditions. This was certainly the case at Keijo, where Elrington was regarded by his officers as a courageous and skilful advocate on their behalf in his dealings with the Japanese. Morale was good at the camp, due to strong leadership on his part. Elrington also identified the clandestine news service at Keijo as a key factor in sustaining men's morale. As at every FEPOW camp, news of the outside world had an enormously positive effect. At Keijo, a Korean was bribed to deliver newspapers to the Officers' garden; they were then smuggled into camp to be translated by Baker, who produced news bulletins.[203]

But by far the most positive influence on conditions was the camp's propaganda function, which meant that the prisoners were able send and receive letters, and that their diet was

August 1945 he recorded seeing 'a huge cauliflower of cloud above where an enormous fire is raging to northwards.' (Toze, *Diaries*). Daniel Fraser recalled that fallout from Hiroshima reached as far as the camp at Konan. (IWM (Sound), 8302, Fraser).

[203] Baker's final bulletin is now held at the Lancashire Infantry Museum and is reproduced at Appendix 7. He was later presented with a gold watch by officers at the camp in recognition of the risk he took in doing this work.

augmented by Red Cross parcels. The prisoners had to be kept alive for these yearly visits, and in a condition which did not immediately suggest severe malnutrition or mistreatment.

Manipulation at Keijo

i) ICRC Visits

Keijo was one of the first camps to be visited by the Japan delegation of the ICRC, with Paravicini making an inspection on 19 December 1942. There were further annual visits on 15 November 1943 and 23 November 1944.[204] The inspections formed part of an annual tour outside Japan for the delegation, which encompassed two other show camps, Mukden in Manchuria and Jinsen in Korea. The visits were preceded by intense preparation. The day before the first inspection at Keijo the prisoners were allowed a holiday to clean their living quarters. As well as thorough cleaning, minor cosmetic improvements were made and in 1944, the prisoners were given pot plants to improve their surroundings. Efforts were also made to improve the prisoners' appearance: in the same year, a consignment of Red Cross socks which had lain unopened for several months was issued to the prisoners on the eve of the inspection.[205] In the words of Lieutenant Pat Fuller, the Keijo inspections were 'a complete farce':

> The Japanese put on a special show for him [the inspector]: they gave POWs a special lunch; allowed them light work that day; the canteen was well-stocked for the occasion, and when the Red Cross representative left, the stock was immediately removed. The senior British officer had to prepare a list of questions, and any question which was objectionable was stricken out [*sic*].[206]

[204] See TNA, WO/224/195 Korea: Keijo, Jinsen and Chosen: POW camps and Hospitals, for copies of the reports.
[205] See Baker and Lever *Diaries,* November 1944.
[206] Testimony given at Noguchi's trial.

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

Figure 27: LIM, 846/2.2.165, Miscellaneous. Baker's translations provided news of the war in Europe, in this case the liberation of Holland, Belgium and France.

Paravicini was the recipient of a great deal of flattering attention and hospitality during his 1942 visit, reminiscent of Japanese generosity and courtesy as hosts of the ICRC conference in Tokyo in 1934, and a huge contrast to the suspicion and outright hostility he was treated with by officialdom in mainland Japan.[207] His visit also coincided with an inspection by the Protecting Power's delegate. Reporting back to Geneva by letter he wrote:

> The hospitality and generosity of the Governor-general, the Supreme Commander of the Army, his Chief of Staff, the President of the Red Cross Society of Chosen, the Mayor of Keijo and other dignitaries were overwhelming. Mr Angst the delegate of our Minister arrived at my heels, and a common programme was unavoidable. I pointed out to the authorities that usually the protective [sic] powers work independently.[208]

His letter noted that 'the time allotted to camp visits there and everywhere was too short, but this seems to be a kind of rule with the Army. We always struggle for more time on our camp visits'. Nevertheless, he was reassured by his interview with Noguchi, forming the impression that he was 'a real father to his prisoners'.

[207] At a dinner given in his honour, Paravicini fainted, an early sign of his illness, which progressively worsened.
[208] ACICR G8/76 V, Paravicini letter to Geneva, December 1942.

The extraordinary number of senior officials involved in Paravicini's reception point to the importance attached to the visit. The format of the inspection, on this and each succeeding visit, followed the general pattern outlined in Chapter 1. Recording the 1942 inspection, Toze wrote: 'We had a day off, with larger meals (which made us go short the after they'd left)'.[209] Paravicini was rushed from room to room, visiting only those areas of the camp selected by Noguchi. As at other camps, areas that would not bear inspection remained unseen. Writing of the 1943 inspection, Toze noted: 'Today is a holiday on account of the Red Cross representative. To our disgust he did not come into our room – the darkest, coldest, and most miserable in the building.'[210] Another feature at Keijo noted by Baker was a general relaxation in discipline in the days leading up to the inspection, with minor indulgences such as lights being allowed on for an extra hour in the evenings. [211]

The three inspection reports contain many deliberate misstatements. Each year, Noguchi mentioned schemes for future improvements which never in fact materialised, such as the installation of showers and a cinema, or instituting recreational walks. More generally, the reports suggested that heating, sanitation, and medical facilities were adequate, and that the relationship between captor and captive was generally cordial. It is evident from the reports that the inspectors were not allowed to visit the hospital, as they describe a much larger space than actually existed. The hospital hut never held more than 10 beds, yet in 1942 it was reported that the 'Infirmary' had 15; by 1944 this had increased to twenty, with both isolation and convalescent wards. The report states: 'The medical, surgical and dental equipment is adequate for minor cases', a completely misleading statement.

The very detailed information reproduced in the reports concerning the prisoners' diet indicates considerable planning. Each year, the prisoners' daily diet was itemised and its quantity given.[212] According to the reports, the men's calorific intake varied according to their rank and the nature of their work. Over three years, the figures give an average of 3,250 calories a day, although in reality, as we have seen, it was closer to 1,800 calories, and sometimes as low as 1500, except for those periods when the prisoners' diet was supplemented by Red Cross parcels. The quantities of meat, fish and vegetables in the prisoners' diet, as reported by the delegation, are particularly gross distortions when compared to Major Rigby's records. Each

[209] Toze, *Diaries*, November 1942.
[210] Ibid., November 1944.
[211] Baker, *Diaries*, November 1944.
[212] See Appendix 5.

inspection report also records the meals served on the day of the visit, which were specially prepared for the visit and entirely unrepresentative of the actual daily diet.

Taken as a whole, the reports are convincing propaganda. There are minor criticisms: in 1944, Angst noted that the light in the squad rooms during the day was poor, and that the prisoners requested far more fat in their diet. But the criticisms lend an air of authenticity without detracting from the overall message that conditions were mainly satisfactory, if far from idyllic. The final report also contains a complaint from Noguchi to the effect that the prisoners had a tendency to complain and over-stress the negative aspects of camp life. The three reports show that Noguchi deliberately deceived the Red Cross delegation over every aspect of camp life. Henling Wade's statement that Noguchi was 'an honourable man' is a tribute to Noguchi's success in creating a false persona rather than an accurate assessment of his character.[213]

ii) Photography and Filming

The prisoners were filmed and photographed within days of their arrival at Keijo. The photograph below at Figure 33 is one of several taken at an open-air service held at the camp at the beginning of October 1942. In November, the funeral services for Captain J Whiting and Colonel Dyson were also recorded.[214] On 2 November 1942 a Memorial service was held for the fourteen prisoners who had so far died in Korea from the ill effects of the voyage. This was an elaborately staged propaganda event which involved the participation of senior Japanese officers up to the level of Major General. As well as Methodist, Roman Catholic and Anglican ministers, there were also two Shinto priests, one carrying a horse hair whisk and wearing a mask, as seen in Figure 30 below. The Japanese army donated large floral tributes which were displayed on trestles. The British officers borrowed items of clothing in order to appear appropriately dressed. Figure 31 below shows a cameraman recording the scenes at the graveyard. At this very early stage of their captivity in Korea, the prisoners appear to have accepted the sincerity of Japanese motives, although they were bemused by the amount of attention the prisoners received once they were dead. As Lever remarked, a comparable level of concern earlier would have kept them alive.[215]

[213] Tom Henling Wade, p.62.
[214]Colonel John Dyson, senior officer of 22nd Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, died from heart failure, Captain Whiteing died of dysentery. The latter's death is recorded by Lever in his diaries.
[215] Lever, *Diaries*, November 1942.

Figure 28: LIM, 846/2.2.165, Miscellaneous. Red Cross parcels made a vital difference to the lives of POWs at Keijo. Most men carefully husbanded their share, and a complex bartering system evolved around the various items. But some ate their entire portion at one sitting, as depicted at bottom right

Figure 29: LIM, 846/2.2.165, Memorial Service, Keijo, November 1942. Senior Japanese officers, including a Major General, pay their respects.

