



Kent Academic Repository

Malksoo, Maria (2019) *The Normative Threat of Subtle Subversion: The Return of 'Eastern Europe' as an Ontological Insecurity Trope*. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32 (3). pp. 365-383. ISSN 0955-7571.

Downloaded from

<https://kar.kent.ac.uk/71578/> The University of Kent's Academic Repository KAR

The version of record is available from

<https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1590314>

This document version

Author's Accepted Manuscript

DOI for this version

Licence for this version

UNSPECIFIED

Additional information

Versions of research works

Versions of Record

If this version is the version of record, it is the same as the published version available on the publisher's web site. Cite as the published version.

Author Accepted Manuscripts

If this document is identified as the Author Accepted Manuscript it is the version after peer review but before type setting, copy editing or publisher branding. Cite as Surname, Initial. (Year) 'Title of article'. To be published in *Title of Journal*, Volume and issue numbers [peer-reviewed accepted version]. Available at: DOI or URL (Accessed: date).

Enquiries

If you have questions about this document contact ResearchSupport@kent.ac.uk. Please include the URL of the record in KAR. If you believe that your, or a third party's rights have been compromised through this document please see our [Take Down policy](https://www.kent.ac.uk/guides/kar-the-kent-academic-repository#policies) (available from <https://www.kent.ac.uk/guides/kar-the-kent-academic-repository#policies>).

The Normative Threat of Subtle Subversion: The Return of ‘Eastern Europe’ as an Ontological Insecurity Trope

Abstract

A combination of undemocratic developments in Hungary and Poland and the eastern Europeans’ foot-dragging about solidary burden-sharing at the height of the refugee crisis in Europe has brought back the familiar allusions of eastern Europeans as troublemakers for the European unity and peace. This article offers a discursive dissection of ‘eastern Europe’ as a subtly subversive challenge to Europe’s security of ‘self’, entailing a fear of being overrun by an ‘Other’ perceived as endangering one’s particular normative and cultural order. Proceeding from Ingrid Creppell’s (2011) notion of normative threat, I argue that the reappearance of ‘eastern Europe’ as an ontological insecurity trope points at a set of deeper anxieties within Europe, some of which are systemic (doubts about the efficacy of integration and the legitimacy of the European Union) and some more contingent (vacillation about defending the European political order from populist upsurge amidst ‘resurgent nationalism’).

Keywords: normative threat; ontological (in)security; eastern Europe; Poland; Hungary; liminality; illiberal democracy; populism

Introduction

The more things change, the more they stay the same. On surface, the post-Cold War evolutionary curve from the high hopes of thoroughly transforming the formerly Soviet-bound east European region to the re-emergence of anxiety about certain Central-East European states' subtle subversion of the European order and way of life has been nothing short of extraordinary. A combination of undemocratic developments in Hungary and Poland and a general lack of enthusiasm of the east Europeans for solidary burden-sharing at the height of the refugee/migration crisis in Europe have brought back the familiar tropes of eastern Europeans as 'not quite like us' – as cunning schemers and adamant nationalists for some, and troublemakers for the European unity and peace for others. In various guises, 'eastern Europe' has reappeared as a challenge to the European normative order and the EU's sense of security.

Why is this happening? What makes eastern Europe a particular cause for concern amongst the many travails the EU is currently facing (or only just beginning to recover from), such as the Eurocrisis, migration surge and the related solidarity crisis, the rise of far right and populist politics throughout Europe, and Brexit? This article grapples with the return of the mimetic wall between 'eastern Europe' and 'Europe' by way of thinking through the relationship between ontological security (OS)/insecurity (OIS), normative threats, and liminality. Spelling out the linkages between these notions, I seek to contribute to a more refined empirical understanding of the operational logic, patterns of occurrence, and ethico-political consequences of normative threat depictions in action. I do so via poststructuralist discourse analysis, drawing on Hansen's (2006) model of linking and differentiation in the study of identity formation through canvassing the pertinent political, academic and media debates.

The argument about the return of 'eastern Europe' as an OIS trope makes three points. First, the 'problem with eastern Europe' highlights the cross-pollination within the proposed conceptual triangle. The concept of OS, or a sense of confidence or trust about the basic

existential parameters of self and social identity (Giddens 1984, 375), and its mirror notion of OIS, are synergistic with the notion of normative threat, defined as ‘a promise of harm to the political body through defiance of basic principles of order and right that constitute one’s group’ (Creppell 2011, 450). Normative threats jeopardize the established conceptions of self and the world, promising to dislocate the moral self-affirmation of a community, disturb its existing routines and undermine the trust within. They are thus particularly potent generators of OIS as a state of uncertainty about one’s identity and place in the world, leading to an upset sense of agency. Liminality as an in-between condition which entails challenges both for the figures and groups suspended in the transitional state and those defining the boundaries of the ‘normal state’ and the transition thereof (Horvath et al 2015) adds a further critical nuance to our understanding of the functioning of political communities and the normative orders they seek to sustain. Through their anti-structural qualities and order-upending potential, liminal groups illuminate the limits and contradictions of a structure currently in place (Rumelili 2012, 496; Turner [1969] 1995). Liminal actors are thus by definition ontologically upsetting for the guardians of the existing order.¹ I suggest that the conflict of values between the liberal EU mainstream and certain Central-East European populist governments and ideologues, unapologetically focused on their national sovereignty and values, appears to be particularly disturbing for the EU’s positive sense of self precisely for the normative challenge’s emergence *from within* the cohort of ‘new Europeans’, now evidently rebelling against their designated position of meek converts into the liberal inclusionary norms of the EU convention. The main

¹ As compellingly captured by Mária Schmidt, a vociferous defender of the Orbán’s version of democracy in Hungary, in the following quote: ‘While [the western half of Europe] see[s] themselves as being able to integrate millions of Muslim migrants, they are unable to even tolerate us, who – like them – have been socialized within the Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian traditions. They consider “the other” to be beautiful, but we are too similar to them to be beautiful, and are unable to rise to their “progressive” standards.’ (Schmidt 2018, 262).

fronts of the discursive battleground of the unfolding European *Kulturkampf* (cf. Trencsényi 2014) include, on the one side, the official bespeakers of Europe (e.g., European Parliament 2016, 2017; Venice Commission 2017; Timmermans 2018), EU federalists (e.g., Verhofstadt 2017b), and the anti-populists² of various feathers; academic critics of illiberal models of governance in Central-East Europe (e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele and Jan-Werner Müller of Princeton University); mainstream West European media and popular icons,³ all highly critical of the ‘brand of Europe’ propounded by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Poland’s Jaroslaw Kaczynski. On the other, there are the ideological explicators and mnemonic warriors of the latter ‘discourse circle’ (cf. Elder-Vass 2011, 10), voicing their pro-nation, anti-EU, anti-Muslim immigration sentiments (e.g., Schmidt 2015, 2018) in conjunction with the liberal free speech campaigners, seeking to serve as sympathetic interpreters in this supposed ‘act of miscommunication’ between the two sides (whilst accusing the West European states/the EU of double standards vis-à-vis the east) (e.g., Furedi 2018, 3).