Figure 30: Private Collection (Richard Baker), Memorial service, 2 November 1942.

Wallwork recorded that the prisoners were told that an investigation would beheld into the conditions on the *Fukkai Maru,* and that in due course the deceased prisoners' belongings would be sent back to their relatives, along with letters of condolence.[216] He appears to accept the truth of this information. He also noted that Colonel Elrington 'felt obliged' to write a letter to Noguchi to express his thanks for the respect shown his dead comrades. The fact that the letter was photographed and forwarded to the ICRC offers further proof of the propaganda purpose of the event.[217]

[216] Wallwork, *Diaries*, November 1942.
[217] See Figure 32 below.


PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE BRITANNIQUES AU JAPON
Camp de Keijo

3. Hommage de l'armée japonaise aux défunts

4. Service divin britannique

Figure 31: ICRC *Revue*, April 1943. A cameraman can be seen at left of top photograph



To The Superintendent,
Prisoner of War Camp, Keijo.

Sir,

I have the honour to convey to you the appreciation and thanks of all officers and men of this Camp for the honour done to our dead Commrades at yesterday's ceremony. We were all very gratified at the excellent arrangements made and at the attendance of representatives of the Imperial Japanese Army. The kindness and sympathy shown by yourself and the camp staff in many ways, including the gift of the floral tributes, are very much appreciated and will be remembered.

It would be an added kindness if some of the photographs could be made available, as in due time they would be of great interest and value to the parents and families of the deceased soldiers.

May I add a personal word of thanks to yourself for so kindly taking me in your car.

Keijo, 3.11.'42

M. Elrington,
Lieut.Colonel

M. Elrington Lieut Colonel
Prisoner No 1 Keijo

Figure 32: ACICR, (ARR)/V-P-HIST-E-02330, Letter of thanks from Elrington to Noguchi

Later, the prisoners came to realise that the deaths of their comrades had been exploited for propaganda. In 1947, Toze and Sergeant Stan Strange published a book of sketches, including one of the funeral with the caption: 'Mass burial of fourteen British Prisoners of War who died at Keijo Camp. Propaganda screen and artificial wreaths were used for press purposes. Later, in Kobe, men who died were broken into crouching position and put into soya barrels, two feet high.'[218]

Eight of these photographs appeared in the April 1943 edition of the ICRC Review, with an accompanying acknowledgement to the Hurojohokyoku for permission to reproduce them. Given that it took a minimum of six months for correspondence from the Japan delegation to reach Geneva Headquarters, the relatively brief timespan between the date the photographs were taken and the date they appeared in print illustrates the value the Japanese attached to them as propaganda. News of the photographs was soon reported by the Japanese press agency, *Dome*i. The 12 May 1943 edition of *Nippon Times* reported:

> Dr Paravicini, Delegate of the International Red Cross Committee for Japan declared that the British prisoners are leading disciplined lives and are in a satisfactory condition according to a report from Zurich to Domei. [81]The bulletin carries eight photographs depicting the funeral services held for British prisoners in Keijo.

The following month, Christmas celebrations offered more opportunities for creating propaganda. There was a fortuitous element to this: Noguchi had observed the prisoners rehearsing their Christmas show, and, realising its propaganda value, suddenly offered generous resources for the production. A large ground floor room was transformed into a theatre, with stage and curtains, and materials for props became available.

On Christmas Day, photographers, journalists and a film crew arrived at the camp. The amount of electricity required by the professional lighting resulted in a temporary power cut within the city of Keijo itself, according to Rigby.[219] They captured images of the show itself, a Christmas morning service, Christmas dinner, the band playing various pieces, and communal singing. Elrington led a round of 'For he's a jolly good fellow' to thank not just the various participants but also Colonel Noguchi.

[218] Toze, Strange, *In Defence of Singapore*, caption opposite plate XIX.
[219] Rigby, *Diaries*, December 1942.The filming is also mentioned by Wallwork, Toze and Lever.

Figure 33: Private collection. First service at Keijo, October 1942.

Figure 34: LIM, 846/2.2.165, Miscellaneous, Funeral of Col Dyson, Keijo, November 1942

Figure 35: GB0099KCLMA, Christmas lunch 1942, medical staff.

Figure 36: GB0099 KCLMA. Bombardier Arthur Butler as his alter ego, 'Gloria D'Earie', Christmas1942.[220]

In terms of time and resources devoted to them, the Memorial service and the Christmas events were, along with the Red Cross inspections, the major propaganda occasions during the camp's existence. They were also the only occasions that the prisoners were filmed, except as part as a series of 'racial comparison' tests which took place in November 1942.[221] It is certain, then, that these scenes would have formed part of the film *Huryo Chosen ni Kita,* 'The Prisoners who came to Korea.' We can infer that the film offered a far more convincing representation of b*ushido* generosity than *Calling Australia*, which featured the zombie-like performances of coerced prisoners from Java's 'Bicycle' camp, as discussed in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, both films were among a group of four shown to senior Japanese leadership who were to decide which to distribute. The fact that *Calling Australia* was adjudged the betrays the poor judgement of many of those involved in Japanese propaganda. In the event, Aiko Utsumi tells us, none of the films was used.[222] However, a letter from the Japan delegation proves that at least portions of these films were forwarded to Geneva.[223] Assistant delegate Max Pestalozzi wrote to Geneva to inform Headquarters that he had forwarded film reels of camps in Java, Korea and the Japanese mainland, provided by the Japanese Army. As we have seen in the last chapter, several stills from *Calling Australia* were published in the ICRC's *Review*. Unfortunately, no trace of the filming in Korea remain in the Geneva Archives. Film footage of Keijo

[220] The subject of POWs in drag is explored by Clare Makepeace in *Captives of War: British Prisoners of War in Europe in the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp.121-128.
[221] These involved measuring, filming and photographing various parts of the prisoners' bodies, and taking samples of hair. Prisoners were also questioned on their ancestry. The tests seem related to eugenics, but I have been unable to find any reference to them other than in the prisoners' diaries, nor have I been able to find evidence of similar activities at any other FEPOW camps.
[222]Aiko Utsumi, trans. Gavan McCormack, 'Prisoners of War in the Pacific War: Japan's Policy,' in Gavan McCormack and Hank Nelson, *The Burma-Thailand Railway* (Thailand, Silkworm Books, 1993), p.178.
[223] ACICR G7/6, Letter from Pestalozzi to Geneva, 16 July 1944

does in fact exist, but it was shot by the liberating American forces. A clip of it can be accessed on the Australian War Memorial website.[224]



Figure 37: IWM, John Jesson Collection. Letter from Jesson to his mother.

Photography continued at Keijo at least until the end of 1944.The camp was visited by professional photographers on occasions, but various officials at the camp also took photographs regularly. A *Kempetai* guard, Sergeant Kobiashi, appears to have been a keen amateur photographer. The violent Corporal Takuma and the camp doctor, Uchida, are also mentioned in the diaries as photographers. Their work was officially sanctioned and the prisoners could buy the photographs for 10 sen each.[225] Their subject matter can be divided into six categories: individual portraits, Red Cross parcels, religious services, Christmas celebrations, gardening, and men tending rabbits.

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Figure 38: GB0099 KCLMA. Many individual photographs were taken during 1944.

Figure 39: GB0099 KCLMA

[224] AWM, F01244.

[225] By comparison, cigarettes could cost up to 35 Sen each.



Figure 40: GB0099 KCLMA. Captain Mummery and Major Rigby (the annotations are incorrect)

They reflect those aspects of life at the camp which could collectively present a positive picture without resorting to overt, undisguised manipulation. Prisoners were keen to be photographed, and Lever sometimes expresses disappointment at not being in particular shots. The prisoners enclosed their photographs in letters home, thus providing persuasive images of good treatment. The individual portraits reproduced above offer a significant contrast to the manner in which prisoners chose to represent themselves in sketches and caricatures, reproduced in Appendix 6.

We can contrast these photographs with other, clandestine, images of the Loyal Regiment taken at Changi in 1942, reproduced below at Figures 41 and 42. A chaplain at the camp, Revd. Lewis Headley secretly took pictures with a Leica camera, X-ray equipment was used to produce negatives, which Headley was able to conceal during his later captivity in Siam.[226] The pictures are dated October 1942, when the Loyals had in fact left the camp, but as we have seen, misdating is a common feature of records of FEPOW captivity. As well as reminding us of the potency and visceral impact of the visual image, these very rare un-staged photographs of captivity in the Far East illustrate the great difference between the reality of incarceration and how it was presented to the outside world in images of Keijo.