Second, the return of ‘eastern Europe’ as a normative threat marks the reactivation of a well-sedimented framework of intelligibility regarding the region (cf. Laclau 2014; Nabers 2015). This is demonstrated by a concise cut into the shifting scripts of eastern Europe from the early post-Cold War era to the recent recurrence of popular connotations of eastern European countries with the normative breaches of, or the looming potential to, profoundly

² Albeit populism could be regarded as ‘the ultimate essentially contested concept’ (Kinnvall, this issue), its core characteristics are generally taken to include a revolt against the ruling elites, anti-pluralism, and a moral claim to represent ‘the people’ (Müller 2016c). It is the latter that appears as most abrasive for the democratic credentials of the European polity, as the populists commonly criticize the un-accountability and technocratic, rather than politically representative and visionary nature of governance by the EU (cf. Browning, this issue).

³ <http://hungarytoday.hu/news/u2-frontman-bono-blasts-hyper-nationalist-hungary-poland-existential-threat-europe-98661> (accessed 15 August 2018).

endanger the European order *in spe*. The convergence of eastern Europe's historically liminal position in Europe's self-definition with the growth of populist-nationalist politics in the region amplifies the power of the socially and politically perceived normative threat in question.

Third, and relatedly, 'normative threat eastern Europe' brings to bear on the topic of populism the nostalgia for a past state of the European community as a more tight-knit and unreservedly 'Western' affair (cf. Steele, this issue). Populism is generally depicted as an eroding force of the normative essence of the contemporary European polity for its targeting of liberal democratic membership norms (Thomas 2017). Curiously, eastern Europeans concurrently emerge as the objects of populist politics⁴ and as the embodiments of populism, depicting non-native elements as fundamentally threatening to the nation-state. They are thus widely held responsible for generating the moral panic related to the most recent migration/refugee crisis in Europe (Walker and Gyori 2018; see Furedi 2018 and Schmidt 2018 for examples).

Yet, as David Runciman quips, '[j]ust because democracies have been guilty of crying wolf in the past doesn't mean there is no wolf out there' (2018, 317). Let me thus stress at the outset what I am *not* arguing here: I do not seek to placate valid concerns and criticism about the unreeling of central democratic principles and values in Hungary and Poland (such as infringements on the separation of powers, the rule of law, media and academic freedom, and civil society organization in recent years). Nor do I wish to mollify the questionable record of Visegrád states in contributing to the constructive handling of the refugee/migration crisis in Europe.⁵ Instead, my aim is to highlight how the developments in the empirical reality of

⁴ As in the context of Brexit, and the broader European debates displaying fear and aversion toward the phantom figure of the 'Polish plumber' as a symbol of West European welfare chauvinism (cf. Noyes 2018).

⁵ Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia refused to participate in the relocation scheme of the asylum-seekers conceived by the EU at the height of the migration/refugee crisis in 2015, rejecting the European

eastern Europe are widely read through an interpretive lens of an embedded socio-cultural resource (or a discursive structure) about what ‘eastern Europe’ allegedly stands for.

The argument unfolds in four parts. I begin by dissecting the ternary of normative threats, ontological (in)security and liminality. I suggest that the two sub-types of Creppell’s (2011) notion of normative threat – transgression (prompting grievance) and subversion (eliciting insecurity for a fear of being overrun by an ‘Other’ perceived as endangering one’s particular normative and cultural order) – are particularly illuminating for understanding the contemporary east European predicament. The next section illustrates the main features of the discourse depicting eastern Europe as a normative challenge to the EU with reference to important academic and policy works in the field, along with illustrations from the EU’s political discourse and the related debates in the media. Normative threats function as harbingers of dreaded change in the accustomed ways of life and expectations about the rules governing relationships within a community (Creppell 2011, 455). Hungary’s and Poland’s challenge to liberal democracy as a constitutive *norm* of the European community and the Visegrád states’ distinct takes on solidarity as a core *value* of the EU in the context of handling the migration surge are key moments here. A concise retrospective of ‘eastern Europe’ as a subtle normative challenge to the EU’s security of self from the 1990s to the contemporary era follows suit. The conclusion sums up the main implications of the argument presented here and suggests some further research perspectives.

A promise of harm: unpacking the relationship between normative threats, ontological (in)security and liminality

Commission’s mandatory quotas designed to distribute asylum-seekers in a solidary manner between the EU member states.

Normative threats refer to understanding the threat experience as beyond physical material damage, as ‘promises of destruction to something essential about one’s group or nation’ (Creppell 2011, 452). According to Creppell (2011, 450),

perceptions of threat emerge and carry a heightened emotional and moral energy when basic features of a political body’s normative order appear to be at stake... /--/. Normative order comprises a set of principles citizens believe to be necessary for the functioning, justifiability, and indeed ‘reality’ of their political body.

Based on the premise that ‘[h]umans care as much about losing their particularistic forms of existence as they care about death itself’ (Creppell 2011, 455), the notion of normative threat intrinsically resonates with that of OIS. While OS refers to a condition underpinning the actor’s agency and a sense of continuity in the world (Mitzen 2006a; Steele 2008), OIS signifies the relative lack of the former, indicating a state of disruption and the related inability of collectives to ‘sustain a linear narrative and answer questions about doing, acting and being’ (Kinnvall and Mitzen 2017, 7). Normative threats explicitly disturb an actor’s ‘security as being’ (Giddens 1991) by generating anxiety and portending harm for their potential to introduce an alternative (and possibly potent) order (Creppell 2011, 471). Due to their hypothetical power to unsettle a particular order (be it internal or external, retrospective or prospective) (Creppell 2011, 470-473), normative threats have a distinctly OIS-generating clout. Normative threats emerge and are dreaded precisely for their promise to upend something fundamental holding a specific political body together, along with dislocating terms of relationships among that polity and its counterparts in the world at large (Creppell 2011, 484). As per Creppell (2011), the promise of normative breach can manifest in three principal modes: transgression, subversion, and abomination, triggering the sensations of grievance, insecurity, and indignant aversion in

the danger-detecting community, respectively. Transgression of a normative order threatens to betray the shared expectations, or the implicit and/or explicit norms on the basis of which the said order operates (Creppell 2011, 475-479). Subversion pertains to the anxieties about the sustainability of a habitual way of life in face of someone or something alien to one's self, with a looming onset of an unfamiliar and undesirable order (Creppell 2011, 479-481). It encapsulates a fear of infiltration, closely resonating with a vulnerability in one's self (Creppell 2011, 482). Abomination, in turn, is the type of normative threat challenging the basic background assumptions about the proper parameters of human conduct more generally. It is therefore not limited to one's own immediate political community, pertaining to the ground norms of human behaviour instead (Creppell 2011, 481-484). As the concise discursive dissection will demonstrate in the next section, the former two types of normative threat – transgression and subversion – are central for understanding the return of 'eastern Europe' as a manifold source of OIS in recent years.