[226] IWM, HU 95190- HU 95197 Scenes at Changi POW camp, L V Headley Collection.

As we have noted in Chapter 1, Christmas celebrations were a feature of life at nearly all camps, and if there is only a single surviving photograph of a POW camp, it is usually of Christmas. Many photographs of the three Christmases at Keijo survive. There is an irony to this: the prisoners believed that by putting on a show of good cheer they were demonstrating to the Japanese that their captors had not succeeded in dampening their spirit or sense of comradeship. In December 1944 Baker noted in his diary that the prisoners spent two whole weeks making Christmas decorations, in his opinion a complete waste of time.[227] However, Wallwork's diaries explicitly make the point that they were an expression of indomitability to the Japanese.[228] They were also an assertion of their own identity: by decorating their quarters, and enacting the traditional ceremonies, they were in a sense proclaiming their own culture and way of life. In the photographs at Figure 46 below, we also see how the paper chains reflect status, with the senior officers in the top photograph enjoying the most elaborate display. The prisoners also spent many hours making Christmas cards for each other, providing evidence of the friendships that existed, even between the ranks. But the underlying irony was that this display of festive cheer furnished the Japanese with excellent propaganda, some of which would eventually appear in British magazines.



Figure 41: IWM, HU 95197, Lewis Headley Collection. Members of Loyal Regiment eat an evening meal of durian fruit and rice.

[227] Baker, *Diaries*, December 1944.
[228] Wallwork, *Diaries*, December 1943.

Figure 42: Imperial War Museum, HU 95193, Headley Lewis Collection. Queuing for evening meal, Changi

Figure 43: *Far East*, August 1945. Conditions at the Nisshin Oil Mills, where the POWs in the lower photograph worked, were appalling.

As at many other camps, the prisoners at Keijo were allowed a garden, but, as also was the case elsewhere, a great deal of its produce was appropriated by the Japanese. It was designated the 'Officer's garden', as it was an area where officers could choose to work if they wished. Toze describes it as being about the size of a small football pitch, large enough to provide an appreciable supplement to the men's diet. But Baker records that 'after a year's work on the garden very little has appeared in the men's stews' and that the guards were taking more than a fair share. [229]

Figure 44: GB0099 KCLMA Figure 24, Harvesting daikon

Early in 1943, rabbits were introduced into the camp, but strict limits were placed on breeding them. Rigby records that a maximum of ten rabbits were allowed at a time to augment the diet of 400 men. A prisoner suffering from heart damage through beriberi, Lieutenant 'Bunny' Wardle, was appointed their keeper. Subterfuge enabled a slight increase in the minuscule rations allowed:

[229] Baker, *Diaries*, February 1944.

The Japanese never knew the rabbit strength, as they had been told that the does were likely to eat their young if frightened by strangers. The fact that the strength was unknown made it possible to increase the numbers ordered for the cook-house. by up to fifty percent, provided the skins were not found. Never more than 10 were ordered officially.' [230]

Figure 45: GB0099KCLMA, Lever believed that the 'ruddy rabbits' were for the benefit of the inspectors rather than the prisoners.

Several of Lever's diary entries express his belief that the rabbits, and later the few hens and pigs introduced to the camp in 1944, were merely 'eyewash' for the benefit of the inspectors. He also records that during the 1944 ICRC inspection, the Japanese made a point of showing the inspectors the gardens and rabbits, but that the inspector 'did not appear interested'.[231]

Red Cross parcels appeared in many propaganda photographs, including those taken taken at Keijo. These had a specific objective: to counter Allied complaints about Japanese obstructiveness over relief supplies and to provide a response to entirely justified suspicions over the fate of relief supplies once they had reached Japanese territories.

The correspondence of the Japan delegation held in the Geneva archives illustrated how it was continually frustrated in its objective of setting up supply channels and getting relief into the camps. Their proposals were either ignored or responded to with loosely worded promises of future action which never transpired. In August 1942, the Japanese had ordered that no neutral ship, even flying the flag of the Red Cross, would be allowed in Japanese waters. From then until November 1944, relief supplies were limited to food parcels carried on

[230] LIM, 846/2.2.165, Miscellaneous, Unattributed annotation to an uncatalogued photograph of rabbits.
[231] Lever, *Diaries*, November 1944.

ships returning to Japan with Japan nationals.[232] Other food supplies were stockpiled in Vladivostok from September 1943 until November 1944, when the Japanese allowed just one ship, *Hakusan Maru*, to transport parcels to Japan.

After the capitulation, large consignments of parcels were found stockpiled at wharves and warehouses across Japan. Paravicini had sensed that the Japanese were unhappy about receiving Red Cross supplies, as they were a form of propaganda, illustrative of the enemy's abundant resources and logistical capabilities. Indeed, had proper supply channels been established, the POWs would have enjoyed a better diet than the average Japanese citizen.

The Japan delegation had also requested receipts to prove that the parcels had arrived at their intended destination but hardly any were forthcoming. The reality was that, even if supplies reached the camps, camp commandants refused to accept them, whilst others appropriated them for their own use. Again, Keijo was an exception. Although the guards stole supplies, either for themselves or to sell on, the Hurjojohokyoku was able to offer receipts for medical supplies signed by both Noguchi and Elrington.

As well as receipts, there is a photographic record of each delivery of Red Cross parcels at the camp. The images reproduced below at Figures 48-49 are part of a larger set, one of which was reproduced on the cover of *Far East* magazine in January 1945 (see Figure 51).

Figure 46: GB00099KCLMA, Procter Album

Figure 47: ACICR, G8/76. Correspondance, 1945, Délégation, Japon. Receipt of Medical supplies

If we summarise the images of Keijo, we can again see common themes and methods and the effectiveness of visual propaganda. They are true likenesses conveying a false impression; of well-being, nourishment, and a respect for the enemy, who is honoured with due dignity in death. Individual photographs of smiling prisoners suggest a cordial relationship between captor and captive. Perhaps the one area which illustrates Japanese miscomprehension of Western culture is the propaganda's over-emphasis on funeral and Memorial services, assuming they held the same significance for the West as they did in Japanese culture. In Japan,

[232] For detailed accounts see *The Activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross During the Second World War*, pp.441-444, and Satow, *The Work of the Prisoners of War Department*, pp.146-149.

the ceremonies for the dead were to allow the bereaved to uphold the family's honour, rather than to grieve. National ceremonies held for the war dead at the Yasukini shrine were broadcast throughout Japan and its wartime colonies, and local ceremonies were held in schools and village halls.[233]

If we compare the photographs taken at Keijo with the ones taken at Zentsuji and Formosa, discussed in the last chapter, we can note one essential difference. At Keijo, the prisoners were not coerced into taking part in blatantly faked scenes. Although the prisoners were aware that the photographs and film reels of Christmas shows served a propaganda purpose, they were never made to participate in obvious deception, as for example in the photograph of the Australian POW at Zentsuji, reproduced at Figure 53, whose tunic conceals a blanket which has been wrapped around him to conceal evidence of weight loss.

Figure 48: LIM, 846/2.2.165, Miscellaneous

Figure 49: GB0099 KCLMA, Colonel Cardew and Major Bale

Figure 50: GB0099 KCLMA, First consignment of Red Cross parcels

Figure 51: *Far East* January 1945, front page with Keijo photograph. The parcels were received in February rather than August 1943 as stated in the caption, or January, the date given in Procter's album.

[233] See Kosuge, Margaret, 'Religion, the Red Cross and the Japanese Treatment of POWs' in P.Towle et.al.*Japanese Prisoners of War* (London: Hambledon, 2000), pp.149-161.

Figure 52: Private Collection. Grave visit, Easter 1944. Lieutenant Baker is standing behind the Padre, Captain Peter Cazalet. To Baker's right is Major O'Donnell, a Medical officer who later gave evidence at the Yokohama War Crime Trials

Figure 53: AWM, PO1294.001. Captain Stuart Nottage, AIF. Zentsuji, 11 February 1943.

iii) Correspondence

The positive messages conveyed by the photographs were corroborated by the letters received from Keijo. As we have noted in the previous chapter, FEPOWs were able to send and receive very few, if any, letters or postcards, but at the show camps far greater opportunities existed for correspondence. Thanks to David Tett's detailed analysis in a chapter devoted to Jesson's correspondence, it can be noted that on average, letters took six months to arrive in England from Keijo, about the same length of time as correspondence between the Japan delegation and Geneva, and considerably less than from other camps.[234] Correspondence from Changi, for example, could take took over a year to reach its destination, if it arrived at all.

[234] David Tett, *A Postal History of the Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees in East Asia During the Second World War* vol. 6, *Japan, Korea, Manchuria and Borneo, 1942-1945: Hellships to Slavery* (Wheathamspstead , Herts: BFA Publishing, 2010), chapter 5.