The historically liminal position of eastern Europe in the political imaginaries of those who have traditionally enjoyed a sense of entitlement to speak and act in the name of Europe has provided a hospitable soil for the wide reading of the recent developments in Central-East Europe through the prism of normative threat for the European project of democracy, unity, and peace. As Victor Turner ([1969] 1995), 108-109) showed in his study of the Ndembu rites, the custodians of the current structure are by definition wary of the transgressive and order-transcending potential of the liminal communities. Liminality is therefore not just another tag for marginal, borderline or hybrid actors, spaces and states of being/transitioning, but an important conceptual lens for illuminating the constitution of social order of international politics more generally (Rumelili 2012; Mälksoo 2012). The ongoing contestation between structure and liminality ('where social structure seeks to domesticate liminality by positioning it in one of the pre-given identity categories, and liminality continues to subvert those very

categories by presenting the possibility of an in-between existence’) serves as a continuous reminder of the limits and contradictions of structure (Rumelili 2012, 496). Liminal groups are hence innately challenging for the extant structure/order and its (self-appointed) guardians as liminal actors embody the possibility of transgressing the norms governing the current structure in place (Turner [1969] 1995, 128). They highlight the existing order’s limits and constraints (Turner [1969] 1995, 167) and entail a promise of an alternative order. Crisis and social change do not just ‘represent the manifestation of power relations’ (Nabers 2015, 195), but also bring forth the opportunity of the reversal of the present relations by unravelling rather than reproducing the existing structure/order.

Historically, eastern Europe has been constituted as ‘less-Europe’, rather than ‘anti-Europe’ or ‘non-Europe’ (cf. Rumelili 2012, 498). The region’s relative incongruence with the European standards, norms and expectations of behaviour and governance has accordingly been deemed a subject of socialization. The post-Cold War ‘Europeanization’ of eastern European states via their integration into the European political and security structures, particularly the EU, emerged as the attempted domestication of the historical east European liminality by repositioning eastern Europeans in one of the existing social categories available (i.e. ‘normal Europe’ and ‘Europeans’) (Mälksoo 2010; cf. Rumelili 2012, 498-504). The processes of domestication by the West(ern European states) and self-domestication by the eastern European states themselves effectively sought to reproduce the social order of Europe. The clear juxtaposition by some eastern European states of themselves against the constitutive norms and values of the EU in recent years (such as the consolidation of ‘illiberal democracy’ in Hungary or the infringements of the separation of powers in Poland, along with the recent introduction of the highly controversial Holocaust-complicity negation law) demonstrates the subversive potential of liminal actors: their embracing of their difference (‘ambiguity and in-betweenness’; Rumelili 2012, 504) in a way that is provoking the current structure (that is, the

normative order underpinning the EU community). Admittedly, the incomplete and contested nature of European integration makes the EU's normative wholeness by definition an aspiration rather than a fully materialized empirical reality. The EU's proneness to OIS and its sensitivity towards normative threats is a multi-level problem due to the sui generis nature of the Union. Logically, it should be explored on multiple levels of analysis, ranging from the EU as a supranational civic and legal order to its member states, societies and individuals therein (cf. Rumelili 2018). Importantly, the Central-East European apologists of illiberal democracy do not negate Europe, but posit a distinct vision of it with an emphasis on 'organic' national communities, Christian tradition, and national/popular sovereignty. Their scorn of multiculturalism, minority rights, and disdain of Europe's 'culture of victimhood' (i.e. the EU's alleged inability 'to stand up for its own values, way of life and culture'; Schmidt 2018, 61-62) goes against the grain of the ideal-type depiction of the EU's normative order with the rule of law, respect for civil liberties, human and minority rights, gender equality, multiculturalism and minority cultures, multi-level governance and relatively liberal forms of representative government at its heart (cf. Bideleux 2015, 24). Instead of the EU-enshrined values of pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, and solidarity (no matter how skewed in reality), the emphasis of the Central-East European populists is brazenly on the securitization of their 'national selves', traditions and values – a fictional idea of the homogenous and authentic 'past self'.

While the Brexit referendum on the UK's membership in the EU has generated a fair share of dread and ontological anxiety for the 'Remainers' (Browning 2018) and the EU alike (Mogherini 2016); and the anti-establishment, exclusionary parties have been even more significantly on the rise in West European states compared to their post-communist counterparts, populist mobilizations in the traditionally liminal states of Central-East Europe still affront the liberal normative consensus underpinning the EU with particular poignance. In

part, this is due to Britain's commitment to the European project having always been half-hearted and the EU's dealing with the separation process consequently rather matter-of-factly, and the nationalist parties in the heart of the EU having yet to reach the kind of power Fidesz and PiS are enjoying in Hungary and Poland. Above all, the conflicting perspectives on sovereignty (national and popular) and the distinct takes on tradition and the past between some Central-East European states and the EU (Furedi 2018, 9) flag the inconsistencies in the post-Cold War self-congratulatory narrative of the Union as a successful promoter of democracy, an efficient socializer of east European 'students' into an inclusionary liberal norm-set, and the bold unifier of the continent thereof. Central-East European backlash to the perceived post-nationalist, cosmopolitan, and federalist agendas of the European elites (cf. Auer 2010) disturbs the foundational myth of the Union which depicts European integration as the result of an aspiration to overcome nationalism in order to ensure the stability and security of the continent (Della Sala 2016). Whereas the EU's autobiographical myth is 'breaking with the past' (Della Sala 2018), this is understood as 'one of embarrassed alienation', and juxtaposed to the east Europeans' 'respect' towards the past in Hungary (Furedi 2018, 81). The EU's conception of European identity and solidarity based on an ethical self-distancing of the continent's nationalist legacies stands in sharp contrast with the pride and primary affiliation found in national pasts in certain Central-East European states. The resurgent nationalism is deemed dangerous for Europe not only for the polarizing and exclusionary effects for democratic politics, but also for the potentially more intense and captivating affective basis such alternative vision of the European identity proffers.⁶ Nationalist assurance of a more organic and cohesive community might be a fantasy, but it nonetheless promises a hotter emotional attachment to people and hence remains unsettling for the cooler type of solidaristic belonging the EU has on

⁶ I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer on pushing me on that point.

offer.

In all, the discourse of east European transgression and subversion of the European norms and values and the related political developments in the region have contributed to the reappearance of ‘eastern Europe’ as a threat-trope for the liberal European normative order, pointing at a set of deeper anxieties within the EU, some of which are systemic (doubts about the efficacy of integration and the legitimacy of the Union) and some more contingent (vacillation about defending the European political order from populist upsurge) (cf. Müller 2016b).