The prisoners' letters were an effective propaganda tool. The constraints which the Japanese placed on their contents, together with the prisoners' desire to allay their families' anxieties, resulted in a very false picture being given. In his memoir of captivity at Changi, Donald Smith records that in the summer of 1942 the prisoners were each given a blank card and told that they could write up to twenty words. Smith's main concern was to let his parents know he was still alive and allay their anxieties. Accordingly, he wrote to assure them he was being well-treated. In this he was typical: he relates how even a prisoner who had just had a leg amputated wrote home that he was 'fit and well'.[235] This desire to reassure family members appears to have been a universal one amongst FEPOWs.

Jesson sent his first postcard to his mother, reproduced below, at the same time and under the same conditions as Smith.



Figure 54: IWM Jesson Papers.

We can contrast it with a later postcard reproduced in *Far East* magazine:

> Still well and happy, nearly eleven stone on Oriental diet. With many old friends, chief events meals, sleep, reading, talk, smoking, enough of each. Always freezing now but warm enough. Cheery Christmas: carols, snow, stew (Irish) saki, show (self-stage manager), made usual greetings cards.[236]

We can see that from his first arrival at Keijo, Jesson had greater opportunity of expression than at Changi. But the postcard is also interesting in its ambiguity. 'Nearly 11 stone on Oriental diet' is in fact a reference to weight loss, 'always freezing but warm enough' is a somewhat contradictory statement, and the list of his 'chief events', qualified by the phrase

[235] Donald Smith, *And All the Trumpets* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1954), p.124.
[236] *Far East*, November 1943. Although letters were published in the magazine without identifying the writer, we know that this is from Jesson as his diary records that he was stage manager for the Christmas show in 1942.

'enough of each' may hint at the profound boredom and sense of stagnation which his diaries occasionally articulate.

An analysis of the letters published in Red Cross magazine and those held in archives reveals that, in its mention of Christmas celebrations, Jesson's postcard is typical of correspondence from Keijo and other show camps. With the exception of the funeral services, they reiterate the themes of the Keijo photographs: Christmas celebrations, the receipt of Red Cross parcels and gardening activities form the chief subject matter of the letters, along with assurances that the writer is well and in good spirits.

But correspondence at Keijo was closely controlled. Opportunities to write home usually coincided with positive events. In January 1944 Baker recorded somewhat sarcastically that letter paper had been issued just after Christmas 'so that we could mention what a wonderful time we'd been given.'[237] He also provides evidence of the importance that the Japanese attached to correspondence and their methods of ensuring they contained the right propaganda messages. Baker notes that officers were permitted to write eight letters per year with a length of up to 400 words, but that the Japanese were 'infernally touchy' about the letters' contents:

> Last Monday six of us who had letters returned went to the office. Ushihara [camp interpreter] gave some advisory asides in which he counselled avoidance of being too detailed in statement – a harmless vagueness was preferable. Then Terada [Adjutant] appeared and the letters were returned with the offensive passages bracketed in red. Terada said: 'Noguchi does not want you to paint life here in glowing terms (!!!!) but does not want the bad side of it stressed', which seemed to me to be fair. Clean paper issued and given until one to re-write.[238]

He also observes that the Japanese were 'exceedingly annoyed' that many officers had not mentioned Christmas with sufficient enthusiasm, or indeed had ignored it all together: 'Peter Cazalet spent an hour being arraigned in the office for writing "we had a quite a good Christmas eked out with Red Cross parcels."' Baker's returned letter, with the censor's red brackets enclosing the unacceptably negative phrases, is reproduced at Appendix 2.

iv) Feedback from the Prisoners

In the introduction I have stated that the writing activities that took place at Keijo were highly unusual, if not unique. Prisoners were allowed to keep diaries, whereas at other camps

[237] Baker, *Diaries*, January 1944.
[238] Baker, ibid.

this could be an offence punishable by death. They were also required to write essays and answer questionnaires.

As I have discussed in chapter 1, some of these writing activities can be directly related to a specific propaganda purpose: to obtain accounts of Japanese martial prowess from the prisoners. Other activities, such as Baker's account of the Malaya campaign, quoted in the introduction, may have yielded useful military intelligence. There are no documents or secondary literature, asf ar as I am aware, to explain the exact purpose of the diaries or the essays, but we can draw useful comparisons with the activities of American and Chinese Intelligence units at the same time.[239]

The Chinese army studied the diaries of dead or captured Japanese soldiers in order to gain insights into the average soldier's mindset and his attitude towards the war, as a means of identifying areas that could be targeted by propaganda. Similarly, an American Psychological Operations unit travelled to Yenan in China to interview Japanese Prisoners of War. As part of the interview process, the prisoners were made to answer questionnaires.

In March 1944 at Keijo, the prisoners' diaries were collected and examined over a six week period. John Jesson wrote at the time:

> Diaries taken for censorship. We understand that Japanese children are forced, and soldiers encouraged, to keep diaries. It is recognised that these are liable to periodic inspection, as no private communications are allowed. We are so used to thinking what we like, and writing or saying what we think, without official interference, that such a custom as this diary inspection is hard to comprehend.[240]

As Jesson correctly stated, soldiers in the IJA kept diaries. It was compulsory for recruits, employed as a method of monitoring and controlling the new soldier's thoughts and attitudes. At this later stage of the war and captivity, such a motive would not have applied at Keijo. Instead, the diaries offered an insight into the captives' mindset which could be useful in creating propaganda. At the time they were collected for reading the Japanese gave assurances over freedom of expression. Baker recorded:

> We are permitted to be as abusive as we like, expressing ourselves completely with no fear of punishment for they say (!) they recognise the fact that these are private, personal diaries but we must be prepared to have them perused from time to time.[241]

[239] See Kushner, *The Thought War*, pp.163-167 for a discussion of American and Chinese Intelligence units.
[240] John Jesson, *Diaries*, June 1944.
[241] Baker, *Diaries*, June 1944.

As we have seen in the introduction, the prisoners kept their diaries throughout captivity, and although the only entirely clandestine writing activities appear to have been the magazine *Nor Iron Bars* and Baker's *Nippon News*, the prisoners nevertheless exercised caution in what they wrote in their journals for fear of repercussions should the Japanese should read them.

Baker, however, had shown no such reticence. He gives various abusive vignettes of the guards, identified by nickname: 'Smoko', is described as 'conceited, arrogant and stupid, heartily disliked by all the men'; another, 'Smiles', as an 'ill-mannered slobber-guts'. Corporal Takuma as 'an evil-visaged, short-arsed runt of an individual'. These remarks were read by the camp authorities and his diary was duly returned, without comment. That Baker could express himself in these terms with impunity illustrates the value the Japanese set upon reading their captives' unrestrained thoughts. Keijo was a particularly suitable camp for such a propaganda exercise: a less abusive regime would have been an environment where the prisoners were more likely to give their true opinions.

The essays given to the prisoners in Korea would also have served this purpose. On first arriving in Korea, Kerr records that he was asked to write an essay on 'Japan and the Japanese'.[242] All the prisoners had to write at length on 'your opinion of the voyage to Korea'.[243]These seemingly innocuous subjects could have aided a greater understanding of the enemy attitudes and vulnerabilities. As I have observed in the introduction, one of the great failures of Japanese propaganda was its inability to gauge the western mind accurately. Indeed, it can be said that the decision to wage war, which was influenced by the initial belief that America would be reluctant to wage a prolonged war, reflects a basic misunderstanding of the way the enemy thought.

One of the questionnaires was copied out in full by Lieutenant Baker (reproduced at Appendix 1). It asks for aspects of Japanese fighting qualities that they admired, but also asks for incidents in action which were particularly disturbing, suggesting that the Japanese were looking for areas of vulnerability that could be exploited. Other questions relate to the prisoners' attitude towards the conflict, the enemy, and the war's outcome, and could be used to gauge the enemy's motivation to continue the fight:

> D. Is it profitable, or advisable, for Britain to fight against Japan?
>
> E. Your opinion concerning the establishment of the Greater East Asia.
>
> F. How long do you think the war will last? When do you think you will return to your country?

[242] Kerr, *Diaries*, November 1942.
[243] Jesson's essay is amongst his uncatalogued papers at IWM.