‘Eastern Europe Goes South’⁷

In recent years, the problem of ‘east Europeanness’ as a problem of difference within the European polity has returned with gusto. This problem, described tongue-in-cheek by an Estonian writer and conservative columnist as a PITA-problem for Europe (Mutt 2016, 13) appears in two main modalities: *first*, as an already materialized harm (and the looming promise of further damage) in Hungary’s and Poland’s violation of democratic rules of the game; and *second*, as a threat of a retroactive normative order returning and thus endangering the present ‘self’ of Europe (as exemplified by the reluctance to accepting refugees and the alleged general xenophobia in eastern European countries). Cumulatively, the normative threat of eastern Europe is purportedly jeopardizing liberal democracy as a constitutive norm and solidarity as an underlying value of the European community. This section will unfold these facets of constructing eastern Europe as a normative threat along with their related emotional prompts in turn.

⁷ The sub-title is borrowed from the eponymic article by Müller in *Foreign Affairs* (2014).

Transgressing democracy

Among general concerns about the ‘unravelling’ of the post-1989 liberal order (Krastev 2016b), there are particularly acute worries about ‘disappearing democracy in the EU’s newest members’ (Müller 2014). Jan-Werner Müller describes the accompanying feeling as ‘Central Europe [] living 1989 in reverse’, as ‘a new Authoritarian International’ is emerging in the region (Müller 2016a). Scholars ruminate whether Hungary⁸ and Poland⁹ should be regarded as solidifying illiberal democracies, or even emerging examples of hybrid regimes – as new paragons of competitive authoritarianism, wherein free and fair elections are combined with considerable restraints on the separation of powers (the independence of judiciary, media, and civic unions), the rule of law, opposition, and civil liberties (Levitsky and Way, 2010).¹⁰ Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s policies certainly meet three of the four key indicators of authoritarian behaviour, as developed by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018, 21-24): the rejection of (or weak commitment to) democratic rules of the game; denial of the legitimacy of political opponents, and readiness to curtail liberties of opponents, including media. Levitsky and Ziblatt identify both Hungary (post-May 2010) and Poland (post-November 2015) as ‘mildly authoritarian’ (2018, 188). Béla Greskovits takes distinct note of the ‘hollowing’ (or declining popular involvement) and ‘backsliding’ of democracy (that is, destabilization and reverting to semi-authoritarian practices) in East Central Europe (Greskovits 2015, 28). The European Parliament has expressed explicit concern about the ‘danger to democracy, human

⁸ On Hungary’s illiberal turn, see further Tóth (2012); Verluise (2012); Lendvai (2012); Müller (2012); Fletcher (2017).

⁹ See Ost (2016).

¹⁰ For discussion, see Isaac (2017). See further Müller (2016a), who argues against the murky notion of ‘illiberal democracy’ in the cases of Hungary and Poland, preferring the descriptor of ‘populist authoritarianism’ instead. For a broader debate about the intricacies of the democracy-liberalism nexus, see Berman (2017).

rights and the rule of law' in Poland in relation to the PiS government's manoeuvres to gain control of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the autonomy of the judges (European Parliament 2016), thus effectively threatening the politicization of the court system in Poland (Grabbe and Lehne 2017). Poland's and Hungary's transgression of the EU rules of the game has evoked palpable grievance of 'the dream is over'-kind, as once celebrated democratic transition success stories are now considered 'at the forefront of the movement toward illiberal democracy' (Mounk, 2016).

The concern is not only about eastern Europe 'going South' (Müller 2014), but the disturbing trend of detaching democracy from the commitment to liberal values is regarded as potentially fateful for the viability of the liberal democratic model of governance and, by consequence, the EU as a whole. A fear of a slippery slope is evident throughout the manifold academic, policy and media debates: this 'clear threat to democracy at the heart of the European Union' (Cormaic 2017) in Poland's and Hungary's defiance of the rule of law and legally binding decisions of the EU is deemed to present 'a risk of contagion' for the EU, along with the threat of the latter's loss of 'cohesion' and 'external clout' (Grabbe and Lehne 2017; Cooper 2017; Uitz 2018). Specifically, the EU is 'in threat' over pressuring the academic freedom in the Central European University's case and the treatment of asylum-seekers in Hungary (BBC 2017). Hungary's 'assault on academic freedom is a threat to European principles' (Lyer 2017; see also Timmermans 2017); indeed, 'to freedom everywhere' (Botstein et al 2017). As Europe's inner boundaries are marked by the extent of liberal democracy and the rule of law (Müller 2013), Orbán's populist experiment is perceived as challenging the 'moral core of the European project' (Müller 2015). Thus the grim warning that 'the Western liberal order's apparent collapse in 2016 could turn out to be yet another historic upheaval that began in Eastern Europe' (Kisilowski 2017). Two uncomfortable questions underpin this thread of the debate, detecting the anxiety of being subverted by the 'illiberal other' and thus going to the

heart of the EU's vision of its self. First, has the Union actually fulfilled its democracy-building promise with acceding the post-communist states (or what exactly went wrong) (Krastev 2016a, 36)? Secondly, is the EU in fact equipped with proper legal and political instruments to intervene in case its members are undermining the Union's functioning principles in practice? (cf. Müller 2014) The Union's apparent caution in applying the sanctioning mechanism of its punishment clause of Article 7 of the Treaty of the EU to Hungary and Poland is evocative in that regard.

Some find a quantum of solace in the assertion that in the east European case, 'there has never been much to hollow out in the first place' (Greskovits 2015, 30). Dawson and Hanley (2016, 23), for instance, regard East-Central Europe's democratic consolidation 'as having always been somewhat illusory'. Views are further divided about the particularly east European versus a more universal nature of the current democratic malaise. For some, illiberal norms have long cohabited with liberal ones in the political centre ground across the East-Central-Europe, recently overpowering the former (Dawson and Hanley 2016, 23). For others, the upsurge of illiberalism in the region is less about weak elite commitment to the values of liberal democracy and more about a genuine failure of liberalism to deliver (Krastev 2016a, 36-37).

Two overarching features of the discourse are noteworthy: a generalization from concrete cases (Hungary and Poland) to the region as a whole,¹¹ and a strongly moral language, potently exemplified by the recurrence of the theologically-flavoured term 'backsliding', referring to reverting to old sins (Jenne and Mudde 2012; Krastev 2016a, 36). The association of wider 'eastern Europe' with the onslaught and spread of 'illiberal democracy' evokes profound anxieties at multiple levels. The illiberal challenge of Orbán's rule in Hungary and

¹¹ Müller (2014) maintains that 'the problems with the union's eastern European members have grown so numerous that they can hardly be dismissed as a matter of one or two bad apples'.

that of Law and Justice party's in Poland appears as a normative threat of transgression and subtle subversion for the liberal democratic normative order underpinning the contemporary European project. The transgression of well-articulated democratic norms and intersubjectively acknowledged standards of behaviour in the EU by two of the weightiest Central-East European member states of the Union has exposed an internal vulnerability and generated a sensation of harm in the European community. Hungary's and Poland's lack of respect for a set of central democratic principles underpinning the 'European project' illuminates the attachment of the EU (and those who speak in its name) to democratic norms, indeed, a deep identitarian dependence on and caring about the acknowledgement and maintenance of the liberal democratic values and principles within the political boundaries of the EU (cf. Creppell 2011, 475).

Subverting solidarity

The east European region's contemporary 'problem of difference' has been further exacerbated by the public reluctance of its elites and populace to share the burden of solidarity in Europe's most recent migration/refugee crisis (see Dingott Alkopher 2018 for a detailed discussion). This crisis has 'reopened the gap between East and the West' (Krastev 2016c, 112). Yet, it is not simply a 'lack of solidarity' on the east Europeans' part that is at issue here, but a clash of competing solidarities (national, ethnic, religious, European) grinding against each other (Krastev 2016c, 112; Porter 2016). The images about the treatment of asylum-seekers and the accompanying rhetoric from Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, in particular, have been reciprocated by intensely emotional reactions (e.g., Euractiv 2016; Kopytowska and Grabowski 2017; Kosicki 2016; Segeš Frelak 2017). Blaming the east Europeans' reluctance to accept refugees to their lack of a 'sense of shame' and the incomplete process of coming to terms with the region's 'murderous past' (Gross 2015), the critics regard the 2015 migration

surge in Europe as an eye-opener of ‘the unfinished business of transition in the newest member states in the East, where democratic institutions are weak, where old reflexes dominate, where nationalism blinds, and where in the name of “Christianity”, the most un-Christian decisions are made’ (Simonyi 2015; see further Krastev 2016b, 92; Ben-Ami 2016). This goes against the grain of the contemporary European (peace) project, the ‘other’ of which is ‘*its own past* which should not be allowed to become its future’ (Wæver 1998, 90). The Visegrád countries’ staunch emphasis on their sovereign right to refuse abiding by the EU refugee quotas strikes the critics as an embodiment of that past Europe of territorially exclusive sovereign nation-states. Orbán’s praising of the virtues of illiberal governance (Orbán 2014) and the recent memory law put in place by the PiS government in Poland¹² appear as further reminders of the lack of self-reflexivity and self-transcendence on part of the east European members in the European community which routinely juxtaposes its present ‘self’ to the undemocratic legacies and the related crimes and human rights violations of the Second World War-era. ‘Eastern Europe’ emerges as a warning of a creeping return of this retrospective self, as the region’s core states demonstrate an apparent disregard for the settled parameters of the European normative order where the ‘othering’ of authoritarianism along with the self-reflexivity and acknowledgement of the co-responsibility for the Holocaust in Europe have been the central animating forces behind the European integration project and the construction of the European identity (cf. Subotic, this issue).¹³ Orbán’s and PiS’s policies create utter discomfort

¹² The so-called ‘Holocaust-law’ of January 2018, amending an earlier memory law in Poland, penalizes public statements that ‘accuse the Polish nation, or the Polish state, of being responsible or complicit in the Nazi crimes committed by the Third German Reich’ (Gross 2018).

¹³ As most evocatively expressed by Verhofstadt to Orbán in the European Parliament debate on Hungary (2017a): ‘... how far will you go? What is the next thing? Burning books on the square in front of the Hungarian Parliament...?’

within the European community as they raise questions about the actual success of the EU in democratizing and socializing the eastern European states and nations sufficiently into the normative frameworks of governance of the European polity. The pro-sovereignty, anti-immigration discourses of the Visegrád countries further point at the limits of the liberal democratic model of government and Germany's open-door policy-related contradictions within the wider EU community (Dingott Alkopher 2018).

From the perspective of the EU, a distinct reading of the European lessons of the twentieth century in the context of the most recent refugee/migration crisis in the East and West of Europe serves as a warning of Europe's subtle subversion by the normatively different 'other within' (cf. Creppell 2011, 475-480), feared to be able to hollow out and discredit the European democratic order, effectively rendering it unworkable. It is as if the multiple recent crises have exposed an internal liability for the unity and normative cohesion of the EU in the form of 'eastern Europe' – a failure of sufficient integration, endangering the EU's progressive self-narrative as an efficient democracy promoter and the main guarantor of peace and security in the continent. An emerging illiberal *communitas* of Hungary and Poland, and of the right-wing populist parties in eastern Europe more generally is seen as a particularly 'grave threat to the EU' (Hutton 2018). While such formation of small group alliances is typical to the members of a particular stigma category (Goffmann 1963, 23), the danger of subversion by that liminal group in its trending of illiberalism and toying with a 'return of the dark past of Europe' provides an incentive for the European community to re-claim its collective power through stressing the very subversive threat or grievance from that alternative group within the political community (Creppell 2011, 474). Accordingly, in June 2017 the European Commission introduced infringement procedures against Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for their failure to take 'the necessary action' under the Union's 2015 refugee relocation plan.

Taken together, the normative breaches foreboded by eastern European states for the OS of the European community illustrate the importance of path dependency in the effectiveness of normative threat emergence, perception and framing as such. The pattern of thinking that eastern Europe is a normative challenge that needs to be ‘fixed’ or ‘socialized’ to become a ‘full’ and ‘integral’ European subject has a long pedigree, as the next section briefly illustrates. A parallel dynamic has historically informed the constitution of European political subjectivity: the EU’s OS needs have been routinely identified and met in relation to such duties of care for the other(s) (Mitzen 2006b).

From the ‘Barbarians at the Gate’ to ‘Barbarians Within’

The semi-Orientalist underpinnings of ‘eastern Europe’ as a discursive concept (as mobilized by ‘the West’) have been comprehensively analysed by historians, literary scholars and political scientists over two decades now (Wolff 1994; Kuus 2007; Todorova 2009; Mälksoo 2010; Zarycki 2014). Eastern Europe has historically occupied the position of ‘defined’, rather than been involved in the process of defining itself and others. Since its Enlightenment origins, the concept of ‘eastern Europe’ has encapsulated the state of in-betweenness in Europe’s self-image, measuring the distance between civilization and barbarism on the developmental scale envisioned by Western Europe (Wolff 1994, 4-13). The idea that crossing Europe from west to east means leaving behind ‘civilization’ and entering a zone of ‘backwardness’ has remained a predominant image in popular imagination, numerous journalistic accounts, and even some scholarship (Kubik 2014, 360).