Question E illustrates this lack of insight into the Allied mind. Baker's reply was that he hadn't the 'faintest idea' what was meant by 'the establishment of a Greater East Asia'.[244] Lever records that, as in the case of the diaries, the Japanese emphasised that the prisoners could express themselves without fear of reprisal:

> We were told to write what we thought, as the idea was not to punish anyone for stating their opinions. The replies were quite direct, no effort was made to be complimentary. Comparisons were made of Japan's attitude 2 years ago with what it must be now. Prophecies of Japan's capitulation were made and a lot said without necessarily using foul language. They must have found it very enlightening.[245]

Comparison with the questionnaires given to Japanese POWs in Yenan illustrate considerable similarities in that they canvass views on the war's outcome and Japanese motivation. Below are representative examples:

'Do you think the China incident was correct or not?'
'If Japan wins, do you want to return?'
'Is the Emperor supporting the war?'
'If Japan loses, do you think the Emperor should remain?' [246]

As mentioned in the introduction, the Japanese had studied Western propaganda techniques throughout the 1930s, so the similarities in methodology are unsurprising, and it is reasonable to assume they held the same purpose. Although it is impossible to identify all the motives for these writing activities with complete certainty, they were nevertheless a component of Keijo's propaganda function.

In summary, we see that Keijo served a variety of significant propaganda functions, and we can discern common features with other 'show camps', indicative of centralised organisation. In my introduction I drew a comparison with Theresienstadt. The level of deception at Keijo may seem negligible compared to the huge resources devoted to creating a false impression at this concentration camp. But Theresienstadt was used to deceive the ICRC inspectors on just one occasion. Keijo served a propaganda purpose throughout its existence and formed part of a strategy of deception which operated throughout the Pacific war.

[244] Baker, *Diaries*, May 1944.
[245] Lever, *Diaries*, May 1944.
[246] Quoted in Barack Kushner, *The Thought War* (Hawaii: Hawaii University Press, 2007), p.187.

CHAPTER 3

Responses to Japanese POW propaganda from the British government, the general public and Red Cross organisations

In its primary aim of persuading the world that it treated its prisoners humanely, Japanese POW propaganda was a failure. However, it was by no means a complete failure. In this chapter I examine the responses to Japanese Prisoner of War propaganda from the British government and the general public. I argue that it succeeded in confusing the government as to the pervasiveness of Japanese maltreatment and raised false hopes amongst the families of FEPOWs. But an unintentional consequence of this propaganda was that it actually *aided* the British government in pursuing its 'Germany first' policy'.[247] The benign picture of POW conditions offered by Japanese propaganda helped keep public consciousness of the Pacific conflict at a low level. I also examine the work of the British Red Cross and ICRC and consider whether the criticisms directed at these organisations by the British government were justified. In following these lines of discussion I illustrate the importance of Keijo in shaping perceptions.

Administrative arrangements for receiving, analysing and disseminating FEPOW information.

No clear strategy for collating, analysing or disseminating information about Prisoners of War, in whatever theatre, had been planned before 1939**.** At the time of the fall of Singapore in February 1942, the British government's administrative infrastructure for handling FEPOW issues was still utterly inadequate for the scale of the task it faced. Sir Harold Satow, head of the Foreign Office Prisoner of War department, recorded that even at the end of 1943 'arrangements for information and publicity about the Far East were little short of chaotic'.[248] The two most important bodies for analysing POW information were the Directorate of Prisoners of War at the War Office and the Prisoners of War Department at the Foreign Office, but other departments at the War Office also held an interest in POW issues, and the Navy and Airforce both wished to maintain responsibility for their own men in captivity. Responsibility for publicity and organising relief supplies had been devolved to the British Red Cross, an independent

[247] The policy was to defeat the Nazis first, then turn its attention to the Pacific theatre. See Douglas Ford, *The Pacific War* (London: Continuum, 2003), chapter 5 for a discussion of the policy.
[248] Satow, *The Work of the Prisoners of War Department,* p.142.

body, and one moreover that valued its independence highly. At least initially, these organisations were under-staffed and poorly co-ordinated. This lead to friction, particularly between the government organisations and the British Red Cross.[249]

Official news of FEPOWs came to the government bodies through the ICRC and the Protecting Power, Switzerland. However, there was no single line of communication. Although the Prisoner of War department at the Foreign office was the official point of contact with the ICRC and Switzerland, the War Office had independently established contacts with the ICRC at both its London office as well as the Geneva Headquarters. The British Red Cross also communicated directly with the ICRC, as well as relying on unofficial sources such as letters received by prisoners' families, which the organisation requested in its journals. It also contacted the ICRC on occasions to request photographs as publicity material.

The Huryojohokyoku's policy of withholding POW information and denying access to all but a few camps meant that news of British and Dominion FEPOWS came to Britain very slowly. According to British Red Cross statistics, as late as August 1942 only a few hundred names had been released. In January 1943 the total stood at 10,000 of the 44,000 servicemen estimated to be in captivity in the Far East.[250] The lists of British and Dominion prisoners remained far from complete at the time of the Japanese capitulation, and even in October and November 1945, relatives were placing advertisements in local newspapers requesting information about missing family members.

The government departments at last began to receive ICRC reports via Geneva in the first months of 1943. At the same time, the first POW letters, almost all coming from the show camps, began to arrive. News from unofficial sources had been received much earlier, however. In February 1942, the British government had begun to receive reports of Japanese atrocities against its servicemen in Hong Kong from escapees and unofficial intelligence sources. From then onwards, reports of appalling conditions intermittently escaped from Japanese territories, although not the northern areas, and in 1943 the first reports of the terrible conditions in Siam were received.

The depa ning an accurate picture of conditions from relatively little data, with unofficial reports contradicting the rtments at the Waur Office and Foreign Office were thus faced with the difficulty of obtai more reassring impressions given in ICRC reports, photographs and

[249] Satow wrote that the War Office and Foreign Office enjoyed a good working relationship on the POW issue. However, this has been challenged in recent studies. See in particular Barbara Hately-Broad, *War and Welfare* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), pp.186-7.

[250] These figures are taken from the February 1944 edition of *Far East*, ('No.9, Park Place', *Far East*, February 1944). The figure of 44,000 is significantly lower than current estimates of approximately 50,000.

prisoners' letters. As we shall see below, the evidence suggests that although the most obvious propaganda was recognised and discounted, most of the reports and correspondence from the show camps were taken at face value as at least as offering a realistic, albeit incomplete, pictures of actual conditions.

One of the first reports to arrive in Britian was Egle's inspection of a civilian internment camp, Port Stanley, in Hong Kong. We have seen in chapter 1 that this delegate's correspondence was subjected to considerable doctoring by the Japanese. Such seems to have been the case with the report, which conveys a holiday camp existence and concludes with the words: 'I believe that ninety nine percent of the inmates, once the time comes for their liberation, will leave the camp with a profound feeling of thankfulness and respect for the Japanese people.' The Foreign Office response was to note that this was 'too good to be true'.[251] A cloud of suspicion thereafter hung over Egle in official circles until 1945, when the constraints he was operating under at last became fully known.

But the reports from the delegation in Japan contained nothing of Egle's effusiveness. They were written in sober, measured prose and contained criticisms: in particular they recorded the inadequacy of the prisoners' diet. Even the Keijo reports indicate dietary deficiencies, with the 1944 report noting that the prisoners felt their diet as 'greatly lacking in fat'.[252] Summaries of them were presented at monthly meetings at the War Office.[253] Their minutes record that the first telegraphic reports of Red Cross inspections were received in February 1943, and came from the show camps Zentsuji, Keijo, Jinsen and an unidentified location in Shanghai.[254] There is nothing in these or subsequent minutes to suggest that the veracity of the information given was ever called into question. Writing in 1950, Satow cites the reports from Japan, Manchuria, Formosa and Korea as evidence of the 'incomparably better conditions' in the northern areas.[255]

Prisoner correspondence was analysed at both the War Office and Foreign Office. The brevity and formulaic nature of the messages from most camps, often on pre-printed cards, coupled with knowledge of actual conditions in some of the areas the communications came from, led the government to suspect, rightly, that they were, in Eden's words, 'written in terms

[251] Cited in Caroline Moorehead, *Dunant's Dream*: *War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross* (London: Harper Collins, 1998), p.231.
[252] It should be emphasised that even though the inadequacies of the prisoner's diet or of medical supplies were sometimes noted, the reports nevertheless paint a vastly better picture than the reality.
[253] TNA WO/32/9890, Imperial Prisoner of War Sub Committee 'A', 'Summaries of actions taken in matters relating to Prisoners of War, 1941-45'.
[254] This is likely to be Kiangwan, where conditions were unusually good.
[255] Satow, *Work of the Prisoners of War Department*, p.32.

dictated by the Japanese'.[256] But government records indicate that the longer, freer letters from the show camps, bearing the imprint of the writer's personality, were regarded as valuable evidence of actual conditions. The fact that the Foreign Office sent its analyses of the letters to Geneva is further proof. In a covering note sent to Geneva with an analysis of mail received over the Christmas period in 1943 the author states: 'The details are of necessity of a sketchy nature, owing to the limited facilities granted to the prisoners, but an attempt has been made to draw as complete a picture as possible.'[257] The implication is that these letters were reliable sources. It also notes that most of the letters came from Korea, but does not offer the suggestion that Jinsen and Keijo might be untypical of conditions generally.