This is the case despite the fact that the end of the Cold War fuelled unprecedented hopes that both ‘West’ (as a ‘synonym for advancement, culture, freedom and decency’) and ‘East’ (as an equivalent of ‘underdevelopment, callous authoritarianism and omnipresent nonsense’) would gradually become morally neutral concepts (Havel 2001). This did not quite

materialize, as we now know. Rather, the collapse of the Eastern bloc only enhanced ‘western chauvinism’ (Delanty 1995, 140), displaying a fear of the advance of the ‘Wild East’ and presuming that only ‘they’ on the other side of the Berlin Wall had to change (Eyal 1997, 696). The post-Cold War eastward enlargement debates of the EU and NATO frequently exposed concerns about the looming change in the Euro-Atlantic structures and the ability of the European ‘self’ to continue living *as itself* in the future. This idea figured quite prominently in not just off-the-record policy and many on-the-record journalistic discussions, but in the scholarship on EU enlargement, and the related socialization process of eastern European countries it called for, as well.¹⁴ The dual enlargement debates evocatively manifested Western Europe’s historical outlook toward eastern Europe as swinging between an effort to civilize the ‘barbarians’ and a basic urge to leave these ‘far away countries of whom we know nothing’ (to borrow the infamous appeasement-expression of Chamberlain) on their own. The consequent debates about the preferred foci of the European security culture and the memory regime of the twentieth-century legacies reiterated a normative hierarchy between various ‘Europes’ and ‘Europeans’, with discursively salient tropes of ‘badly brought up East Europeans’ versus ‘postmodern Westerners’ (Mälksoo 2010, chapters 4-6).

East European response to this hierarchy has been a mixture of acceptance and resistance. On the one hand, a role of ‘younger Europeans’ has generally been deferred to, particularly during the open-end period of the dual enlargement processes of the EU and NATO. On the other, East European political leaders from Václav Havel and Lennart Meri in the 1990s to Viktor Orbán in the contemporary era have frequently endorsed their identity as more Catholic than a Pope – as embodiments of an even ‘truer Europe’ than Western Europe,

¹⁴ As captured in the caustic observation by Douzinas (2017, 182): ‘The rapid expansion from six to twenty-eight members added to the club of post-Communist states, which were economically, culturally and politically *distant if not incompatible with the European core*’ (my emphasis).

assuming the messianistic role of telling ‘Europe’ what it needs to do in order to remain ‘Europe’. For example, the east Europeans’ challenging of the singularity of Holocaust as the negative foundational myth of the EU in the 2000s constituted a distinct defiance of the West-centric frames of remembrance in the EU’s pre-eastern enlargement mnemonic regime of the Second World War and the twentieth-century totalitarianisms, as the east European states sought to foreground the criminal legacy of communism next to that of the Nazis (Mälksoo 2009, 2014; Bernhard and Kubik 2014).

Although the window of 1989-1991 undoubtedly marked a critical juncture in the process of east Europeans’ ‘becoming European’, the mind-set about their ‘lesser Europeanness’ persists in new iterations (cf. Mutt 2016). Notably, neither the resurgence of ‘eastern Europe’ as a problem-trope nor the community displaying alarm and moral superiority thereof follow the standard western vs. eastern European line of contrast any more. The eastern enlargement of the EU has produced various levels of normative internalization of the core values of the united Europe project in the Central-East European region. The pejorative associations with ‘eastern Europe’ were on display in the recent public debate over the Global Compact for Migration in Estonia, for example, where the foreign policy establishment deemed vital not to be seen as part of ‘the east European box we have so much tried to leave behind’ (Raik 2018).

Conclusion

After intense decades of Europeanization and democratization, eastern Europe as Europe’s historically defined in-between foil has re-emerged as a normative challenge in public, political and academic discourse, particularly in relation to the rise of illiberal governance in the region,

along with popular (and populist) reactions to the recent migration crisis in Europe. The 1990s' trope of the 'barbarians at the gate' has given way to a subtler 'barbarians within'-discourse.

For the academic community, there is noticeable resentment about eastern Europe, in many ways, failing as a laboratory of democratization and normative socialization into the European community of liberal democratic norms and values. The return of the familiar script of eastern Europe as a threat of transgression and subtle subversion of Europe's normative order provides *inter alia* a routine way for the policy and academic communities to alleviate some anxieties in the midst of the multiple contemporary crises. From an institutional perspective of the EU, it is as if an embedded identitarian control mechanism has been reactivated in order to escape a paralysing sense of OIS amidst the upheavals the Union faces from within and the external world in this day and age. The re-appearance of eastern Europe as a challenge to the European (liberal democratic) normative order could accordingly be interpreted as a late recurrence of Europe's post-Cold War 'peace anxieties', generating an endeavour to re-instate the pre-existing objects of fear, systems of meaning and standards of moral purpose (Rumelili 2015). Yet, as Browning and Joenniemi remind us (2017, 32), OS is not just about stability but also adaptability or openness towards and the ability to cope with change. The allocation of meaning to the trope of 'eastern Europe', and its mobilization thereof, point at a perpetual struggle over power to define what Europe is, and what it should be like.

Two main implications emanate from this truncated discourse analysis. First, the re-emergence of Central-East Europe as a normative challenge for the European order also serves as a warning against a common tendency to generalize from the far-from-universal developments in the region. While such a penchant is less frequent in the official political discourse of the EU and the academic accounts, it is wide-spread in the media depictions. The rise of populist parties and politics in eastern Europe underscores the importance of analytical expansion beyond the narrow institutionalist lens in assessing the success of political

transitions, and the imperative to turn the investigative focus more seriously to the societal meanings of transition and the everyday insecurities as experienced by the communities in question (Mälksoo 2018). Moreover, sustained comparisons between the populist political developments within both eastern and western Europe would be instrumental, as the upsurge of populist movements and the entry of populist parties into ruling establishment has been hardly unique to the east European region over the last decade (Browning, this issue).

Secondly, the populist and illiberal politics of some eastern European countries serve as a reminder of the political potency of long-term stigmatizing practices¹⁵ being turned into objects of manipulation in the hands of their original targets/referent objects, thus refuelling a cycle of mutual securitization and fear-mongering. The re-emergence of ‘eastern Europe’ as a normative threat for the EU could hence also be read as a case of an internally flustered ‘we’-concept. My point here has been to illuminate that such a normative challenge is deemed particularly disturbing for its emotional connotations with betrayal and subversion of the ‘true Self’. The discursive power of ‘normative threat eastern Europe’ (cf. ‘normative power Europe’; Manners 2002) is specifically efficient for the trope’s resonance with a well-anchored depiction of eastern Europe as a liminal figure in the (western/liberal) European mindscapes. OS literature has shown how existential anxieties can range from agonizing over fate and death, emptiness and meaninglessness, guilt and condemnation (Browning 2018, 350). The resurgence of ‘eastern Europe’ as a normative threat to the modern European project reflects collective angst over the contested meaning and the possible demise of the European venture.