A further document sent to the ICRC, 'Information regarding Prisoners of War in the Far East, secured from a study of the Mail received from them in June and July 1944', again gives considerable attention to these camps.[258] Both analyses create a false picture: they suggest that 'health appears to be fully maintained', morale was high, and that the Keijo camp garden had produced about eight tons of vegetables in 1943. Although morale was reasonably high at Keijo, this was very far from the case at Jinsen, and the prisoners at Keijo saw little of their garden produce on their plates.[259]

From its analysis, the government formed two misconceptions: firstly, that the propaganda from camps like Keijo, Jinsen and Zentsuji gave an accurate picture of conditions; secondly, and more significantly, that these camps were representative of the FEPOW experience in northern areas as a whole. They are reflected in a speech by Eden to the House of Commons on 28 January 1944, reversing the government's policy of censorship and disclosing information regarding Japanese atrocities. Eden drew a distinction between northern and southern areas and told the House that the government was 'reasonably satisfied that conditions generally are tolerable' in the northern areas, which he defined as Hong Kong, Formosa, Shanghai, Korea and Japan itself.[260] Although Eden's carefully worded speech was far from a candid disclosure of all the government knew, or of how long it had been in possession of this knowledge, the geographical distinction he made was an accurate reflection of government perceptions.

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[256] Eden, Speech to House of Commons, Hansard, 28 January 1944.
[257] ACICR G 8/76 720/84, Prisoners of War Department, Foreign Office, 'Information regarding Prisoners of War in the Far East, secured from a study of the mail received from them at Christmastide, 1943'.
[258] ACICR G8/76 720/85, Prisoners of War Department, Foreign Office, 'Information regarding Prisoners of War in the Far East, secured from a study of the mail received from them in June and July,1944'.
[259] Toze was moved to Jinsen where he recorded that in comparison to Keijo, there was more sickness and morale was very low. Other diarists record low morale at the camp. (Toze, *Diaries*, Introduction.)
[260] Eden, Speech to House of Commons, Hansard

From this misconception arose yet another: from its analysis the government deduced that the abuses that occurred in the southern areas were due to rogue elements acting under their own initiative, unconstrained by central control. In the summer of 1943 the government acted on this belief and made a series of broadcasts to Tokyo to reveal the maltreatment of prisoners in the southern areas, at the same time taking great pains to ensure that the contents of the broadcasts were kept secret from the British public.[261] The hope was that these broadcasts would stir the more responsible authorities in the north to stem the abuses in outlying areas. Unsurprisingly, there is no evidence that these broadcasts had any effect whatsoever.

The same misconception was expressed, albeit in somewhat euphemistic terms, in an article in the August 1944 edition of *Far East*, a magazine produced by the Red Cross for FEPOW families. Under the heading 'The Mysterious Japanese', it suggested to its readers that 'Japanese commandants and guards in Malay and Siam, thousands of miles from any enlightened influences that may still remain in Japan, are less readily imbued with the idea of the humane treatment of prisoners.'

The idea persisted. In January 1945, the British Foreign Office Political Warfare (Japan) Committee minuted: 'There was evidence that prisoners of war in Japan itself and in the more accessible regions are treated reasonably well, according to Japanese standards, and that the reports of serious ill-treatment come from outlying areas where the Japanese government has little control over local military officers in charge of camps'.[262] We see then that although Japanese propaganda did not cast doubt over intelligence of atrocities, it confused the British government as to the pervasiveness of maltreatment and led it to formulate and enact a futile strategy in broadcasting to the Japanese people.

Dissemination of Information to the public

Between the Fall of Singapore and the beginning of 1944, public consciousness of the Pacific theatre was generally low.[263] But the relative indifference of the general public was counterpointed by the terrible anxiety of FEPOW families who were left in a state of agonising uncertainty for long periods; some did not hear news of family members taken prisoner until after the Japanese capitulation. This was principally due to the Huryojohokyoku's policy of

[261] Satow, *The Work of the Prisoners of War Department,* pp.101-3.
[262] TNA WO/203/5609, British Foreign Office Political Warfare (Japan) Committee, 'Minutes, January 1945.'
[263] See Angus Calder, *The People's War* (London: Panther, 1971), p.563; Christopher Thorne, *The Issue of War*: *States, Societies, and the Far Eastern Conflict of 1941-1945,* pp.118-126; Ian McLaine, *Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), pp.273-274; Ford, *The Pacific War,* p.183.

withholding information, but the problem was compounded by the British government's administrative failings, which we have noted. With responsibility divided between so many different departments, it was difficult to know which one to approach. In a chapter aptly entitled 'Nobody would Tell us Anything' Barbara Hately-Broad has argued that a consequence of this lack of news was the growth of voluntary and 'self-help' groups whose purpose was to pool news and offer emotional support.[264] One of these groups, The Prisoners of War Relatives Association, also lobbied the government for a single channel of communication for families.

Until January 1944, news of FEPOW atrocities was also suppressed by Allied governments. There were good reasons for this: to publicise atrocities might hinder negotiations for providing relief to the POWs or lead to reprisals. Silence also helped sustain morale and avoid what Harold Satow termed the 'fruitless worry and anxiety' that disclosures would provoke.[265] The resulting public outcry and call for action might also be damaging to the government's 'Germany first' policy

The policy held until January 1944, although news of atrocities committed on British POWs taken at Hong Kong leaked to the press in March 1942, when the government's hand was forced into making a statement in the House of Commons. This was the first official news of Japanese atrocities: the word would have carried a particular resonance for those with memories of the First World War and anti-German propaganda.

After the fall of Singapore the FEPOW families had heard nothing for several months, eventually receiving official letters reporting their family member 'missing' or 'missing believed dead'. Again, the word 'missing' would be charged with unwelcome connotations for those with memories of the previous conflict. Immediately on receiving this news about her only son, Captain Jesson's mother wrote him a letter, unsure if she was 'writing to a ghost'.[266] It provides an insight into the reaction which must have been felt by many thousands of parents: 'I have of course been down to the very utmost depths, which is only natural, and still dip pretty deep if I let my imagination go out of control'.[267] But Jesson's mother was relatively fortunate. She finally heard that her son was alive on 4 November 1942, twenty-two months after his capture. Comparatively speaking, this was a brief wait. Toze's parents, for example, did not learn of his fate until September 1943.[268] Some of the reports were inaccurate. It seems likely

[264] Barbara Hately-Broad, *War and Welfare*, chapter 5.
[265] Satow, *The Work of the Prisoners of War Department*, p.48.
[266] Quoted in David Tett, *A Postal History of Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees in East Asia during the Second World War*, vol. 6 (Bristol: Stuart Rossiter Trust Fund, 2002), p.108.
[267] Jesson and his divorced mother had an unusually close relationship: she had come to live with him when he became a medical student in London; after the war, when Jesson married, she moved in again, which in his daughter's account resulted in the breakdown of the marriage.
[268] Reported in *Exeter and Plymouth Gazette*, 20 September 1943.

that Lieutenant Baker had been reported 'missing believed dead' in confusion with another Loyals officer of the same surname who had been killed during the Malayan campaign. His brothers were so sure of his death that they divided his belongings amongst themselves, and as late as April 1945, his younger brother, Major Peter Baker, serving in the Western theatre, was still unaware that he was alive.[269] In another case, a wife whose husband had been reported dead thought she recognised him in one of the Keijo photographs published in the ICRC journal, and eventually her plea for more details reached the Japan delegation.

 v

Figure 55: Private collection. Lieutenant Baker, shortly after his return to England, November 1945.

Communications were so slow that in some cases reports of servicemen being alive and in captivity arrived in Britain after they had in fact died from Japanese maltreatment. Such was the tragic case of Gunner 'Tweet' Nightingale, whose parents first received news that he was alive in August 1943, when he had in fact died of spinal meningitis at Keijo the previous month.[270]

The public at last began to receive more reassuring news in 1943, when reports and letters from the camps began to be reported in Red Cross publications and in the media generally. But it was all Japanese propaganda. A report on FEPOWs appeared in the 8 August

[269] My father never mentioned this, but his brother, Major Peter Baker and half-brother Robert Buckingham Baker separately gave me this information in 1981 and 1982.
[270] News that he was alive and held at Keijo appeared in the *Bolton Argus*,15 August 1943.