Democracy’s viability as a political form depends on the enduring commitment to debate with others who have different views (Kinnvall and Mitzen 2018; Müller 2016c). If ‘[c]ounteracting the twenty-first century autocrat requires a twenty-first century democrat’ (Frantz

¹⁵ Such as non-recognition, infantilization, and exclusion (Rumelili 2015; see also Zarakol 2011).

and Kendall-Taylor 2017, 66), an attempt at making sense of the normative threat in question is a more prudent and productive strategy than the condemnation reflex of the illiberal ‘Other’, academically and politically.

References

Auer, Stefan (2010) 'New Europe: Between Cosmopolitan Dreams and Nationalist Nightmares', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 48:5, 1163-1184

BBC (2017) 'EU in threat over Hungary university and asylum moves', 12 April

Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2016) 'Eastern Europe's Authoritarian Return', *Project Syndicate*, 11 February

Berman, Sheri (2017) 'The Pipe Dream of Undemocratic Liberalism', *Journal of Democracy*, 28:3, 29-38

Bernhard, Michael and Jan Kubik (2014) *Twenty Years after Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

Bideleux, Robert (2015) 'The "Orientalization" and "de-Orientalization" of East Central Europe and the Balkan Peninsula', *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, 23:1, 9-44

Botstein, Leon, Carol Christ and Jonathan Cole (2017) 'Hungary's xenophobic attack on Central European University is a threat to freedom everywhere', *The Washington Post*, 4 April

Browning, Christopher S and Pertti Joenniemi (2017) 'Ontological security, self-articulation and the securitization of identity', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 52:1, 31-47

Browning, Christopher S (2018) 'Brexit, existential anxiety and ontological (in)security', *European Security*, 27:3, 336-355

Cooper, Corey (2017) 'The Erosion of Liberal Democracy in Central Europe is the Greatest Threat to the EU', *Huffington Post*, 16 August

Cormaic, Ruadhán Mac (2017) ‘Why is Ireland silent on the threat to democracy at the heart of Europe’, *The Irish Times*, 9 September

Creppell, Ingrid (2011) ‘The concept of normative threat’, *International Theory*, 3:3, 450-487

Dawson, James and Seán Hanley (2016) ‘The Fading Mirage of the “Liberal Consensus”’, *Journal of Democracy*, 27:1, 20-34

Delanty, Gerard (1995) *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality* (London: Macmillan)

Della Sala, Vincent (2016) ‘Europe’s odyssey?: political myth and the European Union’, *Nations and Nationalism*, 22:3, 524-541

Della Sala, Vincent (2018) ‘Narrating Europe: the EU’s ontological security dilemma’, *European Security*, 27:3, 266-279

Dingott Alkopher, Tal (2018) ‘Socio-psychological reactions in the EU to immigration: from regaining ontological security to desecuritisation’, *European Security*, 27:3, 314-335

Douzinas, Costas (2017) *Syriza in Power: Reflections of an Accidental Politician* (Cambridge: Polity)

Elder-Vass, Dave (2011) ‘The causal power of discourse’, *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior*, 41:2, 143-160

Euractiv (2016) ‘Luxembourg foreign minister wants Hungary out of EU’, 13 September

European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) (2017) Opinion no 904/2017 on Poland, CDL-AD(2017)031, Strasbourg, 11 December

European Parliament (2016) Recent developments in Poland and their impact on fundamental rights as laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, P8_TA(2016)0344, Strasbourg, 14 September

European Parliament (2017) Resolution on the situation in Hungary (2017/2656(RSP)), Strasbourg, 17 May

Eyal, Jonathan (1997) 'NATO's enlargement: anatomy of a decision', *International Affairs* 73:4, 695-719

Fletcher, Martin (2017) 'Is Hungary the EU's first rogue state? Viktor Orbán and the long march from freedom', *New Statesman*, 1 August

Frantz, Erica and Andrea Kendall-Taylor (2017) 'The Evolution of Autocracy: Why Authoritarianism is Becoming More Formidable', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 59:5, 57-68

Furedi, Frank (2018) *Populism and the European Culture Wars: The Conflict of Values between Hungary and the EU* (London and New York: Routledge)

Giddens, Anthony (1984) *The Constitution of Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press)

Giddens, Anthony (1991) *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Cambridge: Polity)

Goffmann, Erving (1963) *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (New York: Simon and Schuster)

Grabbe, Heather and Stefan Lehne (2017) 'Defending EU Values in Poland and Hungary', *Carnegie Europe*, 4 September

Greskovits, Béla (2015) 'The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in East Central Europe', *Global Policy*, 6:1, 28-37

- Gross, Jan T (2015) Eastern Europe's Crisis of Shame, *Project Syndicate*, 13 September
- Gross, Jan T (2018) 'Poland's Holocaust Denial', *Project Syndicate*, 7 February
- Hansen, Lene (2006) *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge)
- Havel, Václav (2001) Address by the President of the Czech Republic at the Conference 'Europe's New Democracies: Leadership and Responsibility', Bratislava, 11 May
- Horvath, Agnes, Bjørn Thomassen, Harald Wydra (eds) (2015) *Breaking Boundaries: Varieties of Liminality* (New York: Berghahn)
- Hutton, Will (2018) 'Beware the illiberal alliance of Poland and Hungary, a grave threat to the EU', *The Guardian*, 7 January
- Isaac, Jeffrey C (2017) 'Is there illiberal democracy? A problem with no semantic solution', *Eurozine*, 9 August
- Jenne, Erin K and Cas Mudde (2012) 'Can Outsiders Help?', *Journal of Democracy*, 23:3, 147-155
- Kinnvall, Catarina and Jennifer Mitzen (2017) 'An introduction to the special issue: Ontological securities in world politics', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 52:1, 3-11
- Kinnvall, Catarina and Jennifer Mitzen (2018) 'Ontological security and conflict: the dynamics of crisis and the constitution of community', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 21:4, 825-835
- Kisilowski, Maciej (2017) 'How Eastern Europe Blew Up the West', *Project Syndicate*, 24 January

- Kopytowska, Monika and Lukasz Grabowski (2017) 'European Security Under Threat: Mediating the Crisis and Constructing the Other' in: Christian Karner and Monika Kopytowska (eds) *National Identity and Europe in Times of Crisis: Doing and Undoing Europe* (Bingley: Emerald), 83-112
- Kosicki, Piotr H (2016) 'Solidarity, Liberal Democracy, and Eastern Europe Today', *The Caravan* no 1611, 11 May
- Krastev, Ivan (2016a) 'What's Wrong with East-Central Europe: Liberalism's Failure to Deliver', *Journal of Democracy*, 27:1, 35-39
- Krastev, Ivan (2016b) 'The Unraveling of the Post-1989 Order', *Journal of Democracy*, 27:4, 88-98
- Krastev, Ivan (2016c) 'Anatomy of Resentment' in: Mathei Segers and Yoeri Albrecht (eds) *Re:Thinking Europe: Thought on Europe: Past, Present and Future* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 109-119
- Kubik, Jan (2014) 'Between Contextualization and Comparison: A Thorny Relationship between East European Studies and Disciplinary "Mainstreams"', *East European Politics, Societies and Cultures*, 29:2, 352-365
- Kuus, Merje (2007) *Geopolitics Reframed: Security and Identity in Europe's Eastern Enlargement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan)
- Laclau, Ernesto (2014) *The Rhetorical Foundations of Society* (London: Verso)
- Lendvai, Paul (2012) *Hungary: Between Democracy and Authoritarianism* (New York: Columbia University Press)

Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A Way (2010) *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press)

Levitsky, Steven and Daniel Ziblatt (2018) *How Democracies Die: What History Reveals about Our Future* (Penguin: Random House, UK)

Lyer, Kirsten Roberts (2017) 'Hungary's assault on academic freedom is a threat to European principles', *The Conversation*, 10 April

Mälksoo, Maria (2009) 'The Memory Politics of Becoming European: The East European Subalterns and the Collective Memory of Europe', *European Journal of International Relations*, 15:4, 653-680

Mälksoo, Maria (2010) *The Politics of Becoming European: A Study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War Security Imaginaries* (London and New York: Routledge)

Mälksoo, Maria (2012) 'The Challenge of Liminality for International Relations Theory', *Review of International Studies*, 38:2, 481-494

Mälksoo, Maria (2014) 'Criminalizing Communism: Transnational Mnemopolitics in Europe', *International Political Sociology*, 8:1, 82-99

Mälksoo, Maria (2018) 'Liminality and the Politics of Transitional' in: Harald Wydra and Bjørn Thomassen (eds) *Handbook of Political Anthropology* (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar), 145-159

Manners, Ian (2002) 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40:2, 235-258

Mitzen, Jennifer (2006a) 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', *European Journal of International Relations*, 12:3, 341-370

Mitzen, Jennifer (2006b) 'Anchoring Europe's civilizing identity: habits, capabilities and ontological security', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13:2, 270-285

Mogherini, Federica (2016) Foreword to the European Union Global Strategy, <<https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union>>, accessed 15 August 2018

Mounk, Yascha (2016) 'The Week That Democracy Died', *Slate*, 14 August

Müller, Jan-Werner (2012) 'Longing for Greater Hungary', *London Review of Books*, 34:12, 12-13

Müller, Jan-Werner (2013) 'Defending Democracy Within the EU', *Journal of Democracy*, 24:2, 138-149

Müller, Jan-Werner (2014) 'Eastern Europe Goes South', *Foreign Affairs*, 93:2, 14-19

Müller, Jan-Werner (2015) 'Hungary: "Sorry About Our Prime Minister"', *The New York Review of Books*, 14 October

Müller, Jan-Werner (2016a) 'The Problem with Poland', *The New York Review of Books*, 11 February

Müller, Jan-Werner (2016b) 'Protecting Popular Self-Government from the People? New Normative Perspectives on Militant Democracy', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19:1, 249-265

Müller, Jan-Werner (2016c) *What is Populism?* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press)

Mutt, Mihkel (2016) *Eesti ümberlõikaja* [Estonia's Circumciser] (Tallinn: Fabian)

Nabers, Dirk (2015) *A Poststructuralist Theory of Global Politics* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan)

Noyes, Dorothy (2018) 'Blaming the Polish plumber: phantom agents, invisible workers, and the liberal arena', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, <<https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-017-0128-7>>

Orbán, Viktor (2014) Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp, 30 July

Ost, David (2016) 'Regime Change in Poland, Carried Out from Within', *Nation*, 8 January

Porter, Anna (2016) 'Hungary: a new threat to the EU', *Maclean's*, 26 October

Raik, Kristi (2018) 'ÜRO ränderaamistik ja välispoliitika hapud viinamarjad' [The UN Global Compact for Migration and Sour Grapes of Foreign Policy], *ERR*, 19 November

Rumelili, Bahar (2012) 'Liminal identities and processes of domestication and subversion in International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, 38:2, 495-508

Rumelili, Bahar (ed) (2015) *Conflict Resolution and Ontological Security: Peace Anxieties* (London: Routledge)

Rumelili, Bahar (2018) 'Breaking with Europe's pasts: memory, reconciliation, and ontological (in)security', *European Security*, 27:3, 280-295

Runciman, David (2018) *The Confidence Trap: A History of Democracy in Crisis from World War I to the Present* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press)

Schmidt, Mária (2015) *All is Moving on the Western Front* (Budapest: Public Endowment for the Research of Central and East European History and Society)

Schmidt, Mária (2018) *Language and Liberty*, trans. János Betlen and Gergely Bottyán (Budapest: Public Endowment for Research on Central and Eastern European History and Society)

Segeš Frelak, Justyna (2017) 'Solidarity in European Migration Policy: The Perspective of the Visegrád states' in: Andreas Grimmel and Susanne My Ciang (eds) *Solidarity in the European Union: A Fundamental Value in Crisis* (Cham: Springer), 81-96

Simonyi, András (2015) 'The Refugee Crisis Will Define Europe's Future', *HuffPost*, 18 September

Steele, Brent J (2008) *Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State* (London and New York: Routledge)

Thomas, Daniel C (2017) 'Beyond identity: Membership norms and regional organization,' *European Journal of International Relations*, 23:1, 217-240

Timmermans, Frans (2017) 'Statement of the First Vice-President of the Commission', European Parliament Plenary debate on the situation in Hungary, 26 April

Timmermans, Frans (2018) 'Commission Statement by First Vice-President Timmermans', European Parliament Plenary debate on the Commission decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland, 28 February

Todorova, Maria (2009) *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

Tóth, Gábor Attila (2012) *Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On Hungary's 2011 Fundamental Law* (Budapest: CEU Press)

Treaty on the European Union (2012) *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 326/1

Trencsényi, Báalazs (2014) 'Beyond Liminality? The Kulturkampf of the Early 2000s in East Central Europe', *Boundary 2*, 41:1, 135-152

Turner, Victor (1995 [1969]) *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (New York: Aldine De Gruyter)

Uitz, Renáta (2018) 'What Being Left Behind by the Rule of Law Feels Like, Part II', *Verfassungsblog: On Matters Constitutional*, 31 October

Verhofstadt, Guy (2017a) Speech at the European Parliament Plenary debate on the situation in Hungary, 26 April

Verhofstadt, Guy (2017b) 'Confronting Europe's Illiberals', *Project Syndicate*, 24 May

Verluisse, Pierre (2012) 'UE-Hongrie V. Orban: vers la rupture?', *Diploweb.com*, 2 December

Wæver, Ole (1998) 'Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community' in: Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds) *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 69-118

Walker, Vivian S. and Lorant Gyori (2018) 'Migrants, Moral Panic, and Intolerance in Hungarian Politics', *War on the Rocks*, 24 July

Wolff, Larry (1994) *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press)

Zarakol, Ayse (2011) *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press)

Zarycki, Tomasz (2014) *Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe* (Oxon: Routledge)