1943 edition of a Scottish newspaper, *Sunday Post*, informing its readers that nothing definite was known about camps in Sumatra, Thailand, Borneo and Malaya, but nevertheless offering the reassuring news that conditions in camps in Japan, monotonous Korea and Hong Kong were 'pretty good generally. Not Ritzy, but bearable.' Although the diet was, the prisoners had sufficient food and in one camp they were allowed to keep hens and rabbits to supplement their diet. In another, the prisoners were let out for recreational walks. Keijo is the only camp mentioned by name: 'a one-time mill, surrounded by a wooden fence. Prisoners sleep sixty to a room on folding Japanese mattresses. They have sufficient blankets'.[271]

Such was the paucity of information that prisoners' letters and cards became news items. A significant number of them were from Keijo: on 28 May 1943, for example, the *Chelmsford Chronicle* reported that a Keijo prisoner, Private Saye, 'wished to be remembered to all Essex people' and that 'there was plenty of food and clothing, he was in excellent health and the climate was good.'[272] On 8 February 1944 the *Hull Daily Mail* carried a photograph of the first religious service at the camp, held in October 1942, enclosed in a letter sent by Sergeant Hillier:

> Sergeant Norman Hillier R.A., son-in-law of Police Sergeant Smith, of Welton Police Station, became a prisoner of war at the fall of Singapore in January,1942. Nothing was heard from him for some considerable time, his wife has now received four postcards and a letter from him. He is stationed at Keijo camp, Korea, with 190 British and Australian soldiers. He is very grateful for the British Red Cross Parcels he has received. [273]

The following day the photograph appeared on the front page of the national *Daily Mail*, where it was described as the first photograph of British prisoners in captivity in the Far East to be published in the country.[274] The claim was correct, although the *Daily Mail* did not tell its readers that it had in fact first been published several months earlier in *The Prisoner of War*, a British Red Cross publication for families of POWs. The magazine had published just two photographs of FEPOW camps at this date, both of Keijo. Undoubtedly, the photographs taken at the camp in 1942 were useful propaganda.

[271] *Sunday Post* 8 August 1943. 'Prisoners of the Japs: what it means'.
[272] *Chelmsford Chronicle* 28 May 1943.
[273] 'Photo of a Jap camp'. *Hull Daily Mail* 8 February1944.
[274] *Daily Mail*, 9 February 1944.

Figure 56: *Prisoner of War*, January 1944

Throughout the period the British Red Cross was in fact the main source of official information for the families of the prisoners. The organisation had set up an Enquiry section for POWs in conjunction with the Foreign Office in 1942. Following the fall of Singapore, a Far Eastern Correspondence and Enquiry Section was added. Family members could get in contact with the office by letter or telephone, or visit in person. The organisation also gave public talks across the country, where families could ask questions and pool information. It published two magazines which gave news about the prisoners and the efforts of the Red Cross and other bodies to supply aid and establish channels for correspondence.[275] First published in 1942, *Prisoner of War* contained little information about Far Eastern camps, and what little information it carried, such as the photograph of Keijo in its January 1944 edition, reproduced at Figure 51, was Japanese propaganda. In February 1944 another magazine, *Far East*, was launched specifically for the families of FEPOWs. This carried letters and reports from the camps, but again they were almost entirely Japanese propaganda. It should be emphasised however that there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the organisation *knowingly* carried propaganda. Its correspondence with ICRC requesting publicity photographs illustrates that

[275] The second of these, *Far East*, was first published in February 1944 in response to requests from FEPOW families. The fact that it first appeared just days after Eden's disclosures is suggestive, but there is no documentary evidence to connect the two events.

these images were sent from Geneva without any scepticism as to their veracity on either side.[276]

The talks given at public meetings by the Far East Section of the Red Cross were similarly coloured by Japanese propaganda. Despite its links with the Foreign Office, it had not been informed of Japanese atrocities. Barbara Hately-Broad has observed that the Red Cross had to tread a fine line between maintaining morale and giving families accurate information. [277] However, we can suggest that its ignorance of atrocities made the organisation more liable to cross that line. Knowledge of them would surely have tempered Red Cross optimism. In his report Satow later criticised the Red Cross for being over-anxious to provide reassurance 'without strict regard to accuracy'.[278] But his statement that his own organisation could not 'of course' share its intelligence with those responsible for informing the public is questionable.

Once Eden had divulged news of Japanese atrocities, the British Red Cross was heavily criticised for its previous overly-reassuring statements. A particularly notable instance relates to a speech given by the Controller of the British Red Cross Far East Section, Sidney G. King, to an audience of two thousand in October 1943. The *Liverpool Post* reported that he told his audience 'there is not a single authenticated case of atrocities in POW camps in Japan'. The newspaper report summarised his message: 'Treatment was considerate, but food could be improved. Morale was tremendously high'.[279]

The anger that such statements retrospectively caused once the truth was known is displayed in an exchange in the House of Commons shortly after Eden's disclosure. Conservative M.P Captain John Gammans asked Secretary of State for War, John Grigg, whether he was aware of what Sidney King had said about prisoners held 'by the Japanese', and whether this was based on all the information the Foreign Office possessed. When Grigg admitted that the organisation 'might not have been in possession of all the facts', the member for Witney, Sir Alfred Knox, added: 'Would it not be better for the Red Cross to keep their mouths shut?'[280] But the false comfort offered by King reflects the success of Japanese propaganda and the failings of government communication as much as it does King's over-eagerness to offer reassurances to his audience.

King's statement that there was no evidence of atrocities in Japan itself was in fact true insofar as information relating to British POWs was concerned. A more informed criticism of

[276] ACICR BG/87 *Correspondance*, Janvier-Avril 1944. Letter from Far East Section to British Red Cross, 12 March 1944.
[277] Barbara Hately-Broad, W*ar and Welfare*, p.156.
[278] Satow, *The Work of the Prisoners of War Department,* p.142.
[279] *Liverpool Post,* 11 October 1943.
[280]*Hansard*, 15 February 1944.

his speech was made by the Commander-in-Chief, India, General Auchinleck, who had read a Reuters report on King's speech and on 15 October 1943 sent an angry telegram to the War Office: 'While realising remarks were confined to Japan itself and did not refer to camps outside Japan I consider general impression conveyed is very far from truth and misleading, especially as only very small proportion of Allied prisoners held in Japan itself. In any case, it contrasts with American publicity regarding murder of American airmen in Japan'.[281]

The low level of public interest in the Japanese outside FEPOW families was temporarily replaced by widespread shock at Eden's revelations. The horrified response from the press was to denounce the Japanese as barbarians and sub-humans and to call for retribution on the whole of Japan after it had been defeated. In an article seething with anger the *Daily Express* declared: 'The bestiality of our other enemy commands the full hatred of all Englishmen. We shall avenge their deeds', whilst the *Daily Mail* told its readers: 'The Japanese have proved themselves a sub-human race. It is in that regard that they must in future be treated'.[282]

The impact the disclosures had on FEPOWs families is seen in a reader's anguished letter to the *Lincolnshire Guardian*:

> Who was responsible for giving the details of the atrocities over the wireless? Was it necessary to give our women folk such ghastly news, especially those whose men are prisoners in Japanese hands? Publish it in the Press, certainly – it should be made public. Our wives can discriminate as to what they read or leave unread in the papers. To make matters worse, Mr. Eden says nothing can be done about it, therefore we have the dreadful knowledge that the treatment will continue while those whose boys are in that theatre of war and are at present free carrying about with them the shattering thought of what will happen to them if they are taken prisoner.'[283]

Following the shock caused by the release of this knowledge, it is possible to argue that *Far East* served an unstated function in maintaining morale. In its first issue in February 1944 it stated that its aim was to pass on 'every scrap of information' it received about the Far Eastern prisoners, but it did not do so entirely. Although it did not ignore reports of maltreatment and atrocities, there is nevertheless a strong slant towards more positive news; its editorial tone is calm and, wherever possible, optimistic. Here, Japanese propaganda was useful for the British

[281] TNA, CAB/66/42/34. 'Publicity concerning Japanese Treatment of British Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees'.
[282] *Daily Express*, 30 January 1944; Daily Mail, 1 February 1944.
[283] *Lincolnshire Guardian*, 5 February 1944.

government, although neither side was aware of it. Each of the magazine's nine editions is full of propaganda in the form of staged photographs, prisoners' letters and manipulated camp reports.

Analysis of the mail published in a *Far East* magazine underlines the significance of the letters from the show camps, particularly Jinsen and Keijo. The principal criterion for publication was that the letters should appear to be spontaneously written. Of the 108 letters from FEPOWs that it published, ten came from Keijo and eight from Jinsen, only Zentsuji being more fully represented with 12 letters.

The example reproduced below in Figure 57 is typical of the correspondence pages in that the longer letters are from the show camps, in this case Formosa and Korea. The illustration is also representative of all the editions in that it offers a picturesque image of a camp location, rendering the unknown more assimilable. The caveat at the bottom left of the page reminds readers that most of the correspondence comes from the northern areas, but perhaps significantly, does not spell out that ninety percent of the prisoners were held in the southern areas and that the more spontaneous letters only came from a very small percentage of the total number of camps known to the Allies in the northern areas.

The official reports are likewise tainted by Japanese distortions. Every one of the summaries carried in its first edition came from show camps: Keijo and Jinsen, Mukden, Zentsuji and Kiangwan. A more detailed and equally misleading report from Keijo also appeared in the May 1945 edition.

Figure 57: Letters page, *Far East* January 1945.

Figure 58: Summaries of camp reports from Keijo and Jinsen, *Far East*, February 194

As we have seen, the reports and photographs published in *Far East* were all received from Geneva. At this period, the ICRC had acquired a particularly strong moral authority under Max Huber's presidency, and a reputation for the impartiality and accuracy of its reporting.

This reputation would have added greatly to the credibility of this material. It is necessary then to consider whether the organisation was at fault in publishing and disseminating propaganda. Satow criticised them for this in strong terms:

> A Japanese attempt to refute the serious and entirely true charges against them regarding their treatment of prisoners of war was to provide, in January 1944, the ICRC delegate at Tokyo with photographs, alleged to have been taken in prisoner of war camps in Netherlands East Indies.
>
> The International Committee of the Red Cross at Geneva very foolishly published some of these in their periodical, to our great annoyance and embarrassment. As we pointed out to them, this action was all the more dangerous because the photographs had not been taken by ICRC representatives themselves. The result was an assurance that there would be no repetition of the offence.[284]

The photographs Satow refers to are in fact stills from the film *Calling Australia*. They include the photograph of the kitchen of the *Hotel des Indes*, reproduced in Chapter 1 at Figure 20, and other images featuring healthy-looking prisoners working in a camp garden, reproduced below at Figure 59, and attending a religious service and an out-door-concert, which raises the larger questions of whether the organisation's judgement was at fault, or that it acquiesced too easily in Japanese exploitation.

Figure 59: Still from *Calling Australia*, reproduced in *Far East*

The role of the ICRC

We have seen in chapter 1 that Geneva was aware that its reports were being distorted and exploited for propaganda by the Japanese. At a meeting on 14 March 1944 a decision was

[284] Satow, *The Work of the Prisoners of War Department*, p.147.

made to ask the Japanese government to ensure that when its delegates' reports were published, they were quoted accurately. Shortly thereafter the decision was rescinded for fear of compromising successful results from other more important issues.[285] We see in this reversal the pragmatic, cautious approach characteristic of the organisation, especially during the 1930s. Like their delegates, they were concerned with getting aid to the prisoners, and were willing to bend their principles to achieve this. But it might also be suggested that their approach also illustrates a certain timidity which critics have seen as a characteristic of the organisation's dealings with the Nazi party and earlier with the Mussolini regime's breaches of international law in Abyssinia in the last decade.

The ICRC's awareness that the Japanese were distorting its reports for propaganda appears to have had no effect on the readiness with which they published photographs and reports received from the Far East, nor in forwarding them to the British Red Cross for publicity purposes. By publishing the photographs it was in fact breaking its own guidelines. In 1943 Geneva had sent the Japan delegation a letter encouraging them to send photographs of the camps where possible, as they were greatly valued by the belligerent nations.[286] However, the letter stipulated that all photographs had to be taken in the presence of an inspector to guarantee their veracity. Most of the covering letters that accompanied photographs forwarded to Geneva, such as the one from delegate Max Pestalozzi reproduced below, make it quite plain that they had been received from the Huryojohokyoku: there is no suggestion that an independent witness had been present when the photographs were taken.

The images themselves invite scepticism: the kitchen of the luxury hotel in Java, which the ICRC captioned as a camp cookhouse, shows facilities far superior to any described in the reports. The faked scenes from the Formosa camps, published by the ICRC in 1945, are entirely unrepresentative of what the ICRC knew of conditions generally. Moreover, there was no necessity to publish these photographs: it was an active choice on the part of the ICRC. It can be observed that ICRC Inspector Maurice Rossel took 36 photographs of scenes at Theresienstadt, but the ICRC chose not to publish them, or any images of concentration camps at all, before they were liberated.[287]

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[285] 'Nous le prions de veiller à ce que les rapports de nos délégués, lorsqu'ils sont cités, soient reproduits de façon exacte.' Later, the decision was reversed : 'Il ne faudrait pas, en effet, risquer de compromettre, par une telle démarche, le résultat favorable qui pourrait être donné à d'autres questions plus importantes'. Quoted in Laurent, 'Les Obstacles', Annex 22.

[286] ACICR, G8/76 Correspondance janvier-mars, 1943.

[287] For a discussion of these photographs, see Sébastien Farreé and Yan Schubert, 'L'illusion de l'objectif. Le délégué du CICR Maurice Rossel et les Photgraphies de Theresienstadt', *Le Mouvement Social*, No. 227 (April–June 2009), pp.65-83.

Unfortunately, the archives do not hold information about the ICRC's policies for its journals at this time. However, it is hard to conceive of extenuating factors which could remove blame on this issue entirely. By publishing them it weakened the Allies' hand in complaining about the abuses which it was the ICRC's role to alleviate.

Figure 60 : ACICR G8/76 Correspondance, Juin-Septembre 1944. Letter from Delegate Pestalozzi, 12 July.

Summary

Although Japanese propaganda did not cast doubt on the atrocity stories which reached the Allies, it nevertheless succeeded in confusing both the British government and the ICRC as to the ubiquity of Japanese maltreatment of its prisoners. But its propaganda also unwittingly aided the government's 'Germany first' policy. *Far East* magazine offers the interesting phenomenon of Japanese propaganda being transmuted into British government propaganda.

The effects on FEPOW families were wholly negative. The Huryojohokyoku's policy of withholding capture information meant that the families lived in a state of prolonged and agonising uncertainty. The propaganda materials which appeared in the media succeeded in offering illusory comfort, which later made the disclosure of atrocities the more devastating for some. Letters, reports, and photographs from Keijo all played a significant role in shaping both government and public perceptions. This role has never hitherto been recognised, but as we have seen, is significant enough to merit investigation.

Conclusion

This study has illustrated the significance of Keijo's propaganda function as part of Japanese POW propaganda strategies. Although de Groen and Kovner have recognised its significance, this is the first detailed examination of that function. The multitude of previously unused primary sources I have employed offer a picture of Keijo which substantially differs from previous accounts. As we have seen, there is a great deal of evidence to challenge de Groen and Kovner's suggestion that facilities at the camp were generally satisfactory and that the regime was characterised by benignity.

But I have also argued for a wider significance. In chapters 1 and 2 I have argued that a more co-ordinated approach to POW propaganda existed than has previously been recognised. As part of the argument I have examined the Huryojohokyoku and suggested that it played a hitherto unrecognised role in orchestrating POW propaganda and manipulating the ICRC's Japan delegation.

In chapter 3 I have examined the reception and response to this propaganda in Britain. In his popular history of the Pacific War, Max Hastings has stated that the British government's belief that conditions were better in the northern area was based on 'wishful thinking'.[288] I have illustrated that it was in fact based on Japanese propaganda. As far as I am aware, this has never previously been suggested. My discussion of the propaganda photographs which appeared in the ICRC's monthly journals and the British Red Cross magazines *Prisoner of War* and *Far East* also offers new insights into how and where these images were created and transmitted to Europe. My discussion also raises new questions about the ICRC's judgement in publishing propaganda photographs whose provenance they could not vouch for.

I have also suggested that the greater understanding Japanese POW propaganda which this dissertation offers may be valuable in assessing, or re-assessing, conditions at other Japanese POW camps. At the least, it may invite a greater scepticism towards academic articles which claim to see evidence of Japanese beneficence or humanity. Both de Groen and Kovner in fact unwittingly demonstrate the prolonged after-life of the propaganda we have been discussing. De Groen tells us that conditions were better in the northern areas and Kovner ponders

[288] Max Hastings, *Nemesis: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45* (London: Collins, 2007), p.374.

what conditions might have been like in ‘outlying areas’ if senior Japanese officials had exercised more sway, her implication being that they would have been far better. It is also evident in Henling Wade’s description of Noguchi as an ‘honourable man’, and his insinuations about Paravicini.

To conclude, it is hoped that this dissertation offers new insights on this topic and also raises questions of wider relevance to those interested in Far Eastern incarceration and the roles of the Huryojohokyoku and the ICRC during the Pacific War.

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